FM 3-90.119

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

(FMI 3-34.119/MCIP 3-17.01)

COMBINED ARMS IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE

DEFEAT OPERATIONS

September 2007 DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies only to protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange Program or by other means. This protection applies to publications required solely for official use and to those containing valuable technical or operational information. This determination was made on 10 August 2005. Other requests for this document must be referred to Commandant, United States Army Engineer School, ATTN: ATZT-T-TD-D, 320 MANSCEN Loop, Suite 220, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri 65473-8929. DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

This publication is available

at Army Knowledge Online

and the General Dennis J. Reimer Training and

Doctrine Digital Library at .

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

C1 Change 1

Headquarters Department of the Army United States Marine Corps Washington, DC, 6 August 2008

Combined Arms Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Operations 1. Change Field Manual (FM) 3-90.119/ Marine Corps Information Publication (MCIP) 3-17.01, 21 September 2007, as follows: Remove old pages: i through vi C-1 through C-5

Insert new pages: i through vi C-1 through C-6

2.

A bar (|) marks new or changed material.

3.

File this transmittal sheet in front of the publication.

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies only to protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange Program or by other means. This protection applies to publications required solely for official use and to those containing valuable technical or operational information. This determination was made on 10 August 2005. Other requests for this document must be referred to Commandant, United States Army Engineer School, ATTN: ATZT-TDD, 320 MANSCEN Loop, Suite 220, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri 65473-8929. DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01, C1 6 August 2008

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: GEORGE W. CASEY, JR. General, United States Army Chief of Staff Official:

JOYCE E. MORROW Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army 0819816

DISTRIBUTION: Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve. To be distributed in accordance with the initial distribution number (IDN) 121724, requirements for FM 3-90.119. By Direction of the Commandant of the Marine Corps:

Marine Corps PCN: 146 000003 01

*FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01, C1 (FMI 3-34.119/MCIP 3-17.01) Headquarters Department of the Army United States Marine Corps Washington, D.C. 6 August 2008

Field Manual No. FM 3-90.119 Marine Corps Information Publication No. 3-17.01

COMBINED ARMS IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DEFEAT OPERATIONS Contents Page

PREFACE..............................................................................................................vi INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................ix Chapter 1

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT...................................................................... 1-1 Concept .............................................................................................................. 1-1 Variables............................................................................................................. 1-2 Adaptive Principles of the Enemy....................................................................... 1-4 Varied Actions .................................................................................................... 1-8

Chapter 2

MOBILITY OPERATIONS AND THE FRAMEWORK OF IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DEFEAT ......................................................................... 2-1 Movement and Maneuver................................................................................... 2-1 Combined Arms Mobility Operations.................................................................. 2-1 Clearing Operations............................................................................................ 2-2 The Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Framework ....................................... 2-4

Distribution Restriction: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies only to protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange Program or by other means. This protection applies to publications required solely for official use and to those containing valuable technical or operational information. This determination was made on 10 August 2005. Other requests for this document will be referred to Commandant, United States Army Engineer School, ATTN: ATZT-TDD, 320 MANSCEN Loop, Suite 220, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri 65473-8929. Destruction Notice: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document. *This publication supersedes Field Manual Interim (FMI) 3-34.119/MCIP 3-17.01, dated 21 September 2005. i

Contents

Chapter 3

THREAT ANALYSIS.......................................................................................... 3-1 Military Intelligence Disciplines........................................................................... 3-1 Unit Support to Intelligence ................................................................................ 3-5 Threat Motivation and Construct ........................................................................ 3-6 Component Analysis (Individual and Nodal) .................................................... 3-12 Improvised Explosive Device Descriptions....................................................... 3-16

Chapter 4

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DEFEAT ............................................................................................................. 4-1 Planning Processes............................................................................................ 4-1 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield to Defeat Improvised Explosive Devices ............................................................................................................... 4-2 Targeting........................................................................................................... 4-19 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Synchronization ................... 4-20 Composite Risk Management .......................................................................... 4-26 Assured Mobility ............................................................................................... 4-30 Planning Considerations................................................................................... 4-35

Chapter 5

ACTIONS IN RESPONSE TO IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES.............. 5-1 Observations From the Field .............................................................................. 5-1 Commander’s Guidance and Authorization........................................................ 5-2 Leader’s Decision Considerations...................................................................... 5-2 Actions When Safety or Intelligence is the Priority............................................. 5-4 Actions When Operations Tempo is the Highest Priority ................................... 5-7 Military Search.................................................................................................... 5-8 Electronic-Warfare Considerations................................................................... 5-15 Route Clearance Operations ............................................................................ 5-18

Appendix A

SELECTED ORGANIZATIONS AND UNITS INVOLVED IN IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DEFEAT .........................................................................A-1 Selected Organizations and Contact Information............................................... A-1 Selected Units and Personnel ............................................................................ A-7 Other Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organizations .............................. A-12

Appendix B

ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES, TOOLS, AND PRODUCTS ..............................B-1 Imagery and Geospatial Intelligence .................................................................. B-1 Link Analysis....................................................................................................... B-5 Significant Dates............................................................................................... B-15 Timelines .......................................................................................................... B-15 Culture Description or Culture Comparison Chart............................................ B-16 Perception Assessment Matrix......................................................................... B-16 Population Status Overlays .............................................................................. B-16 Terrain Overlays ............................................................................................... B-17 Lines of Communication Overlays.................................................................... B-17 Line-of-Sight Overlays ...................................................................................... B-18

Appendix C

REPORTING, RECORDING, DISPLAYING, AND TRACKING ........................C-1 Reporting ............................................................................................................C-1 Recording ...........................................................................................................C-2 Displaying ...........................................................................................................C-2 Tracking ..............................................................................................................C-3

ii

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01, C1

6 August 2008

Contents

Explosive Hazards Database .............................................................................C-4 Joint Digital Incident Gathering System .............................................................C-4 Future Database.................................................................................................C-5 Appendix D

TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES CONSIDERATIONS ............D-1 Typical Improvised Explosive Device Types ......................................................D-1 Immediate Action Drills.......................................................................................D-7 Risk Mitigation for Convoys ................................................................................D-8 Mobility Corridors..............................................................................................D-11

Appendix E

SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT ............................................................................. E-1 Interim Vehicle-Mounted Mine Detector ............................................................. E-1 Buffalo................................................................................................................. E-2 Casspir................................................................................................................ E-3 Mine-Protected Vehicle–RG-31.......................................................................... E-4 Mine-Protected Armored Vehicle–RG-33L......................................................... E-5 Cougar ................................................................................................................ E-5 Heavy Wheeled Armored Vehicle–GOLAN........................................................ E-6 Armored Security Vehicle–ASV M-1117 ............................................................ E-7 Mine-Protected Armored Dozers........................................................................ E-8 Counter Radio-Controlled Improvised Explosive Device Electronic Warfare ............................................................................................................... E-9 Robots .............................................................................................................. E-11 Specialized Search Dogs ................................................................................. E-12 Handheld Detectors.......................................................................................... E-13 Search Kit ......................................................................................................... E-15

Appendix F

TRAINING EXPECTATIONS AND RESOURCES ............................................ F-1 Training Expectations From the Field................................................................. F-1 Staff and Unit Training........................................................................................ F-2 Training Aids....................................................................................................... F-9 SOURCE NOTES.......................................................................... Source Notes-1 GLOSSARY ..........................................................................................Glossary-1 REFERENCES ..................................................................................References-1 INDEX.......................................................................................................... Index-1

Figures Figure 2-1. Mobility Operations Army Tasks and IED Defeat ......................................... 2-4 Figure 3-1. Enemy IED Activity Model............................................................................. 3-8 Figure 3-2. Example of Functional Nodes in an IED Network....................................... 3-13 Figure 3-3. Iconic Representation of Functional Node Analysis by Activity .................. 3-14 Figure 3-4. Example Threat IED System Nodal Diagram Showing Relationships........ 3-15 Figure 3-5. Components of an IED................................................................................ 3-17 Figure 3-6. Command-Initiated Concealed IED ............................................................ 3-18 Figure 3-7. Common Areas of IED Emplacement ......................................................... 3-20 Figure 4-1. ASCOPE Construct With Examples.............................................................. 4-9

6 August 2008

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01, C1

iii

Contents

Figure 4-2. Example of Threat Analysis Layers ............................................................ 4-14 Figure 4-3. Example Event Template for IED Defeat Operations ................................. 4-18 Figure 4-4. Example Incident Overlay Identifying Allegiances ...................................... 4-19 Figure 4-5. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Task Development Process ...................................................................................................... 4-21 Figure 4-6. ISR Synchronization.................................................................................... 4-25 Figure 4-7. IED Defeat Framework ............................................................................... 4-31 Figure 5-1. Example of a Leader’s Decision Considerations .......................................... 5-3 Figure 5-2. Diagrammatic Representation of Levels of Risk, Training, and Technology.......................................................................................... 5-11 Figure 5-3. Detection Element....................................................................................... 5-20 Figure 5-4. Improvement Element................................................................................. 5-21 Figure 5-5. Example Organization for a Route Clearance Operation ........................... 5-22 Figure B-1. Example Coordinates Register..................................................................... B-3 Figure B-2. Example Pattern Analysis Plot Sheet ........................................................... B-4 Figure B-3. Example Time Event Chart........................................................................... B-6 Figure B-4. Example Association Matrix ......................................................................... B-7 Figure B-5. Example Activity Matrix ................................................................................ B-8 Figure B-6. Example Link Analysis Diagram ................................................................. B-14 Figure B-7. Example Timeline Created in an Analyst’s Notebook ................................ B-15 Figure B-8. Example Population Status Overlay ........................................................... B-17 Figure C-1. IED Equipment .............................................................................................C-3 Figure C-2. IED Explosion ...............................................................................................C-3 Figure C-3. Explosive Hazards Spot Report Flow...........................................................C-6 Figure D-1. Command-Wired IED ...................................................................................D-1 Figure D-2. Suicide IED...................................................................................................D-2 Figure D-3. Radio-Controlled IED ...................................................................................D-3 Figure D-4. Explosive Laden Vehicle ..............................................................................D-4 Figure D-5. Vehicle-Borne IED ........................................................................................D-4 Figure D-6. Victim-Operated IED With a Tripwire ...........................................................D-5 Figure D-7. Example Diagram of a Victim-Operated IED With a Pressure Plate............D-6 Figure D-8. Simulation of a Penetrator Formation...........................................................D-7 Figure D-9. Example of an Explosively Formed Penetrator ............................................D-7 Figure D-10. Basic Attack..............................................................................................D-10 Figure D-11. Change of Traffic Attack...........................................................................D-11 Figure D-12. Multiple IED Attack ...................................................................................D-11 Figure E-1. Meerkat......................................................................................................... E-2 Figure E-2. Husky With Mine Detection Trailer ............................................................... E-2 Figure E-3. Buffalo........................................................................................................... E-3 Figure E-4. Buffalo With the Clearing Arm Extended...................................................... E-3 Figure E-5. Casspir.......................................................................................................... E-4 Figure E-6. Medium Mine-Protected Vehicle–RG-31 ...................................................... E-4

iv

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01, C1

6 August 2008

Contents

Figure E-7. Mine-Protected Armored Vehicle–RG-33L................................................... E-5 Figure E-8. Cougar .......................................................................................................... E-6 Figure E-9. Heavy Wheeled Armored Vehicle–Golan..................................................... E-7 Figure E-10. Armored Security Vehicle–ASV M-1117 .................................................... E-8 Figure E-11. Mine-Clearing Armor Protection Dozer ...................................................... E-8 Figure E-12. D-9R Armored Dozer.................................................................................. E-9 Figure E-13. Hunter ....................................................................................................... E-10 Figure E-14. Warlock Family of CREW Systems .......................................................... E-11 Figure E-15. EOD Robot ............................................................................................... E-12 Figure E-16. Specialized Search Dogs ......................................................................... E-13 Figure E-17. AN/PSS-14 Mine Detector........................................................................ E-14 Figure E-18. Handheld Explosive Sniffer ...................................................................... E-14 Figure E-19. Search Kit Equipment............................................................................... E-16

Tables Table 3-1. Threat Motivations.......................................................................................... 3-7 Table 3-2. Possible Nodes Located in an IED Network ................................................ 3-10 Table 4-1. Risk Assessment Matrix............................................................................... 4-27 Table 4-2. Composite Risk Assessment Aligned With the MDMP ................................ 4-29 Table 4-3. TLP and CRM Steps .................................................................................... 4-29 Table 5-1. Military Search Equipment Capabilities........................................................ 5-14 Table 5-2. Rate of March During Clearance Operations............................................... 5-21 Table F-1. Example Training Task List for Training Expectations From the Field .......... F-3 Table F-2. Critical Tasks for Collective Training.............................................................. F-6

6 August 2008

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01, C1

v

Preface Field Manual (FM) 3-90.119/Marine Corps Interim Publication (MCIP) 3-17.01 establishes doctrine for improvised explosive device (IED) defeat operations. It is based on existing doctrine and lessons learned from combat operations. To make this manual useful to leaders involved in IED defeat operations, regardless of where these operations may occur, the doctrine contained herein is broad in scope and involves principles applicable to various theaters. The intent of this FM is not to focus on any region or country; however, Iraq and Afghanistan are often referred to in this manual in an effort to relate the material to current operations and captured lessons learned. IED defeat operations exhibit common characteristics, but their methods of implementation may vary widely. This FM is not a stand-alone document. Readers must be familiar with the warfighting functions (WFFs) found in FM 3-0 and the fundamentals of assured mobility found in FM 3-34. While IED defeat operations have applicability to tasks in all of the WFFs, this FM focuses on the applicability to the WFFs of intelligence and movement and maneuver along with the necessary linkages to command and control (C2). The purpose of this focus is to develop a doctrinal approach that facilitates the coordination and synchronization of those tasks most critical to successful IED defeat operations. The intelligence WFF contains those tasks that most directly impact those operations that collect and analyze information to predict, prevent, detect, avoid, neutralize, and protect against the procurement, proliferation, and use of the IED. This WFF is focused on a proactive approach that enables commanders to interdict and exploit IED networks and the associated operations before IEDs are planned or emplaced. The movement and maneuver WFF contains those tasks that directly impact those operations that investigate and report information to detect, avoid, neutralize, and protect against the emplaced IED. This WFF tends to be reactive in nature, but is an essential function to mitigate or negate the intent of the emplaced IED. It is important to understand that tasks within these two functions overlap and are a continuous process—collect, analyze, investigate, and report. To integrate this continuous process into the military decision-making process (MDMP) and the rapid decision-making and synchronization process (RDSP), this FM focuses on the integrating process of assured mobility and its six fundamentals as the shared framework for IED defeat and to assist leaders with planning and executing IED defeat operations. Additionally, this FM incorporates lessons learned and major studies from sources across the Army and joint community. It focuses on asymmetric threats and establishes doctrine to defeat them. This FM is designed primarily to assist Soldiers and Marines at all echelons in planning and coordinating IED defeat operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. It is also a resource available to Department of Defense (DOD), Joint, and other military Services and agencies that have a role in executing or supporting the execution of IED defeat operations. It is the primary manual to define the doctrinal linkages and integrating processes associated with IED defeat. This manual― z z z

z

vi

Provides doctrinal guidance for commanders and staffs for planning, preparing for, and executing and assessing IED defeat operations. Outlines the critical integration processes that must be incorporated into the staff planning process for IED defeat. Serves as an authoritative reference for emerging doctrine-providing linkage for IED defeat from the movement and maneuver WFF, through mobility operations, to the focused application of IED defeat in support of primarily route clearance operations. Highlights the linkages between reconnaissance, clearance, and military search as focused tasks in support of IED defeat.

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01, C1

6 August 2008

Preface •

•

Describes the relationship of the assured mobility fundamentals to the construct for IED defeat, incorporating the focuses of exploit and mitigate into the established framework of assured mobility. Provides a general description of the threat associated with IED operations and the intelligence support to counter those operations and activities.

Specifically, this manual provides commanders, leaders, and staffs with fundamental principals and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for the defeat of adversary IED operations. The following briefly describes the contents of this manual: • Chapter 1 provides a description of the operational environment (OE) in which IEDs are employed. It explains how and why the enemy uses IEDs to disrupt friendly operations from a strategic to a tactical perspective. • Chapter 2 defines IED defeat operations. It describes the doctrinal framework and provides the necessary linkages so that commanders and staffs have a common approach to planning, preparing, executing, and assessing IED defeat operations. • Chapter 3 defines typical intelligence gathering assets and the processes used to conduct threat analysis for IED defeat. Additionally, it provides a summary of how threat forces operate and use IEDs. • Chapter 4 provides an overview of the planning processes of the Army and United States Marine Corps (USMC) and describes how a commander and staff integrate IED defeat considerations into unit plans. Additionally, it discusses intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB); targeting; intelligence synchronization; composite risk management (CRM); and assured mobility as integrating processes to assist the commander and staff in integrating IED defeat considerations throughout all planning processes. This chapter also offers planning considerations for IED defeat based on the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). The METT­ TC factors are not all-inclusive, but serve as a base for further development depending on the situation. Note. The Marine Corps and joint doctrine use METT-T, without “civil considerations” being added. •

•

•

Chapter 5 provides guidance for a leader upon encountering an IED. All units must be able to maintain operations despite these hazards. It briefly describes military search, route reconnaissance, and clearing operations. Appendix A identifies United States (U.S.) military and government agencies that are involved in IED defeat operations. Although not an all-inclusive list, it covers selected military and other governmental centers of expertise and special coordination and response organizations from the strategic to the operational level and includes intelligence and technology development organizations. This chapter provides basic mission statements of the organizations. Appendixes B through F provide greater depth to the chapters and offer basic suggestions for conducting IED defeat operations. • Appendix B. Analytical Techniques, Tools, and Products. • Appendix C. Reporting, Recording, and Tracking • Appendix D. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Considerations. • Appendix E. Specialized Equipment. • Appendix F. Training Expectations and Resources.

Terms that have joint or Army definitions are identified in both the glossary and the text. Glossary references: The glossary lists most terms used in FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01 that have Joint or Army definitions. Terms for which FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01 is the proponent FM (the authority) are indicated with an asterisk in the glossary. Text references: definitions for which FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01 is the proponent FM are printed in boldface in the text. These terms and their definitions will be incorporated into the next

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

vii

Preface

revision of FM 1-02/Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 5-12A. For other definitions in the text, the term is italicized, and the number of the proponent FM follows the definition. As a dual Service manual, references made to the U.S. Army, Soldiers, and brigade combat team (BCT) are interchangeable with and/or include the USMC, Marines, and regimental combat team (RCT) unless stated otherwise in the text. This publication applies to the Marine Corps, Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and the United States Army Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve unless otherwise stated. The primary audience for this FM includes commanders, leaders, and staffs at corps-level and below. The proponent for this publication is the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Send comments and recommendations on Department of the Army (DA) Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to Commandant, United States Army Engineer School, ATTN: ATZT-T-TD-D, 320 MANSCEN Loop, Suite 220, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri 64573-8929. Submit an electronic DA Form 2028 or comments and recommendations in the DA Form 2028 format by e-mail to .

viii

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Introduction This is not a new war. Our enemies have been waging it for some time, and it will continue for the foreseeable future. As President Bush has stated, “This is a different kind of war against a different kind of enemy.” It is a war we must win, a war for our very way of life. General Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff of the Army Arrival Message, 1 August 2003

The proliferation of IEDs on the battlefield in both Iraq and Afghanistan has posed the most pervasive threat facing coalition forces in those theaters. The persistent effectiveness of this threat has influenced unit operations, U.S. policy, and public perception. IEDs are a weapon of choice and are likely to remain a major component of the war on terrorism (WOT) for the foreseeable future. The definitive history of IEDs has not been extensively documented. However, many specific incidents in the last 100 years have been well documented. In recent history, there has been a continuing trend of terrorist acts against the United States. These attacks have increased in frequency, level of sophistication, and lethality. For example, the Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, was attacked with a vehicle-borne IED (VBIED) that killed 241 U.S. Marines in 1983. This was followed by the bombing of Pan American Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988. The plane carried passengers from 21 countries, but 189 of the 259 on board were Americans; the crash also killed 11 people on the ground. In the first terrorist attack on the World Trade Center, New York City, New York, in 1993, a VBIED failed to cause the desired number of casualties but nevertheless demonstrated the ability to attack the U.S. homeland. In 1996, another truck bomb killed 19 U.S. Soldiers and injured 372 at the Khobar Towers housing complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. The violence continued with the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and the United States Ship (USS) Cole in the port of Aden, Yemen, in 2000. Recently, with the development of sufficiently powerful, stable, and accessible explosives, a bomb or IED has become a preferred weapon for terrorists and has been used extensively in Iraq and Afghanistan. IEDs are characterized as obstacles to movement and maneuver but can also serve as a close contact weapon, depending on the intent of individual or group employing the IED. As an obstacle, the IED is typically emplaced to fix, turn, block, or disrupt the movement or maneuver of U.S. military, coalition forces, or host nation (HN) civilians. When used in conjunction with other obstacles or as a close contact weapon, IEDs are typically used to ambush military forces; assassinate key military, government, or civilian figures; or to target a particular group or organization. When an IED is used as a close contact weapon, the event is often recorded and later televised in an effort to maximize the psychological (and perhaps political) effectiveness of the IED and distract U.S. efforts at the strategic level. However the IED is used, as an obstacle or close contact weapon, the approach to IED defeat is the same. The sophistication of the IED depends on the maker. IEDs range from being very simple to very complex with booby traps, antihandling devices, and sophisticated electronic-initiation devices to prevent disarming. IEDs may be encountered as a singular explosive hazards (EH) or as multiple devices daisy-chained together (such as secondary, tertiary, or more) per tactical encounter. Generally, IEDs can be triggered in a variety of ways. A timer is common and can be set hours in advance. Remote-controlled detonators with a limited range allow the exact timing of the detonation. IEDs can be manufactured out of many household products (including fertilizer and batteries), but most sophisticated IEDs use a small amount of explosive to trigger a larger quantity of explosive material. IEDs do not have to be large to be effective. Most IEDs are small and are directed at individual targets, such as military personnel or civilians. Often these are planted along a roadside and detonated as a vehicle passes. Larger devices can be placed in vehicles parked along the roadway or driven into the target by suicide bombers willing to give up their lives for the cause.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

ix

Introduction

The primary focus of this manual is IED defeat operations conducted by the combined arms team. Furthermore, the manual accentuates clearing operations that are purposely planned and executed to eliminate current and/or recurring IED and obstacle threats. The common use and lethality of the IED as an obstacle or close contact weapon requires that the combined arms team fully integrate those members with special expertise in reducing, clearing, or neutralizing the IED. While engineers and others have special expertise that is well-suited to support the maneuver commander in this combined arms operation, it is only the explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team that is capable or authorized to eliminate or “render safe” an IED. As such, commanders must consider the availability and use of EOD personnel during both the planning and as part of the clearing team. This manual adopts the framework of assured mobility to define the framework for IED defeat. Assured mobility is defined as actions that give the force commander the ability to maneuver where and when he desires without interruption or delay to achieve the mission (FM 3-34). Soldiers and Marines contribute to assured mobility by reducing or eliminating the effects of EHs on the force. Assured mobility is an integrating process relating to each of the WFFs similar to that of IPB, targeting, intelligence synchronization, and CRM. As an integrating process, assured mobility provides linkage between the tasks associated with mobility, countermobility, and survivability and their roles across the six WFFs. It applies in all operations and across the complete spectrum of conflict. While focused primarily on the WFFs of movement and maneuver, intelligence, and protection, assured mobility has linkages to each of the WFFs and both enables and is enabled by those functions. It strives to ensure freedom of maneuver and preserve combat power throughout the area of operations (AO) as it seeks to exploit superior situational understanding (SU). This framework (or construct) is one means of enabling a force to achieve the commander’s intent. Assured mobility emphasizes proactive mobility and countermobility (and supporting survivability) and integrates all of the engineer functions (combat, general, and geospatial engineering) in accomplishing this. Assured mobility is broader than the term mobility and should not be confused with the limited application of the mobility operations. Its focus is on supporting the maneuver commander’s ability to gain a position of advantage in relation to the enemy; by conducting mobility operations to negate the impact of enemy obstacles, conducting countermobility to impact and shape enemy maneuver, or a combination of both. Assured mobility provides the broad framework of fundamentals (predict, detect, prevent, avoid, neutralize, and protect) that serve to retain the focus and integration of mobility, countermobility, and survivability within the combined arms team. Planners at all levels of the combined arms team rely on this framework to ensure that adequate support is provided to the commander’s scheme of maneuver and intent. The engineer plays an integrating role in assured mobility that is similar to the role played by the intelligence officer in the IPB integrating process. Ultimately assured mobility is the commander’s responsibility. Other staff members also integrate mobility, countermobility, and survivability tasks as a part of assured mobility. Examples include regulating traffic in the maneuver space, handling displaced persons, and performing other mobility, countermobility, and survivability tasks to support the maneuver plan. Within the combined arms team planning staff, it is the assured mobility section at the BCT and RCT level (and those same staff members at echelons above the BCT and RCT) that provides the input for engineer; chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive (CBRNE); and similar specialized reconnaissance. Each plans for the application and coordinates the integration of specialized reconnaissance. In the case of the engineer coordinator, this applies across the engineer functions and spanning the range from tactical to technical reconnaissance capabilities. See FM 3-34 for an in-depth discussion of assured mobility. As identified in Joint Publication (JP) 3-15, there are two basic approaches for organizing IED defeat operations. The first involves creating specialized cells within the intelligence staff section (J-2), operations staff section (J-3), and engineering staff section (J-7) to plan and oversee the conduct of IED defeat operations. This approach is normally used in small-scale, short-duration operations when supporting technical specialist forces are limited. The second approach is to create a separate headquarters (a combined joint task force [JTF]) to manage the EOD assets, associated technical specialists, and other

x

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Introduction

specialized organizations that may be attached to the joint force for the IED defeat fight. This approach is appropriate to large-scale, long-duration operations with a large specialist presence. At the BCT and RCT echelon and the tactical level, a single integrated IED defeat cell is typically created to optimize the available assets and respond to the requirement for very rapid synchronization of staff interaction. What is referred to in this manual as the IED defeat cell may actually be as many as three separate cells at the joint and echelons-above BCT and RCT level.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

xi

This page is intentionally left blank.

Chapter 1

Operational Environment The continued effectiveness of the IED threat has impacted unit operations, U.S. policy, and public perception. Therefore, this deadly enemy capability is likely to be a component of war and armed conflict for the foreseeable future. This chapter provides an overview of the OE and the baseline rationale for why and how state and nonstate actors employ IEDs against a superior military force. In the complicated environment of today, it is impossible to predict the exact nature of the OE in which IEDs might be used. Therefore, the U.S. Army and USMC must be ready to meet challenges that IEDs present within a multitude of diverse OEs. FM 3-0 provides an analysis of the OE using the variables of political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information, and the added Army variables of physical environment and time. An analysis of these variables and their association and impact on IED defeat assists commanders in defining conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect operational options and decisions for military forces.

CONCEPT 1-1. The OE is defined as a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 1-02). The OE is complex, dynamic, and multidimensional; it encompasses a collection of eight interrelated variables. 1-2. Military forces seeking to transform the OE must consider all factors that bear on tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. An IED is defined as a device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract. It may incorporate military stores, but is normally devised from nonmilitary components (JP 3-07.2). Due to the extensive use, destructive nature, and overall impact on military operations, the IED has a significant impact on the OE and, therefore, must be considered by commanders at all levels. 1-3. In practice, reshaping fundamental conditions and human perceptions, behaviors, and actions is extremely difficult. Therefore, the ability of leaders and Soldiers and Marines to understand the OE, interact with the people, and use capabilities effectively, bears directly upon the ability of the Army and USMC to achieve its tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. 1-4. Analysis of the OE proceeds through the political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT) variables. Conceptually, PMESII-PT provides an unconstrained view of the situation—not not only in basic terms, but also in terms of its emergent characteristics. Such a comprehensive view assists commanders in appreciating how the military instrument complements the other instruments of power. To gain a broad understanding of these influences, commanders will normally consult with specialists in each area. In some cases, senior commanders will have specialists in nonmilitary subjects assigned to their staffs. 1-5. Analysis of the OE in terms of PMESII-PT variables provides an encyclopedic look at the overall situation in terms of the variables and their interactions. This analysis provides the relevant information that senior commanders can use to frame operational problems. When Army forces receive a mission, they use a much more focused analysis of the factors of the situation. At the tactical level, and at the operational level for major operations, Army leaders use METT-TC as a planning and execution tool. The PMESII-PT

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

1-1

Chapter 1

variables support the decision-making process by providing the underlying detailed information upon which METT-TC and mission analysis draw. (See Chapter 4 for more discussion of METT-TC as a planning consideration.) This enables leaders at the tactical and operational levels to act effectively, anticipating the consequences of their operations before and during mission execution.

VARIABLES POLITICAL 1-6. The political variable describes the distribution of responsibility and power at all levels of governance or cooperation. Such political institutions and actors enjoy varying degrees of legitimacy with the populations at local, regional, and national (or transnational) levels. 1-7. In the state or states where IEDs are employed, the nature and stability of a country often are related to where the real strength of the state lies. It may be the political leadership, the military, the police, or some other element within the population. In understanding where the power resides, analysts can consider who would use IEDs, against whom, and why—as a means to achieve a specific end. Those who employ IEDs may be nonstate actors (such as criminals, insurgents, or terrorists) that are either subnational or transnational in nature; in that case, Soldiers and Marines need to understand the nature and stability of the nonstate organization. A weak state may be unable to control the activities of nonstate actors who would use IEDs within its territory. 1-8. Another consideration for the political analysis of an OE is the concept of “will.” Will encompasses a unification of values, morals, agendas, effort, and the probability of acting on them. Through this unity, participants are often willing to physically sacrifice themselves or members of the group to employ an IED to support the achievement of the unified goal. Understanding the will of key groups (political, military, insurgent, and terrorist) in the OE will help further define various groups’ goals and their willingness to support and achieve their ends.

MILITARY 1-9. The military variable explores the military capabilities of all relevant actors in a given OE. Such capabilities include equipment, manpower, military doctrine, training levels, resource constraints, and leadership issues. Military leadership is especially important in gaining an understanding of individual leaders and the human characteristics of their forces. Analysis should focus on an actor’s ability to field forces and leverage them for use domestically, regionally, or globally. 1-10. Military institutions or groups have the knowledge and ability to use a combination of conventional and unconventional capabilities. When confronted by stronger military power, weaker forces will employ irregular capabilities and methods, using indirect approaches to achieve their aims. The IED is an example of an irregular weapon that has become a weapon of choice for criminals, insurgents, terrorists, and paramilitary organizations.

ECONOMIC 1-11. The economic system encompasses individual behaviors and aggregate phenomena related to the production, distribution, and consumption of resources. Specific factors may include the influence of industrial organization, international trade, development (foreign aid), finance, institutional capabilities, geography, and the rule of law. Differences in the ability to produce, distribute, and receive goods are important to the frequency of IED use and the types of IEDs used. With IEDs, an enemy can use a large number of cheap, expendable items that affect U.S. capabilities and can cause the United States to use high-technology systems to defeat the IED. In other cases, IEDs are used to disrupt the flow of goods or against critical infrastructure that can impact a local economy.

1-2

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Operational Environment

1-12. The economic situation within an OE should be carefully analyzed to determine the enemy’s: • Currently available resources. • Ability to acquire materials. • Level of sophistication. • Ability to sustain IED operations.

SOCIAL 1-13. The social variable describes the cultural, religious, and ethnic makeup within an OE. A social system consists of the people, groups, and institutions that exhibit shared identity, behaviors, values, and beliefs. Social groups consist of groups organized, integrated, and networked by relationships, interacting within their environment. Societies are comprised of structured, interrelated, and overlapping groups and institutions, each with statuses and roles that support, enable, and provide opportunity to achieve personal or community expectations. Culture is a system of shared beliefs, values, customs, behaviors, and artifacts that the members of society use to cope with their world and among each other. Oftentimes, this social commonality is a basis for support of the enemy. Providing information to the enemy about potential targets, troop or other target movements, and locations of IED materials are examples of how societal variables support the enemy’s use of IEDs. If treated properly, the populous can be cooperative with the U.S. or coalition forces and provide information about enemy activity and locations of weapon caches, bomb-making factories, and emplaced IEDs. 1-14. Important characteristics of a social system include population demographics, migration trends, urbanization, standards of living, and cohesiveness of cultural, religious, or ethnic groups. Understanding these characteristics can be a crucial element in successfully fighting the IED threat.

INFORMATION 1-15. The information variable describes the nature, scope, characteristics, and effects of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. Information involves the access, use, manipulation, distribution, and reliance on data, media, and knowledge systems—civilian and military, by the global community. Information systems are the infrastructure that enables the dissemination and storage of information. The enemy understands the value of information. The enemy has seen the important role that information operations (IO) has played in achieving the overall objectives of various actors in current and past conflicts. Media and other information means facilitate the visibility of IED operations to the world (providing publicity), while the use of IEDs can provide standoff and anonymity to the user. The enemy can use IO to try to provide justification for its actions as a means for recruitment. Knowing that casualties from IEDs will be publicized in the media in the United States and other coalition countries, the enemy can use this reporting to affect the U.S. national will and the coalition will. The enemy will exploit U.S. mistakes and leverage the media and other information systems to impact U.S. political decision making. IO is a nonlethal tool that is used in conjunction with lethal operations to achieve an end. 1-16. The enemy will emphasize the fact that U.S. and coalition forces and/or local authorities are unable to protect themselves or the local population from the effects of IEDs. This is a physical and psychological threat to elements of the local population; it can keep them from supporting U.S. objectives and coerce them into providing aid to enemy forces or at least passively protecting them. 1-17. Information may flow by complex telecommunications or by less sophisticated means––couriers, graffiti, rumors, cultural symbols, art, literature, radio, or local print media. Understanding whatever communication infrastructure exists is important because it facilitates the IED information flow that can promote IED activities and/or influence local, regional, national, and international audiences.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

1-3

Chapter 1

INFRASTRUCTURE 1-18. The infrastructure variable is composed of the basic facilities, services, and installations needed for the functioning of a community or society. IEDs can be used to degrade or destroy needed infrastructure which can affect the entire OE. Conversely, selected infrastructure may be used for bomb-making factories, weapons caches, and/or a place to conduct planning and training as they typically offer space and some level of cover and concealment. 1-19. This variable also reflects the technological sophistication of a given OE. Since IEDs may be remotely detonated using communications technology and range from relatively crude to fairly sophisticated devices, analysis of this and other variables is critical to assist in determining potential types of IEDs, methods of emplacement, and triggers the enemy may use. 1-20. This category also represents the industrial base of the local setting and the availability of toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) For example, cylinders or ton containers of chlorine may be used in conjunction with IEDs.

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT 1-21. The physical environment defines the physical circumstances and conditions that influence the execution of operations throughout the domains of air, land, sea, and space. The defining factors are urban settings (super surface, surface, and subsurface features), and other complex terrain, weather, topography, hydrology, and environmental conditions. 1-22. The enemy clearly understands that less complex and open environments favor U.S. forces with long-range, precision-guided weapons and sophisticated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability. Because of this, the enemy usually avoids open terrain and operates in urban areas and other complex terrain to mitigate U.S. technical superiority. Such terrain is also optimal for emplacing IEDs with minimal risk to those who emplace them. However, the physical environment includes more than just terrain and weather patterns. Natural resources, population centers, and critical infrastructure are also important especially since they may become targets for IEDs.

TIME 1-23. The variable of time influences military operations within an OE in terms of the decision-cycles, operational tempo, and planning horizons (see FM 5-0.) It may also influence endurance or protraction of operations since popular support for extended operations may diminish over time. Timing is often a critical planning factor that the enemy uses to maximize the effectiveness of an IED. 1-24. The enemy may take advantage of a relatively immature and nonsecure sea port of debarkation (SPOD) or aerial port of debarkation (APOD). Additionally, if the enemy determines that time has caused complacency or lack of attention, they will typically employ IEDs to take advantage of the vulnerability.

ADAPTIVE PRINCIPLES OF THE ENEMY 1-25. An enemy who is not a peer competitor will avoid engaging U.S. or coalition forces in a head-to-head conventional fight. The enemy will not fight U.S. or coalition forces in the same manner as it would its peers or lesser forces in its region. Instead, it will have to resort to adaptive approaches to accomplish its goals against a U.S. or coalition force that overmatches it in conventional military power. Asymmetry in warfare is not a new phenomenon, but given the relative capabilities of the United States as opposed to its potential opponents, it is increasingly likely that enemies will seek adaptive, asymmetric approaches. They will seek to avoid or counter U.S. strengths without having to oppose them directly, while exploiting perceived U.S. weaknesses. In such cases, IEDs may become the weapon of choice. 1-26. Various nation-state and nonstate actors generally view the United States as having an overall advantage in technology and warfighting capability. Despite these U.S. strengths, these actors also see some weaknesses that they may be able to exploit. Actions against such a superior force will focus on perceived centers of gravity (such as national will and the willingness to endure casualties, hardship, stress,

1-4

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Operational Environment

and continued deployments over time). Based on these perceived vulnerabilities, enemy forces are likely to employ the following principles for dealing with technologically or numerically superior forces: • Cause politically unacceptable casualties. • Control access into the region. • Employ operational shielding. • Neutralize technological overmatch. • Control the tempo. • Change the nature of the conflict. • Allow no sanctuary.

CAUSE POLITICALLY UNACCEPTABLE CASUALTIES 1-27. The enemy will attempt to inflict highly visible and continuous losses on U.S. forces to weaken U.S. domestic resolve and national will to sustain the deployment or conflict. In recent history, modern wealthy nations have shown an apparent lack of commitment over time and sensitivity to domestic and world opinion in relation to conflict and seemingly needless casualties. The enemy will try to influence public opinion in the U.S. homeland to the effect that the goal of intervention is not worth the cost. 1-28. IEDs are well-suited to the goal of causing politically unacceptable casualties. They can cause a relatively large number of casualties for a relatively small expense. The United States or its coalition partners may be unwilling to accept military or civilian casualties regardless of the location or situation.

CONTROL ACCESS INTO THE REGION 1-29. U.S. and coalition forces capable of achieving overmatch against the enemy must first enter the region using power-projection capabilities. To completely deter U.S. or coalition involvement or severely limit its scope and intensity, the enemy would first target the national will of the United States and/or its coalition partners. Given the challenges IED operations have caused for U.S. and coalition forces in the past, an enemy could mount an extensive IED campaign in its region to dissuade such forces from intervening there. 1-30. Access-control operations do not necessarily have to deny access entirely. A more realistic goal is to limit the U.S. or coalition accumulation of applicable combat power to a level and to locations that do not threaten the goals of the enemy organization. One means of accomplishing this is the employment of IEDs to attack U.S. or coalition forces at APODs and SPODs, along routes to the region, at transfer points en route, at aerial ports of embarkation (APOEs) and sea ports of embarkation (SPOEs), and even at their home stations. These are fragile and convenient targets. To selectively deny a U.S. or coalition force the use of or access to forward operating bases (FOBs) within or near the region, enemy organizations might use IEDs to attack the indigenous (or regional) population and economic centers for the intimidation effect.

EMPLOY OPERATIONAL SHIELDING 1-31. The enemy will use any means necessary to protect key elements of its forces or infrastructure from destruction by a more powerful U.S. or coalition force. This protection may come from the use of urban and complex terrain and may exploit U.S. or coalition concerns about the attendant risk of civilian casualties or unacceptable collateral damage when engaging the enemy. Dispersion and the use of IO can also help protect the enemy. The enemy will try to conceal and protect the locations where its personnel plan IED operations, collect the necessary materials, make bombs, or train operatives for IED emplacement. 1-32. Operational shielding generally cannot protect the entire enemy organization for an extended time period. Rather, the enemy organization will seek to protect selected elements of its forces for enough time to gain the freedom of action necessary to execute IED operations.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

1-5

Chapter 1

NEUTRALIZE TECHNOLOGICAL OVERMATCH 1-33. Although the United States currently enjoys overwhelming military superiority, this no longer serves as an adequate deterrent against many emerging threats, especially those from nonstate actors. When conflict occurs, any enemy will seek ways to neutralize U.S. technological advantages. Against a technologically superior force, enemy organizations will disperse their forces in areas where complex terrain limits the U.S. ability to apply a full range of technological capabilities. However, the enemy can rapidly mass forces from these dispersed locations to conduct IED operations at the time and place of their choosing. Enemy organizations train their forces to operate in adverse weather, limited visibility, rugged terrain, and urban environments. Such conditions can shield the enemy from the effects of U.S. or coalition force high-technology weapons and/or deny U.S. or coalition forces the full benefits of their advanced ISR and targeting assets. 1-34. Adversaries also use TICs in conjunction with IEDs. Despite the U.S. military’s advanced detection, protection, and medical counter-measures against traditional chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats, U.S. systems offer limited capabilities against TICs. Odor and symptoms may be the warning systems Soldiers and Marines use to identify a TIC hazard. The primary protection is to don a military mask and immediately vacate the area. 1-35. Enemy forces might concentrate the use of IEDs on the destruction of high-visibility (flagship) U.S. systems. Losses among these premier systems may not only degrade operational capability, but also undermine U.S. or coalition morale. Thus, attacks against such targets are not always linked to militarystyle objectives.

Technology for Situational Understanding 1-36. The enemy will use its own ISR means to support IED employment. The proliferation of advanced technologies permits some enemy organizations to achieve a SU of U.S. or coalition deployments and force dispositions formerly reserved for the militaries of technologically advanced nations. Much information on the sources of such technology is readily and cheaply available on the Internet and in open-source documents. These media sources can provide enemy forces with extensive information on U.S. or coalition members and their armed forces. 1-37. Intelligence can also be obtained through greater use of human intelligence (HUMINT) assets that, among other sources, gain information through sympathetic elements in the local population and from civilians or local workers contracted by U.S. or coalition forces for base operation purposes. Similarly, communication technologies are becoming more reliable and inexpensive. Therefore, they could act as a primary communication system or a redundant measure. There will be little U.S. or coalition forces can do to prevent the use of these assets, especially since it is becoming harder to discriminate between civilian and military-type usage.

Availability of Technology 1-38. Enemy forces use all the technology available to them, sometimes in adaptive or innovative ways. Low-technology solutions could be used against high-technology systems of an enemy. The construction of IEDs often involves employment of components for other than their originally intended purpose. Enemy forces take advantage of opportunities to upgrade available materials primarily through captured equipment, the black market, or outside support. 1-39. The enemy can use IEDs in conducting what many foreign forces, including potential adversaries, called “systems warfare.” This concept describes how an enemy force would prefer to operate against U.S. or coalition forces that overmatch the enemy technologically, as a means of “leveling the playing field.” In this approach, the enemy views its adversary as a collection of complex, dynamic, and interrelated systems and advocates the use of all elements of available power to create actions leading to desired effects on those systems. IEDs may be the weapon of choice, since they can produce disproportionate, often unpredictable affects. The focus of systems warfare is not just on the immediate target, but on the effects that can be created by striking that target. The enemy will frequently attack the more vulnerable, “soft”

1-6

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Operational Environment

components of the U.S. or coalition force (such as logistics, C2, and ISR assets). This can allow the enemy to degrade the effectiveness of the overall force without having to directly engage superior U.S. maneuver and fire support forces. 1-40. IEDs are useful for systems warfare, as a means of attacking U.S. and coalition lines of communications (LOCs), convoys, and other logistics assets. They also provide a means to attack U.S. or coalition C2 and sustainment forces without having to mount force-on-force attacks. In the complex OE, some of the smallest activities and interactions can cause the greatest effects. No activity is subject to successful prediction.

CONTROL THE TEMPO 1-41. The enemy forces will try to execute IED operations at a time and place of their choosing. IED activities may not be linked to other enemy actions or objectives. Rather, their purpose is to inflict mass casualties or destroy flagship systems (both of which can reduce the will of U.S. or coalition forces to continue the fight). 1-42. Enemy forces can vary the tempo of IED operations. A period of relatively low activity in IED employment might lull U.S. or coalition forces into a false sense of security, making them more vulnerable to the next round of IEDs.

CHANGE THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT 1-43. Enemy forces will try to change the nature of the conflict to exploit the differences between friendly and enemy capabilities and sensitivities—presenting the U.S. or coalition forces with conditions they are not prepared for. Enemy organizations will adjust their IED TTP to the strengths and weaknesses of U.S. or coalition forces. The enemy is prepared to disperse its forces in areas of sanctuary and employ them in ways that present a battlefield that is difficult for U.S. or coalition forces to analyze and predict. 1-44. Enemy forces may use a sympathetic population to provide refuge or a base of operations. They move out of sanctuaries and employ IEDs when they can create a window of opportunity or when physical or natural conditions present an opportunity. Also, they may use IEDs against U. S., coalition, and HN civilians, Soldiers, or Marines not directly connected to the intervention as a device to change the fundamental nature of the conflict.

ALLOW NO SANCTUARY 1-45. Enemy forces seek to use IEDs to deny U.S. or coalition forces safe haven during every phase of a deployment and as long as they are in the region or threatening to intervene. The resultant drain on U.S. or coalition manpower and resources to provide adequate protection measures can reduce strategic, operational, and tactical means to conduct war. Such actions will not only deny U.S. or coalition forces sanctuary, but also erodes their national will. 1-46. IEDs can be used to cause politically unacceptable casualties anywhere and at any time. However, they can be used at a particular time and/or place to deny U.S. or coalition forces access to an area, deny them safe haven, disrupt logistics, or impede movement. They can also be used to assassinate key military, government, or civilian figures or to target a particular group or organization. Physical casualties caused by IEDs also create a psychological effect that can intimidate or coerce others. 1-47. The enemy, whether a nation-state or nonstate actor, will try to present U.S. or coalition forces with a nonlinear operational environment in which there is no safe “rear area.” The enemy can use IEDs to attack U.S. headquarters, logistics centers, and supply and evacuation routes. The enemy can also use IEDs to attack living quarters, dining facilities, and places frequented by off-duty Soldiers, Marines, or civilians.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

1-7

Chapter 1

VARIED ACTIONS 1-48. Most of the above principles, to some degree, involve decentralized, dispersed, and distributed activities. To best attack superior forces, enemy leaders use initiative to conduct IED operations at a time and place of their choosing. This may mean under circumstances that offset U.S. advantages and maximize sanctuary from the effects of U.S. or coalition systems. 1-49. The enemy also varies the types of IEDs it employs and the methods of employment. This can make pattern analysis and templating challenging for U.S. or coalition forces.

1-8

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Chapter 2

Mobility Operations and the Framework of Improvised Explosive Device Defeat With the proliferation of technology and access to explosive materials, many enemy groups have come to rely on IEDs as a primary means of attack due to the overwhelming strength of conventional U.S. military capabilities. As seen in recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, IED attacks have destabilizing and destructive effects on friendly operations. This chapter provides commanders, leaders, and staffs with the doctrinal hierarchy and linkages to the WFFs necessary to define and integrate IED defeat. Additionally, it describes the IED defeat framework.

MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER 2-1. The WFFs are defined as a group of tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives (FMI 5-0.1). The movement and maneuver WFF encompasses the related tasks and systems that move forces to achieve a position of advantage in relation to the enemy. It includes those tasks associated with moving and employing forces in relation to a threat in combination with direct fire or fire potential (maneuver), force projection, and repositioning within or between joint operational areas (movement), mobility, and countermobility. 2-2. Movement and maneuver are the means by which commanders mass the effects of combat power to achieve surprise, shock, momentum, and dominance. FM 3-90, Tactics, discusses maneuver and tactical movement, while FMI 3-35 provides additional detail on force projection.

