HAZID Worksheet FORM Rev.25 May 2012 - Timas & Premier Oil Indonesia

HAZID WORKSHEET

Project

: ANOA PHASE 4 - AGX COMPRESSION RECONFIGURATION PROJECT

Node Description Date of HAZID Study

: DLB Activities in the vicinity and moored alongside AGX Platform : 25 May 2012

No

Type of Event

Potential Hazards

Initial Risk

Consequences

1

Anchor Handling Work Boat collision with Boat damage / lost boat the platform / AHT Personnel injury (Running Messanger Line Under the Bridge) using Work Boat

5

S 2

R HR

2

3 Running Anchor Lost control of wire due Damage to redundant umbilical / subsea structure / Anchor Wire to failure of comunication or control system

2

3

AHT collision with the platform / complex

Damage to vessel or complex (damage to riser) Personnel injury Schedule delay

5

L

HAZID Study for Premier ANOA Phase 4 - AGX Compression Reconfiguration Project

Safeguards (Existing and Recommended Control Measures)

Residual Risk

1. Approved Anchor Handling Procedure 2. Reliable / maintained work boat 3. Weather limit 4. Adequate illumination of work area 5. Trained work boat operation 6. Maintain good communication 7. JSA for work boat operation 8. FRC/MOB Boat ready at all time 9. Suitable PPE: include work vest

1

1

R LR

MR

1. Approved Anchor Handling Procedure 2. DP Vessel as AHT 3. Reliable and well maintained vessel (with MWS approval) 4. Competence Vessel Captain 5. Maintain good communication between Anchor Tower and AHT

3

1

LR

HR

1. Approved Anchor Handling Procedure 2. JSA for Anchor Handling 3. Weather limit for Anchor Handling 4. Parachute Buoy 5. DP Vessel as AHT 6. Reliable and well maintained vessel (with MWS approval) 7. Competence Vessel Captain 8. Maintain good communication between Anchor Tower and AHT 9. Weather limit 10. Briefing about the facility for all Vessel Captain including the location of risers 11. Secondary AHT standby in the field at all time

3

1

LR

N1

S

L

REC #

Recommendation

Action Party

Page 1 of 15

HAZID WORKSHEET

No

Type of Event

Potential Hazards

Initial Risk

Consequences

S

3

DLB Approach / Final Departure of AGX

L

Drop/Drag Anchor on Subsea Facility

Damage Subsea Facility Environmental HC Discharge Potential fire/explosion Company reputation

5

3

R HR

DLB colission with platform and riser

Damage to both DLB and 5 Platform Personnel injury / Lost of life Schedule delay Environmental impact

2

HR

Safeguards (Existing and Recommended Control Measures)

Residual Risk S

L

1. Subsea / Seabed Survey DONE 3 2. Approved Anchor Handling Procedure and Approved Anchor Pattern 3. Anchor on Deck of AHT 4. Mooring Analysis 5. BMS/Survey Equipment Calibration 6. Pull test the anchors 7. Continue anchor wire tension monitoring by Anchor Tower 8. Shut Down & Depressurize West Lobe line 9. Compliance with POI Marine Procedure

1

R LR

1. Approved Anchor Handling Procedure 3 (Step by Step DLB Approach to AGX) 2. Weather limit 3. Maintain good communication with all parties 4. Final approach only after all anchors are installed / laid and DAY Light only. 5. Shut Down the platform and Depressurize West Lobe line during Final Approach 6. AGX Riser is inside the Jacket 7. Responsible person on DLB monitoring the gangway tip during final approach 8. Minimize personnel on AGX during DLB final approach 9. Complete GO and No GO Checklist for the DLB Final Approach to AGX

1

LR

REC #

Recommendation

Action Party

10. Anchor removal for final departure is the reverse of anchor installation. (Meeting will be performed with relevant parties including MWS for removal anchors).

