Group 5 Round 2 ULP Digest

PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, JORGE L. ARANETA, JUDY A. ROXAS, MANUEL B. JOVER , RAMON LLORENTE and PROGRESSIVE EMPLOYEES UNION, petitioners, vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and ARANETA COLISEUM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, respondents. G.R. No. L-39546 November 29, 1977 FACTS: In September 1962, Araneta Coliseum Employees Association (ACEA) a legitimate labor organization in behalf of forty-eight (48) members, instituted Case No. 3304-ULP for unfair labor practice in the Court of Industrial Relations against Progressive Development Corporation (PDC), a domestic business entity operating the Araneta Coliseum, Jorge Araneta, Judy A. Roxas, Manuel B. Jover and Ramon Llorente, as officers of the corporation PDC and Progressive Employees Union (PEU), a labor organization existing in the PDC. The complaint alleged that the PDC, through its officers, initiated a move to disauthorize the counsel of the complainant ACEA from appearing in a union conference with the respondents, petitioners herein; that the supervisors of PDC encouraged, and assisted in, the formation of the Progressive Employees Union (PEU) and coerced the employees, particularly the individual complainants, to disaffiliate from the complainant union and to affiliate with the PEU; that in July and August 1962 the respondents, petitioners herein, discriminated against the individual complainants by either not giving them their working schedules, lessening their number of working days and eventually dismissing them from their employment, because of their refusal to disaffiliate from their union and join the Progressive Employees Union That, on June 13, 1962, respondent Ramon Llorente requested the President of the complainant union Antoni Buluran to him in his residence to take up with him the agenda for tomorrow's meeting. It was this meeting, as well as the circumstances that preceded the same, which the union claims started the management's exertion of all efforts to discourage membership in the complainant union, and which eventually culminated in the formation of the respondent union, The Progressive Employees Union (PEU), allegedly formed purportedly to bust the complainant union. ISSUE: Whether or not Progressive Development Corporation and its officials were involved with the formation of the Progressive Employees Union constituting an Unfair Labor practice? RULING: YES. The assertion of the petitioner Progressive Development Corporation and its officials that they have nothing to do with the formation of the Progressive Employees Union is not supported by the facts of record. This shows that the Progressive Employees Union was organized to camouflage the petitioner corporation's dislike for the Araneta Coliseum Employees Association and to stave off the latter's recognition. It is also a fact that the Progressive Employees Union, after exerting efforts to win in the Certification Election, Case No. 1054-MC, did not conclude and enter into a collective bargaining agreement with the management. According to Generoso, the Progressive Employees Union was already disbanded. The evidence shows that Reynaldo Asis, like the other individual complainants, was dismissed because he refused to join the Progressive Employees Union. Under the circumstances and equity of the case, and considering the length of time and the union-busting activities of

petitioner, the individual complainants are granted back wages for five (5) years without qualification or deduction. As testified to by Jose Generoso, Jr., President of the Progressive Employees Union, their members were also casual employees but are now regulars. From the facts of record, it is clear that the individual complainants were dismissed because they refused to resign from the Araneta Coliseum Employees Association and to affiliate with the Progressive Employees Union which was being aided and abetted by the Progressive Development Corporation.

Carmel Craft Corp v. NLRC FACTS: The Carmelcraft Employees Union, after registration as a labor union, sought recognition from the company Carmel Craft Corporation but failed to obtain recognition. The union filed a petition for certification election in June 1987. On July 13, 1987, the Company announced that it would cease operations on August 17,1987 due to serious financial losses. Operations did cease as announced. The Union filed a complaint with DOLE against the company for unfair labor practice. ISSUE: Whether or not the company committed unfair labor practice by closing operations instead of dealing with the union? HELD: YES. The Supreme court held that the reason invoked by the petitioner company to justify the cessation of its operations is hardly credible; in fact, it is preposterous when viewed in the light of the other relevant circumstances. Its justification is that it sustained losses in the amount of P1,603.88 as of December 31, 1986 .There is no report, however, of its operations during the period after that date, that is, during the succeeding seven and a half months before it decided to close its business. Significantly, the company is capitalized at P 3 million. Considering such a substantial investment, a loss of the paltry sum of less than P 2,000.00 could not be considered serious enough to call for the closure of the company. The Supreme Court stated that the real reason for the decision of the company to cease operations was the establishment of respondent Carmelcraft Employees Union. It was apparently unwelcome to the corporation, which would rather shut down than deal with the union. There is the allegation from the private respondent that the company had suggested that it might decide not to close the business if the employees were to affiliate with another union which the management preferred. This allegation has not been satisfactorily disproved. The act of the petitioners was an unfair labor practice prohibited by Article 248 of the Labor Code, to wit: ART. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers.-It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practice: (a) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to selforganization.

Itogon-Suyoc Mines v. Baldo Facts an Acting Prosecutor of the Court of Industrial Relations charged the herein petitioneremployer, Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc., and Claude Fertig its General Superintendent, with having committed unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 4(a), paragraphs 1, 4 and 5 of Republic Act No. 875. The complaint substantially alleged that A. Manaois and Jose Baldo, employees of herein petitioner, were dismissed by said petitioner, respectively, because of their membership with the herein respondent Sangilo-Itogon Workers Union and for having testified against the petitioner in a certification election case involving the employees of the petitioner (Case No. 3-MC-PANG). The petitioner herein (respondent below), in its answer to the complaint, admitted the fact of the dismissal of the two complaining employees, but alleged that the complaining employees were dismissed for just and lawful causes, namely, "inefficiency, utter disregard and violation of safety rules and regulations established and enforced by the respondent for the protection of the lives of the employees and properties of the respondent company, utter disregard of the company property and poor attendance records."

the service he brought his case to the grievance committee of the Itogon Labor Union and the management of the petitioner — said committee being composed of representatives of the Itogon Labor Union and the management of the petitioner — with a view to securing his reinstatement; that the grievance committee withheld action on the case of Baldo; that the case of Baldo was pending before the grievance committee when he was asked by MansuetoGelladoga plant engineer and former labor relations officer of the petitioner (he was also former Vice-President of the Itogon Labor Union), not to testify in the hearing of the certification election case so that be would be reinstated to his job; that in spite of Gelladoga's request Baldo testified at the healing of the certification election case on April 7,1958, and Baldo's testimony was adverse to the petitioner; and that after Baldo had thus testified his case was dropped by the grievance committee, and he was never reinstated. This conclusion is bolstered further by the fact that the petitioner herein had opposed the petition for certification election.