COMBINED ARMS MOBILITY OPERATIONS 2-3. “Conduct Mobility Operations” is an Army tactical task (ART) and a Marine Corps task (MCT) subordinate to the movement and maneuver WFF that has applicability across many of the other WFFs (to include intelligence, protection, and sustainment); however, as it relates to IED defeat it is primarily focused on the WFF of movement and maneuver. As a combined arms operation, mobility operations assure freedom of movement within the AO, allowing the commander to move and/or maneuver units, weapon systems, and critical supplies to desired locations without delay or disruption. 2-4. Mobility operations consist of five functional areas or supporting tasks that are focused on providing uninterrupted maneuver and mobility on the battlefield. These five areas are articulated in FM 3-34.2 and include— z Conduct combined arms breaching operations. Detect, reduce, neutralize (by combined arms breach or bypass), mark, and proof mined areas and obstacles. Countermine and counterobstacle activities are typically performed in a close combat environment. z Conduct clearing operations. Employ tactics and equipment to detect and eliminate obstacles, mines, and other EHs. While this is not always part of a combined arms breaching operation and is typically not performed in a close combat environment, it will still generally include the task of breach. z Conduct gap-crossing operations. Fill gaps in the terrain to allow personnel and equipment to pass. For specifics on gap-crossing operations, see FM 90-13/MCRP 3-17.1.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

2-1

Chapter 2 •

•

Construct and maintain combat roads and trails. Expediently prepare or repair routes of travel for personnel and equipment. This includes temporary bypasses of damaged roads and bridges. Perform forward aviation combat engineering. Construct and maintain forward airfields and landing zones (LZs), forward arming and refueling points, landing strips, or other aviation support sites in the forward combat area.

2-5. The combined arms team clearing of IEDs is the main focus of this manual, because they are performed to eliminate current or recurring obstacle threats such as those presented by IEDs. While there are specific special considerations for IEDs, the same basic principles apply to other EHs and obstacles in general.

CLEARING OPERATIONS 2-6. The maneuver commander may order clearing operations be conducted to facilitate mobility within the AO, based on a METT-TC analysis. The operation could be conducted as a single mission to open or reopen a route or area; or it may be conducted on a recurring basis in support of efforts to defeat a recurring threat to a critical route. FM 3-90 will identify clearing operations as a type of tactical enabling operation when it is revised. Conduct Clearing Operations is one of the three subordinate ARTs of Conduct Mobility Operations that enable a force to maintain its mobility by reducing and/or clearing obstacles. 2-7. Clearing operations are a combined arms tactical enabling mission conducted when the commander orders all EHs (enemy and friendly) and enemy or natural obstacles within an assigned area or along a specified route cleared. They can include a combined arms breach but are not limited to reducing a lane or lanes through identified obstacles. In both route and area clearance, EHs and other obstacles that are a threat to mobility along the route or within the specified area are eliminated or neutralized. Clearing operations may include the tactical mission task to clear. Clear is defined as a tactical mission task that requires the commander to remove all enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance within an assigned area (FM 3-90). The force does this by destroying, capturing, or forcing the withdrawal of enemy forces so they cannot interfere with the friendly unit’s mission. 2-8. The main focus of clearing operations is clearing the IED. However, the focus on the IED is merely the end product of a complex set of enemy activities. Commanders operating in the OE or fighting an asymmetric enemy have ordered clearing operations in support of an overall IED defeat mission. Defeat is a tactical mission task that occurs when an enemy force has temporarily or permanently lost the physical means or the will to fight. The defeated force’s commander is unwilling or unable to pursue his adopted course of action, thereby yielding to the friendly commander’s will, and can no longer interfere to a significant degree with the actions of friendly forces. Defeat can result from the use of force or the threat of its use (FM 1-02). 2-9. Combat engineers supporting clearing operations are task-organized to conduct either route or area clearance. If a combined arms breach is required as part of the clearing operation, selected combat engineer and other forces are task-organized specifically for the breaching operation. Bypassing or otherwise avoiding the obstacle may be preferred over a combined arms breach; however, in clearing operations the objective is to eliminate the enemy force or organized resistance within an assigned area or along an assigned route. Combat engineers within the task-organized clearance force detect and mark EHs. They then either clear within their capability, or allow an EOD unit to respond appropriately based on METT-TC and the commander’s guidance. Only the EOD team is capable of eliminating or “rendering safe” an IED.

AREA CLEARANCE 2-10. In land operations, area clearance detects and if found, identifies, marks and neutralizes, destroys, or removes mines or other explosive ordnance, IEDs, and booby traps in a defined area to allow a military operation to continue with reduced risk (FM 3-34.2). It is a combined arms operation. The clearance of land mines is primarily the responsibility of combat engineer units; the clearing of most other EHs is primarily the responsibility of EOD units within the Army or from EOD elements in other Services.

2-2

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Mobility Operations and the Framework of Improvised Explosive Device Defeat

2-11. An explosive hazards is any hazard containing an explosive component. All explosive hazards currently encountered on the battlefield can be broken down into five categories: unexploded explosive ordnance, booby traps, improvised explosive devices, captured enemy ammunition, and bulk explosives (FM 3-34.210). Unexploded explosive ordnance (UXO) is explosive ordnance which has been primed, fused, armed, or otherwise prepared for action, and which has been fired, dropped, launched, projected, or placed in such a manner as to constitute a hazard to operations, installations, personnel, or material and remains unexploded either by malfunction or design or for any other cause (JP 3-15). A booby trap is an explosive or nonexplosive device or other material, deliberately placed to cause casualties when an apparently harmless object is disturbed or a normally safe act is performed (JP 1-02). An IED is a device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract. It may incorporate military stores, but is normally devised from nonmilitary components. Captured enemy ammunition (CEA) is defined as all ammunition products and components produced for or used by a foreign force that is hostile to the United States (that is or was engaged in combat against the United States) in the custody of a U.S. military force or under the control of a DOD component. The term includes confined gaseous, liquid, and solid propellants; explosives; pyrotechnics; chemical and riot-control agents; smokes and incendiaries (including bulk explosives); chemical warfare agents; chemical munitons; rockets; guided and ballistic missiles; bombs; warheads; mortar rounds; artillery ammunition; small demolition charges; and devices and components of the above. Captured enemy ammunition can also include North Atlantic Treaty Organization or U.S.-manufactured munitions that may not have been under U.S. custody or control (FM 3-34.210). 2-12. Enough time should be allotted for area-clearing planning and execution because area clearance is inherently dangerous. Often times, specific information is not known about the area to be cleared. Leaders must perform constant risk, threat, and task analysis using the factors of METT-TC. Area clearance is normally not conducted under fire, only conducted during hours of daylight, and is not normally conducted in adverse weather. Leaders and planners must strive to limit the areas requiring clearing to only those areas necessary to support military operations. When possible, areas not required for military operations and not an immediate threat to joint forces will be permanently marked and avoided. 2-13. As a primary component for making IEDs, caches of explosive remnants of war must be located, secured, and recovered or removed by disposal. To reduce the enemy’s capability to exploit explosive remnants of war, it is critical for units to include this under area clearance operations of possible sites or former military holding facilities. Also important to such operations is the task organization of necessary skills to accomplish this mission. The inclusion of EOD personnel is critical to this type of mission and engineers can assist as required. Explosive ordnance clearing agent (EOCA) personnel should be aligned with EOD teams, if available, depending on the size of the cache, because they can assist but not conduct these operations alone. By eliminating these caches or explosive remnants of war, the enemy’s ability to use such ordnance as weapons is greatly reduced.

ROUTE CLEARANCE 2-14. Route clearance is a key enabling task in IED defeat. It provides the maneuver commander the capability to employ a combined arms force of combat engineers, EOD, and other units task-organized, equipped, and trained to neutralize the IED threat along critical routes. Neutralize is defined as rendering enemy personnel or material incapable of interfering with a particular operation (FM 3-90). In land operations, route clearance is the detection, investigation, marking and reporting, and neutralization of explosive hazards and other obstacles along a defined route to enable assured mobility for the maneuver commander. It is a combined arms operation that relies on a reconnaissance of the route to be cleared (FM 3-34.2). It is usually preceded by but can include a reconnaissance of the route to be cleared. It can be conducted to open a route for the necessary traffic or on a recurring basis to minimize the risk along selected routes. 2-15. The clearing operation aims to completely eliminate or neutralize EHs or other obstacles along the route. The route clearance is typically not conducted under fire. However, a task-organized route clearance team must be prepared to employ the fundamentals of SOSRA (suppress, obscure, secure, reduce, and

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

2-3

Chapter 2

assault) at any point along the targeted route (see FM 3-34.2). While these actions may not be executed during a route clearance, they are planned for just as they are in breaching operations. The clearance team must be prepared to execute SOSRA fundamentals as necessary. 2-16. Route and area clearance are not the only tasks required to defeat a sustained IED threat throughout the AO, but they can provide a solution the commander may employ to defeat this type of threat. For more information on clearing operations see FM 3-34.2. 2-17. Figure 2-1 provides a graphical depiction to describe the ARTs and MCTs discussed in the preceding paragraphs. While it is not inclusive of all the mobility operations ARTs and MCTs, it is important to understand the doctrinal linkages of those subordinate ARTs and MCTs that describe those tasks that support IED defeat operations as they relate to the movement and maneuver WFF. The IED defeat framework provides structure to the focused discussion of IED defeat.

Figure 2-1. Mobility Operations Army Tasks and IED Defeat

THE IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DEFEAT FRAMEWORK 2-18. With a focus on clearing IEDs, the IED defeat framework is derived from the fundamentals of assured mobility. Assured mobility encompasses those actions that enable commanders with the ability to deploy, move, and maneuver where and when they desire (without interruption or delay) and to achieve the mission (see FM 3-34). When properly planned and evaluated, the fundamentals of assured mobility assist in developing SU for the commander that allows them to exploit opportunities to defeat the IED prior to its inception, thus enabling freedom of movement and maneuver. Because all IEDs will not be eliminated, commanders plan to mitigate the impacts by developing standing operating procedures (SOPs), TTPs, battle drills, and other response actions to lessen the effects of the IED and/or eliminate the enemy’s desired outcome. To effectively mitigate the impact of IEDs, the fundamentals of detect, avoid, neutralize, and protect are used in conjunction with the factors of METT-TC to plan and develop coordinated and well-executed responses. 2-19. As a parallel construct to the framework of assured mobility, the IED defeat framework enables commanders and staffs to exploit (proactive defeat) the IED networks and the associated operations before they occur. It also provides a methodology for mitigating (reactive defeat) the impacts of the IED by

2-4

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Mobility Operations and the Framework of Improvised Explosive Device Defeat

addressing IEDs upon contact. See Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of assured mobility and the IED defeat framework. 2-20. Proactive defeat is focused on denying the enemy the ability to even emplace an IED. Reactive defeat typically is a function of the clearance operation. Proactive and reactive defeat functions and tasks, when planned and employed concurrently and continuously, complete the doctrinal approach to IED defeat operations. See Chapter 3 for more information on the intelligence WFF, Chapter 4 for a discussion of the integrating processes, and Appendix A for a description of selected units that directly support IED defeat operations.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

2-5

This page is intentionally left blank.

Chapter 3

Threat Analysis Although virtually any person or type of conventional or paramilitary group may employ an IED, it is a proven and effective weapon for insurgents, terrorists, and other nonstate actors. Such groups may or may not be linked to a nation-state and are not limited by geographic boundaries. Their motivations are often ideological and do not possess the same characteristics or centers of gravity as those found in a typical state versus a state in conflict. They can be organized in a nonhierarchical, noncontiguous network of cells. The structure resembles that of a communication network, such as the Internet, and its noncontiguous nature makes it extremely survivable. There are often many communication paths and decentralized C2. Some of these networks are independent and range from theater down to village level. Others are linked together to provide coordinated attacks against U.S. and coalition forces and are a part of large international terrorist organizations. The rapid technological advances in communication devices (such as wireless) and the Internet provide low-cost and easily obtainable modes of communication. Nevertheless, U.S. forces are equipped and prepared to attack these networks using a variety of capabilities and resources (see FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5).

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DISCIPLINES 3-1. Military intelligence disciplines are clearly defined areas of intelligence collection, processing, exploitation, and reporting using a specific category of technical or human resources. The Army’s and USMC’s intelligence disciplines are HUMINT, imagery intelligence (IMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), measurement and signatures intelligence (MASINT), counterintelligence (CI), technical intelligence (TECHINT), open-source intelligence (OSINT), geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), and allsource intelligence.

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE 3-2. HUMINT is the collection of information by a trained HUMINT collector from people and their associated documents and media sources to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment, personnel, and capabilities. It uses human sources as a tool and a variety of collection methods, both passive and active, to gather information to satisfy the commander’s intelligence requirements and cross-cue other intelligence disciplines (see FM 2-22.3). 3-3. During operations where IEDs are employed, the most important information and intelligence may come from the population and from those in direct contact with the population. The quantity and quality of this information will depend on the credibility U.S. forces have established with the local population, the effective security they provide the local population, and their ability to interact with the local population. One predictor of the ability to prevent the threat use of IEDs is the quality and depth of relationships between the unit and the communities. Local leaders will root out troublemakers within their towns and villages only if there is a good working relationship and trust built between them and coalition forces. Because HUMINT collectors are trained in the art of building rapport with foreign populations, they can use this skill to gather information to assist in identifying the threat and the location of their bombs, bombmaking supplies, and facilities. They can also record or photograph IED related personnel and events.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

3-1

Chapter 3

3-4. In the IED fight, HUMINT can collect information to assist in–– • Identifying hostile personnel in the unit AOs, including IED makers, emplacers, and suppliers. • Determining connections between known or suspected hostile personnel, thus building a detailed understanding of threat organizations and their structure. • Identifying and locating hostile organizations, meeting places, supply caches, materiel sources, and C2 elements. • Providing indications and warnings (I&W) of impending IED activities.

IMAGERY INTELLIGENCE 3-5. IMINT is derived from the exploitation of imagery collected by visual photography, infrared lasers, multispectral sensors, and radar. These sensors produce images of objects optically, electronically, or digitally on film, electronic-display devices, or other media. These topographic products allow the analysts to see the enemy’s pattern of IED employment and determine the terrain that favors their use. 3-6. In the IED fight, IMINT can–– • Graphically show change detection of objects on the terrain. • Determine the amount of vehicular or personnel traffic entering or leaving an area or along LOCs. • Locate personnel emplacing IEDs. • Record indications of population sentiment and demonstrations. • Use recorded imagery to backtrack movements around an IED event to determine threat locations and patterns.

SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE 3-7. SIGINT is a category of intelligence comprising both individually and in combination all communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation SIGINT, however transmitted. SIGINT provides intelligence on threat capabilities, disposition, composition, threat intentions, and targeting information for the delivery of lethal and nonlethal effects. 3-8. SIGINT intercept operators analyze intercepted communications to derive immediate intelligence and combat information, whereas SIGINT analysts analyze signals and emitters to derive further intelligence. SIGINT systems provide detection and locations of emitters as well as imagery download and exploitation capabilities. 3-9. In the IED fight, SIGINT can–– • Determine hostile plans, intent, and objectives. • Provide I&W of impending IED activities. • Identify hostile personnel and links between such persons and organizations. • Provide indications of population sentiment and demonstrations. • Identify and provide limited information on emitters associated with IED attacks. • Use emitter mapping correlated to IED events in time and space.

MEASUREMENT AND SIGNATURES INTELLIGENCE 3-10. MASINT is technically derived intelligence that detects, locates, tracks, identifies, and/or describes the specific characteristics of fixed and dynamic target objects and sources. MASINT possesses the ability to exist or remain in the same state for an indefinitely long time to provide close observation of a person or group, especially one under suspicion. This act of observing or the condition of being observed further provides the collection, collation, analysis, and dissemination of data. This type of observational study that involves continuous monitoring of questionable occurrence within a population is the persistent surveillance capability unique to MASINT. MASINT capabilities can additionally thwart many of the camouflage, concealment, and deception techniques currently used to deceive ISR systems.

3-2

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Threat Analysis

3-11. MASINT technology is used to detect levels of activities as well as penetrate man-made and/or natural camouflage or cover; detect recently placed IEDs; detect natural or man-made environmental disturbances in the earth’s surface not discernible through other intelligence means; and provide signatures (target identification) to munitions and sensors, to determine paths or trails to caches or IED locations. 3-12. Nationally derived MASINT advanced geospatial intelligence products provide an enhanced capability not currently in the scope of the legacy intelligence disciplines. The delineation of MASINT products comes from the ability in distinguishing and measuring levels of activities. This data, when correlated or fused with sensor-derived data, enables horizontal and vertical synchronization of the OE. The Army and USMC MASINT program spans from space-based capabilities to portable handheld equipment and emplaced sensor technologies. 3-13. In the IED fight, MASINT can–– • Provide persistent surveillance of frequent IED attack locations. • Monitor or detect movement of threat personnel using technology-derived methods. • Provide persistent surveillance of likely reconnaissance or overwatch positions. • Support and exist in every combatant command. MASINT also provides support by leveraging DOD MASINT products and providing correlation and fusion in support of, or with, MASINT organic sensor data. • Provide support to both persistent surveillance and protection requirements using multiple sensor-derived technologies in conjunction with nationally derived MASINT platforms.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 3-14. CI is focused on countering threat intelligence collection activities against U.S. forces through collection, CI investigations, operations, analysis and production, and functional and technical services. CI personnel work in conjunction with military police (MP), engineers, EOD, medical service personnel, and others as required, creating threat assessments (TAs) and vulnerability assessments (VAs). (TAs and VAs provide commanders with a comprehensive protection assessment, comparing pertinent threat capabilities to existing conditions.) 3-15. In the IED fight, CI can–– • Reveal threat perceptions of friendly patterns and vulnerabilities. • Understand threat intentions, objectives, goals, and methods. • Identify and eliminate threat collection efforts which support IED operations (for example, identifying surveillance of main supply routes [MSRs] or compounds for the purpose of providing data on convoys). • Educate Soldiers, Marines, and commanders as to how to identify and report threat incidents and possible intrusion related to IEDs.

TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE 3-16. TECHINT is intelligence derived from the collection and analysis of threat and foreign military equipment and associated materiel for the purposes of preventing technological surprise, assessing foreign scientific and technical capabilities, and developing countermeasures designed to neutralize an adversary’s technological advantages. Weapons technical intelligence (WTI), which is a subcomponent of TECHINT, focuses on IED exploitation. Weapons intelligence teams (WITs), as a part of WTI, collect forensic evidence and device components, rendered safe (or through post blast analysis) by EOD personnel, from IED incident locations. WTI and WIT conduct an initial review of collected material and then forward the material to the Combined Explosives Exploitation Cell (CEXC) for further exploitation. See Appendix A for further information on the CEXC.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

3-3

Chapter 3

3-17. In the IED fight, TECHINT can–– • Collect IED components or materials for further analysis. • Populate databases that track different types of IEDs and link an IED to a known or suspected maker based on the materials and methods used in its construction. • Analyze found or captured materials to determine if they are IED precursors. • Analyze current IED construction and initiation methods. • Predict IED trends and likely future construction and initiation methods. • Assess possible sources of IED materials based on forensic analysis of IEDs found either before or after detonation. • Assist in linking captured personnel to IED activity based on forensic evidence.

OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE 3-18. OSINT is intelligence produced from publicly available information that is collected, exploited, and disseminated in a timely manner to an appropriate audience for the purpose of addressing a specific intelligence requirement. The availability, depth, and range of publicly available information enable intelligence organizations to satisfy many intelligence requirements without the use of specialized human or technical means of collection. OSINT operations support other ISR efforts by providing foundational information that enhances collection and production. As part of a multidiscipline intelligence effort, the use and integration of OSINT ensures that decision makers have the benefit of all available information. 3-19. In the IED fight, OSINT can–– • Collect and monitor IED related information discussed during events that are open to the public or occur in public areas. • Collect and monitor IED related information that is located in any recorded public document (such as newspapers, magazines, leaflets, brochures, posters). • Collect and monitor IED related information that is broadcast for general public consumption to all receivers or terminals within a computer, radio, or television network. • Monitor threat or IED related Internet sites that may provide I&W of threat intentions, capabilities, activities, and a responsible party for a specific incident.

GEOSPATIAL INTELLIGENCE 3-20. GEOINT is intelligence derived from the exploitation, analysis, and fusion of imagery and IMINT with geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the earth. GEOINT consists of imagery, IMINT, and geospatial information. 3-21. In the IED fight, GEOINT can–– • Graphically show ingress and egress routes from past and probable IED sites. • Determine the probable location of future IED attacks. • Locate changes in terrain. • Locate possible observation posts (OPs) from past and probable IED sites.

ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE 3-22. All-source intelligence is defined as the intelligence products, organizations, and activities that incorporate all sources of information and intelligence, including open-source information, in the production of intelligence. All-source intelligence is a separate intelligence discipline, as well as the name of the function used to produce intelligence from multiple intelligence or information sources. 3-23. All-source analysts are key in converting combat information and all intelligence from each discipline into all-source intelligence products and targeting information. All-source analysis and assessments must be placed into context with the current OE. From the multiple sources of information received, the staff analyzes and identifies critical information; determines the relevancy and accuracy of the

3-4

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Threat Analysis

information; and reaches conclusions about the information. These conclusions are either immediately disseminated or are used to form the basis of intelligence analysis products. 3-24. In the IED fight, all-source intelligence analysts can–– • Provide analysis to answer the commander’s intelligence requirements. • Brief the threat situation to the commander and staff. • Develop predictive estimates on threat actions, especially the threat’s courses of action (COAs). • Continuously update the IPB. • Provide ground forces situational awareness regarding the IED threat in their operating area. • Produce special analysis products, such as threat models, templates, estimates, pattern analysis, and association matrixes. • Determine connections between events related to IED planning and execution, thereby building a better understanding of threat IED TTP. • Maintain a database of suspected IED related personnel for use during screening and interrogation operations.

UNIT SUPPORT TO INTELLIGENCE 3-25. Although not a military intelligence discipline, information observed and reported by every Soldier and Marine is also important in the fight against IEDs. Unit support to intelligence facilitates the idea that every Soldier and Marine on the battlefield has the ability and responsibility for collecting combat information through observation and appropriate tactical questioning. The information obtained and reported by every Soldier and Marine can be paramount in the fight against IEDs. Cultural awareness must be taught throughout the organization, from the most senior to the most junior Soldiers and Marines. Junior Soldiers and Marines normally have the most direct contact with the civilian population, and they have the opportunity to make cultural mistakes or to take cultural advantage of the situation, thus negatively or positively impacting the ability to operate. 3-26. Tactical questioning can provide critical information for situational awareness. Tactical questioning– • Is the expedient initial questioning for information of immediate tactical value. • Is not intended to make all Soldiers and Marines intelligence collectors or experts in intelligence collection. • Does not entail running source operations (which is prohibited except by trained and certified personnel) nor is it a replacement for the operations of HUMINT collectors. • Is designed to instill the basics of questioning and reporting to all Soldiers and Marines and to provide briefing and debriefing tools for patrols and intelligence staff officers (S-2s). 3-27. Soldiers and Marines conduct tactical questioning based on the unit’s SOP, the rules of engagement (ROE), and the order for that mission. Unit leaders must include specific guidance for tactical questioning in their mission briefings. Patrols must be aware of the need to identify friendly locals to cue HUMINT collectors. The unit operations staff officer (S-3) and S-2 must also provide specific guidance down to the unit level to help guide tactical questioning. 3-28. The information Soldiers and Marines report up the chain of command as a result of completed missions forms a vital part of understanding the situation. Careful and quick handling of enemy prisoners of war or detainees and documents or media also helps the effort.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

3-5

Chapter 3

3-29. In the IED fight, unit support to intelligence can provide–– • Good relationship development with the local populace. • Coordination with local police. • Assistance with joint patrol operations. • Greater understanding of the population’s perceptions. • Greater trust between Soldiers and Marines and the local population. 3-30. Providing patrols with a digital camera or video camera can greatly assist in the debriefing process and allow intelligence staff personnel to make their own judgments about items of interest that the patrol reports. Videotaping events, such as demonstrations, allow analysts who were not on the scene to identify key elements, leaders, and potential indicators to help preclude future incidents.

THREAT MOTIVATION AND CONSTRUCT 3-31. Rarely are only two sides involved in modern conflicts. More often, one group opposes other groups with conflicting interests. This is also the case in the Afghanistan and Iraq theaters of operation. Religious and tribal differences are but two conditions that fuel conflict. This poses a significantly more complex set of potential adversaries—entities that leaders must understand. 3-32. Threat forces try to create conditions to defeat U.S., coalition, and HN forces and to slow the support those forces obtain. Threat forces often disregard the law of war. They have used human shields, targeted innocent civilians, and occupied religious and health facilities as sanctuaries. These actions and techniques offset U.S. advantages and make it more difficult to locate and defeat the threat. U.S. reaction to these tactics can also have tremendous IO appeal. 3-33. While the threat may manifest itself in a variety of ways, there are several “types” of groups. Some of these groups are based on the religious belief system held by the members, while other groups may be focused on the condition they wish to reach to identify them. Table 3-1 shows a list of motivations. The list is not all-inclusive, but it provides a discussion of several motivations which have been historically apparent. Some threat types may exhibit a combination of the listed motivations.

3-6

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Threat Analysis

Table 3-1. Threat Motivations Type

Motivation

Anarchist

Seeks to eliminate all governmental institutions.

Commercialist

Seeks material or economic gain; operates within what may normally be legitimate enterprise, but within the context of the OE threatens U.S. interests via activities supporting threat forces.

Criminal

Seeks to gain personal, economic, or social advantage through criminal activities. Threat forces may use criminal activities to raise capital, move supplies, or gain influence.

Domestic

Operates within and against their home country. They are frequently tied to extreme social or political factions within a particular society and focus their efforts specifically on their nation's socio-political arena.

Egalitarian

Seeks to overthrow the political order and create a system based on distributional equality.

Ethnocentric

Uses race as the defining characteristic of a society, and therefore a basis of cohesion. There is usually the attitude that a particular group is superior because of their inherent racial characteristics.

Ideologist

Seeks ideological changes. The ideologist desires a set of doctrines or beliefs that form the basis of a political, economic, or other system.

Internationalist

Operates in multiple countries, but retains a geographic focus for their activities. For example, Hezbollah has cells worldwide and has conducted operations in multiple countries, but it is primarily concerned with events in Lebanon and Israel.

Irredentist

Identifies with and seeks to join a region or a state with a “parent” nation.

Nationalist

Uses their loyalty and devotion to a nation as their foundation. Their national consciousness comes from placing one nation's culture and interests above those of other nations or groups.

Pluralist

Seeks to overthrow the political order and create a system based on individual freedom, like a democracy.

Political

Deals with the structure and organization of the forms of government and communities.

Preservationist

Seeks to maintain the status quo.

Reformist

Seeks to alter the political order to benefit their constituents.

Regionalist

Uses their loyalty and devotion to a region of the country.

Revolutionary

Seeks to overthrow an established order and replace it with a new political or social structure.

Religious

Sees their objectives as based upon scripture, and therefore infallible and nonnegotiable.

Secessionist

Seeks to withdraw from an existing state and create their own.

Separatist

Sees their goal of separation from existing entities through independence, political autonomy, or religious freedom or domination.

Socialist

Sees particular social policies or issues as so contentious that they advocate collective or governmental ownership and administration as a means of production and distribution of goods.

Traditionalist

Seeks to overthrow the political order and create a system based on ancestral society or religion.

Transnationalist

Operates internationally, but isn’t tied to a particular country or even region.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

3-7

Chapter 3

3-34. The threat may manifest itself in a variety of forms. These forms may range anywhere from loose cells to highly orchestrated cellular networks or to other more military-like organizations. When the threat is constructed in a cellular formation, the activities which take place within the cellular structure are only known to the members of that specific cell and the command structure which controls the cell. This type of structure is typical of a threat network structure. This type of structure allows for operations to take place without worrying about compromise from members of other cells, thus providing security. The compromise or loss of one cell should not compromise the identity, location, or actions of other cells. 3-35. A cellular organizational structure makes it difficult for an adversary to penetrate the entire organization. Personnel within one cell are often unaware of the existence of other cells and, therefore, cannot divulge sensitive information to infiltrators. These small cells form the foundation for a much larger threat organization. The cellular structure of the threat organization may be based on functionality, geographic location, or family or tribe affiliation. The number of cells and their composition depend on the size of the threat organization. 3-36. Regardless of the structure or type of group that systematically employs IEDs, key functions must be performed. These functions can be described as a noncontiguous system, and critical personnel, actions, and resources determine the enemy IED system. The enemy IED activity model in Figure 3-1 describes the key nodes in a sample system designed to conduct IED attacks. Many of these nodes are part of the operation of a larger group. Successful IED defeat requires the commander to influence a subset of these functions to defeat the IED threat. The interconnections depicted in Figure 3-1 represent the impact one node may have on another. For example, local support will make it easier for the enemy to recruit and find supplies. These interconnections will be used to determine the level of effect that attacking a node has on the overall capability of the enemy.

Figure 3-1. Enemy IED Activity Model

3-8

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Threat Analysis

3-37. Descriptions of enemy nodes are listed below and also shown in Table 3-2, page 3-10. • International leadership. International leadership is a person or group that provides the overall direction and purpose for the group if it is transnational in nature. This leadership may coordinate the relationship between the nodes and conduct strategic planning. • Regional and local leadership. These nodes describe the leadership required to carry out the operations delegated by the overall group leadership. A network can also be made up of many splinter organizations carrying out specific orders from a larger, more centralized coordination group. • Recruitment. Recruitment includes the activities related to the act of building a force of operatives, trainers, financers, and technicians to carry out the campaign of the group. • Training. Training is the act of providing a means to educate recruited personnel in a skill needed to perform a role in the overall effort. Some personnel may be trained as engineers, while others may be trained to emplace IEDs. • Target selection and planning. Planners must first select a target before mission planning can begin. Through observation, the enemy collects valuable information on troop movement, times of vulnerability, target vulnerability, and areas of approach and escape. IED operations will become more complex as friendly security and IED defeat capabilities grow. • Surveillance. Surveillance entails observing potential targets to collect information used in the planning of IED operations. These observations aid the enemy planner with critical information (such as ideal IED emplacement locations; high-traffic areas; concealment data; observation points; avenues of escape and reinforcement; and insight into friendly tactics, techniques, and procedures). • Attack rehearsal. A rehearsal both prepares the IED team for its actions and tests and evaluates the plan of attack. • Regional and local support. Active local support consists of citizens and other locals assisting with enemy IED efforts (such as looking out for troops while IEDs are being placed or donating supplies). Passive local support for insurgent IED efforts consists of the refusal of citizens and other locals to give U.S. or coalition forces information or assistance. Passive local support of IED efforts results in part from fear of reprisal, and may also be attributed to sympathy with enemy objectives. • Movement. Movement is the physical movement of devices, supplies, and personnel into and out of an AO during predetonation and postdetonation phases. • Funding. Funding is the means and methods used to underwrite the cost of IED operations. • Supplies. Supplies are the materials and the availability of materials used to accomplish IED operations. • IED makers. IED makers are the persons involved in the design and fabrication of an IED. • Orders group. An orders group (which may have no formal name) is a small cell made up of one or more members of the regional and/or local leadership and possibly the IED makers. It is designed to coordinate the IED effort while compartmenting information in case of infiltration or discovery. • IED team. An IED team is the personnel who emplace, monitor, and detonate the IED. • International support. International support is support in the form of funding, training, organization, recruiting, publicity, and planning assistance that is provided to the group from nonlocal sources, to include foreign nations and states, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), terrorist organizations, media outlets, and other organizations or individuals. • Emplacement. Emplacement entails the positioning of an IED for the purpose of conducting an attack. • IED monitoring and detonating. Monitoring and detonating IEDs involves observing the area of emplacement so that the IED can be command detonated.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

3-9

Chapter 3 •

• •

Battle damage assessment. Battle damage assessment (BDA) involves observing the detonation or aftermath of an explosion to evaluate the destruction of the IED and record the information. This may be a decision point for the enemy to initiate a follow-on attack or egress out of the kill zone. Infrastructure. IED makers require an infrastructure of safe houses, work areas, and storage facilities. IO campaign. The enemy can be very effective using IO as a method of promoting group success, which fuels recruiting efforts and encourages support by portraying a positive image of the operations of the group. Table 3-2. Possible Nodes Located in an IED Network

When determining what type of activities may take place in the LEADERSHIP function, consider the following: International Support and Leadership

• Emir and front commander-level leader of a country directing the political agenda, IO, and funds to the nodes.

National and Regional Leadership

• Emir and front commander-level leader of a region directing the political agenda, IO, and funds to the nodes. • Knowledge of the local populations and terrain providing efficient use of resources. • Local target-type selection for the information campaign.

Local Leadership

• Leadership of a cell that carries out processes contained in the other nodes. • Facilitation of the factory to make IEDs includes training grounds, money transfers, and/or messengers. • Target selection to produce the desired effects for the IO campaign.

When determining what type of activities may take place in the PLANNING function, consider the following: Adaptation/Research and Development (R&D)

• Take ideas from the assessment node and try out the concepts.

Recruiting

• Recruitment, at all levels, of willing subjects or coercion of unwilling subjects to perform tasks in other nodes.

• R&D will include adapting to effective coalition force countermeasures.

• Looking for all skill levels. • Finding and smuggling militants into the joint operations area (JOA) who are willing to be messengers, emplacers, or suicide bombers. Surveillance

• Watching coalition and U.S. forces for target selection opportunities and viability of locations. • Surveillance also verifies or denies timelines as well as friendly and enemy TTPs.

Training

• Willing or coerced people are evaluated and trained to act in other nodes.

When determining what type of activities may take place in the LOGISTICS function, consider the following: Procurement

• Acquisition and production of bomb components (purchased or stolen). • Local support that is directly related to construction, emplacement, detonation, and expertise on new bomb-making techniques.

Inventory

• Secure storage of components before they are used to build an IED.

Manufacture

• Bomb makers take raw materials from storage and construct the desired type of IED and deliver it to the inventory node.

Storage

• Storage and maintenance of completed IEDs while waiting for orders to ingress and emplace.

3-10

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Threat Analysis

Table 3-2. Possible Nodes Located in an IED Network When determining what type of activities may take place in the EXECUTION function, consider the following: Ingress

• Moving the IED from the storage location to the detonation point using a secure transport mechanism.

Emplace

• Burying or disguising the IED, running the wires for arming switches, and placing an antenna for reception from the monitoring point. • Parking or driving a car next to the target (for VBIEDs). • Walking an IED to the target (suicide bombers).

Monitor

• Observation of IED location from a secure vantage point. • Output is the arming signal to the IED. • Performed to keep the IED secure and protect assets until the target is present.

Detonate

• Initiation of the IED using arming signals from monitoring node and fusing signals from victim. • Output is the physical effect on the victim.

Observe and Record

• Observation and cataloging of the effect on the target—simply data collection, no assessment or analysis.

Egress

• Postdetonation and after friendly forces arrive, removal of evidence and personnel to a secure location. • Postdetonation movement of the personnel who carried out the detonation includes anyone who was there to observe the attack and report damage assessment.

Assess

• Use the cataloged effects collected in the observation node to quantify the performance of the device type. • Generate ideas on how to make the device better and provide it to the adaptation or R&D node.

When determining what type of activities may take place in the SUPPORT function, consider the following: Domestic Support

• Local populace support and supporting infrastructure that are involved with dual use items. • Noncombatant support in the form of food, shelter, and water that supports activities in other nodes.

Post Detonation IO

• Use of media images to develop support for international fundraising and local support. • Any use of the media to lend support to the local threat. • Use of speeches by international leaders, footage from recent attacks, and/or interviews with citizens.

3-38. Figure 3-1, page 3-8, shows that there are multiple vulnerabilities that the JTF commander can exploit to bring about IED defeat. It is not necessary to attempt to prevent the detonation of every IED. By attacking or isolating one or more key action(s) (resources or groups of personnel), the JTF commander can prevent the effects of IEDs in a proactive manner. 3-39. The challenge is to identify which nodes the JTF commander can affect and which of those has the largest payoff for IED defeat. Enemy activity nodes fall into different levels of influence from the national to the tactical level. Successful attacks against the enemy will require a joint interagency effort including the DOD, the intelligence community, law enforcement, and interaction with international partners.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

3-11

Chapter 3

COMPONENT ANALYSIS (INDIVIDUAL AND NODAL) INDIVIDUAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS 3-40. Individual component analysis is the process of analyzing individuals as well as individual component parts of an organization. Individual component analysis tends to yield more immediate results as compared to nodal analysis. At the tactical level, emphasis should be placed on individual component analysis and small unit support to it. The analyst describes what is taking place inside each specific node using basic interrogatives (who, what, when, where, why, and how). Individual component analysis should focus on individual cells and activity conducted in small geographic areas versus trying to define regional threat models based off widely dispersed and possibly unrelated data. 3-41. Analysts working in individual component analysis spend a great deal of time reading and researching all pertinent intelligence and information reporting, preparing analysis of current operations, briefing the analysis, and disseminating intelligence to consumers. The basic tasks of analysts working in current operations are to–– • Read all incoming message traffic. • Conduct analysis on specific past and current enemy actions (as a foundation for future-event pattern analysis). • Conduct research to fill intelligence gaps. • Track the effects of friendly operations on the populace and enemy. • Provide intelligence support to ongoing operations. • Disseminate immediate threat warnings to appropriate consumers. 3-42. Analysts receive raw data and intelligence from numerous sources including organic sensors, situation reports, pilot debriefings, HUMINT support teams, and intelligence reports from subordinate, higher, and adjacent headquarters, as applicable.

NODAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS 3-43. A node is a point at which subsidiary parts originate or center. Nodal component analysis is the analysis of how the nodes of a designated system function in relation to one another. Nodal component analysis assists in identifying critical nodes of the system. A critical node is an element, position, or C2 entity whose disruption or destruction immediately degrades the ability of a force to command, control, or effectively conduct operations. 3-44. Analysts working with nodes will spend a great deal of time working with various pieces of information to assist them in understanding relationships. Relationships can exist between people, organizations, entities, locations, or any combination of the above. How the various groups interact is as important as knowing who knows (or should know) whom. Relationships are also present within the IED network itself. An IED network is a complex, interconnected group or system which, in some manner, concerns itself with IEDs. 3-45. The analysis of any type of network involves the use of models designed to graphically display the system or network components. Models of various complexities are useful to different command levels. The upper echelons will employ the use of a smaller, less complex diagramming model while the lower echelons will use a more complex and detailed model. Figure 3-2 and Figure 3-3, page 3-14, depict the same network using different representations to show varying levels of complexity. The reason there are different levels of complexities is due to the operational focus of the echelon.

Functional Analysis 3-46. As analysts begin to look at the network by its functional components they must be cognizant of the different types of nodes within that network. Functional analysis attempts to break down a network into nodes where the same type of function is performed. Figure 3-2 shows an example of a possible IED system broken down into functional areas.

3-12

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Threat Analysis

Figure 3-2. Example of Functional Nodes in an IED Network

Nodal Activity Analysis 3-47. Once an analyst has determined the functional nodes (see Figure 3-3) within an IED network, he can begin to dissect the system even further by breaking down each of the functions into activities which take place within that functional node. Some possible nodes located in an IED network are discussed in Table 3­ 2, page 3-10. This is by no means an all-inclusive list. It is not necessary for a network to contain each node listed. Conversely, there may also be networks that contain nodes not mentioned. It is imperative for the analyst to understand that each network will be structured differently.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

3-13

Chapter 3

Figure 3-3. Iconic Representation of Functional Node Analysis by Activity 3-48. After the analyst has determined which activities are taking place within the network being analyzed, they can create a model graphically depicting those activities. The activities can be depicted graphically using an iconic diagram or any similar type of diagramming tool to facilitate understanding. The functional analysis and the activity node model can be layered (or the information fused together) to show how the activities fit within the functional analysis scheme. Figure 3-3 uses shapes to depict the various functional areas. Color, if available, may also be used to distinguish between the functional areas. 3-49. Once the analyst has determined how the IED network is constructed, it is also important to understand how the various activity nodes interact with one another. The goal is to produce a model of the threat IED operations that captures the processes present in the threat IED network. Intelligence on threat activity within each node should be analyzed to produce signatures and vulnerabilities. This mapping will produce a list of vulnerability gaps that will be the basis for exploitation priorities. For the purpose of this illustration, refer to Figure 3-4 for an example IED model annotated to show the type of commodities moving between the nodes.

3-14

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Threat Analysis

Figure 3-4. Example Threat IED System Nodal Diagram Showing Relationships 3-50. The nodes are processes that can operate independently of each other. The nodes take commodities as they become available, process them, and produce an output for the next node to use. Threat networks are opportunistic and therefore operate asynchronously. The amount of synchronization between the nodes in Figure 3-4 is purposely left out as a parameter to keep the model generic. For example, there may be enough volunteers for daily tasks that recruiting does not need to be active, but has to be ready to process volunteers when they show up and direct them to the proper training locations. The timelines within nodes can vary greatly, from months in the leadership type nodes, to minutes in the monitor and detonate nodes. 3-51. As depicted in Figure 3-4, the model defines interfaces between nodes allowing an interface control document (ICD) to be written. An ICD describes the relationship between two components of a system in terms of data items and messages passed, protocols observed, and timing and sequencing of events. See Training Circular (TC) 2-91.701 for sample IED network interface control documents. It follows that these quantitative measures (if they are known) can be used to feed a computer simulation of the activity. The ICDs are an intelligence product that needs to be kept up to date. The ICDs should capture–– • What is traveling on the arrows (materiel, money, people, orders, ideas, research, BDA, other)? • How are actions along the arrows executed? • How much materiel is moving on each arrow?

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

3-15

Chapter 3

3-52. While all of this modeling may seem like a one-size-fits-all effort, and to some extent it is, by varying the levels of abstraction, the desired size of the same model can be produced for the current need. Once modeling has taken place, the result should assist in understanding a specific region for a specific snapshot in time. The models are constantly evolving and can be adapted by the analyst to assist in understanding any AO.

IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DESCRIPTIONS 3-53. When used as an obstacle in conjunction with other obstacles or as a close contact weapon, IEDs can be dangerous and effective. IEDs can be almost anything with any type of material and initiator. They are improvised devices that are designed to cause death or injury by using explosives alone or a combination of other materials, to include projectiles, toxic chemicals, biological toxins, or radiological material. IEDs can be produced in varying sizes and can have different types of containers and functioning and delivery methods (see Appendix D for various types of IEDs). IEDs can use commercial or military explosives, homemade explosives, or military ordnance and ordnance components. 3-54. IEDs are primarily conventional high-explosive charges, also known as homemade bombs. A chemical and biological (CB) agent, or even radiological material, may be included to add to the destructive power and psychological effect of the device. They are unique in nature because the IED builder has had to improvise with the materials at hand. Designed to defeat a specific target or type of target, they generally become more difficult to detect and protect against as they become more sophisticated. The degree of sophistication depends on the ingenuity of the designer and the tools and materials available. IEDs of today are extremely diverse and may contain any type of firing device or initiator, plus various commercial, military, or contrived chemical or explosive fillers. Cached and stockpiled munitions or explosive remnants of war (ERW) within the current theater of operations may provide the explosive materials to “would be” enemy bombers.

COMPONENTS 3-55. IEDs can vary widely in shape and form (see Figure 3-5). IEDs share a common set of components and consist of a main charge, initiating system, and casing.

3-16

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Threat Analysis

Figure 3-5. Components of an IED

MAIN CHARGE 3-56. Military munitions are one of the most common types of charges, usually 122-millimeter or larger mortar, tank, and/or artillery rounds. These items are the easiest to use and provide for relatively easy “daisy-chaining,” which is linking multiple main charges together over long or short distances for simultaneous detonation. 3-57. Other IEDs have used military, commercial, and homemade explosives, such as plastic explosives, trinitrotoluene (TNT), ammonium nitrate (fertilizer) and fuel oil. Common hardware, such as ball bearings, bolts, nuts, or nails, can be used to enhance the fragmentation. Propane tanks, fuel cans, and battery acid can and have been added to IEDs to propagate the blast and thermal effects of the IED.

INITIATING SYSTEM 3-58. The initiation system or fuze sets off the device. Initiation systems are often complicated and can range from a simple hard wire for command detonation, a cellular telephone or remote controlled/radio­ controlled improvised explosive device (RCIED) detonation, a time fuze detonation, or victim-operated detonation. Multiple initiation systems can be used to detonate a device. These initiation systems trigger the IED event. 3-59. Batteries or an uninterrupted power supply are used as a power source for detonators. Batteries of all types are the primary source of power for IEDs. Batteries could be as small as 9-volt, AA, or those used in long-range cordless telephones (LRCTs), to car and truck batteries. IEDs may even be wired into the local power supply of a home or office.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

3-17

Chapter 3

CASING 3-60. Casings can be anything that can contain any or all components of the IED. The casing can provide enhanced fragmentation and also camouflage the IED. A myriad of containers have been used as casings, including soda cans, animal carcasses, plastic bags, and vests or satchels for suicide bombers.

INITIATION METHODS 3-61. Initiation methods include— • Time. Time IEDs are designed to function after a preset delay, allowing the enemy to escape or target military forces which have created a pattern. Timers used include igniferous (producing fire), chemical, mechanical, and electronic. • Command. Command-initiated IEDs are a common method of employment and allow the enemy to choose the optimum moment of initiation. They are normally used against targets that are in transit or where a routine pattern has been established. The most common types of command-initiated methods are with command wires or radio-controlled devices, such as LRCTs, cellular telephones, and remote car openers and alarms (see Figure 3-6). • Victim. A victim-operated IED is a means of attacking an individual or group of individuals. There are various types of initiation devices, which include pull or trip, pressure, pressure release, movement-sensitive, light-sensitive, proximity, and electronic switches.

Figure 3-6. Command-Initiated Concealed IED

USES AND TARGETS 3-62. IEDs can be used in the following manners: • Disguised static IEDs concealed with just about anything (trash, boxes, tires, and so on) and placed in, on, or under a target (to include unsecured vehicles). • Disguised moveable IEDs (VBIEDs, suicide bomber vests, or remote-controlled cars). • Thrown or projected IEDs (improvised grenades, rockets, or mortars) in areas such as overpasses and rooftops.

3-18

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Threat Analysis • •

Hidden with chemical containers (such as cylinder containers) or ton containers that will release a toxic gas with the IED detonation. Hoax IEDs (Used for learning friendly force TTP, entrapment, nonexplosive obstacles, and development of complacency for future IED attacks, they resemble an actual IED, but have no charge or lack a fully functioning initiator device).

3-63. IEDs can be designed to attack specific targets, such as high-visibility targets, high-value targets (HVTs), and military targets, such as― • Quick-reaction forces (QRFs) and first responders. • Specialized route clearance equipment and personnel. • Cordons. • Checkpoints and control points. • Logistics movements or combat patrols. • Any location or object that the enemy has assessed by pattern analysis to be vulnerable.

WARNING

Secondary and tertiary IEDs should be expected in the area.

Failure to comply could result in immediate personal injury or

damage to equipment.

INDICATORS 3-64. The primary indication of an IED will be a change in the environment (something new on the route that was not there yesterday). The enemy may leave behind visual indicators of an emplaced IED by accident or, in some cases, on purpose to inform the local population or for use as an aiming reference point. Vigilant observation for these subtle indicators can increase the likelihood of IED detection by friendly forces before detonation. Examples of possible roadside IED indicators include, but are not limited to— • Unusual behavior patterns or changes in community patterns, such as noticeably fewer people or vehicles in a normally busy area, open windows, or the absence of women or children. • Vehicles following a convoy for a long distance and then pulling to the roadside. • Personnel on overpasses. • Signals from vehicles or bystanders (flashing headlights). • People videotaping ordinary activities or military actions. Enemies using IEDs often digitally record their activities for use as recruitment or training tools. • Suspicious objects. • Metallic objects, such as soda cans and cylinders. • Colors that seem out of place, such as freshly disturbed dirt, concrete that does not match the surrounding areas, colored detonating cord, or other exposed parts of an IED. • Markers by the side of the road such as tires, rock piles, ribbon, or tape that may identify an IED location to the local population or serve as an aiming reference (such as light poles, fronts or ends of guardrails, and road intersections or turns). • New or out of place objects in an environment such as dirt piles, construction, dead animals, or trash. • Graffiti symbols or writing on buildings. • Signs that are newly erected or seem out of place. • Chemical containers (such as cylinders and drums) that appear out of place.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

3-19

Chapter 3

3-65. Friendly forces should be especially vigilant around— • Obstacles in the roadway to channel convoys. • Exposed antennas, detonating cord, wires, or ordnance. • Wires laid in plain site; these may be part of an IED or designed to draw friendly force attention before detonation of the real IED.

