FM 3-05.105 Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, And Procedures for Special Operations Forces in Nuclear, Biological, And Chemical Environments

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FM 3-05.105 NTTP 3-11.30 AFTTP(I) 3-2.35 USSOCOM Pub 3-11

Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Operations Forces in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Environments September 2001

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies only to protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange Program or by other means. This determination was made on 15 August 2001. Other requests for this document will be referred to Commander, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, ATTN: AOJK-DT-JAA, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28310-5000. DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOREWORD This publication has been prepared under our direction for use by our respective commands and other commands as appropriate.

CHARLES R. HOLLAND General, U.S. Air Force Commander in Chief United States Special Operations Command

WILLIAM G. BOYKIN Major General, U.S. Army Commanding United States Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School

R. G. SPRIGG Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy Commander Navy Warfare Development Command

LANCE L. SMITH Major General, U.S. Air Force Commander Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center

PREFACE 1. Scope This publication provides tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for the planning and execution of special operations forces (SOF) nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense operations. It provides a basis for understanding the requirements of individual SOF personnel operating in NBC environments as well as the requirements of joint force staff planners. TTPs support planning to meet the requirements of different scenarios. Across the range of military operations, it also provides guidance for commanders who determine force structure, equipment, material, and operational requirements necessary to conduct the missions and collateral activities herein described.

2. Purpose This publication has been prepared by direction of the Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC) who has recognized the need to share the skills developed by individual components within the SOF community. Each SOF element brings unique capabilities to an operation that can be improved upon from the knowledge of other elements. This publication compiles existing joint doctrine, principles, and known multi-Service/component TTP for NBC defense preparedness. It establishes a single “how to” guide for use by individual SOF personnel and SOF components supporting Joint Task Force/Joint Special Operations Task Force (JTF/JSOTF) operations. It is a guide intended to enhance SOF force protection, survivability, and readiness in NBC environments.

3. Application The TTPs described in this publication apply to the commanders and staffs involved in special operations as well as individual SOF operating elements. This publication contains established joint and Service doctrine, and supplements joint and Service TTPs.

4. Implementation Plan Participating component command's and subcomponent's offices of primary responsibility will review this publication, validate the information, and incorporate for use.

5. User Information a. This entire publication is “For Official Use Only.” Distribution is authorized to US government agencies only to protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination. This determination was made on 27 October 2000. See Appendix S, “Administrative Instructions,” for additional distribution guidance. b. The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) – Center for Operations, Plans, and Policy (SOOP-PJ-D) developed this publication with the joint participation of its components and Service subject matter experts. USSOCOM will review and update this publication as necessary. c. This publication reflects current joint and Service doctrine, organizations, personnel, responsibilities, and procedures. Changes in Service protocol, appropriately reflected in joint and Service publications, will likewise be incorporated in revisions to this document. d. USSOCOM encourages recommendations for improving this publication. Key all comments to the specific page and paragraph and provide rationale for each recommendation. Send comments and recommendations directly to: Commander in Chief United States Special Operations Command Attn: USSOCOM SOOP–PJ-D 7701 Tampa Point Blvd MacDill AFB FL 33621-5323

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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FM 3-05.105 NTTP 3-11.30 AFTTP(I) 3-2.35 USSOCOM Pub 3-11

Field Manual No. 3-05.105

Headquarters Washington, DC, 28 September 2001

Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Operations Forces in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Environments

Contents Page

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY............................................................................................ ix Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................1-1 Purpose ....................................................................................................................1-1 Special Operations (SO) Principal Missions .............................................................1-1 SO Collateral Activities .............................................................................................1-5

Chapter 2

SOF OPERATING ENVIRONMENTS AND POTENTIAL NBC THREATS.............2-1 General .....................................................................................................................2-1 Section A. SOF AOR Operating Environments....................................................2-2 Urban Areas..............................................................................................................2-2 Desert Areas.............................................................................................................2-2 Low Terrain, Temperate Zone Areas........................................................................2-2 Mountain Areas.........................................................................................................2-2 Jungle Areas.............................................................................................................2-3 Cold Weather Regions .............................................................................................2-3 Maritime Environments and Riverine Areas .............................................................2-4

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Atmospheric Environments ...................................................................................... 2-4 Section B. Potential Threats ................................................................................. 2-5 Biological .................................................................................................................. 2-5 Chemical .................................................................................................................. 2-5 Toxic Industrial Materials ......................................................................................... 2-6 Riot Control .............................................................................................................. 2-6 Nuclear ..................................................................................................................... 2-6 Radiological.............................................................................................................. 2-7 Chapter 3

PLANNING STAFF NBC CONSIDERATIONS IN PREMISSION ACTIVITIES....... 3-1 Purpose .................................................................................................................... 3-1 Mission Analysis....................................................................................................... 3-2 Mission Planning ...................................................................................................... 3-5 Mission Preparation.................................................................................................. 3-8

Chapter 4

NBC CONSIDERATIONS IN PREMISSION ACTIVITIES....................................... 4-1 Purpose .................................................................................................................... 4-1 General..................................................................................................................... 4-1 Section A. Principles of NBC Defense ................................................................. 4-2 Avoidance................................................................................................................. 4-2 Protection ................................................................................................................. 4-3 Decontamination ...................................................................................................... 4-3 Section B. NBC Premission Activities ................................................................. 4-4 Mission Analysis Considerations.............................................................................. 4-4 Mission Planning Considerations ............................................................................. 4-4 Mission Preparation Considerations ........................................................................ 4-6

Chapter 5

NBC CONSIDERATIONS DURING INFILTRATION, EXECUTION, AND EXFILTRATION ....................................................................................................... 5-1 Purpose .................................................................................................................... 5-1 General..................................................................................................................... 5-1 Section A. Air Planning Considerations .............................................................. 5-1 Infiltration, Execution, and Exfiltration Requires Detailed Planning.......................... 5-1 Section B. Maritime Planning Considerations .................................................... 5-4 Infiltration, Execution, and Exfiltration Requires Detailed Planning.......................... 5-4 Section C. Land Planning Considerations .......................................................... 5-6 Infiltration, Execution, and Exfiltration Requires Detailed Planning.......................... 5-6 Section D. Stay Behind Operations Considerations .......................................... 5-8 Stay Behind Operations Are an Alternative to Infiltration ......................................... 5-8

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Section E. SOF Platform NBC Defense Considerations .....................................5-8 Air .............................................................................................................................5-8 Maritime ..................................................................................................................5-12 Ground....................................................................................................................5-14 Appendix A

SOF ORGANIC NBC DEFENSE ASSETS ............................................................. A-1

Appendix B

SOF COMPONENT AND SERVICE COMMON NBC EQUIPMENT ...................... B-1

Appendix C

U.S. ARMY THEATER NBC DEFENSE ASSETS .................................................. C-1

Appendix D

U.S. MARINE CORPS ORGANIC ASSET .............................................................. D-1

Appendix E

NBC RISK ASSESSMENTS/VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS TOOL ....................... E-1

Appendix F

NBC WARNING MESSAGE AND THREAT CONDITION SYSTEM ...................... F-1

Appendix G

NBC HAZARD PREDICTION..................................................................................G-1

Appendix H

NBC RECONNAISSANCE (SURVEY TECHNIQUES) ........................................... H-1

Appendix J

SAMPLING TECHNIQUES ......................................................................................J-1

Appendix K

DECONTAMINATION OPERATIONS .................................................................... K-1

Appendix L

NBC CASUALTY PROCESSING AND HANDLING TECHNIQUES .......................L-1

Appendix M

FORCE PROTECTION ASSESSMENT..................................................................M-1

Appendix N

COMPONENT NBC SUPPORT STRUCTURE....................................................... N-1

Appendix O

TECHNIQUES TO REDUCE AND LIMIT CONTAMINATION ................................O-1

Appendix P

FOREIGN NBC EQUIPMENT RECOGNITION AND CAPABILITY/LIMITATION SUMMARY .................................................................. P-1

Appendix Q

INTERNET/ONLINE REFERENCES ......................................................................Q-1

Appendix R

REFERENCES ........................................................................................................ R-1

Appendix S

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS ...................................................................... S-1 GLOSSARY.............................................................................................................G-1 Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms ......................................................... Glossary-1 Part II Terms and Definitions.................................................................... Glossary-5 FIGURES Figure 4-1. The Principles of NBC Defense .............................................................4-2 Figure 5-1. Advantages and Disadvantages of Air Infiltration/Exfiltration.................5-2 Figure 5-2. Advantages and Disadvantages of Water Infiltration/Exfiltration ...........5-4 Figure 5-3. Advantages and Disadvantages of Land Infiltration/Exfiltration .............5-7 Figure 5-4. Aircraft Decontamination Types ...........................................................5-11 Figure C-1. NBC Defense Covers ........................................................................... C-9 Figure D-1. CBIRF NBC Defense Equipment.......................................................... D-2 Figure E-1. Nuclear Risk Assessment..................................................................... E-9 Figure E-2. Biological Risk Assessment................................................................ E-10 Figure E-3. Chemical Risk Assessment ................................................................ E-11

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Figure G-1. Chemical Operational Planning Considerations .................................. G-1 Figure G-2. Weather Effects on Chemical Agents.................................................. G-4 Figure G-3. Atmospheric Indication of Biological/Chemical Attack Prospects ........ G-5 Figure G-4. Biological Operational Planning Considerations .................................. G-7 Figure G-5. Weather Effects on Biological Agent Dissemination............................ G-9 Figure G-6. Nuclear Operational Planning Considerations ................................... G-11 Figure G-7. Nuclear Radiation Exposure Status Guidelines ................................. G-13 Figure H-1. Fundamentals NBC Reconnaissance ...................................................H-1 Figure K-1. Principles for Planning Decontamination Operations ............................K-1 Figure K-2. Planning Considerations for Conducting Decontamination Operations ................................................................K-2 Figure K-3. Planning Decontamination Operations..................................................K-3 Figure K-4. Considerations for Planning Decontamination Site Reconnaissance ............................................................................K-4 Figure K-5. Immediate Decontamination Actions.....................................................K-4 Figure K-6. Operational Decontamination Concept of Operations (with vehicles) .......................................................................................K-5 Figure K-7. Thorough Decontamination-Detailed Equipment Decontamination ......K-8 Figure K-8. Thorough Decontamination-Detailed Troop Decontamination ..............K-9 Figure K-9. SOF Element Decontamination Options .............................................K-10 Figure K-10. Expedient Personnel Decontamination System ................................K-13 Figure K-11. Expedient Personnel Decontamination System Rucksack and System Components..................................................................K-19 Figure K-12. Aircrew Decontamination Station #1 .................................................K-22 Figure K-13. Aircrew Decontamination Station #2 .................................................K-23 Figure K-14. Aircrew Decontamination Station #3 .................................................K-24 CHECKLISTS Special Precautions Checklist.................................................................................. 2-4 Assets Review Checklist .......................................................................................... 3-3 Planners Host Nation Interoperability Checklist ....................................................... 3-6 Securing NBC-Related Site Checklist ...................................................................... 3-6 NBC Environment Specific Considerations.............................................................. 4-5 NBC Environment Course of Action Considerations................................................ 4-5 Mission Concept Briefing Considerations ................................................................ 4-5 AIR Checklist for Prelaunch Considerations ............................................................ 5-2 AIR Checklist for Enroute Considerations................................................................ 5-3 AIR Checklist for Infiltration/Exfiltration Considerations ........................................... 5-3 AIR Checklist for Recovery Considerations ............................................................. 5-3

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MARITIME Checklist for Prelaunch Considerations .................................................5-5 MARITIME Checklist for Enroute Considerations.....................................................5-5 MARITIME Checklist for Infiltration/Exfiltration Considerations................................5-5 MARITIME Checklist for Recovery Considerations ..................................................5-6 LAND Checklist for Prelaunch Considerations .........................................................5-7 LAND Checklist for Infiltration/Exfiltration Considerations........................................5-7 LAND Checklist for Recovery Considerations ..........................................................5-8 Considerations for Stay Behind Operations..............................................................5-8 Pre-Attack Techniques to Limit Contamination ........................................................5-9 During-Attack Techniques to Limit Contamination ...................................................5-9 Post-Attack Techniques to Limit Contamination.....................................................5-10 Decontamination Flight Considerations ..................................................................5-11 Maritime Techniques to Limit Contamination .........................................................5-12 Maritime Decontaminants.......................................................................................5-13 Patrol Coastal Craft Shipboard Actions for Taking on Contaminated SOF Personnel .......................................................................................................5-13 MK V Shipboard Actions for Taking on Contaminated SOF Personnel..................5-14 Threat Analysis Checklist ........................................................................................ E-1 NBC Plans and Operations Checklist...................................................................... E-2 NBC Guidance and Doctrine Checklist.................................................................... E-6 Joint Force Training and Exercise Checklist ........................................................... E-6 NBC Readiness Checklist ....................................................................................... E-7 Route Recon Critical Tasks Checklist ..................................................................... H-3 Zone Recon Critical Tasks Checklist....................................................................... H-4 Area Recon Critical Tasks Checklist ....................................................................... H-4 Survey Critical Tasks Checklist ............................................................................... H-4 Surveillance Critical Tasks Checklist....................................................................... H-5 Sampling Guidance Checklist...................................................................................J-2 Critical Background Information Checklist................................................................J-6 Commander’s Inherent Responsibilities Checklist .................................................. K-5 Individual Decontamination Responsibilities Checklist ............................................ K-5 SOF Decontamination Element Actions at the Decontamination Site Checklist ..... K-6 Decontamination Site Critical Tasks Checklist ........................................................ K-6 Commander’s Responsibilities Checklist................................................................. K-6 Equipment/Logistical Requirements Checklist ........................................................ K-7 Decontamination Site Operation Checklist .............................................................. K-7 Decontamination Site Closure Checklist ................................................................. K-7 Thorough Decontamination Considerations Checklist............................................. K-9

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Thorough Decontamination Close-Out Procedures Checklist ...............................K-10 Unsupported SOF Element Decontamination Steps..............................................K-11 Expedient Personnel Decontamination System Tactical Planning Guidelines.......K-12 Generic EPDS Mission Sequence .........................................................................K-12 One Piece Cut Out Steps .......................................................................................K-13 Two Piece Cut Out Steps .......................................................................................K-14 One Piece Cut Out Procedure Checklist................................................................K-16 Two Piece Cut Out Procedure Checklist................................................................K-17 EPDS Key Decontamination Considerations Checklist..........................................K-18 Decontamination of Exfiltration Platform Considerations.......................................K-20 Individual NBC Defense Readiness Checklist ........................................................ M-2 Commander’s NBC Defense Readiness Checklist ................................................. M-3 NBC Primary Duty Personnel NBC Defense Readiness Checklist ......................... M-3 NBC Additional Duty Personnel NBC Defense Readiness Checklist...................... M-4 NBC Medical Personnel NBC Defense Readiness Checklist ................................. M-5

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Executive Summary

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

• • • • • •

Provides an Introduction to Special Operations Principal Missions and Collateral Activities Conducted in an NBC Environment Discusses the Operating Environment and the Effect of NBC Hazards on the Battlespace Provides Commander and Staff Planning Considerations for Planning and Conducting Operations in an NBC Environment Provides Operational Element Considerations for Planning and Conducting Operations in an NBC Environment Addresses the Considerations for Infiltration, Execution, and Exfiltration when in an NBC Environment Provides Detailed Considerations Across the Range of Activities in an NBC Environment

Introduction to a New Dimension of Operations SOF assets must become completely proficient in the skill’s necessary to survive in an NBC environment. The ability to operate successfully when an NBC hazard exists will depend on having validated procedures, conducting realistic training, and possessing the means to vigorously execute any mission.

Where proliferation has occurred in regions of potential conflict, deterrence of an adversary’s nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons employment is a principal US national objective. To support deterrence, commanders must ensure that their forces and supporting facilities are visibly able to operate effectively in NBC environments. Should deterrence fail, US forces will need to survive, fight, and win in a contaminated battlespace. Key to operational success may be the ability to mitigate the effects of NBC weapons employment, and eliminate or reduce the adversary’s NBC capabilities in order to reduce the burden on passive and active defense systems. The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the Services have the primary responsibility for organizing, training, and equipping their forces for the full range of potential operations. This includes appropriate professional military education and leader development, planning guides, and supporting actions with emphasis on current threats and combatant command planning considerations. USSOCOM must train and prepare forces to meet the requirements for planned, contingency, and unexpected but plausible operations in NBC environments in the geographic combatant commands’ areas of responsibility. The command also is responsible for appropriate military actions within the United States to counter adversary threats and employment of NBC weapons directly against the US homeland. Such domestic military activity is subject to constitutional, statutory, and policy direction.

SOF Missions and Activities The principal missions and collateral activities remain the same, NBC hazards only make them more difficult.

The components of USSOCOM are a highly trained force that prepares for operations in varied environments around the world. The addition of NBC hazards to what may already be harsh operating conditions has established the requirement to improve NBC defensive skills. In the conduct of the nine special operations forces (SOF) principal missions and eight collateral activities, staff planners and personnel must consider and practice defensive measures to minimize the hazards of an NBC tainted battlespace.

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Executive Summary Operating Environments and NBC Hazards SOF must operate and survive in some of the harshest environments around the world. NBC defense capabilities must be incorporated as standard operating procedure.

The areas of responsibility in which SOF operate may contain several environments, each with a distinct set of NBC planning factors and considerations. Varying from the intense heat of the desert to the frigid arctic, NBC hazards behave differently. How an NBC hazard acts in an environment requires unique planning and operational considerations which must be addressed fully to ensure both the safety and success of SOF elements.

Planning Considerations Detailed analysis and planning Planners at every level must provide the most complete and accurate information provide a basis for successful mission available to ensure mission success and personnel survival. Deliberate or time accomplishment in an NBC environment. sensitive planning must now be expanded to address the NBC dimension.

Responsibilities Commanders can no longer overlook an Individual SOF personnel, theater special operations commands, and joint task force/ joint special operations task force commanders and staffs must recognize an NBC threat. adversary’s capability to use NBC weapons. Any use of these weapons will have a significant impact on the outcome of a single mission, as well as national and coalition objectives. The potential use of NBC weapons and their effects must be considered when planning any special operations (SO) mission. Commanders must ensure all personnel are proficient in the individual and collective NBC defensive skills required to carry out their respective missions in NBC environments. Training must be designed to ensure that SOF units can execute their mission essential tasks under all circumstances.

Summary This publication, derived from multiple sources, is a guide for all personnel and planners working with or within the SOF community. For those unfamiliar with the requirements of SOF operations, it serves as an introductory guide to SOF NBC planning considerations. SO principal and collateral missions are portrayed in NBC environments to show how future operations require awareness beyond customary thinking. To assist commanders, staffs, and personnel in successful mission planning and execution, this publication has included those considerations that must be incorporated into an NBC way of thinking. The tactics, techniques, and procedures provided are intended to facilitate joint special operations planning.

Conclusion The key to preparing SOF for future operations in NBC environments depends upon how well commanders and staffs maximize the skills and information available today. This publication provides tactics, techniques, and procedures applicable to the conduct of joint operations in an NBC environment.

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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION “SOF may be tasked to perform missions for which they are either the best suited among available forces or the only force available. When assigned a mission by a controlling headquarters, that mission becomes the mission and the focus of the assigned unit, even if it is not a primary mission or a common collateral activity. Under these circumstances, SOF provide the tasking commander with a candid assessment of its capabilities, limitations, and risks associated with employment in nontraditional missions. When tasked to do these missions, SOF execute with the same professionalism demanded of primary missions. In an ideal world, SOF would be used only in operations for which they are specifically trained and equipped. In reality, circumstances often dictate the use of SOF for other missions.” JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations

1. Purpose This publication provides a defensive “how to” guide for special operations forces (SOF) personnel and planners preparing for and conducting operations in NBC contaminated environments. It also serves to familiarize conventional staffs with the dynamics of SOF operational support. It describes tactics, techniques, procedures, and capabilities tailored to the requirements of the NBC dimension in special operations (SO) missions and activities.

SOF missions and activities take on a new dimension when an NBC environment exists.

2. Special Operations (SO) Principal Missions in NBC Environments Pursuant to 10 United States Code (USC) 164, 10 USC 167, and the Unified Command Plan, eight activities have been designated as principal SO missions for SOF. Pursuant to CJCSI 3210.01, “Joint Information Warfare Policy,” and Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC) directive, information operations (IO) has been designated as the ninth principal SO mission. Furthermore, USCINCSOC has recognized the probability of operating in an NBC environment exists; therefore, SOF must specifically organize, train, and equip to be successful in that environment. The term “NBC environment” includes the deliberate or accidental employment or threat of NBC weapons and attacks with other chemical, biological, or radiological materials or toxic industrial materials (TIMs). The following is a discussion of the nine SO principal missions. Where possible, the discussion will include examples of situations that can confront planners and personnel conducting SO missions in an NBC environment.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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Chapter I a. Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Counterproliferation (CP) refers to the activities of the Department of Defense (DOD) across the full range of US Government (USG) efforts to combat proliferation. Included are the application of military power to protect US forces and interests; such as, intelligence collection and analysis, support to diplomacy, arms control, and export controls with particular responsibility for assuring US forces and interests can be protected should they confront an adversary armed with WMD. The application of military power may include actions taken to seize, destroy, render safe, capture, or recover WMD. WMD are defined as weapons capable of destroying large numbers of people utilizing nuclear, biological, chemical, and/or radiological means. The mere presence of these weapons could produce an intentional or unintentional NBC operating environment. If directed, SOF can conduct or support direct action (DA), special reconnaissance (SR), combating terrorism (CBT), and information operations (IO) missions to deter and/or prevent the acquisition of WMD, neutralize proliferation where it has occurred, and operate against the threats by WMD to defeat them. SOF are tasked with organizing, training, equipping, and otherwise preparing to conduct operations in support of USG CP objectives. Specific CP activities conducted by SOF are classified and further discussion of CP is beyond the scope of this publication.

“WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION - weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people. Can be nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological weapons, but excludes the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon.”

JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms For additional information on CP of WMD, refer to JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations. b. Combating Terrorism (CBT). These are actions, including antiterrorism (AT) (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (CT) (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. Terrorists pursue a variety of objectives using selected tactics. Examples of terrorist objectives include: publicity for the group’s cause, demonstrating their power and the government’s inability to protect the populace, revenge, acquiring logistical support, and causing a government to overreact. Preferred terrorist tactics include assassination, kidnapping, hostage taking, hijacking, raids, seizures, bombings, sabotage, hoaxes, environmental destruction, and uses of technology and special weapons. The Department of Defense (DOD) is responsible for protecting its own personnel, equipment, bases, installations, ships, and deployed forces. While DOD is not the lead USG agency for combating terrorism, it assists the Department of State for incidents outside the United States, the Department of Justice for incidents within the United States, and the Department of Transportation and/or the Federal Aviation Administration for certain aviation incidents. When directed by the National Command Authorities (NCA) or the appropriate combatant commander, SOF involvement in combating terrorism activities can include such antiterrorism measures as protecting people, facilities, and events from terrorist attack. Counterterrorism measures include hostage rescue, recovery of sensitive materials from terrorist groups, and attacking terrorist infrastructure. Specific examples of combating terrorism activities are classified and beyond the scope of this publication. For further information on AT, refer to JP 3-07.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism. c. Foreign Internal Defense (FID). This is participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. SOF’s primary contribution in this interagency activity is to organize, train, advise, and assist host nation (HN) military and paramilitary forces. Should an NBC threat exist, training provided could cover basic masking techniques for protection against riot control agents to full individual protective equipment (IPE). By training host nation (HN) forces on NBC defense, SOF contribute to the deterrence of an adversary’s use of NBC weapons. During the Gulf War, in Operation DESERT SHIELD, SOF were involved in NBC defense technique training and the equipping of Saudi Arabian HN personnel and other coalition forces. A FID program in an NBC environment requires additional operational and logistic planning factors beyond those normally considered in a non-NBC environment. For further information on FID, refer to JP 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID). d. Special Reconnaissance (SR). These are reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted by SOF to obtain or verify, by visual observation or other collection methods, information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of actual or potential enemies. SOF’s highly developed capabilities of access to denied and hostile areas, worldwide communications, and specialized air/naval platforms with sensors enable SOF to conduct SR against operational and strategic targets beyond the range of conventional reconnaissance forces. SR includes NBC reconnaissance, area assessment, environmental (hydrographic, geological, and meteorological) reconnaissance, coastal patrol and interdiction, target and threat assessment, and poststrike

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Introduction reconnaissance. In addition to reconnaissance and surveillance, SR overt information collection may be conducted to determine the need for, or viability of, contemplated operations. The following illustrates considerations which can affect SR conducted in an NBC environment. • A Navy SEAL (sea-air-land) team, infiltrated by submarine and while conducting SR, locates a suspected enemy theater ballistic missile (TBM) forward operating base (FOB). As the team observes the FOB, an allied aircraft strikes the target, unaware of the team’s presence. Upon destruction of the target, it is realized the FOB was a chemical storage facility for TBMs and the team is contaminated. The team returns to the submerged submarine and reenters the dry deck shelter (DDS). The amount of decontamination that was achieved by being in saltwater is unknown. To avoid contaminating the submarine and its crew, the team remains inside the DDS until the submarine exfiltrates to a safer area where the team members can be thoroughly decontaminated and provided medical treatment. • An Army SF (Special Forces) team, conducting SR from two hide sites and a mission support site, is tasked to perform point detection as a means of standoff detection for a conventional force. All three sites show positive readings for chemical contamination and it is determined the team will begin showing effects of contamination which, if left untreated, may result in death. The joint special operations task force (JSOTF) commander must determine whether to keep the team in place until link-up or extract them, possibly compromising US intentions and alerting the enemy as to the depth of SOF operations in the enemy rear area. If the team is to be extracted, critical decisions will be made regarding a clean aircraft picking up contaminated team members. For further information on SR, refer to FM 31-20-5, Special Reconnaissance Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Special Forces and JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. e. Direct Action (DA). These are short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive surgical actions by SOF or SO capable units to seize, destroy, capture, recover, or inflict damage on designated personnel or materiel. DA mission activities include raids, ambushes and direct assaults, standoff attacks, terminal guidance operations, precision destruction operations, recovery operations (including noncombatant evacuation), anti-surface warfare, mine warfare, and amphibious warfare. When conducting DA against an adversary’s NBC capabilities, SOF must consider the collateral effects of the strike. These collateral effects may cause NBC hazards that could affect SOF operating in the area. An example of a DA mission conducted in an NBC environment follows. • As part of a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO), SOF elements are sent to evacuate American citizens from a remote location in the vicinity of a chemical plant. Local nationals set the plant ablaze, spreading chemical toxins over the area and possibly contaminating the American citizens. The JSOTF commander must contend with the mission complications of: contamination by toxic industrial materials (TIMs), SOF aircraft entering contaminated areas to pick up American citizens who have no personal NBC protective equipment, and resultant casualties. For further information on DA, refer to JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. f. Psychological Operations (PSYOP). PSYOP are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The fear of the horrific capability of NBC weapons can cause unreasoned panic in many groups. PSYOP themes can educate and reduce fears in friendly populations, influence neutral nations, and be turned against hostile nations threatening use of NBC weapons. An example of PSYOP conducted in support of NBC defense operations follows. • The US, as part of a multinational force, deploys a JTF to a friendly country to compel a regional despot to withdraw from illegally occupied territory. The despot threatens use of chemical and biological weapons against the friendly country, multinational force, and a neutral country in the region. The JTF and multinational force develop a coordinated/integrated PSYOP campaign comprised of multiple themes, objectives, and aims. One theme is directed to the civilian populations of the friendly and neutral countries to prepare them for possible NBC attack and supports their respective national defense plans. Another theme is directed towards the world community and seeks condemnation of the despot for violation of international laws and treaties banning use of NBC weapons. A major theme is directed towards the despot’s government, armed forces, and general population. This theme highlights the extreme moral variance that use of NBC weapons has with the primary religion of the rogue country and implies the likelihood of strong retaliation with specific examples of consequences.

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Chapter I For further information on PSYOP, refer to JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations; and JP 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations. g. Civil Affairs (CA). A commander has an inherent responsibility to establish and maintain effective relations between military forces, civil authorities, the general population, resource providers, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and institutions in friendly, neutral, or hostile areas where military forces are employed. The conduct of such relations is called civil-military operations (CMO). Properly executed CMO can reduce potential friction points between the civilian population and the joint force, specifically by eliminating civilian interference with military operations. Use of CA forces and units specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct CA activities in support of CMO can assist the commander in dealing with civilians affected by NBC environments. The following is an example of CMO conducted in an NBC enviornment. • A joint force commander (JFC) is preparing to conduct joint urban operations (JUO) in support of a host nation (HN) against an external neighboring adversary who recently captured and occupied a strategic HN port city. A fanatical religious terrorist organization, traditionally supported by the external adversary, is active in this city. The terrorists claim to have biological agents and threaten release against the city’s population if the HN and JFC retake the city. The JFC directs his CA forces to assist HN officials evaluate HN capabilities and to enhance mitigation of the threat if carried out. CA generalists assess anticipated requirements and realistic HN capabilities, to include evacuation and transportation routes that will not interfere with military operations. CA specialists work with HN civil defense, and medical and public health counterparts to develop and implement a coordinated emergency civil response plan. CA personnel set up a civil-military operations center (CMOC) to coordinate support for the HN from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations (IOs), and the United Nations, all of whom have offered help. CA and HN officials coordinate closely with PSYOP, public affairs, and other public information agencies to provide factual information and rumor control. For further information on CA, refer to JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations; JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations; and JP 3-57.1, Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs. h. Unconventional Warfare (UW). UW involves use of indigenous or surrogate forces that are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed by SOF in support of US national objectives in the full range of military and paramilitary operations. UW includes guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape. UW is complicated by the presence of NBC weapons. Proficient in local languages, SOF assist indigenous forces with combat skills training, NBC defense training, intelligence, communications, PSYOP, civic action projects, and medical support. Working in these activities can either be conducted in support of conventional forces, acting as a force multiplier in an integrated theater campaign, or as part of a stand-alone unconventional operation. However, regardless of the manner in which UW is conducted, the threat or active use of NBC weapons can further complicate normal operational and logistic sustainment factors as well as uncover cultural fears never before actualized. Examples of UW conducted in an NBC environment follow. • An SF team is preparing for insertion and linkup with an indigenous force not possessing NBC defensive equipment. Because the hostile government recently used chemicals against portions of the rebellious indigenous population, the USG decides to equip the force with IPE. A command logistical and training problem confronts the SF team when the supported indigenous force demands NBC protection for their families located within the camp and a nearby city. • The USG decides to inoculate the supported indigenous force and their families against a biological hazard. As word spreads that the SF team has inoculated the force and their families, large numbers of other indigenous personnel arrive at the clandestine base pleading for inoculation. For further information on UW, refer to FM 31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces Operations and ST 31-187, Standing Operating Procedures for Special Forces Operational Detachments in Unconventional Warfare. i. Information Operations (IO). Information operations are a means to support the objectives of the National Security Strategy by enhancing decision superiority and by influencing foreign perceptions. SOF continuously conducts information operations as part of daily operations to achieve information dominance and national security objectives. SOF implementation of IO will allow SOF to attain a relative advantage in the information environment, which in-turn, will shift the central focus from predominately SOF operations using direct action to obtaining information dominance. • Information Operations (IO) involve actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems. IO apply across all phases of an operation and the range of military operations, and at every level of war. Information warfare is IO conducted during time of crisis or conflict (including war)

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Introduction to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries. Defensive IO activities are conducted on a continuous basis and are an inherent part of force employment across the range of military operations. IO may involve complex legal and policy issues requiring careful review and national-level coordination and approval. • All SOF principal or collateral missions may employ information operations tasks. Likewise, all SOF missions may be supported through the employment of IO capabilities. The increasing requirement for SOF to participate in military operations other than war (MOOTW) is based upon inherent capabilities that may be employed in peacetime to deter a crisis, control crisis escalation, project power, or promote peace. An adversary's nodes, links, human factors, weapon systems, and data are particularly lucrative targets, capable of being affected through the use of lethal and nonlethal applications of coordinated SOF IO capabilities. • SOF IO plans support regional and transnational security objectives in coordination with, and complementary to, other USG activities as part of an overarching political-military strategy. SOF IO effectiveness is greatest during times of peace when SOF are in a premium position to assist in deterring the eruption of violent conflicts or the development, transport, and use of NBC weapons. IO may influence and shape perceptions/intent of target audiences, offering an alternative to kinetic solutions. • The unique capabilities of SO enable the JSOTF to support the joint force commander (JFC) by accessing, altering, degrading, delaying, disrupting, denying, or destroying adversary information systems throughout the full range of SO. • Synchronization of SO tactical and operational theater-level IO activities in concert with other DOD and national agencies significantly enhances SO IO effectiveness on a strategic level. SO psychological operations, civil affairs, and public affairs further assist in managing foreign perceptions, particularly regarding NBC threats requiring a continuous effort that spans peace, crisis, and conflict. • Mature SOF IO capabilities, consisting of both offensive and defensive measures; provide force protection for SOF that may be required to operate in high threat or high-risk NBC environments. Information protection is a prerequisite for SOF force protection and achieving decision-superiority and mitigation of NBC threats. For further information on IO, refer to JP 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations.