HAZID Study for Premier ANOA Phase 4 - AGX Compression Reconfiguration Project

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HAZID WORKSHEET

No

Type of Event

Potential Hazards

Initial Risk

Consequences

S 4

DLB Crane Operation

Dropped loads / objects Damage asset causing HC on Topside of AGX / leak Subsea Facilities Personnel injury Schedule delay Environmental delay

5

4

R HR

Crane Boom collision Damage asset causing HC with the AGX Topside leak and/or with Other Crane Personnel injury Schedule delay

4

3

Damage asset causing HC 3 leak / Environmental impact Personnel injury Schedule delay

2

Crawler Crane fall over the side due to bad weather related during lifting (overloaded / dynamic load)

L

HAZID Study for Premier ANOA Phase 4 - AGX Compression Reconfiguration Project

Safeguards (Existing and Recommended Control Measures)

Residual Risk

1. Approved Lifting Procedure 4 2. Certified and good condition Crane (include MWS inspection/approval) 3. Certified and good condition Rigging 4. Certified and experienced Crane Operator and Rigging Personnel 5. Maintain good communication among parties involved 6. All lift within the SWL of the crane / rigging 7. Weather limit 8. Stay clear from load 9. Suitable PPE

1

R MR

HR

1. All Cranes will be under the control of the 3 Project (CTR). 2. Designated Person In Charge for Every Lift 3. Good illumincation 4. Procedure control for Cranes Operations (SIMOPS) 5. Detail planning meeting for Crane Operations 6. Trained and experienced Crane Operator and Rigging Personnel 7. Maintain good communication among all involved parties

1

LR

MR

1. Weather limit 2. Barge rails in place 3. Certified and good condition crane 4. Certified and good condition rigging equipment 5. Certified and experienced Crane Operator and Rigging Personnel 6. Operate cranes within the design limit

1

LR

N1

S

3

L

REC #

Recommendation

Action Party

1

1. Risk Assessment to be Timas/POI performed for using the Crawler Crane for Personnel Transfer related to the visibility (ability of the Crane Operator to see the FROG)

2

2. Review Crawler Crane Operation Procedure

Timas

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HAZID WORKSHEET

No

Type of Event

Potential Hazards

Initial Risk

Consequences

S 5

Ignition Source DLB Exhaust on DLB - Gas Release (10mm hole on Gas-Gas Exchanger) with 20knots wind speed toward the DLB

Increase risk of Fire/Explosion in the event of HC release

1

L 1

R LR

Safeguards (Existing and Recommended Control Measures)

Residual Risk

1. DLB Exhausts are located on the STBD 1 Forward. 2. Gas is lighter than air (Gas-Gas Exchanger is +16 elevation) 3. F&G and ESD System on AGX 4. ERP Procedures 5. Platform will inform the DLB in case of F&G detection system on platform is activated 6. PM on platform e.g. leaks prevention 7. Portable Multi-Gas Detector on Stern of DLB

S

L 1

R LR

1

LR

REC #

Recommendation

Action Party

NOTE: based on 10mm hole during the study, the dispersion of HC release / gas cloud would NOT reach the DLB.

Electrical Equipment on Increase risk of DLB (Lights, Etc) Fire/Explosion in the event of HC release

1

1

LR

1. Gas is lighter than air (Gas-Gas Exchanger 1 is +16 elevation) 2. F&G and ESD System on AGX 3. ERP Procedures 4. Platform will inform the DLB in case of F&G detection system on platform is activated 5. PM on platform e.g. leaks prevention 6. Switch off the light on Crane Boom during the Day Light 7. Weather proof lighting/electrical system on the barge deck and crane boom 8. DLB can be pulled / winched away (winch speed approx 60m per minute) 9. Construction activities around process area controlled by PTW asper integrated project plan 10. Portable Multi-Gas Detector on Stern of DLB

3

Explore the possibility to Timas switch off the lights and other ignition source on crane

NOTE: based on 10mm hole during the study, the dispersion of HC release / gas cloud would NOT reach the DLB.

