HAZID Report Rev-0

UNITED ENERGY PAKISTAN LTD. NAIMAT PHASE V PROJECT

HAZID REPORT Feb 2014 Revision: A

REV

DATE

DESCRIPTION

PREPARED

CHECKED

APPROVED

A

22/02/2014

Issued for Review

MSA

Sheraz (MSG)

MSZ

0

10/02/2014

Issued for distribution

MSA

Sheraz (MSG)

MSZ

CONTENTS ABBREVIATIONS

3

DEFINITIONS

4

HOLDS

6

1.0

INTRODUCTION

7

1.1

7

2.0

Workshop Scope

PROCESS DESCRIPTION

8

2.1

8

Background

3.0

METHODOLOGY

4.0

MEETING DETAILS

10

5.0

HAZID FINDINGS

11

5.1

Recommendations:

11

5.2

HAZID Comments

13

6.0

HAZID FOLLOWUP

APPENDICES

9

16

NO TABLE OF CONTENTS ENTRIES FOUND.ABBREVIATIONS BLEVE

Boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion.

BOP

Blowout preventer.

CVP

Capital value process.

DCS

Distributed control system.

EA

Engineering authority.

FEED

Front end design.

HAZID

Hazard identification.

HAZOP

Hazard and operability (study).

HSSE

Health, safety, security, and environmental.

HSSE&O

Health, safety, security, environmental, and operational.

IPL

Independent protection layer.

ISD

Inherently safer design.

LNG

Liquefied natural gas.

LPG

Liquefied petroleum gas.

MOC

Management of change.

OMS

Operating management system.

P&ID

Piping and instrumentation diagram.

PFD

Process flow diagrams.

PHSSER

Project HSSE review.

TOR

Terms of reference.

DEFINITIONS Cause Event, situation, or condition that results, or could result, directly or indirectly in an accident or incident. Competent Describes an individual with knowledge and skills deemed acceptable by the engineering authority (EA) to perform a task. Appropriate knowledge and skill may be acquired through training, experience, qualifications, or some combination of these. Consequences Direct, undesirable result of an accident sequence usually involving a fire, explosion, or release of toxic material. Consequence descriptions may be qualitative or quantitative estimates of the effects of an accident in terms of factors such as health impacts, economic loss, and environmental damage. Hazard Condition or practice with the potential to cause harm to people, the environment, property, or reputation. Hazard identification (HAZID) Brainstorming approach used to identify possible hazards. HAZID studies are very broad in their scope. The HAZID is sometimes called a Preliminary Hazard Analysis. Hazard and operability (HAZOP) Systematic qualitative technique to identify and evaluate process hazards and potential operating problems, using a series of guidewords to examine deviations from normal process conditions. Independent protection layer (IPL) Device, system, or action that is capable of preventing a postulated accident sequence from proceeding to a defined, undesirable endpoint. An IPL is (1) independent of the event that initiated the accident sequence and (2) independent of any other IPLs. IPLs are normally identified during layer of protection analyses. Initiating cause A failure, error, situation, or condition that results or may result in the propagation of a hazardous event. Risk A measure of loss / harm to people, the environment, compliance status, Group reputation, assets or business performance in terms of the product of the probability of an event occurring and the magnitude of its impact. Throughout this Practice the term “risk” is used to describe health, safety, security, environmental, and operational (HSSE&O) undesired events. Node A discrete area or portion of an activity, plant, or system that permits a stepwise approach towards progressing through the HAZID. Safeguards Device, system, or action that would likely interrupt the chain of events following an initiating cause or that would mitigate loss event impacts.

What If analysis Scenario based hazard evaluation procedure using a brainstorming approach in which typically a team that includes one or more persons familiar with the subject process asks questions or voices concerns about what could go wrong, what consequences could ensue, and whether the existing safeguards are adequate.

HOLDS No holds.

1.0

INTRODUCTION United Energy Pakistan commissioned HAZID study for Naimat Phase-V Gas treatment and LPG extraction project. The project is in FEED stage. Detailed design (EPCC) will be initiated soon, a Tender Document has been prepared by FEED which will form basis of design for detailed engineering. HAZID looked into generic project and process hazards associated with the project. A two days session was conducted at UEPL head office in Bahria Complex-1 on 17th & 18th of Feb 2014.

1.1

Workshop Scope The HAZID will look into Naimat Phase-V scope only. Existing on-going projects, Phase-IV and TAP will not be subject of this HAZID however hazards due to SIMOPSs and any interconnectivity between existing and new units will be considered in this HAZID scope. The purpose of HAZID is to: •

Identify potential hazards as defined in the TOR for the HAZID study.

•

Consider consequences of the hazards.

•

Identify safeguards that are in place to provide hazard prevention or mitigation.

•

Propose recommendations, as needed, to eliminate, prevent, control, or mitigate hazards.

•

Provide assistance to facility management in its efforts to manage risks.

•

Support objectives of ISD.

