Hitra Procedure Kz01 Cg Pro 53 0113 a02

Khazzan Project Security Classification: Project Internal

Contract No. CO-BPXO-12-0376

Khazzan Commissioning Hazard Identification and Task Risk Assessment (HITRA) Procedure (CPF)

Khazzan Project

Commissioning Hazard Identification and Task Risk Assessment (CPF)

Revision History Amendment Date

Revision Number

Amender Initials

24/02/2016

A01

RT

Amendment

Related Documents Document Number

Document Name

Description of Content

Petrofac Golden Rules of Safety KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0107

Khazzan Commissioning Control of Work

KZ01-SA-PLN-53-0005

Emergency Response & Crisis Management Plan

KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0111

Energy Isolation Procedure

A02

24/02/2016

A01

Khazzan Project Commissioning Energy Isolation procedure

RE-ISSUED FOR REVIEW

05/02/2016

Rev.

Commissioning specific CoW process including PtW and Authorisations

ISSUED FOR REVIEW

Date

Reason for Issue

RT

CM

VK Author

EC Checked

CE ELIE LAHOUD Approved Rev.

KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0113

Holds Section Number

Short Description of Hold

Abbreviations AA

Area Authority

AAD

Area Authority Designate

ALARP

As Low as Reasonably Practicable

CoW

Control of Work

KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0113

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CSE

Confined Space Entry

GPO

BP Global Projects Organisation

GRoS

BP Golden Rules of Safety

HITRA

Hazard Identification and Task Risk Assessment

ISA

Isolating Authority

MOC

Management of Change

PA

Performing Authority

PTW

Permit to Work

PTWC

Permit to Work Coordinator

SA

Site Authority

TBT

Toolbox Talk

TRA

Task Risk Assessment

TRAT

Task Risk Assessment Table

KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0113

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0.

2.0.

INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................. 1.1.

PURPOSE......................................................................................................................................

1.2.

SCOPE...........................................................................................................................................

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES............................................................................ 2.1.

SINGLE POINT OF ACCOUNTABILITY.........................................................................................

2.2.

SITE AUTHORITY..........................................................................................................................

2.3.

AREA AUTHORITY.........................................................................................................................

2.4.

AREA AUTHORITY DESIGNATE....................................................................................................

2.5.

PERFORMING AUTHORITY..........................................................................................................

2.6.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF HITRA FACILITATORS.......................................................................... 2.6.1.

HITRA LEVEL 1 FACILITATOR (TYPICALLY PA) 10

2.6.2. HITRA LEVEL 2 FACILITATOR (TYPICALLY AA OR REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE HSE SITE TEAM) 10 3.0.

4.0.

5.0.

6.0.

7.0.

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND TASK RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS OVERVIEW ....................................................................................................................... 3.1.

TASK RISK ASSESSMENT LEVELS............................................................................................

3.2.

HITRA PROCESS STEPS............................................................................................................

3.3.

LEVEL 1 HITRA PROCESS..........................................................................................................

3.4.

LEVEL 2 HITRA PROCESS..........................................................................................................

ENERGY SOURCES, HAZARDS AND RISK............................................................. 4.1.

HAZARDS.....................................................................................................................................

4.2.

DETERMINING CONSEQUENCES.............................................................................................

4.3.

RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK RANKING.................................................................................

4.4.

IDENTIFICATION OF CONTROLS...............................................................................................

PERFORM TASK................................................................................................ 5.1.

PERMIT TO WORK AND COMMUNICATION..............................................................................

5.2.

PERFORMING THE TASK............................................................................................................

5.3.

MONITOR FOR CONDITION CHANGE.......................................................................................

5.4.

LESSONS LEARNED...................................................................................................................

TRAINING AND COMPETENCY............................................................................ 6.1.

GENERAL.....................................................................................................................................

6.2.

LEVELS OF TRAINING................................................................................................................

TASK RISK ASSESSMENT TABLE (TRAT)..............................................................

APPENDIX A ENERGY SOURCE PROMPTS..................................................................... APPENDIX B HAZARD IDENTIFICATION PROMPTS......................................................... APPENDIX C IMPACT ASSESSMENT TABLE.................................................................... KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0113

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APPENDIX D RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX...................................................................... APPENDIX E APPROVAL MATRIX.................................................................................. APPENDIX F TASK RISK ASSESSMENT TABLE (TRAT)..................................................... APPENDIX G LEVEL 1 RISK ASSESSMENT PRO FORMA................................................... APPENDIX H HITRA FORM...........................................................................................

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1.0. INTRODUCTION Hazard Identification and Task Risk Assessment (HITRA) is used during the planning and execution stages of Commissioning Control of Work (CoW) to identify hazards associated with performing tasks. It prescribes the control measures to implement during task execution to prevent or eliminate, isolate or minimize task risks so that work is executed in a safe, systematic and compliant manner. This document should be read in conjunction with Khazzan Commissioning Control of Work Procedure KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0107 and the Energy Isolation Process KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0111

1.1. Purpose The purpose of this procedure is to describe how to identify work-related hazards and assess risks associated with activities undertaken as part of the Khazzan Project Commissioning scope. It provides the necessary detail to illustrate ‘what good hazard identification and task risk assessment looks like’. The HITRA process forms an essential part of the Commissioning Control of Work (CoW) process. Before conducting HITRA, evaluate: 1. Is the job really necessary? 2. Is there an alternate way(s) to do the work that ‘eliminates’ inherent hazard(s) involved? It is a Khazzan Project principle that no unnecessary work will be done. Only work that provides business value will be undertaken.