HAZID Study for Premier ANOA Phase 4 - AGX Compression Reconfiguration Project

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HAZID WORKSHEET

No

Type of Event

Potential Hazards

Initial Risk

Consequences

S Crawler Crane Exhaust

Increase risk of Fire/Explosion in the event of HC release

1

L 1

R LR

Safeguards (Existing and Recommended Control Measures)

Residual Risk

1. Crawler Crane is located more than 60 1 meters away 2. Crawler Crane Exchaust is fitted with Spark Arrestor 3. Gas is lighter than air (Gas-Gas Exchanger is +16 elevation) 4. F&G and ESD System on AGX 5. ERP Procedures 6. Platform will inform the DLB in case of F&G detection system on platform is activated 7. PM on platform e.g. leaks prevention

S

L 1

R LR

1

LR

REC #

Recommendation

Action Party

NOTE: based on 10mm hole during the study, the dispersion of HC release / gas cloud would NOT reach the DLB.

Welding Machines on DLB

Increase risk of Fire/Explosion in the event of HC release

1

1

LR

1. During SIMOPS, Welding Machines are 1 located on DLB are 60m away from the platform. 2. Standby Persons to disconnect the welding leads to Platform and shut down (turn off) the welding machines on DLB. 3. Gas is lighter than air (Gas-Gas Exchanger is +16 elevation) 4. F&G and ESD System on AGX 5. ERP Procedures 6. Platform will inform the DLB in case of F&G detection system on platform is activated 7. PM on platform e.g. leaks prevention 8. Portable Multi-Gas Detector on Stern of DLB NOTE: based on 10mm hole during the study, the dispersion of HC release / gas cloud would NOT reach the DLB.

HAZID Study for Premier ANOA Phase 4 - AGX Compression Reconfiguration Project

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HAZID WORKSHEET

No

Type of Event

Potential Hazards

Initial Risk

Consequences

S Hot Works on DLB

Increase risk of Fire/Explosion in the event of HC release

1

L 1

R LR

Safeguards (Existing and Recommended Control Measures)

Residual Risk

1. All Hot Works on DLB Deck will be covered 1 by PTW 2. Standby Persons to disconnect the welding lead to Platform and shut down (turn off) the welding machines on DLB. 3. Gas is lighter than air (Gas-Gas Exchanger is +16 elevation) 4. F&G and ESD System on AGX . ERP Procedures 5. Platform will inform the DLB in case of F&G detection system on platform is activated 6. PM on platform e.g. leaks prevention 7. Portable Multi-Gas Detector on Stern of DLB

S

L 1

REC #

Recommendation

Action Party

R LR

NOTE: based on 10mm hole during the study, the dispersion of HC release / gas cloud would NOT reach the DLB.

COMMENT: The probability (frequency) of having leaks will be further elaborated (POI)

HAZID Study for Premier ANOA Phase 4 - AGX Compression Reconfiguration Project

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HAZID WORKSHEET

No

Type of Event

Potential Hazards

Initial Risk

Consequences

S 6

Ignition Source DLB Exhaust on DLB - Gas Release (100mm hole on Gas-Gas Exchanger) with 20knots wind speed toward the DLB

Increase risk of Fire/Explosion in the event of HC release

1

L 1

R LR

Safeguards (Existing and Recommended Control Measures)

Residual Risk

The release of HC with 100mm hole is 1 demonstrated to unlikely because: 1. As per QRA 2. Process Integrity Management e.g. FLIR Camera, rectification of significant TSS Matrix Integrity Related Defect. All Integrity related check and improvement are included on the GO and NO GO Process. 3. No break of containment the process system during SIMOPS 4. No Heavy Lifting over the process during SIMOPS (Most construction activities involved small weights - structure lifted in around the platform edges west and south 5. Drop Object Protection is in place for Gas Gas Exchanger

S

L 1

REC #

Recommendation

Action Party

R LR

The risk of release of gas has been reduced to ALARP, if it would occur the severity would be less. Additional Safeguards: 1. DLB Exhausts are located on the STBD Forward. 2. Gas is lighter than air (Gas-Gas Exchanger is +16 elevation) 3. F&G and ESD System on AGX 4. ERP Procedures 5. Platform will inform the DLB in case of F&G detection system on platform is activated 6. PM on platform e.g. leaks prevention 7. Portable Multi-Gas Detector on Stern of DLB NOTE: based on 100mm hole during the study, the dispersion of HC release / gas cloud would NOT reach the DLB Exhaust.