2.0

PROCESS DESCRIPTION

2.1

Background Naimat Facility is a gas treatment and LPG recovery plant which consists of four (04) phases. Each phase consists of Amine Sweetening unit and Glycol Dehydration unit along with their utilities. There is a refrigerated LPG unit and Condensate stabilization unit. Within this plant there is condensate and LPG storage and loading area.

2.1.1

New facilities (PHASE-V) Naimat Phase-V will be adjacent to and fed from Naimat Facility which consists of Separation unit, Amine Sweetening unit, Glycol Dehydration unit, Molecular Sieve Dehydration unit, Turbo-Expander LPG Recovery Unit, Condensate Stabilization unit and Sales Gas Compression along with their utilities and offsites. It is decided that this phase will be a stand-alone and will process Naimat West gas whereas 40 and 85 MMSCFD additional gas from existing Naimat Phases can be processed in Glycol dehydration unit and LPG unit respectively. There is also provision given in condensate stabilization unit to process condensate from existing Naimat Phases. Utilities for Naimat Phase-V will consist of Hot Oil system, Instrument and utility Air system, Fuel Gas system, Power Generation system, Firewater system, Warm and Cold Flare system. RO (Reverse Osmosis) system for this phase will be installed along with Naimat Phase-IV RO system. Storage and Loading facilities will be provided for condensate and LPG. Produced water system will be installed for disposal of produced water. LP/HP drain systems will also be provided to handle drains generated during maintenance and shutdown. Storm water pit is provided at the area where flare stack is situated and have enough capacity to handle large amount of water generated due to rain fall.

3.0

METHODOLOGY HAZID was carried out as per industry standard practices. HAZID looked into Major Accidents as well as HSSE hazards during construction as well as commissioning and operation stage. A set of guidewords or brainstorming reference list was used during the session. HAZID team was encouraged to consider more deviations / hazards which may be missing in generic list. For each guideword team did brainstorming, identifying potential consequences and list existing safeguards and generate recommendations for further mitigation as required. A risk Matrix (8x8) was used to risk rank all the identified hazards. The purpose of risk ranking was to prioritize the findings on a scale. Risk ranking should not be interpreted as Qualitative or Quantitative risks of the project as at the FEED stage limited technical details were available to assess the risks accurately hence only relative ranking of findings was done. HAZID identified a number of actions which were categorized either as Recommendations or Comments, former being actions to be addressed at FEED to EPCC stage and later (comments) to be either incorporated in Tender Document or actions already in place but need completion or verification.

4.0

MEETING DETAILS

Workshop Attendees Name

Designation

17/02/2014

18/02/2014

Muhammad Saim Ahmed

Facilitator

√

√

Muhammad Sheraz Goraya

Process Engineer / HAZID Scribe

√

√

Jamal uddin

Field Production Engineer

√

√

Abduallah Sheikh Muhammad

Engineering Manager

√

√

Syed Fraz Rizvi

FOE-MKK

√

√

Mansoor Ahmed Khan

Mechanical Engineer

Mansoor Ali Khan

Engineering Consultant

Yasir Mahdi

FOE-Central & South

√

Iqbal Sahto

Facility Manager-MKK

√

Masood Sarwar

HSE

√

Muhammad Hani

Process Engineer (ZEL)

√

Ahsan Nasir

Project Engineer (ZEL)

Muhammad Mudassir Mirza

Sr. Electrical Engineer (ZEL)

√

Irfan Khokhar

Sr. Instrumentation Engineer (ZEL)

√

√ √

√

√ √

√

5.0

HAZID FINDINGS HAZID identified a number of actions to be addressed in Tender Document, during detailed engineering or management actions addressing issues like regulatory compliance and organization related actions. Some actions need to be closed before issuing tender document for EPCC others require closure during detailed engineering (EPCC), some management actions need to be closed during the course of project e.g. resourcing and development of operating staff, preparation of Emergency Response Plans etc. These actions and comments are listed below:

5.1

Recommendations:

1.2.2.1 Evaluate flare foundation design in storm water pit considering long residence time for storm water 1.2.2.2 Consider facility drain system in design for heavy rains case (no option available for storm water drainage out of facility at present) 2.4.1 Verify that transport protocol for contractor is included in tender documents

UEP & EPCC

UEP

3.3.1 Verify that Tender Document clearly states that plant and equipment layout shall be based on Fire & Explosion Hazard Analysis and applicable NFPA, API Codes and standards, define basis for layout and spacing. 3.3.2 Consider QRA for entire Naimat facility to finalize the layout w.r.t to risks posed by the project to on-site and offsite population.

UEP & EPCC

3.3.3/20.3 Noise survey to be included in EPCC scope, ensure that noise in occupied buildings area and adjacent community residential areas does not exceed NEQS limits 4.1.1 Include the updation of Naimat SOP incorporating Phase-V operations in project scope 4.1.2 Identify and provide communication infrastructure needed for safe and efficient plant operation.

