In Defense of the Draft Bangsamoro Basic Law
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In Defense of the Draft Bangsamoro Basic Law...
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In Defense of the Draft Bangsamoro Basic Law
In Defense of the Draft Bangsamoro Basic Law
In Defense of the Draft Bangsamoro Basic Law
Selected Essays January–March 2015
In Defense of the Draft Bangsamoro Basic Law Selected Essays January–March 2015 Copyright Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, 2015 Published and exclusively distributed by the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process Agustin 1 Bldg., F. Ortigas Jr. Rd., Ortigas Center Pasig City, Philippines Telephones: (+632) 636-0701 to 06 Fax: (+632) 638-2216 Website: W ebsite: www.opapp.gov www.opapp.gov.ph .ph
Contents vii
Acknowledgments
ix
Liss t o f Ac ro nym s Li
xi
Lis t of B oxe s
xiiii xi
Liss t o f Fi Li Fig g ur ure es
xv
Introduction
1
Leg is la ti tion on versus C ons ti tituti tutiona ona l C ha ng e S EC R ETARY TER ERES ES ITA QUINT QU INTOS -DE -DELES LES
Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process 4
On the Ma tter of S ubs ta te P RO ROF F. MIRIA MIRIAM C OR ORONEL ONEL FERR FERR ER
Chairperson, Government Peace Negotiating Panel for Talks Talks with wi th the MILF 11
C heck heckss a nd B a la nces in the B B L FORMER S EC RETARY S ENEN C . B AC ANI
Member,, Government Member Government Peace Peace Negotiating Negotiating Panel Panel for Talks with the MILF 14
The B B L Fu Fullly Rec og ni nizes zes a nd P res erv erves es the Territorial Integrity o f the Rep ubli o ublic of the P hi hillippi ppines nes J OS E LUI LUIS S MA MART RTIIN C. G AS C ON, ESQ .
Board Member, Human Rights Victims Claims Board Member, 1987 Constitutional Constitutional Commission 22 Leg is la ti tion on ver verss us C ha rter C ha ng e J US TIC E ADOLFO ADOLFO S . AZC AZC UNA
Chancellor, Philippine Judicial Academy Retired Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the Philippines Member,, 1987 Constitutional Member Constitutional Commission
v
vi 26
In Defense of the Draft Bangsamoro Basic Law
S over overei eig g nty ver verss us S ubs ta te DEA DE AN J U LKI LKIP P LI WADI
Institute of Islamic Studies, University of the Philippines Diliman 36
Let Rea s on a nd F Faa c ts S w a y Ou Ourr Opi Opini nion, on, Not Deepl Deeplyy Held Hel d B ia s es a nd Mis Mis trust trust ATTY. ANNA TAR ARH HATA S . B AS MAN
Head, GPH Peace Panel Legal Le gal Team Team 39
P rivi villeg e S pe ec h on the C omm emo ra ti tion on of the 19 1968 68 J a bi bida da h Ma ss a cr cre e HO N. S IT ITT TI DJ ALIA A. TU TU R AB ABIN-H IN-HA ATAMA AMAN N
Representative, Party List – Anak Mindanao (AMIN), House of Representatives 45
Fra me rs of the 198 Fra 1987 7 C ons ti tituti tution on in in S uppo rt of the Bangsamoro
Appendix 57
11 C ommon Myths on the B B L
Acknowledgments
W
e would like to express our appreciation to the different authors for permitting the publication of these statements and essays in this compilation. Our thanks as well to Mr. Joser Dumbrique and Mr. Daryl Lasala for the cover design and to the OPAPP Communications Team for the illustrations and graphics. We are also very gratful for the assistance of the Australian Government through its Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) in the printing and launch of this volume. And last but not the leas least, t, we than thankk the har hardwor dworking king staff of the GPH Pa Panel nel Secretariat—partic Secretaria t—particularly ularly Ms. Farrah Grace V. V. Naparan, Mr. Mark Sherwin C. Bayanito, Ms. Leila A. Halud, Ms. Airiz Jessica Mia T. T. Parrilla, and Mr. Al-Bari B. Macalawan—for putting together the manuscript and making the idea for this book become a reality. 27 March 2015
vii
List of Acronyms ARMM
Autonomous Region Region in Muslim Muslim Mindanao Mindanao
BBL
Bangsamoroo Basic Law Bangsamor
BIR
Bureau of Internal Revenue
BJE
Bangsamoro Juridical Entity
BTA BT A
Bangsamoro Transitio ransition n Authorit Authority y
BTC
Bangsamoro Transitio ransition n Commissi Commission on
CAB
Comprehensivee Agreement on the Bangsamoro Comprehensiv
CCT
Conditional cash transfer
CHED
Commission on Higher Educaion
COA
Commission Commissi on on Audit
CSC
Civil Service Commission
CSO
Civil society organization
DA
Department of Agriculture
DepEd
Department of Education
DENR
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
DOH
Department of Health
DPWH
Department of Public Works and Highways
DSWD
Department of Social Welfare and Development
EDSA
Epifanio delos Santos Avenue
FAB
Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro
GMA
Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arr Macapagal-Arroyo oyo
GPH
Government of the Philippines
HB
House Bill
IDP
Internally displaced persons
IRA
Internal Revenue Allotment
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x
In Defense of the Draft Bangsamoro Basic Law
LGU
Local government unit
MILF
Moro Islamic Liberatio Liberation n Front
MMA
Ministry of Musli Muslim m Affairs
MOA-AD
Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestr Ancestral al Domain
OPAPP
Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Proces
PNP
Philippine National Police
RA
Republic Act
NAPOLCOM National Police Commissio Commission n PAGs
Private armed groups
PhilHealth PhilHeal th
Philippine Health Insurance Corporation
SAF
Special Actions Force
SB
Senate Bill
SPCD
Southern Philippine Council on Peace and Development
SPDA
Southern Philippine Developm Development ent Authority
TESDA
Technical Education and Skills Development Authorit Authority y
US
United States of America
ZJC
Zones of Joint Cooperation
List of Boxes Box 1
Creating the Bangsamor Bangsamoroo is provide provided d for in the Constitution
Box 2
What comprises the proposed Bangsamo Bangsamoro ro territory?
Box 3
Justice system in the Bangsamoro
Box 4
Bangsamoro Transitio ransition n Authorit Authorityy (BT (BTA) A)
Box 5
Computing the Annual Block Grant
Box 6
What is the Bangsamoro Police?
Box 7
What is normalization in the GPH-MILF peace process?
xi
List of Figures Figuree 1 Figur
North Cotabato barangays in the Bangsam Bangsamoro oro core territory
Figuree 2 Figur
Proposed Propose d core territory of the Bangsam Bangsamoro oro
Figure 3
Government spending in the ARMM/Bangsam ARMM/Bangsamoro oro
Figure 4
Bangsamoro Waters and Zones of Joint Cooperat Cooperation ion
Figure 5
The Bangsamoro Government: Parliamentary System
Figure 6
Annex on Normalization
xiii
Introduction
I
n fulfillment of the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) signed between the Government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front on 15 October 2012, Executive Order 120 was issued on 12 December 2012, creating the 15-member Bangsamoro Transition Commission (BTC). The BTC was tasked to draft the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) as the legal instrument that will establish the Bangsamo Bangsamoro ro political entity and replace the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The signing of the t he Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) on 27 March 2014 paved the way for the BTC to complete the draft BBL. After undergoing a meticulous meticulous review process by the Office of the President, President, the draft law was turned t urned over by the BTC to Congress under the leadership of Senate President Franklin M. Drilon and House Speaker Feliciano Belmonte Jr.. on 10 September 2014 in Malacañan Palace. The bill was filed as Senate Jr Bill No. 2408 with thirteen sponsors headed by the Senate President and as House Bill No. 4994 with seventeen sponsors spons ors led by the House Speaker. Both Houses separately conducted in-house hearings and public consultations on the proposed law in Mindanao, Northern Luzon, and the Visayas. These public hearings have served as avenues for stakeholders with differen differentt constituencies and backgrounds to share their insights on the draft BBL. So have the many other fora held by various groups and organizations to discuss the important issues attendant to this endeavor. endeavor. The Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) believes that it is through such robust and open exchange of ideas that the crafting of the BBL is made inclusive and transparent. It is in this spirit that these essays have been compiled. The OPAPP earnestly hopes that this book will help inform public discussion and debate on the proposed law, deepen our appreciation of the imperative for securing sustainable peace in conflict-ridden Mindanao, and allow us to understand the need to address the Moro struggle as a component of nation-building and development.
xv
Legislation versus Constitutional Change* S ec reta ry Teres ita Qui Quinto nto s -Del Deles es P res identi dentiaa l Advi dvise se r on the P ea ce P roc es s
W
hen the negotiations between the Government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) restarted in 2009, we knew that we had a daunting dau nting task ahead ah ead of us. The Supreme Court’s Court’s decision decisio n to render the contents and the manner by which the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was drafted as unconstitutional and contrary to law weighed heavily on our scale of decision-making. Even more, the immediate repercussions of a botched peace process—the reignition of violence, the many lives and properties lost and horribly affected, the general sentiment of hopelessness— hopelessness—were were our constant reminders that we cannot take every word, phrase, or statement in any of the political agreements lightly. Thus, we made it our mission to prevent any misstep in forging the Comprehensive Agreem Agr eement ent on the Ba Bangsa ngsamor moroo (CAB (CAB)—to )—to kee keepp all the pro provisi visions ons the therei reinn within the flexibilities of our Constitution and as guided guid ed by the Supreme Supreme Court ruling in the landmark case of the Province of North Cotabato or the MOA-AD case. v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines or Since the Government Panel under the Aquino administration started, we have conducted 442 consultations across the nation, in keeping with the commitment to make this process inclusive,
* This statement was delivered delivered during the Joint Joint Committee Hearing Hearing on SB No. No. 2408 (Bangsamoro Basic Law) by the Committee on Local Government; the Committee on Peace, Unification, and Reconciliation; and the Committee on Constitutional Amendments and Revision of Codes on 26 January 2015 2015 at the Philippine Philippine Senate, Pasay City.
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In Defense of the Draft Bangsamoro Basic Law
participative, and consultative. Nowhere in the CAB can the term “associative” be found, nor any of its features entrenched or alluded to in the peace agreement. We will also not find a single guarantee for charter change to accommodate the CAB. The most accurate that can be said is that this agreement recognizes the right of any citizen of the Republic, including those who are appointed in the Bangsamoro Transiti ransition on Commission Commissi on (BTC), to propose amendments amendme nts to the Supreme Supreme Law,, through the modalities provided in our Constitution. These and Law more distinguish the CAB from the declared unconstitutional unco nstitutional MOA-AD. The draft Bangsamoro Basic Law or Senate Bill No. 2408, the translation of the CAB into a proposed legislation, is one that can be well accommodated by the provisions of our Charter. Even as the Constitution is deemed read into any legislation passed by the Nationall Congress, SB No. 2408 explicitly guarantees that it will be in Nationa consonance with the Constitution (Preamble ) and thus its provisions, in case of ambiguity, should be read with the parameters of the 1987 Constitution in mind. The establishment of a parliamentary form of government in the Bangsamoro intends to bring life to the text of the Charter that leaves to the wisdom of Congress the determination of the structure of government for the region, provided only that the executive and legislative branches will be elective and representative of its constituent political units (Section 18, Article X, 1987 Constitut Constitution). ion). The draft BBL, as it gives improved autonomy to the Bangsamoro, continues to honor its place as an integral part of the country (Section 1, Article III) whose government remains under the general supervision of the President (Section 3, Article VI). The Bangsamoro Police Police (Article (Artic le XI), a unit of o f the Philippine National Police Police and an integral part of its law enforcement functions, remains true to the constitutional proscription of maintaining only one national police under the administration and control of the NAPOLCOM (Section (Section 6, Article XVI, 1987 Constitution). But perhaps the most glaring difference between the MOA AD—a political document—and Senate Bill No No.. 2408—a proposed legislation—is the operationalization of the constitutional requirement
Legislation vs. Constitutional Change
3
to conduct a plebiscite and allow those provinces, cities, and geographi geographicc which favorably vote for the BBL to be part of the Bangsamoro areas which (Section 18, Article X, 1987 Constitution). In this bill, for the first time, we recognize the spirit of the provision that gives primacy to the consent of the governed in determining their political status. By allowing municipalities municipaliti es and barangays—not just provinces provinces and cities—to participate in the plebiscite, we intend to right the wrong committed against the phrase “geographic areas” when it was all but rendered a mere surplusage in past legislation. Senate Bill No. 2408 proposes many novel changes for the proposed Bangsamoro. As demonstrated, demonstrated , this however does not mean that there is no constitutional basis for all of these, or that a mere piece of legislation without charter change can enforce them. We maintain that a closer scrutiny of the provisions of the draft BBL and a more comprehensive understanding—even beyond the textual or traditional interpretation— of the words of the Constitution, will bring us to the conclusion that the framers and the people who ratified the Charter had the foresight to entrench a unique setup in i n the autonomous region, one that respects the peculiar situation in the area that is not inconsistent with but is in fact a means to preserve our national sovereignty and territorial integrity integrit y under the 1987 Constitution.
On the Matter of Substate* P ro f. Mir Miria m C o ro ne nell Ferr Ferrer er C ha irperso n, G overnment P ea c e Nego ti tiaa ti ting ng P a nel for Ta lks w ith the MILF MILF
I
speak before you this blessed morning more more as a student and practitioner of politics, and less of law, as I am not a lawyer. Politics, rather than constitutional law, I believe, is the best discipline with which to approach the questions before us: Is the Bangsamoro a substate? Corollarily, is being a substate in/by/for itself, necessarily unconstitutional? Why do I say that political science relative to jurisprudence is our best recourse in getting to the heart of the matter of the Bangsamoro? Wee all know that matters of state are foremost matters of politics W rather than law. Over and above law, is the matter of peace and justice which, to go back to the Greek classics, constitute the reason for being of the polity or of the state. Stretching forward to the Enlightenment period, peace and justice, likewise, are the ends of the social contract. Madame Chair, the “substate” word has been unjustly demonized. As in any demonized term, wave it like a red flag, and people will rail against it. It is almost like the term “Moro”—say it and in the minds of many,, you generate fear, distrust, suspicion, many suspici on, hate. Such is the unfortunate state of mind that we have inherited from Spanish and American colonial rule. Such hatred has led us to continue to think like the colonials: A
* This statement was delivered delivered during the Joint Joint Committee Hearing Hearing on SB No. No. 2408 (Bangsamoro Basic Law) by the Committee on Local Government; the Committee on Peace, Unification, and Reconciliation; and the Committee on Constitutional Amendments and Revision of Codes on 26 January 2015 2015 at the Philippine Philippine Senate, Pasay City.