[G.R. No. 100342-44. October 29, 1999] RURAL BANK OF ALAMINOS EMPLOYEES UNION (RBAEU) and ISMAEL TAMAYO, SR., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, Third Division, Exec. Labor Arbiter JOSE B. BOLISAY and RURAL BANK OF ALAMINOS, Inc., respondents. D E C I S I O N PURISIMA, J.:

After hearing, the Court of Industrial Relations, on October 5, 1960, rendered a decision, finding that the charge of unfair labor practice as far as it concerned the complaining employee A. Manaois was not proved and that the dismissal of said employee was just and legal; but as far as the other complaining employee Jose Baldo was concerned, the charge of unfair labor practice was proved and that the dismissal of said employee was unjust and illegal. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision with the Court of Industrial Relations en banc, but said Court, on October 27, 1960, denied the petition for reconsideration. The petitioner has appealed from the decision, and from the order denying the motion for reconsideration, of the Court of Industrial Relations affecting only the case of Jose Baldo. No appeal has been filed regarding the case of A. Manaois. Issue Whether there is an unfair labor practice on the part of the petitioner? Ruling Yes. The petitioner had committed unfair labor practices as contemplated in subparagraphs 1, 4 and 5 of sub-section (a) of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 875 (Henares & Sons vs. National Labor Union, G. R. No. L-17535, December 28, 1961; National Fastener Corporation of the Philippines vs. Court of Industrial Relations, etc. G.R. No. L-15834, January 20, 1961). The evidence shows that Baldo had joined the Sangilo-Itogon Workers Union, the rival union of the Itogon Labor Union that had a collective bargaining contract with the petitioner.; that at the time that Baldo was given the 30-day notice of separation from the service there was pending before the Court of Industrial Relations a certification election case which involved the employees of the petitioner, and the certification case was precisely brought about upon petition by the Sangilo-Itogon Workers Union; that when Baldo was given said notice of separation from

Before The Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to nullify and set aside the Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission, dated January 31, 1991, and the subsequent Resolution of March 26, 1991 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, for being tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The assailed Resolutions set aside the consolidated decision of Labor Arbiter Ricardo N. Olairez and remanded the cases to the Regional Arbitration Branch of origin for further proceedings. The Petition stems from three cases originally instituted before Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch No. 1 of the National Labor Relations Commission in Dagupan City. The first case, NLRC Case No. 01-03-7-0049-89, was commenced by the herein petitioner, Ismael Tamayo, Sr., against Rural Bank of Alaminos, Inc. (RBAI) for illegal dismissal and damages. The second case, docketed as NLRC Case No.01-04-7-0059-89, was filed by the herein private respondent, Rural Bank of Alaminos, Inc., against the Rural Bank of Alaminos Employees Union for unfair labor practice, declaration of illegality of strike and damages. While the third case, docketed as NLRC Case No. 01-06-0097-89, was filed by the Employees Union against the Bank, charging the latter with unfair labor practice and damages. As gathered by the respondent National Labor Relations Commission, the facts of the controversy litigated upon are as follows: With the appointment of one Benefredo Quinto to the position of internal auditor, which position he had held since January 1, 1976, Ismael P. Tamayo, Sr., who had been with Rural Bank of Alaminos, Inc. (RBAI for brevity) since it started operations in September of 1956, feeling shortchanged, filed on June 3, 1988 a complaint aginst RBAI for illegal dismissal.

In an effort to buy peace, that is, to settle the case amicably, RBAI agreed on a compromise agreement dated July 13, 1988 to reinstate Ismael P. Tamayo, Sr. to the position of internal auditor. Claiming that his services were not actually needed, RBAI terminated effective January 1, 1989 Ismael P. Tamayo, Sr.s services. This led to the filing on March 27, 1989 of a complaint for illegal dismissal by Ismael P. Tamayo, Sr. against Rural Bank of Alaminos, Inc. docketed as NLRC Case No. SUB-RAB-01-03-7-0049-89. Subsequent to its certification on December 12, 1989 as the sole bargaining agent of the employees of RBAI, the Rural Bank of Alaminos Employees Union (hereinafter called the Union) submitted sometime in February 1989 proposals with respect to salary/wage increases. RBAIs counter-proposals not (sic) acceptable to it, the Union, which had earlier filed a notice of strike on March 3, 1989, went on strike on April 3, 1989. Its position being that the strike staged by the Union is illegal and in violation of Article 248 (e) of the Labor Code, RBAI instituted a petition for the declaration of the strike as illegal and for actual damages it incurred by way of loss of earnings to the tune of P30,000.00 per day. This petition was docketed as NLRC CASE NO. SUB-RAB-01-04-7-0059-89. The Union, assailing the alleged constructive dismissal of its members brought about or resulting from the strike, lodged against RBAI a complaint for unfair labor practice with prayer for moral and exemplary damages. This complaint has been docketed as NLRC CASE NO. SUBRAB-01-06-7-0097-89. The identity of the parties led the Labor Arbiter, Ricardo N. Olairez, to consolidate the three (3) aforementioned cases. On December 14, 1989, Labor Arbiter Ricardo N. Olairez rendered a consolidated decision. With respect to Ismael P. Tamayos complaint for illegal dismissal against RBAI, the Labor Arbiter held that complainant, whose nature of work, that of internal auditor, was usually necessary and desirable in the business engaged in by the respondent, was a regular employee whose summary discharge from the service effective January 1, 1989, was illegal.

accountable for the full backwages and other benefits due the Union members who he found to have been constructively dismissed during the strike. Moreover, the Labor Arbiter, on the Unions claim for damages of not less than P200,000.00, ruled that the award of P10,000.00 moral damages and P5,000.00 exemplary damages to each of the union member is in order. The Labor Arbiter disposed thus: WHEREFORE, with all the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: 1. In the first case, we find complainant Ismael Tamayo, Sr. illegally and unjustly dismissed and we hereby order the respondent Rural Bank of Alaminos, Inc. to pay him as follows: P 63,442.56 - Total full backwages/benefits 29,822.80 - Retirement pay P 93,265.36 9,326.53 - 10% Attorneys fees P102,591.89 - Total award as of December 31, 1989 plus one (1) percent interest per month until the award is actually paid. 2. In the second case, we find the strike legal and the Union having violated no provision of the Labor Code, the complaint of the Rural Bank of Alaminos, Inc. is hereby dismissed for lack of merit. 3. In the third case, we find the respondent Rural Bank of Alaminos, Inc. guilty of unfair labor practice, whose act is tantamount to an illegal lockout amounting to a constructive dismissal of the Union members, and we hereby order the bank to pay them their full backwages and other benefits for the nine (9) months period from April to December 1989 with the computations to include the wage increase under R.A. 6727 effective July 1, 1989.

