FM 31-35 Jungle Operations (1969) (2-2)

CHAPTElI 4 COMIIAT SElIVICE SUPPORT

5ectiOft I. GENIRAL 4-1. PUfpoM Thill dtllpt.er outlmell pnwt'dUtl'lI {or cumbBt IIl'rv· Ire lIupport \If jungle ..moLal. OpeFOItiollll lo m· dude .upply, mtlinlenance. transportation, and

f·. Loj(l~tictd requirementll mUlit be antldpated well in IIdnm:e of attual need!!.

4-3. Orgonlaation

comb..t Htvice support IIMpecb! of medical treat-

Caml.mt operationll in the junJtlciJ are CArried. out

ment and eVl:I.(ualiorJ, and perllonnel roanagermUlt and flt'rvic~.

by tlmall unita or tuk forct'tI operaUnr on an isolated ilnd independent bll!ljll. Dinw.:t lIuPJIQrt ill !~roYlded by 11 mobile logistk element tailored for and attached to each lluIk fort't!: general I!!upport IA furnillhed on lin Area built. 4. mred Support. The function of the dlreet !lupport element is to provide dOR and continUOUII IqiaUc .IIUpport tu customer unitll of the tuk forte. 'I'M dired Ilupport element mU.llt have m.lfl'·~O\lntry fMbllity and the capability to IIUI!uin the combat opel""tltion& ;}f the t'lUpported unit fur a definite period of tinw without rMuppb. The rompoaition 01 the dinw.:t IIUPJXIrt .tern.nt vArl8 accorGmlt to the type of uTnt l'Iupported and Ittl peculiaritiea in equipment. b. Ge,.~rcl SUVPQrt. General .upport adivill. in Sllpport 01 jungle oJ)l!talions are Mublilbed at

4-2. loti< Con..._ 4. 'fM> eIItaLliahed principles of combet IM!rvlce lIupport apply to jungle OJM!'rationll. LoaiatiCII «:chniqUH, ptueedurell tlnd crjlanizationaL ron· ~ptM must bP modified to provide re8ptJHIIIW!: eup_ port to cambtlt elenten18 ItS f"@quired by the specific: lIitU8lion.

b. tn a juoirle environmeot. movmnent overland is .IleVl!i"*ly N'tltrid.ed. The ronftiUtaUon of the

terrain, denaity of veretation. availability of ground linfm of communication, and tbe Muon have a direct inftuence on the ty~ of traol!ijl(lrl,a. lion thllt ran b. used. and. eonaequentl:r. on the fundiontn,lf 01 the supply, maintenance, and med· kil} evacuaUnn .IIY.llteml!!, and Ptll"3Onnel manaiement and Ilervice.ll. c. :e requiNltnenta Nlsultinl frum hip humidity and u:mpera\ure; iJUpport of small isolated units enll~ in illdtopendent operatloNl; and requiremenlll ror Lmtperawrf' and humidity controlled swrue fad Uti" til proleft shelf life of dimauHlenaitlve items.

4. The !Opt1CilJ .upport unit must be IlQ located as to bel!t atwmpllllh its IIUpport mluion. and mU.IIt be prepared to provide all or part of tht!i.rown ~urity.

_ Planning for eombat oparatluna In the jungle wilt alwaYIl include (:on~ider.t.ion of the supply cap....

point. that facilitate Jotr!atical movement.!!

.ueh ..

waterway., roadl!. lind lllnding fieJdll, and Include .IIupply. maint.enanCe, Mlrvlce element. of the anvieM lind medica! evacuation flnd hUdplt.ll&ation capablUtie.ll. (rimefa) .IIupport actlvitie& aNI orpnized to provide backup lIupport to diN« .llUpport eklmentll of the tuk force, Theile pn.ral .upport organizations hold &umcient IltockaM"M to .upport the projected O~TatlOnll, with due conlilckr.t!on to local "fllenlllhment cydell, time and dl.tance fador. and uall()nlll rilllupply conll.ld.,aUohs: ha'l't'" !.he cap&bHlty to OJ.lIIfate liBel of communication to direct l'IUpport element.!! crou-country and by Army aircTlIft; aad hue the cRpabllity to de_ fend themllelvf!ll IIIAIMt attack.

II. $Ul'Pl.Y bllity to support the operlltion. Supply ~ratiQt'la wHl affect combat unitA in aeeordan« with ,.... quirementtl that .lUPPUtI.II be made avanable in the

4-.

ri)tht amounts Rlld at the Ti.ht time MOO pl1tcc. lWtjuir~mflnL~ for all d.lt~~~ of Hupply IU'C

tlJ·

fcd!:'d lIy jnultlt, q,nditiom mm~t l'lIt!lblu~h C!tt8$ III diMtribution pointll for vf'h:ide~ II.mlll.ircrl1ft II.Il required. Tank ll'U(ka will l;w' 11"'1'11 jt..~ fnr forward all IlOssible; f)(}(l gillIlln I"llllaJllllible drumM are UIlOO for Clau lIt fi!lO,upply whel'l \ank trucks cannot rueh the (or_ ward arl'M, When dTC'urnl&w.ncell ptrmlt tM UM of tracked vehide.., planninr mUll. indude addi. tional POL !linct;' tracked v('hides normally have I higher fud l'ul1xumpti()n rate when operating in TU • .I((!11 b·rrail1. The UIM! of helicopter" 14 support operalionA rf'qul!'('l!\ that afl adequa:w Iuppiy of rllll411 IliA be available at forward .IIUpply huel. CIaIHI fll. TM lupply of CIB!18 IV itemll -will. ror tht' mMt PArt, concern IIpecial items of individulil and unit equipment In many CaM\ll, the equipment normally authorized a unit will be augmented by ndditional aliowalWeI. The UM ot iarjte amount>; of epKial equipment and fon.iflcation!b&rrier maleriel ror rie(el'lelve poai~ lionl will be difficult due to tralUlpDrtalion probierM aaaociated with: brinilnx up such m.teritl. f', ('UI}!}!

a,

(/, elM.

1.'. Because of the weight and bulk in· the Ilupply of ammunition and exploaivM ofwn pfelle:nlri the mOl'lt ditReun rellupply probvoj~.

lem. Cloae e{)ntNil exerelaed by .11 lea~n: OVfir ammunition expenditurflll: within thelt unita and the employmen1 of the appruprlate welpon (or the 11« mitvlion will A8IIllIt in eliminating unn~ry ammunition rMuppiy. 1'lNt nature ot the terrain and c1imatlc conditiona in the tropies magnify the problems involved in siw 1MIleetion and ammunition lltor.... Lat~ percefl.tapa of the a""a aN! not IlUltable 101' etorap due to .... eon14ur. Lewd, firm I'round may be wowrted to a Quall1lli:re overnight .. a rflal.llt of the huV)' downpour. ot rain frequently "parl.need. Rain

f.-.Ilnwed by intfWlI1' h'-Ilt 'Combir'i!' to proolJ('e COil. dlti(ms thKt Jof,"'idtly at't'elerate the deterioratlHn or ammllllilloll _nd Il!l;ddnx mail'rialtlurh II~ pmf.wthllll rhlkl'gt' UIlj(" Ilbd ham!lJlel'rll. T~rmlh! .. elli thrl,uJ(h PIl1'khl)t rna1.'rlllll1 fwd wvod"/I dunll!\~e. Cumbint'il, t~ ("ooditwM amplify th .. IJrublemli thllf facf' _mmunlti(1O prroonn,,1 in the trol'i1')I. Th., 1It1j)(ll"tant't' af Mlf;'(juat" dutl!lRjI'l" Itlwlt!;'1', and \l1'lIti1l1.tion in ... tnrill/!! nmmlmitioH rlUlrlllt IK> !)vl'rV'mllha"iited, {. L'1tWN'n ltupportm¥ tmllt'lIl\m:l BreM (If operatinnll. the ItHlepenilellt nHture of OJ}< did"!" th., flt,f'd ,.,lIhttlnK .. r hntlllimn nid MU.tH>!\~. h(l€htu>f!hl rrwdil'nl Iwr" lU)llIlel wlllh€' rfi]\;lrl!,J Wnl'll II "ll:Nlb!;' unit up, t'rnh~ fl'llm a JIIIIKle hlllill' ,'ami) urNI, it m"y he advauil11l('!'H!i to! n,jh)('nlto a moL1I\" army Mlll'jfknl h(!~pjtnl with it, 111 JHII"l!' ternill, ml't 1I\lItahle for junjlll' opt'rntilln~, TO"; v('hid~M mllY Ilot be ahlt' lo tn,. v .. rlll' lhl' ll'rrain whcrl' operlitiolUll l:.H.!(\uidnjl aUlnl1cnla· tiOIl IIf lht· ml'di(,lI.l unit'! with many nonmt'dit'a! per1'!nnn{'L AU IIvaililb!e nwthOdM may be UHed to IIUlfml'nt or,(lln[c m('di('ul t'vII;rl1Ut)(m melinll. They may inc!ud~' trli\'"kl"d ..... hidel>, pa ~luired ror recovery and the

nr

So"'" V. 4-n, o.n:aral

()f

mu~t be fully briefed on initial land;nsr lonell, re" IIU!Jp)y inndiuK zoneJI and any other pertinent ill>