1.2. Scope This procedure applies to work undertaken –inside the CPF boundary limits. See Figure 1 below illustrating the CPF Commissioning CoW document structure. An equivalent approach managed by BP for GWES Category 1 scope.

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Figure 1: Commissioning CoW Document Structure

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2.0. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

2.1. Single Point of Accountability Khazzan CPF HITRA Single Point of Accountability (SPA) is the Petrofac Commissioning Manager and is responsible for ensuring that: 

All activities within their area of responsibility comply with this procedure



Delegation of any of the CoW role’s responsibility is documented



CoW audit, assurance and self-verification systems are in place, including lessons learned and continual improvement processes



Sufficient resources (time, people and budget) are allocated to implement this procedure



Personnel involved in facilitating HITRA are properly trained and competent



Periodic self-verification against the requirements in this procedure is undertaken

Responsibility can be delegated but not accountability. This delegation must be documented (Refer to CPF Commissioning CoW ProcedureKZ01-CG-PLN-53-0107.

2.2. Site Authority The Site Authority (SA) is responsible to: 

Ensure that an adequate number of competent persons are appointed to manage the work and the associated risks, as defined in this procedure



Confirm that a process is in place to manage the appointment of competent persons as: o

Authorizing signatories for Level 1 and Level 2 HITRAs,

o

Level 1 HITRA completers,

o

Team Leaders to facilitate the Level 2 HITRA process.



Ensure that the HITRA process is in place and followed consistently



Review and self-verify the HITRA process to confirm that the quality of the HITRAs and areas of improvement have been identified and implemented



Ensure that the HITRA process is subject to regular monitoring and Self Verification , acting upon the results of Self Verification to maintain the integrity of the system and proposing any recommendations for system improvement



Ensure that formal records of all TRAs are maintained



Ensure that the training and competency standards, and formal authorization of personnel, as defined in this document and in Control of Work Procedure (KZ01-CG-PLN-53-0107) are followed



Manage the TRAT

Note: The SA is the Single Point of Accountability for CoW on their site. The responsibilities but not the accountabilities can be delegated to a competent person with proper documented approval from the SPA. Review and authorization of all Level 1 & 2 HITRA should be commensurate with the level of risk. It is incumbent on the SA to request a higher level of risk assessment should they consider that risks have not been fully addressed.

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2.3. Area Authority The Area Authority (AA) role is central to the site CoW process for the management and control of CoW tasks. AAs are accountable for task hazard identification and risk control measures associated with work performed in their area of responsibility. The number of areas can be depending on the complexity and the footprint of the work to be undertaken. Responsibility can be delegated but not accountability. This delegation should be through documented approval from the SA. The Area Authorities are responsible for ensuring that the requirements of this procedure are adhered to for all TRAs conducted within their area of responsibility. The AA or their competent delegate (AAD) shall be trained and competent to lead the team in performing a Level 2 HITRA. They shall be responsible to: 

Ensure that everyone associated with the work activity is aware of the requirements of HITRA, permit to work conditions and any risks or hazards



Ensure that the appropriate level of risk assessment is conducted for the task



Organise and participate in the HITRA process



Ensure that the Performing Authority (PA. Refer to Section 2.5) participates in risk assessments and conducts Tool Box Talks associated with the work activity



Ensure that the HITRA is communicated to the workforce in commonly used language(s)



Ensure that the risk assessment requirement is included in the planning for each work activity



Ensure that a pre-job site visit is conducted with the PA to identify all hazards and appropriate controls that need to be included in the Work Permit or risk assessment



Ensure that the appropriate level of HITRA has been carried out for the task



Ensure that all the appropriate control measures have been put in place prior to a permit being issued, confirming that the PA fully understands the scope of work and tasks involved



Ensure that active permits and hazard control measures are effective at the work site and can continue simultaneously with other PTW tasks



Ensure that the PA is competent to perform the task and HITRA



Promote the culture to “STOP the Job” if anyone feels unsafe.

2.4. Area Authority Designate The AAD serves as a delegate for the AA, can facilitate L1 HITRA, participate in L2 HITRA and perform site visit for low residual risks tasks. Only certain elements of the AA role can be delegated by the AA to the AAD. The accountability for ensuring hazards are identified and the associated risks are controlled cannot be delegated. The AA cannot delegate worksite visit for high residual risk tasks or approval of Level 2 HITRA that requires AA approval as per the Approval Matrix (Appendix E)

2.5. Performing Authority The Performing Authority (PA) is the person responsible for the activity being carried out under the Permit to Work. For permit-related work, the PA should perform the Level 1 HITRA assessment. The PA may also participate in Level 2 HITRAs. The PA shall be competent to supervise performance of the task and be very familiar with the equipment and tools being used. The PA may be the person carrying out the task or supervising a group of people carrying it out. KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0113

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The PA can be responsible for more than one task at a time providing they can safely manage the tasks simultaneously. This should be discussed and agreed with the Area Authority The PA shall ensure that: 