HAZID Study for Premier ANOA Phase 4 - AGX Compression Reconfiguration Project

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HAZID WORKSHEET

No

Type of Event

Potential Hazards

Initial Risk

Consequences

S Electrical Equipment on Increase risk of STERN of DLB (Lights, Fire/Explosion in the event Etc) of HC release

5

L 1

R HR

Safeguards (Existing and Recommended Control Measures)

Residual Risk

The release of HC with 100mm hole is 4 demonstrated to unlikely because: 1. As per QRA 2. Process Integrity Management e.g. FLIR Camera, rectification of significant TSS Matrix Integrity Related Defect. All Integrity related check and improvement are included on the GO and NO GO Process. 3. No break of containment the process system during SIMOPS 4. No Heavy Lifting over the process during SIMOPS (Most construction activities involved small weights - structure lifted in around the platform edges west and south 5. Drop Object Protection is in place for Gas Gas Exchanger

S

L 1

R MR

REC # 4

Recommendation

Action Party

Requirement of Multi Gas Timas Detector on the STERN of DLB to be captured in Project Procedure

The risk of release of gas has been reduced to ALARP, if it would aoccur the severity would be less. Additional Safguards are: 1. F&G and ESD System on AGX 2. ERP Procedures 3. Platform will inform the DLB in case of F&G detection system on platform is activated 4. Close water tight doors on the crane tub 5. Portable Multi Gas Detector on the Stern of DLB. 6. Any lifting over the process during the SIMOPS shall be covered by PTW, Risk Assessment.

HAZID Study for Premier ANOA Phase 4 - AGX Compression Reconfiguration Project

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HAZID WORKSHEET

No

Type of Event

Potential Hazards

Initial Risk

Consequences

S Crawler Crane Exhaust

Increase risk of Fire/Explosion in the event of HC release

5

L 1

R HR

Safeguards (Existing and Recommended Control Measures)

Residual Risk

The release of HC with 100mm hole is 4 demonstrated to unlikely because: 1. As per QRA 2. Process Integrity Management e.g. FLIR Camera, rectification of significant TSS Matrix Integrity Related Defect. All Integrity related check and improvement are included on the GO and NO GO Process. 3. No break of containment the process system during SIMOPS 4. No Heavy Lifting over the process during SIMOPS (Most construction activities involved small weights - structure lifted in around the platform edges west and south 5. Drop Object Protection is in place for Gas Gas Exchanger

S

L 1

REC #

Recommendation

Action Party

R MR

The risk of release of gas has been reduced to ALARP, if it would aoccur the severity would be less. Additional Safguards are: 1. Crawler Crane is located more than 60 meters away 2. F&G and ESD System on AGX 3. ERP Procedures 4. Platform will inform the DLB in case of F&G detection system on platform is activated 5. PM on platform e.g. leaks prevention 6. Crane Crawler will be shut down upon the detection of Gas Release after operation is secured.

HAZID Study for Premier ANOA Phase 4 - AGX Compression Reconfiguration Project

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HAZID WORKSHEET

No

Type of Event

Potential Hazards

Initial Risk

Consequences

S Welding Machines on DLB

Increase risk of Fire/Explosion in the event of HC release resulting: - Personnel injury - Asset damage

5

L 1

R HR

Safeguards (Existing and Recommended Control Measures)