fllrmHtian rrllljifill to:! tactical (fOOIl mtwetnenhi Mr(h{'u! lI:irH!lft mny nrbit over a spt't'it1c pOint dllrinjl th .. itJJtiHi ph&lW of Sil iillrmr.bil .. (')per.t!(')1'1 to .. xpedite r\'Jlcuation dnrillll thill t'riUea! perioo. (:0 Pr/Olrip/f't1 of Nrorua/wrL Prifl{'iplt>1'! (If e\'a.·uatiml lIrc to~er ..d in detail in FM 3-35, Fcr prinfiplt's or pVlIcuatiof\ in mnuntaint)ulI jllnjllf'

tl'rrain,li r'&'weril'M. With few exe.>ptiotIB••ur~ far\" tr&nllp!:lrtation fMdlltie!l in the humid tftlPiea Are poorly developed Bnd have. very limited t'.... p&bllity for movinj{ larKe lonn.1iN of {'arro or numht-n

fll'lAl rt'>lultll or tlw trt'.tmt!lll. Tht! UIHt of th.'l1e ure inni))ahl., of hUPPlll"tlnll mlhtury v('hwlplI without e;.;wmuvt I'nM'lIwer t'onlltrudlOlI c-tf1lrL lJurillK tlw rainy lWalIUll mill!)" II,. mowl'n('Jll uf IIllllpHH,. ehould n.~~1111 ill th(' identification at an early time of symptoms of indlVlllull1 or unlt inlltulily to ~lJ('l'e~.~fullr cope With tht· junJ,l'lt· l'nvll'onmf'llt

4-18, Penonnel and Admlnlttrotive Service. II. (;I'II('rlll. I'&A ~ervi('{'.~ rUnctlOn cIIsenlililly the ~umt' UII in more cOllventiounl environment!l; howt'vpr. thl' mnnlll'r in whleh they lire furnished dl'peud~ upon nvailable tranJ{portation Rnd the lo_ cation of lIulIPorted umt!!. Complete peraonnei. Rdmilll.~lrnlivI'. replm'('ment and IlOlItal J{er ... i('eM (I'M 12-:!). un(1 finlll1('I' (FM 14..,1). normnlly will hI' uvuilubl(· ut hlille (·amp~. and pruJcct('d a~ r('· Iruin'li to lIuiJllOrled unit~ hy the Olle of Rmlill ('(Ill· tart lellmll. Spl·cial Ser ... ice~ ('an be expected ltl be minimlll in the jUnll'ie und will C'on~i91 mainly of the indiddunl and small J,l'roup recreational purlIuil~ RepillCementll Rlld mall WIll. In th(' majorIty of ru~r~. bl' delivered by IIlr (prohably h('\1· ('uph'r) 10 lho~t, unit.~ whil'h arf' i!lolllt('d from mnin wllter. uir~trip. or roud lhorouJ,l'hfar(,H. On o('{'a.~)(m, thc wenthcr, terrnin fenlurell of n pRrti. culRr l()('ality in th{, junJ,l'le. ur preval('nt bnltle ('ondition~ mny temllorurily delay deli ... ery of mnil or r('placements; the~e InstRllcell should b(' of \'f'ry ~hort durnlion Ilnd !lhould ntot develop mto t'rill('alitie~ which will uffect the lIupport('(1 lInit',~ enpability to perform It II millllion, /J, PrrMOllllf'1 [./(1I1IUIi rzlld Sln/11i1 Rrportmo. C'ummand('r!l Ahoultl allaurf' thf'msel ... ('~ that efTeC'·

tive lial!llln nlld \'ommlinicRtion~ exillt betwf'('n their Ilupportt'd unit~ und th(' !lollrc(' of P&A Ser .... ieell and lhat thcir 1I.~.~iJ,l'nf'd pf'r~onnt'l who ar(' chRrJ,l't'd WIth I'&A n('ljoll!1 nnd liailloll rellpon!li. bilitw~ lllldt'I'~lnlJ(l nnd npprl'l"int(' lht' ne('1i for expl'llit iOUH. Iu·(·urnlt·, nnd timt·ly pt'r!ltllll1el ,~tntu,~ reportinJ,l'to I'&A dire('l !lupJlort el{·mt·ntM. c, Milllrz,.U 1'111/. C()mmnudf'r~ !lhould impre!lH upon their men Ixoture nn oJlf'ralion beJ,l'illll that there is litllt' or no nt,pd for money in the junJ,l'h' and ('nCUUrRJ,l't· lhpnl 10 JlnrticiplI1(' in programll whi('h providt' tur pay tlt'JlO,~lt~ in thl' Unifnrml'll SavinJ,l'~ llt'p(lKit~ 1'1"!I1I'1"IIm. trnnHnlittnlnf riel puy to II bunk or uulhorl'ted KII"'II1J,l'K )l1l1tltlitlOI1 by C'heck from thl' ~t'rvit'inll' linnllt't' nnke, or ac('rllnl of pay Rt thl' fman('(' ofllce for withdrllwnl by the member Rt It tutur(' dRt('. Particular ('mphallill IIhouid be place(1 011 the RdvanlllJ,l'eH to the mem_ ber ot dillt'hnrJ,l'inll' hi!l t1nanC'inl rellpollllibililiell throuJ,l'h pny nliotment.w..

4-19. Grovet Reglttration Direct lIupporl for lh(' recovery. id('ntification

und t'VIIt'uutiO!l of dt'('ell~p(1 p('r,~onnel will nor· mnlly he uvniluhl(' to the ('ommand('r in the junJ,l'1,· t'n",l)"llnmt·nl. All t·(,ht·I01II1 or ('nmmumlllhould t·mphU~I\(t· lht' lnll",rlulU'I' of l'xr)('diti'Ill.~ remnval fIr r,'nlllinn III thl' Illlt'rl'.~l.~ of troop morule, to prl'YI'nt lo.~~, 1')(l't'~~IV\' 111·II·rJorulion. or multiln· tum (If n'nlnlll~ III Iht· jlln.,;lt·. IIIHI to muintnin our nutlOlo·.~ cnllndell{,(, in tht· uniformed lIer ... irell· melhod,~ of hurl(lhnl< Ihl'lr dend, Th(' hot and humId cllmnl(', pr'f'lI('!1{'1' of willi nnimal~. birds. lnlll·I't.~, nllliv('.~ IIll1ltht' d(,I1~(, v('g('lution and poor vl.~lllilily Oil thl' JIIIIIition. eomJlQtlltion. and activities II() tbat he l'l'UtY mllke II. continuing Mtlmate !)( enemy capAbilities and lIulnerabillt'ie •. In thl' 001lectig.n effort, extensiw patrolling ~llon wlll be f1t!€e.s& ..y due to the limitation of other MOrrell normally available. PooT observlI.tion froM both ground and air will make it dlllin~ldered tO(l /lIr away to Ulled IOR'icaUy (OT lhllt fiUTjIOM' An "nrmy rApablllty of employinR' IIlrbnrll!' or l!:ir mohi!(' (orr(']-3 . Operational l imitations In junA'le warfare, ro rce~ may ha ve to move rap.. idly from primarl' jungle through t.eCOndl\Ty ;ro ....·th to rull ivllled areas. This ""'juirl':!l grut flexihil ity in thouK'ht, planning. organi1;ntion, equipment, and taCtiCli; it may require dt{:elltralitlllion of command and control for at tirnca a unit may be located where eonlrol is easy ; on otber oc· casions. small un it leaders may find thems elves operating on their o..... n initiali ve for loni periods.

The pO~lI i h ilit)' of ~ u d dtH\ ~nemy air or ground at. tack a t 3.ny time must not he Qverlooked. The unit fightinlL' in jungle has to operate within its own resourcea more often than in any other type of terrlli n. The j.unjtle unit lnU~t be 1\0 balanced that it i.~ CApable of devcloJlill~ al any time an elfe'orccllihould move on lIeparated aXb. b. Tht: amount of heln'}' ef,uipmeul and sup. portill,lt' WeRponll thl.t can be ul!('d il ae>,'el"l!ly lim· ited.

c. Control ill difficul t Rnd must be de~enlral_ ired. d. Fronl:1I!'H mul't be s hortened and interval ~ must be !eAAened in Ino\·eme nt. r. Nu meruuII limited ob;er:tiv8 mUllt be ul!i.ikned ill IIll aHack. ;. Maintaining- directioo of movement is dimeull

g . Silence and security meklurel! increase in importance.

FM 31 -35 FM 3 1-3.5

5-"

fM 31-35

~_

Preparation hw Combat

For jungle operations, a detailed lIand in, operatin, p r ocedure (SOP) and rehearsed battle drills should be prePlI!·ed by all units down to Ilnd incI\.Iding fire teams . Th.i.~ SOP mAy include organir.aliull for combat, ,upVly pr()('edur,-~, bivoullc

tlnd shelter preV-rations, march rate, :l:nd formations. The batt le drills s hould provide (or action to be 14ken in the event of sudden enemy coDtaet, OC(upalion of patrol baBes, defensive positions, And silent eommunieati ons.

