International Organizations

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

International International Organization, membership group that operates across national borders for specific purposes. Scholars of international relations consider international organizations to have growing importance in world politics. Examples of international organizations include the United Nations (UN), the World Bank ( see International Bank for Reconstruction and Development), the International Committee of the Red Cross, and Greenpeace. Most international organizations operate as part of one or more international regimes . An international regime is a set of rules, standards,

and procedures that govern national behavior in a particular area. Examples of international regimes include arms control, foreign trade, and Antarctic exploration. International organizations are often central to the functioning of an international regime, giving structure and procedures to

share many characteristics of NGOs, they are not international organizations because they do not coordinate the actions of members for mutual gain. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Historically, international organizations and regimes have reflected the interests of the world’s most powerful nations, or great powers. Many

international organizations and regimes were established during times of  global hegemony —that is, when one nation has predominated in international power. These periods have often followed a major war among the great powers. Today’s international organizat ions—such as the UN, the Organization of American States (OAS), and the World Bank —were created after World War II ended in 1945, when the United States was powerful enough to create rules and institutions that other countries would follow.

the “rules of the game” by which nations must play. For example, the

World Trade Organization (WTO), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the European Union (EU) are key organizations that define the international trade regime. TYPES OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS:

International International organizations fall into two main categories: intergovernmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations. Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) have national governments as members. Hundreds of IGOs operate in all parts of the world. Member nations have created each of these organizations to serve a purpose that those nations find useful. Membership can range from as few as two member nations to virtually all nations. The UN and its various agencies are IGOs. So are most of the world’s economic coordinating institutions, such

as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Group of Eight (G-8). The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) seeks to coordinate the production and pricing policies of its 11 member states. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) seeks to regulate the flow of nuclear technology to developing nations. The WTO helps negotiate and monitor agreements among 146 nations to lower trade barriers. Military alliances, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and political groupings, such as the Arab League and the African Union, are also IGOs. In general, regional IGOs have experienced more success than global ones, and those with specific purposes have worked better than those with broad aims.

Although rooted in power, international organizations and regimes generally serve the interests of most participating nations and usually endure even when hegemony wanes. Most countries share mutual interests, yet find it hard to coordinate their actions for mutual benefit because of the lack of a central authority. Nations also face the temptation to bend the rules in their own favor. For example, it is in everyone’s interest to halt production of chemicals that damage the earth’s ozone

layer. However, a country can save money by continuing to use those chemicals. The coordination of efforts to write new rules and monitor them requires an international organization. For example, the United Nations Environment Program helped countries negotiate a treaty to stop producing ozone-destroying chemicals. Thus, nations find it useful to give international organizations some power to enforce rules. Most countries follow the rules most of the time. International organizations are also able to make countries aware of the need to act on emerging issues. For example, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations were instrumental in focusing attention on acquired immunodeficiency immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) as a global crisis. In the 18th century, German philosopher Immanuel Kant and French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau broadly outlined the concept of a global federation of countries resembling today’s UN. Nations joined the

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are private organizations whose memberships and activities are international in scope. NGOs do not possess the legal status of national governments. However, the UN and other international forums recognize many NGOs as important political institutions. Examples of NGOs include the Roman Catholic Church, Greenpeace, the International Olympic Committee, and the International Committee of the Red Cross. Although multinational corporations (MNCs)

first IGOs in the 19th century. These were practical organizations through which nations managed specific issues, such as international mail service and control of traffic on European rivers. Such organizations proliferated in the 20th century to cover a wide variety of specific issues. At the same time, the scope of international organizations expanded, culminating with the creation of the League of Nations in 1920.

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The development of European regional organizations after World War II ended in 1945 mirrored the growth of IGOs historically, in that narrowly focused organizations preceded broader and more encompassing international institutions. The European Coal and Steel Community, predecessor of the European Union, coordinated coal and steel production. production. Today, the European Commission, executive agency of the European Union, enforces regulations concerning labor, the environment, agriculture, and a host of other issues that affect the daily lives of virtually every citizen in Europe. NGOs similarly developed from the need to coordinate specific, narrowly defined activities across national borders. Beginning in the 19th century, churches and professional and scientific occupational groups formed the first NGOs. The Red Cross was organized in 1863 to establish and monitor the laws of warfare. It was one of the first NGOs to actively work to change the behavior of states. Some political parties —notably communist parties in the early 20th century—organized internationally and began to function as NGOs. In the 20th century, specialized NGOs also sprang up in such areas as sports, business, tourism, and communication. Between 1945 and 1995, the number of international organizations increased fivefold, reaching about 500 IGOs and 5,000 NGOs. By 2003, the number of international organizations increased fivefold again, to nearly 25,000—mostly due to the proliferation of NGOs made possible by new technologies such as the Internet. On average, a new NGO is created somewhere in the world every few days. This trend reflects the growing importance of international coordination for both governmental and private institutions in an interdependent world. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TODAY

One sign of the important role of international organizations is how they have endured as international power relations shift. In 1991, the Soviet Union dissolved and the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States ended. Russia and other formerly communist countries in Eastern Europe ceased to pose a threat to the capitalist democracies of  Western Europe. One might have expected NATO, which defended Western European nations, to go out of business, but it did not. Similarly, the creation of the WTO did not cause smaller free-trade associations such as NAFTA to end. Instead, the mosaic of international organizations continues to expand, particularly as new communications and informationprocessing technologies make international groups more practical and effective. International organizations have emerged as important actors in international relations. relations. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997 for its work coordinating the efforts of IGOs, NGOs, and states to write, sign, and ratify the international treaty banning the use of land mines. International organizations organizations are now able to pressure states into adopting certain courses of action. When a state will not act,

international organizations can mobilize individuals to take action. In some matters, such as disaster assistance or aid for refugees, states have come to rely on international organizations to provide essential services that states are unwilling or unable to offer.

to be kept against the Enemy; and it is understood that the Courts of  England. Austria, Russia, and Prussia engage by the present Treaty to keep in the field, each of them, 150,000 effective men, exclusive of garrisons, to be employed in active service against the common Enemy.

The interdependence of nations in the modern world means that no single nation can dictate the outcome of international conflicts. Nor can private groups and individuals rely on national governments to solve major world problems. Therefore, both governments and individuals will continue to turn to international organizations as an important way to address these problems and to protect their own interests.

The High Contracting Parties reciprocally engage not to treat separately with the common Enemy, nor to sign Peace, Truce, nor Convention, but with common consent. They, moreover, engage not to lay down their Arms until the object of the War, mutually understood and agreed upon, shall have been attained.

EARLY COOPERATION AMONG STATES

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Treaty of Chaumont March 1, 1814.

This treaty in terms includes only Austria and Russia, but Great Britain and Prussia were included in similar treaties formed at the same time. Although dated March 1 the treaty was not actually signed until March 9. The terms alluded to in article 1 were those offered to Napoleon at the Congress of  Châtillon. As the most comprehensive and typical of the series of treaties which created and controlled the alliance against France the terms of this document should be carefully noted. His Imperial Majesty and Royal Highness the Emperor of Austria, King of  Hungary and of Bohemia, His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, His Majesty the King of Prussia, having forwarded to the French Government proposals for the conclusion of a general peace, and desiring, in case France should refuse the conditions of that peace, to draw closer the bonds which unite them for the vigorous prosecution of a war undertaken with the salutary purpose of putting an end to the misfortunes of Europe by assuring future repose through the re-establishment of a just equilibrium of the Powers, and wishing at the same time, if Providence blesses their pacific intentions, to settle the methods of maintaining against every attack the order of things which shall have been the happy result of their efforts, have agreed to sanction by a solemn Treaty, signed separately by each of  the four Powers with the other three, this double engagement. The High Contracting Parties above named solemnly engage by the present Treaty, and in the event of France refusing to accede to the Conditions of  Peace now proposed, to apply all the means of their respective States to the vigorous prosecution of the War against that Power, and to employ them in perfect concert, in order to obtain for themselves and for Europe a General Peace, under the Protection of which the Rights and Liberties of all Nations may be established and secured. This engagement shall in no respect affect the Stipulations which the several Powers have already contracted relative to the number of Troops

In order to contribute in the most prompt and decisive manner to fulfill this great object, His Britannic Majesty engages to furnish a Subsidy of  £5,000,000 for the service of the year 1814, to be divided in equal proportions amongst the three Powers; and His said Majesty promises, moreover, to arrange before the 1st of January in each year, with their imperial and Royal Majesties, the further succours to be furnished during the subsequent year, if (which God forbid) the War should so long continue. The High Contracting Parties, reserving to themselves to concert together, on the conclusion of a peace with France, as to the means best adapted to guarantee to Europe, and to themselves reciprocally, the continuance of  the Peace, have also determined to enter, without delay, into defensive engagements for the Protection of their respective States in Europe against every attempt which France might make to infringe the order of things resulting from such P acification. To effect this, they agree that in the event of one of the High Contracting Parties being threatened with an Attack on the part of France, the others shall employ their most strenuous efforts to prevent it, by friendly interposition. In case of these endeavours proving ineffectual, the High Contracting Parties promise to come to the immediate assistance of the Power attacked, each with a body of 60,000 men. As the situation of the Seat of War, or other circumstances, might render it difficult for Great Britain to furnish the stipulated succours in English troops within the term prescribed, and to maintain the same on a War establishment, His Britannic Majesty reserves the right of furnishing his contingent to the requiring Power in Foreign Troops in his pay, or to pay annually to that Power a sum of money, at the rate of £20 per man for infantry, and of £30 for cavalry, until the stipulated succour shall be complete. The High Contracting Parties mutually promise, that in case they shall be reciprocally engaged in hostilities, in consequence of furnishing the stipulated Succours, the party requiring and the parties called upon, and

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acting as Auxiliaries in the War, shall not make Peace but by common consent. In order to render more effectual the Defensive Engagements above stipulated, by uniting for their common defence the Powers the most exposed to a French invasion, the High Contracting Parties engage to invite those Powers to accede to the present Treaty of Defensive Alliance. The present Treaty of Defensive Alliance having for its object to maintain the equilibrium of Europe, to secure the repose and Independence of its States, and to prevent the Invasions which during so many years have desolated the World, the High Contracting Parties have agreed to extend the duration of it to 20 years, to take date from the day of its signature; and they reserve to themselves to concert upon its ulterior prolongation three years before its expiration, should circumstances require it. Secret Articles

The re-establishment of an equilibrium of the powers and a just distribution of the forces among them being the aim of the present war, their Imperial and Royal Majesties obligate themselves to direct their efforts toward the actual establishment of the following system in Europe, to wit: Germany composed of sovereign princes united by a federative bond which assures and guarantees the independence of Germany. The Swiss Confederation in its former limits and in an independence placed under the guarantee of the great powers of Europe, France included. Italy divided into independent states, intermediaries between the Austrian possessions in Italy and France. Spain governed by King Ferdinand VII in its former limits. Holland, free and independent state, under the sovereignty of the Prince of  Orange, with an increase of territory and the establishment of a suitable frontier. The high confederated parties agree, in execution of article 15 of the open treaty, to invite the accession to the present treaty of defensive alliance of  the monarchies of Spain, Portugal, Sweden, and His Royal Highness the Prince of Orange, and to admit to it likewise other sovereigns and states according to the exigency of the case. Considering the necessity which may exist after the conclusion of a defensive treaty of peace with France, to keep in the field during a certain

time sufficient forces to protect the arrangements which the allies must make among themselves for the re-establishment of the situation of  Europe, the high confederated powers have decided to concert among themselves, not only over the necessity, but over the sum and the distribution of the forces to be kept upon foot, according to the need of the circumstances. None of the high confederated powers shall be required to furnish forces, for the purpose set forth above, during m ore than one year, without its express and voluntary consent, and England shall be at liberty to furnish its contingent in the manner stipulated in article 9. 2.

Treaty of Tordesillas

The Treaty of Tordesillas was concluded on June 7 1494 to settle the contentious matter of the possession of the newly discovered lands of the non Christian world between Portugal and Spain. It was ratified by Spain on July 2, 1494. and by Portugal on September 5, 1494. The judiciary precedent of the treaty was the Inter Caetera Papal Bull, issued on May 4, 1493 by the Spanish Pope Alexander VI. The Inter Caetera Bull fixed the demarcation line along a circle passing 100 leagues W of the Cape Verde Islands and through the two poles. This division gave the entire New World to Spain and Africa and India to Portugal. The margin of the maneuver given to Portugal by the papal bull was small. The Treaty of Tordesillas shifted the demarcation line to a circle passing 370 leagues West of the Cape Verde Islands and thus set the legal base for the colonization of the eastern coast of the land now known as Brazil by the Portuguese explorer Pedro Alvarez Cabral. He landed there on April 22, 1500 claimed the land and named it:Tierra da Vera Cruz (land of the true cross).