3. Special Operations Collateral Activities in NBC Environments SO principal missions are enduring and will change infrequently; however, SO collateral activities will shift more readily because of the changing international environment. SOF are not manned, trained, or equipped for collateral activities. SOF conduct collateral activities in an NBC environment using the inherent capabilities resident in the principal missions. Collateral activities conducted under actual or threatened NBC conditions require the same adjustments as made for the principal missions. The following discussions include examples of situations that may confront planners and individuals conducting collateral activities in an NBC environment. a. Coalition Support. Coalition support improves the interaction of coalition partners and US military forces. It includes training coalition partners on tactics and techniques, assisting with communications interface to integrate them into the coalition command and intelligence structure, and establishing liaison to coordinate for combat support and combat service support. SOF teams assigned to coalition units often provide the JFC (joint force commander) with an accurate evaluation of the capabilities, location, and activities of coalition forces, thus facilitating JFC command and control (C2). This activity was first employed during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM and has been critical in subsequent multinational operations. Past successes of these operations in assisting and integrating coalition units into multinational military operations has made it likely that coalition support will become an important aspect of future multinational operations. Examples of considerations confronting planners and personnel in an NBC environment follow. • An SF coalition support team (CST) is planning to link up with a supported force from a country not possessing adequate stocks of individual NBC defensive equipment. While the team will carry its required minimum deployment package of NBC clothing and equipment, serious problems will arise if an NBC attack occurs and the team goes into full protective posture in the presence of an unprotected supported force. To accomplish its mission of improving the interaction between the coalition partner and US military forces, the team’s highest priority becomes coordinating for the US to supply adequate amounts of NBC protection to the supported force. Failure to procure the equipment will effect the post-attack sustainability of the mission and threaten the welfare of the team.

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Chapter I b. Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR). CSAR involves a specific task performed by rescue forces to effect the recovery of distressed personnel during war or military operations other than war (MOOTW). With the expanding role of counterforce in US counterproliferation of WMD, CSAR missions may occur to rescue forces involved in the strike of an adversary’s NBC capability. CSAR may have to be conducted in the hazards created by the collateral effect. Planners and personnel conducting CSAR in these environments must use NBC hazard avoidance and protection principles. Joint doctrine states that each Service and USSOCOM are responsible for performing CSAR for their respective forces. SOF maintains an inherent and/or organic capability to conduct self personnel recovery and/or CSAR within its core mission force structure. When CSAR requirements exceed theater joint CSAR (JCSAR) capabilities, SOF may be directed (on a case-by-case basis) to perform JCSAR missions. However, JCSAR taskings will be conducted at the expense of core SOF mission readiness and/or capabilities. The unique ability of SOF to penetrate hostile defense systems and conduct joint air, ground, or sea operations deep within hostile or denied territory at night, or in adverse weather, make SOF highly suited for this mission. Based on these capabilities, the JFC may task SOF to participate in the joint search and rescue center. • CSAR in an NBC environment brings about many challenges. First, CSAR in any environment requires extensive mission preparation, coordination among all CSAR components, and a clearly defined chain of command. Often, personnel and equipment will be forward deployed to a launch location in order to shorten response time into the AOR. An NBC environment greatly increases the need for coordination. An important planning factor is to make some decisions prior to mission notification that can reduce response times. An example is whether to limit the travel of rescue assets to only clean environments. A critical factor in making such a decision may be the limited decontamination materials/procedures available for aircraft, especially non-pressurized cabins in helicopters. Contaminating a recovery asset early in a conflict may render the asset unusable or require all personnel to wear full individual protective equipment (IPE) when in contact with the asset. Secondly, aircrew will have to be wearing their aircrew ensemble prior to launch. Certain situations may not allow a crew to don IPE after mission notification. Thirdly, the aircraft should be configured to handle contaminated personnel (i.e. line aircraft cabin with nonabsorbing material to reduce contamination transfer to aircraft). Recovery assets required to operate in an NBC environment should carry additional decontamination material and ground ensembles for expedient field decontamination. Finally, recovery personnel should be prepared to conduct the recovery rendezvous with the survivor in full IPE. For further information on CSAR, refer to JP 3-50.2, Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR). c. Counterdrug (CD) Activities. CD activities are active measures taken to detect, monitor, and counter the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs. The CD mission is very similar to FID and UW missions. Using their skills in cross-cultural communication, SOF train host nation (HN) CD forces on critical skills required to conduct small-unit CD operations. SOF CD activities are in support of the geographic combatant commander’s regional CD campaign plan or the US Ambassador’s countryspecific CD plan. PSYOP units, as part of the geographic combatant commander’s overt peacetime PSYOP program, provide tailored CD-specific PSYOP support to regional CD activities. CA units support US and HN efforts abroad by assisting in the planning, and organizing of CD operations. Whenever SOF are conducting CD against an adversary there is an inherent chemical [TIM] hazard risk. SOF commanders must conduct a vulnerability analysis to determine risk, active defense measures, and passive defensive measures. An example of a CD activity conducted in this toxic environment follows. • A SOF-trained HN CD force is planning to conduct small-unit operations to locate and destroy clandestine cocaine laboratories. The laboratories are known to store large quantities of chemicals required for production. These chemicals, if combined and set ablaze, can create toxic hazards. Accordingly, the SOF team has ensured the CD force is equipped with appropriate IPE and trained in tactics, techniques, and procedures for operating in toxic environments. For further information on CD, refer to JP 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations. d. Humanitarian Demining Operations (HDO). These are operations by US forces supporting a DOD program to help selected HNs establish their own demining organizations capable of conducting long term and self-sustaining operations to reduce or eliminate the suffering and threats to the safety of its civilian populations caused by landmines and associated unexploded ordnance. SOF teams train HN cadre in techniques to locate, identify, and destroy landmines and unexploded ordnance. PSYOP teams assist the HN governments in developing and implementing mine awareness programs to train local populations in the identification, avoidance, and procedure to report locations of landmines and unexploded ordnance until these threats are removed. CA teams train the HN demining headquarters in management, administration, logistics, communications, and command and control of its subordinate elements. CA assets also provide liaison with the USG, UN, international organizations (IOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to coordinate support of the HN demining infrastructure. An example of an HDO conducted in an NBC environment follows.

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Introduction • SOF-trained HN demining elements inadvertently explode several chemical mines in a minefield next to and upwind from an inhabited small town. The resulting contamination of the town’s population causes the SOF/HDO team to react in support of the HN. The SF medical specialists, supported by the remainder of the team, conduct an initial assessment and render aid. Coordinating with USG agencies in country, CA personnel advise and assist the HN demining organization in mitigation of the incident through HN, international organizations, NGOs, and US resources. PYSOP personnel assist the HN government with the public information program and other appropriate themes to the HN population. For further information on HDO, refer to JP 3-15, Joint Doctrine for Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare. e. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA). FHA involves programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. FHA provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of HN civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing FHA. SOF units are well suited to perform FHA activities in remote areas because of their rapid deployability, regional orientation, organic communications, and ability to sustain operations under adverse environmental conditions. SOF can assess the needs of an area quickly and communicate this assessment to a JFC or ambassador designing a plan to alleviate suffering. In support of FHA, CA is particularly important in organizing civilian infrastructure; PSYOP are integral to fostering popular support. Participation in FHA requires significant interagency coordination. For further information on FHA, refer to JP 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. f. Peace Operations (PO). PO encompasses peacekeeping operations (PKO) and peace enforcement operations (PEO) conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace. Although PO are guided by the six principles of military operations other than war (objective, security, unity of effort, legitimacy, perserverance, and restraint), the principles of war should be considered in those peace operations where combat operations are possible. SOF, because of their capabilities are ideally suited for peace operations and are often the lead military organization when participating in these types of missions with conventional forces. For further information on PO, refer to JP 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations. g. Security Assistance (SA). SA consists of groups of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (as amended) and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (as amended), or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. The primary SOF role in SA is to provide mobile training teams (MTTs) and other forms of training assistance. Personnel conducting SA are prohibited by law from performing combatant duties. SOF are particularly effective in SA because they use the same regional orientation, communications, mobility, and expertise developed for FID and UW missions. SA is a particularly valued mission because SOF train themselves in skills useful in operations other than war while they train or otherwise assist foreign military forces. An example of SA conducted in a potential NBC environment follows. • A SOF MTT planning to provide training (to include NBC defense TTP) to a friendly foreign military force is aware that many soldiers within the supported force do not shave for cultural and religious reasons. Beards prevent an airtight seal with US supplied masks. Therefore, the team advises the supported force commander to issue his soldiers disposable razors to be carried in their mask carrying cases and to be used prior to the threat of an NBC attack (normally up to three days of beard growth does not hinder mask seal). The team also advises procurement of masks which close around the neck as a long-term solution. For additional information on SA, refer to JP 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense; JP 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance; and JP 3-57, Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs. h. Special Activities. Special activities are actions conducted abroad in support of national foreign policy objectives. These activities are planned and executed so that the role of the USG is not apparent or acknowledged publicly. SOF may perform any of their primary missions during special activities, subject to the limitations imposed by Executive Order 12333. Special activities require a Presidential finding and Congressional oversight.

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CHAPTER II SOF OPERATING ENVIRONMENTS AND POTENTIAL NBC THREATS “NBC warfare is not a separate, special form of war, but instead a battlefield condition just like rain, snow, darkness, electronic warfare, heat and so on. Units must train to accomplish their wartime missions under all battlefield conditions. Whenever NBC is separated from other training events, we condition our soldiers to regard operations under NBC conditions as a separate form of warfare.” Officer comment during chemical training SOLID SHIELD '87 Army Chemical Review, January 1988

1. General NBC weapons and hazards can directly influence the battlespace and physical environment in which SOF operate. The most notable influences of the physical environment are weather and terrain. Weather conditions are the “uncontrollable wildcard” of NBC employment and provide useful clues to probable times and places for NBC use (i.e., employment windows). Diligent tracking of weather conditions aids in the assessment of risks to SOF from NBC weapons, as well as toxic industrial materials (TIM) hazards. In concert with weather conditions, the terrain influences where NBC effects may concentrate (e.g., chemical agents in low-lying areas) and in many cases, it influences enemy NBC targeting (e.g., exploiting or creating chokepoints). The areas of responsibility (AORs) in which SOF operate may contain several environments, each with a distinct set of NBC planning factors and considerations.

Trained to operate in the world’s environments, SOF must adapt standard operating procedures to NBC threats.

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Chapter II SECTION A. SOF AOR OPERATING ENVIRONMENTS 2. Urban Areas a. Urban structures such as sewers, storm drains, reinforced concrete buildings, subways, and basements, etc., can protect against spray attacks of chemical or biological agents and the effects of nuclear blast and radiation. However, this exchange for overhead cover creates other problems. Chemical agents tend to act differently in urban areas and will tend to collect in low areas; nonpersistent agents may enter buildings or seep into piles of rubble. SOF personnel should avoid these low areas. Also, SOF personnel should attempt to shut down ventilation systems in urban structures to prevent the spread of vapor or aerosol hazards. The persistency of an agent can greatly increase when it has settled in these areas. Once an attack has occurred, detection of chemical contamination becomes very important. Personnel must thoroughly check areas before attempting to occupy or traverse them. b. The stable environment of an urban area may increase the persistency of live biological agents and the effectiveness of toxins. Existing food and water supplies are prime targets for biological agents. Personal hygiene becomes very important. Leaders must establish and consistently enforce sanitary and personal hygiene measures, including immunizations. They also must ensure that all personnel drink safe water and never assume that any local water is safe. c. The population density of an urban area must be considered. During planning, the potential of encountering a large number of contaminated, panicked, injured, and dying people must be considered. d. Urban areas can be susceptible to an adversary's use of TIMs as a weapon, especially if there is a sizable chemical industry or storage facilities associated with the area. SOF should be aware of potential hazardous materials they may encounter. For additional information see FM 3-4, NBC Protection, Appendix A.

3. Desert Areas Desert operations may present additional problems. Desert daytime temperatures can vary from 90°F to 125°F resulting in unstable temperature gradients that are not particularly favorable to biological/chemical (BC) attacks. Evaporation of chemical agents during the day will rapidly create a downwind hazard and an inhalation problem. However, with nightfall, the desert cools rapidly, and a stable temperature gradient occurs creating the possibility of night or early morning attacks. For additional information see FM 3-4, NBC Protection, Appendix A.

4. Low Terrain, Temperate Zone Areas a. An adversary's use of BC (biological/chemical) or TIMs can be effective in this environment when forces are not prepared. Use of these weapons (nonpersistent) are more efficient when employed at night and during periods of inversion conditions. Terrain features such as tall grass or scrub brush have the tendency to retard the flow of an agent cloud, thus reducing the overall size of the contamination. Also, the grass and brush may absorb the chemical agent, which would not pose a significant effect on the mission. However, movement through the area requires care be taken as the absorbed agent may be released when the vegetation is disturbed or crushed, creating a secondary toxic hazard. Persistent agents can cling to vegetation, creating surface exposure and an off-gasing during daylight. TIMs, such as chlorine, may tend to meander, as would a fog. b. Movement of a biological aerosol over grass and brush reduces the concentration as the particles impact on vegetation and settle out of the air. However, the cover provided by vegetation protects the biological agent from the weather and; thus, favors its survivability, specifically wet aerosols. For additional information see FM 3-6, Field Behavior of NBC Agents.

5. Mountain Areas a. Terrain and weather in mountainous areas magnify the requirement for a high degree of NBC defense preparedness. Rugged terrain limits the employment of large forces, reduces maneuver, and impedes logistical support. Shelters are difficult to dig and may require improvisation using existing rocks, snow, and timber. However, this same terrain may also provide caves, ravines, and cliffs as a natural source of protection.

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SOF Operating Environments and Potential NBC Threats b. Chemical agents are heavier than air and will settle in valleys and depressions. Subject to mountain breezes, agents will move down and within the valley. Thus, high dosages are less likely on crests or sides of ridges or hills. c. Radiation contamination will be erratic due to rapid changes in wind patterns but at the same time, the range of thermal effect increases with the clarity of mountain air. The location of hot spots may be erratic. Additionally, a nuclear blast can produce rock and snow slides. d. Colder mountainous temperatures may affect biological agents in the same manner as cold weather. For additional information see FM 3-4, NBC Protection, Appendix A.

6. Jungle Areas a. Tropical climates require the highest degree of individual discipline and conditioning to maintain effective NBC defensive readiness. Leaders and staff planners must expect and plan for a rapid decrease in unit efficiency. They also must anticipate heat casualties. Strict adherence to field sanitation is necessary. In addition, they must ensure that special precautions are taken to maintain unit NBC defense equipment in usable condition. The rapid mildew, dry rot, and rust inherent in jungle areas necessitate this requirement. b. Dominant climatic features of jungle areas are high, constant temperatures; heavy rainfall; and very high humidity. These features increase the survivability of biological agents. In thick jungle there is usually little or no wind, and the canopy blocks most of the sunlight from the ground, thus providing excellent conditions for adversary use of biological agents and toxins. c. The same canopy that may provide slight shielding from radiation may also enhance blast effect with tree blow-downs and projectiles. Also, a lack of penetrating wind may result in decreased downwind hazards. d. A jungle canopy creates good overhead cover from aircraft spray. However, persistent agents delivered by artillery or bombs may penetrate the canopy before being released, thus creating a hazard in the immediate area of impact. e. Additionally, rains can wash radiation into water collection areas producing hot spots. For additional information see FM 3-4, NBC Protection, Appendix A.

7. Cold Weather Regions a. Cold weather conditions create many added problems in NBC defense. During the winter months, 45 percent of the North American landmass and 65 percent of the Eurasian landmass are characterized by extreme cold and deep snow. These areas include Korea, China, Bosnia, Kosovo, Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and the United States. The former Soviet Union developed procedures to weaponize a series of agents to be effective in extreme cold weather. Some of those agents do not have known freezing points. In temperatures from -20° to -40°F, agents such as Sarin [GB] become like a thickened Soman [GD]. Choking agents have increased persistency from 0° to -40°F. Even hydrogen cyanide [AC] which solidifies at -14°F can be disseminated as fine particles, thereby increasing its effective time and threat. Mustard agents employed through pyrotechnic devices create effective vapor hazards far below the freezing point of mustard. b. Most decontaminants have reduced effectiveness at temperatures below 0°F. In field conditions decontaminant effectiveness would be reduced due to impurities in agents and decontaminants. Present detection technology is not effective in cold environments. An agent must be in liquid or vapor form and in significant quantities in order to be detected by currently available equipment. In cold environments agents may be undetectable, yet still hazardous. c. Frozen contamination must be prevented from being tracked into a warmed area such as a tent, heating to form a vapor and then producing a deadly off-gassing hazard. Agents mixed with frozen water can adhere to protective clothing, thereby preventing removal of the hazard. These hazards may occur as temperatures increase from night to day and decrease from day to night. d. Special precautions and actions to be considered for conducting cold weather chemical decontamination:

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Whenever possible, conduct detailed troop decontamination (DTD) in a warm tent, gross contamination must be removed prior to DTD. Provide warming tents for contaminated soldiers working on the decon line. Place chemical agent alarms in all warming tents. In most cases the alarms would not detect contamination outside. Drain all decon equipment of water during storage to prevent water freezing and damaging the equipment. Minimize digging because it increases the risk of vapor hazards. Contaminates may be trapped in frozen layers below the surface. When soldiers dig, the layer becomes exposed to the surface, where the temperature creates a different vapor pressure. The change in vapor pressure may create a new hazard. Check a core snow sample when entering a new assembly area. Contaminants can become occluded in snow and ice. This makes detection difficult and may increase the spread of contamination. Snow may drift for miles. Contaminants may be trapped in a layer beneath the surface. NBC recon teams should take samples of snow from several layers by digging in a few areas. Test the snow with detection paper - M8 or M9 paper. If possible, warm the snow to a liquid and test it with a chemical agent monitor (CAM). Mission oriented protective posture does not prevent cold weather injuries.

e. Use of nuclear weapons in arctic conditions can increase the effects and potential casualties at greater distances from ground zero (GZ). Personnel should be aware of potential snow blindness and burns, avalanches as far as 30 kilometers (km) from GZ, quick thaws and freezes, and frozen material/snow storms. f. In cold temperatures, biological agents are more persistent. For additional information refer to FM 3-4, NBC Protection, Appendix A; and TC 3-10, Commander’s Tactical NBC Handbook.

8. Maritime Environments and Riverine Areas a. Maritime Environments. SOF operating in maritime environments have the potential of encountering chemical, biological, or radiological attacks from the shoreline; however, a chemical attack is considered the most likely. Delivery of a nonpersistent chemical agent, in favorable climatic conditions, is no different across open water from that of low, rolling terrain. The effects of wind and heavy surf will tend to disperse a chemical cloud. Direct use of persistent agents against deploying forces is not considered feasible, but contamination of a beach would provide a formidable barrier. Note – mustard agents can remain for extended periods of time on the surface of the water. Surface vessels operating in support of SOF risk being attacked by artillery, missile, or air depending on their offshore location. The feasibility of the use of biological agents, except against large targets, would be considered low, however, radiological contamination as a barrier should be considered in any plan. b. Riverine Areas. Operations on and around rivers present situations that have a potential to disrupt operations. Use of both persistent and nonpersistent agents will require SOF to establish mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) levels that could degrade personnel effectiveness. During inversion climatic conditions, nonpersistent chemical agent clouds have the tendency to follow a river’s path when channeled by the high grass and brush along the banks. See Appendix G, “NBC Hazard Prediction.” Persistent agent could be used to contaminate the riverbanks. For additional information refer to FM 3-6, Field Behavior of NBC Agents.

9. Atmospheric Environments a. SOF planning involving aviation assets should consider the possibility of both external and internal aircraft contamination. Three primary regimes need to be considered: • Operating/Staging Bases. The possibility of NBC use against airfields where SOF aviation assets are operating should always be considered. Airfields are typically wide-open and have well known, publicly available, and highly accurate coordinates making them easy to target. To minimize the effects of NBC attacks, SOF personnel, aircraft, supplies, and support assets should be dispersed and covered (situation permitting). The typically clear, wide-open nature of most airfields

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SOF Operating Environments and Potential NBC Threats will allow nonpersistent chemical agents to disperse quickly. Assets should be protected against NBC contaminants that adhere to surfaces – covering allows quick reuse after an attack. • En Route. The likelihood of NBC contamination while airborne is remote, with the odds decreasing as altitude increases. Increasing altitude, however, increases the risks of detection by threat systems, and must be weighed against mission requirements. Flying through rain and clouds increases the possibility of partial decontamination to outside surfaces when transiting to and from objective areas. • Objective Area Operations. The greatest potential for contamination is during objective area operations – infiltration/ exfiltration (infil/exfil), airdrop, or other operations that require SOF aircraft to operate in close proximity to the ground. The aircraft will typically be “opened up,” increasing the possibility of internal aircraft contamination from the effects of NBC agents and the blast from propellers/rotors and contaminated personnel/equipment requiring infil/exfil. SOF aircrews must be prepared to operate in an NBC environment and anticipate the additional requirements of passengers during missions. b. The decision to send aircraft into situations where they will likely become internally contaminated should consider the inability to effectively decontaminate (decon) aircraft in a timely manner and doing so will likely require the aircraft to be maintained and flown in a “dirty” condition.

SECTION B. POTENTIAL THREATS 10. Biological Agents The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defines a biological agent as a microorganism (or its toxin) that causes disease or deterioration of material. Biological agents are generally directed against the respiratory system to maximize the organism’s ability to diffuse directly into the bloodstream and bodily tissue. Individual protective equipment (IPE) generally provides protection against a biological warfare (BW) attack. a. Generally, biological warfare agents may be classified into two broad groups: • Pathogens—microorganisms that produce disease in humans, animals, and/or plants (e.g. protozoa, fungi, bacteria, rickettsia, and viruses). • Toxins—any toxic substance that can be produced by a living organism. b. Most organisms are naturally occurring and can be found in almost any environment. Without proper hygiene and appropriate vaccines, they have the capability to rapidly cause incapacitating or lethal illness. When employed as a warfare agent, biological agents can be disseminated in aerosol form, by vectors such as mosquitoes and ticks, or through contaminated food or water. For additional biological agent operational planning considerations see Appendix G, "NBC Hazard Prediction."

11. Chemical Agents a. Chemical warfare (CW) agents produce both immediate and delayed effects that will degrade operations through lethal, incapacitating, or other damaging effects to individuals as well as contamination of equipment, supplies, and critical terrain features. The types of chemical warfare agents that could be encountered by USSOCOM forces are classified as lethal and incapacitating. Agents may exist as solids, liquids, or gases. In addition, toxic industrial materials (TIMs) and potentially dangerous herbicides/pesticides could be encountered accidentally or employed by an adversary. b. CW agents are grouped according to use. They can either be lethal or incapacitating. Lethal agents produce serious injury requiring medical attention (death may occur when used in field concentrations). Incapacitating agents produce temporary physiological or mental effects and may not require medical treatment to recover. Both types of agents may hinder the ability to carry out the mission. • Lethal agents are chemical substances intended for use in military operations to kill, seriously injure, or hinder military operations through their physiological effects. They are classified as nerve, choking, or blood agents. Nerve agents are considered the primary agents of threat to the US military because of their high toxicity and effectiveness through multiple

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Chapter II routes of entry. Nerve agents attack the body’s nervous system. Even small quantities are extremely toxic and can cause death in less than 15 minutes, if not treated. • Incapacitating agents include blister (mustards) and compounds that effect the nervous system (BZ, LSD, etc.). Note – blister agents such as mustard when received in high enough doses and/or not treated properly may be lethal. Attack by these agents may cause additional constraints by taxing the logistical force to provide additional medical support personnel and treatment. c. Lethal and incapacitating agents may be disseminated by artillery, mortar shells, rockets, bombs, or aircraft spray. They may be persistent or nonpersistent and produce immediate casualties among unprotected troops, restrict friendly use of terrain, objectives, and equipment, degrade friendly combat effectiveness by forcing protective posture and creating confusion and stress, especially among leaders. d. Nerve agents also have been produced and used by terrorist groups as evidenced by the use of Sarin [GB] in the Tokyo, Japan subway attack. For additional chemical agent operational planning considerations see Appendix G, “NBC Hazard Prediction.”

12. Toxic Industrial Materials (TIMs) Although less lethal than current chemical warfare agents, industrial materials often are available in enormous quantities, do not require expensive research programs, are easily mass produced, do not violate the Chemical Weapons Convention, and can still produce mass casualties. TIMs could be released from industrial plants or storage depots through battle damage, as consequence of a strike against a particular facility, or as a desperation measure during military operations. They could also be utilized as improvised chemical weapons and have potential for inclusion in clandestine programs or contingency plans. Note: IPE does not protect against all TIMs, e.g., IPE will not protect the wearer from ammonia-based or chlorinebased industrial chemicals. For additional TIM operational planning considerations see Appendix G, “NBC Hazard Prediction.”

13. Riot Control Agents (RCAs) RCAs are chemicals that produce temporary irritating or disabling effects when in contact with the eye or when inhaled. Generally used in the control of violent disorders, they can be effectively employed to contaminate terrain and to cause degrading effects on individuals, requiring them to use IPE for protection. US policy does not classify RCAs as chemical warfare agents. Presidential Executive Order 11850 establishes the national policy for the use of RCAs by US forces in combat. For additional RCA operational planning considerations see, Appendix G, “NBC Hazard Prediction.”

14. Nuclear Nuclear weapons are similar to conventional weapons insofar as their destructive action is due mainly to blast or shock. However, nuclear explosions can be millions of times more powerful than the largest conventional detonations. For the release of a given amount of energy, the material mass required for a nuclear explosion would be much less than that of a conventional explosion. Nuclear effects are divided into four categories — blast/overpressure, heat and light (thermal radiation), radioactivity (alpha, beta, gamma, and neutron), and electromagnetic pulse (EMP). a. Blast/Overpressure. The blast wave created by an explosion produces a shock front that travels rapidly away from the fireball behaving like a moving wall of highly compressed air (approximately 900 miles/hour). When this blast wave strikes the surface of the earth, it is reflected back causing a second wave to be formed, which will eventually merge with the first wave (called Mach effect). When this occurs, the “overpressure” will essentially double. Winds generated by the blast of the weapon could reach several hundred miles per hour at ground zero, and be as high as 70 mph as far as six miles away. b. Thermal Radiation. Immediately after a detonation, weapon residues emit primary thermal radiation (x-rays) which are adsorbed within a few feet of air. This energy is then re-emitted from the fireball as thermal radiation consisting of ultraviolet, visible, and infrared rays. There are two distinct thermal pulses that result from the detonation.

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SOF Operating Environments and Potential NBC Threats • First Pulse: Lasts about a second, high temperatures, and can cause flash blindness or retinal burns. • Second Pulse: Lasts about 10 seconds, carries about 99 percent of the thermal radiation energy, and causes skin burns and fires. c. Radioactivity. A detonation emits various forms of nuclear radiation (alpha, beta particles, gamma rays, and neutrons) that are referred to as initial and residual radiation. The initial radiation is emitted within the first minute of the detonation, and residual is that radiation released after that time. • Initial radiation: Requires extensive shielding, creates additional radiation contamination, and can affect materials such as those used in electronic systems (e.g., radio and radar sets, gyroscopes, and computers). • Residual radiation: Primary hazard is fallout. d. Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP). An electromagnetic signal produced by a nuclear detonation is commonly known as EMP. EMP induced currents and voltages can cause electronic component equipment failure, affecting a wide range of electric and communication equipment, global positioning systems, command control nodes, vehicle ignition systems, avionics, and fire control systems. For additional nuclear operational planning considerations see, Appendix G, “NBC Hazard Prediction.”

15. Radiological Nuclear threats are associated with the explosive detonation of special nuclear material. The radiological threat deals with radiation hazards and radioactive materials that may be in more common use. The threat of low level radiation exists in all operations. This threat can exist in certain expended rounds (depleted uranium), damaged or destroyed equipment, or contaminated shrapnel. It also may occur from inadequate nuclear waste disposal, deterioration of nuclear power facilities, damage to facilities that routinely use radioactive material/sources, and the direct employment of radioactive materials/compounds by an adversary (terrorism). Specialized detection equipment is required to detect lower levels of radiation. For additional radiological operational planning considerations see, Appendix G, “NBC Hazard Prediction.”

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CHAPTER III PLANNING STAFF NBC CONSIDERATIONS IN PREMISSION ACTIVITIES “… SOF face an operational environment characterized by accelerating geopolitical change, rapid technological advancement, evolving threats, constrained resources, and potential new roles. These factors require innovative thinking and new ways to shape change to provide the widest array of options in protecting America’s interests. And the truth is, business as usual will not provide the capabilities needed to deal with the transnational and asymmetric threats of tomorrow.” SOF Posture Statement 1998 H. Allen Holmes Fmr. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict)

General Peter J. Schoomaker Commander in Chief U.S. Special Operations Command

Commanders at all levels must understand the NBC threat environment to be able to give accurate detailed “commander’s guidance.”

1. Purpose This chapter provides planning considerations to supplement those already in place when conducting deliberate or timesensitive planning for operations in an NBC environment. Primarily designed for JTF/JSOTF staff planners, these considerations can be applied to any staff involved in the planning for operations in an NBC environment. Detailed mission planning is vital to SOF mission success. Planners at every level must provide the most complete and accurate information available to ensure mission success and personnel survival. SOF NBC planners must be brought in early in premission activities and utilized continuously until mission completion.