UEP

4.2.2 Communication protocol between EPCC ERP and UEP ERP shall be defined 4.2.3 Identify and provide communication infrastructure needed during emergencies (including onsite and remote command posts etc.)

UEP

6.1.1 It is recommended to include following studies in project scope: 1) Emergency Evacuation and Response study 2) QRA 3) SIMOPS 4) Dispersion modeling 5) SCEs identification report

UEP

6.3.1 Develop and maintain project hazard and effects register during the course of project and follow project MoC system

UEP & EPCC

6.4.1 Project MoC system shall be established for change control. 6.4.2 Green field construction work permit system shall be agreed with EPCC and shall be in line with UEP work permit system.

UEP & EPCC

7.1.2/7.2.2 It is recommended that provision of resources (equipment/man power) for ER such as Ambulances, trained Emergency Responders etc. as required, shall be part of Project deliverables considering major impact of project on MKK ERP

UEP

8.1.1/8.2.1/8.3.1/13.1.1 Project organogram shall include Operation tag for training need analysis and developing training program. 8.1.2/8.2.2/8.3.2/13.1.3 Staffing requirement to be identified and hiring to be completed before plant commissioning.

UEP

11.1.1 Verify that ITP (Inspection & Testing Plan) is defined in Tender Document.

UEP & EPCC

13.1.2 Conduct SIMOPs study 13.1.4/4.2.1/7.1.1/7.2.1 Include the updation of Naimat ERP, incorporating Phase-V scenarios, in project scope. 14.1.1 Confirm that UEP health and Hygiene standards is included Tender Document and EPCC shall comply during the construction activities/camp. 14.1.2 Safe drinking water supply at contractor's camp and work site to be ensured.

UEP & EPCC

16.1.1 As per API-521, Rupture disc to be installed at u/s of PSVs on corrosive/choking environment especially at CO2 route. (refer 2010/11 Naimat Phase-2 over pressure incident report & MKK HAZOP recommendations related to this)

UEP & EPCC

16.12.1/17.3.1 Consider self-contained fire suppression system such as Inergen etc. for critical buildings for e.g. DCS room, switchgear room etc. as per governing NFPA 16.13.1 Tender Document defines blow down time as 25 min, this is a deviation from API-521 15 min depressurization requirement. FEHA shall determine escalation potentials due to delayed blow down. A cost-benefit analysis shall be carried out to make decision on savings on flare header size due to increasing blow down time vs. potential escalation. 17.6.1 Fire response strategy to be defined in Tender Document and EPCC should provide fire response plan as per philosophy.

UEP

UEP & EPCC

20.3.1 Noise survey to be included in EPCC scope, ensure that noise in occupied buildings area and adjacent community residential areas does not exceed NEQS limits 22.1.1 Identify firewater source meeting NFPA guidelines 22.7.1 Review drain system design avoiding any connection of HP/LP drains open to atmosphere 22.12.1 Identify potable water source for facility

UEP & EPCC

UEP

UEP & EPCC

UEP

22.16.1 Communication protocol (for normal & emergencies) shall be prepared by UEP and provision of communication system /hardware for conformance to UEP protocol shall be included in tender document

UEP & EPCC

22.23.1 Flare exclusion zone shall be isolated/barricaded as per API-521

EPCC

23.2.1 Review LPG spheres location with respect to FEHA results to minimize impact of fire, dispersions and BELEVE on adjacent equipment and surrounding population (consider future population growths along the facility fence where UEP has no control). Adequate distance from plant fence to be maintained. 23.2.2 Review LPG storage drain impoundment area design considering flooding in case of fire water application 23.9.1 Implement condensate storage tank overfilling safeguards recommended by Buncefield incident investigation report.

5.2

UEP & EPCC

EPCC

HAZID Comments

1.2.3.1/7.1.1 Ensure that Tender Document contains instructions related to establishment of onsite medical facilities (by EPCC during construction period) approved by UEP-HSE

UEP

1.2.5.1 Confirm Earthquake zoning given in Tender Document, is it 2A or 2B.

UEP

1.2.7.1 Ensure lightning protection is being considered in Tender Document

UEP

3.2.1/10.1 .1 Refer Naimat Phase-IV and TAP Lesson Learned document for Transport related and other project lessons.

UEP

3.3.1 Verify that tender document contains requirement of modeling for acid gas (H2S in acid gas) release scenarios.

UEP & EPCC

3.6.1/15.1.1 IEE initiated with 3rd party consultant, discussion in-progress with SEPA for study scope. Need to be closed at earliest and obtain NoC. 3.6.2/15.1.2 Address the issue of H2S emissions NEQS non-compliance with SEPA.

UEP

3.7.1 Consult Legal, PSCM, LMS, C&EA to identify and address social issues that may arise during construction

UEP

7.2.1 Ensure that Tender document contains instructions that EPCC shall submit ERP for handling Major accident scenarios during construction phase for UEP approval.

