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INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES UNIT-I INTRODUCTION •

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Interpretation means the art of finding out the true sense of an enactment by giving the words of the enactment their natural and ordinary meaning.

It is the process of ascertaining asce rtaining the true meaning of the words used in a stat ute. The Court is not expected to interpret arbitrarily and therefore there have  been certain principles which have evolved out of the continuous exercise by the Courts. These principles are sometimes called ‘rules of interpretation ’. Meaning and Object of Interpretation The object of interpretation of statutes is to determine the intention of the legislature conveyed expressly or impliedly in the language used. According to Salmond interpretation or construction is the process by which the courts seek to ascertain the meaning of the legislature through the medium of authoritative forms in which it is expressed. As explained by Cooley: “ Interpretation differs from construction in the sense that the former is the art of finding out the true sense of any form of words; i.e. the sense that their author intended to convey. Construction on the other hand, is the drawing of conclusions, respecting the subjects that lie beyond the direct expression of the text. This distinction has been widely criticized. Nature and Scope of Interpretation  Necessity of interpretation would arise only where the language of a statutory  provision is ambiguous, not clear or where two views are possible or where the provision gives a different meaning defeating the object of the statute. In R.S. Nayak v A.R. Antulay, it was held that “… If the words of the Statute are clear and unambiguous, it is the plainest duty of the Court to give effect to the natural meaning of the words used in the  provision.”

In Grasim Industries Ltd. v Collector of Customs, Bombay same principle was observed that “Where the words are clear and there is no obscurity, and there is no ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed , there is no scope for court to take upon itself the task of amending or altering the statutory provisions.” According to Blackstone the fairest and rational method for interpreting a statute is by exploring the intention of the Legislature through the most natural and probable signs which are ‘either the words, the context, the subject matter or the spirit and reason of the law’. Reasons for Interpretation of Statutes Legislative Language may be complicated for a layman, and hence may require interpretation; and

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Legislative Intent connotes the concept of ‘purpose’ and ‘object’ or the ‘reason’ or ‘spirit’ pervading through the statute.

While interpreting Statutes following essentials are required:  Intention of the legislature. Statute must be read as a whole in its Context.  Statute should be Construed so as to make it Effective and Workable – if  statutory provision is ambiguous and capable of various constructions, then that construction must be adopted which will give meaning and effect to the other  provisions of the enactment rather than that which will give none. none.  If meaning is plain, effect must be given to it irrespective of consequences. CLASSIFICATION OF STATUTES STATUTES A. Classification with reference to basis of Duration  (i) Perpetual statutes - It is perpetual when no time is fixed for its duration and such a statute remains in force until its repeal which may be express or implied. Temporary statutes -  A statute is temporary when its duration is only for a  specified time and it expires on the expiry of the specified time unless it is repealed earlier earli er.. B. Classification with reference to Nature of Operation  (i) Prospective statutes – A statute which operates upon acts and transactions  which have not occurred when the statutes takes effect, that is which regulates the future is a Prospective statute. (ii) Retrospective statutes – Every statute takes away or impairs vested rights  acquired under the existing laws or creates a new obligation into a new duty or attaches a new disability in respect of transactions or considerations already  passed are deemed retrospective or retroactive statute.  (iii) Directory statutes – A directory statute is generally affirmative in its terms, recommends a certain act or omissions, but imposes no penalty on non observance of its provisions.  (iv) Mandatory statutes –   A Mandatory statute is one which compels  performance of certain acts and directs that a certain thing must be done in a certain manner or form. A type of Mandatory Statute is the Imperative Statute. C. Classification with reference to Objective  Enabling statutes statutes – These statutes are which enlarges the common law where it  is too strict or narrow. It is a statute which makes it lawful to do something which would not otherwise be lawful. Disabling statutes  – These statutes restrict or cut down rights existing at  common law. Prohibitory statute  – This type of statute which forbids the doing of certain  things. Codifying Statute  – It presents and orderly and authoritative statement of the  leading rules of law on a given subject, whether those rules are to be found in statute law or common law. Consolidating statute  – The purpose of consolidating statute is to present the  whole body of statutory law on a subject in complete form repeating the former statute. 

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Curative or validating Statute - It is passed to cure defects in the prior law and too validate legal proceedings, instruments or acts of public and private administrative powers which in the absence of such statute would be void. stat ute which revokes or terminates another statute sta tute is a Repealing Statute  – A statute repealing statute. Amending Statute – It is a Statute which makes and addition to or operates to change the original law so as to effectively carry out the purpose for which the original law was passed Intention of the Legislature (SENTENTIA LEGIS) The object of interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of the Legislature (Pvt.) Ltd. S. Sarup Sarup Singh. Singh . enacting it”, South Asia Industries (Pvt.) The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the Legislature must be found in the words used by the Legislature itself. The question is not what may be supposed to have been intended but what has been said. The key to the opening of every law is the reason and spirit of the law. Each word, phrase or sentence, is to be construed in the light of the general purpose of the Act itself. Interpretation must depend on the text and the context, as they are the  bases of interpretation. If the text is the texture, context gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. A  particular clause or expression is construed by b y construing the whole instrument inst rument and any dominant purposes that it may express.

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BASIC PRINCIPLES/ GUIDING RULES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION OF LAW   

Statute to be construed to make it effective and workable Language Of The Statute Should Be Read As It Is Statute Must Be Construed As Whole

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Language Of The Statute Should Be Read As It Is

The intention of the Legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used. The words of a statute never should, in interpretation, be added to or subtracted from without almost a necessity.  I. Avoiding Avoiding addition or substitution of words words It is wrong and dangerous to proceed by substituting some other words for words in a statute. The rules of interpretation do not permit addition or deletion, unless the section itself stands meaningless or of doubtful meaning. 

