GD respondents

IV Mahamana Malviya National Moot Court Competition – 2016

BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF RHODO

APPELLATE WRIT JURISDICTION PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION

W.P. (CIVIL) NO. ___ OF 2016

UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF RHODO In the matter of Article 19 and Article 21 of Constitution of Rhodo

UNION OF RHODO…………….…………………………PETITIONERS v. DASHANAN MOTORS LTD. ………..……………………. RESPONDENTS

UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HIS COMPANION JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF RHODO

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

GD

TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Contents ........................................................................................................................

i

List Of Abbreviations .............................................................................................................. iii Index Of Authorities ..................................................................................................................

iv

Statement of jurisdiction………………………………………………………………….vii Statement of Facts……………………………………………………………………… viii Statement of Issues ................................................................................................................ xi Summary of Arguments .......................................................................................................... xii Arguments Advanced................................................................................................................. I.

1

Whether the directive issued by the Government is unreasonable………………………………………………………………………………..1 II.

Whether There Has Been Violation Of Article 21 of the Constitution.......4

Prayer……………………………………………………………………………9

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ¶

Para

¶¶

Paras

AIR

All India Reporter

All

Allahabad

Art.

Article

Del

Delhi

Ed.

Edition

Mad

Madras

DML

Dashanan Motors Ltd.

p.

Page No. PIL

Public Interest Litigation

SC

Supreme Court

SCC

Supreme Court Reports

SCJ

Supreme Court Journal

Sec.

Section

u/a

Under Article

iii

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES CASES Baksey V. Board of Regents , 347 M.D. 442 (1954) Basheshar Nath V. Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi (1959) Supp. 1. S.C.R 528 Basheshar Nath V. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi , 1959 Supp. 1 S.C.R 528 Chintaman Rao V. The State of Madhya pradeshram 1951 , AIR 118, 1950, SCR 759 Delhi Development Horticulture Employees Union V. Delhi Administration , Delhi & Ors. 1992 CLR 537 Kharak Singh V. State of UP AIR 1963 SC 1295 Kharak Singh V. The State of UP (1964) 1 S.C.R 332 Krishnan Kakkan V. Govt of Kerela And Ors. Air 1996 ker 329 LIC of India & Anr. V. Consumer Education & Research 1995 AIR 1811,1995 SCC (5) 482 Madhu kiswhar & Ors. V. State of Bihar & Ors. 1996, AIR 1864 SCC (5) 125 Olga Tellis V. Bombay Municipal Corpn. (1985) 3 SCC 545 : AIR 1986 SC 180 P C Mishra V. Secretary to Govt. of India 2007 (2) SLJ 156 CAT State of Maharashtra V. Chandrabhan , AIR 1983 SC 803 UP Power Corporation Ltd V. & Anr. V. Sant Steels & Alloys (P) Ltd & Ors

iv MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

BOOKS 1. Basu D.D , Constitution of India ,14th edition 2009, LexisNexis, Butterworths Wadhwa Publication Nagpur. 2. Desai . A. Ashok, Environmental Jurisprudence , 2 nd Edition 2002, Modern Law House. 3. Dhirajlal & Ratanlal, The Law of Torts.26 th edition 2012, LexisNexis Butterworths Wadhwa. 4. Divan Shyam , Rosencranz Armin ,Environmental Law and policy in India, Second Edition 2004, Oxford India paperbacksS.C.Shastri, Environmental Law, Fifth edition 2015, Eastern Book Company, Lucknow. 5. Doabia T.S, Environmental & Pollution laws in India, 1 st Edition 2005, Wadhwa Nagpur. 7. Jain M.P., Indian Constitutional Law, 6th Edition 2011, LexisNexis Butterworth Wadhwa Nagpur. 8. Jaswal P.S., Environmental Law, 2nd Edition 2006, Allahabad Law agency.

LEGAL DATABASES 1. Manupatra 2. SCC Online 3. West Law 4. Hein Online

v MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

LEGISLATIONS 1.

