FM 3-05.60 Army Special Operations Forces Aviation Operations

FM 3-05.60 (FM 1-108)

ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AVIATION OPERATIONS

October 2000 DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to U. S. Government agencies and their contractors only to protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange Program or by other means. This determination was made on 5 December 2003. Other requests for this document must be referred to Commander, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, ATTN: AOJK-DT-PO, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28310-5000. DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that must prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.

Headquarters, Department of the Army

*FM 3-05.60 Field Manual No. 3-05.60

Headquarters Department of the Army Washington, DC, 16 October 2000

Army Special Operations Forces Aviation Operations Contents Page

PREFACE .................................................................................................................. iii Chapter 1.

ARSOA MISSION, OPERATION, AND ORGANIZATION .....................................1-1 Mission .....................................................................................................................1-1 Mission-Essential and Battle Tasks .........................................................................1-1 Supporting Tasks .....................................................................................................1-2 Employment Considerations ....................................................................................1-2 Characteristics of ARSOA Forces............................................................................1-3 Organization .............................................................................................................1-5

Chapter 2.

ARSOA MISSIONS AND COLLATERAL ACTIVITIES ...........................................2-1 Principles of War......................................................................................................2-1 Army Special Operations Imperatives......................................................................2-3 ARSOA Principles ....................................................................................................2-6 Operational Considerations......................................................................................2-7

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to U. S. Government agencies and their contractors to protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange Program or by other means. This determination was made on 5 December 2003. Other requests for this document must be referred to Commander, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, ATTN: AOJK-DT-PO, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28310-5000. DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that must prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.

* This publication supersedes FM 1-108, 3 November 1993.

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Page

ARSOA Support to ARSOF Missions and Collateral Activities................................ 2-8 Tactical Application................................................................................................ 2-19 Evasion and Recovery........................................................................................... 2-19 Combat Search and Rescue ................................................................................. 2-20 Maritime Operations .............................................................................................. 2-21 Chapter 3.

ARSOA MISSION PLANNING PROCESS ............................................................. 3-1 ARSOA Participation During the Entire Planning Process ...................................... 3-1 Mission Planning...................................................................................................... 3-4 War Game Process ................................................................................................. 3-9 Communications.................................................................................................... 3-10

Chapter 4.

COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT ..................................................................... 4-1 Fire Support ............................................................................................................. 4-1 SEAD and Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses ............................................ 4-4 Air Defense .............................................................................................................. 4-4 Attack Helicopters.................................................................................................... 4-5 Intelligence and Electronic Warfare......................................................................... 4-5 Weather Support ..................................................................................................... 4-7 External Communications Support .......................................................................... 4-7 Engineer Support..................................................................................................... 4-7 Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Support ............................................................. 4-8

Chapter 5.

ARSOA LOGISTICS SUPPORT ............................................................................. 5-1 ARSOF Logistics Environment ................................................................................ 5-1 Preparation Modes .................................................................................................. 5-2 Planning Considerations.......................................................................................... 5-6 Field Services Support............................................................................................. 5-7 Forward Arming and Refueling Point Operations .................................................... 5-9 Resupply Procedures for Developed and Undeveloped Theaters......................... 5-10

Appendix A.

INTELLIGENCE ......................................................................................................A-1

Appendix B.

AIRCRAFT CAPABILITIES.....................................................................................B-1

Appendix C.

OPERATIONS ........................................................................................................ C-1

Appendix D.

LOGISTICS ............................................................................................................ D-1 GLOSSARY.................................................................................................Glossary-1 BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................... Bibliography-1 INDEX............................................................................................................... Index-1

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Preface Field Manual (FM) 3-05.60 describes the mission tasks, capabilities, limitations, command and control (C2) relationships, employment principles, and operational considerations of Army special operations aviation (ARSOA). The manual establishes doctrine for operational employment of aviation combat support (CS), combat service support (CSS), and command and support relationships. The manual identifies requirements of ARSOA in different levels of conflict and duration of operations. It further delineates unique capabilities, limitations, and requirements when supporting a standing joint special operations task force (JSOTF) or a commander in chief (CINC) during a regional contingency. This manual explains short- and long-term employment and execution concepts for ARSOA, including support requirements and relationships. The manual provides doctrinal guidance to the ARSOA commander for the employment of ARSOA in support of special operations (SO). The employment guidance considerations and the command and support responsibilities apply to the special operations forces (SOF) commander and his staff, as well as the conventional commander and his staff. The proponent of this manual is the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS). Submit comments and recommended changes to Commander, USAJFKSWCS, ATTN: AOJK-DT-JAA, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28310-5000. Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

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Chapter 1

ARSOA Mission, Operation, and Organization Unconventional Warfare and special operations are as old as war itself. Throughout history, success by a small force against a strategic or operational objective usually has called for units with combinations of special equipment, training, people, or tactics that go beyond those found in conventional units. These characteristics have allowed such units to be employed in unusual ways, for which the enemy often was unprepared. Lieutenant General Schoomaker United States Special Operations Forces Posture Statement, 1998

ARSOA is an integral part of SO. ARSOA units can operate as part of an Army special operations task force (ARSOTF) or a JSOTF. They give the ground commander a means to infiltrate, resupply, and extract SOF. To employ ARSOA properly, commanders must understand the characteristics of SO in general and ARSOA in particular.

MISSION 1-1. The mission of ARSOA is to plan, conduct, and support SO by clandestinely penetrating nonhostile, hostile, or denied airspace. ARSOA conducts air operations in any operational environment across the spectrum of conflict. ARSOA supports SOF conducting joint, combined, interagency, and liaison and coordination activities in regional crises and major conflicts, or as directed by the National Command Authorities (NCA). As part of the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), ARSOA organizes, equips, trains, validates, sustains, and employs assigned aviation units for USASOC missions.

MISSION-ESSENTIAL AND BATTLE TASKS 1-2. The mission-essential and battle tasks for ARSOA are to— • Infiltrate, resupply, and exfiltrate United States (U.S.) SOF and other selected personnel. • Insert and extract SOF land and maritime assault vehicles and vessels. • Conduct direct action (DA) or close air support (CAS) using organic attack helicopters to provide aerial firepower and terminal guidance for precision munitions, unilaterally or with other SOF. • Provide forward air control for U.S. and multinational CAS and indirect fires in support of SOF.

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• Conduct special reconnaissance missions in support of SOF. • Conduct electronic, photographic, and visual reconnaissance in support of SOF. • Conduct limited electronic warfare (EW) in support of SO. • Recover personnel or sensitive materiel in support of SOF. • Conduct assisted evasion and recovery (E&R) when dedicated combat search and rescue (CSAR) assets are unavailable in support of SO. • Conduct CSAR as a part of the SOF component apportioned to the joint search and rescue center (JSRC) when the mission requires ARSOA capabilities above and beyond conventional theater CSAR assets. • Perform emergency air evacuation of SOF personnel during the conduct of SO. • Conduct strategic helicopters.

self-deployment

of

all

aerial

refuel-capable

• Conduct SO joint maritime operations. • Conduct SO water insertion and recovery operations. • Support and facilitate ground and aerial command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) operations for SOF. • Provide the C2 element, when augmented with required United States Air Force (USAF) assets (military occupational specialties [MOSs] and communications equipment), for SO aviation assets and attached conventional aviation assets supporting SOF. • Provide liaison officers (LNOs) or subject matter experts (SMEs) as required or until aircrew manning is detrimental to the mission. • Perform aviation unit maintenance (AVUM) and aviation intermediate maintenance (AVIM) for all organic aircraft.

SUPPORTING TASKS 1-3. Supporting tasks for ARSOA are to— • Design, integrate, and maintain aviation systems and support equipment unique to SO aircraft and mission capability. • Establish and maintain a program to recruit, select, and train Army and other personnel for attachment to ARSOA units. • Establish and maintain liaison positions with other SOF to plan and coordinate activities.

EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS 1-4. ARSOA provides SOF the capability to penetrate hostile or denied territory and to accomplish SO missions and collateral activities. ARSOA units have specialized aircraft with sophisticated state-of-the-art special mission equipment. ARSOA aircrews undergo intense training in the tactical employment of the aircraft and the execution of SO aviation tasks. ARSOA should arrive in the theater of operation with other SOF before hostilities and should be a part of high payoff SO and collateral missions that support the

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theater commander’s campaign plan. ARSOA should exploit the darkness, adverse weather conditions, and extended range and navigation systems to penetrate hostile territory from unexpected avenues of approach in the execution of special mission tasks.

CHARACTERISTICS OF ARSOA FORCES 1-5. The unique capabilities of ARSOA are a function of the quality, training, and education of its soldiers, as well as the mission profiles those soldiers must execute. The competitive ARSOA selection process, coupled with technological training and education, produces an ARSOA soldier who is adaptable, mature, innovative, culturally aware, self-assured, and selfreliant. Policy decision makers, therefore, use ARSOA as a strategic and operational economy of force to expand the range of available options. 1-6. ARSOA forces are specially organized, trained, and equipped military forces. They conduct SO to achieve military, political, economic, or informational objectives by generally unconventional means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. Decision makers may choose the ARSOA option because it provides the broadest range of capabilities that have direct applicability in an increasing number of environments. 1-7. Politico-military requirements frequently cast ARSOA into clandestine or low-visibility environments that require oversight at the national level. ARSOA operations differ from conventional force operations by their degree of acceptable physical and political risk, their modes of employment, and their operational techniques. ARSOA allows the unified commander or the joint force commander (JFC) to perform critical small-unit missions that directly strike or engage the aim or objective of the operational mission. 1-8. Early use of Army special operations forces (ARSOF) in an operation may prevent or contain conflict and may conserve national resources. When conflict is imminent, ARSOA may support a variety of prehostility missions to signal determination, to demonstrate support to allies, and to begin the complicated processes of positioning forces for combat and of preparing the operations area or battlespace. 1-9. During conflict, ARSOF may be most effective in conducting strategic and operational economy-of-force operations, generating military or diplomatic advantages disproportionate to the resources they represent. With support from ARSOA, SOF can locate, seize, or destroy strategic and operational targets and obtain critical intelligence. They can analyze an enemy’s defenses and diminish his morale. They can disorganize, disrupt, and demoralize his troops. They can also divert important resources. 1-10. ARSOF expand the options of the NCA, particularly in crises and contingencies (terrorism, insurgency, subversion, and sabotage) that fall between wholly diplomatic initiatives and the overt use of large conventional forces. The use of ARSOF enables decision makers to prevent a conflict or to limit its scope. Decision makers can, therefore, better control committed U.S. forces and resources. ARSOA in support of SOF may be the best choice for actions requiring a rapid response or a surgically precise, focused use of force.

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1-11. ARSOA training is one of the most rigorous, technical forms of training in the world. It produces some of the most professional and highly trained soldiers who demonstrate superior performance in small groups or as part of an integrated U.S. response with other military forces, as well as nonDepartment of Defense (DOD) and civilian agencies. Selected small, selfcontained units can work swiftly and quietly without the noticeable presence of conventional forces. Even under the most austere conditions, they are able to operate without the infrastructure often needed by a larger force. They can penetrate enemy territory by various means, sustain themselves in the denied area, and execute various missions. 1-12. To make sure missions selected for ARSOA are compatible with ARSOF capabilities, commanders must be familiar with the following SO characteristics: • ARSOA personnel undergo careful selection processes or missionspecific training beyond basic military skills to achieve entry-level SO skills. These programs make unlikely any rapid replacement or generation of personnel or capabilities. • Mature, experienced personnel compose ARSOA. Many maintain a high level of competency in more than one military specialty. • Some ARSOA elements are regionally oriented for employment. Crosscultural communications training is a routine part of the regional training of those elements. • ARSOA conducts specific tactical operations by small units with unique talents that directly strike or engage strategic and operational aims or objectives. • Planning for SO may begin at the unified, joint, or interagency levels for execution that requires extensive, rigorous rehearsal. • SO are frequently clandestine or low-visibility operations, or they may be a part of overt operations. They can be covert but as such require a declaration of war or a specific finding executed by the NCA. ARSOF can deploy at relatively low cost with a low profile that is less intrusive than that of larger conventional forces. • ARSOA units often conduct SO at great distance from operational bases. They employ sophisticated communications systems and means of insertion, support, and extraction to penetrate and return from hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. • SO occur throughout full spectrum operations—offense, defense, stability operations, and support operations. • SO influence the will of foreign leadership to create conditions favorable to U.S. strategic aims and objectives. • ARSOA are often high-risk operations that have limited windows of execution and require first-time success. • Employment of SO may require patient, long-term commitment and support to achieve U.S. national goals in an operational area. • ARSOA requires theater- and, frequently, national-level intelligence support.

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• Selected SO require a detailed knowledge of the cultural nuances and languages of a country or region where employed. • SO are inherently joint and sometimes multinational, requiring interagency and international coordination. The contribution of ARSOF to national security is greatest when ARSOF are fully integrated into the JFC’s plan at the earliest stages of planning. • ARSOA can be task-organized quickly and deployed rapidly to provide tailored responses to many different situations. • ARSOA can gain access to hostile and denied areas. • ARSOA can live in austere, harsh environments without extensive support for short periods of time. For long-duration operations, ARSOA require support from theater Army. • ARSOA can survey and assess local situations and report these assessments rapidly.

ORGANIZATION 1-13. The ARSOA regiment (Figure 1-1, page 1-6) consists of a headquarters and headquarters company (HHC), an assault battalion, an aviation support battalion (with three forward-deployed companies), and an aviation battalion. The forward-deployed companies are under the administrative control (ADCON) of the ARSOA regiment. Additionally, table of distribution and allowances (TDA) documents authorize a special operations aviation training company (SOATC) and a systems integration and maintenance office (SIMO). 1-14. The ARSOA regiment has SO rotary-wing aircraft, including the AH/MH-6J Cayuse, the MH-60L/K Blackhawk, and the MH-47D/E Chinook. ARSOA units can plan, conduct, and support SO missions for the ARSOF commander or for the theater special operations command (SOC). ARSOA can be task-organized based on expected missions, the requirements of the units they will support, the environmental conditions in the theater of operations, and sustainment requirements. ARSOA task-organizes around one of the special operations aviation (SOA) battalions. With proper personnel and equipment augmentation, the ARSOA battalion commander and his staff could also serve as a joint special operations air component commander (JSOACC). When two or more battalions are required in the theater, the regimental commander could serve as the JSOACC.

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Figure 1-1. ARSOA Organization

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Chapter 2

ARSOA Missions and Collateral Activities It cannot be too often repeated that in modern war . . . the chief factor in achieving triumph is what has been done in the way of thorough preparation and training before the beginning of wars. President Theodore Roosevelt Graduation Address, U.S. Naval Academy, June 1902

ARSOA abides by ARSOF truths (Figure 2-1), the principles of war, and Army SO imperatives. All have unique implications to ARSOA’s concept of operations in the battlespace and are manifested in ARSOA’s operational considerations. Each SO mission and collateral activity requires special capabilities from ARSOA. Mission planning for SO is a detailed process conducted directly with the supported unit. ARSOA has assets that maintain cultural, regional, and language orientation.

• Humans are more important than hardware. • Quality is better than quantity. • ARSOF cannot be mass produced. • Competent ARSOF cannot be quickly created after emergencies arise. Figure 2-1. ARSOF Truths

PRINCIPLES OF WAR 2-1. The principles of war apply equally to SO. SOF commanders, however, apply them from a different perspective than do conventional force commanders. This perspective comes from the nature of the forces and the methods of application. Normally, SOF carry few weapons and have limited fire support. They maintain a high degree of mobility and remain undetected as long as possible. ARSOA commanders must understand the effects of their operational environment and force capabilities as they apply the principles of war. With each principle, the ARSOA commanders must consider various components. OBJECTIVE 2-2. Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. SOF objectives may be political, economic, psychological,

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or military. During war, SO usually focus on enemy weaknesses other forces cannot exploit. ARSOA must have a clearly defined objective that promotes the supported commander’s intent. OFFENSIVE 2-3. Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. SO are inherently offensive actions. ARSOA, like all aviation, is offensive in nature as well. It allows the supported commander to conduct operations in any direction on the battlefield, unencumbered by terrain or obstacles. MASS 2-4. Concentrate the effects of overwhelming combat power at the decisive time and place. The employment of SOF is not in the conventional sense. Even more so than conventional forces, SOF must avoid attrition or force-onforce battles. They must subtly and indirectly concentrate their combat power at decisive times and places. ARSOA efforts must not be against attractive targets that may be operationally or strategically irrelevant. Extensive SO planning and rehearsal are necessary to achieve temporary superiority of force or, conversely, to avoid enemy engagement. Concentration of force relies as much on the quality and focus of tactics, timing, and weaponry as it does on numerical strength. ARSOA delivers the supported force to the precise place at the precise time. ECONOMY OF FORCE 2-5. Allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts. When employed as a part of SOF, ARSOA is an economy-of-force measure that allows the concentration of other forces elsewhere. The role of many SO is to divert hostile forces into secondary theaters. This practice prevents a concentration of hostile forces against the friendly main effort. ARSOA gives the commander a means to employ a specialized force in the right location to maximize the effect. MANEUVER 2-6. Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage using the flexible application of combat power. During SO, maneuver implies the ability to infiltrate and exfiltrate denied areas to exploit enemy weaknesses. When employed by ARSOA, maneuver is the ability to concentrate (infiltrate) the supported commander’s elements, to strike the enemy where and when the enemy is most vulnerable, and to disperse (exfiltrate) to avoid the enemy’s strengths. UNITY OF COMMAND 2-7. For every objective, seek unity of command and unity of effort. When ARSOA is a part of SOF, the organization is joint, with uncluttered chains of command that reduce layered headquarters elements. SECURITY 2-8. Never let the enemy gain an unexpected advantage. Security is paramount to SO and often dominates all other considerations. Compartmented planning is

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typical for SO, and planning staffs are normally small. Within a compartmented activity, however, individuals must share information. 2-9. To enhance security and achieve surprise, individuals must follow intelligence, counterintelligence, EW, and cover and deception procedures when planning and executing SO. To provide security for the plan and to preserve the security for other planned operations, ground and air planners must go into isolation. 2-10. To allow ARSOA crews to conduct follow-on missions in the same areas, however, planners should rotate crews to perform these missions if possible. To enhance operational security, ground forces normally discuss only the portion of the ground tactical plan that involves the ARSOA crews and the immediate actions on the objective. When planning and coordinating air operations, planners should discuss E&R plans and CSAR procedures for downed aircrew as well. This practice provides mutual protection for all SOF personnel in the event of capture. SURPRISE 2-11. Strike the enemy at a time and place or in a manner for which he is unprepared. Achieving surprise is usually a precondition for success in SO and the major principle of war provided to a ground force commander through ARSOA assets. ARSOA enables the commander to strike the enemy indirectly and unexpectedly. It also allows the supported commander to take imaginative, bold, and audacious action and to apply his combat power with precision. SIMPLICITY 2-12. Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure a thorough understanding. By nature, ARSOA missions are complicated and multifaceted. Plans require and depend on precise timing and accuracy. SO often use sophisticated, unorthodox methods and equipment requiring specifically selected and trained SO aviators. Although the missions are complex, detailed planning, in-depth briefings, and rehearsals help simplify the mission and prepare the aircrews for every possible contingency.

ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS IMPERATIVES 2-13. The application of Army SO imperatives and the principles of war characterize successful SO. Although the imperatives may not apply to all types of ARSOF, SOF commanders must include the applicable imperative into their mission planning and execution. UNDERSTAND THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 2-14. Although ARSOA assets cannot dominate the environment, they can help the ARSOF commander influence it by providing assets for him to gain a better understanding of the theater, including civilian influence as well as the friendly and enemy capabilities. SOF must know who the friendly and hostile decision makers are, their objectives and strategies, and the way they interact. Commanders must make sure the friendly decision makers understand the implication and impact of mission requirements. An improper decision can commit or expend SOF on targets of little importance in the

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overall plan. ARSOA commanders must remain flexible and adapt their operations to changing situations. By expecting these changes, they can exploit fleeting opportunities. RECOGNIZE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS 2-15. Many SO are conducted to advance critical political objectives. ARSOA must understand that their actions can have international consequences. Rules of engagement (ROE) provide a framework that considers political implications; however, they cannot anticipate every situation. ARSOF must understand the intent of the ROE and act accordingly, despite any military disadvantage that may result. The advancement of the political objective may take precedence over the military disadvantages. The ARSOA commander must fully understand the intent of the ROE and act accordingly. FACILITATE INTERAGENCY ACTIVITIES 2-16. ARSOA support and complement U.S. and multinational civilian programs driven by nonmilitary considerations. ARSOA also can operate in the ambiguous and complex political environments found in coalition operations or alliances formed to avert situations that would lead to human tragedy. ENGAGE THE THREAT DISCRIMINATELY 2-17. ARSOA commanders have limited resources that are not easily replaced, and their missions often have sensitive political implications. They must, therefore, analyze the risk and advise the supported commander of the risk to the force and to the ARSOA assets. Together, the ARSOA commander and the supported commander carefully select when, where, and how to use ARSOA to achieve the desired results with the least risk. CONSIDER LONG-TERM EFFECTS 2-18. ARSOA commanders must avoid strategic failure and achieve tactical success. ARSOA commanders must not risk the success of national and theater long-term objectives in their desire for immediate or short-term effects. Plans and procedures must be consistent with accomplishing the national or theater priorities. Commanders must consider the prudent use of force in view of these priorities. ENSURE LEGITIMACY AND CREDIBILITY OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS 2-19. Significant legal and policy considerations apply to many SO activities. Legitimacy is the most crucial factor in developing and maintaining internal and international support. The United States cannot sustain its assistance to a foreign power without this legitimacy. The concept of legitimacy is broader than the strict legal definition contained in international law. The concept also includes the moral and political legitimacy of a government or resistance organization. The people of the nation and the international community determine its legitimacy based on collective perception of the credibility of its cause and methods. Without legitimacy and credibility, SO will not gain the support of foreign indigenous elements, the U.S. population, or the international community. ARSOA legal advisors must review all sensitive aspects of SO mission planning and execution.

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ANTICIPATE AND CONTROL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS 2-20. All SO have potential psychological effects. Some SO, however, have a specific mission to produce such effects. ARSOA commanders must understand Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and be able to support the integration of PSYOP. APPLY CAPABILITIES INDIRECTLY 2-21. The primary role of ARSOA in multinational operations is to assist the ARSOF commander in advising and training indigenous military and paramilitary forces. The supported non-U.S. forces then serve as force multipliers in the pursuit of U.S. national security objectives with minimum U.S. visibility, risk, and cost. The long-term self-sufficiency of the foreign force must assume primary authority and accept responsibility for the success or failure of the mission. All U.S. efforts must reinforce and enhance the effectiveness, legitimacy, and credibility of the supported foreign government or group. DEVELOP MULTIPLE OPTIONS 2-22. ARSOF must maintain their operational flexibility by developing a broad range of options. The key to operational flexibility includes— • Developing contingency plans that anticipate problems during critical events. • Using a deliberate, interactive planning and rehearsal process. • Having the same people plan, rehearse with ground forces, and execute the mission. (These types of actions on the objective become a common point of departure, not inflexible blueprints.) 2-23. Under these circumstances, the operators understand all the critical elements of the plan, as well as alternate courses of action (COAs), reasons for discarding alternate COAs, and unstated assumptions underlying unexpected difficulties. ENSURE LONG-TERM SUSTAINMENT 2-24. Resourcing of ARSOA assets varies with each mission. ARSOA must demonstrate continuity of effort when dealing with political, economic, informational, and military programs. They must not begin programs that are beyond the economic, technological, or cultural capabilities of the host nation (HN) to maintain without U.S. assistance. Such efforts are counterproductive. ARSOA policy, strategy, and programs must therefore be durable, consistent, and sustainable. PROVIDE SUFFICIENT INTELLIGENCE 2-25. ARSOA has neither the combat power nor the reinforcement and support of conventional forces to deal with unexpected enemy actions. The success of ARSOA in support of SO missions often depends on detailed, nearreal-time, all-source intelligence (Appendix A) that focuses on specific mission requirements. Timely national and theater intelligence is particularly important to SOF. ARSOA intelligence preparation is critical to mission success and imposes great demands on the capabilities of supporting

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intelligence organizations. ARSOA commanders must clearly identify and prioritize their intelligence requirements. BALANCE SECURITY AND SYNCHRONIZATION 2-26. Security concerns control SO. Excessive compartmentalization can, however, exclude key personnel from the planning process. ARSOA commanders must resolve these conflicting demands on mission planning and execution. While insufficient security can compromise a mission, excessive security can jeopardize the coordination of plans.

ARSOA PRINCIPLES 2-27. SO principles are an important part of SO mission planning. Principles for ARSOA are as follows: • Integrate supporting ARSOA assets from mission analysis to COA development, through mission accomplishment. • Increase ARSOA effectiveness by using the tactical and logistic capabilities of other Services and nations. • Use near-real-time and all-source intelligence products during mission planning, rehearsal, and execution. • Negate hostile acquisition means and weapons systems before and during the mission. • Employ the element of surprise by— Œ Conducting operations at night and during periods of low ambient light. Œ Using deception and operations security (OPSEC) measures. Œ Using terrain-following techniques. Œ Using the range capability of the aircraft to fly indirect approaches. Œ Controlling or reducing electronic emissions during the mission. 2-28. During extended operations— • Change tactics and procedures regularly to avoid becoming predictable. • Anticipate enemy actions. • Concentrate combat power on enemy vulnerabilities. • Stay flexible. • Designate the main effort clearly. • Move SOF throughout the depth of the operational area as the tactical situation changes. • Concentrate SOF at the critical time by using precision timing and navigation. • Displace forward elements frequently for security. • Maintain the ability to operate continuously. • Understand the effects of battle on soldiers, units, and leaders.

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OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 2-29. Several considerations affect aviation support to SOF and must be a part of all mission planning. Some may benefit the mission but most have an adverse effect. WEATHER 2-30. Weather affects friendly and enemy capabilities. ARSOA has the unique capability to take advantage of adverse weather and to operate during periods of zero illumination, reduced ceilings, and other limiting meteorological conditions. The effects of the weather must be a part of mission planning. Strong winds affect ground speed. Limited visibility or low cloud ceilings provide some concealment for air operations and aid in achieving surprise. These same conditions, however, restrict supporting highperformance aircraft operations, such as tactical air, CAS, airlift, and aerial refueling. Employment of aviation in these environments involves several terrain considerations. TERRAIN 2-31. Freedom of maneuver over terrain is an inherent characteristic of aviation. This environmental flexibility provides a rapid means to overcome the difficulties of movement and support of ground forces. Several factors must be considered when employing aviation in these environments. Mountains 2-32. High altitudes and high temperatures limit lift capabilities, useful loads, and normal cruise speed. Weather conditions change rapidly. Limited safe landing areas are available. Arctic Areas 2-33. Cold temperatures increase lift capabilities and useful loads, but snow and ice can adversely affect the aircraft’s performance. Blowing snow limits visibility, especially during takeoff and landing. Extremely cold temperatures have an adverse effect on aircraft components. Weather conditions change rapidly. Jungles 2-34. Dense jungles limit the range and effects of weapons. Hot, humid air decreases aircraft lift, thus reducing the useful load. Problems with aircraft corrosion increase, thereby increasing maintenance requirements. Safe landing areas are scarce. Deserts 2-35. High daytime temperatures decrease aircraft lift, thus reducing useful loads. Sand and dust increase maintenance requirements. Flat, featureless terrain increases the enemy’s long-range observation and complicates navigation. Sandstorms and other phenomena develop quickly. Weather support must be timely.

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Urban Areas 2-36. Aircraft are at high risk from small arms fire, complicated by the proximity of noncombatants. Blowing debris increases foreign object damage and can make landing areas unusable. High levels of artificial illumination reduce night vision goggles (NVG) perception. If, however, lights are too bright for NVG operation, unaided vision is probably sufficient. Tower and wire hazards increase, thereby causing limited flight routes. Fire control measures must relate to easily distinguishable features to control fratricide. Observation, detection, and weapons engagement of aircraft from numerous locations are critical considerations. Linear corridors, which are characteristic of urban areas, limit fields of fire. Identifying targets, landing zones (LZs), and pickup zones (PZs) is difficult. Maritime 2-37. Air operations from naval vessels require extensive coordination with naval air operations to synchronize the location, sequence, and timing of departing or returning flights and long-range over-water and over-thehorizon operations. Operating from naval vessels magnifies complications from adverse weather conditions. Increased airframe corrosion from salt water exposure requires fresh water source for aircraft washing.

ARSOA SUPPORT TO ARSOF MISSIONS AND COLLATERAL ACTIVITIES 2-38. ARSOA possesses unique capabilities to support United States Special Operations Command’s (USSOCOM’s) roles, missions, and functions as directed by Congress in Title 10 U.S. Code 164 and Title 10 U.S. Code 167. ARSOA plans, conducts, and supports SO in stability operations, support operations, and war. ARSOA missions are normally joint or interagency in nature. When planning operations, ARSOA commanders adhere to planning fundamentals (discussed in FM 100-5, Operations), the Army universal task list (AUTL), and the universal joint task list (UJTL). Mission priorities vary from theater to theater. ARSOA missions are dynamic because they are directly affected by politico-military considerations. A change in national security strategy or policy may add, delete, or radically alter the nature of an ARSOA mission. Although each mission is treated separately, all missions are interrelated and interdependent. 2-39. The NCA or a JFC may task an ARSOF element to perform missions for which it is the best suited among available forces or perhaps the only force available. When ARSOA is assigned a mission by the controlling headquarters (JSOACC), the ARSOA provides the tasking commander an estimate of its capabilities, limitations, and risks associated with employment in nontraditional missions. With additional training, ARSOA elements can execute nonstandard or nondoctrinal missions with the same skills and expertise demanded of their primary missions. In an ideal world, ARSOA would be used only in operations for which they are specially trained and equipped. In reality, circumstances often dictate the use of ARSOA for other missions. 2-40. ARSOA performs various missions and collateral activities (Figure 2-2, page 2-9). ARSOA missions affect the way ARSOA is organized, trained, and

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equipped. In contrast, ARSOA collateral activities are capabilities ARSOA can readily perform because of ARSOA’s primary missions. The primary missions of ARSOA are enduring, and they infrequently change. ARSOA collateral activities, however, more readily shift because of the changing international environment.

Missions

Collateral Activities

•

Unconventional Warfare

•

Coalition Support

•

Foreign Internal Defense

•

Combat Search and Rescue

•

Psychological Operations

•

Counterdrug Activities

•

Civil Affairs

•

Countermine Activities

•

Information Operations

•

Humanitarian Assistance

•

Direct Action

•

Security Assistance

•

Special Reconnaissance

•

Special Activities

•

Combatting Terrorism

•

Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Figure 2-2. ARSOF Missions and Collateral Activities

2-41. ARSOA missions and collateral activities fall into two categories: direct and indirect. Direct contact with the adversary applies military resources to accomplish a task without relying on indigenous or surrogate forces not under direct U.S. control. Indirect contact with the adversary applies military resources to train, advise, or assist interagency activities, nations important to U.S. interests, or indigenous or surrogate forces pursuing objectives that further U.S. interests. The categorization of ARSOA missions and collateral activities as direct or indirect is useful when discussing the general characteristics of these forces and when evaluating how various doctrinal principles apply to them. These categories are not mutually exclusive. 2-42. Certain ARSOA missions and collateral activities may be executed as sensitive special operations (SSOPS). These operations require national oversight and interagency coordination because of their low visibility and clandestine or (under special circumstances) covert methods. These techniques are used to ensure secrecy or concealment. All SSOPS are conducted in pursuit of national military, political, economic, or psychological objectives. SSOPS are characterized as politically or militarily sensitive and are of a high-risk nature. The activities of SO-related intelligence elements, when deployed through joint staff operations channels, are also defined as SSOPS. 2-43. ARSOA can support SOF in all of the core missions and collateral activities. ARSOA conducts these missions predominantly in a joint

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environment and may support the U.S. military conventional forces, multinational forces, or other agencies and special activities. ARSOF CORE MISSIONS 2-44. ARSOA participation in each ARSOF core mission and collateral activity varies. In a DA role, ARSOA’s primary contributions are to infiltrate SOF directly onto the objective or into a secure LZ where SOF can move to their target. With armed helicopters, ARSOA units provide CAS or conduct deep, unilateral, DA SO missions. They can support DA SO units as small as split SF teams and as large as a Ranger battalion. ARSOA can also conduct complex battalion-level air assault raids. They also support command, control, and communications, and intelligence (C3I), deception, and show-offorce operations. ARSOA infiltrates, provides CAS and airborne C2, and exfiltrates supported SOF. Normal ARSOA support for special reconnaissance (SR) operations is through infiltration, resupply, or exfiltration of SOF teams that perform these missions. Support for counterproliferation (CP) encompasses the same operational techniques used for DA, combatting terrorism (CBT), and SR, including any required transportation of seized equipment or materiel. ARSOA support to SOF conducting unconventional warfare (UW), Civil Affairs (CA), PSYOP, information operations (IO), and foreign internal defense (FID) is normally limited to a supporting role and can be accomplished by conventional or HN aircraft. If, however, the threat dictates, ARSOA can provide long-range, precise navigation insertion and extraction. Unconventional Warfare 2-45. UW is a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low-visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and E&R. 2-46. Winning the conventional land battle “remains the absolute priority,” despite an acknowledgment that potential adversaries are likely to follow unconventional strategies (terrorism, insurgency, or guerrilla warfare) when faced with a complex, adaptive army. Military operations conducted in enemy-held, enemy-controlled, or politically sensitive territory make up UW that includes guerrilla warfare and support to an insurgency. Indigenous personnel carry out UW. External forces may support or direct these forces in varying degrees in full spectrum operations. The focus of UW is primarily on the success of existing or potential insurgent, secessionist, or other resistance movements. The United States may engage in UW in three ways: as part of a major theater war (MTW) or lesser regional contingency, in support of a citizen or partisan defense intended as a deterrent, and as an effort to support an insurgency. Special Forces (SF) provide advice and support as training and assistance to UW organizations. Experiences in Afghanistan and Nicaragua prove that support for an insurgency can be an effective way of putting indirect pressure on adversaries. The costs versus the benefits of

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using UW against states that support insurgencies against the United States and its allies must be carefully considered before employment. 2-47. During war, properly integrated and synchronized UW can extend the depth of the conventional forces’ full spectrum operations. It gives the JFC the windows of opportunity to seize the initiative through offensive action. During UW, ARSOA supports the supported commander by conducting air movement of supported SOF teams, indigenous forces, and supplies. These air movements require ARSOA to conduct covert or clandestine penetration, precision navigation, and long-range infiltration and exfiltration. ARSOA is not for use in routine administrative and logistic air movements. It can, however, extract U.S. and allied personnel recovered by the unconventional assisted recovery mechanism (UARM). Foreign Internal Defense 2-48. FID is participation or training by ARSOF in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. FID operations develop political, economic, psychological, and military infrastructures of friendly governments to prevent or defeat an insurgency. Like UW, FID is an umbrella concept that covers a broad range of activities. Its primary intent is always to help the legitimate host government address internal threats and their underlying causes. FID is not restricted to times of conflict. It also can take place in the form of training exercises and other activities that show U.S. resolve to and for the region. These exercises train the HN to deal with potential internal threats. Because the U.S. Government does not normally commit its forces to combat against foreign insurgents, FID usually consists of indirect assistance, such as participation in combined exercises and training programs or limited direct assistance without U.S. participation in combat operations. These actions support the HN in establishing internal defense and development (IDAD) programs. 2-49. ARSOA assists FID operations by providing aviation assets to supported multinational SOF requiring ARSOA skills and equipment. It normally assists only in the movement of HN SOF to conduct surgical operations, such as precision application of fire with no collateral damage. In a FID environment, general aviation operations are inappropriate ARSOA missions. 2-50. ARSOA may conduct or support tactical operations in support of FID operations. The objective of tactical operations in FID is to provide a secure environment in which balanced development can occur. Tactical operations should not be independent military operations aimed solely at destroying insurgent combat forces and their base areas. Tactical operations should be part of a synchronized effort to achieve the national strategic objectives of the HN. Psychological Operations 2-51. PSYOP are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations,

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groups, and individuals. The purpose of PSYOP is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. 2-52. In full spectrum operations, PSYOP take on an added significance. Modern conflict is often a protracted politico-military struggle between political systems. It often encompasses all spheres of national activity— political, military, economic, social, and cultural. In protracted operations, noncombat activities can be as decisive as combat operations are in conventional warfare. Sometimes failure to achieve PSYOP objectives can mean defeat, regardless of the outcome of military operations. 2-53. In modern conflict, emphasis on the psychological or informational objective places PSYOP in a unique position. During stability operations and support operations, PSYOP can be used unilaterally or with economic, social, and political activities to limit or preclude the use of military force. In some cases, the military objective may be relevant only in terms of the psychological effect. History has shown that conflict is a battle of wills where the intangible nature of morale and willpower can be defeated more in psychological than physical terms. 2-54. Conventional assets or Air Force special operations forces (AFSOF) normally support overt PSYOP, aerial broadcast, and leaflet delivery. ARSOA, however, normally supports clandestine PSYOP missions. The use of ARSOA is advisable when broadcast and leaflet delivery requires penetration of nonpermissive airspace to reach the PSYOP target audience. ARSOA may be able to perform overt PSYOP missions if it is the only aviation asset available. Civil Affairs 2-55. CA are activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities, both government and nongovernment, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives. CA may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local government. These activities may occur before, during, or after other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. 2-56. ARSOA can provide freedom of maneuver for CA operations and CA coordination within the host country. Generally, ARSOA has limited use in CA. Normally, it only supports CA in support of an SF unit in a FID or UW mission. As in PSYOP, the best use of ARSOA is in covert or clandestine missions when hostile nations landlock the target audience or target country and the penetration of nonpermissive airspace is necessary. Information Operations 2-57. IO are actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one’s own information and information systems. IO include interacting with the global information environment and exploiting or denying an adversary’s information and decision capabilities. Activities that support IO include acquiring, using, protecting, managing, exploiting, and denying information and information systems.

