Heidegger - Being and Time

MARTIN HEIDEGGER

BEING AND TIME

Translated by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson

1 BLACKWELL O xford U K

4‫ ־‬Cam bridge

U SA

This translation copyright © Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1962

First English edition 1962 R eprinted 1967, 1973, 1978, 1980, 1983, 1985, 1987, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1995 (twice), 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 (twice), 2001

Blackw ell Publishers Ltd 108 C ow ley Road Oxford OX4 1JF, UK

Translated from the German Sein und Zeit (seventh edition) by perm ission o f Max N iem eyer V erlag, Tübingen

British L ibrary C ataloguing in P ublication Data A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the B ritish Library

0 -6 3 1 - 1 9 7 7 0 -2 (pbk)

Printed and bound in Great Britain by MPG Books Ltd, B odm in, Cornw all

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Dedicated to

EDMUND HUSSERL in friendship and admiration Todtnauberg in Baden, Black Forest 8 April igs6

CONTENTS [Page references marked *H* indicate the pagination o f the later German editions, as shown in the outer margins o f the text¡]

Translators' Preface

13

Author's Preface to the Seventh German Edition

17

Introduction

Exposition o f the Question of the Meaning of Being T

N

he

Q

e c e s s it y ,

u e s t io n

Structure,

and

P r io r it y

of

B e in g

of

H.

2

21

H.

2

21

H.

2

21 24 28

th e

1. The necessity for explicitly restating the question of B e in g

II.

2. The formal structure o f the question of Being

H.

5

3 . T h e o n t o lo g i c a l p r i o r i t y o f t h e q u e s t io n o f B e in g

H.

4. The ontical priority o f the question of Being

H.

8 11

H.

15

36

H.

36 4i

H.

15 19 17

H.

27

H.

32 34 39

T

T

he

of

w ofold

B e in g . M

T

a s k in

W

eth od an d

D

o r k in g

O

ut th e

Q

u e s t io n

e s ig n o f o u r i n v e s t ig a t io n

5. The ontological analytic o f Dasein as laying bare the horizon for an Interpretation of the meaning of Being in general 6. The task of Destroying the history of ontology 7. The phenomenological method of investigation The concept o f phenomenon b . The concept o f the lo g o s c. The preliminary conception o f phenomenology

a

32

.

H.

H.

8. Design of the treatise

H.

49 5i 55 58 63

Part One

T h e Interpretation o f Dasein in Term s o f T em p orality, and the E xplication o f T im e as the Transcendental H orizon for the Question o f Being D IV IS IO N O N E : P R E P A R A T O R Y F U N D A M E N T A L A N A L Y SIS O F D A S E IN I . E x p o s it io n of

D

of th e

T

ask

of a

Preparatory A

a s e in

9. The theme o f the analytic o f Dasein

n a l y s is

. 41

67

H. 4 1

67

h

Being and Time

8

10. How the analytic o f Dasein is to be distinguished from anthropology, psychology, and biology H . 45 11. The existential analytic and the Interpretation of primitive Dasein. The difficulties of achieving a ‘natural conception o f the world’ h . 50 I I . B e i n g - in -t h e ‫־‬w

III.

orld

in

G

eneral

as th e

b a s ic

12. A preliminary sketch o f Being-in-the-world, in terms o f an orientation towards Being-in as such 13. A founded mode in which Being-in is exemplified. Knowing the world T

he

W

orldh ood

of

th e

W

orld

14. The idea o f the worldhood o f the world in general a

.

Analysis o f environmentality and worldhood in general

15. The Being of the entities encountered in the en­ vironment 16. How the worldly character o f the environment announces itself in entities within-the-world 17. Reference and signs 18. Involvement and significance: the worldhood of th e w o r ld

A contrast between our analysis o f worldhood and Descartes' Interpretation o f the world 19. The definition o f the ‘world’ as res extensa b

h

.

5a

78

h

.

52

78

h

.

59

86

h.

.

63 63

h.

66

9i 9i 95

h

.

66

95

h

.

h

.

72 76

102 107

h

.

83

114

h

.

20. Foundations o f the ontological definition o f the ‘world’ 21. Hermeneutical discussion of the Cartesian ontology o f the ‘world’

h

.

89 122 89 123

h

.

92

125

h

.

95

128

h.

c . The aroundness o f the environment,andDasein’sspatiality h . i o i

The spatiali ty o f the ready-to-hand within-the-world 23. The spatiality of Being-in-the-world 2 4 . Space, and Dasein’s spatiality 22.

IV .

76

state

D a s e in

of

7i

B e i n g -i n - t h e -w o n e ’ s -s e l f .

T

orld h e

‘T

as

B e i n o -w

it h

and

h

. 102

134 135

h

.

104

138

h

. 110

145

B e in g -

hey’

25. An approach to the existential question of the “ who” of Dasein 26. The Dasein-with o f Others, and everyday Beingwith 27. Everyday Being-one’s-Self and the “ they”

149

h

. 113

h

.

114 150

h

.

h

.

117 i 53 126 163

Contents V.

B e i n g -i n

as such

28. The task of a thematic analysis of Being-in

h

.

The existential Constitution o f the “ there"

h

.

h

.

a

V I.

g

h

.

h

.

h

.

h

.

130 134 134 140 142 148 153 160

o f Dasein

h

.

166

210

Idle talk Curiosity Ambiguity Falling and thrownness

h

.

h

.

h

.

h

.

167 170 173 175

211 214 217 219

h.

180

225

.

29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

Being-there as state-of-mind Fear as a mode o f state-of-mind Being-there as understanding Understanding and interpretation Assertion as a derivative mode o f interpretation Being-there and discourse. Language b . The everyday Being o f the “ there” , and the falling

35. 36. 37. 38.

C are

as th e

B e in g

of

D a s e in

39. The question of the primordial totality of Dasein’s structural whole 40. The basic state-of-mind o f anxiety as a distinc­ tive way in which Dasein is disclosed 41. Dasein’s Being as care 42. Confirmation o f the existential Interpretation of Dasein as care in terms of Dasein’s pre-onto-

H.

h

196 200

241 244

.

202 209 211 212

246 252 254 256

H.

214

257

.

219

262

H.

226

269

.

h

.

43. Dasein, worldhood, and Reality (a) Reality as a problem o f Being, and whether

h

.

th e ‘e x te r n a l w o r ld ’ c a n b e p ro v e d

h

.

Reality as an ontological problem (c) Reality and care 44. Dasein, disclosedness, and t r u t h (а) The traditional conception of truth, and its ontological foundations (б) The primordial phenomenon o f truth and the derivative character o f the traditional conception of truth (c) The kind of Being which truth possesses,

h

.

h

.

h

a n d t h e p r e s u p p o s it io n o f t r u t h

225 228 235

.

h

(b)

180 184 191

h

lo g ic a l w a y o f in te r p r e tin g it s e lf

.

169 172 172 179 182 188 195 203

h

io

Being and Time

D IV IS IO N T W O : D A S E IN A N D T E M P O R A L IT Y

45. The outcome o f the preparatory fundamental analysis o f Dasein, and the task of a primordial existential Interpretation o f this entity I. D

a s e in ’s

P o s s ib il it y

of

B e i n g -a -w

h ole, and

231

274

H. 2 3 5

279

h

.

B e in g -

TOWARDS-DEATH

46. The seeming impossibility o f getting Dasein’s Being-a-whole into our grasp ontologically and determining its character 47. The possibility o f experiencing the death o f Others, and the possibility o f getting a whole Dasein into our grasp 48. That which is still outstanding; the end; totality 49. How the existential analysis o f death is distin­ guished from other possible Interpretations of th is p h e n o m e n o n

h

.

235

279

h

.

h

.

237 241

281 285

H.

246

290

h

.

249

293

h

.

252

296

h

.

255

299

h

.

260

304

h

.

267

312

h

.

267

312

H.

315 3*7 3*9

H.

270 272 274 280

H.

289

335

H• 295

34 i

50. Preliminary sketch of the existential-ontological stru ctu re o f d e a th

51. Being-towards-death and the everydayness of Dasein 52. Everyday Being-towards-the-end, and the full e x is t e n t ia l c o n c e p t io n o f d e a t h

53. Existential projection o f an authentic Being-towards-death II.

D

a s e in ’s

A

t t e s t a t io n o f a n

i t y -f o r -b e i n g ,

and

R

A

u t h e n t ic

P o t e n t ia l -

esolu ten ess

54. The problem o f how an authentic existentiell possibility is attested 55. The existential-ontological foundations o f con­ science 56. The character of conscience as a call 57. Conscience as the call of care 58. Understanding the appeal, and guilt 59. The existential Interpretation o f the conscience, and the way conscience is ordinarily interpreted 60. The existential structure of the authentic potentiality-for-Being which is attested in the con­ science

h

.

h

.

325

Contents III.

D

a s e in ’s

A

u t h e n t ic

P o t e n t i a l i t y - f o r - b e i n g -a -

W HOLE, AND T E M PO R A LIT Y AS THE O N TO LO G ICA L M

e a n in g

of

C are

61. A preliminary sketch of the methodological step from the definition o f Dasein’s authentic Beinga-whole to the laying-bare o f temporality as a phenomenon 62. Anticipatory resoluteness as the way in which Dasein’s potentiality-for-Being-a-whole has existentiell authenticity 63. The hermeneutical situation at, which we have arrived for Interpreting the meaning o f the Being o f care; and the methodological character o f the existential analytic in general 64. Care and selfhood 65. Temporality as the ontological meaning o f care 66. Dasein’s temporality and the tasks arising there­ from o f repeating the existential analysis in a more primordial manner IV .

T

e m p o r a l it y

and

E veryd ayn ess

67. The basic content o f Dasein’s existential con­ stitution, and a preliminary sketch o f the temporal Interpretation o f it 68. The temporality o f disclosedness in general (a) The temporality o f understanding (b) The temporality of state-of-mind (c) The temporality o f falling (d) The temporality of discourse 69. The temporality o f Being-in-the-world and the problem o f the transcendence of the world (a) The temporality o f circumspective concern (b) The temporal meaning of the way in which circumspective concern becomes modified into the theoretical discovery o f the presentat-hand within-the-world (c) The temporal problem o f the transcendence o f the world 70. The temporality o f the spatiality that is charac­ teristic o f Dasein 71. The temporal meaning o f Dasein’s everydayness

h

. 301

h

. 301

h

. 305

h

. 310

H. 3 1 6 H. 3 2 3

H.

331

H. 334

h

. 334

h.

335

h . 336

H. 339 h . 346

H. 349 h

. 350

H. 352

H. 3 5 6 H. 3 6 4 H. 3 6 7 H.

370

19

Being and Time T

e m p o r a l it y

72 .

73• 74• 75• 76.

77•

V I.

T

and

H

is t o r ic a l it y

Existential-ontological exposition of the prob­ lem o f history The ordinary understanding o f history, and Dasein’s historizing The basic constitution o f historicality Dasein’s historicality, and world-history T he existential source o f historiology in Dasein’s historicality The connection of the foregoing exposition o f the problem o f historicality with the researches of Wilhelm Dilthey and the ideas o f Count Yorck

e m p o r a l it y a n d

W

. 372

424

h

. 372

424

h

. 378

429

h

. 382

H. 3 8 7

434 439

392

444

H• 397

449

H. 4 0 4

456

H.

i t h i n -t i m e -n e s s a s t h e s o u r c e

OF THE ORDINARY CONCEPTION OF TIME

78. The incompleteness o f the foregoing temporal analysis o f Dasein 79. Dasein’s temporality, and our concern with time 80. The time with which we concern ourselves, and within-time-ness 81. Within-time-ness and the genesis of the ordinary conception of time 82. A comparison o f the existential-ontological connection o f temporality, Dasein, and world­ time, with Hegel’s way o f taking the relation between time and spirit (a) Hegel’s conception o f time (b) Hegel’s Interpretation o f the connection b e t w e e n t im e a n d s p ir it

83. The existential-temporal analytic of Dasein, and the question o f fundamental ontology as to the meaning o f Being in general Author's Notes Glossary o f German Terms Index

h

h

.• 404

h

.

406

456 458

h

.

411

464

h

.

420

472

h

.

h

.

428 428

480 480

h

.

433

484

h

.

436

486 489

503 524

TR A N SLA TO R S’ PREFACE M o r e than thirty years have passed since Being and Time first appeared, and it has now become perhaps the most celebrated philosophical work which Germany has produced in this century. It is a very difficult book, even for the German reader, and highly resistant to translation, so much so that it has often been called ‘untranslatable’. W e feel that this is an exaggeration. Anyone who has struggled with a philosophical work in translation has constantly found himself asking how the author himself would have expressed the ideaswhich the translator has ascribed to him. In this respect the ‘ideal’ translation would perhaps be one so constructed that a reader with reasonable linguistic competence and a key to the translator’s con­ ventions should be able to retranslate the new version into the very words o f the original. Everybody knows that this is altogether too much to demand; but the faithful translator must at least keep this ahead o f him as a desirable though impracticable goal. The simplest compromise with the demands o f his own langugage is to present the translation and the original text on opposite pages; he is then quite free to choose the most felicitous expressions he can think of, trusting that the reader who is shrewd enough to wonder what is really happening can look across and find out. Such a procedure would add enormously to the expense o f a book as long as Being and Time, and is impracticable for other reasons. But on any page o f Heidegger there is a great deal happening, and we have felt that we owe it to the reader to let him know what is going on. For the benefit of the man who already has a copy o f the German text, we have indicated in our margins the pagination o f the later German editions, which differs only slightly from that of the earlier ones. A ll citations marked with ‘H ’ refer to this pagination. But for the reader who does not have the German text handy, we have had to use other devices. As long as an author is using words in their ordinary ways, the trans­ lator should not have much trouble in showing what he is trying to say. But Heidegger is constantly using words in ways which are by no means ordinary, and a great part of his merit lies in the freshness and penetra­ tion which his very innovations reflect. He tends to discard much o f the traditional philosophical terminology, substituting an elaborate vocabu­ lary o f his own. He occasionally coins new expressions from older roots, and he takes full advantage o f the ease with which the German language lends itself to the formation o f new compounds. He also uses familiar

14

Being and Timt

expressions in new ways. Adverbs, prepositions, pronouns, conjunctions are made to do service as nouns; words which have undergone a long history o f semantical change are used afresh in their older senses; spec­ ialized modem idioms are generalized far beyond the limits within which they would ordinarily be applicable. Puns are by no means uncommon and frequently a key-word may be used in several senses, successively or even simultaneously. He is especially fond o f ringing the changes on words with a common stem or a common prefix. He tends on the whole to avoid personal constructions, and often uses abstract nouns (‘Dasein’, ‘Zeitlichkeit’, ‘Sorge’, ‘In-der-Welt-sein’, and so forth) as subjects o f sentences where a personal subject would ordinarily be found. Like Aristotle or Wittgenstein, he likes to talk about his words, and seldom makes an innovation without explaining it; but sometimes he will have used a word in a special sense many times before he gets round to the explanation; and he may often use it in the ordinary senses as well. In such cases the reader is surely entided to know what word Heidegger is actually talking about, as well as what he says about it; and he is also entitled to know when and how he actually uses it. We have tried in the main to keep our vocabulary under control, providing a German-English glossary for the more important expres­ sions, and a rather full analytical index which will also serve as an EnglishGerman glossary. W e have tried to use as few English terms as possible to represent the more important German ones, and we have tried not to to use these for other purposes than those we have specifically indicated. Sometimes we have had to coin new terms to correspond to Heidegger’s. In a number o f cases there are two German terms at the author’s disposal which he has chosen to differentiate, even though they may be synonyms in ordinary German usage; if we have found only one suitable English term to correspond to them, we have sometimes adopted the device of capitalizing it when it represents the German word to which it is etymologically closer: thus ‘auslegen’ becomes ‘interpret’, but ‘interpretieren’ becomes ‘Interpret’ ; ‘gliedern’ becomes ‘articulate’, but ‘artikulieren’ becomes ‘Articulate’ ; ‘Ding’ becomes ‘Thing’, but ‘thing’ represents ‘Sache’ and a number o f other expressions. In other cases we have coined a new term. Thus while ‘tatsächlich’ becomes ‘factual’, we have intro­ duced ‘factical’ to represent ‘faktisch’. We have often inserted German expressions in square brackets on the occasions of their first appearance or on that o f their official definition. But we have also used bracketed expressions to call attention to departures from our usual conventions, or to bring out etymological connections which might otherwise be over­ looked.

Being and Time

15

In many cases bracketing is insufficient, and we have introduced foot­ notes o f our own, discussing some of the more important terms on the occasion of their first appearance. W e have not hesitated to quote German sentences at length when they have been ambiguous or obscure; while we have sometimes taken pains to show where the ambiguity lies, we have more often left this to the reader to puzzle out for himself. We have often quoted passages with verbal subtleties which would otherwise be lost in translation. W e have also called attention to a number o f significant differences between the earlier and later editions o f Heidegger’s work. The entire book was reset for the seventh edition; while revisions were by no means extensive, they went beyond the simple changes in punctuation and citation which Heidegger mentions in his preface. We have chosen the third edition (1931) as typical o f the earlier editions, and the eighth (1957) as typical of the later ones. In general we have preferred the read­ ings o f the eighth edition, and our marginal numbering and cross-references follow its pagination. Heidegger’s very valuable footnotes have been renumbered with roman numerals and placed at the end of the text where we trust they will be given the attention they deserve. Hoping that our own notes will be o f immediate use to the reader, we have placed them at the bottoms of pages for easy reference, indicating them with arabic numerals. In general we have tried to stick to the text as closely as we can without sacrificing intelligibility; but we have made numerous concessions to the reader at the expense of making Heidegger less Heideggerian. W e have, for instance, frequently used personal constructions where Heidegger has avoided them. W e have also tried to be reasonably flexible in dealing with hyphenated expressions. Heidegger does not seem to be especially con­ sistent in his use o f quotation marks, though in certain expressions (for instance, the word ‘Welt’) they are very deliberately employed. Except in a few footnote references and some o f the quotations from Hegel and Count Yorck in the two concluding chapters, our single quotation marks represent Heidegger’s double ones. But we have felt free to introduce double ones o f our own wherever we feel that they may be helpful to the reader. We have followed a similar policy with regard to italicization. When Heidegger uses italics in the later editions (or spaced type in the earlier ones), we have generally used italics; but in the relatively few cases where we have felt that some emphasis o f our own is needed, we have resorted to wide spacing. We have not followed Heidegger in the use of italics for proper names or for definite articles used demonstratively to introduce restrictive relative clauses. But we have followed the usual practice of italicizing words and phrases from languages other than English

16

Being and Time

and German, and have italicized titles o f books, regardless o f Heidegger’s procedure. W e have received help from several sources. Miss Marjorie W ard has collated the third and eighth editions, and made an extremely careful study o f Heidegger’s vocabulary and ours, which has saved us from innumerable inconsistencies and many downright mistakes; there is hardly a page which has not profited by her assistance. W e are also indebted to several persons who have helped us in various ways: Z. Adamczewski, Hannah Arendt, J. A . Burzle, C. A . Campbell, G. M . George, Fritz Heider, Edith Kern, Norbert Raymond, Eva Schaper, Martin Scheerer, John W ild. I f any serious errors remain, they are probably due to our failure to exploit the time and good nature o f these friends and colleagues more unmercifully. We are particularly indebted to Professor R . Gregor Smith who brought us together in the first place, and who, perhaps more than anyone else, has made it possible for this translation to be presented to the public. W e also wish to express our appreciation to our publishers and to M ax NiemeyerVerlag, holders o f the German copyright, who have shown extraordinary patience in putting up with the long delay in the preparation o f our manuscript. W e are particularly grateful to the University o f Kansas for generous research grants over a period o f three years, and to the University of Kansas Endowment Association for enabling us to work together in Scotland.

A U T H O R ’S PREFACE T O THE SEVEN TH G ERM AN EDITIO N T h is treatise first appeared in the spring o f 1927 in the Jahrbuch fiir Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Forschung edited by Edmund Husserl,

and was published simultaneously in a special printing. The present reprint, which appears as the seventh edition, is unchanged in the text, but has been newly revised with regard to quotations and punctuation. The page-numbers o f this reprint agree with those of the earlier editions except for minor deviations.1 While the previous editions have borne the designation ‘First H alf’, this has now been deleted. After a quarter o f a century, the second half could no longer be added unless the first were to be presented anew. Yet the road it has taken remains even today a necessary one, if our Dasein is to be stirred by the question o f Being. For the elucidation of this question the reader may refer to my Einführung in die Metaphysik, which is appearing simultaneously with this reprinting under the same publishers.2 This work presents the text o f a course of lectures delivered in the summer semester o f 1935. 1 See Translators’ Preface, p. 15. 2 M ax N iem eyer V erla g, Tübingen, 1953. English translation b y R a lp h M anheim , Y a le U niversity Press and O xford U niversity Press, 1959.

B E IN G

AN D T IM E

. . . 8rj\ov y a p w s v/ie ls {¿ev r a v r a ( t i tto tc ßovXeaOe cn)fiaivei.v on•orav ov

deyyr](Tde) -jraXat yiyvcooKere, ij/xeis S¿ irpo

tov

fiev thofieda, vvv S ’ ■qnopr¡-

Kafiev . . .

‘For manifestly you have long been aware o f what you mean when you use the expression “ being". We, however, who used to think we under­ stood it, have now become perplexed.’1 Do we in our time have an answer to the question o f what we really mean by the word ‘being’ ?1 Not at all. So it is fitting that we should raise anew the question o f the meaning2 o f Being. But are we nowadays even perplexed at our inability to understand the expression ‘Being’ ? Not at all. So first o f all we must reawaken an understanding for the meaning of this question. Our aim in the following treatise is to work out the question o f the meaning of Being and to do so concretely. O ur provisional aim is the Interpretation3 o f time as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever o f Being.4 But the reasons for making this our aim, the investigations which such a purpose requires, and the path to its achievement, call for some intro­ ductory remarks. 1 ‘seiend’ . H eidegger translates Plato’s present participle 5v b y this present participle o f the verb ‘sein’ (‘ to be’). W e accordingly translate ‘seiend’ here and in a num ber o f later passages b y the present participle ‘being’ ; where such a translation is inconvenient w e shall resort to other constructions, usually subjoining the G erm an word in brackets or in a footnote. T h e participle ‘seiend’ must be distinguished from the infinitive ‘sein’ , which we shall usually translate either b y the infinitive ‘to be’ or b y the gerund ‘ being’ . It must also be distinguished from the im portant substantive ‘Sein’ (always capitalized), which w e shall translate as ‘Being’ (capitalized), and from the equally im portant sub­ stantive ‘ Seiendes’, w hich is directly derived from ‘seiend’, and w hich w e shall usually translate as ‘entity’ or ‘entities’ . (See our note 6, H . 3 below.) 2 ‘Sinn.’ In view o f the im portance o f the distinction between ‘Sinn’ and ‘Bedeutung’ in G erm an writers as diverse as D ilthey, Husserl, Frege and Schlick, w e shall translate ‘Sinn’ by ‘m eaning’ or ‘sense’ , depending on the context, and keep ‘signification’ and ‘signify’ for ‘Bedeutung’ and ‘bedeuten’ . (T h e verb ‘m ean’ w ill occasionally be used to translate such verbs as ‘ besagen’ , ‘sagen’, ‘heissen’ and ‘meinen’, but the noun ‘m eaning’ w ill be reserved for ‘Sinn’.) O n ‘Sinn’, see H . 151, 324; on ‘B edeutung’, etc., see H . 87, and our note 47 ad loc. 3 H eidegger uses two words which m ight w ell be translated as ‘interpretation’ : ‘A us­ legung’ and ‘ Interpretation’. T hough in m any cases these m ay be regarded as synonyms, their connotations are not quite the same. ‘Auslegung’ seems to be used in a broad sense to cover any activity in which w e interpret something ‘as’ something, whereas ‘ Inter­ pretation’ seems to ap ply to interpretations which are more theoretical or systematic, as in the exegesis o f a text. See especially H . 148 ff. and 199 f. W e shall preserve this distinc­ tion b y w riting ‘interpretation’ for ‘Auslegung’ , bu t ‘ Interpretation’ for H eidegger’s ‘ Interpretation’, following similar conventions for the verbs ‘auslegen’ and ‘interpretieren’ . 4 ‘ . . . als des möglichen H orizontes eines jeden Seinsverständnisses überhaupt . . .’ Throughout this work the word ‘horizon’ is used w ith a connotation somewhat different from that to w hich the English-speaking reader is likely to be accustomed. W e tend to think o f a horizon as something w hich w e m ay widen or extend or go beyon d; Heidegger, however, seems to think o f it rather as something w hich w e can neither widen nor go beyond, but w hich provides the limits for certain intellectual activities perform ed ‘w ithin’ it.

INTRODUCTION E X P O S IT IO N OF TH E Q U E S T IO N OF TH E M E A N IN G OF BEING

I THE NECESSITY, STR U C T U R E , AND P R IO R IT Y OF TH E Q U E S T IO N OF BEING /. The Necessity for Explicitly Restating the Question o f Being T h i s question has today been forgotten. Even though in our time we deem it progressive to give our approval to ‘metaphysics’ again, it is held that we have been exempted from the exertions o f a newly rekindled yiyavroixaxla ircpl rrjs ovalas. Y et the question we are touching upon is notjust a n y question. It is one which provided a stimulus for the researches of Plato and Aristotle, only to subside from then on as a theme fo r actual investigation.1 W hat these two men achieved was to persist through many alterations and ‘retouchings’ down to the ‘logic’ o f Hegel. And what they wrested with the utmost intellectual effort from the phenomena, fragmentary and incipient though it was, has long since become trivialized. Not only that. O n the basis of the Greeks’ initial contributions towards an Interpretation o f Being, a dogma has been developed which not only declares the question about the meaning o f Being to be superfluous, but sanctions its complete neglect. It is said that ‘Being’ is the most universal and the emptiest o f concepts. As such it resists every attempt at definition. Nor does this most universal and hence indefinable concept require any definition, for everyone uses it constantly and already understands what he means by it. In this way, that which th', ancient philosophers found continually disturbing as something obscure and hidden has taken on a clarity and self-evidence such that if anyone continues to ask about it he is charged with an error o f method. A t the beginning o f our investigation it is not possible to give a detailed 1 *. . . als thematische Frage wirklichtr Untersuchung’ . W hen H eidegger speaks o f a question as ‘ thematisch’, he thinks o f it as one which is taken seriously and studied in a systematic manner. W hile w e shall often translate this adjective by its cognate, ‘ them atic’, w e may sometimes •find it convenient to choose more flexible expressions involving the word ‘ them e’ . (H eidegger gives a fuller discussion on H. 363.)

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account of the presuppositions and prejudices which are constantly reimplanting and fostering the belief that an inquiry into Being is unneces­ sary‫׳‬ . They are rooted in ancient ontology itself, and it will not be possible to interpret that ontology adequately until the question o f Being has been clarified and answered and taken as a clue— at least, if we are to have regard for the soil from which the basic ontological concepts developed, and if we are to see whether the categories have been demonstrated in a way that is appropriate and complete. We shall therefore carry the dis­ cussion o f these presuppositions only to the point at which the necessity for restating the question about the meaning o f Being become plain. There are three such presuppositions. i. First, it has been maintained that ‘Being’ is the ‘most universal’ concept: t o ov ¿cm KadoXov fidXiora ndvTtov} Illud quod primo cadit sub apprehensione est ens, cuius intellectus includitur in omnibus, quaecumque quis apprehendit. ‘An understanding o f Being is already included in conceiving

anything which one apprehends as an entity.’111‫׳‬But the ‘universality’ of ‘Being’ is not that o f a class or genus. The term ‘Being’ does not define that realm of entities which is uppermost when these are Articulated con­ ceptually according to genus and species: ovre t o o v yevos.111 The ‘univer­ sality’ o f Being ‘ transcends’ any universality of genus. In medieval ontology ‘Being’ is designated as a ‘ transcendens’ . Aristotle himself knew the unity of this transcendental ‘universal’ as a unity o f analogy in contrast to the multiplicity o f the highest generic concepts applicable to things. With this discovery, in spite of his dependence on the way in which the ontological question had been formulated by Plato, he put the problem o f Being on what was, in principle, a new basis. T o be sure, even Aristotle failed to clear away the darkness o f these categorial interconnections. In medieval ontology this problem was widely discussed, especially in the Thomist and Scotist schools, without reaching clarity as to principles. And when Hegel at last defines ‘Being’ as the ‘indeterminate immediate’ and makes this definition basic for all the further categorial explications o f his ‘logic’, he keeps looking in the same direction as ancient ontology, 1 * . . was einer am Seienden erfasst” T h e word ‘Seiendes‫־‬, which H eidegger uses in his paraphrase, is one o f the most im portant words in the book. T h e substantive ‘das Seiende’ is derived from the participle ‘seiend’ (see note i, p. 19), and means literally , that which is’ ; ‘ ein Seiendes’ means ‘something which is’ . T h ere is much to be said for translating ‘ Seiendes’ by the noun ‘being’ or ‘beings’ (for it is often used in a collective sense). W e feel, however, that it is smoother and less confusing to write ‘entity’ or ‘en­ tities’ . W e are w ell aw are that in recent British and A m erican philosophy the term ‘entity’ has been used more generally to ap ply to almost anything whatsoever, no m atter w hat its ontological status. In this translation, however, it w ill mean simply ‘something which is’ . A n alternative translation o f the Latin quotation is given by the English Dom inican Fathers, Sunrna Theologica, T hom as Baker, London, 1915: ‘F or that w hich, before aught else, falls under apprehension, is being, the notion o f which is included in all things whatsoever a m an apprehends.’

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except that he no longer pays heed to Aristotle’s problem o f the unity of Being as over against the multiplicity o f ‘categories’ applicable to things. So if it is said that ‘Being’ is the most universal concept, this cannot mean that it is the one which is clearest or that it needs no further discussion. It is rather the darkest o f all. 2. It has been maintained secondly that the concept o f ‘Being’ is indefinable. This is deduced from its supreme universality,lv and rightly so, if definitio fit per genus proximum et differentiam specificam. ‘Being’ cannot indeed be conceived as an entity; enti non additur aliqua natura: nor can it acquire such a character as to have the term “ entity” applied to it. “ Being” cannot be derived from higher concepts by definition, nor can it be presented through lower ones. But does this imply that ‘Being’ no longer offers a problem ? Not at all. W e can infer only that ‘Being’ cannot have the character o f an entity. Thus we cannot apply to Being the concept o f ‘definition’ as presented in traditional logic, which itself has its founda­ tions in ancient ontology and which, within certain limits, provides a quite justifiable way o f defining “ entities” . The indefinability o f Being does not eliminate the question o f its meaning; it demands that we look that question in the face. 3. Thirdly, it is held that ‘Being’ is of all concepts the one that is selfevident. Whenever one cognizes anything or makes an assertion, whenever one comports oneself towards entities, even towards oneself,1 some use is made o f ‘Being’ ; and this expression is held to be intelligible ‘without further ado’, just as everyone understands “ The sky is blue’, ‘I am merry’, and the like. But here we have an average kind o f intelligibility, which merely demonstrates that this is unintelligible. It makes manifest that in any way o f comporting oneself towards entities as entities— even in any Being towards entities as entities— there lies a priori an enigma.2 The very fact that we already live in an understanding o f Being and that the mean­ ing o f Being is still veiled in darkness proves that it is necessary in principle to raise this question again. Within therangeofbasicphilosophical concepts— especially when we come to the concept o f‘Being’— it is a dubious procedure to invoke self-evidence, even if th e‘self-evident’ (Kant’s ‘covert judgments ofthecommon reason’)3 1 . . i n jedem V erh alten zu Seiendem, in jedem Sich-zu-sich-selbst-verhalten . . T h e verb ‘verhalten’ can refer to any kind o f behaviour or w ay o f conducting oneself, even to the w a y in which one relates oneself to something else, or to the w ay one refrains or holds oneself back. W e shall translate it in various ways. 2 ‘Sie m acht offenbar, dass in jedem Verhalten und Sein zu Seiendem als Seiendem a priori ein Ratsel liegt.’ T h e phrase ‘Sein zu Seiendem’ is typical o f m any similar expressions in which the substantive ‘Sein’ is followed by the preposition ‘zu ’. In such expressions w e shall usually translate ’zu ’ as ‘ towards’ : for example, ‘Being-towards-death’, ‘Being towards Others’, ‘Being towards entities within-the-world’. 3 ‘ “ die geheimen U rteile der gemeinen V em u n ft” ’.

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is to become the sole explicit and abiding theme for one’s analytic— ‘the business o f philosophers’. By considering these prejudices, however, we have made plain not only that the question o f Being lacks an answer, but that the question itself is obscure and without direction. So if it is to be revived, this means that we must first work out an adequate way of formulating it. 2. The Formal Structure o f the Question o f Being The question o f the meaning o f Being must be formulated. I f it is a fundamental question, or indeed the fundamental question, it must be made transparent, and in an appropriate w ay.1 We must therefore explain briefly what belongs to any question whatsoever, so that from this standpoint the question o f Being can be made visible as a very special one with its own distinctive character. Every inquiry is a seeking [Suchen]. Every seeking gets guided before­ hand by what is sought. Inquiry is a cognizant seeking for an entity both with regard to the fact t h a t it is and with regard to its Being as it is.a This cognizant seeking can take the form o f‘investigating’ [‘ ‘Untersuchen’ ’], in which one lays bare that which the question is about and ascertains its character. Any inquiry, as an inquiry about something, has that which is asked about [sein Gefragtes\. But all inquiry about something is somehow a questioning of something [Anfragen bei . . .]. So in addition to what is asked about, an inquiry has that which is interrogated [ein Befragtes‫ ]־‬. In investigative questions— that is, in questions which are specifically theo­ retical— what is asked about is determined and conceptualized. Further­ more, in what is asked about there lies also that which is to be found out by the asking [das Erfragte]; this is what is really intended:3 with this the inquiry reaches its goal. Inquiry itself is the behaviour o f a questioner, and therefore o f an entity, and as such has its own character o f Being. W hen one makes an inquiry one may do so ‘just casually’ or one may formulate the 1 . dann bedarf solches Fragen der angemessenen Durchsichtigkeit’ . T h e adjective ‘durchsichtig’ is one o f H eidegger’s favourite expressions, and means simply ‘ transparent’, ‘perspicuous’, something that one can ‘see through’. W e shall ordinarily translate it by ,transparent’. See H . 146 for further discussion. 2 . in seinem Dass- und Sosein’ . 3 ‘ . . . das eigentlich Intendierte . . .’ T h e adverb ,eigentlich’ occurs very often in this work. It m ay be used inform ally where one m ight w rite ‘really’ or ‘on its p art’, or in a m uch stronger sense, where something like ‘genuinely’ or ‘authentically’ w ould be more appropriate. It is not always possible to tell w hich m eaning H eidegger has in m ind. In the contexts which seem relatively informal w e shall write ‘really’ ; in the more technical passages w e shall w rite ‘authentically’, reserving ‘genuinely’ for ‘genuin’ or ‘e d it’ . T h e reader must not confuse this kind o f ‘authenticity’ w ith the kind, which belongs to an ‘authentic text’ or an ‘authentic account’. See H . 42 for further discussion. In the present passage, the verb ‘intendieren’ is presum ably used in the m edieval sense o f ‘intending’, as adapted and modified b y Brentano and Husserl.

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question explicitly. The latter case is peculiar in that the inquiry does not become transparent to itself until all these constitutive factors o f the question have themselves become transparent. The question about the meaning of Being is to be formulated. We must therefore discuss it with an eye to these structural items. Inquiry, as a kind of seeking, must be guided beforehand by what is sought. So the meaning o f Being must already be available to us in some way. As we have intimated, we always conduct our activities in an'understanding o f Being. O ut o f this understanding arise both the explicit ques­ tion o f the meaning o f Being and the tendency that leads us towards its conception. W e do not know what ‘Being’ means. But even if we ask, ‘W hat is “ Being” ?’, we keep within an understanding o f the ‘is’, though we are unable to fix conceptionally what that ‘is’ signifies. We do not even know the horizon in terms of which that meaning is to be grasped and fixed. But this vague average understanding o f Being is still a Fact. However much this understanding of Being (an understanding which is already available to us) may fluctuate and grow dim, and border on mere acquaintance with a word, its very indefiniteness is itself a positive pheno­ menon which needs to be clarified. A n investigation of the meaning of Being cannot be expected to give this clarification at the outset. I f we are to obtain the clue we need for Interpreting this average understanding of Being, we must first develop the concept o f Being. In the light o f this concept and the ways in which it may be explicitly understood, we can make out what this obscured or still unillumined understanding o f Being means, and what kinds o f obscuration— or hindrance to an explicit illumination— of the meaning of Being are possible and even inevitable. Further, this vague average understanding o f Being may be so infil­ trated with traditional theories and opinions about Being that these remain hidden as sources o f the way in which it is prevalently understood. W hat we seek when we inquire into Being is not something entirely unfamiliar, even if proximally1 we cannot grasp it at all. In the question which we are to work out, what is asked about is Being— that which determines entities as entities, that on the basis o f which 1 ‘zunächst’ . This w ord is o f very frequent occurrence in H eidegger, and he w ill discuss his use o f it on H . 370 below. In ordinary G erm an usage the w ord m ay mean ‘at first’, ‘ to begin w ith’, or ‘in the first instance’, and w e shall often translate it in such ways. T h e word is, however, cognate w ith the adjective ‘nah’ and its superlative ‘nächst’ , w h ich w e shall usually translate as ‘close’ and ‘closest’ respectively; and H eidegger often uses ‘zunächst’ in the sense o f ‘most closely’, when he is describing the most ‘natural’ and ‘obvious’ experiences w hich w e have at an uncritical and pre-philosophical level. W e have ventured to translate this Heideggerian sense o f ‘zunächst’ as ‘proxim ally’, bu t there are m any border-line cases where it is not clear whether H eidegger has in m ind this special sense or one o f the more general usages, and in such cases w e have chosen whatever expression seems stylistically preferable.

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[woraufhin] entities are already understood, however we may discuss them in detail. The Being of entities ‘is’ not itself an entity. I f we are to understand the problem of Being, our first philosophical step consists in not ¡xvdov T i v a 8iriyeiadai,v in not ‘telling a story’— that is to say, in not defining entities as entities by tracing them back in their origin to some other entities, as if Being had the character o f some possible entity. Hence Being, as that which is asked about, must be exhibited in a way o f its own, essentially different from the way in which entities are discovered. Accord­ ingly, what is to be found out by the asking— the meaning of Being— also demands that it be conceived in a way o f its own, essentially contrasting with the concepts in which entities acquire their determinate signification. In so far as Being constitutes what is asked about, and “ Being” means the Being of entities, then entities themselves turn out to be what is inter­ rogated. These are, so to speak, questioned as regards their Being. But if the characteristics o f their Being can be yielded without falsification, then these entities must, on their part, have become accessible as they are in themselves. When we come to what is to be interrogated, the question o f Being requires that the right way o f access to entities shall have been obtained and secured in advance. But there are many things which we designate as ‘being’ [“ seiend” ], and we do so in various senses. Everything we talk about, everything we have in view, everything towards which we comport ourselves in any way, is being; what we are is being, and so is how we are. Being lies in the fact that something is, and in its Being as it is; in Reality; in presence-at-hand; in subsistence; in validity; in Dasein; in the ‘there is’.1 In which entities is the meaning o f Being to be discerned? From which entities is the disclosure o f Being to take its departure? Is the starting-point optional, or does some particular entity have priority when we come to work out the question of Being ? Which entity shall we take for our example, and in what sense does it have priority? I f the question about Being is to be explicitly formulated and carried through in such a manner as to be completely transparent to itself, then any treatment of it in line with the elucidations we have given requires us to explain how Being is to be looked at, how its meaning is to be under­ stood and conceptually grasped; it requires us to prepare the way for choosing the right entity for our example, and to work out the genuine way o f access to it. Looking at something, understanding and conceiving it, choosing, access to it— all these ways o f behaving are constitutive for our inquiry, and therefore are modes o f Being for those particular entities 1 ‘Sein liegt im Dass- und Sosein, in R ealität, Vorhandenheit, Bestand, G eltung, Dasein, im “ es gibt” .’ O n ‘Vorhandenheit’ (‘ presence-at-hand’ ) see note j, p. 48, H . 25. O n ‘Dasein’, see note 1, p. ay.

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which we, the inquirers, are ourselves. Thus to work out the question of Being adequately, we must make an entity— the inquirer— transparent in his own Being. The very asking o f this question is an entity’s mode of Being•, and as such it gets its essential character from what is inquired about— namely, Being. This entity which each o f us is himself and which includes inquiring as one o f the possibilities o f its Being, we shall denote by the term “ Dasein” .1 I f we are to formulate our question explicitly and transparently, we must first give a proper explication o f an entity (Dasein), with regard to its Being. Is there not, however, a manifest circularity in such an undertaking? I f we must first define an entity in its Being, and if we want to formulate the question o f Being only on this basis, what is this but going in a circle? In working out our question, have we not ‘presupposed’ something which only the answer can bring? Formal objections such as the argument about ‘circular reasoning’, which can easily be cited at any time in the study o f first principles, are always sterile when one is considering concrete ways o f investigating. When it comes to understanding the matter at hand, they carry no weight and keep us from penetrating into the field o f study. But factically2 there is no circle at all in formulating our question as we have described. One can determine the nature o f entities in their Being without necessarily having the explicit concept o f the meaning of Being at one’s disposal. Otherwise there could have been no ontological know­ ledge heretofore. One would hardly deny that factically there has been such knowledge.8 O f course ‘Being’ has been presupposed in all ontology up till now, but not as a concept at one’s disposal— not as the sort o f thing we are seeking. This ‘presupposing* o f Being has rather the character of taking a look at it beforehand, so that in the light o f it the entities pre­ sented to us get provisionally Articulated in their Being. This guiding 1 T h e word ‘Dasein’ plays so im portant a role in this w ork and is alread y so fam iliar to the English-speaking reader w ho has read abou t H eidegger, th at it seems simpler to leave it untranslated except in the relatively rare passages in w hich H eidegger himself breaks it up w ith a hypthen (‘Da-sein’) to show its etym ological construction: literally ‘Being-there’. T h o ugh in traditional G erm an philosophy it m ay be used quite generally to stand for almost any kind o f Being o r ‘existence’ which w e can say that something has (the ‘existence’ o f G od, for exam ple), in everyday usage it tends to be used m ore narrow ly to stand for the kind o f Being that belongs to persons. H eidegger follows the everyday usage in this respect, but goes somewhat further in that he often uses it to stand for any person w ho has such Being, and w h o is thus an ‘entity’ himself. See H . 1 x below. 2 ‘faktisch’. W hile this word can often be translated sim ply as ‘in fact’ or ‘as a m atter o f fact’, it is used both as an adjective and as an adverb and is so characteristic o f H eideg­ ger’s style that w e shall as a rule translate it either as ‘factical’ or as ‘factically’, thus preserving its connection with the im portant noun ‘F aktizität’ (facticity’), and keeping it distinct from ‘ tatsächlich’ (‘factual’) and ‘w irklich’ (‘actu al’). See the discussion o f ‘T atsächlichkeit’ and ‘F aktizität’ in Sections la and 29 below (H . 56, 135). ® . deren faktischen Bestand m an w ohl nicht leugnen w ird’.

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activity o f taking a look at Being arises from thé average understanding o f Being in which we always operate and which in the end belongs to the essential constitution1 o f Dasein itself Such ‘presupposing’ has nothing to do with laying down an axiom from which a sequence o f propositions is deductively derived. It is quite impossible for there to be any ‘circular argument’ in formulating the question about the meaning of Being; for in answering this question, the issue is not one o f grounding something by such a derivation ; it is rather one o f laying bare the grounds for it and exhibiting them.® In the question o f the meaning o f Being there is no ‘circular reasoning’ but rather a remarkable ‘relatedness backward or forward’ which what we are asking about (Being) bears to the inquiry itself as a mode o f Being o f an entity. Here what is asked about has an essential pertinence to the inquiry itself, and this belongs to the ownmost meaning [eigensten Sinn] o f the question o f Being. This only means, however, that there is a way— perhaps even a very special one— in which entities with the character o f Dasein are related to the question o f Being. But have we not thus demon­ strated that a certain kind o f entity has a priority with regard to its Being ? And have we not thus presented that entity which shall serve as the primary example to be interrogated in the question of Being? So far our discussion has n o t demonstrated Dasein’s priority, nor has it shown decisively whether Dasein may possibly or even necessarily serve as the primary entity to be interrogated. But indeed something like a priority of Dasein has announced itself. 2• T ïv Ontological Priority o f the Question o f Being

When we pointed out the characteristics o f the question o f Being, taking as our clue the formal structure o f the question as such, we made it 1 ‘Wesensverfassung’ . ‘Verfassung’ is the standard word for the ‘constitution’ o f a nation or any political organization, bu t it is also used for the ‘condition’ or ‘state’ in w hich a person m ay find himself. H eidegger seldom uses the w ord in either o f these senses ; but he does use it in ways which are somewhat analogous. In one sense D asein’s ‘V e r­ fassung’ is its ‘constitution’, the w a y it is constituted, ‘sa condition humaine’ . In another sense Dasein m ay have several ‘Verfassungen’ as constitutive ‘states’ or factors which enter into its ‘constitution’ . W e shall, in general, tran slate‘Verfassung’ as *constitution’ or ‘constitutive state’ according to the context; but in passages w here ‘ constitutive state’ w ould be cumbersome and there is little danger o f am biguity, w e shall sim ply write ‘state’. These states, however, must always be thought o f as constitutive and essential, n ot as tem porary or transitory stages like the ‘state’ o f one’s health or the ‘state o f the nation’. W hen H eidegger uses the word ‘Konstitution’, w e shall usually indicate this by capitalizing ‘Constitution’ . 2 ‘ . . . w eil es in der Beantwortung der Frage nicht um eine ableitende Begründung, sondern um aufweisende G rund-Freilegung geht.’ Expressions o f the form ‘es geht . . . um ;— ’ appear very often in this work. W e shall usually translate them by variants on ‘— is an issue for . .

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clear that this question is a peculiar one, in that a series of fundamental considerations is required for working it out, not to mention for solving it. But its distinctive features will come fully to light only when we have delimited it adequately with regard to its function, its aim, and its motives. Hitherto our arguments for showing that the question must be restated have been motivated in part by its venerable origin but chiefly by the lack o f a definite answer and even by the absence o f any satisfactory formula­ tion of the question itself. One may, however, ask what purpose this ques­ tion is supposed to serve. Does it simply remain— or is it at all— a mere matter for soaring speculation about the most general o f generalities, or is it rather, o f all questions, both the most basic and the most concrete ? Being is always the Being o f an entity. The totality o f entities can, in accordance with its various domains, become a field for laying bare and delimiting certain definite areas o f subject-matter. These areas, on their part (for instance, history, Nature, space, life, Dasein, language, and the like), can serve_as objects which corresponding scientific investigations may take as their respective themes. Scientific research accomplishes, roughly and naively, the demarcation and initial fixing of the areas of subject-matter. The basic structures o f any such area have already been worked out after a fashion in our pre-scientific ways of experiencing and interpreting that domain o f Being in which the area of subject-matter is itself confined. The ‘basic concepts’ which thus arise remain our proximal clues for disclosing this area concretely for the first time. And although research may always lean towards this positive approach, its real progress comes not so much from collecting results and storing them away in ‘manuals’ as from inquiring into the ways in which each particular area is basically constituted [Grundverfassungen]— an inquiry to which we have been driven mostly by reacting against just such an increase in information. The real ‘movement’ o f the sciences takes place when their basic con­ cepts undergo a more or less radical revision which is transparent to itself. The level which a science has reached is determined by how far it is capable o f a crisis in its basic concepts. In such immanent crises the very relationship between positively investigative inquiry and those things themselves that are under interrogation comes to a point where it begins to totter. Among the various disciplines everywhere today there are freshly awakened tendencies to put research on new foundations. Mathematics, which is seemingly the most rigorous and most firmly constructed o f the sciences, has reached a crisis in its ‘foundations’. In the controversy between the formalists and the intuitionists, the issue is

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one o f obtaining and securing the primary way o f access to what are supposedly the objects o f this science. The relativity theory o f physics arises from the tendency to exhibit the interconnectedness o f Nature as it is ‘in itself’. As a theory o f the conditions under which we have access to Nature itself, it seeks to preserve the changelessness o f the laws of motion by ascertaining all relativities, and thus comes up against the question o f the structure o f its own given area o f study— the problem o f matter. In biology there is an awakening tendency to inquire beyond the definitions which mechanism and vitalism have given for “ life” and “ organism” , and to define anew the kind o f Being which belongs to the living as such. In those humane sciences which are historiological in character,* the urge towards historical actuality itself has been strengthened in the course o f time by tradition and by the way tradition has been presented and handed down: the history o f literature is to become the history of problems. Theology is seeking a more primordial interpretation o f man’s Being towards God, prescribed by the meaning o f faith itself and remaining within it. It is slowly beginning to understand once more Luther’s insight that the ‘foundation’ on which its system o f dogma rests has not arisen from an inquiry in which faith is primary, and that conceptually this ‘foundation’ not only is inadequate for the problematic o f theology, but conceals and distorts it. Basic concepts determine the w ay in which we get an understanding beforehand o f the area o f subject-matter underlying all the objects a science takes as its theme, and all positive investigation is guided by this understanding. O nly after the area itself has been explored beforehand in a corresponding manner do these concepts become genuinely demon­ strated and ‘grounded’. But since every such area is itself obtained from the domain o f entities themselves, this preliminary research, from which the basic concepts are drawn, signifies nothing else than an interpretation o f those entities with regard to their basic state o f Being. Such research must run ahead o f the positive sciences, and it can. Here the work o f Plato and Aristode is evidence enough. Laying the foundations for the sciences in this way is different in principle from the kind o f ‘logic’ which limps along after, investigating the status o f some science as it chances to find it, in order to discover its ‘method’. Laying the foundations, as we have described it, is rather a productive logic— in the sense that it leaps ahead, 1 ‘ In den historischen GrisUswisscnschaften . . .’ H eidegger makes m uch o f the distinction between ‘Historie’ and ‘ Geschichte’ and the corresponding adjectives ‘historisch’ and ‘geschichtlich’. ‘Historie’ stands for w h at H eidegger calls a ‘science o f history’ . (See H . 375, 378.) ‘Geschichte’ usually stands for the kind o f ‘history’ that actually happens. W e shall as a rule translate these respectively as ‘historiology’ and ‘history’, following sim ilar conventions in handling the two adjectives. See especially Sections 6 and 76 below.

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as it were, into some area o f Being, discloses it for the first time in the constitution of its Being, and, after thus arriving at the structures within it, makes these available to the positive sciences as transparent assign­ ments for their inquiry.1 T o give an example, what is philosophically primary is neither a theory o f the concept-formation of historiology nor the theory o f historiological knowledge, nor yet the theory of history as the O.bject o f historiology; what is primary is rather the Interpretation of authentically historical entities as regards their historicality.2 Similarly the positive outcome of K ant’s Critique o f Pure Reason lies in what it has contributed towards the working out o f what belongs to any Nature whatsoever, not in a ‘theory’ o f knowledge. His transcendental logic is an a priori logic for the subject-matter of that area o f Being called “ Nature” . But such an inquiry itself— ontology taken in the widest sense without favouring any particular ontological directions or tendencies— requires a further clue. Ontological inqury is indeed more primordial, as over against the ontical3 inquiry of the positive sciences. But it remains itself naïve and opaque if in its researches into the Being of entities it fails to discuss the meaning of Being in general. And even the ontological task of construct­ ing a non-deductive genealogy o f the different possible ways o f Being requires that we first come to an understanding o f ‘what we really mean by this expression “ Being” ’. The question o f Being aims therefore at ascertaining the a priori condi­ tions not only for the possibility o f the sciences which examine entities as entities o f such and such a type, and, in so doing, already operate with an understanding of Being, but also for the possibility o f those ontologies themselves which are prior to the ontical sciences and which provide their foundations. Basically, all ontology, no matter how rich and firmly compacted a system o f categories it has at its disposal, remains blind and per­ verted from its ownmost aim, i f it has not first adequately clarified the meaning o f Being, and conceived this clarification as its fundamental task.

Ontological research itself, when properly understood, gives to the question o f Being an ontological priority which goes beyond mere resump­ tion of a venerable tradition and advancement with a problem that has hitherto been opaque. But this objectively scientific priority is not the only one. 1 ‘ . . . als durchsichtige Anweisungen des Fragens . . .’ 2 *. . . sondern die Intepretation des eigentlich geschichtlich Seienden a u f seine Ges­ chichtlichkeit’. W e shall translate the frequently occurring term ‘G eschichtlichkeit’ as ‘historicality’. Heidegger very occasionally uses the term ‘H istorizität’, as on H . ao below, and this w ill be translated as ‘historicity’. 3 W hile the terms ‘ontisch’ (‘ontical’) and ‘ontologisch’ (‘ontological’) are not explicitly defined, their meanings w ill em erge rather clearly. O ntological inquiry is concerned prim arily with Being; ontical inquiry is concerned prim arily w ith entities and the facts about them.

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if 4. The Ontical Priority o f the Question o f Being Science in general may be defined as the totality established through an interconnection of true propositions.1 This definition is not complete, nor does it reach the meaning of science. As ways in which man behaves, sciences have the manner of Being which this entity— man himself— pos­ sesses. This entity we denote by the term “ Dasein” . Scientific research is not the only manner of Being which this entity can have, nor is it the one which lies closest. Moreover, Dasein itself has a special distinctiveness as compared with other entities, and it is worth our while to bring this to view in a provisional way. Here our discussion must anticipate later analyses, in which our results will be authentically exhibited for the first time. Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it. But in that case, this is a constitutive state of Dasein’s Being, and this implies that Dasein, in its Being, has a relation­ ship towards that Being— a relationship which itself is one of Being.2 And this means further that there is some way in which Dasein understands itself in its Being, and that to some degree it does so explicitly. It is pecu­ liar to this entity that with and through its Being, this Being is disclosed to it. Understanding o f Being is itself a definite characteristic o f Dasein’s Being. Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological.3 Here “ Being-ontological” is not yet tantamount to “ developing an ontology” . So if we should reserve the term “ ontology” for that theoreti­ cal inquiry which is explicitly devoted to the meaning o f entities, then what we have had in mind in speaking o f Dasein’s “ Being-ontological” is to be designated as something “ pre-ontological” . It does not signify simply “ being-ontical” , however, but rather “ being in such a way that one has an understanding o f Being” . That kind o f Being towards which Dasein can comport itself in one way or another, and always does comport itself somehow, we call “ exis­ tence” [Existenz]. And because we cannot define Dasein’s essence by citing a “ what” o f the kind that pertains to a subject-matter [eines sachhaltigen Was], and because its essence lies rather in the fact that in each case it 1 ‘ . . . das G an ze eines Begründungszusammenhanges w ahrer Sätze . . See H . 357 below. 2 ‘Z u dieser Seinsverfassung des Daseins gehört aber dann, dass es in seinem Sein zu diesem Sein ein Seinsverhältnis h at.’ This passage is am biguous and m ight also be read as: ‘ . . . and this implies that Dasein, in its Being towards this Being, has a relationship o f Being.’ * ‘ . . . dass es ontologisch ist'. As ‘ontologisch’ m ay be either an adjective or an adverb, w e m ight also write: ‘ . . . that it is ontologically’ . A similar am biguity occurs in the two following sentences, where w e read ‘ Ontologisch-sein’ and ‘ontisch-seiend’ respectively.

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has its Being to be, and has it as its own,1 we have chosen to designate this entity as “ Dasein” , a term which is purely an expression o f its Being [als reiner Seinsausdruck], Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence— in terms o f a possibility o f itself: to be itself or not itself. Dasein has either chosen these possibilities itself, or got itself into them, or grown up in them already. O nly the particular Dasein decides its existence, whether it does so by taking hold or by neglecting. The question o f existence never gets straight­ ened out except through existing itself. The understanding o f oneself which leads along this way we call “ existentiell” .2 The question of existence is one o f Dasein’s ontical ‘affairs’. This does not require that the ontological structure o f existence should be theoretically transparent. The question about that structure aims at the analysis [Auseinanderlegung] o f what constitutes existence. The context [Zusammenhang] o f such structures we call “ existentiality’ . Its analytic has the character o f an understanding which is not existentiell, but rather existential. The task o f an existential analytic of Dasein has been delineated in advance, as regards both its possibility and its necessity, in Dasein’s ontical constitution. So far as existence is the determining character o f Dasein, the onto­ logical analytic o f this entity always requires that existentiality be con­ sidered beforehand. By “ existentiality” we understand the state o f Being that is constitutive for those entities that exist. But in the idea o f such a constitutive state o f Being, the idea o f Being is already included. And thus even the possibility o f carrying through the analytic o f Dasein depends on working out beforehand the question about the meaning o f Being in general. Sciences are ways o f Being in which Dasein comports itself towards entities which it need not be itself. But to Dasein, Being in a world is something that belongs essentially. Thus Dasein’s understanding o f Being pertains with equal primordiality both to an understanding of something like a ‘world’, and to the understanding of the Being o f those entities which become accessible within the world.3 So whenever an ontology takes for its theme entities whose character o f Being is other than that of Dasein, it has its own foundation and motivation in Dasein’s own ontical structure, in which a pre*ontological understanding o f Being is comprised as a definite characteristic. 1 . . dass es je sein Sein als seiniges zu sein h a t . . 2 W e shall translate ‘existenziell’ by ,existentiell’, and ‘existenzial’ by ‘existential’ T h ere seems to be little reason for resorting to the more elaborate neologisms proposed by other writers. 3 . innerhalb der W elt . . H eidegger uses a t least three expressions which m ight be translated as ‘in the w orld’ : ‘innerhalb der W elt’, ‘in der W elt’, and the adjective (or adverb) ‘innerweltlich*. W e shall translate these respectively b y ‘w ithin the w orld’, ‘in the w orld’, and ‘within-the-world’ . B

13

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Therefore fundamental ontology, from which alone all other ontologies can take their rise, must be sought in the existential analytic o f Dasein. Dasein accordingly takes priority over all other entities in several ways. The first priority is an ontical one: Dasein is an entity whose Being has the determinate character of existence. T h e second priority is an ontological one: Dasein is in itself‘ontological’, because existence is thus determinative for it. But with equal primordiality Dasein also possesses— as constitutive for its understanding of existence— an understanding of the Being o f all entities of a character other than its own. Dasein has therefore a third priority as providing the ontico-ontological condition for the possibility o f any ontologies. Thus Dasein has turned out to be, more than any other entity, the one which must first be interrogated ontologically. But the roots of the existential analytic, on its part, are ultimately existentiell, that is, ontical. Only if the inquiry o f philosophical research is itself seized upon in an existentiell manner as a possibility o f the Being o f each existing Dasein, does it become at all possible to disclose the existentiality of existence and to undertake an adequately founded onto­ logical problematic. But with this, the ontical priority of the question of being has also become plain. Dasein’s ontico-ontological priority was seen quite early, though Dasein itself was not grasped in its genuine ontological structure, and did not even become a problem in which this structure was sought. Aristotle satys: r¡ tf>vxq to. ovra nms ianv.vl “ M an’s soul is, in a certain way, entities.” The ‘soul’ which makes up the Being o f man has ataOrjms and voTjins among its ways of Being, and in these it discovers all entities, both in the fact t h a t they are, and in their Being a s they are— that is, always in their Being. Aristotle’s principle, which points back to the ontological thesis of Parmenides, is one which Thomas Aquinas has taken up in a characteristic discussion. Thomas is engaged in the task o f deriving the ‘ transcendentia’— those characters of Being which lie beyond every possible way in which an entity may be classified as coming under some generic kind of subject-matter (every modus specialis entis), and which belong necessarily to anything, whatever it may be. Thomas has to demonstrate that the verum is such a transcendens. He does this by invoking an entity which, in accordance with its very manner of Being, is properly suited to ‘come together with’ entities o f any sort whatever. This distinctive entity, the ens quod natum est convenire cum omni ente, is the soul (anima).vl1 Here the priority o f ‘Dasein’ over all other entities emerges, although it has not been ontologically clarified. This priority has obviously nothing in common with a vicious subjectivizing of the totality of entities. By indicating Dasein’s ontico-ontological priority in this provisional

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manner, we have grounded our demonstration that the question o f Being is ontico-ontologically distinctive. But when we analysed the structure of this question as such (Section 2), we came up against a distinctive way in which this entity functions in the very formulation of that question. Dasein then revealed itself as that entity which must first be worked out in an ontologically adequate manner, if the inquiry is to become a trans­ parent one. But now it has been shown that the ontological analytic of Dasein in general is what makes up fundamental ontology, so that Dasein functions as that entity which in principle is to be interrogated beforehand as to its Being. I f to Interpret the meaning of Being becomes our task, Dasein is not only the primary entity to be interrogated; it is also that entity which already comports itself, in its Being, towards what we are asking about when we ask this question. But in that case the question of Being is nothing other than the radicalization of an essential tendency-of-Being which belongs to Dasein itself— the pre-ontological understanding of Being.

II TH E T W O F O L D T A S K IN W O R K I N G O U T TH E QU ESTIO N OF BEIN G . M E T H O D AND D ESIG N OF O U R IN VESTIG ATIO N f j . The Ontological Analytic o f Dasein as Laying Bare the Horizon fo r an Interpretation o f the Meaning o f Being in General

In designating the tasks o f ‘formulating’ the question o f Being, we have shown not only that we must establish which entity is to serve as our primary object of interrogation, but also that the right way o f access to this entity is one which we must explicitly make our own and hold secure. We have already discussed which entity takes over the principal role within the question o f Being. But how are we, as it were, to set our sights towards this entity, Dasein, both as something accessible to us and as something to be understood and interpreted ? In demonstrating that Dasein in ontico-ontologically prior, we may have misled the reader into supposing that this entity must also be what is given as ontico-ontologically primary not only in the sense that it can itself be'grasped ,immediately’, but also in that the kind o f Being which it possesses is presented just as ‘immediately’. Ontically, of course, Dasein is not only close to us— even that which is closest: we are it, each o f us, we ourselves. In spite o f this, or rather for just this reason, it is ontologically that which is farthest. T o be sure, its ownmost Being is such that it has an understanding of that Being, and already maintains itself in each case as if its Being has been interpreted in some manner. But we are certainly not saying that when Dasein’s own Being is thus interpreted pre-ontologically in the way which lies closest, this interpretation can be taken over as an appropriate clue, as if this way of understanding Being is what must emerge when one’s ownmost state o f Being is considered1 as an onto­ logical theme. The kind of Being which belongs to Dasein is rather such that, in understanding its own Being, it has a tendency to do so in terms o f that entity towards which it comports itself proximally and in a way which is essentially constant— in terms of the ‘world’. In Dasein itself, and therefore in its own understanding of Being, the way the world is 1 ‘Besinnung’ . T h e earliest editions have ‘Bestimm ung’ instead.

