Gutierrez vs House Committee on Justice case digest

G.R. No. 193459 February 15, 2011 GUTIERREZ vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE Facts: 1. On 22 July 2010, Baraquel, et al. filed an impeachment complaint (First Complaint) against Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez (petitioner) based on betrayal of public trust and culpable violation of the Constitution. 2. On 3 August 2010, a Second Complaint was filed by Reyes, et al. against the same respondent also based on betrayal of public trust and culpable violation of the Constitution. 3. On 11 August 2010, the two complaints were referred by the House Plenary to the Committee on Justice at the same time. 4. On 1 September 2010, the Committee on Justice found the First and Second Complaints sufficient in form. On 7 September 2010, the Committee on Justice, found the First and Second Complaints were sufficient in form. 5. On 13 September 2010, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court seeking to enjoin the Committee on Justice from proceeding with the impeachment proceedings. The petition prayed for a temporary restraining order. Petitioner: She invokes the Court’s expanded certiorari jurisdiction to "determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." Public Respondent: The petition is premature and not yet ripe for adjudication since petitioner has at her disposal a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of the proceedings before public respondent. Public respondent argues that when petitioner filed the present petition on September 13, 2010, it had not gone beyond the determination of the sufficiency of form and substance of the two complaints. Hence, certiorari is unavailing. 6. The following day, during the en banc morning session of 14 September 2010, the majority of the Court voted to issue a status quo ante order suspending the impeachment proceedings against petitioner. (Note: In urgent cases, it is a matter of practice for the Court that all the Justices should have been given time, at least an hour or two, to read the petition before voting on the issuance of the status quo ante order. Unfortunately, this was not done.) 7. Section 3(5), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that "no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year." Issue #1: Does the Supreme Court have the power to determine whether public respondent committed a

violation of the Constitution in the exercise of its discretion relating to impeachment proceeding? Held: YES, under the doctrine of expanded judicial review. The Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr,"judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review. There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution. Indubitably, the Court is not asserting its ascendancy over the Legislature in this instance, but simply upholding the supremacy of the Constitution as the repository of the sovereign will. Issue #2: Is the petition premature and not yet ripe for adjudication? Held: NO. In the present petition, there is no doubt that questions on the validity of the simultaneous referral of the two complaints and on the need to publish as a mode of promulgating the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the House (Impeachment Rules) present constitutional vagaries which call for immediate interpretation. The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent two impeachment complaints presents a novel situation to invoke judicial power. Petitioner cannot thus be considered to have acted prematurely when she took the cue from the constitutional limitation that only one impeachment proceeding should be initiated against an impeachable officer within a period of one year. Issue #3: When is an impeachment complaint deemed initiated? Held: There are two components of the act of initiating the complaint: the filing of the impeachment complaint AND the referral by the House Plenary to the Committee on Justice. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated (meaning, filed and initiated), another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period. Issue #4: Do the Impeachment Rules provide for comprehensible standards in determining the sufficiency of form and substance?

Held: YES. Contrary to petitioner’ contention, the Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the constitutional requirements and providing that there must be a "verified complaint or resolution," and that the substance requirement is met if there is "a recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee. In fact, it is only in the Impeachment Rules where a determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is made necessary. This requirement is not explicitly found in the Constitution which merely requires a "hearing." ( Section 3[2], Article XI). In the discharge of its constitutional duty, the House deemed that a finding of sufficiency of form and substance in an impeachment complaint is vital "to effectively carry out" the impeachment process, hence, such additional requirement in the Impeachment Rules. Issue #5: May the Supreme Court look into the narration of facts constitutive of the offenses vis-à-vis petitioner’s submissions disclaiming the allegations in the complaints? Held: NO. This issue would "require the Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislature (Francisco vs. House of Representatives.) Issue #6: Was petitioner denied of due process, because of the delay in the publication of the Impeachment Rules? Held: NO. The Supreme Court discussed the difference between publication and promulgation. To recall, days after the 15th Congress opened on July 26, 2010 or on August 3, 2010, public respondent provisionally adopted the Impeachment Rules of the 14th Congress and thereafter published on September 2, 2010 its Impeachment Rules, admittedly substantially identical with that of the 14th Congress, in two newspapers of general circulation.

usage. The Constitution notably uses the word "promulgate" 12 times. A number of those instances involves the promulgation of various rules, reports and issuances emanating from Congress, the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman as well as other constitutional offices. To appreciate the statutory difference in the usage of the terms "promulgate" and "publish," the case of the Judiciary is in point. In promulgating rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the Supreme Court has invariably required the publication of these rules for their effectivity. As far as promulgation of judgments is concerned, however, PROMULGATION means "the delivery of the decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication. Promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is generally understood—that is, to make known. Since the Constitutional Commission did not restrict "promulgation" to "publication," the former should be understood to have been used in its general sense. It is within the discretion of Congress to determine on how to promulgate its Impeachment Rules, in much the same way that the Judiciary is permitted to determine that to promulgate a decision means to deliver the decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication. It is not for the Supreme Court to tell a co-equal branch of government how to promulgate when the Constitution itself has not prescribed a specific method of promulgation. The Court is in no position to dictate a mode of promulgation beyond the dictates of the Constitution. Inquiries in aid of legislation under Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution is the sole instance in the Constitution where there is a categorical directive to duly publish a set of rules of procedure. (Neri vs. Senate)

Citing Tañada v. Tuvera, petitioner contends that she was deprived of due process since the Impeachment Rules was published only on September 2, 2010 a day after public respondent ruled on the sufficiency of form of the complaints. She likewise tacks her contention on Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution which directs that "Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section."