SeC1ion II. RECONNAISSANCE. SURVEIllANCE AND SECURITY OPERATIONS 5-5 . Reconnaiuanca r.o.urtU. Reconnaissance operolion ... take on ".l(kd importance in ju ngle wa rfare. M:IIIY offell_ si vl' ,, ~rationl in the jungle ta ke on uspe«:b of a rC"(.:vllIllliSl!anee oper:ltion durinlcC mOVenlent to contact. E :den ~i \" e patrolling will be r eq uired to obtain infOl·mahon on enemy locatio ns. strength R.

end d i&pC)$ilion. The ~utce.S!\ of olfenllive operat ions dt>siglled to destroy the E'l1emy dl'lu'uds upon bEoinR" ab le to lind him . T he excellent con~aJment found in the jU lIlCle C'R."\blNl the enemy to COII.... trucl wi!ll c:onctaled pu:'('tj. R!'c»llIlltillllunre ill a ,,{}p. linuilll{ rf'lIpotlldhilily u( PHd} t'ommul1dt'r ~JHI lIo1d1er. All \lltjt~ htlv!, retOllnl,l>b\ll.OCe capah!1ities and n'_~lu)f\.~ib!litiell whirh may he limited In short putrol.~ durinl{ condurt flf normHI roilmion activHi ...... or roilY eXit'.);l to ()ffe!\lIive operntioll)O involving ~pe mny ahn tw employed effPliriei htw·of-lIll{ht. Tht' romplexlty ul ~~'rr,jtjll and the envirohment mtt'ke it diflkolt t.o diMplace and move t!'lec-tronk lI~nllorK in time to be- rellp4l1t1iv.. 1.0 immediate n!quirement.[l, Higb temperaturell and hlKh humidity have an adverse elfeelon the life of the power eOON:e tor theee de ... ke~, (1) Shurt rangt' KtOlll1d 8urVl!iHanct. radars, niKht ohflervati£l!l de ... it~, and \Jnattended jlTound aenllOrH un prnvlde information on ent"tny mavt'_ mellt. estimalt!d sixe, dirution, and raw of movt!'ment, Tlte radar Ilnd unattended «round lIenllOtli flft! equally effective d.y and ni«ht while the night obeervatlun devit-e" IIj1ffate only during darkneJitl.

{il Th., m!lIlY waYI\ that th(' unAttt'mlM arovpd 8t'H>«1J'1I rAU be empliwed Ilnd Ul'Ied i .. )!:ain infnrmatinn koout tht' enemy llt'tlVily mAke t~m a valuable ~ 11\ tht' Jun)!:l ... (" Air SU"'f'Ui41HfC n) Villual !lir KurvNlIant'e mlly be eonducted frum helll::~)Pten anti n~ed wing fl,ircraft, Piluu and ubaerIMrA .h .. uld be completely familiar with ground Sl¢tivlty in their ar~&l\ of nllpCIlIsibility in order to NlCOlniu kny d~viati(ln rrom TKlrm.al palterm. Sy~tematk ('Qvers.lte by the &Ame penonnei will llIuli~t In revealln, unuRual e.ctlVity, Thue p.. r~onnel (!an alao locate and report Ukely l..ndinK tones in 'aat mavin, situationll fer employment of alrm.. bile furcell. (2) Alr·ial ph%graphll. Periodic photo covt'ral~ of an .. rt'a ran be used to supplement viaual air .urveillllnce, For further detailll on the employment of aerial photoKrAphll, refer to FM 30-20. (S) Sidl1.tooking 4irbttrhi' radur

(SLAR).

Pen~ratlon

of tM foiiAP with radar emiNJion from an aerial pt.J.ttorm ill limited; hOWi!ver, SLAR ean IX' uiled effectively during the day, at night, or durinlf perloda ot poor Vi3ihility, It ean dilJCove:r location and movem~nt of elWmy wa.ter~ (!ratt along jungle COMta a.nd on rivera, anemy ve. hkln on roalD, and railways. It will also locate uvannu and diacover a.ny vehicular movement therein, (4) Infrll~d dd~ctimf dt'llicel. ThNe devieu an ABIIilt in detectlnr eciin8 of enemy troop concentrations and .toekpiles ot auppli... The ef. fed.h-eneaa ot these devle.s is rodurod by foe. eiouda, v~tatl(in and prtcipitaUon. See FM 80-20 tor d*taill. (5) Airbur'nf! ~rto1l1l/l1 /Utl/etor (8ftiff,llT.). Theile devlc.. sre valuable in

dtt!ic~.

laeatinll' human habitation under the junlle eanopy. They detect product.t of hum .. n metabolism in the air. The effeetivenea of thele device. I. redueed by fOff. p1"fIIeipltatlon and windy conditions, (Ii} S.ppm"l!'1lg "meU, Air Foree reeon· naluanee wina. ~an provide a.ddttkmaJ l'lurv"U. lanee in(Qrm ..tk!n llueh all ni«ht pho1oll'aphic, radar photolfraphic and weather information. Naval and Marlnt' air ..an provide similar aupport and may I:w primary lK/T ('I)jCflll:f'd in rivt'rmt· hrwratiom~ or amphibiouita\llt(' nf thf> la('k Ilf artequaU! rout ..s or communication. tht, f..w (>xllltinJt h"lknpt.r land· In.. ~'fWs, MIldlt, anrl tralll< ltTe rritk,ll to junKIe combat. CommandeNl mUKt lle('ure and ('ontl'Ol luch reatun's and deny their lise to the enemy. (Ii) The emlt'llt'uratlon (If the terrain with it« artompanying herivy vegetation will requj~ dOle t:OOrdination I)('twfl'n fire, 8r.. lIupport, and mftneUVl'r "It'rnentll l(j croal,(' II. preP6ndli'rance or combd powf'r anti insure the mom~ntum !It th ... attack. (6) JunKI .. r!lmbat rli'quirps a r(,SE'rVe to gen_ erate arlditi!lnal rombat power to exploit IIUCCe1\1I and to inllure ~omllletE' dPfllrucUon of an enemy in retreat. r. F()rTft-t! flf .t(fl1H'ltrcr. The initial ('f)fUlideratlon in a mSlleunr tactir 1& lhat th~ plan muat IX' lIimpl.. aM that the manE'uver f'lement doel! not mask the 1\N! fl.t the &uP1K>rt element, Forma of offenllivt maneuver in the junlfie an! normally re.trirted to t'nve:!oPm.. nLA and trontal atta...kII. Envelopmenta are' e;;;et'uted. where pouible. in ronjunction with frontal aUarka. Airmobile forr"l1 art' tilleful in t''If'(''uting ertvek'J}nwntfl in thP form of aurpritte atwks, lIankinlf maneuver. a.nd In blulfedive ('Ontl'ol by the commander. Rerum\(" of In., diffleulty in obtalnlnlf Information Uti tht' Nwm) awar .. (It the (!1I('tull tiro rlUPIWll't plBn aud ht' eupable (It rallinlt tor atld din;ebnJ{ urtil~ Ivy, tadi... 1 tIlr. I\fival Ituni'tr#, .. tid armed hvllcoplkrl', >', Confrnl Hlld Courtil1Uliion. Control of an at. tt«:it ttl jun!(le deI*nd. upon the COl'nmander and hi. lIuoordlnatt' leaders hninlt current informatum abnut the prol{l'1!SS of the RU.ack and having t1Hcicnt means tu paM inf(lrmation on to all eon· cerM ot tOpolfraphy. Le.• wh..ther tu by· J*III tl:w area and then narth bACk, (If whether to .Iter the fnrmHtwn and pa' J Wtwn 8upportlnil I1rcs are used, they at(> lifted or IIhltted by the comma.nder ot the enlteblPIlig foret:!!. l/l T{lfflervc elementA pmtect thtt NlAr and d(>feud all.lnilt enemy countemnvt'lopmenh. If not required (,n' "uch purpo8M, the rpctve elemeutll may be ul e.pln!t a IIIUCCI!8IJ or extend an envelopment. but they ahould always be held "ut imtially until thtt l!ituaUon i. clear,

5-12. CondUit of the Attack B&IU~ on information obtained by n;ermnaiuance lind other 1I0Ur('$!!, the commander deddM on the dlref'tiou "'f attack, The attack illl conducted with a fprmation 81milar to th .. t ua.ed In • night attack :0 "'pen country, Dll!l:ance and interv&ls aN r~ duood. and the column formation III maintained u tar forward all pO&llllble. Flm IIl1pport !II .... ttuen· tlal in tbe junKltt all In open terrain; uMupported infantry ",rdlnarily cannot breach a detenalve poIIltton without !ncurrlna heavy cUIl.tUn. 'l1Ie are« to be brea:ehed muli be pinpointed. Artillery and mortar forward abHrYertI may bave to approach within .xtremely l!bort r.nee of their own firM, Durin, the ulIalllt. Ilupportin,a: fl.rw; ahoilid continue until they are lifted ar shitted by tile ..... ...u!tlnr commander. They ar~ them .hltted to eever the speelfte ta......bJ that will moat ...ltt the prorretlll of lh, al&aultin. torce and block probabl~ withdrawal routel. of til, ClnIIID),. Beau.. of terrain and vhubUftt reetrletlon, an aluult line. u Iu¢h, I. not nonully tormed, Rather, .~ lift ftN and movement by __ultina: fl.re tElarna ar& conducted to overcome enem)' l'flliataDei. Due tv the dltneulty Irt I~..tlba: e-nem,y empiaetment.& by vlaual muna alone, th& f\n abd nIOYIJJ1Mnt phue of the .....ult may f01'e& tile enemy to dlaciNe his poeltion. AI eDemy emplaeem~nt8 &ra located, the ....loIltlJl,f force: ,..nerally movee oa a ain,le axil. with the ftre oone.Dualed OD a Mleeted and limited aNa of the enemy d4i1ttMiv... perlm.ter. Smoke mQ' btl UNd to ecnen oft' the I\snka ot tht ..na ot the tnernt dtt-en.lve ,"rim.. Ulr, 8m!).. mQ' be wted to It:NIrl oft' the t.ua of the arM Mlect.d for peHtn,UoI\, Thl objeetivt of the Initial ...... utt ,. to achieve a local puwtn,t1on

.....

th~ mflin battl~ poaition nf th .. enemy. Onc" JWMlratinli :J'I mad~, It is exp!tl' darkn('AJ'l to lhr I(nmll'!. Thl~ t'lItHl:tijHl !()l'ft'~ the :-toldier til ulle hi~ ~1'nlW.!I of lime!), h('Krinlf and tlluch to il high ;jeIlT"(' Trntlllll, R!< It t'tlllf!eition, whiffi, 8till mllintalnin" contact, in order to permit exteneive employmenl or tacti all detl'nMivi' (~b"lonll. and providM (or artificial obi8tfld(ll1 and barrit'rll t.o improve the natural d(L renKive s.lrengtb of tb!' t"rrllin, II MpellK out ..-ount"raUIl('k pl!lnM Hnd (r!~'flM (Irllignll(e-d for tbt!l purpo.~(>.

