FMEA Training
Short Description
fmea...
Description
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
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Sequence of System Drawings and Specification
Feasibility Study
Process Flow Diagram
Process FMEA
Control Plan
Process Sheet and Work Instruction 2
What Is An FMEA? FMEA is a systematic analytical, logical & progressive potential failure analysis technique (a paper test) that combines the technology and experience of several engineering disciplines in identifying foreseeable failure modes of a product / process/ system and service and planning for its elimination.
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Types of FMEA •System FMEA (System / Sub system / Component) •Design FMEA (System/Sub System / Component) •Process FMEA •Service FMEA •Machines •Human Resources
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POTENTIAL FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT ANALYSIS (PROCESS FMEA)
FMEA NUMBER
ITEM
PROCESS RESPONSIBILTY
PAGE
MODEL YEAR(S) / VEHICLE(S)
KEY DATE
PREPARED BY FMEA DATE(ORIG.)
CORE TEAM
Item / Process Step Function
OF
Potential Failure Mode
Potential Effect(s) of Failure
S e v
C l a s s
Potential Cause(s)/ Mechanism(s) Of Failure
O c c u r
Current Process Controls Prevent Detect
D e t e c
R P N
Response & Recommended Traget Actions Complete Date
Action Results Action Taken
S E V
O C C
D E T
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R P N
FMEA Preparation Vertical Approach – Key Elements of Efficient Development – Identify all functions/process steps – Identify all failure modes via brainstorming/data/warranty/COQ – Identify all effects via brainstorming/data • Customer focus
– Develop data pools for • Failure Modes, Effects and Causes for future/ faster FMEA development
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System/Subsystem/ Design FMEA – Effect • Customer view/customers words • Regulation violation • Level of dissatisfaction
– Consider All Customers • • • • •
End User Engineering Community Manufacturing Community (Operators/Employees) Regulatory Body
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Severity Column Item / Process Step Function
Potential Failure Mode
Potential Effect(s) of Failure
S e v
C l a s s
Potential Cause(s)/ Mechanism(s) Of Failure
O c c u r
Current Process Controls Prevent Detect
D e t e c
R P N
Response & Recommended Traget Actions Complete Date
Action Results Action Taken
S E V
O C C
D E T
Severity Column
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R P N
Severity Column An assessment of the seriousness of the effect to - The next level of operation - Assembly operation - End User ( Final Customer) •Applies to the effect and effect only •Severity expressed as a number on a scale of 1 to 10 •A reduction in severity ranking can be achieved only through a product or process design change.
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AUTOMOTIVE EXAMPLE SEVERITY EVALUATION CRITERIA Effect
Criteria: Severity of Effect The ranking results a potential failure mode results in a final customer and/or a manufacturing/assembly plant defect. The final customer should always be considered first. If both occur, use the higher of the two severities. (Customer Effect)
Criteria: Severity of Effect The ranking results a potential failure mode results in a final customer and/or a manufacturing/assembly plant defect. The final customer should always be considered first. If both occur, use the higher of the two severities. (Manufacturing/Assembly Effect )
Hazardous without warning
Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode affects safe vehicle operation and/or involves noncompliance with government regulation without warning.
Or may endanger operator (machine or assembly) without warning.
10
Hazardous with warning
Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode affects safe vehicle operation and/or involves noncompliance with government regulation with warning.
Or may endanger operator (machine or assembly) with warning.
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Very high
Vehicle/Item inoperable (loss of primary function)
Or 100% of product may have to be scrapped, or vehicle/item repaired in repair department with a repair time greater than one hour.
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High
Vehicle/Item operable, but at reduced level of performance, Customer very dissatisfied.
Or Product may have to be sorted and a portion (less than 100%) scrapped, or vehicle/item repaired in repair department with a repair time between a half-hour and an hour.
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Moderate
Vehicle/Item operable, but comfort/Convenience item(s) inoperable Customer dissatisfied.
Or a portion (less than 100%) of the product may have to be scrapped with no sorting, or vehicle/item repaired in repair department with a repair time less than a half-hour.
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Low
Vehicle/Item operable, but comfort/Convenience item(s) inoperable at a reduced level of performance. Customer somewhat dissatisfied.
Or 100% of product may have to be reworked, or vehicle/item repaired offline but does not got to repaire department.