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understood is, as we shall show, reflected back ontologically upon the way in which Dasein itself gets interpreted. Thus because Dasein is ontico-ontologically prior, its own specific state of Being (if we understand this in the sense o f Dasein’s ‘categorial structure’) remains concealed from it. Dasein is ontically ‘closest’ to itself and ontologically farthest; but pre-ontologically it is surely not a stranger. Here we have merely indicated provisionally that an Interpretation of this entity is confronted with peculiar difficulties grounded in the kind o f Being which belongs to the object taken as our theme and to the very behaviour o f so taking it. These difficulties are not grounded in any short­ comings o f the cognitive powers with which we are endowed, or in the lack o f a suitable way o f conceiving— a lack which seemingly would not be hard to remedy. Not only, however, does an understanding of Being belong to Dasein, but this understanding develops or decays along with whatever kind of Being Dasein may possess at the time; accordingly there are many ways in which it has been interpreted, and these are all at Dasein’s disposal. Dasein’s ways o f behaviour, its capacities, powers, possibilities, and vicis­ situdes, have been studied with varying extent in philosophical psychology, in anthropology, ethics, and ‘political science’, in poetry, biography, and the writing o f history, each in a different fashion. But the question remains whether these interpretations o f Dasein have been carried through with a primordial existentiality comparable to whatever existentiell primordiality they may have possessed. Neither o f these excludes the other but they do not necessarily go together. Existentiell interpre­ tation can demand an existential analytic, if indeed we conceive of philosophical cognition as something possible and necessary. O nly when the basic structures o f Dasein have been adequately worked out with explicit orientation towards the problem o f Being itself, will what we have hitherto gained in interpreting Dasein get its existential justification. Thus an analytic o f Dasein must remain our first requirement in the question of Being. But in that case the problem o f obtaining and securing the kind o f access which will lead to Dasein, becomes even more a burning one. T o put it negatively, we have no right to resort to dogmatic construc­ tions and to apply just any idea o f Being and actuality to this entity, no matter how ‘self-evident’ that idea may be; nor may any o f the ‘cate­ gories’ which such an idea prescribes be forced upon Dasein without proper ontological consideration. W e must rather choose such a w ay of access and such a kind o f interpretation that this entity can show itself in itself and from itself [an ihm selbst von ihm selbst her]. And this means that it is to be shown as it is proximally and for the most park—

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in its average everydayness.1 In this everydayness there are certain structures which we shall exhibit— not just any accidental structures, but essential ones which, in every kind of Being that factical Dasein may possess, persist as determinative for the character o f its Being. Thus by having regard1for the basic state of Dasein’s everydayness, we shall bring out the Being of this entity in a preparatory fashion. When taken in this way, the analytic o f Dasein remains wholly oriented towards the guiding task of working out the question o f Being. Its limits are thus determined. It cannot attempt to provide a complete ontology of Dasein, which assuredly must be constructed if anything like a ‘philo­ sophical’ anthropology is to have a philosophically adequate basis.2 If our purpose is to make such an anthropology possible, or to lay its ontological foundations, our Interpretation will provide only some o f the ‘pieces’, even though they are by no means inessential ones. O ur analysis of Dasein, however, is not only incomplete; it is also, in the first instance, provisional. It merely brings out the Being o f this entity, without Interpreting its meaning. It is rather a preparatory procedure by which the horizon for the most primordial way o f interpreting Being may be laid bare. Once we have arrived at that horizon, this preparatory analytic o f Dasein will have to be repeated on a higher and authentically onto­ logical basis. We shall point to temporality3 as the meaning of the Being o f that entity which we call “ Dasein” . I f this is to be demonstrated, those structures of Dasein which we shall provisionally exhibit must be Interpreted over again as modes of temporality. In thus interpreting Dasein as temporality, however, we shall not give the answer to our leading question as to the meaning of Being in general. But the ground will have been prepared for obtaining such an answer. 1 ‘ U n d zw ar soll sie das Seiende in dem zeigen, wie es zunächst und zumeist ist, in seiner durchschnittlichen Alltäglichkeit.’ T h e phrase ‘zunächst u nd zum eist’ is one that occurs m any times, though H eidegger does not explain it until Section 71 (H. 370 below), where ‘A lltäglichkeit’ too gets explained. O n ‘zunächst’ see our note 1, p. 25, H . 6. 2 T h e am biguity o f the pronominal references in this sentence and the one before it, reflects a similar am biguity in the G erm an. (T h e English-speaking reader should be reminded that the kind o f philosophical ‘anthropology’ w hich H eidegger has in mind is a study o f m an in the widest sense, and is not to be confused w ith the em pirical sciences o f ‘physical’ and ‘ cultural’ anthropology.) 3 ‘ Zeitlichkeit’ . W hile it is tempting to translate the adjective ‘zeitlich’ and the noun ‘ Zeitlichkeit’ b y their most obvious English cognates, ‘tim ely’ and ‘timeliness’, this would be entirely m isleading; for ‘ tem poral’ and ‘ tem porality’ com e m uch closer to what H eidegger has in mind, not only when he is discussing these words in their popular senses (as he does on the following page) but even when he is using them in his own special sense, as in Section 65 below. (See especially H . 336 below, where ‘Zeitlichkeit’ is defined.) O n the other hand, he occasionally uses the noun ‘T em poralität’ and the adjective ‘ tem poral’ in a sense which he w ill explain later (H. 19). W e shall translate these by ‘T em porality’ and ‘T em p oral’, with initial capitals.

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We have already intimated that Dasein has a pre-ontological Being as its ontically constitutive state. Dasein is in such a way as to b e some­ thing which understands something like Being.1 Keeping this inter­ connection firmly in mind, we shall show that whenever Dasein tacitly understands and interprets something like Being, it does so with time as its standpoint. Tim e must be brought to light— and genuinely conceived— as the horizon for all understanding of Being and for any way o f interpreting it. In order for us to discern this, time needs to be explicated primordially as the horizon for the understanding o f Being, and in terms o f temporality as the Being o f Dasein, which understands Being. This task as a

whole requires that the conception of time thus obtained shall be dis­ tinguished from the way in which it is ordinarily understood. This ordinary way of understanding it has become explicit in an interpretation precipitated in the traditional concept o f time, which has persisted from Aristode to Bergson and even later. Here we must make clear that this conception o f time and, in general, the ordinary way o f understanding it, have sprung from temporality, and we must show how this has come about. We shall thereby restore to the ordinary conception the autonomy which is its rightful due, as against Bergson’s thesis that the time one has in mind in this conception is space. ‘Tim e’ has long functioned as an ontological— or rather an ontical— criterion for naively discriminating various realms o f entities. A distinc­ tion has been made between ‘temporal’ entities (natural processes and historical happeiiings) and ‘non-temporal’ entities (spatial and numerical relationships). W e are accustomed to contrasting the ‘timeless’ meaning o f propositions with the ‘temporal’ course o f propositional assertions. It is also held that there is a ‘cleavage’ between ‘temporal’ entities and the ‘supra-temporal’ eternal, and efforts are made to bridge this over. Here ‘temporal’ always means simply being [seiend] ‘in time’— a designation which, admittedly, is still pretty obscure. The Fact remains that time, in the sense o f ‘being [sein] in time’, functions as a criterion for distinguishing realms o f Being. Hitherto no one has asked or troubled to investigate how time has come to have this distinctive ontological function, or with what right anything like time functions as such a criterion; nor has anyone asked whether the authentic ontological relevance which is possible for it, gets expressed when “ time” is used in so naively ontological a manner. ‘Tim e’ has acquired this ‘self-evident’ ontological function' ‘o f its own accord’, so to speak; indeed it has done so within the horizon o f the way it is ordinarily understood. And it has maintained itself in this function to this day. 1 ‘D asein ist in der W eise, seiend so etwas wie Sein zu verstehen.’

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In contrast to all this, our treatment o f the question of the meaning of Being must enable us to show that the central problematic o f all ontology is rooted in the phenomenon o f time, i f rightly seen and rightly explained, and we must show how this is the case. I f Being is to be conceived in terms of time, and if, indeed, its various modes and derivatives are to become intelligible in their respective modifications and derivations by taking time into consideration, then Being itself (and not merely entities, let us say, as entities ‘in time’) is thus made visible in its ‘temporal’ character. But in that case, ‘temporal’ can no longer mean simply ‘being in time’. Even the ‘non-temporal’ and the ‘supra-temporaP are ‘temporal’ with regard to their Being, and not just privatively by contrast with something ‘temporal’ as an entity ‘in time’, but in a positive sense, though it is one which we must first explain. In both pre-philosophical and philosophical usage the expression ‘tem­ poral’ has been pre-empted by the signification we have cited; in the following investigations, however, we shall employ it for another significa­ tion. Thus the way in which Being and its modes and characteristics have their meaning determined primordially in terms o f time, is what we shall call its “ Temporal” determinateness.1 Thus the fundamental ontological task of Interpreting Being as such includes working out the Temporality o f Being. In the exposition of the problematic o f Temporality the question o f the meaning o f Being will first be concretely answered. Because Being cannot be grasped except by taking time into considera­ tion, the answer to the question of Being cannot lie in any proposition that is blind and,isolated. The answer is not properly conceived if what it asserts propositionally is just passed along, especially if it gets circulated as a free-floating result, so that we merely get informed about a ‘standpoint’ which may perhaps differ from the way this has hitherto been treated. Whether the answer is a ‘new’ one remains quite superficial and is o f no importance. Its positive character must lie in its being ancient enough for us to learn to conceive the possibilities which the ‘Ancients’ have made ready for us. In its ownmost meaning this answer tells us that concrete ontological research must begin with an investigative inquiry w hich keeps within the horizon we have laid bare; and this is all that it tells us. If, then, the answer to the question of Being is to provide the clues for our research, it cannot be adequate until it brings us the insight that the specific kind o f Being o f ontology hitherto, and the vicissitudes o f its inquiries, its findings, and its failures, have been necessitated in the very character o f Dasein. 1 ‘seine tcmporaU Bestimmtheit’ . See our note 3, p. 38, H . 17 above.

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If 6. The Task o f Destroying the History o f Ontology A ll research— and not least that which operates within the range o f the central question o f Being— is an ontical possibility o f Dasein. Dasein’s Being finds its meaning in temporality. But temporality is also the con­ dition which makes historicality possible as a temporal kind o f Being which Dasein itself possesses, regardless o f whether or how Dasein is an entity ‘in time’. Historicality, as a determinate character, is prior to what is called “ history” (world-historical historizing).1 “ Historicality” stands for the state of Being that is constitutive for Dasein’s ‘historizing’ as such; only on the basis o f such ‘historizing’ is anything like ‘world-history’ possible or can anything belong historically to world-history. In its factical Being, any Dasein is as it already was, and it is ‘what’ it already was. It is its past, whether explicidy or not. And this is so not only in that its past is, as it were, pushing itself along ‘behind’ it, and that Dasein possesses what is past as a property which is still presentat-hand and which sometimes has after-effects upon it: Dasein ‘is’ its past in the way o f its own Being, which, to put it roughly, ‘historizes’ out of its future on each occasion.2 Whatever the way o f being it may have at the time, and thus with whatever understanding o f Being it may possess, Dasein has grown up both i n t o and i n a traditional way of interpreting itself: in terms of this it understands itself proximally and, within a certain range, constantly. By this understanding, the possibilities o f its Being are disclosed and regulated. Its own past— and this always means the past of its ‘generation’— is not something which follows along after Dasein, but something which already goes ahead of it. This elemental historicality o f Dasein may remain hidden from Dasein itself. But there is a way by which it can be discovered and given proper attention. Dasein can discover tradition, preserve it, and study it explicitly. The discovery o f tradition and the disclosure o f what it ‘transmits’ and how this is transmitted, can be taken hold o f as a task in its own right. In this way Dasein brings itself into the kind of Being which consists in historiological inquiry and research. But historiology— or more precisely historicity3— is possible as a kind of Being which the inquiring Dasein may 1 ‘weltgeschichtliches Geschehen’. W hile the verb ‘geschehen’ ordinarily means to ‘happen’, and w ill often be so translated, H eidegger stresses its etym ological kinship to ‘ Geschichte’ or ‘history’ . T o bring out this connection, w e have coined the verb ‘historize’, w hich m ight be paraphrased as to ‘happen in a historical w a y ’ ; w e shall usually translate *geschehen’ this w ay in contexts where history is being discussed. W e trust that the reader w ill keep in mind that such ‘historizing’ is characteristic o f all historical entities, and is not the sort o f thing that is done prim arily b y historians (as ‘philosophizing’ , for instance, is done by philosophers). (O n ‘world-historical’ see H . 381 if.) 2 ‘Das Dasein “ ist” seine V ergangenheit in der W eise seines Seins, das, roh gesagt, jew eils aus seiner Zukunft her “ geschieht” .’ , ^, 3 ‘H istorizität’ . Cf. note 2, p. 31. H . 10 above.

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possess, only because historicality is a determining characteristic for Dasein in the very basis of its Being. I f this historicality remains hidden from Dasein, and as long as it so remains, Dasein is also denied the possibility o f historiological inquiry or the discovery of history. I f historiology is wanting, this is not evidence against Dasein’s historicality; on the contrary, as a deficient mode1 o f this state o f Being, it is evidence for it. O nly because it is ‘historical’ can an era be unhistoriological. O n the other hand, if Dasein has seized upon its latent possibility not only o f making its own existence transparent to itself but also o f inquiring into the meaning o f existentiality itself (that is to say, o f previously inquiring into the meaning o f Being in general), and if by such inquiry its eyes have been opened to its own essential historicality, then one cannot fail to see that the inquiry into Being (the ontico-ontological necessity of which we have already indicated) is itself characterized by historicality. The ownmost meaning of Being which belongs to the inquiry into Being as an historical inquiry, gives us the assignment [Anweisung] o f inquiring into the history of that inquiry itself, that is, o f becoming historiological. In working out the question o f Being, we must heed this assignment, so that by positively making the past our own, we may bring ourselves into full possession o f the ownmost possibilities o f such inquiry. The question o f the meaning of Being must be carried through by explicating Dasein beforehand in its temporality and historicality; the question thus brings itself to the point where it understands itself as historiological. O ur preparatory Interpretation o f the fundamental structures of Dasein with regard to the average kind of Being which is closest to it (a kind o f Being-iq. which it is therefore proximally historical as well), will make manifest, however, not only that Dasein is inclined to fall back upon its world (the world in which it is) and to interpret itself in terms o f that world by its reflected light, but also that Dasein simultaneously falls prey to the tradition of which it has more or less explicitly taken hold.2 This tradition keeps it from providing its own guidance, whether in 1 ‘defizienter M odus’ . H eidegger likes to think o f certain characteristics as occurring in various ways or ‘modes’, am ong which m ay be included certain ways o f ‘not occurring’ or ‘occurring only to an inadequate extent’ or, in general, occurring ‘deficiently’ . It is as if zero and the negative integers were to be thought o f as representing ‘deficient modes o f being a positive integer’ . 2 ‘. . . das Dasein hat nicht nur die Geneigtheit, an seine W elt, in der es ist, zu verfallen and reluzent aus ihr her sich auszulegen, Dasein verfällt in eins dam it auch seiner m ehr oder m inder ausdrücklich ergriffenen T radition.’ T h e verb ‘verfallen’ is one w hich H eidegger w ill use m any times. T hough w e shall usually translate it simply as ‘fall’, it has the connotation o f deteriorating, collapsing, or falling down. Neither our ‘fall back upon’ nor our ‘falls prey to’ is quite rig h t: but ‘fall upon’ and ‘fall on to’, which are more literal, would be misleading for ‘an . . . zu verfallen’ ; and though ‘falls to the lot o f ’ and ‘devolves upon’ would do w ell for *verfallt’ w ith the dative in other contexts, they w ill not do so w ell here.

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inquiring or in choosing. This holds true— and by no means least— for that understanding which is rooted in Dasein’s ownmost Being, and for the possibility of developing it— namely, for ontological understanding. When tradition thus becomes master, it does so in such a way that what it ‘transmits’ is made so inaccessible, proximally and for the most part, that it rather becomes concealed. Tradition takes what has come down to us and delivers it over to self-evidence; it blocks our access to those primordial ‘sources’ from which the categories and concepts handed down to us have been in part quite genuinely drawn.1 Indeed it makes iis forget that they have had such an origin, and makes us suppose that the neces­ sity of going back to these sources is something which we need not even understand. Dasein has had its historicality so thoroughly uprooted by tradition that it confines its interest to the multiformity of possible types, directions, and standpoints of philosophical activity in the most exotic and alien of cultures; and by this very interest it seeks to veil the fact that it has no ground o f its own to stand on. Consequently, despite all its historiological interests and all its zeal for an Interpretation which is philologically ‘objective’ [“ sachliche” ], Dasein no longer understands the most elementary conditions which would alone enable it to go back to the past in a positive manner and make it productively its own. We have shown at the outset (Section 1) not only that the question of the meaning of Being is one that has not been attended to and one that has been inadequately formulated, but that it has become quite forgotten in spite of all our interest in ‘metaphysics’. Greek ontology and its history — which, in their numerous filiations and distortions, determine the con­ ceptual character o f philosophy even today— prove that when Dasein understands either itself or Being in general, it does so in terms o f the ‘world’, and that the ontology which has thus arisen has deteriorated [verfällt] to a tradition in which it gets reduced to something self-evident — merely material for reworking, as it was for Hegel. In the Middle Ages this uprooted Greek ontology became a fixed body o f doctrine. Its systematics, however, is by no means a mere joining together o f traditional pieces into a single edifice. Though its basic conceptions o f Being have been taken over dogmatically from the Greeks, a great deal of unpre­ tentious work has been carried on further within these limits. W ith the peculiar character which the Scholastics gave it, Greek ontology has, in its essentials, travelled the path that leads through the Disputationes metaphysicae of Suarez to the ‘metaphysics’ and transcendental philosophy ■of modern times, determining even the foundations and the aims o f Hegel’s 1 In this passage’ H eidegger juxtaposes a num ber o f words beginning w ith the prefix ‘über-’ ; ‘übergibt’ (‘ transmits’) ; ‘überantwortet’ (,delivers over’ ) ; ‘das Überkom m ene’ (‘w hat has come down to us’) ; ‘überlieferten’ (‘handed down to us’).

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‘logic’. In the course o f this history certain distinctive domains o f Being have come into view and have served as the primary guides for subsequent problematics: the ego cogito o f Descartes, the subject, the “ I ” , reason, spirit, person. But these all remain uninterrogated as to their Being and its structure, in accordance with the thoroughgoing way in which the question o f Being has been neglected. It is rather the case that the cate­ gorial content o f the traditional ontology has been carried over to these entities with corresponding formalizations and purely negative restric­ tions, or else dialectic has been called in for the purpose of Interpreting the substantiality o f the subject ontologically. If the question of Being is to have its own history made transparent, then this hardened tradition must be loosened up, and the concealments which it has brought about1 must be dissolved. We understand this task as one in which by taking the question o f Being as our clue, we are to destroy the traditional content o f ancient ontology until we arrive at those prim­ ordial experiences in which we achieved our first ways o f determining the nature o f Being— the ways which have guided us ever since. In thus demonstrating the origin o f our basic ontological concepts by an investigation in which their ‘birth certificate’ is displayed, we have nothing to do with a vicious relativizing of ontological standpoints. But this destruction is just as far from having the negative sense of shaking off the ontological tradition. We must, on the contrary, stake out the positive possibilities o f that tradition, and this always means keeping it within its limits; these in turn are given factically in the way the question is for­ mulated at the time, and in the way the possible field for investigation is thus bounded off. On its negative side, this destruction does not relate itself towards the past; its criticism is aimed at ‘today’ and at the prevalent way o f treating the history of ontology, whether it is headed towards doxography, towards intellectual history, or towards a history o f problems. But to bury the past in nullity [Nichtigkeit] is not the purpose of this destruction; its aim is positive; its negative function remains unexpressed and indirect. The destruction o f the history o f ontology is essentially bound up with the way the question of Being is formulated, and it is possible only within such a formulation. In the framework o f our treatise, which aims at working out that question in principle, we can carry out this destruction only with regard to stages of that history which are in principle decisive. In line with the positive tendencies of this destruction, we must in the first instance raise the question whether and to what extent the 1 ‘ . . . der durch sie gezeitigten Verdeckungen.’ T h e verb ‘zeitigen’ w ill appear fre­ quently in later chapters. See H . 304 and our note ad loc.

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Interpretation o f Being and the phenomenon o f time have been brought together thematically in the course o f the history o f ontology, and whether the problematic o f Temporality required for this has ever been worked out in principle or ever could have been. The first and only person who has gone any stretch o f the way towards investigating the dimension of Temporality or has even let himself be drawn hither by the coercion of the phenomena themselves is Kant. Only when we have established the problematic o f Temporality, can we succeed in casting light on the obscurity o f his doctrine of the schematism. But this will also show us why this area is one which had to remain closed off to him in its real dimensions and its central ontological function. K ant himself was aware that he was venturing into an area of obscurity: ,This schematism o f our understanding as regards appearances and their mere form is an art hidden in the depths o f the human soul, the true devices o f which are hardly ever to be divined from Nature and laid uncovered before our eyes.’1 Here K ant shrinks back, as it were, in the face o f something which must be brought to light as a theme and a principle if the expression “ Being” is to have any demonstrable meaning. In the end, those very phenomena which will be exhibited under the heading o f ‘Temporality’ in our analysis, are precisely those most covert judgments of the ‘common reason’ for which K ant says it is the ‘business o f philosophers’ to provide an analytic. In pursuing this task of destruction with the problematic of Temporality as our clue, we shall try to Interpret the chapter on the schematism and the Kantian doctrine o f time, taking that chapter as our point o f depar­ ture. A t the same time we shall show why K ant could never achieve an insight into the problematic o f Temporality. There were two things that stood in his way: in the first place, he altogether neglected the problem o f Being; and, in connection with this, he failed to provide an ontology with Dasein as its theme or (to put this in Kantian language) to give a preliminary ontological analytic o f the subjectivity o f the subject. Instead o f this, K ant took over Descartes’ position quite dogmatically, notwith­ standing all the essential respects in which he had gone beyond him. Furthermore, in spite of the fact that he was bringing the phenomenon of time back into the subject again, his analysis o f it remained oriented towards the traditional way in which time had been ordinarily under­ stood; in the long run this kept him from working out the phenomenon o f a ‘transcendental determination o f time’ in its own structure and func­ tion. Because of this double effect o f tradition the decisive connection between time and the ‘I think,' was shrouded in utter darkness; it did not even become a problem.

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In taking over Descartes’ ontological position K ant made an essential omission: he failed to provide an ontology o f Dasein. This omission was a decisive one in the spirit [im Sinne] o f Descartes’ ownmost Tendencies. W ith the ‘cogito sum’ Descartes had claimed that he was putting philo­ sophy on a new and firm footing. But what he left undetermined when he began in this ‘radical’ way, was the kind o f Being which belongs to the res cogitans, or— more precisely— the meaning o f the Being o f the ‘sum’ . 1 By working out the unexpressed ontological foundations o f the ‘cogito sum’ , we shall complete our sojourn at the second station along the path o f our destructive retrospect of the history o f ontology. O ur Interpretation will not only prove that Descartes had to neglect the question o f Being alto­ gether; it will also show why he came to suppose that the absolute ‘Beingcertain’ [“ Gewisssein” ] o f the cogito exempted him from raising the ques­ tion o f the meaning o f the Being which this entity possesses. Y et Descartes not only continued to neglect this and thus to accept a completely indefinite ontological status for the res cogitans sive mens sive animus [‘the thing which cognizes, whether it be a mind or spirit’] : he regarded this entity as a fundamentum inconcussum, and applied the medieval ontology to it in carrying through the fundamental considerations o f his Meditationes. He defined the res cogitans ontologically as an ens; and in the medieval ontology the meaning o f Being for such an ens had been fixed by understanding it as an ens creatum. God, as ens infinitum, was the ens i n c r e a t u m . But createdness [Geschaffenheit] in the widest sense of something’s having been produced [Hergestelltheit], was an essential item in the structure o f the ancient conception o f Being. The seemingly new beginning which Descartes proposed for philosophizing has revealed itself as the implantation o f a baleful prejudice, which has kept later generations from making any thematic ontological analytic of the ‘mind’ [“ Gemütes” ] such as would take the question o f Being as a clue and would at the same time come to grips critically with the traditional ancient ontology. Everyone who is acquainted with the middle ages sees that Descartes is ‘dependent’ upon medieval scholasticism and employs its terminology. But with this ‘discovery’ nothing is achieved philosophically as long as it remains obscure to what a profound extent the medieval ontology has influenced the way in which posterity has determined or failed to deter­ mine the ontological character o f the res cogitans. The full extent o f this cannot be estimated until both the meaning and the limitations o f the ancient ontology have been exhibited in terms o f an orientation directed 1 W e follow the later editions in reading ‘der Seinssinn des “ sum” ’ . T h e earlier editions have an anacoluthic ‘den’ for ‘der’.

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towards the question of Being. In other words, in our process o f destruc­ tion we find ourselves faced with the task of Interpreting the basis o f the ancient ontology in the light of the problematic of Temporality. When this is done, it will be manifest that the ancient way of interpreting the Being of entities is oriented towards the ‘world’ or ‘Nature’ in the widest sense, and that it is indeed in terms of ‘time’ that its understanding of Being is obtained. The outward evidence for this (though o f course it is merely outward evidence) is the treatment o f the meaning o f Being as •napovoia or overla, which signifies, in ontologico-Temporal terms, ‘presence’ [“ Anwesenheit” ] .1 Entities are grasped in their Being as ‘pre­ sence’ ; this means that they are understood with regard to a definite mode o f time— the ‘Present’2 The problematic o f Greek ontology, like that o f any other, must take its clues from Dasein itself. In both ordinary and philosophical usage, Dasein, man’s Being, is ‘defined’ as the ¡¡,wov X6yov e%ov— as that living thing whose Being is essentially determined by the potentiality for dis­ course.3 Xdyeiv is the clue for arriving at those structures of Being which belong to the entities we encounter in addressing ourselves to anything or speaking about it [im Ansprechen und Besprechen]. (Cf. Section 7 b .) This is why the ancient ontology as developed by Plato turns into ‘dialec­ tic’. As the ontological clue gets progressively worked out— namely, in the ‘hermeneutic’ o f the Aoyos— it becomes increasingly possible to grasp the problem o f Being in a more radical fashion. The ‘dialectic’, which has been a genuine philosophical embarrassment, becomes superfluous. That 1 T h e noun ovaia is derived from one o f the stems used in conjugating the irregular verb tlvat, (‘to be’) ; in the Aristotelian tradition it is usually translated as ‘substance’, though translators o f Plato are more likely to write ‘essence’, ‘existence’, or ‘being’ . H eidegger suggests that ovaia is to be thought o f as synonymous with the derivative noun napovoia (‘being-at’, ‘presence’). As he points out, napovoia has a close etym ological correspondence w ith the G erm an ‘Anwesenheit’, which is sim ilarly derived from the stem o f a verb m eaning ‘ to be’ (Cf. O .H .G . ‘wesan’ ) and a prefix o f the place or tim e at which (‘an-’ ). W e shall in general translate ‘Anwesenheit’ as ‘presence’, and the participle ‘anwesend’ as some form o f the expression ‘have presence’. 2 ‘die “ Gegenwart” ’ . W hile this noun m ay, like napovoia or ‘Anwesenheit’, mean the presence o f someone at some place or on some occasion, it more often means the present, as distinguished from the past and the future. In its etym ological root-structure, however, it means a waiting-towards. W hile H eidegger seems to think o f a ll these meanings as somehow fused, w e shall generally translate this noun as ‘ the Present’, reserving ‘in the present’ for the corresponding adjective ‘gegenw ärtig’ . 3 T h e phrase (wov Xoyov ex»v is traditionally translated as ‘rational anim al’, on the assumption that Aoyos refers to the faculty o f reason. H eidegger, however, points out that Aoyos is derived from the same root as the verb Xtyeiv (‘ to talk’, ‘to hold discourse’ ); he identifies this in turn w ith votiv (‘to cognize’, ‘to be aware o f ’, ‘ to know’ ), and calls attention to the fact that the same stem is found in the adjective SiaAexrocoy (‘dialectical’ ). (See also H . 165 below.) H e thus interprets Aoyos as ‘R ed e’ , which w e shall usually translate as ‘discourse’ or ‘talk’, depending on the context. See Section 7 b below (H. 32 if.) and Sections 34 and 35, where ‘R ed e’ w ill be defined and distinguished both from ‘Sprache’ (‘language’ ) and from ‘G erede’ (‘idle talk’) (H. 160 ff.).

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is why Aristotle ‘no longer has any understanding’ o f it, for he has put it on a more radical footing and raised it to a new level [aufhob]. Xeyeiv itself— or rather voelv, that simple awareness o f something present-athand in its sheer presence-at-hand,1 which Parmenides had already taken to guide him in his own interpretation o f Being— has the Temporal structure o f a pure ‘making-present’ o f something.2 Those entities which show themselves in this and fo r it, and which are understood as entities in the most authentic sense, thus get interpreted with regard to the Present; that is, they are conceived as presence (ovaia).3 Y et the Greeks have managed to interpret Being in this way without any explicit knowledge o f the clues which function here, without any acquaintance with the fundamental ontological function o f time or even any understanding o f it, and without any insight into the reason why this function is possible. O n the contrary, they take time itself as one entity among other entities, and try to grasp it in the structure o f its Being, though that way o f understanding Being which they have taken as their horizon is one which is itself naively and inexplicitly oriented towards time. Within the framework in which we are about to work out the principles of the question o f Being, we cannot present a detailed Temporal Inter­ pretation o f the foundations o f ancient ontology, particularly not o f its loftiest and purest scientific stage, which is reached in Aristotle. Instead we shall give an interpretation o f Aristotle’s essay on time,11 which may be chosen as providing a way o f discriminating the basis and the limitations of the ancient science o f Being. Aristotle’s essay on time is the first detailed Interpretation o f this 1 *. . . von etwas V orhandenem in seiner puren Vorhandenheit . . T h e adjective ‘vorhanden’ means literally ‘beforo /the hand’ , bu t this signification has long since given w ay to others. In ordinary G erm an usage it m ay, for instance, be applied to the stock o f goods which a dealer has ‘on hand’, or to the ‘extant’ works o f an author; and in earlier philosophical w riting it could be used, like the word ‘Dasein’ itself, as a synonym for the L atin 'exislentia'. H eidegger, however, distinguishes quite sharply between ‘D asein’ and ‘Vorhandenheit’, using the latter to designate a kind o f Being w hich belongs to things other than Dasein. W e shall translate ‘vorhanden’ as ‘present-at-hand’, and ‘V orhanden­ heit’ as ‘presence-at-hand’. T h e reader must be careful not to confuse these expressions w ith our ‘presence’ (‘Anwesenheit’ ) and ‘ the Present’ (‘die G egenw art’ ), etc., or w ith a few other verbs and adjectives which w e m ay find it convenient to translate b y ‘present’ . 2 ‘ . . . des reinen “ Gegenwärtigens” von etwas’. T h e verb ‘gegenwärtigen’, w hich is derived from the adjective ‘gegenwärtig’, is not a norm al G erm an verb, but was used by Husserl and is used extensively by H eidegger. W hile we shall translate it b y various forms o f ‘m ake present’, it does not necessarily m ean ‘m aking physically present’, but often means something like ,bringing v ividly to m ind’. 3 ,D as Seiende, das sich in ihm für es zeigt und das a b das eigentliche Seiende verstanden w ird, erhält dem nach seine Auslegung in Rücksicht a u f— Gegen-wart, d.h. es ist a b Anwesenheit (ovoia) begriffen.’ T h e hyphenation o f ‘G egen-w art’ calb attention to the structure o f this w ord in a w a y which cannot be reproduced in English. See note 2, p. 47, H . 35 above. T h e pronouns ,ihm ’ and ,es’ presum ably both refer back to Aeytiv, though their reference b ambiguous, as our version suggests.

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phenomenon which has come down to us. Every subsequent account of time, including Bergson’s, has been essentially determined by it. When we analyse the Aristotelian conception, it will likewise become clear, as we go back, that the Kantian account o f time operates within the structures which Aristotle has set forth; this means that K ant’s basic ontological orientation remains that o f the Greeks, in spite o f all the distinctions which arise in a new inquiry. The question o f Being does not achieve its true concreteness until we have carried through the process o f destroying the ontological tradition. In this way we can fully prove that the question o f the meaning o f Being is one that we cannot avoid, and we can demonstrate what it means to talk about ‘restating’ this question. In any investigation in this field, where ‘the thing itself is deeply veiled’111 one must take pains not to overestimate the results. For in such an inquiry one is constantly compelled to face the possibility o f disclosing an even more primordial and more universal horizon from which we may draw the answer to the question, “ W hat is ‘Being’■?” W e can discuss such possibilities seriously and with positive results only if the question o f Being has been reawakened and we have arrived at a field where we can come to terms with it in a way that can be controlled. Tf 7. The Phenomenological Method o f Investigation In provisionally characterizing the object which serves as the theme o f our investigation (the Being of entities, or the meaning o f Being in general), it seems that we have also delineated the method to be employed. T h e task o f ontology is to explain Being itself and to make the Being of entities stand out in full relief. And the method of ontology remains questionable in the highest degree as long as we merely consult those ontologies which have come down to us historically, or other essays o f that character. Since the term “ ontology” is used in this investigation in a sense which is formally broad, any attempt to clarify the method o f ontology by tracing its history is automatically ruled out. When, moreover, we use the term “ ontology” , we are not talking about some definite philosophical discipline standing in interconnection with the others. Here one does not have to measure up to the tasks o f some discipline that has been presented beforehand; on the contrary, only in terms of the objective necessities o f definite questions and the kind of treatment which the ‘things themselves’ require, can one develop such a discipline. With the question o f the meaning o f Being, our investigation comes up

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against the fundamental question o f philosophy. This is one that must be treated phenomenologically. Thus our treatise does not subscribe to a ‘stand­ point’ or represent any special ‘direction’ ; for phenomenology is nothing of either sort, nor can it become so as long as it understands itself. The expression ‘phenomenology’ signifies primarily a methodological concep­ tion. This expression does not characterize the w h a t of the objects of philosophical research as subject-matter, but rather the how o f that research. The more genuinely a methodological concept is worked out and the more comprehensively it determines the principles on which a science is to be conducted, all the more primordially is it rooted in the way we come to terms with the things themselves,1 and the farther is it removed from what we call “ technical devices” , though there are many such devices even in the theoretical disciplines. Thus the term ‘phenomenology’ expresses a maxim which can be for­ mulated as ‘T o the things themselves!’ It is opposed to all free-floating constructions and accidental findings; it is opposed to taking over any conceptions which only seem to have been demonstrated; it is opposed to those pseudo-questions which parade themselves as ‘problems’, often for generations at a time. Y et this maxim, one may rejoin, is abundantly self-evident, and it expresses, moreover, the underlying principle o f any scientific knowledge whatsoever. W hy should anything so self-evident be taken up explicitly in giving a title to a branch o f research ? In point of fact, the issue here is a kind of ‘self-evidence’ which we should like to bring closer to us, so far as it is important to do so in casting light upon the procedure o f our treatise. We shall expound only the preliminary conception [Vorbegriff] of phenomenology. This expression has two components: “ phenomenon” and “ logos” . Both of these go back to t6rms fr^om the Greek: aa!6fievov and Aoyos. Taken superficially, the term “ phenomenology” is formed like “ theology” , “ biology” , “ sociology” — names which may be translated as “ science of God” , “ science o f life” , “ science of society” . This would make pheno­ menology the science o f phenomena. We shall set forth the preliminary con­ ception of phenomenology by characterizing what one has in mind in the term’s two components, ‘phenomenon’ and ‘logos’, and by establishing the meaning o f the name in which these are put together. The history of 1 T h e appeal to the ,Sachen selbst’, which H eidegger presents as virtually a slogan for Husserl’s phenomenology, is not easy to translate without giving misleading impressions. W h at Husserl has in mind is the ‘ things’ that words m ay be found to signify when their significations are correctly intuited by the right kind o f Anschauung. (Cf. his Logische Untersuchungen, vol. 2, part 1, second edition, H alle, 1913, p. 6.) W e have followed M arvin Farber in adopting ‘ the things themselves’ . (Cf. his The Foundation o f Phenomenology, C am bridge, Mass., 1943, pp. 202-3.) T h e word ‘Sache’ w ill, o f course, be translated in other ways also.

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the word itself, which presumably arose in the Wolffian school, is here of no significance. A. The Concept o f Phenomenon

The Greek expression at,voyuevov, to which the term ‘phenomenon’ goes back, is derived from the verb aiveodai, which signifies “ to show itself” . Thus aivo[ievov means that which shows itself, the manifest [das, was sich zeigt, das Sichzeigende, das Offenbare], alveodai itself is a middle-voiced form which comes from aIvai— to bring to the light of day, to put in the light. — that he (Parmenides) was compelled to follow that which showed itself in itself. In another passage he remarks that these thinkers carried on their researches wr’ ainfjs rijs aX-qOelas avayKa£o/x€vchxx1v— “ compelled by the ‘truth’ itself” . Aristotle describes these researches as iXoaoeiv nepl rijs aAij0iia jxxv— “ ‘philosophizing’ about the ‘truth’ ” — or even as dnoau/eo8ai nepl rrjs dAij0eiasxxvl— as exhibit­ ing something and letting it be seen with regard to the ‘truth’ and within the range o f the ‘truth’. Philosophy itself is defined as hnarr¡¡¡.!¡ rijs dXrjdelasxxvU— “ the science o f the ‘truth’ ” . But it is also char­ acterized as emcrTij/xij, r¡ OetapeZ t¿ ov rj ovxxvl‫ —״‬as “ a science which con­ templates entities as entities” — that is, with regard to their Being. W hat is signified here by ‘carrying on researches into the “ truth” ’, by “ science o f the ‘truth’ ” ? In such researches is ‘truth’ made a theme as it would be in a theory of knowledge or of judgment? Manifestly not, for ‘truth’ signifies the same as ‘thing’ [“ Sache” ], ‘something that shows itself’. But what then does the expression ‘truth’ signify if it can be used as a term for ‘entity’ and ‘Being’ ? If, however, truth rightfully has a primordial connection with Being, then the phenomenon of truth comes within the range o f the problem­ atic of fundamental ontology. In that case, must not this phenomenon have been encountered already within our preparatory fundamental analysis, the analytic of Dasein? W hat ontico-ontological connection does ‘truth’ have with Dasein and with that ontical characteristic of Dasein which we call the “ understanding of Being” ? Can the reason why Being necessarily goes together with truth and vice versa be pointed out in terms of such understanding? These questions are not to be evaded. Because Being does indeed ‘go together’ with truth, the phenomenon o f truth has already been one o f the themes of our earlier analyses, though not explicitly under this title. In

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giving precision to the problem of Being, it is now time to delimit the phenomenon of truth explicitly and to fix the problems which it comprises. In doing this, we should not just take together what we have previously taken apart. O ur investigation requires a new approach. Our analysis takes its departure from the traditional conception o f truth, and attempts to lay bare the ontological foundations of that conception (a). In terms o f these foundations the primordial phenomenon o f truth becomes visible. W e can then exhibit the way in which the traditional conception o f truth has been derived from this phenomenon (b). Our investigation will make it plain that to the question of the ‘essence’ of truth, there belongs necessarily the question of the kind o f Being which truth possesses. Together with this we must clarify the ontological meaning o f the kind o f talk in which we say that ‘there is truth’, and we must also clarify the kind of necessity with which ‘we must presuppose’ that ‘there is’ truth (c). (a) The Traditional Conception o f Truth, and its Ontological Foundations

There are three theses which characterize the way in which the essence of truth has been traditionally taken and the way it is supposed to have been first defined: (1) that the ‘locus’ of truth is assertion (judgment); (2) that the essence o f truth lies in the ‘agreement’ of thp judgment with its object; (3) that Aristotle, the father of logic, not only has assigned truth to the judgment as its primordial locus but has set going the defini­ tion of “ truth” as ‘agreement’.1 Here it is not our aim to provide a history o f the concept o f truth, which could be presented only on the basis of a history o f ontology. W e shall introduce our analytical discussions by alluding to some familiar matters. Aristotle says that the n a d ^ i i a r a r r j s are t w v i r p a y j j i a T a i v o y . o u L jtiaTa3“ 1*— that the soul’s ‘Experiences’, its v o ^ a ra (,representations’), are likenings of Things. This assertion, which is by no means proposed as an explicit definition o f the essence of truth, has also given occasion for developing the later formulation o f the essence of truth as adaequatio intellectus et rei.2 Thomas Aquinas,xxx who refers this definition to Avicenna (who, in turn, has taken it over from Isaac Israeli’s tenth-century ‘Book o f Definitions') also uses for “ adaequatio" (likening) the terms “ correspondentia" (“ correspondence” ) and “ convenientia" (“ coming together” ). 1 H ere w e follow the older editions in reading . . hat sowohl die W ahrheit dem U rteil als ihrem ursprünglichen O r t zugewiesen als auch die Definition der W ahrheit als “ Ü bereinstim m ung” in G an g gebracht.* T h e newer editions read . . hat sowohl . . . zugewiesen, er hat auch . . * T his is usually translated as ‘adequation o f the intellect and the thing’ . H eidegger makes the connection seem closer b y translating both the L atin adaequatio and the Greek ¿ßoiwfia by the w ord ‘A ngleichung’, w hich w e have som ewhat arbitrarily translated as ‘likening’ .

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The neo-Kantian epistemology of the nineteenth century often char­ acterized this definition o f “ truth” as an expression o f a methodologically retarded naive realism, and declared it to be irreconcilable with any formulation o f this question which has undergone K ant’s ‘ Copernican revolution’. But K ant too adhered to this conception o f truth, so much so that he did not even bring it up for discussion; this has been overlooked, though Brentano has already called our attention to it. ‘The old and celebrated question with which it was supposed that one might drive the logicians into a corner is this: “ what is truth?” The explanation o f the name o f truth— namely, that it is the agreement o f knowledge with its object— will here be granted and presupposed . . .,xxxl. ‘I f truth consists in the agreement o f knowledge with its object, then this object must thus be distinguished from others; for knowledge is false if it does not agree with the object to which it is related, even if it should contain something which might well be valid for other objects.’*“ 11 And in the introduction to the “ Transcendental Dialectic” K ant states: ‘Truth and illusion are not in the object so far as it is intuited, but in the judg­ ment about it so far as it is thought.’*“ 111 O f course this characterization o f truth as ‘agreement’, adaequatio, ¿nolojms, is very general and empty. Y et it will still have some justifica­ tion if it can hold its own without prejudice to any o f the most various Interpretations which that distinctive predicate “ knowledge” will support. W e are now inquiring into the foundations o f this ‘relation’. What else is tacitly posited in this relational totality o f the adaequatio intellectus et rei? And what ontological character does that which is thus posited have itself?

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W hat in general does one have in view when one uses the term ‘agree­ ment’ ? The agreement o f something with something has the formal character of.a relation of something to something. Every agreement, and therefore ‘truth’ as well, is a relation. But not every relation is an agree­ ment. A sign points at what is indicated.1 Such indicating is a relation, but not an agreement o f the sign with what is indicated. Y et manifestly not every agreement is a convenientia o f the kind that is fixed upon in the definition o f “ truth” . The number “ 6” agrees with “ 16 minus 10” . These numbers agree; they are equal with regard to the question of “ how much ?” Equality is one way of agreeing. Its structure is such that something like a ‘with-regard-to’ belongs to it. In the adaequatio something gets related; what is that with regard to which it agrees? In clarifying the ‘truth-relation’ we must notice also what is peculiar to the terms o f this relation. W ith regard to what do intellectus and res agree ? In their kind of Being and their essential content do they give us anything at all with 1 ‘ Ein Zeichen zeigt auf das G ezeigte.’

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regard to which they can agree ? I f it is impossible for intellectus and res to be equal because they are not of the same species, are they then perhaps similar? But knowledge is still supposed to ‘give’ the thing just as it is. This ‘agreement’ has the Relational character of the ‘just as’ [“ So— W ie” ]. In what way is this relation possible as a relation between intellectus and res? From these questions it becomes plain that to clarify the structure o f truth it is not enough simply to presuppose this relational totality, but we must go back and inquire into the context of Being which provides the support for this totality as such. Must we, however, bring up here the ‘epistemological’ problematic as regards the subject-Object relation, or can our analysis restrict itself to Interpreting the ‘immanent consciousness of truth’, and thus remain ‘within the sphere’ of the subject ? According to the general opinion, what is true is knowledge. But knowledge is judging. In judgment one must distinguish between the judging as a Real psychical process, and that which is judged, as an ideal content. It will be said of the latter that it is ‘true’. T he Real psychical process, however, is either present-at-hand or not. According to this opinion, the ideal content of judgment stands in a relationship o f agreement. This relationship thus pertains to a connection between an ideal content of judgment and the Real Thing as that which is judged about. Is this agreement Real or ideal in its kind of Being, or neither o f these ? How are we to take ontologically the relation between an ideal entity and something that is Real and present-at-hand? Such a relation indeed subsists [besteht]; and in factical judgments it subsists not only as a rela­ tion between the content of judgment and the Real Object, but likewise as a relation between the ideal content and the Real act of judgment. And does it manifestly subsist ‘more inwardly’ in this latter case ? O r is the ontological meaning o f the relation between Real and ideal (fieOegis) something about which we must not inquire? Y et the relation is to be one which subsists. W hat does such “ subsisting” [Bestand] mean ontologically ? W hy should this not be a legitimate question? Is it accidental that no headway has been made with this problem in over two thousand years ? Has the question already been perverted in the very way it has been approached — in the ontologically unclarified separation of the Real and the ideal ? And with regard to the ‘actual’ judging of what is judged, is the separa­ tion o f the Real act o f judgment from the ideal content altogether unjust­ ified? Does not the actuality of knowing and judging get broken asunder into two ways o f Being— two ‘levels’ whiqh can never be pieced together in such a manner as to reach the kind of Being that belongs to knowing ? Is not psychologism correct in holding out against this separation, even

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i f it neither clarifies ontologically the kind o f Being which belongs to the thinking of that which is thought, nor is even so much as acquainted with it as a problem ? If we go back to the distinction between the act o f judgment and its content, we shall not advance our discussion o f the question o f the kind o f Being which belongs to the adaequatio; we shall only make plain the indispensability of clarifying the kind of Being which belongs to knowledge itself. In the analysis which this necessitates we must at the same time try to bring into view a phenomenon which is characteristic o f knowledge— the phenomenon o f truth. When does truth become phenomenally explicit in knowledge itself? It does so when such knowing demonstrates itself as true. By demonstrating itself it is assured of its truth. Thus in the pheno­ menal context of demonstration, the relationship o f agreement must become visible. Let us suppose that someone with his back turned to the wall makes the true assertion that ‘the picture on the wall is hanging askew.* This assertion demonstrates itself when the man who makes it, turns round and perceives the picture hanging askew on the wall. W hat gets demon­ strated in this demonstration? W hat is the meaning o f “ confirming” [Bewährung] such an assertion? Do we, let us say, ascertain some agree­ ment between our ‘knowledge’ or ‘what is known’ and the Thing on the wall? Yes and no, depending upon whether our Interpretation o f the expression ‘what is known’ is phenomenally appropriate. If he who makes the assertion judges without perceiving the picture, but ‘merely repre­ sents’ it to himself, to what is he related? T o ‘representations’, shall we say? Certainly not, if “ representation” is here supposed to signify repre­ senting, as a psychical process. Nor is he related to “ representations” in the sense of what is thus “ represented,” if what we have in mind here is a ‘picture’ of that Real Thing which is on the w all.1 T h e asserting which ‘merely represents’ is related rather, in that sense which is most its own, to the Real picture on the wall. W hat one has in mind is the Real picture, and nothing else. Any Interpretation in which something else is here slipped in as what one supposedly has in mind in an assertion that merely represents, belies the phenomenal facts of the case as to that about which the assertion gets made. Asserting is a way o f Being towards the Thing itself that is.2 And what does one’s perceiving of it demonstrate? Nothing 1 ‘E r ist auch nicht a u f Vorstellungen bezogen im Sinne des Vorgestellten, sofern dam it gemeint wird ein “ Bild” von dem realen D in g an der W an d .’ W hile w e follow tradition in translating ‘Vorstellung’ as ‘representation’, the literal m eaning is somewhat closer to ‘putting before us’. In this sense our ‘picture’ or ‘im age’ (‘B ild’ ) o f the actual picture (‘B ild’ ) on the w all, is itself something w hich w e have ‘put before us’ and w hich is thus ‘ vorgestellt’, though in English w e w ould hardly call it ‘ that w hich w e represent’. 2 ‘D as Aussagen ist ein Sein zum seienden D in g selbst.’

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else than that this Thing is the very entity which one has in mind in one’s assertion. W hat comes up for confirmation is that this entity is pointed out by the Being in which the assertion is made— which is Being towards what is put forward in the assertion; thus what is to be confirmed is that such Being uncovers the entity towards which it is. W hat gets demonstrated is the Being-uncovering o f the assertion.1 In carrying out such a demon­ stration, the knowing remains related solely to the entity itself. In this entity the confirmation, as it were, gets enacted. T h e entity itself which one has in mind shows itself just as it is in itself; that is to say, it shows that it, in its selfsameness, is just as it gets pointed out in the assertion as being— just as it gets uncovered as being. Representations do not get compared, either among themselves or in relation to the Real Thing. W hat is to be demonstrated is not an agreement o f knowing with its object, still less o f the psychical with the physical; but neither is it an agreement between ‘contents o f consciousness’ among themselves. What is to be demonstrated is solely the Being-uncovered [Entdeckt-sein] of the entity itself— that entity in the “ how” of its uncoveredness. This uncovered­ ness is confirmed when that which is put forward in the assertion (namely the entity itself) shows itself1as that very same thing. “ Confirmation” signifies the entity's showing itself in its self sameness.***to The confirmation is accom­ plished on the basis o f the entity’s showing itself. This is possible only in such a way that the knowing which asserts and which gets confirmed is, in its ontological meaning, itself a Being towards Real entities, and a Being that uncovers. T o say that an assertion “ is true” signifies that it uncovers the entity as it is in itself. Such an assertion asserts, points out, ‘lets’ the entity ‘be seen’ (airofavcns) in its uncoveredness. The Being-true (truth) o f the assertion must be understood as Being-uncovering*. Thus truth has by no means the structure o f an agreement between knowing and the object in the sense o f a likening o f one entity (the subject) to another (the Object). Being-true as Being-uncovering*, is in turn ontologically possible only on the basis o f Being-in-the-world. This latter phenomenon, which we have known as a basic state o f Dasein, is the foundation for the primordial phenomenon o f truth. We shall now follow this up more penetratingly. 1 ‘Ausgewiesen w ird das Entdeckend-sein der Aussage.’ H ere and in the following pages w e find the expression ‘Entdeckend-sein’ consistently printed w ith a hyphen in the m ore recent editions. In the older editions it is w ritten sometimes as one word, sometimes as two, and it is hyphenated only at the ends o f lines. In both editions w e sometimes find this w ord printed w ith a lower-case initial. W e have m arked such cases with an asterisk; for w hile w e prefer the translation ‘Being-uncovering’ in such cases, the lower-case initia suggests that ‘to-be-uncovering’ m ay be a better reading.

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(b) The Primordial Phenomenon o f Truth and the Derivative Character o f the Traditional Conception o f Truth

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“ Being-true” (“ truth” ) means Being-uncovering*. But is not this a highly arbitrary way to define “ truth” ? By such drastic ways o f defining this concept we may succeed in eliminating the idea o f agreement from the conception of truth. Must we not pay for this dubious gain by plunging the ‘good’ old tradition into nullity? But while our definition is seemingly arbitrary, it contains only the necessary Interpretation o f what was primordially surmised in the oldest tradition of ancient philosophy and even understood in a pre-phenomenological manner. I f a Aoyos as anofiavois is to be true, its Being-true is aXrjBeveiv in the manner o f arroaiveaBai — of taking entities out of their hiddenness and letting them be seen in their unhiddenness (their uncoveredness). The ¿XtfOeui which Aristotle equates with -npayfia and aivo(ieva in the passages cited above, signifies the ‘things themselves’ ; it signifies what shows itself— entities in the “ how" o f their uncoveredness. And is it accidental that in one o f the fragments of Heracleitusxxxv— the oldest fragments of philosophical doctrine in which the Aoyos is explicitly handled— the phenomenon o f truth in the sense of uncoveredness (unhiddenness), as we have set it forth, shows through? Those who are lacking in understanding are contrasted with the Aoyos, and also with him who speaks that Aoyos, and understands it. The Aoyos is pa£a)v 07ra)s exei: 11 te^s how entities comport themselves. But to those who are lacking in understanding, what they do remains hidden — XavOavti. They forget it (emXavBdvovrai) ; that is, for them it sinks back into hiddenness. Thus to the Aoyos belongs unhiddenness— a-Xrjdeia. T o translate this word as ‘truth’, and, above all, to define this expression conceptually in theoretical ways, is to cover up the mean­ ing o f what the Greeks made ‘self-evidently’ basic for the terminological use o f aX-qOeia as a pre-philosophical way of understanding it. In citing such evidence we must avoid uninhibited word-mysticism. Nevertheless, the ultimate business of philosophy is to preserve the force o f the most elemental words in which Dasein expresses itself, and to keep the common understanding from levelling them off to that unintelligibility which functions in turn as a source o f pseudo-problems. W e have now given a phenomenal demonstration o f what we set forth earlier**3™1 as to Aoyos and aXrjOeia in, so to speak, a dogmatic Inter­ pretation. In proposing our ‘definition’ o f “ truth” we have not shaken off the tradition, but we have appropriated it primordially; and we shall have done so all the more if we succeed in demonstrating that the idea of agreement is one to which theory had to come on the basis o f the prim­ ordial phenomenon o f truth, and if we can show how this came about.

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Moreover, the ,definition’ o f “ truth” as “ uncoveredness” and as “ Being-uncovering” , it not a mere explanation of a word. Among those ways in which Dasein comports itself there are some which we are accus­ tomed in the first instance to call ,true’ ; from the analysis o f these our definition emerges. Being-true as Being-uncovering*, is a way of Being for Dasein. What makes this very uncovering possible must necessarily be called ,true’ in a still more primordial sense. The most primordial phenomenon o f truth is first shown by the existential-ontological foundations o f uncovering.

Uncovering is a way of Being for Being-in-the-world. Circumspective concern, or even that concern in which we tarry and look at something, uncovers entities within-the-world. These entities become that which has been uncovered. They are ,true’ in a second sense. What is primarily ‘true’— that is, uncovering— is Dasein. “ Truth” in the second sense does not mean Being-uncovering* (uncovering), but Being-uncovered (un­ coveredness). Our earlier analysis of the worldhood of the world and of entities withinthe-world has shown, however, that the uncoveredness of entities withinthe-world is grounded in the world’s disclosedness. But disclosedness is that basic character of Dasein according to which it is its “ there” . Disclosedness is constituted by state-of-mind, understanding, and discourse, and pertains equiprimordially to the world, to Being-in, and to the Self. In its very structure, care is ahead o f itself-—Being already in a world— as Being alongside entities within-the-world; and in this structure the disclosedness of Dasein lies hidden. With and through it is uncoveredness;1 hence only with Dasein’s disclosedness is the most primordial phenomenon o f truth attained. W hat we have pointed out earlier with regard to the existential Constitution o f the “ there’,xxxv‫ ״‬and in relation to the everyday Being of the “ there” ¿“ *vui pertains to the most primordial phenomenon of truth, nothing less. In so far as Dasein is its disclosedness essentially, and discloses and uncovers as something disclosed to this extent it is essen­ tially‘true’. Dasein is ‘in the truth'.This assertion has meaning ontologically. It does not purport to say that ontically Dasein is introduced ‘to all the truth’ either always or just in every case, but rather that the disclosedness o f its ownmost Being belongs to its existential constitution. I f we accept the results we have obtained earlier, the full existential meaning o f the principle that ‘Dasein is in the truth’ can be restored by the following considerations: 1 ‘ M it und durch sie ist Entdecktheit . . O u r version reflects the am biguity o f the G erm an, w hich leaves the gram m atical function o f the pronoun ‘sie’ obscure and permits it to refer either to ‘the disclosedness o f Dasein’, to ‘care’, or— perhaps most likely— to ‘ the structure o f care’.

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(1) To Dasein’s state of Being, disclosedness in general essentially belongs. It embraces the whole o f that structure-of-Being which has become explicit through the phenomenon of care. To care belongs not only Beingin-the-world but also Being alongside entities within-the-world. The uncoveredness of such entities is equiprimordial with the Being of Dasein and its disclosedness. (2) To Dasein’s state of Being belongs thrownness; indeed it is constitutive for Dasein’s disclosedness. In thrownness is revealed that in each case Dasein, as m y Dasein and th is Dasein, is already in a definite world and alongside a definite range o f definite entities within-the-world.1 Dis­ closedness is essentially factical. (3) To Dasein’s state of Being belongs projection— disclosive Being to­ wards its potentiality-for-Being. As something that understands, Dasein can understand itself in terms of the ‘world’ and Others or in terms of its ownmost potentiality-for-Being.2 The possibility just mentioned means that Dasein discloses itself to itself in and as its ownmost potentiality-for Being. This authentic disclosedness shows the phenomenon o f the most primordial truth in the mode o f authenticity. The most primordial, and indeed the most authentic, disclosedness in which Dasein, as a potent­ iality-for-Being, can be, is the truth o f existence. This becomes existentially and ontologically definite only in connection with the analysis o f Dasein’s authenticity. 1 (4) T o Dasein’s state of Being belongs falling. Proximally and for the most part Dasein is lost in its ‘world’. Its understanding, as a projection upon possibilities of Being, has diverted itself thither. Its absorption in the “ they” signifies that it is dominated by the w ay things are publicly interpreted. That which has been uncovered and disclosed stands in a mode in which it has been disguised and closed off by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity. Being towards entities has not been extinguished, but it has been uprooted. Entities have not been completely hidden; they are precisely the sort of thing that has been uncovered, but at the same time they have been disguised. They show themselves, but in the mode of semblance. Likewise what has formerly been uncovered sinks back again, hidden and disguised. Because Dasein is essentially falling, its state o f Being is such that it is in ‘untruth'. This term, like the expression ‘falling’, is here used ontologically. I f we are to use it in existential analysis, we must 1 ‘ In ihr enthiillt sich, dass Dasein je schon als meines und dieses in einer bestimmten W elt und bei einem bestimmten U m kreis von bestimmten innerweltlichen Seienden ist.’ 2 . der Entwurf: das erschliessende Sein zu seinem Seinkonnen. Dasein kann sich als verstehendes aus der “ W elt” und den Anderen her verstehen oder aus seinem eigensten Seinkonnen.’ T h e earlier editions have a full stop after ‘Entwurf ’ rather than a colon, and introduce ,das’ w ith a capital. T h e gram m atical function o f ‘als verstehendes’ seems ambiguous.

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avoid giving it any ontically negative ‘evaluation*. T o be closed off and covered up belongs to Dasein’s facticity. In its full existential-ontological meaning, the proposition that ‘Dasein is in the truth’ states equiprimordially that ‘Dasein is in untruth’. But only in so far as Dasein has been disclosed has it also been closed off; and only in so far as entities withinthe-world have been uncovered along with Dasein, have such entities, as possibly encounterable within-the-world, been covered up (hidden) or disguised. It is therefore essential that Dasein should explicitly appropriate what has already been uncovered, defend it against semblance and disguise, and assure itself o f its uncoveredness again and again. The uncovering of anything new is never done on the basis of having something completely hidden, but takes its departure rather from uncoveredness in the mode of semblance. Entities look as i f . . . That is, they have, in a certain way, been uncovered already, and yet they are still disguised. Truth (uncoveredness) is something that must always first be wrested from entities. Entities get snatched out of their hiddenness. The factical uncoveredness o f anything is always, as it were, a kind o f robbery. Is it accidental that when the Greeks express themselves as to the essence of truth, they use a privative expression— d-Ai?0eia? W hen Dasein so expresses itself, does not a primordial understanding o f its own Being thus make itself known— the understanding (even if it is only pre-ontological) that Being-in-untruth makes up an essential characteristic o f Being-in-the world ? The goddess o f Truth who guides Parmenides, puts two pathways before him, one o f uncovering, one o f hiding; but this signifies nothing else than that Dasein is already both in the truth and in untruth. The way o f uncovering is achieved only in Kpiveiv X6ya>— in distinguishing between these understanding^, and making one’s decision for the one rather than the other.xxxix The existential-ontological condition for the fact that Being-in-theworld is characterized by ‘truth’ and ‘untruth’, lies in that state of Dasein’s Being which we have designated as thrown projection. This is something that is constitutive for the structure o f care. The upshot of our existential-ontological Interpretation of the pheno­ menon of truth is (1) that truth, in the most primordial sense, is Dasein’s disclosedness, to which the uncoveredness o f entities within-the-world belongs; and (2) that Dasein is equiprimordially both in the truth and in untruth. Within the horizon of the traditional Interpretation of the phenomenon o f truth, our insight into these principles will not be complete until it can

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be shown: (i) that truth, understood as agreement, originates from dis­ closedness by way o f definite modification; (2) that the kind o f Being which belongs to disclosedness itself is such that its derivative modification first comes into view and leads the w ay for the theoretical explication of the structure o f truth. Assertion and its structure (namely, the apophantical “ as” ) are founded upon interpretation and its structure (viz, the hermeneutical “ as” ) and also upon understanding— upon Dasein’s disclosedness. Truth, however, is regarded as a distinctive character o f assertion as so derived. Thus the roots o f the truth of assertion reach back to the disclosedness o f the under­ standing.*1 But over and above these indications o f how the truth of assertion has originated, the phenomenon o f agreement must not be exhibited explicitly in its derivative character. O ur Being alongside entities within-the-world is concern, and this is Being which uncovers. To Dasein’s disclosedness, however, discourse belongs essentially.*11 Dasein expresses itself [spricht sich aus]: it expresses itself as a Being-towards entities— a Being-towards which uncovers. And in assertion it expresses itself as such about entities which have been uncovered. Assertion communicates entities in the “ how” of their un­ coveredness. W hen Dasein is aware o f the communication, it brings itself in its awareness into an uncovering Being-towards the entities discussed. The assertion which is expressed is about something, and in what it is about [in ihrem Worüber] it contains the uncoveredness o f these entities. This uncoveredness is preserved in what is expressed. W hat is expressed becomes, as it were, something ready-to-hand within-the-world which can be taken up and spoken again.1 Because the uncoveredness has been preserved, that which is expressed (which thus is ready-to-hand) has in itself a relation to any entities about which it is, an assertion. Any un­ coveredness is an uncoveredness o f something. Even when Dasein speaks over again what someone else has said, it comes into a Being-towards the very entities which have been discussed.3 But it has been exempted from having to uncover them again, primordially, and it holds that it has been thus exempted. Dasein need not bring itself face to face with entities themselves in an ‘original’ experience; but it nevertheless remains in a Being-towards these entities. In a large measure uncoveredness gets appropriated not by one’s own uncovering, but rather by hearsay o f something that has been said. 1 ‘D as Ausgesprochene wird gleichsam zu einem innerweltlich Zuhandenen, das aufgenommen und weitergesprochen werden kann.’ W hile w e h a v e ' followed our usual p olicy in translating ‘das Ausgesprochene’ as ‘what is expressed’, it m ight perhaps be translated as ‘that w hich is spoken out’ , ‘the utterance’, or even ‘ the pronouncem ent’ . 2 “ A u ch im Nachsprechen kommt das nachsprechende Dasein in ein Sein zum be­ sprochenen Seienden selbst.’