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On the Matter of Substate
5
good Moro is a dead Moro. Fast forward 100–500 years later: A good substate is a dead substate. Unconstitutional! Bang, you’re dead. This, when in i n fact a “substate” can only mean being a “subdivision “subdivisi on”” of and therefore a part of the state in the “subnational” sense, in the same way that a “subset”—as we learned from grade school math—can only mean being part of a bigger set. Madame Chair, the word “substate” is not even a legal term. It is merely a descriptive word pertaining pertaini ng to one part or unit uni t of a state. How can we judge legality or illegality, constitutionality or unconstitutionality, by mere mention of the word? This is not to say that substates or substate entities do not exist. Governanc e through thro ugh Territorial Territorial I have here a copy of the book, Substate Governance Aut onomy: Autono my: A Com Compa parati rative ve Stud Studyy in Co Const nstitu itutio tional nal Law of Powers Powers,, (2011) written by the Finnish professor of Procedures and Institutions (2011)
comparative law and politics, Markku Suksi. Madame Chair, if I may, may I respectfully give you a copy, copy, a humble contribution to your library? This book provides us with a survey sur vey of substate entities that are of particular interest to us. These are substate entities that are in the form of territorial autonomies such as one finds in countries like China, with Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet; Finland, Finland, with wit h Swedish-sp Swedish-speaking eaking Åland; Ålan d; Indonesia, with Aceh, West Papua, and Yogyakarta. Territorial autonomies—a genre that is applicable to our case on hand—are here distinguished from federal states and obviously, independent states. Madame Chair, Chair, independence was never on the negotiating agenda of the government. The The whole idea of negotiation was precisely to keep the country intact. Any notion of a substate can only mean a setup within the Philippine state and under the current Philippine Constitution. Some critics insist that the Bangsamoro in the signed documents is still the substate as originally conceived when we began negotiations in 2010. They do not realize how the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro, for the sake of peace, national unity, and social justice, had arrived at the necessary compromises in accordance with the 1987
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In Defense of the Draft Bangsamoro Basic Law
Constitution and its flexibilities, without prejudice of course c ourse to future constitutional change. This brings us to the second level of the claim of unconstitutionality unconstitutionality before us: that the Bangsamoro, being a substate, is not the autonomous autonomou s region contemplated in the Constitution. Specifically, that the powers that have been enumerated in the signed documents go beyond what is possible in a unitary setup. Notably,, our Constitution did Notably d id not explicitly say that we are a unitary unitar y state. In fact coming from a highly centralized state under martial rule where the Executive branch was able to wield wide powers both formally and informally, the crafters of the 1987 Constitution took pains to devolve powers through principles and provisions on local autonomy, decentralization decentraliz ation and autonomous regions that it ensconced in Article X, “On Local Governments,” and wrote up a whole article on Social Justice to correct the political, social, and cultural exclusion in our country country.. Markku Suksi writes, in the case of Europe: “If states that include one or several autonomous entities are counted together with the number of federal states, the result at least in i n Europe is that the ‘regular’ text-book example of state, the entirely monolithic unitary state, finds itself in a minority and is no longer the prime example of a state.” Evidently, there are so many existing possibilities to structure a relationship between government and its multiple constituencies that a binary system of political ordering (federal-unitary) can no longer accommodate. The members of the Constitutional Commission in 1986 grappled with adopting a federal system of government. But in the end, they settled for this unique animal—so unique it may be set up only in two parts of the country—in countr y—in the Cordillera and in Muslim Mindanao. They called this animal “autonomous region.” In so doing, they also produced produ ced a model that is distinct but also finds a semblance in other non-federal republics such as Indonesia with its three autonomous autonomou s regions, and China with its three special administrative regions that I mentioned earlier; Spain with its seventeen autonomous regions; and the United Kingdom with its four constituent parts, the most appropriate term for which has
On the Matter of Substate
7
not been found. These constituent parts are Northern Ireland, Wales, Scotland, and England. All the these se are vari variatio ations ns of that much derid derided, ed, alth although ough aff affably ably neut neutral ral and practical, generic word, “substate.” Regardless, other critics say that the structure of government and the powers enumerated in the Power Sharing and Wealth Sharing Annexes and now the BBL partake of the nature of a federal state. Proof to such claim is the concept introduced in the documents of an “asymmetrical relationship” between the Bangsamoro and the Central Government. To the Supreme Court’s credit, we have recently been provided with jurisprudence on what asymmetry could mean. In the League of Provinces of the Philippines and the DENR, the concerning opinion penned by Justice Marvic Leonen states that: Auto nomous Autonom ous reg region ionss are gr grant anted ed more powe powers rs and les lesss intervention from the national government than territorial and political subdivisions. They are thus in a more asymmetrical relationship with the national government as compared to other local governments or any regional formation. The Constitution grants them legislative powers over matters … that are usually under the control of the national government … (GR No. 175368, 2013).
While the text did not define “asymmetry asymmetry,” ,” it provides us with the context clues by which we can understand the concept within Constitutional boundaries. Another claim put forward to argue violation violation of the constitution is the list of powers enumerated in the Annex on Power Sharing: reserved, concurrent, and exclusive. Reserved powers are powers or matters over which authority and jurisdictio juris dictionn are reta retained ined by the Cent Central ral Go Governm vernment. ent. Concu Concurre rrent nt pow powers ers shall refer to the shared powers between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro Government. Exclusive Exclu sive powers shall refer to powers or matters over which authority and jurisdiction pertain to the Bangsamoro Government.
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In Defense of the Draft Bangsamoro Basic Law
Is there anything in this definition and the list of powers that violates the constitution? Does the granting of exclusive powers to the Bangsamoro effect its separation from the state? Not so, in many ways. Exclusive powers, which are exercised within the Bangsamoro territorial jurisdiction, may be clipped by the reserved powers of the Central Government, which are exercised in the whole country countr y, including the Bangsamoro. For example, regulation of trade, banking, and finance inside the Bangsamoro may have been devolved but this matter is governed by national fiscal and monetary policies; foreign treaties, and conventions our country has entered into; foreign policy, policy, customs, and tariff laws—all reserved powers of the Central Government. Clipping of the powers of the Bangsamoro can very well be justified by these reserved powers. But then what we envision here is a democratic relationship based on mutual respect—or parity of esteem—as public officials and leaders vested with their respective authorities. Moreover, when the exercise of the Bangsamoro Government’s powers impacts outside of the territorial jurisdiction of the Bangsamoro, it is understood that the neighboring local government units (LGUs) and the Central Government can take the appropriate action—again, based on the respective powers vested on them. This is fairly well understood in that the president, as provided for in the Constitution, shall exercise general supervisory powers over of the autonomous region as provided in Article X, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution and reiterated in Article VI, Section 3 of the Senate Bill No. 2408: “The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.” Finally, the 1987 Constitution itself grants the parameters for the autonomous jurisdiction of the autonomous regions when it said that these regions shall have the following legislative powers, subject of course to the Constitution and national laws (of course, national laws may
On the Matter of Substate
9
also be qualified by the forthcoming BBL in so far as the Bangsamoro is concerned, as is the nature of a special law). Article X, Section 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
Administrative organization; Creation of sources of revenues; Ancestral domain and natural resources; Personal, family, and proper property ty relation relations; s; Regional urban and rural planning development; Economic, social, and tourism development; Educational policies; Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and 9. Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region
All so-called so-called exclusive exclusive powers powers listed in the Annex on Power Sharing and the draft BBL fall under any one of this category, not to mention that fairly encompassing category of matters for the promotion of the general welfare of the people in the region. All powers shall not prejudice the powers and authority of Constitutional bodies, the Supreme Supre me Court and Congress. If certain provisions may have given rise to such misinterpretation, then certainly we can improve and fine-tune the languaging. Truth to tell, many of these powers actually actual ly were already given to the ARMM. However However,, many of these powers—for powers—for examples, examples, the power to enact its own indigenous people people’’s rights act and civil service code and to expand Shari’ah courts including appellate courts—were never exercised. exercised.
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In Defense of the Draft Bangsamoro Basic Law
To say that giving such powers as one now finds in the BBL compromises the sovereignty of the state is to deny the powers which the Constitution itself allocates to the autonomous regions. Remember sovereignty is not just about our standing before other states and relations with them—a matter that remains in the hands of the national government. Sovereignty is first and foremost the exercise of the people’s will, and the people’s will operates at different territorial and political subdivisions of the state, including autonomous regions. That is why we have local and regional plebiscites, as well as our law on initiatives and recall. Modern political and legal thinking on devolution, decentralization, and autonomy, autonomy, and the right to self-determination not only of colonies but of indigenous peoples and minorities are all pointing in this direction of a multilayered sovereignty within states, as we can glean from these quotations from authoritative sources: “Sovereignty, like the atom, can be split.” “In modern times, sovereignty is divisible.” Indeed, Madame Chair, Chair, the world wo rld has changed much since the Peace of Westphalia Westphalia was forged in the seventeenth century with its emphasis on state sovereignty. Wee credit the framers of our Constitution for their wisdom in W finding the balance between the sovereignt sovereigntyy of the Philippine state and the sovereignty of the people of the Philippines. We thank them for showing us the manner by which such sovereignty may be shared among the various peoples and groups making up the Philippine Republic. And among these groups of people, among the Filipinos, as we know, know, are the Bangsamoro. Let us give to them their due, even as we ensure the protection of rights and the promotion of welfare of all.
Checks and Balances in the BBL * For ormer mer S ec reta ry Se nen C . Ba c a ni Membe r, G overnment P ea c e Neg otiati otiating ng P a nel for for Ta lks w ith the MI MILF LF
T
o say that there are no checks and balances in the proposed BBL as compared to those existing in the National Government can only be due to a complete misreading of the proposed BBL. In fact, the proposed law that will establish the framework framew ork for the future Bangsamoro Government is replete with so many examples of checks and balances on the powers to be exercised by the new political entity. The proposed BBL in the first place is a classic example of trying to balance autonomy autonomy,, subsidiarity,, and devolution with sufficient internal controls. subsidiarity Overarching the whole concept of checks and balances is the fact that the President will continue to exercise general supervision over the Bangsamoro Government to ensure that national laws are faithfully executed. It is worthy to note that national laws cannot be amended by the Bangsamoro Parliament unless authorized to do so by Congress. Moreover, it is clear in the proposed BBL that reserved powers (both expressed and residual) of the National Government can at anytime be exercised within the Bangsamoro territory without any limitation whatsoever. For example, the Bangsamoro Government’s power to enter into economic agreements and to establish linkages for cultural exchange, economic, and technical cooperation with other countries is subject to the Central Government’s reserved powers over foreign affairs. In addition, the exercise of the concurrent or shared powers by
* This statement was delivered delivered during the Joint Joint Committee Hearing Hearing on SB No. No. 2408 (Bangsamoro Basic Law) by the Committee on Local Government; the Committee on Peace, Unification, and Reconciliation; and the Committee on Constitutional Amendments and Revision of Codes on 26 January 2015 2015 at the Philippine Philippine Senate, Pasay City.
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In Defense of the Draft Bangsamoro Basic Law
the Bangsamoro Government Government can only be done with the coordination and cooperation of the Nat National ional Government. To supplement the work of the Constitutional bodies in the Bangsamoro (Commission on Audit, Civil Service Commission, Commission on Elections, Commission on Human Rights) is the proposed establishment of auditing, civil service, election, and human rights units in the Bangsamoro without prejudice prejudi ce of course to the powers, authorities, and duties of these Constitutional bodies. The The only goal is to assist, and not to replace in any manner whatsoever the powers and authorities of these bodies. The Ombudsman shall have the power to act on erring erri ng Bangsamoro officials. The Supreme Court will continue to exercise the powers of supervision and judicial review over all courts including Shari’ah Courts. Moreover, there are clear statements in the proposed BBL that the Bangsamoro Government will have to adhere to the commitments of the National Government as embodied in international treaties and agreements. The draft law also provides for additional intergovernmental intergovernmental bodies to be established in order to ensure cooperation and coordination between the National and Bangsamoro Governments. These are: 1. The Central Government – Bangsamoro Government Intergovernmental Relations Body to resolve issues on intergovernmental intergovernm ental relations; 2. The Intergovernment Intergovernmental al Fiscal Policy Board that shall address revenue unbalances and fluctuations in regional financial needs and revenue-raising capacity of the Bangsamoro; 3. The Philippine Congress – Bangsamoro Bangsamoro Parliament Parliament Forum Forum for purposes of cooperation and coordination of legislative initiatives; 4. The Bangsamoro Sustainable Development Board to ensure the harmonization of environmental and development plans, as well as to formulate common environmental objectives; and
Checks and Balances in National Government vs. None in the BBL
13
5. The Joint Joint Body for the the Zones Zones of Joint Cooperation which shall shall be responsible for drawing up of policies in the Zones of Joint Cooperation in the Sulu Sea and the Moro Gulf. Also worthy of note is the provision on the possible vote of no confidence against the Government of the Day which can serve as a further check on the performance of the Bangsamoro Government by the duly elected representatives of the Bangsamoro. Another is the full disclosure policy of the Bangsamoro Government of its budget and finances and of bids and public offerings. Regarding public order and safety, there will be a Bangsamoro Police Board which shall perform the functions of the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) in the Bangsamoro. The board shall be part of the NAPOLCOM with the NAPOLCOM ensuring that the Bangsamoro Police Police Board performs its powers and functions within the bounds of its authority. Above all of these controls within and outside the Bangsamoro however,, what is of paramount importance would be the demand of the however governed for complete accountability from those who govern, supported by a strong press and strong civil society organizations. That That way we can further strengthen the democratic institutions that will be established, and ensure the general welfare of the people in the Bangsamoro.
The BBL Fully Recognizes and Preserves the Territorial Integrity of the Republic of the Philippines * J os e Lui Luiss Marti Martin n C. G a s co n, Esq . B oa rd Memb er er,, Human Rig Rig hts Vi Vic ti tims ms Claims B oa rd Memb er er,, 198 1987 7 C ons ti tituti tutiona ona l Co mmi mmiss s ion
T
he proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL), now Senate Bill No. 2408, fully recognizes and preserves the territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. Nothing in the proposed legislative measure is incongruent with the time-honored principle of “territorial integrity” integrity” because the bill, in Article III, Section 1 thereof itself, itself, emphatically and categorically affirms the preservation of the wholeness of the Philippine national territory, to wit: Territory refers to the land mass as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, and the aerial domain above it. The Bangsamoro territory shall remain a part of the Philippines .” .” (emphasis supplied)
This should more than adequately set aside any fear that the BBL would threaten any dismemberment dism emberment of the Philippine Philippi ne territory territor y. The bill clearly guards against any and all possibility of the proposed Bangsamoro territory from being separated from the Philippines—as it unequivocally determines where the Bangsamoro territory shall belong. In plain * This statement was delivered delivered during the Joint Joint Committee Hearing Hearing on SB No. No. 2408 (Bangsamoro Basic Law) by the Committee on Local Government; the Committee on Peace, Unification, and Reconciliation; and the Committee on Constitutional Amendments and Revision of Codes on 2 Feb February ruary 2015 at the Philippine Philippine Senate, Senate, Pasay City.