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2-58. ARSOA conducts IO across the range of Army operations, from passive defense to PSYOP to precision strike operations against key information nodes. The goal of ARSOA within IO is to achieve information dominance at the right time, at the right place, and with the right weapons or resources. C2 measures gain and maintain information dominance. 2-59. Command and control warfare (C2W) is defined as the integrated use of OPSEC, military deception, PSYOP, EW, and physical destruction, mutually supported by intelligence, to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy adversary C2 capabilities while protecting friendly C2 capabilities against such actions. C2W applies across the operational continuum and all levels of conflict. C2W is further divided into command and control-attack (C2-attack), and command and control-protect (C2-protect) functions. The goal of C2-attack is to gain control over the adversary’s C2 function, both in terms of flow of information and level of situational awareness. During C2-attack, ARSOA through DA, can strike at the adversary’s capabilities at all echelons, targeting personnel, equipment, communications, and facilities in an effort to disrupt or shape an adversary’s C2. With effective C2-attack, ARSOF can either prevent an adversary from exercising effective C2 or leverage it to friendly advantage. SF, CA, and PSYOP can play a key role in C2-attack planning and operations with the creation and maintenance of regional databases on historical and cultural influences. SF, through SR, also can play a key role in intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB), and battle damage assessments (BDAs)—both soft and hard kill. 2-60. The goal of C2-protect is to maintain effective C2 of friendly forces by negating or turning to a friendly advantage the adversary’s efforts to influence, degrade, or destroy friendly C2 systems. C2-protect is divided into active and passive measures and seeks to limit the vulnerability of forces (personnel, equipment, and information) to hostile action. C2-protect includes countering an adversary’s propaganda to prevent it from affecting friendly operations, options, public opinion, and the morale of friendly troops. 2-61. PSYOP are an essential tool in both C2-attack and C2-protect operations. In C2-attack, PSYOP can drive a wedge between the adversary’s leadership and its populace to undermine the adversary leadership’s confidence and effectiveness. Through the proliferation of discrete messages, demonstrations, and surrender appeals to adversary C4I collectors, PSYOP forces magnify the image of U.S. superiority. In C2-protect, the main objective of PSYOP is to minimize the effects of an adversary’s hostile propaganda and disinformation campaigns against U.S. forces. PSYOP units must work closely with other C2W elements and public affairs (PA) and civilmilitary operations (CMO) strategists to maximize the advantage of IO. 2-62. CA forces support IO and facilitate military operations by applying their skills and experience in public administration, economics, public facilities, linguistics, cultural affairs, and civil information. Daily interfacing of CA with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), humanitarian relief organizations, local authorities, civilian populace, and military allows CA to passively gain information relevant to the commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR). When properly integrated, CA elements have an

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intricate and important role in providing information for the operational planning cycle. 2-63. ARSOA use PA to inform soldiers about where they fit in, what is expected of them, and how they help accomplish the mission, in addition to providing information to the external media regarding ongoing operations. This information also helps soldiers combat the effects of enemy propaganda or misinformation. ARSOA, through the public affairs officer (PAO), can initiate, direct, and emphasize internal information topics and programs that disseminate clear and objective messages about U.S. military operations. ARSOA commanders ensure that PA activities are synchronized with all operations and missions promoting early coordination of PA, CMO, and PSYOP functions during the planning process. For more information on IO, see FM 100-6, Information Operations. 2-64. ARSOA assists in defensive measures to protect C2 platforms, using passive sensors and hardened communications sites. ARSOA may provide a platform for offensive measures to be inserted into the battlespace. Direct Action 2-65. DA are short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions by SOF to seize, destroy, capture, recover, or inflict damage on designated personnel or materiel. In the conduct of these operations, ARSOA may employ raid, ambush, or direct assault tactics; emplace mines and other munitions; conduct standoff attacks by fire from air, ground, or maritime platforms; provide terminal guidance for precision-guided munitions; conduct independent sabotage; and conduct antiship operations. 2-66. Normally limited in scope and duration, DA operations usually incorporate an immediate withdrawal from the planned objective area. They are designed to achieve specific, well-defined, and often time-sensitive results of strategic and operational critical significance. 2-67. DA operations may be conducted independently or as part of larger conventional or unconventional operations or campaigns. Although normally considered close-combat type operations, DA operations also include sniping and other standoff attacks by fire delivered or directed by SOF. Standoff attacks are preferred when the target can be damaged or destroyed without close combat. SOF employ close combat tactics and techniques when the mission requires precise or discriminate use of force or the recovery or capture of personnel or material. 2-68. DA recovery missions are designed to locate, recover, and restore to friendly control selected personnel or materiel that are isolated and threatened in sensitive, denied, or contested areas. DA recovery missions usually result from situations that involve political sensitivity or military criticality of the personnel or materiel being recovered from remote or hostile environments. These situations may arise from a political change, combat actions, chance happening, or mechanical mishap. DA recovery operations differ from CSAR by use of— • Dedicated ground combat elements. • Unconventional techniques.

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• Predominantly clandestine search procedures. • The likelihood of indigenous assistance. 2-69. DA operations may be unilateral or combined actions but are still shortduration, discrete actions. ARSOA chain of command executes DA operations to achieve the theater CINC’s objectives. Unlike UW operations, they do not involve the support of an indigenous or surrogate chain of command to achieve objectives of mutual interest. 2-70. In a DA role, ARSOA’s primary contribution is assisting SOF infiltration. With organic armed helicopters, ARSOA units can also conduct deep, unilateral DA SO missions independently. ARSOA can support terminal guidance operations (TGO) or conduct TGO unilaterally. It can support DA SO units as small as three- to five-man teams and as large as a Ranger battalion. ARSOA air assault operations support DA missions that include raids, ambushes, and seizure of key facilities. They also support interdiction of major lines of communications, deception schemes, and shows-of-force. Special Reconnaissance 2-71. SR activities are reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted by SOF to obtain or verify, by visual observation or other collection methods, information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of an actual or potential enemy or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. SR includes target acquisition, area assessment, and post-strike reconnaissance. 2-72. SR complements national and theater intelligence collection assets and systems by obtaining specific, well-defined, time-sensitive information of strategic or operational significance. It may complement other collection methods constrained by human intelligence (HUMINT) activity that places U.S. or U.S.- controlled “eyes on target,” when authorized, in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive territory. Normal ARSOA support for SR operations is through infiltration, resupply, or exfiltration of SOF teams that perform these missions. ARSOA can also perform some SR missions independently and report strategic intelligence on enemy locations, intentions, and actions. Combatting Terrorism 2-73. CBT activities are actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire spectrum. HN responsibilities, Department of Justice and Department of State lead agency authority, legal and political restrictions, and appropriate DOD directives limit SOF involvement in CBT. 2-74. CBT involves offensive measures SOF agencies take to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. SOF apply specialized capabilities to preclude, preempt, and resolve terrorist incidents. The U.S. Department of Justice and the Department of State are the lead agency authorities. ARSOA’s support of a hostage rescue, the recovery of sensitive materiel, or an attack on the terrorist infrastructure is similar in nature to a DA mission. ARSOA provides

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CAS, provides airborne C2, and extracts supported SOF. Most CBT activities are classified. Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 2-75. CP activities are actions taken to seize, destroy, render safe, capture, or recover weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The major objectives of DOD CP policy are to prevent the acquisition of WMD and missile capabilities, roll back proliferation where it has occurred, deter the use of WMD and their delivery systems, and adapt U.S. military forces and planning to operate against the threats posed by WMD and their delivery systems. 2-76. Specific CP and CPWMD activities conducted by ARSOF are classified. See Joint Publication (JP) 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. COLLATERAL ACTIVITIES 2-77. ARSOA can provide limited support to ARSOF collateral activities. CS, CMO, humanitarian assistance (HA), and security assistance (SA) would normally be provided general support (GS). Counterdrug (CD) and special activities may require insertions and extractions, airborne C2, or air movement of seized materiel. The most significant of the collateral activities, CSAR can require the largest commitment of assets. Although not routinely organized or trained to conduct CSAR, ARSOA has the inherent capability to perform the mission. Each Service is required to provide CSAR for its own operations and be prepared to support the joint force as required. SOF can provide the ARSOF commander or theater SOC a CSAR capability that is timely and flexible. ARSOA can also provide the joint force commander an interim but limited JSRC capability during the initial stages of an operation. ARSOA is a highly trained force that is best used for SO requiring the unique capabilities of the aircraft (Appendix B) and its personnel. ARSOA supports ARSOF collateral activities as follows: Coalition Support 2-78. Coalition support by liaison elements improves the interaction of coalition partners and U.S. military forces, particularly in coalition warfare. It includes training coalition partners on tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), providing communications to integrate them into the coalition command and intelligence structure, and establishing liaisons to coordinate for CS and CSS. Liaison elements often give the JFC an accurate evaluation of the capabilities, location, and activities of coalition forces, thus facilitating JFC C2. Coalition support improves the interaction of coalition partners. SOF have unique capabilities for this mission because of their geographic orientation and language skills. ARSOA normally does not support coalition forces unless for a specific mission or capability. Combat Search and Rescue 2-79. CSAR is a specific task performed by rescue forces to recover distressed personnel during wartime or contingency operations. Personnel recovery (PR) is the umbrella term for operations that focus on the task of recovering captured, missing, or isolated personnel from denied or hostile territory. PR includes, but is not limited to, search and rescue (SAR); CSAR; survival,

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evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE); theater SAR; E&R; and the coordination of negotiated and forcible recovery options. 2-80. Each Service is responsible for providing forces capable of performing CSAR in support of its own operations and in support of the JFC. The ability of ARSOA to penetrate air defense systems and to conduct joint air, ground, or sea operations deep within hostile or denied territory at night or in adverse weather inherently makes ARSOA highly suitable for CSAR. Considering these capabilities, ARSOA may be tasked to perform CSAR for other components, or for the joint force as a whole, until they are able to establish their own capabilities. The JFC must realize that diversion of ARSOA assets to CSAR reduces their capability to perform their primary mission. In the 31 instances during Operation DESERT STORM where CSAR operations were not conducted, the initial risk assessment (a requirement for CSAR operations) convinced commanders that the risks outweighed the benefits. In these cases, the individual evaders independently made their way back to friendly control or to a point where CSAR or unconventional assisted recovery (UAR) could be accomplished. During a UAR, UW forces, dedicated SOF recovery teams, and UARMs direct the evader’s recovery. A UARM is an entity, group of entities, or organizations within enemy-held or hostile areas that operate to receive, support, move, and exfiltrate distressed military personnel or other selected individuals to friendly control. They are specially trained SOF and indigenous forces or other clandestine organizations, with unique capabilities to seek out, contact, authenticate, support, and return evaders and other distressed personnel to friendly control. Counterdrug Activities 2-81. CD activities are active measures taken to detect, monitor, and counter the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs. Most ARSOF CD activities are closely related to FID missions. Using their skills in cross-cultural communications, ARSOF train and support HN CD forces on critical skills required to conduct small-unit CD operations. ARSOA CD activities overseas support the geographic combatant commander’s regional CD campaign plan or the U.S. ambassador’s country-specific CD plans. CD operations are measures to disrupt, interdict, track, or destroy illicit drug activities. The levels of violence by the drug infrastructure may dictate the increased use of military and paramilitary forces in CD operations. A 1981 amendment to the Posse Comitatus (18 U.S. Code 1385) authorizes specific DOD assistance in drug interdiction. The primary role in this interagency activity is to support U.S. and HN CD efforts abroad. ARSOA support for CD is similar to the SR mission. Countermine Activities 2-82. Countermine (CM) activities attempt to reduce or eliminate the threat to noncombatants and friendly military forces posed by mines, booby traps, and other explosive devices. CM activities include mine awareness, identification and teaching of demining techniques, and minefield breaching operations. It does not include actual demining and minefield breaching operations. ARSOF, using their language skills and organic engineering and demolitions capabilities, along with conventional forces support, train HN forces in locating, recognizing, and safely disposing of mines and other

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destructive devices from a specific area. ARSOF also may assist in managing an HN’s or a multinational CM program. PSYOP and CA teams help local governments develop and execute public education programs to reduce risks to noncombatants through public awareness of the problem. ARSOA supports only unique CM missions, such as providing reconnaissance for and destroying anti-shipping mines in sea-lanes. Humanitarian Assistance 2-83. HA consists of programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to, or loss of, property. HA provided by U.S. forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the HN civil authorities or agencies (NGOs) that may have the primary responsibility for providing HA. ARSOF are well suited to perform HA activities in remote regions because of their rapid deployability, regional orientation, organic communications, and ability to sustain operations under adverse environmental conditions. SF and CA can assess the needs of an area quickly. They then communicate their assessment to a JFC or an ambassador to help design a plan to alleviate suffering. CA and PSYOP forces are particularly important in organizing the civilian infrastructure, in coordinating NGO activities, and in encouraging popular support of humanitarian efforts. Participation in HA requires significant interagency coordination. ARSOA supports HA only if the requirement is valid and GS is unavailable. Security Assistance 2-84. SA consists of a group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, and other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. The primary ARSOF role in SA is to provide mobile training teams (MTTs) and other forms of mobile training assistance. Public law prohibits personnel who provide SA services, including mobile training assistance, from performing combatant duties. SF, with CA and PSYOP attachments, are particularly effective in SA because they use the same regional orientation, communications, mobility, and other skills required for FID and UW missions. SA is a particularly valued activity because ARSOF train themselves in skills useful in stability operations and support operations while they train or otherwise assist foreign military forces. ARSOA normally does not participate in SA. Special Activities 2-85. Special activities fall under Executive Order 12333 and require a Presidential finding and Congressional oversight. ARSOA conduct special activities abroad that support national foreign policy objectives; however, these activities are conducted in such a manner that U.S. Government participation is neither apparent nor acknowledged publicly. Whether supporting or conducting a special activity, SOF may perform any of their

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primary wartime missions, subject to the limitations imposed on special activities. Such activities are highly compartmentalized and centrally managed and controlled. Mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC) and the nature of the special activities determine ARSOA’s involvement.

TACTICAL APPLICATION 2-86. ARSOA tactics focus on surprise, mass, maneuver, and simplicity. Mission execution should be during the hours of darkness, as risks increase during daylight operations. Low-level terrain flight altitudes during lowambient light or limited visibility provide the element of surprise. Training in night formation flight and precision navigation enables the massing of combat power at the precise time and place. The use of indirect routes exploits the increased range capability of the aircraft and is a measure to avoid known enemy locations or indigenous personnel. This capability allows ARSOA to maneuver over the battlespace. Simplicity is only possible because of the equipment employed by ARSOA. All ARSOA aircraft are capable of precision navigation, long-range secure communications, long-range flight performance, and increased weapons lethality.

EVASION AND RECOVERY 2-87. E&R includes the full spectrum of coordinated actions by evaders, recovery forces, and operational recovery planners to effect the successful return to friendly control of personnel isolated in hostile territory. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) is responsible for developing joint E&R TTP; publications; equipment; and specialized E&R aids and tools. They also provide functional survival and E&R training expertise to the Services and combatant commanders. USSOCOM is responsible for performing individual training of potentially isolated personnel and for developing and procuring equipment. Combatant commanders develop plans and requirements to locate, support, recover, and repatriate isolated personnel. 2-88. The Joint Operations Center (JOC) coordinates and synchronizes the overall E&R plan. The JSOTF headquarters (HQ) coordinates directly with the JOC. The ARSOA operations and training officer (S3) coordinates the planning process and makes sure the controlling command plan incorporates the requirements of the air element. The role of the ARSOA intelligence and training officer (S2) is to acquire the necessary publications and products to support the E&R plan. 2-89. The E&R plan must be simple, well coordinated, and disseminated as early as possible in the planning process. Simplicity will make the plan easy to memorize and execute during periods of mission urgency. Early dissemination allows all personnel to study the plan, memorize it, and anticipate the actions of others. A critical piece to the E&R plan is the evasion

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plan of action (EPA). As a minimum, the EPA should contain the following information: • Identification of each crew or team member (name and rank), the mission number, the aircraft or team call sign or identifier, the crew or team position, the type of aircraft, and the call sign suffix. • Planned route of flight for both ingress and egress, including in-flight emergency plans for each phase of the mission. • Immediate evasion actions and intentions for the first 48 hours, if uninjured. For example— Œ Hide near aircraft or parachute landing site or area of separation from team. Œ Evade alone or link up with crew or team (rally points). Œ Determine travel plans (distance, duration or time, speed, and other details). Œ Determine intended actions or length of stay at initial hiding location. Œ Identify person in charge on the ground. Œ Determine plan for handling sensitive items. • Immediate evasion actions or intentions if crew or team members are injured. The plan should include hiding intentions, evasion intentions, travel intentions, and intended actions at hiding locations. • Extended evasion actions or intentions after 48 hours. Include destination (selected area for evasion [SAFE], mountain range, coast, border, forward edge of the battle area [FEBA]); travel routes, plans, and techniques; actions or intentions at potential contact or recovery locations; and recovery or contact point signals, signs, or procedures. 2-90. Appropriate support personnel information and attach it to the EPA:

should

complete

the

following

• Color or letter of the day, month, or quarter; base time; base heading; base altitude; base number; code word; and other similar information, as applicable. • Available communications and signaling devices; type and quantity of radios; quantity of batteries; and type and quantity of flares, beacons, mirrors, strobe lights, and other items. • Primary communication schedule, procedures, and frequencies (first 48 hours and after 48 hours). • Backup communication schedule, procedures, and frequencies.

COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE 2-91. CSAR is a specific task performed by rescue forces to effect the recovery of distressed personnel during wartime or contingency operations. Each Service and USSOCOM is responsible for performing CSAR in support of its own operations. JFCs have primary authority and responsibility for

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CSAR in support of U.S. forces within their areas of responsibility (AORs). Additionally, the JFC should establish a JSRC to— • Monitor recovery efforts. • Plan, coordinate, and execute joint SAR and CSAR operations. • Integrate CSAR operations with other evasion, escape, and recovery operations within the geographical area assigned to the joint force. 2-92. Component commanders should establish a rescue coordination center (RCC) to coordinate all component CSAR activities, including coordination with the JSRC and other component RCCs as appropriate. If a component commander does not establish an RCC, those CSAR activities and responsibilities normally assigned to the RCC should be under another component staff organization, normally the operations section. For example, the joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC) normally designates each SOF component to carry out these responsibilities. 2-93. Component commanders should make sure all subordinate units properly prepare and maintain isolated personnel reports (ISOPREPs), including fingerprinting, for personnel whose duties may place them in danger of isolation. Department of Defense (DD) Form 1833 should be the primary means of authenticating isolated personnel. Component RCCs should make sure ISOPREPs are readily available to the JSRC or other higher authority upon request. 2-94. The ARSOA does not normally dedicate aircraft to perform CSAR. During mission planning, planners develop an internal CSAR plan. During mission execution, SOA provides aircraft to perform internal CSAR as required. 2-95. When SOA performs CSAR for a high priority evader, mission planners develop a mission similar to a DA mission, complete with rehearsal. When time does not allow for the ARSOA military decision-making process (MDMP), ARSOA mission planners use the crisis-action planning process. 2-96. On rare occasions, SOA must provide aircraft for the JSRC because it is the only asset in the theater that can perform the mission. CSAR is not a primary mission of SOA.

MARITIME OPERATIONS 2-97. ARSOA is inherently capable of providing viable maritime operations in a joint or unilateral environment. The U.S. Navy Service Component staff for maritime operations is thoroughly familiar with aviation procedures and coordination requirements. Elements of ARSOA are proficient in maritime operations. Aircraft, systems, and equipment comply with the current materiel requirements of joint procedures and regulations. ARSOA can perform assault missions with internal and external loads to support land or water-surface operations.

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Chapter 3

ARSOA Mission Planning Process If officers desire to have control over their command, they must remain habitually with them, industriously attend to their instruction and comfort, and in battle lead them well. Stonewall Jackson Winchester, Virginia, 1861

The first step in defining the ARSOA mission planning process is to identify the C2 structure. ARSOA operates under varied C2 relationships. Operating under varied relationships requires a clear, responsive, unified, and well-defined C2 structure. The command structure enhances mission response time and OPSEC to avoid excessive C2 layering. The relationship must— • Provide a clear, unambiguous chain of command. • Provide staff experience and expertise to plan, conduct, and support the operations. • Ensure ARSOA personnel participate during the entire planning process. Personnel conducting the mission must be thoroughly familiar with all operational and support requirements to match the capabilities of the employed force.

ARSOA PARTICIPATION DURING THE ENTIRE PLANNING PROCESS 3-1. C2 is the exercise of authority and direction by the designated commander assigned the forces to accomplish the mission. Figure 3-1, page 3-2, shows a typical C2 structure. ARSOA normally interacts with the JSOTF, the joint special operations air component (JSOAC), the special operations liaison element (SOLE), and the Army and Navy ground force elements. JOINT FORCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMPONENT COMMANDER 3-2. The JFSOCC normally delegates C2 of ARSOA to the JSOACC or gives operational control (OPCON) to the SOF ground commander. The JSOTF commander is the theater JFSOCC. In stability operations and support operations, the JSOTF commander reports directly to the geographic combatant commander. In war, he reports directly to the joint task force (JTF) commander. The JSOTF commander is the principal SO advisor in theater. All SOF normally fall under his control. The JSOTF commander may organize the JSOTF HQ as necessary to carry out all assigned duties and responsibilities. The commander may retain command of the ARSOA task force on an equal level with the conventional force commanders.

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Figure 3-1. Command and Control Structure JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER 3-3. The JSOTF commander may designate a subordinate commander as a JSOACC to coordinate the efforts of assigned aviation assets (Figure 3-2, page 3-3). If more than one aviation unit or Service is present, a JSOACC unifies the C2 of aviation assets under a single air manager. The JSOACC provides the command the most efficient use of aviation assets to mission requirements. The responsibilities of a JSOACC in a JSOTF are the same as the responsibilities he has working for a JFSOCC. The JSOACC is typically the SOC Service commander who has the preponderance of the aviation forces or is the most capable of conducting, commanding, and controlling operations within a given environment. The JSOACC is the single spokesperson for all SOF aviation. He is responsible for planning and executing joint air operations and for deconflicting and coordinating SOA with conventional air operations by direct coordination with the joint force air component commander (JFACC). The JSOAC works closely with the SOLE to ensure the receipt and disposition of all requirements sent to the JFACC. The JSOACC apportions ARSOA to SOF missions as required to support JFSOCC missions. The apportionment and use of assets are more efficient in supporting missions, and they reduce mission conflicts due to competing demands. ARSOA normally works closely with the JSOAC intelligence directorate (J2) and the JSOAC operations directorate (J3) but may also have requirements for manning the JSOAC based on METT-TC for a particular theater.

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Figure 3-2. Typical JSOACC Command Relationships SPECIAL OPERATIONS LIAISON ELEMENT 3-4. The SOLE team (Figure 3-3, page 3-4) provides SOF liaison to the JFACC and reports directly to the JSOTF. The SOLE is a joint SOF organization that includes SOF aircrews, intelligence, airspace, logistics, special tactics teams (combat control and pararescue teams), Army SF, and Navy sea-air-land (SEAL) teams. It ensures that all SOF targets, teams, and air missions are deconflicted, properly integrated, and coordinated at all planning and execution phases. Specific functions include air tasking order (ATO) and airspace control order (ACO) development, real-time mission support within the JFACC, operations and intelligence support for targeting, combat airspace control for prevention of fratricide, coordination with special plans and functions, and coordination with the JSRC. The SOLE coordinates and synchronizes SOF air and surface operations with conventional air operations. The SOLE must consider airborne fire support and reconnaissance C2 aircraft, aerial refueling, and deconfliction of deep battlefield operations. The SOLE also assists the JFACC in deconfliction of the joint special operations area (JSOA). ARSOA primarily interacts with the SOLE through the JSOAC, which ensures that ARSOA operations are deconflicted and supported with unconventional assets as required.

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Figure 3-3. Typical SOLE Organization

MISSION PLANNING 3-5. FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, explains the Army MDMP in depth. The MDMP is the foundation for planning in a timeconstrained environment. The products created during the full MDMP are for use during subsequent planning sessions when time may be unavailable for thorough planning and existing METT-TC factors are substantially unchanged. The desired outcome of an effective mission planning process is the synchronization of total combat power in the battlespace. PROCESS 3-6. The JSOTF uses the 96-hour special operations mission planning process (Figure 3-4, page 3-5). This process complements the C2 structure. The 96-hour time line is a base time line for mission support, but METT-TC can increase or reduce the time line as required. The time line generates from the earliest anticipated launch time (EALT), which is the JFSOCC’s best estimate for mission execution. The JSOAC must keep the JSOTF informed of ARSOA’s asset availability, as limited aviation platforms may affect JSOTF’s operating tempo (OPTEMPO) and hinder mission execution. The JFSOCC sends the tasking order to the joint air operations center (JAOC) and simultaneously to the ground force element and ARSOA 96 hours before the EALT. 3-7. ARSOA begins mission planning based on the EALT but determines the actual launch time to meet the time-on-target after METT-TC analysis. An important aviation link in this process is airspace coordination handled by the JSOACC and the JFACC through the SOLE. The JSOACC, the single air manager for SOF aviation, deconflicts JSOTF fixed-wing and rotary-wing missions. The JFACC, located at the JFC or other assigned location, deconflicts theater assets and produces allocation requests, ATOs, and ACOs or other assigned duties.

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Figure 3-4. The 96-Hour SO Mission-Planning Process

3-8. The 96-hour mission flow defines the JSOTF planning sequence and provides limits and boundaries to the mission process. ARSOA integrates the supported SOF ground commander’s plan into the mission planning process. The ARSOA representative to this process is the aviation LNO attached to the planning staff. The JFSOCC representation to the process is the SOLE. The JFSOCC provides the SOLE to coordinate, deconflict, and integrate SOF air and surface operations with conventional air operations. ARSOA receives the information copy of the tasking order (TASKORD) approximately the same time as the planning staff receives the support request (SPTREQ). ARSOA conducts parallel planning, allowing the LNO to receive initial guidance from the aviation commander and to input those limitations and constraints into the planning staff ’s COA development. LNO and SOLE input at this stage is critical in ensuring the feasibility of aviation survivability and support for the ground force commander’s COA. This early input reduces planning time through elimination of impracticable aviation COAs. The LNO participates in the war games with the planning staff to determine decision points and abort criteria critical to mission success. The SOLE ensures all support criteria for the mission are provided to the JFACC. Throughout the entire process, the LNO and SOLE keep higher HQ and the ARSOA operations officer informed of the mission’s direction and the CCIR and intent. 3-9. The LNO participates in the operation order (OPORD) brief to the supported ground force commander. (See Appendix C.) The ground force commander coordinates with the LNO to brief the preliminary ground plan and rehearsal plan. This first meeting with the ground force element is usually 8 to 12 hours after the ground force commander’s mission brief.

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During this period, the ground force element conducts its mission planning and completes a detailed aviation mission checklist. The checklist discusses infiltration, exfiltration, contingencies, communications, and other requirements. 3-10. The LNO takes the preliminary tactical plan, the rehearsal plan, and the completed checklist to the aviation operations officer for analysis. The LNO then disseminates the information to the air mission commander and the flight leader. If the rehearsal is complicated, the flight leader takes that responsibility from the LNO and conducts the rehearsal with the ground force element to develop the plan. The next meeting is not later than the ground force element’s back brief to the ground force commander. The flight leader finalizes the tactical plan, the E&R plan, the communications plan, and any other contingencies that may need adjustment after the rehearsals. The LNO and flight leader disseminate threat and mission updates from the ground force element until mission launch. The air mission commander (AMC), the flight leader, and the ground force commander perform simulation to examine the threat and to develop appropriate contingencies for flying given routes, using special operations forces planning and rehearsal system (SOFPARS). The planning and rehearsal information support (PARIS) provides information to SOFPARS during rehearsal and simulation. 3-11. ARSOA performs a tailored MDMP that parallels the ground force commander’s planning process. Several factors favor the MDMP. The primary ARSOA mission is to nurture ARSOA’s relationship with the ground force and to support the force with as many assets as the mission requires. This type of support forces ARSOA to react and adjust to the ground commander’s tactical plan, thus limiting the ARSOA COAs and planning time. 3-12. Throughout mission planning, SOA must remain flexible and adaptable to the ground force commander’s intent. Without the ground plan, ARSOA COAs are limited to asset availability, forward arming and refueling point (FARP) capability, and scheme of maneuver. ARSOA can develop and request suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) and fire support through the SOLE, but the ground force commander must integrate those requests into the tactical plan. ARSOA war games the entire tactical plan and finalizes full-mission profile rehearsals only after the ground force commander approves the ground force element’s plan. SR and FID missions may not require complex analysis and only static rehearsals (rock and contingency drills), as these missions usually require only infiltration and exfiltration operations. DA missions are, however, normally intricate operations that require detailed war-gaming and flying rehearsals. Synchronizing the planning, focusing the key players, conducting rehearsals, and performing precombat checks and inspections are critical to the ARSOA mission-planning process and to mission success. 3-13. Figures 3-5 through 3-7, pages 3-7 and 3-8, illustrate the sequence of ARSOA mission planning, including the tasks performed by each mission element. The mission-planning time line begins 106 hours before take-off and progresses to mission take-off (H-hour).

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Figure 3-5. Time-Line Phase, 106 Hours to 72 Hours

Figure 3-6. Time-Line Phase, 72 Hours to 48 Hours

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Figure 3-7. Time-Line Phase, 48 Hours to Take-Off (H-Hour) REHEARSALS 3-14. The rehearsal is a major step in the ARSOA MDMP model. It allows all soldiers to visualize the events and contingencies required for successful accomplishment of the mission. Conducting the rehearsal presents two significant challenges: time available and selection of the rehearsal facilitator. ARSOA rehearsal must integrate into the supported ground force commander’s MDMP sequence, as well as the overall mission plan. The rehearsal facilitator must be intimately familiar with the plan and have sufficient time to prepare adequately for the rehearsal. An LNO, a ground force commander, an air mission commander, or an ARSOA full-missionqualified aviator may fill this role. The person chosen must understand the plan and have the time to rehearse the mission properly. The rehearsal serves several purposes: • It allows the key players an opportunity to visualize the key events of the plan and identified contingencies. • It provides a forum for key players to analyze and make adjustments to the plan. • It reinforces and confirms the final version of the mission plan discussed in the war game and briefed in the air mission brief. 3-15. When time permits, ARSOA executes a combined arms rehearsal, with ground force representation. If a ground force representative is unavailable, an ARSOA officer should serve as the ground force advocate in the rehearsal. Based on the limited time normally available for rehearsals, ARSOA normally uses the sketch map or terrain model technique or the rock drill.

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The sketch or model replicates the terrain of the area of operations and should reflect the route, objective, and key terrain necessary for the mission. Detailed terrain models, sketches, or maps and diagrams of appropriate key terrain may be used. The techniques chosen must ensure the air and ground forces gain a better understanding of the plan while the force remains postured to preserve combat power. 3-16. Planning and preparation are critical to the success of the rehearsal. The essential elements of the preparation are the rehearsal plan, the script, and ground rules. The disciplined execution of the mission plan ensures that the rehearsal reflects the plan clearly, simply, directly, and completely. Rehearsal Plan 3-17. Identification of major events to be rehearsed and the time available is critical to the rehearsal plan. The facilitator must be familiar with key events of the concept of the operation, scheme of maneuver, and contingencies to build the rehearsal plan. The rehearsal plan should address the agenda, the response sequence (who is talking), and actions checklist (friendly and enemy), and the sequence of events. The amount of time available determines the level of detail and resolution of the rehearsal. At a minimum, the actions on the objective must be rehearsed. As the amount of time available increases, other key events should be rehearsed. An ideal rehearsal includes the full-mission profile, from start to finish, and all first-level contingencies. Participants of the rehearsal are the AMC, all aircrews, and representatives from each staff section. The AMC approves the key events for the rehearsal. Script 3-18. The script provides structure, focus, and discipline to the rehearsal. Mission walk-through should occur twice during the rehearsal. During the first iteration, the walk-through should not include contingencies. The second iteration includes all planned contingencies. Ground Rules 3-19. The S2 briefs deployments of the enemy during each phase and addresses the most likely and most dangerous enemy COAs. The S2 makes sure the plan is suitable and feasible against the enemy’s most dangerous response. The ground force representative or LNO briefs the ground force disposition and scheme of maneuver during the appropriate phase. The AMC determines when the rehearsal meets the standards and is complete.

WAR GAME PROCESS 3-20. The scope of the ARSOA war game is more limited than the war game of ground force counterparts, but it is no less important. As a supporting unit, ARSOA assists the ground force commander in developing and analyzing his COAs. ARSOA then fully develops the aviation concept of the COA selected by the ground force commander. 3-21. The war game is a critical step in refining and developing the aviation plan to support the ground force commander adequately. The ARSOA challenge is to make the war game fit into the parallel planning process.

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ARSOA may need to conduct its own war game before the ground force commander’s COA decision; however, the purpose of the ARSOA war game process is to refine and develop the aviation concept of the ground force commander’s COA fully. During the war game, the commander or AMC can make decisions, assess risk, and provide guidance to keep the plan and planning process focused. The process also allows the AMC, flight leaders, and staff to— • Visualize the plan from the same form of reference. • Identify and discuss contingencies. • Determine decision points and discuss preconditions and associated CCIR necessary in making feasible, acceptable, and suitable decisions. • Anticipate battlespace events. • Synchronize the fight and necessary resources. • Determine the C2 plan for each phase of the operation. • Identify hazards, assess risk, and implement control measures. • Refine the bump plan.

COMMUNICATIONS 3-22. ARSOA communications must support covert air-to-air and air-toground aircraft communications for C2, mission deconfliction, and mission support to SOF units. Figure 3-8 depicts the C2 networks necessary to support the ARSOA C2 structure. The location of the JSOACC depends on the command relationship between the supporting and supported units.

Figure 3-8. ARSOA C2 Communications Connectivity

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3-23. ARSOA aircraft employ multiband satellite communications (SATCOM), single-channel ultrahigh frequency (UHF) SATCOM, high-frequency (HF) burst and data, and amplitude-modulated (AM) or frequency-modulated (FM) line of sight radios that are interoperable with supported SOF units. ARSOA does not have organic SATCOM assets—it requires augmentation. Figure 3-9 illustrates ARSOA command, control, communications, and computers (C4) systems connectivity.

Figure 3-9. ARSOA C4 Systems Connectivity

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Chapter 4

Combat and Combat Support The onus of supply rests equally on the giver and the taker. General S. Patton, 1947

ARSOA requires CS from either SO or other capable units (theater, Service, joint, or combined forces). This chapter discusses ARSOA CS requirements, the use of other CS units, and CS request procedures.

