Final Paper on Chinese History (opium war)

December 10, 2017 | Author: Mrscourt | Category: Qing Dynasty, Unrest, Armed Conflict
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[Type the company name] 1 The Opium War: Its History and Legacy

The Opium War: Its History and Legacy 1. INTRODUCTION On August 29, 1842, a treaty was signed between the Queen of Great Britain and the Emperor of China, which entailed opening of the Northern ports of China, ceding the island of Hong Kong, and paying the total amount of twenty-one million dollars in four different dates. Things do not add up when we consider why the Qing Dynasty (1644 – 1911), with the largest standing army (800,000 soldiers) in the world, lost numerous battles against the 7,000 British soldiers dispatched in China (Lovell 113). To that peculiarity, discussions of the following four themes, globally occurred in the 19th century, might shed light on our understanding of the Qing’s fall during the Opium War (1839 – 1841): the advent of new ideologies, increased desire for international free trade, internal upheavals and treatment, and advanced military technology. Throughout the 19th century, the four factors (or lack thereof) played crucial roles in defining the Opium War in the global context. First, ideologies like nationalism and patriotism expanded throughout the world, putting the national interest as the single most important consideration. Second, desires to gain access to previously untapped markets led advanced nations to expand the region of free trade across the continents. Third, riots, civil wars, and industrial depressions weakened the internal stability of China as well as Britain. Fourth, technological development and exploitation of new source of energy (i.e. coal) allowed the western armies to expand militarily. These four global themes equally affected China and Britain, by which China’s conflict with Britain in stopping the opium trade intensified, by which the British Parliament justified entering a war with the Qing Dynasty, and by which China suffered military defeat and was forced to sign the Treaty of Nanking (August 29, 1842). 2. THE QING EMPIRE AND THE APPOINTMENT OF LIN ZEXU

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The quest for China seemed quite clear: eradicate the supplies and demands of opium in Canton and restore the healthy economic balance. But there were formidable obstacles to achieving this, and such were internal fragility in China, entangled financial interests of multiple parties and pressure for the free trade, abetted by British lobbyists to the British Parliament. Daoguang (1820 – 1850), Qing Emperor in the 19th century, appointed Lin Zexu (December 31, 1838 – September 28, 1840) to resolve this cluster of problems. Yet, Lin’s strict anti-opium policy combined with his several miscalculations exacerbated the conflict between China and Britain. Charles Elliot (1836 – May 1841), who represented British trade in Canton, was not shy about initiating a war for the benefit of the British. At the backdrop of the sequences leading up to the Opium War was Lin’s diplomatic shortfall. Eventually, the combination of China’s internal and external failures paved the destructive path to the Opium War.

China’s Internal Struggle Even before the Emperor Daoguang took the throne in 1820, Qing Dynasty (1644 – 1911) struggled to maintain China’s internal order. The Dynasty formed upon the granite spilled of the Han people’s blood. For example, in 1645, Manchu’s ten-day rampage in the city of Yangzhou left 800,000 dead Chinese bodies (Lovell 209). Since the bloody conquest, the chasm between the Han and the Manchu had continued to deepen. Therefore, as the minority leader of majority Han people, Daoguang symbolized the centuries-long issue of legitimating its leadership—the rights to rule by the Heaven’s decree (the Mandate of Heaven). Continuous expansion throughout Kangxi’s reign (1661 – 1722) and Qianlong’s reign (1736 – 1795) stretched the frontlines of the empire, conquering many nations such as Taiwan, Mongolia and Tibet (Lovell 39 – 40); However the Qing Dynasty in the 18th century faced what Paul Kennedy called

