Homo Ludens Revisited

Homo Ludens Revisited Author(s): Jacques Ehrmann, Cathy Lewis, Phil Lewis Source: Yale French Studies, No. 41, Game, Play, Literature (1968), pp. 31-57 Published by: Yale University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2929664 . Accessed: 21/05/2011 09:05 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at . http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=yale. . Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

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JacquesEhrmann Homo Ludens revisited

In writingabout play, it is impossibleto ignore Huizinga's book, Homo Ludens1,whichinauguratesan anthropology of play expressing views of remarkablescope and insight.Huizinga is in fact the first in a systematic to have undertaken, way,to establishcertainrelationships betweenvarious human activities(law, war, poetry,art, etc.) whichat firstglance mightappear to have nothingin common.His greatmeritis specificallyto have discoveredin the play-elementof these activitiesa commondenominatorand an importantfactorof culture.Extending,completingtheground-breaking workof Huizinga but also modifying and contesting certainof his theses,Roger Caillois criticizesHuizinga's conceptionand definition of play as being simultaneouslytoo broad and too narrow.2 Too narrowinsofaras Huizinga retainsonly one characteristic of play,its competitiveaspect,whereasaccordingto Caillois's typology play falls into four basic categories (agon: competition;alea: chance; mimicry:simulation;ilinx:vertigo); theseare subjectto anotherclassificationsuperimposedon the first,a continuumrunning fromludus (controlledplay) to paidia (spontaneousplay). Too broad insofaras Huizinga fails to delineatewithprecision the sphere of play, to draw the line betweenthat which,in each culture,belongsto the domainof play and thatwhichbelongsto the domain of the "sacred," the "institutional." 'French translationfrom the Dutch by CUcile Seresia, Gallimard, 1951. The original text was published in 1938. The page numbers given in parenthesisafter the quotations refer to the French edition. 2As Caillois has published the same texts (with modificationswhich appear minor in as much as they do not affecthis thesis) twice or even three times (once in the form of articles in various reviews,again in his book Les jeux et les hommes, a third time in the volume of the Encyclopedie of La Pleiade devoted to "Sports and Games"), we will refer to his book Les jeux et les hommes, Gallimard, 1958, assuming that it representsthe most complete expression of his thought on this problem. The page numbers given in parenthesesfollowingthe quotations referto the pocket edition. For his critiqueof Huizinga's definitionof play, cf. p. 33.

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Yale FrenchStudies If Caillois has to his creditthe discoveryof certainaspects of play neglectedby Huizinga,his debit,so to speak, is to have been too categorical,to have succumbedto his own classifications, believing thathe could confineplay withinthem.On the otherhand, even if Huizinga erredin limitingplay to one of its characteristics (competition),he had the meritof perceivingthatplay could not be enclosed in a separatedomain,identifiable as such amonghumanactivities.Indeed, fallingpreyto a sort of hesitationas he concludes,he looks back on the theseshe has been advancingand, withcreditable honesty,insteadof maskinghis inabilityto delimitthe fieldof play in culture,he exposes it in theseterms: of the Here once again is revealedthe troublinginsolubility problem: play or seriousness.We have graduallybecome convincedthatcultureis groundedin noble play, and thatit cannotneglectthe play-elementand stilldisplayits supreme qualityof styleand dignity.Observance of the established rules is nowhereso indispensableas in the relationshipbetweenpeoples and States. If the rules are violated,society fallsintobarbarismand chaos. On the otherhand, we judge thatit is specifically in war thatman lapses intothe agonistic attitudewhich gave formand meaningto primitivegames playedforthe sake of prestige.(p. 335) Play or seriousness.This alternativeis sometimestreatedas a dialectic:play and seriousnesswhich,in turn,impliesa whole series of others:gratuitousness and/orutility;play and/orwork;play and/ or everydaylife; the imaginaryand/or the real; etc. . . . The conceptshere placed in oppositionor in parallel are foundconstantlyin Huizinga- as in Caillois,moreover,and in an even morepronounced of play lead him, and classifications way, since the latter'sdefinition as we have indicated,to delimittoo categoricallythe sphereof play by opposingit to the real,to work,and so forth. Thus, althoughthere are divergencesbetween Huizinga and Caillois (where the one findstransitionbetween spheresthe other sees division), these appear secondaryonce we have observedthat 32

JacquesEhrmann rationalist theyare based on the same world-view,a fundamentally view accordingto whichhumanactivitiesrelate,on the one hand, to dreams,gratuitousness, nobility,imagination,etc. and on the other to consciousness,utility,instinct, reality,etc. A profoundlyconsequential cleavage. Each of these terms, loaded withmeaningand tacit implications,evidentlyneeds quotation marksto sustain itself (is it the sign of unacknowledgeduneasinessiftheseauthorsuse themabundantlywhenevertheyare concernedwith"ordinarylife," "reality,"and all theirsynonyms?)and to sustainthe assault of efforts to question,to define,to analyze efforts which,to be sure, are neverundertaken. For finally,if the statusof "ordinarylife," of "reality,"is not throwninto questionin the verymovementof thoughtgivenover to play,thetheoretical, bases on whichthis logical,and anthropological thinkingis based can only be extremelyprecariousand contestable. In other words, we are criticizingthese authors chieflyand most seriouslyforconsidering"reality,"the "real," as a givencomponent of the problem,as a referent needingno discussion,as a matterof course,neutraland objective.They defineplay in oppositionto, on the basis of, or in relationto this so-called reality.As the criteria againstwhichplay is measuredare externalto it, its natureremains necessarilysecond in relationto the "reality"thatservesas its yardstickand is thereforeconsidered"primary"(cf. Huizinga: "Play always representssomething,"p. 35). But it is legitimateto wonder by what right"reality"may be said to be first,existingpriorto its components- play in this case (althoughit mightjust as well be some other object of the social sciences) - and servingas their standard.How could "reality"serveas a normand therebyguarantee normalityeven before having been tested and evaluated in and throughits manifestations? For - we need not insiston it - there is no "reality"(ordinaryor extraordinary!)outsideof or priorto the manifestations of the culturethatexpressesit. The problemof play is thereforenot linkedto the problemof "reality,"itselflinkedto the problemof culture.It is one and the same problem.In seekinga solutionit would be methodologically un33