14
The BBL Fully Recognizes and Preserves the Territorial Integrity … …
15
language, Article III, Section 1 states that whatever may be the final configuration of the Bangsamoro territory; the same shall remain to be part of the Philippines. The word “remain remain”” must be underscored because it evinces a powerful meaning of peculiar significance significanc e of this all-important BBL provision in connection with the inviolability and integrity of our national territory. The verb “remain” is defined in the dictionary as “to continue in the same state state””1 or “to “to continue continu e to be specified.” specified. ”2 The use of the word “remain “remain”” hence imports a dual recognition—on recog nition—onee retrospective (as to origin) and the other prospective (as to the result)—of where and to whom such territory really belongs (i.e., (i.e. , the Philippines and the Filipino Filipino people), that of course include the people of the Bangsamoro. Simply put, the BBL recognizes that—(1) the territories that may eventually comprise the Bangsamoro are originally (retrospectively) already parts of the Philippines; and (2) will continue to be, therefor thereforee prospectively, prospectively, from the establishment establishme nt of the Bangsamoro. Significantly Significantl y, this provision comes without any qualification quali fication or conditionality conditio nality whatsoever. Under Under no circumstances, therefore, therefore, shall the Bangsamoro territory not remain to be part of the Philippines. Evidently, Evidently, this important provision, after all, carries with it such potent and forceful meaning that in our last hearing Mr. Justice Florentino Feliciano had also referred to it as sufficient to dispel any concern in this matter. Thus, it is not merely window dressing. It should be clarified that Article III, Section 1 of the BBL does not, in relation to the powers of the Bangsamoro over its territory, partake of total exclusivity to the Bangsamoro Government. We highlight that within the Bangsamoro territory, the exercise of concurrent and reserved powers by the Central Government shall not be constrained or compromised within the territory of the Bangsamoro. Thus, to the fullest extent of the Bangsamoro’s territory, the Central Government’s authority and jurisdiction shall nevertheless be present and felt. This finds application for instance, when the army, army, the navy and the air force of the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall exercise full authority there as directed by the commander-in-chief and depending on the demands of national security. As to jurisdi jurisdiction ction over the aerial domain, the Bangsamoro will likewise exercise jurisdiction only in so far as the power involved is exclusive. An example of the Bangsamoro’s authority over air space is
16
In Defense of the Draft Bangsamoro Basic Law
similar to the LGU’s jurisdiction under the Local Government Code (Republic Act No. 7160) over the regulation of high-rise buildings by zoning. On the matter of air transportation, specifically, it should be noted that exclusive powers over the same have not been given to the Bangsamoro. As proposed in the BBL, these matters would be determined through the Intergovernmental Relations mechanisms, 3 whereupon we could expect that airside operation will be retained as pertaining to national competencies while landside operations for example, maintenance and management of airports, could be shared or concurrent. The same is true with respect to pollution control, where the extent of coordination and cooperation between the Bangsamoro and Central governments shall be determined through the intergovernmental mechanisms. All of these indicate that there shall be no actual diminution diminuti on or reduction in the powers of Central Government in the Bangsamoro that it already exercises. There There would be, instead, a system of devolution of powers between/from the Central Government to the Bangsamoro under the BBL, consistent with the framework of autonomy ordained under the 1987 Philippine Constitution Constit ution and not beyond it. This cannot be interpreted as a limitation li mitation over the general sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines because it precisely conforms to the very expression of the sovereign will of the people in the Constitution.4 Also, we must recall that what are devolved under the BBL are mere governmentall powers, and not the exercise of sovereignty as such. That governmenta sovereignty sovereign ty still resides in the sovereign Filipino Filipino people from whom all governmental authority emanates.5 Respect for this sovereign will is adequately reflected in the BBL as it categorically states that all powers to be devolved shall be “in consonance with the Constitution.”6 Thus, whatever Congress enacts in the BBL will be undertaken with that in mind. More to the point, we must remember that the source of all the powers that will be delegated to or devolved in the BBL is still the Central/National Government. Therefore, Therefore, the Central Government will certainlyy not become inferior within the Bangsamoro territory certainl territor y. Residual powers remain with the Central Government. The autonomous region cannot rise higher hig her than the source of its authority au thority.. Thus, it is a misplaced notion to believe that the Bangsamoro Government has the authority
The BBL Fully Recognizes and Preserves the Territorial Integrity … …
17
to abrogate or negate national policies. There is nothing in the BBL that empowers the Bangsamoro Government, on its own, to change or disregard the application of national laws within the Bangsamoro territory.. If at all, it will be the BBL itself, a piece of national legislation territory once passed by Congress, that will effectively modify other affected existing national laws of the land in accordance with the doctrine of specificity. Autonomy mandate mandatess that governme governmental ntal powers will be shared, or otherwise clearly delineated as either reserved or exclusive. This, however, does not necessarily imply any specific functional division of powers as commonly seen in “cooperative federalisms.” We are, after all, not establishing a federal government. It should be stressed that in cooperative federalism, the vast majority of competencies are “concurrent” or “shared,” thus requiring a strong representation of the federal units at the central level.7 Also, there is a “functional “function al division divisi on”” of labor in such jurisdictions because there the central level makes policies while the federal units are responsible for implementing them.8 Such is clearly not the case for the Bangsamoro. Under the BBL, one can easily glean that the delineation of powers favors the devolution of powers to the autonomous region (with over fifty exclusive powers), rather than the concurrent or shared ones (only fourteen). Hence, the autonomous region is manifestly not reduced to mere administrative agents of the Central Government. Too, there is no requirement under the BBL for strong representation representation of the Bangsamoro in the Central Government— Government— only adequate Bangsamoro participation in Central Government9 is sought in the BBL and the same is strictly provided as a matter policy, policy, not as a mandate. Neither does the BBL propose a duality type of federalism. As retired Supreme Court Justice Adolf Azcuna previously pointed out, “in the US, the states retain powers unless given give n to the federal government … in our set-up, the unspecified powers are retained by the national government.” This is consistent with Article X, Section 17 of the Constitution, which states: “All powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted by this Constitution or by law to the autonomous regions shall be vested in the National Government.” It is, therefore, false to believe that under
18
In Defense of the Draft Bangsamoro Basic Law
the BBL, there will wil l be a Central Government Governmen t “of “of limited powers.” power s.” This residual clause in the fundamental law is fully adopted in a BBL as the same is being ordained under its Preamble to be consistent with the Constitution. In any case, the fact is, the BBL does not promote or adopt any kind of federalism at all. Full stop . Rather, it creates and establishes an
autonomous region as provided in the Philippine Constitution. The import of Article III, Section 1 indeed gains further legal significance in favor of preserving the territorial integrity of the Philippines when it is read together with the statement of intent in the bill’s proposed Preamble that the BBL shall be In consonance with the Constitution and the universally accepted principles of human rights, liberty, justice, democracy,, and the norms democracy nor ms and standards of international law l aw..
As a matter of interpretation, interpretation, it becomes becomes apparent apparent that the measure measure of what comprises the Philippine national territory under the BBL is no other than the Philippine Constitution, in particular Article I thereof. Perforce, when the BBL mentions that the Bangsamoro territory shall remain a part of the Philippines , it refers to Philippine national territory as defined in Article I of the Constitution, nothing else. As such, the Bangsamoroo territory is evidently an integral part of the national territory Bangsamor of the Philippines as defined in the Constitution, not separate therefrom. This should properly address the concerns raised on the appropriateness of using of the term “territory” (to refer to the territorial breadth of the Bangsamoro autonomous region) or even the reference in the Pr Preamble eamble to the Bangsamoro “ancestral homeland”—since all of these areas shall, in all cases , be subsumed under the fullness of the Philippine national territory. Parenthetically, the Local Government Code (Republic Act No. 7160) itself uses the th e term “territory” to refer to the areas covered by the jurisdiction of the different local government units.10 In the words of Mr. Justice Feliciano (ret.) last hearing, Under Philippine Administrative law, provinces, municipalities, municipal districts, etc., do have defined
The BBL Fully Recognizes and Preserves the Territorial Integrity … …
19
territories as designating the earthly limits of exercises of their legislative and law enforcement authorities. (emphasis
supplied)11
This is the sole import of defining the territory territor y of the Bangsamoro— to repeat, to delimit the earthly bounds of its legislative and law enforcement authorities. As defined in Article III, Section 1 of the BBL, territory pertains to physical (or earthly) realms, not to political ones as mistakenly understood by some. It is, hence, plainly inaposite to refer to other political definitions of the word (e.g., “as a geographical area under the jurisdiction of another country or sovereign power”) when the BBL already supplies us the definition. Finally,, from the point Finally p oint of view vi ew of international inter national law, we are reminded that the principle of territorial integrity remains to be a fundamental and “important part of the international legal order and is enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, in particular in Article Ar ticle 2, paragraph 4.”12 This principle continues to underlie the contemporary rules of international law, law, notwithstandin notwithstandingg significant inroads and challenges to it by the emerging influence of international human rights law, law, including that of the right to self-determination.13 Indeed, international law still affords a central place to [preserving] territorial integrity, even in the context of self-determination.14 This has been interpreted to mean that the principle of territorial integrity exists even within the context the right to self-determination. With respect to the BBL, there have been criticisms raised against the provision of the BBL recognizing recog nizing the Bangsamoro Bangs amoro peoples’ “right “right to self-determination … to chart their political future.”15 Manifestly, these have lost sight of the prevailing principles of international law that, by the incorporation clause, are adopted “as “as part of the law of the land.”16 The BBL’’s recognition BBL recogniti on of the Bangsamoro peoples’ peop les’ right to self-determination self-determi nation is not necessarily opposed to the inviolability of the country’ country’ss territorial integrity.. In fact, under the precise status of the prevailing international integrity legal principles on territoria territoriall integrity and the right to self-deter self-determination, mination, such provision of the BBL can only be interpreted to mean that the Philippines’ territorial integrity takes a central place in the context of the Bangsamoro’s right to self-determination.
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In Defense of the Draft Bangsamoro Basic Law
Speaking of the Bangsamoro people, the definition in the BBL of who the Bangsamoro people are is actually far from the concept of citizenship, contrary to what has been intimated in the last hearing. We We find the analogy decidedly out of place because there is, in fact, nothing in the BBL that allows the denial of any privilege (whether political, social, cultural, or economic) to a non-Bangsamor non-Bangsamoro. o. Conversely, Conversely, it does not unduly privilege only those who would wou ld subscribe to the Bangsamoro identity. Contrary to what has been claimed, the definition of such identity does not function whatsoever “to screen out outsiders from certain privileges of national life.”17 Proof of this can be abundantly found in many provisions of the BBL. On the matter suffrage, we look at Article VII, Section 12 on the qualifications of Members of Parliament and we find there that, among others, the requirement speaks only of “residency” in the Bangsamoro, not identity as a Bangsamoro. The same is true for the qualification to become Chief Minister (Article VII, Section 28) or Wali (Article VIII, Section 3). As to economic privilege, the same non discriminatory policy is found. Thus, in terms of preferential rights to fishing in the Zones of Joint Cooperation, for example, the same is extended not only to the Bangsamoro people but to all other resident fishers in the Bangsamoro (Article XIII, Section 19, paragraph 3 [d]). When we say “residents,” of course that is blind as to cultural or even religious identity. Therefore, under the BBL, anyone and everyone so long as they qualify under the residency rules regardle regardless ss of their subscription to the Bangsamoro identity can enjoy the political and economic privileges that are provided in the law. Lastly, we invite everyone to recall that the very reason for the adoption of the autonomous arrangement is to preclude any separation or secession, that is, to favor internal and not external self-determination. The international support for the peace peac e process is there precisely because of this fundamental premise. In view of the foregoing, we stand firm in our conviction that the BBL fully preserves and maintains the territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
The BBL Fully Recognizes and Preserves the Territorial Integrity … …
21
Notes
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
Dictionary.com Ibid. BBL, Article XIII, Section 31. See 1987 Constitution, Article X, Section 1 and Sections 15-21. 1987 Constitution, Article II, Section 1 Preamble of the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) Tanja A. Börzel and Madeleine Madeleine O. Hosli, “Brussels between Berlin and Bern: Comparative Federalism Meets the European Union.” Working Papers Political Science No. 02/2002 (ISSN 1569-3546), Vrije University. Amsterdam, October 2002. 8. Ibid. 9. See BBL, Article VI, Section 9. 10. See Republic Republic Act no. 7160, 7160, Section 15; Section Section 386; Section Section 442 11. See Statement of Mr. Mr. Justice Florentino Florentino Feliciano delivered orally oral ly during the hearing on 26 January 2015 of the Senate Committee on Constitutional Amendments, joint joint with the Committee on Local Government; Government; presided presided by the Chair Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, among others. 12. International Court of Justice, Accordance with internationa internationall law of the unilateral Declaration of Independence of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (2010), para. 80. 13. Encyclopedia Princetoniesis. 14. Ibid. 15. BBL, Preamble, par. 3 16. 1987 Constitution, Article II, Section Section 2 17. Statement of Mr. Mr. Justice Vicente V. V. Mendoza, submitted to the Senate Committee on Constitutional Amendments entitled “SB no. 2408 Beyond the Power of Congress to Pass.”
Legislation versus Charter Change* J usti usticc e Ad Ad ol olfo fo S . Azc Azc una C ha nc ell ellor or,, P hi hillipp ine J udicial Ac a d em y Retirred As so c ia te J ustice, S upr Reti upreme eme Co ur urtt of the P hi hillippi ppines nes Memb er er,, 198 1987 7 C ons ti tituti tutiona ona l Co mmi mmiss s ion
T
hank you very much, Madam Chair. My submission, Madam Chair, is that of my colleagues and the framers of the Constitutional Commission. We We have taken the stand that there is no need for amending the Constitution in order to effect the autonomous region that is mandated under the Constitution precisely because the Constitution has already mandated it. It is very clear from Article X of the Philippine Constitution that there shall be created this Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The only question really is whether the proposed legislation is within the framework of that provision of the Constitution on the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. One of the objections presented against it is because under the BBL, the form of government is ministerial and, therefore, it goes against the Constitution because under the Constitution, our form of government is presidential. I respectfully submit, Madam Chair, that this is not a correct argument because to start with, the present Constitution of the Philippines is not strictly presidential in form. There There are many features of the parliamentary form of government that have been incorporated in our system, including inclu ding the question hour, the party-list representation, * This statement was delivered delivered during the Joint Joint Committee Hearing Hearing on SB No. No. 2408 (Bangsamoro Basic Law) by the Committee on Local Government; the Committee on Peace, Unification, and Reconciliation; and the Committee on Constitutional Amendments and Revision of Codes on 2 Feb February ruary 2015 at the Philippine Philippine Senate, Senate, Pasay City. City. It has been edited by the author for purposes of this publication.
22
Legislation versus Charter Change
23
and many other features like recall. The framers of the Constitution saw wisdom in having a mixed form of government where you have features of the parliamentary system incorporated incorporate d in our structure of government. Secondly, Madam Chair, what the Constitution requires for the form of government in the autonomous region is simply that it should be elective and representative of the constituent political units. A parliamentary system will fulfill this minimal requirement. Under our Constitution, what is, therefor therefore, e, required of the autonomous region is that it be representative and democratic. And under the BBL, the form of government, although ministerial, is also going to be representative and democratic. Furthermore, Madam Chair, the practice of mixing the legislative and the executive in our local governments is not new. In our local governments,, as they are structured today under existing laws, you have governments the executive in the provincial level—a governor, and a vice governor participating in the parliamentary parliamentar y legislative body of the province which is the provincial board. In the City of Manila, I understand, the vice mayor presides over the council of the city. city. So it is not really an oddity but, in fact, a common occurrence in our country today to have this kind of government where you have the executive and the legislative working together together.. It has also been said that the features of the autonomous region are unconstitutional because it grants a definite territory to the autonomous region. And since territory is an essential element of a state, therefore, to grant a definite territory to the autonomous region is to recognize it as a separate state. I respectfully submit, Madam Chair, Chair, that that is a flawed argument. The essential requisites of a sovereign state are territory, people, government, and sovereignty or independence. It is not enough enou gh to have a definite territory to become a separate state. You You must have independence. And independence is definitely not granted to the autonomous region in this proposed setup. Therefore, even if they have people, they have territory, they have government but absent independence, they cannot be a sovereign state.
