History of the Balkans, Vol. 1: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries - Barbara Jelavich

H I S T O R Y OF T H E B A L K A N S EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURIES VOLUME I

H I S T O R Y OF T H E BALKANS Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries

VOLUME I

B A R B AR A J E L A V I C H

CAM BRIDGE U N IV E R S IT Y P R E S S

Published by the Press Syndicate o f the University o f Cambridge The Pitt Building, Trum pington Street, Cam bridge CB2 IRP 40 W est 20th Street, New York, NY 10011-4211, USA 10 Stam ford Road, Oakleigh, M elbourne 3166, Australia © Cambridge U niversity Press 1983 First published 1983 Reprinted 1984, 1985, 1987, 1989, 1990, 1993 (tw ice), 1994, 1995 Full term copyright is claimed. T hereafter all portions o f this work covered by this copyright will be in the public domain. This work has developed under a contract with the U.S. Office of Education, Departm ent o f Health, Education, and W elfare. However, the content docs not necessarily reflect the position or policy o f that Agency, and no official endorsem ent of these m aterials should be inferred. Printed in the U nited States of Am erica Library o f Congress Cataloging-in-Publication D ata is available ISBN 0-521-25249-0 (vol. 1) hardback ISBN 0-521-27458-3 (vol. 1) paperback

Contents

page v ii

List of maps and illustrations Prefate

ix

In tro d u c tio n

1

T h e lan d

1

T h e h isto ric a l b a c k g ro u n d

4

P A R T I. T H E E I G H T E E N T H C E N T U R Y

C h a p te r i. B a lk a n C h ristia n s u n d e r O tto m a n ru le

39

T h e O tto m a n sy ste m

39

T h e B a lk a n C h ristia n s

+8

T h e w a rs o f th e e ig h te e n th century'

62

B a lk a n p e o p le u n d e r O tto m a n ru le

72

T h e a u to n o m o u s re g io n s: D u b r o v n ik , M o ld a v ia , an d

98

W allach ia T h e O tto m a n E m p ir e : p o litic a l e v o lu tio n in the eig h te e n th ce n tu ry

113

C h a p te r 2. B a lk a n n a tio n a litie s u n d e r H a b s b u r g ru le P o litic a l a n d so cia l c o n d itio n s in th e e m p ire H a b s b u r g fo re ig n re la tio n s in th e e ig h te e n th ce n tu ry T h e re fo rm p e rio d : M a r ia T h e re s a an d Jo s e p h

II

127 129 133

134

T h e re fo rm s in p ra c tic e : th e B a lk a n n a tio n a litie s in the e ig h te e n th ce n tu ry T h e F re n c h R e v o lu t io n an d N a p o le o n C h a p te r 3. B a lk a n p e o p le u n d e r O tto m a n an d H a b s b u r g ru le: a c o m p a riso n

V

139

161

165

Contents PART II. THE REVO LUTIO N ARY YEARS, 18 0 4 - 18 8 7

Chapter 4. T he first national revolutions Balkan nationalism: the background o f the revolutions T he Serbian revolution T he revolution in the Danubian Principalities T he Greek revolution Conclusion: The achievements o f the first revolutions Chapter 5. The form ation o f the national governments Serbia from M ilos to M ilan M ontenegro Greece under K in g O thon The D anubian Principalities under Russian protection O ttom an reform : the Crim ean War The form ation o f the Rom anian state Conclusion: The Balkan national regimes

171 171 193

204 214 229 235

238 247 254

264 274 287 298

Chapter 6. The national issue in the H absburg Em pire The H absburg Em pire after 1815: the Hungarian problem C roatia and Slavonia: the Illyrian movement The H absburg M onarchy, 1848-1867 C roatia, Slavonia, and the Vojvodina, 1848-1868 Transylvania Conclusion: The H absburg Em pire in 1867

300 300 304 308

Chapter 7. War and revolution, 1856-1887 Balkan cooperation The Bulgarian national movement Bosnia and H ercegovina The crisis o f 1875-1878 Albania: the League o f Prizren Bulgarian unification, 1878-1887 The Eastern Q uestion, 1887-1897: a decade o f relative quiet

329

315

321 327

332 335

348 352

361 366 373

Conclusion. The national movements: a century o f accomplishment

377

Bibliography

381

Index

393

VI

Maps and illustrations

MAPS

I. R e lie f map o f the Balkans 2. Ancient Greece and the Balkans 3· T he Danube lands under Rom an rule 4 - The Byzantine Em pire 5- Bulgaria in the M iddle Ages 6. Serbia under the Nem anja dynasty 7 - Croatia in 1070 8. M edieval Bosnia 9 - M edieval Balkan empires io. The Ottoman Em pire in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries II. O ttom an territorial losses, 1683-1815 12. M oldavia and Wallachia 13· The H absburg Em pire in 1780 14 · The H absburg M ilitary Frontier 15· Transylvania 16. The O ttom an Balkans, 1815 17- Europe in 1815 18. The Straits 19 - The expansion o f Serbia, 1804-1913 20. The expansion o f Greece, 1821-1919 21. The expansion o f M ontenegro, 1859-1913 22. The expansion o f Rom ania, 1861-1920 23 - Austria-H ungary, 1867-1918 2 4 · T he Treaty o f San Stefano; the Treaty o f Berlin 25. Bulgarian territorial changes, 1878-1918

ILLUSTRATIONS

Serpent from Tomis (Constanja), second or third century A .D .

page 2 5

8 14 17

20 24 26 28 33 63 99

136 145

151 184 187 190 194

215 253

288 314 359

367

Maps and Illustrations An O rthodox priest’s house on the Bosphorus M ap o f the Balkans by H erm an M oll, 1717 The A cropolis o f A thens w ith O ttom an cavalry Castle o f Parga Albanians at Janina Pass th ro u g h the Balkan M ountains, Bulgaria The transportation o f goods The tom b o f Ali Pasha in Janina Pass and waterfall in the Balkan M ountains Pass in the Balkan M ountains C onstantinople Entrance to the governm ent buildings, C onstantinople The Sulina C hannel, the m outh o f the D anube Village near Adrianople

VUl

51

67 74 79

82 96 183 218 230 233

276 280 289 336

Preface

c o n c e r n s the history o f the people o f five m o d ­ ern Balkan states - Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, R om ania, and Y u go ­ slavia — over approxim ately three centuries. A lth ough the Balkan peninsula has played a m ajor role in history, the area has been subject to less intensive study than any other European region. To the outside observer the Balkans often appear to be a puzzle o f confusing complexity. A geographic region inhabited by seven m ajor nationalities, speaking different languages, it has usually im pinged on the Western consciousness only when it has be­ com e the scene o f wars o r acts o f violence. L o n g characterized as the “ pow derkeg o f Europe,” the peninsula has indeed lived up to its reputation. T he C rim ean War, the m ajor European engagem ent in the century after 1815, had its origins here; the assassination o f Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 191+ was the immediate cause o f World War I. A fter 1944 the Balkan events were a major factor in initiating the C old War; the Greek civil w ar was the occasion o f the reorientation o f American foreign policy w ith the Truman D octrine. A lth ough it is certainly true that crises such as these have received thorough study, particularly in their w orld significance, much less attention has been paid to the study o f the area on its ow n terms. Western historians, hindered by language difficulties and limited access to archival materials, have only recently begun to examine in detail the many aspects o f the Balkan experi­ ence. Yet this area, because o f both its past contributions and its present im por­ tance, certainly deserves a larger place in m odern historical studies. Part o f form er ancient Greek, Rom an, Byzantine, O ttom an, and H ab sbu rg lands, and situated at the convergence o f E urope, A frica, and A sia, the peninsula has felt the w eight o f the convergence o f alternate imperial drives and com ­ peting ideologies. H ere at various historical periods m ajor political and cul­ tural borderlines have intersected —for instance, the boundaries between the Eastern (Byzantine) and Western Rom an empires, between Islam and C h ris­ tianity, between O rthodoxy and Catholicism , and today between the military blocs o f the N orth Atlantic Treaty and the Warsaw Pact, alignments repre­ senting conflicting social, political, and econom ic systems. Subject to rival external influences, as well as internal pressures, the area is in a very real sense

T

H IS n a r r a t i v e

Preface a testing ground for alternative systems. Thus in the past tw o centuries the Balkans have been a laboratory in which som e o f the m ore elusive aspects o f national and liberal form s o f political organization and econom ic develop­ m ent could be observed; at present the socialist regimes offer similar oppo r­ tunities for investigation. In addition, for both the N orth and the South Am erican reader, an examination o f Balkan history has the added appeal o f dealing w ith the national hom eland o f m i l l i o n s o f emigrants to the N ew World. This survey is designed to introduce the reader to the dramatic and fateful history o f the Balkan peninsula in the years from the Treaty o f K arlow itz (Srem ski K arlovci) o f 1699 to the beginning o f the 1980s. Th e aim is to pre­ sent a balanced picture, based on recent research and on the standard histo­ ries and m onographs, o f the developm ent o f this region in the m odern era. T h e m ajor theme w ill be the process by which the Balkan nationalities broke away from im perial control, both O ttom an and H absburg, established inde­ pendent national states, and then em barked on the even m ore arduous road to econom ic and social m odernization. T he Treaty o f K arlow itz, w hose terms were a m ajor perm anent setback to O ttom an control, is a convenient land­ mark at which to begin our story. T h e subsequent period witnessed the com ­ mencement o f the m ovem ents that were to lead the Balkan people away from the imperial, ecclesiastical organization o f the O ttom an governm ent tow ard the national, secular, state system. T h e national revolutions, as w e shall see, were carried through on an individual basis w ith com paratively litde co o p­ eration am ong the Balkan nationalities. Nevertheless, the activities o f the separate groups shared certain com m on characteristics. F o r instance, each national m ovem ent w as associated w ith a cultural revival that involved the formulation o f a literary language and a renewal o f interest in the pre-Ottoman history o f the people. Similarly, all o f the national leaders organized and car­ ried through arm ed insurrections, w hether successful o r not, and they shared a similar vision o f the political and econom ic goals for the future. T h e road to political transform ation was to be long. T he slow pace o f the w eakening and gradual withdraw al o f O ttom an control made the process m ore difficult. U n d er the absolute rule o f the sultan, internal national and religious rivalries had been m uted, and European influences w ere confined to the periphery o f the peninsula. With the increasing inability o f the O tto ­ man governm ent to defend its possessions, the Balkan lands became prizes coveted by other great powers. In the eighteenth century the Russian and H ab sbu rg empires com peted both w ith the O ttom an Em pire and against each other fo r predominance. In the nineteenth century the region m oved to the center o f the diplom atic stage; the Eastern Q uestion, involving all o f the E uropean great pow ers, became the m ajor continuous diplom atic issue until the com mencement o f World War I, a conflict w hose immediate origins were deeply rooted in Balkan problems. U nfortunately for the Balkan people, du r­ ing the period o f the national liberation movements their lands thus became

x

Preface the focus o f international attention. H ere the increasingly dynamic imperial drives o f Britain, France, and Russia crossed and conflicted. Later the newly united G erm any and Italy joined in the battle. B y the beginning o f the tw en­ tieth century the H absburg Em pire, like the O ttom an, was faced w ith rising national antagonism s w ithin its ow n boundaries. Nevertheless, this state too attempted to carry through a strong Balkan policy. A lth ough the peninsula declined in significance as a center o f diplom atic conflict between the tw o w orld wars, its importance as an object o f international rivalry revived after 1945, w ith an altered list o f combatants. L iv in g in a region o f international tension, the Balkan people naturally found themselves under constant pressure from abroad. U n w illing to accept the substitution o f the rule o f other powers for that o f the O ttom an Em pire, the Balkan national leaderships fought against any outside attempts at annex­ ation o r dom ination. A t the same time they were enorm ously attracted by the material and cultural achievements o f the European states. Thus, despite the fact that the national movements were directed tow ard w hat was in fact the revival o f pre-O ttom an political organizations, their leaderships accepted European political institutions and often justified their actions on the basis o f contem porary Western ideologies o f liberalism and nationalism. In the nineteenth century the great powers determ ined the form o f governm ent, the person o f the ruler, and the boundaries o f m ost o f the new Balkan national states. H ow ever, their decisions, often based on progressive political con­ cepts, in general reflected the convictions o f the m ajority o f the Balkan lead­ ers. In the twentieth century socialist and communist political programs, drawn both from the Soviet U n ion and from Western E urope, have attracted similar support am ong some groups. U n til O ttom an control was rem oved and the national governm ents were form ed, internal political issues and foreign policy received the principal at­ tention o f the Balkan leaders. T h e parallel process o f social and econom ic change w ent forw ard at a much slow er pace until after 1945, w hen it became a predom inant consideration in Balkan affairs. U ntil very recent times the bulk o f the population has consisted o f an im poverished and largely illiterate peasantry living under extremely backward conditions. A lth ough some o f its members rose to form the political leadership o f the national governm ents, the greater num ber witnessed the gradual erosion o f their econom ic and so­ cial position under the pressure o f the new conditions. D espite their preoc­ cupation w ith political and diplom atic issues, the Balkan leaders were well aware o f the implications o f their weak econom ies, particularly in questions involving general state interests such as national defense. A m ajor aim o f all the national governm ents was thus m odernization — including the develop­ m ent o f industry, the im provem ent o f agriculture, the introduction o f an advanced educational system, and the acquisition o f the traits and amenities that w ere so admired in Western European societies. In this effort, too, the ambivalent attitude tow ard foreign influences was clearly show n. A lthough

XI

Preface the Balkan states, lacking the necessary capital, resources, expertise, and ex­ perience, needed assistance, they feared foreign exploitation o r imperial dom ­ ination. T h e theme o f the conflicting attraction to and rejection o f foreign political, ideological, and econom ic influence has thus been a constant element in B al­ kan history. H ow ever, although Balkan societies, either w illingly o r under duress, have accepted much from the outside w orld, it must be em phasized that even where foreign institutions and ideas were adopted, they w ere subsequendy m olded and changed to fit national traditions and prejudices. C er­ tainly, the m ajor element in Balkan life is that draw n from the lo n g historical experience o f the people and their ow n unique reactions to the outside inter­ ferences to which the peninsula has been so vulnerable.

Th is w o rk was prepared as part o f a program organized in 1972 b y the Jo in t Com m ittee on Eastern E urope o f the Am erican C ouncil o f Learned Societies and the Social Science Research C ouncil to provide histories o f Eastern E u ­ rope. Professor Peter E Sugar o f the U niversity o f W ashington was the chair­ man o f the special com mittee that prepared the original proposal; Professor M ichael B . Petrovich o f the U niversity o f W isconsin became chairman o f the supervising com mittee and was responsible for the subsequent organization. Th is Balkan history has received generous funding from the Office o f E d u ­ cation, including grants that allowed the author the free time necessary to com plete the w riting and funds to assist in the preparation o f the volum es fo r publication. Dr. G ord on B. Turner, Vice-President o f A C L S until 1980, and his successor, Dr. Jason H . Parker, contributed valuable suggestions and assistance. T h e author is also greatly indebted to Julia A . Petrov o f the Office o f Education fo r her advice and support. A s stated in the original project, this book is designed as an introduction to Balkan history; it assumes no prior knowledge. M ajo r European events and political, philosophical, and econom ic theories necessary to the narrative are also covered. Because o f the complexity o f the developments being treated, some subjects are touched on in m ore than one section. T h is area has played a m ajor role in w orld affairs. C onsequendy attention is directed not only to internal Balkan events, but also to the great international conflicts in this period. T h e book thus covers both Balkan developm ents and the place o f the peninsula in history. Because o f the dual aspect o f the text, numerous maps have been included to help clarify both the internal problems and the crises caused by the in­ volvem ent o f the great pow ers in the region. T h e illustrations are designed to cover these and other aspects o f Balkan history. A lm ost all are prints pre­ pared in the first h alf o f the nineteenth century. In the eighteenth and nine­ teenth centuries the Balkans and the O ttom an E m pire in general attracted the interest not only o f statesmen and generals, but also o f writers, poets,

xii

Preface and artists, w h o w ere draw n to the area by the extreme beauty o f the land­ scape and by w hat was to them an exotic and romantic atmosphere. Th e peninsula itself was litde known; there were many misconceptions. A s is shown in the map prepared in the early eighteenth century by one o f the best British cartographers, H erm an M oll, until the m iddle o f the nineteenth century it w as generally believed that a lofty and almost impenetrable east—w est m oun­ tain range crossed the entire peninsula. T h e illustrations make particularly clear the im pression left upon the artists by the w ild and m ountainous nature o f the lands. T h e narrative has been divided into tw o volum es, which, with som e lim i­ tations, can be read separately. T he first commences w ith a general introduc­ tion on the m ajor historical events through the seventeenth century, but dis­ cusses in detail the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. H ere the themes o f the nature o f O ttom an and H absburg rule and the subsequent national m ovem ents have been emphasized. T he volum e concludes w ith the achieve­ ment o f G reek, M ontenegrin, Rom anian, and Serbian independence and Bulgarian autonom y and the organization o f their new governm ents. In in­ ternational relations Volum e I covers the events from the conclusion o f the Treaty o f K arlow itz in 1699 to the signing o f an agreement on the Balkans between Russia and the H absbu rg Em pire in 1897Volum e II concerns principally the events o f the twentieth century to 1980, although some background on the political developments in the previous decades is included. T he m ajor themes are the com pletion o f the territorial unification o f the m odern states; the great wars and their consequences; and, in particular, the measures taken to meet the enorm ous political, social, and econom ic problem s faced by these nations in the m odern w orld. T he diffi­ culties caused by constant outside great-pow er interference and dom ination, issues that w ere very im portant in the previous centuries, also carry over into the recent period. T h e m ultiplicity o f languages and the varieties o f spelling used over the past centuries provide certain difficulties for the historian o f the area. In this book the attempt has been made to adopt in the spelling o f personal names and geographic points the form that is m ost com m only used and that w ill be m ost familiar to the reader. Standard systems o f transliteration have been used for G reek and Bulgarian; Serbian w ords and names appear in their Latin spelling. Com plete consistency has not been possible. In addition, names o f rulers and O ttom an statesmen and many first names have been anglicized. D ating also provides some problem s, since the Balkan people used three separate calendars until after World War I. T he M uslim s dated events from the H egira in A .D . 622. T he O rthodox used the Julian, or O ld Style, calen­ dar, whereas the Catholics and Protestants adopted the G regorian, o r N ew Style. In the eighteenth century the Julian calendar ran eleven days behind the G regorian; in the nineteenth century this num ber increased to twelve; and in the twentieth century it reached thirteen. A ll dates in this book are in

xiii

Preface the N ew Style. Th e difference in dating produces difficulties principally when a particular day or m onth is associated w ith an event. F o r example, the A pril U p risin g o f 1876 in Bulgaria occurred in M ay under the N ew Style. W hen these complications arise, they are explained in the text.

For the most pairt the footnotes have been limited to identifications o f the sources o f quotations and o f some o f the statistical information. The capital­ ization and spelling o f quotations from old sources have been changed to conform to the style o f the text. The bibliography is designed to provide the reader with a list o f books on various aspects o f Balkan history. Books in languages other than English and all articles are excluded, although, o f course, these have been used extensively in the preparation o f the book. The author is greatly indebted to her friends and colleagues, specialists in the field, who kindly consented to read the manuscript. Their expert com­ ments and criticisms greatly assisted in the preparation o f the final version o f the book. All or a major section o f the work was read by Professors Richard V Burks, Wayne State University; Dimitrije Djordjevic, University o f Cali­ fornia, Santa Barbara; Rufus Fears, Indiana University; John V A. Fine, Jr., University o f Michigan; Keith Hitchins, University o f Illinois; Halil Inalcik, University o f Chicago; John R. Lampe, University o f Maryland; Thomas A. Meininger, York University; John A. Petropulos, Amherst College; Michael B. Petrovich, University o f Wisconsin; Dennison I. Rusinow, American Uni­ versities Field Staff; Traian Stoianovich, Rutgers University; and Peter F. Sugar, University o f Washington. In addition, this work is in fact the product o f the collaboration o f the author with her husband, Charles Jelavich, who contributed not only suggestions and criticisms, but also the results o f his own research. The author would like to thank Debbie Chase, who typed the final copy, and Janis Bolster, whose excellent editorial reading and valuable suggestions added much to the manuscript in its final stages o f preparation. She also compiled the index. The maps were prepared by William Jaber.

xiv

Introduction

THE LAND c o n c e r n s primarily the history o f the peoples o f the Balkan peninsula, an area o f land surrounded by the Black, Ae­ gean, Ionian, and Adriatic seas. Although the line o f the Danube, Sava, and Kupa rivers has often been given as designating the northern pe­ rimeter o f the region, this account will also be concerned with the fate o f lands across the Danube inhabited by Romanian, Croatian, Slovene, and Hungarian populations. From a geographic point o f view, the outstanding feature o f the area under study is its mountainous character; Balkan comes from the Turkish word for a chain o f wooded mountains. The great ranges dividing the peninsula and the Carpathians to the north had the effect o f separating the peoples from each other; there is no natural center for the region. In order to understand much o f subsequent Balkan history the reader should first study Map i, giving particular attention to both the mountains and the river systems. To the north, in the territory o f present-day Romania, the sweep o f the Carpathian Mountains dominates the landscape. To the south, Bulgaria is divided by the Balkan Mountains and separated from Greece by the Rhodope chain. Turning to the northwest, a Slovenian and Croatian population is found in the Karawanken and Julian Alps. Continuing southward, the Dinaric Alps form a formidable barrier between the Adriatic coast and the hinterland o f Bosnia and Hercegovina. Further south, the Pindus Mountains run the length o f Greece. The major river system o f the region is formed by the Danube and its tributaries: the Drava, the Tisza (Theiss), the Sava, the Morava, the Isker, the Sereth, and the Pruth. Throughout history the Danube has been the principal route in this area for military invasion, trade, and travel. This great river highway provided obstacles to communication only at the Iron Gates, a nar­ row section with rocks and swift currents. The other important rivers —the Vardar, the Struma, and the Maritsa —flow into the Aegean Sea. Because o f the mountainous nature o f the Adriatic coastline, the rivers emptying into that sea are not o f a character to foster waterborne trade or travel. The Ne-

O

u r n a r r a tiv e

I

M a p i. R e lie f m ap o f the Balkans

Introduction retva, the Drin, and the Shkumbi, nevertheless, played an important part in the development o f the adjacent lands. Dominated by mountains and hills, the region has relatively few areas o f rich agricultural land. The exceptions are the Danube River valley, including sections o f present-day Romania and two areas o f Yugoslavia - Slavonia and the Vojvodina. The Maritsa and Shkumbi river valleys are also valuable agri­ cultural areas. The mountains, with their extensive forests and pastures, o f course also provide support for the population. The mineral wealth was ex­ ploited in Roman times, but not as much as at the present time. Situated strategically at the crossroads o f Asia, Africa, and Europe, the Balkan peninsula has proved both a tempting object o f conquest and a pas­ sageway to other regions. Although the mountains contributed to particular­ ism and isolation among the Balkan people, they did not provide a shield against outside invasion. The entire peninsula is cut through by major corri­ dors, which run chiefly through the great river valleys and the mountain passes. Along these relatively few great routes, invading forces could easily enter, whether they were nomadic tribes with their ponies and herds or mod­ ern great powers with railroads, cars, trucks, and tanks. Two principal doorways opened the peninsula to outside penetration. The Danube River valley was historically the major route by which people from the Asian steppelands entered not only the Balkans, but also Central Europe. No natural barriers hindered passage from the lands north o f the Black Sea, along the Danube valley, into the Pannonian Plain. Invading tribes could also proceed southward and either cross the Balkan Mountains at one o f the con­ venient passes or follow the coasdine. The second roadway commenced at Belgrade at the confluence o f the Danube and the Sava and proceded down the Morava valley. At Nis two branches formed, one leading through the Vardar valley to Thessaloniki (Salonika), the great Aegean port, and the other crossing over the Dragoman Pass to Sofia, Plovdiv (Philippopolis), Adrianople (Edirne), and finally Constantinople (Istanbul), the most important city o f the Balkans. In Roman times another road, the Via Egnatia, was o f prin­ cipal significance. This major line o f communication ran from Durres (Durazzo) on the Adriatic coast through the Shkumbi valley, by Lake Ohrid, to Thessaloniki, and from there either by sea or through Thrace to Constanti­ nople. Other river valleys were also o f significance. The Bulgarian region near the present capital o f Sofia is linked with the Danube through the Isker River valley and with the Aegean by the Struma valley. The Neretva River connects the Adriatic seacoast with the Bosnian interior. The long coastline to the east and south, with its convenient harbors and river oudets, was also conducive to the establishment o f influence and control by outside powers; the islands o f the Aegean, Ionian, and Adriatic seas were similarly open to attack by sea. Venice, for example, was able to build up an impressive imperial presence in the area because o f its commercial and naval supremacy. In more recent times, Britain’s naval power enabled that state to

3

Introduction exert great influence in the area, in particular in Greece and the entire eastern Mediterranean.

THE HISTORICAL BA CK G R O UN D

Ancient civilizations: Greece and Rome Although this account commences formally with the last decade o f the sev­ enteenth century, a brief survey o f the previous period is necessary because o f the important role o f history in the development o f the Balkan national states, the main theme o f this book. As will be demonstrated later, at each stage o f the formation o f the modern governments the leaders repeatedly recalled the past to explain or justify their policies. No attempt will be made here to present a detailed account o f Balkan history since the Iron Age; the intention is only to discuss briefly those events and individuals that exerted a direct influence on the later period. The first inhabitants o f the peninsula about whom a body o f information is available are the Illyrians, who lived in the region generally west o f the Morava valley to the Adriatic, and the Thracians, who settled east o f the river in lands stretching from the Aegean to north o f the Danube. Both o f these peoples, with Iron Age civilizations, had tribal organizations. The Thracians established an organized state in the fifth century B.C. The Dacians, a branch o f the Thracians, were to become a basic element in the formation o f the Romanian nationality. The Illyrians were the ancestors o f the modern Alba­ nians. The major political and cultural achievements o f the ancient period did not, however, take place in the central Balkan region, but to the south in the Greek lands (see Map 2). The shores and islands o f the Aegean Sea were to be the site o f the first great European civilization, that o f the Greeks, who at this time called themselves Hellenes and their land Hellas. An advanced Bronze Age civilization developed in Greece in the period 16 0 0 -12 0 0 B.C. Such sites as Mycenae, Tiryns, Pylos, Athens, and Thebes were centers o f a palace-based society marked by a relatively complex economic and social organization, literacy, and a refined art and architecture heavily influenced by the nonHellenic civilization o f Minoan Crete. By 1450 B.C. Greeks from the main­ land had occupied Crete and Rhodes, and extensive commercial relations existed with the lands o f the Near East and Egypt. Records o f the Hittite kingdom have been interpreted to indicate the political presence o f Greeks on the mainland o f Asia Minor. For reasons that are not fully understood, the sophisticated civilization o f Bronze Age Greece collapsed in the period after 1200 B.C. The invasion o f new groups o f Hellenes, speaking the Doric dialect o f the Greek language, was accompanied by a marked decline in ma­ terial civilization on the Greek mainland and by the migration o f large num­ bers o f Greeks to the shores o f Asia Minor.

4

Introduction

Map 2. Ancient Greece and the Balkans

Greek civilization subsequently developed around the city-states o f the mainland, particularly in Attica, the Peloponnesus, and Ionia in western An­ atolia. Each was composed o f the city with its surrounding territory, the most important being Athens, Sparta, Thebes, Argos, and Corinth. Some, in par­ ticular Athens, developed extensive maritime empires. Each had the attri­ butes o f a sovereign state; they conducted foreign relations and waged war independendy. They were able to cooperate when threatened by the Persian attacks in the fifth century B.C., but they engaged in the suicidal Peloponne­ sian Wars, which were waged between Athens and Sparta, each supported by its allies. Despite their political divisions and their willingness to war with

5

Introduction

Serpent from Tomis (Constança), second or third century A.D. (From V. Canarache, A. Aricescu, V. Barbu, and A. Râdulescu, Tezaurul de Sculpturi de la Tomis. Bucharest: Editura §tiinpficâ, 1963.)

each other, the Greeks were conscious o f their cultural unity and shared a strong feeling o f superiority to the “ barbarian” outside world. The great cultural heritage o f classical Greece, which so deeply affected later Western European patterns o f thought, is based chiefly on the civiliza­ tion o f the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. in Athens. The architecture o f fifthcentury Athens has deeply influenced styles o f building, especially o f public offices, to the present. Greek literature —for instance, the plays o f Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, and Aristophanes; the histories o f Herodotus and

6

Introduction T hucydides; and the philosophy o f Plato and Aristotle - was to become an integral part o f the education o f the leaders o f m odern Europe. M oreover, although G reek society was based on slavery, m ost states developed represen­ tative institutions involving the direct participation o f free male citizens in the political guidance o f the state. T he achievements o f this age w ere to re­ main a unique and brilliant m em ory for the G reek people and to play a m ajor role in their later national revival. F o r Balkan history in general, G reek colonization was m ost important. T h e Ionian Greeks o f A sia M inor, in particular, were extrem ely active in fo un d ing cities along the seacoasts o f the peninsula. Exam ples o f G reek settlement are Istros (H istria), Tomis (C onstanja), Callatis, O dessos (Varna), and M esem bria (N esebur) along the Black Sea coast and Trogurium (Trogir), E petion (near Split), and Issa (on the island o f Vis) on the A driatic. These cities, prim arily com m ercial centers, reproduced the architecture and modes o f life and thought o f the G reek parent, and accordingly they had consider­ able influence on the people living near them. T h e G reek settlers themselves, how ever, w ere content to remain on the periphery o f the peninsula. T h ey did not attempt to penetrate into the interior o r to make w ide territorial con­ quests. A lth ou gh united in language, religion, and culture, the city-states dis­ persed much o f their strength in constant internal quarreling and warfare. T h ey w ere thus not prepared to meet the challenge o f the strong m ilitary pow er that arose in M acedonia beginning w ith the reign o f Philip o f M acedon (359-336 B .C .). T h e M acedonians w ere probably Illyrian in ethnic back­ ground, although by this time the upper class was under the strong cultural influence o f Greece. Philip’s son, Alexander the G reat (336-323 B .C .) , perhaps the m ost fam ous conqueror o f the ancient w orld , extended his dom ains as far as India. W hen he died at a you ng age, his vast em pire fell apart. M ace­ donia remained an im portant state, but it could not dom inate even the pen­ insula. M eanw hile, another imperial pow er was rising in Italy. Rom an forces first m oved across the A driatic in the third century B .C . T h eir aim w as to suppress the pirates w h o were operating from the eastern coast o f the A driatic, w hich was subsequently to becom e the R om an province o f Dalm atia. H avin g de­ feated Carthage and having become master o f the western M editerranean (201 B .C .) , R o m e em barked upon a generation o f warfare and political activ­ ity in the eastern M editerranean. B y 167 B .C ., R om an hegem ony over the eastern M editerranean area was an accom plished fact. In the year 148 B .C ., after fo u r victorious wars (215—205, 20 0 -19 7, 171—167, 149—148 B .C .) , the R o ­ mans acquired the territory o f M acedonia and declared it a R o m an province. Tw o years later R om an armies defeated the forces o f the Achaean League o f Greek cities, destroyed the city o f C orinth, and annexed Greece. B y the end o f the reign o f A ugustus (27 B .C .—A .D . 14 ), m ost o f the peninsula south o f the D anube had been secured (see M ap 3). U nlike the G reek colonists, the

I Map 3. The Danube lands under Roman rule

Introduction Roman rulers were not content with scattered settlements. They occupied the entire region, and they governed it direcdy. Intensely concerned with problems o f administration and defense, they established a network o f mili­ tary camps and roads. Roman settlements came into being along the great natural highways. Modern Belgrade (Singidunum), Edirne (Hadrianopolis, Adrianople), Nis (Naissus), and Sofia (Serdica), among other cities, were important centers in this period. The Roman cities, like the Greek, resembled their counterparts in the homeland, with temples, forums, baths, and ad­ vanced water and sewage systems. Roman influence was to be profound. Participation in the economic life o f a vast empire brought obvious advantages. Agricultural production rose; the gold, silver, iron, and lead mines were exploited. Illyrium, the western section, in particular, enjoyed a period o f real prosperity. During the centu­ ries o f Roman rule the population became largely Romanized. Some joined the army and the administration; Roman patterns o f life, including the lan­ guage, were accepted. Men born in the Balkans, for instance, the emperors Claudius, Aurelian, Probus, Diocletian, and Maximian, rose to high posts in the state. The entire region also enjoyed the advantages o f the Pax Romana; for a long period the population was spared from major outside invasions or disastrous wars. Defense, nevertheless, was a constant imperial problem. In general, Rome attempted to hold the line o f the Danube, but there were some exceptions. Among the barbarian tribes threatening the Roman outposts, a particular danger came from the Dacians. Their king, Burebista (ca. 7 0 - 4 4 B.C.), suc­ ceeded in uniting a number o f tribes, and he erected a stronghold at Sarmizegetusa in the Carpathian Mountains. Successful expeditions had been sent previously against the Dacians, but in A.D. 101 Trajan (98-117) determined to crush the independent kingdom. In A.D. 106 the Dacians, under their king Decebalus (87-106), were defeated, and their lands were brought directly under imperial rule. For the next 165 years the region was administered by Rome. Soldiers, administrators, and colonists were brought from all over the empire, many o f them from other Balkan regions. The native Dacians were also Romanized. This outpost o f empire, however, was difficult to defend. In order to shorten the lines o f the Roman frontier, Emperor A urelian (270 275) in 270 ordered the evacuation o f the province. The Roman soldiers and administrators, together with part o f the population, were then moved across the Danube. What happened to the rest o f the inhabitants during the subse­ quent turbulent centuries was to become a matter o f controversy. From this time the Roman Empire faced increasing difficulties in holding its frontiers and preventing the massive incursion o f outside tribes. For the Italian peninsula the chief danger came from the Germanic invaders, partic­ ularly the Goths. The Balkan lands suffered a millennium o f devastation at the hands o f succeeding waves o f invading tribes. The Goths o f the third, fourth, and fifth centuries and the Huns, also o f the fourth and fifth centu-

9

Introduction ries, w ere follow ed by the A vars, Slavs, and Bulgars in the sixth and seventh centuries, the M agyars, o r H ungarians, in the ninth and tenth, the Pechenegs in the tenth and eleventh, the Cum ans in the twelfth and thirteenth, and the M on gols in the thirteenth. M ost o f these people had been displaced from their original hom elands by stronger tribes; others were attracted by the relative wealth o f the R o m an lands. In general, they m oved w ith their flocks and families, fo llo w in g the grasslands that w ere necessary fo r the subsistence o f their horses and live­ stock. T h ey thus kept to the great highw ays that have already been described. M ovem ent was necessarily slow ; invasion and occupation could last decades. Som e o f the tribes, such as the H uns and M on gols, came as raiders; they conquered and looted large areas and then passed on. In contrast, the Slavs, M agyars, and Bulgars remained to settle the land. T h ey either conquered and absorbed the resident population o r lost their individual identities and amal­ gam ated w ith the local society. These invasions naturally caused a basic alter­ ation in the ethnic com position o f the Balkan people. M eanw hile, enorm ous changes had taken place in the organization and the influence o f the R om an Em pire.

Byzantium U n d er increasing pressure from the outside, and facing com plex internal problem s, the R om an governm ent had to meet the issue o f h ow best to ad­ minister its w ide dom ains in a time o f adversity. A lth ou gh m aintaining the theory o f a united em pire, D iocletian (284-305) was forced to create four administrative units. U n d er Constantine (306-337), a single em peror ruled direcdy over the entire dom ain, but the administrative separation was re­ stored after his death. In 395 a final division was made. T h e line, w hich was to be o f enorm ous historical significance, ran from the A driatic coast, along the D rin a R iver, and then to the Sava and the Danube. In the future the boundary between the Catholic and O rthodox churches and the western and eastern cultural zones was to be approxim ately this frontier. A language line was in existence, too. D espite the fact that they were the conquering power, the Rom ans had a deep respect fo r G reek civilization; they cultivated and preserved G reek art and learning. T h e R om an Em pire was officially bilingual, and Greek as well as Latin was a language o f imperial administration and the law courts. G reek was also the ch ief spoken language in the lands approxim ately south o f N is in the peninsula and, o f course, in all o f the areas o f G reek settlement in the islands and A sia M inor. T h e use o f G reek as the language o f the N ew Testament is an indication o f its im por­ tance as a m ajor lingua franca throughout the vast extent o f the R o m an E m ­ pire. F o r Balkan history the developm ent o f the Eastern R o m an E m pire was

10

Introduction decisive. Its center was to be at the site o f the form er G reek city o f B yzan ­ tium, w hose name was to becom e that o f the state itself. H ere in 330 C o n ­ stantine founded the city o f Constantinople, which w as to be the capital o f the Byzantine E m pire and to carry on the traditions o f R o m e for over a thousand years. Situated strategically at the crossroads between A sia and E u ­ rope, it lay at the junction o f the great trade routes running from north to south and east to west. T h e best natural harbor anywhere in the Balkans and M editerranean area, the city, surrounded on three sides by water, could be easily defended. D espite repeated attempts at conquest, it was captured only twice, in 1204 and 1453. T h e ethnic com position o f the em pire was com plex. In 212 E m peror Caracalla (211-217) granted R o m an citizenship to all freem en; the term Roman thus no longer represented a geographic o r national designation. T h e citizens o f B yzantium called themselves R om ans, even i f they w ere o f G reek o r an­ other background. M oreover, the principal language was Greek. A fter the division o f the entire em pire in 395, the position o f this language became naturally stronger, since the proportion o f G reek speakers to others was in ­ creased. Nevertheless, although G reek was the prim ary language o f govern ­ ment, com m erce, and the church, the Byzantine citizens did n ot regard them ­ selves as G reek in nationality in the m odern sense o f the w ord . It should be noted also that in this period mainland Greece, the center o f the classical civilization, receded drastically in im portance; the area became a provincial backwater. G reek life w as centered in the Byzantine capital. A lth ou gh the basis o f the Byzantine governm ent remained the R om an legal and political system, changes in the position o f the ruler, influenced by conditions in the neighboring eastern courts, were to be o f great significance. A n authority has described the em peror as transform ed into an O riental, divine, absolute monarch. D iocletian’s arrangements com pleted the transform ation. “ Proskynesis” o r “ adoratio” (the eastern cerem ony o f genuflection addressed to divin­ ity), purple robes, jew elled diadems, belts, and sceptres became per­ m anent parts o f the imperial tradition. T he em peror, ruler by divine grace, w as the sole fount o f law. Seclusion o f the m onarch, an O ri­ ental practice by w hich the person o f the ruler w as rem oved from contact w ith the profane, was carefully balanced by the splendid o f­ ficial cerem onials, at w hich his pow er and glory w ere displayed to the citizens and courtiers.1 T h is autocratic m onarch presided over a large bureaucratic governm ent, w hose efficiency and success varied through the centuries. Like every great 1

Speros V y ro n is, Jr., Byzantium and Europe (N ew York: H a rc o u rt, Brace & W orld, 1967), p p . 1S - 19.

II

Introduction em pire, Byzantium was beset by constant rivalries between political factions and problem s concerning succession to the throne. M oreover, the church and doctrinal disputes played a m ajor and often disturbing part in state life. A fter the division o f the em pire, Constantinople became the center fo r the Eastern Christian, or O rthodox, church. T he conversion o f the em peror Constantine began the process by which Christianity became the official re­ ligion o f the R om an Em pire. Constantine’s sons prohibited sacrifice to the pagan go d s; and in 392 the em peror Theodosius (379-395) forbade pagan w orship under penalties o f treason and sacrilege. Earlier, in 380, Theodosius had decreed that all his subjects m ust accept the Christian faith as form ulated at the C ouncil o f Nicaea in 325. Th e language o f the Byzantine church was Greek, whereas that o f the Rom an remained Latin. M ost o f the Balkan people, the Serbs, Rom anians, Bulgarians, and Greeks, w ere to be influenced pri­ m arily by the ecclesiastical developm ents in Constantinople. Th e Russians w ere also to be converted from Byzantium and to becom e part o f the O rth o ­ dox w orld. A lth ou gh the Constantinople hierarchy at first recognized the prim acy o f R o m e, unity proved im possible to maintain. In 1054 the final break occurred, a division that was never to be healed. In doctrine and cere­ m ony the tw o organizations became increasingly separated. M ost im portant, the relationship between church and state was m arkedly different in E ast and West. In the O rthodox system the churches in general supported the pow er and authority o f the secular ruler; they did not directly challenge the state’s influence. Th u s the political and religious leadership tended to w ork together against com m on internal and external enemies. M oreover, the Eastern church did not develop a predominant central institution such as the Papacy in Rom e. T h e Patriarchate o f Constantinople had great prestige and influence, but the national patriarchates o r archbishoprics that were eventually established in the Balkan states and Russia exerted the prime influence over their members. A s the Italian peninsula was overwhelm ed by barbarian invaders and R o ­ m an authority in the West was broken, Byzantium became heir to the R om an imperial idea. L ike the Greeks and Rom ans before them, the Byzantine lead­ ers regarded their state as the forem ost civilization o f the time and the legit­ imate ruler o f the w orld. T he idea o f universal em pire was shared by the Byzantine enemies. A s w e shall see, Balkan Christian and M uslim rulers alike attempted to occupy the imperial city and to claim for themselves the prestige and position o f the Byzantine emperor. T h e idea o f a single legitim ate secular authority and one universal church was extremely beguiling. T he O rthodox view s also gave support to this conception. A s one historian has written: T h e essence o f O rthodox belief was that w ith the confluence at C o n ­ stantinople o f R om an and Christian theories o f terrestrial and celes­ tial em pire, the w orld had achieved its final order, o f which the E m ­ peror was the sym bol. N o t only were O rthodox Christians superior

12

Introduction to the rest o f m ankind; not only was all future im provem ent o r in­ novation im possible; but also error was unthinkable.2 A t its height Byzantium was the m ost pow erful em pire in the Western w orld (see M ap 4-)· Its wealth was based on trade and the prosperity o f its lands. Its m ilitary com m anders adopted the m ost advanced m ethods o f w ar­ fare, and they had the best w eapons. The bureaucracy carried ou t its respon­ sibilities well. In foreign affairs the state follow ed a system that made “ B yzan ­ tine diplom acy” proverbial for shrewd, clever, and not to o scrupulous negotiation. M ost im portant, the em pire’s high level o f civilization provided patterns fo r governm ent and culture for the Balkan O rthodox states and for Russia. Balkan rulers wished to be Byzantine autocrats. They copied the court cerem onial, and they used Byzantine architectural styles fo r their buildings and churches. M edieval Balkan civilization was thus in essence Byzantine. D espite the em pire’s great achievements, its long history w as marked by m any fluctuations o f fortune. O ne o f the m ost notable em perors, Justinian (527—565), attempted to restore the em pire after the devastation o f the bar­ barian invasions o f the fourth and fifth centuries. F o r the future his reign was o f significance fo r his administrative reform s and his codification o f the laws. H e also em barked on an ambitious building program in C onstantinople, o f which the great achievement was the construction o f H agia Sophia, the church o f the H o ly W isdom (called Sancta Sophia or St. Sophia in m ost Western w ritin g); it was to becom e the very sym bol o f O rthodox Christianity. Ju stin ­ ian w as not, how ever, able to find solutions to the great problem s that had previously beset the R o m an Em pire. Byzantium had great difficulty in de­ fending and adm inistering its w ide territories, w hich were once again faced with attack in both the Balkan peninsula and A sia M inor.

In the sixth and seventh centuries the chief danger came from the advance of the Persians and Arabs in Asia and the Avars and Slavs in Europe. The Persian threat was ended by a military victory in 627. Also in the seventh century, the empire simultaneously faced its first challenge from a Muslim people, the Arabs, and attacks from the Avars and Slavs to the north. This century proved to be a difficult period for Byzantium: Enemies pressed for­ ward on all sides. The Arabian invaders were eventually defeated, but the Slavic presence in the Balkans was permanently established. The Slavs: the Bulgarian and Serbian states

The Slavic invasion In the sixth and seventh centuries the Slavs, an IndoEuropean people, crossed the Danube frontier and occupied most of the 2.

C . M . W o o d h o u se, The Story o fModem Greece (L o n d o n : F aber & F aber, 1968), p. 30.

13

Map 4· The Byzantine Empire

Introduction Balkan peninsula. A t first they were closely associated w ith the Avars, w h o apparently held the dom inant position in the relationship. T h e Slavs m oved forw ard in small groups under their ow n leaders; there was no central o rga­ nization, although unions were form ed am ong the tribes. U nlike m any o f the previous invaders, the Slavs settled the land, which they occupied as peasant farmers. T h e basis was thus laid at this time for the future Bulgarian, C ro a­ tian, Serbian, and Slovenian medieval states. C om paratively little is know n about the early history o f the Slavic societies; the fate o f the indigenous population is also controversial. It is necessary here to deal w ith events for w hich there are no written records, so that archeolog­ ical o r anthropological evidence or that gained from the study o f language must be used. It is apparent that the Slavic tribes m oved th roughout the peninsula and penetrated as far south as the Peloponnesus and even the island o f Crete. In m any areas the original population was forced to retreat to the remote hills and m ountains. In the m ountainous areas o f Greece and Albania a people, know n variously as Vlachs, Arum anians, Kutsovlachs, o r Tsintsars, have remained until the present. T h ey speak a language related to Latin and close to m odern Rom anian. In the lands o f present-day Greece, A lbania, and Romania, the local population absorbed the Slavic setders, w ho came to speak the language o f the region. Slavic-speaking people w ere to settle perm a­ nently, how ever, in a w ide band o f territory stretching from the A driatic to the Black Sea. A lth ough the Slavs and Avars reached the gates o f Constantinople, they were not able to take the city. A fter the disasters o f the seventh century the Byzantine state recovered and regained some o f the lost territory. It n o w also had to deal w ith the strong Bulgarian pow er that had been established on the northern border.

Bulgaria T h e principal threat to Byzantium from the Balkans was to come in the future from the Bulgarians. T h eir name was derived from that o f the original B ulgars, a Turanian people w h o had once inhabited an area between the Sea o f A zov and Kuban. Defeated by the Khazars, the Bulgars were forced to m ove. A section under the leadership o f Asparukh m igrated to an area near the m outh o f the D anube. A fter suffering a defeat, the Byzantine g o v ­ ernment recognized this group as an independent pow er in 681, and Pliska became the capital o f the first Bulgarian state. U n d er K han K ru m (803—814) and later, the territory was considerably expanded. Th e Bulgars had taken possession o f land inhabited by Slavs, w h o considerably outnum bered the conquerors. A t first, the tw o people lived together; the prince and the nobil­ ity w ere Bulgar. B oth w ere pagan and worshiped their ow n gods. A process ° f assim ilation was accom plished in the ninth century; all o f the population became Slavic-speaking and Christian. C hristianity was accepted in 865 by the ruler B oris (852—889). A lth ough he at first briefly recognized the jurisdiction o f R om e fo r political reasons, he

15

Introduction subsequently changed the affiliation. The Bulgarian church thus became as­ sociated with the Patriarchate at Constantinople and the Orthodox world, but it kept its own ecclesiastical organization. Because of the favorable atti­ tude it adopted toward Christian scholarship, Bulgaria became in fact the first major center o f Slavic culture. At this time the Byzantine Empire dis­ patched the two brothers Cyril and Methodius to the Greater Moravian Kingdom in Central Europe to try to combat the activities of missionaries representing Rome. The brothers had devised a Slavic script, called Glago­ litic, and they and their assistants undertook the translation of religious works from Greek into Slavic, using the language spoken near their home in Thes­ saloniki. Their efforts in Moravia failed; the brothers died. Their disciples, forced to leave Moravia, were welcomed in Bulgaria in 885. Establishing their center in Preslav, which in 893 became the new capital, they continued their task of translating and copying religious texts. Old Bulgarian, or Church Slavic, became the language o f the Slavic Orthodox churches and Slavic scholarship for the next centuries. The original Glagolitic alphabet was mod­ ified to resemble the Greek more closely, and the subsequent Cyrillic alphabet was adopted by the Orthodox Slavs - the Bulgarians, the Serbs, and the Russians. The First Bulgarian Empire reached its height in the reign of Simeon (893927), the second son of Boris. The attraction of Byzantium and Constanti­ nople remained strong for the Bulgarian rulers. Krum had died trying to take the imperial city, and Simeon’s prime objective became the capture of the capital and with it the claim to supremacy in the universal empire o f the Christian world. In 925, after repeated failures to take the city, he proclaimed himself emperor o f the Romans and Bulgars. He also raised the Bulgarian ecclesiastical center at Preslav from an archbishopric to a patriarchate in order to give its head the same title as that held by the Constantinople church leader. The great extent of the Bulgarian lands under Simeon can best be appreciated by examining Map 5. Bulgaria had become the strongest Balkan power. These conquests had, however, strained the resources o f the country. In addition, the Bulgarian rulers faced internal problems. Some nobles chal­ lenged the central authority, and a period of religious controversy also en­ sued. The problem of heresy had always been a major issue for both the Eastern and the Western churches. The Bogomil heresy, which originated in Bulgaria, was to be particularly important. The Bogomils were dualists; they believed that man’s soul represented the principle of good, whereas the body and the material world were evil. Neither respecting the rituals nor accepting the sacraments, they leveled strong attacks on the established church. They rejected such religious symbols as the cross, the relics o f the saints, and the ikons. Their doctrines were a challenge to both the political and the religious authorities. At the same time, external threats to the state increased. The major Bul-

16

Introduction

garian opponent remained Byzantium, but the new invaders, the Hungarians and the Pechenegs, had to be dealt with. Moreover, the Byzantine Empire was in a period o f revival, and the Russians were taking an active part in Balkan events. In 969 the Russian ruler Sviatoslav (964—972) captured Preslav and took the Bulgarian emperor, Boris II (969-972), prisoner. In answer, the Byzantine emperor, John Tzimisces (969—976), sent an army to force the Russians out o f Bulgaria. After a military victory, Byzantium took these Bul­ garian lands. A center o f resistance, however, remained in the southwest. H ere Sam uel (991—10 14 ), the son o f a district governor, organized a new governm ent w ith !ts center at O hrid, and the struggle w ith Byzantium continued. A lthough the Bulgarian forces w on some victories, the Byzantine emperor Basil II (963—

17

Introduction 1025), who was also known as the “Bulgar Killer,” was in the end triumphant. In 10 14 , after a major victory, he took fourteen thousand Bulgarian prisoners. He then had them blinded, leaving one man in every hundred with one eye so that he could lead the defeated army back to its homeland. Samuel died at the sight of this atrocity. In 1018 the Byzantine army took Ohrid, and the region passed into Byzantine possession; there it would remain for a century and a half. Byzantium was now in its strongest position since the Slavic in­ vasions; it was, in fact, the greatest single power in existence at the time. T h e Byzantine E m pire could not, however, maintain its predominance. W ithin fifty years o f Basil’s death the state was again reduced in territory. Internal conflicts weakened the governm ent, and new enemies, in particular the Seljuk Turks and the H ungarians, threatened the borders. T h is situation allowed a Bulgarian revival. In 1186 tw o Bulgarian notables, Peter and Ivan A sen, organized a successful revolt. T h eir action marks the beginning o f the Second Bulgarian Em pire, w hose capital was established at T u rn ovo. B u l­ garian lands were considerably expanded under K aloian (119 7-1207), at a time w hen the Byzantine E m pire was in a desperate position. In 1204 C o n ­ stantinople was taken by the adventurers o f the Fourth Crusade, w h o divided those Byzantine possessions they conquered into small kingdom s fo r them­ selves.

As in the preceding period, the Bulgarian rulers, despite their military vic­ tories, had difficulty in controlling their nobles. Kaloian was possibly assas­ sinated by one of his own commanders. The revived empire reached its height in the reign o f John Asen II (1218 -124 1); once again the major Balkan power, the Bulgarian state held a wide block o f territory. The situation was not, however, stable. In succeeding reigns the kingdom fell apart; competing nobles controlled the regions that remained in Bulgarian hands. The strongest state in the Balkans was to become Serbia, which took possession of Macedonian lands that had formerly been part of the Bulgarian and Byzantine empires.

Serbia T h e Serbs, a Slavic people, arrived in the Balkans in the seventh cen­ tury. T h ey w ere converted to Christianity in the second h alf o f the ninth century and were subsequently to be Orthodox. From the eighth to the twelfth centuries the majority lived in lands under Bulgarian or Byzantine rule. When, after 1018, the Byzantine Em pire destroyed Bulgarian independence, the Ser­ bian leaders w ere in a better position. Tw o states w ere eventually organized: Zeta, in the m ountainous area that later became the site o f M ontenegro, and subsequently RaSka, to the east.