LOCATIONS 3-66. IEDs may be emplaced anywhere that enough space exists or can be created to hide or disguise the IED. Whenever possible, devices are located where employment can exploit known U.S. patterns (such as the use of an MSR) or vulnerabilities (such as soft-skinned vehicles or chokepoints). Common areas of IED emplacement (see Figure 3-7) include, but are not limited to— • Previous IED sites (past successes). • Frequently traveled, predictable routes, such as roads leading to FOBs and along common patrol routes. • Boundary turnaround points (pattern). • Roadway shoulders (usually within 10 feet). • Medians, by the roadside, or buried under the surface of any type of road, often in potholes and covered with dirt or reheated asphalt. • Trees, light posts, signs, overpasses, and elevated bridge spans. • Unattended vehicles, trucks, cars, carts, or motorcycles (attached or installed in them). • Guardrails (hidden inside) or under any type of material or packaging. • Potential incident control points (ICPs). • Abandoned structures (sometimes partially demolished). • Cinder blocks (hidden behind) or piles of sand to direct blast into the kill zone. • Animal carcasses and deceased human bodies. • Fake bodies or scarecrows in coalition uniforms. • Buildings.

Figure 3-7. Common Areas of IED Emplacement

3-20

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Chapter 4

Planning Considerations

for Improvised Explosive Device Defeat

The METT-TC factors are the variables whose infinite mutations always combine to form a new tactical pattern. They never produce exactly the same situation; thus, there can be no checklist that adequately addresses all the situations friendly forces may encounter. Each tactical problem is unique and must be solved on its own merits. This chapter provides an overview of the planning processes of the Army and USMC and describes how the commander and staff integrate IED defeat planning considerations into unit plans. It discusses IPB, targeting, ISR synchronization, CRM, and assured mobility as tools to assist the commander and staff in integrating IED defeat considerations. This chapter also offers planning considerations for IED defeat based on the METT-TC factors. The factors for the considerations are not allinclusive, but serve as a basis for further development depending on the situation.

PLANNING PROCESSES 4-1. As described in Chapter 2, IED defeat operations include part of the broader mission of the unit to predict, detect, prevent, avoid, neutralize, and protect the force from IED attacks. While IED defeat is primarily focused on the WFF of movement and maneuver, it has applicability to other WFFs and is not tied specifically to a staff cell or type of unit. 4-2. Means of integrating IED defeat considerations are the two tactical planning processes of the Army: the MDMP and troop-leading procedures (TLP). The MDMP is more appropriate for headquarters with staffs. It provides a logical sequence of interactions and decisions between the command and staff for developing estimates and effective plans and orders. At lower tactical echelons, commanders use TLP to plan and prepare for an operation (see FM 5-0). Both planning processes provide a logical sequence of understanding the situation, developing and analyzing the COA, deciding on the best COA, and producing a plan or order to accomplish the mission. 4-3. During the MDMP, commanders play a critical role in planning. After receiving a mission, commanders develop their initial commander’s visualization. They describe this visualization to the staff in the form of a commander’s intent, commander’s planning guidance, and commander’s critical information requirement (CCIR). The staff then uses the commander’s guidance to continue planning. IED defeat may have a large impact on a commander’s planning guidance and the CCIR. 4-4. The goal of the MDMP is to achieve a faster decision cycle than the threat. During execution, commanders and staffs can use the RDSP to make changes or adjustments. Planning should, however, include considerations that address increased operational tempo and control of the OE, entail an aggressive mindset, and provide plans for rapid responses to the IED threat tactically, operationally, and technologically. If the threat responds to new technologies or procedures, then coalition forces must be able to also rapidly change TTPs and technologies. 4-5. Threat centers of gravity must be identified and understood. Data collection on IED characteristics and threat tactics place a “signature” on an IED that must be tracked and catalogued. The funding sources are identified, and this threat is addressed at the strategic level of warfare. All C2 assets and support infrastructure are leveraged to achieve a faster response time than the threat. The new capabilities needed are identified to overcome a dynamic, changing threat and get new TTP and capabilities into the field as

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

4-1

Chapter 4

rapidly as possible. If impediments exist to rapid response in IED TTP or technologies, then identify the bottlenecks and raise the issues to the appropriate level of command to bypass or overcome the bottleneck. A more rapid decision and response cycle is the key to minimizing innovative threat IED practices. 4-6. Factors that impact IED defeat are considered throughout the planning process and are contained throughout the operation order (OPORD). Information, directives, and tasks for IED defeat may be found in several parts of the OPORD of the unit. For example, enemy information concerning IED attacks may be found in Annex B (Intelligence) and Annex F (Engineer). Specific tasks, such as “Conduct a Raid to Destroy a Bomb-Making Factory,” may be found in tasks to subordinate units in the base OPORD. Highpayoff targets (HPTs) related to IED defeat may be found in Annex B and Annex D (Fire Support). Specific instructions on neutralization and disposal of IEDs may be found in Appendix 5 (Explosive Ordnance Disposal) to Annex F of the OPORD (see FM 5-0). 4-7. In other instances, IED defeat may be the focus of the entire unit OPORD. For example, an infantry company conducting a raid to seize a weapons cache or an engineer unit assigned a route clearance mission. 4-8. In addition to the MDMP and TLP, there are other staff integrating processes designed to assist the commander and staff in synchronizing operations (see FM 3-0 and FM 5-0). These include― • IPB (see FM 34-130). • Targeting (see FM 6-20-10/MCRP 3-1.6.14). • ISR synchronization (see FM 3-0). • CRM (see FM 5-19). • Assured mobility (see FM 3-34 and FM 3-34.2). 4-9. These processes are continuous throughout the operations process (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) and aid with integrating IED defeat considerations into unit operations. The following paragraphs discuss each process in greater depth.

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD TO DEFEAT IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES 4-10. Every commander and member of the staff must not only understand and apply IPB during the staff planning process but also must be a part of the process. This is even more important after the reduction or cessation of high-intensity combat operations as the offensive posture is reduced and the AO is often filled with units conducting counterinsurgency, stability, or support operations. Units conducting these type of missions, and the NGOs that they interact with are often targeted in asymmetrical attacks, incorporating IEDs. These attacks take full advantage of the increased complexity surrounding counterinsurgency, stability, and support operations. IPB, as a systematic and continuous method of analyzing the threat and other conditions of a specific AO, is an important tool in the IED fight. IPB identifies the facts and assumptions about the OE that allows effective staff planning, as well as forming the basis for defining the various COAs that may be employed by friendly and threat forces. 4-11. The doctrinal principles of IPB call for— • Evaluating the OE effects on friendly and threat operations. • Identifying assets the threat needs to make each COA successful. • Determining the threat’s possible COAs and arranging them in order of probability of adoption. • Identifying the activities, or lack thereof, and the locations where they will occur that will indicate which COA the threat has adopted.

4-2

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Planning Considerations for Improvised Explosive Device Defeat

4-12. The IPB process consists of four steps: • Step 1. Define the Operational Environment. • Step 2. Describe the Environmental Effects on Operations. • Step 3. Evaluate the Threat. • Step 4. Determine Threat COAs. 4-13. The information in the following subparagraphs is designed as an overview. For specific examples and in-depth discussion, see TC 2-91.701. For general information on IPB, see FM 34-130.

DEFINE THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 4-14. The force commander defines the AO. The OE is often complex and includes not only physical but also information and social (human) dimensions that, individually and collectively, pose significant challenges to the force’s ability to gain and maintain SU and to dominate any threat and any situation across the spectrum of operations. 4-15. During Step 1 of the IPB process, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence (G-2)/S-2–– • Identifies significant characteristics of the environment. • Identifies the limits of the command’s AO. • Establishes the limits of the area of influence and area of interest. • Evaluates existing databases and identifies intelligence gaps. • Initiates collection of information required to complete the IPB. Note. It is important for the analyst to understand that Step 1 deals with compiling information already known, not analyzing and creating new information. 4-16. Step 1 considerations specific to the IED threat: • Determine the AO with boundaries specified in the OPORD: • Which towns, villages, or other urban areas are located in the AO? • Review the LOC overlays for the AO. Refer to Appendix B for a discussion on LOCs. • From existing information and/or databases, identify characteristics of the operational environment as they relate to IED and IED defeat operations. What do we already know? Examples may include, but are not limited to–– • What are the physical, information, and social dimensions of the operational environment? • Which organizations are operating in the AO? How is the threat structured? What are the regional and global relationships between the threat and other organizations? What is their level of equipment, training, resources, and leadership? How do the members procure, develop, and employ IEDs? Who are the IED builders, IED emplacers, and security force? Which individual and/or group is providing financial, material, or sanctuary assistance to the IED members? • What type of terrain is the threat using in their IED operations? Is the terrain in the AO conducive to IED emplacement? What is the road system in the AO? What infrastructure is located in the AO? • What is the nature and stability of state or nonstate actors? How are they contributing to IED supply, finance, or other? Where does the real power lie? What key people are in the AO (imams, warlords, influential and prominent people, or families)? • What is the cultural, religious, ethnic makeup of the AO? What are the tribal or clan affiliations in the AO, and how are they structured? Which tribes or clans in the AO are skilled with electronics or possess manufacturing skills? Which tribes or clans in the AO are known to use, manufacture, or distribute IEDs? Who is the threat targeting? Where has the threat attacked?

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

4-3

Chapter 4

What type of IED technology has been located in the AO? What type of IED technology has been linked to the threat? What type of IED technology has been linked to other organizations known to associate with the threat? What is the level of IED expertise in the AO? What is the level of triggering-device expertise in the AO? What identifiable patterns of IED activity have taken place in the AO? • Where are the IEDs employed? What is the threats desired effect when employing specific IEDs? What is the concealment methodology and is it linked to a specific type of IED or desired effect? • How is the threat using the media and Internet to accomplish their mission? If they are broadcasting IED videos, how soon after the event are the videos aired? • What level of support is the threat receiving from the government, the population, and/or other organizations with similar values? • Which NGOs and private organizations are operating in the AO? What is the relationship between each external organization and the threat? How is the threat manipulating the external organizations in the AO? • What are the economics in the AO? What is the average annual income in the AO? What is the rate of unemployment in the AO? How has unemployment in the AO affected IED operations; for example, will the threat have ready access to people who will work for them (digging holes, transporting materials, performing other tasks) simply to earn money? • What materials are available to the threat to construct their IEDs? How has the threat changed their product because of materiel availability or lack thereof? How much of a surplus of supplies is available? What is the ability of the threat to sustain their IED operations? • What are the religious prayers or ritual times at religious centers, moon phases, holiday or festival dates that might incite the threat or create a lull in the activities? Search current databases for the above information. Submit a request for information (RFI) to the CEXC or counter-IED JTF, J-2 requesting “AO threat IED TTP/Technology Analysis.” For information see JP 3-15. Coordinate with supporting EOD unit/planners for current IED threat TTP within the planned AO. EOD teams, platoons, and companies provide the most current tactical level IED intelligence. Identify gaps in the current intelligence holdings. Prioritize and initiate the requests for information or collection requirements needed to fill the identified gaps. •

• • •

•

4-17. Examining each characteristic in general terms helps focus the command’s initial intelligence collection efforts and the remaining steps of the IPB process. Defining the significant characteristics of the operational environment also assists in identifying gaps in current intelligence holdings.

DESCRIBE THE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS ON OPERATIONS 4-18. During step 2 of the IPB process, the G-2/S-2–– • Analyzes the operational environment concerning–– • Terrain. • Weather. • Civil considerations. • Identifies the limitations and opportunities the environment offers on the potential operations of friendly and threat forces.

Terrain 4-19. Terrain analysis interprets natural and man-made features of a geographic area to determine their effects on military operations. The main portion of the terrain analysis is conducted by the engineer detachment. Using GEOINT principles and techniques, they combine extensive database information with

4-4

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Planning Considerations for Improvised Explosive Device Defeat

the results of reconnaissance. An AO may consist of various types of terrain ranging from jungles, mountains, and deserts to rural or urbanized areas. Expect increased frequency of IED employment in complex terrain as it allows concealed egress, ease of observation for the IED triggerman, and potential inclusion of direct-fire weapons during a complex attack. While complex physical terrain (urban, desert, jungle, forest, or mountain) provides an extremely difficult structure in which to fight, it assists the threat by providing them the opportunity to avoid detection. 4-20. Terrain analysis includes an evaluation of the military aspects of the operational environment to determine its effects on military operations. There is no difference when dealing with a threat that employs IEDs. The military aspects of terrain are observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment (OAKOC). 4-21. Observation is the ability to see the threat either visually or through the use of surveillance from a given position. A field of fire is the area that a weapon or group of weapons may effectively cover with fire from a given position. The following are observation considerations specific to the IED threat: • Where can the threat (trigger man, observation team, videographer, other) sit and see friendly forces? • Where would the threat emplace a device along this route? • From where can the threat observe the IED site? • Where are tall buildings or structures located (these could be used as observation posts by the threat)? • Where are the areas that IEDs can be emplaced without being observed by friendly forces or a neutral indigenous population? 4-22. Field of fire considerations specific to the IED threat: • Fields of fire may be extremely limited when emplacing IEDs. • Command-wired IEDs require that the enemy be linked to the IED by a wire. This wire may be several kilometers long or may be easily concealed among existing telephone or power lines. • If the IED is radio control initiated, the threat may require line-of-sight of the detonation site. 4-23. An avenue of approach (AA) is an air or ground route of an attacking force of a given size leading to its objective or to key terrain in its path. In stability operations, AAs may be individual or small group approaches which are difficult to identify; for example, rat trails or lines, cache sites, ingress and egress paths, or smuggling routes. AA considerations specific to the IED threat are as follows: • In an environment favorable to IED emplacement, AAs may be very difficult to identify. The avenues may consist of a simple lightly worn foot path through high grass to an IED emplacement site or may be a main highway which runs through terrain conducive to IED emplacement. • AAs encompass both ingress and egress from a specific site. • When considering AAs, populations present during operations may physically restrict movement and maneuver by limiting or changing the width of AAs. • People may assist movement if a group can be used as human barriers between one combatant group and another. Refugee and pilgrim flows can provide a concealed AA for members of the threat. 4-24. Key terrain is any locality or area that if seized, retained, or controlled would afford an advantage to either combatant. In stability operations, the population is generally considered to be key terrain. Key terrain considerations specific to the IED threat are as follows: • Any structure or form which assists in the threat’s ability to build, store, emplace, conceal, or detonate IEDs. Long stretches of unobserved or unguarded highways afford threat forces the ability to emplace IEDs while remaining undetected. • The population or group (tribal, religion, ethnic) may also be considered key terrain in that public opinion and their support, or lack thereof, can change the course or the aims of a mission.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

4-5

Chapter 4 •

Captured combatants or a well-informed noncombatant can provide valuable information about the enemy. These individuals may also be considered important for the information they can provide on key terrain.

4-25. Obstacles are any natural or man-made terrain feature designed or employed to disrupt, fix, turn, or block the movement and to impose additional losses in personnel, time, and equipment. Obstacle considerations specific to the IED threat are— • The density of construction and population within the AO, the street patterns within urban areas, and compartmentalization of areas within the AO (such as areas separated by waterways or highways), and functional zones. • The functions that different areas serve within the AO can be residential, commercial, and government, as well as natural choke points (overpasses, underpasses, and bridges). 4-26. Cover considerations specific to the IED threat are— • Areas where the threat has caused friendly casualties in previous IED attacks. Insurgents are often creatures of habit, making them vulnerable to observation. • Cover may be provided by, but is not limited to, block walls, buildings, caves, ditches, or embankments. • If a TIC is used with an IED to produce a toxic plume, movement to higher ground will be necessary to mitigate the effects. For plumes such as chlorine gas, the vapor will settle in lowlying areas or be confined in built up areas. Appropriate escape routes should be considered. 4-27. Concealment is protection from observation by denying the ability to observe forces, equipment, or positions, while cover is physical protection from injury. Concealment considerations specific to the IED threat are as follows: • Experience has shown that IEDs come in a variety of shapes and sizes. The threats’ ability to conceal their explosive devices has only been limited by their imagination. IEDs have been located in dead animal carcasses; road debris;, or meals, ready-to-eat (MRE) pouches. However, like any human being, the threat is apt to stay with what works. Once the threat has developed a concealment technique which is yet undetectable by coalition forces and U.S. forces, they will continue to use that technique. An example would be the threat technique of concealing explosives inside expanding foam designed to resemble boulders and then placing them along the side of the road in Iraq. • The threat has learned not only to conceal their devices but also to conceal themselves by blending into the population to avoid detection. Civilian populations provide concealment for nonuniformed forces. These threat forces operating in any part of the country can easily conceal themselves from a cursory investigation. However, they will not be able to conceal themselves from a more detailed investigation among ethnically or ideologically similar populations (such as Al Qaida in Al Anbar or the Moro Liberation Front in the Southern Philippines’ Muslim population). Note. Trusted local nationals can assist in the identification of possible foreign fighters coming into a new location. Use of trusted local residents may be an efficient means of countering concealment. Local nationals can move around the area unnoticed and can provide information and insights. For instance, residents may know of a threat cell which has moved into the area because they appear to be out of place. The residents may also be able to observe and report on an IED emplacement prior to detonation. 4-28. Staffs must be able to produce products that facilitate “seeing the terrain” and ultimately enable leaders to make decisions. Terrain visualization tools such as Falconview™, Terrabase®, and Digital Topographic Support Systems must be leveraged to help commanders and their staffs identify terrain that favors the enemy’s use of IEDs. Commonly available visualization tools can be used for route analysis, route rehearsals, or change detection. Most analysis deliverables (for example, friendly and threat pattern

4-6

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Planning Considerations for Improvised Explosive Device Defeat

analysis) can and will be layered on some terrain visualization tool. The terrain visualization product is the base upon which the rest of the products will be built.

Weather 4-29. Weather analysis interprets the military aspects of weather (visibility, winds, precipitation, cloud cover, temperature, and humidity) and evaluates the weather’s direct effect on an operation. Weather data is collected using the integrated meteorological system. The main portion of the weather analysis is conducted by the U.S. Air Force staff weather officer. The engineer detachment works closely with the U.S. Air Force staff weather officer to ensure the terrain analysis incorporates the effects of current and projected weather phenomena, thus allowing automated support of the terrain analysis process. 4-30. Weather can have a significant impact on the unit’s ability to accomplish the mission. Evaluate weather effects on the mobility of the threat and their logistic efforts. Extreme weather conditions may impact the blast effect, ignition ability, and the volatility of the explosives. Weather effects apply to many aspects of military operations to include mobility, observation, fields of fire, camouflage, helicopter LZs, and line-of-sight radio and radar equipment. (See FM 34-81-1 for details on weather effects on systems, operations, and personnel, including climatic conditions, weather effects, and weather forecasts.) Weather analysis based on current observations or forecasts, together with terrain analysis, must be reviewed and updated continuously. 4-31. Weather effect analysis considerations specific to the IED threat are— • Visibility of IEDs, initiators, and targets. • Selection of emplacement locations of IEDs. • Effectiveness of IEDs. • Mobility on egress and ingress routes. • Weather conditions favorable or not favorable for threat fund-raising operations. • Weather conditions which could uncover, displace, or cover up IEDs that have been emplaced. 4-32. Step 2 considerations specific to the IED threat are— • Analysis of the AO. Import imagery, video, and digital products to facilitate real-time “change detection” {the ability to identify differences in the AO and possible IED indicators along or adjacent to a route.) • Analysis of the population include— • NGOs and private organizations. • Media. • Culture. • Perceptions. • Relationships. • Loyalties. • Analysis of the road network and terrain (areas conducive to IED emplacement). Import imagery, video, and digital products to facilitate real-time “change detection” with an emphasis on the following: • Overpasses. • Places that force slowdowns and closer intervals. • Areas of dense civilian traffic. • Culverts, medians, shoulders, and unpaved roadways. • Terrain features that provide overwatch. • Regularly spaced objects. • Metal guard rails.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

4-7

Chapter 4

Areas with a lot of rubble or trash on the side of the road. Well-traveled roads that have some standoff from locals to minimize collateral damage. Analysis of line-of-sight. • Use as high a resolution as feasible to analyze fire points, observation points and distances, range fans for IED emplacement, rapid response routes, communications, and remote detonation. • Identify ingress and egress routes. • Identify possible prestaging locations. Analysis of previous IED site exploitation (past successes). Development of population status overlays showing potential hostile areas. • •

•

• •

Civil Considerations 4-33. Civil considerations comprise the influence of man-made infrastructure, civilian institutions, and attitudes and activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an AO on the conduct of military operations. They are a factor in offense, defense, and stability operations. If the military’s mission is to support civil authorities, civil considerations define the mission. 4-34. An appreciation of civil considerations—the ability to analyze their impact on operations—enhances several aspects of operations: among them, the selection of objectives; location, movement, and control of forces; use of weapons; and protection measures. Civil considerations comprise six characteristics, expressed in the memory aid areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE) (see Figure 4-1): • Areas. • Structures. • Capabilities. • Organizations. • People. • Events.

EVALUATE THE THREAT 4-35. In Step 3, the G-2/S-2 and their staff analyze the command’s intelligence holdings. These holdings, identified in Step 1, to determine how the threat normally conducts operations under similar circumstances. 4-36. When operating against a new or less defined threat, the G-2/S-2 may need to develop or expand intelligence databases and threat models concurrently. To accomplish this, the G-2/S-2 should conduct threat characteristic analysis for each group identified in Step 1. Note. If the majority of the ASCOPE factors were identified in Step 1 and researched during Step 2, this step will be simplified.

4-8

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Planning Considerations for Improvised Explosive Device Defeat

Figure 4-1. ASCOPE Construct With Examples

Composition 4-37. Composition is the identification of threat cells and their affiliated political, religious, or ethnic organizations. Composition includes⎯ • Operational and support cells (similar to sections in a military unit). • Echelons. • Staff elements. • Affiliated political, religious, or social organizations. • Political, religious, ideological, and military aims. • Internal and external C2. • Operational organizations or cells (IED builders, IED emplacers, IED site developers). • Internal and external support structure. • External ties.

Disposition 4-38. Disposition consists of the geographic location of threat elements and how they are deployed, employed, or located. The analyst wants to know where on the ground these facilities are located, will be located, or were located. Additionally, disposition includes the recent, current, and projected movements or locations of these following elements: • Training camps (remote locations that tend to be transient in nature, the threat members encountered in the AO were probably trained in a different AO). • Logistics locations (storage facilities, bomb-making facilities). • C2 locations.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

4-9

Chapter 4 • • •

Safe houses (remote locations, urban locations, may be temporary in nature). Front organizations. Areas of control (tribal, familial, demographic, neighborhood).

Tactics 4-39. Tactics include strategy, methods of operation, and doctrine. Each refers to the threat’s accepted principles of operation. Tactics also involve political, military, psychological, and economic considerations. The use of IEDs is a method the threat chooses to carry out its tactics. IEDs can be inexpensive to produce and, because of the various detonation techniques available, may be a low risk to the perpetrator. 4-40. Other advantages include its ability to gain publicity, as well as the ability to control casualties through timed detonation and careful placement of the device. It is also easily deniable should the action produce undesirable results. Threat tactics vary in sophistication according to the level of training the individual or organization has received. Threat organizations carefully plan and train for individual and small-group operations.

Training 4-41. The type and level of individual and group training that threat members have received is important. When analyzing an unconventional threat, there is normally little commonality of training like there is in a military sense. Some cell members enter into the organization with skills they already possess, such as bomb making. These members can either construct IEDs or teach others in the art of bomb making.

Logistics 4-42. The effectiveness of threat operations depends heavily on logistics. Logistics are the “staples” which the threat needs to operate. This dependency fluctuates horizontally and vertically between the various groups and levels of operation. The intensity of logistics activity is based on operations. Critical components of logistics include, but are not limited to–– • Weapons and ammunition. • IED and bomb-making components. • Food. • Water. • IO equipment and materials. • Medical. • Shelter. • Transportation.

Operational Effectiveness 4-43. Operational effectiveness for threat forces does not exactly equate to combat effectiveness for conventional forces. Operational effectiveness factors for threat forces include, but are not limited to the⎯ • Ability of the threat to replace personnel losses. • Ability of the threat to replace equipment losses. • Ability of the threat to obtain necessary logistical supplies. • Ability of the threat to conduct operations at various levels of expertise. • Level of operational IED experience of the leaders or members of the organization. • Level of morale of the leaders or members of the organization.

4-10

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Planning Considerations for Improvised Explosive Device Defeat

Communications 4-44. During IED operations, threat forces often use a number of communication methods. Plans, orders, or information may be passed using high-frequency, shortwave radios; cellular telephones; the Internet; mail; couriers; face-to-face meetings; citizen band sets; the drop system; or ham radio sets. Due to a rise in the amount of sophisticated communications equipment available, commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) communication equipment and methods available to the threat range from the most primitive to the most modern.

Personality 4-45. Personality is a critical factor when analyzing intelligence in an environment where IEDs are employed. Attention must often be focused on individuals in an attempt to link them to other known or unknown elements of the group; this process takes time. 4-46. Threat organizations can be depicted through multidimensional link analysis (determining relationships between critical personalities and then their group association). Once relationships and the level of contact or knowledge the personalities have with each other are known, their activity can be determined (see Chapter 3). Personality files include, but are not limited to— • Leaders (political, ideological, religious, military). • Staff members. • Organization spokespersons. • Personnel with an anti-, neutral, or pro-attitude toward coalition or U.S. forces. • Family members (immediate and extended). • Experts in demolition, weapons, and assassinations. • Media exploitation personnel and IO campaign personnel. • Trainers.

Miscellaneous 4-47. Miscellaneous data includes supporting information needed but not covered by other threat characteristic factors. This could include family history and genealogy, false names or designators, political and military goals, and demographics. In addition to the traditional threat characteristic factors listed above, the following additional factors apply to a stability operation.

Recruitment and Support 4-48. Recruiting is a main source of viability in a threat’s organizational structure. Recruiting deals not only with selecting people to become members of the cell but also with developing a network of supporters of the organization who may or may not claim membership. Membership 4-49. Many threat cells are very suspicious of people wanting to volunteer to become a member of their organization. The suspicion lies in the fear of having their organization infiltrated by someone who has ulterior motives or is a foreign intelligence agent. Because of this fear, some organizations have a very structured, long process to become a full-fledged member of the cell. 4-50. At a minimum, an analyst should consider the following: • How are potential members identified? Once identified as potential members, how are they assessed for loyalty and how are they vetted for reliability? • How does the threat organization use fear and/or intimidation to aid in its recruitment efforts? • What is the level of loyalty of recruits co-opted in the above manner? • What other type of inducements (pay, religion, other) is the threat using?

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

4-11

Chapter 4

Local Support 4-51. Threat networks depend on support from the local population. Of all the activities conducted by a threat organization, generating local support is one of the most important to ensure the threat’s sustainability. While the support may or may not be voluntary, it is a means of fulfilling the needs of the organization. These needs may include but are not limited to finance, medical support and supplies, and transportation. 4-52. As with the member recruitment, an analyst should consider the following when analyzing all levels of supporters: • How are potential supporters identified? Once identified as potential supporters, how are they assessed for loyalty and how are they vetted for reliability? • What is the type of support being provided to the organization? • Is the support voluntary? • What does the organization do with supporters who become disloyal? (The answer to this question will assist the analyst in determining the organization’s power over the local population.) • Why is the local, regional, national, or international population supporting the threat? National Support 4-53. Generating national support has a great impact on the threat’s long-term viability. This is almost always the backbone of a threat force. National support may come in a variety of ways. For example— • Morale (Which influential figures are pronouncing support for the organization? This pronouncement may increase the effectiveness of the organization’s recruiting activities.). • Physical (This may include providing safe passage, safe houses, or training facility locations.). • Financial (What type of financial assistance [either money, transaction devices, securities, or materiel] are the national supporters providing to the threat?). Regional Support 4-54. Regional support of a threat organization can come in a variety of venues. Regions may have a greater ability than the local population to provide certain services and support to the threat. For example— • Sanctuary (What type of sanctuary are the various regions providing to the threat?). • Security (How does the region support the threat movement through the area? What type of security is the threat provided; for example, local look-outs, cover stories, armed escorts, other?). • Secrecy (What regional rural training facilities are provided to the threat?). • Transportation (This may include transportation from a border crossing point across the region.). International Support 4-55. Of the activities conducted by any threat organization, generating international support often has the greatest impact on the threat’s long-term effectiveness. International support may include— • Technical. Expertise of a technical nature may be passed across borders from one organization to another, allowing the threat to gain from another’s experience. • Financial. Money, transaction devices, securities, or materiel may pass unencumbered over borders. • Transportation. This may include providing safe passage across international borders. • Governmental. Which foreign governments are sympathetic to the threat? • Ideological. Religious or doctrinal support provided by an aligned nation state lends moral and esprit to threat forces. This motivation encourages inexperienced insurgent fighters to engage in sustained direct-fire engagements with friendly forces.

4-12

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Planning Considerations for Improvised Explosive Device Defeat

Popular Support 4-56. Popular support applies to local, national, regional, and international arenas. Popular support results in safe havens, freedom of movement, logistical support, financial support, intelligence, and new personnel for the threat. Generating popular support has a positive feedback effect on a threat organization. As the threat gains in support, its capabilities grow, which in turn enables it to gain more support. Threat forces generally view popular support as a zero sum game in which a gain in support for the threat is a loss for the government, and a loss of support for the government is a gain for the threat. 4-57. At a minimum, an analyst should consider the following: • The overall level of popular support to the threat relative to the government. • The forms of popular support the threat receives. • Sources of popular support by type (active, passive, internal, external). • Services the threat provides to the community (building schools, repairing infrastructure). • How the threat provides services to the community. • Segments of the populace supporting the threat. • Methods used to generate popular support and its relative effectiveness. • Grievances (real or perceived) corrected by the threat. • Capabilities and vulnerabilities in generating popular support.

Threat Intelligence 4-58. Intelligence is an important function of a threat organization. Just like any U.S. intelligence organization, the threat conducts a variety of intelligence tasks in preparation for a mission. Intelligence personnel and leaders, through the use of the assistance of CI personnel, must understand the strengths and weaknesses of threat intelligence and leadership as well as how best to exploit those weaknesses (see Figure 4-2, page 4-14). 4-59. At a minimum, an analyst should consider— • How is the threat conducting target reconnaissance? • What factors is the threat evaluating when choosing a target? • How is the threat recording the IED incidents for which they are responsible? • How is the threat getting the IED incident recording to the media? • What type of IO is the threat using? • Who are the leaders? Is there a single, dominant charismatic leader? • What ideology is the leadership dedicated to? • How are the leaders committed to a specific organizational and operational pattern? • What is the relationship between the leadership and the operational and support elements? • What is the decision-making process of the threat leadership? How are decisions made? • How will the organization continue to function effectively without key leaders?

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

4-13

Chapter 4

Figure 4-2. Example of Threat Analysis Layers

Finance 4-60. Finance is a main source of viability to a threat’s organizational structure. Finance deals not only with how the organization pays for services rendered or items purchased, but also with how the organization is going to sustain their operations and continue to draw in the much-needed financial support. 4-61. At a minimum, an analyst should consider the following information: • Who is providing the threat organization with financial support? • How is the threat financing its IED operations? • Charitable organizations.

4-14

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Planning Considerations for Improvised Explosive Device Defeat

Charitable donations. Fundraising. • Illicit activities (drug trafficking; compact disc [CD], digital video disc, video compact disc counterfeiting, money laundering, other). • Tithing to a threat-supporting imam or mosque. How is financial support being transferred to the organization? • Which financial institutions does the threat use? • What is the location of each financial institution used by the threat? • How does the threat use the “hawala” system? • •

•

Note. In the most basic variant of the “hawala” system, money is transferred via a network of “hawala” brokers, or “hawaladars.” A customer approaches a “hawala” broker in one city and gives a sum of money to be transferred to a recipient in another, usually foreign, city. The “hawala” broker calls another “hawala” broker in the recipient’s city, gives disposition instructions of the funds (usually minus a small commission), and promises to settle the debt at a later date. The unique feature of the system is that no promissory instruments are exchanged between the “hawala” brokers; the transaction takes place entirely on the honor system. Since the system does not depend on the legal enforceability of claims, it can operate even in a defunct legal and juridical environment. No records are produced of individual transactions; only a running tally of the amount owed one broker by the other is kept. Settlements of debts between “hawala” brokers can take a variety of forms, and need not take the form of direct cash transactions. 4-62. In an environment where the threat employs IEDs, analysis is a continual process of compiling and examining all available information concerning potential threat activities that target elements of the population, local security forces, and facilities or bases. A comprehensive threat analysis reviews the factors of a threat’s existence, capability, intentions, history, and targeting, as well as the environment within which friendly forces operate. Threat analysis is an essential step in identifying the probability of threat attacks and results in a threat assessment. 4-63. Step 3 considerations specific to the IED threat include— • Developing an understanding of how each threat organization is organized and operates. • Developing threat models, personality profiles, and targeting folders. • Determining primary operating or staging areas. • Determining mobility corridors (MCs) and escape routes. • Determining where the threat’s logistic facilities are located and how their support organizations operate. • Determining the level of popular support (active and passive). • Determining the recruiting techniques and methods of each threat organization. • Locating neutrals and those actively opposing these organizations. • Using pattern analysis and other tools to establish links between each threat organization and other organizations. • Determining the underlying social, political, ideological, and economic issues that caused the threat’s existence. These issues may continue to cause the members of the organization as well as elements of the population to support the threat.

Modeling 4-64. Threat models depict how the threat prefers to conduct operations under ideal conditions. They are based on the threat’s normal or “doctrinal” organization, equipment, doctrine, and TTP. Although not exactly doctrinally similar, an asymmetric threat can be modeled just as a conventional threat can be.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

4-15

Chapter 4

4-65. Threat models result from a detailed study of the threat force. Ideally, analysts construct threat models prior to deployment, and continue to evaluate the threat and update the threat models as required. Threat models consist of three parts: templates, preferred tactics and options, and HVT identification.

Templates 4-66. Templating is the graphical portrayal of the deployment patterns and tendencies preferred by threat forces. Templates may be designed to depict the threat’s propensity for a particular type of operation (ambush, kidnapping, IED emplacement). However, they should be tailored to the needs of the unit or staff creating them. 4-67. Construct templates through an analysis of the intelligence database and an evaluation of the threat’s past operations. Look for patterns in how the threat organizes forces, timing, distances, relative locations, groupings, or use of the terrain and weather.

Preferred Tactics and Options 4-68. The threat model includes a description of the threat’s preferred tactics. It addresses the operations of the elements portrayed on the template and the activities of the different WFFs. Even if the threat’s preferred tactics can be depicted graphically, the threat model includes a description. This allows the template to become more than a “snapshot in time” of the operation being depicted. 4-69. Like the template itself, the analyst will develop the description of the threat’s tactics and options from an evaluation of doctrine and past or current operations. EOD units provide IED defeat expertise throughout all levels of the maneuver force planning staff. The division’s direct support EOD battalion is an excellent source of detailed IED analysis.

High-Value Target Identification 4-70. HVTs are assets that the threat commander requires for the successful completion of the mission depicted and described on the template. The analyst will identify HVTs from an evaluation of the database, the threat template, its supporting narrative, and the use of tactical judgment. Analysts should determine how the threat might react to the loss of each identified HVT and consider the ability to substitute other assets to the operation.

DETERMINE THREAT COURSES OF ACTION 4-71. The final step of the IPB process integrates the results of the previous steps into a meaningful conclusion. Given what the threat normally prefers to do, and the effects of the specific OE in which it is operating now, what are the likely objectives and the COAs available? When dealing with an unconventional threat, the analyst must develop multiple COAs and explain any uncertainties developed. It is important for the analyst to develop the most dangerous COA, depending on time constraints. The threat COA models which drive the decision-making process are valid only if the G-2/S-2 establishes a good foundation during the first three steps of the IPB process. 4-72. In Step 4, the G-2/S-2 develops threat COA models that depict the threat’s available COAs and prepares event templates and matrices that focus intelligence collection on identifying which COA the threat will execute. The resulting threat COA models are the products that the staff will use to portray the threat in the decision-making and targeting processes. Figure 4-3, page 4-18, is an example event template for IED defeat operations, while Figure 4-4, page 4-19, is an example incident overlay identifying allegiances. 4-73. The use of IEDs is a method the threat uses to carry out its tactics and not a specific COA. Therefore, predicting the next IED may not be an optimal approach to IED defeat intelligence. The specific task of the intelligence analyst support to IED defeat operations should focus on the identification of key threat peculiarities and weaknesses for maneuver commanders to exploit.

4-16

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Planning Considerations for Improvised Explosive Device Defeat

4-74. Pattern analysis, which can facilitate predictive analysis, can be an effective tool in IED defeat operations, but it should focus on the limits of enemy capabilities, not solely on future intentions. The threat, as well as friendly forces, are constrained by the limits of their capability. These limitations affect patterns and when analyzed over time can be exploited. Pattern analysis is susceptible to denial and deception and analysts should look for indications of denial or deception and understanding the limitations. 4-75. Step 4 of the IPB is conducted the same way whether the threat uses IEDs or not. While determining threat COAs, the G-2/S-2 will incorporate IEDs into larger threat COAs. How the threat uses IEDs will be part of this larger framework of goals and intent. In terms of IEDs, technical capabilities (current and predicted) are important, while the most important considerations are recent methods and trends. 4-76. Step 4 considerations specific to the IED threat might include the following threat COAs: • Attacks and raids where IEDs may be employed as a weapon (police stations, election sites, schools, security forces, military installations, or other HN government and security-related facilities). • Attacks on public utility installations (power, water, telephone) where IEDs may be included as a tactic for destruction. • Attacks or other forms of economic sabotage (pipelines, transmission towers, ports, marketplaces) where IEDs may be included as a tactic for destruction. • Ambushes of HN or friendly convoys. • Kidnappings. • Attacks on the population. • Assassination. 4-77. When using IEDs, the threat’s most likely end state is to–– • Inflict casualties to weaken coalition and U.S. forces and commitment to operations. • Break morale of friendly forces. • Persuade friendly forces to conduct retribution operations against civilians. • Inflict casualties on civilian and friendly forces. • Create instability and lack of trust in authority. • Persuade locals to do something or not do something (not support coalition, keep locals in line, intimidation).

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

4-17

Chapter 4

Figure 4-3. Example Event Template for IED Defeat Operations

4-18

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Planning Considerations for Improvised Explosive Device Defeat

Figure 4-4. Example Incident Overlay Identifying Allegiances 4-78. Analysts evaluate the most vulnerable locations and facilities that can quickly affect the greatest number of the populace (such as power plants; transmission lines; religious sites; police and military facilities; road, rail, and water networks; and local open-air markets) to determine the most likely locations for potential threat attacks, sabotage, raids, and roadblocks as the most likely threat COA. The analyst must learn to think unconventionally because threat targets and attacks will not be based on a U.S. style of thinking and application of ethics. Commanders should consider the benefits of long-term target development and relationship to short-term tactical success. While the IED emplacer is often the most visible element of an insurgent IED network, striking these more accessible targets often denies an opportunity to develop actionable intelligence on higher value nodes (facilitators, financiers, leaders, logisticians, and bomb makers). When possible, methodical steps should be taken to identify the portions of the network that remain underground or invisible without being compromised. This process requires exceptional field craft (snipers/observers), detailed terrain analysis, and a combined-arms plan employing tactical patience.

TARGETING 4-79. Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking account of operational requirements and capabilities (JP 3-0). It is an integral part of Army and USMC operations. Based on the commander’s targeting guidance and targeting objectives, the targeting team determines what targets to attack and how, where, and when to attack. It then assigns targets to systems best suited to achieve the desired effects. Targeting begins during planning and continues

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

4-19

Chapter 4

throughout the operations process. It is a mechanism the commander and staff use to continually update and refine the plan and assess the operations through a cyclical process. 4-80. The targeting process follows the functions of decide, detect, deliver, and assess (D3A) (see FM 6-20-10). The targeting team, represented by the entire staff, considers all options (lethal and nonlethal) to create the desired effect on the intended targets. In the case of IED targeting, using the operational categories mentioned in Chapter 1 (PMESII-PT) provide an excellent framework to integrate or filter the D3A process. 4-81. The targeting process is another means of integrating IED defeat into unit operations. Critical nodes within the IED attack system of the enemy can be identified and nominated as HPTs. Examples include specific leaders, bomb makers, or munitions caches. Collection assets are then assigned, ranging from HUMINT, SIGINT, and IMINT to reconnaissance patrols. Options are developed to attack key enemy IED nodes or to defeat enemy IED attack efforts. Subject matter experts (SMEs) from various in-theater organizations, such as CEXC or EOD leaders from the AO, provide targeting data which aids the prioritization and selection of targets.

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE SYNCHRONIZATION 4-82. Brigade combat teams (BCTs) and regimental combat teams (RCTs) conduct ISR operations producing intelligence on the operational environment, including but not limited to enemy, weather, terrain, and civil considerations. As such, ISR operations are a critical function to develop SU and assist in planning and making decisions concerning IED defeat strategies and procedures. ISR operations are a commander’s function supported by the entire staff and subordinate units. ISR operations are multifaceted and develop, synchronize, and integrate intelligence from a multitude of collection sources to eliminate functional “stovepipes” for planning, reporting, and processing information and producing intelligence. ISR operations must be nested from division to battalion level to ensure integration of all available assets toward a single purpose that results in increased security and flexibility to gain and maintain the initiative at the tactical level, the focus of the BCT and RCT and its subordinate elements. 4-83. The S-2, with staff participation, synchronizes the entire collection effort to include all assets the commander controls, assets of lateral units and higher echelon units and organizations, and intelligence reach to answer the commander’s priority information requirements (PIRs) and intelligence requirements. ISR synchronization activities include the following: •

• • •

• • • •

4-20

Conducting requirements management: anticipate, develop, analyze, validate, and prioritize information requirements (IRs). Recommend PIRs to the commander. Manage the commander’s IRs, RFIs from subordinate and lateral organizations, and tasks from higher headquarters. Eliminate satisfied requirements and add new requirements as necessary. Developing indicators for an enemy COA. Developing specific information requirements (SIRs) that will answer the PIR and IR. Converting the SIRs into ISR tasks or RFIs that tailor the reporting criteria to the collection capabilities of tasked assets (see Figure 4-5 for the ISR task development process). The S-2 assigns intelligence production and reach tasks to subordinate intelligence elements or personnel, submits RFIs to higher and lateral echelons, and coordinates with (or assists) the S-3 to develop and assign ISR tasks. Comparing the ISR tasks to the capabilities and limitations of the available ISR assets (in coordination with the S-3). Forwarding SIRs that cannot be answered by available assets to higher or lateral organizations as RFIs. Assessing collection asset reporting and intelligence production to evaluate the effectiveness of the ISR effort. Maintaining SU to identify gaps in coverage and to identify the need to cue or redirect ISR assets.

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Planning Considerations for Improvised Explosive Device Defeat •

Updating the ISR synchronization plan. The S-2 manages and updates the ISR synchronization plan as PIRs are answered and new requirements arise.

Figure 4-5. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Task Development Process

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

4-21

Chapter 4

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE SYNCHRONIZATION CONSIDERATIONS 4-84. The S-2 generally follows six considerations in planning ISR synchronization and ISR activities: anticipate, integrate, prioritize, balance, control, and reach. Refer to FM 34-2 for more information regarding ISR synchronization. •

•

•

•

•

•

Anticipate. The intelligence staff must recognize when and where to shift collection or identify new intelligence requirements. The overall intent of this principle is to identify a new, or adjust an existing requirement, and present it to the commander for approval before waiting for the commander or the staff to identify it. Integrate. The intelligence staff must be fully integrated into the unit’s orders production and planning activities to ensure early identification of intelligence requirements. Early and continuous consideration of collection factors enhances the unit’s ability to direct collection assets in a timely manner, ensures thorough planning, and increases flexibility in selecting assets. Prioritize. Prioritize each intelligence requirement based on its importance in supporting the commander’s intent and decisions. Prioritization, based on the commander’s guidance and the current situation, ensures that limited ISR assets and resources are directed against the most critical requirements. Balance. ISR capabilities complement each other. The intelligence staff should resist favoring or becoming too reliant on a particular unit, discipline, or system. Balance is simply planning redundancy when required, eliminating redundancy when not desired, and ensuring an appropriate mix of ISR assets or types. The intelligence synchronization matrix (ISM) is useful in determining or evaluating balance. Control. To ensure timely and effective responses to intelligence requirements, a unit should first use the ISR assets it controls. These assets usually are more responsive to their respective commander and also serve to lessen the burden on the ISR assets of other units, agencies, and organizations. Reach. Intelligence reach may be the only way to satisfy an intelligence requirement. If at all possible, one should not depend solely on intelligence to answer a PIR.

4-85. EOD team leaders and their chain of command have an exceptionally clear understanding of insurgent TTPs and IED technology and should be considered when conducting ISR synchronization. This IED information is shared on the target (if tactical conditions allow) in a debrief to the on-scene commander. It is also available up the chain of command from the EOD company commander to their supported BCTs operations or intelligence officer and from the EOD battalion commander to the division Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations and Plans (G-3) or assistant corps engineer (ACE). 4-86. EOD teams exploit rendered safe IEDs to protect the force and to collect IED specific technical intelligence. This technical intelligence often comes in the form of biometric data (fingerprints, trace deoxyribonucleic acid [DNA]) or physical construction of the IED itself. The specific components or how they are assembled all have the potential to relate a “bomb-maker’s profile.” This profile is used in pattern analysis and eventually in target development for conventional maneuver or special operations forces. A single defeated and exploited IED may be the missing piece of a complex puzzle that leads to a network being neutralized. 4-87. An effective discussion of ISR has to include an understanding of the CCIRs. The CCIRs are elements of information required by commanders that directly affect decision making and dictate the successful execution of missions. The commander decides what information is critical based on experience, the mission, the higher commander’s intent, and the staff’s input (initial IPB, information, intelligence, and recommendations). See FM 3-0 for more information regarding CCIRs. 4-88. Based on the CCIRs, two types of supporting IRs are generated: PIRs and friendly force information requirements (FFIRs). However, commanders may determine that they need to know whether one or more

4-22

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Planning Considerations for Improvised Explosive Device Defeat

essential elements of friendly information (EEFI) have been compromised or that the enemy is collecting against a designated EEFI. In those cases, commanders may designate that question as one of their CCIRs. 4-89. IRs are all of the information elements required by the commander and staff for the successful planning and execution of operations; that is, all elements necessary to address the factors of METT-TC. Vetting by the commander or a designated representative turns an IR into either a PIR or an intelligence requirement. IRs are developed during COA analysis based on the factors of METT-TC. 4-90. PIRs are those intelligence requirements for which a commander has an anticipated and stated priority in their task of planning and decision making. PIRs are associated with a decision based on action or inaction, or the OE that will affect the overall success of the commander’s mission. The commander designates intelligence requirements as CCIR (PIR and FFIR). Answers to the PIRs help produce intelligence essential to the commander’s SU and decision making. 4-91. The S-2 recommends to the commander those IRs produced during the MDMP that meet the criteria for PIR. They do not become CCIR until approved by the commander. Additionally, the commander may unilaterally designate PIRs. The IRs that are not designated by the commander as PIRs become intelligence requirements. The intelligence requirement is a gap in the command’s knowledge or understanding of the OE or threat that the intelligence WFF must fill. However, commanders must realize that PIR drive the collection manager’s allocation of ISR, as well as driving the efforts of the intelligence analysts. When IED questions are relegated to IR only and not to PIR, the likelihood that ISR will be tasked to gain information on IED networks, and that the information will be analyzed are greatly reduced. This applies at all levels of command and is particularly important at those echelons that control large amounts of ISR capabilities. 4-92. The S-3 then tasks the unit’s assets to answer both the PIR and intelligence requirements through the ISR plan. The PIR should— • • • • •

Ask only one question. Support a decision. Identify a specific fact, event, activity (or absence thereof) that can be collected. Indicate an enemy course of action (ECOA) prior to, or as early as possible, in its implementation (if linked). Indicate the latest time the information is of value (LTIOV). The LTIOV is the absolute latest time the information can be used by the commander in making the decision the PIR supports. The LTIOV can be linked to time, an event, or a point in the battle or operation.

FRIENDLY FORCE INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS 4-93. The staff also develops FFIRs. The FFIRs, when answered, provide friendly force information that the commander and staff need to achieve SU and to make decisions.

