Heidegger Hegel's Concept of Experience[1]

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Harper

Ro

Edit Editio ions ns of

CONCEPT

HEGEL'S

Basic Basic Wrili Wriling ng Be

nd

im

Disco Discours urs on Thinki Thinking ng Ear-ly Ear-ly Gree Thinking Thinking Th En

With

of Phil Philos osop ophy hy

Hege Hegel's l's Conc Concept ept of Experi Experienc enc denti dentily ly an ie zs

lu

I, Th

Po

rt

lu

I llll , T h an

il io

er

of Spirit

in the

ietz ietzsc sche he Volu Volume me Il Th Etem Etemal al Recu Recurr rren ence ce of th Same Same ie zs e:

from from Hege Hegel' l'

Phen Phenom omen enol olog og

Differ Differenc enc il

sect sectio io

KE LE

K1wwledge

as Metap Metaphy hysic sic

OY

DO

translation

Niet Nietzs zsch che: e: Volu Volume me [V Nihi Nihili lism sm ay to Lang;uag Lang;uag

Ti

ei

Poetry Poetry Langu Languag age, e, Thou Though gh Th Ques Questi tion on Conc Concer erni ning ng Tech Techno nolo logy gy an

Othe Othe Essa Essays ys

What What Is Call Called ed Thin Thinki king ng

1817

Harper

R ow ow , P u l is is he he rs rs ,

Sa

Ne o rk rk , G ra ra n a pi pi ds ds , P hi hi la la de de lp lp hi hi a Lo do ga or dn ok o,

F r n ci ci sc sc o St. Louis or nt

Harper

Ro

Edit Editio ions ns of

CONCEPT

HEGEL'S

Basic Basic Wrili Wriling ng Be

nd

im

Disco Discours urs on Thinki Thinking ng Ear-ly Ear-ly Gree Thinking Thinking Th En

With

of Phil Philos osop ophy hy

Hege Hegel's l's Conc Concept ept of Experi Experienc enc denti dentily ly an ie zs

lu

I, Th

Po

rt

lu

I llll , T h an

il io

er

of Spirit

in the

ietz ietzsc sche he Volu Volume me Il Th Etem Etemal al Recu Recurr rren ence ce of th Same Same ie zs e:

from from Hege Hegel' l'

Phen Phenom omen enol olog og

Differ Differenc enc il

sect sectio io

KE LE

K1wwledge

as Metap Metaphy hysic sic

OY

DO

translation

Niet Nietzs zsch che: e: Volu Volume me [V Nihi Nihili lism sm ay to Lang;uag Lang;uag

Ti

ei

Poetry Poetry Langu Languag age, e, Thou Though gh Th Ques Questi tion on Conc Concer erni ning ng Tech Techno nolo logy gy an

Othe Othe Essa Essays ys

What What Is Call Called ed Thin Thinki king ng

1817

Harper

R ow ow , P u l is is he he rs rs ,

Sa

Ne o rk rk , G ra ra n a pi pi ds ds , P hi hi la la de de lp lp hi hi a Lo do ga or dn ok o,

F r n ci ci sc sc o St. Louis or nt

HOLZWEGE,

c op op yr yr ig ig h

Hege Hegels ls BefP BefPif if de Erfa Erfahn hnmg mg 1 95 95 0 b y V ir ir ro ro ri ri o K lo lo st st er er ma ma nn nn ,

E ng ng l s h t ra ra n l at at io io n o f t h

F. Mart Martin in 70

Heid Heideg egger ger's 's ng

1 97 97 0

ou

w ri ri tttt e

l iE iE GE GE L' L' S

Inc., Row, Row, Publi Publish sher ers, s, I nt nt ro ro du du ct ct io io n Phenomenology of ov

gl

O F E XP XP E. E. RI RI EN EN C

e xc xc ep ep t in

Harper N.Y. N.Y. 10022. 10022. FIRST FIRST H.ARP H.ARPER

1989

ROW

Congre ress ss Cata Catalo logi ging ng-i -inn-Pu Publ blic icat atio io Library of Cong

H ei ei de de gg gg er er , M aarr ti ti n 1 88 88 99- 19 19 76 76 . H eg eg el el ' c on on ce ce p o f e xp xp er er ie ie nc nc e Translation eg el el s B eg eg ri ri f [; H eg pr bl d: ©1970.

de

I. H eg eg el el ,

Data Data

E rf rf ah ah ru ru ng ng , or -p

Row,

I he he l e or or g F ri ri e r ic ic h 1 77 77 0 1 83 83 1 . 2 . E x pe pe ri ri en en ce ce 19 eg el el , G eo eo r i l 1 m F r ie ie dr dr ic ic h I. H eg 1 77 77 00- 18 18 31 31 . P ha ha no no me me no no lo lo gi gi e d e G ei ei st st es es . V or or re re d E ng ng lili sh sh . 1983. II TiLle.

Histor

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C ON ON CE CE P

on

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..

~:rt1~n

Heidegger:

"Science of th Experience

of Consciousness"-this

titl Hege gave to hi Phenomenolog publishe perience

is the

of Spirit w he n

wa

in 1807 Th word "experience" appear in bold states what "Phenomenology

is. What

such emphasis We find th answer in th openin t ha t f ol l w s f te r h e p r f ac e I n t h o ri gi n

is in

passag

e di ti on , t h

passag runs Hegel:

INTRODUCTION* 1.

It is

must first come to an understandin

concerning th nature

namely th actual knowledg of what trul in turn, t e d s t o

r eg ar de d a s t h

v a i ou s k in d o f k n w le dg e o f w hi c

Knowledge,

n st r m en t w i

h ic h

o n m i h t b e e tt e

om t ra n l at e b y K en le y R o c e P he no m n o o g of Spri ve by pe n. Th nu ra g i n in g p ar ag ra ph s h av e b ee n a dd e t o . si mp li f i de nt if ic at io n o f t h s pe c f i passage to w hi c H ei de gg er ' c om me nt s h av e r ef er en ce , T he y d o n o a pp ea r i n H eg el ' o ri g n a w or k n or , o f c ou r e , i n M r o ve ' t ra ns la tion. (Ed.)

or ov a mo n

l e i ti ma te , f o b y th

ne

a ki n

an

r ro ne o

ch ic

hi

we

a v g ai ne d t h o u

it.

i l t hu s g ra s c lo ud s o f r ro r i ns te a o f p ar tu re . F o [ i i f w e r e o v f ro m

a cu ]! Il ' agai

d et er mi n t e

in an

co e, th

o nc e

e n t o it, t h us exactl

more precisel determined Indeed this concer will surely itself into th conviction that ther is an absurdit

i n t h C on ce p

e ve n e gi nn i

p ro c s s o f n o l e g e

d es ig ne d t o g ai n o r o ns ci ou sn e knowledg an

th

w hi c

t hi n

h ic h h a b ee n

o nc e

seem legitimate that erro will be graspe instea of

transfor

f ac t h ow e e r t hi s

(in this case th absolute

is for

obviousl superfluou

effort Or [ii], closer

by

limetwig withou bein change at ail, it would surely if

n -i t e lf ,

th absolute Fo if knowledg is th instru

t h t hi n

as it wa before this no

itself woul

be

ruse pretending throug

it multifarious

ment to take hold of th absolute essence,one isimmediately e mi nd e do an

th

th

p pl ic at io n

n o l ea v t h t hi n l te ra ti o

it

fo ou activity bu

it is

a n i ns tr um e

to

u t r in g a bo u

r, if no le ge is no

t hi n s h p in g

relation whic

hi tr th as

i s i n i ts e f , b u

i t i s in an throug

thus effortless Or [iii], if

t h t ru t

th

es lt fo kn wl dg

t o c he s u s is t h r a

bo

t hr ou g

l ig h i t e l r at he r t h

e fr ac ti on ; a n i f h i b e s ub t a ct ed , i mm e i at el y b r n g

represen as

refraction in th medium it is likewise useles to subtract t hi s a ct o f r

r ec ei v

an

of knowledge, whic we no

medium,

n st ru m n t

more or lesspassiv medium throug

is immediat

th examinatio

ou

h ic h it

b e l ef t

it

up it

or

t h o pp o i t o f t s w n e nd ; o r place.

th wa th instrument function migh help overcome this

2.

d if fi c l ty . o r t h

m ea n h il e

wo ld ee

p os si bl e

ge he tr th

an

If

i st r s tf u o f s ci en ce ,

h ic h a k

actually know withou an such hesitations, then on

h o l d n o o ve rl oo k t h

p os si bi li t

r ev e s in g t hi s p ro -

an

trut

ofsom othe sort an that "absolute,

cedure by placin distrust in this very distrust an becoming

e dg e, "

concerne abou anothe question Is no thisfea of erring

ha ye to be discovered

l re ad y t h

t c. , a r

w or d

r e u p o si n

grea deal as truth; it hesita

4.

n e o u d , o f o ur se , s im p

on em

all suc

gether with all t al k a b u t k no wl e g e a s it presupposes notions about knowledge

medium, a n

i ns tr um en t t o

instrument

betwee ourselves and thi knowledge bu abov all, it pre-

of

separate

th

useles

o ti o t ha t t he r i s a difference

ls th

su po es th

b s l ut e

knowledge, though it is

knowledg separate

from th absolute an an absolute

from knowledg will no doub lead to some such

f o i ts el f n d

from th absolute is nevertheless somethin

real

possible to spur wh

presupposition that knowledg is outsid th absolute an therewit

h ic h

r ro r i ts el f As

supposes something, indeed

separate

"knowl

i gn if ic an c

outsid th trut

in i k f as hi o

th

e xc u e s

a r i nc a a bl e o f s ci en c d er iv e r o

hi

uc

th se r e u me d

conditions excuse designed to avoi th toil of scienc an

as well By taking this position zealou effort And, rejectin could, instea

of botherin

thes notion straightway, on to find answer to al this even

with these hi

c o c lu si o

f ol lo w f r

th absolute alon is t ru e T o r ej ec t i t o n m ig h

th ra

th

r e u p o si ti o

t ha t

t h t ru e a lo n i s a bs ol ut e d i t in ct io n

et ee

no l-

b s l ut e

ig

e g n ni n

t o s e t ha t s uc h t al ki n b a

l ea d t o a n

bs ur

a p b l o f y e a no t e r t ru th . B u i st i c ti o 10

et ee

o rd s l ik e " ab s l ut e, " " kn ow le d e ,

"objective ea in

an "subjective" an innumerabl

is ss me

a n f or t w i an

el others whos

b e a mi li a t o e ve r o n

h e i mp r s si on , p ar tl y t ha t t h i r

aim

.'

n o i on s

ea in

or to gi is universally

ar nl

b s l ut e t ru t

fundamenta b et te r r ig ht ,

task namely ow ve

on

to

give this Concept. With stil

c o l d s pa r

hi se

th

e ff o

in whic

scienc

an

nd

is

er ce

t se l

itself is

its m ak e

its appearance.

is an appearance

B u s ci en ce , i n m ak in g i t a pp ea ra nc e

nt ti

of

ed

en

en

it el

this science is th it

a ke s i t a pp ea ra nc e

en

ne

appearance

o th e

el

is

nd

la ce

becaus

bj ct

en

n ow le d

to

it an

en

ed

ie if c,

at al

io

ou

eq

ic

he

e se n a t

ik

en e,

tr

ar

t se l ot

is

by purifyin

ce

it

an

itself lift

is in i t l f ex

ie

at

ug

th

e te d

it

assurance es

t s being;

tr iv

is

as

le an

al

al

a t to it science ia el

ta

ts

al

ed

is

th

is a ct ua ll y t h is

12

error.

a pp ro pr ia te l

In

that

d i s ip at ed ,

is

co pa h,

e al i e d

Co

pt

o f p he no me na l

c on sc io u n es s

S pi ri t b ec o e s a bl e

ef

resolve ion straightway, e' t ea d

nv ti

th

or

e tt e

en is

to

ce

ch

a d is t h

d et ai le d

h is to r

er

io

o f c on sc io us ne ss '

an

7. es

The com~lete system il an

es th

ca io

e at e

ta

es in

ts

th ou

re th

ec

ty

re at ne

ak

in

li

ra

negative

io th

og

is li in

em nt

at al

!ougE.

lo

is no

to

em

th

necessarily

IS

ha

il

co

ep ci

ic

es in

p u r e nothingness

er

that it is the nothing!Les§'

terminate,

that ftom

is only when nothingnes

it f o t he n n ot hi ng ne s

e d a te l

hich it

limitedness

re

consciousness,

is

content. tr ct no

t; an

abin es

in

p re se nt s i ts el f t o it,

tr

an

c ee d

in

lor its.eLLlts- .own Concept, it im-

is

is

ce

is it own, it transcends it self. W it h t h p os it in g

et ng

he tr

determinate nothingnes

i ts el f is

SInce consciousnes

is de-

this nothingness

in

id l,

t ia l i n i ti o

lence at its ow

ci

hands,

is,

io

ha isin

er

rest Should it eg ti

main

in t h

tl

thoughtlessnes ad

er

h ic h i t d es tr oy s

er

try

determinate

is ti

er

v io le nc e t hr ou g

f or .

limited..

fo itsel an] limited satisfactiq_n.

if,

th tr

is a ls o e st ab li sh e

ey

even when it i s o nl y next to

ic

th

th

le ce

an

It

th

il

bl

th

restlessness will

lence. 0.1,. should it

cf its own

c la im s t o f in d e ve ry th in g

t hi s c la i

will

accord.

it goal

..

go ou beyond to. es io at

a.Jlf

t ru t o wa r

e a l ie r

is ag

a l is c o e q e n ti

c ti o

What is I;m.l'ted. to..a n.atura.1

an

it

ed at

is

ce

to

th

di cu t,

e,

an

th

is by .•.. f. power.les to anis

is its death. But

16

i ts el f m ad e it

al

this t s

un

an ng

is

er ta in

ic

t er m n at i n s o f n ow le dg e a n t ru t b ar re n " I, " i s

s at is f c ti o w hi c m us t b e l e t o t se lf , f o

it flee th universa an seek only being-far-itself

ar

a ll e t o m i

the exist in consciousness. Consciousnes distinguishes from i ts el f s om et hi n

h ic h i t a t t h s a

ti

relates itself; [o

consciousness.

r e a rk s

o nc er ni n

t h m an ne r a n

n e e ss i

o f t h p ro -

l at in g

.t

being of somethin

gression it ma also be helpfu to mentio somethin abou

knowledge.

the m e t h o d of carrying ou th inquiry. Fo if this presenta

distinguis

t io n i s v i e e d a s

knowledge is a t t h s a

d es cr ip ti o o f t h w a science is related

to p h e n o m e n a l

th

fo

c on sc io us ne ss ,

is

being-in-itself;

t im e d is t n gu i h e

f ro m it and

and

is posite as existing outside this relationship too..The side

does

of this in-itsel [existin

outsid

not seem possible fo it even

E xa ct l

i nv ol v

presupposition which wil serve as the fundamental standard

need no furthe concer us here Inasmuch as phenomenal

critical examination

investigation

into h e

ea

o f k no w e dg e

of measurement. Fo an examinatio

it

consists in applying

c ce pt e s ta nd ar d a n i n d ec i i ng , o n h e b as i o f i na l

w ha t m ig h

th

relationship

is truth,

in these determinations

knowledg is ou object so at th outset th determinations o f h i o bj ec t a r t ak e

a s t he y i m e di at el y p re se n

h em -

selves an they presen themselves very much as they have what is bein tested is correc or incorrect. Thus th stand-

been taken.

it cepted as th essenc or th in-itself. Bu here wher scienc will make it firs appearance neithe scienc no anything else ha justifie itself as th essence

in-itself; and

1. ha

Wh

w e i nv es ti g t e h e t r t h o f n ow le dg e i t e em s

a r i nv e t ig at in g w h

since knowledge is ou

k no wl ed g i s in itself. But

object in this investigation, it is fO

withou some such basi principl it seem that an examina-

us Therefor

th in-itself o f t h

tion cannot take place.

i nv es ti ga ti o

o ul d n o b e t h

rather it bein 0.

h i c on t a di c i o

fO

b je c r es ul ti n

fr

in-itself of knowledg

ou bu

us What we woul affirm as it essenc

a n i t r e o va l w il l p re se n t he m

selves more distinctly if

T h e ss en c o r t h s t n da r 18

o ul d l i

s , a n t ha t w h c h

recogniz

that standard

in

ct hr

th

ti

another in-itself

en ir

C on ce p

ts

th in

an

ob ec

and being-in-ils-self,

o r u s] , is overcome, ou

precon-

this i nv es ti ga ti on ; es

id

t se l

th ts

ta ar

es

a ti o

ug

ea in

th

ut

il

en al

as

in

th

de er in io

i ts el f

in

io th

ed

in it.

is

only something fo ti

a nd ,

e ac h t h p o

is in and f o ot

ig

be ng or

it; it i s l s

th

t si d

hi

el

i n i ts el f

ip

is in-itself

true,

actual examination.

sciousness itself proposes to measur If w e c al l knowledge

the true

at

t he re fo re ,

s in c

the C o n c e p t ,

ch

ec

an

ot

n sc i

t s ",1£; it is con-

essence

object th object as object, i.e., fOT

f o r c o n sc i ou s ne s s c on sc io u n e

i ts el f i s t he i

c o p ar is on ;

w he th e

i t k no wl -

a n o th e t o r c o n sc i ou s n es s itself. 20

ex

amna io

the C o n c e p t ,

in-itself

c on sc io us ne s

observation. en

ec if

is

An

it knowledge.