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Absorption in something that has been said belongs to the kind o f Being which the “ they” possesses. That which has been expressed as such takes over Being-towards those entities which have been uncovered in the asser­ tion. If, however, these entities are to be appropriated explicitly with regard to their uncoveredness, this amounts to saying that the assertion is to be demonstrated as one that uncovers. But the assertion expressed is something ready-to-hand, and indeed in such a way that, as something by which uncoveredness is preserved, it has in itself a relation to the entities uncovered. Now to demonstrate that it is something which uncovers [ihres Entdeckend-seins] means to demonstrate how the asser­ tion by which the uncoveredness is preserved is related to these entities. T h e assertion is something ready-to-hand. The entities to which it is related as something that uncovers, are either ready-to-hand or presentat-hand within-the-world. The relation itself presents itself thus, as one that is present-at-hand. But this relation lies in the fact that the uncovered­ ness preserved in the assertion is in each case an uncoveredness o f some­ thing. The judgment ‘contains something which holds for the objects’ (Kant). But the relation itself now acquires the character of presence-athand by getting switched over to a relationship between things which are present-at-hand. The uncoveredness o f something becomes the presentat-hand conformity o f one thing which is present-at-hand— the assertion expressed— to something else which is present-at-hand— the entity under discussion. And if this conformity is seen only as a relationship between things which are present-at-hand— that is, if the kind o f Being which belongs to the terms o f this relationship has not been discriminated and is understood as something merely present-at-hand— then the relation shows itself as an agreement of two things which are present-at-hand, an agree­ ment which is present-at-hand itself. When the assertion has been expressed, the uncoveredness o f the entity moves into the kind o f Being o f that which is ready-to-hand within-the-world.1 But now to the extent that in this uncoveredness, as an uncoveredness o f something, a relationship to something present-at-hand persists, the uncoveredness (truth) becomes, for its part, a relationship between things which are present-at-hand in tellectu s and res)— a relationship that is present-at-hand itself.

Though it is founded upon Dasein’s disclosedness, the existential phenomenon o f uncoveredness becomes a property which is present-athand but in which there still lurks a relational character; and as such a property, it gets broken asunder into a relationship which is present-athand. Truth as disclosedness and as a Being-towards uncovered entities— a 1 ‘ Die Entdecktheit des Seienden ruckt mit der Ausgesprochenheit der Aussage in die Seinsart des innerweltlich Zuhandenen'

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Being which itself uncovers— has become truth as agreement between things which are present-at-hand within-the-world. And thus we have pointed out the ontologically derivative character o f the traditional con­ ception o f truth. Y et that which is last in the order o f the way things are connected in their foundations existentially and ontologically, is regarded ontically and factically as that which is first and closest to us. The necessity o f this Fact, however, is based in turn upon the kind o f Being which Dasein itself possesses. Dasein, in its concemful absorption, understands itself in terms o f what it encounters within-the-world. The uncoveredness which belongs to uncovering, is something that we come across proximally within-theworld in that which has been expressed [im ■¿«¿gesprochenen]. Not only truth, however, is encountered as present-at-hand: in general our under­ standing o f Being is such that every entity is understood in the first instance as present-at-hand. If the ‘truth’ which we encounter proximally in an ontical manner is considered ontologically in the way that is closest to us, then the Xoyos (the assertion) gets understood as Xóyos nvós — as an assertion a b o u t something, an uncoveredness o f something; but the phenomenon gets Interpreted as something present-at-hand with regard to its possible presence-at-hand.1 Y et because presence-at-hand has been equated with the meaning o f Being in general, the question of whether this kind o f Being of truth is a primordial one, and whether there is anything primordial in that structure of it which we encounter as closest to us, can not come alive at all. The primordial phenomenon o f truth has been covered up by Dasein’s very understanding o f Being— that understanding which is proximally the one that prevails, and which even today has not been surmounted explicitly and in principle.

A t the same time, however, we must not overlook the fact that while this way o f understanding Being (the way which is closest to us) is one which the Greeks were the first to develop as a branch o f knowledge and to master, the primordial understanding o f truth was simultaneously alive among them, even if pre-ontologically, and it even held its own against the con­ cealment implicit in their ontology— at least in Aristotle.*111 Aristotle never defends the thesis that the primordial ‘locus’ of truth is in the judgment. He says rather that the Aóyos is that way of Being in which Dasein can either uncover or cover up. This double possibility is what is distinctive in the Being-true o f the Xóyos: the Aóyos is that way of comporting oneself which can also cover things up. And because Aristotle never upheld the thesis we have mentioned, he was also never in a 1 ‘. . . interpretiert aber das Phänomen als Vorhandenes a u f seine m ögliche V orhandenheit.’

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situation to ‘broaden’ the conception o f truth in the Aoyos to include pure voclv. The truth of aloQ-qois and o f the seeing o f ‘ideas’ is the prim­ ordial kind o f uncovering. And only because v6-qpvxh KaL llJVX ls vovs, a8uvarov etvai y^povov ifri>xfjs fir¡ ovor!$.. . . x l v And Saint Augustine writes: 1 ‘D agegen bleibt umgekehrt die Zeitlichkeit im H orizont des vulgären Zeitverständnisses unzugänglich.’

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“ inde mihi visum est, nihil esse aliud tempus quam distentionem; sed cuius rei nescio; et mirum si non ipsius animi.‫״‬xv Thus in principle even the Interpretation of

Dasein as temporality does not lie beyond the horizon of the ordinary con­ ception of time. And Hegel has made an explicit attempt to set forth theway in which time as ordinarily understood is connected with spirit. In Kant, on the other hand, while time is indeed ‘subjective’, it stands ‘beside’ the ‘I think’ and is not bound up with it.3™1 The grounds which Hegel has explicitly provided for the connection between time and spirit are well suited to elucidate indirectly the foregoing Interpretation of Dasein as temporality and our exhibition of temporality as the source of worldtime. if 82. A Comparison o f the Existential-ontological Connection o f Temporality, Dasein, and World-time, with Hegel’s Way o f Taking the Relation between Time and Spirit History, which is essentially the history of spirit, runs its course ‘in time’. Thus ‘the development of history falls into time’.xv111 Hegel is not satisfied, however, with averring that the within-time-ness of spirit is a Fact, but seeks to understand how it is possible for spirit to fall into time, which is ‘the non-sensuous sensuous’.xv111 Time must be able, as it were, to take in spirit. And spirit in turn must be akin to time and its essence. Accordingly two points come up for discussion: (1) how does Hegel define the essence of time ? (2) what belongs to the essence of spirit which makes it possible for it to ‘fall into time’ ? O ur answer to these questions will serve merely to elucidate our Interpretation of Dasein as temporality, and to do so by way of a comparison. We shall make no claim to give even a relatively full treatment of the allied problems in Hegel, especially since ‘criticizing’ him will not help us. Because Hegel’s conception of time presents the most radical way in which the ordinary understanding of time has been given form conceptually, and one which has received too little attention, a comparison of this conception with the idea of temporality which we have expounded is one that especially suggests itself. (a) Hegel’s Conception o f Time

When a philosophical Interpretation of time is carried out, it gets a ‘locus in a system’; this locus may be considered as criterial for the basic way of treating time by which such an Interpretation is guided. In the 1 ‘Also fallt die Entwicklung der Geschichte in die Z eit” .’ Throughout this section it w ill be convenient to translate H egel’s verb ‘fallen’ b y ‘fall’, though elsewhere w e have largely pre-empted this for H eidegger’s ‘verfallen’. ‘V erfallen ’ does not appear until H . 436, where we shall call attention to it explicitly. (In this quotation, as in several others, Heidegger has taken a few m inor liberties with H egel’s text, w hich are too trivial for any special comment.)

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‘physics’ of Aristotle—that is, in the context of an ontology of Nature— the ordinary way of understanding time has received its first thematically detailed traditional interpretation. ‘Time’, ‘location’, and ‘movement’ stand together. True to tradition, Hegel’s analysis of time has its locus 429 in the second part of his Encyclopedia o f the Philosophical Sciences, which is entitled ‘Philosophy of Nature’. The first portion of this treats of mechanics, and of this the first division is devoted to the discussion o f‘space and time’. He calls these ‘the abstract “outside-of-one-another” ’.xlx Though Hegel puts space and time together, this does not happen simply because he has arranged them superficially one after the other: space, ‘and time also’. ‘Philosophy combats such an “also” .’ The transition from space to time does not signify that these are treated in adjoining paragraphs; rather ‘it is space itself that makes the transition’.1 Space ‘is’ time; that is, time is the ‘truth’ of space.“ If space is thought dialectically in that which it is, then according to Hegel this Being of space unveils itself as time. How must space be thought? Space is ‘the unmediated indifference of Nature’s Being-outside-ofitself’.5“ 1 This is a way of saying that space is the abstract multiplicity [Vielheit] of the points which are differentiable in it.2 Space is not interrupted by these; but neither does it arise from them by way of joining them together. Though it is differentiated by differentiable points which are space themselves, space remains, for its part, without any differences. The differences themselves are of the same character as that which they differentiate. Nevertheless, the point, in so far as it differen­ tiates anything im space, is the negation of space, though in such a manner that, as this negation, it itself remains in space; a point is space after all. The point does not lift itself out of space as if it were something of another character. Space is the “outside-of-one-another” of the multiplicity of points [Punktmannigfaltigkeit], and it is without any differences. But it is not as if space were a point; space is rather, as Hegel says, ‘punctuality’ [“ Punktualität”]. xx‫ ״‬This is the basis for the sentence in which Hegel thinks of space in its truth—that is, as time: ‘Negativity, which relates itself as point to space, and which develops in space its determinations as line and surface, is, however, just as much for itself in the sphere of Beingoutside-of-itself, and so are its determinations therein, though while it is 430 1 . sondern “ der R au m selbst geht über” .’ 2 . in ihm unterscheidbaren Punkte.’ W e have often translated ‘unterscheiden’ as ‘distinguish’ or ‘discriminate’, and ‘U nterschied’ as ‘distinction’ or ‘difference’, leaving ‘ differentiate’ and ‘differentiation’ for such words as ‘differenzieren’ and ‘D ifferenz’, etc. In this discussion o f H egel, however, it w ill be convenient to translate ‘unterscheiden’ as ‘differentiate’, ‘U nterschied’ as ‘difference’, ‘unterscheidbar’ as ‘differentiable’, ‘unter­ schiedslos’ as ‘without differences’ . (W e shall continue to translate ‘gleichgültig as ‘in­ different’ .)

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positing as in the sphere of Being-outside-of-itself, it appears indifferent as regards the things that are tranquilly side by side. As thus posited for itself, it is time.’3“ 111 If space gets represented—that is, if it gets intuited immediately in the indifferent subsistence of its differences—then the negations are, as it were, simply given. But by such a representation, space does not get grasped in its Being. Only in thinking is it possible for this to be done—in thinking as the synthesis which has gone through thesis and antithesis and transmuted them. Only if the negations do not simply remain subsisting in their indifference but get transmuted—that is, only if they themselves get negated—does space get thought and thus grasped in its Being. In the negation of the negation (that is, of punctuality) the point posits itself fo r itself and thus emerges from the indifference of subsisting. As that which is posited for itself, it differentiates itself from this one and from that one: it is no longer this and not yet that. In positing itself for itself, it posits the succession in which it stands—the sphere of Being-outside-of-itself, which is by now the sphere of the negated negation. When punctuality as indifference gets transmuted, this signifies that it no longer remains lying in the ‘paralysed tranquillity of space’. The point ‘gives itself airs’ before all the other points.1 According to Hegel, this negation of the negation as punctuality is time. If this discussion has any demonstrable meaning, it can mean nothing else than that the positing-of-itself-for-itself of every point is a “now-here” , “now-here” , and so on. Every point ‘is’ posited for itself as a now-point. ‘In time the point thus has actuality.’ That through which each point, as this one here, can posit itself for itself, is in each case a “ now” . The “now” is the condition for the possibility of the point’s positing itself for itself. This possibility-condition makes up th< Being of the point, and Being is the same as having been thought. Thus in each case the pure thinking of punctuality—that is, of space—‘thinks’ the “now” and the Being-outside-of-itself of the “now” ; because of this, space ‘is’ time. How is time itself defined ? ‘Time, as the negative unity of Being-outside-of-itself, is likewise some­ thing simply abstract, ideal. It is that Being which, in that it is, is not, and which, in that it is not, is: it is intuited becoming. This means that those differences which, to be sure, are simply momentary, transmuting themselves immediately, are defined as external, yet as external to themselves.,xxlv For this interpretation, time reveals itself as ‘intuited becom­ ing’. According to Hegel this signifies a transition from Being to nothing or from nothing to Being.xxv Becoming is both arising and passing away. 1 ‘D er Punkt “ spreizt sich a u f” gegenüber allen anderen Punkten.’ T h e verb ‘spreizen’ means ‘to spread apart’ ; but when used reflexively, as here, it takes on the more specific connotation o f swaggering, giving oneself airs.

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Either Being ‘makes the transition’, or not-Being does so. W hat does this mean with regard to time? The Being of time is the “now” . Every “now” , however, either ‘now’ is-no-longer, or now is-/zoi-yct; so it can be taken also as not-Being.1 Time is ‘ intuited' becoming—that is to say, it is the transition which does not get thought but which simply tenders itself in the sequence of “nows” . If the essence of time is defined as ‘intuited becoming’, then it becomes manifest that time is primarily understood in terms of the “now” , and indeed in the very manner in which one comes across such a “now” in pure intuition. No detailed discussion is needed to make plain that in Hegel’s Inter­ pretation of time he is moving wholly in' the direction of the way time is ordinarily understood. When he characterizes time in terms of the “now”, this presupposes that in its full structure the “now” remains levelled off and covered up, so that it can be intuited as something present-at-hand, though present-at-hand only ‘ideally’. T hat Hegel Interprets time in terms of this primary orientation by the “now” which has been levelled off, is evidenced by the following sentences: ‘The “now” is monstrously privileged: it ‘is’ nothing but the individual “now” ; but in giving itself airs, this thing which is so exclusive has already been dissolved, diffused, and pulverized, even while I am expressing it.,xxvl ‘In Nature, moreover, where time is now , no “ stable” [“bestehend”] difference between these dimensions’ (past and future) ‘ever comes about’.xxv11 ‘Thus in a positive sense one can say of time that only the Present is; the “before” and “after” are not; but the concrete Present is the result of the past and is pregnant with the future. Thus the true Present is eternity. ,xxvl‫״‬ If Hegel calls time ‘intuited becoming’, then neither arising nor passing away has any priority in time. Nevertheless, on occasion he characterizes time as the ‘abstraction of consuming’ [“Abstraktion des Verzehrens”]— the most radical formula for the way in which time is ordinarily experi­ enced and interpreted.3“ 1* O n the other hand, when Hegel really defines “ time”, he is consistent enough to grant no such priority to consuming and passing away as that which the everyday way of experiencing time rightly adheres to; for Hegel can no more provide dialectical grounds for such a priority than he can for the ‘circumstance’ (which he has intro­ duced as self-evident) that the “now” turns up precisely in the way the point posits itself for itself. So even when he characterizes time as “be­ coming” , Hegel understands this “ becoming” in an ‘abstract’ sense, which goes well beyond the representation of the ‘stream’ of time. Thus 1 ‘D as Sein der Z eit ist das Je tzt; sofem aber jedes Je tzt “ je tz t” auch schon nicht-mehrbzw. j e je tzt zu vor noch-ntcAi-ist, kann es auch als Nichtsein gefasst werden.’

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the most appropriate expression which the Hegelian treatment of time receives, lies in his defining it as “ the negation o f a negation” (that is, of punctuality). Here the sequence of “nows” has been formalized in the most extreme sense and levelled off in such a way that one can hardly go any farther.” “ Only from the standpoint of this formal-dialectical con­ ception of time can Hegel produce any connection between time and spirit. 433

434

W Hegel's Interpretation o f the Connection between Time and Spirit If Hegel can say that when spirit gets actualized, it accords with it to fall into time, with “ time” defined as a negation of a negation, how has spirit itself been understood ? The essence of spirit is the concept. By this Hegel understands not the universal which is intuited in a genus as the form of something thought, but rather the form of the very thinking which thinks itself: the conceiving of oneself—as the grasping of the not-I. Inasmuch as the grasping of the not-1 presents a differentiation, there lies in the pure concept, as the grasping of this differentiation, a differentiation of the difference. Thus Hegel can define the essence of the spirit formally and apophantically as the negation of a negation. This ‘absolute negativity’ gives a logically formalized Interpretation of Descartes’ “ cogito me cogitare rem", wherein he sees the essence of the conscientia. The concept is accordingly a self-conceiving way in which the Self has been conceived; as thus conceived, the Self is authentically as it can be— that isfree.1 ‘The “ I " is the pure concept itself, which as concept has come into Dasein.'**** ‘The “ I ” , however, is this initially pure unity which relates itself to itself—not immediately, but in that it abstracts from all determinateness and content, and goes back to the freedom of its unrestricted self-equality.’30“ 11 Thus the “ I ” is ‘universality', but it is ‘individuality’2 just as immediately. This negating of the negation is both that which is ‘absolutely restless’ in the spirit and also its self-manifestation, which belongs to its essence. The ‘progression’ of the spirit which actualizes itself in history, carries with it ‘a principle of exclusion’.3““ 111 In this exclusion, however, that which is excluded does not get detached from the spirit; it gets surmounted. The kind 1 ‘ D er B egriff ist sonach die sich begreifende Begriffenheit des Selbst, als welche das Selbst eigentlich ist, w ie es sein kann, das heisst frei.’ T h e noun ‘Begriffenheit’ is o f course derived from ‘begriffen’, the past participle o f ‘begreifen’ (‘to conceive’ or ‘ to grasp’ ). ‘Begriffen’, however, m ay also be used when w e would say that someone is ‘in the process o f ’ doing something. T his would suggest the alternative translation: ‘T h e concept is accordingly a self-conceiving activity o f the S elf— an activity o f such a nature that when the S e lf performs it, it is authentically as it can be— nam ely, jfree.’ 2 ‘ “ Einzelheit” ’ . W e take this reading from Lasson’s edition o f H egel, w hich H eidegger cites. T h e older editions o f H eidegger’s w ork have ‘Einzelnheit’ ; the newer ones have ‘Einzenheit’. Presum ably these are both misprints.

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of making-itself-free which overcomes and at the same time tolerates, is characteristic of the freedom of the spirit. Thus ‘progress’ never signifies a merely quantitative “more”, but is essentially qualitative and indeed has the quality of spirit. ‘Progression’ is done knowingly and knows itself in its goal. In every step of its ‘progress’ spirit has to overcome ‘itself’ “as the truly malignant obstacle to that goal” .xxxlv In its development spirit aims ‘to reach its own concept’.xxxv The development itself is ‘a hard, unending batde against itself’.xxxvi Because the restlessness with which spirit develops in bringing itself to its concept is the negation o f a negation, it accords with spirit, as it actualizes itself, to fall ‘into time' as the immediate negation o f a negation. For ‘time is the concept itself, which is there [da ist\ and which represents itself to the consciousness as an empty intuition; because of this, spirit necessarily appears in time, and it appears in time as long as it does not grasp its pure concept—that is, as long as time is not annulled by it. Time is the pure Self-external, intuited, not grasped by the Self—the concept which is merely intuited.,xxxvli Thus by its very essence spirit necessarily appears in time. ‘World-history is therefore, above all, the interpretation of spirit in time, just as in space the idea interprets itself as Nature.,xxxvli The ‘exclusion’ which belongs to the movement of development harbours in itself a relationship to not-Being. This is time, understood in terms of the “now” which gives itself airs. Time is ‘abstract’ negativity. As ‘intuited becoming’, it is the differen­ tiated self-differentiation which one comes across immediately; it is the concept which ‘is there’ [“daseiende”]—but this means present-at-hand. As something present-at-hand and thus external to spirit, time has no power over the concept, but the concept is rather ‘the power of time’.50“ 1* By going back to the selfsameness o f theformal structure which both spirit and time possess as the negation o f a negation, Hegel shows how it is possible for spirit to be actualized historically ‘in time’. Spirit and time get disposed of with the very emptiest of formal-ontological and formal-apophantical abstractions, and this makes it possible to produce a kinship between them. But because time simultaneously gets conceived in the sense of a world-time which has been utterly levelled off, so that its origin remains completely concealed, it simply gets contrasted with spirit—contrasted as something that is present-at-hand. Because of this, spirit must first o f all fa ll ‘into time’. It remains obscure what indeed is signified ontologically by this ‘falling’ or by the ‘actualizing’ of a spirit which has power over time and really ‘is’ [‘‘seienden’’] outside of it. Just as Hegel casts lititle light on the source of the time which has thus been levelled off, he leaves totally unexamined the question of whether the way in which spirit is essentially

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constituted as the negating of a negation, is possible in any other manner than on the basis of primordial temporality. We cannot as yet discuss whether Hegel’s Interpretation of time and spirit and the connection between them is correct and rests on foundations which are ontologically primordial. But the very fact that a formaldialectical ‘construction’ of this connection can be ventured at all, makes manifest that these are primordially akin. Hegel’s ‘construction’ was prompted by his arduous struggle to conceive the ‘concretion’ of the spirit. He makes this known in the following sentence from the concluding chapter of his Phenomenology o f the Spirit: ‘Thus time appears as the very fate and necessity which spirit has when it is not in itself complete: the necessity of its giving self-consciousness a richer share in consciousness, of its setting in motion the immediacy of the “ in-itself” (the form in which substance is in consciousness), or, conversely, of its realizing and making manifest the “in-itself” taken as the inward (and this is what first is inward) —that is, of vindicating it for its certainty of itself.’*1 Our existential analytic of Dasein, on the contrary, starts with the ‘concretion’ of factically thrown existence itself in order to unveil tem­ porality as that which primordially makes such existence possible. ‘Spirit’ does not first fall into time, but it exists as the primordial temporalizing of temporality. Temporality temporalizes world-time, within the horizon of which ‘history’ can ‘appear’ as historizing within-time. ‘Spirit’ does not fall into time; but factical existence ‘falls’ as falling from primordial, authentic temporality.1 This ‘falling’ [“Fallen”], however, has itself its existential possibility in a mode of its temporalizing—a mode which belongs to temporality. if 83. The Existential-temporal Analytic o f Dasein, and the Question o f Funda­ mental Ontology as to the Meaning o f Being in General In our considerations hitherto, our task has been to Interpret the primordial whole of factical Dasein with regard to its possibilities of authentic

and inauthentic existing, and to do so in an existential-ontological manner in terms o f its very basis. Temporality has manifested itself as this basis and accordingly as the meaning of the Being of care. So that which our preparatory existential analytic of Dasein contributed before temporality was laid bare, has now been taken back into temporality as the primordial structure of Dasein’s totality of Being. In terms of the possible ways in which primordial time can temporalize itself, we have provided the 1 ‘ D er “ Geist” fällt nicht in die Zeit, sondern: die faktische Existenz “ fallt” a b ver­ fallende aus der ursprünglichen, eigentlichen Zeidichkeit.’ T h e contrast between H egel’s verb ‘fallen’ and H eidegger’s ‘verfallen’ is obscured b y our translating them both as ‘fall’. C f. our note 1, p. 480, H . 428.

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‘grounds’ for those structures which were just ‘pointed out’ in our earlier treatment. Nevertheless, our way of exhibiting the constitution of Dasein’s Being remains only one way which we may take. O ur aim is to work out the question of Being in general. The thematic analytic of existence, however, first needs the light of the idea of Being in general, which must be clarified beforehand. This holds particularly if we adhere to the principle which we expressed in our introduction as one by which any philosophical investiga­ tion may be gauged: that philosophy “is universal phenomenological ontology, and takes its departure from the hermeneutic of Dasein, which, as an analytic of existence, has made fast the guiding-line for all philo­ sophical inquiry at the point where it arises and to which it returns.” *11 This thesis, of course, is to be regarded not as a dogma, but rather as a formulation of a problem of principle which still remains ‘veiled’: can one provide ontological grounds for ontology, or does it also require an ontical foundation? and which entity must take over the function of pro­ viding this foundation? The distinction between the Being of existing Dasein and the Being of entities, such as Reality, which do not have the character of Dasein, may appear very illuminating; but it is still only the point o f departure for the ontological problematic; it is nothing with which philosophy may tranquil­ lize itself. It has long been known that ancient ontology works with ‘Thingconcepts’ and that there is a danger of ‘reifying consciousness’. But what does this “ reifying” signify ? Where does it arise ? Why does Being get ‘con­ ceived’ ‘proximally’ in terms of the present-at-hand and not in terms of the ready-to-hand, which indeed lies closer to us ? Why does this reifying always keep coming back to exercise its dominion ? W hat positive structure does the Being of ‘consciousness’ have, if reification remains inappropriate to it? Is the ‘distinction’ between ‘consciousness’ and ‘Thing’ sufficient for tackling the ontological problematic in a primordial manner? Do the answers to these questions lie along our way? And can we even seek the answer as long as the question of the meaning of Being remains unformu­ lated and unclarified ? One can never carry on researches into the source and the possibility of the ‘idea’ of Being in general simply by means of the ‘abstractions’ of formal logic—that is, without any secure horizon for question and answer. One must seek a way of casting light on the fundamental question of onto­ logy, and this is the way one must go. Whether this is the only way or even the right one at all, can be decided only after one has gone along it. The conflict as to the Interpretation of Being cannot be allayed, because it has not yet been enkindled. And in the end this is not the kind of conflict one can ‘bluster into’; it is of the kind which cannot get enkindled unless

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preparations are made for it. Towards this alone the foregoing investiga­ tion is on the way. And where does this investigation stand ? Something like ‘Being’ has been disclosed in the understanding-ofBeing which belongs to existent Dasein as a way in which it understands. Being has been disclosed in a preliminary way, though non-conceptually; and this makes it possible for Dasein as existent Being-in-the-world to comport itself towards entities—towards those which it encounters withinthe-world as well as towards itself as existent. How is this disclosive under­ standing o f Being at all possiblefor Dasein? Can this question be answered by going back to the primordial constitution-of-Being of that Dasein by which Being is understood ? The existential-ontological constitution of Dasein’s totality is grounded in temporality. Hence the ecstatical projection of Being must be made possible by some primordial way in which ecstatical temporality temporalizes. How is this mode of the temporalizing of temporality to be Interpreted ? Is there a way which leads from primordial time to the meaning of Being? Does time itself manifest itself as the horizon of Being?

A U T H O R ’S N O T E S Foreword i. (H. i) Plato, Sophistes 244a. Introduction, Chapter One i. (H . 3) Aristotle, Metaphysica B 4, 1001 a 21. ii. (H. 3) T hom as Aquinas, Summa Theologica 1 11 Q_. 94 art. 2. iii. (H. 3) Aristotle, Metaphysica B 3, 998 b 22. iv. (H. 4) C f. Pascal, Pensées et Opuscules (ed. Brunschvicg),6 Paris, 1912, p. 169; ‘O n ne peut entreprendre de définir l’être sans tom ber dans cette absurdité: car on ne peut définir un m ot sans commencer par celui-ci, c'est, soit qu ’on l’exprim e ou qu ’on le sous-entende. D onc pour définir l’être, il faudrait dire c'est, et ainsi em ployer le m ot défini dans sa définition.’ v. (H. 6) Plato, Sophistes 242c. vi. (H. 14) Aristotle, De Anima r 8, 431 b 21 ; cf. ibid. r 5, 430 a 14 ff. vü. (H. 14) Thom as A quinas, Quaestiones de Veritate, q. I, a 1 c; cf. the somewhat diffèrent and in part more rigorous w a y in w hich he carries out a ‘deduction’ o f the transcendentia in his opuscule ‘De Natura Generis’ . Introduction, Chapter Two i. (H . 23) I. K a n t, Critique o f Pure Reason,2 pp. 180 f. ii. (H. 26) Aristotle, Physica A 10 -14 (217b 29-2243 17). iii. (H. 26) I. K a n t, op. cit., p. 121. iv. (H. 32) Cf. Aristotle, D e Interpretation 1-6 ; also Metaphysica Z 4, and Ethica Nicomachea Z v. (H . 38) I f the following investigation has taken any steps forward in disclosing the ‘ things themselves’, the author must first o f all thank E. Husserl, who, b y providing his ow n incisive personal guidance and b y freely turning over his unpublished investiga­ tions, fam iliarized the author w ith the most diverse areas o f phenom enological research during his student years in Freiburg. Division One, Chapter One i. (H. 44) St. Augustine, Confessiones, X , 16. [‘B ut w h at is closer to m e than myself? Assuredly I labour here and I labour w ithin myself; I have become to m yself a land o f trouble and inordinate sweat.’— T r.] ii. (H. 47) Edm und Husserl’s investigations o f the ‘personality’ have not as y et been published. T h e basic orientation o f his problem atic is apparent as early as his paper ‘ Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft’, Logos, vol. I, 1910, p. 319. His investigation was carried m uch further in the second part o f his Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie (Husserliana I V ), o f w hich the first part (Cf. this Jahrbuch [Jahrbuch fü r Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung— T r.] vol. I, 1913), presents the problem atic o f ‘pure consciousness’ as the basis for studying the Con­ stitution o f any R eality whatsoever. His detailed Constitutional analyses are to be found in three sections o f the second part, where he treats: 1. the Constitution o f m aterial N ature; 2. the Constitution o f anim al N ature; 3. the Constitution o f the spiritual w orld (the personalistic point o f view as opposed to the naturalistic). Husserl begins w ith the words: ‘A lthough D ilth ey grasped the problems w hich point the w ay, and saw the directions which the work to be done would have to take, he still failed to penetrate to any decisive formulations o f these problems, or to any solutions o f them w hich are m ethodologically correct.’ Husserl has studied these problems still more deeply since this first treatm ent o f them ; essential portions o f his work have been com m unicated in his Freiburg lectures.

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iii. (H. 47) This Jahrbuch, vol. I, 2, 1913, and II, 1916; cf. especially pp. 242 ff. iv . (H . 47) Ibid., II, p. 243. v. (H. 47) Cf. Logos I, loc. cit. vi. (H. 48) Ibid., p. 246. vii. (H. 48) Genesis I, 26. [‘A n d G od said, “ L e t us m ake m an in our im age, after our likeness.” ’— T r.] viii. (H. 49) C alvin, Institutio I, X V , Section 8. [‘M an ’s fa st condition w as excellent because o f these outstanding endowments: that reason, intelligence, prudence, ju d g ­ m ent should suffice not on ly for the governm ent o f this earthly life, but that b y them he m ight ascend beyond, even unto G od and to eternal felicity.’— T r.] ix. (H. 49) Zw ingli. Von der Klarheit des Wortes Gottes (Deutsche Schriften I, 56). [‘Because m an looks up to G od and his W ord, he indicates clearly that in his very N ature he is bom somewhat closer to G od, is something m ore after his stamp, that he has something that draws him to God— all this comes beyond a doubt from his having been created in G od’s image.’— T r.] x. (H. 50) But to disclose the a priori is not to m ake an ,a-prioristic’ construction. Edm im d Husserl has not only enabled us to understand once m ore the m eaning o f any genuine philosophical empiricism ; he has also given us the necessary tools. ‘ A-priorism’ is the method o f every scientific philosophy w hich understands itself. T h ere is nothing constructivistic about it. B ut for this very reason a priori research requires that the phenom enal basis be properly prepared. T h e horizon w h ich is closest to us, and w hich must be m ade ready for the analytic o f Dasein, lies in its average everydayness. xi. (H . 51) Ernst Cassirer has recently m ade the Dasein o f m yth a them e for philosophical Interpretation. (See his Philosophie der symbolischen Formen, vol. I I, Das mythische Denken, 1925.) In this study, clues o f far-reaching im portance are m ade available for ethno­ logical research. From the standpoint o f philosophical problem atics it remains an open question whether the foundations o f this Interpretation are sufficiently transparent— whether in particular the architectonics and the general systematic content o f K a n t’s Critique o f Pure Reason can provide a possible design for such a task, or whether a new and more prim ordial approach m ay not here be needed. T h a t Cassirer him self sees the possibility o f such a task is shown by his note on pp. 16 ff., where he alludes to the phenom enological horizons disclosed by Husserl. In a discussion between the author and Cassirer on the occasion o f a lecture before the H am burg section o f the Kantgesellschaft in Decem ber 1923 on ‘Tasks and Pathways o f Phenomenological Research’, it was alread y apparent that w e agreed in dem anding an existential analytic such as was sketched in that lecture. Division One, Chapter Two i. (H . 54) Cf. Jakob G rim m , Kleinere Schriften, vol. V I I , p. 247. ii. (H. 56) C f. Section 29. Division One, Chapter Three i. (H . 72) T h e author m ay rem ark that this analysis o f the environm ent and in general the ‘hermeneutic o f the facticity’ o f Dasein, have been presented repeatedly in his lectures since the w inter semester o f 1919-1920. ii. (H. 77) C f. E . Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, I. T eil, this Y earbook [Jahrbuch fü r Philosophie und Phänomenologische Forschung] vol. I, Section 10 ff., as w ell as his Logische Untersuchungen, vol. I, C h. 11. For the analysis o f signs and signification see ibid., vol. II, I, C h . 1. iii. (H . 90) Descartes, Principia Philosophiae, I, Pr. 53. (Œuvres, ed. A dam and T annery, vol. V I I I , p. 25.) [‘A n d though substance is indeed known b y some attribute, yet for each substance there is pre-em inently one property w hich constitutes its nature and essence, and to w hich all the rest are referred.’— T r.] iv . (H . 90) Ibid. [‘ Indeed extension in length, breadth, and thickness constitutes the nature o f corporeal substance.’ T h e emphasis is H eidegger’s.— T r.] v. (H. 90) Ibid. [‘For everything else that can be ascribed to body presupposes extension.’ — T r.] vi. (H . 90) Ibid., Pr. 64, p. 31. [‘A n d one and the same body can be extended in m any different ways w hile retaining the same quantity it had before; surely it can sometimes be greater in length and less in breadth or thickness, while later it m ay, on the contrary, be greater in breadth and less in length.’— T r.]

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vü. (H. g i) Ibid., Pr. 65, p. 32. [*. . . if w e think o f nothing except w hat has a place, and do not ask about the force by which it is set in motion . . — T r.] viii. (H. 91) Ibid., I I , Pr. 4. p. 42. [‘For, so far as hardness is concerned, the sense shows us nothing else about it than that portions o f hard bodies resist the m ovem ent of our hands when they come up against those portions. For i f whenever our hands are moved towards a certain portion, all the bodies there should retreat with the same velocity as that w ith which our hands approach, w e should never feel any hardness. N o r is it in any w ay intelligible that bodies which thus recede should accordingly lose their cor­ poreal nature; hence this does not consist in hardness.’— T r.] ix. (H . 91) Ibid. [‘A n d b y the same reasoning it can be shown that w eight and colour and all the other qualities o f this sort w hich are sensed in corporeal matter, can be taken aw ay from it, while that m atter remains entire; it follows that the nature o f this < v iz . o f extension > depends upon none o f these.’— T r.] x. (H. 92) Ibid., I, pr. 5 1, p. 24. [‘Indeed w e perceive that no other things exist without the help o f G o d ’s concurrence.’— T r.] xi. (H. 92) Ibid. [‘ . . . on ly one substance w hich is in need o f nothing whatsoever, can be understood, and this indeed is G od .’— T r.] xii. (H . 92) Ibid. [‘ Indeed w e perceive that other things cannot exist without the help o f G o d ’s concurrence.’— T r.] xiii. (H. 93) Ibid. [T h e com plete passage m ay be translated as follows: ‘T h e nam e “ sub­ stance” is not appropriate to G od and to these univocally, as they say in the Schools; that is, no signification o f this nam e w hich would be common to both G od and his creation can be distinctly understood.’— T r.] xiv. (H. 93) In this connection, cf. Opuscula omnia Thomae de Via Caietani Cardinalis, Lugdtmi, 1580, Tomus I I I , TractatusV; ,de nominum analogia’ , pp. 2 11-2 19 . x v. (H .93) Descartes, op. cit., I, Pr. 5 1, p. 24. [‘N o signification o fth isn a m e < “ substance” > w hich would be comm on to G od and his creation can be distinctly understood.’— T r.] xvi. (H. 94) Ibid., I, Pr. 52, p. 25. [‘Y e t substance cannot first be discovered m erely by the fact that it is a thing that exists, for this alone b y itself does not affect us.’— T r.] xvii. (H. 94) Ibid., I, Er. 63, p. 31. [‘ Indeed w e understand extended substance, or think­ ing substance more easily than substance alone, disregarding that which thinks or is extended.’— T r.] xviii. (H. 96) Ibid., II, Pr. 3, p. 41. [‘ It w ill be enough i f w e point out that the perceptions o f the senses are not referred to anything but the union o f the hum an body with the m ind, and that indeed they ordinarily show us in w h at w a y external bodies can be of _help to it or do it harm .’— T r.] xix. (H . 97) Ibid., I I , Pr. 3, pp. 41-42. [‘ . . . but they do not teach us w hat kinds o f things < bodies> exist in themselves.’— T r.] xx. (H. 97) Ibid., I I , Pr. 4, p. 42. [‘I f w e do this, w e shall perceive that the nature o f m atter, or o f body as regarded universally, does not consist in its being something hard or heavy or coloured or affecting the senses in some other w ay, but only in its being something extended in length, breadth, and thickness.’— T r.] xxi. (H. 109) Im m anuel K a n t: ‘W as Heisst: Sich im Denken orientieren?’ (1786) Werke (Akad. Ausgabe), V o l. V I I I , pp. 13 1-14 7 . xxii. (H. 112) C f. O . Becker, Beiträge zur phänomenologischen Begründung der Geometrie und ihrer physikalischen Anwendungen, in this Yearbook [Jahrbuch fü r Philosophie und phäno­ menologische Forschung‫ ]־‬, vol. V I (1923), pp. 385 ff. Division One, Chapter Four i. (H . 116) C f. w h at M a x Scheler has pointed out phenom enologically in his Z ur Phäno­ menologie und Theorie der Sympathiegefühle, 1913, Anhang, pp. 118 ff.; see also his second ‫ ״‬edition under the title Wesen und Formen der Sympathie, 1923, pp. 244 ff. ii. (H. 119) ‘ Ü ber die Verw andtschaft der Ortsadverbien m it dem Pronomen in einigen Sprachen’ (1829), Gesammelte Schriften (published by the Prussian A cadem y o f Sciences), vol. V I , Part 1, pp. 304-330. Division One, Chapter Five L (H . 131) C f. Section 12, H . 52 ff. ji. (H . 131) C f. Section 13, H . 59-63. iii. (H. 137) C f. Section 18, H . 83 ff. W. (H. 138) C f. Aristotle, Metaphysica A 2, 982 b 22 sqq. [,comfort and recreation’— Ross],

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v . (H . 139) Cf. Pascal, Pensées, [ed. Brunschvicg, Paris, p. 185]. 'E t de là vient qu’au lieu qu’en parlant des choses humaines on dit qu'il faut les connaître avant que de les aimer, ce qui a passé en proverbe, les saints au contraire disent en parlant des choses divines qu'il faut les aimer pour les connaître, et qu’on n’entre dans la vérité que par la charité, dont ils ont fa it une de leurs plus utiles sentences.’ [‘A n d thence it comes about that in the case where we are speaking o f hum an things, it is said to be necessary to know them before w e love them, and this has become a proverb; but the saints, on the contrary, when they speak o f divine things, say that w e must love them before w e know them, and that w e enter into truth only b y charity; they have m ade o f this one o f their most useful m axim s’.— T r.] C f. with this, Augustine, Opera, (M igne Patrologiae Latinae, tom. V I I I ) , Contra Faustum, lib. 32, cap. 18: ‘ non intratur in veritatem, nisi per charitatem.’ [‘one does not enter into truth except through charity’ .— T r.] vi. (H. 140) C f. Aristotle, RhetoricaB 5, 138a a 20-1383 b 11. vii. (H. 143) C f. Section 18, H . 85 ff. viii. (H . 147) C f. Section 4, H . 11 ff. ix. (H. 156) C f. Section 13, H . 59 ff. x. (H. 166) O n the doctrine o f signification, cf. Edm und Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, vol. II, Investigations I, I V -V I. See further the more radical version o f the problem atic in his Ideen I, Sections 123 ff., pp. 255 ff. x i. (H. 171) Aristotle, Metaphysica A 1, 980 a 21. xii. (H. 171) Augustine, Confessiones, X , 35. xiii. (H . 175) C f. Section 9, H . 42 ff. Division One, Chapter Six i. (H . 180) C f. Section 12, H . 52 ff. ii. (H. 188) C f. Section 12, H . 53 ff. iii. (H . 189) Cf. Section 27, H . 126 ff. iv. (H . 190) It is no accident that the phenom ena o f anxiety and fear, w hich have never been distinguished in a thoroughgoing m anner, have come within the purview o f Christian theology ontically and even (though within very narrow limits) ontologically. T his has happened whenever the anthropological problem o f m an’s Being towards G od has won priority and when questions have been form ulated under the guidance o f phenom ena like faith, sin, love, and repentance. Cf. Augustine’s doctrine o f the timor castus and servilis, which is discussed in his exegetical writings and his letters. O n fear in general cf. his De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, qu. 33 (de metu) ; qu. 34 (utrum non aliud amandum sit, quam metu carere) ; qu. 35 (quid amandum sit). (M igne, Patrologiae Latinae tom. V I I , pp. 23 ff.) Luther has treated the problem o f fear not only in the traditional context o f an Interpretation o f poenitentia and contritio, but also in his com m entary on the Book o f Genesis, where, though his treatm ent is b y no means highly conceptualized, it is a ll the more impressive as edification. Cf. Enarrationes in genesin, cap. 3, Werke (Erlanger A usgabe), Exegetica opera latina, tom. I, pp. 177 ff. T h e m an who has gone farthest in analysing the phenomenon o f anxiety— and again in the theological context o f a ‘psychological’ exposition o f the problem o f original sin— is Seren Kierkegaard. C f. Der Begriff der Angst [ The Concept o f Dread], 1844, Gesammelte Werke (Diederichs), vol. 5. v. (H . 197) T h e author ran across the following pre-ontological illustration o f the existential-ontological Interpretation o f Dasein as care in K . Burdach’s article. ‘Faust und die Sorge’ (Deutsche Vierteljahrschrift fü r Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte, vol. I, 1923, pp. i ff.). Burdach has shown that the fable o f Cura (which has com e down to us as No. 220 o f the Fables o f Hyginus) was taken over from H erder by Goethe and worked up for the second part o f his Faust. C f. especially pp. 40 ff. T h e text given above is taken from F. Bücheier (Rheinisches Museum, vol. 41, 1886, p. 5) ; the translation is from Burdach, ibid., pp. 41 ff. vi. (H. 1g8) C f. H erder’s poem : ‘Das K in d der Sorge’ (Suphan X X I X , 75). vii. (H. 199) Burdach, op. cit., p. 49. Even as early as the Stoics, pépipva was a firm ly established term, and it recurs in the N ew Testam ent, becom ing “ sollicitude” in the V u lgate. T h e w a y in w hich ‘care’ is view ed in the foregoing existential analytic o f D asein, is one which has grown upon the author in connection w ith his attempts to Interpret the A ugustinian (i.e., Helleno-Christian) anthropology w ith regard to the foundational principles reached in the ontology o f Aristotle.

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viii. (H. 201) C f. H . 89 if. and H . 100. ix. (H. 203) C f. K a n t, Critique o f Pure Reason,2 pp. 274 ff., and further the corrections added in the preface to the second edition, p. xxxix, n o te : see also ‘O n the Paralogisms o f the Pure R eason’, ibid., pp. 399 ff., especially p. 412. x . (H . 203) Ibid., Preface, note. xi. (H . 203) Ibid., p. 275. xii. (H. 203) Ibid., p . 275. xiii. (H. 204) Ibid., p . 275. xiv. (H. 205) Ibid., Preface, note. x v. (H . 205) C f. W . D ilthey, ‘Beiträge zu r Lösung der Frage vom U rsprung unseres G laubens an die R ealität der Aussenwelt und seinem R e ch t’ (1890), Gesammelte Schriften, V o l. V , 1, p p. 90 ff. A t the very beginning o f this article D ilth ey says in no uncertain terms: ‘F or i f there is to be a truth which is universally valid for m an, then in accordance w ith th e method first proposed b y Descartes, thought must m ake its w a y from the facts o f consciousness rather than from external actuality.’ {Ibid., p . 90.) x vi. (H. 208) F ollow ing Scheler’s procedure, N icolai H artm ann has recently based his ontologically oriented epistemology upon the thesis that knowing is a ‘relationship o f B eing’ . C f. his Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis, second enlarged edition, 1925. Both Scheler and H artm ann, however, in spite o f all the differences in the phenomeno­ logical bases from w h ich they start, fail to recognize that in its traditional basic orienta­ tion as regards Dasein, *ontology’ has been a failure, and that the very ‘relationship o f B eing’ w hich knowing includes (see above, H . 59 ff.), compels such ‘ontology’ to be revised in its principles, n ot ju st critically corrected. Because H artm ann underestimates the unexpressed consequences o f positing a relationship-of-Being w ithout providing an ontological clarification for it, he is forced into a ‘critical realism’ which is at bottom quite foreign to the level o f the problem atic he has expounded. O n H artm ann’s w a y o f taking ontology, cf. his ‘W ie ist kritische Ontologie überhaupt m öglich?’, Festschrift f ü r Paul Natarp, 1924, pp. 124 ff. x vii. (H. 209) C f. especially Section 16, H . 72 ff. (‘H o w the W orld ly C haracter o f the Environm ent Announces itself in Entities W ithin-the-w orld’); Section 18, H . 83 ff. (‘ Involvem ent and Significance; the W orldhood o f the W orld’ ); Section 29, H . 134 ff. (‘Dasein as State-of-M m d’) . O n die Being-in-itself o f entities within-the-world, cf. H . 75 f. xviii. (H. 209) D ilth ey, op. cit., p. 134. x ix. (H. 210) C f. Scheler’s lecture, ‘D ie Form en des Wissens und die Bildung’, 1925, notes 24 and 25. In reading our proofs w e notice that in the collection o f Scheler’s treatises w h ich has ju st appeared {Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft, 1926) he has published his long-promised study ‘Erkenntnis und A rb eit’ (pp. 233 ff.). D ivision V I o f this treatise (p. 455) brings a more detailed exposition o f his ‘voluntative theory o f Dasein’, in connection w ith an evaluation and critique o f D ilthey. xx. (H. 212) Diels, Fragm ent 5. [This passage m ay be translated in m ore than one w ay: e.g., ‘for thought and being are the same thing’ (Fairbanks); ‘it is the same thing that can be thought and th at can be’ (Burnet).— T r.] xxi. (H. 212) A ristode, Metaphysica A . xxii. (H. 213) Ibid., A , 984a 18 ff. [‘ . . . the very fact showed them the w a y and joined in forcing them to investigate the subject.’ (Ross)— T r.] xxiii. (H. 213) Ibid., A , 986b 31. xxiv. (H . 213) Ibid., A , 984b 10. x xv. (H. 213) Ibid., A , 983b 2. C f. 988a 20. xxvi. (H. 213) Ibid., a l, 993b 17. xxvii. (H. 213) Ibid., a l, 993b 20. x xviii. (H . 213) Ibid., r 1, 1003a 21. xxix. (H. 214) A ristode, De interpretation 1, 16a. 6. [This is not an exact quotation.— T r.] x xx . (H . 2 14) C f. Thom as Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, qu. 1, art. 1. xxxi. (H. 215) K a n t, Critique o f Pure Reason,2 p. 82. xxxii. (H. 215) Ibid., p . 83. [T w o trivial misprints in this quotation w hich appear in the earlier editions have been corrected in the later editions.— T r.] xxxiii. (H. 215) Ibid., p . 350. [Another trivial misprint has been corrected in the later editions.— T r.] xxxiv. (H. 218) O n the idea o f demonstration as ‘identification’ cf. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen,2 vol. I I , part 2, Untersuchung V I . O n ‘evidence and truth’ see ibid., Sections 36-39, pp. 115 ff. T h e usual presentations o f the phenomenological theory

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o f truth confine themselves to w h at has been said in the critical prolegom ena (vol. I), and mention that this is connected with B olzano’s theory o f the proposition. But the positive phenom enological Interpretations, w hich differ basically from Bolzano’s theory, have been neglected. T h e only person w ho has taken up these investigations positively from outside the m ain stream o f phenom enological research, has been E. Lask, whose Logik der Philosophie (19 11) was as strongly influenced by the sixth Untersuchung (Ü ber sinnliche und kategoriale Anschauungen’, pp. 128 ff.) as his Lehre vom Urteil (1912) was influenced by the above-mentioned sections on evidence and truth. xxxv. (H. 219) C f. D ieb, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, H eracleitus fragm ent B 1. xxxvi. (H. 220) C f. H . 3a ff. xxxvii. (H. 221) C f. H . 134 ff. xxxviii. (H. 221) C f. H . 166 ff. xxxix. (H. 223) K a rl R ein hardt (Cf. his Parmenides und die Geschichte der grieschischen Philosophie, 1916) was the first to conceptualize and solve the hackneyed problem o f how the two parts o f Parmenides’ poem are connected, though he d id not explicitly point out the ontological foundation for the connection between aAijflcta and So£a, or its necessity. xl. (H. 223) C f. Section 33 above, H . 153 ff. (‘Assertion as a derivative m ode o f inter­ pretation.’ ) xli. (H. 223) C f. Section 34, H . 160 ff. xlii. (H . 225) Cf. Aristotle, Ethica Nicotnachea Z and Metaphysica 0 10. Division Two, Section 45 i. (H. 231) Cf. Section 9, H . 41 ff. ii. (H. 231) C f. Section 6, H . 19 ff.; Section 21, H . 95 ff.; Section 43, H . 201. iii. (H. 232) C f. Section 32, H . 148 ff. iv. (H . 232) C f. Section 9, H . 41 ff. v . (H . 233) C f. Section 41, H . 191 ff. vi. (H . 235) In the nineteenth century, Seren K ierkegaard explicitly seized upon the problem o f existence as an existentiell problem , and thought it through in a penetrating fashion. But the existential problem atic was so alien to him that, as regards his ontology, he rem ained com pletely dom inated b y H egel and b y ancient philosophy as H egel saw it.1 Thus, there is more to be learned philosophically from his ‘edifying* writings than from his theoretical ones— with the exception o f his treatise on the concept o f anxiety. [Here H eidegger is referring to the work generally known in English as The Concept o f Dread.— T r.] Division Two, Chapter One i. (H. 240) C f. Section 9, H . 41 ff. ii. (H . 241) Cf. Section 10, H . 45 ff. iii. (H . 244) T h e distinction between a w hole and a sum, oXov and irav, totum and compositum, has been fam iliar since the tim e o f Plato and Aristotle. B ut adm ittedly no one as yet knows anything about the systematics o f the categorial variations w hich this division already embraces, nor have these been conceptualized. A s an approach to a thorough analysis o f the structures in question, cf. Edm und Husserl, Logische Unter­ suchungen, vol. I I , Untersuchung I I I : ‘Z u r Lehre von den G anzen und Teilen*. iv. (H. 245) Der Ackermann aus Böhmen, edited b y A .B e m ta n d K . Burdach. {Vom Mittelalter zur Reformation. Forschungen zur Geschichte der deutschen Bildung, edited b y K . Burdach, vol. I I I , 2. Teil) 1917, chapter 20, p. 46. v. (H. 246) O n this topic, cf. the comprehensive presentation in E. K orschelt’s Lebensdauer, Altem und Tod, 3rd Edition, 1924. N ote especially the full bibliography, pp. 414 ff. vi. (H. 249) In its Interpretation o f ‘life’, the anthropology w orked out in Christian theology— from Paul right up to C alv in ’s meditatio futurae vitae— has always kept death in view . W ilhelm D ilthey, whose real philosophical tendencies were aim ed a t an ontology o f ‘life’, could not fail to recognize how life is connected with death: ‘ . . . and finally, that relationship which most deeply and universally determines the feeling o f our Dasein— the relationship o f life to death; for the bounding o f our existence b y death is always decisive for our understanding and assessment o f life.’ (Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung, 5th Edition, p. 230.) R ecently, G . Simmel has also explicitly included the 1 H ere w e follow the older editions in readin g ‘. . . und der durch diesen gesehenen antiken Philosophie . . .’ In the new editions ,gesehenen’ has been changed to ‘ges­ chehenen*.

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phenom enon o f death in his characterization o f ‘life’, though adm ittedly without clearly separating the biological-ontical and the ontological-existential problematics. (Cf. his Lebensanschauung: Vier Metaphysische Kapitel, 1918, pp. 99-153.) For the investigation w hich lies before us, com pare especially K a rl Jaspers’ Psychologie der Weltanschauungen, 3rd Edition, 1925, p p. 229 ff., especially pp. 259-270. Jaspers takes as his clue to death the phenom enon o f the ‘lim it-situation’ as he has set it forth— a phenomenon whose fundam ental significance goes beyond any typology o f ‘attitudes’ and ‘world-pictures’. D ilth ey’s challenges have been taken up b y R u d o lf U n ger in his Herder, Novalis und Kleist. Studien über die Entwicklung des Todesproblems im Denken und Dichten von Sturm und Drang zur Romantik, 1922. In his lecture ‘Literaturgeschichte a b Problemgeschichte. Z u r Frage geisteshistorischer Synthese, m it besonderer Beziehung a u f W ilhelm D ilth ey’ (1Schriften der Königsberger Gelehrten Gesellschaft, Geisteswissenschaftliche Klasse, 1. Jahr, H eft 1, 1924), U n ger considers the principles o f D ilth ey’s w a y o f form ulating the question. H e sees clearly the significance o f phenom enological research for laying the foundations o f the ‘problems o f life’ in a more radical m anner. (Op. cit., pp. 17 ff.) vii. (H . 249) C f. Section 4 1, H . 192. viii. (H . 251) C f. Section 40, H . 184 ff. ix. (H . 252) C f. Section 27, H . 126 ff. x. (H . 253) C f. Section 16, H . 72 ff. xi. (H. 253) C f. Section 38, H . 177 ff. xii. (H. 254) In his story ‘T h e D eath o f Ivan Ilyitch ’ L eo Tolstoi has presented the phenom enon o f the disruption and breakdown o f having ‘someone die’ . xiii. (H. 255) In connection with this m ethodological possibility, cf. w h at was said on the analysis o f anxiety, Section 40, H . 184. xiv. (H . 256) C f. Section 44, H . 212 ff., especially H . 219 ff. xv. (H . 257) C f. Section 44 b H . 222. xvi. (H. 259) T h e inauthenticity o f Dasein has been handled in Section 9 (H. 42 ff.), Section 27 (H. 130), and especially Section 38 (H. 175 ff.). xvii. (H. 263) C f. Section 31, H . 142 ff. x viii. (H. 265) C f. Section 62, H . 305 ff. x ix. (H . 265) C f. Section 29, H . 134 ff. x x . (H . 266) C f. Section 40, H . 184 ff. Division Two, Chapter Two i. (H. 267) C f. Section 25, H . 114 ff. ii. (H. 267) C f. Section 27, H . 126 ff., especially H . 130. iii. (H. 268) These observations and those w hich follow after were com m unicated as theses on the occasion o f a public lecture on the concept o f tim e, which was given at M arbu rg in J u ly 1924. iv. (H. 270) C f. Section 28 ff., H . 130 ff. v. (H . 271) C f. Section 34, H . 160 ff. vi. (H. 272) Besides the Interpretations o f conscience w hich w e find in K a n t, H egel, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche, one should notice M . K ä h le r’s Das Gewissen, erster geschichtlicher Teil (1878) and his article in the Realenzyklopädie fü r Protestantische The­ ologie und Kirche. See too A . R itschl’s ‘ Ü b e r das Gewissen’ (1876), reprinted in his Gesammelte Aufsätze, Neue Folge (1896), pp. 177 ff. See finally H . G . Stoker’s m onograph, Das Gewissen, w hich has recently appeared in Schriften zur Philosophie und Soziologie, vol. II (1925), under the editorship o f M a x Scheler. T his is a wide-ranging investiga­ tion; it brings to ligh t a rich m ultiplicity o f conscience-phenomena, characterizes critically the different possible ways o f treating this phenom enon itself, and lists some further literature, though as regards the history o f the concept o f conscience, this list is not complete. Stoker’s m onograph differs from the existential Interpretation w e have given above in its approach and accordingly in its results as w ell, regardless o f m any points o f agreem ent. Stoker underestimates from the outset the herm eneutical con­ ditions for a ‘description’ o f ‘conscience as something w h ich subsists O b jectively and actu ally’ (p. 3). T h is leads to blurring the boundaries between phenom enology and theology, w ith dam age to both. A s regards the anthropological foundation o f this investigation, in which the personalism o f Scheler has been taken over, cf. Section 10 o f the present treatise, H . 47 ff. A ll the same, Stoker’s m onograph signifies notable progress as com pared with previous Interpretations o f conscience, though more by its

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comprehensive treatment of the conscience-phenomena and their ramifications than by exhibiting the ontological roots of the phenomenon itself. vii. (H. 277) Cf. Section 40, H. 189. viii. (H. 291) Cf. Max Scheler, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, Part Two, Jahrbuch f ü r philosophic und phänomologische Forschung, vol. II (1916), p. 192. [This passage is found on page 335 of the fourth edition, Francke Verlag, Bern, 1954 - T r .] ix. (H. 296) Cf. Section 34, H. 164. x. (H. 297) Cf. Section 44, H. 212 ff. xi. (H. 297) Cf. ibid., H. 221. xii. (H. 297) Cf. Section 18, H. 83 ff. xiii. (H. 298) Cf. Section 44b, H. 222. xiv. (H. 299) Cf. Sections 23 and 24, H. 104 ff. xv. (H. 301) In the direction of such a problematic, Karl Jaspers is the first to have explicitly grasped the task of a doctrine of world-views and carried it through. Cf. his Psychologie der Weltanschauungen, 3rd edition, 1925. Here the question of ,what man is’ is raised and answered in terms of what he essentially can be. (Cf. the foreword to the first edition.) The basic existential-ontological signification of ‘limit-situations’ is thus illumined. One would entirely miss the philosophical import of this ,psychology of world-views’ if one were to ,use’ it simply as a reference-work for ,types of world-view’. Division Two, Chapter Three

i. (H. 302) Cf. Section 58, H. 280 ff. [This reference, which appears in both earlier and later editions seems to be incorrect. Cf. Section 53, H. 260 ff.— Tr.] ii. (H. 306) The Being-guilty which belongs primordially to Dasein’s state of Being, must be distinguished from the status corruptionis as understood in theology. Theology can find in Being-guilty, as existentially defined, an ontological condition for the factical possibility of such a status. The guilt which is included in the idea of this status, is a factical indebtedness of an utterly peculiar kind. It has its own attestation, which remains closed off in principle from any philosophical experience. The existential analysis of Being-guilty, proves nothing eitherfor or against the possibility of sin. Taken strictly, it cannot even be said that the ontology of Dasein o f itself leaves this possibility open; for this ontology, as a philosophical inquiry, ,knows’ in principle nothing about sin. iii. (H. 309) Cf. Section 45, H. 231 ff. iv. (H. 310) Cf. Section 45, H. 232. v. (H. 311) Cf. Section 5, H. 15. vi. (H. 314) Cf. Section 43, H. 200 ff. vii. (H. 314) Cf. H. 212 and H. 117. viii. (H. 314) Cf. Section 32, H. 152 ff. ix. (H. 316) Cf. Section 44b, H. 219 ff. x. (H. 317) Cf. Section 41, H. 191 ff. xi. (H. 317) Cf. Section 45, H. 231 ff. xii. (H. 318) Cf. Section 25, H. 114 ff. xiii. (H. 318) Cf. Section 43c, H. 211. xiv. (H. 318) Cf. Section 41, H. 193. xv. (H. 318) Cf. Kant, Critique o f Pure Reason, second edition, p. 399; and especially the treatment in the first edition, pp. 348 ff. xvi. (H. 319) On the analysis of transcendental apperception, one may now consult Martin Heidegger, Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik (zweite unveränderte Auflage, 1951), Division III. [This note replaces the following note in the earlier editions, referring to a portion of Being and Time which has never appeared: ‘The first division of the second part of this treatise will bring the concrete phenomenologico-critical analysis of transcendental apperception and its ontological signification.’— Tr.] xvii. (H. 319) Kant, op. cit., second edition, p. 404. xviii. (H. 319) Kant, op. cit., first edition p. 354. xix. (H. 320) The fact that in taking the ontological character of the personal Self as something ,substantial’, Kant has still kept basically within the horizon of the inappro­ priate ontology of what is present-at-hand within-the-world, becomes plain from the material which H. Heimsoeth has worked over in his essay ‘Persönlichkeitsbewusstsein und Ding an sich in der Kantischen Philosophie’ (reprinted from Immanuel Kant.