FIRE SUPPORT 4-1. Fire support is often critical to mission success. The nature of the ARSOA mission requires fire support to be timely and target critical. It must not, however, prematurely reveal the objective of the mission; therefore, emphasis is on OPSEC. 4-2. For ARSOA-supported missions, the supported unit originates most fire support requests. The ARSOA commander requires the fire support request and status to be included in SOA mission planning. The fire support coordinator for the entire SO mission, including the ARSOA portion, is the mission planning agent (MPA). Fire support requests go to the JSOTF or SOC J3 as appropriate. When working for the joint force land component commander (JFLCC), SOF coordinates with the land component commander’s (LCC’s) G3 and fire support element (FSE) for fire and air support. When they operate as a separate component, the commander, joint special operations task force (COMJSOTF) obtains and deconflicts air and fire support through the Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB) process. FIRE SUPPORT ASSETS 4-3. Fire support assets may be available to ARSOA, including field artillery, the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), naval surface fire support (NSFS), and tactical air support. Field Artillery 4-4. SOF have no organic field artillery. Field artillery units may have a mission of direct support (DS) to SOF for an operation. These DS field artillery units focus their positioning and fire planning to meet the needs of the SOF. Field artillery units, with a mission of GS or GS reinforcing, may provide fire support to SOF. These field artillery units support the force as a whole and are generally not as responsive as DS units. Requests for field artillery support go to the SOC through normal channels, down to the supporting field artillery unit. The nature of ARSOA missions results in most missions being flown beyond the range of friendly field artillery. This extended range makes field artillery support most useful for covering ingress

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and egress and for local SEAD. The support may be solely for the ARSOA mission, or it may be a combined effort with other fire missions. It may also be a diversion to preserve the clandestine characteristics of the ARSOA mission. Army Tactical Missile System 4-5. With a range of 165 kilometers, the ATACMS is the best groundlaunched fire support system for ARSOA deep missions. Because ARSOA normally operates deep in enemy territory, ATACMS is a viable support asset if it is both in theater and available to SOF. Limited assets and control at corps level, however, dictate the need for early, detailed support requests to ensure— • Allocation of munitions. • Designation of launchers. • Identification of request procedures. • Establishment of sensor-to-shooter relationships. Naval Surface Fire Support 4-6. When operations occur near a coastline, NSFS to ARSOA is the same as field artillery support. Like field artillery, the request for NSFS is at the joint level through the SOC J3. Coordination and use of NSFS are similar to field artillery and tactical air (TACAIR). Tactical Air Support 4-7. The Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps can provide TACAIR support. TACAIR has the range and firepower to support ARSOA missions anywhere in the theater. Requests for TACAIR support go through command channels to the JFACC. The JFACC makes sure the air component commander (ACC) satisfies all TACAIR requirements. The single-air-manager concept is a proven concept, universal to all theaters. The JFACC provides effective procedures, the organization, and the resources to manage aircraft in the theater. The SOC, JSOACC, or SOLE coordinates requests for TACAIR with the JFACC. If the JFACC cannot support the SOC because of higher priority requests and the SOC views its needs as critical, the commander, joint task force (CJTF), through the JTCB (if established), reviews and establishes priorities. TACAIR, when available, can support SEAD, interdiction, or CAS. Planning for TACAIR includes detailed timing and definition of either the target or the mission requirements. Requests for preplanned missions should occur 72 hours in advance for inclusion in the ATO process. Exact target coordinates, however, are unnecessary until immediately before the launching of the mission. If precision-guided munitions are the best ordnance for ARSOA support requirements, they should be a part of the initial request. Comments should also include whether the target designation is by TACAIR, ARSOA, other SOF, or other agencies. The controlling agency normally approves requests for immediate support if aircraft is available with the appropriate ordnance. 4-8. U.S. Army aviation can provide additional aerial fire support to ARSOA beyond its own capabilities. Early aviation liaison with representatives from

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supporting attack helicopter or air cavalry elements is necessary to enhance the understanding of ARSOA missions and tactics, to ensure the transfer of vital information, and to enhance mutual trust. 4-9. U.S. Army aviation support to ARSOA may include aerial demonstrations, feints, or raids. Demonstrations and feints may divert the enemy’s attention while ARSOA penetrates the forward line of own troops (FLOT) at another location and upon return from the mission. Raids may require massed aerial fire support to ARSOA when dictated by mission requirements. Examples of external aerial fire support missions and targeting include neutralization or destruction of reaction forces in the vicinity of the objective or target, C3I and air defense artillery (ADA) facilities and installations, and vehicle targets. AIR INTERDICTION 4-10. Air interdiction operations are conducted to destroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy’s military potential, thereby reducing the need for detailed integration of fire and movement of friendly forces. Close coordination with the battlefield coordination detachment (BCD) and the tactical air control system (TACS) is necessary to emphasize the nature and need of any SO request for TACAIR. The JTCB and the TACS obtain and deconflict air and fire support through the JTF’s established targeting process. If interdiction taskings affect ARSOA missions or requests, the JTCB must be aware of these taskings to prevent fratricide. Deconfliction of air interdiction operations is performed through the JSOACC to the JFACC directly or through the SOLE. If provided, the SOLE is the COMJSOTF’s primary link to the JFACC’s targeting cell. CLOSE AIR SUPPORT 4-11. CAS includes air action by fixed- and rotary-winged aircraft against hostile targets in close proximity to friendly forces. It requires detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. CAS can be a preplanned effort or an immediate action. Although exact targets and coordinates are unnecessary, requests for preplanned CAS should occur 72 hours in advance. On-call CAS tasks aircraft to support a specific operation within a defined period with requested ordnance. The request normally does not specify the exact target location. If an immediate need for TACAIR becomes apparent, a call to a controlling agency—such as the air support operations center (ASOC), the airborne battlefield command and control center (ABCCC), or the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)—normally determines if TACAIR assets are available. The agency may immediately divert assets to support ARSOA requirements. When TACAIR is diverted for immediate CAS, the requester must control the aircraft in the target area. RECONNAISSANCE 4-12. Immediate reconnaissance is normally unavailable. The procedures for requesting the support, however, are the same as those for CAS.

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SEAD AND JOINT SUPPRESSION OF ENEMY AIR DEFENSES 4-13. SEAD and joint suppression of enemy air defenses (J-SEAD) may be necessary to penetrate and exit enemy territory during the conduct of ARSOA missions. Careful planning by both is necessary to prevent disclosure of the targeted areas. Enemy reaction usually occurs to increased activity in operational areas. Ideally, SEAD support for other operations or with other activities should be the primary method of support for ARSOA. J-SEAD and SEAD activities can also distract enemy defenses from the actual planned routes or sequence of ARSOA operations. PLANNING 4-14. Like TACAIR, requests for SEAD go through the theater JFACC. SEAD planning occurs at the JAOC level. All requests for SEAD support should go to the JAOC. Although local SEAD often supports high-priority missions, SEAD planning is normally on a theater or area basis rather than a single-mission basis. Tasking SEAD assets to fill the ARSOA SEAD requests is, therefore, normally a part of a comprehensive GS package. To compete for scarce assets, SEAD requirements must be on time within the theater’s ATO cycle. COORDINATION 4-15. SEAD is temporary. It does not have long-term effects unless it is part of a major extended SEAD operation. Although dedicated SEAD support for some ARSOA missions may be necessary, the timing of SEAD must take advantage of the initial impact yet not jeopardize the ARSOA mission. The SEAD request must specifically state the greatest need for SEAD, including where and when. Normally, full coverage of an operation is impossible because of limited, dedicated SEAD assets. SEAD support may also be split, such as between TACAIR and artillery, and be for different areas or targets or at a different time. ASSETS AND TECHNIQUES 4-16. SEAD may be by fires or electronic means and by airborne or surfacebased systems. For example, artillery can silence some defenses, and airborne jammers can degrade acquisition systems. Combining these assets increases the total effect of SEAD support. Normally, SEAD is part of an overall operation, which includes other TACAIR and ground activities. SEAD support may not be obvious unless the supported unit knows that SEAD is taking place. Limited numbers of lethal and nonlethal SEAD systems may restrict the availability of SEAD, particularly under quick-reaction requirements. In general, operations should include the employment of SEAD or J-SEAD on all known targets.

AIR DEFENSE 4-17. Although ARSOA does not have organic ADA assets, air defense may be available from several sources. Elements of the divisional forward area air defense (FAAD) battalions or the corps Patriot battalions may, for example, provide air defense support. Depending on the theater, echelons-above-corps (EAC) Patriot units may provide incidental ADA coverage as well. Because of

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its range, the Patriot provides coverage well beyond the FLOT and engages hostile aircraft and missiles attempting to penetrate the forward area. Patriot units can support corps and EAC units. 4-18. Without proper coordination and integration in the modern battlespace, the potential exists for conflict between aviation and air defense operations. ADA units must neutralize hostile aircraft and missiles in the same airspace where friendly aviation units conduct operations. To coordinate each other’s efforts, the units observe the following three control statuses of air defense weapons: • WEAPONS HOLD: Do not fire except in self-defense or in response to a formal order. • WEAPONS TIGHT: Engage aircraft only if positively identified as hostile in accordance with (IAW) published hostile criteria. • WEAPONS FREE: Engage aircraft if not positively identified as friendly. 4-19. To reduce the risk of fratricide, units must coordinate with the area air defense commander (AADC) for routes through borders, FLOTs, or defense zones before mission execution. Similarly, units must request any dedicated air defense requirements or combat air patrol (CAP) over enemy territory before mission execution. Like SEAD, CAP attracts the attention of the enemy. To prevent compromising ARSOA activities, units must, therefore, use CAP judiciously. CAP may serve as a barrier between enemy air bases and the ARSOA mission or route area, as a moving CAP near the route or task force, or as a sweep ahead of ARSOA aircraft. In any case, close coordination with the supporting unit is an absolute necessity.

ATTACK HELICOPTERS 4-20. The accuracy and lethality of attack helicopters make them useful in supporting egress or ingress operations. The limited availability of attack helicopters (as a theater asset) and their versatility place them in great demand. The ARSOA commander must, therefore, state his intent, submit early requests, plan for the use of these helicopters, and specify the desired mission results. Staging the ARSOA mission from the same base as the attack helicopters allows face-to-face briefings, which in turn improve mission coordination. Staging from the same base also reduces the operational visibility of ARSOA operations.

INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE 4-21. To operate deep within enemy territory successfully, ARSOA units must avoid enemy detection. They must give particular attention to avoiding enemy acquisition systems. Current intelligence on the location, status, and operating modes and frequencies of enemy acquisition and tracking systems is essential. ARSOA uses intelligence information to plan routes and to determine the needs and settings of aircraft survivability equipment (ASE). It also uses the information to determine the type of non-SO support it requires. ARSOA mission planners use combat information and intelligence to plot infiltration and exfiltration routes and to recommend LZs. ARSOA has access

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to Air Force special operations weather teams (SOWTs) to support battalion and task force deployments. 4-22. The SOC J2 is the primary agency for tasking and disseminating intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) information to support ARSOA. The MPA is the main focus for requesting and disseminating mission-specific information requirements (IRs). The supported unit, such as an SF detachment, usually coordinates IRs for the mission and passes them to the MPA, who forwards them to the SOC J2. The SOC J2 then sends the ARSOAspecific IRs to the JSOACC. The JSOACC J2 then determines if SO, Army, or Air Force intelligence sources can best fill the need. Cross-coordination of IRs at all times and levels during mission planning is necessary to prevent the duplication of IRs and to ensure the availability of essential intelligence to the planners. 4-23. The SO IEW system is the Special Operations Command, Research, Analysis, and Threat Evaluation System (SOCRATES). ARSOA has no connection to any other intelligence net, and current table of organization and equipment (TOE) limitations do not allow ARSOA task forces to deploy a SOCRATES. ARSOA, therefore, must rely on either SF-, ARSOF-, or AFSOFdeployed SOCRATES for access to intelligence products and reports. Collocating the ARSOA task force with the Special Forces group (SFG), AFSOF, or JSOACC, allows access to a SOCRATES and to the intelligence data needed for mission planning. ARSOA units should automatically submit their standing IRs to the JSOACC or the JSOC J2 for early resolution. INTELLIGENCE 4-24. Although ARSOA units gather certain operational intelligence as part of their overall mission, they have no dedicated organic intelligence-gathering capability. The ARSOA task force S2 does not process intelligence—it is a forwarding office only. The lack of any deployable connection to an operations and intelligence net also reduces the ability to enter mission debriefings into the intelligence nets. 4-25. Route selection partially depends on known enemy air defense locations. A target information broadcast system or another system collects this information. The detect-and-destroy radius of known enemy positions allows the system to select routes that avoid these positions. Normally, these systems are unavailable at the Air Force special operations component (AFSOC); however, access to them is necessary during the planning phase. ELECTRONIC WARFARE 4-26. ARSOA relies upon a combination of organic ASE and CS systems to defeat enemy ground and air defenses. Ideally, SEAD and other activities, such as ground and airborne jammer support, decrease the need for ARSOA to use active ASE. The use of organic equipment to defeat enemy tracking systems and missiles is, however, necessary. Coordination with supporting units and intelligence agencies provides the data necessary for mission planning. ARSOA planners should tailor route selection, ASE settings and equipment, and tactics to the expected threats.

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COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 4-27. ARSOA has no organic deployable counterintelligence (CI) assets. SOC, JSOTF, or another appropriate higher echelon must accomplish coordination and support for ARSOA CI needs.

WEATHER SUPPORT 4-28. ARSOA has an Air Force weather team assigned that supports battalion task force deployments. The support permits face-to-face weather briefings for flight crews. It also gives the flight crews access to Air Weather Service products. If the weather team is not in place, ARSOA task forces normally receive weather support from AFSOF, SOC, or a SOWT attached to an SFG. ARSOA requires light data, sea condition data, and weather forecasts from deep within enemy territory up to 72 hours before mission execution. Accurate and current weather forecasting, including satellite weather forecasting products and interpretation, is necessary for mission planning to support route selection, equipment requirements, fuel needs, and combat support.

EXTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT 4-29. ARSOA task forces have no deployable switchboard or mobile subscriber equipment. They require additional state-of-the-art HF equipment and peripherals to integrate with theater C2 nets. They normally receive message traffic through a collocated unit, another supporting unit, or radio facsimile. Full communications with other theater and service HQ require support from either a signal battalion, an SFG, a Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE), a SOC, a JSOTF, or other units.

ENGINEER SUPPORT 4-30. Corps and division engineer units may support ARSOA. When available, engineer units conduct a variety of missions to support ARSOA. MOBILITY 4-31. Engineer reconnaissance teams may assist in reconnaissance missions to locate possible sites for FARPs, LZs, or forward operational bases (FOBs). Engineers provide current mine threat overlays that may impact on ground operations. They clear obstacles and possible booby traps. COUNTERMOBILITY 4-32. Engineers support countermobility by providing hasty protective row minefield training and by installing obstacles to disrupt, turn, fix, and block enemy forces. SURVIVABILITY 4-33. Engineers construct berms and trenches to protect holding areas and FARPs. They help construct wire obstacles around the perimeter. They also help in training camouflage techniques.

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GENERAL ENGINEERING 4-34. Engineers perform tasks to ensure the continuous supply of CS and CSS assets forward, including replacement of tactical bridges, support facilities, and area damage control. Tasks also include constructing, maintaining, and repairing combat roads and trails, main supply routes, and lines of communication. TOPOGRAPHIC ENGINEERING 4-35. Engineers provide terrain data in support of air and ground operations. Terrain data help identify possible air corridors, FARP operations, potential LZs and PZs, and terrain that can mask movement.

NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL SUPPORT 4-36. ARSOA has no organic capability to provide thorough decontamination. It can, however, conduct limited, hasty decontamination. The greatest nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) threat is crossing the FLOT, the location of the highest concentration of troops. The MPA must be very mindful of known or suspected NBC-contaminated areas and must avoid them. ARSOA must coordinate with the corps NBC decontamination element upon exposure of ARSOA aircraft to NBC agents.

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Chapter 5

ARSOA Logistics Support I don’t know what . . . this logistics is that Marshall is always talking about, but I want some of it. Fleet Admiral E.J. King, 1942

The U.S. Army strategy for conducting land warfare has changed from AirLand Operations to force projection. Most ARSOF units are in the continental United States (CONUS) and have always operated in a forceprojection mode. USASOC has aligned its ARSOF sustainment organizations and activities with the U.S. Army’s concept of force projection. This change allows ARSOF to integrate organic CS and CSS elements within the theater Army support structure for continuous, responsive sustainment to deployed ARSOF.

ARSOF LOGISTICS ENVIRONMENT 5-1. The type of operation, deployment sequence, unit basing, and AOR shape the logistics environment for ARSOF. A common problem throughout the logistics environment is the integration and distribution of logistics to committed ARSOF. 5-2. A robust sustainment system that builds up over time into a mature logistics infrastructure characterizes a protracted MTW. When the theater support system is in place, it can meet most ARSOA requirements, except dedicated DS or GS that ARSOF CS or CSS elements must provide. 5-3. ARSOA logistics planners must concentrate on— • Initial entry. They must determine the type of sustainment required, the number of days of accompanying supplies based on the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD), and the ARSOA basing needs. • Buildup and integration. They must coordinate and integrate ARSOA logistics with the theater support system before TPFDD closure and as it continues to mature. In some cases, the theater logistics infrastructure never achieves full maturity. • Redeployment. As units start the redeployment phase, the Army Service component command (ASCC) makes sure the remaining support units (HN or contract) are able to meet stay-behind ARSOF support requirements. 5-4. Each peacetime operation is unique and requires mission-specific analysis that develops a tailored sustainment force. Joint, international, and interagency activities add complexity to the sustainment system. ARSOF may conduct peacetime operations outside a theater support system because of

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geographic location. Preparation and submission of a statement of requirements (SOR) during these types of operations not only enhance the unit’s requirements determination process but also add a final review to the theater operation plan (OPLAN).

PREPARATION MODES 5-5. Deliberate planning and crisis-action planning are the two methods of planning for continued CS and CSS. In deliberate planning and preparation, ARSOA can fully identify support requirements for OPLANs and concept plans (CONPLANs) in a bare base SOR down to the user level. This way, the ASCC coordinates in fulfilling requirements from the support structure in the theater Army and prepares a support plan establishing and identifying support relationships. In crisis-action planning and preparation, the requirements the combatant commander anticipates dictate the amount of responsiveness and improvisation for reactive, no-notice support and sustainment. Upon notification of mission requirements, ARSOA units submit another SOR, thus modifying logistics requirements that differ from the bare base SOR and published theater support plan. SPECIAL OPERATIONS SUPPORT COMMAND (SOSCOM) 5-6. The geographic combatant commander establishes the command relationship involving ARSOF. Regardless of command relationships in theater, the relationships do not affect support for ARSOA. The ASCC has Title 10 U.S. Code responsibility to support and sustain all ARSOF unless the commander designates otherwise. The theater combatant commander may direct the ASCC or other Service component to support and sustain ARSOF in common items and services. SOSCOM HQ provides C2 of its organic elements and, when directed, deploys its CS and CSS battalions in DS of deployed ARSOF. Figure 5-1, page 5-3, shows the organization of the SOSCOM. SPECIAL OPERATIONS THEATER SUPPORT ELEMENT (SOTSE) 5-7. The SOTSE is a staff planning, coordinating, and facilitating element. It serves as the bridge between ARSOF and the operational and tactical logistics levels to make sure the tactical commander has all the necessary resources to accomplish the mission. Each ASCC commander has a SOTSE embedded within the staff. As a part of the ASCC staff, the SOTSE plays a key role in identifying support requirements. 5-8. A critical source of information the ASCC needs in its coordination and facilitation functions is the SOR from the ARSOF units. The ARSOA, regiment logistics (S4), and other logistics staffs must be proactive and be a part of the mission-planning process. The logistics planners must anticipate operational unit requirements at all stages of the mission. Ideally, the regiment S4 uses the ASCC OPLAN in preparing his CONPLAN for inclusion in the mission order. This approach allows theater support elements time to review required support before the ARSOA mission unit submits its missiontailored SOR. This review is especially critical in crisis-action planning and short-notice mission changes. Appendix D provides the format of an aviationspecific SOR.

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Figure 5-1. Special Operations Support Command Organization

STATEMENT OF REQUIREMENTS FLOW 5-9. The SOR is a living document that requires periodic reevaluation and updating as requirements change. Determination of requirements begins with the receipt of the mission. Figure 5-2, page 5-4, depicts the SOR flow. Time and accuracy are critical factors. The intent of the SOR process is to make sure each ARSOF unit or task force submits a comprehensive, valid SOR early in the planning cycle. The unit or task force coordinates through its higher HQ operations and logistics staff to provide the USASOC Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) an initial list of requirements. The USASOC DCSOPS tasks the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG) to source all requirements.

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Figure 5-2. ARSOF Statement of Requirements Flow

5-10. When an ARSOA unit receives a mission, it updates the standing SOR developed during the deliberate-planning process. The ARSOA commander uses this SOR to cross-level supplies necessary at the assigned mission unit level. The SOR identifies and consolidates in priority all unit requirements that exceed organic capabilities. The mission unit forwards the SOR to the next higher organization. 5-11. At the next higher level, the SOR begins the process into the operational channels, through the S3 or operations staff officer (G3). The operations and logistics sections review the SOR and direct or assist crossleveling and transfer of necessary items in the most expeditious way possible. The staff level then forwards the SOR to the next higher level for any supplies and services remaining on the SOR. This staff level forwards an SOR through the process again, requesting only the supplies and services not previously obtained. At the next level, USASOC coordinates with DA HQ, Army Materiel Command (subordinate commands), other agencies, and major commands to source all requirements. 5-12. To complete the SOR process, USASOC forwards unsatisfied support requirements (two copies of the SOR—one to the SOC and the other to the

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ASCC for information pending validation) to the SOC for validation. The SOC coordinates with the ASCC for the necessary supplies and services. 5-13. The theater ASCC then tasks the assigned units the sustainment mission. After all the units specify their efforts to satisfy all support requirements identified in the SOR, the ASCC publishes a support plan providing the details of the support. If the ASCC cannot sustain the ARSOA mission or a sister Service can better sustain it, the theater ASCC forwards the SOR to the theater CINC for assistance. 5-14. The SOR flow is not an exact procedure. More than one level may be working the sustainment issues at the same time. ARSOA develops an SOR for all theater contingency plans. The ASCC staff looks at the key issues and coordinates them before submitting the revised SOR. ARSOA LOGISTICS SUPPORT EXECUTION 5-15. Conventional CSS organizations and procedures are adequate for ARSOA requirements. Standard procedures are in place to handle the few ARSOA-peculiar requirements. The ASCC is responsible for reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) and follow-on support and sustainment of in-theater Army forces, including ARSOA. The ASCC is responsible for intermediate staging bases. ARSOA have some key differences that impact on the type of support required for RSOI and sustainment. The following conditions occur often enough that they must receive special consideration during logistics planning: • Forward-deployed ARSOA units are usually in isolated and austere locations. Distribution is the key consideration. • Some special equipment exists; however, most equipment is Army common, and organic ARSOA assets can maintain it. RESPONSIBILITIES 5-16. Responsibilities for planning and executing theater support do not align with the levels of war or with the HQ normally associated with them. The ASCC provides the necessary capability for the Army forces assigned to a unified command. 5-17. The theater SOC tasks missions to ARSOF. The theater SOC works closely with the unified command staff and the theater ASCC to articulate the ARSOF requirements. The theater CINC establishes priorities and allocates the available resources to ARSOF to accomplish each mission. The ASCC develops the theater support plan, which includes sustainment of ARSOA by the theater logistics organizations. The theater SOC then monitors in-theater ARSOA sustainment. 5-18. The SOC and ARSOA logisticians coordinate with the ASCC to develop plans and subsequent orders or to implement directives the ASCC issues to support the ARSOF assigned to the unified command. The SOC advises the ASCC commander on the appropriate command and support relationships for each ARSOF mission. The SOTSE keeps SOSCOM informed of the status of ASCC supporting plans.

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5-19. The geographic combatant commander supports ARSOF in his AOR. The ARSOA logistics planners identify the support requirements in the planning phase. The ASCC must also identify the logistics shortfalls for inclusion in the CINC’s risk assessment in his AOR. If the ASCC cannot support ARSOF, the ASCC must raise the shortfall to the supported CINC for resolution.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 5-20. Planners must address the following considerations: • Maximizing the use of existing facilities. • Limiting CSS requirements to mission essentials. • Concentrating maintenance on returning major end items to service. • Relying on air lines of communications (ALOC) for rapid resupply. • Anticipating high attrition during resupply missions into denied areas. • Identifying to the ASCC as early as possible those items that require operational floats or other special logistics arrangements. • Making maximum use of HN support, including local and third country resources. • Coordinating basing requirements for surveillance and security force support during combat operations. 5-21. The collocation of ARSOA assets with other SOF reduces distribution problems and facilitates use of the airlift. ARSOA organic support capabilities and limitations include— • Class I. The ARSOA task force deploys with a basic load of meals, ready to eat (MREs) for initial sustainment. They have no organic food service or water storage capability. • Class II. ARSOA deploys with a basic load of administrative supplies for initial sustainment. It has limited document management resources, such as computers, copiers, and shredders. • Class III. ASCC pipeline support, joint assets, or in-country sources provide bulk fuel to ARSOA in theater. During sustained operations, heavy expanded mobile tactical truck (HEMTT) fuelers deploy if airlift or sealift is available from the ASCC to provide fuel support at the intermediate staging base (ISB) or forward staging base (FSB). They can establish limited FARPs as well. ARSOA can deploy the equipment by airborne or airland methods to establish 500-gallon blivet FARPs, usually in support of a tactical operation. They do not have the capability to conduct long-term sustainment operations without bulk resupply from theater assets. Theater assets must deliver bulk resupply, as ARSOA does not have the organic capability to transport large quantities of fuel. Because of the high OPTEMPO of ARSOA, the fuel requirement is higher than it is for a similarly sized conventional force. Additionally, the fuel must be tested and certified for use with aviation assets. ARSOA deploys with a basic load of Class III-packaged petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) for initial sustainment. ARSOA

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requires aerial refueling support for missions when appropriate. The SOR must identify the requirements. • Class IV. Identification of barrier or construction materiel occurs, based on mission requirements in the SOR. Because of the limited space on United States Army Reserve (USAR) strategic airlift allocated for deployment, coordination must occur for pre-positioning and HN support. • Class V. ARSOA deploys with a basic load of common and ARSOAspecific ammunition. Planners schedule airlift and configure resupply and follow-on ammunition packages for delivery based on the mission. The ASCC or JTF coordinates ammunition resupply from available sources in theater. ARSOA logistics planners identify common Class V requirements using the SOR. ARSOA has a limited capability to transport or store large quantities of Class V and relies on theater transportation and storage. • Class VI. Units deploy with personal demand items for initial sustainment (usually 15- to 30-day supply), when available. Health comfort packets arrive in theater upon establishment of the logistics system. • Class VII. ARSOA controls weapon systems and replacement aircraft from based stations using the ARSOA’s limited operational readiness floats. The deployed ARSOA task force requests airframes, weapons systems, and aviation parts through the logistics directorate (J4), to CONUS logistical channels. ARSOA S4s coordinate with appropriate activities and item managers for immediate release of replacement systems. • Class VIII. ARSOA flight surgeons develop their deployment load of Class VIII based on METT-TC for initial sustainment. The task force then integrates into the joint or theater health service support (HSS) system for resupply and sustainment. • Class IX. The ARSOA task force deploys with forward support packages (FSPs). These packages include Class IX air and armament parts and contractor logistics items. The regiment S4 directs the deployment of FSPs, based on METT-TC and availability of ALOC for initial sustainment and follow-on resupply. If ALOC are unavailable after deployment for a brief period of time, the forward support section coordinates with the regiment aviation maintenance office and directs additional items to accompany the standard FSP. • Class X. The SOTSE coordinates—through major Army command (MACOM)—Class X supplies for CMO, based on METT-TC and not covered in the other classes of supply. Coordination occurs with the JTF or JSOTF battle staff.

FIELD SERVICES SUPPORT 5-22. ARSOA requires the following services for which the regiment has no organic capability: • Food service. The regiment has no food service capability. Because of mission duration and times, the ARSOA task force requires rations during 24-hour operations. ARSOA units must rely on the supported

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unit to provide food service. The SOR must identify food service requirements. • Laundry and shower. Based on duration of the operation, the ARSOA task force may require laundry and shower services. When developing SOR, logistics planners must compute and include water requirements for these services into the total water requirements. • Aircraft water requirements. ARSOA has additional water requirements to wash ARSOA aircraft and flush engines to prevent corrosion during operations in austere environments, such as the desert or the ocean. Logistics planners must compute these water requirements as well. Figure 5-3 lists the minimum water planning requirements for each type of organic aircraft in remote operations. This minimum water requirement is for manual washing of aircraft and engine flushing on a daily basis. The SOR must identify these water requirements.

Figure 5-3. Water Requirements for Aircraft Washing and Engine Flushing • Billeting. ARSOA has no organic tentage. Logistics planners must identify and procure tentage for the ARSOA task force operating in an austere environment. When available, fixed, climate-controlled billeting is optimal for flight management. The SOR must identify billeting requirements. • Rigging and airdrop. ARSOA has limited airdrop resupply and equipment maintenance capability. It can, however, provide airborne insertion of a FARP and C2 elements. The SOR must identify follow-on airborne requirements. Coordination is through the ASCC or JTF. • Aviation life support equipment (ALSE). The regiment S4 is responsible for deploying ALSE personnel and equipment based on METT-TC, mission profile, and duration of the mission. The ALSE officer in charge ensures preinspections of personal equipment, protective armor, climate kits, and mission-specific equipment. ALSE specialists deploy with limited backup equipment to support the deploying task force. Additionally, the ALSE section provides SAR swimmers for over-water operations. • Mortuary affairs. The ARSOA task force requests mortuary services as required and coordinates requests through the JSOTF and the ASCC.

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• Funding and finance support. The finance battalion in the area of operations provides support for funding and finance service, or the finance battalion supporting the ARSOA in garrison, as determined by the task force commander, may provide the service. Funding and finance support includes— Œ Providing funds to agents. Œ Coordinating resupply of funds in theater. Œ Coordinating currency exchange with the appropriate embassy or agency. Œ Paying local vendors and contracts.

FORWARD ARMING AND REFUELING POINT OPERATIONS 5-23. ARSOA has an organic airborne forward arming and refueling section that provides Class III B and V support for operational units. The airborne forward arming and refueling section is capable of rigging for airdrop and operating 12-, 16-, or 32-foot Type V platforms with FARP equipment. FARP personnel also have the capability to operate small FARP operations using internal systems in the MH-47 and MH-60 aircraft. Additionally, they can conduct refueling operations using wet-wing, Bladder Bird (aerial bulk fueldelivery system [ABFDS]), sling load, and Z-bags. 5-24. Some of the common configurations of the FARP platforms are as follows: • A 12-foot FARP platform. Œ 500-gallon fuel blivet, 2 each (each filled to 432 gallons), 864 gallons. Œ 250-gallons-per-minute (GPM) pump with filter separator, 1 each, and 100 GPM pump, 1 each. • A 12-foot FARP platform (Little Willie). Œ 500-gallon fuel blivet, 1 each (filled to 432 gallons). Œ 250-GPM pump with equipment, 1 each. Œ 2.75 rocket, 56 each. Œ 7.62-millimeter (mm) minigun, 12,000 rounds. • A 16-foot FARP platform (defensive armed penetrator [DAP]). Œ 500-gallon fuel blivet, 2 each, 864 gallons. Œ 250-GPM pump with equipment, 1 each. Œ 2.75 rocket, 76 each. Œ 7.62-mm minigun, 12,000 rounds. Œ 30-mm, 4,400 rounds. • A 32-foot FARP platform (Big Willie). Œ 500-gallon fuel blivet, 6 each, 2,592 gallons. Œ 250-GPM pumps with equipment, 2 each. Œ 2.75 rockets, 224 each. Œ 7.62-mm minigun, 48,000 rounds.

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• Combat offload. Œ 463L pallet. Œ 500-gallon fuel blivet, 1 each, 432 gallons. Œ 250-GPM pump with equipment, 1 each. Œ 2.75 rocket, 56 each. Œ 7.62-mm minigun, 12,000 rounds. 5-25. The C-130, C-141, C-17, and C-5 can airdrop the 12- and 16-foot FARP platforms and 18 FARP personnel parachutists. The following aircraft can airdrop the 32-foot FARP platforms: • C-130 and MC-130 with no jumpers. • C-141 with one platform and 18 FARP personnel parachutists or two platforms and no jumpers. • C-17 with one platform and 18 FARP personnel parachutists. • C-5 with one or two platforms and 18 FARP personnel parachutists.

RESUPPLY PROCEDURES FOR DEVELOPED AND UNDEVELOPED THEATERS 5-26. The supporting ARSOA task force must coordinate with the supported theater for logistics resupply. The supported ASCC has a SOTSE mandated to coordinate logistics for ARSOA operating in theater. The SOTSE is a key element in setting the logistical conditions for successful ARSOA. The ASCC receives the validated SOR and reviews the document (usually during initial and in-progress planning conferences) with the ARSOA units to determine availability of support and services. The SOTSE planners coordinate with the other key elements in the theater logistics structure, particularly the theater support command, to support ARSOF. 5-27. The essential element of support to ARSOA is the establishment of scheduled intertheater and intratheater airlift. Coordination of movement from the home station to the theater is through USASOC, DCSOPS. Coordination of movement within the theater is through the SOC, JTF, corps movement control center (MCC) headquarters, with approval for C-130 use coming from the CINC. This transportation support is the hub of logistics support since many SOF-peculiar repair parts, test sets, and associated tools are unavailable in theater supply systems. This airlift transports SOFpeculiar items from origin to the aerial port of debarkation (APOD). If the APOD is the destination airfield in the supported theater, the ARSOA unit (if within range) picks up the repair parts, or scheduled intratheater transportation delivers the parts to the destination airfield. ARSOA UNIT OR BATTALION 5-28. The deploying ARSOA unit must accomplish the following essential logistical tasks: • Develop the SOR based on OPLANs and mission plans. Submit the SOR through operational channels for validation by the SOC as early as possible but not later than the suspense date.

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• Deploy with sufficient required basic loads. Schedule additional supplies on later flights as priorities allow. • Resource key personnel in the following locations to facilitate parts and equipment collection and transfer: Œ Battalion S4 representative and production control forward (deployed). Œ Battalion S4 and production control rear at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, with access to unit technical supply sections able to conduct lateral searches for required items needed forward. These key personnel coordinate with the FSP manager (deployed) and the supply support activity (SSA) at Fort Campbell. • Provide regiment S4 representative in the regiment emergency operations center (EOC) an information copy of requests (message traffic, facsimile transmissions) from deployed assets or units upon receipt. REGIMENT HEADQUARTERS 5-29. Upon receipt of a mission or the notification of an impending mission, the regiment HQ begins planning the operation or contingency. Upon notification of authorization to deploy forces, the regiment HQ— • Implements a 24-hour EOC. • Provides an FSP manager for the deploying task force. • Reviews with the regiment S3 the SOR from the deploying ARSOA task force and submits these requirements to USASOC DCSLOG, JSOTF J4, and ASCC. • Provides 24-hour oversight of activities of the SSA, ALSE, property book officer (PBO), organization clothing and individual equipment (OCIE), and regimental aviation maintenance officer (RAMO) for aviation-intensive managed items (AIMI) release. • Provides PBO or material management for deployed assets. Coordinates directly with designated direct support unit (DSU), under direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH). • Provides a deployment Department of Defense Activity Address Code (DODAAC) to the deploying task forces. • Coordinates for all local purchases of items not readily available from the Army supply system and SO sources of supply. SPECIAL OPERATIONS SUPPORT COMMAND 5-30. The mission of the SOSCOM is to coordinate sustainment of ARSOF. SOTSE assignment is to the SOSCOM, with duty at each theater Army, either in the G3 or the logistics section (G4). The SOSCOM oversees the preplanned support of SOF-peculiar items identified in unit SORs. Additionally, the SOSCOM— • Provides SOTSEs to theater Army HQ to coordinate logistics support for ARSOA operating in theater. • Provides SO support as required in the SOR.

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USASOC DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR LOGISTICS 5-31. The USASOC DCSLOG coordinates for identified SOF-peculiar items. DCSLOG arranges for a temporary loan, hand receipt, or purchase of these items in support of the deploying task force. Additionally, USASOC coordinates for intertheater airlift for the resupply of SOF-peculiar items, including ARSOA Class IX air, associated tools, and test sets. SOTSE 5-32. The SOTSE is responsible for coordinating and monitoring ASCC logistics support for ARSOA deployed to that theater. The SOTSE— • Reviews, coordinates, and monitors logistics support (intertheater and intratheater transportation, supplies, and services) identified and agreed upon in the validated SOR. • Coordinates logistics to deployed ARSOA task force operating in or from the theater. ASCC 5-33. The ASCC provides CSS IAW Title 10 U.S. Code. SOTSE coordinates logistics support between the supporting unit and the supported ARSOA task force. Additionally, the SOC must coordinate for intratheater airlift of SOFpeculiar repair parts, tools, and associated test equipment. The airlift must be routine, scheduled support in order to forecast delivery of parts into the theater AOR. Theater SOC 5-34. When certain items are unavailable in the Army supply system but are available in a sister Service, the SOC is the executive agent for coordinating logistics support from another Service in support of the ARSOA task force. DIRLAUTH between the SOC and the ASCC is essential to ensure appropriate logistics support. Supported Theater Command 5-35. The CINC’s staff coordinates CSS for the ARSOA task force that is unavailable from ASCC, including common supplies and services available from another Service or foreign nation, as identified by the ASCC. Deployed JSOTF HQ 5-36. Once the JSOTF or ARSOTF officially initiates operations, the JSOTF or ARSOTF J4 must validate logistics planning. The JSOTF HQ oversees and validates required items and documents the need on the logistics situation report (LOGSITREP). Shipment of SOF-Peculiar Items from CONUS 5-37. The SOC, USSOCOM, and USASOC coordinate—on a case-by-case basis—the procedures for shipping repair parts and other SOF-peculiar items from CONUS to an overseas area.

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Appendix A

Intelligence The effectiveness of SOA depends primarily upon the ability of the S2 to gather and disseminate detailed operational intelligence quickly to mission planners. The SOC J2, with theater intelligence assets, provides near-real-time intelligence throughout mission planning and execution.

INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE SUPPORT TO SOA A-1. The S2 staff is the only dedicated organic military intelligence (MI) support in the ARSOA regiment and subordinate battalions. The regiment S2 section has three teams: order of battle (OB), imagery analysis, and intelligence planning. A-2. The S2 is the representative for intelligence and CI measures. The S2— • Recommends priority intelligence commander and establishes IRs.

requirements

(PIR)

to

the

• Provides accurate threat air defense and enemy OB information to supported SOA units. • Acquires necessary imagery for SOA operations. • Validates geospatial information and services (GI&S) requirements. • Assists the S3 in planning operations and participates in the MDMP. A-3. The S2 and the S3 maintain the commanders’ threat information on common situational overlays and automated data processing (ADP) systems and coordinate weather information and analysis with the appropriate Air Force weather element. The SOC J2 coordinates and provides in-theater IEW support. OB TEAM A-4. The OB team is responsible for foreign OB files. It studies and processes information on specific geographical target areas and assesses foreign military capabilities. SOA OB intelligence goes beyond enemy air defense threats. It includes foreign air support facilities and navigation aids that SOA elements exploit or avoid while deep in hostile territory. IMAGERY ANALYSIS TEAM A-5. The imagery analysis team develops and maintains imagery data files on specific geographical target areas.

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INTELLIGENCE PLANNING TEAM A-6. The intelligence planning team coordinates with the theater CINCs to make sure the regiment has each theater’s intelligence estimates and OPLANs on hand.