21

To be sure th object seem to be fo consciousnes only as consciousnes know it consciousnes seems, as

it

were,

is i n i ts el f

sciousness also seem unable to examin by comparin

Therefor

con-

n l a n e xa mi na t o n o f n ow le dg e b u a ls o o f

th standard used in th examinatio

itself

its own knowledge

sex

it with th object Bu th difference betwee

th in-itsel an

th for-itself is

l re a

r es e

i n t h v er y

i se s o n i t

e lf -

consciousness is to it

i t k no wl ed g a s w el l a s its object-is, me

fact that consciousnes know an object at all. Something is the in-itself, b u h e k no wl ed g o r t h b ei n o f t h o b ject fo

h os e s ta nd ar d i t w a s u p os e t o b e f ai l

to endure th course of th examination. Thus th examination is n o

no is f o r c o ns ci ou s ne s s

changed if t ha t

it, precisel that whic

In this connection ther is

is called experience.

moment in th just mentione

r oc es s w hi c m us t b e f ur t e r

r ti c l at e

th

ne

l ig h

if, c om pa ri s n , t h t w m o e nt s d o n o c or re sp o d , t he n it

sentation Consciousnes knows something,

s ee m

ha

i n o rd e atio

o ns ci ou s e s

il

b r n g i t i nt o a cc or d

av

t o a lt e i t k n w le dg e

is t h e s e nc e

it

h e b je c I n t h a l e r

itself for consciousnes

of th knowledge, however, th object itself become

to consciousnes somethin a s w el l

whic

o r t h k no wl ed g

e xi st e

w a e ss en ti al l

k no wl ed g o f h e o bj e t : w it h c ha ng e i n t h k no wl ed ge , a s a n e ss e t ia l

part of this knowledge. Henc it come to pass fo consciousin-itself isnot in itself or

h a w a i n i ts el f w a s o n l

e ss .

When therefor

consciousnes find it knowledg no cor-

r es po n i n

it

b je ct , t h

b je c i t e l

i l a ls o i v

ut hi

an

t hi s o bj ec t

b je c i s a ls o h e in this

t r t h c om e i nt o p la y W e s e t ha t c on sc io us ne s in-itself a n

ha in fact been altere

w hi c

t h o bj ec t a ls o e co me s a n o th er , s in c

wi

t h in-itself.

b e in g ~f o r- co n sc io u sn e J

o f t hi s i n- it se l f

ow ha

t h s ec on d is the

T h l at te r s ee m a t

firs to be merely th reflection of consciousnes into its self, representation no of an object bu only of it knowledg of th firs object But, as alread indicated, th firs object come to be altere c ea se s t o b e t h

fo consciousnes in this very process; it

i n- it s l f a n in-itself

b e o me s t o c o s ci o s ne s a n only fo

it. A n

follow that this th b e in g -f ar -c o ns c io u sn e s

t h r ef o

it

o f t hi s i n- it se lf , essence or

22

consciousness' new object. a nn ih i a ti o throug 15

o f h e f ir s

wa of observin is th same as th on previously discusse it is th

experience constitute

that firs object

with regard to th relationship betwee

th presen inquir

an skepticism In ever case th result whic emerge from

I n t hi s p re se nt at io n

t h c ou rs e o f x pe ri en ce , t h r e

is

s ol v i nt o a n e mp t

n ot hi n n e

u t m us t o f n ec es si ! e su l it if,

graspe as th nothingnes o f h a w ho s

it

result

agreemen with th ordinary us of th term "experience. T hi s m o e n i s t h e t ra ns it i

f ro m t h f ir s

b je c a n t h

Within th presen context,

circumstance manifests it-

knowledg of that object to th othe object Although it is this o th e r o b je ct , here

object sink to th leve of bein to consciousnes i n -i ts e l

knowledg of th firs object or th being-for-consciousnes

f or -c on sc io u sn e s

o f t h f ir s i n- it s l f i s s ee n t o b e o m t h s e o n o bj ec t i t

An with this ne

self By contrast it usuall seem that we someho a n o th e

o bj ec t i n

o us , a n

th

ma ne

w e x pe ri en c

u it e a c i de nt a

of th

i n- it se lf , then this is th ne

object

ne

discover

n d e xt ra ne -

in it

knowl-

b e c om e s

being-

object

Shap of consciousnes also to

somethin differen from that whic wa th essenc to th p r c ed in g S ha p

I t i s t hi s c i c u s ta nc e w hi c

g ui de s t h

entire succession of th Shapes of consciousnes in it necesexperience, is t he re f r e s im pl y t h

pu

apprehension

of

sity Bu it i s t h ne

presen investigation, however, th ne

object show itself

n ec es si t a lo ne -o r

latter's knowin

ho

on

'*

sciousness

is ou

t se l

Th

contribution

a y o f o bs er vi n

h e u bj ec t m a t e

it does no exist fo th consciousnes

this

its i n- it se l

an

f or -u s is thereb

c o s ci ou sn es s

introduced into th movement

o me n w hi c

whic weobserve.But when viewed in this wa th sequence

fo th consciousnes engage

of experience constitute

the content

level of As

by consciousnes is raised to th

o m r eh en d

scientifi progression. m at te r o f f ac t

h e c ir c m s a nc e 24

h ic h u id e t hi s

he emergence of th

object presenting itself to consciousnes withou th

w ha t

d oe s n o

r es e

it el

in th experience itself Bu

s e e me r i n

x is t [o

it,

n l t h f or ma l a sp ec t o f w ha t e m r ge s o r i t

pur emerging. F o r c o ns c io u sn e ss , what ha emerge exists 25

as

to us

j ec t

Heidegger:

becoming.

TH

IR

E CT IO N

science. the e xp er ie nc e

from itself

o f c on sc io u sn e ss .

aw6 (Aristotle at

an

cc

in

in it lf

ep

in

cu ia

le

te

ie ce

an

in te es

le

ng as

te

nd

co

hi

i st e c e

io

iv il

ea

nt

is only fo

o f i ts el f w il l t he re fo r

f in al ly , w he n c on sc io us ne s il in ca

t se l

it

s ci ou sn es s p re se nt at io n

th

at

an

1 , 1 00 3

ap ar

in

what is p re se nt ,

ar

®€Wpro.

en es

l, in

e al i

ir

«o f)'

a il s co ea ed

i n i t p re se nc e

e se n

of looking

V7Tapxovra

ve

il C on te mp la ar

it

as

of hi

an

tu

it

e si d

self-consciousness. is le tu

co

p hi lo so ph y w hi c o f r ea so n

el

ti

th

lo

it and

c on ve rg e w it h

i t e l ~.£S ab lu

Met.

TOVT€p

i n i t r el at io ns hi p

S ha pe s o f C o ns ci ou sn e ss . its

us

er

contemplates

on ci

ey ar

n es s o r a s t hi s c on sc io u n es s i ts el f a pp ea r

toward

Kat -ro:

an

k no w

t ha t t h

t ha t it i s t h c on sc io us ne s

i nd ep en de n

p ro du c

o f e lf , e lf -c on sc io us -

ew

od

he

is thinking

in pl

thinking

proceeding

from in

t s fundamentu

ee

must, qua

absolutum.

Absolute

an

necessaril

fails

ef

i t If

l at e

ed

is the is conis

e d only

er

fundamentu

is

ir

th

o f u nc on di ti on a as

is

ic

e se n

it lf

s el f- kn ow le dg e

gs

th

a ct i l y

an

ta nt

R ea l k no wl ed g

te

If an

is

absolutu

ed

o f b ei ng s

th

te

ic

is estab-

t il l

c ou l

try

co

th

if

ul

an

in its absoluteness is

am

l is he d i n t h ke in

in the em

lo

er

r eq ui re s o f i ts el f in

l an d o f s el f- co n c io us ne ss ,

th th

li

of

we eliminat

p r io r i certainty

tr

gain an understanding ef

an

th

kn

le

it knows absolutely

it is doing.

thing, it e c io od

w hi c

es

es ar

es of a lo n

co ta

re

ze a ti o

nd

le t, am ec el

i s s ui te d t o a bs ol ut e k no wl ed ge .

at

e sc ar te s

e, examination

is

ls an

is be

at em co er

cr ti al th

nc io us

ll al in tr

in

is

th

is all t hi s c ri ti ca l a d

ol e.

a bo u

lr dy

ed

ch

k no wl -

it s ee m

rs

e tt l

es

ai

e tt e

cr iq

im

it ca

at

a mi n

ed

te Absolute

in

en

would is

ll th

cr ti al

ie em nt

an

ti

on

is "in

i sc a i n

to

an

lo

te ab

ak

e xa mi na ti o

te

present-to-us, bs lu

th

isto

cc pt an

is

ng

this parousia, in

thi

ec iv it

th

te is

ei

Advent, is

l f If p hi lo so ph y a s t h k no w! -

th

ar

io

Hegel: 2. If

an ed

fo

t io n i ts el f e xh ib it s

in it

co

cr ti al

if

in ap it

(-m1povO'ta.)

th

ne l,

e l is

t.

il

n o b e t h A bs ol ut e

Only

lo en

rn

in

it,

A bs ol ut e w ou l

t ha t

er

en

ed ti

i t is

is, seeing

US

d if fe re n

n at ur e

or

a ct u l y

it ut an

t he n o n s ho ul d n o o ve rl oo k t h

ch

p os si bi li t

it ti o f r ev er si n

terr firma o n w hi c

it

mental

el ce ai ty

distrust

e se n a ti o

in

e sp e

To take complete possession

a t it represents.

t se l a n

As te

t,

is ea

es

in

nd

on

ai

t h is

qua

knowledge an

le

e n a ll y

il

is

no

it presupposes

notions about

knowledge

instrument

medium, b e tw e e

it

difference o u rs el ve s a n

h i k n ow le d ge ; nd on on

lu

is o n h e o th e s id e for itself th

ab

te

ne er

ch

un

is th

lo

i ti o

en ir -k

par

science

dg

tu kn

he dg

excellence.

philosophy

d e and

pr

ar ed

th

Philosophy

that knowledge, an

ed lt

le

its e sp i

ts

o si ti o

at

le

is outis e , t h subiectum, the

VrrOKeLP,&OV,.

its

Heidegger: THE SECOND SECTION t o h e

philosophy sinc

is present.Phi-

l os op h th

whic

ha

b ec om e s ci en c

b ec au s

it remains philosophy.

it ci way

s op hi ca l c ri ti qu e o f k no w l ed ge . H eg e n o l on ge r u se s t h t er m "philosophy"

in

every j ec t

ns

en at th

is

r e s c a g it an s and in

is so is

33

es s el f T h r el at e

ha

s ub je c

it

t o i ts el f i n t h

ep

t hi s r ep re se nt at io n nt ti

is

el

ei

in

i ll i

il is

ts y,

ei

os

ll

ts

R ep re se nt in g

as of

rather,

it means:

philosophy is

is only s uc h t ha t it

ge

on ci

lo

te

to th

predicate;

no le

Abso-

en

a ti o

(7Ta.povu[a).

e se n

as

ay

it

ic ch ac er j ec t

e la t

i ts el f p re se nt s i ts el f as subject.

t h s ub je c

ad

ti

m od e o f r ep re se nt at io n

o bj ec t of representing

p re se nt s t h

tu

ei

ll

As

losophy, as b s l u

kn

le e, issc en

to

en if

ec us

t , it

ei je ts

f-

u nc on di ti on a

ta ty

is

lf

ti ed

th

is

l li n

er

t h m od e o f b e in g ( O l ] U L a . )

s el f- kn ow le dg e- i

Philosophy

is science in that

w it h i t task. " Su c ec

je tn

e.

tu kn

as

un th

le e,

e ct ,

ec at

ec

ce ed

ed

el

en e.

in

o f t h k in d t ha t t ra di ti on a

el be te

being

that represents beings as beings-i

n co nd it io na l ec te

s el f- a a re ne ss , lu

le

b ei n

es

it

gl

il

is

en

knowledge

c5v)

of th

Philosophy

te th

e st i a b

au

t ha t h a

u nh es it at in gl y

b ee n p o i te d in

is ll

in its absolute-

34

a ti o

amna io

itself science.

t h s ub je ct ne s lu

uc

te

exists insofa presentation

is its

be tu io

j ec t a s ei

in

absolutely knowing, it stays

h e i ta ti on s, " el

er

(T

th

el

in

is

e ct n

er in

ti al

on ti te

t se l

rank: scientific research.

so?