UEP

10.3.2 QRA shall include LPG + Condensate bowzer movement scenario 10.3.3 Consider separate entrance for loading bowzers and normal plant entrance 10.3.4/11.1.1 Detailed shipment and inland transport plan to be developed at Detailed Engineering stage by EPCC, approved by UEP

UEP & EPCC

12.1.1 EPCC shall submit lifting plans for UEP approval

UEP & EPCC

13.1.1 Ensure that Tender document contains requirement for submission of Maintenance plans by EPCC to UEP for incorporation into MAXIMO 13.1.2 Verify that tender document clearly defines independence between control and ESD systems to be verified as per required SIL levels 14.2.1 EPCC shall Follow confined space working procedures approved by UEP

EPCC

16.2.1/16.7.1/18.1.1 EPCC to carry out FEHA and consider minimizing congestion to optimize the plot plan with respect to blast overpressure contours. 16.2.2/18.1.2 OPBs to be located out of blast overpressure contours or designed to withstand overpressure.

UEP & EPCC

16.3.1 EPCC to carry out FEHA and update plot plan as necessary. 16.3.2 OPBs to be located out of fire radiation contours of concern as per API-521 or design as shelter in place.

UEP & EPCC

16.7.2 Plot plan is preliminary layout. EPCC to finalize the plant boundaries based on FEHA

UEP & EPCC

16.9.1 SIL study to be done by EPCC. Specifications of SIF, reliability, survivability, availability and maintenance intervals to be defined on the basis of SIL study.

EPCC

17.4.1 Location of fired heaters to be finalized based on FEHA results considering flammable gas dispersion contours and wind directions.

EPCC

17.6.1 FEHA shall provide basis for fire prevention and control engineering, fire response plan shall be developed accordingly.

UEP & EPCC

22.1.1/22.12.1 SEPA permission required for utilization of groundwater as potable water or fire water

UEP

22.4.1 Ensure that diesel storage meets OGRA regulations

UEP

22.9.1 Hazop to evaluate the requirement of ESD on IA low pressure

EPCC

22.15.1 Requirement of HVAC for control room and security room to be established based on dispersion modeling

EPCC

22.17.1 Evaluate R134A as a refrigerant in place of propane, compare cost and safety aspects for both options.

UEP

22.22.1 Evaluate facility drain system for heavy rains case

UEP

22.24.1 Ensure that sewerage and septic pit scope is included in Tender Document

UEP

23.4.1 Ensure that diesel storage meets OGRA regulations

UEP

23.9.1 Propane filling arrangement for refrigeration loop for black start to be kept in design

EPCC

23.10.1 Provision of recycling of off-spec LPG from storage back to recovery unit to be kept in design

EPCC

24.1.1 Review requirement of BTEX monitoring for heaters and incorporate provisions for monitoring BTEX in design.

UEP

24.13.1 Evaluate relief requirement on heat exchangers where tube side operating pressures exceeds 1.5 times of shell side design pressure. Fast acting relief devices are required on some heat exchanger shell sides.

UEP & EPCC

6.0

HAZID FOLLOWUP HAZID recommendations are very broad in nature covering various aspects of project from concept to commissioning and operations. Some recommendations and comments are to be addressed at FEED stage before issuing tender document, most action are to be taken during EPCC and some management action have to be taken independent of EPCC but before commissioning. As has been recommended with HAZID a project Hazard Register shall be established and HAZID findings shall be added to it (later HAZOP and other studies’ findings to be added). It is further recommended to re-validate HAZID at a suitable time during detailed engineering such as upon completion of process engineering and finalization of plant layout.

Annex-I HAZID Worksheet

NAIMAT PHASE-V (FEED) HAZID WORKSHEET Category/Node

Guideword

Hazard Description

Consequence

Safeguards

R Safety

1.1 Seismic.

1.1 .1 Uneven settling of Plot, foundation damage

1.1.1 Piping and equipment failure leading to loss of containment, fires, explosion, fatalities, asset damage

1.1.1 Soil Investigation is in progress to be made part of Tender Document 1.1.2 No Seismic activities (exploration) planned in area

D2=6

1.2.1.1 Damage to tall equipment/ columns

1.2.1.1 Piping and equipment failure leading to loss of containment, fires, explosion, fatalities, asset damage

1.2.1.1 Plant design for 100 mph which is sufficient based on available historical data

D2=6

1.2.2.1 No threat from river floods. 1.2.2.2 Heavy rains

1.2.2.1 Piping and equipment failure leading to loss of containment, fires, explosion, fatalities, asset damage 1.2.2.2 Facility flooding due to heavy rains and no drainage