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Chapter III 2. Mission Analysis Mission analysis involving NBC, whether during time-sensitive or deliberate planning, must be able to focus staff planners throughout the decision making process. This is accomplished by applying a narrowing down process. A series of questions is used to assess the suitability, feasibility, and acceptability of undertaking a special operation in an NBC threat environment. The following considerations should be incorporated into existing mission analysis standing operating procedures (SOPs) when faced with an NBC threat. a. Analyze Higher Headquarters Order – determine mission and intent, concept, time lines, adjacent units missions, assigned area of operation (AO), review for NBC protection guidance and specified/implied NBC defense tasks, such as exposure guidance. Evaluate potential SOF employment for appropriateness, feasibility, and supportability early in the planning cycle and prior to target assignment (joint targeting coordination board representation). Provide clear guidance to commanders for planning and executing SO. • Is this an appropriate mission for SOF? SOF should be used against those key strategic or operational targets that require unique SOF skills and capabilities. If the targets are not of operational or strategic importance, then SOF should not be assigned. SOF should not be used as a substitute for other forces. • Does this mission support the theater campaign plan? If the mission does not support the JFC’s campaign plan, then there are probably more appropriate missions available for SOF. • Is this mission operationally feasible? Does it require SOF to operate in an NBC environment longer than they can sustain themselves? The Joint Services Lightweight Suit (JSLIST) will provide effective protection from contamination for up to 24 hours once contaminated. Current protective undergarments provide limited protection (up to 12 hours) against vapor exposure only. Butyl rubber gloves provide 6 hours of protection from contamination. Protection factors less than the 24 hours provided by the JSLIST must be planned for (maritime – salt water degrades protection factor). SOF are not structured for attrition or force-on-force warfare and should not be assigned missions that are beyond their capabilities. Planners must consider the vulnerability of SOF units to larger, more heavily armed or mobile forces, particularly when in hostile territory. • Are the required operational resources available to support the mission? Some SOF missions require support from other forces for success. Are these resources capable of supporting in an NBC environment? Support involves aiding, protecting, complementing, and sustaining employed SOF. Support can include airlift, maritime transport, intelligence, communications, and logistic support. Even though a target may be vulnerable to SOF, deficiencies in support may affect the likelihood for success or may entirely invalidate the feasibility of employing SOF. SOF chemical detachments must be considered in planning and prepared to perform "dirty" exfiltration decontamination. • Does the expected outcome justify the risk? Commanders should recognize the high value and limited resources of SOF and ensure that the benefits of the mission are worth the risks. Assessment of risk should consider not only the potential for loss of SOF units and equipment, but also the risk of adverse effects on US diplomatic and political interests should the mission fail. b. Conduct Initial Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace – define the operational environment. Describe the battlespace effects; evaluate the adversary; determine most probable/most dangerous adversary course of action (COA) (including TIM considerations); determine adversary offensive and defensive NBC capabilities; determine adversary NBC usage intent; determine threat values; superstitions, fears, religious beliefs, etc., which may be exploited to deter use of NBC weapons. Determine enemy centers of gravity, vulnerabilities, and limitations. Analyze how the enemy conceptionalizes the situation and the opposing friendly situation. Identify water sources and any local demands against that water supply. Decon sites are located away from local water supplies to prevent contamination of that water source. c. Determine Specified and Implied Tasks – review the plan/order for further specified or implied NBC defense tasks. d. Review Available Assets – review the status of available assets (forces, equipment, supplies, HN support) to support identified tasks.

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Planning Staff NBC Considerations in Premission Activities Assets Review Checklist ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !

Availability of detection and identification equipment. Availability of collective protection for rest and relief. Medical pretreatments, prophylaxis, treatments, and evacuation. Decontamination of equipment and casualties. Resupply of expendable gear (e.g. clothing, IPE, masks, gloves, drink bags, medical kits, etc.). Equipment recovery and evacuation of contaminated equipment and personnel. Mortuary affairs – policy, standards, and procedures. Emergency destruction and evacuation of munitions – US or captured. Safe transportation and handling of NBC samples.

e. Determine Constraints – shortage of mission essential assets at the individual/unit/theater level is an immediate constraint on operational capabilities. Other NBC defense constraints include items such as levels and rates of supply, rates of usage, decon throughput capability, water availability, protective suit life expectancy, environmental considerations, military and civilian NBC training readiness, and HN NBC support requirements. Note: include an assessment of psychological impacts of US forces having chemical/biological defense equipment that is not available to HN personnel. f. Identify Critical Facts/Assumptions – determine NBC facts or assumptions that are specific to mission situations. Apply Mission, Enemy, Terrain and Weather, Troops and Support Available, Time Available, and Civil considerations (METTTC) to assist in making determinations. • Analyze the situation in the context of METT-TC. •• Mission refers to the ability of personnel to accomplish the required tasks (while wearing protective equipment) and the criticality of the mission in relation to force survivability (how much risk is acceptable). •• Enemy refers to enemy activity. For example, it would be somewhat fruitless to attempt the “thorough” or “reconstitution” levels of decontamination if chemical-laden missiles were continually impacting or excessive sniper or special forces activity existed. •• Terrain and weather refers to the suitability of the land in regards to decontamination operations. This assessment includes composition, degree of roughness and/or vegetation, vertical slant, availability of water sources, available space, etc. •• Troops and support available refers to the ability and proficiency of personnel. Sufficient personnel (both in the context of numbers and training) may not exist to effectively conduct large-scale decontamination operations. To a degree this factor is interrelated with the “mission” component. On one hand decontamination operations may not be required for a group of people who can function effectively in IPE while at least the appearance of extensive decontamination operations may be needed to motivate personnel who have been psychologically affected by the use of chemical agents. The length of time that personnel have already been at MOPP4 will impact the criticality of decontamination efforts. Personnel will almost certainly need to find or create (decontaminate) a clear area after 36 hours of MOPP4 while this is not nearly as critical at the 2-hour point. •• Time available refers to the timing associated with, or required for task completion. Generally speaking, “thorough” or “reconstitution” decontamination operations are exceptionally time consuming. The factor “time” itself brings options with it. For example, if an area is not needed for mission operations, it can be clearly identified with warning placards and left to weather. •• Civil refers to the local populations that are either contaminated or may become contaminated. For example, a SOF element, possessing complete IPE, may operate in a local village where there is no IPE available. What are the implications of the village coming under NBC attack, and the post attack welfare/sustainability of the protected SOF? What are the likely reactions of the surviving populace and the logistical considerations for scores of sick and dying littering the area, etc.?

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Chapter III • In addition to the factors associated with METT-TC the following items must be considered. •• Agent Toxicity. While the use of skin decontamination kits associated with “immediate” decontamination is always required, extending the effort into the “personal” level or above may not be required for a variety of reasons. One factor is agent toxicity. For example, if personnel are well trained and protected, the contact hazard associated with miniscule drops of mustard agent (HD) (lethal dose (LD) 50 of 1400 mg per person) does not begin to approach the contact hazard of VX (LD of 5 mg per person – a figure 280 times deadlier). Operational decontamination activities are potentially more beneficial with VX because the human penalty associated with inadvertent contact, e.g. through a hole in a glove, is much higher. •• Agent Persistency. It is probable that some threat agents could have largely dissipated before an installation could get to the point of focusing concentrated decontamination efforts. For example, given a missile ground burst with Sarin (GB) the agent should be effectively weathered in 18 minutes under typical weather conditions of 20°C temperature and three knot wind speed. •• Specific Hazard to Personnel. Personnel must assess whether the hazard is one of contact, inhalation, vapor skin penetration, skin penetration through cuts or scratches only, or ingestion. The answer(s) to these questions provides insight to the type (if any) and extent of decontamination that may be required. •• Type of Contaminated Surface. Chemical agents are removed from some surfaces easier than others are. For example, agents can be easily removed from metal while they cannot be removed from untreated wood or concrete block. The type of surface includes such factors as composition (metal or wood), surface shape (smooth, rough, crinkled, multiple bends or catch basins, etc.), and ability to manipulate the surface (turning over dirt is much easier than turning over runway surfaces). •• Extent of Contamination. The three considerations in this area are total area coverage (small areas are potentially workable where decontamination of large areas is generally not cost effective), the concentration of agent(s) in the area (surface deposition of g/m2 with resulting vapor hazard of mg/m3), and the criticality of the item or area in question. If the items are not essential to mission operations it is easier and safer to let them weather. •• Present or Forecasted Weather Conditions. The effect of weather will play an important part in any decontamination decision, both in terms of the need for the operation and in terms of what effect the weather will have on personnel. Increases in temperature and/or wind speed will result in decreased agency persistency times. However, these same conditions may resuspend agents in dusty or powder form and make it more difficult for personnel to work at MOPP 4. •• Equipment Limitations. This is a critical factor. SOF leadership must accurately compare the numbers and types of decontamination assets available with the decontamination results desired. For example, there may be sufficient M291 kits to handle skin decontamination but insufficient M295 kits to effectively use them for operational decontamination operations. Further, many agent’s characteristics of insolubility with water and limited hydrolysis are determining factors why certain decontamination apparatus, such as the M17, can move contamination (to a degree) from one place to another but cannot neutralize the agent to the point an overall reduction in MOPP easily occurs. g. Conduct Risk Assessment – detailed assessment of risks and mitigating measures during course of action (COA) development. See Appendix E, “NBC Risk Assessment and Vulnerability Analysis Tool.” h. Determine Initial Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) – list less than 10 questions that focus on a specific event and provide intelligence required to support a single critical decision. i. Determine Initial NBC Operation Plan – determine key events or triggers that will initiate NBC actions. Prioritize use of NBC assets. Identify likely NBC or TIM hazard areas (these areas become named areas of interest (NAI)). j. Plan Use of Available Time – overlay friendly timelines with projected enemy timelines to mitigate or exploit the visible windows of risk or opportunity. k. Conduct a Mission Analysis Briefing – brief mission analysis products and recommended restated mission. Key NBC factors should include discussion of NBC and TIM hazards, their associated risks, and critical mitigation measures.

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Planning Staff NBC Considerations in Premission Activities l. Develop Initial Commander’s Intent – include conditions for success with respect to adversary, the terrain, or the desired end state. m. Issue Commander’s Guidance – key NBC aspects of command guidance include CCIR, risk guidance, priorities of support, (avoidance, protection, decontamination, recon, and smoke), time lines, and rehearsals. n. Issue a Warning Order – a warning order is issued unless the threat is immediate. NBC guidance in unit warning orders is generally restricted to minimum protective posture or time-sensitive requirements, e.g., initiating medical immunizations and prophylaxis, initiating contamination avoidance measures, preparation of medical treatment facilities to receive NBC casualties, and/or preparation for decontamination operations. o. Review Facts/Assumptions.

3. Mission Planning The effects of NBC weapons can negate the operational advantages afforded SOF because SOF have limited NBC defense infrastructure. Therefore, SOF rely heavily on threat assessment, early detection, contamination avoidance, and self-decontamination. Deployed SOF may operate dismounted and carry all essential equipment with them. If threat analysis does not accurately identify NBC risks, commanders may not consider individual protective equipment (IPE) to be mission essential and may deploy their units without adequate NBC protection. Assuming IPE is available, extended periods in MOPP may be unacceptable under all but emergency conditions. Timely and accurate intelligence, use of field expedients, foreign or captured NBC equipment, and maximum use of weather and terrain are key considerations for SOF operating in NBC environments. Designated SOF detachments are uniquely trained to infiltrate deep into adversary rear areas to confirm or deny the adversary’s NBC capability. The role of SOF in counterforce operations is an integral element of the deliberate planning process. Mission planning must not be limited to individual NBC defensive measures. Planning must consider the overall mission, intent, and subsequent impact. a. Detailed mission planning based on specific, comprehensive, and current intelligence is vital to successful execution of SO missions and, potentially, the very survival of a SOF element. Collection and analysis gives appropriate attention to regional NBC threats. Intelligence assets define the operational environment, describe the battlespace effects, evaluate the adversary, determine most probable/most dangerous adversary COA (including TIM considerations), determine adversary offensive and defensive NBC capabilities, and determine adversary NBC usage intent. SOF personnel must have a thorough knowledge of the operational area, to include geographic, political, social, economic, informational, military (enemy order of battle and operational concepts), and environmental conditions. Also, for some missions, SOF personnel must know the language, customs, ethnic and religious affiliations, and antagonisms of the local population that may affect mission execution (e.g. custom of wearing a beard precludes a tight seal on a gas mask). This level of area orientation is best achieved through previous operational experience, MTTs, deployments for training in the area, or intensive pre-employment study of the intended operational area. b. SO missions must be planned completely — insertion, resupply, fire and maneuver support, extraction — prior to committing the force. The nature of the target, enemy situation, environmental characteristics of the operational area, methods of insertion and extraction, length of force exposure, tactical considerations, logistic requirements, and the size and composition of the command and support structure dictates the size and capabilities of the assigned force. Planners must consider the NBC defense procedures utilized by components when involved in joint operations. Note - consider establishing component working groups to resolve interoperability issues. c. SO mission planners ensure adequate situational awareness is a central concern for commanders and staffs. A welldeveloped and exercised, component compatible NBC warning and reporting system provides a significant measure of protection by assisting forces to avoid the hazard. Accurate and timely understanding of the hazard and its effects minimizes the possibility of either excessive or inadequate protection of the force, maintaining a protective posture longer than necessary, or misusing scarce NBC defense assets such as early warning, detection, reconnaissance, surveillance, and decontamination units. These assets are combat multipliers and must be managed effectively to support the campaign plan and protect capabilities with high vulnerabilities to the effects of NBC weapons. For additional warning information see Appendix G, “NBC Hazard Prediction.” d. SOF missions must include a plan for medical support – management and treatment of casualties, impact of NBC casualties on a mission. Medical NBC defense should be fully integrated into the deliberate planning process in order to

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Chapter III maximize readiness. Key elements include casualty estimation, prophylaxis, diagnostics, mass casualty management, evacuation of contaminated patients, patient decontamination, evacuation of decontaminated patients to medical treatment, and requirements for stand-by or surge medical operations. JFC’s planning should recognize that NBC attacks have the potential to create mass casualties. The treatment and evacuation of NBC casualties will be difficult and hazardous both to the patients and to medical personnel. e. Planners must ensure interoperability of SOF with conventional forces that either host or support their activities. Common standards for NBC defense, especially training and equipment, must be established in order to maximize effectiveness and prevent inadvertent vulnerabilities in joint force capabilities. Gaps in the NBC defense capabilities of multinational coalition forces must be addressed in order to ensure coalition cohesion and effectiveness in both planning and operations. This is especially true during time-critical contingency operations. For example, if SOF are operating from naval surface vessels during forced entry operations, they must be prepared to function compatibly with the host vessel in the areas of weapons, communications equipment, shipboard logistics, and NBC defense procedures. f. Planners must ensure interoperability of SOF with Host Nation (HN) forces and equipment.

Planners Host Nation Interoperability Checklist !

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!

! !

Determine communications procedures and links to give deployed SOF elements NBC situational awareness. Threat early warning. Threat description (type/level/estimated effects) and updates. Situation-specific guidance on local NBC response. Primary US and/or foreign agencies responsible for providing NBC situational awareness. Determine technical NBC detection capabilities of HN. Determine HN alarm signals and procedures. Determine HN decontamination capabilities for personnel, aircraft, and equipment. Decontamination equipment type/condition/availability. Decontamination procedures. Levels of HN training (currency and proficiency). HN plans/capability for decontaminating HN personnel. Estimated overall effectiveness of HN decontamination capability. Determine specialized decontamination equipment and/or procedures SOF elements must possess while residing on HN installations. Determine HN equipment compatibility – air and ground components. Consider the emergency recall requirements for unsupportable NBC hazard situations.

g. Regardless of the level of security involved, key planners from all disciplines (e.g., intelligence, fire support, communications, logistics, PSYOP) must be involved in all phases of SOF mission planning. Commanders should evaluate all SO operational mission criteria in considering mission advisability. h. SOF missions require clear rules of engagement (ROE) for execution, which could encompass a diverse set of tasks, for example: Securing NBC-Related Sites Checklist !

!

! !

!

Disabling or confiscating NBC weapons and materiel, including emergency operations to dispose of dangerous materiel that cannot wait for normal processing. Detaining enemy or third country nationals associated with NBC weapons or who otherwise might be considered war criminals. Countering efforts to remove NBC assets from an adversary country. Caring for displaced civilians and enemy prisoners of war in accordance with international law and interacting with nonmilitary entities, especially to provide information to international organizations and news media to counter disinformation efforts related to NBC weapons. Special considerations for American citizens, ambassadors, and precious cargo, to include medical care and IPE.

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Planning Staff NBC Considerations in Premission Activities i. Staff Responsibilities - NBC Specific • J-1 NBC Responsibilities - when faced with an enemy willing to use NBC weapons to produce mass casualties, the J-1 needs to be exploring short-notice personnel replacements for SOF personnel as well as NBC defense units. In the law enforcement arena, the J-1 should consider that current doctrine requires providing NBC protection and training for enemy prisoners of war (EPWs). • J-2 NBC Responsibilities - when faced with an enemy capable of causing mass casualties through the use of NBC weapons, the J-2’s primary concern is determining the enemy’s NBC capabilities and intent, such as weapon inventory, location, and likelihood of employment (how determined they are to use it). A J-2 works with the NBC special staff, analyzes, and interprets how weather and terrain may determine where NBC weapons could be used against friendly forces (participate in an NBC vulnerability analysis) as well as develop NBC specific priority intelligence requirements (PIRs)/intelligence requirements (IRs). Also, the J-2 ensures that the statement of intelligence interest (SII) includes NBC capabilities. In addition, the J-2 considers possible collateral damage to friendly troops and noncombatants if attacking NBC storage and delivery areas and industrial targets that house toxic chemicals. • J-3 NBC Responsibilities - the J-3 considers how to develop the NBC Defense Task Organization for components, analyzes the effects that an NBC attack will have on friendly COAs, and recommends actions in response to an NBC attack. • J-4 NBC Responsibilities - the J-4 develops policy for linking HN civil defense support as well as equipping and training identified mission-critical civilians, contractors, third country nationals, and DOD personnel. J-4 logistics planning should include component LNOs to facilitate component support. In addition, the J-4 ensures that an NBC logistic system for supplies and repairs is in place and ready to perform. The J-4 coordinates and monitors the status of equipment, expenditure of IPE and supplies, and the movement of NBC assets. The J-4 may also be required to locate and use alternate main supply routes (MSRs) due to NBC contamination and to critique plans based on NBC equipment shortages. The J-4’s engineering responsibilities include assisting in construction of decontamination sites. The J-4’s transportation responsibilities include keeping ports and airfields operational and clear of contamination. The surgeon oversees J-4 medical responsibilities. • J-5 NBC Responsibilities - the J-5 ensures that NBC considerations have been included in both operation plans (OPLANs) and concept plans (CONPLANs). The J-5 coordinates HN approval of decon sites, operations and equipment/facility support. The J-5 also must participate in recommending the JFC’s response to NBC attacks. When developing COAs, the J-5 must consider both previous NBC employment and possible future NBC employment by enemy forces. The J-5 also develops the friendly force nuclear weapon employment policy for the theater if an authorization for use is received from the NCA. • J-6 NBC Responsibilities - the J-6 focuses on the theater forces’ ability to send and receive NBC reports. This includes having a dedicated net (if deemed necessary by the JFC) for NBC reporting and ensuring that components have communications capabilities to communicate with both joint and multinational forces. • J-7 Training/Exercise/Readiness NBC Responsibilities - the J-7 has several key responsibilities. The J-7 ensures that component NBC readiness in the areas of plans, personnel, equipment, interoperability training, doctrine, and exercise is at an acceptable level. If any are not acceptable, the J-7 assists in rectifying the situation. The J-7 ensures that meaningful NBC scenarios are included in joint force and component level training and exercises. • Chemical Officer/NCO NBC Responsibilities – the chemical officer ensures NBC trained personnel are used as subject matter experts prepared to advise the commander and staff as to the effects of NBC on all aspects of a mission. A chemical officer must ensure the coordination between SOF elements, multinational forces, and HN assets for NBC equipment, information dissemination, defensive operations, and emergency response. Special plans are also included to protect nonmilitary personnel from NBC threats. • Surgeon/Medical Officer NBC Responsibilities - the surgeon ensures that medical personnel within the theater are prepared to provide medical support for NBC injuries and contaminated casualties. The surgeon is responsible for ensuring the immunization status of both the medical staff members, as well as all military personnel for which the surgeon is responsible. In addition, the surgeon coordinates the availability of Class VIII medical supplies. Medical personnel must be briefed on agent symptoms and be aware of known enemy BC agents within the theater as well as radiation exposure limits (RES – radiation exposure status). Often times, biological agent symptoms could be misdiagnosed as common cold symptoms, until it is too late. Quantities of antidotes and related treatment supplies must be on hand and resupply ordered. In addition, the surgeon/medical staff supports the theater mortuary affairs (MA) staffs.

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Chapter III • Theater Mortuary Affairs NBC Responsibilities – theater mortuary staffs ensure contaminated cadavers are properly handled and evacuated. • Civil Military Operations (CMO) Staff NBC Responsibilities – CA personnel on the CMO staffs must be prepared to negotiate for HNS particularly in the areas of loading/unloading ships and planes as well as decontamination assistance. CA personnel also deal with issues such as providing protective equipment to civilians, HNS, and multinational members. • Public Affairs NBC Responsibilities - the public affairs section prepares to issue press releases dealing with US policy regarding the use of NBC weapons as well as explaining the nature of such weapons. This can help gain support for the United States around the world. The public affairs staff should also be prepared to release articles showing how the United States prepares and trains for this type of warfare. These articles and releases are coordinated with higher headquarters prior to release to the media. This, in turn, can help deter the enemy from using such weapons against the United States. • Legal Officer NBC Responsibilities - the legal officer prepares to advise the JFC on the rules of engagement for nuclear weapons as well as RCAs IAW EO 11850. In addition, the legal officer prepares to advise on the furnishing of NBC training and equipment to civilians and the legal ramifications of attacking NBC or industrial targets. The joint force will require a clear ROE for execution of their mission, which could encompass a diverse set of tasks. For additional ROE considerations refer to page 6, paragraph h, ”Securing NBC-Related Sites Checklist.” • Chaplain NBC Responsibilities - when faced with an enemy capable of causing mass casualties using NBC weapons, the chaplain can contribute to maintaining morale. In addition, by continuing to provide religious services, even if in MOPP4, the chaplain provides an important spiritual need for the troops.

4. Mission Preparation At this stage of premission activity, SOF refines support requirements and tailors training to specific NBC mission requirements. a. Intelligence Support of SOF • Timely, detailed, tailored, and fused all-source intelligence is vital in identifying relevant targets, COA development, and mission planning and execution. The ability to interface with theater and national intelligence systems and assets is critical for SOF mission success. Additionally, SOF mission accomplishment may hinge on target or intelligence updates provided by other government agencies. A JSOTF, if formed, must also have these same interfaces. • The nature of many SOF objectives and tactics require intelligence support that is frequently more detailed than that needed in conventional operations. SOF often require intelligence to avoid enemy forces, regardless of size or composition, as opposed to information that would allow conventional forces to engage an enemy. • Intelligence support to SOF in MOOTW requires an expanded focus of the standard scope of intelligence functions. This is particularly true in FID operations where intelligence must contain aspects related to political, informational, economic, and cultural institutions and relationships, as well as enemy and friendly forces and target specific data. • SOF missions are particularly sensitive to HN and enemy collection efforts. Counterintelligence support is also considered in protecting sensitive SOF missions across the range of military operations. Commanders at all levels should be well informed of the capability and effectiveness of HN intelligence and security services to collect information on SOF units and personnel. For additional specific guidance on intelligence support refer to, Joint Pub 3-05.3, Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures, Joint Pub 3-05.5, Joint Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning Procedures, and the Joint Pub 2-0 series of publications. b. Meteorological and Oceanographic Support of SOF Meteorological and oceanographic (METOC) support services are critical to the success of SOF missions. From initial planning through execution, environmental intelligence should be included in the decision making process. Unique local conditions may expedite or negate a particular COA. A study of general climatology, hydrography, and specific weather forecasts for the operational area may provide the commander with the information necessary to choose the best windows of opportunity to

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Planning Staff NBC Considerations in Premission Activities execute, support, and sustain specific operations. Potentially, the execution decision may be based on exploiting certain adverse weather and METOC conditions to provide cover for operations while avoiding those environmental conditions that will hamper operations. However, these decisions often require finesse and judgment to ensure that, while the weapon systems are operating near their environmental limits, they do not exceed them. With the increased reliance on space capabilities, the SOF commander must also be kept informed of environmental effects on space operations. METOC support personnel can also provide information that will allow the SOF commander to plan for the possibility of the loss of one or more critical space-based systems. c. Logistic Support of SOF The commander, theater special operations command (SOC) or the commander, joint special operations task force (JSOTF) determines SOF in-theater logistic requirements for the geographic combatant commander. Logistic support for SOF units is provided through one or more of the following. • Service Support. The logistic support of SOF units is the responsibility of their parent Service except where otherwise provided for by support agreements or other directives. This responsibility exists regardless of whether the SOF unit requiring support is assigned to the Service component, the SOC, or joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC), or a JSOTF. SOF logistic support includes the sustainment and replenishment of all classes of supply, maintenance, transportation, facilities, and services. • Joint In-theater Support. The majority of SOF missions require joint logistic planning and execution. When the theater Service component cannot satisfy its Service SOF support requirements, the geographic combatant commander determines if another Service component can satisfy the requirement through common or joint servicing arrangements. Joint logistic arrangements also may be used when normal Service support cannot satisfy requirements. SOF often require nonstandard arrangements when operating in locations geographically separated from established theater Service support infrastructures. Geographic combatant commanders and theater Service component commanders, in coordination with the theater SOC, are responsible for ensuring that effective and responsive SOF support systems are developed and provided. • SO - Peculiar Support. SO-peculiar equipment, materials, supplies, and services are defined, as those items and services required for SOF mission support for which there is no broad conventional requirement. Responsibility for developing and acquiring SO-peculiar equipment and for acquiring SO-peculiar materials, supplies, and services belongs to USCINCSOC. This support will be provided to theater-deployed SOF via USSOCOM Service component logistic infrastructures and in coordination with theater Service components. For additional discussion of SOF logistic support, see Appendix N, “Component NBC Support Structure,” JP 3-05.3, Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures; and the JP 4-0 series of publications. d. Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Support of SOF • Command, control, communications, and computers (C4) support to SOF is global, secure, and jointly interoperable. It must be flexible so that it can be tailored to any mission and add value to the SOF operational capability. C4 systems support the full range of SO worldwide. Normally, command and control of SOF is through SOF channels. SOF must be able to communicate anywhere and anytime utilizing national capabilities to the maximum extent possible. The SOF operational unit must have a variety of methods for communicating, reporting, and querying available resources, regardless of geographic location. C4 systems must never compromise the SOF operational unit on the ground, in the air, or at sea. • SOF C4 support consists of multiple and varied groups of systems, procedures, personnel, and equipment that operate in diverse manners and at different echelons, from national to unit levels. C4 systems support discrete as well as collective functions. SOF missions normally are controlled at the lowest level that can accomplish the needed coordination, although political considerations may require control at higher national levels. To provide for necessary control, SOF C4 systems offer seamless connectivity from the lowest to the highest levels. • SOF C4 systems must be interoperable with each other, with conventional forces, with US national resources, and with allies and HNs. They must integrate not only with state-of-the-art systems (the NBC Warning and Reporting System), but also must be capable of integrating with less sophisticated equipment often found in less developed nations. For more detailed discussion on C4 support to SOF, see Appendix F, “NBC Warning and Reporting System (NBCWRS),” J P 3-05.3, Joint Special Operations Operational Procedure; and the JP 6-0 series of publications.

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Chapter III e. PSYOP and CA Support of SOF. The theater SOC submits requests for PSYOP and CA support to the supported combatant commander, who consolidates, validates, and submits the requests to the Joint Staff for a deployment order, or as part of an overall OPLAN. PSYOP and CA support will be provided to the theater SOC based on mission requirements, availability, and priorities established by the combatant commander or JTF commander. CA and PSYOP support provide the SOF commanders and their indigenous counterparts the ability to motivate and mobilize crucial segments of the population to enhance the probability of mission success. For more detailed discussion of PSYOP and CA support see JP 3-05.3, Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures; JP 353, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations; JP 3-57, Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs; and JP 3-57.1, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs. f. Public Affairs Support of SOF. The political sensitivity of many SO, especially in peacetime, mandates that thorough and accurate public affairs guidance be developed during the operational planning stage and approved for use in advance of most operations. Public affairs planning should accurately reflect the objective of the mission for domestic audiences and be consistent with both the overall PSYOP effort and operations security (OPSEC) requirements. The commander having operational authority develops proposed public affairs guidance that is coordinated with supporting commands and government agencies, as appropriate, prior to forwarding that guidance to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) for approval. For further information see JP 3-61, Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations. g. Legal Support of SOF. SOF missions frequently involve a unique set of complex issues. There are federal laws and executive orders, federal agency publications and directives, and theater ROE that affect SOF activities. These guidelines become especially important during sensitive peacetime operations when international and domestic laws, treaty provisions, and political agreements affect mission planning and execution. Commanders must seek legal review during all levels of planning and execution of SO missions, to include planning of the theater ROE. h. Space Support of SOF. As space-based support to military operations continues to improve, SOF commanders and planners should be aware of potential space support operations and its integration with SO. i. Combat Camera Support of SOF. Combat camera provides still and video documentary products that support PSYOP and other special operations missions. Many teams supporting SOF are specially equipped with night vision and digital image transmission capabilities. Combat camera also provides gun camera image processing for theater and national use. Combat camera imagery is used to show allies, adversaries, and civilian populaces the effects of US operations and to counter enemy disinformation with on-screen or gun camera evidence. j. Medical Support of SOF. SOF medical support is characterized by an austere structure and limited number of medical personnel with enhanced medical skills. SOF medical personnel provide emergency treatment and a basic level of medical care at the team level. Medical support provided to SOF units in the area of operations is planned and conducted by SOF surgeons and medical personnel. Provision of medical support beyond this capability depends on the thoroughness of advanced planning so that the conventional medical support structure umbrella is extended to cover the lack of internal capability or to meet requirements for additional medical assets (i.e., antidotes (nonorganic), advanced trauma life support, surgical intervention, evacuation, and medical logistics). Certain operations also may require security requirements be in place to preclude compromising the names of SOF personnel upon entry into the conventional medical system. Preparation includes prophylaxis and the practice of certain NBC procedures to achieve a level of proficiency that allows safe mission accomplishment. Medical personnel must be briefed on agent symptoms and known enemy chemical and biological agents within the theater. Often times, the early stages of biological agent symptoms can be misdiagnosed as common cold symptoms. For additional discussion of SOF medical support see Chapter II, “SOF Operations and Environment Considerations;” Appendix E, “NBC Risk Assessments/Vulnerability Analysis Tools;” Appendix G, “NBC Hazard Prediction;” and JP 4-02, Doctrine for Health Services Support in Joint Operations.

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CHAPTER IV NBC CONSIDERATIONS IN PREMISSION ACTIVITIES “The keystone of SOF mission planning is that the operational element executing the mission MUST plan the mission.‘ JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations

1. Purpose This chapter provides planning considerations to supplement those already in place when conducting deliberate or timesensitive planning for operations in an NBC environment. These considerations are primarily designed to assist SOF elements in receiving the most complete information and resources available to ensure mission success and individual survival.