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 II Casus Omissus Omissus  It is an application of the same principle that a matter which should have been,  but has not been provided in a statute cannot be supplied by courts. ( Hansraj Gupta v. Dehra Dun Mussoorie Electric Tramway )  To do so, will constitute legislation, and not construction. The duty of the Court is to interpret the words that the legislature has used. Those words

may be ambiguous, but, even if they are, the power and duty of the Court to travel outside them on a voyage of discovery are strictly limited.

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State of Jharkhand v Govind Singh Section 52(3) and 68 of Forest Act, 1927 was amended in Bihar that provided for confiscation of vehicle used in a forest as an offence and did not provide for the release of the vehicle on payment of fine. The vehicle could only be released on payment of full value of the vehicle and therefore it was not not possible to levy a fin in lieu of confiscation and release of vehicle.

 III Avoiding rejection rejection of words As on the one hand, it is not permissible to add words or to fill in a gap or  lacuna, on the other hand, effort should be made to give meaning to each and every word used by the legislature.  In the interpretation of statutes, the courts always presume that the legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect.  Therefore the words should not  be wasted, except for compelling reasons.

 IV.  IV. Departure from from the rule  The court, in the process of discharging its interpretative function, may correct the obvious drafting errors, after having considered the intended purpose.  A departure from the rule of literal construction may be legitimate so as to avoid any part of the statute becoming meaningless. It may therefore, be permissible to supply words, which appear to have been accidentally omitted or adopt a construction, which deprives certain existing words of all meaning. 

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Statute Must Be Construed As Whole

This principle states that statute should be interpreted ex visceribus actus, that is within the four corners of the act. Every clause needs to be construed with reference to the context and other clauses of the Act, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute or series of statutes relating to the subject-matter. The conclusion that the language is plain or ambiguous can only be truly arrived at by studying the statute as a whole. How far and to what extent each component influences the meaning of the other , would be different in each given case. Each word, must however, be allowed to play its role, however significant or insignificant it may be. in achieving the legislative intent. Each section must be construed as a whole, whether or not one of the parts is a saving clause or a  proviso. They may be interdependent, each ea ch portion throwing light, if i f need be on the rest.

JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS O.P. SINGLA V UNION OF INDIA  Rule 7 of delhi judicial service stated recruitment by promotion or by direct recruitment. The proviso stated not more than one third members would would be 

appointed by direct recruitment. Rule 8 laid down the seniority of diret recruitment but subject to provision of rule 7. The court held that while interpreting the statute as whole rule 8 would have to consider the proviso of rule 7  

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POPPATLAL SHAH V STATE OF MADRAS The word sale in the madras sale tax while interpretation as a whole relates to contract of sale and not contract for sale. Mere transaction taking lace in Madras , while actual sales taking place somewhere else does not attract the sale tax of madras.

MEDICAL COUNCIL OF INDIA V RAMA MEDICAL COLLEGE The court held that even though medical colleges have been given permission to open colleges, yet they till require permission from medical council in case they want to increase the seats. Unlimited powers have not been given to medical colleges as their statute has to be read with the provisions of medical council.

ATTAR SINGH V INDER KUMAR  Section 13 of Punjab Rent Act, 1949 enabled the landlord to obtain possession of land  If he requires for his own use  He is not occupying in urban area for the purpose of his business  He has not vacated his rented land  ………. The court held that for his own use has to be construed with all the latter clauses and not to be construed alone. Statute to be construed to make it effective and workable   Where alternative construction is possible, the court must give effect to that which will be responsible for smooth working of system for which statute was enacted, rather than to put hindrances on its way. This is known as Construction ut res magis valeat quam pereat. The interpretation should be construed to make the statute workable, which  secures the object, unless crucial omissions or clear direction makes that end unattainable. The meaning of the statute must be considered rather then the rendering the  statute a nullity. nullity. 

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Plain words require no construction. This starts with the premise that the words are plain and that the conclusion can be arrived at after construing the words. Statutory enactment must ordinarily be construed according to its plain meaning and no words shall be added, altered or modified unless it is plainly necessary to do so to prevent a provision from being unintelligible, absurd, unreasonable, unworkable or totally irreconcilable with the test of the statute.” [Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P.) Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 111 : AIR 2003] JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS STATE OF PUNJAB V QAISER JEHAN BEGUM

The respondent made an application to civil court beyond six months of from the date of award regarding compensation but within six months from the knowledge of the award . The court while interpreting constructively that it would be just, fair to compute the period of limitation from date of of knowledge of the award. RAINBOW STEEL LIMITED V COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX The question was whether a thermal plant sold in perfect condition would be an  old machinery within UP Sales Tax. The court held that while constructively giving the meaning to the word ‘old’ visa vi enactment it means discarded, unserviceable and obsolete. Thus thermal plant would not be regarded as old machinery.  JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS K.B. NAGPUR V UNION OF INDIA  Indian medical council Act provided that the President, Vice President and members of central council shall continue till the successor is duly nominated or elected is not violative of Article 14. This provision is not arbitrary as it would take care of certain emergency situation, and old members can take a decision till the new members are elected 

INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES UNIT-II LITERAL RULE OF INTERPRETATION INTERPRETATION 

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The Literal Rule, also known as the Plain-Meaning rule, is a type of statutory construction. The literal rule of statutory interpretation should be the first rule applied by  judges. Under the literal rule, the words of the statute are given their natural or ordinary meaning and applied without the judge seeking to put a gloss on the words or seek to make sense of the statute.

The plain meaning rule attempts to guide courts faced with litigation in the absence of a contrary definition within the statute , words must be given their  plain, ordinary and literal meaning. The courts are enjoined to take the words as used by the legislature and too give (deceased) v. them the meaning which naturally implies as held in  Molar Mal (deceased)  Kay Iron Works (Pvt.) Ltd. If the language used by the legislature is clear and unambiguous, a court of law at the present day has only to expound the words in their natural and ordinary sense; ‘Verbis plane expressis amnino standum est’. JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS Whitely v Chappel (1868) Chappel (1868) LR 4 QB 147

A statute made it an offence 'to impersonate any person entitled to vote .' The defendant used the vote of a dead man. The statute relating to voting rights required a person to be living in order to be entitled to vote. Held:

The literal rule was applied and the defendant was thus acquitted. 