Translation of the Treaty

Don Ferdinand and Dona Isabella, by the grace of God king and queen of  Castile, Leon, Aragon, Sicily, Granada, Toledo, Valencia, Galiciaj Majorca Seville, Sardinia, Cordova, Corsica, Murcia, Jaen, Algarve, Algeciras, Gibraltar, and the Canary Islands, count and countess of Barcelona, lord and lady of Biscay and Molina, duke and duchess of Athens and Neopatras, count and countess of Roussillon and Cerdagne, marquis and marchioness of Oristano and Gociano, together with the Prince Don John, our very dear and very beloved first-born son, heir of our aforesaid kingdoms and lordships. Whereas by Don Enrique Enriques, our chief steward, Don Gutierre de Cardenas, chief commissary of Leon, our chief auditor, and Doctor Rodrigo Maldonado, all members of our council, it was treated, adjusted, and agreed for us and in our name and by virtue of our power with the most serene Dom John, by the grace of God, king of Portugal and of the Algarves on this side and beyond the sea in Africa, lord of Guinea, our very dear and very beloved brother, and with Ruy de Sousa, lord of 

Sagres and Berenguel, Dom Joao de Sousa, his son, chief inspector of  weights and measures of the said Most Serene K ing our brother, and Ayres de Almada, magistrate of the civil cases in his court and member of his desembargo, all members of the council of the aforesaid Most Serene King our brother, [and acting] in his name and by virtue of his power, his ambassadors, who came to us in regard to the controversy over what part belongs to us and what part to the said Most Serene King our brother, of  that which up to this seventh day of the present month of June, the date of  this instrument, is discovered in the ocean sea, in which said agreement our aforesaid representatives promised among other things that within a certain term specified in it we should sanction, confirm, swear to, ratify, and approve the above-mentioned agreement in person: we, wishing to fulfill and fulfilling all that which was thus adjusted, agreed upon, and authorized in our name in regard to the above-mentioned, ordered the said instrument of the aforesaid agreement and treaty to be brought before us that we might see and examine it, the tenor of which, word for word, is as follows: In the name of God Almighty, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, three truly  separate and distinct persons and only one divine essence. Be it manifest  and known to all who shall see this public instrument, that at the village of  Tordesillas, on the seventh day of the month of June, in the year of the nativity of our Lord Jesus Christ 1494, in the presence of us, the secretaries, clerks, and notaries public subscribed below, there being present the honorable Don Enrique Enriques, chief steward of the very exalted and very  mighty princes, the lord and lady Don Ferdinand and Dona Isabella, by the grace of God king and queen of Castile, Leon, Aragon, Sicily, Granada, etc., Don Gutierre de Cardenas, chief auditor of the said lords, the king and  queen, and Doctor Rodrigo Maldonado, all members of the council of the said lords, the king and queen of Castile, Leon, Aragon, Sicily, Granada, etc., their qualified representatives of the one part, and the honorable Ruy de Sousa, lord of Sagres and Berenguel, Dom Juan de Sousa, his son, chief  inspector of weights and measures of the very exalted and very excellent  lord Dom John, by the grace of God king of Portugal and of the Algarves on this side and beyond the sea in Africa, lord of Guinea, and Ayres de Almada, magistrate of civil cases in his court and member of his desembargo, all of  the council of the said lord King of Portugal, and his qualified ambassadors and representatives, as was proved by both the said parties by means of the letters of authorization and procurations from the said lords their  constituents, the tenor of which, word for word, is as follows: [Here follow the full powers granted by Ferdinand and Isabella to Don Enrique Enriques, Don Gutierre de Cardenas, and Dr. Rodrigo Maldonado on  June 5, 1494; and the full powers granted by John II. to Ruy de Sousa, Joao de Sousa, and Ayres Almada on March 8, 1494.] "Thereupon it was declared by the above-mentioned representatives of the aforesaid King and Queen of Castile, Leon, Aragon, Sicily, Granada, etc., and  of the aforesaid King of Portugal and the Algarves, etc.:

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[I.] That, whereas a certain controversy exists between the said lords, their  constituents, as to what lands, of all those discovered in the ocean sea up to the present day, the date of this treaty, pertain to each one of the said parts respectively; therefore, for the sake of peace and concord, and for the  preservation of the relationship and love of the said King of Portugal for the said King and Queen of Castile, Aragon, etc., it being the pleasure of their  Highnesses, they, their said representatives, acting in their name and by  virtue of their powers herein described, covenanted and agreed that a boundary or straight line be determined and drawn north and south, from  pole to pole, on t he said ocean sea, from the Arctic to the Antarctic pole. This boundary or line shall be drawn straight, as aforesaid, at a distance of  three hundred and seventy leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands, being calculated by degrees, or by any other manner as may be considered the best and readiest, provided the distance shall be no greater than abovesaid.  And all lands, both islands and mainlands, found and discovered already, or  to be found and discovered hereafter, by the said King of Portugal and by  his vessels on this side of the said line and bound determined as above, toward the east, in either north or south latitude, on the eastern side of the said bound provided the said bound is not crossed, shall belong to, and  remain in the possession of, and pertain forever to, the said King of  Portugal and his successors. And all other lands, both islands and  mainlands, found or to be found hereafter, discovered or to be discovered  hereafter, which have been discovered or shall be discovered by the said  King and Queen of Castile, Aragon, etc., and by their vessels, on the western side of the said bound, determined as above, after having passed the said  bound toward the west, in either its north or south latitude, shall belong to, and remain in the possession of, and pertain forever to, the said King and  Queen of Castile, Leon, etc., and to their s uccessors. [2.] Item, the said representatives promise and affirm by virtue of the  powers aforesaid, that from this d ate no ships shall be despatched-namely  as follows: the said King and Queen of Castile, Leon, Aragon, etc., for this  part of the bound, and its eastern side, on this side the said bound, which  pertains to the said King of Portugal and the Algarves, etc.; nor the said  King of Portugal to the other part of the said bound which pertains to the said King and Queen of Castile, Aragon, etc.-for the purpose of discovering and seeking any mainlands or islands, or for the purpose of trade, barter, or  conquest of any kind. But should it come to pass that the said ships of the said King and Queen of Castile, Leon, Aragon, etc., on sailing thus on this side of the said bound, should discover any mainlands or islands in the region pertaining, as abovesaid, to the said King of Portugal, such mainlands or islands shall pertain to and belong forever to the said King of  Portugal and his heirs, and their Highnesses shall order them to be surrendered to him immediately. And if the said ships of the said King of  Portugal discover any islands and mainlands in the regions of the said King and Queen of Castile, Leon, Aragon, etc., all such lands shall belong to and  remain forever in the possession of the said King and Queen of Castile, Leon, Aragon, etc., and their heirs, and the said King of Portugal shall cause such lands to be surrendered immediately.

[3.] Item, in order that the said line or bound of the said division may be made straight and as nearly as possible the said distance of three hundred  and seventy leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands, as hereinbefore stated, the said representatives of both the said parties agree and assent that  within the ten months immediately following the date of this treaty their  said constituent lords shall despatch two or four caravels, namely, one or  two by each one of them, a greater or less number, as they may mutually  consider necessary. These vessels shall meet at the Grand Canary Island  during this time, and each one of the said parties shall send certain persons in them, to wit, pilots, astrologers, sailors, and any others they may deem desirable. But there must be as many on one side as on the other, and  certain of the said pilots, astrologers, sailors, and others of those sent by  the said King and Queen of Castile, Aragon, etc., and who are experienced, shall embark in the ships of the said King of Portugal and the Algarves; in like manner certain of the said persons sent by the said King of Portugal  shall embark in the ship or ships of the said King and Queen of Castile,  Aragon, etc.; a like number in each case, so that they may jointly study and  examine to better advantage the sea, courses, winds, and the degrees of  the sun or of north latitude, and lay out the leagues aforesaid, in order that, in determining the line and boundary, all sent and empowered by both the said parties in the said vessels, shall jointly concur. These said vessels shall  continue their course together to the said Cape Verde Islands, from whence they shall lay a direct course to the west, to the distance of the said three hundred and seventy degrees, measured as the said persons shall agree, and measured without prejudice to the said parties. When this point is reached, such point will constitute the place and mark for measuring degrees of the sun or of north latitude either by daily runs measured in leagues, or in any other manner that shall mutually be deemed better. This said line shall be drawn north and south as aforesaid, from the said Arctic  pole to the said Antarctic pole. And when this line has been determined as abovesaid, those sent by each of the aforesaid parties, to whom each one of the said parties must delegate his own authority and power, to determine the said mark and bound, shall draw up a writing concerning it  and affix thereto their signatures. And when determined by the mutual  consent of all of them, this line shall be considered as a perpetual mark and  bound, in such wise that the said parties, or either of them, or their future successors, shall be unable to deny it, or erase or remove it, at any time or  in any manner whatsoever. And should, perchance, the said line and bound   from pole to pole, as aforesaid, intersect any island or mainland, at the first   point of such intersection of such island or mainland by the said line, some kind of mark or tower shall be erected, and a succession of similar marks shall be erected in a straight line from such mark or tower, in a line identical  with the above-mentioned bound. These marks shall separate those  portions of such land belonging to each one of the said parties; and the subjects of the said parties shall not dare, on either side, to enter the territory of the other, by crossing the said mark or bound in such island or  mainland. [4.] Item, inasmuch as the said ships of the said King and Queen of Castile, Leon, Aragon, etc., sailing as before declared, from their kingdoms and  seigniories to their said possessions on the other side of the said line, must  cross the seas on this side of the line, pertaining to the said King of 

Portugal, it is therefore concerted and agreed that the said ships of the said  King and Queen of Castile, Leon, Aragon, etc., shall, at any time and  without any hindrance, sail in either direction, freely, securely, and   peacefully, over the said seas of the said King of Portugal, and within the said line. And whenever their Highnesses and their successors wish to do so, and deem it expedient, their said ships may take their courses and routes direct from their kingdoms to any region within their line and bound to which they desire to despatch expeditions of discovery, conquest, and trade. They shall take their courses direct to the desired region and for any   purpose desired therein, and shall not leave their course, unless compelled  to do so by contrary weather. They shall do this provided that, before crossing the said line, they shall not seize or take possession of anything discovered in his said region by the said King of Portugal; and should their  said ships find anything before crossing the said line, as aforesaid, it shall  belong to the said King of Portugal, and their Highnesses shall order it  surrendered immediately. And since it is possible that the ships and subjects of the said King and Queen of Castile, Leon, etc., or those acting in their  name, may discover before the twentieth day of this present month of June,  following the date of this treaty, some islands and mainlands within the said line, drawn straight from pole to pole, that is to say, inside the said  three hundred and seventy leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands, as aforesaid, it is hereby agreed and determined, in order to remove all doubt, that all such islands and mainlands found and discovered in any manner  whatsoever up to the said twentieth day of this said month of June, although found by ships and subjects of the said King and Queen of Castile,  Aragon, etc., shall pertain to and remain forever in the possession of the said King of Portugal and the Algarves, and of his successors and kingdoms,  provided that they l ie within the first two hundred and fifty leagues of the said three hundred and seventy leagues reckoned west of the Cape Verde Islands to the above-mentioned line-in whatsoever part, even to the said   poles, of the said two hundred and fifty leagues they may be found, determining a boundary or straight line from pole to pole, where the said  two hundred and fifty leagues end. Likewise all the islands and mainlands  found and discovered up to the said twentieth day of this present month of   June by the ships and subjects of the said King and Queen of Castile,  Aragon, etc., or in any other manner, within the other one hundred and  twenty leagues that still remain of the said three hundred and seventy  leagues where the said bound that is to be drawn from pole to pole, as aforesaid, must be determined, and in whatever part of the said one hundred and twenty leagues, even to the said poles,-they that are found up to the said day shall pertain to and remain forever in the possession of the said King and Queen of Castile, Aragon, etc., and of their successors and  kingdoms; just as whatever is or shall be found on the other side of the said  three hundred and seventy leagues pertaining to their Highnesses, as aforesaid, is and must be theirs, although the said one hundred and twenty  leagues are within the said bound of the said three hundred and seventy  leagues pertaining to the said King of Portugal, the Algarves, etc., as aforesaid.  And if, up to the said twentieth day of this said month of June, no lands are discovered by the said ships of their Highnesses within the said one hundred  and twenty leagues, and are discovered after the expiration of that time,

