GB Civil Law - 2015

1

2015 GOLDEN BEACON CIVIL LAW Dean 1.

MANUEL

By: R.

BUSTAMANTE

HUMAN RELATIONS

ARTICLE

19

Every person must, in the exercise of performance of his duties, act with justice, and observe honesty and good faith.

his rights and give everyone

in his

the due,

DART PHILIPPINES vs. SPOUSES FRANCISCO CALOGCOG G.R. No. 149241, August 24, 2009, 596 SCRA 614 FACTS: Dart entered into Distributorship Agreement with Spouses Calogcog . Following the expiration of the agreement, Dart was only convinced to extend the period of distributorship upon the written promise of the Calogcogs that they will observe and comply the terms and conditions thereof. Dart subjected the spouses to an audit review by an auditing firm. However, Spouses Calogcog disallowed the auditing firm from inspecting their books and records . As a result, Dart only accepted the spouses’ purchase order on a prepaid basis. ISSUE: Whether Dart acted in bad faith or intended to injure the Spouses Calogcog when it caused the auditing of the latter’s account and when it implemented the prepaid basis in treating the latter’s order. HELD: NO. Bad faith cannot be attributed to the acts of Dart which was supported by legitimate reasons , principally to protect its own business. The exercise of its rights was not impelled by any evil motive designed, whimsically and capriciously, to injure or prejudice the Calogcogs.

HSBC vs. CATALAN G.R. No. 159590, October

18,

2004,

440

SCRA

498

FACTS: A complaint was filed seeking to compel the bank to pay the value of checks issued to her by Thompson as it refused to pay the same despite repeated directives of the drawer to recognize the check he issued. The bank filed motion to dismiss alleging that the complaint failed to state a cause of action under Section 189 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, a check itself does not operate as an assignment of any part of the funds to the credit of the drawer with the bank and the latter is not liable to the holder unless and until it accepts or certifies it. ISSUE: Whether the bank inaction on the drawer’s

is liable instructions.

for

damages

on

the

basis

of

its

HELD: YES. The bank can be held liable for damages . It was not a suit on the value of the check itself , but how it acted in relation to the claim for payment. The allegations in the complaint that there was gross inaction of the bank on Thompson’s instructions as well as its evident failure to inform her of the reason are insouciance (lack of concern) on its part. The complaint was anchored on Article 19 of the New Civil Code . When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another , a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But a right , though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. A person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right , that is, when he acts with prudence and in good faith; but when he acts with negligence or abuse.

2 Thus, in order to elements must concur, (a) (b) (c)

be to

liable wit:

that there is a legal which is exercised in for the sole intent of

under

the

abuse

of

right or duty; bad faith; and prejudicing or injuring

right

principle ,

three

another.

SOLEDAD CARPIO vs. LEONORA VALMONTE G.R.

No.

151866,

September

9,

2004, 438 SCRA 38

One is not allowed to exercise his right in a manner which would cause unnecessary prejudice to another or if he would thereby offend morals or good customs. A person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right , that is when he acts with prudence and good faith, but not when he acts with negligence or abuse.

G.F. EQUITY, INC. vs. ARTURO VALENZONA G.R. No. 156841,

June

30,

2005,

462

SCRA

466

FACTS: There was a contract whereby Valenzona was hired as a coach of the Alaska Basketball Team in the PBA for a period of two years. Paragraph 3 of the contract provides that “if at anytime during the contract, the Coach, in the sole opinion of the Corporation, fails to exhibit sufficient skills or competitive ability to coach the time, the Corporation may terminate the contract .” During his stint as head coach, the team placed third in both Open and All Filipino PBA Conferences in 1988. He was later on served with notice that the management was terminating his services . Six years thereafter, he filed a complaint for damages asking for payment of his compensation arising from the arbitrary and unilateral termination of his employment. ISSUE: Whether paragraph 3 of the the right of petitioner to terminate

contract is respondent’s

a legitimate employment.

exercise

of

HELD: NO. The assailed condition clearly transgressed the principle mutuality of contracts, hence, it is null and void . It leaves determination of whether Valenzona failed to exhibit sufficient skill competitive ability to coach Alaska team solely to the opinion GF Equity.

of the or of

When one party in an employment contract is given an unbridled prerogative to pre-terminate the contract irrespective of the soundness, fairness, reasonableness or even lack of basis of its opinion, it must be struck down. To sustain the validity of the assailed paragraph would open the gate of arbitrary and illegal dismissals , for void contractual stipulations would be used as justification therefore. Consequently, since the pre-termination of the contract was anchored on an illegal ground , hence, contrary to law and GF Equity negligently failed to provide legal basis for such pre-termination , the latter failed to exercise in a legitimate manner its right to pre-terminate the contract , thereby abusing the right of Valenzona, thus, entitling the latter to damages under Article 19 in relation to Article 20 of the Civil Code.

2.

CIVIL PERSONALITY CONTINENTAL STEEL MFG. CORP. vs. VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR G.R. No. 182836, October 13, 2009, 603 SCRA 621

FACTS: Hortillano’s was in the 38th Hortillano’s unborn ISSUE: Whether death of his

wife, week child.

Marife, had of pregnancy

Hortillano is unborn child.

entitled

a

pre-mature delivery while she which resulted to the death of

to

bereavement

benefits

on

the

HELD: YES. Even a child inside the womb already has life . No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life , then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.

3 It was not disputed that Hortillano and his wife were validly married and that their child was conceived during said marriage , hence, making said child legitimate upon her conception , thus, Hortillano was entitled to bereavement benefits.

3. FAMILY Article

26

CODE

paragraph

2

REPUBLIC vs. OBRECIDO III G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005,

472

SCRA 114

FACTS: Cipriano and Lady Miros got married in 1981 and thereafter were blessed with two children . Miros went to the United States and eventually acquired American citizenship . Later, she obtained a divorce decree of her marriage with Cipriano and got married to Stanley . By reason thereof, Cipriano filed a petition for authority to marry invoking paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code . The Solicitor General opposed the petition on the ground that paragraph 2 of Article 26 is not applicable to Cipriano because it applies only to a valid mixed marriage, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. ISSUE: Whether the Filipino spouse is legally capacitated the other party is naturalized as a foreign citizen obtained a valid divorce decree.

to re-marry and later

after on

HELD: YES, paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties, who at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to re-marry as if the other party was a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. - - - To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to spouse.

and injustice spouse who , the Filipino

- - - There are two (2) elements for the application of paragraph 2 of Article 26, namely,: (1) a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner ; and (2) a valid divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of marriage , but rather, their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to re-marry. - - - Moreover, it is necessary that the naturalization of the other spouse and the foreign divorce decree be proven. The party pleading it must prove the divorce law as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it . Likewise, it must be shown that the divorce decree allows the former spouse to re-marry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.

Article 40

LUCIO MORIGO

vs. PEOPLE

OF

THE

PHILIPPINES

G. R. No. 145226, February 6, 2004, 422 SCRA 376 FACTS: When Lucio and Lucia got married, they merely signed the marriage contract without the presence of solemnizing officer. Since Lucia has been working in Canada for many years , she was able to obtain a divorce decree in 1991 from Canadian Court. The following year, Lucio contracted a second marriage with Maria . On September 21, 1993, Lucio filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place . In October 1993, he was charged with bigamy and was later on convicted by the lower court. The first marriage was nullified by the court after the celebration of the second marriage. ISSUE: Whether necessary before

judicial declaration the spouse may

of nullity of validly contract

the first a second

marriage is marriage.

4 HELD: NO. In this case, it was found out that the first marriage is void ab initio in accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code. This simply means that there was no marriage to begin with and such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes , reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void as initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage , the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married. The first element of bigamy requires that the accused must be legally married. But in this case , legally speaking, the accused was never married. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married from the beginning . Accordingly, accused was not married to his wife at the time he contracted the second marriage with another woman. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which accused might be held liable for bigamy unless he secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage. What is contemplated by Article 40 void marriage that must be declared contract a subsequent marriage is one is void.

of the Family Code as the void before a party may that must exist although, it

Article 41

EDUARDO MANUEL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G. R. 165842, November 29, 2005, 476 SCRA 461 ISSUE: before

Whether the other

a judicial declaration spouse may legally

of presumptive re-marry.

death

is

necessary

HELD: YES. There must be a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse. Otherwise, the spouse who contracted the second marriage may be convicted of the crime of bigamy. Such judicial declaration constitutes proof that he acted in good faith and would negate criminal intention on his part when he married the complainant . According to Article 41 of the Family Code , there is a need for judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse to enable the present spouse to remarry . Parties should not be permitted to judge for themselves such matter . The latter should be submitted to the proper court for resolution. The requirement for a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse is for the benefit of the spouse present as protection from the pains and the consequences of a second marriage precisely because he or she could be charged and convicted of bigamy if the defense of good faith based on mere testimony is found incredible. It is also for the benefit of the State . Marriage is a social institution of the highest importance . Public policy, good morals and the interest of society require that the marital relation should be surrounded with every safeguard and its severance in the manner prescribed and the causes specified by law.

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM vs. TERESITA JARQUE VDA. DE BAILON G.R. No. 165545,

March 24, 2006, 485 SCRA 376

FACTS: On April 25, 1955, Clemente G. Bailon, who was a member of SSS and Alice P. Diaz contracted marriage . More than 15 years later, Bailon filed before the CFI a petition to declare Alice presumptively dead. The CFI granted the petition . Close to 13 years after his wife Alice was declared presumptively dead , Bailon contracted marriage with respondent Teresita Jarque. Upon Bailon’s death, respondent thereupon filed a claim for funeral benefits and was granted P12,000 by the SSS . Cecilia Bailon-Yap, who claimed to be a daughter of Bailon and one Elisa Jayona , contested before the SSS the release to respondent of the death and funeral benefits. She claimed that Bailon contracted three marriages in his lifetime, the first with Alice Diaz, the second with her mother Elisa Jayona and the third with respondent, all of whom are still

5 alive. In the meantime, a certain Hermes P. Diaz , claiming the brother and guardian of “Aliz P. Diaz,” filed before the claim for death benefits accruing from Bailon’s death. ISSUE: Who between Alice to the death benefits?

Diaz

and

the

herein

respondent

is

to SSS

be a

entitled

HELD: Respondent is entitled to the death benefits . The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity on August 3, 1988 of the Family Code , the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. Under Art. 83 of the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved or contracted under any of the three exceptional circumstances. It bears noting that the marriage under any of these exceptional cases is deemed valid “until declared null and void by competent court .” If follows that the onus probandi in these cases rests on the party assailing the second marriage. In the case at bar, as found by the CFI, Alice has been absent for 15 consecutive years when Bailon sought declaration of her presumptive death , which judicial declaration was not even a requirement then for purposes of remarriage. Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable , it is terminated by final judgment of annulment in a case instituted by the absent spouse who reappears or by either of the spouses in the subsequent marriage. Under the Family Code, specifically Art. 42, no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage is necessary . If the absentee reappears , but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by affidavit or by court action, such absentee’s mere reappearance even if made known to the spouses in the subsequent marriage, will not terminate such marriage. Since the second marriage has been contracted because of the presumption that the former spouse is dead , such presumption continues in spite of the spouse’s physical reappearance and by fiction of law , he or she still be regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law. In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify in accordance with law, Bailon’s and respondent’s marriage prior to the former’s death in 1998 , respondent rightfully the defendant spouse beneficiary of Bailon.

Article

36 - PSYCHOLOGICAL

INCAPACITY

JUANITA CARATING-SIAYNGCO vs. MANUEL SIAYNGCO G.R. No. 158896, October 27, 2004, 441 SCRA 422 Psychological incapacity refers to no less than a mental physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed discharged by the parties to the marriage.