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Festschrift zur zweiten Jahrhundertfeier seines Geburtstages, 1924). The line taken in the essay

goes beyond giving a mere historiological report, and is aimed towards the *categorial’ problem of personality. Heimsoeth says: ‘Too little note has been taken of the intimate way in which the theoretical and die practical reason are worked into one another in Kant’s practice and planning; too litde heed has been given to the fact that even here the categories (as opposed to the way in which they are filled in naturalistically in the ‘principles’) explicitly retain their validity and, under the primacy of the practical reason, are to find a new application detached from naturalistic rationalism (substance, for instance, in the ‘person’ and personal immortality; causality as the ‘causality of freedom’ ; and reciprocity in the ‘community of rational creatures’ ; and so forth). They serve as intellectual fixatives for a new way of access to the unconditioned, without seeking to give any ratiocinative knowledge of it as an object.’ (pp. 31 f.) But here the real ontological problem has been passed over. We cannot leave aside the question of whether these ‘categories’ can retain their primordial validity and only need to be applied in another way, or whether they do not rather pervert the ontological problematics of Dasein from the ground up. Even if the theoretical reason has been built into the practical, the existential-ontological problem of the Self remains not merely unsolved; it has not even been raised. On what ontological basis is the ‘working into one another’ of the theoretical and the practical reason to be performed? Is it theoretical or practical behaviour that determines the kind of Being of a person, or neither of them— and if neither, then what is it ? In spite of their fundamental signifi­ cance, do not the paralogisms make manifest how ontologically groundless are the problematics of the Self from Descartes’ res cogitans right up to Hegel’s concept of spirit? One does not need to think either ‘naturalistically’ or ‘rationalistically’, and yet one may be under the domination of the ontology of the ‘substantial’— a domination which is only more baleful because it is seemingly self-evident. See what is essentially a supplement to the above-mentioned essay: Heimsoeth, ‘Die metaphysischen Motive in der Ausbildung des Kritischen Idealismus’, Kantstudien, X X IX , (1924), pp. 121 ff. For a critique of Kant’s conception of the “ I” , see also Max Scheler, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, Part Two, in this Yearbook [Jahrbuch für Philosophie undphänomenologische Forschung] vol. II, 1916, pp. 246 ff. (‘Person und das Ich” der transzendentalen Apperzeption’). [This section is to be found on pp. 384 ff. of the fourth edition of Scheler’s work, Bern, 1954.— Tr.] xx. (H. 321) Cf. our phenomenological critique of Kant’s ‘Refutation of Idealism’.. Section 43a, H. 202 ff. xxi. (H. 321) Cf. Sections 12 and 13, H. 52 ff. xxii. (H. 324) Cf. Section 32, H. 148 ff., especially H. 151 f. xxiii. (H. 327) Cf. Section 41, H. 196. xxiv. (H. 332) Cf. Section 9, H. 43. xxv. (H. 332) Cf. Sections 25 ff., H. 113 ff. Division Two, Chapter Four

i. (H. 334) Cf. Division One, H. 41-230. ii. (H. 336) Cf. Section 31, H. 142 ff. iii. (H. 338) S. Kierkegaard is probably the one who has seen the existentiell phenomenon of the moment of vision with the most penetration; but this does not signify that he has been correspondingly successful in Interpreting it existentially. He clings to the ordinary conception of time, and defines the “ moment of vision” with the help of “ now” and “ eternity” . When Kierkegaard speaks of ‘temporality’, what he has in mind is man’s ‘Being-in-time’ [“ In-der-Zeit-sein” ]. Time as within-time-ness knows only the “ now” ; it never knows a moment of vision. If, however, such a moment gets experienced in an existentiell manner, then a more primordial temporality has been presupposed, al­ though existentially it has not been made explicit. On the ‘moment of vision’, cf. K . Jaspers, Psychologie der Weltanschauungen, third unaltered edition, 1925, pp. 108 ff., and further his ‘review of Kierkegaard’ (ibid., pp. 419-432). iv. (H. 339) Cf. Section 29, H. 134 ff. v. (H. 341) Cf. Section 30, H. 140 ff. vi. (H.342) Cf. Aristotle, Rhetorica B 5, 1382a 21. vii. (H. 342) Cf. Section 40, H. 184 ff. viii. (H. 346) Cf. Section 38, H. 175 ff.

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ix. (H. 346) Cf. Sections 35 ff., H. 167 if. x. (H. 346) Cf. Section 36, H. 170 ff. xi. (H. 349) Cf. Section 34, H. 160 if. xii. (H. 349) Cf., among others, Jakob Wackernagel, Vorlesungen über Syntax, vol. I, 1920, p. 15, and especially pp. 149-310. See further G. Herbig, ‘Aktionsart und Zeitstufe’ in Indogermanische Forschung, vol. V I, 1896, pp. 167 ff. xiii. (H. 349) Cf. Division Three, Chapter II of this treatise. [Since Division Three has never been published, this footnote has been deleted in the later editions.— Tr.J xiv. (H. 350) Cf. Section a8, H. 133. xv. (H. 35a) Cf. Section 15, H. 66 ff. xvi. (H. 35a) Cf. Section !a, H. 56 ff. xvii. (H. 353) Cf. Section 18, H. 83 ff. xviii. (H. 354) Cf. Section 16, H. 7a ff. xix. (H. 357) Cf. Section 44, H. aia ff. xx. (H. 357) Cf. Section 7, H. 37 ff. xxi. (H. 358) Kant, Critique o f Pure Reason, second edition p. 33. xxii. (H. 360) Cf. Section 3a, H. 151. xxiii. (H. 363) The thesis that all cognition has ‘intuition’ as its goal, has the temporal meaning that all cognizing is making present. Whether every science, or even philo­ sophical cognition, aims at a making-present, need not be decided here. Husserl uses the expression ‘make present’ in characterizing sensory perception. Cf. his Logische Untersuchungen, first edition, 1901, vol. II, pp. 588 and 620. This ‘temporal’ way of describing this phenomenon must have been suggested by the analysis of perception and intuition in general in terms of the idea of intention. That the intentionality o f‘consciousness’ is grounded in [Italics in newer editions only.— Tr.] the ecstatical unity of Dasein, and how this is the case, will be shown in the following Division. [This Division has never been published.— Tr.] xxiv. (H. 364) Cf. Section 18, H. 87 ff. xxv. (H. 367) Cf. Sections 33-24, H. 101 ff. xxvi. (H. 370) Cf. Section 9, H. 42 ff. Division Two, Chapter Five

i. (H. 375) Cf. Section 64, H. 316 ff. ii. (H. 375) Cf. Section 63, H. 310 ff. iii. (H. 377) Cf. Section 80, H. 411 ff. iv. (H. 382) Cf. Section 60, H. 295 ff. v. (H. 38a) Cf. Section 6a, H. 305 ff. vi. (H. 383) Cf. H. 384. vii. (H. 384) Cf. Section a6, H. 117 ff. viii. (H. 385) On the concept of the ‘generation’, cf. Wilhelm Dilthey, ‘Über das Studium der Geschichte der Wissenschaften vom Menschen, der Gesellschaft und dem Staat’ (1875). Gesammelte Schriften, vol. V (1924), pp. 36-41. ix. (H. 388) On the question of how ‘natural happening’ is to be distinguished ontologicauy from the movement of history, cf. the studies of F. Gotti, which for a long time have not been sufficiently appreciated: Die Grenzen der Geschichte (1904). x. (H. 392) Cf. Section 6, H. 19 ff. xi. (H. 394) On the Constitution of historiological understanding, cf. Eduard Spranger, ‘Zur Theorie des Verstehens und zur geisteswissenschaftlichen Psychologie’, Festschrift f ü r Johannes Volkelt, 1918, pp. 357 ff. xii. (H. 397) Cf. Briefwechsel zwischen Wilhelm Dilthey und dem Grafen Paul Yorck von Warten­ burg i8 jj- i8 g y , Halle-an-der-Saale, 1923. xiii. (H. 398) Briefwechsel, p. 185. xiv. (H. 399) We can forgo this all the more because we are indebted to G. Misch for a concrete presentation of Dilthey which is aimed at his central tendencies, and which is indispensable for coming to terms with Dilthey’s work. Cf. his introduction to Wilhelm Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. V (1924), pp. vii-cxvii. xv. (H. 403) Cf. Sections 5 and 6, H. 15 ff. Division Two, Chapter Six

j. (H. 408) Cf. Section 33, H. 154 ff. ii. (H. 413) Cf. Section 15, H. 66 ff.

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iii. (H. 414) Cf. Section 18, H. 83 ff., and Section 69c, H. 364 ff. iv. (H. 417) Here we shall not go into the problem of the measurement of time as treated in the theory of relativity. If the ontological foundations of such measurement are to be clarified, this presupposes that world-time and within-time-ness have already been clarified in terms of Dasein’s temporality, and that light has also been cast on the existential-temporal Constitution of the discovery of Nature and the temporal meaning of measurement. Any axiomatic for the physical technique of measurement must rest upon such investigations, and can never, for its own part, tackle the problem of time as such. v. (H. 418) As a first attempt at the Interpretation of chronological time and ‘historical numeration’ [“ Geschichtszahl” ], cf. the author’s habilitation-lecture at Freiburg in the summer semester of 1915: ‘Der Zeitbegriff in der Geschichtswissenschaft’ (published in Zeitschrift f ü r Philosophie und Philosophische Kritik, vol. 161, 1916, pp. 173 ff.) The con­ nections between historical numeration, world-time as calculated astronomically, and the temporality and historicality of Dasein need a more extensive investigation. Cf. further G. Simmel, ‘Das Problem der historischen Zeit’ in philosophische Vorträge, veröffentlicht von der Kantgesellschaft, No. 12, 1916. The two works which laid the basis for the development of historiological chronology are Josephus Justus Scaliger, De emendatione temporum (1583) and Dionysius Petavius, S. J., Opus de doctrina temporum (1627). On time-reckoning in antiquity cf. G. Bilfinger, Die antiken Stundenangaben (1888) and Der b ärgerliche Tag. Untersuchungen über den Beginn des Kalendertages im klassischen Altertum und in der christlichen Mittelalter (1888). See also H. Diels, Antike Technik, second edition,

1920, pp. 155-232: ‘Die antike Uhr’. More recent chronology is handled by Fr. Rühl in his Chronologie des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit (1897). vi. (H. 420) Cf. Section 44c, H. 226 ff. vii. (H. 421) Cf. Aristotle, Physica A 11, 219b 1 ff. viii. (H. 421) Cf. Section 6, H. 19-27. ix. (H. 423) Cf. Section 21, especially H. 100 f. x. (H. 423) Cf. Plato, Timaeus 37 d. [‘But he decided to make a kind of moving image of the eternal; and while setting the heaven in order, he made an eternal image, moving according to number— an image of that eternity which abides in oneness. It is to this image that we have given the name of “ time” .’— Tr.] xi. (H. 424) Cf. Section 41, H. 191 ff. xii. (H. 424) Cf. Section 51, H. 252 ff. xiii. (H. 427) The fact that the traditional conception of “ eternity” as signifying the “ standing “ now” ’ (nunc starts), has been drawn from the ordinary way of understanding time and has been defined with an orientation towards the idea of ‘constant’ presenceat-hand, does not need to be discussed in detail. If God’s eternity can be ‘construed’ philosophically, then it may be understood only as a more primordial temporality which is ‘infinite’. Whether the way afforded by the via negationis et eminentiae is a possible one, remains to be seen. xiv. (H. 427) Aristotle, Physica J 14, 223 a 25; cf. ibid., 11, 218 b 29-219 a 1, 219 a 4-6. [‘But if nothing other than the soul or the soul’s mind were naturally equipped for numbering, then if there were no soul, time would be impossible.’— Tr.] xv. (H. 427) Augustine, Confessiones X I, 26. [‘Hence it seemed to me that time is nothing else than an extendedness; but of what sort of thing it is an extendedness, I do not know; and it would be surprising if it were not an extendedness of the soul itself.’— Tr.] xvi. (H. 427) On the other hand, the extent to which an even more radical understanding of time than Hegel’s makes itself evident in Kant, will be shown in the first division of the second part of this treatise. [This portion of the work has not been published.— Tr.] xvii. (H. 428) Hegel, Die Vernunft in der Geschichte. Einleitung in die Philosophie der Welt­ geschichte (ed. G. Lasson, 1917), p. 133. xviii. (H. 428) Hegel, loc. cit.' [This phrase (‘das unsinnliche Sinnliche’) does not occur in this section of Hegel’s work as presented in Lasson’s 1920 edition, though we do find: ‘Die Zeit ist dies ganz Abstrakte, Sinnliches.’ And in the addendum to Section 254 of Hegel’s Encyclopedia, which Heidegger cites in the following note, we read that space is ‘eine unsinnliche Sinnlichkeit, und eine sinnliche Unsinnlichkeit’.— Tr.] xix. (H. 429) Cf. Hegel, Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (ed. G. Bolland, Leiden, 1906), Sections 254 ff. This edition also includes the ‘addenda’ from Hegel’s lectures. xx. (H. 429) Op. cit., Section 257, addendum.

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xxi. (H. 429) Ibid., Section 254. [Here Heidegger has again somewhat rearranged Hegel’s words.— Tr.] xxii. (H. 429) Ibid., Section 254, addendum. [The passage reads as follows: ,Space is thus punctuality, but a punctuality which is null— complete Continuity.’— Tr.] xxiii. (H. 430) Cf. Hegel, Eruyklopädie, Hoffmeister’s critical edition, 1949, Section 257. [In the later editions Heidegger quotes this passage as follows: ,Die Negativität, die sich als Punkt auf den Raum bezieht und in ihm ihre Bestimmungen als Linie und Fläche entwickelt, ist aber in der Sphäre des Aussersichseins ebensowohl fü r sich und ihre Bestimmungen darin, aber zugleich als in der Sphäre des Aussersichseins setzend, dabei als gleichgültig gegen das ruhige Nebeneinander erscheinend. So für sich gesetzt, ist sie die Zeit.’ This version differs somewhat from that given in the earlier editions of Heidegger’s work, in which this footnote does not include the reference to Hoffmeister’s edition of the Encyclopedia. Neither version entirely matches those found in the earlier editions of Hegel, and similar discrepancies are found in Heidegger’s other quotations from the Encyclopedia.— Tr.] xxiv. (H. 430) Ibid., Section 258. xxv. (H. 431) Cf. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik, Book I, Division I, chapter I (ed. G. Lasson, 1923), pp. 66 ff. xxvi. (H. 431) Cf. Hegel, Encyklopädie, Section 258, addendum. xxvii. (H. 431) Ibid., Section 259. [‘ “ Übrigens kommt es in der Natur, wo die Zeit Jetzt ist, nicht zum ‘bestehenden’ Unterschiede von jenen Dimensionen” (Vergangenheit und Zukunft).’ The quotation appears in a considerably less accurate form in the earlier editions of Heidegger’s work.— Tr.] xxviii. (H. 431) Ibid., Section 259, addendum. xxix. (H. 431) Ibid., Section 258, addendum. [The passage from Hegel reads as follows: ,Time is not, as it were, a receptacle in which everything has been put in a stream, and from which it gets swept away and swept under. Time is only this abstraction of such consuming.’— Tr.] xxx. (H. 432-433) The priority which Hegel has given to the “ now” which has been levelled off, makes it plain that in defining the concept of time he is under the sway of the manner in which time is ordinarily understood; and this means that he is likewise under the sway of the traditional conception of it. It can even be shown that his con­ ception of time has been drawn directly from the ‘physics’ of Aristotle. In the Jena Logic (Cf. G. Lasson’s 1923 edition), which was projected at the time of Hegel’s habilitation, the analysis of time which we find in his Encyclopedia has already been developed in ail its essential parts. Even the roughest examination reveals that the section on time (pp. 202 ff.) is a paraphrase of Aristotle’s essay on time. In the Jena Logic Hegel has already developed his view of time within the framework of his philosophy of Nature (p. 186), the first part of which is entitled ‘System of the Sun’ (p. 195). Hegel discusses the concept of time in conjunction with defining the concepts of aether and motion. Here too his analysis of space comes later. Though the dialectic already emerges, it does not have as yet the rigid schematic form which it will have afterward, but still makes it possible to understand the phenomena in a fairly relaxed manner. On the way from Kant to Hegel’s developed system, the impact of the Aristotelian ontology and logic has again been decisive. The Fact of this impact has long been well known. But the kind of effect it has had, the path it has taken, even its limitations, have hitherto been as obscure as the Fact itself has been familiar. A concrete philosophical Interpretation comparing Hegel’s Jena Logic with the ‘physics’ and ‘metaphysics’ of Aristotle will bring new light. For the above considerations, some rough suggestions will suffice. Aristotle sees the essence of time in the vvv, Hegel in the “ now” . Aristotle takes the vvv as Spos; Hegel takes the “ now” as a ,boundary’. Aristotle understands the vvv as oTiy/irf; Hegel interprets the “ now” as a point. Aristotle describes the vvv as róSt t i ; Hegel calls the “ now” the ‘absolute this’ Aristotle follows tradition in connecting Xpóvos with the apalpa; Hegel stresses the ‘circular course’ of time. To be sure, Hegel escapes the central tendency of the Aristotelian analysis— the tendency to expose a foundational connection (amXov8etv) between the vvv, the ¿pos, the an.yy.ri, and the roSe

ti.

In its results, Bergson’s view is in accord with Hegel’s thesis that space ‘is’ time, in spite of the very different reasons they have given. Bergson merely says the reverse: that time (temps) is space. Bergson’s view of time too has obviously arisen from an Inter­ pretation of the Aristotelian essay on time. That a treatise of Bergson with the title

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Quid Aristoteles de loco senserit should have appeared at the same time as his Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience, where the problem of temps and durée is expounded, is

not just a superficial literary connection. Having regard to Aristotle’s definition of time as the äptß/ios kivijattos, Bergson prefaces his analysis of time with an analysis of number. Time as space (Cf. Essai, p. 69) is quantitative Succession. By a counter­ orientation to this conception of time, duration gets described as qualitative Succession. This is not the place [Ort] for coming to terms critically with Bergson’s conception of time or with other Present-day views of it. So far as anything essential has been achieved in to-day’s analyses which will take us beyond Aristotle and Kant, it pertains more to the way time is grasped and to our ‘consciousness of time’. We shall come back to this in the first and third divisions of Part Two. [The preceding sentence has been deleted in the later editions.— Tr.] In suggesting a direct connection between Hegel’s conception of time and Aristotle’s analysis, we are not accusing Hegel of any ‘dependence’ on Aristotle, but are calling attention to the ontological import which this filiation has in principle for the Hegelian logic. On ,Aristotle and Hegel’, cf. Nicolai Hartmann’s paper with this title in Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus, vol. 3, 1923, pp. 1-36. xxxi. (H. 433) Cf. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik, vol. II (ed. Lasson, :923)’ Part 2, p. 2ao. xxxii. (H. 434) Ibid. xxxiii. (H. 434) Cf. Hegel, D ie Vernunft in der Geschichte. Einleitung in die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte (ed. G. Lasson, 1917), p. 130. xxxiv. (H. 434) Ibid., p. 132. xxxv. (H. 434) Ibid. xxxvi. (H. 434) Ibid. xxxvii. (H. 434) Cf. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, Werke vol. II, p. 604. [In italicizing the word ‘time’, we have followed Heidegger’s earlier editions and the principal editions of Hegel’s works; these italics are not found in the later editions of Sein und Zeit. The italicization of ‘is’ has been introduced by Heidegger, and does not appear in the edition of Hegel which he has apparently used.— Tr.] xxxviii. (H. 434) Cf. Hegel, Die Vernunft in der Geschichte, p. 134. xxxix. (H. 435) Cf. Hegel, Enzyklopädie, Section 258. xl. (H. 435) Cf. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, p. 605. xli. (H. 436) Cf. Section 7, H. 38.

N O T E ON T H E IN D E X AND GLOSSA RY Being and Time is a work o f many interwoven themes, where words are used in

strange ways made stranger still by the shift to another language. The reader must constantly remind himself of how specific expressions are used, and he must recall the contexts in which they have appeared before. In our index of English expres­ sions we have tried to list most of those which he m ay have occasion to look up, indicating which German expressions they have been used to translate and the chief passages in which they appear. W e have also provided a German-English glossary for the benefit o f the reader who needs a translation as an aid in studying the German text, or who has read other works o f Heidegger or discussions o f his theories and wants to know how we have handled specific problems. W e have taken the reader into our confidence, as it were, exposing not only the pedantic consistency with which many expressions have been treated but also our many departures from consistency when a little more pedantry might have been warranted. Rather than overloading the index and glossary with trivial details, we have made no effort to list all the important expressions which belong to the same family, but have usually chosen one or two to serve as representatives for the rest. W e have, however, used the expression ‘ But cf.' to introduce members o f the family which have been handled in ways other than those which our main entry suggests; we have done so even in some cases where these exceptions are quite trivial. In both the index and the glossary we have usually tried to list all the *equiva­ lents for expressions o f each family for which an entry is made. In those cases where our list is incomplete, we have usually indicated this by an ‘etc.’ ■ , and we can assure the reader that most of the expressions covered by this abbreviation are o f little philosophical importance. In the index, an asterisk (*) attached to a German expression means that to the best of our knowledge this expression has always been translated by some member o f the family for which the entry is made. Similarly, in the glossary we have used asterisks to indicate those English expressions which (again to the best of our knowledge) have been used solely to translate the corresponding German expression and its cognates. When several ‘equivalents’ are listed, we have put the more frequent ones first. I f a word not marked with an asterisk is given as an ‘equivalent’ for an expression listed in the glossary, but is not itself listed in the index (or vice versa), we have sometimes indicated in parentheses the other expressions to which it corresponds. When an English expression has been used to translate several German words o f which only one or two are of philosophical interest, we have often confined our index references explicitly to these. When two or more English expressions have been used to translate the same German word, we have sometimes found it convenient to put all the references together under a single entry. See, for example, our entries for ‘assign’ and ‘refer’ . In the index we have usually made no attempt to indicate all the passages in which an expression occurs. Indeed there are several expressions of the utmost importance, occurring nearly on every page, for which we have been content to

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list only a few key passages o r even none a t all. W h en , how ever, w e have some reason to suppose th a t o u r list is com plete, w e have in d icated this w ith a d agger (■f‫)־‬. I n general, the less frequently a w ord ap p ears, th e fuller o u r coverage. I n b o th the index a n d the glossary w e have used th e ab b rev iatio n \fin.’ to in ­ d icate th e pages on w hich o u r relev an t footnotes are to be found. I n th e index we h av e som etim es used th e ab b rev iatio n id f.' to designate th e chief passages in w hich th e a u th o r has discussed th e m ean in g o f a n expression, if these d o n o t coincide w ith those in w hich it first ap p e ars; we have d one so even in som e cases w here the a u th o r w ould p ro b ab ly n o t feel th a t he has given a full o r official ‘d efinition’. T h e fullness a n d accu racy o f b o th in d ex a n d glossary are due in large m easure to the extensive a n d careful records p re p a re d b y Miss M arjorie W ard . She is n o t responsible, how ever, for an y errors w e have m ade in su pplem enting h e r records o r red u cin g th e m to a m ore co m p ac t form . A ll references a re to th e p ag in atio n o f th e la te r G e rm a n editions as in d icated in o u r m argins.

G LO SSA R Y OF GERM AN EXPR ESSIO N S a b b len d e n : *dim dow n A bgeschlossenheit: (See abschliessen.) A b g ru n d : *abyss (fin . H . 152) ab k ünftig: derivative (fin . H . 329) a b leb en : *dem ise (fin . H . 247) abschliessen, A bschluss: *settle; con­ clude (H . 184, 25g) A b sta n d : distance abstandm ässig, A b stän d ig k e it: *distan tial, *distantiality A bsturz: *dow nw ard plunge ab träg lich : *detrim ental A bw esenheit: absence (F ehlen; M angel, H . 9; etc.) A ktionsart: aspect alltäglich, A lltäglichkeit; A lltag : *everyday, *everydayness B ut cf. alle T ag e (every day, H . 370) (fin . H . 16) a n : a t; to ; etc. (ftn- H . 54) A nalyse: analysis, analyse A n alytik: *analytic d er Ä n d ere: th e O th e r, etc. A ngabe, an g e b e n : assign; tell (erzählen, Aufschluss geben, sagen, A nw ei­ sung, etc.); eite (an fü h re n ); etc. (ftn . H . 408) A ngänglichkeit, angehen: m a tte r (verb); b e feasible (*tunlich, H . 337) an g leichen: *liken; *assim ilate (fin . H . 214) A ngst: * anxiety; d re a d (H . 190 n. iv) (fin . H . 182, 277) a n h a lte n : persist (H . 134); persevere (H . 354 ) B ut cf. A n h alt (support, foothold); ansichh alten (hold itself in , H . 75. 80) (fin . H . 354) ankom m en, an k ü n ftig : *com e along, *com e on, *oncom ing; etc. B ut cf. A nkunft (*arrival, H . 250) A nruf, an ru fen : appeal (fin . H . 269, 273)

A nsatz, ansetzen: * a p p ro a c h ; re g a rd ; sta rt; p osit; etc. an schauen. A nsch au u n g : behold (schauen, H . 37, 169); in tu it, in tu itio n (fin . H . 27, 402) an schneiden: *take th e first c u t (fin . H . 150) an sic h h a lten : h o ld itself in B ut cf. entry fo r 'anhalten’ above. (fin . H . 75) A n-sich-sein: Being-in-itself, Being-inthem selves (A n-ihm -selbst-sein, H .

90) (fin . H . 75) ansprechen: address; consider (fin . H . 37, 408) A n thropologie: *anthropology (fin . H . 17) anvisieren: *set o u r sights anw eisen, angew iesen, A ngew iesenheit: subm it, subm ission; *enjoin, *in­ ju n c tio n ; a llo t; assign; d ep en d en t (* ab h än g ig ; etc.); *instruct, *in­ stru ctio n ; tell (H . 19, 43, 115); p rovide (H . 19) (fin . H . 68, 87) anw esend: *hav in g presence B ut cf. A nw esenheit (presence). (fin . H . 326) A nw esenheit: presence B ut !f. anw esend (*having presence). (fin . H . 25, 326) anzeigen, A nzeige: in d ic a te ; call a tte n ­ tion (fin . H . 77) a p o p h a n tisc h : * ap o p h an tical a rtik u lieren : * A rticulate (fin . H . 153) ästhetisch: *aesthetic a u f: to ; fo r; etc. (fin . H . 84, 329) aufdecken: u n co v er; expose (freilegen, H . 375; sich aussetzen, H . 376) aufd rin g lich : *obtrusive (fin . H . 74) A u fen th alt: dw elling; sojourn (H . 24); *stop for a w hile H . 303) (ftn . H . 61)

5°6

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auffallig, auffallend : *conspicuous (fin . H . 74) aufg ehen: *be ab so rb ed ; rise (H . 412) (fin . H . 54) a u fh a lte n : dw ell; ho ld u p (vorhalten, H . 266) (ftn . H . 61, 354) aufrufen, A ufruf: *sum m on (fin . H . 269, 273) Aufsàssigkeit : *obstinacy (fin . H . 74) aufschliessen: *lay open B ut cf. Aufschluss (inform ation; tell; etc.) (fin . H . 75) das “A uf-sich-zu” : * th e ‘tow ardsoneself’ (fin . H . 329) sich aufspreizen: *give itself airs (fin . H . 430) aufw eisen: ex h ib it; p o in t o u t; p o in t to (fin . H . 53) aufzeigen: p o in t o u t; ex h ib it; p o in t to (H . 71); *poin t a t (H . 215) A u genblick: m o m en t; *m om ent o f vision (fin . H . 328, 338) ausdrücken, A usdruck : express, ex­ pression B ut cf. ausdrücklich (explicit; etc.) (fin . H . 149) ausdrücklich: explicit B u t cf. unausdrü ck lich (tacit, u n ­ expressed, n o t explicit, etc.) (fin . H . 149) au seinanderlegen: analyse; take a p a rt (fin . H . 149) ausgleichen: b alan c e off; *even o u t (H . 126) auslegen: * in te rp re t; lay o u t (H . 409) (fin . H . 1, 148, 149, 409) ausliefern: *surrend er ausrichten, ausgerich tet: d irect, * d i­ rectional, *directio n ality ; c o n tri­ b u te (H . 82) (fin . H . 102) (Note: while ‘Ausrichtung' is translated as 'directionality', 'Ausgerichtetheit' is translated as * ‘directedness’.) ausrü ck en : *back aw ay (fin . H . 339) * ausru fen: proclaim aussagen, A ussage: *assert, *assertion; *deposition (H . 197)

B ut cf. Aussagesatz (sta te m e n t); H eraussage (*speaking forth). (ftn . H . 62, 149) Aussein a u f . . . : *Being o u t for . . ; *Being o u t to g e t . . . (H . 261) äusserlich: *superficial; external (ftn . H . 339) d as A usser-sich: * th e “ outside-of-itself” A ussersichsein: *Being-outside-of-itself aussprechen: express; *speak o u t (H . i68f) B ut cf. unausgesprochen (ta c it; u n ­ expressed) ; A usspruch (p ro ­ n o u n cem e n t; etc.); A ussprache (p ro n o u n cin g ; etc.). (fin . H . 149, 167, 224, 408) A usstand, ausstehen: * o u tstan d in g ; has y et to b e given (H . 205, 230) (fin . H . 236, 250) ausw eisen: dem onstrate (fin■ H . 53) bed eu ten , B edeutung, B edeutsam keit: *signify, signification, *significance (fin . H . 1, 87) (Note; ‘Bedeutsamkeit’ has always been translated as 'sig n ifica n cew h ich , however, has also been used occasionally fo r 'Bedeutung’.) b ed ro h en : th re a te n befinden, befindlich, B efindlichkeit: * state-of-m ind; to be fo u n d ; find B ut cf. B efund (findings; d a tu m , H . 5 3 ; find) (ftn . 134, 137, 328) (Note: ‘Befindlichkeit’ has always been translated as ‘state-of-mind’, which has also been used occasionally fo r 'befinden’ and ‘befindlich’.) b efragen: *in terro g ate befreien: * lib erate b efü rch ten : *be apprehensive But cf. F u rc h t, fü rch ten (* fea r); sich fü rch ten (*be afraid), begegnen: *enco u n ter (fin . H . 31, 44, 329) (Note; while ‘Begegnisart’ is translated as ‘way o f encountering’, ‘Begegnis’ is translated as ‘mishap’ in H . 25s.) begreifen, B egriff: Begrifflichkeit: *con­ ceive, *concept, *conception, * co n cep tu al; inclu d e; etc. B ut cf. In b eg riff (aggregate). (fin . H . 150, 433)

Glossary o f German Expressions b eh alten : retain , *retention, * reten ­ tive; keep (H . 132) B ut cf. R e c h t behalten (is right, is justified); Vorbehalten (reserve) (ß n . H . 354) b ei: *alongside; in ; in spite of; etc. (fin . H . 54, 84, 85, 141, 239, 329) belegen: reserve (H . 368), *p re-em p t (H . 19); evidence (H . 431) (ftn . H . 368) ben om m en: *fascinated B ut cf. b enehm en (take aw ay ; deprive). (fin . H . 344) b erechnen: calculate b ereden: *talk ab o u t B ut cf. R ed e (*discourse, talk) berufen: *invoke; ap p e a l (H . 150) B ut cf. B eruf (*occupation), b e ruhigen: * tran q u illize; tran q u illity (R uhe, H . 254, 430) b e rü h ren : touch besagen: m ean ; say; am o u n t to ; be ta n ta m o u n t to (fin . H . i) beschliessen: in clu d e; im p ly ; em b race; com prise; m ake a decision (H . 299) (fin . H . 299, 300) b esinnen: consider (fin . H . 15) besorgen: *concern; provide (H . 253); *m ake provision (H . 106) B ut cf. Besorgnis (*w orry); Sorge (care) a n d its o th er com pounds. (fin . H . 57) besprechen: discuss B ut cf. sprechen (speak, etc.) a n d its o th er com pounds. (fin . H . 34) Bestand: content; *stock; subsistence; etc.

B u t cf. L eh rb estan d (*body o f doctrine, H . 212); T a tb e stan d (*facts o f th e case; *how things stan d , H . 242); B estandstuck (*com ponent); B estand art (w hat . . . consists in ); beständig (q.v.). (fin . H . 36, 303) beständig, B eständigkeit: steadiness; sta­ bility (H . 417); p e rm an e n t (H . 98) B ut cf. B estand (q. v.). bestehen: b e; consist; subsist; rem a in ; persist (H . 174); etc. (fin . H . 303)

507

bestim m en: * d eterm in e; define; *m ake d efinite; *give a definite ch ara c te r; ch aracterize (*charak­ terisieren, etc. ; k en n zeich n en ); a ttrib u te (* A ttrib u t; zusprechen); ascertain (festlegen; feststellen); *destine (ftn . H . 15, 344) (Mote: this verb and its derivatives are by no means technical termsfo r Heidegger, but are ubiquitous in German philo­ sophical writing. While we have found it impossible to adopt any standard polity fo r translating them, we have tried to use form s o f ‘deter­ mine’ or ‘define’ whenever we can do so without awkwardness.) bevorstehen, B evorstand: * im pend, * im pendence; sta n d before; etc. (fin . H . 250) B ew andtnis: involvem ent (bew enden) (fin . H . 84) bew egen: m ove; o p era te; *to. B ew egtheit: m ovem ent B ew egung: *m o tio n ; m ov em en t; etc. bew enden: *involve, involvem ent (Be­ w andtnis) (ftn . H . 84) b ezeu g en : * attest B ut cf. Z eugnis (*testim o n y ; d o cu ­ m e n t); Z eu g (* eq u ip m en t, etc.) a n d its com pounds, beziehen, B eziehung, Bezogenheit, Bezug, b ezüglich: relate, relation, relationship, relatio n al, etc. (Note: ‘Bezug’ and ,bezüglich’ have been translated very freely, but ‘un­ bezüglich’ is always translated as ‘non-relational’.) B ild: p ic tu re ; im age (H . 397) (fin . H . 217) (Note: compounds such as ‘Gebild’, ‘bilden’, etc. have been translated in other ways.) b in : * am (fin. H . 54) C h arak te r, C h arakteristik, ch a ra k te r­ isieren: ch ara c ter, ch aracterize, ch aracteristic; factor (H . 5) (Note: while these words appear quite frequently, we have used their English cognates even more freely.)

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Being and Time

d a : th e re ; th a t; as; h e re (H . 102, 4 3 °) (fin . H . 7, 135, 408) d a b e i: there alongside; thereby, etc. B ut cf. M it-dabei-sein (Being “ in o n it” w ith som eone). (ftn . H . 85, 119, 239) dagew esen: *has-been-there d am als: *on th a t form er occasion B ut cf. d am alig (of th a t tim e), d a n n : th e n ; th a n ; in th a t case; etc. (ftn . H . 406) D asein: *D asein (fin . H . 7, 25, 41, 58, 63, 184) D a-sein: *Being-there ( ftn . H . 7) daseinsm assig: *of th e ch aracter of D asein; *of th e k in d w h ich b e­ longs to D asein ; *on th e p a rt o f D asein; D asein’s; etc. (Note: see entry on ‘-mässig’ below.) d as D ass: *th e “ th at-it-is” (ftn . H . 135) d as “ Dass es ist” : * th e ‘th a t it is’ (fin . H . 135) d a tie re n : * d a te (verb) D a u e r: *du ratio n B ut cf. L eb ensd au er (*longevity); U nsterblichkeitsd au er (*im m or­ ta lity ); d a u e rn (q.v.) d a u e rn : * to last B ut cf. D a u e r (q.v.) das D a z u : * the “ tow ards-this” defizient: *deficient (fin . H . 20) d eterm in ieren : *D eterm ine d e u te n : p o in t to ; ex p lain B u t cf. a n d eu te n (in tim ate ; suggest; * h in t); A usdeu tu n g (*exegesis); b ed eu ten (signify; etc.) (ftn . H . 87) d ie n e n : serve; etc. (ßn■ H . 78) D ienlichkeit: *serviceability (fin . H . 78) D ifferenz, differenzieren: differentiate B ut cf. indifferen t (*Indifferent, * u n d ifferen tiated ; etc.) (ftn . H . 429) D in g : * T h in g B ut cf. verdinglichen (*reify) das D o rt: *th e “ yo n d er” B ut cf. das D o rth e r (*th e “ th en ce” ) ; das D o rth in (th e “ th ith e r” ).

D ran g : u rg e (Note: while ‘urge’ has been reserved fo r ‘Drang’ and fo r ‘drängen’ and some o f its compounds, most o f these have usually been translated in other ways.) d ro h e n : th re ate n D u rc h s c h n itt, d u rc h s c h n ittlic h : *average durch sich tig : * tra n sp a re n t B ut cf. u n d u rch sich tig (*opaque). (ftn . H . 5) ec h t: genuine B u tcf. u n e ch t (*bogus; n o t genuine). . (ftn . H . 5) eigen; eigenst: ow n; *ow nm ost, *m ost its ow n B ut cf. eigentlich (q.v.)', E igenschaft (q.v.); eig n en (*have as its ow n; b elo ng ; etc.); geeignet (q.v.). (fin . H . 42) E igenschaft: * p ro p erty (ftn . H . 83) eigen tlich : * a u th e n tic ; * re a l; p ro p erly (H . 171 );e tc . (ftn . H . 5, 42, 329) ein eb n en : *level dow n E in fü h lu n g : * e m p ath y ein h o len : catc h u p (fin . H . 302) ein m alig : once for all ein n eh m en : o ccu p y ; take in (H . 368f) (fin . H . 368) e in rä u m e n : *m ak e room (fin . H . h i , 368) ein sch rän k en : confine; restrict (fin . H . 155) ein sp rin g en : * leap in ; *in terv en e (H . 100) (fin . H . 100, 122) einw ohnen (fin . H . 54) Ekstase, ekstatisch: *ecstasis, *ecstatical. (fin . H . 329, 338) E n d e : *end (noun) etc. B ut cf. en d e n (q.v.); end gü ltig (q.v.); endlich (q.v.); u n en d lich

(?.».). (Note: ‘Ende’ is usually translated as ‘end’ except in the expression ‘am Ende’, which is translated not only as ‘in the end’ but also as ‘ultimately ,in the long run’, etc.)

Glossary o f German Expressions e n d e n : en d (verb) B u t cf. B eendigung (* term in atio n ); verenden (* p erish ); vollenden (ful­ fil; com plete) en d g ü ltig : final endlos: *endless en tdecken: *discover; uncover (fin . H . 33, 218) en tfernen: *desever; *rem ove B u t cf. ent-fernen (q.v.). (fin . H . 103, 105) ent-fernen: *de-sever B ut cf. entfernen (q.v.) (fin . H . 105) e n tfrem d en : *alienate B ut cf. befrem den (*seem stran g e), en tgegenkom m en: accom m o d ate (H . I2 7 f); confront . . . as com ing from (H . 337); com e its w ay (H .

384)

entgegenw ärtigen: *deprive o f its ch a r­ a c te r as present entgegenw erfen: * th ro w against (fin . H . 363) e n th a lte n : * co n tain ; in clu d e; hold back (* retardieren, H . 169) B ut cf. v o re n th a lte n (*w ithhold, H . 281) (ftn . H . 61) e n th ü llen : * reveal; *unveil; p a te n t (H . 141) en trücken , E n trü c k u n g : *carry aw ay; * ra p tu re ; w ith d raw (H . 401, Torek) (ftn . H . 338, 339) entschliessen: *resolve (fin . H . 299, 300) E ntschlossenheit: *resoluteness (fin . H . 297) E ntschluss: *resolution e n tsp rin g en : arise; *spring fro m ; *leap a w ay ; source (H . 45, 70); etc. (ftn . H . 347, 348) en tw eltlichen: *deprive o f its w orld­ hood entw erfen, E n tw u rf: *project, *pro­ jectio n (fin . H . 124, 145, 285, 315) E reignis: event e rfah ren : *experience; un d erg o ; etc. (ftn . H . 46) erfassen: g rasp : *get in one’s g rasp ; * ap p re h e n d ; *com prehension (H . 49)

509

erfü llen : *fill in ; fulfill; com plete (verb) B ut cf. N o rm erfü llu n g (*satisfying a norm ) (fin . H . 151) ergreifen: *seize u p o n ; *take h o ld of; grasp (H . 332, 38 4 ); etc. e rin n e rn : * rem em b er; *recall (fin . H . 339) erkennen, E rk e n n tn is: know , know led g e; *cognize, * cognition; recognize (anerk en n en , *w iedererkennen, ken n en , etc.) B ut cf. an erk en n en (recognize; acceptance, H . 3 2 ); E rkenntnistheorie (*th eory o f know ledge: *epistem ology). (fin . H . 36, 123, 124, :46) (Note: ‘verkennen’ and ‘verfehlen’ have both been translated as fa i l to recogn ize'; ‘kenntlich’ as ‘recognizable’ and *1unrecognizable'.) erleben, E rleb n is: *E xperience B ut cf. E r-leb en (*living-through). (fin . H . 46) e rrech n en : com p u te (fin . H . 48) erscheinen, E rsch ein u n g : * ap p ear, * a p p e aran c e; * a p p aritio n (H . 402, Torek) B ut cf. K rankh eitsersch ein u n g (*sym ptom o f a disease). (fin . H . 29) erschliessen: *disclose; infer (H . 318) (fin . H . 75, 151, 297, 298, 300,

3 ‫ ז‬5(

erschrecken: * alarm erstrecken: * stretch a lo n g ; stretch (S trecke); exten d erw a rte n : *expect erw id ern : *rejoin, *rejoinder (fin . H . 386) das “ es g ib t” : th e ‘th ere is’ (fin . H . 212, 412) Essenz: *Essence (fin . H . 117) essentiell: *Essential (fin . H . 117) existent, Existenz, existieren: *existent, *existence, *exist B ut cf. Existenzverfassung (existential constitution, H . 43)

(fin■ 303)

E xistenzial (noun) : *existentiale

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Being and Time

existenzial (a d j.): *existential (ftn . H. 12) existenziell: *existentiell (ftn . H. 12) explizit: explicit B u t cf. explizieren (explain). (ftn .

H. 149)

faktisch: *factical (ftn . H. 7, 56) Faktizität: *facticity (ftn . H. 7, 56) Faktum: *Fact (ftn . H. 56) fallen: fall; etc. (ftn . H . 134, 428) (Note: in general verbs terminating in ,-fallen' have been translated by variants o f ,f a l l ’ . Exceptions: auffal­ lend (conspicuous); ausfallen (drop out); beifallen (help); entfallen (drop out); überfallen (*assail); zerfallen (*disintegrate; collapse; etc.); zurück­ fa llen (*fa ll back; *relapse); zusam­ menfallen (coincide; collapse).)

fern: far (ftn . H. 105) (Note: while the adjective fer n ' and the derivative noun ,Feme’ have generally been translated by some form o f ,f a r ', this is not usually the case with compounds based on this stem.)

festhalten: *hold fast; adhere (*anhaften); keep in mind; reserve; etc. (ftn . H. 354) finden: find (ftn . H. 135) fliehen, Flucht: flee (flüchtig) B ut cf. Zuflucht (*refuge; *resort to), (ftn . H. 184) flüchtig: *fugitive; *fleeting; flee (*fliehen, *Flucht) B ut cf. verflüchtigen (*volatilize), fortlaufend: continuing (ftn . H. 243) frei: free (adj.) B u t cf. befreien (*liberate); freilegen (*lay bare; *expose to view, H. 3 7 5 ) j Freimut (*ingenuousness); freihalten (*hold free; *steer clear, H. 33; *keep open, H. 101; etc. ) ; freschwebend (q-v.) ; wahlfrei (*options o f choice).

freigegen, Freigabe: *free (verb) (ftn . H. 83) freischwebend: *free-floating; soaring (*überfliegend, H. 310) Fundament: foundation (fundieren, *fundamentieren) B ut cf. fundamental (q.v.); funda­ mentieren (q.v.). fundamental: *fundamental B u t cf. Fundament (q.v.); funda­ mentieren (q.v.). fundamentieren: *lay the founda­ tions B u t cf. Fundament (q.v.); funda­ mental (q.v.). fundieren: *to found; foundation (*Fundament; *fundamentieren) (ftn . H . 34, 59) fü r: for, etc. (fin - H. 84) Furcht, fürchten: fear (noun and verb) B u t cf. befürchten (*be apprehen­ sive); sich fürchten (q.v.). (ftn . H . 141, 142) with für: *fear for . . . with um: *fear a b o u t. . . with vo r: fear in the face o f . . . sich fürchten: *be afraid (ftn . H . 142) furchtbar: *fearsome furchtsam: *fearful Fürsorge: *solicitude; *welfare work (H. 121) B u t cf. Sorge (*care); besorgen (*concern; etc.) (ftn . H. 121) ganz: whole (Ganze), *wholly; com­ pletely; quite; altogether; etc. B u t cf. Ganzheit (?.».); ergänzen (*round out). Ganze: whole (ganz); totality (*Ganz­ heit; Gesamtheit, H. 28; das All) (ftn . H. 236) Gänze: *wholeness (ftn . H. 236) Ganzheit: totality (Ganze; das A ll; Gesamtheit, H. 28) B u t cf. ganz (q.v.). (ftn . H. 236) G anzzein: *Being-a-whole Ganzseinkönnen: *potentiality-forBeing-a-whole geeignet: appropriate; suited (ftn . H. 83)

Glossary o f German Expressions das Gegen: *the “ counter to” H . 210) { fin . H. 255) (Note: while the prefix ‘ Gegen- has often been translated by 'counter', this is not always the case; the preposition 'gegen' is usually translated in other ways.)

G egen d : *region B u t cf. Region (*realm). (ftn . H . 103) Gegenstand: object B u t cf. Objekt (*Object). G egenwart: * Present; * Present-day (H. 432 n. xxx) gegenwärtig (q.v.); gegen­ wärtigen, etc. (q-v.)■

B u t cf. (ftn .

H.

25, 26, 326, 329, 338,

347)

gegenwärtig: *in the present B u t cf. Gegenwart (q.v.). (ftn . H. 326) gegenwärtigen: *make present B u t cf. Gegenwart (q.v.); entgegenwärtigen (*deprive o f its character as present); Nichtgegenwärtigen (*not-making-present); Ungegen­ wärtigen (*making-unpresent); vergegenwärtigen (*envisage). (ftn . H. 326, 347, 359) Gehalt: content (*Inhalt; Bestand) gehören: belong; etc. B ut cf. sich gehören (*be fitting). (ftn . H. 284) Geist, geistig: spirit, *spiritual; in­ tellectual B ut cf. Geisteswissenschaft (q.v.). Geisteswissenschaft: *humane science B u t c f. Geist (q.v.). gelten, Geltung: valid, validity (gültig, Gültigkeit); be accepted as . . .; be regarded as . . . ; hold, etc. (ftn . H. 155) genuin: genuine (echt) (ftn . H. 5) Gerede: *idle talk B u t cf. das Geredete (*what is said in the talk), geschehen: *historize; happen (ftn . H. 19, 371, 384) Geschichte, geschichtlich: *history, *historical; story (H. 6 ) cf. Historie *History), etc. (ftn . H. 10)

B ut

(*historiology,

5”

Geschichtlichkeit: *historicality B ut cf. Historizität (*historicity). Geschick: *destiny; *vicissitude (ftn . H. 384) Gestalt: form; pattern; *shape; etc. gestimmt, Gestimmtheit, Gestimmt­ sein: (See stimmen.) gewärtig, gewärtigen: await (fin■ 337 , 347) das Gewesen: *the “ been” gewesen: having been, have been; etc. (ftn . H. 326) gewesend: *in the process o f having been (ftn . H. 326) Gewesenheit: having been; *the char­ acter o f having been; etc. (ftn . H. 326, 328, 329) gewesen sein: *be as having been (ftn . H. 326) gewiss: certain (bestimmt; etc.) B ut cf. Gewissen (q.v.). ( fin . H. 291) Gewissen: *conscience B ut cf. gewiss (q.v.). (ftn . H. 291) Gewissenhabenwollen: *wanting to have a conscience Geworfenheit: *thrownness (ftn . H. 135) Gier: *craving (ftn . H . 346) gleichgültig: *indifferent B u t cf. indifferent (*Indifferent; *undifferentiated, etc.). (ftn . H. 42, 255,429) Gleichmut: *equanimity (fin . H..134) gleichursprünglich: *equiprimordial; *with equal primordiality gliedern: *articulate; divide B ut cf. zergliedern (*dissect); artiku­ lieren (*Articulate). (ftn . H. 153) Grenzsituation: *limit-situatxon Grund, gründen: ground (Boden; etc.); *base; basis (*Basis; Boden, etc.); reason (Vernunft; etc.); *bottom; etc. (ftn . H. 34, 152) (Note: most o f the compounds in which the stem ‘grund-’ or the termination '-grund' appears have been translated with the aid o f either 'base', 'basic',

Being and Time

512 Grund— cont.

or ‘ basis'. Exceptions: ‘Abgrund’ , ‘ begründen’ , ‘grvndlage’ , ‘gründlich’ , ‘ Grundsatz’ , ‘grundsätzlich’ , ‘grund­ verschieden’, ‘Hintergrund’, ‘ Rechts­ grund’, ‘ zugrundeliegen’ .)

Grundsein: *Being the basis, *Being a basis Grund Verfassung: *basic constitution, *basic state, *basically constituted gültig, Gültigkeit: valid, valid char­ acter (gelten, Geltung) B u t cf. endgültig (finally, finality); gleichgültig (*indifferent). (ftn . H. 155) halten: hold; maintain; etc. (ftn . H. 75, 256, 347, 354) (Note: we have made no effort to translate ‘halten’ and its numerous compounds in any systematic fashion.)

zur Hand: *to hand B ut cf. zuhanden (*ready-to-hand). handeln: *take action; handle; act, action; be a matter of B u t cf. abhandeln, Abhandlung (treat, *treatise); behandeln (treat, handle); verhandeln (dis­ cuss; *plead one’s cause; etc.). (ftn . H. 300) handlich: *handy; *manual (adj. Ht 109); manipulable B ut cf. unhandlich (*unmanageable, 355); leichthandlich (facile, H . 78) H ang: *addiction hantieren: manipulate heissen: mean; etc. ( fin . H. 1) hellsichtig: *have clear vision ( ftn . H. 384) herannahen: *draw close hereinstehen: *enter into Hermeneutik, hermeneutisch: *her­ meneutic, *hermeneutical hervorbringen: bring forth (ftn . H. 29) hinhören: *listen away ( ftn . H. 271) Historie: *historiology; *History B ut cf. Geschichte (*history; story) (ftn . H. 10, 397) historisch: *historiological; *Historical B u t cf. geschichtlich (*historical) (ftn . H. 10, 397)

Historizität : *historicity B ut cf. Geschichtlichkeit (*histori­ cality) (ftn . H. 10, so) horchen: *hearken hören: *hear; *listen ( fin . H. 164, 271, 284) (Note: most compounds in which ‘ hören’ appears have been translated with variants o f ‘ hear’ and ‘ listen’ . B ut cf. ‘ aufhören’ (‘ stop’ ) ; ‘gehören’ (‘ be­ long’ ) ; ‘ unerhört’ (‘ unprecedented’ ).)

hörig: *thrall to . . . B ut cf. zugehörig (belonging) ; Gehörigkeit (*belongingness, H.

■")

Horizont, horizontal: *horizon, *horizonal (ftn . H. i)

das Ich: *!the “ I ” Ichheit: * “ I ” -hood identifizieren: identify (feststellen, H. 79 ) identisch: *identical (ftn . H . 114) Illusion: *Illusion B u tcf. Schein (*illusion; *semblance; etc.)

in der W elt: *in the world B ut cf. innerweltlich (q.v .) ; innerhalb der Welt (q.v.). (ftn . H. 13) indifferent, Indifferenz: *Indifferent; *undifferentiated; etc. B ut cf. gleichgültig (*Indifferent; *undifferentiated; etc. B ut cf. gleichgültig (*Indifferent). (ftn . H. 42) innerhalb der W elt: *within the world B ut cf. innerweltlich (q.v.): in der W elt (q.v.). (ftn . H. 13) innerweltlich: *within-the-world But cf. in der W elt (q.v .) ; innerhalb der W elt (q.v.). (ftn . H. 13) innerzeitig: *within-time In-Sein, In-sein: *Being-in intendieren: *intend (ftn . H. 5) intentional: *intentional

Glossary o f German Expressions in terp retieren , In te rp re ta tio n : * In te r­ p ret, * In te rp re ta tio n B u t cf. auslegen (* in terp ret; lay ou t) ( fin . p. 1)

Inwendigkeit: *insideness isolieren: *isolate ( fin . H . 142)

je m eines, Jem ein ig k eit: *in each case m ine, * m ine ness jew eilig: * cu rren t; a t th e tim e; p a r­ ticu lar; any, etc. jew eils: in every case; o n each occasion; alw ays; a n y ; som etim es (H . 60); etc. k en n en : know ; b e a c q u a in te d ; ac­ q u ain tan ce (d er B ekannte, H . 107, 118) B u t cf. k en n tlich (q.v.); K en n tn is (q.v.); erkennen (q.v.). ( fin . H . 124, 146) k en n tlich : recognizable B u t cf. kenntlich m ach en (designate, H . 151, 351; a c q u ain t, H . 3 9 a); kennen (q.v.); K en n tn is (q.v.). K en n tn is: in fo rm atio n ; acq u a in ta n c e; know ledge; etc. B u t cf. K en n tn isn ah m e, K en n tn is n ehm en (*take cognizance; acq u ire in fo rm atio n ; etc. ); K e n ­ n en (q.v.); E rk en n tn is (q.v.). (fin . H . 46, 58) _ -k ö n n en : * p o ten tiality for . . . ; etc. (Note: compounds ending in '-können' are very numerous and have usually been translated by 'potentiality fo r . . .’ . In other contexts the verb 'können’ has been translated more freely.)

K o n stitu tio n : *C onstitution B u t cf. V erfassung (*constitution) ( fin . H . 8) K onstituens, konstituieren, K o n stitu tiv u m , k o n stitu tiv : *constituent, constitute, constitutive (Verfassungs-) K o n tin u ität, kon tin u ierlich : * C o n tin ­ uity, *C ontinuous B u t cf. Stetigkeit, stetig (*continuity, *continuous). (fin . H . 423) L ag e: *situation ( fin . H . 299) (N ote: compounds terminating in '-tage' are always translated in other ways.)

513

laufen, L au f: ru n ; course (fin . H . 243) (Note: most words terminating in '-laufen' or '-la u f' have been trans­ lated with either 'run' or 'course'. Exceptions: Anlauf, anlaufen, durch­ laufen, fortlaufen, verlaufen, zuwider­ laufen.)

L eben, leb en : *life, *live B ut c f ableb en (*dem ise); erleben, Erlebnis (*E xperience); lebendig (alive; *lively; * v ital; etc.) ; L ebensalter (*age); L ebensdauer (*longevity); N ur-noch-leben (m ere aliveness). (fin . H . 46, 58) leich t: lig h t; easy (fin . H . 360) L eitfäd en ; *clue; *guiding-line, L ic h t: light, etc. B ut cf. lichten, L ich tu n g (q.v.). (ftn . H . 133) lichten, L ich tu n g , G elich teth eit: *clear (verb), *clearing (noun), *clearedness; etc. B ut cf. L ich t (q.v.). ( ftn . H . 133). das M a n : * th e “ they” (ftn . H . 113, 129, 253) das M an-selbst: * th e they-self (ftn . H . 129) M an n ig faltig k eit: m u ltip licity ; m an i­ fold -m ässig (Note: Heidegger uses at least twentythree compounds terminating in '-mässig', some o f them (notably 'daseinsmässig' and 'nichtdaseinsmässig') very frequently. T he original meaning o f this suffix is roughly 'after the measure o f ’ , but Heidegger seems to use it primarily as ju s t a device fo r constructing adjectives or adverbs from nouns. W e have made no effort to translate it systematically, though in a fe w cases we have used 'in accordance with' (e.g. 'bedeutungsmässig', 'bewandtnismässig’ , 'situationsmässig’ , ‘stimmungsmässig’ , 'weltmässig').

m ein en : m e a n ; h av e in view ; have in m in d ; suppose; sta n d fo r; etc. B u t. cf. M ein u n g (opinion; suppose; etc.); v erm ein en etc. (suppose;

5 !4

Being and Time

meinen— cont. presume; etc.); Vormeinung (as­ sumption) ; das Mitgemeinte (*connotation). (fin . H. i) melden: *announce (fin . H. 29) Methode, methodisch: *method; *methodological; *methodical (H. 4 9 » 3 62 ) But cf. Methodik, Methodologie (q.v.). Methodik, Methodologie: *method­ ology B ut cf. Methode, methodisch (q.v.). Missmut: *ill-humour (fin . H. 134) m it: with; etc. (fin . H. 84) (Note: there are overy forty compounds in which ‘mit-’ has been used as a prefix. With about a dozen rather unimportant exceptions, we have trans­ lated these with the help o f 'with', 'too', or the prefix ‘co-'.) Mit-dabei-sein: *Being “ in on it” with someone Mitdasein: *Dasein-with B ut cf. mit-da‫־‬sein. mit-da-sein: *be there with us B ut cf. Mitdasein, miteinander: *with one another B ut cf. miteinanderteilen (mutual sharing, H. 155). mitnehmen: *take along; *carry along Mitsein: Being-with (Sein mit . . ., H. 263) (Note: this expression is usually followed by a prepositional phrase introduced by ‘mit’. Rather than writing ‘Beingwith with . . .’, we have usually omitted the second ‘with’.) mitteilen: communicate (*Kommuni­ kation, H. 3g8f); present (H. 26, 72 n. i) B ut cf. teilen mit . . . (*share with . . . ; impart, H. 168). M itwelt: *with-world Modus: *mode (ftn . H. 20, 59) Moment: *item; *momentum (H. 271) B ut cf.: momentan (*momentary); momentweise (*from moment to moment).

nacheinander: *successive, *succession B ut cf. Sukzession (*Succession); Sich-jagen (*rapid succession, H. 322). nachhängen: *hanker nachreden: *gossip Nachsehen: inspection; *perfunctoriness (H. 123) (fin . H. 123) Nachsicht: *forbearance B ut cf. unnachsichtig (relentless, nachspringen: *leap after (ftn . H. 347) nah: close (adj.); etc. B u tcf. zunächst (*proximally; *in the first instance; etc.) (fin . H. 6) (Note: while we have usually translated this expression and its derivatives by variants o f ‘close’, the superlative ‘nächst’ occasionally appears as ‘next’, ‘f irst’, ‘proximate’, ‘most intimate’, etc. Exceptions: ‘nahelegen’; ‘naheliegen’.) Nähe: closeness; etc. (fin . H. 102) (Note: with a fe w trivial exceptions, the phrase ‘in der Nähe’ and ‘innerhalb der Nähe’ are translated as ‘close by’.) Natur: *Nature; natural (natürlich) nebeneinander: *side by side Neugier: * curiosity (fin . H. 346, 347) Nichtheit: *notness nichtig: *null; *nugatory (H. 237); *which count for nothing (H. 344) But cf. vernichten (*annihilate; *nullify). (fin . H. 283) Nichtmehrdasein: *no-longer-Dasein But cf. Nicht-mehr-da‫־‬sein (*nolonger-Being-there); Nicht-mehrdasein-können (*no-longer-beingable-to-be-there). (ftn . H. 250) das Niemand: *the “ nobody” nivellieren: *level off das Noch-nicht: *the “ not-yef” B ut cf. vorläufig noch nicht (*not right away). (fin . H. 259) Nur-immer-schon-bei: *just-alwaysalready-alongside (fin . H. 195)

Glossary of German Expressions nur-noch-vorhanden: *just present-athand-and-no-more {ftn . H. 74) O b je k t: *Object B u t cf. Gegenstand, etc. (object). {ftn . H. 363)

O ffe n b a r, o ffe n b a re n ; m a n ife s t; o p e n

UP (H•

öffentlich, Öffentlichkeit: *public; *publicness B u tcf. veröffentlichen (*make public; *give a public character). Ohnm acht: *powerlessness {ftn . H. 384) ontisch: *ontical, *ontico(ftn . H. 11, 12) Ontologie, ontologisch: *ontology, *ontological, *ontologico{ftn . H. 11, 12) O rt: *locus; *location; *locative; place (H. 399, 432 n. x x x ); etc. { ftn . H. 44) pflegen: be accustomed to . . .; *look after; etc. { ftn . H. 54) Platz, platzieren: place B u t cf. Schauplatz (*arena, H. 388) praktisch: *practical { ftn . H. 69) Privation, privativ: *privation, *pri­ vative { ftn . H. 58) Projektion: *Projection B u t cf. entwerfen, Entwurf (*pro­ jection, etc.) { ftn . H. 124) Raum, räumlich: *space; *spatial, *spatio-; room (H. 103) B u t cf. Spielraum (*leeway); einräu­ men (*make room); umräumen (*move around: *rearrange); wegräumen (*move out of the w a y ; clear away). {fin . H. i n , 368) Raum -geben: *give space ( ftn . H. h i ) real: *R eal; *realia (H. 68) B u t cf. eigendich (*real, *authentic; etc.).

rechnen: *reckon; account; *calculus (H. 159) B u t cf. anrechnen (deem); ausre­ chnen, berechnen (*calculate);

515

errechnen, rechnerisch (*com­ pute); vorrechnen (*accuse). Rede, reden: talk; *discourse; words (H. 30); say (H. 32) B ut cf. Ausrede (*subterfuge); nachreden (*gossip); überreden (*persuade); verabreden (*stipu­ late; *make an appointment); Vorrede (*preface); weiterreden (*pass the word along). C f. also bereden (*talk about); aufreden, einreden (*talk into); etc. {ftn . H. 25, 160) Region: *realm B ut cf. Gegend (*region). (ftn . H. 103) Reife, reifen: *ripeness, *ripen (ftn . H. 244) Relation: *Relation B ut cf. Beziehung, Bezug, Verhältnis (*relation, *relationship, etc.) richten: direct (verb); regulate B ut cf. aufrichten (set up, H. 420); ausrichten (q .v.); berichten (re­ port); einrichten (arrange; etc.); Richtung (q.v.) verrichten (per­ form); zurichten (*adapt). ( ftn . H. 102) Richtung: direction; direct (H. 114); movement (H. 38, 47); field (H.