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF FRIENDLY INFORMATION 4-94. EEFI establish information to protect, not information to obtain. Thus, EEFI are established to inform or direct BCT and RCT unit and element efforts to deny enemy efforts to collect against specific BCT and RCT actions, units, intentions, or capabilities. In some cases EEFI may form the underlying basis for tasks to subordinate units, particularly during security operations. Further, commanders may determine that they need to know whether one or more EEFI have been compromised or that the enemy is collecting against a designated EEFI. In those cases, commanders may designate that question as one of their CCIRs, using the ISM which generates PIRs and/or FFIRs. For example, a commander may determine that if the enemy discovers the location and movement of the friendly reserve, the operation is at risk. In this case, the location and movement of the friendly reserve are EEFI. 4-95. The commander determines whether the enemy has discovered the location and movement of the friendly reserve as a CCIR. That CCIR, in turn, generates PIR and FFIR to support staff actions in determining whether the EEFI has been compromised.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

4-23

Chapter 4

DEVELOP THE INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE SYNCHRONIZATION PLAN 4-96. The entire unit staff develops their IRs and determines how best to satisfy them. The staff uses reconnaissance and surveillance assets to collect information. The ISR synchronization plan includes all assets that the operations officer can task or request and coordination mechanisms to ensure adequate coverage of the areas of interest. 4-97. The ISR synchronization plan, often presented in a matrix format, aids in synchronizing the entire ISR effort with the overall operation and the commander’s decisions and/or decision points. The ISR synchronization plan is often produced in conjunction with the ISR plan. However, before performing ISR synchronization and finalizing the ISR synchronization plan, the S-2 must have the following: • • • •

The CCIR (PIR and FFIR). A prioritized list of the remaining intelligence requirements. Evaluated ISR assets and resources. All of the assigned ISR tasks.

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE INTEGRATION 4-98. ISR integration is a continuing process. Refer to Figure 4-6. 4-99. The S-3, in coordination with the S-2 and other staff members, orchestrates the tasking and directing of all available ISR assets to answer the CCIRs by matching requirements with specific collection assets using the following factors: • Availability. Determine what assets are organic and readily available. When will attachments arrive? What systems are not fully mission capable and when will they be repaired? What are the maintenance and crew rest requirements? What systems are available in higher, adjacent, and subordinate units? How long will it take the asset to get into position? • Capability. Determine if the asset can answer the questions asked? Does it have sufficient range? Can it operate in the expected climate and visibility conditions? Will contact with the target need to maintained when it is identified? • Vulnerability. What is the threat’s ability to locate, identify, and destroy the collector both at the target area and on the route to and from the mission? Is the risk of loss greater than the potential gain of information? Will the asset be needed for other subsequent operations? 4-100. How reliable is the specific asset based on training, leadership, and past experience. Who are the “work horses” that can get the job done? The result of this process is the forming of the ISR plan. The ISR plan provides a list of all the ISR tasks to be accomplished, both internal and external to the BCT and RCT. The S-2 and the S-3 develop tasks, orders, and requests from the SIRs. These tasks, orders, and requests are then assigned based on the capabilities and limitations of the available ISR assets and the LTIOV taking into account the concepts of— • Cueing. Cueing involves the use of one or more sensor systems to provide data that directs collection by other systems. For example, sweeping the battlefield electronically with a wide area surveillance system may reveal activity that in turn triggers direct collection by a more accurate, pinpoint sensor system such as an unmanned aircraft system (UAS) or scout team. • Redundancy. Redundancy involves the application of several identical assets to cover the same target. Use redundant tasking against HPTs when the probability of success by any one system is low. For example, several scout teams infiltrating over different routes when the risk of detection is high, but no other systems are capable of collecting the required information.

4-24

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Planning Considerations for Improvised Explosive Device Defeat •

•

Mix. Mix refers to planning for complementary coverage by a combination of assets from multiple disciplines. Sensor mix increases the probability of collection, reduces the risk of successful enemy deception, facilitates cueing, and provides more complete reporting. For example, thermal imagery from a UAS may indicate several vehicle-like hot spots in a suspected enemy battle position. A scout team observing the same named area of interest (NAI) may reveal that half of those hot spots are actually decoys and not enemy armored vehicles. Integration. Integration is the management-of-resources aspect of collection strategy development. Barring a decision to use redundant coverage for a critical target, attempt to integrate new requirements into planned or ongoing missions. Integration helps avoid the common problem of under-tasking very capable collectors. During limited periods of time, collection capability may exceed that of the tasking. Brigades can resolve this by reevaluating each collection asset for excess capability, focusing excess collection capability on the most important of the remaining unfulfilled requirements and, finally, redirecting assets to maximize support to the most important requirements.

Figure 4-6. ISR Synchronization

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

4-25

Chapter 4

THE INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE PLAN 4-101. The finalized ISR plan is produced as an ISR order in the ISR Annex (Annex L) to a BCT and RCT OPORD. Refer to FM 5-0 for specific information on the ISR Annex. However, an initial ISR order is usually prepared at the conclusion of mission analysis during the planning process and issued prior to the completed BCT and RCT operations order to start reconnaissance and surveillance operations required to achieve the intended ISR effect.

EXECUTE AND UPDATE THE INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE PLAN 4-102. The S-3 updates the ISR plan based on information received from the S-2. The S-3 is the integrator and manager of the ISR effort through integrated staff processes and procedures. As PIRs are answered and new IR arise, the S-2 updates ISR synchronization requirements and provides the new input to the S-3 who updates the ISR plan. The S-2 works closely with all staff elements to ensure the unit’s organic collectors receive appropriate tasking. The ISR plan reflects an integrated collection strategy and employment, production, and dissemination scheme that will effectively answer the commander’s PIR.

COMPOSITE RISK MANAGEMENT 4-103. CRM is the Army’s primary decision-making process for identifying hazards and controlling risks across the full spectrum of Army missions, functions, operations, and activities (FM 5-19). CRM is integrated into the MDMP (see FM 5-0) and continues throughout the operations process. Commanders and staffs assess risk whenever they identify hazards, and regardless of type, they do not wait until a set point in a cycle. 4-104. Effective CRM can reduce the frequency of IED strikes and diminish the physical effects when they do occur. It is used to identify hazards, define risks, identify methods for control, and identify responsibilities for implementation. The risk management process enables commanders and staffs to define acceptable risk levels and implement controls until risks are commensurate with the mission. CRM is a five-step process. The steps are as follows: • Step 1. Identify hazards. • Step 2. Assess hazards to determine risk. • Step 3. Develop controls and make risk decisions. • Step 4. Implement controls. • Step 5. Supervise and evaluate.

IDENTIFY HAZARDS 4-105. This is often the most difficult part of CRM. The factors of METT-TC serve as a standard format and are used for hazard identification during mission planning with the MDMP. Since an IED incident is the condition that results from the interactions of an IED, a catalyst (such as activation from a Soldier, Marine, or vehicle), and a common spatial relationship, the hazards can be further refined by identifying the types of IEDs (such as a package IED, VBIED, or suicide bomber), how a Soldier or Marine might encounter the hazard (dismounted or mounted and the type of vehicle), and the locations where encounters would be most likely.

ASSESS HAZARDS TO DETERMINE RISK 4-106. This process is systematic in nature and uses charts, codes, and numbers to present a methodology to access probability and severity to obtain a standardized level of risk. It relates the probability and effects of an IED strike based on the mission, COA, or frequency of IED events. An effective risk assessment is critical for evaluating the combat effectiveness of a unit in an IED environment. Risk-assessment criteria are developed by using Table 4-1. The elements of the table are further described in follow-on paragraphs.

4-26

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Planning Considerations for Improvised Explosive Device Defeat

Risk Assessment Matrix 4-107. The risk assessment matrix depicted in Table 4-1 combines severity and probability estimates to form a risk assessment for each threat. Use the risk assessment matrix to evaluate the acceptability of a risk and the level at which the decision on acceptability will be made. The matrix may also be used to prioritize resources, to resolve risks, or to standardize threat notification or response actions. Severity, probability, and risk assessment should be recorded to serve as a record of the analysis for future use. See the risk mitigation considerations in Appendix D. Table 4-1. Risk Assessment Matrix Probability Severity

Frequent

Catastrophic

I

Critical

II

Marginal

III

Negligible

IV

Likely

Occasional

Seldom

Unlikely

A

B

C

D

E

E E H M

E H M L

H H M L

H M L L

M L L L

Key: E – Extremely high

H – High

M – Moderate

L – Low

Risk Probability Definitions 4-108. The following describes each of the risk probability categories: • Frequent. Occurs very often, known to happen regularly. In an example, given 500 or so exposures to the hazard, expect that it will definitely happen to someone. Examples of frequent occurrences are vehicle rollovers, rear-end collisions, and heat injury during a battalion physical training run with hot weather or nonacclimated Soldiers and Marines. • Likely. Occurs several times, a common occurrence. In an example, given 1,000 or so exposures without proper controls, it will occur at some point. Examples might include IEDs, wire strikes for aircraft, controlled flights into terrain, and unintentional weapons discharges. • Occasional. Occurs sporadically, but is not uncommon. A Soldier and Marine may or may not get through deployment without it happening. Some examples might include UXO and fratricide. • Seldom. Remotely possible, could occur at some time. Usually several things must go wrong for it to happen. Examples might include things like heat-related death or electrocution. • Unlikely. Can assume will not occur, but not impossible. Examples might include detonation of containerized ammunition during transport. Risk Severity Categories 4-109. The following describes each of the risk severity categories: • Catastrophic (I). Loss of ability to accomplish the mission or mission failure. Death or permanent total disability. Loss of major or mission-critical systems or equipment. Major property or facility damage. Severe environmental damage. Mission-critical security failure. Unacceptable collateral damage. • Critical (II). Severely degraded mission capability or unit readiness. Permanent partial disability or temporary total disability exceeding three months time. Extensive major damage to equipment or systems. Significant damage to property or the environment. Security failure. Significant collateral damage.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

4-27

Chapter 4 •

•

Marginal (III). Degraded mission capability or unit readiness. Minor damage to equipment or systems, property, or the environment. Lost days due to injury or illness not exceeding three months. Negligible (IV). Little or no adverse impact on mission capability. First aid or minor medical treatment. Slight equipment or system damage, but fully functional and serviceable. Little or no property or environmental damage.

Risk Definitions 4-110. The following describes each of the risk definitions: • E–Extremely high risk. Loss of ability to accomplish the mission if hazards occur during the mission. A frequent or likely probability of catastrophic loss (IA or IB) or frequent probability of critical loss (IIA) exists. • H–High risk. Significant degradation of mission capabilities in terms of the required mission standard, inability to accomplish all parts of the mission, or inability to complete the mission to standard if threats occur during the mission. Occasional to seldom probability of catastrophic loss (IC or ID) exists. A likely to occasional probability exists of a critical loss (IIB or IIC) occurring. Frequent probability of marginal loss (IIIA) exists. • M–Moderate risk. Expected degraded mission capabilities in terms of the required mission standard and will result in reduced mission capability if hazards occur during the mission. An unlikely probability of catastrophic loss (IE) exists. The probability of a critical loss is seldom (IID). Marginal losses occur with a likely or occasional probability (IIIB or IIIC). A frequent probability of negligible (IVA) losses exists. • L–Low risk. Expected losses have little or no impact on accomplishing the mission. The probability of critical loss is unlikely (IIE), while that of marginal loss is seldom (IIID) or unlikely (IIIE). The probability of a negligible loss is likely or less ([IVB] through [IVE]).

DEVELOP CONTROLS AND MAKE RISK DECISIONS 4-111. In this step, controls are developed and applied. It is accomplished during the COA development, COA analysis, COA comparison, and COA approval of the MDMP. This may be accomplished by developing and applying actions to reduce the probability of an IED encounter. 4-112. Educational controls, physical controls, or avoidance/elimination controls are the basic categories that will provide more protection to the Soldier, Marine, or materiel to reduce the severity of an IED strike. Often, it is a combination of the two. Examples of controls include― • Updating or improving IED awareness/training. • Closing routes. • Allowing only certain types of vehicles on the routes. • Increasing patrols in suspected IED areas. • Increasing observation of suspected IED areas. • Increasing protection by hardening of positions, facilities, vehicles, and personnel.

IMPLEMENT CONTROLS 4-113. Leaders must ensure that controls are integrated into SOPs, written and verbal orders, mission briefings, and running estimates. A key element to this step is to ensure that the identified controls to reduce the probability and/or severity of an IED attack are clear and simple in execution orders.

SUPERVISE AND EVALUATE 4-114. This step of the CRM process ensures that controls are implemented to standard. Precombat inspection (PCI) checks, rehearsals, and leader presence is key. This is a continuous process that provides

4-28

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Planning Considerations for Improvised Explosive Device Defeat

the ability to identify weaknesses and to make adjustments to controls based on performance, changing situations, conditions, or events.

COMPOSITE RISK MANAGEMENT RELATIONSHIP TO THE MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS AND TROOP-LEADING PROCEDURES 4-115. As mentioned earlier, risk management is not an add-on feature to the MDMP, TLPs, or the RDSP. It is a fully integrated element of planning and executing operations. The goal of integrating the process is to make risk management a routine part of planning and executing operational missions. Table 4-2 and Table 4-3 describe the CRM process as it is integrated into the MDMP and TLPs. More detailed discussion on CRM and key risk management terms can be found in FM 5-19; FM 3-100.12/MCRP 5-12.1C/NTTP 5-03.5/AFTTP(1) 3-2.34, and FM 5-0. Table 4-2. Composite Risk Assessment Aligned With the MDMP Risk Management Steps Military Decision-Making Process

Mission Receipt Mission Analysis COA Development COA Analysis COA Comparison COA Approval Orders Production Rehearsal Execution/Assessment

Step 1 Identify Hazards

Step 2 Assess Hazards

X X X X

X X X

X X

X X

Step 3 Develop Controls & Make Risk Decisions

Step 4 Implement Controls

Step 5 Supervise & Evaluate

X X X X X X X

X X X

X X

Step 5 Supervise & Evaluate

Table 4-3. TLP and CRM Steps Risk Management Steps Troop-Leading Procedures

Receive Mission Issue Warning Order Make a Tentative Plan Initiate Movement Conduct Reconnaissance Complete Plan Issue Order Supervise and Refine

21 September 2007

Step 1 Identify Hazards

Step 2 Assess Hazards

Step 3 Develop Controls & Make Risk Decisions

Step 4 Implement Controls

X X X X X

X X X X X

X X X X

X X

X

X

X X

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

X X X

X X

4-29

Chapter 4

COMPOSITE RISK MANAGEMENT SUMMARY 4-116. The key to using CRM successfully is to employ it at each echelon—from the commander, through the tactical planner, to the Soldiers and Marines executing the mission. Each level identifies hazards, eliminates or reduces hazards as feasible, and communicates the residual hazards to the next lower echelon. As such, each echelon works as a filter to control unacceptable risks. 4-117. Training provides Soldiers and Marines with an understanding of equipment limitations and plays a critical role in the CRM process. The capabilities and limitations of Army/USMC systems are taken into consideration during the development of doctrine and TTP. 4-118. CRM at the tactical planning level requires a thorough knowledge and awareness of the hazards and potential controls that can be employed. The planning process requires a methodical and disciplined technique to identify the hazards and develop appropriate controls for operating in an IED environment. 4-119. The execution level is the culminating point of CRM. It is where Soldiers, Marines, and leaders employ the systems provided to accomplish the mission. The amount of residual hazards remaining after the filtering process from echelons above may well determine the success of risk management. The individual Soldier or Marine is the last element to control any residual hazards. 4-120. Optimizing the components of CRM at the tactical planning level is more challenging as emerging technology-dependent systems bring more variables into the mission. While tactical intelligence is the key element in identifying IED related hazards, technical knowledge is the key element in assessing the risks associated with IEDs. This knowledge assimilates the tactical intelligence with the capabilities of the equipment of the unit, the performance of enemy IEDs, and the protection provided to Soldiers and Marines by their vehicles or personal protective equipment.

ASSURED MOBILITY 4-121. As described in Chapter 2, the framework for IED defeat is a parallel construct to the fundamentals of assured mobility. They follow a continuous cycle of planning, preparing, executing, and assessing decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations. Achieving assured mobility rests on applying six fundamentals that both sustain friendly maneuver, preclude the ability of the enemy to maneuver, and assist in the protection of the force. The six fundamentals of assured mobility are predict, detect, prevent, avoid, neutralize, and protect. 4-122. The IED defeat framework (see Figure 4-7) can be broken down into two major subelements: proactive (predetection or those measures that facilitate exploitation) and reactive (postdetection or those measures that mitigate the IED). • Proactive elements are actions taken by friendly forces to predict, detect, prevent, avoid, neutralize, and protect against IED events. • Reactive elements are actions taken by friendly forces to detect, avoid, neutralize, and protect against IED events.

4-30

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Planning Considerations for Improvised Explosive Device Defeat

Figure 4-7. IED Defeat Framework Note. The fundamentals of detect, avoid, neutralize, and protect applies to both sides of the framework (proactive and reactive measures).

Predict 4-123. Planners must accurately predict potential enemy impediments to force mobility by analyzing the enemy’s TTP, capability, and evolution. This enables the commander by demonstrating an understanding of how terrain, weather, enemy, and friendly activities continually interact to impact the mobility of the force. The maneuver planning staff (to include engineer, intelligence, and EOD planners) work together to produce the common operational picture (COP) and develop a real-time modified combined-obstacle overlay. Intelligence and known IED locations should be shared, and the IED picture should be developed jointly. The explosive hazards database (EHDB) provides valuable information on enemy attacks, and IEDs encountered in the AO. Its data can be used in pattern analysis to determine possible IED sites. Prediction requires a constantly updated understanding of the OE and is a function of division-, brigade-, and/or task force-level staff action, coordination, and analysis. 4-124. For the framework of IED defeat the staff section engineer, along with the S-2, must identify and understand enemy personnel, equipment, infrastructure, TTP, support mechanisms, or other actions to forecast specific enemy IED operations directed against U.S. interests. This is driven largely by the success of analysis in requirements management and assists in— • Identifying patterns of enemy behavior.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

4-31

Chapter 4 • • • • • • •

Identifying emerging threats. Predicting future enemy actions. Prioritizing ISR missions. Exploiting IED threat vulnerabilities. Targeting enemy IED attack nodes (such as funding and supplies). Disseminating alert information rapidly to specific users. Analyzing forensics and enabling better on-scene technical analysis.

4-125. The physical identification (indicators) of explosive threats is typically gained through visual and/or aerial reconnaissance. Active and passive reconnaissance is critical to the commander’s selection of MCs. It is accomplished using different maneuver and ISR assets, such as engineer IED defeat patrols; infantry patrols; observation posts; HUMINT sources; SIGINT sources; UAS; and reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition assets. Early deployment elements, which have been placed in the AO, can provide engineer reconnaissance in support of early entry and shaping operations. 4-126. Change detection technology can be used to identify where enemy threats exist and areas to avoid. Change detection is based on the physical comparison of two photographic images of the same terrain taken at different points in time. The first step to conduct change detection is to place photographic equipment on an airborne platform, and then fly over the specified terrain and photograph the AO. Then at a later time, conduct the exact same flight and again photograph the AO. Following the second flight, the imagery from both flights is compared side by side to look for anomalies or changes in the terrain that might indicate threat activity. This can be done manually, be automated, or be a combination of both.

Detect 4-127. Using ISR assets, engineers and other capabilities planners identify early indicators for the location of natural and man-made obstacles, preparations to create and emplace obstacles, and potential means for obstacle creation. They identify both actual and potential obstacles and propose solutions and alternate COAs to minimize or eliminate their potential effects. 4-128. For the framework of IED defeat, detection activities contribute to the identification and location of enemy personnel, explosive devices and their component parts, equipment, logistics operations, and infrastructure to provide accurate and timely information. Detection of IEDs is ideally accomplished before the enemy can inhibit mobility or cause harm to U.S. and coalition forces. The following actions assist in the efforts to interdict and destroy these activities: • Detecting and identifying explosive material and other components. • Detecting CBRN material and TICs. • Recognizing various IED types. • Conducting forensic operations to track bomb makers and/or handlers. • Conducting persistent surveillance. • Training to improve human detection of potential hazards locations. • Developing PIR tied to IED operation decisive points. • Linking and synchronizing detection assets to PIR-related NAIs. • Using detection means across the full range available (from imagery, mechanical-clearance operations, search techniques, to dogs). • Recognizing individual Soldier and Marine actions and awareness in all activities. 4-129. EOD and engineers also provide additional training to maneuver, MP, and HN forces to increase effectiveness in identifying and detecting IEDs. The four general phases during which an IED can be detected are prior to emplacement, during emplacement, while emplaced but not detonated, and after detonation.

4-32

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Planning Considerations for Improvised Explosive Device Defeat

Prevent 4-130. Engineers and other planners apply this fundamental by denying the enemy’s ability to influence mobility. This is accomplished by forces acting proactively before the obstacles are emplaced or activated. This may include aggressive action to destroy enemy assets and capabilities before they can be used to create obstacles. Political considerations and ROE may hinder the ability to apply the fundamental early in a contingency. Prevent potential impediments to maneuver from affecting the battlefield mobility of the force by acting early, such as neutralizing before or during emplacement. 4-131. For the framework of IED defeat, these activities disrupt and defeat the IED operational chain of events. These actions focus on the target to interdict or destroy key enemy personnel (bomb makers, leaders, and financiers), the infrastructure and logistics capabilities (suppliers and bomb factories), and surveillance and targeting efforts (reconnaissance and overmatch operations) before emplacement of the device. They also include actions to deter public support for the use of IED by the enemy. Prevention actions aid in― • Disrupting enemy operations and their support structure. • Denying critical IED related supplies to the enemy. • Increasing awareness of enemy TTP and its effectiveness. • Denying the enemy the opportunity to emplace IEDs (through presence patrols, OPs, checkpoints, aggressive surveillance operations, and so forth). • Rewarding local nationals’ cooperation in determining the location of caches or bomb making or emplacing activities. • Denying easily concealed locations (such as trash piles and debris along the sides of primary routes) and removing abandoned vehicles along routes. 4-132. To prevent enemy placement of IEDs, IED defeat forces patrol continuously, especially in front of critical soft logistical convoys. Soldier and Marine competence and alertness, coupled with mounted crewserved weapons and hardening of soft-skinned vehicles, make a more aggressive and less enticing target for the enemy. IED emplacement is also prevented through the seizure of caches and securing critical ammunition supply points within the AO. Reducing the amount of ordnance available to bomb makers is a key component of prevention. Finally, and most importantly, preventing the enemy from impeding mobility in the first place requires successful targeting. The best way to prevent IEDs is to capture or kill those that build the bomb. ISR assets should be tasked and focused on gathering intelligence on these HPTs.

Avoid 4-133. If prevention fails, the commander will maneuver forces to avoid impediments to mobility if this is viable within the scheme of maneuver. For the framework of IED defeat, these activities keep friendly forces from IEDs when prevention activities are not possible or have failed. Avoidance activities include― • Increasing SU of the AO and continually refining the COP and the timely and accurate dissemination of related information. • Ensuring timely and accurate status reporting and tracking. • Altering routes and routines. • Marking and bypassing suspected IEDs. 4-134. Route status should be tracked and used to inform higher and subordinate elements on the threat conditions for the routes in the AO. This tracker, an element of the COP, is updated as necessary and briefed to the commander. This tool is used to plan and execute convoys and combat missions and avoid areas with IEDs. When IEDs are identified or detonated, they are immediately reported to the brigade tactical operations center. The unit reporting the IED sends an EH spot report (SPOTREP) that contains critical IED information and a request for EOD support. The unit also populates the Force XXI battle command–brigade and below (FBCB2) system with the location of the IED and the blocked locations along the route, allowing military units and convoys to avoid the hazard.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

4-33

Chapter 4

Neutralize 4-135. Commanders plan to neutralize, reduce, or overcome obstacles and impediments as soon as possible to allow unrestricted movement of forces. The breaching tenants and fundamentals apply to the fundamental of “neutralize.” The combined arms team neutralizes, reduces, or overcomes (breaches) impediments to battlefield mobility that cannot be prevented or avoided. A commander’s decision to destroy an IED in place must address the phase/context of the operation so that the detonation will not accomplish the enemy’s desired effect. For example, if the enemy has placed the IED on key infrastructure/terrain, blowing the IED in place may accomplish the enemy’s desired effect of destroying the target. 4-136. For the framework of IED defeat, these activities contribute to the destruction or reduction of enemy personnel, explosive devices, or supplies. Neutralization can be proactive or reactive in nature. • Proactive activities include conducting operations to eliminate or interrupt the enemy leaders, suppliers, trainers, enablers, and executors responsible for the employment of IED against coalition forces. • Reactive activities include conducting controlled detonations or render safe procedures against identified EH. EOD forces are the only personnel authorized to render safe IEDs or UXO. Render safe procedures are particular courses or modes of action taken by explosive ordnance personnel for access to, diagnosis, rendering safe, recovery, and final disposal of explosive ordnance or any hazardous material associated with an explosive ordnance incident. The explosive ordnance procedures involving the application of special explosive ordnance methods and tools to provide for the interruption of functions or separation of essential components of unexploded explosive ordnance to prevent an unacceptable detonation (JP 1-02). 4-137. Breaching tenets and fundamentals apply when forced to neutralize an obstacle. In extremely high operating tempo (OPTEMPO) or high-intensity combat missions, U.S. Army and Marine engineer units may conduct limited reduction or clearing of mines and other EH. Engineers are required to clear obstacles as part of area clearance operations, overcome urban barriers, and participate in combined arms route clearance operations. In large cities where traffic is already severely congested, it is important to remove the hazard as soon as possible and get civilian traffic moving again. 4-138. IEDs should be neutralized as soon and safely as possible to allow unrestricted movement. The unit that finds an IED or the maneuver unit that owns the AO secures the site and keeps civilians and other military traffic away from the hazard area. Once the hazard is neutralized, the route is reopened.

Protect 4-139. Engineers and other elements plan and implement survivability and other protection measures that will deny the enemy the ability to inflict damage as forces maneuver. This may include countermobility missions to deny the enemy maneuver and provide protection to friendly maneuvering forces. Maneuver elements protect against enemy countermobility effects. Both personnel and equipment must survive IEDs. 4-140. For the framework of IED defeat, these activities improve the survivability of IED targets through hardening, awareness training, or other techniques. Protective activities include― • Disrupting, channeling, blocking, or redirecting energy and fragmentation. • Creating greater standoff distances to reduce the effect that IEDs have on their intended targets. • Incorporating unmanned platforms. • Using jamming devices. • Reducing time and distance in which intended targets are within IED range. • Using smoke or moving under the cover of darkness. • Accelerating processes and increasing the effectiveness of reaction and evacuation operations. • Providing blast and fragmentation mitigation for platforms, structures, and personnel. • Avoiding establishing patterns and predictable forms of behavior. • Conducting proper PCIs and rehearsals for all operations.

4-34

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Planning Considerations for Improvised Explosive Device Defeat •

Treating every operation as a combat mission (from a simple convoy to daily FOB security).

4-141. The Army and the USMC have aggressively pursued ways to add survivability protection of softskinned vehicles. The Army and the USMC have come up with excellent kits for this purpose. The equipment given to Soldiers and Marines has improved as well. Each Soldier and Marine should have in their possession: ballistic eye protection, small arms protective insert plates, hatch operator gloves, knee and elbow pads, advance combat helmets, and medical battle packs. Items at the squad and higher levels include ratchet-type tourniquets, different litter types, “Jaws of Life®” extraction tools, combat lifesaver bags at the fire team level, intra squad radios, and modular integrated communication headsets that filter out noise and prevent hearing loss. These items provide protection to Soldiers and Marines during or after IED incidents. The Army and the USMC continue to look for additional COTS technology to increase vehicle protection and Soldier and Marine survivability.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 4-142. A thorough mission analysis is crucial to planning. Both the process and the products of mission analysis help the commander and staff develop and refine their SU and develop effective plans. By having a thorough understanding of the METT-TC factors, the commander and staff are better equipped to develop effective plans to accomplish the mission. The remainder of this section offers IED planning considerations along the METT-TC factors.

MISSION 4-143. The mission statement defines the who, what, when, where, and why of the operation. A thorough understanding of why the unit is conducting an operation provides the focus for planning. Commanders analyze a mission in terms of the intent of the two higher commanders and their concept of operations. They also consider the missions of adjacent units to understand their contributions in relation to their own unit. 4-144. During mission analysis, the staff identifies those specified and implied tasks necessary for mission accomplishment, to include IED defeat tasks. IED defeat must be an integral part of unit operations, particularly those operations involving maneuver and mobility within the unit AO. Leaders must coordinate their IED defeat efforts with adjacent units and integrate them as necessary. Often, leaders will need to coordinate the use of theater-level assets and resources for use in IED defeat operations. IED defeat tasks may include― • Reconnaissance (route, zone, area). • Security patrols. • Route security. • Route clearance. • Area security, to include defending critical sites and infrastructure. • Raids. • Cordon and search operations. • Sniper operations.

ENEMY 4-145. Both conventional and unconventional forces may use IEDs. However, IEDs are often a weapon of choice for insurgents and terrorists due to imbalances in technology or numbers. IEDs allow them to strike without exposing themselves. This negates the advantages of conventional forces and allows the insurgent or terrorist to fight on its own terms. Conventional forces are often left to mitigate the effects of the device which impacts upon mission completion. 4-146. The defeat of IEDs will often require a more holistic and coordinated approach than merely focusing on the device itself. IED defeat must engage the entire system, to include public support,

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

4-35

Chapter 4

financing, supply, manufacturing, leadership, and the planning processes of the enemy. Chapter 3, Figure 3-1, page 3-8, depicts key nodes and activities within an enemy IED system. 4-147. Enemy considerations include their disposition (organization, strength, location, and tactical mobility), doctrine and/or methods, vulnerabilities, and probable COAs. Focus areas include― • Methods and TTP for initiation of IEDs. • Common materials used. • Favored targets. • Patterns developed for the areas and location of IED attacks. • Organization (cells, echeloned, and so forth). • Supply sources. • Safe house and safe areas (for the insurgents). • Level of popular support (may vary across the AO). • Communications means. • Known or suspected funding sources. • Known or suspected leadership.

TERRAIN AND WEATHER 4-148. Terrain and weather are natural conditions. Terrain and weather impact both friendly and enemy operations. 4-149. The terrain has a direct impact on the selection of objectives and locations for the placement of IEDs. The type of terrain will also impact on the effectiveness of IEDs or the protective measures of friendly forces. The natural and man-made terrain features not only affect maneuver and mobility in an operation, but can also mask the employment of IEDs. Terrain is analyzed from both the friendly and enemy perspectives using the OAKOC methodology (see FM 7-92). Typical locations for enemy IED emplacement include― • Bridges and overpasses. • Road and rail intersections. • Places that force slowdowns and closer intervals on convoys (winding turns, unpaved surfaces, steep or sharp turns, narrow roadways, and choke points). • Areas of dense civilian traffic or congestion. • Culverts or tunnels. • Terrain that provides overwatch. • Terrain that offers cover or concealment for IEDs and initiators. • Terrain used for marshalling personnel, equipment, and supplies. 4-150. Weather and the climate have direct and indirect effects on IEDs. The weather affects the― • Visibility of IEDs, initiators, and targets. • Selection of emplacement for IEDs. • Effectiveness of IEDs (Low and dense cloud cover may increase the blast effects of an IED, and temperature and moisture may cause failure to initiate or premature detonation.).

TROOPS AND SUPPORT AVAILABLE 4-151. When given a mission, a leader does a troop-to-task analysis. This analysis of troops and support available includes the number, type, capabilities, and condition of available friendly troops and support. It also includes supplies and support available from joint, interagency, and multinational forces. Commanders consider available troops and support when analyzing whether they have enough resources to accomplish a mission.

4-36

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Planning Considerations for Improvised Explosive Device Defeat

4-152. The types of units and support that commanders should consider for IED defeat operations include― • Intelligence support, to include all the intelligence disciplines. • Reconnaissance assets, to include reconnaissance units, scouts, and UASs. • Engineer units and support, to include mobility augmentation companies, clearance companies, sapper units, search teams, and specialized search dog teams. • EOD units or personnel. • Combat forces, to include maneuver and fire support units. • Linguist support. • Civil affairs (CA) support. • MP units. • Psychological operations (PSYOP) support.

TIME AVAILABLE 4-153. Leaders must take into account the ability of their unit and subordinate units to plan, prepare, and execute operations within the time available. The ability of the enemy to plan, prepare, execute, and react is also a function of time. Within IED defeat, many operations are time-sensitive. They include— • Convoying route change detection. • Responding to an IED incident (EOD render safe and disposal, forensics, and so forth). • Targeting. • Raiding an IED maker or factory. • Seizing stockpiled caches.

CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS 4-154. Civil considerations impact operations throughout the entire spectrum of conflict and at all echelons. Civil considerations comprise the influence of man-made infrastructure, civilian institutions, and attitudes and activities of the civil leaders, populations, and organizations within an AO on the conduct of military operations. Leaders must consider the relationship between IED defeat operations and the effects and influences they have on the civilian populace. They must also consider the impact of enemy IED attacks on the populace. The six characteristics that comprise civil considerations (expressed by the acronym ASCOPE) are— • Areas. Areas are the political boundaries, city districts, municipalities, trade routes, sociological and religious enclaves, agricultural and mining regions, trade routes, and so forth. Support for U.S. forces may vary between areas. Analysis may indicate which areas have an increased chance for encountering IED activity. • Structures. Structures are the infrastructure (dams, bridges, power plants, warehouses, communications nodes) and religious or cultural areas (mosques, churches, libraries, hospitals). Control of key structures can protect populations from hardship or deny their use to the enemy. Some structures may be identified as targets for military action; others may be prohibited from targeting. • Capabilities. Capabilities provide sustenance, key civic services, and resources to support military operations. Populations with access to basic sustenance and services are usually not prone to support insurgent terrorist or criminal activity. • Organizations. Organizations are the nonmilitary groups or institutions within the AO that influence and interact with the populace, the force, and each other. Identification of influential organizations may assist in gaining the support of the population.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

4-37

Chapter 4 •

•

People. People is the general term for nonmilitary personnel encountered by military forces whose actions and influence can affect the mission. The support of the population is critical to U.S. forces. Some enemy forces, such as insurgents, cannot operate without the support of the people. Events. Events are the routine, cyclical, planned, or spontaneous activities that significantly affect organizations, people, and military operations. Events may arouse tremendous emotion in the population and affect support for U.S. forces.

4-155. Other civil considerations are ensuring that tasks and methods are in place for the employment, cultural understanding, and interaction with the local population, nongovernment agencies, and contractors in support of stability operations. Shaping how the enemy (and the local/regional populations that may support enemy activity) thinks is the key element required for IED defeat at the beginning of the process. A decrease in IED activity in the AO over time should be seen if such an effort is synchronized throughout the theater of operations. Once the aspect of how the enemy thinks is understood, one may be able to shape its actions in their favor. Using these abilities and capabilities to win over the enemy is essential for IED reduction. Proper integration of humanitarian projects in each AO (at ground level) that meets the most important needs of the local leaders and population can help to establish friendships and/or alliances. Such actions can have a positive impact on IED defeat at its source. Some points of consideration, though not a conclusive list, include— • Planning a meeting with the local leaders. Know when the next meeting with the local leaders is and know the intent. Know about the culture, language, and the pressing needs of the community in the AO. Know what questions to ask and what questions to anticipate. Determine who in the AO knows the most about the leader, the population, and culture and if this person is essential to the meeting. Identify other essential personnel required for the meeting. • Meeting the essential community requirements. After meeting with the community leaders, decide how the units can help meet some of the essential requirements in the community in such a way as to help win over the population. For example, does this community require a trash service? Trash service, as the U.S. culture envisions, may not be what this local leader requires. Their culture may prefer that trash be removed to a specific site to attract wildlife that can be killed for food. • Improving formal and informal connections. Formal and informal connections with the local population should be improved in a controlled manner, from the highest commander to the lowest level and tracking and assimilation of this information into the planning process should be ensured. This can include use of special forces, NGO, contractors, and interpreters; information obtained by employment; proper treatment of the local population on projects for their benefit and the benefit of the unit; establishment of business opportunities for local leaders and their community; and media considerations. For example, there may be an opportunity to create conditions for brass and plastic recycling during ammunition demilling or to establish a local construction element for road improvement in the area that benefits local and military activities. Such activities are essential to decrease the IED production at the source, providing that the community needs are met and the information is shared with the local population in such a way as to convey good intent by the units. Note. The perceived ability to attack and destroy IED enemy nodes contributes to success in stability operations by deterring potential threats. Conversely, successful stability operations reduce the chance of IED threat by influencing civilians to not support the enemy efforts.

4-38

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Chapter 5

Actions in Response to Improvised Explosive Devices The use of IEDs on the modern battlefield has a direct impact on mobility, survivability, and logistical support requirements. All units must be able to maintain operations despite these hazards. Units must understand what actions to take upon encountering a suspected IED. The following are the keys to success: • Adaptation. The enemy will continue to adapt, and units must also adapt. • Information flow. Share information. • Training. Training is a must, even as a unit is deployed. • After-action reviews. Conduct honest, thorough after-action reviews (AARs) after every mission.

OBSERVATIONS FROM THE FIELD 5-1. There is a significant tactical performance gap between unit predeployment training tasks, conditions, standards, and the actual tactical environment and mission expectations in theater. Army Service Component Command and theater predeployment training guidance lists tasks, but do not describe required capabilities. Units practice individual TTP, rather than execute a battle-focused wartime training strategy. Mandated certification of standardized tasks is driving a sequential, event-driven approach to predeployment training strategy, vice the battle-focused training strategies described in Army and USMC training doctrine. 5-2. Soldiers and Marines and units transitioning for reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSO&I) report an expectation that they will be “trained” by someone before commitment to operations. This is particularly true for support type units. Some units with a high level of enemy attacks were found to have limited relevant training and low confidence in their ability to fight effectively. They tend to look for a “silver bullet,” such as SOPs, a textbook TTP, or training from others outside their leadership. Some units are assigned missions that are either different from their prewar mission (such as Multiple Launch Rocket System battalions performing MP battalion missions) or are executing missions under different conditions than prewar doctrinal assumptions (for example, there is no secure rear area). 5-3. The theater expects individuals and units that are trained to be ready to fight on arrival. There is neither time nor the resources to make up for predeployment training shortfalls during RSO&I. The concepts of multiechelon training and the commander’s responsibilities are essential to effective predeployment training. However, current operations have also shown that the conditions do not always match established prewar doctrinal assumptions, training procedures, and exercises. For some combat arms units the difference is not great, requiring little adjustments. For many units, however, experiences in current operations have shown that prewar training techniques, resources, and assumptions have not prepared Soldiers and Marines, staffs, or leaders for the demands of combat. Training for current operations often means discarding or reevaluating “the way it has always been done.” 5-4. Basic expectations can be ascribed to any Army and USMC unit deployed to current operational theaters. Assessment of expectations and conditions in the current operational theaters have been synthesized down to this simple summary of tactical expectations, required techniques, required capabilities, training conditions, and enemy tactics. While it is infeasible to put every unit in the field at the highest collective levels or to recreate a combat training center-like environment at every installation, it is feasible to train effectively and realistically. An effective predeployment training strategy to develop the

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

5-1

Chapter 5

right capabilities at the right levels is imperative. A commander (at any echelon) needs to have confidence in the unit’s ability to meet expectations on arrival in-theater. Leaders need to apply tactical lessons learned to predeployment training and resource this training with personnel and equipment not organic to current modified tables of organization and equipment (MTOEs). See Appendix F for more discussion concerning training and some of the resources available.

COMMANDER’S GUIDANCE AND AUTHORIZATION 5-5. Commanders receive guidance or authorization from higher headquarters in an OPORD or established procedures in the unit SOPs that frame IED responsibilities during operations. While every unit must send an EH SPOTREP when encountering an IED, a commander must ultimately decide whether to mark and bypass the IED, isolate the area for follow-on EOD response, or remotely destroy the device as they accomplish the primary mission. The EOD team is a combat multiplier to any operation and is the only organization authorized and equipped to conduct render safe neutralization of an IED and collect detailed forensics from it. Before a commander decides to destroy IEDs with organic assets, they must weigh the mission requirements with both safety and potential actionable intelligence. Destroying the IED is extremely dangerous and the less desirable COA due to unforeseen considerations in the construction and placement of the IED and potential secondary IED arrangement. Additionally, destruction most likely will prevent forensic analysis that could provide intelligence to interrupt the decision cycle of the enemy and potentially the IED supply chain, which may impact IED use in the future.

WARNING When the IED is suspected to have chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear components, take no action toward the device—it is an imminent CBRN threat. Take appropriate protective precautions, and report it according to the unit SOP. Failure to comply could result in immediate personal injury or damage to equipment.

LEADER’S DECISION CONSIDERATIONS 5-6. When a unit encounters a suspected IED, the leader must make a decision on the appropriate action to take. After taking immediate actions to alert personnel and confirming the suspected IED by remote means (such as robot, binoculars, thermal optics, and repositioning), the leader must assess the following operational, situational, and tactical factors: • Higher command guidance on IEDs. • The effect of the delay on the mission. • The threat from direct and indirect fire. The risk of casualties from direct or indirect fire may be greater than that from the IED. • The size, location, possibility of multiple devices, and potential CBRNE contents of the IED. • The type of terrain. The terrain determines the effectiveness and discernment of the IED and, consequently, the ability of the unit to detect, avoid, neutralize, or protect against it. • The alternate routes or positions available. • The location and security of potential ICPs. • The degree of protection available. • The capabilities of the unit. • The availability of EOD support. • The dedicated security support for EOD. • The danger to follow-on forces and missions.

5-2

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Actions in Response to Improvised Explosive Devices •

The danger to the civilian population and infrastructure.

5-7. After assessing the situation, the leader must report it according to the unit SOP. An example of a leader’s decision considerations is outlined in Figure 5-1. Possible leader COAs include― • Marking and bypassing the IED. • Isolating and securing the area for EOD response. • Remotely destroying the device.

Figure 5-1. Example of a Leader’s Decision Considerations

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

5-3

Chapter 5

5-8. Regardless of the COA, leaders must consider the following reactions, as a minimum, that could result from the selected COA— • High-order detonation. • Death/injury and mass casualty or fratricide. • Release of CBRNE. • Collateral damage including downrange hazards. • Loss of forensics intelligence. • Damage to information operations. • Damage to counterinsurgency operations.

ACTIONS WHEN SAFETY OR INTELLIGENCE IS THE PRIORITY 5-9. All Service personnel (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine, DOD civilians, and contractors) are responsible for the immediate actions required to react to IEDs. If a suspected IED is found, the following basic confirm, clear, cordon, check, and control (5-Cs) steps will help to ensure that the situation is dealt with quickly and safely. Remember, the first 5 to 10 seconds are critical. While the 5-Cs are conducted in no specific order, the response must be instinctive, effective, and based on METT-TC. 5-10. The commander should conduct the 5-Cs and then wait for EOD personnel to neutralize the device. While waiting, the commander should ensure that appropriate protective measures are taken to minimize the risk to personnel and equipment. The commander can choose to evacuate, isolate, or protect against the effects of the IED, depending on METT-TC.

CONFIRM 5-11. The presence of the suspected IED should be confirmed. This should be done from a safe distance whenever possible. Maximum use of hard cover and spotting equipment (binoculars and scopes) should be made. From the decided position, conduct 5- and 25-meter checks to ensure that no secondary devices are present. 5-12. When in convoys, the first vehicle to identify an IED should turn on the appropriate turn signal indicating contact and use a unit-designated IED marking system. The nearest vehicle (outside of 100 meters from the IED) with a radio must transmit the location of the IED to the remainder of the convoy using vehicle interval call signs and indicate the distance, direction, and description (3-Ds) of the threat. After completing the 3-Ds, the element must call the appropriate headquarters using the 9-line EH SPOTREP format (see Appendix C for the EH SPOTREP format).

CLEAR 5-13. All personnel should be cleared from the area to a tactically safe position and distance from the potential IED. All leaders should use the factors of METT-TC to determine a safe position and distance; however, the minimum safe distance for exposed personnel is 300 meters from the IED site. 5-14. Detonation may be imminent if the device was activated before being located. When there is a possibility that all IEDs have not been located, stay alert. Once the unit clears the minimum 300-meter safe distance from the suspected IED, either the lead or trail security element will conduct a 25- to 50-meter sweep on each side of the route to locate IED materials and equipment (detonating cord, receivers, transmitters, and so forth) that may lead to other IEDs flanking the unit. If subsequent IEDs are located, units will execute the procedures for clearing the area as listed above.

5-4

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Actions in Response to Improvised Explosive Devices

CORDON 5-15. The area should be cordoned off (a minimum of 300 meters from a small device, 1,000 meters for a van-size device, and 2,000 meters for a truck-size device). The purpose of the cordon is to prevent unauthorized personnel from entering the site (for their own safety and for the safety of the EOD responders), to preserve the scene for further exploitation, and to provide outward protection and security against command-initiated IEDs. As part of the cordon, leaders should— • Direct personnel out of the danger area. • Establish escalation of force (EOF) measures. • Position jammers/counter radio-controlled IED electronic warfare (CREW) devices to best protect the element. • Identify, clear, and establish an area for an ICP. • Ensure Soldiers and Marines remain vigilant in providing protection and security against command-detonated IEDs, person-borne improvised explosive devices (PBIEDs), and VBIEDs and scan for other enemy activity such as a triggerman, cameraman, or sniper from their cordoned positions. • Allow entry only to EOD (and WIT, if available) personnel. • Follow existing ROE procedures to question, search, and detain suspects.

CHECK 5-16. Check the immediate area around the ICP and cordoned positions for secondary devices using the5and 25-meter checks. Expand the search area as time/threat permits.

CONTROL 5-17. To ensure only authorized access, control the area inside the cordon. Only emergency services (medical, firefighting, or EOD) should be allowed to enter the cordon. All personnel and vehicles should enter and exit the cordoned area through the ICP. All civilian and nonessential military traffic should be diverted away from the cordon. To ensure that no tampering occurs, maintain (from a safe distance) a visual/line-of-sight (binoculars and scopes) observation on the IED. Immediately report any personnel observed approaching the IED according to the unit SOP. A 360-degree security around the cordon should be maintained until EOD has given the all-clear signal. 5-18. The military incident commander has C2 of the overall IED incident. The incident commander will coordinate the operation with technical advice from the EOD team leader and supporting agencies. 5-19. Upon arrival, the EOD team leader has control of the incident site within the cordon around the IED and is responsible for observing all safety procedures for equipment and explosives used. Control of entry into the cordon area during an IED operation is approved only by the EOD team leader, who will direct all actions within the cordon. Actions include coordination of incident site exploitation and searches and direction of specific uses of CREW equipment. To prevent fratricide, the EOD team leader must have control of all CREW assets operating in the area. 5-20. EOD team leaders will maintain a close liaison with the incident commander to ensure that correct security, search, EOD, and CREW procedures are executed within the bounds of safety and tactical considerations. The EOD team leader is responsible for the render safe procedure and must be involved in every aspect of incident planning. The EOD team leader will coordinate all safety aspects through the incident commander and directly coordinate the use of CREW. The EOD team leader will notify the incident commander upon completion of the EOD mission. Figure 5-1, page 5-3, depicts a flow chart designed to provide leaders some basic considerations that may assist in decision making when detecting an IED. While the chart provides a logical approach to resolving an IED event, it may not include all variables that are relevant to and could have an impact on the leader’s ultimate decision. Additionally,

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

5-5

Chapter 5

leaders should carefully consider a decision to “bypass” as this option may require approval from a higher headquarters. See Figure 5-1, page 5-3.

PROTECTIVE MEASURES 5-21. Consider the information in the following paragraphs when evacuating, isolating, and barricading an area.

Evacuate 5-22. Evacuation of personnel and equipment is the best protective measure. Evacuate out to a minimum distance of 300 meters to reduce the hazard to personnel and equipment. If suitable cover/barriers are available (such as buildings) or natural terrain around the IED will absorb or deflect fragmentation and blast, these distances can be reduced. After all personnel and equipment are evacuated, movement within the area should be limited to essential operations only. 5-23. Minimum evacuation distances are intended to be used for initial evacuation purposes only. In many cases, fragmentation will travel beyond these distances.