1.2.2.1 Facility is designed for 250 mm rain in 24 hr

F3=5

1.2 Weather:

1.2.1 High winds.

1.2.2 Floods. 1. Natural and Environmental Hazards

En Re

2. Security

1.2.5 Earthquake.

1.2.5.1 Earthquake leading to buildings/ equipment damage

1.2.6 Hurricane.

1.2.6.1 No threat of hurricane

1.2.7 Lightning.

1.2.7.1 Lightning strike on equipment or person

1.3 Marine life impacts on equipment.

1.3.1 Not Applicable

1.4 Subsidence.

1.4.1 Uneven settling of Plot, foundation damage

1.5 Geological conditions for structural support.

1.5.1 Uneven settling of Plot, foundation damage

2.1 Assault 2.2 Sabotage 2.3 Crisis (military action, civil disturbances, terrorism)

1.2.5.1 Piping and equipment failure leading to loss of containment, fires, explosion, fatalities, asset damage

1.2.5.1 Design for Earthquake zone 2A upper moderate as per area classification issued by Geological survey of Pakistan

1.2.7.1 Piping and equipment failure leading to loss of containment, fires, explosion, fatalities, asset damage

1.4.1 Piping and equipment failure leading to loss of containment, fires, explosion, fatalities, asset damage 1.5.1 Piping and equipment failure leading to loss of containment, fires, explosion, fatalities, asset damage

D2=6

E3=6

1.4.1 Soil Investigation is in progress to be made part of Tender Document

D2=6

1.5.1 Soil Investigation is in progress to be made part of Tender Document

D2=6

2.1.1 Not in UEP Experience 2.2.1 Not in UEP Experience

2.3.1 Not in UEP Experience

2.4.1 Existing UEP

3.3 Proximity to Populationduring operations

3.3.1 Vapor cloud explosion and dense gas dispersion 3.3.2 High H2S conc ( >10 ppm) in Acid gas Stream 3.3.3 High noise 3.3.4 Heavy vehicle movements see section 10

3.4 Adjacent Land Use

3.4.1 Flare radiations affecting crops

3.5 Proximity to Transport Corridors

3.5.1 No major issues

3.6 Environmental Issues

3.6.1 H2S at cold vent tip exceeding NEQS limits for atmospheric release.

3.3.1 Injuries and fatalities to onsite/offsite population, equipment failure 3.3.2 Exposure to H2S due to acid gas dispersion at grade level, complains of odors n possible minor health effects to neighbors 3.3.3 Health n social issues due to high noise

3.3.1 Acid gas vent design to ensure less than 10 ppm grade level H2S conc.

3.4.1 Social issues

3.4.1 Flare height to be evaluated as per API 521 not to exceed 500 BTU/hr-ft2 at facility battery limits

3.6.1 Environmental damage, Non Compliance with regulations

3.6.1 Cold vent height to be such that on ground concentration of H2S does not exceed 10 ppm.

D3=7

4.2 Communications for Contingency planning

4.2.1 Inefficient communication during emergency

4.3 Supply Support

4.3.1 No concerns

4.2.1 Delay in emergency response and medical care, escalation of event

E4=7

Project Implementation Issues

5. Contracting Strategy

5.1 Prevailing influence 5.2 Legislation 5.3 External Standards 5.4 External Environmental Constraints

6.1 Hazard Studies

6.1.1 Unsafe design due to unidentified hazards

6.1.1 Major accident leading to safety/ environment asset and reputation damage

6.1.1 Following studies have been listed in EPCC scope in tender Document: HAZID, Hazop, SIL, FEHA and Plant Layout Study, Hazardous Area

D3=7

7.1 Geographical Infrastructure

7.1.1 No major medical facility for immediate medical response

7.1.1 Delay in medical treatment to critically ill or injured person

7.2 Recovery Measures

7.2.1 Inadequate emergency response

7.2.1 Escalation of event

7.1.1 First aid and primary care facilities will be provided at Naimat along with qualified medical doctor and ambulance will be on standby 24/7. For secondary and tertiary treatment patient will be mobilized to Hyderabad and onwards to Karachi if needed.

7. Contingency Planning

E4=7

8.3 Level of Technology

9. Construction/ Existing Facilities

9.1 Tie-ins (shutdown requirements) 9.2 Concurrent Operations 9.3 Reuse of Material 9.4 Common Equipment Capacity 9.5 Interface Shutdown/blowd own/ 9.6 ESD 9.7 Skid Dimensions (weight handling/equipm ent (congestion) 9.8 Soil Contamination (existing facilities) 9.9 Mobilization/ demobilization

8.3.1 Unavailability of competent/trained staff for DCS, no prior experience of DCS at UEP

9.1.1 See comment

8.3.1 Unsafe/inefficient operation leading to process upset, production loss or incident may happen

D3=7

10.4 Helicopter incidents

11. Fabrication/installati on

10.4.1 Not Applicable

11.1 Complexity.

11.1.1 Complex construction process

11.2 Modularization.

11.2.1 Not Applicable

11.3 Transportation.

11.3.1 Transportation of large equipment

11.1.1 Project delays

11.1.1 No complex construction activity involved, extensive experience of similar projects within company

11.3.1 limitation at Port or inland transport of large equipment causing project delays

