HPCL QRA

DET NORSKE VERITAS Report on QRA for POL IRDs/ depots BHARATPUR For Hindusthan Petroleum Corporation Limited Mumbai – 400 001 Maharashtra, India

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th Julyy, 2013

DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL IRD/depot Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK DET NORKSE VERITAS AS EMGGEN CHAMBERS, 10 C.S.T ROAD, VIDHYANAGARI, SANTACRUZ ( E),KALINA MUMBAI 400098 TEL: +91 22 26676400 FAX: +91 22 26653380 http://www.dnv.com

QRA for POL IRDs/ depots – Bharatpur For: Hindusthan Petroleum Corporation Limited Gresham Assurance Building, Sir P.M. Road, Post Box No. 198, Fort, Mumbai – 400 001 Maharashtra, India Account Ref.: K Somashekhar Rao, Sr. Manager – HSE-O&D [email protected] Date of First Issue: Report No.: Revision No.: Summary:

2013-05-29 12QR1P2-27 02

Project No. Organisation Unit: Subject Group:

PP046380 Maritime & Oil and Gas, India SHE

DNV conducted Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) for HPCL POL IRDs/ depots. This QRA Study aims to identify Individual and Societal Risk associated with the Bharatpur location. This report presents the DNV’s findings and conclusion from the study. Prepared by:

Vishalakshi Daine Consultant

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Verified by

Anil Bhat Avvari Consultant

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Approved by:

Salian Varadaraja Project Sponsor

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No distribution without permission from the client or responsible organisational unit (however, free distribution for internal use within DNV after 3 years)

Indexing Terms

No distribution without permission from the client or responsible organisational unit

Key Words

QRA

Strictly confidential

Service Area

SHE Risk Management

Unrestricted distribution

Market Segment

Oil & Gas

Rev. No. / Date: 02/30-07-2013

Reason for Issue: Prepared by: Verified by Approved by: Draft report issued to HPCL VDAI AVAB VASAL for comments All rights reserved. This publication or parts thereof may not be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, including photocopying or recording, without the prior written consent of Det Norske Veritas AS.

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Executive Summary Det Norske Veritas (DNV) conducted a Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) study covering the entire HPCL POL IRDs/ depots. The presentation of results is in line with UK HSE guidelines. This report presents the DNV’s study findings and conclusion from the study for the Bharatpur. The overall objective of the QRA study is to quantify the level of individual fatality risks associated with the Bharatpur; and to demonstrate that the level of risks is in compliance with the UK HSE guidelines Based on the QRA study for the Bharatpur, the following conclusions and recommendations can be drawn: Area under Study

Tank Farm

Pump House Area

Gantry Operations

Major Hazard

Recommended Control /Mitigation

Ensure availability of water spray system in the tank farm area for Pool fire and Tank fire are protecting the tank from major events in the Tank the external fire farm area, leading to the escalation of the fire from Ensure regular one tank to the another maintenance procedure to reduce likelihood of failure of the valves, flanges and pipes Release of pressurized inventories from the pump Consider providing HC house may cause severe detectors in Pump house damage in the Depot area premises

Fire due to Leak during TT loading operations. Major events of pool fire due to leak or spillage, flash fire are observed. Hazardous radiation levels of 12.5 kw/m2 and 37.5 kW/m2 are observed close to gantry.

As the gantry area is a high risk and high consequence zone, ensure minimum activity of trucks and personnel in this area.

Ensure emergency escape route is provided and informed to all

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Major Hazard

Recommended Control /Mitigation gantry and TT crew.

Consider provision of HC detectors for early detection of hazardous leaks. Ensure training, SOP, emergency procedures established and implemented for all personnel at gantry. Ensure PPE usage by all personnel. Ensure that the loaded trucks spend minimum time near the gantry after the loading operations

Office Building

Ensure that the loaded Fire radiation due to leak trucks spend minimum from the loaded tanker time near the gantry after trucks. the loading operations

Even though the Individual and societal risk levels of the Bharatpur has been found to be in ALARP region in assessing with HSE UK risk criteria, In order to maintain the level of risk at this level, cost effective risk mitigation measures should be implemented to mitigate the risks to a level that is As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).

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MANAGING RISK GLOSSARY ALARP: As Low As Reasonable Practical HSE

: Health Safety Environment

IR JF

: Individual Risk : Jet Fire

kW/m2 : Kilo Watt per Square Metre, a measure of heat flux or radiant heat LFL : Lower Flammable Limit LOC

: Loss of containment

LSIR

: Location Specific Individual Fatality Risk per year

P&ID : Piping and Instrumentation Diagram PLL

: Potential Loss of Life

QRA

: Quantitative Risk Assessment

UFL

: Upper Flammable Limit

UK HSE: UK Health and safety Executive

VCE

: Vapour Cloud Explosion

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary .......................................................................................................... III 1

INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................... 1 1.1 Background ............................................................................................................ 1 1.2 Objectives ............................................................................................................... 1 1.3 Scope of Study ........................................................................................................ 1 1.4 Report Structure ...................................................................................................... 2 1.5 Facility Description................................................................................................. 3 1.6 Input Data ............................................................................................................... 5 1.6.1 Material Inventory ............................................................................................ 5 1.6.2 Process Conditions ........................................................................................... 5 1.6.3 Material Composition ....................................................................................... 5 1.6.4 Weather ............................................................................................................ 5 1.6.5 Ignition Sources................................................................................................ 5 1.6.6 Population ........................................................................................................ 5

2

RISK ASSESSMENT CRITERIA ................................................................................ 6 2.1 UK HSE criteria...................................................................................................... 6 2.2 Individual Risk Criteria ........................................................................................... 7 2.3 Societal Risk Criteria .............................................................................................. 8

3

RISK RESULTS ............................................................................................................ 9 3.1 Individual Risk ....................................................................................................... 9 3.2 Societal Risk ......................................................................................................... 11 3.2.1 FN Curve........................................................................................................ 11

4

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................................... 13

5

REFERENCES ............................................................................................................ 15

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List of Tables Table 2-1: Societal Risk Criteria – Onsite ............................................................................................................... 8 Table 3-1: LSIR ....................................................................................................................................................... 9

List of Figures Figure 1-1: Bharatpur Layout ................................................................................................................................. 3 Figure 1-2: Bharatpur Layout .................................................................................................................................. 4 Figure 2-1: ALARP Principle .................................................................................................................................. 6 Figure 2-2: FN Curve and Criterion Line ................................................................................................................ 7 Figure 3-1: Individual Risk Contours for Bharatpur ............................................................................................. 10 Figure 3-2: FN Curve Onsite ................................................................................................................................. 11 Figure 3-3: FN Curve Offsite ................................................................................................................................ 12

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1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background Det Norske Veritas (DNV) conducted a Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) study covering the entire HPCL POL IRDs/ depots. The presentation of results is in line with UK HSE guidelines. This report presents the DNV’s study findings and conclusion from the study for the Bharatpur.

1.2 Objectives The overall objective of the QRA study is to - Quantify the level of individual fatality risks associated with the Bharatpur; and - Demonstrate that the level of risks is in compliance with the UK HSE guidelines

1.3 Scope of Study DNV has performed the work in accordance to the UK HSE guidelines. Following are the important aspects of this study: - Verify the individual and societal risk levels in accordance with UK HSE criteria - Tabulation of the consequences in terms of: Distances to radiation levels, Lower Flammability Limit (LFL) and explosion overpressure for different weather classes according to specific criteria classes.

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1.4 Report Structure This report presents: Section 1

Introduction This section provides a general introduction of the project, the main objectives of the QRA study, the scope of study, and the structure of this report.

Section 2

Risk Assessment Criteria This action outlines the risk criteria applied in this QRA study.

Section 3

Risk Results This section provides the risk results due to process hazard

Section 4

Conclusions and Recommendation This section outlines the overall conclusions of the study and provides the recommendation to be implemented in order to ensure ALARP performance in the operation.

Section 5

Reference This section details the reference used in this QRA.

Annexe 1

QRA Methodology This appendix explains the QRA methodology applied in this QRA.

Annexe 2

Assumptions Register The assumptions presented are applied in the modelling and preparation of the reports/technical notes.

Annexe 3

Failure case and frequency analysis This appendix defines the failure cases selected for analysis, as well as the corresponding frequencies.

Annexe 4

Consequence Analysis This appendix presents outcome of an event in terms of toxic, fire and explosion.

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1.5 Facility Description The Bharatpur layout is shown in the figure below. Figure 1-1: Bharatpur Layout

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Figure 1-2: Bharatpur Layout Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 4

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1.6 Input Data 1.6.1 Material Inventory Material required for the QRA study is taken from the Mass and Energy balance sheet provided by the client. The static and dynamic inventory is calculated based on the flow rate and equipment dimension provided by the client. The inventory details with respect to vessel and pipelines is given at Annexe 3 - Failure case and frequency analysis.

1.6.2 Process Conditions The process conditions like temperature and pressure required for the QRA study is taken from the Mass and Energy balance sheet and Process flow diagram provided by the client. The details are placed in a table at Annexe 3 - Failure case and frequency analysis.

1.6.3 Material Composition Material required for the QRA study is taken from the Mass and Energy balance sheet provided by the client for most of the cases. If the data is not available suitable representative material is considered as per DNV – Technical note 13 and international standard. This is explained in Assumption Register (Annexe 2) in detail.

1.6.4 Weather Meteorological data are required at two stages of the QRA. First, various parts of the consequence modelling require specification of wind speed and atmospheric stability. Second, the impact (risk) calculations require wind-rose frequencies for each combination of wind speed and stability class used.

1.6.5 Ignition Sources In order to calculate the risk from flammable materials, information on the ignition sources (which are present in the area over which a flammable cloud may drift) is required.

1.6.6 Population All the population details are provided to the study and the presence factor is explained with respect to the unit is given in details in Assumption Register (Annexe 2).

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2

RISK ASSESSMENT CRITERIA

In order to determine acceptability, the risk results are assessed against a set of risk criteria as per UK HSE criteria.