Even assuming arguendo that publication is required, lack of it does not nullify the proceedings taken prior to the effectivity of the Impeachment Rules which faithfully comply with the relevant self-executing provisions of the Constitution. Otherwise, in cases where impeachment complaints are filed at the start of each Congress, the mandated periods under Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution would already run or even lapse while awaiting the expiration of the 15-day period of publication prior to the effectivity of the Impeachment Rules. In effect, the House would already violate the Constitution for its inaction on the impeachment complaints pending the completion of the publication requirement. (Just like what happened in this case, where the complaint was filed even before the 15th Congress open its first session)

Public respondent counters that "promulgation" in this case refers to "the publication of rules in any medium of information, not necessarily in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general circulation." While "promulgation" would seem synonymous to "publication," there is a statutory difference in their

Given that the Constitution itself states that any promulgation of the rules on impeachment is aimed at "effectively carry[ing] out the purpose" of impeachment proceedings, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion when the House deemed it proper to provisionally adopt the Rules on Impeachment of the

14th Congress, to meet the exigency in such situation of early filing and in keeping with the "effective" implementation of the "purpose" of the impeachment provisions. In other words, the provisional adoption of the previous Congress’ Impeachment Rules is within the power of the House to promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the avowed purpose. Moreover, the rules on impeachment, as contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, merely aid or supplement the procedural aspects of impeachment. Being procedural in nature, they may be given retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason for this is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws." In the present case, petitioner fails to allege any impairment of vested rights. It bears stressing that, unlike the process of inquiry in aid of legislation where the rights of witnesses are involved, impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people as a body politic, and not for the punishment of the offender. Issue #7: When do we reckon the start of the one-year ban? Petitioner contends that it is reckoned from the filing of the first impeachment complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She posits that within one year from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment complaint may be accepted and referred to public respondent. Held: Francisco doctrine states that the term "initiate" means to file the complaint and referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period. Therefore, the one-year period ban is reckoned not from the filing of the first complaint, but on the date it is referred to the House Committee on Justice. Petitioner submits that referral could not be the reckoning point of initiation because "something prior to that had already been done.” This is wrong. Following petitioner’s line of reasoning, the verification of the complaint or the endorsement by a member of the House – steps done prior to the filing – would already initiate the impeachment proceedings. Issue #8: Does an impeachment complaint need to allege only one impeachable offense? Petitioner argues that public respondent gravely abused its discretion when it disregarded its own Impeachment Rules, which provides that "the Rules of Criminal Procedure under the Rules of Court shall, as far as practicable, apply to impeachment proceedings

before the House." Petitioner invokes the application of Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on one offense per complaint rule. To petitioner, the two impeachment complaints are insufficient in form and substance since each charges her with both culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust. Petitioner adds that heaping two or more charges in one complaint will confuse her in preparing her defense; expose her to the grave dangers of the highly political nature of the impeachment process; constitute a whimsical disregard of certain rules; impair her performance of official functions as well as that of the House; and prevent public respondent from completing its report within the deadline. Public respondent counters that there is no requirement in the Constitution that an impeachment complaint must charge only one offense, and the nature of impeachable offenses precludes the application of the above-said Rule on Criminal Procedure since the broad terms cannot be defined with the same precision required in defining crimes. It adds that the determination of the grounds for impeachment is an exercise of political judgment, which issue respondent-intervenor also considers as non-justiciable, and to which the Baraquel group adds that impeachment is a political process and not a criminal prosecution, during which criminal prosecution stage the complaint or information referred thereto and cited by petitioner, unlike an impeachment complaint, must already be in the name of the People of the Philippines. Held: The Constitution allows the indictment for multiple impeachment offenses, with each charge representing an article of impeachment, assembled in one set known as the "Articles of Impeachment." It, therefore, follows that an impeachment complaint need not allege only one impeachable offense. Petitioner’s claim deserves scant consideration. Without going into the effectiveness of the suppletory application of the Rules on Criminal Procedure in carrying out the relevant constitutional provisions, which prerogative the Constitution vests on Congress, and without delving into the practicability of the application of the one offense per complaint rule, the initial determination of which must be made by the House93 which has yet to pass upon the question, the Court finds that petitioner’s invocation of that particular rule of Criminal Procedure does not lie. Suffice it to state that the Constitution allows the indictment for multiple impeachment offenses, with each charge representing an article of impeachment, assembled in one set known as the "Articles of Impeachment."94 It, therefore, follows that an impeachment complaint need not allege only one impeachable offense. The second procedural matter deals with the rule on consolidation. In rejecting a consolidation, petitioner

maintains that the Constitution allows only one impeachment complaint against her within one year. Records show that public respondent disavowed any immediate need to consolidate. Its chairperson Rep. Tupas stated that "[c]onsolidation depends on the Committee whether to consolidate[; c]onsolidation may come today or may come later on after determination of the sufficiency in form and substance," and that "for purposes of consolidation, the Committee will decide when is the time to consolidate[, a]nd if, indeed, we need to consolidate."95 Petitioner’s petition, in fact, initially describes the consolidation as merely "contemplated." 96 Since public respondent, whether motu proprio or upon motion, did not yet order a consolidation, the Court will not venture to make a determination on this matter, as it would be premature, conjectural or anticipatory.97 Even if the Court assumes petitioner’s change of stance that the two impeachment complaints were deemedconsolidated,98 her claim that consolidation is a legal anomaly fails. Petitioner’s theory obviously springs from her "proceeding = complaint" equation which the Court already brushed aside.