NONORGANIC SOURCES OF INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE A-7. Nonorganic sources of intelligence include HUMINT, intelligence (SIGINT), and imagery intelligence (IMINT).

signals

• HUMINT sources include enemy prisoners of war (EPWs), civilian internees, detainees, and refugees. Other sources are U.S. personnel who have returned from capture or who have escaped or evaded the enemy. Elements that have conducted reconnaissance are sources of HUMINT as well. ARSOA personnel—using aircraft forward-looking infrared (FLIR) tapes and pilot debriefings following mission completion—are also excellent intelligence collectors. • SIGINT sources are the result of the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of information derived from intercepted electromagnetic emissions. • IMINT sources include radar and photographic, infrared, and electrooptic imagery. SOA uses detailed imagery to develop sophisticated target folders. Through IMINT, SOA can determine clearance distances for landing areas and can locate hazards, such as wires or tall obstacles. A-8. EW is any military action that uses electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. EW has three subdivisions: electronic protection (EP), electronic attack (EA), and electronic warfare support (ES). • EP constitutes protection of friendly combat capability against undesirable effects of friendly or enemy employment of EW. • EA supports SOA in disrupting, damaging, and killing enemy forces; destroying enemy C2 and weapon systems; conducting deception operations; and jamming enemy early warning radar and communications. • ES includes surveillance of the electromagnetic spectrum for immediate threat recognition in support of EW operations and other tactical actions, such as threat avoidance, homing, and targeting. A-9. CI involves the detection, evaluation, counteraction, or prevention of foreign intelligence collection, subversion, sabotage, and terrorism. CI personnel are a critical force protection asset, both in CONUS and upon receipt of a mission. A-10. All aviation assets, including SOA, are susceptible to the effects of weather. Detachments of the SOWT provide weather support to SOA. Direct weather support includes— • Forecasts of general weather conditions.

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• Lunar illumination data. • Solar geophysical information and climatic studies and analyses. • Weather advisories and warnings, as well as specialized weather briefings, including flight weather briefings. • Electro-optical forecasts.

REQUESTS FOR INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION A-11. Requests for intelligence information (RIIs) are a means of gathering information for which a valid requirement exists to support assessments or plans. Requesters should submit RIIs anytime the information is unavailable on local databases or when requesters need an answer to a specific question on published intelligence information. A-12. Community On-Line Intelligence System for End-Users and Managers (COLISEUM) is the preferred means of transmitting requirements. If E-mail is the means of sending a requirement, an information copy must go to USASOC and to USSOCOM. Different processes exist for requesting information in CONUS (Figure A-1) and for requesting in theater (Figure A-2, page A-4).

Figure A-1. CONUS-Related RII Process

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A-13. Requesters must forward RIIs in support of CONUS training exercises through their appropriate validation chain of command. Regiment requesters must send RIIs in support of theater OPLANs, contingency operations, or theater exercises directly to the appropriate theater SOC and other commands and agencies. This process ensures that the theater is aware of all SOF requirements for its area of operations and responsibility. USASOC and USSOCOM proactively monitor all requests and coordinate (as required) with theaters to ensure the proper processing of the RIIs.

Figure A-2. Theater-Related RII Process PRIORITIZATION A-14. Major subordinate units (MSUs) and major subordinate commands (MSCs) should use the following priority categories to validate their RIIs or PIR for further submission: • Expedite, to cover mission-essential RIIs that require an answer during or before the deployment of a unit. Expedite RIIs warrant the national intelligence community’s immediate attention and are vital to the security and success of the mission. Expedite RIIs or PIR should have a message precedence of immediate. • Priority one, to cover mission-essential RIIs that support the imminent deployment of a unit into a theater of operations for contingency operations or foreign training missions, such as MTTs and

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joint-combined exchange training. Priority one RIIs or PIR should have a message precedence of immediate or priority. • Priority two, to cover RIIs relevant to the operational decisionmaking process of CONPLAN or OPLAN mission planning. Priority two RIIs focus on intelligence gaps that require an answer in order to support peacetime operations planning of OPLAN fulfillment. Priority two RIIs should have a message precedence of priority. • Priority three, to cover RIIs that build or enhance the general database. Priority three RIIs are not immediately critical to mission support of OPLAN decision-making. Priority three RIIs should have a message precedence of routine. • Priority four, to cover RIIs that support CONUS-based exercises internally driven by the unit or that pertain to general background queries for regional areas not specifically assigned to the unit by mission statement. Priority four RIIs should have a message precedence of routine. PREPARATION AND METHOD OF SUBMISSION A-15. Each paragraph or subparagraph must show its individual classification, versus overall document classification. Theater-related RIIs adhere to individual theater formats. As a minimum, all CONUS-based or non-theater-related RIIs must contain the following information: • A clear statement of the specific requirement. • A justification of the need for the information, the intended use of the information, and the applicable priority category. • A suspense and a no-longer-valid date for the information. • A listing of the resources already exploited for the information, so analysts or agencies responding to the RIIs or PIR do not duplicate the research effort. • An internally generated number assigned to each RII. The number includes the unit, calendar year of requirement, and sequence number of the unit’s request. The number must appear in the subject line of the RII for immediate reference and identification. POTENTIAL CRISIS SITUATION REQUEST PROCEDURES A-16. Upon receipt of a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)-directed alert, warning, planning, or EXORD requiring increased intelligence support from national agencies, the ARSOA regiment contacts USASOC Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ODCSINT) via secure communications and provides the following information: • The country or region of the planned action. • The estimated time frame for national agencies to provide intelligence dissemination support. • A short description of the current situation and planned action.

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• A brief statement of the types of information needed to support the crisis-action planning—for example, background information on the threat situation and the types of equipment in the threat inventory. • A list of units needing current and recurring intelligence, including their complete message addresses with office symbols and routing indicators. • A point of contact for the requested action, including name, office symbol, and telephone numbers.

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLESPACE FOR ARSOA A-17. ARSOA uses the IPB process to support commanders and their staffs in the MDMP. The commander directs the intelligence effort by selecting and prioritizing intelligence requirements. These requirements support the commander in conducting and planning operations. CCIR are the information the commander needs to visualize the outcome of current operations. CCIR become PIR. CCIR include information on both friendly and threat forces. They help develop the IPB. The IPB results in a written, graphic intelligence estimate that evaluates and portrays probable threat, friendly and nonbelligerent third party capabilities, and their respective vulnerabilities and probable COA. A-18. IPB is a cyclic process of intelligence analysis and evaluation that focuses on the assigned operational area and the forces expected to be operating in the area. IPB is the systematic, continuous process of integrating and analyzing data on the populace (threat, friendly, and nonbelligerent third party), weather and climate, disease and environmental threat, and terrain in a specific geographic area, and operational environment. A-19. IPB is a graphic tool for presenting key characteristics of the operational environment. The essential difference between IPB for conventional forces and SOA is the detail required in each step of the IPB process. STEP 1 - EVALUATE THE BATTLESPACE AREA A-20. The IPB begins with a battlespace area evaluation (BAE). The BAE is an assessment of the battle area, including the overall nature of the friendly and enemy forces and the operational environment. In this step, the S2 determines and answers requirements for weather, climate, and terrain. A-21. The S2, working closely with the unit surgeon, develops detailed threat intelligence on disease and the environment of the target area and intermediate staging areas. The surgeon uses the intelligence to develop appropriate countermeasures to the medical threat—for example, appropriate immunizations, chemoprophylaxis regimes, and preventive medicine countermeasures. These measures help decrease the loss of aircrew availability due to disease or nonbattle injury. A-22. During the BAE for SOA, the S2 evaluates threat ground, air, and naval forces expected to operate within the battlespace area, including routes to and from the target. The evaluations are useful in determining the capabilities of the forces in relation to the weather, terrain, and friendly mission. Particular

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attention is on air bases (including ships carrying aircraft), refueling points, LZs, drop zones (DZs), minefields and air defense weapons, radar, and other sensors operating within the battlespace area. STEP 2 - ANALYZE THE TERRAIN A-23. The purpose of terrain analysis is to reduce the uncertainties and effects of natural and synthetic terrain and to assess the effects of the population on military operations. SOA conducts in-depth studies of each optional flight route during the terrain analysis step of IPB. This study is imagery intensive because target areas are often inaccessible by ground or are behind enemy lines. SOA operates primarily at night and under limited visibility. Identifying and measuring terrain features are, therefore, often critical to the success of the SOA mission. A-24. Highly detailed imagery is necessary for precise preflight planning. Because SOA flies long infiltration and exfiltration routes, critical terrain consists of identifiable reference points that aid in navigation, as well as terrain features that can mask friendly aircraft from detection. A-25. SOA terrain overlays depict all the obstacles to flight, reference points, checkpoints, masked areas, and danger zones. These factors are useful in determining the best flight routes to the target. The S2 and engineers use the modified combined obstacles overlay to determine flight routes for infiltration and exfiltration. This overlay is the basis for input to the SOA requirements section of the target intelligence package (TIP). When preparing to support DA and SR ground missions, SOA terrain analysis must surpass the detail developed by the ground force terrain analysis. Because of the low altitudes SOA aircraft fly, features that are obstacles to ground forces may also be obstacles to SOA. SOA terrain analysis, for example, requires the S2 and engineers to provide heights of buildings, poles, trees, wires, streets, open fields, and anything else that could be in an LZ, a PZ, or an obstacle to flight during insertions and extractions. The theater terrain team may provide terrain support if time permits. STEP 3 - ANALYZE THE WEATHER A-26. Detailed weather analysis is a necessity. Generic weather summaries for a country are insufficient for SOA elements. Development of the best flight routes requires weather patterns for each geographical region and a comparison of the terrain data. Weather data that may have a negligible impact on conventional Army aviation assets may be critical for night infiltration operations in denied areas. A-27. Within the target area, last-minute weather conditions may be critical elements to the target analysis. The following weather aspects affect ARSOA: • Moon illumination and angle are important for flight operations with NVGs. • Visibility, wind speed, and wind direction can significantly affect light helicopter operations.

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• Conditions of sand or snow in a moderate wind; loose rock and gravel in a high wind; and sudden brown-out or white-out can render SOA operations ineffective. • Sea and water conditions are also important to know for survivability and for CSAR operations when SOA works over water. STEP 4 - EVALUATE THE THREAT A-28. Threat evaluation is a detailed study of threat forces and their composition, organization, tactical doctrine, weapons, equipment, and supporting systems. Threat evaluation determines threat capabilities and limitations and the way the threat fights if unconstrained by weather and terrain. A-29. Threat evaluation for SOA is often difficult and complex because of the environment in which SOA aircraft work. Many of the systems presenting a threat to SOA do not affect conventional commanders. Because the mission for SOA in DA and SR missions is to infiltrate and exfiltrate undetected, the primary threat is anything that can detect and report aircraft movements. A-30. During threat evaluation, the SOA S2 also examines communications links. A threat that can detect the mission aircraft but cannot report its presence in a timely manner is not a major concern to the SOA element. On the other hand, a lone rifleman with a radio or a telephone can ruin an SOA mission. Terrain masking is a critical factor in determining the threat’s detection and reporting capabilities. A-31. Threat evaluation of the SOA target site itself is also complex and goes beyond the usual OB available or target area. SOA elements must know almost as much as the ground element about security forces. They also need information on aerial patrol reaction forces, lighting at the target, and so on. When SOA and other ARSOF work together, close coordination—or even consolidation of their threat evaluations—is necessary. STEP 5 - INTEGRATE THE THREAT A-32. The integration of all the factor analysis in the preceding steps occurs during this final phase of the IPB process. It presents a total picture to the S2, the commander, and the staff. Templates play a key role in presenting this picture to the commander. A-33. The S2 uses situation templates to show how threat, friendly, and nonbelligerent third-party forces might operate and communicate within the constraints of specific meteorological conditions and sociopolitical geography. The situation template is basically a doctrinal template that takes into account geographical and meteorological constraints. It identifies the critical threat and friendly and nonbelligerent activities and locations. It also provides a basis for situation and target development and high-value target analysis. A-34. Event templates show locations where critical events and activities are to occur and where critical targets and opportunities are to appear. The S2 uses the event template to predict time-related events within critical areas. It provides a basis for collection operations; predicting threat, friendly, and

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nonbelligerent third-party intentions; and locating and tracking high-value targets. A-35. The S2 and the S3 use a decision support template to show decision points keyed to significant events and activities. The template is the intelligence estimate in graphic form. It identifies critical events and human activities related to time and location that may require a tactical or operational decision by the commander. A-36. During this step, the S2 must also integrate pertinent threat data into situational and event templates that affect the choice of flight routes and modes of infiltration and exfiltration. This phase is the final step in the development of the target folder. The threat as it relates to flight route options is the final factor in deciding which operation provides the best route. Threat integration helps determine the best approach and final assault paths into the target area. It provides the necessary visual products for the integration of coordinated assault fires if needed. Situation templates are important for SOA only if the element must perform sustainment operations. A-37. This step integrates threat data with the target terrain data, including the location and dimension of every structure and obstacle. The final product— • Depicts the best insertion or extraction points. • Identifies targets for destruction by support attack helicopter fire. • Helps reconcile multiple flight routes in limited airspace. A-38. Finally, threat integration results in the decision support template for SOA, which depicts— • Overlays of the air defense zone. • Reaction times of threat aircraft. • Combat radio overlays. • Terrain-masking overlays. • Other threat COAs. A-39. The decision support template shows the best flight route and COA on the target under varying conditions. It depicts terrain, obstacles to flight, routes, LZs, PZs, alternate PZs, OBs, targets or target areas of interest (TAIs), and operational time lines. In a sustained DA or SR mission, personnel use named areas of interest (NAIs) along with TAIs when SOA aircraft perform interdiction missions.

A-9

Appendix B

Aircraft Capabilities This appendix lists all aircraft in the ARSOA inventory. It defines the most advanced technology in helicopters. Because of continuous advancements in technology, the capabilities of all aircraft and systems are dynamic in nature. This appendix also provides a capabilities matrix that lists all ARSOA aircraft. The matrix serves as an easy, rapid reference for mission planners.

MH-6J HELICOPTER

MISSION B-1. The primary mission of the MH-6J helicopter is to conduct overt and covert infiltration, exfiltration, and combat assaults over a wide variety of terrain and environmental conditions. The MH-6J also performs C2 and reconnaissance missions.

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DESCRIPTION B-2. The MH-6J is a light assault helicopter. It is a single-engine, light utility helicopter modified to transport up to six combat troops and their equipment externally. Its small size allows for rapid deployability in C-130, C-141, and C-5 transport aircraft. Aircraft modifications and aircrew training allow for extremely rapid upload and download times. COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS B-3. The ARC-186 (V) VHF provides AM and FM, air-to-air, and air-toground communications. It has a band range from FM 30.000 to 87.975 megahertz (MHz) and AM 116.000 to 151.975 MHz in 25-kilohertz (kHz) increments. B-4. The AN/ARC-210 provides the following band ranges: • UHF, 225.0 to 399.975 MHz. • VHF and AM, 108.0 to 155.975 MHz. • FM, 30.000 to 87.975 MHz. B-5. The SATCOM provides ability for satellite air-to-air and air-to-ground communications. B-6. The SABRE is a ground radio with capabilities for air-to-air and air-toground communications. Each aircraft has the system, although it is not installed in all aircraft. B-7. The AN/ARC-182 is a multichannel, multimode radio. It is SATCOM, HaveQuick, and single-channel ground and airborne radio system (SINCGARS) capable. The AN/ARC-182 can operate on the following frequencies: • UHF, 225.0 to 399.975 MHz. • VHF and AM, 108.0 to 155.975 MHz. • VHF and FM, 155.975 to 173.975 MHz. • FM, 30.0 to 87.975 MHz. NAVIGATION SYSTEMS B-8. The Trimble 3100 Navigation System uses global positioning system (GPS) and long-range navigation (LORAN). B-9. The AN/APN-154 (V) has a very high frequency omnidirectional range (VOR), distance-measuring equipment (DME), and tactical air navigation (TACAN). B-10. The ARGUS 7000 Display is a pictorial navigation instrument that depicts aircraft position, orientation, and direction of flight in relation to landing facilities, navigational aids, and special-use airspace. The unit provides real-time situational awareness designed to reduce cockpit workload. AIRCRAFT SURVIVABILITY EQUIPMENT B-11. Each aircraft has the APR-39 Radar Warning Receiver System. This passive omnidirectional warning set detects and identifies hostile search and

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acquisition and fire control radar. It provides audio and visual alerts to the flight crew. STANDARD MISSION EQUIPMENT B-12. Some aircraft have the FLIR, a passive radar system that provides an infrared image of terrain features and ground or airborne objects of interest. A standard videocassette recorder can play back recorded images. B-13. The MH-6J can have two Goliath tanks installed as an internal auxiliary fuel system (IAFS). The tanks provide 62 additional gallons of fuel each. Each tank adds approximately 90 minutes of flight time. Armament B-14. The MH-6J has no standard armament. SPECIAL MISSION EQUIPMENT B-15. Personnel can rapidly configure the aircraft for fast-rope operations. Motorcycle racks provide the capability to insert and extract up to two motorcycles. TRANSPORTABILITY OF MH-6J AIRCRAFT B-16. A C-130 can carry 3 MH-6Js, a C-141 can carry 6, a C-17 can carry 9, and a C-5 can carry 21. In each case, tactical uploading and downloading of the aircraft can take place in an extremely short time. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS Weather Minimums B-17. A minimum 500-foot ceiling and a 2-mile visibility capability must exist for day and night flying over all types of terrain. The unit commander may reduce weather minimums on a case-by-case basis. B-18. A visible horizon must exist in two of the four horizontal quadrants at all times. All MH-6J missions must take place under visual meteorological conditions (VMC). Instrument flight rule (IFR) flights are unauthorized. Winds B-19. The maximum wind allowed to start the aircraft is 40 knots, with a 20knot gust spread. Flight Altitudes B-20. For training missions, the minimum en route altitude for routes not reconnoitered is 300 feet above ground level (AGL). The minimum overwater altitude is 50 feet. For operational missions, the minimum en route altitude is METT-TC dependent. Landing Areas B-21. The MH-6J is capable of landing on any structure that allows clearance for the rotor systems (30 feet) and meets stress requirements. Single-aircraft confined landing areas require a minimum size of 50 feet by 50 feet.

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Shipboard Operations B-22. The MH-6J can operate day and night from any ship with at least a one-spot helicopter-landing capability. Aircrew Composition B-23. The normal aircrew for most training exercises and operational or contingency missions consists of a pilot and a copilot. All overwater flights require a pilot and copilot current and qualified in overwater flight. All aircrews can conduct NVG infiltration and exfiltration, stabilized body operations (STABO), fast-rope insertion and extraction system (FRIES), and aerial suppression operations to urban, mountainous, desert, and jungle objectives, as well as to ships and offshore drilling platforms. Aircrews have training in long-range precision navigation and formation flight over land and water to arrive at objectives at a prearranged time (± 30 seconds). Aircraft Capabilities B-24. Table B-1 lists the capabilities of the MH-6J aircraft. Figures B-1 and B-2, page B-5, illustrate specific dimensions of the aircraft. Table B-1. MH-6J Aircraft Capabilities Aircraft Weight Basic weight

1,925 pounds

Mission weight

3,100 pounds

Maximum gross weight

3,750 pounds

Aircraft Dimensions Length blades folded

22 feet 6 inches

Blades unfolded

32 feet 1 inch

Width blades folded

6 feet 5 inches

Blades unfolded

27 feet 4 inches

Height

8 feet 11 inches

Diameter of main rotor

27 feet 4 inches

Aircraft turning radius

36 feet 9 inches

Range and Endurance at 240 Pounds Per Hour Fuel Tank

Endurance (Hours + Minutes)

Aircrew

Passenger

Fuel Range (Nautical Miles)

Main

1+20

2

3

110

Main plus one auxiliary

3+00

2

2

240

Main plus two auxiliary

3+50

2

1

310

Airspeed. The cruise airspeed for the MH-6J helicopter is 80 knots.

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Figure B-1. MH-6J and AH-6J Aircraft Dimensions

Figure B-2. MH-6J and AH-6J Aircraft Dimensions and Turning Radius SAFETY B-25. The MH-6J has no seat belts installed for passengers. Each passenger must provide his own means of securing himself. A short length of rope— wrapped and knotted around the waist with a snap link attached to one end—allows each passenger to secure himself to hard points on the aircraft.

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AH-6J HELICOPTER

MISSION B-26. The mission of the AH-6J helicopter is to provide a rapidly deployable light attack helicopter to meet the need for precise, small-area target destruction or neutralization, with provisions for close air fire support for ground assault operations. DESCRIPTION B-27. The AH-6J is a highly modified version of the McDonald Douglas 530series commercial helicopter. The aircraft is a single turbine engine, dualflight control, light attack helicopter. Its primary employment is close air support of ground troops, target-destruction raids, and armed escort of other aircraft. COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS B-28. The ARC-186 (V) VHF provides AM and FM air-to-air and air-toground communications. It has a band range from FM 30.000 to 87.975 MHz and AM 116.000 to 151.975 MHz in 25-kHz increments. B-29. The AN/ARC-210 provides the following communications band ranges: • UHF, 225.0 to 399.975 MHz.

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• VHF and AM, 108.0 to 155.975 MHz.

• FM, 30.000 to 87.975 MHz. B-30. The SATCOM communications.

provides

satellite

air-to-air

and

air-to-ground

B-31. The SABRE is a ground radio with capabilities for air-to-air and airto-ground communications. Each aircraft has one, although it is not installed in all aircraft. B-32. The AN/ARC-182 is a multichannel, multimode radio. It is SATCOM, HaveQuick, and SINCGARS capable. The AN/RC-182 can operate on the following frequencies: • UHF, 225.0 to 399.975 MHz. • VHF and AM, 108.0 to 155.975 MHz. • VHF and FM, 155.975 to 173.975 MHz. • FM, 30.0 to 87.975 MHz. NAVIGATION SYSTEMS B-33. The Trimble 3100 Navigation System is installed in the MH/AH-6J only. It uses GPS and LORAN. B-34. The AN-APN-154 (V) uses VOR, DME, and TACAN. B-35. The ARGUS 7000 Display is a pictorial navigation instrument that depicts aircraft position, orientation, and direction of flight in relation to landing facilities, navigational aids, special-use airspace. The unit provides real-time situational awareness designed to reduce cockpit workload. AIRCRAFT SURVIVABILITY EQUIPMENT B-36. Each aircraft has the APR-39 Radar Warning Receiver System. This passive omnidirectional warning set detects and identifies hostile search and acquisition and fire control radar. It provides audio and visual alerts to the flight crew. Additional survivability equipment includes fire extinguishers, underwater beacons, first-aid kits, and survival kits. STANDARD MISSION EQUIPMENT B-37. Some aircraft have FLIR, a passive radar system that provides an infrared image of terrain features and ground or airborne objects of interest. A standard videocassette recorder can play back recorded images. B-38. The AH-6J can have two Goliath tanks installed as an IAFS. The tanks provide 62 additional gallons of fuel each. Each tank adds approximately 90 minutes of flight time. SPECIAL MISSION EQUIPMENT B-39. Personnel may configure the MH/AH-6J to employ the family of loudspeakers - aircraft configuration (FOL-AC) for PSYOP missions.

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WEAPONS SYSTEMS B-40. The AH-6J uses the plank system (Figure B-3), which features detachable, foldable outboard store stations. The system permits simplified aircraft transportability. Because of the flexibility of the plank system, numerous configurations of weapons systems are possible. The M-27 system is a single minigun mounted on the left side of the AH-6J. It has a maximum of 1,500 rounds loaded in the ammunition can. The HGS-17 system is a single rocket pod (7- or 19-shot) mounted on the right side. The standard plank configuration for an AH-6J aircraft is two miniguns and two seven-shot rocket pods.

Figure B-3. AH-6J Plank System for Aircraft Weapons Configurations B-41. Provisions are available on the AH-6J plank system to mount and fire the following systems: • M134, 7.62-mm minigun, 2,000- or 4,000-round-per-minute rate of fire. (See Figure B-4, page B-9.) The ammunition can holds a maximum of 2,625 rounds of ball, tracer, low-light tracer, or Sabot-launched armorpiercing (SLAP) ammunition. Each aircraft uses two ammunition cans. The normal load is 1,500 to 2,000 rounds per gun. The mounting site for miniguns is normally on the inboard stores. • M260 rocket launcher, seven-shot 2.75-inch folding-fin aerial rocket (FFAR) pod. This system can fire both Mark 40 and Mark 66 rocket motors and numerous warheads, including flare, infrared flare, chlorobenzaimalononitrile, flechette, 17-pound high-explosive dual purpose (HEDP), 17-pound HE-proximity, white phosphorus, 10-pound HEDP, smoke, and inert. The mounting site for rocket pods is normally on the outboard stores. • M261 rocket launcher, 19-shot 2.75-inch FFAR rocket pod. All other information on the M261 is the same as the data on the M260 rocket launcher. • Hellfire missile launchers attach to the plank system in pairs. The mounting site is on the outboard stores. Each launcher can hold two missiles, for a total of four missiles. The AH-6J has a Hellfire missile laser designator mounted on the aircraft.

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Figure B-4. AH-6J Weapons Variations B-42. Some of the optional configurations are as follows: • Two seven-shot rocket pods. • One minigun, with two seven-shot rocket pods. • Two 19-shot rocket pods. • One minigun and two Hellfire missiles. • Four Hellfire missiles. • Four Hellfire missiles and one minigun. • One minigun and one seven-shot rocket pod. WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT B-43. The pilot may fire weapons systems from either pilot station. He may fire rockets in singles (one at a time), pairs (two rockets, one from each rocket pod), or multiple rockets (depressing and holding down firing button). The pilot can select, while in flight, the rocket he wishes to fire next on a 7-shot rocket pod or on a 19-shot pod. The pilot can select a zone he wishes to fire next (two to three rockets per zone, zones loaded with the same type of warhead). This arrangement allows the pilot to select the type of warhead to use on the target. B-44. During a call for fire, the radiotelephone operator can request a type of round for firing (for example, a minigun only or flechettes), but normally the pilot selects the type of rounds fired during an engagement. Normal engagement ranges are as follows: • Minigun, 10 meters to 750 meters. • The 2.75-inch FFAR, 100 meters to 600 meters. • Hellfire missiles, 800 meters to 8,000 meters.

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B-45. Minigun and 2.75-inch FFAR targets include ground troops, buildings, small boats, aircraft, and thin-skinned vehicles (SLAP rounds can penetrate 3/4-inch homogeneous rolled steel). Hellfire missile targets include tanks and other hard-skinned vehicles, bunkers to some degree, larger boats, and buildings (shaped warhead causes very localized damage). TRANSPORTABILITY OF AH-6J AIRCRAFT B-46. The C-130 can carry 3 AH-6Js, a C-141 can carry 6, a C-17 can carry 9, and a C-5 can carry 21. In each case, tactical uploading and downloading of the aircraft can take place in an extremely short time. Off-load times vary, based upon numerous factors, such as ramp space, ramp condition, ramp type, off-load area, aircraft configuration, and mission configuration. General planning times for off load from ramp down to takeoff (except C-5 deployment) are as follows: • With the plank system, approximately 10 minutes. • With the “T” tail removed, approximately 15 minutes. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS Weather Minimums B-47. A minimum 500-foot ceiling and 2-mile visibility capability must exist for day and night flying over flat or mountainous terrain or over water. The unit commander may reduce weather minimums on a mission-essential, caseby-case basis. B-48. A visible horizon must exist in two of the four horizontal quadrants at all times. All AH-6J missions must take place under VMC rules. Winds B-49. The maximum wind allowed to start the aircraft is 40 knots, with a 20knot gust spread. Flight Altitudes B-50. For training missions, the minimum en route altitude for routes not reconnoitered is 300 feet AGL. The minimum overwater altitude is 50 feet. For operational missions, the minimum en route altitude is METT-TC dependent. Landing Areas B-51. The AH-6J is capable of landing on any structure that allows clearance for the rotor systems and meets stress requirements. Single-aircraft confined landing areas require a minimum size of 50 feet by 50 feet. Shipboard Operations B-52. The AH-6J can operate day and night from any ship having at least a one-spot helicopter-landing capability. Because of the high radio and radar electromagnetic interface (EMI) signature onboard U.S. Navy vessels, only Mark 66 MOD-3 rocket motors are compatible with shipboard operations without waiver approval.

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Aircrew Composition B-53. The aircrew of an AH-6J consists of two pilots—a pilot in command (PIC) and a copilot. The PIC is responsible for the employment and actions of his aircraft. The copilot assists the PIC in accomplishing the mission. Both aircrew members have extensive training in navigation, gunnery, shipboard operation, overwater training, mountain flying, urban operations, and desert flying. The lead aircraft has a flight-lead-qualified pilot during all operations. The flight-lead pilot is responsible for mission accomplishment and is the primary mission planner. Aircraft Capabilities B-54. Table B-2 lists the capabilities of the AH-6J. The aircraft dimensions illustrated in Figures B-1 and B-2, page B-5, also pertain to the AH-6J. Table B-2. AH-6J Aircraft Capabilities Aircraft Weight Basic weight

2,196 pounds

Mission weight

3,100 pounds (fully fueled, dual pilot)

Maximum gross weight

3,950 pounds

Aircraft Dimensions Length blades folded

22 feet 6 inches

Blades unfolded

32 feet 1 inch

Width blades folded

6 feet 5 inches

Blades unfolded

27 feet 4 inches

Height

8 feet 11 inches

Diameter of main rotor

27 feet 4 inches

Aircraft turning radius

36 feet 9 inches

Range and Endurance at 240 Pounds Per Hour (With Optional Fuel Tank) Fuel Tank

Endurance (Hours + Minutes)

Fuel Range (Nautical Miles)

Main

1+17

116

Main plus one auxiliary

2+57

266

NOTE: Because of weight restrictions, the use of the optional fuel tank prevents the installation of a minigun and ammunition cans and requires a reduced rocket load. B-55. The cruise airspeed of the AH-6J is 90 knots indicated airspeed. The maximum airspeed is 108 knots indicated airspeed. All speeds are dependent on mission configuration and load.

B-11

FM 3-05.60

SAFETY B-56. Personnel must observe the following safety precautions: • Never walk in front of armed aircraft. • Wear protective headgear at all times when working around the turning rotor blades of the low rotor and tail rotor system of the AH-6J. • Wear hearing and eye protection when working around operating aircraft. • Be aware that the aircraft exhaust can start ground fires in extremely dry conditions with combustible material present (for example, dry grass or straw). • Approach operating AH-6J aircraft as depicted in Figure B-5.

Figure B-5. AH-6J Safety Approach Areas

B-12

FM 3-05.60

MH-60L HELICOPTER

MISSION B-57. The primary mission of the MH-60L is to conduct overt or covert infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply of SOF across a wide range of environmental conditions. Additionally, the MH-60L/DAP has the primary mission of armed escort and fire support. Secondary missions of the MH-60L include C2, external load, CSAR, and medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) operations. The MH-60L can operate from fixed-base facilities, remote sites, or oceangoing vessels. DESCRIPTION B-58. The MH-60L (Blackhawk) is a highly modified twin-engine utility helicopter. Its configuration may include a number of auxiliary fuel systems to allow for operational times of as much as 5.5 hours with a range of 640 nautical miles. The MH-60L has secure Selective Adaptive Communications Processor (SELSCAN) HF, FM, UHF, VHF, SATCOM, and SABRE communications. The FRIES allows for rapid insertion and extraction of personnel in areas blocked from air-land maneuvers. The aircraft has two M134 7.62-mm Gatling guns (miniguns), a ballistic armor subsystem (BASS), and ASE to increase aircrew survivability in all threat environments. Dual GPSs, Omega, Doppler, and weather-detection systems allow pinpoint navigational and weather-avoidance capability. Mission-selective systems include a cargo hook for external load operations, a personnel locator system (PLS) for CSAR, and a four-place C2 console for airborne C2 operations. An armed version of the MH-60L, the DAP is capable of mounting two M134

B-13

FM 3-05.60

7.62-mm miniguns, two 30-mm chain guns, two 2.75 rocket pods, Hellfire missiles, or combinations of the systems for armed escort and fire support operations. COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS B-59. The ARC-186 (V) VHF provides AM and FM air-to-air and air-toground communications. It has a band range from FM 30.000 to 87.975 MHz and AM 116.000 to 151.975 MHz in 25-kHz increments. B-60. The AN/ARC-220 HF Radio with SELSCAN provides long-range air-to-air and air-to-ground communications. B-61. The AN/ARC-210 provides the following communications band ranges: • UHF, 225.0 to 399.975 MHz. • VHF and AM, 108.0 to 155.975 MHz. • FM, 30.000 to 87.975 MHz. B-62. The ARC-164 (V) UHF provides HaveQuick II and air-to-air and airto-ground communications. The band range is from 225.000 to 399.975 MHz in 25-kHz increments. B-63. The SATCOM is capable of satellite air-to-air and air-to-ground communications. B-64. The SABRE is a ground radio, capable of air-to-air and air-to-ground communications. B-65. The AN/ARC-182 is a multichannel, multimode radio capable of SATCOM, HaveQuick, and SINCGARS. It can operate on— • UHF, 225.0 to 399.975 MHz. • VHF and AM, 108.0 to 155.975 MHz. • VHF and FM, 155.975 to 173.975 MHz. • FM, 30.0 to 87.975 MHz. B-66. The AN/ARC-174 HF-AM, with SELSCAN, is capable of long-range air-to-air and air-to-ground communications. B-67. The airborne target handover system (ATHS) is capable of data bursting preselected and formatted information to other equipped aircraft or ground stations. NAVIGATION SYSTEMS B-68. The AN/ARN-149A Automatic Direction Finder (ADF) is capable of direction finding and homing. B-69. The ARN-123 (V) (VOR/DME/Instrument Landing System [ILS]) is capable of heading guidance for instrument navigation and instrument approaches. B-70. The AN/ASN-137 Doppler Navigation System is capable of continuous Doppler-derived measurements of the helicopter’s velocity and

B-14

FM 3-05.60

continuous computations of the present position for worldwide navigation guidance. B-71. The AN/ASN-149 GPS is capable of continuous satellite-derived measurements of the helicopter’s velocity and continuous computations of present position to the MH-60L integrated avionics system. The GPS may act as a stand-alone navigation system. B-72. The AN/ARN-153 (V) TACAN Navigation Set is capable of slantrange distance, relative bearing, course deviation, distance to and from the station, and station audio identification. B-73. The AN/ARS6B PLS can provide the relative position of downed aviators equipped with the AN/PRC-112 transponder radio. It is capable of homing to a continuous UHF radio signal. AIRCRAFT SURVIVABILITY EQUIPMENT B-74. The AN/APR-39A (V) 1 Radar Warning Receiver System identifies threat pulse radar in the C/D and H through J bands. It provides audio and visual alerts to the flight crew. B-75. The AN/APR-44 (V) 3 Radar Warning Receiver System detects continuous wave (CW) surface-to-air missile (SAM) threat radar emissions. It provides audio and visual warnings to the flight crew. B-76. The AN/ALQ-144 Infrared Countermeasures Set provides false infrared signals to defeat the threat of infrared-sensing missiles. B-77. The M-130 Chaff Dispenser dispenses decoy chaff as an effective countermeasure against radar-guided missiles. B-78. The AN/APX-100 (V) I Identification, Friend or Foe (IFF) Transponder provides automatic identification of the helicopter to suitably equipped ground and airborne interrogators. B-79. The emergency locator transmitter transmits a distress signal on UHF and VHF guard frequencies. It goes on the avionics rack on the left side of the right pilot’s seat. Impact activates the transmitter, or personnel may turn it on manually. B-80. The underwater acoustic beacon radiates a pulsed acoustic signal (37.5 kHz) detectable by hydrophone-equipped vessels. Water activates the beacon. B-81. Fire extinguishers are hand operated. One is mounted on the cabin wall forward the right gunner’s window, and one is mounted on the right side of the left pilot’s seat. B-82. The first aid kits are located one each on the back of the left pilot’s seat and one each mounted on the back of the right pilot’s seat. B-83. Survival kits are one or two environment-specific kits attached to the internal auxiliary fuel tanks.

B-15

FM 3-05.60

STANDARD MISSION EQUIPMENT Armament B-84. The standard armament is the M134 (7.62-mm minigun). The M134 is a six-barrel, air-cooled, electrically operated Gatling gun, with maximum effective fire of 1,000 meters. The gun fires A165 (7.62-mm balls), A257 (7.62mm low-light balls), and SL66 (armor-piercing sabots). One gun each is on the outside of the left and the right gunners’ windows. The crew chiefs normally operate the guns, using open-steel, aim point, or aim-1 sights. Ballistic Armor Subsystem B-85. This item is a fabric-covered steel plating that provides increased ballistics protection in the cockpit and cabin. Guardian Auxiliary Fuel Tanks B-86. Two 172-gallon tanks, mounted in the cabin area at the aft bulkhead, provide range extension of approximately 2 hours (mains plus two auxiliary tanks, 4 hours total). Each tank occupies approximately 18 square feet of usable cabin floor space. Normal operational time without the guardian tanks is approximately 2 hours. FRIES Bar B-87. Each side of the FRIES bar (Figure B-6) can support a maximum weight of 1,500 pounds.