Routine detailed planning becomes more complicated when an NBC environment must be considered.

2. General The keystone of SOF mission planning is the operational element that will plan and execute the mission. The inherent qualities of SO involve detailed planning and foresight. Intelligence preparation of the joint special operations area is critical to all planning and foresight when an operational area contains an NBC threat. The operational commander uses this intelligence information to adhere to the principles of NBC defense (see Figure IV-1) while formulating a risk assessment (see Appendix E, NBC Risk Assessment/Vulnerability Analysis Tool). Based upon this assessment, decisions will be made that involve tradeoffs between the amounts of protective equipment, rations, ammunition, and supplies, etc. that can be carried and still complete the mission.

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Chapter IV SECTION A. PRINCIPLES OF NBC DEFENSE Consistent with JP 3-11, Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments, the principles of NBC defense are applied at every level of planning.

PRINCIPLES FOR NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL DEFENSE

Contamination: Avoidance Protection Decontamination Figure IV-1. Principles of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense

3. Avoidance Contamination avoidance is the best defense against enemy use of NBC weapons. Avoidance reduces the risks of being exposed to NBC agents and minimizes the effects of NBC hazards. Operating in a contaminated environment makes everything more difficult and time consuming. a. The principle of avoidance includes the following elements: • Detection - learning of the presence of NBC threats through intelligence, live agent, or mechanical identification methods. • Identification - provides multiple levels required for protection, treatment, verification, or confirmation. • Prediction - timely and accurate warning allows SOF to make accurate predictions regarding contamination locations and their actions. Predictions range from manual to sophisticated computer models. • Warning and Reporting - joint doctrine requires two specific NBC responsibilities, the first is to verify first use of NBC weapons for the NCA. The second is to inform US forces, allies, and friendly forces of impending or actual use of NBC weapons by the enemy. • Marking - marking contamination is a possibility for SOF but is mission dependent and must have reuse or critical resources mission application as a rationale. • Relocate or Reroute - relocating or rerouting is a viable option for SOF who are mobile; however, this option is less likely for aerospace support operations. Preplanning, support, and mission dictate the viability of this principle in SO. b. The four steps in contamination avoidance are: • Passive defense measures are those measures taken to reduce the probability of being hit by NBC weapons or to reduce the effects of NBC hazards. Operational security measures such as good communications, light discipline, and good camouflage reduce the chances of a SOF element being targeted. Dispersion, covering and protecting equipment, and using overhead cover reduces the effectiveness of an attack.

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NBC Considerations in Premission Activities • Once an NBC attack has occurred, everyone who might be affected by the hazard is warned. This gives SOF elements time to protect themselves against a possible hazard. The NBC warning and reporting system (NBCWRS) is used for warning and reporting NBC hazards. • By locating, identifying, tracking, and predicting NBC hazards, commanders can make informed decisions for operating in and around these hazards. Locating, identifying, and tracking NBC hazards is accomplished through NBC reconnaissance. NBC reconnaissance may be conducted by specialized SOF NBC detachments, but it can be equally performed by any SOF detachment or designated team from a SOF support unit. Predicting NBC hazards is best accomplished during detailed intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB). • When operations in a contaminated environment become necessary, take measures to limit the amount of individual exposure. Maximize the use of collective protective shelters, conduct operational decontamination to limit the spread of contamination, and enforce good MOPP discipline. For additional exposure guidance see Appendix G, “NBC Hazard Prediction.”

4. Protection a. Force protection involves actions taken by a commander to reduce the vulnerability of his personnel to an NBC attack. A vulnerability assessment (see Appendix E, NBC Risk Assessment/Vulnerability Analysis Tool) to determine the probable impact of an NBC attack on SOF elements is conducted both prior to and after initiation of NBC warfare. This assessment is used in conjunction with METT-TC information to reduce force vulnerability. b. The protection principle includes typical NBC defense measures involving use of individual protective equipment (IPE) to be worn or carried, automatic masking criteria, and shelters (both simple and complex depending upon mission, (e.g. overhead protection poncho to collective protection systems). Medical countermeasures are also included in this principle. • Individual Protective Equipment - IPE is provided for SOF ground personnel, aircrews, groundcrews, and naval forces as specified by the geographic combatant commander. The levels of protection are determined by conducting MOPP analysis. Leaders, generally at shipboard, installation, or battalion level, conduct a MOPP analysis based on the unit’s particular situation. The analysis finds the balance between reducing the risk of casualties and accomplishing the mission. Commanders must recognize the significant increase in time required for mission execution in MOPP 3 or MOPP 4 and anticipate the effects of that degradation on subsequent missions. Leaders must also understand the increased water consumption requirements. The use of MOPP involves risk. Commanders must analyze their units’ needs for protection to lower their units’ risk. FM 3-4, NBC Protection, contains a detailed discussion on MOPP analysis and leaders should carefully analyze their operational situation to determine what level should be used. MOPP analysis enables leaders to select the appropriate MOPP level. During MOPP analysis the commander considers: mission, work rate and its duration, probable warning time, terrain, weather, time of day, unit training, additional protection available, and alarm placement. • Shelters - shelters range from overhead protection of simple devices such as plastic, and ponchos to sophisticated collective protection systems. Additionally, procedures for sealing and closing doors/windows; shutting down heating/cooling and ventilation of vehicles, aircraft, bunkers, and buildings should be considered. These shelters may be provided to staffs during mission planning, SOF detachments in isolation, or as rest areas to allow personnel to rotate through, giving them a break from MOPP 4 for a period of time. • Medicine - vaccination, immunization, and use of auto injectors are included in this principle.

5. Decontamination a. Decontamination consists of the removal, destruction, or neutralization of contamination. The principles of decon are: • Decontaminate as soon as possible - the most important principle that is considered before any other is to decontaminate as soon as possible. Contamination hazards can force SOF elements into higher levels of MOPP and immediately begin to degrade operational ability. The sooner contamination is removed, the sooner an element can reduce MOPP levels and begin restoring effectiveness.

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Chapter IV • Decontaminate only what is necessary to continue the mission. • Decontaminate as far forward as possible to avoid spreading contamination to other areas of the operational area. Safety and security are important considerations for contaminated SOF elements. SOF elements plan to establish a permissive environment to begin decontamination. Within that permissive environment decon assets should establish decon sites as far forward as possible. • Decontaminate by priority - clean important items of equipment first and less important items of equipment last. This maximizes the benefit of decon assets and quickly restores operational use. b. Considerations for when to conduct decontamination: • Consider the lethality of agents when planning decon - some highly toxic agents can kill or incapacitate if they contact exposed skin for only a few minutes. (During decon should accidental skin contamination occur the individual must stop breathing, mask (if removed), give the alarm, and decontaminate the contaminated skin immediately.) • Consider how IPE degrades operational ability through increased levels of MOPP. Use of tools and weapons become awkward. The protective mask reduces fields of view and increases the difficulty associated with using optical sights and night vision devices. Extended operations can physically tire and mentally discourage personnel. Personnel cannot eat while wearing a protective mask. Urinating and defecating are potentially hazardous tasks. Resting and sleeping are also difficult. • Consider equipment limitations. Agents can gradually penetrate the mask, hood, and protective clothing. Once contaminated, protective clothing is only effective for a limited time. Some specialized mission equipment cannot be used in IPE. Note: IPE is not effective against most toxic industrial chemicals (TICs). c. The four types of decontamination are immediate, operational, thorough, and reconstitution. • Immediate - minimizes casualties, saves lives, and limits the spread of contamination. Immediate decon is applied individually to skin, personal clothing and equipment. • Operational - minimizes contact or transfer hazards and sustains operations. This is performed by individuals, crews, teams, or units on specific parts of essential equipment, material, or work areas, and only when operations require such action. • Thorough - reduces contamination to the lowest possible level. This is accomplished by units or wings, with or without external support on personnel, equipment, material or work areas when operations, manning, and resources permit. • Reconstitution - eliminates contamination to restore mission critical resources therefore permitting unrestricted use. This is accomplished by units or wings with external support on mission critical aircraft, equipment, material, work areas, and terrain after hostile actions have terminated or as directed by higher authority.

SECTION B. NBC PREMISSION ACTIVITIES 6. Mission Analysis Considerations The hazards of operating in an NBC environment require a higher degree of mission analysis, planning, and mission specific training than that normally associated with established primary missions and collateral activities. Mission analysis conducted by a higher headquarters provides operational element commanders with sufficient information to begin mission planning. Commander’s intent must be clearly understood.

7. Mission Planning Considerations a. Mission Receipt. The operational element receives higher headquarters’ planning guidance. The commander reviews the guidance and activates an operational element for planning.

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NBC Considerations in Premission Activities NBC Environment Specific Considerations !

! !

! ! !

Communications requirements (particularly in terms of timeliness, NBC warning formats, and interface with nonspecial operations systems). Political and legal (including ROE) constraints to consider in planning. Availability of NBC ready infiltration and exfiltration means. See Chapter 5, NBC Considerations During Infiltration, Execution, and Exfiltration. Clarification of the specific intelligence requirements that include NBC threat indicators. Availability of specialized equipment. Success criteria.

b. Information Exchange. The operational element reviews all available information to ensure that all members understand current information and how operating in an NBC environment must be planned completely. Element members with specialized NBC skills provide their perspective and guidance. c. Restating the Mission and Producing Planning Guidance. Based on a review of higher headquarters’ mission statement and commander’s intent, mission tasks, information received to date, and infiltration/exfiltration feasibility, the operational element leadership develops a comprehensive list of specified/implied tasks and a restated mission. Based on the operational element’s knowledge of the skills, capabilities, current and achievable standards of NBC training and resources, courses of action are developed. NBC Environment Course of Action Considerations ! ! ! !

Tactics in an NBC environment. NBC prepared infiltration/exfiltration means. Required task organization (LB Teams, subject matter expert (SME) attachments). Guidance on specific techniques to be employed such as decontamination procedures.

d. Staff Estimates Preparation. For operations in an NBC environment, specific skills and mission requirements may create the need for a “special staff” type estimate. e. Commander’s Estimate and Decision Preparation. The operational element commander after conducting an internal COA selection briefing and “murder board” prepares a mission concept (MICON) briefing for the higher commander. f. Mission Concept Briefing. This is an informal briefing presented to the operational elements next higher commander to receive approval of the operational element’s concept of operation prior to expending time in detailed planning. Key staff members, including SMEs for NBC operations, should accompany the commander. For operations in an NBC environment, the mission concept briefing normally includes:

Mission Concept Briefing Considerations ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !

Courses of action (COA) considered. Factors used to evaluate the COAs. Commander’s decision. Specific NBC tasks derived. NBC tactics selected. Task organization (to include requests for required attachments). NBC defense capable infiltration and exfiltration means. Identification of external support required (such as specialized equipment and personnel). General statement of the commander’s concept of operations. Mission essential personnel and equipment. Approval is obtained or further planning guidance is obtained.

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Chapter IV g. Operation Plan. The written OPLAN specifies NBC taskings to subordinate elements and individual members. h. Detailed Planning. There is no established way to conduct missions when the threat of operating in an NBC environment exists. However, there are precautions, techniques, and procedures that can be applied as the situation warrants. Many aspects of operating in an NBC environment are beyond the experience of most personnel. Therefore, to validate operational tactics, techniques, and procedures the use of rehearsals is required. i. Briefback. During the briefback, if the operational element cannot justify any action, that action is reconsidered. Operating in an NBC environment could fail due to a minor oversight. j. Mission Planning Approval. Execute the mission or continue training.

8. Mission Preparation Considerations Mission preparation and associated training provide a base level of skills that can be modified to overcome the obstacles of working in an NBC environment. a. Training • When time and situation do not permit actual training in the operational area, request that the conditions of the operational area be replicated. • Conduct tactics and techniques training in a replicated NBC environment to allow element members to adjust to the difficulty of operating in IPE. • Cross train and specialty train for NBC required skills. b. Intelligence • Target intelligence packages (TIPs), intelligence summaries (INTSUMs), and situation assessments must be continually updated. • Area studies also require continuous updating. c. Personnel. Personnel turbulence necessitates careful monitoring of replacement NBC skill proficiency when assigning personnel to units in mission preparation. d. Logistics. All levels of command review NBC-specific requirements and availability as related to mission accomplishment. Operational units must provide the numbers and sizes of protective equipment to the next higher logistics unit so that the equipment can be made ready for transport to a decon site for reconstitution. e. Communications. All levels of command review NBC-specific requirements and availability as related to mission accomplishments. Command, control, communications and computers (C4) systems should be sealed in plastic or some other barrier to avoid contamination. Most C4 systems can be operated normally while sealed in plastic.

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CHAPTER V NBC CONSIDERATIONS DURING INFILTRATION, EXECUTION, AND EXFILTRATION “SOF mission planning must be planned completely—insertion, resupply, fire and maneuver support, extraction—prior to committing the force.” JP 3-05 Doctrine for Joint Special Operations

1. Purpose Infiltration, execution, and exfiltration are conducted by air, land, sea, or a combination thereof. These movements are usually joint activities in support of SO components executing a mission. This chapter provides NBC planning considerations to supplement sophisticated techniques, equipment, and standard operating procedures used by SOF elements conducting infiltration, execution, and exfiltration. Sharing component planning considerations facilitates and enhances joint operations in an NBC environment.

2. General The survivability of SOF assets in an NBC environment depends heavily on the quality of NBC training, use of effective checklists and procedures, and vigorous mission execution. When possible, SOF infiltration/execution/exfiltration adheres to the three basic principles of NBC defense: avoidance, protection, and decontamination. Regardless of component, or size of an operating element, the basic principles apply.

SECTION A. AIR PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 3. Infiltration, Execution, and Exfiltration Requires Detailed Planning Considerations When Operating in an NBC Environment

Different aircraft have different characteristics that must be considered.

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Chapter V Figure V-1 highlights air infiltration/exfiltration advantages and disadvantages that are considered during the decision-making process.

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF AIR INFILTRATION/EXFILTRATION

Advantages Flexibility Speed and Accuracy of Delivery Short Exposure to Hostile Countermeasures Precise Navigation Capability of Delivering Supplies in Excess of Individual Loads

Disadvantages Vulnerability to Hostile Air Detection and Defense Systems Limited in Adverse Weather Conditions Damage or Loss of Equipment Need for Specialty Trained Aircrews Need for Sterilization of Infiltration Site

Figure V-1. Advantages and Disadvantages of Air Infiltration/Exfiltration

a. Prelaunch Considerations: The following checklist may assist air planners during mission preparation.

Checklist for Prelaunch Considerations ! ! ! !

! !

! !

! ! ! ! ! ! !

Prehydrate during planning phase (it is difficult to stay hydrated during operations). Bring additional food and water for en route and return trips and possible en route delays. Bring additional IPE. If a pick up is anticipated: ! Try to isolate a portion of the aircraft for the contaminated personnel and equipment. ! Limit personnel access to the rest of the aircraft. ! Develop a well thought out exit and entrance plan for all contaminated individuals and equipment to limit additional contamination. ! When possible, seal off the exposed area (e.g., lining the aircraft walls and floor with non-absorbent material). Develop emergency-landing procedures for precautionary measures after contamination. Consider bringing clear (allows observation of aircraft components) heavy-duty plastic to line inside of cabin. Plastic should be placed over Kevlar blankets. Preflight aircrew chemical ensembles as well as power connections in the aircraft. Know weather conditions at site and en route effecting NBC use – humidity (for persistent agents), wind direction, temperature, and time of day. Be prepared to wear some sort of undergarment to allow for bodily functions. Know condition and location of possible divert fields for decontamination. Place detection devices on aircrew and aircraft (viewable to aircrew). Make sure atropine, decon kits, and professional gear are accessible after donning IPE. Determine disposition of aircraft after mission. Decon line refresher procedures for crews. Bring decon equipment for crew and the team you may be picking up.

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NBC Considerations During Infiltration, Execution, and Exfiltration b. En route Considerations: The following checklist may assist air planners during route planning.

Checklist for En route Considerations ! ! ! ! ! !

!

Avoid known areas of NBC use, if possible. If threat allows, consider flying at higher altitude. C-130 specific: bleed air valve settings, inflow/outflow valve settings, air conditioner settings, and use 100% oxygen. Set up plastic/containment materials (floor, walls, and isolate flight deck...). If flying through NBC environment consider closing up windows/ramp and hatches. Consider when aircrew needs to don aircrew chemical ensemble/ground ensemble; prior to boarding aircraft or at some later time during a mission. Consider flying through available weather condition that might help decon a dirty aircraft.

c. Infiltration/Exfiltration Zone Considerations: The following checklist may assist air planners during infiltration/exfiltration planning.

Checklist for Infiltration/Exfiltration Considerations ! !

! ! ! ! ! !

Is the location contaminated? Is the team/equipment being loaded contaminated? Coordinate on-loading procedures to avoid unnecessary spread of contamination. C-130 specific: flap settings, air conditioner use, and bleed air valves, ramp and door use, onloading passenger location. Will the threat allow an engine/rotor/prop shutdown load/transload to prevent spreading of contamination? Will crew need to be in aircrew chemical ensemble or similar system prior to landing? When possible, consider approaching LZ/HLZ upwind. Keep all hatches/windows/doors/ramp not required for infil/exfil closed. When possible, decontaminate personnel and equipment prior to allowing them to board (threat may dictate otherwise).

d. Mission Recovery Considerations: The following checklist may assist air planners during recovery planning.

Checklist for Recovery Considerations !

! ! ! ! ! ! !

Is the aircraft returning with a known contaminant (assume aircraft is dirty inside and out)? Notify arrival base of contamination. Check detectors. If threat allows, fly high, pressurized/unpressurized, to decontaminate aircraft. If possible, fly through rainstorms to clean outside of aircraft. C-130 specific: flying at en route airspeeds and altitudes will help decon exterior of aircraft. Helicopter specific: fly "Low-N-Slow" profile over water (saltwater optimum), if available, for aircraft decon. Coordinate recovery activities with all units arriving at same location. Coordinate decon lines – standard life support procedures with all units at same arrival location.

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Chapter V SECTION B. MARITIME PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 4. Infiltration, Execution, and Exfiltration Planning Requires Detailed Considerations When Operating in an NBC Environment

In an NBC environment, the sea, being a natural decontaminant, is an advantage that can also be a disadvantage when you must take into account the degradation of IPE by saltwater.

Figure V-2 highlights water infiltration/exfiltration advantages and disadvantages that are considered during the decisionmaking process.

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF WATER INFILTRATION/EXFILTRATION

Advantages Long-Range Delivery Capability Relative Freedom from Weather Considerations Up to the Point of Debarkation En Route Operational Briefings, Rehearsals, and Intelligence Updates - Platform Dependant Surface Craft Transport of Large Quantities of Accompanying Supplies and Equipment

Disadvantages Time Required for Uploading and Transshipment From Offshore Drop-Off Points Vulnerability of Landing Operations to Hostile Shore Defenses Loss of Personnel and Supplies During Ship-to-Shore Movement Limited Cargo Capacity of Submarines, Assault Craft, and Seal Delivery Vehicles Need for Special Training Need for Additional Packaging to Waterproof Equipment Effects of Wind, Sea and Surf. (Degradation of IPE From Water)

Figure V-2. Advantages and Disadvantages of Water Infiltration/Exfiltration

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NBC Considerations During Infiltration, Execution, and Exfiltration a. Prelaunch Considerations: The following checklist may assist maritime planners during mission preparation. Checklist for Prelaunch Considerations ! ! ! !

!

! !

!

! ! ! ! ! !

Prehydrate during planning phase (it is difficult to stay hydrated during operations). Bring additional food and water for en route and return trips and possible en route delays. Bring additional IPE. If a pick up is anticipated: ! Try to isolate a portion of the watercraft for the contaminated personnel and equipment. ! Limit personnel access to the rest of the watercraft. ! Develop a well thought out exit and entrance plan for all contaminated individuals and equipment to limit additional contamination. ! When possible, seal off the exposed area (e.g. lining the watercraft walls and floor with non-absorbent material). Consider bringing clear (which will allow you to see through to watercraft working parts) heavy-duty plastic to line inside of cabin. Inspect chemical protective suits and equipment (shelf life). If on loading equipment at an infiltration/exfiltration point know the size of object and gear needed for loading and transloading. Note hatch sizes especially on submarines. Know weather conditions at site and en route effecting NBC use – humidity (for persistent agents), wind direction, sea state, temperature. Be prepared to wear some sort of undergarment to allow for bodily functions. Know condition and location of alternate decon locations. Place detection devices on watercraft (viewable to crew). Make sure atropine, decon kits, and professional gear are accessible after donning IPE. Determine disposition of watercraft after mission. If possible, bring decon equipment, both for crew and the element being infil/exfil.

b. En route Considerations: The following checklist may assist maritime planners during route planning. Checklist for En route Considerations ! ! ! !

! !

Avoid known areas of NBC use (upwind if possible). Consider the use of oxygen. Set up plastic/containment materials (floor, walls, bulkheads, and isolate deck...). When transiting through NBC environment consider closing up portholes/ramp and hatches. Secure ventilation – “Circle William.” Consider when crew needs to don IPE prior to loading watercraft or at some later time during a mission. Consider driving through available weather conditions that might help decon a dirty watercraft.

c. Infiltration/Exfiltration Point Considerations: The following checklist may assist maritime planners during infiltration/ exfiltration planning. Checklist for Infiltration/Exfiltration Considerations ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !

Is the location contaminated? Is the element/equipment being loaded contaminated? Confirm on-loading procedures to avoid unnecessary contamination. Will the threat allow an engine shutdown during load/transload to prevent spreading of contamination? Will crew need to be in IPE prior to landing? Take precautions to protect IPE. When possible, approach infil/exfil point upwind. Keep all hatches/portholes/doors/ramp not required for infil/exfil closed. When possible, decontaminate personnel and equipment prior to allowing them to board; however, threat may dictate otherwise.

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Chapter V d. Mission Recovery Considerations: The following checklist may assist maritime planners during recovery planning.

Checklist for Recovery Considerations ! ! ! ! !

Is the watercraft returning with a known contaminant (assume watercraft is dirty inside and out)? Check detectors. If possible, navigate through rainstorms to clean outside of watercraft. Coordinate recovery location with all units arriving at same location. Coordinate decon lines – standard life support procedures with all units at same arrival location.

SECTION C. LAND PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 5. Infiltration, Execution, and Exfiltration Planning Requires Detailed Considerations When Operating in an NBC Environment

Applying Rogers Rangers Standing Order #3 in an NBC environment is more difficult than usual. “When you’re on the march act the way you would if you was sneaking up on a deer: see the enemy first.”

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NBC Considerations During Infiltration, Execution, and Exfiltration Figure V-3 highlights land infiltration/exfiltration advantages and disadvantages that are considered during the decision-making process.

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF LAND INFILTRATION/EXFILTRATION

Advantages

Disadvantages

Minimum Logistics Support

Time Required

Concurrent Area Familiarization and Intelligence

Increased Vulnerability to Enemy Detection and Interdiction

Minimum Interservice Coordination

Limited Capability for Carrying Supplies and Equipment

Figure V-3. Advantages and Disadvantages of Land Infiltration/Exfiltration

a. Prelaunch Considerations: The following checklist may assist ground planners during mission preparation.

Checklist for Prelaunch Considerations ! ! ! !

! ! ! !

Prehydrate during planning phase (most likely you will not be able to stay hydrated during operations). Bring additional food and water for en route and return trips and possible en route delays. Bring additional IPE = ground ensemble(s) and mask(s). Consider weather conditions en route and at site that may effect NBC use – humidity (for persistent agents), wind direction, temperature, and time of day. Be prepared to wear some sort of undergarment to allow for bodily functions. Make sure atropine, decon kits, and professional gear are accessible after donning IPE. Coordinate disposition of contaminated equipment after mission. Coordinate decon line procedures for all involved.

b. En route Considerations: Avoid known areas of NBC use (upwind if possible). c. Infiltration/Exfiltration Zone Considerations: The following checklist may assist ground planners during infiltration/ exfiltration planning.

Checklist for Infiltration/Exfiltration Considerations ! !

Is the location contaminated? When possible, decontaminate personnel and equipment as soon as possible although threat may dictate otherwise.

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Chapter V d. Mission Recovery Considerations: The following checklist may assist ground planners during recovery planning. Checklist for Recovery Considerations ! ! ! !

Is the element returning with a known contaminant? Check detectors. Coordinate recovery location with all units arriving at same location. Coordinate decon lines – standard life support procedures with all units at same arrival location.

SECTION D. STAY BEHIND OPERATIONS CONSIDERATIONS 6. Stay Behind Operations are an Alternative to Infiltration. Prepositioning caches before a hostile force overruns or occupies a joint special operations area allows SOF elements to train and organize in their operational area and requires less external logistics support. Considerations for Stay Behind Operations ! !

Plan/coordinate for resupply – cache, air resupply …RECONSTITUTE. Decon as soon as possible using immediate, and when feasible, thorough decon procedures.

See TC 31-29, Special Forces Operational Techniques, for detailed information on stay behind operations.

SECTION E. SOF PLATFORM NBC DEFENSE CONSIDERATIONS Each SOF delivery means has its own set of characteristics that personnel must be familiar with to operate safely in an NBC environment.

7. Air

Aircraft decontamination operations have been and will be manpower and material intensive.

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NBC Considerations During Infiltration, Execution, and Exfiltration Contamination in the battlespace causes unique problems for aviation. Since an aircraft uses its high mobility to maneuver across the entire battlespace, avoiding contamination is very difficult. Once an aircraft is contaminated, it is very difficult to decon. Therefore, aviation units need to prepare effective standing operating procedures (SOPs) emphasizing contamination avoidance, protection, and methods to decon each type of aircraft using either immediate, operational, or thorough decon procedures. a. Contamination avoidance is critical due to the difficulty in decontamination. Aircrews must be aware of NBC hazards. For instance, an aircraft that hovers or lands in a contaminated area could splash contamination onto itself. Likewise, contaminated passengers or ground crews pose a danger of transferring contaminants into the aircraft where they are difficult to remove. Aircraft can become contaminated by flying through a vapor cloud. Hazards that incapacitate personnel for a short time on the ground can be fatal at higher altitudes. Proper implementation of contamination avoidance and contamination control measures will directly influence the amount and extent of decontamination operations required in a post-attack environment.

Pre – Attack Techniques to Limit Contamination ! !

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Hangar aircraft if facilities exist. Create shuffle boxes and hand decontamination troughs for entrance into aircraft doors, hatches, and loading ramps. Cover shuffle boxes to prevent exposure to elements and hazards and change in accordance with unit SOPs. Use engine running on/offload (ERO) procedures to the maximum extent possible if under the threat of an attack. Know what areas are contaminated and avoid these, if possible. Pick landing zones that will have a reduced splash effect if an aircraft must land in a contaminated area. To minimize the effect of an attack while on the ground, park close to and downwind of trees and buildings. Limit the spread of contamination into the aircraft from the outside. For example, ground crews at a forward arming and refueling point (FARP) could conduct arming and refueling without requiring the aircrew to exit the aircraft. Aircraft doors and windows remain shut. If doors and windows have been removed then alternative chemical resistant material should be considered. If closure is not possible, some form of external over-taping may be appropriate. Increase the use of chemically resistant covers when not flying. Use engine covers, tire covers, flyaway gear, floors and hatches. If possible, provide overhead cover for parked aircraft. For rotary wing aircraft consider installing doors on those normally configured without. Limit the number of aircraft that must operate in a contaminated area or use aircraft already contaminated. If required to fly “dirty” recognize the debilitating nature of operating in aircrew NBC ensembles. Line the troop compartment with plastic (a field expedient way to limit the spread of contamination) when carrying contaminated personnel or casualties. A plastic curtain can be fastened between the troop compartment and the flight compartment with tape or Velcro to limit contamination transfer. The aircraft’s heater can be used with the curtain to create an overpressure in the pilot’s compartment when the outside air is not contaminated. This will limit vapors from entering the compartment. Apply M9 and M8 detector paper to the landing gear of the aircraft. FARP personnel should always check the M9 and M8 detector paper before servicing the aircraft. M8 detector paper can be affixed by taping it along the edges with M9 paper. Pieces of M9 and M8 detector paper can be placed on the windscreen where the aircrew can see them. Note: M9 paper can show a false positive indication when exposed to petroleum base products typically found in wheel wells and other parts of an aircraft.

During – Attack Techniques to Limit Contamination ! ! !

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Don mask and gloves. Close all aircraft doors, hatches, ports, and ramps. Depart airfield if time and aircraft readiness status permits. Avoid running environmental control systems (ECS)/aircraft air conditioning systems if contamination is suspected or known to be present. Use a collective filter system on aircraft (if one exists) if contamination is suspected or known. Maintain positive pressure to aid in venting vapors if contamination is suspected or known. When airborne know what areas are contaminated and avoid these areas, if possible.

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Chapter V Post – Attack Techniques to Limit Contamination !

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Conduct inspections without touching or shaking items. Contaminated crews should perform this task. Many inspection points can be inspected visually. Accomplish self and buddy checks for IPE contamination. Utilize shuffle pits and troughs. If the asset was protected by a single sheet of plastic, tarp, etc., remove and replace within one hour, if possible (single covering 2-3 hours of protection). Plastic offers better protection against penetration than canvas, as chemical agents will remain on the surface longer, and possibly “roll” to a degree. Decon personnel must be in full IPE. If a double sheet of plastic or canvas protected the asset, remove the outer layer within one hour and replace. On departure know what areas are contaminated and avoid these, if possible.

b. Decontaminants • Only approved cleaning compounds are used to decon aircraft. Caustic decontaminants such as DS2, STB, bleaches, and sodium hypochlorite are not considered safe. STB corrodes metal components and the aircraft’s skin and DS2 corrodes rubber, plastic, and acrylic-plastic windows. • Soap and water, kerosene, JP8, and diesel fuels are approved as decontaminants on selected parts of the aircraft. JP8 is effective in removing some agents from the aircraft’s skin and components; however, it does not neutralize the agents. Personnel must use care when handling JP8. When using a cloth soaked in JP8, personnel must avoid wiping internal components near the exhaust. If water is available, use it to rinse off the JP8. Many portions of the aircraft are delicate and cannot stand high-pressure water or extreme hot air. • Sodium carbonate is a fair decontaminant against G nerve agents, but it is not effective against V nerve and blister agents. The chemical reaction of the V nerve agent and sodium carbonate is extremely slow and produces a product that is very toxic. Most of the field-expedient decontaminants are corrosive and could cause damage to the aircraft’s skin or acrylicplastic windows. c. Aircraft Decontamination • When an aircraft becomes contaminated, the aircrew must fly in individual protection equipment (IPE) gear. However, wearing IPE gear degrades the aircrew’s ability to perform its job over time. • If air and ground crews are careful when operating in a contaminated environment, cross-contamination from the exterior to the interior can be minimized. The increased airflow over the aircraft’s smooth skin increases the rate of evaporation. However, some agents will migrate to crevices, rivet heads, and joints, and continue to be a hazard. Thickened agents evaporate slowly and may remain a hazard even after prolonged flights. If the interior is contaminated, flying the aircraft with the doors open can help reduce the hazard. The heat from the running engine decontaminates the interior of the engine compartment. However, more active methods of decon may be needed. Use the immediate, operational, or thorough decon methods, with modifications, to perform an aircrew spot decon, aircraft wash down, or detailed aircraft decon (DAD). • The least expensive and safest means of decontamination is weathering. Weathering will remove many chemical agents (HD, THD, GB, GD, and TGD) in a relatively short time. Normally vapor hazards dissipate to an acceptable risk level in less than three hours. In desert conditions, most agents are removed by natural means within two hours. • Forced hot air from AM 32A-60A Start Cart can be used to aid in decontamination; however, follow up decontamination may be required for thorough decon levels (not effective against VX).