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Fisher

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The defendant had a flick knife displayed in his shop window with a price tag on it. Statute made it a criminal offence to 'offer' such flick knives for sale.  His conviction was quashed as goods on display in shops are not 'offers' in the technical sense but an invitation to treat . The court applied the literal rule of statutory interpretation. Motipur Zanzindary Company Private Limited v. state of Bihar The question was whether. sugarcane fell within the term green vegetables in . Entry 6 of the Schedule and as such no sales tax could be levied under the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 on its sale.

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The Supreme Court held that while dealing with a taxing statute the natural and ordinary meaning Of a word should be the 'correct meaning. In the present instance the word vegetables should be interpreted in its natural and popular -sense and that dictionary meaning is not of such help here. Vegetables as the normal people mean by it are those which can - be  be grown in a kitchen garden to be used for the table, that is to say, to be eaten during lunch or dinner. dinner. Sugarcane definitely definit ely does not fall under this thi s category.

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 Partridge

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The defendant placed an advert in a classified section of a magazine offering some bramble finches for sale. S.6 of the Protection of Birds Act 1954 made it an offence to offer such birds for sale.  He was charged and convicted of the offence and appealed against his conviction. The court held that the defendant's conviction was quashed. The advert was an invitation to treat not an offer. The literal rule of statutory interpretation was applied.  R v Harris (1836) 7 C & P 446 Harris bits of the end of a woman’s nose, the prosecution alleged the bite was included in ‘stab, cut or wound’.

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The court held that under the literal rule the act of biting did not come within the meaning of stab cut or wound as these words implied an instrument had to be used. Therefore the defendant's conviction was quashed.  R v Maginnis [1987] AC 303 House of Lords The defendant was charged with possession of a controlled drug with intent to supply it to another under s.5(3) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 . A  package containing £500 worth of cannabis was found in his car. The defendant stated the cannabis belonged to a friend and that the friend was picking it up later. The trial judge convicted him and ruled that his action in handing the drugs back to the friend was an action of supply .

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On Appeal, his conviction was reinstated  because "The word "supply," "supply," in its ordinary natural meaning, connotes the mere transfer of physical control of some chattel or object from one person to another. This was dissented by a judge stating that either the delivery of goods by a depositor to a depositee, or the redelivery of goods by a depositee to a depositor, can sensibly be described as an act of supplying goods to another. In ordinary language the cloakroom attendant, the left luggage officer, the warehouseman and the shoe mender do not 'supply' to their customers the articles which those customers have left with them."  London and North North Eastern Railway v Berriman [1946] AC 278 A railway worker was killed whilst oiling the track. No look out man had been  provided. A statute provided compensation payable on death for those 'relaying or repairing' the track.

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Under the literal rule oiling did not come into either of these categories. This result although very harsh could not to be said to be absurd so the golden rule could not be applied. There was no ambiguity in the words therefore the mischief rule could not be applied. Unfortunately the widow was entitled to nothing.

Powell v Kempton Park Racecourse (1899) AC 143  Where it is an offence to use a house, office, room or ‘other place for betting’. The defendant argued that he operates an outside place  Held:

The court held that the other items mentioned in the statute related to places indoors whereas plea of enclosure was outside. There was thus no offence committed. Harbhajan Singh v. Press Council of India Section 6 , in so far as relevant for our purpose, provides that the Chairman and other members of the council shall hold office for a period of three years. Subsection 7 of section 6   of the Press Council Act, 1978 provides: ‘ A retiring member shall be eligible for renomination for not more than one term .’ Question was whether a person who had already been a member of the Council for two terms earlier is eligible for being nominated

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The Supreme Court applied the literal and grammatical meaning of these words and held that the provision applied to a member “just retiring” and not to a retired member and that a retired member who had held office for two terms sometime in the past is not debarred from being nominated again.

Vemareddy Kumaraswamy Reddy and Anr. Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh  The appellants were holding land in excess of the limit prescribed under the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural) Act, 1973, (“Act“). The surplus land was surrendered by them which had fruit bearing cashew nut tree plantation. It is to be noted that the trees were 12 years old and stood on the surrendered land. The dispute relates to the amount payable in respect of fruit  bearing trees standing on the land which were surrendered by the appellant. According to the authorities the payment was to be made for one year only and not for thirty years (life of cashew cashe w tree) as was claimed clai med by the appellant.

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According to the notification held that the amounts are to be calculated from 5th to 30th year as up to five (5) years cashew trees are held to be not fruit bearing trees. That being so, the Apex Court held that stand of the State Government (as accepted by the High Court) that the signora rate is for one year and accordingly fixing it for the 12 year is clearl y unsustainable. S.A.Venkataraman v. The State Section 6 of THE PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1947 Previous sanction necessary for prosecutions.(1) No Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Section 161 or Section 164 or Section 165 of the Indian Penal Code or under sub -section (2)

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or sub-section (3A) of Section 5 of this Act, alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction, (a) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of the Union and is not removable from his office gave by or with the sanction of the Central Government, of the Central Government; (b) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of a State and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government, of the State Government; (c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his office. ……………………………….. The court said that this case dealt with Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. It was to do with taking a sanction from an appropriate authority .It considers only the present working employees as employees, those who have retired are not considered as employees. The court said, “In construing the  provisions of a statute it is essential for a court, in the first instance, to give effect to the natural meaning of the words used therein, if those words are clear enough. Rananjaya Singh v. Baijnatli Singh, 14 AIR 1954 SC 749 The Election Tribunal Tribunal set aside the t he election of the appellant under section s ection 123(7) of Representation of the People Act, 1951 on the grounds that. the appellant had employed more persons than prescribed for electioning purpose and that the salary of this persons exceeded the maximum election expenditure permissible under the law. The contention of the appellant was that all those persons who had campaigned for him in the election were in the· employment of his father and were thereby receiving salaries from his father by virtue -of their employment. As far as he was concerned, he had not made payments to; them exceeding the  permissible limit. The Supreme Court, following the grammatical interpretation said that the meaning of section 123 (7) of the Act of 1951 was quite clear and, therefore, as far as these campaigners were concerned they were merely volunteers campaigning· for the appellant Ranjit Udeshi v. State 'Of Maharashtra the appellant was convicted under Section 292, Indian Penal Code by the High Court for selling an obscene book titled Lady Chatterley's Lover the sale of which was banned by the Government of India. the appellant contended before the Supreme Court that mens rea of the accused had always to :be proved to maintain conviction under criminal. cr iminal. law. Since the prosecution had failed to prove mens rea, that is to say, that the appellant sold ·or kept for selling the obscene book with the knowledge that the book was obscene, the conviction was unjustified . He further argued :that there are such a large number 0f books these days in  bookstalls and their contents so different from each other that a book seller cannot possibly know and is not expected to know the contents of each book and cannot, therefore, be convicted. in the absence ,of a guilty mind.