35

t-

of

soon as knowledg

is a k

be

an

ru en confines of its

perousia, et

en

lu

an

in

e ct .

it.

ta ly

ep at

ot r,

it ca

ur

it as th eb

io

th

am

bs lu e. im

lu

ev

c ti n

r i i ci s

ra

is really th

er

The

uncritical If

is it isno

ea

he

what is ca

lu en Oil.

ee in manipulate

if th

o wl e

ar

lo

a ti o

eq

es th

ed

ta

in

this r es t o n

e d its self-examina-

er

ha

ed

at

parousia

ie ce

Abso-

is a i

ec io

is

a s c er ta in ,

a lt ho ug h it

ra c er ta in .

th

certainty

is t il l s up po se d t o u b i s

nd io

el

er ai ty

ll

T hi s en creatu lu

th

a t is

eg cogito

e n s c e rt u m is supposed to be certai

ex po

Hegel:

th

a bs ol ut e a lo n

is abso-

is

independentl

facto be secure

throug

ed

bs lu e,

c h is t h

ai

en e,

it ju

es

te

ad

o..C it ca

ce

an

ea .Bu

withou

th Absolute

It e ve n a pp ea r

t o t hi n

it .is i na cc e s ib le , a n

i n a cc or da nc e t hu s

e em in gl y

or

at

bs lu e,

le e,

e tc .

dis-

under-

covered, 37

Heidegger: THE

e rt a n t sa s:

THIRD SECTIO

h e A bs ol u

a l n e i s t ru e T h

true alon is absolute Thes statements ar se down with

f o i ts el f

object Th

th

n e- si de d r e r es en ta ti o

th

detachment allows this mode of representation

p er si s i n s u

a y t ha t t h r ep r s en ta ti o

n o l on ge r

depend exclusivel on it object This self-detachmen

of

self-certainty from it relation to th object is it absolution I t i s h ar a t er i t i

t hi s a bs ol ut i

grounds, it constantly move away from thei ground Th

relation if i t n l r ef er s t ra i h tw a

s t t em en t

solution is

a r u ng ro un de d

ut no

r bi t a r

i n t h s en s

t ha t i t p pl i

to an

t o t h o bj ec t T h a b

h a i t is only becaus it complete itself in ever

of random assertions Th statements cannot be grounded

respect, tha is absolves itself wholly In absolvin it ab

T he y h a

solution, the self-certainty of representation attain security,

st te

th

w hi c

i ts e

r ov id e g ro un d f ir s o f

whic fo it mean th freedo v er y n a t r e i t i s t o w il l t o b e i t u s E ve r s in c m od e is terra firma, trut which is know

it el of th

p h l os o h y a s s e o o o n

ha

or it

ha held sway as certainty. True is that in unconditiona

self-awareness Earlier,

adequatio rei et intellectus. Truth is

property of representation But, bein certainty,

t ru t

is intellectual representation itself insofa as th

no

intellec represents itself an

assure itself of itself as repre-

ofitsnature It frees,acquits

n e- s d e d ep en de nc e

t hu s

w n k no wl ed ge , n d h a d on e s o in it ow eyes

i t o bj ec ts , a n

f ul l d et ac h e nt )

an

absolution

on th strength of full detachment

(th

(detach-

achievement

(the freein

acquitta

ar what characterize

absoluteness have th characte of representation of unconditiona

of

self-certainty

i t o w a bs ol ut io n T h u ni t o f absolving

ment from th relation), i t c o m p le t io n

there is the parousia o f t h A b o lu t i ts e o f i t

po

th shee representing of these. Unconditiona

In them

T h t r e , i n t h s en s

self-certainty is th Absolute alone. Th

absoluteness here described, of mental self-representation, al particularized representation

of objects. It adhere no

l on ge r t o o bj ec t i n o r e r t o p os se ss t h t r

by th

ad er

ence Knowledg detaches itself from th relation to objects. Mental representation

knowin

detaches itself (absolvere)

ro

is alone wha is true.

et an

e xp la na t o n

o we ve r e l b or at e

is the P h e -

itself as it ow provider it ne

t o f in d u ff i i en t

l ea ve s t he s

statements empty. In fact it even increase th misunder lo

Spirit. Th

phenomenolog

of th spirit is

in its presentation. This i s w h

e ge l

ut

h e s ta te me nt s

unde th suspicio that it assert itself absolutely as abso

down baldly despit th risk of seemin arbitrary. Still, he

lute knowledge, bu fail to produc

make

violates most flagrantly that very clai

th

statements

in

science, as absolute knowledge, wills. Science, in it way,

p r t en d

Absolute, in

decide of what th examinatio

to.

say

to

t ri bu na l c a

th knowers, ther is fo us.only absolute truth. Therefore,

ingly, th task is once agai

a n o n w h s ti l

of th Absolute

x is t o th e k in ds . o f t ru t

of certaint

e e t o p ur e p er f c ti on .

now: becaus th Absolute ha this will,and becaus we ar a y t ha t t he r

its credentials. It thus

whic it

c ie n e , t h r ef o e ,

ofscience isto consist.Tha

n l b e t h parowia of th Absolute Accord to make plai th absoluteness

to. Itself sented th Absolute Bu as long as we seemingl prompted by concer

an

prudence make th distinctio

a bs ol ut e t r t h a n o th e t ru th s i st in ct io n principl

of criticis

judged Ye th

w it h t hi s d is ti nc ti o

e an i

it

an

betwee an

a r a dr i

in an obscur

o bs cu ri t

is

th criterio

of th

o rd s t h

4 . O n c ou l o ti o

o f o ur s

s im pl y c o d em : a l s u

c ci d n ta l a n

a rb it ra r

an

u s l es s

c as t t he m o u

by whic scienc is

is incumben upon scienc alon to establis

"truth," "objective," an

Hegel:

throug

whic we discover th truth, an so o.n-sinc

b so l t e, " " kn ow le dg e, "

"subjective,

To do so however,

b so l t e

n d a n a bs ol ut e s e a ra t

fr

k no wl ed g

its

parousi« o f t h A b o lu t - i

m us t b e w it h i t

science,

b so lu te ne s

agains th very nature of scienc even to become involved with an doubts an r ea l

a n b en ea t

clea of unfittin

tion of knowledge. It woul

also be possible to spur

If this is right, then it is

considerations that remain outsid th t h l ev e o f t ru th . If scienc thus keep

critical doubts it will nonetheles remain

a pa bl e

s ci e c e d er iv e f ro m s uc h

lions, excuse designed to avoi

g iv e a t t h

r es u e d c o d i

th toil of scienc an

a m t im e t h i m r es si o o f a rn es t a n

zealou effort And rejecting these notion straightway, 41

h is , e v

r eg ar d a s e ce pt iv e l h u s o f

o rd s b ou n

up with thes notions, word like "absolute, edge," as well as "objective

an

"knowl

"subjective" an in

p le te l d if f r en t

ay

k n w in g t o

knowledge is as5urance

familiar to everyone Fo to give th impression partly th

t he i m e n in g i s u ni v r sa l

f am il ia r

nd pa tl

that it forc reside in it being;

r at h

l ik e a n a t e mp t t o a vo i t h f un da me nt a it

s ti l

t se l i s

b e a vo id e

o r t h s e c on st it ut e n o

i t a p e ar an ce , is

pearance itself it is no ye scienc in it full realized science it make

an

ed

er

in

kn

is the

it appearance

better

whic issai to be presen in untrue knowledge, pointng th

a y t ow ar d s c e nc e f or , i n t h first place, this

n o l ed g

o ul d b e t o i ts e f , b u a s i. .,

b a m od e o f its

it is p ro po si n

t o u n e rt a

e sc r p ti o

o f k n w le dg e

nomenon. Heidegger:

othe untrue knowledg it mode ofappearance isthere fore

k no wl i ve s a s

ca scienc refe to th intimation of somethin

i t e xi st s i n u n r u

scienc makes its appearance.

appearance becaus

declar

an

a nd , s ec o d ly , t hi s r ef er en c

B u s ci en ce , i n m a i n

woul

t as k

e tt e r ig ht ,

taking notice of such notion an expressions, by whic s ci en c

it

ut he un ru

to that on himsel possessesthei Concept, does seem n am el y t o i v t hi s C o c ep t

h ic h t h o th e

matter of indifference Bu scienc must free itself

FOURTH

SECTION

points to what is r e u ir e

of s, th

knowers, by th will prevailing in th parousia of th Abso

from this semblance, an it ca only do so by confront in th semblanc je

un ru

or

itself Fo scienc cannot simply re o f n ow le dg e 42

m e e l c om m

Curren critical analysis of philosophica knowledge assume withou furthe inquir that this knowledg isa means, an 43

t hu s r ev ea l b ot h i t i gn or an ce . o f a bs ol ut e k no wl ed g

to a ch ie v

incapacity ep

or

al

i nc ap ac it y to

it Th

ri

paTousia

ic lt is no

a s is

th

bein

absolven

t or n s ta t

absolves itself-is th labo

w hi c

is

arises

p a ro u si a . .

grasping itself in

ze lo

us es

ng

of unconditiona

It is it

el ti

p re he n i o

el

it lf on th

in

pe

as the

t ic a

p ar t of t h

ex

at n,

t oi l o f s ci en ce :

be critically examined

is a bs ol ut e

k no wl ed ge ,

e an s is philoso-

w hi c

ch

na re

is

th

tree.

hi

it do

ev

t se l

xa in

is en

e st a l i

th

it is constantly

talking.

ab

lu en s tr en gt h

le

o s d if fi cu l

while in r e l it y e v y t n g el co

e la t o n

t oi l o f c ie nc e

toil of scienc

self-certainty

ot er

however, shirks t h

pasousia. A cc or di ng ly ,

to

th

de

parousia, and

la io

el gs

.i il

parousia,

ts

lu

th

parousia

first

parousia insofar as it is the relation

toil of science

to jake

US

it c-

porousia o f t h A bs ol ut e is

l se ,

is

n o a ll o

an

c ei v

o f u nc on di ti on a

ofself-com-

This sort of examinatio

em ty

if

ie ce

s el f- ce rt ai nt y

pe an ve

it lf th

o wl tr

le

itself 45

must exer ever effort to maintain itself in it ow nature if

tion arises what that appearance is in whic c a a pp ea r T o p pe a

alon scienc

e an s f ir st , t o e me rg e i d b y s id e

make it Ow appearance withou an critical pourparlers?

with othe things in th mode of self-assertion To appear

A t t hi s p oi nt , h ow e e r i n t h m id dl e o f t h s ec ti on , H e e l raises th decisive "But":

m e n s f ur th e

"Bu science, in making its appearance, is an appearanc t se lf .

S ci en c e me rg e j u

l ik e a n

t he r k no wl ed ge . I t

is absolute knowledg be

fore whic

all o th e n ot io n

t o c om e o rt h t o o cc ur , n d

o cc ur r n g

appear mean to presag somethin whic itself ha no ye a pp ea re d o r e ve r w il l p pe ar . T he s m o e s o f a pp ea ri n remain inappropriat

to science' making it entrance

fo

u s v an is h B u b y p uf f n g

in thes modes, scienc ca neve displa itself as itself an

itself up in this fashion, scienc puts itself on th very same

soestablis itselfcompletely. On th othe hand neithe ca

le el as th

e m t y a pp ea ra nc e

o f k no wl ed ge .

h es e a r k no wl ed ge . I t

t he re ; t h

n e s su r n c

is

must brin

us

fort

r in g i t e l f or t i nt o i t t ru t

this

r ut h i ts el f I n e ve r

h as e i n w hi c

assurances will neve make th living sa of real knowledg

scienc come forth, scienc itself s te p f or t

scienc migh distinguis itself from th empt

appearance appropriat

appearance

u t a ls o a b o lu t

to science, therefore, must be that

of knowledge. It coul poin ou that it itself istha knowl-

in whic scienc presents itself in bringing itself fort

ed

i th i

thus establishing itself as knowledg that appears. Scienc

h ic h

c a m ak e i t e nt r n c

w hi c

un ru

k no wl ed g

i ts el f S c e nc e o ul d i n r od u untrut

n wi t i ng l

s ee k

i t e l a s h e t ru t

of

nl

t hi s

ay th

an

i t e rf o m s t h

contains an intimation Bu then scienc woul only

lapse again int mer assurances. Besides, it woul then clai that it emerge in

m an ne r w hi c i s n o

scienc as absolute knowledge. Ther t h t ru e ha

e r b e o mi n t o

is

vast difference

entrance trul

as itself

In it appearance scienc presents itself in th fullness of

a n f o i ts el f h e s it ua ti o

its

it w he n s ci en c m ak e i t

When it make it entrance it

u s a p e ar .

n tr a c e

a tu r

v an is h

he he

m pt y

p pe ar an c

i t i s e je c e d

o f k no wl ed g

m er el y

u t t h q ue s 47

i sr e a rd ed .

oe no n de ed ,

vanish bu to ente full into it appearance It then appear as untrue knowledge, that is as knowledg whic isnot ye true within th trut

of absolute knowledge. Th presenta

i o o f p he no me n

n ow le dg e m us t t u

a g i ns t h e s em -

pearance in whic scienc brings itself forth, bu must do so

the Absolute is with us th Absolute is bein present. In itself thus bringn g i ts el f o rw ar d t h A bs ol ut e i s f o i ts el f F o

th willof th parousia alone, the presentation of knowledge as

phenomenon is necessary The presentation is bound

t o r em ai n t ur ne d t o a r sentatio

wise, if mer semblance is simply rejected as false, it ha no been apprehende

even in it mere semblance. To be sure

even th step-by-step entrance scienc make neve consists in scienc

merely overcoming semblance. If

wo ld re ai

th

o nd ag e

u nt r t h T h a pp ea ra nc e

h e s ak e o f

is itself

th

il of th

b so lu te . T h p re -

willing, that is,

striving bu th action itself if it pull itself together within must consider what this presentation is, in what wa it

way-that

be i n t ha t s am e

,so

is, able to carr ou th presentation

of scienc ha it necessit in that radiance which eve illusion need to be mere semblance. H eg el ' s t t em en t

"B

s ci en ce , i n

a ki n i t a pp ea r

Hegel:

ance, is l of t

u rp os e S ci en c i s n o

s en s i n w hi c

th

e re l a n a p e ar an c

m pt y a p e ar i

too, is an appearance-.o!impl that bein

o f u nt ru e k n w le dg e

by appearin

s ci e c e i s i n i ts el f a l e ad y a p e ar an c

in th

at all. Rather

t h r ad ia n

Th

parousia

a pp ea ra nc e

is a ut h n ti c

ha fo it presentation

itself seem to be unscientific for, unlike free science, it this p oi n o f v ie w

pathwa of th

ra me ns

presence in th full brillianc of self-presenting representat io n

r es e t at i

t h u ni qu e s en s

absolute knowledge, it is

u s T o p pe a b y v ir tu e

this

object only phenomenal knowledge, th

r es en c

i ts e f : t h

of th Absolute In keepin with it absoluteness

of th natura

consciousnes whic

th

is striving

which is ow transformation

as throug

very nature

li

waystation prescribed

that it may, by purifyin

i ts el f t o t h l e e l o f S pi ri t a n

itself

a tt ai n c og ni za nc e o f

what it is in itself throug

th complete

experience of

it ow self

p ar al le l t o t h a pp ea ra nc es , t h

h en om e a , i t i s

p at h o f

experience Empiricism whic pursue data deserves to be preferre

Heidegger:

by al form of knowledg over mere construction

an deduction. Th presentation of phenomenal knowledge, uutiates that consideration. Scienc