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―imperial overstretch‖, according to which the empire was forced to fight internal and external wars without adequate financial resources or manpower (Bayly 89). Three invasions of Burma (1766 – 1769) resulted in defeats or stale mates, and occupation of Vietnam in 1788 collapsed with the loss of 4,000 soldiers. Internally, the public order continued to decline in the 1830s, and Qing government’s military power was eroded by the constant domestic rebels (Lovell 42 - 43). Population exploded, all vying for jobs and resources, causing ecological damages as well as bureaucratic chaos. The government system had overextension problems and failed to secure funds to fulfill its functions. Failure to offer growing applicants civil servant positions resulted in lack of social mobility. Worse yet, the examination system discriminated by giving preferential treatment to the minority Manchus, increasingly frustrating the Hans (Lovell 44 - 46). In part, the Emperor’s personality contributed to his regime’s internal instability. Daoguang was indecisive and prone to scapegoat others for any flaws or failures. His lack of trust in his people and fickleness often led him to reprimand the officials. Daoguang would censure and replace commanders who could not win the ―impossible victories,‖ foretelling indication of Lin Zexu’s punishment once he lost the battle with the British warships (Lovell 41 42). Over the period of 1840 and 1841, Daoguang replaced more than five generals in charge of the battles. At the letter of victory, the emperor would bestow feathers of peacock for congratulations as fast as he would ostracize and punish a general for the war loss.

Corruption in China By the 1830s, widespread Opium usage devastated the Chinese population, especially in Canton. As the majority of population witnessed, smoking opium was not some exotic luxury, but an addictive pattern that self-discipline could not fix. In Chinese Repository Volume 4’s

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article 6, entitled ―Journal of occurrences‖, the unnamed author described how the death of a person from the opium usage was not uncommon, and that even though investigations would follow, the public did not deem such death shocking or anything out of ordinary (Chinese Repository 4 1834, 248). The detailed instructions of preparing opium for smoke were openly available to the public, allowing an average Chinese to make his own opium smoke within a day. This implied the wide access people had to opium in 1837 (Chinese Repository 6 1837, 200 – 205). Despite the edicts commenced by the emperor against the opium, spread of opium was irreversible like that of a plague. Moreover, by the 1830s, the opium issue already penetrated the government officials. A number of notorious opium offenders included employees in the government at Canton, most of whom smoked and even helped selling opium. For instance, a dismissed captain from a military regiment used his previous position to protect the smugglers, making handsome profit by such action (Waley 18). If the guards or officials found ship selling opium, they would habitually let the offenders escape in exchange for a bribe (Waley 60). Under the surface of the opium trade by the British were the Hong merchants in Canton. They gained vast wealth by assisting foreign factories to establish and thrive, all of which contributed to the growth of opium importation in Canton. The merchants also prepared the exchange of opium with silver bullions, abetting the illegal outflow of silver from China, which inhibited the Qing’s effort to finance the military operations (Chinese Repository 7 1839, 615 – 617).

3. LIN ZEXU, CHARLES ELLIOT AND THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT

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Relationship between Lin and the emperor bore similarities to that between Elliot and the British Parliament. Both men were dismissed by the authorities to whom and which they swore allegiance. Both became scapegoats for their failures to resolve opium trade issues that were mostly structurally caused rather than by an individual’s fault. Curiously enough, another set of comparison can be made between the Qing Empire and the British Parliament, where the former’s internal instabilities also incurred in the latter. The only difference was that the British Parliament looked outside of the country to resolve this problem.

Relationship Between Lin Zexu and Daoguang To the Emperor, Lin was the right man for the daunting mission of removing opium from the surface of Canton. The difficulties with the opium ban were complex, as the officials usually exploited their titles to gain wealth, and that many officials themselves smoked opium. But Lin, from the beginning of his career, was famous for his bureaucratic virtuosity, extreme diligence and incorruptibility (Lovell 56). His tenacity for pursuing what is ethical earned Daoguang’s trust. On the day after his arrival in Canton, Lin laid out the orders to restrict and examine his staffs for any wrongdoings. He also focused solely on import and export to estimate the magnitude of the opium trade, determined to resolve the opium matter (Waley 20 – 21). The relationship between the Emperor and Lin, however, deteriorated quickly as the war progressed in 1841. There were a couple of attributes. First, Daoguang’s fickle mind and intolerance of any loss made him lose trust on Lin. Second, the physical distance from Peking to Canton prevented Lin from frequent interactions with the Emperor. As the saying goes, those who have the Emperor’s ears will influence his actions: Eunuchs had Daoguang’s ears; Lin did not. Weeks took for Lin’s letters to be delivered in Peking, and sometimes letters written in

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different dates arrived on the same day, causing Daoguang to question Lin’s credibility (Waley 123). Absent of the Emperor’s support, Lin could not carry through what he set out to do.