/J. PUHO!Wg CmlludrraliMHt. When plAnnln« tbe ddenl!>e, the followin/it fal'i.orll !lhould be ..-onlld~ ered: 0) Tb..-re Are about 12 buura Gf daylhl'bt in junKl(> foflowed by extreme darkae$lL Cl>mmand~ t!t8 should be.in preparatiQn of defenltve poal~ tlon!l At le...t two hpur!l prior to ni.tltfall. (2) The hi.h bumidity will advertely affect phyalt'al eft'art and tl'OOJ)& &hl)1Jld be retied &.II ..... qulred. (S) Tropical downpours wilt Qul..-kly ft09d JKl*llioRl \In_ th(lY art adeq\lately drained. Thll ahnuld be etm8itk>red whtm aitin", poeitionJ. Tbe hlKh water table durltijf the rainy aNUl(lO often Nquir. daftmaive poeltlonll to be dUK Oft hl.h """,lid, (4) Limited fleldl of obMrvat/Gn allow the

enemy to appruaeh poeltiGna without bein. ~" t.cted. facilitate Infiltration by th.. enemy and incmate pouibiHty of attack from any dinICtion, The UM of lltartiirht ~ and anti~intrU5ion de· vleet ahould be conaldend in planniu. n~bt de· tenalve -po&itj''fI\1l, c. o..(1Mtillilian 01 thl! GNh.,ut (1) GtflHlr47. The battalion and &mailer unit. oftl!n of"!rste all indf.pendent unibl, T'h~ tleh-

..."

nUlut'II o-f Iwrimt-wr d(>fernw /U'e- ulIllaily liMed tn providf illl-round d!'fem«', Wtwn jlrnIlIinl(>, a natu~ rill nW!tadl' !\urh P'S 1\ riv"", lil~m, lIwamp, Rtft'p I'li" or !Wit ,.,holl'" iw rnH.IIlde-r~1 .1Id inl(>JlnWd in tht· Hvt-r"l1 dl,ft-lI11ivl' lllR" Whilt- lillrn fellhttt>a r,lIIlItit;t{e- ob.dadl'R ttl tnt' atiarkf'r, tbey art' nt'Vpr ('tlIlJddt'ml aJil iwmrmolJutuble bitrrll'r.. anti prn'ii",iun", mu",t be mmj., to nlf'«{ with fln ih.. ent'my who aHRt'kR ov{'r and thrf!lll'h them. (2} i'rnmi'nitrvatiufl, ... hort fl.el!l:4 of IJr., .. tul I"f'!ltrkt..d ranl'e (of aut ohlltRrle located If) yard", nutside a pollilion may be ~urrwient to pfievf'nt JlfienadCfl beinR' tbrown in if tb .. jfMwlb iM denfte, but it would p.fflbably nnt Allffice after the growth had been IIh.a away,

d. Organu:afilnt lOll' C(I:ottbl1t Ol'scaniuUon for rombat will be bued on a conAideration of thefli(*t01'1' of ME'I'T. NOTmally. three ladl(lI.l R'fflUpInp: an>: orR'aniud-tbe &erll All lntrualon deteetonl 1& valuabl@ for the early detel'tion of enemy aetivity; bo~ver, the limited visibility and ~ueed etr«tiveneu of other electronic MnllOrft may requjm a greater number of tl"OOpl'l than normal for security of an area. It 111 ntltt!ftury til maintain a mobile reJlPrYe fo~ of auifident aize and compoaition to facilltate rapid reactiOn in IIny dJrection,

!', Comma1H/ '1111' (',m/rot R(')!trit'ti(tnl!: impt)Med bv jllnllll' tf'rrllin Oli mllnueVl'r and control place th(' Ill'ellte.">i l'ml.hll'lIis m1 ptulillinJl, !'oordinution, lind MfHlll llIHl j,'WIf'tllblll, IIt'CI'lIirnii:tI'!1 I'flutl'nl llt Ot'cl'tll'lnry 1n illiuw HIll1ll to rl'!I{·t Ijlliddy ilJlftinllt 1I.mllitunt'ol!:< nmltiplt· lbr!'nt... iIt dnlU' rlW!8peeially el'f'w~)\j'l'v(*/I w., •• pons. to tb .. NIt'1n,V. Of 1bt· m1\ny prohlem$ pt't'lllIar tn rlt'fenl't' III juns:lt' terrain, th{' nW!lt I'rltlt'lIl HI rOmmunkAt!OIlIl. Alternat" t'umrnUOlf',~ Rhility to rontrul the effort, Infhl('UN' UII' adi\!1l I!.nd "N'riure unnt"eellfll!.ry n1n'it'!\1I'TIL l. Sa.1flfll fllIIl SI'I'I t·ilftl'frr Mr-nKJfrrJl. l"ecurity jM plRon"d lo Itflin I'ltr1y inf()rmntirm or th .. enemy'JII apI.ro,,>!b: J»IlrIlIJl. ~I"ntril'l''icell abould be located far elmuKb beyond tbe patlltlon 1M) tbat tIM! llJ:ht will not blind the defender. or disdoae their poeitiona. yet dese Ilnougb not to be obsenred by veptatiun. The riled ef all iIlumln.tion ia limited by the heavy foliap and tbe t , . top canopy of the Ju,,~ ",Ie. Additional mMM to provide .Iu~fUal'l(e in~ dude ni",ht villion aide, r.ld.lr, infrartld devk-. and a variMY of unattended jfl'Ound IleOIlOt'1l. 0. tailed planninjt and t'oordlnation muat: ba tffecW by all tommanden III!ndlna out niaht patrola. P1a.na indude tbe miMwn. t'ompoeltion time and J»>lnt of departure, time and point of return. route. to be used. alJ'TI and counteraian. and emeraency aii'Mla, Patrol&' plana an! Hnt to the nnt hllher beadquartel'tl for Cwth rlllhl'F thall rrruthinK throul(h. Thi .. mi!jlll .. h(){)!d lIMl' thl"ir mw'helt'>' to I'lit trllils only a~ a lAst resort 01' to iI>,'nhl rX'·('.~II]V.' detl'UTII. Thf'rc i~ n!'rirly alwayll 1I rout!' m'llrhy whef't' movrmt!'nt will ht> elllljer. Cltt11 11K J( lNtlJ hn.~ ih(' fQ!tnwlnlt diRadvpnlpJ(t!'rI: (1I) It III m)t lIikml (h; tt rr.t!u('{·11 f4IW'Mof mnvl'ment. (r) Jo'atil(ue of aoldiertl in the Ielidilll( pUllh quicklY and blindly forwal'd. It i. important to emphaaise that apeed will alwa)'J ~ lImlttd by the n~ity to avoid nolae in movement: alllO, movflflent must be expected W be

painfully tllow, Mov('mellt in tht!' jungle iH fatigu. lng, i;.)tb phYMica;ly lind mentally, and s balanre between the del.irr lo move ~uidlly mull1 be maintained with tht!' nf'UJd be made of fire t;>Rm leaders w maintain t'olltrol and man·Lo-man contact with lIquad memberA, r....dt'rll 01 platoon.ized or oornmandera of eornpany.aikd patroll will be located within their patrols tu!ctJrding to thf' dktateR. ot tha situation Rnd the formatinn UlI+'d. Thellt!' pOlliti()Aa Alwuld be auMdently forWII!"'d t(~

(11) Allow the leader to iufiuenct! the action from the lltRrt. Although it il'! nut desirable for tha ltader to be ('aught in opening bunta of flre. he ahould plllition of a Kulde. It u/red on a patrol, III W be wilh the patrol reader. The pa~ trol ieader wll! make dl"dllluM al< 10 diredion and iacti(.'1lo, U8lUil aa u~rrwd approvrlat.e. the Kuide'~ adviC4I. (4) Mainto.i1liJttJ ((J1I!!U't. The pa1ml leader muat alwaYI adapt hillapeed of movement to that of hia N'ar and lIank /M!('urity elem~nta. ReaponaibBity for rnaintAininlC contact mURt hi: rrnm front iI) rear,