11.4 Overseas fabrication

12. Lifting equipment

12.1 Dropped/swingin g loads.

12.1.1 Objects falling over live equipment or personnel working below

12.2 Collapse of lifting equipment (cranes, draw works, etc.).

12.2.1 Objects falling over live equipment or personnel working below

12.1.1 Loss of containment, fire hazards, injuries , fatalities, asset damage 12.2 Loss of containment, fire hazards, injuries , fatalities, asset damage 12.3.1 Injuries,

12.1.1 No heavy lifting over live equipment involved 12.1 No heavy lifting over live equipment involved

Maintenance philosophy 13.6 Control philosophy 13.7 Manning levels 13.8 Concurrent Operations 13.9 Emergency Response

14. Health Hazards

14.1 Disease Hazards

14.1.1 Malaria, Food Poisoning and other water borne diseases

14.1.1 Health issues in camp, Project delays

G5=6

14.2 Asphyxiation hazards

14.2.1 Activities inside closed equipment/ confined space

14.2.1 Injuries/Fatalities

E3=6

14.3 Carcinogenic 14.4 Toxic 14.5 Physical 14.6 Mental

14.4.1 No additional issues identified 14.5.1 No additional issues identified 14.6.1 No additional issues identified

14.7 Working Hazards

14.7.1 Snake bite, high temperature in summer

14.8 Transport

14.8.1 No additional issues identified

14.3.1 No additional issues identified

14.7.1 Injuries, fatalities

14.7.1 Snake bite kit available at site

E5=8

15.5 Contaminated Ground

15.5.1 Not Applicable

15.6 Facility Impact

15.6.1 Facility to be constructed on agricultural land/ orchids.

15.7 Waste Disposal Options 15.8 Timing of Construction

16. Inherently safer design characteristics

15.6.1 Minor ecological damage

15.7.1 No Concern 15.8.1 No Concern

16.1 Sufficient equipment design pressure for all high pressure scenarios.

16.1.1 Equipment expose to pressures exceeding design pressure e.g. SIWHP is 4800 psig approx.

16.1.1 Mechanical failure, loss of containment

16.2 Maximize spacing between blast source and buildings and equipment of concern.

16.2.1 OPBs located within blast overpressure contour

16.2.1 Building damage leading to injuries/fatalities

16.1.1 Equipment are design on 1200 psig and protected by PSVs and ESDVs.

E5=8

D4=8

16.5 Minimize inventories of hazardous materials.

16.5.1 Condensate & LPG inventories

16.6 Use less toxic, reactive, flammable, explosive materials, radioactive.

16.6.1 No Concerns

16.7 Reduce size of “congested volume” that can hold a vapor cloud.

16.7.1 See comment

16.8 Simplify plant design and operation.

16.8.1 No Concern

16.9 High equipment or instrumentation reliability.

16.9.1 Protective equipment failure to meet reliability specifications

16.10 Design occupied buildings to withstand a

16.10.1 No additional concern

16.5.1 Major fire & BLEVE Hazard, Loss of life and asset damage

16.9.1 Failure to perform upon demand leading to accidents

16.5.1 Spill containment and Fire protection system provided on condensate and LPG storage

D3=7

16.13 Minimize time exposed to a hazard.

17.1 Pool.

17. Fire

16.13.1 Equipment/ structural failure due to extended exposure to fire, delayed blow down

17.1.1 LPG, Condensate, NGLs

16.13.1 Escalation of event

17.1.1 Pool fire at Condensate storage, loading area and separator area, BLEVE of LPG vessels, Propane tanks Leading to asset damage, injuries and fatalities

D3=7

17.1.1 LPG facility design as per API 2510/ NFPA-58 17.1.2 Condensate facility design as per NFPA-30 in line with OGRA directives 17.1.3 Fire protection on overall plant as per NFPA guidelines 17.1.4 As per Tender Document, fire protection layout and design requirements to be developed based on FEHA 17.2.1 LPG facility design as per API 2510/ NFPA-58 17.2.2 Condensate facility design as per NFPA-30 in line with OGRA directives

E3=6

18. Explosion

17.4 Sources of ignition

17.4.1 Ignition of released hydrocarbon

17.5 Equipment layout

17.5.1 No additional concern

17.6 Fire Protection & response

17.7.1 See comment

18.1 Operator protection

18.1.1 No additional concern, see comment

18.2 BLEVE

18.2.1 No additional concern, see comment

18.3 Vapor cloud explosion

18.3.1 No additional concern, see comment

18.4 Confined space 18.5 Dust

18.4.1 No additional concern, see comment 18.5.1 No Concern

18.6 Other (detonation, etc.)

18.6.1 No Concern

19.1 Hot process.

19.1.1 Amine, Glycol, Hot Oil, Debutanizer Waste heat recovery

17.4.1 Fire & explosion leading to asset damage and injuries/fatalities

17.4.1 Hazardous area classification to be done by EPCC 17.4.2 Open flames eg. Hot oil burners are located outside classified area

