Family Code - Case Digests

PT&T vs. NLRC 272 SCRA 596 Facts: Grace de Guzman, private respondent, was initially hired as a reliever by PT&T, petitioner, specifically as a “Supernumerary Project Worker, for a fixed period due to a certain employee who’s having a maternity leave. Under the agreement she signed, her employment was to immediately terminate upon the expiration of the agreed period. Thereafter, PT&T again hired Grace as reliever for the succeeding periods, this time as a replacement to an employee who went on leave. The reliever status was then formally completed until she was asked again to join PT&T as a probationary employee covering 150 days. In the job application form, she indicated in the portion of the civil status therein that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier. Grace has also made the same representation on her two successive reliever agreements. The branch supervisor of PT&T having discovered the discrepancy sent Grace a memorandum requiring her to explain the said discrepancy and she was reminded about the company’s policy of not accepting married women for employment. In her reply, she stated that she wasn’t aware of such policy at that time and all along she hadn’t deliberately hidden her true civil status. However, PT&T remained unconvinced of this reasoning pledge by Grace and thus she was dismissed from the company. Grace contested by initiating a complaint for illegal dismissal and with a claim for non-payment of cost of living allowances. Issue: Whether or not PT&T is liable against Grace’s illegal dismissal due to certain company policy. Ruling: Marriage as a special contract cannot be restricted by discriminatory policies of private individuals or corporations. Where’s a company policy disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts marriage, the Supreme Court invalidated such policy as it not only runs afoul the constitutional provision on equal protection but also on the fundamental policy of the State toward marriage. The danger of such policy against marriage followed by PT&T is that it strike at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and ultimately of the family as the foundation of the nation. Therefore, PT&T is deemed liable for Grace’s illegal dismissal and the latter shall claim for damages.

Estrada vs. Escritor A.M. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003 Facts: In a sworn letter-complaint, Alejandro Estrada, complainant, wrote to Judge Caoibes Jr. requesting for an investigation of rumors that respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter of Las Piñas, is living with a man not her husband. Judge Caoibes referred the letter to Escritor, who stated that “there is no truth as to the veracity of the allegation” and challenged Estrada, “to appear in the open and prove his allegation in the proper court”. Judge Caoibes set a preliminary conference and Escritor move for inhibition to avoid bias and suspicion in hearing her case. In the conference, Estrada confirmed that he filed a letter-complaint for “disgraceful and immoral conduct” under the Revised Administrative Code against Escritor for that his frequent visit in the Hall of Justice in Las Piñas learned Escritor is cohabiting with another man not his husband. Escritor testified that when she entered judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow since 1998. She admitted that she’s been living with Luciano Quilapo Jr. without the benefit of marriage for 20 years and that they have a son. Escritor asserted that as a member of the religious sect known as Jehovah’s Witnesses, and having executed a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” (which allows members of the congregation who have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations) jointly with Quilapo after ten years of living together, her conjugal arrangement is in conformity with her religious beliefs and has the approval of the congregation, therefore not constituting disgraceful and immoral conduct. Issue: Whether or not Escritor is administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct. Ruling: Escritor cannot be penalized. The Constitution adheres to the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause, provided that it does not offend compelling state interests. The OSG must then demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise clause is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. In this case, with no iota of evidence offered, the records are bereft of even a feeble attempt to show that the state adopted the least intrusive means. With the Solicitor General utterly failing to prove this element of the test, and under these distinct circumstances, Escritor cannot be penalized. The Constitution itself mandates the Court to make exemptions in cases involving criminal laws of general application, and under these

distinct circumstances, such conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for there is a case for exemption from the law based on the fundamental right to freedom of religion. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred freedom, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state.

Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda 35 Phil. 252 Facts: Article 1; Eloisa Goitia, plaintiff-appellant, and Jose Campos-Rueda, defendant, were legally married in the city of Manila. They established their residence 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together for about a month. However, the plaintiff returned to the home of her parents. The allegations of the complaint were that the defendant, one month after they had contracted marriage, demanded plaintiff to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs in which the latter reject the said demands. With these refusals, the defendant got irritated and provoked to maltreat the plaintiff by word and deed. Unable to induce the defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and cease of maltreating her, plaintiff was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her parents. The plaintiff appeals for a complaint against her husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile. However, the defendant objects that the facts alleged in the complaint do not state a cause of action.