5-22. AmlNth 0.. Gtt1r~al

{I) An ambuRh i! $I spedalilled form of combat in which ihl" print'iplell of {,()ncealment, lIurprie, and ttffellilive adion are u!led to reduce Uw tmemy'li combat 1"ft't'e\l""i!eM when they ar~ .}n the move or wmPQrarily halttlij by infiktlnR" heavy cuualtle! and cau~inR" ('(Infm.ion. In tttt tither 1yPfi of ItlIHtary a('tion ill the ambuah more impaNnt. more effective. or mOTe frl'quently em· ployed than in jun¥le combat. The bAIlie elementa of ambutlh are ('(Inred In FM 21-50, r~M 21-76, and FM 31-16: hGweVer, Si d.tailed diseulIJUon of this subjed ill included in thlt! manual beeauM of ita application in junlCie operatwnlL 12) Ambullh may be def\nt'tl aR; "A trap Rprun, on A movinK enemy and ill ba8ed on concentraUd JI"pri-te lire from roncftlled JKIsitiona." Speda! note Rhould be taken of the wordll "trap" and "lIprung" and tht' phn•.IIi:!1I "concentraUd lIur. prille tlre" and "ctmceak!d poaitiona.'· A trap i. "Iprung" ber-aUM! an intrllM Wllume or 6re ill. de. liVered into lh~ kllhnlt :ton~, 1'he«e flTf'1I can I>e dl. reeted At a ain,le pGint or def,jltnat.ed area and tlie delivery is mad.. audd~nly, viorently, Knd withMlt prior indication. "Concealed pofitionll" prevent membeu of th .. ambullh and their ~ujp­ ment frum beini' pr8matuN!ly Men by the enemy. Surprille ill el!lIential for alluttl'lsfulambWlh. b, PJtrp08t1l vI Aml!!.Id. Ambulht'A are eX~ tuted for the genual purpotlt' of redutinR" the en· emy's overall combat etfectl\lt!091 and for the specific purpolet'l of deatruction, har&lllment. and pininr intellipnce infol'11'Ul.tion, (1) DMtruetkm III the primary puJ'Pl.'lR. becaWl(llou of men and equipment caUIle the enemy to dlvRt troop. from other miulons to proieet h!1NIelf aralnl'lt ambuah_ The failure of the en~ eIDy!l! reeonnaluane. snd combat patrola to ;u~ eomplish their mi8llloTltl berauM they were ambuhed deprivlillJ him of valuable C(lntr!butiolUi

which lhe!\(! patrols would make to hia l"ombat d· forti, e!} The dJlmaJ(f: rau"f:d by the har/Uil!'M!nt or trl'ljuent RmbuJlhl!f\ III leu lliPPllirent than phy.i. ut dam~l{r. but !II very important. When ambUllhes Jill'(' fre.juent. troopR bmd to be reluctant to ItO on putrnli'l and mo~ in oonV6YII, or IImall KrOllj!!L Thc)' berome leM IIgltrelllJ11ie and more de· fenllive minded; they llivoid niR"ht oper,alionl!, become more Ilubj.~d to confulliittn and panlt' it ambUl ro be in pollltiGn for a Iont' period ot time; ltnrthy. detailed orden are not likely to b!& I¥membertd euttly end. 00,,"quently, an either not earded out or .rt mlaln_ ~. This mRY OCi'ur even after detailed /"e.

_,..it.

Hi) Concnrlr/1f11i1t of IUltW1I.. Once .prun&,. an ambu.h mUll ulle 1111 available Ilrepower, To do tid. t'equirea CAreful a1tentlGn durin« tralnlnr. Under exdtement &time men will Ilhoot Inafree· tl....y. or fall to fire their weapon. (6) mm·lmlle. The !alt fundamental I. ..1f-dlecipliM, ItemainlnK in a set ambush can be

a boring and uncomfortable joh. It may 1w neee&liMy for the soldier to (()reKO .smokinK, to' endure in Bilen~, inllect bile/!, thtnt, Rnd the deRire to elISe {'Tampc!d !el('8, or to perf Kt'lt,t'tt.'d ".mbuHh p'Jllitum, CO'o',;H'Il ruutl''; wlthtJraw.ll] ~hould be jl.vail.llbiu to ellnbll' lh(, ambuM to brC.IIK n.ntM"t and livoi;l jlur· lIull by f,r.,. F .. vorahlt> OI'ld" (tunrwh,) of fire mUKt Ill' ullflwt'd the ilmLllllh. Th,' :'oice rommantl. For tht' .hrnal to withdraw. voit'(' ('omman€i&, whiHt1$1l or pyrotech~ nkll mIIoy hi! uaed, SliTIAlIlllhould be cbanlled frequently to prevent eompromiatnt mll~t bt- ~lrong t'noUll:h to /l-ulitRin Iwlt ul1tll fo!lOW\IP. tlnitA (An be dep)uyeri til lUUIi!!t ;n rt'du('· ;nll' th .. Ilm!m"h. 1 m('aOIl Hf I'om muoit'Atinnll 1lN' Ulled to .lIlIiKt in maintAininll: (ootrol. In lldditioll. detailed prier plaonioll:, bTiefinW', and rt'ht'IlTIIII.1 for all p('rMlnnel will permit rapld 8ftiOllll and nrdt'MI when An Ambl.lllh dveJI o«ur. It mUilt be< rt>membered that In tht' juntt!e tht're ill rIP 1Iul)lltitule for pel'l'Umd ('ontad e!fe{'ted by leadf'rlt with their stlbordimttt!t' to In. SUN> malumum t'flfltroluf Uu,jr furtelt {r) Spum' I'qulpmrftr AddHinnAI item!!: af equipment and wellpons are Mlmetimm nHtfed hy I!. umt. t'llpet'tRlly wtwn it movt'il through Are~ whert' IlUf'rTilLR .... are likely to he e/Kounteffd. Ad· rilt!omtl lIlllnmati(' Wt'fl.jxmll mlly be- np('eKKal"Y~ l1i· onlYr toolll- 8ml min€' dl"tf'l'torf', art Wled to detect and redure T'fJ/ulblo.:kll or minel\eldR, Demnlition equipment IR uHd lo dell-troy abal8dew encountered en Toute. Additional eommUniCllUr})18 equipment and identification df'vieell ~uch 81t panllllletil, lightll, or IIml,kr grlllladeR may be I'8qUlred. (f) l'irl'; lIt1ppo'rl. A detailed n.Te IIUPPOTt plan to indudt' plaoned flrea on Ilkt'ly enemy 8mbuab lIites Is llece"Rary alon8' with nn-call air IIUpPOTt 5nd Ifl"ound .nd airborne forward air cootrolll"ra, when available. CoordinaUon with the fll'f! ./!iupport unlta indudell: route to be followed~ &ebeduled and en.t:aU lints; ~Jl aixnll and tlrea; t'he Ul(€'d to l!l\t'ort convoys, snr! informatiHn r('lnlinll' to ronvny or vehidf' movpml'llt mu~l Ix> (,lIn'fully Il:uanled. Every unit "hould formulRtt' !'Umpr('hl'n~iY!' .~tl\l'l(linlf npera· tiO!) Ilrnct'dureil ftIVerinlf mOVt'lTlellt by mads. ThL~ AOP "huid stlite drRrl}, whn III authorized lo pill A cunWlY on thl" rOfld lind IIhould a~o provIde dMai!t'd infr,rmatinn rOllcf'rning the appoint. mpnt and dutit'fl oC rltrud.lnnK r ..S/:Ardinll: wiod~hit'ldl\, tRillllltr'l< IIl1d tlll'llnulinlf of vphirlt'li. lIllpnl.tl"d lmml"diat,(' at'tjnl! dl"jllfl, HIII1 illl!lru('tlnn!O to ri(>l«'rihl' 1Wt'1Irlty polidell. ta} Wf1t('ff.T(!/f, Tht> IImbulih of beat? and "mull naft moving along narrow junkIe watt'r~ WAyfi II. lIimilar to the amlmsb o( mOlltlit'd troops, 'rhli' Ilro})lemll ar.' uml)liflf'd by tht; (a1:t that prillT t IIny ..tff!chYe Cftlmtl'Tflrtion, troop» mUllt firat tellrh IIhorf'. Furth~r, point and Ihmk !IOOutliy fttt> riifii;:ult, mBKing {hia typO' o( mOVf1ment l"~trem('tiveneKs ot the ambush. but alao may r-edut't' ineitkn« of ambu.b. The key ill eRrly detedioo followl'ri by imm~dialc and vitrOr. OUK ret\ell"type !!'Ount.era(lion, appliutiol'l of maximum firepower and fele-ntletlll purault. 1'h!' mOllt etred.ive meana for a unit to I!i)\Inter ambullhu ill b}, appb~atiQn of apprnpriate immediate action drill.. CnmmAnde1"5 ahonld inaul'tl that lheu drillll are well reheared and that every man undetalanda wh.t he is aup~ to do, Immediaw sctil)n driJ!aareJ;ov.red in detailln FM 21-76. iZ) f)Wftmnded i'/"OOpl:. When ambuahed. dismountN troops witbln the kiiJin. wne mUllt reatt immediately and vlokmtly ""t.hout ortMrt to overoome t.he iniUal advant.&if ... lned by the eMmy, BeeaUI\(!: an ambuah it dulaned to immedi-