All personnel under their supervision comply with this procedure when involved in risk-assessed activities



Level 1 HITRA is completed where required and that adequate consultation has taken place, typically with AA and the line supervisor



The necessity of Level 2 HITRA is identified and participate in Level 2 HITRA



Risk assessment has been performed and a toolbox talk conducted



Where other persons are involved in the task, they fully understand the scope of the work and the hazards and controls for the job by holding a toolbox talk meeting. This includes ensuring that all of those involved in the specific work activity sign the worksite hard copy of the Work Permit



The controls identified in the HITRA are effectively in place and that the activity is executed in accordance with this procedure



Work activity is STOPPED if an unsafe situation occurs



Work activities have been reviewed and pertinent information exchanged with all other affected parties



Appropriate authorisation is obtained prior to the commencement of work



The proposed controls reduce the risks associated with the task; consider the controls specified by any relevant local procedure and the capability of the person in charge.



Work is stopped immediately when there is any change to the Work Permit conditions, including an emergency, and that hazards and risks are reassessed before the work is resumed



A culture prevails to “STOP the Job” if anyone feels unsafe.

2.6. Responsibilities of HITRA Facilitators 1.1.1.

HITRA Level 1 Facilitator (Typically PA)

The Level 1 HITRA Facilitator should: 

Complete Level 1 HITRAs



Confirm that adequate consultation has taken place, typically with the AA and / or line supervisor



Confirm appropriate authorisation is obtained prior to the commencement of work

1.1.2. HITRA Level 2 Facilitator (Typically AA or representative from the HSE site team) The main responsibilities are to: 

Lead the assigned team in performing a Level 2 HITRA as described in this procedure



Ensure the team understands the assessment process and its objectives



Take responsibility for maintaining the quality of the HITRA



Ensure that the assessment team includes personnel with the necessary experience, knowledge and competence for the task involved



Ensure that the HITRA includes a worksite visit prior to issuing PTW

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Ensure that all members of the HITRA team have full opportunity to contribute and that the details of the assessment are agreed by all team members



Ensure that the details of the assessment are accurately recorded and correspond with the agreed level of risk



Take appropriate guidance on health, safety and environmental legislation and consequent limits on operation

3.0. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND TASK RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS OVERVIEW This section outlines the HITRA process for systematically examining a task to identify the hazards, evaluate the risks and specify appropriate controls.

3.1. Task Risk Assessment Levels There are two levels of Task Risk Assessment (TRA). Level 1 TRA includes a detailed overview of the task to identify the hazards involved and required controls. It is conducted by one or more competent persons, typically the Performing Authority (PA) and / or the Area Authority (AA). Level 2 TRA includes a structured semi-quantitative assessment, conducted when the Site Authority (SA) or AA determines that there are greater hazards or complexities associated with the task, necessitating a more rigorous assessment. Level 2 TRA is performed by a TRA team. The reasons for a Level 2 HITRA include, for example: 

The task is new and unfamiliar



It is not possible to comply fully with the standards in a relevant local procedure or other recognized source of guidance



Previously used controls may not be reasonably practicable in this case



The task is complex and/or has potential impact on other activities.



Energy of significant magnitude will be introduced into the system/process

The following activities require a Level 2 TRA: 

Confined space entry



Excavation of a trench or pit more than 4 feet or 1.2 metres deep or other ground disturbance, such as piling



Working at heights, where a fall could result in serious injury



Work on energised systems



Complex (Category 2) or critical (Category 3) lifting operations



Activities that could involve exposure to substances for which there are defined exposure limits, including:



o

hydrogen sulphide (H2S)

o

products that contain benzene

o

inert gases

Work that could result in performance or availability of safety critical equipment or systems falling below expected standards, for example: o

Removal or inhibition of protective devices

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o

Blocking of escape routes

o

Taking a fire pump or emergency generator offline

Note, safety critical performance shall be considered with respect to the hazards present in a Commissioning, pre hydrocarbon environment. 

Online connections to process equipment tanks or pipelines, including hot tapping.



Planned deviation from an existing policy, procedure or practice.

More examples of activities, and whether they warrant Level 1 or Level 2 assessment, are included in the TRAT, Appendix F.

3.2. HITRA Process Steps 

Identify the site and process hazards that could result in harm such as injury, illness, damage to the environment, plant or process



Identify risk; determine the credible consequences and their probabilities to assess the level of risk(consequence x probability = risk) including who or what could be affected



Reduce risk by eliminating or substituting the hazards AND controlling and / or mitigating the risks



Evaluate residual risk that remains with all the planned controls in effect. Confirm that residual risk has been considered and no additional controls are needed for the task(s) to be conducted safely



Document in a standard format the hazards, controls and residual risk



Record approvals of the HITRA document



Communicate the hazards and controls to all personnel involved in performing the task. Confirm that the controls are effective throughout the task.



Monitor the on-going work to identify any new hazard that may be introduced during or because of the activities.