5
Very Low
Fit & Finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by most customers (greater than 75%)
Or the product may have to be sorted, with no scrap, and a portion (less than 100%) reworked.
4
Minor
Fit & Finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by 50% of customers
Or a portion (less than 100%) of the product may have to be reworked, with no scrap , on-line but out of station.
3
Very Minor
Fit & Finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by discriminating customers (less than 25%)
Or a portion (less than 100% of the product may have to be reworked, with no scrap, on-line but in-station.
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None
No discernible effect.
Or slight inconvenience to operation or operator, or no effect.
R anki ng
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Classification And Definition Column Item
Function
Potential Failure Mode
Potential Effect(s) of Failure
S e v
C O Potential l c Cause(s) / a c Mechanism(s) s u of Failure s r
Current Design Controls
D Response & e R. Recommended Target t P. Actions Complete e N. Date c
Action Results Actions Taken
S e v
O c c
Classification and Definition Column
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D R. e P. t N.
Failure Mode/Cause Relationship In Different FMEA Levels Inadequate Electrical Connection
Cause
Failure Mode
Failure Mode Motor Stops
Inadequate Electrical Connection
Inadequate Causes Harness Locking Too Short Feature 12
Potential Causes of Failures – A identification of a design weakness – A root cause, not a symptom – Actionable, corrective action pointed at this weakness can reduce the risk – Carryout root cause analysis as a separate exercise before listing the causes using Cause and effect Analysis. – Continue through all failure modes. – Note that many causes are recurring. 13
Occurrence Column Item / Process Step Function
Potential Failure Mode
Potential Effect(s) of Failure
S e v
C l a s s
Potential Cause(s)/ Mechanism(s) Of Failure
O c c u r
Current Process Controls Prevent Detect
D e t e c
R P N
Response & Recommended Traget Actions Complete Date
Action Results Action Taken
S E V
O C C
D E T
Occurrence Column
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R P N
Occurrence Evaluation Criteria SUGGESTED OCCURRENCE EVALUATION CRITERIA Probability of Failure
Very High: Persistent failures
High: Frequent failures
Moderate: Occasional failures
Low: Relatively few failures Remote: Failure is unlikely
Likely Failure Rates Over Design Life
Ranking
≥ 100 per thousand vehicles/items
10
50 per thousand vehicles/items
9
20 per thousand vehicles/items
8
10 per thousand vehicles/items
7
5 per thousand vehicles/items
6
2 per thousand vehicles/items
5
1 per thousand vehicles/items
4
0.5 per thousand vehicles/items
3
0.1 per thousand vehicles/items
2
≤ 0.01 per thousand vehicles/items
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*Note: Zero (0) rankings for Severity, Occurrence or Detection are not allowed
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Occurrence Rating – If an action would effectively eliminate the possibility of the cause occurring, the action is listed as described earlier. • Occurrence of 1 or 2 require proof using a surrogate product or mistake proofing.
DATA
HARD FACTS
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Example of Significant/ Critical SpecialThreshold Characteristics Matrix S E V E R I T Y
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
POTENTIAL CRITICAL CHARACTERISTICS Safety/Regulatory POTENTIAL SIGNIFICANT CHARACTERISTICS Customer Dissatisfaction
ANOYANCE ZONE ALL OTHER CHARACTERISTICS Appropriate actions / controls already in place
1
2
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 OCCURRENCE
*Used by permission of Ford Motor Company
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Detection Rating Detection
Criteria
Inspection Types A
B
Suggested Range of Detection Methods
Ranking
C
Almost Impossible
Absolute certainly of non- detection
X
Cannot detect or is not checked.
10
Very Remote
Controls will probably not detect
X
Control is achieved with indirect and random checks only.
9
Remote
Controls have poor chance of detection.
X
Control is achieved with Visual Inspection only.
8
Very Low
Controls have poor chance of detection.
X
Control is achieved with double visual inspection only
7
Low
Controls may detect
X
X
Control is achieved with charting methods, such as SPC (Statistical Process Control.)
6
Moderate
Controls may detect
X
Control is based on variable gauging after parts have left the station, or Go/No Go gauging performed on 100% of the parts after parts have left the station.