The Constitution of India, 1950 2. Environment Protection Act, 1986 3. Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981

CONVENTIONS 1. Stockholm Declaration, 1972

vi MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION The Hon’ble Supreme Court of Rambo has the jurisdiction in this matter under Article 136 of the Constitution of Rambo which reads as follows: “136. Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India (2) Nothing in clause ( 1 ) shall apply to any judgment, determination, sentence or order passed or made by any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces.”

vii MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

Statement of Facts Republic of Rhodo is a sovereign, socialist, democratic republic situated in the southern part of the Asian continent. It was under colonial rule of European powers for over two centuries and finally won its independence in the mid of twentieth century. Immediately, after independence, the intrinsically socialist government of Republic of Rhodo, with the Rhodo National Congress (RNC) at its helm embarked on a rapid industrialisation drive with the establishment of various state owned public sector industries and enterprises. One such establishment was Dashanan Motors Ltd. (DML), its flagship product being Pushpak, a car loosely modelled on the English automobile Morris Minor and buses which were marketed under the name Garuda. In the meantime, there was a growing concern in the international community regarding the degradation of environment, which led to various international treaties and conferences with the aim of creating a consensus among nations to make their environmental safety norms more stringent. The Republic of Rhodo was an active participant and signatory in many of these significant and subsequently it passed various legislations to that effect including an amendment to its Constitution. It also beefed up its vehicle emission standards and issued a directive to the Pollution Control Boards (PCBs) of all its provinces to ensure strict compliance to the afore-mentioned norms. The factory ever since its inception discharged all its trade effluents in the river Asli, has its confluence with the Khari Sea. There it has created the largest riverine delta network on the planet, the Mohana which incidentally has been recognised as an extremely important biosphere reserve by several international organisations. It has a vast spectrum of flora and fauna species and is inhabited by a number of endangered species, and has extensive foliage of mangroves. It was in the year 2015 that certain drastic changes were observed in the flora and fauna, and the health of the natives of this region and the over ground breathing roots of these mangroves were found to be plugged with sludge as a result of which vast patches of mangrove forests withered away and died. Moreover, bloated bodies of dead riverine dolphins unique to the Mohana delta floated up on the shores. The natives of the region started complaining of having developed black sores on various parts of the body and shortness of breath.

viii MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

This raised an alarm amongst the observing scientists and activists of the Mohana Biodiversity Conservation Forum (MBCF). Their study revealed that the water of the river Asli was heavily polluted due to the emission of trade effluents from the plant of DML. It contained various chemicals which are hazardous to flora and fauna of the region. It was also found that some of the major pollutants of the river were sulphur and heavy metals which could have been the cause of death of the dolphins and the black-sore disease. Therefore, it opined that the DML was responsible for such environmental deterioration. The government of Republic of Rhodo, in the mid of the year 2015, after proper consideration and deliberation, and also under the influence of various pressure groups working for environmental conservation opted Euro VI from 1 January 2016, and issued a directive to this effect in October 2015 in which it was strictly ordered to all automobile manufacturing companies to desist the manufacturing and selling all vehicles which do not comply with the new norms. The DML manufactured only three vehicles namely Pushpak Hatchback and Pushpak Sedan among cars and Garuda Premium bus which were noncompliant with the new norms. The board of directors of the company held a meeting on 1 November 2015 at which the vital issues pertaining to compliance with new norms were discussed, and it was concluded that they were not in a position to make the requisite changes in the engines of their products in such a short span. After an exhaustive deliberation it was found that necessary modifications in the engines of the products would require in a time of at least eight months and until the needful is done they would have to lay off their workers and also during this period they will be forced to stop both manufacturing and sale of their products which would incur huge losses. The Board of Directors of the company moved to the Hon’ble High Court of Judicature of Shivpuri on 1st December 2015 seeking issuance of a writ in nature of mandamus so as to get the impugned directive annulled. The writ petition was admitted as WP(C) 9813/2015. The RESPONDENT in this case alleged that the directive of the central government was unconstitutional as it violated their fundamental right to freedom of trade and profession, and also the right to livelihood of their employees. The Hon’ble High Court took the arguments of the DML into proper consideration and ordered in favour of the RESPONDENTs. The Central Government feeling aggrieved by decision of the High Court approached the Supreme Court of Rhodo under its appellate jurisdiction. It filed an SLP on 22nd December 2015 which was admitted as SLP 8015/2015. ix MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