2.1 UK HSE criteria Following points details the UK HSE guidelines: - An individual risk below 1 x 10-6 fatalities per year is considered as acceptable for both plant workers and public. An individual risk above 1 x 10-4 fatalities per year for public is considered as unacceptable and an individual risk above 1 x 10-3 fatalities per year for workers is considered unacceptable. Between these limits the risk is considered as ALARP (As Low as Reasonably Practicable). An indication of this is shown in the below figure Figure 2-1: ALARP Principle

- Societal risk can be represented by FN curves, which are plots of the cumulative frequency (F) of various accident scenarios against the number (N) of casualties associated with the modeled incidents. The plot is cumulative in the sense that, for each frequency, N is the number of casualties that could be equaled or exceeded. Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013

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Often ‘casualties’ are defined in a risk assessment as fatal injuries, in which case N is the number of people that could be killed by the incidents. Figure 2-2: FN Curve and Criterion Line

2.2 Individual Risk Criteria The UK HSE Individual Risk Criteria was considered to assess the risk for HPCL POL IRDs/ depots. Individual risk above 10-3 per annum for any person shall be considered intolerable and fundamental risk reduction improvements are required. Risk criteria for Individual Risk for on-site are as follows: - Individual risk levels above 1 x 10-3 per year will be considered unacceptable and will be reduced, irrespective of cost - Individual risk levels below 1 x 10-6 per year will be broadly acceptable - Risk levels between 1 x 10-3 and 1 x 10-6 per year will be reduced to levels as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). That is the risk within this region is tolerable only of further risk reduction is considered impracticable because the cost required to reduce the risk is grossly disproportionate to the improved gained

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2.3 Societal Risk Criteria When considering the risk associated with a major hazard facility, the risk to an individual is not always an adequate measure of total risks; the number of the individuals at risk is also important. Catastrophic incidents with the potential multiple fatalities have a little influence on the level of risk but have a disproportionate effect on the response of society and impact of company reputation. The concept of societal risk is much more than that for individual risk. A number of factors are involved which make it difficult to determine single value criteria for application to a number of different situations. These factors include; - The hazard, the consequential risks and the consequential benefits - The nature of assessment - Factors of importance to the company, government, regulators and authorities, public attitudes and perception and aversion to major accident Societal risk is the relationship between frequency of an event and the number of people affected. Societal risk from a major hazard facility can thus be expressed as the relationship between the number of potential fatalities N following a major accident and frequency F at which N fatalities are predicated to occur. The relationship between F and N, and the corresponding relationship involving F, the cumulative frequency of events causing N or more fatalities, are usually presented graphically on log-log axis. DNV has used following societal risk criteria. Societal risk should not be confused as being the risk to society or the risk as being perceived by society. The word “societal” is merely used to indicate a group of people and societal risk refers to the frequency of multiple fatality incidents, which includes workers and the public. Societal risk is usually represented by an FN (Frequency – Number of Fatality) curve. Table 2-1: Societal Risk Criteria – Onsite Maximum Tolerable Intercept With N=1

Negligible Intercept With N=1

10-2

10-4

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3

RISK RESULTS

3.1 Individual Risk Location specific individual risk (LSIR) is used to indicate the risk at a particular location. It is the risk for a hypothetical individual who is positioned there for 24 hours per day, 365 days per year. It is a standard output from a QRA. In onshore studies, the geographical variation of LSIR may be represented by iso-risk contour plots and used for land-use planning. In offshore studies, an LSIR value is normally computed for each separate module on the installation. Since in reality people do not remain continually at one location, this is not a realistic risk measure. Table 2.1 presents the LSIR Table 3-1: LSIR S.No

Location

LSIR

Remarks

1 2 3 4

D.G Control room Gantry Office Building Workers change room

5.62E-07 7.38E-07 3.60E-06 3.34E-06

Acceptable Acceptable Acceptable Acceptable

Table 3-2: Major Risk Contributors to office building S.No

Location

Risk/yr

%

1 2 3 4 5

Large Leak from MS Tanker Large Leak from SKO Tanker Large Leak from HSD Tanker Medium leak from MS Tanker Medium leak from SKO Tanker

8.42E-07 7.22E-07 6.25E-07 3.91E-07 2.97E-07

23.40 20.08 17.39 10.88 8.27

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MANAGING RISK Figure 3-1: Individual Risk Contours for Bharatpur

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3.2

Societal Risk

3.2.1 FN Curve FN curve defines the societal risk. It represents the relationship between the frequency and the number of people suffering a given level of harm from the realisation of specified hazards. It is usually taken to refer to the risk of death and usually, expressed as a risk per year. The following figure presents the onsite societal risk FN Curve for Bharatpur. The “blue line” represents the upper limit of risk and the “green line” represents the lower level of risk. The region between this two represents the risk in the ALARP (AS LOW AS REASONABLY PRACTICABLE) region. The region beyond the blue line indicates the unacceptable region and the region below blue line represents the broadly acceptable region. The “red line” represents the level of societal risk that has been realised around Bharatpur. Figure 3-2: FN Curve Onsite

The following observation can be drawn:

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MANAGING RISK - Compared to the UK HSE risk criteria, the FN Curve shows that societal risk is within the Acceptable region and does not exceed the unacceptable criteria.

FN Curve Offsite No Risk curve found for offsite population

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4

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Area under Study

Tank Farm

Pump House Area

Gantry Operations

Major Hazard

Recommended Control /Mitigation

Consider providing water spray system in the tank farm area for protecting Pool fire and Tank fire are the tank from the external major events in the Tank fire farm area, leading to the escalation of the fire from Ensure regular one tank to the another maintenance procedure to reduce likelihood of failure of the valves, flanges and pipes

Release of pressurized inventories from the pump house may cause severe damage in the Depot premises

Consider providing HC detectors in Pump house area Dyke should be provided to the pumps to limit pool formation of the release inventory

As the gantry area is a high risk and high consequence zone, ensure minimum Fire due to Leak during TT activity of trucks and loading operations. Major personnel in this area. events of pool fire due to leak or spillage, flash fire are observed. Hazardous radiation levels of 12.5 Ensure emergency escape kw/m2 and 37.5 kW/m2 are route is provided and informed observed close to gantry. to all gantry and TT crew. Consider provision of HC detectors for early detection of hazardous leaks.

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MANAGING RISK Area under Study

Major Hazard

Recommended Control /Mitigation Ensure training, SOP, emergency procedures established and implemented for all personnel at gantry. Ensure PPE usage by all personnel. Ensure that the loaded trucks spend minimum time near the gantry after the loading operations

Office Building

Ensure that the loaded Fire radiation due to leak trucks spend minimum from the loaded tanker time near the gantry after trucks. the loading operations

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5

REFERENCES - “Methods for the calculation of physical effects – due to releases of hazardous materials (liquids and gases)” TNO Yellow Book, CPR – 14E, 2005 - A Flack / B Bain / T Lindberg / J R Spouge “Process Equipment Failure Frequencies” Rev. 04, October 2009 for Process Pipes, Pumps, Atmospheric Storage Tank - CCPS, Guidelines for Consequence Analysis of Chemical Releases, American Institute of Chemical Engineers, 1999. - Lees, F. P., Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, Butterworth-Heinemann, 1996 - Oil Industry Safety Directorate (OISD), First Edition, August 2007. - Robin Pitblado, Andreas Flack, Phil Crosthwaite, David Worthington, “Consequence Handbook”, Report no.:70037714, August 2008 - TNO, Guidelines for Quantitative Risk Assessment, “The Purple Book”, 2009

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DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur

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Annexe 1 QRA Methodology

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Table of Contents 1

QRA METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................... 1 1.1 Introduction to Risk Assessment ............................................................................. 1 1.2 What is QRA?......................................................................................................... 2 1.3 Key Components in QRA ....................................................................................... 2

2

QRA APPROACH ......................................................................................................... 5 2.1.1 Hazard Identification ........................................................................................ 5 2.2 Consequence Modelling/Phast Software ................................................................. 6 2.3 Frequency Analysis................................................................................................. 7 2.4 Risk Calculation/PHASTRISK Software................................................................. 7 2.4.1 Built-In Event Trees ......................................................................................... 7 2.4.2 Atmospheric Condition................................................................................... 10 2.4.3 Risk Presentation: ........................................................................................... 10

3

QRA SOFTWARE TOOL ........................................................................................... 12

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List of Tables Table 2-1: Explosion Overpressure Effects ............................................................................................................. 6 Table 2-2: Effects of Thermal Radiation ................................................................................................................. 7 Table 3-1 PHAST RISK Default Vulnerability Parameters .................................................................................. 17

List of Figures Figure 1-1: QRA methodology ................................................................................................................................ 3 Figure 1-2: ALARP Principle .................................................................................................................................. 4 Figure 2-1 : Event Tree 1 – Continuous Vapour Release ........................................................................................ 8 Figure 2-2: Event Tree 2 – Continuous Release with Rainout ................................................................................ 8 Figure 2-3: Event Tree 3 – Instantaneous Vapour Release ...................................................................................... 9 Figure 2-4: Event Tree 4 – Instantaneous Release with Rainout ............................................................................. 9

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QRA METHODOLOGY

1.1 Introduction to Risk Assessment This section is presented to assist the reader who is not familiar with the terms used in this document and for those who are familiar to confirm DNV understanding of the terms and their application in the context of this document. An oil & gas facility has the potential to cause harm such as: -

Sickness, injury or death of workers and people in the surrounding community Damage to property and investments Degradation of the physical and biological environment Interruption to production and disruption of business

A state or condition having the potential to cause a deviation from uniform or intended behaviour which, in turn, may result in damage to property, people or environment, is known as hazard. Thus a scraper trap is a hazard because it has the potential to cause a fire; processes such gas compression is a hazardous activity because it has the potential to cause fires and explosions. The word “hazard” does not express a view on the magnitude of the consequences or how likely it is that the harm will actually occur. A “major hazard” is associated with Loss of Containment and has the potential to cause significant damage or multiple fatalities. Again, the term does not imply that such events are likely. Incidents are the actual realization of a hazard, i.e. an event or chain of events, which has caused or could have caused personal injury, damage to property or environment. They are sudden unintended departures from normal conditions in which some degree of harm is caused. They range from minor incidents such as a small gas leak to major accidents such as Flixborough, Mexico City, Bhopal, Pasadena, Texas City, etc. Sometimes, the more neutral term “event” is used in place of the more colloquial term “incident”. For flammable incidents, ignition has to take place for a hazard to be realized. Risk is the combination of the likelihood and the consequences of such incidents. More scientifically, it is defined as the likelihood of a hazard occurrence resulting in an undesirable event. The likelihood may be expressed either as a frequency (i.e. the rate of events per unit time) or a probability (i.e. the chance of the event occurring in specified circumstances). The consequence is defined as an event or chain of events that result from the release of a hazard. The impact or effect is the degree of harm caused by the event. Safety is the inverse of risk. The higher the risk for an occupation or installation, the lower is its safety. The popular understanding of safety sometimes appears to be “zero risk”, but this is impossible in an intrinsically hazardous activity such as oil and gas production.