(not the and

Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code . It must be shown that the unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality which makes him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state and not merely due to his ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and blood.

MA. ARMIDA PEREZ - FERRARIZ vs. BRIX FERRARIZ G.R. No. 162368, July 17, 2006, 495 SCRA 396 Respondent’s alleged mixed personality disorder, the “leaving-the-house” attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptics attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support , and his preference to spend more time with this band mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

6 REPUBLIC vs. LAILA TANYAG-SAN JOSE G.R. No. 168328, February 28, 2007, 517 SCRA 123 There is of course no requirement that the person sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated should be examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non to arrive at such declaration. If it can be proven by independent means that one is psychologically incapacitated, there is no reason why the same should not be credited.

NOEL BUENAVENTURA vs. CA & ISABEL SING BUENAVENTURA G. R. No. 127449, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 261 FACTS: Petitioner Noel Buenaventura filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. The trial court decreed the marriage null and void ab initio . It likewise ordered petitioner to pay private respondent moral damages in the amount of 2.5 million pesos and exemplary damages of 1 million pesos with 6% interest from the date of this decision plus attorney’s fees of P100,000.00. ISSUES: 1. Whether proper. 2. Whether attorney’s

the

award

of

moral

petitioner’s acts and fees and litigation

and

exemplary

omissions expenses.

justify

damages the

award

are of

HELD: 1. NO. Article 21 of the New Civil Code is one of the instances when moral damages may be recovered . It must be noted that Article 21 states that the individual must willfully cause loss or injury to another. There is a need that the act is willful and hence done in complete freedom. However, the marriage was declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity . The latter is confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. It is contradictory to characterize acts as a product of psychological incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the party because an innate inability, while at the same time considering the same set of acts as willful . By declaring the petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral damages on the same facts was negated. The award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into the marriage , but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with malice by a party who had knowledge of his or her disability and yet willfully concealed the same . No such evidence appears to have been adduced in this case. 2. NO. The acts or omissions of petitioner which led the lower court to deduce his psychological incapacity , and his act of filing the complaint for the annulment of his marriage cannot be considered as unduly compelling the private respondent to litigate, since both are grounded on petitioner’s psychological incapacity, which as explained above is a mental incapacity causing an utter inability to comply with the obligations of marriage. Hence, neither can be a ground for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. Furthermore, since the award of moral and exemplary damages is no longer justified , the award of attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation is left without basis.

Art. 45 - VITIATED CONSENT - Ground for Annulment of Marriage ORLANDO

VILLANUEVA

G.R. No. 132955,

October

vs. 27,

COURT

OF

2006,

SCRA

505

APPEALS 564

FACTS: Orlando married Lilia. The former filed a petition for annulment of their marriage stating that he was under threat and duress when he contracted the said marriage since Lilia was already pregnant . In her answer with compulsory counterclaim, she prayed for the dismissal of the petition contending that the petitioner married her voluntarily and he even wrote letters to her to check on the progress of her pregnancy. ISSUE: Whether the of vitiated consent.

subject

marriage

may

be

annulled

on

the

ground

7 HELD: NO. To begin with, it was only on November 17, 1992 or after a span of not less than four (4) years and eight (8) months when Orlando took a serious step to have the same marriage annulled. Unexplained, the prolonged inaction evidently finds basis in Lilia’s allegation that this annulment suit was filed by Orlando solely in the hope that a favorable judgment thereon would bolster his defense in the criminal case for bigamy. Viewed in this perspective, the instant appeal is, therefore, understandable. But even in terms of merit, the recourse must have fail. The Court is not convinced that appellant’s apprehension of danger to his person is so overwhelmingly at that time, being a security guard, it is reasonable to assume that appellant knew the rudiments of self-defense. Orlando’s excuse that he could not have impregnated Lilia because he did not have an erection during their tryst is flimsy at best and an outright lie at worst. The complaint is bereft of any reference to his inability to copulate with Lilia. His counsel also conceded before the lower court that his client had a sexual relationship with Lilia.

Article 120 - CONJUGAL JOSEFA

PARTNERSHIP

FERRER

G.R. No. 166496,

vs.

PROPERTY

SPOUSES

MANUEL FERRER

November 29, 2006, 508 SCRA 570

FACTS: The late Alfredo Ferrer acquired a piece of land . Through a loan he introduced several improvements including a residential house and a 2-door apartment building. However, it was only during his marriage with petitioner Josefa that he was only able to pay the loan using the couple’s conjugal funds. From their conjugal funds, Josefa claimed, they constructed a warehouse on the lot . Moreover, petitioner averred that respondent Manuel Ferrer occupied one door of the apartment building, as well as the warehouse ; however, he stopped paying rentals , alleging that he had acquired ownership over the property by virtue of Deed of Sale executed by Alfredo in favor of respondents , Manuel and Ismael and their spouses. It is petitioner’s contention that when her husband was already bedridden, respondents Ismael and Flora Ferrer made him sign a document, purportedly to be his last will and testament . The document, however, was a Deed of Sale covering Alfredo’s lot and the improvement thereon. Learning of this development, Alfredo filed a Complaint for Annulment of the said sale against respondents . The RTC dismissed the same and ruled that the terms and conditions of the Deed of Sale are not contrary to law , morals, good customs, and public policy, and should be complied with by the parties in good faith, there being no compelling reason under the law to do otherwise. The dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals . Although the Supreme Court reaffirmed the CA’s decision , herein petitioner filed another case claiming that, based on the RTC decision, when Alfredo died on 29 September 1999, or at the time of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, she had the right to be reimbursed for the cost of the improvements on Alfredo’s lot . She alleged that the cost of the improvements amounted to P500,000.00; hence, one-half thereof should be reimbursed and paid by respondents as they are now the registered owners of Alfredo’s lot. ISSUE: Whether petitioner.

or

not

respondents

have

the

obligation

to

reimburse

HELD: YES. Article 120 provides the solution in determining the ownership of the improvements that are made on the separate property of the spouses at the expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both spouses. Thus, when the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase in value are more than the value of the property at the time of the improvement , the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the property of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement ; otherwise, the said property shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse , likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the improvement . The subject property was precisely declared as the exclusive property of Alfredo on the basis of Article 120 of the Family Code.

8 PROPERTY disposal of

RELATIONS - Consent their conjugal property

of

the

Spouse

in

the

DAVID AND LORENZA PELAYO vs. MELKI E. PEREZ G. R.

No.

141323,

June

8,

2005, 459 SCRA 475

FACTS: David Pelayo, thru a Deed of Absolute Sale , conveyed to Melki Perez, two parcels of agricultural lands. The sale was witnessed by David’s wife, Lorenza, who signed only on the third page in the space provided for witnesses of which Perez’ application for registration of the deed with the Office of the Register of Deeds was denied. ISSUE: marital

Whether consent.

the

deed

of

sale

was

null

and

void

for

lack

of

HELD: By affixing her signature to the Deed of Sale on the space provided for witnesses, Lorenza is deemed to have given her implied consent to the contract of sale. A wife’s consent to the husband’s disposition of conjugal property does not always have to be explicit or set forth in any particular document, as long it is shown by acts of the wife that such consent or approval was indeed given. In the present case, although it appears on the face of the deed of sale that Lorenza signed only as an instrumental witness , evidence shows that Lorenza was fully aware of the sale of their conjugal property and consented to the sale . Under Article 173, in relation to Article 166 of the New Civil Code, the lack of marital consent to the disposition of conjugal property does not make the contract void ab initio but merely voidable.

HOMEOWNER

AND G.R. No.

ISSUE: Whether other spouse concerned.

the is

SAVINGS LOAN BANK vs. COURT OF APPEALS 153802,

March

sale of conjugal valid in so

11,

2005, 453 SCRA 283

property far as

without the

the consent of husband’s share

the is

HELD: NO. The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and wife. The absence of one renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale. The rules of co-ownership do not apply to the property relations of the husband and wife even in a suppletory manner. The regime of conjugal partnership of gains is a special type of partnership, where the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds , products, fruits and income from their separate properties and those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance.

JOSEFINA FRANCISCO vs. MASTER IRON WORKS G.R. No. 151967,

February

16,

2005,

451

SCRA 494

FACTS: Josefina Castillo married Eduardo G. Francisco, who at that time was already married to Carmelita Carpio. On August 31, 1984, the Imus Rural Bank, Inc. executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Josefina Castillo Francisco, covering two parcels of residential land with a house thereon. On the basis of the said deed of sale , the Register of Deeds issued TCT Nos. 87976 and 87977 in the name of “Josefina Castillo Francisco married to Eduardo G. Francisco.” On February 15, 1985, the Register of Deeds made of record Entry No. 85-18003 at the dorsal portion of the said titles. This referred to an Affidavit of Waiver executed by Eduardo where he declared that before his marriage to Josefina, the latter purchased two parcels of land , including the house constructed thereon, with her own savings, and that he was waiving whatever claims he had over the property. On June 11, 1990, Eduardo, who was then the General Manager and President of Reach Out Trading International, bought bags of cement from Master Iron Works & Construction Corporation (MIWCC) but failed to pay the same. MIWCC filed a complaint against him in the court . After the judgment in favor of MIWCC has become final , the court issued a writ of execution against the aforementioned parcels of land. In the light of this, Josefina executed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim over the two parcels of land in which she claimed that they were her paraphernal properties and that her husband Eduardo had no propriety

9 right or interest alleged that she by Sheriff Alejo. null and void. ISSUE: Castillo

over them as evidenced by his Affidavit of Waiver. She was the sole owner of the property levied on execution Hence, the levy on execution of the property was

Whether the subject properties and Eduardo Francisco.

are

conjugal

properties

of

Josefina

HELD: NO. Article 148 of the Family Code provides : “In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article , only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned in common in proportion to their respective contributions . In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit . If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article. The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall, likewise, apply even if both parties are in bad faith.” Indeed, the Family Code has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the New Civil Code by expressly regulating in Article 148 the property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage. The petitioner failed to prove that she had any vested right over the property in question. Since the subject property was acquired during the subsistence of marriage of Eduardo and Carmelita , under normal circumstances, the same should be presumed to be conjugal property . Article 148 of the Family Code also debilitates against the petitioner’s claim since , according to the said article, a co-ownership may ensue in case of cohabitation where, for instance, one party has a pre-existing valid marriage provided that the parties prove their actual joint contribution of money , property or industry and only to the extent of their proportionate interest thereon. We agree with the findings of the appellate court that the petitioner failed to adduce preponderance of evidence that she contributed money , property or industry in the acquisition of the subject property and , hence, is not a co-owner of the property.

CHARGES AGAINST THE CONJUGAL PROPERTY ELENITA M. DEWARA vs. SPOUSES RONNIE & GINA LAMELA G.R. No. 179010, April 11, 2011, 647 SCRA 483 FACTS: Eduardo and Elenita were married before the enactment of the Family Code and thus the New Civil Code governed their marital relations. They were separated-in-fact because Elenita went to work in California, USA, while Eduardo stayed in Bacolod City . On January 20, 1985, while Eduardo was driving the private jeep registered in the name of Elenita, hit Ronnie. As a result, MTCC found Eduardo guilty of reckless imprudence and sentenced him to pay civil indemnities. The judgment became final and executory and the sheriff levied the real property registered to Elenita married to Eduardo. Elenita claimed that the said property was her paraphernal property or exclusive property and could not be made to answer for the personal liability of her husband. ISSUE: Whether the property of Elenita.

subject

property

is

HELD: NO. All property of the marriage is the conjugal partnership, unless it can pertains exclusively to the husband or to the name of the husband or the wife this presumption. The separation-in-fact between without judicial approval shall not affect The lot retains its conjugal nature.

the

paraphernal/exclusive

presumed to belong to be proved that it the wife. Registration in alone does not destroy the husband and wife the conjugal partnership .