D3=7

18.2.1 BLEVE of LPG Vessels to be avoided by design as per API-2510 18.3.1 Control room is blast resistant as per API-752

19.1.1 Personnel injuries on contact with hot surfaces

19.1.1 Personal protection insulation is provided where process

H6=6

20.3.1 Tender Document defines noise limits 85 dB as per NEQS. 20.3 Noise

20.4 Stored energy. 20.5 Electrical shock 20.6 High voltage/low voltage electrical hazards. 20.7 Static electrical hazards 20.8 Ionizing radiation 21.1 Earthquake 21.2 Foundations (subsidence, scour) 21.3 Corrosion

21. Structural Failures

21.4 Fatigue 21.5 Weight control 21.6 Primary structure

20.3.1 Noise in plant residential and adjacent population exceeding NEQS limit

20.3.1 Health issues, social unrest

20.3.2 Tender Document states requirement for NEQS in general (including noise level in residential areas).

H6=6

20.4.1 Not Applicable 20.5.1 Not Applicable

20.6.1 No Concerns 20.7.1 Ignition during sampling, loading bowzers

20.7.1 Ignition of hydrocarbon releases, fire, fatalities, asset loss

20.7.1 Grounding requirement for bowzer loading and sampling included in Tender Document

E3=6

20.8.1 No Concern 21.1.1 No additional concern 21.2.1 No additional concern

21.3.1 Loss of containment due to corrosion 21.4.1 No concerns

21.3.1 Fire & explosion leading to asset damage and injuries/fatalities

21.3.1 Tender Document defines corrosion control design and management as per UEP practices 21.4 No cyclic load

21.5.1 No Concerns 21.6.1 Soil investigation

D3=7

22.2 Fuel Gas

22.2.1 See comment

22.3 Heating Medium / hot oil

22.3.1 No additional Concern

22.4 Diesel Fuel

22.4.1 See comments

22.5 Power Supply 22.6 Steam

22.5.1 No Concern 22.6.1 Not Applicable

22.7 Drains

22.7.1 Open to atmosphere HP drains connection

22.8 Inert Gas / Nitrogen

22.8.1 Not Applicable

22.9 Instrument Air

22.9.1 See comment

22.10 Waste Storage and Treatment 22.11 Chemical/fuel Storage

22.10.1 Not Applicable

22.11.1 Not Applicable

22.12 Potable Water

22.12.1 See comments

22.13 Demineralized water

22.13.1 No additional concern

22.7.1 Loss of containment, fire hazards

E3=6

22.17 Refrigeration System 22.18 HP Drains - Amine 22.19 HP drains - Glycol 22.20 HP drains - Hydrocarbon 22.21 HP drains - LPG

22.17.1 See comment

22.18.1 No additional concern 22.19.1 No additional concern 22.20.1 No additional concern 22.21.1 No additional concern

22.22 Plant drains / storm drains

22.22.1 See comment

22.23 Flares

22.23.1 Personnel exposure to flare radiations within flare exclusion zone

22.24 Sewerage

22.24.1 See comments

23.1 Inventory

23.1.1 No additional concern

22.23.1 Injuries, burn

H5=5

23.5 Hot Oil 23.6 Pyrophoric (pigging mud) 23.7 Over Pressure 23.8 Over/under Temperature

24. Loss of

23.5.1 No additional concern 23.6.1 Not Applicable 23.7.1 No additional concern 23.8.1 No concerns

23.9 Excess/zero Level

23.9.1 See recommendation/comment

23.10 Wrong Composition/Ph ase

23.10.1 See comment

24.1 Hazardous chemicals (including hydrocarbons).

24.1.1 See comment

24.2 Extremes of design operating envelopes, process, and utilities. 24.3 Potential for deviation outside design conditions. 24.4 Air ingress.

24.2.1 No additional concern

24.3.1 No concern 24.4.1 No concern

vessel failures.

24.13 Heat exchanger tube leak or rupture

24.13.1 See comment

24.14 Process line failures

24.14.1 No additional concern

Annex-II

Risk Framework – HSE Impact Levels

A

B

C

Levels A-C maintain the visibility of risks with the potential for catastrophic impact even if their probability of occurrence is extremely low. The upper level of this framework is defined by the most severe level of impact ever seen in industry.

SEVERITY

HEALTH AND SAFETY

ENVIRONMENTAL •

Future impact, e.g., unintended release, with widespread damage to any environment and which remains in an "unsatisfactory" state for a period > 5 years.

•

Future impact with extensive damage to a sensitive environment and which remains in an "unsatisfactory" state for a period > 5 years.

•

Future impact with widespread damage to a sensitive environment and which can only be restored to a "satisfactory"/agreed state in a period of more than 1 and up to 5 years.

•

Future impact with extensive damage to a non-sensitive environment and which remains in an "unsatisfactory" state for a period > 5 years.