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1.2

What is QRA?

Quantitative risk assessment (QRA) is a means of making a systematic analysis of the risks from hazardous activities, and forming a rational evaluation of their significance, in order to provide input to a decision-making process. QRA is sometimes called ‘probabilistic risk assessment’ term originally used in the nuclear industry. The term ‘Quantified Risk Assessment’ is synonymous with QRA as used here. The term ‘quantitative risk analysis’ is widely used, but strictly this refers to the purely numerical analysis of risks without any evaluation of their significance. QRA is probably the most sophisticated technique available to engineers to predict the risks of accidents and give guidance on appropriate means of minimizing them. Nevertheless, while it uses scientific methods and verifiable data, QRA is a rather immature and highly judgmental technique, and its results have a large degree of uncertainty. Despite this, many branches of engineering have found that QRA can give useful guidance. However, QRA should not be the only input to decision-making about safety, as other techniques based on experience and judgment may be appropriate as well.

1.3

Key Components in QRA

The study is based on the premises of a traditional Quantitative Risk Assessment. The key components of QRA are explained below, and illustrated in Figure 1-1. The first stage in a QRA is defined as system definition where the potential hazards associated with a facility or activities are to be analyzed. The scope of work for a QRA should be to define the boundaries for the study, identifying which activities are to be included and which are excluded, and which phases of the facility’s life are to be assessed. The hazard identification consists of a qualitative review of possible accidents that may occur, based on previous accident experience or judgment where necessary. There are several formal techniques for this, which are useful in their own right to give a qualitative appreciation of the range and magnitude of hazards and indicate appropriate mitigation measures. This qualitative evaluation is described in this guide as “hazard assessment”.

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MANAGING RISK In a QRA, hazard identification uses similar techniques, but has a more precise purpose – defining the boundaries of a study in terms of materials to be modelled, release conditions to be modelled, impact criteria to be used, and identifying and selecting a list of failure cases that will fully capture the hazard potential of the facilities to be studied. Failure cases are usually derived by breaking the process system down into a larger number of sub- systems, where failure of any component in the sub-system would cause similar consequences. In pipeline case, this can be performed by breaking the line into sections depending on availability of isolation valves along the line. Figure 1-1: QRA methodology

Once the potential hazards have been identified, the frequency analysis estimates how likely it is for the accidents to occur, based on the type and number of equipment components included in the defined failure cases. The component failure frequencies to be used are usually derived from an analysis of historical accident experience, or by some form of theoretical modelling.

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MANAGING RISK In parallel with the frequency analysis, consequence modelling evaluates the resulting effects if the accidents occur, and their impact on people, equipment and structures, the environment or business, depending on the defined scope of the QRA study. Estimation of the consequences of each possible event often requires some form of computer modelling. Consequence analysis requires the modelling of a number of distinctive phases, i.e. discharge, dispersion, fires and explosions (for flammable materials). Closely liaised with the consequence assessment is the impact assessment, i.e. how does the fire, explosion or toxic cloud affect human beings. When the frequencies and consequences / impact of each modelled event have been estimated, they can be combined to produce risk results. Various forms of risk presentation may be used, commonly grouped as follows: - Individual risk - the risk experienced by an individual person - Group/Societal risk - the risk experienced by a group of people exposed to the hazard The next stage is to introduce criteria, which are yardsticks to indicate whether the risks are acceptable, or to make some other judgment about their significance. Risk assessment is the process of comparing the level of risk against a set of criteria as well as the identification of major risk contributors. The purpose of risk assessment is to develop mitigation measures for unacceptable generators of risk, as well as to reduce the overall level of risk to As Low as Reasonably Practical (Figure 1-2). Figure 1-2: ALARP Principle

Unacceptable Region

High Risk

Broadly acceptable only if risk reduction is impracticable or if its cost is grossly disproportionate to the improvement gained

ALARP Region

Broadly Acceptable Region

Given immediate attention and a response developed commensurate with the scale of the threat

Low Risk

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Necessary to maintain assurance that risk remains at this level

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2

QRA APPROACH

2.1.1 Hazard Identification Hazard identification is the structured study of a plant in order to produce a list of foreseeable, potentially hazardous releases. In a plant, there is a wide range of substances that, if released, could cause injury or fatality. The hazards applicable for the plant have been identified through: - Knowledge transfer from other risk assessments for boosting station plants carried out by DNV within the applicable confidentiality constraints - Site specific parameters - The selection of appropriate hazards considered a range of issues, including: Nature of potential hazards Position of plant in relation to the surrounding community Complexity of the process DNV has concentrated on the flammable hazards. A list of the main process streams is defined from the Process Flow Schemes (PFS). Of these, some were considered to be non-hazardous (e.g., water streams) or only likely to give a local hazard (e.g., small pool fires), and were not analyzed further. The streams identified to be hazardous were further analyzed in the QRA. The range of possible releases for a given stream covers a wide spectrum, from a pinhole leak up to a catastrophic rupture (of a vessel) or full bore rupture (of a pipe). It is both time-consuming and unnecessary to consider every part of the range; instead, a finite number of failure cases are generated to characterize each unit. The number of specific cases and the distribution of the cases in terms of the size which are analyzed quantitatively take into account the potential consequences and the format of the frequency data that are being used.

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2.2

Consequence Modelling/Phast Software

The consequence analysis is performed using DNV proprietary software PHAST. PHAST is a consequence and impact assessment module integrated within DNV risk calculation software PHASTRisk. PHAST calculates wide range of possible consequences from the LOC events, including: -

Jet Fire, causing thermal radiation impact Pool Fire, causing thermal radiation impact Flash Fire, causing thermal radiation impact within the flammable cloud envelope Explosion, causing overpressure impact

Various factors affecting the extent of consequence are also considered within the PHAST model which includes: - Atmospheric conditions, including solar radiation flux, ambient temperature, humidity and wind speed/direction as well as weather stability - Release location - Release orientation Detailed findings of the consequence analysis for selected failure cases are presented in Section 6. The qualitative levels of explosion and heat radiation effects are described in Table 2-1 and

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MANAGING RISK Table 2-2 respectively are used to assess the likelihood of harm to people or the likelihood of further loss of containment and / escalation as per DNV’ Technical note. Table 2-1: Explosion Overpressure Effects Overpressure (bar)

Effects Within Zone

0.02

10% window glass broken

0.05

Window glass damage causing injury

0.1

Repairable damage to buildings and house facades

0.2

Structural damage to buildings

0.35

Heavy damage to buildings and process equipment

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MANAGING RISK Table 2-2: Effects of Thermal Radiation Radiation Intensity (kW/m2) 37.5 25

Minimum energy required to ignite wood at indefinitely long exposures (non piloted)

12.5

Minimum energy required for piloted ignition of wood, melting plastic tubing

9.5

Pain threshold reached after 8 sec, second degree burns after 20 sec

4

Sufficient to cause pain to personnel if unable to reach cover within 20 s, however blistering of the skin (second degree burns) is likely; 0% lethality

1.6

2.3

Observed Effect Sufficient to cause damage to process equipment

Will cause no discomfort for long exposure

Frequency Analysis

The failure frequencies for the scenarios developed are obtained from DNV’s Technical Notes (TN 14).

2.4

Risk Calculation/PHASTRISK Software

As mentioned earlier, DNV proprietary software PHASTRisk is used for the main risk calculation in the study. PHASTRisk combines consequence results from the PHAST module with a range of risk-related information in order to produce risk results.

2.4.1 Built-In Event Trees PHASTRisk has 4 built-in consequence outcome event trees, i.e. continuous vapour release, continuous release with rain-out1, instantaneous vapour release, release with rain-out. These event trees are presented in to . It is noted that ‘No Ignition’ event leads to ‘No Effect’ for ‘flammable-only’ material release.

2

Rain-out occurs if liquid drops suspended in a vapour cloud, following a pressurized release of liquid or gas, drop to the ground. Rain-out will occur when the droplets loose their initial (release) momentum and gravity prevails Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 8

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Figure 2-1 : Event Tree 1 – Continuous Vapour Release

Figure 2-2: Event Tree 2 – Continuous Release with Rainout

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Figure 2-3: Event Tree 3 – Instantaneous Vapour Release

Figure 2-4: Event Tree 4 – Instantaneous Release with Rainout

PHAST RISK also accounts for a short-duration continuous release, an event where a continuous release lasts for relatively short duration and hence gives effects similar to an instantaneous release. Release duration of 20 seconds is used as the cut-off time to consider continuous release giving instantaneous effects.

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MANAGING RISK Further, in the event of an instantaneous vapour release, PHASTRisk models the event as a pure fireball, in which the thermal radiation impact defines the level of human fatality, discounting the overpressure wave which may accompany the event. Various probability factors which will determine the route of event within the event trees are also determined in the PHASTRisk model. These include: Immediate Ignition: This is directly specified and will be different depending on the size of the release. Delayed ignition: This is a calculated value within PHASTRisk, unique to each release case and release direction. The calculation is based on the strength, location and presence factor of all ignition sources specified, and the extent and duration of dispersing flammable vapour clouds being exposed to those sources. Delayed ignition sources can be modelled as point sources (e.g. ground flares), line sources (roads, power lines) or area sources (e.g. to cater for “background” sources posed by a variety of human activity). Fireball / flash fire / explosion probability in the event of immediate ignition of instantaneous release. This is directly specified in PHASTRisk. Flash fire/explosion probability in the event of delayed ignition. This is also directly specified in PHASTRisk. Entire Complex has been considered as Ignition source with ignition probability 0.09 and operating probability 1 as per DNV Technical Note.

2.4.2 Atmospheric Condition Variation in wind direction defines the apparent orientation of consequences. PHASTRisk accounts for the different wind directions from the wind distribution probability input and combine the values into the risk calculation. Atmospheric conditions, which include temperature and humidity, are also addressed.