Moreover, the presumption of conjugal partnership applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear. The use of the conjugal funds is not an essential requirement for the presumption to arise . The presumption that the property is conjugal property may be rebutted only by strong, clear, categorical, and convincing evidence -there must be strict proof of

10 the of

exclusive ownership proof rests upon

NULL

AND

of the

one party

VOID

of the asserting

OR

spouses, it.

INEXISTENT

SALLY GO - BANGAYAN vs. BENJAMIN

and

the

burden

MARRIAGE

BANGAYAN,

JR.

G.R. No. 201061, July 3, 2013, 700 SCRA 702 FACTS: Benjamin married Azucena and they had three (3) children. When Azucena left for USA, Benjamin had romantic relationship with Sally where they lived as husband and wife . In order to appease her father, Sally asked Benjamin to sign purported marriage contract without marriage license knowing well that of Benjamin’s marital status. Their cohabitation produced two (2) children and Benjamin acquired several properties. As the relationship Canada bringing their two against Benjamin using In retaliation, Benjamin against Sally. ISSUES:

(1) (2)

HELD: there was initio

What Sally?

is

of (2) the filed

the

Benjamin and Sally children. She then simulated marriage an annulment of nature

of

What is the property Benjamin and Sally?

the

ended , Sally left for filed a bigamy case contract as evidence . non-existent marriage

marriage

relations

(1) The marriage of the parties is was no marriage license, therefore, not committed and the marriage was and inexistent.

of

Benjamin

governing

the

and

marriage

not bigamous because the crime of bigamy null and void ab

(2) Since Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage while the first marriage is still existing , their property relation is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code where only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contribution . Since there is no proof of Sally’s contributions to their cohabitation , there can be no co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code.

PROPERTY OWNED IN COMMON TO BE DIVIDED UNDER THE RULES ON CO-OWNERSHIP MARIETTA N. BARRIDO vs. LEONARDO V. NONATO G.R. No. 176492, October 20, 2014, FACTS: In the able to acquire

a

course of parcel of

Eventually, their psychological incapacity.

marriage

their marriage , land. was

Since there was no more over the property over the partition, but the latter refused. ISSUE:

Whether

HELD: YES. psychological

the

Leonardo incapacity

action

for

declared

reason property ,

partition

is

738 SCRA

510

Leonardo

and

void

on

Marrieta the

to maintain their Leonardo asked

ground

were of

co-ownership Marietta for

proper.

and Marrieta’s marriage had been declared under Article 36 of the Family Code.

void

for

During their marriage, however, the conjugal partnership regime governed their property relations. Although Article 129 provides for the procedure in case of dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime , however, Article 147 specifically covers the effects of void marriages on the spouses’ property relations. This particular kind of co-ownership under Article 147 a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to other, live exclusively with each other as husband and the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage.

applied when marry each wife without

11 Here, the former spouses both agreed that they acquired the subject property during the subsistence of their marriage . Thus, it shall be presumed to have obtained by their joint effort , work or industry and shall be jointly owned by them in equal shares. Therefore, the subject property remains to be owned in common Leonardo and Marietta, which should be divided in accordance with rules on co-ownership.

by the

PATERNITY AND FILIATIONS GERARDO CONCEPCION vs. CA & MA. TERESA ALMONTE G.R.

No.

123450,

August

31,

2005,

468

SCRA

438

FACTS: Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married on December 29, 1989 . Almost a year later, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo . Gerardo and Ma. Theresa’s relationship turned out to be short-lived , however. On December 19, 1991, Gerardo filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground of bigamy. The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresa’s marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting when she married Gerardo and annulled her marriage to the latter for being bigamous . It declared Jose Gerardo to be an illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the child was awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was granted visitation rights. ISSUE: Can a child born during as an illegitimate child on the

a marriage basis of

subsequently annulled be his mother’s statements?

declared

HELD: NO. The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised . Article 164 of the Family Code is clear . A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate . As a guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy , Article 167 of the Family Code provides: Article 167. The child shall be mother may have declared against sentenced as an adulteress.

considered legitimate although the his legitimacy or may have been

The import of Ma. Teresa’s statement is that Jose Gerardo is not her legitimate son with Mario but her illegitimate son with Gerardo . This declaration an avowal by the mother that her child is illegitimate is the very declaration that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code. Gerardo invokes Article 166 (1) (b) of the Family Code. He cannot. He has no standing in law to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo . Only Ma. Theresa’s husband, Mario, or in a proper case , his heirs, who can contest the legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his wife . Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning , he never became her husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child. The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage, particularly during the period of conception . To overthrow this presumption on the basis of Article 168 (1) (b) of the Family Code, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access that could have enabled the husband to father the child . Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not disproved , unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary . The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the evidence of physical impossibility of coitus between husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child.

BELEN

SAGAD

ANGELES

vs.

ALELI

ANGELES

MAGLAYA

G.R. No. 153798, September 2, 2005, 469 SCRA 363 ISSUE: Is a child presumed legitimate in the absence of proof of a lawful marriage between her parents?

any

concrete

HELD: NO. A legitimate child is a product of, and therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage . Remove the element of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child . Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more empathic on the matter: “Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate,

12 VIRGILIO MAQUILAN vs. DITA MAQUILAN G.R. ISSUE: Whether spouses pending is valid.

No. 155409,

the the

June

8,

2007,

524

SCRA

166

partial voluntary separation of property petition for declaration of nullity of

by the marriage

HELD: YES. Under Article 143 of the Family Code , separation of property may be effected voluntarily or for sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval. The questioned Compromise Agreement which was judicially approved is exactly such a separation of property allowed by law . This conclusion holds true even if the proceedings for the declaration of nullity of marriage was still pending. Finally, the conviction of adultery does not carry the accessory penalty of civil interdiction. Article 43 of the RPC enumerates the accessory penalties of prision correccional and civil interdiction is not one of them and does not deprive the person of the rights to manage her property and to dispose of such property inter vivos.

PARENTAL

CONSENT JOCELYN GUALBERTO vs. CRISANTO GUALBERTO G.R. No. 154994, June 28, 2005,

FACTS: During the pendency of of marriage of the spouses, that the custody of their transferred to him. He alleged trial court awarded custody by the appellate court. ISSUE: Whether lesbianism per custody of the child below

an the child that to

461

SCRA

450

action for declaration of nullity husband, Crisanto Gualberto, moved below age of seven be his wife was a lesbian . The the mother , but was reversed

se is a seven years

sufficient ground old from the

to remove mother.

HELD: NO. It is not enough that the woman is a lesbian . He must also demonstrate the she carried on her purported relationship with a person of the same sex in the presence of their son or under circumstances not conducive to the child’s proper moral development. Sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or incompetence. Not even the fact that a mother is a prostitute or has been unfaithful to her husband would render her unfit to have custody of her minor child. To deprive the wife of custody, the husband must clearly establish that her moral lapses have an adverse effect on the welfare of the child or have distracted the offending spouse from exercising proper parental care. Article 213 of the Family Code takes its bearing from Article 363 of the Civil Code which prohibits in no uncertain terms the separation of a mother and her child below seven years , unless a separation is grounded upon compelling reasons as determined by a court.

CONSENT TO

ADOPTION LANDINGIN vs. REPUBLIC G.R. No. 164948, June 27, 2006,

ISSUE: Can minors biological mother?

be

adopted

without

493 the

SCRA written

415 consent

of

their

HELD: NO. The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption. Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a decree of adoption.

FAMILY HOME Article 153

13 JOSE HONRADO vs. COURT G.R. No. 166333,

November

25,

OF

2005,

476

APPEALS SCRA

280

FACTS: The Family Home of the petitioner therein was levied upon to answer for his judgment debt , and the sale of the said property was set. Petitioner was served with a copy of the notice of sale which he opposed. Petitioner, however, allowed the sale at the public auction to proceed and the Sheriff to execute a certificate of sale over the property in favor of the private respondent therein . The petitioner remained silent and failed to seek relief from the Sheriff or the Court until one year from the date of the auction sale when he filed his motion to declare the property exempt from execution. But even in the said motion , petitioner failed did not present evidence that the property was a family home. ISSUE: Whether execution.

or

not

a

family

home

may

not

be

exempt

for

HELD: YES. While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code, such claim for exemption should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. Failure to do so would estop the party from later claiming the exemption.

PERLA G. PATRICIO vs. MARCELINO G. G.R. No. 170829, November ISSUE: Whether the partition of the co-owners refuse to accede minor beneficiary still resides in

the to the

20,

2006,

DARIO

III

507 SCRA 438

family home is proper such partition on the said home.

where ground

one that

of a

HELD: NO. The family home may be preserved for a minimum of 10 years following the death of the spouses or the unmarried family head who constituted the family home, or of the spouse who consented to the constitution of his or her separate property as family home . After 10 years and a minor beneficiary still lives therein , the family home shall be preserved only until the minor beneficiary reaches the age of majority . The intention of the law is to safeguard and protect the interests of the minor beneficiary until reaches legal age and would now be capable of supporting himself . However, three (3) requisites must concur before a minor beneficiary is entitled to the benefits of Art. 159 : (1) the relationship enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home ; and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.

ALBINO

JOSEF

vs. OTELIO SANTOS

G.R. No. 165060, November 27, 2008, 572 SCRA 57 FACTS: Albino was held liable by the trial court to pay to Otelio the sum of P400,000 representing the shoe materials he bought on credit . Otelio moved for the issuance of writ of execution and to satisfy the judgment award, Albino’s house and lot was attached , auctioned and awarded to Otelio as the highest bidder. Albino protested and claimed that he had no other property to answer for the judgment credit and the house and lot in which he was residing was his family home thus exempt from execution. ISSUE: Whether the judgment or attachment and sale on public auction judgment award.

judicial of the

order family

is home

legal for to satisfy

the the

HELD: NO. The judgment or judicial order to attach and sell on public auction of the family home to satisfy the judgment award is null and void and it may be said to be a lawless thing , which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head. The family home is a real right which is gratuitous , inalienable and free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is situated, which confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties, which must remain with the person constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases under Article 155 of the Family Code.

14 SIMEON

CABANG

vs.

MR. &

MRS. GUILLERMO BASAY

G.R. No. 180587, March 20, 2009, 582 SCRA 172 FACTS: Simeon had established his family home over the property of registered owner Felix Odong and he had been in continuous , open, peaceful and adverse possession of the same parcel of land since 1956 up to present . Mr. & Mrs. Guillermo Basay bought the subject property from the heirs of Felix Odong and upon discovery that Simeon was actually occupying the lot, they filed a complaint for recovery of property. ISSUE: Whether constituted family

the property home.

subject

of

the

controversy

is

a

duly

HELD: NO. Under Article 153 of the Family Code , a family home is deemed constituted on a house and a lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence . It is likewise a given fact that the family home must be constructed on property owned by the persons constituting it. Since the property on which the alleged family home stands is owned by the Odongs, their continued stay on the subject land is by mere tolerance of the late Felix Odong.

SUPPORT

PENDENTE

LITE

MA. BELEN B. MANGONON vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 125041, June 30, 2006, 494 SCRA 1 FACTS; Belen and Federico were married. But the same was later annulled because it was solemnized without the required consent per Article 85 of the New Civil Code. Seven (7) months after said annulment, petitioner gave birth to twin daughters which she later raised in the U.S. with the help of her second husband . A petition for declaration of legitimacy and support, with application for support pendente lite was filed by petitioner against Federico since they were no longer capable of paying the college education of the twins. Because the parents are no longer capable of providing support , petitioner alleges that the twins’ grandfather should be ordered to provide the support. On the other hand, respondent Francisco avers that the order of liability for support under Art. 199 is not concurrent such that the obligation must be borne by those related to the recipient and in this case petitioner and her second husband . He also alleges that even if he is responsible for said support , he could not be made to answer beyond what petitioner and the father could afford. ISSUE: Whether the grandfather in default

obligation to of the financial

give support devolves on the capacity of twin daughters’ parents.

