Fortuitous Event

FORTUITOUS EVENT As discussed in Sicam v. Jorge:39 Fortuitous events by definition are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable. It is therefore, not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the same. To constitute a fortuitous event, the following elements must concur: (a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence or of the failure of the debtor to comply with obligations must be independent of human will; (b) it must be impossible to foresee the event that constitutes the caso fortuito or, if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill obligations in a normal manner; and, (d) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury or loss. 40 (Emphases supplied) (Metro Concast Steel Corp., et al. vs. Allied Bank Corpoation, G.R. No. 177921, December 4, 2013) An accident is a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens. (People vs. Malicdem, Nov 12, 2012) Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable. Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable. According to Tolentino (IV, p. 126) This article purports to define fortuitous event or caso fortuito. Its antecedent is found in the Partidas which defines caso fortuito as “an event which takes place by accident and could not have been foreseen. Examples of this are destruction of houses, unexpected fire, shipwreck, violence of robbers, etc.” Escriche defines it as “an unexpected event or act of God which could neither be foreseen nor resisted, such as floods, torrents, shipwrecks, conflagrations, lightning, compulsion, insurrections, destruction of buildings by unforeseen accidents and other occurrences of a similar nature.” The authorities agree that some extraordinary circumstance independent of the will of the obligor, or of his employees, is an essential element of a caso fortuito.1 Fortuitous events may be produced by two general causes: (1) by Nature, such as earthquakes, storms, floods, epidemics, fires, etc., and (2) by the act of man, such as an armed invasion, attack by bandits, governmental prohibitions, robbery, etc. In order that acgs of man may constitute fortuitous event, it is necessary that they have the force of an imposition which the debtor could not have resisted. 2 Thus, the outbreak of war which prevents performance exempts a party from liability.3 Fortuitous even includes unavoidable accidents, even if there was been an intervention of human element, provided fault or negligence cannot be imputed to the debtor. Thus, the act of a train guard of the Manila Railroad Company in shooting a passenger because 1

Lasam vs. Smith, 45 Phil 567. Salvant 83-84. 3 PNB vs. Court of Appeals, 94 SCRA 357. 2

of an old personal grudge, must be considered a “caso fortuito” because the railroad company had no means to ascertain or anticipate that the two would meet, nor could it possibly foresee every personal rancor between each one of its many employees and every one of its eventual passengers.4 There is no essential difference between fortuitous event and force majeure; they both refer to causes independent of the will of the obligor.5 An examination of the Spanish and American authorities concerning the meaning of force majeure or fuerza mayor shows that the jurisprudence of the two countries practically agree upon the meaning of this phrase. Blackstone defines it as: “Inevitable accident or casualty; an accident produced by any physical cause which is irresistible; such as lighting, tempest, perils of the sea, inundation, hurricane, public enemy, attack by robbers, etc.” The term generally applies, broadly speaking, to natural accidents.6 In a legal sense, and consequently, also in relation to contracts, fortuitous event presents the following characteristics: (1) The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligations, must be independent of the human will. (2) It must be impossible to foresee the event which constitute the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid. 7 (3) The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner. And (4) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.8 One who creates a dangerous condition cannot escape liability although an act of God may have intervened.9 For the defense of force majeure to prosper, the accident must be due to natural causes, and absolutely without human intervention.10 Thus, a mishap caused by faulty brakes of a car is not fortuitous in character.11 drigA tire blow-out was considered an inevitable accident where there was no misconduct or negligence imputable to the operator, in a Court of Appeals decision,12 but in a later case the Supreme Court held that a tier blow-out is not fortuitous.13 When a debtor is unable to fulfill his obligation because of fortuitous event or force majeure, the general rule is that he cannot be held liable for damages for nonperformance. Thus, damages were not allowed against the defendants, where under a bond conditioned upon the delivery to the sheriff of certain carabaos, the said carabaos could not be delivered because they died of natural causes, 14 or where during the operation of discharging a case of machinery weighing 25 tons from the hold of a steamer to a lorcha, using for this purpose the vessel’s main mast which had before sustained much greater weight, the pulleys or links of the chain fastening said main broke, allowing the case to fall upon the lorcha and thereby injuring it, 15 or where a vessel during a voyage was blown ashore by a typhoon and lost, 16 or where defendant’s firearm was lost in a storm at sea,17 or where funds in the hands of the defendant were lost through confiscation by the army,18 or where leaks in a newly constructed building passed by the city authorities were caused by a violent torrential rain,19 or where a lorcha which was 4