Yale FrenchStudies sound to proceed as if play were a variation,a commentary on, an interpretation, or a reproduction of this reality.To pretendthatplay is mimesiswould supposetheproblemsolvedbeforeit had even been formulated.It is essentialthen to reversethe order of the analysis noteis valid not onlyforthestudyof play but for (thisprecautionary all other objects of inquiryin the social sciences). This "reality" which is consideredinnocentand behind whose objectivitysome scholarssheepishlytake shelter,mustnot be the starting-point of any analysisbut must ratherbe its finaloutcome. A necessarilydisappointingoutcome,because it is impalpableand fleetingto the extent thatit is dissolvedin the manifestations analyzed,i.e. to the extent thatit has no othercontentbeyondthesemanifestations. We shall attemptto show this througha critique,firstof the play-reality relationship, thenof the play-culture relationship, as seen in Huizinga,Caillois, and the linguistBenveniste.3

I. "Reality," Play, The Sacred of play It willbe simplestto beginwiththe respectivedefinitions givenby theseauthors. Huizinga: From the standpointof form,we can defineplay in shortas a free activity,experiencedas "make-believe"and situated outsideof everydaylife,neverthelesscapable of totallyabsorbingthe player; an activityentirelylacking in material interestand in utility.It transpiresin an explicitlycircumscribedtime and space, is carriedout in an orderlyfashion accordingto givenrules,and givesrise to grouprelationships whichoftensurroundthemselveswithmysteryor emphasize fromthe ordinaryworld. throughdisguisestheirdifference (pp. 34-35) 3Emile Benveniste,"Le jeu comme structure,"Deucalion, 1947, no. 2, pp. 161-167.

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JacquesEhrmann Caillois: . . . the precedinganalysis allows us to defineplay as an activitywhichis essentially: 1. free: the playercannotbe obliged to participatewithout robbingplay of its natureas alluringand joyfuldiversion; 2. separate: it is circumscribedwithinlimitsof space and timewhichare preciseand fixedin advance; 3. uncertain:itscoursecannotbe determined norits outcome reached in advance, a certainlatitudefor innovationbeing leftnecessarilyto the initiativeof the player; 4. unproductive:it createsneithergoods nor wealthnor new elementsof any kind; and, exceptforredistribution of property withinthe circle of players,it results in a situation identicalto thatwithwhichit began; 5. controlled: it is subject to conventionswhich suspend ordinarylaws and introducetemporarilya new body of legislationendowedwithexclusiveauthority; 6. fictive;it is accompanied by a specificawareness of a second realityor of straightforward unrealityin relationto everydaylife. Benveniste: Beforeoffering his definition, Benvenisteis carefulto show the "deep-seated relationship"existingbetween play and the sacred: "The sacred presupposesa reality,thatof the divine;throughritual, the faithfulare introducedto a separate world,more real than the trueworld [sic]. Play, on the contrary,can be unhesitatingly distinguishedfromthe real. The sacred may be seen as pertainingto the surreal,play to the extra-real.In addition,the sacred operationhas a practicalend. . . Play in itselfhas no practicalgoal; its essence lies in its verygratuitousness." (p. 164) Here now is his definition: In shortwe have the elementsof a structuraldefinitionof play. It originatesin the sacred,of whichit offersan inverted and brokenimage. If the sacred can be definedby the con35

Yale FrenchStudies substantialunityof mythand rite,we can say thatthereis play whenonlyhalfof the sacred operationis carriedout when the mythalone is translatedinto words, or the rite alone into acts. We are thus outsidethe devine and human Play understoodin thisway will have sphereof the efficient. twoforms:jocique, whenthemythis reducedto its own contentand separatedfromits rites; ludique, when the rite is practicedfor itselfand separatedfromits myth.From this dual standpoint,play incarnateseach of the two halves into play characterwhichsacredceremonyis split.Furthermore, isticallyrecomposes,throughmakebelieve,themissinghalfin each of itstwo forms:in word play,we act as if some actual realityshouldresult;in physicalplay,we act as if motivated by a rationalreality.This fictionallows the acts and the wordsto be consistent,in an autonomousworldwhichconventionshave protectedfromthe fatalitiesof the real world. (pp. 165-166) it is apparentthatthe zone of play is In each of thesedefinitions caught,like limbo,betweenthe hell of "reality"subject to instincts and theparadiseof the sacred,of the divine.Thus, fortheseauthors, one escapes fromplayeithertowardthelowerrealm (reality,practical life) or towardthe higher(the sacred, divineefficiency)- with,as we shall note, the moral implicationsborne by the termshigh,low, sacred,reality. 1. Play - "ordinaryreality" Huizinga,forexample,explainsthatplay "representsa combat or a contest."Representsin the sense of showingoff,as the peacock lets himselfbe seen whenhe struts."If the bird adds dance steps,it of becomesa spectacle,an evasionof ordinaryreality,a transposition thisrealityto a higherplane. We do notknowwhatis goingon at this point in the animal's head. Very early in human childhood,such are alreadyfullof imagination.The childis representrepresentations ing somethingelse, somethingmore beautiful,nobler or more dangerousthanwhathe usuallyis." (p. 35) (our italics) 36

JacquesEhrmann Withouttryingtoo assiduouslyto understandhow a peacock escapes from"ordinary"towardsan "extraordinary" realitylet us note simplythatHuizingaclearlydistinguishes two levels,thatof play an embeland that of ordinarylife,the firstbeing a transposition, lished,ennobledrepresentation (mimesis) of the second. The same notion of play as representation recursin Caillois: "The pleasurelies in being different in or passingforanother. . . At Mardi gras,themasqueraderdoes nottryto gain acceptanceas a real marquis,a real toreador,a real redskin,he seeks to inspirefear and to profitfromthe generallicensewhichresultsfromthe factthatthe maskconcealsthesocial selfand liberatesthegenuinepersonality .. (p. 64) (our italics) Accordingto Caillois therewould thus be a "genuinepersonality"as opposed to a "social self."The "real" (vraie) personwould be the one who appeared during Mardi gras while "passing for another."The false personwould be the social selfwho plays a role duringall the rest of the year. But, we mightwonder,if this false personis playinga role,thenis he not morereal thanthe "real" person who wantsto "pass foranother"duringMardi gras?This circular logic leads to absurdity. Nevertheless,in the passage we have just cited, Caillois adds: "Nor does theactorseek to have us believethathe is "really"Lear or CharlesV." But then,whichis the "genuinepersonality"in question above, if not the one who wears the mask? The same desireto delimitthe sphereof play,to enclose play in a "pure" time and space, leads Caillois to devote a chapterto the "corruption"of play: "If play consistsin providingthese powerful instinctswitha formal,ideal, and limitedgratification removedfrom ordinarylife,whathappens to it when everyconventionis rejected? When the universeof play is no longersealed off?When it is contaminatedby thereal world.. .? Corresponding to each of thesebasic categoriesof play thereis a specificperversionwhichresultsfromthe absence of bothrestraint and protection.. ." "The principleof play is corrupted... by thecontagionof reality."(pp. 103-104) (our italics) The terminology is eloquent. "Reality" is seen as contagious, 37