.tely inftkt. maximum '('i!llIualtiell and. normally, no attempt la mad.. to prolong tlu! engagement, Immediah' teadion «) build anti retain fire IIUpe--. riorlty IPl: tbe bt>lIt initial defenlle lIjfablat thi" am. buab, The tWI) It''t'hlHtIUf'PI: t'ammonly o~ {j, ('oun. ter ambullhfNI ill Jun/lli' wnain are-(0) In nmbu!!:hftl whl'h> the ambul!hinlf force 111 riepleyed I\t It 1lilltann> (rom the killing Icme, the rout' heing nmll1lllhed will have 1IIm11" lpaC(' lor maneuvpr !lnd Mme opportUnity to lltffik ~ver At 11 It'~~ .. r rll1lo: r.f ril"lltruetion. In thi~ inI\aneC'. thl' I'II'mNlt whkh n'n'iYl'~ the IlliHaJ (ut' talwll t'tIVl't and immedh.lely rt>!urnR !l mllximllm volume of fir ... All th(' ell'menl IItrivl'!\ to gain fiN' lupHiority, th(· ..l('m('ntll that ;'!lcalled the initial bul'llt bf'gin prt'riri!1o;>d maneUYerll to "lIvt'I"pe lh .. flank~ withNli fur!h"'r rder!l. (t)l III ambullhf'1I where the vegetation iM tx.trem('ly fletJ.~l', tho;> killinl( :wnf' wilt W unner hMVY. highly rnlLt'IIntratf'ri. cloRe"rltnj(e fire!4. ThiK will prnlii!lo;> liUl;· timf' lI.nd IljlB,rt' tor men tl) maneuver ;)1' lKpe-daIJy durinll: hnutR of daylill'ht. RteaUh combined with co-mpledty of the terrain wi!! make movement very xlllw and difficult. (4) IllcreaAed emphalliK will be placed on ('ommunicationll to illllure adequate controL flS) Joint patrollinll: qholild be cnnducted 10 IllIlUN:! that the incoming unit iK completely fami. III'Il"itf'd with tht' terrain and the enemy lIituaHon,

5-25, hMia a. Jumd" terrain lenda itxelf to r.id QperatiortJl. The limited villibihty and i'xf:p.lllmt rollcf'lilment !'H.hle akilltd rairlinll: patrol,o; to penetTate det'p into enemy territMY. A platoon 01" >m'Ulller lIiz.. unit ill best suited tH rail type uperlltionA in jun. ald. SUPportiQ' Area II:hnuld be planned anti ulti'd, If avallab1e. but the probw-m of Are oontrol, the tlmln. o( operatioIl& and diffkult!e!I of rommuni. ca.tiOM make the empt.;yrnent !lC fire II'Ull.llOrt di(. neult. 'the elteeution of raid. that rl!1;!uiw deep penetratloT1o!l into the juni:le will be atre.:ted by thll! pby,kal e-oouranee required of the men to traverN the terrain. the lack o! tktalled informfl'. tlon of the enemy pOllUont, n1l1upply and eVB{,UIllion. Thil ean be minimized by ut.ablilhln,a iii lifI. tro1 bUll near tbe ,.nera' area of the final obj~. Uve. From there. reoonnallAlnc:e patrola can be dlspatcbed to ICOUt ille en_my poeitiona. Maal1while. other membe,. of the raidl. fcree ean be .II11nwed to reat and to eomplet.e preparatioN! for the raid. Whenever poNlblt and praet1cabl., aircraft or watercraft Mould be uMd to tran.porl raiding patrol membt:,. Into or MIlr tit. . . nef.1 urea of th .. objl!clJvfl, Thll will anable the ,.(dln, patrol to I"f!./l.Ch their objteUvl futer and In bat"

'MJ1_U

ter phYJlwal condition to accoIDpliJlh their mill8\.on, Thfi limitlnjf fa~wl"R in the Ullt! of aircraft ami wltten'rart are landing .rellll. l«ad eapedty, ItM the po.AIIlbl" 10M fi1 the element or lIurprillG due to the noill/!, Ilnd hyrimgrftphil: limitation!! b, For a dlA('U88ion u1 the jff'neral prinelples J('OveJ'nlul< conduct of raid ope:ratifin8, .Kef' FM 21r.fj and FM 21-7r"

5-26, VIIIOI'* S.-xu,.. and Seorch ~.

When intelligence hAl reported enemy IIodivity ill a jungle villase. a unit may be jfiv(jn the mlllKion to i3ulate lM vJllaKe and ton· duet a 8ear!:h tor enemy peraonnel. weapon8, doc. unwnta, and lIupplielO, M05t jungle vtllagllS are of tWtl typet>. The mOlit tummon ia the "mali vlllaitt. whith usuaJ~ tonllilltll of a collec"Uon ot hutll OJ' hQlules eaver!nfi III very IImfl,U .1"8& and a tr.1I run· /liliK through ~he Cf;nt,er. The other ia • INi!ttle· menlo or IArJft'" vllla~. ifl!l1erallY eOMi..till' ot lIeveralllf'attered ;rruup& of hu,," or trude MUJ\oeIl. There III uaufl,Uy • main trail or "street" runninK throu.h the area and a number of 5ubaldiary trailll linkinjf lhe ;rrnuJifI of huta, JUngle vill~a art' often under IWIDe type 01 (>nt"lny control or dUl'ellll. Enemy fOl'Cl'~ will «ttempt to obtain in. telligent'l.', food, ('luthlng, muu(>y. and recruita frPm tht'lW "iilllJ(l!!I in order W Ilullwin their op. eratitln"l, The Vmll/«l mllY be ~ illS a hid!n, pla~ tor Wdf.l!)nll. ammunition, &11 well AI enemy (orceII themselves. Members of the village are often recruited hy the enemy to provide information un friendly mfwentenb. Any torm of human habitation In the jungle or on Its periphery within l\ unit',. area or ril"ll(JQMlbllit)' will have an effect ilfi Ita ~Imbat /)~l"atioNl, The Ability to etl'ectlvely illOlate and l'Ii'nreh a jun¥lt villue will result in the reduced ef'fecUvent'SlI of the enemy and in en· Ci>Uraaement 01 the local popuJACf! it adequate proteetion and aupport for the people I••ubse~ quently pravlded, The methods And pfQCt!durea uat'd to 6rht In theM: villagU wlllpnerally tollow the prlndplell set rurth in FM 31-60. However. jungle: villa", ftghtin, baa l\.s own peculiarltlea and requ!refl modifkadon to tht standard t«htdq\1f5 0' eombat In huilt-up a~. b, .PlGn1l"t1l"U till! Op.rntV»1I" (l) GenfrQ.l. Each villare aelaurt! and ..areh operation InUIt be earetully and rompltte.l)' planned, based on current intall!.enC*. Ord.n IIhould contain conaiderable d~1 and "tot eapable of rapid hnplemente.tKl-R. The), ,hQuld bt ~om­ p.!Iinied b)' detetled brieAnp ulI!n, a aandteb1e a,

.....

Gtl'H'Jfal,

motkup 01 the target village, Jt ponible and within Sflf'urity limitations. rehea,..als should be ('ondueted uJllnJl: a aimilar vU!a,e, The operation ill normally plAnned in three phue.: in the Hrat phillie the villaKe ia iJwlate lIe('ond phalle the iAhlated area Is deared up to the vil!aKe and the villalte ill lIei:r.ed; and In the third phu.e the viUap is &ellJ'{'hed, Meihodll and technique!l IIhould "tot varied 1rom operation to op· eration to avoid set patterns. (2) SflCtlritV (!nd lIurpn'u, Seeurity and couJlteriJl~IIi~n~e take on Kreat importance durIng Jill vlanninlt and brieHnlf phaHII betore the nt>eratiotl ProJM"l' phYII!!'at /J~uritY meAluret! and d(>tt'ptive rMMurea will have to bt emplo)'ed dur~ inw movement to tbe targ-et villan to prevent the ent'my from iearJlinlt ita true de>tination. P~r !lecutity will permit surpriJte. whkh jIJ ..enti,1 to tht> IIUN~ells ot thill type ot operation, DtPlmd. injf on the proximity or the jun/ifle to the villa",. hellt'tlpl.trx ran J,rovidl' nil excelltnt meanll of rllpid lIud Aet'ure mllvement to the vlllase, When undmy force iK weak in relation to friendl), rm,'('~ In jumclp tnrl\ln thlll method requ!rim em. l,nnMi~ OJI (,olltrol to pf'event the cl"I!ation or aapl !iurl1lK mm'PAwnt and tf) In"ure that &8UulUng j(rtJ(lj)>I Itrl' not "red 00 by another ifl"OUp, Tbe en\'(>:npI!:K forcl' ~h.;u!d dl!velop depth b)' positionIfIX multiple rellerve 1orce! u the circle ti,htene In st'iu' tn,' vltlal{(t. Thie will make a break. throuKh in IItrclli(th by the enemy more dU'lcult. ThiJl m"thml or Keixure IIhoold be eoMldered

(

. . . . '. T"

....

(,...--~)

.....

)

Of"INCIlCUM.flT

---~---

...............

...

('-....::;;.:..--)

....