Lin Zexu’s Role on the Road to the Opium War Armed with determination, Lin banned opium trade and consumption in Canton. But his resolute determination positioned him to be inflexible in dealing with the British traders. The foremost reason for this was his miscalculation that the British will not provoke a war with China. To the contrary, the British had vested interest in maintaining the trade for its national economy. Even by 1836, three to four years before the Opium War began, annual outflow of silver mounted to ten or more millions of taels (Chinese Repository 5 140 – 142). Lord Palmerston, the British Foreign Secretary, persuaded the Queen that only by trading opium could the balance of trade be maintained—otherwise the finances of India would suffer disastrous damages (Waley 31). Thus, the British’s stakes in the opium trade were quite large an incentive for the British to engage in a war. Furthermore, Lin’s Sino-centric view led him to once believe that the British would perish without the goods imported from China such as tea and rhubarb (Waley 33). Perhaps, Lin gave too much weight to the consideration that the British would cease the opium trade so as to continue the legal trade with China. In his letter to the British Queen, Lin warned her that continuation of the opium trade would lead the Chinese to destroy both illegal and legal shipments (Chinese Repository 8 9 - 11). Nevertheless, just as Britain relied on trading with China, vast number of people in Canton made living with the bilateral trades besides opium (Waley 87). Burying himself deeply into the mission, Lin unlikely saw the impact of a complete halt in the opium trade.

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As a diplomatic letter, Lin’s writing utterly ignored the British perspectives. Though he had much interest in Western culture and people, he failed to exhibit his understanding during the diplomacy with Britain. Used phrases like ―heaven-like benevolence‖, ―permission‖ and ―calamities from heaven‖ implied that the principles of heaven stood for China, and that Britain ought to respect this (Chinese Repository 8 9 – 11). While the tribute system in China— allegiance paid by foreigners in return for protection—could have led Lin to assume a higher ground, a more underlying reason for his ―superiority‖ has to do with his misjudgment that the Chinese would easily defeat the British. Reality of the Chinese naval power should have sunk in after the first engagement at Chuenpee on November 3rd 1839, where two English frigates drove back the largest Chinese naval forces (Waley 85). The incident should have ―confirmed to Lin that Qing ships and cannon were no match for the British (Lovell 94).‖ However, Lin obstinately disregarded this notion. On February 19th, 1840, Lin opined that the British navy could not bring ammunition and provisions to last, and that their crews would be worn out, easily disposable by the Chinese forces (Waley 99). On October 24th, 1840, after the warfare had begun, Lin maintained, ―the English…despite all appearances to the contrary, are at the end of their resources (Waley 118).‖ These suggest his fundamental misunderstanding of the magnitude of the British forces and British government’s vast motive in running the opium trade.

Relationship between Charles Elliot and the British Parliament

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Just like Lin, Elliot also had to cope with the slow communication between him and Palmerston, his superior in London. First commercial electrical telegraph was developed in July 9th, 1839, and the advent of first transatlantic telegraphs cable materialized in 1866 (Hubbard 78). His dispatches took five months to arrive in London and a return dispatch would take another six months, making the communication with the British government extremely inconvenient. But this was Elliot’s only one of many problems he had to confront in Canton and in Britain. The two Chinese sources of the Opium War, Lin Zexu and The Opium War, depict Charles Elliot as a villain, who turned previously commercial disputes into a national war (Lovell 61). But a closer look at his role would find that such descriptions slip past a complicated relationship between Elliot and the British government. While Elliot patriotically served Britain, he personally abhorred the opium trade and opium’s perversity. His self-contradiction derived from the clash of his personal belief against opium and the British government’s interest in maintaining the opium trade. Elliot was a frustrated man lodged in between two gigantic nations on the course of collision with each other. Charles Elliot, the Chief Superintendent of British Trade, served as a buffer between Britain and China. Elliot took responsibilities for something he never would have endorsed, such as the murder of Lin Weixi by the English and American sailors on July 7th, 1839. The incident embittered the British-Chinese relationship, and subsequently became Lin Zexu’s primary leverage to halt the trade in Canton. Lin demanded for the murderer of Lin Weixi, and declared that a failure to do so would put Elliot on trial (Waley 79). Facing the charges himself, Elliot eventually performed his duty by sheltering British offenders to be tried in British court, instead in the Qing court.