The rise of the Serbian kingdom is closely associated with the Nemanja dynasty. The first in this line, Stephen Nemanja I (ca. 1168 -119 6 ), became ruler, or grand zupan, o f Raska; his descendants were to hold power for two centuries. Stephen was able to obtain control of Zeta and to expand the Serbian territory to the Adriatic. His son, Stephen II (1196—1227), called the “first-crowned,” assumed the title o f king. At the same time a separate Ser­

18

Introduction bian archbishopric was established at Zifa under the authority of the young­ est son o f Stephen I, Sava, who was a monk. Serbia had become a kingdom with an autonomous Orthodox church. The conquests o f the Second Bulgarian Empire were naturally to the det­ riment o f Serbian interests. The state also had to deal with Hungarian ad­ vances to the north. The subsequent decline of both Bulgarian and Byzantine power, however, created the opportunity for Serbian expansion. Gains of territory were made in the reigns ofM iliutin (1282-1321) and Stephen Deianski (1321—1331), but the height o f the medieval state was reached under Ste­ phen Dusan (1331-1355). With aims o f conquest similar to those of the Bul­ garian emperors, this ambitious ruler concentrated on the acquisition of lands to the south. His control was to extend over Albanian lands, Macedonia, Epirus, and Thessaly, as well as the Serbian territory, which extended to the Adriatic (see Map 6). In 1346 he had himself crowned emperor o f the Serbs and Greeks, and later he added the Bulgars and Albanians to the title. Also in 1346 he raised the Archbishopric of Pec to a Patriarchate. The Serbian political center, too, had shifted southward - from RaS, to Pristina, to Prizren, and finally to Skopje (Skoplje, Uskiib). Under Dusan’s rule Serbia was the major power in the Balkans, with territory extending from the Adriatic to the Aegean. Although DuSan was able to assemble this impressive empire, his lands lacked inner cohesion. After his death in 1355, at the age of forty-six, the Serbian kingdom suffered the same fate as the Bulgarian and simply disinte­ grated. DuSan’s son, Stephen UroS V (1355-1371) succeeded, but he was un­ able to maintain central control against domestic intrigues and foreign pres­ sure. With his death in 1371 the Nemanja dynasty came to an end. The Serbian lands, like the Bulgarian, were fragmented among competing nobles.

North o f the Danube: Hungary, Transylvania, Wallachia, and Moldavia While the Byzantine, Bulgarian, and Serbian rulers were contending for con­ trol of the major part of the Balkan peninsula, important developments were occurring north o f the Danube River. After the Roman evacuation o f Dacia in 270, that area and the Danube valley faced the full weight of successive invasions; Goths, Avars, Huns, Bulgars, Slavs, and Tartars moved through the region. For the future settlement o f the area, the arrival of the Hungari­ ans was to be of lasting significance. Defeated in their attempts to move further westward, these people settled in the Pannonian Plain at the end of the ninth century. Because they were converted to Christianity from Rome, their future religious and political ties were to be with the West. Their great­ est medieval ruler was Stephen (997—1038), who was crowned king in iooo and later canonized. As the patron saint of Hungary, his name was associated 19

Introduction

w ith H ungarian state territory, which came to be referred to regularly as “ the lands o f the crow n o f St. Stephen.” In the future the history o f H u ngary was to be closely associated w ith that o f C roatia and the R om anian principalities, in particular Transylvania. In 1102 the king o f H u n gary succeeded to the Croatian crow n under circumstances that w ill be described in a subsequent section. In the eleventh century H u n ­ gary took possession o f Transylvania, a territory that probably had a m ixed but basically R om anian population. A fter the occupation the H ungarian

20

Introduction governm ent encouraged im m igration in order to strengthen this border re­ gio n against outside invasion. M ost im portant was the settlement o f the Szeklers, w h o w ere closely related to the H ungarians, and o f the Germ ans, called Saxons, w h o came in the twelfth century. In the future the H ungarians, Szeklers, and Saxons w ere to be the privileged, governing section o f the p o p ­ ulation. A lth ou gh Transylvania was part o f the kingdom o f H ungary, it re­ tained w ide autonom ous privileges. In the meantim e, tw o R om anian principalities, Wallachia and M oldavia, w ere in the process o f form ation. Th e exact ethnic background o f the m odern Rom anians and the extent o f the territory that they occupied at different stages in their history have been a matter o f controversy, as have, indeed, similar questions associated w ith all o f the Balkan peoples. T h e question at issue here is w hat happened to the population after the w ithdraw al o f R om an adm inistration in 270. C ontem porary Rom anian historiography emphasizes the continuity in the settlement o f present-day R om anian lands, including Transylvania, arguing that the D aco-R om an population remained in occu­ pation o f this region and absorbed o r repelled the successive invaders. It is, in any case, likely that in the tenth century the m ajority o f the people living to the south and east o f the Carpathian M ountains were Rom anian: they spoke a Rom an ce language, closely related to Latin, but w ith a high pro po r­ tion o f Slavic w ord s; they w ere Christian, although the date o f conversion is not clear; they had also accepted the Slavonic religious service and the Cyrillic alphabet, w hich was used to w rite Rom anian until the nineteenth century. Like the ecclesiastical organizations in the Slavic kingdom s across the D an ­ ube, the Rom an ian church was to remain linked to C onstantinople, although with its ow n national and regional organizations. Rom anian political developm ent was to center around tw o principalities, M oldavia and Wallachia, which were not to be united until the m iddle o f the nineteenth century. B oth states were form ed in the fourteenth century when local territorial units under their ow n lords joined together. In Wallachia the nobility chose as their first prince Basarab (1310-1352). H is capital was at Cim pulung fo r a time, and then at Arge§. T h e first prince o f an independent M oldavian state was B ogdan I (1359—1365). T h e early Rom anian rulers had constantly to meet the threat o f H ungarian conquest; the Polish kingdom and the M on gols w ere also dangers. T he nobility, called boyars, w ere a serious problem fo r the central authority. H ere as elsewhere they form ed conspiracies am ong themselves and carried on intrigues w ith foreign powers. Byzantium and the West: Venice and the Fourth Crusade With the exception o f H ungary, the states that have been discussed so far — B ulgaria, Serbia, the R om anian principalities, and, o f course, the Byzantine E m pire — fell into the orbit o f the Eastern R o m an Em pire and the O rthodox church. C om m on adherence to the O rthodox creed had certainly not kept

21

Introduction these states from warfare. Serbia, Bulgaria, and Byzantium were at different periods responsible for one another’s destruction. In addition to the threat offered by the Slavic powers in the Balkans and the M uslim states to the east, the Byzantine governm ent had to meet a challenge from the West that was political and military as well as religious in character. The attempt o f the Byzantine em perors to maintain the claim to the uni­ versal authority associated w ith R om e did not succeed. In 8oo the Frankish king, Charlem agne (768-814), was crow ned by the pope in R o m e w ith the tide o f R om an emperor. D espite the implications o f this act, the Byzantine governm ent was forced to recognize the action in 812. The title o f R om an em peror w as to pass finally in the thirteenth century to the Germ an house o f H absbu rg, w hose members were regularly elected to w hat became in time a h ollow dignity. Ju st as there were tw o rival empires, there were soon to be tw o Christian churches w ith conflicting claims over jurisdiction. A t first the Constantinople patriarch had recognized the preeminence o f the bishop at R om e. D octrinal controversies soon, however, clouded the relations between the tw o capitals. In 1054 the tw o organizations excom municated each other. A lth ou gh the significance o f the action was not clear at the tim e, the breach was never healed despite numerous attempts. It was, in fact, an arm y repre­ senting Western and Catholic interests that was first to break C onstantino­ ple’s defenses. T h e threat to the em pire from the east, first from the Persians and then from the M uslim A rabs, has been m entioned previously. In the eleventh cen­ tury a m ore form idable M uslim force appeared. A t this time M u slim Turks, under the leadership o f members o f the Seljuk family, became the m ajor dan­ ger to the Byzantine state. In 1071 the Byzantine arm y was defeated in the decisive battle o f M anzikert. T he Turkish pow er took over Byzantine posses­ sions in the N ear East and, most im portant, m ost o f Anatolia. A process o f Turkish settlement, w hich was to be carried out over four hundred years, was thus com menced. T h e region, previously Byzantine and Christian fo r the m ost part, became Turkish and M uslim . Th e change drastically affected the pow er o f the empire, to which this area was im portant fo r m anpower, food, and taxes.

The conquest o f the Holy Lands by a Muslim state led to the organization o f crusades in the West. Although under papal sponsorship, these military campaigns were led by unruly, restless, and power-hungry Western knights, who soon proved themselves interested less in religion than in establishing kingdoms for themselves in the East. They certainly were not concerned with restoring to Byzantium its lost lands in Asia Minor. At this time the Byzantine Empire also came into conflict with Venice. By the twelfth century this enterprising city had built up a great maritime empire based on trade and sea power. It had acquired a chain of islands, ports, and points o f settlement throughout the Adriatic, Mediterranean, and Aegean seas. A rival of Constantinople, Venice found the opportunity during the 22

Introduction fo u r th Crusade to deal a deadly b low to its opponent. Th e crusaders, w h o needed Venetian transport but did not have the m oney to pay fo r it, were diverted by Venice to the capture o f the Dalm atian city o f Z adar (Zara) from the H ungarians. In return, the Venetians offered passage to E gyp t. T h ere­ after, instead o f fighting the M uslim Turks, the Venetians and the Christian knights together first proceeded to occupy and then in 120+ to plunder C o n ­ stantinople. T h ey then elected one o f their number, C oun t B aldw in o f Flan ­ ders, emperor. W ith the capital in their hands, the victors next partitioned the Byzantine lands that they had conquered into small principalities. Som e o f these lasted but a short time, whereas others, such as the Principality o f A chaia (12051432), founded by G eoffrey de Villehardouin, and the D uchy o f the A rch i­ pelago (1207-1566), had long life-spans. Venice too picked up valuable terri­ tory, including points on the D alm atian coast and the Peloponnesus, as well as the island o f C rete, w hich was held until 1669. In the Byzantine Balkans, only the state o f Epirus remained in O rthodox possession. The Western knights and Venetians n ow held lands that were G reek in language and O rthodox in religion. T h e subsequent policies o f the new rulers left a lasting hatred am ong the people for “ the Franks,” as the Western Europeans were to be designated. The C atholic church, despite immense efforts, could not w in converts. In 1261 the Byzantine Em pire was restored by the E m pire o f Nicaea, a Greek state established in Anatolia after the fall o f Constantinople. M ichael V I I I Palaeologus became emperor, foun ding a dynasty that w as to last until the final dow nfall o f the empire. A lth ough some Balkan territory was w on back, the state was basically weak. Th e old enemies, o f course, remained. The conflicts w ith the Second Bulgarian E m pire and Serbia have already been discussed. Byzantine interests were also affected by the events occurring along the coast o f the Adriatic Sea, where H ungary, Venice, Croatia, and Bosnia com peted for supremacy.

T h e Western Balkans and the Adriatic coast: Croatia, D alm atia, Bosnia, and Albania A fter their invasion o f the Balkans, the Slovenes and Croatians, both Slavic peoples, settled in the northwest section o f the area under study. T h e Slo ­ venes did not form an independent political entity. In 748 they became part o f the Frankish kingdom , and they w ere to be o f solidly C atholic faith. B y the end o f the fourteenth century the lands they inhabited had passed under die control o f the H ab sbu rg Em pire. In contrast, the C roats, w h o lived to the south, in lands north o f the Sava and west o f the U na, and along the A driatic coast, did establish an independent state (see M ap 7). T h e first ruler to take the tide o f king was Tom islav (910—928). T h e center was B iograd on the D alm atian coast. Situated near the line o f division between the Eastern and Western em-

23

Introduction

Map 7. Croatia in 1070

pires, and subject to influences from both Rome and Constantinople, Croatia was naturally the scene of religious controversy. Two parties existed, one sup­ porting association with Rome and a Latin liturgy, the other preferring the Slavonic service used in the Orthodox Slavic churches. The choice of Rome was finally accepted in the reign o f Zvonimir (1075-1089). After the conver­ sion of the people, the Croatian lands came under Catholic and Western in­ fluence. Croatian independence was not to last much longer. When the death of Zvonimir led to a disputed succession, the crown was claimed by Ladislas I (1077-1095), the king of Hungary. However, the first Hungarian monarch to be crowned king of Croatia was Koloman (1095-1116), a step taken with the consent of the majority of the Croatian nobility. Croatia was thus in 1102 united with Hungary through the person of the king, but the exact nature of this relationship was to be disputed throughout the next centuries. There­ after, the Croatian leadership was to claim that the union rested on an agree­ ment between equal partners who were joined primarily through the com­ mon monarch. Although the Hungarian government did not accept this interpretation o f the arrangement, Croatia did thereafter retain a special po­ sition within the Hungarian kingdom and did have wide rights of autonomy. Croatia was kept administratively apart from Hungary, and the Croatian as­ sembly of nobles had much authority.

24

Introduction It should be noted that the three areas populated by Croats and associated at times with the medieval Triune Kingdom, that is, Croatia, Dalmatia, and the land between the Sava and Danube known as Slavonia, were henceforth to be governed under separate systems even when they had the same ruler. Only Croatia proper retained a truly autonomous position; Slavonia was soon organized into the Hungarian system o f counties, and the subsequent history of Dalmatia was to be turbulent and complicated. The establishment o f the Hungarian Arpâd dynasty in Croatia did not settle the fate o f Dalmatia. The struggle for possession was waged chiefly between Hungary and Venice, but Serbia and Bosnia also sought a coastline. Although the majority of the inhabitants were Croatian, with a Serbian pop­ ulation concentrated south of Dubrovnik (Ragusa), the cities remained un­ der a strong Italian, primarily Venetian, influence. Most of these had auton­ omous institutions that were respected by successive occupying powers. The government was in the hands of councils of prominent citizens. The language of trade and administration, which was Latin in Roman times, now became Italian; the Italian language remained preeminent until the recent period. However, this situation did not hinder Croatian literary development, which had its center in fifteenth-century Dalmatia. The states that vied for dominance over Dalmatian territory also fought to control Bosnia. Situated between the competing Eastern and Western churches, this area was to have a separate religious movement. The Church of the Bos­ nian Christians, a part of neither the Orthodox nor the Catholic hierarchy, was the object o f strong attack from Rome.3 A Bosnian kingdom was also in existence for a short period (see Map 8). The outstanding leader was Stephen Tvrtko (1353-1391), the first ban, or governor, of Bosnia; the land was at that time under Hungarian suzerainty. In 1377 Tvrtko was crowned king of “the Serbs, Bosnia, and the Croats,” a title reflecting the considerable amount of territory that he was able to control. He was also able to add Dalmatia to his possessions. After his death, in the familiar pattern we have seen in other Balkan states, his kingdom fell apart under the pressures o f domestic conflict and foreign invasion. The last Balkan region that remains to be discussed, that inhabited by the Albanians, shared in the difficulties found elsewhere. The great prosperity experienced during Roman times came to an end with the invasions. The Slavic advance in particular deeply affected the Albanian lands. The native Illyrian population, however, was not Slavicized. Living in a mountainous area, organized into tribal associations, the people maintained their language and their separate existence. The name ultimately applied to the area and the populations was derived from a tribe called the Albanoi, who lived near Durrës. At this early period the people called themselves Arber or Arbereshe. 3

See John V. A. Fine, Jr., The Bosnian Church: A New Interpretation (Boulder, Colo.: East European Quarterly, 1975)·

25

Introduction

In the twelfth century a principality was organized with its center at Kruje, but it had a short existence. Throughout the medieval period the lands suf­ fered from repeated invasions. Normans, Venetians, and Byzantines raided from the sea; the Bulgarian, Serbian, and Byzantine empires held Albanianinhabited regions for long periods. Despite this foreign intervention, it should be emphasized that then, as later, it was difficult to control the area. The local notables and clan leaders ran their own districts and fought one another for local preeminence. Because of the difficult internal conditions, a large Alba­ nian migration southward occurred, with groups moving into Thessaly, the Peloponnesus, and the islands. Some islands - for instance, Hydra, Psara, and Spetsai - became primarily Albanian in ethnic character. The medieval states before the Ottoman conquest By the end o f the fourteenth century the basis had been set for the modem Balkan states, each o f which had a counterpart in this period: Romania in Moldavia, Wallachia, and Transylvania; Bulgaria in the medieval empires;. Yu­ goslavia in the Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian kingdoms; Albania in Illyria; and Greece in the Byzantine Empire. Although there were to be shifts o f population within the region and some immigration, there was no subse­ quent massive intrusion from without comparable to the barbarian invasions. It must be strongly emphasized that none of these early states were national

26

Introduction in the m odem sense. The governments represented primarily alliances o f strong nobles around a central leader. There were few autocratic rulers on the B y ­ zantine m odel. Feudal loyalties rested on the mutual interest o f the m ost pow erful men in the state in the protection and extension o f its frontiers. W hen his personal fortunes were better served by opposition to his ruler and alliance w ith an enemy pow er, a noble could easily shift his allegiance, as the fate o f the Bulgarian and Serbian states well illustrates. Th e Byzantine g o v ­ ernment, despite the strong position o f the em peror, suffered from similar problems. T h is section has been illustrated w ith numerous maps. Th e purpose has been not on ly to demonstrate the size o f the successive em pires, but to show the overlapping claims and conquests. In the nineteenth century the national leaders, looking back on this period, tended to consider the m axim um exten­ sion o f their medieval kingdom s as the natural historical boundaries fo r their nations (see M ap 9). H ow ever, as w e have seen, the areas occupied by the states fluctuated radically; there was also no set center o f national life - w ith the exception, o f course, o f Constantinople fo r Byzantium . F o r instance, w e have seen the Bulgarian capital shift from Pliska, to Preslav, to O hrid, and then to T u rn o vo. T he center o f Serbia m oved southw ard; D usan’s capital was finally Skopje, although the subsequent m ovem ent o f Serbian em igration was to be northward. C roatia, w ith the first center on the Dalm atian coast, was by the sixteenth century to have inland Zagreb (Agram ) as its m ajor city. In the future the ch ief area o f conflict was to be M acedonia. H ere Albanian, Bulgarian, Serbian, and B yzan tine-G reek claims were bound to overlap; all had held the area at some point in their history. A s there w ere few regions that had not known m any rulers, there w ere also no ethnically “ pure” people. O n the eve o f the O ttom an invasion, a band o f Slavic-speaking people separated the Romanians and Hungarians in the north from the Albanian- and G reek-language areas to the south. In each region the population represented a fusion o f original inhabitants w ith subsequent invaders, an am algam ation achieved through m ilitary conquest by a stronger group, the absorption o f one people by another o w in g to the w eigh t o f num ­ bers, o r the acceptance o f another language because o f the cultural attraction offered by a m ore advanced civilization. A s w e have seen, Slavic and Albanian settlers in the southern part o f the peninsula adopted the G reek language and culture; in the Albanian lands the Slavs, in contrast, were assimilated. In Bulgaria a fusion took place between the resident Slavs and the conquering Turanian Bulgars. T h e inhabitants o f the Rom anian principalities were the descendants o f Dacians, R om ans, Slavs, and other peoples. Similarly, the B y ­ zantine E m pire, w ith a G reek official language, was m ixed in population. B y the end o f the medieval period, not only had the foundations fo r the m odern nations been laid, but the area was divided by a long-lasting cultural cleavage, w hose boundaries approxim ated those o f the Eastern and Western Rom an em pires. Basic to this separation was the division between the tw o

27

28 Map 9. Medieval Balkan empires

Introduction Christian churches. The majority o f the people, the Bulgars, Greeks, Roma­ nians, Serbs, and many Albanians, became a part o f the Orthodox world, with its strong Byzantine influence. The Slavic population used their lan­ guages in church services, and Old Slavonic became their common literary language. They wrote in the Cyrillic script. Byzantine patterns were followed in art and architecture. In contrast, Catholic and Western influences predom­ inated in the northwestern Balkans among the Slovenes and Croats, and also among some Albanians and Bosnians. Latin was the language of the church; the Latin script was adopted. Western architectural styles, first romanesque and then gothic, were characteristic o f their building. O f the governments o f the time, the Byzantine was obviously the most successful. A series o f autocratic rulers in control o f a bureaucracy and a strong army was able to establish a great empire that lasted over a thousand years. Even in times o f extreme adversity, a nucleus o f power was maintained. The Byzantine court, with its magnificent ceremonies, was deeply admired by all the Balkan rulers, who attempted to emulate its practices. Few of these could attain the power of the Byzantine autocrat; the feudal nobility or tribal chieftains could usually join together and effectively challenge the central au­ thority. The ephemeral nature of many o f the Balkan political organizations is explained by the fact that political power lay in the hands of the local notables, who were in direct relationship with and had control over the ma­ jority of the people. During the long period that this brief survey has covered, the life and condition o f the mass of the people naturally changed considerably. In time of foreign invasion or barbarian attack, the peasant could find himself in a desperate position. Often large areas were depopulated, as their inhabitants were forced to flee or face massacre. However, even in times of peace, life was extremely difficult. The majority of the people supported themselves either by cultivating the land or as herdsmen; livestock raising was always a major occupation. Those living near the sea could become fisherman, sailors, or pirates. The prosperity and happiness of an individual largely depended on the conditions attached to landholding and on the political situation in the region. The more fortunate peasants were free farmers or shepherds holding their own plots or tending their flocks. In general, they lived in communities where the village held in common the forest, pasture, and water rights, but the individual families controlled their own land. In contrast, conditions might be much worse for those who cultivated the estates of the nobility or the church and were tied to the land under various conditions o f bondage. In its general attributes Balkan serfdom resembled its Western counterpart. Usually the lands o f an estate were divided, with one section worked by the peasants for the lord’s benefit and the other subdivided into individual plots for village use. As well as cultivating the lord’s land, the serf was obligated to pay a percentage of other products of his labor, including such items as wine, 29

Introduction honey, and livestock. Sim ilarly enserfed shepherds w ere expected to deliver part o f their flocks. T he local noble in m ost regions had full jurisdiction over his people. H e collected taxes for the governm ent, and he had com plete ad­ ministrative and judicial authority in his estate. H e kept order, judged crim ­ inal cases, and levied fines and punishments. In addition to the payments to the lord, the peasant ow ed state taxes and labor obligations. H e w as com ­ pelled to w ork on the roads, bridges, and fortifications. In wartim e he was expected not only to fight, but also to provide provisions and transportation. In contrast to the countryside, m ost cities enjoyed a w ide measure o f selfgovernm ent. T h ey were usually administered by councils o f prom inent citi­ zens. Situated on the great trade and com m unication routes, they were the centers for com merce and the crafts. Ports, such as C onstantinople, Thessa­ loniki, and D ubrovnik, played a m ajor role in the life o f the region at a time w hen w ater transport was far easier than land. T he cities w ere also, o f course, the administrative and m ilitary centers. W hen in the fourteenth century the Balkan peninsula faced the invasion o f the O ttom an Turks, certain o f the inherent weaknesses in the political and social system w ere to aid the conquerors. M ost im portant was the lack o f unity am ong the Christian princes. A lthough sharing a com m on religion, m any Balkan leaders in fact allied w ith the M uslim power. A s far as the peas­ antry was concerned, the heavy burden o f feudalism made them often w el­ com e new rulers w h o had another land system. T h e last ruler o f Bosnia told the pope that the Turkish authorities had w on over the peasants by promises o f better conditions.

T he O ttom an conquest A fter the seventh century, as w e have seen, the Byzantine Em pire had to meet challenges from M uslim pow ers, first from the A rabs and then from the Seljuk Turks. A t the end o f the thirteenth century a Turkish grou p o f warriors established itself in northwest A natolia, near the Sea o f M arm ora. T he name Ottoman which was to be given these people derives from that o f the prom ­ inent leader O sm an o r O thm an (1290-1326). T he expansion o f their pow er was rapid, w ith the initial great conquests made in the Balkans. G allipoli, taken in 1354, was the first urban center held by the Ottom ans in E urope. T he fourteenth century provided certain general conditions favorable to O ttom an interests. A t this time the plague spread through E u ro p e; the Black Death decim ated large sections o f the population and spread terror and panic. F rom 1338 to 1453 British and French energies were absorbed in the H un dred Years’ War. T h e church at R o m e was weakened by internal conflicts. Venice and G enoa, the rival com mercial giants, were engaged in m utually destructive conflict. U nder these conditions there was little likelihood that the West would be capable o f uniting to m ount a great crusade to aid the Christian East. T he

30

Introduction weakness and division in the West were reflected in the Balkans. T h e feudal states, each w ith m ajor problem s o f internal organization, were separated by their jealousies and hatreds. Byzantium , which had stood for centuries as a barrier to invasions from the East, never fully regained its pow er after the restoration in 1261. T he O ttom an advance was also immensely aided by the leadership o f a series o f extrem ely able sultans, each o f w hom added territory to the state. M urad I (1360-1389) first took A drianople (1360) and then, after a m ajor victory on the M aritsa R iv er (1371), was able to take control in the Bulgarian, M acedonian, and southern Serbian lands. Sofia was acquired in 1385, N is in 1386, and Thessaloniki in 1387. D u rin g this stage o f its advance the O ttom an governm ent left: som e o f the conquered native princes in power, but as vassals they w ere obligated to pay tribute and render m ilitary aid. In the campaigns the sultans thus were supported regularly by Balkan contingents. O ther areas and the m ajor urban centers were placed under direct O ttom an rule. A lth ough the O ttom an victory o f the M aritsa was the m ost decisive en­ gagem ent for the future o f the peninsula, the battle o f K o so vo Polje (Field o f the Blackbirds) in June 1389 was to be best remem bered in legend and epic poetry. H ere the O ttom an forces met an arm y o f Serbs, Bosnians, and A lb a­ nians. This event was to have a particular significance for Serbia, since it was later com m em orated as the sym bolic end o f the independent Serbian m edie­ val state. Its prince, Lazar (1371-1389), and Sultan M urad both died at K o ­ sovo. The next sultan, Bayezid the Thunderbolt (1389-1402), continued the pat­ tern o f conquest. Ttirnovo was taken in 1393; the ruler o f Wallachia, M ircea the O ld (1386—1418), also became a vassal. A t this point Western Christendom did make a weak attempt to organize a resistance. A nsw ering a call from Pope Boniface IX (138 9 -140 4), K in g Sigism und (1387-1437) o f H u n gary led a cru­ sade in w hich French, G erm an, and British knights participated. T h is army was defeated at N icopolis (N icop) in 1396 by Bayezid. The victorious O tto ­ man advance was tem porarily halted by the activities o f Tamerlane (136914 0 5 ), the last great conqueror to em erge from A sia. T he O ttom an forces were crushed at the battle o f A nkara in 1402, w here Bayezid was taken pris­ oner. A fter the collapse o f Tamerlane’s em pire follow in g his death, and after a civil w ar in the O ttom an state (14 0 3-14 13), M ehm ed I (1413-14 2 1) and the next sultan, M urad II (1421—1451), were able to resume the march forw ard. A new crusade was organized under the leadership o f V ladislav (1434—144 4), the king o f Poland and H ungary, w ith the support o f Wallachia and the S er­ bian noble, G eorge Brankovic. T he real direction o f the undertaking was, how ever, in the hands o f John H unyadi, known in Rom anian historiography as Iancu o f H unadoara, a R om anian in H ungarian service w h o was the g o v ­ ernor o f Transylvania. A lth ou gh the Christian forces w on som e early suc­

31

Introduction cesses, they were decisively defeated at Varna in 14 4 4 ; Vladislav was killed during the fighting. This campaign marked the last united Christian effort to halt the Ottoman conquest of the Balkans. The next sultan, Mehmed the Conqueror ( 14 4 4 -14 4 6 and 1451-148 1), was able to take the single greatest prize on the peninsula. Despite the great O t­ toman victories in the Balkans and the loss of Anatolia, Constantinople had been able to remain free. With the Byzantine territories reduced to little more than the city and some surrounding land, the empire urgently needed outside assistance for its defense. The religious division with the West, however, was still in effect. In a desperate situation, the delegates of the Byzantine church at the Council of Florence, held in 1439, agreed to accept most o f the Roman terms for reunion, and a temporary union took place. The agreement met with strong resistance throughout the Orthodox world, however, and the empire did not secure Western support. When the Ottoman siege o f Con­ stantinople commenced in April 1453, only the king of Naples and some Gen­ oese were willing to send aid. F o r tw o months the O ttom an army invested the city. The advantage was com pletely on the side o f the besieging forces, w h o greatly outnum bered the defenders. Th e Byzantine com manders had about nine thousand soldiers, w ith a city population o f around fifty thousand. Th e O ttom an army, w ith eighty thousand troops, also had artillery and com m and o f the sea. T h e city finally fell on M ay 29. T h e collapse o f the Byzantine state and the taking o f the great imperial city was an event o f tremendous significance. T h e ch ief citadel o f Eastern Christianity and the heir to Rom an pow er and splendor was occupied by a M uslim Turkish conqueror. It was n o w to becom e the capital o f a new em pire, which was based on quite different principles.

Mehmed II was also able to extend the Ottoman boundaries in the Bal­ kans. In 1463 Bosnia was taken; neighboring Hercegovina fell in 1482. Most o f the Christian areas were subsequently to be governed under a system of administration that will be described in the next chapter. Conditions, how­ ever, differed in Bosnia, primarily because of the large-scale conversions to Islam that followed the Ottoman occupation. The subsequent islamization was gradual. The Bosnian towns and the country districts in their vicinity became centers o f Islamic culture. A nobility, Muslim in religion but Slavic in language and ethnic background, was in time to control the countryside. There were also conversions among the peasantry and the townspeople. Over the period of Ottoman rule, immigration of Ottoman administrators and military men into the area was, of course, constant. Although the Muslim element did not exceed in numbers the Christian population, its members held the predominant political, social, and economic power. The Ottoman Empire reached its height during the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent (1520—1566), who is also known as “the Law-Giver.” Its territories embraced great expanses o f Europe, Asia, and Africa (see Map 10). The ri­ valry o f the European great powers continued to benefit Ottoman interests. 32

Map 10. The Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries

Introduction A lth ough certain states, such as Hungary, Poland, and Venice, had consist­ ently opposed the O ttom an advance, the Christian powers had not been able to organize an effective resistance. C onditions were to becom e even m ore favorable for the O ttom an governm ent when the king o f France, Francis I (1515—1547), urged Suleim an to attack his H absbu rg rival, Charles V (1519— 1556). C atholic France thus became one o f the first European allies o f the O ttom an state. T h e R eform ation in G erm any similarly created a diversion that was beneficial to the O ttom an governm ent. T he Lutheran princes hesi­ tated to join in a firm front against the M uslim forces, since such an action m ight aid the papacy and the Catholics. U n d er these favorable conditions Suleiman began a series o f cam paigns in the Balkans. In 1521 he captured the strategically im portant city o f Belgrade. H is greatest victory, how ever, was w on in 1526 when he defeated the H u n ­ garian king, Lou is II (1516-1526), at the battle o f M ohacs, which was the H ungarian equivalent o f K osovo. T he victory was to lead to m ajor political changes. In subsequent years, after further battles, the greater part o f the Hungarian lands, including Transylvania, passed under Ottoman control. The rem aining H ungarian possessions, am ong them some o f Croatia and Sla­ vonia, then became a part o f the H absbu rg Em pire. T h e death o f L o u is II on the battlefield at M ohacs led to a disputed succession. Part o f the H u n ­ garian nobility elected Ferdinand, the brother o f Charles V, as king, and from this time H ab sbu rg kings ruled the H ungarian lands that were not under O ttom an administration. F o r its part, the O ttom an governm ent organized m ost o f its H u n garian possessions into administrative districts called pashaliks. Transylvania, in contrast, kept a large measure o f autonom y and was to act in the future alm ost as an independent state. Suleim an’s career did not end in complete triumph. A lth ough great victo­ ries had been w on , the O ttom an armies could not advance further. In 1529, at the first siege o f Vienna, they failed to take this im portant city. A lth ough further conquests were to be made in the north and east o f the peninsula under other sultans, the expansion westward had been effectively halted.

Resistance to Ottoman rule A lth ou gh the O ttom an Em pire was in possession o f the Balkans, centers o f resistance continued to arise within the peninsula and on its northern fron­ tiers. Because o f the extremely com plicated nature o f these actions, only three are described here: the rebellion o f Skenderbeg in Albania, the events in the D anubian Principalities, and the establishment o f M ontenegro. O ne o f the m ajor revolts against O ttom an rule com menced in A lbania during the reign o f M urad II (1421-1451). It was led by G eorge K astrioti, w hose father was an O ttom an vassal. T he son had been taken to C onstanti­ nople as a hostage; there he converted to Islam, taking the name Skender. In the O ttom an service he rose to the m ilitary rank o f beg, and he is generally

34

Introduction know n by the name o f Skenderbeg, o r Scanderbeg. Sent back to his native land as an official, he soon organized a conspiracy. A fter negotiating for sup­ port w ith both Venice and H ungary, he began his rebellion in 1443. In M arch !444 he convened the notables and organized an Albanian League. Each leader kept control o f his ow n district; Skenderbeg had full pow er in only some regions. T h e governm ent that was thus created was bound to be unstable. A s in the rest o f the Balkans, the notables w ere reluctant to surrender pow er to one o f their num ber; som e cooperated w ith the O ttom an governm ent. Sken­ derbeg, w h o is the A lbanian national hero, died in 14 6 8 , but resistance con­ tinued. Its center was the Albanian highlands, and assistance was given by the Italian states and the papacy. Full O ttom an dom ination was achieved only in the next century. T h e A lbanian lands w ere at this point devastated. Because o f the bad in­ ternal conditions, thousands o f A lbanians em igrated. M o st im portant was the settlement o f large numbers in the K in gd o m o f Naples, w here they lived in their ow n villages and retained their language and customs. These Italian Albanians were to play a leading role in the national m ovem ent in the future. T h e O ttom an E m pire also continued to face intrigue and resistance in the R om anian principalities o f Wallachia and M oldavia. A lth ough O ttom an su­ zerainty w as first established over Wallachia at the end o f the fourteenth cen­ tury and over M oldavia at the end o f the fifteenth, this authority was fre­ quently challenged. T h e principalities had to meet not only the O ttom an threat, but also the am bitions o f neighboring H u n gary and Poland. Th e fore­ m ost Rom anian princes o f the medieval period, Stephen the G reat o f M o l­ davia ( 14 5 7 - 15 0 4 ) and M ichael the Brave o f Wallachia ( 15 9 3 - 16 0 1) , had to deal with a com plex political situation in this part o f E urope as well as w ith the O ttom an overlord. Nevertheless, for a b rie f period Stephen was able to gain control over both Wallachia and M oldavia; M ichael held Wallachia, M o ld a­ via, and Transylvania from 16 0 0 until he w as assassinated in 16 0 1. T h eir ac­ tions in join in g R om anian lands were to be an inspiration to later nationalist writers and political leaders. T he Rom anian princes also had difficulty con­ trolling the boyars, w h o w ere w illin g to join w ith H ungarian, H absbu rg, Polish, o r O ttom an allies to further their ow n interests. Like their contem ­ poraries elsewhere, these men feared the concentration o f too m uch pow er in the hands o f one o f their peers. D espite the unstable situation in these regions, the O ttom an E m pire did not attempt to incorporate Wallachia, M oldavia, o r Transylvania directly into the em pire. A ll three became vassal tributary principalities w ith their ow n princes, in theory elected by the local nobility. Th e ch ief pow er remained in the hands o f this grou p, w h o in turn held full authority over the peasants on their estates. M ost o f these had been reduced to the status o f serfs by the latter h alf o f the sixteenth century.

Despite the fact that control had been established over the peninsula, the Ottoman presence was not felt equally everywhere. Some regions were so 35

Introduction remote and poverty-stricken that they were not w orth the effort that it w ould have cost to administer them. A n example is show n in the history o f M o n ­ tenegro. T h e area had been part o f the Serbia o f D usan until the breakup o f that state. A t the time o f the O ttom an invasion many o f the inhabitants re­ treated further into the mountains to form a new center w ith C etinje as the capital. Th is city had a monastery, and in 1516 the bishops took over the g o v ­ ernment. A lth ough O ttom an troops did penetrate into the region and levy a tribute, they had constant problem s collecting the m oney and controlling the actions o f vassals w h o lived in such a w ild and inhospitable area as this.

Conclusion T h e reign o f Suleim an the M agnificent marked the culm ination o f O ttom an pow er and prestige. T he basic organization o f the em pire, w hich w ill be described in the next chapter, was also set at this time. A lth ou gh the state was to be hampered by grave internal problem s, the boundaries in E urope were held o r extended w ith only som e losses. T he conflicts and jealousies o f the Western governm ents were to the O ttom an advantage. It w as only at the end o f the seventeenth century that the situation changed. A fter that time, European coalitions, o f w hich R ussia and the H ab sbu rg E m pire w ere lead­ ing members, w ere able to deal severe blow s to O ttom an power. T h e long period o f O ttom an dom ination had, as could be expected, a de­ cisive influence o n the future course o f Balkan history and the developm ent o f Balkan society. Except for the m inority under H ab sbu rg rule, all o f the Balkan people w ere by this time subject to O ttom an authority. A m o n g the O rthodox Christians, only the Russians were independent. O rthodox Serbs and Rom anians in the Austrian state had severe restrictions placed on their activities. F o r the next centuries the Balkan people under O ttom an rule were to be administered under a system quite different from that in practice in Western Europe, but one that w ould allow them a great deal o f local selfgovernm ent. T h e m ost obvious immediate effect o f the O ttom an occupation on political life was the destruction o f the form er rulers, Byzantine em perors and Balkan kings alike, and m ost o f the Christian feudal nobility. O nly in areas like B o s­ nia, w here the local notables converted to Islam , or the outlying provinces, M oldavia, Wallachia, and Transylvania, did the members o f the form er ruling class retain their privileges and their estates. It is im portant to emphasize here, how ever, that although the secular leadership was thus elim inated, the O rthodox church and its administrative hierarchy remained. In the future the Balkan population was to be directly controlled by the local community, which was left undisturbed, and by the church leadership. A s w ill be explained in detail in C hapter 1, they were to be integrated into the unique O ttom an system o f governm ent.

36

PART I

The eighteenth century

1 Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule B a l k a n C h r i s t i a n s l i v e d under O ttom an control until the end o f the Balkan Wars in 1913, an understanding o f the aims and prin­ ciples o f that governm ent are essential for ou r narrative. T he ideal and practice o f both the M uslim and the Christian institutions are discussed, as well as their decline in the eighteenth century. T he role o f the great powers in Balkan developm ents and the events in the European provinces and the O ttoman capital in that century are also treated in this chapter. T he period was one o f accelerating internal disintegration from the center and increasing foreign intervention in the affairs o f the Balkan lands. A t the same time, local centers o f power, both Christian and M uslim , assumed a stronger position in the political organization o f the state. These events form the background for the revolutionary m ovem ents o f the next century.

S

in c e

T H E O T T O M A N SYSTEM

The Ottoman government Although many changes had taken place by the beginning o f the eighteenth century, the Ottoman state as a whole retained much of the structure that it had attained at its height in the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent. At this time the empire was governed by a system that contrasted strongly with con­ temporary European regimes. The Ottoman state had been built up on the concept of Holy War; the aim was the extension and defense of Islam. The world was regarded as divided into two spheres, the domain of the faithful, the dariilislam, and the domain of war, the dariilharb. The duty o f the ruler Was to extend the rule o f Islam over as wide a territory as possible. Despite the emphasis on religious war the object was not the destruction ° f the dariilharb or its peoples, but their conquest and domination in a man­ ner of advantage to Islam. If a city or a region submitted without resistance, the population could, if it wished, retain its religion and a large measure of local autonomy; if it resisted, it could be enslaved or massacred, and its prop­ erty was taken as booty. Conversions to Islam were welcomed, but they were seldom forced. Conquered people of another religion were allowed a definite place under the direction of their own ecclesiastical authorities. There was, 39

The eighteenth century however, no question of equality. Non-Muslims paid extra taxes, they were subject to a large number of special restrictions, and they were treated as definitely inferior in status. The first great division in the state was thus along religious lines. A second separated the people by their social position and function within the com­ munity. Here in first place stood the members of the governing class, the askeri, the “military,” which included those who held high administrative po­ sitions, were in the armed forces, or were members of the ulema, the reli­ gious, educational, and legal authority of the empire. High officials in the Christian society, like the patriarchs of the Orthodox church, also belonged here. Below them were the reaya, the subject or “protected flock,” the great majority of the population. People in this group, which was both Muslim and non-Muslim, paid the taxes and were subject to restrictions on their mode of life and dress. Ottoman society was organized into a tight pattern o f estates. Movement between the levels was difficult. At the top o f the pyramid o f state power stood the sultan, an absolute divine-right ruler. Since in theory God gave authority only to him, he was considered the sole source of power and could demand absolute obedience from his subjects; he held complete control over their lives and possessions. He was the owner o f the state lands, and he could dispose o f them as he chose. O f course, in practice his power had real limitations. Obviously, he had to rule through subordinates, who could control his access to informa­ tion and his relations with the mass of the people. Moreover, he could not violate religious law or custom; Muslim public opinion, expressed through the ulema, could strongly influence the actions of the sultan. The faith also dictated the duties o f a ruler; he had been given his people by God in trust. He was responsible for their care and protection; he was to lead them in the proper direction and to realize the great objectives of Islam. One of the principal duties of the sultan was the maintenance o f religious and civil law. Since social justice and balance were theoretical foundations of the Ottoman system, laws and their enforcement were of prime importance. Two principal bodies of law were in effect. First in importance was the sheriat, the religious law o f Islam, based on ecclesiastical texts. The Koran, the basic source, was believed to record the word o f God. The faithful were convinced that it contained all that an individual needed to know for his own life and his government. The sheriat could apply only to Muslims. To supplement this religious law, which could not cover all of the details of the evolving political life of the state, the sultan could formulate laws, kanuns, on his own authority. In practice, these were drawn up by his assistants and then ap­ proved by him. They were then issued in the form of an imperial decree, a firman. Each sultan upon his accession had to reconfirm the actions of his predecessor. Holding absolute power from God, the sultan ruled through a governing class, to whom he delegated authority. At the height of Ottoman strength 40

Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule the administration o f the country and the principal sections o f the arm y were staffed by members recruited through the kul, or slave system. O bviously an absolute ruler had to surround him self w ith men on w hom he could rely with absolute assurance. T h e allegiance o f the soldiers was o f particular im por­ tance. Previously, Islam ic rulers had regularly used slaves fo r administrative positions, and this system was adopted and extended by the O ttom an sultans. Slaves could be obtained by many means. Th e ruler was entitled to a fifth o f the prisoners o f war, w h o w ere enslaved. Slaves could also be purchased. The most notable means used, how ever, was the devshirme, m eaning “ to collect,” which was inaugurated sometime around the end o f the fourteenth century. It remained in effect until the end o f the seventeenth century, but some re­ cruitments w ere apparently made as late as the eighteenth century. A lthough conditions varied over this period, in general, every three to seven years O t­ toman officials w ent into the countryside to make their selections. Fathers were expected to present their unm arried male children between the ages o f eight and twenty. M u slim families w ere exempt, since their children could not be enslaved. T he children deem ed best in both intelligence and appear­ ance were taken and then sent in groups to Constantinople. There they were examined and separated. T h e m ost prom ising were kept in the capital, where they were given an extensive education that was designed to train them to be the future adm inistrators o f the state and the trusted members o f the sultan’s household. T h e others w ere sent to live w ith Turkish farmers in Anatolia, where they learned the language and received religious instruction. Both groups, o f course, w ere converted to Islam. M ost o f the second section be­ came mem bers o f the janissary corps, the m ost effective fighting force any­ where in this period. This body o f dedicated converts was responsible for the great victories o f the O ttom an armies up to the seventeenth century. T he figures given concerning the num ber o f boys recruited through the devshirme system varies sharply. T he num ber runs from 20 0,0 00 to m any times that num ber for the entire period when the practice was in force. Ju d g ­ ments differ w idely about the justice o f the system. R eports exist o f attempts o f families to buy their children both out o f the collections and into them. The M uslim s o f Bosnia in particular requested that they be included in the devshirme. In contrast, nationalist Balkan writers often stress the cruelty o f taking children by force from their families and converting them to a religion that, by Christian judgm ent, w ould lead only to eternal damnation. It must he remem bered that the religious issue was o f central importance in this time. Nevertheless, although the separation was undoubtedly painful fo r families, and did perhaps deprive the Balkan com munities o f their best talent, the children gained the possibility o f acquiring the most advanced education available and the opportunity to rise to the top o f the O ttom an state system. It should also be emphasized that the status o f slave was not necessarily de­ meaning. To be a slave o f the sultan was an honor that conferred high social position and material benefit. 41

The eighteenth century The Ottoman system of government was thus headed by an absolute m on­ arch. His first deputy was the grand vezir, and he was also assisted by an Imperial Council, or Divan. This body dealt with all questions o f state, but its legal functions were probably the most important. Its members included the grand vezir and the highest officials of the state and of the ulema. Below this body a vast bureaucracy, centralized in Constantinople, ran the empire and collected the taxes that were the source of so much resentment. Since Holy War was considered a main function of the empire, the military forces were o f major importance. The two most effective units were the jan­ issaries, the infantry recruited through the devshirme, and the sipahis, the cavalry based on the countryside. The janissaries, as we have seen, were part of the slave system and were directly under the sultan. Forbidden to marry, they were supposed to be ready to go to war at any time. When the country was at peace, they had police duties. The state was also directly served by an artillery corps and a cavalry. The janissary force became particularly signifi­ cant when the foot soldier carrying firearms proved more effective than the cavalry equipped with sword and spear. The original great Ottoman victories, however, were largely the accom­ plishment of the sipahis, who also provided important services in local gov­ ernment. The early Ottoman rulers were faced with the problem o f paying their forces. Since the sultan was considered the holder of all of the land, this question was solved by assigning to the members of the cavalry troops the usufruct of a grant of land, called a ziamet for a large estate, or a timar for the more normal size, from which they could collect certain definite pay­ ments. These funds were designed to support the holder, his family, and his retainers, and also to equip him for battle. The sipahi had to belong to the military class. Although a son could not inherit land directly from his father, as a member o f the governing class he could apply for and be granted a timar if he qualified. Slaves o f the sultan were also eligible to apply. Similar grants o f land were sometimes given to pay wages and provide pensions for officials, or awarded to favorites of the sultan or influential men. A timar was usually held by a Muslim, but sometimes in the early period also by a Christian. When the Ottoman army first occupied a territory, a careful register was made of the population and the resources of the area so that taxes could be properly assessed. At the height of the timar system, the sipahi was entitled only to collect certain specified taxes, usually in kind, and some labor dues. Because these payments were regulated, the peasant was usually better off than he had been under the lords o f the previous feudal regimes. Under the policy known as istimalet, meaning “to make use of,” the Ottoman conquer­ ors attempted to win the peasants’ support against their former masters. Most Balkan peasants cultivated the land of a timar, where they held hereditary rights. Their sons could continue to work the land, but this right could not be sold or transferred without permission. The sipahi usually lived in the village where his lands were located or in a 42

Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule nearby provincial town. He thus was tied to his area, where he had important official duties. He was responsible for the maintenance o f order in his district and for the protection of his tenants. He was also the tax collector. Since his sUpp°rt came from his landholding, he was himself principally dependent on the production of his fields, a fact that limited his effectiveness as a fighter. He naturally wished to be home by fall when the crops were gathered in. The normal campaigning season was thus from March to September or Oc­ tober. The sipahi was also entitled to a proportion o f the booty obtained by victorious warfare. However, in the period covered by this narrative, the Ottoman troops, deprived of rewarding or spectacular achievements, could not gain much through looting. They fought chiefly, not in new or rich re­ gions, but in the impoverished and depopulated Balkan and Black Sea bor­ derlands, where the best that could perhaps be picked up was someone’s stray cow. In addition to the officials and the military, the ruling class included the members o f the ulema. Law, education, and the supervision of the Muslim community’s moral and religious life were in their care. Since the basis o f the state was religion, their duties gave them prestige and power. They were to apply the sheriat and to further the principles of Islam through their educa­ tional and religious institutions. They provided the members of the impor­ tant state office o f judge, or kadi. Judges were dispatched throughout the provincial administration to enforce both the sheriat and the sultan’s laws. They had jurisdiction over all Muslims and over Christians except in those sectors reserved for the Christian church authorities. In addition to the kadis, another group, the muftis, played an important role in the Ottoman system. They acted as interpreters of both the sheriat and the sultan’s decrees, and they were consulted when the meaning of a law was in dispute. At the head o f the ulema stood the seyhiilislam, who was appointed by the sultan, but who held in fact an independent position. He could issue a fetva, which was an opinion or interpretation dealing with the question whether acts performed by the government conformed to Muslim principles. He could not enforce his decisions, but his judgment had an im­ portant hold on public opinion. He could and sometimes did determine the fate of a sultan. The m oral basis o f this system has been described by num erous authors, both O ttom an and contemporary. Its purpose and ideal has perhaps been best expressed in the “ circle o f equity” stated in the eight follow in g principles, in which the last leads back to the first:

1 There can be no royal authority w ithout the military. 2 T h ere can be no m ilitary w ithout wealth. 1

The reaya produce the wealth. 43

The eighteenth century 4 T h e sultan keeps the reaya by m aking justice reign. 5 Justice requires harm ony in the world. 6 T h e w orld is a garden, its walls are the state. 7 T he state’s prop is the religious law. 8 There is no support fo r the religious law w ithout royal authority.1

T h e importance o f the concept o f justice in this theoretical fram ew ork has been emphasized: Justice, in this theory o f state, means the protection o f subjects against abuse from the representatives o f authority and in particular against illegal taxation. To ensure this protection was the sovereign’s m ost im portant duty. T he fundamental aim o f this policy was to maintain and strengthen the pow er and authority o f the sovereign, since royal authority was regarded as the corner-stone o f the w hole social struc­ ture.2 In the O ttom an concept, as we have seen, not only political and religious positions were regarded as fixed, but also social status. O ttom an theory, like medieval European, regarded society as divided into separate estates, each part serving a particular function in a divine order.3 M ovem ent between classes, o r occupations, was not approved because that w ould ultimately upset a bal­ ance ordained by G o d. A s w e have seen, the O ttom an scheme placed the “ M en o f the Sw ord,” the sultan w ith his bureaucracy and army, and the “ M en o f the Pen,” the religious leaders and the learned men, in the first, o r askeri, class. B elo w them, the reaya were divided into tw o general categories, first, the merchants and craftsmen, and second, the peasants. T h is social classifi­ cation cut across religious lines, although M uslim s and Christians w ere never considered equal at any level. T he aim and ideal was thus that o f social justice and balance; everything had its place and purpose as determ ined by G o d ’s will. A go o d Christian or M uslim fulfilled the role assigned to him. A reaya should not seek to become a general. These restrictions were reinforced by both M uslim and Christian church teachings. Society was static; there was no idea o f evolution, progress, 1 2 3

Norman Itzkowitz, Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition (New York: Knopf, 1972), p. 88 . Halil Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300 - 1600, trans. Norman Itzkowitz and Colin Imber (New York: Praeger, 1973), p. 6 6 . See the chart in Kemal Karpat, A n Inquiry into the Social Foundations c f Nationalism in the Ottoman State: From Social Estates to Classes, from Millets to Nations, Research Monograph no. 39 (Princeton, N .J.: Princeton University, Center o f International Studies, 1973), P- 22-

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Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule or social and individual “ betterment” as positive aims to be achieved. In this respect, the assumptions o f the O ttom an w orld were not markedly different from those o f the West. T h e idea o f progress was an eighteenth-century West­ ern concept; that o f evolution belonged to the nineteenth century. The emphasis on religion and its political role was also com m on to both the O ttom an Em pire and the European states. W hen the O ttom an theocratic system was at its height, E urope was entering upon the age o f the R eform a­ tion, the Counter-Reformation, and the religious wars. Certainly, at this time, in com parison w ith the excesses o f both Catholic and Protestant, the M uslim Ottoman state showed itself as remarkedly tolerant. A s already noted, except in isolated and exceptional cases conversions were not forced. There was no equivalent o f the Inquisition. A s w e shall see, throughout the long years o f Ottoman dom ination the Christian and M uslim societies lived side by side in relative peace and understanding, although w ith considerable mutual ex­ clusion.

Th e breakdown o f the system The previous section described the O ttom an system as it should have func­ tioned. H ow ever, no political organization ever attains its stated goals; cer­ tainly the O ttom an governm ent, even at its height, never approached the high ideals expressed by its exponents and theoreticians. This intricate, inter­ related system was particularly vulnerable. B y the beginning o f the eigh ­ teenth century the em pire was in full decline, and the essential elements in the political order either had undergone alterations o r had ceased to function. Basic to the success o f the em pire was a strong, intelligent ruler and a victo­ rious army. In both respects the years after Suleiman’s reign witnessed dis­ appointments and disasters. O bviously, the functioning o f the O ttom an governm ent w as intimately tied to the abilities o f the sultan, w h o was expected to perform almost super­ human tasks. N o t only was he at the head o f the governm ent and the reli­ gious institutions, but he was also as supreme military com m ander supposed to lead armies into battle. T h e first ten sultans were all men o f unusual ability; thereafter a sw ift decline set in. A m ajor problem was the lack o f a satisfactory regulation o f the succession. O n the basis o f the assumption that the ultimate choice lay in the hands o f G o d , the requirement for a new sultan was m erely that he be an adult male o f sound mind and o f the royal house. T he lack o f a clear ruling m eant that a murderous com petition existed between the eligible Princes. T h e successful candidate usually ow ed his victory to luck, superior Military pow er, and court intrigue. T h e extreme rivalry between brothers or others eligible fo r the throne led to the custom by which the victor sultan executed his potentially dangerous relatives to protect himself. F o r instance, ehrned I I I (1595—1603) had his nineteen brothers and over twenty sisters

45

The eighteenth century killed.4 Changes were also made in the education of the princes. At first the sons of the reigning monarch were sent at the age of twelve to the provinces, where they received administrative training. There they were, o f course, in a position to organize political and military centers to support their own inter­ ests. To avoid this situation the princes were next confined in the harem in the kafes (cage) section. Completely excluded from the life of the country and secluded in a society of court intriguers, women, and eunuchs, these men could never be certain o f their ultimate fate. The atmosphere of fear and the lack o f employment produced weak and often mentally incompetent rulers. Suleiman II (1687—1691), when informed of his accession, told those who had come to take him from the cage: “If my death has been commanded, say so. Let me perform my prayers, then carry out your order. Since my childhood, I have suffered forty years o f imprisonment. It is better to die at once than to die a little every day. What terror we endure for a single breath.” 5 Although after Suleiman’s reign it became the practice to choose the senior male can­ didate, no fixed rule of succession was ever set. With the accession o f sultans who were not fit to rule, the power in the state passed to those closest to the throne: the royal household and the min­ isters. The reigning monarch’s mother, the valide sultan, became a person of considerable importance, as did the other women in the palace, the eunuchs, and the court servants. Fortunately for the empire, in the second half o f the seventeenth century the Albanian Kopriilu family provided four extremely able grand vezirs. Coming to office in 1656 at the age o f seventy, the first, Mehmed Kopriilu, sought to end the extreme corruption and to restore the government to the conditions o f the time o f Mehmed the Conqueror. In 1661 his son Fazil Ahmed became vezir and continued these policies. His achieve­ ments were reflected in the Ottoman military victories at this time. The Kopriilii interlude was an exception. By the end of the seventeenth century the classical administrative system had in fact broken down to a con­ siderable extent. The slave and devshirme organization, in which at least in theory advancement was based on training and merit, had ended. The gov­ ernment and military offices were no longer staffed by dedicated converts but by Muslims and some Christians, who had usually acquired their positions by purchase and who looked upon their privileges as sources primarily of private profit. The collapse at the top was thus reflected right down to tht bottom of the centralized bureaucracy. Most dangerous to the state, and typi­ cal of the collapse o f the system, was the disintegration of the army and the apparent inability of the empire to support a strong military establishment. Although the entire question o f the economic life o f the empire will be discussed in a later section, it is important to note here that one of the major 4 5

S tan fo rd J. Shaw an d Ezel K ural Shaw, History o f the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, * vols. (C am bridge: C am bridge U niversity Press, 1976,1977), I, 184. Inalcik, Ottoman Empire, p. 60.