DANGER If you can see the IED, it can kill you.

Isolate 5-24. When METT-TC allows, the senior leader may choose to isolate personnel and equipment from the IED area. Typically, isolation is used when the unit cannot build protective works around facilities, TICs are suspected, or equipment cannot be evacuated. Do not build protective works around the IED. Natural or man-made terrain features are normally used to isolate assets from the IED.

Barricade 5-25. Equipment that cannot be moved must be protected from the effects of the IED with protective works. Personnel deemed to be mission essential must also be protected from the effects of the IED by reinforcing the fighting positions on the side facing the IED and by adding overhead cover. A protective work is an artificial barrier placed around key and essential equipment, personnel, or structures that provides limited protection by channeling the blast and fragmentation from the threatened area, thus reducing the effects of the blast and reducing the size of the evacuation area. The leader must be aware however, that establishing protective works is very time and resource consuming. 5-26. Protective works can be fabricated from sandbags or earthmoving equipment and can be used when feasible. Do not barricade the IED itself. See FM 5-103/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-17.6, FM 4-30.51/MCRP 3-17.2A, and Joint Forward Operating Base Force Protection Handbook for general guidelines on building, placement, size, and types of protective works.

EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL RESPONSE 5-27. The role of the EOD company is to support the leader and execute its assigned missions. EOD works in conjunction with engineer, military intelligence (MI), and other staffs to support the operational plan of the maneuver leader. EOD companies may be used to provide positive IED identification and safety guidance; perform render safe or disposal procedures; perform post blast; and perform crater analysis. EOD teams must have a dedicated security force. Teams can respond in a timely manner with dedicated security provided by the supported unit. Units can expedite the response of EOD teams by reporting

5-6

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Actions in Response to Improvised Explosive Devices

accurate information on the 9-line EH SPOTREP. Proper ordnance description or IED identification is instrumental in determining which types of equipment the EOD teams will need to neutralize the device.

Note. EOD personnel have specialized capabilities. Proper coordination and planning by the EOD staff cell is imperative to employ these capabilities at the right time and place on the battlefield. See FM 4-30.51/MCRP 3-17.2A and FMI 4-30.50 for more information on EOD capabilities.

WEAPONS INTELLIGENCE TEAM RESPONSE 5-28. The role of a WIT is to provide actionable intelligence analysis of IED scenes and enemy TTPs as well as provide input into local and theater-level friendly TTPs. In IED defeat operations, the linkage between WIT and EOD is critical—EOD is required to render an incident site safe before a WIT can begin its exploitation. 5-29. The WITs can accompany EOD and their dedicated security force to provide intelligence forensic investigation of IED incident scenes. The WIT takes all direction from the EOD team leader before conducting a site investigation and is only authorized to take objects that EOD has cleared.

ACTIONS WHEN OPERATIONS TEMPO IS THE HIGHEST PRIORITY 5-30. When the unit is time-constrained to accomplish its mission (in the attack, conducting shaping operations, and so forth), possesses breaching or route clearance capabilities, and/or has no EOD assets readily available, the commander may be willing to accept risk of casualties (reduce safety). In the attempt to clear the IED internally, METT-TC will dictate a commander’s decision to reduce the IED with organic assets available to the unit. If engineer or EOCA personnel are present, they can advise and assist. Techniques, in order of preference (for safety and protection), include― z Marking and bypassing. SU, good communications, and prior planning will allow the force to best use this technique. The leader may employ preplanned alternate tactical plans according to the current OPORD. z Remote or robotic reduction. Small robotic systems can be used to provide Soldiers and Marines with a standoff capability to keep personnel outside the blast radius. The robot may employ a weapons system or an explosive charge to reduce an IED. Remotely-operated laser systems are a viable method of standoff IED reduction. z Mechanical breaching. Employment of mechanical reduction assets (specialized vehicles or equipment) for breaching obstacles (see FM 3-34.210). z Standoff munitions disruption. Standoff munitions disruption (SMUD) is an EOD technique used to remotely detonate, disrupt, or deflagrate small ordnance at safe distances. EOD systems used to disrupt include the Barrett .50-caliber, 7.62-millimeter, and 5.56-millimeter rifles and laser systems.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

5-7

Chapter 5

WARNING Breaching by direct fire can leave a fully functional IED. It is difficult to verify that the hazard has been neutralized. Failure to comply could result in immediate personal injury or damage to equipment.

•

Explosive charge. Setting an explosive charge is an alternative to the breaching by direct-fire technique, particularly where a downrange hazard might not allow the shooting of projectiles. The charge should be remotely or mechanically emplaced using robots or a vehicle with a hydraulic arm (such as the Buffalo).

DANGER An IED in the open may be a detonator for a larger hidden device or multiple devices. Ensure that there is sufficient safety standoff distance and/or adequate cover from an IED before detonating it. Failure to comply could result in immediate personal injury or damage to equipment.

MILITARY SEARCH 5-31. Combating the enemy is not easy. In general, the enemy holds the initiative and friendly forces have to react to its activities. In all operations, it is vital to deprive the enemy of munitions and other material that may be used against military forces or the civilian populace. One of the best techniques for doing so is the military search, which is one of the few operations where the security forces have the initiative (being able to decide when, where, and how the operation will take place). 5-32. Military search is the management and application of systematic procedures and appropriate equipment to locate specified targets in support of military operations. Specified targets include people, information, and material resources employed by an adversary (FM 3-34.210). The aim of military search is to assist in the defeat of an enemy who uses terror tactics. The general search objectives include― • Depriving the enemy of resources. • Protecting potential targets. • Gaining intelligence. • Gathering forensic evidence. 5-33. All search operations should be driven by strong intelligence and have clearly defined objectives that contribute to the military mission. The political and social effects of any intended search operation should be addressed when considering the objectives. 5-34. Before conducting planning for search operations, it is essential to be absolutely clear about the objective of every search operation. METT-TC will assist in determining the search method, and the number and type of search teams involved, equipment, and expertise of the searchers available. The speed at which the operation can be conducted is always governed by the aim and objectives of the search. Some typical examples include― • Finding an enemy hide (a space in which resources are concealed) for munitions and equipment. • Searching for suspected enemy IEDs. • Finding and assisting in the clearance of IEDs from locations of importance to friendly forces. • Allowing friendly forces to conduct offensive operations.

5-8

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Actions in Response to Improvised Explosive Devices • •

Gaining intelligence (including tactical intelligence). Gaining forensic evidence to catch the enemy and support their conviction within the framework and conditions of the law in the HN.

MILITARY SEARCH PRINCIPLES 5-35. Successful search operations are planned and executed by applying the same principles that are key to success in other military operations, particularly the principles of war (objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, simplicity, and surprise). See FM 3-34.210 for more information on military search. The following general principles are essential to a successful military search mission: • Objective. Target all planned searches. Define the objectives that contribute to the military mission. Address the political, cultural, and social impacts of a military search operation when considering the objectives. • Systematic. Ensure that the approach to any search operation is thorough, deliberate, safe, detailed, and methodical to avoid error or oversight—this applies equally to the planning, coordination, and execution of all search operations. Employ standard drills and procedures at all times regardless of the pressure to rush. • Flexible. Adapt TTP and equipment to an evolving OE where the enemy constantly changes the methods of operations in an attempt to trap, deceive, mislead, or misdirect the searcher. • Equipment. Provide all military search teams with adequate tools and equipment for the level of task that they are to undertake. Adapt the equipment as capability deficiencies are identified through changes in the threat and emerging trends. • Tactics, techniques, and procedures. Allow military search TTP to evolve in line with a changing threat and emerging technologies. Consider all the procedures to be adaptable, but give due consideration to ensuring consistency without compromising safety. • Mass. Leverage all available capabilities to the fullest extent possible when military search is the operational focus. Involve local police and/or security forces and resources where practical. • Command and control. C2 is vital to the safe conduct of all the search operations. The potential number of agencies involved in a search operation, including civilian agencies, means any breakdown in C2 can have a significant impact on the operation. • Timely. Plan and conduct time-sensitive military search operations in a timely manner. Balance operational imperatives, requirements for protection, safety, and speed during the planning and execution phases. Time operational execution for optimum effect. • Secure. Consider the following: • Operations security. The requirement to preserve any operational advantage over an enemy demands the implementation of the “need to know” principle. Operations security is a way to retain the element of surprise. • Tactical security. Conduct search operations in a secure environment. Protection must be provided by nonsearch personnel. In addition to providing protection, cordons and reaction forces deny potential suspects freedom of movement into and out of the target area. • Safe. Understand that personal safety is paramount for all personnel deploying on military search operations. Consider and address all the environmental hazards, as well as the enemy threat, in the planning and execution phases of all search operations. Achieve search safety by mitigating the risk. Consider the following: • Minimum personnel in an operating area. Search pairs should ideally operate with some sort of buffer zone between them and the next pair (such as a room). • Minimum time over the target. If a suspect item is found, the searcher must decide if the find is life-threatening. If so, minimum time is spent at the target. If the find is non-life threatening, the searcher should take the time required to record the details of the find before withdrawing.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

5-9

Chapter 5 •

•

•

•

•

•

•

5-10

Remote entry. In all instances, use remote entry where there is deemed to be a high risk of booby traps or victim-operated IEDs present. All suspect items should be treated as life threatening if they cannot be identified as non-life threatening. Use waiting periods (also known as soak times or standoff periods). The minimum time for a waiting period is 5 minutes. In extreme circumstances, this time can be reduced. However, do not reduce this time purely to save time; reductions in time should be for situational-based reasons. To eliminate forming a procedural pattern, vary the time. Secondary hazards. All secondary hazards should be considered (such as chlorine gas in a water plant, sewage, overhead power cables, electrical outlets and wiring, hotplates and burners, broken glass, cleaning supplies, overhead items, or substandard construction of steps or flooring).

Distraction free. Free searchers from distractions. Search operations require the total attention of the participants. Leaders must ensure that searchers are not distracted by visits of senior officers, the media, or any personnel not directly involved in the search. Personnel not participating in the search should be removed from the search area. Prioritized search. Remember that priorities for where to search first will depend on the type of search. Search likely hide locations first, when possible, as is done during the area search. Ensure that other search types that have a set sequence are not being broken. Begin occupied house searches with the kitchen and bathroom being searched first. Minimized disruption and destruction. Ensure that the destructiveness and disruption caused by search operations is proportional to the intensity of the current military operations and the urgency of uncovering a potential search target. In accordance with the established rules of engagement, ensure that military search operations minimize the destruction of property and disruption to the local population. This principle is important to maintain the good will of the local population or at least to minimize the ill will generated. Commanders at all levels have a continuous responsibility to balance long-term physical and psychological damage caused by search operations with the benefit gained. Record all the damage caused during a search on the relevant search documentation. Ensure that the property or land owner signs to say that they agree with the assessment, when possible. Ensure that compensation follows as a matter of course. Legal. Carry out military search within the legal framework governing the operations. Handle evidence and recovered material according to this framework. Ensure that national contingents planning military search operations consider the fact that military search teams from other nations may have laws, directives, and ROE that are more stringent than their own. Conscientious. Remember that careful documentation ensures that search teams are correctly tasked, the search is controlled and thorough, and the maximum benefits are gained from the search. • Documentation. Complete search reports during every military search operation to provide documentary evidence and intelligence and to refute or support any compensation claim submitted. Adapt the reports to meet local, national, or international laws and have them translated into the local language. Document the authority to conduct a search on all search reports. • Evidence. Log and record all evidence on the appropriate search report. Submit evidence and intelligence for analysis in a timely manner. Ensure that the receiving individual signs for the evidence. Evidence may be used for prosecution purposes in a court of law. Analysis provides information for further exploitation, influencing TTP, and future targeting. • Feedback. Feed information gathered during searches into both the intelligence community and the operations staff for further analysis. This leads to more accurate targeting and may enable the refinement of TTP.

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Actions in Response to Improvised Explosive Devices

MILITARY SEARCH CATEGORIZATION 5-36. Military search is categorized according to the assessed risk and the level of training and technology required. The following paragraphs provide a description of the risk assessment categories and the search levels.

Risk Assessment Categories 5-37. The risks in the OE determine the particular level of military search response. The risk assessment and MDMP should consider, as a minimum, three specific categories. If risks in any of these categories are above an acceptable, predetermined level of risk, employ search teams with more advanced training. The categories are— • Explosive hazards threats. The likelihood that an enemy has placed explosive devices, booby traps, or hazardous materials should be considered. The capability, intent, and operational methods of the enemy are important to risk assessment. • Environmental hazards. Threats posed by environmental hazards should be considered, such as confined spaces, heights, high-voltage cables, and explosive ordnance or mines not emplaced by the enemy. • Assurance level required. The level of the threat and degree of assurance required will ultimately define the level of the search capability deployed to ensure that an environment is free of threats and hazards. Commanders must balance the use of limited resources against acceptable risk.

Military Search Levels 5-38. The running estimate, based on search staff input, will determine the required level of search by assessing search-associated risks and using the assessed risks. Commanders can determine the skills, training, equipment, and experience necessary to safely and effectively conduct search operations. Based on the search risk assessments, the chain of command can distinguish between three search levels—basic, intermediate, and advanced. Figure 5-2 shows the relationship between the numbers of military personnel trained to perform each level of search and the level of risk.

Figure 5-2. Diagrammatic Representation of Levels of Risk, Training, and Technology

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

5-11

Chapter 5

Basic Search 5-39. All military personnel must be able and ready to conduct a basic search. They may conduct a basic search incidental to performing their assigned missions and duties on a continuing basis. A basic search does not involve a preplanned search operation. It is inherent to protection. All military personnel must be search aware to recognize situations that may require additional search assets. Commanders must take advice from the appropriate-level search advisor to request the appropriate level of capability. 5-40. A basic search is primarily a defensive protection measure to improve personal security and protection. Search awareness requires an understanding of the METT-TC, especially the operating and attack methods of the enemy. All military personnel must have practical knowledge of and be able to apply procedures to search people, vehicles, and areas and conduct cursory building searches. 5-41. Basic search includes the skills required to conduct impromptu searches during patrol operations. Military personnel who must simultaneously search tactically and provide for their own security require an enhanced search awareness level. This includes the knowledge of the route and vulnerable point check procedures, hot pursuit searches, cursory search procedures, and documentation requirements. Intermediate Search 5-42. An intermediate search is appropriate for deliberate, preplanned search operations when intelligence does not indicate the presence of explosive or hazardous devices or environmental hazards and a high assurance level is not required. Intermediate search is the first level at which units form teams to conduct search operations. 5-43. Military personnel placed into intermediate search teams receive specific and formal training on the procedures and equipment to prepare them for this operation. Intermediate search operations can be classified as deliberate in nature. The unit conducting the search must control the search environment by establishing a security cordon. Note. Cordon and search was the precursor to intermediate search. Cordon and search operations involved isolating the target area and searching suspected buildings to capture or destroy possible insurgents and/or contraband. A cordon and search may also be thought of as a movement to contact, raid, deliberate attack, or area reconnaissance based on the accuracy of intelligence. While the actual operations may fall under the category of any of these missions, the cordon and search was typically oriented at finding insurgents or their caches. For information on cordon and search operations, see FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3­ 058/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62. Advanced Search 5-44. An advanced search is appropriate for deliberate, preplanned search operations when there is specific intelligence indicating the presence of an explosive or hazardous device, there are indications of environmental hazards, or there is a requirement for a high-assurance level (such as when HVTs are involved). 5-45. Military personnel serving on advanced search teams receive the most advanced level of training to give them unique advanced skills and techniques for detection and to prepare them for the increased risks associated with this search level. The equipment employed at this level is more sophisticated and capable. 5-46. Units conducting advanced search operations must control the search environment by establishing a security cordon (this task cannot be carried out by search personnel). To counter specific threats, insert additional specialized capabilities in advanced search teams.

5-12

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Actions in Response to Improvised Explosive Devices

MILITARY SEARCH RESOURCES 5-47. A wide variety of personnel, tools and equipment, and supporting assets are available to assist in a search. The provision of the right resources enables searches to be conducted effectively to save time, minimize property damage, and minimize disruption.

Personnel 5-48. Any person or organization that has received basic search training is a resource that may be able to inform the intelligence picture. Even relatively trivial information provided by a search-aware individual may provide the necessary information from which to launch future search operations. 5-49. A search coordinator is positioned at battalion and higher levels. The search coordinator integrates search operations into the overall mission execution of the unit and can coordinate multiple search missions. The search coordinator is normally trained to perform or be involved in the detailed planning, preparation, rehearsals, or execution of a search operation. The function of the search coordinator requires the understanding of all these processes and capabilities so they can accurately advise the commander. 5-50. The search advisor is usually an experienced company-level officer, warrant officer, or senior noncommissioned officer (NCO) who has received intermediate or advanced search advisor training. A search advisor completes detailed search planning, preparation, rehearsals, and mission execution. The unit commander will delegate authority to the search advisor as appropriate to accomplish the mission. The specific authorities delegated depend upon the situation and the personalities involved. The search advisor assists the commander on the ground in preparing risk assessments and developing risk mitigation measures. The search advisor assists the commander in allocating search resources to search tasks. When multiple teams are searching an area, the search advisor will often assist the commander in controlling search team activity during the search, enabling the mission commander C2 of the overall operation. 5-51. Search teams are normally organized at the company level and are trained, qualified, and equipped to conduct either intermediate or advanced search missions. A search team must have a leader (usually the squad leader) and ideally a second in command, usually a team leader. One individual is designated as the recorder and is responsible for completing the required documentation. Search teams may comprise a variable number of search pairs, but should never comprise less than two pairs.

Tools and Equipment 5-52. The purchase of equipment should be considered far in advance of any search operation. Units should be given a great deal of notice to enable them to acquire a cross section of materials, such as explosives or other items, which may be necessary to support the search. 5-53. Table 5-1, page 5-14, shows which equipment is used during each type of search. Equipment is not infallible and is only an aid to search. Where possible, use two different pieces of equipment based on different technologies.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

5-13

Chapter 5

Table 5-1. Military Search Equipment Capabilities Equipment

Basic

Intermediate

Advanced

X (mirrors)

X

X

X1

X2

Video equipment (video scopes and camera systems)

X

X

Common hand tools (entry equipment)

X

X

Semi-remote handling equipment (hook and line)

X

X

Scopes (fiber scopes, endoscopes, and mirrors) X-ray equipment— Bulk scanning (baggage and freight) Handheld

Particle detector (explosive, drug, and CBRNE) Vapor detector (explosive, drug, and chemical)

X X (dogs)

X (dogs)

X

X

X

X

Cable detector

X

X

Anomaly detector

X

X

Metal detector

Ground-penetrating radar (GPR)

X

Sonar

X

Imaging

X

Self-contained breathing apparatus (life-preserving escape systems)

X

Gas monitors (noxious and flammable gas monitoring)

X

Spectrum analyzer (electron, neutron, and so forth)

X

CREW (man- or vehicle-portable self-protection)

X

Robotic systems

X

X

X

X

Supporting Assets 5-54. A variety of assets may support military search operations. The unit conducting the search may require external resources to establish a secure area (cordon), transport seized material, provide CA support, and so forth. Supporting assets include, but are not limited to— • Dog teams. Specialized search dogs are integral to most search operations and are complementary to search equipment. Note. Although dogs can detect minute quantities of explosives and the presence of trip wires, they are trained to detect the charge and not the firing device. They tend to become confused if the area contains explosive odors other than those emitting from the EH. • • •

5-14

Explosive ordnance disposal teams. When EOD action may be required, consider the involvement of the appropriate EOD team. CREW. Where necessary and where a threat exists, deploy specialized CREW assets to support a search operation. Robots. In their simplest form, robots can be used to neutralize IEDs. More sophisticated models can be remotely controlled to carry out simple tasks, such as videotaping or cutting wires.

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Actions in Response to Improvised Explosive Devices •

• • • •

•

Cameras. Cameras have a wide range of applications. They can be used with different film types, such as infrared and ultraviolet, to disclose evidence that is indiscernible to the naked eye. For example, infrared photography reveals differences in the heat emitted by objects and can often disclose recent digging and buried or concealed objects. Aerial photography. Aerial photography, particularly photographs that have been interpreted or analyzed, is fundamental to planning search operations. Imagery. Specialized imagery allows penetration of target barrier materials. Geographic products are used when specialized imagery is not available. Interpreters. Interpreters who are familiar with the regional dialect should be used when necessary. Female support. Ideally, a person of the same gender as the person to be searched conducts the search. Some countries may require that the search of a child (age determined by the laws of the country) be conducted by a female. Law enforcement agencies. Maximum legal compliance may require the presence of HN civil police or United Nations police representatives throughout all search operations. Search teams should be trained to respect and preserve the forensic and legal integrity of all evidence assimilated during a search operation.

5-55. Searching for IEDs is only part of the solution. Continued action must be applied and maintained in all areas through the use of patrols, surveillance, operations, and temporary traffic control points (TCPs). For more information about military search, see FM 3-34.210.

WARNING Routines and patterns should be varied. Developing routines and patterns gives the enemy what it needs to anticipate actions―a time and a place. Failure to comply could result in immediate personal injury or damage to equipment.

ELECTRONIC-WARFARE CONSIDERATIONS 5-56. Military operations are executed in an increasingly complex electromagnetic environment. Today, electromagnetic devices are used by both civilian and military organizations for communications, navigation, sensing, information storage, and processing, as well as a variety of other purposes. 5-57. The increasing portability and affordability of sophisticated electromagnetic equipment guarantees that the electromagnetic environment in which military forces operate will become more complex in the future. The recognized need for military forces to have unimpeded access to and use of the electromagnetic environment creates vulnerabilities and opportunities for electronic warfare (EW) in support of military operations.

ELECTRONIC-WARFARE SUBDIVISIONS 5-58. The electromagnetic spectrum refers to the range of frequencies of electromagnetic radiation from zero to infinity. In military operations, EW refers to any military actions involving the use of electromagnetic or directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. EW includes three major subdivisions: electronic attack (EA), electronic protection (EP), and electronicwarfare support (ES). • EA involves the use of electromagnetic energy, directed energy, or antiradiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability and is considered a form of fires (see JP 3-09). EA includes actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy’s effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum, such as jamming and electromagnetic deception, employment of weapons that use either

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

5-15

Chapter 5

•

•

electromagnetic or directed energy as their primary destructive mechanism (lasers, radio frequency weapons, or particle beams), and offensive and defensive activities to include countermeasures. Offensive EA activities are generally conducted at the initiative of friendly forces (jamming an adversary’s radar or C2 systems using antiradiation missiles to suppress an adversary’s air defenses, using electronic deception techniques to confuse an adversary’s ISR systems, and using directed energy weapons to disable an adversary’s equipment or capability). Defensive EA activities use the electromagnetic spectrum to protect personnel, facilities, capabilities, and equipment (self-protection and force protection measures such as use of expendables [flares and active decoys], jammers, towed decoys, directed energy infrared counter measure systems, and RCIED systems). EP is the subdivision of EW involving actions taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy use of the electromagnetic spectrum that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability. Examples include spectrum management, electromagnetic hardening, emission control, and the use of wartime reserve modes. EP includes actions taken to ensure friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum, such as frequency agility in a radio or variable pulse repetition frequency in a radar. EP should not be confused with self-protection. The use of flare rejection logic on an infrared missile to counter an adversary’s use of flares is EP. The flare rejection technique ensures friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum to track the intended target despite the adversary selfprotection/defensive EA actions (such as the flare) to prevent or reduce friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum. While defensive EA actions and EP both protect personnel, facilities, capabilities, and equipment, EP protects from the effects of EA (friendly and/or adversary), while defensive EA is primarily used to protect against lethal attacks by denying adversary use of the electromagnetic spectrum to guide and/or trigger weapons. ES refers to that division of EW involving actions tasked by, or under direct control of, an operational commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate or localize sources of intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition, targeting, planning, and conduct of future operations. ES data can be used to produce signals intelligence, provide targeting for electronic or destructive attack, and produce MASINT.

BASIC ELECTRONIC-WARFARE COMPONENTS 5-59. EW components, as they pertain to CREW, consist of transmitters, receivers, and jammers. A transmitter is a device that sends information to a receiver via a specific radio frequency (RF). Contemporary threat forces have used radio-controlled transmitters to detonate RCIEDs. A receiver is the listening end of a communication channel. Receivers are tuned to specific frequencies and react when they detect a signal on those frequencies. 5-60. An RCIED uses a receiver to acquire trigger signals from a transmitter. A jammer is a special transmitter that prevents a receiver from picking up a signal on a specific frequency. Jamming is the use of a second radio transmitter at the same frequency as the first transmitter with higher power. When CREW is jamming, it prevents the receiver from getting an executable signal.

SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT 5-61. EW is waged throughout the electromagnetic spectrum to secure and maintain effective control and use of the spectrum by friendly forces and to deny use by an adversary through damage, destruction, disruption, and deception. The need for control of the electromagnetic spectrum and the type of EW actions that can be used to control that spectrum depend on the operational environment in which a military operation is carried out. 5-62. EW is a complex aspect of modern military operations that must be fully integrated with other aspects of operations to achieve its full potential for contributing to an operation’s objectives. Such integration requires careful planning. EW is only one type of activity that occurs in an increasingly

5-16

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Actions in Response to Improvised Explosive Devices

crowded electromagnetic spectrum. As such, EW planners must be concerned with coordinating their planned activities with other aspects of military operations that use the electromagnetic spectrum as well as third party users of the spectrum that EW does not wish to disrupt. 5-63. Just as CREW jammers can interfere with threat force receivers, it can also interfere with, or conflict with, friendly communications equipment. Prior to deploying the CREW devices, settings must be adjusted so Soldiers and Marines can use other equipment frequencies and assure that friendly forces are able to communicate in the field. 5-64. Since EW activity takes place in the electromagnetic spectrum, planners must closely coordinate their efforts with those members of the staff who are concerned with managing military use of the electromagnetic spectrum. Normally, the electronic-warfare officer (EWO) is the principal staff EW planner. The scope and nature of the EWO’s responsibilities are dependent on the size of the staff, the size of the operational area that the staff supports, and the type of mission or operation that the staff must plan.

SELECTED BRIGADE AND HIGHER ELECTRONIC WARFARE OFFICER DUTIES 5-65. The following is a list of selected duties that a brigade or higher EWO may be expected to perform: • Coordinating with tactical operations and the other members of the IO cells. There is an electronic warfare coordination cell (EWCC) at this level. • Drafting and supervising the implementation of EW policies and instructions within the commander's operational area. • Serving as the commander’s principal delegate to EW planning and coordination meetings within the operational area. • Supervising EW planning efforts and the preparation of EW appendixes to operation plans. • Assessing the effects of friendly and enemy EW activity in the AO. • Monitoring the number, type, and status of U.S. EW assets within the operational area or involved in specific operations or exercises. • Coordinating the augmentation of EW staff planners and EW assets for exercises and operations within the operational area. This includes lower echelons, other Services, and allies. • Representing EW interests in the preparation of the joint restricted frequency list (JRFL) for specific operations and exercises within the operational area. • Coordinating the multinational aspects of EW in exercises and operations within the operational area. • Representing EW interests and requirements in the EWCC and other multifunctional planning organizations within the staff. • Monitoring the execution of the EW plans in current operations and exercises within the operational area and supervising the adaptation of those plans to meet operational contingencies. • Coordinating and supervising the analysis of EW plans and activities during operations and exercises within the operational area to derive lessons learned. • Supervising the preparation and submission of EW lessons learned.

SELECTED BATTALION ELECTRONIC WARFARE OFFICER DUTIES 5-66. The following is a list of selected duties that a battalion EWO may be expected to perform: • Coordinating spectrum management with the Assistant Chief of Staff, Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Operations (G-6)/command, control, communications, and computer operations officer (S-6) to include deconflicting EA. • Facilitating persistent and realistic EW training. • Obtaining the most recent intelligence for the AO. • Ensuring that operators are knowledgeable and competent with CREW systems. • Monitoring IED trends and emerging enemy TTP. • Implementing a maintenance plan for unit CREW systems.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

5-17

Chapter 5 • • • • • • • • • •

Conducting EW mission planning, to include the use of the convoy planning tool. Loading, verifying, and updating the load sets based on fragmentary order (FRAGOs) and the Army Reprogramming Analysis Team (ARAT) Web site. Using CREW interoperability charts. Ensuring that the unit uses a spectrum analyzer for precombat checks on systems. Ensuring that the current frequency load sets are valid. Ensuring that the CREW TTPs are valid and implemented. Compelling focused counter RCIED operations. Coordinating the integration of CREW assets within the AO. Managing and overseeing employment of assigned CREW assets and personnel. Ensuring that lost, stolen, or destroyed CREW system procedures are in place.

INTEROPERABILITY 5-67. Understanding interoperability issues is essential to use EW effectively as an element of military power and protection. One way to avoid electronic fratricide and interoperability issues is to establish standards and practice procedures that allow for integrated planning and execution of EW operations (including joint EW) as well as timely and routine exchange of EW information. 5-68. EW systems may interfere with each other when they are too close. CREW systems may have a conflict when a reactive system is operating in the same area as an active system. Active systems operate regardless of the electromagnetic interference; however, active systems can cause reactive systems to respond, thereby tying up a portion of its power resources. This may cause a reactive system to not see and/or not be able to respond to an actual threat signal and expose Soldiers and Marines to an RCIED attack. CREW systems do not identify the difference between friendly and threat communication. The system will work just as hard to defeat either.

ELECTRONIC-WARFARE SUPPORT AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 5-69. Electronic forms of intelligence gathering (SIGINT, MASINT, and other forms) comprise a significant portion of the day-to-day activities of the intelligence community. The distinction between intelligence and ES is determined by who tasks or controls the intelligence assets, what they are tasked to provide, and for what purpose they are tasked. ES is achieved by intelligence collection, processing, and exploitation assets tasked or controlled by an operational commander. These assets are tasked to search for, intercept, identify, and locate or localize sources of intentional or unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy. 5-70. The purpose of ES tasking is immediate threat recognition, targeting, planning and conduct of future operations, and other tactical actions such as threat avoidance, targeting, and homing. ES is intended to respond to an immediate operational requirement. However, the same assets and resources that are tasked with ES can simultaneously collect intelligence that meets other collection requirements. Intelligence collected for ES purposes is normally also processed by the appropriate parts of the intelligence community for further exploitation after the operation.

ROUTE CLEARANCE OPERATIONS 5-71. The purpose of route clearance is to eliminate concealment for IEDs and munitions caches and the systemic detection and deterrence sweeps along the cleared routes. Clearance teams should be comprised of― • Mechanized and combat heavy engineers with route clearance capabilities. • EOD teams either task-organized to the clearance teams or when not task-organized as part of the clearance company, will respond promptly to route clearance teams’ calls for assistance. Upon receipt of request for assistance (using the 9-line EH SPOTREP) and in conjunction with dedicated security elements, EOD teams will respond according to the commander’s priorities of

5-18

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Actions in Response to Improvised Explosive Devices

•

effort, to render safe and dispose of IEDs in their AO. EOD response priorities include safety, collection of actionable intelligence to target the bomb maker, and contribution to assured mobility of routes. EOCA personnel, who are task-organized in route clearance operations, can remotely identify and dispose of by detonation only those designated UXO for which they are specifically trained and authorized to blow in place. EOCA personnel are not trained or authorized to render safe and/or dispose of IEDs.

5-72. Route clearance missions consist of the following two phases: • Right-of-way clearance. • Route maintenance and sweep operations.

RIGHT-OF-WAY CLEARANCE 5-73. Units should remove rubble, debris, berms, holes, trenches, vegetation, and trash from the medians and shoulders of MSRs to eliminate concealment of IEDs and munitions caches and to aid in the visual and sensory detection of IEDs. Units should then conduct a deliberate route reconnaissance, identify and record the location of man-made objects (buried pipe and cable), and investigate suspicious areas.

ROUTE MAINTENANCE AND SWEEP OPERATIONS 5-74. The unit should conduct systemic, random detection sweeps of the cleared areas and progress to detection and deterrence sweeps along the cleared route. A visual detection sweep should focus on changed conditions. 5-75. Any investigation of suspected devices will be performed remotely with the Buffalo or other system, as required. The preferred way to conduct route clearance is to form C2, detection, security, and improvement elements.

Command and Control Element 5-76. The C2 element integrates the activities of the security, detection, and improvement sections. It maintains communications with its higher headquarters and with the maneuver unit whose area of operation the clearance unit is operating in. The C2 element usually travels within the security element.

Detection Element 5-77. The mission of the detection element (see Figure 5-3, page 5-20) is to scan the medians and shoulders of a route before employing engineer equipment to remove concealment and obstacles. The element will sweep the median and shoulder for IEDs, UXO, and mines; investigate all suspicious objects; mark and report UXO; and secure and report IEDs. When a suspected object is detected, the location will be pinpointed. The suspected object will be investigated remotely. EOD is the only force authorized to render safe an IED. Note. Do not attempt to render safe, disassemble, or dispose of a suspected or actual IED during route clearance operations without EOD support present.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

5-19

Chapter 5

Figure 5-3. Detection Element

Security Element 5-78. The security element consists of the forward, flank, and rear sections. The mission of the security element is to provide traffic control, crew-served weapons support, and protection; the security element can dismount as necessary. • The mission of the forward security section is to observe oncoming traffic for threats, identify hazards or obstructions in the route, and contain suspect vehicles identified by other elements. • The mission of the flank security section is to protect the main body from threats on the shoulder or from traffic traveling in the opposite direction, observe vehicles passing through the work area for threats, and provide traffic control within the work area. • The mission of the rear security section is to observe traffic approaching for threats, provide a visual warning to traffic that the clearance unit is ahead on the road, contain suspect vehicles, and provide limited traffic control. 5-79. The three security teams must be integrated and centrally controlled. It is critical that the security teams not be exposed when interrogating a potential IED.

Improvement Element 5-80. The mission of the improvement element (see Figure 5-4) is to remove all concealment for IEDs from the entire width of the median and from the shoulders of the road to a minimum distance of 25 feet. The best package for the improvement element is two bulldozers, two scrapers, a bucket loader, a 20-ton dump truck, and some type of concrete/asphalt patch capability. Upon completion of the work of the improvement element on a section of the route, the median and shoulders should be flat and level, eliminating any opportunity to hide IEDs or IED making material without altering the terrain. Given random, systemic detection sweeps, changes in terrain or other indicators such as trash or asphalt patches will become immediately obvious, indicating potential IEDs.

5-20

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Actions in Response to Improvised Explosive Devices

Figure 5-4. Improvement Element 5-81. Based on the terrain and the equipment available in the improvement element, leaders can use the rates of march for clearing operations shown in Table 5-2 for planning purposes. Figure 5-5, page 5-22, depicts an example organization for a clearance operation. Vehicles depicted in this figure are generic in nature. For specific vehicle information, see Appendix E. See FM 3-34.210 for a description of the tools and functions associated with each of the elements. Table 5-2. Rate of March During Clearance Operations Two Armored Dozers

Two Armored Dozers, Two Armored Scrapers, One Armored Bucket Loader, and One Armored Dump Truck

Light

3 km/day

10 km/day

Moderate

2 km/day

8 km/day

Heavy

1 km/day

4 km/day

Vegetation

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

5-21

Chapter 5

Figure 5-5. Example Organization for a Route Clearance Operation

5-22

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Appendix A

Selected Organizations and Units Involved in Improvised Explosive Device Defeat This chapter provides a list of organizations and units that are directly involved in IED defeat operations. This is not an all inclusive list of organizations or units, because IED defeat is a significant task that involves a threat that impacts many organizations and units and how they plan, conduct, and support coalition, U.S., and HN force operations.

SELECTED ORGANIZATIONS AND CONTACT INFORMATION A-1. This section provides a description and contact information (if appropriate) for several organizations involved in IED defeat. Many of these organizations are a component of or are directed by a service component command and often are assisted by civilian and federal agencies to support IED defeat in support of full spectrum operations.

ASYMMETRIC WARFARE GROUP A-2. The Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) conducts operations in support of Joint, Army, and USMC force commanders to mitigate and defeat specified asymmetric threats. The AWG— • Serves as the global conventional U.S. Army expert in asymmetric warfare. • Deploys, integrates, coordinates, and executes battle command of AWG trained and ready forces. • Assists in identification, development, and integration of countermeasure technologies. • Establishes linkages with all internal, combatant command, and national intelligence agencies. • Analyzes asymmetric threats. • Observes, collects, develops, validates, and disseminates emerging TTPs.

203D MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION (TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE) A-3. The 203d MI Battalion is a multicomponent (Active Army and Reserve Component) intelligence asset administratively subordinate in peacetime to its assigned Military Intelligence Reserve Command (MIRC) and subordinate to the United States Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) during contingencies and while at war. In peacetime, the 203d MI Battalion is under the training supervision of the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC). A-4. The NGIC provides training guidance and approves the battalion’s mission essential task list. It is unique both in mission and in structure. The mission is twofold. It provides battlefield technical intelligence on foreign equipment systems derived from the physical examination of equipment and material. This analysis provides indicators on enemy readiness, capabilities, and intentions. The 203d MI Battalion also forms the Captured Material Exploitation Center (CMEC) which can serve as a Joint CMEC. The CMEC provides direct support to theater commanders through the intelligence directorate of the joint staff (J-2). The specialized teams in the CMEC monitor material handling and evacuation and answer the commander’s PIRs regarding foreign equipment.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

A-1

Appendix A

20TH SUPPORT COMMAND (CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR, AND HIGH-YIELD EXPLOSIVE ) A-5. The 20th Support Command (CBRNE) is assigned to the United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) and provides C2 of the Army’s most specialized weapons of mass destruction (WMD) operational assets. This provides a single point of contact within the Army for the DOD to call when a coordinated response to the threat or use of CBRNE is needed anywhere in the world. The command maintains C2 of Army EOD forces. A-6. The mission of the 20th Support Command is to deploy and provide C2 responsive, modular, multifunctional, joint and/or Army-specialized CBRNE forces and capabilities able to operate across the entire spectrum of military operations while supporting national WMD objectives. The command is also responsible for managing DOD technical support to consequence management operations and providing CBRNE technical advice and subject matter expertise. A-7. This deployable operational-level command conducts CBRNE operations in support of combatant and joint force commanders and other lead organizations; provides C2 of assigned CBRNE forces; conducts CBRNE technical advice and assistance operations; maintains a technical reachback capability; and provides training readiness oversight to select units. Its subordinate units include two EOD groups, six EOD battalions, and two technical escort chemical battalions. The command also maintains training readiness oversight of a National Guard EOD group. Future growth of the command includes the activation of one subordinate EOD battalion, a chemical brigade, and an analytical and remediation directorate.

Technical Escort Units A-8. The 22nd and 110th Technical Escort Units (TEU) are battalion-size units subordinate to the 20th Support Command. They deploy task-organized teams to the continental United States (CONUS) or outside the continental United States (OCONUS) to conduct technical escort, CBRNE hazard characterization, monitoring, disablement, and elimination support operations. A-9. They provide WMD and CBRNE incident emergency response, homeland defense, and contingency support operations to combatant commanders and lead federal agencies. They also provide site remediation and restoration support operations for DOD.

COMBINED EXPLOSIVES EXPLOITATION CELL A-10. The CEXC is a joint agency team tasked with the collection and exploitation of IEDs. CEXC provides immediate in-theater technical and operational analysis of IEDs and develops measures to counter bombing campaigns; collects and exploits TECHINT and forensic evidence from explosives-related incidents (with major emphasis on IED components); and collects construction and techniques to determine enemy tactics, identify trends, target IED bomb makers, and enable both offensive and defensive IED defeat operations by coalition forces. Critical tasks include― • Conducting first-line technical exploitation and evaluation of IEDs and components and preparing detailed laboratory reports for all exploited material. • Providing advice on EOD, protection, and combat tactics in regard to the threat posed by IEDs. • Attending all significant IED/explosives-related incidents. • Exploiting cache discoveries containing large quantities of military ordnance, bomb-making materials, and/or homemade explosive manufacturing and storage sites. • Exploiting any incident site where the collection of forensic evidence is important. • Providing detailed field forensics analysis for targeting. • Preparing, publishing, and disseminating throughout theater a comprehensive report for every incident attended and a weekly report summarizing IED incident statistics, significant events, and recovered devices for the last 7 days. • Preparing, publishing, and disseminating throughout theater SPOTREPs and technical bulletins for rapidly emerging threats, significant incidents, and newly seen devices.

A-2

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Selected Organizations and Units Involved in Improvised Explosive Device Defeat • • • •

Providing technical assistance to support the interrogation of IED related detainees. Providing technical advice on protection issues and IED defeat TTP. Providing assistance for operations against suspected bomb makers and transporters, IED factories, storage locations, and training sites. Providing briefings, component familiarization, personnel, and SME support.

A-11. For more information, see .

COUNTER EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS CENTER A-12. The Counter Explosive Hazards Center (CEHC) has been designated as the Army integrator for all countermeasures involving explosive hazards and serves as a Center of Excellence to ensure the U.S. Army maintains superiority in all facets of countermine and counter-explosive warfare. CEHC countermeasures are the result of a fusion of intelligence information, available technological capabilities and systems, supported by education and training of new tools, skills, or techniques that are not available elsewhere. During contingency operations, these countermeasures may include new operational concepts, application of nonstandard materiel or off-the shelf technology into unique conditions, plus development and training of theater specific TTPs against explosive threats consisting of landmines, UXOs, and IEDs. A-13. The CEHC remains in continuous contacts with the field to identify equipment and training needs or capability gaps in order to immediately provide combat engineers with better mission capabilities. Having identified the need, the CEHC coordinates with program managers, combat developers, government laboratories, the rapid equipping force (REF), the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), and others to evaluate suitable material systems and candidates for potential integration and rapid fielding. Once a device or item is selected, the CEHC assists in the system’s integration, development of its operational concept, training support package, and operational assessment. A-14. To stay ahead of the IED and explosive hazards threat, the CEHC consistently monitors trends in threat activity, their tactics and technology, plus tracks the migration and relationships among enemy factions. To ensure countermeasures are up-to-date and relevant, the CEHC gathers the latest intelligence on explosive hazards TTPs employed by the enemy as well as TTPs employed by deployed units to counter that threat. A-15. A key task for the CEHC is training and updating the force in current counter explosive hazards techniques and employment of COTS and contingency equipment. This instruction enables units to receive theater-specific training prior to deployment and allows them to focus on the mission during transition of authority. Contingency training that will be permanently retained in the Army will eventually be institutionalized in doctrinal manuals and transferred to the official school training curriculum, such as operator training for route clearance vehicles. Meanwhile, the CEHC maintains a global and futuristic vision by monitoring global activities, associated hot spots, existing or expected use of explosive hazards, and anticipating countermeasures necessary to assure mobility and protect the force during full spectrum military operations. A-16. For more information, contact the CEHC by email at or see the Web site or the secure Internet protocol router network (SIPRNET) .

EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS COORDINATION CELL A-17. The Explosive Hazards Coordination Cell (EHCC) assists in the development of the COP and provides informational and situational understanding on EHs to all coalition forces, the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA), and NGOs. EHCC enables the land component commander to predict, track, distribute information on, and mitigate EHs within the theater that affect force application, focused logistics, protection, and OE awareness. This minimizes casualties and equipment damage to coalition forces and the civilian populace and supports stability operations and humanitarian demining operations. The EHCC supports counter-IED efforts throughout the theater and JOA with technical advice, TTPs, and

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

A-3

Appendix A

training. The EHCC has oversight responsibility for geospatial and topographic products and manages acquisition and distribution of specialized route clearance equipment. The EHCC— • Provides counter-IED and EH awareness training to the force. • Provides mine detector training using the AN/PSS 14. • Provides technical and tactical training using mobile training teams. • Manages acquisition and distribution of specialized route clearance equipment. • Tracks NGO operations within the AO. • Establishes, maintains, and shares the EH tracking database within the JOA. • Assists intelligence analysts and ISR planners with EH pattern analysis and intelligence collection management. • Supports efforts with C7 engineers in sourcing engineer units (mine detection equipment, specialized search dogs, and new technologies). • Conducts training and assessments for route clearance teams. • Provides engineer liaison as required.

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL INCIDENT RESPONSE FORCE A-18. The United States Marine Corps Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) provides a rapid response force for WMD incidents; consequence management support in military and industrial agent identification; downwind hazard prediction; advanced lifesaving support; casualty reconnaissance, extraction and triage; personnel decontamination; medical treatment; and stabilization for incident site management, including ordnance disposal, security, and patient evacuation. An EOD detachment in the CBIRF protection element provides specialized response capabilities.

JOINT IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DEFEAT ORGANIZATION A-19. The JIEDDO focuses all counter-IED efforts within the DOD, while concurrently engaging other outside sources of potential solutions, to defeat current and future IED threats endangering joint and coalition forces. It is chartered to adopt a holistic approach that combines applied intelligence, TTP, and the tenets of assured mobility (mitigation, prediction, detection, prevention, and neutralization). JIEDDO attacks the networks responsible for employing IEDs as weapons of strategic influence by identifying and neutralizing enemy leaders, suppliers, trainers, enablers, and executors responsible for the employment of IEDs against coalition forces. At the same time, JIEDDO is focused on training U.S. forces in the most current TTP being used by the enemy and the best available U.S. TTP to eliminate the IED threat. Further, JIEDDO continues to invest in capabilities, technologies, and initiatives to defeat the device itself. A-20. The JIEDDO has developed an entire spectrum analysis of IEDs that considers and applies multiple doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) strategies to effectively counter the IED threat. This counter-IED effort is a combined joint Service, interagency, multinational program designed to leverage all available resources and technologies in a coordinated campaign to defeat the IED threat. To facilitate this effort a senior resource steering group (SRSG) (comprising representatives from all the Services, the joint staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and others as directed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense) has been formed to evaluate issues for decision by the joint IED defeat integrated process team. A-21. For more information, see the SIPRNET Web site for .

the

JIEDDO

at

NATIONAL GROUND INTELLIGENCE CENTER A-22. The NGIC produces and disseminates all-source, integrated intelligence on foreign forces, systems, and supporting combat technologies to ensure that U.S. forces have a decisive edge on any battlefield. NGIC provides all-source analysis of the threat posed by IEDs produced and used by foreign terrorist and insurgent groups. NGIC supports U.S. forces during training, operational planning, deployment, and

A-4

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Selected Organizations and Units Involved in Improvised Explosive Device Defeat

redeployment. NGIC maintains a counter-improvised explosives device targeting program portal on the SIPRNET Web site that provides information concerning IED activities and incidents and NGIC IED assessments. In the IED fight, NGIC increases the capability of the coalition force to collect TECHINT and provide dedicated intelligence fusion to target bomb makers and their networks. NGIC provides WITs, which are deployed to brigade level to assist with IED incidents. A-23. For more information, see the SIPRNET Web sites for the NGIC at http://avenue.org/ngic/ or .

NAVAL EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL TECHNOLOGY DIVISION A-24. The Naval EOD Technology Division exploits technology and intelligence to develop and deliver EOD information, tools, equipment, and their life cycle support to meet the needs of joint Service EOD operating forces and other customers. Its core functions are― • Developing EOD countermeasures and render safe procedures for UXO and IEDs. • Developing and publishing joint EOD procedures via the Automated EOD Publication System (AEODPS). • Developing tools and equipment to meet EOD operational needs. • Performing in-service engineering for EOD tools and equipment. • Performing depot-level management and repair for EOD tools and equipment. • Maintaining an EOD EHDB. • Maintaining the Joint Digital Information Gathering System (JDIGS). • Providing electronic exploitation engineering manpower support to CEXC. • Developing and providing program management for various CREW systems. • Providing a joint EOD technical support center. • Maintaining convoy planning tool software. A-25. For more information, see the SIPRNET Web site for the Naval EOD Technology Division at .

RAPID EQUIPPING FORCE A-26. The REF is an organization that takes its operational guidance from the G-3 and reports directly to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. It has a broad task to rapidly increase mission capability while reducing the risk to Soldiers, Marines, and others. The REF accomplishes this mission in the following three ways: • Equips operational commanders with off-the-shelf (government or commercial) solutions or near-term developmental items that can be researched, developed, and acquired quickly. • Inserts future force technology solutions that currently engaged and deploying forces require. It does this by developing, testing, and evaluating key technologies and systems under operational conditions. • Assesses the capabilities and advising Army and USMC stakeholders of the findings that will enable forces to rapidly confront an adaptive enemy. A-27. For more information, see the REF Web site at . Soldiers and Marines who have REF equipment concerns can contact . Commanders can contact REF headquarters at .