HELD; YES. Respondent Francisco is liable for half of the amount of school expenses incurred by twin daughters as support pendente lite. The petitioner was able to establish , by prima facie proof, the filiation of her twin daughters to private respondents and the twins’ entitlement to support pendente lite thus the next question is who should be made liable for said award. Anent respondents Francisco and Federico’s claim that they have the option under the law as to how they could perform their obligation to support the twins. Art. 204 provides that “the person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a right to receive support . The latter alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto.” Under the said provision , Francisco could not avail for himself of the second option.

Articles 175 & 176 - PROOF

OF

FILIATION

JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ vs. RONALD PAUL GARCIA G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009, 594 SCRA 648

FACTS: without

Jenie the

and Dominique were benefit of marriage

living together as and resided with

husband and wife Dominique’s parents .

15 Thereafter, Dominique died. After almost two month, Jenie gave birth to Christian. Jenie applied for the registration of the child’s birth using the surname of Dominique in support of which she submitted affidavit to use the surname of the father and affidavit of acknowledgement executed by Dominique’s father. Attached to the affidavit is a document entitled “Autobiography” which was handwritten by Dominique. The Civil Registrar denied Jenie’s application because the child was born out of wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge the paternity of the child. ISSUE: father

Whether can be

the unsigned considered as

handwritten recognition of

statement paternity.

by

the

deceased

HELD: YES. A father who acknowledges paternity of a child through a written instrument must affix his signature . It is clearly implied in Article 176 of the Family Code . However, special circumstances exist to hold that the unsigned Autobiography of Dominique substantially satisfies the requirement of law. First, Dominique died about two months prior to the child’s birth. Second, the relevant matters in the Autobiography , unquestionably handwritten by Dominique. Third, Jenie’s testimony is corroborated by the Affidavit of Acknowledgment of Dominique’s father . These circumstances indicating Dominique’s paternity of the child give life to his statements in his Autobiography.

3. PROPERTY FEL ENERGY, INC. vs. THE PROVINCE OF BATANGAS G.R. No. 168557, February 16, 2007, 516 SCRA 186 ISSUE:

Whether

power

barges

are

considered

personal

properties.

HELD: NO. Power barges are real property and are thus subject to real property tax. Article 415 (9) of the New Civil Code provides that “docks and structures which, though floating, are intended by their nature and object to remain at a fixed place on a river , lake, or coast” are considered immovable property. Thus, power barges are categorized as immovable property by destination, being in the nature of machinery and other implements intended by the owner for an industry or work which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of said industry or work.

LUIS MARCOS P. LAUREL vs. HON. ZEUS ABROGAR G.R. No. 155076, January 13, 2009, 576 SCRA 108 FACTS: Luis was charged of the crime of theft by stealing and using the international long distance calls belonging to PLDT by conducting International Simple Resale (ISR) which is a method of routing and completing international long distance calls using lines , cables, antennae, and/or airwave frequency which connect directly to the local or domestic exchange facilities of the country where the call is destined. Luis claimed that international long distance calls and the business of the providing telecommunications or telephone services are not personal properties under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. ISSUE: Whether the business of providing telecommunications telephone services are personal property under Article 308 Revised Penal Code.

and of

the the

HELD: YES. The only requirement for a personal property to be the object of theft under the penal code is that it can be capable of appropriation. It need not be capable of “asportation” which is defined as “carrying away.” Jurisprudence is settled that to “take” under the theft provision of the penal code does not require asportation or carrying away. Appropriation of forces of nature which are brought under control by science such as electrical energy can be achieved by tampering with any apparatus used for generating or measuring such forces of nature. Luis was charged with engaging in International Simple Resale (ISR) or the unauthorized routing and completing of international long distance calls using lines, cables, antennae, and/or air wave frequency and connecting these calls directly to the local or domestic exchange facilities of the country where destined.

4. CO-OWNERSHIP

16 Article 487 RESUENA vs. COURT OF APPEALS 454 SCRA 42, G.R. No. 128338, March 28, 2005 * * * It ejectment. - - this co-owners to

was

held

that

is an unqualified evict possessors

anyone

of

479

ADLAWAN

SCRA

275,

co-owners

and categorical or lessees.

When the action is brought by of all, a favorable decision will benefit decision cannot prejudice their rights.

ARNELITO

the

vs.

one the

authority

of

of them co-owners ,

EMETERIO

G. R. No. 161916,

may

sue

anyone for but

the an

of

for the

benefit adverse

ADLAWAN

January

20,

2006

FACTS: Arnelito Adlawan was acknowledged illegitimate son of Adlawan who died without an issue and survived by Graciana. Claiming to be the sole heir of Dominador, executed an affidavit adjudicating to himself Lot 7226 and built thereon. Arnelito filed an unlawful detainer suit to eject from the property in his own name and as the sole the property.

Dominador his wife petitioner the house respondents owner of

ISSUE: Whether ejectment.

case

petitioner

can

validly

maintain

the

instant

HELD: NO. The late Dominador Adlawan was survived not only petitioner but also by the legal wife of the decedent , Graciana, died 10 years after the demise of Dominador on May 28, 1987. - - - By intestate succession, Graciana 7226 under Article 998 of the

and petitioner became New Civil Code.

- - - the death of Graciana on May absolute owner of Lot 7226 because relatives by consanguinity and not no blood relations.

6, 1997, did the share of to petitioner

- - - Article 487 provides action in ejectment.”

one

that

“any

of

the

co-owners

for by who

of

Lot

not make petitioner Graciana passed to with whom she

the her had

co-owners

may

bring

an

- - - this article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession: forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of possession (accion publiciana) and recovery of ownership (accion de reivindicacion). A co-owner may bring such an action without the necessity joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit presumed to have been filed to benefit his co-owners. - - - Where the suit for the to be the sole owner and property, the action should be 157767,

September

9,

of if

benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims entitled to the possession of the litigated dismissed. (Baloloy vs. Hular, 438 SCRA 80, G. R. No.

2004).

- - - It is not disputed that petitioner brought the suit for unlawful detainer in his name alone and for his own benefit to the exclusion of the heirs of Graciana as he even executed an affidavit of self-adjudication over the disputed property. - - - It is clear therefore that petitioner cannot validly maintain the instant action considering that he does not recognize the co-ownership that necessarily flows from his theory of succession to the property of his late father Dominador.

PUBLIC

DOMINION DOMALSIN vs. SPOUSES VALENCIANO G.R. No. 158687, January 25, 2006, 480 SCRA 114

Q:

What

is

the

property

of

public

dominion?

17 A: Property of public Code as follows:

dominion

is

defined

by

(1) Those intended for public use such torrents, ports and bridges constructed by roadsteads and other of similar character;

Article

as the

420

roads, state,

of

canals, banks,

the

Civil

rivers, shores,

(2) Those which belong to the State , without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. Q:

Who

owns

property

of

public

dominion?

A: Properties of public dominion are owned by the general public . Public use is “use that is not confined to privileged individuals , but open to the indefinite public .” As the land in controversy is a portion of Kennon Road which is for the use of the people , there can be no dispute that same is part of public domain . This being the case, the parties cannot appropriate the land for themselves . Thus, they cannot claim any right of possession over it.

5. IN

SUCCESSION THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF DELGADO & RUSTIA vs. HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN G.R. No. 155733, January

ISSUE: Are right of

grandnephews representation

27,

2006,

and grandnieces in the collateral

480

SCRA

entitled line?

334

to

inherit

by

the

HELD: NO. Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code , the right of representation in the collateral line takes place only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces), Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces . Therefore, the only collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate estate are her brothers and nieces , or their children who were still alive at the time of her death on September 8, 1972. They have a vested right to participate in the inheritance.

FELIX

AZUELA

vs.

COURT

G.R. No. 122880, April 12, 2006,

OF 487

APPEALS SCRA

119

A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on which the will is written is fatally defective. A will whose attestation clause is not signed by the instrumental witnesses is fatally defective. The attestation clause is “a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the will ” required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses and it must necessarily bear the signatures. An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses, since the omission of their signatures at the bottom thereof negatives their participation. And perhaps most importantly, a will, which does not contain an acknowledgment, but a mere jurat, is fatally defective. A jurat is that part of an affidavit where the notary certifies that before him/her ; the document was subscribed and sworn to by the executor . Any one of these defects is sufficient to deny probate . A notarial will with all three defects is just aching by judicial rejection. There is a distinct and consequential reason the Civil Code provides a comprehensive catalog of imperatives for the proper execution of notarial will.

CELESTINO G.R.

No.

BALUS

168970,

vs.

January

SATURNINO

15,

2010, 610

BALUS SCRA

178

FACTS: Rufo, the father of Celestino and Saturnino, mortgaged a parcel of land he owns as a security for a loan with the Rural Bank . For his failure to pay his loan , the mortgaged property was foreclosed and was subsequently sold to the Bank as the sole bidder. The property was not redeemed within the period allowed by law and a new title was issued in the name of the bank. Later, Celestino where they intended with the Bank.

Saturnino thereafter, he Celestino.

and Saturnino to redeem the

bought filed a

the subject complaint for

executed property

an Extrajudicial Settlement mortgaged by their father

property recovery

from of

the bank and possession against

18

ISSUE: Whether there ever a Saturnino over the subject property

co-ownership between at any given point

Celestino of time.

and

HELD: NONE. At the time of the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement , the subject property formed part of the estate of their deceased father. The rights to a person’s succession are transmitted from the moment of his death. In addition, the inheritance of a person consists of the property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of his death , as well as those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession. Since Rufo lost ownership of the subject property during his lifetime , it only follows that at the time of his death, the disputed parcel of land no longer formed part of his estate.

RESERVA MARIA

TRONCAL

MENDOZA vs. JULIA P. DELOS SANTOS

G.R. No. 176422, March 20, 2013,

694 SCRA

74

FACTS: Placido and Dominga had four (4) children: Antonio, Exequiel married to Leonor, Apolonio and Valentin. Three (3) parcels of land located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan were registered in the name of Exequiel married to Leonor in which Exequiel was in possession of the properties. After Exequiel’s death, the properties passed to his spouse Leonor and only daughter Gregoria. After Leonor’s death, her share went to Gregoria. In 1992, Gregoria died intestate and without issue and these properties were adjudicated to Julia , Leonor’s sister, as the sole surviving heirs of Leonor and Gregoria. On the other hand, the heirs of Antonio: Apolonio and Valentin claimed that these properties should be reserved by Julia in their behalf and must now revert back to them applying Article 891 of the New Civil Code on reserva troncal. ISSUES:

(1)

Who

(2)

Whether qualifies

(3)

Whether the as reservees

HELD: (1) As persons are

are

the

person

Julia, sister as reservoir

contemplated in Article involved in reserva

descendant

of or

or

in

reserve

troncal?