2.4.3 Risk Presentation: Risk would be presented in terms of Individual and Societal (group). Individual Risk per Annum (IRPA) is the annual frequency that any individual in a specific worker group becomes a fatality. Individual risk criteria are intended to ensure that individual workers are not exposed to excessive risk levels on an installation. They are largely independent of the number of workers exposed, and hence in principle may be applied to different situations. Location specific individual risk (LSIR) is used to indicate the risk at a particular location. It is the risk for a hypothetical individual who is positioned there for 24 hours per day, 365 days per year. It is a standard output from a QRA. In onshore studies, the geographical variation of LSIR may be represented by iso-risk contour plots and used for land-use planning. In offshore studies, an LSIR value is normally computed for each Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 12

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MANAGING RISK separate module on the installation. Since in reality people do not remain continually at one location, this is not a realistic risk measure. IRPA = ∑ LSIR x presence factor Risk is defined as the product of the consequences (here measured as harm to people) and the likelihood of occurrence (i.e. an expected rate of occurrence per year). Societal (or group) risk measures the risk of an operation to the company, the industry or a community. There are several ways of presenting societal risk, but the measure, which is found to be most useful for offshore installations, is the Potential Loss of Life (PLL). PLL is defined as the long term average number of fatalities per year due to a specific cause and can be expressed mathematically as: PLL = ∑ f . N Where:

∑= sum for all outcomes f = frequency of an outcome (per year) N = number of fatalities caused by the outcome Potential Loss of Life (PLL) is the measure of the average number of statistical fatalities that may be expected within a given time period. "PLL per year" is another term for annual fatality rate. Potential loss of life (PLL) is a societal or group risk measure and is typically used in cost benefit analysis for assessing remedial measures, or for comparing alternatives during the design stages of any project. There is no acceptance criterion for PLL.

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3

QRA SOFTWARE TOOL

The basis for this QRA study is DNV’s proprietary risk modelling software, PHAST RISK software version 6.7. The PHAST RISK software has been in existence since the 1970s, and has been under continual development and improvement ever since, which is managed by DNV’s London-based software development division. An electronic database of approximately 1400 materials is available to the PHAST RISK software, with the material properties regularly reviewed and if required re-adjusted, based on the latest available data. The PHAST RISK consequence modelling results (for each material) are regularly reviewed and where required re-calibrated, based on the latest available accident and test data. The PHATS RISK software will calculate dispersion and consequence modelling results for all specified weather classes and wind speeds with the failure case specified release frequency data, specified weather class, wind speed, wind directional probability data, specified immediate ignition probability data, software calculated delayed ignition probability data, built-in event tree alternate consequence outcome branch probability data, fatal impact probability data for each alternate consequence outcome (e.g. jet fire, flash fire, explosion), based on the specified consequence impact criteria levels, and specified population data by location, to produce individual and societal risk results, as required. This PHAST RISK modelling software requires the following inputs to be able to produce risk results: - Import an electronic map of the study area, on which individual fatality risk contour results may be produced. - The electronic map may be programmed in PHAST RISK to: - Superimpose all on-site and off-site populations within the study area by location, and specifying the day / night number of people for each location. - Superimpose all potential ignition sources within the study area, which may cause delayed ignition of a flammable release.

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MANAGING RISK Delayed ignition sources may be specified as point sources (e.g. flares, fired heaters, diesel-generators, and transformers), area sources (e.g. welding work shops) or line sources (e.g. roads, railway lines, and overhead power lines). Each ignition source carries additional specification in terms of presence factor and ignition source strength (probability of ignition per unit time, when in contact with a flammable vapour cloud between LFL and UFL). The actual delayed ignition probability of any release is calculated by PHAST RISK, based on the dispersion modelling results and event duration. The immediate ignition probability associated with each flammable failure case is a risk analyst programmed value, based on historical ignition data, which varies with leak size and release phase (Gas / Liquid / 2-Phase) (the larger the leak vapour flow rate, the higher the ignition probability, typically varying from 1% to 30%, unless above auto ignition, then 100%). Prepare and import weather class, wind speed and wind direction probability data for the study area. Normally separate day / night, weather class, wind speed, wind directional probability files are entered into PHAST RISK, most often broken down into 16 wind directions. Enter all identified failure cases, which are defined in terms of: Location, Material released, Quantity released (or release duration), Temperature, Pressure, Leak size, Leak direction (e.g. horizontal, vertical), Leak elevation, Leak frequency and Immediate ignition probability. Each failure case calculation in PHAST RISK starts with discharge modelling. Based on release duration and release phase (gas, liquid, 2-phase), PHAST RISK directs the dispersion and consequence calculations to one of 4 alternate, built-in consequence outcome event trees (continuous vapour release, continuous release with rain-out, instantaneous vapour release, instantaneous release with rain-out), where each event tree branch probability carries default values, which may be reprogrammed by the risk analyst. PHAST RISK will then calculate all alternate consequence outcomes (e.g. jet fire, explosion) of the event tree selected, in terms of hazard range and event duration (where applicable), for each weather class / wind speed combination.

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MANAGING RISK So far the calculations performed in PHAST RISK only relate to the alternate consequence outcomes and the consequence hazard ranges, for each specified failure case. To produce risk results, PHAST RISK will perform impact frequency calculations, using the failure case specified leak frequency as starting point. Frequency aspects of the risk calculations relate to the: Risk analyst defined failure case leak frequency. Weather class, wind speed and wind directional probability, for each of the 16 wind directions. Specified immediate ignition probability and PHAST RISK calculated delayed ignition probability. The delayed ignition probability calculation is based on the strength and location of all specified ignition sources and the failure case dispersion hazard range, combined with vapour cloud persistence (duration). PHAST RISK selected event tree and branch probabilities, for each alternate consequence out come. Fatal Impact probability for each alternate consequence outcome. This is based on the PHAST RISK calculated magnitude of each consequence and the PHAST RISK default impact probability criteria or risk analyst specified impact criteria for that type of consequence. Location and number of people (or equipment) within hazard area for societal risk results, with separate calculations for day and night, indoors and outdoors. PHAST RISK performs its individual and societal risk calculations based on a 200 x 200 grids (40,000 points), with the grid point spacing automatically varied, based on the consequence hazard range results. For each release case, PHAST RISK takes the failure case release frequency as initial input, multiplies this by the first weather class / wind speed probability, for the first of 16 wind directions. PHAST RISK takes this result and multiplies it by the immediate ignition probability, while also separately multiplying this result by the PHAST RISK calculated delayed ignition probability.

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MANAGING RISK These 2 results are multiplied by the first of the event tree consequence branch probabilities, relating to immediate or delayed ignition branch path. PHAST RISK takes the calculated consequence hazard range and verifies which grid points are within the consequence hazard area. For each grid point within range PHAST RISK then calculates the magnitude of the consequence at each grid point (e.g. explosion overpressure at a particular grid point may be 3psi). The calculated consequence magnitude at each grid point is then compared to the PHAST RISK programmed impact criteria level, and the likelihood of fatality or damage calculated, based on the impact probability criteria specified in PHAST RISK, for the type of consequence and the magnitude of the consequence. This calculation is repeated for each event tree alternate consequence outcome at each grid point, for that weather class / wind speed and wind direction, and the result added to the previous risk level, at each grid point. The above calculations are then repeated for each of the 16 wind directions, cumulatively adding to the risk level at each grid point. The above calculations are repeated for all day / night weather classes, wind speeds and wind directions, cumulatively adding these risk results at each grid point. Once all risk calculations at these grid points have been completed for the first failure case, the next failure case will be calculated, again adding all results cumulatively at each grid point. This is repeated until all failure cases have been calculated, while PHAST RISK also tracks the risk contribution made by each failure case at each grid point. Once completed, PHAST RISK produces individual risk contour results by linking points of equal risk, based on the pre-specified levels of individual fatality risk (or equipment damage) to be plotted, and using linear interpolation between relevant grid points. The risk contour results are super imposed on the electronic site map, entered in the PHAST RISK software. PHAST RISK can also produce societal risk results by comparing the calculated level of individual risk at all 40,000 grid points, and combining this with the number of people indoors and outdoors, entered by the risk analyst by location.

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MANAGING RISK The above discussion demonstrates that the meteorological data, ignition data and population data entered into the PHAST RISK software are critical to the risk results. Note that with default settings the risk modelling within PHAST RISK aims to produce conservative offsite fatality risk results. This is in line with the intention of performing a QRA as per the “Guidelines for QRA Study (Revision April 2008)” for a purpose of land-use planning. This is achieved by the build-in but programmable parameter settings, which include: Indoor & outdoor people fatality impact criteria levels, for each alternate consequence outcome. For flammable releases the alternate consequences would be spill fires, fire balls, jet fires, flash fires and vapour cloud explosions (VCEs), each with predefined values for the impact levels that will affect people. For jet fires, pool fires and fire balls the varying percentage fatalities (with distance) is calculated based on the Eisenberg Probit equation. For flash fires the LFL envelope is used and for VCE overpressure two impact criteria levels are used, 1.5 psi (0.1 barg) and 5 psi (0.34 barg). For jet fires, pool fires and fire balls the varying percentage fatalities (with distance) is calculated based on the Eisenberg Probit equation. For flash fires the LFL envelope is used and for VCE overpressure two impact criteria levels are used, 0.5(0.034) psi, 1.0 psi (0.068 barg) and 5 psi (0.34 barg). 4 built-in event trees (Continuous No Rain Out; Continuous With Rain Out; Instantaneous No Rain Out; Instantaneous With Rain Out) that are automatically selected based on the type of material and the release conditions. Each event-tree assigns a ‘split’ between alternate consequence outcomes (spill fires, fire balls, jet fires, flash fires, VCEs and no hazard), based on the immediate ignition, delayed ignition and no ignition probabilities. People vulnerability criteria, which pre-determines the fraction of fatalities resulting indoor & outdoor from being exposed to specific consequence outcomes for a specified duration, or to one or more specified criteria levels. The normal default people fatal fraction impact criteria used in PHAST RISK are shown in the below table.

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MANAGING RISK Table 3-1 PHAST RISK Default Vulnerability Parameters

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Annexe 2 Assumption Register

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Table of Contents

1

RISK CALCULATION TOOL ..................................................................................... 1

2

METEOROLOGICAL DATA ...................................................................................... 2 2.1 Day Weather Class.................................................................................................. 2 2.2 Night Weather Class ............................................................................................... 2

3

IGNITION ...................................................................................................................... 4 3.1.1 Identification of Ignition Sources ...................................................................... 5

4

POPULATION ............................................................................................................... 5

5

MATERIAL COMPOSITION ...................................................................................... 5

6

IMPACT CRITERIA..................................................................................................... 6 6.1 Jet fire, pool fire and fireball ................................................................................... 6 6.2 Flash fire................................................................................................................. 6 6.3 Explosion................................................................................................................ 6

7

RELEASE SIZES........................................................................................................... 7

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1

RISK CALCULATION TOOL

The risk analysis within this study is conducted using DNV Software’s Phast Risk program Version 6.7, which is an industry standard method for carrying out QRA of onshore process and pipelines (chemical and petrochemical) facilities.