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Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule causes o f the decline o f the state was its increasing impoverishment. Most apparent was the high rate of inflation that commenced at the end of the sixteenth century and continued into the seventeenth. With the sharp rise in prices and with the rising costs of the administration and the military forces of the empire, the Ottoman government was forced to increase the rates of taxation and to adopt new methods of collection. The economy also suffered to an extent from the fact that the great trade routes to Asia now shifted to the Atlantic, where the British and Dutch were the main beneficiaries. The relative poverty o f the state directly affected its military effectiveness. As we have seen, the initial great conquests were due primarily to the ability o f the sipahi cavalry, which had received its income from the timar and from booty won during the conquests. There had been no question o f a cash payment. Unfortunately, this group proved increasingly ineffective against trained infantry armed with guns. The janissaries, equipped with the new weapons, thus became the base of Ottoman fighting strength. These troops, however, had to be paid a salary, and their arms were expensive. The in­ creased costs had to be met at a time when the empire was no longer expand­ ing rapidly, when new sources of booty were not available, and when prices were rising steadily. The economic problems of the central government were directly reflected in the countryside. Since a cash income was urgently needed, some timar land was brought under the direct control o f the treasury and then farmed out for taxes. Courtiers also received land grants as gifts or in return for services. As will be explained later, some land became in fact the private prop­ erty of the man who held it. With the failure o f the empire to acquire new territory by conquest and with the withdrawal of areas from the timar system, the number o f sipahis equipped for battle naturally declined. These condi­ tions also affected the peasant population in the provinces. The new control­ lers of the land imposed harsher conditions, and frequent disorders soon characterized provincial life. Certainly, no “circle of justice” existed. In the seventeenth century the government sent janissaries into the provinces to try to control the situation and, incidentally, to remove some of these unruly dements from the capital. Once assigned to provincial centers, the janissaries tended to make the local conditions even worse. They often joined with the Ottoman officials, the tax collectors, the wealthy local merchants, and land­ owners and acted against the interests o f the peasants who worked the land and were the basic source o f the state’s tax income. Although some janissaries settled in the provinces, the center of their power remained Constantinople, where they became an important political force With the ability to depose vezirs and even sultans. Once an elite, dedicated f° rPs, chosen on the basis of ability and carefully trained, the janissaries had y the eighteenth century become something quite different. With the end ° f the devshirme system the recruits were usually Muslims by birth and not converts. They also had won the right to marry and to enroll their sons in 47

The eighteenth century the corps. O nce established w ith hom es and families, these soldiers became increasingly reluctant to fight in distant lands in what were seldom victorious campaigns. M oreover, the financial weakness o f the governm ent meant that their salaries were often far in arrears. Because o f this problem , and also because o f the opportunities offered, janissaries entered into trade o r crafts. T h ey became an im portant element in the guild system. T h eir new status meant that they could not be easily disciplined and they were financially in ­ dependent. B y the end o f the eighteenth century they had becom e a p rivi­ leged element in the state w ith a m ajor political role. T h eir strength as a fighting force was another matter. It has been estimated that o f the 4 0 0 ,0 0 0 enrolled janissaries, only 20,000 could be called upon in event o f war.6 T he fact that members o f the military class could so easily pass over into com ­ merce also show s h ow the system o f social classes had weakened.

T H E BA LK AN C H R IS T IA N S T h e Balkan Christian population was thus living w ithin a system that was rapidly declining at the center. In fact, i f w e examine the bleak history o f the O ttom an state in the eighteenth century, the question imm ediately arises w h y the entire structure did not sim ply collapse from pressures w ithin both the Christian and the M uslim sectors o f society. A n answer perhaps lies in the basic resilience o f the O ttom an administrative system and its ability to isolate its potential opponents. Th e Porte (or Sublim e P orte), a term com m only applied to the O ttom an governm ent, did not attempt to deal w ith the indi­ vidual citizen directly. It preferred to make use o f a chain o f intermediaries w hom it could control and w h o in turn could bear m uch o f the blame for disasters. F o r instance, the O ttom an governm ent did not concern itself w ith the daily life o r the beliefs o f its Christian population. T h e mass o f peasantry was controlled on the higher level by the O rthodox church through the millet system and on the lower, local basis by village authorities chosen on tradi­ tional bases. These tw o institutions w ere thus the essential element in the life o f the Balkan Christian.

The Orthodox millet T h e Balkan peasant, although w ell aware o f the pow er o f the central and provincial adm inistration, was m ost directly affected b y the actions o f officials o f his ow n religion, including his ecclesiastical authorities. W hen the M uslim armies took over new areas during the great period o f conquest, they usually found that the form er civil administrators had fled, had been killed, o r had 6 Peter F. Sugar, Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354 - 1804, vol. V o f Peter F. Sugar and Donald W. Treadgold, eds., A History o f East Central Europe (Seattle: University o f Washington Press, 1977), p. 193-

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Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule to be excluded from office because o f their resistance to Ottoman authority. Since the church hierarchy usually remained, the custom of using the leaders

0f the religious communities for government functions was established early. Although they maintained their superior position, the conquerors were wili­ n g to work with people of any monotheistic religion whose leaders submit­ ted to their authority. They respected in particular the Christians and Jews, the “people of the book,” that is, with a revealed scripture. The members of the accepted faiths were organized into communities, known as millets. By the eighteenth century there was a Gregorian Armenian, a Catholic, and a Jewish millet, but they were far smaller than the Orthodox. There was also a Muslim millet. For the Orthodox the most significant step was taken in 1454, immediately after the capture of Constantinople. After the fall of the imperial city, Mehmed the Conqueror considered himself the heir to the Byzantine emperors and the first ruler o f the world. He personally was extremely interested in Greek thought and theological doctrine; he held in great respect the civilization that he had subdued. Determined to assure a contented Christian population, he sought a suitable head for the Orthodox church and one with whom he could cooperate. At the time the Orthodox world was torn apart by ecclesiastical disputes, in particular over the question of reunion with the church of Rome. Mehmed chose as the new patriarch a respected scholar, George Scholarios, who as a monk had taken the name Gennadios. He had the advantage of being a firm opponent o f union. Together the two men supervised a new church organization, and in 1454 the sultan conferred upon the patriarch his insignia of office. As head of the Orthodox millet the patriarch o f Constantinople assumed heavy duties and responsibilities. Previously, the Byzantine emperors had played a major role in church affairs; like the sultans, they were regarded as God’s representatives on earth and responsible to him for the welfare o f their sub­ jects. Under the emperors, religious affairs were controlled by the patriarch and the Holy Synod; the patriarch was the highest state official after the emperor. When disputes arose over dogma, the emperor would summon a council o f representatives of the five patriarchs - from Constantinople, An­ tioch, Jerusalem, Alexandria, and Rome before the schism - over which he °ften presided. With the removal o f the emperor and his officials after the conquest, a major portion o f their former duties fell under the jurisdiction of die church. Although theoretically the four eastern patriarchs were equal, in Practice the Constantinople Patriarchate spoke for the Orthodox and gained a clearly superior position. In fact, by the eighteenth century the other churches ad become dependent upon it. Two other autocephalous churches were in existence: in Ohrid for the Bulgars and in Pec for the Serbs. N ot only were j^ey not equal to Constantinople, but by the middle of the century they had become so weakened that the Constantinople office was able to obtain their abolition. The Patriarchate then had jurisdiction over the entire Balkan pen­ 49

The eighteenth century insula and the Aegean and Ionian islands. Accordingly, it was the major cen­ ter for the Balkan Orthodox people. Although the sultan had agreed that the Orthodox establishment would be run by the patriarch with a Holy Synod composed of his metropolitans, he maintained a strong degree of control. The patriarch was in theory elected by the synod and then confirmed by the sultan. Although they had the power to dictate the choice, the sultans at first rarely interfered in the elections un­ less state interests were clearly at issue. The patriarchs, in turn, were seldom found in opposition to Ottoman policy. Other high church officials were chosen or dismissed by the action of the patriarch and the synod, but the sultan’s approval was necessary. The Patriarchate had full control of the O r­ thodox churches and their property. The clergy were under the jurisdiction o f their own courts, and they were free from taxation. The church was sup­ ported by fees, donations, and income from property. The patriarch’s temporal duties and his power had by the eighteenth cen­ tury become immense. He was the millet bashi (head o f the millet) and ethnarch (secular ruler) o f the Orthodox population. Since he was a high official in the Ottoman government and part of the askeri bureaucratic class, he was entided to a standard with two horsetails (an Ottoman governor or general had three, the sultan six). The patriarch was responsible to his ruler for the behavior and loyalty of his flock. He was also given important duties con­ nected with tax collecting and the maintenance of public order. His judicial functions were particularly significant for the Christian population. The church had full jurisdiction over a wide range o f affairs, including matters relating to marriage and the family and, in practice, commercial cases involving only Christians. Although criminal cases, such as murder and theft, were theoreti­ cally under the control o f the Muslim judicial system, the Orthodox courts often handled these as well, as long as no Muslim was involved. In adminis­ tering justice the church based its decisions on canon law, Byzantine statutory law, local customs, and church writings and traditions. Ecclesiastical courts could hand out penalties such as imprisonment, fines, and exile, along with the denial o f the sacraments and excommunication. The Christian population usually preferred to have recourse to these courts, where they were judged on an equal basis and their testimony had weight and significance. In integrating Orthodox institutions into their system, the Ottoman gov­ ernment had the advantage of being able to incorporate a complete admin­ istrative network. The church had already organized the lands under its juris­ diction into dioceses and subdioceses based on the number of their adherents in an area. A hierarchy from the lowest priest right through the patriarch existed throughout the Balkan lands. Moreover, the church and its officers were accustomed to working with, and not in opposition to, the civil au­ thority. Since the Patriarchate was so closely associated with the Ottoman state, its institutions were bound to reflect the gradual decline and disintegration of 50

CT

An Orthodox priest’s house on the Bosphorus

The eighteenth century the other governmental institutions. This condition was most apparent at the top and in the office of the patriarch itself. Like other high offices, this posi­ tion came to be awarded to the candidate who could pay the highest price. By the end o f the seventeenth century it has been estimated that the cost of an election was about 20,000 piastres, or 3,000 gold pounds, an amount that rose to 5,600 pounds in 1727 and then declined. With this source of revenue it was to the advantage o f the Porte for the position to change hands as often as possible. From 1595 to 1695 there were sixty-one separate nominations, but since one man could hold the office many times, only thirty-one individuals were involved. The situation subsequendy improved. In the eighteenth cen­ tury there were only thirty-one appointments, involving twenty-three candi­ dates.7 T h e costs o f purchasing the Patriarchate were added to the church budget until 1763. W ith these expenditures and the enorm ous losses o w in g to corrup­ tion w ithin the organization, the debt o f the Patriarchate reached 1.5 million Turkish piastres by around 1820. Other Orthodox establishments carried similar burdens. Since these charges were passed on dow n through the hierarchy, the costs ultimately had to be paid by the members o f the church on the lowest level, that is, the peasantry, o r from profits from ecclesiastical property. On the estates ow ned by the church this question concerned the dues and o b li­ gations o f the peasants w ho w orked the lands. In M oldavia and Wallachia the issue was to involve the use o f income from local monasteries to support outside institutions.

Nevertheless, despite its close connections with the Ottoman government and the corruption in its operation, the Orthodox church did provide im­ portant services for the Christian people. Most significant was the fact that it kept the Christian community almost unchanged in an ideological sense until the age o f the national movements. Certainly, the church preserved carefully the idea o f Christian exclusiveness. It taught that the Ottoman Empire had been victorious because the sins of the Christians had called down God’s punishment. Muslim rule was, however, ephemeral; a new age would soon arrive when the Christian people would again emerge triumphant. Although the Christian was a second-class citizen in the Muslim state, his religious leaders taught him that on a higher moral basis he was infinitely superior to his conquerors. In his personal, daily life the Balkan peasant was surrounded by Christian symbols, by crosses and ikons, and not by reminders o f O tto­ man domination. In addition, the civil jurisdiction of the church, particularly its control of family matters, assured that there would be little intermingling of religions or nationalities. All religious organizations forbade intermarriage. Christian girls of Balkan nationalities did indeed often become part of Muslim harems, 7

Steven Runciman, The Great Church in Captivity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), p p . 201- 203.

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Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule but they thereby lost their national and religious identification and joined the Muslim society. There was little chance o f conversions from the Muslim com­ munity to Christianity, since this action was punishable by death. In general, both Christian and Muslim authorities acted to maintain the religious sta­ tus quo. The Patriarchate also preserved Orthodoxy against other sects. During the period of Ottoman domination the major opponent was considered to be the Catholic church. And indeed Catholicism was the main enemy: it was both crusading and intolerant of other beliefs. The Orthodox position was usually that Ottoman rule was preferable to that o f a Catholic power. In this matter the interests o f the patriarch coincided with those of the Porte, whose main enemies were at first the Catholic Habsburgs and Venice. Although Catholic France was an Ottoman ally, that state did not become a major instrument for Catholic penetration in the Balkans. In the eighteenth century the O rtho­ dox authorities were well aware that in the areas where their followers lived under the jurisdiction of a Catholic state, notably in Transylvania, their po­ sition was worse than in the Ottoman Empire. In one major respect the identification of the foreign interests of O rtho­ doxy and the Ottoman state was to be modified during the eighteenth cen­ tury. At that time, Russia, the only Orthodox great power, emerged as the major external threat to the empire. The patriarch and most of the Orthodox Balkan population looked to and expected assistance from this state. Con­ stant Orthodox missions went from Ottoman lands to Russia to seek mainly financial but sometimes military support. It should be strongly emphasized, however, that the Russian government never obtained a dominant influence in the Orthodox hierarchy. The church, like the Orthodox people, expected virtually limidess aid from the northern power, but there was no intention to establish anything like a dependent relationship. During the eighteenth cen­ tury the church was under one predominant national influence, but it was from the strongest Christian group within the empire. Greek influence: the Phanariots Over the centuries o f Ottoman rule it could be expected that some Christian nationalities would enjoy better conditions than others. By the eighteenth century certain Greeks had won a privileged status in comparison not only with other Christians, but also with most Muslims. The majority of the Greek people lived much like their Balkan neighbors; their fate will be discussed in a later section. A minority, however, had moved out o f the limited, parochial, peasant world and had won wealth and power through commercial ventures, finance, or close association with the Ottoman government. In comparison with other Balkan people, the Greeks were notable for their dispersion. In antiquity Greek communities were to be found around the shores o f the Black Sea and the Mediterranean and in Asia Minor. After the 53

The eighteenth century Ottoman conquest Greeks emigrated in particular to Italy, where the King­ dom of the Two Sicilies and Venice were to harbor large Greek colonies. For the future the Venetian center was to prove most important. With the expan­ sion o f European trade, and with the participation o f Greeks in it, Greek colonies appeared in the major European cities; London, Vienna, Marseilles, and later Odessa were to prove particularly influential. As at home, the Greek colonies were organized around the local Orthodox church; the members preserved their language and a strong awareness of religious and national identity. These emigrants were not a peasant population. Usually employed as shopkeepers or merchants, they were found at all economic levels. Some became extremely successful; others barely survived. Together they formed a tight, nationally conscious society whose members had opportunities for education and a vision far beyond that o f the inhabitant o f a Balkan village. Greek nationals also prospered from their predominance in the commercial life o f the empire. In the Balkan peninsula, Greeks formed an important ele­ ment o f the population of the major cities, especially those located on the trade routes. With their connections outside the empire, their strong eco­ nomic advantages, and their concern for education, they were the most pros­ perous and successful of the Balkan people. The really privileged position among the Christians was held, however, not by merchants or even by high church officials, but by another group, the Phanariot oligarchy with its center in Constantinople. Deriving its name from the Phanar, or lighthouse, district, where most of the Orthodox Christians lived and where the Patriarchate was located, this group was largely Greek in nationality, but its members included Hellenized Italian, Romanian, and Al­ banian families. The influence of the Phanariots was derived mainly from their great wealth, which was gained largely through the high offices they held in the state and the financial rewards that could be extracted from them. They thus profited exceedingly from Ottoman corruption. From the middle of the seventeenth century they enjoyed a unique position in the empire be­ cause o f both their wealth and their political influence. As the military power and prestige o f the empire declined, and the borders contracted, the Porte was forced to face the fact that it would have to meet the European powers on their terms. Since it could not overpower its adver­ saries on the battlefield, it would have to learn to deal with them through diplomacy and negotiation. Because Turkish officials did not easily learn other languages, they became dependent on intermediaries in their dealings with foreigners. As the best educated of the Balkan peoples, and the most closely connected with European countries, the Greeks were fully suited to this task. They thus usually filled the post of dragoman at all levels. Although this term is translated as “interpreter,” a dragoman was in fact an agent or an interme­ diary, rather than someone simply trained in languages. Through their skill in this occupation, Greeks came to control four major posts in the Ottoman administration: grand dragoman, who became something close to a perma­ 54

Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule nent secretary for foreign affairs; dragom an o f the navy, w h o became the interm ediary between the grand admiral o f the navy and the G reek islands; and the governorships o f the tw o Rom anian provinces o f Wallachia and M o l­ davia. T h eir role as rulers o f the Principalities w ill be discussed in a fo llow in g section. H ere only the relationship o f the Phanariots to the O ttom an govern ­ ment and the Patriarchate is under consideration. Th e im portance o f the Balkan Christian element in O ttom an adm inistra­ tion has been emphasized. H ow ever, before the seventeenth century, high position in the bureaucracy w ent almost exclusively to converts. In contrast, the Phanariot officials retained their Christian faith and remained in close touch w ith the Patriarchate. T h e first Phanariot to w in a high post was Panagiotis N ikou sios, w hom A hm ed K opru lii made grand dragom an in 1669. With this office came significant privileges, such as gro w in g a beard and rid­ ing a horse w ith attendants, which previously had been accorded only to M uslim s. T h e m ost fam ous Phanariot statesman w as, however, Alexander M avrokordatos, w h o was grand dragom an from 1673 to 1709. L ik e m any Greeks o f the time he was educated in Italy at the U niversity o f Padua. H e then became a doctor. H is advancement was rapid; he became grand d rago ­ man in his thirties. H e was the ch ief O ttom an diplom at at the negotiations leading to the Treaty o f K arlow itz (Sremski K arlovci); his son Ioannis held a similar position in the discussions relating to the Treaty o f Passarowitz (Pozarevac). A s translators and mediators, the Phanariot diplomats were, o f course, able to learn m any o f the O ttom an state secrets, and they were directly in touch w ith foreign governm ents. T he Phanariots at this time w ere also deeply involved in the affairs o f the Patriarchate. T h rou gh their financial power, they w ere able to exert a large measure o f control over the church institutions. A lw ays in need o f money, the church naturally turned to the wealthy laymen. A great deal o f the in­ debtedness o f the Patriarchate was caused by the extreme corruption o f the empire and the necessity o f purchasing offices and m aking other payments. In the eighteenth century, for instance, the cost o f the Patriarchate was high. A lthough few candidates had the cash necessary, they could borrow from Phanariot sources at 10 percent. O nce a banker had invested in a successful candidate, he had a measure o f control over his debtor. T h e Phanariots also wielded influence by acquiring seats in the synod assigned to laymen and by assuring that vacant positions in the church administration were filled by com pliant candidates. T he period o f Phanariot control in O rthodox affairs coincided w ith a shift from a universalist to a Greek national emphasis, particularly in the top church hierarchy. G reek had always been the language o f the Patriarchate, but it had not been that o f the m ajority o f the Balkan churches. T h e Slavic churches, the Patriarchate o f Pec and the A rchbishopric o f O hrid, and the Rom anian institutions used prim arily C hurch Slavic. There was also an assumption that the Constantinople office represented O rthodox Christians in general and

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The eighteenth century certainly not Greeks in particular. T h is emphasis underwent a m ajor shift in the eighteenth century. T he m ost decided action taken was the abolition o f the organizations o f Pec in 1766 and O hrid in 1767. B oth institutions, which served Slavic peoples, were placed under an exarch appointed by the patri­ arch. T he results o f this m ove were to prove m ost dam aging to the cultural interests o f the Bulgarians. Their ecclesiastic and educational institutions were now Greek-dom inated. T he Serbs had an alternate religious center at Sremski K arlovci in the H absbu rg Monarchy. A G reek hierarchy also was in control in M oldavia and Wallachia. H ere Phanariot Greeks ran the political life o f the country. In the Balkans only the M ontenegrin church, under a hereditary prince-bishop, maintained a posi­ tion o f independence. A t the end o f the eighteenth century this organization had complete religious autonomy. H ow ever, the remoteness, backwardness, and poverty o f this area made it a matter o f little concern in the general O rthodox w orld. Th e center o f O rthodox prestige and pow er remained the Constantinople Patriarchate. A lthough it did not control the G eorgian or Russian churches, neither was a challenge to its position. T h e G eorgian in­ stitution was too weak, and Peter the Great abolished the Russian Patriarch­ ate. T h e Russian church and state w ere also regarded by the O rthodox as sources o f financial assistance and political support. A lthough there was much resistance within the church to the penetration o f the lay elements represented by the Phanariot interest, the outlook o f this grou p did profoundly influence the attitude o f the upper hierarchy o f the O rthodox church throughout the empire. D espite the fact that the Phanariots served and cooperated closely w ith the O ttom an governm ent, their aim w as not the welfare o r strengthening o f the empire. T he great Phanariot families felt themselves directly tied to the Byzantine E m pire.8 T h ey took great trouble in trying to discover o r fabricate genealogies that w ould link them to noble Byzantine dynasties. A lth ou gh these connections could sel­ dom be demonstrated w ithout fraud, individuals did adopt the names and titles o f their supposed ancestors. T h eir ultimate goal, an outlook that em ­ braced the entire O rthodox w orld, was nothing less than the recreation o f a triumphant Byzantine Empire, which they envisioned as a multinational state, governed by a Greek nobility, w ith Greek as the language o f governm ent. T h e O rthodox church was thus under the strong influence o f a class that intended to inherit the O ttom an Em pire and replace a M uslim w ith a Greek O rthodox regime. In the next century this concept was to be the basis o f the Megali Idea (Great Idea); it w ould play a m ajor role in shaping the G reek national outlook until 1922. Prom inent Phanariots, in particular those w h o became governors o f the D anubian Principalities, adopted what they re­ 8 See Cyril Mango, “The Phanariots and the Byzantine Tradition,” in Richard Clogg, ed., The Struggle far Greek Independence: Essays to Mark the isoth Anniversary o f the Greek War o f Independence (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1973), pp. 41- 66.

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Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule garded as Byzantine styles in their conduct of government and in the luxuri­ ous ordering of their lives. Phanariots looked to Russia, the only indepen­ dent Orthodox state, for assistance. Thus in the eighteenth century one national group, which had won wealth and high position, did assume a predominant position in the Orthodox mil­ let. This action was particularly significant because the church provided the sole means o f education for most Balkan Christians. The Greek imprint on ecclesiastical culture was not acceptable to most o f the non-Greek nationali­ ties. Among the first steps in the national movements of the Bulgarians, Serbs, and Romanians was the effort to throw off Greek influence and substitute their own national patterns. This reaction naturally affected the prestige of the Constantinople Patriarchate and limited its effectiveness in influencing all of the Balkan Orthodox people. National movements were to develop apart from, and sometimes in conflict with, the highest religious authority. Provincial government: village communities In the preceding sections the emphasis has been on the upper level of O tto­ man administration and on the corresponding Christian institutions. The Ottoman government also had a highly developed network of provincial gov­ ernment, which had a Christian counterpart in the village communities with their traditional organization. Many changes were made in the provincial institutions during the entire period of Ottoman rule; this matter will be discussed in greater detail in connection with specific historical issues. For the present it is sufficient to note that the Balkan peninsula, which was re­ garded as a single administrative unit, was divided into sections that were called at various times eyalets, vilayets, or pashaliks; these in turn had subor­ dinate jursidictions known as sanjaks or livas, which were further subdivided into kazas, then into nabiyes. The area was also organized into judicial dis­ tricts called kadiliks; treasury officials, defterdars, had a separate administra­ tive system. The local authorities worked in cooperation with the resident sipahis, who had definite duties and obligations. The provincial administra­ tion also controlled police forces. Janissaries, who were under the jurisdiction of the central and not the local government, were also supposed to perform police duties. The chief official at the local level, usually titled pasha, relied for advice on a council, a divan, in which Christian notables and guild offi­ cials might also sit. The vast majority o f Balkan Christians lived in the countryside in small villages organized on traditional and pre-Ottoman bases. Local variations will be discussed subsequently, but it is possible to make some wide general­ izations. The villages were usually run by officials known by various titles, according to the local language: archon, knez, chorbazhi, koca-ba$i, or hodzabashi, for example. Some were elected, according to local custom, by the male population of the village, usually from among the more prosperous or braver 57

The eighteenth century o f the men; others held office simply because they were members of a family or clan that traditionally held the position. They were assisted by, or they governed in cooperation with, the leading men of the community, whom we will refer to as notables or elders. Most communities were controlled by the leading notables. Great decisions, involving the life and fortunes o f the in­ habitants, were usually discussed by assemblies of all o f the male members of the group. Most villages also formed a part of a larger organization; repre­ sentatives from local communities met at a central location to discuss com­ mon problems. Village notables could form part of the local Ottoman offi­ cial’s council, or they could act as unofficial advisers on Christian affairs. The notables played certain essential roles in the Ottoman administration. Like the church officials they acted as intermediaries between the Ottoman government and the peasant. Their role in tax collecting and in the assess­ ment o f what each individual owed was particularly important. In return for their services, they received special privileges, for instance, exemption from the head tax. Over the years the notables won for themselves a generally bad reputation. The corruption o f the Ottoman system allowed many to profit at the expense o f those under their authority. Some held timars. Others gained wealth through the tax-farming system; that is, they held by agreement with the Ottoman government the right to collect taxes, and they fully exploited the opportunity to enrich themselves. The notable’s role in revenue collect­ ing, particularly where it was in kind, enabled him to influence the sale and distribution of local agricultural produce. He could use his advantage to en­ ter into trade in these commodities himself. He often lent money to the local peasants and thus won the traditional stigma attached to usurers in rural societies. Notables were also in a position to buy land, and they could come to control considerable estates. Their wealth naturally allowed them to live in a different manner from that of their poorer neighbors. Despite the many abuses, the local notables did provide Christian leader­ ship in the countryside. As the central government declined, their importance rose. They were to play a major role in the national movements of the next century. In provincial society they, together with the merchant and the guild members in the trading centers, formed a Christian elite that worked with its Ottoman counterparts. These people together made the Ottoman system work even at times when the centrd government was in disarray. At the bottom o f the social scale were, o f course, the peasants, who farmed the land and paid the taxes. They lived under a variety o f conditions. It must be first emphasized that in the eighteenth century the Balkan peninsula was covered by vast forests and great stretches of unused land. In the second half o f the century, war, banditry, and disease caused a depopulation of wide areas. The uncertain political situation, together with the existence o f more than adequate pastureland, caused the peasant in most areas to rely on animal husbandry as his main occupation. He raised cattle, sheep, and pigs. If local conditions became too bad or taxes were too high, peasant families could 58

Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule move. Serfdom was not prevalent; the Balkan peasant usually was not tied to the soil. Moreover, Ottoman authorities never were able to control the entire peninsula. There were always remote regions o f hill and mountain country where the central government could not reach the individual. For the peasant who earned his living tilling the soil, conditions could differ widely. As previously explained, the agricultural land was regarded as fundamentally belonging to the sultan, who held it from God. All land was divided into three categories: miri, or state land; miilk, or private property; and vakif, which belonged to religious foundations. The timar system rested naturally on miri land. Immediately after the Ottoman conquest, the position o f the peasant at least in theory was not bad. Although he had to make certain definite payments, he had important rights. He was regarded as a hereditary tenant or sharecropper, and he could pass on his land to his heirs. Moreover, he could usually farm his holding as he saw fit. There were often no controls on his methods or over what he chose to produce. He could also sell the right to work his plot or transfer it, as long as he obtained permission from the sipahi and found someone who would assume his obligations. The peas­ ant also held some possessions as private property, whether by law or by tradition. In the villages the houses, gardens, and some communal pasture and forest land qualified as such. Most timar land was devoted to the upkeep of the sipahi. Some estates, however, were preserved for the public treasury and used to compensate high state officials or to support members of the sultan’s family or household. The vakif land also became o f great significance. It was possible for an individual to assure personal salvation by giving property or money to a Muslim chari­ table foundation with the intention of having the income used for a pious purpose. Since the Ottoman state did not provide social services, these insti­ tutions supported hospitals, orphanages, and similar public services. Al­ though the grants were primarily intended for religious and charitable pur­ poses, they could also serve individual interests. The donor could arrange for the position of supervisor, or miitevdli, to be permanendy assigned to a mem­ ber of his family; sometimes the income from the property sufficed only for this person’s support. Christian churches enjoyed similar privileges through foundations supported by bequests from their members. The peasant whose land formed part o f a timar or a vakif was obviously closely dependent on the man who held formal control. This situation be­ came more apparent as the central government weakened and proved unable to enforce its edicts in the provinces. Most detrimental to the position o f the peasant was to be the gradual conversion of some timar land into estates, called chifiliks, which were in operation controlled as the private property of their holders. These arose through various processes. Often a sipahi was able to obtain what were in fact hereditary rights over his territory; sometimes a family or an individual would receive the right o f tax farming on a perma­ nent, hereditary basis. On these lands the individual peasant was subject to 59

The eighteenth century much heavier obligations than before. On the timar he had had certain defi­ nite rights; the state determined his obligations and regulated his relations with the sipahi. The new owners were not similarly controlled, and they had great influence in local government. Although most chiftliks were organized on a sharecrop basis, the peasant had to surrender a much greater proportion of his produce than on the timar. His supplementary payments in kind, money, or labor were higher. In many places he was reduced to the position o f an agricultural laborer. In reviewing the position of peasants in the Balkans in the eighteenth cen­ tury, it should be emphasized that there was no single uniform system in effect. It is extremely difficult to make wide generalizations because the ques­ tion has not been studied in detail. Different areas obviously underwent vary­ ing developments. However, as far as landholding is concerned, it can be safely said that some peasants lived on timar land. Their obligations de­ pended on the individual situation, but they were in a better position than their counterparts working on chiftlik estates, where payments and obliga­ tions were higher. For all peasants the question of the control o f the local government was essential. Where the sipahi or chiftlik holder dominated the authorities and the police, the peasant was clearly in a worse position. There were, however, also wide areas where villages paid nothing for the use of the land. Privileged areas and remote villages paid state taxes, when they could be collected, and little else. When conditions became too bad, the peasant had the alternative of fleeing to the mountains, over the border into a neigh­ boring state, or to a large city, such as Thessaloniki or Constantinople. Since the preceding discussion has applied principally to the Christians, a word should be said about the Muslims, whether of Turkish or Balkan na­ tional background. Muslims were, o f course, to be found in the towns as government officials, military men, or members o f guilds. In the countryside there were Muslim landowners and also peasant villagers. Obviously the si­ pahi or the chiftlik owner was in a strong position and was part of the ruling establishment. The peasant, in contrast, was usually not in a favorable situa­ tion. Some peasants were converts from the Balkan nationalities; others were Turkish colonists brought from Anatolia. Many of the Muslim villages held their land from the state as virtual private property. However, despite the fact that in theory the Muslims held a superior place in Ottoman society, the Muslim peasant, on the bottom of the social ladder, was often little better off than his Christian neighbor. Although excused from some taxes, he still paid a large proportion o f his income to the state, and he suffered equally from extortionate local officials and the deprivations o f warfare. He was also sub­ ject to recruitment into the army, which the Christian was spared. For all o f the citizens of the empire, the single major common complaint concerned the tax system. At issue were not only the amounts demanded, but the methods of collection. The question will be discussed throughout this volume, since it remained the major source of controversy and grievance until

60

Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule the fail o f the empire. As the Ottoman government became weaker and local revolt and national feelings grew stronger, resistance to tax payments to an unpopular regime naturally increased. The Christian inhabitant of the empire paid taxes to the state, to whoever held the land he worked, and to his church. The payments could be in kind, in money, or in labor dues. As far as state taxes were concerned, he paid one, the harag, a head tax, that was not levied on Muslims. This payment was regarded as a replacement for the obligation to serve in the army owed by the Muslim population. In addition to the regular taxes, the Christian could be assessed special amounts for particular purposes. Most burdensome once decline set in were the taxes extracted at time of war. We have seen that the Christian population had on the provincial level its own political organizations under local leaders. There were also Christian armed forces. When it early proved inexpedient or impossible to try to hold all o f the lands o f the Balkans with its own troops, the Ottoman government assigned either to villages or to groups of Christians the duty of garrisoning important points, such as bridges or passes, or of simply assuring peace and order in their districts. The Christian militia could be appointed by the local Muslim or Christian officials. Members, known usually as armatoles, received tax exemptions, land, or other payments. These men were armed and they were trained to fight. In practice, they proved difficult for the central govern­ ment to control. Despite its use of local militia, the Porte, especially during the period of decline, was unable to guarantee law and order throughout the Balkans. At all times certain areas were controlled by bands who defied state control. Individual voyagers and merchants had to travel in caravans protected by armed retainers, especially in the mountains. They particularly feared the bandits, known as klephts, haiduks, or haiduts, according to the local lan­ guage. These oudaws operated in bands o f up to a hundred men and often had the full cooperation o f the local inhabitants. In good weather they lived in the forests and hills; in winter they retreated to hide in friendly villages. Like the official militia, they were skilled in the use of firearms and in guerilla warfare. Often the link between bandit and armatole was close; they could interchange roles. Over the years the bandits came to enjoy a high reputation among the Christian peasantry, for some o f whom they became a symbol o f resistance to political and social repression. They in fact did offer an alternative to the individual who was under severe pressure from his landlord or the state. Although these men were treated as heroes in popular mythology, legend, and song, by the eighteenth century the armed outlaw had become a major problem throughout the Balkans. By that time a floating population o f mili­ tary men, both Christian and Muslim, inflicted continual terror on many Parts o f the countryside. Some of the bands were formed from deserters from the army or from men who had lost their lands and homes as the Ottoman

61

The eighteenth century forces retreated before the Habsburg and Russian attacks. These desperate men, along with the bandits, devastated defenseless villages. The failure to control these groups was another perfectly justified grievance o f the Chris­ tians against the Ottoman authorities, though the Muslim population, o f course, suffered equally. The city The major cities of the Balkan peninsula lay along the great military and trade routes to Europe. They were the administrative, military, and judicial centers for the Ottoman government.9 Here the same separation of people by na­ tionality and religion existed that has been seen in the countryside. The cities were divided into quarters, mahallas, each inhabited by a separate group o f the population. The national and religious composition could often contrast sharply with that of the countryside. The cities naturally held strong concen­ trations of the commercial people of the empire, the Jews, the Greeks, the Tsintsars, and the Armenians; the Muslim element, whether composed of administrators, military men, or holders of estates, usually preferred to live in urban centers. Within the city the activities of the artisans were strictly controlled through the guild system. These organizations could be Christian, Muslim, or mixed in membership. Like their equivalents in the West, their aim was to produce what was needed for the market and to assure a fair division of work and profit for the membership. They exerted a strict control over the price, qual­ ity, methods of production, and sources o f raw materials for their goods. Since their efforts were directed toward securing a stable market and a prod­ uct o f guaranteed quality, they tended to restrict the activities o f their mem­ bers and to oppose new methods. They were also under strong state super­ vision. At the head of the guilds stood the masters, followed by the journeymen and apprentices. In addition to their role in the production and distribution of goods, the organizations acted as charitable institutions for their members and cared for the sick, widows, and orphans. Most guilds, representing a conservative and traditional way of life, upheld a strict moral code. T H E W ARS OF TH E E IG H T E E N T H C E N T U R Y

During the eighteenth century the fate o f the Christian people was deter­ mined not only by the political and social structure of which they formed a part, but by the constant wars that ravaged a large part o f the Balkan lands. During this period the military weakness o f the empire was demonstrated by repeated defeats; the state was on the defensive in relation to the European great powers (see Map n). The Ottoman disasters had an extremely detri9

For the Ottoman city see Sugar, Southeastern Europe, p p. 72- 92.

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6? Map 11 Ottoman territorial losses, 1683-1815

The eighteenth century mental effect on the Balkan lands. The great battles took place deep within the peninsula. Balkan cities and villages were destroyed; populations were scattered. War taxes and army requisitions further impoverished the coun­ tryside. Before the end o f the seventeenth century the Ottoman Empire had been in the advantageous position o f seeing its potential opponents divided. Be­ ginning with the reign o f Francis I, the French government had attempted to bring the Porte into its system of alliances. Along with Sweden and Po­ land, the empire was to form a part o f the Eastern Barrier that France wished to use first against the Habsburg Empire and then against Russia. The rivalry between France and the Habsburg Empire was to prove of benefit right up to the eighteenth century. The great issues of the Reformation, the CounterReformation, and the Thirty Years’ War similarly distracted the European states. Although Ottoman military power in fact commenced to decline after the reign o f Suleiman the Magnificent, the rivalries among the European great powers made it impossible for them to organize a new crusade of Chris­ tian states. Because of this situation the Ottoman Empire was able to continue to make some territorial conquests. Two Venetian possessions, Cyprus and Crete, were taken in 1573 and 1669. Podolia was gained from Poland in 1676; this acquisition marked the furthest extension northward of Ottoman penetra­ tion, but also the beginning o f what was to be a bitter struggle for control o f the land north of the Black Sea. The Ottoman successes were largely due to the wise policies o f the one able sultan of the century, Murad IV (16231646), and of the Kopriilu family o f grand vezirs. The first, Mehmed (16561661), concentrated on internal reform; his son, Ahmed (1661-1678), recom­ menced a strong military program with the emphasis on Transylvania and the Ukraine. In 1678 Kara Mustafa Pasha, the brother-in-law of Ahmed, became grand vezir. His great ambition was to inflict a decisive defeat on the major Ottoman opponent, the Habsburg Empire. In 1683, with an army of ninety thousand, o f whom perhaps fifteen to twenty thousand were effective troops, he arrived before Vienna, which remained under siege from July to Septem­ ber. Faced by this formidable threat, the Austrian military commander, Charles of Lorraine, withdrew from the city and left it to be defended by a force of under twenty thousand. The siege was lifted in September by an allied force commanded by Charles and King John Sobieski of Poland. The sultan had Kara Mustafa strangled for his failure, and the empire thus lost its most able military commander. Encouraged by the victory, the Ottoman opponents banded together in a new Holy League, composed of Austria, the papacy, Venice, and Poland, to be joined later by Russia. Assaults were then launched on the major periph­ eral Ottoman military centers. Buda, the capital o f Ottoman Hungary, fell in 1686; Belgrade was taken in 1688. Venice enjoyed similar victories; a campaign was undertaken in the Peloponnesus, and Athens was occupied in 1687. The 64

Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule forward movement o f the Western allies, however, was soon halted. A new Koprulii vczir, Mustafa, came to office in 1689 under Sultan Suleiman III (1687-1691). The War of the League of Augsburg with France forced Austria to withdraw troops to that front. In a counteroffensive of 1690 the Ottoman army was able to drive back the Habsburg army. In 1697, by which time Russia had joined the allies, the situation was again reversed. The end of the war in Western Europe released the imperial forces, who under the command of their brilliant general, Eugene of Savoy, were able to inflict a devastating defeat on their enemy at Senta. Faced with disaster, the Porte was forced to make peace. The Treaty o f Karlowitz of 1699, concluded with Austria, Venice, and Poland, marks a watershed in Ottoman history and is one of the major peace treaties of modern European history. In this agreement, for the first time, the Ottoman Empire ceded territory permanently to Christian powers. The peace was negotiated through British and Dutch mediation and involved much disagreement among the allies. The Habsburg Empire was most inter­ ested in ending the fighting, and it received the principal gains. In the treaty Austria annexed extensive and valuable territories: Transylvania and sections of Hungary, Croatia, and Slavonia that had been under Ottoman control. Venice took the Peloponnesus and most of Dalmatia, and Poland regained Podolia. In the agreement the Habsburg Empire secured important commercial and religious clauses, which were reconfirmed in later pacts. Article XIV stated: “Let there be free commerce for the subjects o f both parties according to earlier sacred treaties in all realms and subject territories of the emperors, so that it may be carried on in useful fashion without fraud and deceit for both parties.” Commercial relations were in fact to increase steadily throughout the next century. The provision in favor o f the Catholic religion, contained in article XIII, stated that the sultan reconfirmed previous privileges so that the adherents o f the aforementioned religion can restore and repair their churches and may carry on the customary rituals which have come down from earlier times. And let no one be permitted to establish any kind o f vexation or monetary demand on the religious people of any order or condition, against the sacred treaties and against the divine laws, to hinder the practice o f that religion, but rather let the adherents of it flourish and rejoice in the customary imperial sense o f duty.10 Russia, who had not joined in these negotiations, made a separate peace m 1700. The terms included the Russian acquisition of the port of Azov,

10

T h e text o f th e T reaty o f K arlow itz is in F red L. Israel, ed., M ajor Peace Treaties o fModem History, 164S -1967 (N ew York: C helsea H o u se, 1967), l i , 869- 882.

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The eighteenth century which had been taken in 1696, and the right to send a resident Russian min­ ister to Constantinople. The Treaty o f Karlowitz was a major Habsburg victory; it marked the climax o f the monarchy’s successful resistance to the repeated Ottoman at­ tacks o f the past century. Although some changes were to be made in the Austrian—Ottoman boundary, this frontier was to remain relatively stable un­ til 1878. Only two permanent changes occurred. Austria took the Banat o f Temesvar (Timi§oara) in 1718 and the province o f Bukovina in 1775. Neverthe­ less, in the course o f the next century the Habsburg Empire was to fight three major wars with the Porte. The initiative for these actions, however, would lie more often in St. Petersburg than in Vienna. T he O ttom an Em pire at this point found itself perpetually on the defensive on the battlefields. In foreign affairs the m ost significant developm ent was the em ergence o f a new strong adversary. A s we have seen, in the past the ch ief opponent had been the H absburg Em pire; France had been a supporter and an ally. In 1682 Peter the Great ascended the Russian throne at the age o f ten. H e first ruled in conjunction w ith his h alf brother, but in 1696, at the latter’s death, Peter was free to em bark upon active policies. H e joined the H o ly League and launched an attack on A zov. A lthough he was involved in cam paigns against the O ttom an Em pire, his principal attention was directed tow ard the Baltic and against Sweden. H e made peace in 1700 so that he could join in a coalition w ith Poland, Saxony, and D enm ark to attack Sw e­ den, which was ruled by the young king Charles X II. A fter being defeated decisively at N arva in N ovem ber 1700, Peter turned to strengthening his m il­ itary forces and reform ing his state. In 1709 Charles XII, in alliance with the Ukrainian forces o f Mazeppa,

commenced an invasion o f Russia, which was halted at Poltava in July. After their crushing defeat, Charles and Mazeppa fled to Constantinople, where they intrigued to draw the Porte into war against Russia. Their efforts were aided by France and also by the leaders o f the Crimean Tartars, who feared Russian encroachment on their lands north o f the Black Sea and the Crimea. In 1710 the Ottoman Empire did declare war on Russia. In the same year Peter embarked upon an ambitious Balkan campaign. F or the first time in the m odern era Russian armies crossed into Balkan lands and advanced as far as Ia§i (Jassy). Peter then called upon the Balkan Christians to rise in aid o f his army. This appeal to the subject population was a new w eapon fo r Russia, although the H absbu rg M onarchy had used it during the invasion o f Serbian lands. T he policy was not a success. A lthough there was som e local action in southern H ercegovina and M ontenegro, there was cer­ tainly no mass uprising o f O rthodox peasants. In the D anubian Principali­ ties, the M oldavian hospodar (governor), Dim itrie Cantem ir, joined Peter, but Constantine Brincoveanu in Wallachia refused to act. In Ju ly 1711 Peter and his arm y were surrounded on the Pruth River. In an impossible m ilitary po ­ sition, the tsar signed a treaty surrendering A zov, which he had only recently

66

67 Map of the Balkans by Herman Moll, 1717

The eighteenth century acquired. Later controversy was to arise over the question w hether the O t­ toman government should not have used the opportunity to gain much more. It perhaps could even have destroyed the Russian army and taken Peter pris­ oner. Certainly the O ttom an Em pire was never again to have a similar o p ­ portunity o r to w in such a victory over Russia. H avin g defeated Russia, the Porte next turned to deal w ith Venice. In 1715 an army was sent to the Peloponnesus and attacks were made on the Ionian Islands and Dalmatia. In the G reek lands the O ttom an troops were w elcom ed by the local population, where the Venetian attempts to w in converts to C a ­ tholicism had aroused much enmity. In 1716 the H absbu rg Em pire joined Venice. Prince Eugene o f Savoy, again back from w ar against France, dem ­ onstrated his great military talents in another sweep through the Balkans. T h e Treaty o f Passarow itz o f 1718 gave the m onarchy new gains; A ustria ac­ quired the Banat o f Temesvar, northern Serbia including Belgrade, and Oltenia (Wallachia west o f the river O lt). T he O ttom an E m pire kept the P elo ­ ponnesus, but Venice retained the Ionian Islands and Dalm atia. B y 1736 all sides were ready to renew the contest. T he O ttom an E m pire had just fought an unsuccessful w ar w ith Persia, but the Porte was concerned about concurrent developments in Poland, w hich threatened to fall under Russian control. T he French governm ent, w ith similar apprehensions, also pressed for action. War began between the em pire and Russia in 1736; A ustria joined the next year. A gain a Russian offensive action was undertaken in M oldavia, this time under the leadership o f General M iinnich. A ppeals were addressed once m ore to the Christian people. T he Russian armies took A zo v and reached as far as Ia§i in the Principalities. Sim ilar successes w ere not, however, achieved by the H absburg forces. T he H ab sbu rg governm ent, alarmed at Russia’s progress, which could lead it to disproportionate gains, insisted upon peace. In the Treaty o f Belgrade o f 1739 the m onarchy surren­ dered m ost o f the acquisitions o f Passarowitz; the O ttom an Em pire thus regained northern Serbia and O ltenia, although the Banat had passed per­ manently to Austrian control. Forced to make peace also, R ussia received A zo v and certain com mercial privileges in the Black Sea. A lth ou gh another unsuccessful w ar w ith Persia was fought from 1743 to 1746, the O ttom an Em pire was to enjoy almost thirty years o f uninterrupted peace in its relations w ith Europe. T he War o f Austrian Succession (17 4 0 1748) and the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763) absorbed the European energies. A t this time European politics were dom inated by the figures o f three ener­ getic rulers, Frederick the G reat o f Prussia, M aria Theresa o f A ustria and Catherine the G reat o f Russia. O ttom an interests came into conflict chiefly w ith those o f the am bitious and aggressive Russian empress. T h e true heir o f Peter the Great, Catherine embarked on large-scale plans to extend the Russian boundaries southward, to include the Black Sea coast and the C ri­ mea, and westw ard into Polish lands. T he interests o f the O ttom an vassals,

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Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule the C rim ean Tartars, w ere thus directly menaced, as were those o f Poland, a state that both the Porte and France wished to maintain. Russian and Prussian interference in Polish internal affairs resulted in the form ation o f the Confederation o f Bar, an association o f Polish nobles w h o led an uprising against the outside control. Russian troops in pursuit o f a group o f rebels crossed the O ttom an frontier and burned a tow n. U rged on by France and the C rim ean Tartars, the O ttom an Em pire declared w ar on Russia in 1768. T he Porte was Soon faced w ith an enemy offensive on tw o fronts. A Russian fleet was sent from the Baltic to the eastern M editerranean, with the aim o f destroying the Turkish naval forces and starting a revolt in Greece. T h e first objective was soon reached. T he Russian fleet under the com m and o f Adm iral Alexis O rlov successfully engaged the O ttom an navy near the island o f C hios and forced it to take shelter in the harbor o f Chesme. A fire ship sent into this port destroyed the fleet. T h e attempt to start a m ajor rebellion in Greece, however, failed. In 1770 Albanian troops crushed the revolt that had broken out. A t the same time a Russian army again advanced into the Principalities and took the O ttom an fortresses o f K ilia, Akkerm an, Ismail, Bender, and Braila. These Russian victories frightened the other E u ­ ropean pow ers, w h o feared a com plete upset o f the balance o f power. F red­ erick the G reat thus pressed for a moderate peace w ith the O ttom an Em pire, to be accom panied by a partition o f Poland. The Treaty o f Kuchuk Kainarji (K iiciik Kajnarca), signed in Ju ly 1774, was the equivalent fo r R ussia o f the Treaty o f K arlow itz for Austria. It was a major military and diplomatic disaster for the Ottoman Empire, since it marked a com plete change in the pow er balance in the Black Sea region. R ussia ac­ quired territory form erly belonging to the Khanate o f the Crim ea, including the fortresses o f K erch and Yenikale, and an area along the Black Sea between the B u g and D nieper rivers. T h e Khanate was declared independent, a status that left it open to Russian penetration and eventual annexation. Russia was also granted extensive commercial privileges - m ost im portant, the right o f free navigation for its merchant ships on the Black Sea and through the Straits. The Black Sea, w hich had previously been a closed O ttom an lake, was open thereafter to the great northern power. Russia, in addition, received the right to appoint consuls in O ttom an cities and to enjoy the same com mercial priv­ ileges as had been granted previously to Britain and France. T he Porte was also required to pay an indemnity.

For the future the most important provisions were to be those establishing what was to become a Russian foothold inside the empire. First, although Russian troops were evacuated from the Principalities, the Ottoman govern­ ment gave formal political and religious guarantees to the population, and Russia was expressly allowed the right to intervene with the Porte in their behalf. Second, in two articles o f the agreement the Porte gave assurances that were interpreted later by Russian diplomats as giving them the right to

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The eighteenth century speak in b eh alf o f the O rthodox Christian population o f the entire empire. A rticle X IV allowed R ussia to build in Constantinople “ a public church o f the G reek ritual, which shall always be under the protection o f the M inisters o f that Em pire, and secure from all coercion and outrage.” Article V I I , the m ost controversial, declared: T h e Sublim e Porte promises to protect constandy the Christian re­ ligion and its churches, and it also allows the M inisters o f the Im ­ perial C o u rt o f Russia to make, upon all occasions, representations, as well in favor o f the new church at Constantinople, o f which m en­ tion w ill be m ade in Article XIV, as on behalf o f its officiating m in­ isters, prom ising to take such representations into due considera­ tion, as being made by a confidential functionary o f a neighboring and sincerely friendly pow er.11 B efore the signing o f this agreement, in A ugust 1772, Russia, A ustria, and Prussia participated in the first partition o f Poland, a state that had previously been a m ajor power. In 1774 Austria occupied the M oldavian province o f B ukovina, claim ing it as a reward fo r having aided in the achievement o f peace. U nable to resist this annexation, the Porte ceded the area form ally in 1775. D espite the gains in the Treaty o f Kuchuk K ainarji, Catherine had w ider plans em bracing nothing less than the destruction o f the O ttom an Em pire and the partition o f its European territories between Russia and Austria. H er m ost am bitious scheme was the so-called G reek Project, which involved the breakup o f the em pire and the restoration o f a revived Byzantine Em pire, w ith the capital at Constantinople and under Russian protection. T h e em­ press had her second grandson named Constantine w ith this dream in view. O bviously, such a large undertaking could not be accom plished alone, and neither Frederick nor M aria Theresa could be expected to be sympathetic. H ow ever, in 1780, at the death o f his mother, Joseph II ascended the Austrian throne. Weaker than M aria Theresa in dealing w ith Catherine, he allowed h im self to be drawn into the empress’s plans. In a series o f letters and in conversations during a visit made by Joseph to Russia, the partition o f the O ttom an Em pire was arranged. In the division Russia was to obtain the C rim ea, lands along the Black Sea to the Dniester R iver, and territory in the Caucasus. Austria was to receive O ltenia, part o f Serbia, Bosnia, H ercego­ vina, Istria, and Dalm atia. F o r her surrender o f these last tw o places, Venice was to be com pensated by the acquisition o f the Peloponnesus, C rete, and C ypru s, territories that she had once held. France w ould be allowed Syria and E gyp t. T he rem aining O ttom an territory in Europe was to be form ed n

T h e text o f th e Treaty o f K uchuk K ainarji m ay be fo u n d in T hom as E rskine H o llan d , A Lecture on the Treaty Relations o fRussia and Turkey from 1774-1853 (L o n d o n : M acm illan, 1877), PP· 36- 55·

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Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule into two states, both o f which would be under Russian control. The first, composed o f Moldavia and Wallachia, was to become the independent nation o f Dacia and to be ruled by a Russian prince. The second, a revived GreekByzantine Empire, would embrace Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Greece. Con­ stantine would rule, but his throne was never to be united with that o f Rus­ sia. This arrangement, which gave the major advantages to Russia, was only the first in a series o f schemes that the great powers were to discuss among themselves for the partition o f Ottoman territories. For states that were in the process o f dividing Poland, such a program appeared logical. With assurances o f support in Vienna, Catherine proceeded to move against her initial goal, the Crim ea. T he Russian governm ent first supported a pre­ tender to the throne; after he gained pow er and the population arose against this outside interference, Russian troops were ordered to march in on the pretext o f “ restoring order.” The territory was then annexed. The Porte, which had no practical alternative except acquiescence, agreed in 1783, since the O t­ toman governm ent could not resist Russia alone. Its single foreign supporter, France, was involved in a conflict w ith Britain in connection w ith the A m er­ ican War o f Independence. French leaders were also becom ing less enthusias­ tic about the O ttom an connection.