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then they shall pertain to the said King of Portugal as is set forth in the above. The said Don Enrique Enriques, chief steward, Don Gutierre de Cardenas, chief auditor, and Doctor Rodrigo Maldonado, representatives of the said  very exalted and very mighty princes, the lord and lady, the king and queen of Castile, Leon, Aragon, Sicily, Granada, etc., by virtue of their said power, which is incorporated above, and the said Ruy de Sousa, Dom Joao de Sousa, his son, and Arias de Almadana, representatives and ambassadors of  the said very exalted and very excellent prince, the lord king of Portugal and  of the Algarves on this side and beyond the sea in Africa, lord of Guinea, by  virtue of their said power, which is incorporated above, promised, and  affirmed, in the name of their said constituents, [saying that they and their  successors and kingdoms and lordships, forever and ever, would keep, observe, and fulfill, really and effectively, renouncing all fraud, evasion, deceit, falsehood, and pretense, everything set forth in this treaty, and each  part and parcel of it; and they desired and authorized that everything set   forth in this said agreement and every part and parcel of it be observed,  fulfilled, and performed as everything which is set forth in the treaty of   peace concluded and ratified between the said lord and lady, the king and  queen of Castile, Aragon, etc., and the lord Dom Alfonso, king of Portugal  (may he rest in glory) and the said king, the present ruler of Portugal, his son, then prince in the former year of 1479, must be observed, fulfilled, and   performed, and under those same penalties, bonds, securities, and  obligations, in accordance with and in the manner set forth in the said  treaty of peace. Also they bound themselves [by the promise]that neither  the said parties nor any of them nor their successors forever should violate or oppose that which is abovesaid and specified, nor any part or parcel of it, directly or indirectly, or in any other manner at any time, or in any manner  whatsoever, premeditated or not premeditated, or that may or can be, under the penalties set forth in the said agreement of the said peace; and  whether the fine be paid or not paid, or graciously remitted, that this obligation, agreement, and treaty shall continue in force and remain firm, stable, and valid forever and ever. That thus they will keep, observe,  perform, and pay everything, the said representatives, acting in the name of their said constituents, pledged the property, movable and real,  patrimonial and fiscal, of each of their respective parties, and of their  subjects and vassals, possessed and to be possessed. They renounced all  laws and rights of which the said parties or either of them might take advantage to violate or oppose the foregoing or any part of it; and for the greater security and stability of the aforesaid, they swore before God and  the Blessed Mary and upon the sign of the Cross, on which they placed their  right hands, and upon the words of the Holy Gospels, wheresoever they are written at greatest length, and on the consciences of their said constituents, that they, jointly and severally, will keep, observe, and fulfill all the aforesaid and each part and parcel of it, really and effectively, renouncing all fraud, evasion, deceit, falsehood, and pretense, and that they will not  contradict it at any time or in any manner. And under the same oath they  swore not to seek absolution or release from it from our most Holy Father  or from any other legate or prelate who could give it to them. And even though, proprio motu, it should be given to them, they will not make use of  it; rather, by this present agreement, they, acting in the said name, entreat 

our most Holy Father that his Holiness be pleased to confirm and approve this said agreement, according to what is set forth therein; and that he order his bulls in regard to it to be issued to the parties or to whichever of  the parties may solicit them, with the tenor of this agreement incorporated  therein, and that he lay his censures upon those who shall violate or oppose it at any time whatsoever. Likewise, the said representatives, acting in the said names, bound themselves under the same penalty and oath, that  within the one hundred days next following, reckoned from the day of the date of this agreement, the parties would mutually exchange the approbation and ratification of this said agreement, written on parchment, signed with the names of the said lords, their constituents, and sealed with their hanging leaden seals; and that the instrument which the said lords, the king and queen of Castile, Aragon, etc., should have to issue, must be signed, agreed to, and sanctioned by the very noble and most illustrious lord, Prince Don Juan, their son. Of all the foregoing they authorized two copies, both of the same tenor exactly, which they signed with their names and executed before the undersigned secretaries and notaries public, one  for each party. And whichever copy is produced, it shall be as valid as if  both the copies which were made and executed in the said town of  Tordesillas, on the said day, month, and year aforesaid, should be  produced. The chief deputy, Don Enrique, Ruy de Sousa, Dom Juan de Sousa, Doctor Rodrigo Maldonado, Licentiate Ayres. Witnesses who were  present and who saw the said representatives and ambassadors sign their  names here and execute the aforesaid, and take the said oath: The deputy  Pedro de Leon and the deputy Fernando de Torres, residents of the town of  Valladolid, the deputy Fernando de Gamarra, deputy of Zagra and Cenete, contino of the house of the said king and queen, our lords, and Joao Suares de Sequeira, Ruy Leme, and Duarte Pacheco, continos of the house of the said King of Portugal, summoned for that purpose. And I, Fernando Alvarez de Toledo, secretary of the king and queen, our lords, member of their  council, and their scrivener of the high court of justice, and notary public in their court and throughout their realms and lordships, witnessed all the aforesaid, together with the said witnesses and with Estevan Vaez, secretary of the said King of Portugal, who by the authority given him by  the said king and queen, our lords, to certify to this act in their kingdoms, also witnessed the abovesaid; and at the request and with the authorization of all the said representatives and ambassadors, who in my   presence and his here signed their names, I caused this public instrument of  agreement to be written. It is written on these six leaves of paper, in entire sheets, written on both sides, together with this leaf, which contains the names of the aforesaid persons and my sign; and the bottom of every page is marked with the notarial mark of my name and that of the said Estevan Vaez. And in witness I here make my sign, which is thus. In testimony of  truth: Fernando Alvarez. And I, the said Estevan Vaez (who by the authority  given me by the said lords, the king and queen of Castile, and of Leon, to make it public throughout their kingdoms and lordships, together with the said Fernando Alvarez, at the request and summons of the said  ambassadors and representatives witnessed everything), in testimony and  assurance thereof signed it here with my public sign, which is thus.

 John, our son, we approve, commend, confirm, execute, and ratify it, and  we promise to keep, observe, and fulfill all the abovesaid that is set forth therein, and every part and parcel of it, really and effectively. We renounce all fraud, evasion, falsehood, and pretense, and we shall not violate or  oppose it, or any part of it, at any time or in any manner whatsoever. For  greater security, we and the said prince Don John, our son, swear before God and Holy Mary, and by the words of the Holy Gospels, wheresoever  they are written at greatest length, and upon the sign of the Cross upon which we actually placed our right hands, in the presence of the said Ruy de Sousa, Dom Joao de Sousa, and Licentiate Ayres de Almada, ambassadors and representatives of the said Most Serene King of Portugal, our brother, thus to keep, observe, and fulfill it, and every part and parcel of it, so far as it is incumbent upon us, really and effectively, as is abovesaid, for ourselves and for our heirs and successors, and for our said kingdoms and lordships, and the subjects and natives of them, under the penalties and obligations, bonds and abjurements set forth in the said contract of agreement and  concord above written. In attestation and corroboration whereof, we sign our name to this our letter and order it to be sealed with our leaden seal'  hanging by threads of colored silk. Given in the town of Arevalo, on the second day of the month of July, in the year of the nativity of our Lord Jesus Christ, 1494. I, THE KING. I, THE QUEEN. I, THE PRINCE. I, FERNANDO ALVAREZ de Toledo, secretary of the king and of the queen, our lords, have caused it t o be written by their mandate.

3.

The Holy Alliance Treaty - September 26, 1815

This treaty, drawn up by Tsar Alexander, reflects the return to conservative politics in Europe after the long struggle against Revolutionary and Imperial France. It was subsequently acceded to by all the monarchs of Europe except the King of Great Britain, who declined to sign on constitutional grounds, Pope Pius VII, who refused to treat with Protestant monarchs, and the Sultan of Turkey. Both Castlereagh and Metternich dismissed the wording of treaty as largely meaningless, and it had little influence on the policies of the signatories.

truths which the Holy Religion of our Saviour teaches: Government and Political Relations

They solemnly declare that the present Act has no other object than to  publish, in the face of the whole world, their fixed resolution, both in the administration of their respective States, and in their political relations with every other Government, to take for their sole guide the precepts of that  Holy Religion, namely, the precepts of Justice, Christian Charity, and Peace, which, far from being applicable only to private concerns, must have an immediate influence on the councils of Princes, and guide all their steps, as being the only means of consolidating human institutions and remedying their imperfections. In consequence, their Majesties have agreed on the  following Articles:  ART. I. Principles of Christian Religion: Conformably to the words of the

Holy Scriptures, which command all men to consider each other as brethren, the Three contracting Monarchs will remain united by the bonds of a true and indissoluble fraternity, and considering each other as fellow  countrymen, they will, on all occasions and in all places, lend each other aid  and assistance; and, regarding themselves towards their subjects and  armies as fathers of families, they will lead them, in the same spirit of   fraternity with which they are animated, to protect Religion, Peace, and   Justice.

 ART. II. Fraternity and Affection : In consequence, the sole principle of force, whether between the said Governments or between their Subjects, shall be that of doing each other reciprocal service, and of testifying by unalterable good will the mutual affection with which they ought to be animated, to consider themselves all as members of one and the same Christian nation; the three allied Princes looking on themselves as merely designated by  Providence to govern three branches of the One family, namely, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, thus confessing that the Christian world, of which they 

The treaty of Holy Alliance

and their people form a part, has in reality no other Sovereign than Him to

THEIR Majesties the Emperor of Austria, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of Russia, having, in consequence of the great events which have marked the course of the three last years in Europe, and especially of the blessings which it has pleased Divine Providence to shower down upon those States which place their confidence and their hope on it alone,

The said deed of treaty, agreement, and concord, above incorporated, having been examined and understood by us and by the said Prince Don

observed by the Powers, in their reciprocal relations, upon the sublime

acquired the intimate conviction of the necessity of settling the steps to be

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whom alone power really belongs, because in Him alone are found all the treasures of love, science, and infinite wisdom, that is to say, God, our  Divine Saviour, the Word of the Most High, the Word of Life. Their Majesties consequently recommend to their people, with the most tender solicitude, as the sole means of enjoying that Peace, which arise from a good  conscience, and which alone is more durable, to strengthen themselves

every day more and more in the principles and exercise of the duties which the Divine Saviour has taught to mankind.  ART. III.  Accession of Foreign Powers- All the powers who shall choose solemnly to avow the sacred principles which have dictated the present Act, and shall acknowledge how important it is for the happiness of nations, too long agitated, that these truths should henceforth exercise over the destinies of mankind all the influence which belongs to them, will be received with equal ardour and affection into this Holy Alliance.

Done in triplicate, and signed at Paris, the year of Grace 1815, 14/26th September.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

International organizations (IOs) serve as crucial forces of coordination and cooperation on many political, economic, social, military and cultural issues. Aside from the traditional domination of international politics by established or recently codified nation-states, IOs are important participants of the international system. The growth of transnational IOs was greatly facilitated by the rise of an increasing number of  tenuous networks of nation-states in political, economic, and financial affairs in early modern Europe. They began to proliferate in the course of the nineteenth century. As will be seen, the United States first participated in the development of IOs in a relatively minor way in the first two decades after the Civil War and in a more important way when American statesmen attended the Hague conferences of 1899 and 1907. For much of the twentieth century the United States remained a leading proponent of the formation and development of IOs. Washington was even instrumental in the creation of two of the most important IOs ever: the League of Nations founded in 1919 after World War I and the United Nations established in 1945 at the end of World War II. The breakdown of the international system in the 1910s and late 1930s and the global bloodshed, devastation, and unsurpassed misery brought about by two world wars convinced the international community, led by the United States and Britain, of the urgency for the establishment of a new universal and cooperative order. In the course of World War II traditional American political isolationism was marginalized to a considerable degree. Beginning with the Atlantic Charter of 1941 and continuing with the 1944 Dumbarton Oaks and Bretton Woods conferences, the establishment of the United Nations in 1945 and the formation of many other international political and economic institutions, the pillars for a new multilateral order were created. The Cold War soon added another dimension to this, which led to the shelving of the dream of a new cooperative world order for more than four decades: the politics and culture of  bipolar containment. Genuine multilateralism was sidelined during much of the second half of the twentieth century. Instead international institutions, in particular the