5
Moderately High
Controls have a good chance to detect
X
X
Error detection in subsequent operations, OR gauging performed on setup and first piece check (for set-up causes only.)
4
High
Controls have a good chance to detect
X
X
Error detection in-station, or error detection in subsequent operations by multiple layers of acceptance: supply, select, install, verify. Cannot accept discrepant part.
3
Very High
Controls almost certain to detect.
X
X
Error detection in-station (automatic gauging with automatic stop feature). Cannot pass discrepant part..
2
Very High
Controls certain to detect.
X
Discrepant parts cannot be made because item has been error-proofed by process/product design.
1
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Detection Column Item / Process Step Function
Potential Failure Mode
Potential Effect(s) of Failure
S e v
C l a s s
Potential Cause(s)/ Mechanism(s) Of Failure
O c c u r
Current Process Controls Prevent Detect
D e t e c
R P N
Response & Recommended Traget Actions Complete Date
Action Results Action Taken
S E V
O C C
D E T
Detection Column
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R P N
RPN / Risk Priority Number RPN = Severity x Occurrence x Detection Top 20% of Failure Modes by RPN R P N
Failure Modes 20
Evaluation by RPN Only – Case 1 • S=5 O=5 D=2 RPN = 50
– Case 2 • S=3 O=3 D=6 RPN = 54
– Case 3 • S=2 O=10, D=10 = 200
WHICH ONE IS WORSE?
– Case 4 • S=9 O=2 D=3 = 54
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Example – Extreme Safety/Regulatory Risk • =9 & 10 Severity
– High Risk to Customer Satisfaction • Sev. > or = to 5 and Occ > or = 4
– Consider Detection only as a measure of Test Capability.
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Example of Significant/ Critical SpecialThreshold Characteristics Matrix S E V E R I T Y
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
POTENTIAL CRITICAL CHARACTERISTICS Safety/Regulatory POTENTIAL SIGNIFICANT CHARACTERISTICS Customer Dissatisfaction
ANOYANCE ZONE ALL OTHER CHARACTERISTICS Appropriate actions / controls already in place
1
2
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 OCCURRENCE
*Used by permission of Ford Motor Company
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Actions Potential Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (Design FMEA)
Your Company Name Here System Subsystem Component:
FMEA Number: Page of Prepared by: FMEA Date (Orig.):
Design Responsibility: Key Date:
Model Year/Vehicle (s):
(Rev.):
Core Team: Item Potential Failure Mode Function
Potential Effect (s) of Failure
s e v
c l a s s
Action Results Potential Cause (s)/ Mechanism (s) Failure
o c c u r
Current Design Controls
D e t e c
R. P. N.
Recommended Action(s)
Responsibility & Target Completion Date
Actions Taken
s e v
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o c c
D e t
R. P. N.
Actions EXAMPLE: Project: Issue Number 143
Date Of Meeting: Issue
Status/ Open Date
Issue Champion
Action Number
Action Date
Action
Person Resp. Team
Completion Date
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Re-rating RPN After Actions Have Occurred Potential Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (Design FMEA)
Your Company Name Here System Subsystem Component:
FMEA Number: Page of Prepared by: FMEA Date (Orig.):
Design Responsibility: Key Date:
Model Year/Vehicle (s):
(Rev.):
Core Team: Item
Potential Failure Mode Function
Potential Effect (s) of Failure
S e v
C l a s s
Potential Cause (s)/ Mechanism (s) Failure
O c c u r
Current Design Controls
D e t e c
R. P. N.
Recommended Action(s)
Responsibility & Target Completion Date
Action Results Actions Taken
S O D R. e c e P. v c t N.
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Re-rating RPN After Actions Have Occurred – – – –
Severity typically stays the same. Occurrence is the primary item to reduce / focus on. Detection is reduced only as a last resort. Do not plan to REDUCE RPN with detection actions!!! • 100% inspection is only 80% effective! • Reducing RPN with detection does not eliminate failure mode, or reduce probability of causes • Detection of 10 is not bad if occurrence is 1
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Summary – FMEA can be used creatively in continuous processing. – Linking key customer requirements to process outputs instead of standard product grade is valuable. – Future customer requirements will drive new and modified processes to achieve specialty results as a normal practice
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The FMEA is a living document and should always reflect the latest Design level , as well as the latest relevant actions in production
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Thank you
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