3.3. Level 1 HITRA Process A Level 1 HITRA involves a review of the task by the PA in consultation with the AA to identify the hazards associated with the task and appropriate control measures required to manage these hazards. The PA uses their technical knowledge and task information to select job hazards from the prompt list on the permit (see Figure 2 below). The PA should not be constrained by the list and must use their judgement to identify any other hazards and record on the space provided on the permit. The PA then uses the controls listed to show how the hazards will be managed. Once again, the PA should not be constrained by the list and must use their judgement to identify any other control measures and record on the space provided on the permit. The AA with the PA will review task details, hazards and control measures described on the permit along with any documentation. Prior to the commencement of the job, they will visit the worksite to confirm all hazards have been identified and adequately controlled. During Commissioning, where there will be repetitive low risk tasks carried out such as instrument loop checks, or uncoupled motor runs; a Level 1 risk assessment may be carried out and recorded on a specific L1 risk assessment pro forma, included in Appendix G These risk assessments shall be held in the PtW office and given a unique reference number. The assessment shall be reviewed, copied and attached to subsequent equivalent permits as required. This will ensure a level of consistency in low risk activities. Additional site specific hazards can be added directly to the permit as required.

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This approach shall also be followed when considering Risk Assessed Procedures and the existing HITRA shall be reviewed for applicability and any lessons learned from previous application of the procedure.

Figure 2: Example from Cold Work Permit - Hazards and Controls Checkboxes

Figure 3: Level 1 HITRA Flowchart If the proposed controls are adequate for the identified risks of the task, and the task can be conducted safely, the task risk assessment is approved. If, considering any residual risks, the authorised signatory doubts that the risks are adequately controlled by the proposed means, they will request a Level 2 HITRA. Those who conducted the Level 1 HITRA may also participate in the Level 2 HITRA.

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3.4. Level 2 HITRA Process A Level 2 HITRA is a structured examination of all hazards associated with a task to devise a set of control measures that reduce the level of risk sufficiently to allow a task to proceed safely. If the risk cannot be sufficiently reduced, alternative methods must be found before the task can proceed. The Level 2 method uses a risk assessment proforma sheet and a suite of matrices to help to determine the consequences and likelihood of hazardous conditions in a consistent and repeatable manner. To complete a Level 2 risk assessment, a team is formed with a minimum of 3 persons with suitable experience, led by a competent Level 2 HITRA facilitator appointed by the AA. The objective of forming a team is to bring together understanding and experience of the task to examine all the hazards and devise a set of controls that will ensure that the level of risk is reasonable. Where larger tasks, series of tasks or significant introduction of energy is planned the potential to require Level 2 HITRAs should be identified early, to allocate time in the plan to complete the HITRAs. A Level 2 HITRA can be carried out at any stage in the work process if the PA, AA, a member of management or any other personnel believes that significant risks exist which will not be adequately controlled without a more rigorous assessment and the application of additional controls. The AA is responsible for deciding whether a L2 HITRA is required. The decision about when Level 2 Risk Assessment is required is somewhat subjective, depending on the people involved, but the following rules should be applied to ensure a consistent level of assessment is being carried out across the organization.

Figure 4: Level 2 HITRA Flowchart

4.0. ENERGY SOURCES, HAZARDS AND RISK This section provides guidance on the use of an energy source approach to identify hazards and clarifies the differences between hazards and risks.

4.1. Hazards Hazards are anything with the potential to result in harm such as injury, illness or damage.

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NOTE: Through Commissioning, the absence of hydrocarbons and associated SIMOPs makes the process of hazards identification and risk assessment less complex than Operational facilities. To identify all the hazards, consider the aspects below: 

Affected Hazards: The energy sources affected by the work, e.g. commissioning fluids and the system in which they are transported and contained (e.g. operations equipment).



Applied Hazards: Uncontrolled or unwanted contact with an energy source that may occur while setting up tools and equipment at the job site.



Ambient Hazards: The site conditions that may cause uncontrolled or unwanted contact with an energy source (e.g. weather conditions or concurrent work).

Other considerations may include; 

Characteristics of the plant and / or systems involved:



Access



Type of service (e.g., water, diesel, inert gas)



Likelihood of foam, sand, and sludge, types of scale



Sensitivity of the location within the premises, including proximity to Health, Safety, Security and Environment (HSSE) critical plant or systems such as:



o

Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning (HVAC) intakes

o

Flare header

o

Emergency Shut Down Valves (ESDVs)

o

Escape routes, fire pumps, large inventories (pipelines, vessels or tanks)

Possible interactions between simultaneous activities within the task, or with another task taking place nearby, that call for close coordination or controls.

Energy Sources and Hazard Identification prompts are found in Appendices A and B. Also, consider what would occur in the event of an emergency.

4.2. Determining Consequences After identifying the hazards, the potential credible consequences should also be identified, taking into consideration any impact on personnel or plant. The worst reasonably credible consequences should be identified and recorded for each hazard. There may be more than one consequence per hazard. Refer to Appendix C: Impact Assessment Table for guidance on determining the level of impact for each of: Health and Safety, Environment or Financial consequences.

4.3. Risk Assessment and Risk Ranking Risk assessment assigns semi-quantitative values for each consequence and probability. The product of these values lies inside or outside the allowed limits. The risk created by each hazard on the list should be evaluated according to: The worst reasonably credible impact, should anything go wrong (taken from Appendix C) AND the probability of such an impact being realized (from Appendix D) The result is a numerical risk ranking which must be recorded and approved according to the requirements found in Appendix E.