General Assembly of the United Nations, were frequently exploited as a mere talking shop and a forum for ventilating hostile rhetoric. From the mid-1970s, however, a cautious revival of  multilateralism, in the form of the Helsinki process inaugurated in 1975, may even have contributed to hastening the end of the Cold War in 1989 –1991. The dangers of an everincreasing nuclear arms race, as well as economic and financial globalization and, paradoxically, the simultaneous development of a politically and culturally ever more fragmented world, once again gave IOs a crucial role as a forum for consultation, mediation, and arbitration. In the late twentieth and early twentyfirst centuries not only globalization and fragmentation but also the influence of  more sophisticated means of transportation and communication and the increasingly transnational character of military, political, and environmental conflicts posed entirely new challenges. Despite recurrent bouts of political isolationism, the United States —like most other countries —recognized the impossibility of addressing contemporary problems merely on a nation-state basis. After the end of the East-West conflict and the gradual realignment of  eastern and western Europe, this led to the formation of a host of new international organizations and institutions. Yet in the post  –Cold War era the policies of the United States toward international organizations remained ambiguous; a widespread revival of both isolationism and unilateralism could be observed. However, the unprecedented terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 had a fundamental impact on American political strategy. In the immediate wake of the attack no one could say whether it would result in the abandonment of unilateralism, but many policy analysts believed that it might well lead to a much greater American reengagement with international organizations to fight global terrorism.

a global or a regional character, with the latter in general displaying a more centralized structure due to the limited number of regional state actors available. While many IOs are singleissue organizations, others focus their attention on a multitude of issues. IOs can either be open to new members or consist of a closed system. On occasion IOs are established for a certain duration as specified in their respective charters, but more often than not no time restriction is applied. In some of the older literature IOs tend to be subdivided into political and apolitical organizations, the former referring to military and political alliances to further the power of their member states and the latter referring to organizations dealing with mere administrative and technical issues. However, in the last few decades of the twentieth century many of the allegedly technical and "apolitical" suborganizations of the United Nations (for example, the Atomic Energy Commission and the World Health Organization), as well as such wideranging entities as the International Olympic Committee, the International Monetary Fund, and even many large multinational corporations, developed into highly politicized organizations with a multitude of political aims. The differentiation between political and technical IOs is therefore unhelpful. It makes much more sense to differentiate between international governmental organizations (IGOs) like the United Nations, NATO, the IMF, and the World Bank, to name some of the best-known ones, and international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) like Amnesty International and the International Red Cross. Although estimates differ profoundly, at the turn of the twenty-first century at least five hundred IGOs and eleven thousand INGOs were in existence. They were organized in the Union of International Organizations (founded 1907), which is based in Brussels and publishes the annual Yearbook of  International Organizations.

Intellectually the development of IOs was rooted in Immanuel Kant's eighteenthcentury insight that only the "pacific federation" of liberal democratic, interdependent, and lawful republics could overcome the inherent anarchy of  the international system, as described by Thomas Hobbes, and therefore the permanent danger of the outbreak of war. While Hobbes believed that a strong authoritarian state and the balance of power among the world's greatest powers could rectify this situation and provide lasting international security, Kant was not convinced. He was in favor of the establishment of peace-creating confederations and thus, in effect, of bringing about the interdependence of  nation-states. Over time these insights developed into the contemporary conviction that interdependent democratic states will hardly ever embark on military action against one another. Democracy and cooperative multilateralism within (but also outside) international organizations were thus seen as the best vehicles for the creation of a more stable and peaceful world. What Are International Organizations?

In general international organizations are based on multilateral treaties between at least two sovereign nation-states. The formation of an initially fairly loose bond among the participants is generally fortified by the development of more or less stringent institutional structures and organs to pursue certain more or less clearly defined common aims in the international arena. IOs can either have

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While INGOs help to clarify international rules and regulations that enable at least two societal actors (parties, issue groups, unions, associations, international businesses, and corporations) to cooperate in the coordination of  certain specified transnational and cross-border issues, IGOs, with which this essay is mostly concerned, are based on the cooperation of nation-states. An IGO is usually based on a multilateral treaty of two or more sovereign nationstates for the pursuit of certain common aims in the international arena. It is helpful to differentiate between supranational or semi-supranational IGOs, like the European Union, or looser confederations of states and nonsupranational IGOs, like the United Nations and NATO. While the former limit the sovereignty of the participating nations to a lesser or greater degree, the latter normally do not infringe on the sovereignty of their member states; they therefore tend to have only a limited degree of influence over their members. Despite the equality of recognized nation-states in international law, in fact a hierarchy of power and influence exists even within nonsupranational IGOs. The UN Security Council, dominated by its five permanent members, as well as the IMF, the World Bank, and many other IOs, are all dominated by the established great powers, not least on account of their political and military influence and capabilities as well as their financial and economic clout. With the exception of China and Russia, the influential powers of the early twenty-first century all come from the ranks of  the West.

There are some institutionalized meetings and conferences that can easily be mistaken as IGOs. Among these are the increasingly controversial G7/G8 meetings of developed nations and the meetings of the World Trade Organization as well as summit meetings between heads of states and, for example, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which played such an important role in overcoming the Cold War. In fact they are not IGOs; instead these loose organizational structures are only very temporary alliances of a hybrid nature. But they are increasingly important and, in addition to the IGOs and INGOs, must be characterized as a third —albeit no less ambiguous and still largely unexplored —actor in internationa l diplomacy. Development of IOs and the Role of the United States

International organizations began to appear during the nineteenth century in the predominantly European state system. A considerable number of separate and limited-purpose agencies had accumulated by the outbreak of World War I. The organization-creating tendency of this period was stimulated primarily by the interdependencies engendered by the Industrial Revolution. New forms of  production and new methods of transport and communication created problems and opportunities that necessitated more elaborate and systematic responses than those traditionally associated with bilateral diplomacy. International organization was an outgrowth of the multilateral consultation that came into vogue. It was a short step, and sometimes an almost imperceptible one, from convening a meeting of the several or many states whose interests were involved in a given problem and whose cooperation was essential to solving it, to establishing permanent machinery for collecting information, preparing studies and proposals, arranging recurrent consultations, and administering schemes agreed upon by the participating states. The nineteenth-century concern with the challenge of developing rational multilateral responses to the changes wrought by steam and electricity in the economic and social spheres did not exclude concern with either the perennial or the newly developing problems of the "higher" sphere of international relations: war and peace, politics and security, law and order. Indeed it was clear that changes in the former spheres contributed to difficulties in the latter, and it was hoped that organized collaboration in the first might contribute to improvement in the second. Awareness of the increasing complexity of  internationalpolitics , anxiety about the problems of preventing and limiting war, concern about the orderly balancing of stability and change, and hope for the strengthening of international law combined to inspire the ideal of applying international organization to the politico-legal realm. The effort to do this at the end of the Napoleonic wars had yielded meager results, but the idea of giving firm institutional shape to the Concert of Europe persisted and was supplemented during the nineteenth century by the ideal of  developing judicial means for the resolution of international disputes. It remained for the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 to stimulate the hope, and for World War I to demonstrate the necessity, of extending the concept of  international organization into the "higher" sphere of international relations. The League of Nations embodied that extension, represented an effort to provide a

central focus for the varied organizational activities that had emerged in the preceding century, and accelerated the growth of the organizing process among states. The collapse of the L eague and the outbreak of World War II g ave rise to the establishment of the United Nations and a network of affiliated organizations. It also gave impetus to the institution-building disposition of  statesmen, not least on the European continent, that has produced scores of  agencies of almost every conceivable size and concern. If the nineteenth century was the period of the beginning of the movement toward international organization, the twentieth century has been the era of its multiplication. In the post –Cold War world the landscape is dotted with international agencies: global and regional, single-purpose and multipurpose, technical and political, regulatory and promotional, consultative and operational, modest and ambitious. And the habit of creating new ones and maintaining old ones remains well established among statesmen. By any test of quantity and variety, international organization has become a major phenomenon in international politics. The beginning of the trend toward international organization in the nineteenth century and the proliferation of that trend in the next substantially involved the United States. The well-known isolationist tradition of the United States and the fact that it rejected membership in the League of Nations but joined the United Nations at its creation should not be taken as evidence that America is a latecomer to international organization. On the contrary, American participation in the nineteenth-century organizing process was at least as active as might reasonably have been expected given the country's geographic remoteness from the European center of the movement and its modest standing among the powers. American initiative contributed to the formation of such multilateral agencies as the Universal Postal Union (1874) and, within the Western Hemisphere, the Pan American Union (1890). Although the determination of the dates of establishment of international organizations and of adherence by particular states is by no means an exact science, one can take it as approximately correct that by 1900 the United States was a member of ten international bodies, and that by the outbreak of World War I it participated in twenty-seven, as against twenty-eight for Great Britain and thirty-six for France. This record would seem to substantiate Henry Reiff's assertion that "The United States … is a veteran, if not an inveterate, joiner of unions or leagues of nations," despite its failure to affiliate with the League of Nations and the Permanent Court of International Justice. America's record of interest and involvement in international organization made it less surprising that President Woodrow Wilson took the lead in creating the League of Nations than that the United States refrained from joining it. The American rejection of the league, historically considered, was an aberration rather than a continuation of settled policy regarding international organization. Moreover, it did not presage a drastically altered policy. Although the United States never accepted membership, it gradually developed cooperative relationships with the league in many areas of  activity and ultimately assumed a formal role in several of its component parts. In the final analysis the United States became a more active and more useful participant in the operation of the league than many of the states that were officially listed as members. In addition, between the world wars the United States continued to join organizations outside the league family to such an extent that by 1940 it held a greater number of organizational memberships

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than did Britain and France, the leading powers in the league. Following World War II the United States became the world's unchallenged leader in promoting and supporting the development of international organizations of every sort. American Ambiguity Toward IOs

The attitude of the United States toward international organization, however, has been very ambivalent. Presumably the United States has gone along with, and has sometimes displayed enthusiasm for, the organizing process for essentially the same reasons that have moved other states: it has recognized the practical necessity, in its own interest, of developing and participating in systematic arrangements for dealing with the complex problems of the modern world. It has also shared the ideal of creating a global mechanism better adapted to promoting and maintaining peace and human welfare. Even when it has been skeptical of the utility or importance of particular multilateral institutions, the United States, like most other states, has generally inclined to the view that it can ill afford to be unrepresented in their functioning or to give the appearance of being indifferent to the ideals they purport to serve. America's limited and informal engagement in the operation of the League of  Nations illustrated the first of these points. The United States could bring itself  neither to join nor to abstain entirely from the League. Its enthusiastic adherence to the United Nations in 1945 can be interpreted as in part a symbolic act of  repentance and reversal, a conscious repudiation of the American abandonment of the League. Moreover, already during World War II, American statesman had been very active in planning for the postwar world. Even though idealistic and quite unrealistic plans predominated —such as Franklin Roosevelt's strong advocacy of a "one world" system including something approaching a world government, the abolition of the balance-of-power concept and of  geographical spheres of influence, and Secretary of State Cordell Hull's enthusiasm for uninhibited global free trade —this still compared favorably to the passivity of Britain, the nation that had hitherto dominated the international system. While the British hesitated to embark on any postwar planning exercises for fear of  undermining the war effort, Washington began planning for the postwar world before the country had even become a belligerent power. After Pearl Harbor, and once Hitler had declared war on the United States, it was unlikely that a return to the political isolationism of the interwar years would occur despite the continuation of a strong isolationist strand in American thinking. Thus, America's joining the United Nations with New York as the new organization's headquarters and San Francisco as the venue for the ceremonial signing of the UN Charter was much more than a mere symbolic denial of  indifference to the high ideals enunciated in the charter. It was, more positively, a declaration of resolve to accept a position of leadership in world affairs, an affirmation of the intention to play a role that this country had never before assumed in international relations. In this sense American ratification of the UN Charter was a unique act, a dramatization of an event of peculiar significance: the decision of the United States to transform its approach to world affairs. The country's subsequent role in the distribution of Marshall Plan aid to western

Europe and, above all, its adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in April 1949, reaffirmed the same point and even strengthened it. After all, NATO membership carried more concrete obligations and more definite alliance commitments than did membership in the United Nations. Article 5 of the NATO treaty pledged all member states to regard an attack on a member state as an attack on itself. Although during the ratification process the U.S. Senate insisted that the last decision of how the United States would react to any such emergency had to be left to Congress, article 5 imposed a firm obligation of  some form of assistance on NATO member states.

meaning. "Sovereigntyism" as a subjective phenomenon is a more important factor in international relations than sovereignty as an objective fact. Concern about sovereignty has pervaded America's policy with respect to international institutions from the earliest days to the present. While it has rarely prevented the joining of organizations, it has always affected American contributions to their design and the style of participation in their functioning. The fear that organizational involvements might cut more deeply into national autonomy than originally intended or agreed has never been far beneath the surface of  American politics.