The dismissal being illegal, complainant should have ordinarily been reinstated to his former position. However, the Labor Arbiter, finding the complainant to have reached the retirable age, opted instead to award the latter the following amounts, to wit: P63,442.56 representing full backwages/benefits; P29,822.80 as retirement pay; and P9,326.53 as attorneys fees, or a grand total of P102, 591.89 plus one (1) percent interest per month until actually paid.

The Bank is hereby ordered to re-open and accept/reinstate the striking union members without loss of seniority rights and the union members are likewise ordered to return to work and may now claim their respective 13th month pay for 1989. In case they are not immediately reinstated, their full backwages shall not exceed a maximum of three (3) years.

Regarding the banks petition, NLRC Case No. SUB-RAB-01-04-7-0059-89, the Labor Arbiter disposed of the same by holding that the strike staged by the Union was legal and not in violation of any provision of the Labor Code. Hence, the dismissal of the petition.

The respondent bank is further ordered to pay the Union members P10,000.00 as moral damages and P5,000.00 as exemplary damages to each of the Union members, plus attorneys fees andlitigation expenses of ten (10) percent of the total awards.

In the third case, NLRC CASE NO. SUB-RAB-01-06-0097-89, the Labor Arbiter held the bank

The order of reinstatement or return to work is immediately executory, hence the Bank is commanded to reopen its banking business immediately.

to lack of jurisdiction where it ruled that private respondent was denied the right to crossexamine petitioner Ismael Tamayo, in spite of the express mandate of Article 221 of the Labor Code and the 90-day Rule under Executive Order No. 109 (1-23-89)

SO ORDERED D. In all three cases: Dissatisfied with the disposition of the Labor Arbiter, the Rural Bank of Alaminos, Inc. appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission, which promulgated, on January 31, 1991 its assailed Resolution setting aside the ruling of the Labor Arbiter and ordering the remand of all the three cases to wit: xxx In the broader interest of justice, We deem it best to remand all the afore-numbered cases to Regional Arbitration Branch of origin for further proceedings. WHEREFORE, premises considered, all the aforenumbered cases are hereby remanded to the Regional Arbitration Branch of origin for further proceedings. SO ORDERED. The reversal by the respondent Commission of the Labor Arbiters original Resolution prompted petitioners to bring the present petition imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess jurisdiction to the respondent Commission, particularly describing the errors under attack: A. Case No. 0059-89: Whether or not the respondent NLRC Third Division committed grave abuse of discretion and exceeded its jurisdiction amounting to lack of jurisdiction in remanding the case for further proceedings, in spite of its finding which affirmed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter that the strike is legal and where the complaint is for a declaration of illegality of the strike. B. Case No. 0097-89: Whether or not the respondent NLRC Third Division committed grave abuse of discretion and exceeded its jurisdiction amounting to lack of jurisdiction in remanding the case for further proceedings, despite the fact that the private respondent failed to appeal the Labor Arbiters finding that the respondent is guilty of unfair labor practice thus the said issue not raised on appeal had become final. Whether or not the respondent NLRC Third Division committed grave abuse of discretion and exceeded its jurisdiction amounting to lack of jurisdiction in remanding the case for further proceedings for the reason that it could not resolve the issues squarely because it was at a loss as to the exact number of the banks employees, but which is contrary to the record of the case, as evidenced by the list of employees in private respondents Annex A. C. Case No. 0049-89: Whether or not respondent NLRC Third Division committed grave abuse of discretion amounting

Whether or not the right of petitioners to speedy disposition of labor justice has been violated in the remand of the cases for further proceedings and consequently, whether a writ of prohibition shall lie. Whether or not respondent NLRC Third Division committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it denied the motion for reconsideration for being filed out of time, despite the fact that neither petitioner Ismael Tamayo, Sr. nor his deceased counsel was furnished with a copy of the resolution, and likewise the copy for the petitioner union was served to a stranger who is not an employee of the law office of petitioners counsel. Respondent NLRC ordered the remand of all the three cases to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings: opining that with respect to NLRC Case No. 0049-89, respondent Bank should have been given an opportunity to cross-examine the petitioner, Ismael Tamayo, Sr., as to the veracity of the allegations contained in his unverified position paper, the lack or absence of which amounted to a denial of due process. As regards, Case No. 097-89, the NLRC held that the finding by the Labor Arbiter of an illegal lock-out was not substantiated by evidence, as it was found out that no proof was ever adduced by the Union to show that the bank refused them employment during the pendency of the strike, thus necessitating the remand of the case to the Labor Arbiter for reception of evidence. So also, the NLRC ruled that a complete disposition of the case could not be had since there was nothing in the record which indicates the number of employees constructively dismissed by the respondent Bank. Before delving into the merits of the case, it should be remembered that in the decision in the case of St. Martin Funeral Homes vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.130866, promulgated on September 16, 1998, this Court pronounced that petitions for certiorari relating to NLRC decisions must be filed directly with the Court of Appeals, and labor cases pending before this Court should be referred to the appellate court for proper disposition. However, in cases where the Memoranda of both parties have been filed with this Court prior to the promulgation of the St. Martin decision, the Court generally opts to take the case itself for its final disposition. With respect to the first assigned error, petitioners contend that it was an error for NLRC to remand Case No. 0059-89 to the Labor Arbiter as the issue of legality of subject strike has been resolved in favor of the Union by the Arbiter and the Commission. There is merit in petitioners contention. NLRC Case No. 0059-89 was filed by the respondent Bank against the Union, for declaration of illegality of the strike, unfair labor practice and damages. In the proceedings below, the Labor Arbiter found that the strike conducted by the Union was legal and complied with all the requirements of law. Such finding was, in fact, affirmed by the NLRC in the following Resolution, to wit:

xxx It appears that the Union filed its notice of strike on March 3, 1989 and that it commenced its strike thirty (30) days thereafter, or on April 3, 1989. Obviously, the Union had duly observed the mandatory cooling-off period such that the strike it eventually undertook complied with what is required by the Labor Code. Hence, Our finding that the strike is legal. It is well-settled that when findings of fact by the labor arbiter are sufficiently supported by the evidence on record, the same must be accorded due respect by this Court.[1] More so when such findings by the Labor Arbiter are affirmed by the NLRC on appeal. Since the NLRC found the strike conducted by the Union legal, the Court finds no justifiable reason for the Commission to remand Case No. 0059-89 to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings. The allegation of unfair labor practice and the claim for damages proceed from and are consequences of the strike, the findings of which are based on the legality or illegality thereof. The strike thus being adjudged as legal, the charges of unfair labor practice and damages are thereby negated and bereft of any basis. Therefore, the NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it ordered the remand of NLRC Case No. 0059-89 to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings. Anent the second assigned error which pertains to NLRC Case No. 0097-89, the case instituted by the Union against the respondent Bank for unfair labor practice with damages, the Court believes, and so holds, that the remand of said case was in order. NLRC Case No. 0097-89 charged RBAI with unfair labor practice and the Labor Arbiter concluded that the Bank employed all available means to further delay the resolution of the dispute, thus creating a scenario of an illegal lock-out. A lock-out means the temporary refusal of an employer to furnish work as a result of an industrial or labor dispute.[2] As correctly found by the NLRC, in the case under consideration evidence of illegal lock-out is wanting such that there can be no conclusive determination by the NLRC as to the charge. Petitioners failed to present sufficient proof to support the allegation of illegal lock-out. No evidence was adduced by the Union to show that the Bank really refused them employment during the pendency of the strike. As to the allegation that the Bank was interfering with and restraining the employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, suffice it to state that filing a petition for cancellation of the Unions registration is not per se an act of unfair labor practice. It must be shown by substantial evidence that the filing of the petition for cancellation of union registration by the employer was aimed to oppress the Union. Consequently, the NLRC was right in ordering the remand of Case No.0097-89 for further proceedings. Anent the observation of NLRC that it was at a loss as to the exact number of employees who were constructively dismissed by the Bank, such claim is belied by the records clearly indicating that in its Complaint in NLRC Case. 0059-89, petitioner Union did attach a letter addressed to the respondent Bank containing a list of the banks employees together with their length of service and monthly basic salary.[3] Respondent avers that since the said list was presented in evidence in Case No. 0059-89, the same could not be considered as evidence in Case No. 0097-89 because these two cases are separate and distinct from each other. The contention is untenable. It must be recalled that Case No. 0097-89 was filed in the nature of a countercharge to Case No. 0059-89 by the petitioner Union against respondent Bank.

Besides, all the three cases were consolidated before the Labor Arbiter because of the identity of the parties. Thus, the list, although introduced in Case No. 0059-89, could likewise be properly considered as evidence in Case No. 0097-89. As held by this Court, proceedings before a labor arbiter are non-litigious in nature in which, subject to the requirements of due process, the technicalities of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law do not strictly apply.[4] Petitioners stance that the finding of unfair labor practice already became final as the issue was not raised on appeal, is untenable. The first, fourth and fifth issues raised by the Bank in its Appeal Memorandum filed with the NLRC on December 24, 1989 theorized that: 1. The Labor Arbiter gravely abused his discretion in holding that appellant violated its duty to bargain collectively. xxx xxx xxx 4. The Labor Arbiter gravely abused his discretion in holding that appellant is guilty of illegal lock-out. 5. The Labor Arbiter gravely abused his discretion in holding that appellant illegally dismissed its employees. xxx xxx xxx.[5] Although the issue was not collectively appealed as unfair labor practice, the first, fourth and fifth issues relate to acts which by themselves constitute unfair labor practice. As regards the third assigned error, petitioners maintain that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in remanding NLRC Case No. 0049-89 for further proceedings because the Labor Arbiter denied respondent Banks right to cross-examine petitioner Ismael Tamayo, Sr. Respondent NLRC, on the other hand, ruled that the Labor Arbiter should have granted respondent Bank the right to cross-examine the said petitioner on the veracity of the allegations in his unverified position paper, and it was grave abuse of discretion not to allow respondent Bank to cross-examine petitioner Tamayo. In a long line of cases, this Court has held that the holding of a trial is discretionary on the part of the Labor Arbiter, and it cannot be demanded as a matter of right by the parties[6] The absence of a formal hearing or trial before the Labor Arbiter is no cause for a party to impute grave abuse of discretion.[7] The submission of position papers and memoranda in labor cases satisfies the requirements of due process, and a decision rendered on the basis of the position papers which were found to be sufficient, meets the requirements of a fair and open hearing.[8] Thus, in the case under scrutiny, the Labor Arbiter did not act with grave abuse his discretion in not conducting a formal hearing or trial and in basing his decision solely on the position papers submitted by the parties. The fact that the position paper submitted by petitioner Tamayo was not verified is of no moment. Succinct and clear is the ruling of this Court that the lack of a verification of a position paper is only a formal and not a jurisdictional defect.[9] It is not fatal and could be easily corrected by requiring an oath.[10]