24
In Defense of the Draft Bangsamoro Basic Law
Furthermore, Madam Chair, Chair, the territory granted g ranted to the autonomous region here is definitely stated to be still part of Philippine territory. territory. So it is not a separate territory taken out of the Philippine territory but it is just delineated for purposes of governance but still forms part of Philippine territory. There are other features that are admittedly objectionable from the viewpoint of the Constitution such as the police, for instance. Under the Constitution, there can only be one police force, this is the Natividad provision, authored by the late Teodulo Natividad and passed without amendment, that there shall be only one police force in the whole country,, civilian in character, country character, national in scope. I pointed this out to the Philippine panel of negotiators, and they assured me that this will be observed. And if i f it is not, it is up to Congress to make sure that all these features are aligned with the Constitution—a Constitution —a separate COA, separate Civil Service, and separate separat e police force must not be allowed to be really separated from our constitutional bodies because the Constitution does not allow it. So the objectionable features can be remedied by Congress, the essential feature which is an autonomous region that is part of social justice and development of peoples can be retained. One of the objections I was surprised by Madam Chair, was that we would be granting the autonomous region autonomy on matters of education. But, Madam Chair, Chair, educational policy is specifically granted to the autonomous region under the Constitution. Section 20 of Article X, subsection seven states educational policies as among those granted granted to the autonomous region to legislate over. Another objection was that the enumeration of powers given to the autonomous region was too much—fifty-eight against eight—but it is not the number of the powers but the nature of the powers. The powers reserved for the national government are precisely those of an independent state and that is not granted to this autonomous region. Furthermore, Furthermor e, there was an error on the part of one of the speakers against who said that under the proposal, the residual powers, the powers neither granted nor reserved, are given to the autonomous region. That is wrong, Madam Chair. The residual powers are retained by the
Legislation versus Charter Change
25
national government. That is according to the Constitution itself and that cannot be violated by the BBL. I don do n’t think the BBL has a provision to that effect either. So you have powers that are retained by the national government, powers that are shared by both, powers that are exclusive to the autonomous region and any other power not mentioned is a residual power and is with the national government. So, Madam Chair, I submit that the proposed BBL conforms with the Constitution. The MOA-AD that was invalidated by the Supreme Court at the time that I was a member of the court suffered from many defects. One of them was that there was failure of consultation. Consultation is very essential when you try to change the structure of government. That has been remedied in the present setup, as there had been numerous consultations consultatio ns done on this proposed proposed autonomous region. Another feature was the absence of mention of the Constitution. Now,, it is very clear Now clea r that this exercise is and must be in consonance co nsonance with wi th the Philippine Constitution. So there are, I submit, Madam Chair, big differencess between the MOA-AD that was invalidated by the Supreme difference Court and the present proposal. I respectfully reiterate the paper that our colleagues submitted, Madam Chair, supporting the Bangsamoro proposal. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Sovereignty versus Substate* De a n J ul ulk kipl plii Wa d i Ins ti titute tute o f Is Is la mi micc S tud ies , Univers Univers ity o f the P hi hillipp ines Di Dillima n
I
t is an honor to be given the opportunity to share my view in today’s Joint Committee hearing of the Senate on the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL). In the invitation’s guideline provided by the Senate Joint Committee, the resource person is requested to take an affirmative or negative position relative to the draft BBL given four topics to choose from and to identify one topic as a focus of discussion. The The four topics are: (1) Legislation v. Constitutional Change; (2) Checks and Balances in National Government v. None in BBL; (3) Sovereignty v. Substate; and (4) Territorial Integrity vs. Functional Division. I would like to discuss Number 3, “Sovereignty v. Substate” with emphasis on the latter (i.e., substate) in the context of Philippine experience in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. Last Monday (26 January), the Chair of the Philippine panel on the GPH-MILF peace process exhorted this august body to consider the broad and dynamic field of Political Science—not solely the legal construction of Philippine Constitutional Law—as a prism in understanding the BBL, its nature, and the vision it purports purpor ts to entrench known as the Bangsamoro Political Entity. If I may interpret the tone of argument of GPH Peace Panel Chair Prof. Miriam Coronel Ferrer, she is almost making a plea for Congress * This paper was presented during the Senate joint committee on SB No. 2408 (Bangsamoro Basic Law) by the Committee on Local Government Joint; Committee on Peace, Unification, and Reconciliation; and the Committee on Constitutional Amendments and Revision of Codes on 2 Feb February ruary 2015 at the Philippine Philippine Senate, Senate, MindaNews ews on Pasay City. It also appeared in the author’s regular column in MindaN on 23 February Feb ruary 2015. A condensed version was earlier published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on on 22 February 2015 entitled, “Antecedents, Restricting, Possibilities.”
26
Sovereignty versus Substate
27
to use a broader and dynamic scale in weighing the merits (or demerits) of the BBL. It is a scale that is able to harness the tools of political and legal concepts, theories, and principles relative to today’s trend of subnational level governance discourses and development in many parts of the world. One of the recent works on this subject is Markku Suksi’s Substate Governance through Territorial Territorial Autonomy: A Comparative Study in Constitutional Constitutiona l Law of Powers, Powers, Procedures and Institutions (2011). If I quote Ferrer’s Ferrer’s plea and the th e work of Suksi, it does not no t mean that I conspire with her in pushing for particular perspective on the issue of substate and its cases as articulated quite comprehensively by Markku Suksi. Although Althou gh we are friends with wit h Prof. Ferrer Ferrer,, we hardly talk or share views as she is too absorbed with her position as Peace Chair, given the fact, too, that I do not wholly toe the line Office of Presidential Assistant on the Peace Process’s (OPAPP) issues relative to strategic questions of the peace process. It is just that Suksi’s work is readily available on the Internet where any student of Political Science, Public Administration, and Political and Constitutional Law could easily read. But there is another scale that I would like to add as part of a weighing instrument to assess the BBL and its substate proposal. It is the scale of history. Perhaps, the field of history (particularly Filipino/ Moro history) would provide a comprehensive frame together with Constitutional Law and Political Science for our understanding of the issue at hand. The logic in using these three instruments of weighing scale as tools in assessing the draft BBL is obviously to make our judgment dynamic and creative while aware of the longue durée surrounding the political dynamics of constitutional interpretation for, without stating the obvious, even the fundamental law of the land is historically constituted. co nstituted. This means providing us a bigger canvas as we paint our thoughts about an issue of supreme importance. To begin with, allow me to express my thoughts (and this is not to raise myself). myself ). Like many others, we have followed quite persistently the issue of the Mindanao peace process these past several years. In 2000, the year when peace talks between the Estrada Administration and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were in tatters, I published in
28
In Defense of the Draft Bangsamoro Basic Law
the Diliman Review a a paper entitled: “Tier-M “Tier-Making aking and Tier-Changing Tier-Changing in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago (2000).” In that paper, I explored the puzzle regarding the instability of national-local relations between the Philippine government and Moro areas and the futility of what I refer to as tier-making and tier-changing approach that come in the form of military militar y, political, and an d administrative units that were created yet abolished as another one was created and later abolished and so on and so forth. So that, the trend of creating and abolishing tiers continued since the American Ameri can colon colonial ial peri period od until the expan expansion sion of the Aut Autonomo onomous us Regi Region on in Muslim Mindanao in 2001, and possibly, until the entrenchment of the Bangsamoro in 2016. This is not to include small and sometime a d hoc tiers or offices including proposals that were promised by the Philippine government to Moro fronts that never materialized. For historical appraisal, it is worthy to remember that there were nine (9) tiers or military military,, administrative, and ad hoc units in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago that were created and eventually abolished successively during the American colonial period. Some of these were: the Military District of Mindanao and Jolo (created in 1899), the Moro Province Pro vince (created in 1903), the Office of Commissioner for Mindanao and Sulu (created in 1937), and few others. During these past Philippine administrations, there were fourteen (14) tiers created and abolished successively starting startin g with Commission on National Integration (created in 1957), and many others like Mindanao Development Authority (MDA), Ministry of Muslim Affairs (MMA), Southern Philippine Development Authority (SPDA), Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), Southern Philippine Council on Peace and Development (SPCPD), Expanded ARMM, Maglanco-Socsargen Council (Government proposal in 1999), until the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE), a political arrangement in the MOA-AD of 2008. So that, if we count the number of tiers created and abolished successively since the American period until these days including the present ARMM and the proposed Bangsamoro in 2016, there were/are
Sovereignty versus Substate
29
already twenty-four (24) tiers, units or entities. In this regard, it was not surprising when Malacañan declared three or four years ago that the ARMM is a “failed political experiment.” Truth Truth is Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago had been subjected to continuing political experiments for 117 years if we include the critical year of 2016. Before I present my conclusion as to why Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago are subjected to this morass of tier-making and tierchanging, I would argue that the subject of substate presents a relatively new mode of tier-making with its attendant politics with the national government and an d its tendency tenden cy,, as feared by many, to become a gateway for secession, I would like to note another paper that I wrote when the GMA (Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo) Macapagal-Arroyo) administration was in its twilight year after being bruised heavily due to the bungled Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) in 2008 and the Maguindanao Massacre in 2009. It is entitled: “The Philippines and the Bangsamoro Polity: Breaking the Sisyphean Ordeal (2012).” Here, with the added but unimplemented tier called the BJE, while increasing the number of political experiments in the south, I articulated my frustration after years of the peace process during the GMA administration with the government and MILF, only to end up slugging it out once again. I thought the metaphor of Sisyphus fits in explaining the morass wherein whenever the peace process is about to reach the peak of a mountain, the weight of its load becomes too heavy that it would cascade uselessly rendering all peace efforts and other peace dividends for naught; so that, it would take succeeding Philippine administrations to take the cudgels by rolling up u p the stone of the peace process once again. In today’s presentation, I raise two questions: What explains the continuing tier-making and tier-changing in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago? Archip elago? Could the substat substatee project contem contemplated plated in the BBL break the cycle and stabilize Philippine intergovernmental relation in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago? These questions entail much time to discuss and elaborate. For brevity, let me quote the first paper mentioned above:
30
In Defense of the Draft Bangsamoro Basic Law
The main source of instability is anchored on a century of unresolved contestation contestat ion over the political status of Mindanao and Sulu. Moreover, the colonial mixture of Philippine political system that failed to address the “power vacuum” in Mindanao and Sulu reinforces intergovernmental instability. instability. The unitary setup of the Philippine government was a legacy of Spain … Yet, the setup was institutionalized by the “Philippine Commission to facilitate the extension of American Amer ican sov sovere ereignty ignty to the Phil Philippi ippines nes”” inclu including ding Mind Mindanao anao and Sulu. The separation of powers (executive, legislative, and judiciary) was copied from the US. The unitary setup defines the “vertical” division of powers (structure of government) between the national government and local government units while the “horizontal” separation of powers defines the form of government (e.g., presidential or parliamentary). In all indications, the colonial-political mixture is what creates a disjuncture between the “horizontal” “horizon tal” and “vertical” “vertical” relation of powers because, from the point of view of governance, a unitary setup requires a relatively homogenous society while an effective application of separation of powers presupposes a stable system of democracy … As a consequence, it emboldened intergovernmental problem and rendered futile the national government effort of tier-making and tier-changing and further worsened the “power vacuum” in southern Philippines (Diliman Review 2000). 2000).
Despite my rather grim view about the relation of the Philippine government vis-à-vis the Bangsamoro in terms of gaps, especially their historically asymmetrical intergovernmental positions ever since, I thought the concept of substate provides an option where the two fundamental bases of power in a democratic system of polity (i.e., separation of powers and division of powers) could be adjusted in such a way that while the former is made to share power horizontally (e.g., concurrent, exclusive exclusi ve powers) with the Bangsamoro, “structural relation of power” (i.e., division of power in terms of national-local relation) must also be adjusted from the previous strong-executive type to the
Sovereignty versus Substate
31
strong-legislature kind (e.g., parliamentary, ministerial form) to allow the latter to have a subgovernment that does not necessarily have the power of national government relative to the first fundamental source or arrangement of power (i.e., separation of powers), but which is able to have enough power under the division of power (i.e., vertical power) that reflects partly a federal form of government but which still enjoys an autonomous character under a unitary setup of government as in the case of the Philippines. As a clarification, this notion of substate reflects Suksi Suksi’’s definition as that political space of “organizational options which include federalism with its ‘intermediate’ state-level entities, normally distributed over the entire sovereign territory, and also a variety of different territorial autonomy arrangements” arrangements” (2011, 1). Acco Ac cord rdii ng to Su Suks ksi,i, “b “bot othh fe fede dera rall so solu luti tion onss an andd au auto tono nomy my arrangements are used to accomplish the same thing, to bring about the creation of public authority of a devolved nature for territorially circumscribed entities at the substate level.” Suksi’s notion of public authority “is normally the power to make laws, that is, the legislative power or the law-making competence, managed through institutions of self-government.” The need to have such an adjustment from strong executive to strong legislature is in consonance with the essentially and historically asymmetric power relation of the Moros that even the Americans recognized when they organized the Moro Province in 1903. Although the Legislative Council Council of the Moro Moro Province Province which was composed obviously of Moros from different different districts and tribal wards was not as powerful, the explicit recognition recognit ion of the US for such legislature to coexist with a Governor under the Insular Government (headed by Governor General and Philippine Phili ppine Commission) Commiss ion) proves America’s America’s respect on Moro asymmetrical relation during the US colonial administration in the Philippines. Moreover, the dispersal of power under a unitary setup by simply touching on the powers of national government under the separation of power principle or the traditional strong executive approach without adjusting the corollary structure of division of power (e.g., powers
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In Defense of the Draft Bangsamoro Basic Law
in nation-local relation) assumes a symmetrical relation between the national government and the Moros, which, in my view, is responsible for the cycle of tier-making and tier-changing in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. Understandably,, and from the perspective Understandably perspec tive of the State, the traditional traditi onal approach of power dispersal through autonomy using strong-executive approach is favorable to the national government in terms of maintaining national power down the line. However, such an approach rests on the assumption that local areas are relatively homogenous and fully integrated with the national community. But given the political and cultural distinction of Moro society honed by separate history different from Philippine history, history, then the autonomous, integrative, and strong executive approach of power relation is inappropriate as it continuously creates political disjuncture in national-location relation between the two communities (Filipinos and Moros). If such an approach of unitary, strong-executive type is made to persist, it perpetuates patron-client relationship as local or regional executives in Moro areas are usually forced to kowtow to the national government particularly the Executive while rendering local or regional legislature weak and generally underutilized where local executives acting as alter ego of the President President dominates local and regional political system. In this regard, the notion of autonomy and decentralization loses its essential meaning as the fundamental function of the government including the function of legislation legislati on in subnational level that supposedly operates part of the separation of powers (like rule-making, ruleimplementing) fails to fully operate. What happens on the ground thus is a persistence of pseudo-democratic subpolity with institutions and processes undermined by patronage politics, warlordism, and so on. For sure, patronage system, political dynasties, dynastie s, and political bossism are prevalent not only in the south but in the country as a whole. I would contend though that due to the depth of political and cultural asymmetry between Moro society and national community, there are both qualitative and quantitative differences of patron-client relations affecting thus the workings of intergovernmental conditions in the area.
Sovereignty versus Substate
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In this regard, there is a need to adjust the fulcrum of separation of powers structure (horizontal) with the division of power relation (vertical) away from strong-executive type to the strong-legislature one in mid-tier or regional level where check and balances are made to operate not in traditional presidential form where the three branches of government are conceived to be independent and coequal but along parliamentary arrangement where the parliament as legislature minus the judiciary coexists with the executive headed by the Prime Minister or Chief Minister for that matter. The rationale of having the stronglegislature type like a parliament is for real autonomy to be fully realized in regional or local level. The Constitutional question thus is: Can a State with unitary structure and presidential form of government accommodate a tier or “substate substate”” that carries a strong-legislatur strong-legislaturee feature generally understood as a parliamentary or ministerial form of government? I would leave this question for our Constitutional lawyers to argue. My end at this juncture is to articulate the impact of power dispersal through traditional mode of autonomy using strong-executive strong-executi ve approach without making adjustment in the fulcrum of power relation on both separation and division of power that often results in the instability of political and administrative tiers between national government and regional and local government as shown vividly in the continuing political experiments in Moro areas. areas. But if I may express my 25 cents’ worth of view on this matter, Article Artic le 10, Section 15 of the Philippi Philippine ne Constitu Constitution tion provides the creation of autonomous regions with Section 18 underscoring the need to “define the basic structure of government for the region consisting of the executive department and legislative assembly” assembly” without identifying a specific structure and form of government whether whether unitary or federal and whether presidential or parliamentary parlia mentary.. In my humble opinion, such a noncommittal structure and form of government in the autonomous region by the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides space for “Constitutional flexibility” that could be viewed or used as a way out to get rid of the morass of political experiments in Moro areas.