Yale FrenchStudies impure.It is the domain of the "powerful corrupting,perverting, instincts"whichmustbe restrained. And Caillois writesin concludingthischapter: It is easilyunderstoodthatthey(the instinctsof competition, pursuitof luck,mimicry, vertigo) can onlybe satisfiedpositivelyand creativelyunder ideal and circumscribedconditions,thosewhichare providedin each case by the rules of the game. Left to themselves,franticand ruinous like all instincts,these elementaryimpulses can only lead to disastrousconsequences.Games disciplinethe instinctsand inthem.Duringthe timethatgames grantthema stitutionalize formaland limitedsatisfaction,they are being trainedand the soul being vaccinatedagainsttheirvirulence. fertilized, At the same time the games are preparingthe instinctsto and the stabilito the enrichment make a usefulcontribution zationof culturalpatterns.(p. 121) (our italics) Caillois's languageis clear. It allows us to pinpointat once the thatgovernshis reasoning:on the one hand,naturerepmetaphysics resentsdisorder,chaos, the absence of laws; "these elementaryimpulses" are "like all instincts"(!) "franticand ruinous,"theirconsequences are "disastrous";on the otherhand, civilization(culture) the instincts;it representsorder, the law which "institutionalizes" "trains,""fertilizes,""enriches,""vaccinates" against "contagion," the "contamination"(cf. pp. 103-104) of reality. play (and by extensioncivilizationitself) From thisperspective, sick since it is would act as a remedyfora naturewhichis inherently subject to destructiveinstincts.Play would thus have a "civilizing role" whichwould oppose it to "naturalavidity"(p. 106). As comfortingas this thesismay sound to those who retaina "humanist" vision of "civilization,"it appears untenableon the simple level of way theproblemof origins, logic,insofaras it poses in a contradictory as we willsee lateron. (cf. partII, Play and culture). 2. Play and thesacred sacred, "reality"is for these If in the sequence reality-play-the 38

JacquesEhrmann authors"corrupted"play,play is, thenby way of contrast,the sacred invertedand therebyimpoverished,degraded, devaluated. This is of the explained by Benveniste,accordingto whom the efficiency sacred act lies in the "conjunctionof the mythwhich sets forththe storyand the ritewhichreproducesit." (p.165) Play occurs in two forms:jocus, play in words,correspondsto the myth;ludus,play in action,correspondsto therite. Cut offfromits myth,the riteis reducedto an orderedbody to an inoffensive inefficacious, of acts which are thereafter reproductionof the ceremony,to a pure "game." From the divinestruggleforthe possessionof the sun thereremainsa ball game in whichtheplayercan withimpunity- did a god ever have such a privilege?- take possessionat will of the solar disc. Such is ludus. (p. 165) Once again,ludushas no independentexistencesince it is onlya "reproduction"of somethingelse, of the sacred, and even then an impoverished,gratuitousreproductionbecause it is "inefficacious," "inoffensive." Thus we confrontthe same oppositionof the gratuitousand theusefulwhichwe notedearlierand whichwill attractour attention the very uselessnessof play, which again: it is the gratuitousness, makes it "pure." since, In relationto the sacred,play is perceivedas a deficiency, cut offfromits myth,it has been deprivedof its voice, so to speak. If play can say nothing,one would be temptedto concludethatit means in itsveryabsurdity. nothing.The senseof playwouldlie in itsfutility, The remainderof a subtraction,it is reducedto gratuitousrules,to gratuitousgestures.Withinsuch a perspective,it would be usefulto knowin whichdomain,thatof playor of thesacred,theauthorwould place the Tour de France. How could it be alignedwith"pure" play since we know,after Barthes's admirableanalysis,that it is inseparablefromits accompanyingmythicdiscourse? 39

Yale FrenchStudies locus offersa similarbut inversestructure.Here words instead of acts constitute play,but theyare wordswhichincorporatenothingbut theirown beingas words;theyare uttered "as if" theyconveyeda reality,but withinthe convention, acceptedby all participants,that theyhave in fact no true content.locus is characterizedby the deliberatelyfictivenatureof the realityto whichit alludes. (p. 165) Here Jocusis gratuitous, ineffective speech,"pure mythto which no corresponding ritegivesa graspon reality."Does Benvenistemean therebyto characterizethe domain of poetry?It is difficult to affirm this withcertainty.But how can we accept the distinctionbetween efficacious and inefficacious speech exceptby relyingon the evidence of a causalitywhichhas neverproved anything? Huizinga'spointof view on the relationsof play and the sacred appear muchless debatableinsofaras thesetwo domainsare not,for him,incompatible.The passage fromone to the otheroccurs gradually. In contrastto Benveniste'sthesis (and Caillois's), Huizinga observesno breaksplitting play offfromthe sacred. Whetherenigma (cf. pp. 185-188), judicial conflict(156-157), or music (257), etc. is in question,play can be transformed into "sacred play," or the sacred into play. In the latter situationthere is a "giving way" anothertermsynonymouswithdegradation)of cus(flechissement; toms whichwere formerly serious,as in the case of the riddle,for example,or the duel (cf. p. 159). In the othersituationplay passes througha subjectivemetamorphosis intothesublime,it is transcended "upward,"as withmusicforexample: "the sensationsof beautyand of sacredmystery minglewithone anotherin theenjoymentof music, and in this confusionthe oppositionof play and seriousnessdisappears." (p. 257) It is at this point thatHuizinga's intuitionappears to us more accurate than his judgement.He warns us repeatedlythat "play doesn'texclude seriousness"(p. 291), but by thissame statementhe maintainsthemas two separate categories.Indeed, if in the sacred game the oppositionof play and seriousnessdisappears,it is because 40