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Elliot also opposed the opium trade, controlled by the merchants like Jardine and Matheson. On the brink of the Opium War, he wrote to Palmerston, ―No man entertains deeper detestation of the disgrace and sin of this forced traffic on the coast of China than the humble individual [Elliot] who signs this dispatch (Lovell 63).‖ At the same time, Elliot clearly was not reserved about having a war with China, which in fact he believed would have the ―purgatory benefits (Lovell 68).‖ He would do what was in the best interest of his country. For that matter, Elliot served to the continuation of the opium trade that resulted in growing dispute with Lin’s strict opium ban, subsequently leading to the military intervention.

British Parliament and its Internal Problems British Parliament in the 1830s suffered as much internal instabilities as the Qing government. Poor harvest, industrial depression and high unemployment caused the majority Whigs party to lose support. Constant rebellions in Ireland, Jamaica and Canada threatened Britain’s social status quo, and external pressure in the form of blockades by France and Russia choked the trade route available for the British. Riots by Welsh Miners caused damage to the government facilities and authorities. Moreover, the idea of war lost interest to the politicians who have witnessed loss of 16,500 British soldiers during the expedition in Kabul (Lovell 98 – 105). Despite all the above notions to the contrary, British Parliament well understood that the only way to resolve their two million pound budget deficit was by continuing trades in China. Behind the scene of British Parliament’s decision to enter the war with China, there was a deeply rooted sense of nationalism, a sense of patriotic identity surrounding religion, language and resistance to invaders (Bayly 202 – 203). The nationalism turned the British Parliament’s attention from the lost profit from the opium ban to a more stirring issue of patriotism, issue of

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protecting the British citizens and restoring the national honor desecrated by the Chinese’s pompous behaviors. With the mixture of the patriotism and economic benefits, the British Parliament declared the war against the Qing Dynasty.

4. THE OPIUM WAR AND THE TREATY OF NANKING Once Elliot was dismissed, the Opium War turned around the corner of diplomacy to a straight warfare. Lin was also dismissed by Daoguang on September 28, 1840, and the newly appointed High Commissioner Qishan (September 1840 – February 13 1841) took charge of banning the opium trade and negotiating with the British naval forces. But the series of ensuing events suggested that no progresses were being made; the British warships hopelessly destroyed the Chinese troops and fortresses. A several important reasons for the failures in military engagements with the British could be found in military dilapidation, lack of honesty in internal communication, and local residents’ frustration towards the government: military technology could not compete with the battle-experienced British navies; lies given to Daoguang by the Chinese governor-generals amplified the problems in resolving the Opium trade issues; locals despised more the cruelty and corruption of the government officials than the defeat by the British.

Elliot’s Efforts to Maintain Sino-British Relations and Subsequent Dismissal Elliot believed that negotiation should salvage the long-term Sino-British relations, and in order for this, he asserted that rather than ―negotiation supported by the mere appearance of formidable forces‖ that might improve the trade in Canton temporarily, a long-term trade would be best attained by ―without a blow…by a quiet improvement of opportunities‖ that would allow

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the British to avoid China’s hostilities and deep hatred (Lovell 129). Despite the his contribution to the nation while sacrificing his safety, profit and family life, Elliot later finds himself pitted against the accusations of not fulfilling the duty and being sympathetic toward the Chinese. Palmerston, in April 1941, brought cases against Elliot for disobeying his original instructions to negotiate extraterritorial rights for British citizens, to agree on reasonable tariffs and most importantly, open the northern ports for trades (Lovell 169 – 170). Shortly after, Elliot was replaced by Sir Henry Pottinger, a 51 year old veteran of the British Indian Army (Lovell 177). Even after his dismissal, Elliot faced his notoriety depicted by the British newspapers, which deemed Elliot as the facilitator of the trade in opium, ―one of the darkest that ever invoked the wrath of the Most High God upon a people (Lovell 105).‖ But the blame against Elliot did not stop the opium trade. To the very opposite result, Elliot’s dismissal in May 1941 marked a fast turning point of the war, beyond which the British installed a gunboat diplomacy designed to effectively subdue the Qing Empire (Lovell 168).