CAUTION: M9 detector paper will show false positives if exposed to petroleum products.

• Unit personnel conduct the aircrew spot decon and aircraft wash down, but a chemical decon unit usually conducts the DAD.

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NBC Considerations During Infiltration, Execution, and Exfiltration • Figure V-4 shows the three types of aircraft decon.

Decon Types

When, Why, Who Performs Decon

Areas to Decon

Types of Decon Agents

Aircrew spot decon

The crew: decontaminates immediately after contamination to allow continued operations

Essential operating surfaces on the aircraft

IEDK (individual equipment decon kit), JP8 1

Aircraft washdown

The unit decon crew or decon unit performs decon within 6-24 hours to reduce contact hazards 2

The entire exterior surface of the aircraft 3

Hot, soapy water, surfactant

Detailed Aircraft Decon

The decon units decon when the mission allows to reduce the hazard to negligible risk levels

The entire exterior surface and selected interior surfaces of the aircraft

10 percent sodiumcarbonate solution (10 pounds of sodium carbonate to 12 gallons of water)

1

JP8 should not be used inside the aircraft. An aircraft washdown is most effective if conducted within 1 hour of contamination. 3 An aircrew post decon is performed to reduce contact hazards inside the aircraft. Do not spray water inside the aircraft. 2

Figure V-4. Aircraft Decon Types

d. In-Flight Aircraft Decon

Flight Considerations ! ! ! !

En route flying will help speed the cleaning process. Flights of at least four hours are recommended. Flights at lower altitudes are more effective. Fly with aircraft configured with gear, flaps, slats down/extended to help clean wheel wells, flap wells, rivet and screw heads, cracks or crevices where contaminant may migrate.

For detailed information on aircraft decon refer to FM 3-5, NBC Decontamination, and AF TO 11C15-1-3,dated 10 June 97. e. Individual Aircraft NBC Decontamination Techniques. Aircraft have some advantages over other vehicles for decontamination. If air and ground crew are careful when operating in a contaminated environment, contamination can be contained on the exterior of the aircraft. This is not always true for SOF peculiar aircraft (MH-6 assault helicopter, AH-6 attack helicopter, MH-60 Blackhawk helicopter, MH-47 Chinook helicopter, MH-53J Pave Low III helicopter, and MC, EC, AC –130 aircraft). SOF aircraft utilize standard decontamination techniques with modified procedures to facilitate decontamination of unique equipment.

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Chapter V 8. Maritime

The largest SOF maritime asset, the coastal patrol craft, must have validated detailed SOPs for operations in an NBC environment.

Contamination in the battlespace can cause problems for maritime operations. As a maritime vessel maneuvers across areas of the battlespace, avoiding contamination can be very difficult. Once maritime vessels are contaminated, they are difficult to decon. Therefore, maritime SOF units need to prepare effective SOPs that emphasize contamination avoidance, protection, and methods to decon each maritime vessel using immediate or operational decon where possible. a. Contamination avoidance is critical due to the difficulty of conducting decontamination operations at sea. Maritime SOF units must be aware of NBC hazards. For example, maritime vessels transiting or beaching in a contaminated area will splash contamination onto themselves. Furthermore, contaminated passengers or crewmembers can transfer contaminants onto the vessel where it is more difficult to remove. Maritime vessels can also pick up contamination while transiting through invisible vapor clouds. Techniques to Limit Contamination ! ! ! !

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Through threat assessment of AOR, contaminated areas will be known and can possibly be avoided. Use early warning systems (JWARN). Use detectors, forward looking and distant scanning, as well as point detection. (JSCALD, ICADS and JCAD) Saturation of maritime vessels with saltwater wash-down prior to entering contaminated battlespace to minimize contamination absorption. Travel upwind from insertion/extraction sites to reduce the spread of contamination. Increase the use of chemically resistant covers when not transiting. Use engine covers, boat, and trailer covers to provide overhead cover for vessels not in use. Limit the number of vessels that must operate in a contaminated area or use vessels already contaminated. If required to transit “dirty” recognize the debilitating nature of operating in NBC ensembles. Line the rear deck with plastic (a field expedient way to limit the spread of contamination) when carrying contaminated personnel or casualties. A plastic curtain can be fastened between the rear deck and the cockpit of the MKV with tape or Velcro to limit contamination transfer. Apply M9 detector paper to the boat covers when in storage. Boat crew personnel should always check the M9 detector paper before servicing the vessels.

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NBC Considerations During Infiltration, Execution, and Exfiltration b. Decontaminants Decontaminants ! ! !

Saltwater (saltwater wash-downs). Weathering. STB, bleaches and calcium hypochlorite solution.

c. Maritime Vessel Decon. Craft too small to do anything but individual decon use natural elements such as salt/fresh-water spray during transit or salt-water wash-down. • Seal Delivery Vehicle. Natural element/saltwater can be used to decon craft and personnel aboard. (The submarine community manager is currently developing decon procedures for recovering contaminated SDVs and personnel.) • Patrol Coastal Craft. In anticipation of operating in an NBC environment preparatory measures include pre-attack activation of the countermeasures washdown rig, removal of nonessential topside flammable materials, and continual contamination avoidance. For example, if under chemical attack, active measures to be taken immediately include: individual decon, evasive maneuvering, continual washdown, identification of contaminated areas, and setting PURGE SHIP to flush out vapor hazards.

Shipboard Actions for Taking on Contaminated SOF Personnel !

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Watercraft ties up to swimmer platform. Fire hose eductor sprays personnel and craft with 3% to 5% calcium hypochlorite solution. Personnel remain in watercraft, wipe each other off with M-291 or M-295 pads. Include protective masks, gloves weapons, and special equipment. Web gear and ordnance is thrown over board. Personnel depart watercraft, one at a time, as instructed. Weapons, communication gear, and other special/sensitive equipment remain on the swimmer platform with patrol craft crewmember in MOPP 4. Personnel step up, climb ladder, and step into boot wash (9% calcium hypochlorite solution). From boot wash personnel move to station one, remove protective garment utilizing appropriate technique (See Appendix K, Decontamination Operations for detailed individual decon techniques), and discard overboard. Remain in mask. Move to station two. Using appropriate technique (See Appendix K, Decontamination Operations for detailed individual decon techniques) remove boots and any remaining outer protective garments, discard overboard. Remain in mask. Move to shower point in vestibule (SEAL shower). Remove inner garments and mask and shower for at least five minutes. Move to station three, clean area. Utilize detector to determine presence of any remaining contamination (“Hotspots”). If clean, personnel can move to the SEAL prep area. If hotspots are detected return to shower to scrub area and repeat the shower process. Medical personnel must be prepared to triage and administer aid should any personnel become symptomatic. Personnel wait in the SEAL prep area for further direction.

• MK V Special Operations Craft. In anticipation of operating in an NBC environment, preparatory measures include; removal of nonessential topside flammable materials, wetting down with hoses, continual contamination avoidance, and attempting to navigate a course into the wind. For example, if under chemical attack, active measures to be taken immediately are individual decon (See Appendix K, Decontamination Operations, for detailed individual decon techniques), continue hose wet down, evasive maneuvering, and identification of contaminated areas.

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Chapter V Shipboard Actions for Taking on Contaminated SOF Personnel ! !

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Set a course into the wind to limit the spread of contamination, in and on the craft, and on personnel. Crew (in MOPP4) conducts craft decon from forward to aft using saltwater washdown and 5% calcium hypochlorite (HTH) solution. Aft deck is designated as the “Hot Line” for approaching contaminated vessel (CRRC, RHIB), vessel ties off and immediate saltwater/HTH washdown begins. Personnel climb onto aft deck, conduct individual decon by wiping each other down with M291/M295 decon pads. At the same time, sensitive items and special equipment are secured off to the side of the aft deck. Due to limited space and contamination, the disposition of these contaminated items must be considered in planning. Actions must be taken to decontaminate, contain, or dispose. Personnel then step into boot wash of 9% HTH. Step forward to remove protective garments (See Appendix K, Decontamination Operations for detailed individual decon techniques) and throw garments over the side. Step forward, staying on the hot side and take off boots, discard over the side, remove gloves, discard over the side (See Appendix K, Decontamination Operations, for detailed individual decon techniques). Any type of liner is still being worn at this point. Each person now removes their protective masks and is sprayed down with saltwater and tested for contamination. If declared clean, move to the cockpit for further instructions. If declared still dirty, repeat the process.

• Rigid Inflatable Boat/Combat Rubber Raiding Craft (CRRC ). In anticipation of NBC contamination, craft navigates into the wind to limit the spread of contamination onto the craft and personnel. Utilizing saltwater and HTH, crew decons craft from forward to aft. Personnel decon themselves and equipment (See Appendix K, Decontamination Operations, for detailed individual decon techniques). Disposition of craft is considered during planning. • Dry Deck Shelter. Decon procedures are currently being developed by the Navy submarine community.

9. Ground Vehicles

SOF planners must consider the increased logistical requirements when decontaminating vehicles.

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NBC Considerations During Infiltration, Execution, and Exfiltration If decon assets are available and the tactical situation permits, ground vehicles should be decontaminated within 1 to 6 hours. Resource intensive, vehicle decontamination operations require personnel support, logistical sustainment, site selection/setup/ security, processing time, and clearance. Disposition of contaminated vehicles is also considered during planning (situation may require abandoning vehicles). SOF peculiar vehicles (Ranger Special Operations Vehicle (RSOV), motorcycles, and Mobile Over Snow Transport (MOST or snowmobile) utilize standard decontamination techniques with modified procedures to facilitate decontamination of unique items. For detailed information on vehicle decontamination refer to FM 3-5, NBC Decontamination.

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APPENDIX A SOF ORGANIC NBC DEFENSE ASSETS 1. General The military conducts operations based on the knowledge of its own mission, threat, and NBC defense capabilities. Shared knowledge of available NBC defense resources with the SOF community facilitates planning. SO missions tend to be conducted jointly. Therefore, SOF personnel and planners must know what component resources are available to support mission accomplishment.

2. Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) Assets a. Chemical Detachment. The SF Chemical Detachment of a SF Group is a 10-man detachment, organized in three-2 man Decon/Recon teams and a headquarters consisting of a captain (O-3) commander, sergeant first class (E-7) NBC staff NCO, staff sergeant (E-6) computer plotter, and a staff sergeant (E-6) NBC NCO. The Detachment’s mission is to provide decontamination support and limited rear area NBC reconnaissance for ARSOF units. The five decon missions performed by the Chemical Detachment are: decon site reconnaissance, employment of the Expedient Personnel Decontamination System (EPDS), dirty exfiltration decontamination, operational decontamination, and thorough decontamination. Thorough decontamination requires augmentation. Chemical detachments conduct NBC reconnaissance in rear areas, primarily to search for a route or location for a special force’s operational base (SFOB) or forward operational base (FOB) to move to after an NBC attack. In addition, detachment personnel can augment the staff of the nuclear, biological, chemical, collection center (NBCCC) and be task organized within individual groups to satisfy mission requirements. • Capabilities: •• The detachment can provide decontamination and limited rear area NBC reconnaissance for SOF units. •• Each team can conduct decon site reconnaissance. •• Each team can establish and operate one dirty exfiltration decon in support of contaminated special forces operational detachment-A (s) (SFODAs) if there is no exfiltration platform or if it is augmented by 13-15 personnel. •• The Detachment can establish and operate one dirty exfiltration decon site in support of SFODAs if there is an exfiltration platform. •• Each team can establish and operate one operational decon site in support of an SFOB, FOB, or advanced operational base (AOB). •• The Detachment can establish and operate one thorough decon site with 31-35 augmentees in support of an SFOB, FOB, or AOB. •• The Detachment can conduct one NBC reconnaissance mission at a time. This can be search, survey, or surveillance. •• The Detachment is mobile, using HMMWVs and M101A1 trailers. •• The Detachment is air assault capable. •• The Detachment is airborne capable. •• The Detachment can establish flame field expedients in support of base defense. • Limitations: •• The Detachment has no organic security assets. It is unable to secure a decon site.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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Appendix A •• The Detachment cannot support a detailed troop decon (DTD) for more than 20 soldiers without augmentation (13-15 personnel). •• The Detachment has no water hauling capability. •• The Detachment requires two hours to transition from NBC reconnaissance to decontamination missions.

b. Chemical Reconnaissance Detachment (LB Team). The Chemical Reconnaissance Detachment (CRD) of a SF Group is a five-man detachment capable of training or augmenting an SFODA for NBC special reconnaissance. Currently there are only two active duty CRDs. • Capabilities: •• Able to support NBC aspects of special reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, and direct action. •• Able to train SOF elements to perform NBC SR/DA missions and provide mission support. •• Can be employed as a whole or in a split team configuration. •• Capable of deploying on short notice with minimal preparation at any level of conflict. •• Capable of detecting and collecting NBC samples.

• Limitation. The CRD is designed as an augmentation team/training team, operationally limited requiring security, medical, language and communications support. c. Additional Duty Personnel. Varying in numbers within ARSOF, there are NBC trained (extra-duty) individuals at the team [SFODA], company, and battalion level.

3. Naval Special Warfare Forces (NAVSOF) Assets a. Naval forces do not have separate units for NBC defense. Navy NBC defense duties are assigned as an additional duty to already established teams of personnel. b. NBC defense resources are coordinated through the unified combatant commands and provided by Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), and Naval Facilities Command (NAVFAC). For additional information on NAVSOF NBC support refer to Appendix M, “NBC Support Considerations and Requirements.”

4. Air Force Special Operations Forces (AFSOF) Assets a. Air Force NBC defense resource organizations are similar to that of the Navy. NBC defense duties are assigned (as an additional duty) to existing readiness units. b. Air Force readiness units provide NBC defense support, as well as their usual support, to the command elements to which they are assigned.

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APPENDIX B SOF COMPONENT AND SERVICE COMMON NBC DEFENSE EQUIPMENT 1. Component Common Equipment a. Detection Equipment • Chemical Agent Detector Paper, M8. NSN: 6665-00-05-0829, TM 3-6665-205-1011. M8 is chemically treated, dye impregnated paper. It detects liquid V and G (nerve), and H (blister) CW agents. It does not detect vapors or agents in water. Exposure to liquid insecticides, antifreeze, and petroleum products may cause false readings. (Navy non-asset) • Chemical Agent Detector Paper, M9. NSN: 6665-01-049-8982, TM 3-4230-229-10. M9 detector paper detects the presence of liquid chemical agent (nerve & blister), but does not identify the specific agent or its type. M9 paper reacts to CW agents by turning a reddish color. Exposure to liquid insecticides, antifreeze, and petroleum products may cause false readings. The paper can be attached with an adhesive back. • Chemical Agent Automatic Alarm, M8A1. NSN: 6665-01-105-5623, TM 3-6665-312-12P. The M8A1 is a nerve agent alarm. The system consists of the M43A1 detector, as many as five M42 alarm units and various power supplies. • Remote Sensing Chemical Agent Alarm (RSCAAL), M21. NSN: 6665-01-302-1968, TM 09676A-1-101. The M21 is a two-man-portable, passive infrared sensor that detects nerve and blister agent vapor clouds from a distance of 3-5 kilometers. It can be used for reconnaissance and surveillance missions. It consists of a detector, tripod, M42 remote alarm unit, transit case, power cable assembly, and standard military power source. (AF non-asset) • Automatic Chemical Agent Detection Alarm (ACADA), M22. The M22 is an advanced, point-sampling, chemical agent alarm system. It detects standard nerve and vesicant agents. The system consists of the detector, as many as five alarm units, and various power supplies. This system replaces the M8A1 alarm in most SOF units. (NAVSOF non-asset) • NBC Reconnaissance System FOX, M93A1. NSN 6665-01-323-2582. FM 3-3. The FOX (M93A1) is a fully integrated NBC reconnaissance system with a dedicated system of NBC detection, warning, and sampling equipment integrated into a high speed, high mobility, armored carrier. Its components include a Mobile Mass Spectrometer. (NAVSOF & AF nonasset) • Chemical Agent Detector Kit, M256A1. NSN: 6665-01-016-8399, TM 3-6665-307-10. The M256A1 Chemical Agent Detection Kit is designed to detect and identify blood (AC & CK) blister (H, HN, HD, CX, L) and nerve (V & G series) agents and consists of a carrying case, 12 sampler-detectors, instruction cards, and M8 paper. • Water Testing Kit for Chemical Agents, M272. NSN 6665-01-134-0885, TM 3-6665-319-10. The M272 is a lightweight, portable kit that detects and identifies harmful amounts of CW agents present in raw and treated water. It detects AC, HD, L, and nerve agents. (Naval non-asset) • Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM). NSN: 6665-01-199-4153, TM 3-6665-327-13 P. The CAM is used to search and locate contamination, specifically nerve and blister agents. It is a battery operated, portable point monitoring system. It cannot realistically assess the vapor hazard over an area from one point. It weighs 8.6 pounds. (AF non-asset) • Individual Chemical Agent Detector (ICAD). NSN 6665-01-340-1693, TM 3-6665-340-12&P. ICAD is a miniature, chemical agent detector for nerve, blood, choking, and vesicant/blister agents. The ICAD has a slower detection response time for some agents and may not be suitable for individual force protection missions in certain roles. (Army and AF nonasset) • Improved Chemical Agent Monitor (ICAM). NSN 6665-01-357-8502, TM 3665-327-19. The ICAM merges two improvements to the CAM. These improvements are a modular design and an updated electronics board. The modular design significantly reduces repair time. (NAVSOF & AF non-asset)

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Appendix B b. Protection Equipment • Protective Mask, M24. NSN 4240-00-808-8799, TM 3-4240-280-10. The M24 mask protects personnel in aircraft and on the ground against all known CB aerosols and vapors. It can be attached to the aircraft oxygen system using an M8 adapter kit. (AF & NAVSOF non-asset) • Protective Mask, M40A1. NSN 4240-01-258-0061, TM 3-4240-400-10. The M40 mask protects against CB agents, radioactive fallout particles, and battlefield contaminants. It has a silicone face piece, binocular lens system, voicemitter, drink tube, clear and tinted inserts, and standard thread filter canister. • Combat Vehicle Crewman Mask, M42. NSN 4240-01-258-0065, TM 3-4240-400-10. The M42 series mask has the same components as the M40 with an additional built-in microphone for wire communications. The filter canister is attached to the end of the hose with an adapter for CPFU connection. (AF & Naval non-asset) • Aircrew Protective Mask, M43. NSN 4240-01-208-6966. The M43A1 mask has a form-fitting butyl rubber face piece with lens mounted close to the eyes, an integrated hood with a skull-type suspension system, a portable battery or power operated blower/filter system, and an inhalation air distribution assembly. (AF & Naval non-asset) • General Aviator Protective Mask, M48. NSN 4240-01-386-4686, TM 3-4240-342-20. M49. NSN 4240-01-413-4096, TM 3-4240-344-20. The M48 and M49 masks are an upgrade of the M43 Type I mask. Its improved blower is chestmounted. The blower is lighter, less bulky, and battery-powered. (AF & Naval non-asset) • Protection Assessment Test System (PATS), M41. NSN 4240-01-0365-8241. FM 3-4. The M41 is used to check the face seal of protective masks. (NAVSOF non-asset) • Aircrew Uniform Integrated Battlefield (AUIB). The AUIB is a standard combat uniform for aircrews. It replaces both the BDO and the NOMEX flight suit and provides NBC and flame protection. (AF & NAVSOF non-asset) • Battle Dress Overgarment (BDO), Overgarment 84 (Marines). NSN 8415-01-137-1704. FM 3-4. The BDO is a camouflage, expendable, two-piece overgarment. It protects for 24 hours against chemical agent vapors, liquid droplets, biological agents, and radioactive particles. Max wear time is 30 days in an uncontaminated environment. (NAVSOF non-asset) • Chemical Protective Glove Set, NSN 8415-01-033-3518, TM 10-277. This protective glove set consists of an outer butyl rubber glove and an inner cotton insert. • Chemical Protective Footwear Cover (CPFC). NSN 8430-01-021-5978. FM 3-4. CPFCs are impermeable and have unsupported butyl rubber soles and uppers. Two variations are fielded; one with a single heel flap, and the other with the newer fishtail doubled heel flap. (NAVSOF non-asset) • Green/Black Vinyl Overboot (GVO/BVO). NSN 8430-01-048-6305. The GVO is a plain olive drab vinyl green overshoe with elastic fasteners. It protects against NBC agents, rain, mud, or snow. The BVO is very similar except it is black with enlarged tabs on each elastic fastener. • Joint Service Lightweight Suit (JSLIST). The JSLIST program, a four-Service effort to field a common chemical protective ensemble, has produced a new protective overgarment that is currently being fielded. Testing continues on the glove and boot. Program objectives include reduced heat stress, compatibility with all interfacing equipment, longer wear, and washability. • Simplified Collective Protective Equipment (SCPE). M20A1. NSN 4240-01-166-2254. FM 3-4. The SCPE consists of an expandable liner, blower/motor assembly, protective entrance, support kit, and replacement liners. It is lightweight and mobile allowing for the conversion of existing structures into protected command and control centers. (AF & Marine nonasset)

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SOF Component and Service Common NBC Defense Equipment c. Decontamination Equipment • Portable Decontamination Apparatus, M11. NSN 4230-00-720-1618, TM 3-4230-204-12&p. The M11 decontaminates small areas that personnel must touch. It is a steel container with an aluminum spray-head assembly and a nitrogen gas cylinder that provides pressure. It’s filled with 1-1/3 quarts of DS2, enough to cover 135 square feet. (AF & NAVSOF non-asset) • Power Driven Decontamination Apparatus, M12A1. NSN 4230-00-926-9488, TM 3-4230-209-12. The M12A1 is power driven and includes a pump unit, heater unit, 500-gallon tank unit, and personal shower unit. (SOF & AF non-asset) • Portable Decontamination Apparatus, M13. NSN 4230-01-133-4124, TM 3-4230-214-12&P. The M13 is used to decontaminate vehicles and crew served weapons larger than .50 caliber. It is about the size of a 5-gallon gasoline can and comes pre-filled with 14 liters of DS2. Decon capability is 1200 square feet. (AF & NAVSOF non-asset) • Lightweight Decontamination System (LDS), M17. NSN 4230-01-251-8702, TM 3-4230-228-10. The M17 is portable, lightweight, and consists of a combined pump and heater unit, 1500 gallon or 3,000 gallon collapsible rubberized tank and personal shower unit. • Skin Decontamination Kit (SDK), M291. NSN 4230-01-101-3984, TM 3-4230-216-10. The M291 is used for skin and equipment decontamination. It is non-toxic, eliminating the need for inert trainers. • Decontamination Kit, Individual Equipment, M295. NSN 6850-01-357-8459. FM 3-4. The M295 uses sorptive resin unlike the liquid based kits. It is a pouch, designed to fit in the cargo pocket of the BDU, and contains four individually wrapped wipe-down mitts to decontaminate personal equipment. • Decontamination Solution (DS2). NSN 6850-00-753-4870. TB CML 113. DS2 is effective against all known chemical and biological agents except bacterial spores. It is issued in 1-1/3 quart cans (M11), 14-liter containers (M13), and 5-gallon containers. It is also extremely corrosive. (AF & NAVSOF non-asset) • Calcium Hypochlorite (HTH). NSN 6810-01-065-2410. FM 3-5. HTH is a decontaminant that is used only when STB is not available. It is effective against lewesite, V agents, and all biological materials including bacterial spores. HTH ignites on contact with liquid mustard agent or DS2 (or any organic compound such as JP8, diesel, any POL product). Observe same precaution as for STB. • STB - Super Tropical Bleach (STB). NSN 6850-00-297-6653. FM 3-5. STB is effective against lewesite, V & G agents, and biological agents. It ignites on contact with liquid mustard agent or DS2 (or any organic compound such as JP8, diesel, any POL product).

2. Army Specific Equipment a. Detection • Biological Integrated Detection System (BIDS). NSN 6665-01392-6191, TM 3-666-F349-12PP. BIDS is a self-contained biological detection lab mounted on a HMMWV. It has sample detectors, identification equipment, navigation devices, weather sensors, and communication links. BIDS is an Army corps-level asset. (SOF non-asset) • Long Range Biological Standoff Detection System (LR-BSDS), M94. FM 3-101-6. The M94 mounts on an airborne platform and detects biological clouds at a distance of up to 50 km. It is equipped with an infrared laser, receiver, and detector.. The M94 also has an information processor for tracking and mapping functions. The M94 does not identify biological agents. It identifies a cloud of biological-type material, but cannot distinguish whether this is from biological warfare or natural background causes. Further analysis is required from other assets. (SOF non-asset) b. Protection Equipment • Apache Protective Mask, M45A1. TM3-4240-341-10. The M45A1 provides protection without the aid of forced ventilation air. It is compatible with aircraft sighting systems and night vision devices. It has close fitting eyepieces, a voicemitter, drink tube, and low profile filter canister.

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Appendix B • Simplified Collective Protective Equipment (SCPE), M28. NSN 42400-01-331-2938. FM 3-4. M28 is a lightweight modular system. It has tent liners, hermetically sealed filter canisters, recirculation filters, protective and tunnel entrances for litter patients. Improvements are a medical air lock, tent interface, and liquid agent resistance.

3. Navy Specific Equipment a. Detection • Chemical Warfare Directional Detector (CWDD), AN/KAS-1. NSN 25-5855-01-147-4362. NAVSEA SWO73-AAMMD010 Op Manual. CWDD is a passive sensor that detects the infrared signature of G and V nerve agent vapor clouds up to 10 nautical miles from a ship. CWDD detects cloud presence but not the distance to an agent cloud. • Chemical Agent Point Detection System (CAPDS). NSN 25-6665-01-294-2556. NAVSEA SWO-AB-MMO-010 Op Manual. CAPDS is a shipboard installed detector that continuously samples outside air and sounds an alarm when G or V nerve agents are detected. • Improved Chemical Agent Point Detection System (IPDS). IPDS is the improved version of CAPDS. In addition to G (nerve) and VX agents, IPDS detects vesicant/blister agent vapors. • Interim Biological Agent Detection System (IBADS). The IBADS can be employed on ships, shore facilities, and vehicles. It takes 20 minutes from detection to identification and alarm for biological agents. b. Protection Equipment • Protective Mask, MCU-2/P. NSN 4220-01-327-4149, TM 0910-LP-287-420. The MCU-2P uses standard NATO filter canisters. The original design came from the Air Force. It has two voicemitters and allows for a wide field of view. • Protective Mask, MCK-3A/P. NAVAIR 13-1-6.10. The MCK-3A/P is the current aviator protective mask. • Chemical Protective Overgarment (CPO). NSN 8415-01-214-8290. NSTM Chapter 470. The CPO is a lightweight, compact, chemical agent protective suit. It lasts for 100 hours of cumulative wear time within 30 days of opening the bag. It will protect up to six hours in a contaminated environment and has a 10-year shelflife. • Aircrew Individual Protective Ensemble (IPE). See NAVAIR 13-1-6.10. NSN Special Mission Equipment. The IPE is composed of the MCK-3A/P mask, tactical ventilator, and A/P37S-1 intercom set. It provides aircrewmen with necessary head, eye, and respiratory protection to guard against toxic effects of nuclear fallout and CW/BW agents. IPE includes: respirator assembly, helmet assembly, MK1 flyer’s chemical protective coverall, white cotton undershirt and drawers, plastic disposable footwear covers, plastic disposable cape, chemical protective gloves and cotton inserts, chemical protective socks and CMU-23A/P survival vest. • Selected Area Collective Protective System (SACPS). The SACPS provides total protection for a selected compartment or group of adjacent compartments on ships without CPS.

4. Air Force Specific Equipment a. Detection Equipment • Automatic Liquid Agent Detector, AN/PSR-2. NSN 6665-01-314-2086. FM 3-4. The AN/PSR-2 ALAD detects liquid droplets of GD, VX, HD, L, and thickened agents within 60 seconds of exposure. It has a built in self-test function and a warning system with integral and auxiliary capability. • Automatic Agent Detector (AMAD), M90. M90 Handbook. The AMAD is an automatic nerve and mustard (HD) agent detector that detects agents in vapor form. This system is currently in use by the Air Force. It transmits an alarm by radio to a central alarm unit. b. Protection Equipment

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SOF Component and Service Common NBC Defense Equipment • CB Protective Mask, MCU-2/AP. NSN 4220-01-327-4149, TM 0910-LP-287-420. The MCU-2P uses standard NATO filter canisters. It has two voicemitters and allows for a wide field of view. • Protective Mask, M17. A1 & A2. NSN 4240-01-143-1019, TM 3-4240-279-10. The M17 mask has been a standard armed forces issue since the 1960’s. It has a voicemitter, hard lens, and filter elements in the cheeks. The M17A1 version has a drinking tube and a resuscitation system. The M40 series mask is replacing it. • Survivable Collective Protection System 2 (SCPS-2). The SCPS-2 uses a pressurized, filtered environment to provide people with protection from nuclear fallout, bio agents, and chem. agents without the need to wear NBC individual protective equipment (IPE). It also provides blast protection. • Building Modification Kit, KMU-450F BLDG. NSN 4240-01-044-7659, TO 11D-3-7-1. The C/B modification kit is a collective protection system used to rapidly convert existing forward military structures to chemical/biological agent-proof shelters. When attached to a base field structure, it provides a pressurized clean air facility.

5. Marine Corps Specific Equipment (Protection Equipment) • Saratoga Suit. NSN 8415-01-333-7574. FMFM 11-9. The Saratoga suit replaced the OG-84 in FY91. It is a camouflage patterned, reusable, two-piece suit with a coat, integrated hood, and trousers. It has a cotton rip stop outer layer with a carbon filter layer to absorb agents before inner layer breach. It protects against chemical agent vapors, liquid droplets, biological agents, radioactive alpha and gamma particles. In a non-NBC contaminated environment the suit may be laundered up to four times during its service life. It is not intended to be decontaminated or reimpregnated, and should be discarded after 24 hours of exposure to chemical agents. Protective capabilities extend to 30 days with active protection of 24 hours. • Armored Vehicle Protective Mask, M25. NSN 4240-00-994-8751, TM 3-4240-280-10. The M25 series mask is special for crews of armored vehicles. Inside an armored vehicle, the mask is coupled to a gas particulate filter and outside the M10A1 canister filters air. It protects against NBC contaminants and is being replaced by the M42. • Portable Collective Protection System (PCPS). NSN 4240-01-200-4340. FM 3-4. The PCPS consists of the protective shelter, support kit, and hermetically sealed filter canister. It provides an uncontaminated, positive pressure shelter for use as a command and control center or rest and relief for 12 to 14 Marines. When over pressure is applied the shelter protects against CB agent penetration. Shelter: tent and fly (saranaex composite material), aluminum support structure, airlock for decontamination. Support kit accessories: motor/blower assembly, flexible ducts and hermetically sealed filter canister: aluminum canister, gas filter, and particulate filter.

6. SOF Specific Equipment • Chemical Protective Undergarment (CPU). FM 3-4. The CPU is an expendable, two-piece undergarment that is worn under a standard uniform. It protects for 12 hours against chemical agent vapors, liquid droplets, biological agents, and radioactive particles.