Leonor and reservista.

heirs of Antonio, or reservatarios.

a) the ascendant or property was received gratuitous title; b) the property;

involved

891 of troncal:

namely: the

New

brother by the

or sister descendant

prepositus

(propositus)

aunt Apolonio Civil

from by who

of

Gregoria,

and

Valentin

Code, the

following

whom lucrative received

the or the

c) the reservor (reservista), the other ascendant who obtained the property from the prepositus by operation of law ; and d) the reservee (reservatario) who is within the third degree from the prepositus and who belongs to the line from which the property came and for whom the property should be reserved by the reservor. The ownership of the properties should be reckoned only from Exequiel as he was the ascendant from where the first transmission occurred, or from whom Gregoria inherited the properties in dispute as the descendant who received the properties by gratuitous title. (2) YES. In determining the collateral line of relationship , ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent to the relative from whom the computation is made. In the case of Julia’s collateral relationship with Gregoria, ascent is to be made from Gregoria to her mother Leonor (one line/degree), then to the common ancestor, that is Julia and Leonor’s parents (second line/degree), and then descent to Julia,

her aunt within the

(third third

line/degree). Thus, Julia is Gregoria’s degree and not her ascendant.

collateral

relative

19 (3) NO. They cannot be not relatives within the properties came. They are fourth degree relatives and

considered reservee/reservatarios as they third degree of Gregoria from whom first cousins of the propositus who are not reservees/reservatarios.

are the are

COLLATION - Article 1061 CORAZON M. GREGORIO vs. ATTY. G.R. No. 185226,

February

11,

JOSE

2010,

612

R. MADARANG SCRA 340

FACTS: During the lifetime of Casimiro, he transferred one lot by way of Deed of Donation to his son , Vicente. Upon the death of Casimiro , an inventory report of the properties of the decedent was made before the probate court excluding the donated lot to Vicente. ISSUE: Whether the donated properties of the decedent.

lot

be

excluded

from

the

inventory

of

the

HELD: NO. Article 1061 of the New Civil Code expressly provides that “every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent , during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir and in the account of partition. By by the inventory

express provision of law decedent to his son, of the properties of the

AMELIA

P.

ARELLANO

G.R. No. 189776,

then, the lot which was Vicente, should be included decedent.

vs.

December

During the settlement of estate Miguel claimed that the parcel of his lifetime to Amelia is subject same as advance legitime. ISSUES:

(1) Whether are entitled

the to

collateral legitime.

(2) Whether the property should be formed part of death. (3)

Whether

the

(4) Whether among the heirs.

property

the three

FRANCISCO PASCUAL

15,

FACTS: Angel died intestate and single siblings: Amelia, Francisco and Miguel.

2010,

638

leaving

SCRA 826

as

heirs

his

three

(3)

of the decedent , Francisco & land donated by Angel during to collation and considered the

relatives donated his estate

donated

donated in the

is

estate of Angel (3) siblings as

of by at

the

Angel to Amelia the time of his

subject be his

decedent

to

collation.

partitioned legal or

equally intestate

HELD: (1) NO. The decedent was survived by his siblings , collateral relatives and therefore, are not entitled to any the law has reserved it for compulsory heirs.

who are his legitime which

(2) NO. The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any legitime, he was at liberty to donate all his properties to anyone, even if nothing was left for his siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His donation to his sister Amelia is valid as is deemed as donation to a “stranger.” (3) NO. Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs and one of its purposes is to determine the legitime and the free portion . There being no compulsory heir , the donated property is not subject to collation. (4) YES. The decedent’s remaining estate should be partitioned equally among his heirs-siblings-collateral relatives pursuant to Articles 1003 and 1004 of the New Civil Code which provides that “the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased . . . and

should the only they shall inherit

survivors in equal

be brother shares.

and

sisters

of

the

full

blood ,

20

NULLITY OF JUAN

MARRIAGE AND INTESTATE SUCCESSION DE

DIOS

CARLOS

vs.

FELICIDAD

SANDOVAL

G.R. No. 179922, December 16, 2008, 574 SCRA 116 FACTS: Teofilo died intestate and was survived by his compulsory heirs , wife Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II. He was predeceased by his parents and he had no other siblings except Juan . Upon Teofilo’s death, all his property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of his inheritance are transmitted to his compulsory heirs . Later, Juan filed an action for declaration of nullity of marriage against Felicidad in view of the absence of the required marriage license ; declaration of nullity of the status of a child as the latter was neither natural or adopted son of his late brother ; and recovery and reconveyance of the property. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Juan based on summary judgment, however, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment. ISSUES: for

1) Whether or not the annulment of marriage.

2) Whether or declaration of nullity

summary

not the brother of marriage.

judgment has

the

is legal

HELD: 1) NO. Both the rules on judgment on the judgment have no place in cases of declaration marriage and annulment of marriage.

applicable

in

personality

an to

action

file

the

pleadings and summary of absolute nullity of

By issuing said summary judgment , the trial court has divested the State of its lawful right and duty to intervene in the case . Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court should order the prosecuting attorney to appear and intervene for the State. It is at this stage when the public prosecutor sees to it that there is no suppression of evidence and to make sure the evidence to be presented or laid down before the court is not fabricated. 2) Generally, NO, because the rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, however, the compulsory heir in order to protect his successional right has the right to question the validity of the marriage of the spouses in the settlement of estate proceedings filed in regular court. The legal personality of Juan to bring is contingent upon the final declaration that adopted or illegitimate son of Teofilo.

the nullity Teofilo II

of is

marriage case not legitimate,

If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate , illegitimate or legally adopted son of Teofilo, then Juan has no legal personality to ask for the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother and Felicidad. This is based on the ground that he has no successional right to be protected . The presence of descendant , illegitimate or even an adopted child excludes the collateral relatives from inheriting from the decedent.

6. CONFLICT

OF

LAWS

Article 15 Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of person are binding upon citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad. Article 16 the law of

Real properties as the country where

well as personal it is situated.

property

is

subject

to

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions , shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration , whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

Article 17 - The forms and solemnities of instruments shall be governed by the they are executed.

contracts, laws of

wills the

and other country in

public which

21

Article 1039 - Capacity of the decedent.

to

Domiciliary Theory posits person are governed by his habitual residence. Nationality nationality

is

governed

that the personal the law of his

Theory postulates that governs such

OBLIGATION OF NORMA

succeed

by

the

status domicile

that it is the status and rights.

law

of

and or

law

the

nation

rights of the place

of

the

a of

person’s

A FOREIGN NATIONAL TO SUPPORT MINOR CHILD

DEL SOCORRO vs. ERST JOHAN BRINKMAN JAN WILSEM G.R. No. 193707,

FACTS: Norma 25, 1990 and

and Brinkman thereafter were

December 10, 2014,

744

SCRA

516

contracted marriage in Holland blessed with a son, Roderigo.

Unfortunately, their marriage bond issued by the appropriate Court of

ended by Holland.

virtue

of

on

a

September

Divorce

Decree

Brinkman made a promise to provide monthly support to their son in the amount of 250 Guildene which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 . However, since the arrival of Norma and her son in the Philippines , Brinkman never gave his promised support. Not long thereafter, Brinkman Norma sent a letter demanding for receive the letter.

came to support ,

the Philippines and remarried . however, Brinkman refused to

for

Norma filed a complaint against Brinkman for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor

not

According obliged to

ISSUE: Whether under Philippine

violation child.

of

RA

9262

to Brinkman, under to the support his son, however, he

laws of Netherlands , he is never proved it in court.

a foreign law.

to

HELD: YES. Under private a foreign law applied proving the foreign law.

national

is

obliged

support

international law, the party to a dispute or case

his

who has

minor

child

wants to have the burden of

In the present case, Brinkman hastily concludes national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such matter of provision of and capacity to support.

that laws

being a on the

While Brinkman pleaded the laws of Netherlands that parents are not obliged to support their child after the issuance of a divorce decree , he failed to prove the same. In view Netherlands in govern.

of Brinkman’s failure to his favor, the doctrine

prove the national law of of processual presumption

the shall

Under the doctrine of processual presumption , if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved , our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law. Thus, since the to support has not is presumed to be obligation of parents compliance therewith.

law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation properly pleaded and proved in the instant case , it the same with Philippine Law, which enforces the to support their children and penalizing the non-

DIVORCE OBTAINED ABROAD OF MA.

REBECCA G.R.

MAKAPUGAY No. 163979,

BAYOT

November

7,

vs. 2008,

FOREIGN COURT 570

SCRA

NATIONAL OF

APPEALS

472

FACTS: Rebecca was born in Guam, U.S.A. to parents both of American citizenship, married Vicente in the Philippines. They begot a daughter in 1982. In 1996, Rebecca initiated a divorce proceeding before the Dominican Republic court which it granted ordering the dissolution of the couple’s

22 marriage and requirements,”

“leaving

ISSUE: Whether and Vicente.

the

them divorce

to

remarry

granted

by

after

the

completing

foreign

court

the binds

legal Rebecca

HELD: YES. There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca at the time she applied for and obtained her divorce from Vicente was an American citizen. The divorce granted by the foreign court during which Rebecca is an American citizen is valid and binds her and her Filipino husband. In determining whether or not a divorce secured abroad would come within the pale of the country’s policy against absolute divorce , the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained.

EDGAR SAN LUIS vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS G.R. No.

133743,

February

6,

2007,

514

SCRA 294

FACTS: During his lifetime, Felicisimo San Luis contracted 3 marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit out of which were born six children. Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. Five years later, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, an American citizen with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, Merry Lee filed a Complaint for Divorce before the court in the State of Hawaii, U.S.A. , which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody. Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad then surnamed Sagalongos in the U.S.A. He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death . Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. She filed a petition for letters of administration . Petitioner Rodolfo, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage , filed a motion to dismiss on the ground, inter alia, asserting that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code (FC) cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondent’s bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256 of the FC. ISSUE: Whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry in the Philippines considering that Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized before the FC took effect. HELD: YES. Firstly, in the case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., 139 SCRA 139 (1985), the SC held that after a valid divorce had been obtained by the foreign husband, the Filipino wife should no longer be considered married to alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera where the Court recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad . In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife . The Court stated that “the severance of the marital bond had the effect of disassociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.”

FELICITAS

AMOR – CATALAN vs.

G.R. No. 167109,

February

6,

COURT 2007,

514

FACTS: Felicitas married Orlando. Thereafter, they States of America and became naturalized citizens of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced. Two Contending subsisting declaration Merope.

APPEALS 607

migrated thereof .

to the United After 38 years

months after the divorce, Orlando married respondent Merope. that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior marriage with Eusebio Bristol , petitioner filed a petition for of nullity of marriage with damages against Orlando and

ISSUE: Whether or for the declaration ground of bigamy. HELD: cause

OF SCRA

not of

petitioner nullity of

YES. Divorce means the arising after marriage .

has the marriage

personality to file a petition of the respondents on the

legal dissolution of a But divorces are of

lawful union for a different types . The

23 two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matirmonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et toro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and the leaves the bond in full force. A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, before it can be recognized by our courts , the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it , which must be proved considering that courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. If this is done, the SC remanded the case to the trial court for its proper disposition for the determination of whether a divorce decree was indeed obtained in accordance with American law and will thus, NOT restrict marriage.

7. OBLIGATIONS Civil Obligation is a juridical necessity gives the creditor the legal right to the performance of such obligation. A natural obligation is based on legal right to compel performance pays it, he cannot recover what

to give, to compel by

equity and thereof but was paid.

do and not an action

to do. It in court

natural law. There is no if the debtor voluntarily

Article 1182 - When the fulfillment of the condition depends upon the will of the debtor, the conditional obligation shall be void . If it depends upon chance or upon the will of a third person , the obligation shall take effect in conformity with the provisions of this Code. Article 1197 - If the obligation does and the circumstances it can be the courts may fix the duration The courts shall depends upon the will

also of

fix the

not fix inferred thereof.

a

period , that a

the duration debtor.

of

but from its nature period was intended , the

period

when

In every case, the courts shall determine such period as may be the circumstances have been probably contemplated by the parties . fixed by the courts, the period cannot be changed by them.