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For example, impact level F and probability level 4 gives a ranking of 6, which falls in Risk Area II, requiring approval by Site Authority.

4.4. Identification of Controls For each risk, control measures shall be identified. The HITRA Facilitator works systematically through the list of hazards to specify all the methods necessary to control each of the associated risks. Existing controls are recorded along with any additional controls that the team considers necessary to achieve a sufficient level of overall control. The hierarchy of controls shown below should be used as a guide to confirm that a full range of options is considered. Note: As consequences are deemed reasonably credible, then control measures should be reasonably practicable. They should be chosen to adequately reduce the identified risk.

Figure 5: Hierarchy of Controls Two types of control measures should be identified from a Level 1 or Level 2 HITRA process: 

Prerequisite controls that should be in effect prior to job execution. These may or may not include a PTW.



Supplementary controls that should be applied during the job. Consideration should be given whether supplementary controls introduce another hazard, while in effect.

Before the task is authorised to start, the person controlling the work activity should confirm that: 

All the prerequisite controls are in effect



The persons allocated to perform the task are competent to initiate and manage the supplementary controls



The output from the risk assessment (with Work Permit where applicable) has been “communicated in writing and signed off by all involved in the task”



Monitoring activities are arranged e.g. controls are still effective, no new hazard is introduced



Actions in the event of an emergency are understood by all involved in the task.

Controls Check KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0113

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Consideration should be given to the following questions: 

Have all the necessary control measures been fully identified?



Is an engineering change necessary for eliminating or reducing the risk?



Are any additional capabilities needed to complete the task?



Should the plant or process be shut down?



Is the residual risk at a level to allow the task to be safely completed?

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Residual Risk Check A. If the residual risk is not at a level to allow the task to be completed safely, the hierarchy of controls should be used again with emphasis on the most effective or prevention categories. 

If any control measures are practicable to implement and would reduce the residual risk, they should be recorded.



If further control measures cannot reduce the risk to a level that allows the task to be completed safely, the HITRA team cannot authorize the task and should refer back to the work requester.

B. The HITRA team will document: 

The assessment including all the identified control measures that should be in effect for the defined task.



The residual risk level for each identified hazard, with the highest residual risk defining the level of approval. (Appendix E)

C. Agreement on risks and controls 

Approval to proceed is sought when the HITRA team unanimously agrees that the hazards and risks are controlled to the point that the task(s) can be conducted safely

D. Documentation and records 

The HITRA team shall record the findings in the HITRA format included as Appendix G

E. Approval levels are explained in Appendix E.

5.0. PERFORM TASK

5.1. Permit to Work and Communication This section discusses the approval to proceed and the importance of communication to the success of HITRA. Before work commences, the risk assessment shall have been approved based on the residual risk and according to the approval matrix Appendix E. The success of a HITRA depends on the effective communication of its results, so that people who execute the job are fully aware of and thoroughly understand the hazards and the controls in effect. The HITRA document is used as the basis for workforce communications so that all personnel concerned have an understanding of the following: 

The steps involved in carrying out the job



The hazards they may encounter at each step



Control measures in effect or planned and how they relate to the hazards



Individual actions and responsibilities at various steps in the work

All involved in the task have the opportunity to identify further hazards and control measures that may have been overlooked in the HITRA. The HITRA Facilitator should be notified if such improvements are identified.

5.2. Performing the Task Each person involved in actually performing the task should: 

Be satisfied that all the defined controls are actually in place and effective (even though the task has been duly authorised)

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Feel empowered (and obliged) to voice any concerns to their supervisor and not start the job if they do not think it can be completed safely

5.3. Monitor for Condition Change The HITRA includes a monitoring frequency for the work. However, personnel who execute the task should monitor their activities on an on-going basis and be alert to: 

Any new or unauthorised personnel



Conditions at the work site (e.g. isolations, weather, SIMOPS)



Hazards generated by the activity



Hazards not originally covered by the HITRA



Whether controls are still effective

If necessary, personnel should stop the job so that the hazards and risk can be re-assessed.

5.4. Lessons Learned It is important to capture lessons learned upon completion of work and incorporate the lessons into the process. This may be in the form of changes or revisions to: 

Links between a procedure and the underpinning HITRA.



HITRA records.



The HITRA process, including team composition.

Lessons learned should be communicated to all concerned through existing methods such as meetings, circulars, training and toolbox talks.

6.0. TRAINING AND COMPETENCY

6.1. General All personnel involved in the HITRA process are trained on HITRA process & procedure and competent. The competency of all relevant personnel shall be established during the planning process for a particular risk assessment. The AA shall ensure that the personnel involved in the activity have the correct competencies through training records or requesting individuals to produce relevant certification. While it is simple, successful application of the HITRA method depends upon participants having industry experience, different perspectives and understanding of relevant hazards, realistic consequences and a hierarchy of risk reduction measures (hierarchy of controls is shown in Section 4.5 above). All personnel involved in the HITRA process should complete the fundamental training module (Refer to Section 6.2 below for links) which covers: 

Definitions of hazard, consequence, probability, risk, control, hierarchy of controls and risk matrix



The principles and process of HITRA



When to conduct Level 1 and 2 HITRAs



HITRA tools (checklists, prompts)



Expectations of team members: the need to contribute personal experience, reach agreement and record divergent views



Responsibility after the completion of the HITRA (communication, responding to changes at the task location)

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Before selection for training, Level 2 HITRA Facilitators should be able to demonstrate an extensive knowledge of the work environment. They should be able to apply informed judgment when using checklists and other available tools.