phenomenology, lets itself be guided by th phenomena. It

itself, in presenting phenomena] knowledge, must by mean

follow th path of experience It ushers natura representa

o f t ha t p re se n a ti o

t io n s t

c o p le t

an

p pe ar an c

th

o ur s o f i t a ch ie v i t o w

T hu s i t d o

no ma

b lu st e i n

entrance just anywhere It entrance consists in its identify-

b y s te p i nt o h e d om ai n o f t h s c e nc e o f p hi l s o

phy. This is indeed ho p he no me n

whic this identification take place? Wher elsebut before th eyes of natura

natura

matter

with th presentation

representation

Natura

representation remain

of al

representation This representation fol-

lows phenomenal knowledg step by step throug

th multi-

fariousnes of it appearances, an thus follow throug

al

the waystations in whic

merely phenomenal knowledg

divest itself of semblanc

unti it finall

true knowledge. Th

presents itself as

presentation of merely phenomenal

absolute knowledge? No That whic nomena knowledge, whic tru

b e i ev e t o t h

absolute knowledge. Th

itinerarium, t h d es cr ip ti o

presentation of merely phenome-

na knowledg is th path of natura

consciousnes toward

e ca us e t h s em bl an c o f u nt r t h f al l a wa y

in t u

presents itself before i l s up po se dl y l ea d t o

knowledge is mere semblance. Ye even philosophy

knowledg escort natura representation up to th gate of

s ci e c e A n

stan

n ow le dg e i f w e l oo k a t i t w it h t h e y

d a t ha t t h Phenomenolog

everyday consciousnes to

of Spirit i s a n

j ou r e y w hi c

il ea

scientific knowledg of philoso-

phy. However, what th Phenomenolog

of Spirit so underin essence. Bu this

soul's purification into Spirit Th

presentation of merely

phenomenal knowledg is an itinerariu h a c ou l

be

or

e lc om e t o a tu r

mentis in Deum o ns ci ou s e ss ,

error is no accidental It follow in t h t ra i

of th

essence, overtake an

by itself th

thus conceals it Take

o ok '

impression is misleading Th natura representation whic ha here crep into philosophy take phenomenal knowledg

j ou rn e

al ng th

p at h

i nc e t h p at h s o d es c i be d r un s

51

appearin

knowledg hold itself in concealment. Bu th

presentation is by no mean th presentation of merely phe-

presentation Th presentation of phenomenal knowledg is no

at

t ha t

a tu r

c o s ci o s ne s

a n t re ad . N o i s i t

from true knowledge,

path whic with each step gain distance from natura con-

th true knowledg to whic th presentation is stil to lead

sciousness an then somewher or othe alon th wa ends

us Rather

up in absolute knowledge. Bu th

nomena knowledg as distinguishe

th presentation is merely th presentation of

phenomenal knowledg in it appearance

This "merely"

does no sa that th presentation isnot ye science=.i says is n o y e s ci en c i n a n e sp ec ts . T h a pp ea ra nc e o f

phenomena

presentation is

nonetheless; it nonetheles runs constantly to an "in-between" that prevails betwee

natura

fr in an

consciousnes

and knowledge

knowledge is

presentation of phenomenal knowledge, in it appearance is itselfscience. From th moment in which the presentation begins it already is science. Hege says "I

t ha t t hi s r es en ta ti o knowledge, th

as fo it

view of th fact

b je c o nl y h en om en a

presentation itself seem to be unscientific

Hegel: 6. Natura

consciousnes will show itself to be merely th

Concep of knowledge, or unreal knowledge. Bu sinc i t i m e di at el y t ak e i ts el f t o b e r e

it

presentation is

nl

d ev el op in g i n

k no wl ed ge , this

s c e nc e n o d oe s h e is

sit

essence, canno be itinerarium,

is usually

However, th presentation does no by an mean guid natura representation throug

th museum of th shapes of

understood by "doubt," i.e. entertaining

consciousness, in

t hi s o r t ha t p re su me d t ru t

on

t hr o g h

" t u th "

h a b ee n a pp r p ri at el y dis-

it

s pe ci a d oo r

i t f ir s

missesnatura

te

nt

a bs ol ut e k no wl ed ge .

a th er ,

if no before then th presentation dis-

consciousnes as that consciousnes whic

n c t h " do ub t

sipated, so that in h e e n

t o e tu r

disbelie in

m at te r s ta n

t o h a s am e r et t

uc is

in

it very characte remain wholly incapabl of followin th 53

whic direct itselfto th whol compas ofphenomenal whic

is in t ru th , o nl y h e u n e al i e d

therefor this thoroughgoin

o n e pt . A n

skepticism is no that de

consciousness, Spirit become able fo th firs time to examin what trut e sp a

vice with whic an earnes zealot ma imagin himsel

is Fo this skepticism brings abou

o ve r n o i on s t ho ug ht s a n

o pi ni on s w hi c

ar called natural, an it is of no consequenc whethe resolve no to foun scienc on authority, surrendering

onesel to th thoughts of others bu rather to examin

whe consciousnes engage in the examination straight-

everything fo onesel an

way, it isstill filled an

follow only one' ow con-

o ti o

viction, or better yet, to produc everything by onesel

an

burdened with thes "natural

t ha t i s w h i t i s i n a ct , i nc ap ab l o f w ha t

it want to undertake. sequence of Shapes throug is th

ow educatio

whic consciousnes passes

detailed histor

of consciousness'

to th leve of science. An wherea that

r es ol v a ss um e t ha t e du ca ti o resolution as somethin

ma

Heidegger:

THE

SIXT

SECTIO

b eg in s t o i nd i a t t h p a

th

re

b e t re a e d l i

immediatel

dispense

with

presentation necessaril move to brin phenomenal knowledge to ligh as phenomenal Accordingly, th sectio open

actually carrie it through.

w it h

ha

aspect belong together an what constitute th ground of

to gi

o ne se l o v

v er si o o f o pi n o n o u o f p er s n a

t o a ut ho ri ty ; b u b y t h c on -

e l o n a ut ho ri t

i nt o o pi ni o h el d

o nv i t io n t h c on te n o f w h

is no necessaril altered, an trut

i s h el d

does no necessaril

d is ti nc ti o

t h i r u ni ty . twee natura

h ic h e me rg e f ro m e ct i

u r f ir s t as k is consciousnes an

Hege uses th

o f o pi n o n a n

p re ju di c

it

base himsel on th authorit c o v ic t o n t h

on

i ff er en c

a tt e

l it tl e w h t he r o n

f oc u o n t h d is ti nc ti o

be

real knowledge.

term "consciousness

t o e si gn at e h e s am e

t o s ec ti o

an

h e t w e xp li c t e e a

"knowledge o th er .

be

consciou mean to be in th stat of knowledge. Knowledg

of others or on personal i s t h v an it y w h c h i s

"being in bein conscious. In that stat ar especially that

represents-s-and th knower himsel wh represents as well

represented. Thi is t h m od e i n s en te d t ha t w hi c h av e b ei ng , a n

know however, means: oidi, sigh of something, gained insigh into something. Th

peris

u nd er st oo d h er e a s a vi n whethe

This

t er m b ei n

n d t h a c o f e pr e e nt in g

t he y b el on g t og et he r c on sc io us " s pe a

" b i ng .

s o e th i

representation

b ef or e

in me ta

presents

regardless

sound.

It

a ys : b ei n p re se n i n t h

o d o f h e g at he ri n

used also.means by long accustomed usage, th bein

non-sensibly in ou though or will or feelings To represen i s t o s ig h f ro m t h start.•t o a tc h s i h t o f

idea,

percepHo. Percepti

h a is seen; it is take up some

is in th mode of knowin

lies an

is "subject -tha

thus accompanie

all consciousness: "subject"

is t ha t i ts el f w hi c

sure of it Representation prevails in all t h m o e s

us that whic refers to. itself what it b a

sciousness. It is neithe mere contemplatio sens of conceptual judgment

gathers (co-agitat)

no ye

c on -

ha

that is presen whic

In

e e s ee n is being present. Con-

scientia i s t h g at h r in g i nt o p re s n c

t h k in d in which

is represented. Representing

i n i t r ep re s n ti ng , p ut s t hi n

b ef or e

u t b e o r u s a nd .

think-

Representation

f ro m t h s ta r i nt o a n " I a v s ee n. "

wh

whic under-

henc precedes everything else is always alread

present, an

thin that is present, as such,explores it, scrutinizes it, makes

t hi sg at he ri n

itself

that is

what is

ing in th

u t t hi s

,"

is

representation

Th

r ep r s en t re

h ic h t ha t w hi c is repre-

as th

of representation Th Bein of th subjec whic precedes everyth.ing that is represented, insofa as it reflects th subjeer-objec relation within itself is called subjectness. Sub [ectness is p re s n c i n t h m od e

. f r e r es e t at io n T o b e

presen in th stat of representednes mean that somethin

it appears in the

presents itself in knowledg as knowledg brings th sight, th image, into presence Representation is

sens of emerging into an unconcealedn.ess somethin

th in-gathering of th imag whic prevails in knowledg

i s t he r

understood as having sighte th image: imagination. To be consclou mean to be presen in th in-gathering of what is h e G re e

extant Gree

ot6..,

EZ6""

su

knour, i! th perfec tens of th no actually

(Ed.

C o s ci ou sn es s

h ic h a pp ea r

e in g c on s i ou s

that

s uc h is that

i n i t e lf . A p e ar a c e i s t h d ir ec t p re se n

of consciousnes or knowledge in of th appearance is formed within an itself as it arena. It ma by no

by th appearance

have become cleare what

tl

e se n t i

en

al

le

an knowledge, or unreal knowledge. Natura

ep

ed ch

lf

its a pp ea ra nc e

ea

t og et he r w it h k no wl ed g c o s ci ou sn e

as th

th

a ct ua l

er h e p re se nt at io n

b ei ng -c on sc io us -o f- it ,

is c o

knowledg

ed

th

al

le

is no natural

th p re se nt s an

t hi s

Natural

is

is

r ea l k n w le dg e rhis is

ed

to

th

it

ea

er ta

is appearance th

enters into representation es

in

jv

only insofa

as beings

ov).

is

the en qu

en perceptu

th

cogiiaiiones that are as conscieniia.

in th

presentation ha

b e p re se nt e

th

o nt ol og y o f t h

in itself is

e se n appearin

r ea l c on sc io us ne s

whic

ap

ce

r ep re se nt at io n

a s r ea li ty .

t o p hi lo so ph y

P hi lo so ph y

t io n o f p he no me na l

e, k no wl ed g

w il l p ro v

le

al which is

co io th

ll

es

et ch

at

in

n at ur a

al

c on sc io us -

ed

tu

te

in

at

eg

in

at

at

is

is, o f r ea l k no wl ed g e.

as

l it y

m er el y

58

al

i ts el f

is em

e c is present

th

is

subjec

is p hi lo so ph i

c t is

ea

us

is

no

consciousnes

eg

th

c on ce pt . B u h e d oe s s a t ha t n at ur a

is something

c on sc io us ne s

w il l r o

t o b e " me re l t h

real knowledge. o f n ow l d g

on ep

kn wl dg

What is here called "merel ca

be de er in

un

thin everywhere as beings only if, unbeknowns to itself it

th Concep

n l w it h r ef er en c t o

beings Natura

representation of beings necessaril implie

this genera representation of th beingnes of beings with edge."

u t h ow e e r a n

s p c if i

no le ge of th

ei gn ss of

ens verum is th ens cerium that whic know itself with cert a n ty , t h

h ic h is

cettum is know

r es en t

k no wl e g e B u t h

it. It cannot avoi includin

trul only if it is known qu ens. Such is

t h c as e w he n t h esse o f t h en

beings natura consciousnes is no awar of Being, an ye

en

s en ta ti o

in it repre-

t h B ei n o f e in g i n g en e a l b e a u

is specifically represented

it ou to beings.

an th particular bein is know in it Being, th real in it

Unde this aspect natura consciousnes is merely the repre-

reality. Rea knowledge is that knowledg whic always an

sentatio

everywher

represent beings in thei beingnes

an represents phenomen

(reality),

in thei appearance This is why

of beingnes

" me r l y h e C on ce p

in

of

t ha t a c i e e s c er ta in t

n o l e g e, " n o

he kn wl dg

h e r ea li t o f t h r ea l

knowledg of th realit of th real is called rea knowledge e an in g

If

m ea n t ha t i t t u n s

ut to be th

n o l e g e w hi c e ve r

c c r di n

t o l og ic ,

rule of natura thinking

hi

d ef in e t h

fo ms nd

concep is th representation of

wher represents no beings qua beings bu in it represent-

somethin

in merely adhere to whatever is Whenever it seeksto find

such representation does no even specifically gras what it

beings in h ei r t r t h i t will always strive to explai beings

represents Bu it is characteristic of natura

in term of beings Th

beings in whic

consciousnes be

ot

nl

in g_eneral;"merel

on ta tl

th Concept" indicate that consciousnes

t o b e o m a b o r e d i n t h b ei n

ha

come absorbed ar thus fo consciousnes everything that

it represents bu alsoto regard them alon as true an thus

it is

to re ar

is

it kn wl dg

as re

k no wl e g e

c co rd in g y ,

natural. Sinc such representation become itself absorbed

Hege continues: "But sinc it (natural consciousness) im

in th

mediatel

e i g s o f w hi c i t

a wa r

an th

r em ai n i n t he i

environment, thi knowledge is naturalknowledge

Bu even

take itself

(that is t h

p at h a y

to

be real knowledge, this pathwa th

knowledg in it appearance 60

p re s n t t io n ha

61

ph no en

negative significance fo

it... nt

Whenever real knowledg places th Bein ofbeing th li el gh

e ca u

n at ur a

i t o w t ru t

k n w le d

t he re b

ubsume under thi statement

l oo k t h o th e w a

di pu ed

at ra kn wl

it isand remain mine an

thin that is throug

t hi n i nt o a n b je c f o

in th

at re of ec no og

ne

in so et in

b y h e s en se s

in

p i i o , " h e t ta ch e t o t h

word severa meanings th immediat focusing upon some thing, th trusting acceptance of what is given, an opinio

u b e ct .

v e s o a bs ol ut e m et a

physic is no th caus of this thin

is, as such as bein mine When Hege call this representa s b ei n

it irresistible transformation of every-

oe

ha is at ra in on ci us

o t l i in that whic ut in wh

tbat establishe itself

is sensible an

perceptibl

a ri se s d i e c l y in consciousness

n d a s s uc h d i e c l y e nt e

o ns ci ou s e s

Na ur

sensible be it th non-sensible of intellec an ou own. Such opinio is th basi constitution of al representin in whic natura consciousnes ha it habitat. Thus

Bu as soon as th appearance of phenomenal knowledg edge Natura

system of opinion."

logi or th

supra-sensible of the spiritual c o e s t o l i h t i t i s t hi s m er g n c t ha t

"persists within

co

sciousnes accepts in

o u t s f o k no wl -

consciousnes sees itself placed in

differen

What Hege call natura consciousnes does by no mean coincide with sensible consciousness. Natura a li v

l l s ha p

way-includin

t h S pi ri t l iv e

ll

knowledg is

th

i n t s o wn '

such In that light, natura knowledg lose its truth, becaus t ha t t ru t

o w p r v e t o b e h a w hi c i s o t y et -t r e ; f o

especially th shap of absolute knowledg

that come abou as absolute metaphysics, an that isvisible

realit of th phenomena. Th

only occasionally to

ance realizes what wa "merel th Concep of knowledge.

fe

thinkers This metaphysic is so

It br ng th twentieth-centur

positivism that on th contrary mode

n at ur a

c on s i o s n s s w hi c

in

ee in

wi

o pi ni on s

accomplishes the unlimited self-assurin feasibility of eve.ry mean "havin an Heidegger's word Meinen, whic colloquiall opinion," is relate to mein (mine) an suggest "makin somethin my own, an to Ol High German minne (love) (Tr.)

e a f or t i n t s r ea li ty , a n

within th real Th phenomen no ar th

s ep a a t

s er ve d w it hi n r e t he i

presentation of th appear

f ro m r e

k n w le d

wn th ir ea it

n t r o e s r e l it y

ar no thereb eliminated no le ge h er e h e

n d t he i t r t h

he ar

re

h av e o m i n at ra

co sc ou

nessand real knowledg ar indeed th Same in that natura consciousnes as what is not-yet-true an real knowledg as

nomena! knowledge, w hi c

reason th tw ar no identical.