*SO

Rücksicht: regard; *considerateness; etc. B ut cf. rücksichtslos (*inconsiderate; relentless, H. 333). (ftn . H. 123) Ruf, rufen: call B ut cf. Anruf, anrufen (q.v.) ; Aufruf, aufrufen (q.v. ) ; ausrufen (q.v.) ; Beruf, berufen (q .v .); hervorrufen (*conjure up. H. 175; *evoke, H. 401); W iderruf (q.v.). ( ftn . H. 269, 273, 291) rügen: *reprove rühren: touch Sache: thing; matter; affair; etc. ( ftn . H. 27) (Note: most o f the compounds based on this stem have been translated with the aid o f one o f the three expressions listed, or with 'fact' or ‘ subjectmatter'. Exceptions: ‘sachlich' (q.v.); ‘ Ursache' ('cause').).

die Sachen selbst: *the things themselves ( f t n . H. 27)

5 i6

Being and Time

sachlich: *objective B ut cf. Sache (q.v.); objectiv (*O b­ jective). Satz: *proposition; *sentence; prin­ ciple (*Prinzip; Grundsatz) {Note: compounds beginning with ‘ S a t¿ have been translated with the aid o f ‘proposition’ or 'propositional', but compounds with '-satz.' as a suffix have always been handled in other ways.)

Schein: *semblance; *illusion; seem (H. 176) B ut cf. Illusion (*Illusion). (Note: except fo r the adjective ,schein­ bar’ , compounds based on this stem are not translated by any o f the expressions here listed.)

scheinen: seem {ftn . H. 29) Schicksal: *fate B u t cf. fatal (*fatal) (ftn . H. 384) schliessen, Schluss: include; conclude; infer; close; etc. B ut cf. abschliessen, Abschluss (q.o.) ; anschliessen, Anschluss (attach; etc.) ; aufschliessen, Aufschluss (q.v .) ; ausschliessen (exclude, rules out, prevent); beschliessen (q .v .) ; einschliessen (include; *enclose, H. 60); entschliessen, Entschluss (q.v.); erschliessen (q.v.) ; umschliessen (*close round); verschliessen (q.v.) ; zusammenschliessen (fit together). (ftn . H. 330) Schon-sein-bei : *Being-already-alongside (ftn . H. 195) Schon-sein-in : *Being-already-in (ftn . H. 329) Schuld: *guilt; *debt; *responsibility B ut cf. Unschuld (innocence, H. 292) ; Verschuldung *indebted­ ness). (ftn . H. 242, 280) Schuld haben an . . . : *have responsi­ bility for . . . schuld sein an . . .: be responsible for (schuldig) Schulden haben : *have debts Schulden machen: *incur debts schulden: owe ( ftn . H. 281)

schuldig: *guilty; responsible But cf. schuldig werden (q.v.). (ftn . H . 280, 281, 282, 287) sich schuldig machen: *make oneself guilty; *make oneself responsible Schuldigsein: *Being-guilty (ftn . H. 281) schuldig werden: *come to owe; *become guilty schweigen: *keep silent; *silence B ut cf. stillschweigend (tacit); ver­ schwiegen (*reticent) schwer: heavy, etc. (ftn . H. 360) sehen: see; look; etc. B ut cf. Nachsehen (q.v.), etc. (ftn . H. 69, 171) (Note: in most cases where Heidegger seems to be concerned with seeing or looking when he uses compounds involving ‘sehen’ , we have translated them accordingly, but not otherwise.) seiend: being (sein; etc.); entity (H.

130); is; are (ftn . H. 1, 3)

Seiendes: entity (seiend, H. 130); *entities; that which is (H. 154); what is (H. 96) ( ftn . H. I , 3) sein: be; being (seiend) (ftn . H. 1, 326) Sein: *Being (ftn . H. 1, 4) (Note: we have counted 48 compounds beginning with 'Sein-' and as many as 10 6 terminating with ‘ -Sein’ , or more frequently '-sein'. With veryfe w excep­ tions these have been handled with ‘Being' or occasionally ‘ being'. Except fo r ‘Bewusstsein’ and ‘Dasein’ and some o f their compounds, none o f the exceptions occurs more than once, and we have usually indicated the German reading. C f. ‘ Enthaltensein' (‘ is contained'); Enthobensein' (‘hasbeen*alleviated’ ) ; 'Hingegebertsein' (‘ devotion'); ‫׳‬ In-derWelt-gewesensein’ (*having-been-inthe-world'); Nicht-mehr-sein (‘ is *no longer'); ‘ Noch-nicht-zugänglichgeworden-sein' ('has not yet become * accessible’) ; ‘ Überfallensein' (‘ is *assailed’ ) ; ‘Nochnichtbeisammensein’ (‘ is not yet a ll together’ ).

Sein-bei, Sein b e i. . . : *Being alongside (ftn . H. 54, 141, 329)

Glossary of German Expressions S e in k ö n n e n : * p o ten tia lity -fo r-B e in g {ftn . H. 250)

Seinssinn, Sinn des Seins: *meaning o f Being Seinsverfassung: *constitution of Being; *state o f Being; *constitutive state o f Being; etc. Sein zu . . . : *Being towards (ftn . H. 4) Sein zum Ende: * Being-towards-theend) B u t cf. Zu-Ende-sein (*Being-at-anend) {ftn. H. 234) Sein sum Tode: *Being-towards-death {ftn. H. 4, 262) selbig: *selfsame {ftn . H. 114) Selbst: *Self B u t cf. sich, selbst (itself, oneself, etc.) {ftn . H. 114) {Note: most o f the compounds based on ‘ Selbst’ have been translated with either ‘S e lf ’ or ‘s e lf ’ or, more rarely, ‘ itself’ , ‘ oneself’, etc. Exceptions: ‘ Selbstge­ spräch’ {* ‘soliloquy’ ) ; 'Selbstmord' {* ‘suicide’ ) ; ‘ Selbstverhalten’ {‘ be­ haviour’ ) ; ‘selbstverständlich {* ‘selfevident’ ; ‘ obvious’ ).)

selbständig: *self-subsistent B u t c f Selbst-ständigkeit (*Self-conconstancy); Unselbständigkeit (*failure to stand by one’s Self; etc.)•, Unselbstständigkeit (*nonSelf-constancy). {ftn . H. 117, 128, 291, 303, 322, 332 ‫ ״‬375 ( Selbsterkenntnis: *knowledge o f the Self {ftn . H. 124, 146) Selbstsein: *Being-one’s-Self; *Beingits-Self; etc. Sichkennen: knowing-oneself {ftn . H. 124, 146) Sicht: sight {noun) sichtbar {q.v.); B u t cf. sichten (q .v.); sichtbar (q.v.); Nachsicht (q.v.); Rücksicht (q.v.), Umsicht (q.v.). (ftn . H. 69, 123) (Note: with a fe w obvious exceptions, the word ‘sight’ is not used in translating compounds involving ‘Sicht’ .)

sichtbar: visible (*sichtig, H. 14g); see; etc. sichten: *sight (verb); *sift (H. 51, 394)

517

Sichtlosigkeit: *sightlessness (ftn . H. 69) Sich-vorweg: (See vorweg.) Sinn: *meaning; *sense (noun); etc. ( fin . H. 1, 137, 151) (Note: most compounds based on ‘ Sinn’ have been translated with some deriv­ ative o f ‘sense’ or ‘ mean’ . Exceptions: ‘sinnend’ (‘ thoughtfully’ ) ; ‘ besinnen’ (q.v.); ‘ einsinnig’ ( * ‘ univocal’ ) ; ‘ tiefsinnig’ ( * ‘ deep’ ) ; ‘ widersinnig’ ( * ‘absurd’ ) ; ‘sinnlich’ ( * ‘sensory; * ‘sensuous’ ).)

Situation: *Situation B ut cf. Grenzsituation (*limit-situation). ( fin . H. 299) (N ote: see note on ’ situation’ in the Index o f English Expressions.)

Sorge: *care B ut cf. besorgen (q.v.) ; Besorgnis (q.v.); Fürsorge (q.v.); Vorsorgen (take precautions, H. 406, 413). (ftn . H. 57, 121, 171) Spanne, spannen: *span B ut cf. gespannt (*spanned; *intent; *drawn tense, H. 374); umspannen (*span round, H. 374; encompass, H. 64); weitgespannt (broad, H. 242). ( fin . H. 409) Spielraum: *leeway ( fin . H. 368) Sprache, Sprach-, sprachlich: *lan­ guage; *linguistic B ut cf. Aussprache (discussion, H. 51 n. xi; pronouncing, H. 161); Fürsprache (*interceding, H. i ö if ) ; Rücksprache (consulting, H . 161); Selbstgespräch (*solilo­ quy); Sprachgebrauch (usage). ( fin . H. 25) spreizen: (See aufspreizen.) ständig: constant (*konstant, H. 416) B ut c f Abständigkeit (q .v.) ; Boden­ ständigkeit (*indigenous character, H. 36; *grounds to stand on, H. 168); eigenständig (*autonomous; in its own right; etc.); selbständig (q.v.); vollständig (complete). (ftn . H. 117, 128, 291, 303, 322, 332, 375 ) Stätigkeit: steadiness B ut cf. Stetigkeit (q.v.). ( fin . H. 423)

5 i8

Being and Time

Stelle: position; etc. stellen: put; set; formulate; raise, etc. (ftn . H. 300) (Note: the numerous compounds o f ‘ stellen’ do not call fo r any uniform policy o f translation.)

sterben: *die B ut cf. absterben, ersterben (*die away); der Gestorbene (the dead person, H . 238; etc.) ; der Verstor­ bene (*the deceased); sterblich (*mortal); unsterblich (*im­ mortal). stetig, Stetigkeit: *continuous, *con­ tinuity B ut cf. Stätigkeit (q.v.) ; kontinuier­ lich, Kontinuität (*Continuous; *Continuity). (ftn . H. 423) stilllegen: *immobilize (ftn . H. 371) Stimme- *voice B ut cf. stimmen (q.v.); Stimmung (qj).); einstimmig (agreed), etc. stimmen: *attune; fit (H. 78); mood (See note.) B ut cf. bestimmen (q.v.); überein­ stimmen, zustimmen, zusammen­ stimmen, einstimmig (*agree); Ungestimmtheit (*lack o f mood’). (ftn . H. 134) (Note: while the participle ‘gestimmt’ is occasionally translated by some form o f ‘ attune’ , it is f a r more often translated by variants o f ‘ have a mood’ , as are its derivatives ‘ Gestimmtheit’ and ‘ Gestimmtsein’ .)

Stimmung: *mood B ut cf. Verstimmung (*bad mood). (ftn . H. 134, 144) Struktur: *structure Subjekt: *subject (noun) (Note: all compounds based on ‘Subjekt’ have been translated with the help o f the noun ‘subject’ or the adjective ‘subjective’ ; but the verb ‘subject’ has been used only in translating other [ex­ pressions, and the noun ‘ subject matter’ has been reservedfo r expressions derived from ‘ Sache’— chiefly ‘sachhaltig’ .)

Substanz: *substance (ftn . H . 303) tasten: touch, *grope; *feel one’s way by touch

B ut cf. antasten (impair, H. 227);

unantastbar (*unimpeachable, H. 59 )• Tatbestand: *facts o f the case; *how things stand (H. 242) But cf. Bestand (q.v.) Tatsache: fact B u tc f. Faktum (*Fact), tatsächlich: *factual (ftn . H . 7, 56, 135) temporal: *Temporal B ut cf. tempora (*tenses, H. 349) (ftn . H. 17) Thema, thematisch, thematisieren: *theme, *thematic, *thematize . ( ß n . H. 2) tilgen: *pay off; annul (H. 434) überantworten: *deliver over (ftn . H. 21) übereinstimmen: agree überfallen: *assail übergeben: transmit (ftn . H. 21) übergehen, Übergang: pass over; *transition; etc. überholen: *outstrip überhören: *fail to hear ( ftn . H . 271) überkommen: come down; traditional (ftn . H. 21, 383) überlassen: abandon; etc. überlegen: *deliberate (verb) B ut cf. the adjective ‘ überlegen’ (‘superior’ ).

überliefern: *hand down; come down; traditional (ftn .

H. 21, 383)

übernehmen, Übernahme: take over (entnehmen, H. 61, 259); etc. (ftn . H. 383) überspringen: pass over überwinden: *overcome; *surmount; *conquest (H. 105) Überzeugung: *conviction (ftn . H. 256) um: around; about; in order to; etc. (ftn . H. 8, 65, 69, 11, 141) Umgang, umgehen: *dealings; *deal; etc. B u t cf.

unumgänglich (inevitable; indispensable; unsociable, H. 125); es geht . . . um - - - (*----is an issue for . . .) (ftn . H. 8, 65, 66)

Glossary o f German Expressions das Umhafte: *the around ness {ftn . H. 101) U m k re is : ra n g e {noun) {Note: the noun ‘range’ has been re­ served fo r ‘ Umkreis’ and a fe w in­ frequent compounds in ‘ -kreis’ or ‘ -weite’ ; the verb ‘ range’ translates a fe w other expressions o f little impor­ tance.)

U m schlägen, U m s c h la g : * c h a n g e o v e r U m s ic h t: * c irc u m sp e c tio n {ftn . H. 65, 69, 123) Umwelt: *environment {ftn . H. 65) das Umwillen: *the “ for-the‫־‬sake-of” das Um -zu: *the “ in-order-to” {ftn . H. 65, 78) unausdrücklich: tacit; unexpressed; inexplicit unbestimmt: *indefinite; *undetermin­ ed; *indeterminate (H. 3) unbezüglich: *non-relational {ftn . H. 250) undurchsichtig: *opaque B u t cf. durchsichtig (*transparent) unendlich: *infinite; *unending (H.

434)

B u t cf. un-endlich (*in-finite). {ftn . H. 330)

ungehalten: *indignant; *not held on to {ftn . H. 347) unheimlich: *uncanny B ut cf. heimlich (secret). {ftn . H. 188)

Unselbständigkeit: *failure to stand by itself B ut c f Unselbstständigkeit (*nonSelf-constancy). {ftn . H. 117, 322) unterscheiden: differentiate; discrim­ inate; distinguish; differ; etc. {ftn . H. 429) Unterschied:

difference;

distinction;

etc. {ftn . H. 429)

unüberholbar: *not to be outstripped Ursprung: source B u t cf. ursprünglich {q.v.). {fin . H. 348)

ursprünglich: *primordial B u t cf. Ursprung {q.v.). {ftn . H. 348)

5*9

verantwortlich: *answerable verbrauchen: use up (*aufbrauchen, H. 245) {ftn. H. 333) verdecken: conceal; *cover up verdinglicien: *reify B u tcf. dinglich (*Thinglike). vereinzeln: *individualize {ftn. H. 142) verenden: *perish verfallen: fall; deteriorate (verderben, H. 134) {ftn. H. 21, 134, 175, 428) verfangen: *entangle Verfassung: *constitution; *constitu­ tive state; state But cf. Verfassungsmoment (con­ stitutive item ); Verfassungsganz­ heit (*constitutive totality). (ftn . H. 8) Vergangenheit: past (vergangen) B ut cf. Vergänglichkeit (q.v.) ; ver­ gehen (q.v.). (ftn . H. 326, 380) Vergänglichkeit: *transience B ut cf. Vergangenheit (q.v.). vergegenwärtigen: *envisage B ut cf. Gegenwart (*Present, etc.)■, gegenwärtigen (*make present). (ftn . H. 359) vergehen: *pass away; transgress (über­ schreiten) B ut cf. Vergangenheit (q.v.). (fin . H. 380) N ote: the participle ‘ vergangen’ is some­ times translated as ‘passed away’ , but more often simply as ‘past’ .)

vergewissern: *make certain (ftn . H. 291) verhalten: behave, behaviour (*sich gebärden, H. 128); *comport; relate; inhibit (H. 253); attitude B ut cf. Verhältnis (q.v.). (ftn . H. 34) Verhältnis: relationship, relation B ut cf. verhalten (q.v.). (ftn . H. 34) verhüllen: to veil; to conceal verlassen: abandon; *forsake Verlauf: course; etc. B ut cf. verlaufen (run its course; go astray; etc.). (ftn . H. 243) verlegen: *divert; *block; *shift; mis•* place (H. 352); defer (H. 377)

Being and Time

520

vernehmen: perceive; be aware; etc. vernichten: *annihilate; *nullify Vernunft, vernünftig: reason; rational; *reasonable (H. 204) {fin . H. 34) veröffentlichen: *make public; *give a public character; *publish; *publication verräumlichen: *spatialize verrechnen: *reckon up B u t cf. rechnen, etc. (q.v.). (fin . H. 48, 300) Verschliessen: *close off Verschuldung: *indebtedness B ut cf. Schuld, schuldig, etc. (q.v.). verschwiegen, Verschwiegenheit: *reticent, *reticence Verstand, Verständnis, verstehen: *understanding; *understand B ut cf. verständig (q .v .) ; verständlich (q.v.) ; verstandesmässig (*intel­ lective, H. 98); Verstandeswesen (*something endowed with intel­ ligence, H. 49). ( fin . H. 143, 151) verständig, Verständigkeit: *commonsense, *common sense B u t cf. Verstand, etc. (q.v.); unver­ ständig (*lacking in understand­ ing, H. 219); Vorverständigung (*first came to an understanding,

H• ” )•

verständlich, Verständlichkeit: *intel­ ligible, *intelligibility But cf. Verstand, etc. (q.v.); selbstverständlich (*self-evident; obvious); unmissverständlich (un­ mistakable; etc.). verstellen: *disguise; obstruct (ver­ bauen) Verstimmung: *bad mood ( fin . H. 134) der Verstorbene: *the deceased vertraut: familiar; aware (H. 1) vertreten: represent; etc. ( fin . H . 239) verweilen: *tarry verweisen: *refer; assign (ftn . H. 31, 68, 70, 84, 408) verwenden: use; utilize (H. 333); make use; put to use ( fin . H. 333) verwirklichen: *actualize verwirren :*bewilder; confuse (*zusam­ menwerfen; verwechseln, H. 138)

vollenden: fulfill; complete (verb) (fin . H. 243, 244) vor, vor-: *in the face of; *face to face with; fore-; pre-; forth; before; in advance; etc. (ftn . H. 150, 184, 291, 327) vorausspringen: *leap ahead ( fin . H. 122) vorfallen: *befall B u t cf. zu-fallen, Zu-fall (*be-fall). vorfinden, vorfindlich: come across; *show up (H. 108) Vorgabe: (See vorgeben.) vorgängig: previous; preliminary; prior; beforehand; first; etc. vorgeben, Vorgabe: present (verb); give; H. 204; etc. ( fin . H. 150) vorgreifen: anticipate ( fin . H. 150) Vorgriff: *fore-conception; *something we grasp in advance (ftn . H. 150, 327) Vorhabe: *fore-having; something we have in advance (ftn . H. 150, 327) Vorhaben: *have before us; *purpose (H. 1) vorhanden, Vorhandenheit: *presentat-hand, *presence-at-hand (ftn . H. 7, 25, 74, 106) Vorkommen: *occur; *come before us (H. 106) (ftn . H. 106) vorlagern: *lie ahead of (ftn . H. 259, 264, 302) vorlaufen: anticipate B ut cf. vorläufig (q.v.). ( ftn . H. 262, 264, 302) vorläufig: *provisional B ut cf. Vorläufigkeit (*anticipatoriness, H. 302); vorläufig noch nich (*not right away, H. 255, 258); vorlaufen (q.v.). vorrufen: *call forth (ftn . H. 273, 291) Vorsicht, Vor-sicht: *fore-sight; *something we see in advance B u t cf. vorsichtig (*foresightedly, H. 150; *with foresight, H. 257). (ftn . H. 150, 327) vorspringen: *leap forth ( f t n . H. 122)

Glossary of German Expressions vorstehen: manage (H. 143); fore­ going; preceding; etc. {ftn . H. 143) vorstellen, Vorstellung: represent, re­ presentation; *lay before (H. 83); put before (H. 300); *ideation (H. 139) (ftn . H. 217, 239, 300) V o r- s tr u k tu r : * fo re -s tru c tu re (ftn . H. 327)

v o rw e g : * a h e a d , in a d v a n c e B u t !f. Vorwegnahme (*foreseen, H.

131); vorwegnehmen (take for granted, H. 147); *take in ad­ vance, (H. 264); anticipate, H.

39 0 •

(ftn . H. 329)

vorwerfen: *reproach; *throw before (ftn . H. 145) Wahl, wählen: *choose, *choice B u t cf. Auswahl, auswählen (*select, *selection). W ahr, W ahrheit: *true, *truth B u t cf. wahren, etc. (q.v.)•, währen, etc. (q.v.). wahrnehmen (q.v.). wahren: preserve (aufbewahren, H. 380; bewahren; *verwahren; erhalten, H. 380; Sichretten, H.

342)

B u t cf. wahr (q.v.).

(q .v.) ; währen,

etc.

währen: endure (*fortwährend; *im­ merwährend) B u t cf. wahr (q.v.); wahren, etc. (q .v.) ; während (q.v.) ; bewähren (confirm; prove, H. 72; *sub­ stantiation, H. 209; etc.) ; Gewähr, gewähren, gewährleisten (guaran­ tee, assure, grant, etc.) das “ während” : *the ‘during’ B u t cf. währen, etc. (q.v.). wahmehmen: perceive B u t cf. wahr (q.v.). wegräumen: *move out o f the w ay; clear away (lichten) weitersagen: *pass along in further retelling; *further retelling W elt: *world B u t cf. Umwelt (*environment). (ftn . H. 63, 73) w e ltlic h : * w o rld ly ; * a fte r th e m a im e r o f th e w o rld ; * in a w o rld ly w a y

(H. 276)

521

B ut cf. Weltlichkeit (q.v.); innerweltlich (q.v.); entweltlichen (q.v.). (ftn . H. 63)

Weltlichkeit: *worldhood B u t cf. weltlich (q.v.) ; Innerweltlichkeit (q.v.); entweldichen (q.v.). (ftn . H . 63)

Weltmässigkeit: *worldly character B u t cf. weltmässig (in-accordancewith-the-world, H. 104); Weltcharakter (*world-character). (ftn . H . 63) werfen, W urf: *throw; cast H. 415) B u t cf. entwerfen, Entwurf (q.v.); hinwerfen (*put forward casually, H. 311); hinauswerfen (*emit, H. i n ) ; unterwerfen (subject, H. 78); verwerfen (rejection, H. 32); vorwerfen (q.v.); zusammen­ werfen (confuse). (ftn . H. 135, 145) Werk: work B u t cf. bewerkstelligen (accomplish; etc.) ; handwerklich (mechanical, H. 394); Werkzeug, etc. (*tool, etc.; *equipment for working, H . 68). (ftn . H. 70) Wesen, wesenhaft, wesentlich: *essence *essential; creature (Gebild) B u t cf. sein Wesen treibt (*is haunted by, H. 392); Lebewesen (*some­ thing living); Nachrichtenwesen (*information service, H. 126); Verstandeswesen (*something endowed with intelligence, H. 49); Essenz (*Essence). (ftn . H. 117) das W ider: the “ against” (H. 210) Widerruf: *disavowal ( ft n . H. 386) widerstehen, Widerstand: resist, re­ sistance das W ie: *the “ how” wiederholen: *repeat; *restate; *re­ capitulate (H. 51, 234); *over again (H. 17, 332); raise again (H. 4) (ftn . H. 308, 339, 385, 386) wirklich: *actual B ut cf. aktuell (right now, H. 374). (ftn . H. 7) wissen: know B ut cf. Nichtwissen (*ignorance).

522

Being and Time

Wissenschaft,wissenschaftlich :*science, *scientific; *scholarly (H. 3a); learned (adj.) (H. 171); *as a branch o f knowledge (H. 235) But cf. vorwissenschaftlich (*prescientific; *colloquial, H. 5a). das W obei: *the “ in-which” ; *the “ whereat” (H. 107); etc. (Note: see our entry on bei’ above.)

das

W ofür: the “ for-which” (das W ozu, H. 414) das W oher: *the ‘whence’ das W ohin: *the ‘whither’ wohnen: *reside; accustom (pflegen) (ftn . H. 54) wollen: *want; w ill; *volition (H. 136, 139); insist upon (H. 353, 365); seek; etc. das Womit: *the ‘with-which’ ; etc. das W oraufhin: *the ,upon-which’ etc. (Note: ‘ woraufhin ’ has been translated in many contexts.)

ways,

depending

on

the

das Woraus: *the “ whereof” das W orin: *the “ wherein” ; etc. das Worinnen: *the “ inside-which” ; etc.

das

Worüber, das which; etc. (ftn . H. 141)

Worum;

about

das Worumwillen: *the “ for-the-sakeof-which” ; etc. das W ovor: that in the face of which; etc.

das W ozu: *the “ towards-which” ; the “ for-which” (H. 414) (ftn . H. 78, 84, 414) W urf: throw (werfen) B u t cf. Entwurf (projection). Zeichen: sign B u t c f Anzeichen (symptom; *be­ token, H. 185); Anführungszei­ chen (*quotation mark); Frage­ zeichen (*question mark); V or­ zeichen (*warning signal), zeigen: show; indicate B u t cf. Anzeige, anzeigen (indicate; call attention); aufzeigen (exhibit; point out; point to; *point at, H. 215); Zeiger (*pointer). (ftn . H. 39 , 77, 1 3 2 , 178, 304) Zeit: time; era (H. 401) B ut cf. Zeitbestimmtheit (*temporal character, H. 303, 370; *temporal

attribute, H. 333); zeitgenössisch (*contemporaneous); Zeitigen (q.v.); zeitlebens (*for its lifetime; *for life, H. 370); zeitlich (q.v.); Zeitstufe (*temporal stage); Folge­ zeit (*posterity); Zeitalter (era); unzeitgemäss (*out o f season). (ftn . H. 304, 339) Zeitablesung, Ablesung der Zeit: *reading off the time; *telling the time (H. 70) Zeitangabe, Zeit angeben: *assigning a time (ftn . H. 408) zeitigen: *temporalize; *bring to maturity; bring about (*her­ beiführen, H . 261) (ftn . H. 3 3 , 133 , 178, 235, 403) zeitlich: *temporal B u t cf. neuzeidich (of modem times, H. 49); temporal (*Temporal). (ftn . H . 17, 304 sich zeitnehmen: *take one’s time Zeitrechnung: *time-reckoning zergliedern: *dissect zerstreuen: *disperse; *distract Zeug: *equipment; *item o f equip­ ment B u t cf. Schreibzeug (*inkstand; *equipment for writing); Schuhzeug (*footgear); Werkzeug (q.v.) ; Zeugnis (q.v.). ( ftn . H . 68, 74) Zeugganze, Zeugganzheit: *equip­ mental totality, *totality o f equip­ ment Zeugnis: *testimony; document (*Dokument, *dokumentieren) das zu: the “ towards” (ftn . H. 84, 339) (Note: the preposition ‘ zu ’ has o f course been translated in many other ways.)

Zu-Ende-sein: *Being-at-an-end B ut c f Sein zum Ene (*Beingtowards-the-end) (ftn . H . 234) Zufall, zufällig: *accident, *accidental; *chance; *haphazard (H. 37, 398); *incidental (H. 310) B u t cf. Zu-fall, zu-fallen (q.v.). (ftn . H. 300) Zu-fall, zu-fallen: *be‫־‬falling, *be-fall B u t c f Zufall, sufallen (q.v.). (ftn . H. 300)

Glossary o f German Expressions Zugang, zugänglich: *access, *acces­ sible (ftn . H. 44) zugehörig, zugehören: belong to (ftn . H. 163) zuhanden, Zuhandenheit: *ready-tohand, *readiness-to-hand B u t cf. zur Hand (q.v.). (ftn . H. 25, 74, 104, 106) das Zuhause: *the “ at-home” zukommen: come towards; belong to; go with etc. (ftn . H. 325, 329) (Note: whenever , zukommen’ is used with the preposition ,a u f’ , it is trans­ lated by ‘come towards’ ; but when it is used with the dative, it is translated in other ways. It is apparently not used in other constructions.) Zukunft: *future (noun) B u t cf. Zu-kunft (q.v.); zukünftig

)»‫•(•״•׳‬

(ftn . H. 325, 329)

Zu-kunft: *the future as coining towards B u t cf. Zukunft (q.v.). (ftn . H. 325) zukünftig: *futural *future (adj. H. 141,

341» 343)

B u t cf. Zukunft (q.v.) ; Zukünftigkeit

(*futural character, H. 395; *futurity, H. 424!). (ftn . H. 329) zumeist: *for the most part; *mostly (ftn . H. 16) zumuten: *exact (verb) ; impose (H. 39)

523

rächen sich (*exact their penalty, H. 174). zunächst: *proxim ally; *in the first instance; first; right now (H. 253); B u t cf.

etc. B u t cf. nächst. (See entry on ,nah’ above.) (ftn . H . 6, 16)

zur Hand: *to hand B u t cf. zuhanden (q.v.). das Zurück auf: *the “ back to” (ftn . H. 329) zurückkommen: *come back (ftn . H. 329, 383), zurücknehmen, Zurücknahme: *take

( > a H. 308, 344) Zusammenhang, Zusammenhängen: *connection, *connect; *inter­ connection, *interconnect; *con­ text; *hang together Zu-sein; to b e (ftn . H . 42) zuweisen: assign; allot; give (H. 154) (ftn . H . 68, 408) zweideutig: *ambiguous B ut cf. doppeldeutig (*gets used in two ways; double signification); Doppelsinn (*double m eaning); Doppelbedeutung (double signi­ fication); vieldeutig (*has many significations; *is used in several ways). das Zwischen: *the “ between” (Note: in compounds , Zwischen•' often translated as ,intermediate!)

is

INDEX OF ENGLISH EXPRESSIONS accou n t

a priori. (See Index o f Latin Expressions.)

(See d u e o n a c c o u n t , s e t t l e a n a c ­ c o u n t , ta k e a c c o u n t.)

f a b a n d o n : ü b e r l a s s e n ; v e r l a s s e n ( H .)

a c q u a in t, a c q u a in ta n c e , b e a c q u a in te d :

ü b e rla s s e n

kennen,

a . t o o n e s e lf: H . 1 4 1 , 19 2 , 2 7 7 , 30 8 ,

347. 365

K e n n tn is;

k e n n tlic h

m a c h e n (H . 3 9 2 ); d es B e k a n n te (H . 10 7, 118 )

a . to o n e ’s o w n n u ll b a s is : H . 348 a . to o n e ’s h a v in g - b e e n : H . 36 5 a . to h a v in g m a d e a c h o ic e : H . 3 8 4

a c t, a c tio n :

a . to d e fin ite p o s s ib ilitie s : H . 2 7 0

below.) B ut cf. a c t i v i t y ( * A k t i v i t ä t ; * T ä t i g ­ k e i t ; T r e i b e n ; etc.) f A k t ; 4 7 f (Scheler); 1 1 5 , 1 1 9 , 1 3 9 , (Scheler), 1 9 3 , 3 5 2 , 3 9 1

a . t o o n e ’s t h r o w n n e s s : H . 3 4 5 a . t o t h e d is p o s a l o f t h e “ t h e y ” : H .

193 a . to th e w o r ld : H . 172 , 4 12 a . t o a ‘ w o r l d ’ : H . 3 5 6 , 4 0 6 , 4 1 2 f. a . to th e p a s t: H . 386 th e “ a b o u t w h ic h ” : d a s W o r u m ; d as

a c tu a l, a c tu a lit y : * w ir k lic h , * W ir k lic h ­ k e it

(ftn . H . 7 ) a . a n d p o s s ib ility : H . 3 8 , 14 3 , 1 9 5 ,

W o rü b er

2 36 , 2 4 3, 2 54 , 2 6 if, 299, 34 7

das W o ru m

‘ w o r l d ’ - a . : H . 6 2 ,' 1 9 5 a . o f T h in g s : H . 99

(ftn . H . 1 4 1 ) o f fe a r: H . i4 o f o f a n x ie t y : H . i8 7 f, 1 9 1 , 2 5 1 , 2 6 6 ,

342f d as W o rü b er, w o rü b er o f a s s e r tio n : H . 1 5 8 , 2 1 8 , 2 2 4 o f d is c o u r s e o r t a lk : H . i 6 i f , 1 6 4 , 16 8 , 272 a b s o lu t; (utter; e t c .)

s c h le c h th in n ig

v a l i d i t y a s ,f o r m ’ o f a . : H . 1 5 6 ,a .’ s u b je c tiv ity : H . 229 c o n s c i e n c e a s ,a . ’ s u b s i s t i n g (Stoker) : H . 272 n . v i m o m e n t a r y a . , etc. : H . 3 7 3 f f a c tu a liz e , a c tu a liz a tio n : lic h e n

a b s o lu t: H . 2 2 9 , 3 1 8 , 4 3 2 -4 3 4

* v e r w ir k ­

H . 2 6 if, 29 3, 3 8 5, 4 3 4 f

a b so rb , b e a b s o rb e d : a u fg e h e n

(ftn . H . 5 4 ) a b s t r a c t (adj.), a b s t r a c t i o n : * a b s t r a k t , * A b s tr a k tio n

•(a d d ic tio n : * H a n g ; h ä n g e n p e n d o n , c l in g to )

an

(d e­

a d d r e s s : a n s p r e c h e n ( c o n s id e r ); r e s s ie r e n ; w e n d e n a n (ftn . H . 3 4 , 4 0 8 )

*ad­

(ftn . H . 1 8 2 , 1 9 4 ) H . 18 2, 19 4 -19 6 , 34 5

H . 4 0 1 (Torek); 4 2 9 - 4 3 5 (Hegel) ■ fa b su rd : “ w i d e r s i n n i g H . 152 f ab yss: *A bgru n d

advance

(ftn . H . 1 5 2 )

(See g r a s p i n a . , h a v e i n a . , s e e i n a .

H . 152 a c c e s s ib le : ä n g lic h

‘ e x t e r n a l a . ’ (D ilthey) : H . 2 0 5 n . x v h is to r ic a l a . : H . 10 , 3 7 8

a g re e m e n t w ith a . : H . 62

o f ju d g m e n t: H . 2 16 a b s o lu te :

access,

* A k t , * A k t io n ; h a n d e ln ;

e t c . h a n d e l n : (See entry fo r ‘ take action’

t a k e in a .) *Zugang,

*zu g­

H . 396, 399 f>402

(ftn . H . 4 4 )

a ffe c t,

a c c id e n t , a c c id e n t a l: Z u f a ll, z u fä llig (ftn . H . 3 0 0 ) •(■ a cc o m m o d a te : f ü g e n ( H . 6 9 ) ; g e g e n k o m m e n (H . i2 7 f)

‫ (־‬a e s t h e t i c : * ä s t h e t i s c h

e n t-

a ffe c tio n :

* A ffe k t,

* A ffe k tio n ,

* a f f i z i e r e n ; b e t r e f f e n ( p e r t a i n , etc.);

etc. B ut cf. a f f e c t a t i o n ( M a n i e r ) . H . 13 7 -14 0 , 14 2 , 17 3 , 3 4 1, 3 4 5f

Index o f English Expressions + b e a f r a i d : * s ic h fü r c h te n

{ftn.

H . 14 2 )

a n c ie n t o n to lo g y ,

H . i4 i f > 1 8 6 , 1 8 9 , 3 4 i f t h e “ a g a in s t” : d a s W id e r

H . 3 f,

th e a g g r e g a t e o f e n titie s : H . 8 , 14 , 6 4 , 2 4 1, 248 a g g re g a te of

p re se n t-a t-

(Note: this list includes those pas­ sages in which ‘das A ll' has been translated as 'totality'.) a g r e e m e n t: * ü b e r e in s tim m e n ; * z u s tim m e n ; * z u s a m m e n s tim ­ m e n ; * e in s tim m ig f * ü b e r e in s t i m m e n : H . 3 3 ,6 2 ,2 1 4 - 2 2 5 fe in s tim m ig : H . 2 8 1, 4 1 3 , 4 18 a h ea d : vorw eg But cf. l i e a h e a d

n o c h n ic h t”

(See n o w - n o t - y e t . ) a n im a ls

(See also: animal ratione in Index of Latin Expressions.) f a n n o u n c e : * m e ld e n (ftn. K L 2 9 ) H . 8, 2 9 -3 1, 7 2 -7 5 , 80, 9 6 , 19 2 , 252 f a n s w e r a b le : * v e r a n tw o r tlic h H . 1 2 7 , 288 f a n th r o p o lo g y : * A n th r o p o lo g ie

(ftn. H . 1 7 ) H . i6 f ; 4 5 -5 0 ( S e c tio n 1 0 ) ; 1 3 1 , 18 3 , 1 9 0 ,1 9 4 ,1 9 9 n . v i i , 2 0 0 ,2 4 9 n . v i , 2 7 2 , 2 72 n . v i, 290 , 300 a n tic ip a te : * v o r la u fe n ; * v o r g r e ife n ;

(ftn. H . 2 6 2 , 2 6 4 , 3 0 2 ) * v o r la u fe n

f a h e a d o f its e lf: s ic h v o r w e g H . 329)

(df.

H . 1 9 1 - 1 9 6 , 2 0 2 , 2 2 0 , 2 2 7 f, 2 3 6 , 2 4 4 , 2 4 9 - 2 5 1 ,2 5 9 ,2 7 7 ,3 1 5 ,3 1 7 ,3 2 2 ,

H.

327 ‫ ־‬337« 406 , 425 a la rm : * e rsch re ck e n H . 142 a l i e n : f r e m d ( * f o r e i g n ; s t r a n g e , e t c .)

But cf.

b e fr e m d e n (se e m s tr a n g e , e m ­

b a rrass) H . 1 2 1 ,1 7 2 ,2 7 5 ,2 7 7 ^ 3 5 6 H . 1 7 8 ,1 8 0 , 2 5 4 , 3 4 6 f, 3 9 6 a lle v ia t e : e n th e b e n (e x e m p t) ; e r le ic h ­

a llo w tim e tim e .)

a lo n g s id e : b e i H . 5 4 , 14 1, 239, 329) th e ‘a lr e a d y ’ : d a s S c h o n H . 327f a m b ig u o u s ,

18 0 ,

a m b ig u ity :

* z w e id e u tig ,

Z w e id e u tig k e it 1 7 3 - 1 7 5 ( S e c tio n 3 7 ) ; 222,

346,

2 5 3 -2 5 5 ,

271,

177, 2 9 8 f,

378, 384

!a n a lo g y : * A n a lo g ie

H • 3> 93 a n a ly s is : * A n a ly s e , * A u s e in a n d e r le g u n g

^analysis situs H . 112

3 3 *« 3 3 6 » 3 3 9 ‫ ־‬3 4 5 ‫ ־‬3 5 ° . 3 8 2 - 3 8 6 , 3 9 0 f, 4 2 4 f a n tiq u a r ia n : * a n tiq u a risc h H . 3 g 6 f, 400 a n x ie ty , be a n x io u s :

A n g st,

* s ic h

(ftn. H (df. H . H .

. 182, 2 77)

18 2 , 1 9 1 , 2 5 1 , 3 4 2 -3 4 4 ) 1 4 0 , 1 8 2 - 1 8 4 ; 1 8 4 - 1 9 1 ( S e c tio n 192 ,

19 9 , 235 n . v i, 2 5 1 ,

2 5 4 , 2 5 8 , 2 6 5 ^ 2 7 6 f, 2 g 6 f, 3 0 1, 305» 3 0 8 , 3 1 0 . 3 2 2 , 3 4 2 - 3 4 5 r e a d in e s s fo r a n x i e t y : H . 3 8 2 ,3 8 5 ,3 9 1 ‫־‬f a p o p h a n t i c a l : * a p o p h a n t i s c h H . 3 3 f, 1 5 5 h , 4 3 3 4 3 5 ‫־‬ t h e a . “ a s ” : H . 15 8 5 2 2 3 a p p e a l: * A n r u f, * a n r u fe n , b e ru fe n But cf. c o u r t o f a p p e a l ( I n s t a n z )

(ftn.

H .

2 6 2 -2 6 7, 3 0 1-3 0 5 ; 3 0 5 -3 10 ( S e c tio n 6 2 ) ; 3 1 6 - 3 1 8 , 3 2 2 -3 2 6 ,

4 0 );

te rn H . 134^ 256 , 345 a llo t : a n w e is e n ; z u w e is e n ; * b e s c h e id e n

* 134,

H . 2 6 2 -2 6 4 , 3 0 9 , 3 2 6 , 3 3 6 )

ä n g ste n

f a lie n a t e : * e n tfre m d e n

(See

160 ,

th e ‘a n d -n o w -n o t-y e t’ : d a s “ u n d je t z t

( * v o r la g e r n ) ; le a p

a h e a d ( * v o r a u s s p r in g e n ) ,

(ftn.

154 ,

H . 70 , 246, 346 th e

h a n d : H . 362

ag ree,

etc.

19 , 2 4 -2 6 , 4 4 , 4 9 ,

2 3 5 » 4 0 3 . 4 2 1» 4 3 7

H . 210 a g g r e g a te : d a s A ll (to ta lity ) ; G e s a m ­ th e it (H . 3 6 6 ) ; * I n b e g r if f (H . 6 5 )

th e

525

a n a ly t ic : * A n a ly tik

(ftn. 2 6 9 , 2 7 3 ) ' * A n r u f, * a n r u fe n : H . 2 6 9 -2 8 0 ; 2802 8 9 (S e c tio n 5 8 ); 2 9 2 , 2 9 4 -2 9 7 , 300, 30 7, 3 1 7 ap p ear, ap p earan ce: E r s c h e in u n g

* e r s c h e in e n ,

But cf.

o u tw a rd a p p e a ra n c e seh en , H . 69)

(ftn. H . 2 9 ) (df. H . 2 9 - 3 1 ) H . 2 3 , 2 9 -3 1 , 3 5 f, 7 8 , 3 2 1 , 4 3 6

(A u s­

Being and Time

526

a s s e r tio n : A u s s a g e , * a u s s a g e n

■fa p p e r c e p t i o n : * A p p e r z e p t i o n

(ftn.

H . 3 1 9 ,3 1 9 ^ x vi

H . 5 7 , 1 1 7 , 142 , 345 a p p r o p r i a t e {adj. ) : g e e i g n e t ( s u i t e d , etc.) ; a n g e m e s s e n ( p r o p e r ; s u i t ­ e d ; etc.); g e m ä s s ; - m a s s ig But cf. i n a p p r o p r i a t e ( u n g e e i g n e t , u n an gem essen ,

n ic h t

angeben,

(ftn.

17 ),

a n e ig n e n * z u e ig n e n :

* z u e ig n e n ;

69,

12 7,

148 ,

296, 299

a priori (See Index o f Latin expressions.) r i s e ) ; etc. (ftn. H . 3 4 7 )

4 18 , 422 a s tr o n o m ic a l tim e - r e c k o n in g , e tc . H . 3 7 1, 4 1 1 , 4 18 , 4 18 h . v

* e n ts te ­

• fa t h o m e : * z u h a u s e

H . 3 2 8 , 3 3 0 f, 3 3 3 , 3 3 8 , 4 2 0 , 4 2 3 ,

a t th e tim e : je w e ilig

p a s s in g

aw ay:

H . i8 8 f, 2 7 6

h en u n d vergeh en 425, 4 3of th e “ a r o u n d ” : * d a s U m h e ru m

But cf. t i m e ( Z e i t , etc.) ■ fa t h e o r e tic a l: * a t h e o r e t i s c h

H . 66 ja ro u n d n e s s : * d a s U m h a fte

H . 59. 69, 358 * a tte s t: b e ze u g e n

H . 10 1)

(df.

H . 10 3 )

H . 2 3 4 f, 2 5 4 , 2 5 8 , 2 6 7 -3 0 1 ( I I , I I I :

H . 6 6 , 79 , 10 1, 10 3, 112

S e c tio n s 5 4 -6 0 ), 3 0 2 , 3 0 5 ^ 3 0 9

f a r r o w : * P fe il

a t tit u d e : V e r h a lt u n g ; E in s te llu n g ; fa t t u n e m e n t : G e s tim m th e it

H . 78f t A r tic u la tio n : * A r tik u la tio n

(ftn.

(ftn.

H . 153) 12 9 , 149 , 1 5 1 ,

i 5 5 5 9 < ‫ ־‬. i 6 i f , 1 6 5 ,1 6 8 ,2 0 1 ,2 0 6 , 3 11» 3 3 5 » 3 4 9 . 3 6 2 -3 6 4 , 4 0 6 ,4 0 8 ? , 4 1 6 a r tic u la tio n : G lie d e r u n g H. th e

369.

H . 153)

153,

i6 if,

234. ,a s ’ : d a s

etc.

H . 134)

H . 134, 13 7, 2 77 , 335

H . 3, 8, 5 4 , 10 4, i i i ,

(ftn.

210 ,

f a n g e b e n , A n g a b e : H . 4 0 8 -4 10 , 4 1 3 ,

a r is e : e n ts p r in g e n ; e n ts te h e n ( e m e r g e ;

(ftn.

123,

192 ,

(Note: this list also includes the more important passages in which ‘ ver­ weisen’ has been translated as ‘refer’ .)

is o f,

16 0 -16 2 , 1 6 7 -17 0 , 19 6 , 2 2 2 , 2 3 1 ,

a r is in g a n d

(S e c tio n

8 4 , 8 6 -8 8 , 11 o f, 1 1 7 ,

12 9 , 149 , 1 5 1 , 158 , 2 50 , 2 58 , 2 g o f, 360

(m a k e o n e ’s o w n )

H .

A ngabe

H . 3 1 , 6 8 , 70 , 8 4 , 8 7 , 408)

v e r w e is e n (df. H . 6 8 f f , 7 7 f f ) H . 3 1 , 6 8 - 7 1 , 7 4 f, 7 6 -8 3

zukom ­

m en)

(verb):

H . 15 4 -15 7)

2 i 7 f , 2 2 3 -2 2 8 , 2 7 3 a s s ig n : v e r w e is e n ; a n w e is e n ; z u w e is e n ;

(ftn.

H . 83) a p p r o p r ia te

(df.

H . 6 2 , 14 9 )

H . 4 , 32, 36, 62, 133, 149. 1 5 3 6 0 ' ‫־‬ S e c tio n 3 3 ), 1 6 1 - 1 6 5 , 18 3 , 2 1 4 ,

■fbe a p p r e h e n s i v e : * b e f ü r c h t e n But cf. a p p r e h e n d ( e r fa s s e n )

166 ,

i6 8 f,

19 6 , 200,

2 7 1 . 3 * 7 » 3 2 4 f> 3 2 7 . 3 5 1 “ A ls ” ; th e a s -s tr u c tu re :

d ie A is -S tr u k tu r

But cf.

t h e ‘j u s t a s ’ ( d a s “ S o - W i e ” ) ; B e i n g a s i t is ( S o s e in )

H . 1 4 9 -1 5 1 , 15 4 , i5 8 f, 2 2 3 , 3 5 9 f f t h e ‘ a s - it - a lr e a d y - w a s ’ : * d a s “ w i e es je sch on w a r” H . 325f a s p e c t : * A s p e k t ; * A k tio n s a r t A k tio n s a r t: H . 349 f a s s a il: * ü b e r fa lle n H . 70, 13 6 , 19 5 , 296, 328 , 34 4 , 3 5 5

a u t h e n t ic : e ig e n t lic h

(ftn. H . 5 , 4 2 , 3 2 9 ) a . a n x ie t y : H . 190

(df.

H . 4 2 f, 5 3 )

a . a p p r o p r ia tio n o f u n tr u th : H . 299 a . B e in g o f D a s e in : H . 4 4 , 18 8 , 1 9 1 , 322 a . B e in g -c o m e -to -a n -e n d : H . 239 a . B e in g - g u ilt y : H . 291 a . B e i n g - o n e ’s - S e l f : H . 1 2 9 , 1 8 4 , 2 6 3 , 268, 298 a . B e in g -to w a rd s-d e a th : H . 2 3 7 , 260 2 6 7 ( S e c tio n 5 3 ), 3 7 3 a . B e in g to w a r d s o n e s e lf: H . 12 2 a . B e in g - a - w h o le : H . 2 6 7 a . c a re : H . 12 2 , 3 0 1, 323 a . c e r ta in ty : H . 2 5 8 , 308 a . c o m in g to w a r d s : H . 330 a . c o n s ta n c y o f th e S e lf: H . 4 10 a . d is c lo s e d n e s s :

331. 397

H.

2 2 1,

297,

325,

Index o f English Expressions a u t h e n t i c — cont. a . d y in g : H . 247 a . e n c o u n te r in g o f th e u n -r e a d y -to h a n d : H . 73 a . e x i s t e n c e : passim a . e x is te n tie ll p o s s ib ility : 2 6 7 -2 7 0 (S e c tio n 54 )

H .

193 ,

a . fa c e to fa c e w ith th ro w n n e ss: H .

348

But cf.

a . fu tu r e : H . 3 2 9 S 3 3 6 -3 3 8 , 3 4 8 a . g r a s p in g o f a s ig n : H . 79

u n a w a re s (u n v erseh en s).

!b a c k a w a y : *au srü cken

(ftn.

a . “ fo r - th e - s a k e -o f- w h ic h ” : H . 1 9 3

5a7

H • 3 3 7 - 3 3 9 3 4 7 «3 4 1 - 3 4 3 ‫־‬f> 3 5 0 » 3 5 3 3 5 6 , 3 5 9 - 3 6 i , 363» 3 6 8 f , 3 7 1 , 3 9 o f , 4 0 6 - 4 1 0 ,4 1 2 - 4 1 4 , 4 1 6 , 4 2 o f, 4 2 5 a w a r e : v e rn e h m e n , v e rtra u t (See p e r c e i v e . )

H . 339)

H . 339, 3 4 if b a d c o n s c ie n c e : * s c h le c h te s G e w is s e n

(See c o n s c i e n c e .) b a d m o o d : * V e r s tim m u n g

a . g u ilty : H . 28 7

(See

a . h e a rin g th e c a ll: H . 294 a . h is t o r ic a l it y : H . 3 8 2 ,3 8 5 - 3 8 7 ,3 g o f,

395f a . h is to r io lo g ic a l: H . 3 9 5

m o o d .)

b a la n c e o ff: a u s g le ic h e n , S c h u ld b e g le i­ ch u n g

But cf.

a . h is to r iz in g : H . 3 8 2 , 3 8 5 , 3 8 7 a . h is to r y : H . 38 6

e v e n l y b a l a n c e d ( e b e n m ä s s ig )

242, 283, 288, 2 g 2 f b ase,

b a s ic ,

a . m a in ta in in g o n e s e lf in a p r im ­ o r d ia l p o s s ib ility : H . 30 6

(See also

a . m a k in g p re se n t: H . 4 10

b a s is :

G ru n d ,

grü n d en ;

B o d e n ( s o il, g r o u n d , e t c . ) ; B a s is ; e tc . o n t h e b a s is o f .)

a . p o s s ib ilitie s o f e x is te n c e : H . 3 8 3 a . p o s s ib ility w h ic h h a s b e e n : H . 3 9 4

f b e f a ll: * v o r fa lle n H . 158 , 2 7 9 , 2 8 4, 290

a . p o t e n tia lit y - f o r - B e in g :

fb e - fa ll, b e - fa llin g : * z u - fa lle n , * Z u - f a ll

H .

233-

2 3 5 , 2 6 6 , 2 6 7-3 0 1 ( I I , I I I ) 3 2 2 ,

(ftn.

H . 300)

H . 300, 4 10

339. . 343f a . p o t e n t i a l i t y - f o r - B e i n g - o n e ’s - S e l f : H . 175, 322f

th e ‘b e fo re ’ : d a s “ V o r ” (ftn. H . 3 2 7 )

a . p o t e n tia lit y - f o r - B e in g - a - w h o le : H .

H . 3 ? 7f 235, 2 6 6 f , 3 0 1 - 3 3 3 (H > H I ) . 3 7b2 e g i n n i n g : A n f a n g ( o u t s e t , e t c . ) a . P re se n t: H . 338 H . 233, 238, 373, 424 a . r e a d in e s s - to - h a n d : H . 6 9 , 10 6 behave, b e h a v io u r : v e r h a lt e n ; a . r e p e titio n : H . 38 5 a . r e s o lu t e n e s s : H . 3 0 8 , 3 1 0 , 3 1 3 , 3 8 2 a . S e lf : H . i 2 g f , 4 3 3 ( H e g e l) a.

te m p o r a lity :

H.

s ic h

g e b ä r d e n (H . 128)

327,

329,

331,

338, 348, 375» 385. 414 a . “ th e re ” : H . 328 , 3 4 7 a . tim e : H . 329 a . tr a n s p a re n c y : H . 298 a . tr u th o f D a s e in : H . 2 9 7 , 302 a . u n d e r s ta n d in g : H . 14 6 , 3 6 4 , 2 7 9 f, 295«30 2‫ ־‬306, 348, 383, 425 H . 184, 190 , 233,

(Note: see also

2 5 9 , 3 0 6 , 3 5 0 . See average: * D u r c h s c h n itt,

also ‘real’.) *d u rch sch ­

n ittlic h

(df: H . 4 3 ) H . 4 -6 , 8 , 16 , 2 1 , 4 3 f, 50 n . x , 5 3 , 6 6 , 7 1 , 10 7 , 1 2 1 , 1 2 7 -1 2 9 , 16 8 -17 0 , 1 8 1 , 18 8 , 1 9 5 , 2 3 2 , 2 4 8 , 2 5 4 , 272, 3 3 1, 370, 383, 406, 4 10 T a w a it: * g e w ä r tig , * g e w ä r tig e n (ftn. H . 3 3 7 , 3 4 7 )

b e h o ld : a n s c h a u e n ; * s c h a u e n (See i n t u i t i o n . ) B e i n g : * S e i n , S e i n - , - s e in

(ftn. H . i , 4 , 1 1 , 2 1 2 ) (Note: except in a few cases which we shall list explicitly below, expressions beginning or ending with ‘be’ , ‘ being’, or ‘Being’ will be indexed according to their other components. Thus, for ‘be anxious’, see ‘anxiety’ ; for ‘Beingguilty’, see ‘guilt’ ; for ‘spatial Being’, see ‘spatial’, and so on. Cf. our remarks on ‘Sein’ in the glossary. While the word ‘Being’ appears on nearly every page, we shall content our­ selves with listing here a few passages which are particularly relevant to the problem o f Being in general.) H . 1-15

(In t. I ) , 15 -2 7

( S e c tio n s 5 ,

6 ) , 35» 3 7 f , 5 4 , 9 2 - 9 4 , 1 8 3 , 1 9 6 , 2 0 8 , 2 i 2 f , 2 3 0 f, 2 3 5 , 2 4 1 , 3 1 4 ,

Being and Time

52Ö B e in g —

cont.

333» 349» 3 5 7» 3 6 6 , 3 7 2 , 3 9 2 , 4 0 6 , 4 * 9 » 4 3 °f> 4 3 6 - 4 3 7 ( S e c t i o n 8 3 ) ■(■Being a g a i n s t o n e a n o t h e r : * W i d e r e in a n d e r s e in H .1 2 1 f B e i n g a lo n e : * A lle in s e in H.

* A u f-d e r-S p u r-

* S e l-

b s ts e in

1 4 8 ,1 7 2 ,1 8 1 ,1 8 9 , i9 2 f, 1 9 6 ,2 0 2 , a 1 1 ,2 2 0 ,2 2 3 ,2 3 8 ,2 4 g f, 2 5 2 ,2 6 3 , 2 9 8 , 3 1 1 , 3 17» 3 2 2 , 3 2 6 -3 2 8 , 3 3 7 , 3 5 1‫ ־‬3 5 3 « 3 6 3 -3 6 5 « 4 0 6 -4 0 8 , 4 1 3 , 4 1 9 ,4 2 2 f B e i n g a lr e a d y : * S c h o n - s e in H . 194 , 365

H . 4 1 , 1 1 3 - 1 3 0 ( I , I V — esp . 1 2 6 -13 0 , S e c tio n 2 7 ) , 1 3 1 , 1 4 6 , 1 7 6 , 18 4 , 263, 2 6 7 f, 2 7 0 , 2 8 4^ 2 g 8 , 3 2 3 (See also p o t e n t i a l i t y - f o r - B e i n g - o n e ’s S e lf.) f B e i n g o u t fo r . . . : * A u s s e in a u f . . . H . 195, 2 10 , 2 6 if f B e in g - s o m e th in g : E tw a s - S e in H . 160

f B e in g - a lr e a d y - a lo n g s id e : * S c h o n - s e in bei H . 195 )

H . 6 1 , 109, 2 7 7 * B e in g - a lr e a d y - in : * S c h o n - s e in - in

(ftn.

H . 329) H . ig 2 f, i g s f , 2 0 2 ,2 2 0 ,2 4 g f ,2 7 7 ,3 i 7 , 327 fB e in g , am o n g -o n e-a n o th er: * U n te re in a n d e r s e in H . 128 f B e i n g a s it is : * S o s e in H . 5» 7 , 1 4 , 4 2 * B e in g - th e - b a s is : * G r u n d s e in one

a n o th e r:

fB e in g - th e r e : * D a - s e in But cf. B e i n g t h e r e

a lo n g s id e :

D a b e is e in (2 3 9 )

(ftn. H . 7 ) H . 5 5 , 126,

i3 2 f,

2 g ), 14 2 -14 8

1 3 4 -14 0

_ ( S e c tio n

(S e c tio n 3 1 ) , 160 -

16 6 (S e c tio n 3 4 ), 18 9 , 3 4 7 , 35 0

(See also n o - l o n g e r - B e i n g - t h e r e . ) B e in g to w a r d s : * S e in z u

(ftn. H . 4 , 2 3 4 , 2 6 2 ) B . t. th e b e g in n in g : H . 3 7 3 B . t. th e D a s e in th a t h a s -b e e n -th e r e : H . 394 B . t. d e a t h : H . 2 3 4 , 2 3 5 -2 6 7 ( I I , I ) ,

H . 2 8 2 -2 8 5 , 3 0 5 * F iir -e in a n -

d e r s e in H . 121

3 0 if,

3 0 5 -3 0 7 »

3 ° 9 f, 3 2 g , 3 3 7 »

344» 34 8 f» 3 7 3 f » 3 8 6 , 3 9 0 B . t. th e e n d : H . 2 4 5 , 2 4 7 , 2 4 9 -2 5 2 ,

2 5 4 » 2 5 5 -2 6 0 ( S e c tio n 5 2 ) , 2 5 5

B e in g - in : * I n - S e in , * I n - s e in

d f.,

H . 4 1 , 5 2 -5 9 (S e c tio n 1 2 ), io s f , 1 1 9 , 12 3 , 13 0 -18 0 (I , V ) , 18 6 , i8 g f, 19 3 , 200, 20 2, 2 9 7, 350

(H . 90) (Note: s e e e n t r y f o r ‘ i n i t s e l f ’ .) ‘ in ’

one

a n o th e r:

265,

305, 3 17 ,

329,

3 7 2 f,

424 B . t. e n t it ie s : H . 4 , 1 2 1 , 2 1 8 , 2 2 2 -2 2 5 B . t. G o d : H . 10 , 1 9 0 n . i v

B e in g - in -its e lf, B e in g - in -th e m s e lv e s : A n - s ic h - s e in ; A n - ih m - s e lb s t -s e in

fB e in g

B e i n g - o n e ’ s - S e lf . )

H . 173

(ftn. H . 5 4 , 1 4 1 , 3 2 9 ) H . 5 4 f, 10 7 , 10 9 , n g f , 1 3 1 , 1 4 1 , 14 6 ,

fo r

(See

fB e in g -o n -th e -s c e n t:

f B e i n g - o n e ’ s - S e lf, B e in g - its - S e lf;

■ fBeing a l o n g s i d e : * S e i n b e i

‫־!־‬B e i n g

B e in g - its - S e lf

s e in

I2 0 f

(ftn.

(S e c tio n 2 3 ), 1 1 3 -1 8 0 (I , V ) , 3 5 0 - 3 6 6 ( S e c t i o n 6 9 ) , et passim

* “ In ” -

B . t. o n e s e lf: H . i2 4 f, 1 7 3 , 1 7 7 B . t. O t h e r s : H . 124/, 1 7 7 B . t. p o s s ib ilitie s : H . 14 8 , 2 3 6 , 2 6 1 264, 329 B . t . o n e ’s o w n m o s t p o t e n t i a l i t y - f o r B e in g :

e in a n d e r s e in H .5 4 f B e in g “ in o n it ” w ith so m e o n e : * M it -

H .

188 ,

191

d f.,

i9 2 f,

195, 2 2 1, 2 55 , 306, 325 B . t. th e r e a d y -to -h a n d : H . 298 B . t. th e t h in g t h a t its e lf h a s b e e n u n ­

d a b e i- s e in H • !7 4 f ‘ B e in g in s o m e th in g ’ : * “ S e in in . . .’

co v e re d : H . 256 B . t. a t o t a lity o f in v o lv e m e n ts : H .

H .5 4 B e in g - in -th e - w o r ld :

150 B . t. w a y s o f c o m p o r tin g o n e s e lf: H .

H .

13, 4 1 ,

5 2 -6 2

* I n - d e r - W e lt - s e x n (I,

II),

10 4 -110

211

Index o f English Expressions B e i n g t o w a r d s — cant. B . t . w h a t is b r o u g h t c l o s e : H . 1 0 6 ,, d e - s e v e r e d : H . B . t. »

106

ii ii ii ii ii

B . t. B . t. B . t. B . t.

155 82

‫ ״‬h eard : H . ‫ ״‬in d ic a t e d : H .

‫ ״‬p o in te d o u t: H . ,, s e e n : H .