Advanced Military Technology by the British Compared to the Qing’s Military The transition from the old regime to modernity occurred along with the discovery of coal usage for manufacturing and transportation. The development of steam power initiated a series of military-technological innovation in Northwestern Europe, giving them a decisive edge over non-European nations such as China, India, South America, and Africa (Bayly 60). The stable legal systems (e.g., property rights) and independent financial institutions fostered innovation and incentivized individuals to invest in innovating technologies. Large financial institutions supported commercial innovations by means of ―pooling risks and dividing management from ownership‖, allowing British firms to grow and expand their market beyond

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neighboring nations (Bayly 62). With time progression, Britain amassed sophisticated naval ships such as Nemesis (arrived in Canton on January 7, 1841), 184-by-29-foot iron steamer that boasted accuracies and firepower. In Britain, constant warfare gave them reasons to innovate and produce deadly weapons and warships. As a result, both armies and commercial firms recruited and train professional soldiers, later leveraging this advantage to carry out aggressive expedition in China (Bayly 64). To the contrary, the Qing forces lacked adequate equipment, fortress and warships. While the British acquired modern firepower, parts of the Qing army continued to use bows, swords and spears used in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Qing cannons weathered through centuries of neglect and were rusted. Qing’s warships were junks used for patrols, not capable of engaging in wars. Qing’s fortresses were roofless and poorly designed to defend against land warfare. Soldiers lacked disciplines. Under the minority Manchu Bannermen, the Chinese soldiers were underfed and underpaid, and therefore frequently protested, ransacked or deserted their duties. Even ammunitions were too endeared and expensive to be used for practical trainings (Lovell 114). In Chinese Repository 5 Article 3, entitled ―Military skill and power of the Chinese‖, the unnamed observer of the Chinese forces further described the state of Qing forces before the Opium War began. The Correspondent explained that the advancement of the British canons allowed the cannon ball to travel up to two miles. Meanwhile, the Chinese technology was in the same state as it was in the thirteenth century, and any development was only trifling (Chinese Repository 5 1836: 166). The author then delves into the ―miserable‖ quality of Chinese gunpowder easily subject to deterioration due to the changing weather. Many cannons in the forts of Canton River are old and useless, and Chinese marine cannons did not exist. The walls of

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the fortresses were also of the poor material (granite slabs), and soldiers in these forts were poorly trained and not disciplined (Chinese Repository 5 1836: 167). City of Zhoushan, in July, 1840, was completely destroyed by the British warship in nine minutes because of the stark difference in military advancement. In the battle of January 7, 1841, Qishan used a awful strategy of congesting the fortification with soldiers, even paying 11,000 dollars as bribes to men to stay and fight (Lovell 136). Against the British cannon bombardments, the fortress soon turned into a graveyard for the soldiers. Yishan (February 13, 1841 – October 1841) and Yang Fang (February 13, 1841 – April 23, 1841) who took Qishan’s position could not do much better (Lovell 137 – 145). Their lack of plan, a sense of urgency and incompetence resulted in battles that led the British to capture Canton on May 26, 1841, surrounding the city from the waters in the South and hills in the North. Subsequent battles at Ningbo, Zhenhai and Zhoushan with 12,000 soldiers under the leadership of Yijiang (October 18, 1841) in March 1842 proved to be futile against British gun-power, resulting in no British death but loss of six hundred Chinese troops. Same military defeat occurred during the battle at Zhapu (May 1842), and the battle of Zhenjiang (July 1842), all due to the worn out military equipments and lack of soldiers’ morale. During the battle in Canton in February 1841, officers and soldiers even fled on their small boats during the battle scene, the remaining soldiers shooting at their escaping superiors. On the other hand, the most British casualties inflicted were from the peasant militias who engaged in battles with the British to protect their families, not the Qing Empire: The Sanyuanli Incident on May 29, 1841 was subsequently commemorated by the Chinese as a triumph against the Western imperialism (Lovell 158).