6.2. Levels of Training All members defined in the Control of Work team (PA, AA, , AAD, PTWC, SA, ISA, AGT) are required to carry out HITRA awareness training. This will capture HITRA level 1 and a summary of what level 2 risk assessment includes and awareness of why and when it should be used. Personnel identified to be Level 2 facilitators, shall carry out further training to HITRA Level 2 facilitator level. Personnel shall only take on the roles of authorised signatory or HITRA Facilitator after successfully completing the supplementary training and competency assessment. Training and Competency Matrix: Role SA

Experience 1. Has led and facilitated Level 1 and 2 HITRAs using the HITRA process.

Training 1.

2. Practical demonstration in leading a level 2 HITRA 2.

AA

1.

2.

PA

Has led and facilitated Level 1 and 2 HITRAs using the HITRA process. Practical demonstration in leading a level 2 HITRA.

Explain the PA’s role in worksite visits and Level 1 HITRA or equivalent.

KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0113

1.

Completed training for both HITRA participation and facilitation modules. Satisfactorily passed the HITRA knowledge assessment criteria.

Complete the HITRA participation and facilitation training course.

2

HITRA Awareness (participation)

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Assessment Criteria Practical field assessment shall include: 1.

Can lead a Level 2 TRA.

2.

Can articulate the difference between a hazard and a risk.

3.

Can state the difference between Level 1 and 2 HITRAs.

4.

Understands how residual risk is determined and the approval process.

5.

Leads a field CoW verification/audit, including HITRA.

6.

Can articulate the HITRA hierarchy of controls.

Field assessment shall include/verify the following: 1.

He or she has led a Level 2 HITRA.

2.

Demonstrate that they understand the HITRA and approval process.

3.

Explain the difference between Level 1 and Level 2 HITRAs.

4.

Demonstrate ability to lead a L2 HITRA.

5.

Apply the HITRA tools and approval process.

6.

Explain the HITRA hierarchy of Controls and residual risk.

Assessment shall include: 1.

What is a Level 1 HITRA, and what are the key principles

2.

Name the energy sources and identify hazards.

3.

What hazards to look for during a worksite visit

4.

When to escalate to Level 2 TRA

Rev: A02 Project Internal

Assessor SPA with support from Technical Discipline Engineers (if needed)

SA

AA

Khazzan Project

Commissioning Hazard Identification and Task Risk Assessment (CPF)

7.0. TASK RISK ASSESSMENT TABLE (TRAT) TRAT lists typical Commissioning activities, prescribing Level 1 or 2 HITRA, recommended participants and approver. The TRAT table included in Appendix F is based on BP Upstream guidance The purpose of the TRAT is to: 

Categorise a number of standard tasks according to their residual risk level



List the appropriate permit to work types (including procedures and routine)



Define the required Level (1 or 2) of TRA and the approval/authorization level

The Site Authority is accountable for the management of the TRAT. When a task is not covered in the TRAT, the Site Authority will determine the level of TRA required by applying the HITRA process.

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APPENDIX A ENERGY SOURCE PROMPTS Energy sources

Description / guidance

Biological - including wildlife and viruses or bacteria, e.g., as found in sewage systems, drain lines, cooling towers Biological

Body Mechanics - human strength and agility applied to a task involving lifting, pushing, pulling, climbing or positioning Body Mechanics

Chemical - in the form of reactive or life-threatening gases, liquids, solids, e.g., water, methane, nitrogen, process chemicals, etc. Chemical Electrical - includes all types and voltages of electricity: high voltage power systems ( (AC), battery systems (DC) and static.

Electrical

Consider whether the task:  Requires equipment related to the task or in the area of the task to be isolated.  Involves electricity powered equipment.  Is in an area where there is vulnerable electrical equipment such as insulated cabling, un-insulated overhead power lines, etc.  Involves transfer of fluids, powers, etc. or friction between nonconducting materials which could generate static electrical charges. Are systems and equipment where this could occur adequately grounded and / or bonded.

Gravity - causes tools, equipment or people to fall or move. This affects lifting task, work at height and potential dropped objects Gravity Mechanical - includes mobile equipment as well as moving parts on stationary equipment and rotating equipment. Even though items are non-powered, their momentum as they are moved may crush or cut people or vulnerable equipment. Also includes sharp edges of tools and / or equipment. Mechanical

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Energy sources

Description / guidance Noise - A form of pressure energy. Consideration should be given to whether:  The task is in a high noise area.  Noisy tools / equipment will be used.  Noise could cause communication problems, including in any emergency.

Noise

Pressure - air, water, pneumatics, springs, gases are all possible sources of significant pressure.

Pressure

Consideration should be given to:  Non-Return Valves (NRVs) where system contents may be trapped between the NRV and an isolation point.  Section of equipment in which trapped or undrained contents may remain.  General equipment / line condition, e.g., area of corrosion, where a pressure leak is foreseeable.  Reaction forces from a pressure leak, which may move an unrestrained item, such as a hose, cylinder or pipe segment.