7. Equipment in Development a. Joint • Joint Biological Remote Early Warning System (JBREWS). Designed to detect the actual on site presence or approach of biological agents, collect samples to analyze for selected agents, and utilizing a sensor network command provide early warning to take protective action. Consisting of several monitoring units it can be used in the defense of large sites, e.g. airfields etc. The system utilizes a HMMWV and trailer to transport its components. • Portal Shield, Sensor Network Command Post (SNCP). Designed to detect and identify biological agents. Consisting of several monitoring units it can be used in the defense of large sites, e.g. airfields etc. It is currently in the test phase of development. • Joint Service Light NBC Reconnaissance System (JSLNBCRS). NSN 6665-01-323-2582. JSLNBCRS will detect, mark, and warn of NBC hazards on the battlefield. The system will use the HMMWV and the Light Armored Vehicle as mobile platforms to move sophisticated sensors and analysis equipment on the battlefield. (NAVSOF & AF non-asset)

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Appendix B • Modular Decontamination System (MDS). MDS consists of a decontamination pumper and two high-pressure washer modules. Each module may be transported on a ¾-ton trailer. MDS is supported by two 3000-gallon self-supporting fabric water tanks and one 125-gpm-water pump. (NAVSOF non-asset) • Multipurpose Integrated Chemical Agent Alarm (MICAD). MICAD is a near real-time integrated NBC detection, warning, and reporting system. Using existing detectors, it automates data gathering, formats sensor data, transmits alarms, and issues NBC1 and NBC4 reports. (NAVSOF non-asset) • Joint Chemical Agent Detector (JCAD). JCAD detects nerve and blister agents. It is lightweight, portable, and its interferant technology reduces false alarms. JCAD will allow detection of emerging threat agents. • Joint Service Lightweight Standoff Chemical Agent Detector (JSLSCAD). JSLSCAD is a passive, infrared detection unit that detects nerve and blister vapor clouds at a distance of up to 5 km while the detector is moving. • Joint Biological Point Detection System (JBPDS). JBPDS will provide common point detection for all services. It will detect BW agents at low threshold levels and identify them within 15 minutes. Currently three variants are planned including a vehicle mounted, man-portable, and handheld. • Sorbent Decontamination System (SDS). Sorbent decontaminate includes CB decontaminates that increase decon efficiency, are less caustic, and require no water. Development goals are: neutralization with less contact time, no scrubbing, less health risks, and improved storage stability. • Joint NBC Warning and Reporting System (JWARN). JWARN is a system of computers, printers, and software. This equipment is tied together with communications that will enable personnel to rapidly detect, identify, and disseminate data on CB threats. b. Army Equipment in Development • Soldier Hydration System (SHS). SHS is a civilian style camel back system compatible with the M40 mask c. Navy Equipment in Development • Shipboard Automatic Liquid Agent Detector (SALAD). SALAD will be an automated externally mounted liquid agent detector capable of detecting G (nerve), V (nerve), and H (vesicant/blister) series chemical agents. • Shipboard Chemical Agent Monitor, Portable (SCAMP). SCAMP is a portable detector that detects nerve and blister agent vapors. d. Marine Corps Equipment in Development • Joint CB Agent Water Monitor (JCBAWM). JCBAWM will be a man portable device to detect, identify, and quantify CB agents. It will allow the user to sample water and receive a digital readout of the contents. This detection system will be capable of warning personnel of CB agent presence. • Small Unit Biological Detector (SUBD). SUBD is a biological detector capable of operating on the move. It weighs less than 30 lbs. and can be carried by one soldier. It will identify both solid and airborne samples and provide an audible/visual alarm. • NBC Canteen Refilling System (NBC CRS). The Canteen Refilling System developmental goals are compatibility with common water distribution systems and the 5-gallon water container. Other objectives are capability to refill multiple canteens in a contaminated area.

8. Nonorganic Assets • Quick Mask, Model Name: Chem./Bio Model Number: QM-7DT6VR-YE-M (yellow), QM-7DT6VR-BL-M (black). • DECCOFOGGER. Commercial manportable, chemical decontamination fogger.

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APPENDIX C US ARMY THEATER NBC DEFENSE ASSETS 1. Theater Army a. Chemical Battalion (Enhanced). A chemical battalion consists of up to seven chemical companies. The battalion provides command and control of these companies in the area of the theater army command. Battalions provide smoke, decon, biological detection, and/or recon support. b. Decon Company. A chemical decon company provides equipment decon support to units. The company is 100 percent mobile. Each decon platoon is organized with a platoon HQ and three decon squads. c. NBC Recon Company. NBC recon companies are employed to detect contaminated areas or confirm that the area is clear of contamination. Recon units can operate throughout the battlefield conducting search, survey, surveillance, marking, and sampling missions. d. BIO Defense Company. Biological detection companies are an operational level asset. Equipped with 35 BIDS, and M94 long range standoff detection systems the company is arrayed to provide coverage through out the supported units area of operations. e. JA/JB Teams. JA/JB Teams provide NBC operations support to units over one or two 12-hour shifts. These teams also augment a tactical operations center to provide NBC operations support to units over two 12-hour shifts.

2. Corps JTF a. Chemical Brigade. The corps chemical brigade commands and controls two to six chemical battalions and separate units. The brigade provides NBC recon, decon, biological detection, and smoke support throughout the corps area. b. Chemical Battalion. The chemical battalion consists of three to seven chemical companies. The battalion provides command and control of these companies as part of a chemical brigade. Battalions provide smoke, decon, biological detection and/or recon support. c. Decon Company. A chemical decon company provides equipment decon support to units. The company is 100 percent mobile. Each decon platoon is organized with a platoon HQ and three decon squads. d. Smoke/Decon Company. The smoke/decon chemical company (corps/theater army) provides large area smoke and equipment decon support to divisions, units in the corps rear areas, and units in the COMMZ. The company consists of a company HQs and four smoke/decon platoons. e. Smoke/Decon Company (Light). The smoke/decon chemical company (corps/theater army) provides large area smoke and equipment decon support to divisions, units in the corps rear areas, and units in the COMMZ. f. BIO Defense Company. Biological detection companies are an operational level asset. Equipped with 35 BIDS and M94 long range standoff detection systems, the company is arrayed to provide coverage through out the supported units area of operations. g. NBC Recon Company. NBC recon companies are employed to detect contaminated areas or confirm that the area is clear of contamination. Recon units can operate throughout the battlefield conducting search, survey, surveillance, and sampling missions. h. JA/JB Teams. JA/JB Teams provide NBC operations support to units over one or two 12-hour shifts. These teams also augment a tactical operations center to provide NBC operations support to units over two 12-hour shifts.

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Appendix C 3. Division a. Divisional Chemical Company (Active). Assigned to a heavy division, and under the operational control of the division chemical officer, this company provides smoke, decon, recon, and chemical staff support. b. Divisional Chemical Company (Reserve). Assigned to a heavy division, and under the operational control of the division chemical officer, this company provides smoke, decon, recon, and chemical staff support. c. Smoke/Decon Company (ABN and AA). The chemical company (airborne/air assault) provides equipment decon, large area smoke, and chemical staff support to the airborne and air assault divisions. The company is organized with a division chemical section, an NBC center, a company HQ, and three smoke/decon platoons. The smoke/decon platoons contain a platoon HQ, two smoke/decon squads, and a support squad. d. Mechanized Smoke Generator Company. The mechanized smoke company provides large-area smoke support for tactical operations in the forward combat area. The smoke company consists of a company headquarters and three smoke platoons. The company is 100 percent mobile.

4. Brigade a. Smoke/Decon/Recon Chemical Company (ACR). This company provides equipment decon, NBC reconnaissance, large-area smoke, and chemical staff support to armored cavalry regiments (ACR). The company consists of a chemical staff section, a company HQ, one NBC recon platoon, and one smoke/decon platoon. b. Decon/Recon Chemical Company (LACR). This company provides equipment decon, NBC reconnaissance, large-area smoke, and chemical staff support to armored cavalry regiments (ACR). The company consists of a chemical staff section, a company HQ, one NBC recon platoon, and one smoke/decon platoon. c. Separate Brigade Chemical Platoon (Reserve). The platoon provides equipment decon, NBC recon, and large-area smoke support to separate brigades and attached units. The platoon consists of a headquarters, a recon squad, and two smoke/ decon squads.

5. Chemical Brigade a. Mission: To provide command and control of two to six chemical battalions. Personnel: 17 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 47 enlisted. b. Major Equipment Systems • • • • • • • • • • •

5 2 3 3 1 1 2 1 1 1 3

HMMWVs, M998/1038 1HMMWVs, M1028 Trucks, 2 1/2-ton CUCVs, 3/4-ton, M1009 Trailers, 3/4-ton Trailer, 1 1/2-ton Radio, AN/GRC-106 (AN/GRC-193) Radios, AN/VRC-47 (AN/VRC-89) Generator, 3kw Generator, 5kw Generator, 5kw (PU-160) Chem alarms, M8A1

6. Chemical Battalion a. Mission: To provide command and control of three to seven chemical companies (recon, decon, dual purpose (smoke/ decon), mechanized smoke, and/or motorized smoke). Personnel: 10 officers, 2 warrant officers, and 37 enlisted.

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US Army Theater NBC Defense Assets b. Major Equipment Systems • • • • • • • • • • • •

4 3 7 4 3 1 1 7 1 1 2 3

HMMWVs, M998/1038 Trucks, 2 1/2-ton CUCVs, 3/4-ton, M1009 Trailers, 3/4-ton Trailers, 1 1/2-ton Water trailer, 400-gal Radio, AN/GRC-160, (AN/GRC-88) Radios, AN/VRC-46, (AN/VRC-90) Radio, AN/VRC-47, (AN/VRC-89) Generator, 3kw Generators, 5kw Chem alarms, M8A1

7. Chemical Battalion (Enhanced) a. Mission: To provide command and control of three to seven chemical companies (recon, decon, dual purpose (smoke/ decon) mechanized smoke, and/or motorized smoke). Personnel: 12 officers, 2 warrant officers, and 43 enlisted. b. Major Equipment Systems • • • • • • • • • • •

4 3 7 3 3 7 1 1 1 1 3

HMMWVs, M998/1038 Trucks, 2 1/2-ton CUCVs, 3/4-ton, M1009 Trailers, 3/4-ton Trailers, 1 1/2-ton Radios, AN/GRC-160 (AN/GRC-88) Radio, AN/VRC-46 (AN/VRC-90) Generator, 3kw Generator, 5kw Generator, 5kw (PU-620) Chem alarms, M8A1

8. Chemical Company (Mechanized/Smoke) a. Mission: To provide large-area smoke support for a heavy division from the main battle area forward. Personnel: 5 officers, 0 warrant officers, and 102 enlisted. b. Major Equipment Systems • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

7 1 4 5 2 9 1 7 7 3 5 1 21 1

Trucks, 5-ton Truck, wrecker, 5-ton Trucks, 2 1/2-ton HMMWVs, 5/4-ton Trailers, 1/4-ton Trailers, 1 1/2-ton Water trailer, 400-gal trailer-mounted TPU Tank and pump units Radios, AN/VRC-46 (AN/VRC-90) Radios, AN/VRC-47 (AN/VRC-89) Generator, 5kw 1059 smoke carriers M578 recovery vehicle

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Appendix C 9. Chemical Company (Decon) a. Mission: To provide decontamination support for elements of corps/theater army. Personnel: 7 officers, 0 warrant officers, and 127 enlisted. b. Major Equipment Systems • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

31 1 18 2 6 6 47 1 15 15 1 16 45 15 3 6 21 15

Trucks, 5-ton Truck, wrecker, 5-ton Trucks, 2 1/2-ton Commo Trucks, 5/4-ton CUCVs, 3/4-ton, M1009 Trailers, 1/4-ton Trailers, 1 1/2-ton Water trailer, 400-gal 500-gal fabric tanks 3,000-gal fabric tanks Trailer-mounted TPU Tank and pump units 65gpm pumps Radios, AN/GRC-160&88 Radios, AN/VRC-46&90 Radios, AN/VRC-47&89 Chem Alarms, M8A1 M12A1 decon apps.

10. Chemical Company (Smoke/Decon) a. Mission: To provide equipment decontamination and large-area smoke support for elements of a corps/theater army. Personnel: 6 officers, 0 warrant officers, and 135 enlisted. b. Major Equipment Systems • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

26 3 24 24 20 1 10 2 11 5 2 13 8 4 28 24 24

Trucks, 5-ton Trucks, 2 1/2-ton HMMWVs Trailers, 3/4-ton Trailers, 1 1/2-ton Water trailer, 400-gal Tank and pump units Trailer-mounted tank and pump units Radios, AN/VRC-46&90 Radios, AN/VRC-47&89 Generators, 3 kw Chem alarms M8A1 3,000-gal Tanks, fabric AN/VRC-98 Pumps, 65gpm LW decon apps M157 Smk Gens

11. Chemical Company (Smoke/Decon) a. Mission: To provide equipment decontamination and large-area smoke support for a light division. Personnel: 6 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 149 enlisted.

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US Army Theater NBC Defense Assets b. Major Equipment Systems • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

37 1 31 31 28 1 1 8 6 15 5 28 21 24 8

Trucks, 5-ton truck, wrecker, 5-ton HMMWVs, 5/4-ton Trailers, 3/4-ton Trailers, 1 1/2-ton Water trailer, 400-gal Trailer-mounted tank unit 3,000-gal fabric tanks Tank and pump units Radios, AN/VRC-46&90 Radios, AN/VRC-47&89 65gpm water pumps Chem alarms, M8A1 M157 smoke gens M12A1 PDDAs

12. Chemical Company (Recon) a. Mission: To provide NBC reconnaissance support for elements of a corps/theater army. Personnel: 5 officers, 0 warrant officers, and 137 enlisted. b. Major Equipment Systems • • • • • • • • • • • •

1 4 40 1 4 1 1 1 38 4 2 4

Truck, 5-ton Trucks, 2 1/2-ton HMMWVs, 5/4-ton (armored) CUCVs, 5/4-ton, M1008 Trailers, 1 1/2-ton Water trailer, 400-gal Tank and pump unit Trailer-mounted tank and pump unit Radios, AN/VRC-46&90 Radios, AN/VRC-47&89 Generators, 3kw Chem alarms, M8A1

13. Chemical company (Heavy DIV) a. Mission: To provide equipment decon, large-area smoke, NBC recon, NBC warning and reporting, and chemical staff support to a heavy/infantry division. Personnel: 12 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 154 enlisted. b. Major Equipment Systems • • • • • • • • • • • • •

27 6 7 2 1 12 1 15 1 36 6 12 26

5-ton, 15 2 1/2-ton, 1 2 1/2-ton shop van, and 1 5-ton wrecker Truck HMMWVs, 5/4-ton M1059 Smoke Systems CUCVs, 3/4-ton 3/4-ton, 41 1 1/2-ton and 1 400-gal water Tanker 500-gal and 12 3,000-gal fabric Tanks LD Trailer-mounted tank Tank and pump units Tracked recovery vehicle, M578 65gpm water pumps M93 NBCRS M12A1 PDDAs Chem alarms, XM22

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Appendix C 14. Chemical Company (Heavy DIV) a. Mission: To provide equipment decon, large-area smoke, NBC recon, NBC warning and reporting, and chemical staff support to a heavy/infantry division. Personnel: 12 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 150 enlisted. b. Major Equipment Systems • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

25 6 1 1 1 12 1 13 1 36 6 12 12 6

5-ton and 16 2 1/2-ton Trucks HMMWVs, 5/4-ton 5/4-ton and 2 3/4-ton CUCVs HMMWV with commo 3/4-ton, 40 1 1/2-ton, and 1 400-gal water Trailers 500-gal and 12 3,000-gal fabric tanks Trailer mounted tank Tank and pump units M578 65gpm water pumps M113 APCs M12A1 PDDAs Chem alarms, M8A1 M1059 Smk Gens

15. Chemical Company (Smoke/Decon) a. Mission: To provide equipment decon, large-area smoke, NBC recon, NBC warning and reporting, and chemical staff support for an airborne or air assault division. Personnel: 9 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 118 enlisted. b. Major Equipment Systems • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

32 25 1 2 18 2 22 6 6 1 5 21 6 17 30 18

Trucks, 5-ton HMMWVs, 5/4-ton Truck, wrecker, 5-ton CUCVs, 5/4-ton Trailers, 3/4-ton Trailers, 3/4-ton Trailers, 1 1/2-ton 500-gal fabric tanks 3,000-gal fabric tanks Trailer-mounted tank Tank and pump units 65gpm water pumps M12A1 PDDAs [18 M17 LDS] Chem alarms, M8A1 Drums, fabric, 500-gal M157 Smk Gens

16. Chemical Company (Smoke/Decon/Recon) a. Mission: To provide equipment decon, large-area smoke, NBC recon, NBC warning and reporting, and chemical staff support for an armored cavalry regiment. Personnel: 6 officers, 0 warrant officers, and 67 enlisted.

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US Army Theater NBC Defense Assets b. Major Equipment Systems • • • • • • • • • • • • •

4 3 4 4 6 2 1 3 6 6 7 1 11

Trucks, 5-ton Trucks, 2 1/2-ton HMMWVs, 5/4-ton Trailers, 3/4-ton Trailers, 1 1/2-ton 500-gal fabric tanks 3,000-gal fabric tank Tank and pump units 65gpm water pumps M93 NBCRS M1059 Smk Gens M12A1 PDDAs [3 - M17 PDDE] Chem alarms, M8A1

17. Chemical Company (Decon/Recon) a. Mission: To provide equipment decon, NBC recon, NBC warning and reporting, and chemical staff support for a light armored cavalry regiment. Personnel: 7 officers, 0 warrant officers, and 65 enlisted. b. Major Equipment Systems • • • • • • • •

5 3 5 1 3 6 8 6

Trucks, 5-ton Trucks, 2 1/2-ton HMMWVs, 5/4-ton Recovery vehicle, tracked Tank and pump units 65gpm water pumps M93 NBCRSs M17 PDDEs

18. Chemical Platoon (SEP BDE) a. Mission: To provide NBC staff services and smoke/decon support, radiation monitoring, chemical detection, and NBC recon support to brigade and attached units. Personnel: 4 officers, 0 warrant officers, and 33 enlisted. b. Major Equipment Systems • • • • • • • • • •

7 2 4 6 5 8 7 1 4 2

HMMWVs (hvy) HMMWVs Decon apparatuses, lightweight Trailers, 3/4-ton Trailers, cargo, LMTV Trailers, cargo, FMTV Alarms, chem agent, XM22 Water test kit, bacteriological Tank and pump units Tank assembly, fabric, 3,000-gal

19. JA/JB Teams a. Mission: To provide NBC warning and reporting support. JA Team personnel: 1 officer, 0 warrant officers, and 4 enlisted. JB Team personnel: 2 officers, 0 warrant officers, and 8 enlisted.

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Appendix C b. Major Equipment Systems JA: • 1 HMMWV • 1 Trailer, 3/4-ton JB: • 1 CUCV, 5/4-ton • 1 Trailer, 3/4-ton

20. LA/LB Teams a. Mission: To provide NBC recon support. LA Team personnel: 1 officer, 0 warrant officers, and 5 enlisted. LB Team personnel: 1 officer, 0 warrant officers, and 4 enlisted. b. Major Equipment Systems LA: • 2 HMMWVs • 2 Trailers, 1/4-ton • 2 Radios, AN/VRC-46 (AN/VRC-90) LB: • 1 Radio, AN/PRC-70 • 1 Radio, AN/PRC-90 • 1 Camera set, KS-99

21. Chemical Company (Biodetection) a. Mission: To provide biological detection across a joint task force or corps area of operations. Personnel: 10 officers, 0 warrant officers, and 204 enlisted. b. Major Equipment Systems • • • • • • • • • •

38 7 84 35 48 1 36 83 35 35

Generators Radios, AN/GRC-193A Radios, AN/VRC-90A M1097 HMMWVs MM998 HMMWVs TPU Trailers, 3/4-ton NAVSTAR GPS Shelters, S-788/G TACMET Meteorological Stations

For additional information on units and equipment refer to FM 3-101, Chemical Staffs and Units.

22. Covers a. The use of buildings and covers to protect supplies and equipment provide significant benefits to the fixed site commander. Limiting the exposure of these items to NBC agents reduces the hazard, and subsequently the need for decontamination. As a general rule anything that provides a barrier between the items of concern and the environment will provide some degree of protection. Currently there are NBC protective covers (NBC-PC) available as common table of allowances (CTA) items. These covers are specifically designed to provide a 24-hour barrier from liquid agent contamination. b. Covering can also be accomplished with items as basic as canvas tarpaulins and plastic sheeting, or as elaborate as large area maintenance and tactical aircraft shelters. The following table depicts some examples of material and equipment that may be

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US Army Theater NBC Defense Assets available to the fixed site commander for this purpose. These items generally provide protection from liquid agent hazards, however those with integral overpressure/filtration systems additionally provide vapor hazard protection. In all cases a significant degree of protection will be afforded to the personnel, equipment, or material either covered or contained within. Any building provides partial cover. To maximize the cover supplies, equipment should be placed in rooms without external walls. All ventilation ducts, doors, windows, and electrical outlets should be covered with plastic sheeting. Note: Caution should be exercised when using commercially available protective covers/material in place of military issued covers. These items may not possess the multi-spectral camouflage qualities of their military counterpart and would subsequently be easier to detect by enemy acquisition systems. Figure C-1 depicts available NBC defense covers.

NBC Defense Covers Item

Remarks

ROWPU Cover

Lightweight flexible fabric for covering ROWPU. Puncture, crack, and tear resistant.

Large Area Maintenance Shelter (Clamshell)

Aluminum framed PVC coated fabric shelter, 192 feet x 75 feet x 31 feet

Tactical Aircraft Shelter (TAS)

Aluminum box frame PVC coated fabric shelter with clamshell opening at each end, 100 feet x 64 feet x 27 feet. Has air conditioning and heating ductwork.

Tent Extendable Modular Personnel (TEMPER)

Modular aluminum framed fabric tentage system, (8 feet x 20 feet x 10 feet.

Modular Command Post System (MCPS)

Aluminum framed PVC coated fabric tent, 11 feet x 11 feet x 9' feet. (Effort is underway to develop a chemically hardened version as part of a pre-planned product improvement (P3I)).

Modular General Purpose Tent System

Replacement for current General Purpose Tents; Pole or frame support system fabric tent. Extendable to any length required by adding modules, 54 feet x 18 feet x 14 inches.

Chemically and Biologically Protective Shelter (CBPS)

Protective shelter system constructed of flouro-polymer/aramid laminate fabric that provides liquid and vapor protection and is readily decontaminable. Integrated with a Field Litter Ambulance (FLA), M1097 HMMWV, 300 square feet fully integrated. Also contains a 10 kW tactical quiet generator on a high mobility trailer.

Modular Chemically Hardened Tent

Multipurpose frame supported collective protection tent. Tent fabric is flouropolymer/aramid laminate. Features four interchangeable removable walls. Individual tent covers 121 square feet. Figure C-1. NBC Defense Covers

23. Government/Nongovernment Organization Assets Government agencies or nongovernmental organizations may be capable of providing assets to the fixed site commander in either materials or assistance. Consult the Staff Judge Advocate for advice concerning the legal requirements for obtaining support from government and nongovernmental agencies. Examples of these agencies or organizations includes but is not limited to: a. United Nations Peacekeeping Forces. Source of trained personnel, equipment, and materials. b. World Health Organization. Source of medical assistance teams. c. International Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies. Source of materials, manpower, and equipment.

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Appendix C 24. Host Nation Assets In addition to the resources available through military supply channels, assets may be available from the host nation. Consult the Staff Judge Advocate for advice concerning the legal requirements for obtaining host nation support. Use of these facilities will not only reduce turn around time, but will also alleviate some of the burden placed on military logistics channels. Examples of these include, but are not limited to: a. Local Police Departments. Source of trained personnel for refugee handling, maintenance of civil order, security operations, and traffic control. b. Local Retail Centers and Industries. Source of covers, expendable supplies, and decontaminants. c. Local Fire Departments. Source of high-pressure water dispensing equipment, hoses. Note: In some countries local fire departments are outfitted with equipment packages to support evacuation of the public from toxic areas. (e.g., French Fire Brigades) d. Local Water Department. Source of large quantities of water. e. Local Sanitation Department. Source of trained personnel to handle disposal of non-persistent materials and hazardous waste. f. Environmental Control Office or similar agency. Source of trained personnel to assist in monitoring, reduction, and disposal of hazardous material and waste. g. Civil Defense Agencies. Source of trained personnel, detection equipment, and materials. h. Water Treatment Plants. Source of decontaminants. i. Local Construction Companies. Sources of earth moving equipment, materiel-handling equipment, and construction materials. j. Multinational Corporations. Potential source of assets previously mentioned.

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APPENDIX D US MARINE CORPS ORGANIC ASSET 1. Purpose The Marine Corps has approximately 800 chemical/biological (CB) specialists spread across its force and assigned at the battalion level and higher. With the exception of the Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF), the Marine Corps does not use structured NBC defense units. Personnel intensive tasks such as unit decontamination and NBC reconnaissance operations are performed as an additional duty within Marine units.

2. Organization a. The CBIRF was established to combat the growing chemical/biological, radiological-nuclear (CBR-N) threat. The force is a mission ready national asset that is manned, trained, and equipped to respond to CBR-N incidents worldwide, when directed by the National Command Authority. Self sufficient and capable of sustained operations, the force can assist local and military agencies in dealing with CBR-N terrorist acts by providing initial post incident consequence management. CBIRF is unique as it integrates all the elements needed for CBR-N consequence management in a single command. CBIRF also provides training to local, state, and federal agencies as well as to other DOD forces, and assists with the development of new equipment, techniques, and procedures for responding to the use of CBR-N weapons. b. The threat will dictate the force size requirement. This self-contained response force has five elements: 1) headquarters, 2) force protection, 3) medical, 4) security search and rescue, 5) service support. The mission focus of CBIRF is to quickly evacuate causalities of a WMD incident and provide time critical medical intervention in a contaminated environment. A unique feature of CBIRF is its electronic linkage to an advisory group (AG) of experts through the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). The AG, composed of military and civilian experts in chemical/biological matters, advises the CBIRF in training, incident response, and effects modeling. Additionally, a deployable laboratory from the Naval Medical Research Institute will support CBIRF. This laboratory is capable of identifying biological agents.

3. Equipment CBIRF is designed to deploy as a complete unit (375 Marines and Sailors) and is able to provide the best support if predeployed in the operational area. CBIRF’s Initial Response Force (IRF) is kept on a six-hour alert status and is capable of deploying in two C-5’s with all of its vehicles, personnel, and equipment. If required, the IRF can be rapidly configured to deploy in all types of military and commercial aircraft. The limited assets of the IRF are only intended to provide initial response capability as the IRF should be reinforced by the entire force within 24 hours.

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Appendix D CBIRF NBC Defense Equipment Detection Equipment

Description

Gas Chromatograph/Mass Spectrometer; Field and Portable.

Detects, identifies and analyzes low level concentrations of chemical agents.

Detection Tubes; Chemical Agents.

Monitors a broad range of hazardous and toxi c gases and vapors.

Monitor, Chemical Agent.

Detects and monitors various levels of nerve and blister agents on equipment surfaces and personnel.

Kit, Detector, Chemical Agent M256A1.

Portable kit used to detect chemical contamination.

Detector, Gas.

Hand-held device that detects, monitors and provides instant values on hazardous and toxic gases or vapors.

Detector, Radiac DT236/PDR75.

Portable device used primarily by NBC and medi cal personnel to detect radiological exposure levels.

Radiac Set, AN/VDR-2.

Portable, hand-held device used to monitor and detect radiological contamination.

Advanced Chemical Agent Detector and Alarm System (ACADA), M22.

An advanced point sampling, detection, and alarm system capable of detecting nerve and blister agents.

Detector, Chemical Agent, M9 Paper.

Personal device used to detect chemical agent contamination on equipment and personnel.

Meter, pH.

Hand-held device used in detecting liquid chemical agents and determining the decontamination solution concentration.

Kit, Testing, Water, M272.

Portable device used to detect chemical and biological agents in water.

NBC Reconnaissance System (FOX) M93.

Armored vehicle mounted system designed to detect, identify, monitor, quantify, and mark chemical and radiological contamination.

Alarm, Chemical Agent Remote Sensing (RSCAAL) M21.

Detects nerve and blister agent clouds at a distance up to 5 kilometers.

Individual Protection Equipment

Description

Coveralls, Level B.

Lightweight, disposable overgarment which provides protection against chemical and biological contamination.

Suit, Protective, Chemical, Overgarment.

Provides protection against chemical agents.

Suit, Protective, Level A.

Provides protection from organic and inorganic chemical agents originating from a variety of sources and biological hazards.

Suit, Level A D urable.

A front entry, encapsulating, positive pressure, vapor and liquid protective, one-piece overgarment.

Level A training.

Provides Level A training.

Suit, Level B D urable.

An encapsulating suit which protects against commercial liquid chemicals.

Gloves; Chemical Agent with insert, leather and improved.

Provides handwear protection against chemical agents.

Cover, Footwear, Protector.

Provides protection against known chemical agents. Figure D-1. CBIRF NBC Defense Equipment

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US Marine Corps Organic Asset CBIRF NBC Defense Equipment (Cont.) Individual Protection Equipment

Description

Mask, C/B Protective (M40).

The improved mask provides improved facial and respiratory protection with cup, ballistic protective eyelense, redesigned drinking tube coupling.

Breathing Apparatus, Self-Contained.

A compressed air breathing apparatus used to provide clean-air respiratory support in contaminated areas.

Rebreathers.

A positive pressure closed circuit breathing apparatus, used for respiratory and eye protection in dangerously contaminated environments.

Apron, Toxicological Agents.

Impermeable butyl rubber apron used to provide additional contamination protection.

Decontamination Equipment

Description

Decon System, M1731.

Portable, lightweight, power driven decontaminating system.

Shelter, Decon.

Provides facility to decontaminate personnel.

Decon Kit, M291.

Provides personnel, immediate decontamination capability.

Trailer, Decon.

Supports decontamination operations.

Medical Equipment

Description

Medical Support Equi pment.

Includes aspirators, ventilators, pacemaker/defibrillators, breathsaver bags, heat stress monitors, surgical sets, and an armored, 4 litter ambulance.

AMALs.

Includes laboratory, shock surgical, and aid station sets.

Manikins; Adult, Child, and Trauma.

Provides cardio/respiratory training support for all personnel.

Collective Protection Portable Collective Protection System.

Description Provides protective shelters for command and control, medical, and rest and relief operations.

General Support

Description

Generator Set, 50kw, 3kw, 10kw, 30kw, and 8kw.

Provides electrical power for required support.

Pump Module; Fuel and Water.

Provides support for required operations.

Storage Tanks; Fuel and Water.

Provides support for required operations.

Shower, Unit.

Portable system which provides personnel decontamination.

Water Purification Units, Reverse Osmosis.

Water purification system capable of treating water from any source.

Water Storage Tanks; vehicles, modules, and collapsible.

Used to support operations.

Vehicle Fleet.