TECHNICAL SUPPORT WORKING GROUP A-28. The Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) is the U.S. national forum that identifies, prioritizes, and coordinates interagency and international R&D requirements for combating terrorism. The TSWG rapidly develops technologies and equipment to meet the high priority needs of combating the

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

A-5

Appendix A

terrorism community (to include IEDs) and addresses joint international operational requirements through cooperative R&D with major allies. A-29. Since 1986, the TSWG has pursued combating terrorism technologies in the broad context of national security by providing a cohesive interagency forum to define user-based technical requirements spanning the federal interagency community. By harnessing the creative spirit of the U.S. and foreign industry, academic institutions, government, and private laboratories, the TSWG ensures a robust forum for technical solutions to the most pressing counterterrorism (CT) requirements. Participants in the ten functional subgroup areas of the TSWG can come to a single table to articulate specific threats and a userdefined approach to the rapid prototyping and development of combating terrorism devices, training tools, reference materials, software, and other equipment. A-30. The TSWG continues to focus its program development efforts to balance investments across the four pillars of combating terrorism. They include― • Antiterrorism. Antiterrorism is the defense measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts. • Counterterrorism. CT is the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. • Intelligence support. Intelligence support is the collection and dissemination of terrorism-related information taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum, to include terrorist use of CBRNE materials or high-yield explosive devices. • Consequence management. Consequence management is the preparation and response to the consequences of a terrorist event. A-31. For more information, see the TSWG Web site at , explosives detection information at , or improvised device defeat information at or .

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE PROTECTION BATTLE LABORATORY A-32. The United States Air Force Protection Battle Laboratory identifies innovative concepts for advancing joint warfighting. It uses field ingenuity, modeling, simulation, and actual employment of exploratory capabilities in OEs to test new and innovative ideas which can be readily transitioned into the protection arena.

UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND A-33. The INSCOM conducts dominant intelligence, security, and IO for military commanders and national decision makers. Charged with providing warfighters the seamless intelligence needed to understand the battlefield and to focus and leverage combat power, INSCOM collects intelligence information in all intelligence disciplines. INSCOM also conducts a wide range of production activities, ranging from IPB to situation development, signal intelligence analysis, imagery exploitation, and science and technology intelligence production. INSCOM also has major responsibilities in the areas of CI and protection, electronic and IO, and support to force modernization and training. A-34. INSCOM is a global command with four brigades that tailor their support to the specific needs of different theaters. Eight other groups or activities located worldwide focus primarily on a single intelligence discipline or function. They are available in a reinforcing role, enabling any combat commander to use INSCOM’s full range of unique capabilities. A-35. For more information, see the INSCOM Web sites at or .

A-6

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Selected Organizations and Units Involved in Improvised Explosive Device Defeat

UNITED STATES ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND A-36. The United States Army Materiel Command (USAMC) shares responsibility for managing the overt acquisition of foreign material for TECHINT purposes. The USAMC buys foreign material for exploitation purposes in the United States, as well as through its centers in Europe and the Far East.

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS WARFIGHTING LABORATORY A-37. The United States Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL) is the lead USMC agency for IED defeat. MCWL leads a USMC IED working group made up of representatives from the USMC, beltway agencies, and operating forces. The USMC IED working group rapidly identifies, evaluates, and facilitates the fielding of material and nonmaterial IED defeat solutions to the operating forces. They work in close coordination with the JIEDDO integrated product team to synchronize DOD IED defeat efforts. A-38. For more information, see the MCWL Web site at .

UNITED STATES ARMY CENTER FOR HEALTH PROMOTION AND PREVENTATIVE MEDICINE A-39. The United States Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventative Medicine (USACHPPM) is a multifaceted health organization within the medical command. USACHPPM provides subject-matter expertise on a variety of occupational, environmental, and CBRN hazards and the associated protective measures for military operations. Specific directorates with USACHPPM that have been addressing hazards associated with CBRN and TICs in operational settings include, the Directorate of Occupational and Environmental Medicine, the Directorate of Health Risk Management, and the Directorate of Occupational Safety and Health. A-40. For more information, see the USACHPPM Health Information Operations Program Web site at .

SELECTED UNITS AND PERSONNEL ENGINEER UNITS A-41. The specific combat engineer missions concerning EH are breaching, clearing, and proofing minefields. In extreme high-operational tempo or high-intensity combat missions, U.S. Army and USMC engineers or other non-EOD units may conduct limited reduction or clearing of nonmine EH and IED hazards, under the technical guidance of Army and USMC EOD forces. A-42. During the post-conflict phase, engineers may also assist EOD forces in battlefield UXO cleanup operations, as required. JP 3-34 and FM 3-34 provide more details on specific engineer units and tasks.

Clearance Company A-43. A clearance company (Army only) conducts detection and limited IED reduction (as outlined in Chapter 5) along routes and within areas of support to enable force application, focused logistics, and protection. It provides training readiness and oversight of assigned route and area clearance platoons. A-44. The company provides battle command for three to five route, area, or sapper platoons. It is capable of clearing a total of 255 kilometers of two-way routes per day (three routes of 85 kilometers each) and can clear a total of two acres per day (two areas at one acre each) depending on the enemy situation, terrain, and weather conditions. Route Clearance Platoon A-45. The mission of a route clearance platoon is to conduct route reconnaissance, minesweeping, enemy or unobserved minefield clearance operations, and deliberate route clearance. It clears obstacles with engineer (countermine) equipment or uses demolitions and performs engineer reconnaissance. The platoon

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

A-7

Appendix A

provides digital hazard area data to other units at the objective and is fully mobile in-theater using organic assets only. It is capable of― • Clearing and marking 85 kilometers (daylight only) of route (4 meters wide) per day (enemy capability, terrain, and weather dependent). • Identifying and neutralizing mines, IEDs (as outlined in Chapter 5), and UXO on routes. • Receiving and analyzing Ground Standoff Mine Detection System and Airborne Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Minefield Detection System data from other units. Area Clearance Platoon A-46. The mission of an area clearance platoon is to conduct area clearance, minesweeping, and enemy or unobserved minefield clearance operations. The platoon clears obstacles with engineer (countermine) equipment or uses demolitions and performs engineer reconnaissance. It is fully mobile in-theater using organic assets only. It is capable of― • Clearing and proofing 0.004 square kilometers per day of mines (buried and surface), IEDs (as outlined in Chapter 5), and UXO (daylight only). Rates are impacted by the enemy situation, terrain, and weather conditions. • Extracting casualties from an EH area. • Providing digital hazard area information to other units (objective).

Engineer Mine Dog Detachment A-47. The Engineer Mine Dog Detachment consists of trained mine detection dog teams with specialized search dog capability. Engineer mine detection dogs are trained for the military OE to perform area and route clearance and search, minefield extraction, combat patrols, building search (disruptive and nondisruptive), vehicle search, and cave clearance. A-48. The dogs can reduce the time spent on a search. Dogs can search in open areas, fields, woods, hedgerows, and embankments. They are an excellent tool to route proof along roads, tracks, and railways. They can detect metallic and nonmetallic mines, both buried and surface laid. Dogs increase the speed and efficiency of an IED defeat operation.

Explosive Ordnance Clearance Agent A-49. EOCA personnel are Army combat engineers trained to perform limited battlefield disposal of UXO as outlined in the EOCA identification guide and supplemental list of EOCA ordnance provided by the theater EOD commander (part of the ordnance order of battle) during route reconnaissance or route clearance operations or other engineer missions. If the UXO is out of the scope of operations for the EOCA, EOD personnel must be called. EOCA personnel can assist EOD personnel in disposing of other EH as requested. Properly trained and certified EOCA personnel capabilities include— • Unexploded ordnance reconnaissance. EOCA personnel are trained to perform detailed reconnaissance of a suspected UXO. • Unexploded ordnance identification. EOCA personnel can perform limited identification of items listed in the EOCA identification guide and the supplemental EOCA ordnance list provided by the theater EOD commander (part of the ordnance order of battle). Items that the EOCA cannot positively identify must be reported to EOD personnel. • Unexploded ordnance area marking. EOCA personnel mark the UXO area according to the standard UXO marking system. • Protective works. EOCA personnel can provide protective works to isolate a blast and fragmentation danger area of identified UXO. EOCA personnel may provide an estimated blast and fragmentation danger area for items similar to, but not included in the EOCA identification guide and supplemental list of EOCA ordnance provided by the theater EOD commander (part of the ordnance order of battle). EOCAs will advise the on-scene commander about the recommended personnel and equipment protective measures. When the commander determines

A-8

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Selected Organizations and Units Involved in Improvised Explosive Device Defeat

•

•

that certain personnel or equipment cannot be removed from the hazard area, protective works must be established to protect those personnel and assets from the effects of the UXO. EOCAs will recommend and supervise the appropriate protective works to be completed. Unexploded ordnance disposal. EOCA personnel are authorized to destroy (by detonation) individual UXO identified in the EOCA identification guide and supplemental list of EOCA ordnance list provided by the theater EOD commander (part of the ordnance order of battle). Improvised explosive device disposal. EOCA personnel are authorized to blow in place single munitions-based IEDs that are positively identifiable in the EOCA identification guide and the supplemental EOCA ordnance provided by the theater EOD commander (part of the ordnance order of battle) and based upon theater policy.

A-50. The following are the EOCA’s limitations: • Not trained to move, combine, and/or destroy multiple UXO (such as a cache or IED incorporating more than one munition). • Not trained to perform reconnaissance or handling of IED or VBIED incidents. • Can only perform ERW operations under the direct supervision of EOD personnel (includes EHTs). • Are not to be used for EH response calls. However, if EOD is not readily available as determined by the maneuver commander, EOCA personnel can be used to conduct an initial reconnaissance of the UXO. If the UXO falls within their capability, then EOCA personnel may dispose of the UXO. Note. The joint area commander will be advised by the senior EOD commander who creates and manages modifications to the JOA UXO supplemental list. Requests to modify the supplemental list will be coordinated through the local EOD unit or EHT for approval by the CBRNE cell or EOD group/battalion staff. Any modification to the JOA UXO supplemental list will be provided based upon positively identifiable munitions in the theaters ordnance order of battle.

Mobility Augmentation Company A-51. A mobility augmentation company conducts assault gap crossings, mounted and dismounted breaches, and emplaces obstacles in support of maneuver BCTs and RCTs and support brigades to enable force application, focused logistics, and protection.

Sapper Company A-52. The mission of a sapper company is to execute mobility, countermobility, and survivability tasks and to provide support of maneuver and support brigades to enable force application, focused logistics, and protection. A sapper company reinforces engineers in maneuver BCTs and RCTs.

Terrain Team A-53. Terrain teams are deployed at the brigade, division, and corps levels to provide terrain analysis and geospatial support to the field. IED defeat-related support includes route analysis, identification of choke points, AAs, line-of-sight analysis, and other tactical decision aids (TDAs). Terrain teams can also perform geospatial pattern analysis for tracking and locating IEDs. They provide the geospatial input to the IPB process.

EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL UNITS A-54. EOD companies are on call 24 hours a day to provide emergency response teams in support of military missions, public safety, and law enforcement authorities at the federal, state, and municipal level. Each company can field nine response teams depending on the manning configuration of the teams and the

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

A-9

Appendix A

mission requirements. Each team is matched with a tailored equipment set and vehicle. Teams with equipment can be airlifted via rotary and fixed wing aircraft. EOD capabilities include― • Identifying, rendering safe, and disposing of conventional/unconventional explosives and/or CBRNE munitions or devices (U.S. or foreign origin), to include IEDs. (EOD units are the only forces trained and equipped to render safe and dispose of IEDs.) • Maintaining an EOD incident database located above division in the protection cell. • Providing technical expertise to EHCCs and EHTs on EHs. • Acting as the SME for EHs (IEDs, UXO, and ERW) to commanders (BCT, RCT, Combat Support Brigade [Maneuver Enhancement] brigades, corps, divisions, and so forth). • Exploitation of the first seen ordnance on the battlefield. • Conducting post blast and crater analysis. • Identification, collection, and exploitation of IED forensic evidence. • Conducting on-site assessment/verification for the presence of CBRNE material. • Formulating a COA to protect forces, citizens, or operations from death, injury, or cessation of operations threatened by UXO, IED, or CBRNE. • Performing CB testing in Occupational Safety and Health Administration Level A and Level B protective ensembles, military toxicological agent protective ensembles, or mission-oriented protective posture/joint Services lightweight integrated-suit technology. Performing IED and UXO render safe procedures in ballistic protective “bomb suits” using an array of sets, kits, and outfits for disruption/defeat of devices and extensive technical manuals (CBRNE and conventional munitions/devices). • Establishing working relationships with the Federal Bureau of Investigation Bomb Data and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (U.S.) Arson and Explosives National Repository Centers; the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) CT Division; the Missile and Space Intelligence Center, NGIC; National Laboratories; the Naval EOD Technical Center; and the Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (U.S. Army) Technical Escort Unit.

Explosive Hazards Team A-55. The mission of an explosive hazards team (EHT) is to provide evaluation of EH incident sites in support of brigade-size and smaller units and other similar size joint, interagency, and multinational forces and organizations. The EOD company and EHT coordinate and synchronize EH information and capability throughout the COP and area of responsibility. The EHT capabilities include― • Conducting site evaluation of EH incident sites. • Conducting TTP training (explosive hazards awareness training [EHAT], AN/PSS-14, and area clearance) for BCT and RCT and joint, interagency, and multinational personnel on EH mitigation in a JOA. • Conducting annual recertification, quarterly reinforcement, and predeployment training of EOCA personnel (Army only). • Providing advice on EHs as requested. • Providing information into the EHDB via the battle command system. • Conducting disposal of limited EHs; however, EHTs are not equipped to conduct render safe procedures on EHs. • Consolidating and conducting analysis of requests for modifications to the JOA UXO supplemental list. • Providing recommendations to the CBRNE cell for modification of the JOA UXO supplemental list.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE UNITS A-56. MI units assist the commander in visualizing the OE, organizing the forces, and controlling operations to achieve the desired tactical objectives or end-state. Intelligence supports protection by

A-10

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Selected Organizations and Units Involved in Improvised Explosive Device Defeat

alerting the commander to emerging threats and assisting in security operations. The commander must understand how current and potential enemies organize, equip, train, employ, and control their forces. Intelligence provides an understanding of the enemy, which assists in planning, preparing, and executing military operations. One of the most significant contributions that intelligence personnel can accomplish is to accurately predict future enemy events. Although this is an extremely difficult task, predictive intelligence enables the commander and staff to anticipate key enemy events or reactions and develop corresponding plans or counteraction (see Chapter 3 for more information on intelligence collection). Commanders must receive the intelligence, understand it (because it is tailored to the commander’s requirements), believe it, and act on it. A-57. Intelligence tasks include― • Supporting SU. • Performing IPB. • Performing situational development. • Providing intelligence support to protection. • Supporting strategic responsiveness. • Performing I&W to ensure intelligence readiness. • Conducting area studies of foreign countries. • Supporting sensitive site exploitation. • Conducting ISR. • Performing intelligence synchronization. • Performing ISR integration. • Conducting tactical and/or technical reconnaissance. • Conducting surveillance. • Providing intelligence support to effects, to targeting, IO, and combat assessment.

WEAPONS TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS A-58. WTI units provide BCTs and RCTs with IED intelligence collection capability to support intelligence analysis of IEDs and IED operations at the corps level and below. The WTI unit is normally a company or company equivalent from another service that consists of two WIT detachments and a weapons intelligence analysis detachment.

MILITARY POLICE UNITS A-59. MP units assist the commander by providing a real-time information flow into the COP. Criminal intelligence results from the collection, analysis, and interpretation of all available information concerning known and potential criminal threats and vulnerabilities of the supported organization. A-60. MPs, in the process of performing their operational functions, are arrayed across the AO conducting traditional mobility/countermobility/survivability missions as well as engaging in close coordination and training with HN elements. These MP elements perform a function as real-time sensors that have the ability to quickly gather and transmit information for dissemination vertically, horizontally, and laterally across the levels of command. A-61. Provost marshal cells, MP brigade and battalion staffs, and criminal investigation division elements gather and analyze incoming police reports and information, producing intelligence for commanders and MI units for inclusion as part of the COP. Critical tasks include–– • Identifying criminal personnel in the unit AO who may be contributing to the threat effort. • Determining connections between known or suspected criminal and hostile personnel, thus building a detailed understanding of criminal organizations, their structure, and their impact on coalition and U.S. forces operations.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

A-11

Appendix A • • •

Identifying and locating criminals, their organizations, meeting places, supply caches, material sources, and criminal command support and operational networks. Providing investigative support to the identification and interdiction of criminal IED activities. Liaison with HN, coalition, and other U.S. law enforcement agencies.

A-62. One of the newest MP functions is police intelligence operations (PIO). PIO is an extension of the MP field-craft and links findings and observations synonymous with other MP operations. It can assist the commander and staffs by providing valuable information gained from typical policing functions that may be suitable for incorporating into the various integrating functions associated with IED defeat. See FM 3-19.50 for more information.

OTHER IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DEFEAT ORGANIZATIONS A-63. It has been the practice in recent combat operations for the combatant command to establish an organization whose function is to coordinate and drive the fight against IEDs. • Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Troy exercises C2 of specialized IED defeat forces, as well as coordinates corps level IED defeat operations, intelligence, technology, and training initiatives throughout the Iraqi theater of operations to defeat the IED system. • Task Force (TF) Paladin fuses IED defeat related, intelligence, effects, training, equipment, and EOD forces into one organization, assigned to CJTF-76, throughout the Afghanistan theater of operations to defeat the IED system.

A-12

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Appendix B

Analytical Techniques, Tools, and Products The selection and use of analytical techniques and tools is an important part of the overall intelligence synchronization plan. Collectively, these techniques and tools can assist in providing the necessary information to proactively attack the IED network prior to or at conception through the actual emplacement of a device. This appendix provides some basic information concerning the tools and products available and the techniques used to accomplish this task.

IMAGERY AND GEOSPATIAL INTELLIGENCE B-1. Analysis of an OE where IEDs are employed would be incomplete without the use of imagery. Imagery products for such an environment include both aerial photography and satellite imagery. In many cases, tasked aerial reconnaissance platforms, including UASs, respond directly to the commander, thus ensuring timely and focused data collection. Because of technical limitations or priorities established at the higher echelons, space-based and other national collection assets may or may not be available to the commander and staff. Additionally, as each collection system has its own unique capabilities, traditional black and white or infrared imagery may offer the best view of the target in a given situation. B-2. Advanced GEOINT products are produced using any combination of imaging platforms: visible, infrared, radar, or spectral depending on the requestor’s needs. Due to the versatility of these products, they have a wide range of applications in the OE. Presenting imagery in an oblique perspective by combining it with digital terrain elevation data provides a perspective view. Using spectral imagery can accomplish discovery and identification of man-made and indigenous activity from patterns of heat distribution and determination of changes in a scene imaged at various times. Other uses include facility analysis, structural analysis, target detection, soil analysis, and damage assessment. For IED analysis, use imagery, IMINT, and geospatial information to determine the–– • Locations where IED incidents have taken place. • Characteristics of past IED sites. • Size. • Distance from road, mosque, other natural or man-made objects. • Type of terrain the threat prefers. • Other obstacles used in conjunction with IEDs. • Ingress and egress routes (worn paths, other). • Distance from the IED site to the possible cache. • Type of IEDs: single or multiple munitions, explosively formed penetrator (EFP), shape charge, other. • IED main components, such as a main charge (explosives), casing (materials that are around the explosives), and initiators. • Methods of initiation, such as command-wire, radio-controlled, victim-operated, and timed. • Sample indicators present at the site. • Wires. • Antennas. • Detonation cord. • Parts of ordnance exposed.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

B-1

Appendix B • •

• • • • • • • •

Markers (rocks, survey stacks, other). Out-of-place debris, wires, dead animals, suspicious civilians, unusually unpopulated normally populated areas. Vehicles following convoy for a long distance and then pulling off to the side of the road. Freshly dug holes along the roadway (potential IED site). New dirt or gravel piles. Obstacles in the roadway used to channel the convoy. Personnel on overpasses. Signals with flares or lights. Absence of the ordinary (lack of people on a usually busy road, other). Birds released into the air.

To locate potential IED sites or cache locations, look at the target area and use the techniques discussed in the following paragraphs.

PATTERN ANALYSIS B-3. Pattern analysis includes analyzing multiple map overlays and text assessing military or other threat activity in an area. These events can be related by any number of factors to include location, type, or time. They can be displayed by plotting them on maps, multiple historical overlays (analog or digital), a coordinates register, a pattern analysis plot sheet, or other analysis tools to include automated tools. B-4. Pattern analysis is the ability to observe a selection of events or actions over a period of time in a defined location or area. It is used to discover likely patterns or similarities that lead to a logical conclusion that the action or event will occur again in the same location. For instance, over a period of weeks or months a unit encounters IEDs along the same 1-kilometer stretch of route in different locations, but basically with the same design or makeup. These IED (either detonated or disarmed) locations, plotted over time, begin to show a pattern that can be analyzed and used to possibly prevent further occurrences by killing or capturing the person or persons responsible for emplacing the IEDs. The ability to report and track IEDs throughout the AO is critical to mission success. B-5. The threat attacks in the area where it achieves success; attack frequency depends on where it is in the attack cycle. It chooses the target area for a reason; it may be convenience or it may be friendly force patterns in that area. It will continue to use its favorite attack area until they are killed or an event or action occurs to make it move. B-6. If the threat moves its attack area, continuous pattern analysis will eventually allow the new pattern to emerge. Analysis of the patterns allows analysts to predict the threat’s events and therefore set the conditions to trap it in its target area. • Use the time between attacks or finds to estimate when the threat will strike again at a specific location. • Use probability to commit resources to specific targets on days that events are most likely to occur. • Remember that the threat is going, to some extent, to come to friendly forces to attack. B-7. IEDs are going to be on routes that Soldiers and Marines use. This may be important to remember when conducting pattern analysis, particularly in a generally high-density IED area where most attacks are on MSRs. An attack which does not fit the pattern may indicate a specifically targeted event or a separate cell operating within the noise of other groups. Combine this analysis with that of the analysis gathered through post-blast analysis to create a possible start point for further exposing a specific group. Focus on HUMINT and fully use information and analysis conducted by PSYOP and CA units. Sometimes the sheer oddity of these events allows an analyst to reverse-engineer the problem and break the “non” pattern not by their adherence to the pattern but by their oddity. While this may be counter-intuitive to the purpose of pattern analysis, this may work in two directions instead of one.

B-2

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Analytical Techniques, Tools, and Products

Coordinates Register B-8. One type of pattern analysis tool is the coordinates register. Figure B-1, which is an example of a coordinates register, is also known as an incident map. It shows cumulative events that have occurred within the AO and focuses on the “where” of an event. B-9. Unit SOPs may suggest or mandate employment of multiple coordinates registers, focusing on several individual subjects or blending subjects. Additionally, the coordinates register will include additional information such as notes or graphics. Analysts should always use the coordinates register in conjunction with the pattern analysis plot sheet.

Figure B-1. Example Coordinates Register

Pattern Analysis Plot Sheet B-10. The pattern analysis plot sheet, shown in Figure B-2, page B-4, focuses on the time and date of each serious incident that occurs within the AO. The rings depict days of the month; the segments depict the hours of the day. As shown in the plot sheet's legend, the chart depicts the actual events; it identifies each by using an alphanumeric designation that directly corresponds to the legend used on the coordinates register. The legend icons can be changed to depict other types of incidents such as VBIEDs, commandwired IEDs, and RCIEDs. B-11. Another type of pattern analysis plot sheet helps distinguish patterns in activities associated with particular days, dates, or times. Analysts may choose to modify this product to track shorter periods to avoid clutter and confusion.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

B-3

Appendix B

Figure B-2. Example Pattern Analysis Plot Sheet

B-4

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Analytical Techniques, Tools, and Products

LINK ANALYSIS B-12. Link analysis is used to depict contacts, associations, and relationships between persons, events, activities, and organizations. Four types of link analysis tools are the— • Time event chart. • Association matrix. • Activities matrix. • Link diagram.

TIME EVENT CHARTS B-13. A time event chart is a method for placing and representing individual or group actions chronologically (see Figure B-3, page B-6). It uses symbols to represent events, dates, and time flow. • Normally, triangles are used to depict the beginning and end of the chart and may be used within the chart to indicate particularly critical events such as an ideological shift or change. • Rectangles, used as event nodes, store administrative data and indicate significant events or activities. • An “X” drawn through the event node may highlight noteworthy or important events. B-14. Each of these symbols contains a sequence number, date (day, month, and year of the event), and may, if desired, contain a file reference number. The incident description written below the event node is a brief explanation of the incident and may include team size and incident type. Arrows indicate time flow. B-15. By using these symbols and brief descriptions, it is possible to analyze the group's activities, transitions, trends, and particularly operational patterns in both time and activity. If desired, the event nodes may be color coded to indicate a particular event or type of event to aid in pattern recognition. The time event chart is one of the best analytical tools for pattern analysis.

MATRIXES B-16. Using matrixes, the analyst can pinpoint the optimal targets for further intelligence collection, identify key personalities within an organization, and considerably increase the analyst's understanding of an organization and its structure. Matrixes can be used to present briefings or to store information in a concise and understandable manner within a database. Matrixes augment but cannot replace SOPs or standard database files. It is possible, and sometimes productive, to use one matrix for all associations. B-17. Construction of a matrix is the easiest and simplest way to show the relationships that exist between numbers of similar or dissimilar associated items. The items can be anything that is important to a collection effort such as people, places, organizations, automobile license plates, weapons, telephone numbers, or locations. In analysis, matrixes are often used to identify “who knows whom,” “who should know whom,” or “who has been where or done what” in a clear, concise manner. B-18. Two types of matrixes used in analysis are the association matrix, which is used to determine existence of relationships between individual human beings; and the activities matrix, which is used to determine connectivity between individuals and any organization, event, address, activity, or any other nonpersonal entity. The graphics involved in constructing the two types of matrixes differ slightly, but the principles are identical.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

B-5

Appendix B

Figure B-3. Example Time Event Chart

Association Matrix B-19. The association matrix shows connections between key individuals involved in any event or activity (see Figure B-4). It shows associations within a group or associated activity. Normally, this type of matrix is constructed in the form of an equilateral triangle having the same number of rows and columns. Personality names may be listed along the diagonal side of the matrix. An alternate method is to list the names in exactly the same order along both the rows and columns to ensure that all possible associations are correctly depicted. B-20. The purpose of the matrix is to show the analyst who knows whom and who is suspected to know whom. In the event that a person of interest dies, a diamond is drawn next to their name on the matrix. The analyst uses a dot or closed (filled-in) circle to depict a strong or known association. A known association is determined by direct contact between one or more persons. Direct contact is determined by several factors. Direct associations include–– • Face-to-face meetings.

B-6

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Analytical Techniques, Tools, and Products • •

Telephonic conversations in which the analyst is sure who was conversing with whom. Members of a cell or other group who are involved in the same operations.

B-21. Suspected or weak associations are associations where there are indicators that individuals may have had associations but there is no way to confirm the association; this is depicted with an open circle. Examples of suspected associations are–– • A known party calls a known telephone number (the analyst knows to whom the telephone number is listed), but it cannot be determined with certainty who answered the call. • A face-to-face meeting where one party can be identified, but the other party can only be tentatively identified. B-22. The rationale for depicting suspected associations is to get as close as possible to an objective analytic solution while staying as close as possible to known or confirmed facts. If a suspected association is later confirmed, the appropriate adjustment may be made on the association matrix. B-23. A secondary reason for depicting suspected associations is that it may give the analyst a focus for tasking limited intelligence collections assets to confirm the suspected association. An important point to remember about using the association matrix is that it will, without modification, show only the existence of relationships; not the nature, degree, or duration of those relationships.

Figure B-4. Example Association Matrix

Activities Matrix B-24. The activities matrix is a rectangular array of personalities compared against activities, locations, events, or other appropriate information (see Figure B-5, page B-8). The quantity and quality of data that are available to the collector determine the number of rows and columns and their content. The analyst may tailor the matrix to fit the needs of the problem at hand and can add to it as the problem expands in scope.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

B-7

Appendix B

B-25. This matrix normally is constructed with personalities arranged in a vertical listing on the left side of the matrix, and events, activities, organizations, addresses, or any other common denominator arranged along the bottom of the matrix. This matrix is critical for the study of a group’s internal and external activities, external ties and linkages, and even modes of operation. As with the association matrix, confirmed or “strong” associations between individuals and nonpersonal entities are shown with a solid circle or dot, while suspected or “weak” associations are illustrated by an open circle.

Figure B-5. Example Activity Matrix

LINK DIAGRAMS B-26. A link analysis diagram shows the connections between people, groups, or activities. The difference between matrixes and a link analysis is roughly the same as the difference between a mileage chart and a road map. The mileage chart (matrix) shows the connections between cities using numbers to represent travel distances. The map (link analysis diagram) uses symbols that represent cities, locations, and roads to show how two or more locations are linked to each other.

B-8

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Analytical Techniques, Tools, and Products

B-27. As with construction of association matrixes, there are certain rules of graphics, symbology, and construction that must be followed. Standardization is critical to ensuring that everyone constructing, using, or reading a link analysis diagram understands exactly what the diagram depicts. Circles and lines are arranged so that no lines cross whenever possible. Often, especially when dealing with large groups, it is very difficult to construct a link diagram in which no lines cross. In these cases, every effort should be made to keep the number of crossings at an absolute minimum. The standard rules are as follows: • Persons are shown as open circles with the name written inside the circle. Deceased persons are depicted in either open circles with a diamond next to the circle representing that person or as open diamonds with the name written inside the diamond.

•

Persons known by more than one name (alias or also known as [AKA]) are shown as overlapping circles with names in each circle or both names are simply listed in the same circle. If the alias is suspected, a dotted line is used to depict the intersection. If the alias is confirmed, the intersection is shown with a solid line.

•

Nonpersonal entities (organizations, governments, events, locations) are shown as appropriately labeled rectangles.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

B-9

Appendix B •

Solid lines denote confirmed linkages or associations and dotted lines show suspected linkages and associations.

•

Footnotes on the matrixes can be shown as a brief legend on the connectivity line.

•

Each person or nonpersonal entity is depicted only once in a link analysis diagram.

B-28. The following diagram shows connectivity between persons.

B-29. The analyst can easily determine from the diagram that Alpha knows Bravo, Bravo knows Charlie and Delta. Bravo is suspected of knowing Echo, and Charlie knows Delta, Bravo, and Echo. Although the same information could be shown on a matrix, it may be easier to understand when depicted on a link analysis diagram. As situations or investigations become more complex, the ease in understanding a link analysis diagram becomes more apparent. In almost all cases, the available information is first depicted and analyzed on both types of matrixes, which are then used to construct a link analysis diagram for further analysis.

B-10

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Analytical Techniques, Tools, and Products

B-30. Link analysis diagrams can show organizations, membership within the organizations, action teams or cells, or participants in an event. Since each individual depicted on a link analysis diagram can be shown only once, and some individuals may belong to more than one organization or take part in more than one event. Squares or rectangles representing nonpersonal entities may have to overlap. The following illustration demonstrates that Ralph and Fred are both members of the "Red Fighters," and that Fred also is a member of Students for Peace (S.F.P.). Further, since Ralph and Fred are shown in the same “box,” it is a given that they are mutually associated.

B-31. There is more to overlapping organizations than is immediately obvious. At first glance, the overlap indicates only that an individual may belong to more than one organization or has taken part in multiple activities. Further study and analysis would reveal connections between organizations, connections between events, or connections between organizations and events, either directly or through persons. The diagram below reveals a more complex connection between organizations, personal connections, and linkages. The link analysis diagram shows a connection between organizations and events to which an individual belongs or is associated. In this example, a national government runs a training camp for terrorists. Ahmed, a member of the terrorist group, is associated with the training camp and participated in the bombing attack. From this diagram, one can link the supporting government to the bombing through the camp and the participant.

B-32. When, as is often the case, an organization or incident depicted in a link analysis diagram contains the names of more than one individual, it is not necessary to draw a solid line between those individuals to indicate connectivity. It is assumed that individual members of the same cell or participants in the same activity know each other, and the connection between them is therefore implied. If the persons are not mutually associated, they cannot be placed in the same “box.” Another solution must be found to depict the situation; that is, show the persons as associated with a subordinate or different organization or activity. B-33. A final set of rules for link analysis diagrams concerns connectivity between individuals who are not members of an organization or participants in an activity, but who are somehow connected to that entity. Two possibilities exist: First, the individual knows a member or members of the organization but is not associated with the organization itself; or second, the person is somehow connected with the organization or activity but cannot be directly linked with any particular member of that entity.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

B-11

Appendix B

B-34. In the first case, the connectivity line is drawn only between the persons concerned as depicted here.

B-35. In the second case, where Smith is associated with the entity, but not the persons who are members of the entity, the situation is shown as depicted here.

B-36. The steps in constructing a link diagram are as follows: • Step 1. Raw data or fragments of information are organized into logical order. Names of individuals, organizations, events, and locations are compiled on appropriate lists. At this point, a time event chart may be completed to assist in understanding the information and to arrange events into chronological order. • Step 2. Information is entered onto the appropriate matrixes, graphically displaying “who is associated with whom” and “who is associated with what.” • Step 3. Drawing information from the database and intelligence reports, and relationships from the matrixes, the link analysis diagram can be constructed. The best method to start the link analysis diagram is to–– • Start with the association matrix and determine which person has the greatest number of personal associations. Depict that person in the center of the page.

•

B-12

Determine which person has the next highest number of personal associations. Depict that person near the first person.

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Analytical Techniques, Tools, and Products

•

•

Use the association matrix and show all confirmed and suspected personal associations.

After all personal associations have been shown on the link analysis diagram, the analyst uses the activities matrix to determine which activities, organizations, or other nonpersonal entities need to be depicted by appropriate rectangles. Having done so, the lines of connectivity between persons within the rectangles may be removed to prevent clutter. (It is assumed that participants in the same activity or members of the same cell are acquainted.)

B-37. The link analysis diagram shown in Figure B-6, page B-14, depicts the membership, organization, activities, and connections of the group introduced in the time event chart in Figure B-3, page B-6, and the matrixes in Figure B-4, page B-7, and Figure B-5, page B-8. From these products, one can gain a basic understanding of the group and its activities and develop working hypotheses for additional collection and analysis efforts.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

B-13

Appendix B

Figure B-6. Example Link Analysis Diagram B-38. After completion of the time event chart, matrixes, and the link analysis diagram, the analyst makes recommendations about the group’s structure and areas which should be identified for further collection. Collection assets are employed to verify suspected connections, identify key personalities, and substantiate or refute the conclusions and assessments drawn from the link analysis that has been done. The link analysis diagram and a thorough analysis of the information it contains can reveal a great deal about an organization. It can identify the group’s leadership, its strong and weak points, and operational patterns. The analyst can use this information to predict future activities.

B-14

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Analytical Techniques, Tools, and Products

SIGNIFICANT DATES B-39. In many operations, including most stability operations, key local national holidays, historic events, and significant cultural and political events can be extremely important. Soldiers and Marines are often provided with a list of significant dates to identify potential dates of increased or unusual activity. While a listing is helpful, it may be beneficial to include a description of why these dates are significant and what can be expected to happen on the holiday. In some cases, not only dates but also days of the week are significant.

TIMELINES B-40. A timeline is a list of significant dates, along with relevant information and analysis, which seeks to provide a context to operational conditions. Timelines could include descriptions of population movements or political shifts that are relevant to the operational area. They could also include a brief historical record of the population or area, highlighting the activities of a certain population sector. B-41. Timelines and significant dates become analytical tools that help the intelligence analyst predict how key sectors of the population might react to given circumstances. See Figure B-7 for an example of a timeline created in an analyst’s notebook.

Figure B-7. Example Timeline Created in an Analyst’s Notebook

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

B-15

Appendix B

CULTURE DESCRIPTION OR CULTURE COMPARISON CHART B-42. In order for the intelligence analyst to avoid the common mistake of assuming that only one perspective exists, it may be helpful to clearly point out the characteristics of the local ideology, politics, predominant religion, acceptable standards of living, norms, and more. A culture comparison chart can be a stand-alone tool, listing just the different characteristics of the culture in question, or it can be comparative—assessing the host country population relative to known and familiar conditions.

PERCEPTION ASSESSMENT MATRIX B-43. A perception assessment matrix is an individually derived matrix used to track assessments of how friendly force operations are affecting the perceptions of the local population. A perception assessment matrix can be a valuable tool for intelligence analysts. Perception assessment matrixes aim to measure the disparities between friendly force actions and what population groups perceive. Friendly force activities intended to be benign or benevolent might have negative results if a population’s perceptions are not considered, then assessed or measured. This is true because perceptions––more than reality––drive decision making and in turn could influence the reactions of entire populations. B-44. A perception assessment matrix seeks to provide some qualitative (and often indirect) measure of effectiveness for the unit’s ability to reach an effect (for example, maintain legitimacy) during an operation. In this sense, the matrix can also be used to directly measure the effectiveness of the unit’s IO, CA, and public affairs efforts. Since perceptions can work counter to operational objectives, they should be assessed both before and throughout an operation. Since each operation is different, the perception matrix may contain different observables. Although it is not possible to read the minds of the local national population, there are several means to measure perceptions, these include the following: • Demographic analysis and cultural intelligence are key components of perception analysis. • Understanding a population’s history can help predict expectations and reactions. • HUMINT, unit support to intelligence, IO, CA, and PSYOP products can provide information on population perceptions. • Reactions and key activities can be observed to assess whether people act based on real conditions or perceived conditions. • Use of OSINT include–– • Editorial and opinion pieces of relevant newspapers can be monitored for changes in tone or opinion shifts that can steer or may be reacting to the opinions of a population group. • Political and nonpolitical organization handouts, billboard postings, or handbills.

POPULATION STATUS OVERLAYS B-45. Population status overlays are a group of products rather than a single product. These products depict how the population of a designated area is divided based on a single characteristic (such as age, religion, ethnicity, or income). For instance, one population status overlay can show what areas of a city are Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, Hindu, and so on. Another overlay can indicate income levels or areas of known gang membership. There is no limit to the number of overlays that can be created to depict the population characteristics of a chosen area. The benefits of these overlays range from determining possible lines of contention (that can exist between groups) to identifying the population or location in greatest need of a certain activity or asset. B-46. Many examples of population status overlays are produced by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees and are readily available at . Figure B-8 is one example of a population status overlay.

B-16

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Analytical Techniques, Tools, and Products

Figure B-8. Example Population Status Overlay

TERRAIN OVERLAYS B-47. Terrain overlays depict specific aspects of terrain unique to the OE. These overlays can depict the details of a single building, a group of buildings, a section of an area, an infiltration or exfiltration route or lane, or even an entire area. This type of overlay can also depict the different terrain zones apparent in an area. Zone types may be defined by any designated characteristics required by the mission, such as zones of threat occupation; zones of previous IED incidents; zones divided by the types of predicted weapons effects; or historical zones divided by wells, oasis, sources of water, or trading routes.

LINES OF COMMUNICATION OVERLAYS B-48. LOC overlays identify the major LOCs within and around an area. This includes roads, alleys, airfields, waterways, railroads, and foot paths. More advanced versions of these overlays can be combined with the traffic conditions overlay and long-term surveillance of LOCs to determine which LOCs are most conducive to IED emplacement. Also included as an LOC may be an overlay depicting any one of the following entities: telephone lines, telegraph lines, cellular telephone towers, radio towers, television towers, subway (both active and no longer used as tunnels), utilities, sewer tunnels, gas line tunnels, other

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

B-17

Appendix B

underground lines, and easements. Threat forces can take advantage of higher volumes of civilian traffic to use these LOCs to conceal their presence.

LINE-OF-SIGHT OVERLAYS B-49. Line-of-sight overlays can help define an AA to an objective. Just as important are reverse line-of­ sight overlays that show the friendly AAs from the threat point of view. Friendly forces can expect the enemy to try to cover dead space from the objective area with other positions or devices (such as mines or IEDs). If the enemy on the objective wants to flee, dead spaces may be covered by some type of early warning system. Line-of-sight overlays can help pinpoint potential point of origin positions along each relevant AA based on the best locations given line-of-sight, elevation, exposure, and other pertinent considerations.

B-18

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Appendix C

Reporting, Recording, Displaying, and Tracking Obtaining and disseminating accurate information regularly is the key to battlefield management and superior SU. Reporting and recording IED field information is critical to the success of the mission and the overall SU of a unit and its leadership. Proper reporting, recording, and tracking of IEDs not only provides actionable and tactical data for the commander, but also provides information to subordinate and adjacent units through establishment of a COP and allow such tasks as pattern analysis to be conducted. The ability to report, record, and track IEDs throughout the AO is critical to mission success.

REPORTING C-1. The reporting of IEDs is the same as for any other EH category (UXO and ammunition, booby traps, ERW/CEA, bulk explosives, and IEDs). See FM 3-34.210 for more details concerning EH categories. C-2. When a unit encounters a suspected or confirmed IED, they report using the 9-line EH SPOTREP format. Units must provide timely, adequate information to their higher headquarters to ensure that followon elements are well informed. Information must include known or suspected IED locations, types of IED (if known), the time encountered, and any additional information that may be of use to the EOD response personnel. The 9-line EH SPOTREP is the first step in the process and allows for immediate action and decisions to occur.

EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS SPOT REPORT C-3. The EH SPOTREP is the critical report sent when units encounter an IED while on patrol, in convoys, and so forth. The EH SPOTREP format can be found in FM 3-34.210. Graphic Training Aid (GTA) 09-12-001 and GTA 90-01-001 also contain the report format, and leaders should ensure that all Soldiers and Marines understand the report and reporting procedures. The report should be submitted as soon as possible (local SOPs will indicate the time requirements). The EH SPOTREP contains the following nine lines: z Line 1, date-time group. Provide the date-time group (DTG) that the item was discovered (for example, 181230ZMAY05). z Line 2, reporting unit and location. Provide the unit identification code of the reporting activity unit and the location of the EH in an 8-digit grid coordinate. z Line 3, contact method. Provide the radio frequency, call sign, point of contact, and telephone number. z Line 4, type of munition. Note the size, quantity, type of ordnance (dropped, projected, placed, possible IED, or thrown), and subgroup, if available. If antihandling devices were used, indicate the emplacement method and type of initiation device. z Line 5, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear contamination. Be as specific as possible.

6 August 2008

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01, C1

C-1

Appendix C z z z z

Line 6, resources threatened. Report any equipment, facilities, or other assets that are threatened. Line 7, impact on mission. Provide a short description of the current tactical situation and how the presence of the EH affects the status (for example, delayed, diverted, cancelled). Line 8, protective measures taken. Describe any measures taken to protect personnel and equipment (for example, marked). Line 9, recommended priority (immediate, indirect, minor, no threat). Recommend a priority for response by EOD technicians. Ensure that the priority requested corresponds with the tactical situation described on Line 7 of the report (impact on mission). These priorities refer only to the EH’s impact on the current mission. A priority of MINOR or NO THREAT does not mean that the EH is not dangerous. „ Immediate. Stops the maneuver and mission capability of the unit or threatens critical assets vital to the mission. „ Indirect. Slows the maneuver and mission capability of the unit or threatens critical assets important to the mission. „ Minor. Reduces the maneuver and mission capability of the unit or threatens noncritical assets of value. „ No threat. Has little or no affect on the capabilities or assets of the unit.

DISPOSITION REPORT C-4. As EOD units neutralize IEDs, they report the disposition according to EOD procedures. See Standardization Agreement (STANAG) 2430, and STANAG 2221.

RECORDING C-5. There is no standardized methodology for recording and tracking EHs. An EH numbering system that complements the normal obstacle numbering system can be found in FM 90-7. Once discovered, all EHs have the same impact for reporting requirements and must be accounted for and eventually cleared. C-6. The EH numbering system has two primary purposes. The first purpose is to give units a method of recording, organizing, and tracking discovered EH. The second is to provide a record of the discovered EH to follow-on units or organizations for awareness or possible clearance. C-7. The EH number is designated by the headquarters that enters the discovered IED information into the database. Once an EH is entered into a tracking database, it is permanent. After it has been cleared (detonated, removed, or rendered safe), the tracking status will change, but the item remains in the database for future use.

DISPLAYING C-8. IEDs are graphically represented by two military symbols. The first symbol is an equipment symbol which shows the location of an IED that has been positively identified. The second symbol is an event symbol under stability operations that shows the location of an IED blast site. Both are basic symbols. When used without modifiers or amplifiers, neither symbol represents the size or type of IED when displayed for situational awareness. When modifiers and amplifiers are included as part of the symbol, additional information such as mobility, size, type, and so forth can be displayed. C-9. A hostile IED equipment symbol is shown in Figure C-1. It is characterized by a red diamond with the letters “IED” on the inside. (The red diamond connotes an action event.)

C-2

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01, C1

6 August 2008

Reporting, Recording, Displaying, and Tracking

IED Figure C-1. Hostile IED Equipment

C-10. A hostile IED explosion event is shown in Figure C-2. It is characterized by the letters “IED” inside an explosion icon that is inside a red diamond.

IED

Figure C-2. Hostile IED Explosion C-11. Within the intelligence operations dynamic, when a grouping of five IED symbols (equipment and event) are displayed in the same general area over a 1-kilometer radius for a period of 30 days, this constitutes an “IED hotspot.” An IED hotspot means that the enemy has established a pattern we can analyze and exploit to our advantage. Sufficiently detailed analysis of the hotspot, coupled with a detailed social network analysis, provides the staff with an opportunity to study the IED network, to find those who are responsible for implanting IEDs, and to neutralize the IEDs. There is currently no symbol to represent this concept. Note. The rules for equipment and event symbols can be found in FM 1-02.

TRACKING C-12. The EHCC is the central repository at the tactical operational level. The EHCC tracks all EHs intheater. C-13. The CEXC collects information on IED incidents. The CEXC prepares, publishes, and disseminates throughout theater a comprehensive report for every IED incident. Note. An IED incident includes any unplanned activity involving an IED. It also includes near misses that could have resulted in potential damage or injury.

6 August 2008

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01, C1

C-3

Appendix C

C-14. Division and BCT engineer planning cells typically establish a central control cell for IED clearance information. The central control cell— z Maintains a current situation map and an overlay that depicts IED activity. z Maintains and updates information on IED tracking and route status. z Maintains a database of IED information and forwards information according to the SOP. z Processes, analyzes, updates, and disseminates the information to subordinate commanders and staff. C-15. Other Services and organizations execute specific procedures to collect, record, track, and report EHs information. The standardization of tracking this information is critical to the planning and execution of missions in an IED environment.

EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS DATABASE C-16. The EHCC uses the maneuver control system (MCS) EHDB to manage EH information. The EHDB is a geo-referenced database system that takes advantage of true geographic information systems functionality. The EHDB provides a capability to input, manage, track, and disseminate EH data to maneuver units and to conduct pattern analysis on the use and location of potential IED sites. Note. Other Services execute specific procedures to collect, record, track, and report EH information. The centralized management of this information is critical to the planning and execution of missions in an IED environment. C-17. The EHDB is also used to― z Provide a capability to manage all hazard information for Army and USMC and joint operations. z Provide a comprehensive hazard tracking capability for all minefields, IEDs, UXO, and enemy ammunition caches in-theater. z Provide tools that assist in developing strategies for IED activity. z Support predeployment IPB for theater with hazard intelligence and assist in the MDMP. z Communicate with higher headquarters to maintain up-to-date information. z Provide data interoperability with a C2 personal computer, MCS-light, and FalconView. z Provide a means to collect and disseminate hazard data at any echelon. Outputs include raw data for trend analysis, TDA, and mobility/map decision aids in the form of maps, overlays, and graphics. z Conduct analysis on the EH data within the theater to support assured mobility to dominate land operations. z Use the standard report format. See FM 90-7 for further details. C-18. The EHDB team is responsible for the input, analysis, product production, and management of the EHDB. EHDBs are also used by organizations other than the EHCC to track EH data. C-19. The global minefield database (GMFDB) is maintained at the United States Army Engineer School (USAES) by the CEHC. The GMFDB collects information from the various EHDBs, merges the data into one database, and sends the updated information back to the field.