In most cases decisions by the United States to take part in international agencies can be assumed to be motivated in much the same way and can be assigned essentially the same meaning as such decisions by other states. Neither in the case of the United States nor in other instances does it make sense to regard acceptance or support of international organizations as in itself a demonstration of virtue comparable with the virtue sometimes attributed to the individual because he goes to church and pays his tithe. International agencies are not embodiments of a sacred cause but, rather, instruments of the purposes of their members, susceptible of use to promote both noble and ignoble causes. States join them for mixed reasons, and the mere act of affiliation typically provides no solid information about the constructiveness, willingness to cooperate, or the peacefulness of the intentions of the state concerned.

American "sovereigntyism" was originally linked with isolationism, which was based upon the fact that the new state was substantially isolated from the European cockpit of world affairs; it was distant, separate, and different. Moreover, it was weak and vulnerable to exploitation in any intimate association with European powers. Fixation on sovereignty reflected the conviction that prudence required the fledgling state to go its own way, capitalizing upon its peculiar situation to maintain political distance between itself and the leading states of the day. Isolationist doctrine related to political and military embroilments, not to economic and commercial ties, and for that reason it did not significantly inhibit American participation in the public international unions that began to emerge in the nineteenth century.

America's inhibitions and reservations concerning international organization are a blend of the typical and the peculiar. Despite the vogue of creating new international organizations since the 1990s and the strong trend toward economic and financial globalization, it is clear that all states maintain some measure of reluctance to become too encompassed, circumscribed, and absorbed by international bodies. It is perhaps unfair to accuse them of  harboring the illogical desire to have their cake and eat it too, for in the relations between organization and sovereignty, just as in the relations between national society and individualism, the real question is not which to choose but how much of each to include in the package. In either the domestic or the international case, however, the perennial tension between control and autonomy remains, and it becomes especially acute when circumstances require reconsideration of the necessary and proper balance between them. The fact that states need and want international organizations does not eliminate their desire to retain as much as possible of the autonomy that the traditionally decentralized international system affords them. The tension between the desire for effective and useful international organization and the urge to continue to enjoy and exploit the freewheeling possibilities of a simpler era profoundly affects the behavior of states in creating, joining, and operating multilateral agencies. In the Western world both NATO and in particular the European Union are prime examples of this. Sovereignty and Autonomy

Although sovereignty may figure as an abstract concept with definable meaning in legal and political scholarship, in the real world of states and peoples it is a symbol and slogan no less powerful for its having indistinct and highly variable

It was when international organization turned political, with the formation of the League of Nations, that jealous regard for sovereignty, nurtured in the era of  isolationism, came to the fore as an impediment to American involvement. President Wilson's leading contribution to the formulation of the covenant made the league largely an American enterprise, but it was nevertheless profoundly un-American in certain fundamental respects. The league promised or threatened to involve the United States deeply and systematically in the political and security problems of a world that was still fundamentally Europe-centered. The covenant prescribed commitments that seemed to restrict America's freedom to keep its distance, to stand aside. By this time the United States had lost its isolation and the cogency of much of the rationale for isolationism had faded. However, Americans continued to value the freedom to decide, unilaterally and ad hoc, whether, when, and how to become involved in the quarrels of other states. The right to be unpredictable constituted a major part of the substance of the American idea of sovereignty, and membership in the league was regarded as involving the drastic curtailment of that right. Wilson lost his battle for American affiliation with the league not to nineteenthcentury isolationists who believed that their country was safely encapsulated by the huge continent it had ruthlessly conquered and now inhabited without challenge but to proponents of the idea that the United States should continue its recently espoused auxiliary role in world affairs, the central feature of which was untrammeled discretion concerning engagement and disengagement. Wilson's successor, Warren G. Harding, expressed this idea succinctly: "If our people are ever to decide upon war they will choose to decide according to our own national conscience at the time and in the constitutional manner without advance commitment, or the advice and consent of any other power." When the league actually dealt with political and military crises, the United States was

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sometimes willing and eager to take an active role, but it was never willing to accept an obligation to do so. Sovereignty, interpreted as the retention of a free hand, continues to have a major impact upon American policy regarding international organization. World War II convinced most Americans that the advance and well-understood commitment of the United States to throw its weight onto the scales was essential to the preservation of world peace, and the United States made the shift from the policy of the free hand to the policy of commitment that it had rejected when Wilson proposed it. Nevertheless the urge to keep options open has not been displaced by recognition of the value of clear and credible commitments. The strength of that urge was demonstrated in American insistence upon having the power to veto substantive decisions in the UN Security Council. It could also be observed in the careful hedging of obligations under the various bilateral and multilateral security treaties concluded during the Cold War. The United States has wanted to put the world on notice as to its future strategy while retaining the possibility of deciding its policy ad hoc. It has wanted to enjoy the benefits of being committed without paying the price of  losing the national freedom to choose its course of action. The Role of Domestic Jurisdiction

The American conception of sovereignty has traditionally included another element: the right to national privacy, the capacity to fend off external intrusions into domestic affairs. This concern was rooted in the original American sense of  separateness and differentiation from Europe. The New World had broken off  from the Old World, and maintaining the sharpness of the break was deemed essential to retaining the valued newness of the qualities of American political society. The isolationist tradition combined cautions against being drawn into European affairs and against Europe's poking into American affairs. The latter concern is typically expressed with reference to international organization by the concept of domestic jurisdiction. Participation in multilateral agencies necessarily involves exposure as well as commitment; nothing can be done with the collaboration of, or for the benefit of, a member state without something being done to that state. American enthusiasm for international organization has always been qualified by fear of expanding the national vulnerability to external interference, a concern that was manifested in the drafting of both the League Covenant and the UN Charter by vigorous insistence upon provisions protecting domestic jurisdiction. The campaign that defeated American affiliation with the league concentrated as heavily upon what might be done to this country by and through the organization as upon what the United States might be required to do on behalf of the league. Similarly, misgivings about the United Nations and the specialized agencies have often expressed the belief that the United States has been, or the fear that it might be, improperly penetrated by foreign influences flowing through those institutional channels. This concern for sovereignty, translated as domestic jurisdiction, is shared by all states. It has received peculiar emphasis in American policy for reasons that go beyond the attitudes that were initially associated with an isolated position and

an isolationist doctrine. It seems probable that, perhaps until very recently, the United States never shared the keen need for international organization to serve its particular interests —as distinguished from its broader interest in a stable and peaceful world —that most other states have felt. As a big country, a continental state, the United States appeared not to require the relief of difficulties posed by cramped territorial area that many other states have been compelled to seek through international organizations. It did not fully share the need of European states, now matched by states on other continents with numerous national divisions, for mechanisms of coordination to facilitate interchange across state boundaries. In this respect the American situation was analogous to that of a great rural landowner, in contrast with that of residents in congested urban areas. Throughout the twentieth century the United States perceived itself as a powerful, wealthy, and highly developed state, not dependent upon others for protection or for economic and technical assistance. This feeling of  independence and omnipotence even increased at the end of the Cold War. Given these characteristics it is perhaps understandable that the United States tended to conceive of participation in international agencies as a matter more of  giving than of receiving, and that it insisted upon limiting both what it gave and what it received. The United States could afford to resist having undesired things done to it by international organizations because it had little stake in having essential things done for it by those bodies. With regard to the impact of  multilateral programs and activities upon and within national societies, the United States accepted the biblical proposition that it was more blessed to give than to receive. America, more than most other states, could plausibly consider its engagement in organized international activities as predominantly a means of  contributing to the general welfare of the global body politic rather than as a means of acquiring particular benefits for itself. Perhaps for this reason Americans appeared especially prone to believe that international organizations were, or should be, expressions of collective idealism and altruism. The sudden awareness of the exposure of the hitherto invulnerable American continent to international terrorism, however, changed this attitude dramatically at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Another set of difficulties and inhibitions that affected American participation in international organization in the twentieth century might be said to derive from the reverse of the attitude toward national sovereignty discussed above. International organizations inevitably cut into the sovereignty of participating states in the sense that they require them to accept commitments —thereby restricting in some measure their freedom to decide what they will and will not do—and in the sense that states' domestic exposure to external impacts is enhanced, thereby diminishing their sense of national privacy. Yet the development of so-called international rogue states like Iraq and North Korea in the 1990s, and in particular the increasing vulnerability of the United States to international terrorism, led to a much greater sense of the inevitability of  American involvement with the rest of the world. A wide spectrum of U.S. policymakers began to embrace the idea that even the territory of such a vast and powerful and geographically protected country like the United States could not do without the support of the international community to safeguard its physical security.

Democratic Constitutionalism versus International Commitments

One should not conclude that the relationship between national sovereignty and international organization is in all respects a competitive one. International agencies are not engaged in a zero-sum game with states, a situation in which the weakening of the latter is the condition of the strengthening of the former. On the contrary, effective international organization requires the participation of  broadly competent states —states that are able as well as willing to meet their obligations, that are capable of formulating responsible positions and reaching meaningful decisions, and that can manage their resources, people, and territories to the degree required for dependable cooperation in multilateral activities. States deficient in these respects are frequently pressed by involvement in international organization to remedy their deficiencies, and the agencies of the United Nations system have attempted to give attention to building up the capabilities of particularly deficient member states to increasing, rather than diminishing, the meaningfulness and effectiveness of their sovereignty. America's engagement in international organizations has always been handicapped by limited possession of the kind of national sovereignty essential for effective and reliable participation. Its collaboration in multilateral enterprises has been restrained by reluctance to bend to pressure for strengthening the national capabilities in question. When Americans worry about the implications of membership in international bodies, they are at least as likely to exhibit concern about the enlargement as about the diminution of  the sovereign competence of the U.S. government. The essence of the matter is that the United States is a political society dedicated to the ideal of constitutional democracy, a state whose central government is designed to operate within a framework of limitations derived from the principles of democracy and constitutionalism. Democracy implies that government must be responsive to the majority will more than, and in case of  conflict, instead of, the exigencies of the international situation, the rules or decisions or pressures of the organs of international agencies, or the obligations prescribed either by general international law or by treaties. The problem posed by the tension between international commitment to order and domestic commitment to democracy is a real one for the United States; and the more the country becomes involved in multilateral agencies and activities the more intense it becomes. Unfortunately for international organizations, the democratic principle is not exhausted by the proposition that national commitment requires popular consent. Consent theory implies the right of a nation to change its mind and the obligation of a government to accept the implications of the withdrawal of  popular consent. The international legal sanctity of national commitments is challenged by the democratic legitimacy of popularly inspired decisions to violate or repudiate such commitments. The government of the United States came face to face with this problem in the 1960s and 1970s, when the popular consensus that had supported the acceptance of commitments in the two preceding decades began to dissolve. So long as the United States undertakes to

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combine international responsibility with domestic democracy, its leaders will confront serious dilemmas, and uncertainty will prevail in international organizations as to what can be expected from the United States. Democracy coexists uncomfortably with international law and organization. Constitutionalism, no less than democracy, creates difficulties for the United States as a participant in international agencies. The president's responsibility for the conduct of American foreign relations, including the management of  American participation in international organizations, is not fully matched by his legal authority or his political power to exercise this responsibility. He must compete and cooperate with the Congress, which shares in the control of foreign policy. The division of powers associated with American federalism limits the capacity of the federal government to accept and carry out obligations, or to engage in cooperative arrangements, under the auspices of international bodies. The national commitments to preserve a significant degree of autonomy for the private sector of the economy, to m aintain the freedom of a press that zealously guards the right to self-definition of its responsibility, and to respect individual rights enshrined in a written constitution and interpreted by an independent  judiciary, establish further limitations upon the capacity of those who speak and act officially for the United States to engage the country fully and reliably in the work of international organizations. To say that the United States is a constitutional democracy is to say that the body politic has not conferred upon its central government the full powers, usually associated with the concept of sovereignty, that may be required for loyal and effective performance in foreign relations, including the country's effective performance in international organizations. To say that the American public is dedicated to the preservation of the system of constitutional democracy is to emphasize its reluctance to enlarge, or to countenance the enlargement of, governmental capacities relevant to involvement in multilateral enterprises, capacities to make and carry out commitments, to act decisively, and to exercise the degree of control over a variety of internal matters that may be entailed by acceptance of international schemes of regulation or cooperation. There is a constitutional doctrine, derived from the Supreme Court opinion in Missouri  v. Holland  (1920), supporting the view that the valid acceptance of  international obligations carries with it the enhancement of federal powers to the extent required for meeting those obligations. Moreover, early enthusiasm for membership in the United Nations was reflected in a widespread tendency to acquiesce in a broad interpretation of executive authority to act as might be required for effective collaboration with the organization. This acquiescence proved to be short-lived. In the 1950s the Bricker amendment campaign argued—at least according to President Eisenhower —in favor of curtailing presidential power and empowering Congress with the obligation to ratify all treaties negotiated by the executive. Yet the campaign revealed the high regard for the U.S. Constitution. The doctrine of  Missouri v. Holland was more generally feared as a threat to the integrity of the American constitutional system than valued as a promise of the adaptability of that system to the requirements of the age of international organization. The formal constitutional renunciation of the doctrine was obviated by assurances that it would not be exploited. Less than two decades later there emerged a political mood dominated by insistence that