Maya Mehta has been one of the most prominent green crusaders of the legal fraternity of Rhodo. She took up the cause of the MBCF and sent a number of representations to the State Pollution Control Board and the concerned government authorities with detailed evidence of massive air and water pollution caused by the DML plant and its widespread consequences on both human and natural subjects. Aggrieved Ms. Mehta filed a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in the High Court of Judicature of Northern Province at Shivpuri on 16 November 2015. In the petition she alleged that the reason because of which there was drastic shift in the ecological balance of the deltaic region which had resulted in acute harm to the flora and fauna of the region was the discharge of noxious trade effluents by the DML plant situated on the banks of the river Asli. From the Hon’ble High Court she sought relief in terms of damages and a writ in nature of mandamus to be issued to the State Pollution Control Board to close the plant of DML. After having a heard the arguments and thorough examination, the High Court in its final judgment dated 21st December held that due to this heavy discharge of pollutants in the river that the flora and fauna of the deltaic region were badly affected, and also that it was due to this reason that the natives had developed black sore diseases and ordered the company to pay damages worth Rs.10 crores to the aggrieved natives. The court further it decided not to issue any directive to shut the plant because if the plant was closed then it would render about 45000 employees of the enterprise unemployed, and it would also leave around 2 lacs family members of these employees in misery, hunger and squalor. But, Ms. Maya Mehta and the aggrieved natives were unsatisfied with the amount of damages awarded. She also said that the order of the court was not bold enough so as to meet the ends of justice because it had failed to issue a directive to shut the plant which had constantly for over a period of years polluted the river Asli and had disturbed the ecological harmony of the region. She filed a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court of Republic of Rhodo seeking enhancement of the awarded damages and closure of the plants. The Supreme Court admitted the Special Leave Petition under SLP 031/2016. After a couple of hearings, SC decided to club Special Leave Petition no. SLP 031/2016 and SLP 8015/2015 as they originated from the same subject matter and the same parent company, and also because Ms. Mehta was the council for the central government in the latter. The Supreme Court has set both of these cases to be decided before a division bench on 1st April 2016 for final hearing. x MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS Issue I Whether the directive issued by the Government is violative of Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution? It is most humbly submitted that Article 19(1( (g) of the Constitution have been violated as the restriction imposed was unreasonable on account of arbitrary action of state, thus, resulting in the violation of Article 14 as well.

Issue II Whether there has been violation of Article 21 of the Constitution. It is most humbly submitted that the directive issued by the govt was violative of Article 21 of the constitution of Rhodo as it would lead to loss of livelihood of the employees of the industry as well as their families.

1 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

I. WHETHER THE DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE GOVERNMENT VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 19 (1) (g) OF THE CONSTITUTION?

IS

It is humbly submitted that the directive issued by the Government is violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution as the restrictions imposed were unreasonable and arbitrary and violated the fundamental right to carry on trade and profession. Reasonableness of a restriction has to be tested both from procedural as well as substantive aspects of the law. In order to determine the reasonableness of the restrictions, regard must be had to the nature of the business and the conditions prevailing in the trade. These factors differ from trade to trade and no hard and fast rules concerning all trades can be laid down. Further, a restriction on a trade or business is unreasonable if it is arbitrary or drastic and has no relation to, or goes much in excess of the objective of law which seeks to impose it. In Chintaman Rao v. The State of Madhya Pradeshram 19511, the Supreme Court laid down the test for a ‘reasonable restriction’ as follows“The phrase reasonable restriction connotes that the limitation imposed on a person in enjoyment of the right should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature beyond what is required in the interest of the public. The word reasonable implies intelligent care and deliberation, that is, the choice of a course which reason dictates. Legislation which arbitrarily or excessively invades the right cannot be said to contain the quality of reasonableness, and unless it strikes a proper balance between the freedom guaranteed in Article 19(1) (g) and the social control permitted by clause (6) of Article 19, it must be held to be wanting in that quality.” Thus, in this case, as we can see that the The board of directors of the company held a meeting on 1 November 2015 at which the vital issues pertaining to compliance with new norms were discussed, and it was concluded that they were not in a position to make the requisite changes in the engines of their products in such a short span. After an exhaustive deliberation it was found that necessary modifications in the engines of the products would require a time of at least eight months and until the needful is done they would have to lay off their workers and also during this period they will be forced to stop both manufacturing and sale of their products which would incur huge losses. Thus, the