JOINT DIGITAL INCIDENT GATHERING SYSTEM C-20. The JDIGS database records all information and procedures used during joint EOD missions and consolidates those joint EOD incident/mission reports in one location. The JDIGS is primarily for EOD countermeasures development. Other uses of the database information include identifying EOD equipment performance trends, updating joint EOD technical manuals, providing training resources for EOD, providing enemy TTP information (technical characteristics and emplacement), and providing situational awareness to other EOD forces on or off the battlefield.

C-4

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01, C1

6 August 2008

Reporting, Recording, Displaying, and Tracking

C-21. JDIGS is a structured and searchable database that resides on the SIPRNET and allows access based upon preidentified and approved roles. Due to its usage of an enterprise data warehouse for data storage and Web services, JDIGS is flexible in data sharing and currently exchanges information with Headquarters Central Command (CENTCOM) and with several intelligence agencies via a software tool (Web-Enabled Timeline Analysis [WebTAS]). JDIGS has also demonstrated its ability to exchange EOD incident/mission data with an Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) theater significant activities reporting tool (the Combined Information Data Network Exchange [CIDNE]). Users of JDIGS can search and save/export search results in hypertext markup language (HTML) or spreadsheet formats for localized use. Geospatial mapping is also available for plotting EOD incident/mission data.

FUTURE DATABASE C-22. The Army is working toward a future, joint digital integrated EHDB that merges the current Army Battle Command System (ABCS) into an interoperable single system. The EHCC is a likely choice for the repository of this single system. C-23. Information would be reportable via the FBCB2, MCS-light, and ABCS systems. The reporting unit would populate the database directly, as opposed to through a specific command post (CP). C-24. The database would link into COP graphics simultaneously and be displayed in unit tactical operations centers on an EH overlay. The data could include minefield information, UXO locations, IED trend patterns, and so forth; and units could filter and tailor the information as required. The information could be used by CPs for various functions: predict EH information by S-2s and engineers, coordinate detection assets, plan and coordinate EOD and engineer neutralization and disposal capabilities, divert units to different routes to avoid hazards, prevent enemy emplacement of EHs through planned and coordinated combat patrols, and protect forces using the technical information in the database to synchronize CREW systems. C-25. The database would be extensive and expand beyond the current capabilities of the EHDB. As EOD and engineer units dispose of EHs, they would report the disposals using the same systems, and COP graphics would be automatically populated with the correct information displaying the removal of the EHs from routes and areas. The database will be able to communicate automatically with the JDIGS. Future databases may include JDIGS capabilities to migrate to a single EH system that is useful for all organizations (see Figure C-3).

6 August 2008

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01, C1

C-5

Appendix C

Figure C-3. Explosive Hazards Spot Report Flow

C-6

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01, C1

6 August 2008

Appendix D

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Considerations This appendix provides a description of the various types of IEDs and the emerging considerations in TTP and drills in support of planning considerations for IED defeat. It provides immediate action drills and risk mitigation and describes the MC LOC security.

TYPICAL IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE TYPES D-1. As previously mentioned, an IED is an improvised device which has been created to explode. Clever manipulations of inexpensive low-technology components often counter the coalition and U.S. forces’ high-tech countermeasures. The IED types and description shown are not the only IEDs that have been encountered, but give the reader an increased understanding of the variety of IEDs located worldwide.

COMMAND-WIRED IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE D-2. The command-wired IED (see Figure D-1) is initiated by a hard wire attached to some sort of power source, similar to that of the Claymore mine. The explosive is emplaced and then camouflaged to avoid detection. Depending on the amount of time used and the care taken in camouflaging techniques to emplace the device and run the wires, the wires may be visible to the convoy or patrol coming in contact with the system. D-3. The use of a command-wired IED mandates that the operator is physically attached to the explosive device in some manner. This type of IED is also frequently used in conjunction with aiming stakes to ensure accuracy.

Figure D-1. Command-Wired IED

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

D-1

Appendix D

SUICIDE IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE D-4. The suicide IED (see Figure D-2) is also known as a suicide bomber. The explosives are attached to a person. The person carrying the IED moves into kill range of the target and then initiates the explosives. This type of IED is often initiated with a plunger type trigger device or a reverse plunger device also known as a “deadman’s switch.” D-5. The reverse plunger device requires the carrier to maintain pressure on the trigger until the carrier is ready to detonate the explosives. This system is used so that even if the carrier is stopped by gunfire, the device will still detonate. These types of initiation systems have also been used with a small delay built into the trigger. The carrier can be shot and release the trigger, but the explosion will not occur for several seconds, giving the unsuspecting shooters time to walk up on the body of the carrier.

Figure D-2. Suicide IED

RADIO-CONTROLLED IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE D-6. The RCIED (see Figure D-3) is initiated electronically with a wireless method consisting of a transmitter and a receiver. Examples include a radio, cordless phone, or key fob (an electronic handheld device used for remote keyless entry systems using infrared with a required clear line-of-sight to function or using challenge-response authentication over RF which does not require line-of-sight). D-7. RCIEDs have been effectively used in many recent conflicts, including Palestine, the Balkans, Chechnya, Afghanistan, and Iraq (Operation Enduring Freedom [OEF], OIF, and Operation Desert Storm [ODS]). The threat uses either cheap, easy-to-assemble components to target military forces and civilians and/or expensive, more sophisticated technology to counter the coalition’s technically superior armored and nonarmored vehicles. They provide standoff and do not require the threat to commit forces.

D-2

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Considerations

Figure D-3. Radio-Controlled IED D-8. RCIEDs require an OP from which to time the remote detonation. The following apply: • The OP location is greatly dependent on the range of the remote device. • The OP location is highly dependent on line-of-sight. • Garage door openers have a range of less than 50 meters. • Wireless phones have greater ranges, but require line-of-sight. • Cellular telephones have greater ranges, but are highly dependent on relay towers or repeaters. D-9. Many situations involve secondary RCIEDs meant for vehicles stopped after the first RCIED detonates. An RCIED is typically used to stop a convoy, conduct an ambush, or detonate a secondary RCIED on a halted convoy.

VEHICLE-BORNE IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE D-10. A VBIED (Figure D-4 and Figure D-5, page D-4) is a vehicle filled with explosives. The vehicle may be driven or towed to a target. The vehicle may be either moving or static. The VBIED may be initiated in a variety of ways. The nature of the initiation device will depend on whether the initiator is remaining inside the vehicle. The initiation method of a VBIED should be spelled out in reports (for example, remote-controlled VBIED, command-wired VBIED, timed VBIED, or suicide VBIED).

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

D-3

Appendix D

Figure D-4. Explosive Laden Vehicle

Figure D-5. Vehicle-Borne IED

VICTIM-OPERATED IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE D-11. The victim-operated IED, also known as the victim-actuated IED, is initiated by actions of an unsuspecting person or, in some cases, by one willing to commit suicide. Examples of this type of initiation may be the use of tripwire, pressure plate, bait, or passive infrared sensor initiation. An example of the bait technique may include newly trained HN Soldiers and Marines on patrol who pick up a used AK-47 magazine attached to an explosive device. The victim-operated IED was placed in such a manner as to not be visible to the initiator, but deadly just the same. In Figure D-6, the electronic circuit is complete when the clothespin tripwire is pulled.

D-4

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Considerations

Figure D-6. Victim-Operated IED With a Tripwire D-12. Pressure plate or pressure switch devices initiate IEDs through the use of pressure exerted on a switch, either from a vehicle or a person. The triggers that target vehicles are typically larger and connected to larger amounts of explosive material than pressure plate-initiated IEDs targeting a person or foot patrol. IEDs using pressure plate-triggering devices may be found on any route that has frequent or routine vehicular or foot travel. D-13. Figure D-7, page D-6, is a diagram of a crude pressure switch. The two metal strips are insulated from one another by bits of rubber at each end. A wire from the battery is attached to one metal strip. A lead wire from the electric caps is attached to the other metal strip. The inner tube is used to weather proof and provide camouflage. When a vehicle drives over the pressure switch, it compresses the two metal contacts, causing them to touch, and completes the firing circuit.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

D-5

Appendix D

Figure D-7. Example Diagram of a Victim-Operated IED With a Pressure Plate D-14. Passive infrared sensors are electronic devices used to detect change produced by an infraredemitting source. Contrary to popular belief, passive infrared sensors do not have a red beam, visible with use of night vision or any other type of optical assistance devices, shining across the target area. A device which emits a beam would make the electronic device active versus passive. D-15. With a passive infrared system, the device is a detector not an emitter. The detector is set to detect rapid changes (for example, temperature changes) in the infrared spectrum. When changes are detected, for example, when a vehicle enters into the device’s “field of sight,” the system is triggered to function as designed. Explosives may be initiated by such a passive infrared sensor system. D-16. One example of a passive infrared sensor-initiated device seen in the Iraqi theater is an EFP (see Figure D-8 and Figure D-9). An EFP is an IED constructed from a pipe, fitted with a concave liner, usually made of copper (brass and steel have been noted, but not as frequently) because copper is denser and has a lower melting point. The acceleration and deformation of the metal causes it to melt and flow into a shaft which is also pushed to super high speed by the explosion. The small shaft of heavy molten metal moving at high speed forces tremendous energy into one small spot on the target. Upon detonation, the liner forms into a lethal projectile. A detonation charge causes the liner to form into a “hyper-velocity” projectile or “focused energy” projectile that is capable of penetrating armored vehicles. The triggerman may arm the passive infrared sensor by radio control if the radio control receiver is located outside the protective electronic countermeasure bubble and is connected to the passive infrared sensor by command wire.

D-6

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Considerations

Figure D-8. Simulation of a Penetrator Formation

Figure D-9. Example of an Explosively Formed Penetrator

IMMEDIATE ACTION DRILLS D-17. To properly respond when IEDs or suspect IEDs are encountered, units must plan, develop, and execute training to prevent or mitigate the potential effects that an IED may have on personnel and equipment. The training should incorporate immediate action drills that are synchronized with other unit battle drills. Immediate action drills may include the following activities: • Executing a counter ambush drill and immediately focus outward. The biggest mistake troops make is focusing inward towards the site of the IED. Obviously, some will have to focus inward. The unit needs to develop a battle drill to identify who provides security and who focuses inward. It cannot be by name, because the unit does not have the choice of whom the IED will target.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

D-7

Appendix D • • • • •

•

• • • •

• • •

Moving out of the kill zone (depending on the unit TTP), and seeking cover and concealment if stopped. Being prepared to maneuver against the enemy. Ensuring that Soldiers and Marines know and understand the ROE. Reporting contact with an IED using the EH SPOTREP. Establishing and maintaining 360 degree security, and watching for enemy and enemyassociated activities. For example, personnel fleeing with or without weapons; vehicles rapidly departing or entering the area; personnel with LRCTs, video recorders, or some type of remote device; small arms fire; and drive by shootings. Searching (in detail) for personnel that may command detonate the IED; this is paramount to support bomb maker targeting. Detaining/capturing these personnel is a priority, killing only when necessary and detaining all other suspect personnel. Searching the immediate safe area. Using 5- and 25-meter checks from positions and expanding search as time/tactical situation permits. Caring for the wounded or performing medical evacuation (MEDEVAC). Expecting additional attacks and checking the area for other IEDs. Securing suspected evidence. Evidence is those things that will help the intelligence community to identify the bomber or bomb maker. Evidence includes shrapnel, parts of detonation devices, and containers. Talking to local witnesses. Obtaining names, pictures, and locations of personnel for follow-up interviews. Giving locals contact information for reporting suspicious activity. Continuing the mission. Conducting a comprehensive AAR.

RISK MITIGATION FOR CONVOYS Note. These are broad generic suggestions. Refer to the most current convoy handbooks. D-18. The five golden protection rules for convoys are― • Rule 1. Be equipped to fight. • Rule 2. Understand the threat. • Rule 3. Know how to react to threat situations. • Rule 4. Know where help is. • Rule 5. Know how to ask for help. D-19. There are three types of convoys and different reasons why the enemy would hit them. They are― • Long haul (replacement forces). The enemy wants to initiate contact and try to get into the decision cycle first. • General support. These are huge convoys carrying food, water, and numerous pilferable items that the enemy would like to capture for financial gain. • Local (brigade support area to the unit). The enemy will try to capture equipment, slow down resupply operations (which slows down combat operations), and possibly continue to try and intimidate friendly forces to leave. D-20. Every convoy should be treated as a combat operation. Units must follow or develop tactical convoy SOPs. Before conducting convoy operations, units must consider the following: • Predictability. Do not set patterns. Patterns kill Soldiers and Marines; developing patterns gives the enemy what it’s looking for―a time and a place. • Contingency plans. Ensure that contingency plans are comprehensive. Remember that what works in peacetime may not work in war. Cover, at a minimum, procedures for―

D-8

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Considerations

Vehicle preparation, vehicle hardening, gear preparation, maps/smart packs, and load sheets. • A wreck, flat tire, stalled vehicle, damaged vehicle, and so on. Plan for self-recovery, to include alternate towing options (tow bars, tow straps, and locally fabricated chains). Rehearse vehicle recovery with wheeled vehicles on flat tires. • Debris removal. • Crowd control. Crowds quickly gather around disabled vehicles and accidents. They can loot cargo and remove or strip the vehicles. • EOF procedures. • Encountering a sniper (with or without casualties). • IEDs (predetonation and postdetonation). Decide whether to stop the convoy or continue moving if an IED is located. This will depend on if the IED was seen before the convoy entered through the kill zone or if the convoy was hit and the extent of vehicle damage. TLP and comprehensive rehearsals. Execute TLP and comprehensive rehearsals. Commanders should ensure that convoys are organized to fight at all times. Convoys must rehearse reaction drills frequently to be able to fight as a cohesive team. Communications. Ensure that― • A good communications plan for the convoy exists. • Every vehicle can communicate via a common method. Have a backup communications method. In dead zones (which can cover several miles), have a plan in case the convoy gets hit in one of those areas. • Everyone knows the combat network identification changes while moving through unit zones. • Everyone knows the frequencies for MEDEVAC and how to call it in. • Everyone knows how to call for fire and close air support (CAS). Medical considerations. Ensure that― • A plan for medical attention exists. • Everyone is trained on basic first aid. • Combat lifesavers (CLSs) or medics are in the convoy and their location is known by all. • Everyone knows the location of aid bags. • Aid bags are stocked. •

•

•

•

D-21. During convoy operations, units must― • Ensure that personnel wear all protective gear available, to include ballistic eye protection, goggles, Kevlar® helmets, body armor with plates, and hearing protection. Wear seatbelts when moving. During mounted movement, ensure that drivers, vehicle commanders, and gunners have as much of their body inside the vehicle as possible to reduce the possibility of being struck by shrapnel or being exposed to the initial blast. • Keep doors locked during movement to prevent vehicle occupants from being thrown from the vehicle during the initial blast or in the event of a vehicle rollover. • Keep windows down (unless windows are made of ballistic glass). Place polyester fragmentation retention film on windows if they are not made of ballistic glass. • Drive with the daytime lights off. Try to make them appear as regular vehicles during hours of darkness by limiting any unnecessary lighting or equipment. • Ensure that Soldiers and Marines who are not driving are alert for suspicious activity and prepared to respond. • Designate sectors of observation and fire. Ensure that a designated spotter uses binoculars during the daytime and thermal optics or night vision devices at nighttime. Try to use the same spotter whenever possible to increase the chances of noticing any changes on the route.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

D-9

Appendix D • • •

• • •

•

• •

Vary the separation distance between vehicles. Maintain an appropriate reaction time between vehicles. Consider the role of the vehicles in overwatch to support convoys. Drive at a safe/fast speed based on the leadership, Soldier or Marine experience, and METT-TC factors. Do not be a steady target that allows the enemy to successfully engage. Base a safe speed on factors such as vehicle type, weather, road conditions, time of day, and driver experience. Consider driving in the center of the road and staying on the hardball to increase security and standoff. Avoid potholes, drainage holes, manhole covers, and overpasses where possible. Be extra cautious at choke points. Pay attention to the flanks for possible IED and VBIED attacks if anything causes the convoy to stop. Stay alert for vehicle breakdowns, vehicles entering roads, bridges, traffic jams, sharp turns, and so forth. Prevent civilians and civilian vehicles from entering convoys. Consider placing signs on convoy vehicles in the native dialects to warn civilians and motorists to stay away from the convoy and that failure to do so may result in deadly force to be used against them (depending on the ROE). Execute the 5-meter check immediately upon stopping and the 25-meter check once the unit has been stopped for longer than 1 minute. Be prepared to execute near and far ambush drills and to fight and maneuver against the enemy.

D-22. There are several different types of attacks involving IEDs and VBIEDs. Examples of these include basic, change of traffic, and multiple IEDs (see Figures D-10 through D-12). Such attacks may be supported by direct and indirect fires as well as other obstacles to stop and canalize forces.

Figure D-10. Basic Attack

D-10

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Considerations

Figure D-11. Change of Traffic Attack

Figure D-12. Multiple IED Attack

MOBILITY CORRIDORS D-23. The MC is part of a layered and integrated security approach to LOC security. Layered security constitutes concentric rings that increase in survivability and response measures. The first ring (the center ring) is the ability of every convoy to defeat a Level I threat and to delay a Level II threat. The next ring (middle ring) provides the increased security/protection capability in support of the center ring activities, is capable of defeating Level I and Level II threats, and supports the defeat of Level III threats. The middle ring is also capable of integrating fires, CAS, MEDEVAC, safe havens, and vehicle removal/recovery operations in support of the center ring and central effort that is the MC concept. The final ring (the outer ring) is the final ring of protection and brings with it the ability to defeat all level of threats through the integration of all joint capabilities. D-24. An MC is a protected LOC that connects two support areas within the AO. Within the MC are main and alternate roads, railways, and/or inland waterway supply routes used to support operations. Within an AO, there is an MC network that consists of multiple MCs that connect intertheater APOD and SPOD; intra-theater APOE and APODs; corps support, distribution, and storage areas; division support, distribution, and storage areas; and BCT and RCT civil-military operations areas. While the support area is within the BCT’s and RCT’s AO and responsibility, the supporting MC is the responsibility of the division.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

D-11

Appendix D

The BCT and RCT are responsible for tactical LOC operations and security beyond the BCT and RCT support area. The width and depth of an MC will be dependent on METT-TC factors and the guidance of the combatant commanders. D-25. The establishment of an MC network is the result of applying multiple functions and establishing required command, control, and support relationships. The collective integration and synchronization of units, capabilities, and facilities will provide a comprehensive three-dimensional protection capability for the designated LOCs, the unit and convoy movements on the LOCs, and the units supporting LOC and movement operations. A fully developed MC will consist of MP units providing route regulation and enforcement, straggler and dislocated civilian control, area and route security, convoy escort, QRF, and logistical units conducting and managing movement control. Supporting functions include units and capabilities for vehicle recovery and storage, cargo transfer, refueling, road maintenance and repair, MC safe haven support facility construction and repair, CBRNE detection and response, aerial reconnaissance, and medical treatment and evacuation. D-26. The constitution of an MC and the required units and capabilities to support MC operations are not new to the Army and the USMC. The requirement to doctrinally codify a holistic, fully integrated and synchronized LOC and convoy protection system is new. The requirement to establish MC doctrine is based on the combination of, and the complexity resulting from, the following: • Asymmetrical OE. • Conducting threat-based operations with minimal regard for occupying terrain. • Combat forces by-passing up to company-size mechanized forces. • Combating new categories of threat forces. • Smaller stockpiles with an anticipatory “push” logistics system. • Conducting simultaneous major combat operations and stability operations. D-27. The establishment of an MC network and the allocation of resources to conduct MC protection for sustainment operations are command functions that must be synchronized with Army and USMC, joint, multinational, and HN forces supporting MC operations and the applicable movement control agencies. D-28. The MC concept provides a solution to current and future force requirements for ground LOC movement as it pertains to a comprehensive approach to increasing the survivability of land forces in the conduct of full spectrum operations. This concept provides for continuous support in keeping the MC secure and operational, thus directly increasing the mobility, survivability, sustainability, and responsiveness of combat enablers in support of all operational effort. Further refinement of this concept and the DOTMLPF recommendations is required to ensure that the best solution and overall success are achieved in support of our military forces.

D-12

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Appendix E

Specialized Equipment In general, IED area clearance requires a combination of systems to survey an area contaminated with IEDs. An initial survey determines the type and net explosive weight of munitions they expect to encounter in the area. Detection requires personnel and equipment (for example, Buffalo or AN/PSS-14) to inspect the area for possible IEDs, which are then neutralized by EOD personnel. Proofing involves verifying that all explosive material is removed. Due to the unconventional nature of IEDs, it is almost impossible to “proof” an area of IEDs. Area clearance operations are extremely deliberate and require commanders to thoroughly understand the threat presented by the type of munitions they expect to encounter and the capabilities and limitations of the available equipment as a framework to guide their area clearance operation. Thorough planning and attention to detail are paramount to ensure that Soldiers and Marines are kept safe. Note. Many of the vehicle descriptions and photos in this appendix were provided by DefenseUpdate, an online magazine.

INTERIM VEHICLE-MOUNTED MINE DETECTOR E-1. The complete Interim Vehicle-Mounted Mine Detector (IVMMD) System consists of one mine detection vehicle (referred to as the Meerkat), one towing or mine detection vehicle (referred to as the Husky), and three mine detection trailers (referred to as Duisendpoots). This kit comes with repair packs (referred to as “Red Packs”) which contain spare detection arrays and front and rear assemblies. Each unit receiving two or more IVMMDs will also receive a third repair pack, called a “Blue Pack.” This pack contains all of the major repair parts, such as axles, engines, and batteries. This system can clear single traffic routes at a rate of 85 kilometers (daylight only) per day when employed under optimal conditions as part of a combined arms team. Figure E-1, page E-2, shows a Meerkat, and Figure E-2, page E-2, shows a Husky with mine detection trailers.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

E-1

Appendix E

Figure E-1. Meerkat

Figure E-2. Husky With Mine Detection Trailer

BUFFALO E-2. The Buffalo (see Figure E-3) is a heavy blast-resistant vehicle (mine-resistant ambush protected vehicle, Category III) used for route clearance missions. The Buffalo protects the crew from the effects of blasts. The IVMMD and the Buffalo are highly effective. They are routinely used to sweep the shoulders of the route before movement. The Buffalo has an arm with mine detection capabilities, which is maneuvered by the vehicle operator from inside of the vehicle while it is moving (see Figure E-4). Soldiers and Marines use the hydraulic arm to search suspect areas along the route from inside the blast-protected vehicle.

E-2

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Specialized Equipment

Figure E-3. Buffalo

Figure E-4. Buffalo With the Clearing Arm Extended

CASSPIR E-3. The Casspir (see Figure E-5, page E-4) has been in use in South Africa for over 20 years. It is a fourwheeled armored vehicle used for transporting troops. It can hold a crew of two, plus 12 additional Soldiers or Marines and associated gear. The Casspir is unique in design, and provides for passive mine defense. The main body of the vehicle is raised aboveground, so that if a mine is detonated, the explosion is less likely to damage the crew compartment and kill the occupants. The vehicle is also armored for added mine safety as well as protection from small arms fire.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

E-3

Appendix E

Figure E-5. Casspir

MINE-PROTECTED VEHICLE–RG-31 E-4. The medium mine-protected vehicle (MPV) RG-31 (see Figure E-6) is a C-130 transportable medium blast-resistant transport vehicle. The system is used to transport combat and Combat Support (CS) personnel conducting route clearing. In addition to these missions, the medium MPV can be used for transporting very important persons (VIPs). To conduct a thorough route clearance, units must, as a minimum, employ the IVMMD, Buffalo, and medium MPV as a package.

Figure E-6. Medium Mine-Protected Vehicle–RG-31

E-4

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Specialized Equipment

MINE-PROTECTED ARMORED VEHICLE–RG-33L E-5. The RG-33L IED and mine-protected armored vehicle (see Figure E-7) can be configured as an infantry carrier, ambulance, C2, convoy escort, EOD, and other roles. The new RG-33L is an air transportable 6 by 6 MPV, incorporating a classic monocoque V-shaped hull design, similar to all modern MPVs. It uses a base armor protection against small-arms fire and mine attacks; panoramic windows using the transparent armor protection platform (TRAPP) transparent armor; and modular, mission configurable appliqué armor kits. E-6. The vehicle is equipped with a hydraulic ramp, a gunner's protection kit, a robotic arm for handling IEDs, survivability gear, and a dedicated space for equipment stowage. Survivability enhancements include provisions for modular add-on armor kits, TRAPP transparent armor that provides excellent visibility and improved situational awareness, and run-flat tires. The vehicle is recoverable by another RG-33L. E-7. The vehicle is equipped with multipositional mine-protected seating and air conditioning. Base armor protects the vehicle against medium machine gun or small arms fire and mine blasts at a level equal to or exceeding any fielded MPV. The platform is designed with a power train equipped to handle upgrades and enhancements. The vehicle features on-board exportable power for command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) and other mission equipment.

Figure E-7 Mine-Protected Armored Vehicle–RG-33L

COUGAR E-8. The Cougar (see Figure E-8, page E-6) hardened engineer vehicle is a multipurpose, armored, mineprotected 12-ton vehicle. The design uses a monocoque capsule which protects the driver and crew from small arms fire, mine blasts, and IEDs. Typical roles for the vehicle are mine-protected troop transport for security, stability, and peacekeeping missions; protected weapons platform; law enforcement special response vehicle; and an EOD and range clearance vehicle. The vehicle can accommodate 10 passengers in a 4 by 4 configuration and 16 passengers in a 6 by 6 configuration.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

E-5

Appendix E

Figure E-8. Cougar

HEAVY WHEELED ARMORED VEHICLE–GOLAN E-9. The Golan heavy wheeled armored vehicle (see Figure E-9) is a 15-ton armored wheeled troop carrier configured to accommodate 10 troops in a highly protected environment. The vehicle has three protection level configurations, all presenting the same physical silhouette. The vehicle uses an armored monocoque structure. The integrity of this structure provides the strength to absorb the deformations generated by mines and IED blasts. The V-shaped hull has a "floating floor" panel to mitigate the blast effects of mines. The vehicle has an effective armor suite to defeat small arms and shoulder-fired antitank rocket launcher threats, medium-size IEDs, 7-kilogram mines under the belly, and 14 kilograms under the wheels. E-10. Unlike vehicles using a COTS chassis, the Golan does not have a chassis at all. Instead, the 4 by 4 automotive system axles and suspensions link directly to the armored structure, which acts as a frame. This approach is similar to that used with tracked armored personnel carriers (APCs) and tanks. It retains good off-road mobility, and is particularly suitable for operations in dense urban terrain. E-11. The maximum protection level includes reactive modular armor tiles, while the medium and light levels are based on passive modular armor. Protection from antitank rockets (such as shoulder-fired antitank rocket launchers) can be provided by appliqué reactive armor modules or an active protection system which are "plug-in" add-ons to the basic design. Other plug-ins include IED defeat and counter sniper systems. The add-on reactive armor system utilizes the insensitive explosive reactive armor (I-ERA) tiles installed on the side walls. The I-ERA is based on the same technology provided for the U.S. Bradley infantry fighting vehicle. The reactive I-ERA add-on armor is an insensitive explosive known as low burn rate (LBR) or low flammability (LF2) that was approved by both the Israeli Defense Force and the U.S. Army. The vehicle can be equipped with remotely controlled weapon station mounting a machine gun, and optronic equipment, as well as the gunshot detection system.

E-6

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Specialized Equipment

Figure E-9. Heavy Wheeled Armored Vehicle–Golan

ARMORED SECURITY VEHICLE–ASV M-1117 E-12. The armored security vehicle (ASV) M-1117 (see Figure E-10, page E-8) is a highly mobile, survivable, and C-130 transportable, 4 by 4 wheeled vehicle. The vehicle uses modular, expandable, ceramic and composite appliqué armor to protect the front, rear, and sides of the crew compartment from armor-piercing ammunition. The ASV is lightweight and able to "roll-on/roll-off" from C-130 military transport aircraft in fully armored configuration. The vehicle offers mobility, agility, handling, and ride quality through the use of a four-wheel independent suspension system. The ASV M1117 is typically used for convoy protection and by combat observing and lasing teams. E-13. Additionally, the ASV offers defense from artillery shell fragments overhead and mine blasts under each wheel. The vehicle is fitted with a dual-weapon station which, as standard issue on U.S. Army ASVs, mounts a grenade launcher and machine gun. The weapon station enables the crew to load, reload, and clear gun jams under full armor protection. With minor modifications and appropriate outfitting, ASV variants can perform a wide variety of missions including scout, infantry personnel carrier, reconnaissance, command, and recovery. A future configuration of the ASV is the Armor Knight, M707.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

E-7

Appendix E

Figure E-10. Armored Security Vehicle–ASV M-1117

MINE-PROTECTED ARMORED DOZERS E-14. The mine-clearing/armor protection kit (MCAP) (see Figure E-11) includes all the necessary armor to protect the operator and critical components of D7G dozers from 7.62-millimeter armor-piercing ammunition and antipersonnel mine blast fragmentation. The kits are bolted and pinned to a bulldozer and the existing frame assemblies of track-type tractors and hydraulic excavators. Mine-clearing rakes can be attached to existing bulldozer blades, creating a 12-foot-wide path and a soil penetration depth of 12 to 18 inches. Both a light-soil and a heavy-soil blade are available. The MCAP is capable of mine and UXO clearing in uneven, lightly or heavily vegetated terrain.

Figure E-11. Mine-Clearing Armor Protection Dozer

E-8

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Specialized Equipment

E-15. The D-9R armored dozer (see Figure E-12) is another route or area clearance asset available to commanders for use in maneuver operations. The dozer is capable of removing abandoned vehicles or suspected VBIEDs from roadsides. Its armored plating can withstand up to .50-caliber ammunition and serves as a protective measure to its operators. The dozer is also effective in removing rubble and debris from roadsides, demolishing buildings, and breaching strong points or defensive positions.

Figure E-12. D-9R Armored Dozer

COUNTER RADIO-CONTROLLED IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE ELECTRONIC WARFARE E-16. CREW is a RF jammer, located on unit vehicles (tracked or wheeled) or manpacked, which preempts the detonation of an RCIED by disrupting the radio signal of the initiating device. In order for any CREW system to be effective, it must be programmed to jam the correct RCIED initiator signal frequency and be within range of the RCIED and the RCIED’s receiver. This will prevent the initiating RF signal from reaching the receiver of the explosive device. CREW is a protection family of systems, referred to as the Warlock family of systems, which is in theater now, with follow-on system improvements and new equipment in the pipeline. Because of the systems’ capability to jam RFs, commanders, EW officers, and staff elements must maintain close coordination. E-17. CREW provides 360 degree coverage around the system, as part of a dismounted, convoy, or fixed site overall protection plan. The SIPRNET-based convoy planning tool is designed to assist planners in determining interoperability issues and advantageous placement of the various CREW components within the convoy. E-18. The Army employs the Warlock family of systems, which is designed to eliminate or reduce the effects of IEDs and their employment in the WOT. These systems are employed in the forward combat areas during offensive, defensive, military operations in urban terrain, sustainment area logistical support, cantonment area security, and peacekeeping operations. Besides the Warlock family of systems, there are several other CREW systems used by other Services to reduce the effects of RCIEDs. Examples of these systems include, but are not limited to: Chameleon, Hunter, and Symphony (see Figure E-13, page E-10).

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

E-9

Appendix E

Figure E-13. Hunter E-19. These systems each target specific RF-dependent technologies and are often used as a suite of systems to defeat the entire spectrum of RCIEDs. Active systems are those which transmit continuously, while a reactive system scans the spectrum and transmits only when a specific frequency is detected. Regardless of whether RCIED defeat systems are employed to protect convoys, patrols (mounted and dismounted), or fixed facilities, the collective RCIED defeat capability is known as CREW. This first generation of CREW systems is referred to as CREW1. CREW1 systems included Red, Green, IED Countermeasure Equipment (ICE), modified IED countermeasure equipment (mICE), self-screening vehicle jammer (SSVJ), mobile multiband jammer (MMBJ), and Blue (see Figure E-14). E-20. CREW2/Duke is the second generation of CREW systems and consolidates the technical and operational capabilities of the CREW1 systems into a single, reconfigurable system. The first system to be developed and fielded as CREW2/Duke was a vehicle-mounted/fixed-site system (see Figure E-14). The second system to be developed and fielded will be the manwearable quick-reaction dismount (QRD) system.

E-10

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Specialized Equipment

Figure E-14. Warlock Family of CREW Systems Note. The ARAT SIPRNET Web site contains threat data reports and information on all CREW1/Warlock and CREW2/Duke systems, including manuals, TTP, frequently asked questions, trouble reports, and points of contact. To access— Step 1. The Web site can be located at . Step 2. To enter ARAT-SE, choose either TEXT or graphic user interface (GUI). Step 3. GUI is selected for this demonstration. From the menu on top, click Warlock. Step 4. Next, choose CREW/Warlock Web site. Step 5. The entire Warlock family of systems is found on top. Pick one to view: threat loads, manuals, and TTP. To view threat data, go to step 6. Step 6. From the menu, choose CREW info. Then choose threat reports to view threat data package reports and briefings.

ROBOTS E-21. Small robotic systems are the primary EOD tool for remote operations to render safe and dispose of IEDs. They are also used to provide Soldiers and Marines with a standoff capability to avoid unseen dangers, thus keeping Soldiers or Marines outside the blast radius of IEDs. E-22. Units will request EOD personnel to investigate suspected IEDs by using camera-carrying robotic platforms designed to convey real-time imagery to EOD personnel. These provide unit personnel a safe method of verifying that the device is an IED. Figure E-15, page E-12, shows an EOD robot.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

E-11

Appendix E

Figure E-15. EOD Robot

SPECIALIZED SEARCH DOGS E-23. To obtain the maximum value from the services of trained dogs, it is essential to have a sound understanding of the tactical situation and conditions best suited to their employment. Dogs, like the rest of the animal kingdom, are subject to outside influences that have a direct bearing on their behavior. Dogs can only be used after a careful appreciation of the tactical picture, climatic conditions, and the terrain has been made and found favorable. E-24. A specialized search dog (see Figure E-16) is trained for route and area, building (occupied, unoccupied, or derelict), and vehicle search. The specialized search dog searches for and indicates to its handler the presence of all firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other materials relating to bomb-making equipment or IEDs. Dog teams are capable of searching all types of urban and rural environments and can locate both fresh and long-term hides (mines and explosives) constructed of a variety of materials. Dogs are a quick and reliable method for checking an area. They can work at night, but adequate artificial light is required to enable the handler to see the dog working and the immediate surrounding area.

E-12

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Specialized Equipment

Figure E-16. Specialized Search Dogs E-25. Specialized search dog teams, when deployed correctly, can minimize the risk of life to friendly force personnel. They can be used when other forms of detection fail. The specialized search dog works off leash and out ahead of its handler, minimizing risk to its handler and other Soldiers and Marines on the mission. These dogs have a high degree of public acceptance since they are not attack-trained and are family friendly breeds (such as Labradors and Spaniels). The dogs are not influenced by factors that affect human opinions. They are bold, but not aggressive, and steady under gunfire. They are of limited use to search personnel. The dogs may tire during extended searches (if working 40 minutes each hour for about 6 hours). Much of their value is negative, that is, if they show no interest, there are unlikely to be any weapons or explosives in the search area. The specialized search dog will― • Search for firearms, ammunition, explosives, hides, and bomb-making equipment in― • Buildings that are occupied, unoccupied, or derelict. • Vehicles (cars, trucks, trains, ships, boats, or aircraft). • Open areas (fields, islands, woods, hedgerows, or embankments). • Route clearance (roads, tracks, or railways). • Check buildings after workmen have left. • Search AOs, such as vehicle checkpoints and helicopter landing zones. These dogs can be used to search buildings and areas immediately before VIP visits in-theater.

HANDHELD DETECTORS E-26. The AN/PSS-14 is a single-Soldier-operated handheld mine detector (see Figure E-17, page E-14) that integrates a state-of-the-art metal detector with compact GPR into a lightweight handheld system (about 11 pounds with batteries). Only one standard issue Army battery (BB-390A/U) is used to power the AN/PSS-14. The AN/PSS-14 is capable of detecting metallic and low-metallic antipersonnel and antitank mines in on-road and off-road conditions. Sensor fusion and sophisticated algorithms reduce the false alarm rate that current metal detectors experience in cluttered metal environments.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

E-13

Appendix E

Figure E-17. AN/PSS-14 Mine Detector E-27. Handheld explosive sniffers (see Figure E-18) draw air through a detector nozzle/valve, which determines the presence of several types of common explosive chemicals. Several of these detectors are reliable in detecting traces of explosives on packaging materials or even residue on individual’s hands or clothing. Several companies produce these detectors (handheld explosive sniffers and explosives residue detection sprays), which are available as COTS purchases.

Figure E-18. Handheld Explosive Sniffer

E-14

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Specialized Equipment

SEARCH KIT E-28. A wide variety of tools and equipment are available to assist in a search. The provision of the right tools and equipment enables searches to be conducted effectively, saves time, and minimizes damage to property. To ensure safety and efficiency, users must be trained on and practice the use of this type of equipment. E-29. The purchase of equipment should be considered far in advance of any search operation. Trial units must be given a great deal of notice to enable the acquisition of a cross section of materials, such as explosives and facilities and venues. E-30. Equipment is fallible and is only an aid to search. When possible, two different pieces of equipment that are based on different technologies should be used. E-31. Marking equipment includes a route-marking system (40 white markers or 20 red markers), a mine bonnet, and an antitamper security seal. Investigation equipment includes the following― • Explosive detection kit. • Handheld metal detector. • Extendable lit mirror. • Two extendable poles. • One with a small mirror. • One with a large mirror. • Mine probe. • Distance finder. • Nonmagnetic fork. • Nonmagnetic trowel. • Pruning saw. • Scrub cutter. • Two small flashlights. • Laser pointer. • Bore scope. • 17-piece bit set. • Cordless drill. E-32. Remote-access equipment includes the following (see Figure E-19, page E-16)― • 3.5-millimeter Kevlar line to include a― • Fifty-meter reel. • One hundred-meter reel. • Pulling handle. • Carabiners. Carabiners and related equipment include― • Two screw gates. • Five integral pullies. • Ten screw eye self taps. • Four pitons (two large and two small). • Hooks. Hooks required include― • Two single tangs. • Four double tangs. • Four 25-millmeter eyes.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

E-15

Appendix E • • • • •

Self-opening snatch block. Two self-locking grips. Two shock cords. Spring-loaded clamp. Two wire slings.

E-33. Access equipment includes a Biel Tool® and a panel remover. Refer to Figure E-19.

Figure E-19. Search Kit Equipment

E-16

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Appendix F

Training Expectations and Resources This section is a compilation of training information on IED defeat. It is imperative; however, that Soldiers and Marines at all levels understand that the listed expectations and resources are under constant development and refinement, based on the changes in the OE. As such, those listed in this appendix should be carefully reviewed when developing and executing training to ensure they are current, meet the commander’s intent, and support unit SOPs (see FM 3-24).

TRAINING EXPECTATIONS FROM THE FIELD F-1. The training strategy outlined in Table F-1, page F-3, and Table F-2, page F-6, shows key skills, activities, and tasks that the leader and commander must see performed to standard. Demonstration of those skills requires prioritizing requirements, allocating and providing the right resources, and timing specific training exercises to allow execution under relevant conditions. Paragraphs F-7 through F-11 refer to Table F-1. F-2. The column “Tactical Expectations” describes the tactical capabilities that theater missions, conditions, and threats demand of all units regardless of the type, function, or prewar doctrine. This does not replace unit functional requirements. For some combat arms Soldiers and Marines, unit expectations differ little from prewar doctrinal requirements. For many units, particularly support units and units assigned nonstandard missions, these expectations are different from prewar doctrinal assumptions and training conditions. At the collective levels, expectations include shifting of tactical responsibilities, which under prewar doctrine belonged to the corps or division levels, down to lower levels of command for planning and execution. F-3. The column “Tactical Techniques Required” describes the skills that subordinates must train on to effectively meet the tactical expectations. For example, the conditions in-theater will require all Soldiers and Marines to participate in patrols. It does not matter whether this is an infantry Soldier or Marine participating in a reconnaissance patrol, an artilleryman participating in a combat patrol, or a logistics Soldier or Marine participating in a base security patrol. To meet the tactical expectation for Soldiers and Marines to be able to patrol, they must have been trained in these skills before deployment. F-4. The column “Capabilities Required” describes the required minimum personnel or materiel capabilities necessary for effective training, to include predeployment training. In many cases, these specialized personnel or additional equipment are parts of a prewar MTOE of the unit or doctrinal expectations. Based on prewar equipment disposition for many units, these items are either low-density items, not yet fielded, or not available for predeployment training. However, execution of operations, techniques, and threats may require these additional capabilities. F-5. The column “Training Conditions” requires leaders to assess readiness to meet tactical expectations. Realistic training conditions are essential to closing the gap between predeployment training and theater expectations. Conditions and standards that are published in doctrinal manuals and combined arms training strategies may not be relevant to the expectations in-theater. For example, units experienced and conditioned by peacekeeping operations must be trained and conditioned for counterinsurgency operations because they are not the same. For most organizations, developing relevant, realistic training conditions requires reviewing and revising training resource allocations, peacetime range operations, and traditional branch or unit training strategies.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

F-1

Appendix F

F-6. The column “Enemy Tactics” describes the enemy tactics that Soldiers, Marines, and units must understand. Soldiers, Marines, and units require practice and experience applying the required tactical techniques and capabilities, under realistic conditions, for the focused purpose of defeating these enemy tactics and techniques. In training, opposing force (OPFOR) tactics are the most important aspect to emphasize. Specific techniques (types of IEDs or types of attacks) change very rapidly; however, enemy tactics (regardless of technique) typically remain relatively stable. Commanders must resist the temptation to chase the latest enemy technique during predeployment training and instead use enemy tactics to develop experience, adaptation, and aggressiveness in subordinates.

STAFF AND UNIT TRAINING F-7. Commanders should ensure that staffs are properly trained to conduct planning as discussed in Chapter 4. Planning becomes an important process during IED defeat operations. F-8. Unit training is a continuous process. Success comes from battle-focused training that emphasizes the training of essential warfighting tasks to standard. Units, leaders, and individuals train to standard on their assigned missions, first as an organic unit and then as an integrated component of a team. Their battle-focused training experience gives them the flexibility to continue training and adapting to the mission as it evolves. F-9. The commander’s responsibility is to focus on developing individual and collective training, not only mission-essential tasks. Visualizing the decisive effects is more important than simply listing all the MTP tasks and standards. The commander should― • Establish the relationship between doctrinal concepts, unit mission-related priorities, and physical demonstration of proficiency. • Describe the intent. Visualize the desired arrangement of battlefield activities and the competencies required to achieve it. • Establish personal measures for assessing organizational capability to meet requirements. • Provide multiechelon training exercises that develop and assess appropriate leader, staff, and unit training. • Arrange live-virtual-constructive (L-V-C) training to sustain proficiency and to expand an experience base for commanders, leaders, staffs, and units. • Design and resource exercise evaluations and situational training exercises to create opportunities to develop, observe, and assess combat proficiency. F-10. Senior commanders use training evaluations as one component of a feedback system. To keep the training system dynamic, they use feedback to determine the effectiveness of the planning, execution, and assessment portions of the training management cycle. These feedback systems allow the senior commander to make changes that lead to superior training results and to teach, coach, and mentor subordinate leaders. To be effective, this feedback flows between senior and subordinate headquarters, within each command echelon, and among a network of trainers that may cross several command lines. Table F-1 provides an example of training expectations at the various echelons. Table F-2 on pages F-6 through F-7 provides a summary of suggested critical tasks for collective training to support those training expectations.

F-2

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Training Expectations and Resources

Table F-1. Example Training Task List for Training Expectations From the Field

Tactical Leaders (Commanders, Staff Officers, and Senior NCOs)

Individual Soldiers and Marines in All MOSs

Description

Tactical Expectations What do the missions, conditions, and threats dictate that all units must have the capability to perform?

EH awareness and IED recognition Observation and reporting Individual patrol skills Actions on contact Urban movement– individual movement techniques and driving skills

Tactical Techniques Required What must commanders see their subordinates do to meet tactical expectations?

Capabilities Required

Training Conditions

Enemy Tactics

Additional nonstandard minimum capabilities required for effective training: organic/attached personnel or additional/new equipment fielding.

Must be trained and demonstrated under the conditions shown below.

Develop experience against the threats shown below.

Urban driving

Detection optics

EHs

IEDs–RCIED

Close quarters marksmanship

Simple IED marking

Ambush

Reporting procedures

Kidnapping

IEDs–with direct-fire ambush

Mounted live fire

Individual survivability equipment

Shoulder-fired antitank rocket launcher

IEDs–combined with kidnapping

Urban movement

IEDs–with civilians on the battlefield (COB)/HN forces

Urban live fire TLP CLS and casualty evacuation (CASEVAC)

Individual communications equipment Night vision devices

Theater culture Day/night operations

IEDs–VBIED

Observation and reporting

Crowds restrict movement and fires

Physical fitness and endurance

Mounted land navigation

Targeting of friendly patterns

Collect and pro cess information

TLP

Maintain offensive orientation Anticipate, prioritize, decide, adapt Delegate and multitask Disseminate information Organize and train subordinates Integrate new capabilities Lead forward

Drive-by shootings Drive intelligence development “nonstandard” missions

Use of commun ications equipment

Urban environment Decentralized operations Concurrent operations

IEDs–to isolate subunits

Simultaneous events “nondoctrinal” tasks

IEDs–to distract/deceive

Proactive decision making

IO targeting

IEDs–to cause casualties

Create training strategies

Continuous stress

IO targeting

Perform actions on contact

Use of translators Use of pattern analysis tools Use of SU tools

Negotiations Theater culture

IEDs–to protect supplies/workshops/ leaders Intimidation of HN forces

Persevere under pressure

IED–with attack on responders

Analyze friendly and enemy patterns

False information from locals

Execute missions aggressively

Mortar/rocket attacks on FOBs

Execution

21 September 2007

Attack to recon U.S. responses

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

F-3

Appendix F

Table F-1. Example Training Task List for Training Expectations From the Field Tactical Techniques Required

Tactical Expectations

Training Conditions

Enemy Tactics

IED recognition and reporting

Simple IED detection tools

IEDs

IEDs–RCIED

Secure movement

VBIEDs

Conduct actions on contact

Urban driving and navigation

Simple IED marking tools

Mines/UXO

IEDs–with direct-fire ambush

Conduct recon naissance patrols

CLS and CASEVAC

Reporting procedures

Close quarters marksmanship and mounted live fire

Survivability

Secure site

All Squad/Crew/Platoon in All Combined Arms Units

Capabilities Required

Raid Cordon and search Ambush

Communications

Indirect fire (mortars and rockets)

IEDs with kidnapping

Shoulder-fired antitank rocket launcher

IEDs–with COB/HN forces

IEDs–VBIED

Crowds to restrict movement/fires

Listening post

Sniper

Night operations

Ambush

TCP procedures

Kidnapping

Targeting friendly patterns

Entry control point (ECP) procedures

Urban movement

Drive-by shootings

Theater culture

Detainee procedures Vehicle/equipment recovery Organize/execute site/base security

C2

Breaching/clearing IEDs

Urban movement

TLP

Organize/execute convoy movements

Report

Marking/proofing IEDs

Antiaircraft attacks

Integrate attachments

Reporting/tracking

Bait/ambush

Integrate into another unit

Enhancing IED detection

HN security forces

Execute CASEVAC

Enhancing surveillance

Facility/base security "nondoctrinal" conditions

Performing longrange communications

Continuous operations

Organize/execute QRF

Company Level

Apply force discriminately Organize/execute reconnaissance patrols

QRF

Consolidate after attack

Functional task proficiency

Perform sustainment

Handle detainees

Control aviation support

Using translators effectively

Crowd/riot

Integration of replacements Theater culture

IEDs–to isolate a subunit IEDs–to distract/ deceive IEDs–to cause casualties/symbolic target IEDs to protect supplies/workshops /leaders Intimidation of HN security forces IED–with attack on responders Crowds–hostile demonstrations

Integrate replacements

False information from local sources

Organize/execute raids and ambushes

Mortar/rocket attacks on FOBs

Organize/execute cordon and search

F-4

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Training Expectations and Resources

Table F-1. Example Training Task List for Training Expectations From the Field Tactical Techniques Required

Tactical Expectations Execute information operations

Training Conditions

Long-range communications

Anticipate requirements

Long-range detection

Distributed capabilities

Translators

Simultaneous events

Clear/concise intel ligence summaries/ FRAGOs

Pattern analysis

IEDs–to bait response forces

Pattern analysis/ targeting

Reaction force

CA support

Continuous operations and sustainment

Reconnaissance

Organize shaping efforts

Functional task proficiency

Organic EOD capability

Situational uncertainty

Kidnap Soldier or Marine to create media event

Organize sustain ment operations

Contracting management

Integrate/allocate “nonstandard” capabilities

Track detainees

Collect/process/ report information

Aviation support

Detainee temporary hold capability

Extended distances

Enemy Tactics

C2 distributed operations

Organize civil and military efforts

Battalion and Brigade Levels

Capabilities Required

HN security forces "nondoctrinal" conditions Integration of replacements Special operations forces operating in AO

Transition quickly/ nonstandard missions

U.S./non-U.S. media in AO Contractors/local hires

Organize/execute replacement operations

Attacks to identify friendly patterns IEDs–to isolate ambush target

Antiaircraft attacks

VBIED against fixed facilities Rocket/mortar attack against fixed facilities Attacks against civilian, Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, and NGO targets Local-hire spies inside FOB Attacks against contractors, and local hires

Apply force discriminately

Division Level

Consequence management Plan/direct/ coordinate IO

Anticipate requirements

Geographic responsibility

Disseminate information

Coordinate/ resource civilmilitary operations

Adapt procedures quickly

Allocate resources to subordinates

Interagency coordination

Collect/develop/ disseminate intelligence

Distributed operations

Provide unity of effort/command Control MSRs Conduct consequence management Adapt/modify ROE

21 September 2007

Political advisors Long-range communications Dedicated security Joint, interagency, and multinational task organization

Contracting support

Plan/prepare/ execute/sustain/train Proactive decision making IO

Extended duration and operational environment Concurrent offensive and stability operations Multitask subordinates

External military influences Iraqi/tribal political conflicts Media pressure– U.S./non-U.S.