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The Supreme Court held that knowledge of obscenity was not an essential element of the offence under Section 292, Indian Penal Code. The section is  plain and its meaning unambiguous. The Court must give natural meaning to the words used in the section and on this count the contention of the appellant held no water 

SUSIDIARY RULES FOR LITERAL INTERPRETATION A. Noscitur a Sociis Noscitur a Sociis literally means “It is known from its associates”. Under the doctrine of "noscitur a sociis" the questionable meaning of a word or doubtful words can be derived from its association with other words within the context of the phrase. This means that words in a list within a statute have meanings that are related to each other. In Foster v Diphwys Casson((1887) 18 QBD 428) , the case involved a statute which stated that explosives taken into a mine must be in a "case or canister". Here the defendant used a cloth bag. The courts had to consider whether a cloth  bag was within the definition. Under noscitur a sociis, it was held that the bag could not have been within the statutory definition, because parliament's intention in using ‘case or container’ was referring to something of the same strength as a canister. c anister.

Under noscitur a sociis , it was held that the bag could not have been within the statutory definition, because parliament's intention in using ‘case or container’ was referring to something of the same strength str ength as a canister.  Inland Revenue Revenue v Frere [1964] The respondent sought to deduct the interest paid on a short term loan from his income for the purposes of assessing his liability to pay tax. tax . The Income Tax Tax Act of 1952 allowed "the amount of interest, annuities or other annual interest" to be deducted from the income. 

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It was held that Under the noscitur a sociis rule, the mention of amount of interest related only to annual interest as the other items related to annual payments. The respondent's interest payment was not an annual interest payment and therefore he could not deduct it from his income and he was required to pay tax on it. In Commrs. v. Savoy Hotel, (1966) 2 All ER 299 . While dealing with the Purchase Tax Act, which used the expression ‘manufactured  beverages including fruit- juices  juices and bottled waters and syrups etc.’, The question was whether orange juice unsweetened and freshly prepared comes within the description or not.

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It was held that the description ‘fruit juices, as occurring therein should be construed in the context of the preceding words and the orange juice unsweetened and freshly prepared was not within the description B. CASUS OMISSUS In Hiradevi v. District Board, Shahjahanpur,

Section 71 of the U. P. Districts Boards Act, 1922, provided that a Board may dismiss it secretary by special resolution which in certain cases required sanction of Local Government, and Section 90 conferred a power to suspend the secretary ‘pending enquiry into his conduct or pending orders of any authority whose action is necessary for his dismissal’. By U.P. Act 1 of 1933, Section 71 was amended and the amended section provided that a resolution of dismissal was not to take effect till the expiry of the period of appeal or till the decision of appeal if it was so presented. No corresponding amendment was, however made in Section 90 and it was held by the Supreme Court that a suspension resolved under Section 90 to be operative till appeal against the dismissal was decided, was ultra- vires the powers of the Board C. EJUSDEM GENERIS When particular words pertaining to a class, category are followed by general words, the general words are construed as limited to the things of the same kind as those specified. This rule which is known as the rule of ejusdem generis. Difference between Noscitur A Sociis and Ejusdem Generis Rule

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 , the Supreme Court has laid  In Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board Board v. Harishanker  Harishanker  down conditions that needs to be fulfilled for this rule of construction is used. They are: The statute contains an enumeration of specific words.  The subjects of enumeration constitute a class or category.   The general terms follow the enumeration.  There is no indication of a different legislative intent.

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In State of Bombay v. Ali Gulshan , the interpretation of Section 6 (4) (a) of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 which said: 'State Government may requisition for the purpose of State or any other public purpose , was involved. It was contended that under the provision the appellant was entitled to requisition premises for housing a member of the foreign consulate. The High Court held that the expression any other public purpose should be read Ejusdem Generis with purpose of state, and providing accommodation to a member of the foreign consulate being a purpose of the Union and not of the State, the State Government had no authority to requisition. In Evans v. Cross the words 'other devices' had to be interpreted in Section 48 (9) of the Road Traffic Act, 1930 which defined a 'traffic sign' to include 'all signals, warning sign posts, direction posts, signs, or other devices'. Applying the rule of Ejusdem Generis the Court decide whether a painted white line on a road could be called a traffic sign or not.