i s in t r t h

knowledg fo whic that is mos rea nl

th

u n e al iz e

o nc e t .

lo

this road natura consciousnes lose definitively what unti presentation of phenomena] knowledg in it appearance is

then wa it truth, bu neve lose itself thereby. Rather it

a n i nc es sa n c ha ll en g

establishe itself in th ne

t o w ha t

at ra

c o s ci ou sn e

re

ro stoo as doubt. However, as th COUISef Descartes'

ed

is of anothe

tations

r ue , i t u t i n q ue st io n

an

nd va io

od

kind

o f r ep r

dg

trut

accordin

to its ol way.

h e i e p oi n o f t h s ci e c e o f p h n o e na l th

oa

n ow l

conscious-

t h p r s e t at io n i s f o n a u r

ness th road of despair, though natura consciousnes does no know it Bu natura consciousnes itself neve despairs Doub that lead into despai isthe business of th presenta tion that is of absolute knowledge. Bu even th presenta

doubting-doubtin

whic itselfisin no wa bein doubted. natura

c hi ev e

it

w n s e u r t y~ a

the fundamentum

absolutum

se ur ty Bu th

hi

is considered

absoluteness of this

consciousness, becaus

this consciousnes

w an t t o e a i z w ha t i t o n t a t l i s- t n o l ed g - a

y e n ev e c ea s

t o a rr o a t

no questioned no is its

trut

essenc even mentioned. Hegel'

wa

of knowledge. Th more completely th presentation follow

in that

he know that ther ca be absolute knowledg only if t , i n whatever manner begins with absoluteness Thus it is no unti Hegel' though that natura consciousnes appear it ow proper setting-whil n t t h l an d

m od e

in

Descartes, though he sets foot

p hi l s o h y thesubiectum

ego cogiio, actually does no se th landscap

as th

Th absolute presentation of phenomenal knowledg does r ut h T h

r oa d

t h p r s e t at io n o f h e o me n

appearance is "the consciou insigh into th untrut

bein th sole standard

o f d e p a r , h e s o n e s ci e c e c om pl et e i t o w

appearance. Th

presentation of phenomenal knowledg submerge

o ta ll y i nt o t h s t t e

d es p i r I t i s t h c o s u

d es p i r

e g l , " th or o g hg oi n

i s s ay s

a ti o

s ke p i ci sm ,

skepticism in it consummation We thus recove th origi-

at all.

n o a l o w n at u a l c on s i o s n s s v e t o r et u

he oa

to preten

to it el th

Absolute is bein neithe doubte

is differen

of knowledg an

neve

e r c o c ep t o f

ts wn he of phe-

n a m ea n n g o f t h w or d s k p s s " a t h in g s cr ut i i zi ng , b ei n s . S ke ps i

th

se

CTKbJIL,>

ha an

s en s p ur s e s t h

w it h i t g az e I t w at c i n

means seeing

o w b ei ng s r e

a s a u h t s ig h

e in g

b ei n s o e th i

fo itself,

knowledg that it s cr ut in iz e

perspectiv ca

it

au

h in ke r

a r i nn at el y s ke p

is

in

ir

em t,

an

these

en

th

i;

earance

in

Skepsis is e w itself,

th is

im

skepsis is that oidi (I

it

al

ci

in

ar

es

al

th

education" ea

co

it

e se n i o

ay

in

en n om en a t he m e lv es , t ak in g t he ms el ve s f o w ha t i s r ea l

this a pp ro ac h is th

hi

as

s i u lt an eo u

c om in g a n

ov

ac

ce

i t e lf , w hi c ap ea

e.

ci

es

ce

en

in th

od

er

o f s el f- pr od uc in g

ay

ap lo

ce

te er

e. tt tu

in th

--ci

ci

an eg

is

s ke pt ic is m

. . H eg el ' t er m i s i l u ng -t h formed or shaped (Tr. 66

it-

ci s ke pt ic is m ap

to c on sc io u n es s

ie

it

it

d ev el op s i nt o k e t ic i m , a n

lr

self.

it co

ci

g oi n

l f is.

ic

ch

r oc es s by

whic

somethin

is

h or i o n o f s om e i mi te d e v d e c e

lo ki

u t t ow ar d

th appearance of phenomenal knowledge, it look over th whol expans of phenomenal knowledge. Th isolated ego cogito with it representation li it

f r m ew or k

th ou

or

r em ai n

h o o ug h

er ap

certum

Bu

remain captiv within this

ve

t hi s f ra me wo r - t o u h t

th

nl as th

H eg e

o ul d o ns id e i t

no ye se foot into th land of philosophy-self-consciouses -w er

th

ep es nt

o bj e

f ir s e xi st s

t a d s " Be i g "

th

au

tr ly

h a w hi c

actualitas or realit

a r o we r s e s e o f m er e

t h ego cogito i n t h f or m

consists in th knowledg of self-know-

t s e nl ar ge me n t o "is" all reality, the

is preceded by skepsi into th larg spac that

subjectnes appear to itself

he

In on ra

complete retrea into that trut of beings which, as absolute

ot

certainty, consider itself to be Bein itself

an clarificatio

of terminolog

whic

become necessary. Once Hege ha

This object is what is represente

hi

fo what become

object of consciousnes in immediat

representation

onesidedly only as bein

ob-jected, se against, withou regard fo th representing w hi c

e i g s i n t hi s s en s ye tr

an

r ea l

ut th

bs lu

ep es nt

de ig at e ge l m pl o

" Be i g , a s t h t er m f o h a i n a ct u "B in

realit tha is in hi sens stil untrue an

or

wi

ha

H eg e ' s u sa g e g l , o ll ow in g

an

se he te

" Be i g "

ca ls th

o bj e t iv e

objectivity, an also fo what he represents as th trul

ha meanwhil

firmly establishe

terminology, he uses th term "beings"

ct an fo th

w a s u p o e d t o a v v an i h e

knowledg of scienc take no notice thereof.

But this preceding is

th

eho

e mo r o f t h esse o f t h en

open up when unconditione

pone

ei g,

the en actu t h r e l ,

th realit of absolute knowledge. True this enlargement requires an

uc

thinks of th real only as that whic is Hege always under-

tr th is ot

E i v C t t , bein

as th Greeks understood it, from Hegel' poin

of view as th objectivity' of an immediatel s ub j c t v it y h a h a

interpre it on th basi of this subjectivity bu on th basi th

r ee k ' A . X 7 j 8 E L C t ,

nco

cealedness,

representation of consciousnes as skepsi is oww"

to de ig at th interprets classi

representing

o t e t f ou n i ts el f w e d o n o t ha t i s

m od e

b ei n

r ri ve s f r

concealed are where nature is as ye unthought. Th beingness of beings whic from th beginnings of Gree though

It

Vas Seie'lde

N ie tz sc he ' d o t ri n

(Tr.)

68

of Et rn 69

R ec u r e c e

oo

pl ce

wa does th presentation thereb cisive-mod

of Bein whic need no byany mean appear

o nl y a s t h p re s n c

h a i s p re s n t

iv

eg l'

achiev it ow appear

ance so that it ceasesto be a-mere entrance Th presenta

se

it

is certai

of containing

within itself th whol histor of th formatio entitled to designat what fo hi term

nd ye

is t h

ru re li

he

still containin the wor "being."

d oe s s o v e y wh er e s i c e h e e s e nc e o f

ness trut

of conscious-

proces in whic natura consciousnes ca find th ofall it Shapes

p ir i

remains "being self-conscious.":" This usage, to be sure is e rm i o lo gy ,

ut

es

u po n t h

o nc e l e

wa

in

hi

Hegel:

Being itself reveal and conceals itself.

complete system of th Iorm of unreal conscious-

ness will presen itself throug "Being to th appearance of phenomenal knowledge, an g ai n t o t h a b o lu t n es s

he

so ut

at firs seem arbitrary. However,

ou

sa

ma

neithe arbitrar

no

case of mere terminology, assuming it ispermissible at al

g r s si o a n th

co

r e e ns i l e

p r l i i na r

th necessit of th pro-

i nt e r e a t d ne s

h e f or ms .

ay

ay th

ot d, in

t h p r s en t t i

sciousness in it untrut

isnot

ke e ne r

an

o f n tr u

on

merely negative move-

ment as natura consciousnes onesidedly view it An terminolog

is by its nature an instrument of th sciences

h e a n u ag e o f h i k in g i t i t d es ti ny , r at he r o f t h n ki n

in

th

ic

as ro

u mm on s t ho ug h

l a i t o f its w n t h n ki n

in keeping

n ot h

ki

in or er to

se that othe thinking free into it ow nature ha cede an

h ap pe n

en th

look forwar

s ke ps i

c on s i ou s e s

re

into th appearance of phenome-

na knowledge, an brings abou it presentation er an r d C o c on sc i "being-ccnscious. (Tr.)

s ne s

i. Beurusstsein,

In what literally

de

k no wl ed g

hi

its basic principle is o n

a ke s t h th

o ne si d d ne s

S ha pe s

nc

pl te

consciousnes which, as such belong to th system of th se

h ap e

of th

r oa d i ts el f I t s , n am el y

nd

il

e co m

sees in ever result only pur

ni es

h e c ou rs e

h e s ke p i c s m

nothingness

hi

and abstracts

from th fact that this nothingnes is determinate, that it is the nothingness

th

ic

it

In

fact it is only when nothingnes is take as th nothingn es s o f

ha

c om e f r

ha

he tr

r es ul t f o

then nothingnes itself is content. abstractio

determinate nothingness and

he sk pt ci

hi

nd

it

he

p re s n t t i principl

p h n om en a

k no wl e g e T h

vi

one-sided; fo natura representation always look

of nothingness, or with emptiness, cannot bu fo th

ho e- he

object Natura

si

i t d ir e

n co u t e

it

he

consciousnes neve look to th othe side

toward th Bein of beings This essentia one-sidedness of t h c on t a r

h e e s l t i s o mp re h n d

as it ru

is

as determinate mediatel

in t h n eg a i o

th tr ns ti

th pr gr ss on hr ug

th

is

o mp le t

sequence of Shapes take plac of it ow accord

KE SE

f or tn at i n .

s ho w i ts el f a s t ha t s k p t c is m w hi c

n o i n a n c o d uc t n d u p w it h t h c o c l s i This skepticism i.e. sophistry, an

N TH S E T I N de ve l p s t h

pl te sy te

specific Shap of

of th

or

of

i nq u r y i nt o t h

n re a

o ns ci ou sn e s .

shee addictio

to doubt, is absolute

How, in this Shap of consciousness, is the one-sidedness o f n at ur a k no wl e g e r a s e t o h e s ta t a y t ha t

at ra

of

ci le In th

everywhere find only beings only phenomena, an everything it meet accordin

is

emergenc of th Shapes ca result only from th course of m us t be

is no of he in

he

w hi c

judges

f al l

i c i m t o t h u ka s

necessar progression, fo only then ca

th pr se ta io

In

na ur

o ns c o u n e

is

h y t h a pp ea r n c

of thes things isBeing This

h a a pp e r s t h r ea li t

ha

h a d oe s h e a t r e

of th progressio consist? ie

lw ys nd

of appear

gaps What is it that constitute th necessit of progressio ou se

r in -

to thes findings Whatever

in in

which finds only beings-one in th

c on s i o s ne s

no

knowledg ha no ye appeared to itself in it appearance

a nc e

th

always result in empt nothingness.

Thes ar th Shapes of phenomenal knowledge, sinc this

this emergence. That course is th progressio

in ll

th

knowledg supposedly attained always amount to nothing.

Heidegger:

"c

consciousnes ma even ente as

consciousness. It must displa itself within th histor of it

arisen an

m ad e b y w hi c

natura

natura consciousness. In th judgment of natura consciousi n g en e a l t a e s

th

n ow l d g

il ea

t o n ot hi ng . I n a ct , h a p r s e t a i o

ne er ge

be on

it

i rs t s te p

n ot hi ng . H ow , n d w hi c from there? An

hi

ha

l re ad y l e

ay isthe pr se ta io

progressio

to

to go

remain denied to it-unles

it constantly allowssome othe Shap ofphenomenal knowlsupposed appearance with whic

enough in th

allegedl philo-

sophical objections that ar raised agains Hegel' philosophy. In anticipation of such objections Hege himsel says in th presen sectio merely that th nothingnes to whic

n o l ed g

l ea d i s n o

m pt y b u

Therefore, if th

t h n ot hi ng ne s o f t h

f ro m

result whic

th progressin

presentation

t he n i t is no surprising that th course of th presentation to ee

s tr an g

t o n at ur a

c o s c o u n e s . It is

a l t h m or e n e e s a r f ro m h e o ut se t t o p re v n t t hi s

one-side progressio

view whic

natura

consciousnes take of th

of th presentation from throwing everything

confusion

h a n ee d t o g o u t e y n d n d w he r t h

bj ct an

he bj ct

o nc e

c or -

h e C on ce pt .

itself powerles to transcen

it immediat

existence, it

is. r oo t

i s i t death. Bu sinc consciousnes is fo itself Concept, i t m me di at el y

ra sc nd

w ha t i s

h ic h

yields fo th presentation stem from wher th progressio

c on ti nu e

l on g

Th progressio toward this goal is consequently with

presentation of phenomenal knowledg is supposed to

it results. However, appearance result from what appears.

int

w he r

presentation of phenomenal knowledg

also find expression ofte

th

sarily as th sequence of th progression. It istha poin

r es p n d t o t h

Th view that natura consciousnes must cheris when

th

8. Fo knowledge, however, th goal is fixe just as neces-

i t e lf , w he r i t f i d s i ts e

it

nothingness. ever it judges th

Hegel:

individual th beyond is also establishe fo consciouse ss , e ve n spatia

he it is on

n ex t t o what is

intuition. Consciousnes therefor

suffer vio-

destroys for itself any limite satisfaction U nd e

th

w el l r et re a

i nf lu en c ro

o f t hi s

i o e n e , a n i et y

th tr th an tr to on er

in an er of ei

os Bu

an fi

ay

ha is

n o r e t . h ou l

it wish to remain in thoughtles indolence, though will

troubl

th thoughtlessnes an

it restlessness will disit

sentimentality whic

claims to find everything

it kind

th

an

ic

in

ti

ci

at

it is

th

te ev

in

le

itself made et es

in

ay

li tu

f es ta ti on , a n

im ie

tw

t o t se l in its appearance

ap

t hu s o rg an iz e

ty

toit el an

th

ea

ty

ly

i ts el f a s t h

itself is neither

Consciousnes

to

er ta

es

eh

it so difficult, if not Impossible, t ha n

is

en io

lu io

io

itself of its

sciousness inform

r ea l

o f i t S ha pe s

merely natura

consciousness

is

al co ci

th

er

co li

th

an

h ow ev er , l i in consciousnes

like lifeless items. Conscious-

e m in b ar re n

" I, " is

f o i t f le e t h

s at is fa ct io n

w hi c

u ni ve r a l a n

mu

be left to itself

is ed

it

in io

ex

s ee k o nl y b ei ng -f o - it se lf .