JacquesEhrmann this oppositionwas basically,or originally,presentsomewhere.Our criticismbears preciselyon this point,namely on the possibilityof groundingan anthropology of play in the dual oppositionof play and reality,ofplayand thesacred,thisin turnentailinga divisionbetween the serious (the real, the sacred) and the non-serious(play), with play then being definedprivativelyas non-serious,non-real,nonsacred.The precedinganalysispermitsus to concludethatthe operative value of such a classificationis highlycontestable,for it rests on a simplisticand ethnocentric metaphysicsof consciousness.The anti-oran-economicrole whichthese authorsassignto play will furnish supplementary proof. 3. Play and economy In these authorsthe play-seriousness oppositionappears, in effectin theeconomicdomaninthroughanotheropposition:gratuitousness and utility.Gratuitousnessis one of the pointstheystressmost readily.We may recall that it constitutesone of the common denominatorsof theirthreedefinitions of play. A surveyof theirvocabularypermitsus to establishthe followingparadigms: seriousness usefulness fecundity f .)sterility whichare opposed by work science reality

play gratuitousness leisure leisure literature unreality

Whenhe drawsup theinventory of play at of the characteristics thebeginningof his book, Huizinga notes: We see herethefirstfundamental traitof play: it is free,it is freedom.To this traitanotheris directlyconnected.Play is not "daily" lifeor life"properlyso-called."It offersa pretext forevadingthelatterto entera provisionalsphereof activity withits own characteristics. The small child is alreadyfully conscious of acting "just because," "just for fun." In this "just" of play,a feelingof depreciationis expressed,of joking 41

Yale French Studies as opposed to seriousness,whichappears primary.Nevertheless, the oppositionplay-seriousnessremains at all times fluid.(pp. 26-27) (our italics) This quote allows us to see clearlythe close connectionwhich seriousness the authorestablishesbetweenplay and gratuitousness, to and utility,i.e., the an-economiccharacterattachedsystematically play in orderto preserveit fromthe "contamination"of economic But ifhe does not noticethatthisan-economyremains contingencies. an economy,even though turned upside down, it is because his The dialecticonlyoperatesat the level of conscioussocial structures. same criticismapplies to Caillois and Benveniste.Contraryto their of play, Huizinga regardingthe so-called gratuitousness affirmations exhibitsin the quotation we have just given the triunwittingly partiteeconomicrole of play: a. play as freeexpenditure. of play Huizinga was alreadyinWe recallthatin his definition sistingon its characteristicliberty: "free activity,experiencedas 'make-believe'. . . entirelylackingin materialinterestand in utility." (p. 35) To insiston the freedomof play is to insistin the same If play is detachedfromordinarylife,it breathon its gratuitousness. mustalso be detachedfromits contingencies. But even if play is understoodas a "pure" expenditure,an expenditurefor nothing,it consumes somethingnevertheless,if only timeand energy,but sometimesalso considerableproperty.It would be appropriatethento account for this expenditure,to learn where it went,whatit produced.It was consummatedand consumedin play itself,say Caillois and Huizinga.That is why,in theirview,play must be accomplished"in an expresslycircumscribedtime and place." But theyfail to see that the interioroccupied by play can only be definedby and withtheexteriorof the world,and inverselythatplay by and withthe interior viewedas an exterioris onlycomprehensible of theworld;thattogethertheyparticipatein thesame economy.Play cannottherefore be isolatedas an activitywithoutconsequences.Its its gratuitousness are onlyapparent,since the veryfreedom integrity, 42

JacquesEhrmann made in it is partof a circuitwhichreachesbeyond of theexpenditure the spatial and temporallimitsof play. On the level of conscious structures(where these authorsare working) it may be that play is experiencedas an expenditurefor nothing,thatits end lies in itself;but at the level of underlying(unthe ethnolthisexplanationprovesinsufficient: conscious) structures ogists (the same ones whom are quoted by Huizinga and Caillois) have taughtus thatthe "pure" giftis in factan exchange.One gives, one spendsin orderto receive.The so-calledlibertyof the giftis in of play are ways of the gratuitousness fact liberality;the generosity, of the acquiringprestigeand power. Thus Huizinga's interpretation potlatch (pp. 102-110) as ennoblingplay remainspartial and erroneousinsofaras the authorrefusesto see thatthe potlatchis also the ritualizationof an economyand even of a politicalexchange.4 b. play as "depreciation." If we returnto the quotationfromHuizingawhichservedas the of play, forour analysisof the economiccharacteristics starting-point we note that play's share can be calculated by subtraction:what remainswhen seriousnesshas been taken away. This remainderis the "just" of play, activityin whichone engages "forfun,"or, as we weresayingabove, fornothing.Thus play appears not onlygratuitous but also withoutvalue, an activitywhose worthhas been withdrawn as it has been weighteddown withthe "plus value" of seriousness.It is thiswhichallows Huizinga to separateplay fromdaily life,to say thatplay "is situatedoutsidethe mechanismof immediatesatisfaction of needs and desires" (p. 27). However in our view this is by no means correct.In play thereis no subtractionof value (deprecia41n spite of the superficial divergences, Caillois's position does not deviate significantly

from Huizinga's. He reproaches the latter for excluding bets and games of chance by his definitionof play. He is indeed correct in pointing out that play is defined as an action lacking in all material interest,the "implication is that play has no inherenteconomic interest." We have seen that this is by no means the case. However, after the incursion into the economic domain which allows him to retrievea sphere of play which Huizinga had that play "remains rigorouslyunproductive." cast aside, he withdrawsat once by affirming itself "It is in fact characteristicof play to create no wealth, no works. It differentiates therebyfrom work and from art." Once again Caillois is a victim of his own categories. Within a series of activities running from basketball to dancing to ballet to comedy, it would be interestingto know, indeed, where play stops and where work and art begin. We come back to the same opposition of utilityand gratuitousness."Play is an occasion for pure expenditure,"he writes (p. 36). And again: play is "always a contingentand gratuitousactivity."(p. 115)