Figure B-6. MH-60L/K Fast-Rope Infiltration-Exfiltration System Bar

B-16

FM 3-05.60

MISSION-SELECTIVE SYSTEMS B-88. The following items are mountable on the MH-60L to support a primary mission or to enhance the capabilities of aircraft performing assault or DAP missions: • Cargo Hook. This item is mountable in the belly of the aircraft, below the main rotor. The hook can support external loads up to 9,000 pounds. • External Rescue Hoist System. This system is a hydraulic hoist capable of lifting 600 pounds. It contains 200 feet of usable cable. The crew chief or the hoist operator maneuvers the hoist using a handheld pendant. • Internal Auxiliary Fuel System. The MH-60L has wiring provisions for four additional 150-gallon fuel cells, mountable in the cargo area. Each fuel cell provides approximately 50 minutes flight endurance. Ambient conditions and weight restrictions limit the maximum number of additional fuel cells. The use of all four IAFS cells reduces usable cargo area space to near zero. • External Extended Range Fuel System (ERFS). This system consists of two 230-gallon, or two 230- and two 450-gallon, or four 230gallon jettisonable fuel tanks mountable on the external stores support system (ESSS) for long-range deployment of the aircraft. The use of the ERFS restricts the employment of the M134 miniguns. Center-ofgravity or maximum-gross-weight restrictions and ambient conditions may limit the specific configuration of the ERFS. • C2 Console. This system provides four operator positions with access to the four AN/ARC-182 (V) multiband transceivers and FLIR display. Personnel may configure the MH-60L with an ESSS to employ the FOL-AC with the supporting amplifier array frame on the cabin floor for PSYOP missions. DAP SPECIAL CONFIGURATION B-89. The mission of the armed MH-60L DAP (Figure B-7, page B-18) is to conduct attack helicopter operations using area fire or precision-guided munitions and armed infiltration or exfiltration of small units. The DAP is a multimission aircraft capable of deploying on short notice and of conducting direct action missions. It is also capable of reconfiguring for troop assault operations. The DAP is capable of conducting all missions during day, night, or adverse weather.

B-17

FM 3-05.60

Figure B-7. MH-60L Defensive Armed Penetrator B-90. The DAP can provide armed escort for employment against threats to a vertical-lift formation. Using team tactics, the DAP is capable of providing suppression or CAS for formations and teams on the ground. In the defensive armed role, the DAP is not a primary transport for troops or supplies because of high gross weights. The DAP conducting deep attacks has a combat radius of 225 nautical miles (takeoff, fly 225 nautical miles, no loiter, and return). MH-60L DAP WEAPON SYSTEM AND EMPLOYMENT B-91. The CMS-80 of the MH-60L DAP has integrated fire-control systems. The integration gives the pilot a reduced cockpit workload and an increased weapons-selection capability through cockpit control driver (CCD) and handson collective and stick weapons selection. B-92. The AN/AVQ-34 Monocular Head-Up Display Set (MONOHUD) provides a lightweight, infinity focus, optical sight that allows the pilot to deliver rockets and gun fire effectively at targets. It gives the pilot cues for accurately launching missiles. It also provides aircraft flight symbology. The symbology is concise and provides all pertinent information in a manner that accommodates the pilot operating in daytime or with NVG. B-93. The standard armament configuration of the DAP is one rocket pod, one 30-mm cannon, and two miniguns. The configuration changes, based on METT-TC. (See Figure B-8, page B-19.) NOTE: To avoid exceeding maximum gross weight limitations, reconfiguration of the ammunition or fuel mix may be necessary to achieve the desired insertion ranges for personnel when the MH-60L is in the DAP configuration.

B-18

FM 3-05.60

Figure B-8. Armament Options, MH-60L Defensive Armed Penetrator B-94. The M134 7.62-mm Minigun is a six-barrel, air-cooled, link-fed, electrically driven Gattling gun, with a 1,000-meter maximum effective range and a tracer burnout at 900 meters. The weapon has a rate of fire of 2,000 or 4,000 rounds per minute. The weapon is mountable in the fixed position on the left and right sides of the aircraft. The minigun fires a variety of 7.62-mm rounds. Nighttime operations use a 7.62-mm ball with a special low-light tracer, which prevents the shutting down of NVG. The weapon also fires 7.62 SLAP ammunition for light armor penetration. The DAP normally carries 3,000 rounds of 7.62-mm ammunition. B-95. The M261 19-Shot Rocket Launcher fires a 2.75-inch FFAR with a variety of special-purpose warheads. It has a 10-pound and a 17-pound highexplosive warhead for light armor and bunker penetration. The bursting radius for the 10-pound warhead is 8 to 10 meters and 12 to 15 meters for the 17-pound warhead. The antipersonnel flechette warhead contains 2,200 flechettes. Its minimum launch distance is 800 meters, and its optimum range is 1,100 meters. Another warhead is white phosphorous used for smoke. The illumination warheads come in two types. One provides a bright light; the other, a bright infrared light. Firing of the warheads is within 3,000 meters of the target area. After deploying, the warheads provide 120 seconds of overt light or 180 seconds of infrared light. The multipurpose submunition (MPSM) warhead contains nine submunitions that are effective against light armor and personnel. The MPSM round has a fuse that can be preset and deploys the submunitions at the desired distance. The 2.75-inch FFAR is useful as a point target weapon at ranges from 100 to 750 meters and an area fire weapon at ranges up to 7,000 meters. The DAP can also fire chlorobenzaimalononitrile, HE-proximity, and inert rockets. The aircraft can carry an additional load of rockets internally, allowing the aircrew to reload the rocket pod. The aircrew can accomplish the reload within 15 minutes. B-96. The M230 30-mm Chain Gun has its own magazine capable of carrying 1,100 rounds. The M230 has a cyclic rate of fire of 625 ± 25 rounds per minute. The M230 is capable of firing the HEDP, target practice (TP), and

B-19

FM 3-05.60

target practice tracer (TPT). The HEDP is effective against light armor and personnel at ranges of 4,000 meters. With the use of the MONOHUD as a sighting system, the 30-mm cannon is a point-target weapon at a range of 1,500 meters and less. It is also an area fire weapon at ranges up to 4,000 meters. B-97. The AGM-114 Hellfire is a 100-pound semiactive laser-guided missile, capable of defeating any known armor. The M272 launchers are able to hold four Hellfire missiles each. The minimum engagement range is .8 kilometer to a maximum of 8 kilometers. Any ground or air North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) standard laser designator can designate the missile. B-98. The AN/AAQ-16D Airborne Electronic Special Operations Payload (AESOP) FLIR is a FLIR with a laser range finder or designator (LRF/D). The Q-16D allows the DAP to detect, acquire, identify, and engage targets at extended ranges with laser-guided munitions. The FLIR is a controllable, infrared surveillance system that provides a television videotype infrared image of terrain features and ground or airborne objects of interest. The FLIR is a passive system and detects long wavelength radiant infrared energy emitted, naturally or artificially, by any object in daylight or darkness. B-99. Air-to-Air Stinger (ATAS). The DAP can fire the infrared seeking, fire-and-forget missile. MH-60L DAP RECONFIGURATION B-100. The MH-60L DAP has the capability to perform utility and armed missions. The time to reconfigure the aircraft from either the armed to the utility or vice versa is minimal. The 7.62 miniguns remain with the aircraft regardless of the mission. TRANSPORTABILITY B-101. C-5A/B and C-141 aircraft can deploy the MH-60L, including the DAP configuration. The C-5A/B can carry a maximum of six MH-60Ls. The helicopters need a short time to prepare for on-load and again for rebuild upon arrival at the destination. The C-17 can carry three MH-60Ls. The C141 can carry a maximum of two MH-60Ls; however, it requires considerable time for preparation and rebuild. During disassembly, the ESSS wings are removed and loaded onto the floor of the helicopter. The loaded helicopter then goes onto the C-141 aircraft. The removed DAP equipment goes on a separate trailer and accompanies the helicopter on the same C-141 aircraft. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS B-102. Successful mission accomplishment is largely a function of adequate pre-mission planning time. Mission notification should occur in time to have an adequate mission-planning session and briefing, followed by a period of rest before mission execution. Weather Minimums B-103. For training missions, forecast and actual weather of 500-foot ceiling and 2-mile visibility. For contingency missions, as directed by the commander, a 500-foot ceiling and 2-mile visibility for planning purposes.

B-20

FM 3-05.60

This type of forecast allows for en route cruise speed of the standard 120 knots and ample opportunity to adjust mission execution in the event of lower weather. Winds B-104. The MH-60L rotor has the capability to start and stop in actual winds no greater than 45 knots. Flight Altitudes B-105. For training missions, the minimum altitude for routes not reconnoitered is 300 feet AGL and 150 feet AGL for reconnoitered routes. For contingency missions, the minimum altitude is dependent upon METT-TC. Landing Areas B-106. The minimum landing area for the MH-60L is 100 feet by 100 feet. Shipboard Operations B-107. The MH-60L, including the DAP, can operate day and night from Navy ships with Level II Class 2 helicopter-landing pads. For DAP, because of the high radio or radar EMI signature onboard U.S. Navy vessels, only Mark 66 MOD-3 rocket motors are compatible with shipboard operations without waiver approval. Aircrew Composition B-108. Most training flights and all NVG operations require four aircrew members—a PIC, a pilot, and two aircrew chiefs or gunners. One aircrew chief is at the right gunner’s position. He scans for hazards, operates the hoist, conducts FRIES operations, operates the minigun, and conducts external load operations. The other aircrew chief is at the left gunner’s position and scans for hazards, conducts FRIES operations, operates the minigun, and assists in external load operations. Aircrew Qualifications B-109. All aircrews are qualified to support flight operations for the missions stated in JP 3-05. Aircrew qualifications include multiship NVG infiltration, exfiltration, and live-fire operations in urban, overwater, mountain, desert, jungle, and NBC environments to LZs, buildings, ships, and oil rigs. Aircrews are trained in NVG long-range overland and overwater navigation, with an arrival standard of ± 30 seconds.

B-21

FM 3-05.60

Aircraft Capabilities B-110. Table B-3 lists the capabilities of the MH-60L. Table B-3. MH-60L Aircraft Capabilities Maximum Gross Weight (Ferry) Ferry configuration

23,500 pounds

Assault configuration

22,000 pounds

Aircraft Dimensions Length

64 feet 10 inches

Width

53 feet 8 inches

Height

16 feet 10 inches

Diameter of main rotor

53 feet 8 inches

Range and Endurance Fuel Tank

Endurance (Hours + Minutes)

Fuel Range (Nautical Miles)

Main

1+45

212

Main plus one auxiliary

3+02

364

Main plus two auxiliary

4+10

496

Main plus three auxiliary

5+00

600

Airspeed Cruise

120 knots indicated airspeed

Maximum

165 knots indicated airspeed

B-22

FM 3-05.60

MH-60K HELICOPTER

MISSION B-111. The primary mission of the MH-60K (Blackhawk) is to conduct overt or covert infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply of SOF over a wide range of environmental conditions. The MH-60K is capable of operating from fixed base facilities, remote sites, or oceangoing vessels. DESCRIPTION B-112. The MH-60K is a highly modified twin-engine utility helicopter. The aircraft can be configured with a number of auxiliary fuel systems to allow for operational times of as much as 5.5 hours with a range of 634 nautical miles. The MH-60K is equipped with secure HF, SINCGARS, FM, UHF, VHF, SATCOM, and SABRE communications. The FRIES allows for rapid insertion and extraction of personnel in areas occluded from AirLand maneuvers. The aircraft has two M134 7.62-mm Gattling guns, a BASS, and ASE to increase aircrew survivability in all threat environments. The GPS, area navigation unit, inertial navigation unit (INU), attitude and heading reference system (AHRS), and multimode radar systems allow pinpoint navigation. Missionselective systems include the cargo hook for external load operations and the PLS for CSAR. COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS B-113. The ARC-186 (V) VHF (AM/FM) System provides air-to-air and airto-ground communications, with a band range from FM 30.000 to 87.975 MHz and AM 116.000 to 151.975 MHz in 25-kHz increments.

B-23

FM 3-05.60

B-114. The ARC-164 (V) UHF with HaveQuick II Capability provides air-to-air and air-to-ground communications, with a band range from 225.000 to 399.975 MHz in 25-kHz increments. B-115. The AN/ARC-231 SKYFIRE SATCOM provides satellite two-way communications, both line of sight or satellite with a band range from 255.000 to 399.995 MHz in either 25 or 5 kHz spacing. B-116. The SABRE Ground Radio provides air-to-air and air-to-ground communications. B-117. The AN/ARC-201A (V) SINCGARS (VHF-FM) provides voice and data communications, in single channel of frequency-hopping mode, with a band range from 30.000 to 87.975 MHz. B-118. The AN/ARC-220 HF Radio with SELSCAN provides long-range air-to-air and air-to-ground communications. NAVIGATION SYSTEMS B-119. The AN/ARN-206A ADF provides direction finding and homing. B-120. The ARN-123 (V) (VOR/DME/ILS) provides heading guidance for instrument navigation and instrument approaches. B-121. The AN/ASN-137 Doppler Navigation System provides continuous Doppler-derived measurements of the helicopter’s velocity and continuous computations of the present position for worldwide navigation guidance. B-122. The EGI H764G Navigation System is an embedded GPS inertial (EGI) navigation system. It is a self-contained INU with an embedded GPS card. The EGI system is fundamentally a dead-reckoning navigation system. The advantage of a self-contained INU is its invulnerability to enemy countermeasures. The disadvantage is its inaccuracy, which builds over time unless the INU can be updated over known landmarks. Through miniaturization, the GPS receiver has been reduced to the size of a computer card. This miniature GPS receiver can now be installed (embedded) in the INU. Using the closely coupled technique to apply the GPS signal to the INU functions provides a means of accurately fixing position and measuring velocity. B-123. The AN/ASN 145 AHRS provides accurate outputs of pitch, roll, heading, acceleration, velocity, and position to the integrated avionics system or may act as a stand-alone system. B-124. The AN/ARN-118 (V) TACAN Navigation Set provides slant range distance, relative bearing, course deviation, distance to and from the station, and station audio identification. Additionally, it is used during aerial refueling for tanker-bearing information and during shipboard operations. B-125. The AN/ARS6B PLS provides the relative position of downed aviators equipped with the AN/PRC-112 transponder radio. It also homes to a continuous UHF radio signal.

B-24

FM 3-05.60

AIRCRAFT SURVIVABILITY EQUIPMENT B-126. The AN/APR-39A (V) 1 Radar Warning Receiver identifies threat pulse radar in the C or D and the H through J bands and provides audio and video alerts to the flight crew. B-127. The AN/APR-44 (V) 3 Radar Warning System detects CW SAM threat radar emissions and provides audio and visual warnings to the flight crew. B-128. The AN/AVR-2 Laser Warning Receiver detects laser emissions directed toward the helicopter. B-129. The AN/AAR-47 Missile emissions from a missile’s exhaust.

Warning

Receiver

detects

plume

B-130. The AN/ALQ-162 (V) 2 CW Radar Jammer detects and jams CW radar emitters. B-131. The AN/ALQ-136 (V) 2 Pulse Radar Jammer detects and jams pulse radar emitters. B-132. The AN/ALQ-144 Infrared Countermeasures Set provides false infrared signals to defeat infrared-sensing missile threats. B-133. The M-130 Chaff and Flare Dispenser dispenses decoy chaff and flare as an effective countermeasure against radar-guided and infrared missile threats. B-134. The AN/APX-100 (V) 1 IFF Transponder provides automatic identification of the helicopter to suitably equipped ground and airborne interrogators. B-135. The emergency locator transmitter is mounted on the left side of the right pilot’s seat avionics rack. It transmits a distress signal on UHF and VHF guard frequencies. The transmitter is impact activated or may be turned to the ON state manually. B-136. The underwater acoustic beacon is activated by contact with water. It radiates a pulsed acoustic signal (37.5 kHz) detectable by hydrophone-equipped vessels. B-137. Fire extinguishers are hand operated—one mounted on the cabin wall forward of the right gunner’s window and one mounted on the right side of the left pilot’s seat. B-138. First aid kits are located two each on the back of the left pilot’s seat and one each mounted on the back of the right pilot’s seat. B-139. Survival kits are environment-specific kits attached to the internal auxiliary fuel tanks. STANDARD MISSION EQUIPMENT B-140. The following are systems and equipment always onboard the aircraft during tactical missions. This list does not include avionics, ASE, and sensors, as they are considered part of the basic aircraft.

B-25

FM 3-05.60

Armament B-141. The standard armament is the M134 (7.62-mm minigun), 6-barrel, air-cooled, electrically operated Gattling gun. (See Figure B-9.) The maximum effective fire (MEF) is 1,000 meters. The M134 fires A165 (7.62 ball); A257 (7.62 low light ball); and SL66 (armor-piercing sabot) ammunition. One gun is mounted outside both the left and right gunner’s windows. Aircrew chiefs normally operate the weapon system. Weapon sighting is by open steel sights.

Figure B-9. MH-60K, M134 Minigun Window-Mounted Field of Fire Ballistic Armor Subsystem B-142. The system consists of fabric-covered steel plating, which provides increased ballistic protection in the cockpit and cabin areas. Guardian Auxiliary Fuel Tanks B-143. Two 172-gallon fuel tanks provide a range extension of approximately 2 hours (4 hours total). The tanks are mounted in the cabin area at the aft bulkhead. They occupy approximately 18 square feet of usable cabin floor space. The normal operational time without the Guardian tanks is approximately 2 hours and 10 minutes. FRIES Bar B-144. Each side of the FRIES bar can support a maximum weight of 1,500 pounds. MISSION-SELECTIVE SYSTEMS B-145. The following systems are mountable on the MH-60K to support a primary mission or to enhance the capabilities of aircraft performing assault missions: • Cargo Hook. Is mountable in the belly of the aircraft below the main rotor. It can support external loads up to 8,000 pounds.

B-26

FM 3-05.60

• External Rescue Hoist. Is a hydraulic hoist capable of lifting 600 pounds with 200 feet of usable cable. The aircrew chief or hoist operator uses a handheld pendant to control the system. • External Tank System (ETS). Has two 230-gallon external fuel tanks that may be jettisoned during emergencies. The fuel tanks are mounted on the ETS for long-range deployment of the aircraft. Installation of the ETS restricts the use of weapons systems. Aircraft center of gravity, maximum gross weight limitations, or ambient conditions may limit specific configuration. • Aerial Refueling System. Is an aerial refueling probe that allows extended range and endurance by refueling from HC/MC/KC-130 tanker aircraft. • Aerial Loudspeaker System. The MH-60K with ESSS can be configured to employ the 2,700-watt FOL-AC with the supporting amplifier array frame on the cabin floor for PSYOP aerial loudspeaker missions. TRANSPORTABILITY B-146. The MH-60K may be deployed by C-5A, C-5B, C-17, and C-141 aircraft. A maximum of six MH-60Ks can be loaded on a C-5A or a C-5B. (See Figure B-10, page B-29, and Figure B-11, page B-30.) A short time is needed to prepare the helicopters for on-load and again for rebuild on arrival at the destination. Three MH-60Ks can be loaded onto a C-17. A maximum of two MH-60Ks can be loaded on a C-141, requiring considerable time for preparation and rebuild. ETS “wings” are removed during disassembly and floor loaded on the StratAir aircraft. Ammunition for the weapon systems is palletized and loaded on the same aircraft for distribution at the destination. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS B-147. Successful mission accomplishment is largely a function of adequate pre-mission planning time. Mission notification should occur in time for an adequate mission-planning session and briefing followed by a period of rest before execution. Weather Minimums B-148. Training missions require forecast and actual weather of a 500-foot ceiling and a 2-mile visibility. For contingency missions, as directed by the commander, a 500-foot ceiling and a 2-mile visibility work well for planning purposes. This type of forecast allows for en route cruise speed of the standard 110 knots and ample opportunity to adjust mission execution depending on the weather. Flight Altitudes B-149. For training missions, the minimum altitude for routes not reconnoitered is 300 feet AGL and 150 feet AGL for reconnoitered routes. Contingency missions are METT-TC dependent.

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Landing Areas B-150. The minimum landing area for the MH-60K is 100 feet by 100 feet. For shipboard operations, the MH-60K can operate day and night from Navy ships that have Level II Class 2 helicopter-landing pads. Aircrew Composition B-151. Most training flights and all NVG operations require four aircrew members. These members include a PIC, a pilot, and two aircrew chiefs or gunners. One aircrew chief—stationed at the right gunner’s position—scans for hazards, operates the hoist, conducts FRIES operations, operates the minigun, and conducts external load operations. The other aircrew chief— stationed at the left gunner’s position—conducts FRIES operations, operates the minigun, and assists in external load operations. Aircrew Qualifications B-152. Aircrews can perform all mission tasks in all environments. They can perform NVG long-range overland and overwater navigation, with an arrival standard of ± 30 seconds. Aircraft Capabilities B-153. Table B-4 lists the capabilities of the MH-60K aircraft. Figures B-10 through B-12, pages B-29 through B-31, illustrate specific dimensions and capabilities of the aircraft. Table B-4. MH-60K Aircraft Capabilities Aircraft Weight Basic weight

15,600 pounds

Maximum gross weight

24,500 pounds

Aircraft Dimensions Length

64 feet 10 inches (Folded, 60 feet 7 inches)

Width

53 feet 8 inches (Folded, 9 feet 9 inches)

Height

16 feet 10 inches

Diameter of main rotor

53 feet 8 inches

Aircraft turning radius

41 feet 8 inches

Range and Endurance Fuel Tank

Endurance (Hours + Minutes)

Fuel Range (Nautical Miles)

Main

1+30

165

Main plus one auxiliary

2+30

275

Main plus two auxiliary

3+30

385

Airspeed Cruise

115 knots indicated airspeed

Maximum

145 knots indicated airspeed

B-28

FM 3-05.60

Figure B-10. MH-60K Dimensions and Turning Radius

B-29

FM 3-05.60

Figure B-11. MH-60K Dimensions for Strategic Airlift Preparation

B-30

FM 3-05.60

Figure B-12. MH-60K Aircraft Capabilities

B-31

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MH-47D HELICOPTER

MISSION B-154. The primary mission of the MH-47D is to conduct overt and covert infiltration, exfiltration, air assault, resupply, and external-sling operations under a wide range of environmental conditions. The aircraft can perform a variety of other missions, including shipboard operations, platform operations, urban operations, water operations, FARP operations, mass casualty operations, and CSAR operations. DESCRIPTION B-155. The MH-47D (Chinook) is a twin-engine, tandem rotor, heavy assault helicopter specifically modified for long-range SO flights. It has secure voice communications on FM, UHF with HaveQuick II, VHF, HF and SELSCAN, SABRE, and SATCOM radios. Other features include FRIES, limited aircraft survivability equipment, a defensive armament system of two M134 machine guns (one located in the left forward cabin window and one at the right cabin door), one M-60D machine gun (located on the ramp), and an internal rescue hoist with a 600-pound capacity. B-156. The MH-47D adverse weather cockpit (AWC) is equipped with weather avoidance and search radar, an aerial refueling probe for in-flight refueling, a PLS used with the PRC 112 for finding downed aircrews, FLIR,

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and a navigation system consisting of a mission computer using GPS, inertial navigation system (INS), or Doppler navigation sources for increased accuracy. It is instrument capable with ADF, VOR, DME, ILS, and TACAN with the ability to do fully coupled approaches. Mission-computer-generated approaches can be used when normal approaches are unavailable. B-157. The MH-47D helicopter is capable of operating at night during marginal weather conditions. With the use of special mission equipment and night vision devices (NVDs), the aircrew can operate in hostile mission environments over all types of terrain. The aircrew can operate at low altitudes during periods of low visibility and low ambient lighting conditions with pinpoint navigation accuracy ± 30 seconds on target. COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS B-158. The ARC-186 (V) VHF (AM/FM) Systems (two) provide air-to-air and air-to-ground communications, with a band range from FM 30.000 to 87.975 MHz and AM 116.000 to 151.975 MHz in 25-kHz increments. B-159. The ARC-164 (V) UHF with HaveQuick II capability provides air-to-air and air-to-ground communications, with a band range from 225.000 to 399.975 MHz in 25-kHz increments. B-160. The AN/ARC-174 HF with SELSCAN provides long-range air-to-air and air-to-ground communications. B-161. The SATCOM communications.

provides

satellite

air-to-air

and

air-to-ground

B-162. The SABRE Ground Radio provides air-to-air and air-to-ground communications. B-163. The ATHS provides data bursting preselected and formatted information to other equipped aircraft or ground stations. NAVIGATION SYSTEMS B-164. The AN/ARN-149 ADF provides low- and medium-frequency direction finding. B-165. The ARN-123 (V) (VOR/DME/ILS) provides heading guidance for instrument navigation and instrument approaches. B-166. The AN/ARN-153 (V) TACAN Navigation Set provides slant range distance, relative bearing, course deviation, distance to and from the station, and station audio identification. It is used during aerial refueling for tankerbearing information and during shipboard operations. B-167. The AN/ASN-137 Doppler Navigation System provides continuous Doppler-derived measurements of the velocity of the helicopter and continuous computations of the present position for worldwide navigation guidance. In the MH-47D, these displayed signals are sent to the Rockwell Collins CMS 80 Mission Computer for sensor integration or may act as a stand-alone navigation system. B-168. The AN/ARN-148 GPS provides continuous satellite-derived measurements of the velocity of the helicopter and continuous computations

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of the present position to the Rockwell Collins CMS 80 Mission Computer for sensor integration. B-169. The LTN 92 Ring Laser Gyro INS provides continuous derived measurements for computations of the present position for worldwide navigation guidance based on gyro precession. It sends these signals to the Rockwell Collins CMS 80 Mission Computer for sensor integration or may act as a stand-alone navigation system. B-170. The mission computer unit provides mission navigation management, including flight plan and automatic navigation. The aircraft automatic flight control system (AFCS) can be coupled to the mission computer for two-axis autopilot capabilities. AIRCRAFT SURVIVABILITY EQUIPMENT B-171. The AN/APR 39A Radar Warning Receiver identifies hostile pulse fire control radar and provides audio and video alerts to the flight crew when the system detects threat radar emissions. B-172. The AN/ALQ 156 (V) 47 is an active airborne Doppler radar system that detects the approach of antiaircraft missiles. When detecting a missile, the system automatically triggers the M-130 flare system and ejects a decoy flare. B-173. The AN/ALE-47 (V) Countermeasures Dispensing System consists of five components used to provide preemptive and terminal threat protection. The pilots control the system by using the cockpit control unit (CCU) mounted in the center console. The AN/ALE-47 replaces the M-130 system and enhances aircraft survivability by— • Integrating with avionics and EW systems. • Providing threat adaptive programmable dispensing routines. • Providing data links for advanced expendables. • Using available threat sensors. B-174. The AN/AAR-47 (V) 3 Radar Warning System is a passive system that provides visual and aural alert indications of CW radar signals from SAM and airborne interceptor (AI) threats. The APR-44 interfaces with the APR-39 to provide visual and aural indications. The system consists of two SAM antennas, an AI receiver, a SAM receiver, and a low-pass filter. B-175. The AN/ALQ 44 Radar Warning Receiver identifies hostile AI and SAM CW fire control radar and provides audio and visual alerts to the flight crew when the system detects threat radar emissions. B-176. The M-130 Infrared Countermeasures Dispenser System is a chaff and flare dispenser system designed to deceive radar guidance and infrared missiles by using chaff or flares as required.

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STANDARD MISSION EQUIPMENT Armament B-177. The MH-47D has three weapon stations—left forward window, right cabin door, and at the ramp. The forward station mounts a 7.62-mm minigun, and the ramp station mounts an M60D 7.62-mm machine gun. An aircrew member at each station manually operates the weapon. The primary use of the weapon is self-defense and enemy suppression. The minigun is normally used for soft targets and troop suppression, which requires a high rate of fire. The minigun is air cooled and link fed. It has a maximum effective range of 1,500 meters, with a tracer burnout at 900 meters. The weapon has an adjustable rate of fire of 2,000 or 4,000 rounds per minute. The aircrew members currently fire ball or SLAP ammunition with a mix of four ball rounds to one tracer round (4:1) or a 9:1 mix to prevent NVD shutdown on low-illumination nights. The ammunition complement without reloading is 8,000 rounds per weapon. Ballistic Armor Subsystem B-178. This subsystem is a fabric-covered steel plating that provides increased ballistic protection in the cockpit and cabin. FRIES B-179. The FRIES is used for insertion and extraction of personnel. Applied loads at the rear ramp for insertions will not exceed nine persons per rope at the same time. Applied loads at the rear ramp for extractions will not exceed six persons per rope at the same time. MISSION-SELECTIVE SYSTEMS B-180. The external cargo hook system facilitates greater load stability and ensures faster airspeeds during flight. Each hook (Table B-5) may be used separately or with each other. All loads should be planned as a tandem-rigged load. Table B-5. External Cargo Hooks, MH-47D Type

Capacity

Forward hook

17,000 pounds

Center hook

26,000 pounds

Aft hook

17,000 pounds

Tandem hook

25,000 pounds NOTE: These are maximum hook-rated loads and may not accurately reflect the true capability of the aircraft because of external conditions, such as pressure, altitude, and temperature. B-181. The external rescue hoist system is configured for use at the center cargo hook and rescue hatch. It has a 600-pound capacity and approximately 150 feet of usable cable. B-182. The AN/AAQ-16 FLIR is a controllable, infrared surveillance system that provides a television video-type infrared image of terrain features and ground or airborne objects of interest. The FLIR is a passive system and

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detects long wavelength radiant infrared energy emitted, naturally or artificially, by any object in daylight or darkness. B-183. The cargo compartment expanded range fuel system (CCERFS) consists of one and up to three ballistic-tolerant, self-sealing tanks. Each tank has the capacity of holding 800 gallons of fuel but normally are filled to 780 gallons. They are refillable using aerial refueling operations. B-184. The forward area refueling equipment (FARE) consists of fueling pumps, hoses, nozzles, and additional refueling equipment to set up a twopoint refueling site. Gallons of fuel dispensed are dependent upon the range of operation required of the tanker aircraft. TRANSPORTABILITY B-185. ARSOA has modified validated procedures to load two MH-47Ds on a C-5 and one MH-47D on a C-17, with all support equipment. Compared to all other SO helicopters, the MH-47D requires extensive time for aircraft disassembly and assembly to become combat ready. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS Weather Minimums B-186. The weather minimum for the MH-47D is a 500-foot ceiling, with a visibility of 2 miles. Winds B-187. The MH-47D has no specified minimum wind; however, the maximum wind for starting and stopping the rotor system is 30 knots. Flight Altitudes B-188. For training missions, the minimum en route altitude for reconnoitered routes is 150 feet AGL or above the highest obstruction (AHO). For routes not reconnoitered, the minimum en route altitude is 300 feet AGL or AHO. For operational missions, the minimum en route altitude is dictated by threat systems. Landing Areas B-189. The minimum landing area for the MH-47D is 150 feet by 100 feet. Shipboard Operations of the MH-47D B-190. The MH-47D can operate day and night from Navy ships that have Level II Class III helicopter-landing pads. Aircrew Composition B-191. Most training, exercises, and operational or contingency missions require five aircrew members, including a pilot, a copilot, a flight engineer, and two aircrew chiefs. The flight engineer, usually positioned at the ramp station, scans for other aircraft, targets, and obstacles. He also operates the hoist (when required), assists in FRIES operations, operates the machine gun, and conducts sling load operations. The aircrew chiefs, positioned at the left and right forward gunners’ stations, scan for other aircraft, targets, and obstacles. They also operate the miniguns and assist in sling load and FRIES operations.

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Aircrew Qualifications B-192. MH-47D aircrews can perform all mission tasks in all environments. They can perform NVG infiltration and exfiltration operations, arriving at the target time of ± 30 seconds. MH-47D aircrews can also perform aerial refueling operations. Aircraft Capabilities B-193. Table B-6 lists the capabilities of the MH-47D aircraft. Table B-6. MH-47D Aircraft Capabilities Aircraft Weight Maximum gross weight

50,000 pounds

Empty gross weight

25,000 pounds

Maximum altitude

20,000 feet

Fuel Flow Normal fuel consumption

2,750 pounds per hour

Maximum fuel consumption

3,300 pounds per hour

Range and Endurance Fuel Tank Integral

Endurance (Hours + Minutes)

Fuel Range (Nautical Miles)

2+08

256

NOTE: The range is limited only by aircrew and aerial refueling. Cruise Speed Normal Cruise

120 knots indicated airspeed

Maximum

170 knots indicated airspeed

NOTE: Actual figures are dependent upon temperature, aircraft gross weight, and density altitude. Aircraft Dimensions Length of fuselage

50 feet 9 inches

Length of blades

98 feet 10 inches

Width of fuselage

11 feet 11 inches

Width of blades

52 feet

Height

18 feet 11 inches

Diameter of main rotor

60 feet

Aircraft turning radius

122 feet

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Table B-6. MH-47D Aircraft Capabilities (Continued) Cargo Area (unobstructed) Height

78 inches

Width

90 inches

Depth

366 inches

Troop Capacity With seats

33 troops

Floor loading

65 troops

Litters

24 troops

NOTE: Actual amounts are dependent upon infiltration and exfiltration distances flown and the number of internal auxiliary fuel tanks installed or the availability of aerial refueling. TYPICAL MISSION COMPOSITION B-194. A variety of mission scenarios may employ the MH-47D. A typical mission profile for a low-to-medium threat infiltration and exfiltration sortie could take the following form: • Night, single-ship, VMC departure from a forward operating location to a target 260 nautical miles (range dependent upon fuel configuration and availability of prestaged FARP locations). MH-47D aircraft are aerial refueling capable and are range limited by availability of MC-130 support. • Navigate to an initial point using the best option of three navigational modes available. GPS is the primary mode when the required number of satellites is available. • Using guidance cues, follow navigation steering to a landing site and accomplish the approach to landing to a remote site of not less than 150 feet by 100 feet. • On-load an exfiltration party of up to 65 passengers from conditions not worse than 50°C (123ºF) at 500-foot pressure altitude. • Reverse the route and return to a recovery base or location in friendly territory. • Low en route altitudes (down to 50 feet) are possible given favorable conditions of ambient light and visibility and the use of infrared searchlight with NVDs.

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MH-47E HELICOPTER

MISSION B-195. The primary mission of the MH-47E is to conduct overt and covert infiltration, exfiltration, air assault, resupply, and sling operations over a wide range of environmental conditions. The aircraft can perform a variety of other missions, including shipboard operations, platform operations, urban operations, water operations, FARP operations, mass casualty operations, and CSAR operations. DESCRIPTION B-196. The MH-47E (Chinook) is a twin-engine, tandem rotor, heavy assault helicopter specifically designed and built for the SOA mission. It has a totally integrated avionics subsystem that combines the following: • Redundant avionics architecture with dual mission processors. • Remote terminal units. • Multifunction displays and display generators to improve combat survivability and mission reliability. • Aerial refueling probe for in-flight refueling. • External rescue hoist.

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• Two L714 turbine engines with full authority digital electronic control, which provides more power during hot or high environmental conditions. • Two integral aircraft fuel tanks, providing 2,068 gallons of fuel. • Stormscope for thunderstorm avoidance. COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS B-197. The ARC-186 (V) VHF (AM/FM) provides air-to-air and air-toground communications, with a band range from FM 30.000 to 87.975 MHz and AM 116.000 to 151.975 MHz in 25-kHz increments. B-198. The AN/ARC 201A (V) SINCGARS (VHF-FM) is a single-channel ground and airborne radio system that provides voice and data communications, in single channel of frequency hopping mode, with a band range from 30.000 to 87.975 MHz. B-199. The ARC-164 (V) UHF with HaveQuick II capability provides air-to-air and air-to-ground communications with a band range from 225.000 to 399.975 MHz in 25-kHz increments. B-200. The AN/ARC-200 HF Radio provides long-range two-way communications in AM and single sideband (SSB), including the upper and lower sidebands. B-201. The AN/ARC-231 SKYFIRE SATCOM provides satellite two-way communications, both line of sight or satellite, with a band range from 255.000 to 399.995 MHz in either 25- or 5-kHz spacing. B-202. The SABRE is a ground communication radio that provides two-way line-of-sight communication in the 136 MHz to 174 MHz range. B-203. The CP-1516/ASQ ATHS provides the capability of data bursting preselected and formatted information to other equipped aircraft or ground stations. NAVIGATION SYSTEMS B-204. The AN/ARN-149A ADF provides direction finding and homing. B-205. The ARN-123 (V) (VOR/DME/ILS) provides heading guidance for instrument navigation and instrument approaches. B-206. The AN/ASN-137 Doppler Navigation System provides continuous Doppler-derived measurements of the velocity of the helicopter and continuous computations of the present position for worldwide navigation guidance. In the MH-47E, these signals are sent to the mission processors and are used as velocities only. B-207. The EGI H764G Navigation System is a self-contained INU with an embedded GPS card. The EGI system is fundamentally a dead-reckoning navigation system. The advantage of a self-contained INU is its invulnerability to enemy countermeasures. The disadvantage is its inaccuracy, which builds over time unless the INU can be updated over known landmarks. Through miniaturization, the GPS receiver has been reduced to the size of a computer card. This miniature GPS receiver can now

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be installed (embedded) in the INU. Using the closely coupled technique to apply the GPS signal to the INU functions provides a means of accurately fixing position and measuring velocity. B-208. The AN/ASN 145 AHRS provides accurate outputs of pitch, roll, heading, acceleration, velocity, and position to the integrated avionics system or may act as a stand-alone system. B-209. The AN/ARN-118 (V) TACAN Navigation Set provides slant range distance, relative bearing, course deviation, distance to and from the station, and station audio identification. It is additionally used during aerial refueling for tanker-bearing information and during shipboard operations. B-210. The AN/ASN-43 provides heading reference for system navigators. B-211. The 2800A Air Data Computer (ADC) provides true airspeed, pressure altitude, outside air temperature, and indicated airspeed to the integrated avionics system or may act as a stand-alone system. B-212. The AN/ARS6B PLS provides the relative position of downed aviators equipped with the AN/PRC-112 transponder radio. It can also be used to home to a continuous UHF radio signal. B-213. The mission processor unit (2) provides mission management, performance planning, and flight following. It provides the flight director’s cues to the pilot, or it can be coupled through the AFCS as a two-axis autopilot, allowing hands-off hovering, departures, cruise, and approaches. (The pilot must still control the pitch axis.) AIRCRAFT SURVIVABILITY EQUIPMENT B-214. The AN/APR 39A (V) 1 Radar Warning Receiver identifies hostile pulse fire control radar and provides audio and video alerts to the flight crew when the system detects threat radar emissions. B-215. The AN/APR 44 Radar Warning Receiver identifies hostile AI and SAM CW fire control radar. It also provides audio and visual alerts to the flight crew when the system detects threat radar emissions. B-216. The M-130 Infrared Countermeasures Dispenser System deceives radar guidance and infrared missiles by using chaff or flares as required. B-217. The AN/AAR-47 Missile Warning System is a passive electronic warfare system that detects in-band infrared and ultraviolet radiation emanating from a missile plume. STANDARD MISSION EQUIPMENT Armament B-218. The MH-47E has three weapon stations: left forward window, right cabin door, and the ramp. The forward stations mount a 7.62-mm minigun, and the ramp station mounts an M60D 7.62-mm machine gun. An aircrew member at each station manually operates the weapon. The weapons are primarily for self-defense and enemy suppression.