172

155

(See also H.

b o ta n y

H • 3 5 » 4-6 , 70 b reaks

( in a B ru ch H . 75f

10 8 , 1 2 5 , 19 4 ).

f B e in g - w h a t - it - is : * W a s - s e in

la w - b r e a k in g .)

b r ig h tn e s s : H e lle ( lig h t ) , H e llig k e it H . 28, 350, 4 12 t b r in g a b o u t : z e itig e n , * h e r b e ifü h r e n (ftn. H . 2 2 , 3 0 4 b rin g

B e in g -w ith : * M its e in , * S e in m it (H . 2 6 3 o n ly )

back:

b e lo n g : g e h ö r e n ; z u g e h ö r e n ; h in g e h ö ren ; an geh ö ren ; zu k om m en ;

H.

H . 2 7 1 , 3 4 0 , 3 4 3 f, 3 4 6 , 3 9 1 b r in g c lo s e : * n ä h e r n , * n a h e b r in g e n . b r in g c lo s e r : * n ä h e r b r in g e n ■ fbring

(ftn.

H . 163 , 284, 325)

2 4 2 f, 2 4 6 , 3 6 8 , 3 7 8 - 3 8 1 , th e “ b e tw e e n ” : d a s Z w is c h e n .

et passim

as

*vo r­

H.

et passim b in d e n ;

b in d in g

H . 29)

H . 30, 339 ■(■bring t o m a t u r i t y : z e i t i g e n

b u r d e n : * L a s t ; e tc .

b e w ild e r : v e r w ir r e n v e r b in d e n ; m e r n ; e tc .

* h e r v o r b r in g e n ;

(ftn. H . 1 2 2 , 3 0 4 ) H . 12 2 , 152

H . 5 5 , 10 8 , 13 2 , 2 3 3 , 3 7 3 f, 390 (See also t h e “ i n - b e t w e e n ” .) H . 14 1, 34 if, 344,

fo rth : h o le n

H . 6 5 , 6 8 , io 2 f, 10 8 , u o f , 12 6 , 16 3 ,

122,

i2 7 f,

i3 4 f, 2 6 8 , 2 8 4, 29 9 ,

345 » 371 v e r k la m ­

to g e th e r:

H.

3 2 f, i s g f , 3 1 9 b in d in g to g e th e r o f in te n t io n a l a c t s :

H. 49 b in d in g to g e th e r o f p e o p le d e v o te d t o t h e s a m e a f f a ir : H . 12 2 v a lid it y a s u n iv e r s a lly b in d in g , e t c .: 15 6 , 2 78 , 3 1 2 -3 14 , 362 tim e a s b o u n d u p w ith lo c a tio n : H . 4 17

et passim b io g r a p h y H . 16, 2 47, 361 b io lo g y H . 10 , 2 8 , 4 5 , 4 9 f, 5 8 , 2 3 7 , 2 4 1 , 2 4 6 249, 269, 275 T b irth : * G e b u r t H . 2 3 3 , 3 6 3 ^ 3 8 7 , 3 9 o f, 3 9 4 b o d y : L e ib ( fig u r e ); K ö r p e r (c o rp o r­ e a l) ; * L e ib k ö r p e r ; e tc . H .

18 9 , 1 9 1 , 268, 2 7 1 , 2 8 7, 289, 296, 328 , 338, 349

e ig n e n ; e tc .

ju d g m e n t

*zu rü ck ­

19 3 , 2 3 7 -2 3 8 , 2 5 0 , 2 6 3 -2 6 4 * z, u r ü c k b r i n g e n

2 7 0 - 2 7 2 , 2 8 0 - 2 9 3 , 288» 2 9 8 , 3 8 4 , 386, 406, 4 10

b in d :

* z u r ü c k h o le n ;

b rin g e n ; * R ü c k n a h m e * z u r ü c k h o le n

H . 4 1 , 1 1 3 - 1 30 ( I , I V , e s p . S e c tio n s 26 , 2 7 ), 1 3 1, 14 2 , 146 , 16 1-16 4 ,

(ftn.

co n te x t):

H . 22, 178 , 261

H. 42

181,

r e fe r e n tia l

b r e a k in g a la w

(See

168

‫ ״‬ta lk e d a b o u t : H . B . t. B . t. t h e w o r l d : H . 5 7 , 6 i f , 1 0 6 , 122, 177

529

29, 48, 54, 56, 60, 91, 96f, I07f, 117, 121, 147, 198, 346,368,416

th e

‘ b u s in e s s o f p h i l o s o p h e r s ’ : d a s “ G e s c h ä ft d e r P h ilo s o p h e n ”

(See p h i l o s o p h y . ) f c a lc u la te :

But cf.

*b erech n en ;

*au srech n en

c a lc u lu s ( R e c h n e n )

H . 10 2 , 10 6 , 1 1 if , 2 5 8 , 2 6 1 , 2 9 4 , 3 0 7, 324 , 4 i8 n . v , 420 ■ fcalen d e r, c a le n d r ic a l:

* K a le n d e r,

* k a le n d a r is c h H . 370» 376» 4 ° 7 > 4 1 1 , 4 1 8 c a l l : *R uf, * ru fen ; n e n n e n ; e t c .

(ftn. H . 2 6 9 , 2 7 3 , 2 9 1 ) H . 2 6 9 -2 7 2 , 2 7 2 -2 7 4 (S e c tio n 5 6 ); 2 74 -2 8 0 (S e c tio n 5 7 ) , 2 8 1 , 28 6296, 300, 305, 30 7, 310 c a ll b a c k : * R ü c k r u f, * z u rü c k ru fe n H . 2 7 7 , 280, 28 7, 2 9 1, 294, 296 c a ll fo r th : * v o rru fe n H . 2 7 3 f, 2 8 0 , 2 8 7 , 2 g o f, 2 9 4 , 300,

305 c a ll

to : a n ru fe n , a p p e a l) . H . 2 73 , 288

zu ru fe n

(See also

Being and Time

53°

call— cont. call o f conscience: *Gewissensruf, * R u f des Gewissens H. 269-280, 288f, 307, 317 ‘It’ calls: * “ es” ruft, H. 275-278 care: *Sorge, *sorgen (/in. H. 57, 121, 171) (df. H. 231, 249, 284f, 306, 3i6f, 329, 335 « 346 . 350 , 364‫ ־‬374 . 4 ° 6« )4 3 6 H. 41, 57, i2 if, 126, 131, 171-174» 180-230 (I, V I), 231, 233, 235f, 246, 249, 25 if, 254, 259, 265, 270, 274-280 (Section 57), 284289, 298, 300, 310-333 (II, III), 334 f» 337 » 3 4 4 » 346353 ‫־‬f> 359 » 264, 367, 372, 374, 376, 382, 385» 390, 397 » 406, 41 if, 419» 424, 436 carry along: (See entry fo r ‘ take along' below.)

carry a w ay: entrücken (See rapture.) case o f death: Todesfall (See death.) fcatch up: *einholen; *aufholen H . 97, 126, 302, 307, 391 (ftn . H. 302) f category, categorial: *Kategorie, *kategorisch ( d f H. 44f, 54) H. 3, 11, 2if, 44f, 54-56» 63, 65, 68, 71, 78, 88, 105, n 8 f, 135, 143, 157 (categorical), 165, 188, 241, 24411. iii, 318, 320 n. xix, 377,

29gf, 402f

■fcause, causation: *Ursache, *verur­ sachen B ut cf. causality (Kausalität— 320 n. xix), causal inference (Kaus­ alschluss— 204), plead its cause (verhandeln). H. 190, 246, 282-284, 352 certain: gewiss ( ftn . H. 291) (df. H . 256) H . 24, 136, 177, 255-258, 264-266, 291-293» 302, 3 ° 7 f> 362, 435, et passim, w e c h s e ln ; v e r ä n d e rn ;e tc . H . 90-92, 97, 108, 1 14, 203f, 375, 389 f c h a n g e o v e r: lä g e n

* U m sc h la g ,

*U m sch­

H. 134, 158, 238, 357, 36of, 364 choice, choose: *W ahl, *wählen H . 7, 12, 21, 42, 188, 194, 264, 268,

270,287f, 298,371,383-385,391, 394-396

Christian theology and anthropology H. 48, igon. iv, 199 n. vii, 229, 249 fchronology: *Chronologie H. 4 i8 f circle: *Zirkel; Kreis H . 7f, i52f, 3i4f, 432 n. x x x circumspection: *Umsicht (ftn . H. 65, 69, 123) H. 69, et passim circumstance: *Umstand B u t cf. factual circumstance (Sach­ verhalt) H . 177, 300, 338, 379, 382, 384, 389 clairvoyance (ftn . H. 384) clear (verb), clearing (noun), clearedness: lichten, *Lichtung, *Gelichtetheit (ftn . H . 133) (df. H . 170, 350) H. 133, 170, 350f, 408) B u t cf. clear away (lichten, wegräu­ men), clear up (klären), clear (klar, deutlich, etc.) Î clear vision: *hellsichtig (ftn . H. 384) H . 384. clock: *U hr H. 7of, 376, 404, 413-418, 42of close (adj.) : nah (ftn . H . 6, 102) (See glossary entries on ‘ nah' and ,N ähe'.)

close (verb): schliessen (fin . H . 330) H . 1 14, 330 fclose off, *verschliessen H . 23, 124, 132, 136, 141, i6gf, 173, 178,184, ig s , 222,273,276, 286, 288,300,306 n. ii, 3 0 8 ,311,33gf, 342, 347f, 425 clue: Leitfaden co-: mitcognition, cognize : Erkenntnis, erkennen B u t cf. take cognizance (Kenntnis nehnen, Kenntnis nähme) (ftn . H. 25) (See know, knowledge.) come across: vorfinden, vorfindlich (fin . H . 135) * c o m e a lo n g : a n k o m m e n , a n k ü n ftig H. 242, 254, 330, 34 if, 382, 38g, 422f, 427

Index o f English Expressions come along— cont. (Note: this list also includes the passages in which ‘ ankommen’ and ‘ ankimftig’ , etc. have been translated as ‘ come on’ or ‘ oncoming’ .)

531

conceive, concept, conception: be­ greifen, Begriff, Begrifflichkeit; etc. (ftn . H . 150, 433) H • 3 f. 7 . 9 f> 32 , 150» 157 . «80, 310, 3 4 9 4 3 3 - 4 3 5 ‫ ־‬3634 3 «. 432 n. xxx, H . 282, 286, 288 435 ■fcome towards: zukommen, *Z u ­ confirm: *bewähren, verfestigen (H. kunft, zukünftig 100) (ftn . H . 325, 329) (df. H. 218) H . 325f, 32gf, 336f, 341, 343, 347, connectedness, connection: Zusam­ 365. 395 menhang common: gemein T he c. o f Dasein’s life from birth to B u t cf. common sense. death: H . 373-390 ‘c.’ interest: H. 174 (See also 35 i f , et passim, and entry fo r c. reason: H . 4, 23 (Kant) ‘ context’ .) c . understanding (Verstand): H. conscience: *Gewissen 182, 334, 220 (ftn . H. 291) (df. H. 269, 271, 277, ‘c.’ world: H. 64 289, 300) fcom m on sense: *Verständigkeit H. 234, 268-270, 270-272 (Section H . 147, 260, 269, 288, 292-294, 296, 55), 272-274 (Section 56), 2742 9 9 . 3 ° 9 . 3 i if. 3 > 5 3 4 2 ,329 ‫»־‬ 280 (Section 57), 286, 288, 387 ii 395 422 ,406 ‫־‬ 289-205 (Section 50), 295-301 communication: Mitteilung; *Kom ­ (Section60), 307,3iof, 317, 372, munikation (H. 398f) 385, 403 (Yorck) (df. H. 155, 162, 168) bad conscience: H. 279, 290-293 H . 32, 155-157, 160, i62f, i68f, 224, call o f conscience: 269-274 (Section 272, 274, 363, 384 56), 274-280 (Section 57), 288f, compare, comparison: *vergleichen; 3 ° 7 . 317 abheben (contrast, bring out; evil conscience: H. 209 etc.); zusammenstellen; etc. good conscience: H. 279, 281, 288, vergleichen: H. 52, 131, 166, 178, 290-293 . 218, 399 public conscience: H. 278,403 ( Yorck) Tcompetence: können (*potentiality; universal conscience: H. 278 can; be able) voice o f conscience: H. 268f, 271, H• 143 275, 278, 280, 290-292, 294, 300 comport: verhalten wanting to have a conscience (ftn . H. 4, 124) (df. H. 270, 289, 295O tcom pute: *errechnen: *rechnerisch H. 234, 27of, 288f, 292, 295f, 300, H . 48, 105, 264, 388, 390 305 . 307 . 3 ° 9 f world conscience: H. 278 conceal: verdecken, verhüllen

Being and Time

532

consciousness: Bewusstsein (mind H. 50, 246) c. o f G o d : H. 269 c. o f guilt: H. 281, 286 c. o f Reality: H. 21 i f c. o f truth: H. 216 intentionality o f c .: H. 363 n. xxiii reification of c.: H . 46, 114, 437 transcending o f c.: H. 20iff Dilthey: H. 205 n, xv, 209 Hegel: H. 435, 437 Husserl: H. 47 n. ii Kant: H. 203, 319 Torek: H. 40i f See also H. 49, 62, 115, 218, 229, 265, 278 consider: besinnen; betrachten (ob­ serve; study; contemplate H. 213); ansprechen; etc. ( ft n . H. 15) considerateness: Rücksicht (ftn . H. 123) H. 123, 125, 131, 146 consist: bestehen; etc. (ftn . H. 303) fconsole: *trösten H. 253 f ■fconspicuous: *auffallig, *auffallend (ftn . H. 74) H. 46, 71, 73-75, 8of, 104, 107, h i , 121, 126, 157, 253, 274, 354f, 37 ° (Note: all references fo r are included here.)

inconspicuous

constant: ständig; *konstant (H. 416) (ftn . H. 117, 128, 291, 303, 322, 332, 375 ) constancy, in-constancy, and nonSelf-constancy o f the Self: H. 117, 322f, 332, 375, 390, 410 Descartes on the constancy o f corporeal Things, etc.: H. 92, 96

c. presence-at-hand: H. 96 c. readiness-to-hand: H. 103 the closest c. o f Dasein: H. 128 the primordial c. o f existence: H. 340 c. ahead-of-itself: H. 337 c. Being-guilty: H. 305 c. certainty: H. 308 c. resoluteness: H. 391 inconstancy, in-constancy: H. 128, 336 f, 39 of et passim

Constitution: *Konstitution (ftn . H. 8)

constitution, constitutive state: Verfas­ sung (ftn . H. 8) constitute, constitutive, constituent: *konstituieren, *konstitutiv, *konstituens; Verfassungs— ; ausmachen (make up, go to make up, etc.) construct, constructive, construe: *kon­ struieren, *Konstruktion, *kon­ struktiv; bauen; etc.) *konstruieren, *Konstruktion, *kon­ struktiv; H. 1 1 , 16, 28, 33,36,43, 50 n. x, 61, 109, 197, 206, 260, 302f, 375, 378 , 399 f> 427 »• 3“ ii, 435

•)‫־‬consume: *verzehren H. 431 content: Bestand; *Gehalt; *Inhalt; etc. (ftn . H. 303)

context: Zusammenhang (See also connectedness.) ‫■(־‬contingency: *Kontingenz H. 143 continue: *fortlaufen; *fortgehen; bleiben; etc. B ut cf. Continuity, Continuous: Kontinuität, kontinuierlich (ftn . H. 423) H. 4ogf, 423 !continuity, continuous: *Stetigkeit, *stetig (ftn . H. 423) H. 423f !contradiction, principle of: *Satz vom Widerspruch H. 226 | conviction: *Überzeugung (ftn . H. 256) H. 116, 256 f copula: *Copula, *Kopula H. i 59 f. 349 360 ‫־‬ fcorporeal-Thing: *Körperding H. 54, 56, 90-92, 97, io6f, 117, 238, 361, 368 ‫־‬fcorpse: *Leiche H. 238 !corruption: *Verderbnis H. i 79f count: zählen (number H. 413); etc. H. 125, 42of (Note: other derivatives o f 'Z a h l' are usually translated in other ways.)

Index o f English Expressions counter-: GegenB u t cf. counter-thrust (Rückschlag); run counter to '(widerstreiten H. 71). •(•the ‘counter to’ : *das “ Gegen” H . 210 course: Gang; *Lauf; *Ablauf, *ablau­ fen; Verlauf, verlaufen; etc. (fin . H. 243) course o f time: * L a u f der Zeit (H. 380, 422); *mit der Zeit (H. 328) (See also run its course.) cover up: verdecken (df. H. 36) fcowardliness: *Feigheit H. 254, 266 fcraving: *Gier (ftn . H . 346) H . 346 f critical, criticism, critique: *kritisch, *Kritik critical epistemology etc. : H. 156, 206 critical function o f the conscience: H. 279, 288, 290, 294 Hartmann's critical realism: H. 208, n. xvi Nietzsche on critical historiology: H.

396f et passim

culture: *K ultur H . 21, 5if, 167, 176, 178, 379, 395f fcumulation: *Anhäufung H . 242, 328f t curiosity: *Neugier (ftn . H. 346, 347) (df. H. 170, i72f, 346 ) H. 134, 170-173 (Section 36), 174^ i77f, 180, 222, 271, 273, 277, 310, 346-348 current: jeweilig fdamage: *Beschädigung; *Schaden (H. 272, n. vi) _ H .7 3 f.3 5 4 f Dasein: *Dasein (ftn . H. 7, 25, 41, 58, 63, 184) (df. H. n f, 25, 42, 52, 54, 57, 85-87, i!3 f, 119, 121, i28f, 133, 143^ 203, 210, 221, 231, 249f, 25gf, 284^ 298, 323, 332, 381, 4 *2 » 433) et passim) Dasein-with: *Mitdasein H. 114, 116, 1 17-125 (Section 26), 137, 140, 142, i62f, 168, 170,

533

176, 187, 193, 239, 272, 297 fdating, datability: *datieren, *Datierbarkeit H. 407-418, 422-424» 427 day: *T ag ; etc. H : 7 i> ! 79 » 37 °f> 409, 4 1 2 f> 415 dealings: *Um gang, umgehen (ftn . H. 65, 66) H. 66-70, 79, 102, 104, io6f, 121, i 4 9 >352 - 355 » 358 , 364» 4 *2 , 429 death: *Tod (df. H. 250, 258Q H. 104, 198, 233f, 237-241 (Sec­ tion 47), 242, 246-249 (Section 4 9 )» 249-252 (Section 50), 302, 306-308, 311, 317, 329, 345, 372 -3 7 4 » 382-387, 390» 4 2 4 f Being towards death: (See Being towards.) fcase o f death: *Todesfall H. 252-254, 257, 264 •(freedom for death: H. 384f ffreedom towards death: H. 266 !thinking about death :_H. 254, 258, 261, 309 fd eb t: Schuld H. 242, 281-283 fth e deceased: *der Verstorbene H. 238f deception: Täuschung (delusion) H. 33, 38, 146, 169 decide: *entscheiden, beschliessen (H. 299) (ftn . H. 299, 300) H. 12, 42, 107, 127, 177, 223, 228, 259» 268, 396 •(,deduce, deductive: *deduzieren, *deduktiv; schliessen (H. 4) H. 8, 11, 36, 182, 242, 289, 301, 314, 34 °. 367» 377 ■(deficient: *defizient (ftn . H. 20) H. 20, 57, 61, 75, 104, 12of, 123-125, 336 , 3 5 2 » 3 5 5 define, definition: bestimmen; umgren­ zen (delimit, etc.); *Definition, *definieren; etc. definite character (See give a definite character.) deformalize: *entformalisieren H. 35 , 241 deliberation: *Überlegung H. 187, 359-361 ■(deliver over: *überantworten (ftn . H. 21)

Being and Time

534

deliver over— cont. H . 21, 42, 134f, 144, 148, 167, «73 . 188f, 192, 251f, 254, 259, 276, 284, 364, 383, 396 !delusion: Täuschung (deception) H. 62, 138, 274 fdem ise: *Ableben (ftn . H. 247) H. 247, 251, 254, 257-259, 261 demonstrate: *ausweisen; erweisen (prove, turn out); nachweisen; demonstrieren (illustrate) (ßn■ H. 5 3 ) depersonalization: *Entpersonalisierung H. 48 •fdepression: *Gedrücktheit H . 342 fdeprive o f its character as present: *Entgegenwärtigung H . 391. 397 fdeprive o f its theological character: * enttheologisieren

H• 49

!deprive of its worldhood: *Entweltlichung H . 6 5 ,7 5 ,112f, derive, derivation, dederivation: *abkünftig; *ableiten, *abgeleitet; *Derivat, *Derivation; Herkunft (origin); etc. (ftn . H. 329) d. character o f assertion: H. 133, 153160 (Section 33) d. sense o f ‘certainty: H. 256 d. conception o f guilt: H. 287 d. conception o f time: H. 326, 329-331 d. conception o f truth: H. 214, 219-226 (Section 44b), 256 d. kinds o f understanding: H. 143, 147, 152, 160 underived character o f Being: H . 4, 8 underived character o f care: H. 182, 318 history as derivation (Herkunft) from the past: H. 378 et passim

tde-sever: *ent-fernen (See entry fo r ‘ desever.’ )

!desperation: *Verzweiflung H. 229, 345 !destiny: Geschick B ut cf. destine (bestimmen, H. 15, 344) (ftn . H. 384) (df. H. 384)

H. 56, 384-386, 394 !destruction, destroy: *Destruktion, *destruieren; *zerstören (H. 152) H. 19-27 (Section 6), 31, 39, 89, 392 !Determ ine: *determinieren H. 241, 298, 362, 368 determine: bestimmen ( fin . H. 344) !detrimentality: *Abträglichkeit H. 83, i4of, 144, i85f, 341 devote, devotedness: *hingeben, *Hingabe; etc. !*hingeben, *Hingabe: H. 136, 199,

347. 354.

!diaeresis: *Diairesis H. 159 !dialectic: *Dialektik H. 22, 25, 215, 229, 286, 301, 42gf, 432, 432 n. xxx die: *sterben (df. H . 247, 251) H. 238-241, 245, 247-255, 257,

259

| ‘one dies*: “ man stirbt** H. 253-255 !d ie away: *absterben; *ersterben

H. i 73f differentiate: unterscheiden; *differ­ enzieren, *Differenz B ut cf. undifferentiated, without differentiation (indifferent) (See entry fo r ‘ Indifferent’ .) (ftn . H. 429)

unterscheiden: H. 429^ 433-435 !differenzieren, *Differenz: H. 43,

5°. 77. 119. 324. 396>399f. 4°3

!dim dow n: *abblenden !desever: entfernen H. 138, 155, 189, 195, 265 (ftn . H. 105) (df. H. 105) dimension: *Dimension H. 27, 103, 105-IU , 120, 132, 136, 147, 167, 172, 279, 293, 299, H. 103, 110, 112 , e t passim direct (adj.): *direkt; etc. 335 . 361 , 368f, 370, 396 (Note: this list also includes all the direct (verb) : richten; ausrichten passages in which 'ent-femen' has (ftn . H. 102) been translated a s ‘ de-sever’ etc., or in richten: H. 62, 137, 181, 287, 411 which ‘ entfernen’ has been translated as ‘ remove’ , etc.

et passim

ausrichten: H. 79, 108-110, 368

Index o f English Expressions direction: Richtung; etc. (ftn . 102) H . 71, 79) io2f, 1 0 8 - m , et passim •(•directional, directionality: ausgerichtet, *Ausrichtung (ftn . H. 102) H. 79, 102, 105, 1 0 8 -m , 120, 132, i 57>299» 335. 368f disappear: verschwinden (vanish) H . 105, 244f> 251, 342, 357. 375»379»

389

•(,disavowal: *W iderruf (ftn . H . 386) H. 386 •(•disburden: *entlasten disclose: ferschließen (ftn . H. 75, 151, 297, 298, 300, 315) (df. H . 75, 175, 180, 220, 269, 334f) (See Sections 44, 68, et passim.)

discourse: Rede, reden (ftn . H. 25, 160) (df. H. 32, i6 if) H. 25, 32, 34, i33f, 160-167 (Section 34), i68f, i73f, 180, i87f, 220, 223, 269-273, 277, 295f, 335, 346, 349f (Section 68d), 406408, 416, 425 (Note: this list includes the more im­ portant passages in which the alternative translation ‘ talk' has been used.)

discover: entdecken (ftn . H . 33) (Note: see also ‘ uncover’ .)

discriminate; unterscheiden; *Diskrimen (ftn . H. 429) discuss: *besprechen; erörtern; *Dis­ kussion, *diskutieren; etc. ad­ dressing and discussing: ans­ prechen und besprechen (ftn . H. 34) H. 25, 34, 44f, 59, 62, 406, 408 •fdisguise: verstellen H. 35f, 58, i24f, 129, 132, 175, 191, 222, 274, 295, 302, 326 tdisperse: zerstreuen H. 56, 67, 129, 172, 273, 310, 338,

347. 37i.389f (Note: this list also includes all passages in which ‘ zerstreuet1’ is translated as ‘distract’ .)

tdissect: *zergliedern H. 178, 209, 273 tdistance, distant: *Abstand

5 35

cf. distance-senses (Fernsinne H . 107). (ftn . H. 105) H. 102, 105-108, 122, 126, 269, 361, But

369» 38l

fdistantial, distantiality: *abstandmässig, *Abständigkeit H. 107, 126-128 distinctive: ausgezeichnet, auszeichnen (special; distinguish; etc.) B ut cf. distinguish (abgrenzen, auszeichnen, scheiden, trennen); distinct (verschieden, deutlich, Unterschied); distinction (Abgren zung, Unterschied, schei­ den), distract: zerstreuen (Note: see entry fo r ‘ disperse’ .)

fdivert: verlegen H. 146, 165, 201, 206, 222, 259 fdownward plunge: *Absturz H. 178 fdread: *Grauen (ftn . H. 182; cf. H. 190 n. iv.) H. 142 fdrive (noun) : Trieb H. 194, 2 io f |due on account: *etwas am Brett haben H. 281 fdum b: *stumm H. 164, 296 !duration: *Dauer H. 106, 432-3 n. xxx the ‘during*: das “ während” B ut cf. endure (*währen, etc.); duration (*Dauer). H. 409 (Cf. also H . 4 13 .) •(,dwell, dwelling: a u f halten, Aufenthalt (ftn . H. 61) H. 54,61-63,69, 75,80,88, 107, 119, 124, 164, 173, 189, 261, 347, 352, 388, 422 easy: leicht (ftn : H . 360)

H• 36°

ecstasis, ecstatical: *Ekstase, *ekstatisch (ftn . H. 329, 338) (df. H. 329, 365) H. 329-331, 3 3 1 ff, passim felate: heben (raise, etc.) H. i34f, 345 element: *Element; etc. H. 46, 181, 196, 334, 403 elemental: *elementar

Being and Time

536 f emanate: ausstrahlen (radiate) H. 30, 140, 350

(Note: this list includes all passages in which ‘ ausstrahlen' appears.)

fem p athy: *Einfühlung H . I24f f empirical: *empirisch H . 3of, 50, 162, 229, 257f, 269, 321,

367

empty: leer (vacuity, H . 60) encounter: *begegnen (ftn . H. 31, 44, 329) end: Ende, enden H . 233-238, 241-246 (Section 48), 249 f> 259 » 264, 305, 329, 373f, 424, 426 Being-at-an-end: *Zu-Ende-sein (ftn . H. 234) H. 234, 237, 245f, 305 Being towards the end: *Sein-zumEnde (See Being towards.) •(■come to an end: *Zu-Ende-kommen H. 238-242 endless: *endlos H. 33of, 348, 384,424,426 •(endanger: *gefährden H. 141, 282, 356 tendure: *währen; *fortwährend; *im ­ merwährend B ut cf. duration (*Dauer); the ‘during’ (*das “ während” ) H . 96, 128, 409 •fentangle: *verfangen, *verfänglich B ut c f disentangle (auswickeln, H. 241; entwirren) H . 67, 173, 178, 180, 346-348 •(,enter into: *hereinstehen B u t cf. the transitive verb ,enter’ (‘ kom­ men in . . .') H . 152, 248, 255, 258, 302

entity: Seiendes; seiend (H. 130) (ftn . H. i, 3, 7, 11) environment: *Umwelt (ftn . H. 65) H. 57f, 66-88 (I, III A), 89, 101-113

(I, III C), et passim ■fenvisage: *vergegenwärtigen (ftn . H. 359) H . 34, 5 5 . 248, 303. 359 . 393 . •fepistemology: Erkenntnistheorie H. io, 59, 156, 183, 206-210, 213216, 375 . 4 0 * (Note: this list includes all passages in which ‘Erkenntnistheorie’ has been

translated as ‘ theory o f knowledge'. See also ,cognition’ , ‘know.')

•fequality: Gleichheit (sameness, H. 118) B ut cf. equiprimordial, with equal primordiality (gleichursprüng­ lich) H. 216, 434 ■fequanimity: *Gleichmut (ftn . H . 134) H. 134. 345 equipment, item o f equipment: *Zeug (ftn . H. 68, 74) H. 68ff, et passim equiprimordial, with equal primordi­ ality: *gleichursprünglich f Essence: *Essenz O - H . n 7) H. 117, 233, 318 essence, essential: Wesen, *wesenhaft, *wesendich (ftn . H. n 7) H. 12, 42, 48f, 214,231, 298, et passim •(•Essential: *essentiell (ftn . H. 117) H. 117 •(•establishing o f signs: *Zeichenstiftung H. 8of estimation: schätzen (esteem, assess); abschätzen (assess) H. iosf, 369 feternal, eternity: *ewig, *Ewigkeit H. 18, 106, 227, 229, 338 n. iii, 371, 423, 437 n. xiii, 341 *ethics: *Ethik H. 16, 291 n. viii (Scheler), 294, 316, 320? n. xix (Scheler), 402 (Yorck)

ethnology H. 51, 51 ftn. xi, 247 (See also culture, primitive.) teudaemonism: *Eudaimonismus H. 293 f evade: ausweichen (give way, H . 78O H. 93 f> i 35 f. *39. 213. 254-260, 264, 322, 342f, 371, 391, 425 ■fevent: *Begebenheit; *Ereignis *Begebenheit: H. 240, 277, 280, 310, 379 . 384. 395 . 4 >of *Ereignis: H. 152, 250, 253f, 257, 273, 284, 290, 378f, 382, 389 everyday, everydayness: *alltäglich, *Alltäglichkeit; *Alltag (H. 258, 345 . 37°0 But cf. every day (alle Tage, H. 370)

Index o f English Expressions everyday— cant. (ftn . H. 16) ( d f H. 43f, 181, 332,

370-372)

H. i6f,43f,5of, 117-125 (Section 26), 126-130 (Section 27), 166-180 (I, V B), 181, 233-235, 252-255 (Section 51), 255-260 (Section 52)» 332 -335372 ‫ ־‬370 ‫( ־‬Section 71), et passim ■[■Everyman: *Jedermann H. 362, 3 7 0 ,4 11,4 13 , 416 everyone: *jedermann; etc. H. 413, 417, 425 •(■everywhere and nowhere: *überall und nirgends H. 173, 177. 347 fevil (noun): *Ü bel H. 141, 248, 3 4 if •fevil (adj.) : *böse H. 286f, 2gof f exact (verb): zumuten (impose upon, H. 39); *sich rächen (exact a penalty, H. 174) H . 266, 285, 305, 307-310, 322 exhibit: aufweisen; aufzeigen; heraus­ steilen (set forth, etc.) (ftn . H. 34, 53) exist, existence, existent: *existieren, *Existenz, *existent (ftn . H. 303, 329) ( d f H. I2f, 42, 53, 231-233, 313^ etc.) existential, existentiality: *existenzial (adj.), *Existenzialität (ftn . H. 12) (df. H. 12, 327) H. i2f, 16, 20, 38, 41, etc. and Sections 11 , 25, 29-34, 4 2 « 4 5 ‫ ־‬4 9 ‫ ־‬50 ‫ ־‬52‫־‬ 53‫ ־‬59‫ ־‬60, 67, 72, 76, 82, 83, et passim

*existentiale: *Existenzial (noun) (df. H. 44) H . 44f, 54-57,64, 1 0 5 ,1 1 1 ,1 2 1 , i2gf, 134, 143^ 148, isof, 160, 165, iggf, 226, 242, 2g7, 311, 336 existentiell: *existenziell (ftn . H. 12) ( d f H . 12) Sections 54, 62, et passim texpect: *erwarten (df. H. 262, 337) H. 1 ig, 156, 195, 205, 246, 248, 26lf, 274 f3 4 1-3 4 3 ,339 ,337 ,294 ‫־‬. 3 4 5 3 5 5 . 353 ‫־‬ !Experience: *erleben, *Erlebnis (ftn . H. 46) H . 46-49, 114, 11g, 130, 136, 181, ig4, 214, 247, 251, 265, 26g,

537

2792 ‫־‬go-2g3, 340, 344, 355, . 3 7 3 *3 9 ° ‫ ־‬3 8 7 *‫־‬f> 400

experience: erfahren (ftn . H. 46) explain: erklären (declare, etc.)•, ex­ plizieren, Explikation (expli­ cate); deuten (point to); etc. deuten (ftn . H. 87) erklären (df. H. 336) explicit: *ausdrücklich; *explizit (ftn . H. 14g) express, expression: *ausdrücken, *Ausdruck; aussprechen; etc. (ftn . H. 14g, 167, 224, 408) aussprechen: H . 14g, 155, 161-165, ^ f 223-225 ‫־‬, 271, 406-411, 414, 417, 42lf, et passim

fextend, extension: ausdehnen, Aus­ dehnung (a high degree, H. 195); sich erstrecken B u t cf. extensive (weitgehend, weitläufig); extent (Weite, Reichweite, Tragweite, inwie­ weit, inwiefern, sofern, etc.) ausdehnen, Ausdenhnung: H . 54, 68, 90, 101, 112, 368, 427 n. xv fsich erstrecken: H. 173, 188, 239 •(■external world: *Aussenwelt H. 201, 202-208 (Section 43a), a n , 273

face to face with: vor (with accusative)•, das W ovor (But cf. in the face o f (vor, with dative) (ftn . H. 184, 327)

H. 184, 188, 224, 227, 255, 2Ö5f, 276, 288 Fact: *Faktum (ftn . H. 56) H. 5, 18, 56, 66, 79, 148, 152, 168, 179, 190, 225, 254, 268f, 276, 287,328,371,382,387,392f, 428 fact: *Tatsache; etc. (ftn . H. 56) *Tatsache: H. 56, 179, 229, 254, 257f, 268f, 2go, 2g3, 328, 362, 394f4°4 ‫ ־‬398‫>־‬et passim (Note: the word fa c t' has been used informally in translating several other expressions. Our list o f passages is by no means complete, but

Being and Time

538

fact— cont. includes only some in which it is perhaps o f particular interest that the word ‘ Tatsache' has been used.) factical :*faktisch (ftn . H. 7, 56) (H. I45f, 179, 192, 221, 229, 25if, 256f, 25gf, 263^ 266, 269, 276, et passim ffacticity: *Faktizität (ftn . H. 7, 56, 135) H . 56, 59, 72 n. i, 120, 128, 135, 145, 179, 181,190-193, 222, 229, 231, 250, 252, 275f, 284, 298, 314, 3*6, 328, 348, 350, 404 factual, factuality: *tatsächlich, *T at­ sächlichkeit B ut cf. factual circumstance (Sach­ verhalt, H. 264^; factual science (Tatsachenwissenschaft, H. 362) (ftn . H . 7, 56, 135) (df. H. 56, 394) H. 56, 135, 276, 315, 394, et passim fail to hear: *überhören (ftn . H . 271) H . 271, 27gf, 296 failure to stand by itself: *Unselb­ ständigkeit (ftn . H . 117, 322) H . 117, 128 f faith: *Glaube, glauben, (think; be­ lieve, etc.) H. 10, 180, 190 n. iv, 205f fall: verfallen (deteriorate, H. 22, 36); fallen; Verfall (H. 378) B ut cf. fa ll s h o rt (Z u rü ck b leib e n ; n ic h t in s Z ie l b rin g e n ).

(ftn . H. 21, 134, 175, 300, 428) (df. H. 175, 180, 254, 346f, 369) verfallen: H. 21, 134^ 139, 166-180 (I, V B ; esp. Section 38); 346349 (Section 68c), et passim fallen: H . 134, 405, 428, 433-436 false: *falsch B ut cf. falsify (v erfälschen) H. 33, 215, 226f, 393 familiar: vertraut; bekannt (well known; acquaintance) ffam ess: Fem e (ftn . H . 105) H . 105, i07f, 140, 172 (Note: this includes all passages in which ‘Feme’ occurs.) ffascinated: *benommen (Jin. H . 344) H . 61, 76, 113, 176, 271, 344)

ffate, *Schicksal B ut cf. fatal (fatal, H. 368) (ftn . H. 384) (df. H. 385, 386) H. 166, 384-392, 394f, 410, 435 ffear: *Furcht, *fürchten (ftn . H. 141) (df. H. 140fr, 189, 342, 344f

H. 133, 140-142 (Section 30), 182, i85f, 189, 190 n. iv, 251, 254, 266, 341-345 ffear about: *fürchten um H. i4 if, 341 ffear for: *fürchten für H. I4 if . f fearful: *furchtsam H. i4 if, 345 f fearlessness: *Furchtlosigkeit H. 137 ffearsome: *furchtbar H. 140-142, i85f f feeling: *Gefühl B ut cf. feel (fühlen); feel by touch (tasten, betasten) H. 109, I38f, 142, 249 n. vi, 271, 342, 400 (Yorck) f fill in: erfüllen (ftn . H. 151) H. 151, 192,320 n. xix, 326, 343 ffill up: *auffüllen (242f, 374); *aus­ füllen (103, 368) find oneself: sich finden, sich befinden, Befindlichkeit (H. 328) (ftn . H. 134, 135, 137, 328) sich finden: H . 119, I28f, 135, 144, 268, 271, 328, 340 sich befinden: H . 135, 180, 188, 340, 346 (Note: the verb ‘f ind’ has been used informally to translate \finden’ and many other expressions, o f which the most important is ‘befindlich’— ‘to be found’.) ffinite: *endlich H. 93, 264, 329-331, 348, 384-386, 413, 424f ffirst instance: See in the first instance, fflee: *fliehen, *Flucht; flüchtig (fleet­ ing, fugitive) (ftn . H. 184) H. 44, 134^ 184-186, 189, ig2f, 251255. 258-260, 276, 278, 310, 322, 340, 348, 390, 425 (Note: this list also includes the passages in which ‫׳‬flüchtig’ is translated as fleeting’ or fugitive’.)

Index o f English Expressions

fleeting: *flüchtig (See flee.) for the most part: zumeist (fin . H. 16) (df. H. 370) the “for-the-sake-of-which” : das Worumwillen H . 84, 86-88, m , 123, 129, 143, 145-147, 181, 191-194» 228, 236, 297f, 327, 333f, 337, 347,

359.

364^ 412» 414

(Note: this list also includes all the chief passages in which ,umwillen' is translated as ‘f o r the sake o f’.)

the “for-which” : das Wofür (H. 83f); das Wozu (H. 414) (ftn . H. 414) fforbearance: *Nachsicht (ftn . H. 123) H. 123 f fore-conception: V orgriff (ftn . H . 150, 327) H . isof, 153, 157, 232, 311 (Note: this list also includes all passages in which *Vorgriff ’ is translated as ‘something we grasp in advance’.) ,)■fore-having: Vorhabe (ftn . H. 150, 327) H. isof, 153, i57f, 232-234,236,268, 290, 311, 316, 323, 372 (Note: this list also includes all passages in which ‘Vorhabe’ is translated as *something we have in advance'.) tfore-sight: Vorsicht (ftn . H . 150, 527) H . 80, isof, 153, 156-158, 232f, 257,

3 ” . 3*6 (Note: this list also includes all passages in which ‘vorsichtig’ occurs, and all those in which ‘Vorsicht’ is trans­ lated as ‘something we see in advance’.) tfore-structure: *Vor-Struktur (ftn . H . 327) H . 151-153 forget: *vergessen (df. H. 219, 339) H. 44, 62, 219, 262, 277, 292, 322,

339‫ ־‬341-345‫ ־‬347^. 35° . 354«

369, 388, 391, 4o6f, 4ogf, 424^ et passim form: *Form; *ausformen: Gestalt (H. 158, 163); etc. U . 31» 78, 103, i n , 156, 163, 319, 3 6 6 f, 4P0 ,

et passim

539

(Note: the word ‘form ’ has been usedfreely in translating many other expressions. formal: *formal (Note: in Heidegger’s usage this word is to be thought o f as roughly synony­ mous with ‘empty’ and ‘abstract’. Its opposite is ‘concrete’, not ,in­ form al’. C f. H . 7, 27, 88, 147, 159, 241, S48, 255, 277, 435,

et passim.) formalism: *Formalismus H . 9, 400 ■fformalize: *formalisieren H. 22, 77f, 88, 147, 159, 208, 283,

432f (Note: see also ‘deformalize’.) former occasion: See on that former occasion, forward: vor-; etc. (ftn . H. 291) forthwith: sogleich; sofort H . 407, 421, 424 found, foundation: *fundieren; *Fundament; *fundamentieren; *Grundlagenkrisis (H. 9) B ut cf. fundamental (fundamental) (ftn . H. 34, 69) Sections 13 (H. 59-62), 20 (H. 9295), 44a (H. 214-219), et passim free (adj.), freedom: frei, *Freiheit; -los (angstlos, H. 258; sorglos, H . 57, 192, 294) (df. H. 285, 366, 384) f. for authenticity or inauthenticity: H . 188, 191, 195, 232, 344 f. for Being-guilty: H. 288 f. for the call o f conscience: H . 287 f. for care: H. 122 f. for death: H. 264, 266, 384f f. for freedom o f choice: H. 188 f. for oneself: H . 122 f. for possibilities: H. 191, 193, 199, 264, 285, 312, 344 f. for one’s ownmost potentiality-forBeing: H. 144, 191 f. for repetition : H . 385 free (verb): *freigeben, *Freigabe (ftn . H. 83) H . 83-86, 104, n o f, 118, 120-123, 129, 141, 144, 227, 264, 297f, 3 *o. 313» 343» 363 ffree-floating: freischwebend (soaring, H. 9) H. 19, 28, 36, 123,144,156,272,276, 279‫ ־‬298, 309,325«339« 388,424

Being and Time

540

ffruit H. 243f fugitive: flüchtig (See flee.) fulfill: vollenden (complete); erfüllen; genügen (H. 31) {ftn. H. 244) H . 244f function: Funktion; fungieren; etc. H . 88, et passim fundamental: *fundamental f. analysis: H. 39, 41, 131, 181, 184, 213, 230, 231-235 (Section 45), 360 f. ontology: H. i3f, 37, 131, 154, i82f, 194, 196, 200-202, 213, 232, 268, 301, 310, 316, 403, 405f, 436-437 (Section 83) !further retelling: *weitersagen H . 155, 169, 277 ffuture, futural: *Zukunft, zukünftig {ftn. H. 325, 329) {df. H. 325) H. 20, 141, 325350 ,336-348 .330‫־‬, 360,365, 378, 381, 385-387, 391,

395-397, 4 >o, 423-427, 431 generation: *Generation H . 20, 385, 385 n. viii !genesis: *Genesis H. 171, 357f, 360-362, 392, 406, 420-428 (Section 81) genuine: *echt; *genuin {ftn. H. 5) {df. Cf. H . 142, 146) !genus, generic: *Gattung H. 3, 14, 38, 42, 77, 128, 433 (Hegel) give a definite character: bestimmen H. 154-8, 162 tgive oneself airs: *sich aufspreizen {ftn. H . 43of, 434 tgive to understand: *zu verstehen geben H. 148, 267, 269-271, 27gf, 287, 296 given: gegeben H. 36, i i s f , 129, 265, et passim go to make u p : See make up God: H. 10, 24, 28, 48f, 49 nn. vii, ix; 92f, 95, 190 n. iv, 199, 269, 275, 291, 427 n. xiii

{Mote: see also 'theology'.) good: *gut; Dutzendware (H. 71) H. 29, 99, 199, 279, 281, 286, 288, 290-293, 383 fgossip: *nachreden H. i68f

!gram m ar: *Grammatik H . 165 grasp: fassen (take, etc.) ; erfassen (*apprehend; comprehension, H. 49); greifen; etc. grasp in advance: *Vorgriff {ftn. H. 150) (Note: see fore-conception.) Greeks H. 25f, 33f, 39, 68, 165, i7of, 222,

225, 358, 378

ground (verb): gründen (base, basis); begründen (establish, etc.) ; etc. ground (noun): Grund (basis, reason, bottom, etc.); Boden (basis, soil, footing, etc.) ; etc. H . 32, 34f, 152, et passim 377, groundless: *bodenlos H. 168-170, 17 7f, et passim fguilt, guilty: Schuld, schuldig (ftn. H. 280, 281, 287) (df. H. 281283, 286, 305f) H. 26g?, 279, 280-289 (Section 58), 290-293, 295-297, 301, 305-307, 306 n. ii, 311, 317, 325, 372, 382, 385 tham m er: *Hammer H. 6gf, 7 8 ,83f, 109, i54f, 157, 36of hand down: überliefern (ftn. H. 21, 383) H . 21, 166, 379, 383-387, 39of, 395 handle: *handhaben; handeln; be­ handeln (H. 34) *handhaben: H. 109, 353, 355, 360,

368f !handy: handlich H. 73, 414, 418 thanker: *nachhängen

H. 195

happen: geschehen; *Rückzeichen (H. 78, 80) (ftn. H. 19) H. 330, 376, 388 n., ix, 389, 395, 404, 426, et passim

(See also ‘historize’■) hard, hardness: *hart, *Härte; *ersch­ weren (H. 360) H. 91, g6f have been, having been: gewesen, *Gewesenheit; etc. (ftn. H. 326) H. 326.32g, 340-346, 348, 350, 360, 365, 381, 385-387, 391, 395. 427

Index o f English Expressions have been— cont. f have-been-there: *da-gewesen H . 30of. 385^ 393-397 ■fhaving-been-in-the-world: *In-derWelt-gewesen-sein H. 394 . !be-as-having-been: Gewesensein

gewesen

sein,

H. 326, 328, 339f, 344f !in

the process gewesend

o f having been:

(ftn. H. 326) H. 326, 350, 385, 391, 396,410 fhave before us: Vorhaben

H. 149, 260, 279, 300 have a conscience: See conscience, fhave debts: *Schulden haben

H. 281-283 fhave due on account: *etwas am Brett haben

H. 281 ,have’ an environment: H. 57f ‘have’ a history: H . 378, 382, 417 have in advance: See fore-having, fh ave meaning: *Sinn haben H . 151, 154, 324, 361 have a mood: See mood, fhaving presence: *anwesend (ftn. H. 326) H . 326, 346, 359, 369, 389, 417, 423 fhave responsibility: *Schuld haben H . 282 have something: Haben von etwas H • 351 have time: See time have to be: zu sein haben H . 12, 134 have to d o : *zu tun haben H. 48, 56, 61, 79, 125, 149, 158, 160, 172‫ ־‬35 1 fhaving the ‘world’ : die “ W elt” haben H. 58 hear: hören (ftn. H. 164, 271, 284) H . 33, 107, 155, 161, 163-165, 168, 174, 269, 271, 273-275, 277, 279-281, 284, 287, 292, 294-

296

f hearken: *horchen H. i63f f hearsay: *Hörensagen H. 155, 169, 173, 224 heavy: schwer (ftn. H. 360) H • >54» >57» 36of

541

the “ here” : das Hier (df. H . 369) H. 107, n g f, 132, 186, 369,417 ‫[־‬,heritage: *Erbe, *Erbschaft H. 383-386, 39of fhermeneutic, hermeneutical: *Her­ meneutik, *hermeneutisch (df. H. 37f; 398 (Dilthey)) h. o f Being with one another: H. 138 h. o f Dasein: H. 37f, 436 h. o f Dasein’s facticity: H. 72 n. i h. o f empathy H. 125 h. o f the A oyor H . 25 psychological hermeneutics: H. 398 hermeneutical “ as” : H. 158^ 223 h. discussion o f the Cartesian onto­ logy o f the ‘world’ : H. 89, 95101 (Section 21) h. conditions etc.: H. 272 n. vi h. Situation: H. 232f, 235, 304, 310315 (Section 63), 397 !hero: *Held H. 37». 385 hide: bergen (lurk; harbour; etc.); *verbergen; Versteck, ver­ stecken (H. 124, 273) H . 33, 36, 219, 222, et passim fhistorian: *Historiker H . 152, 393f, 396 (Note: cf. also H .

4ooff.)

■)■Historical: historisch (ftn. H. 397) H. 399-403 (Yorck) historical: historicality: !geschichtlich, Geschichts-, *Geschichdichkeit (ftn. H . 10) (df. H . 375, 378, 381,

385O

H . 10, 19-22, 38, 197, 234f, 332f, 36if, 372-404 (II, V ), 4ogf, 415, 417, 417 n. v, 435 world-historical: weltgeschichtlich (See entry below.)

fhistoricism: *Historismus H • 396 !historicity: *Historizität (ftn. H. 10, 20) H. 20 historiology, historiological: Historie, historisch (df. H . 375, 378, 392, 394, 396) (ftn. H. 10, 397) H. 10, 2of, 38f, 45f, i52f, 235, 247, 332. 36«. 375-377, 379-382 (Section 73), 386, 389, 392-397 (Section 76), 398, 415, 418

Being and Time

542

•fhistorize: geschehen {ftn. H . 19, 371, 384 {df. H . 375) H . i g f . 371378-382 80, 222, 252f, 255, 271, 277, 296, 346 the ‘if— then’ : das “ wenn-so” _H . 359 till-humour: *Missmut (ftn. H. 134) H . 134 illumine, illuminate: erhellen; *erleu­ chten; *einleuchten H. 133 (erleuchten), 351 (Erhellung) 1‫־‬Illusion: *Illusion illusion: Schein

543

‫׳‬ (■immanent: *immanent H. 9, 136, 144, 181, 216, 326 immediate: *unmittelbar H.

3 » 3 9 4 3 3 - 4 3 5 «430 33«. 335, 350, 390 o f what one’s drive and will are out for: H. 210 i. Being-ahead-of-oneself: H. 195 f indeterminate immediate: *unbes­ i. Being-in-the-world: H. 179 timmte Unmittelbare i. Being-towards-death :H . 252, 259^ H. 3 (Hegel) 264, 373 indicate: anzeigen, Anzeige; zeigen; i. Being-a-whole: H. 331 *indizieren, *Indikation, Index i. disclosedness: H . 325, 331 (ftn. H. 77) i. everydayness: H. 178 H. 77-82, 215 ,etpassim i. existence: H. 232, 328, 376, 387, fIndifferent, Indifference: indifferent, 410, 425, 436 Indifferenz i. future: H . 337, 343, 347 (ftn. H. 42) i. having-been: H. 339, 345 i. historicality: H . 376, 387, 3gof, 396 H. 43» 53. J2i, i23f, 160, 169, 192, 194, 2o8f, 212, 232, 252, 263, i. interpretation: H. 281, 331 270,283,295,323,331,337,352, i. possibilities o f concern: H. 347 i. potentiality-for-Being-a-whole: H. 389 (Note: this list includes all passages tn 331 which the German expressions have i. Present: H. 338, 347 been translated by ,undifferentiated', i. Self: H. 181, 332 ‘without further differentiation', i. temporality: H. 326, 329, 331, 341,

424

i. “ they” : H . 179, 332 i. they-self: H. 181, 303 i. time: H. 329 i. understanding: H. 146, 148, 254, 326, 337-339 inconspicuous: *unauffällig (See conspicuous.) inconstancy: Unständigkeit (See constant.) fincorruption: *Unverdorbenheit H. 180 f indebtedness; *Verschuldung But cf. are indebted to (verdanken, 399 n. xiv) H. 284, 287f, 290-293, 300, 306 n. ii> 307 indefiniteness: Unbestimmtheit o f the call o f conscience: H. 273f,

278f o f the caller: H. 274f, 280 o f death and its “ when” : H. 253, 258-260, 263, 265, 308 o f that in the face o f which one is anxious: H. i86f o f Dasein’s potentiality-for-Being: H. 298, 308 o f resoluteness: H. 298

etc.) findifferent: *gleichgültig (ftn. H. 42, 255, 429) H. 42, 121, i23f, 134, 144, 175, 243f, 254f, 265, 280, 342, 345, 352, 358, 361, 386, 42gf (Hegel) •findignant: ungehalten (ftn. H . 347) H . 174»

347

individual, individuality: einzeln (*single; particular, H. 399); *individuell (H. 395); *In ­ dividualität (H. 403) ■)■individualize: *vereinzeln (ftn. H . 142) H. 39, 142, 187-189, 191, 263-266, 276f, 280, 307, 310, 322, 336, 339, 343 ■findividuation: *Individuation H. 38 infer: schliessen, Schluss; folgern; entnehmen; erschliessen (H.

318) (ftn. H. 75, 315) finfinite, infinity: unendlich, *Unend­ lichkeit (ftn. H. 330) H. 92f, 33of, 424f, 427 n. xiu

Index of English Expressions

545

■fin-finite, in‫־‬finitude: *un-endlich, Interpret, Interpretation: *interpre­ *Un-endlichkeit tieren, *Interpretation (ftn . H. 330) (ftn . H. 1) (df. H. 130, 150, 232, 331) interpret, interpretation: auslegen, H. 33of *Auslegung information: Kenntnis; Aufschluss; (ftn . H. 1, 148, 149, 409) (df. H. 62, *Auskunft; *Nachricht; Kunde 148, 149, 150, 23lf) H. 9, 52, 148, 272f, 280, 287, et passim H. 148-160 (Sections 32,33), et passim ■finhood; *Inheit interrogate: *befragen H. 53 H. 5F, 8, I3f, 41, 56, et passim inner, inside, inward: inner, *inner­ lich; *innen, *Innen-; *in­ !intervene: einspringen (ftn . H. 100) wendig; innig (H. 216) H. 100 H. 31, 56. 60, 62, 101, 132, i36f, 188, f intuit, intuition: anschauen; *Wesens­ 203-206, 216, 273, 364. 389, schau (intuition of essences, H. 401 ( Yorck), 435 (Hegel) ■finner experience: *innere Erfahrung ' 47 ) B ut cf. intuitionists (*Intuition­ H. 204 ismus, H. 9), intuitive (*intuitiv, ■finner life: *Innenleben H. 273 H. 37) (ftn . H. 27, 402) ■finner sense: *innerer Sinn anschauen: H. 203 forms o fi.: H. 31, 367 finner sphere: *Innensphäre, *in­ objects of i . : H. 30, 215, 358 nere Sphäre i. o f R eality: H. 202 H. 60, 62 i. o f space: H. 112 fBeing inside: *Innensein i. as care: H. 193 H. 60 limitations o f pure beholding: H. flnsideness: *Inwendigkeit H. 56, 101, 132, 188 1 35! 138, 341 voftv as beholding: H. 96, 171 inquire: fragen Hegel on i.: H. 43of, 433f H. 5, 7-11, 2of, 38, et passim Husserl on i . : H. 363 n. xxiii !insignificance; lacking significance: Kanton i.: H. 3of, 215, 358, 367 *Unbedeutsamkeit; *Bedeu­ Yorck on i . : H . . 402 tungslosigkeit (H. 273) (N ote: this list also includes all H. i86f, 273, 343 passages in which ‘ anschauen’ is finspect: nachsehen; *beschauen (H. translated as ‘ behold’ .) 146); *Zusehen (H. 81) invoke: berufen (ftn . H. 123) finvolve, involvement: *bewenden, H. 355, 358 *Bewandtnis t intelligible: *verständlich (ftn . H. 84) (ftn . H. 151) H. 80, 83-88 (Section 18), ggf, 103^ H. 4, 59, 81, 86, 151-153, 161-165, 110-112, 117, 123, 129, 140, i68f, 209, 220, 271, 324, 225, 144, 148-150, 158, 186, 210, 366, 368f, 405, 408, 410, 412 261, 297, 300, 343, 353-357, (Note: this list also includes the passages 3 5 9 3 6 ‫־‬i , 364, 368, 412 in which ‘ unintelligible’ and ‘ un­ firrationalism: *Irrationalismus intelligibility occur.) H. 136 fintend: *intendieren firresoluteness: *Unentschlossenheit (ftn . H. 5) H. 299, 308, 322, 336, 330f, 384, 390, H. 5, 94, 295, 390 410 tintent (adj. ) : gespannt f isolate: *isolieren H. 175, 2 6 if (ftn . H. 142) !,intention, intentional: *intentional isolated “ I ” or subject: H. 116, 118, 17g, 188, ig2f, 204, 206, 298, 321 H • 48363 ‫( ־‬n• xxiii) SeealsoYL. ig ,8 2 ,247,344,352^388 interconnection: Zusammenhang

Being and Time

546 issue: *es geht um . . . (ftn . H. 8) {df. H. 191, 192) f i t ’ calls: *“ es” ruft (ftn . H. 275) H. 275-277 item•: Moment item o f equipment: Zeug {ftn . H. 68)

fjo y: Freude H. 310, 345 judgm ent: *Urteil, *urteilen, *beur­ teilen B ut cf. verurteilen (condemn, H. 185) j. and assertion: H. 32, 153, 214, 224, 226 j. and the copula: H. 159, 349 j. and binding: H. 32, 159 j. and knowing etc.: H. 210 (Scheler), 213, 2 i6 f j. and Aoyor: H. 32 j. and the “ they” : H. 127 j. and truth: H. 33, 214, 226 j. and validity: H. i5 5 f covert judgments: H. 4 {Kant), 23 (Kant)

theoretical judgments :H . 157 acts vs. content of j.: H. 156, 2 i6 f See also H. 204 (Kant), 224 (Kant), 273• fthe “just-always-already-alongside : *das Nur-immer-schon-sein-bei (ftn . H. 195) H. 195 the ‘just as’ : das “ So— W ie” H. 216, 218 (C f. also H. 219, 222) •fthe ‘just now’ : *das “ soeben” H. 407, 424 fjust-present-at-hand-and-no-more: *nur noch vorhanden (ftn . H. 74) H. 73, 81, 88, 238 fkeep silent: schweigen H. 161, i64f, 273, 296, 323 know, knowledge: erkennen, Erkenntnis *wissen; kennen, Kenntnis; etc. B ut cf. make known (bekunden; *kundgeben, *K undgabe; ankün­ digen); well-known (bekannt) (ftn . H. 25, 36, 123, 124, 146)

erkennen, Erkenntnis: (Note: this list also includes several passages in which these words have been translated as ‘ cognize’ , ‘ cogni­ tion’ ,, etc., but not those in which they have been translated as ‘ recog­ nize’ .) k/c (in general) : H. 71, 134, 138, i7of, 324, et passim

k/c o f Nature: H. 152 k/c o f the present-at-hand (See theoretical k/c.) k/c o f the R e a l: H. 202 k/c o f the Self: H. 146 k/c o f space: H . 111 k/c o f the world (See know the world.) k/c and intuition: H. 258, 363 n. xxiii k/c, judgment, and truth: H. 210, 215-219, 228 k/c and making-present: H. 363 n. xxiii k/c and mood: H. 134, 136 k/c and understanding: H . 143, 356 historiological k/c: H. 392 perceptual k/c: H. 67 rigorous k/c: H. 152 scientific k/c: H. 28, 152, 324 theoretical k/c: H. 69, 136, 166, 335, 352, 356364‫( ־‬Section 69b) theory o f knowledge (See epistemology.) Augustine on k/c: H. 171 Descartes on k/c: H. 95f, 100 Kant on k/c: H . 215, 358 Scheler on k/c: H. 210 wissen: k. o f death: H. 251, 258, 425 k. o f distances: H. 106 k. o f entities encountered: H. 58 k. o f space: H . 368 k. o f what one is capable of: H. 144, 270, 336 k. and acquaintance, H. 155 k. and curiosity: H. 172 k. and mood: H. 134-136 k. and the Other: H. 174 Scheler on k.: H. 210, 210 n. xix kennen, Kenntnis: H. 36, I24f, 169, 178, 252, 300, 330, 367, 401, 425, et passim (See also acquaintance, informa' tion, take cognizance.) fknow oneself: *Sichkennen (ftn . H. 124) H. i24f

Index o f English Expressions •fknow

the world: *Welterkennen, *das Erkennen der Welt H . 58, 59-62 (Section 13), 65, 67,

131» 138 lack: Mangel, mangeln, mangelhaft, ermangeln; fehlen; U n-; etc. !,Mangeln, mangeln, mangelhaft, ermangeln: (df. H . 283) H . 16, 113, 233, 260, 269, 282f, 285f, 291, 336, 374 ffehlen: H. 4 ,9,39 ,8 2,163,179,20 2 , 233. 243» 256, 328 tU n -: Unbestimmtheit: lacking significance: H . 186 Unfreiheit: lack o f freedom: H. 312 Unganzheit: lack o f totality: H. 236, 242, 244, 259 Ungestimmtheit: lack o f mood: H. 134. 345. 37 ! Unkenntnis: lack o f acquaintance: H . 146 unverständig: lacking in underStanding: H. 219 Unverständnis: lack o f underStanding: H . 195, 207 Unzusammen: lack of togetherness: H. 242f, 40gf (Note: as these entries indicate, we have used the word 1lack' much more freely than Heidegger’s discussion on H . 283 strictly warrants.)

language: *Sprache; Sprach-; sprachlieh; etc. (ftn . H . 25) (df. H . 160, 161) H . 9, 87, 119, 133, 157, 160-167 (Section 34), 272, 349, 369, 406 last (verb): *dauern H . 391, 409 the “ later” : das Später H . 327, 421 the “ later on” : das “ Späterhin” H . 407, 409 fla w : *Gesetz H . 10, 47, 226f, 282f, 293, 361, 395 flaw-breaking: *Rechtsverletzung H . 282f fla y open: *aufschliessen ( ftn . H. 75) ., H . 75, 359 f la y out: auslegen (H. 409); anlegen (H. 104); *herauslegen (H. 150) (ftn . H . 149, 409)

547

fleap after: *nachspringen (ftn . H. 347) H•

347. 369

fleap ahead: *vorausspringen (ftn . H. 122) H. 122 fleap away: entspringen; abspringen (H. 262) H. 347f, 350 (ftn . H. 347, 348) (Note: cf. also H . 427, et passim.)

fleap forth and liberate: *vorspringend-befreiend (ftn . H. 122) H. 122, 298 !leap in: einspringen (ftn . H. 100, 122) H. 122 fleew ay: *Spielraum (ftn . H. 368) H. 107, 145, 355, 368f let be: sein lassen H. 84f, 345, 354 let be encountered: begegnen lassen (ftn . H. 328, 329) (df. H. 137, 366) H. 85f, 111, 137. 326, 328, 346, 354, 356 ‫־‬

366. 4°8

flet be involved: *bewenden lassen (ftn . H. 84) (df. H. 84f, 353fr) H. 84-86, 1 lof, 353-356 •flet be seen: *sehen lassen H. 32-35, 44, 63, i54f, 158, 213, 2i8f, 360 let come towards oneself: * au f sich zukommen lassen (See come towards.) level: *Niveau; etc. f level down: *einebnen H. i2 7 f flevel off: *nivellieren H. 88, 158, 194, 220, 253, 329, 405, 422, 424-426, 43if, 432 n. xxx,

435

■ fliberate: *befreien H. 113, 122, 165, 264, 288, 298, 303,

344

■(•liberty o f indifference: *Gleichgül­ tigkeit der Willkür H. 144 flie ahead o f: *vorlagern (ftn . H. 259, 264, 302) H. 259, 264, 302 life, living; Leben, leben, etc. B ut cf. livelihood (*Fortkommen) (ftn . H. 46, 58) (df. H. 46, 50, 58)

Being and Time

548

life— cont. that which has life (Lebewesen, Lebendiges, Lebendes, Nur­ lebendes): H. 10, 25, 48, 50, 97» «65, 194, 240, 247, 346, 377 life and care: H. 198 (Hyginus) life and death: H. 104, 238, 240, 245247, 249 n. vi, 316 (See also connectedness o f life.) life and historicality: H . 401 (Torek) life and historiology: H. 396 (Nietzsche)

life and language: H. 163 life and philosophy: H . 402 (Torek) life and Reality: H . 212 life and the “ they” : H . 177 life, curiosity, and idle talk: H. 173 life as a business: H . 28g the full and genuine ‘life’ : H. 177 f the inner life (*Innenleben): H . 273 fth e cares o f life (*Lebenssorge): H.