Heidegger: THE

EIGHTH

SECTIO

d es cr ib e

th

c ha ra ct er i t i

mo en

in t hi s r es tl e s ne s

t io n o f c on sc io u n e

c o e s t o p as s

h e p ro gr es si o

t hr ou g

ti

o f c on sc io us ne s

t o it. C on sc io us ne s

i s n ei th e

n o e ve n g ui de d in i t d ir ec ti o it ow

a cc or d

"Of

w hi c

it

i nd ee d g iv e d ir ec -

pu in

o ti o

b y h i t or y

by it

at

at

io

in itself p ro gr es si on . C on sc io us ne ss , t he re fo re , m u view. Accordingly,

this

no

co

i nt o

er c on sc io us ne s no

it

ch as

i n r ep re se nt in g

explicitly includes in

b ei ng s

u na vo id ab l

ta io 77

th

al t ho ug h

in

ei

tu

on ci is n o

ts o ut si d

as tr

i t e lf .

a tu ra l

en c on sc io us ne s

is set

it is en

ci

ig b ei ng s i n

h ic h n at ur a

c on sc io u n e

et

ti

in

he

al

ef

ts as

is

th

ip io

io

a bi de s is determined, e ve r t h

goal is

is

k no wl ed g

o f t h b ei ng ne s

ness refuse

to face th

o f b ei ng s B u n at ur a

restless tensio

c on sc io us -

of self-transcendence ing.

II

it. in th

h is to r

o f c on sc io us ne ss '

is

f or ma ti o

it

on ta ly a n i rr e i st ib l

ay

tl

te

p ul l i nt o s el f- tr an sc en de nc e

th

e su l

h e p re se nt at io n

which is COD-

ci

ta

to

le tu

ca tension

ts

ll ta

ti te

e-

is

is ea it

th

in

ar

e a is

is

al ad o ve me n is

i ss ui n eh

Cram

ut

knowledge ep

ts

co

is

as pl te

ll he

bl

ap

ay

ll

le 79

io th

in

e se n t i pp

an

is

a n o bj ec t o f k no wl ed g i s o t y e g r s pe d c on ce pt ua l k ep si s t ha t p r v ai l i n t h

n at u

o f o ns ci ou s e ss .

as

he

skepsi sustains from th outset th irresistible pull by whic consciousnes is violentl carrie

beyond itself-b

which,

corresponds to it, n d m u

in th

e la ti o

that is,

with that knowledg itself Only in t hi s

uprooting natura consciousnes loses wha it t a e s t o b e i t

know

consciousness. In this constant dyin

wh ch is

totall within knowledge, whic ha thus become

genera representing (conceiving) in natura

b e e pr es en t

ay isth

comprehensiv

an

consciousnes

sacrifices itself so that it ma by th sacrific gain it resur-

concep in which consciousnes conceivesitself, natura con

r ec ti o i nt o i t o w

sciousness always remain "merel

sciousness is bein

a tu r

restless tensio il

u p o ot i g , n at ur a c on -

violated Bu th violatio

consciousnes itself Th is th

In th

violence is th w hi c

i t a bs ol ut e e s

a nt s

in t h m od e o f

natura consciousnes always live in th mids of beings

known. Onl becaus consciousnes is fo itself it ow concept ca

natura

. .. .

sciousnessis fo itself it ow

Thi statement

else than does th referenc at th beginnin

of th sixt section: "Natural consciousnes will show itself e.

consciousness, as part of consciousnes it

self, persist, in t s p o i ti o o f b ei n

e re l t h C on ce p o f

knowledge. However, we shal adequately understand th firs statemen abou consciousnes only when we no only pa attentio

statemen abou consciousnes will be plausible: "But consays somethin

Fo inas

come from

prevalence of th

within consciousnes itself That prevalence t h A b o lu t

th Concept.

to th distinctio

Hege emphasizes betwee

«Concept" an "merel th Concept, bu alsogivethought t o w ha t w e o ns id er e

in

sentence "But consciousnes is fo itself it ow h e r ea ] s t e s l ie s o n t h

i s. "

i ts el f t ha t a cc om pl i h e i t

Concept,"

m e n s i t i s o ns ci ou s e s

p pe ar an c

t o i ts e

nd at th

speaking no of natura consciousness, bu of consciousnes

s am e t im e c on st it ut e

t h s ta g f o t h a pp ea ra n e , s in c

i ts el f w it h u t q ua li f c at i n s N o

th

or

C on ce pt " i s

this stag is part of it nature Thus consciousnes find it-

o ns ci ou s e s t o i ts e i n i t t ru th .

he

a tu r

o f t ha t t r t h

self in it Concept. lies in n co nd it i n a

e rt ai nt y

I n t e m s o f this certainty,

-'

i nc e H e e l' s f ir s

t at e e n

a bo u

r ou gh t t h t r t h o f c o s ci o s ne s i n 81

c on sc io us n s s v ie w h e i s n o

as in

position also to clarif natura consciousnes with regard to

ow thoughtlessnes in whic it dissolve everything At th en of th same sectio which, with it firs statemen abou

c o s ci ou sn e s . B u t hi s d oe s n o

a l m ea n t h

n at ur a

consciousness is f al se , d ec ep ti v

consciousness, look ahea

into th trut

of knowledge, th

is

an

e rr o

a th e

it

means: natura

consciousness is always not-yet-true consciousness, over p ow e e d b y t h

v io le nc e t h

i nt o i t t ru th .

a tu r

f or c w hi c

a rr i

it fo th

c on sc io us ne s f ee l t hi s o rc e a n

'I

whic find it sole satisfaction in limiting itself to th

beings it encounters. Th

"barre

h an de d

e ha vi o

"barren

'I'''

'I'''

o f o m o n o pi n o n in philosophy. Still,

begins to fear fo it ow survival Hegel, whos rationalis cannot be praise passage-wher e dg e

th

or blamed enough speaks in th decisive he mentions th relation of natura knowl-

e in g

b ei ng s- o

t h " fe el in g o f i ol e c e. "

This feelin of th violence of th willas whic th Absolute is, characterize the manner in which natura

'I'''

,"

consciousnes

."

is

e ye s t o t h p r s en t t io n whic

prompt consciousnes to evad th Bein of beings

is ipso facto, qu

n at ur a r el at io n t o B ei ng . a ls o h e w a through

p he no me na l k no wl ed g a n

refuse to follow th progressio of th presentation Hence, t h d og m t is m o f c ur re n o pi n o n m u

which, philosophy

t o r ef e b a

e r i m e di at el y

th me cy of

bein

e r f ee l n g i ns t a d o f is

coul it, sinc scienc is

is it.

f ee li ng . p hi lo s p h

grounded in science. This superficia view whic

l ef t t o i t o w

devices. Philosophy, in making this decision does no reject natura consciousness. Indeed ho

t ho u h t i s c om pe ll e

to

though in it truth. Only philosophy discover natura cons c o us ne s i n i t n at ur al n s s a n

r ec og ni ze s i t H o e ve r

professe toda as widely as ever isitsel part of that vanity

philosophy does pass natura consciousnes by when natura

o f h e u nd er st a d in g w hi c

consciousnes puff itself up as philosophy in orde to eras

H eg el ' o w ol

e li g t s i n t h i n o le nc e o f i t

p hr as e t ra ns la te d by M r D ov e " Un de r t h i nf lu en c Be de Geluhl ditSlr Gewall." (Tr.)

th borderline that separate it from philosophy an to turn t s b ac k u po n p hi l s op h a s t h k no wl ed g o f h e B ei n o f

beings Bu philosophy then bypasses only what ha alread th while philosophy in bypassing it, nonetheless concerns itself with natura

consciousness, an

th course in whic th trut

e re l

sentatio

itself it work itself

presentation produces itself as such in

does no go from natura to real consciousness= as this distinctio in ever

obscure. If

r ea d w it h u s h o

c ou l a b o lu t k no wl ed g b e

th

betwee

th

form of consciousness,

n l o f t ha t p a

h ic h t h A bs ol u

is

phenomena knowledge is this path this course Th nature of th presentation ha become even more enigmatic. Only this remain clear: th presentation does not, in separation f ro m t h A b o lu t

c om e r o

c o r s w ho s

i n h e w a i n w hi c

o rc e o f t h w i o f t h A bs ol ut e

he

r es en ta ti o

f ol -

i t e l t ra ve l i n

it

f r n t t h A bs ol u

o ti o i s e te r i ne d b y t h g oa l h a i s b y

p at h t o

still

the Absolute? If

p r c ee d f ro m o n S ha p t o t h n e t . T hi s p r g re ss io n i s th

ay th tw

difference-remai

n te r n g o n h e s ce ne . T h w a o f t h p re -

consciousnes itself whic

ha

in-

Th presentation of phenomenal knowledg is skepticism out in detail Th

t h q ue st io n w h t he r a n i n

only with it in of consciousnes appears.

in it consummation In accomplishin s te a o f

presentation belong together with what is

s e t ed , a n

o me wh er e o r o th e t o c on n a u ra l

o ns ci ou s

nes conceives of knowledge

lows th appearance of phenomenal knowledg that come it wa is

T h n a u ra l n ot i

m ea ns -h a

a pp li e

no

a bs ol u

v a i sh e

No

t o a n o bj ec t F ur th er mo re ,

k no wl ed ge -t ha t

it

a n k n w le dg e o w

Hegel:

i nc e t h p r s en t t io n r em ar k

s up e f lu o

n y c as e T h s , a f e r t hi s c la r f ic at io n t h

presentation coul begi immediately. Bu it does no begin, a s u mi n i t h a n o b eg u

a lr ea dy .

e w p ar ag r p h

of re

c on ce rn i

th

a nn e

n d n ec es si t o f t h

progression, it method o f c a r yi n Fo if this presentation is viewed as

ou th

i nq u r y

descriptio of th

way science is related to phenomenal knowledge and p re s n ta t o n o f p he no me na l k n w le dg e h a n o y e b ee n

investigation an r ea l

o f k no w e dg e

critical examination into the

even to take plac withou some presupposition whic

e ri v

t s l ai m f ro m t h d e a il s o f h e

r es e t at io n

still,

will serv as th fundamenta standard of measurement. F o a n e xa m n at io n c o s is t i n a pp l i n standard an

in d ec i i ng ,

whethe what

tested is correc or incorrect. Thus th standard is ac~

c ep t

a s t h e ss en c

thein-itself.

scienc will make it firs appearance

Bu here wher neithe scienc

an

a nd , t h s ta n a r

an re ul

t se lf , s su m n g t ha t a b o lu t

n l f ro m t h

e rf o m an c

k n w le dg e c a n o

p ic k u p

it standard just anywhere If the presentation is to measur n tr u

k no wl ed g b y i t t r t h i t m us t r e o nc i

reconcilable Th

wh

impossible blocks it way. Ho

ca

i s irthis

cannot take place.

Hegel:

Heidegger: NINT

th on ha d,

i th ou t s om e s uc h b as i p ri n i pl e i t

seem that an examinatio

THE

s ta n a rd .

obstacle be removed?

no anything else ha justifie itself as th essence the in-itself;

x am in at io n a s a n a cc r d it e

th ba is of fi al ag ee

ment or disagreement with th standard is bein

a n a cc ep te d

SECTIO

h i n a u ra l c on c p ti o

nonetheles take up agai o f n ow le dg e a l h ou g

o nl y i n o rd e t o r ai s o nc e m or e t h q ue s i o

precisel i t d oe s

c o c er ni n

10

h i c on tr ad ic ti o

n d i t r em ov a w il l p re se n t h m -

selves more distinctly if d et er mi n t io n

o f k no wl ed g

an

t ru t

ar

c al le d t o

mind as they exis in consciousness. Consciousnes disknowledge is

is s o f a f r

n va li da ti n

th

tinguishes from itselfsomethin

to whic it a t t h s a

time relates i t e lf ; o r a s t hi s is expressed: this some is in question When

th presentation brings phenomenal knowledg

fort

its appearance

is no ye

it places th consciousnes whic

thin

is somethin

fo

c o n sc io u sn e s . . The determinate being of some

into thing f o r

c o n sc io u sn e ss , is knowledge. From this bein

true into it truth, It measures what appear by it appear

fo an other, however, we distinguis th being~in·itself;

ance Appearance isthe standard Wher does th presenta

t ha t w hi c

tion ge that standard

distinguishe

Science, in undertaking the exami-

nation of phenomenal knowledge, itselfacts as th authorit

i s e la te d t o n ow l d g i s a t t h s a Iro

it and is posite

t hi s r el at io ns hi p o o T h

si

ti

as existing outside

o f t hi s i n- s l f [ ex i t in g

outsid th relationship is truth. Exactl what migh be 86

in

ed

th

rn

et

e. In

ch

j ec t ar

a ti o en

ou

ta en

ne

th

he

no

er

en

ed

e te r i n i o

e d t el y

is

e se n

ec

te

em el

at ns as o wl e

ey

is

tr

co

ey ar

calls them

ou ne al ed

b st r c t

et

a-

taken. constitution

of consciousness.

is understood

Consciousnes

Heidegger: o ne si de dl y- t

SECTION

n at ur a

r ep re se nt at io n

io

ei

io

hi

th

is known e an s o f l og ic a

a rg u e nt s . . T h

s ee mi ng l

i rr ec on ci la bl e

e xi st s i n k no wl ed ge ,a n

It lies in the

th

ch co

e xi st s a s k no wl ed ge .

ha

i s k n ow n

e l t e in

io ne

is a te d

th

n sc i

es

of

e se n a t o n

at

en at n.

el

at al en ti

that it

im

is

this mode somethin

Is consciousness, n sc i

es

Is

a ct iv it y

it lf io

H er e

th as

c on sc io us ne s

li

ea nh

nt

qua

ai

i t is

is in itself hence, somethin

ta an

i t e l c o e s m or e c le ar l

in

is o n

tr

o f t hi s r ef le ct io n

in

et in

ep

en d)

in i ts el f

u nd e c io us ne ss , k no wl ed g

th

ic

But in

ness. If

ard?

io

in

an

it lf

t ru th , a r eg 89

d is ti ng ui sh e el

ir ts

an " fo r

a s " be in g OUf

atten-

c ei ve s i t s ta nd ar d

an it

h ar ac te r

b ei n

in which it m ov es . T h

terminations." Yet, unbeknow

to us although on purpose,

c le ar e a s s oo n

H eg e h a h er e

a si c p r p er t

examination, see fro

o in t

ou

o f c on sc i u s

ness Th openin sentence of this sectio even name it in

x am in a

p r s pe c g ro w

i t b ec om e e v d en t w ha t t h

e as ur in g

the viewpoint of consciousnes itself

is aiming at

passing. is different fro

an

distinguishe

consciousnes

by it As itself an by virtue of itself it is

th relation of somethin

to somethin else However, that

which is distinguished in this distinctio

(th object fo th

Hegel:

1 1 W he n w e i nv es ti ga t t h t ru t

subject in

ha we ar

tinguishes precisel by virtue of th distinction. In repre-

Bu sinc knowledg is ou

senting, consciousnes separate

it is o r u s Therefor

s uc h

a y t ha t i t r el at e i t

somethin

from itself in

sciousness is ambiguou in it nature That ambiguit

such

an

t ru th , " b i n

f or " a n

everywhere immediatel

presentation which, as representation It investigates knowledg n ow le dg e o r i t

r ut h

distinguishing activity of th distinctio

o nl y o u k no wl ed g o f i t T h it

regardin

hi

t an da r

of

e ss e c e o r h e s t n da r

a n d e i de d p o

c o p ar i o n w ou l

remain itself

mode of consciousness? It represents phenomen I t e xa mi ne s

in-itself

h a w e w ou l

or

" be in g i n- it -

wa that they themselves ar ambiguous.

appearance

th in-itself of th object resultin

knowledg bu rather it bein

in consciousness, in

,. is th

k no wl ed g i s i n i ts el f

object in this investigation,

is the

nature of representation Becaus of it th tw determinat io ns -k n w le dg e

wh

t se lf . C on sc io u n es s i n i ts el f

make distinctions that ar no distinctions In thissense, con-

self"-occu

n ve s i ga ti n

k no wl ed ge , i t s e m s

in thei it truth.