the competence of the president to commit the country in international affairs should be significantly reduced. In 1973, in view of the lost war in Vietnam and the Watergate crisis, this led a Democratic Congress to pass the War Powers Act, which compelled the president to consult with Congress about sending American troops into combat abroad and required him to withdraw these troops within sixty days unless Congress gave its approval for a longer mission abroad. Generally, however, it appeared that Americans were more concerned about preventing involvement in international organization from impinging upon the distribution of authority within their political system than about preventing the peculiarities of their domestic arrangements from handicapping the nation's performance in international organization. The dominance of this concern had a great deal to do with American rejection of the League of Nations. Acceptance of  the United Nations clearly has not eliminated this element from the American attitude toward involvement in world affairs. Nineteenth-century isolationist doctrine, with its emphasis upon aloofness from European political entanglements and intrigues, expressed not only a pragmatic  judgment concerning the best way for the United States to survive in a dangerous world but also a moral aspiration, an ideal of national virtue defined as innocent abstention from the evils of power politics. This heritage of moral distaste for international politics colored early American thinking about international organization to promote world peace and order. Nineteenthcentury Americans, ranging from spokesmen for the various peace societies that sprang up after 1815 to leaders in government, tended to conceive organization for peace in essentially apolitical terms, emphasizing legal formulas and arbitral or judicial settlement of disputes. World courts figured more prominently than diplomatic forums or international armies in favored formulations, and the ground was prepared for the perennial popularity of the "rule of law" in American internationalist thought. In particular the vision of the future did not include the involvement of the United States in the international political arena or the burdening of the United States with weighty political responsibilities. It certainly did not refer to the obligation to participate in military sanctions against disturbers of the peace. America was not to be contaminated by being dragged into power politics; rather, the world was to be purified by being persuaded to rise above politics, to the realm of law. Global salvation was to be achieved by formula and gadget, not by American commitment to share in the hard, dangerous, and dirty work of an organized political system. The scheme, set forth during World War I by the League to Enforce Peace and by similar organizations in Europe, then formulated in the League of Nations Covenant under the leadership of President Wilson, was not in accord with this American vision. Calling for an essentially political approach to world order supported ultimately by national obligation to engage in military sanctions, it violated the basic tenets of the traditional American creed. It offered a painful, not a painless, solution to the problem of order. The American peace movement had hoped for the appointment of a judge; it was confronted by the demand that the United States serve as a policeman. The league promised not reliance upon predictable legal process but involvement in the uncertainties of political and military activity. True, the new machinery included the World Court, and there was massive American support throughout the life of the league for

membership in that body. The movement to join the court was ultimately frustrated, however, by the fear of involvement in the political league through adherence to its judicial annex. The American legalistic tradition demanded acceptance of a court, but it did not permit acceptance of that particular court. IOs in the Cold War and the Post –cold War World

During the Cold War the role of the United States in creating, supporting, and operating the United Nations reflected the official abandonment of preoccupation with legal system-building and of  aversion to engagement in the political and military aspects of international affairs. Nevertheless the Cold War record contains numerous indications of the survival of these sentiments. The mood engendered by the Vietnam War was characterized by the revival of the tendency to conceive national virtue in terms of innocence rather than of  responsibility. Fighting for peace, the central motif  of the twentieth-century ideal of collective security, tended to be regarded not as paradoxical but as inconsistent at best and hypocritical at worst. Self-critical Americans are inclined to interpret the performance of the United States in the early years of the United Nations as a record of  shameful manipulation and abuse of the organization, not of constructive leadership and loyal support. The image of the responsible defender of international order was overshadowed by the image of the irresponsible adventurer and imperialist. In the eyes of selfpitying Americans, the national image was that of an overloaded and insufficiently appreciated bearer of international burdens. Those who put the matter as the abdication of a discredited tyrant and those who put it as the retirement of a weary servant were advocating the same thing: the diminution of  the American role in world affairs. The appeal of this prescription was strengthened by the rise to dominance in the United Nations of political forces and factions that the United States could neither lead nor control; America's opportunity to exercise leadership declined as much as its inclination to do so. Traditional American misgivings about involvement in international political organization was thus confirmed. Discounting the excesses of guilt and self-pity, it must nevertheless be concluded that participation in the United Nations entailed the disappointment of national hopes, the frustration of national efforts, and the dirtying of national hands. It required that the luxury of pure adherence to principle be sacrificed in favor of the more ambiguous and less satisfying morality of responsibility. The glamour of sharing in the formulation of  a grand design gave way to the never-finished work of international housekeeping and the never-solved problem of managing the affairs of an almost unmanageable international system. It was not surprising that the United States failed to find this work inspiring or pleasant. From the late 1960s to the 1980s —strongly influenced by the disastrous involvement in Vietnam, the country's subsequent severe economic problems, and, due to East-West détente, the diminishing Soviet threat —the shift from isolationism to international engagement that occurred during World War II was temporarily reversed. Instead attention was focused once more upon the dangers of overcommitment and the advantages of unilateralism. The pursuit of 

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the national right to make foreign policy decisions unfettered by promises to, or participation by, other states was vigorously asserted by the Nixon, Carter, and Reagan administrations. But widespread talk of "American decline" and the loss of will to preserve the standing of the United States as one of two superpowers proved premature. Instead the crisis situation brought about by the end of the Cold War and the subsequent Gulf War of 1990  –1991 to liberate Kuwait from the Iraqi invasion saw impressive American leadership and the country's constructive reengagement with IOs like NATO, the European Union, and the United Nations. Above all, leading U.S. involvement in the "two-plus-four" negotiations (the two German states and the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, and France) for bringing about German unification within the NATO, European Union, and United Nations framework, along with constructive American engagement with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, did much to achieve a relatively peaceful and stable transition to the post –Cold War era. After the end of the Cold War and the collapse and disappearance of the Soviet Union in December 1991, with the United States remaining the only global superpower and by far the most powerful nation on earth, once again American suspicion of restrictive international commitments and American preference for unilateral activities increased dramatically. The symbolic significance of American membership in the United Nations and its many suborganizations was drastically reduced. Washington's reluctance to pay its full dues to the United Nations was indicative of the United States's ambiguous position toward its involvement and responsibilities in international affairs. While the American superpower was unwilling to pay its dues to the United Nations, the UN itself was in debt to some poor countries such as Bangladesh, owing it $15 million. Between 1994 and 1999 the United States built up a bill of $2.3 billion, arguing that it was asked to pay too much to the United Nations. By late 2001 Washington still owed a substantial amount to the world organization; it was committed to pay the outstanding amount of $582 million in 2001 and the remainder of $244 million in 2002. In 1999 and 2000, after passage of the Helms-Biden act, the United States paid some of the $1 billion it had promised to contribute belatedly to the UN coffers. In return the United States had asked for and obtained various UN reforms and the elimination of the rest of the American debt and a reduction of  its future annual dues. (Instead of 25 percent, the United States would now finance only 22 percent of the UN's regular budget; it would also reduce its contributions for UN peacekeeping missions from 31 to 27 percent of the overall costs.) While the Senate accepted this, the repayment of the remaining debt was controversial among Republican leaders in the House of Representatives who wished to impose further conditions and asked for greater UN reforms. The attitude of the House of R epresentatives was partially also a reaction to the fact that the United States was voted off the UN Human Rights Commission in May 2001 by some UN members (including some of America's European allies) who were running out of  patience with Washington's less than constructive role in the human rights body and the administration's general lack of support for the United Nations. Washington's manifold policy of suspicion toward the United Nations, Franklin Roosevelt's harbinger of hope, must serve as just one example for the claim that an increasing concentration on domestic affairs and a neglect of American

involvement in IOs was indeed the dominant feature of American policy in the 1990s. The few years of renewed international activism at the end of the Cold War—President George H. W. Bush's somewhat rash announcement of a "new world order" in 1990 and the occasional brief burst of  peacemaking activities that characterized the foreign policy of the Clinton administration after 1993 — must be regarded as exceptions rather than the rule. Senate majority leader and 1996 Republican presidential candidate Robert Dole's assessment in the mid1990s reflected the deep and widespread American unease about IOs. Dole believed that frequently IOs either "reflect a consensus that opposes American interests or do not reflect American principles and ideas." Yet as G. John Ikenberry wrote in 1996, while the bipolar order of the Cold War years came to an end in 1989 –1991, the dense economic and political "web of  multilateralist institutions" and thus the "world order created in the 1940s is still with us." Despite a tendency to focus on the domestic enjoyment of the prosperity and rising share values of the multiplying "dot com" companies of the Clinton years, the United States was unable and indeed unwilling to abdicate its global leadership. In fact globalization demanded the opposite, and the administration made sure that the United States would continue to dominate the World Bank and the increasingly important International Monetary Fund. The efforts the Clinton administration made for the full implementation and expansion of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and for enabling China to become a member of the World Trade Organization, allowing it to enjoy most-favorednation status, are further examples that indicate that the Clinton administration had no intention to revert to economic isolationism. The same applied to the political sphere. The Clinton administration was careful to denounce any talk of a new isolationism in the post  –Cold War world, including alleged American disinterest in Europe in favor of a Pacific-first policy. In fact, despite the administration's ambiguous if not outright negative attitude to the United Nations and the many petty trade wars with the European Union, the post –Cold War world at times saw a vigorous and often constructive reengagement of the United States in many parts of the world. However, this became frequently mixed with a strong dose of American unilateralism. Clinton called this "assertive multilateralism." For example, despite much international pressure, for largely domestic reasons the Clinton administration insisted on preventing a UN treaty controlling the trade in small arms. The administration's ambiguity toward the United Nations had disastrous consequences in the East Timor crisis of 1999 –2000, when the lack of U.S. support induced a withdrawal of  UN troops, which in turn led to the wholesale slaughter of many East Timorese people in the Indonesian civil war. Clinton's unsuccessful and unilateral bombing raids on buildings in Sudan and elsewhere in response to terrorist attacks on American diplomatic and military targets abroad also turned out to be illadvised; they may well have contributed to inflaming even more hatred of the United States in the Islamic world. Still, American peacemaking efforts in cooperation with IOs during the Clinton era often added a constructive element to the frequently chaotic and very violent developments in such embattled regions as the Middle East and the Balkans. It is unlikely that the successful NATO pursuit of the 1999 Kosovo war and the ousting and subsequent handover of Serbian president Slobodan

Milosevic to the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague in 2001 would have been achieved without strong American involvement. The Clinton administration's attempts to act as a neutral arbiter in the "Troubles" in Northern Ireland and in the reconciliation between South and North Korea were also relatively successful. This explained the regret voiced in many parts of the world of Clinton's departure in January 2001. Paradoxically, despite Clinton's contempt for the United Nations and his many other unilateral activities, the president's reputation as an international peacemaker far surpassed his embattled and scandal-ridden standing within the United States. Yet his years in office may well be primarily remembered for his administration's ability to maintain and increase America's prosperity and the achievement of a substantial budget surplus rather than for a farsighted foreign policy. After the drama of the presidential election of 2000, which was only narrowly decided by the Supreme Court in December, it was not Vice President Al Gore but Texas governor George W. Bush who moved into the White House. The new president immediately surrounded himself with many right-wing and unilateralist if not isolationist advisers. Many of these people were very experienced policymakers who had already served under Bush's father in the early 1990s and even under Presidents Ford and Reagan in the 1970s and 1980s. Yet his administration did not appear to consist of a vigorous modernizing team prepared to tackle the international problems of globalization and fragmentation. In a 1999 article in Foreign Affairs, Condoleezza Rice, who became Bush's national security adviser in January 2001, tellingly talked at length about the importance of the pursuit of America's "national interest" but rather less about American international involvement and engagement in IOs. She wrote that a Republican administration would "proceed from the firm ground of the national interest, not from the interest of an illusory international community." Indeed, the Bush administration treated the United Nations with even greater disdain and suspicion than Clinton had done. During its first eight months in office the new administration walked out of five international treaties (and withdrew from the conference on racism in protest at anti-Israel passages in the draft communiqué in South Africa in early September 2001). Among the treaties the United States opposed were the Kyoto Protocol on climate change supported by much of the rest of the world and a treaty for the enforcement of  the important Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972. The administration also withheld support from the establishment of the World Court to be based in The Hague. Although Washington agreed with the principle of  establishing such a court, it did not wish any of its nationals ever to appear before it. The Bush administration also threatened to abandon several other contractual pillars of the postwar world, notably the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty concluded between Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev to contain the nuclear arms race. Above all, Bush's insistence on implementing a national missile defense (NMD) to protect the United States (and perhaps its NATO allies) from nuclear attacks from rogue states like North Korea and Iraq caused great unease in the Western world. Not even Britain, traditionally America's closest ally, was able to show much enthusiasm for a missile plan that had not been tested successfully and would cost billions of dollars and resembled Reagan's ill-fated Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star Wars"), a plan that had not been tested successfully and would