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NOTE: When using the right cabin door weapon system, do not use the forward fast-rope station. B-219. The minigun is normally for soft targets and troop suppression, which require a high rate of fire. The minigun is air cooled and link fed. It has a maximum effective range of 1,500 meters with tracer burnout at 900 meters. The weapon has an adjustable rate of fire of 2,000 or 4,000 rounds per minute. The aircrew members currently fire ball or SLAP ammunition with a mix of four balls to one tracer, 4:1, or a 9:1 mix to prevent NVD shutdown on low-illumination nights. The ammunition complement without reloading is 8,000 rounds per weapon. FRIES B-220. The FRIES is a system for inserting and extracting personnel. Applied loads for the FRIES are as follows: • Applied loads at the rear ramp for insertions will not exceed nine persons per rope at the same time. • Applied loads at the rear ramp for extractions will not exceed six persons per rope at the same time. FLIR, AN/AAQ-16 B-221. The AN/AAQ-16 is a controllable, infrared surveillance system that provides a television video-type infrared image of terrain features and ground or airborne objects of interest. The FLIR is a passive system that detects longwavelength radiant infrared energy emitted, naturally or artificially, by any object in daylight or darkness. In the MH-47E, the pilots or the onboard computer may control the FLIR, and the infrared video may be saved on VHS tape for later mission debriefings. MAP DISPLAY GENERATOR B-222. When used with the data transfer module (DTM), the map display generator (MDG) displays aeronautical charts, photos, or digitized maps in the mission planning and 3D modes of operation based on digital terrain elevation data (DTED) and digital feature analysis data (DFAD). MISSION-SELECTIVE SYSTEMS External Cargo Hook System B-223. Use each hook (Table B-7) separately or with others. Plan all loads as a tandem-rigged load to facilitate greater load stability and to ensure faster airspeeds during flight. Table B-7. External Cargo Hooks, MH-47E Type

Capacity

Forward hook

17,000 pounds

Center hook

26,000 pounds

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Table B-7. External Cargo Hooks, MH-47E (Continued) Type

Capacity

Aft hook

17,000 pounds

Tandem hook

25,000 pounds

NOTE: These are maximum hook-rated loads and may not accurately reflect the true capability of the aircraft because of external conditions, such as pressure, altitude, and temperature. External Rescue Hoist B-224. The external rescue hoist is for use at the right front cabin door. It has a 600-pound capacity, with 200 feet of usable cable. Fast-rope operations can still be conducted out the front cabin door with the hoist installed. Internal Rescue Hoist B-225. The internal rescue hoist is for use at the center cargo hook and rescue hatch. It has a 600-pound capacity, with approximately 150 feet of usable cable. Cargo Compartment Expanded Range Fuel System B-226. The CCERFS consists of one and up to three ballistic-tolerant, selfsealing tanks. Each tank has the capacity of holding 800 gallons of fuel but normally are filled to 780 gallons. Filling may occur during aerial refueling operations or ground refueling operations. Forward Area Refueling Equipment B-227. The FARE consists of fueling pumps, hoses, nozzles, and additional refueling equipment to set up a two-point refueling site. Gallons of fuel dispensed are dependent upon the range of operation required of the tanker aircraft. TRANSPORTABILITY B-228. SOA has modified validated procedures to load two MH-47Es on a C-5 and one MH-47E on a C-17, with all support equipment. The time required to disassemble and assemble the MH-47E is greater than the time required of other SO helicopters. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS Planning Time B-229. Execution of SOA missions usually follows a deliberate planning sequence, time lined for maximum effectiveness. As planning time decreases, a concurrent loss in planning detail occurs and risk increases. Weather Minimums B-230. The weather minimum for the MH-47E is a 500-foot ceiling, with a visibility of 2 miles.

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Winds B-231. No wind minimums are specified for training, operational, and support missions; however, 45 knots is the maximum wind for starting and stopping the rotor system in the MH-47E. Flight Altitudes B-232. For training missions, the minimum en route altitude is 150 feet AGL or AHO for reconnoitered routes and 300 feet AGL or AHO for unreconnoitered routes. For operational missions, the minimum en route altitude is dictated by threat systems. Landing Areas B-233. The minimum landing area for the MH-47E is 150 feet by 100 feet. Shipboard Operations B-234. The MH-47E can operate day and night from Navy ships possessing Level II Class III helicopter-landing pads. Aircrew Composition B-235. Most training, exercises, or operational or contingency missions require five aircrew members. Aircrew members include a pilot, a copilot, a flight engineer, and two aircrew chiefs. The flight engineer is usually at the ramp station. He scans for other aircraft (targets or obstacles), operates the hoist (when required), assists in FRIES operations, operates the machine gun, and conducts sling-load operations. The aircrew chiefs are at the left and right forward gunners’ stations. They scan for other aircraft (targets or obstacles), operate the miniguns, and assist in sling-load and FRIES operations. Aircrew Qualifications B-236. All aircrews can support flight operations for the missions stated in JP 3-05. Aircrew qualifications include NVG infiltration and exfiltration operations to urban, overwater (ship, oil rigs), mountainous, desert, and jungle objectives arriving at the target at a prearranged time ± 30 seconds. Aircrews are trained in formation live-fire, long-range NVD operations over land and water. MH-47E aircrews can also perform aerial-refueling operations. Aircraft Capabilities B-237. Table B-8 lists the capabilities of the MH-47E aircraft. Figures B-13 through B-20, pages B-46 through B-53, illustrate specific dimensions and capabilities of the aircraft. Table B-8. MH-47E Aircraft Capabilities Aircraft Weight Maximum gross weight

54,000 pounds

Empty gross weight

26,918 pounds

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Table B-8. MH-47E Aircraft Capabilities (Continued) Aircraft Dimensions Length of fuselage

50 feet 9 inches

Length of probe

68 feet 7 inches

Length of blades

98 feet 10 inches

Width of fuselage

15 feet 8 inches

Width with blades

52 feet

Height

18 feet 7 inches

Diameter of main rotor

60 feet

Aircraft turning radius

122 feet

Cargo Area (unobstructed) Height

78 inches

Width

90 inches

Depth

366 inches

Troop Capacity With seats

44 troops

Floor loading

65 troops

Litters

24 troops

Airspeed Normal cruise

120 knots indicated airspeed

Maximum dash

170 knots indicated airspeed

Maximum altitude

20,000 feet

Fuel Flow Normal fuel consumption

2,750 pounds per hour

Maximum fuel consumption

3,300 pounds per hour

Range and Endurance Fuel Tank Integral

Endurance (Hours + Minutes)

Fuel Range (Nautical Miles)

4+30

540

Aircrew endurance and aerial refueling support may limit the range.

NOTE: Actual figures are dependent upon temperature, aircraft gross weight, and density altitude.

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Figure B-13. MH-47E Aircraft Capabilities, Dimensions

B-46

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Figure B-14. MH-47E Capabilities, Cargo Areas

B-47

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Figure B-15. MH-47E Capabilities, Turning Radius

B-48

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Figure B-16. MH-47E Maximum Package Size

B-49

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Figure B-17. MH-47E Maximum Package Size, Ramp Door

B-50

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Figure B-18. MH-47E Compartment Data

B-51

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Figure B-19. MH-47E Fitting Capabilities

B-52

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Figure B-20. MH-47E Passenger Seating and Litter Placement

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TYPICAL MISSION COMPOSITION B-238. A variety of mission scenarios may employ the MH-47E. A typical mission profile for a low-to-medium threat infiltration or exfiltration sortie could take the following form: • Departing by night, single-ship, VMC from a forward operating location to a target 520 nautical miles (range dependent upon fuel configuration and availability of prestaged FARP locations). The MH-47E aircraft is capable of aerial refueling. Availability of KC-, HC-, or MC-130 support limits the range. • Navigating to an initial point using the best option of eight navigational modes available. GPS is the primary mode when the required number of satellites is available. • Using guidance cues, follow navigation steering to a landing site and accomplish the approach to landing to a remote site of not less than 150 feet by 100 feet. • On-loading an exfiltration party of up to 65 passengers from conditions not worse than 50°C (123°F) at 500-foot pressure altitude. • Reversing the route and returning to a recovery base or location in friendly territory. • Using low en route altitudes (down to 50 feet), given favorable conditions of ambient light and visibility and use of infrared searchlight with NVDs or during adverse weather conditions.

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CAPABILITIES MATRIX B-239. The ARSOA aircraft capabilities matrix (Figure B-21) is a ready reference for mission planners. Its purpose is to reduce mission-planning time. The matrix provides instant information, without time-consuming research on the part of mission planners. The current aircraft capabilities matrix encompasses all aircraft systems. ARSOA units must update the matrix periodically as technology changes occur. MH-6J

AH-6J

MH-60L

MH-60L (DAP)

MH-60K

MH-47D

MH-47E

Aircraft Capabilities Cruise Speed (Knots)

80

90

120

120

110

120

120

Flight Time (Standard Tanks)

1+20

1+17

1+45

1+40

1+30

2+08

4+30

Range (Nautical Miles) (Standard Tanks)

110

116

212

200

165

256

540

Air Refuelable

no

no

no

yes (FY 01)

yes

yes

yes

Passengers

6

0

12

0

14

26

37

Maximum Passengers (No Seats for Rucksacks)

6

0

17

0

23

60

65

Landing Area (Feet)

50x50

50x50

100x100

100x100

100x100

150x100

150x100

UHF

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

HF

no

no

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

VHF (FM/AM)

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

SATCOM

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

SINCGARS

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

Sabre

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

ATHS

no

no

yes

yes

no

yes

yes

IMC Certified

no

no

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

GPS

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

ADF

no

no

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

VOR/DME

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

ILS

no

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

Doppler

no

no

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

Communications

Navigation

Figure B-21. ARSOA Aircraft Capabilities Matrix

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MH-6J

AH-6J

MH-60L

MH-60L (DAP)

MH-60K

MH-47D

MH-47E

Navigation (Continued) Inertial Navigation System

no

no

no

no

yes

yes

yes

Attitude Heading Reference System

no

no

no

no

yes

no

yes

TACAN

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

Air Data Computer

no

no

no

no

no

yes

yes

PLS

no

no

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

Mission Computer Unit

no

no

no

no

yes

yes

yes

LORAN

yes

yes

no

no

no

no

no

M134 7.62-mm Minigun

no

yes

yes (2)

yes (2)

yes (2)

yes (2)

yes (2)

M230 30-mm Chain Gun

no

no

no

yes

no

no

no

M260 7-Shot Rocket

no

yes

no

yes

no

no

no

M261 19-Shot Rocket

no

yes

no

yes

no

no

no

AGM-114 Hellfire (Maximum)

no

yes (4)

no

yes (8)

no

no

no

M2 Caliber .50 Machine Gun

no

yes (2)

no

no

no

no

no

ATA Stinger

no

yes

no

yes

no

no

no

Armament

Standard or Special Equipment Ballistic Armor Subsystem

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

Guardian Auxiliary Fuel Tank

no

no

2+00

2+00

2+00

no

no

FRIES

yes

no

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

FLIR

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

External Cargo Hook

no

no

9,000 pounds

no

8,000 pounds

26,000 pounds

26,000 pounds

Rescue Hoist

no

no

600 pounds

no

600 pounds

600 pounds

600 pounds

Auxiliary Fuel System (Time/Nautical Miles)

3+50/ 310

2+57/ 266

5+00/ 600

4+45/ 570

3+30/ 385

7+53/ 945

8+20/ 1000

C2 Console

no

no

yes

no

no

no

yes

Figure B-21. ARSOA Aircraft Capabilities Matrix (Continued)

B-56

Appendix C

Operations This appendix contains the formats of an OPORD and a mission-planning folder specifically designed for ARSOA aircrews. Mission-planning aircrews continually coordinate and update these documents throughout the execution of the mission. This appendix also discusses airspace C2 for ARSOA aircrew operations.

ARSOA OPERATIONS ORDER C-1. The S3 of the ARSOA task force modifies the standard OPORD to develop an aviation-specific OPORD (Figure C-1). A detailed ARSOA OPORD is critical to mission success.

(Classification) 1. SITUATION. a. Enemy forces. (1) Weather (current and forecast). (a) Area of operations or objective area. (b) Forward staging base. (c) En route (ingress and egress). (2) Light data. (a) Sources of light for night operations. (b) Percent of moon illumination. (c) Angle of moon during operation. (3) Sea data. (a) Sea state. (b) Water temperature. (4) Terrain (area of operations and objective area). (a) Key terrain. (b) Decisive terrain. (c) Avenues of approach (air, land, and sea).

(Classification) Figure C-1. ARSOA Operations Order Format

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(Classification) (d) Cover and concealment. (e) Observation and fires. (f) Hazards (existing obstacles and minefields). (g) Effect on aviation. (h) Effect on mission. (i) Choke points on route. (5) Enemy troops. (a) Permissive, uncertain, and hostile environment. (b) En route, LZ and objective area, FARP sites. (c) Identification of forces. (d) Locations. (e) Strength. (f) Morale. (g) Capabilities. (h) Vulnerabilities. (i) Activities (current and future). (j) C2. (k) Service and support. (l) Probable COAs following mission execution. (m) Reaction time from known locations. b. Friendly forces. (1) Higher HQ. (a) Command relationship (effective date-time group [DTG]). (b) Mission. (c) Intent. (2) Ground and assault force. (a) Command relationship (effective DTG). (b) Mission. (c) Intent. (3) Adjacent units. (a) Location. (b) Mission. (c) Airspace coordination.

(Classification) Figure C-1. ARSOA Operations Order Format (Continued)

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(Classification) c. Attachments and detachments. (1) Command relationship (effective DTG). (2) Mission. (3) Location. d. Public affairs guidance. e. Priority intelligence requirements and information requirements (PIR and IRs). f. Essential elements of information and essential elements of friendly information (EEI and EEFI). 2. MISSION. Who, what, when, where, and why. 3. EXECUTION. Intent: State the commander’s intent. a. Concept of the operation. (1) Scheme of maneuver. (a) General scheme, mission profile (diagram, chart), and H-hour (if applicable). (b) Event- or time-driven. (c) Phasing. (d) Main effort. (2) Plan of fire support. (a) General scheme (air, ground, naval). (b) Priority of fires. (c) Target overlay. (d) Types of fires. (e) Preparatory or prehour fires. (f) Fire support coordination measures. (g) Illumination requirements. (h) J-SEAD. (i) Employment of nuclear or chemical fires. (j) Test fire time and location. (k) Actions to prevent fratricide. (3) Counterair operations. (a) Assets and plan. (b) Use of ASE. (c) Passive measures.

(Classification) Figure C-1. ARSOA Operations Order Format (Continued)

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(Classification) (4) EW. (a) Collection and jamming. (b) Types of targets. (c) Priority of jamming. (5) Deception. (a) LZs, routes. (b) Special movement and landing instructions. (c) Deception target and intent. b. Tasks to subordinate units. (1) Companies, platoons, sections, or teams. (2) AVUM. (3) HQ. c. Tasks to combat support units. (1) Fire support. (a) CAS. (b) Chemical support. (c) Field artillery support (including displacement). (d) Naval gunfire support. (e) Attack helicopters (AHs). (f) Special instructions. (g) Fire support overlay and target list. (2) Air defense. (a) Command relationship. (b) Specified tasks. (3) Chemical (including decontamination). (4) EW. (5) Engineering (battlespace preparation). d. ISB. (1) Marshalling area procedures and control. (2) Time sequence. (a) Show. (b) Concept briefing. (c) Weather decision. (d) Preflight.

(Classification) Figure C-1. ARSOA Operations Order Format (Continued)

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(Classification) (e) Aircraft run-ups, equipment checks, communications checks, load time. (3) Route to the area. (4) Fuel requirements. (5) Special equipment required. (6) Contingencies. (a) Minimum number of aircraft. (b) Aircraft abort (cross-loading of personnel and equipment). (c) Weather abort criteria. (d) Ground force command and AMC bump plan. (7) Aircraft parking plan. (8) Aircraft load plan on C-5, C-17, C-130, C-141. (9) Security plan. e. FSB. (1) Location. (2) Landing. (a) C-5, C-17, C-130, C-141. 1. Direction. 2. Time. 3. Offload sequence and position. 4. Aircraft parking and buildup area. 5. Fuel plan. (b) Self-deployed. (3) Aircraft combat load (ACL) plan. (a) Seat configuration (if any) and number. (b) Straps. (c) Doors opened or closed. (d) Miscellaneous equipment (stored, location). (4) Security requirements. (5) Repositioning for departure. *(6) Hazards. *(7) Weapons systems loading. (a) Location. (b) Orientation or heading.

(Classification) Figure C-1. ARSOA Operations Order Format (Continued)

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(Classification) (c) Safety measures. *(8) Takeoff. (a) Time. (b) Heading. (c) Formation. (d) Airspeed. (e) Altitude. (f) Hazards. (g) Aircraft lighting. (h) ASE requirements. (i) Fuel required. (j) Weapons status. (9) Combat control team (CCT) instructions. (a) Communications. (b) Signal. *(10) Contingencies. (a) Air Force air aborts. (b) Air Force go-around. (c) Aircrew injuries. (d) Bump plan. 1. Change of lead aircraft due to maintenance. 2. Change of AMC aircraft due to maintenance. 3. Change of ground commander aircraft due to maintenance. 4. Change of other aircraft. 5. Spare (location, running, not running). (11) Weather abort criteria. (12) Aircraft abort criteria. (a) Minimum number aircraft required to accomplish the mission. (b) Aircraft systems failure criteria. f. Flight route. (1) Initial approach fix (IAF) air aborts. (2) Formation. (3) Airspeed and ground speed.

(Classification) Figure C-1. ARSOA Operations Order Format (Continued)

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(Classification) (4) Altitudes. (5) Hazards to flight. *(6) Turns in excess of 60Û *(7) Communications signals unique to this portion. *(8) Air traffic control (ATC) and CCT procedures. *(9) Aircraft lighting. *(10) Checkpoints. *(11) Rally points (air and ground). *(12) Point of no return. *(13) Brief penetration control measures. (a) IFF set for penetration. (b) ASE and electronic countermeasures (ECM) (APR-39/44, flares, chaff, ALQ-144, radar, TACAN). (c) Armor panels and plates, forward. (d) Armament systems. (e) Review release point (RP), target, departure, and go-around procedures. (f) Fast rope, extend bars. (g) Fuel transfer off, prior to RP. (h) Warning calls. (i) Aircraft lights, interior and exterior. (j) FLIR, lower brightness RP or short final. (14) RP; time, distance, and heading (TDH) from RP to objective. (15) Egress. (a) Armament systems. (b) Aircraft lights, adjust. (c) IFF. (16) Penetration control point (PCP) procedures. (17) Aviation element link-up procedures. (a) Location. (b) Communications. (c) Link-up procedure. (18) ASE requirements (specify actions along route and especially when cross-FLOT). *(19) Weapons status. (a) Hold, fire only in self-defense.

(Classification) Figure C-1. ARSOA Operations Order Format (Continued)

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(Classification) (b) Tight, fire only if target identified as enemy. (c) Free, fire at anything except if positively identified as friendly. **(20) Contingencies. (a) Downed aircraft. (b) Actions on enemy contact. (c) Communications failure. (d) Lead disorientation. (e) Weather abort. (f) Adjustment to route procedures. (g) Maintenance divert. (h) Casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) divert. (i) Formation change. (21) Mission abort criteria. g. Landing area procedures (LZ, PZ). (1) Location (primary and alternate). (2) Description. *(3) Hazards. *(4) Arrival procedures. (a) Time. (b) Formation. (c) Direction. (d) Airspeed. (e) ATC and CCT procedures. (f) Aircraft lighting. (g) Doors opened and closed. (h) Door gunner instructions. (i) Signal to execute alternate PZ and LZ. (5) PZ and LZ marking and control. (6) Aircraft positioning in PZ and LZ. (a) Engines running. (b) Auxiliary power unit (APU) only. (c) Complete shutdown. (d) Security in the PZ and LZ.

(Classification) Figure C-1. ARSOA Operations Order Format (Continued)

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(Classification) *(7) Load plan (including troop safety considerations). (a) Seat configuration (if any) and number. (b) Strap configuration. (c) Doors opened or closed. *(8) Link-up procedures with supporting aviation elements. *(9) Minimum fuel required to complete the mission from PZ and LZ. (10) FARP operations (see coordinating instructions). **(11) Contingencies. (a) Lead aircraft change. (b) AMC aircraft change. (c) Task Force (TF) commander aircraft change. (d) Tactical bump plan. (e) Dispersal plan and rally point. *(12) Time sequencing. (a) Load. (b) Reposition. (c) Takeoff. (d) Time on target (TOT) or H-hour. *(13) Security requirements. *(14) Weapons status. (15) Departure procedures (same as FSB). (16) En route procedures (same as flight route). h. Assault (landing) plan and actions on the objective or target. (1) LZ and objective location (primary and alternate). (2) TOT and H-hour (rounds on target or wheels down) or critical event that must occur before assault. (3) Formation at RP (assault formation). (4) Direction of flight. *(5) Airspeed and ground speed. *(6) Altitude. *(7) Aircraft lighting. (8) Hazards in the LZ or objective. (9) LZ marking and control. (10) ATC or CCT procedures.

(Classification) Figure C-1. ARSOA Operations Order Format (Continued)

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FM 3-05.60

(Classification) (11) Aircraft touchdown points. (12) Type of assault (fast rope, air, land). (13) Location of friendly troops in LZ (reconnaissance and surveillance team, sniper). *(14) ASE requirements in the LZ. *(15) Air defense status and coordinating instructions. *(16) Weapons status (hold, tight, free). (17) Fires. (a) Door gunner’s missions (be specific). 1. Priorities and sectors. 2. Shift-fire and hold-fire instructions. 3. Control measures and actions taken to prevent fratricide. (b) Target overlay (artillery, AH control measures). (c) Preplanned fires. (d) ROE. (e) Laser safety (troops on the ground). (f) DAP, AH priorities, and type of ammunition. **(18) Contingencies. (a) Downed aircraft on insertion and departure. (b) Go-around procedures (direction, signal, altitude, lighting, communication, control measures, and intentions). (c) Actions on enemy contact (flight and individual aircraft). (d) Communications failure. (e) Rally point. (f) Friendly killed in action (KIA)/wounded in action (WIA) (troops and aircrew members). (g) Signal to execute alternate LZ or objective. (h) Aircraft delay and down on LZ. (19) Departure instructions. (a) Authorization to depart. (b) Departure plan (when ready, in chalk order, or as a flight). NOTE: If departing individually, identify departure sectors, control measures (“Eagle” call), rally point, and safety measures. (c) Heading. (d) Formation. (e) Airspeed and ground speed.

(Classification) Figure C-1. ARSOA Operations Order Format (Continued)

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FM 3-05.60

(Classification) (f) Aircraft lighting. (g) ATC and CCT procedures. (h) Routes (primary and alternate). (20) Follow-on instructions (laager, prepare for extraction, hold, return to FSB). (21) Safety considerations during the assault and extraction. i. Departure airfield procedures. (1) Location. (2) Arrival procedures. (3) Parking and tear down. (4) Repositioning. (5) Marshalling. (6) Critical times. **(7) Contingencies. (a) Friendly WIA and KIA. (b) Aircraft abort or down. (c) Weather abort. (8) Security. j. Coordinating instructions. (1) Location and markings of friendly. (2) Maps and charts. (3) SAR plan. (a) Brief CSAR zones for ingress, egress, safe area. (b) Brief concept of operation, CSAR assets, C2, signal. (c) Recovery hospital, secure LZ and FSB. (d) Weather or divert plan (alternate recovery instructions). (e) Effect on tactical operation. (f) PLS coordination. (g) Activation or implementation of SAR plan. (4) EPA. (a) Escape and evasion route, checkpoints, and procedures. (b) Designated area for recovery (DAR). (c) Recognition and recovery procedures. (d) Notification procedures. (e) PLS and ISOPREP coordination.

(Classification) Figure C-1. ARSOA Operations Order Format (Continued)

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FM 3-05.60

(Classification) (f) Destruction of aircraft and sensitive items. (5) Initial IMC procedures. (a) Altitude to climb to, heading, airspeed, squawk. (b) Recovery airfield and instrument capabilities. (c) Minimum safe altitude. (d) Communications procedures. (e) Highest terrain, obstacles, and hazards. (f) Effect on mission. (g) Forecast weather and freezing level. (h) Tactical procedures. (i) Approval by higher headquarters of initial IMC recovery plan. (6) FARP procedures. (a) Location, marking, and marshalling control. (b) Airspace management. (c) Refueling points. (d) Rearm points. (e) Safety (weapons, ammunition, personnel). (f) Security. (g) Dispersal plan (including link-up procedures at rally point). (h) Lighting. (7) J-SEAD. (8) Aircrew coordinating instructions with assault force in flight (time warnings and navigation). (a) Fast-rope procedures, doors open and closed, removal of cargo strap, primary doors. (b) Headset and communications coordination. (c) Call-out of air control points (ACPs) or RP-TDH to objective or LZ. (d) Time warnings. (e) Confirm LZ. (f) Door fires. (g) Clamshell report (report given after all personnel and equipment are clear of the target area). (9) Mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) level (include instructions on NBC defense and decontamination procedures and operational exposure guide [OEG]). (10) ROE. (a) Combatants. (b) Noncombatants.

(Classification) Figure C-1. ARSOA Operations Order Format (Continued)

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FM 3-05.60

(Classification) (11) Precious-cargo-handling instructions (person or item that is the objective of the mission). (a) Handling and control in and out of aircraft. (b) Control in the aircraft. (c) Doors closed. (d) Reporting requirements (clamshell report). (12) Preaccident plan. (13) Inspections. (a) Individual. (b) Aircraft systems and communication. (c) Weapons systems. (14) Rehearsals and equipment checks. (a) Loading and offloading procedures. (b) Aerial link-ups. (c) Assault procedures and actions on the objective. (d) Door gunner fire procedures. (e) Communications checks. (f) ASE checks. (g) Weapons checks, bore sighting, laser mount. (h) Precious cargo handling. (i) FARP operations. (j) Actions on the objective. (15) Air defense warning and air defense weapons control status. (16) Individual responsibilities. (a) Flight plan. (b) Manifest. (c) Weather. (d) Sensitive item inventory. (e) Weapons issue. (f) ALSE issue. (g) Mission brief sheet. (h) Sterilization. (i) Fuel identification plate (government credit card). (j) NVG emergency locator transmitter (ELT) and radio aircraft key. (17) Airspace deconfliction and coordination.

(Classification) Figure C-1. ARSOA Operations Order Format (Continued)

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FM 3-05.60

(Classification) (18) Precision letdown procedures (GPS) at FSB, ISB, target. (19) Antiterrorism measures. (20) Backbrief time and location (platoon leader, AMC, flight lead, and key personnel backbrief critical events or concept to commander). (21) Debrief time and location. (22) Weather decision time. (23) Final mission update time and location. 4. SERVICE SUPPORT. a. Supply. (1) Class I (rations). (2) Class III (fuel, POL). (a) Location. (b) Type. (c) Amount. (d) Compatibility of fuel and equipment. (3) Class V (ammunition). (a) Issue point and procedures. (b) Individual authorizations by type. (c) Crew-served authorizations by type. (d) Aircraft systems authorizations by type. (e) Turn-in procedures. (4) Class VIII (medical supplies). (5) Class IX (aircraft repair parts). b. Water. c. Maps. d. Uniform. e. ALSE. f. Special equipment. (1) ASE. (2) PLS. (3) Oxygen. (4) FRIES. (5) Cargo hook. (6) Seats.

(Classification) Figure C-1. ARSOA Operations Order Format (Continued)

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FM 3-05.60

(Classification) g. Storage. h. Weapons. (1) Aircraft systems and aircrew-served weapons. (2) Individual weapons. (3) Issue instructions. (4) Storage and security. (5) Test firing and cleaning. (6) Maintenance. (7) Turn-in procedures. i. Billeting. j. Finance. k. Transportation. l. Maintenance. (1) Location and composition of support. (a) Pre-mission. (b) Preflight. (c) Crank. (d) Mission. (2) Location and composition of ground support equipment. (a) Pre-mission. (b) Preflight. (c) Crank. (d) Mission. (3) Support facilities available. (a) Hangar. (b) Shop capabilities. (4) Downed aircraft recovery. (a) Recovery officer in charge and team location. (b) Notification on command net frequency of the following information: 1. Type and serial number of downed aircraft. 2. Latitude and longitude of aircraft. 3. Description of recovery site. 4. Brief description of aircraft condition.

(Classification) Figure C-1. ARSOA Operations Order Format (Continued)

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FM 3-05.60

(Classification) 5. Area security call sign and frequency. 6. Sensitive items and aircraft configuration. 7. Authority to destroy, if required. (c) Method of recovery. 1. Method of recovery or disposition of aircraft made after consideration of information received and tactical situation. 2. One of three methods of recovery. m. MEDEVAC procedures. (1) Responsibilities. (2) Recovery hospital and location. (3) Coordination procedures and communications. (4) Alternate recovery procedure. (5) Collection point at objective area. (6) Launch authority. n. Prisoner of war handling and collection point (including civilian detainees, if applicable). o. NBC equipment and location of decontamination sites. p. Services (hygiene, laundry, trash collection). q. Discipline, law, and order. r. Casualty reporting procedures. 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. a. Command. (1) Commander and location. (2) AMC and location. (3) Assault force commander (second in charge) and location. (4) TF commander and location. (5) Flight lead. (6) Succession of command (air assault TF commander or ground commander, air component commander, air mission commander, flight or serial commander). (7) Rear detachment commander. (8) Battalion or company command post location. (9) TF command post location. (10) Assault force command post location. (11) Location of command sergeant major or first sergeant.

(Classification) Figure C-1. ARSOA Operations Order Format (Continued)

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FM 3-05.60

(Classification) b. Signal. (1) Signal operating instructions (SOI) period (fill dates). (2) Call signs. (3) Frequencies or nets (primary and alternate, secure and nonsecure). (a) Mission command. (b) TF command. (c) Helicopter communications. (d) Company internal. (e) Adjacent units. (f) Fire control. (g) SAR. (h) SERE and PLS PRC 112-A-B. (i) MEDEVAC. (j) ATC and CCT. (k) AWACS. (l) Vectoring. (m) Satellite and HF. (4) Execution checklist and prowords. (5) Signals. (a) Lights. (b) Visual markers. (c) Recognition (day and night). (d) Recognition (near and far). (6) Challenge and password. (7) Running password and number combination. (8) Secure communications requirements. Identify element responsible for keying. (9) Transponder. (a) Mode requirements (include Transponder Kit lA/C) and codes. (b) Antenna requirements. (10) Aids to navigation.

* May be briefed under coordinating instructions. ** May be briefed under contingencies.

(Classification) Figure C-1. ARSOA Operations Order Format (Continued)

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ARSOA MISSION PLANNING FOLDER C-2. This portion of the appendix provides guidance on preparing the various components of an ARSOA mission planning folder. Components of the mission planning folder include the mission tasking letter, the feasibility assessment, the initial assessment, the TIP for DA and SR missions, the TIP for FID and UW missions, the mission tasking package, the SOF plan of execution (POE), and the POEs for infiltrations and exfiltrations. MISSION TASKING LETTER C-3. The JFSOCC assigns missions to SOF commanders based on the joint targeting process. Along with the commander who is responsible for executing the mission, the JFSOCC selects a JSOA. Missions may range from a specified task to a broad, continuing mission order. Figure C-2 shows a sample format for a mission tasking letter.

(Classification) Addressees: I. REFERENCES. II. GENERAL. A. JFSOCC’s concept for employment of the Army special operations aviation task force (ARSOATF) (deployment, employment, and sustainment). B. JFSOCC’s contingency missions assigned the ARSOATF. C. U.S. military strategic objectives. D. Variables that complicate the attainment of strategic objectives. E. JFC’s campaign plan points that accommodate the variables. F. Preparation and priorities for unplanned contingencies. III. JFSOCC CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. A. Location and mission of the JFSOCC. B. ARSOATF mission. IV. SPECIFIC MISSION GUIDANCE. A. Force operating locations. B. Readiness standards (deployment time and time to commence operations expressed in N+XX). C. Specified operations tasks. D. Specified planning and preparation tasks. E. Specified area and mission orientation. F. Actions to prevent fratricide. V. SUSTAINMENT. VI. COMMAND AND CONTROL. VII. OTHER RESPONSIBILITIES.

(Classification) Figure C-2. Mission Tasking Letter Format

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FEASIBILITY ASSESSMENT C-4. The feasibility assessment (Figure C-3) is a basic target analysis that provides an initial determination of the viability of a proposed target for SOF employment. Normally, the feasibility assessment is associated with the SOF ground element. When an ARSOATF is given a unilateral mission to conduct a DA or an SR mission, the feasibility assessment should be used for target analysis. It should include an initial assessment.

(Classification) SECTION I - MISSION DESCRIPTION A. Target Identification Data (Basic Encyclopedia [BE] Number, Category Code, Geographic Coordinates, Universal Transverse Mercator [UTM] Coordinates, and Map Sheets). B. Mission Statement and Commander’s Guidance. SECTION II - COMMANDER’S ASSESSMENT A. Target Feasibility. B. Probability of Mission Success. C. Recommendation. SECTION III - ASSUMPTIONS SECTION IV - FACTORS AFFECTING COURSES OF ACTION A. Characteristics of Joint Special Operations Area. 1. Weather. 2. Terrain. 3. Other factors. B. Friendly Situation. C. Enemy Situation. 1. Composition. 2. Disposition. 3. Strength. a. Committed forces. b. Location of reinforcements and estimated reaction times. c. NBC capabilities. 4. Significant enemy activity, intelligence, and counterintelligence capabilities. 5. Peculiarities and weaknesses. 6. Vulnerability to deception.

(Classification) Figure C-3. Feasibility Assessment Format

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(Classification) 7. Enemy capabilities. a. Defensive. b. Offensive. c. Intelligence and counterintelligence. 8. Reaction and reinforcement. 9. Security on target. SECTION V - COURSES OF ACTION A. Identification of COAs. B. Analysis of COAs. C. Comparison of COAs. 1. Advantages. 2. Disadvantages. 3. Risks. D. Recommended COA. SECTION VI - INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION VII - SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS A. Personnel. B. Logistics (Including CSS). C. Other.

(Classification) Figure C-3. Feasibility Assessment Format (Continued)

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INITIAL ASSESSMENT C-5. The initial assessment (Figure C-4) provides a basic determination of the viability of the infiltration and exfiltration portions of a proposed SOF mission. If the mission is to support another Army or Navy SOF mission, the initial assessment becomes a part of the feasibility assessment as needed to help establish the overall viability of the mission. The initial assessment goes to the MPA for review and approval before it goes to the JFSOCC.

(Classification) SECTION I - MISSION DESCRIPTION (BE Number, Category Code, Geographic Coordinates, UTM Coordinates, Map Sheets) SECTION II - ASSUMPTIONS SECTION III - MISSION DATA A. Launch Bases, ISBs, Recovery Bases. B. LZs, DZs, Seaward Launch Points (SLPs), Beach Landing Sites (BLSs), Recovery Zones (RZs), and Seaward Recovery Points (SRPs). C. Abort and Emergency Divert Bases. D. Air-Refueling Tracks and FARPs. E. Flight and Seaward Approach Routes. 1. Ingress. 2. Egress. 3. Orbiting and holding. F. Range Factors. G. Time Factors. H. Route Factors. I. Refueling Factors. J. Aircrew Factors. K. Weather. SECTION IV - MISSION ASSESSMENT A. Threat. 1. Air defenses. 2. Deception of air defenses. 3. Surface and subsurface waters. B. Probability of Team Infiltration. C. Probability of Team Resupply. D. Probability of Team Exfiltration.