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Yale French Studies . . . in pursuitof immediatesatistion) but relocation,redistribution factionof needs and desires. We have seen that play consistsin givingin orderto receivemore. This mediationis none otherthan that of the law (or: rule of the game), a detourwhich mustbe followedfor the satisfactionof Far human needs and desires,the path of theirinstitutionalization. frombeinga depreciation,the detourof law as an expressionof play a placingin reserve. constitutes a transfer, One could summarize,then,by sayingthat since play consists form,it in givingin orderto receive. . . lateron or . . . in a different fulfills a dual functionof expenditureand savings.5 The necessityto conceive of play as economyis confirmedfor us by game theoryinsofaras it can be consideredas a way to reof play - in otherwords, cuperate,to utilizethe verygratuitousness to constructthe economyof chance. Economy in the dual sense of for to take chance expenditureand savings,of expenditure-savings, intoaccountis to preserveit in orderto investit, to spend it in order to save it. The gratuitousness of play is thusonlyapparent,i.e., it accounts external,conscious structure.But at the level onlyforits superficial, of underlyingstructuresthe division between gratuitousnessand utility,the separationinto intra-andextra-economicspheres,an interiorand an exterior,are no longer operative.We recognizehere to a supposedlygratuitous,disinterested that,farfromcorresponding aspect of culture,play in the fullestsense is coextensivewithculture. This is confirmed by a critiqueof thenotionof play as a complement, as a luxury. c. play as "complement"and as luxury. in "Play appearsto us," writesHuizinga,". . . as an intermission daily life,as a relaxation.But by virtueof its regularalternationit constitutes an accompaniment, a complement,and even a part of life

5Cf. Sigmund Freud, Le mot d'esprit et ses rapports avec l'inconscient,French translation by Marie Bonaparte and M. Natman, Gallimard, 1953. See especially the second part (pp. 135-181) in which Freud presents an economy of witticismsprecisely in terms of psychic expenditureand savings.

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JacquesEhrmann in general.It adornslife,compensatesforthe deficiencesof life and in thisrespectis indispensable."(p. 28) Huizinga deservescreditfor noting"the utility[of play] with respectto culture" (a notionhe develops in the lines followingthe precedingquote). He cannotbringhimselfto enclose play withinthe limitshe had prescribedat the outset.Play, in the end, invades the territory of culture;it becomes "indispensable"to culture,to life in general.And yetthisconcessionis onlya last resort. Huizinga's analyticprocedurecan be broken down into three stages: 10, play is gratuitousin relationto the seriousnessof life;20, play affectsall (or nearlyall) aspectsof culture;3?, play,because it is gratuitous, is usefulto culture.We can see here how seriousnessis privilegedin being granted precedence over play. Seriousness is "primary,"he says. This pointof view tallieswiththe notionof play as a representation of somethingwhichexistedpriorto play. We are tryingto show the methodologicaldangers and the ideological implicationsof such a pointof view. Indeed, if play were secondaryin relationto a primaryseriousness, whateverconcessionsmay be made to the culturalutilityof play,the latterremainsa contribution to culture,a "complement."It could thereforebe cut off, substracted,without taking anything essentialaway fromculture,in a word withoutdeprivingcultureof what it is. Even deprivedof play, life would remainlife. It would simplybe serious,dull, ordinary.In such a perspective,it is clear that play representsthe gratuitous,the beautiful,the noble, the artisticaspect of life,the Sunday of life. As a costumehides nudity and embellishesit, so play "adorns life"; it is life'sluxury.6 Caillois says so explicitly:"play is a luxuryand impliesleisure. The hungryman does not play." (Encyclopelie des jeux, p. xv). This last statement,designedto forestallany objection,nonetheless strikesus as highlycontestable.We can replyepigrammatically: the hungryman beguileshunger,and therebyplays. This answer,sufficientin itself,can be supportedby another,which is more "pro6Was this not already Rousseau's point of view on science and art, civilization's (corruptive) luxuries?

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Yale French Studies found:" if play as the capacityforsymbolizationand ritualizationis consubstantialwith culture,it cannot fail to be presentwherever thereis culture.We realize then that play cannot be definedas a luxury.Whethertheirstomachsare fullor empty,men play because theyare men. To say that play "impliesleisure" is to set forththe problem while placingoneselfin an ethnocentric perspectivethatfalsifiesthe basic data to be analyzed: it is to oppose the notionof work to that of leisure (an oppositionwhichcarrieswithit all the otherswe have alreadynoted: utility-gratuitousness, seriousness-play, etc.). Such an oppositionmay be valid in our society (and even there,less and less), but it certainlycannotbe generalizedto includeculturesother thanour own. On the veryfirstpage of the prefaceof the Encyclopedie des jeux et sports,Caillois writes: [play] evokes an activityfreeof constraintsbut also without consequencesforreal life.It is opposed to the seriousnessof real life and is thus termedfrivolous.It is opposed on the otherhand to work,as timelostis opposed to timewellspent. In effectplay producesnothing:neithergoods nor works.It is essentiallysterile.(vii) And severallinesfarther: It is condemnedto establishnothing,to producenothing,for by its verynatureit cancels out its results,whereasworkand the world,more or sciencecapitalizeon theirsand transform less. (xv) (our italics) Clearly,the oppositionleisure-work(science) correspondsto a conceptionof culturelimitedto the industrialphase of our civilization.It seems to give rise onlyto rudimentary and simplisticMarxist analyses. In point of fact, alienationin and throughwork can no longerbe automaticallyopposed to leisure-freedom in a societyour society- whereleisureis beingindustrialized and work is being automated. The value attributedto accumulation,to capitalizationthrough 46

JacquesEhrmann work and scienceis thuspart of this same utilitarianand materialist attitudetowardculture (time lost as opposed to time well spent) whose ethnocentric position- as we have alreadyhad occasion to observe entailstheexpulsionof play intothe exteriorof gratuitouswhereit becomestheutopiancomplementof seriousness and futility, ness. This utilitarianism and this materialismare accompaniedby a contradictory impulsetowardidealisminsofaras the "purityof play is guaranteedby its gratuitousness, by the fact that it costs nothing (as opposed to work,of course): "lost time,"it is pure loss but also - beingdisinterested - pure generosity. "Sterile,"it is clean; in contrast,money,earnings(paymentfor work) are defiling,degrading. Whenmoneycomesintoplay,play is corrupted.Hence thedistinction made by Caillois and Huizinga betweenthe activitiesof professional whichappears moreand actorsor athletesand amateurs,a distinction moredubiousifwe are to judge by theincidentsit provokesin various international athleticcontests.7 This distinctioncorrespondsto the industrialphase of our history.The veryphase in whichplay and work have become antithetical. The veryphase whichhas witnessedthe birthof the notionof "realism" in literatureand the arts. This convergenceis not accidental.It correspondsto the materialist-idealist metaphysicswhich 7The explanations given by Caillois are confusingand hardly convincing (cf. pp. 65, 105, 149-150). Huizinga too denounces the corruptionof play by professionalism,by money: It now appears that the ever-increasingsystematizationand discipline of play are going to suppress in the long run somethingof the pure play-element.The behavior of the professional is no longer appropriate to play, no longer carefree and unconcerned . . . (p. 315)