57

the connectedness o f life (See con­ nectedness.) the philosophy o f life: H . 46,48, 398, 403

the science o f life (biology): H . gf, 28, 49 living (in general): H. 194 flivin g along (*dahinleben): H. 345,

405

‘living’ away from oneself: H . 179 ‘living* concretely: H . 178 living in a m yth: H. 313 living in an understanding o f Being: H. 4

flivin g on (*fordeben): H. 247 flivin g unto the day (*in den T a g hieninleben): H. 37of fliving-through (*Er-leben): H . 47 (Schein) the urge ‘to live’ : H . ig s f getting lived by one’s world: H. ig s f getting lived by the ambiguity of publicness: H. 299 Dilthey on life: H. 46, 2ogf, 249 n. vi,

398

.

Torek on life: H . 400-402

light: Licht; Helle; leicht; etc. B u t cf. light up (*aufleuchten) (ftn . H . 133, 360) Licht: H . 28, 350f, 35g, 412f, et passim

Helle: H. 28 leicht: H . 36of

fligh t up: *aufleuchten H. 72, 75f, 83, 343 fliken: angleichen (fin . H . 214) H. 153, 214, 219, 393 (Note: this list includes a ll passages in which ‘angleichen’ has been trans­ lated as ‘assimilate’ .)

flimit-situation: *Grenzsituation H. 249 n. vi, 301 n. vi, 308, 349 flink: *verketten; *verknüpfen; *knüpfen H . 33» 159» 202, 268, 388, 390, 417 f liquidate: beheben (*obviate, *remedy) (ftn . H . 236, 300) H . 236, 242 flisten: hören; *abhören; *hinhören; *zuhören (ftn . H . 271) f listen (*zuhören): H. 164 flisten away (*hinhören): H. 271 f listen in (*abhören): H . 139, 175 flisten to (*hören a u f. . .): H . 163, 168, 271, 275 lit up (See light up.) literature: *Literatur H. 10, 127, 397 live (See life.) flocation, locus, local, locative: *O rt, *örtlich (ftn . H . 44) location o f Dasein: H . 132, 368, 417f, 424 location o f the present-at-hand: H. 54» 36 i f spatial location: H. 54, 119, 132, 299, 416-418, 428 (Aristotle) change o f location: H. 91, 97, 389 locative expressions: H . 119 locus in a system: H. 428f locus o f language: H. 166 locus o f the problem o f history: H.

375

locus o f the problem of historicality: H . 377 locus o f truth: H . 33, 154, 214, 226 logic, logical: *Logik, *logisch H. 2f, i of, 129, 143, 152, 157-160, 165, 2i4f, 285, -315, 319, 35 375» 398f>432 n. xxx, 433, 437 flongevity: *Lebensdauer H. 246, 246 n. v look: See entries below. fabsehen (look away): H. 361

Index o f English Expressions look— cont. •fsich ausnehmen wie . . . (look like . . .) H. 398 ■ f*Ausschau halten (look out for): H. 153 •faussehen: H. 28-30, 42, 61, 63, 69, 73 . 135 . »38, i 72 f. 222, 346, 403 (Note: this list also includes the one passage in which ‘Aussehen’ is translated as ‘ outward appearance’ — viz. H . 6g.)

Blick, *Durchblick, *Blickweite, Hinblick, *hinblicken, *rückblicken: see passim. ■f*hinsehen, *Hin-sicht: H. 7, 33, 61, 69,73.79 «‫״‬2 ,119 ,13 5 ,13 8 ,14 1 , 149, 158, 220, 264, 335^ 351 , 357

‫■(־‬pflegen (look after): H . 54, 56 sehen: H. 67, 71, 416 fsuchen: H . 278, 423 t*öb ersch au (look over) : H. 358 f*umsehen (look around): H. 336,

358 f*wegsehen (look away): H. 119, 26 if, 347, 424 lose, loss: verlieren (waste, H. 157); Verlust (go, H. 56); *verlustig gehen; etc. lose its aroundness: H. 112 lose its basis: H. 119 lose its Being: H. 176, 239 lose the Being o f one’s “ there” : H. 237

lose one’s Being-in-the-world: H. 236, 238 lose its equipmental character: H. 361 lose its force: H . 127 lose its genuineness: H . 142 lose its indigenous character: H . 36 lose its involvement-character: H. 112 lose one’s life: H . 235, 238 lose oneself: H . 42, 76, 116, 124, 128, 177. >79. >95. 253, 265, 3 !2. 3 4 4 . 34 8 f, 369, 39 ° lose its readiness-to-hand: H. 73f lose its sign-character: H. 81 lose one’s time: H. 404,410, 418,425 lost in what is encountered withinthe-world: H . 76 lost in equipment: H . 354, 422 lost in everydayness: H. 263

549

lost in factual circumstances: H . 265 lost in irresoluteness: H. 308 lost in just-always-already-alongside: H. 195 lost in the making-present o f the “ to-day” : H. 391 lost in possibilities which thrust themselves upon one: H. 264 lost in publicness: H. 175, 271 lost in something with which one is concerned: H. 277, 289, 312, 34 4 . 422, 424 lost in the “ they” : H. 175, 177, 189, 253. 268, 271, 274, 287, 289,

297.

299. 3° 7f. 383. 390

lost in the they-self: H. 263, 266 lost in the world o f equipment: H. 354 lost in one’s ‘world’ : H. 221, 277,

3 *2, 348f

lost hearing: H . 271 lost making-present: H. 355, 369 lost Present: H . 345 (See also H. 119, 166, 277, 348, 390,

4 ° 7)

■flove: *Liebe H. 190 n. iv f loyalty: *Treue H . 385. 391

‫־¡־‬lust o f the eyes: *Augenlust H. 171 •fmagic: *M agie; *Zauberei H. 81, 247, 313 maintain: halten, erhalten, durch­ halten, festhalten; etc. (ftn . H. 256) ■fmake certain: *sich vergewissern (ftn . H. 291) H. 265, 291, 293 make determinate: bestimmen H. 62 fm ake history: *Geschichte machen H. 378 make known: *bekunden; *kundgeben, Kundgabe; ankündigen make one’s own: aneignen (appro­ priate) 289, H. 15, 21, 62, 71, 171, 220, 226, 377, 386, 396-398 (N ote: this list also includes all passages in which ,aneignen’ is translated as ‘ appropriate’ .)

•(•make present: *gegenwärtigen (ftn . H. 326, 347, 359) (df. H. 328,

338, 366)

Being and Time

55°

make present— eont. H. 26, 326-328, 338f, 342, 344, 346350 . 353 *357 . 359 >". 363, 3 ^ 3 ‫•״‬ xxin, 365^ 369, 381, 391, 406410, 413^ 416-418, 420-422, 425 fm ake public: veröffentlichen H . 411,414^417-420, 423 (Note: this list also includes all passages in which ‘ veröffentlichen’ is trans­ lated as ‘give a public character’ , but not those in which it is trans­ lated as ‘publish' or ‘publication’ .)

fm ake room: *einräumen ( ftn . H. 111,368) H . i n , 299, 368f fm ake unpresent: *ungegenwärtigen H. 355 make up, go to make up: ausmachen (constitute; establish; etc.) B ut cf. make up for (nachholen, 268, 406); help make up (mitmachen, H. 176). make use (See use.) m an : Mensch (human, etc.) man’s Being: H. 25, 45, 48f man’s Being towards God: H. 10, 190 n. iv man’s good: H. 199 man’s spatiality: man’s substance: H. 117, 212, 314 man’s transcendence: H. 49 man as rational animal: H. 48f, 165, 183» 197

man as the entity which talks: H. 165 man as unity o f body, soul, spirit: H. 48, 117, 198 man as made in G od’s image: H. 48f man as the ,subject’ o f events: H . 379 man as an *atom’ in world-history: H. 382 man and Dasein: H. 25, 46, 182 man and the world: H. 57, 105, 152 man and the environment: H . 57 man and the lumen naturale: H. 133 Aristotle on man: H. 171 Calvin on m an: H . 49 Dilthey on man: H. 398 Hyginus on man: H . ig8 f Seneca on man: H. 199 Zw ingli on man: H . 49 See also H . 51, 54, 60, 97, 120, 176, 179, 198, 203, 246, 371, 379, 382, 396, 400f, 425. (N ote: this list also includes the principal passages in which the word

'human' has been used in translating ‘ M ensch', ‘ menschlich’ , or the prefix ‘ Menschen-’ . In view o f Heidegger’s insistence in H . 4 6 that the term ‘ Mensch' is to be avoided, these passages are o f interest.) manage: vorstehen (H. 143); etc. (ftn . H. 143)

manifest: *offenbar, offenbaren; *Machtäusserung (H. 275); *Lebensmanifestation (H. 402) manifold: mannigfaltig; mannigfach; vielfältig f manipulate, manipulable: *hantieren; handlich hantieren: H. 33, 61, 67, 69, 102, 352 -354 , 3 5 7 3 6 ‫־‬i handlich: H. 68f, 73, 78, io8f, 127, 288, 355, 414, 418 (Note: this list includes all passages in which 'handlich' and its deriva­ tives occur. 1See our glossary entry.)

fm anual: handlich (H. 109); Hand­ buch (H. 9) material: materiell, material, Material; Geschichtsstoff (H. 400) f materiell: H. 47 n. ii, g8f, 238 fm aterial: H. 68, 293f, 320 n. xix fM aterial: H. 73, 320 n. xix, 366, 394 . fmathematics: *Mathematik H . 9, 63, 65, 88, 95f, 153, 362, 402 matter (noun): *M aterie; etc. f*M aterie: H . 10, 91, 362 (Note: the noun ‘ matter’ has been used informally in translating many other expressions.) matter (verb): angehen, *Angänglichkeit; etc.

H. 106, 12if, I 37 • ^ , 14 1» >7 ° maturity (See bring to maturity.) meaning: Sinn (ftn . H. 1, 137, 151) (df. H . 151153 . «56 , } 61, 324) meaning o f Being: *Seinssinn, *Sinn des Seins, *Sinn von Sein meaningful: *sinnvoll (H. 151) meaningless: *sinnlos (H. 151) unmeaning: *unsinnig (H. 152) give meaning: *Sinn geben (H. 324f) have meaning: *Sinn haben H. 151, 154, 221, 324, 348, 361 (Note: while the noun ‘ meaning' has been reserved fo r ‘ Sinn’ , the verb ‘ mean’ has been used informally to

Index o f English Expressions meaning— cont. translate 'meinen’ , 'heissen’ , sagen’ , ‘sagen’ , etc.)

‘ be­

measure, measurement: Mass, messen, ausmessen; metrisch; etc. B ut cf. measure up (genügen); cut to the measure (zugeschnitten). (df- H . 4 17f.) m. o f space and spatial distances: H. i02f, iosf, 11 of, 369 m. o f time: H. 71, 404, 413-415, 417-419 See also H. 68, 262, 358, 417 n. iv. (Note: the German expressions listed and their derivatives are often translated informally in other ways.) •{•mechanics: *Mechanik (H. 429, Hegel) B u t cf. fm echanical (*mechanisch, H. 400, Yorck', *handwerklich,

H. 394)

•[,mechanistic: *mechanistisch (H. 402, Yorck) B u t c f *mechanism (*Mechanismus,

H. 10; *Getriebe, H. 382) (ftn . H. 402)

■fmedical: *medizinisch H. 241, 247 medieval ontology H. 3, 25, 40, 93f metaphysics: *Metaphysik H. 2, 2 if, 56, 59, 248, 293, 40i f (Yorck), 433 n. xxx method, methodology, methodological, methodical: *Methode, *meth­ odisch, *Methodologie (H. 38, 398), *M ethodik (H. 202); W eg

(H55 ‫)־‬

(df. H . 303)

H. 2, 27-39 (Section 7), 49, 66f, 131, i39> 156» >6o, 182, 185, 190, 202, 205 n. x v (Dilthey), 208, 215, 230, 248, 255 n. xiii, 280, 301-305 (Section 61), 309, 310316 (Section 63), 324, 332, 387» 393> 398 (Dilthey), 3ggf (Yorck), 402 (Yorck) mine, fmineness: meines, *Jemeinigkeit H - 4 I53 ,43‫ >־‬i i 4 ‫ ־‬n 6 , 118, 191,228, 232, 240, 253, 278, 424f t misgivings: *Bangigkeit H. 142, 345 wiss: fehlen (lack; absence; etc.), verfehlen (fail; etc.); *vermissen

55

1

fehlen: ( d f H. 12of, 283, 355)

73. 75. i2of, 191, 242f, 283, 353. 355. 407. 422

H.

(Note: see also our entryfo r ‘ lack’ above, and c f I i . 24, 49f , 5 5 , 149, 203, 216 , 273, 3 3 9 , 3 5 7 , where fehlen’ has been translated in other ways.) verfehlen: H. 130, et passim

vermissen: (df. H. 73, 355) H.

mode,

73. 294. 355

modal, modify: *Modus, *modal, *modifizieren (ftn . H. 20, 59) fmoment, moment o f vision: *Augenvlick; *momentweise (H. 292) (ftn . H. 328, 338) B ut cf. momentary (*momentan, H.

374. 423. 43°)•

•fmoment: H. 142, 165, 172, 258,

3° 8, 39 1. 425

fmoment of vision: H. 328, 338, 338 n. iii, 344f, 347, 349f, 371, 385^. 391f. 397. 410, 427 fmonument: *Denkmal H . 78.

394

fmonumental: *monumentalisch, *monumental H. 3g6f (Nietzsche) fm ood: *Stimmung; gestimmt (attuned) (ftn . H. 134, 344) H . 134-139, 142,148,162,169,190, 25if, 265, 270, 276f, 284, 310, 335, 339- 346, 371 (Note: this list includes the passages in which ‘gestimmt’ and its derivatives have been translated by form s o f ‘ attune’ or ‘ have a mood’ .)

fb a d mood: *Verstimmung: H. 134, 136 flack o f mood: *Ungestimmtheit: H . 134,

345. 37 '

moon: *M ond 362, H. 243 fm oral: *moralisch, etc. ; *sittlich, etc. H. 167, 282, 286, 288, 293, 295 fm ortal: *sterblich H . 199 most part (See for the most part.) fm otion: Bewegung, sich bewegen (H.

419)

H. 10, 91, 178, 180, 362, 375, 388f, 392, 419, 532 n. xxx, 435

Being and. Time

552

m o v e: b ew egen; rü c k e n ; -rä u m e n ; etc.

fm ove a ro u n d : u m räu m en (re­ arran g e, H . 109): H . i i i , 368 fm o v e out o f the w ay : w egräum en (clear aw ay, H . 129): H . 111, 308, 368 fm o v em en t: *B ew egtheit; B ewegung; R ich tu n g (H . 38, 47) *B ew egtheit: H . 134, 177-180, 348, 374f, 388 n. ix, 389 Bew egung: H . 9, 91, 97, 109, 421 (Aristotle), 421, 428 (Aristotle), 435

m u ltiplicity: M annigfaltigkeit; V iel­ fältigkeit (H . 322); *V ielheit (H . 429) H . 3, i02f, 110, 112, 164, 203, 362, 417, 429, et passim fm y th : *M ythos H . 51 n. xi, 313 N atu re, n a tu ra l: * N atu r, *natü rlich (df. H . 65) *N atu r, *N atu rH . 9-11, 18, 25, 47 n . ii, 48, 60, 63, 65, 70f, 89, 95, 98-100, to6, 112, i44f, 152, 165, 179, 199, 211, 3 6 1 - 3 6 3 3 8 8 .388 ix, 398-400, 401 (Yorck), 404, 4 i2 f, 415, 417 n. iv, 418, 428 (Aristotle ) ; 429, 431, 432 n. xxx, 434 (Hegel) fn a tu ra l history: * N aturgeschichte: H . 388 f n a tu ra l science: *N aturw issen­ schaft: H . 63, 362, 398, 400 (Yorck)

f environing N a tu re : * U m w e ltn atu r: H . 71, 381, 413 f T h in g o f N a tu re : * N a tu rd in g : H . 48, 63, ggf, 211 (Note: while 1Natur’ has been trans­ lated either as ‘Nature’ or as 1natural’ , ‘natürlich’ has been trans­ lated only as ‘ natural’ . The word ‘nature’ has been used informally to translate other expressions.)

f n a tu ra lis tic : *naturalistisch H . 47 n. ii, 320 n. xix necessity: N otw endigkeit H . 143, 214, 226, 228f, et passim fn e g a te , n eg atio n : *negieren, N egation (deny, H . 22g) H . 22, 207, 229, 286, 429-435 (Hegel)

negative: *negativ; p rohibitiv (H . 260) H . 15g, 248, 286, 42gf (Hegel), 433f (Hegel)

n eo -K an tian epistem ology H . 215 fn e v e r dw elling any w h ere: *Aufenthaltlosigkeit new : neu (*novelty, H . 172; etc.) H . 174, 2 7 1 ,3 4 6 , 348, 3gi no longer: n ic h t m eh r f no - longer - being -able- to- be- th e r e : N icht-m ehr-dasein-können: H . 250 (ftn . H . 250) fn o -longer-B eing-there: H . 236 (C f. H . 381 , 393) fn o longer D asein (ftn . H . 250) H . 237f, 240, 242, 330 fn o -lo n g er-n o w : *nicht-m ehr-jetzt H . 327, 421, 424 f n o w -no-longer: * jetzt n ich t m eh r H . 380, 406, 421 fn o longer p resen t-a t-h a n d : H . 374, 378, 380 f B eing-no-longer-in-the-w orld: H . 176, 238, 240 See also H . 3 7 3 , 4 3 o f (Hegel), et passim. .379 .377 ‫ ־‬n.

nobody: * N iem and H . 128, 177, 253, 268, 278, 425 n o o n e: kein er; etc. H . i2 7 f th e “ n o t” ; *das N ich t H . 2g, 283-286 fn o tn ess; *N ich th eit H . 285f fn o t-B ein g : *N ichtsein H . 170, 243, 431 (Hegel), 434 (Hegel) f n o t rig h t aw ay : *vorläufig noch n ic h t H . 255, 258 n o t y e t: noch n ich t (ftn . H . 25g) H . 1 4 5 ,2 4 2 -2 4 6 ,2 5 0 ,25g, 317,325, 347. 373. 380, 393f43 «427 ‫־‬of (Hegel), et passim

f th e “ not-yet-now ” : *das N ochn ich t-je tz t: H . 327, 421, 424,

427

f th e “ now -not-yet” : *das Je tz tn o ch -n ich t: H . 406, 30g, 421 fB eing-not-yet: *N och-nicht-sein: H . 237, 246 f n o t y et p resen t-at-h a n d : H . 144, 237» 243. 374

Index o f English Expressions

553

‫)־‬,O b je c t: * O b jek t n o th in g : nichts; etc. {ftn . H . 363) {df. H . 363) H . 43 ‫ ־‬ia 8 > 186-189, 266, 273, 276f, O . and ju d g m e n t: H . 156, 216 279 , 3°8, 343, 352, 431 {Hegel), et passim J O . and su b ject: H . sgf, 156, 176, 179, 192, 204, 208, 216, 219, 366, 388 fn o v elty : das N eue (new ) {Note: cf. also H . 3 16 .) H . 172 O and w o rld : H . 60, 179, 203, 366 n ow : je tz t; etc. O . o f historiology, e tc .: H . 10, 375^ H . 325, 33 8> 338, n. iii, 373, 378, 392 , 397 ‫ ־‬4 01 406-411, 414, 416-418, 421-427, o b ject: * G eg en stand ; etc. 430-432, 432, n . xxx •fnow -here: * Jetzt-h ier: H . 421, 430 now -no-longer {See n o longer.) now -not-yet (See n o t yet.) fn o w -p o in t: * Je tz t-P u n k t: H . 430 now t h a t : je tz t, d a . . . {ftn . H . 408) H . 406-408, 4 io f, 414, 422 fnow-time: *Jetzt-zeit: H . 421, 423, 426 fju st now : *soeben: H . 407, 424 no-longer-now {See n o longer.) not-yet-now {See n o t yet.) ‫•(־‬multiplicity o f “ now s” : * Jetztm an ­ n igfaltigkeit: H . 417 say “ now ” : *Jetzt-sagen: H . 406, 408, 416, 418, 421 fsequence o f “ now s” : *Jetztfolge, *Folge d er J e tz t: H . 329, 373, 422-426, 4 3 if fs tre a m o f “ now s” : *Jetztfluss: H . 410, 436 n ow here: *nirgends H . 175, 177 , 186-188,347 f n u ll: nichtig B ut c f an n u l (tilgen, H . 434); nullify (vernichten, H . 61, 131) {ftn . H . 284) {df. H . 285, 343) H . 23, 178, 206, 219, 237, 283-288, 3 ° 5 f> 308, 325, 330 , 343 f, 348 {Note: this list also includes those passages in which ‘ nichtig’ is trans­ lated as ‘ nugatory’ and ‘ count fo r nothing’ .) n u m b er {noun): * Z a h l; *A nzahl (H .

125, 4 0 9 ); *M asszahl (H . 41 7 ); etc.

Z a h l: H . 215, 418, 432 n . (Bergson) t n u m e ra l: *N um m er H . 125 ■(,n u m eratio n : *G eschichtszahl torical n u m eratio n , H . 418 !,n u m erical: *zahlenm ässig (H . 418); * zahlhaft (H . 18)

xxx

(his­ n . v) 412,

{Note: the word ‘ object’ has often been used informally in translating substantivized participles such as ‘ das Besorgte'— ‘ the object o f con­ cern’ — etc.)

G e g e n sta n d : o. o f a n assertion: H . 157 o. o f co n cern : H . 238 o. o f historiology, etc.: H . 152, 375 ‫ ־‬380 , 392-395 o. o f ju d g m e n t: H . 214, 224, 273 o. o f know ing: H . 60, 215 {Kant), 218 o. o f m a th e m a tic s: H . 9 o. o f p h enom enology: H . 34-36 o. o f a science: H . gf, 238, 361 o. to b e disclosed: H . 232, 303 p erson as o.: H . 4 7 f (Scheler), 114 Kant on o.: H . 215, 224 Scheler o n o . : H . 47f, 210 fO b jectify : *objektivieren; *objicieren (H . 41g) H . 48, 82, 363, 375f, 378, 381, 4 i9 f ■(•Objective: *objektiv (df. H . 395, 41g) O . B eing: H . 64 O . d istan ce: H . 106 O bjectively a c tu a l: H . 272 n . vi (Stoker)

O bjectively ‘th e re ’ : H . 38g O bjectively v a lid : H . 156 O b jectivity and subjectivity: H . 278, 326, 366, 405, 41g O bjectivity o f th e ap p e a l: H . 278 O b jectivity o f historiology: H . 395 O b jectivity o f a science: H . 395 O b jectivity o f tim e: H . 405, 419 O b jectivity o f th e w o rld : H . 366 See also H . 237, 260, 275, 289, 363 ■(,objective: *sachlich H . 11, 21, 27, 45, 98, 122, 265, 333, 377 , observe: b e tra c h te n (consider; stu d y ; con tem p late, H . 21 3 ); *be­ o b ach te n

Being and Time

554

observe— cont. *b eo b ach ten : H . 340, 358, 362, 415 fo b s tin a c y : *Aufsässigkeit ( fin . H . 74) H . 74f, 186, 354 t obtrusiveness: *A ufdringlichkeit ( fin . H . 74)

H. 73-75» 8!» 189, 354. 377

obvious: selbstverständlich (*self-evi­ d e n t); offensichtlich (open, H . 128); etc. occasion, occasionally, o n occasion: *V eranlassung; *gelegentlich; jew eils; zuw eilen; etc. (See also on th a t form er occasion.) f o ccu p y : einnehm en (take in, H . 3 6 8 f); *besetzbar (H . 103) B u t cf. occupation (*Beruf, H . 239) (ftn . H . 368) H . 103, io7f, 413, 416

occur: *Vorkommen ( fin . H . 106) H . 12, 29, 33, 48, 54-56, 63, 6gf, 73, 7g -8 i, 102, 104, 117, 119-121, 125, 128, 154, 170, 173, 177, 179,188, 194, 252-254, 257, 269, 278, 291, 299f, 327, 332, 338, 344 » 367» 384» 4 0 4 f» 4 >9 f t o cu lar: *okular 400 ( Torck), 402 (Yorck) t o n th a t form er occasion: *dam als H . 406-409, 4 2 i f o n th e basis of: a u f d e m G ru n d e (by reason of; because o f ) ; a u f d em B oden; w o ra u fh in (w ith reg a rd to w hich; u p o n w h ich ; w here­ u p o n ; etc.) w o ra u fh in : H . 6, 85^ n o , 143 f o n its w ay: *unterw egs H . 79 to n c e for a ll: *einm alig

H. 395

oncom ing (See com e along.) t ‘one dies’ : “ m a n stirb t” H . 253-255 o n tic a l: *ontisch ( fin . H . 11) H . n - 1 5 (Section 4 ), 19, 43, 92, 63, 94 , 114,‫ ־‬116, 182 , 199, 201 , 266 ,

279» 293» 312» 324» 371» 382,

39gf (Yorck), 402f, et passim ontology, ontological: *O ntologie, *ontologisch (ftn . H . 11, 12) (df. H . 11, 12, 27, 35, 38, 231, 232, 248)

H . 8-11 (Section 3), 12, is f, 27, 43, 52, 94, 116, 182, 199, 201, 204, 210, 301-333 ( I I , I I I ) , 266, 295, 31 if, 403, 436, et passim (See also a n cie n t o ., fu n d a m en ta l o., m edieval o.) to p a q u e : * u n durchsichtig H . 1 1 ,4 4 , 14 6 , 156 o p en : *offen; *offnen; etc. H . 137, 163, 169, 265, 307^ 341, 350, 369, 392f, 3g6f, 408, 421 to p p o rtu n ity : *G elegenheit H . 172, 174, 300, 359, 389 o rd in a ry : *vulgar (df. H . 289) o. conception o f Being: H . 387, 389 o. conception o f B eing g u ilty : H . 282 o. conception o f conscience: H . 26gf, 279 » 28g-2g5 (Section 5g) o. conception o f th e ‘connectedness o f life’ : H . 374 o. conception o f D asein: H . 374, 378,

427 o. conception o f h istoricality: H . 377 o. conception o f histo ry : H . 376f, 378-382 (Section 73) o. conception o f p h en o m en o n : H . 31 » 3 5 » 37 o. conception o f tim e: H . i7f, 24, 235 » 3 0 4 » 326, 32gf, 333, 338 n. iii, 404-437 (II, V I) origin, o rg m a te : H erk u n ft (derivation) to rig in a l: *o rig inar B u t cf. orig in al sin (E rbsiinde, H . 1go, n . iv.) H . 37, 62, 224 O th e r: A n d ere; frem d (H . 124) (df. H . 118) Being tow ards O th e rs: H . I24f, 177 B eing-w ith O th ers (See B eing-w ith.) com ing to ow e som ething to O th e rs : H . 282 conscience o f O th e rs: H . 298 D asein-w ith o f O th ers (See D aseinw ith.) d e a th o f O th e rs : H . 237-241 (Section

47). 254» 257

enco u n terin g o f O th e rs: H . 117, 120, . ,2 5

fearing for O th e rs: H . I 4 i f potentiality-of-B eing o f O th e rs: H . 264, 298 solicitude for O th ers (See solicitude.) u n d erstan d in g O th e rs: H . 123

Index o f English Expressions O th er— cont. See also H . 126, i28f, 155, 174, 260, 28if, 383, 418 (Note: the uncapitalized ‘ other’ has been used to translate the un­ capitalized adjective ‘andere’ etc.)

•(•the other-w orldly: *das Jenseits H . 148 o u g h t: Sollen H . 283 o u t for . . . (See Being o u t for.) ! o utlast: * ü b erd au ern H . 247 outside: ausser; A ussen, d raussen: ausserhalb •fB eing-outside: *D raussensein: H . 62, 162 fB eing-outside-of-itself: * Aussersichsein: H . 42gf (Hegel) •(•the “ outside-of-itself” : *das Aussersich: H . 329, 350, 365 th e “ outside-of-one-another” : *das A ussereinander: H . 429 (Hegel) See also H . 62, 118, 136, 162, 177, 205, 227, 243, 366, 374, 419, 435 (Note: see also 'external world’ .)

•foutstanding: *A usstand, ausstehen (ftn . H . 236, 250) (df. H . 242) H . 144, 227, 233f, 236f, 241-246 (Section 48), 24gf, 259, 317, 374 ! o u ts tr ip : *überholen (ftn . H . 391) (df. H . 264) H . 250-256, 258f, 263-265, 307, 309, 330 . 383 ‫ ־‬386 , 391 over ag ain (See repeat.) to w e : *schulden; v erd an k en (H . 405) B u i cf. com e to owe (schuldig w erden) (ftn . H . 281) H . 242, 28i f ow nm ost: eigenst tp a llid

lack-of-m ood: *fahle U ngestim m theit H . 134, 345. 371 fp a rad o x icality : *P aradoxie H . 402f (Torek) !p aralo g ism : *Paralogism us H . 318 (Kant), 320 n. x ix (Kant), 332

p a rtic u la r: jew eilig; etc. !p ass along: w eitersagen; *nachsagen (H . 19); w eiterreden (H . 168) H . 155,169, 277

555

!p ass aw ay : v ergehen (ftn . H . 380) H . 373 » 382, 393 f> 422f, 426f (See also arising a n d passing aw ay.) pass over: ü b erg eh en ; ü berspringen !p a s t: * V ergangenheit, v ergangen (ftn . H . 326, 380) (df. H . 328, 378, 380, 381) H . 20-23, 326, 328, 374 » 378-381, 385 f> 391 , 393 - 395 , 4 2 4 , 427, 431 (Hegel) !p a tristic theology H . 139 ! p a tte m : G estalt B ut cf, lan g u ag e p a tte rn (Sprachgebild , H . 349) H . 163, 39gf (Torck) !p a y off: tilgen H . 242, 307 B ut cf. p a y for (*bezahlen, H . 219); p a y o n e’s w ay (bestreiten, H . 30 0 ); etc. !p e a s a n t’s clock: * B au em u h r H . 416 *perceive, p erc ep tio n : v ern eh m en ; *W ahrnehm en v ern eh m en : (ftn . H . 25) (df. H . 25, 33f, 6 if,

346) H . 25, 33f, 6 if, 67, 94, 96-98, 115, 147, 163, 170-172, 212, 224, 273, 335» 346, 3 5 1» 400 (Torck) (Note: this list also includes a ll passages in which ‘ vernehmen' has been translated as ‘aware’ .)

*w ah rn eh m en : (df. H . 149) H . 120, i35f, 144, i46f, 149» 181, 2 i7 f, 243, 354, 363 n . xxii !p erfu n cto rin ess; N achsehen (ftn . H . 123) H . 123 !p e ris h : *v eren d en H . 24of, 247, 251 !p e rm a n e n t: b e h a rrlic h (H . 2 03f); b estän d ig (H . 98) !p ersist, p ersisten t: b eh arren , b e h a rr­ lic h ; sich d u rc h h a lte n ; bestehen b leib en (H . 174); a n h a lte n d (H . ! 3 4 ) b e h a rre n , b e h a rrlic h : H . 45, 322f, 373-375

p erso n : * P erson; etc. (df. H . 47f) perso n as o b ject: H . 114

556

Being and Time

person— cont. p erso n -T h in g : H . !a o p ra ctical person: H . 319 G od as person: H . 275 personal actions: H . 272 personal B eing: H . 4 7 / personal consciousness: H . 278 personal im m o rtality : H . 320 n . xix personal pro n o u n s: H . 42, 119 depersonalization: H . 48 personalism : H . 47f, 47 n. ii, 272 n. vi Heimsoeth on perso n ality : H . 320 n. xix Husserl on personality : H . 47, 47 n. ii K ant on p erso nality : H . 3 i8 f, 320 n. xix, 323 Scheler on p erso nality : H . 47f, 272 n. vi, 320 n. xix See also H . 22, 38, 46, 119, 137, 274, 278 (Note: this list includes a ll passages o f which we have record in which the German word 'Person' and its derivatives occur, but does not in­ clude any passages in which ‘person’ has been used to translate other expressions.)

tP h a risa ism : *Pharisäism us H . 291, 293 phenom enology, p henom enological: *Phänom enologie, * p h än o m ­ enologisch (df. H . 27f, 34f, 37, 357) H . 27-39 (Section 7), 39, 47, 51 n. xi, 63f, 89, ii5 f , 116 n . i, 131, i 39 f> 14 7 , >59 180 ‫־‬, i84f, 207, 208 n. xvi, 218 n . xxxiv, 219, 249 n. vi, 267, 272 n. vi, 357, 375

See also pre-phenom enological. p henom enon, p h en o m en a l: * P h än o ­ m en, * p hänom en a l ( ftn . H . 29, 303) (df. H . 28-31, 63) H . 28-31 (Section 7 A ) et passim See also pre-phenom en al. fp h ilo lo g ic a l: *philologisch H . 21, 152 philosophy, p h ilo so p h ical: *Philo­ sophie, *philosophisch (df. H . 6, 13, 27, 38, 45, 50 n . x, 208, 213, 229, 310, 436) ‘th e business o f philosophers’; H . 4, 23, 220 (Kant)

‘th e scan d al o f philosophy’ : H . 203, 205 (Kant) philosophy o f c u ltu re : H . 167 philosophy o f histo ry : H . 402 (Yorck) p hilosophy o f lan g u ag e : H . 166 p hilosophy o f life: H . 4 6 ,4 8 , 398, 403 philosophy o f N a tu r e : H . 432 n . xxx (Hegel) et passim

!physics, phy sical: *Physik, *physisch, *physikalisch H . 9, 33, 60, g sf, 204, 206, 218, 361 f, 367, 4 0 if (Yorck), 417 n . iv, 419, 428, 431 n . xxx !physiology, p hysiological: *P hysiol­ ogie, *physiologisch H . 190, 241, 246f, 402 (Yorck) !p ic tu re : B ild; *ausm alen (H . 262) (ftn . H . 217) H . 217, 249, 271, 400 (Yorck) p lac e : * P latz, * p latzieren ; O r t (H , 399, 432 n. x x x ); Stelle (H . 130) B u t cf. dw elling-place (sich au f­ h a lten , H . 119); h id in g -p lace (V ersteck, H . 273); tak e place (abspielen, H . 9 ; sich bew egen, H . 168). !* P la tz , * p latzieren (ftn . H . 368) (df. H . 102) H . 97, 102-104, io7f, m f , 3Öif. 358, 413, 416 p lan ts: *Pflanzen H . 246 !p le a d o n e’s cause: sich v erh a n d eln (discuss, H . 27; etc.) H . 274, 293, 296 !p lu n g e : *S turz, *stü rzen ; stossen (H .

219) H . 178 See also d o w n w ard plunge, p o e try : D ich tu n g H . 16, 162 p o in t (noun) : * P u n k t; etc. H . 105, 107, 119, 179, 362, 374, 407, 429f, 432, et passim !p o in t b ack : zurückw eisen (reject); *rückw eisen (H . 2 9 if) H . 14, 151, 290, 294 !p o in t fo rw a rd : *vorweisen (ftn . H . 291) H . 280, 2 9 if, 302 p o in t o u t: aufzeigen; aufw eisen aufzeigen: H . 155-158, 160, 218, 227f, et passim aufw eisen: H . 32f, et passim

Index o f English Expressions •!•political: *politisch H . 16, 193, 400 (Yorck) p osit: ansetzen, A n satz; setzen, m it­ setzen; festlegen (H . 197) ansetzen, A nsatz: H . 46, 99, 109, 114, 147, 204, 208 n . xvi, 229,

291. 373

setzen, m itsetzen: H . 88, 193, 203t‫־‬,

215. 365. 430-432 (Hegel) (Note: except perhaps in the pages on Hegel, these expressions are by no means technical termsfor Heidegger, and we have translated them freely in other ways.)

557

existentiell possibilities: H . 267-270 (Section 54), 336f factical possibilities: H . 264, 299,

383 im possible a n d possible possibilities: H . 342 logical possibilities: H . 143 ‘m o n u m en tal’ possibilities: H . 396 o n tical a n d ontological possibilities:

H• 312 tra d itio n a l possibilities, e tc .: H . 383, 385. 39 !> 394 possibility a n d a c tu a lity : H . 38, 262, 299

position: Stelle, S tellung; S ta n d ; Posi­ p ., ad d ictio n , a n d u rg e : H . ig ^ f tion (H . 24, 204); etc. p . a n d curiosity: H . 347 S telle: H . 102-104, 107, 110, 112, p. a n d historiology: H . 394 119, 362, 368f, 420, et passim p ., projection, a n d u n d erstan d in g : S ta n d : H . 71, 321, 415, etpassim H . 145-148, 151, 194, 260, 270, positive: *positiv (affirm ative, H . 159) 274, 284f, 295, 302, 306, 312, positive sciences, etc.: H . 9-11, 50-52, 324, 336, 339, 383, 387, 394, 58, 324, 398 397 positive vs. privative, negative, p . as existential( a n d as category: H . critical, e tc .: H . 19, 52, 75, 141, 260, 279, 286, 378, et passim positive c h a ra c te r o f th e call o f conscience: H . 279, 294, 300 possibility: *M öglichkeit

{df H. 143) p . o f a n a u th e n tic potentiality-forB eing: H . 266, 343 p. o f concern: H . 338 p . o f D asein: H . 7, i2f, igf, 42f, 50, 62, 104, i25f, 144, 148, 170, 173» *77f> >8i, i87f, 191, 193!95) 199» 211, 236, 23gf, 244, 250, 260, 264, 266, 270, 273, 284, 288, 295, 325, 384, 394,

396 p. o f ‘h av in g ’ a n en v iro n m en t: H .

57f

p . o f th e im possibility o f existence: H . 250, 262, 265!■, 306 p. o f irresoluteness: H . 339 p . o f n u llity : H . 330 p . o f the re a d y -to -h an d : H . 187 p. o f rep resen tatio n b y a n o th e r: H .

239f

p. o f resoluteness: H . 302 p. o f sight: H . 412 p. o f tak ing a c tio n : H . 294 p. o f tem p o rality : H . 304 p . o f ‘w illed’ entities: H . ig 4 f accid en tal a n d provisional possibil­ ities: H . 384

i 43f

D asein as possibility o r Beingpossible: H . 42f, 143-145, 188, 248f, 259 B eing-tow ards-death as a possibility o f D asein : H . 260, 266 D e a th as a possibility o f D asein: H . 248, 250-266, 302f, 307, 309,

.391 discoveredness as a possibility o f B eing: H . 85 B eing tow ards possibility: H . 262 th e blindness o f th e “ th ey ” to pos­ sibilities: H . 391 th e levelling-off o f possibilities: H . 194

p oten tiality -fo r . . .: -können potentiality-for-B eing: *Seinkönnen (ftn. H . 250) (df. H . 86, 144, 285) a u th e n tic potentiality-for-B eing: H . 233 » 235, 267-301 (I I, I I ) , 302,

313. 3 17 . 322. 343

chosen potentiality-for-B eing: H . 288, 298, 394 existentiell potentiality-for-B eing: H . 260, 280, 313, 385 factical potentiality-for-B eing: H . 145, 187, 268, 280, 298, 306,

325. 34if

ontical p o tentiality-for-B eing: 260

H.

Being and Time

558

potentiality-for-Being— cont. ownmost potentiality-for-Being: H. 163, 181, 188, 191, 221, 228, 250-255, 259, 262f, 265, 267, 273, 276-279, 287f, 296, 299, 306*308, 317, 325, 336f, 339,

348 projected potentiality-for-Being: H. 336f, 365 (Note: contrast H . 19 4 , 34 3 , 38 5, 406.)

whole potentiality-for-Being: H. 264, 266, 303, 317 Dasein as potentiality-for-Being: H . 143, 145» 19 1» 231, 250, 252, 264f, 277, 284, 287, 3i2f, 337 Dasein as delivered over to its potentiality-for-Being: H. 383 Dasein’s potentiality-for-Being as an issue: H . 284, 327 (Note: contrast H . 3 1 3 .)

potentiality-for-Being as something for the sake o f which: H. 86, 1 9 »» 19 3 *-» 33 4 » 33 6» 3 59 » 4J2, 4*4

(N ote: contrast H . 14 3 , 3 3 7 .)

potentiality-for-Being o f Others: H. 264

!potentiality-for-Being-guilty: H. 289, 3o6f tpotentiality-for-Being-in-the-world: H . 144, 179, 187, 19 if, 228, 252, 295» 412 fpotentiality-for-Being in the ‘truth’ : H . 363 tpotentiality-for-Being-one’s-Self: H. 175* lS4. 267-269, 273-275, 294,

298, 307» 316» 322f

potentiality-for-Being-a-whole: H. 2 33 -2 35 » 2 37 » 266, 301-333 (II, III)» 34 5 » 372 (Note: see also H . i s s , 147/, 15 3 , i 73> S56-S58, 3 3 4 , 3 5 9 . It should perhaps be remarked that the term ,potentiality-for-Being’ is al­ ways used in connection with some­ thing o f the character o f Dasein, while the term 'possibility ’, which often seems interchangeable with it, is occasionally used in a somewhat wider sense.) power: M acht; K raft (force, etc.);

Vermögen (H. 16, 236) M acht: H . 275, 278, 296, 310, 384^ 435 (Heget), et passim

!practical: *praktisch B ut cf. practicable (gangbar, H. 261); practise (Praxis, H. 193; üben, H . 320 n. xix) (ftn . H . 69) H. 5 7 » 5 9 » 69, 294, 300, 3i5f, 319, 320 n. xix, 357f, 364, 402 (Yorck)

t praxis'. Praxis (practise, H . 193) H . 3 57 f. 402 (Yorck) See also •np&Zis.

fpre-ontological: *vorontologisch H. iaf, 15-17, 44, 65, 68, 72, 86, 130, 182-184, 196-200 (Section 42), 197 n. vi, 201, 222, 225, 289, 3 *2 , 3 *5 » 356 fpre-phenom enal: *vorphänomenal H. 67 fpre-phenomenological: *vorphän­ omenologisch H. 51» 59. 63, 72, 99, 219, 318 tpre-philosophical: *vorphilosophisch H. 19, 165, 219 fpre-predicative: *vorprädikativ H . 149»

359

!pre-scientific: vorwissenschaftlich (colloquial, H . 57) H. 9, 393 !predicate: *Prädikat

H. 94, 99» *54f» >57» 215, 281, 318, 359

prepare, preparatory, preparation: *vorbereiten; bereiten; *zube­ reiten (H. 148); *Zurüstung (H. 151,4 37); *Präparat (H • 358); etc, !presence: *Anwesenheit; *Zugegen­ sein (H. 75); vor (H. 44) (ftn . H. 25, 326) *Anwesenheit: H. 25f, 71, 415-418, 42 3

(See also have presence, presenceat-hand, etc.) present (adj.): vorliegend; *jetzig;

*zugegen (H. i n ) See also makes present, deprive o f its

character as present.) !Present (noun) : *Gegenwart (ftn . H . 25, 26, 326, 329, 338, 347) H. 25f, 326, 328f, 337 -34 0 , 342, 34434 8 , 350, 35 5 , 360, 363, 365, 369, 378-381, 385, 3 9 *. 39 3 -3 95 . 3 97 » 40 7 f> 410, 427» 431

Index o f English Expressions present (noun): See in th e present, p resent (verb): darstellen (represent, H . 94; afford, H . 179); *V orgabe, vorgeben; g eb en ; etc. (ftn . H . 150) p resen t-at-h an d , presen ce-at-h an d : *vorhanden , * V o rh an d en h eit ( fin . H . 14, 25, 74, 106) (df. H . 42, 4 3 . 4 5 . 5 5 . 61. 70 - 7 4 . 88, 183) preserve: b ew ah ren ; *verw ah ren ; etc. preservation o f uncoveredness or coveredness•. H . 172, 224

dis­

presupposition: V oraussetzung (pre­ requisite, H . n o ) ; V o ru rteil (H . af) (df. H . 228, 314) H . 226-330 (Section 44c), et passim p revious: vorgängig, etc. fp rim itiv e : * p rim itiv H . 50-52 (Section 11), 8 if, 247, 396,

415 p rim o rd ia l: *ursprünglich (ftn . H . 348) (df. H . 231-233, 306, 334) H . 219-226 (Section 44b), et passim p rio rity : V o rra n g (*privileged position, H . 379, 386; ad v an ta g e, H . 207); etc. p. o f th e question o f Being: H . 2-15 (int. I) p . o f th e p ro b lem o f m a n s Being to­ w ards G o d : H . 190 n. iv p . o f D asein: H . 7f, 13-16, 37, 126 p . o f existentia over essentia: H . 43 p . o f Being-in-the-w orld as con cern : H .5 8 p. o f care: H . 198 p . o f volition a n d cognition: H . 136 p. o f D asein’s disclosure o f itself: H . 136 p . o f ‘seeing’ : H . 171, 358 p. o f p u re in tu itio n : H . 147 p . o f the p ractical a ttitu d e : H . 193 p . o f ‘b a d ’ conscience in in te rp re ta ­ tions o f th e conscience: H . 290 p. o f tim e over space: H . 367 (Kant) p . o f th e fu tu re : H . 311 p . o f th e p a st: H . 379 p. o f h aving-been: H . 386 p. o f m aking-present: H . 417 p. o f th e “ now ” : H . 432 n. xxx p. o f arising a n d passing aw ay : H . 43 i f p. o f the p resen t-at-h an d : H . 147

559

p . o f th e concept o f R e a lity : H . 201, 211 p . o f th e isolated su b ject: H . 204 p . o f idealism over realism : H . 207 E very p rio rity is suppressed b y th e “ th ey ” : H . 127 (Note: this list includes those passages in which ‘ Vorrang’ has been trans­ lated as ‘privileged position’ or as ‘advantage’ . The word ‘prior’ has been used freely in translating ‘ vorliegen’ , ‘ vorgangig’ , and other expressions.)

fp riv a tio n , p riv ativ e : *P rivation, * p riv ativ (ftn . H . 58) H . 18, 29, 50, 58, 75, 141, 149, i63f, 184, 194, 201, 222, 246, 285^

291.

357. 378

process o f h av in g been (See have been.) p ro d u ce : herstellen (pro d u ct, H . 71; restore, H . 99) p ro d u ctio n o f clocks: H . 4 i4 f p ro d u ctio n o f th e read y -to -h a n d : H . 261, 352 p ro d u c tio n o f signs : H . 8 o f p ro d u ctio n o f w o rk : H . 67, 69-71,

117. 353

p ro d u c tio n and c reatio n : H . 24, 92 p ro d u ctio n as m ode o f B eing-in : H . 56, 61 et passim

progress, progression: F o rtsch ritt, fort­ schreiten (advance) ; F o rtg an g (H . 388) H . 434 (Hegel), et passim f P rojection: *P rojektion (ftn . H . 124) H . 124 p roject, p ro jectio n : *entw erfen, * E n tw u rf (ftn . H . 124, 245, 285, 315) (df. H . 145, 147, 199, 221, 262, 284f, 324, 336) pro jectio n o f D asein: H . 270, 277,

284. 3 i 3>363. 385. 394. 406

(Note: see also self-projection.)

p . o f D asein’s B eing: H . 145, 147,

195. 324

p. o f existence: H . 325, 372 p. o f B eing-in-the-w orld : H . 147 p. o f a u th e n tic B eing-tow ards-death : H . 237, 260-267 (Section 53)

Being and Time

56°

project— cont. p . o f a n tic ip a tio n : H . 266f p. o f resoluteness: H . 385 p. o f u n d erstan d in g : H . 148, 151, 174. 265, 324 p. o f possibilities: H . 298, 312, 383,

394

p. o f a potentiality-for-B eing: H . p. p. p. p. p. p. p. p. p. p.

148‫ ־‬3°5 83, 87, 88, 117, 144) !R e a l, R eality : real (realia, H . 68), * R ealität (df. H . 183, 211; contrast H . 128) H . 7, 47 n. ii, 68, 94 (Kant), io6f, 128, 170, 177, 183^ 200-212 (Section 43), 216-218, 230, 303, 3 i 3 f> 3 i 8 > 320 (Kant), 324, 368, 400 (Torek), 420, 437 re a l: eigentlich (ftn . H . 5, 42) fre a lism : *R ealism us H . 34, 183, 206-208, 208 n. xvi, 215 realm : *R egion, *regional (ftn . H . 103) reason: *V ernunft, vernünftig (ratio n a l); G ru n d ; etc. (ftn . H . 25, 34) H . 4, 22f, 32, 34, 48, 165, 320 n. xix,

tq u a lity ; q u alitativ e: Q u a litä t; * q uali­ tativ H . 98f, 282, 285, 295, 297, 333, 432 x x , 434

recap itu late (See repeat.) !re ck o n : rechnen H . 284, 293, 333

359‫־‬413 p ublic w o rld : H . 65, 71 pu b lic tim e: H . 411-430, 424-426 p u b lic conscience: H . 278, 403 (Torek)

public law : H . 282 public no rm s: H . 288 public opinion: H . 403 (Torek) See also : H . 174, 190, 371. (Note: see also ‘ makepublic’ .)

!p u n c tu a lity : * P u n k tu alität H . 42gf, 432 (Hegel) tp u n ish a b le : * stra fb a r H . 282f p u t forw ard ! p u t forw ard casually: *hinw erfen (H .3 1 1 ) th a t w hich is p u t forw ard in the assertion: das A usgesagte: H . 6 2 ,1 5 4 ^ 1 5 7 ,2 1 8 (N ote: this list includes one passage in which ‘ das Ausgesagte’ is translated as ‘ what has been asserted’ .)

et passim

562

Being and Time

reckon— cont. reckon o n : * rech n en a u f H . 356, 4 i2 f reckon u p : * verrechnen {ftn. H . 300) H . 207, 283, 288f, 292, 294, 300, 406 reckon w ith : * rechn en m it H . 125, 235, 333, 356, 371, 404, 4 1 1 -4 1 3 ,4 2 0 ,4 2 2 take in to o ne’s reckoning: *R ech­ n u n g trag en H . 71, 81, 83, 103, 290, 356, 371, 4 ° 4 f> 4 " . 413 (N ote: this list also includes all passages in which ‘ Rechnung tragen’ has been translated as ,take ac­ count’ .)

tim e-reckoning: *Z eitrech n u n g H . 235, 333, 41 if, 414-418, 418 n. v re c u r: *w iederkehren H . 39 if, et passim refer: verweisen (1See assign.) reflect, reflection: *Reflexion, *re­ flektieren; *W iderschein; etc. !*R eflexion, *reflektieren: H . 48, 60,

115‫ ־‬136

!re g io n : *G egend (ftn . H . 103) (df. H . 103, n o , 368) H . 79, i03f, io7f, 110-112, 140, i8 5f, 368f re g u late: regeln (co n tro l); *regulieren, *regulativ; ric h ten (direct) !re g u la te oneself acco rd in g to : sich richten nach H . 128, 404, 411, 416, 4 ig f

r. betw een subject a n d O b ject (See O bject.) r. betw een intellectus a n d res : H . 216 r. betw een ideal co n ten t a n d R eal O b je c t: H . 216 r. betw een ideal co n ten t a n d a c t of ju d g m e n t: H . 216 r. betw een know ing a n d k n o w n : H . 218 r. betw een assertion a n d entities u n co v ered : H . 224 r. betw een sign an d reference: H . 82 r. b etw een m a n a n d th e w o rld : H .

57

r. b etw een soul a n d w o rld : H . 59 r. betw een life a n d d e a th : H . 249 n. vi (Dilthey) D asein’s relatio n sh ip to itself: H . 125,

433

D asein’s relationship to O th e rs: H . 120, 250 ag reem en t as a re latio n : H . 2 i5 f b in d in g a n d sep aratin g as relations:

. H 1 59 .‫־‬

in d icatin g as a relatio n : H . 215 reference as a relatio n : H . 77f location relationships: H . 54 sp atial relatio n sh ip s: H . 54, 112 relationships o f Being: H . 54f, 57, 60, 62, 122, I24f, 168, 170, 208 n . xvi, 209f, 238 relationships o f in v o lv em en t: H . 355,

359‫ ־‬361

‘relatio n ’ as a m eaning o f Aoyoy: H .

32» 34. •59f

!n o n -re la tio n a l: *unbeziiglich H . 250-260, 263-265, 280, 307,

(Note: this list also includes two passages in which this expression has been translated by ‘ direct’ .)

defining o f relationships: H . 4oof

tre ify : *verdinglichen H . 46, 420, 437 !rejo in , rejoinder: *erw idern (ftn . H . 386) H . 28, 386 !R e la tio n : *R elation H . 8yf relate, relation, relatio n sh ip : beziehet), *Beziehung, B ezug; v erhalten, *V erhältnis (ftn . H . 4, 34, 124) (df. H . 77) r. betw een caller a n d called: H . 274 r. betw een phenom enon a n d logos: H . 54

!relativ e, relativ ity : *relativ, *R elativ itat H . 9, 22, 93, 97, 105, 227, 261, 290, 398, 401, 417 n . iv rem em b er: e rin n ern (ftn . H . 339) H . 290, 339, 343, et passim rem o te: en tfern t (See desever.) rem ove: entfernen (See desever.) !re p e a t: w iederholen (ftn . H . 308, 339, 385, 386) (df. H . 339. 385> 386, 295)

3°9. 337 (Torek)

Index o f English Expressions re p eat— cont. re p e titio n o f th e analysis o f D asein: H . 17, 234, 304^ 331-333 (Section 66) rep etitio n o f possibilities: H . 343,

3.85f> 39°f> 395f

rep etitio n o f th e question o f Being: H . 2-4 (Section 1), 8, 26 rep etitio n o f w h a t has been ontically discovered: H . 51 r. a n d a n tic ip a tio n : H . 391 r. a n d destiny: H . 386 r. a n d fa te : H . 386, 39of, 395 r. a n d th e fu tu re : H . 386, 397 r. a n d h av in g -b een : H . 339, 343^

350, 391. 394$ 397

r. a n d resoluteness: H . 308, 386, 392,

396 (Note: this list includes a ll passages in which ' wiederholen’ has been translated as ‘ restate’, ‘recapitulate’, ‘ raise again', 'over again’ , and ‘ revive’ . See also H . 380.)

-(■repentance: *R eue H . 190 n. iv ■(,re p o rt: *b erich ten , B ericht (record, H . 394); konstatieren (H . 296) H . 39, 140, 158, 277, 320 n . xix rep resent, rep resen tatio n : vorstellen, *V orstellung; v e rtrete n ; *re­ präsen tieren ; darstellen (H . 94) ( ftn . H . 217, 239, 300) vorstellen, *V orstellung: H . 33, 62,

>39. 154. 159. 2° 3f> 214. 2i7f, 3 '9‫ ־‬321, 354« 359‫ ־‬367‫־‬369«

410, 424, 430 (Note: cf. also H . 139 ■) fv e rtre te n : H . 59, 82, 126, 239^ 242,

253 tre p ro a c h : vorw erfen (ftn . H . 145) H . 291 ,(,reprove: *rügen H . 279, 290-292, 294 req u ire, req u irem en t: fordern (de­ m a n d ; etc.) ; verlangen (dem and etc.) ; b ed ü rfen ; etc. F o rd e ru n g : H . 282f, et passim research: forschen, F orschung; n ach ­ forschen, N achforschung H . 9-11, 19, 315, et passim reserve: *Vorbehalten; belegen (H . 368); *R eserve (H . 122) (ftn . H . 368)

563

•(•reside: w ohnen (ftn . H . 54) H . 54, 68, 188, 385 t resign oneself: *sich abfinden H; 152, 355 f f resist, resistance: * W iderstand, *W iderständigkeit, *w ider­ steh en ; w iderstreben (H . 88, 246) H . 2 ,9 1 , g6f, 137, 209-211, 300.356 f resolve, resolute, resolution: *entschliessen, *entschlossen, *E ntsch­ luss (ftn . H . 297, 299, 300) (df. H . 270, 296, 298, 301, 305, 329, 382,

39if)

H . 166, 235, 267-301 ( I I , I I ; esp. H . 2 9 7 3 ‫־‬oi ) , 302-304, 305-310 (Section 62), 313, 3 i6 f, 322f, 325-331» 335 - 3 3 9 » 3 4 2 - 3 4 5 » 3 4 9 > 363, 382-387, 390-392, 394-397, 404, 410, 424 ‫(־‬,responsible, responsibility: schuldig, S chuld, schuld ( ftn . H . 280) H . 282f rest: R u h e (tran q u illity , H . 254, 430); ru h e n ; b e ru h e n ; etc. H . 172, 178, 303 (See also tra n q u il, take a rest.) ■(,restless, restlessness: * u n ru h ig , U n ­ ru h e (distu rb in g , H . 2) H . 172, 398, 434 restate : w iederholen (See rep eat.) re ta in , reten tio n , reten tiv e: b e h a lte n ; e rh a lte n (H . 204) H . 62, 339, 353-356, 359-361, 368, 388, 391, 406-409, 413f, 416, 42of, et passim fre te ll: *w eitersagen H . 155, 169, 277 ■(■reticence: *V erschw iegenheit H . 165, 174, 273, 277, 2g6f, 301, 305, 322f, 382, 385 reveal: enthüllen, H . 307, et passim reverse: u m k eh ren ; *rückgängig (H. 268) H . 426, et passim rig h t aw ay (See n o t rig h t aw ay.) f ripeness, rip e n : *Reife, *reifen (ftn . H . 244) H . 243f

Being and Time

564 '(‫׳‬rom anticism : * R o m an tik H .6 5

■froom: *Zimmer (H. 68), Raum (H. 103) , (See also m ak e room .)

! th e

‘scandal o f philosophy’; * ‘d e r Skan d al d e r Philosophie’ H . 203, 205 (Kant) fsc e n t: S p u r (trail, H . 281), *spüren H . i 73 f

■},the “round-aWit-us” : *das Um-unsherum

(Note: the derivative verbs 'aufspüren' and ‘ nachspüren’ have been translated as ' track down' in H . 94, 146.)

H . 103

■fround out: *ergänzen H . 5 3 » 9 9 f» 13 I» 148, 255 » 3*6

run: laufen; etc.

( ftn . H . 243) ‫־¡־‬ru n a h e a d : *vorauslaufen (H . 10) ( ft n . H . 262, 264, 302) f r u n aw ay : * entlau fen (H . 347) (ftn . H. 347 ) ■frun its course: ab lau fen , A b lau f; verlaufen, V e rlau f; abspielen (H . 80) verlaufen, V e rla u f (ftn . H . 243) H . 243, 3 5 5 » 367» 4 ° 4 » 4 I0 > 428 ab laufen, A b lau f H . 18, 176, 291, 293, 327, 340, 349, 367, 388, 425 (Note: this list includes all passages in which 'A b la u f'a n d ,ablaufen' occur, regardless o f how they are trans­ lated; the list fo r 'V erla u f' and 'verlaufen', however, is confined to those passages in which these are translated as ‘ run its course'.)

fsa id -in -th e -ta lk : *das G eredete H . 162, 164, 168, 272f sake (1See ‘for-the-sake-of-w hich’.) say: sagen; etc. (df. H . 169) saying a n d discourse: H . 32, 162,

i64f s. s. s. s.

a n d keeping silen t: H . 165 a n d speaking: H . 160 a n d u n d erstan d in g : H . i68f, 173 w ith o u t au d ib le o r explicit u tte r­ an ce: H . 406, 408, 416, 422 ‘w h a t conscience says’ : H . 269, 280 saying “ I ” : H . 3 i8 f, 321-323 saying “ now ” , etc.-. H . 406, 408, 416, 418, 4 2 lf (Note: ‘sagen’ and its compounds have been translated informally in many other ways, and the verb 'say' has been used no less informally in translating other expressions.)

fscep tic ism : *Skeptizism us, *Skepsis H . 203, 228f, 400 (Torck) ■fschema, schem atic: *Schem a, ‫־‬fsche­ m atisch H . 78, 132, 270, 332, 35gf, 365, 398 !sch em atism : *Schem atism us H . 23, 40 !scholasticism , Schoolm en: *Scholastisk, scholastisch H . 22, 25, 93, 139 science; scientific: *W issenschaft, wis­ senschaftlich (*scholarly, H . 32; learn ed, H . 171) (df. H . 9, 11, 13, 28, 50 n . x, 52, 62, 152, 357 » 362f, 393 ) s. o f B eing: H . 26, 230 s. o f h istory: H . 375^ 378, 392, 397f, 404 s. o f lan g u ag e : H . i65f, 349 s. o f life: H . 49 s. o f N a tu re : H . 404 (Note: see also 'natural science'.)

s. s. s. s. s. s.

o f p h e n o m e n a : H . 31 o f th e p resen t-a t-h a n d : H . 324 o f th e psychical: H . 398 o f th e read y -to -h a n d : H . 361 o f th e tr u th : H . 213 o f m an , society, a n d th e sta te : H .