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cost billions of dollars. America's allies reasoned that not least for financial reasons the implementation of Bush's missile shield scheme would in all likelihood prevent the United States from giving equal attention to the development of other defensive and military schemes that deserved greater priority. Moreover, the Bush administration showed scant regard for international institutions like NATO by making clear that the missile shield decision had already been made. While America's allies would be consulted and informed and would hopefully participate in the project, any allied advice to abandon the project would not be heeded. Unilateralism was triumphing. Multilateralism and constructive open-minded engagement with IOs had been abandoned for good. Or so it seemed. Then, in September 2001, the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon occurred. This was not only a severe shock to the American people, who for so long had felt secure on a continent that was geographically very distant from most of the world's battlegrounds, it also shook the Bush administration to its core. Alexis de Tocqueville's statement in his famous Democracy in America (1835) that the United States was a nation without neighbors, securely enveloped in a huge continent and thus separate from the problems of the rest of the world, became out of date within a matter of hours. Despite its superpower status, and probably even because of it, it was recognized that America was no longer invulnerable. The Economist  wrote presciently that the United States and the entire world realized that America was "not merely vulnerable to terrorism, but more vulnerable than others. It is the most open and technologically dependent country in the world, and its power attracts the hatred of enemies of freedom everywhere. The attacks have shattered the illusions of post-cold war peace and replaced them with an uncertain world of  'asymmetric threats.'" The value of American reengagement with IOs was recognized in m any quarters almost immediately. Suddenly the United States was not merely the provider of  benefits to the international community but could also greatly benefit itself from a close cooperative engagement with IOs. Within a matter of days the Security Council of the United Nations had unanimously condemned the attack in the strongest terms and pledged its support to the American intention to embark on a prolonged war against international terrorism. The European Union and many other IOs followed suit. NATO went even further. For the first time in its history the North Atlantic Alliance invoked article 5 of its charter, which obliged each member to take "such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force" if a member state was attacked from abroad. The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington were interpreted as a military attack on a NATO member state, which obliged all NATO members to come to the common defense of  NATO territory. This was unprecedented; above all, it demonstrated the value of  IOs to the hitherto unilateral Bush administration. While it was unlikely that the Bush administration would not resort to unilateralist activities in the fight against international terrorism, it was equally improbable that even a state as powerful as the United States could win this fight by itself. Engagement with international organizations like NATO and the United Nations and cooperative multilateralism appeared to be decisive. Thus the occasional bouts of American neo-isolationism that could frequently be

observed in the 1990s were thought by many to be largely a thing of the past. This, however, would also depend on whether or not the unity of NATO and its member states could be upheld for a prolonged period of time. Quite understandably, both the American people and the Bush administration were sufficiently enraged by the appalling attacks that cost the lives of more than six thousand people and caused damage in excess of $30 billion to "go it alone" if  Western and indeed international unity could not be preserved. While the danger existed that the attacks might have the opposite effect and induce America to withdraw from international engagement altogether, this is unlikely; after all even an entirely isolationist America would continue to be exposed to the threats posed by international terrorism. Multilateralist engagement with international organizations and acting in concert with its allies appeared to be the best chance of reestablishing a degree of national and international security. However, it was thought abroad, at least, that this could well take the form of  the controversial American "assertive multilateralism" that the world had to put up with during the Clinton years. Still, after 11 September it appeared that unilateralism and isolationism were no longer regarded as viable political concepts. In view of the Bush administration's active engagement with the international community to fight the "war against international terrorism," the Financial Times concluded that multilateralism was "no longer a dirty word." Similarly, British Prime Minister Tony Blair expressed the belief that the answer to the unprecedented challenge confronting the world was "not isolationism but the world coming together with America as a community." It was generally recognized that the world had to look beyond bombing Afghanistan, the country that hosted the terrorist network responsible for planning the attacks, and other military options. An American correspondent put it succinctly in a letter to the International Herald Tribune in early October 2001: "The Bush administration's unilateralism has been revealed as hollow. Rather than infringe our sovereignty, international institutions enhance our ability to perform the functions of national government, including the ability to fight international crime." LEAGUE OF NATIONS

League of Nations, international alliance for the preservation of peace. The league existed from 1920 to 1946. The first meeting was held in Geneva, on November 15, 1920, with 42 nations represented. The last meeting was held on April 8, 1946; at that time the league was superseded by the United Nations (UN). During the league's 26 years, a total of 63 nations belonged at one time or another; 28 were members for the entire .

contained the requirement that all members preserve the territorial independence of all other members, even to joint action against aggression. During the next two decades, American diplomats encouraged the league's activities and attended its meetings unofficially, but the United States never became a member. The efficacy of the league was, therefore, considerably lessened. STRUCTURE

The machinery of the league consisted of an assembly, a council, and a secretariat. Before World War II (1939-1945), the assembly convened regularly at Geneva in September; it was composed of three representatives for every member state, each state having one vote. The council met at least three times each year to consider political disputes and reduction of armaments; it was composed of several permanent members —France, Britain, Italy, Japan, and later Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) —and several nonpermanent members elected by the assembly. The decisions of the council had to be unanimous. The secretariat was the administrative branch of the league and consisted of a secretary general and a staff of 500 people. Several other bodies were allied with the league, such as the Permanent Court of  International Justice, called the World Court, and the International Labor Organization.

attacks on China were condemned by the league. The league failed to end the war between Bolivia and Paraguay over the Chaco Boreal between 1932 and 1935 and to stop the Italian conquest of Ethiopia begun in 1935. Finally, the league was powerless to prevent the events in Europe that led to World War II. The USSR, a member since 1934, was expelled following the Soviet attack on Finland in 1939. In 1940 the secretariat in Geneva was reduced to a skeleton staff, and several small service units were moved to Canada and the United States. In 1946 the league voted to effect its own dissolution, whereupon much of its property and organization were transferred to the UN. LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Never truly effective as a peacekeeping organization, the lasting importance of  the League of Nations lies in the fact that it provided the groundwork for the UN. This international alliance, formed after World War II, not only profited by the mistakes of the League of Nations but borrowed much of the organizational machinery of the league. MEMBERSHIP

WORLD INVOLVEMENT

The league was based on a new concept: collective security against the “criminal” threat of war. Unfortunately, the league rarely implemented its

available resources, limited though they were, to achieve this goal. One important activity of the league was the disposition of certain territories that had been colonies of Germany and the Ottoman Empire before World War I. Supervision of these territories was awarded to league members in the form of  mandates. Mandated territories were given different degrees of independence, in accordance with their stage of development, their geographic situation, and their economic status. The league may be credited with certain social achievements. These include curbing international traffic in narcotics and prostitution, aiding refugees of  World War I, and surveying and improving health and labor conditions around the world.

In 1918, as one of his Fourteen Points summarizing Allied aims in World War I, United States president Woodrow Wilson presented a plan for a general association of nations. The plan formed the basis of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the 26 articles that served as operating rules for the league. The covenant was formulated as part of the Treaty of Versailles, which ended World War I, in 1919.

In the area of preserving peace, the league had some minor successes, including settlement of disputes between Finland and Sweden over the Åland Islands in 1921 and between Greece and Bulgaria over their mutual border in 1925. The Great Powers, however, preferred to handle their own affairs; France occupied the Ruhr, and Italy occupied Corfu (Kérkira), both in 1923, in spite of the league.

Although President Wilson was a member of the committee that drafted the covenant, it was never ratified by the U.S. Senate because of Article X, which

Although Germany joined the league in 1926, the National Socialist (Nazi) government withdrew in 1933. Japan also withdrew in 1933, after Japanese

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The accompanying table lists the countries that were members of the international organization. Where no date is given, the country was an original member of the league. The year in parentheses is the year of admission to the league unless otherwise indicated.

military force would be used to put into place the League’s decision. However,

Background

The League of Nations came into being after the end of  World War One . The League of Nation's task was simple - to ensure that war never broke out again. After the turmoil caused by the Versailles Treaty, many looked to the League to bring stability to the world. America entered World War One in 1917. The country as a whole and the president - Woodrow Wilson in particular - was horrified by the slaughter that had taken place in what was meant to be a civilised part of the world. The only way to avoid a repetition of such a disaster, was to create an international body whose sole purpose was to maintain world peace and which would sort out international disputes as and when they occurred. This would be the task of the League of Nations. After the devastation of the war, support for such a good idea was great (except in America where isolationism was taking root). The Organization of the League of Nations

The League of Nations was to be based in Geneva, Switzerland. This choice was natural as Switzerland was a neutral country and had not fought in World War One. No one could dispute this choice especially as an international organisation such as the Red Cross was already based in Switzerland. If a dispute did occur, the League, under its Covenant, could do three things these were known as its sanctions:

the League did not have a military force at its disposal and no member of the League had to provide one under the terms of joining - unlike the current United Nations. Therefore, it could not carry out any threats and any country defying its authority would have been very aware of this weakness. The only two countries in the League that could have provided any military might were Britain and France and both had been severely depleted strength-wise in World War One and could not provide the League with the backing it needed. Also both Britain and France were not in a position to use their finances to pay for an expanded army as both were financially hit very hard by World War One . The League also had other weaknesses : The country, whose president, Woodrow Wilson, had dreamt up the idea of the League - America - refused to join it. As America was the world’s most powerful nation, this was a serious blow to the prestige of the League. However, America’s refusal to join the League, fitted in with her desire to have an

isolationist policy throughout the world. Germany was not allowed to join the League in 1919. As Germany had started the war, according to the Treaty of Versailles, one of her punishments was that she was not considered to be a member of the international community and, therefore, she was not invited to join. This was a great blow to Germany but it also meant that the League could not use whatever strength Germany had to support its campaign against aggressor nations. Russia was also not allowed to join as in 1917, she had a communist government that generated fear in western Europe, and in 1918, the Russian royal family the Romanovs - was murdered. Such a country could not be allowed to take its place in the League.

It could call on the states in dispute to sit down and discuss the problem in an orderly and peaceful manner. This would be done in the League’s Assembly which was essentially the League’s parliament which would listen to disputes

and come to a decision on how to proceed. If one nation was seen to be the offender, the League could introduce verbal sanctions - warning an aggressor nation that she would need to leave another nation's territory or face the consequences. If the states in dispute failed to listen to the Assembly’s decision, the League could introduce economic sanctions. This would be arranged by the League’s

Council. The purpose of this sanction was to financially hit the aggressor nation so that she would have to do as the League required. The logic behind it was to push an aggressor nation towards bankruptcy, so that the people in that state would take out their anger on their government forcing them to accept the League’s decision. The League could order League members not to do any trade with an aggressor nation in an effort to bring that aggressor nation to heel. if this failed, the League could introduce physical sanctions. This meant that

Therefore, three of the world’s most pow erful nations (potentially for Russia and

Germany) played no part in supporting the League. The two most powerful members were Britain and France - both had suffered financially and militarily during the war - and neither was enthusiastic to get involved in disputes that did not affect western Europe.

The League experienced success in: The Aaland Islands (1921)

These islands are near enough equal distant between Finland and Sweden. They had traditionally belonged to Finland but most of the islanders wanted to be governed by Sweden. Neither Sweden nor Finland could come to a decision as to who owned the islands and in 1921 they asked the League to adjudicate. The League’s decision was that they should remain with Finland but that no weapons should ever be kept there. Both countries accepted the decision and it remains in force to this day. Upper Silesia (1921)

The Treaty of Versailles had given the people of Upper Silesia the right to have a referendum on whether they wanted to be part of Germany or part of Poland. In this referendum, 700,000 voted for Germany and 500,000 for P oland. This close result resulted in rioting between those who expected Silesia to be made part of  Germany and those who wanted to be part of Poland. The League was asked to settle this dispute. After a six-week inquiry, the League decided to split Upper Silesia between Germany and Poland. The League’s decision was accepted y both countries and by the people in Upper Silesia. Memel (1923)

Memel was/is a port in Lithuania. Most people who lived in Memel were Lithuanians and, therefore, the government of Lithuania believed that the port should be governed by it. However, the Treaty of Versailles had put Memel and the land surrounding the port under the control of the League. For three years, a French general acted as a governor of the port but in 1923 the Lithuanians invaded the port. The League intervened and gave the area surrounding Memel to Lithuania but they made the port an "international zone". Lithuania agreed to this decision. Though this can be seen as a League success  – as the issue was settled – a counter argument is that what happened was the result of the use of  force and that the League responded in a positive manner to those (the Lithuanians) who had used force. Turkey (1923)

Therefore, the League had a fine ideal - to end war for good. However, if an aggressor nation was determined enough to ignore the League’s verbal

warnings, all the League could do was enforce economic sanctions and hope that these worked as it had no chance or enforcing its decisions using military might. The successes of the League of Nations In view of the League’s desire to end war, the only criteria that can be used to

classify a success, was whether war was avoided and a peaceful settlement formulated after a crisis between two nations.