De Gullaco vs. Manila Railroad, G.R. No. L-8034, Nov. 18, 1955. University of Santo Tomas vs. Descals, 38 Phil 267. 6 Pons vs. Compañia Maritima, 9 Phil 125. The phrase “Act of God” used in the English original of a law was held to be incorrectly translated into Spanish as “fuerza mayor,” and that the depredations of an armed band of robbers cannot be said to have resuled from “an act of God.” (American Surety Co. vs. 19 Phil 110) 7 Republic vs. Luzon Stevedoring Corporation, 21 SCRA 279; Dioquino vs. Laureano, et al., 33 SCRA 65. 8 Enciclopedia Juridica Española 309; Lasam vs. Smith, 45 Phil 657, 661. 9 Nakpil vs. Court of Appeals, 144 SCRA 596. 10 BLTB Co. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 167 SCRA 379. 11 Tugade vs. Court of Appeals, 35 SCRA 226. 12 Rodriguez vs. Red Line Transportation, (C.A.) 5103, 3006, June, 1955. 13 La Mallorca vs. De Jesus, 17 SCRA 23; Tugade vs. Court of Appeals, 35 SCRA 596. 14 Crame Sy Pnnco vs. Gonzaga, 10 Phil 646. 15 Rocha & Co. vs. Steamship Muncaster Castle, 17 Phil 543. 16 Milan vs. Rio y Olabarrieta, 45 Phil 718. 17 Insular Government vs. Bingham, 13 Phil 558. 18 Bishop of Jaro vs. De la Peña, 26 Phil 144. 19 Yap Kim Chuan vs. Tiaoqui, 31 Phil 433. 5

well anchored was driven by the force of a storm against the shore and completely destroyed, together with the merchandise on board, 20 or where the inadequacy of means of transportation, the floods and draughts, caused the failure of rice crops, making im impossible for the debtor in good faith to fulfill the obligation created, 21 or where the non-compliance with the terms of a lease contract is due to enemy occupation during war.22 In order that fortuitous event or force majeure may excempt a person from liability, it is necessary that he be free from negligence. An act of God cannot be urged for the protection of a person who has been guilty of negligence in not trying to avert its results. When the negligence of a person concurs with an act of God in producing a loss, such person is not exempt from liability by showing that the immediate cause of the damage was the act of God. To be exempt from liability for loss because of an act of God, he must be free from any previous negligence or misconduct by which that loss or damage may have been occasioned.23 Thus, where an automobile accident, causing injuries to a passenger, was caused either by defects in the automobile or the negligence of the driver, the owner of the automobile was held liable for damages to the injured passenger.24

ORDINARY FORTUITOUS EXTRAORDINARY FORTUITOUS

The exempting circumstance of caso fortuito may be availed only when: (a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was independent of the human will; (b) it was impossible to foresee the event which constituted the caso fortuito or, if it could be foreseen, it was impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible to perform an obligation in a normal manner and (d) the person tasked to perform the obligation must not have participated in any course of conduct that aggravated the accident. 25 (Perla Compania de Seguros vs. Sarangaya III, 474 SCRA 191, Oct. 25, 2005 ) In Yobido vs. Court of Appeals (281 SCRA 1, Oct. 17, 1997) As Article 1174 provides, no person shall be responsible for a fortuitous event which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. In other words, there must be an entire exclusion of human agency from the cause of injury or loss. i[14]