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In Defense of the Draft Bangsamoro Basic Law
By the way, it must be noted that the long political experiment did not only hamper autonomy and democratization in the south; it practically exhausted exh austed national resources burdening thus the State almost perpetually.. Traditionally perpetually Traditionally,, the national impulse i mpulse is to lay the blame on the Moros with their doggedness and tenacity in pursuing their right to selfdetermination. But as Moro fronts like the MILF begin to redefine selfdetermination generally in its internal dimension and not in its external aspects, the government should also be ready to make corresponding recalibrations beyond the traditional approach of autonomy autonomy.. At this point, I would like to leave this major constit constitutional utional questi question on and address the fear of some that the BBL may serve as a gateway for secession of the Bangsamoro. Agreeably,, this fear is not necessarily unfounded. The draft BBL Agreeably is not simply a political or legal document. The BBL is a vision of possibilities whose tendency could tread in many ways. One of the possibilities may be captured with this question: Given that the fulcrum of power in the Bangsamoro contemplated contemplated in the BBL would change from the Executive (headed by the Regional Governor) to the Parliament which, with some surety, surety, could evolve into difficulty for the President to control its sixty members, what if the Bangsamoro Parliament becomes too nationalistic in its orientation and too demanding or protective of its power power,, while unyielding with its position where the situation could possibly reach a point where there would be polarization of positions between the National Government and the Bangsamoro Government? While the BBL provides that the supervisory power power of the Pr President esident overarches on various Bangsamoro political and military entities with the attendant intergovernmental bodies, Congress-B Congress-Bangsamoro angsamoro Parliament Forum and subconstitutional bodies as venues to resolve possible tension between the National Government and an d the Bangsamoro, I would say, say, in fact, I should be frank, these are not enough to ward off the possibility of Moros’ growing appetite for secession through the Bangsamoro Government. Like any politics, Bangsamoro politics, by that time,
Sovereignty versus Substate
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remains a terrain of possibilities. But for us to fail to distinguish a phantom or ghost out of such possibilities as if they were real would be to grip us in fear before we realize that, on its flipside, the BBL can be viewed too as a key in addressing in a rather different way the political experiments in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. At this point, what I would like to point out in order to avoid the risk of polarization mentioned is to raise a basic postulate that may be captured with what I indigenously call a tambusah or knapsack metaphor. It is akin to a natural law or common sense that as one increases the load of power unto a bag, it is i s necessary to strengthen the ties that bind so they th ey won wo n’t snap altogeth altogether er.. In other words, to avoid the Bangsamoro from becoming a gateway for secession, the process of power dispersal distributed along the division of power structure must correspondingly be countered not simply through the President’s power of supervision and the various intergovernmental bodies as such bodies could also be “politicized” when push comes to shove. Moros should be able to identify with the national aspiration through ample representation in major branches of government as these remain the critical sources of power that determine the working of the separation of power principle. This way the fundamental basis or structure of national power is fully utilized not simply as source of empowering the Bangsamoro Bangsamoro with optimum potential of autonomy called substate extended to them but as a guarantee in making them glued to the Republic and thus ascertaining the country’s territorial integrity remains intact. Finally,, as the BBL is faced with serious challenge Finally chal lenge with the so-called so-ca lled Fallen 44 tragedy in Mamasapano, Maguindanao Maguindanao (on 25 January), the onus is on the MILF and the whole branches of government including the legislators. Like Sisyphus, they face the grand task to roll up the BBL stone even more doggedly; and, with precious time ticking, they could cou ld not afford to succumb to despair and helplessness, as they are just a distance away the mountaintop.
Let Reason and Facts Sway Our Opinion, Not Deeply Held Biases * and Mistrust Atty tty.. Anna Anna Ta rha ta S . B a s ma n Head, G P H Pea ce P a nel Lega l Tea m
ssalamu alaykum wa rahmatullah wa barakatuh.
AThe past weeks have taken a toll on the peace process. Public opinion, which a couple of months ago was overwhelmingly positive and in favor of our milestones in the negotiating table, has generally turned against it. Sincerity and commitment are constantly questioned. Timelines and deadlines have been reset. The BBL, decommissioning, and other aspects of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro are under even stricter scrutiny. The past weeks have taken a toll on our dynamics as a multicultural Filipino society. Naiveté has perhaps made some of us believe that we were slowly achieving national reconciliation and understanding only to find out that division was still brimming on the surface just waiting for a trigger to explode. But more tragically, the past weeks have taken a toll on the lives of the families, friends, and loved ones of the sixty-five or sixty-seven Filipinos who died on that fateful day in Mamasapan Mamasapano. o. Calls for justice abound. And rightfully so. Every single one of them deserves no less than to have those responsible held accountable for the loss of lives. Let us call for justice but not prejudge. * This opening statement was delivered during the Media Roundtable on the Bangsamoro Basic Law held at Pearlmont Hotel, Cagayan de Oro City, on 21 February 2015.
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Let Reason and Facts Sway Our Opinion, Not Deeply Held Biases …
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Let reason and facts sway our opinion, not deeply held biases and mistrust. Let us also not view this incident in isolation. The reality of the fragility of the security situation in a conflictaffected area is i s precisely that—a t hat—a reality. We offer the Bangsamoro Bangs amoro Basic Law not as a be-all-and-e be-all-and-end-all nd-all solution to the decades-long conflict but as a crucial step towards the right direction—the direction direction of recognizing historical injustices, the need to address them, and only then to move on. We offer the BBL as a means of establishing a regional government with the authority to craft and implement government policies that are closer and more responsive to the peculiar needs of these specific communities. We offer the BBL as a step towards normalizing the situation on the ground, where law and order prevail not because of fear of military might but because of the general sense of belongingness and empowermentt without the need to use arms. empowermen This step definitely involves not only the parties to the agreement, not only the negotiators, not only the various peoples living within the Bangsamoro, but the entire country. If there is one thing that came out right from all these, it is that we are given the chance to introduce to the public consciousness the roots of the conflict—the horrors suffered not only in the hands of foreign colonizers but also those in power thereafter. Indeed, voices to this effect have always been weak but they are getting stronger by the day. Wee offer the BBL as an essent W essential ial tool towa towards rds giving the Bangs Bangsamoro amoro something that is guaranteed in international law and reiterated in our Constitution—their right to self-determination within the bounds of our Supreme Law. By all means review the BBL. Make it stronger and less susceptible to judicial nullification. nulli fication. Let our lawmakers come up with a BBL that will stand constitutional scrutiny and address the legitimate grievances grievanc es of the Bangsamoro. We We remain confident that our legislators legis lators will not shirk from this duty. The events of late also provide us the opportunity to review and recheck our perspective. Wee have to stop thinking of the BBL as a reward to the MILF W MILF,, a prize they earned after negotiating with the Government for seventeen
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In Defense of the Draft Bangsamoro Basic Law
long years. We need to realize that the BBL is a government action, a legislation, that is due all Moros, all Lumads, all Christian settlers, all Filipinos in conflict-affected areas who are tired of the status quo, who are tired of living their lives awaiting the next armed skirmish—whatever the trigger may be—that will leave them IDPs (internally displaced persons), out-of-school youths, orphans, widows, or worse, dead. We should start recognizing that taking away the BBL is not a punishment to the MILF but a disservice to all the Filipinos who have offered their lives for peace in Mindanao—the Minda nao—the forty-four forty -four from the SAF, SAF, the eighteen from the MILF, the three or five civilians, and the 120,000 nameless others all crying cr ying out for justice j ustice and peace in i n the Bangsamoro. We We should not further add to the statistics. Thank you very much.
Privilege Speech on the Commemoration of the 1968 Jabidah Massacre Hon. Ho n. S itti Dj Djaa lia A. Tur uraa b in-Ha ta ma n Representative, Party List – Anak Mindanao (AMIN), House of Representatives
B Mr. Speaker, distinguished colleagues, honorable members of ismillah ir-Rahman ir-Raheem.
the House of Represe Representatives, ntatives, ladies and gentlemen, Assalamu alaikum Warahmatullahi taala Wabarakatuh . Good afternoon. “Over the last eight years as a result of the so-called Muslim Mini War W ar in the the Philippines, more than hundred thousand Filipino Muslim Muslimss have lost their lives, over two hundred fifty thousand have come as refugees in the neighboring Sabah State of Malaysia, and more than one million have been displaced and rendered homeless…” These words, ladies and gentlemen, are not new. In fact, they are not mine. These were from a speech given by Nino Ninoyy Aquino in Jeddah in May 1981—13 years after the Jabidah Massacre, which happened March 18, 1968. Today Today is its 47th Year Year Commemoration. Again I quote: On the other side, according to President Marcos himself, about ten to 11,000 thousand Filipino soldiers have been killed over the last eight years as a result of the battle in the Southern Philippines … the Philippine government under *
This speech was delivered during 47th Commemoration of the Jabidah massacre held on 18 March 2015 in Corregidor Island with the theme, “ Baliktanaw sa Kasaysayan Kasaysay an Tungo Tungo sa s a Pagkamit ng Tunay Tunay na Kapayapaan .” The event was organized by the ALL-OUT PEACE Network and the Office of Rep. Sitti Djalia A. TurabinTurabinHataman.
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In Defense of the Draft Bangsamoro Basic Law
President Marcos calls the Muslim fighters as rebels, he calls President them outlaws, he calls them insurrectionists, and he calls them secessionists or far worse—traitors to the Philippines. The Muslims on the other hand see themselves as patriots, as holy warriors, birth right of self-determination from infidel attacks. It is most unfortunate that Filipinos are fighting against Filipinos today.
These words, uttered thirty-four thirty -four years ago, ring rin g true to this very ver y day. day. So we ask, why? What did we miss? What have we not learned? From Fr om 2002 to 2013 alone—prior to the signing of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro in 2014—3.5 million Filipinos were displaced, a large majority concentrated in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Mindanao. 3.5 million Filipinos Filipinos—that —that is more than twice the population of the city of Manila. Must we wait for another thirty-four years, hundreds of thousands more dead Filipinos and millions more homeless and traumatized by war? Wee need peace and we need it now. W now. We, We, who have have long been living in fear and conflict. We, We, who are more familiar with the sounds of guns in our fields than the sounds of bells in our schools; we, who are more experienced in building tents in evacuation areas than building decent homes in our communities. Wee need peace, we need it now W now,, and this peace we hold in our hands, honorable members of this august body. Perhaps, for many of us legislators, and for majority of our fellow Filipinos, the Bangsamoro Basic Law is just a piece of legislation. But for us, the Bangsamoro people, this is the key to our aspirations, the recognition of our rights and identity, an acknowledgement of the historical injustices committed against us as a people, a recognition of our history and heritage, an acceptance of who we are and that we do not need to give up our identity to belong to this nation, that we are as much Filipinos as any other Filipino. This is what the BBL is to us. It is a product of foremost, seventeen years of negotiations between the Government of the Philippines and
Privilege Speech on the Commemoration of the 1968 Jabidah Massacre
41
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, and second, because it seeks to preserve and build on the gains of the previous peace agreements, the BBL contains almost 40 years of peace talks. But even as such, we know it is not perfect and that as legislators, it is our duty and responsibility to scrutinize every line, every word, every letter of the proposed law. law. By all means, let us do that. Our only prayer is for us to not lose sight of what this piece of legislation is all about—an integral component of a peace process, an enabling law towards the realization of a peace agreement. Thus, our earnest appeal, to remain consistent with the spirit of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro. Yes, Y es, we understand the anger after Mamasapan Mamasapanoo and we are one with the nation in calling for justice for all the victims, including the innocent civilians, civ ilians, most especially especi ally,, the 8 year old girl, Sarah Panangolan Panangolang, g, who died in the same incident. Justice is due to every soul, regardle regardless ss of faith, or sex, or age, or line of work. But must we choose between Justice and Peace? Must Must we give up one in favor of the other? Is there no way we can give Justice to all who claim it and still sti ll give Peace to those tho se who seek it? i t? Can’t Justice and Peace come together, especially when this Peace is also in response to the decades of and continuing injustices committed against those who yearn for it? Some of us say, say, because of Mamasapano, Mamasa pano, we must give up u p the BBL. Napakadali pong sabihin, ngunit napakahirap pong pakinggan at tanggapin Napakadali paraa sa amin na halo par haloss buong buhay ay inala inalayy na sa usapin usapingg pangka pangkapayap payapaan aan na siyang nagbunga ng BBL. I started as a peace worker in 1997, then as a
student activist. activi st. Five children after, after, we are now about to see a conclusion conc lusion to the peace talks, only to be hostaged by an incident which is neither our fault nor something we asked for. Some say because of Mamasapano, we must give up the BBL, because the MILF cannot be trusted. I am not an MILF Your Honor, I cannot speak in their behalf. But allow me to speak as a Moro Filipino. September 2008, during the Holy Month of Ramadhan, the Mandi family were onboard onboard one of the boats ferrying civilians who left
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In Defense of the Draft Bangsamoro Basic Law
their village upon seeing military planes hovering above them. With their parents, were the Mandi children: Aida, seventeen; Bailyn, ten; King, eight; Dayang, six; and Faiza, one year old. All of them died, together with their father, when their boat was hit by a rocket from one of the planes of the Philippine Air For Force. ce. This was in Datu Salibu, Maguindanao. As a Moro, I ask, was there a nationwide demand for justice for them? Was there a call to stop the peace talks because the Philippine government cannot be trusted based on the actions of some of its troops? I ask, magkaiba po ba ang halaga ng buhay nila sa buhay ng iba nating kababayan? Sila, na mga inosenteng sibilyan, at walang sinumpaang Their only fault was to be in the tungkuling paglingkuran ang bayan? Their
wrong place at the wrong time, and yet, only a few human rights and peace advocates were interested to know their story and seek justice for them, which to this day, has not been served. As a Moro, Moro, I ask, will we, as a people, people, be made accountable accountable for the Mamasapano incident? Will we be held responsible for what some of us think the MILF did? Yes, Y es, the BBL is a product of the peace process between the GPH and the MILF, MILF, but what it contains co ntains is the aspirations asp irations of the Bangsamoro Ban gsamoro people, and not solely the interests of the MILF MILF.. Although we were not in the formal structures of negotiation, we as peace workers and advocates of the Bangsamoro people’s right to self-determination have ownership of the BBL. It is an ownership we claim cl aim regardless of what wha t the MILF or the GPH or whoever thinks or says so. The Bangsamoro Basic Law is not just j ust about the th e MILF. MILF. It is about us. That is why, why, when we hear questions question s like, “Do they have the capacity capac ity to run a regional government? Are you ready for democracy? How can we entrust such and such to them?,” these questions are not only directed to the MILF Your Your Honors, but bu t also to us, Moro members member s of this august augus t body, us, whom you all refer to as your esteemed colleagues. The Bangsamoro Basic Law, as contemplated in the Comprehensive Comprehensi ve Agreement is not a solution that will only temporarily temporarily stop the bombs
Privilege Speech on the Commemoration of the 1968 Jabidah Massacre
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and the bullets. More than anything, it is about us trying to create a solution that will allow us to live alongside each other peacefully, while working towards our political, economic, social and cultural development, the realization of our right to self-determination. It is not just another piece of legislation. l egislation. We We can have all the brilliant bril liant lawyers argue as to the legal provisions and their interpretations, interpretations, but we pray that we also consider, how much it means to us as a people, the historical perspective of the Bangsamoro struggle it seeks to address. Kilalanin ninyo po ang Bangsamoro, kilalanin ninyo po kami. k ami. Now more than ever, ever, we call c all for a deeper understanding of the Bangsamoro people and their cause, for the greatest injustice injusti ce we legislators can do, is to enact or not enact a law l aw,, for a people we do not know, we did not care to know. know. Lastly, allow me to humbly remind all of us, that enacting the BBL will not give rise to the Bangsamoro regional government. The decision of the people will. As legislators, our duty is to deliberate and enact the best law we can offer them, a law that will best serve the interest of everyone, not just the Bangsamor Bangsamoroo and Mindanao but the whole country and our people. But at the end of the day, it will be them who will have the final say, whether or not to accept the law we passed. But to end it now, to not enact the law, is to decide for them and deny them that opportunity to make the decision. Yesterday Y esterday,, the Honorable Speaker Fe Feliciano liciano Belmonte and other members of this House, met with the delegates of the Basilan Young Leaders Program. They were asked: What do they think of those who say the BBL is i s not the answer to the Muslim Mindanao problem. One young woman in her early twenties stood up and said, “Taga-Basil aga-Basilan an po ako, taga roon. Siguro po kung may nakakaalam kung ano ang makabubuti o hindi para sa amin, kami po ‘yun.” Another young man stood up and
said, he himself was a victim of the armed conflict caught in a crossfire, and after narrating his story asked, “ Ano po ba ang mawawala sa inyo kung ibigay n’yo sa amin ang kapayapaan? ” Sana, lahat tayo, ay magkaroon ng pagkakataong marinig sila . Listen. Hear.. And so as I end my message, I appeal to everyone, to please, just Hear
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In Defense of the Draft Bangsamoro Basic Law
listen and let us allow ourselves to absorb what each is saying, without the need to urgently respond or ask, just allow our words to sink in until it reaches our hearts. And this time, inste instead ad of just hear hearing ing ourse ourselves, lves, may I ask each one of us to listen, to these people, men, women and children of Maguindanao, displaced by the recent conflict in their homeland. Sana po, sila, hindi kaming mga politiko o ang mga rebolusyonaryo ang maalala natin sa tuwing pinag-uusapan ang Kapayapaan para para sa Bangsamoro. Bangsamoro.