Includes command and control, transport, cargo and utility, logistics, mobile operations, and troop carriers types of vehicles. Figure D-1. CBIRF NBC Defense Equipment

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Appendix D

Intentionally Blank

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APPENDIX E NBC RISK ASSESSMENT/VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS TOOL SECTION A. RISK ASSESSMENT 1. Purpose A risk assessment allows the commander and his staff to identify vulnerabilities to an NBC hazard and mitigate those risks. The assessment is a series of questions that provides insight into mission areas that may be susceptible to an NBC attack. Conversely, shortcomings, and the need for improvement, may be identified in critical warfighting capabilities. The areas of interest generally relate to a defensive NBC posture within the purview of the primary staff and special staff. It should be noted that the result of any staff evaluation dealing with readiness requires a determination of security classification.

2. Risk Analysis Considerations a. Identify and Disseminate Threat

Threat Analysis Checklist !

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What is the threat? ! Are adversaries thought to have an NBC threat? ! By adversary, what NBC agents are known to be on-hand? ! By adversary, what NBC agents are thought to be available? ! By adversary, what and how many NBC delivery systems (e.g., SOF, missile, aircraft, ship, and artillery) are available and where are they located? ! By adversary, are NBC preventative measures such as inoculation and defensive training, being conducted and if so how extensive are the measures (e.g., inoculations of all military, or just SOF; for one biological agent or several) and how much vaccine do they have available? ! Is there a release other than attack (ROTA) threat? ! How have we considered the “collateral damage” threat posed by industrial compounds? ! Will coalition forces be subjected to environmental hazards that have aspects similar to deliberate chemical agent attacks and if so, what? ! What specific environmental hazards have been identified that might affect coalition proposed routes of advance of withdrawal? ! Where are NBC production facilities/stockpiles? ! By adversary, which individual(s) have NBC release authority and at what times (e.g., at all times, delegates to field commanders discretion during crisis, etc.)? ! By adversary, what is their NBC doctrine and strategy – including declaratory policy. How will the NBC threat be employed? ! When do we anticipate attack in terms of deployment? ! What is the most likely type of strike that might occur early in the deployment process? ! What is the anticipated priority of attack against ports, airfields, and similar locations? ! Is the enemy conducting noticeable recon of these ports, airfields and similar locations? ! What are the enemy agents of choice for specific scenarios? ! What is the stated national resolve and capability of the enemy regarding NBC employment in the region as well as in CONUS to prevent or disrupt deployment? ! What is/are the enemy’s anticipated concept(s) of operation with regard to employment of NBC weapons against an adversary either armed with WMD or allied with an adversary that is armed with WMD and capable of holding at risk strategic centers of gravity? For example, is the enemy expected to threaten use of NBC weapons to deter intervention operations against strategic centers of gravity? Is the enemy expected to use NBC weapons if deterrence fails, to preempt, retaliate, or withhold for use as a last resort, or use in a combination with any of the preceding concepts? ! Will adversarial use of NBC weapons increase their regional “prestige” and/or alter the psychological balance? ! Will adversaries be able to threaten US forces throughout the depth of their deployment?

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Appendix E Threat Analysis Checklist (cont'd) In priority order, what kinds of information is the adversary seeking on its opponent that may be useful to it in planning NBC operations? ! Have friendly/neutral population centers been identified as potential targets? What friendly commercial NBC facilities are potential targets? ! What effect will threat employment have on our operations? ! Which pre-positioned storage areas are critical to the allied effort? ! What is the vulnerability of storage areas for pre-positioned assets? ! What is the enemy’s resolve and threat toward noncombatant US citizens in theater? ! What level of deployment degradation will the enemy seek to achieve using NBC weapons? ! What are the impacts of threat NBC usage with respect to psychological, medical, logistical, etc., implications? ! Will the use of WMD impact the cohesiveness of coalitions? If so, how? ! Which ports and airfields will be prime targets for enemy use of NBC agents under current operational plans? ! Will NBC weapon use produce a strategic, political, and/or psychological effect that overshadows its actual military utility? Have appropriate intelligence activities been tasked to develop the NBC threat? ! Which agencies are developing the NBC threat? ! What resources does the combatant command have for obtaining NBC threat data when deployed? ! What is the timeliness of NBC threat data? ! How are the above resources informed of specific information to be watching for? ! What system is in place to prioritize intelligence requests? Have we pieced together the various intelligence reports to identify and deconflict contradictory information? ! How is contradictory information deconflicted? ! Which staff sections or personnel contribute to deconflicting of NBC intelligence? ! What criteria are in place to determine if pieces of information should be incorporated into planning? Have we disseminated this information to the whole team (Services, planners, OJCS, and units)? ! When is data considered ready to be sent out to other team members? ! How is NBC threat data routed? ! How and when do we share information and conclusions with actual or potential allies (coalition partners)? ! What is the threat to host nation (HN) population/forces and how might this impact on coalition operations? ! What HN emergency response and reporting agencies are included in the dissemination of NBC data? When? What types of data? Do we have the capability to monitor for changes to the threat and rapidly disseminate major changes? !

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b. Incorporate NBC Threat into Plans and Operations

NBC Plans and Operations Checklist !

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Do combatant command OPLANS accurately identify the current NBC threat? ! What is the U.S. doctrinal operational response to a confirmed chem/bio use on US forces? ! What other operational responses are authorized to be made by the CINC? ! When is the CINC authorized to make these operational responses? ! How do friendly targeting plans consider the environmental aspects of industry and potential enemy weapons storage areas? ! What are the plans and priorities for distribution of force protection assets to combatants, noncombatants (i.e., US, HN, and others), and enemy prisoners of war? (1) Decontamination units and material? (2) NBC reconnaissance, detection and warning units and equipment? (3) Chemical/biological defense equipment and support (e.g., individual and collective protection, medical prophylaxes, etc.)? (4) Smoke and obscurants (i.e., units and munitions)? ! What plans are in place, tested and evaluated, regarding handling and evacuation of contaminated corpses? ! What passive avoidance measures are required by the combatant commander? ! In consideration of joint doctrine, how is HN support needs determined? ! How do the plans provide NBC protection guidance for the entire spectrum of operations, from operations other than war to general war?

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NBC Risk Assessment/Vulnerability Analysis Tool NBC Plans and Operations Checklist (cont'd) !

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Are planners addressing the NBC threat, in peacetime, to forward-deployed forces? ! How are changes in threat status in the unit’s AO sent quickly with a proper priority? ! What priority is used to ensure timely receipt of information? ! Are chemical and biological defense requirements being fulfilled? ! Are forward-deployed forces inoculated with safe and effective vaccines for high threat BW agents? ! How sufficient are the medical (e.g., vaccines, antibiotics, antidotes, etc.) and non-medical (e.g., protective equipment) stocks on hand? ! Are units trained to operate in a chemical and biological warfare environment? Is there a structured plan to reduce/mitigate the NBC threat? ! Do we understand which “smart” sensors, are available and how to use this information? ! Once “smart” sensors detect agents, how (using what communication system) is their information transmitted, especially across service and coalition lines? ! What is the (our) standard to confirm enemy use of NBC weapons? For example, is a Gold Seal biological laboratory required for BW confirmation? ! Which staging areas are most critical to our success? ! What alternate staging areas have been identified? ! What priority are enemy NBC weapons delivery and storage units being given in the targeting sequence? ! What military/nonmilitary steps are planned to negate or deter the use of NBC weapons? ! What friendly actions may create an NBC hazard for SOF? ! What steps are planned to eliminate enemy capability to target ports, airfields, etc.? ! What measures, related to countering NBC weapons, are being used throughout the coalition depth of deployment and beyond? ! Are we prepared to portray enemy use of NBC weapons in such a negative way as to rally world opinion against our enemy? ! What NBC defense units will be deployed early to provide protection against the enemy’s use of NBC weapons at points of entry? ! Which, if any, warning systems have digitization connectivity? ! What risk analysis methods are in place to determine if/and or when to decontaminate? ! How does the command know what units are trained and equipped to perform decontamination in the absence of chemical units? ! What can the command do about it if they are not? ! What steps have been taken to ascertain the NBC defense readiness of potential coalition partners? ! What means are available to alleviate shortcomings in coalition partners’ NBC defense posture/capability? ! If deployment is planned to be continuous over a relatively long period of time, what protective measures are planned for later deploying units? ! How frequently are field artillery and air defense artillery (ADA) units required to move? ! What is the theater guidance with regard to dispersion? ! What steps have been taken to mitigate the effect of NBC weapons employment on tempo? ! What awareness training have component forces received to negate the threat of covert positioned NBC weapons? Is the entire staff involved in the NBC defense process? Medical considerations ! What medical protection assets are in place in the form of vaccines, pretreatment, and/or skin protectants? ! What plans are in effect for using them? ! What is the immunization protocol? ! Providing medical assistance for enemy use presents significant implications. What plans have been made to address this? ! What levels of medical protection have been provided to the subordinate units to increase an individual’s resistance to an NBC attack, indigenous medical threat, and environmental hazards? Do they understand how to use this protection? ! What provisions for providing military supplied medical assistance to nonmilitary personnel are included in campaign plans? ! What plans are in place to alleviate shortfalls caused by providing medical support to nonmilitary personnel? ! What steps have been taken to ensure proper medical assistance is available for combat units, US and HN civilian workers, dependents, and EPWs? ! Are all hospitals (component, HN, and coalition) equipped to care for NBC casualties?

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Appendix E NBC Plans and Operations Checklist (cont'd) What vaccines are available within the theater? If sufficient vaccines are not available to inoculate all personnel, what is the protocol for determining who receives vaccinations? ! What is the policy for decontaminating and evacuating the wounded? ! What steps have been taken to ensure that the decontamination and evacuation policy is known and understood? ! What steps have been taken to ensure that an adequate number of medical personnel have received specialized training in NBC casualty treatment and management? ! Have plans been made for combating the indigenous medical threat within the theater? ! What medical force structure, by sequence, is available to the theater? ! What is the policy for determining the priority of medical attention to non-military personnel: US, allies, EPWs, and HN? Logistics ! What NBC defensive procedures have logistical commanders initiated to limit exposure of their units and facilities to NBC attacks and to protect personnel and supplies from NBC contamination? ! What command and control procedures are established to ensure the effective NBC defense of multi-service, HN, coalition, and major logistics bases, including ports and airfields? ! What plans are in effect for ensuring that sufficient protective equipment is available for issue to US civilians, HN personnel, and allies? ! How much equipment for protecting EPWs has been ordered? What is a reasonable amount to plan for? Where is it stored? ! How do you determine if the required amount of individual protective gear and unit NBC defense equipment is on hand in each subordinate unit? ! What procedures are in place to ensure that sufficient water and other supplies are on-hand in the proper location to permit effective and efficient decon operations? ! What plans have been made to ensure that necessary medical supplies are kept at the level required to execute the mission? ! What steps have been taken to ensure that sufficient alternate supply routes exist for logistical operations? ! What plans are in place to address NBC defense equipment resupply? ! What training has been conducted with HN police, fire, and other emergency organizations regarding NBC defense? Civil-Military Operations ! What action plans are in place to depict an NBC defensively trained force? ! What provisions have been made to protect or replace the noncombatant workforce if evacuation is ordered? ! What cross training of military to perform civilian technician work has been conducted? ! What evacuation routes for noncombatants have been designated? ! How has this information been communicated to those affected? ! How has it been practiced, if at all? ! What plans have been made for controlling civilian evacuations? ! How has this been practiced? ! How has information concerning potential environmental hazards been communicated to the noncombatant population? ! What steps have been taken to protect the nonmilitary personnel from environmental hazards? ! When was the last NEO exercise? ! What was the percentage of participation? ! How do you ensure personnel with wartime missions are not simultaneously slotted for NEO? ! What steps have been taken to ensure that the guards have been trained in how to teach EPWs the proper use of protective equipment? ! What units have been designated to protect civilians, medical facilities, etc.? What steps have been taken to ensure that these units are not called for elsewhere in operations plans? ! What are the NBC defense-related duties and responsibilities of the various civil affairs units deployed in support of the OPLAN? ! Who is responsible for coordinating NBC defense matters with the various other US and HN government agencies in the theater? Is he/she prepared to do so? PAO ! What PAO plans are in place to deter NBC weapon use? ! What PAO plans are in place to rally world opinion before and after NBC weapon use? ! !

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NBC Risk Assessment/Vulnerability Analysis Tool NBC Plans and Operations Checklist (cont'd) What PAO plans are in place to deter further NBC weapon use? Legal ! What are NBC weapon rules of engagement? ! What are rules of engagement for employing riot control agents? ! What is the US policy for use of NBC weapons? Do we provide enough guidance to synchronize the component NBC defense plans? ! What decision support tools are available to assist the unit commander in determining proper protective posture? ! What decision support tools are available to assist the unit commander in determining when to decontaminate? Is the NBC threat adequately considered in the OPLAN? ! What alternate ports and airfields are available? ! What protective and defensive measures are in effect at ports and airfields? ! What is our policy on sending out NBC warning reports - affected units only? All units? If all units, how do we differentiate between affected and non-affected units? ! How do we transmit this information across service and coalition lines? ! What is the time-phased arrival of medical units in theater? ! What flexibility for changing arrival sequence exists? If NBC defense assets are needed more quickly, what is the mechanism for making it happen? ! What provisions are in place to ensure adequate NBC force protection units are sequenced for early entry operations? ! What is the deployment sequence for all components as applicable to— NBC reconnaissance units? Bio detection (BIDS and Gold Seal Lab) units? NBC decon units? Medical units and personnel? Smoke generation units? ! What NBC defense measures are integrated into the overall force protection plan? ! What measures are taken to protect deep strike capabilities? ! What methods of NBC warning and reporting have been established to ensure dissemination of information to subordinate components and coalition forces? ! What is the current method of determining the need for decontamination? ! What priorities of decontamination have been established in the theater? ! What provisions have been made to ensure knowledge of all joint force unit locations? ! What steps are being taken to ensure that subordinate commanders know where contaminated areas are during operations? ! What priority is placed on avoiding contamination? ! What is the plan for deploying NBC sensor suites in the theater of operations? Do supporting component OPLANS adequately address NBC defense? ! How are supporting component assets organized to perform dedicated NBC defense functions? ! How do supporting component commanders determine NBC readiness? ! What is the status of supporting component commanders’— Plans? Equipment? Training? Personnel? ! What NBC functions have the other components planned for conducting internally? ! For which NBC functions will a CJTF need to provide support to the other components? ! What methods are in place to monitor NBC defense readiness of component forces in the areas of training, equipment, and personnel? ! How are component NBC defense assets coordinated into a comprehensive theater NBC defense plan? Do the plans maximize joint service synergy, effectively utilize resources, and produce a seamless NBC defense posture across the operation? ! How has NBC warning and reporting been integrated into the joint force C2S systems? ! When was it last practiced? ! How have the services’ requests for NBC defense forces been incorporated into OPLANs? ! Where are the recon assets located? ! Where do plans call for NBC recon units to be located during offensive and defensive operations? Have NBC defense shortfalls been addressed? ! What actions are taken to alleviate shortfalls in the NBC defense readiness of supporting service commanders’ units? ! !

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Appendix E c. Ensure Adequacy of Guidance and Doctrine

NBC Guidance and Doctrine Checklist ! ! !

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What enemy NBC/WMD employment concepts are being considered in plans? What JTF guidance is in place to synchronize component NBC defense plans? What are the procedures for decontaminating the wounded and quarantining contagious casualties? What are the shortcomings? What procedures have been written regarding handling and evacuation of contaminated corpses? How has the CJTF ensured that components are aware of this policy? How and when has knowledge of this policy been evaluated? What steps have been taken to ensure that this policy is known and understood? What is the stated national policy of massive response to enemy use of NBC? What plan exists to obscure high priority/high signature targets with smoke and obscurants from enemy acquisition assets (including smoke deception plan)? What is the policy of coalition partners on response to enemy use of NBC? Does the policy of coalition partners include acting independently if NBC is used on their troops/homeland? Has the issue of a coordinated response concerning coalition partners been coordinated in advance?

d. Train and Exercise the Joint Force in NBC Defense

Joint Force Training and Exercise Checklist !

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Do combatant command staff and Service senior leaders understand the NBC threat and how they support the theater NBC defense strategy? (Suggestion: “Wargame” the plan with senior leaders and talk them through NBC attacks. Have them brief back how their units will respond. Discuss what key decisions have to be made; when and what the available options are.) ! What steps have been taken to negate the operational difficulties likely to be encountered if attacked by NBC weapons? ! What steps have been taken to prevent the occurrence of needless casualties if attacked by NBC weapons? ! What steps are being taken to improve leader awareness of the NBC threat and how to counter it? ! What steps are being taken for NBC defense of power projection operations? Do necessary models and simulations support the combatant command’s training and exercise needs? ! What computer models/simulations are currently used to train the combatant command’s staff and subordinate services? ! How often are models/simulations used to exercise the staff and services? ! How thoroughly is an NBC threat integrated into these models? ! What model(s) would the combatant commander or staff like to see an NBC threat thoroughly integrated into? Has the NBC threat been adequately addressed in joint exercises and training? ! What is the combatant commander’s stated goal for NBC defense in joint exercises? ! What universal joint task list (UJTL) tasks have been incorporated into joint exercises? Does this accommodate the government accounting office (GAO) findings? ! How are the modern computer based tools being used to exercise NBC defense tasks? ! How many times during the past year were each of the NBC defense tasks of the UJTL exercised? ! How were they evaluated? ! How is the staff being trained to ensure their understanding of their responsibilities with regard to the NBC defense tasks tested? ! What is the requirement to perform realistic missions for extended periods of time while fully encapsulated? What is the combatant commander’s expectation? ! What training objectives are mandatory for major joint task force and combatant command level exercises? ! What training has been provided for leaders to mitigate the demonstrated extra toll that encapsulation takes on leaders? ! What is the minimum required NBC defense training specified by command directives? ! How have unit leaders been trained in hazards and protective measures associated with depleted uranium on the battlefield? ! How have unit leaders been trained to distinguish between an environmental hazard and a chemical agent attack? ! What training has been given to both soldiers and leaders with regard to protecting themselves from an environmental hazard?

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NBC Risk Assessment/Vulnerability Analysis Tool Joint Force Training and Exercise Checklist (cont'd) What training has been given to both soldiers and leaders with regard to avoiding an environmental hazard? What training has been given to both soldiers and leaders with regard to decontaminating an environmental hazard? ! What practice have personnel had in communicating while encapsulated? ! How has medical unit ability to perform their mission with contaminated casualties been assessed? ! What plans are in place for movement of contaminated patients within theater? ! What units are responsible for this mission? ! When did they last practice this mission? ! What evacuation routes have been designated? Have plans and responses against the NBC threat been adequately exercised? ! What action plans are in place to ensure quality NBC defense play is included in exercises? ! How does the command envision (written in specific planning documents) maintaining op tempo following enemy use of biological or chemical weapons? ! Do multinational/coalition force exercises include sufficient NBC defense play to determine coalition readiness? ! What are the coalition force political policies that discourage the inclusion of NBC defense events in major exercises? ! What is the combatant commander’s standard regarding practice of self-sustaining decontamination operations (without a chemical unit available)? ! How are exercises designed to ensure that NBC warnings are received across both service and coalition lines? ! How do exercises incorporate both active and passive measures to protect key ports of entry from NBC hazards? ! How do joint exercises measure the proper use of dispersion and movement as preventive measures against NBC attacks? How is targeting of enemy NBC weapons/capabilities played in exercises? ! How are NBC weapon effects on the civilian population played in exercises? ! How is the need for additional medical support in NBC war exercised? ! How do exercises test a unit’s ability to decontaminate wounded personnel and quarantine contagious casualties? ! How have military personnel slated to take the place of key civilian personnel been exercised to ensure that they can perform their wartime mission? ! How has exercising around massive evacuations been accomplished? ! When was the last NEO exercise? What percentage of noncombatants participated? ! How do exercises give leaders opportunities to make realistic NBC defense decisions? ! Do exercise scenarios anticipate the use of decision support tools? ! How often is using EPW guards to train EPWs in the use of US NBC defense equipment incorporated into exercises? ! How do exercises adequately account for the time-phased arrival of NBC defense and medical support? ! How often are decontamination priority decisions included in exercises? ! !

!

e. Assess Readiness and Identify Needs

NBC Readiness Checklist !

! ! !

!

!

! !

!

Have combatant command issues identified in wargames and exercises (e.g. how to handle civilian/coalition requirements, logistics shortfalls gaps in command and control, NBC warning and reporting in developing theaters) been identified for resolution? What process is being used for resolution? What is the process to ensure plans have been updated to reflect exercise lessons learned? What mechanism(s) do the combatant commander and staff use to determine unit NBC defense readiness? How is NBC defense readiness incorporated into unit readiness reporting? Are ratings based on objective criteria or subjective criteria? Can the commander call his status anything he wants regardless of what the data indicates? How has the staff ensured that the process for resolving NBC defense readiness issues is known to all subordinate commands? What are the NBC defense standards that the combatant commander expects all deploying units to meet? What steps are being taken to ensure that these standards are being met? What is the combatant commands criteria for determining NBC defense readiness? How does the combatant commander and staff consider and encourage technological developments related to NBC defense individual protection? To what degree has the combatant command elevated the requirement for uniform and meaningful NBC readiness standards and reporting to OJCS?

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Appendix E NBC Readiness Checklist (cont'd) What are the measurement standards which the combatant commander and staff use to ensure uniform and meaningful standards and assessment of NBC defense readiness among the assigned forces? What combatant commander NBC guidance has been published? What is the system to ensure issues that cannot be resolved at Service, component, or combatant command staff level has been identified to appropriate organizations for resolution? What mechanisms exist for providing theater NBC defense readiness needs to service chiefs for their information/action? What is the process to ensure that NBC defense needs have been incorporated into the combatant commander’s integrated priority list (IPL) process?

!

! !

! !

SECTION B. VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS TOOL 3. Purpose The Vulnerability Analysis (VA) is the commander’s tool to conduct continuous, systematic estimating of consequences to friendly forces resulting from NBC attacks. The overall methodology includes intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB), risk assessment, and VA with associated mitigation measures. The VA is a stand-alone document usually developed by a small group of subject matter experts from the staff.

4. Risk Assessment Charts The charts (Figures E-1 to E-3) on the following pages describe the risk assessment process. They aid the commander and staff in determining force risk levels and the minimum recommended steps to reduce the NBC risk. Follow these basic steps when using the risk assessment charts:

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

Enter the chart at “Start Here.” Answer the main question in the shaded box by considering subordinate questions/answers underneath it. If the answer to any question below the shaded box is a “yes,” then the shaded box answer is “yes.” Go to the next lower box and repeat the process. If the answer to a shaded box question is “no,” read the risk assessment to the right. Read to the right to determine the minimum recommended procedures to reduce risk. Complete the assessment by assigning the assessed risk level in the risk assessment box at the bottom of the page.

Note: Sound judgement by commanders and staffs determine this subjective “Risk” rating. Charts should be modified with additional questions and mitigation measures based on mission specific situations.

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NBC Risk Assessment/Vulnerability Analysis Tool

NUCLEAR RISK ASSESSMENT Select YES if one or more boxes are checked START HERE

YES

YES

Operational Risk Assessment

Is the enemy Nuclear capable?

NO

Is there a production capability? Are there known nuclear stockpiles? Is there a national policy (other than non-use) governing the use of Nuclear weapons?

NO Does the enemy reserve the right of “first use”? Does the enemy reserve the right to “retaliate in kind”?

LOW

YES

NO

Is the enemy trained and equipped to conduct nuclear operations? YES NO Have nuclear munitions been delivered to nuclear capable units? Has probable use message traffic been intercepted? Has the enemy used nuclear weapons? Is the enemy exercising its nuclear delivery capabilities? Is the enemy threatening to use nuclear weapons?

1. Continue the IPB process. 2. Conduct psychological operations convincing the enemy of the futility of nuclear weapons use. 3. Know the threat/protective measures. 4. Ensure all defensive plans include NBC defense measures. 5. Maintain NBC training.

RISK

Is the fixed site/unit within the range of likely delivery systems? YES NO Aerial bomb Artillery Missiles Mines Rockets Other Would the enemy target the unit doctrinally or as a possible COA?

Minimum Acceptable Response By Category

MEDIUM

RISK

HIGH

RISK

6. Continue steps above. 7. Increase NBC defense training. 8. Be aware of Nuclear Weapons Risk Indicators - see Service references. 9. Continue to harden storage locations. 10. Implement dispersion plan for personnel/supplies. 11. Be aware of radiation effects to exposed personnel. 12. Create templates depicting radii of vulnerability (RV). NOTE: Use the appropriate classified manuals. 13. Reduce susceptibility to EMP effects.

14. Continue all steps above. 15. Be prepared to transfer mission functions to secondary locations. 16. Use EMP susceptible equipment as little as possible.

Assessment = _______Risk

Figure E-1. Nuclear Risk Assessment

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Appendix E

BW RISK ASSESSMENT Select YES if one or more boxes are checked START HERE

YES

Operational Risk Assessment

Is the enemy BW capable?

NO

Is there a production capability? Are there medical/pharmaceutical plants in country/theater? Are there any known agent stockages? Does the enemy have BIO munitions plants?

Is the fixed site/unit within the range of likely delivery systems? YES NO Aerial spray Aerial Bomb Artillery Missiles Rockets Mines Other

YES YES

Would the enemy target the unit doctrinally or as a possible COA? Are weather and terrain favorable for employment?

LOW

RISK

NO MEDIUM NO

Is the enemy trained and equipped to conduct BW operations? YES NO

RISK

Are protective masks and clothing readily available? Are immunizations, prophylaxis, and pretreatments available? Have BW munitions been delivered to units? Has probable use message traffic been intercepted? Has the enemy used BW weapons? Is the enemy exercising its biological delivery capabilities? Is the enemy threatening to use biological weapons?

Assessment = _______Risk

HIGH

RISK

Minimum Acceptable Response By Category 1. Ensure immunizations are current. 2. Maintain intel and passive data collection efforts. 3. Maintain good personal hygiene. 4. Maintain good area sanitation. 5. Ensure MOPP gear is readily available. 6. Maintain physical conditioning. 7. Cover all supplies and equipment. 8. Know the threat/protective measures. 9. Use approved food/water sources. 10. Ensure all defensive plans include NBC defense measures.

11. Continue steps above. 12. Actively employ biodetection capabilities. 13. Be alert to medical reports of an unusual nature. 14. Be aware of enemy activity regarding biological weapons. 15. Ensure prophylaxis, pretreatments, and immunizations are available for the known/suspected threat. 16. Implement dispersal plans for personnel/supplies. 17. Continually monitor weather conditions. 18. Assume designated MOPP level.

19. Continue all steps above. 20. Be prepared to transfer mission functions to secondary locations. 21. Increase MOPP level for exposed personnel.

Figure E-2. Biological Risk Assessment

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NBC Risk Assessment/Vulnerability Analysis Tool

CHEMICAL RISK ASSESSMENT Select YES if one or more boxes are checked START HERE

YES

Operational Risk Assessment

Is the enemy CW capable?

NO

Are there industrial chemical production facilities in country/theater? Are there any known agent stockpiles? Does the enemy have weaponization capabilities?

Is the fixed site/unit within the range of likely delivery systems? YES NO Aerial spray Aerial Bomb Artillery Missiles Rockets Mines Other

YES YES

Would the enemy target the unit doctrinally or as a possible COA? Are weather and terrain favorable for employment?

LOW

RISK

NO MEDIUM NO

Is the enemy trained and equipped to conduct CW operations? YES NO

RISK

Are the following items readily available? Protective masks? Chemical protective garments? Chemical defense equipment? Have CW munitions been delivered to units? Has probable use message traffic been intercepted? Has the enemy used CW weapons? Is the enemy exercising its chemical delivery capabilities? Is the enemy threatening to use chemical weapons?

HIGH

RISK

Minimum Acceptable Response By Category 1. Maintain intel and passive data collection efforts. 2. Ensure MOPP gear is readily available. 3. Cover all supplies and equipment. 4. Know the threat/protective measures. 5. Use approved food/water sources. 6. Ensure all defensive plans include NBC defense measures. 7. Maintain NBC defense training.

8. Continue steps above. 9. Increase NBC defense training. 10. Actively employ chemical detection capabilities. 11. Be alert to medical reports of exposure to chemical agents. 12. Be aware of enemy activity regarding chemical weapons. 13. Ensure antidotes are available for the known/suspected threat. 14. Implement dispersal plans for personnel/supplies. 15. Continually monitor weather conditions. 16. Assume designated MOPP level.

17. Continue all steps above. 18. Be prepared to transfer mission functions to secondary locations. 19. Implement pretreatment directives. 20. Be prepared to increase MOPP.

Assessment = _______Risk

Figure E-3. Chemical Risk Assessment

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Appendix E 5. Nuclear Vulnerability a. To assess a unit’s vulnerability to a nuclear attack, a commander determines the likelihood of an adversary using a nuclear weapon, the unit’s NBC defense protection level, the type, and size of the weapon likely to be employed by the enemy (see Figure E-1). The commander then weighs various courses of action (COAs) to determine which COA allows for mission accomplishment at an acceptable risk. b. When addressing unit vulnerability to nuclear weapons employment, consider friendly force dispositions and capabilities. c. A nuclear explosion’s biological effects are measured according to the amount of radiation (centigrays) to which personnel are exposed. For the biological effects of radiation in man refer to FM 8-9/NAVMED P-5059/AFJMAN 44-151, NATO Handbook on the Medical Aspects of NBC Defensive Operations. d. Two techniques to evaluate unit vulnerability to nuclear detonations are: • A technical approach in which unit dispositions are compared with the effects of an expected yield. • An operational approach in which unit dispositions are compared with targeting criteria used by the threat target analyst. e. In a nuclear environment, the more concentrated a unit is, the more lucrative a target it becomes. If the unit itself is not the target, but falls within the fallout pattern, unit monitors will be capable of providing the commander with essential information regarding the hazard. For additional information on nuclear hazard prediction refer to FM 3-7, NBC Field Handbook. f. The primary tool for analyzing friendly dispositions is the radius of vulnerability (RV). RV is the radius of a circle within which friendly troops will be exposed to a risk equal to, or greater than, the emergency risk criterion (five percent combat ineffectiveness) and/or within which material will be subjected to a five percent probability of the specified degree of damage. For additional RV information and tables refer to, JP 3-12.2 Secret Restricted Data (SRD), Nuclear Weapons Employment and Effects Data; and JP 3-12.3, Nuclear Weapons Employment and Effects Data (Notional) (unclassified for training purposes).