Under the circumstances of this case, the explosion of the new tire may not be considered a fortuitous event. There are human factors involved in the situation. The fact that the tire was new did not imply that it was entirely free from manufacturing defects or that it was properly mounted on the vehicle. Neither may the fact that the tire bought and used in the vehicle is of a brand name noted for quality, resulting in the conclusion that it could not explode within five days’ use. Be that as it may, it is settled that an accident caused either by defects in the automobile or through the negligence of its 20

Tan Chiong San vs. Inchausti & Co., 22 Phil 152. Soriano vs. De Leon, et al., 48 Off. Gaz. 2245, June, 1952. 22 Castro vs. Longa, G.R. Nos. 2152-2153, July 31, 1951; PNB vs. CA, 94 SCRA 357. 23 Tan Chiong vs. Inchausti, 22 Phil 152; 24 Lasam vs. Smith, 45 Phil 657. 25 Yobido v. Court of Appeals, 346 Phil. 1 ; 281 SCRA 1, Oct 17, 1997. 21

driver is not a caso fortuito that would exempt the carrier from liability for damages. ii[15]

Moreover, a common carrier may not be absolved from liability in case of force majeure or fortuitous event alone. The common carrier must still prove that it was not negligent in causing the death or injury resulting from an accident. This Court has had occasion to state: iii[16]

“While it may be true that the tire that blew-up was still good because the grooves of the tire were still visible, this fact alone does not make the explosion of the tire a fortuitous event. No evidence was presented to show that the accident was due to adverse road conditions or that precautions were taken by the jeepney driver to compensate for any conditions liable to cause accidents. The sudden blowing-up, therefore, could have been caused by too much air pressure injected into the tire coupled by the fact that the jeepney was overloaded and speeding at the time of the accident.” iv[17]

Caso fortuito or force majeure, by definition, or extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable, events that could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, are inevitable. It is, therefore, not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the same [GACAL v. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., 183 SCRA 427, March 15, 1990] In order that an event may be considered force majeure, so as to excempt the possessor of the animal from liability, it is necessary that the same be extraordinary and unforeseen. Thus, the passing of a vehicle, creating a noise which frightens a horse, which in turn runs loose and kills or injures a person, does not constitute force majeure . (V Tolenino 624) Caso fortuito or force majeure (which in law are identical insofar as they exempt an obligor from liability) by definition, means extraordinary events not forseeable or avoidable, "events that could not be forseen, or which though foreseen, were inevitable." It is therefore not enough that the event should not have been forseen or anticipated, but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the same: "un hecho no constituye caso fortuito por la sola circunstancia de que su existencia haga más dificil o más onerosa la acción diligente del presénto ofensor." (Republic vs. Luzon Stevedoring, 21 SCRA 279, Sept 19, 1967) But the Court of Appeals held that the tooting of a horn,which frightens a mare, causing it to run and injure a person, causing his death, is a fortuitous event for which the owner of the mare is not liable to the heirs of the deceased for damages. (Derifas vs. Escaño (C.A.) 40 Off. Gaz. (Suppl. 12) 525 If during six of the thirty years fixed as the duration of a contract, one of the parties is prevented by force majeure to perform his obligation during those years, he cannot after the expiration of the thirty-year period, be compelled to perform his obligation for six more years to make up for what he failed to perform during the said six years, because it would in effect be an extension of the term of the contract. The contract is stipulated to run for thirty years, and the period expires on the thirtieth year; the period of six years

during which performance by one of the parties is prevented by force majeure cannot be deducted from the period stipulated. (IV Tolentino 190, Reprinting1991 citing Victorias Planters Ass’n. vs. Victorias Milling Co., G.R. No. L-6648, July 25, 1955.

i[14]

Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, supra, at p. 557.

ii[15]

Son v. Cebu Autobus Co., 94 Phil. 893, 896 (1954) citing Lasam v. Smith, supra.

iii[16]

Bachelor Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85691, July 31, 1990, 188 SCRA 216, 222-223.

iv[17]

Juntilla v. Fontanar, supra, at p. 630.