Once in possession o f the Black Sea and Crimean lands, Catherine and her ministers, in particular her favorite, Gregory Potemkin, launched a major effort to colonize and develop the newly acquired areas. Russian and German settlers were brought in; efforts were made to encourage the commercial development o f the region. Kherson was built up as a naval base, and the foundations were laid for a Black Sea fleet. These developments deeply af­ fected the military balance not only in the Black Sea area, but also in the Balkan peninsula. With a firm hold on the Black Sea coast and with control of the major port cities, the Russian fleet was only two to two and a half days sailing time from Constantinople. The Russian ability to transport by sea an expeditionary force whose aim was the conquest o f that capital was recog­ nized and feared by the other powers. Despite the Ottoman military weakness, war could not be avoided. Russia continued to press forward in the Caucasus. Problems were also encountered in the Principalities; in 1786 the Porte deposed a hospodar in violation o f previous agreements. In 1787 the Ottoman Empire declared war on Russia; Austria joined its ally the next year. The Russian war aims were the conquest o f the fortresses o f Ochakov and Akkerman and the establishment o f an in­ dependent Dacian state that would serve as a buffer to protect the new Black Sea territories. At first, the Ottoman armies made advances. Russia was dis­ tracted by a concurrent war with Sweden, and the Austrian armies also suf­ fered defeats. The situation was then reversed. Russian armies again entered the Principalities, and there the great Russian general Alexander Suvorov Won impressive victories. Austrian troops advanced in Bosnia and Serbia. The Ottoman Empire was to be immensely aided by the problems that 71

The eighteenth century Joseph II was having in internal affairs and by the basic distrust between Austria and Russia. In 1790 Joseph died and was succeeded by the far more cautious Leopold II. Faced with a rising in the Netherlands and fearing what Prussia would do, the new emperor made a separate peace, the Treaty o f Sistova, on the basis o f the restoration o f the status quo before the war. In an additional agreement, Austria also received some territory to be added to the Banat. The Austrian withdrawal was naturally a blow to Russia, whose armies were win­ ning victories. Revolts had also broken out in Greece, and the Ottoman Empire was without allies. Other matters, however, had to be taken into consideration. In 1789 the revolution commenced in France; the international situation was not clear. Russia thus in 1792 concluded with the Porte the Treaty o f Jassy. Catherine obtained Ochakov and territory to the Dniester River, but the Prin­ cipalities were again returned to Ottoman rule. In 1793 and 1795 Russia joined with her neighbors in the final partitions o f Poland. By the last decade o f the eighteenth century it was clear that Russia was the predominant European power in the Near East and the principal threat to Ottoman survival. Austria had cooperated in Russian ventures, but its leaders, like Prussia’s, feared a rapid Russian advance. The single state that had shown support for the Ottoman government had been France, but that power had never sent military forces to the area. Although concerned about the mainte­ nance o f the Eastern Barrier states, the French government had not been able to prevent the division o f Poland, the defeat o f Sweden, or the continual Russian and Habsburg victories over the Porte. The French attitude determined at first the position o f a power about whom little has yet been said —Great Britain. Principally concerned with its world­ wide colonial contest with France, Britain tended to support its rival’s adver­ saries, including Russia, which was seen also as a valuable trading partner. When the Russian Baltic fleet sailed to the Mediterranean in 1769 it took on supplies at British ports, and British officers, notably Lord Elphinstone, ac­ companied the expedition. However, in the 1770s British opinion began to shift. Catherine’s policy o f armed neutrality during the American War o f In­ dependence was against British interests. Moreover, like Prussia, Britain saw the dangers o f too great an increase o f Russian power. The stage was thus set for a shift in alliances that would ultimately make Britain the chief supporter o f the Ottoman Empire against Russian pressure.

B ALK AN PEO PLE U N D E R O TTO M AN R U LE

The questions discussed in the preceding sections affected all o f the Balkan people: the Ottoman government, the Christian ecclesiastical and local admin­ istration, and the great wars o f the century. It is next necessary to examine in greater detail events in the lands inhabited by the Christian people under direct Ottoman rule: the Greeks, Albanians, Montenegrins, Serbs, and Bulgarians. 72

Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule H ere the general conditions in the areas are considered, as well as the specific effects o f the lessening o f O ttom an authority and the disastrous wars.

The Greeks As w e have seen, by the eighteenth century the most favorable position among the Christians was held by the Greeks, in particular by the merchants and those w h o w orked w ith the O ttom an governm ent. H ow ever, the peasant population o f Greece proper also had w ide rights o f self-administration. A l­ though a G reek population was to be found scattered throughout the empire, the concentration was in the islands o f the A egean, in the Peloponnesus, in Thessaly, and in Rum eli. Greeks also lived in large numbers in Thrace, E p i­ rus, and M acedonia. A n area w ith only a small percentage o f arable land, m ost o f continental Greece was not farmed. Because the land was unsuitable for widespread chiftlik agriculture, these estates were concentrated in certain areas, especially in Thessaly and the Peloponnesus. T he inhospitable hill and mountain land was better fo r animal husbandry, particularly for the raising o f sheep and goats. T h e go o d agricultural lands were generally part o f an estate belonging to a chiftlik, a religious foundation, or members o f the sul­ tan’s household. In the hill and mountain country agricultural land could be held in w hat amounted to private property by the cultivators.

Since the Ottoman government did not attempt to control closely areas remote from the major cities and lines o f communication, the villages o f herdsmen and small farmers in the mountains o f continental Greece usually were allowed to run their own affairs as long as they paid their taxes. Some regions, such as Mani in the Peloponnesus, Suli in Epirus, and Agrapha in the Pindus, were in practice almost independent in relation to the central authority. Other areas were granted special privileges in return for services, such as securing a pass or guarding and maintaining a bridge. The people received tax benefits, and they had the right to bear arms. In the rest o f mainland Greece and the islands a vigorous system o f local self-governm ent had developed. Since the O ttom an governm ent preferred to deal w ith organized Christian groups and not directly w ith individuals, these local systems, w hich predated the O ttom an conquest, had been supported and encouraged. A netw ork o f com munal governm ent thus paralleled the O ttom an administrative fram ework. These institutions took the responsibil­ ity fo r the assessment and collection o f taxes, and they assumed regular police duties. T h e villages w ere usually under the direction o f local notables, chosen from am ong the prom inent men. T he m ost complete system was developed in the Peloponnesus after the Venetian expulsion in 1715. H ere the elders o f each village form ed a council to decide local problem s; they also sent repre­ sentatives to the vilayet council. In turn, this body chose delegates to meet w ith representatives o f other vilayets in the Peloponnesian senate, w here mat­ ters o f administration and taxation were discussed. Two members o f this group,

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74 The Acropolis of Athens with Ottoman cavalry

Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule together w ith tw o M uslim s, form ed the permanent council o f the vezir o f the Peloponnesus. T he Greeks o f the area also had the important privilege o f sending tw o representatives to Constantinople, where they could complain direcdy to the Porte, over the heads o f the local administrators, about con­ ditions o r about arbitrary acts o f the authorities. Communal government in Greece was conservative and traditional. It formed a support to O ttom an administration, and it paralleled in spirit and aim the ecclesiastical system. T he ch ief pow er was in the hands o f local notables, called archons, w h o were also the Christian large landowners or tax farmers. Th ey dom inated the assemblies and the Peloponnesian senate. Secure in their privileges, they did not challenge O ttom an rule. A s a group, they w ere to be severely criticized. Frequently unscrupulous and bent on profiting from the system, they often appeared in the role o f the oppressors o f the poorer and weaker members o f their ow n society. F ar from united as a class, they split into fam ily factions that fought for econom ic and political advantage. This division am ong the m ore pow erful families and their bitter feuds became clearly apparent in the G reek revolution o f the 1820s. T he G reek islands were in an even m ore favorable position. Since they were usually held by members o f the O ttom an royal family, they were under the control o f the kapudan-pasba, the grand admiral o f the O ttom an fleet. B y the eighteenth century their actual administration was in the hands o f the dragom an o f the fleet, w h o, as w e have seen, was a Phanariot Greek. In return for certain services, such as supplying sailors for the O ttom an navy, the islanders were freed from some taxes, and they governed themselves. N o ­ tables, chosen by popular assemblies, dom inated the political structure as they did on the mainland. T he com m unal system had an important judicial as well as political func­ tion. T h e local officials together w ith the church offered a preferred alterna­ tive to the O ttom an kadi. T he Greek authorities based their decisions on Rom an law, the principal source being the H exabilis o f Constantine Arm enopoulos o f the fourteenth century. O ver the years, however, m ore reliance began to be placed on custom ary or com m on law. T h e G reek com m unal organization, like that in other parts o f the Balkans, was extremely im portant for the preservation o f local separateness. T h e local governm ent did not becom e a center o f resistance to O ttom an rule, but it did protect the individual G reek from absorption into a larger unit. It also shielded the individual in w hat was a lawless and violent environm ent, par­ ticularly w hen the central governm ent broke dow n. Then the local authori­ ties with their armed auxiliaries could protect the average citizen. The Greeks, a seagoing people, also suffered from the dangerous conditions on the sur­ rounding waters. T h rou ghou t the O ttom an era the population o f the islands and the coastal towns faced threats from M uslim and enemy attacks and from the depredations o f pirates. Life was often unsafe near the seashores fo r the peasant population. Just as, in the mountains, the relationship between klepht

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The eighteenth century and armatole was often close, so the pirate was often interchangeable with the sailor, the fisherman, and the commercial shipper. Because o f the mountainous and inaccessible nature o f much o f the Greek mainland, the Christian armed forces always played an important role in local life. In order to control these areas and to combat the klephts, the Ottoman government organized the remote districts into armatoliL· , or kapitanates. Armatole bands were given jurisdiction over a definite assembly o f villages and the responsibility for maintaining law and order and for collecting taxes. They were paid by the district that they were supposed to protect. The lead­ ers were known as kapitanios, their followers as pallikaria. The position o f captain could be hereditary in a family, or he could be chosen by the village elders. Although recognized and authorized by the Porte, these bands were closely attached to their areas. There were also police, kapoi, hired by the local government or the notables. The activities o f the armatoles were greatly ad­ mired, and they did indeed act as a protection in times o f disorder. The klephts, whom the armatoles were supposed to be opposing, won even greater fame. Operating in bands o f about forty or fifty, they gained the romantic reputation o f embodying all the ideals that this mountain society admired. They were known for their “ extraordinary imperviousness to fa­ tigue, hunger and thirst” ; they were extremely strong and believed to be great athletes. Their shooting ability was legendary. They specialized in guerilla warfare and “in ambushing enemies in the dark.” 12 The intense admiration that their activities aroused is reflected in modern Greek historical writing: When captured, they displayed great stoicism in the hands o f Turk­ ish torturers. It was a question o f honor with them to endure all suffering in silence. There is not a single known case o f a klepht whose courage failed him or who surrendered his faith in order to save himself from death by torture. The prospect o f such a lingering death made them salute their fellows with the words “May the bullet be sure!” I f a klepht was so badly wounded that he could not be saved, he implored his comrades - and the request was always hon­ ored as though it were sacrosanct - to cut off his head and take it with them so that the enemy could not impale it on a spike and subsequently parade it through the towns and villages.13 The Greeks and other inhabitants o f the Balkans found that the wars in­ volving the European powers had a deep effect on their own development. Prior to the eighteenth century the influence o f Venice, which held Crete, 12

13

A p o sto lo s E. V acalopoulos, The Greek Nation, 1453-1669: The Cultural and Economic Back­ ground o fModem Greek Society, trans. Ian M oles and P hania M oles (N ew B runsw ick, N .J.: R u tg ers U n iversity Press, 1976), p. 222. Vacalopoulos, The Greek Nation , p. 222.

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Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule Cyprus, and points in the Peloponnesus and in the islands, had been most directly felt in the Greek lands. During the seventeenth century, however, its power began to wane. Fighting raged over Crete from 1645 to 1669, resulting in the loss o f the island to the Ottoman Empire. This extended conflict drained the resources o f the merchant city and marked its decline as a Mediterranean power. Despite the fact that Venetian rule represented a European and a Christian control, it did not win the support o f the Greek population. The friction was chiefly due to religious conflict. Unlike the Islamic, the Catholic faith was militant and it did seek converts. As we have seen, the chief enemy o f the Patriarchate was Catholicism, largely because the main danger to the Orthodox establishment lay in this direction. The principle that “the turban o f the prophet is preferable to the cardinal’s hat” was to dominate GreekVenetian relations. In addition, Venetian administration, more efficient than the Ottoman, proved more effective in the collection o f taxes and allowed less participation in government by the local Greek population. Venetian merchants were also in competition with Greeks. Although many Greeks did indeed cooperate with the Venetians against Ottoman rule, in the long run little regret was felt when they lost their strongholds in Greek lands. At the end o f the seventeenth century Venetian power in the Aegean had one final period o f upsurge. After the formation o f the Holy League, the main Ottoman forces were drawn into the northern Balkans to defend the empire against the chief threat, the Habsburg Empire. Venetian forces under Francesco Morosini used the opportunity to launch an expedition in the Pel­ oponnesus. With local support they were able to establish a firm position and to advance as far as Athens in 1687. While attacking the Turkish positions there, they shelled the Parthenon, the most noble monument o f the Greek classical past. Although Venetian possession o f the Peloponnesus was con­ firmed in the Treaty o f Karlowitz, this acquisition could not be held long. By this time Venice did not have the resources to maintain a great empire. Since it was expensive to fortify, defend, and administer the new territory, the Vene­ tian authorities attempted to raise taxes and to conscript local labor for civil needs and to build fortifications. These actions proved most unpopular. The presence o f foreign soldiers and the strong proselytizing activities o f the Catholic church caused further deep antagonism. In 1714, when Turkish troops again appeared, they met little resistance among the local population, who apparendy preferred a reestablishment o f the former regime. In the Treaty o f Passarowitz the area was returned to the Ottoman Empire; Venice was re­ duced to holding the Dalmatian coast and the Ionian Islands, which still left her the strongest power in the Adriatic. Once again in possession o f the area, the Ottoman government made an effort to improve conditions in the Pelo­ ponnesus and to attract new settlers. As we have seen, Greek local govern­ ment again assumed great significance. Although the Ottoman Empire was at war with Austria and Russia in the 1730s, the hostilities did not extend into the Greek lands. Naturally, during

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The eighteenth century the long period o f peace follow ing the Treaty o f Belgrade o f 1739, interna­ tional problem s did not involve the area. H ow ever, beginning in the 1760s another external factor began increasingly to influence the G reek position. A t this time the Russian interest in the O rthodox church and in general Greek affairs was extended to the mainland. In preparation for w ar w ith the O ttom an Em pire, agents from the Russian governm ent were sent into G reek territory to attempt to prom ote an uprising to back the Russian military actions to the north. A G reek captain o f the artillery, G rigorios Papadopoulos, was dispatched to M ani, and the organization o f a G reek revolt was placed in the hands o f the brothers G regory and Alexis O rlov. T h e Russian agents were indeed able to interest some notables in their enterprise; they received promises o f men and supplies. H ow ever, in return the G reek partisans expected massive Russian assistance - som ething like ten thousand troops and extensive military equipment. W hen in 1769 a Russian expedition did indeed arrive, the Greeks were profoundly disappointed to find that it consisted o f four ships, a few hundred soldiers, and entirely in­ adequate supplies o f arms and ammunition. D espite the fact that no great G reek uprising occurred and the Russian contribution was totally insuffi­ cient, G reek and Russian forces did attempt a cam paign; N avarino was taken in A p ril 1770. T he O ttom an governm ent, pressed by the necessity o f fighting a major war on its northern boundary, called in Albanian troops, w h o crushed the expedition at Tripolitza (Tripolis). D uring the campaign the Christian forces had massacred M uslim civilians and destroyed their property; the A l­ banians now took a fearful revenge. T h e dam age was so extensive and the troops so out o f control that in 1779 the Porte finally had to send a Turkish force to suppress the Albanians. The first Greek-Russian endeavor thus proved a total disaster and brought considerable suffering to G reek lands. A lth ou gh the Peloponnesian undertaking failed, Russia’s victories in the Principalities and in the eastern M editerranean allowed that governm ent to im pose a m ajor peace. In the clauses affecting the A rchipelago, the Treaty o f Kuchuk Kainarji required the Porte to grant a general amnesty and tax relief and to allow the em igration o f those w ho wished. In addition the treaty stated “ that the Christian religion shall not be exposed to the least oppression any m ore than its churches, and that no obstacle shall be opposed to the erection o r repair o f them; and also that the officiating ministers shall neither be oppressed nor insulted.” 14 In the later Treaty o f A inali K avak o f 1779 the Porte agreed to make payment for G reek lands that had been confiscated during the war. Interest in Greece continued to m ount in Russia after the war, despite the failure in the Peloponnesus. Catherine’s Greek Project was no secret. Such plans were discussed in diplom atic circles. Russian agents continued to cir­ culate in Greece, and G reek students were brought to Russia for their edu1+

Q u o te d in H o llan d , Treaty Relations o fRussia and Turkey, p. 47·

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79 Castle of Parga

The eighteenth century cation. When war with the Porte broke out again in 1787, Russian manifestos calling again for Christian rebellion were distributed. Thoroughly discour­ aged by the failure o f the previous action, most Greeks did not move. How­ ever, the Christian Albanians o f remote Suli took advantage o f the situation. They were later defeated by the pasha o f Janina (Ioannina), Ali, in an early episode in the career o f that remarkable adventurer. Not only did the Chris­ tian people not respond to the Russian appeal, but it was not even found possible, as it had been in the previous war, to launch a Russian naval action in the Mediterranean. The declaration o f war by Sweden in 1788 confined the Russian navy to the Baltic. The Treaty o f Jassy o f 1792, ending the conflict, had no specific provisions in regard to Greece. During the next few years the Russian government retained its interest in the Greek lands and, largely because o f the common Orthodox religion, was the most influential foreign power. In the previous peace treaties and in the associated commercial agreements, Russia had gained important rights within the empire. The provision concerning the appointment o f consuls was to be particularly significant. These men, usually Greek nationals, had offices in the major cities throughout the Greek provinces. Like the consulates o f the other powers, they became centers for intrigue against the Ottoman Empire and for the organization o f local Russian partisans. The treaties with the Porte also made the provision that Greek merchant ships could fly the Russian flag and thus enjoy Russia’s protection as well as share its commercial privileges. During the wars o f the first decade o f the nineteenth century, these Greek ships came to dominate Mediterranean trade as French shipping was driven from the seas. The new Russian port o f Odessa became a major Greek center with an influential merchant population. The Russian ties with the Constan­ tinople Patriarchate, o f course, continued. The church leaders, the Phanariots, and the merchants all expected support from St. Petersburg. Russia was, in fact, the only great power that remained consistendy interested in a partition o f Ottoman territory. The Albanians Although the Albanians shared with the Greeks many o f the problems o f a people endowed with a rocky, mountainous land, they marked a strong con­ trast in other respects. Whereas the Greeks had acquired a wealthy, educated merchant and Phanariot class and had won a position o f dominance in the Orthodox church organization, the Albanians remained among the most backward people in the Balkans. They also had the largest numbers o f con­ versions to Islam. This second condition was to have perhaps the greatest effect on the course o f their history. When the Ottoman armies arrived in Albania, they found the country divided between an Orthodox south and a Catholic north. Although there were at first few conversions, conditions changed in the seventeenth century. Current Albanian historiography ex­

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Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule plains this occurrence as chiefly the result o f the sharp rise in taxes, in partic­ ular in the poll tax paid by the Christian but not the M uslim . In the sixteenth century the tax, the djizia , was 45 akches; in the beginning o f the seventeenth century it was 305 akches, a figure that rose precipitately in the next h alf century to 789 akches.15 A lthough this rise to an extent reflected the increase in general prices, the fiscal pressure on the individual made conversion to Islam a great tem ptation. In addition, though this was usually not the case elsewhere, in Albania some measure o f force appears to have been used.

The main target was the Catholic population, which declined notably in the seventeenth century. Like the Orthodox church, the Porte saw the Catholic church as a major enemy. Catholic Venice was entrenched in the Adriatic Sea; the Habsburg Empire was a frequent problem. During the war that broke out with Venice in 1645, Catholic Albanians hoped for a Venetian victory. In 1689, during the war o f the Holy League, they revolted. Most o f the forced conver­ sions occurred at this time; many former Catholics were resettled in the Kosovo area, which thereafter became a center o f strong Albanian and Muslim feeling. Most o f the conversions took place in the lowlands around the Shkumbi River, where direct Ottoman pressure could most easily be exerted. In the eighteenth century Albania thus presented a complex religious pic­ ture. The Catholics, by then the weakest group, were concentrated in an enclave in the north with Shkoder (Skadar, Scutari) as the center. The Ortho­ dox were to be found principally south o f the Shkumbi and in the districts o f Kor^e (Koritsa) and Gjirokaster. Muslims lived throughout the country, but chiefly in the center and in Kosovo. The Catholics looked for support primarily to the Habsburg Empire, which claimed a right o f protection. The Orthodox were part o f the Ohrid Archbishopric until its abolition; thereafter they were under a strong Greek cultural influence. What education was avail­ able to them was in the Greek language, as was the church liturgy. The Albanian Muslims enjoyed a privileged position not only in their own lands, but throughout the entire empire. A warlike people, they had many opportunities to serve the state. The best o f the janissaries recruited through the devshirme system came from the Albanian Christian families. The Alba­ nian sipahis and the mercenary troops were renowned for their effectiveness. Albanian guards served high officials throughout the Balkans. As Muslims Albanians had many opportunities to win influential administrative posi­ tions. The four Koprulii grand vezirs were the most successful, but it has been estimated that at least thirty men o f Albanian background held this high post.16 The Albanian Muslim, who had no reason to dislike the privileges accorded his faith, was usually one o f the strong foundations o f the state. In addition to the three-way division in religion, the Albanians form ed ■5 ■6

K risto Frasheri, The History ofAlbania (Tirana: n. p., 1964), P· 95· S tavro S kendi, The Albanian National Awakening, 1878-1912 (P rinceton, N .J.: P rin c eto n U n i­ versity Press, 1967), p. 21.

8l

82 Albanians at Janina

Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule two other groups, the Ghegs and the Tosks. The Ghegs, inhabiting the rug­ ged northern mountain areas, had developed a self-governing tribal organi­ zation similar to that o f the neighboring Montenegrins, and one that lasted until recent times. The basic unit was the clan, called afis, which was headed by the oldest male. Associated with the fis was a territorial and political coun­ terpart, called a bajmk (standard), which was composed o f one or more clans. The position o f leader, or bajraktar (standard-bearer), was hereditary. The bajrak has been described as “ an autonomous state governed by customs and other juridical regulations basically common to all the other bajraks.” 17 A tribe was formed o f a group o f bajraks led by a man from a prominent family. Major matters were settled by assemblies o f the male members o f the tribe, and judgments were made on the basis o f unwritten customary law. Although mountain tribes were supposed to pay taxes, they were very difficult to col­ lect. In fact, the central government could not really control the actions o f men living in these inaccessible areas. It repeatedly had to send troops against them. The Tosks, who had no tribal system, lived in villages under their own elected notables. They were to be found mostly in the southern lowland areas that had early been subject to the timar system. By the eighteenth century large estates, particularly in the central regions, had come under the control o f strong families who had both economic and political power. Here the conditions for the peasants were very hard, even though both peasant and landowner might be Muslim. The flat areas o f the country were easier for the government to control, but some Tosk Orthodox villages, situated in remote mountain areas, like Suli in Epirus, had won an independent position similar to that o f the Gheg tribes. In return for payment o f taxes, whose collection was often resisted, the villages were granted an autonomous administration. Although Albania was not a theater o f war in the eighteenth century, con­ ditions were anything but peaceful. Like the other Muslim lands, the Alba­ nian lands contributed many soldiers to the Ottoman campaigns; losses were high. Even worse were the struggles for power among the local Muslim no­ tables. Weighed down with foreign war and internal political problems, the Porte was increasingly unable to control its provincial officials. In Albania the owners o f the large estates and the wealthy naturally sought political power, which was to be gained by securing appointments to official positions from the central government. Once in office they could refuse to follow or­ ders unless it suited their personal interests. They were Muslims, and they had bands o f armed retainers. These men, known as beys, not only were com­ pletely out o f the control o f Constantinople, but fought frequently among themselves for power, position, and extensions o f their political jurisdiction. In the mountain areas, similar conflicts raged among the tribal chieftains, each o f whom sought to expand the area under his domination. Helpless to 17

Skendi, Albanian National Awakening, pp. i+, 15.

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The eighteenth century enforce order directly, the Porte attempted a policy o f divide and rule, but that tactic also failed. A s a result o f these circumstances, by the end o f the eighteenth century tw o centers o f pow er had emerged. In the north, around the city o f Shkoder, the Bushati fam ily gained a dom inating position; to the south a second stronghold was established at Janina under A li Pasha. A li’s career was to in­ fluence O ttom an policy until the 1820s; the Bushati fam ily had a shorter pe­ riod in power. The Bushatis’ prime influence in northern Albania was estab­ lished by Mehmet Pasha in the years between 1757 and 1775. Aided by highland tribes, he was able to extend his area o f control, and he received official ap­ pointments from the Porte. W hen he attempted to widen his political ju ris­ diction further and refused to forw ard the taxes he had collected, the O tto ­ man governm ent had him poisoned. A lthough a conflict over succession follow ed, his son, Kara M ahm ud, took his place. The Porte then unsuccess­ fully tried to organize a rival coalition o f families. T he career o f K ara M ah ­ m ud, w h o was to exert a m ajor influence on the history o f the entire western Balkan area, merges w ith the progress o f events that were sim ultaneously taking place in neighboring M ontenegro. T he M ontenegrins A fter its conquest in 1499 the O ttom an governm ent made little effort to control the remote mountain land o f M ontenegro. The timar system was never applied, and in return for the payment o f the poll tax, which was not heavy, the region was in general left to itself. T he only O ttom an official w h o appeared was the representative from the central governm ent w ho attempted, usually in vain, to collect the tax. Th e M ontenegrins, like the armatoles in Greece, were also expected to perform a military function. Because their lands after 1699 were close to Venetian possessions in Dalm atia, they were expected to help defend that frontier, but they were m ore often found fighting on the opposin g side. Th e m ajority o f M ontenegrins inhabited the m ountain areas, where they led a life very much like that o f Albanians and Greeks in similar circumstances. T h eir main occupations were cattle and sheep raising, hunting, and banditry w here that proved profitable. T he basic social and political unit w as the tribe, which in turn was made up o f clans. Th e tribe, held together by ties o f fam ily and by the constant quarrels conducted with neighbors, controlled the pasture and w oodland communally. M ontenegro, together w ith the adjacent Albanian highlands, w as probably the m ost prim itive area in the Balkans, i f not in E urope. It has been estimated that in the first h alf o f the nineteenth century the population numbered only about 120,000, from which 20,000 fighting men could be d raw n .18 Nevertheless, as a political unit this country was to play a role far outw eighing its poverty, small size, and backward condition. 18

Vladim ir Dedijer et al., History of Yugoslavia, trans. Kordija Kveder (N ew York: M cGraw H ill, 1974), p· 291.

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Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule Since the land was torn apart by the quarreling tribes, the single element o f unity was at first the church. Montenegro was both Serb in nationality and Orthodox in religion. The center was the Cetinje monastery, whose bishops had jurisdiction over the entire territory. They were usually elected by a synod, and before 1766 they were confirmed by the patriarch o f Pec. From the eigh­ teenth century the position was always held by a member o f the Petrovic family from the NjeguS tribe; the first bishop was Danilo (1696-1737). The family came from the district o f Katuni, near Mt. Lovccn, the area that was the stronghold o f Montenegrin resistance to Ottoman authority and to the inva­ sion o f the neighboring Muslim provincial armies. Not only did the church serve as an instrument o f unity, but its leaders established relations with other countries. Thus the bishop functioned as a head o f state and allowed Montenengro to play at least a small role in international affairs. The first close relations with an outside state were with neighboring Ven­ ice, which made payments to Montenegrin tribal leaders to gain their sup­ port. In the war o f the Holy League some tribes fought for Venice, an action that led to an occupation by a Turkish force. Uprisings also occurred when Peter the Great called for Christian support for his invasion o f the Principal­ ities. Venice, however, remained the most important center o f possible assist­ ance. When in the Treaty o f Karlowitz Venice extended its possessions to include the whole o f Dalmatia, it became a direct neighbor. From 1714 to 1718 Venice was again at war with the Porte. Since it desired Montenegrin assist­ ance, ties between the countries were strengthened. In 1717 the doge o f Ven­ ice, Cornaro, issued a decree establishing a political officer, called a guvemadur (civil governor), for Montenegro. There were now two officials, the bishop and the governor, with political roles. The Venetian appointee at first lived in Kotor, on Venetian territory, on a subsidy. The position was thereafter regularly held by a member o f the Radonjic clan, which was also part o f the Njegus tribe. Although both the bishop and the governor were supposed to be elected by an assembly o f the heads o f the tribes, both positions became in fact hereditary in the two families. Initially the two officials appear to have cooperated well. The first major quarrel came in 1802 over the question o f the appointment to the secular office. After 1718 the link with Venice weakened. Montenegro received no gains in the Treaty o f Passarowitz. Although closer relations were sought with Austria, Russia became henceforth the main focus o f Montenegrin attention. Already in 1710, it will be remembered, the Montenegrins, supported by tribes in Brda and Hercegovina, had revolted when Peter called for Christian assistance. The uprising had been suppressed with great losses. Thereafter, the major connec­ tion was between the church authorities in both countries. In 1716 Danilo went to Russia, where he received gifts o f money, books, and equipment for the church. One o f the foremost Montenegrin supporters o f reliance on Russia was Bishop Vasilije Petrovic, who made three visits to St. Petersburg. He hoped that Empress Elizabeth would assume a protectorate over his country.

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The eighteenth century In order to instruct the Russians about his country, he published in M o sco w in 1754 a book entitled History o f Montenegro, in which, needless to say, M o n ­ tenegrin exploits were not slighted. Meanwhile, throughout the century, relations with the Porte remained tense. M ontenegrin tribes repeatedly raided over their borders, and they w ere a nuisance and a danger to their neighbors. In 1756 Bosnian troops, aided by Venice, w hose subjects w ere similarly injured by M ontenegrin actions, at­ tacked the area. A fter an O ttom an force invaded their land, the M ontenegrins gave assurances that they w ou ld pay their taxes and that the raids w ou ld cease. In 1766 a m ost bizarre episode occurred w hen an im postor arrived in the country claim ing to be Peter III, Catherine the G reat’s husband, w h o had actually been m urdered in 1762. A n educated m an o f com pelling pow ers, even though o f slight stature, this pretender was able to convince m any o f the prim itive and naive tribesm en o f his true royalty. H e w as to rule under the name o f Stephen the Small. H e could not convince the bishop, Sava, w h o had received his office in 1735 and had met the real tsar. Nevertheless, Stephen was able to push the bishop aside and assume the pow er in the state. D espite his dubious background, the new ruler did attempt to introduce some muchneeded measures. H e tried to establish som ething like a form al civil go vern ­ ment and to end the constant feuding between the rival tribes. Stephen’s actions caused concern to the great powers. Russian subsidies w ere stopped. M ontenegrins also resumed raiding into Turkish and Venetian territory. In 1768 the Porte dispatched an arm y against Stephen, but could do little since w ar had also broken out w ith Russia. Concerned about develop­ ments in M onten egro, Catherine sent Prince Iu rii D olgorukii in 1769. A l­ though the envoy recognized that Stephen was an im postor, he did n ot at­ tempt to secure his removal. O n his departure, D olgorukii left some munitions and money, but M ontenegro at this time did nothing to aid R ussia in the war. Stephen was finally poisoned in 1773 by a G reek servant in the pay o f the Porte. Relations w ith R ussia then deteriorated. In 1777 a M ontenegrin m ission was sent to St. Petersburg, but it was not received by Catherine. T h e Russian governm ent was follo w in g a policy o f cooperation w ith Vienna, and it hesi­ tated to interfere in the western Balkans. M ontenegro also made approaches to the H ab sbu rg Em pire. In 1777 a M ontenegrin, Nicholas M arkovic, offered to form a com pany to fight for Austria. N oth in g was done, since the Austrian governm ent knew little about conditions in M ontenegro. In 1781 an Austrian officer, C olonel Paulic, was dispatched to report on the country. H is opinion was negative: the hostile factions, Bishop Sava’s lack o f control over the tribes, and the Venetian and O ttom an opposition to an increase o f H ab sbu rg involve­ ment all influenced his judgm ent. A fter Sava’s death in 1782, the next leader o f importance was Peter I, w h o became bishop in 1784· H e had been part o f the unsuccessful m ission to

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Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule R ussia in 1777, but he still wished to be consecrated there. W hen he was unable to get a passport, he went to Srem ski Karlovci instead. Thereafter, he turned to A ustria to try to get m ilitary supplies and assistance; the governor, Jo van R adonjic, also supported a close H ab sbu rg orientation. F o r the rest o f the century the main threat to M ontenegro came from n eighboring A lbania and from the w ide ambitions o f K ara M ahm ud, w h o attem pted to set up an autonom ous principality in defiance o f Constantino­ ple. H is first attack on M ontenegrin territory took place in 1785. A t this time he w as able to gain the support o f some o f the tribes. H is victories and his attitude o f resistance tow ard the Porte attracted the attention o f both A ustria and R u ssia, w h o w ished to make use o f him in their ow n plans against the empire. It w ill be rem em bered that this w as the period o f Catherine’s Greek Project. T h e H ab sbu rg governm ent was w illin g to recognize K ara M ahm ud as the independent ruler o f Albania i f he assisted A ustria against the Porte. In these circumstances the sultan was forced to offer him a full pardon in return fo r his allegiance.

Russian policy toward Montenegro also changed, since once again war with the Ottoman Empire was contemplated. When fighting broke out in 1787, the government issued another proclamation calling for the support o f the Balkan Christians. Montenegro thus found itself in the pleasant position o f being courted by both Austria and Russia, who sent military advisers and gifts. Austrian soldiers and Hercegovinian volunteers began to arrive in the country. A t the same time, the H ab sbu rg governm ent made an effort to make con­ tact w ith K ara M ahm ud, w h o, it was judged, could be o f great assistance in the war. In Ju n e 1788 an Austrian delegation w ent to Shkoder to negotiate w ith him . T h e A lbanian pasha, influenced by the fact that the Turkish armies were w in nin g at the time, massacred the agents and sent their heads to the sultan. Back in favor in Constantinople, K ara M ahm ud was appointed g o v ­ ernor o f Shkoder. H e subsequendy fought fo r the em pire in M ontenegro and Bosnia. A lth ou gh w arfare in the region should have ceased when A ustria made peace in 1791, the fighting continued in M ontenegro. K ara M ahm ud, unsatis­ fied, w ished to w iden his territorial control; his actions brought on another clash w ith the Porte, follow ed by another reconciliation in 1794. In 1796 the pasha thought that he had a fine opportunity to settle his controversies w ith M ontenegro and to gain m ore land. A t this time both Venice and Austria had been defeated in the w ar that was goin g on w ith France. M ontenegro was isolated and could not expect outside assistance. K ara M ahm ud thus began an invasion. H ow ever, at the battle o f K ru si he was defeated and be­ headed. Th is event was to be extremely significant in M ontenegrin history. It ended fo r a period the attempts o f the O ttom an Em pire or its agents to conquer and control the country. Furtherm ore, M ontenegro was able to an­ nex the n eighboring region, Brda, w hich was controlled by the Piperi and

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The eighteenth century Bjelopavlic tribes, an addition that significantly enlarged its territory. The state at this point had a firm territorial base, and the central government had a stronger position than before against the tribal leadership. Bosnia and Hercegovina In Bosnia and H ercegovina, as in Albania, large-scale conversions occurred after the O ttom an occupation; in time many am ong both the old nobility and the peasants accepted Islam. M oreover, in the subsequent years Bosnia attracted M uslim refugees from the lands that passed under the control o f the Christian powers. Peasants, soldiers, craftsmen, and merchants came from C roatia, Slavonia, and H u n gary and settled south o f the Sava River. Refugees also arrived from Dalm atia. T he country thus became a center o f strong re­ ligious feeling and o f local patriotism. T he political situation was extremely favorable for the M uslim s. T he conversions had created a situation in which the political and econom ic pow er was held by a M uslim ruling class that was nevertheless o f a predom inantly local Slavic origin. A fter the conquest this grou p had preserved its hold over the land and thereby also over the peasants w h o w orked the estates. In addition to the native aristocracy, other m ilitary elements became a part o f Bosnian society. In the eighteenth century sipahis held 14 4 ziamets (large estates) and 3,617 timars. U sually these men lived on their o w n lands unless they were away at war. T h ey form ed an im portant element in the O ttom an armed forces. It has been estimated that 1,553 sipahis from Bosnia fought in the battle o f the Pruth against Peter the G reat.19 M oreover, large num bers o f janissaries settled in the land in the course o f the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. A lth ough m any lived in villages, the largest num ber chose to stay in Sarajevo. Since their pay could be as much as a year in arrears, they were virtually com pelled to find alternate occupations. T h ey thus became m er­ chants and craftsmen and played a m ajor role in the guilds. In the eighteenth century they were the m ost influential political element in the three largest cities, Sarajevo, M ostar, and Travnik.

Among the ruling military there was also an important additional group, the captains, who had functions similar to those o f their Christian equivalent in Greece. Since Bosnia was a border province, both with the Habsburg Empire and with Venetian Dalmatia, particular care had to be taken in its defense. The captains were in charge o f hereditary military fiefs, the kapitanates, o f which there were thirty-eight, including sixty-four towns, after the Treaty o f Belgrade in 1739. At the end o f the century there were about 24,000 soldiers attached to them. The captains’ chief duties were to guard the fron­ tiers and the lines o f communication, but some were also called to serve outside the country. They and their retainers were sometimes salaried. 19

Branislav D jurdjev, B ogo G rafenauer, and Jorjo Tadic, Historija Naroda Jugoslavije [H isto ry o f th e peoples o f Yugoslavia], 2 vols. (Z agreb: Skolska K njiga, 1953, 1959), II, 1321·

Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule T h e old Slavic nobility holding large estates, together w ith the high g o v ­ ernment and m ilitary officials, form ed the dom inant class. This grou p, known as begs o r beys, numbered a few hundred. Below, but still in a privileged position, w as a low er nobility called the ago.s, com prised o f smaller landow n­ ers, sipahis, and janissaries. T h is group in the course o f the eighteenth cen­ tury was able to tighten its control o f the land. Its political and military pow er allowed it to infringe on form erly peasant land, exploit the unused or deserted areas, and use the tax-farm ing system to acquire property. Tw o types o f estates developed. O n the agalik s the peasants retained their traditional rights concerning the use o f the land and the payments required. In contrast, on the begliks the land was regarded as the property o f the noble, w h o either w orked the estate h im self o r let it to tenants. H ere the condition o f the peas­ ant depended on the arrangements he could make w ith the owner. Naturally, he was in a much weaker position than the peasant on an agalik, and his payments and labor obligations were higher. T h e unrest am ong these peas­ ants, w h o resented the constandy rising obligations, increased the instability in the country, which was im poverished by the wars o f the century. T h e social situation in both Bosnia and H ercegovina was made m ore tense by the fact that although M uslim s predom inated am ong the ruling group, they constituted only about 33 percent o f the population. T he O rthodox had a plurality o f about 43 percent, w ith the Catholics in a m inority o f 20 percent. O n both the begliks and the agaliks a Christian Slavic peasantry was thus likely to be subordinate to M uslim Slavic landlords. A s far as their loyalties were concerned, the Muslims naturally favored Ottoman rule, but with strong provincial self-rule, whereas the O rthodox felt drawn to their neighboring Serbs and Montenegrins - a situation that caused difficulties when these people were in conflict w ith the Porte. T he Catholics were attracted to the H absbu rg lands and to Catholic C roatia. T he m onarchy claimed the right o f religious protection over them. A s a border province o f a steadily w eakening em pire, Bosnia bore a heavy share o f the m ilitary burden and was the scene o f much fighting. In the Treaty o f K arlow itz a border was established that w ith som e readjustments was to last until 1908, but the w ar left the country in a chaotic state. N o t only did M uslim refugees arrive from the lands lost to the H ab sbu rg E m pire, but Catholics em igrated from Bosnia, particularly into Slavonia. In 1703 the cap­ ital was m oved from Sarajevo to Travnik, which became a m ajor craft and trading center as well as a m ilitary stronghold. Special attention was given to the question o f the defense o f the entire province. G uns and m unitions were both m anufactured locally and im ported from Constantinople. The wars o f 1714 to 1718 and 1736 to 1739, involving Austria, Venice, and

Russia, were naturally extremely damaging to Bosnian development. Terri­ tory was lost to both Venice and the Habsburg Empire in the Treaty o f Passarowitz. In addition, Bosnia, like other parts o f the empire, suffered severely from the plague and other epidemic diseases. Agriculture was repeatedly dis­

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The eighteenth century rupted by the Austrian invasions. The Muslims in particular were affected by the wars, since they were called up to fight not only against the European powers, but also against Persia. They had heavy casualties. For instance, o f 5,200 men sent to Persia, only 500 returned after peace was made in 1727. A t this time Bosnia had one able administrator, A li Pasha H ekim O glu, w h o was vezir o f Bosnia from 1735 to 1740, w hen he was sent to E gyp t. H e governed w ith the assistance o f a council com posed o f the prom inent men o f the province and representatives o f the central governm ent. A fter his depar­ ture, the political situation disintegrated. A lth ough the country did not suffer from an outside invasion fo r almost five decades, the m ilitary elements within turned against each other. A long period o f civil turm oil follow ed, which the Porte could not master. T h e struggle fo r pow er am ong the M uslim m ilitary involved in particular the captains and the janissaries. T h e captains used their m ilitary strength to acquire chiftdik estates, and they sought political control. T h e janissaries too became m ore involved in local affairs. In this situation the provincial adm in­ istration grew weaker. A s the authority o f the Bosnian vezir dim inished, that o f the notables and the captains increased. In 1745 A li Pasha H ekim O glu returned, but w ith the m ission from the central governm ent to im pose heavy taxes. O pposition from the Bosnian notables caused him to leave the same year. H e returned again in 1747 for the same purpose, but since he had alien­ ated his form er supporters, he was forced out within a year. From 1747 to 1756 Bosnia was in a condition o f anarchy involving both the

cities and the countryside. During this decade the local notables collected the taxes and waged war on each other. Captains fought janissaries, who fought other janissaries. In 1752 another able vezir, Mehmed Pasha Kukavica, was sent to handle the situation. He was able to pacify the province by 1756. He returned for a second term between 1757 and 1760, but he was removed after complaints were made against his administration. Nevertheless, the former disorders did not recur. T h e H ab sbu rg Em pire, meanwhile, retained its interest in Bosnia. In the discussions between Joseph II and Catherine, this region was designated as part o f A ustria’s share in the division o f the O ttom an Em pire. E ven before w ar started again, the Austrian governm ent made efforts to increase its influ­ ence. Support was expected particularly am ong the C atholic C roatian popu­ lation. Bosnian students w ere brought to study in Zagreb. W hen w ar broke ou t in 1788 the H ab sbu rg governm ent issued proclamations calling upon the Christians to support their armies and the M uslim s to remain passive. A n arm y o f 51,000, accom panied by some Serbian volunteers, invaded Bosnia. Since the main O ttom an arm y was engaged elsewhere, only a small force was left to defend the Bosnian frontiers. Local M uslim s thus joined to repel the invaders. T he conflict is know n as the D ubica War, since the main fighting was around the city o f D ubica, where the M uslim s were defeated. B y the Treaty o f Sistova some Bosnian land was ceded to Austria.

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Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule The Serbs Although the Serbs lived in wide areas in the western Balkans, the national movement was to have its center in the Smederevo sanjak, to become the pashalik o f Belgrade. This area, like Bosnia, was a border district, but unlike that province it had no notable Muslim population outside the cities. More­ over, there had been no widespread movement, as there had been in some parts o f the Balkans, to transform sipahi and other land into chiftlik estates. The average Serbian peasant retained certain traditional rights over the land he worked. He was technically a sharecropper, and thus usually liable for payments, some o f which increased at the end o f the eighteenth century, but he had in practice virtually free use o f his plot. He could dispose o f it more or less as he wished. He could pass it on to his heirs, and he could sell it if he could find someone to assume his liabilities. He could grow what he chose and sell his produce at his convenience. He was not a serf; he was personally a free man. The large landholder could live in the country, but he usually stayed in one o f the larger cities. Like other Balkan people the Serbian peasant had the advantages o f a tight local administrative system. The basic unit was the knezina (district). The knezinas were composed o f villages, which in turn were made up o f zadrugas (extended family organizations). Each knezina had a council o f notables that elected the knez. As elsewhere, this official represented his district before the Ottoman authorities and was responsible for the assessing and collecting o f taxes as well as general police duties. The local government also provided judicial services, using customary law as the basis. The Orthodox church was to play a particularly important role in Serbian history. At the beginning o f the eighteenth century the Serbian lands were still under the Patriarchate o f Pec, which was an autocephalous organization under the general jurisdiction o f the Patriarchate o f Constantinople. The church governed itself through the synods and kept in touch with other Orthodox institutions, including those in Russia. The jurisdiction o f the Patriarchate extended over a wide range, including the Orthodox o f Buda, Arad, Komarom, and Dalmatia, as well as Bosnia, Hercegovina, and lands with a Serbian majority. When Ottoman power was at its height, these territories had, o f course, been under one political jurisdiction. The Habsburg and Venetian victories split the area politically, but the ecclesiastical boundaries remained. The majority o f the population in the ceded territories was Catholic and not subject to Orthodox authority. During the period o f Ottoman rule the Patriarchate o f Pec felt itself the heir to the medieval Serbian kingdom and was well aware o f its national mission. The lands under its ecclesiastical jurisdiction were referred to as “Serbian lands” despite their varying religious and ethnic character. The church carried the national idea and kept alive in the minds o f the faithful the inde­ pendent and glorious past. There are

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The eighteenth century in the Serbian church calendar some fifty-eight Serbian saints, in­ cluding eighteen tsars, kings and queens, princes, and lords, begin­ ning with St. Sava and his father, Nemanja. The cult o f Serbian royal saints — “the sacred stock o f Nemanja” — constandy reminded the Serbian people, with all o f the awesome pomp and artistry o f the Byzantine ritual, that the Serbs had once had an independent king­ dom, indeed, an empire, blessed by God through His wonder-working saints.20 Like the Patriarchate at Constantinople, the Serbian church held fast to the idea that Ottoman domination was a temporary phenomenon and would pass, and it too looked upon the Catholic church as the most serious rival, which undoubtedly it was. The two religions conflicted in Bosnia, and within the Habsburg Empire Catholic pressure on the Orthodox population was constant and strong. Despite the religious differences, geography dictated cooperation with the Habsburg Empire. The Serbs who subsequendy fought with the Austrian troops expected to establish at least an autonomous political unit, not to submit to direct Habsburg rule. During the war o f the Holy League, Serbian units participated in the fighting. The most significant action came in 1688, when Habsburg troops had been uniformly successful and were in occupa­ tion o f Belgrade. At that time the patriarch o f Pec, Arsenije III Crnojevic, who was in touch with the Habsburg government, called upon his followers to rise against the Ottoman domination. At first, the Austrian army remained victorious; in 1689 NiS, Skopje, Prizren, and Stip were occupied. The next year marked a reversal, however, and the allied forces were pushed back to the former border. Fearing massacre if they remained, Arsenije and some thirty thousand families migrated with the retreating army. This group was joined by others from the Ottoman lands who had compromised themselves by supporting the invader and who feared Ottoman revenge. In Belgrade the Serbian leaders held an assembly and sent an emissary, Bishop Isaija Djakovic, to the Habsburg emperor, Leopold I, to discuss their position. They agreed to accept him as their hereditary ruler if he, in exchange, assured them o f religious freedom and recognized their autonomous church administration. In 1690 Leopold issued a proclamation in which he called on the Balkan people to rise and support his armies. He promised in return religious liberty, lower taxes, and the free election o f the Serbian leaders. With these assur­ ances, a large number o f families crossed the border to settle in Habsburg lands. The emigration created a difficult condition. Both the Habsburg govern­ ment and the Orthodox authorities expected the situation to be temporary; 20

M ichael B o ro P etrovich, A History o fModem Serbia, 1804-1918, 2 vols. (N ew York: H a rc o u rt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), 1, 13.

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Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule both awaited a great trium ph o f Austria over the O ttom an Em pire and the return o f the Serbs to their form er homes. U ntil then, the Serbian leaders wished to have som ething like the millet system, which w ould give the O r­ thodox church a large measure o f political control over its follow ers, intro­ duced into the H ab sbu rg M onarchy. A lth ough the question caused constant controversy, the Serbs did receive special privileges. A religious and cultural center was established at Srem ski Karlovci. Th e tie with Pec was kept; the m etropolitan at Srem ski K arlovci swore obedience to the patriarch o f Pec and m entioned his name in the liturgy. T he great em igration had unfortunate consequences for the Pec Patriarch­ ate, and it contributed to the alteration o f the ethnic com position o f the K o so vo area. T he m ovem ent o f Albanians into the region has been m en­ tioned previously; the large em igration o f Serbs was to have a lasting effect on the national com position o f what had form erly been the heart o f the Ser­ bian m edieval kingdom . W ith the departure o f the Serbs and the large-scale im m igration o f A lbanians, the region acquired an Albanian majority. The apparent treason o f the patriarch naturally affected the attitude o f the Porte tow ard the Pec establishment. Thereafter, it preferred to name Phanariot can­ didates rather than Serbs. Th u s a G reek w as chosen to succeed A rsenije, al­ though a Serb held the post next, from 1713 to 1725. H ab sbu rg incursions into O ttom an territory w ere renewed in 1716, this time w ith m ore success. In the Treaty o f Passarowitz o f 1718 the m onarchy gained control o f m ajor Serbian lands. H ab sbu rg administration, although neither particularly popular n or especially successful, was im portant fo r the future developm ent o f the area. T he new arrangements, w hich w ere both military and civilian in nature, placed the new ly annexed territory, including O ltenia, under a C o u rt Cham ber C ouncil w ith its headquarters at Belgrade and Temesvar. T h e Serbian section was divided into fifteen districts in which the upper level o f adm inistration was in the hands o f H absbu rg officials, but the low er consisted o f a strengthened Serbian local governm ent network. The m ajor unit o f administration was the nahije, which was placed under the direction o f an official called an oborknez. Th e knezinas headed by the knez remained as before. T h e duties o f the local authorities, as under O ttom an nile, w ere prim arily the collection o f taxes, local police functions, and the administration o f justice. Belgrade was also affected by the changes. Germ an craftsmen w ere brought in to replace the Turkish, and the C atholic church made this city the center o f its attempts to obtain conversions. 1737, it w ill be remem bered, the m onarchy was drawn into w ar through Ks alliance w ith Russia. T h is cam paign, w hich was characterized by inept Austrian m ilitary leadership, nevertheless started out on a victorious note. NiS again fell into H ab sbu rg hands. Once m ore the invading arm y called for Serbian support. T h e patriarch o f Pec, n ow Arsenije IV, follow ed the example o f his predecessor and gave assistance. W hen the O ttom an arm y reversed the batdefield situation and, recapturing NiS, drove northward, the patriarch and

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The eighteenth century his followers, numbering about two thousand, were forced to withdraw to Belgrade and then across the border. In the disastrous peace that followed, the Habsburg Empire lost its Serbian and Romanian territory, but kept the Banat. A frontier was now established that was to last about a century and a half. The second treason, in Ottoman eyes, associated with the Patriarchate o f Pec was another blow to an organization that was already deeply troubled with maladministration and corruption. After the departure o f Arsenije IV, a Greek candidate was chosen, and a swift succession o f appointments fol­ lowed. Since the Habsburg center, Sremski Karlovci, was in a much better economic position than Pec, numerous appeals for financial assistance were directed toward it. Nevertheless, the combination o f circumstances, includ­ ing the pressure o f Greek nationalism within the church, its weak financial basis, and its association with the treasonous activities o f the two patriarchs, proved too much. In 1766 the Porte abolished the Patriarchate o f Pec and transferred its jurisdiction to the Patriarchate o f Constantinople. The move had particular significance for the Serbian church. The Metropolitanate at Sremski Karlovci became the main Serbian ecclesiastical center. It was hence­ forth to have the major cultural and educational influence on the Serbs. After the conclusion o f the peace in 1739, the Turkish administration, to­ gether with the sipahis and janissaries, returned to the region. Serbian con­ ditions, however, remained much as before. The Austrian administrative sys­ tem, which had been based on local tradition, was still used. The village was relatively autonomous, and it was the focus o f Serbian life. The Muslim pop­ ulation remained concentrated in Belgrade and the cities. A long period o f peace followed. The region was not a scene o f battle in the war between Russia and the Porte from 1768 to 1774, but in 1788, when Austria joined Russia in a new conflict, the situation changed and another invasion oc­ curred. As usual, the Habsburg government commenced the campaign with an appeal for aid from the Balkan Christians. Special Serbian detachments, Frei corps, were established, which operated in Serbia, Bosnia, and the Banat. The most important Serbian action, however, was conducted by K oia Andjelkovic and his followers. In fact, this episode is known in Serbian history as K oia’s War. This local leader at the head o f a group o f about three thousand men endeavored to interrupt the Ottoman lines o f communication, particu­ larly in the Sumadija, an area lying between Belgrade and Ni§. Despite the fact that they were at first very successful, they could not withstand an attack from the better-organized and more-disciplined Ottoman army. T h is w ar was a disaster not only for the Serbian volunteers, but also for the H ab sbu rg Em pire. A lth ough the Austrian arm y took Belgrade in 1789, it was forced to evacuate the conquered land the next year, o w in g chiefly to the pressure o f events w ithin the m onarchy and in the rest o f E urope. T h e Treaty o f Sistova o f 1791 left the situation much as it had been before the war. T he

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Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule Ottoman Empire promised amnesty for those who had joined the Habsburg army, and about fifty thousand refugees did return. A century o f experience of cooperation with Austria had discouraged the Serbian leaders in their hopes o f Habsburg assistance. They felt that once more they had been sacrificed and abandoned. The war did have one important consequence: large num­ bers o f Serbs had received experience in fighting in conjunction with the Habsburg army and in their own volunteer bands. The stage was thus set for them to take further action on their own initiative.

Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Thrace The regions that have been discussed so far - mainland and island Greece, Albania, Montenegro, Bosnia, and Serbia - had the opportunity to control their own local affairs and often to conduct independent policies. The re­ moteness o f their mountain homes gave much independence to some Greeks, Albanians, and Montenegrins. The closeness to the land frontiers and the seas allowed all o f these areas to maintain some sort o f contact with foreign pow­ ers. In contrast, Bulgaria, Thrace, and Macedonia, which will be treated here together, because o f their geographical position remained under a tighter control by the Muslim authorities. Nevertheless, they shared many o f the experiences o f their neighbors. They had the pattern o f local administration that has been discussed elsewhere; their village notables collected taxes and had the same opportunity to become wealthy and influential within the Ot­ toman system. A local judicial system based on customary law existed. How­ ever, the area was more affected by the changes in the landholding system. Chiftlik estates arose particularly in the advantageous locations, such as the Maritsa Valley and north o f Thessaloniki. Small farms remained common in the hill and mountain regions. Unlike most o f the rest o f the Balkans, this area had a large Muslim and Turkish presence. Turkish peasants had emigrated particularly to Thrace and Macedonia, where they lived in conditions not much different from those o f their Christian counterparts. The Muslim farmers, however, paid smaller taxes, and they held their land under conditions o f virtually private ownership. This area also had one region in which there had been mass conversions. The Pomaks, living mainly in the Rhodope Mountains but also in the Danubian plain north o f the Stara Planina, were both Bulgarian and Muslim. They lived apart in their mountain communities and remained a primitive, backward society. For the Christians, as in other areas, the Orthodox church was the major element o f unity. The Bulgarian people were under the jurisdiction o f the Archbishopric o f Ohrid, whose fate was much like that o f Pec. Although it did not blatantly collaborate with an enemy power, it did suffer from the same problems o f corruption and debt as did the other Slavic institution. The Greek cultural pressure was also stronger here. When in 1767 the Archbishop-

Pass through the Balkan Mountains, Bulgaria

Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule ric was abolished and the church placed under the jurisdiction o f C onstanti­ n o p le , the consequences fo r the Slavic population were m ore serious than they were for the Serbs. T he latter always had an alternate authority in Sremski K arlovci, w hich remained a strong center o f Serbian influence. F o r the Bulgarians the loss o f the Slavic Archbishopric gave rise to a period o f Greek cultural dom ination. G reek became the language o f the services in even sol­ idly Slavic areas. W hat education was available was also in this language. W hen it is considered that G reek was also the language o f com merce, the cultural dom inance o f the G reek civilization can well be understood. A lthough this area was not the scene o f m ajor battles in the eighteenth century, it was not spared from the consequences o f w ar and political anarchy. Banditry was widespread. A particularly serious problem was the devastation caused by bands o f deserting or returning soldiers. Repeated waves o f epi­ demic diseases and the plague w ent through the lands. Th e extra w ar taxes also contributed to the general impoverishment. M oreover, as the O ttom an central authority weakened, M acedonia, like Bosnia and Albania, became the scene o f struggles fo r pow er am ong local officials, military men, and M uslim notables. T h e A lbanian rivalries involved M acedonia too. T he m ost secure conditions w ere to be found in the villages o f the Balkan M ountains. The worst situation arose in the eighteenth century in the area between the D an ­ ube and the Balkan M ountains that was depopulated and ravaged by armed bands, know n as kirdjalis, and by the supporters o f the rebellious pasha, Pasvanoglu. D espite these unfavorable conditions, the century did witness an increase in trade, in particular w ith the H absburg Em pire, and a grow th in the size and prosperity o f Thessaloniki, which was the m ajor port for the entire area. A fter the signing o f the Treaty o f K arlow itz, w hich gave A ustria trading privileges, com merce increased, reaching a height in the last quarter o f the century. T h e French had been the first to establish themselves in Thessaloniki, followed by British, D utch, and Venetian merchants. Regular caravan routes connected the city w ith the Balkan trading centers, such as Sofia, Skopje, and Bitola (Bitolj, M onastir), and ran northward through Belgrade to Austria and westw ard tow ard the A driatic ports. T h e carrying trade was in the hands ° f O rthodox merchants, especially Greeks.

A survey o f conditions in the lands under direct O ttom an rule thus shows similarities as w ell as variations in development. A ll o f the regions w ere af­ fected by the consequences o f the wars o f the century, both the occupation by O ttom an and foreign soldiers and the fiscal pressures o f th i taxation sys­ tem. In general, the inhabitants were under the dual governorship o f the O ttom an administrative fram ew ork and their ow n village organizations. The O rthodox church form ed a third element not only in the m oral and spiritual

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The eighteenth century life o f the Christians, but also in the political control o f the region. Som e church authorities acted as a support o f the system; others, notably some Serbian patriarchs and the M ontenegrin bishops, led in the fight to under­ mine O ttom an rule. In the same manner, some local notables, particularly those w h o benefited financially from the conditions o r w ho saw no practical alternative, cooperated w ell with the O ttom an authority; others strongly re­ sisted. It should also be emphasized that even though the O ttom an E m pire was in theory a centralized absolutist state, the authorities in Constantinople had little direct control over the life o f the individual Balkan Christian. T h ey always preferred to govern through intermediaries, either the church or the elected chiefs o f the villages. A s the eighteenth century progressed they also increasingly lost control over their ow n provincial authorities.

THE AUTONOMOUS REGIONS: DUBROVNIK MOLDAVIA, AND W ALLACHIA T h e lands w hose histories have just been discussed w ere regarded as integral parts o f the empire. F o u r other Balkan areas, Transylvania, M oldavia, Walla­ chia, and the city o f D ubrovnik, were linked by special arrangements. B e­ cause Transylvania was transferred to H absbu rg control in the Treaty o f Karlow itz, it w ill be discussed in another section. A b rief com m ent about D ub rovnik is in order, however, before w e proceed to the D anubian Princi­ palities.

D ubrovnik T h e city o f D ubrovnik, previously a possession o f Venice, was placed under O ttom an protection in 1458. A tribute, which was set at 12,500 ducats in 1481, was paid; but aside from this, and the recognition o f O ttom an suzerainty, D ubrovnik was for all practical purposes independent. It entered into rela­ tions w ith foreign powers and made treaties w ith them. Its ow n flag flew over its ships. T he O ttom an vassalage had the im portant result o f givin g the city special rights in trade w ithin the empire. It was obviously to O ttom an advantage to have one o f its dependents, rather than the Venetians, handle the Adriatic trade. D ubrovn ik was in a position to make full use o f the priv­ ileges that it was given. Its traders received from the Porte special tax exem p­ tions and trading benefits. T h ey w ere also allowed to set up, in m ajor O tto­ man cities, colonies that had extraterritorial rights; that is, the members governed themselves according to their ow n laws rather than those o f the locality. Since this was a Catholic city, religious jurisdiction was also involved. Like the Italian city-states, D ubrovnik was a republic controlled by its pa­ trician class. T he main organ o f governm ent was the senate, which repre­ sented the interests o f this group. T he city was both a m anufacturing and a trade center and thus had a population o f merchants, seamen, and craftsmen.

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The patricians controlled the surrounding agricultural lands. D ubrovn ik re­ tained its autonom ous position until 1806, when French troops occupied the city.

M oldavia and Wallachia A fter M oldavia and Wallachia fell under the control o f the O ttom an Em pire in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, they, like Transylvania, were not incorporated into the imperial system, but became instead autonom ous pro v­ inces w ith their ow n institutions (see M ap 12). Th e native aristocracy, the boyars, was thus left intact and retained its form er social and econom ic, and to a large extent its political, privileges. T he relations o f the provinces w ith the O ttom an Em pire were determined by a series o f treaties w hose provisions at first allow ed the Principalities a large measure o f autonomy. O n ly in the eighteenth century did this situation change to the great disadvantage o f the Rom anian population. T h e O ttom an Em pire did not w ant to incorporate these lands direcdy; it needed buffer provinces. Its aim was to assure that the Principalities did not

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The eighteenth century becom e centers o f intrigue, that they form ed an adequate defense against the neighboring pow ers, and that they contributed m oney and agricultural sup­ plies. T he tribute im posed on the provinces was first set at a lo w level, but it soon rose precipitously. T he payments made by Wallachia at the beginning o f the eighteenth century have been described as follows: In 1709, the total tax receipts o f the Wallachian governm ent were 649.000 thalers, and o f these, 514,000 w ere sent in one w ay o r an­ other to the Turks. In 1710, o f the total receipts o f 547,000 thalers, 430.00 0 w ent to the Turks. In terms o f gold, this am ounted to be­ tween 180,ooo and 220,000 gold ducats a year fo r tribute. T h is was twice as much as the official tribute, and one-third to on e-h alf again as much as the tribute paid in the 1590s.21 T he Porte also saw the Principalities as a m ajor source o f supplies for the military and, in particular, for the city o f Constantinople. It thus maintained the right o f preem ption on agricultural products. Imperial agents, w h o were chiefly interested in buying sheep, cattle, and grain, could make the first pur­ chases, and they also determined the prices to be paid. T he pow er entrusted to these agents gave them in many cases w hat am ounted to a right o f confis­ cation. Since price and trading conditions were thus severely circumscribed, the agricultural developm ent o f the provinces was hampered. In the eigh­ teenth century the ch ief activity was animal husbandry; grain production was to predom inate only in the second h alf o f the next century. In addition to the tribute and the delivery o f food supplies, the Principal­ ities w ere liable for a long list o f other payments, including gifts due at the accession o f each new sultan and bribes to maintain the favor o f influential officials. T he native princes had to make payments, both at their appointment and at periodic intervals during their reigns. In return fo r these heavy contri­ butions, the provinces enjoyed m any privileges not shared by areas direcdy incorporated into the empire. Th e council o f boyars, which consisted o f the richest and m ost pow erful o f the native aristocracy, named from am ong their num ber the princes, sometimes called hospodars, w h o then had to be ap­ proved by the sultan. Once elected, the prince had im portant powers, but he ruled in conjunction w ith the boyars’ council. T he Turkish troops were con­ fined to the great fortified centers such as K ilia, Akkerm an, and Bender. M u s­ lims did not ow n estates in either principality, nor were there m osques and other M uslim religious establishments. In practice, the political system did not function smoothly. Th e pow er in the country lay in three centers: the prince, the boyars, and the Porte. The fact that the prince was an elected official and not a hereditary ruler made 21

D an iel C h iro t, Social Change in a Peripheral Society: The Creation o f a Balkan Colony (N ew York, A cadem ic Press, 1976), p. 64· IO O

Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule possible innum erable intrigues am ong the three groups. Th e Porte also reg­ ularly intervened in the elections and named the candidates. T h rou ghou t the seventeenth century, the boyars, not the prince, were in the strongest posi­ tion. D espite these problem s both principalities did effectively control the running o f their internal administrations, and they had direct relations with foreign governm ents. A s border regions, they were involved in the wars o f the suzerain pow er w ith its neighbors. As Ottoman pow er waned, and as pressure from the outside became stronger, the R om anian princes and boyars w ere naturally tem pted to use the situation to their o w n advantage. A lth ough they always kept links w ith both the H ab s­ burg M onarchy and Poland, in the eighteenth century Russia, the great O r­ thodox power, seemed to offer the best hope o f assistance. As that state pressed toward the Black Sea, the tem ptation to act w ith the Russian leaders to throw o ff the O ttom an suzerainty became increasingly stronger. T h e first practical opportunity fo r cooperation came from the endeavors o f Peter the G reat to move southw ard and his conflicts w ith Charles X II o f Sweden. T he R o m a ­ nian leaders w ere gready impressed by the Russian victory over the Swedish king at Poltava in 1709. W elcoming R om anian support, the Russian governm ent at this time en­ tered into negotiations w ith Constantine Brincoveanu, the prince o f Walla­ chia (1688-1714), and D im itrie Cantem ir, the ruler o f M oldavia (17 10 -1711). A lthough an agreem ent was also reached w ith Brincoveanu, the m ajor R u s ­ sian achievement w as the conclusion o f the Treaty o f Lu ck w ith Cantem ir in April 1711. H ere the M oldavian prince secured not only advantages fo r his principality, but also his ow n personal position. It was agreed that M oldavia would becom e an independent state under the protection o f the tsar. C ante­ mir was to be prince, and the rule was to be hereditary in his family. In internal affairs the prince was to have m ore pow er than the boyars. U n fo r­ tunately for Cantem ir, the Russian cam paign was a disaster; Brincoveanu took no action. A fter the Russian arm y was defeated in Ju ly 1711, Cantem ir fled to Russia, w here he lived a highly productive literary life. A s a reward he received from the Russian governm ent fifty villages and fifty thousand serfs, together w ith tw o houses in St. Petersburg.22 Brincoveanu remained in office until 1714, w hen he and his four sons were beheaded by the O ttom an authorities on suspicion o f treason for their relations w ith Austria.

The Phanariot regim e T he defeat o f Peter and the defection o f Cantem ir had enormous political consequences for the Principalities. A fter the Treaty o f K arlow itz, in w hich Transylvania had been ceded, the Porte was naturally concerned about the political stability o f the frontier provinces. In a period ° f retreat before the European great pow ers, it needed princes w hom it could trust and w h o w ou ld not conspire w ith the enemy. T he native princes no 22

N icolac Io rg a, Histoire des relations russo-roumaines (Ia§i: N eam ul Rom Snesc, 1917), p. 128.

IOI

The eighteenth century longer appeared trustworthy. Since Phanariot Greeks had proven able ser­ vants in other areas o f administration, their appointm ent to the highest p o ­ sitions in the Principalities n ow seemed advisable. T h ere were already m any Greeks in both principalities. T h e attraction o f the Rom anian provinces for them was great. In Constantinople they could not display their new wealth and prestige conspicuously. M oreover, other areas did not offer the same opportunities for enrichment. F o r reasons o f personal security, individual preference, and safe investment o f funds, so many Greeks entered the Principalities in the seventeenth century that the boyar class felt threatened in its control o f landholding, public office, and the eccle­ siastical establishments. Despite much opposition, the Greek influence steadily increased. M an y wealthy Greeks married into the great boyar families. Som e became prosperous merchants, whereas others w on m any o f the high posi­ tions w ithin the O rthodox church hierarchy. T h e O ttom an appointm ent o f Phanariot princes introduced w hat is gen ­ erally regarded as the w orst period in m odern Rom anian history, not only because o f the corruption o f the system, but also because o f the uncontrolled fiscal exactions made by the Porte in the provinces. The choice o f Greek princes marked a fundamental change in the political position o f the prov­ inces. The new rulers were not representatives o f the Principalities, but agents o f the O ttom an governm ent sent to guard the interests o f the suzerain. They ranked as pashas o f tw o horsetails. From the O ttom an point o f view their function was to assure control o f the area against foreign intrigue and inter­ vention and to deliver huge sums o f m oney back to the Porte fo r its military and civilian needs. Th e securing o f food supplies was also necessary, both for the arm y and for the capital city. It w ill be noted that the Porte still did not turn the area into a pashalik, nor was it occupied by the O ttom an army. The provinces retained m ajor autonom ous rights, but the rulers were under direct O ttom an control. W ith the appointm ent o f Phanariot princes, the O ttom an governm ent did succeed in breaking the control o f the R om anian boyars over their country. A council o f great boyars still took part in the adm inistration; a larger coun­ cil, w hich included representatives from all the landow ning classes and the church, could be convened on certain occasions. H ow ever, the pow er in the governm ent remained firmly in the hands o f the ruler, w ith his retainers, appointees, and fam ily supporters. The boyars were left w ith relatively little political influence, although naturally the prince and his G reek contingent could not com pletely alienate the native aristocracy. Th e Phanariots had to w ork w ith them and through them; they could always find some w ith w hom they could cooperate. N ative boyar factions could also intrigue in C onstan­ tinople against the prince in office. D espite this loss o f political power, the native boyar still maintained his privileged position in relation to the rest o f the population, and despite the reform s o f die period, his hold over the land and the peasant was not significantly weakened. H e also paid few i f any taxes.

Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule Nevertheless, th roughout the period he remained discontented w ith the po ­ litical conditions. B oyar opposition to Phanariot rule was constant; individ­ uals and groups repeatedly sought outside assistance from both Vienna and St. Petersburg. C ertainly the boyar had much to com plain about. T he prince was n ow an agent o f the Porte. T h e provinces no longer had anything like an indepen­ dent o r separate stance in regard to foreign powers. T he Phanariots did con­ duct diplom atic negotiations, but as representatives o f Constantinople. The provinces had also no independent military forces. T he prince had a personal guard, and som e troops w ere available for the maintenance o f public order, but the country did not have the corps o f armed men that existed even in regions under direct O ttom an administration. B oth provinces gave the ap­ pearance o f being integral parts o f the em pire, and not self-governing depen­ dencies. M ost im portant, how ever, was the fact that the new rulers brought neither order nor prosperity, but instead increasing turm oil and internal anarchy. In the period o f Phanariot rule, from 1711 to 1821, eleven families provided can­ didates fo r seventy-four different reigns. T he average period in office fo r a prince was 2.5 years. Like the Patriarchates and the other high offices in C o n ­ stantinople, the H ospodarships in the Principalities were sold to the highest bidder. T h e com petition am ong the Phanariot families was intense. M ost offices w ere purchased on borrow ed money. Once in power, the successful candidate had to assure that he made a profit. H e sold low er offices and resorted to measures o f outright extortion. T he position o f Rom anian prince was thus expensive, and it was also dangerous. A s w e have seen, the Porte had a propensity for abrupt execution o f those w hose policies w ere displeas­ ing or unsuccessful. T h e question thus remains w h y Greek families com peted so strongly for w hat seems a dubious honor. Q uestions o f prestige w ere, o f course, im portant, but so was the fact that enorm ous profits could be made from the office. O ne authority has estimated that around the m iddle o f the eighteenth century the cost o f the Moldavian throne was 30,000 gold pounds; that o f Wallachia, 45,000. H ow ever, the annual tax income o f M oldavia was 180,oo o go ld pounds; that o f Wallachia, 300,o o o .23 Even after heavy tribute payments to Constantinople, these provinces remained rich sources o f private profit. T he Phanariot system was attacked not only for its fiscal and political cor­ ruption, but fo r its style and its G reek coloration. T he Phanariot ideal was the Byzantine Em pire. T h e princes could not be Byzantine despots in C o n ­ stantinople, but they could be in Bucharest and Ia§i. T h ey thus adopted an elaborate court cerem onial, surrounded themselves w ith articles o f great lux­ ury, and treated those beneath them, including often the native boyars, w ith contem pt and indifference in accordance w ith w hat they considered an im23

R u n cim an , The Great Church, p p. 374, 375·

1 03

The eighteenth century perial manner. T h ey w ere, nevertheless, always conscious o f the instability o f their power. A contem porary observer w rote: “ W hat is remarkable about these despots . . . is that all their riches, money, jewels, hordes and furnish­ ings, are always in trunks and traveling coffers, as i f they had to leave at any moment.” 24 A lthough it is possible to overestimate the damage caused by Phanariot rule, it is true that the princes did represent an influence that was foreign to the provinces over w hich they ruled. T h e restored Byzantium o f the Phan­ ariot dream w as indeed O rthodox, but it was not Rom anian. W hat the Phan­ ariot rulers accom plished was the establishment o f a Byzantine island within the O ttom an Em pire. G reek dom inance o f the Rom anian church has already been m entioned. Phanariots controlled the high offices and the synods. The rulers o f the Principalities in the past had always been generous in their do­ nations to O rthodox institutions and causes. T he gifts from the Phanariots tended to strengthen Greek influence. M ost im portant was the question o f the D edicated M onasteries. B oth G reek and Rom anian boyars increasingly gave land to certain monasteries, w hose incom e was devoted to the support o f H o ly Places, such as the H o ly Sepulchre, M t. Sinai, M t. A thos, o r a Pa­ triarchate. T h e direction o f the establishments was G reek; the heads, or hegum ens, w ere appointed by the H o ly Place in question. In time an eleventh o f the arable land o f the Principalities fell under the control o f these estab­ lishments, which not only were under foreign dom ination, but sent their profits out o f the country. Th e m ajor factor in the Principalities, that which determ ined the fate o f both the governm ent and the individual, was the enorm ous fiscal pressure o f the political regim e in power. H avin g purchased their offices, the rulers had to repay the loans, and they expected to make large personal profits. They had to support a luxurious court and make frequent payments to the right officials in Constantinople to assure that they stayed in favor w ith the Porte. T h ey also had to give regular contributions, outside o f the tribute and private bribes, to the O ttom an governm ent. T h ey recouped their m oney by selling the offices under their control and by the fraudulent handling o f state fi­ nances. H u g e sums o f m oney thus found their w ay to Constantinople and into the pockets o f the Phanariot supporters. Aside from the costs o f corruption, the Ottoman government was in des­ perate need o f money. Throughout the century pressure was put on the Prin­ cipalities to increase the money payments and the delivery o f food. The chief drain was the military and the high cost o f the wars. Moldavia and Wallachia not only paid for war expenses, but, as frontier provinces, suffered exceed­ ingly from the fact that much o f the fighting was on their territory. It will be remembered that between 1711 and 1812 the empire was engaged in six wars. 24

Q u o te d in R o b e rt W. S eton-W atson, A History sn;a ant[ Hercegovina see Jozo Tomasevich, Peasants, Pol­ itics, and Economic Change in Yugoslavia (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1955), pp. 96-107.

351

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 vention in favor o f the Balkan Christians i f extremely dangerous o r atrocious conditions arose. In the summer o f 1875 a revolt broke out in H ercegovina and rapidly spread into Bosnia. T he basic cause was the agrarian situation and the strained relations between the peasants and the landholders, both o f w h om , it w ill be remembered, were usually South Slavic in language and ethnic background, although they differed in religion. T h e m ovem ent was thus prim arily social and econom ic, not national, in nature. T he rebels were in a very strong position. T h ey were backed by the armed m ountain tribes inhabiting lands adjacent to M ontenegro, w h o were experienced fighters, and aid was received from Dalmatia. Th e Porte was thus called upon to sup­ press a rebellion in a region where previously it had found military operations costly and impractical. This event was to reopen the Eastern Q uestion and to lead to another Russo-Turkish War. T H E C R I S I S OF 1 8 7 5 - 1 8 7 8

Although the Balkan lands continued to be a center o f great-power concern, no major conflict erupted in the twenty years after 1856. The unification o f the Principalities, followed by the accession o f a foreign prince, and the re­ volts in Crete were settled by diplomatic means. One other major alteration occurred in the balance o f forces in the region. During the Franco-Prussian War, which broke out in the summer o f 1870, Russia adopted a policy o f benevolent neutrality in favor o f Prussia. When it became clear that this latter power would make enormous gains, the question o f compensation for Russia arose. The objective was clear. Ever since the signing o f the humiliating Treaty o f Paris, the first goal o f Russian foreign policy had been to break the terms o f this peace, in particular the clauses pertaining to the neutralization o f the Black Sea and the cession o f southern Bessarabia. The opportunity had now arisen when positive action could be taken. At the end o f October the Rus­ sian foreign minister, Alexander M. Gorchakov, denounced the Black Sea provisions in a circular note to the powers. His action caused particular con­ sternation in London because this limitation had been the major British achievement in the Crimean War. Nevertheless, a conference o f the signatory powers o f the treaty was held in London. They accepted the Russian action, and some alterations were made in the conditions surrounding the closure of the Straits. The Russian government was thus freed from the treaty restrictions pre­ venting it from fortifying its southern coast and maintaining a Black Sea fleet. Although very few measures were taken in this direction, a major block to Russian action in the Balkans had been removed. The Russian leaders, how­ ever, had no intention o f adopting adventurous policies. Instead, after the unification o f Germany, they supported the rebuilding o f the conservative alliance with Vienna and Berlin whose chief purpose was the preservation o f the status quo. The new alignment, known as the Three Emperors’ Alliance 352

War and, revolution, 18S6-1887 (Dreikaiserbund), was based not on signed agreements, but rather on the close relations that were maintained among the three monarchs, Alexander II, Franz Joseph, and William I, and the frequent consultations o f their min­ isters. The rulers exchanged visits, discussed questions o f current importance, and cooperated in international affairs. As long as these three powers re­ mained united, they formed the most powerful diplomatic combination in the world. In the past the danger spot in the relations o f these states had always been the N ear East, because o f the often contradictory interests o f Russia and the H ab sbu rg Em pire. Austrian fears o f Russian predominance in the Balkans were never laid at rest. T he rebellions in Bosnia and H ercegovina produced exacdy the type o f situation that had caused conflict in the past. M oreover, influences w ere at w ork w ithin Russia that could lead to friction between the tw o pow ers. A lth ou gh both G orchakov and the tsar, as well as m ost o f their principal advisers, w ere in favor o f continuing a policy o f retrenchment in foreign affairs, other elements in Russian society were arguing fo r m ore pos­ itive action. Alexander II always allowed much divergence o f opinion am ong his ministers, and he consulted different advisers on foreign policy matters. G orchakov was in his late seventies and was often sick. T he governm ent was thus open to the pressure exerted upon it by the adherents o f the Panslav doctrines, w hich had w on increasing popularity after the Crim ean War. T h e Panslavs had no single program o r spokesman. In general, they stood for the rem oval o f all the Slavic people from foreign, that is, O ttom an or H absburg, rule and their organization into a federation o f states in which Russia w o u ld take the leading role. T h eir emphasis was on the O rthodox Slavs: the Serbs, Bulgarians, and M ontenegrins. T h ey certainly did not stand for the liberation o f Polish territory from Russian rule; in fact, they regarded the C atholic Poles w ith extreme distrust and as traitors to their fellow Slavs. In foreign relations they tended to be more anti-Habsburg than anti-Ottoman. There was much talk about the road to Constantinople leading through V i­ enna. T h e central organization for the m ovem ent was the Slavic Benevolent Society, w hich was founded in 1858 in M oscow, w ith branches established later in other cities. It was this grou p that brought hundreds o f Bulgarian and other Slavic students to study in Russia. T he Panslavs had at their service a number o f talented publicists and journalists, including Ivan Aksakov, M . N. K atkov, R . A . Fadeev, and N . I. Danilevsky. It is im portant to note that although they w ere proponents o f radical action abroad, they were strongly conservative in dom estic politics. Thus they fully supported Russian autoc­ racy. Th e Panslav ideas offered a great attraction to large elements o f Russian society in the 1870s. Russia had been defeated in a m ajor European conflict; the great reform s w ere not achieving their expected goals. A united Germ any had been created, and although it was at present an ally, the unification marked a resurgence o f Germ an power. T he Panslav program offered a plan fo r R u s­

353

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 sian and Slavic greatness in a period o f apparent national weakness, and its doctrines attracted a large num ber o f highly influential people. B oth the em ­ press and the heir to the throne, the future Alexander III, w ere to have a part in the movement. Ignatiev, the ambassador at Constantinople, was a Panslav, but, as w e have seen, he was prim arily interested in using the Slavic people for Russian aims. Panslavism was in fact a fad; its influence in foreign policy was not long-lasting. H ow ever, a protracted period o f crisis that arose in the Balkans allowed its proponents to play an influential role in the form ation o f foreign policy. W hen the O ttom an Em pire was unable to suppress the uprising in Bosnia and H ercegovina, the members o f the Three Em perors’ Alliance consulted. A t this time the Russian governm ent recognized the priority o f the H ab s­ burg interests, because o f the geographic location o f the rebellion, and the lead in the negotiations was taken by the H absbu rg foreign minister, G yula Andrassy. In D ecem ber 1875 the three powers offered a reform proposal, the A ndrassy N o te, as a basis o f settlement. T he terms were accepted by the Porte, but refused by the insurgents. In M ay 1876 another program , the B er­ lin M em orandum , was form ulated, but it was rejected by the O ttom an g o v ­ ernment. B y this time the crisis had intensified, w ith the outbreak o f the Bulgarian revolt and the subsequent massacres. M eanw hile, political conditions had deteriorated in Constantinople. A com bination o f conservatives, w h o wished to return to old w ays, and liberals, w h o wanted to advance tow ard representative institutions, overthrew A bdul A ziz at the end o f May. M urad V then came to the throne. M entally impaired by the events surrounding him , the new sultan was never able to assume the duties o f his office. T he O ttom an governm ent was thus in a state o f confusion until A ugust, when the stronger and m ore determined A bdul H am id II came to power. D u rin g this period o f O ttom an weakness, conditions in the B al­ kans worsened. W ith the continuation o f the revolt and the increasing inter­ vention o f the great powers, the Montenegrin and Serbian governments found themselves under great pressure to take advantage o f the situation. In the past M ontenegro had been deeply involved in the affairs o f the neighboring lands. T he governm ent had designs on H ercegovinian territory and wanted to acquire an outlet on the Adriatic Sea. N egotiations had, as we have seen, been carried on w ith Serbia, particularly during the reign o f Prince M ichael O brenovic. A fter his death, the Serbian governm ent had adopted a more passive attitude and had shown less interest in national expansion. Milan was still you ng; foreign policy was under the direction o f Jo van Ristic, who was not in favor o f bellicose policies. D espite the lack o f official involvem ent, various groups continued the w ork o f national organization and propaganda. Th is was still an age o f romantic nationalism and revolutionary ardor. D uring the sum m er o f 1875 there was naturally great pressure on both M ilan and Prince N icholas o f M ontenegro to support the insurgents and to exploit the O ttom an weakness. Nicholas was quite w illing to take strong action, but

War and revolution, 18S6-1887 Milan hesitated. The elections had returned a majority that favored military action, but the prince recognized that the country was not ready for war. Moreover, all o f the powers, including Russia, were urging restraint. A lth ough official Russia was thus attem pting to prevent Serbia and M o n ­ tenegro from m oving, support for an opposite course o f action came from the Panslav circles w h o had actively involved themselves in the affair. M on ey and volunteers poured into the area. In M ay 1876 General M . G . Cherniaev, w h o had been responsible for the great Russian victories in Central Asia, arrived in Belgrade to take com m and o f the M orava section o f the Serbian army. T h e com bination o f Serbian public pressure and Panslav enthusiasm was too strong fo r M ilan. In Ju ly both Serbia and M ontenegro were at w ar with the Porte. Th e belligerents hoped that another uprising w ould occur in Bulgaria and that help w ould come from the insurgents in Bosnia and H e r­ cegovina. Nevertheless, the correctness o f M ilan’s judgm ent o n the unpre­ paredness o f his forces was soon demonstrated. T h e M ontenegrin arm y was quite successful, but Serbia faced disaster. C hem iaev proved a poor com ­ mander in this situation. There w ere few trained soldiers am ong the five thousand Russian volunteers, and they became the cause o f friction and con­ troversy. In contrast, the O ttom an army, strengthened by the reform s and w ith better equipm ent, was able to w in a series o f victories. W hen in O ctober the road to Belgrade had been opened, the Russian governm ent intervened, forcing the Porte to make an armistice at the beginning o f Novem ber.

During this period the representatives o f the Three Emperors’ Alliance kept in close touch. After the commencement o f the Balkan conflict, Gor­ chakov and Andrässy met in July in Reichstadt. Here they came to an under­ standing concerning their mutual interests in the crisis. Although there were to be important differences between the Austrian and the Russian version o f the decisions reached, the statesmen agreed on a policy o f cooperation and settled certain questions in connection with the war that was in progress. They decided that, should the Ottoman Empire win, the territorial status quo ante should be preserved. If, however, the Balkan states were victorious, a partition o f the Ottoman possessions would be undertaken, but no large Slavic state would be created. Montenegro and Serbia would receive exten­ sions o f territory; Greece would be given Thessaly and Crete. The remaining Ottoman lands would be divided into three autonomous states - Bulgaria, Rumelia, and Albania - whose territorial extent was not specified. Constan­ tinople was to become a free city. The two diplomats also provided for re­ wards for themselves. Russia was to receive back southern Bessarabia and an extension o f the Russian boundary in the Caucasus area; Austria-Hungary was to obtain compensation in Bosnia and Hercegovina. It was on this point that the two governments were later to disagree on what had been decided at Reichstadt. The Habsburg representatives later were to claim the right to annex or to determine the fate o f almost the entire area o f the two provinces; the Russian government, in contrast, asserted that only “ Turkish Croatia,” a 355

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 small area in northwest Bosnia adjacent to Dalmatia, had been assigned to Vienna. In any case, it was agreed that Serbia was not to gain its principal territorial objective. W hen it became clear that the tw o Balkan states w ou ld be defeated, and when the full extent o f the massacres in Bulgaria became known, a very strong public reaction against the O ttom an Em pire occurred in both Britain and Russia, which was to affect the attitudes o f both governm ents. In London the conservative cabinet o f Benjam in Disraeli found its policy o f supporting the O ttom an governm ent severely hampered. E ven m ore im portant, the Russian statesmen faced strong pressure from the Panslavs and those ele­ ments o f Russian society w h o felt that support should be given to the O rtho­ dox Slavic people in their struggle against O ttom an control. Serious prepa­ rations fo r w ar were com menced, but the responsible Russian statesmen still sought a peaceful solution. In an effort to achieve a settlement, representa­ tives o f all o f the great powers met in Constantinople in D ecem ber 1876. H ere they drew up proposals and presented them to the Porte. T h e O ttom an g o v­ ernment, however, took the occasion to issue a constitution, which it claimed gave full equality to all o f the O ttom an citizens and made the intervention o f the powers needless. T he European suggestions were thus rejected, and the conference broke up. D espite this failure, further efforts to settle the crisis through diplom acy continued from January to A pril 1877. With the failure o f these negotiations, the Russian leaders had to face the probability o f war. T h eir m ajor fear was that the events o f the Crim ean War m ight be repeated, and they m ight find themselves fighting a European coa­ lition. A ustria-H ungary and Britain caused the m ost concern. U n d er these circumstances it was considered essential that H absburg neutrality be as­ sured. In January and M arch 1877 further agreements were made that achieved this aim and reaffirmed the general partition arrangements o f Reichstadt. A t the same time an agreement on the passage o f troops was discussed with the Rom anian governm ent. Since a peaceful settlement seemed hopeless, the tsar in A p ril reluctandy came to the conclusion that w ar could not be avoided. O n A pril 16 the convention with Rom ania was signed; on A pril 24 the R u s­ sian troops crossed the Pruth River.

The Russian statesmen had wished to avoid a war because o f both their uncertainty over the reaction o f the other powers and their lack o f confidence in their own military capabilities. The reforms begun in the 1860s had not been completed, and the Black Sea defenses were not in readiness. During the war the Ottoman navy commanded the Black Sea. The Russian leaders fully realized the great financial burdens which a war would entail and for which they were not prepared. The difficulties o f the war justified many o f their previous apprehensions. After passing through Romania, the army 1° June crossed the Danube and thereafter won a series o f quick victories. Bul­ garian volunteer units joined the Russian troops. In July, however, the adv-

356

War and revolution, 18S6-1887 vance w as stopped at Pleven (Plevna), and the O ttom an arm y succeeded in holding this city until December. With this serious check, it became clear that the w ar w ou ld not be w o n quickly. In this situation the attitude o f the Balkan states became im portant. A t the beginning o f the campaign the Russian lead­ ers had shunned their assistance, looking upon their participation as a nui­ sance and a hindrance. The Balkan governments also wanted arms and money, w hich the Russians could not easily provide. H ow ever, w ith the failure o f Russia’s first offensive, assistance from the Rom anian, Serbian, and Greek armies took on another aspect. Each o f these governm ents, facing a decision about entering the war, found it under the circumstances not an easy one to make. M ontenegro w as still technically at w ar w ith the Porte; Serbia had made peace in M arch ; Greece was neutral. T he R om anian position was per­ haps the m ost com plicated. A lth ough the Rom anian governm ent had signed the agreement concern­ ing Russian passage, it had not imm ediately entered the war. In fact, the entire diplom atic situation caused great uneasiness in Bucharest. T he R o ­ manian leaders w ere concerned that the presence o f the Russian army in the country w ou ld lead to a return o f the conditions o f the protectorate. T h ey also, w ith justification, feared that Russia w ould take back southern Bessa­ rabia. To protect themselves against the possibilities, they had insisted that the treaty on troop passage contain assurances about R om anian “ territorial integrity and political rights.” O nce the hostilities com menced it was difficult for the Rom anian governm ent to remain passive, since nationalist public opinion pressed fo r action. O n M ay 21 the senate and the cham ber passed a resolution declaring the independence o f the country, which the prince signed the next day. N o great pow er recognized this act; it was chiefly significant for dom estic politics. Rom anian policy was being decided at this time principally by Charles, in cooperation w ith the Liberal statesmen Ion Bratianu and M ihail Kogalniceanu. T h e prince, in particular, disliked Rom anian neutrality. H e w ished to exploit the situation to make positive gains fo r his country. W hen after the Pleven defeat the Russian governm ent requested Rom anian participation, he was eager to agree, particularly when he was offered the com m and o f the operations around this beleaguered city. Rom anian troops thus w ent into action at Pleven and in the Vidin-Belgradchik area. Th e Serbian decision was m ore difficult. T he country was exhausted by the previous war. T he governm ent was also apprehensive about the territorial settlement that m ight follow the conflict. A t the Constantinople conference the powers had agreed on the establishment o f tw o autonom ous Bulgarian states, w ith the line o f division running from north to south. Areas claimed by Serbia, such as N i3 and Skopje, had been assigned to Bulgarian authority. The Serbian leaders thus wanted both assurances on what they w ould receive at the peace and financial assistance before they w ould com m it their country

357

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 to war. A lth ou gh they never received satisfactory assurances, they did enter the w ar on D ecem ber 13, after the fall o f Pleven. T h ey feared that i f Serbia did not fight, its claims w ou ld be ignored at the peace conference. T h e G reek governm ent w as, i f anything, in a w orse position than the other tw o states. O n the one hand, an opportunity had apparently arisen to gain m ore territory; on the other, the British governm ent exerted constant pres­ sure to prevent a G reek action. Even m ore dangerous, the Russian support w ould clearly be given to the Balkan Slavs, the Bulgarians in particular. Like the H absbu rg, British, and Rom anian governm ents, the G reek leaders o p ­ posed the creation o f large Slavic states. T h ey had been jolted by the deci­ sions o f the Constantinople conference, w hich had included territories they considered ethnically G reek in the Bulgarian provinces. T he ardent nation­ alists were convinced that M acedonia, Epirus, Thessaly, and Thrace w ere sol­ idly Greek in population. The question whether to enter the war or not caused a split in the governm ent, which was also under pressure from a public en­ thusiastic fo r war. Finally, in early February 1878, G reek troops crossed into O ttom an territory. W hen it was learned that an armistice had been signed between R ussia and the O ttom an Em pire on January 31, this arm y had to w ithdraw back behind its ow n borders. T h e victory had not been easy for the Russian forces to achieve. T h e ad­ vance had been stalled at Pleven until Decem ber, when the city was finally taken. Thereafter, the army had m oved sw iftly tow ard Constantinople. Fac­ in g a m ilitary disaster, the O ttom an governm ent asked fo r peace, and on January 31 the armistice was concluded at Adrianople. O ttom an and Russian representatives then negotiated a treaty, which was signed at San Stefano on M arch 3. A lth ough assurances were given that this agreement was “ prelim i­ nary” and that the terms involving a change in European treaties w ou ld sub­ sequently be reviewed by the powers, it caused consternation in the E u ro ­ pean capitals. T h e San Stefano settlement threatened to upset gravely the balance o f pow er in the N ear East, and it led to a protracted crisis. T h e negotiations had been conducted chiefly by Ignatiev, and the terms reflected his concern for Russian interests. F o r the great powers the most disturbing sections o f the agreement w ere those calling fo r the creation o f a large Bulgarian state w hose territories w ould include lands north and south o f the Balkan M ountains, M acedonia, and a large section o f Thrace (see M ap 24). It could be assumed that this state w ould be a Russian satellite. The treaty provided fo r a two-year occupation by the Russian army and Russian participation in the organization o f the governm ent o f the new autonom ous state. Th e geographical extent o f the country, together w ith the Russian m il­ itary occupation, w ould have placed Constantinople under a permanent threat from the north. W ith full control o f M acedonia, Bulgaria w ould also be the strongest Balkan power. O ther provisions o f the treaty were also disturbing. M ontenegro received a huge increase in territory; in fact, that state m ore than tripled in size. In

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Scale in miles

Map 24. The Treaty o f San Stefano; the Treaty o f Berlin contrast, Serbia received only about 150 square miles o f additional territory, much less than that assigned to M ontenegro. Rom ania received even worse treatment. D espite the fact that the state had joined in the w ar and thus had becom e a Russian ally, the treaty required that southern Bessarabia be surren­ dered in return fo r the D anube Delta and D obrudja. Greece and AustriaH u n g ary received nothing. D espite the secret treaties, the H absbu rg interest in B osnia and H ercegovina was not given recognition, and a large Slavic state had certainly been created. T h e agreem ent was chiefly detrimental to British and H absburg interests; both pow ers protested strongly. A British fleet entered the Straits. T h e R o ­ manian, Greek, and Serbian governments also made their dissatisfaction clear. T h e Serbian position was particularly difficult. It was obvious that Russian patronage w ou ld henceforth be placed exclusively behind Bulgarian national aims. In fact, the Russian governm ent told the Serbian representatives that they should look to Vienna for support. T h e Rom anian governm ent refused to accept the surrender o f Bessarabia and appealed to the other governments. A period o f extreme tension lasted through the spring months. Facing this opposition and fearful that it m ight have to deal w ith a situa­ tion sim ilar to the Crim ean War, the Russian governm ent backed dow n. In M ay it made an agreement w ith Britain w hose ch ief provisions included the division o f the large Bulgarian state. A ustria-H ungary was given assurances that its desires w ould be taken into consideration in relation to Bosnia and H ercegovina. In addition, R ussia agreed to attend a European conference that w o u ld take place in Berlin under the chairmanship o f the Germ an chan­ 359

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 cellor, O tto von Bism arck. Since the discussions w ould involve changes in existing European treaties, all o f the great powers - Russia, Britain, France, Germ any, Italy, A ustria-H ungary, and the O ttom an Em pire - w ere invited. There w as to be no participation by the Balkan states, although their govern­ ments w ere allow ed to send representatives to present their views at the ses­ sions that concerned their interests. T h eir opinions, in fact, were to have little, i f any, effect on the proceedings. T h e C ongress o f Berlin opened on June 13, 1878, and lasted a m onth. Its principal achievement was a partitioning o f a large part o f the O ttom an E m ­ pire, w hich lost control over m any o f its remaining Balkan possessions (see M ap 24). T h e large Bulgarian state was divided into three sections: Bulgaria, including the area to the north o f the Balkan M ountains together w ith the Sofia region, was to becom e an autonom ous tributary principality; Eastern Rum elia, the land between the Balkan and the Rhodope m ountains, received a sem iautonom ous status w ith an O ttom an appointed Christian governor and w as placed under great-pow er supervision; M acedonia and Thrace were returned to direct O ttom an rule. It was assumed that Russia w ould be the predom inant pow er in the autonom ous principality. To balance this Russian gain, A ustria-H ungary received the right to occupy and administer Bosnia and H ercegovina. In addition, the m onarchy w as allowed to occupy the Sanjak o f N o vi Pazar, a strip o f territory separating Serbia and M ontenegro. This territorial arrangem ent was the principal bargain o f the conference. A s a re­ sult, Russia gained a strong position in the eastern h alf o f the peninsula, with the H ab sbu rg E m pire assum ing a similar position o f dom inance in the west, including a m ajor influence in Serbia. F rom the point o f view o f the Balkan states, the results o f the conference were very disappointing. R om ania, M ontenegro, and Serbia were recognized as independent. M ontenegro obtained a port on the A driatic, but not as m uch territory as it wished. Serbia received only some additional land. A l­ though G reek claims were still not met, Article X X IV o f the treaty provided that the G reek governm ent should enter into negotiations w ith the Porte; should the tw o states not com e to an agreement on a territorial settlement, the great pow ers w ou ld mediate the dispute. D espite the protests o f the R o ­ m anian representatives at the conference, their governm ent was still required to surrender southern Bessarabia and to take in return the D anube D elta and Dobrudja. The recognition o f Romanian independence was attached to changes in the status o f the Jew s in the state, conditions that were strongly resented in Bucharest. Therefore, although all o f the Balkan governm ents received some com pensation, the treaty in no w ay met their aspirations. Th e m ajor losses w ere suffered, o f course, by the O ttom an Em pire. In addition to the lands that went to the Balkan states, the Porte had to cede even m ore im portant areas to the great powers. Russia, besides southern Bessarabia, acquired Batum , K ars, and Ardahan. Even before the Berlin con­ ference opened, Britain had com pelled the O ttom an governm ent to surren-

War and revolution, 1856-1887 der control o f the island o f C yprus, a m ajority o f w hose inhabitants were Greek. T h e greatest O ttom an resentment, however, was felt over the H ab s­ burg occupation o f Bosnia, H ercegovina, and the Sanjak. T he m onarchy had not defeated the Porte in a war, and the demand was totally unexpected. Th is settlement marked the effective end o f O ttom an pow er in the Balkan peninsula. A lth ough A lbania, M acedonia, as well as Thessaly and Epirus until 1881, w ere still under O ttom an administration, they could be held only with difficulty. A n A lbanian national m ovem ent had already taken shape. Both Bulgarian states, together w ith Bosnia, H ercegovina, and the Sanjak o f N o vi Pazar, were still technically a part o f the em pire, but the governm ent held no illusions that they w ould ever be returned to full O ttom an control. T h e peace was also very unpopular in Russia. It appeared to many R u s­ sians that their country had fought a cosdy w ar and received very little for its efforts. M o re than that, the governm ent had been called to account by E u ­ rope and had been forced to agree to the partition o f the large Bulgarian state, the one great achievement. It appeared that the real victors were B rit­ ain and the H ab sbu rg M onarchy; they had gained C yprus and BosniaH ercegovina. A lth ough this judgm ent was certainly true in regard to Britain, w h o had indeed w on a great diplom atic victory, the H ab sbu rg gains were to become a heavy liability. T he occupation o f Bosnia and H ercegovina, w ith their Serb, C roat, and M uslim population, was sim ply to add another na­ tional problem to a state that was unable to handle the controversies it al­ ready had. W orld War I was to have its immediate origin in just these issues. T he closing o f the C ongress o f Berlin in Ju ly 1878 did not mark the end o f the territorial changes occasioned by the Russo-Turkish War. The Greek claims had to be discussed and new boundary lines drawn. M oreover, the frontiers o f M on ten egro and A lbania had still to be settled. T h e Albanians were now com pelled to organize to defend their national lands.