Residual Risk

The release of HC with 100mm hole is 4 demonstrated to unlikely because: 1. As per QRA 2. Process Integrity Management e.g. FLIR Camera, rectification of significant TSS Matrix Integrity Related Defect. All Integrity related check and improvement are included on the GO and NO GO Process. 3. No break of containment the process system during SIMOPS 4. No Heavy Lifting over the process during SIMOPS (Most construction activities involved small weights - structure lifted in around the platform edges west and south 5. Drop Object Protection is in place for Gas Gas Exchanger

S

L 1

REC #

Recommendation

Action Party

R MR

The risk of release of gas has been reduced to ALARP, if it would aoccur the severity would be less. Additional Safguards are: 1. During SIMOPS, Welding Machines are located on DLB are 60m away from the platform. 2. Standby Persons to disconnect the welding lead to Platform and shut down (turn off) the welding machines on DLB. 3. F&G and ESD System on AGX 4. ERP Procedures 5. Platform will inform the DLB in case of F&G detection system on platform is activated 6. PM on platform e.g. leaks prevention 7. Refer to Technical Note for Control of Welding Machines Isolation 8. Portable Gas Detector on the STERN of the DLB.

HAZID Study for Premier ANOA Phase 4 - AGX Compression Reconfiguration Project

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HAZID WORKSHEET

No

Type of Event

Potential Hazards

Initial Risk

Consequences

S Hot Works on DLB

Increase risk of Fire/Explosion in the event of HC release resulting: - Personnel Injury - Asset Damage

5

L 1

R HR

Safeguards (Existing and Recommended Control Measures)

Residual Risk

The release of HC with 100mm hole is 4 demonstrated to unlikely because: 1. As per QRA 2. Process Integrity Management e.g. FLIR Camera, rectification of significant TSS Matrix Integrity Related Defect. All Integrity related check and improvement are included on the GO and NO GO Process. 3. No break of containment the process system during SIMOPS 4. No Heavy Lifting over the process during SIMOPS (Most construction activities involved small weights - structure lifted in around the platform edges west and south 5. Drop Object Protection is in place for Gas Gas Exchanger

S

L 1

R MR

1

LR

REC #

Recommendation

Action Party

The risk of release of gas has been reduced to ALARP, if it would aoccur the severity would be less. Additional Safguards are: 1. All Hot Works on DLB Deck will be covered by PTW 2. Standby Persons to disconnect the welding lead to Platform and shut down (turn off) the welding machines on DLB. 3. F&G and ESD System on AGX 4 ERP Procedures 5. Platform will inform the DLB in case of F&G detection system on platform is activated 6. PM on platform e.g. leaks prevention 7. Portable Gas Detector on STERN of DLB

7

Emergency (Fire) Fire as Ignition Source and its Impact to the on DLB Safety of the Platform Complex

Increase Risk of Fire on Platform (AGX) if there is concurrent HC Release

2

2

LR

1. DLB can be pulled / winched away from the 1 Platform (winch speed is approx 60m per minute). 2. F&G System and Fire Fighting System on the DLB 3. ERP 4. Portable Gas Detector on the STERN of the DLB. NOTE: based on 10mm hole during the study, the dispersion of HC release / gas cloud would NOT reach the DLB.

HAZID Study for Premier ANOA Phase 4 - AGX Compression Reconfiguration Project

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7

Emergency (Fire) on DLB

HAZID WORKSHEET

No

Type of Event

Potential Hazards

Initial Risk

Consequences

S Helicopter Emergency on DLB

Increase Risk of Fire on Platform (AGX) if there is concurrent HC Release

2

L 2

R LR

Safeguards (Existing and Recommended Control Measures)

Residual Risk S

1. DLB can be pulled / winched away from the 1 Platform (winch speed is approx 60m per minute). 2. F&G System and Fire Fighting System on the DLB 3. ERP 4. Portable Gas Detector on the STERN of the DLB.