Then he observes the same "sliding toward seriousness" in certain card games: "With its manuals and its systems,its important instructors and professional trainers, bridge has become a deadly serious affair." This sentence is followed directlyby another which does not appear very appropriate in the developmentof the argumentbut which by its almost involuntarycharacter emphasizes to what extentseriousness and gratuitousnessare opposed in the mind of the author: "A recent newspaper item estimated the income of the Culbertson couple at more than $200,000." (p. 317) The indignationis transparent.Must we conclude that to play "well" one must be neithertoo rich nor too poor? Being too rich preventsenjoymentof play - for play is no longer a complementto the needs of ordinary life. Being too poor, too hungry,as Caillois puts it, creates a thresholdbehind which these needs totally occupy the mind, and since not even the essential ones can be satisfied,there is surely no room for a complement.However, adds Huizinga: The attemptto uncover the play-elementof the confused present leads us constantly to contradictoryconclusions . . . In opposition to the tendency of play to turn into seriousness,certainphenomenaseem to manifestthe opposite tendency.(p. 318) He is referringthere to a certain "gratuitous" form of rivalry among major enterprises, rivalry which takes on an agonistic character; wherever industrial production takes on a sportingcharacter,the desire for settingrecords has free rein: "the liner with the greatest tonnage,the blue ribbon for the most rapid maritimecrossing . . ." (pp. 319-320)

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Yale French Studies has been circulatingduringthe last hundredand fiftyyears of our civilization. We have still to carryout the critiqueof the anthropological on whichHuizinga and Caillois base the relationof play framework and culture. II. Game and Culture "The play attitudemusthave been presentbeforehumanculture or a linguisticfaculty of expression existed" (p. 230), writes Huizinga. In otherwords,one mightsay: in the beginningtherewas play. We would subscribeto thisformulaif it allowed us to account for the passage fromanimal to human play, i.e., that fault (faille) whichis foundin everyinstanceof play and due to which thereis to cosmicplay wouldbe biological "play,"i.e., chance.Corresponding chance. this However,nothingpermitsus to say thatHuizinga attributes meaning,suddenlyenlarged,to play. It seems more reasonable to believe- ifwe relyon thecontextprovidedby the entirebook - that it is stillin theperspectiveof a dialecticbetweenplay and the serious, betweenplay and utility,that this "play attitude"which antedates culturetakeson itsmeaningforHuizinga.8We have triedto show the of thisconceptionof play; corresponding ideologicalpresuppositions to it thereis a conceptionof culturethroughwhich Huizinga and their Caillois, by failingto call it into question,reveal unwittingly implicitvalues and underminetheirown analyses. It will be noted thatforthemthe word culture(and its synonym,civilization)has a technicalor ethnological,simplydesignates double meaning.The first, the diverseformsthat human societiestake. The second, whichwe of a historyof manmay call "metaphysical,"refersto the trajectory 80rtega y Gasset develops the same point of view, but in a more categorical, almost caricatural fashion in his essay on "The sportingorigin of the state." He writes: Utility creates nothing,inventsnothing; it simply approves and registerswhat has been createdindependently. Life's original, primary activity is always spontaneous, playful, superfluous in its intent.It is freeexpansion of a pre-existing energy. What is most necessaryis the superfluous. Needless to say, we can hardly subscribe to this view, with its rather naive idealism.

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JacquesEhrmann kind whichwould also be that of a progression,of a historywhich startingwithprimitiveman would lead necessarily,in its "superior" - to us. stage,to civilized (cultured)-western-man Let us note, firstin Huizinga, this progressiveconceptionof culturalhistory,and play's correlativefunctionwithinit: . . .If religion,science,law, war and politicsseem to lose littleby little,in more advanced formsof society,the abundantcontactswhichtheyseem to have had withplay in these remoteperiodsof culture,poetryforits part,whileit originated in thesphereof play,has not stoppedmovingout of this sphere.Poiesis is a play function.It is located in a play space of the mind,in a universeall its own createdby the mind, fromthat of "daily wherethingstake on an aspect different from life"and are relatedto each otherby bonds whichdiffer those of logic. If we conceivedof the serious as thatwhich is expressedexclusivelyin the termsof lucid life,thenpoetry is never entirelyserious. It lies beyond seriousnessin the primordialdomainpeculiarto the child,the animal,the savage, the visionary,in the domain of dreams,of ecstasy,of intoxication,of laughter.(pp. 197-198) (our italics) The quotationis long,but crucialin as muchas it drawstogether all the threadsof the conceptionof play and of culturewhichwe are examining.We findhere in fact that play is assimilatedto: 1) a particularstage of human historywhere culture in its entiretyis articulatedin play (the "most remoteperiods" which are implicitly opposed to the most recentperiods,i.e. the present); 2) a type of mentality(infantile,animal, savage, visionary,as opposed to an adult,"civilized,"reasonablementality);3) a typeof behaviorand a form of awareness (playful,illogical, non-lucid as opposed to serious,logical,lucid). Poetrywould be the connectinglinkbetween "primitive"and "civilized" mentality,the bridge which the adult takes to rejoin the child: "To understandpoetry,one mustbe able to adopt the soul of a child,as one would put on a magic cloak, and admitthe superiority of the child's wisdom over that of the man." 49

Yale French Studies to nostalgiaforchildhoodthereis nostalgia (p. 198) Corresponding forprimitive life (the modernformof themythof the noble savage), for a life whichis "played" thus gratuitous,a life in which poetry impregnates all humanactivity:"In all civilizationwhichis alive and flourishing, and especiallyin archaiccultures,poetryhas a social and liturgicalfunction."(p. 199)9 But curiously,in spiteof the value attachedto childhoodand to the primitive-poetic mentality,we note a reticencewith respectto the unreasonableillogicalityof thissame mentality where "the playseriousnessoppositionhas not yet taken hold," in contrastto what appears in the superior,logical, adult stages of civilization (our own!): The line betweenthatwhichis conceivedas possibleand that whichis nothas been drawnonlygraduallyas civilizationhas developed.For the savage withhis limitedlogical conception of theworldeverything, in short,remainspossible. Myth,in its absurditiesand its enormities,in its exaggerationand its and confusionof relationships, in its tranquilinconsistencies its hecticvariations,does not yet troublehim as something impossible.(p. 213) Caillois subscribes to the same conception of history as Huizinga,a historywhichwouldhave meaning(direction),i.e., which would move from originalmeaninglessnessto presentmeaningfulness; a historyin whichthe "civilizing"process would have allowed men graduallyto rid themselvesof the illogicalityof the "earliest ages"; in a word, a historyof the conquests of reason. He writes: "Spread over the whole surfaceof the globe, [the wearingof masks] appears as a false solution,obligatoryand fascinating,before the