A L B A N I A : T H E L E A G U E OF P R I Z R E N Th e treaties o f San Stefano and Berlin both assigned Albanian-inhabited land to other states. Th e inability o f the Porte to protect the interests o f a region that was 70 percent M uslim and largely loyal forced the Albanian leaders not only to organize for their defense, but also to consider the establishment o f an autonom ous administration like those which Serbia and the D anubian Principalities had enjoyed. T he revolt o f the Albanians against both the greatpow er decisions and the O ttom an authority com pelled the Porte once again to take action against this refractory M uslim population. The Albanian lands had never been easy for the governm ent to control. A t the beginning o f the century there had been tw o great pashaliks, which often acted independently o f the central governm ent. A li Pasha o f Janina, it w ill be remem bered, alternated between cooperating w ith and defying Constanti­ nople; the Bushati fam ily in Shkoder adopted a similar position. A fter the

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The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 death in 1796 o f Kara M ahmud Bushati, w ho had resisted the Porte, his brother, Ibrahim Pasha, was appointed as his successor in the governorship. O pposed to the policies o f K ara M ahm ud, Ibrahim governed in cooperation w ith the Porte until his death in 1810. A fter a struggle over the governorship, M ustafa Pasha Bushati came to pow er in 1811. A lth ough he too proved recalcitrant in his attitude, the O ttom an governm ent did not m ove against him because o f its prim ary concern with A li Pasha. M ustafa was able to bring a large area under his control and to w ork w ith the mountain tribes. In 1820, it w ill be remembered, M ahm ud I decided to crush A li Pasha. H e first discharged him from his official posts and then sum m oned him to C o n ­ stantinople. W hen A li refused, he was sentenced to death and an arm y was sent to Janina. T he fact that the O ttom an governm ent chose to concentrate its strength against Janina allowed the G reek rebels the opportunity to gain their first victories in the Peloponnesus and Rum eli. A lth ough m ost o f A li’s local allies deserted him, he was able to put up a strong resistance from his fortress city. Finally, in January 1822, O ttom an agents had him assassinated and his head was sent to Constantinople. T h e O ttom an arm y was then free to deal w ith the G reek revolt. M ustafa Pasha supported the O ttom an military efforts against both A li Pasha and the G reek rebels. In 1826 he took part in the victory at M isolonghi. Thereafter, he resumed his independent stance, but the war with Russia in 1828-1829 prevented the Porte from m oving against this defiant vassal. In 1830, how ever, the sultan was again free to act. H e dispatched M ehm ed R eshid Pasha to Albania. H ere the O ttom an general invited the principal A lbanian M uslim leaders to meet w ith him in Bitola in A u gu st 1830. Despite the safe-conducts that had been given, he massacred about five hundred o f these men. The most prominent begs and agas were thus eliminated. Mehmed R eshid then turned to defeat M ustafa Pasha. H e, however, surrendered and spent the rest o f his life as an official in Constantinople. This decisive action by the central government ended the period o f almost seventy-five years when the Albanian lands had been controlled by local leaders. T h e Albanian pashaliks had not been representative o f a national movement. T h ey were based on the pow er and influence o f a strong leader, A li Pasha, and o f the Bushati family. T h eir loyalties and allegiances could shift radically. T h ey fought both w ith and against the O ttom an army; they could cooperate w ith o r fight their G reek and Slavic neighbors. W ith the region back under its control, the Porte was able to introduce some reforms. A lth ough the timars were abolished in 1832, this measure had little effect on the country. In m ost areas the large estates had already passed into the full possession o f individual landholders. Th e O ttom an state too held huge tracts o f land. T he system o f large estates w ith M uslim owners was to remain predom inant, especially in the central lowland areas. In the m oun­ tains the tribal system was still in effect. Because o f this situation the question o f land reform o r peasant rights was not to become a m ajor issue until after

War and revolution, 18S6-1887 World War I. R u ral conditions were bad. A t this time, as before, there was a great deal o f em igration. Large Albanian colonies existed in Rom ania, E gyp t, Bulgaria, the U nited States, and Constantinople; the settlements in southern Italy have already been mentioned. A lbanian opposition to the Tanzimat reform s was to be expected. Like the Bosnians, the Albanian M uslim notables resented officials im ported from Constantinople and preferred to be governed by their ow n begs. T h ey sim i­ larly disliked the military reform s and the establishment o f a m odern army based on recruitment. Albanian m ilitary men had always fought for the O t­ toman Em pire, but they wished to retain traditional procedures and to follow their ow n leaders into battle. In Albania as in Bosnia, the Porte could not secure m any soldiers for the Crim ean War. In fact, it was difficult for the governm ent to enforce any o f its decrees in this M uslim society. Attem pts to control the highland regions w ere abandoned. There the population contin­ ued to run its ow n affairs under its tribal leaders according to the local laws and customs. Nevertheless, despite this widespread opposition, administrative changes were accomplished. N ew regional divisions were made, but at no time were the A lbanian lands joined in a single political unit. In 1836 the region was divided into the eyalets o f Janina and Rum elia, with Bitola as the center. In the reform s o f 1865 three vilayets were created: Shkoder, Janina, and B itola; a fourth, K o so vo , was added later. A ll had large populations o f other nation­ alities. A lth ou gh the Porte had by this time gained much experience in deal­ ing w ith national problem s, it did not look upon the Albanians as presenting a difficulty o f this sort. Since they were M uslim s, they were regarded as O t­ tomans despite their distinctive language and past history. Indeed, up to this time there had been no national movement comparable to those which we have seen in other Balkan regions. Som e intellectuals had been aware o f the issue, but there was no central organization and no real national program . Th e negotiations am ong the powers in 1878 forced a radical change in the Albanian attitude. T h e Treaty o f San Stefano, which assigned Albanianinhabited territory to Serbia, M ontenegro, and the Bulgarian provinces, vir­ tually com pelled a defensive action. In the spring o f 1878 prom inent A lbani­ ans in Constantinople organized a secret committee. T he m ost im portant individual here was A bd u l Frasheri, w h o was to remain the leading figure in the early stages o f the Albanian national movement. In M ay this group de­ cided to call a general m eeting at Prizren that w ould be com posed o f repre­ sentatives from all o f the Albanian lands. Th e vital necessity o f the form ation o f a central authority and the organization o f an armed force was recognized. O n June 10 the conference opened at Prizren. It was attended by about eighty delegates from the four vilayets; the representatives were predom i­ nantly M uslim religious leaders, notables, and clan chiefs. T h ey decided to set up a permanent organization w ith its headquarters in Prizren; it was to be under the direction o f a central committee. A netw ork o f regional orga-

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The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 nizations in other areas o f the country w ould be subordinate to this authority. T he central committee w ould have the pow er to levy taxes and raise an army. D urin g the meetings a division o f opinion arose that was to be o f fundam en­ tal importance at this stage o f Albanian national development. Th e m ajor issue to be setded was the attitude to be taken toward the O ttom an govern­ ment. A t first the Porte gave support to the Albanian actions. It, however, wanted the representatives to declare themselves Ottom ans, not Albanians. Th ose w h o supported this position urged the new organization to emphasize its M uslim O ttom an com position and to direct its ch ief efforts tow ard de­ fending all M uslim lands, including Bosnia. A second group, under the lead­ ership o f Frasheri, stressed the unity o f all Albanians no m atter w hat their religion. These men wished to concentrate on the achievement o f predom i­ nantly Albanian goals and to seek to secure an autonom ous administration. Since m ost o f the delegates were conservative M uslim s, the conference in the end supported the maintenance o f O ttom an suzerainty. D espite these differences o f opinion, a central authority was established w ith a center at Prizren. Thereafter the League o f Prizren, o r the Albanian League, was to direct the efforts made to prevent the implementation o f the treaties. O ther centers also were established, o f which the best know n to the outside w orld was that at Shkoder. H ere Catholics and M uslim s w orked to­ gether. Prenk Bib D oda, a M irdite mountain captain, played a prominent role in events in this region. O ne o f the main tasks undertaken by the Prizren assembly was the dis­ patching o f a m em orandum to the C ongress o f Berlin. Th is appeal had no m ore effect on the great-pow er decisions than had those o f any other Balkan nationality. In the Berlin treaty M ontenegro was assigned the cities o f Bar (Antivari) and Podgorica, together w ith the districts o f G usinje and Plav, w hich the A lbanian leaders regarded as integral parts o f their ow n lands. T h ey w ere also concerned about the future territorial settlement w ith Greece. There was a strong internal reaction against the cessions to M ontenegro and against the Porte, w hich had not defended the Albanian regions. Centers o f resistance w ere established, in particular in the areas near the border, that is, Prizren and Shkoder in the north and Prevesa and Janina in the south. The Albanian defiance w as aided by the fact that able fighting men w ere available for action. Like M ontenegro, Albania had a large supply o f armed men w ho regarded m ilitary valor as the highest virtue. In A ugu st 1878, the powers, as provided for in the Treaty o f Berlin, set up a com m ission to delineate the Turkish-M ontenegrin border. T h ey expected the Porte to enforce the decisions upon the local population, despite the fact that the O ttom an forces in the region were not strong enough to do so. A lthough it made some efforts to implement the treaty provisions, the O t­ toman governm ent could only benefit from Albanian resistance. It gave the rebels arms, and it approved their collection o f taxes. In m any areas where

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W ar an d revolution, 1856-1887 the O ttom an forces were obligated to w ithdraw by the peace agreements, the Albanians sim ply took control after the Turkish evacuation. T h e A lbanian forces, nevertheless, had to be prepared to fight both the M ontenegrins and the O ttom an army. T h ey w ere very successful against M ontenegro. T h e Albanian reaction was so strong that the powers decided to switch the territories involved. Instead o f Gusinje and Plav, they gave M ontenegro the port o f U lcinj (D ulcigno). T he Albanians firmly resisted the surrender o f this city too. To force the transfer the European pow ers set up a naval blockade, and they pressed the O ttom an governm ent to act. M eanw hile, difficulties had arisen in the south. T he Treaty o f Berlin had directed Greece and the O ttom an Em pire to enter into negotiations. In these the Porte naturally wished to give up as little territory as possible. A t the same time A lbanian committees w ere organized at Prevesa and Janina. Th ey were w illing to accept a cession to Greece o f Thessaly, but not o f Epirus, w hich they claimed was Albanian. Once again O ttom an authorities sup­ ported the resistance and provided arms. In M ay 1881 the powers decided that only the relatively small A rta district o f Epirus should be given to Greece, which received also Thessaly. T he O ttom an governm ent at this point faced a difficult choice. It was un­ der strong pressure from the European powers to enforce the transfer o f Ulcinj to M ontenegro, and there w ere aspects o f the Albanian movement that could bring a challenge to the Porte’s authority in the region. A s w e have seen, m any A lbanian leaders, w ith a grow in g consciousness o f their ow n national individuality, supported a program calling for the unification o f the Albanian-inhabited lands into a single political unit w ith the capital at B itola; Albanian was to be the language o f governm ent and education. T h ey did not seek independence because they recognized that the country was too weak to stand alone. Th is attitude did not receive general acceptance. T h e division o f opinion was show n in a m eeting held by the League in July 1880 in Gjirokaster, w hich was attended by delegates from all the Albanian regions. H ere Frasheri presented the arguments fo r an autonom ous organization. A ccord­ ing to his plan, the Porte w ould appoint a governor fo r A lbania, tribute w ould be paid to the em pire, and support w ould be given in war, but oth­ erwise the country w ould administer its ow n affairs. A t this congress and at another held at D ib er in O ctober 1880, attended by about three hundred representatives, the conservative forces supporting a close union w ith the O ttom an E m pire were stronger than those favoring a truly autonom ous status. The entire m atter was to be settled by force. A lthough the Porte at first hesitated on the policy to follow, it finally determined, both from domestic and from international considerations, to suppress the League and deliver Ulcinj to M ontenegro. A large army under D ervish Pasha was sent to A l­ bania, where it received assistance from loyal Albanians. T he League at-

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The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 tem pted to resist, but in A pril 1881 Prizren was taken and the m ovem ent collapsed. T he resistance in U lcinj was similarly crushed. T he O ttom an offi­ cials did not take strong reprisals: T he leaders were arrested and som e were deported. Frasheri him self was captured, sentenced to death, and then to life im prisonm ent instead. H e was released in 1885, but remained in exile until his death in 1892. T h e O ttom an governm ent restored the centralized adm inistra­ tive system. Som e Albanians were named to official posts, but no other moves w ere made tow ard political autonomy. Since the m ajority o f the population was M uslim , the Porte continued to regard the Albanians prim arily as O tto ­ mans. D espite the final failure, the League o f Prizren had accom plished a great deal. B oth M ontenegro and Greece received significantly less Albanian terri­ tory than they w ou ld have gained w ithout the organized protest. M oreover, the great pow ers were made aware o f the existence and separate national interests o f the Albanian people. T he danger that A lbanian lands w ould be partitioned am ong the neighboring Balkans states remained, but at least a first step had been taken in the direction o f national organization. BULGARIAN U N IFICATIO N , 1878-1887 T h e division o f the Bulgarian state set up in the San Stefano treaty was nat­ urally a bitter blow to the Bulgarian nationalists. T h ey thereafter regarded the boundary draw n by this treaty as the state’s correct border, and its attain­ ment became the national goal. D espite this disappointm ent, much had been achieved. Tw o Bulgarian states were in existence, and it was generally ex­ pected that Eastern Rum elia w ou ld eventually join the autonom ous princi­ pality (see M ap 25). In addition, changes had occurred in the countryside that w ere to the advantage o f the Bulgarian peasantry. D u rin g the war, the Bulgarians had seized O ttom an lands and personal property. Even m ore im ­ portant, thousands o f M uslim s had fled southward tow ard Constantinople. D u rin g the centuries o f O ttom an rule a large M uslim and Turkish population had settled in the territory south o f the Balkan M ountains. A lth ough the Treaty o f Berlin confirmed the rights o f these people, neither the Bulgarians nor the Russians intended to allow them to remain. In A u gu st 1878 a Russian order stipulated that a M uslim accused o f crimes w ould be tried in a military court; some executions were carried out as a result o f this measure. Other M uslim owners were victims o f extreme harassment. U n der these conditions m ost M uslim s w ere afraid to return to o r to stay in their form er homes. In the end the Bulgarian peasants acquired the land after m aking a paym ent to the state, and som e com pensation was paid to the original owner. T he land settlement resulting from the w ar was thus to accelerate the developm ent o f Bulgarian agriculture in the direction it had already taken. Like Serbia, B u l­ garia was henceforth to be prim arily a land o f small peasant farms. Because o f the process by w hich Bulgarian autonom y had been w on , there

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was in 1878 no recognized central authority. In the movements in other lands - in M ontenegro, Serbia, Greece, and the D anubian Principalities - a na­ tional leadership had been form ed before the state passed ou t o f O ttom an control. D espite the fact that n o similar developm ent had occurred in B u l­ garia, the people did have som e administrative experience. T h ey had held posts in the O ttom an administration, and the village com munities had run their ow n affairs. A s in other Balkan states, the change to an autonom ous regim e did not involve a social upheaval. Those w h o had run local affairs under O ttom an rule n o w began to direct the nation.

The organization o f the first national government was made the responsi­ bility o f the Russian government. The Treaty o f Berlin limited the Russian army occupation to nine months. Russia’s major gain from the war was the creation o f the autonomous Bulgarian state, and the Russian officials were determined to establish a strong and stable government that would be closely tied to Russia in the future. Although it was not stated in the treaty, all of the powers recognized Russian predominance in the area. As had been the case in regard to the Danubian Principalities after the war o f 1828-1829, it was in the Russian interest to have Bulgaria become a model principality. Moreover, the Russian representatives wanted to set up an administration 367

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 that w ould serve as a point o f attraction to the Bulgarians o f Eastern Rum elia and that w ou ld aid in an eventual unification. T he Russian governm ent thus accepted for Bulgaria m odern and progressive institutions that were far in advance o f those existing in Russia itself. It must be remem bered that Russia at this time was an autocracy and had no national representative institutions whatsoever. T h e Russian com missioner, Prince A . M . D ondukov-K orsakov, assumed in Bulgaria the tasks that had been undertaken previously by K iselev in the Principalities. H e and his assistants drew up a draft constitution, based on the Serbian and Rom anian examples, that provided for a strong executive. It was sent to St. Petersburg and there examined by various committees. A fter it was returned to Bulgaria, it was considered by a constitutional assembly, which met at T u rn ovo in February 1879. T he Russian authorities made it clear that the draft was only a suggestion and that the assembly w as perfectly free to alter its stipulations. T h e constitutional assembly was attended by 231 delegates, o f w hom 89 w ere elected and the rest chosen from am ong church and civil notables. The representatives soon divided into tw o camps, the Liberals and the C onserv­ atives. T he basis o f disagreem ent was the issue o f h ow much pow er should be given to the executive, and h ow much to the legislative branch o f govern­ ment. Since the Liberals w ere stronger, the T u rn o vo constitution placed the real pow er in the hands o f an assembly that was to be elected by universal m anhood suffrage. Provision was also made for a second assembly to be sum ­ m oned only on special occasions, such as the confirmation o f a new ruler, the am ending o f the constitution, o r the discussion o f questions regarding the disposition o f Bulgarian territory. A s in the neighboring countries, a central­ ized administrative system was introduced. T he state was divided into de­ partments and districts, w hose officials were appointed by the central govern ­ ment. M ore pow er than in other Balkan states, however, was given to the local population on the lowest level o f administration, the com m unes, in recognition o f their historic role in Bulgarian life. H ere an elected council chose the mayor. A lth ough a Bulgarian assembly was chiefly responsible fo r the constitu­ tion, the great powers chose the ruler. T h ey named the twenty-two-year-old prince o f H esse, A lexander o f Battenberg, to the position. H e had the enor­ mous advantage o f being related to the British royal fam ily as well as to the tsar, w hose w ife was the sister o f A lexander’s father. Bulgaria, like Greece and Rom ania, thus had a ruler from a European dynasty o f considerable prestige. T h e prince was an extremely able man, but he had no background in Balkan affairs and, o f course, no experience in dealing w ith the problem s o f consti­ tutional governm ent. M eanw hile, the powers had supervised the establishment o f an administra­ tion in Eastern Rum elia that represented the w orst that can com e from in­ ternational collaboration. In A pril 1878 an O rganic Statute was issued that

War and revolution, 18S6-1887 was the product o f a mixed com m ission, w ith the British, Italian, H absburg, French, and Russian representatives each drafting a section. T he result was a docum ent o f 495 articles that was much too com plicated for the province. T h e mess thus created is illustrated by the comments o f the British consul in Plovdiv on the French-sponsored administrative regulations: B efore the w ar o f 1877, the present Province o f Eastern Rum elia was divided into two Sandjaks and fourteen Cazas. The tw o Prefects with the fourteen Baillis w h o then governed the Province were found more than sufficient. Now, then to the System with which the French delegate has endow ed it, there are six Departm ents and twenty-eight Cantons, and consequently, six Préfets, six “ Conseils généraux,” six “ Com m issions permanentes,” twenty-eight “ Baillis,” twenty-eight “ Com m andants de Gendarmerie,” twenty-eight “ Com m issaires de Police” and so forth . . . O bscure Ham lets which before the War never saw an Official - except the tax collector - have n o w been erected into “ C h e f lieux de Cantons” w ith each o f them a “ B ailli” “ Com m andant de Gendarm erie” “ Com m issaire de Police” a “ Juge de C anton” a “ Percepteur de Finance” a “ Caissier” a “ C h e f des C o n ­ tributions indirectes” and a Brigade o f Gendarm erie consisting o f six o r eight gendarmes . . . A province which contains at the utmost 800,o o o inhabitants - the population o f a C ity o f the second rank has been endow ed w ith an Executive w orthy o f a K ingd om . Besides the G overn or General, there is the Secretary General or D irector o f the Interior, D irectors o f Justice, Public Works, Education, and a C om m ander in C h ie f o f M ilitia and Gendarm erie.5 T he first governor was A leko Pasha. H e had associated w ith him an assem­ bly o f fifty-six mem bers, o f w hom thirty-six were elected. A leko soon w on the disfavor o f both the Russian and the O ttom an governm ents. W hen his term o f office expired, he was replaced by G avril Effendi Krustevich. A s could be expected, from the beginning there was a strong desire for unification w ith Bulgaria. A t first the Russian representatives supported any activity in this direction. Com m ittees were organized and “ gym nastic societies,” w hose members could be used for revolutionary activities, were founded. Lo cal R u m elian officials too expected that union was only a m atter o f time. T he main Russian effort was made in Bulgaria proper. A s they had done in the Principalities, the Russian agents expected to have a strong influence in the running o f the governm ent. T he ch ief diplom atic representative was A . P. Davydov, the consul-general in Sofia. The real source o f Russia’s strength, 5

Q u o te d in C harles Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism: Russian Influence in the Internal Affairs o f Bulgaria and Serbia, 1879- 18 S6 (Berkeley: U niversity o f C alifornia Press, 1958), pp- 209 - 2 10 .

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The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 how ever, lay in its control over the new Bulgarian army, w hich w as in the process o f form ation. T he minister o f w ar for Bulgaria, General P. D . Parensov, was a Russian, as were all o f the officers above the rank o f captain. T h e Russian War M inistry expected to be consulted on all matters o f im por­ tance. T h is arrangement gave the Russian governm ent a m ilitary strongpoint in the heart o f the Balkan peninsula and near Constantinople. It should also have assured it full political dom ination in the principality. Three centers o f political pow er em erged at this point: the prince, the political parties, and the Russian agents. T he situation was further com pli­ cated by the fact that the Russian representatives did not agree. Instead, the diplom atic and military agents supported different parties. A lexander soon found that he could not govern w ith the constitution, which he thus wished to change. H is position was supported by the Conservative party and by D avydov. In contrast, the Liberals and General Parensov opposed the move. In 1881 T sar Alexander II was assassinated. H e was succeeded by his son, A lexander II I, w h o was extremely conservative in political orientation. Prince A lexander was thus able to obtain Russian support fo r the suspension o f the constitution. Relations, however, were soon to become worse. T he tsar and the prince, although cousins, did not get along well. Alexander I I I did not w ant to be treated as a relative, but as the ruler o f a m ighty em pire to w hom the Bulgarians ow ed gratitude and deference. M oreover, by this time increas­ ing numbers o f Bulgarians had become tired o f Russian interference. B y 1883 the situation developed to the point where the prince and the political parties joined together to form a com m on front against the Russian officials. In return for Liberal support, the prince restored the T um ovo constitution. Faced w ith this opposition, the Russian diplom ats changed their attitude toward the union o f Bulgaria and Eastern Rum elia. W hereas previously they had favored the measure and had made it one o f their m ajor aims in foreign policy, they now sought to prevent an action that w ou ld increase the prestige and pow er o f a prince w hom they wished to replace. M atters had nevertheless progressed too far in Eastern Rum elia. In Sep­ tem ber 1885 a revolt broke out in Plovdiv that was quickly successful. The leaders took control o f the governm ent and declared the union o f the pro v­ ince w ith Bulgaria. T h e revolution placed Prince Alexander in a very difficult position. In the previous m onth he had met w ith the Russian foreign m in­ ister, N . K . G iers, and had given assurances that he w ould not prom ote a unification. T h e union was also in violation o f the Treaty o f Berlin and could not be accomplished without great-power approval. Russian opposition could beexpected. Nevertheless, the prince was fiilly aware that, unless he retained the leadership o f the Bulgarian national movement, he w ould lose his throne. H e therefore accepted the situation and gave his full support to union. Th e Russian reaction was angry and immediate. A ll o f the Russian officers were recalled, a m ove that was intended to leave Bulgaria defenseless. Serbia, expecting Bulgaria to be weak as a result o f the internal crisis, de­

War and revolution, 18S6-1887 cided to take advantage o f the situation. U ntil this time M ilan’s reign had not been much o f a success. A personally unpopular ruler, he had achieved little in the national interest. H is army had been defeated in the w ar w ith the O ttom an Em pire in 1876. T h e territorial additions gained in the Treaty o f Berlin w ere small com pensation for the previous sacrifices and expectations. T h e H ab sbu rg M onarchy was in occupation o f exactly those lands which the Serbian nationalists had desired. M oreover, M ilan had been forced to sign an agreement w ith Vienna that placed him under the dom ination o f the m on­ archy. Russian favor and support had until the mid-i88os gone to the B u lgar­ ians. T h e unification o f the tw o Bulgarian states in 1885 did indeed upset the balance o f pow er in the Balkans, and M ilan felt that he could not allow this change w ithout gaining compensation. To enforce this position, his govern ­ ment declared w ar in N ovem ber and commenced an invasion o f Bulgaria. To the surprise o f most observers, the Serbian army was decisively beaten. AustriaH u n gary was forced to intervene to protect its Balkan ally. Peace was made sim ply on the basis o f the restoral o f the prewar conditions.

Although the Bulgarian government gained no concrete rewards from the victory, the powers were compelled to recognize that the union would have to be accepted. The great problem was the enforcement of the terms o f the Berlin treaty. As the suzerain power, the Porte would have to carry out any military measures taken, and no government wanted to allow the Ottoman army into the area. Moreover, the Bulgarian defiance o f Russia changed the British attitude. The previous objection to a large Bulgaria had been based on the assumption that the state would be a Russian puppet and a permanent danger to Constantinople. Now that Prince Alexander was opposing his pro­ tector, the British reaction was favorable. The Habsburg attitude was similar. Given this situation, the Russian government had no practical means of blocking the unification. A compromise solution was therefore reached. The Porte recognized the personal union of the two states and appointed Alex­ ander as governor of Eastern Rumelia for a five-year term. Despite this lim­ itation, the prince proceeded to govern both areas as if they were one political unit. The two assemblies were immediately joined together. These events naturally caused profound discontent in St. Petersburg. If union was to be accomplished, the Russian statesmen had wished it to be under their sponsorship and with the credit going to them rather than to the prince. As could be expected, they laid the blame for this awkward situation on Alexander. Most Russian officials were firmly convinced that the Bulgar­ ian people were deeply pro-Russian and loyal to their leadership. Believing that their partisans would command popular support, they therefore coop­ erated in the organization of the opposition to the prince. In Bulgaria at this time, as in every country, there were a number o f dis­ contented elements, including some army officers who felt that their talents had not been sufficiendy rewarded. A conspiracy was organized with the knowledge o f the tsar and of the Russian ministers o f foreign affairs and war. 371

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 On the night of August 2 0 -2 1, 1886, a group of officers seized the prince, forced him to sign an abdication, and escorted him out of the country. A revolutionary government was then set up. This military coup and the kid­ napping of the prince had litde popular backing. A counterrevolution under the direction of Stephen Stambolov, a Liberal politician, soon overturned the new regime. Alexander was then invited to return. After crossing the border into Bulgaria, the prince made a grave mistake. Hoping to win Rus­ sian support, he sent the tsar a telegram stating: “As Russia gave me my crown, I am prepared to give it back into the hands of its Sovereign,” an offer that was prompdy accepted.6 This ill-judged action was resented by the Bul­ garian patriots, who did not wish to remain in political subservience to St. Petersburg. Alexander had no other alternative than to abdicate. A regency was appointed and the prince left the country. Stambolov remained the most prominent national leader. When it became apparent that his government would retain a defiant attitude, the Russian government broke relations with the state on whose establishment so much effort had been expended. A special assembly was summoned to choose a new Bulgarian ruler. The position o f the country was very difficult. The powers had expected that Bul­ garia would remain in the Russian sphere. Its break with St. Petersburg marked a significant alteration in the balance of power in the peninsula and the Black Sea region. The shift won the enthusiastic approval not only of Great Britain, but also of Austria-Hungary. Nevertheless, the Bulgarian leaders had a great deal of difficulty in finding another prince. No power had officially recog­ nized the new situation or wished to defy Russia openly on the issue. Finally, Ferdinand o f Saxe-Coburg accepted the office and became prince in August 1887.

Ferdinand’s position was very precarious. He did not have great-power sanction. He could expect that conspiracies would be formed against him with Russian approval and assistance. At first he ruled in cooperation with Stambolov, but in 1894 disagreements forced the Bulgarian minister to re­ sign. He was assassinated in 1895. By this time Ferdinand recognized that, because his own situation was so tenuous, regular relations would have to be restored with Russia. In addition, he and the other Bulgarian leaders were well aware that they could not attain their territorial objectives in Macedonia without great-power assistance, and this support could come only from Rus­ sia. The new tsar, Nicholas II, and the Russian diplomats also were in favor of a rapprochement. Regular relations were restored in 1896, and Russia and the other powers then recognized Ferdinand. The union had been accepted as permanent. A united Bulgarian state under a foreign prince had thus been established. Although it was still in theory under the suzerainty of the Porte, that govem6

Q u o te d in C . Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, p. 258.

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War and revolution, 18S6-1887 ment had no influence within the country. Great advances had been made. However, the nationalists still considered the Bulgaria defined by the Treaty o f San Stefano as their goal. Events in Macedonia were followed with close attention. The Bulgarian unification and the deposition of Alexander had caused major international crises in the 1880s. Macedonia was to be the next center o f conflict in the Balkans. THE EASTERN QUESTION, 1887-1897: A D E C A D E OF R E L A T I V E Q U I E T

The predominant diplomatic alignment of the period before 1878 was, as we have seen, the Three Emperors’ Alliance. The extreme Russian dissatisfaction with the meager results o f the Russo-Turkish War was thereafter turned not against the outright opponent, Britain, but against the Russian allies, in par­ ticular Germany. Many Russian statesmen felt that the German government had not returned in kind the benevolent assistance that St. Petersburg had rendered during the period o f German unification. When relations became particularly strained in 1879, Bismarck looked for alternate diplomatic com­ binations. The Three Emperors’ Alliance o f the 1870s had been an informal entente. In the future, in contrast, the international alignments were to be based on written engagements that specified the obligations of the partners. These were in theory secret, but their general contents were usually known. The Balkan states became associated with the alliances o f the great powers either direcdy, through supplementary agreements, or indirectly, through some sort o f special relationship with one of their members. In the negotiations after 1878 the principal responsibility was taken by Bis­ marck. Germany, the strongest European state, stood at the center o f the diplomatic stage. It will be noticed that Balkan issues played a key role in the formation of the alliances. The Dual Alliance, signed by Germany and AustriaHungary in October 1879, was the first agreement made at this time. A de­ fensive alliance directed against Russia, it obligated its members to go to war should either be attacked by Russia. The treaty was particularly significant because it involved Germany deeply in Balkan affairs and on the side of Vi­ enna. Despite the distrust that had developed between Russia and the Habs­ burg Empire, Bismarck was able to bring all three courts together again in June 1881 when the Three Emperors’ Alliance was revived, this time in the form o f a written agreement. A general neutrality pact, this document had clauses dirtcdy affecting the Balkans. The signatories agreed that Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia could unite at a propitious time and that the Habsburg Empire could annex Bosnia-Hercegovina under favorable circumstances. All three powers were to consult on any changes that occurred in the Balkans, and the Russian interpretation of the closure of the Straits was accepted. A third agreement, the Triple Alliance, followed in May 1882. It linked

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The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 Germ any, Italy, and Austria-H ungary. A lthough it was directed at first pri­ marily against France, it too was to have great significance for Balkan affairs. R egard in g their country as an equal great pow er, and dissatisfied w ith the failure to make gains at the C ongress o f Berlin, the Italian statesmen wished to share in influence in the Balkans. A t each renewal o f the pact, which o c­ curred every five years, the Italian governm ent pressed for the recognition o f its position. T he ch ief interest was show n in the fate o f the Albanian regions, w here Italy hoped to play a role similar to that o f R ussia in the eastern part o f the peninsula and A ustria-H ungary in the west. B y 1883 a pattern o f alliances had thus been form ed, w ith G erm any at the center. T h is netw ork included Serbia and Rom ania. A fter 1881 Serbia became associated w ith the H ab sbu rg Em pire through a series o f agreements, and in 1883 the R om anian and H absbu rg governm ents concluded a defensive alli­ ance directed against Russia, to which Germ any later adhered. Since these treaties w ere defensive in nature, their obligations did not conflict w ith those undertaken by G erm any and A ustria-H ungary in the Three Em perors’ A lli­ ance. T h ey did, however, tie the Balkan states to Vienna and Berlin. T h e weakest alignment was obviously that o f the Three Em perors’ A lli­ ance. T h e basis o f an understanding between Russia and the H absbu rg M o n ­ archy was an implicit division o f the Balkans into tw o spheres o f influence, w ith R ussia predom inant in Bulgaria. It was this balance that A lexander o f Battenberg and then Ferdinand o f Saxe-C oburg destroyed. H ab sbu rg sup­ port o f the Bulgarian actions made the renewal o f the alliance in 1887 im pos­ sible. Since neither R ussia nor Germ any wished to break their partnership, another pact, the Reinsurance Treaty, was signed by these tw o powers. It was basically a neutrality agreement, but Germ any assured the Russian govern ­ m ent in a secret protocol that support w ould be given in securing a favorable regim e in Bulgaria and in maintaining the closure o f the Straits. A s long as R ussia did not have adequate coastal fortifications or a strong Black Sea fleet, its governm ent wished to make certain that in case o f w ar the British fleet could not enter the Black Sea; the tw o countries were in conflict in Central A sia and A fghanistan, as well as in the N ear East.

Although Germany had apparendy joined with Russia on the Bulgarian question, Bismark at the same time gave tacit approval to the formation of a counter-alignment, the Mediterranean Agreements. These informal under­ standings linked Britain, Italy, Austria-Hungary, and Spain against French expansion in northern Africa and in support o f the status quo in the Medi­ terranean and Black Sea regions - language that implied backing for Ferdi­ nand’s rule in Bulgaria. This alignment made any Russian military action in Bulgaria almost impossible and led to St. Petersburg’s eventual acceptance of the new regime. This elaborate alliance system was upset w hen the Germ an em peror, W il­ liam II, in 1890 dropped the Reinsurance Treaty and accepted Bism arck’s res­

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War and revolution, 18S6-1887 ignation. B oth France and Russia w ere thus out o f any diplom atic system. N either could afford to remain isolated. In 1891 and 1894 they signed first a military agreem ent and then an alliance. T h e Continent was thus divided into tw o diplom atic camps. O n one side stood Russia and France; on the other G erm any and the H ab sbu rg Em pire were joined by the D ual Alliance, and Germ any, Italy, and the m onarchy by the Triple Alliance. R om ania and Serbia were associated w ith what came to be known as the Central Pow ers by sup­ plem entary agreements. T he break between Berlin and St. Petersburg in 1890, which w as com pletely a Germ an initiative, was to be extremely significant for Balkan affairs. Germ an prestige and pow er were ultimately to be used to support the H ab sbu rg interests and to contribute to a renewal o f the Russia n -H a b sb u rg antagonism in the region. Britain, it w ill be noted, joined neither side, preferring to follow a policy o f “ splendid isolation.” A fter the passing o f the crisis over Bulgaria, however, these alliances had litde direct effect on events in the Balkans. In fact, the area was to enjoy a relatively lo n g period o f repose. T he European powers wished to avoid an­ other Eastern conflict, so they cooperated to maintain calm in the area. T he H ab sbu rg M onarchy was thoroughly occupied with its internal problem s; it had to fo llo w a cautious foreign policy. Russian attention was draw n increas­ ingly to the F ar East. Britain too no longer looked at O ttom an affairs in the same light. In 1882 a British arm y occupied E gypt. Thereafter the base for British N ear Eastern policy became E g y p t and Suez, not Constantinople and the Straits. T h e reluctance o f the powers to become involved in another O t­ tom an crisis was clearly show n in the years 1894 to 1897. A t this time a na­ tional m ovem ent very similar to those in the Balkans occurred in the A rm e­ nian provinces. Local revolts were repressed with massacres, which, like those in B ulgaria in 1876, were fully reported in the European press. H ow ever, this time the great pow ers did not organize the massive intervention that had occurred in the previous period. D espite the existence o f the tw o European alliance systems and the break­ dow n o f the Three Em perors’ Alliance, Russian and H absbu rg interests in the Balkans w ere very close in this last decade o f the century. B oth wanted conditions o f tranquility maintained in the region. In A pril 1897 Franz Joseph and his foreign minister, A gen o r G oluchow ski, traveled to St. Petersburg, w here they signed an agreem ent w ith the Russian governm ent stipulating that the tw o pow ers w ould cooperate in m aintaining the status quo in the Balkans. F o r a decade thereafter the governm ents did w ork together to pre­ vent any m ajor crisis from developing that could reopen the Eastern Q ues­ tion. There were to be tw o m ajor centers o f disturbance in the Balkan pen­ insula. In 1897, as the result o f another Cretan uprising, Greece and the Ottoman E m pire w ent to war. T h e G reek arm y was defeated, but great-pow er pressure prevented the Porte from taking any G reek territory. Instead, a small indem n­ ity was paid. Th roughout this period there were also constant problem s in

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 Macedonia. However, Russia and the Habsburg Empire were to cooperate to try to calm the situation. All o f the great powers, with the exception of Austria-Hungary, were occupied with carving out empires for themselves in Asia and Africa. Russia was soon to become involved in a disastrous war with Japan. No power wished to be distracted by Balkan events.

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Conclusion The national movements: a century of accomplishment toward the formation of the Balkan na­ tional states had been taken. An independent Greece, Montenegro, Romania, and Serbia, and an autonomous Bulgaria, were in exis­ tence. A movement aiming at the unification of the Albanian lands had been organized. Although the Balkan people of the Habsburg Empire had suffered a political setback with the conclusion of the Ausgleich, Croatia enjoyed a restricted but nevertheless autonomous status. The Romanians, Serbs, and Slovenes had political organizations, usually closely identified with their churches. The paths to national independence or autonomy had been varied. In Ser­ bia and Greece local notables led armed peasants into battle against the O t­ toman army. Although foreign intervention was in the end decisive in deter­ mining the final political status, the revolutionary forces did take control of national lands and establish governments. In contrast, the Danubian Princi­ palities and Bulgaria, despite the fact that revolts occurred, owed their free­ dom from Ottoman control largely to shrewd diplomatic negotiations in Ro­ mania’s case, and to a war waged by Russia in Bulgaria’s. The position of the nationalities inside the Habsburg Monarchy before 1867 was, o f course, entirely different. They could not call in outside assist­ ance or play the international diplomatic rivalries. There was, however, the possibility of utilizing the internal struggle between the imperial government in Vienna and the most self-confident and nationally conscious group in the empire, the Hungarians. Since the majority of the Habsburg Croats, Serbs, and Romanians lived within the boundaries of the lands o f the crown o f St. Stephen, their fate was closely tied to the results of this conflict. When the choice had to be made, the Romanian leadership sided with Vienna; the Croats at times supported the Hungarian position. With the conclusion of the Ausgleich both lost their gamble, and they were placed under the effective domination of a militant and aggressive Hungarian administration. The battie for power between the national groups and Budapest, and between that cap­ ital and the Habsburg imperial government, was to end only with the col­ lapse o f the monarchy in 1918. A great deal has been said in this account about the role of the great pow­ ers. In the nineteenth century, not only were they influenced by their desire

B

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Conclusion to maintain the balance o f pow er in the N ear East, but individual govern ­ ments w ere often tem pted to make use o f their advantages to gain a control­ ling position either in a single region o r in the entire area. T he French inter­ est and influence in the E g y p t o f M uham m ad A li and in the Principalities has been noted. A t different periods Britain, France, and Russia contested for predom inance in the councils o f the sultan. A ll o f the Balkan people at one time o r another called for British, French, H absburg, o r Russian assistance. T h e tem ptation to answer the appeals and to exploit them was sometimes great. M uch o f the European intervention rested on treaties concluded by the Porte that gave the governm ents individually o r collectively the right to interfere in O ttom an dom estic affairs o r limited the actions o f O ttom an offi­ cials in their o w n territory. These agreements dealt w ith m ore than the affairs o f the nationalities; as w e have seen, capitulations and trade treaties gave special privileges to foreigners trading inside the empire. T h e treaties o f Karlow itz and Kuchuk Kainarji were the first that allowed outside powers the right to speak in behalf o f O ttom an Balkan subjects. E ven m ore dangerous to the Porte were the agreements signed in the nineteenth century, such as the C onvention o f Akkerm an in 1826, the Treaty o f A drianople o f 1829, the Treaty o f Lon d o n o f 1830, and the Treaty o f Paris o f 1856, all o f w hich gave the great powers political protectorates over Balkan territories. It should nevertheless be emphasized that intervention was a two-edged sw ord. T h e Balkan people often asked foreign governm ents for assistance; they expected this aid to be given freely and w ithout political implications. W hen a European pow er attempted to gain repayment fo r its expenditures o f m oney o r lives, the Balkan governm ents usually reacted w ith horror and indignation. Russia, o f course, was the state m ost affected by this circum ­ stance. Its repeated wars w ith the O ttom an Em pire had been the ch ief instru­ m ent securing autonom ous rights in the Balkans. These efforts cost enor­ m ous am ounts, which, considering the meager results gained for Russian national interests, could better have been spent at hom e. This dilemma was well expressed in a letter from A . G . Jom ini, a close associate o f G orchakov, to N . K . G iers, w h o at the time was second to the foreign minister. Writing in the m iddle o f the Russo-Turkish War o f 1877—1878, Jom ini took a pessimis­ tic view o f the outcom e o f the conflict, which was to be com pletely justified by subsequent events:

Moreover, even if, in one way or another, we finish by achieving our object, it would still be impossible for me to see things through rosetinted glasses! In that case first of all will come the setding of ac­ counts. Once the gunsmoke and the clouds of glory have faded away the net result will remain; that is to say enormous losses, a deplorable financial situation, and what advantages? Our Slav brothers freed, who will astonish us with their ingratitude . . . This is the balance which I foresee if everything goes as well as 378

Conclusion possible. I cannot find this situation a good one, or the policy which is drawing us towards it at the cost of the country’s ruin an able one! I persist in thinking that instead of pursuing these Slav chimaeras, we should have done better to see to our own Slav Christians. If the Emperor would come down from the heights and from official splendours and play the role o f Haroun al Rashid, if he would visit incognito the suburbs of Bucharest and those o f his own capital, he would convince himself o f all there is to be done to civilize, organize and develop his own country, and he would draw the conclusion that a crusade against drunkenness and syphilis was more necessary and more profitable to Russia than the ruinous crusade against the Turks for the profit of the Bulgars!1 In addition to the direct intervention by the diplomats, there was, as has been demonstrated, a strong European influence over the political institu­ tions adopted by the Balkan states. In every case, the governments came to be based on constitutions drawn after Western models. However, the extent of this outside influence can be overstated. Certainly, the form and language of European liberalism was used, but the Balkan societies did have precedents for representative institutions. The interests of the nobility and the notables had been defended in the councils of the medieval kingdoms; the divans in the Principalities had the same function. Peasant participation in administra­ tion during the Ottoman period was perhaps even more significant. The role o f the communities has been discussed; there heads of peasant families had a major role in deciding local affairs. The institution of the skupStina in Serbia, where the men o f a region met to discuss major problems, played an impor­ tant part in the evolution of the Serbian political system. Similar customs existed in primitive areas such as Montenegro. In fact, these traditional, dem­ ocratically based institutions were to cause problems for all of the national regimes. Although representative assemblies had a place in Balkan history, central­ ized, secular Christian administrative systems usually did not. With only a few exceptions, the Balkan people in the past had been governed indirecdy through agents o f the central power or by a local nobility that might rival in real authority the titular master o f a region. Through most of the period of Ottoman rule, the Christian was under the direct authority of his millet and communal leaders, not the representatives o f the Porte. In the Habsburg domains and the Danubian Principalities he was subject to the local noble, not to the monarch’s officials. In the nineteenth century the convictions of most Balkan statesmen, as well as the influence o f the great powers, led to i

Jo m in i to G iers, S ep tem b er 1/ 13 , 1877 , in C harles Jelavich an d B arbara Jelavich, eds., Russia in the East, 1876-1880 (L eiden: Brill, 1959 ), PP· 59, 6 0 ; trans. in M . S. A nderson, ed., The Great Powers and the N ear East, 1774—1923 (N ew York: St. M a rtin ’s Press, 19 70 ), p p. 96 - 98 ·

379

Conclusion the adoption o f centralized bureaucratic regimes. H ere the aim was to extend the control o f the central offices o f the state over the citizenry w ithout the interm ediary o f provincial o r local institutions. Agents o f the central govern­ ment w ou ld thus deal direcdy w ith the individual. Th e Balkan governm ents adopted this system, because it was considered m odern, progressive, and en­ lightened at the time. Th e O ttom an Tanzimat reform s, the Bach system in the H absbu rg Em pire, and the H ungarian administration in 1848-1849 and after 1867 were all based on the attempt to organize the lands in question on these principles. T he result o f this process, which is discussed in greater detail in Volum e II, was the limitation o f the political pow er o f the peasantry and the grow th in influence o f a m iddle class com posed prim arily o f those m em ­ bers o f Balkan society w h o were able to acquire a higher education. The representative institutions granted in the constitutions were thus canceled ou t by the existence o f a strong, centralized bureaucracy that, in control o f the police and the electoral procedures, could manipulate and dom inate the political process. A lth ough by 1887 much had been accomplished, many o f the m ajor goals o f the national leadership had not yet been fully attained. Th e territorial uni­ fication o f the states had not been achieved; the Albanian national movement in particular had far to go. M oreover, m any South Slav and Rom anian na­ tionals lived in the H absburg Em pire, w hich at the beginning o f the tw en­ tieth century remained a strong, functioning great power. T h e O ttom an E m ­ pire also still controlled much o f the peninsula. In addition, although national regim es had been organized, these governm ents had to face severe economic and social problems. Th e tragedy o f the tw o devastating w orld wars o f the twentieth century, both o f which caused great destruction in the Balkans, was to make their solution even m ore difficult. T he accomplishment o f the final form ation o f the m odern Balkan states o f Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, R o ­ mania, and Yugoslavia, and their subsequent efforts to secure econom ic ad­ vancement and to maintain their independence in an era o f continuing greatpow er im perialism, w ill provide the m ajor themes for the second volum e o f this narrative.

380

Bibliography

T

h i s b i b l i o g r a p h y c o n t a i n s a selection o f books in English de­

signed to guide a reader w h o w ould like more inform ation on the subjects covered in this volum e. It does not, o f course, include all o f the excellent books concerning Balkan history that are available. Articles have been excluded, as well as w orks in other languages. F o r inform ation on pu b­ lications o f these sorts and on studies on the Balkan area in all disciplines the reader is referred to Paul L . H orecky, ed., Southeastern Europe: A Guide to Basic Publications (Chicago: U niversity o f C hicago Press, 1969), and to the bibliographic essays in volum es V and V I I I o f A History of East Central Eu­ rope., edited by Peter F. S u gar and D onald W Treadgold, cited herein. A n examination o f American scholarship in Balkan studies is to be found in Charles Jelavich, ed., Language and A rea Studies: East Central and Southeastern E u­ rope (Chicago: U niversity o f C h icago Press, 1969). Publications that appeared in the decade after the com pletion o f that book are review ed in the journal Balkanistica 4 (1977-1978), in an issue devoted to the question. F or a better understanding o f Balkan life in this period, the reader is strongly advised to read som e o f the m any travel accounts on the region. T h e m ajority o f these are listed in Shirley H o w ard Weber, Voyages and Travels in the Near East during the Nineteenth Century (Princeton: Am erican School o f Classical Studies at A thens, 1952). A lth ou gh this book does not cover the subject in detail, som e surveys o f Balkan literature are listed in the final section o f the bibliography. G E N E R A L H I S T O R I E S Op T H E B A L K A N S D jordjevic, D im itrije, and Stephen Fischer-Galati. The Balkan Revolutionary Tradition. N e w York: C olum bia U niversity Press, 1981.

Hosch, Edgar. The Balkans: A Short History from Greek Times to the Present Day. Translated by Tania Alexander. Ne\y York: Crane, Russak, 1972. Jelavich, Charles, and Barbara Jelavich. The Balkans. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965. Jelavich, Charles, and Barbara Jelavich, eds. The Balkans in Transition: Essays

on the Development of Balkan Life and Politics since the Eighteenth Century. R eprin t ed., H am den, C o n n .: Archon Rooks, 1974·

381

Bibliography Lam pe, John R., and M arvin R. Jackson. Balkan Economic History, isso-mo. Bloom ington: Indiana U niversity Press, 1982.

Ristelhueber, René. A History of the Balkan Peoples. Edited and translated by Sherman David Spector. New York: Twayne, 1971. Schevill, Ferdinand. The History of the Balkan Peninsula. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1933Seton-Watson, Robert W The Rise of Nationality in the Balkans. London: Constable, 1917. Stavrianos, L . S. The Balkans, 181S-1914· N e w York: H o lt, Rinehart & W in­ ston, 1963. The Balkans since 1453. N e w York: Rinehart, 1958. Stoianovich, Traian. A Study in Balkan Civilization. New York: Knopf, 1967. Sugar, Peter F., and Ivo J. Lederer, eds., Nationalism in Eastern Europe. Seatde: U niversity o f W ashington Press, 1969.

Sugar, Peter F., and Donald W Treadgold, eds. A History of East Central Europe. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Vol. V, Southeastern Eu­ rope under Ottoman Rule, 13S4-1804, by Peter F. Sugar, 1977; vol. VIII, The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804-1920, by Charles Jelavich and Barbara Jelavich, 1977. NATIO NAL AND IM PER IAL H ISTORIES

Balkan nationalities A L B A N IA N S

Frasheri, Kristo. The History of Albania. Tirana: n. p., 1964. L o g o reci, A nton. The Albanians: Europe’s Forgotten Survivors. B oulder, C olo.: W estview Press, 1977. M arm ullaku, Ram adan. Albania and the Albanians. Translated by M argot M ilosavljevic and BoSko M ilosavljevic. Lon d on : H urst, 1975.

Swire, Joseph. Albania: The Rise of a Kingdom. London: William & Norgate, 1929. B U L G A R IA N S

K ossev, D., H . H ristov, and D. A ngelov. A Short History o f Bulgaria. Sofia: F oreign Languages Press, 1963. Macdermott, Mercia. A History of Bulgaria, 1393-188S. Allen & Unwin, 1962. M ichew, C . The Bulgarians in the Past: Pages from the Bulgarian Cultural History. Lausanne: Librairie Centrale des N ationalités, 1919. GREEKS

Campbell, John, and Philip Sherrard. M odem Greece. London: Benn,

1968.

C lo g g , Richard. A Short History o f M odem Greece. C am bridge: C am bridge U niversity Press, 1979.

382

Bibliography Forster, E dw ard S. A Short History o f Modem Greece, 1821-1956. Lo n d o n : M e ­ thuen, 1958. Heurdey, W A ., H . C . Darby, C . W Crawley, and C . M . Woodhouse. A Short History o f Greece. C am bridge: C am bridge U niversity Press, 1965. K ou sou las, D . G eorge. M odem Greece: Profile c f a Nation. N e w York: Scrib­ ner, 1974. M iller, W illiam. Greece. N e w York: Scribner, 1928. Sophocles, S. M . A History o f Greece. Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Stud­ ies, 1961. W oodhouse, C . M . The Story o f Modem Greece. Lond on : Faber & Faber, 1968. ROM ANIANS

C hirot, D aniel. Social Change in a Peripheral Society: The Creation o f a Balkan Colony. N e w York: A cadem ic Press, 1976. G iurescu, D inu C . Illustrated History o f the Rom anian People. Bucharest: Editura Sport-Turism , 1981. O jetea, A ndrei, ed. The History o f the Rom anian People. N e w York: Twayne, 1970. Seton-W atson, R o b ert W A History o f the Roumanians from Rom an Times to the Completion o f Unity. Cam bridge: Cam bridge U niversity Press, 1934. S E R B S , C R O A T S , A N D S LOV ENES

Auty, Phyllis. Yugoslavia. N e w York: Walker, 1965. C lissold, Stephen, ed. A Short History o f Yugoslavia from Early Times to 1966. C am bridge: C am bridge U niversity Press, 1966. D edijer, Vladim ir, Ivan B ozic, Sim a C irkovic, and M ilorad E km eiic. History o f Yugoslavia. Translated by K o rd ija Kveder. N e w York: M cG raw -H ill, 1974· G azi, Stephen. A History o f Croatia. N e w York: Philosophical Library, 1973. Temperley, H . W V History o f Serbia. N e w York: Fertig, 1969. Tom asevich, Jozo. Peasants, Politics, and Economic Change in Yugoslavia. Stan­ ford, C alif.: Stanford U niversity Press, 1955.

The Ottoman Em pire D avison, R o d eric H . Turkey. E n glew oo d Cliffs, N .J.: Prentice-H all, 1968. G ib b , H . A . R ., and H aro ld B ow en. Islamic Society and the West: A Study o f the Impact o f Western Civilization on Moslem Culture in the N ear East. 1 vo l., 2 pts. L on d o n : O xford U niversity Press, 1950,1957. Inalcik, H alil. The Ottoman Em pire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600. Translated by N orm an Itzkow itz and C olin Imber. N e w York: Praeger, 1973. Itzkowitz, Norm an. Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition. N ew York: K nopf, 1972.

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The Habsburg Em pire K ann, R ob ert A . A History o f the Habsburg Empire, IS26-1918. Berkeley: U n i­ versity o f C alifornia Press, 1974.

The M ultinational Em pire: Nationalism and N ational Reform in the Habs­ burg Monarchy, 1848-1918. 2 vols. N ew York: C olum bia U niversity Press, 1950. Macartney, C . A . The Habsburg Empire, 1790-1918. Lo n d o n : W eidenfeld & N icolson, 1968. M ay, A rthu r J. The Habsburg Monarchy, 1867-1914. N e w York: N orton Library, 1968. Tapie, Victor. The Rise and F a ll o f the Habsburg Monarchy. Translated by Ste­ phen H ardm an. N e w York: Praeger, 1971. Taylor, A . J. P. The Habsburg Monarchy, 1809-1918. N e w York: H arper Torchbooks, 1948.

SELECTED STU DIES: P R E -N IN E T E E N T H CENTURY Barker, Thom as M . Double Eagle and Crescent: Vienna’s Second Turkish Siege and Its Historical Setting. A lbany: State U niversity o f N e w York Press, 1967. Cassels, Lavender. The Struggle fo r the Ottoman Empire, 1717-174$ ■ London: M urray, 1966. Fine, John V A ., Jr. The Bosnian Church: A New Interpretation. Boulder, Colo.: East European Quarterly, 1975. M cN eill, W illiam H . Venice: The H inge o f Europe, 1081-1797. C hicago: U n iver­ sity o f C hicago Press, 1974. O lson, R o b ert W The Siege o f Mosul and Ottoman-Persian Relations, 1718-1743B loom ington : Indiana U niversity publications, 1975. 384

Bibliography Roider, K arl A ., Jr. The Reluctant A lly: Austria's Policy in the Austro-Turkish War, 1737-1739 ■ Baton R o u ge: Louisiana State University Press, 1972. Roth en berg, G unther Erich. The Austrian M ilitary Border in Croatia, IS22174-7- U rbana: U niversity o f Illinois Press, i960. Runcim an, Steven. The Great Church in Captivity. C am bridge: Cam bridge U niversity Press, 1968. Sorel, A lbert. The Eastern Question in the Eighteenth Century. N e w York: Fertig, 1969. Vacalopoulos, A postolos E . The Greek Nation, 14S3-1669: The Cultural and Economic Background o f Modem Greek Society. Translated by Ian M oles and Phania Moles. N ew Brunswick, N .J.: Rutgers University Press, 1976. History o f Macedonia, 1 354-1833. Translated by Peter M egann. Thessaloniki: Institute fo r Balkan Studies, 1973. V ryon is, Speros, Jr. Byzantium and Europe. N e w York: H arcourt, Brace & W orld, 1967. Ware, Timothy. The Orthodox Church. H arm ondsw orth, M iddlesex: Penguin B ooks, 1963.

THE N INETEEN TH CENTURY: THE F O R M A T I O N OF T H E N A T I O N A L S T A T E S TO 1 9 1 4

Economic Developments Berend, Ivan T., and G y o rg y Ranki. Economic Development in East-Central Europe in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. N e w York: C olum bia U niversity Press, 1974. Blaisdell, D onald. European Financial Control in the Ottoman Em pire: A Study

c f the Establishment, Activities, and Significance o f the Administration o f the Ottoman Public Debt. N ew York: Colum bia U niversity Press, 1929. Evans, Ifo r L . The A grarian Revolution in Roumania. Cam bridge, M ass.: H arvard U niversity Press (Belknap Press), 1962. Feis, H erbert. Europe the World’s Banker, 1870-1914· N ew York: N orto n , 1965. H o ievar, Toussaint. The Structure o f the Slovenian Economy, 184S-1963. N ew York: Studia Slovenica, 1965. Sugar, Peter F. Industrialization o f Bosnia-Hercegovina, 1878-1918. Seatde: U n i­ versity o f W ashington Press, 1963. Warriner, D oreen. Contrasts in Em erging Societies: Readings in the Social and

Economic History c f South-Eastern Europe in the Nineteenth Century. Bloom ington : Indiana U niversity Press, 1965.

General Studies on Diplomacy AnastassofF, C hrist. The Tragic Peninsula: A History c f the Macedonian Move­ mentfo r Independence since 1878· St. Lou is: Blackwell & Wielandy, 1938.

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London: Murray, 1915. H elm reich, Ernst C . The Diplomacy o f the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913. C am bridge, M ass.: H arvard U niversity Press, 1938. Jelavich, Barbara. The Habsburg Empire in European Affairs, 1814-1918. Reprint ed., H am den, C on n .: A rchon Books, 1975.

The Ottoman Empire, the Great Powers, and the Straits Question, 1870-1887. Bloom ington: Indiana U niversity Press, 1973.

St. Petersburg and Moscow: Tsarist and Soviet Foreign Policy, 1814-1974. Bloom ington: Indiana U niversity Press, 1974. Jelavich, Charles, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism: Russian Influence in the Internal A ffairs o f Bulgaria and Serbia, 1879-1886. Berkeley: University o f C alifornia Press, 1958. Langer, W illiam L . European Alliances and Alignments, 1870-1890. N e w York: V intage Books, 1964. M edlicott, W illiam N . The Congress o f Berlin and A fter: A Diplomatic History o f the N ear Eastern Settlement, 1878-1880. Lon don : M ethuen, 1938. Petrovich, M ichael B. The Emergence o f Russian Panslavism, 18S6-1870. N ew York: C olum bia U niversity Press, 1956. Puryear, Vernon J. England, Russia and the Straits Question, 1844-1856. Berke­ ley: U niversity o f California Press, 1931.