Petitioner Tamayo faults respondent NLRC for denying his motion for reconsideration for the reason that it was filed out of time. He contends that neither he nor his deceased former counsel, Atty. de Vera was furnished a copy of the NLRCs resolution. Petitioners allegation is not meritorious. It is axiomatic that notice to counsel is notice to parties and when a party is represented by counsel, notices should be made upon the counsel of record at his given address, to which notices of all kinds emanating from the court should be sent.[11] In the appeal before the respondent Commission, it was Atty. Teofilo Humilde who entered appearance in behalf of the Union and petitioner Tamayo. It was thus reasonable for the NLRC to send a copy of the NLRC Resolution to the said lawyer. Since the said resolution was received by counsel on February 26, 1991 and the motion for reconsideration was filed only on March 13, 1991, the denial by the NLRC was in order, the ten-day period for filing a motion for reconsideration having lapsed. WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED in that the Order of the NLRC remanding NLRC Cases No. 0049-89 and No.0059-89 to the Labor Arbiter is SET ASIDE but, the Order remanding NLRC Case No. 0097-89 to said Labor Arbiter for further proceedings, is UPHELD. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

SAN MIGUEL v. BERSAMIRA G.R. No. 87700 June 13, 1990 J. Melencio-Herrera FACTS: Sometime in 1983 and 1984, SanMig entered into contracts for merchandising services with Lipercon and D'Rite (independent contractors duly licensed by the DOLE). In said contracts, it was expressly understood and agreed that the workers employed by the contractors were to be paid by the latter and that none of them were to be deemed employees or agents of SanMig. There was to be no employer-employee relation between the contractors and/or its workers, on the one hand, and SanMig on the other. Petitioner San Miguel Corporation Employees Union-PTWGO (the Union, for brevity) is the duly authorized representative of the monthly paid rank-and-file employees of SanMig with whom the latter executed a Collective Bargaining Agreement. In a letter, dated 20 November 1988 (Annex C, Petition), the Union advised SanMig that some Lipercon and D'Rite workers had signed up for union membership and sought the regularization of their employment with SMC. On 12 January 1989 on the ground that it had failed to receive any favorable response from SanMig, the Union filed a notice of strike for unfair labor practice, CBA violations, and union busting Beginning 14 February 1989 until 2 March 1989, series of pickets were staged by Lipercon and D'Rite workers in various SMC plants and offices. On 6 March 1989, SMC filed a verified Complaint for Injunction and Damages

ISSUE: Whether, or not the case at bar involves, or is in connection with, or relates to a labor dispute HELD: A "labor dispute" as defined in Article 212 (1) of the Labor Code includes "any controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee." A labor dispute can nevertheless exist "regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relationship of employer and employee" That a labor dispute, as defined by the law, does exist herein is evident. At bottom, what the Union seeks is to regularize the status of the employees contracted by Lipercon and D'Rite in effect, that they be absorbed into the working unit of SanMig. This matter definitely dwells on the working relationship between said employees vis-a-vis SanMig. Terms, tenure and conditions of their employment and the arrangement of those terms are thus involved bringing the matter within the purview of a labor dispute. Further, the Union also seeks to represent those workers, who have signed up for Union membership, for the purpose of collective bargaining. SanMig, for its part, resists that Union demand on the ground that there is no employer-employee relationship between it and those workers and because the demand violates the terms of their CBA.

BALMAR FARMS, INC., petitioner, vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU), respondent. G.R. No. 73504 October 15, 1991 FACTS: On October 27, 1982, Med-Arbiter Antonino G. Jolejole issued an order certifying the ALU as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file workers and employees of BALMAR, Kapalong, Davao del Norte Sometime in November, 1982, BALMAR received a copy of the letter dated November 12, 1982 signed by Johnny Y. Luces in his capacity as President of the BALMAR Employees Association, addressed to the Regional Director, Hon. Eugenio Sagmit, Jr. The letter stating that: We are filing this with your Office so that you could help us in requesting BALMAR FARMS to negotiate directly with us and not thru ALU. That on February 8, 1983, ALU sent a letter to BALMAR, attaching therewith their proposals for collective bargaining agreement. On March 10, 1983, BALMAR replied to ALU's letter of March 1, 1983, stating that the management was requested by Balmar Farms Employees Association to negotiate with them directly and not with ALU because ALU has been dis-authorized as the agent of the BALMAR employees. BALMAR further contended that ALU has to disprove the disauthorization for only then can BALMAR negotiate with ALU. For alleged refusal to bargain, ALU filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and damages against BALMAR docketed as NLRC Case No. 1114-LR-XI-83 (Rollo, pp. 22-24).

ISSUE: whether or not petitioner BALMAR is guilty of unfair labor practice for refusing to bargain collectively with ALU. RULING: YES. It can, therefore, be inferred that BALMAR's refusal to bargain collectively with ALU is a clear act of unfair labor practice. Article 248 (Labor Code, as amended), enumerates unfair labor practices committed by employers such as for them: (g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by this Code; The duty to bargain collectively means the performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect to wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions or employment including proposals for adjusting any grievance or questions arising under such agreement if requested by either party but such duty does not compel any party to agree to a proposal or to make any concession (Art. 252, Labor Code, as amended). BALMAR cannot also invoke good faith in refusing to negotiate with ALU, considering that the latter has been certified as the exclusive bargaining representative of BALMAR rank and file employees. As observed by the Solicitor General, BALMAR'S pretense that majority of its rank and file employees disaffiliated simply because of a letter it received to that effect, all the more sustains the finding of bad faith for it is not for the petitioner BALMAR to question which group is the collective bargaining representative of its rank and file employees. Balmar's taking side with the rank and file employee who allegedly disaffiliated, renders its stand on the matter highly suspicious.

Management admits allowing employees not covered by the CBA to share in the collection of the service charge, thereby reducing the individual shares of the employees but maintains that it was done in the spirit of fairness and to boost the morale of everybody working in the restaurant and that anyway the practice had been discontinued long before the complaint was filed. The second charge pertains to a violation of the union-shop clause of the CBA which required membership in the union as a condition of continued employment in the restaurant and that management is bound to dismiss, upon demand of the union, any employee who ceased to be a member in good standing of the union. The union had expelled four employees, Raquing Yupo, Francisco Ibañez, Manuel Dante and Rodolfo Canalita, as members of the union for acts of disloyalty, after due investigation. The union demanded from management for their dismissal in accordance with the union-shop clause embodied in the collective bargaining agreement, but management refused on the ground that the union officers never specified why these individuals were dismissed and management had reason to believe that the individual complainants who were then officers of the union, sought the dismissal of the said three persons because they dared ask for an accounting for union funds. The third charge concerns the resignation of the four (4) individual complainants allegedly made under threats of management that should private respondents do not resign, the establishment would be closed. Management refutes this accusation and counters that their resignation was voluntary and of their own free will. The company’s argument that though there was a violation of the CBA, such violation did not constitute an unfair labor practice because there was a conspicuous absence in the statute, the Industrial Peace Act (R.A. No. 875) making a violation of the CBA an unfair labor practice. ISSUE: Whether or not the company committed unfair labor practice when the provisions of the CBA were violated?