9Cf. the entire chapter on "Play and poetry" and in particular pp. 210, 212, 217-220. Huizinga expresses too his nostalgia for an art unaware of itself, of its "civilizing" role, in these terms: Since the eighteenthcentury,art, manifestinga new awareness of itself as a factor in civilization,has to all appearances lost more than it has gained in play quality. Does this signifya raising of its level? It would not be impossible to show that it was formerlya blessing for art to be in large measure unconscious of the meanings it transmitsand the beauty it creates. In the pronounced feeling for its own greatness, somethingof its worldlyingenuousnessis lost. (p. 323)

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JacquesEhrmann slow, painful,patientand decisive advancementof civilization.The way out of thistrapis nothingless thantheverybirthof civilization." (p. 193) It now appearsevidentthatthe relationsof play and cultureare fortheseauthorsbased on two "acknowledgments":on the one hand thatman becomesmoreand morecivilized,on the otherthatcivilization becomes less and less play-likein the course of history.Therefore,if play has a civilizinginfluence(that is theirthesis!), it becomes impossibleto reconcilethe contradictionsimplicitin such a pointof view.Indeed,ifplay is essentialto culture,civilizationshould become, not less and less play-like,but constantlyand consistently more so.10

If neitherHuizinga nor Caillois manages to resolve this contradiction,it is because theyare both prisonersof a contradictory notionof theoriginof civilization, whichitselfrestson a contradictory idea of the presentof theircivilization.In theirview,both innocence and brutalityare presentin the origin.Brutalitywhen the instinctof of rivalryis not checkedby any rule.Nature'slaw is the competition, law of the jungle. We have then a returnto primordialchaos and disorder,"perversionsof the agon," as Caillois explains: Outside the arena,afterthe bell, beginsthe veritableperversion of the agon, the most widespreadperversionof all. It appears in each antagonismno longertemperedby the rigor of thespiritof play.Now absoluterivalryis nothingbuta law of nature,which resumesin societyits originalbrutalityas soon as it findsan open path in the networkof moral,social or legal constraintswhich,like those of play, are limitsand conventions.For this reason frantic,obsessive ambition,in whateverdomainit breaksout, providedthatrespectforthe rules of play or forfreeplay is lacking,mustbe denounced as the decisivedeviationwhich,in the particularcase, brings

lOThis contradiction.although not avoided by Caillois, is particularlynoticeable in Huizinga who, writingjust before the Second World War, had good reasons to be alarmed at the returnto barbarism which the rise of Hitlerism symbolized for every "conscience."

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Yale French Studies about a returnto the originalsituation.Nothingshows the civilizingrole of play betterthan the restraints by whichit habituallycountersnaturalgreed. (p. 106) (our italics) This text (like the one frompage 121 whichwe quoted in the firstpart of thisessay) obligesus to formulatecertainquestionsnot exist priorto play itself? resolvedby Caillois: do the play-instincts The authorforwhomthecompetitive instinctis a law of natureseems to be sayingthis (we may recall thathe considersplay to be a purifiedreproduction of "ordinaryreality").However,if thisis the case, one wondershow theseinstinctscould have createdthe conditionsin whichplay is possible,since theyare describedas "disastrous,"destructive,manifesting "primordialbrutality."On the otherhand, if - in otherwords,if law pregames existpriorto the play-instincts cedes nature,as one would logicallyhave to suppose in order that the verypossibilityof law, of civilizationmightcome to light- we do not see how games could be "perverted"into instincts(i.e., into an unbridled"nature"whicheludes thelaw; does thelaw of thejungle not remainlaw?) since theselaws would have been presentfromthe beginningand even the animalswould obey them (for, accordingto Caillois himself,animalsdo play)." But forthese authors,as we have alreadyshown,the originof civilizationis also innocent,insofaras play and civilizationare not distinguishable, but on thecontraryparticipatein a full-blownworldview whichis "poetic,"childlike.This view, theysay, is opposed to theirown, whichtheycall "realistic." This very "realism" which we examined criticallyin the first vision partof thisessaylies at theheartof thedual and contradictory of thepresentperiodof our civilizationseen in Huizingaand Caillois. In fact (like the origin,but inversely),the presentis simultaneously experiencedas more "civilized" insofaras we do not committhe error (!) of confusingplay and reality(which neitherchildrennor "Law, nature! It seems that we have not taken a single step forward since Rousseau. See also, in regard to the relation of law and natural savagery, Huizinga, po. 168-170. While leaving open the possibilityof returningto this problem, let it sufficeto point it out here and to say that it could only be resolvedby a new approach to play.

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JacquesEhrmann savages knowhow to do!); we mighteven say insofaras we do not let ourselvesbe takenin by play. Thus the morewe are consciousof play, of thefactthatthe game is onlya game,thatwe mustnot take it seriously,themorewe are supposedto be civilized,polite,orderly. The ideal beingtheBritishfairplay - an ideal of nobility,of respect fortherules,of moraland estheticdetachment(perhaps also of indifference? ): It is understoodthatthegood playeris one who can envisage withdistance,detachmentand some appearance at least of composurethe unhappyresultsof the most sustainedeffort, or the loss of exorbitantstakes.The decision of the arbiter, even if unjust,is approved on principle.Corruptionof the agon beginswhereno arbiterand no arbitration is recognized. (Caillois, pp. 106-106) The same attitudeis foundin Huizinga: ... trueculturecannotexistwithouta certainplay-element, forculturepresupposesa kind of moderationand masteryof self,an abilitynot to see ultimateperfectionin ones own propensities, but to understandthatcultureis confinedwithin certainfreelyaccepted limits.Culture will always in a sense be played accordingto given rules based on mutual agreement.True civilizationalwaysrequiresfairplay in every respect,and fair play is nothingbut, in the terminology of play, the equivalentof good faith.Whoeverbreaks up the game breaksdown cultureitself.(p. 337) "True culture," "true civilization,"must thereforelift itself toward "true play," "pure" play. Whence the ethical functionattributedto play,or ratherplay consideredas an ethicalstandard.[cf. Huizinga,pp. 336-337, and: In orderthattheplay-element of civilizationbe productiveof cultureor favorableto it, thiselementmustbe pure. It must not consistin deviationfromor in the repudiationof the 53