6. Biological Vulnerability a. Prior to conducting vulnerability analysis, determine the risk of a biological agent attack or the enemy’s capability and probability of use (see Figure E-2) and presence of endemic diseases. Once it is determined that the enemy has the capability and the willingness to employ biological weapons, the next step is to determine the unit’s vulnerability to an attack (Figure E-2). Even if an enemy lacks the capability to employ biological weapons, the unit is still vulnerable to endemic diseases. Possible sources include contaminated water sources and local food. Commanders need to ensure units practice good hygiene. Ensure personnel wash hands frequently, particularly prior to eating to prevent ingestion of harmful biological material (either indigenous or BW agents found on various surfaces). b. To determine vulnerability to biological agents: • Determine immunization levels in relationship to threat/theater endemic agents and availability of prophylaxis. • Determine unit’s protective posture. Is the unit protected by forward deployed, prompt response, all weather, precisionstrike conventional or nuclear capabilities to deter the adversary; and if deterrence fails, to preempt or respond to the adversary’s use of NBC weapons? Furthermore, is the unit protected by active defenses or force protection against NBC weapons before detonation/release of agent(s)? • Determine unit’s biological detection posture – does it have early warning systems? Does it have biological integrated detection system (BIDS), Portal Shield, Interim Biological Agent Detection System (IBADS), long range biological stand off detection system (LRBSDS), or Joint Biological Point Detection System (JBPDS)? Point detectors such as the BIDS or IBADS will determine if a biological attack has occurred, provide information on the BW agent, and provide a sample for

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NBC Risk Assessment/Vulnerability Analysis Tool confirmation purposes. A biological detector generally consists of a trigger, collector, detector, and identifier. The trigger will monitor the background, determine if significant changes occur in the ambient background, and initiate the collection, detection/identification process. It is important to note that due to the state of technology and the nature of the background, triggers may react to the background changes that are not due to a BW attack. This is normal and generally protection actions should not be taken upon trigger events alone. The detector, if present, will determine if the aerosol is biological or non-biological (i.e. smoke, dust). The identifier specifically identifies the BW agent allowing the commander to initiate force protection and contamination avoidance measures. Other point detectors such as Portal Shield provide point detection and alarm of a BW attack through the use of multiple networked sensors. Unlike other biological detection systems it uses networking and smart logic to reduce false alarms due to man made events and certain natural aerosols. Generally, the system triggers when a predetermined threshold concentration is reached. This activity is communicated to the command post. Agent identification occurs within 15 minutes and alarms are transmitted to command post. A sample for confirmatory analysis is also automatically stored in the system and can be delivered to a supporting medical unit for analysis. • Determine unit’s hygienic practices. For example, are troops provided means to bath/cleanse regularly? • Determine current or projected maneuver (or mobility) disposition. • Consider time of day and weather conditions – the time most conducive for BW attack is during a clear night or during early morning hours with light winds (less than 10 knots or 12 miles per hour (mph)).

7. Chemical Vulnerability Prior to conducting a vulnerability analysis, first determine the risk of a chemical attack or the threat’s capability and probability of use (see Figure E-3). If the possibility exists for the threat to employ chemical agents, conduct a vulnerability analysis in two parts: First, make an estimate of the threat’s capability to employ chemical munitions in the unit’s AO/ area of interest (AI) (see Figure E-3. Chemical Risk Assessment) within a specific time period. Second, use this information to generate simplified effects information. a. Estimate Delivery Capability • Step 1. Determine time periods of interest. Time periods of interest are based on the commander’s operational concept and situation variables, such as mission, enemy, terrain, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations or METT-TC. The time period is coordinated with the intelligence and operations officers. They will normally conform to phases or the expected duration of an operation; however, it may be desirable to use other criteria. For example, a maintenance unit may want to use the expected time lag between an anticipated threat chemical attack and the time required to retrieve and don their protective gear (as in “MOPP READY” protective posture) as the time period of interest. A time period may also be based on factors relating to enemy tactics, such as the expected arrival time of a second echelon force. Further, significant weather changes could also influence the selection of time periods. The time period of interest can range from 6 hours to 48 hours. While some planning factors are based on a 12-hour to 48-hour cycle. Fixed site operations may be based on a significantly higher time frame (i.e., 12 hours to 96 hours), with time periods of 24 hours or greater used when IPB allows. Time periods of less than 6 hours are generally not used. For short-term actions, shorter time periods could be used to estimate the effects of initial enemy preparation fires or to estimate the effect of a single chemical agent attack. • Step 2. Associate weather data with each time period. Associate each time period with a temperature (ambient or ground); wind speed, and stability category. (Note: the M93 NBCRS can also report ground temperature.) The temperature will impact primarily on agent persistency. For each time period, temperature should be expressed as one of the following (in degrees Celsius): 55o, 50o, 40o, 30o, 20o, 10o, 0o, -10o, -20o, or -30o. Determine temperature by taking the average of the temperatures from each Chemical Downwind Message (CDM) line applicable to the time period of interest. Use this average temperature for all calculations. When estimating persistency for agents expected to last beyond the time period of interest, use the average daily temperature of the day in which the attack may occur. Wind speed will impact on casualty production, persistency, and downwind agent travel. It should be expressed as one of the following: 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, or 18 kilometers per hour (kmph). As a rule of thumb, for any wind speed above 18 kmph, use 18 kmph. Calculate wind speed in the same manner used above for temperature. In some situations it may be necessary to modify this number for casualty estimate purposes. For example if a 24-hour period contains six hours of expected high wind speeds (unstable conditions), a calculator would probably elect to disregard those figures and develop a separate (lower) average for casualty estimation. The staff estimates an enemy would not employ chemicals for casualty effects during that 6-hour period of high

E-13

Appendix E winds. Base this decision on the magnitude and duration of the wind change and the expected enemy COA. Stability categories (stable, neutral, or unstable) also affect casualty production and downwind agent travel. Stability has a major impact on casualty production down wind since it affects the vertical dispersion of the agent. During inversion (stable atmosphere) the agent is trapped in a shallow layer near the ground and the concentration remains high. When the atmosphere stability category is either neutral or unstable the agent’s concentration near the ground is lower. Inversions occur at night with clear skies and light winds. Determine the stability category in the same way as temperature and wind speed. Other environmental factors exist that could impact the analysis. Terrain and vegetation could affect the estimate. These factors can effect the dispersion of the agent, its concentration down wind, and the estimated casualties. However, these factors have been incorporated in the persistency estimate process. • Step 3. Estimate delivery capability. Estimate the number of chemical munitions likely to be employed in the AO for each required time period. Coordinate with the intelligence officer to produce this estimate. Provide the intelligence officer with the time periods of interest. Request information concerning the threat capability to deliver chemical munitions in your AO. •• The estimate should indicate the number of delivery units, by type, and the number of rounds, by agent, if available. The intelligence officer also provides estimates on when, where, and what type of agent the enemy might use in the AO. If the situation or event template does not yield needed information, assume the enemy can optimize the agent mix. For example, to determine the threat’s capability to create a contamination obstacle, assume they will fire only persistent agents. Likewise, to predict casualty effects, assume the enemy will fire agents that have the greatest casualty producing effects. •• When the primary threat is covert or unconventional, express enemy delivery capability in terms of agent weight or as agent weight times some expected delivery means. For example, ten kilograms of nerve agent delivered by an agricultural sprayer. If estimates indicate limited agent supply, it will be difficult to estimate how much of that supply will be used each day. As an option for this situation, conduct the analysis for a single enemy attack based on the threat’s maximum employment capability during the selected time period. •• The intelligence officer considers a number of factors in making his estimate such as the number of employment assets within range of the AO and other AOs the enemy force must service. NOTE: Do not assume every delivery system within range will be firing into the AO being considered. Enemy locations of chemical munitions. Weather effects on probable agents. Threat capability to deliver chemical munitions to delivery systems. Impact of threat attacks on civilians. •• The intelligence estimate should provide a range of numbers based on estimated COA for each time period. The estimate should provide the enemy’s maximum capability and his likely delivery capability. Alternatively, different estimates can support various enemy COAs. Estimates should not be based on a friendly COA unless they would significantly impact on the enemy delivery capability. •• It is not necessary to assess every possible situation and enemy option. To do so would result in inefficient use of available time. The goal is to provide estimates to the commander/staff, which can be later refined. Continuously assess the situation and look for events and options with the potential of changing the outcome of the battle. b. Generate Effects Information. Effect information will provide the following estimates: casualty effects and downwind agent effects. • Determine Casualty Estimate •• Step 1. Determine probable friendly targeted size. Based on the chemical staff and S2/G2 IPB, select an area/activity the enemy would probably target then determine the target size. For example, determine the area occupied by a fixed site activity, in this case 400m x 600m. Calculate the number of hectares (ha) in the selected target area. One hectare is 10,000 square meters; therefore, an area that is 400m x 600m = 240,000 square meters or 24 hectares. •• Step 2. Determine probable agent. Unless it is known which agents the threat will employ, assume the most effective casualty-producing agent available.

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NBC Risk Assessment/Vulnerability Analysis Tool •• Step 3. Estimate casualties based on intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB). The number of rounds the threat may use to engage the specific target. Predicted temperatures (from CDM or other sources). For additional information refer to FM 3-3, Nuclear Contamination Avoidance; FM 3-7, NBC Field Handbook; FM 3-14, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Vulnerability Analysis; AFMAN 32-4017, Civil Engineer Readiness Technician Manual for NBC Defense; and AFMAN 32-4019, Chemical-Biological Commanders Guide.

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Appendix E

Intentionally Blank

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APPENDIX F NBC WARNING MESSAGE AND THREAT CONDITION SYSTEM 1. General The NBC Warning and Reporting System (NBCWRS) is developed to provide critical data on enemy NBC attacks and resulting hazard areas to the various levels of command within NATO. This system provides for reporting the following: nuclear detonations, radioactive contamination, enemy biological or chemical attacks and resulting contamination, predicting and warning of fallout areas, and predicting/warning of chemical hazard areas. This information contributes to the declared “Threat Condition.”

SECTION A. STANDARD MESSAGE SYSTEM 2. NATO NBC Reporting and Warning Categories a. Source Level. Observation Posts (OPs) or any agency below NBC collection or NBC sub-collection centers fall into this category. The responsibilities of the source level are: • Report the initial enemy use of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons by the most expeditious means available (FLASH precedence). (NBC 1) • Report immediately any further NBC attacks and subsequent data to the NBC sub-collection or NBC collection center. (NBC 1) • Disseminate timely warnings of predicted hazard areas to enable forces to increase their NBC state or readiness, to conduct monitoring and to prepare for survey and decontamination. (NBC 3) • Report monitoring and survey results to the NBC sub-collection or NBC collection center. (NBC 4) • Submit detailed information on chemical or biological attacks on request. (NBC 6) b. NBC Sub-Collection Centers and NBC Collection Centers (NBCCC). This is the NBCCC on air bases. Corps or lower formation, headquarters, air division headquarters, sector operation centers fall into this category. Their responsibilities include: • Report the initial enemy use of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons by the most expeditious means available in accordance with directives and standard operating procedures (SOPs). (NBC 1) • Clarify, consolidate, and evaluate NBC attack data reported from the source level or other NBC centers or agencies. (NBC 1 and NBC 2) • Compute fallout predictions and chemical downwind hazard areas based upon processed NBC attack data and pass the appropriate warnings to units likely to be affected. (NBC 3) • Direct survey efforts within its zone of observation. • Analyze survey and monitoring results and pass actual contaminated areas to units likely to be affected. (NBC 4 and NBC 5) • Request and provide detailed information on chemical and biological attacks as directed. (NBC 6) • Exchange NBC information with appropriate national military and civilian reporting agencies. c. NBC Control Center Level. Major NATO commands, major subordinate commands, and forward-deployed headquarters such as in Southwest Asia fall into this category. Their responsibilities include: • Report the initial enemy use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons by the most expeditious means available in accordance with directives and SOPs. (NBC 1)

F-1

Appendix F • Clarify, consolidate, and evaluate NBC attack data reported from the source level or other NBC centers or agencies. (NBC 1 and NBC 2) • Transmit promptly NBC warnings to adjacent HQ or agencies when predicted hazard areas extend beyond their own area of observation. (NBC 3) • Exchange NBC information with appropriate national military and civilian authorities as arranged by directives and SOPs. • Organize and coordinate the NBC warning system within its area of observation by contributing to the war plans and issuing a comprehensive directive and/or SOP. • Submit reports to higher headquarters and adjacent agencies as required. (NBC Summary Report)

3. Standard NBC Message Purpose Organizations within the NBCWRS should use the standard NBC message formats for reporting nuclear, biological, and chemical attacks and predicted or actual hazard areas following attacks. a. NBC 1 through NBC 6 Report Application • NBC 1 Observers initial report. • NBC 2 Used for passing evaluated data. • NBC 3 Used for immediate warning of predicted contamination and hazard areas. • NBC 4 Used for passing monitoring and survey results. • NBC 5 Used for passing information on areas of actual contamination. • NBC 6 Used for passing detailed information on chemical or biological attacks. b. NBC SITUATION Report is used for passing information on the NBC situation. The NBC SITREP is a free text message; any rules for content are given by the local national authority or command. c. NBC Summary Report is used for passing information on the NBC situation. d. STRIKWARN is used to warn of impending nuclear attack. e. CHEMWARN is used to warn of impending chemical attack. f. NBC Weather and Wind Messages are used to pass pertinent information (e.g. direction, speed, and conditions). g. Signal/Audio/Visual Services Supplement (SAV SER SUP) provides general information on communication matters. The SAV SER SUP also supplements and amplifies, signal operating instructions (SOIs), signal extracts instructions (SEIs), and SOPs issued by the United States Army Special Forces Command (USASFC) for Special Operations communications.

4. JWARN JWARN is a joint warning system of detectors, computers, printers, and software tied together with communications that will rapidly detect, identify, and disseminate data on CB threats. For detailed information on NBCWRS message formats refer to FM 3-7, NBC Field Handbook. For convenient reference see Graphic Training Aid (GTA) 3-6-8, NBC Warning and Reporting System.

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NBC Warning Message and Threat Condition System SECTION B. THREAT CONDITIONS 5. General The NBC Threat Warning System provides commanders with information to establish appropriate unit defense measures. This system consolidates the most current intelligence estimates, intent and activities, and recommends measures to be employed to combat a threat.

6. THREATCON White a. Probability of attack: Negligible/Low b. Definition: The opposing force does not posses NBC defense equipment, is not trained in NBC defense or employment and does not posses the capability to employ NBC agents or systems nor will they most probably gain access to NBC agents. c. Enemy indicators: None d. Recommended actions: • A deploying force would not necessarily have to carry their full complement of chemical defense equipment (CDE). However, ground forces should carry protective masks and components should have a contingency plan to deploy and distribute their full complement of CDE if the situation warrants. • Chemical personnel should concentrate effort in smoke and herbicide employment planning and constantly monitor threat indicators for any change in the enemy NBC status.

7. THREATCON Green a. Probability of attack: Possible/Low b. Definition: The opposing force has an offensive CB capability, has received training in defense and employment techniques, but there are no indications of the use of CB weapons in the immediate future. c. Indicators: There has been no overt NBC activity. The enemy has a CB capability but weapons have not been dispersed or deployed. d. Recommended unit actions: • Personnel carry their IPE and commanders have additional contingency IPE stockpiles identified and readily available for distribution, if the threat status should increase. • Conduct refresher NBC defense training to include individual common survival skills training, team training, and unmasking procedures. • Activate the NBCWRS. • Activate passive NBC defense measures. • Identify decontamination sites, water sources, and civilian nuclear, biological and chemical hazards. • Analyze CDE logistics requirements. Submit requests for Host Nation Support if required.

8. THREATCON Amber a. Probability of attack: Probable/Medium

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Appendix F b. Definition: The enemy is equipped and trained in NBC defense and employment techniques. NBC weapons and employment systems are readily available. There are indicators the enemy will employ weapons in the immediate future in the JTF AOR. c. Indicators: • The enemy is exercising with NBC delivery systems. • NBC munitions have been deployed to either field storage sites or firing sites. • Enemy troops are wearing or carrying protective equipment. • Enemy NBC reconnaissance elements observed with conventional units. • Enemy decontamination units observed with front line units. • The opposing force use of meteorological radars associated with surface to surface missiles (SSMs) has been detected. d. Recommended unit actions: • Deploy NBC detection device and alarms; initiate selective, periodic or continuous monitoring. • Integrate routine NBC reconnaissance assets (if assigned) into conventional reconnaissance plan. • Rehearse decontamination procedures. • Analyze MOPP level and consider change based on current situation and mission. • Intensify training; rehearse IPE exchange and automatic masking procedures. • Cover vehicles, supplies, and equipment to the fullest extent possible. • Fill portable decontamination apparatuses and mount on vehicles (if applicable). • Issue Class VIII medical supplies. Begin prophylaxis with command approval.

9. THREATCON Red a. Probability of attack: High b. Definition: There is a strong indication of imminent use of NBC weapons. The opposing force has threatened to use NBC weapons. In addition to those listed for THREATCON Amber, indicators may include: • NBC weapons have been used within the AOR. • Enemy observed providing NBC warning to its forces. • Munitions delivered to firing units within range of friendly forces. • In addition to those listed for THREATCON Amber, recommended unit actions include: •• Initiate continuous NBC monitoring. •• Begin operation of collective protective shelters and other systems.

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NBC Warning Message and Threat Condition System SECTION C. THREAT CONDITION ACTIONS 10. PRE-ATTACK ACTIONS — Alarm Amber a. Assess Likelihood of NBC Attack and Inform Unit. The NBC assessment team should advise the commander on the current NBC threat. The commander should initiate unit notification of the possibility of NBC attack by declaring Alarm Amber, at the appropriate time. This tells unit personnel to be observant for signs of an NBC attack and to take appropriate precautionary measures. b. Suspend Noncritical Activities and Shelter All Non-mission Essential Personnel. The Commander should initiate sheltering of all non-mission essential personnel in designated shelters, available collective protection systems, or inner rooms of buildings (improvised shelters) which offer the best available degree of protection from contamination when the possibility of attack is imminent. Personnel should remain in these areas when not performing mission essential tasks. c. Monitor Health Status/Disease Situation. Preventive medicine personnel should continuously evaluate and assess the unit’s health status and environmental situation for indications of an NBC attack. They should look for agent symptoms, unusual disease patterns or indications of environmental contamination. Information sources include medical intelligence reports, disease and injury rates, laboratory analysis results, and epidemiological studies. d. Watch for Attack Indications. All personnel should be alert for signs of attack. Personnel specifically monitoring air and land approaches to the base, such as active air defense units, security forces, and air traffic control personnel, should be particularly alert for indications of attack e. Activate/Monitor Detectors and Detection Systems. Commanders should direct activation and monitoring of available detectors by shelter teams and readiness personnel and initiate periodic sampling/analysis performed by the preventive medicine staffs. f. Cover Unprotected Mission Essential Equipment. Commanders should direct units to cover mission essential equipment to prevent deposition of contamination on the equipment. This will reduce the need for decontamination and minimize the possibility of personnel contaminating themselves if they have to handle the equipment at a later time.

11. TRANS-ATTACK ACTIONS — Alarm Red a. Attack Warning. Trans-attack procedures begin when the attack against the base begins. Detection and warning of the attack are critical to the implementation of protective measures. The attack warning signal, Alarm Red, directs personnel to take cover and use protective measures. b. Take Cover. Taking cover protects personnel against blast, shrapnel, heat, and liquid and particulate contamination. After taking cover, personnel don their masks and remaining protective gear as appropriate. All but the most mission essential functions cease. Personnel able to safely observe the attack in progress should watch for any unique signs of an NBC attack. c. Use MOPP 4. All personnel should assume MOPP 4 (full IPE) in the absence of any other information, and remain in IPE until directed to reduce the MOPP level. Commanders should consider going with full MOPP until they can gain more information on the type and extent of contamination. MOPP levels may then be reduced accordingly. The ultimate goal is to balance mission continuation with force survivability in order to maximize mission effectiveness. Towards this end, the concept of risk assessment (what risk a commander is willing to take in relation to the importance of the mission) is an integral part of the equation. d. Keep Shelters Closed. Shelter teams or senior personnel in each shelter should ensure shelter doors remain closed as much as possible to limit infiltration of contamination, and control personnel entering and exiting the shelter.

12. POST-ATTACK ACTIONS — Alarm Black a. Maximize Shelter Use and Restrict Nonessential Movement. Commanders should ensure personnel continue to use shelters as long as there is residual contamination.

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Appendix F b. Employ Contamination Control Measures for Shelter Entry. Shelter teams should employ contamination control measures to limit the infiltration of contamination. They should continue to do so until it has been determined there is no longer a contamination hazard. c. Avoid Potentially Contaminated Surfaces/Areas. All personnel should minimize contact with potentially contaminated surfaces until there are indications that surface contamination is no longer a hazard. d. Obtain and Report Observations or Evidence of NBC Attack. Base personnel and designated specialized team members (i.e., security, shelter, reconnaissance, ordnance, and damage assessment) provide reconnaissance and assessment information for all types of damage and hazards. During initial reconnaissance, personnel should be observant for activated detectors, operating or spent NBC delivery systems or devices, such as spray tanks, aerosol generators, and submunitions or bomblets. This information should flow up to the survival recovery center where readiness personnel will report any indications of NBC attacks to higher headquarters through established NBC Warning and Reporting systems. e. Survey, Control, and Mitigate NBC Health Hazards. The preventive medicine staffs should continue to take patient and environmental samples to analyze them or send them to DOD labs for analysis. They should review medical intelligence reports, monitor patient diagnoses and symptoms, and conduct epidemiological studies to find and inform commanders of the indications of an NBC attack. If there are indications of an NBC attack, the medical staff should administer antidotes, vaccines and antibiotics and prepare to quarantine casualties as dictated by the agent and previous medical protective countermeasures. They should provide treatment for NBC casualties according to established medical protocols. Such treatment includes supportive measures, isolation procedures, and antibiotic, antiviral, or antitoxin therapy. f. Adjust MOPP. Commanders should adjust the MOPP to the lowest possible level consistent with identified hazards. g. Handle and Dispose of Contaminated Remains. Commanders should ensure mortuary affairs and medical personnel, including augmentees, identify and place suspected NBC contaminated remains in double human remains pouches (one inside the other) and mark them with “CHEMICAL” or “CHEM”, “BIOLOGICAL” or “BIO”, prior to evacuation to theater mortuary affairs decontamination collection points or local temporary mass burial. Nuclear contaminated remains require additional special handling.

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APPENDIX G NBC HAZARD PREDICTION 1. General SOF elements confronted with an NBC hazard will utilize the NBC message warning system to submit critical information. Once received in the NBC Collection Center (NBCCC), it is critical to quickly interpret and prepare NBC reports. These reports are vital during any wartime contingencies in which the enemy has the ability to employ NBC weapons. Information must be current and accurate to allow for mission critical decisions. The impact of NBC agents can influence operational tempo and sustainment of forces.

SECTION A. CHEMICAL CONSIDERATIONS 2. Chemical Warfare Agents a. Chemical warfare agents are classified according to physical state, physiological action, and use. Threat forces classify chemical agents according to their physiological effect on the body, such as nerve, blood, blister, and choking. The terms persistent and nonpersistent describe the time an agent stays in an area. Persistent chemical agents affect the battlefield for an extended period of time. Conversely, nonpersistent agents affect the battlefield for relatively short periods of time. b. The hazards from a chemical strike may last for less than an hour or for several weeks. The effects on personnel may be immediate. For units forced into high levels of protection, missions will take longer to perform. Figure G-1 is a summary of chemical weapon, RCA, and TIM characteristics that commanders, staffs, and personnel need to consider when planning operations in a chemical environment.

CHEMICAL OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS Chemical Agent

Tabun (GA)

Target of Choice

Personnel

(colorless to brown liquid; odorless to fruity)

Sarin (GB)

Method of Employment/ Portal of Entry (PoE)

Night/Early Morning; Artillery, Bomb, Inversion; Wind 6-16 km Missile, Bomblet

Personnel

1 to 2 Days

Night/Early Morning; Artillery, Bomb, Inversion; Wind 6-16 km Missile, Bomblet

Effect/Rate of Action (RoA)

Prevention

Treatment

Untreated - visual disturbance, secretions, nausea, diarrhea, twitching, seizures, paralysis, death:

Individual Protective Equipment (IPE); Pyridostigmine Bromide (PB)

Atropine/2-Pam Chloride; Diazepam Benzodiazepines Ventilate as required.

IPE

Same as Tabun

RoA: Vapor - seconds to minutes Liquid - minutes 1 Day Same as Tabun Cold - months RoA: Vapor - seconds to minutes Liquid - minutes

Figure G-1. Chemical Operational Planning Considerations

G-1

Appendix G CHEMICAL OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS (Cont.) Chemical Agent

Mustard (H, HD, HN-1, HN-2, HN-3

Target of Choice

Personnel, Equipment, Terrain

Conditions for Employment

Above 56F

(colorless to pale yellow to dark, oily liquid; garlic/fishy/fruity to odorless)

Arsine (AS)

Personnel

Night/Early Morning; Inversion; Wind 6-16 km

Personnel

Night/Early Morning; Inversion; Wind 6-16 km

Personnel

(colorless to brown; geranium/floral)

Phosgene (CG)

Artillery; B omb; Missile

Portable Cylinder

Night/Early Morning; Inversion; Wind 6-16 km

Artillery, Bomblet

Night/Early Morning; Inversion; Wind 6-16 km

Artillery, Bomblet

PoE: Respiratory, Digestive

PoE: Skin, Respiratory Personnel

Night/Early Morning; Inversion; Wind 6-16 km

(colorless gas; ne w cut hay)

Phosgene Oxime

Days to Year Temperature Dependent

Portable Cylinder

Night/Early Morning; Inversion; Wind 6-16 km

Artillery, Bomblet

Blisters; Respiratory Tract, immune suppression; death

Prevention

Treatment

Supportive Therapy; Calamine; Antibiotics; Major exposure topical antibacterial cream; Eyes neomycin ophthalmic ointment

IPE

Supportive Therapy

IPE

Oxygen Amyl or Sodium Nitrite and Sodium Thiosulfate

IPE

Supportive Therapy

Environmental Immediate pain, blisters, airway damage persistent. More Volatile than mustard RoA: 30 minutes to 13 hours, inhalation - fatal in 10 minutes

IPE

Same as Mustard. Treat with British Anitlewisite

Minutes to Hours

IPE

Oxygen; Supportive Therapy; Avoid exertion

IPE

Supportive Therapy

IPE

Supportive Therapy

IPE

Supportive Therapy

IPE

Supportive Therapy

IPE

Oxygen; Supportive Therapy; Avoid exertion

Special clothing; respirator

Supportive Therapy; Flush eyes and skin with water

RoA: 2 to 48 hours Minutes

Severe respiratory, headache, nausea, vomitting RoA: 2 hours to days

Minutes

Deep breathing, convulsions, death

RoA: Exposure to onset - 15 seconds - minutes; Lethal dose - inhalation- seconds 1 Day

PoE: Skin, Respiratory

Immediate pain, skin welts, sores, fluid on lungs RoA: 30 seconds

Riot Control Agents (RCAs) CS/CN

Personnel, Terrain

Wind - Light

Spray tank; Bomblet; Bulk; Grenade

(white powder; apple blossom/ pepper)

Adamsite (DM)

19 kph (aerial bombs

Air Stability

Stable

Neutral

Unstable

Temperature

> 21 degrees C

4 - 41 degrees C

< 4 degrees C

Humidy

> 60%

40 - 60%

< 40%

Precipitation

None

Light

Any

Figure G-2. Weather Effects on Chemical Agents

d. Adversaries may choose to deliver agents upwind of targets, in which case, stable or neutral conditions with low to medium winds of 5-13 kph are the most favorable conditions. Marked turbulence, winds above 19kph, moderate to heavy rain, and an air stability category of “unstable” result in unfavorable conditions for chemical clouds. Figure G-3 depicts the visible indications of atmospheric conditions that are favorable or unfavorable to a successful biological/chemical attack.

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NBC Hazard Prediction

ATMOSPHERIC INDICATIONS OF BIOLOGICAL/CHEMICAL ATTACK

a.

Smoke, Neither Rising or Falling. An indication of a normal temperature gradient-neutral atmospheric stability prevails-BW/CW attack prospects are generally favorable.

b.

Smoke Rising. An indication of a high temperature gradient-atmosphere is thermally unstable-BW/CW attack prospects are poor.

c.

Smoke Falling/Inversion Condition. An indication of a low temperature gradient-atmosphere is thermally stable-BW/CW attack prospects are generally excellent. Figure G-3. Atmospheric Indication of Biological/Chemical Attack Prospects

e. Most weather conditions do not affect the quantity of munitions needed for effective, initial liquid contamination.

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Appendix G SECTION B. CHEMICAL PLOTTING 3. Simplified Chemical Plots Chemical plotting is one of the critical tasks performed in the NBCCC. Raw data from NBC 1 reports and current weather information is necessary to construct a chemical plot. Chemical plots are divided into two categories: Type A (air contamination) and Type B (ground contamination) attacks. The sole source document for chemical plotting is Allied Tactical Publication (ATP) 45A and should always be referenced when constructing a plot. a. Chemical Downwind Message (CDM). A key element in constructing any type of plot is current surface weather conditions. CDMs are valid for six hours. The CDM contains downwind direction and speed, air stability, temperature, humidity, any significant weather, and cloud cover. Anytime a CDM is used you must insure that it is valid at the time of use and that it was developed for your location. b. Type A Chemical Plots. Type A chemical plots are constructed after each air contamination attack. There are two distinct plots under Type A, which are referred to as “cases” (1 and 2). Determining which case to use is based on wind speed. If the wind speed is 10 kmph or less, then you use case one and if the wind speed is >10 kmph or greater then case two is used. In determining the case always use a current CDM. • Case one plots are always a circle plot with a one km radius circle around the center of the attack location and a 10 km radius circle around the attack location. • A case two plot is always constructed with wind speeds >10 kmph or greater. The case two plot has a specific wind direction and 30 degree angles forming on each side of the centerline. The downwind distance of a case two plot is determined by the air stability and delivery method c. Type B Chemical Plots. Type B chemical plots are constructed after a confirmed ground contaminating attack. There are six distinct plots that are also referred to as cases. Without exception all Type B plots have a maximum downwind distance of 10 km. Determining which case to use will be based on the wind speed and the size of the attack area. • Cases 1, 3, and 5 are constructed when the wind speed is 10 kmph or less. Case 1 is a one km radius circle around the attack area and a 10 km radius circle around the attack area. Case 3 is a 2 km radius circle around the center of the attack area and a 10 km radius circle around center the center of the attack area. Case 5 is spray attack with a 1 km radius circle around the start and finish locations of the attack and a 10 km radius circle around these same two points. • Cases 2, 4, and 6 are constructed when the wind speed is >10 km or greater. Case two is constructed with a one km radius attack area and a 10 downwind hazard. Case four is constructed with a 2 km radius circle attack area and a 10 km downwind hazard. Case 6 is a spray attack with two 1 km radius circles and two 10 km down-wind hazard areas. • Recalculation: It may necessary to recalculate an existing plot because of changes in weather conditions. The weather conditions that could cause you to recalculate a plot are: •• Wind direction changes of 30 degrees or more. •• A change in air stability category that extends the downwind hazard or a change in wind speed. Note: a new NBC 3 report has to be forwarded. •• There is a change in representative downwind speed of 10 kmph or more or if the wind increases from < 10 kmph to > 10 kmph or the reverse. For additional information on chemical attacks see FM 3-3, Chemical and Biological Contamination Avoidance.

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NBC Hazard Prediction SECTION C. BIOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 4. General Significant characteristics for biological warfare environments include: vulnerable target population, infectious or toxic agent properties, agent availability or adaptability for scaled-up production, agent stability, and agent suitability for aerosol dispersion. Limiting factors include biological properties, environmental factors, and dissemination methods.

5. Technical Aspects Biological agents can be classified as pathogens or toxins. Human pathogens are defined as organisms that cause disease in man. Pathogens include bacteria, rickettsia, chlamydia, fungi, and viruses. Naturally occurring toxins are non-living, byproducts of cellular processes that can be lethal or highly incapacitating. Figure G-4 is a summary of biological weapon characteristics that commanders, staffs, and personnel need to consider when planning operations in a biological environment. For additional details on hazards refer to JP 3-11, Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments.

BIOLOGICAL OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS Biological Agent

Target of Choice

Personnel Anthrax (B.anthracis)

Conditions for Employment

Darkness ,Temp