Framers of the 1987 Constitution Support Bangsamoro PREAMBLE : In a first formal meeting since the drafting of the 1987 Charter, former members of the Constitutional Commission forged a consensus on the issue of Bangsamoro. Representing the unanimous sentiment of fourteen of the eighteen surviving members of the 1986 Constitutional Commission (four of us are either bedridden or could not be reached) out of the original forty eight, this Statement on the Bangsamoro deals with the vision, spirit, and the core principles behind the provisions on autonomous regions which to our mind constitute the essential constitutionality of the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law. I.
Our P os iti tion on
The importance of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region to the future of our country is unprecedented both as an unfulfilled promise and as a model of equitable autonomy. Wee fully support the creation of the Bangsamoro Autonomous W Region. Wee believ W believee that a new organic law is necess necessary ary to fulfill the vision and spirit that guided the constitutional provisions on autonomous regions since RA 6734 and RA 9054 have clearly not gone far enough to give life to the concept of autonomy for Muslim Mindanao as envisioned by the Constitution. Wee were aware in 1986 that we were imperfect instruments W instruments of the sovereign will of our people But however imperfect our perceptions then or our fading memories today, recurring questions on the “constitu constitutionality” tionality” of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) and of the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) lead us to offer our insights.
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In Defense of the Draft Bangsamoro Basic Law
II. B a ngs a mor moro o is is a bo ut the de vel velopment opment of peopl people, e, not not a bo ut the c ons ti tituti tutiona ona lity o f w or ord ds
The core principle of the 1987 Constitution in mandating a special status for the autonomous regions is the human development of the people of Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras. Hence, the public conversation should not be about semantics but about people—their needs, their aspirations, their choices—and about empowering them with the environment and institutional framework for social justice. Social justice that calls for genuine social change is the central theme of the 1987 Constitution; and here, it is broader in scope and intent than in the 1973 and the 1935 Constitutions. An interpretation of any relevant provision of the Constitution that results in war and abject poverty would be contrary to its intention. During the deliberations of the Commission, the testimony of an old man from the Cordilleras is instructive on the real issue that should be considered: We asked government for a teacher We teacher,, it did not give us one, we asked for help to repair our road, it did not send us any, any, we asked for a doctor, it did not send us one. Instead government men came to build a dam and sent in the Philippine constabulary and the army. army. This—we did not ask for.
It is a simple statement but one that has far-reaching implications on public policy—the people of the Cordilleras and of Muslim Mindanao Mindanao do not want war. They want human development, and they want to be heard. And the government needs to listen. This is mandated by a new provision in the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making. The 2005 Philippine Human Development Report entitled “Peace, Human Security and Human Development” validates the context and vision of the Constitution. It discusses human development in all its dimensions, with the following excerpts of the Report:
Framers of the 1987 Constitution Support Bangsamoro
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Development is about people and about freedom—from fear, from want, from humiliation and prejudice. It is about the security of real people and not of a state or a regime. It goes beyond the material benefits of an end to armed conflict, and care must be taken not to reduce it to a question of money or of economics. Nor can we delimit the Muslim situation as a “Mindanao issue” because it is a human development issue that touches all Filipinos. It’s also about the non-monetary cost of displacement, diaspora, and discrimination that lead to a breakdown in the social cohesion of communities, and ultimately of national solidarity. Rather than hardship alone, the sense of deprivation, injustice, and indignity lie at the heart of armed conflict. Often, not even the most abject conditions by themselves cause grievances, much less revolutions. The revolutionary argument is that deprivation and indignity can be relieved, injustice remedied, and national cohesion achieved only by pursuing resolutely some promised alternative. People People must perceive and be convinced that something somethin g “higher” and “better” than their present condition is possible. III. The la la rg er c onte xt of the CAB CAB a nd B B L
Human development development is a noble end in itself. But the larger context of the CAB and the proposed BBL is our failure to effectively address the longest running insurgency and the development of our peoples, especially those of Muslim Mindanao. Excerpts from a paper sent to the Constitutional Commission in 1986 briefly describes that perspective: Autonomy is an expression of the Bangsa Bangsa Moro’ Moro’s conviction of its being a viable alternative to separation…. The Bangsa Moro is historically and culturally a distinct and separate nation…. and the political fusion with the Christian majority is workable only under a framework of political autonomy which shall allow the full flowering of the genius of Bangsa Moro in the context of his Islamic culture.
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In Defense of the Draft Bangsamoro Basic Law
The full flowering of the genius of a people is human development . And
it needs a place of its own because it is a basic human right. Both sovereignty and property are premised on exclusion. That leaves us with a problem. How do we reconcile our needs and our borders?” If all human beings are free and equal, then each person is entitled to belong somewhere and to obtain the things they need to live and to be free. If people cannot obtain what they need where they are, or if they have no place where they are entitled to be, then our exclusion of them denies their humanity.”
The full flowering of Bangsamoro is assured if their leaders from a long line of heroic resistance to colonization can believe that Bangsamoro, with meaningful self-determination within the framework of the Republic, has a future and they can help create that future. IV. S oc ia l J us ti ticc e unde r the 1987 1987 C ons ti tituti tution on
The flagship provision is Article XIII, Section 1 which states: The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good. To this end, the State shall regulate reg ulate the acquisition, acquis ition, ownership, owners hip, use, and disposition of property and its increments.
While all the ramifications ramifications of social justice cannot be fully discussed, discussed, the provision clearly decrees the removal of cultural cu ltural inequities. Social justice in the 1987 Constitution is not just about negative rights to be protected such as civil and political rights in the United States Constitution and in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Nor is it limited to “equal opportuni oppo rtunity ty.” .” It is also about abou t
Framers of the 1987 Constitution Support Bangsamoro
49
affirmative action and the attainment of desirable social and economic outcomes. It is about the development and the liberation of people. Especially the poor and the indigenous peoples who are being left behind because of an often undue focus on growth per se, on market mechanisms which are never perfect and have no moral limits, and on deference to the interests interests of the rich and the powerful in social legislation, jurisprudence and program implementation. implementation. V. C los ing the the g a p be tw ee n la w a nd justi usticc e
International Law is not an iron law imposed imp osed by a supra-body above all nations that disallows interpretations of words and language to fit the diverse situations of individual nations. Wee are not restricted W restricted from defining defining Bangsamoro Bangsamoro as an integral integral and permanent part of the Philippines, which is sui generis descriptive of the historical fact that it is the “homeland” of Filipino citizens with institutions of governance that conform with our Constitution. And our decision, rooted in its own history, can become part of “international law” upon its approval in a plebiscite of those affected by the creation of Bangsamoro, and by its acceptance by the community of nations. According to a learned justice of our Supr Supreme eme Court, the whole development of law is about closing the gap between law and justice, Tracing the changing chang ing jurisprudence jurispru dence on human rights ri ghts from the infamous Dred Scott 1847 Supreme Supreme Court ruling that blacks are inferior to whites, to the 1896 Plessy promulgation of “separate “separate but equal doctrine,” and to the 1954 Brown decision which finally closed the gap, he concludes: Historicall y, the gaps between law and justice have been closed Historically either through force of arms or through force of reason. This constant struggle to close the gaps through reason and the legal processes may be tedious but this is the t he only way to avoid a bloody closure of the gaps between law and justice. This is the only guarantee to maintain peace in our land.
Reason tells us that a Bangsamoro Autonomous Region can close the centuries-old gap between law and justice and that we are on the cusp of a historic opportunity to make it happen.
50
In Defense of the Draft Bangsamoro Basic Law
The negotiations on a Bangsamor Bangsamoroo peace agreement have dragged on for seventeen years. The Aquino government committed itself to bring the peace process to fruition and has earned the trust of the Bangsamoro people that it will stay the course. We must bring about that fruition, not because it is the will of one man, but because it is the shared vision of a nation. The efforts and sincerity of both panels are demonstrated by the broad consultations that were conducted, by the explicit requirement in the BBL that the new organic law should be in conformance with the Constitution, and the unequivocal statement that the Bangsamoro territory shall remain part of the Philippines. A new organic law is the second of a two-stage process mandated by Article X, Section 18 and is the proper subject of the Supreme Court power of judicial review. The CAB is equivalent to the first stage of that process. VI. The pric pric e of pe a c e
The story of how the Israel-Egypt Peace Agreement of 1978, despite despit e its acknowledged shortcomings, at least restored peace to their borders that lasts to this day, exemplifies what ultimately counts in a peace agreement: Afterr thirt Afte thirteen een days of nego negotiat tiations ions brok brokere eredd by then Pr Presid esident ent Jim Jimmy my Carter of the United States, Israel Prime Minister Begin refused to sign the Agreement already signed by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, primarily because it called for the return of certain annexed territories to Egypt which he had said was nonnegotiable: There was a stalemate. The three, by now tired and emotionally drained, were about to depart without any peace accord. As President Carter and Prime Minister Begin were about to depart they remembered that they had earlier agreed to sign photographs ph otographs for each other’s other’s families. They met on the front porch of Prime Minister Begin’s cabin for the signing. President Carter asked for the names of the children to make the signing more personal and Prime Minister Begin reciprocated. Then President Carter decided to show the photographs of his grandchildren describing the personality p ersonality
Framers of the 1987 Constitution Support Bangsamoro
51
of each; Prime Minister Begin did likewise. As they looked at the pictures, tears filled their eyes. What type of world would their grandchildren grow up in? Prime Minister Begin returned to his cabin and re-emerged after five minutes asking to look at the peace proposal once again. This is peace-making without borders and self-limiting mental models .
But there is always a price to pay for any worthy vision. Sadat was assassinated by disgruntled elements of the military in 1981 but not before he and Begin were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. VII. Wha Wha t o ur pe o pl plee w a nt
The decision on the Bangsamoro will ultimately rest on what the people want of our country. And what the deliberations and the overwhelming vote in the plebiscite for the Constitution tell us is that democratic tic society where peace and justice they dream of a free people in a democra reign. It was clearly a vision borne of EDSA—an extraordinary event in our history because it was the coming together of ordinary people from all walks of life to peacefully regain their freedom. The challenge of the BBL presents to us another chance at national politi cs and incandescence . It is within our reach. Let us set aside partisan politics
stop the urge to exhibit our ability to find nuances of legalism that can delay,, or worse, derail the process, feeding on the cynicism and playing delay on the fears in the national psyche that are more reflex reaction than reasoned response. Former Speaker and Commissioner Laurel Jr. described the new Constitution as the imprisonment of the past and the unfolding of the future. It has been twenty-seven years since it was approv approved ed by our people but we are still living in the mass poverty, poverty, gross inequalities, inequali ties, and cultural cultur al inequities of the past, and the promise of genuine social change has not unfolded. There is no better way to demonstrate out commitment to peace and development than by giving the Bangsamoro people the opportunity to create a higher and better future for themselves than
52
In Defense of the Draft Bangsamoro Basic Law
what they have. This calls for courageous statesmanship from our leaders and the generosity of spirit of a united nation. In turn, the challenge to the Bangsamoro people is to demonstrate the same commitment by treating other indigenous peoples and uniting other Muslim communities with magnanimity magnanimit y and statesmanship. In this manner, Bangsamoro can be a model for us to do the same for the rest of the country and thereby build together a more just and peaceful nation.
Nieva , Those who are bedridden or could Those could not be reac reached hed: P onc ia no L. Be nna ge n, Teresa F. Nieva Florenz Fl orenz D. Rega la do , a nd Napo leon G . Ra ma (4) 4).. Munoz noz -Pa lma , Yusup Yusup R. Abub Abub a kar kar,, In memoriam of those who are no longer longer with us: C ec ilia Mu Ahma d Domo ca o Al Alonto, J os e F. F. S. B engz on J r., Li Lino O. Brocka, J os e D. Ca lde ron, Crispino Crispino M. de Ca str stro, o, Rustico Rustico F. de los Reyes, J os e C . Co la yco, Roberto R. Conc epcion epcion,, Vi Vicente B . Foz, S erafin V. C . G ui uing ng ona , Al Albe rto M. K. K. J a mi mirr, J os e B . Laurel J r.. Eulog Eulog io R. Lerum, Reg a la do E. Ma Ma a mbo ng, Teod ul ulo o C . Na Na ti tivi vida da d, J os e N. Noll Nolled ed o, Ambrosio Ambrosio B. P a dil dillla , B la s F. Ople, Mi Minda Lu Luzz M. Quesa da , C irilo A. Rigo Rigo s, Fr Fraa nci ncisc sc o A. Ro dri drigo go , Dec oroso R. Ro sa les , J os e E. S ua rez, Lor Lorenzo enzo M. S umul umulong ong , C hr hriis ti tine ne O. Ta n, G reg ori orio o Ti Tings on, Efren Efren B . Trena s , and Lugum I. Uka (30).