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Lack of Honesty in Internal Communications and Locals’ Hatred Against Qing Officials Partly because the Qing military could not compete against the British, the Commissioners resorted to lying to the Emperor. When Qishan lost the battle on January 7, 1840, he informed Daoguang that the cause of the loss was due to the 2,000 Chinese traitors helping the British. On January 27, 1841 despite the emperor’s order to the contrary, Qishan invited Elliot for a face-to-face diplomatic meeting, while denying that the meeting had not happened at all (Lovell 137). This exchange of lies exacerbated the problems because to the emperor, who took the letter from his Commissioners at face value, the idea of negotiation and coming a term with the British never came across his mind. Daoguang further urged Qishan to punish and annihilate, saying that ―it’s time to dispatch a punitive mission to suppress them… my mind is made up, there will be no wavering at all. (Lovell 136)‖ Similarly, before March 20, 1841—when the Trade in Canton resumed—Yang Fang intentionally misinformed the Emperor that ―having lost two ships and countless men, the English fled in terror, no longer daring to advance.‖ Glorifying his interactions with the British was one thing. However, lies turned into troubles because without the accurate information, the emperor himself could not assess the situation and make salient decisions. Instead, on March 22, 1841, Daoguang ordered Yang Fang to pursue the British and storm Hong Kong, which in reality was simply impossible (Lovell 145). Finally, the locals had less intention of helping the Qing government than losing to the British forces. The fact was that the majority of the local residents, especially those Cantonese, depended greatly on foreign trade, and thus was hard hit by the Government’s opium ban policies (Waley 88). Meanwhile beginning with Lin Zexu, the locals at Canton were considered as traitors, Lin describing them as ―poisons‖ (Lovell 127). There were rationales for the Chinese

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local civilians’ hatred against the Chinese officials. In the city of Zhenjiang in July 1842, for example, the local Chinese groups were fighting not against the British, but the Manchu authorities who arrested the civilians at the flimsiest suspicion and killed them as traitors (Lovell 216). Incidents convinced the locals that the Machus were the ones who brought torments upon the Chinese, not the British soldiers.

5. CONCLUSION Among the seven articles of the one page treaty between the British and the Qing, the first article reads as follows: ―There shall henceforward be peace and friendship between Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and His Majesty the Emperor of China.‖ After the unilateral destruction in the Qing Empire, it is almost paradoxical that Britain would commence the treaty with the words such as ―peace‖ and ―friendship‖. Furthermore, the rest of the articles all note how China ought to open their ports (Canton, Amoy, Foochowfoo, Ningpo, and Shanghai) and allow consuls to be established in each port, also cede the island of Hong Kong and pay twenty-one millions of dollars for the damages and ransoms. Such humiliating terms starkly juxtapose with the letter Lin sent out to the Queen of Britain in early 1839, warning her against the ―calamities of Heaven‖ in one sentence and showing her ―Heaven-like benevolence‖ of the emperor in another (Chinese Repository 8 9 -11). We now understand that throughout the Opium War, ideologies like patriotism allowed the British Parliament to justify declaring a war, despite the negative public sentiments. On the other hand, lack of patriotism by the local Chinese made them sway by the economic interests and even assist the British in times of war. Perhaps the most important distinction between the British and the Qing government can be found in their reaction to their instabilities. Facing the

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internal upheavals and government deficit, British Parliament looked outward in China to defuse and distract the attention at the internal problems. Expedition in China to ensure free trade would help increase government revenue and reduce deficit. Conversely, Qing government looked inward in resolving the problems. Daoguang distrusted his men at the top, undermining the unity of his cabinet. The commissioners exploited the far distance from Peking, and lied about the victories and pulled scapegoat on others by calling the local civilians traitors. While the corrupt officials squeezed petty dollars from their own people, the British sucked away 10 million taels of silver each year from China. The Opium War legacy exposed the trust issues prevalent in the Qing government. After the war, people focused on improving technologies and infrastructures rather than blaming the war loss. Fundamentally, perhaps, the idea of nationalism or patriotism could not sprout in China. The minority Manchus, outsiders and foreigners themselves, massacred their way to the Chinese throne. Nationalism is rooted in the fact that the state represents the people within. The state of China clearly failed to represent the Han people in many aspects, including in granting as equal opportunities and respects as that given to Manchus. At the time of war and chaos, people witnessed the fearful—cannons, guns and death; but simultaneously, perhaps, people saw the truth and clarity of their government. The Opium War left the Chinese with stains and humiliation, but also hopes in future civil revolutions to come.