- Phast Risk allows efficient identification of major risk contributors, so that time and effort can then be directed to mitigating these highest risk activities. - Phast Risk analyses complex consequences from accident scenarios, taking account of local population, land usage and weather conditions, to quantify the risk associated with the release of hazardous materials. - Phast Risk incorporates the industry standard consequence modeling of Phast.

Phast Risk is intended as a set of models for risk analysts to enable them to provide timely, accurate and appropriate advice on safety related issues. It models all stages of a release from outflow through a hole or from a pipe end, through atmospheric dispersion, rain-out and re-evaporation of liquid, to thermal radiation from fires, explosion overpressures and toxic lethality. PhastRisk combines recognized and validated models for the various physical phenomena, automatically selecting the appropriate model depending on the circumstances of the release. It provides an experienced risk analyst with a tool that allows them to focus their attention and experience on the real problem areas rather than the administration of large quantities of data.

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2

METEOROLOGICAL DATA

Data on the wind speed and stability category have been obtained from the client and this will be used for this particular QRA study. There are two different weather classes for Day and Night which are listed below:

2.1 Day Weather Class - D11 : D stability (neutral) and 11 m/s wind speed. - B2 : B stability (Unstable) and 2 m/s wind speed.

2.2 Night Weather Class - D11 : D stability (neutral) and 11 m/s wind speed. - F3

: F stability (very stable) and 3 m/s wind speed.

This distribution is combined with the wind rose information to generate likelihood for the wind to be from a particular direction and of a specified speed and stability. Table 2-1: Wind Speed Distribution (Day)

Wind Direction N NE E SE S SW W NW Calm

Weather Categories 3B 5D 0.042958904 0.00460274 0.042958904 0.00460274 0.104328767 0.011178082 0.024547945 0.002630137 0.006136986 0.000657534 0.018410959 0.001972603 0.085917808 0.009205479 0.110465753 0.011835616 0.177972603 0.019068493

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MANAGING RISK Table 2-2: Wind Speed Distribution (Night)

Wind Direction N NE E SE S SW W NW Calm

Weather Categories 3B 5D 0.060931507 0.005041096 0.038082192 0.003150685 0.060931507 0.005041096 0.038082192 0.003150685 0.022849315 0.001890411 0.060931507 0.005041096 0.167561644 0.013863014 0.190410959 0.015753425 0.121863014 0.010082192

Referring to the same study, the following meteorological parameters will be applied: An average ambient condition as follow is used in the study: - Atmospheric temperature

: 15-25°C

- Surface temperature

: 15-25°C

- Humidity

: 70%

- Solar radiation flux

: 0.5kw/m2 for day and 0kw/m2 for night

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3

IGNITION

In order to calculate the risk from flammable materials, information on the ignition sources (which are present in the area over which a flammable cloud may drift) is required. For each ignition source considered, the following factors need to be specified: Presence Factor This is the probability that an ignition source is active at a particular location. Ignition Factor This defines the “strength” of an ignition source. It is derived from the probability that a source will ignite a cloud if the cloud is present over the source for a particular length of time. - Location -

The location of each ignition source must be specified on the site layout. This allows the position of the source relative to the location of each release to be calculated. The results of the dispersion calculations for each flammable release are then used to determine the size and mass of the cloud when it reaches the source of ignition. If these factors are known for each source of ignition considered, then the probability of a flammable cloud being ignited as it moves downwind over the sources can be calculated. The data is entered into the risk quantification software, namely PHAST RISK, for each source (as that used for population data). The PHAST RISK software then calculates equivalent combined ignition factors and presence factors for all sources based on its location on the map. Ignition sources in a QRA study may be of 3 types: Point sources

Known specific sources such as flares, workshops, etc.

Line sources

Roads, railways, electrical transmission lines.

Area sources

Population, industrial sites where location of specific ignition sources is unknown.

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3.1.1 Identification of Ignition Sources The ignition sources identified for the proposed expansion project are near-by Industrial plants and onsite ignition sources like hot machinery surfaces, electrical sources. No specific field survey is performed for the neighbouring industrial plants in this risk study; however, generally a process petro-chemical plant has various types of ignition sources on-site, e.g. hot work, hot surface, flare, turbine, compressor and vehicles movement etc. In summary, the ignition sources considered in this QRA study are listed below:

- It is assumed that stringent ignition control is maintained, as is the standard prevailing in the HPCL Bharatpur - Entire Complex has been considered as Ignition source with ignition probability 0.9 and operating probability 0.1 as per DNV Technical Note.

4

POPULATION

A representative estimate of the exposed populations is sufficient to determine the acceptability of societal risks by determining the order of magnitude of potential fatalities within a population group. The basis of the population assigned to the facility will be based on the data given by HPCL Bharatpur. Further analysis of the population will be conducted in order to define various factors associated with the population presence, e.g. day/night variation, fraction of time spent indoor etc.

5

MATERIAL COMPOSITION

The material composition used for the study is provided by HPCL Bharatpur.

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6

IMPACT CRITERIA

The following impact criteria are used.

6.1 Jet fire, pool fire and fireball Two sets of criteria are used to determine impact from combination of these events. Areas exposed to radiation levels of 37.5 kW/m2 are assumed to give 100% fatality level. The fatality levels in areas exposed to lower radiation levels are determined using the following Probit function. Pr = -36.38 + 2.56 ln(I1.333 . t) Where: Pr : Probit I : thermal radiation level in W/m2 t : exposure duration in second The maximum exposure duration for these events is set to 20 seconds. This is assumed as the time that someone will remain within the radiation envelope before attempting to escape.

6.2 Flash fire The area within the LFL envelope of flammable vapor cloud is used as single value criteria and it is assumed that this area gives 100% fatality level.

6.3 Explosion The study applies the TNT Correlation Model which utilizes two fixed coefficients to establish ranges to specified damage levels (these coefficients are 0.03 for heavy damage to buildings and 0.06 for repairable damage to buildings). These damage levels are not explicitly associated with overpressure levels but are generally considered to be equivalent to 0.3 and 0.1 bar for heavy and repairable damage, respectively. The damage levels are used as single criteria to establish the human fatality rate. Fatality modification factors are also applied and are combined with the above impact criteria to produce the final fatality rate resulted from each type of consequence. Separate factors are used for people being outdoors at the time of the event and for people inside a building. The parameters considered for Explosion are following: - Explosion location criterion: Cloud Centroid - The minimum explosive mass considered: 100 Kg. Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 6

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7

RELEASE SIZES

The following representative leak sizes have been applied: Release Sizes: - Small release through 5 mm equivalent hole, representative of 3 to 10 mm hole sizes. - Medium release through 25 mm hole, representative of 10 to 50 mm hole sizes. - Large release through 100 mm hole, representative of 50 to 100 mm hole sizes. - Catastrophic Rupture at vessel diameter/ Full bore release at pipeline diameter, representative of releases larger than 150mm.

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Annexe 3 Frequency Analysis

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Table of Contents 1

2

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION ...................................................................................... 3 1.1

Failure case scenarios ............................................................................................. 3

1.2

Continuous Releases ............................................................................................... 5

1.3

Instantaneous Releases............................................................................................ 5

1.4

Events which could lead to a Release ...................................................................... 5

1.5

Failure Cases .......................................................................................................... 6

1.6

Release duration ..................................................................................................... 8

FREQUENCY DISCUSSION ....................................................................................... 8

List of Tables Table 1-1 : Failure case scenarios ............................................................................................................................ 3 Table 1-2 : List of Failure Cases ............................................................................................................................. 6 Table 2-1 : Failure frequencies of the identified scenarios ...................................................................................... 9

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page ii

DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK

1

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

1.1 Failure case scenarios Following scenarios have been identified for the Bharatpur Table 1-1 : Failure case scenarios Sr. No 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

Failure Case TK-1 TK-2 TK-3 TK-4 TK-5 TK-6 TK-7/UG TK-8/UG TK-9/UG TK-10 TK-11 TK-12 TK-13 TK-14 TK-15 TK-16 TK-17 TK-18 HSD Pump_2400 LPM SKD Pump_1200 LPM MS Pump 2400 LPM Receipt Pipeline to Tank MS Receipt Pipeline to Tank HSD Receipt Pipeline to Tank SKO

Material Handled HSD HSD SKO SKO MS MS MS MS HSD WATER WATER HSD HSD MS MS MS HSD HSD HSD SKO MS MS HSD SKO

Temp ambient ambient ambient ambient ambient ambient ambient ambient ambient ambient ambient ambient ambient ambient ambient ambient ambient ambient ambient ambient ambient ambient ambient ambient

Pressure atmospheric atmospheric atmospheric atmospheric atmospheric atmospheric atmospheric atmospheric atmospheric atmospheric atmospheric atmospheric atmospheric atmospheric atmospheric atmospheric atmospheric atmospheric 2.5bar 2.5bar 2.5bar 2.5bar 2.5bar 2.5bar

25

pl from tank to pump house_MS

MS

ambient

2.5bar

26

PL from tank to pump house_HSD

HSD

ambient

2.5bar

27

PL from tank to pump house_SKO

SKO

ambient

2.5bar

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 3

DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK

Sr. No

Failure Case

Material Handled

Temp

Pressure

28

PL from pump house to gantry_MS

MS

ambient

2.5bar

29

PL from pump house to gantry_SKO

SKO

ambient

2.5bar

30

PLfrom pump house to gantry_HSD

HSD

ambient

2.5bar

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 4

DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK

1.2 Continuous Releases If ignited immediately, a continuous release will form a jet fire. If ignition is delayed, a flammable cloud would be formed and drifted with the wind. In such situation, if the cloud is ignited (after some delays), a flash fire or Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE) may result, depending upon the degree of congestion within area and energy strength of the ignition source.

1.3 Instantaneous Releases An instantaneous release would result from catastrophic rupture of a storage vessel (such as the storage cylinders, the trailers etc.) or reactors. If ignition is immediate, a fireball may be formed depending on the nature of the material. If ignition occurs after some delay similar to continuous release, a flash fire or VCE may be the consequence.