Simultaneous events

Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) priorities

Decentralized, unstable condition

International political issues/crises

Dedicated civil-military operations center

Joint, interagency, and multinational

Movement control

Integrate new capabilities

New/changing joint, interagency, and multinational priorities

Constant media information demands

Enemy tactical adaptation

Domestic political issues

Multiple/diverse/ disparate enemies

Media/VIP support Morale, welfare, and recreation requirements

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

F-5

Appendix F

Table F-2. Critical Tasks for Collective Training Supporting Collective Task 19-2-2171 Provide Antiterrorism and Force Protection 03-3-C201 Prepare for Operations Under CBRN Conditions 05-2-3092 Prepare for a Suspected VBIED/Suicide Bomber Attack

Supporting Individual Task None

Establish an ECP

19-4-4900 Establish Access Control Point (ACP) Operations 19-4-4901 Plan Access Control Operations

191-376-5151 Control Access to a Military Installation

191-378-5315 Supervise an Installation ACP 191-379-4430 Develop an Access Control Training Program

Establish a TCP

19-3-1202 Conduct Route Regulation Enforcement 19-2-2401 Supervise the Establishment of Roadblocks and Checkpoints

191-377-4202 Supervise the Establishment and Operation of a TCP

19-1-1201 Prepare Traffic Control Plan 19-2-1202 Supervise Route Regulation Enforcement

Conduct ECP Procedures

19-4-4900 Establish ACP Operations 19-4-4901 Plan Access Control Operations

None

191-377-4214 Supervise Emergency Entrance and Exit Procedures 191-379-4435 Inspect an ACP

Conduct TCP Procedures

19-3-1202 Conduct Route Regulation Enforcement 19-2-2401 Supervise the Establishment of Roadblocks and Checkpoints

191-376-4105 Conduct TCP Procedures

19-1-1201 Prepare Traffic Control Plan 19-2-1202 Supervise Route Regulation Enforcement

Search Vehicles, Personnel, and Equipment

19-4-4900 Establish ACP Operations 19-4-4901 Plan Access Control Operations

191-376-5115 Search a Person 191-376-5121 Search a Building 191-376-5122 Search a Vehicle for Explosive Devices or Prohibited Items at an Installation ACP

191-378-5308 Supervise Search for an Individual

Operate a QRF

19-3-2201 Conduct Response Force Operations

None

19-2-2201 Direct Response Force Operations

Critical/Collective Task Employ the Appropriate Protection Measures

F-6

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

Leader Task 05-1-0035 Control a Base in a Base Cluster 05-6-0068 Conduct Cluster Operations

21 September 2007

Training Expectations and Resources

Table F-2. Critical Tasks for Collective Training Supporting Collective Task 19-3-2007 Conduct Convoy Security Operations 05-1-1006 Prepare for Ground Emplaced IED Defeat Operations Prior to Movement 55-2-4003 Conduct Convoy Movement

Supporting Individual Task None

React to a Possible IED (No Detonation)

05-2-3091 React to a Possible GroundEmplaced IED

191-378-5310 Supervise First Response to a Crisis Incident

None

React to an IED Attack

None

None

191-378-5310 Supervise First Response to a Crisis Incident

Establish a Cordon

19-3-2206 Conduct a Cordon and Search

None

19-2-2206 Supervise Cordon and Search Operations 191-377-4203 Supervise the Establishment and Operation of a Roadblock/ Checkpoint 191-379-4402 Plan Roadblocks and Checkpoints

Establish a Media Control Point

19-1-D618 Interact with the Media in the AO 19-2-6018 Support Media in the AO

None

None

Coordinate and Supervise a Recovery Operation

19-3-2012 Support Area Damage Control Operations

None

19-2-2012 Supervise Area Damage Control Operations

Critical/Collective Task Plan a Convoy Movement

Leader Task 19-2-2004 Supervise Convoy Security 191-379-4407 Plan Convoy Security Operations

TASKS INDIVIDUAL TASKS F-11. Individual tasks available on the Reimer Digital Library at include― • Individual Task 052-192-1270. React to a Possible Improvised Explosive Device. • Individual Task 052-192-1271. Identify Visual Indicators of an Improvised Explosive Device. • Individual Task 052-192-3261. React to an Improvised Explosive Device Attack. • Individual Task 052-192-3262. Prepare for an Improvised Explosive Device Threat Prior to Movement.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

F-7

Appendix F

F-12. Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) and IED TF/staff articles are available at and include― • Focused Intelligence. • Understanding the Enemy. • What Does a Commander Owe the Staff. • Training Strategy. • Training Strategy Narrative. F-13. Leader related articles available from CALL/IED TF at include― • Conducting Realistic Training. • Convoys Are Combat. • Fundamentals of Warfighting. • Terrorist and You.

COLLECTIVE TASKS F-14. Collective tasks available on the Reimer Digital Library at include― • Collective Task 05-1-1006, Prepare for Ground-Emplaced Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Operations Prior to Movement. • Collective Task 05-2-3091, React to a Possible Ground-Emplaced Improvised Explosive Device, Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device, Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device, or Person-Borne Improvised Explosive Device. • Collective Task 05-2-3092, Prepare for a Suspected Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device/Person-Borne Improvised Explosive Device Attack. F-15. CALL products available from CALL/IED TF/articles at include― • Newsletters 1 through 21, Iraq; 1 through 3 Afghanistan. • Various articles relating to IEDs, convoys, and so on. • Support to deploying units. • TTP, company, battalion, and brigade staff briefings. • Warfighting, OIF, and up-to-date articles of OIF and OEF. F-16. Training support packages (TSPs) available on the Reimer Digital Library, commandant approved training, at include― • TSP 052-21B10D020, Detect Explosive-Hazard Indicators by Visual Means, 23 July 2004. • TSP 071-T-1003, Secure a Route, 7 March 2003 (Geared to Bosnia, but presents valid points for OIF and OEF). • TSP 071-T-3412, Force Protection, 7 March 2003. • TSP 093-401-5050, React to a Possible Improvised Explosive Device, 21 May 2004. • TSP 159-T-0001, Overview to a Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, 12 October 2004. • TSP 159-O-0301, Opposing Force: Paramilitary and Nonmilitary Organizations and Tactics, 1 June 2003. • TSP 551-Z-001, Convoy Survivability, Version 1.8, 14 December 2006. • TSP 551-Z-0001-EX, Convoy Live Fire Exercise, Version 1.1, 27 August 2004.

F-8

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Training Expectations and Resources

F-17. Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana, situation training exercise training and evaluation outlines include― • Conduct Cordon and Search in a Built-up Area. • Conduct Patrol Operations. • Conduct Urban Area Reconnaissance. • Establish Checkpoints or Roadblocks. • Conduct a Convoy Escort. • Conduct a Route Reconnaissance. • React to Civil Disturbance Operations. • Secure Routes. • React to a Sniper. • Search a Building.

TRAINING AIDS F-18. GTA, CJTF-7, and multinational corps IED products available from CALL/IED TF/training at include― • CJTF-7, Operation Enduring Freedom, Improvised Explosive Device Handbook, May 2004. • CJTF-7, Operation Enduring Freedom Smart Card 1, Report Procedures, 10 January 2004. • CJTF-7, Operation Enduring Freedom Smart Card 2, Convoy Operations (Logistics), January 2004. • CJTF-7, Operation Enduring Freedom Smart Card 3, Convoy Operations (Combat), 10 January 2004. • CJTF-7, Operation Enduring Freedom Smart Card 4, Improvised Explosive Device and Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device Threat, 10 January 2004. • CJTF-7, Operation Enduring Freedom Smart Card 5, Vehicle Search Techniques, 5 January 2004. • CJTF-7, Multinational Corps Improvised Explosive Device Smart Cards, 27 October 2004. • GTA 05-10-044, Mine Awareness Stop, Access, Note, Draw Back, and Inform (SANDI), 1 May 1999. • GTA 07-01-038, Infantry Leader’s Reference Card, January 1995. • GTA 90-01-001, Improvised Explosive Device and Vehicular-Borne Improvised Explosive Device Smart Card, 20 May 2004. • GTA 90-10-047, Joint Counter Radio-Controlled IED Electronic-Warfare Handbook, 15 March 2007. • GTA 09-12-001, Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Procedures, 3 January 1992. • GTA 90-01-003, Vehicle Search Techniques Smart Card, 6 August 2004. • GTA 90-01-004, Logistics Convoy Operations Smart Card, 1 September 2004. F-19. A video available on the Reimer Digital Library at is television tape (TVT) 5-159. Improvised Explosive Device Awareness. 1 August 2004. F-20. IED simulators available from USAES include Training Aids for Possible Improvised Explosive Devices at .

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

F-9

Appendix F

REFERENCES F-21. SIPRNET Web sites include― • 4th Infantry Division: . • 82d Infantry Division: . • CALL Web site: . • CENTCOM: . • CEXC: . • DA Deputy Program Manager:

.

• DA IED TF: . • DIA: . • Joint EOD Technical Support Center: . • Joint IED Defeat TF: . • Joint Counter Radio-Controlled IED Electronic Warfare:

or .

• Multinational Corps−Iraq (MNC−I): . • MNC−I EHCC: . • NGIC: . • NGIC Energetics: . • U.S. Army INSCOM IED Threat:

.

F-22. The CALL NIPRNET Web site is (unclassified) or (restricted) and includes the following handbooks― • CALL/IED TF/Training, Convoy Leader Handbook Revision V, 15 September 2004. • CALL Handbook 03-06, Tactical Convoy Operations, March 2003. • CALL Handbook 03-31, Route Clearance, November 2003. • CALL Handbook 03-34, Mission Rehearsal Exercise, December 2003. • CALL Handbook 03-35, Operation Enduring Freedom II, December 2003. • CALL Handbook 04-14, Effects-Based Operations Brigade to Company Level, July 2004. • CALL Handbook 04-16, Cordon and Search, July 2004. • CALL Handbook 04-24, USSOCOM Combat Convoy Handbook, October 2004. • CALL Handbook 04-27, Convoy Leader Training Volume II, November 2004. • CALL Handbook 05-06, Operation Enduring Freedom III, January 2005. • CALL Handbook 05-11, Ranger Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, February 2005. • CALL Handbook 05-19, Effect-Based Approach to Military Operations, May 2005. • CALL Handbook 05-25, Leaders Guide to Army Aviation Command and Control (A2C2) at Brigade and Below, June 2005. • CALL Handbook 06-15, Traffic Control Point Operations, March 2006. • CALL Handbook 06-17, Detainee Operations at the Point of Capture, May 2006. • CALL Handbook 06-18, Tactical Combat Casualty Care Handbook, April 2006. • CALL Handbook 06-31, Unarmored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), August 2006. • CALL Handbook 06-32, Route Clearance Handbook, September 2006.

F-10

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Training Expectations and Resources z z

CALL Handbook 07-06, Southern Afghanistan Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations, November 2006. CALL Handbook 07-15, The First 100 Days, January 2007.

F-23. References available from the Army Publishing Directorate at include― z FM 2-0, Intelligence, 17 May 2004. z FM 2-22.3, Human Intelligence Collector Operations, 6 September 2006. z FM 2-22.401, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Technical Intelligence Operations, 6 September 2006. z FM 3-07, Stability Operations and Support Operations, 20 February 2003. z FM 3-13, Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, 28 November 2003. z FM 3-34/MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, 15 December 2006. z FM 3-34.210, Explosive Hazards Operations, 27 March 2007. z FM 3-90, Tactics, July 2001. z FM 3-100.38/MCRP 3-17.2B/NTTP 3-02.4.1 (Rev A)/AFTTP (1) 3-2.12, Multi-Service Procedures for Unexploded Ordnance, 23 August 2001. z FM 4-30.16, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Multi-Service Procedures for Explosive Ordnance Disposal in a Joint Environment, 15 February 2001. z FM 4-30.51/MCRP 3-17.2A, Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Procedures, 13 July 2006. z FM 34-54, Technical Intelligence, 30 January 1998. z FM 55-30, Army Motor Transport Units and Operations, 27 June 1997. z FMI 4-30.50, Modular Explosive Ordnance Disposal Operations, 31 July 2006. z TC 9-21-01, Soldiers Improvised Explosive Device Awareness Guide Iraq and Afghanistan Theaters of Operation, May 2004. z TC 20-32-3, Foreign Mine Handbook (Balkan States), 15 August 1997. z TC 20-32-4, Foreign Mine Handbook (Asia), 15 August 1997. z TC 20-32-5, Commander’s Reference Guide: Land Mine and Explosive Hazards (Iraq), February 2003. F-24. Joint Publications can be found at . Media CDs available at include― z Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Task Force Field Team Products. z Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Task Force Train the Trainer. z Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Task Force Training Version 2.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

F-11

Appendix F

COURSES F-25. Courses available from CEHC at include― • Advanced Search Course, 3 weeks. • Combat Search, 1 week. • Route Reconnaissance and Clearance Course–Operator (R2C2-O), 2 weeks. • Route Reconnaissance and Clearance Course–Maintainer (R2C2-M), 1 week. • Route Reconnaissance and Clearance Course–Sapper (R2C2-S), 2 weeks. • IED Defeat Train the Trainer (IEDD-T3), 2.5 days. • Area Clearance Course (ACC). • Counter Explosive Hazards Planning (CEHC-P). F-26. Courses available for the Ordnance Munitions and Electronic Maintenance School (OMEMS) are located at . The primary OMEMS course is 2E-F231/030-F14. F-27. Courses available on the Reimer Digital Library at include the 553G-NG0021-A553 D01, Virtual Mission Preparation Course Conduct Escort of a Convoy, 8 June 2004. F-28. Computer based courses for operator .

F-12

and

leader

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

CREW

training

are

located

at

21 September 2007

Source Notes

ix

“This is not a new war…”: General Peter J. Schoomaker, Arrival Message, 1 August 2003.

[Online]. Available: .

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

Source Notes-1

This page is intentionally left blank.

Glossary

SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 3-D 5-Cs

distance, direction, and description confirm, clear, cordon, check, and control

AA

avenue of approach

AAR

after-action review

ABCS

Army Battle Command System

ACC

Area Clearance Course

ACE

assistant corps engineer

ACP

access control point

AEODPS AFTTP AKA

Automated Explosive Ordnance Disposal Publication System Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures also known as

AM

ante meridiem (period between midnight and noon)

AO

area of operations

APC

armored personnel carriers

APOD

aerial port of debarkation

APOE

aerial port of embarkation

Apr ARAT ART AS ASCOPE ASV ATTN Aug AWG

April Army Reprogramming Analysis Team Army tactical task areas and structures areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events armored security vehicle attention August Asymmetric Warfare Group

BCT

brigade combat team

BDA

battle damage assessment

Bde C C2

brigade capabilities command and control

C4I

command, control, comminications, computers, and intelligence

CA

civil affairs

CALL CAS CASEVAC CB

21 September 2007

Center for Army Lessons Learned close air support casualty evacuation chemical and biological

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

Glossary-1

Glossary

CBIRF

Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (United States Marine Corps)

CBRN

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear

CBRNE CCIR CD

commander’s critical information requirement compact disk

CDR

commander

CEA

captured enemy ammunition

CEHC CEHC-P CENTCOM CEXC CI CIDNE CJTF CLS CMEC

Counter Explosive Hazards Center Counter Explosive Hazards Planning Central Command Combined Explosives Exploitation Cell counterintelligence Combined Information Data Network Exchange combined joint task force combat lifesaver Captured Material Exploitation Center

COA

course of action

COB

civilians on the battlefield

CONUS COP COTS CP CPA CREW CRM

continental United States common operational picture commercial off-the-shelf command post Coalition Provisional Authority counter radio-controlled improvised explosive device electronic warfare composite risk management

CS

combat support

CT

counterterrorism

D3A

decide, detect, deliver, and assess

DA

Department of the Army

DC

District of Columbia

DD

doctrine division

DIA

Defense Intelligence Agency

DNA

deoxyribonucleic acid

DOD

Department of Defense

DOTMLPF

doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities

DTG

date-time group

EA

electronic attack

ECOA ECP

Glossary-2

chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive

enemy course of action entry control point

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Glossary

EEFI EFP EH

essential elements of friendly information

explosively formed penetrator

explosive hazards

EHAT

explosive hazards awareness training

EHCC

explosive hazards coordination cell

EHDB

explosive hazards database

EHT EOCA

explosive hazards team explosive ordnance clearing agent

EOD

explosive ordnance disposal

EOF

escalation of force

EP

electronic protection

ERW

explosive remnants of war

ES

electronic-warfare support

ESV

engineer support vehicle

EU

Europe

EW

electronic warfare

EWCC EWO FBCB2 Feb FFIR FM

electronic warfare coordination cell

electronic-warfare officer

Force XXI battle command-brigade and below

February

friendly force information requirements

field manual

FMI

field manual interim

FOB

forward operating base

FORSCOM FRAGO freq Fri ft

United States Army Forces Command

fragmentary order

frequency

Friday

foot

G-2

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence

G-3

Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations and Plans

G-6

Assistant Chief of Staff, Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Operations

GEOINT GICM

geospatial intelligence

Moroccan Islamic combatant group

GMFDB

global minefield database

GPR

ground-penetrating radar

GTA

graphic training aid

GUI

graphic user interface

HN HPT

21 September 2007

host nation

high-payoff target

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

Glossary-3

Glossary

HQ HTML HUMINT

HyperText Markup Language human intelligence

HVT

high-value target

Hwy

highway

I&W

indications and warnings

ICD

interface control document

ICE

improvised explosive device countermeasure equipment

ICP

incident control point

IED

improvised explosive device

I-ERA IEDD-T3 IEW IMINT INSCOM IO IPB IR

insensitive explosive reactive armor IED Defeat Train the Trainer Intelligence and Electronic Warfare imagery intelligence United States Army Intelligence and Security Command information operations intelligence preparation of the battlefield information requirement

ISM

intelligence synchronization matrix

ISR

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

IVMMD IVO

interim vehicle-mounted mine detector in vicinity of

J-2

intelligence staff section

J-3

operations staff section

J-7

engineering staff section

Jan

January

JDIGS JIEDDO JOA JP JRFL JTF

Joint Digital Incident Gathering System Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization joint operations area joint publication joint restricted frequency list joint task force

Jul

July

Jun

June

km

kilometer

L-V-C

live-virtual-constructive

LBR

low burn rate

LF2

low flammability

LOC

LRCT

Glossary-4

headquarters

line of communications long-range cordless telephone

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Glossary

LTIOV LZ m

latest time the information is of value landing zone meter

Mar

March

mm

millimeter

MANSCEN MASINT MC

Maneuver Support Center measures and signatures intelligence mobility corridor

MCAP

mine clearing/armor protection kit

MCIP

Marine Corps interim publication

MCRP

Marine Corps reference publication

MCS

manuever control system

MCT

Marine Corps task

MCWL

Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory

MCWP

Marine Corps warfighting publication

MDMP

military decision-making process

MEDEVAC MEOICC METT-TC MI mICE min

medical evacuation Mine and Explosive Ordnance Information and Coordination Center mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations military intelligence modified improvised explosive device countermeasure equipment minimum

MIRC

Military Intelligence Reserve Command

MMBJ

mobile multiband jammer

MMPV

medium mine-protected vehicle

MNC–I

Multinational Corps–Iraq

MPCV

mine-protected clearance vehicle

Mon MP

Monday military police

MPV

mine-protected vehicle

MRE

meals, ready-to-eat

MSR

main supply route

MTOE MTP N NAI NCO NGIC NGO NIPRNET

21 September 2007

modified table of organization and equipment mission training plan North named area of interest noncommissioned officer National Ground Intelligence Center nongovernmental organization Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

Glossary-5

Glossary

NMAA No. NTTP OAKOC OCONUS Oct

number Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment outside the continental United States October

ODS

Operation Desert Storm

OE

operational environment

OEF

Operation Enduring Freedom

OIF

Operation Iraqi Freedom

OMEMS OP OPE

Ordnance Munitions and Electronic Maintenance School observation post organizations, people, and events

OPFOR

opposing force

OPORD

operation order

OSINT OPTEMPO PBIED

open source intelligence operating tempo person-borne improvised explosive device

PCI

precombat inspection

PID

positive identification

PIO

police intelligence operations

PIR

priority information requirement

PM

post meridiem (period from noon to midnight)

PMESII-PT

political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information, physical environment, and time

PSYOP

psychological operations

QRD

quick-reaction dismount

QRF

quick-reaction force

R&D

research and development

R2C2-M

Route Reconnaissance and Clearance Course–Maintenance

R2C2-O

Route Reconnaissance and Clearance Course–Operator

R2C2-S

Route Reconnaissance and Clearance Course–Sapper

RCIED

radio-controlled improvised explosive device

RCT RDSP REF RF RFI ROE RP

Glossary-6

National Mine Action Authority

regimental combat team rapid decision-making and synchronization process Rapid Equipping Force radio frequency request for information rules of engagement release point

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Glossary

RSO&I

reception, staging, onward movement, and integration

S-2

intelligence staff officer

S-3

operations staff officer

S-6

command, control, communications, and computer operations officer

SAF SANDI

small arms fire stop, access, note, draw back, and inform

Sat

Saturday

SE

South East

Sep

September

S.F.P.

Students for Peace

SIGINT

signals intelligence

SIM SIPRNET SIR SME

simulation Secure Internet Protocol Router Network specific information requirement subject matter expert

SMUD

standoff munitions disruption

SOP

standing operating procedure

SOSRA SP

suppress, obscure, secure, reduce, and assault start point

SPOD

sea port of debarkation

SPOE

sea port of embarkation

SPOTREP

spot report

SRSG

senior resource steering group

SSVJ

self-screening vehicle jammer

ST STANAG SU

special text Standardization Agreement situational understanding

Sun

Sunday

TA

threat assessment

TC

training circular

TCP

traffic control point

TDA

tactical decision aid

TECHINT TEU TF

technical intelligence technical escort unit task force

Thu

Thursday

Thur

Thursday

TIC

toxic industrial chemical

TLP

troop-leading procedures

TNT

trinitrotoluene

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

Glossary-7

Glossary

TRADOC TRAPP TSP

United States Army Training and Doctrine Command transparent armor protection platform training support package

TSWG

Technical Support Working Group

TTP

tactics, techniques, and procedures

Tue

Tuesday

TVT

television tape

UAS

unmanned aircraft system

U.S.

United States

USACHPPM USAES USAMC USMC USS USSOCOM UXO VA VBIED VIP VMMD

United States Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventative Medicine United States Army Engineer School United States Army Materiel Command United States Marine Corps United States ship United States Special Operations Command unexploded explosive ordnance vulnerability assessment vehicle-borne improvised explosive device very important person vehicle-mounted mine detector

WARNO

warning order

WebTAS

Web-Enabled Timeline Analysis

Wed

Wednesday

WFF

warfighting function

WIT

weapons intelligence team

WMD

weapons of mass destruction

WOT

war on terrorism

WTI

weapons technical intelligence

www

world wide web

SECTION II – TERMS area clearance In land operations, the detection and if found, the identification, marking and neutralization, destruction, or removal of mines or other explosive ordnance, improvised explosive devices, and booby traps in a defined area to allow a military operation to continue with reduced risk. (FM 3-34.2)

Glossary-8

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

Glossary

assured mobility Actions that give the force commander the ability to maneuver where and when he desires without interruption or delay to achieve the mission. (FM 3-34) booby trap (DOD) An explosive or nonexplosive device or other material, deliberately placed to cause casualties when an apparently harmless object is disturbed or a normally safe act is performed. (JP 1-02) captured enemy ammunition Captured enemy ammunition is all ammunition products and components produced for or used by a foreign force that is hostile to the United States (that is or was engaged in combat against the United States) in the custody of a United States military force or under the control of a Department of Defense component. The term includes confined gaseous, liquid and solid propellants, explosives, pyrotechnics, chemical and riot-control agents, smokes and incendiaries (including bulk explosives), chemical warfare agents, chemical munitions, rockets, guided and ballistic missiles, bombs, warheads, mortar rounds, artillery ammunition, small arms ammunition, grenades, mines, torpedoes, depth charges, cluster munitions and dispensers, demolition charges, and devices and components of the above. Also called CEA. (FM 3-34.210) clear (DOD) 1. To approve or authorize, or obtain approval or authorization for: a. a person or persons with regard to their actions, movements, duties, etc.; b. an object or group of objects, as equipment or supplies, with regard to quality, quantity, purpose, movement, disposition, etc.; and c. a request, with regard to correctness of form, validity, etc. 2. To give one or more aircraft a clearance. 3. To give a person a security clearance. 4. To fly over an obstacle without touching it. 5. To pass a designated point, line, or object. The end of a column must pass the designated feature before the latter is cleared. 6. a. To operate a gun so as to unload it or make certain no ammunition remains; and b. to free a gun of stoppages. 7. To clear an engine; to open the throttle of an idling engine to free it from carbon. 8. To clear the air to gain either temporary or permanent air superiority or control in a given sector. (Army) 1. A tactical mission task that requires the commander to remove all enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance in an assigned area. (FM 3-90) 2. To eliminate transmissions on a tactical radio net in order to allow a higher-precedence transmission to occur. (FM 11-32) 3. The total elimination or neutralization of an obstacle that is usually performed by followon engineers and is not done under fire. (FM 3-34.2) composite risk management The Army’s primary decision making process for identifying hazards and controlling risks across the full spectrum of Army missions, functions, operations, and activities. (FM 5-19) defeat (Army) A tactical mission task that occurs when an enemy force has temporarily or permanently lost the physical means or the will to fight. The defeated force’s commander is unwilling or unable to pursue his adopted course of action, thereby yielding to the friendly commander’s will, and can no longer interfere to a significant degree with the actions of friendly forces. Defeat can result from the use of force or the threat of its use. (FM 3-90) explosive hazards An explosive hazards is any hazard containing an explosive component. All explosive hazards currently encountered on the battlefield can be broken down into five categories: unexploded explosive ordnance. booby traps, improvised explosive devices, captured enemy ammunition, and bulk explosives. (FM 3-34.210) explosive ordnance (DOD) All munitions containing explosives, nuclear fission or fusion materials, and biological and chemical agents. This includes bombs and warheads; guided and ballistic missiles; artillery, mortar, rocket, and small arms ammunition; all mines, torpedoes, and depth charges; demolition charges;

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

Glossary-9

Glossary

pyrotechnics; clusters and dispensers; cartridge and propellant actuated devices; electro-explosive devices; clandestine and IEDs; and all similar or related items or components explosive in nature. (JP 1-02) improvised explosive device (DOD) A device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract. It may incorporate military stores, but is normally devised from nonmilitary components. (JP 3-07.2) military search The management and application of systematic procedures and appropriate detection equipment to locate specified targets in support of military operations. Specified targets include people, information, and material resources employed by an adversary. (FM 3-34.210) neutralize (DOD) 1. As applies to military operations, to render ineffective or unusable. 2. To render enemy personnel or material incapable of interfering with a particular operation. See FM 3-90. 3. To render safe mines, bombs, missiles, and booby traps. See FM 3-34.210. 4. To make harmless anything contaminated with a chemical agent. (FM 3-90) operational environment (DOD) A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 1-02) render safe procedures (DOD) Those particular courses or modes of action taken by explosive ordnance personnel for access to, diagnosis, rendering safe, recovery, and final disposal of explosive ordnance or any hazardous material associated with an explosive ordnance incident. The explosive ordnance procedures involving the application of special explosive ordnance methods and tools to provide for the interruption of functions or separation of essential components of unexploded explosive ordnance to prevent an unacceptable detonation. (JP 1-02) route clearance In land operations, the detection and if found, the identification, marking, neutralization, destruction or removal of explosive hazards and other obstacles along a defined route to allow a military operation to continue with reduced risk. (FM 3-34.2) targeting The process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking account of operational requirements and capabilities. (JP 3-0) unexploded explosive ordnance; unexploded ordnance (DOD) Explosive ordnance which has been primed, fused, armed, or otherwise prepared for action, and which has been fired, dropped, launched, projected, or placed in such a manner as to constitute a hazard to operations, installations, personnel, or material and remains unexploded either by malfunction or design or for any other cause. Also called UXO. (JP 3-15) warfighting function A group of tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives. (FMI 5-0.1)

Glossary-10

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

References SOURCES USED These are the sources quoted or paraphrased in this publication.

ARMY PUBLICATIONS DA Form 2028, Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms. CALL/IED TF/Training, Convoy Leader Handbook Revision V, 15 September 2004. CALL Handbook 03-06, Tactical Convoy Operations, March 2003. CALL Handbook 03-31, Route Clearance, November 2003. CALL Handbook 03-34, Mission Rehearsal Exercise, December 2003. CALL Handbook 03-35, Operation Enduring Freedom II, December 2003. CALL Handbook 04-14, Effects-Based Operations Brigade to Company Level, July 2004. CALL Handbook 04-16, Cordon and Search, July 2004. CALL Handbook 04-24, USSOCOM Combat Convoy, October 2004. CALL Handbook 04-27, Convoy Leader Training Volume II, November 2004. CALL Handbook 05-06, Operation Enduring Freedom III, January 2005. CALL Handbook 05-11, Ranger Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for OIF/OEF, February 2005. CALL Handbook 05-19, A Special Study on Effects-Based Approach to Military Operations, May 2005. CALL Handbook 05-25, Leaders Guide to Army Aviation Command and Control at Brigade and Below, June 2005. CALL Handbook 06-15, Traffic Control Point Operations, April 2006. CALL Handbook 06-17, Detainee Operations at the Point of Capture, May 2006. CALL Handbook 06-18, Tactical Combat Casualty Care, April 2006. CALL Handbook 06-31, Uparmored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle Rollover Prevention and Egress Training, August 2006. CALL Handbook 06-32, Route Clearance, September 2006. CALL Handbook 07-06, Southern Afghanistan Counterinsurgency Operations, November 2006. CALL Handbook 07-15, The First 100 Days, January 2007. CJTF-7, Operation Enduring Freedom, Improvised Explosive Device Handbook, May 2004. CJTF-7, Operation Enduring Freedom Smart Card 1, Report Procedures, 10 January 2004. CJTF-7, Operation Enduring Freedom Smart Card 2, Convoy Operations (Logistics), January 2004. CJTF-7, Operation Enduring Freedom Smart Card 3, Convoy Operations (Combat), 10 January 2004. CJTF-7, Operation Enduring Freedom Smart Card 4, The Improvised Explosive Device and VehicleBorne Improvised Explosive Device Threat, 10 January 2004. CJTF-7, Operation Enduring Freedom Smart Card 5, Vehicle Search Techniques, 5 January 2004. CJTF-7, Multinational Corps Improvised Explosive Device Smart Cards, 27 October 2004. FM 2-0, Intelligence, 17 May 2004. FM 2-22.3, Human Intelligence Collector Operations, 6 September 2006. FM 3-0, Operations, 14 June 2001. FM 3-07, Stability Operations and Support Operations, 20 February 2003.

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

References-1

References

FM 3-13, Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, 28 November 2003. FM 3-19.50, Police Intelligence Operations, 21 July 2006. FM 3-34, Engineer Operations, 2 January 2004. FM 3-34.2, Combined Arms Breaching Operations, 31 August 2000 (To be revised as FM 3-90.11). FM 3-34.210, Explosive Hazards Operations, 27 March 2007. FM 3-90, Tactics, 4 July 2001. FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production, 20 January 2005. FM 5-19, Composite Risk Management, 21 August 2006. FM 5-116, Engineer Operations: Echelons Above Corps, 9 February 1999 (To be revised as FM 3-34.23). FM 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, 11 August 2003. FM 6-20-10, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process, 8 May 1996. FM 6-22, Army Leadership, 12 October 2006. FM 7-0, Training the Force, 22 October 2002. FM 7-92, The Infantry Reconnaissance Platoon and Squad (Airborne, Air Assault, Light Infantry), 23 December 1992. FM 9-20, Technical Escort Operations, 3 November 1997. FM 34-2, Collection Management and Synchronization Planning, 8 March 1994. FM 34-54, Technical Intelligence, 30 January 1998. FM 34-81-1, Battlefield Weather Effects, 23 December 1992. FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, 8 July 1994 (To be revised as FM 2-01.3). FM 55-30, Army Motor Transport Units and Operations, 27 June 1997. FM 90-7, Combined Arms Obstacle Integration, 29 September 1994 (To be revised as FM 3-90.13). FMI 3-35, Army Deployment and Redeployment, 15 June 2007. FMI 4-30.50, Modular Explosive Ordnance Disposal Operations, 31 July 2006. FMI 5-0.1, The Operations Process, 31 March 2006. GTA 05-10-044, Mine Awareness (SANDI), 1 May 1999. GTA 07-01-038, Infantry Leader’s Reference Card, 01 January 1995. GTA 09-12-001, Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Procedures, 1 March 2007. GTA 90-01-001, Improvised Explosive Device (IED) and Vehicular-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) Smart Card, 20 May 2004. GTA 90-01-003, Vehicle Search Techniques Smart Card, 6 August 2004. GTA 90-01-004, Logistics Convoy Operations Smart Card, 1 September 2004. GTA 90-10-047, Joint Counter Radio-Controlled IED Electronic-Warfare Handbook, 15 March 2007. ST 2-50, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW) Systems, 1 June 2002. ST 2-91.6, Small Unit Support to Intelligence, 1 March 2004. STANAG 2221 (EOD), Explosive Ordnance Disposal Reports and Messages – AEODP – 6 February 2001, 1 June 2001. STANAG 2430 (ENGR), Land Forces Combat Engineer Messages, Reports and Returns – AengrP-2(B), 18 August 2004. TC 2-91.701, Intelligence Analytical Support to Counter Improvised Explosive Device Operations, 30 March 2007.

References-2

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

21 September 2007

References

TC 9-21-01, (O) Soldiers Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Awareness Guide Iraq and Afghanistan Theaters of Operation, 28 May 2004. TC 20-32-3, Foreign Mine Handbook (Balkan States), 15 August 1997. TC 20-32-4, Foreign Mine Handbook (Asia), 15 August 1997. TC 20-32-5, Commander’s Reference Guide for Land Mine and Explosive Hazards (Iraq), 13 February 2003. TSP 052-21B10D020, Detect Explosive-Hazard Indicators by Visual Means, 23 July 2004. TSP 071-T-1003, Secure a Route, 7 March 2003. TSP 071-T-3412, Force Protection, 7 March 2003. TSP 093-401-5050, React to a Possible Improvised Explosive Device (IED), 21 May 2004. TSP 159-T-0001, Overview to a Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, 12 October 2004. TSP 159-O-0301, Opposing Force: Paramilitary and Nonmilitary Organizations and Tactics, 1 June 2003. TSP 551-Z-001, Convoy Survivability, 14 December 2006. TSP 551-Z-0001-EX, Convoy Live Fire Exercise, 27 August 2004. TVT 5-159, Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Awareness Guide, 1 August 2004.

JOINT PUBLICATIONS JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001. JP 2-01.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, 24 May 2000. JP 3-07.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism, 14 April 2006. JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support, 13 November 2006. JP 3-15, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations, 26 April 2007. JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations, 12 February 2007.

MULTI-SERVICE PUBLICATIONS FM 1-02/MCRP 5-12A, Operational Terms and Graphics, 21 September 2004. FM 2-22.401/NTTP 2-01.4/AFTTP(I) 3-2.63, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Technical Intelligence Operations, 9 June 2006. FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Cordon and Search Operations, 25 April 2006. FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, 15 December 2006. FM 3-100.12/MCRP 5-12.1C/NTTP 5-03.5/AFTTP(I) 3-2.34, Risk Management for Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, 15 February 2001. FM 3-100.38/MCRP 3-17.2B/NTTP 3-02.4.1/AFTTP(I) 3-2.12, (UXO) Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Unexploded Ordnance, 16 August 2005. FM 4-30.16/MCRP 3-17.2C/NTTP 3-02.5/AFTTP(I) 3-2.32, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Explosive Ordnance Disposal in a Joint Environment, 27 October 2005. FM 4-30.51/MCRP 3-17.2A, Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Procedures, 13 July 2006. FM 5-103/MCWP 3-17.6, Survivability, 10 June 1985 (to be revised as FM 3-34.300/MCWP 3-17.6, Survivability Operations).

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

References-3

This page is intentionally left blank.

Index

adaptive principles of the

enemy, 1-4

after-action reviews, 5-1

Air Force Protection Battle

Laboratory, A-6

AN/PSS-14 Mine Detector,

E-1, E-13, E-14

analytical techniques, B-1

area clearance, 2-2, 2-4, 4-34,

A-11, E-1, E-9

area clearance platoon, A-8

areas, structures, capabilities,

organizations, people, and

events. See ASCOPE, 4-8

Armored Security Vehicle–ASV

M-117, E-7, E-8

Army Intelligence and Security

Command, A-1, A-6

Army Materiel Command, A-7

ASCOPE, 4-38

areas, 4-38

capabilities, 4-38

events, 4-39

organizations, 4-38

people, 4-39

structures, 4-38

ASCOPE. See areas,

structures, capabilities,

organizations, people, and

events, 4-8

assured mobility, vi, vii, x, 2-4,

4-1, 4-2, 4-30, 5-19, A-4,

C-3

asymmetric warfare group, A-1

authorization, 5-2

basic attack, D-10

Blue, E-10

Buffalo, 5-8, 5-19, E-1, E-2,

E-3, E-4

Casspir, E-3, E-4

catastrophic loss, 4-28

CEHC. See Counter Explosive Hazards Center, A-3

CEHC. See Counter Explosive

Hazards Center., C-3, F-12

cellular organizational

structure, 3-8

Center for Health Promotion

and Preventative Medicine,

A-7

chemical biological incident

response force, A-4

chemical, biological,

radiological, nuclear, and

high-yield explosive, x, A-2

civil considerations, vii, 4-4,

4-8, 4-20, 4-38, 4-39

clearance company, 5-18, A-8

clearing operations, 2-2

combined arms training

strategies, F-1

combined explosives

exploitation cell, A-2

command and control element,

5-19

command-wired improvised

explosive device, 4-5, D-1

composite risk management.

See CRM, vii, 4-26, 4-29,

4-30

coordinates register, B-2, B-3

cordon, 4-35, 5-5, 5-9, 5-12,

5-14, F-4, F-7, F-9

Cougar, E-5, E-6

Counter Explosive Hazards

Center. See CEHC, A-3

counter radio-controlled

improvised explosive device

electronic warfare. See

CREW, 5-5, E-9

counterinsurgency, 4-2

courses of action, 4-16

CREW. See counter radio-

controlled improvised

explosive device electronic

warfare, 5-5, 5-14, 5-16,

5-17, A-5, C-4, E-10, E-11,

F-12

critical loss, 4-28

critical nodes, 4-20

CRM. See composite risk

management, vii, x, 4-1, 4-2,

4-26, 4-29, 4-30

D-9R Armored Dozer, E-9

defeat intelligence, 4-16

defeat operations, 4-16

detection element, 5-19

electronic warfare, 5-15

enemy, 4-35

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

enemy tactics, F-2

engineer units, A-7

essential elements of friendly

information, 4-22

explosive hazards, ix

Explosive Hazards

Coordination Cell, A-3

explosive hazards database, C

3

explosive hazards spot report,

4-33, 5-2, 5-4, 5-7, 5-18,

C-1, D-8

explosive hazards team, A-10

explosive ordnance clearance

agent, A-8

explosive ordnance disposal, 5

6

explosive ordnance disposal

units, A-10

explosively formed penetrator,

B-1

friendly force information

requirements, 4-22

future database, C-4

guidance, 5-2

handheld detectors, E-13

handheld explosive sniffer,

E-14

hazards, 4-26

Heavy Wheeled Armored

Vehicle–Golan, E-7

high-value targets, 3-19

high-visibility targets, 3-19

Hunter, E-10

Husky, E-2

IED countermeasure

equipment, E-10

IED defeat efforts, 4-35

IED defeat framework, 4-30

IED defeat tasks, 4-35

immediate action drills, D-7

improvement element, 5-20

improvised explosive device

defeat operations, vi

improvised explosive device

defeat organizations, A-12

improvised explosive device

descriptions, 3-16

References-1

Index casing, 3-18

components, 3-16

indicators, 3-19

initiating system, 3-17

initiation methods, 3-18

locations, 3-20

main charge, 3-17

uses and targets, 3-18

intelligence, 5-4

intelligence preparation of the

battlefield, 4-2

intelligence, surveillance, and

reconnaissance

synchronization plan, 4-24

Interim Vehicle-Mounted mine

Detector System, E-1

Joint Digital Incident Gathering

System, C-3

Joint Improvised Explosive

Defeat Device Defeat

Organization, A-4

link analysis, B-5

link analysis diagram, B-8

long range cordless

telephones, 3-17

marginal loss, 4-28

Marine Corps Warfighting

Laboratory, A-7

matrix, B-5

activities, B-7

association, B-6

perception assessment,

B-16

mechanical breaching, 5-7

Medium Mine-Protected

Vehicle–RG 31, E-4

Meerkat, E-2

military decision-making

process, vi

military intelligence, 3-1

all source, 3-4

counterintelligence, 3-3

geospacial, 3-4

human, 3-1

imagery, 3-2

measurement and

signatures, 3-2

open source, 3-4

signals, 3-2

technical, 3-3

unit support, 3-5

military intelligence battalion

(technical intelligence), A-1

military intelligence units, A-11

military police units, A-12

military search, 5-8

military search categorization,

5-11

military search levels, 5-11

advanced, 5-12

basic, 5-12

intermediate, 5-12

military search principles, 5-9

military search resources, 5-13

advisors, 5-13

coordinators, 5-13

search teams, 5-13

mine dog detachment, A-8

Mine-Clearing Armor Protection

Dozer, E-8

Mine-Protected Armored

Vehicle–RG-33L, E-5

mobile multiband jammer, E-10

mobility augmentation

company, A-9

mobility corridors, 4-15, D-11

mobility operations, 2-1

breaching, 2-1

clearing, 2-1

forward aviation combat

engineering, 2-2

gap crossing, 2-1

maintain combat roads and

trails, 2-2

modified IED countermeasure

equipment, E-10

movement and maneuver, 2-1

National Ground Intelligence

Center, A-5

Naval Explosive Ordnance

Disposal Technology

Division, A-5

negligible loss, 4-28

nodal component analysis,

3-12

activity, 3-13

functional, 3-12

observation and fields of fire,

avenues of approach, key

terrain, obstacles, and cover

and concealment, 4-5

operating tempo, 4-34

operation order, 4-2

operational environment, vii

operational environment

variables, 1-2

economic, 1-2

information, 1-3

infrastructure, 1-4

military, 1-2

Index-2

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

physical environment, 1-4

political, 1-2

social, 1-3

time, 1-4

overlays, B-16

line-of-sight, B-18

lines-of-communication,

B-17

population status, B-16

terrain, B-17

pattern analysis, B-2

pattern analysis plot sheet, B-3

political, military, economic,

social, infrastructure,

information, physical

environment, and time, 1-1

proactive defeat, 2-4

protective measures, 5-6

radio-controlled improvised

explosive device, 3-17, D-2

rapid decision-making and

synchronization process, vi

reactive defeat, 2-4

reception, staging, onward

movement, and integration

report, 5-1

recording, C-2

render safe procedures, 4-34

reporting IEDs, C-1

required capabilities, F-1

risk assessment, 4-27

probability definitions, 4-27

risk definitions, 4-28

risk severity, 4-27

risk assessment categories,

5-11

risk mitigation, D-8

robotic systems, 5-7

robots, E-11

route clearance, 2-3

route clearance operations,

5-18

route clearance platoon, A-8

safety, 5-4

sapper company, A-10

search kit, E-15

security element, 5-20

self screening vehicle jammer,

E-10

significant dates, B-15

situational understanding, 1-6

six fundamentals of assured

mobility, 4-30

21 September 2007

Index avoid, 4-33

detect, 4-32

neutralize, 4-34

predict, 4-31

prevent, 4-33

protect, 4-34

specialized search dogs, E-12

stability operations, 4-5

standoff munitions disruption,

5-7 suicide improvised explosive

device, D-2

support command, A-2

systems warfare, 1-6

tactical expectations, F-1

tactical techniques, F-1

targeting, 4-19

technical escort units, A-2

Technical Support Working

Group, A-6

terrain and weather, 4-37

terrain team, A-10

terror tactics, 5-8

threat, 4-8

communications, 4-10

composition, 4-9

disposition, 4-9

finance, 4-14

identifying high-value

targets, 4-16

intelligence, 4-13

logistics, 4-10

miscellaneous data, 4-11

modeling, 4-15

operational effectiveness, 4

10

personality, 4-11

preferred tactics and

options, 4-16

recruitment and support,

4-11

tactics, 4-10

templates, 4-16

training, 4-10

threat motivation, 3-6

time available, 4-38

time event charts, B-5

timelines, B-15

tools and equipment, 5-13

21 September 2007

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

tracking, C-2

traffic attack, D-10

training conditions, F-1

training strategy, F-1

troop-leading procedures, 4-1

troops and support available, 4

37

vehicle-borne improvised

explosive device, D-3

victim-operated improvised

explosive device, D-4

warfighting function. See WFF,

vi

Warlock, E-9

weapons intelligence team,

3-3, 5-7

weapons technical intelligence

units, A-11

WFF. See warfighting function,

vi, x, 2-1, 2-4, 2-5, 4-1, 4-16,

4-23

Index-3

This page is intentionally left blank.

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01 21 September 2007

By order of the Secretary of the Army:

GEORGE W. CASEY, JR. General, United States Army Chief of Staff

Official:

JOYCE E. MORROW Administrative Assistant to the

Secretary of the Army

0724102

DISTRIBUTION: Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve. To be distributed in accordance with the initial distribution number (IDN) 121724, requirements for FM 3-90.119.

By Direction of the Commandant of the Marine Corps:

JAMES F. AMOS Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration Marine Corps PCN: 146 000003 00

MARINE CORPS PCN: 146 000003 00

PIN: 084328-000