L 1

REC #

Recommendation

Action Party

R LR

NOTE: based on 10mm hole during the study, the dispersion of HC release / gas cloud would NOT reach the DLB. Failure of Main Generator / Black Out on DLB

8

Process Upset on AGX

DLB cannot pull away in case required

3

2

LR

1. Redundancy of Generators 2. Emergency Power Generator 3. Fail Safe Brake on the anchor winches 4. AHT / Tow Tug standby in the field at all time 5. PM System on DLB

1

1

Increasing Flaring Rate Increase Radiant Heat in the 2 due to Blow Down Event vicinity of AGX Crane

2

LR

1. Radiant Heat Study for AGX shows that it 1 is safe for the Crane Operator to be inside the Crane Cabin during Full Process Blow Down. 2. Proximity of DLB Crane Operator is farther from the Flare Tip therefore impact of Radiant Heat is minimal.

1

LR

2

LR

1. Process System is designed to fail safe 1 2. Process is continuosly monitored from CCR 3. Process System will be maintained and functional with no significant case to operate in place during SIMOPS 4. Contingency Plan in place such that AGX Project Team will be asked to leave AGX until ESD event has been rectified 5. COntingency Plan in place such that HOFO will communicate potential for escalation to DLB such that preparation may made for DLB withdrawl from AGX vicinity.

1

LR

NOTE: No Effect anticipated to the DLB based on Flare Radiation Study

ESD Event Causing Creates changes in Process 2 AGX Process Instability System Pressure, Temperature, and Liquid Inventory which could lead to an increase potential for HC release

HAZID Study for Premier ANOA Phase 4 - AGX Compression Reconfiguration Project

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HAZID WORKSHEET

No

Type of Event

Potential Hazards

Initial Risk

Consequences

S 5

2

R HR

Interference with Crane Helicopter collision with 4 Operation Cranes / Crash Personnel injury / Lost of life

3

10 Vessel Movement / alongside on DLB

Collision with the DLB / Platform / Material Barge / Anchor Buoy / Anchor Wire

Asset damage 4 Personnel injury / Lost of life Schedule delay

11 SIMOPS Operation Between DLB Crane and AGX Crane

DLB Crane Boom collision with the AGX Crane

Damage asset Personnel injury Schedule delay

Gas Release Anoa Riser

9

Helicopter Operation on DLB

Fire / Explosion Personnel Injury

4

L

Safeguards (Existing and Recommended Control Measures)

Residual Risk

1. Mitigation as per CTO Procedure 5 2. F&G System on AGX 3. ERP Procedures 4. Platform will inform the DLB in case of F&G detection system on platform is activated 5. DLB can be pulled / winched away to clear from platform (winch speed approx 60m per minute)

1

R HR

HR

1. Crane Operations on DLB will be shut down and/or crane boom would be clear for Helicopter Operations 2. Trained and experienced HLO 3. Inform Crane Operators of Incoming Helicopters 4. ERP

3

1

LR

3

HR

1. Suitable Vessels (Include MWS 2 inspection/approval) 2. Competent Vessel Captain 3. Slack Anchor Wires if required 4. Good communication between paties involved 5. Weather limit 6. Adequate fendering on DLB and vessels 7. Briefing to all Vessel Captain prior to entering 500m zone 8. High Vis painted Anchor Buoys 9. Comply with POI Marine Operation Procedure 10. Establish communication with HOFO prior to entering 500m Zone and/or Marine Supertindent prior to approaching DLB

2

LR

3

HR

1. All Cranes will be under the control of the 3 Project (CTR). 2. Designated Person In Charge for Every Lift 3. Good illumincation 4. Procedure control for Cranes Operations (SIMOPS) 5. Detail planning meeting for Crane Operations

1

LR

HAZID Study for Premier ANOA Phase 4 - AGX Compression Reconfiguration Project

N1

S

L

REC #

Recommendation

Action Party

Page 13 of 15

HAZID WORKSHEET

No

Type of Event

Potential Hazards

Initial Risk

Consequences

S

L

R

Safeguards (Existing and Recommended Control Measures)