1 AIR 118, 1950 SCR 759

2 directive being unreasonable and arbitrary, it violates the fundamental right of trade and profession and also the right to livelihood of 2 lakh persons. Infringement of fundamental right under Article 19(1) (g) must have a direct impact on the restriction on the freedom to carry on trade and not ancillary or incidental effects on such freedom to trade arising out of any governmental action. It has also been held in that case that unless the trader or merchant is not wholly denied to carry on his trade, the restriction imposed in denying the allotment of wagon in favour of such trader or merchant to transport coal for carrying put trading activities does not offend Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution.2 It is further submitted that fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1) (g) may not be an absolute right and such right may be subjected to reasonable restriction but such reasonable restriction may be imposed by statutory law and regulation on cogent grounds justifying the reasonable restriction imposed with reference to the object for which reasonable restriction is imposed. In this connection, in Kharak Singh Versus State of U.P. 3 A Constitution Bench of this Court considered the validity of Regulation 236 clause (b) of U.P. police Regulations. It has been held in the said decision that if the petitioner who has challenged the constitutional validity of the Regulation is able to establish that the impugned Regulation constitutes an infringement of any of the freedom guaranteed to him by the Constitution, then the only manner in which this violation of the fundamental right can be defended is by justifying the impugned action taken by the police under the said Regulation by reference to a valid law, i.e. be it a statute, a statutory law or a statutory regulation. The regulation contained in Chapter XX of the U.P. Police Regulations under which Regulation 237 is placed, have no such statutory basis but are merely executive or departmental instructions framed for the guidance of the police officers. They are, therefore, not a law which the State is entitled to make under relevant clauses (2) to (6) of Article 19 in order to regulate or curtail fundamental rights guaranteed by the several clauses under Article 19(1) nor can the same be "a procedure established by law." within Article 21 of the Constitution. In the instant case, the directive issued is also not arising from any statutory law and it has no statutory basis but is merely a executive instruction framed to curb pollution. In this 21st century, when there is global economy, the question of faith is very important. Government offers certain benefits to attract the entrepreneurs and the entrepreneurs act on those beneficial

2 Krishnan Kakkantn vs Government Of Kerala And Ors AIR 1996 Ker 329 3 (AIR 1963 SC 1295).

3 offers. Thereafter, the Government withdraws those benefits. This will seriously affect the credibility of the Government and would show the shortsightedness of the governance.4 Therefore, in order to keep the faith of the people, the Government or its instrumentalityshould abide by their commitments. In this context, the action taken by Government opting to switch from Euro IV emission norms to those of Euro VI from 1 January 2016 rather than 2020 in revoking the benefits given to the entrepreneurs reflect their credibility and people will not take the word of the Government. That will shake the faith of the people in the governance. Therefore, in order to keep the faith and maintaingood governance it is necessary that whatever represe ntation is made by the Government or its instrumentality which induces the other party to act, the Government sh ould not be permitted to withdraw from that. This is a matter of faith. Thus, If the broad and liberal interpretation is given to the impugned rule, the rule will operate harshly and in an unreasonable manner. Therefore, we feel that it must be suitably read down and the decision of the High Court in this matter must be upheld.

4 U.P Power Corporation Limited & Anr. v. Sant Steels & Alloys (P) Limited & Ors.

4 Whether the directive issued by the Central govt. was violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of Rhodo? It is most humbly submitted that the directive issued by the Central govt. was violative of Article 21 as it would lead to loss of livelihood of the employees of the industry. The Right to livelihood was recognized by the Supreme Court in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal corpn5. In this case the petitioner, a journalist, and two pavement dwellers challenged the government’s scheme to deport pavement dwellers from Bombay city to their place of origin. It was argued by the petitioner that right to life includes right to livelihood. If they were evicted from the slums and pavements they would loose their means of earning as well. Hence, this government action be declared unconstitutional. The court accepted the argument of the petitioner and declared : Deprive a person of his right to livelihood and you shall have deprived him of his life…..The State may not, by affirmative action, be compellable to provide adequate means of livelihood or work to citizens. But, any person, who is, deprived of his right to livelihood except according to just and fair procedure established by law, can challenge the deprivation as offending the right. If the right to livelihood is not treated as a part and parcel of the constitutional right to life, the easiest way of depriving a person of his right to life would be to deprive him of his means of livelihood to the point of abrogation. The right to life includes right to livelihood. The right to livelihood therefore cannot hang on to the fancies of individuals in authority. The employment is not a bounty from them nor can its survival be at their mercy. Income is the foundation of many fundamental rights and when work is the sole source of income, the right to work becomes as much fundamental. Fundamental rights can ill-afford to be consigned to the limbo of undefined premises and uncertain applications. That will be a mockery of them.6 It was said by Douglas J. in Baksey that the right to work is the most precious liberty because it sustains and enables a man to live and a right to life is a precious freedom. "Life", as observed by Field, J. in Mum v. Illinois (1877) 94 U.S. 113, means something more than mere animal existence and the inhibition against the deprivation of life extends to all those limits and facilities 5 (1985) 3 SCC 545 : AIR 1986 SC 180 6 P. C. Mishra v. Secretary to Govt of India 2007(2) SLJ 156 CAT