Applying the rule of Ejusdem Generis the Court held that a painted white line on a road could not be called a traffic sign because devices are things, which a  painted line on road I

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In M/s Siddeshwari Cotton Mills Private Limited v. Union of India , the Supreme Court observed that the expressions 'bleaching, mercerizing, dyeing, printing, water-proofing, rubberising, shrink -proofing, organdie processing, which precede the expression 'or any other process ' in Section 2 (f) (v) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 contemplate processes which import a change of a lasting character to the fabric by either the addition of some chemical into the fabric or otherwise. 'Any other process' in the section must share one or the other of these incidents. s not. EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCUSIO ALTERIUS The express mention of one person or thing is the exclusion of another. Where the statutory language is plain and the meaning clear, there is no scope for applying the rule. This maxim is also not used to extend the operation of a statute beyond the operation of a statute beyond the provision that it actually makes , e.g. a law enacted by Parliament for A, what is already a law la w for A and others, the new law l aw will not change the law for others. Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act,1882  defines “transfer of property”, which means, “an act by which living persons conveys property, in present or future, to one or more other living persons or to himself in and one or more other living persons and to “transfer property” or to himself is to perform such act.”The next paragraph provides that in this section “living person” includes a company or association or body of individuals whether incorporated or not .This clearly provides that “living person” not only means an individual or human  being but can also refers to a company or association or body of individuals whether incorporated or not CRITICISM OF LITERAL RULE AMBIGUITY INJUSTICE RESTRICTION ON COURTS  NOT SUITABLE SUITABLE FOR CHANGING CHANGING TIMES GOLDEN RULE The golden rule of statutory interpretation may be applied where an application of the literal rule would lead to an absurdity. The courts may then apply a secondary meaning. The Golden rule is a form of statutory interpretation that allows a judge to depart from a word’s normal meaning in order to avoid an absurd result. It is a compromise between the literal rule and the mischief rule. Like the plain meaning rule, it gives the words of a statute their plain, ordinary meaning. However, when this may lead to an irrational result that is unlikely to be the legislature’s intention, the judge can depart from this meaning.

This rule may be used in two ways. It is applied most frequently in a narrow sense where there is some ambiguity or absurdity in the words themselves.

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For example, imagine there may be a sign saying “ Do not use lifts in case of fire.” Under the literal interpretation of this sign, people must never use the lifts, in case there is a fire. However, this would be an absurd result, as the intention of the person who made the sign is obviously to prevent people from using the lifts only if there is currently a fire nearby. The second use of the golden rule is in a wider sense, to avoid a result that is obnoxious to principles of public policy, even where words have only one meaning. Example: The facts of a case are; a son murdered his mother and committed suicide. The courts were required to rule on who then inherited the estate, the mother’s family, family, or the son’s descendants. There was never a ques tion of the son profiting from his crime, but as the outcome would have been binding on lower courts in the future, the court found in favour of the mother’s family. family.  R v Allen Allen (1872) LR 1 CCR 367 The defendant was charged with the offence of bigamy under s.57 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. The statute states 'whosoever being married shall marry any other person during the lifetime of the former husband or wife is guilty of an offence '. Under a literal interpretation of this section the offence would be impossible to commit since civil law will not recognise a second marriage any attempt to marry in such circumstances would not be recognised as a valid marriage. Held:

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The court applied the golden rule and held that the word 'marry' should be interpreted as 'to go through a marriage ceremony'. The defendant's conviction was upheld.  Re Sigsworth [1935] 1 Ch 98 A son murdered his mother. She had not made a will. Under the statute setting the law on intestacy he was her sole issue and stood to inherit her entire estate. The court applied the Golden rule holding that an application of the literal rule would lead to a repugnant result. He was thus entitled to nothing.

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An example of the same is S. 125 of the CrPC which deals with maintenance given to women. The court while interpreting the term ‘wife’ included those women who have entered into bigamy, talakshuda women and divorced women. The court has stated that even though a woman may have relinquished her rights on divorce, she may claim maintenance u/s 125 as she will she be regarded as a ‘wife’ 10 years after such divorce. Further, in the case of  Chairman, Railway Board & Ors. Vs. Mrs. Chandrima Das & Ors the courts interpreted that Article 21 shall be available to non-citizens as well as citizens. Lee v Knapp The defendant committed a breach of section 77 (1) of the Road Traffic Act, 1960, which provides, so far as material, that if in any case owing to the  presence of a motor vehicle on a road an accident occurs whereby damage is caused to a vehicle other than that motor vehicle , the driver of the motor

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vehicle shall stop and then move away. The defendant commiteed an accident, stopped his car and moved away. The golden rule of interpretation is in case of accident, the person has to stop for reasonable period. Applying the golden rule the court held that the driver had not fulfilled the requirement of the section, as he had not stopped for a reasonable period so as to enable interested persons to make necessary inquires from him about the accident at the spot of accident Uttar Pradesh Bhoodan Yagna Samiti v. Brij Kishore The Supreme Court held that the expression “landless person” used in section 14 of U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act, 1953 which made provision for grant of land to landless persons, was limited to “landless laborers”. A landless labour is he who is engaged in agriculture but having no agricultural land. The Court further said that “any landless person” did not include a landless businessman residing in a city. The object of the Act was to implement the Bhoodan movement, which aimed at distribution of land to landless labourers who were verged in agriculture. A businessman, though landless cannot claim cl aim the benefit of the Act Annapurna Biscuit Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U P. Sales Tax was fixed at two per cent, of the turnover in the case of “ cooked food” under section 3A of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948. The appellant firm engaged in the business of biscuit manufacture and sale. Whether biscuits though intended for human consumption, can be construed as “cooked food” and liable to be taxed as per the notification issued under the said  provision.

Held that if an expression is capable of a wider meaning, the question whether the wider or narrower meaning should be accepted depends on the context of the statute. Here biscuit was not covered within the words ‘cooked food’. However, where the precise words used are plain and unambiguous the court is bound to construe them in their ordinary sense and not to limit plain words in an Act of Parliament by consideration of policy which has to decided not by court but by Parliament itself. Ramji Missar v. State of Bihar [ Construing section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, the Supreme Court laid down that the crucial date on which the age of the offender had to be determined is not the date of offence, but the date on which the sentence is pronounced by the trial court . An accused who on the date of offence was  below 21 years of age but on the date on which the judgment pronounced, if he was above 21 years, he is not entitled to the benefit of the statute. This conclusion reached having regard to the object of the Act. The object of the Statute is to prevent the turning of the youthful offenders into criminals by their association with the hardened criminals of mature age within the walls of the  prison. An accused below 21 years is entitled to the benefit of the Act by sending him under the supervision of the probation officer instead of jail. CRITICISM OF GOLDEN RULE It suffers from the same difficulties as the literal approach vis lack of wider contextual understandings of “meanings.” The idea of “absurdity” covers only a very few cases. Most cases involve situations where difficult choices have to be made between several fairly  plausible arguments, not situations where the words words lead to obvious absurdities.