Stavrianos, Leften S. Balkan Federation: A History c f the Movement toward Balkan Unity in Modem Times. Northhampton, Mass.: Smith College Studies in History, 1944· Stojanovic, Mihailo D. The Great Powers and the Balkans, 1875-1878. Cam­ bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1939· Sum ner, B. H . Russia and the Balkans, 1870-1880. O xford: O xford University Press, 1937. Temperley, H . W V England and the N ear East: The Crim ea. Reprint ed., H am den, C o n n .: A rchon B ooks, 1964. W ilkinson, H . R. Maps and Politics: A Review o f the Ethnographic Cartography o f Macedonia. Liverpool: U niversity Press o f Liverpool, 1951.

National Development ALBA N IA N S

G reat Britain, Office o f the Admiralty, N aval Intelligence D ivision. A lbania: Basic Handbook. 2 pts., 1943—1944. Skendi, Stavro. The A lbanian N ational Awakening, 1878-1912. Princeton, N .J.: Princeton U niversity Press, 1967.

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Beam an, A . H ulm e. M . Stambuloff. Lon don: Bliss, Sands & Foster, 1895. Black, C . E . The Establishment o f Constitutional Government in Bulgaria. Princeton, N .J.: Princeton U niversity Press, 19+3. Clarke, Jam es F. Bible Societies, Am erican Missionaries, and the N ational R evival o f Bulgaria. N e w York: A rn o Press, 1971. C orti, E g o n Caesar C onte. Alexander von Battenberg. Translated by E . M . H od gson . Lon d on : Cassell, 1954. H all, W illiam W Puritans in the Balkans: The American Board Mission in B u l­ garia, 1878-1918. Sofia: Cultura Printing H ouse, 1938. H arris, D avid. Britain and the Bulgarian Horrors o f 1876. C hicago: U niversity o f C hicago Press, 1939. M acD erm ott, M arcia. The Apostle o f Freedom: A Portrait o f Vasil Levsky against a Background o f Nineteenth Century Bulgaria. Lon d on : Allen & U n w in , 1967. M adol, H ans R oger. Ferdinand o f B ulgaria: The Dream o f Byzantium . Trans­ lated by Kenneth Kirkness. L on d on : H urst & Blackett, 1933. M eininger, Thom as A . Ignatiev and the Establishment o f the Bulgarian E xar­ chate, 1864-1872: A Study in Personal Diplomacy. M adison: State H istorical Society o f W isconsin, 1970. GREEKS

A ugustinos, Gerasim os. Consciousness and History: Nationalist Critics o f Greek Society, 1897-1914. Boulder, C o lo .: E ast European Quarterly, 1977. Chaconas, Stephen G . Adamantios Korais: A Study in Greek Nationalism. N ew York: C olum bia U niversity Press, 1942. C lo g g , Richard, ed. and trans. The Movement fo r Greek Independence, 17701821: A Collection o f Documents. London: M acm illan Press, 1976. C lo g g , Richard, ed. The Struggle fo r Greek Independence: Essays to M ark the isoth Anniversary o f the Greek War o f Independence. H am den, C o n n .: Archon B ooks, 1973. C ouloum bis, T. A ., J. A . Petropulos, and H . J. Psomiades. Foreign Interfer­ ence in Greek Politics: A n Historical Perspective. N ew York: Pella, 1976. Crawley, C . W The Question o f Greek Independence: A Study o f British Policy in the N ear East, 1821-1833. C am bridge: C am bridge U niversity Press, 1930. D akin, D ouglas, The Greek Struggle fo r Independence, 1821-1833. Lon d on : Batsford, 1973· The Greek Struggle in Macedonia, 1897-1913. Thessaloniki: Institute for B al­ kan Studies, 1966. The Unification c f Greece, 1770-1923. Lon d on : Benn, 1972. D iam andouros, N ikiforos P., and John P. A nton, Joh n A . Petropulos, and Peter Topping, eds. Hellenism and the First Greek War o f Liberation (1821-

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Frazee, Charles A. The Orthodox Church and Independent Greece, 1821-18S2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969. H enderson, G. P. The Revival o f Greek Thought, 1620-1830. A lbany: State U n i­ versity o f N ew York Press, 1970.

Jelavich, Barbara. Russia and Greece during the Regency o f K in g Othon, 1832183s. Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1962. Russia and the Greek Revolution o f 1843. M unich: O ldenbourg, 1966. K aldis, W illiam P. John Capodistrias and the Modem Greek State. M adison: State H istorical Society o f W isconsin, 1963. Kaltchas, Nicholas S. Introduction to the Constitutional History of Modem Greece. N e w York: C olum bia U niversity Press, 1940. K o fos, Evangelos. Greece and the Eastern Crisis, 187S-1878. Thessaloniki: Insti­ tute for Balkan Studies, 1975.

Kolokotrones, Theodoros. Memoirsfrom the Greek War o f Independence. Trans­ lated and edited by E. M. Edmonds. Chicago: Argonaut, 1969. Koumoulides, John T. A. Greece in Transition: Essays in the History of Modem Greece, 1821-1974· London: Zeno, 1977. Levandis, John A. The Greek Foreign D ebt and the Great Powers, 1821-1898. New York: Columbia University Press, 1944· Makriyannis, Ioanncs. M akriyannis: The Memoirs o f General M akriyannis, 17971864. Translated and edited by H. A. Lidderdale. London: Oxford Uni­ versity Press, 1966. Papacosma, S. Victor. The M ilitary in Greek Politics: The 1909 Coup d’etat. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1977. Petropulos, John Anthony. Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom o f Greece, 1833-1843· Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968. Prevelakis, Eleutherios. British Policy towards the Change o f Dynasty in Greece, 1862-1863. Athens: n.p., 1953. W oodhouse, C. M. Capodistria: The Founder o f Greek Independence. Lon don : O xford U niversity Press, 1973. The Battle ofN avarino. Lon d on : H od der & Stoughton, 1965. The Greek War o f Independence: Its Historical Setting. L o n d o n : Hutchinson’s U niversity Library, 1952. R O M A N IA N S

B od ea, Cornelia. The Romanians’ Struggle for Unification, 1834-1849· Trans­ lated by Liliana Teodoreanu. Bucharest: Academ y o f the Socialist R e ­ public o f R om ania, 1970.

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D espalatovic, E lin or M urray. Ljudevit G aj and the Illyrian Movement. B o u l­ der, C o lo .: E ast European Quarterly, 1975. D jilas, M ilovan. Njegof. Introduced and translated by M ichael B. Petrovich. N e w York: H arcourt, Brace & W orld, 1966. E dw ards, L ovett E , trans. and ed. The Memoirs o f Prota M atija Nenadovtc. O xford: O xford U niversity Press (Clarendon Press), 1969· M cC lellan, W oodford D . Svetozar Markovic and the Origins o f Balkan Social­ ism. Princeton, N .J.: Princeton U niversity Press, 1964. M acK enzie, D avid. The Serbs and Russian Panslavism, 1875-1878. Ithaca, N .Y .: C ornell U niversity Press, 1967.

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Bibliography N oyes, G eorge R ., trans. and ed. The L ife and Adventures ofD im itrije Obradovic. Berkeley: U niversity o f C alifornia Press, 1953. Pavlow itch, Stevan K . Anglo-Russian R ivalry in Serbia, 1837-1839: The Mission o f Colonel Hodges. Paris: M ou ton , 1961. Petrovich, M ichael B oro. A History c f M odem Serbia, 1804-1918. 2 vols. N e w York: H arcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976. Ranke, L eo p o ld von. The History o f Servia and the Servian Revolution. Trans­ lated by M rs. Alexander Kerr. Lon d on : B oh n , 1853. R o g e l, C arole. The Slovenes and Yugoslavism, 1890-1914. Boulder, C o lo .: East European Q uarterly, 1977. R oth en b erg, G unther E . The M ilitary Border in Croatia, 1740-1881: A Study o f an Im perial Institution. C hicago: U niversity o f C hicago Press, 1966. Seton-W atson, R o b ert W The Southern Slav Question and the Habsburg M on­ archy. L o n d o n : Constable, 1911. Stokes, Gale. Legitimacy through Liberalism : Vladim ir Jovanovic and the Trans­ formation o f Serbian Politics. Seatde: University o f Washington Press, 1975. W ilson, D uncan. The Life and Times o f Vuk Stefanovic Karadzic, 1787-1864: Literacy, Literature, and N ational Independence in Serbia. O xford: O xford U niversity Press (Clarendon Press), 1970.

The Ottoman Em pire Bailey, E E . British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movements: A Study in AngloTurkish Relations, 1826-1853. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1942. Berkes, N iyazi. The Development o f Secularism in Turkey. M ontreal: M cG ill U niversity Press, 1964. Davison, Roderic H . Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 18S6-1876. Princeton, N .J.: Princeton U niversity Press, 1963. D evereux, R ob ert. The First Ottoman Constitutional Period: A Study o f the M idhat Constitution and Parliam ent. Baltim ore: Johns H opkins Press, 1963. K arpat, Kem al. A n Inquiry into the Social Foundations o f Nationalism in the Ottoman State: From Social Estates to Classes, from M illets to Nations. R e ­ search M onograph no. 39. Princeton, N .J.: Princeton University, Center fo r International Studies, 1973. Karpat, Kemal, ed. Social Change and Politics in Turkey: A Structural-Historical Analysis. Leiden: B rill, 1973. M ardin, §erif. The Genesis o f Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modern­ ization c f Turkish Political Ideas. Princeton, N .J .: Princeton U niversity Press, 1962. Ram saur, Ernest E . The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution c f 1908. Prince­ ton, N .J.: Princeton U niversity Press, 1957.

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Barac, Antun. A History o f Yugoslav Literature. Translated by Peter MijuSkovic. Ann Arbor: Michigan Slavic Publications, 1973. Dimaras, C. Th. A History o f Modem Greek Literature. Translated by Mary P. Gianos. Albany: State University o f New York Press, 1972. Mann, Stuart E. A lbanian Literature: A n Outline o f Prose, Poetry, and Drama. Lon d on : Q uaritch, 1955. M oser, Charles A. A History o f Bulgarian Literature, 865-1944- T h e H agu e: M ou ton , 1972.

Munteano, Basil. M odem Romanian Literature. Bucharest: Editura Cuvantul, 19+ 3-

391

Index

In a d d itio n to th e m aterial no rm ally co n tain ed in an index, th e reader will find here a listing o f m o st o f th e fo reig n w o rd s, usually T urkish, used in th e text. T h e page o r pages cited co n tain a tran slatio n o r a d efinition o f th e term . T h is index th u s also serves as a glossary. A b d u l A ziz, O tto m a n su ltan , 2 8 2 , 2 8 6 - 2 8 7 , 354 A b d u l H a m id I, O tto m a n sultan, 116 A b d u l H a m id II, O tto m a n su ltan, 3 5 4 A b d u l M ejid , O tto m a n su ltan , 2 8 1 , 2 8 2 A bel, K arl v o n , 2 5 4 A b u Bekir, 1 9 7 A chaean L eague, 7 A chaia, P rincipality o f, 23 A drian o p le, 3, 9, 3 1 , 114, 358 A drian o p le, T reaty o f (1 8 2 9 ): A d d itio n al A ct to , 2 6 5 ; A rticle V o f, 2 6 5 ; A rticle V I of, 2 4 1 ; A rticle X o f, 2 2 8 ; pro v isions of, 2 2 8 , 266, 278, 378 A driatic Sea, 1, 3 A egean Sea, 1, 3, 73 aga (defined), 8 9 agalik (defined), 8 9 A gram , see Z ag reb A grapha, 73 A grarian Law, 2 9 3 - 2 9 4 A hm ed C ev d et Pasha, 2 8 2 A hm ed III, O tto m a n sultan, 114 A inali Kavak, T reaty o f (1 7 7 9 ), 78 A kkerm an, 6 9 , 71 A kkerm an, C o n v e n tio n o f (1 8 2 6 ), 2 2 7 , 2 2 8 , 240, 265, 278 A ksakov, Ivan, 353 A lba Iulia, 154 A lbania, see A lbanians A lbanian L eague, see L eague o f P rizren A lbanians: C h ristian s am o n g , 8 1 ; early his­ to ry o f, 2 5 - 2 6 ; eig h teen th -cen tu ry centers o f p o w er o f, 8 4 ; as g ra n d vezirs, 8 1; as ja n ­ issaries a n d sipahis, 8 1 ; in K osovo, 9 3 ; an d L eague o f P rizren , 3 6 1 - 3 6 6 ; a n d mass conversions to Islam , 8 0 - 8 1 ; M uslim s am o n g , 8 1 , 8 3 , 3 5 0 , 3 6 1 , 3 6 3 , 3 6 4 ; u n d er O tto m a n E m p ire, 8 0 - 8 4 , 3 3 1 , 3 6 1 -3 6 6 ; an d rebellion o f S ken d erb eg , 3 4 —3 5; and regional divisions, 3 6 3 ; an d struggles for po w er, 9 7 ; and tax atio n , 8 0 —8 1, 8 3, 8 4 ; as

th reat to M o n te n eg ro , 8 7, 365 A lbanoi, see A lbanians A lbert, prince, 263 A leko Pasha, 369 A lexander o f B attenberg, 3 6 8 , 3 7 0 —372, 373, 374 A lexander th e G reat, 7 A lexander I, tsar o f R ussia, 120, 121, 191, 199, 2 0 6 , 2 0 7 , 2 1 1 , 2 2 3 , 2 2 4 , 2 2 6 , 2 7 1 , 302 A lexander II, tsar o f R ussia, 2 9 0 , 3 5 3 , 370, 372 A lexander I II , tsar o f R ussia, 3 5 4 , 3 7 0 A lexandria, 4 9 Ali C eläleddin Pasha, 349 Ali Pasha, 2 8 2 , 28 6 Ali P asha D erendelia, 34 9 Ali P asha H ek im O g lu , 90 Ali P asha o f Janina, 80, 8 4, 118, 120, 123, 1 2 4 -1 2 5 , 216, 217, 219, 274, 277, 282, 3 6 1 -3 6 2 alodial land, see m anorial land A m alia o f O ld en b u rg , 2 5 8 , 2 6 3 A natolia, 5, 2 2, 3 0, 4 1 , 27 9 A ndjelkovic, K o fa, 94 Andrässy, G yula, 3 5 4 , 355 A nghel, A tanasie, 154, 159 A nkara, battle o f (1 4 0 2 ), 31 A n tim I, exarch o f B ulgaria, 34 4 A ntioch, 4 9 A ntivari, see Bar A rabs, 13, 22 A rad, 91 A rber, A rbereshe, see A lbanians A rchipelago, D uchy o f the, 23 archon (defined), 5 7 - 5 8 , 75, 146 A rdahan, 360 Arge?, 21 A rgos, 5 A rm ansperg, C o u n t Joseph v o n , 2 5 4 , 2 5 8 , 26 0 armatole (defined), 6 1 , 76

393

Index armatolik (defined), 7 6; see also kapitanate A rm enians, 6 2 A rm en o p o u lo s, C o n stan tin e, 75 A rsenije I II C rnojevié, patriarch o f P e i, 92, 93, 129, 145, 148, 149 A rsenije IV, p atriarch o f Pec, 93 A ru m an ian s, see V lachs A sen, Ivan, 18 A sen, Jo h n II, B ulgarian em p ero r, 18 A sen, P eter, 18 askeri (defined), 4 0 , 4 4 A sparukh, 15 A stros, 2 21 A th en s, 4 , 5, 6 , 6 4 , 77 A th o s, M t., 2 9 2 , 3 3 7 A ttica, 5 A u g u stu s, R o m a n em p ero r, 7 A urelian, R o m a n em p ero r, 9 A usgleich o f 1 8 6 7 , 3 1 3 , 3 1 5 , 3 1 9 , 3 2 7 , 3 3 0 , 335, 377 A usterlitz, 120 A ustria, 3 1 3 ; see also H a b sb u rg E m pire, H u n g ary A u stria-H u n g ary , 3 1 3 ; see also H a b s b u rg E m ­ p ire, H u n g ary A ustroslavism , 3 0 9 , 3 1 7 Avars, 10, 13, 15, 19 «yaws (defined), 123 A zov, 6 5 - 6 6 , 6 8 A zov, Sea of, 15 Bach, A lexander, 311—3 1 2 , 3 1 8 , 326 bajrak (defined), 83 bajraktar (defined), 83 bakshish (defined), 2 9 9 Bâlcescu, N icolae, 1 1 1 , 2 7 4 , 3 2 4 , 325 B aldw in, c o u n t o f F landers, 23 Balkan (defined), 1 Balkan M o u n ta in s, 1, 3, 9 7 Balkan peninsula: ag ricultural land in, 3; and basis fo r m o d ern states, 2 6 —2 7 ; coloniza­ tio n o f, by G reeks, 4 , 7; H u n g a ria n settle­ m en ts in , 19; invasions of, 9 - 1 0 , 13, 15, 2 3 ; m ig ra tio n to , by B ulgars, 15; m ig ra­ tio n to , by Serbs, 18; m ineral w ealth of, 3; m o u n tain o u s ch aracter of, 1, 2 (M ap 1); native Illyrian p o p u latio n of, 2 5 ; nobles of, 2 9 - 3 0 ; peasants of, 2 9 - 3 0 ; perim eters of, 1; p o p u latio n of, 2 7 ; religious affiliations o f p o p u latio n s in, 2 9 ; river system of, 1; R o m a n settlem ents and influence in, 7, 9; T urkish settlem en ts in, 2 2 ; see also Balkan states, names of individual countries Balkan states: centralized bureaucratic re­ gim es in, 3 8 0 ; com m ercial activity in, 1 8 1 186; n in eteen th -cen tu ry alliances of, 2 4 6 , 3 3 3 —3 3 5 ; paths o f au to n o m y of, 3 7 7 ; role o f g re a t p o w ers in , 2 9 9 , 3 7 7 - 3 7 9 ; status of, in th e 1860s, 2 9 8 —2 9 9 ; see also Balkan

peninsula, names o f individual countries Balkan Wars (1 9 1 2 , 191 3 ), 39 Balta L im an, C o n v e n tio n o f (1 8 4 9 ), 2 7 3 274 Balta L im an, T reaty o f (1 8 3 8 ), 282 ban (defined), 25 B anat o f Tem esvar: u n d e r H a b s b u rg E m pire, 6 6 , 6 8 , 9 3 , 9 4 , 1 6 0 - 1 6 1 ; u n d e r H ungary, 3 0 4 ; O rth o d o x church in, 161; peasants in, 1 6 0 - 1 6 1 ; p o p u latio n of, 1 6 0 - 1 6 1 ; te r­ ritory added to , 72 Banja L uka, 350 Bar, 36 4 Bar, C o n fed eratio n of, 69 B arijiu, G eorge, 3 2 2 , 323 B a m u jiu , S im ion, 3 2 2 , 3 2 3 , 3 2 4 Basarab, prince o f W allachia, 21 basin bozuks (defined), 34 7 Basil II, B yzantine em peror, 1 7 -1 8 B atum , 360 Bayezid th e T h u n d e rb o lt, O tto m a n sultan, 31 beglik (defined), 89

begs, see beys Belcredi, C o u n t R ichard, 313 Belgrade, 3 4, 6 4 , 9 2 , 9 3 , 9 4, 2 0 3 , 2 4 3 ; as cen ter o f S erbian national m ovem ent, 92; as first center for a successful Balkan revo­ lution, 193; M uslim s in, 2 4 6 ; an d trade an d invasion routes, 3, 9 7, 182 B elgrade, T reaty o f (1 7 3 9 ), 6 8 , 105 Bern, Jozef, 3 1 0 , 3 1 1 , 325 Bender, 69 Benkovski, G eorge, 3 4 6 - 3 4 7 berats (defined), 181 Berlin, C ongress of, see B erlin, T reaty o f (18 7 8 ) Berlin, Treaty o f (1 8 7 8 ), 3 6 0 - 3 6 1 , 364, 365, 3 6 6 , 3 7 0 , 371 Berlin M em o ran d u m (1 8 7 6 ), 35 4 Bessarabia, 123, 125, 189, 2 8 7 , 2 9 0 , 355, 35 9 beys (defined), 8 3, 89 Bibescu, G eorge, 2 7 0 , 2 7 2 B iograd, 23 Bism arck, O tto von, 3 5 9 - 3 6 0 , 3 7 3 , 374, 375 B istrija, 150 B istritz, see Bistri{a B itola, 9 7, 3 6 2 , 3 6 3 , 365 Bitolj, see Bitola Black Sea, 1, 6 8 , 6 9 , 71 Blaj, 156, 3 2 1 , 323 B ogdan I, prince o f M oldavia, 21 B ogom il heresy, 16 B ohem ia, 309 B okhara, 188 B oniface IX, pope, 31 B onneval, C laude Alexander, c o u n t of, 116

Index Boris, B ulgarian ruler, 1 5 - 1 6 B oris II, B ulgarian em p ero r, 17 B osnia: ad m in istratio n o f, 3 4 9 ; an d A ustriaH u n g ary , 3 5 5 , 3 6 0 ; captains in, 88, 9 0; C h ristian p o p u latio n of, 8 9, 3 5 0 ; conver­ sions to Islam in , 3 6 , 8 8 ; and D alm atia, 2 5 ; and dev sh irm e, 4 1 ; an d D ubica War, 9 0 ; early h isto ry of, 2 5 ; 1 8 7 5 - 1 8 7 6 revolt in, 2 8 7 , 3 4 6 , 3 5 2 ; an d H a b s b u rg E m pire, 89, 9 0 ; u n d e r ju risd iction o f P atriarchate, 9 1 ; la n d h o ld in g in , 8 8 - 8 9 ; an d M uslim s, 8 8 , 8 9 - 9 0 , 3 4 8 - 3 5 0 ; an d N aiertan ije, 3 3 1 ; n o tab les in , 9 0 ; O rth o d o x ch u rch in, 8 9 ; u n d e r O tto m a n s, 32, 8 8 - 9 0 , 331, 3 4 8 - 3 5 2 , 3 6 1 ; peasants in, 8 9 , 3 5 1 ; and Serbia, 3 3 3 , 3 3 4 , 3 5 0 ; society of, 88 B o sp h o ru s, see Straits Botev, K h risto , 3 4 6 , 3 4 7 B raf, 121 Braila, 6 9 , 105, 2 6 5 B rankovic, G eo rg e, 31 Bra§ov, 15 0 , 15 2 , 182, 2 1 2 , 322 B ritia n u , D u m itru , 2 7 2 , 2 7 4 B rJtian u , Io n , 2 7 2 , 2 7 4 , 2 9 5 , 2 9 6 , 3 5 7 Bratislava, 139, 3 0 4 B rda, 8 5 , 8 7 , 2 4 8 , 2 5 0 B rincoveanu, C o n stan tin e, 6 6 , 101 B ucharest, 2 3 5 , 2 9 4 B ucharest, T reaty o f (1 8 1 2 ), 118, 164; A r­ ticle V III of, 189, 2 0 1 - 2 0 2 , 2 0 3 , 2 3 9 B uda, 6 4 , 9 1 , 13 9 , 3 0 4 , 3 0 8 ; see also B uda­ pest B udapest, 2 1 2 , 3 1 3 ; see also B uda, Pest B udva, 121 B ug R iver, 6 9 , 112 B ukovina, 6 6 , 7 0 , 16 0 , 2 9 0 B ulgarian B en ev o len t Society, 34 6 B ulgarian E xarchate, 3 4 4 B ulgarians a n d B ulgaria: an d A pril uprising, 3 4 7 - 3 4 8 ; cen ters o f political p o w er of, 3 7 0 ; an d co n stitu tio n al assem bly at T u rn o v o , 3 6 8 , 3 7 0 ; an d cultural revival, 3 3 5 , 3 3 7 ; early h isto ry of, 1 5 - 1 8 ; a n d 1 8 7 5 1876 revolt, 2 8 7 ; a n d F irst B ulgarian E m ­ pire, 16; G reek influence o n , 5 6, 5 7, 9 7 ; and G reek P ro ject, 7 1 ; an d H ellenoB ulgarian schools, 3 3 7 ; an d lan dholding, 3 3 8 - 3 3 9 , 3 4 2 ; an d local self-governm ent, 3 3 9 ; an d M uslim s, 9 5 , 3 6 6 ; and national m o v em en t, 3 3 5 - 3 4 8 , 3 6 6 - 3 7 3 ; an d O r ­ th o d o x ch u rch , 12, 9 5 , 9 7 ; u n d e r O tto m a n E m p ire, 9 5 - 9 7 , 3 3 1 , 3 3 9 ; and Panslav in ­ fluence, 3 3 8 ; an d peasants, 3 3 9 - 3 4 0 , 3 4 1 ; an d rev o lt in Plovdiv, 3 7 0 ; a n d R ussia, 3 3 7 - 3 3 8 , 3 4 1 , 3 4 3 , 3 4 4 , 3 4 5 - 3 4 6 , 359, 367—3 7 2 ; an d San S tefano, 3 5 8 ; an d Ser­ bia, 2 4 6 , 3 4 1 , 3 7 1 ; a n d S tara Z ag o ra re­ volt, 3 4 6 ; an d tax atio n , 3 4 0 - 3 4 1 ; and trad e, 3 3 8 —3 3 9

B ulgars, 1 0 ,1 5 , 19 B urebista, D acian king, 9 Bushati, Ib rah im Pasha, 362 B ushati, K ara M a h m u d , 8 4, 8 7, 123, 124, 125, 362 Bushati, M ehm ed Pasha, 84 Bushati, M ustafa Pasha, 3 4 9 , 362 B yron, L o rd , 2 2 4 - 2 2 5 B yzantine E m pire, 1 0 - 1 3 , 2 1 - 2 3 , 5 6; de­ cline and collapse of, 18, 2 2 - 2 3 , 3 1, 32; em p ero r in, 11; ethnic co m p o sitio n of, 11; G reek language in, 11; influence o n Balkan civilization of, 13, 2 9 ; religion in, 12—13; tem p o rary resurgences of, 15, 1 7 -1 8 , 23; and Venice, 2 2 - 2 3 ; see also R o m an E m pire B yzantium (city), see C o n stan tin o p le B yzantium (em pire), see B yzantine E m pire Callatis, 7 C allim achi, Scarlat, 208 C a m p o F o rm io , T reaty o f (1 7 9 7 ), 119, 162 C a n n in g , R o b e rt, 22 3 C antacuzino, C o n stan tin e, 27 3 C antacuzino, G eorge, 105 C antem ir, D im itrie, 6 6, 101 capitulations, 180, 2 3 6 , 378 C apodistrias, A vgoustinos, 2 2 3 , 2 2 8 C apodistrias, Ioannis, 2 0 5 , 2 0 6 , 2 0 7 , 2 1 1 , 221, 2 2 2 , 2 2 3 , 2 2 8 , 2 5 4 , 2 5 5 , 260 Caracalla, R o m an em peror, 11 C aragea, lo a n , 208 C arp ath ian M o u n ta in s, 1 C astlereagh, V iscount, 2 2 3 C atargiu, Lascar, 2 9 6 , 2 9 7 C atargiu, M arie, 2 4 6 C ath erin e th e G reat, 6 8 - 7 2 , 78, 8 6, 9 0 , 112, 119, 121, 157 C atholic church, 10, 5 3, 7 7, 8 1, 8 9, 9 1 , 137; see also C hristian churches, Papacy, U n iate church C engic, Sm ail A ga, 34 9 C erta P uncta, 157 C etinje, 36, 8 5, 2 4 7 , 2 4 8 , 253 C harlem agne, 2 2 , 128 C harles V, H a b sb u rg em peror, 34 C harles V I, H a b sb u rg em peror, 129, 133, 134, 143 C harles X, king o f F rance, 2 2 6 C harles X II, king o f Sw eden, 6 6 , 101 C harles o f H ohenzoU em -S igm aringen, 2 9 5 2 9 7 , 3 3 0 , 3 3 3 , 35 7 C harles o f L orraine, 64 C hem iaev, M . G ., 355 C hem ishevsky, N . G ., 338 C hesm e, 69 chetas (defined), 345 chiftliks (defined), 5 9 - 6 0 C hios, 6 9 , 2 1 7 chorbazhi, see archon

395

Index C h ristian churches: co n trasted , 77; division b etw een , 2 2 , 2 9 ; u n d e r H a b sb u rg s, 131— 132; tem p o rary u n io n of, 32 C h u rch , Sir R ich a rd , 221 C h u rch Slavic language, see O ld B ulgarian language C im p u lu n g , 21 Circassians, 2 8 6 , 3 4 7 -3 4 8 “circle o f equity,” 4 3 - 4 4 Civil C ro atia, 1 4 0 - 1 4 3 , 148, 150; see also C ro ats an d C ro atia Civil Slavonia, 14 0 , 1 4 3 - 1 4 5 , 150; see also Slavonia claca, 109 dacaji, 109 C lain, lo a n In o ch en tie, 1 5 5 -1 5 6 C laudius, R o m a n em p ero r, 9 Cloaca, 158 C luj, 151, 3 2 4 C o ch ran e, A lexander, 221 C oncivilitat, 158 C o n stan ta, 7 C o n stan tin e, o f R ussia, 70 C o n stan tin e, B yzantine em p ero r, 10, 11, 12 C o n stan tin o p le: as capital o f B yzantine E m ­ pire, 11; cap tu res of, 16, 18, 2 3 , 32; and th e devshirm e, 4 1 ; d isc o n te n t in, 115; as focus o f g reat invasion ro u tes, 3; janissaries in, 4 7 ; Ju stin ian ’s b u ild in g p ro g ram in, 13; as m ajo r p o rt, 30; R ussian th reat to , 71; v ulnerability of, 190; see also B yzantine E m p ire, P atriarch ate o f C o n stan tin o p le C o n stitu tio n alist P arty (S erbia), 2 4 1 - 2 4 2 C o rin th , 5, 7 C o m a ro , d o g e o f Venice, 85 C rete, 4 , 15, 2 3 , 6 4 , 76, 7 7, 2 1 9 ; desired by G reece, 3 5 5 ; revolts in, 2 8 7 , 375 C rim ea, 6 8 , 6 9 , 71 C rim ean W ar, 2 3 5 , 2 4 4 , 2 6 2 , 2 8 3 - 2 8 4 , 302 Cri§an, 158 C ro atian language, 3 0 6 - 3 0 7 , 3 1 5 , 320 C ro a to -H u n g a ria n P arty (C ro atia), 3 0 8 , 319, 320 C ro ats an d C ro atia: an d A ustroslav su p p o rt, 3 1 7 ; an d au to n o m y, 141, 142, 3 1 8 ; and d em an d fo r liberal reform s, 3 1 6 ; an d diet in Z ag reb , 1 4 0 - 1 4 1 ; early histo ry of, 2 3 2 5 ; g o v ern m en t o f, 141; u n d e r H a b sb u rg E m p ire, 3 4 , 6 5 , 129, 135, 1 4 0 - 1 4 5 ; and H u n g ary , 2 0 , 2 4 - 2 5 , 142, 3 0 4 , 3 0 5 ; and Illyrian m o v em en t, 3 0 4 - 3 0 8 ; an d nobles, 3 0 4 - 3 0 5 ; an d peasants, 1 4 3 - 1 4 5 ; political e v o lu tio n o f, after 1 848, 3 1 5 - 3 2 1 ; and re­ ligion, 2 4 ; an d R oyal C ouncil, 142; social classes of, 3 0 4 - 3 0 5 crusades, 18, 2 2 - 2 3 C u m an s, 10 C ustozza, b attle o f (1 8 4 8 ), 30 9 C uza, A lexander, 2 4 6 , 2 7 4 , 291—2 9 5 , 2 9 6 ,

2 9 7 , 332, 3 3 3 , 344 C yprus, 6 4 , 7 7, 3 6 1 -3 6 2 C yril, 16 Cyrillic alphabet, 16, 2 1, 2 9, 322 C zartoryski, P rince A dam , 198, 2 7 1 , 32 9 D acians and D acia, 4 , 19, 71, 112

dabis (defined), 196 D alm atia: an d Bosnia, 2 5 ; u n d e r H a b sb u rg E m pire, 164, 3 0 4 ; an d H ungary, 2 5 ; u n ­ d e r jurisdiction o f P atriarchate, 9 1 ; and Serbia, 2 5; and Venice, 2 3 , 2 5 , 6 5, 6 8 , 77, 85 D am ad Ib rah im Pasha, 114 Danica, 3 0 7 Danilevsky, N . I., 353 D an ilo , bishop o f M o n te n eg ro , 85 D an u b e R iver and valley, 1, 3, 4 , 9, 10, 19 D an u b e vilayet, 340 D an u b ian C onfederation, 332 D an u b ian Principalities: an d A grarian L aw o f 1 864, 2 9 3 - 2 9 4 ; boyars in, 2 1 , 1 0 1 -1 0 3 , 105, 106, 1 0 8 - 1 0 9 ; eth n ic backgrounds o f peoples of, 2 1 ; fiscal pressure o n , 1 0 4 105; an d G reek P roject, 7 1; as interest o f N ap o leo n I II , 3 2 9 ; lan d h o ld in g in, 108; and n in eteen th -cen tu ry centers o f au­ thority, 2 6 8 - 2 6 9 ; an d O rth o d o x church, 12; an d O tto m a n E m p ire in nin eteen th century, 2 6 5 ; an d O tto m a n -R u s s ia n w ar o f 1 7 1 0 -1 7 1 1 , 6 6, 189; peasants in, 106, 1 0 8 -1 0 9 , 2 6 7 - 2 6 8 ; P h an ario ts in, 56, 57, 102, 1 0 3 - 1 0 4 , 1 0 7 -1 1 0 ; rev o lu tio n in, 2 0 4 , 2 0 6 , 2 0 7 - 2 1 4 , 2 7 1 - 2 7 4 , 3 3 1 , 332; R ussian in terv en tio n in, 1 0 1 -1 0 5 , 1 1 0 112, 1 1 9 -1 2 3 , 2 6 4 - 2 7 4 , 2 8 7 - 2 8 8 , 2 9 0 , 3 3 7 ; social an d cultural changes in, d u rin g n in eteen th century, 2 7 1 ; as source o f m ili­ tary supply, 100; an d T reaty o f Jassy, 72; see also M oldavia, N ap o leo n ic W ars, R o ­ m anians an d R o m an ia, W allachia D ardanelles, see Straits dariilharb (defined), 39 dariilislam (defined), 39 D ashkov, I. A ., 2 6 9 - 2 7 0 D avydov, A. P., 369 D eak, Ferenc, 313 D ecanski, S tephen, 19 D ecebalus, D acian king, 9 D ed icated M onasteries, 104, 2 9 2 - 2 9 3 defterdars (defined), 57 D eligeorgis, E pam inondas, 2 6 4 dem es (defined), 255 D en m ark , 66 D ervish Pasha, 365 devshirme (defined), 4 1 , 4 6 D iber, 365 Digenis Akritas, 175 D im itu r, H ad zh i, 346

Index D io cletian , R o m a n em p ero r, 9 , 10 D ip lo m a o f 1 6 9 9 , 1 54 D ip lo m a o f 1 8 6 0 , 312 D israeli, B enjam in, 3 5 6 Divan (defined), 4 2 D jakovic, B ish o p Isaija, 92 djizia (defined), 81 D n iep er R iver, 6 9 D n iester R iv er, 7 2 , 112 D o b ru d ja, 3 5 9 D o d a, P re n k B ib, 3 6 4 D o lg u ru k ii, Iu rii, 86 do m enical lan d , see m an o rial land D o n d u k o v -K o rsak o v , P rince A. M ., 3 6 8 D ràgàçani, 2 1 3 dragoman (defined), 5 4 - 5 5 , 1 8 0 -1 8 1 D rag o m an Pass, 3 D raskovic, Janko, 3 0 6 , 3 0 7 D rava R iver, 1, 3 1 7 Dreikaiserbund, see T h ree E m p e ro rs, A lliance D rin R iver, 3 D rin a R iver, 10 D u al A lliance, 3 73 D u b ica W ar, 9 0 D u b ro v n ik , 2 5 , 3 0 , 9 8 - 9 9 , 119, 121 D u lcig n o , see U lcinj Dunavski Lebed, 345 D u razzo , see D u rrës D u rrës, 3, 2 5 , 182 D uSan, S tep h en , 19, 2 7 , 36 E astern B arrier, 6 4 E astern Q u e stio n , 1 8 6 - 1 9 2 , 2 8 3 , 302 E astern R o m a n E m p ire, see B yzantine E m ­ pire E astern R u m elia, 3 6 6 , 3 6 8 - 3 7 1 E d ic t o f T o leratio n (1 7 8 1 ), 1 3 7 -1 3 8 , 148, 159 E d im e , see A d rian o p le E g y p t, 4 , 2 3 , 2 6 2 , 3 75 E lizabeth, em press o f R ussia, 8 5, 134 E lizabeth o f W ied, 2 9 6 E lp h in sto n e, L o rd , 72 en lig h ten ed d esp o tism , 135 E n lig h ten m en t, influence of, o n Balkan lead­ ers, 1 7 1 -1 7 2 eparchies (defined), 2 55 E p etio n , 7 E p id au ru s, 2 21 E p id a u ru s c o n stitu tio n , 2 5 8 E p iru s, 19, 2 3 , 7 3 , 2 1 7 , 3 3 1 , 3 3 4 , 361 E rfu rt, 12 2 , 201 E tairia, see F ilik i E t atria ethnarch (d efin ed ), 5 0 E u g en e, p rince o f Savoy, 6 5 , 6 8 , 116 eyalet (defined), 5 7 Fadeev, R . A ., 3 5 3 F eb ru ary P a te n t o f 1 8 6 1 , 3 1 2 , 3 1 9

Feraios, R igas, 176 F erd in an d I, H a b sb u rg em p ero r, 3 0 2 , 30 9 F erd in an d , king o f H ungary, 34 F erd in an d o f S axe-C oburg, 3 7 2 , 3 7 4 fetva (defined), 43 Filaret, m etro p o litan o f M oscow , 34 4 F ilik i Etairia, 2 0 4 , 2 0 5 —2 1 3 , 2 1 6 , 2 2 0 , 2 2 3 , 2 3 9 , 3 3 2 ; basic objective of, 2 0 5 , 2 0 7 , 2 3 1 ; o rg an izatio n of, 20 6 firm an (defined), 4 0 fis (defined), 83 F ium e, see Rijeka Florence, C ouncil of, o f 1 4 39, 3 2 , 1 5 3 -1 5 4 Foaia pentru minte, tmma ji literatura, 322 F o u rth C rusade, 18, 2 2 - 2 3 France: alliance w ith R ussia of, 3 2 9 , 375; an d E astern Q u estio n , 188; an d 1848 rev­ o lu tio n , 3 0 9 ; and G reek P roject, 70; and H ab sb u rg s, 6 4 , 8 7, 161—164; and O tto ­ m ans, 3 4, 5 3, 6 4 , 6 9 , 71, 72, 1 1 8 -1 1 9 ; an d P oland, 3 2 9 ; and Serbs, 2 4 4 ; and V en­ ice, 8 7; w ars of, 6 5 , 6 6 , 8 7 , 119, 3 3 0 ; see also C rim ean W ar, F ranco-P russian War, N apoleonic Wars Francis I, king o f F rance, 3 4 , 6 4 F rancis I, H a b s b u rg em p ero r, 3 0 2 , 305 Francis II, H a b sb u rg em p ero r, 161 Franco-P russian W ar, 2 9 6 , 3 3 0 , 352 F ran k o p an , F ran K rsto, 141 F ranz Joseph, H a b sb u rg em p ero r, 309, 311, 3 1 2 , 3 1 3 , 3 1 6 , 3 1 8 , 3 2 5 , 3 2 6 , 3 2 7 , 353, 375 F rasheri, A bdul, 3 6 3 , 3 6 5 , 36 6 F rederick the G reat, 6 8, 6 9 , 134 Freicorps (defined), 9 4 F u ad Pasha, 2 7 3 , 28 2 Fundus Regius, 1 5 1 -1 5 2 G ab ro v o , 3 3 7 G agic, Jerem ija, 2 5 0 G aj, L judevit, 3 0 6 , 3 0 7 G alatis, N ikolaos, 2 0 5 G allipoli, 30 G arasanin, Ilija, 2 4 3 - 2 4 4 , 2 4 5 , 331, 333, 3 5 0 -3 5 1 Gazeta de Transilvania, 32 2 G azi H asan Pasha, 117 G elu, D u k e, 156 G en o a, 30 G eo rg e I, long o f G reece, 2 6 3 - 2 6 4 , 333 G erm an language, 138, 1 4 2 -1 4 3 , 3 0 1 , 311, 326 G erm anos, b ish o p o f P atras, 2 0 6 , 2 1 7 G erm ans, see Saxons G erm any, 3 3 0 , 375 G hegs, 83 G hica, A lexander, 2 6 8 , 2 6 9 , 2 7 0 G hica, G rigore, 107 G hica, G rig o re D ., 2 1 4

397

Index G hica, Io n , 2 7 2 G iers, N icholas K arlovich, 2 6 9 - 2 7 0 , 3 7 0 , 3 78 G iu rg iu , 2 6 5 G jirokastër, 8 1 , 365 G lagolitic script, 16 G o eth e, J. W. v o n , 175 G olescu, A . G ., 2 7 2 G olescu, N icolae, 2 7 2 G olescu, R a d u , 2 7 2 G o luchow ski, A gen o r, 375 G orchakov, A lexander M ., 3 5 2 , 3 5 5 , 378 G ôrgey, A rth u r, 3 1 0 G o th s, 9, 19 G rah o v o , 2 5 1 , 2 5 3 G raz, 3 0 5 , 3 0 6 G reat B ritain: an d th e E astern Q u estio n , 1 8 7 -1 8 8 ; an d E g y p t, 3 7 5 ; naval p o w e r of, 3 - 4 ; an d O tto m a n s, 72, 119, 123, 3 3 1 ; an d P o lan d , 3 2 9 ; reaction to G reek revolu­ tio n o f, 2 2 4 - 2 2 6 ; an d R ussia, 7 2; “splen­ d id isolatio n ” o f, 3 7 5 ; an d trad e w ith Asia, 4 7 ; see also C rim ean W ar G reater M o rav ian K in g d o m , see M oravia G reat Id ea, see M egali Idea G reek C ath o lic ch u rch , see U n iate church G reek language, 10, 11, 12, 2 3 , 2 7 , 5 5, 1 7 5 1 77, 3 3 7 G reek P roject, 7 0 - 7 1 , 7 8 - 8 0 , 8 7 G reeks an d G reece: ancient histo ry of, 4 - 7 ; and arm y, 2 5 6 - 2 5 7 , 2 6 0 , 3 3 3 ; an d a u to n ­ o m o u s g o v ern m en t, 3 3 1 ; an d B ulgarians, 5 6 , 5 7 , 9 7 ; an d co m m unal g o vernm ent, 7 3 - 7 5 ; an d C o n s titu tio n o f 1844, 2 6 1 ; an d C rete, 3 5 5 ; an d first n atio n al g o v ern ­ m en t, 2 2 2 ; an d G reat B ritain, 2 2 4 - 2 2 6 ; an d G reek P ro ject, 7 1; u n d e r K in g O th o n , 2 5 4 - 2 6 4 ; an d lan d h o ld in g , 2 5 7 - 2 5 8 ; and levels o f society, 2 0 4 , 2 1 5 - 2 1 6 ; an d local a d m in istratio n , 2 5 5 ; an d M acedonia, 3 3 3 ; an d m aritim e m onopoly, 181; and n o ­ tables, 7 3 , 7 5 ; an d O rth o d o x church, 12, 2 5 6 ; u n d e r th e O tto m a n s, 7 3 - 8 0 ; political p arties o f, 2 6 0 ; an d p o p u latio n co n cen tra­ tio n s, 7 3 ; an d rev o lu tio n , 2 0 4 - 2 2 9 , 2 6 3 2 6 4 ; an d R ussia, 7 8 - 8 0 , 2 2 3 - 2 2 4 , 2 2 6 2 2 8 , 3 3 7 ; an d Serbs, 5 7 , 2 4 0 ; an d Slavic states, 3 5 8 ; an d T reaty o f L o n d o n , 2 2 8 ; and Venice, 7 6 - 7 7 ; an d w ar w ith O tto m a n E m p ire (1 8 9 7 ), 3 7 5 ; see also P hanariots G reiner, Jo h a n n , 2 5 4 gubem ium (defined), 153 G ü lh an e d ecree (1 8 3 9 ), 2 8 2 , 343 G usinje, 3 6 4 guvem adur (defined), 85 H a b s b u rg E m p ire: an d agriculture, 3 0 2 3 0 3 ; a n d B an at o f Tem esvar, 6 6 , 6 8 , 9 3, 9 4 , 1 6 0 —16 1 ; basic n a tu re o f em p ire of,

3 0 0 - 3 0 1 ; an d Bosnia, 8 9 , 9 0 , 3 5 5 , 360; centralized au th o rity of, 127, 165; as ch ief th reat to O tto m a n E m p ire, 5 3 , 7 7 , 105; co n trasted w ith O tto m a n E m pire, 1 2 7 133, 1 6 5 -1 6 8 ; and C ro ats, 3 4, 6 5 , 129, 135, 1 4 0 -1 4 5 ; and D alm atia, 164, 3 0 4 ; and E astern Q u estio n , 1 8 6 —187; and F rance, 6 4, 87, 1 6 1 -1 6 4 ; an d G reek P ro j­ ect, 7 0; an d H ercegovina, 3 5 5 , 3 6 0 ; and H ungary, 6 5, 1 2 9 -1 3 0 , 131, 1 3 9 -1 4 5 , 3 0 3 - 3 0 4 , 3 1 0 - 3 1 5 , 3 1 7 , 3 1 9 , 3 2 7 -3 2 8 , 3 3 0 , 3 3 4 - 3 3 5 , 3 7 7 ; lan d h o ld in g under, 1 3 2 -1 3 3 ; an d M ilitary F ro n tier, 1 4 5 -1 4 8 ; an d M o n te n eg ro , 8 7; an d nam e A ustnaHungary, 3 1 3 ; an d n eutrality in C rim ean W ar, 3 0 2 ; nobles u n d er, 129, 1 3 0 -1 3 1 , 133, 3 0 2 - 3 0 3 ; peasants u nder, 1 3 2 -1 3 3 , 135, 137, 1 6 7 -1 6 8 , 3 0 2 - 3 0 3 , 3 2 8 ; and P oland, 3 2 9 ; p o sitio n o f B alkan peoples u nder, 166; p o sitio n o f m o n arch under, 1 2 9 -1 3 0 ; and P ragm atic S anction, 1 3 3 134; reform s under, 1 3 4 - 1 3 9 , 1 6 5 -1 6 6 , 168; religion un d er, 128, 1 3 1 -1 3 2 ; and revolution o f 1848, 3 0 9 ; an d R om ania, 135, 152, 1 5 5 -1 6 0 , 3 7 4 ; and R ussia, 2 4 4 , 2 8 8 , 3 1 2 ; an d Serbs, 6 8 , 9 1 - 9 5 , 135, 145, 1 4 8 -1 5 0 , 316, 3 7 4 ; an d Slavonia, 3 4, 6 5, 140, 1 4 3 -1 4 5 ; and trad e w ith Balkans, 97, 182; and T ransylvania, 6 5 , 101, 1 5 0 -1 6 0 , 30 4 , 3 2 1 , 3 3 2 ; and Treaty o f B elgrade, 6 8 ; an d Treaty o f K arlow itz, 6 5 , 6 6 , 9 7 , 9 8 , 101, 2 8 3 ; an d Treaty o f P assarow itz, 8 9, 93, 105; and Treaty o f P ressburg, 121; and W allachia, 105; and w ar w ith O tto m a n E m p ire (1 6 8 2 -1 6 9 9 ), 6 4 - 6 5 , ( 1 7 1 4 1 7 1 8 ), 6 8 , 9 3 , ( 1 7 3 6 -1 7 3 9 ) , 6 8 , 9 3 , 105, ( 1 7 8 8 -1 7 9 1 ) , 7 1 -7 2 , 9 4 - 9 5 ; an d w ar w ith Prussia (1 8 6 6 ), 3 1 3 , 3 3 0 ; an d w ar w ith Sardinia and France (1 8 5 9 ), 3 3 0 ; see also H o ly L eague, N apoleonic Wars H ad ji M ustafa Pasha, 195, 196 H ad rian o p o lis, see A drianople H adzhivulkov, Vasil, 345 H afiz Pasha, 198 H ag ia S ophia, 13 haiduks, haiduts, see klephts H alil H am id , 117 harts, 182 haraf, 61 H a tti H u m ay u n , 2 8 4 - 2 8 5 H eideck, K arl von, 2 5 4 , 2 5 8 H ellas, 4 ; see also G reeks an d G reece H ellenes, 4 ; see also G reeks an d G reece H ercegovina: and A ustria-H ungary, 3 5 5 , 3 6 0 ; captains in, 8 8, 9 0 ; C hristian p o p u la­ tio n of, 8 9; conversions to Islam in, 88; 1 8 7 5 - 1 8 7 6 revolt in, 2 8 7 , 3 4 6 , 3 5 2 ; u n ­ d e r jurisdiction o f P atriarchate, 9 1; and M uslim s, 8 8, 8 9, 3 4 8 - 3 5 0 ; an d the N aier-

398

Index tan ije, 3 3 1 ; n o tab les in , 9 0 ; O rth o d o x ch u rch in , 8 9 ; u n d e r O tto m a n s, 3 2, 8 8 90, 3 3 1 , 3 4 8 - 3 5 2 , 3 6 1 ; peasants in, 89; an d P eter th e G reat’s Balkan cam paign, 6 6; an d Serbia, 3 3 3 , 3 3 4 , 3 5 0 H erd er, Jo h a n n G o ttfrie d , 172, 306 H e rm a n n sta d t, see Sibiu H erzen , A lexander, 3 3 8 H exabilis, 75 History o fMontenegro, 8 6 H istria, see Istro s

hodza-bashi, see anhon H o ly Alliance, 19 1 , 2 8 8 , 3 0 2 , 3 1 1 - 3 1 2 , 329 H o ly L eague, 6 4 , 7 7 , 8 5 , 92 H o ly W ar: co n c e p t o f, 3 9 ; as m ain function o f O tto m a n E m p ire, 4 2 ; against R ussia, 227 H o rea, 158, 3 02 hospodar (defined), 6 6 H u b e rtu sb e rg , T reaty o f (1 7 6 3 ), 134 H u n g a ria n lan g u ag e, 143, 150, 3 0 5 , 3 1 5 , 322, 323 H u n g ary : an d B an at o f Tem esvar, 3 0 4 ; and b attle o f M o h acs, 3 4 , 128; an d C roatia, 2 0 , 2 4 - 2 5 , 14 2 , 3 0 4 , 3 0 5 ; an d D alm atia, 2 5 ; d ie t o f, 1 3 9 - 1 4 0 ; an d em igre revolu­ tio n ary m o v em en t, 3 3 2 ; an d H a b sb u rg E m p ire, 6 5 , 1 2 9 - 1 3 0 , 131, 1 3 9 -1 4 5 , 3 0 3 -3 0 4 , 3 1 0 -3 1 5 , 317, 319, 3 2 7 -3 2 8 , 3 3 0 , 3 3 2 ; an d M ag y ar nationality, 315; peasants in , 3 1 7 - 3 1 8 ; an d rev o lu tio n o f 1 8 4 8 - 1 8 4 9 , 3 2 9 ; a n d Slavonia, 2 5, 3 0 4 ; and T ransylvania, 2 0 , 2 1 , 151, 152, 3 2 3 3 2 7 , 3 32 H iin k a r Iskelesi, T reaty o f, see U n k iar Iskelessi, T reaty o f (1 8 3 3 ) H u n s , 9 , 1 0 ,'1 9 H u n y a d i, Jo h n , 31 H iisein , 3 4 9 H var, 121 H y d ra, 2 6 , 2 1 7 Ian cu , A vram , 3 2 3 , 325 Ian cu o f H u n a d o a ra , see H u n y a d i, John la§i, 6 6 , 6 8 , 1 05, 121, 2 1 2 , 2 3 5 , 2 7 0 , 2 7 2 , 294 Ib rah im P asha, 2 1 9 , 2 7 7 , 27 8 Ignatiev, N ich o las Pavlovich, 3 4 3 , 3 4 4 , 345, 354, 358 Illyrian m o v em en t, 3 0 6 - 3 0 8 , 331 Illyrian Party, see N a tio n a l P arty (C roatia) Illyrian P rovinces, 1 62—163 Illyrians an d Illyria, 4 , 2 5 , 26 Illyrium , 9 In d e p e n d e n t N atio n al P arty (C ro atia), 31 9 Io an n in a, see Janina Io n ia, 5 Io n ian Islands, 6 8 , 7 7 Io n ian Sea, 1