(Classification) Figure C-4. Initial Assessment Format

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(Classification) E. Overall Probability of Mission Success. F. Other Factors. SECTION V - LIMITING FACTORS A. Intelligence. B. Weather. C. Terrain and Hydrography. D. Equipment. E. Monitors. F. Tactics. G. Logistics (Including CSS). H. Personnel. I. Training. J. Supporting Forces. K. ROE, Fratricide Prevention, and Legal Issues. SECTION VI - SUPPORTING DATA A. Photography and Imagery Requested. B. Intelligence Information Requested. SECTION VII - INITIAL ASSESSMENT BOARD A. Composition. B. Recommendation. SECTION VIII - SOA, SURFACE SHIP, AND SUBMARINE REQUIREMENTS FROM AFSOF, ARSOF, AND NAVSOF TO CONDUCT INITIAL ASSESSMENT A. Target Coordinates. B. Maximum and Minimum Distances of LZs, DZs, SLPs, BLSs, RZs, SRPs From Target. C. Time Frame in OPLAN and CONPLAN Scenario (Pre-D-Day or D+XX). D. Desired Launch and Recovery Bases. E. Type of Delivery and Recovery Required (Airdrop, AirLand, Fast Rope, SEAL Delivery Vehicle, or Combat Rubber Raiding Craft) and Preferred Platform. F. Number of Personnel to be Transferred and Approximate Weight per Person. G. Approximate Size and Weight of Additional Equipment. H. Assumptions Made During Supported Commander’s Feasibility Assessment. NOTE: Although not always readily available, information on hand is normally sufficient to conduct the initial assessment. An effort should be made, however, to obtain and include in the initial assessment all the information in the format sample.

(Classification) Figure C-4. Initial Assessment Format (Continued)

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TARGET INTELLIGENCE PACKAGE FOR DA AND SR MISSIONS C-6. Figure C-5 provides a sample format of a SOF TIP for DA and SR missions.

(Classification) SECTION I - TARGET IDENTIFICATION AND DESCRIPTION A. Target Identification Data. B. Description and Significance. C. Detailed Target Description. D. Target Vulnerability Assessment. SECTION II - NATURAL ENVIRONMENT A. Geographic Data (Including Terrain and Hazards to Movement). B. Meteorological Data (Climatological Overview and Tables and Illumination Data). C. Hydrographic Data (Coasts, Waterways, Lakes, and Luminescence). SECTION III - THREAT A. Ground Forces (Including Border Guards). B. Paramilitary and Indigenous Forces (Including Intelligence and Security and Police Services). C. Naval Forces (Including Coast Guard and Maritime Border Guard). D. Air Forces. E. Air Defense Forces (Including Radars; Passive Detectors; and Command, Control, and Communications [C3]). F. Electronic OB. G. Space-Based Assets. H. Other. SECTION IV - DEMOGRAPHICS AND CULTURAL FEATURES A. Area Population Characteristics. B. Languages, Dialects, and Ethnic Composition. C. Social Conditions. D. Religious Factors. E. Political Characteristics. F. Economic Conditions. G. Miscellaneous (Currency, Holidays, Dress, and Customs). SECTION V - LINES OF COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS

A. Airfields.

(Classification) Figure C-5. Format of Target Intelligence Package for DA and SR Missions

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(Classification) B. Railways. C. Roadways. D. Waterways. E. Ports. F. POL. G. Power Grid. H. Telecommunications and Media (Print, Radio, and Television). SECTION VI - INFILTRATION AND EXFILTRATION (Potential LZs, DZs, BLSs, and helicopter landing zones [HLZs]) A. Potential Zones. B. Choke Points Between Insertion Points and Objective. SECTION VII - SURVIVAL, EVASION, RESISTANCE, ESCAPE, AND RECOVERY DATA A. Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape, and Recovery (SERER) and SAFE Areas. B. Survival Data. SECTION VIII - UNIQUE INTELLIGENCE (Mission-Specific Requirements Not Covered Above) SECTION IX - INTELLIGENCE SHORTFALLS Annex A. Bibliography. Annex B.

Glossary.

Annex C.

Imagery.

Annex D.

Maps and Charts.

Annex E.

Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) (If Applicable).

(Classification) Figure C-5. Format of Target Intelligence Package for DA and SR Missions (Continued)

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TARGET INTELLIGENCE PACKAGE FOR FID AND UW MISSIONS C-7. Figure C-6 shows a sample format of a TIP for FID and UW missions.

(Classification) SECTION I - OBJECTIVE AREA IDENTIFICATION AND DESCRIPTION A. Objective Area Identification Data. B. Description and Significance. SECTION II - NATURAL ENVIRONMENT A. Meteorological Data (Illumination Data and Climatological Overview and Tables). B. Hydrographic Data (Coasts, Waterways, Lakes, and Luminescence). C. Water Sources (Color-Coded Overlay). D. Flora and Fauna (Plants and Animals of Tactical Importance). SECTION III - THREAT A. Objective Country (Enemy OB). B. Opposition and Resistance Forces. SECTION IV - DEMOGRAPHIC, CULTURAL, POLITICAL, AND SOCIAL FEATURES (EEI Must Be Answered for Objective Country and for Opposition and Resistance Forces) A. Area Population Characteristics (Including Resistance Potential). B. Languages, Dialects, and Ethnic Composition. C. Social Conditions. D. Religious Factors. E. Political Characteristics. F. Available Labor Force. G. Customs (Society, Weapons, Religion, Culture, and Mores). H. Medical Capabilities. I. Health and Sanitation Conditions. J. Economic Conditions. K. Currency, Holidays, and So On. SECTION V - LINES OF COMMUNICATION, INFORMATION SYSTEMS, AND LOGISTICS A. Airfields. B. Railways. C. Roadways. D. Waterways. E. Ports.

(Classification) Figure C-6. Format of Target Intelligence Package for FID and UW Missions

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(Classification) F. POL. G. Power Grid. H. Telecommunications and Media (Print, Radio, and Television). I. Exploitable Civilian Transportation. J. Primary Modes of Transportation. K. U.S.-Provided Materials and Services. L. Stockpiles. M. War-Sustaining Industries. N. War-Sustaining Resupply. O. Movement Control Centers. SECTION VI - INFILTRATION AND EXFILTRATION (Potential LZs, DZs, BLSs, and HLZs) A. Potential Zones. B. Choke Points Between Insertion Points and Objective Country (EEI Must Be Answered for the Objective Country and for Opposition and Resistance Forces.) SECTION VII - FID AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE (EEI Must Be Answered for the Objective Country and for Opposition and Resistance Forces.) A. Military Assistance Provided. B. Foreign Personnel (Noncombatants). C. Foreign Military Materiel. D. Deployments of Foreign Personnel and Equipment. E. Foreign Contractor Services and Construction. F. U.S. Support. SECTION VIII - SURVIVAL, EVASION, RESISTANCE, ESCAPE, AND RECOVERY DATA A. SERER, SAFE Areas, and DAR Areas. B. Survival Data. SECTION IX - UNIQUE INTELLIGENCE (Mission-Specific Requirements Not Covered Above) SECTION X - INTELLIGENCE SHORTFALLS Annex A. Bibliography. Annex B. Glossary. Annex C. Imagery. Annex D. Maps and Charts. Annex E. SCI (If Applicable).

(Classification) Figure C-6. Format of Target Intelligence Package for FID and UW Missions (Continued)

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MISSION TASKING PACKAGE C-8. Each mission tasking package consists of a mission tasking letter and the transmittal documents. Figure C-7 shows the items included in the mission tasking package.

(Classification) SECTION I - MISSION TASKING LETTER AND TRANSMITTAL DOCUMENTS A. Joint Force Special Operations Component (JFSOC) Tasking. B. Subordinate Tasking From the JFSOCC. C. Coordinating Instructions. D. Direct Liaison Authorized (Yes or No). SECTION II - TARGET IDENTIFICATION DATA A. Name. B. BE Number. C. Mission Number (If Applicable). D. Mission Tasks. E. Functional Classification Code. F. Country. G. JSOA Coordinates (Geographic Reference [GEOREF] or UTM). H. Geographic Coordinates (GEOREF or UTM). I. General Description and Target Significance. SECTION III - CINC MISSION GUIDANCE (Combatant Commander’s Mission Statement and Objectives) A. Mission Statement. B. Specific Targeting Objective. C. Commander’s Guidance. D. C2. SECTION IV - RECORD OF CHANGES SECTION V - RECORD OF DISTRIBUTION

(Classification) Figure C-7. Mission Tasking Package Format

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SOF PLAN OF EXECUTION C-9. The POE is a detailed plan that shows how the SOF mission will be carried out. This plan, along with the POE for infiltration and exfiltration and mission rehearsals, is the result of the targeting and mission planning process. It also describes the supporting infiltration and exfiltration plan developed by the supporting organization. Figure C-8 shows a sample SOF POE format.

(Classification) Issuing HQ: Place: Day, Month, Year, Hour: Commander’s or MPA’s Estimate of the Situation: References (Maps, Charts, and Other Pertinent Documents): SECTION I - MISSION DESCRIPTION (BE Number, Category Code, Geographic Coordinates, UTM Coordinates, and Map Sheets) SECTION II - THE SITUATION AND COURSES OF ACTION A. Considerations Affecting the COAs. 1. Characteristics of the JSOA. a. Military geography. (1) Topography. (2) Hydrography and luminescence data. (3) Climate, weather, and illumination data. b. Transportation. c. Telecommunications. d. Politics. e. Economics. f. Sociology. g. Science and technology. 2. Relative combat power. a. Enemy. (1) Strength. (2) Composition. (3) Location and disposition. (4) Reinforcements. (5) Logistics.

(Classification) Figure C-8. SOF POE Format

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(Classification) (6) Time and space factors. (7) Combat efficiency. b. Friendly forces. (1) Strength. (2) Composition. (3) Location and disposition. (4) Reinforcements. (5) Friendly force assistance. (6) Logistics (including CSS). (7) Time and space factors. (8) Combat efficiency. 3. Assumptions. B. Analysis of Enemy Capabilities. C. Comparison of Friendly COAs. 1. Statement of COAs. 2. Assessment of the probability of success. 3. Comparison of COAs. D. Decision (Recommended COA) and Mission Profile. 1. Method and location of infiltration. 2. Movement to target area. 3. Actions at the objective. 4. Movement to the objective and the method of exfiltration. SECTION III - SUPPORTING PLANS A. Overall Schedule. 1. Preparation. 2. Rehearsal. 3. Rendezvous. 4. Transit. 5. Execution. 6. Recovery. B. C. D. E.

Logistics (Including CSS). Communications and Electronics Procedures and Equipment Operating Instructions. Deception. Indigenous Force Support.

(Classification) Figure C-8. SOF POE Format (Continued)

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(Classification) F. Time and Distance Charts. G. Deployment. H. Weaponeering. I. Target recuperability. J. Resupply. K. Exfiltration. L. SERER. M. Command Relationships. N. PSYOP and CA. SECTION IV - LIMITING FACTORS A. Intelligence. B. Weather. C. Equipment. D. Tactics. E. Logistics (Including CSS). F. Personnel. G. Training. H. Supporting Forces. I. C3. J. Law of War, ROE, and U.S. Law and Legal Issues. K. Other Factors. (Signed) Commander

ANNEXES (As required. List letter and title.) DISTRIBUTION (According to policies and procedures of the issuing HQ and at the direction of the JFSOCC.)

(Classification) Figure C-8. SOF POE Format (Continued)

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POE FOR INFILTRATION AND EXFILTRATION C-10. The POE for infiltration and exfiltration is a detailed plan that shows exactly how the SOA will execute its assigned mission. This plan, along with the supported element’s POE and mission rehearsals, is the result of the targeting and mission planning process. It includes fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, surface ships, and submarines. Figure C-9 shows a sample format of a POE for infiltration and exfiltration.

(Classification) SECTION I - MISSION A. Target Identification Data. B. Mission Statement. SECTION II - MISSION SUMMARY A. Mission Tasking. B. Objective Area. C. General Concept. D. Summary of Limiting Factors. E. Probability of Mission Success. SECTION III - ASSUMPTIONS SECTION IV - THREAT ASSESSMENT SECTION V - NAVIGATION AND OVERALL MISSION PORTRAYAL (This section represents the entire infiltration and exfiltration route from launch to recovery on a suitable scale chart. It shows information the planning cell deemed necessary to portray the mission. Items listed, however, are not all-inclusive.) A. Launch Bases. B. Intermediate Staging Bases. C. LZs, DZs, BLSs, RZs, SLPs, and SRPs. D. Recovery Bases. E. Abort and Emergency Diversion. F. Air Refueling Tracks and FARPs. G. Routes. 1. Ingress. 2. Egress. 3. Orbiting and holding. 4. Safe passage procedures. 5. Strip charts, navigation logs, GPS receivers, and other aids (as required).

(Classification) Figure C-9. Format of Infiltration and Exfiltration POE

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(Classification) SECTION VI - SUPPORTING PLANS A. Overall Schedule of Events. B. Prelaunch Requirements. 1. Updates to OB. 2. EEIs. 3. Problem areas and key factors. C. Infiltration and Exfiltration Platform Factors and Logistical Considerations. D. C3. 1. Security Preparations. 2. Departure procedures (overt or deception procedures). 3. Communication equipment requirements. a. Infiltration and exfiltration platforms. b. SOC. 4. Specialized operational procedures and techniques. 5. Radio silence areas. 6. GO, NO-GO point. 7. Publication of joint SOI for air mission. 8. Deception. E. Emergency. 1. Engine-out capabilities. 2. Weather. 3. Faulty intelligence. 4. Infiltration and exfiltration platform abort procedures. a. Late departure procedures. b. Maintenance problems. c. Battle damage. d. Aircraft destruction plan. e. Bump plan. 5. Drop or other fuel-related malfunctions. 6. Lost communications procedures. 7. Mission abort procedures. F. Evasion Plan of Action. 1. Aircrew responsibilities. 2. Immediate actions upon sinking, ditching, or bailing out. 3. Evasion movement. 4. Safe area intelligence descriptions.

(Classification) Figure C-9. Format of Infiltration and Exfiltration POE (Continued)

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(Classification) 5. SAFE. 6. Evasion team communications. 7. SAR contact procedures. SECTION VII - LIMITING FACTORS A. Intelligence. B. Weather. C. Equipment. D. Munitions. E. Tactics. F. Logistics (Including CSS). G. Personnel. H. Training. I. Supporting Forces. J. ROE and Legal Issues. SECTION VIII - SOA, SURFACE SHIP, AND SUBMARINE REQUIREMENTS FROM AFSOC, ARSOF, AND NAVSOF TO CONDUCT INITIAL ASSESSMENTS A. Target Coordinates. B. Maximum and Minimum Distances of LZs, DZs, SLPs, BLSs, RZs, and SRPs From the Target. C. Time Frame in OPLAN and CONPLAN Scenario (Pre-D-Day or D+XX). D. Desired Launch and Recovery Bases. E. Type of Delivery and Recovery Required (Airdrop, AirLand, Fast Rope, SEAL Delivery Vehicle, Combat Rigid Rubber Raiding Craft, and Platform Preferred). F. Number of Personnel to be Transferred and Approximate Weight per Person. G. Approximate Size and Weight of Additional Equipment. H. Assumptions Made During Supported Unit’s Feasibility Assessment or POE. I. Desired Time Over Target. J. Resupply and Exfiltration Requirements. NOTE: Although not always readily available, information on hand is normally sufficient to conduct the initial assessment. An effort should be made, however, to obtain and include in the POE all the information in this sample format.

(Classification) Figure C-9. Format of Infiltration and Exfiltration POE (Continued) C-33

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AIRSPACE COMMAND AND CONTROL C-11. The C2 of airspace in the combat zone enhances combat operations by promoting safe, efficient, and flexible airspace use. ARSOA must be aware of positive, procedural Army airspace command and control (A2C2) measures. In addition, ARSOA must adhere to directed control procedures. To facilitate rapid and accurate dissemination of information on the use of airspace, the commander must make sure a strong, ongoing communications link exists with A2C2 elements. AIRSPACE CONTROL MEASURES (ACM) C-12. The following measures provide procedural control: • High-density airspace control zone. A high-density airspace control zone is an area of concentrated employment of numerous and varied weapons or airspace users. The zone has defined dimensions that usually coincide with geographical features or navigational aids. The appropriate commander normally approves access to a high-density airspace control zone and air defense weapons status within the zone. • Coordinating altitude. A coordinating altitude is a procedural method to separate fixed- and rotary-winged aircraft by determining an altitude below which fixed-wing aircraft normally will not fly and above which rotary-wing aircraft normally will not fly. It may include a buffer zone for small altitude deviations and extend from the forward edge of the communications zone to the FLOT. The coordinating altitude does not restrict fixed- or rotary-winged aircraft when operating against or in the immediate vicinity of enemy ground forces. Fixed- or rotarywinged aircraft planning extended penetration of this altitude notifies the appropriate airspace control facility. Approval acknowledgment is not, however, required before fixed-wing aircraft operate below the coordinating altitude or rotary-wing aircraft operate above the coordinating altitude. • Restricted operations zone. The terms airspace restricted area and restricted operations zone refer to the same control measure. A restricted operations zone is a volume of airspace of defined dimensions developed for a specific mission. Some or all airspace users are restricted from the area until the end of the mission. A restricted operations zone may be established around a tactical airfield, DZ, search and rescue operation, infiltration and exfiltration points, and special electronic mission aircraft (SEMA) orbits, or it may be established to facilitate fire support operations. • Joint special operations area. The JSOA is a restricted area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a JFC to the commander of a joint SO force to conduct SO activities. The commander of joint SO forces may further assign a specific area or sector within the JSOA to a subordinate commander for mission execution. • Low-level transit route. A low-level transit route is a temporary corridor of defined dimensions in the forward area. It minimizes the risk to friendly aircraft from friendly air defenses or surface forces.

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• Minimum-risk route. A minimum-risk route is a temporary corridor of defined dimensions recommended for use by high-speed, fixed-wing aircraft. It presents the minimum known hazards to low-flying aircraft transiting the combat zone. • Standard Army aircraft flight route. A standard Army aircraft flight route (SAAFR) is a route below the coordinating altitude established to facilitate the movement of Army aircraft during VMC. Army aircraft movements in the rear operations area during IMC will comply with established IFR. The SAAFR is normally in the corps and the divisional rear areas. It is a recognized Army ACM that does not require joint approval. The A2C2 element develops SAAFRs to route Army aircraft safely when conducting CS and CSS missions at terrain flight altitudes. SAAFRs are primarily for single aircraft or for small flights of aircraft. • Base defense zone. A base defense zone is an air defense zone established around an air base. It is limited to the engagement envelope of the short-range air defense (SHORAD) systems defending the base. Base defense zones have specific entry, exit, and IFF procedures aircrews must follow. • Weapons-free zone. A weapons-free zone is an air defense zone established for the protection of key assets or facilities of the joint force other than air bases. ADA systems defending the weapons-free zone may fire at any target not positively identified as friendly. Aircrews must avoid active weapons-free zones or coordinate their use with the designated control authority before entering or transiting the zone. • Air corridor. An air corridor is a restricted air route of travel specified for friendly aircraft use to prevent friendly fires against friendly aircraft. Air corridors are temporary corridors for routing combat elements of the division and corps aviation brigade between such areas as assembly areas, battle positions, and FARPs. They are control measures employed during air assault operations to designate routes for air assault forces during the air movement phase. C-13. Although ARSOA often operates in underdeveloped countries, ARSOA personnel should review established ACMs. The control measures help planners avoid suspected concentrations of aircraft. When the operations are in developed countries, the ACMs show concentrations of aircraft as well as other hazards to flight. AIRSPACE DECONFLICTION C-14. Route deconfliction is vital to ARSOA survival. Review of routes must, therefore, occur at several levels. Planners should deconflict their routes by plotting them on a map that is current with the latest ACM and enemy locations. They should also send the route information through the chain of command to the A2C2 cells for input into the airspace deconfliction software (ADS). C-15. When deconflicting the route of flight, planners should consider time and space and plot all routes of flight on the map to make sure the routes do not conflict with any ACM published in the ACO. They should then note all

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locations where routes cross and make sure aircraft will not cross within 10 minutes of each other. To allow for changes in mission times, all mission aircrews should be notified of the aircraft crossing routes within 30 minutes of each other. C-16. Mission planners must send the route information up the chain of command as soon as the information is available. The information for the ATO must be submitted not later than (NLT) 24 hours before the ATO takes effect. The lead time is necessary so that aerial refueling requests can be submitted and put into the ATO. C-17. In undeveloped AORs or during the initial stabilization of an AOR, ACPs should be established throughout the AOR. These points expedite the planning process and enable A2C2 personnel to plot and deconflict the routes more quickly and accurately. Mission planners and the airspace control authority should develop the list of ACPs. If an ACO has been published, those ACPs should be used.

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Appendix D

Logistics The SOR document (Figure D-1) is a key to SOF mission success. Theater army closely reviews the SOR for detailed accuracy to support the unit’s mission fully.

(Classification) 1. ( ) REFERENCES. 2. ( ) GENERAL. a. ( ) Supported unit. b. ( ) Time of support. c. ( ) Location of supported unit at time of support. d. ( ) Unit points of contact (POCs). e. ( ) Database. f. ( ) Number of supported personnel. g. ( ) Force activity designator. 3. ( ) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. a. ( ) Mission. State the general mission of the unit, command, or operation. b. ( ) Desired Results. Provide a concise statement of the desired results of the requested support. 4. ( ) ASSUMPTIONS. Give the conditions that are likely to exist or that must exist for the support to be required. Relate the assumptions to specific requirements, as appropriate. 5. ( ) CONSTRAINTS. Define the situation that, if experienced, will degrade operations. Give conditions to specific requirements, as appropriate. 6. ( ) COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COORDINATION. Describe functional C2 of the unit. Attach organizational diagram, if necessary, and describe location of liaison with the HN. 7. ( ) SUPPLIES. a. ( ) Class I. (1) ( ) Requirements of Dining Facility. Identify personnel requirements. (2) ( ) Type of Dining Facility. Determine if the dining facilities should be one of the following: (a) ( ) U.S. Government.

(Classification) Figure D-1. Statement of Requirements Format

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(Classification) (b) ( ) U.S. civilian contracted. (c) ( ) HN civilian contracted. (d) ( ) HN military. (3) ( ) Augmentation. If dining facilities are U.S. Government facilities, identify the requirements for augmenting personnel. (4) ( ) Food Storage Facilities. Determine which of the following food storage facilities are required to contain a 30-day supply of rations. (a) ( ) Dry space in cubic feet. (b) ( ) Chill space in cubic feet. (c) ( ) Freezer space in cubic feet.

(5) ( ) Insulated Food Containers. Determine the requirement for insulated food containers. List the number of containers and required meals. (6) ( ) Sack Lunches. Determine the requirements for sack lunches. (7) ( ) Meal Payment. Determine how individuals will pay for their meals. (a) ( ) Cash collection. (b) ( ) Payroll deduction. (c) ( ) Meal cards. (8) ( ) Dining Facility Hours. Determine the requirement for a 24-hour facility. (9) ( ) Equipment Augmentation. Determine the requirement for equipment augmentation. List the equipment by nomenclature, national stock number (NSN), and quantity. (10) ( ) Combat Rations. Estimate the number of combat rations for 30-day sustainment packages for aviation personnel. (a) ( ) MRE. (b) ( ) Long-range reconnaissance patrol (LRRP) rations. (c) ( ) Other (specify). (11) ( ) Pre-positioned Rations. List the number of days required for pre-positioned rations. (12) ( ) Percentage of Pre-positioned Rations. Identify the required percentage of the following pre-positioned rations: (a) ( ) MRE. (b) ( ) LRRP rations. (c) ( ) Other (Specify). (13) ( ) Local Purchase, Cash. Determine the need for small units to have cash to purchase rations on the economy.

(Classification) Figure D-1. Statement of Requirements Format (Continued)

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(Classification) b. ( ) Class II. (1) ( ) Self-Service. List the essential self-service supply center (SSSC) items required for a 30-day sustainment. (2) ( ) NBC Equipment. List the requirement for NBC consumables and nonconsumables for two complete issues of NBC equipment following an NBC attack. (3) ( ) Sustainment. List other Class II items required for sustainment, such as common table of allowance (CTA) 50-900 items. (4) ( ) Reproduction Equipment. Determine the required reproduction equipment. List the equipment and the number of copies needed for 30-day sustainment. (5) ( ) Special Equipment. List any special Class II equipment required beyond the equipment already authorized and on hand. List the equipment by nomenclature, NSN, and quantity. (6) ( ) Clothing Sales. Determine the requirement for clothing sales facility. c. ( ) Class III. (1) ( ) POL. Determine POL, including base support functions, for a 30-day sustainment. List item by type and quantity. (a) ( ) Motor gasoline (regular or super). (b) ( ) Diesel fuel (DF1 or DF2) or JP8. (c) ( ) Aviation gasoline (JP4, JP5, JP8, or equivalent). (d) ( ) Oil (bulk). (e) ( ) Grease. (f) ( ) Coolants. (g) ( ) Packaged POL or other lubricants. (h) ( ) Commercial grades of aviation fuel. (i) ( ) Availability of POL laboratory for fuel testing. (2) ( ) Tankers and Dispensers. Identify the requirement for tankers or dispensers in addition to organic capabilities. List item by type, capacity, and quantity. (3) ( ) Planning Factors. Determine if the planning factors used to identify POL requirements were factors other than those in the Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM) database or operational log (OPLOG) planner. If so, specify. d. ( ) Class IV. Determine the requirements for building or barrier materials for the following items, listing them by type and quantity—for example, plywood, lumber, long and short pickets, sandbags, and B-wire. (1) ( ) Administrative and command post. (2) ( ) Tactical and defensive use. (3) ( ) Rigging and shoring. (4) ( ) Concertina and barbed wire.

(Classification) Figure D-1. Statement of Requirements Format (Continued)

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(Classification) (5) ( ) Stakes and pickets. e. ( ) Class V. (1) ( ) Additional Class V Requirements. Determine Class V requirements beyond those in the unit basic load (UBL). List by Department of Defense identification code (DODIC), nomenclature, and quantity. Identify nonstandard Class V requirements separately. (2) ( ) Planning Factors. Determine the planning factor used to forecast Class V consumption rates. f. ( ) Class VI. Determine the number of personal demand items based on the number of unit personnel and the individual consumption rate. List items by type and quantity. g. ( ) Class VII. (1) ( ) Additional Equipment. Determine the requirement for additional items of equipment, such as trucks and generators. List the items by nomenclature, NSN, and quantity. (2) ( ) Maintenance Augmentation. Determine the requirement for augmenting maintenance personnel to support the equipment listed in paragraph 7g(1). List the personnel by grade, MOS, and quantity. h. ( ) Class VIII. (1) ( ) Determine the requirement for Class VIII supplies by nomenclature, NSN, quantities, and special requirements associated with a particular item, such as refrigeration. (2) ( ) Determine the schedule of resupplies required. (3) ( ) Determine whether resupply will be prepackaged standard line items. Project when line item ordering will be established and, if feasible, how often, how long, and through what channels. (4) ( ) Determine the need for Class VIII supplies peculiar to the area of operations and whether the supplies are readily available or must be specifically acquired, such as refrigeration, security, and shelf life—for example, antivenins. (5) ( ) Determine the availability and reliability of HN Class VIII for emergency purposes. (6) ( ) Determine the need for blood and blood products and associated equipment. (7) ( ) Determine coordinating agencies for chemical support. i. ( ) Class IX. (1) ( ) Mandatory Parts List. Determine if a mandatory parts list exists to support the equipment. (2) ( ) Prescribed Load List (PLL). Determine if PLL includes repair parts to support— (a) ( ) Weapons. (b) ( ) Communications equipment.

(Classification) Figure D-1. Statement of Requirements Format (Continued)

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(Classification) (c) ( ) Vehicles. (d) ( ) Support equipment, such as generators. (e) ( ) NBC equipment. (3) ( ) Other Equipment. Determine if the unit has nonstandard or commercial equipment. List by type, model number, manufacturer, and density. (4) ( ) Repair Parts Support. Identify how repair parts support is obtained for commercial and nonstandard equipment. (5) ( ) Maintenance Support. Determine maintenance support requirements. j. ( ) Class X. Determine Class X Requirements. List by type and quantity. k. ( ) Other. (1) ( ) Emergency Resupply. Identify the requirement for emergency prepackaged resupply. Specify by nomenclature, NSN, and quantity. Attach as separate enclosure for each type of package. (2) ( ) Maps and Photographs. Identify the requirement for maps and aerial photographs. 8. ( ) SERVICES. a. ( ) Field Services. Determine field services support requirements, such as riggers and graves registration (GRREG). b. ( ) Engineering Services. (1) ( ) Equipment Power Rating. Determine power rating needed for the equipment. (2) ( ) Power Requirements. Determine power requirements beyond the organic generating capability. (3) ( ) Equipment Power Capability. Determine the following, if supplied with commercial power at the wartime site: (a) ( ) Equipment compatibility. (b) ( ) Requirement for plug adapters, including voltage and the number of adapters needed. (c) ( ) Requirement for transformers, including voltage and the number of transformers needed. (4) ( ) Water Requirements. Identify daily requirements for potable water and for washing engines and fuselages. (5) ( ) Pest Control Requirements. Determine the requirement for rodent and insect control assistance. (6) ( ) Heavy Equipment Requirements. Identify requirements for heavy engineer equipment, such as bulldozers. List the needed quantity. c. ( ) Other Services. (1) ( ) Linen Requirements. List by type and quantity. (2) ( ) Linen Exchange. Determine the frequency of linen exchange.

(Classification) Figure D-1. Statement of Requirements Format (Continued)

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(Classification) (3) ( ) Laundry Services Requirements. List by pounds per week. If none, so state. (4) ( ) Commercial Cleaning Requirements. Determine the requirement for commercial laundry and dry cleaning. (5) ( ) Other Services Identification. Determine the need for other services. 9. ( ) MAINTENANCE. a. ( ) Personnel Requirements. Determine if enough personnel exist to conduct the necessary maintenance. If not, list the necessary augmentation by grade, MOS, and quantity. (1) ( ) Vehicle. (2) ( ) Support equipment. (3) ( ) Communication. (4) ( ) Weapons. (5) ( ) Aviation. b. ( ) DS and GS Maintenance. Identify requirements for DS and GS maintenance. c. ( ) Other Maintenance Equipment. List commercial and nonstandard equipment requiring maintenance. 10. ( ) TRANSPORTATION. a. ( ) Air Transportation. (1) ( ) Unit Load Plans. Enclose unit load plans. (2) ( ) Administrative Aircraft. Determine the requirement for administrative aircraft. Specify the type and number of hours per week. (3) ( ) 463L Pallets. Determine the requirement for 463L pallets at the wartime location. Specify the amount. (4) ( ) Equipment and Personnel requirements. Determine the requirement for additional materials handling equipment (MHE) and personnel at the SFOB and FOB airfield. Specify requirement for crane or for rough terrain container handler (RTCH). (5) ( ) Passenger Facilities. Determine the requirement for passenger facilities. Specify the required type and size of the facilities, based on the duration of passenger use. (6) ( ) Cargo Storage Facilities. Determine the requirement for cargo storage facilities. Specify by the number of square feet required for the following: (a) ( ) Covered secure storage. (b) ( ) Outdoor secure storage. (7) ( ) Airfield Requirements. Determine the requirement for an airfield to handle the following: (a) ( ) C-130s. (b) ( ) C-141s. (c) ( ) C-17s.

(Classification) Figure D-1. Statement of Requirements Format (Continued)

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(Classification) (d) ( ) C-5As. (e) ( ) Other (specify). (8) ( ) All-Weather Surface Airfield. Determine the requirement for an all-weather surface airfield. (9) ( ) Airfield Services. Determine the requirement for airfield services, including MHE support. List by type and quantity. (10) ( ) Airfield Operations. Determine the requirement for airfield operations provided by other sources. (11) ( ) Flight Line Facilities. Determine the requirement for other aircraft flight line facilities. Specify the types of aircraft. b. ( ) Water Transportation. Determine the requirement for water transportation. Specify the type and size of the maritime vehicle. c. ( ) Ground Transportation. Determine the requirement for supplemental military vehicles. Specify by type of vehicle and quantity. (1) ( ) Commercial-Type Military Vehicles. (a) ( ) Sedan. (b) ( ) Carryall. (c) ( ) Bus. (d) ( ) Ambulance. (e) ( ) Other (specify). (2) ( ) Tactical Vehicles. (a) ( ) Radio-equipped vehicles (state type of radio and quantity). (b) ( ) Nonradio-equipped vehicles. (c) ( ) Trucks and trailers. (d) ( ) Wreckers and cranes. (e) ( ) Aircraft-towing vehicles. (f) ( ) Ambulances. (g) ( ) Fire trucks. (h) ( ) Other special purpose vehicles, such as warehouse trucks. 11. ( ) FACILITIES. a. ( ) Maintenance Facilities (list in square feet). (1) ( ) Maintenance Area Requirements. Identify vehicle maintenance area requirements. (a) ( ) Number of bays. (b) ( ) Number of pits. (c) ( ) Aircraft parking (concrete or asphalt).

(Classification) Figure D-1. Statement of Requirements Format (Continued)

D-7

FM 3-05.60

(Classification) (d) ( ) Wash racks. (e) ( ) Secure storage (tools, test measurement and diagnostic equipment [TMDE]). (f) ( ) Secure storage (repair parts). (2) ( ) Signal Maintenance Area Requirements. Identify signal maintenance area requirements. (a) ( ) Power. (b) ( ) Safety. (c) ( ) Secure storage (repair parts). (d) ( ) Secure storage (tools, TMDE). (3) ( ) Weapons Maintenance Area Requirements. Identify weapons maintenance area requirements. (4) ( ) Aviation Maintenance Area Requirements. Identify aviation maintenance area (covered) requirements. (a) ( ) Aircraft parking (concrete or asphalt). (b) ( ) Secure storage (repair parts). (c) ( ) Secure storage (tools, TMDE). b. ( ) Billeting Facilities. (1) ( ) Billet number and size requirements. List the number of billets and required square feet. (a) ( ) Officers. (b) ( ) Senior Enlisted. (c) ( ) Enlisted. (d) ( ) Females. (2) ( ) Tentage. Determine if sufficient tentage is available within the unit to house personnel. If not, specify number and types of tents required and when operationally required, environmentally controlled tentage for an acceptable temperature range. (3) ( ) Showers. Determine the required number of showers. (4) ( ) Latrines. Determine the number and location of latrines. c. ( ) Medical Facilities. Determine the requirement for physical facilities and optometry. (1) ( ) Hospital beds. (2) ( ) Treatment rooms. (3) ( ) Dental treatment rooms. (4) ( ) Laboratories. (5) ( ) X-ray rooms. (6) ( ) Pharmacies. (7) ( ) Other (specify).

(Classification) Figure D-1. Statement of Requirements Format (Continued)

D-8

FM 3-05.60

(Classification) d. ( ) Other Facilities (list by function and square feet). (1) ( ) Operations center. (2) ( ) Logistics center. (3) ( ) Signal center. (4) ( ) Reception and palletizing facilities. (5) ( ) Dining facility. (6) ( ) Dispensary. (7) ( ) Isolation facility. (8) ( ) Parachute rigging and drying facility. (9) ( ) Ammunition storage. (10) ( ) Clubs. (11) ( ) Gym. (12) ( ) Antenna fields. (13) ( ) Ranges (list types of weapons requiring ranges). (14) ( ) Drop zones. (15) ( ) Secure facilities (for storing, receiving, and transmitting classified messages and documents). (16) ( ) Other (specify). 12. ( ) PERSONNEL SERVICES. a. ( ) Personnel. (1) ( ) Military Occupational Specialty. Identify critical MOSs (include additional skill identifiers and special qualifications identifiers). (2) ( ) Personnel Action Dissemination. Determine the routing of the following personnel actions and the classification of those actions. (a) ( ) Assignments. (b) ( ) Reassignments. (c) ( ) Efficiency reports. (d) ( ) Awards. (e) ( ) Promotions. (f) ( ) Reclassifications. (g) ( ) Other. (3) ( ) Casualty Reporting. Determine the procedures for casualty reporting. (4) ( ) Civilian Personnel Requirements. Identify civilian personnel requirements.

(Classification) Figure D-1. Statement of Requirements Format (Continued)

D-9

FM 3-05.60

(Classification) b. ( ) Administrative Services. (1) ( ) Reproduction and Word Processing. Determine reproduction and word processing requirements. (2) ( ) Equipment Requirements. Determine the requirement for administrative equipment beyond the present equipment. Specify the type and quantity of systems. (3) ( ) Blank Forms and Publications. Determine the requirement for pre-positioning of blank forms and publications. (4) ( ) Accident Reporting Procedures. Determine the requirement for accident reporting procedures (DA Form 265) and other related safety reports. (5) ( ) Postal. Identify postal requirements. c. ( ) Finance. Determine finance support requirements. Identify the type of requirement (pay and allotments). d. ( ) Religious Support. (1) ( ) Religious Support Requirements. Determine the following religious support requirements: (a) ( ) Catholic. (b) ( ) Protestant. (c) ( ) Jewish. (d) ( ) Orthodox. (e) ( ) Muslim. (f) ( ) Other. (2) ( ) Vehicular Support. Determine additional equipment support, including transportation and C4I to accomplish the religious support mission. e. ( ) Legal. Determine the requirement for staff judge advocate (SJA) support in the following areas: (1) ( ) Administrative law. (2) ( ) Claims. (3) ( ) Defense. (4) ( ) Prosecution. (5) ( ) International law. (6) ( ) Operational law, including ROE. f. ( ) Public Affairs. Determine the requirement for PAO support. 13. ( ) COMBAT HEALTH SUPPORT (CHS). a. ( ) Hospitalization (Theater or ASCC). (1) ( ) Determine the casualty estimate for the number of required hospital beds. (a) ( ) Surgical. (b) ( ) Medical.