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The use of the “absurdity” safety valve can be very erratic HARMONIOUS CONSTRUCTION According to this rule, a statute should be read as a whole and one provision of the Act should be construed with reference to other provisions in the same Act so as to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute. The Courts should avoid “a head on clash”,  between the different parts of an enactment and conflict between the various provisions should be sought to be harmonized. The normal presumption should be consistency and it should not be assumed that what is given with one hand by b y the legislature is sought to be taken ta ken away by the other. (CIT v Hindustan Bulk Carriers)

The aim of the courts are: i) An interpretation  which makes the enactment consistent . ii) A construction which avoids inconsistency or repugnancy between the various sections or parts of the statute . However, in the case in which it shall be impossible to harmonize both the provisions, the court’s decision shall prevail. 

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Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore The Supreme Court applied the rule of harmonious construction in resolving a conflict between Articles 25(2)(b) and 26(b) of the Constitution and it was held that the right of every religious denomination or any section thereof to manage its own affairs in matters of religion [Article 26(b)] is subject to a law made by a State providing for social welfare and reform. M.S.M. Sharma v. Krishna Sinha The same rule was applied to resolve the conflict between Articles 19(1)(a) and 194(3) of the Constitution and it was held that the right of freedom of speech guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) is the read as subject to powers, privileges and immunities of a House of the Legislature which are those of the House of Commons of the United Kingdom as declared by the latter part of Article 194(3). Sirsilk Ltd. v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh Certain disputes between the employer and the workmen were referred to an industrial tribunal. After adjudication, the tribunal sent its award to the government for publication. However, before the award was published, the  parties to the dispute came to a settlement s ettlement and accordingly, wrote a letter to the government jointly, intimating the fact that the dispute had been settled; hence the award shall not be published. On the government’s refusal to withhold the publication, the employer approached the High Court for a writ or direction to the government to withhold the publication.

The High Court rejected the writ petition as well as the writ arising therefrom. The parties then appealed by special leave to the Supreme Court. The main contention of the appellants was that Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is directory in nature and not mandatory . A mandatory statute or statutory provision is one which must be followed in order that the proceeding to which it relates may be valid.

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A directory statute or provision is one which need not be complied with in order that the proceeding to which it partakes may be valid. It is not always easy to determine whether a particular statute is mandatory or directory. Ordinarily the words ‘shall’ and ‘must’ are mandatory, and the word ‘may’ is directory, although they are often used interchangeably in legislation.

Section 17(1) states, ‘Every award shall within a period of thirty days from the date of its receipt by the t he appropriate government be published in such manner as the appropriate government thinks fit”. The use of the word ‘shall’, the court observed, is a pointer to Section 17(1)  being mandatory in nature.  Award published under under sub-section (1) shall be final and Section 17(2) states, ‘ Award shall not be called in question by any court in i n any manner whatsoever. whatsoever. Section 17A, of the Industrial Disputes Act, provides that the award under  Section 17 becomes enforceable enforceable after thirty days of publication, though the  government may declare certain contingencies in which it may not be enforceable . Section 18 (1) provides that a settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and the workmen otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding shall be binding on the parties to the agreement. The court read Section 17 and Section 17A together and declared that the intention behind Section 17 is that the duty cast on the government to publish the award is mandatory and not directory. And hence, the contention of the appellants did not hold good. Though the Supreme Court maintained that Section 17 (1) is mandatory, and ordinarily the government has to publish an award sent to it by the tribunal, in special circumstances of the case and with a view to avoid a conflict between a settlement binding under Section 18 (1),   it held that the only solution is to withhold the publication of the award as this would not in any way affect the mandatory provision of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Raj Krushna Bose vs Binod Khanungo & others. Two provisions of Representation of People Act, 1951, which were in apparent conflict, were brought forth in this case. Section 33 (2) says that a Government Servant can nominate or second a candidate in election but Section 123(8) says that a Government Servant cannot assist any candidate in election except by casting his vote. The Supreme Court observed that both these provisions should be harmoniously interpreted and held that a Government Servant was entitled to nominate or second a candidate seeking election in State Legislative assembly. This harmony can only be achieved if Section 123(8) is interpreted as giving the govt. servant the right to vote as well as to nominate or second a candidate and forbidding him to assist the candidate in any other manner.

Commissioner of Sales Tax, MP v Radha Krishna

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Under section 46 (1) c of the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958, criminal prosecution of the respondent partners was sanctioned in this case by the Commissioner when even after repeated demands the assesse did not pay the sales tax. The respondent challenged this provision on the ground that there were two separate provisions under the Act, namely, section 22 (4 – A) and section 46 (1) c under which two different procedures were prescribed to realize the amount due but there was no provision of law which could tell that which  provision should be applied in which case. According to the Supreme Court, the provision prescribed u/s 46 (1) c was more drastic. It was held that by harmonious construction of these two provisions, the conclusion drawn is that the Commissioner had a judicial discretion to decide as to which procedure to be followed in which case. Whenever the Commissioner will fail to act judicially, the court will have the right to intervene. However, in this case, the Commissioner had correctly decided that the more drastic  procedure under section 46 (1) c deserved to be followed because of the failure of the assesse firm in paying sales tax despite the repeated demands by the sales tax officer. PURPOSIVE CONSTRUCTION To understand the meaning of words in a statute, Courts have to understand the statute's intent. The purpose of an Act, i.e. why it was enacted and how it came to be, is not  just a relevant factor in deciding how to give effect to a statute's words,  but is essential to determining its meaning. Purposive approach   to statutory interpretation involved the consideration of three factors: the language of the provision; the context in which the language  is used; and the purpose of the legislation or statutory scheme in which the language is found.