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Works Cited Bayly, C.A. Birth of the Modern World: 1780- 1914. Wiley-Blackwell, 2004. Hubbard, Geoffrey (1965) Cooke and Wheatstone and the Invention of the Electric Telegraph, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London ―Letter to the Queen of England from the imperial commissioner and the provincial authorities requiring the interdiction of opium". Chinese Repository Vol.VIII. Article II 1839. Lovell, Julia. The Opium War: Drugs, Dreams and the Making of China. First Edition edition. Picador USA, 2011. Military skill and power of the Chinese‖ Chinese Repository Vol. V. Article III 1836. "Opium". Chinese Repository Vol. V. Article VIII 1836. "Treaty between Her Majesty and the Emperor of China." N.p., 7 Nov. 1843. http://www.london-gazette.co.uk/issues/20276/pages/3597. Waley, A. The opium war through chinese eyes. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1958.

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Appendix (Timeline of the Opium War) 1838 December 31: Lin appointed by the Emperor Daoguang 1839 March 10: Lin arrives in Canton March 11: Lin posts to his staff about how he wants to focus only on Opium, and posts to general public to form a five people surveillance system. March 16: Meeting during which Lin discussed about sending letter to Queen. March 18: Lin determines that he wants to destroy all the foreign opium in front of the traders and the locals. April 22: Lin is appointed as Governor-General of Kiangnan and Kiangsi, the most coveted of all the Governor-Generalships. May 24: Emperor accepts Lin’s suggestion that he send opium to Peking (45) -- trust issues between Lin and Emperor. June 3: Destruction of the opium began. July 7: Murder of Lin Wei-His. July 19th: Now importers are subject to death penalty for dealing in opium. September 22: Lin lays down three conditions for a settlement--(1) the murderer of Lin Wei-Hsi must be surrendered, (2) the opium-receiving ships must all leave China at once, and (3) any opium-trading ship still loitering at Canton will be deserted. September 28: Lin asserts that if the murder of Lin Wei-Hsi is not handed over, China will annihilate the English. October 6: Lin writes to the Emperor to defend the guarantee system instead of all-search procedure. October 14: Captain Waner of Thomas Coutts becomes the first guarantee signer. November 3: Captain Smith of Volage opens fire at the Chinese Naval forces December 6: All British ships are debarred from trading.

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1840 January 18: Captain Warner of the Thomas Coutts was responsible for delivering the letter to Queen Victoria but did not come through. January 26: Lin’s Special Commissioner position ended. February 19: Emperor’s first warning to Lin for his accountability. February29: 23 Chinese boats for opium trade are set on fire. May 4: Lin opposes to Tseng’s proposal of total abolition of all foreign trade during the Committee meeting. June 21: The main body of British expeditionary force (consisted of twenty warships) appears in Canton. June 24: The British forces leaves from Canton to Northward. July 4: Fall of Ting-Hai by the British force. August 3: James Gordon Bremer, Commander-in-Chief of the British naval, declares a state of blockade in Canton. August 11: Elliot and Fleet reach Tianjin and were clearly not expected. September 28: Emperor decides that Lin is not the right person to deal with the situation and dismisses him. October 20: Lin is summoned by the Emperor for a trial. 1841 January 7: Second Battle of Chuenpee. January 20: Convention of Chuenpee. February 23 – 26: The Battle of Bogue (British victory). February 27: the British voluntarily evacuates from Zhoushan. May: Elliot’s dismissal. May 21: The Siege of Canton. May 24: The British moves up the river to the west of Canton.

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May 25 – 26: The forts at Canton are captured; agreements between Elliot and Yishan for the ransom of six million dollars. May 29 -31: the Sanyuanli Incident. August 26 - 27: the Battle in Xiamen; falls to the British under the leadership of Sir Henry Pottinger. October: Battle in Zhoushan; more than estimated 5,000 Qing forces are dead. October 10: Battle in Zhenhai; about 1,500 Qing soldiers died. October 18: Yijiang is appointed as the General by the emperor. November: Elliot’s return to England. 1842 2nd week of February: Yijiang gathers almost 12,000 troops across eight different provinces. Early March: Yijiang attacks the British forces. March 9: Battle at Ningbo March 10: the attack at Ningbo starts, but fails. Battle at Zhenhai—also fails. March 28: Liu’s report about grim prospect of war reaches Daoguang May 18: Battle of Zhapu; whole villages would commit suicides after the loss. July 17: Battle of Zhenjiang; the state of Civil War between the Manchu authorities and local Chinese population. August 7– 13: Zhang Xi arrives in Nanjing and meets with Pottinger for discussion about the treaty. August 29: the Treaty of Nanking is signed.

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