It move within th

as whic conscious-

as

e su l o f h i

o t n ec es sa r l y h av e

e co gn iz e

that standard Heidegger:

THE

ELEVENTH

SECTIO

s k d ir ec tl y

presentation of phenomenal

knowledg

h a i t is is investigating.

However, this question is pose directly only when it asks,

nes itself is open on th essentia possibilit that th presentation re

does th investigating. Fo if that whic is to be investigated

is somethin

that is known, then it is within ou knowledg

fo us wh ar investigating. With th characterization ofthe s ci en ce ,

h ic h p r s en t p he no me na l k no wl ed g

in it ap

pearance we suddenly become ourselve involved in th pres en ta ti o

t ur n

u t h a w e a r i n o lv e

w ha t h e r es e t at i

l re a y , i nc e

p re se nt s i s " fo r u s. " T h

t he r is no is to play

i n s ci en ce . h a q ue st io n l ea d i n no

f o i t t ru t fo

w e i nv es ti ga t T ru t

he

xa in

i s b ei ng -i n- it s l f

n ow le dg e

n o l ed g

consciousness. When we investigat th trut

ed e,

i s b ei n of knowl-

t r t o f in d o u w ha t k no wl ed g i n i ts el f i s B u o u

investigatio woul make knowledg ou object If we were to plac knowledg before us in its being-in-itself, it would trut

of knowledge, bu only ou knowledg of knowledge.

Being-for-us woul remain th standard by whic we mean o l ed g s ub mi t t o is t o

s ta nd ar d w hi c

i nv er t t h

m e s ur ed , a n m a e s i t i nt o t h

th

r es en ta ti o

fr

t h c on si de r t io n o f h e t w

p h n om en a

s ci ou sn es s k no wl ed g woul posite.

an

invert it ow performanc

[between what is in-itself c om e t og et h

w it h t h

n d w ha t is

d is ti nc ti o us

is over

a t e nd an t p r s up po si t o n b y

Sinc consciousnes provides itself with it ow stand-

ha

other; in othe words, consciousnes in genera ha th determinatio

of th moment of knowledg in it. At th

same time this othe is to consciousnes no only some thing for it; it is also somethin outsid this relationship or in itself consciousnes within it ow self designates as th itself

in-

true,

sciousnes itself proposes to measur its knowledge If we call knowledge

the Concept, an call th essenc

true

h ic h

t o f ol lo w

d et er mi n t io n t he n

made fall in it. In consciousness, on moment is

e as ur e i ts el f If

k no wl ed g

r ut h

1 2 B u t hi s d is t n ct i n , o r t hi s s em bl an c o f

i me ns io n w h c h

hardly suspect. What is

Hegel:

c on -

h e p re s n ta t o n

continuall

into its op-

essence or th

in-itsel

the Concept,

and

object the

if,

object as object, i.e. as it is aminatio

th r,

will consis in ou lookin to se whethe th

object correspond to it Concept. It is no difficul to se

h a t he s

tw

r es en ta ti on s c oi nc id e i t i s h o 93

e ve r e ss en ti a

moments,

t o h ol d f as t t o t h

C o nc ep t

being-in-its-sell,

an

al

f ol lo wi n

f ac t t hr ou gh -

o b e ct , b e n g f or ·a no th e th

at

ge

ou

is measured,

and

co

us es

j ec t

tt

preconceived

ep at

el

ECTI

ex ic te

d if fi cu lt y

t at i

p re se nt at io n

p re se nt s

th

ts

h e r el ea s is brough

th

co

es

ib

n at ur e

o f c on sc io us ne s

el

a su r

nd

ts ow

a bo u

ig

c on sc io u n es s

ti

Concept."

Th

ad

f ir s s ta te me nt ,

on ci

It is

abou ta

th

in

t at e e n

ad

e me rg e

is t h

to th

es

s ec on d

TWEL TH

t hi s n ew l

it

a s it is in and f o r i ts e lf .

Heidegger: THE

es en al

hi

at in

ow

If

rd

en en

isco

ic

it

in

ut

T ha t o bj ec t i s c on sc io u n es s i ts el f

with ard? If it

en

on ci

lf

ff

it i s d is ti ng ui sh e

th

in it

t ea d

ay

t an da r

f o it.

io

as ts ta ar

ta ar

isno

nt

in

lf

ce

is sciousness from outsid representation

whil

th

representation

implie

in consciousness, becaus

consciousnes

is

c on ta in s t h possibility t ha t c on -

94

i s p ro vi de d

w it h

is COD-

s ci ou sn es s T ha t d ic ho to m

it. C on sc io u n e

is

95

isthe dichotoe as ur ed .

Bu

consciousness provides its standard in itself Bu what is

representation that whic

consciousnes in itself Consciousnes is in itself when it is

o nl y " fo r a n o th e . .

by itself an it is by itself when it is specificallyfor itself and

consciousnes represents fo it consciousnes ha give "far

is represented, bu no Io Itself

o we ve r t o e th e w i

itself, If consciousness were to give its stand-

ard in itself it woul mean strictly speaking gives to itself th standard fo itself Bu as ness is precisel no concerne th athe hand trut

.th

with what it is

applied. By presenting phenomenal knowledg as such we t ak e a p e ar a c e a s h e t an d r d b y

w n c on ce p f o

h ic h

m ea su r t h

knowledg that regard as true what appears. In phenomena knowledge, that whic

it knows is

h a i s t r e . If we

itself. This is wh it "provide itself with it ow standard."

call this trut

T hi s i s w h

it then th critical presentation of th phenomen

o ns c o us n s s t se l

disposal of consciousness. Th

l ac e t h

t an d r d a t t h

word "itsel with it own"

of th ir

th object an call concep th knowledg of

p pe a a nc e c on si st s i n n ve st ig at in g

have this twofol meaning: consciousnes carrie th stand-

knowledge-that

a r w i h i i t o w n a u re .

its kncwledge=-corresponds to that whic

sciousness, and applicable. to. is na somethin

u t w ha t t hu s it

an

n o to. something else,

It give an ye does

versely, if

is what natura th

knowledg

th

consciousnes regard as unde

is true Or coninvestigatio

th

consciousnes represents beings as

representing conseiousness, In keepin

th

th

x am i a ti o

c on si st s i n c o s id e i n

h et h

th

object corresponds to

t im e

Inasmuch as natura mediatel

a p l ie d to. can-

in respect

h et h

that consciousnes give directly to itself

I t i s r ov i e d w it h i t o w s ta nd ar d n o g iv e a t t h s a

th

consciousnes rule conscious-

does no drop Into consciousnessfro

th sky. Consciousnes itself is a lr e d y i t

t h t ru t

with th

expression "itsel with its

it"

this explanatio

is this; ever time we represen phenomen

with whic we measur fall within consciousnes itself Cansciousness supplies In consciousnes itself the

tWO.

essential

when he want to sa that consciousnes regard as true that

moment of th examination. We who.mak th presenta

whic it ha directly represented. Consciousness, indirectly

t io n t hu s d er i

representing is absorbed by what is represented, an na specifically refe what is r ep re se n e d b a

t h m ax i

t ha t g ui d

a l r e r es en ti n

of

does

to it el as

th on that represents True consciousnes does have in its

Accordingly, th basi attitude of absolute knowledg is no 97

t o a ss ai l p he no me na !

c on sc io us ne s

it

p an op l

o f k no wl -

it id

t ta i

at n,

in

if t h

ap ar ce

th

itself."

ic

o f t h r ea l is appearance

Th

appearin

i n c on sc io us ne s

al

no le

to ts

j e t - a tt e ig

r ea li t

r ep re se nt e

is

ce

ar ce

it is in and tO

t ru t

is

consciousnes

itself

th

is

th

em

is

it ar he

f ir s s ta te me n

is from

at

a bo u

Concept." W he re ve r

is

es

e s e d in

Bu

c on sc io u n es s

on ci

c on sc io us ne ss :

ner in

c on sc io us ne s

re

will tr

is

tr

"for us." Sine

it lf ts

nc t,

itself

provides er

it."

is

consciousnes

ap ar --

o r it"

"-t

this it ar

ject."

th ef

th ef

tt

aI ed

j ec t

then knowledg

pearance.

er

is

If

en th

is t h

consciousness. Bu if k no wl ed g

If

ed

as

knowledg

ed

is thu

representation

of somethin

as

it," fo natural

j ec t

a s s uc h is called th

qua phenomenal

ness is cept"

is

e n i ca l

th

tu

is t h co

e,

th

o bj ec t

disposal

he

ed

lf

its knowledge."

an

by consciousnes

ex

re

l ic i l y a t th

is

ti

itself, there

o u d is po sa l i n o fa r a s w e a r et

ts

itself

proposes to measur ce

io

ci

have

lutely]

object

conceived is the

in

is

in. this

is not

c on sc io u n es s o ur se lv e

ur di

ax

If

er

is 99

io

en ti

it remain

obscur

is

pose to have received something, an to possessalread th standard itself Grante be measured an

that both th knowledg whic

is to

th standard of measurement, fall within

consciousness, so that we need only to receiv them--still,

i nc e o t

r e for consciousness,

thei comparison

correspond or fail be

consciousnes itself is

whethe it knowledg of th object to

correspond with this object will

matter for consciousnes

itself. be for consciousness

withou ou contribution Everything that is essentia in th p re s n ta t o n- d e s

i t n o in t h

n d r em ai n d ep en de n

ou ow activity What abou th examinatio s t n da r

ar wh

itself with

only as consciousnes knows it; consciousnes seems, as i t w e e , u na bl e t o g e b eh i

t h o bj ec t

it, not as

it

consciousnes also seem unable to examin

but as it is in iisel]

is for consciousness.

it with th object Bu

th difference betwee th in-itsel an k no w

b je c a t a ll . o m t hi n

th for-itself is the in·itself,

is

for con-

Hegel:

13

ut

er to se

Therefor

its ow knowledg by comparin

t he y a re ?

ino r

c o t ri b t io n b y u s b ec o e s s up er fl u u s n o o nl y

in connection with th side of th investigatio just outl in ed -t h is to

C o c ep t a n o bj ec t t h

n d w ha t

x am in ed , a r p r s en t i n c on sc io u n es s i ts el f

m o e nt s I nd ee d undertak

ea ur

An therefor

sinc

consciousnes examines itself what remain fo us on this side of th investigatio

too, is simply th pure ac

For consciousnes is

consciousnes of th object and, on th other, consciousn es s o f i t s el f it i s c on sc io us ne s o f true an

differentiation, whic exists an is presen at hand that the examination is

h a t o i t is the

consciousnes of it knowledg of this truth. 10

r ou nd ed . A n

f , i n t hi s c om p r i

son, th tw moment do no correspond then it seems t ha t c on sc io u n es s w il l h av e t o l te r i t k no wl ed g i n o rd e t o b ri n

is

th actual examination.

of observation.

sciousness is to it stil anothe moment It is upon this

it

alteration of th knowledge, however, th object itself become to consciousnes somethin been altere

ha in fact

as well Fo th knowledg whic existe

wa essentiall sinc it wa

whic

knowledg of th object with change

an essentia part of this knowledge. Henc

it co es to as

o r c on sc i u sn es s t ha t 10

ha ha be

in-itself

i ts el f e s s . When there-

fore consciousnes find it knowledg no correspond in

i t i t o bj ec t t h

b je c i ts e w il l a ls o g iv e

a tu r

h a s ho w

i ts el f i n s e e ra l r e p ec t

sciousness is t h i mm ed ia t k no wl ed g r eg ar d a s t ru e N at ur a

a tu r

co

t h o bj ec t t h

it

c on sc io us n s s i s a t t h s am e t im e

ay is

does no specifically refe back to that knowing. Consciousn es s o f t h o bj ec t n d t h c on sc io u n es s o f k n w le dg e r e

fails t o e nd ur e t h c ou rs e o f t h e xa mi na t o n T hu s t h

examinatio bu

is no only an examinatio

ls of th

t an da r

us

of knowledge,

i n t h e x m in at io n t se lf .

Heidegger: TH

THIRTEENT

th Same to whic both object an knowledge, ar known. t he r a r

t h s am e t i

or th

a me , f o

o ns c o us ne s

itself Consciousnes is fo it th differentiatio

of each from

th other. Consciousnes is by it nature th comparison of SECTIO

in an explaining th thir

answer that question by mak-

th on with th other. This comparison is the examination.

statemen abou consciousness.

"Consciousness examines itself."

The statement is inconspicuous, buried in a n i nd ep en de n

s e t en c

subclause. Pu

i t r u s : " C n sc io us n s s e x

But consciousnes is properly speaking th only in

becom-

amines itself." That is to say: Consciousness, inasmuch as

ing w he th e t h

it is consciousness, is

t hu s

modem

what knowledg

metaphysics-consciousness,

being

conscious-is

graspe adequately in though only if we when thinking of

k no wl ed g c or re s o nd s

t h t ru e o bj ec t w he th e

when such

whic

is deter-

mine by th fact that knowledg isconscious I n t h e xa mi na ti o measurin

o t w ha t i s t o b e

e as ur e a n t h

standard ar presen together Thus thei meet

i mm ed ia te l

h e o bj ec t c o r es p n d t o

t ak e

e ls e e yo n

mediat

of consciousnes consists in

must open itself

abou whatever it ha

f o t r e ; w he n i t d is c v er s w ha t i t h e assoo as it represents th object in it

o bj ec ti vi ty . A cc or di n l y

in in consciousnes is neve only th consequenc of some

10

exists only

proces of becoming occurs that is, when con-

know with certaint s o e th i

t h o bj ec t a n

actually knows. Examinatio

sciousness discover th actual trut amination, specifically of an examinatio

examinatio

h er e i s o r c on sc io us ne s

th ob ec an

representation of th

10

t il l

b ey on d i t o w i m

object....-..,somethin whic

it

In th discussion of th firs statemen abou consciousness it become clea that natura

consciousnes is "merely

."