Framers of the 1987 Constitution Support Bangsamoro
53
Notes
1. RCC, Volume III, August 11, 1986, page 172. 2. “The right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged….” (Article XIII, Section 16). 3. RCC, Volume III, August 11, 1986, page 184. 4. “Titles of Nobility: Poverty Poverty,, Immigration and Property in a Free and Democrati Democraticc Journal al of Law, Law, Property Property,, and Society (August Society,” by Joseph William Singer. Journ (August 2014). 5. Excerpts from a speech of Supreme Supreme Court Justice Justice Antonio Carpio during the regional convention of Mindanao lawyers on Nov November ember 20, 2007. 6. 13 Days in September by Lawrence Wright (2014). World: A Guide to Reaching Twenty-First Twenty-First Century Listeners 7. Preaching to a Postmodern World: by Graham Johnston (pages 143–44) 143–44 ) which cites President Carter’ Ca rter’ss Keeping Faith as the source.
Appendix
11
C ommo n Myt yth h s on th the B B L Deb un unk king lies . J ust fa c tua l.
MYT MY TH #1 That the B a ngs a mor moro o w ill be a n indepe indepe ndent sta te se pa ra te from from the P hi hillippines, w ith its its inha b ita nts ha ving ving a c iti tize ze ns hi hip p d iff fferent erent from from the res t of the Filipinos.
FACT The B a ngs a moro w ill not b e a n indep indep ende nt s ta te. It It w ill be a n a utonomous reg ion tha t w ill repl eplaa ce the Autonomous Autonomous Re g ion in Mus lim Mi Mind nd a na o (ARMM RMM)). The The B a ng s a mo ro w ill rema in pa rt o f the te rritory of the Rep ubli ublicc of the P hi hillippin ppines es a nd its inha b ita nts a re Fil Filipi pino no c iti tize ze ns . Arti ticc le III, S ec ti tion on 1 of t he B B L (HB (HB 499 4994/ 4/S S B 240 2408) 8) provi provid d es that, “ Terr erriitory refers refers to the la la nd m a s s a s w el elll a s the ma riti time, me, terres terr es tr triia l, fluvi fluviaa l a nd a lluvi uviaa l do ma ins , a nd the a eri eriaa l do ma in a bo ve it. it. The Bangsamo ro territory shall remain a part of t he Philippine .”
Box 1. Creat Creating ing the Bangsamoro Bangsamoro is provided for in the the Constitut Constitution ion “There sha ll be c rea ted autonom ous regions in “There in Muslim M indanao and in the consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical Cordilleras a rea s s hari haring ng c ommo n a nd distinctiv distinctivee histo histo rica l a nd c ul ultur turaa l her heriita ge , ec onomic a nd s oc ia l structur structures es , a nd o ther rel releva eva nt cha ra cte ristics w ithi thin n the Fra Fra mew ork of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the R epub lic of the P hi hillippines.” Article X, Section 15, 1987 Constitution
57
58
In Defense of the Draft Bangsamoro Basic Law
MYT MY TH #2 Tha t the B a ngs a moro ide ide nti ntity ty is is impo s ed on a ll inha bitants in the B a ng s a mo ro a rea s irres pec ti tive ve of their their s oc io-cul o-cultur turaa l a nd reli relig ious a ffi ffini nity ty and ancestry.
FACT The propo propo s ed B B L pr provi ovide de s tha t “thos e w ho a t the time time of conquest and colonization were considered natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago and its adjacent islands including Palawan, and their descendants, whether of mixed or of full blood, shall have the ri right to ide nti ntify fy thems thems el elves ves a s B a ngs a mor moro o by a sc ripti ption on or self-ascription.” Spouses and their descendants are claa ss ified a s B a ngsa mor cl moro. o. Thi hiss mea ns that a person ha s to c la im hims hims el elff or her herss el elff as B a ngs a mor moro. o. The The B a ngs a mor moro o identi identity ty is is not being being impos impos ed on anyone. The propos propos ed B B L a ls o expres expres s ly s tates that “ the fr freed om of choice choice of other indi ndigg enous p eop les s ha ll be res pec ted .” See Article II, II, Sections 1- 2 of the B BL (HB (HB 4 994/ SB 240 8) 8)..
59
Appendix
MYT MY TH #3 Tha t inclu incluss ion in in the prop prop os ed B a ng s a mo ro e nti ntity ty req req ui uirres onl onlyy a loc a l g ove rnment unit unit (L (LG U) res oluti olution on o r pe ti titi tion on o f 10 pe rc ent o f the reg reg is tered voterss in the a rea . voter
FACT The LG U res oluti olution on o r the p etiti etition on o f 10 pe rc ent o f q ua lifi fied ed voters will only be for purposes of being included in the plebiscite. A favorable vote (i.e., majority of votes cast in a plebiscite) is still needed for an LGU to be included in the B a ngs a moro terr territory upon upon its its crea ti tion. on. Other areas who may wish to join the Bangsamoro a utonomous reg ion a fter its c rea ti tion on need : a.
to be co nti ntigg uous to the reg ion;
b.
a pe ti titi tion on to hol hold d a p leb is cit citee for for incl nclusi usion on sig sig ned b y at lea s t 10 per perce ce nt of the the reg reg is ter tered ed votes in the a rea ; a nd
c.
a pleb pleb is cit citee where where majori majority ty of the votes ca s t in the a rea a nd its mo ther LG LG U fa vor inclu incluss ion.
The c ons ent o f the po liti ticc a l uni unit/ t/s d irec tl tlyy a ff ffec ec ted , w hi hicc h is req ui uirred b y the 1987 1987 C ons ti tituti tution on a nd Loc a l G overnment Code (R.A. 7160), will apply to the LGUs outside of the Bangsamoro.
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In Defense of the Draft Bangsamoro Basic Law
Box 2. What comprises the proposed Bangsamoro territory? The c ore terri territory of the B a ng s a mo ro s ha ll be c omp os ed of (s (s ee Arti Articc le III III, S ec tion 2; Arti rticc le XV XV, B B L): L): a . The prese nt g eog ra phi phicc a l a rea of the Autonomo us R eg ion in Musli Muslim m Mindanao which includes five (5) provinces (Basilan, Lanao del Sur, Mag ui uinda nda na o, S ul ulu, u, a nd Ta w i-Ta w i), a nd tw o (2) (2) c om po nent c iti ties es (Mara w i and Lamitan).; b. Area s tha t vo ted for inclusi inclusion on in the ARMM duri during the 2001 plebisc ite: i. 6 munic munic ipa liti ties es of B a loi, Muna Muna i, Nununga Nununga n, P a nta r, Ta g oloa n a nd Ta ngka l in the provi province nce of La na o de l Norte Norte ii. 39 barangays in the Municipalities of Kabacan, Carmen, Aleosan, Pigkawayan, Pikit and Midsayap in the province of North Cotabato (see table below):
Municipality
Barangays
No. of brgys
Ale o s a n
D un g u a n , Lo w e r Min g a d in g , Ta p o d o c
3
C a rm e n
Na s a p ia n , Ma n a ra p a n
2
Ka ba ba c a n
Na ng ng a -a n, n, S a ng ng ga g a do d o n g , S im im b u h a y
3
Mid s a ya ya p
D a m a tu tula n, n , Ka d ig ig a s a n, n , Ka d in in g ilila n, n, Kapinpi Kapi npilla n, Kuda ra nga n, C entr entraa l La ba s, Mali Malinga o, Muds Muds eng, Nab al alaw aw ag , Olanda Olanda ng, S a mbul mbulaa w a n, Tuga l
12
B a la la c a y o n, n, B ur uric a in in , Da Da t u B in in a s in in g , Kad ilinga n, Lowe r Ba guer guer,, Low er P anga ngk ngkal alan, an, Matil Matilac , P atot
8
B a go g o a ng ng uid (B (B ag a g o in g e d ), Ba B a la la ti tic a n, n, Balong, Balungis, Batulawan, Buliok, Gokoton (Gokotan), Kabasalan, Lagunde, Macabual, Macasendeg
11
P ig ig ka ka w a y a n
P ik ikit
c. the citi cities es of Cota ba to and Isa Isa bel belaa ; and d. a ll other contiguous a rea s whe re there is is reso luti ution on of the loca l go vern vernment ment unitt or a petiti uni petition on o f a t lea lea s t ten p ercent (10% 10%)) of the reg is tered vo ters in the a rea a ski sking ng for thei theirr incl inclusi usion on a t lea lea st two months pr priior to the c onduc t of the ratification of the Bangsamoro Basic Law and the process of delimi deli mita ta ti tion on of the Ba ngs a moro. In or order der to ensure ensure the the wides wides t acc eptab ility of the B a ngs a mor moro o Ba sic La La w in in the core areas a bo vementi vementioned oned , a pop ul ulaa r ra ti tifi fica ca ti tion on sha ll be c onduc ted a mong a ll the Ba ngs a moro withi within n the areas for thei theirr a do pti ption. on.
Appendix
61
) P P A P O f o y s e t r u o c p a M ( . y t i t n e l a c i t i l o p o r o m a s g n a B e v i t c e p s o r p e h t o t r e f e r n e e r g n i s a e r a e h T . 2 e r u g i F
62
In Defense of the Draft Bangsamoro Basic Law
"
"
d n a , t i k i P , n a y a w a k g i P , n a s o e l A , n e m r a C , n a c a b a K f o s e i t i l a p i . c i e n t u i c i m s e b e h t l p n i 1 s 0 y 0 a 2 g e n h a r t a g b n i e r u n i d n - M y t r i M h t R A e e h t h t e r n a i n n i e o e r s u g l c k i r n a r d o f n i d s e a t o e r v a t e a h h t T p . 1 a y e r a u s d g i i F M
63
Appendix
MYT MY TH #4 Tha t the Ba ngs a moro wil will be a n Is Is la mi micc s ta te w her heree Shari’ah law law will be a ppl ppliied to a ll of its its inhab ita nts, Mor oros os , C hr hriis ti tiaa ns, a nd Luma ds a like.
FACT Firs t, there Fir there is now her heree in in the propo propo s ed B B L that a n Is Is la mi micc S tate is is menti mentioned, oned, even more more s o to b e es tab lished . S ec ond, the justi justice ce s ys tem in in the the B a ngs a mor moro o s hal halll co nsi nsist st of (1) Shari’ah la w w hi la hich ch s ha ll ha ve suprema suprema cy a nd a ppl ppliica ti tion on ove r Musli Muslims ms only; (2) (2) the tra d iti tiona ona l or trib trib a l jus ti ticc e s ys tem for the indige indige nous peo pl ples es in the B a ng s a mo ro; (3) (3) the loc loc a l courts; and (4) alternative dispute resolution systems. It is clear that Shari’ah law and the recourse to Shari’ah c ourts a pply to Musli Muslims onl onlyy.
Box 3. J ustic ustice e system in the the Bangsamoro Bangsamoro • The prop prop os ed B B L (HB 4994/S B 2408) provi provide de s tha t the administration of justice is a concurrent power between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro Government: “Administration of justice shall be in accordance with the relevant provi pr ovisions sions of this this B a sic Law a nd w ith due reg reg a rd to the po we rs o f the the S upr upreme eme Co ur urtt and the co mpetence of the Ba ngsa mor moro o G over overnmen nmentt over Shari’ah co co ur urts ts a nd the Shari’ah justice justi ce sys tem in in the Ba ngs a mor moro. o. The s upr uprema ema cy of Shari’ah a nd its a ppl a ppliic a ti tion on s ha ll only be to Mu Muss lims. ” Arti rticc le V, V, S ec tion 2, pa ra. 11, B B L (HB (HB 4994/S B 2408) •
The propo propo se d B B L also also pr provi ovides des for a plurality of justice system in the
Bangsamoro: “The justi “The justice ce sys tem in in the Ba ngs a moro sha ll co nsist of Shari’ah law which shall have supremacy and application over Muslims only; the traditional or tribal justice system, for the indigenous peoples in the Bangsamoro; the local courts; and alternative dispute resolution systems. For Muslims, the justice system in the Bangsamoro shall give primary consideration to Shari’ah , and customary rights and traditions of the indigenous peoples in the Bangsamoro. Nothi othing ng her herei ein n s hall be co nstru nstrued ed to o perate to the pr prej ejudi udice ce of nonMusl usliims a nd nonnon-iindi ndige ge nous peop les .” Arti rticc le X, S ec ti tion on 1, B B L (HB (HB 4994 4994/S /S B 2408 2408))
64
In Defense of the Draft Bangsamoro Basic Law
MYT MY TH #5 Tha t the B a ngs a moro w ill ha ve its its ow n a rmed for force ce s , forei foreigg n poli policy, a nd currency.
FACT It is clearly stated in the proposed BBL that defense and external security, foreign policy, coinage and monetary policy, among others, are reserved powers of the Central G overnment. Ther Therefore, efore, the Ba ng s a mo ro w ill not ha ve its its ow n a rmed for force ce s , forei foreigg n policy, policy, a nd cur currrency. S ee Arti rticc le V, S ec ti tion on 1 o f the B B L.
MYT MY TH #6 Tha t the B a ng s a mo ro G overnment w ill rec ei eive ve a n ini initi tiaa l fun fund d ing o f ab out PHP70—75 billion on its first year of operation.
FACT Th e a m o u n t t h a t w ill g o d ire c t ly ly t o t h e B a n g s a m o r o G overnment for for the fir firs t yea r is is a s fol folllow s : a.
P HP 1 Bill Billion tra tra ns iti tion on fund fund w hi hicc h w ill g o to the B a ng s a mo ro Tra ns ition Autho Autho ri rity ty (B (B TA) to en a b le it to c a rry o ut the req ui uirreme nts of tra ns iti tion on fr from om ARMM to the B a ng s a mo ro (s ee Arti ticc le XVI, S ec ti tion on 13 13,, B B L);
b.
P HP 7 B illion a s S pec ia l Devel Developme opme nt Fu Fund nd for for pur purpos pos es of rehabilitation, reconstruction, and development (see Arti rticc le XIV, S ec tion 2, B B L) L);; a nd
c.
The Annua Annua l B loc k G ra nt w hi hicc h w ill b e a pproxi pproxima ma tely P HP 27 bil billlion B loc k Grant b a s ed on the formul formula in the propo s ed B B L (A (Arti rticc le XII, S ec ti tions ons 1515-20, 20, B B L).
65
Appendix
The fo rmul rmulaa is 4 pe rc ent o f 60 perce nt (o (o r 2.4%) 2.4%) o f the National Interval Revenue collections three years prior to the c ur urrrent ye a r. Thi Thiss mea ns tha t the Annual Annual B loc k G ra nt for 2016 20 16 wil will b e b a s ed on the na ti tiona ona l interna l revenue c oll ollec ec ti tion on for 201 2013 3 w hi hicc h is is es ti tima ma ted to b e P HP 1.1 tri trillion. The LG Us in the B a ng s a mo ro w ill c onti ontinue nue to rec ei eive ve their Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) just like the other LGUs in the co untr untryy. The The s a la ries of public public s c hoo l tea c hers a nd other public servants under it shall be shouldered by the Ba ngsa mor moro o G over overnmen nment. t.
Box 4. Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA) The B TA refers to the inte ri rim m g o vernm ent o r the go vern verniing b od y in in the Ba ngs a moro duri during the trans iti tion on period that shall exercise executive and legislative functions for this purpose. It will be composed of fifty members, all of whom shall be appointed by the P res ident. Non-M on-Moro oro indi indige ge nous co mmuni mmuniti ties es , w omen, se ttl ttler er co mmuni mmuniti ties es , a nd o ther sec tors s ha ll ha ve repres repres enta ti tives ves in the B TA. The B TA is a lso MI MILF–l LF–led ed (Art. XVI, S ec . 2–4, B B L) L)..