Residual Risk S

L

12 Personnel Transfer

Personnel being Transferred Fall from Height

Personnel injury / Lost of life 5

3

HR

1. Certified and good condition Crane 2. Certified and good condition FROG 3. Certified and good condition rigging 4. Provision of safety sling 5. No personnel transfer untill the Vessel will be securely moored 6. Distance of free board between DLB and vessel is small 7. Provision of tag lines 8. Familiarization for transfer using FROG 9. Maintain good communicaton among parties involved (CO, Bunksman, and Riggers). 10. Weather limit defined for personnel transferring using FROG and Crawler Crane

2

1

LR

13 MAE on AGX/ANOA

Pool Fire on ANOA coming from ANOA 8" Riser Pipeline

Personnel injury / Lost of life 5 Impair both ANOA and AGX Muster Area

1

HR

1. All personnel shall muster to DLB including 5 POI Personnel 2. Corrosion Monitoring and Pigging Pipeline covered by FIMS 3. PSLL on the pipeline 4. Daily surface inspection 5. DLB will be pull / winched away

1

HR

14 N2 Operation

Condensate on the sea Personnel Injury / Lost of due SKIM pile overfilled Life

3

1

MR

1. Level Management 2. Daily surface inspection 3. DLB will be pull / winched away

1

1

LR

Extreme Temperature Personnel injury (minus 160 - minus 200 Cryogenic C) Embrittlement

3

3

MR

1. Engineered and certified ISO Storage Tanks 2. Scaffold and bunded area 3. Use of planks and tarpaulin

3

2

MR

N2 Spill

Personnel Injury Cryogenic Embrittlement

3

3

HAZID Study for Premier ANOA Phase 4 - AGX Compression Reconfiguration Project

MR

1. Engineered and certified ISO Storage Tanks 2. Scaffold and bunded area 3. Use of planks and tarpaulin

N1

3

2

REC #

Recommendation

Action Party

R

5

Verify the certification of the storage tank and inspection prior to mobilization offshore

Timas / PNS

6

Review the N2 handling and storage procedure

Timas / PNS

MR

Page 14 of 15

HAZID WORKSHEET

No

Type of Event

Potential Hazards

Initial Risk

Consequences

S 15 3rd Party Vessel Collision with the Anchor Buoy / Anchor / Security Wire

Personnel Injury Asset Damage Schedule Delay

L

3

2

R MR

Safeguards (Existing and Recommended Control Measures)

Residual Risk S

L

1. High Vis Anchor Buoy 2. Standy By Vessels 3. Radar Watch 4. Intensity of Marine Activities would deter the 3rd Party Vessel to stay away 5. Liaison Officer onboard of DLB

3

1

R LR

REC #

Recommendation

Action Party

16 Sabotage

Construction Crew Increase risk of incident tempering with Platform and DLB system

3

2

MR

1. Socialization of work to the offshore construction team in advance 2. PTW, JSA, and workpacks 3. Involve operation team during work pack review and execution of the works 4. Maintain positive working environment, provide motivation 5. Restriction to sensitve areas (security measures) e.g. safety / warning signs, socialize restricted areas during meeting/awareness, Access Control 6. Maintain adequate supervision / QC 7. Reward program

3

1

LR

7

Operation to review the existing "security measures" and improve as required

POI

17 Communication between DLB and its Support Vessels and between DLB and AGX/ANOA

Clear Communication Method NOT established

3

2

MR

1. ANOA HSE Induction / Awareness 3 2. Various coordination meeting e.g. daily planning meeting 3. Provision of radio communication 4. English speaking key personnel 5. Permission to be obtained from HOFO prior to entering 500m zone 6. Permission to be obtained from Marine Superintendent for approaching DLB or entering the Anchor Pattern 7. Competent Vessel Captain 8. Briefing of all support vessels include socialization of procedures 9. Complete GO and No GO Checklist.

1

LR

8

Establish radio communication channel for all parties to minimize interference

Timas/POI

Increase risk of miscommunication / interference leading to incident resulting to: - Personnel injury - Asset damage

HAZID Study for Premier ANOA Phase 4 - AGX Compression Reconfiguration Project

N1

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