1.4 Events which could lead to a Release Releases can be caused by: - Impact event; - Natural event (e.g. tide, waves, tsunamis, strong winds); - Failure or leak from other equipment, pipe-work or fittings; - Internal explosion in ship; - Incorrect operation; - Release occasioned from other operations or maintenance; - Vandalism/sabotage

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 5

DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK

1.5 Failure Cases The failure cases with the hole sizes considered for each of the release is as follows Table 1-2 : List of Failure Cases Sr. No

Failure Case

Hole Size (mm) Small

Medium

Large

Cata/ FBR

Tank Fire Tank Fire

1

TK-1

5mm

NA

100 mm

catastrophic Rupture

2

TK-2

5mm

NA

100 mm

catastrophic Rupture

Tank Fire

3

TK-3

5mm

NA

100 mm

catastrophic Rupture

Tank Fire Tank Fire

4

TK-4

5mm

NA

100 mm

catastrophic Rupture

5

TK-5

5mm

NA

100 mm

catastrophic Rupture

Tank Fire

6

TK-6

5mm

NA

100 mm

catastrophic Rupture

Tank Fire

7

TK-7/UG

5mm

NA

NA

catastrophic Rupture

NA

8

TK-8/UG

5mm

NA

NA

catastrophic Rupture

NA NA

9

TK-9/UG

5mm

NA

NA

catastrophic Rupture

10

TK-10

5mm

NA

100 mm

catastrophic Rupture

Tank Fire

11

TK-11

5mm

NA

100 mm

catastrophic Rupture

Tank Fire

12

TK-12

5mm

NA

100 mm

catastrophic Rupture

Tank Fire

13

TK-13

5mm

NA

100 mm

catastrophic Rupture

Tank Fire

14

TK-14

5mm

NA

100 mm

catastrophic Rupture

Tank Fire

15

TK-15

5mm

NA

100 mm

catastrophic Rupture

Tank Fire

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 6

DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK Sr. No

Failure Case

Hole Size (mm) Small

Medium

Large

Cata/ FBR

Tank Fire

16

TK-16

5mm

NA

100 mm

catastrophic Rupture

Tank Fire

17

TK-17

5mm

NA

100 mm

catastrophic Rupture

Tank Fire

18 19 20 21

5mm NA NA NA

NA NA NA NA

100 mm NA NA NA

catastrophic Rupture FBR FBR FBR

Tank Fire NA NA NA

5mm

25mm

100 mm

FBR

NA

5mm

25mm

100 mm

FBR

NA

24

TK-18 HSD Pump_2400 LPM SKD Pump_1200 LPM MS Pump 2400 LPM Receipt Pipeline to Tank MS Receipt Pipeline to Tank HSD Receipt Pipeline to Tank SKO

5mm

25mm

100 mm

FBR

NA

25

pl from tank to pump house_MS

5mm

25mm

100 mm

FBR

NA

26

PL from tank to pump house_HSD

5mm

25mm

100 mm

FBR

NA

27

PL from tank to pump house_SKO

5mm

25mm

100 mm

FBR

NA

28

PL from pump house to gantry_MS

5mm

25mm

100 mm

FBR

NA

29

PL from pump house to gantry_SKO

5mm

25mm

100 mm

FBR

NA

30

PLfrom pump house to gantry_HSD

5mm

25mm

100 mm

FBR

NA

22 23

NA stands for “Not Applicable”

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 7

DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK

1.6 Release duration Release duration of 600 seconds is chosen for this study. This includes the time to detect, isolate and the subsequent blow down (if possible) of the node from which leak occurs. After the leak is detected and the section is isolated it is understood that no more inventory is entering the section.

2

FREQUENCY DISCUSSION

Estimation of the likelihood of occurrence of each of the failure cases modelled has been done based on historical failure frequencies of process equipment. The historical failure data are based on an extensive research by DNV on several failure frequency databases worldwide. DNV has ensured that the most reputable, comprehensive and appropriate data are selected for each of the equipment failure frequencies quoted. The below Table shows the failure frequencies that are considered for the failure case scenarios

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 8

DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK Table 2-1 : Failure frequencies of the identified scenarios Case Description

Small

Medium

Large

FBR

2.50E-03

1.00E-04

5.00E-06

2.00E-03

3.80E-04

4.30E-05

8.40E-06

1.00E-05

9.00E-07

1.10E-06

2.50E-07

5.60E-08

9.00E-07

1.10E-06

2.50E-07

5.60E-08

0

0

0

3.00E-05

HSD, SKD, MS loading arm Failure

7.80E-03

1.80E-02

7.10E-03

1.40E-03

HSD,SKD, MS Road Tanker Failure

9.00E-05

9.00E-05

1.00E-05

5.00E-07

Atmospheric Storage tank Failure Underground Tank Failure Pipeline from Tank to Pump House Receipt Lines to Tanks HSD, SKD, Ethanol, MS pump failure

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 9

DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK

Annexe 4 Consequence Analysis

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page i

DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK

Table of Contents 1

CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENT ................................................................................ 4 1.1 Pool Fire ................................................................................................................. 5 1.2 Jet Fire .................................................................................................................... 6 1.3 Flash Fire ................................................................................................................ 7 1.4 Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE).............................................................................. 8

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page ii

DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK

List of Tables Table 1-1 : Consequence Results............................................................................................................................. 9

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page iii

DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK

1

CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENT

For each defined failure case for the POL Terminal Bharatpur, the consequence modelling is carried out to determine the potential effects of releases, the results of which are discussed in terms of hazard distances. The corresponding consequences in terms of flammable and explosive effects are modelled and analysed by using PHAST RISK software version 6.7. The flammable consequences that may potentially arise from failure of equipment’s or lines are: - Jet fires; - Flash fires; - Fireball; and/or - Explosions. The hazard distances for each event depend on the leak size, operating conditions, weather conditions, the release location, the release conditions and the dispersion characteristics as calculated by the PHAST RISK software. Each failure case is entered into PHAST RISK software, where the corresponding consequences and risk impact are calculated, based on built-in programmable event trees. The dispersion of gas releases from different hole sizes are modelled using state-of-art methods. For flammable and explosive consequence, the effect zones for the various possible outcomes of such a release are determined for both early and delayed ignition presents the consequence hazard distances for the failure case scenarios identified in the POL Terminal Bharatpur. Consequence distances for the following weather conditions have been evaluated in the tables below, - D11 : D stability (neutral) and 11 m/s wind speed. - F3

: F stability (very stable) and 3 m/s wind speed.

- B3 : B Stability (Unstable) and 3 m/s wind speed

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 4

DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK

The consequence analysis is performed using DNV proprietary software PHAST. PHAST is a consequence and impact assessment module integrated within DNV risk calculation software PHAST Risk. The following descriptions are based on the different hazard types modeled, which are jet fires, flash fires, vapor cloud explosions, pool fires.

1.1

Pool Fire

A pool fire in the open air and in an enclosed area may take place when there is an ignition of a liquid spill which is released on a horizontal, solid surface in the open air or within an enclosure. A liquid pool fire can be either fuel controlled or ventilation controlled. In general terms, outside pool fires rarely cause fatalities as the time between when the fire starts until the time when the fire is fully developed is usually sufficient for people to escape. If there are fatalities, these tend to be people caught within the pool itself or later fire fighting personnel in the event of a boil-over (due to burning oil not thermal radiation). The extent of the consequence of a Pool fire is represented by the thermal radiation envelope. Three levels of radiation are presented in this report, i.e.: - 4 kW/m2; this level is sufficient to cause personnel if unable to reach cover within 20s; however blistering of the skin (second degree burn) is likely; 0: lethality. - 12.5 kW/m2; this level will cause extreme pain within 20 seconds and movement to a safer place is instinctive. This level indicates around 6% fatality for 20 seconds exposure. - 37.5 kW/m2; this level of radiation is assumed to give 100% fatality. In Case of tanks small, medium leaks are considered from the fittings around the tanks like flanges, valves etc, and tank fire and bund fire scenarios are considered as the worst case scenarios. Table 1-1 below summarises representative failure cases with the associated pool fire consequence results.

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 5

DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur

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1.2

Jet Fire

A jet fire may result from ignition of a high-pressure leakage of gas from process plants or storage tanks. Jet fires are characterized by a high momentum jet flame that is highly turbulent. The flame is lifted above the exit opening from which the gas is discharged generally at high pressure. This distance appears because the combustion process can only take place when the flow velocity is reduced sufficiently to allow stable combustion. Another feature of such fires is the high entrainment of air into the flame plume due to the highly turbulent flame. The extent of the consequence of a Jet fire is represented by the thermal radiation envelope. Three levels of radiation are presented in this report, i.e.: - 4 kW/m2; this level is sufficient to cause personnel if unable to reach cover within 20s; however blistering of the skin (second degree burn) is likely; 0: lethality, - 12.5 kW/m2; this level will cause extreme pain within 20 seconds and movement to a safer place is instinctive. This level indicates around 6% fatality for 20 seconds exposure. - 37.5 kW/m2; this level of radiation is assumed to give 100% fatality. Jet fires are a direct hazard to people and structures caught within the flame envelope or exposed to high thermal radiation levels. This scenario is considered for the whole boosting station in which material is handled at the significant pressures. Table 1-1 below summarises representative failure cases with the associated jet fire consequence results.

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 6

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1.3

Flash Fire

A flash fire is the non-explosive combustion of a flammable vapour cloud resulting from a release of volatile material into the open air, which, after mixing with air, ignites. The flame initially propagates slowly, often 10m/s or less, and in the Shell Maplin Sands experiments often was unable to overcome the wind speed to flash back to the source. However, where congestion or confinement exist, flame speeds can accelerate to hundreds of m/s and overpressure effects will result. The cloud burns as a flash fire and the major hazard to people and to equipment (especially control cabling) is for those within the burning envelope (including those who might be above on elevated structures). Flame duration and intensity for most flammable clouds are insufficient to cause a significant thermal radiation hazard outside the flame envelope. The literature provides little information on the effects of thermal radiation from flash fires, probably because thermal radiation hazards from burning vapour clouds are considered less significant than possible blast effects. Furthermore, flash combustion of a vapour cloud normally lasts no more than a few tens of seconds. Propane experiments (Maplin) gave average flame speeds of up to about 12 m/s. higher transient flame speeds, up to 28 m/s were observed in one instance. Pool Fire Formation of pools is also likely, particularly for materials that have high boiling points. Flash calculations were conducted to consider the vaporization of light components in the streams, especially for high pressure or high temperature process conditions. Flashed vapor and light component releases will behave as jets, with jet fire and vapor cloud impacts modelled in the same way as for gas releases, as set out in the previous sections. The extent of the consequence of a flash fire is represented by the flash fire envelope, i.e. the maximum dispersion distance of the flammable cloud at LFL concentration. Table 1-1 below summarises representative failure cases together with their flash fire consequence results.