Box 5. Computing the Annual Block Grant
• The net na ti tiona ona l internal revenue revenue c oll ollec ec ti tion on o f the B ur urea ea u of Internal Internal Revenue is is understoo d to be the s um of a ll internal revenue revenue ta x co llec ti tions ons during the base year less the amount released during the same year for ta x refun refunds ds , pa yments for infor informer’ mer’ss rew a rd, a nd a ny portion portion o f intern internaa l revenue tax collections which are presently set aside, or hereafter ea rmark rmarked ed under spe c ia l la w s for pa yment to third third pe rsons (Art. XII, S ec . 16, BBL).
66
In Defense of the Draft Bangsamoro Basic Law
(cont’d) Box 5. Computing the Annual Block Grant • The co mputation sha ll be b a se d on c ol olllec ti tions ons from from the thir third fisc fisc a l yea r prec pr ec ed ing the c ur urrrent fisc a l yea r (A (Art. XI XII, S ec . 16, B B L) L).. • The formula formula s ha ll be a dju djuss ted if, a fter the effectivity effectivity of the BB L, there oc curs a cha nge in the the tota l la nd a rea of the B a ngs a moro (A (Art. XI XII, S ec . 16, BBL).
Figure 3. Government Government Spending Spending in the ARMM/Bangsamoro ARMM/ Bangsamoro (in Billions of Pesos)
1.
2.
2015 Actual
2016 Projected
Exiss ting in the ARMM Exi a.
S ubs idy to the ARMM in the G eneral Approp ri riaa tions Ac t
24.3
27.0 (Block Grant)
b.
IRA of Loca l G ove rnment Uni Units ts in the ARMM
18 . 0
2 0. 0
c.
S pendin pendingg of Nati Nationa ona l G overnment Ag en c ies in the ARMM ARMM (P (P NP NP,, C C T, DP WH, and other a genc ies)
Will co nti ntinue nue to b e b udg eted a nd spent b y National National Agenc Agenc ies as these have not b een de vol volved. ved.
Incremental S pending in the P ropo se d B B L a.
S pec ia l Devel Developme opme nt Fu Fund nd for the Reha bil biliita ti tion, on, Re co nstru nstruction, ction, a nd Development
b.
B TA Tra n s it io n Fun d BT
c.
Norma liza tion Fund in Dif Different ferent Line Li ne Ag enc ies (DA DA,, Dep Ed, TES DA DA,, P hi hillHea lth, DOH, C HED, a nd DS WD) for exex-co mba tants
—
7. 0 1. 0
3. 0
4. 0
Notes: a . Fr From om 2017 to 2021, 2021, the S pec ia l Developme nt Fund is is P hp 2 Bill Billion pe r yea r. b. B TA Trans iti ition on Fund is o nly allotted for 2016. c. Nor Normali maliza za ti tion on fund cons ists of prog prog ra ms to as sist the retur return n to normal life of ex-co ex-co mba tants S ource: G enera l Appropri Appropriaa ti tion on Act 2015, dra ft B B L (HB (HB 4994/S B 2408)
67
Appendix
MYT MY TH #7 Tha t only only B a ngs a mo ros w ill b e a llow ed to exploit, exploit, de vel velop op , a nd util utilize naturaa l a nd o ther a q uati natur uaticc res our ources ces fou found nd in in the Ba ngs a mor moro o Wa Wa ter terss a nd Zones of J oi oint nt Co ope ra ti tion on (ZJ (ZJ C ).
FACT B a ngs a moro Wa Wa ter terss a re pa rt of the terri territori toriaa l w a ter terss of the Philippines and are for the benefit of all Filipinos. P referenti eferentiaa l rig hts for loc loc a l fi fiss hers a re s ubj ubjec ec t to reg ul ulaa ti tion on by the Bangsamoro Government and the respective LGUs with respect to their municipal waters. The Zones of J oi oint nt Co opera ti tion on (ZJ (ZJ C ) in the the S ul ulu u Se a a nd the Mor Moro o G ul ulff outside outside of the B a ngs a moro Wa Wa ter terss a re not pa rt of the Bangsamoro’s jurisdiction. It is only established for: a.
The pr prote ote c ti tion on of the tr traa d iti tiona ona l fi fiss hi hing ng grounds ,
b.
B enefi enefitti tting ng fr from om the res our ource ce s , a nd
c.
Inter nterco co nnecti nnectivi vity ty of the is la nds a nd the the mainl mainlaa nd parts of a co hes ive B a ngs a moro poli politi tica ca l enti entity ty..
The ZJ C rema in a va ila b le to a ll Fi Fillipi pino no c iti tize ze ns b ut the preferential rights of the Bangsamoro people, other indige nous p eo pl ples es in the ad join oiniing province province s , a nd res res id ent fishers in the Bangsamoro over fishery, aquamarine, and other lilivi ving ng res our ource ce s in the ZJ C s ha ll be res pec ted .
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In Defense of the Draft Bangsamoro Basic Law e d i s t u o f l u G ) o r P o P M A d P n O a f a o y e s S e u t r l u u o S c n i p s a a M e r ( . a k r s r a e m v o r c e t C a J w Z w e l h o T m . n o r f o i t a r m e k p 4 o 2 o 2 . C 2 t 2 n i r o o J s f e i o l s m e l n a o c i Z t u d a n n a 2 s r 1 e t o a t p W u o r d o n e m t x a e s l g l n a a h B s e h c h t i f h o w p s a r e m t a e W v i t o a r c i o d m n I a . s 4 g n e r a u B g i e F h t
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MYT MY TH #8 Tha t the propo propo s ed pa rlia menta ry form form of g overnment in in the B a ngs a moro is unco ns ti tituti tutiona ona l.
FACT: The pa rlia menta ry form of g overnment in in the B a ngs a moro is possible under the Constitution. The C ons ti tituti tution on d oe s not pres c ribe a pa rti ticc ul ulaa r form of government for autonomous regions. It only provides that “the organic act shall define the basic structure of government for the region consisting of the executive de pa rtment a nd leg leg is la ti tive ve a s s emb ly, bo th of w hi hich ch s ha ll be elec el ec ti tive ve a nd repres repres enta ti tive ve of the c ons ti tituent tuent politi politicc a l uni units ts ” (Arti rticc le X, S e c tion 18) 18).. A parliamentary form of government satisfies these c ond iti tions ons . The The leg is la ti tive ve a uthori uthority ty s ha ll fa ll on t he B a ngs a mor moro o P a rlia ment compos ed o f pa rty repr repres es entati entatives, ves, district representatives, and reserved seats and sectoral representatives, to be chosen by the voters in the B a ngs a moro. The The hea d of the g overnment, the C hi hief ef Mi Mini niss ter ter,, shall be elected by a majority vote of the Bangsamoro P a rlia ment from from a mo ng its mem b ers. The The C hi hief ef Mini Miniss ter is is thus an elected official.
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In Defense of the Draft Bangsamoro Basic Law
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Figure 5. Proposed composition of the Bangsamoro Parliament.
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In Defense of the Draft Bangsamoro Basic Law
MYT MY TH #9 Tha t the Mor Mo ro Isla mic Lib Lib era tion Fro Fro nt (MI (MILF LF)) w ill a uto ma ti ticc a lly rep rep la c e the poliice in the B a ngs a moro a rea s (for pol former mer ARM ARMM M) a nd tha t the B a ngs a moro P oli olicc e w ill b e inde pend ent from from the P hi hillippin ppinee Na ti tiona ona l P oli olicc e (P NP ).
FACT The propos ed B B L nei neither ther provi provide de s for automa ti ticc a bs orpti orption on or replacement of existing PNP officers and personnel by MILF comb a ta nts, nor doe s it put forwa forwa rd the es ta bl bliis hment of a police force independent from the PNP. Under the proposed BBL, the Bangsamoro Police shall be primarily res pons ibl blee for “law enf enfor orce ce ment and ma intenance of pea ce a nd order in the the B a ngs a mor moro,” o,” a nd it it “s hal halll be pa rt of the the P hi hillipp ine Nat iona l P oli olicc e” (s ee Arti rticc le XI on P ub lic Or Ord d er a nd S a fet fety) y)..
Box 6. What is the Bangsamoro Police?
The B a ngs a moro police police for force ce sha ll be a reg iona l uni unitt of the P hi hillippine Nationa l P oli olice ce . Al All reg reg ions ha ve the s a me s uch reg reg iona l co mma nds , includi including ng the ARMM ARMM today.
All police officers, from regional director down to the municipa municipa l poli policc e, sha ll c ome fr from om the P NP NP.. The The MILF combatants will not become the police force for the Bangsamoro, unless they apply and qualify as individuals.
Unde r the P NP La w (RA 6975 of 1990, 1990, a s a mend ed by RA 8551 in in 1998), 1998), loc a l exec uti utives ves have opera ti tiona ona l co ntr ntrol ol over the P ol oliice , a nd c ertai ertain n discipliina ry pow ers. That discipl That the propos ed B B L gives the sa me pow ers to the chief chief executive executive of the Ba ngs a moro Go ver vernment nment is is nothing nothing new.
The B a ngs a moro P oli olice ce w ill be unde r the co mma nd a nd d irec ti tion on of the PNP Chief and the administrative control and supervision of the Nationa l P oli olicc e C omm is sion (NA NAP P OLCOM) OLCOM)..
The B a ngs a moro P oli olice ce sha ll be pr profes ofes s iona l, c ivi villia n in in c ha ra c ter ter,, regional in scope, effective and efficient in law enforcement, fair and impa rti tiaa l, free free from pa rti tisa sa n politi politica ca l c ontrol ontrol,, a nd a c co untab le unde r the the la w for its a ctions. It sha ll be res pons ible both to the C entr entraa l G overnment and the Ba ngsa mor moro o G over overnment nment,, a nd to the c ommun ommuniiti ties es it se rves (Art. XI, S e c . 2).
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MYT MY TH #10 Tha t the a bs enc e o f a p rovi oviss ion in in the B B L on the d is a rma ment of the MIL MILF proves pr oves tha t the the nego ti tiaa ti tion on w a s fl flaa w ed.
FACT Th e An An n e x o n No N o r m a liz a t io i o n o f t h e C o m p r e h e n s iv e Agreement on the Bangsmoro includes, among others, the commitment of the MILF to decommission its forces and weapons, working side-by-side with the Independent Decommissioning Body. The fir firs t pha s e or the c eremoni eremoniaa l tur turnn-ove ove r of hig hig hh-po po w ered a nd c rew -served w ea po ns o f the the MIL MILF will will oc c ur even prior prior to the passage of the law. By the time the Bangsamoro Government is fully established, the full decommissioning of the MIL MILF should should ha ve b een a cc ompli ompliss hed. The proc proc es s would be accompanied by the disbandment of private armed groups (PAGs) and other lawless elements, the socioeconomic upliftment of previously conflict-afflicted co mmuni mmuniti ties es , a nd vari various ous co nf nfiide nce-bui nce-builldin dingg mea s ur ures es See Annex on Norm al aliz ization ation and Program for No rmaliz rmalization. ation.
Box 7. What is Normalization in the GPH-MILF peace process? • Normal ormaliiza ti tion on wil will simu simulltaneo usl uslyy happen alongside the roa roa dma p towa rds esta bl bliishi shing ng the Ba ngsmo ro. • Normal ormaliiza ti tion on “is proc proc ess whereby co mmun mmuniiti ties es c a n ac hi hieve eve their their des ired quality of life, which includes the pursuit of sustainable livelihood and politi poli ticc a l pa rti rticipa cipa ti tion on w ithi thin n a pea c eful de libe rative so c iety.” • Normal ormaliiza ti tion on a ims to ens ur uree human sec ur uriity in in the the B a ngs a mor moro o a nd buil build a so ciety that is is c ommit ommitted ted to ba sic human rights rights where indi indivi vidua dua ls a re free fr ee fr from om fea r of violence violence or c ri rime. me. So ur urce: ce: Annex on Normali Normaliza za ti tion on (signed (signed b y the GP H and MILF MILF P ea ce P ane ls on 25 J a nuary 2015 2015 in Kuala Lumpur, Lumpur, Ma la ysia)
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75
. s s e c o r p n o i t a z i l a m r o n e h t g n i t n e m e l p m i f o s t c e p s a d n a s t n e n o p m o c t n e r e f f i d e h T . 6 e r u g i F
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In Defense of the Draft Bangsamoro Basic Law
MYT MY TH #11 Tha t the G overnment o f the P hi hillippin ppines es (G P H) s houl hould d not b e neg otiatin otiatingg w ith the Moro Is Is la mi micc Lib era ti tion on Front Front (MI (MIL LF) b ec a us e it do es not repres ent the sentiments of the Muslim Filipinos.
FACT The G P H neg oti otiaa tes w ith armed g roups tha t are comm itted to p rovi ovid d ing prag ma ti ticc s olu oluti tions ons in b ui uilld ing pea c e in c onfl onfliic ta ff ffec ec ted Musli Muslim m Mind Mind a na o. The The MIL MILF is is b y fa r a nd c ur urrrently the la la rg es t revolu revoluti tiona ona ry orga ni niza za ti tion. on. When When the pea c e ta lks res umed in 2011 2011 unde r the a d mi mini niss tr traa ti tion on o f P res . Aq Aq ui uino no III III, folllow ing the a ll-outfol out-w w a r unde unde r Pres. Estrad a in 2000 2000 and the MOA-AD debacle under Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo in 2008, the G P H and the MI MILF res res ta rted the pea ce ta lks w ith the the a im of finding finding la la s ti ting ng s olu oluti tion on for pea c e in in Mi Minda na o. Although the MILF acts as a principal party in the C omprehensi omprehensive ve Ag Ag reem ent o n the B a ngs a mor moro o (C AB ), the propo pr opo s ed B B L do es not repr repres es ent alone the the inter interes es ts o f the the MILF as a n org org a ni niza za ti tion. on. Ra ther ther,, the propo propo s ed B B L a ims to address the Moros’ grievances for social justice and selfde ter termi minati nation, on, a ckn cknow ow led g ing these s enti entiments ments a nd bri bringi nging ng in s ol oluti utions ons to a dd res s the Mor Moro o s tr trugg ugg le w ith the end view view of resolving economic and political marginalization. At the s a me time it it prote prote c ts the w elf elfaa re a nd interes interes ts of a ll Fi Fillipi pino no citiizen-r cit zen-res es ide nts in the pros pros pec ti tive ve B a ngs a moro. The B B L, w hi hicc h bring bring s into leg leg is la ti tive ve proc proc es s the id id ea ls and commitments espoused in the CAB signed on 27 Ma rch 2014, 2014, wa s crafted by the fifteen fifteen membe r-B a ngs mor moro o Trans iti tion on C om miss ion (B TC ) rep res enting the d ivers e perspectives of Moros, Christians, and lumads in Muslim Mindanao. B oth the CAB CAB a nd the dra ft B B L w er eree inf informed ormed b y hundreds hundreds of consultations which include a variety of activities and meetings for small audiences, workshops and public fora. Thes e w er eree c ond ucted s epa ra tel telyy a nd joi jointl ntlyy by the G P H and MILF Peace Panels, as well as by various civil society groups grou ps a nd o ther sta kehol eholders. ders.
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77 From 2010 until March 2015, the GPH Peace Panel has conducted 511 public consultations with different s takehol takeholde de rs s uch a s the a ca dem e, civi civil s oc iety org org a ni niza za ti tions ons (C S Os) Os),, bus ines s s ec tor tor,, rel reliig ious g roups , med ia , g overnment a g enc ies , loc loc a l g overnment units units (LG Us ), mili milita ry, po lic e, a nd the d ipl ploma oma ti ticc co mmuni mmunity ty,, a mong others.
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