398 factical s .: H . 392f factual s .: H . 362 h u m a n e sciences (Note: see entry above.)

n a tu ra l science (Note: see entry under 'Nature'.)

th eoretical science: H . 358 existential genesis o f s.: H . 171, 358 existential conception o f s .: H . 357 logical co nception o f s.: H . 357 O b jectivity o f sc ie n c e : H . 395 theory o f science: H . 45, 375^ 398, 401 ethics as a science: H . 402 (Torck) scientific a ttitu d e (or b e h a v io u r): H .

358, 361 scientific pro jectio n : H . 363 See also H . 4 5 ,1 3 8 , 7 5 5 , 400, et passim

Index o f English Expressions •fscribbling: *G eschreibe H . 169 see: sehen; sic h tb ar; etc. {ftn. H . 69, 171) (df. H . 147, 346 ) seeing B eing-in-the-w orld: H . 58 seeing colours: H . 33 seeing entities in th e ir B eing: H . 45 seeing everything: H . 177 seeing E xperiences: H . 119 seeing th e h a m m e r: H . 155 seeing ‘ideas’ : H . 226 seeing possibilities: H . 148 seeing th e re a d y -tp -h a n d : H . 149 seeing th e T hings w hich a re closest: H . 149 seeing som ething w rongly: H . 281 seeing th e ‘w orld’ m erely as it looks: H . 172 seeing in w hich o ne ‘m erely ’ u n d e r­ stan d s: H . 149 seeing as a distance-sense: H . 107 ‘seeing’ as m ad e possible b y clearedness: H . 351 ‘seeing’ as d eterm in ed by th e “ th ey ” : H . 170, i2 6 f seeing a n d curiosity: H . 170-173 (Section 36), 346-348 th e care for seeing: H . 171 th e desire to see: H . 170 th e priority o f ‘seeing’ : H . 358 th e m u tu al sh arin g w hich sees: H .

155 St. A ugustine on seeing: H . 171 see in advance (See fore-sight.) let b e seen (See entry fo r this expression above.) (See also H . 3 5 1 , et passim. T he verb ‘see’ has been used informally in translating several expressions. The above list includes only passages in which some form o f the verb ‘ sehen’ occurs, and is confined to those which are o f some philosophical interest.) seek: suchen (search; try ; etc.)', w ollen (w an t; w ill; insist; etc.)

seem : *scheinen, scheinbar (sem blant, H . 29); Schein (H . 176); etc. B ut cf. seem stran ge (befrem den, frem d artig anm u ten ) (ftn . H . 29) (df. H . 29) seize hold of: *zugreifen, *Z ugriff

565

seize u p o n : ergreifen (Note: the follow ing list includes the chief passages in which 'ergreifen’ has been translated as ‘seize upon’ , ‘ take hold o f ’ , or ‘grasp’ .) ‘ergreifen’ o f possibilities or p o te n tia l­

ities: H . 20, 38, 86, 144, 153, 195, 268, 299, 302, 342, 344, 3 4 7 » 383» 3 6 9 f . o f o n e’s ow n D asein : H . 122, 188 . . . o f th e Self: H . 129 . . . o f th e disclosedness o f Being-inth e-w o rld : H . 146 . . . o f B eing-w ith: H . 162 . . . o f everydayness: H . 179 . . . o f b ein g g u ilty : H . 291 . . . o f th e fin itu d e o f o n e’s existence: H . 384 . . . o f something not specified•. H . 12, 126, 273, 326 . . . o f a n e n tity as som eth in g to be co n cern ed w ith : H . 194 . . . o f e v ery th in g : H . 173 . . . o f a. tra d itio n : H . 20? . . . o f th e p ro b le m o f existence: H . 235 n . i . . . o f historiology as a scien ce: H . 332 . . . o f p h enom enology: H . 38 . . . o f th e “ for-the-sake-of-w hich” :

H . 193 Self: *Selbst (ftn . H . 114, 303, 375.) (See also our entryfo r ‘ Selbst’ in the Glossary.) (df. H . 117, 267, 273, 284, 303,

3 ° 3 > 3 *8 , 323» 3 3 2 ) Self as a w ay o f D asein’s B eing: H . n 7 existentiality o f th e S .: H . 267, 318, 322 S. as th e “ w ho” o f D asein: H . 114, 267 S. o f everyday D asein: H . 129, 193, 252> 273 (See also they-self.) S. as a constitutive item in Being-inth e-w o rld : H . 190, 200, 220, 273 » 297 (C f. H . 146.) S. as a u th en tic or in a u th e n tic : H . I2gf, 181, 317, 332, 433 (Hegel) D asein’s ow n or ow nm ost Self: H . «29, 253, 268, 271, 273, 280, 288, 295, 339 B eing-one’s-Self (See entry fo r this expression above.)

Being and Time

566

Self—cont. potentiality-for-B eing-one’s-Self (See entryf o r this expression above.)

S. as disinterested sp ec ta to r: H . 293 S. as subject or su b stan ce: H . 12gt, 317, 320 n. xix, 323, 332 (See also subject and substance.) S elf and th e “ I ” : H . 12gf, 317-323, 348

S elf-T hing: H . 323 S. as th ro w n : H . 277, 284, 3 3 9 ,3 8 3 S. as lost in th e “ th ey ” : H . 271, 274, 383 {Cf. H . 116, and see theyself.) S. as factically existing: H . 419 selfsameness o f th e Self: H . 114, 130, 320, 373 constancy, inconstancy, a n d nonSelf-constancy o f th e S elf (See entry above under 'constant'.)

failure to sta n d by o n e’s Self (See entry fo r this expression above.)

t Self-subsistence: * S elbständigkeit (ftn . H . 291, 303, 322, 375) H . 303, 332 (C f. H . 2g1f.) S. and th e O th e r: H . 124, 128 ( C f also they-self.) S. as being-ahead-of-itself: H . 193 S. and c a re : H . 193, 304, 316-323 (Section 64) S. and the call o f conscience, etc.: H . 273f, 277, 280, 288, 296 S. and resoluteness: H . 298, 300, 310, 39« S. and r a p tu r e : H . 348 D asein’s u n d erstan d in g o f th e S .: H . 72 (See entry under 'se lf ’ below.)

‘know ledge o f the S elf’: *“ Selbsterkenntnis” (ftn . H . 124, 146) H . 146 T h e S. m ust lay th e basis for itself: H . 284 T h e S. m ust forget itself: H . 354 Hegel on the S .: H . 433f Kant on the S .: H . 318-321, 320 n. xix, 323 Yorck on the consideration o f th e Self: H . 399 . 401 self, oneself, itself: selbst; Selbst— (in certain compounds); sich f self-consciousness: *Selbstbewusstsein H . 401 (Yorck), 435 (Hegel)

,)‫־‬self-dissection: *Selbstzergliederung H . 178 self-evidence: Selbstverständlichkeit (obviousness) H . 4, 16, 43, 49, 93, et passim self-forgetful: selbstvergessen H . 322, 424 (C f. also H . 277, 342,

354•)

self-interpretation, in te rp re ta tio n of th e Self, etc. : *selbstauslegung H . 51, 116, 184, ig6f, 200, 3 12,318 self-subsistent: *selbständig (ftn . H . 291) H . 2 9 i f (See entry fo r 'Self-subsist­ ence' above.) (Note; this list includes only a fe w o f the more interesting expressions in which 's e lf', 'oneself', etc. appear.)

tselfsam e: *selbig {ftn . H . 114) H . 114, 130, 188, 218, 320, 322, 373,

423.

435

fsem b lan ce: Schein H . 29-32, et passim fsense (verb), sensation: *em pfinden; *S innlichkeit (H . 97) H . 137, 152, i6 3 f sense (noun): S inn B ut cf. com m on sense (*V erständig­ keit). (ftn . H . 1, 137) H . 91, 96, 107, 137, 147 (Note: cf. our entry fo r 'meaning' above and our glossary-entry fo r 'Sinn'. T h is list includes only passages re­ ferring to ‘senses' such as vision or touch, not to the ‘senses' o f words or other expressions.)

sentence: Satz sep aratio n : T re n n u n g (distinguishing; etc.) ; S cheidung (distinguishing, division, etc.) H . 159, 217, et passim sequence: Folge; *Abfolge s. o f d a y s: H . 371 s. o f E xperiences: H . 291, 293, 355,

373. 387f, 390

s. o f “ now s” : H . 329, 373, 409, 422426, 43if s. o f processes: H . 379 s. o f resolutions: H . 387 ‫•(־‬serviceability: *D ienlichkeit (ftn . H . 78) H . 68, 78, 82-84, 137, 144

Index o f English Expressions serviceability— cont.

567

B ut cf. d o u b le signification (D oppel

(Note: the verb 'serve' has been used informally to translate ‘ dienen’ and several other expressions.)

d eutigkeit, H . 202); has m any significations (vieldeutig, H . 32) H . 77f, 77 n . ii, 87, 93, 150, 157, i65f, ‫•(־‬set o u r sights tow ards: *anvisieren 168, 188, 349, 369 H . 15,61, 150, 157 silent fs e ttle : abschliessen (See keep silent.) H• ' 7 5 4 0 5 ,239 ,236 .179sim ‫ ־‬plicity: E infachheit, * S im plizität sh ap e: G estalt E in fac h h eit: H . 318, 322, 384, et H . gof, 112 passim sh are: teilen !* S im p liz itä t: H . 318 (Kant), 323 (Kant) H• 155. 162, 164 •fsh ift: verlegen !s in : *S ünde H . 180, 190 n . iv, 306 n . ii H. 355. 357 !s h o rn : beschnitten (curtailed, H . 316) !S itu a tio n : S itu atio n H . 422, 426f (ftn . H . 299) (df. H . 232, 299) show : zeigen; etc. H . 158, 189, 232f, 235, 29gf, 302, (ftn . H . 29, 77, 122, 178, 304) 304, 307, 310-316 (Section 63), show itself: H . 28-31, 35^ 57, 63, 326, 328, 338, 347, 349, 360, 67f. 72f, 97, i37f, 140, 155, 173, 382, 384, 391, 397, 410 213, 2 i8 f, 222, 361, 421, et (N ote: see note on ‘situation * below.) passim !s itu a tio n : *L age (Note: see also our entry fo r ‘ indicate’ B ut cf. lim it-situ atio n (*G renzsitua­ above.) tion). fsh rin k back: *zurückw eichen; z u r­ (ftn . H . 299) ückziehen (w ithdraw ) H . 110, 193, 226, 299f, 359, 369, 371 H . 23, 127, 185 (Note: in H . 36g and 3 7 1 , where the ■fside-by-side: *nebeneinan d er words ‘Lage’ and 'Situation’ appear H . 55. 68, 97, 173, 175, 430 together in the German, we have fsig h t (verb): sichten (sift, H . 51, 394) simply used ‘situation' and indicated

. H• 33. 45. 75. 146, 312, 359. 42 i

sight (noun): S ic h t; etc. B ut cf. set o u r sights tow ards (*an­ visieren). (ftn . H . 69, 123) (df. H . 146, 147, 170) H . 69, 74f, i33f, 146-149, 167, 170,

173. 336, 347. 358. 412

sign: Z iechen; etc. H . 76-83 (Section 17), 108, 215 significance, significant: *B edeutsam ­ keit; B edeutung (ftn . H . 87) (df. H . 87, 123, 143, 1 9 2 ,2 9 7 ,3 6 4 ) *B edeutsam keit: H . 83-88 (Section 18), 104, 11 of, 123, 129, 143148, 151, 158, 166, i86f, 192, 210, 297, 334, 364-366, 414, 422f, 427 !B ed eu tu n g : H . 28, 51, 139, 198 (Note: see also our entry fo r ‘ insignifi­ cance’ above.)

signification, signify: B edeutung, *bedeuten (ftn . H . 1, 87) (df. H . 161, 166)

the German reading.)

sketch: vorzeichnen (prescribe, deline­ ate, o utline, etc.); *skizzieren (H . 43, 51 n. x i) ; Z eich n u n g (H . 398) (ftn . H . 315) solicitude: Fürsorge ( fin . H . 121) (df. 12if, 193, 318) H . 121-124, 131. 143. •46, 176, i 93f, 238, 253, 263, 266, 268, 289300, 318 !soliloquy: *Selbstbespräch H . 273f, 401 (Yorck) !solipsism : *Solipsismus H . 188 som ething: etw as; etc. B eing-som ething: H . 160 som ething as som ething: H . I49f, 159, 35gf T h e w orld is th e m ost p rim o rd ial ‘som ething’. H . 187 !so u l: Seele H . 14, 23, 46, 48, 59, 114, 117. 202, 214, 318, 402 (Yorck), 405, 427

568

s o u l—

Being and Time

cont. (N ote: see also our entry fo r 'psychical' above, and the quotations from Aristotle and Augustine translated in Heidegger’ s footnotes xiv and xv on H . 427.) s o u r c e : * U r s p r u n g ; Q u e l l e ; etc. (ftn . H . 3 4 8 ) H . 3 3 4 , et passim

s p a t i o - t e m p o r a l: H . 3 6 2 , 3 6 7 ! g iv in g s p a c e : * R a u m -g e b e n : H . i n ft a k in g s p a c e i n : * R a u m e in n e h m e n : H . 368 f ts p a tia liz in g : * v e r r ä u m lic h e n : H . 10 8 , 1 12 , 4 1 8 !stre tc h o f sp a ce : * R a u m s tr e c k e : H . 10 6 , 4 1 8 !s p a c e b e tw e e n : * Z w is c h e n r a u m : H . 55 fw o r ld - s p a c e : H . 54 , 20 4 fs p a t ia lly - lo c a l: * r ä u m lic h - ö r t lic h :

!s o u th w in d : * S ü d w in d H . 8of s p a c e , s p a tia l: R a u m , * r ä u m lic h ( ftn . H . h i , 3 6 8 ) (df. H . 5 6 , 1 1 2 , H. 417 4 2 9 (Hegel) ) Bergson on s p a c e : H . 1 8 , 3 3 3 , 4 3 2 n . XXX H . 9 , 18 , 3 1 , 5 4 -5 6 , 6 6 , 6 8 , 7 9 , 8 9 , Descartes on s p a c e : H . 8 9 1 0 1 -1 1 3 (I, I I I , C ) , n g f , 13 2, 1 4 1 ,1 6 6 ,1 8 6 ,2 9 9 ,3 3 3 ,3 3 5 ,3 6 7 Hegel on s p a c e : H . 4 2 9 f, 4 3 2 n . 3 6 9 ( S e c t io n 7 0 ) , 4 1 6 - 4 1 8 , 4 2 9 f Kant on s p a c e : H . 8 9 !sp a n : span n en , *S p an n e (Hegel), 4 3 2 n . x x x s p a tia lity o f D a s e in : H . 5 6 , 8 9 , 10 1(ftn . H . 4 0 9 ) 113 ( I , I I I , C ) , n g f , 1 3 2 , 1 4 1 , H . 3 7 3 f > 409, 414! 416, 4 2 3 f s p e a k , s p e e c h : s p r e c h e n ; etc. 2 9 9 . 3 3 5 3 6 9 ‫ ־‬3 6 7 ‫ ( ־‬S e c t io n 7 0 ) s p a tia lity o f th e “ th e r e ” : H . 13 2 , 2 g g H . 3 2 , 1 6 0 , et passim s p a t i a l i t y o f B e in g - in - t h e - w o r l d : H . !sp e a k a g a in : *n ach sprech en ( H . 2 2 4 ) ; * w e it e r s p r e c h e n ( H . 7 g , 1 0 1 , 1 0 4 - 1 1 0 ( S e c t io n 2 3 ) , 14 1, 299 224) s p a t i a l i t y o f B e in g - in : H . 5 4 , i o s f , !sp e a k fo r th : *H era u ssa g e 18 6 H . 15 5 , 16 0 s p a tia lity o f th e w o r ld : H . 10 1, n o !sp e a k o u t: au ssp rech en 112 , 369 (ftn . H . 1 4 9 , 1 6 7 , 2 2 4 ) s p a tia lity o f th e ‘w o r ld ’ : H . 11 2 H . i6 7 f s p a tia lity o f th e e n v ir o n m e n t: H . 6 o , (Note: see also our entry fo r ‘ express' 66, 89, 112 above.) s p a t i a l i t y o f e n t it ie s e n c o u n t e r e d in !sp h e re : *S p h ä re t h e e n v ir o n m e n t : H . 10 1 in n e r s p h e r e : H . 6 0 , 6 2 s p a tia lity o f th e r e a d y -to -h a n d : ‘s p h e re ’ o f th e R e a l: H . 202 H . 1 0 2 - 1 0 4 ( S e c t io n 2 2 ) , 1 1 0 , ‘s p h e re ’ o f th e s u b je c t: H . 2 1 6 112 , 4 18 s p h e r e o f B e in g - o u t s id e - o f - it s e lf: H . s p a tia lity o f e x te n d e d T h in g s : H . 4 2 g (Hegel) 1 1 2 f, 3 6 8 ! s p i r i t ; s p i r i t u a l : G e is t , g e is t ig s p a t i a l p o s it io n s : H . 1 0 2 , 1 0 7 , 1 1 9 , H . 22, 46, 47 n . i i (Husserl), 48, 56, 368f 8g, 117, 152, ig8, 320 n . x i x ! s p a tia l r e c e p ta c le : * R a u m g e fä s s : (Hegel), 368, 37g, 395, 3g7, 401, H . 10 1 (Torek), 404, 405f (Hegel), 427, s p a t i a l s ig n if ic a t io n s : H . 1 6 6 , 2 g g , 428-436 ( S e c t io n 82) (Note: both * Geist’ and ‘ geistig' have 369 s p a c e in i t s e l f : H . 1 1 2 occasionally been translated as fs p a c e o f N a tu re : * N a tu rra u m : intellectual, and ‘ Geisteswissen­ H . 112 schaft’ always becomes ‘humane p u r e s p a c e , etc.: H . 1 1 2 science.’ ) s p a c e and r e g i o n : H . 1 1 o f, 18 6 , 3 6 8 f s p r in g f r o m : e n t s p r in g e n s p a c e and t im e , s p a t i a l i t y and t e m ­ (ftn . H. 347) p o r a lity : H . 18 , 3 1 , 3 3 3 , 3 3 5 , H • 3 3 4 > 3 4 4 > et passim 3 6 7 3 6 ‫ ־‬g ( S e c t io n 7 0 ) , 4 1 6 - 4 1 8 , *std-: 4 2 g f (Hegel) (ftn . H . 3 0 3 , 3 2 2 ; cf. fin . H . 1 1 7 )

Index o f English Expressions sta n d : steh en; etc. {ftn . H . 117, 303, 32a) stan d before (See our entry fo r ‘ impend’ above.)

stan d by itself (See our entry fo r failure to stand by itself’ .)

stan d o u t: ab h eb en (con trast; b rin g o u t; com parison); herau sh eb en (H . 118) B ut cf. ou tstan d in g (ausstehen, *A usstand), and ftn . H . 250 •)■standard: *M assstab; *m assgebend (H . 160, 165) H . 268, 395, 417 state: V erfassung: * S taat (H . 398, 403) B ut cf. state o f affairs: *S achlage: H . 51, 158 ( ß n . H . 8) constitutive state: V erfassung state o f Being: Seinsverfassung state-of-m ind: *Befindlichkeit, befind­ lich, sich befinden (ftn . H . 134, 137, 328) (df. H . 133, 134, I36f, 190, 276, 328, 346,

350) H . 133, 134-148 (Sections 29-31), 184-191 (Section 40), 339 - 34 6 (Section 68 b ), et passim Statem ent: *A ussagesatz: etc.

H• !57f

fs te a d in e s s : * B e stän d ig k e it, b e s tä n d ig ; *S tätigkeit (ftn . H . 423) H . 320, 322, 39of, 398 (Note: the adjective ‘steady’ has occas­ ionally been used in translating other expressions.)

fstill-a-D a sein : *N ochdasein H . 239 stock: B estand sto p : * au fh ö ren ; etc. H . 244 f, 329 f !s tre a m : *Strom"; *Fluss B ut cf. Ausfluss (effluence, H . 291) stream o f E xperiences: H . 194, 344, 388 stream o f “ now s” : H . 410, 422, 426 stream o f tim e : H . 426, 432 !stre tc h , stretch alo n g : Strecke, ers­ trecken H . 23, 106, 371, 373 *37539 ° ‫־‬f> 4 ° 9 f‫־‬

4 !7f423 ‫־‬

stru ctu re, s tru c tu ra l: *S tru k tu r, *struktu ral

569

B ut cf. stru c tu ra l elem ent (*Auf-

bauelem ent, H . 33 4 ); sub­ stru ctu re (* U n terb au , H . 210; *S ubstruktion, H . 241) !a s-stru c tu re: *A ls-struktur, *Struktu r des Als H . 149, 151, 154, 158, 359f fcare-stru c tu re, stru c tu re o f care: *S orgestruktur H . 196, 259, 317, 323, 328, 3 3 if,

346, 35° |e n d -s tru c tu re : *E n d e-stru k tu r H . 244, 246 fore-structure (See our entry above.)

! te m p o ralizatio n -stru ctu re: * Zeitigungsstruktur H . 332 |w o rld -stru c tu re : *W eltstru k tu r H . 366, 414 stru ctu re o f Being, B eing -stru ctu re: *Seinsstruktur !stru c tu re o f tr u th : *W ahrheitsstru k tu r H . a 16, 223, 226 !s tru c tu ra l to ta lity : *S tru k tu rg an zheit H . 131, 182, 193, 209, 234, 334 stru c tu ral w hole: * S trukturganze H . 65, 131, 180-184 (Section 39), ig if, 231-233, 236, 252, 3i6f,

323‫־‬325‫ ־‬35°

See also H . 2-15 (Int. I) , especially H . 5-8 (Section 2), et passim subject (noun), subjective: *Subjekt,

*subjektiv B ut cf. su bject-m atter. (See entry below). (df. H . 46, 60, 114, 126, 204, 227,

227, 230, 366, 419) subject vs. D asein: H . 60 (Contrast H . 229) subject vs. Self: H . 303, 322 subject vs. O b ject: (See Object.)

subjectivity vs. O b jectiv ity : H . 395, 405, 411, 419 isolated subject: H . 118, 179, 188, 204, 206, 321 worldless su b ject: H . 11 of, 116, 192, 206, 366 subjects o f O th ers: H . 119, 121, 123, 126, 128, 384 p resen t-at-h an d su b ject: H . 119, 121, 123, 128, I3 if, 176, 320

570

Being and Time

subject— cont. ‘id eal subject’ : H . 229 absolute subject: H . 228, 318 know ing subject: H . 47, 60 th e ‘subject’ o f everydayness: H . 114, 128 ‘factu al’ subject: H . 229 factical su b je c t: H . 229 ‘theoretical subject’ : H . 316 ‘historical’ su b je c t: H . 382 ‘logical subject’: H . 319 (Kant) subject vs. p red icate : H . 154^ 3 i8 f th e a priori and th e subject: H . 229 (Cf. H . n o ) tr u th and the subject: H . 227, 229 tim e and th e su b ject: H . 419 th e w orld and the subject: H . 62, iogf, 164 (See also worldless subject.) subjectivity o f the subject: H . 24 ‘subjectivity’ o f th e w o rld : H . 65,

3 * 4 3 2 0

‫ ־‬3 17-323 ‫ ־‬n . xix,

435.

su b stan tial B eing: H . 47, 87f su b stan tiality as basic a ttrib u te of B eing: H . 201 ontology o f th e su b stan tial: H . 319, 320 n . xix substance and su b je c t: H . 2, 317, 321,

332

substance and Self: H . 114, 303, 317, 320 n. xix, 323, 332 substance and th e “ I ” : H . 317f, 320, 322 substance and p erson: H . 47, 320 n. xix substance and sp irit: H . 117 su b stan tiality and D asein’s subsistence: H . 303 soul-substance: H . 46, 114, 318 m a n ’s su bstance: H . 117b, 212, 314 substance and w o rld : H . 90, 94, g6 corporeal su b stan ce: H . 90, 92 366 substance and th e p resen t-at-h an d : ‘subjectivity’ o f tim e : H . 419, 427 ‘subjectivity’ o f w o rld -tim e : H . 419 H . 114, 318 Kant on the subject: H . 24, lo g , 204, su b stan tiality and R e ality : H . 212 substance a n d fu n ctio n : H . 88 3 i 9 3 2 ‫־‬i su b ject-m atter: sachDescartes o n su bstance: H . 90, 92(Note: this expression has been used only 96, 98, 100 in translating the words ‘sachK a n t o n su b stan tiality : H . 318-323 haltig’ , 'Sachgebiet', and *‘SachScheler on substances, etc.'. H . 47 logik'.) ,(succession, successive: *N ach ein an d er; f subjectum: *S ubjektu m ; *subjectum *Sukzession (H . 432, n. x x x ); H . 46, 114, 319, 322 *Sich-jagen (H . 322) f subm it, subm ission: anw eisen, *An*N ach ein an d er: H . 242, 291, 350, gew iesenheit; Sichstellen u n te r 3 7 4 ‫ ־‬422 , 426 , 430 (H . 74) ■fsuicide: *S elbstm ord ( fin . H . 87) H . 22g H . 87, 137, 139, 161, 297, 348, 383, sum , sum m ation, su m m a tiv e: *Sum m e, 412 *S um m ierung, *sum m ativ fsubsist, subsistence: bestehen, BeH . 125-127, 187, 210, 242-244, 244 n. stan d iii. 370 , 374 (ftn . H . 303) fsu m m o n : *A ufruf, *aufrufen H . 7. 1 5 3 2 7 2 ,216 ‫ ־‬n . vi, 284, 288,(ftn . H . 26g, 273) H . 26g, 273-275, 277, 27gf, 287, 303» 333 430 ,420 ‫ ־‬348 , 3 5 2 ‫־‬ (See also entries f o r 'Self-subsistence' 28gf, 292, 294-296, 2ggf, 313, and ‘self-subsistent’ above.)

substance, substan tial, su b stan tiality : *Substanz, * substantial, *substantiell, * S u b stan tialitat B ut cf. su b sta n tiatio n (Bewahru n g , H . 209) (ftn . H . 25, 303) ( d f H . 87, 8gf, 92, 94, 318) H . 22, 46f, 63, 68, 87-90, 92-g6, 98, 100, 114, 117, 201, 212, 303,

317 fs u n : *Sonne B u t cf. sunrise (A ufgang, H . 103, 4 1 3 ); sunset (N iedergang H . 4! 3 ) .C f . also sonnenklar (clarity, H . 2) H . 71, 103, 412f, 415f, 432 n. xxx (Hegel)

superficial: äusserlich (ftn . H . 33g)

Index o f English Expressions su p erio r: überlegen (adj.) But cf. superior pow er (*Ü b erm ach t, H . 384f). Cf. also the verb ‘überlegen’ (‘to deliberate’). H . 254, 258 ■fsupra-tem poral: überzeitlich H . 18, 395 •fsurmise: * ahnen H . i73f, 219 su rm o u n t: ü berw inden surprise: verw undern (am aze, H . 172); ü berraschen (H . 355) ■fsurrender: *ausliefem H . 128, i38f, 144, 178, 185, 199,

57 *

take b a ck : * zurücknehm en, *Z u rü ck ­ n ah m e (ftn. H . 308, 344) H . 308, 332, 244, 370, 436, et passim tak e co g n izan ce: K en n tn is n ehm en, K en n tn isn ah m e But cf. cognize, cognition (erkennen, E rkenntnis), fta k e th e first c u t: *anschneiden (H .

150)

(ftn. H . 150)

H. 79. 315. 359

tak e in : ein n eh m en : au fn eh m en (H . 428) But cf. tak e in ad v an ce (vorw egneh­ m en, H . 264) (ftn. H . 368) H .3 6 8 take in to one’s reckoning

H. 33f. ” 7. !59f. 178, 430 {Hegel)

take o v er: ü b ern eh m en , Ü b ern a h m e fta k e a re st: *au sruh en H . 57, 172, 193 take tim e (See tim e.) talk (See discourse.) f ta r r y : *verw eilen H . 61, 120, 138, 172, 220, 238, 346f,

299, 412

survey: Ü bersicht, übersehen (over­ look; etc.) sym bol: *Sym bol H . 29, 7 7 t 163 sym ptom : A nzeichen (*betoken, H . 185); *S ym ptom (H . 29) But cf. sym ptom o f a disease (K ran k ­ heitserscheinung, H . 29) (ftn. H . 29) H . 78, 80 synthesis: *Synthesis, *Synthese

(Note: see also owBtots.)

system : *System H . 36, 87f, 159, et passim ta c it: unausdrücklich (unexpressed, n o t explicit, etc.); unausges­ p rochen (unexpressed); *still­ schw eigend tak e accoun t

(See entry on ‘take into one’s reckoning’ under ‘reckon’ above.) tak e actio n : h an d eln H . 69, 174, 176, 288, 294f, 300, 302,

3 I0> 3 *9. 326

(Note: this list also includes passages in which ‘handeln’ is translated by 'action’ or some-other form of the verb ‘act’.) fta k e along: m itn eh m en H . 108, 172, 268, 273, 345, 348, 369

(Note: this list also includes those pas­ sages in which ‘mitnehmen’ has been translated as ‘carry along'.) tak e a p a rt: auseinanderlegen ; *auseinan d em e h m en (H . 159) (ftn. H . 149) H . 149

(See entry under ‘reckon’ above.)

358

f te a r (verb): reissen H . 142, i73f, 178, 193, 222, 236, 238, 263, 348, 351, 383f

(Note: this list includes all passages in which ‘reissen’ and its compounds appear, though they are often translated by ‘snatch’ , ‘drag’ , or ‘wrench’ rather than by ‘tear’.) fT e m p o ra l, T em p o ra lity : *tem poral, * T e m p o ra lität (ftn. H . 17, 231) H . 19, 23-26, 39f, 147 tem p o ral, tem p o ra lity : *zeitlich, *Z eit­ lichkeit But cf. tem p o ral attrib u te , tem p o ral c h arac te r (* Z eitb estim m th eit); tem p o ral stage (*Zeitstufe, H . 349 ) (ftn. H . 17, 304) (df. H . i7f, 234f, 326, 329, 331, 333f, 338 n . iii, 350 . 36 7 . 39 6 ‫ ־‬405 . 420 , 426 ,

436)

H . 17-19, 21, 39, 41, 199, 204, 231437 (Division II; see Table o f

Contents.)

572

Being and Time

tem poralize: zeitigen (ftn . H . 235, 304) (df. H . 235, 304, 328, 365) H . 22, 122, 152, 178, 235, 304, 328340, 342, 344, 348-350> 252-355‫־‬ 365 *375 ‫־‬f‫ ־‬381 ‫ ־‬388 , 395-397 ‫־‬ 405-416, 420f, 425-427, 436f (T h is list includes, in its first fou r items, the passages in which ‘zeitigen’ has been translated as ‘ bring about’ or *'bring to maturity’ .) te m p t: versuchen (try ; a tte m p t; etc.)', etc.

th eoretical, th eo ry : *theoretisch, * T heorie (ftn . H . 69) (df. H . 69, 138, 356ff) H . 59, 67, 69, 81, 136, 138, i57f, 166, 193, 199, 248, 251, 257f, 261, 300, 312, 3 i5 f, 320 n. xix, 33535 ‫ ־‬if, . 356-364 (Section 69b), et passim) (Note: fo r ‘ theory o f judgment’ , ‘ theory o f relativity’ , etc., see entries fo r ‘judgment’ , ‘ relativity’ , etc. B ut fo r ‘ theory o f knowledge’ , see ‘epistemology’ .)

H . i77f, 180, 253f, 330, 347 th e “ th ere” : *das D a f tense (a d j.) : gespannt (ftn . H . 135, 239) (df. H . 119, 132, (ftn . H . 409) 13 3 4 2 » ‫» ־‬35 ‫־‬f 2 H . 374 350364 ‫)־‬ f tense (noun) : *T em pus H . 75, 102, 119, i32f, 134-166 (I, V , A ). 166-180 (I, V , B), 22of, H . 349 f te rro r : *E ntsetzen 237 ‫ ־‬263 , 265 , 270 , 276 , 284 , H . 142 296-300 , 311 , 326 , 334-336 , testim ony: Z eugnis 339 ‫ ־‬343 ‫ ־‬3 47-350 , 364 , 366 , (ftn . H . 256) 382, 385, 391, 406, 408, 410, 4!2f, 415 f th e “ that-it-is” : *das Dass (Note: cf. also H . 74, 83, i26f, 186, (ftn . H . 135) 189 , 195 ‫ ־‬238 , 328 , 365 , 389 , H . i35f, 276, 284, 340, 343 422, 434 (Hegel)). See also ■fthe ‘th a t it is’ : *das “ Dass es ist” entries fo r ‘Being-there’ , ‘haveB u t cf. th e fact th a t it is (*Dass-sein, been-there’, ‘ no-longer-Being-there’ .) H . 5, 7, 14) (ftn . H . 135) th ere is: es g ib t; etc. H . i 34f (ftn . H . 212, 412) ■fthe ‘th a t it is a n d has to b e ’ : *das th e ‘th ere is’ : H . 7, 228 “ Dass es ist u n d zu sein h a t” ‘T h e re is’ som ething re a d y -to -h a n d : H . i34f, 276, 284 H. 7 1 ‘T h e re is’ a w o rld : H . 72 ■fthe ‘th a t it is th ere’ : *das “ dass-es-da‘T h e re is’ B eing: H . 212, 230, 316 ist” ‘T h e re L>’ tr u th : H . 214, 226, 228, H . 265 ‘T h e re is’ tim e: H . 41 if. them e, th em atic, th em atize: * T h em a, *them atisch, * them atisieren th ere-w ith -u s: *m it-da(ftn . H . a) (df. H . 363) H . 130, 250 H - 2, 4, 9, 31, 41-45 (Section 9), (Note: cf. also 'Dasein-with’ .) 6 7 - 6 9 8 3 ,74-76 ‫־‬, i n f , 124,th130e “ th ey ” ; *das M a n ; etc. 134 (Section 28), 145, 149, (ftn . H . 113, 129, 253) (df. H . 114, 238f, 354, 362-365, 376, 393126-130, 138, 252, 391, etc.), 397, 422, et passim publicness o f th e “ th ey ” : H . 138,188, th e “ th e n ” : *das D a n n 190, 192, 252f, 271, 277f (ftn . H . 406) com m on sense o f th e “ th ey ” : H . H . 406-414, 4 2 if, 427 260, 288, 292, 296, 309, 312, f th e “ th en ce” : *das D o rth er 387 ‫ ־‬395 H . 369 th e w ay things h av e been in te rp re te d ■ftheology: *Theologie b y th e “ th ey ” : H . 190, 252, H . 10, 28, 34, 48f, 139, 190 n . iv, 258, 273, 309, 331 229, 248, 249 n. v i, 269, 272 n. idle ta lk o f th e “ th ey ” : H . 174, 252, vi, 290, 306 n. 2 255, 277f> 296

,6

Index o f English Expressions th e “ th ey ” — cont. am b ig u ity o f th e “ th ey ” : H . 174 tran q u illizatio n b y th e “ th ey ” : H . ! 7 7 2 5 4 .195 ‫ ־‬J B eing-w ith-one-another in th e “ they” : H . 175 th e D asein-w ith o f O th ers in th e “ they” : H . 176 everyday Being-one’s-Self a n d th e “ they” : H . 126-130 (Section 27), 252 in au th en tic B eing (or existence) in th e “ th ey ” : H . i78f, 367 au th en tic B eing-one’s-Self as a m odi­ fication o f th e “ they” : H . 267Ç 277 absorption in th e “ they ” : H . 167, 184, 189, 222, 270, 315 lostness in th e “ th ey ” : H . 175, 177, 189, 253, 268, 271, 274, 287, 289, 297, 299, 307f, 383, 390 listening aw ay to th e “ they ” : H . 271 fleeing in to th e “ th ey ” : H . 322 falling a n d th e “ th ey ” : H . 135, 189, 277» 287, 331 th e “ they” as h ero : H . 371 th e “ they” as d eterm in in g o n e’s state-of-m ind: H . 170, 177, 254 passing over th e “ they” : H . 273 th e “ they” a n d th e call: H . 296 th e “ they” a n d resoluteness: H . 299,

307 th e “ they” a n d th e S itu atio n : H . 300 th e “ th ey ” a n d rep etitio n : H . 391 th e “ they” a n d d e a th : H . 252-255, 257, 263, 266, 424f. th e “ they” a n d tim e : H . 411, 425 (See also: H . 167, 193, 224, 278, 298, 318.) tthey-self: *M an-selbst (ftn . H . 129, 287, 322) H . 129, 181, 193, 263, 266-268, 271274, 276-278, 280, 288, 299, 3 ” . 317 ‫ ־‬322 , 337 , 391 T h ing, T h in g h o o d : *D ing, *D inglichkeit H . 46-49, 54, 63f, 67-69, 73f, 79-83, gof, 96-100, 114, 121, 124, 203f, et passim thing, thinghood: Sache, *S ach h eit; etc. (ftn . H . 27) th e things them selves: *die S achen selbst H . 9, 27, 34, 38 n . v., 95, 153, 166, 213, 219, 256, 358

573

th in k : d en k en ; etc. ‘I th in k ’ : H . 24, 319-321, 427 thin k in g as Siavoeiv: H . 96 p u re th in k in g : H . 88 th in k in g as a d erivative from u n d e r­ stan d in g : H . 147 R elations as m erely ‘som ething th o u g h t’: H . 87f th in k in g a b o u t d e a th : H . 254, 257f, 261, 309 th in k in g to th e e n d : H . 305, 424 (See also H . 62, et passim.) f th e this-w orldly: *das Diesseits H . 248 fth e “ th ith e r” : *das D o rth in H . i n , 368 f th ra ll to : *hörig H . 163, 287 fth re a te n , th re a t: * bedrohen, * drohen (df. H . 140, 142, 253, 341, 343) beholding a n d th e th re a te n in g : H . 138 fear a n d th e th re ate n in g : H . 137, 140-142, i85f, 341 anxiety a n d th e th re a te n in g : H . i86f, 189, 265, 277, 343 uncanniness a n d th e th re a te n in g : H . 189, 277 (See also H . 241.) throw , throw nness: *w erfen, *Geworfenheit, * W u rf (ftn . H . 135, 145) (df. H . 135,179, 221, 276, 277, 284, 285, 348,

364)

throw nness in to existence: H . 276 throw nness in to th e “ th ere” : H . 135, 148, 265, 284, 297, 413 throw nness in to a w o rld : H . 192, 228, 348, 383, 406, 413 throw nness in to un can n in e ss: H . 343

throw nness in to indefiniteness: H . 298, 308 throw nness in to th e possibility o f d e a th : H . 251 throw nness in to Being-tow ardsd e a th : H . 348 throw nness in to d e a th : H . 251, 256, 308, 329 throwness in to th e “ n o th in g ” : H . 277n th ro w n B eing-in-the-w orld: H . 161, 181, 189, ig if, 259, 383 th ro w n B eing-w ith-one-another: H .

175

Being and Time

574

th ro w — cont. th ro w n B eing-tow ards-the-end: H .

251

th ro w n B eing-tow ards-death: H . 344,

348 th ro w n basis: H . 284, 287, 306, 325 th ro w n in d iv id u alizatio n : H . 280, 343

th ro w n possibility: H . i4 4 f th ro w n potentiality-for-B eing: H . 188,339 th ro w n potentiality-for-B eing-in-a w orld: H . 192, 252 throw nness and facticity : H . 135, 179, 221, 276j 284, 328, 348, 410, 414, 436 throw nness and everydayness: H . 167 throw nness and disclosedness: H . 221, 276, 415 throw nness and falling: H . 179, 415, 424 throw nness and tu rb u le n c e : H . 179 throw nness and ab a n d o n m e n t: H . 3 4 7 » 365» 406, 413 throw nness and m ood, state-of-m ind, etc.-. H . I35f, 139, 144, 179, 181, 251, 270, 276, 328, 340, 365 throw nness and fear: H . 342 throw nness and anxiety•. H . 187,191, 251» 343 f throw nness and ad d ictio n a n d u rg e: H . 196 throw nness and c a re : H . 383, 406, 412 throw nness and p ro jectio n : H . 145, 138, 195» 199» 223, 285, 3 36,406 throw nness and conscience: H . 291 throw nness and B eing -to w ard s-d eath : H . 344, 348, 374 throw nness and freed o m : H . 366 throw nness and h av in g -b e en : H . 328, 3 4 ° . 345 » 385 » 396 throw nness and tim e-reckoning: H . 412f tak in g over o ne’s thro w n n ess: H . 383, 385

com ing back b eh in d one’s th ro w n ­ ness: H . 284, 383 th row ing ag ain st: *entgegenw erfen: H . 363 tie u p : festm achen; k lam m em (H . 274) H . 123, 151, 192, 414 tim e: * Z eit; etc. {ftn. H . 329, 408) {df. H . 329, 408, 421, 423, 431-434)

tim e as th e h orizon for th e u n d e r­ stan d in g o r in terp re ta tio n o f B eing: H . i, 17, 3 9 ,4 1 , 235, 437 th e o rd in ary w ay o f u n d erstan d in g or in te rp re tin g tim e: H . 18, 235, 304, 326, 328f, 338n. iii, 404437 (I I, V I ; esp. Section 81) th e tra d itio n a l conception o f tim e: H . 18, 24, 235, 349, 428, 432, xxx. th e everyday experience o f tim e:

H. 333, 405» 420 p rim o rd ial and derivative tim e: H . 329-332, 405, 426, 436 tim e and c a re : H . 235, 327, 424 tim e and th e “ th ey ” : H . 425 tim e and id le ta lk : H . 174 tim e and reticen ce: H . 174 tim e and space: {See entry under ,space’ )

tim e and histo ry : H . 379, 4 0 4 f tim e and sp irit: H . 405f, 428-436 (Section 82), 427 allow ing tim e: *Z eit lassen: H . 404,

4° 9f»4'4

assigning tim e : *Z eit angeben, * Z eit­ a n g a b e : H . 408-410, 413, 418, 422 counting tim e : Z e it zählen*. H . 4 2 i f d a tin g tim e : H . 4o8f, 4 i2 f, 415, 417, 422 expressing tim e : *Z eit aussprechen: H . 408, 411, 4 2 i f {Cf. also H . 4o6f, 410) giving th e tim e : *Z eit g eb en : H . 4 i2 f, 420, 422, 432 n . xxx h av in g tim e: * Z eit h a b e n : H . 404, 4ogf, 4 i8 f, 422, 425 in terp re tin g tim e : H . 407-414 levelling o ff tim e : H . 329, 405, 422, 424-426, 4 3 if, 432 n. xxx, 435 losing tim e : H . 404, 410, 418, 425 m easuring tim e : *Zeitm essung, *Z eitm ass: H . 71, 413-419, 417 n. iv, 422 read in g o ff th e tim e: Z eit ablesen (*tell tim e, H . 70 ): H . 415-417 sp an n in g tim e : {See span.) tak in g tim e, tak in g o n e’s tim e : *sich Z eit n eh m e n : H . 4 0 4 f 410-413, 416, 418, 421, 424f {See also entry fo r ,taking time into one’ s reckoning’ below.) telling tim e : {See read in g o ff the

tim e.)

Index o f English Expressions tim e— cont. using tim e (*Z eit b ra u c h e n ): H . 235, 333 ‫ ־‬409 concern w ith tim e: H . 406-420 (Sections 79, 80), 42a {Cf. also H . 333.) tim e-reckoning: H . 235, 333, 411t, 414-418 n. v reckoning w ith tim e : H . 235, 333, 3 7 14 4 22 tak in g tim e in to o ne’s reckoning: H . 371, 404 f413 ‫ ־‬4 ” ‫־‬ ‘tim e goes o n ’ : H . 330, 425 ‘tim e passes aw ay ’ : H . 330, 425f tim e as finite, endless, in-finite: H . 33of, 424-426 tim e as continuous: H . 423 tim e as irreversible: H . 426 stream o f tim e: H . 426, 432 course o f tim e: * L a u f d e r Z eit (H . 422); * Z eitv erlau f (H . 40 0 ); * K reislau f d e r Z eit (H . 432 n. xxx); m it d er Z e it (H . 328) p o in t o f tim e: * Z eitp u n k t: H . 374, 407 earlier tim e: H . 378, 419 ‘p ast’ tim e: H . 380 ‘fugitive’ tim e: H . 425 ‘q u alitativ e’ tim e : H . 333 ‘psychical’ tim e: H . 349 ‘subjective’ or ‘O bjective’ tim e: H . 326, 405, 411, 419, 427 ‘im m an e n t’ or ,tran scen d en t’ tim e: H . 326, 419 ‘tim e for . . *“ Z eit zu . . H. 412, 414 ‘w rong tim e for . . * U n zeit fü r

575

Aristotle on tim e: H . 26, 40, 42, 427,

427

n. xiv, 432 n. xxx

Augustine on tim e : H . 427, 427 n. xv Bergson on tim e : H . 18, 26, 3 3 3,432 n. XXX

Hegel on tim e: H . 405^ 427, 428-436

(Section 82), H . 432 n . xxx Hyginus on tim e : H . 198 Kierkegaard on tim e: H . 338 n. iii Plato on tim e : H . 423

th e B eing o f tim e: H . 406, 419, 431 (Note: the word ‘time’ has also been used in a fe w stereotyped phrases to translate some other expressions in which ‘ Z eit’ does not appear.)

th e “ to ” : das a u f . . . (ftn . H . 329) to b e: *Zu-sein H . 42 fto h an d : *zur H and H . 73, 102, 105 B ut cf. read y -to -h an d (*zuhanden) to -d ay : h eu te H . 371, 378, 381, 386, 391, 397, 407,

409 to g eth er:

zusam m en;

*beisam m en;

etc.

H . 33» 55f204- 206, 242- 244, 390 ‫ ־‬159‫־‬, et passim

tom orrow : *m orgen, *das M orgige H . 371 th e “ too” ; das “ A u ch ” H . 118 tool: W erkzeug (eq u ip m en t for w ork­ ing, H . 68) H . 69, 73f, 157, 354^ 361 to tality : * G an zh eit; G an ze (w hole); das' A ll (H . 9, 14, 6 4 ); G esam ­ . . . ’:H. 414 th e it (H . 28) a t th e tim e: jew eilig, jew eils; etc. B u t cf. to tal (*total) in tim e: in d e r Z eit: H . i8f, 204, 330, (ftn . H . 236) 338, 338 n. iii, 34of, 349, 355, 367. 373 f38 ‫ ־‬3 7 6 , 379 ‫ ־‬if, to tality o f B eing-in-the-w orld: H . 231 to tality o f c a re : H . 193^ 196, 317, 4 ° 4 f9 «72 , 263, 288, 295f, 311, 336 ‫ ־‬338 ( 350 , 387 ( H . 1, 4, 12, 20-22, 53, 58, 85-87, 123-125, 133, 142-153 (Sections 31, 32), i6of, 170, i73f, 178, 183, 207f, 212, 222, 225, 231, 235> 252, 260, 272, 279, 280289 (Section 58), 295f, 304, 334 3 3 6 3 3 9 ‫( ־‬Section 68a), 340, 350, 361-364, 378-382 (Section 73), 421, 437, et passihi give to u n d e rstan d : (See entry fo r this expression above.)

undifferentiated (See Indifferent.) un ity , u n itary , u n ite d : *E in h eit, *ein­ heitlich u n ity o f analo g y : H . 3 u n ity o f B eing-in-the-w orld: H . 53,

351

Index o f English Expressions u n ity — cont. u n ity o f B eing-outside-of‫־‬itself: H . 430 (Hegel) u n ity o f ca re : H . 181, 316, 327f,

351 u n ity o f D asein’s con stitu tio n : H . 200 u n ity o f D asein’s existential stru c tu re : . H . 351 u n ity o f E xperiences: H . 390 u n ity o f horizo n tal sch em ata: H . 365 u n ity o f th e “ I ” : H . 433 (Hegel) u n ity o f liv in g -th ro u g h : H . 47 (1Scheler) u n ity o f m ean in g : H . 48 (Scheler) u n ity o f N a tu re : H . 144 u n ity o f th e p e rs o n : H . 4 7 f (Scheler) u n ity o f p ro jectio n : H . 407 u n ity o f relations: H . 354 u n ity o f significance: H . 365 u n ity o f sp atiality : H . 104 u n ity o f th e stru ctu ral w hole: H .

. 3 *7) 325

579

*A llesvergleichen: *universal comp ariso n : H . 52 +u n i vocal: *einsinnig

H• 93

fu n m a n a g e a b le : * u n h an d lich B ut cf. m a n ag e (vorstehen; etc.)

H. 355 u n p resen t: {See m ake u n p resen t.) f u n -re a d y -to -h a n d : * u n zu h an d en (ftn . H . 74) H . 73f, 242f, 355, 359 tu n so c ia b ility : U n u m g än g lich k eit (inev itable, indispensable, etc.) H . 125 u n su itab le: ungeeignet (in ap p rop riate) H • 733« ‫ >־‬J57>355*4 ‫־‬M 422 ‫־‬

(Note: this list includes the chief passages in which ‘ungeeignet’ has been translated as ‘ inappropriate’ .)

th e ‘u n til-th e n ’; das “ bis d a h in ” H . 409 f u n tr u th : * U n w ah rh eit H . 222f, 229, 256f, 2g8f, 308 un v eil: en th ü lle n ; u n v erh ü llt th e “ u p o n -w h ich ” : das W o ra u fh in H • >45324 ‫ ־‬151‫־‬f, 365

u n ity o f te m p o ra lity : H . 33gf, 365f, 369, 408, 423 {See also ecstatical unity.) u n ity o f tem p o ralizin g : H . ■427 ,4‫ףן‬ u n ity o f th e “ there” : H . 366 u n ity o f T hings o f N a tu re : H . 48 (Note: this list also includes a few u n ity o f th e w o rld : H . 364 passages in which ‘ woraufhin’ has ecstatical u n ity : 328, 338-340, 342, been translated as ‘ upon which' or 346, 34gf, 353, 355, 363 n. ‘ whereupon'.) xxiu, 365, 381, 408, 421, 423 fu p ro o t: *entw urzeln u n ity o f fu tu re a n d h aving-been: H . 2 if, 170, 173, 177, 196, 222 H. 397 ju r g e {noun): * D ran g ; d rä n g e n (H. u n ity o f m aking-present a n d reten345) tive aw aiting: H . 355, 416 B u t cf. u rg en t (dringlich). u n ity o f the ontical a n d th e H ist(ftn . H . 182, 194) orical: H . 403 H . 10, 194-196 u n ity o f th e reference o f serviceability an d th e reference o f u rg e (v erb): d rän g e n ; * b ed rän g en (H . 196); * ein d rän g en indicating: H . 78 use, m ake use, p u t to use, usable, etc. : u n ity o f throw nness a n d Beingverw enden; g eb rau ch en (emto w ard s-d eath : H . 374 ploy, H . 2 5 ); * G eb rau ch ; u n ita ry ph en o m en a: H . 5 3 ,1 5 1 , 181, b rau ch en (n e e d ); etc. 326 {ftn. H . 333) u n ita ry stru ctu res: H . 130f, 192 H . 56, 67-70, 74, 83f, 99, 102f, universal— allgem ein (general); *uni14 4 3 5 2 ,333 ,235 ‫־‬f, 357, e versal; etc. passim allgem ein: H . 2-4, 156, 177, 251, using a n d m an ip u latin g (Geb278, 280, 395, 417. 434 (H 'gel) *A llgem eingultigkeit: *universal ra u c h en u n d H a n tie re n ): H . 67, 69 ‫ ־‬102, 352 , 357 , 359 validity, *universally valid charusing clocks: H . 404, 414-418, 420f acter using signs: H . 79, 8 i f H . 156, 205 n. xv, 227, 395 using tim e: H . 235, 409 *universal: H . 38f, 178, 395

580

Being and Time

use— cont. using up: *verbrauchen, *auf­ brauchen: H. 244f, 333 unusable: *unverwendbar, *un­ brauchbar: H. 73f, 355 Thing o f use: * Gebrauchsding: H. 99 ']‫׳‬ utilitarianism: *Nützlichkeitsmoral H. 293 utilize: verwenden (H. 333); nutzen (H. 61); ausnützen (H. 4 11); etc. ( ftn . H. 333) utter (verb), utterance: Verlautbarung

H. 32f, 163-165, 271-273, 277, 296 utter (a d j.): völlig: schlechthin; schlechthinnig f uttermost: äusserst H. 250, 255, 259, 262-264, 266, 302f, 326 valid, validity: gelten, Geltung; gül­ tig, Gültigkeit (ftn . H. 155) H. 7, 99, 127, i55f, 227, 357, 395 value: W ert; etc. H. 63, 69, 80, ggf, 150, 152, 227, 286, 293f veil: verhüllen; einhüllen; versch­ leiern (H. 136) f velocity: Geschwindigkeit (speed, H. 105) H . 91, 97 f vicissitude: Geschick (ftn . H . 384) H. 16, 19, 379) fviolent: gewaltsam (drastic, H. 219) H . 183, 287, 311, 313, 315, 327 •fvirtuality: *Virtualität H . 401 vision: (See d ear vision, moment o f vision.) f vitalism: *Vitalismus (H. 10) B ut cf. vital (lebendig, H . 400, 402). fvolition: Wollen H . 136, 139 voice: *Stimme alien voice: H . 277 mysterious voice: H . 274 voice o f conscience: H . 268f, 271, 275, 280, 290-292, 294, 300 voice o f the friend: H. 163 voice o f the “ they” : H . 278 voice which is universally binding: H . 278

•fvolatilize: *verflüchtigen H. 87f, 117, 177, 420 fvoluntative: *voluntativ H . 210, 210 n. xix w ait: warten; etc. (ftn . H. 25, 26, 338) H . 262, 337f, et passim want: wollen wanting to have a conscience: (See entry under ‘conscience' above.) fw a m : *warnen B u t cf. warning signal (H. 78, 80). H . 161, 279, 281, 290, 292, 294 w ay of conceiving: Bergrifflichkeit the ‘we’ : das “ wir” H. 227f •fthe we-world: *das Wir-welt H .6 5 weak, weakness: *schwach, *Schwäche B u t cf. weaken (*abschwächen). H . 251, 254 fw elfare work: Fürsorge (ftn . H . 121) H . 121 the “ what” : das Was H. 12, 27, 42, 45, 122, 143, 158, 274 the “ when” : das Wann H . 258, 265 fth e ,then, when . . .*: *das “ dann, wann . . .” : H. 407, 410, 412, 4* 4

■fthe “ whence” : *das Woher H. 134-136, 280, 348 the “ where” : das W o H . i02f, 107 fth e “ whereat” : das Wobei H . 107 the “ wherein” : das Worin H . 30, 65, 76, 80, 86f, n o , 151, 198, 202 (Note: this list also includes some passages in which ‘ das Worin' or ‘ worin' has been translated some­ what more freely.)

the “ whereof” : das Woraus H. 70 (Note: cf. also H . ig 8 .)

■fthe “ whereupon” : das Woraufhin H .36 5 (Note: cf. our entry fo r ‘ the “ uponw hkh" ’.)

the “ whither” : das Wohin H . 103, 108, n o f, 134-136, 280, 365, 368

Index o f English Expressions 5

the “ who” : das W er 7 ” ‫ ־‬5 3 . " 3 < 114 ‫( ־‬Section 25), 126, 128-131, 267, 276, 311, 3 17 . 375 whole: ganz, Ganze; etc. (ftn . H. 236) the whole o f Dasein: H. 181, ig if, 200, 230, 232f, 237-241 (Sec­ tion 47), 259, 264, 306, 317, 329, 372f, 436 the whole o f Being-in-the-world: H. 41, 137, 152, 180 the whole o f care: H. 221, 300 the whole o f life: H. 46 the whole of discourse: H . 163 the whole o f places: H. 48 the moon as a whole: H. 243 whole and sum: H. 244 n. iii Being-a-whole: *Ganzsein H. 234, 235-267 (II, I esp. Section 4 6). 3 013 ° 5 ‫( ־‬Section 61), 317, 325. 331 » 37 2 f potentiality-for-Being-a-whole: (See entry under ‘potentiality-for-Being’ .) (See entry under 1structure'.) (Note: see also totality.)

structural whole:

‫־‬wholeness: *Gänze ( ftn . H. 236) H. 236-238, 240 lie “ w hy” : das W arum H . 276 (,will (noun) : *Wille (ftn . H. 182) H. 136, 182, 209-211, 271, 275 will (verb): wollen (ftn . H. 194) H . 194^ 210, 290-293 wish: *Wunsch, *wünschen (ftn . H. 182, 194) H. 162, 182, i94f the ‘with’ : das “ M it” (H. 118) (ftn . H. 84) the “ with-which” : das Womit H . 85-88 (C f. also H. 158, 352f). with one another: miteinander (mutu­ al, H. 155) H. 120-127, i2gf, 138, 142, i6 if, i64f, 168, 173-175, 177, 238240, 252f, 273, 282, 2g8, 354, 37 °> 37 9 » 384» 387^ 4» of, 4 «3 » 416, 425 tBeing without one another: *Ohne­ einandersein H . 121

■fwith-world: *Mitwelt H. 118, 125, 129, 300 within: innerhalb (in; among, H. 211); inner-; das “ Innere” (H. 136) fwithin-the-environment: *inner­ umweltlich: H. 66, 85 fwithin-space: *innerräumlich: H. 102 fw ithin-tim e: (See entry under ‘ time’ .) within-the-world: *innerweltlich (But cf. within the world (*inner­ halb der W elt); in the world (*in der Welt) (ftn . H. 13) (df. H . 65, 101, 118, 209, 366) H. 65, 72-76 (Section 16), 80, 8288, 95-98, ioof, 102-104 (Section 22), 113, 118, i86f, 189, 201, 203, 209, 211, 351, 366, et passim word: W ort; etc. H. 87, 15g, 161, 164, 202, 273, 402 (Yorck)

work (noun): *W erk; Arbeit B ut cf. welfare work (Fürsorge, H. 121). (ftn . H. 70) *W erk: H. 6gf, 352-354, 387-389,

3g5>412

work (verb): -arbeiten; -wirken; etc. work out: ausarbeiten (treat); *her­ ausarbeiten; *durcharbeiten (H. 93; auswirken (development, H. 96) H. 148, 231, et passim work-world, world o f w ork: * Werkwelt H. 71, 117, 172, 352 world: *Welt (ftn . H. 63) (df. H. 64f, 72, 75, 364^ 380, 414) abandonment to the world: H. 172, 412 absorption in the world: H. 125, i2gf, 172, 192 Being alongside the world: H . 54, 119, 146, 194, 277 Being-already-alongside-the-world: H. 61, 109, 277 Being-in-the-world: (See special entry above.)

Being-no-longer-in-the-w orld: H. 176, 238, 240 Being towards the world: (See entry under 'Being towards’ above.)

B e in g -w ith -o n e -a n o th e r-in -th e world: H. 238f, 384

582

Being and Time

w orld— cont. belonging to the w orld, H . 65, 381 concern w ith th e w o rld : H . 61, 199, 253, 277, et passim discovering th e w o rld : H . 55, 129, 138, 165, 195, 203 disclosedness o f th e w o rld : H . 76, *37‫ ׳‬139« 14 1‫ ־‬J45f> 186-188, 202f, 2 io f, 220, 272, 297, 333, 364^ 368, 412, 4 i9 f fam iliarity w ith th e w o rld : H . 76, 86 fascination w ith th e w o rld : H . 61 fleeing th e w o rld : H . 254 g ettin g ‘lived’ by th e w o rld : H . ig s f going-out-of-the-w orld: H . 238, 240 having-been-in-the-w o rld : H . 394 inform ation ab o u t th e w o rld : H . 152 in terp re tin g th e w o rld : H . 129 know ing the w o rld : (See entry fo r ' know the world’ above.)

lettin g the w orld ‘m a tte r’ to one: H . 170 openness to the w o rld : H . 137 presupposing th e w o rld : H . 361, 365 relations to th e w o rld : H . 57 su b m ittin g to th e w o rld : H . I37f, 139 surren d ered to th e w o rld : H . 199 th ro w n into th e w o rld : H . 192, 199, 221, 228, 348, 413 u n d erstan d in g the w o rld : H . 16, 86, 146, 148, 152, 168, 366 am b ig u ity and th e w o rld : H . 173 anxiety and th e w o rld : H . 186-188, 335 , 343 D asein-w ith and th e w o rld : H . 121. 123, 137 environm ent and th e w o rld : H . 66, 101-113 (I, H I C) fear and the w orld : H . 141 the p resent-at-han d and th e w o rld : H . 57 , , 3 0, 369 R eality and th e w o rld : H . 106, 203, 211 the ready-to-hand and th e w o rld : H . 75f, 83, 106, 119, 122, 137 resoluteness and th e w o rld : H . 2g8f significance and th e w o rld : H . i n , i44f, 147, 151, 166, 186, 297, 335 , 343 , 366, 423 spatiality and the w o rld : H . 101-113 (I, I I I C ), 369 Being-there o f th e w o rld : H . 132 historizing o f the w o rld : H . 389 ‘n atu ral conception o f th e w orld’: H . 50-52 (Section 11)

th e “ n o th in g ” o f th e w o rld : H . 187, 189, 276, 335, 343 ontology o f th e w o rld : H . 100 ‘subjectivity’ o f the w o rld : H . 36 transcendence o f th e w o rld : H . 3 5 0 3 6 6 (Section 69, esp. 69c), 4*9

w orldhood o f th e w o rld : (See entry fo r ‘worldhood’ below.) alien w o rld : H . 172 e x tern al w o rld : (See entry above.) historical w o rld : H . 376, 381,