Radiation - in the form of sunlight, radio waves or ionizing radiation (radioactivity) Radiation

Thermal - energy associated with hot or cold surfaces and fluids, undesired chemical reactions and / or ambient temperatures. Thermal

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APPENDIX B HAZARD IDENTIFICATION PROMPTS Category Mechanical

Type of harm Trapping (crushing, pressing, drawing in and shearing injuries)

Examples Two moving parts, or one moving part and a fixed surface Conveyor belt and drive V belt and pulley Power press Using hammer Hoist, crane

Impact (includes puncture) / mobile equipment

Something that may strike or stab someone or may be struck against Moving vehicle, machine, aircraft Drill, lathe Crane hook or load

Contact (cutting, friction or abrasion)

Something sharp or with a rough surface Knife, chisel, saw Fan blade Circular saw blade Sanding belt Abrasive wheel

Entanglement (rotating parts)

Power take-off shaft Pipe threading machine Abrasive wheel

Ejection (of work piece or part of tool)

Cartridge tool Hammer and chisel Abrasive wheel Abrasive blasting

Electrical

Shock / burn / fire /

Electricity > 240v, 240v, 110v…

Explosion

DC electricity, especially batteries (hydrogen gas) when charging

Ignition sources

Static Batteries Pressure

Release of energy

Compressed air

(explosion / injection /

Compressed gas

implosion)

Process fluid Steam Vacuum Hydraulic system

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Category

Type of harm

Examples Hydro-blasting

Stored energy

Flying objects,

Springs under tension

Electrical / hydraulic / pneumatic systems

Springs under compression Turbine variable inlet guide vanes Conveyor tension weight Counterweight Accumulators/ pulsation dampers

Gravity

Struck by falling objects

Overhead work areas / platforms Items mounted or stored on ceilings or on walls High rack storage areas (warehouse) Hoist platform cage Load carried by crane Raised tipper lorry body

Thermal

Burns / fires / scalds / frostbite

Hot surface Welding flame / arc Refrigerant Steam Process fluid, heat transfer medium

Radiation Ionizing radiation

Burns, cancer, sunburn, melanoma, skin cancer

X Rays  or  radiation Ultra violet

Non ionizing radiation

Burns

Micro wave Radio frequency Laser Infrared

Noise

Hearing loss, tinnitus

Noise > 85 dB(A) continuous Noise >? dB impact

Vibration

Vibration white finger, whole body effects

Pneumatic drill Driving mobile plant Using jackhammer

Stability

Crushing

Inadequate crane base Fork lift truck on slope Machine not bolted down Mobile scaffold too high Scaffold not tied

Overload or defect due to KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0113

Crushing Page 25 of 41

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Category

Type of harm

mechanical failure

Examples Chain sling Scaffold overload Structure overload, especially extreme weather

Fire / explosion

Burns

Combustion

Paper store Grease Plastic foam

Flammable substances (highly and extremely flammable)

Burns

Petrol, diesel, avgas Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) Hydrogen

See also explosive below Oxidizing substance

Burns

Organic peroxide, other oxidising agents Nitric acid

Gas explosions

Burns, structural failure

Flammable gas or liquid above its flash point in a confined space

Dust explosions

Burns, structural failure

Wood dust

Health hazards

Skin, eyes and respiratory track effects; noise

Sulphuric acid, other acids – especially hydrofluoric

Corrosive / irritating materials

Caustic soda, other alkalis Ammonia, chlorine

Sensitising materials and particulates

Sensitisation, fibrosis and cancers of the lungs irritation / injury to eyes

Silica dust Wood dust Iron dust

Vapours

Acute and chronic effects on health

Benzene Toluene Acetone

Fumes

Acute and chronic effects on health (local and systemic effects)

Lead fume Rubber fume Asphalt fume

Gases

Acute and chronic effects on health and death

Carbon monoxide Hydrogen sulphide Sulphur dioxide

Mists

Acute and chronic effects on health

Oil mist, cutting fluids Printing ink mist Detergents Aerosols

Asphyxiates

Acute and chronic effects on health and death

Nitrogen Carbon monoxide Smoke Argon

Health hazard by ingestion KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0113

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Category

Type of harm

Examples

Poisoning

Toxins All harmful aerosols Polluted water Contaminated food and drink

Hazards by contact

Cuts, abrasions

Metal swarf Concrete blocks

Environmental Hazards Biological / hazardous waste storage and disposal

Burns, frostbite;

Molten metal

also structural failure

Cryogenic gases

Sewage systems / groundwater / soil pollution / biohazardous waste and sharps / influenza / malaria

Crude / condensate transportation and storage Storage of hazardous sludge / material in pits Infectious and non-infectious diseases, parasites

Human factors / fatigue

Injuries, illness

Shift work Work patterns Driving Poor ergonomic design of plant Control / alarm systems Procedures

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APPENDIX C IMPACT ASSESSMENT TABLE Severity

A

B

Health and Safety Levels A-C maintain the visibility of risks with the potential for catastrophic impact even if their probability of occurrence is extremely low. The upper level of this framework is defined by the most severe level of impact ever seen in industry.

Comparable to the most catastrophic health/safety incidents ever seen in industry. The potential for 100 or more fatalities (or onset of life threatening health effects) shall always be classified at this level.