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The League failed to stop a bloody war in Turkey (see League failures) but it did respond to the humanitarian crisis caused by this war. 1,400,000 refugees had been created by this war with 80% of them being women and children. Typhoid and cholera were rampant. The League sent doctors from the Health Organisation to check the spread of disease and it spent £10 million on building farms, homes etc for the refugees. Money was also invested in seeds, wells and digging tools and by 1926, work was found for 600,000 people.

A member of the League called this work "the greatest work of mercy which mankind has undertaken." Greece and Bulgaria (1925)

should go to Poland while Czec hoslovakia should have one of Teschen’s suburbs. This suburb contained the most valuable coal mines and the Poles refused to accept this decision. Though no more wholesale violence took place, the two countries continued to argue over the issue for the next twenty years.

Both these nations have a common border. In 1925, sentries patrolling this border fired on one another and a Greek soldier was killed. The Greek army invaded Bulgaria as a result. The Bulgarians asked the League for help and the League ordered both armies to stop fighting and that the Greeks should pull out of Bulgaria. The League then sent experts to the area and decided that Greece was to blame and fined her £45,000. Both nations accepted the decision.

Vilna (1920)

The failures of the League of Nations

However, by 1920, 30% of the population was from Poland with Lithuanians only

Many years before 1920, Vilna had been taken over by Russia. Historically, Vilna had been the capital of Lithuania when the state had existed in the Middle Ages. After World War One, Lithuania had been re-established and Vilna seemed the natural choice for its capital.

In 1923, contrary to League rules, the French and the Belgium’s invaded the Ruhr  – Germany’s most important industrial zone. Within Europe, France was seen as a senior League member  – like Britain  – and the anti-German feeling that was

felt throughout Europe allowed both France and Belgium to break their own rules as were introduced by the League. Here were two League members clearly breaking League rules and nothing was done about it. For the League to enforce its will, it needed the support of its major backers in Europe, Britain and France. Yet France was one of the invaders and Britain was a major supporter of her. To other nations, it seemed that if you wanted to break League rules, you could. Few countries criticised what France and Belgium did. But the example they set for others in future years was obvious. The League clearly failed on this occasion, primarily because it was seen to be involved in breaking its own rules.

making up 2% of the city’s population. In 1920, the Poles seized Vilna. Lithuania

Article 11 of  the League’s Covenant stated:

"Any war of threat of war is a matter of concern to the whole League and the League shall take action that may safe guard peace."

asked for League help but the Poles could not be persuaded to leave the city. Vilna stayed in Polish hands until the outbreak of World War Two. The use of  force by the Poles had won. War between Russia and Poland (1920 to 1921)

Therefore, any conflict between nations which ended in war and the victor of  one over the other must be considered a League failure.

In 1920, Poland invaded land held by the Russians. The Poles quickly overwhelmed the Russian army and made a swift advance into Russia. By 1921, the Russians had no choice but to sign the Treaty of Riga which handed over to Poland nearly 80,000 square kilometres of Russian land. This one treaty all but doubled the size of Poland.

Italy (1919)

What did the League do about this violation of another country by Poland?

In 1919, Italian nationalists, angered that the "Big Three" had, in their opinion, broken promises to Italy at the Treaty of Versailles, captured the small port of  Fiume. This port had been given to Yugoslavia by the Treaty of Versailles. For 15

The answer is simple  – nothing. Russia by 1919 was communist and this "plague from the East" was greatly feared by the West. In fact, Britain, France and America sent troops to attack Russia after the League had been set up. Winston Churchill, the British War Minister, stated openly that the plan was to strangle Communist Russia at birth. Once again, to outsiders, it seemed as if League members were selecting which countries were acceptable and ones which were not. The Allied invasion of Russia was a failure and it only served to make Communist Russia even more antagonistic to the West.

months, Fiume was governed by an Italian nationalist called d’Annunzio. The

newly created League did nothing. The situation was solved by the Italian government who could not accept that d’Annunzio was seemingly mor e popular than they were  – so they bombarded the port of Fiume and enforced a surrender. In all this the League played no part despite the fact that it had just been set up with the specific task of maintaining peace.

Italy and Albania (1923)

The border between Italy and Albania was far from clear and the Treaty of  Versailles had never really addressed this issue. It was a constant source of  irritation between both nations. In 1923, a mixed nationality survey team was sent out to settle the issue. Whilst travelling to the disputed area, the Italian section of the survey team, became separated from the main party. The five Italians were shot by gunmen who had been in hiding. Italy accused Greece of planning the whole incident and demanded payment of a large fine. Greece refused to pay up. In response, the Italians sent its navy to the Greek island of Corfu and bombarded the coastline. Greece appealed to the League for help but Italy, lead by Benito Mussolini, persuaded the League via the Conference of Ambassadors, to fine Greece 50 m illion lire. To follow up this success, Mussolini invited the Yugoslavian government to discuss ownership of Fiume. The Treaty of Versailles had given Fiume to Yugoslavia but with the evidence of a bombarded Corfu, the Yugoslavs handed over the port to Italy with little argument

The invasion of the Ruhr (1923) Teschen (1919)

Teschen was a small town between Poland and Czechoslovakia. Its main importance was that it had valuable coal mines there which both the Poles and the Czechs wanted. As both were newly created nations, both wanted to make their respective economies as strong as possible and the acquisition of rich coal mines would certainly help in this respect.

The Treaty of Versailles had ordered Weimar Germany to pay reparations for war damages. These could either be paid in money or in kind (goods to the value of a set amount) In 1922, the Germans failed to pay an installment. They claimed that they simply could not rather than did not want to. The Allies refused to accept this and the anti-German feeling at this time was still strong. Both the French and the Belgium’s believed that some form of strong action was needed to ‘teach Germany a lesson’.

In January 1919, Polish and Czech troops fought in the streets of Teschen. Many died. The League was called on to help and decided that the bulk of the town

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The social successes of the League of Nations

At a social level the League did have success and most of this is easily forgotten with its failure at a political level. Many of the groups that work for the United Nations now, grew out of what was established by the Le ague. Teams were sent to the Third World to dig fresh water wells, the Health Organisation started a campaign to wipe out leprosy. This idea - of wiping out from the world a disease - was taken up by the United Nations with its smallpox campaign.

Work was done in the Third World to improve the status of women there and child slave labour was also targeted. Drug addiction and drug smuggling were also attacked. These problems are still with us in the C21st - so it would be wrong to criticise the League for failing to eradicate them. If we cannot do this now, the League had a far more difficult task then with more limited resources. The greatest success the League had involving these social issues, was simply informing the world at large that these problems did exist and that they should be tackled. No organisation had done this before the League. These social problems may have continued but the fact that they were now being actively investigated by the League and were then taken onboard by the United Nations must be viewed as a success.

nations could force them to act on behalf of peace and equity whether they wanted to do so or not.

was solved by the United States' issue of the Monroe Doctrine in 1820, which prevented any European nation from gaining control of Latin America.

To counter a peace plan suggested by the Bolsheviks, Wilson offered his own plan for peace. Addressing Congress on January 8, 1918, Wilson outlined what he

Eastern Question

called his Fourteen Points. Wilson's program imagined “open covenants of  peace, openly arrived at,” freedom of the seas, weapons reduction, territorial

A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.

Russia began to exercise her military strength during the Russo-Turkish Wars of  1828, and in 1831 when Russia defended the Ottomans from Egyptian attack. The Ottoman Empire bountifully rewarded Russia with the Treaty of UnikarSkelessi in 1833, which gave Russia an advantageous access to the straits between Bosporus and Dardanelles. The Concert was angered that Russia was permitted to use this area, and in an effort to peaceably solve the problem and curtail Russian expansionism, held the Straits Convention of 1841. The resolution of this meeting was that no foreign warships were to enter the Straits .

THE CONCERT OF EUROPE

Impact of Nationalism

Concert of Europe, term used in the 19th cent. to designate a loose agreement

In the 1840s, nationalism began to assert a strong hold among many European countries, and the Concert was unable to stop the unifications of Germany and Italy. As these two countries had shown, Europeans were filled with a new spirit of "real politics" that was strongly nationalistic and not afraid to use force to accomplish their goals.

adjustments between nations, and Wilson's dearest cause, the League of  Nations:

Woodrow Wilson

A political novice who had held only one public office before becoming president, Wilson possessed considerable political skill. He was a brilliant and effective public speaker, but he found it difficult to work well with other government officials, from whom he tolerated no disagreement. He was, in private, a warm, fun-loving man who energetically pursued his ideals. But the strain of years in office, a tragic illness, and the public's disillusionment following World War I transformed Wilson's image to that of a humorless crusader for a feeble League of Nations. Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924), 28th president of the United States (1913-1921), enacted significant reform legislation and led the United States during World War I (1914- 1918). His dream of humanizing “every process of our common life” was shattered in his lifetime by the arrival of the war, but the programs he so earnestly advocated inspired the next generation of  political leaders and were reflected in the New Deal of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Wilson's belief in international cooperation through an association of  nations led to the creation of the League of Nations and ultimately to the United Nations. For his efforts in this direction, he was awarded the 1919 Nobel Prize for peace. More than any president before him, Wilson was responsible for increasing United States participation in world affairs. Fourteen Point Agenda

Wilson's crusade for democracy received a severe shock when the Russian Revolution was superseded in October 1917 by a Communist Party uprising and a new regime headed by Vladimir Lenin and Leon Trotsky. The new regime was opposed to all warring nations and was eager to undermine them. When the new government found copies of secret treaties the Allies had made with the tsar, they immediately published them. The treaties revealed that the Allies had not entered the war for purely idealistic purposes any more than Germany had. Wilson was not disillusioned to learn that the Allies had been plotting the dissolution of the German Empire. He was well aware that Allied leaders were primarily concerned with national self-interest. His belief was that a league of 

by the major European powers to act together on European questions of  common interest. The concert emerged after the Congress of Vienna (1814  –15) and included the Quadruple Alliance powers of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, and, as of 1818, France as well. It aimed to preserve peace by concerted diplomatic action reinforced by periodic conferences dealing with problems of mutual concern. The Concert of Europe was formulated in 1815 as a mechanism to enforce the decisions of the Congress of Vienna. Composed of the Quadruple Alliance: Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Great Britain, its main priorities were to establish a balance of power, thereby preserving the territorial status quo, and to protect "legitimate" governments. Headed by Prince Metternich of Austria, the Concert of Europe was one of the first serious attempts in modern times to establish an international society to maintain the peace. This made it a significant event in world history, even though it only lasted for a few decades. Internal Uprisings

The Concert of Europe was successful in suppressing uprisings for constitutional governments in both Spain and Italy in the respective years of 1820 and 1822. Crushing liberal forces in these two countries proved to be positive as they enhanced the Concert's integrity by proving to the world that it had the muscle to uphold its resolutions. Britain Checks Out

The first major roadblock for the Concert was their decision to intervene in Latin American revolutions and Briatin's subsequent refusal to do so. Britain reasoned that it would lose trade profit from the Spanish if the rebellions were ended, and thus from nationalistic interest refused to cooperate. Fortuitously, the problem

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Crimean War

In 1853, Russia gave up any sort of a pretense at supporting an altruistic "balance of powers" and made an expansionary thrust at the Ottoman Empire. France and Britain, along with some aid from Sardinia, went to war with Russia in the flimsy hope of preserving the balance of power, however, in doing so they ended up sacrificing the peace. The outbreak of this Crimean War in 1853, signified the downfall of the Concert of Europe because the great papers were fighting against each other for national interests. The Treaty of Paris reached in 1856, firmly centered the great burden imposed on the almost lifeless balance of power. Russia was no longer allowed to have their battleships in the Black Sea or in the Straits, which left Russia with a southern border in need of defense. Now Russia was at a disadvantage with the other powers in the Concert of Europe, and no longer motivated to uphold its goals. Communication between the powers had reached a complete stand-still; by the end of treaty negotiations, the goals of the Concert lay in shattered remnants, and thus, the Concert's function became obsolete.