Alba Patio De Makati v. Alba Patio De Makati Employees Association

(2) failing and refusing to terminate the services of some union members who were expelled by the complainant union for acts of disloyalty induced by the management, violative of the unionshop clause; and

HELD: YES. The Supreme Court rejected the petitioners’ contention that it is not legally justifiable to maintain that a violation of the collective bargaining agreement is an unfair labor practice for under the legal maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" (the express mention of one person, thing or consequence is an express exclusion of all others), there is no express mention that a CBA violation is an unfair labor practice in the list of unfair labor practices cited above and that since the provision making it an unfair labor practice by employers when they violate a collective bargaining agreement was provided under Presidential Decree No. 442, Title VI entitled "Unfair Labor Practice", Chapter I, Article 294, any violation of a collective bargaining agreement before the new provision or amendment was not an unfair labor practice. The prevailing jurisprudence on the matter is to the effect that "a violation of the provisions of the CBA is an unfair labor practice.

(3) forcing private respondents to resign and making them sign papers prepared by management with the threat that if the private respondents do not resign, the establishment would be closed.

Asuncion Bros. Co. c CIR

FACTS: A complaint for unfair labor practice was filed against the petitioner company for violating the terms terms of the Collective Bargaining Agreement by committing the following acts: (1) allowing non-union members from sharing in the service charge and locking-out the employees for nine (9) days when the union officers demanded for reimbursement;

The first charge refers to the CBA which provides: "10% of the total amounts of service charge collected every month as reflected by the sales book will be retained by the restaurant for general breakage. The remaining amount after the 10% has been deducted will be distributed twice a month following collection by the restaurant to the employees covered by this agreement in the manner they may agree upon.

Facts The petitioners, Asuncion Bros. & Co., Inc. and Jose Asuncion were charged with unfair labor practice in the C.I.R. by the Court Prosecutor, on complaint of certain of their employees and the latter's labor organization, the Asuncion Bros. Woodcraft Employees and Laborers Union. The complaint substantially alleged that because the individual complainants had organized a

labor organization which later affiliated itself with the Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization (PTGWO), the company, thru its general manager, Jose Asuncion, had made the members work on rotation basis and eventually dismissed them on various dates.

In their answer, the petitioners denied the accusation; they claimed that the rotation of workers was resorted to on account of circumstances beyond their control, not the least of which was the "systematic" acts of the complainants' absenting themselves at will, reporting late, and "moonlighting" with other firms; and they set up certain affirmative defenses including the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action and the Court's lack of jurisdiction. Evidence was thereafter presented by the parties before a Hearing Examiner in accordance with the procedure obtaining in the CIR.The Hearing Examiner found petitioners guilty as charged.

While it is true that the Labor Code was promulgated on May 1, 1974, it expressly provided 5 that its effectivity would commence six months thereafter, or on November 1, 1974. Moreover, Article 338 relied upon by the petitioners was amended by PD 570-A by inter alia changing the work "passage" to "effectivity."

Thus, there is no doubt that the Labor Court still had jurisdiction of the case at the time it rendered its judgment on June 27, 1974.

2. The case was brought before the Court on an appeal by certiorari. They seek to make two basic points: (1) the C.I.R. lost jurisdiction of the case on promulgation of the Labor Code (PD 442) on May 1, 1974, and (2) the judgment is not reasonably supported by the evidence.

Issue

1.

Whether the C.I.R. lost jurisdiction of the case on promulgation of the Labor Code (PD 442) on May 1, 1974?

2.

(2) the judgment is not reasonably supported by the evidence.

Ruling

1.

The point is grounded on Article 338 of the Code providing that "All cases pending before the Court of Industrial Relations and the National Labor Relations Commission established under Presidential Decree No. 21 at the time of the passage of this Code should be transferred to and processed by the National Labor Relations Commission created under this Code in accordance with the procedure laid down herein." The petitioners set the passage of the Code at May 1, 1974 and argue that the C.I.R. had already lost jurisdiction by the time it rendered judgment on June 27, 1974. The point is not well taken.

As the Court sees it, the error of the Labor Court lies in its omission to take account of relevant evidence on record and the quite material fact that the employees and their union had completely disregard the grievance procedure set forth in their collective bargaining agreement with the petitioner company.

The Court a quo ignored the evidence given by two impartial witnesses: Gilbert Tumlos personnel manager of Permaline and Eustaquio Kerr, manager of Kawayan Woodcraft, who both testified to the employment of a majority of the complainants in their respective firms. 7 Their sworn declarations are fully corroborative and confirmatory of the testimony of the petitioners' witnesses, 8 as well as the documents listing the names of those workers whose employment had been terminated, the specific infractions of company rules constituting the respective causes therefor, and the dates of the commission of said infractions. 9

The evidence satisfactorily establishes the petitioners' claim that their woodcraft plant 44 operates under an integrated assembly fine system ([where] assignments [are integrated: e.g.] pattern, cutting, carving, lathe machine, disc sanding, spindle sanding, drum sanding, varnishing and finishing, packing). Failure of one unit or set of workers to perform in time its assigned functions hampers the whole operation and will cause stoppage of work, to the damage and prejudice of the enterprise, a small and budding one at that." 10 The record thus contains adequate evidentiary foundation for the dismissal of the complainants from employment, a circumstance that at the time constitutes persuasive refutation of the theory that said complainants were fired simply because of their union activities.

Further disclosed by the record is the disregard by the complainant employees and their union of the grievance procedure prescribed in their collective bargaining agreement with the employer

The judgment of the Court a quo was then REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and another entered, absolving the petitioners.

GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 146728. February 11, 2004 Facts: General Milling Corporation employed 190 workers. All the employees were members of a union which is a duly certified bargaining agent. The GMC and the union entered into a collective bargaining agreement which included the issue of representation that is effective for a term of three years which will expire on November 30, 1991. On November 29, 1991, a day before the expiration of the CBA, the union sent GMC a proposed CBA, with a request that a counter proposal be submitted within ten days. on October 1991, GMC received collective and individual letters from the union members stating that they have withdrawn from their union membership. On December 19, 1991, the union disclaimed any massive disaffiliation of its union members. On January 13, 1992, GMC dismissed an employee who is a union member. The union protected the employee and requested GMC to submit to the grievance procedure provided by the CBA, but GMC argued that there was no basis to negotiate with a union which is no longer existing. The union then filed a case with the Labor Arbiter but the latter ruled that there must first be a certification election to determine if the union still enjoys the support of the workers. Issue: Whether or not GMC is guilty of unfair labor practice for violating its duty to bargain collectively and/or for interfering with the right of its employees to self-organization. Held: GMC is guilty of unfair labor practice when it refused to negotiate with the union upon its request for the renegotiation of the economic terms of the CBA on November 29, 1991. the union’s proposal was submitted within the prescribed 3-year period from the date of effectivity of the CBA. It was obvious that GMC had no valid reason to refuse to negotiate in good faith with the union. The refusal to send counter proposal to the union and to bargain anew on the economic terms of the CBA is tantamount to an unfair labor practice under Article 248 of the Labor Code. Under Article 252 of the Labor Code, both parties are required to perform their mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement. The union lived up to this obligation when it presented proposals for a new CBA to GMC within 3 years from the effectivity of the original CBA. But GMC failed in its duty under Article 252. What it did was to devise a flimsy excuse, by questioning the existence of the union and the status of its membership to prevent any negotiation. It bears stressing that the procedure in collective bargaining prescribed by the Code is mandatory because of the basic interest of the state in ensuring lasting industrial peace. The Court of Appeals found that the letters between February to June, 1993 by 13 union members signifying their resignation from the union clearly indicated that GMC exerted pressure on the employees. We agree with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the ill-timed letters of resignation from the union members indicate that GMC interfered with the right of its employee to self-organization.

Visayan Bicycle Manufacturing Co. v. National Labor Union and Court of Industrial Relations May 19, 1965 G.R. L-19997 FACTS Visayan Bicycle Manufacturing Co. (VIBEM) and its company union, VIBEM Workers Union (VIBEMWU) signed a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Later, VIBEMWU affiliated with the National Labor Union (NLU) which demanded for the enforcement of the CBA. During the hearings caused by the notice of strike filed by NLU in behalf of VIBEMWU, the manager warned the VIBEMWU officers that if they will not withdraw the union’s affilation from NLU, he would take steps to dismiss them from work. VIBEM hired Reyes and Pacia, who on the same week as being hired, provoked a fight within company premises and during working hours with VIBEMWU officers: Besana and Rodiel. On the ground that they have violated a company rule which penalizes the inciting and provoking of a fight during work hours and on company premises, the two union officers were dismissed by the company without any investigation. ISSUE Whether the dismissal of the officers is an unfair labor practice RULING Yes, the dismissal of the officers is an unfair labor practice. VIBEM violated Sec. 4(a)(1) and (4) of RA 875 (NOTE: provisions are similar to provisions of the current Labor Code) which include as ULP the interference of the employer with the employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization; and the discrimination in the tenure of employment. (The case falls under INTERFERENCE, one of the forms of ULP.) The pre-arranged fight was pursuant to a strategy of the company. It was designed to provide an apparently lawful cause for their dismissal, as gleaned from the following circumstances: Reyes and Pacia were hold only within the week of the incident. Besana and Rodiel were not shown to have previous similar incidents nor was there any violation of the company policy in their many years of service. VIBEM did not investigate. The manager who warned the officers admitted that Besana was dismissed because he was “a hard-headed leader of the union.” It was a discriminatory dismissal because the violation was brought upon by the company itself through the recent employment of Reyes and Pacia who provoked the fight. The fight is not a ground to punish the union.

ROYAL UNDERGARMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, ROYAL UNDERGARMENT WORKERS UNION (PTGWO) and ANTONIO CRUZ, respondents. G.R. No. L-39040 June 6, 1990

FACTS: Respondent Antonio Cruz was employed by petitioner corporation in 1957 as an electrician. Sometime in December, 1961, he was elected president of the Royal Undergarment Workers Union (RUWU for brevity), a legitimate labor organization which became affiliated with the Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization (PTGWO for brevity). That same month, Spouses Cruz were terminated from their respective Job, but were reinstated after.

tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization (Section 4 (a) (4), R.A. No. 875).

American President Lines v. Clave On March 31, 1962, RUWU-PTGWO and petitioner corporation entered into a collective bargaining agreement which contained a grievance procedure for the settlement of disputes. Sometime in November, 1962, the PTGWO urged its member-unions to stage a nationwide strike. Thus, respondent Cruz campaigned among the members of RUWU to join the strike. On November 28, 1962 at around 11:00 p.m., within the company premises, respondent Cruz approached three co-employees who are supervisors of the company, namely, Camaguin, Dayadante and Gaspar, who he rallied to join the strike the following day. These persons contended that respondent Cruz was under the influence of liquor. On December 13, 1962, petitioner corporation dismissed respondent Cruz for being under the influence of liquor on November 28, 1962 and for having threatened the lives of four of his co-employees. ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of Cruz by Royal Undergarment amounted to an unfair labor practice? RULING: YES. We have perused the record and found that the totality of evidence as found by respondent court supports the conclusion that respondent Cruz has been unjustly dismissed by reason of his union activities. The charge by petitioner against respondent Cruz for being under the influence of liquor on a certain date and for having threatened the lives of his co-employees is too flimsy to merit serious consideration. We have on record the undisputed facts that private respondent, as president of RUWU, was known for his aggressive and militant union activities; that he and his wife had been previously dismissed on the ground of active participation in union affairs; that they were reemployed only pursuant to the express terms of the Return-to-Work Agreement executed by petitioner corporation and RUWU when the latter won in the consent election; that respondent Cruz was dismissed again for the second time in the course of his campaign among RUWU members to join the nationwide strike of PTGWO in which RUWU is a member union. It has previously been indicated that an employer may treat freely with an employee and is not obliged to support his actions with a reason or purpose. However, where the attendant circumstances, the history of the employer's past conduct and like considerations, coupled with an intimate connection between the employer's action and the union affiliations or activities of the particular employee or employees taken as a whole raise a suspicion as to the motivation for the employer's action, the failure of the employer to ascribe a valid reason therefor may justify an inference that his unexplained conduct in respect of the particular employee or employees was inspired by the latter's union membership or activities We accord respect to the findings of the industrial court. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, known as the The Industrial Peace Act, as amended, provides that employees shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining through representatives of their own choosing and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual aid or protection. Hence, it shall be unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to