'M JI-H

,_----v-----_~ ~,

/

ii

r I,.INI '0' \'·'1-==

I

aClIlCLC.1IfT

~

/1 I I

I \ \

~"

------ti---- /V

/

aLOCklU I'OJItCl:

/

I

~

\

'I'htrt{ore. the IIfWjarhead forcu mu.t bit -.ltrt for ambu.th .and have plan. to oven:ome them. 'fbi. method of Histln! ia complete when .eh ..-{pte! action of the village or villa. . iii encircled (aee fta'.lS-1i ). (8) PJua~ 111, HareA. The adual eonducl of tM natch operation win be carried out l1li!Wn« thoae teclIniqu. outlined in YM 41-10. ThtI viltap win be divided Into lanea or aeetora and a

uei._

.paclfic unit the rupoatibiUlJ for durw In. the area. The hw,dqlS&l1era element .bould be poIltioJHld when! it am but control Ute mov. ment of the durin. partiN. Kember. f1l tIM re. cnnnaiManee element parlorm IoeaI ..e:uritJ nteIUJ..

_ when

th(!r~

are many avenueft of eaeape open

u)

theenflmy httf' fur. &-9). (n) Hal1l'1t(r flwl anvil. Thill method iM dllltll1:ttoriZt'd by the UII. of bhxlclng forces and 11 mobile drlvitliol force whlrh ill ofj!aniztd In depth, It I,. URll!!.!!)' UIINI when pa.rt fir the line of enclrdement 11< fI natura! barrier nwh 11M • dlfT or (IVf'r. 0,\(,,· lhe bIH('kinp: forrellllTe in pOl'1ltion the lead elem... nl.!! of th" drivilw (ore.., will move

q\11(''kh' throUllh the At'fl'I, bypllJ!,8lng poc'keta

(Jr

relti~tllnt·(" The bY}>llHHed pock.. ,"", or teMillUlnn' will I~' I·j'minllted by lh~ ron'ell rollmvinll tnt' lead ell!!mclIlII or by the rfllleTVeA (Me flf(. r>-IOI.

ttl S,ll!(lfhf'llda, The third method ill to hnld the line of enrirdel'nent Illld drive !l.pear. ht'nd~ lhrflu~h_ ThDI ml"thvd i,. fharRft~~rizoo by "tlMd and il< UII\!d wh~n "",('tlom~ of the villaife are dlll~rAeti or lie-vera I ArnAll viliAfte8 are located in prmtimlly I" l'Arh othf'r, Thill method i8 mort' vulnerable lo ambush thAn lh~ oth~r methodll.

vlu.o.lIfpmvld!q_.. _ VII. _ _1'l0III

I..,.

J...27. _ I Moat lowland j u1\lle IJl'4IU haft aiaIl~ Mt.worb of rivlH'8, aireama, and .~. Kudt of th. terrain in the j\,ul-lle th. .!,.. ..tt'OUWDt 11 )ubjoef; to periodil: Inundation and othtr ...... .\leh .. man~ve ma1 be ptI"fUDIDu, Iftllndated. J\mi'le rlverlne ...... .,.. e1l.vt.otlf. IMId by very lImif.e;d or n(lnallten-t O'NrlMd

._.pa.

tran.portation eapabllitl .., thua makina' InlPd the p:rincipat m~na of t.raJllporioltJDn.

w.tarw".

uru and ad .. a amal! loul re&:!rvt! for the Mar"h commandtr. The ftre Iupport element pot/. tlon) itaelf where It can rift ftre .uppo:rt to lhe .earcllllementa .hould It bit needed. The bloekln« fOrN ,mQuld remain dear of the vlllaRe6 wheN It cannot be HNI, It 8bouid be poaitioned 110 U to prevent eeeape attemptJ by .mall rtrOuPl Or indio vlduall _ho try CO inftlt,.te from the vii",",. to counter detennlntd and OOfItAlnt,.t«/d brule. thl'OUltl atiernptJ 'by Utmy fort .. , aM to repulte an)' att.mpte b7 oem)' tore.. to "lleft the UIolated vll_. roUo_il'll' tilt eompletion of the Mf.I'\:h, unitt Mould _Jthdra_ tactically from the

~

...

111l1>li ........ _

...

lIflllo .......... _ofw_ _ _ ~.... to _ 1IIl!ltorr f - . ...........d oqul _ _ . . _ ........... r l _ 1M _ Ii... by II'K 11-'11 (Toot) II applleabIo wWI ...." _ to tilt j\tal" ,,"rll. enviroo-

-,

_1'\a!IrtI6-1I11uooc116-1I _ _ ______ 101..,.

f/rlll 1 1--3$

I'/rlil 31--35

5 - 1 8 . J u ngle Ri... erimt Env ironment A ju ngle riv erine envirollme nt IS :t b.nd envlTon m(" nl domi na too by ..... ter lines of communication", There may be one or mo re major waterwaYI Ind an extenSive networ k of lesller waterwal'S. U"able roads a~ 3o.:IITCe a nd cross-count r y movements are dns tlc.:Jly t urta llcd. Althoug h e"tens ive variation is not ent ounter ed in the dif· ferent j\ln.t. ri vl' rine en vironments at the world . thorough lI nller.d'::Llldinsr of a partieulu\' un\'ironment i ~ e5Mnu.vo1 priYr l.o the tonduet or ofJeut1Ons. b. Ge neral descri ptio n of jungl e rive rs. (1) Upper I'cc i qr,f (h.ead·II!!U er~ ). Headwalers are us ua lly in a mountainous region drai ned by numerous brae and smail tributades which mer~ to form 8 river I)'stem. Head waters are charaelllri7.ed hy waterf.lls. rapids, and local variations in w.ter depth wh ich limit o r rutrid the use of wat.erc rah. 4.

(2 ) MiMI' $er'~r (e"'ltrol NLl/,W). The cent rll l \'1,11(1,. hu • broId ri v!'r .... hich ill U,"1\U)' nav1ll nblt· (or ar!'lIl d if.ln nu ·1I Inlllnd. The r;\'er is USUIl!!), fed numerO!b tnbu tllries. In thruOllitional plai n form ed by a number of river diNtribuloriclI dh;bu N in" a great amount of "edinle nt in to l\ gulf. bllY or ocea n. This .area i ~ usually c hAr.actc riiA!d by ma ny la rge tu1d smali tidal slream.!l lind channels, wh ose currents may chllollge l peed o r rever3e with the tide in a rouJthly l)fedictablc manne r. Bottoms Ilf thf' dillt rihu todes normlilly !llope up to a c rest. ur bar. at t he I·i ve r'. mouth. 111 some iosla nces. on l), w ll te~rart wit h mar Kinal draft wi\! be able to CJ'OS.S it a t high t ide.

S--29.

S~I

Consld....a tions in the Conduct of Jungle Wote rbo rne Operation,

n, Th(' nilica\ily af lerrlain IlItclliaence and mule reconll.l&illXllnCll ;1\0 111( ju n~lle ....·uterwa}·s place!; unusu.a lly heav)' demands on engineer reconnai!lSance eJemenu. While aeria l reeonnai5lance yield.~ a considerable amnnnt o f informa tion it will hne to be knpptemented by boat recon: naissance, ~p«ially i n area..wn by vell'etation. The hellvy \'ell'e{.alion 4101lM' t he Lank. or inlund wll tc r wollyll oft'ers exc.Oent collc",imenl and enhllnces the effel"liven~ of IImbnllhillJ! water_

'I.

....,

FM 31 -3S

r "iof"YI i - I ' . 1'.... u/ "'''''j1af ,a~ al ~ fI MI, /fY'_' fr rM _r. ...... 1I~ .. g J ~ "",,I~

craft. Counternmbu~ h measures must be pla nned in «ln j ullclion ",·ith all waler mnvementl. Steep s lippery river banks ('nupled with dense vCJ(eta· tion rtdu~ lhf' ,,,,K>;lhih ly "r committ ing the wa_ le rborDe force in .:I ('flurtlimttecf malllluvcr to mak(' I'm a.sQult landing, thus requiring increRsed flTIphll:'lis on water m4neU \lers to coulll!!r the am· bush. c. The lac.k of ade\tultle landing shell along jungle r iver btlll ks u~"('~lSitale:s utenllive prePllra·

..... ,....... W.

\.o r y work to faci litate entrance a n d exit of com-

Section VIII. STABILITY OPERAnONS

hilt ftll"("~lIllalnl the ";.nw with its many influe-t1ti ntl' tilctO,... T ~. . 1 1I1I11clld n~ fACwr1i will a lWRYI include ,'eg_ II!t ...dnrl. cli mate-, we"ther, mobility And IIl1tunl obet&clfiIL. Thf' t!fTectiveneu of n,ilitary comb.t uni ts in !lIability operations is deicrmined by &.