While the "ordinary meaning" of words still plays a fundamental role in the  judicial interpretation of statutes, Legislative intent will inevitably inform the Courts' method when analyzing the meaning of statutory provisions. The purposive approach not just look to see what gap might have existed in the law previously, but the judges are attempting to identify what they believe Parliament meant to achieve . The courts now adopt a purposive approach which seeks to give effect to the true purpose of legislation and are prepared to look at much extraneous material that bears upon the background against which the legislation was enacted.” (Pepper v Hart)

Literal Rule vs. Purposive Approach  The literal approach takes each word literally. The purposive approach is very  broad and does not look look at the precise meaning of each word. Golden Rule vs. Purposive Approach

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Golden rules look to the actual wording of the statutes. The mischief and  purposive approach go beyond beyond that.

The advantages of the purposive approach  Leads to justice in individual cases. where there is new technology which was unknown when the law was enacted,  in present times those laws can be modified. The disadvantages of the purposive approach It makes the law less certain.  It also allows unelected judges to make law as they are deciding what they think  the law should be rather than using the words that Parli ament enacted  Another problem with the purposive approach is that it is difficult to discover the intention of Parliament.  

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A.P. A.P. v. L.V L. V.A. Dikshitulu Dikshit ulu The

Court

observed:

"The primary principle of interpretation is that a Constitutional or statutory  provision should be construed "according to the intent of they that made it".  Normally,  Normally, such intent is gathered from the language of the provision. If the language employed by the legislation is precise and plain and thus by itself  proclaims the legislative intent in unequivocal terms, the same must be given effect to, regardless of the consequences that may ma y follow. follow. But if the words used in the provision can reasonably bear meanings more than one, the rule of strict grammatical construction ceases to be a sure guide to reach at the real legislative intent. In such a case, in order to ascertain the true meaning of the terms and phrases employed, it is legitimate for the Court to go for purposive interpretation. Ayr Farmers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wright, 2016 ONCA 789  Ayr  Ayr Mutual involved Mutual involved a claim by an insured, Mr. Wright, for statutory accident  benefits ("SABS") following an accident in his garage. Mr. Wright's insurer denied him SABS, claiming that his injuries were not the result of an "accident" as defined in the Ontario Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, Schedule, O. Reg. 34/10 (the "Schedule"). Under section 279 of the Insurance the  Insurance Act , R.S.O. 1990, c.I.8 (the " Insurance " Insurance  Act "), "), disputes concerning an insured's right to SABS are to be submitted to mediation before any litigation can be started. Mr. Wright applied for mediation with his insurer i nsurer..

Rather than participate in the mediation process set out in the Insurance the  Insurance Act , the insurer started an application in the Ontario Superior Court for a preliminary determination of issues. In effect, the insurer's argument was: (i) the dispute resolution process under section 279 of the Insurance Act could only be triggered " in respect of any insured person's entitlement to statutory accident benefits" ; (ii) to qualify as an "insured person" under the Schedule, the claimant must have been involved in an accident;  and (iii) the preliminary issue of whether a claimant was

involved in an "accident" and therefore qualified as an "insured person" under the Schedule had to be determined by the Court first,   before the alternative mediation scheme under section 279 of the Insurance the  Insurance Act applied. Act applied.

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The Superior Court rejected the insurer's argument. The Court, according to  purposive construction, held that the mediation process under the Insurance the  Insurance  Act covered  Act covered all disputes relating to SABS, including the preliminary question of whether the claimant was involved in an accident and qualified as an insured  person under the Schedule Pickstone v Freemans plc Here, women warehouse operatives were paid the same as male warehouse operatives. However, Miss Pickstone claimed that the work of the warehouse operatives was of equal value to that done by male warehouse checkers who were paid £1.22 per week more than they were. The employers argued that a woman warehouse operative was employed on like work to the male warehouse operatives, so she could not bring a claim under section 1(2) (c) of the 1970 statute for work of equal value. This was a literal interpretation of the 1970 statute. The House of Lords decided that the literal approach would have left the United Kingdom in breach of its treaty obligations to give effect to an EU directive. It therefore used the purposive approach and stated that Miss Pickstone was entitled to claim on the basis of work of equal value even though there was a male employee doing the same work as her. Smith v. Hughes The question arose whether a women soliciting men from inside a building, committed an offence. Lord Parker C.J found the text unclear so he looked at the purpose of the legislation and said “everybody knows that this was an Act intended to clean up the street, to enable people to walk along streets without being molested or solicited by common prostitutes. Viewed in that way it can matter little whether the prostitute is soliciting while in the street or is standing in a doorway or on a  balcony,  balcony, or at a window or whether the window window is shut or open. If the literal meaning of the act was followed the outcome would have been different and the women would not have been guilty, so this proves that the  purposive approach is much more superior and flexible than the literal rule.

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In Molar Mal v. Kay Iron Works (P) Ltd. Court while reiterating that courts will have to follow the rule of literal construction, held that there is an exception to that rule. This Court observed:

“That exception comes into play when application of literal construction of the words in the statute leads to absurdity, inconsistency or when it is shown that the legal context  in which the words are used or by reading the statute as a whole, it requires a different meaning. 

Justice G.P. Singh extracts four conditions   that should be present to justify departure from the plain words of the Statute, in his treatise "Principles of

Statutory Interpretation" from the decision of the House of Lords in Stock v. Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd .: 