•

Future impact with extensive damage to a sensitive environment and which can only be restored to a "satisfactory"/agreed state in a period of more than 1 and up to 5 years.

•

Future impact with widespread damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can only be restored to a "satisfactory"/agreed state in a period of more than 1 and up to 5 years.

•

Future impact with widespread damage to a sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of around 1 year.

Catastrophic health/ safety incident causing widespread fatalities within or outside a facility.

•

Future impact with extensive damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can only be restored to a "satisfactory"/agreed state in a period of more than 1 and up to 5 years.

The potential for 10 or more fatalities (or onset of life threatening health effects) shall always be classified at this level.

•

Future impact with widespread damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of around 1 year.

•

Future impact with extensive damage to a sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of around 1 year.

•

Future impact with widespread damage to a sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.

Comparable to the most catastrophic health/ safety incidents ever seen in industry. The potential for 100 or more fatalities (or onset of life threatening health effects) shall always be classified at this level. Catastrophic health/ safety incident causing very widespread fatalities within or outside a facility. The potential for 50 or more fatalities (or onset of life threatening health effects) shall always be classified at this level.

BP's commitment to health, safety and the environment is paramount; this is reflected in BP’s HSE goal of "No Accidents, No Harm to People, and No Damage to the Environment". No accident, injury, or loss of containment causing damage to the environment is ever “acceptable” to BP. BP is using this framework (equivalents of which are used throughout industry) to support the consistent prioritization of actions to eliminate or mitigate HSE risk and as part of BP's Performance Improvement Cycle to deliver continuous risk reduction. Very major health/ safety incident

D

The potential for 3 or more fatalities (or onset of life threatening health effects) shall always be classified at this level. 30 or more injuries or health effects, either permanent or requiring hospital treatment for more than 24 hours.

•

Future impact with extensive damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of around 1 year.

•

Future impact with localized damage to a sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of around 1 year.

•

Future impact with widespread damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.

•

Future impact with extensive damage to a sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.

SEVERITY

E

HEALTH AND SAFETY

ENVIRONMENTAL

Major health/ safety incident

•

1 or 2 fatalities, acute or chronic, actual or alleged.

Future impact with localized damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of around 1 year.

•

Future impact with extensive damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.

•

Future impact with localized damage to a sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.

•

Future impact with extensive damage to a sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of days or weeks.

•

Future impact with localized damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.

•

Future impact with immediate area damage to a sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.

•

Future impact with extensive damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of days or weeks.

•

Future impact with localized damage to a sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of days or weeks.

Medium impact health/ safety incident

•

Future impact with immediate area damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.

Single or multiple recordable injury or health effects from common source/event.

•

Future impact with localized damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of days or weeks.

•

Future impact with immediate area damage to a sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of days or weeks.

Low impact health/ safety incident

•

Future impact with immediate area damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of days or weeks.

10 or more injuries or health effects, either permanent or requiring hospital treatment for more than 24 hours.

High impact health/ safety incident Permanent partial disability(ies)

F

G

Several non-permanent injuries or health impacts. Days Away From Work Case (DAFWC)

First aid

H

Single or multiple over-exposures causing noticeable irritation but no actual health effects

Risk Framework – Business Impact Levels

SEVERITY*

A

Non-Financial Impact

Public or investor outrage on a global scale. Threat of global loss of license to operate.

Financial Impact (EQUIPMENT DAMAGE, BUSINESS VALUE LOST) >$20 billion

Loss of license to operate a major asset in a major market – US, EU, Russia.

B

Intervention from major Government – US, UK, EU, Russia. Public or investor outrage in major western markets – US, EU.

$5 billion - $20 billion

Damage to relationships with key stakeholders of benefit to the Group.

C

Loss of license to operate other material asset, or severe enforcement action against a major asset in a major market. Intervention from other major Government.

$1 billion - $5 billion

Public or investor outrage in other material market where we have presence or aspiration. Severe enforcement action against a material asset in a non-major market, or against other assets in a major market. Interventions from non-major Governments.

D

Public or investor outrage in a non-major market, or localised or limited “interest-group” outrage in a major market.

$100 m to $1 billion

Prolonged adverse national or international media attention. Widespread adverse social impact. Damage to relationships with key stakeholders of benefit to the Segment. Other adverse enforcement action by regulators.

E

Limited “interest-group” outrage in non major market. Short term adverse national or international media coverage.

$5m -$100 m

Damage to relationships with key stakeholders of benefit to the SPU. Regulatory compliance issue which does not lead to regulatory or other higher severity level consequence Prolonged local media coverage.

F

Local adverse social impact.

$500k-$5m

Damage to relationships with key stakeholders of benefit to the Performance Unit (PU).

Short term local media coverage.

G

Some disruption to local operations (e.g., loss of single road access less than 24 hours).

$50k -$500k

H

Isolated and short term complaints from neighbours (e.g., complaints about specific noise episode).