.... u

tl'!eir intelligence eap.abitily. mobility. firepower differentia!, eommunkation capability and ability to optrat. in the tteld on .n au.t.re aupport hula. The ultimate «Impoilition of fON:. la Intlueneed by the aiu and capability of the oppotition foree, lines of communication and the natl.lre of the ter~ rain. Infantry, airborne and airmobile unlta poa.. 88M the eharlCterietkJl and quanti . . .pedany aulted for thl. type of op&ration In a jon"'e environment; howevfJr. in many lituaUonl, armor and mechanized \Inlu un be oeed to adv.n~" b. Operational plana for combattinr f'lM!rrUIA fol'Cft in a junlfl.e envlronlMnt ia covered In detaU In refenMfS lilted abolle, How....er. IOmt modj1\catiol\f of theae techniqua may be required at tlmM becaule of the hani1e anvlronment or be. t:a\Ule of reatridiolU impoiW!d upGn a commander by a hoat IOvernmenl and the poUtleai situation. when ...trh:tiol\f are im~, the eommandar mUit reviae his taetleal doetl1ne to At thOH eondltlonl, nt J,e mtl#t not \ole .lirM of hla ultimate miuion which Ie to And and deatroy the enemy, Durin, aJlltablllty operationl, commanden must not 10M &ipt of the overall objectivea of the sta. bility .woTt. Military and paramill:tuy a.;:lion ap!nat. ilulIJrrent f~ ar4l only a part of the overaU Internal defenM and deveropment effort. The def..t of 'he hoatlle armed fortel doeJ not ruaranlee vletory; tilt deddin, faetor in Ute eeee 01 the lllablllty etl'Qrt is the recondllation between tM Inaurren.tJI and tha ..over~t In power. Therefore. lIince the ultimate objeetive of aU internal detente fortM I, to JAin tile loyalty of the people for their IOvernment. every military action mUllt be planMd and !lvaJuated with full reeornition or il,& polltleal consequenetlll, Ex. treme eare mUllt be taken to in.ure that mlJltary operation. do not &lienaw th4! mUMII of the pe0ple to a point where auch reconeillaUon ia ImpoAaible.

.Ui:-

1:. One of the fl:r.t conlliderationa of the WOVfJrn· m/ftit muat be the prot.ection of the P«lple from 11l11urrenl ra~rell and repriaala, Often the em. ployment of rorcet! to this fled deniell the eom~ mandfr thoae troop. required to conduct effective milUary Qperationa apinsl the guerrilla. Rqard· _ of the other rneaaur. taken to improve eondltione. and otherwiae pin population lIupport, unJeM the PIlOple know they wll! be proteeted from Jnaurrent coercion Ind u:t! of t.rror, their resporuM! 00 other wovernment overtlU" wUl be minimal. Therefore, bulc operatlOruJ mu.t pro. vIde for the eatabliehment of nlaUvtl)' Meur. and atebJe environmental a:rua within the country in

whkh internal dev~lopment and other meuurea aimed at raining population aupporl un be condueted effectively. d, In jun,te areaa the population normally illl wn~ntrated aloni the coutll ,..~nl and major eommunicationR eentera with vUlallfl' And hIm· leU dispel'led. Iiong the periphery or the Jungle. The junlle itulf la normally occupied by priml. tlve tribes. The peopJe along the par!phery of the junKie and the tribes therein have little aile. giance to a ~ntral goyernment lind an &ubjeet to perau.aai'On. ('~rcion and intimidation by the perrilla fOI"('(I&. Unlea the ijDwrnment ean pro· tect these people from the lfUerrillA terror ttetle.. they Mnnnt hope to ,ain their lIupport. One eon~ eept whkh may dlifer from eonyentional wartare iJ the ruerrilla u" 'Of baH eamps in aupport uf ,heir operation.. The very characterilltic of the jungle environment provldtll tho hiflorrent with numeroUI arua for the cOllJItruction of lIecure ballJ!! campa hecaUR of the excellent cover and .eonet!&lment The relatiYflly InaceMllibie terrain rstridl! the full appllcati'On of the firtlpower nOr· mally ayailable to a ronvenilonlll torce and pro· videa the insurf{'l'!nt with hill liihtly equipped, foot mobile fOr'(:e, lln advantellfl over conventionai urllu, AIIIG, the intemrence iatherlrnr capability of the eon'nntional foree: III reatrlcted due to low populaUon density within the jun,le and the de,~ radatlon of Il.Irveillance and other intempnce gather!nJ' .yatema (e.i., rlld.l', aerial photo,ra· phy, and urial reconnll..,.nce).

S-32. Ia.. Compl 6. The tactkal aueceaA of the ruerrilla in llta· bility operaticrllO 10\ hued primarily upon hi. abil. ity to UM'mble quickly, Kui1ce and retreat to a Rhelt.ered or protected balle eamJL The jungle b.wIe camp, theretQt'e. ii, critical to the Kuerrilla operaUOIl.l, From the baae camp he iaunehes hil att&eb And to the baae camp he N!turnll for Roor. ity and fttling, HIli mobilJty depend, to a irQt deal upon a chain ot secure bMe eampI, There· fore. finding .nd dattoy!!]1I' junJJle baH tampa and the forcell the~ln I, paramount to count.rguerrilla fON:e opt'raUonJ. Baae campa aN! ott.n well orpniMd, well fortified and usu"lIy lIur~ rounded with mines and other warnlnll' and de. laylnrdevicea, Q, Oht:e the Junkie baM camp ill diecovered it I" attackad usln.. the ume technique. as thOM' employad in the atlat'k on any fortified poalt\on In & junrle environment. There Are four operational problema involved In attaddng baM eampa; (l)

Anding the ba!le camp: (2) attackin« a fortiftfld pDaltlon: (3) d~troYlng the guerrill. for!'eII before they ('lIcal~; And (4) tielltroying the e:den. live networb of eJlrthYll)rkll and reinforced tun. nell. ThNl" camlM mURt be tlelltro)'tU:! M the guerrilla will N'turn to them onee thl' preallure in the Irell of operation ill. relievt'd. Yri. few unit! have ..ther time nr organk nwanll to d$!ltf'Oy even a J1D&1l percentage of the baae eamps they find. De· strudion of billie eam;m requiretl time, manpower, equipment and larKf' amd euier than troop.. (rom a place farther tr. lht" north. Troopli which are tran!lJKlrt~l t(t troplCAI areall by lIurfacr trlloll'(JOrtRtinn wIll tlot experlent't" Ill! much di4Womfort wheh tbey I taken ()" III every Olllltll'tunity to allow for drying of feet ami hUHtA. find for IIPplicll.tiun G1 100l JXlW' dE'r. r. HI'n.dl/l1i1r, A utilily hat jll l'C'\'omrnendf'll II)r wellr on ll.1I (lperations where stellith ill requIred OOc;aull(' of the nmlle ('ll.Ul'Cd by thl' ~lN'!i1 h ..lmet 11\ deml(' vej;j'etatioll, d, Gltw"" If ftvilitable, ffOkiiefll Rh()ujd wear Kll)v('~ wht!'1) movlnlf' thrt>uKh \el{eillUOon to pruvidl' jlwiN.'t1IL .I. Mad",! •. Thl' nl1li'l'wtt' I.'~ lin indi!Oi~01101I' SI!tlkl'l/. Fellr of 1IlllIkell, which ill common among men. ia IlIrllely II reault of miain. rorml!.tion and unrllmiliarity. Actulllly. only II .~mllll portioo of all Hllilkell in the tropiclI are poiIInnUUII lind thl'Y art' ~eld(!m 1I('f'n even by men engl!.ged in jungll' (·ombnl. Jo'amililirizl!.tioll with the habib of IIllllkell, how to identify l)Oilionouli ~nllk('11 of the IIrefi. lIimllh' Ilrl~IIUtiolill to prevent ~nake bitt'll. lind appropriate first aid meaaurell In the very rare eml'tp:ency of being bitten, will do much to eliminllte a IIOldier'.!I fear. d. Marine Lift. Mllrine life whieh conatitute a hazard in tropieal areaa are poillonoua, venomoull. lind ferocioull ftllh; crO('odilell and caymen; aea urchillI!; and conI, which filII inftlct pllinful eutll. Caution mUllt be exerciMe(1 in fording lind bathing In jungle IItrellmll bec.au~e of the dllnger poal'd by ('lIymlln lind erocodile. TrooplI should be made IIWllre of any wllter hazardll peculillr to an operation,,1 area. 1'. Mamm{1.Ut. The type!! of IInimat.!l one elln exJII'ct lo encounter will depend on the JunKie reMion lind the lype of vegetation. Thf' lara-er lind more dilngerolill IInimlllll arf' found in the gralllliandll Ilonll' the periphery of the junp:le. With few exceptionll, animl!.t.~ of the junp:le and itllllurrounding arellll, will withdr"w from any encounter with mlln. A familiariZlltlOn with the wild inhllbitantll o( the jungle lind lh('I" hllbitll will contribute to the IIf)ldier'lI undentandilig of the lIurroundinM1l in whieh he mUllt ftl'ht, f. Poillon/!!III PW.1I'_II, As a rille. poillonoull planl!c are not a lIerioulI hllZard In the junp:le. The two gl'neral typell of poisonoua plantll are tholle poi~on(!UII to touch and those poiltOnou~ to ellt. Tn tropical rellionll several kindll of planla poiKon by ('nnlact. There are alllO varlelie.!l of plantl! with ~tlllglng hairll which a-enerlllly do not conatitutf' fI relll dllnger; however, their .!lUng, due to formir I!.cid, ill painful. The vllrieties of poillOnoua and stinging plllnla will vary in dlf'r'erent junl'le IIrells. Troop!! IIhollld be IIble to reeognize them and Ilvoid them whenever pOllllible.

TRACKING particulllr area and who hll.!l an Intimate IInowl· edge of the terrain. TrOllplI conductinl' Junl'le operlltJOIl~ (ilarticularly eounterir\Jerrllla opera-

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