of which life is enjoyed. This observation was quoted with approval by this Court in Kharak Singh v. The State of UP. 5 Article 39(a) of the Constitution, which is a Directive Principle of State Policy, provides that the State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards . securing that the citizens, men and women equally, have the right to an adequate means of livelihood. Article 41, which is another Directive Principle, provides, inter alia, that the State shall, within the limits of its . economic capacity and development, make effective provision for securing the right to work in cases of unemployment and of undeserved want. Article 37 provides that the Directive Principles, though not enforceable by any Court, are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country. The Principles contained in Articles 39 (a) and 41 must be regarded as equally fundamental in the understanding and interpretation of the meaning and content of fundamental rights. If there is an obligation upon the State to secure to the citizens an adequate means of livelihood and the right to work, it would be sheer pedantry to exclude the right to livelihood from the content of the right to life. The State may not, by affirmative action, be compellable to provide adequate means of livelihood or work to the citizens. But, any person, who is deprived of his right to livelihood except according to just and fair procedure established by law, can challenge the deprivation as offending the right to life conferred by Article 21. The Court observed that there is no doubt that broadly interpreted and a necessary logical corollary ,right to life would include the right to livelihood, and, therefore, right to work. The Court observed that this country has so for not found it feasible to incorporate the right to livelihood as a fundamental right in the Constitution. This is because the country has so far not attained the capacity to guarantee it and not because it considers its any the less fundamental to life. Advisedly, therefore, it has been placed in the chapter on Directive Principles. Article 41 of which enjoins upon the State to make effective provision for securing the same 'within the limits of is economic capacity and development. Thus even while giving the direction to the State to ensure the right to work, the Constitution makers thought it prudent not to do so without qualifying it.7 Basheshar Nath v. The Commissioner of Income Tax Delhi 8 reffered to – The sweep of the right to life conferred by Article 21 is wide and far reaching. It does not mean merely that life cannot be extinguished or taken away as, for example, by the imposition and execution of the death sentence , except according to procedure established by law. That is but one aspect of right 7 Delhi Development Horticulture Employees Union v. Delhi Administration, Delhi & ors. 1992 CLR 537 8 1959 Supp. 1 S. C.R, 528

to life. An equally important facet of that right is the right to livelihood because , no person can live without the means of living, that is, the means of livelihood. If the right to livelihood is not is not treated as a constitutional right to live, the easiest way of depriving a person of his right to 6 life would be to deprive him of his means of livelihood to the point of abrogation. Such deprivation would not only denude the life of its effective content and meaningfulness but it would make life impossible to live. And yet such deprivation would not have to be in accordance with the procedure established by law, if the right to livelihood is not regarded as a part of the right to life. That, which alone makes it possible to live, leave aside what makes like liveable, must be deemed to be an integral component of the right to life. Life is a precious gift of nature to a being. Right to life as a fundamental right stands enshrined in the Constitution. The right to livelihood is born of it.9 Article 21 provides that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. The scope and content of this article has been expanded by judicial decisions. Right to life enshrined in this Article means something more than survival or animal existence. It would include the right to live with human dignity. Payment of very small subsistence allowance to an employee under suspension which would be wholly insufficient to sustain his living, was held to be violative of Article 21 of the Constitution in State of Maharashtra v. Chandrabhan 10. Article 14 provides equality before law and its equal protection. Article 19 assures freedoms with right to residence and settlement in any part of the country and Article 21 by receiving expansive interpretation of right to life extends to right to livelihood. Article 38 in the Chapter of Directive Principles enjoins the State to promote the welfare of the people by securing and protecting effective social order in which socio-economic justice shall inform all the institutions of the national life. It enjoins to eliminate inequality in status, to provide facilities and opportunities among the individuals and groups of the people living in any part of the country and engaged in any avocation. Article 21 assures to secure the right to livelihood, health and strength of workers, men and women and the children of tender age. The material resources of the community are required to be so distributed as best to subserve the common good. Social security has been assured under Article 41 and Article 47 imposes a positive duty on the State to raise the standard of living and to improve public health. 9 Madhu Kishwar & Ors. V. State of Bihar & Ors. 1996 AIR 1864, 1996 SCC (5) 125 10 AIR 1983 SC 803

Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights envisages that everyone has the right to standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services and the right to security in 7 the event of unemployment sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in the circumstances beyond his control. Article 7 of the International Covenant on Economic Rights equally assures right to everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work which ensures not only adequate remuneration and fair wages but also decent living to the workers for themselves and their families in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant. Covenant on Right to development enjoins the State to provide facilities and opportunities to make rights a reality and truism, so as to make these rights meaningful.11 The Constitution does not put an absolute embargo on the deprivation of life and personal liberty. It is far too settled to admit of any argument that the procedure prescribed by law for the deprivation of the right conferred by Article 21 must be fair, just and reasonable. Any action taken by a public authority which is invested with statutory powers , has , therefore to be tested by the application of two standards. The action must be within the scope of the authority conferred by law , is found to be unreasonable , it must mean that the procedure established by law under which that action is taken is itself unreasonable. The argument which bears on the provisions of Article 21 is elaborated by saying that the eviction of pavement and slum dweller will lead, in a vicious circle, to the deprivation of their employment, their livelihood and, therefore, to the right to life. Our attention is drawn in this behalf to an extract from the judgment of Douglas J in Baksey v. Board of Regents 12, in which the learned Judge said"The right to work I have assumed was the most precious liberty that man possesses. Man has indeed, as much right to work as he has to live, to be free and to own property. To work means to eat and it also means to live.".

11 LIC of India & Anr. V. Consumer Education & Research 1995 AIR 1811, 1995 SCC (5) 482 12 347 M.D. 442 (1954)

The right to live and the right to work are integrated and interdependent and, therefore, if a person is deprived of his job as a result of his eviction from a slum or a pavement, his very right to life is put in jeopardy. It is urged that the economic compulsions under which these persons are forced to live in slums or on pavements impart to their occupation the character of a fundamental right. 8 In Basheshar Nath v. The Commissioner of Income Tax Delhi 13 ,a Constitution Bench of this Court considered the question whether the fundamental rights conferred by the Constitution can be waived. Two members of the Bench (Das C.J. and Kapoor J.) held that there can be no waiver of the fundamental right founded on Article 14 of the Constitution. Two others (N.H.Bhagwati and Subba Rao,JJ.) held that not only could there be no waiver of the right conferred by Article 14, but there could be no waiver of any other fundamental right guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. The Constitution makes no distinction, according to the learned Judges, between fundamental rights enacted for the benefit of an individual and those enacted in public interest or on grounds of public policy. So unimpeachable is the evidence of the nexus between life and the means of livelihood. They have to eat to live: Only a handful can afford the luxury of living to eat. That they can do, namely, eat, only if they have the means of livelihood. That is the context in which it was said by Douglas J. in Baksey that the right to work is the most precious liberty because, it sustains and enables a man to live and the right to life is a precious freedom. "Life", as observed by Field, J. in Munn v. Illinois, (1877) 94 U.S. 113, means something more than mere animal existence and the inhibition against the deprivation of life extends to all those limits and faculties by which life is enjoyed. This observation was quoted with approval by this Court in Kharak Singh v. The State of U.P14., [1964] 1 S.C.R. 332.

13 [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R 528 14 [1964] 1 S.C.R 332

9 PRAYER In the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, may this Hon’ble Court be pleased to: 1. Dismiss the writ petition. 2. In the alternative declare and adjudge: a. That the Respondents have not violated the fundamental rights of the people. b. That the Respondents are not liable for environmental degradation. 3. The decision of High Court must be upheld.

AND/OR Pass any other order that it deems fit in the interest of Justice, Equity and Good Conscience. And for this, the Respondents as in duty bound, shall humbly pray.

COUNSELS FOR THE RESPONDENTS