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 7

DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur

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1.4

Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE)

Due to the large volume of flammable materials and highly flammable material with higher proportion of the more volatile components, there is significant potential for Vapour Cloud Explosion Events (VCE) in case any ignition source is not available immediately. Maximum flammable fuel volume for prediction of explosion overpressure effects estimated to be considerable based on flow rate, isolation time (10 mins), time for vaporization and probability of VCE scenario.

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 8

DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK Table 1-1 : Consequence Results Description TK-1 &2

TK-3&4

Accident Scenario Small

Event Flash Fire Pool Fire

Large

Flash Fire Pool Fire

Catastrophic Rupture

Flash Fire Pool fire

tank Fire

Pool fire

Small

Flash Fire Pool Fire

Large

Impact criteria LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2

Flash Fire Pool Fire

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 9

Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s

F 3m/s

3.2

3.4

2.9

7 11.3 15.7 7.1 26.2 35 76.7 54.9 37.4 38.7 92 NR 18 42

9.6 13.4 16.9 7.1 26.2 36 82 97 37.4 93 157 NR 21 46

6.8 11.1 15.4 7.1 26.2 35 76.7 73 37.4 38.7 92 NR 18 42

2.9

3.2

2.6

6.4 11.2 15.7 11 23.3 30.9

8.8 13.4 17 7.6 23.3 32

6.2 11 15.4 11 23.3 30.9

DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK Description

TK-5&6

Accident Scenario

Event

Catastrophic Rupture

Flash Fire Pool fire

tank Fire

Pool fire

Small

Flash Fire Pool Fire

Large

Flash Fire Pool Fire

Catastrophic Rupture

Flash Fire Pool fire

tank Fire

Pool fire

Impact criteria 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 10

Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s 73.3 85.4 21.1 30.7 37.4 37.4 38.9 41 97 115 6 6 19 23 31 33

F 3m/s 73.3 24 37.4 38.9 97 6 19 31

2.8

3

2.9

6.4 11.4 16 24.9 23 29.7 74.5 47.6 37.5 38.7 99.7 6 19 32

8.8 13.8 17.4 17.4 23 31.7 88.6 67.7 37.5 41 120 6 24 34

6.1 11 15.8 27.7 23 29.8 74.6 50.6 37.5 38.7 99.7 6 19 32

DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK Description

Accident Scenario

Event

Impact criteria

TK-7&8 /UG

Small

Flash Fire Pool Fire

Catastrophic Rupture

Flash Fire Pool fire

Small

Flash Fire Pool Fire

LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2

TK-9/UG

TK-12

Catastrophic Rupture

Flash Fire Pool fire

Small

Flash Fire Pool Fire

Large

Flash Fire Pool Fire

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 11

Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s NR NR 3 4 7 7.9 11 11 21.4 26.5 33.3 33.3 35 38 91 111

F 3m/s NR 3 7 11 18.5 33.3 35 91

NR

NR

NR

3

4

3

6 9.5 21.4 33.3 35 91

6.7 9.3 26.5 33.3 38 111

6.3 9.5 18.5 33.3 35 91

2.9

3

2.6

6.5 10.5 14.5 5.9 23.8 31.5

8.9 12.4 15.5 5.9 23.8 32.6

6.3 10.2 14 5.9 23.8 31.5

DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK Description

TK-13

Accident Scenario

Event

Catastrophic Rupture

Flash Fire Pool fire

tank Fire

Pool fire

Small

Flash Fire Pool Fire

Large

Flash Fire Pool Fire

Catastrophic Rupture

Flash Fire Pool fire

tank Fire

Pool fire

Impact criteria 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 12

Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s 70.5 79.2 22.7 33.8 37.4 37.4 38.7 41 92 104 6 6 17.5 20.5 28 29

F 3m/s 70.5 26.5 37.4 38.7 92 6 17.5 28

3.2

3.4

2.9

7.8 11.3 15.7 7.1 26.2 35 76.7 48.6 37.4 38.7 92 NR 18 38.7

9.6 13.4 16.9 7.1 26.2 36 86 84 37.4 85 149 NR 22 42

6.8 11 15.4 7.1 26.2 35 76.7 63.9 37.4 38 92 NR 18 38.7

DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK Description

Accident Scenario

Event

Impact criteria

TK-14

Small

Flash Fire Pool Fire

LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2

TK-15

Large

Flash Fire Pool Fire

Catastrophic Rupture

Flash Fire Pool fire

tank Fire

Pool fire

Small

Flash Fire Pool Fire

Large

Flash Fire Pool Fire

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 13

Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s

F 3m/s

2.8

3.1

2.6

6.4 11.4 16 24.9 23 29.7 74.5 24.9 23 29.7 74.5 6 19 32.4

8.8 13.8 17.4 17.4 22.9 31 88.6 17 23 31.7 88.6 6 24 34.9

6.1 11 15.8 27.7 23 29.8 74.6 27.7 23 29.8 74.6 6 19 32.4

3.3

3.5

3

7.1 12.7 17.8 31.4 26.2 35 83

9.8 15.3 19.4 23.4 26 36.4 98

6.8 12.4 17.5 35.2 26.3 35 83

DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK Description

TK-16

TK-17&18

Accident Scenario

Event

Impact criteria

Catastrophic Rupture

Flash Fire Pool fire

tank Fire

Pool fire

Small

Flash Fire Pool Fire

LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL

Large

Flash Fire Pool Fire

Catastrophic Rupture

Flash Fire Pool fire

tank Fire

Pool fire

Small

Flash Fire

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 14

Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s 104 170 37.4 37.4 38.7 86.4 99.7 166 NR NR 17.9 20.9 47.3 53.9

F 3m/s 141 37.4 38.7 99.7 NR 17.9 47.3

3.2

3.3

2.9

6.9 12.4 17.3 29.5 25.4 33.8 80.7 75 37.4 38.7 99.7 NR 18 41

9.4 14.9 18.8 21.6 25.4 35 95 118 37.4 41 120.7 NR 23.8 45.7

6.6 12 17 33 25.4 33 81 97 37.4 38.7 99.7 NR 18.3 41

3

3.2

3.7

DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK Description

HSD Pump

Accident Scenario

Event

Impact criteria

Pool Fire

37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2

Large

Flash Fire Pool Fire

Catastrophic Rupture

Flash Fire Pool fire

tank Fire

Pool fire

Rupture

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Pool fire

SKo Pump

Rupture

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 15

Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s 6.7 9.2 10.8 12.9 15 16 6.3 6.3 24.7 24.7 32.9 34 72.9 81.9 6.3 6.3 24.7 24.7 32.9 34 72.9 81.9 6 6 17.5 20.5 28 29 19 19.8 3.2 3.1 4.6 4.4 6.4 6.2 19.5 19.5 40.9 43.2 74.7 82.3 19.4 20.3 42 38.5

F 3m/s 6.4 10.5 15 6.3 24.7 32.9 72.9 6.3 24.7 32.9 72.9 6 17.5 28 19.4 3.1 4.5 6.2 19.5 40.3 74 18.6 40.8

DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK Description

Accident Scenario

Event

Impact criteria 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2

Pool fire

MS Pump

Rupture

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Pool fire

Ethanol Pump

Rupture

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Pool fire

Receipt Pipeline to Tank MS

Small

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 16

Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s 52.4 49 69.7 67 19.3 19.3 41 43.4 78.7 89.8 44.5 51.5 65 58.8 81.1 74.9 108 102 19.1 19.1 41.4 43.9 80.5 93.4 19.1 19.8 3.2 3.1 4.6 4.4 6.4 6.2 27 27.8 38 43.8 51.5 54.5 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR

F 3m/s 50.8 67.5 19.3 40.3 77.9 46.5 63.1 78.7 104 19.1 40.6 79.7 18.4 3.1 4.5 6.2 26.3 37.3 50.8 NR NR NR NR

DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK Description

Accident Scenario

Medium

Event

Impact criteria

Pool fire

37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Pool fire

Large

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Pool fire

Line Rupture

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Pool fire

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 17

Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s 4.4 5.5 11.6 13 18 18.3 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 8.9 8.9 18.3 23.2 42 46.7 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 19.2 19.2 21.7 23.4 60.8 72.9 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 19.3 19.3 21.7 23.2

F 3m/s 4.4 11.6 18 NR NR NR NR 8.9 18.3 42 NR NR NR NR 19.2 21.7 60.9 NR NR NR NR 19.3 21.7

DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK Description

Receipt Pipeline to Tank HSD

Accident Scenario

Small

Event

Impact criteria 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Pool fire

Medium

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Pool fire

Large

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Pool fire

Catastrophic Rupture

Flash Fire

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 18

Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s 60.9 73 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 4.4 5.5 11.6 13 18 18.3 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 8.9 8.9 18.3 23.2 42 46.7 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 19.2 19.2 21.7 23.4 60.8 72.9 NR NR

F 3m/s 60.8 NR NR NR NR 4.4 11.6 18 NR NR NR NR 8.9 18.3 42 NR NR NR NR 19.2 21.7 60.9 NR

DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK Description

Accident Scenario

Event

Impact criteria

Jet Fire

37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2

Pool fire

Receipt Pipeline to Tank FO

Small

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Pool fire

Medium

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Pool fire

Large

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 19

Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s NR NR NR NR NR NR 19.2 19.2 21.7 23.4 60.8 72.9 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 4.4 5.5 11.6 13 18 18.3 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 8.9 8.9 18.3 23.2 42 46.7 NR NR NR NR NR NR

F 3m/s NR NR NR 19.2 21.7 60.9 NR NR NR NR 4.4 11.6 18 NR NR NR NR 8.9 18.3 42 NR NR NR

DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK Description

Accident Scenario

Event

Impact criteria 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2

Pool fire

Line Rupture

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Pool fire

Receipt Pipeline to Tank SKO

Small

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Pool fire

Medium

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Pool fire Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 20

Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s NR NR 19.2 19.2 21.7 23.4 60.8 72.9 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 19.2 19.2 21.7 23.4 60.8 72.9 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 4.4 5.5 10 10.9 15.4 15.3 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 7.6 7.6