Iro n G ates, 1 Isker R iver, an d valley, 1, 3 Islaz P roclam ation, 2 7 2 Ism ail, 69 ispravnik (defined), 107 Issa, 7 Istanbul, see C o n stan tin o p le istimalet (defined), 42 Istria, 70, 164 Istros, 7 Italian language, 25 Italy, 3 2 9 , 330, 3 3 2 ; see also L om bardyV enetia, K in g d o m of, N aples, K in g d o m of, P ied m o n t, Sicily, T w o Sicilies, K in g d o m o f th e, Venice Ivelic, M arko, 121 Janina, 8 4, 125, 3 6 2 , 363 janissaries: A lbanians as, 8 1; converts as, 4 1 ; d u ties of, 4 2 ; as fighting force, 4 7 ,4 8 ; need fo r reform of, 114; as political force, 47—4 8 ; in provinces, 4 7 ; rebellion of, 114; role in first Serbian revolution of, 1 9 5 -1 9 8 Jassy, see Ia§i Jassy, Treaty o f (1 7 9 2 ), 72, 8 0, 112 Jelacic, B aron Josip, 3 1 6 , 3 1 7 , 318 Jerusalem , 49 Jo h n , archduke, 3 0 9 Jom ini, A. G ., 378 Joseph II, H a b sb u rg em peror, 70, 72, 9 0, 112, 129, 1 3 4 -1 3 8 , 142, 145, 148, 1 5 6 159, 160, 167, 168, 3 0 1 , 311 Jovanovic, Peter, 24 3 Justinian, B yzantine em peror, 13

kadi (defined), 43 kadiliks (defined), 5 7 kafes (defined), 4 6 kajkavian dialect, 3 0 7 K alem egdan, 2 4 6 K aloyan, B ulgarian em peror, 18 kanuns (defined), 4 0 kapitanate (defined), 76, 88 kapitanios (defined), 76 kapoi (defined), 76 kapudan-pasha (defined), 75 K aradjordje P etrovic, 196, 1 9 9 - 2 0 0 , 2 0 1 , 2 0 2 , 2 0 7 , 2 0 9 , 2 3 1 , 2 4 0 , 2 5 9 , 342 K aradjordjevic, A lexander, 2 4 3 , 2 4 4 , 245 K aradzha, S tephen, 346 K aradzic, V uk, 177, 3 0 6 , 3 0 7 , 308 K ara M ustafa Pasha, 6 4 K aravelov, L iu ben, 346 K arlobag, 146 K arlovac, 146 K arlow itz, see Srem ski Karlovci K arlow itz, Treaty o f (1 6 9 9 ), 5 5, 182, 378; A rticles X III an d XTV of, 6 5 ; B osnian b o r­ d e r established by, 8 9 ; H a b s b u rg gains

399

Index K arlow itz, T reaty o f (cont.) fro m , 6 5 , 6 6 , 9 7 , 9 8 , 101, 2 8 3 ; results of, 1 29, 14 0 ; V enetian gains from , 7 7, 8 5 ; as w atersh ed o f O tto m a n history, 65 K ars, 3 6 0 K astrio ti, G eo rg e, see S kenderbeg katharevousa, 176 K atkov, M . N ., 3 53 K atu n i, 85 K au n itz, C o u n t W enzel v o n , 134 kaza (defined), 5 7 , 2 8 5 K azanlük, 3 3 7 K erch, 6 9 K h erso n , 71 K hiva, 188 K h o tin , 105 Kilia, 6 9 kirdjalis (defined), 9 7 Kiselev, C o u n t Pavel D ., 2 6 6 , 2 6 7 - 2 6 8 , 368 K lau sen b u rg , see Cluj K lein, M icu, see C lain, lo a n In o ch en tie klephts (defined), 6 1 - 6 2 , 7 5 , 7 6, 175 K lisura, 3 4 7

knez, see archon knezina (defined), 91 koca-baji, see archon K o fa ’s W ar, 9 4 , 9 5 K ogälniceanu, M ih ail, 2 7 4 , 2 9 3 , 3 5 7 K o k an d , 188 K olettis, Io an n is, 2 2 2 , 2 2 3 , 2 6 0 , 2 6 1 , 26 2 K ollär, Jan, 3 0 6 K o lo k o tro n is, T h e o d o ra s , 2 0 6 , 2 2 0 , 2 2 1 , 222, 223, 260 K o lo m an , k in g o f C ro atia, 2 4 K o lo zsv ir, see Cluj K o m iro m , 91 Königsboden, see Fundus Regius K onya, 2 7 8 , 281 K op riv sh titsa, 3 4 7 K o p rü lü , Fazil A h m ed , 4 6 , 5 5, 6 4 K opriilii, M e h m ed , 4 6 , 64 K o p rü lü , M u stafa, 6 5 K orais, A d am an tio s, 176 ΚοΓςέ, 81 K o ritsa, see ΚοΓςέ K oso v o , 8 1 , 9 3 , 2 4 5 , 3 3 1 , 3 3 3 , 36 3 K o so v o P olje, b attle o f (1 3 8 9 ), 3 1, 175, 308 K o ssu th , L ajos, 3 0 3 , 3 1 0 , 3 1 7 , 3 2 9 K o to r, 8 5 , 12 0 , 12 1 , 2 4 8 K o u m o u n d o u ro s, A lexander, 2 6 4 K o u n to u rio tis, G eo rg e, 221 K rem sier, 3 0 9 , 3 1 0 K ro n stad t, see Brasov K ruje, 2 6 K ru m , K h an , B ulgarian ruler, 15, 16 K rusi, battle o f (1 7 9 6 ), 8 7 K rustevich, G avril EfFendi, 3 6 9 K u b an , 15

K uchuk K ainarji, T reaty o f (1 7 7 4 ): Articles V II and X IV of, 70; A rticle X V I of, 111; and balance o f p o w e r in Black Sea, 6 9; provisions of, 6 9 , 7 0, 7 8, 111, 2 1 3 , 2 8 3 , 3 7 8 ; an d R ussian influence in D an u b ian P rincipalities, 110, 265 K ücük K ajnarca, T reaty of, see K u ch u k K ain­ arji, T reaty o f (1774) kul (defined), 4 1 , 4 6 kuluk (defined), 2 4 8 kumparia (defined), 25 9 K upa River, 1 K utsovlachs, see Vlachs K u tuzov, M . I., 201 K vatem ik, E u g en , 3 1 8 , 320 Kyriakodromtom, 3 3 7 Ladislas I, king o f H un g ary , 2 4 L aibach, see L jubljana L aibach, C ongress of, 192 Lashkarev, S. L ., I l l L atin language, 2 5 , 2 9 , 138, 143, 3 0 5 , 315, 322 L azar, prince o f Serbia, 31 L eague o f P rizren, 364, 3 6 5 , 3 6 6 L eith a R iver, 313 L em eni, lo a n , 3 2 2 , 3 2 3 , 3 2 4 , 32 6 L eontije, m etro p o litan , 2 0 2 L eo p o ld o f S axe-C oburg, 2 2 2 , 22 8 L eo p o ld I, H a b sb u rg em peror, 9 2, 139, 152, 154, 159 L eo p o ld II, H a b sb u rg em peror, 72, 9 2 , 129, 138, 159, 160, 161 Levski, Vasil, 346

liva, see sanjak L jubljana, 211 L om bardy-V enetia, K in g d o m of, 164 L o n d o n , 54 L o n d o n , Treaty o f (1 8 3 0 ), 2 2 8 , 378 L o u is P hilippe, king o f F rance, 309 L o u is X V I, king o f F rance, 161 L o u is II, k in g o f H ungary, 34 Lov£en, M t., 85 L uck, T reaty o f (1 7 1 1 ), 101 L u d w ig I, king o f Bavaria, 2 2 8 , 2 5 4 LunevUle, Treaty o f (1 8 0 1 ), 162

M acedonia: desired by G reeks an d Serbs, 3 3 3 ; an d G reek P roject, 7 1; M uslim s in, 9 5 ; u n d e r O tto m a n s, 9 5 - 9 7 , 2 1 7 , 331, 360, 3 6 1 ; p o w er struggles in, 9 7 M agyar language, 143 M agyars, 10 M agyrones, see C ro a to -H u n g a ria n P arty (C roatia) maballas (defined), 62 M a h m u d I, O tto m a n sultan, 116

400

Index M a h m u d II, O tto m a n su ltan , 1 2 5 -1 2 6 , 2 0 1 , 216, 219, 227, 277, 278, 279, 281, 282, 341 M a h m u d N ed im , 2 8 7 M akrigiannis, Io an n is, 2 31—23 2 m anorial lan d , 132, 163 M an zik ert, b attle o f (1 0 7 1 ), 22 M arashli A li P asha, 2 0 3 M arch L aw s o f 1 8 4 8 , 3 13 M ark o , K rali or Kraljcvic, see M ark, Prince M aria T h eresa, H a b s b u rg em press, 6 8 , 70, 12 9 , 1 3 4 - 1 3 6 , 14 2 , 14 7 , 156, 167, 301 M arie A n to in ette, q u een o f F rance, 161 M aritsa R iver, b attle o f (1 3 7 1 ), 31 M ark, Prince, 175 M arkovic, N ich o las, 8 6 M arseilles, 5 4 M au rer, L u d w ig v o n , 2 5 4 , 2 5 5 , 2 5 6 , 25 8 M av ro co rd at, C o n stan tin e, 105, 106, 107, 108, 1 67 M a v ro co rd at, N ico lae, 1 0 7 M av ro k o rd ato s, A lexander, 5 5, 2 2 0 , 2 2 1 , 222, 260, 261, 262 M av ro k o rd ato s, Io an n is, 55 M avrom ichalis, P etrobey, 2 0 6 M axim ian, R o m a n em p ero r, 9 M azeppa, Ivan S tepanovich, 66 mazili (defined), 1 07 M azuranic, Ivan, 3 1 9 MeceUe, 2 8 2 M ed iterran ean A g reem en ts, 3 7 4 M ed ju m u rje, 3 1 7 M egali Id ea (G rea t Id ea), 5 6 , 2 6 2 , 331 M e h m ed I, O tto m a n sultan, 31 M e h m ed th e C o n q u e ro r, O tto m a n sultan, 32, 4 6 , 4 9 M eh m ed III, O tto m a n su ltan, 4 5 - 4 6 M e h m ed P asha K ukavica, 9 0 M eh m ed R e sh id Pasha, 3 4 9 , 3 6 2 M enshikov, P rince A lexander, 2 8 3 M esem bria, 7 M etaxas, A ndreas, 2 6 0 M e th o d iu s, 16 M e tte rn ich , P rince C lem ens v o n , 163, 192, 2 1 1 ,2 2 3 , 3 0 1 - 3 0 2 , 3 0 9 M ichael V I II P alaeologus, B yzantine em ­ peror, 2 3 M ichael th e Brave, prin ce o f W allachia, 35 M ickiew icz, A ., 175 M id h a t P asha, 2 8 2 , 340 M ilakovic, D ., 2 5 0 M ilitary F ro n tier, 139, 140, 143, 1 4 5 -1 4 8 , 1 5 7 -1 5 8 , 161 M iliu tin , S erbian ruler, 19 millet (defined), 4 8 - 5 3 millet bashi (defined), 5 0 M inchiaki, see M inciaky, M atei L eovich M inciaky, M a tei L eovich, 2 6 6 , 2 6 9

M ircea th e O ld , W allachian ruler, 31 m iri (defined), 59 M isolonghi, 2 1 7 ,2 1 9 , 2 2 4 , 2 7 7 , 362 M ohäcs, battle o f (1 5 2 6 ), 3 4 , 128 M oldavia: a u to n o m y of, 9 9 ; centers o f po w er in, 1 0 0 - 1 0 1 ; first prince in, 2 1 ; O rganic S tatutes in, 2 6 6 - 2 6 9 ; u n d e r O tto m an s, 3 5, 36, 9 9 - 1 0 1 ; peasants in, 109; and R ussia, 6 8 , 1 0 1 -1 0 5 , 1 1 0 - 1 1 2 , 123, 2 6 4 2 7 4 ; see also D an u b ian Principalities, R o ­ m anians an d R o m an ia M oltke, H e lm u t von, 281 M onastir, see Bitola M o ngols, 10 M o n te n eg ro : a n d A lbania, 8 7, 3 6 5 ; attack o n , by O m e r P asha, 3 4 9 ; attem p ts a t cen­ tral ad m in istratio n of, 2 4 8 - 2 5 4 ; a u to n o ­ m o u s g o v ern m en t in, 3 3 1 ; characteristics of, 2 4 7 ; an d C ongress o f B erlin, 3 6 0 , 3 6 4 ; d u al offices in, 2 4 7 , 2 4 9 ; e m ig ratio n from , 2 4 7 ; a n d H a b s b u rg E m p ire, 8 7 ; justice in, 2 4 8 - 2 4 9 ; an d th e N acertanije, 3 3 1 ; n in e ­ te e n th century p o p u latio n of, 2 4 8 ; O r th o ­ dox chu rch in, 5 6, 8 5 ; an d O tto m a n E m ­ pire, 3 6, 8 4, 8 7 , 2 5 2 - 2 5 4 , 3 5 5 - 3 6 1 ; revolt in, 8 5, 2 5 1 ; an d R ussia, 6 6 , 8 5 - 8 7 , 1 2 0 - 1 2 1 , 2 4 9 - 2 5 0 , 2 5 2 , 2 5 3 ; an d San S tefano, 3 5 8 —3 5 9 ; an d S erbian national objectives, 3 5 0 ; taxation in, 8 4; an d V en­ ice, 85 M orava R iver an d valley, 1, 3, 4 M oravia, 16 M o ro sin i, Francesco, 77 M o ru zzi, A lexander, 122 M ostar, 8 8 , 248 muftis (defined), 43 M u h a m m a d Ali, 2 1 9 , 2 2 3 , 2 2 7 , 2 7 4 , 2 7 7 , 2 7 8 , 2 8 1 , 2 8 5 , 378 miilk (defined), 59 M ü n n ic h , G eneral, 6 8, 105 M u ra d I, O tto m a n sultan, 31 M u ra d II, O tto m a n sultan, 3 1 , 34 M u ra d IV, O tto m a n sultan, 6 4 M u ra d V, O tto m a n sultan, 35 4 M ustafa B ayraktar P asha, 125, 126 M ustafa R esh id P asha, 2 8 2 M ustafa III, O tto m a n sultan, 116 M ustafa IV, O tto m a n sultan, 125, 126, 201 M üteferrika, Ibrahim , 115 mütevelli (defined), 59 M ycenae, 4 N afertan ije, 2 4 4 - 2 4 5 , 3 3 1 , 333 N ag o d b a, 3 2 0 , 3 2 7

nahije, see nahiye nabiye (defined), 5 7, 9 3 , 2 8 5 N aissus, see NiS N aples, K in g d o m of, 35

401

Index N ap o leo n B o n ap arte, 1 1 8 - 1 2 0 , 162, 199, 278 N ap o leo n H I, 2 9 0 , 2 9 5 , 3 2 9 N ap o leo n ic W ars, 1 1 8 - 1 2 3 , 1 6 2 -1 6 4 N a p p ist P arty (G reece), 2 6 0 nart (defined), 109 N arv a, b attle o f (1 7 0 0 ), 6 6 natio n alist ideologies, 1 7 2 -1 7 8 : an d history, 1 7 7 -1 7 8 ; an d language, 173, 1 7 5 -1 7 7 ; an d relig io n , 1 7 4 - 1 7 5 , 178 N a tio n a l P arty (C ro atia), 3 0 8 , 3 1 5 , 3 1 6 , 3 1 8 ,3 1 9 Nationsuniversitdt (defined), 1 5 1 -1 5 2 N a u p lio n , 2 2 1 , 2 5 4 N av arin o , 78 N av arin o Bay, b attle o f (1 8 2 7 ), 2 2 6 , 2 2 7 , 265 N eo fit, M e tro p o lita n , 2 7 2 , 2 7 3 N eretv a R iver, 1, 3 N eseb u r, see M esem bria N esselrode, K arl, 2 05 N eth erlan d s, th e , 4 7 , 72 N icaea, C o u n cil o f (3 2 5 ), 12 N icaea, E m p ire o f, 23 N ich itici, G h ed eo n , 159 N icholas I, b ish o p o f M o n te n e g ro , 2 5 3 , 2 9 0 , 334, 3 5 4 -3 5 5 N icholas I, tsa r o f R ussia, 2 2 6 , 2 6 1 ,2 8 2 , 3 0 2 ,3 1 1 N icholas II, tsar o f R ussia, 372 N ico p , b attle of, see N icopolis, b atd e o f (1 3 9 6 ) N ico p o lis, b attle o f (1 3 9 6 ), 31 N ik o u sio s, P an ag io tis, 55 NiS, 3, 9 , 10, 3 1 , 9 2 , 9 3 , 182, 3 4 0 , 3 5 7 N izam -i Cedid , 118 NjegoS, see P eter II, b ish o p o f M o n te n e g ro NjeguS trib e , 85 no m arch ies (defined), 255 N o rth G erm an C o n fed eratio n , 31 3 N o v i, 3 5 0 Novine Hotwatzke, 3 0 7 N o v i Pazar, Sanjak of, 182, 3 6 0 , 361 N o v i S ad, 3 1 6

oborknez (defined), 9 3 O b rad o v ic, D o sitej, 1 7 7 O b ren o v ic, M arie, 2 9 5 O b ren o v ic, P rince M ichael, 2 4 3 , 2 4 5 - 2 4 6 , 247, 3 3 2 - 3 3 3 , 3 3 4 , 3 4 5 , 3 5 0 , 35 4 O b ren o v ic, P rince M ilan (ruled 183 9 ), 24 3 O b ren o v ic, P rince M ilan (ruled 1 8 6 8 -1 8 8 9 ), 2 4 6 , 3 5 4 - 3 5 5 , 371 O b ren o v ic, P rince MiloS, 2 0 2 - 2 0 3 , 2 0 7 , 234, 2 3 8 -2 4 5 , 259, 342 O b s h ti, D im itu r, 3 4 6 O ch ak o v , 7 1 , 72 O dessa, 5 4 , 8 0 O desso s, see V arna

O d o b escu , Io n , 2 7 2 - 2 7 3 O h rid , 18 O h rid , A rchbishopric of, 4 9 , 5 5 - 5 6 , 8 1, 9 5 97 O h rid , Lake, 3 O ld B ulgarian language, 16, 5 5, 177, 3 3 7 “O ld Serbia,” see K osovo O ld Slavonic language, 29 O lga, queen o f G reece, 263 O lm u tz, 3 0 9 , 3 2 5 , 326 O ltenia, 6 8 , 9 3 , 105, 106 O lym pio s, G eorgakis, 2 0 9 O m e r Pasha L atas, 2 5 2 , 349 oral literature, as tran sm itter o f trad itio n , 175 O rg an ic S tatu te o f A pril 1 8 78, 3 6 8 - 3 6 9 O rg an ic S tatutes, 2 6 6 - 2 6 9 , 2 7 0 , 2 7 1 , 2 7 2 , 291 O rlo v , Alexis, 6 9 , 78 O rlo v , G regory, 78 O rth o d o x church: in B anat o f Temesvar, 161; in B osnia an d H ercegovina, 8 9; in B ul­ garia, 12, 9 5 , 9 7 ; and C atholicism , 10, 53; an d C hristian ideology, 5 2; conversions to, 5 3 ; an d E dict o f T oleration, 159; and G reece, 12, 2 5 6 ; G reek language in, 12; in H ercegovina, 8 9; in M o n te n eg ro , 5 6, 85; and O tto m a n E m pire, 9 7 - 9 8 ; P hanariot influence o n , 5 6 - 5 7 ; an d preservation o f trad itio n , 1 7 4 -1 7 5 ; an d R om anians, 12, 152, 3 2 7 ; in R ussia, 12, 5 6; an d Serbs, 12, 19, 9 1 - 9 2 , 1 4 8 -1 5 0 ; see also C hristian churches, O rth o d o x m illet, P atriarchate o f C o n stan tin o p le, U n iate church O rth o d o x m illet, 4 9 - 5 0 O sm an, Turkish leader, 30 O sm an III, O tto m a n sultan, 116 O th m a n , see O sm an, Turkish leader O th o n , king o f G reece, 2 2 8 - 2 2 9 , 2 5 4 , 256, 2 5 8 - 2 6 3 , 2 9 6 , 3 3 0 , 3 3 3 ; regency of, 2 5 4 -2 5 8 O tto , see O th o n , king o f G reece O tto m a n E m pire: C hristians under, 4 8 - 5 3 ; cities in, 6 2 ; and concept o f justice, 4 4 4 5 ; and co n q u est o f B yzantium , 18, 22, 3 0 - 3 4 ; co n trasted w ith H a b sb u rg E m pire, 1 2 7 -1 3 3 , 1 6 5 -1 6 8 ; c o rru p tio n in, 4 6 , 52, 54, 5 5, 5 8, 103, 106, 167, 2 3 9 , 2 5 9 , 2 8 5 , 2 9 9 , 3 3 9 ; g o v ern m en t of, 3 9 - 5 3 , 5 7 - 6 2 , 165, 2 8 5 ; guilds u n d er, 4 8 , 6 2 ; im pover­ ish m en t of, 4 6 - 4 7 , 2 8 5 - 2 8 6 ; landholding in, 4 2 - 4 3 , 5 9 - 6 0 ; an d law o f Islam , 40; and m ilitary successes u n d e r M u rad IV, 64; m ilitary w eakness of, 4 6 , 6 2 , 1 1 3 -1 1 4 ; M uslim s under, 6 0 , 6 2 , 1 2 3 - 1 2 5 , 2 8 6 ; an d nam e Ottoman, 3 0; notables under, 58, 1 2 3 -1 2 6 ; peasants u nder, 4 2 , 4 8 , 5 8 6 2 , 1 6 7 -1 6 8 ; as perceived by E uropeans, 1 6 6 - 1 6 7 ; p o sitio n o f Balkan peoples in, 166; reform s un d er, 11 3 —114, 1 1 6 —118,

402

Index 1 6 5 - 1 6 6 , 168, 2 7 4 - 2 8 7 , 3 3 8 , 3 4 0 ; rela­ tio n sh ip o f P h an ario ts to , 5 4 - 5 7 , 1 0 1 106; religious divisions w ith in , 3 9 - 4 0 , 4 4, 128; a n d revolt in C o n stan tin o p le, 115— 11 6 ; as “sick m an,” 2 7 5 ; social p o sitions w ith in , 4 0 - 4 4 ; su ltan u n d er, 4 0 , 4 5 - 4 6 ; taxatio n u n d er, 4 2 , 4 7 , 5 0, 5 8, 6 0 - 6 1 , 114, 2 8 5 ; an d trad e, 1 7 9 -1 8 6 ; and Treaty o f P assarow itz, 7 7 ; an d w ar w ith G reece ( 1 8 9 7 ), 3 7 3 ; an d w ar w ith H a b s b u rg E m ­ p ire ( 1 6 8 2 -1 6 9 9 ) , 6 4 - 6 5 ; an d w ar w ith R ussia ( 1 7 1 0 -1 7 1 1 ) , 6 6 - 6 8 , ( 1 7 6 8 1 7 7 4 ), 6 9 , ( 1 8 0 6 -1 8 1 2 ) , 122, 198, ( 1 8 2 8 -1 8 2 9 ) , 2 4 0 - 2 4 1 , 3 3 7 , (1 8 7 7 1 8 7 8 ), 3 5 6 - 3 6 1 ; an d w ar w ith R ussia and H a b s b u rg E m p ire ( 1 7 3 6 -1 7 3 9 ) , 6 8 , 9 3, 105 (1 7 8 7 -1 7 9 2 ), 7 1 -7 2 , 80, 9 4 - 9 5 ; and w ar w ith S erbia an d M o n te n e g ro (1 8 7 6 ), 3 5 5 ; an d w a r w ith Venice ( 1 6 4 5 -1 6 6 4 ) , 8 1 ; an d w ar w ith Venice an d H a b sb u rg E m p ire ( 1 7 1 4 -1 7 1 8 ) , 6 8 , 8 5, 105; see also C rim ean W ar, H o ly L eague, under names of

P ec, P atriarchate of, 19, 4 9 , 5 5 - 5 6 , 9 1 - 9 2 , 94 Pechenegs, 10, 17 P eloponnesian W ars, 5 P eloponnesus, 5, 11, 2 6, 73, 2 1 7 , 2 1 9 , 2 2 0 , 2 2 7 , 3 6 2 ; cap tures of, 2 3 , 6 5 , 6 8 , 7 7; go v ­ e rn m en t in, 7 3, 75, 2 1 4 - 2 1 5 P eople’s Assembly, 21 0 Persians and Persia, 13, 2 2, 6 8 , 9 0 Pest, 3 1 3 ; see also B udapest P eter I, b ish o p o f M o n te n eg ro , 8 6, 120, 121, 2 4 8 , 25 0 P eter II, bish o p o f M o n te n e g ro , 2 4 9 - 2 5 2 P eter the G reat, 56, 6 6 , 8 8, 101 P eter III, tsar o f R ussia, 8 6, 134 P etronijevic, A vram , 243 P etrovic, D anilo , prince o f M o n te n eg ro , 2 5 2 -2 5 3 P etrovic, R ade, see P eter II, b ish o p o f M o n te ­ n egro P etrovic, Vasilije, bish o p o f M o n te n e g ro , 8 5,

other countries

86

P h an ario ts, 5 3 - 5 7 , 1 0 2 -1 0 5 , 1 0 6 - 1 1 0 O zeretskovskii, Iakov, 251 P hilip, prince o f F landers, 295 P hilip o f M aced o n , 7 Paisii, F ath er, 178, 3 3 7 P hilippopolis, see Plovdiv palltkarta (defined), 76 P indus M o u n ta in s, 1 P an ag iu rish te, 3 4 7 Piraeus, 26 2 pandours (defined), 1 93, 2 0 9 Pisani, A ndrea, 211 P an n o n ian P lain, 3, 19 Pisarev, D . I., 338 Panslav m o v em en t, 3 5 3 , 3 5 4 , 355 Plav, 3 6 4 Papacy, 12, 2 2 , 2 9 , 6 4 - 6 5 , 7 7; see also C a th ­ Pleven, 3 5 7 , 358 olic ch u rch Plevna, see Pleven P ap ad o p o u lo s, G rig o rio s, 78 Pliska, 15, 2 7 P arensov, P. D ., 3 7 0 Ploe§ti, 2 9 7 P arga, 119 P lovdiv, 3, 182, 3 4 4 , 34 7 P aris, T reaty o f (1 8 5 6 ), 2 8 4 , 2 8 7 - 2 8 8 , 3 5 1 P odgorica, 2 5 0 , 2 5 1 , 3 6 4 3 5 2 , 3 78 P odolia, 6 4 , 65 P arty o f R ig h ts (C ro atia), 3 1 8 - 3 1 9 P oland: an d C o n fed eratio n o f Bar, 6 9 ; and pasha (defined), 5 7 G reat B ritain, 3 2 9 ; and H a b s b u rg E m pire, pashalik (defined), 3 4 , 5 7 3 2 9 ; as interest o f N ap o leo n III, 3 2 9 ; par­ titions of, 6 9 , 70, 7 2; revolution in, 329, P assarow itz, T reaty o f (1 7 1 8 ), 55, 6 8 , 114: 3 3 2 ; and R ussia, 6 6 , 6 8 - 6 9 ; and Treaty o f B osnian losses fro m , 8 9 ; H a b s b u rg gains K arlow itz, 6 5 ; and Treaty o f V ienna, 1 6 3 from , 8 9 , 9 3 , 10 5 ; M o n te n e g ro and, 8 5; O tto m a n gains fro m , 7 7 ; V enetian losses 164; see also H o ly L eague fro m , 7 7 , 8 9 Poltava, battle o f (1 7 0 9 ), 6 6 , 101 P asvanoglu O sm a n P asha, 9 7 , 118, 121, 122, P om aks, 95 124, 125, 195, 196, 2 0 9 , 338 P o rte , see O tto m a n E m pire P atriarch ate o f C o n stan tin o p le, 12, 4 9 - 5 3 , P otem kin, G regory, 7 1, 112 91, 9 4 , 9 7 , 2 5 6 ; c o rru p tio n of, 5 2; duties Pozarevac, Treaty of, see Passarow itz, T reaty and resp onsibilities o f, 5 0 ; election to , 52; o f (1718) G reek influence o n , 5 5 - 5 7 ; as hig h est state Pozsony, see Bratislava office after em p ero r, 4 9 ; relation to R om e P ragm atic S anction, 1 3 3 -1 3 4 , 140, 141 o f, 2 2 , 2 9 , 7 7 ; R ussian in terest in, 3 3 7 prelam , 242 P atro n a H alil, 115, 116 P resentation C o n stitu tio n , 241 Paul, tsa r o f R ussia, 11 9 , 120 Preslav, 16, 17, 2 7 P a u lii, C o lo n el, 8 6 P ressburg, Treaty o f (1 8 0 5 ), 121, 162 Prevesa, 119 Paulucci, M a rq u is F. O ., 199 Pax R o m an a, 9 P rincipalities, see D an u b ian P rincipalities

403

Index PriStina, 19 P rizren, 19, 9 2 P ro b u s, R o m an em p ero r, 9 protectorate (defined), 2 3 4 Provincial R e fo rm L aw o f 1 864, 339 Prussia, 6 9 , 7 0 , 72, 2 9 6 , 3 1 3 , 3 3 0 , 352 P ru th , battle o f th e (1 7 1 1 ), 6 6 , 8 8 , 114 P ru th R iver, 1, 123, 186, 2 0 1 , 3 5 6 P sara, 2 6 , 2 1 7 P ushkin, A. S., 175 Pylos, 4 Q u ad ru p le Alliance, 191 Racki, F ran jo , 3 1 9 R acoviia, M ih ai, 107 Radetzky, Jo sep h , 3 0 9 R adonjic, Jovan, 8 7 R adonjic, V u k , 2 4 9 R agusa, see D u b ro v n ik Rajacic, Josip, 3 1 6 , 3 28 Rakoczy, F erenc, 140, 141 R akovski, G eo rg e, 3 3 4 , 345 R aJ, 19 RaSka, 18 R au ch , L evin, 3 1 9 reaya (defined), 4 0 , 4 4 R eglem en ts o rg an iq u es, see O rg an ic S tatutes Reichsrat, 3 1 2 , 3 1 9 R eich stad t, 3 5 5 - 3 5 6 R ein su ran ce Treaty, 3 7 4 rev o lu tio n ary m o v em ents: achievem ents of, in Balkans, 2 2 9 - 2 3 4 ; co m m o n features of, in Balkans, 2 2 9 , 2 3 1 - 2 3 2 , 2 3 4 ; enem ies of, in Balkans, 3 3 2 - 3 3 3 ; im m ediate causes of, in Balkans, 1 9 2 -1 9 3 ; influence o n Bal­ kans o f leftist, 3 3 0 ; an d m ajo r pow ers, 1 9 2 ; ten ets o f, in n in eteen th -cen tu ry E u ­ ro p e, 1 74; see also under names o f individual

countries R h o d es, 4 R h o d o p e M o u n ta in s, 1, 95 R ijeka, 3 1 0 , 3 1 5 , 3 1 7 , 32 0 R ik m an , see R iick m an n, P. I. R im nik, 3 3 7 R istic, Jo v an , 3 5 4 R izvanbegovic, A li, 3 4 9 robot (defined), 132 R o d o fin ik in , C o n stan tin e, 2 0 0 , 201 R o m a n E m p ire, 7 - 1 2 ; see also B yzantine E m ­ pire R o m an ian language, 3 2 4 , 32 6 R o m an ian N atio n al C o m m ittee, 32 4 R o m an ian principalities, see D an u b ian P rinci­ palities, M oldavia, T ransylvania, W allachia R o m an ian s an d R o m ania: an d C o n g ress o f B erlin, 3 6 0 ; a n d fo rm atio n o f national state, 2 8 7 —2 9 7 , 3 3 1 ; an d H a b s b u rg E m ­ p ire, 1 35, 15 2 , 1 5 5 - 1 6 0 , 3 7 4 ; an d O rth o -

d ox church, 152, 3 2 7 ; an d peasants, 2 9 3 2 9 4 ; an d R ussia, 3 5 6 , 3 7 4 ; an d San Stefano, 3 5 9 ; see also D an u b ian P rincipalities, M oldavia, T ransylvania, W allachia R o m e, 49 R o setti, C . A ., 2 7 2 , 2 7 4 , 2 9 5 , 2 9 6 R iickm ann, P. I., 2 6 9 R u d h a rt, Ignaz von, 25 8 R um eli, 73, 2 0 4 , 362 R um elia, 124, 3 6 3 ; see also E astern R um elia R uschuk, see R use R u schuk F riends, 125, 126 R use, 125 R ussia: an d annexation o f C rim ea, 7 1; and B ulgaria, 3 3 7 - 3 3 8 , 3 4 1 , 3 4 3 , 3 4 4 , 3 4 5 3 4 6 , 3 5 9 , 3 6 7 - 3 7 2 ; an d C ongress o f Ber­ lin, 3 6 0 ; an d D an u b ian P rincipalities, 6 8 , 1 0 1 -1 0 5 , 1 1 0 - 1 1 2 , 1 1 9 -1 2 3 , 2 6 4 - 2 7 4 , 2 8 7 - 2 8 8 , 2 9 0 , 3 3 7 ; an d E astern Q u estio n , 1 8 8 - 1 9 0 ; as expected su p p o rte r o f P h an a­ rio ts, 5 7; an d F rance, 3 2 9 , 3 7 5 see also N a ­ poleonic W ars; an d G erm any, 3 7 5 ; and G reat B ritain, 72; an d G reece, 78, 80, 2 2 3 - 2 2 4 , 2 2 6 - 2 2 8 , 3 3 7 ; an d G reek P ro ­ ject, 7 0 - 7 1 , 7 8 - 8 0 , 8 7 ; an d H a b sb u rg E m p ire, 2 4 4 , 2 8 8 , 3 1 2 ; an d M o n te n eg ro , 66, 8 5 -8 7 , 1 2 0 -1 2 1 , 2 4 9 -2 5 0 , 252, 253; O rth o d o x church in, 12, 5 6; and P atriar­ chate o f C o n stan tin o p le, 3 3 7 ; an d P oland, 6 6 , 6 8 - 6 9 , 70, 7 2; an d R o m an ia, 356, 3 7 4 ; an d Serbia, 1 9 8 - 2 0 2 , 2 0 3 - 2 0 4 ; as th re a t to O tto m a n E m pire, 5 3; and Treaty o f A inali Kavak, 7 8; an d T reaty o f Bel­ grade, 6 8 ; and T reaty o f K uchuk K ainarji, 6 9 - 7 0 , 7 8 , 110, 2 6 5 ; an d T reaty o f Passa­ ro w itz, 8 9; an d W ar o f th e L eague o f A u g sb u rg , 6 5 - 6 6 ; an d w ar w ith O tto m a n E m p ire ( 1 7 1 0 -1 7 1 1 ) , 6 6 - 6 8 , ( 1 7 3 6 1 7 3 9 ), 6 8 , 9 3 , 105, ( 1 7 6 8 -1 7 7 4 ) , 6 9, (1 7 8 7 -1 7 9 2 ), 7 1 - 7 2 , 8 0 , ( 1 8 0 6 -1 8 1 2 ) , 122, 198, ( 1 8 2 8 -1 8 2 9 ) , 2 4 0 - 2 4 1 , 337, (1 8 7 7 -1 8 7 8 ), 3 5 6 ; an d w ar w ith Sw eden (1 7 0 0 -1 7 2 1 ) , 6 6 (1 7 8 8 ), 71, 8 0; see also C rim ean W ar, H o ly L eague R ussian Party, see N ap p ist P arty (G reece) rustical land, see m anorial land

sabor (defined), 141 Safafik, P. J., 306 §aguna, B ishop A ndreiu, 3 2 1 , 3 2 3 , 324, 3 2 5 , 3 2 6 , 3 2 7 , 328 St. A ndrew Assembly, 245 St. P etersb u rg , C o n v e n tio n o f (1 8 2 6 ), 226, 26 8 St. S ophia, see H ag ia Sophia S alonika, see T hessaloniki Sam uel, B ulgarian em peror, 17 Sancta S ophia, see H ag ia S ophia

404

Index sanjak (defined), 5 7 , 2 8 5 San S tefano, T reaty o f (1 8 7 8 ), 3 5 8 - 3 5 9 , 363, 366, 373 Sarajevo, 8 8 , 8 9 , 182, 2 4 8 Sardinia, 192, 3 3 0 S arm izegetusa, 9 Sava, b ish o p o f M o n te n e g ro , 86 Sava R iver, 1, 3, 10 Saxons (defined), 2 1 ; see also T ransylvania, Saxons in Saxony, 6 6 , 134 S canderbeg, see S k en d erb eg S chm erling, A n to n vo n , 3 12 Scholarios, G eo rg e G en n ad ios, 4 9 S ch o n b ru n n , T reaty o f (1 8 0 9 ), 162 S chw arzenberg, P rince Felix, 3 0 9 - 3 1 0 S co tt, S ir W alter, 175 Sculeni, 21 3 S cutari, see S h k o d er Sebastiani, H o race, 120 S ebastopol, 2 8 4 Selim III, O tto m a n sultan , 1 1 7 -1 1 8 , 124, 1 25, 19 5 , 196, 19 8 , 2 0 1 , 27 5 Seniavin, D . N ., 1 20 Senta, 65 S eptinsular R ep u b lic, 119 S erbian lan g u ag e, 177, 3 1 6 Serbs an d Serbia: an d A d d itio n al A ct to C o n ­ v en tio n o f A kkerm an, 2 4 0 ; arm y of, 2 4 5 2 4 6 , 3 3 3 ; an d au to n o m y , 2 4 1 , 3 3 1 ; and b a td e o f K o so v o , 3 1 , 1 75, 3 0 8 ; an d B os­ nia, 3 3 3 , 3 3 4 , 3 5 0 ; an d B ulgaria, 2 4 6 , 3 4 1 , 3 7 1 ; an d C o n g ress o f B erlin, 3 6 0 ; consulates in , 2 4 1 ; an d D alm atia, 2 5 ; early h isto ry o f, 1 8 - 1 9 ; an d F rance, 2 4 4 ; and G reeks, 5 7 , 2 4 0 ; a n d H a b s b u rg E m pire, 6 8 , 9 1 - 9 5 , 135, 145, 1 4 8 - 1 5 0 , 3 1 6 , 3 7 4 ; and H erceg o v in a, 3 3 3 , 3 3 4 , 3 5 0 ; an d jan ­ issaries, 1 9 5 - 1 9 8 ; an d M acedonia, 3 3 3 ; an d m ig ra tio n to Balkan p eninsula, 18; u n ­ d e r M ilo s, 2 3 8 - 2 4 3 , 2 4 5 ; an d M uslim s, 94, 2 4 3 ; an d O rth o d o x ch u rch , 12, 9 1 - 9 2 , 1 4 8 - 1 5 0 ; u n d e r O tto m a n E m p ire, 9 1 - 9 5 , 2 3 8 - 2 3 9 ; an d peasants, 9 1 , 2 4 3 , 2 5 7 ; and privileges o f O rth o d o x citizens, 1 4 8 -1 5 0 ; rev o lu tio n ary activity o f, 122, 125, 1 9 3 2 0 4 , 2 4 6 ; R u ssian in terest in, 1 9 8 - 2 0 2 , 2 0 3 - 2 0 4 , 2 4 1 - 2 4 2 , 3 3 7 ; sipahis in, 2 4 3 ; and w ar w ith O tto m a n E m p ire (1 8 7 6 ), 3 5 5 -3 6 1 Serdica, see Sofia S ereth R iver, 1, 123 Seven Years’ W ar, 6 8 , 133, 134 seyhulislam (defined), 4 3 sheriat (defined), 4 0 S hkoder, 8 1 , 8 4 , 8 7 , 2 4 8 , 2 5 1 , 3 6 3 , 3 6 4 S h k u m b i R iv er an d valley, 3, 81 Sibiu, 15 0 , 15 9 , 3 2 1 , 3 2 4 , 3 2 6 , 3 2 7 Sicily, 3 0 9 ; see also T w o Sicilies,

th e K in g d o m o f th e S igism und, k in g o f H u n g ary , 31 Silesia, 133, 134 Silistria, 340 S im eon, B ulgarian em peror, 16 S in g id u n u m , see Belgrade sipahis ·. A lbanians as, 8 1 ; ineffectiveness of, 4 7 ; land grants to , 4 2 ; responsibilities and perquisites of, 4 3 ; in Serbia, 2 4 3 ; te rrito ­ rial rig h ts of, 59 Sistova, T reaty o f (1 7 9 1 ), 7 2, 9 0 , 9 4 , 132, 193 Skadar, see S hkoder Skender, see S kenderbeg S kenderbeg, 3 4 - 3 5 Skopje, 19, 2 7 , 9 2 , 9 7 , 3 5 7 Skoplje, see Skopje S koufos, N ikolaos, 205 skuphina (defined), 241 Slavic B enevolent Society, 3 3 8 , 353 Slavonia: agricultural land in, 3; g o v ern m en t of, u n til 1745, 143; u n d e r H ab sb u rg s, 34, 6 5 , 140, 1 4 3 -1 4 5 ; an d H un g ary , 2 5 , 3 0 4 ; an d Illyrian m ovem ent, 3 0 4 , 3 0 8 ; landh o ld in g in, 143; peasants in, 1 4 3 - 1 4 5 ; p o ­ litical evo lu tio n of, after 1 848, 3 1 5 —3 2 1 ; an d reg u latio n o f 1756, 144 Slavo-Serbian language, 149 Slavs, 10, 1 3 - 1 5 , 19 Slobozia, 199 Slovenes, 2 3 , 129, 135, 160, 3 0 4 S m ederevo, 9 1 , 198 Sobieski, Jo h n , k in g o f P o lan d , 6 4 Sofia, 3, 9 , 3 1 , 9 7 , 182, 3 3 7 S ofronii, b ish o p , 3 3 7 Sokievic, Josip, 31 9 Spain, 192 Spalato, see Split S parta, 5 Spetsai, 2 6 , 2 1 7 S plit, 182 S ponneck, C o u n t, 2 6 4 S puz, 2 5 0 Srem ski K arlovci, 8 7 , 147, 3 1 6 , 3 2 7 ; as Ser­ bian religious an d cultural center, 5 6, 9 3, 94, 9 7 , 149, 152, 154, 159, 177 S tam bolov, S tephen, 372 Stara P lanina, 95 Starfcvic, A nte, 318 S tatu ta V alachorum , 146 S tephen, S t., 1 9 - 2 0 S tephen th e G reat, prince o f M oldavia, 35 S tephen N em anja I, king o f Serbia, 18 S tephen the Small, 86 S tephen II, king o f Serbia, 18 S tephen U ro5 V, k in g o f Serbia, 19 S tip, 92 S tokavian dialect, 3 0 6 —3 0 7 Straits, 6 9 , 1 9 0 -1 9 1

405

Index Straits, C o n v e n tio n o f th e (1 8 4 1 ), 2 8 1 - 2 8 2 S tro g a n o v , G . A ., 2 1 3 Strossm ayer, B ish o p Josip, 3 1 9 , 3 2 0 , 328, 333 S tru m a R iv er an d valley, 1, 3 S tu rd za, Io n , 2 1 4 S tu rd za, M ih ail, 2 6 8 , 2 7 0 , 2 7 2 S ublim e P o rte , see O tto m a n E m pire Suleim an th e M ag n ificent, O tto m a n sultan, 32, 34, 36, 39, 4 5, 64 Suleim an P asha, 2 7 3 Suleim an II, O tto m a n sultan, 4 6 Suleim an I II , O tto m a n sultan, 65 Suleim an U sk iip lu , 2 0 2 , 2 0 3 Suli, 7 3 , 8 0 , 8 3 §ulu{iu, A lexander, 3 26 S um adija, 9 4 , 196 Supljikac, S tep h en , 3 1 6 Supplex LibeUus V alachorum , 1 5 9 -1 6 0 S u p i, A lecu, 2 0 9 , 2 1 0 S u fu , A lexander, 2 0 8 S u fu , M ih ai, 2 0 8 , 2 0 9 S uv o ro v , A lexander, 7 1, 112 Sviatoslav, tsa r o f R ussia, 17 S w ed en , 6 6 , 7 1 , 8 0 Sylva, C a rm en , see E lizab eth o f W ied S zatm ar, Peace o f (1 7 1 1 ), 140 Szechenyi, S tep h en , 303 Szeklers (defined), 2 1 ; see also T ransylvania, Szeklers in T am erlane, 31 Tanzimat, 2 8 2 , 2 8 6 , 2 8 7 , 3 4 0 T ap ir P asha, 3 4 9 T artars, 19, 6 6 , 6 9 T atich, V ladislav, 3 45 Tem esvar, see B an at o f Tem esvar Teofil, m e tro p o lita n , 154 T h eb es, 4 , 5 T heiss R iver, see Tisza R iver T h eo d o siu s, R o m a n em p ero r, 12 T hessaloniki, 3, 3 0 , 3 1, 9 5 , 9 7 , 182 T hessaly, 19, 2 6 , 7 3 , 2 1 7 , 3 3 1 , 3 3 4 , 355, 3 6 1 , 3 65 T hracian s a n d T h race, 3, 4 , 7 3, 9 5 - 9 7 , 331, 360 T h re e E m p e ro rs’ A lliance, 2 9 7 , 3 5 2 , 3 5 4 , 355, 373, 374 T ilsit, T reaty o f (1 8 0 7 ), 121, 122, 199 tim ar lan d , 4 2 , 5 9 - 6 0 T im i§oara, see B anat o f Tem esvar T irgovi§te, 2 1 2 T iryns, 4 Tisza R iver, 1 T ito g ra d , see P o d g o rica T om is, see C o n stan ja T om islav, k in g o f C ro atia, 23 T opal O sm a n P asha, 35 0 T osks, 83

T o tt, B aron de, 117 T rajan, R o m an em peror, 9 Trandiifilov, A lexander, 2 7 0 T ransleithania, see A ustria-H u n g ary T ransylvania: an d Aulic C ouncil, 153; a u to n ­ o m y of, 3 4 ,1 5 0 , 1 5 2 -1 5 3 ; u n d e r H a b s­ b u rg E m p ire, 6 5 , 101, 1 5 0 - 1 6 0 , 3 0 4 , 3 2 1 , 3 3 2 ; H u n g arian s in, 1 5 0 - 1 5 3 , 321, 3 2 2 - 3 2 3 , 3 2 4 , 3 2 6 ; an d H ungary, 2 0 , 2 1, 151, 152, 3 2 3 - 3 2 7 , 3 3 2 ; N atio n al A ssem ­ bly of, 3 2 3 - 3 2 4 ; “n atio n s” an d religions of, 1 5 0 - 1 5 3 , 3 2 1 ; u n d e r O tto m a n E m ­ pire, 3 5 , 3 6 , 150, 152; peasants in, 1 5 6 158, 3 2 3 ; political stru ctu re of, 1 5 1 -1 5 2 , 1 5 8 - 1 5 9 , 3 2 1 ; p o p u latio n of, 1 5 6 - 1 5 7 , 3 2 1 ; revolt in, 1 5 7 -1 5 8 ; an d R o m an ian language, 3 2 1 -3 2 2 ; R o m an ian s in, 152, 3 2 1 -3 2 4 , 3 2 5 - 3 2 7 ; Saxons in, 1 5 0 -1 5 2 , 153, 3 2 1 , 3 2 3 , 3 2 5 , 3 2 6 ; Szeklers in, 150, 152, 153, 3 2 1 , 3 2 2 , 3 2 4 , 3 2 5 , 3 2 6 ; see also R om an ians an d R o m an ia Transylvanian School, 155 Travnik, 88, 89, 24 8 T riavna, 3 3 7 T riple Alliance, 3 7 3 - 3 7 4 T ripolis, see T ripolitza T ripolitza, 7 8, 2 1 7 T riune K in g d o m , 2 5 , 3 1 7 , 318 T rogir, see T rogurium T ro g u riu m , 7 T sakalov, A thanasios, 20 5 T sintsars, 15, 62 T u h u tu m , 156 T ulip P erio d , 1 1 4 -1 1 5 T urkish C o n stitu tio n , 2 4 2 , 2 4 3 “T urkish C roatia,” 3 5 5 - 3 5 6 T u m o v o , 2 7 , 31 T u m u Severin, 2 6 5 T v rtk o , S tephen, 25 T w o Sicilies, K in g d o m o f th e, 5 4 , 192 T zim isces, Jo h n , B yzantine em p ero r, 17

U lcinj, 365, 36 6 ulema (defined), 4 0 ,4 3 , 113 U lm , 120 U n iate church, 1 5 3 -1 5 5 U n io n ists, see C ro a to -H u n g a ria n P arty (C roatia) U n ite d Principalities o f W allachia an d M o ld a­ via, see R om anians an d R om ania U n k iar Iskelessi, Treaty o f (1 8 3 3 ), 2 7 9 , 2 8 1 , 28 2 urbarial land, see m anorial land U rb a riu m o f 1 756, for Slavonia, 144 U rb a riu m o f 1769, for Transylvania, see C erta P uncta U rb a riu m o f 1780, for C ro atia, 144 U skiib, see Skopje

406

Index vakif (defined), 59 valide sultan (defined), 4 6 V araid in , 146 V ardar R iver, 1; 3 Varna, 7, 3 4 4 Varna, battle o f (1 4 4 4 ), 32 Venice: an d B yzantine E m p ire, 2 2 - 2 3 ; an d D alm atia, 2 3 , 2 5 , 6 5 , 6 8 , 7 7, 8 5 ; as enem y o f p atriarch an d P o rte , 5 3; an d F rance, 87; an d F o u rth C ru sad e, 2 3 ; an d G enoa, 30; an d G reece, 7 6 - 7 7 ; a n d G reek P roject, 70; G reeks in , 5 4 ; m aritim e em pire of, 3, 2 2; and M o n te n e g ro , 8 5 ; and T reaty o f K arlow itz, 6 5 , 77, 8 5 ; an d T reaty o f Passarow itz, 77, 8 9 ; an d w ar w ith O tto m a n E m ­ pire ( 1 6 4 5 -1 6 6 4 ) , 8 1 , ( 1 7 1 4 -1 7 1 8 ) , 6 8, 8 5 , 105; see also H o ly L eague Via E g n atia, 3 V ictoria, q u een , 2 6 3 V id in , 12 4 , 3 3 8 , 3 4 0 , 3 4 9 , 3 5 7 V ienna, 3 4 , 5 4 , 6 4 , 3 0 9 - 3 1 0 V ienna, T reaty o f (1 8 1 5 ), 1 6 3 - 1 6 4 , 186 vilayet (defined), 5 7 , 2 8 5 Villafranca, T ruce o f (1 8 5 9 ), 332 V illeh ardo u in , G eoffrey de, 23 Vis, 7 V lachs, 15 V lach S tatu tes, see S tatu ta V alachorum V ladim irescu, T u d o r, 2 0 4 , 2 0 8 , 2 0 9 - 2 1 0 , 2 1 1 - 2 1 3 , 231 Vladislav, k in g o f P o lan d an d H un g ary , 31, 32 vojvoda (defined), 146, 3 1 6 V ojvodina, 3, 2 4 2 , 3 1 6 , 3 1 8 , 3 2 6 Volkgeist (defined), 172, 173 Voulgaris, D im itrio s, 2 6 3 , 2 6 4 V uficevic, M atija, 2 4 9 - 2 5 0 V u iic-P eriäic, T om a, 2 4 1 , 2 4 3 V u k o tii, Iv an , 1 2 0 , 121, 2 4 9 - 2 5 0 W allachia: a u to n o m y o f, 9 9 ; boyars in, 1 0 7 110; as cen ter o f B ulgarian revolutionary

activity, 345; centers o f p o w er in, 1 0 0 101; 1848 rev o lu tio n in, 2 7 2 —2 7 4 ; first prince in, 2 1 ; H a b s b u rg rule in, 105; O r ­ ganic S tatutes in, 2 6 6 - 2 6 9 ; u n d er O tto ­ m ans, 35, 3 6, 9 9 - 1 0 1 ; an d Pasvanoglu, 122; peasants in, 1 0 7 -1 1 0 ; an d R ussia, 1 0 1 -1 0 5 , 1 1 0 - 1 1 2 , 2 6 4 —2 7 4 ; taxation in, 1 0 7 -1 1 0 ; see also D an u b ian P rincipalities, R om anians an d R om ania W ar o f A ustrian Succession, 6 8 , 133 W ar o f th e L eague o f A u g sb u rg , 65 W ar o f th e F irst C o alitio n , 162 W ar o f th e S econd C o alitio n , 162 W ar o f th e T h ird C o alitio n , 162 W ellington, D uke of, 2 2 6 W illiam I, G erm an em p ero r, 353 W illiam II, G erm an em peror, 37 4 W illiam G eorge, prince o f D en m ark , see G eorge I, lung o f G reece X anthos, E m m anuel, 205 Yenikale, 69 Ypsilanti, A lexander, 107 Ypsilanti, C o n stan tin e, 122, 125, 20 6 Ypsilantis, A lexander, 2 0 6 - 2 0 7 , 2 0 9 , 2 1 0 , 2 1 1 - 2 1 3 ,2 1 6 ,2 2 0 Y psilantis, D im itrio s, 22 0 Z abljak, 252 Z adar, 23 zadruga (defined), 91 Z agreb, 2 7, 9 0 , 1 4 0 - 1 4 1 , 142, 3 0 7 , 308, 3 1 6 ,3 1 7 Z aim is, T hrasyvoulos, 2 6 4 Z ara, see Z adar Z eta, 18 ziamet (defined), 42 Z ifa , 19 Z rinski, Peter, 141 zupan (defined), 18 Z vonim ir, king o f C roatia, 24

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S U P P L E M E N T A R Y PLATES

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View o f the Dardanelles The Seraglio Point Port Constantinople Yenikoy on the Bosphorus The Bosphorus (opposite the Genoese Castle) Entrance to the Black Sea (from the Giant’s Grave) Ruse. (The Danube) The plains o f Lower Wallachia. (The Danube, from the Castle o f Sistova)