8.

it

under Once

DOUBLE SALES

Article 1544 - If the same vendees, the ownership shall have first taken possession movable property. Should it be person acquiring it Registry of Property.

immovable who in

thing should have been sold be transferred to the person thereof in good faith , if it property, the good faith

ownership shall first recorded

to different who may should be

belong to it in

Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to person who in good faith who in good faith was first in possession; in the absence thereof , to the person who presents oldest title, provided there is good faith.

RURAL BANK OF

STA. BARBARA vs. MANILA

the the the the the

MISSION

G.R. No. 130223, August 19, 2009, 596 SCRA 415 FACTS: Spouses Soliven sold the subject property to Manila Mission . However, it was only on 28 April 1994 when title was transferred in the name of Manila Mission. In the meantime, on 15 April 1993, Rural Bank of Sta. Barbara filed an action for sum of money before the RTC against Spouses Soliven . The RTC issued a writ of attachment on 21 May 1993 attaching the subject property which was still then in the name of Spouses Soliven.

ISSUE: Which subsequent but

is superior, a previous duly annotated attachment?

but

unregistered

sale

or

a

HELD: The settled rule is that levy on attachment , but duly registered, takes preference over a prior unregistered sale . This result is a necessary consequence of the fact that the property involved was duly covered by the Torrrens system which works under the

24 fundamental validity to

principle that registration is the operative the transferor creates a lien upon the land.

SPOUSES FACTS: sale in

SABITSANA

vs.

JUANITO

F.

which

gives

MUERTEGUI

G.R. No. 181359, August 5, 2013, 703 SCRA 145 On September 2, 1981, Alberto executed an unnotarized favor of Juanito over a parcel of unregistered land.

deed

of

On October 17, 1991, Alberto sold the lot to Juanito’s family lawyer, Atty. Sabitsana, through a notarized deed of sale of absolute sale. The sale was registered with the Register of Deeds and correspondingly paid real property taxes and introduced concrete improvements. In 1998, Juanito applied for registration of the Land Act with the DENR , however, Atty. Sabitsana claiming that he was the true owner of the lot.

lot under the Public opposed the application

On April 11, 2000, Juanito filed an action for quieting of against Atty. Sabitsana claiming that the latter bought the lot in faith and was exercising acts of possession and ownership over same, which acts thus constitute a cloud over his title. ISSUES:

1) Whether

Article

1544

on

double

sales

is

in

this

case.

2) Whether Juanito has a better right with unnotarized sale over the subsequent notarized deed of sale Sabitsana.

deed of of Atty.

3)

Whether

consent.

4)

Whether Juanito is entitled and litigation expenses.

the

sale

is

valid

in

the

for

HELD: 1) NO. The provision of Article 1544 apply to sales involving unregistered land. the the

applies

title bad the

absence the of

of

marital

award the

of

Civil

attorney’s Code

does

fees not

The issue of the buyer’s good or bad faith is relevant only where subject of the sale is registered land, and the purchaser is buying same from the registered owner whose title to the land is clean. The purchaser protected if he

who relies on the is a purchaser in

2) YES. The sale an unnotarized deed made via a notarized years thereafter.

clean good

title faith

of the registered for value.

owner

to Juanito was executed on Septemer 2, 1981 via of sale, while the sale to Atty. Sabitsana was document only on October 17, 1991 or ten (10)

Thus, Juanito who was the first lot, while the subsequent sale to because when it was made, the owner of the lot.

buyer Atty. seller

has a better right to Sabitsana is null and Alberto was no longer

the void the

The fact that the sale to Juanito was not notarized does not alter anything, since the sale between him and Alberto remains valid nevertheless. Notarization or the requirement of a public document under the Civil Code is only for convenience and not for validity or enforceability. 3) YES. Even admittedly the lot was a conjugal property , the absence of the wife’s signature and consent to the deed did not render the sale to Juanito absolutely null and void , but merely voidable. Since Alberto and his wife were married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, Article 173 of the Civil Code should apply. Under the said provision, the disposition of conjugal property without the wife’s consent is not void but merely voidable . In the absence of a decree annulling the deed of sale in favor of Juanito , the same remains valid.

to

4) YES. Atty. Sabitsana’s actual Juanito makes him purchaser in

and bad

prior faith.

knowledge

of

the

first

Moreover, as Juanito’s family lawyer, Atty. Sabitsana was obligation to safeguard his client’s property and not jeopardize it . is his duty as an attorney, and pursuant to his general agency.

sale under Such

25

9.

MACEDA LAW

(Buyer’s Protection

on

Most

(1)

important

Sales

of

(RA

immovable

6552) property

on

installments)

features:

After having paid installments for at is entitled to a mandatory grace every year of installment payments installments without interest.

least period made ,

two of to

years , the buyer one month for pay the unpaid

If the contract is cancelled , the seller shall refund to the buyer the cash surrender value equivalent to fifty percent (50%) of the total payments made, and after five years of installments , an additional five percent (5%) every year but not to exceed ninety percent (90%) total payments made.

(2)

In case the installments paid were less than 2 years , the seller shall give the buyer period of not less than 60 days . If the buyer fails to pay the installments due at the expiration of the grace period, the seller may cancel the contract after 30 days from receipt by the buyer of the notice of cancellation or demand for rescission by notarial act.

MOLDEX REALTY, INC. vs. FLORA SEBERON G.R. No. 176289, April 8, 2013, 695 FACTS: Moldex entered with Metrogate Cavite with Flora 19, her

a Contract despite of

to its

SCRA 331

Sell of a certain property lack of license to sell.

at

Flora had made installment payments from March 11, 1992 to July 1996 in the aggregate amount of P375,295.49 . She had defaulted in succeeding payments.

Moldex sent notices to Flora to update avail. Finally, Moldex sent Flora a Notarized Contract to Sell. ISSUES:

1)

Whether sell is

2)

What

is

the valid. the

contract right

to available

sell to

her account but to Notice of Cancellation

despite

the

lack

Flora

under

the

of

license

Maceda

no of to

Law?

HELD: 1) YES. PD 957 provides that the lack of license to sell on the part of a subdivision developer does not result for the nullification or invalidation of the contract to sell it entered into with a buyer. Thus, the contract to sell entered into between remains valid despite the lack of license to sell on latter at the time the contract was entered into.

Flora and the part

Moldex of the

2) Since Moldex had already sent Flora a Notarized Notice of Cancellation of Contract to Sell, the only option available is Section 3 (b) under Maceda Law or RA 6552, whereby Moldex shall refund to Flora the cash surrender value of her payments on the property equivalent to the 50% of the total payments made or P187,647.75.

GATCHALIAN REALTY, INC. vs. EVELYN G.R. No. 202358,

FACTS: Angeles purchased a house and lot under Gatchalian payable for a period of ten years. After 48 monthly monthly installments with

M. ANGELES

November 27, 2013, 711 SCRA 163

installment Gatchalian.

payments ,

a

Angeles

Several demands were made by Gatchalian continually disregarded by Angeles . Finally, Gatchalian Notice of Notarial Rescission thru registered mail.

Contract failed

to to

Sell satisfy

from her

but the same were served Angeles with a

Consequently, Angeles was furnished by Gatchalian a demand letter demanding her to pay the outstanding reasonable rentals for her use and occupation of the house and lot to date and to vacate the same . She was informed in said letter that the 50% refundable amount that she is entitled to has already been deducted with the reasonable value for the use of the properties.

26

ISSUES:

1) Whether

there

is

a

2) Whether Angeles RA 6552.

is

3) Whether Angeles installments.

can

HELD: 1) NO. A comply with the cancellation and a

valid

cancellation

entitled be

to

of

the

ejected

the

benefit for

valid and effective cancellation mandatory twin requirements of refund of the cash surrender

Contract of

to

Maceda

non-payment

Sell. Law

of

or

monthly

under RA 6552 must a notarized notice of value.

Although there was a notarial rescission sent thru registered mail but it was not accompanied by the refund of the cash surrender value equivalent to 50% of the total payments made. For failure to refund the cash surrender value to the defaulting buyer Angeles, Gatchalian cannot deduct the same for the amount of the rentals due to Gatchalian as there was nothing in the contract to apply compensation under Art. 1279 of the New Civil Code. to of

2) Angeles is entitled to 50% of the total payments RA 6552.

3) In the absence between Gatchalian and Thus the complaint for mandate of RA 6552.

OPTIMUM

receive made

the as

cash surrender value equivalent provided for by Section 3 (b)

of a valid cancellation of the Contract Angeles , the contract remains valid and unlawful detainer would be a violation

DEVELOPMENT

BANK

vs.

SPOUSES

to Sell existing . of the

JOVELLANOS

G.R. No. 189145, December 4, 2013, 711 SCRA 548 FACTS: Spouses Jovellanos entered into a Homes for the purchase of a residential period of 10 years. Later, Palmera Homes Contract to Sell in favor

assigned all its of Optimum.

Contract to Sell with house and lot payable rights ,

A year later, Optimum issued a Cancellation of Contract to Sell to Spouses pay their monthly installments despite several

title

and

interest

Palmera for a in

the

Notice of Delinquency and Jovellanos for their failure to written and verbal demands.

A month later, a final Demand Letter by Optimum required Spouses Jovellanos to vacate and deliver possession of the subject property within seven (7) days, which however remained unheeded. from

Optimum instituted the final demand

the action to vacate.

ISSUE: Whether the validity of under RA 6552 lies within Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC).

for

unlawful

detainer

within

the cancellation of the Contract the competence or jurisdiction

HELD: YES. Under RA 6552, the mechanics of cancellation of to Sell is based on the amount of installments already paid buyer under the said contract.

one

year

to of

Sell the

Contract by the

Since Jovellanos had paid less than two years in installments , Section 4 of RA 6552 provides for three (3) requisites before the seller may actually cancel the subject contract : first, the buyer shall give the buyer a 60-day grace period to be reckoned from the date the installment became due; second, the seller must give the buyer a notice of cancellation/demand for rescission by notarial act if the buyer fails to pay the installments due at the expiration of the said grace period; and

third, the seller may actually cancel the contract only after 30 days from the buyer’s receipt of the said notice of cancellation/demand for rescission by notarial act. There was a valid and effective cancellation of the Contract to Sell in accordance with Section 4 of RA 6552 and since Spouses Jovellanos had already lost their right to retain possession of the subject property as a consequence of such cancellation , their refusal to vacate and turn over possession to Optimum makes out a valid case for unlawful detainer.

27 10. PRESCRIPTION AND RECONVEYANCE SPOUSES

SOFRONIO G.R.

SANTOS

No. 151016,

vs. HEIRS

August

6,

2008,

OF 561

DOMINGA

SCRA

LUSTRE

120

FACTS: Dominga Lustre mortgaged her residential lot to Spouses Santos . She then sold the property to Natividad Santos. The cancellation of the mortgage and the sale of the property were both inscribed in the title . Thereafter, the Spouses Santos transferred the property , by way of sale, to their son, Froilan. The heirs of Dominga Lustre filed a complaint for Declaration of inexistence of contract, annulment of title and reconveyance, averring that the sale to Natividad was simulated as Dominga’s signature was forged and that the spouses Santos also simulated the Deed of Sale transferring the property to their son , Froilan. The Santoses allege that the heirs of Dominga Lustre’s right of action had prescribed. ISSUE: barred

Whether or not by prescription.

the

action

of

the

heirs

of

Dominga

HELD: NO. The action for reconveyance on the ground of title was obtained by means of a fictitious deed action for the declaration of its nullity, which does not

Lustre

is

that the certificate of sale is an prescribe.