Yale French Studies normsprescribedby reason,humanityor faith.It mustnot be pretensewhich masks the objective of attaininggoals determinedby means of intentionaldevelopmentsof play forms.True play excludes all propaganda.It is an end in itself.Its spiritand its climateare thoseof joyous exaltation, not of wild hysteria.The currentpropagandawhichis taking hold of all areas of lifeutilizesthe hystericalreactionsof the masses. Thus even when it takes the formof play it cannot be admittedas the modem expressionof the spiritof play, but onlyconsideredas a falsification. (p. 337)] What Caillois calls "perversion"Huizinga calls "falsification." These termsbear witnessto the nostalgiafor a "pure" society,rid of the violenceof the instincts, to the same consternation in the face of a present- and more justifiably, of a future- which does not square withtheirutopianvision of them (a vision derivedfromthe image theyhave of the originof time). This present,stillburdened and soiledby a "reality"whichhas not yetbeen transformed by play, contradictsthe ideal of "reason,humanity,and faith"throughwhich our civilizationthinksit can proclaimitselfsuperiorto its predecessors. Whereto turn,then,if thisperspectiveis incapable of keeping its promises?Mightrevolutionbe the answer?These authorsreject it, for revolutionbreaks down the play (fair play) of civilization. "Whoeverbreaksup the game breaks down cultureitself." We arrivenaturallythen,througha see-saw effect,at the other side of thevisionof thepresent:a presentwhichthreatensconstantly to fall back into the instinctive, primordialbrutalityof which the signs are all the more visibleto the observersince theyare closer, more "real." To break up the game is to lower civilizationback towardits originalbarbarismand chaos . .. and also towardthatfirst "reality,"the knowledge12of which,our authorstell us, nonetheless constitutesour superiority over primitivemen who were ignorantof it, just as theywere unaware of seriousness.This ignoranceof the 12Hence the care with which Huizinga and Caillois distinguishplay from science. In their view, science is on the side of work. Like work it "transformsthe world," it comes to grips with the "real," in contrastto play which has no grasp of it. Needless to say, we do not share this view.

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JacquesEhrmann "real" and of the seriousdovetailswiththeirmoral ignorance(play does not constitutea standardof "value" forthem,theircivilization being completelyimmersedin play!), in other words with their aftersurveying innocence.So we have returnedto our starting-point of these authors'thinking the variousstages at whichthe circularity comes to light. We can concludethenthatifneitherHuizinganor Caillois succeeds it is because theydo not see them, in resolvingthesecontradictions are at the veryheartof although- or because - the contradictions of the problemof play the viewpointtheyadopt. Their formulation culture.Culmakes no allowance for the problemof understanding ture,theiridea of culture,is at no timecalled into questionby play. On thecontrary, it is given:a fixed,stable,pre-existent element,serving as a frameof referencein the evalutationof play. Thus just as in our firstsectionwe reproachedthemforevaluating play in oppositionto and on the basis of a "reality"which was neverquestionedeven thoughit was onlyvalid in relationto a given culture,itselfrelativeto the observer,we can now reproachthemfor evaluatingplay in oppositionto and on the basis of a conceptionof culturewhichis neverquestionedeven thoughit is onlyvalid in relationto a given"reality,"whichis relativeto the observer. In otherwords,in an anthropology of play, play cannotbe definedby isolatingit on the basis of its relationshipto an a priori realityand culture.To defineplay is at thesame timeand in thesame movementto definerealityand to defineculture.As each termis a way to apprehendthe two others,they are each elaborated,constructedthroughand on thebasis of thetwo others.None of thethree existingprior to the others,they are all simultaneously the subject and theobjectof thequestionwhichtheyput to us and we to them. Huizinga and Caillois erredprincipallyin never doubting(except Huizinga perhaps,timidly,at the end) that the player (themselves!) is the subjectof play; in believingthat,presentin the game, at thecenterof play,theydominatedit. They forgotthatplayersmay be played; that,as an object in the game,the playercan be its stakes (enjeu) and its toy (jouet). 55

Yale French Studies

III.

Conclusions

They need not be very elaborate. They will have become apparentduringthe readingof our text.Let it sufficeto recapitulate: 1. Play is not playedagainsta backgroundof a fixed,stable,reality whichwould serveas its standard.All realityis caughtup in the play of theconceptswhichdesignateit. Realityis thusnot capable of being nor subjectified. objectified, However,it is neverneutral.Nor can it be neutralized.Thus, 2. the role of the literarycritic (since that is our department)is not to tryto measurethe gap whichwould separatea so-called "reality"fromthe domain of the so-called "imaginary",in orderto reach a verdict:one textis realistic,anotherunrealistic.Such an approach makes no sense. Each textcontainsin itselfits own reality,whichin essence (or by nature!) is put into play by the wordswhichmake it up. 3. At the methodologicallevel, play and reality,being inseparable, can onlybe apprehendedgloballyand in the same movement. 4. In otherwords,the distinguishing characteristic of realityis that it is played. Play, reality,cultureare synonymousand interchangeable. Nature does not exist prior to culture.The role of the critic is specificallyto understandand to explain by language (literary manifestsitselfin language in particular) how this nature-culture different historicaland culturalcontexts. 5. Justas cultureis, in the last analysis,communication, so is play . . . and game. Thus, any theoryof communication(or of information) impliesa theoryof play ... and a game theory.And vice versa. Here arises the necessityof a dialogue with our colleagues in the sciences. 6. The player,like the speaker - thatis, each of us - is at once the subject and the object of the play. The pronounsI, you, he are the different modes of the play structure. The subjectivity-objectivitydualismis abolishedbecause it is inoperative. 7. Play is articulation, openingand closingof and throughlanguage. 56

JacquesEhrmann level that it can and must be appreIt is only at the intermediate hended. 8. All of our criticalmethodsmust be reconsideredaccordingto thesenew norms.

Translatedby Cathyand Phil Lewis

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