(Classification) Figure D-1. Statement of Requirements Format (Continued)

D-10

FM 3-05.60

(Classification) (2) Determine the location and accessibility of supporting Echelons III or IV hospitals. b. ( ) Medical Treatment and Patient Evacuation. (1) ( ) Medical Treatment. Echelons III and IV hospitals provide medical treatment. ARSOF must state their specific patient-tracking requirements. (2) ( ) Organic Support. (a) ( ) Availability of assets. (b) ( ) Casualty evacuation. This requirement includes using conventional and ARSOA evacuation assets to extract casualties from hostile and denied territory. It should also include augmentation of ARSOA aircraft with medical personnel (physicians, physician assistants, or ARSOF medics), as required. (3) ( ) Theater or ASCC Support. Use traditional assets to support MEDEVAC only if those assets do not compromise the security of the operation. (a) ( ) Ground evacuation assets in a GS, a DS, or an area support role. (b) ( ) Air evacuation assets in GS, DS, or area support roles. (4) ( ) Theater Evacuation Policy. A requirement may exist that an exception to the theater evacuation policy is necessary to retain qualified ARSOF personnel within the theater. c. ( ) Area Medical Support. The ARSOF must identify the location of the medical support organizations and project medical treatment beyond organic capabilities. d. ( ) Dental Services. Determine dental support requirements and location of support organizations. e. ( ) Preventive Medicine Services. Determine preventive medicine support requirements beyond organic assets and the location of support organizations. f. ( ) Veterinary Services. Requirements for veterinary support must be identified and coordinated through the appropriate command and control element. g. ( ) Combat Stress Control. Control of stress is a command’s responsibility. The ARSOF must plan for combat stress control support and identify combat stress control organizations. h. ( ) Combat Health Logistics. (1) ( ) Determine requirements for Class VIII supplies by nomenclature, NSN, quantities, and special requirements associated with a particular item such as refrigeration. (2) ( ) Determine schedule of resupplies required. (3) ( ) Determine whether resupply will be prepackaged standard line items. Project when line-item ordering will be established and, if feasible, how often, how long, and through what channels. (4) ( ) Determine the need for Class VIII supplies peculiar to the area of operations; whether they are readily available or must be specifically acquired, such as refrigeration, security, and shelf life (for example, antivenins). (5) ( ) Determine availability and reliability of HN Class VIII for emergency purposes.

(Classification) Figure D-1. Statement of Requirements Format (Continued)

D-11

FM 3-05.60

(Classification) (6) ( ) Determine need for blood and blood products and associated equipment, if required. (7) ( ) Determine coordinating agencies for chemical support. i. ( ) Medical Laboratory Support. Determine medical laboratory support requirements and support organizations. 14. ( ) SIGNAL. a. ( ) Terminal Equipment and Access. Determine requirements for the following: (1) ( ) Supplemental terminal equipment. Specify by type and quantity. (2) ( ) Access to HN commercial telephone system. Specify need, such as number of lines. (3) ( ) Access to NATO telegraph network. (4) ( ) Access to HN military teletype system. (5) ( ) Access to automatic secure voice communications (AUTOSEVOCOM). (6) ( ) Access to NATO secure voice network. (7) ( ) Access to automatic digital network (AUTODIN). (8) ( ) Identify Data Communications (DATACOM) requirements for Standard Army Multi-Command Management Information System (STAMMIS) and other data systems. Specify intertheater and intratheater requirements. b. ( ) Transmit and Receive Sites. Determine the number of transmit and receive sites to be set up and amount of area necessary. (1) ( ) Access to NATO telegraph network. (2) ( ) Access to HN military teletype system. (3) ( ) Access to AUTOSEVOCOM. (4) ( ) Access to NATO secure voice network. (5) ( ) Access to AUTODIN. (6) ( ) Identify DATACOM requirements for STAMMIS and other data systems. Specify intertheater and intratheater requirements. c. ( ) Transmit and Receive Sites. Determine the number of transmit and receive sites to be set up and amount of area necessary. d. ( ) Signal Maintenance Support. Determine the requirements for supplemental signal maintenance support. e. ( ) Frequency Requirements. Determine the number of separate frequencies needed on a daily basis. 15. ( ) SECURITY. a. ( ) MP Functions. Determine the requirement for the following MP functions: (1) ( ) Access control. (2) ( ) Detention (prisoner of war and friendly).

(Classification) Figure D-1. Statement of Requirements Format (Continued)

D-12

FM 3-05.60

(Classification) (3) ( ) Investigations. (4) ( ) Traffic control. (5) ( ) Physical security. (6) ( ) General law enforcement. (7) ( ) Convoy security. (8) ( ) Special weapons. (9) ( ) Other (specify). b. ( ) Counterintelligence. Determine the requirement for CI. c. ( ) Base Defense. Determine the requirement for base defense capabilities. 16. ( ) FUNDING AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT. a. ( ) Type of required currency. b. ( ) Source of resupply. c. ( ) Means of contractual payment. d. ( ) Means of local purchase payment. e. ( ) Cost-capturing requirements.

(Classification)

Figure D-1. Statement of Requirements Format (Continued)

D-13

Glossary A2C2

Army airspace command and control

AADC

area air defense commander

ABC3

airborne command, control, and communications

ABCCC

airborne battlefield command and control center

ABFDS

aerial bulk fuel-delivery system

A/C REH

aircraft rehearsal

ACC

air component commander

ACL

aircraft combat load

ACM

airspace control measures

ACO

airspace control order

ACP

air control point

ADA

air defense artillery

adaptive targeting and mission planning ADC ADCON

Targeting and mission planning methods required when circumstances prevent any command echelon from executing the deliberate targeting and mission planning cycle. air data computer administrative control − Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support, including the organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. (JP 1-02)

ADF

automatic direction finder

ADP

automated data processing

ADS

airspace deconfliction software

AESOP AFCS

airborne electronic special operations payload automatic flight control system

AFSOC

Air Force special operations component − The Air Force component of a joint force special operations component. (JP 1-02)

AFSOD

Air Force special operations detachment

AFSOE

Air Force special operations element

Glossary-1

FM 3-05.60

AFSOF

AGL AH AHO AHRS AI AIMI

above ground level attack helicopter above highest obstruction attitude and heading reference system airborne interceptor aviation-intensive managed item

ALOC

air lines of communications

ALSE

aviation life support equipment

AM

amplitude modulation

AMC

air mission commander

AOC

air operations center

AOR

area of responsibility

APOD APU Army special operations component ARSOA ARSOATF ARSOF

aerial port of debarkation auxiliary power unit The Army component of a joint force special operations component. (JP 1-02) Army special operations aviation Army special operations aviation task force Army special operations forces − Those active and reserve component Army forces designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. (JP 1-02)

ARSOTF

Army special operations task force

ASCC

Army service component command

ASE

aircraft survivability equipment

ASOC

air support operations center

ATACMS

Army tactical missile system

ATAS

air-to-air Stinger

ATC

air traffic control

ATHS ATO

Glossary-2

Air Force special operations forces − Those active and reserve component Air Force forces designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. (JP 1-02)

Airborne Target Handover System air tasking order

FM 3-05.60

AUTL AUTODIN AUTOSEVOCOM AVIM AVUM AWACS

Army universal task list automatic digital network automatic secure voice communications aviation intermediate maintenance aviation unit maintenance Airborne Warning and Control System

AWC

adverse weather cockpit

BAE

battlespace area evaluation

BASS

ballistic armor subsystem

BCD

battlespace coordination detachment

BDA

battle damage assessment

BE

basic encyclopedia

BL

butt line

BLS

beach landing site

°C

degree, Celsius

C2

command and control

C2-attack

command and control-attack

C2-protect

command and control-protect

C2W C3

command and control warfare command, control, and communications

C3I

command, control, communications, and intelligence

C4

command, control, communications, and computers

C4I

command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence

CA

Civil Affairs − Designation of individuals trained to plan, support, or conduct civil-military operations.

CAP

combat air patrol

CAS

close air support

CASCOM CASEVAC

Combined Arms Support Command casualty evacuation

CBT

combatting terrorism

CCD

cockpit control driver

CCERFS CCIR CCT

cargo compartment expanded range fuel system commander’s critical information requirements combat control team

Glossary-3

FM 3-05.60

CCU CD CHS

cockpit control unit counterdrug combat health support

CI

counterintelligence

CINC

commander in chief

CINCSOC

Commander in Chief, Special Operations Command

CJCS

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

CJTF

commander, joint task force

clandestine operation

CM

An operation sponsored or conducted by governmental departments and agencies in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment. A clandestine operation differs from a covert operation in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the operation rather than on concealment of identity of sponsor. In special operations, an activity may be both covert and clandestine and may focus equally on operational considerations and intelligence-related activities. (JP 1-02) countermine

CMO

civil-military operations

COA

course of action

COLISEUM

Community On-Line Intelligence System for End-Users and Managers

COMAFFOR

Commander, Air Force Forces

COMARFOR

Commander, Army Forces

combatant commander COMJSOTF COMMARFOR commo COMNAVFOR

A commander in chief of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. (JP 1-02) commander, joint special operations task force Commander, Marine Forces communications Commander, Naval Forces

COMSOC

Commander, Special Operations Command

CONOPS

concept of operations

CONPLAN CONUS

concept plan continental United States

counterterrorism

Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. (JP 1-02)

covert operation

An operation that is so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor. A covert operation differs from a clandestine operation in that emphasis is

Glossary-4

FM 3-05.60

placed on concealment of identity of sponsor rather than on concealment of the operation. (JP 1-02) CP CPWMD CS CSAR

counterproliferation counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction combat support combat search and rescue − A specific task performed by rescue forces to effect the recovery of distressed personnel during war or military operations other than war. (JP 1-02)

CSS

combat service support

CTA

common table of allowance

CW

continuous wave

DA

direct action − Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions by special operations forces or special operations capable units to seize, destroy, capture, recover, or inflict damage on designated personnel or materiel. In the conduct of these operations, special operations forces or special operations capable units may employ raid, ambush, or direct assault tactics; emplace mines and other munitions; conduct standoff attacks by fire from air, ground, or maritime platforms; provide terminal guidance for precision-guided munitions; conduct independent sabotage; and conduct antiship operations. (JP 1-02)

DAP

defensive armed penetrator

DAR

designated area for recovery

DATACOM

data communications

DCSLOG

Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics

DCSOPS

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans

DD

Department of Defense

deception

Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests. (JP 1-02)

deliberate targeting and mission planning

Targeting and mission planning methods used when circumstances permit execution of the deliberate targeting and mission planning cycle (normal routine for targeting and mission planning).

DFAD

digital feature analysis data

DIA

Defense Intelligence Agency

DIRLAUTH

direct liaison authorized

DME

distance-measuring equipment

DOD

Department of Defense

DODAAC

Department of Defense Activity Address Code

Glossary-5

FM 3-05.60

DODIC Doppler

DS DSU DTED

A navigation system that works by sending four radar beams of constant wave energy (8800 MHz) from the aircraft to the ground and measuring the changes in the frequency of the energy returned to the aircraft. The system is completely contained within the aircraft and requires no external signal. It provides aircraft position information with respect to a particular reference point and the selected course. direct support direct support unit digital terrain elevation data

DTG

date-time group

DTM

data transfer module

DZ

drop zone − A specific area upon which airborne troops, equipment, or supplies are airdropped. (JP 1-02)

E&R

evasion and recovery − The full spectrum of coordinated actions carried out by evaders, recovery forces, and operational recovery planners to effect the successful return of personnel isolated in hostile territory to friendly control. (JP 1-02)

EA EAC EALT

electronic attack echelons above corps earliest anticipated launch time

ECM

electronic countermeasures

EEFI

essential elements of friendly information

EEI

essential elements of information − The critical items of information regarding the enemy and the environment needed by the commander by a particular time to relate with other available information and intelligence in order to assist in reaching a logical decision. (JP 1-02)

EGI

embedded GPS inertial

ELT

emergency locator transmitter

EMI

electromagnetic interface

EOC

emergency operations center

EP

electronic protection

EPA

evasion plan of action

EPW

enemy prisoner of war

ERFS ES ESSS

Glossary-6

Department of Defense identification code

extended range fuel system electronic warfare support external stores support system

FM 3-05.60

ETS EW exfiltration EXORD °F

external tank system electronic warfare The removal of personnel or units from areas under enemy control. (JP 1-02) execute order degree, Fahrenheit

FAAD

forward area air defense

FARE

forward area refueling equipment

FARP

forward arming and refueling point − A temporary facility organized, equipped, and deployed by an aviation commander, and normally located in the main battle area closer to the area of operation than the aviation unit’s combat service area, to provide fuel and ammunition necessary for the employment of aviation maneuver units in combat. The forward arming and refueling point permits combat aircraft to rapidly refuel and rearm simultaneously. (JP 1-02)

fast rope

Commercially developed polyester rope (2.5 inches in diameter) used with the FRIES.

fast-rope bar

The stationary fixture in the FRIES to which the fast rope is attached. When all personnel are safely on the ground, the fast rope can be released from the fast-rope bar.

feasibility assessment

A basic target analysis that provides an initial determination of the viability of a proposed target for special operations forces employment. (JP 1-02)

FEBA

forward edge of the battle area

FFAR

folding fin aerial rocket

FID

foreign internal defense − Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. (JP 1-02)

FLIR

forward-looking infrared

FLOT

forward line of own troops

FM FOB

FOL-AC

field manual; frequency modulation forward operational base − In special operations, a base usually located in friendly territory or afloat that is established to extend command and control or communications or to provide support for training and tactical operations. Facilities may be established for temporary or longer duration operations and may include an airfield or an unimproved airstrip, an anchorage, or a pier. A forward operational base may be the location of special operations component headquarters or a smaller unit. family of loudspeakers - aircraft configuration

Glossary-7

FM 3-05.60

FRIES

FSB

forward staging base

FSE

fire support element

FSP

forward support package

functional component command

A command normally, but not necessarily, composed of forces of two or more Military Departments that may be established across the range of military operations to perform particular operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over a period of time. (JP 1-02)

FY

fiscal year

G3

operations staff officer; operations section

G4

logistics staff officer; logistics section

GEOREF

geographic reference − A worldwide position reference system that may be applied to any map or chart graduated in latitude and longitude regardless of projection. It is a method of expressing latitude and longitude in a form suitable for rapid reporting and plotting. (JP 1-02)

GI&S

geospatial information and services

GPM

gallons per minute

GPS GRREG

global positioning system graves registration

GS

general support

HA

humanitarian assistance − Short-range programs aimed at ending or alleviating present suffering. Usually conducted in response to natural or man-made disasters, including combat.

HE

high explosive

HEDP HEMTT HF HHC H-hour HLZ

Glossary-8

fast-rope insertion and extraction system − An insertion and extraction system suspended below helicopters for inserting and extracting SO forces. The system consists of the fast rope and fast-rope bar. Using the fast-rope technique, the individual slides freely down the rope. During rappelling operations, the rate of descent is controlled with a harness.

high-explosive dual purpose heavy expanded mobile tactical truck high frequency headquarters and headquarters company specific time an operation or exercise begins helicopter landing zone

HN

host nation

HQ

headquarters

FM 3-05.60

HSS humanitarian and civic assistance

humanitarian civic action

health service support Defined by Title 10 U.S. Code, sections 401-405. Projects include medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural parts of a country; well-drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and rudimentary repair of public facilities and transport systems. Humanitarian assistance by the military.

HUMINT

human intelligence

IAF

initial-approach fix

IAFS IAW IDAD

internal auxiliary fuel system in accordance with internal defense and development

IEW

intelligence and electronic warfare

IFF

identification, friend or foe

IFR

instrument flight rules

ILS

instrument landing system

IMC IMINT

instrument meteorological conditions imagery intelligence

immature theater

A theater that cannot sustain the initial phase of anticipated combat operations because of limited or no forward-deployed U.S. forces, limited transportation infrastructure, and limited HN support. It is further characterized by unsophisticated or poorly integrated enemy ground, air, and air defense threats. Many areas in Latin America and Africa are examples of immature theaters. Southwest Asia and the NATO flanks have many of the transportation characteristics of an immature theater yet have sophisticated enemy defense characteristics.

infiltration

1. The movement through or into an area or territory occupied by either friendly or enemy troops or organizations. The movement is made either by small groups or by individuals, at extended or irregular intervals. When used in connection with the enemy, it implies that contact is avoided. 2. In intelligence usage, placing an agent or other person in a target area in hostile territory. Usually involves crossing a frontier or other guarded line. Methods of infiltration are black (clandestine); grey (through legal crossing point but under false documentation); white (legal). (JP 1-02)

initial assessment

An assessment that provides a basic determination of the viability of the infiltration and exfiltration portion of a proposed SOF mission. (JP 1-02)

INS

inertial navigation system

Glossary-9

FM 3-05.60

INU

inertial navigation unit

IO

information operations

IPB IR ISB ISOPREP

intelligence requirement intermediate staging base isolated personnel report

J2

intelligence directorate

J3

operations directorate

J4

logistics directorate

JAOC JCS JCSE

joint air operations center Joint Chiefs of Staff joint communications support element

JFACC

joint force air component commander − The joint force air component commander derives authority from the joint force commander who has the authority to exercise operational control, assign missions, direct coordination among his subordinate commanders, and redirect and organize forces to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission. The joint force commander will normally designate a joint force air component commander. The joint force air component commander’s responsibilities will be assigned by the joint force commander (normally these would include, but not be limited to, planning, coordination, allocation, and tasking based on the joint force commander’s apportionment decision). Using the joint force commander’s guidance and authority, and in coordination with other Service component commanders and other assigned or supporting commanders, the joint force air component commander will recommend to the joint force commander apportionment of air sorties to various missions or geographic areas. (JP 1-02)

JFC

joint force commander − A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. (JP 1-02)

JFLCC

joint force land component commander

JFSOC

joint force special operations component

JFSOCC

Glossary-10

intelligence preparation of the battlespace

joint force special operations component commander − The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of special operations forces and assets, planning and coordinating special operations, or accomplishing such

FM 3-05.60

operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force special operations component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. The joint force special operations component commander will normally be the commander with the preponderance of special operations forces and the requisite command and control capabilities. (JP 1-02) JIC

Joint Intelligence Center

JOC

Joint Operations Center

JP J-SEAD JSOA JSOAC

joint publication joint suppression of enemy air defenses joint special operations area joint special operations air component

JSOACC

joint special operations air component commander − The commander within the joint force special operations command responsible for planning and executing joint special air operations and for coordinating and deconflicting such operations with conventional nonspecial operations air activities. The joint special operations air component commander normally will be the commander with the preponderance of assets and/or greatest ability to plan, coordinate, allocate, task, control, and support the assigned joint special operations aviation assets. The joint special operations air component commander may be directly subordinate to the joint force special operations component commander or to any nonspecial operations component or joint force commander as directed. (JP 1-02)

JSOTF

joint special operations task force − A joint task force composed of special operations units from more than one Service, formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. The joint special operations task force may have conventional nonspecial operations units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. (JP 1-02)

JSRC

joint search and rescue center

JTCB

Joint Targeting Coordination Board − A group formed by the joint force commander to accomplish broad targeting oversight functions that may include but are not limited to coordinating targeting information, providing targeting guidance and priorities, and preparing and/or refining joint target lists. The board is normally comprised of representatives from the joint force staff, all components, and if required, component subordinate units. (JP 1-02)

JTF

joint task force − A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander,

Glossary-11

FM 3-05.60

a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. (JP 1-02) kHz

kilohertz

KIA

killed in action

LBL

left butt line

LCC

land component commander

LH LNO LOGSITREP LORAN low-visibility operations

left hand liaison officer logistics situation report long-range navigation Sensitive operations wherein the political-military restrictions inherent in covert and clandestine operations are either not necessary or not feasible; actions are taken as required to limit exposure of those involved and/or their activities. Execution of these operations is undertaken with the knowledge that the action and/or sponsorship of the operation may preclude plausible denial by the initiating power. (JP 1-02)

LRF/D

laser range finder or designator

LRRP

long-range reconnaissance patrol

LZ MACOM

landing zone − Any specified zone used for the landing of aircraft. (JP 1-02) major Army command

MCC

movement control center

MDG

map display generator

MDMP MEDEVAC MEF METT-TC

military decision-making process medical evacuation maximum effective fire mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations

MHE

materials handling equipment

MHz

megahertz

MI

military intelligence

mission tasking letter

The means by which the joint force commander tasks the theater special operations command to validate and mission-plan assigned targets. (JP 3-05.5)

mission tasking package

The documentation and guidance provided by the theater special operations command to the mission planning agent to provide basic guidance for target planning. It contains the tasking and

Glossary-12

FM 3-05.60

administrative framework within which a operations forces target is planned. (JP 3-05.5) mm MONOHUD MOPP

given

special

millimeter monocular head-up display mission-oriented protective posture

MOS

military occupational specialty

MPA

mission planning agent − The subordinate special operations force commander designated by the joint force special operations component commander to validate, plan, and execute a particular special operations mission. (JP 3-05.5)

MPSM

multipurpose submunition

MRE

meal, ready to eat

MSC

major subordinate command

MSU

major subordinate unit

MTT

mobile training team

MTW

major theater war

NAI NATO NAVSOF

named area of interest North Atlantic Treaty Organization Navy special operations forces

NBC

nuclear, biological, and chemical

NCA

National Command Authorities − The President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. (JP 1-02)

NGO

nongovernmental organization

NLT

not later than

NMJIC NSFS NSN NSWTG

National Military Joint Intelligence Center naval surface fire support national stock number naval special warfare task group

NVD

night vision device

NVG

night vision goggles

OB OCIE ODCSINT OEG

order of battle organization clothing and individual equipment Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence operational exposure guide

Glossary-13

FM 3-05.60

Omega

Navigation system that operates using a worldwide very low frequency communication network consisting of eight ground stations, two of which are located in CONUS. Each station transmits continuously on an individually assigned frequency between 14 and 24 kHz. The aircraft computer requires signals from at least two stations to determine if an aircraft has changed position during the flight.

OPCON

operational control − Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Operational control may be delegated and is the authority to perform functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. (JP 1-02)

OPLAN

operation plan

OPLOG

operational log

OPORD

operation order

OPSEC

operations security − A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. Identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems. b. Determine indicators hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries. c. Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. (JP 1-02)

OPTEMPO PA packages (war)

Glossary-14

operating tempo public affairs Part support packages designed to support ARSOA operations up to 30 days. Consists of both standard and nonstandard

FM 3-05.60

components for repair of aircraft at AVUM, AVIM, and limited depot. PAO PARIS

public affairs officer planning and rehearsal information support

PBO

property book officer

PCP

penetration control point

PIC

pilot in command

PIR

priority intelligence requirements

PLL

prescribed load list

PLS

personnel locator system

POC

point of contact

POE

plan of execution − A detailed plan of precisely how the assigned special operations forces will carry out the validated mission assigned to them. This plan, in conjunction with mission rehearsals, is the end result of the targeting and mission planning process. The term also describes the supporting infiltration and exfiltration plan developed by the supporting organization. (JP 3-05.5)

POL

petroleum, oils, and lubricants

PR PSYOP

PZ RAH RAMO

personnel recovery Psychological Operations − Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. (JP 1-02) pickup zone reconnaissance attack helicopter regimental aviation maintenance officer

RBL

right butt line

RCC

rescue coordination center

RH

right hand

RII

request for intelligence information

ROE RP RSOI RTCH

rules of engagement release point reception, staging, onward movement, and integration rough terrain container handler

Glossary-15

FM 3-05.60

RZ

recovery zone

S2

intelligence and training officer (U.S. Army)

S3

operations and training officer (U.S. Army)

S4

logistics officer (U.S. Army)

SA

security assistance

SAAFR SAFE

selected area for evasion

SAM

surface-to-air missile

SAR

search and rescue

SATCOM SCI sea-air-land team

satellite communications sensitive compartmented information A naval force specially organized, trained, and equipped to conduct special operations in maritime, littoral, and riverine environments. (JP 1-02)

SEAD

suppression of enemy air defenses

SEAL

sea-air-land

SELSCAN

Selective Adaptive Communications Processor

SEMA

special electronic mission aircraft

SERE

survival, evasion, resistance, and escape

SERER

Glossary-16

standard use Army aircraft flight route

survival, evasion, resistance, escape, and recovery

SF

Special Forces − U.S. Army forces organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct special operations. Special Forces have five primary missions: unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, direct action, special reconnaissance, and counterterrorism. Counterterrorism is a special mission for specially organized, trained, and equipped Special Forces units designated in theater contingency plans. (JP 1-02)

SFG

Special Forces group − A combat arms organization capable of planning, conducting, and supporting special operations activities in all operational environments in peace, conflict, and war. It consists of a group headquarters and headquarters company, a support company, and Special Forces battalions. The group can operate as a single unit, but normally the battalions plan and conduct operations from widely separated locations. The group provides general operational direction and synchronizes the activities of subordinate battalions. Although principally structured for unconventional warfare, Special Forces group units are capable of task-organizing to meet specific requirements. (JP 1-02)

SFODA

Special Forces operational detachment A

SFODB

Special Forces operational detachment B

FM 3-05.60

SHORAD SIGINT SIMO SINCGARS SJA SLAP

short-range air defense signals intelligence systems integration and maintenance office single-channel ground and airborne radio system staff judge advocate Sabot-launched armor-piercing

SLP

seaward launch point

SMB

staff mission briefing

SME

subject matter expert

SO

SOA SOATC SOC

SOCCE SOCJFCOM SOCJIC

special operations − Operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or informational objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted across the full range of military operations, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional, non-special operations forces. Political-military considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques and oversight at the national level. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. (JP 1-02) special operations aviation special operations aviation training company special operations command − A subordinate unified or other joint command established by a joint force commander to plan, coordinate, conduct, and support joint special operations within the joint force commander’s assigned operational area. (JP 1-02) special operations command and control element Special Operations Command, Joint Forces Command Special Operations Command Joint Intelligence Center

SOCRATES

Special Operations Command Research, Analysis, and Threat Evaluation System

SOF

special operations forces − Those active and reserve component forces of the military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. (JP 1-02)

SOFPARS SOI

special operations forces planning and rehearsal system signal operating instructions

Glossary-17

FM 3-05.60

SOLE

SOR SOSCOM SOTSE SOWT SPTCONF SPTREQ SR

statement of requirements special operations support command special operations theater support element special operations weather team support confirmation support request special reconnaissance − Reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted by special operations forces to obtain or verify, by visual observation or other collection methods, information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of an actual or potential enemy or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. It includes target acquisition, area assessment, and poststrike reconnaissance. (JP 1-02)

SRP

seaward recovery point

SSA

supply support activity

SSB

single sideband

SSOPS SSSC STA STABO STAMMIS sustained operations TACAIR TACAN TACS TACSAT TAI target list

Glossary-18

special operations liaison element − A special operations liaison team provided by the joint force special operations component commander to the joint force air component commander (if designated) to coordinate, deconflict, and integrate special operations air and surface operations with conventional air operations. (JP 1-02)

sensitive special operations self-service supply center station stabilized body operations Standard System

Army

Multi-Command

Management

Information

The capability to conduct effective and uninterrupted combat operations when the necessary resources are provided. tactical air tactical air navigation tactical air control system tactical satellite target area of interest A listing of targets maintained and promulgated by the senior echelon of command; it contains those targets that are to be engaged by supporting arms, as distinguished from a “list of targets” that may be maintained by any echelon as confirmed,

FM 3-05.60

suspected, or possible targets for informational and planning purposes. (JP 1-02) TASKORD

tasking order

TDA

table of distribution and allowances

TDH

time, distance, and heading

TF TGO TIP

TMDE

task force terminal guidance operations target intelligence package − A product tasked and compiled to provide the intelligence support to those personnel who will plan and execute a given special operations forces mission. (JP 3-05.5) test measurement and diagnostic equipment

TOE

table of organization and equipment

TOT

time on target

TP

target practice

TPFDD

time-phased force and deployment data

TPT

target practice tracer

TTP

tactics, techniques, and procedures

UAR

unconventional assisted recovery

UARM

unconventional assisted recovery mechanism − That entity, group of entities, or organizations within enemy-held or hostile areas which operates to receive, support, move, and exfiltrate military personnel or selected individuals to friendly control. (JP 1-02)

UBL

unit basic load

UHF

ultrahigh frequency

UJTL U.S. USAF USAJFKSWCS USAR USASOC USSOCOM UTM UW

universal joint task list United States United States Air Force United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School United States Army Reserve United States Army Special Operations Command United States Special Operations Command universal transverse mercator unconventional warfare − A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who

Glossary-19

FM 3-05.60

are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape. (JP 1-02) VHF

very high frequency

VMC

visual meteorological conditions

VOR

very high frequency omnidirectional range

WIA

wounded in action

WL WMD

Glossary-20

water line weapons of mass destruction

Bibliography FM 1-100. Army Aviation Operations. 21 February 1997. FM 1-111. Aviation Brigades. 27 October 1997. FM 1-112. Attack Helicopter Operations. 2 April 1997. FM 1-113. Utility and Cargo Helicopter Operations. 12 September 1997. FM 1-114. Air Cavalry Squadron and Troop Operations. 1 February 2000. FM 1-564. Shipboard Operations. 29 June 1997. FM 7-85. Ranger Unit Operations. 9 June 1987. FM 31-20. Doctrine for Special Forces Operations. 20 April 1990. FM 33-1-1. Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures. 5 May 1994. FM 34-36. Special Operations Forces Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations. 30 September 1991. FM 34-130. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. 8 July 1994. FM 41-10. Civil Affairs Operations. 14 February 2000. FM 100-5. Operations. 14 June 1993. FM 100-6. Information Operations. 27 August 1996. FM 100-25. Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces. 1 August 1999. FM 101-5. Staff Organization and Operations. 31 May 1997. JP 0-2. Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF). 24 February 1995. JP 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. June 1999. JP 3-05. Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. 17 April 1998. JP 3-05.5. Joint Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning Procedures. 10 August 1993. JP 3-09. Doctrine for Joint Fire Support. 12 May 1998. JP 3-13.1. Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W). 7 February 1996. JP 3-50.2. Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue. 26 January 1996. JP 3-50.3. Joint Doctrine for Evasion and Recovery. 6 September 1996. JP 3-53. Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations. 10 July 1996.

Bibliography-1

FM 3-05.60

JP 3-56. Tactical Command and Control Planning Guidance and Procedures for Joint Operations. 1 April 1974. Change 1, 16 May 1979. JP 3-57. Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs. 21 June 1995. JP 5-0. Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations. 13 April 1995. USSOCOM Pub 1. Special Operations in Peace and War. 25 January 1996.

Bibliography-2

Index A aircraft capabilities, 2-16, B-1 − B-56 AH-6J, B-6 − B-12 MH-6J, B-1 − B-5 MH-47D, B-32 − B-38 MH-47E, B-39 − B-54 MH-60K, B-23 − B-31 MH-60L, B-13 − B-22 aircraft capabilities matrix, B-55, B-56 air defense, 4-4 – 4-5 airspace, C-1, C-34 command and control (C2), C-34 – C-36 control authority, C-36 coordination, C-35 deconfliction, 3-3, C-35, C-36 restricted, C-34 airspace control measures (ACM), C-34, C-35 airspace control order (ACO), 3-3, C-35, C-36 Army tactical missile system (ATACMS), 4-1, 4-2 ARSOA mission, 1-1 ARSOA principles, 2-6 attack helicopters, 1-1, 4-5, B-6 − B-12, B-13, B-17 − B-22, B-55, B-56

combat, 4-1 − 4-3, 5-6, C-34, C-35

evasion and recovery (E&R), 1-2, 2-3, 2-17, 2-19, 3-6

combat search and rescue (CSAR), 1-2. 2-3, 2-16, 2-17, 2-20, 2-21, A-8, B-13, B-23, B-32, B-39, C-11

external communications support, 4-7

combat service support (CSS), Preface-1, 4-8, 5-1, 5-2, 5-5, 5-6, 5-12, C-22, C-29, C-30, C-33, C-35 combat support (CS), Preface-1, 2-16, 4-1, 4-6, 4-8, 5-1, 5-2, C-35 command and control (C2), Preface-1, 1-2, 2-10, 2-13, 2-14, 2-16, 3-1 – 3-4, 3-10, 4-7, 5-8, B-13, B-17, C-1, C-34 command, control, communications, and computers (C4), 3-11 command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I), 1-2

air interdiction, 4-3 Army attack helicopters, 4-3, 4-5 Army tactical missile system (ATACMS), 4-1, 4-2 close air support (CAS), 4-3 field artillery, 4-1, 4-2 fratricide control, 4-5, C-3, C-10, C-18, C-22 naval surface fire support, 4-1, 4-2

forward arming and refueling point (FARP), 3-6, 4-7, 4-8, 5-6, 5-8 – 5-10, B-32, B-38, B-39, B-54

counterintelligence (CI), 4-7, A-1, A-2

fratricide prevention, 4-5, C-3, C-10, C-18, C-22

E engineer support, 4-7, 4-8 countermobility, 4-7

C

fire support, 2-1, 3-3, 3-6, 4-1 – 4-3, B-6, B-13, B-14, C-3, C-4

communications, 1-4, 2-10, 2-13, 2-16 – 2-20, 3-6, 3-10, 3-11, 4-7, 5-6, A-5, B-2, B-6, B-7, B-13, B-14, B-23, B-24, B-32, B-33, B-40, B-55, C-5 – C-8, C-12, C-13, C-16, C-17, C-32, C-34, D-4, D-6, D-12

AH-6J, B-6 − B-12 MH-60L (DAP), B-13, B-17 − B-22

F

general engineering, 4-8

casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), C-8

mobility, 4-7

collateral activities, 2-1, 2-8 − 2-10, 2-16 – 2-19

topographic engineering, 4-8

reconnaissance, 4-3 tactical air support, 4-1 – 4-3

fuel, 5-6, 5-9, 5-10, B-3, B-4, B-7, B-11, B-13, B-16 – B-18, B-22 – B-24, B-26 – B-28, B-32, B-33, B-36 – B-41, B-43, B-45. B-54 – B-56, C-5 – C-7, C-9, C-14, D-3

survivability, 4-7

Index-1

FM 3-05.60

H host nation (HN), 2-5, 2-10, 2-11, 2-15, 2-17, 2-18

M maritime operations, 2-8, 2-21 mission-essential and battle tasks, 1-1, 1-2 mission planning, 3-4 – 3-9

I intelligence, 1-3, 1-4, 2-3, 2-5, 2-6, 2-10, 2-13, 2-15, 2-19, 3-2, 3-3, 4-5 – 4-7, A-1 – A-9, C-3, C-20, C-22 – C-26, C-30, C-32, C-33 intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW), 4-6, A-1 intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB), 2-13, A-6 – A-8

missions, 2-10 − 2-16 Civil Affairs (CA), 2-12 combatting terrorism (CBT), 2-15, 2-16 counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (CPWMD), 2-16 direct action (DA), 2-14, 2-15 foreign internal defense (FID), 2-11 information operations (IO), 2-10, 2-12 − 2-14

J joint suppression of enemy air defenses (J-SEAD), 4-4, C-3, C-12

Psychological Operations (PSYOP), 2-11, 2-12 special reconnaissance (SR), 2-15 unconventional warfare (UW), 2-10, 2-11

L landing zones, 2-8, 2-10, 4-5, 4-7, 4-8, A-7, A-9, B-55 liaison, 1-1, 1-2, 2-16, 3-3, 3-5, 3-6, 3-8, 3-9, 5-11 limitations, 5-6 logistics environment, 5-1 buildup and integration, 5-1 initial entry, 5-1 redeployment, 5-1 logistics planning, 5-2 aviation life support equipment (ALSE), 5-8

N night vision device (NVD), B-33, B-35, B-38, B-42, B-44, B-54, B-56 forward-looking infrared radar (FLIR), A-2, B-3, B-7, B-17, B-20, B-32, B-35, B-42, B-56 night vision goggles, 2-8 nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) decontamination, 4-8

classes of supply, 5-6, 5-7 considerations, 5-6 fuel, 5-6

O operational considerations, 2-1, 2-7, 2-8 terrain, 2-7, 2-8 weather, 2-7

Index-2

operations airspace control measures (ACM), C-34, C-35 airspace deconfliction, C-35, C-36 Army airspace command and control (A2C2), C-34 – C-36 mission planning folder, C-18 operation order (OPORD), C-1 − C-17 organization, 1-5, 1-6

P principles of war, 2-1 − 2-3 priority intelligence requirements (PIR), A-1, A-4 – A-6

R request for intelligence information (RII), A-3 – A-6 resupply procedures for developed and undeveloped theaters, 5-10 – 5-12 rules of engagement (ROE), 2-4

S search and rescue (SAR), 2-9, 2-16, 2-21 special operations (SO) imperatives, 2-1, 2-3 − 2-6 special operations support command (SOSCOM), 5-2, 5-3, 5-11 statement of requirements (SOR), 5-2 − 5-5, 5-7, 5-8, D-1 − D-13 supporting tasks, 1-2

FM 3-05.60

support services, 5-6 − 5-10 aircraft water requirements, 5-8 airdrop, 5-8 aviation life support equipment (ALSE), 5-8 base security, 5-6, D-13 billeting, 5-8 finance, 5-9 food service, 5-6 – 5-8 funding, 5-9 laundry and shower, 5-8 mortuary affairs, 5-8 rigging, 5-8, 5-9 suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), 3-6, 4-2, 4-4, 4-6 assets and techniques, 4-4 coordination, 4-4 planning, 3-6, 4-4

T tactical application, 2-19

W weapons, B-56 weather support, 4-7 wind limitations, 2-7, B-3, B-10, B-21, B-36, B-44

Index-3

PIN: 078613-000