A person acquiring property through fraud becomes , by operation of law, a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the real owner of the property. An action for reconveyance based on implied trust prescribes in ten (10) years. The prescriptive to reconvey the possession of the of the property, him. When an action be in a nature of imprescriptible.

period applies only if there is an actual need property as when the plaintiff is not in property . Otherwise, if plaintiff is in possession prescription does not commence to run against for reconveyance is a suit for quieting

nonetheless filed , it would of title , an action that is

LUCIA CARLOS ALIÑO vs. HEIRS OF ANGELICA LORENZO G.R. No. 159550,

June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 139

An action for reconveyance prescribes is the date of registration of the deed certificate of title over the property. If the person claiming thereof, the right to seek not prescribe. One be the or his right.

to to

be the quiet

in actual possession of owner thereof may wait title is attacked before

in or

10 years, the reckoning point the date of issuance of the

owner is title to

in the

actual possession property , does

a piece of land until his possession taking steps to

claiming to is disturbed vindicate his

RECONVEYANCE NOT INDIRECT ATTACK ON VALIDITY OF TITLE MARIFLOR T. HORTIZUELA G.R. No. 205867, February

vs. GREGORIA

TAGUFA

23, 2015, 751 SCRA 371

FACTS: Spouses Epifanio Tagufa owned an untitled property containing area of 539 square meters. They mortgaged the property to DBP.

sold

For it

failure to redeem the property, to Atty. Romulo Marquez.

DBP

foreclosed

On April 4, 2002, Mariflor, the daughter of American citizen, purchased the subject property from executing a SPA in favor of her brother , Runsted, that the latter will reconvey the said property to demanded.

the

same

an

and

Epifanio and an Atty. Marquez by with an agreement his sister when

Mariflor discovered that the same unregistered property was titled the name of Gregoria, wife of Runsted, under OCT No. P-84609 virtue of a free patent application before the DENR.

in by

28

Because of fraud, recovery of property of Gregoria a collateral principle of

claimed that the attack on the indefeasibility of a

ISSUE: Whether collateral attack HELD: NO. In respected as An personam, registered or the

Mariflor instituted an the subject property.

action

action for available under the

reconveyance

action for reconveyance would title , which was proscribed Torrens title.

the action for reconveyance on the validity of the title. a complaint incontrovertible

for

constitutes

for reconveyance , the and is not being

amount under

to the

indirect

or

registration

is

an

decree of questioned.

reconveyance is a recognized remedy , an to a person whose property has been Torrens system in another’s name.

What is being sought is the erroneously registered in another’s one with a better right.

The fact that Gregoria was able to secure not operate to vest ownership upon her of

Registration not create or ownership.

action in wrongfully

transfer of the property wrongfully name to its rightful owner or to

If the registration of the land is fraudulent , the person name the land is registered holds it as a mere trustee , real owner is entitled to file an action for reconveyance property. does

and

of a piece of land vest title, because it

a title in the subject

under the Torrens is not a mode

in whose and the of the her name land.

System does of acquiring

A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described thereon. It cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner, nor can it be used as a shield for the commission of fraud , neither it permits one to enrich himself at the expense of others. Its issuance in favor of a particular person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be co-owned with person not named in the certificate or that it may be held in trust for another person by the registered owner.

11.

ADVERSE SPOUSES G.R.

CLAIM

JESUS No.

CHING

156076,

vs.

September

SPOUSES 17,

2008,

ADOLFO 565

SCRA

ENRILE 402

FACTS: Spouses Jesus Ching purchased from Raymunda a property in Las Piñas City. The sale was perfected upon delivery of a duly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale with the owner’s duplicate copy of the TCT and they immediately took physical possession of the subject property . The couple failed to register the sale and instead they executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim and the same was annotated at the back of the title. Three years after the sale, Spouses Ching received a Notice of Levy on Attachment and Writ of Execution on account of court decision in favor of Spouses Adolfo against the vendor Raymunda . Spouses Jesus Ching filed a petition to remove cloud or quiet title to real property, however, it was countered by Spouses Adolfo that the Annotated Adverse Claim had already prescribed after a lapse of thirty (30) days from the date of registration.

ISSUE: Whether or not the levy on prevail over the Adverse Claim earlier the title by the mere lapse of 30 petition in court for its cancellation.

attachment later annotated shall annotated at the back of days and even without any

HELD. NO. A notice of Adverse Claim remains valid even after the lapse of the 30-day period as provided by Section 70 of PD 1529. As long as there is yet no petition for cancellation for its cancellation, the notice of adverse claim remains subsisting. After the lapse of 30 days , the annotation of the adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition by the party in interest.

29 The law does not require a person dealing with the owner of registered land to go beyond the certificate of title as he may rely on the notices of the encumbrances on the property annotated on the certificate of title or absence of any annotation . Here, the adverse claim is annotated at the back of title coupled with the fact that the Spouses Ching are in possession of the disputed property. Spouses Adolfo should have put in guard and required them to ascertain the property offered to them has already been sold to another to prevent injury to prior innocent buyers.

NAVOTAS

INDUSTRIAL

G.R.

No.

159212,

CORPORATION September

12,

vs.

GERMAN

2005,

469

D.

SCRA

CRUZ

530

The annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a part of real property , and serves as a notice and warning to third parties dealing with the said property that someone is claiming an interest over it or has a better right than the registered owner.

ROGELIA

P. DIAZ - DUARTE vs. SPOUSES G.R.

No.

130352,

November

3, 1998,

BEN & 298

ESTHER ONG

SCRA

388

In a petition for cancellation of adverse claim , a hearing must first be conducted. The hearing will afford the parties an opportunity to prove the propriety or impropriety of the adverse claim . Petitioner was unlawfully denied this opportunity when the Register of Deeds automatically cancelled the adverse claim. Needless to state, the cancellation of adverse claim in ineffective.

ALFREDO G.R.

SAJONAS No. 102377,

vs.

COURT

July 5, 1996,

OF

258

APPEALS

SCRA 79

The general rule it that a person dealing with registered land is not required to go behind the register to determine the condition of the property . However, such person is charged with notice on the face of the register or certificate of title. A person who deals with encumbrances including adverse

12.

RIGHT

registered land is bound claim annotated therein.

by

the

liens

and

OF FIRST REFUSAL

PURIFICACION ESTANISLAO vs. SPOUSES NORMA & DAMIANO GUDITO G.R. No. 173166, FACTS: Estanislao family by Gaspar since 1934. in accordance with the

March 13, 2013, 693 SCRA 330

have been renting and occupying the lot owned The former built the house on the subject lot lease agreement with Gaspar.

When Gaspar died, the Victorino married to Esther.

subject

property

was

inherited

by

his

son,

In the 1980s, Victorino wanted the Estanislao family to vacate the said property, but the tenants refused because of laws allegedly prohibited their ejectment therefrom. Resultantly, Estanislao, with due notice to Victorino, deposited the amount of monthly rentals at Allied Bank under the savings account in the name of Victorino. In couple Hence, remove

the interim, a Deed of Donation was executed by the Victorino in favor of their daughter Norma married to Damiano Gudito. in October 1994, Spouses Gudito notified Estanislao family to their house and vacate the premises within 3 months.

When Estanislao the Spouses Gudito them. ISSUES:

family failed to comply with filed a complaint for unlawful

1)

Whether the the Deed of

2)

Whether

the

right of Donation. right

of

possession first

refusal

is

the demand to detainer/ejectment established

applies

to

by

vacate, against

virtue

of

Estanislao.

HELD: 1) YES. The Deed of Donation had been prepared and acknowledged before a notary public is vested with public interest , the sanctity of which deserves to be upheld unless overwhelmed by clear and convincing evidence.

30 Thus, the donation made by of their right as owner of the are legally entitled to the said the

2) NO. The owner of the

the Victorino couple is a valid exercise subject property and the Spouses Gudito property as donees.

right of first property intends

refusal applies to sell it to

only to a third

a case party.

where

Since the subject property was donated by the Victorino couple to their daughter Norma and her husband , Damiano Gudito, their right to possess the subject property for their own use as family residence cannot be denied.

13.

QUIETING SEVERINO

OF

TITLE

BARICUATRO, JR. vs.

COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 105902, February 9, 2000, 325 SCRA FACTS: On October 16, 1968, installment basis from Galeos . Subdivision.

Severino The two

137

bought two (2) lots are part of

After the sale, Severino introduced certain improvements and started to reside therein in 1970 . Since then he actual and physical possession of the said two (2) lots. However, on December 7, 1968, two months sold the entire subdivision including the two Subsequently, Galeos informed Severino about the advised him to pay the balance of the purchase lots directly to Amores.

lots on an Spring Village on has

said been

after the sale , Galeos (2) lots to Amores. sale to Amores and price of the two (2)

On December 27, 1974, Amores sold the two (2) lots to Prior to the sale, Amores informed Severino about the impending the two (2) lots, but the latter failed to respond. Before Nemenio caused the transfer lots and issuance of tax declaration residence of Severino. but

Thereafter, the latter

Nemenio refused

A complaint Severino.

for

demanded from to do so. quieting

of

of in

the his

Severino

title

was

lots in

Nemenio. sale of

titles to the two name, he visited

to

vacate

filed

by

title

is

the

said

Nemenio

(2) the lots

against

ISSUES: (1) Whether remedy. (2)

Whether

the Amores

action is

(3) Whether Nemenio upon his reliance in HELD: (1) YES. Quieting removal of any cloud title to real property.

for a

is the

of title upon or

quieting

purchaser

of in

good

also a purchaser indefeasibility of the is a doubt

the

best

faith. in good faith Torrens Title.

common law or uncertainty

remedy for with respect

the to

Its purpose is to secure an adjudication that a claim of title or an interest in property, adverse to that of the complainant, invalid, so that the complainant and those claiming under him may forever afterward free from any danger of hostile claim.

to is be

In an action for quieting of title , the competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants not only to place things in their proper place but to make the one who has no rights to said immovable , respect and not to disturb the other , but also for the benefit of both , so that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may desire, to use and even to abuse the property as he deems best. (2) NO. Amores did not act in good faith when he bought two disputed lots, however, when he registered his title, the preponderance of evidence supports the finding that he already had knowledge of the previous sale of the disputed lots to Severino . Such knowledge tainted his registration with bad faith.

31

The prior registration of does not by itself confer property.

the disputed property by the second buyer ownership or a better right over the

Under belong to registry of

ownership in good

Article 1544, the purchaser property.

the who

of an immovable faith registers it

property first in

For a second buyer to successfully invoke the protection 1544 of the Civil Code , he must possess good faith registration of the deed of conveyance covering the same.

shall the

by Article until the

(3) NO. Nemenio cannot claim to be purchaser in good faith because he visited the residence of Severino before he registered the disputed lots on his name . The registration of Nemenio was done in bad faith. The defense of indefeasibility of a Torrens Title does not extend to a transferee who takes the certificate of title with notice of a flaw. A holder in bad faith of a prosecution of the law, for the fraud.

ELIAS

GALLAR

vs.

G.R. No. L-20954, FACTS: On January 9, 1919 , with the right to repurchase

certificate of law cannot

title be

is not entitled to used as a shield

HERMENEGILDA

the for

HUSAIN

May 24, 1967, 20 SCRA 186

Teodoro sold his within six years shortly after the right to Graciana,

land in a

to Serapio for P30 private document.

On January 28, 1919, Serapio transferred his

deed

of

sale,

Graciana subsequently transferred her rights to the land to Elias 2, 1919 in exchange for one cow in a private document.

on

April

On the same occasion, April together with the TCT was delivered the so bar

On October 10, 1960, after heirs of Teodoro to execute that he could get a transfer On the other Elias’ action.

hand,

the

2, to

execution sister of

1919, Elias.

of the Teodoro.

possession

of

41 years, Elias filed a a deed of conveyance certificate of title. heirs

of

Teodoro

invoked

the

suit against in his favor prescription

ISSUES: (1) the

Is Elias’ quieting

(2)

Has

suit one of title?

the

action

for

specific

performance

or

one

for

prescribed?

(3) If the heirs of Teodoro had been the property (instead of Elias) would the answer

possessor be the

of the same?