F 3m/s NR 19.2 21.7 60.9 NR NR NR NR 19.2 21.7 60.9 NR NR NR NR 4.4 10 15.4 NR NR NR NR 7.6

DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK Description

Accident Scenario

Large

Event

Impact criteria 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Pool fire

Line Rupture

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Pool fire

pl from tank to pump house_MS

Small

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Pool fire

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 21

Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s 18.8 23.5 31.8 33.8 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 7.6 7.6 18.8 23.5 31.8 33.8 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 7.6 7.6 18.8 23.5 31.8 33.8 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 4.4 5.5 11.6 13 18 18.3

F 3m/s 18.8 31.8 NR NR NR NR 7.6 18.8 31.8 NR NR NR NR 7.6 18.8 31.8 NR NR NR NR 4.4 11.6 18

DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK Description

Accident Scenario

Event

Impact criteria

Medium

Flash Fire Jet Fire

LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2

Pool fire

Large

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Pool fire

Line Rupture

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Pool fire

PL from tank to pump house_HSD

Small

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 22

Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 8.9 8.9 18.3 23.2 42 46.7 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 19.2 19.2 21.7 23.4 60.8 72.9 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 19.3 19.3 21.7 23.2 60.9 73 NR NR NR NR

F 3m/s NR NR NR NR 8.9 18.3 42 NR NR NR NR 19.2 21.7 60.9 NR NR NR NR 19.3 21.7 60.8 NR NR

DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK Description

Accident Scenario

Event

Impact criteria 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2

Pool fire

Medium

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Pool fire

large

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Pool fire

Line Rupture

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 23

Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s NR NR NR NR 4.4 5.5 11.6 13 18 18.3 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 8.9 8.9 18.3 23.2 42 46.7 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 19.2 19.2 21.7 23.4 60.8 72.9 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR

F 3m/s NR NR 4.4 11.6 18 NR NR NR NR 8.9 18.3 42 NR NR NR NR 19.2 21.7 60.9 NR NR NR NR

DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK Description

PL from tank to pump house_FO

Accident Scenario

Small

Event

Impact criteria

Pool fire

37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Pool fire

Medium

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Pool fire

large

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Pool fire

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 24

Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s 19.2 19.2 21.7 23.4 60.8 72.9 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 4.4 5.5 11.6 13 18 18.3 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 8.9 8.9 18.3 23.2 42 46.7 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 19.2 19.2 21.7 23.4

F 3m/s 19.2 21.7 60.9 NR NR NR NR 4.4 11.6 18 NR NR NR NR 8.9 18.3 42 NR NR NR NR 19.2 21.7

DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK Description

Accident Scenario

Line Rupture

Event

Impact criteria 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Pool fire

PL from tank to pump house_SKO

Small

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Pool fire

Medium

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Pool fire

large

Flash Fire

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 25

Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s 60.8 72.9 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 19.2 19.2 21.7 23.4 60.8 72.9 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 4.4 5.5 11.6 13 18 18.3 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 8.9 8.9 18.3 23.2 42 46.7 NR NR

F 3m/s 60.9 NR NR NR NR 19.2 21.7 60.9 NR NR NR NR 4.4 11.6 18 NR NR NR NR 8.9 18.3 42 NR

DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK Description

Accident Scenario

Event

Impact criteria

Jet Fire

37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2

Pool fire

Line Rupture

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Pool fire

PL from pump house to gantry_MS

Small

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Pool fire

Medium

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 26

Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s NR NR NR NR NR NR 19.2 19.2 21.7 23.4 60.8 72.9 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 19.3 19.3 21.7 23.2 60.9 73 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 4.4 5.5 11.6 13 18 18.3 NR NR NR NR NR NR

F 3m/s NR NR NR 19.2 21.7 60.9 NR NR NR NR 19.3 21.7 60.8 NR NR NR NR 4.4 11.6 18 NR NR NR

DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK Description

Accident Scenario

Event

Impact criteria 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2

Pool fire

large

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Pool fire

Line Rupture

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Pool fire

PL from pump house to gantry_SKO

Small

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Pool fire Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 27

Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s NR NR 8.9 8.9 18.3 23.2 42 46.7 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 19.2 19.2 21.7 23.4 60.8 72.9 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 19.3 19.3 21.7 23.2 60.9 73 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 4.4 5.5

F 3m/s NR 8.9 18.3 42 NR NR NR NR 19.2 21.7 60.9 NR NR NR NR 19.3 21.7 60.8 NR NR NR NR 4.4

DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK Description

Accident Scenario

Medium

Event

Impact criteria 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Pool fire

large

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Pool fire

Line Rupture

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Pool fire

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 28

Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s 11.6 13 18 18.3 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 8.9 8.9 18.3 23.2 42 46.7 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 19.2 19.2 21.7 23.4 60.8 72.9 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 19.3 19.3 21.7 23.2 60.9 73

F 3m/s 11.6 18 NR NR NR NR 8.9 18.3 42 NR NR NR NR 19.2 21.7 60.9 NR NR NR NR 19.3 21.7 60.8

DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK Description

Accident Scenario

Event

Impact criteria

PLfrom pump house to gantry_HSD

Small

Flash Fire Jet Fire

LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2

Pool fire

Medium

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Pool fire

large

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Pool fire

Line Rupture

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 29

Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 4.4 5.5 11.6 13 18 18.3 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 8.9 8.9 18.3 23.2 42 46.7 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 19.2 19.2 21.7 23.4 60.8 72.9 NR NR NR NR

F 3m/s NR NR NR NR 4.4 11.6 18 NR NR NR NR 8.9 18.3 42 NR NR NR NR 19.2 21.7 60.9 NR NR

DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK Description

Accident Scenario

Event

Impact criteria 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2

Pool fire

PLfrom pump house to gantry_FO

Small

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Pool fire

Medium

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Pool fire

large

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 30

Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s NR NR NR NR 19.2 19.2 21.7 23.4 60.8 72.9 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 4.4 5.5 11.6 13 18 18.3 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 8.9 8.9 18.3 23.2 42 46.7 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR

F 3m/s NR NR 19.2 21.7 60.9 NR NR NR NR 4.4 11.6 18 NR NR NR NR 8.9 18.3 42 NR NR NR NR

DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK Description

Accident Scenario

Line Rupture

Event

Impact criteria

Pool fire

37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Pool fire

Loading Arm

Small

Flash Fire Jet fire

Pool fire

Medium

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Pool fire

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 31

Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s 19.2 19.2 21.7 23.4 60.8 72.9 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 19.2 19.2 21.7 23.4 60.8 72.9 3.3 3.7 NR 2.1 3.7 3.4 5.2 4.7 5.9 9 9.4 12.1 12.5 14.6 6 6.7 12.6 11.7 15.5 14.6 20.3 19.5 8.7 10.3 12.1 13.4

F 3m/s 19.2 21.7 60.9 NR NR NR NR 19.2 21.7 60.9 3.6 NR 3.7 5.2 6.3 9.7 12.8 6 12.6 15.5 20.3 8.7 12.2

DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK Description

Accident Scenario

Line Rupture

Event

Impact criteria 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Pool fire

HSD Tanker

Small

Flash Fire Pool fire

Medium

Flash Fire Pool fire

Large

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Pool fire

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 32

Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s 15.3 15.8 25.7 22.6 36.3 35.8 44.7 45 58.9 60.8 12.2 11.9 15.7 15.1 18.9 17.6 3.3 3.7 11.5 13.3 22.2 29.3 36.1 40 6.1 6.7 31.9 31.9 39.5 41.2 86.5 97.9 8.7 8.8 NR NR 1.3 1.8 2.6 2.9 31.8 31.8 41.9 43.3 88.9 99.9

F 3m/s 15.3 24.5 37.5 46.4 61 12.3 15.8 19 3.6 11.8 22.5 36.5 6.2 31.9 39.62 86.6 8.7 NR 1.4 2.7 31.8 41.9 88.9

DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK Description

MS Tanker

Accident Scenario

Event

Impact criteria

Tank Rupture

Flash Fire Pool fire

Small

Flash Fire Jet Fire

LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2

Pool fire

Medium

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Pool fire

Large

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Pool fire Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 33

Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s 14.7 17.8 31.9 31.9 35.9 40.94 82.9 97.55 3.3 3.7 NR 2.1 3.7 3.4 5.2 4.7 10.2 11.9 22.5 30.7 38.45 41.9 28 13.5 12.6 11.7 15.5 14.9 20.3 19.5 27.8 27.8 35.4 35.4 84.8 97 42 28 30 30.7 37.6 38.5 49.4 51.9 31.3 31.3

F 3m/s 13.3 31.9 35 82.11 3.6 NR 3.8 5.3 10.4 22.8 38.3 23 12.9 15.9 20.7 27.8 34.5 83.4 36 31.6 39 51.2 31.3

DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK Description

SKO Tanker

Accident Scenario

Event

Tank Rupture

Flash Fire Pool fire

Small

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Impact criteria 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2

Pool fire

Medium

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Pool fire

Large

Flash Fire Jet Fire

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 34

Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s 41.3 42.7 95 113 25.7 43 31.6 31.6 34.7 38.6 88.7 109.6 3.3 3.8 NR NR 1.7 1.5 3 2.8 10.9 12.7 22.3 30.9 38.5 42.7 16 8 7.7 7.1 9.7 9.11 12.7 12.2 30.3 30.3 37.6 39.3 88.1 102 12.7 10.4 19.3 19.5 23.85 24.53

F 3m/s 41.2 94.98 26 31.6 34.7 88.7 3.6 NR 1.8 3.1 11.2 22.7 38.6 14 7.9 9.9 12.9 30.3 37.4 87.5 12.6 20 24.57

DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK Description

Accident Scenario

Event

Impact criteria 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2

Pool fire

Tank Rupture

Flash Fire Pool fire

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 35

Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s 31.2 32.98 31.5 31.5 41.6 43 93.4 109 11.5 14.3 31.7 31.7 34.9 39 86.9 105

F 3m/s 32.45 31.5 41.6 93.4 10.9 31.7 86 34.3

DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK

Figure 1: Flash fire damage distance due to catastrophic rupture of TK-1 at 3F weather condition

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 36

DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK

Figure 2: Pool fire damage distance due to catastrophic rupture of TK-1 at 3F weather condition

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 37

DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK

Figure 3: Flash fire damage distance due to catastrophic rupture of TK-13 at 3F weather condition

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 38

DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK

Figure 4: Pool fire damage distance due to catastrophic rupture of TK-13 at 3F weather condition Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 39

DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK

Figure 5: Flash fire damage distance due to catastrophic rupture of TK-15 at 3F weather condition

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 40

DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK

Figure 6: Pool fire damage distance due to catastrophic rupture of TK-15 at 3F weather condition

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 41