Catastrophic health/safety incident causing very widespread fatalities within or outside a facility. The potential for 50 or more fatalities (or onset of life threatening health effects) shall always be classified at this level.

Catastrophic health/safety incident causing widespread fatalities within or outside a facility. The potential for 10 or more fatalities (or onset of life threatening health effects) shall always be classified at this level.

Environmental 

Future impact, e.g., unintended release, with widespread damage to any environment and which remains in an "unsatisfactory" state for a period > 5 years.



Future impact with extensive damage to a sensitive environment and which remains in an "unsatisfactory" state for a period > 5 years.



Future impact with widespread damage to a sensitive environment and which can only be restored to a "satisfactory"/agreed state in a period of more than 1 and up to 5 years.



Future impact with extensive damage to a non-sensitive environment and which remains in an "unsatisfactory" state for a period > 5 years.



Future impact with extensive damage to a sensitive environment and which can only be restored to a "satisfactory"/agreed state in a period of more than 1 and up to 5 years.



Future impact with widespread damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can only be restored to a "satisfactory"/agreed state in a period of more than 1 and up to 5 years.



Future impact with widespread damage to a sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of around 1 year.



Future impact with extensive damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can only be restored to a "satisfactory"/agreed state in a period of more than 1 and up to 5 years.



Future impact with widespread damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of around 1 year.



Future impact with extensive damage to a sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of around 1 year.



Future impact with widespread damage to a sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.

C

Every employee associate with this project has the ultimate responsibility for Health, Safety, Security & Environmental performance. This will be achieved through a positive HSSE culture at all the levels and by implementing a robust HSSE Management system. Petrofac and its Sub-Contractor management will continually strive towards reducing HSSE risks to As Low As Reasonably Practical (ALARP) in all its operations to achieve the Project HSSE goals. KZ01-CG-PRO-53-0113

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Severity

D

Commissioning Hazard Identification and Task Risk Assessment

Health and Safety Very major health/safety incident The potential for 3 or more fatalities (or onset of life threatening health effects) shall always be classified at this level. 30 or more injuries or health effects, either permanent or requiring hospital treatment for more than 24 hours.

Major health/safety incident 1 or 2 fatalities, acute or chronic, actual or alleged. 10 or more injuries or health effects, either permanent or requiring hospital treatment for more than 24 hours.

E

F

High impact health/safety incident Permanent partial disability(ies) Several non-permanent injuries or health impacts. Days Away From Work Case (DAFWC)

Medium impact health/safety incident Single or multiple recordable injury or health effects from common source/event.

G

H

Low impact health/safety incident

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Environmental 

Future impact with extensive damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of around 1 year.



Future impact with localized damage to a sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of around 1 year.



Future impact with widespread damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.



Future impact with extensive damage to a sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.



Future impact with localized damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of around 1 year.



Future impact with extensive damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.



Future impact with localized damage to a sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.



Future impact with extensive damage to a sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of days or weeks.



Future impact with localized damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.



Future impact with immediate area damage to a sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.



Future impact with extensive damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of days or weeks.



Future impact with localized damage to a sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of days or weeks.



Future impact with immediate area damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.



Future impact with localized damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of days or weeks.



Future impact with immediate area damage to a sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of days or weeks.



Future impact with immediate area damage to a non-sensitive environment Rev: A02 Project Internal

Khazzan Project

Severity

Commissioning Hazard Identification and Task Risk Assessment

Health and Safety First aid Single or multiple over-exposures causing noticeable irritation but no actual health effects

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Environmental and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of days or weeks.

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Financial Impact Severity

Non-financial Business Impact

(equipment damage, business value lost)

A

Public or investor outrage on a global scale. Threat of global loss of license to operate.

>$20 billion

B

Loss of license to operate a major asset in a major market – US, EU, Russia. Intervention from major Government – US, UK, EU, Russia. Public or investor outrage in major western markets – US, EU. Damage to relationships with key stakeholders of benefit to the Group.

$5 billion - $20 billion

C

Loss of license to operate other material asset, or severe enforcement action against a major asset in a major market. Intervention from other major Government. Public or investor outrage in other material market where we have presence or aspiration.

$1 billion - $5 billion

D

Severe enforcement action against a material asset in a non-major market, or against other assets in a major market. Interventions from non-major Governments. Public or investor outrage in a non-major market, or localised or limited “interest-group” outrage in a major market. Prolonged adverse national or international media attention. Widespread adverse social impact. Damage to relationships with key stakeholders of benefit to the Segment.

$100 m to $1 billion

E

Other adverse enforcement action by regulators. Limited “interest-group” outrage in non-major market. Short term adverse national or international media coverage. Damage to relationships with key stakeholders of benefit to the SPU.

$5m -$100m

F

Regulatory compliance issue which does not lead to regulatory or other higher severity level consequence Prolonged local media coverage. Local adverse social impact. Damage to relationships with key stakeholders of benefit to the Performance Unit (PU).

$500k-$5m

G

Short term local media coverage. Some disruption to local operations (e.g., loss of single road access less than 24 hours).

$50k -$500k

H

Isolated and short term complaints from neighbours (e.g., complaints about specific noise episode).