HELD: (1) Elias’ suit should be considered an action to quiet title as it seeks to quiet title , to remove the cloud cast on his ownership despite the fact that the transactions had all been merely in private document. (2) As imprescriptible.

Elias

is

in

possession

of

(3) If the heirs of Teodoro were property, Elias’ action would have been action would not be one to quiet title , property which must be brought within limitation governing such action.

the

land,

the

action

in possession of prescribed for then but one to recover the statutory period

is

the the real of

VICENTE SAPTO vs. APOLONIO FABIANA G.R. No. L-11285, May 16, 1958, 103 Phil 683 FACTS: On June 8, 1931, Samuel and Constancio deed of sale of a portion of land covered by favor of Apolonio for P245.00. The sale was conveyed to Apolonio thereof since 1931.

never and

registered. the latter

Possession has been

Sapto executed TCT # T-5701 of in

the the

land

a in

land was possession

to

32

Thereafter, Constantino died death was survived by his Vicente.

without widow

any and

issue. Samuel upon children , Laureana

his and

On October 19, 1954, the widow of Samuel, together with their two children, filed an action for the recovery of the parcel of land sold by their predecessors to Apolonio in 1931. ISSUES: (1) Whether an action for quieting of title would compel the sellers’ successors-in-interest to execute the proper deed of conveyance in 1954 in favor of the buyer. (2)

Has

the

action

(3) Whether the question, although binding?

prescribed?

deed of was never

sale over registered, is

the still

land valid

in and

HELD: (1) YES. The action for quieting of title is to remove the cloud cast upon the buyer’s ownership by the refusal of the sellers’ successorsin-interest to recognize the sale by their predecessors. Thus, Apolonio, it from that date execute the proper may be registered. (2) action

NO. Since DOES NOT

being may deed

a buyer of the land in 1931 who possessed still compel the sellers’ successors-in-interest to of conveyance in 1954 so that the deed

Apolonio has been in possession PRESCRIBE or IMPRESCRIPTIBLE.

of

the

property ,

the

(3) YES. Since the property has remained and still in the possession of the vendee of the property , it is clear that conveyance between buyer and his vendors is valid and binding upon the vendors , and is equally binding and effective against the heirs of the vendors . To hold otherwise would make of the Torrens system a shield for the commission of fraud by the vendors or his heirs.

HERMINIO M.

DE

GUZMAN vs. TABANGAO REALTY

G.R. No. 154262,

February 11,

FACTS: Sometime in 1980, Serafin and Josefino credit oil and lubricating products from FSPC , to pay for their credit purchases from FSPC. FSPC filed Josefino before

a the

complaint RTC of

for sum Manila.

After trial, decision was rendered to pay their outstanding obligation to final and executory. On by TCT Guzman. to on

June 30, # 3531

INC.

2015, 750 SCRA 271

of

de but

Guzman purchased on they eventually failed

money

against

Serafin

finding Serafin and Josefino liable FSPC and the judgment became

1983, FSPC levied upon a in the name of Spouses

parcel of land covered Serafin & Amelia de

At the public auction, the sheriff awarded the certificate Tabangao Realty as the highest bidder and the same was TCT # 3531 on April 13, 1988.

The Spouses De Guzman within one year from registration TCT # 3531.

and

did not redeem the subject of the Sheriff’s Certificate of

of sale annotated

property Sale on

On October 19, 2001, upon the deaths of Spouses De Guzman , their heirs filed a complaint for quieting of title on the ground that the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale has lost its effectivity as it had been terminated and extinguished by prescription, laches and estoppel, since more than 13 years having elapsed from its registration on April 13, 1988 without the buyer taking any step to consolidate its ownership and/or take possession of the property. ISSUE; instant

Whether case.

the

action

for

quieting

of

title

would

prosper

HELD: NO. For an action to quiet title to prosper , two requisites must concur: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has equitable title or interest in the real property subject of

in

the

indispensable a legal or the action ;

33 and (2) the deed, casting a cloud on inoperative despite its

claim, his prima

encumbrances, or proceeding claimed to be title must be shown to be in fact or facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

Complainants’ allegation that they deceased Spouses De Guzman and registered in Spouses De Guzman’s these allegations are insufficient to property.

were children and only heirs of the that the subject property was still names under TCT # 3531 . However, establish complainants’ title to the

Respondent Tabangao was already substituted to and acquired all the rights, title, interest, and claims of the Spouses De Guzman to the subject property on April 13, 1989 , when the one – year redemption period expired. Upon the deaths of Amelia de Guzman on January 1, 1997 and her husband Serafin de Guzman on April 23, 2001, they had no more rights, title, interest and claim to the subject property on by succession to complainants as their heirs. The execution of the final deed of sale and/or conveyance to Tabangao is a mere formality and confirmation of the title already vested in respondent under Rule 39, Section 33 of the Rules of Court . There is nothing in the rules requiring the institution of a separate action for execution of such a deed . Therefore, no prescription period for any action has begun to run.

CLT REALTY DEV’T

CORP.

G.R. No. 160726,

vs. PHIL-VILLE DEV’T

CORP.

March 11, 2015, 752 SCRA 289

FACTS: A complaint for quieting of title was filed by Phil-Ville against CLT claiming that it has been in “actual, open, notorious, public, physical and continuous possession” of the 16 parcels of land before 1980 up to the present . It fenced said parcels of land in 1980 and 1991. On the other of land known as No. 177013.

hand , CLT Lot 26 of

claimed to be the owner of a parcel the Maysilo Estate as evidenced by TCT

However, CLT’s TCT No. 177013, although apparently valid as effective , is in truth and in fact, invalid and ineffective and unless declared by the Court, will inevitably prejudice Phil-Ville’s title over its 16 parcels of land, as said title of CLT is a potential cause of litigation between Phil-Ville and CLT as both parties are claiming title to the subject properties when CLT’s TCT # T-177013 actually overlaps the 16 parcels of land of Phil-Ville’s 16 TCTs. The RTC declared Phil-Ville as “the true, absolute and legitimate owner of the sixteen (16) parcels of land and CLT’s TCT # T-177013 was declared null and void. It was found out that CLT purchased or acquired its TCT # T-177013 on December 10, 1988 from its predecessor Estrellita Hipolito who acquired the land covered by her TCT # R-17994 by virtue of an approved Compromise Agreement between her and Atty. Jose B. Dimson wherein the latter transferred to Hipolito on September 2, 1976 Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate covered by TCT # R-15166 , which property in turn appears to have been acquired by Dimson by virtue of an court order dated June 13, 1966 awarding to him as his attorney’s fees whatever remained undisposed of in Lots 25-A , 26, 27, 28 and 29 of the Maysilo Estate of Maria De La Concepcion Vidal . Finally, the LRTC Verification Committee found that “nothing more was left for the heirs

of Maria dela Concepcion Vidal attorney’s fees and consequently, Dimson to convey to Hipolito . null and void as no land had which was derived from TCT #

to convey to Jose R. Dimson as his nothing at all was left for Jose R. In short, Hipolito’s TCT No. R-17974 is been registered and TCT No. T-177013 T-17974 is similarly null and void.

ISSUED: Whether TCT their 16 parcels of

imposes

# T-177013 land.

a

cloud

on

Phil-Ville’s

titles

to

HELD: YES. Quieting of title is common law remedy for the removal of any cloud, doubt, or uncertainty affecting title to real property or any interest but is in truth and in fact invalid , ineffective, voidable or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title , an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet title. In requisites equitable and (2)

order that an action for quieting of title may prosper , two must concur: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or title or interest in the real property subject of the action ; the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be

34 casting cloud on his title inoperative despite its prima

must facie

be shown to be in fact invalid or appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

Both requisites in order for an action for quieting of title have been met: (1) Phil-Ville had established its equitable title or interest in the 16 parcels of land subject of the action ; and (2) TCT No. T-177013, found to overlap titles to said properties of Phil-Ville , was previously declared invalid.

VILMA I.

QUINTOS

vs.

PELAGIA

G.R. No. 210252, June 16, 2014, 726 FACTS: Spouses Ibarra were owners 281 square meters covered by TCT ten

In (10)

NICOLAS

a parcel 318717.

of

land

1990, Spouses Ibarra had already passed away , children ownership over the subject property.

Having failed to secure instead resorted to executing a 2004 to transfer the property in over

of #

I.

SCRA 482 consisting

leaving

to

of their

a decision for partition, the siblings Deed of Adjudication on September 21, favor of the ten (10) siblings.

Subsequently, respondents (7 siblings) sold their 7/10 the property in favor of the Spouses Candelario.

undivided

share

On June 1, 2009, the petitioners (remaining 3 siblings) filed a complaint for quieting of title against the respondents and Spouses Candelario and alleged that they have been in adverse , open, continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the property for over four (4) decades and there are entitled to equitable title. However in 2005, the with Avico Lending Investor of the petitioners. ISSUE: Whether ownership over

the the

respondents entered into over the subject matter

petitioners property.

were

HELD: NO. Quieting of title in a of any cloud, doubt, or uncertainty

able common affecting

a Contract of Lease without the objection

to

prove

equitable

title

or

law title

remedy for the removal to real property.

For an action to quiet title to prosper , two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action , and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting doubt on the title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or efficacy.

IMELDA SYJUCO G.R. No. FACTS: The Syjucos situated in Caloocan 26, 1984.

vs. FELISA D.

BONIFACIO

148748, January 14, 2015, 745 SCRA 468

are City

the registered owners of a parcel of land covered by TCT # T-108530 issued on March

They have been in open, continuous and uninterrupted possession of the subject land, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest since 1926 and they have been paying the real property taxes over the subject land since 1949. Sometime in 1994, Syjucos learned that the purported owner subject land was Felisa Bonifacio who was able to register the land in her name under TCT No. 265778 on March 29, 1993. Bonifacio’s 1992 by RTC, to Segregate.

title was issued pursuant to Branch 125 of Caloocan City

an in

of the subject

order dated October 8, the Petition for Authority

For unexplained reasons, the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan issued TCT No. 265778 to Bonifqacio on March 29, 1993 even before RTC Branch 125 declared its Order dated October 8, 1992 granting Bonifacio’s petition for segregation final and executory on April 6, 1993.

35 On July 28, 1994, to protect their rights and interest over the subject property, the Syjucos lodged a special civil action for quieting of title especially praying for declaration of nullity and cancellation of Bonifacio’s TCT No. 265778. Subsequently, the land to VSD Realty. by TCT # 285313 in on

As a result, the April 25, 1995.

Syjucos discovered that Bonifacio sold Bonifacio’s TCT # 265778 was cancelled the name of VSD Realty. Syjucos

amended

their

petition

the and

impleading

subject replaced

VSD

Realty

ISSUES: (1) Whether an action for attack on the certificates of Realty.

HELD: attack

(2)

Whether

an

action

for

(1) on

YES. The instituted a certificate of title

quieting of title is title of Bonifacio

quieting

of

title

has

action in this case to real property.

a direct and VSD

prescribed. is

clearly

a

direct

In their complaint for quieting of title, the Syjucos specifically pray for the declaration of nullity and/or cancellation of Bonifacio’s TCT # 265778 and VSD TCT # 285313 over the subject land. The relief sought is certainly feasible since the objective of an action for quieting of title as provided under Article 476 of the Civil Code, is precisely to quiet title, remove, invalidate, annul and/or nullify a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein by reason of any instrument, record, claims, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact , ineffective, voidable or unenforceable and may be prejudicial to the title. (2) NO. It is an established doctrine in land ownership dispute that the filing of an action to quiet title is imprescriptible if the disputed property is in the possession of the plaintiff. One who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right , the reason for this rule being that his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effects on his own title , which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession.

“GODSPEED”