Th fact that Hege make al thes differentiations an ye levels them all d ow n n t k ee pi n

t he m r o

re so in th knowledge as knowledge But natura consciousnes doe not t ro u l e t o a y a tt en ti o

t o t hi s " as ,

ec us

it accept as

ge er

i st i g u s hi ng , t hu s

o mi n i nt o h e

e r n at ur e o f

ow

h a i t h id d

e t p h s ic s n o

th ba ic

metaphysical stance of Hegelian philosophy Th

hidden

nature of metaphysic isresponsibl also fo th fact that th leve to whic th difference ar levele down isdetermine

"as." An

sinc natura consciousnes follow it ow head its head-

hi

d is cr im i a ti o

p r s e t s i ts el f

th

d is ti nc ti o

ratio, reason Hege conceive th distinctio

of

as th nega

tion of th negation curiously, is before it

it

sciousness is c om pa ri so n e nt at io n o f t h

nd

et ga

i s n ot . I n i t

b j c t c o s ci ou s e s i s b y i t n a u r

he

differentiatio

betwee

betwee trut

an knowledge. Consciousnes isnot only that

differentiatio

"being-ill-itself" an

whic is at th same time no

a l d u c au ti o

a n m ak in g t h

e c s sa r r es er v

ep e-

"being fo it,"

to

distinctions posite

by Hegel-

the

difference we mentione

earlie in anothe context. Sinc natura consciousnes goes t ra ig h t o t h o bj e

as

p ar ti cu l

b ei n

an in th sa

differentiaconstantly stay with it it coul be called onti conscious-

w it h i t o bj e t iv i y , o f k no wl e g e

it

i t b ei n

Consciousnes itself isthe comparison-thoug

no n.

natura con-

TO OJ

( be i g )

d e i gn at e

h at ev e

e rt ai n

t o b ei n s . B u t h

sciousness to be sure neve specifically performs that com-

Gree 6J!-beings-harbors

parison.

of beingness ( o O O - L a ) whic does no by an mean remain

within itse.lfa peculiar nature

In th nature of consciousness, knowledg an th object words consciousness, again, object an

an "beings" in thought, we firs of al presuppose

concep ar spli apar in to th variou change of meanin an to th meanin itself

ness this qualit

itself issplit apar an ye ca neve part

a s i t is establishe at an give time in history. When beings 10

In its ambiguity,

d es ig na te s b ot h

ha

is p re se n

an

v,

Soga subiectum,

tnrOKElp.EVOV,

the subiectum i n e r

the

ub ct es

ceives is

io

Since

it is p o i b

ciple "being,

ov.,

the

at er

(>..eYHv)

as

of S O K O V v r a . ,

that is, of

tr

in

Sota

p er ce iv e

ceiv

it presence-s-thi

b el on g

fOUTa,

E!vat,

VO€ZJI

as

ai

er

an

is al ea

ga er

to

is

ei

change

on

t im e t o a no th er ,

to

ha es

t hi s g at he ri ng ,

th

per-

at er

presence is p er ce iv e

by

POEZJI.

in

er nc at ar

JlOEZJI

d ir ec tl y w ha t is

If

qua h i

t og et he r w it h

What

fOJl.

the

a t is p re se n

ua it

its presence

an

will

es from

M yo S' , a ls o c ha ng e

in

et ph

co ci

th

he

in

of

.}'6yoS'

er

51', th

is present,

hi

en

qn)(n'i,

i s p e se n

ed

ap ar ce

le

co ea ed

f ar io u n es s o f w ha t i s p re se nt ,

co in

th

(1)1a, i s c on ce iv e

i-

ap

cs

eg

is present. Ther ceiving (Sf"xEUea.~),

in

th

ca is

h ic h

p ec if ic al l

it

ra es

l at o

o we v

mischievou

disorder (Unwesen)

is

~J •.

that interpretation

th

th

So~a. By contrast, p er ce iv e

ha

VO€ZII

With

is reit gives t. if

i n i t p re se nc e er ce

/0

begins

is that perception

i s p re se n

ha

a s t ha t

its

ay

eg

c p a . t I l E u e c u , the self-manifesting

e v i li n

th 10

am ig ty

t)1) remains

ho

-s

t ut e t h

th

is

th

t le s e s

e ta ph y i cs . As

n at ur e o f

&"

in

this baselessness

ca

th

on ti

e ma i

ho

ho

at on

Thus

it at

Ontological i g i e

"ontology.'

its

xi

it

o nt ol og ic al . i m e di at e

th

iv

ry

un

we

r ep re se nt in g

he

of in

th

A cc or di ng l

at th

is being

b ei ng ne s

tu

it i n e p

naturaIself-testing

consciousness itself is neve

.on

b ei ng s i nt o t he i

ei

nd

nature.

in

consciousnes

so

cu

It

ea

is not

on

itself its sciousnes

natura

is

ts ab ec

is

it

tha

a t is is

ce le es

ay

h e r ep re se nt in g oi conscious-

t o e xa mi na ti on .

ness in itself is

in its nature. ter

it is s ub je c

goes o n c an st an tl y

b eh in d its

c on sc io us ne ss , in its

ay

o f b ei ng s i s o nt i

c on sc io u n es s

Fo

naturall

pre-ontological

it Is

aI ou io

is n a

th as

thus is

lr ad

gh

ga er

nt og al

j ec t

on ci

es

ep ts

Bu

en

tu

co

io

hi

be au

t te n o n

it alread sents it,

is

e ct i i t

l o c al ,

ch

tu

an

pr

to

ic

th skepsls

id

de

a s t ru e ie

It

ee in

is

t ru e a n

o nt ol og ic a

being conscious, mean

truth, Sinc

i ca l

ness is w it h w ha t i s o nt ol og ic al l

p hi lo so ph ic a

o pi ni o

r em ai n

b eh in d

i s i n t ru t

b ef or e, "

background

i s i t e lf , t ha t is

conscious

is ontically r ep re se nt ed . As that comparison, 10

.it

n-

consciousness, or

being this differentiation

th .So

it is its ow a nt ic al l

el

je ts to

at

is preto .g al ei

it

repreti

al

c h it r eg ar d

in

s ci ou sn es s, a

" ha vi n

B u p hi lo so ph y

s ee n. "

i ts el f s tr ug gl e 10

a t t im e

a ga in s skepsis, It

p r f er s t o k ee p t o t h a cc us to m

p in i n s o f n at ur a c on -

This becoming is,

sciousness It does admit, of course that th object qua ob-

w h c h i s a c om pa ri s n .

je

o nl y b y

u s s ur el y h av e o bj e t iv it y B u

j e t iv it y i s

nl

th

k ee p t o o rd in a

w hi c

p in i

o r p hi lo so ph y o b

i s n o - ob je ct i e .

an

t ri e

b e r ep re se nt e

r ec ed in g i ts el f T h

k ep si s l oo k a he a

al t se l

h il o o ph y

r ea s u r i t t ha t i t is

actually in th right; for, says philosophy this non-objectiv l em en t c a

h e e x m in at io n c a p ro c e d

Th sixt sectio alread

indicate

that natura consciousIf its

o nl y i n t h r e r es en ta ti on s o f

fo it truth, it turn ou that

ordinary consciousness, which representations are therefore

presumed truth is scrutinize

n ad eq ua t

knowledg does no correspond to it object becaus it will

s u a nc e ev

an

me

go do

t oy in g

ea il wi

i t s ym bo ls ; a n s uc h a s n a u ra l c o s ci o s ne s

an

c on ve y t o i t t h i m r es si o t ha t t he y r e c ri ti ca l p hi -

l o o ph y s e i n

ta

s ke pt ic a

t ti tu d

t ow ar d

to th trut

of th object consciousnes must change knowl-

n-

edge such as it ha been so far. Bu even whil knowledg is

t ol og y B u s ke ps i o f t hi s k in d i s m er el y t h s em bl an c o f

changing it knowledg of th object th object itself too,

s ke p i s a n

has changed.

hu

th

no respon to th object's objectivity. In orde to do justic

f li gh t f ro m h in k n g i nt o h e s ys te m o f

However, if skepsi accomplishes itself in thoroughgoin skepticism then thinking progresses within th framewor of metaphysic as th comparison of th onti with th preontologica consciousness, whic

object ca no longer be determined on th basi of previous opinio

concerning objects. Thos

stil at work even when objectivit

opinions however, ar is proposed only in term

comparison is performe

by ontologica consciousness. Th latter does no divorc it l o o ph y o cc up ie s i ts el f w it h b ei n n at ur e o f o ns c o us ne s a s t h o ri g n a u n t y o f o nt i

an

pre-ontological representation. Whe the compariso occurs th examinatio

th

g lo r f ic at io n o f t h

thoughtles inadequacy inherent in ordinary opinion. In th examinin

comparison whic look ahea into th

is in progress an in this occurrence con-

sciousness appear to itself within th real

of appearance

It is presen to itself It is. Consciousnes is by coming into

its ow truth, i.e. it is by becoming. 10

n at ur a o nl y t r

k no wl ed g o f t h

b je c

u pp os ed l

th

on

nd

k n w le dg e f ai l t o s t n d u p b u t h o bj ec t i ts el f

examination, whic

constitute th nature of consciousnes

ness in this very process; it ceasesto be th in-itsel an become to consciousnes an object whic is the in-itself

s t n d u p u nd e e x m in at io n ha

meanwhil

o t f ai l b ef or e t h

w hi c

only fo

arisen in

it. An

therefor it follow that this th beingo f t hi s i n- it se lf ,

[or-consciousness

itself.

is

t o s a t ha t h i t ru e is the essence or consciousness' new object. This ne

object contains th annihilation of th

first i t i s h e e xp er i n c

o ns t t ut e

t h o ug h h a

i rs t

object.

Hegel:

14 This dialectical movement c is e o n i t s el f- o

it

whic

n ow le dg e

w el l a s i t

-is,

b je c

me it, precisel

sciousness

Heidegger:

consciousnes exer

TH FOURTEENTHECTIONpen with th sentence "Thi dialectical movement whic

that whic

called experience.

I n t hi s c on ne ct io n t h r e is

f ur th e a rt i u la t

ha

is

self--on it knowledg as well as it object-is, n ew ,

ue ob ec

e me rg e

of it, precisel that whic s ci en ti fi c a s e c o f t h

e w l ig h f ol lo wi n

a y b e cast p r s en t t io n

t ha t H eg e n am e w i C on -

sciousness knows something,

consciousnes exercise en it

th

B ei n o f

subjects an

ns

e su l

is called experience." What is it

th

or

" ex pe ri en c " ? H e n a e s

e in gs . B e n g h av e m e n wh il e therewit

as

as th

u sn e

e co m t h

have become object an objective.

senc or th in-itself. B u t hi s b je c i s a ls o t h in-itself fo consciousness; an henc th ambiguit of this trut come into play We se that consciousnes no b je c s ; o n i s t h f ir s in-it.self b e in g -f o r- c on s ci o us n es s

in whic

ha tw ha

o f t h i i n -i ts e lf . Th latter seem

at firs to be merely th reflection of consciousnes into

consciousness-that

present, is th in

o f h e i rs t o bj e t . B u

a s l re ad y i nd i

cated, th firs object come to be altere 11

for conscious

Consciousness, by bein

i s i s phenomena knowledge The ter

e ge l n am e t ha t

the

The

p er ie n e . its k no wl ed g

whic exists by being known

appearance

h ic h a pp ea r

is implie

In vi tu of th

k in d

i t a pp ea rs ,

in (qua, as), beings ar though

of in thei beingness. Experience is o w or

"experience"

n so f

k no wl ed ge . E xp er ie nc e n o 11

l e g e t h t er m is

B ei ng , i n

ei

i s a pp r h e d e

b y w a o f b ei ng s qua

beings Experience designates th subject' subjectness. Ex perience expresses wha "being"

that unit

as whic

itself is th examinin

consciousnes ha it being, in comparison from whic both emerge

does it

together with th appearance of what appears. Th nature

scious leaves stil to be thought.

of appearance is experience This word must from no

on

Th strang word "experience' enters into ou reflection th nature of consciousness. come due. True this nary usage, an

se of

f al l t ot a l y

u ts id e

or i-

of philosophica usag as well Bu it falls

to usas th result of th very thin to whic Hegel' though remain attached Th justificatio e s e nt ia ll y d if fe re n f r

m er e

in what Hegel, with th precedin

of this usage, whic a n e r o f s pe a i n

consciousnes outlin th

fo eg in

r ef l c ti on ,

it

th

t hr e

s ta te me nt s

to be

e nt io ne d a l

lo g, he au

it

in it wa

unavoid-

is l ie s

paragraphs ha brough

to ligh concerning th nature of consciousness. Th statements abou

Bu th

abou consciousness, ha brough ou somethin that needed

thre

basi structur

whic

th decisive word "experience" occurs Th verb of

all three statement are ambiguous-th

"is" in th first, th

"provides" in th second an th "examines" in th third. Consciousness is i t o w c o c e t , a n

t h s am e t im e it

of that nature on ep co es

i n c on s i o s ne s a n

finds itself in th concept.

"Bu consciousnes is its own Concept."

Consciousnes provides itself with it ow standard

"Consciousness provides itself with it ow standard."

consciousnes comes fro t at em en t i s a n x p i ca ti o

o f t h f i s t in this in whic

e t e r w it h

ha

an

th

i t m ea su re s f a l s

t hi s t an da r i th i

consciousnes itself which comes

i t a pp e r a c e a s a b o lu t c er ta in ty .

do

n ot , i n t h

con-

sciousness conceive of itself in it truth, is th standard of h i p ro c s s o f s el f- c n c i vi n

an

It

"Consciousness examines itself." he se on

c o s ci ou s e s

to

c on s i o s ne ss .

object that in eac instance is untrue neve does hold up consciousness, so to speak, does no come clea with it Consciousnes examines itself an 115

ye agai

it does not.

It examines itself in that th comparison of objectivit an object is that in virtue of whic nd it do

consciousnes is

appear as such Th presentation of appearance is

is

o t e xa mi n i ts el f in that natura consciousnes

men by which consciousnes realizes its own reality. Hege

obstinatel hold to it ow opinio an offersits ow truth, unexamined,a

call

this movement emphatic.aI1y "dialectical."

th absolute truth.

By thi ambiguity consciousnes betray the fundamental h ic h l l t h s a

i t i s n o y et .

o ns ci ou sn es s. i n t h s en s in

we

b ef or e n o i n w ha t f ol l w s A cc or di n l y

u r r e l ec ti on s s o f a o n t h migh be tempte

a tu r

o f o ns ci ou sn es s O n

to offe an explanatio

of th dialectica an

antithesis,

is

sh ll tr

synthesis; or

in

self-direction toward the "already.

It make it wa toward

," o ti o

t h w ay . T h

H e e l t hi nk s a s e xp er i n c h a t h c h r ac t

m ov em en t I n H eg el ' s en te nc e s ta ti n perience, "This dialectical isreaU

o ve me n . .

h e a tu r

of ex

[ th e f i s t

o rd s

what is called experience understood here in th

ligh of what th scienc of phenomenal knowledg presents

ay

t he si s h a i t b ei n i n c on sc io us -

sofa as negativity is understood in term of negation Th character of consciousness, however, is s u p os e t o b e d e dia-

l ec ti c

assume that Hege characterize th presentation as o f e x e ri e c e m e e l i n r de r t o s tr es s t h

kind

u s k ee p t o

empt construction Experience as we must thin of it here does no belong to th presentation as

mark ofthe specific

rather presentation belong to th

nature of experience. Experienc 116

is th appearance of what

m er e

m et ho d o f n ow in g o r

h et h

i t i s p ar t

of objectiv realit assomethin that is real itself This prob le

nature of presentation

is in an

ness, and consciousness, too is th ground of negativity in-

s ci ou s e s c on s s t i n i t b ei n i n e in g w hi c

t hi n t h

wh

isa pseudo-problem as long as it remains undetermined o ns ti t t e t h

r e l it y o f h e r ea l in what way this

realit reside in th bein of consciousness, an t er s s ta n

it

t ha t k in d

e in g

I ec ti c r e l ik e a n a tt em p t o x pl a

ho

mat-

i sc u s io n a bo u d ia u rg i

f ou nt ai n in

term of th stagnant waters of th sewer. Th fountain ma st ll

l on g w a o ff . B u w e m us t try to poin in its direc-

tion with Hegel' help 17

'[

Consciousness is qua consciousnes its own movement, for it is th

comparison betwee

edge an

ontologica knowledge. Th

second Th

first lays clai

to th

first. Be-

tween (aLa)

sciousness in it accomplished truth, is. positional characte th

thes claims

In that dialogue consciousnes as

ltly€£v.

is

OtaltfYEtV

consciousness. Being

self-gathering of the dialogue-Shapes of con

onti pre-ontologica knowl-

second claims to he

whol real

thoroughgoin

OW
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