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A court would only be justified in departing from the plain words of the statute when it is satisfied that (1) there is clear and gross balance of anomaly; (2) Parliament could not have envisaged such anomaly; (3) the anomaly can be obviated without detriment to such a legislative objective; and (4) the language of the statute is susceptible of the modification required to obviate the anomaly.” anomaly.” MISCHIEF RULE The mischief rule is one of the most firmly established rule for construing an obscure enactment. It is another rule of statutory interpretation traditionally applied by English courts. The rule was first laid out in a 16th -century ruling of the Barons of the Exchequer Court in Heydon’s case which have been continually cited with approval and acted upon. The main aim of the rule is to determine the “mischief and defect” that the statute in question has set out to remedy, and what ruling would effectively implement this remedy. remedy. In applying the Mischief Rule, the court is essentially asking what part of the law, did the law not cover, but was meant to be rectified by the parliament in passing the bill. Mischief Rule laid by the Barons of the Exchequer in the Heydon's case (Heydon 's case (1584) 3 Co R ) as follows, namely- "That for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general four things are to be discerned and considered: (1) What was the common law before the making of the Act? (2) What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not  provide? (3) What remedy the Parliament have resolved and appointed to cure it (4) The true reason of the remedy and the judges to always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy Pyarali K. Tejani vs Mahadeo Ramchandra Dange The appellant/petitioner, a dealer in scented supari, was charged with the offence of having sold and retained for selling scented supari with saccharin and cyclamate, prohibited artificial sweeteners, in contravention of S. 7(i)(ii) and rule 47 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 and thereby having committed an offence punishable under section secti on 16(1)(a)(i) of the Act. Court held that Supari is food within the meaning of S. 2(v) of the Act. The Act defines 'food' very widely as covering any article used as food and every component which enters into it and even flavoring matter and condiments. In food offenses mischeif rule to be applied. Appellant will be liable In the Bengal Immunity case , the mischief rule was applied to the construction of Article 286 of the Constitution of India, observing that it was to cure the

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mischief of multiple taxation and to preserve the free flow of the inter -State trade or commerce in the Union of India regarded as one economic unit without any provincial barrier that the Constitution makers adopted Article 286 in the Constitution.  Smith v. Hughes Hughes The defendant was a common prostitute who lived at No. 39 Curzon Street, London, and used the premises for the purposes of prostitution. On November 4, 1959, between 8.50 p.m. and 9.05 p.m. the defendant solicited men passing in the street, for the purposes of prostitution, from a first -floor balcony of No. 39 Curzon Street. It was contended on behalf of the defendant, inter alia, that the  balcony was not ‘in a Street’ within the meaning of section 1(1) of the Street Offences Act, 1959, 1959, and that accordingly a ccordingly no offence had been committed. “The sole question here is whether in those circumstances the appellant was soliciting in a street or public place. The words of s. 1(1) of the Act are in this form: ‘It shall be an offence for a common prostitute to loiter or solicit in a street s treet or public place for the purpose of prostitution’. Considering what is the mischief aimed at by this Act, Everybody knows that this was an Act intended to clean up the streets, to enable people to walk along the streets without being molested or solicited solici ted by common prostitutes. Viewed in that way, it can matter little whether the prostitute is soliciting while in the street or is standing in a doorway or on a balcony, Hence she would be liable B.K. GARAD V. NASIK MERCHANT COOPERATIVE BANK LIMITED On expiry of the term of the committee known as Board of Directors of a specified society under the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 the Collector notified the election programme without specifying that the two seats on the committee would be reserved seats; one for the members belonging to the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes and one for the weaker section of the members of the society. Pursuant to that election programme the poll was held and the result was declared. The said election was challenged by a member of the society  belonging to Scheduled Tribe on the ground that the whole of the election  programme is vitiated on account of its non compliance with the mandatory statutory provision enacted in sec. 73B which prescribed reservation of seats; one in favour of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes and another in favour of weaker section from the members of the society s ociety.. In the instant case, according to mischief rule the use of the expression 'shall' in sec. 73B clearly mandates obligation to reserve. The section itself clearly manifests legislative intention when it says that 'if no such persons are elected or appointed,' the reserved seats may be filled in by co -option. The language and the chronology of the methodology of filling in reserved seats employed in sec. 73B provide a clue to its correct construction and there should be no doubt that opportunity must be provided for filling in seats by election. It is the failure of the election machinery to fill in the seats by election which would enable the concerned authority to fill in seats by appointment or co -option. Corkery v Carpenter(1950)

Defendant was in charge of a bicycle whilst drunk. The defendant was accused of being drunk in charge of a carriage. He was in fact riding a cycle. Section 12

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made it an offence to be ‘drunk while in charge on any highway . . of any carriage, horse, cattle, or steam engine’. Held: The Act was to be read purposively. purposively. The mischief rule allowed the court to hold that a carriage included a bicycle. A bicycle is a "carriage" the mischief was drinking and driving at a high speed on the highway, while being in charge of transport, amounts to be a mischief which needs to be surpressed. BENEFICIAL CONSTRUCTION Socio-economic legislation which is aimed at social or economic policy changes, the interpretation should s hould not be narrow. Beneficial Construction is a tendency and not a rule. The reason is that this  principle is based on human tendency to be fair, accommodating, and just. Instead of restricting the people from getting the benefit of the statute, Court tends to include as many classes as it can while remaining faithful to the wordings of the statute. In the case of Sant Ram v Rajinderlal , the Supreme Court said that welfare legislation must be interpreted in a third World perspective favoring the weaker and poor class. It has also been laid down in the case of labor legislation that courts should not stick to grammatical constructions but also have regard to the  protective intendment of the legislation.

 B Shah v Presiding Officer Officer, Labour Court, court applied beneficent rule of construction in construing section 5 of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961, which makes the employer liable to pay maternity benefit to woman worker at the rate of average daily wage for the period of her actual absence immediately  preceding and including the t he day da y of her delivery and for f or six si x weeks immediately following that day. day.  The court held that Sundays must also be included and held that the Act was intended not only to subsist but also make up for her dissipated energy and take care of child. The Act was read in the light of Article 42 Unichoyi v. State of Kerala  Whether the minimum wages wages act, 1948 in which state government government is empowered to fix minimum wages is violative of Aricle 19(1) (g) because it does not define minimum wages. The court, while applying beneficial construction held that in an underdeveloped country which faces the problem of unemployment on a very large scale, it is not unlikely that labour may offer to work even on starvation wages. The policy of the Act is to prevent the employment of such sweated labour in the interest of general public and so in prescribing the minimum rates, the capacity of the employer need not be considered. What is being prescribed is minimum wage rates which a welfare State assumes every employer must pay before he employs labour. 