FACTS: The Company entered into a contract with Marine Security Agency to guard their vessels in the port. The Contract was for 1 year and may only be terminated by either party upon 30 days notice. The arrangement was that Marine Security Agency would hire and assign the guards, lump sum will be given to the agency who in turn determined the compensation of the individual watchmen. The Contract was terminated and they executed a new contract with the Phil. Scout Veterans Security and Investigation Agency. The Maritime Security Union abolished themselves due to termination of contract, inability of Agency to provide employment and inability of members and Union to provide maintenance. The Individual complainants headed by Julian Advincula filed Unfair Labor Practice case against the company. Their complaint, wherein they charged that the petitioner had refused to negotiate an agreement with them and had discriminated against them with regard to their tenure of employment by dismissing them on January 1, 1961, for no other reason than their membership with the union and union activities, was lodged with the defunct Court of Industrial Relations.

ISSUE: Whether or not there existed an employer-employee relationship between the company and the individual watchmen of the Marine Security Agency who are alleged to be members of the respondent union? Whether or not they committed unfair labor practice? HELD: 1. NO. There was no Employer-Employee relationship. To determine the existence of ER-EE relationship: (1) selection and engagement of the employee (2) payment of wages (3) power of dismissal (4) power to control the employee’s conduct (most important element) The Court fails to see how the complaining watchmen of the Marine Security Agency can be considered as employees of the petitioner. It is the agency that recruits, hires, and assigns the work of its watchmen. Hence, a watchman can not perform any security service for the petitioner’s vessels unless the agency first accepts him as its watchman. With respect to his

wages, the amount to be paid to a security guard is beyond the power of the petitioner to determine. Also no power to dismiss (can ask to change guard but agency still has final say) and contract has clearly ended.

Petitioners claimed that their DISMISSAL WAS PART OF RESPONDENTS' DESIGN TO BUST THEIR NEWLY-ORGANIZED UNION WHICH SOUGHT TO ENFORCE THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE LABOR STANDARDS LAW

2. It necessarily follows that petitioner cannot be guilty of ULP as charged by the private respondents. Under RA 875, Sec. 13, a ULP may committed only within the context of the EEER relationship. On the ULP issue, desire to negotiate agreement must be expressed through a written notice (no showing in this case), no evidence that termination was due to alleged union activities.

Respondent FTC, on the other hand, maintained that there was no employer-employee relationship between FTC and petitioners. It said that at the time of the termination of their services, petitioners were the employees of MISI which was a separate and distinct corporation from FTC. Hence, petitioners had no cause of action against FTC.[2]

De leon v NLRC Facts On August 23, 1980, Fortune Tobacco Corporation (FTC) and Fortune Integrated Services, Inc. (FISI) entered into a contract for security services where the latter undertook to provide security guards for the protection and security of the former. The petitioners were among those engaged as security guards pursuant to the contract. On February 1, 1991, the incorporators and stockholders of FISI sold out lock, stock and barrel to a group of new stockholders by executing for the purpose a "Deed of Sale of Shares of Stock". On the same date, the Articles of Incorporation of FISI was amended changing its corporate name to Magnum Integrated Services, Inc. (MISI). A new by-laws was likewise adopted and approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission on June 4, 1993. On October 15, 1991, FTC terminated the contract for security services which resulted in the displacement of some five hundred eighty two (582) security guards assigned by FISI/MISI to FTC, including the petitioners in this case. Sometime in October 1991, the Fortune Tobacco Labor Union, an affiliate of the National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU), and claiming to be the bargaining agent of the security guards, sent a Notice of Strike to FISI/MISI. On November 14, 1991, the members of the union which include petitioners picketed the premises of FTC. The Regional Trial Court of Pasig, however, issued a writ of injunction to enjoin the picket. On November 29, 1991, Simeon de Leon, together with sixteen (16) other complainants instituted the illegal dismissal case before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. The complaint was later amended to allow the inclusion of other complainants.

Respondent FISI, meanwhile, denied the charge of illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice. It argued that petitioners were not dismissed from service but were merely placed on floating status pending re-assignment to other posts. It alleged that the temporary displacement of petitioners was not due to its fault but was the result of the pretermination by FTC of the contract for security services.[3] The Labor Arbiter found respondents liable for the charges. Rejecting FTC's argument that there was no employer-employee relationship between FTC and petitioners, he ruled that FISI and FTC should be considered as a single employer. He observed that the two corporations have common stockholders and they share the same business address. The Labor Arbiter thus found respondents guilty of UNION BUSTING and illegal dismissal. On appeal, the NLRC reversed and set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Issue Whether respondents are guilty of unfair labor practice? Ruling Yes. An examination of the facts of this case reveals that there is sufficient ground to conclude that respondents were guilty of interfering with the right of petitioners to selforganization which constitutes unfair labor practice under Article 248 of the Labor Code. [8] Petitioners have been employed with FISI since the 1980s and have since been posted at the premises of FTC -- its main factory plant, its tobacco redrying plant and warehouse. It appears from the records that FISI, while having its own corporate identity, was a mere instrumentality of FTC, tasked to provide protection and security in the company premises. The records show that the two corporations had identical stockholders and the same business address. The test of whether an employer has interfered with and coerced employees within the meaning of section (a) (1) is whether the employer has engaged in conduct which it may reasonably be said tends to interfere with the free exercise of employees' rights under section 3 of the Act, and it is not necessary that there be direct evidence that any employee was in fact intimidated or coerced by statements of threats of the employer if there is a reasonable inference that anti-union conduct of the employer does have an adverse effect on selforganization and collective bargaining.