Balogbog vs. CA G.R. No. 83598 March 7, 1997 Facts:

Whether or not Goitia can claim for support outside of the conjugal domicile.

Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arzibal who died intestate in 1951 and 1961, respectively. They had an older brother, Gavino, but he died in 1935, predeceasing their parents. In 1968, private respondents Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog brought an action for partition and accounting against petitioners, claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that, as such, they were entitled to the one-third share of Gavino in the estate of their grandparents. In their answer, petitioners denied knowing private respondents. They alleged that their brother Gavino died single and without issue in their parents' residence at Tagamakan, Asturias, Cebu. The Court of First Instance of Cebu City rendered judgment for private respondents, ordering petitioners to render an accounting from 1960 until the finality of its judgment, to partition the estate and deliver to private respondents one-third of the estate of Basilio and Genoveva, and to pay attorney's fees and costs. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Ruling:

Issue:

Issue:

Marriage is something more than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the rights, duties and obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of the parties but upon the general law which defines and prescribes those rights, duties and obligations. When the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. The law provides that defendant, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill this obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, the option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the defendant to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assaults of the defendant, Beatriz may claim support from the defendant for separate maintenance even outside of the conjugal home.

Whether or not the marriage between Gavino and Catalina is valid even in the absence of marriage certificate. Ruling: Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally married. This presumption may be rebutted only by cogent proof to the contrary. In this case, petitioners' claim that the certification presented by private respondents, to the effect that the record of the marriage had been lost or destroyed during the war, was belied by the production of the Book of Marriages by the assistant municipal treasurer of Asturias. Petitioners argue that this book does not contain any entry pertaining to the alleged marriage of private respondents' parents. This contention has no merit. Although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage,

the failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence may be presented to prove marriage. Here, private respondents proved, through testimonial evidence, that Gavino and Catalina were married in 1929; that they had three children, one of whom died in infancy; that their marriage subsisted until 1935 when Gavino died; and that their children, private respondents herein, were recognized by Gavino's family and by the public as the legitimate children of Gavino. Hence, the marriage between Gavino and Catalina is valid.

Ruling: There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse" embraces common law relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses. The Penal Code article, it is said, makes no distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband and wife de facto. But this view cannot even apply to the facts of the case at bar. We hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-à-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully wedded spouse; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime. Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving brothers and sisters (the Vargases).

Eugenio Sr. vs. Velez 185 SCRA 425 Facts: Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of Vitaliana Vargas, her full blood brothers and sisters, herein private respondents filed a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging that Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and confined by herein petitioner in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. Despite her desire to escape, Vitaliana was allegedly deprived of her liberty without any legal authority. At the time the petition was filed, it was alleged that Vitaliana was 25 years of age, single, and living with petitioner Tomas Eugenio. Petitioner refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana (who had died on 28 August 1988) to the respondent sheriff. As her common law husband, petitioner claimed legal custody of her body. Private respondents (Vargases) alleged that petitioner Tomas Eugenio, who is not in any way related to Vitaliana was wrongfully interfering with their (Vargases') duty to bury her. Invoking Arts. 305 and 308 of the Civil Code, the Vargases contended that, as the next of kin in the Philippines, they are the legal custodians of the dead body of their sister Vitaliana. An exchange of pleadings followed. Petitioner claims he is the spouse contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, the term spouse used therein not being preceded by any qualification; hence, in the absence of such qualification, he is the rightful custodian of Vitaliana's body. Vitaliana's brothers and sisters contend otherwise. Issue: Whether or not petitioner can be considered as a spouse of Vitaliana Vargas.

Cosca vs. Palaypayon 237 SCRA 249 Facts: Ramon C. Sambo and other complainants filed an administrative complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator against Judge Lucio Palaypayon and Nelia Baroy, respondents, for the following offenses:

1. Illegal solemnization of marriage 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Falsification of the monthly reports of cases Bribery in consideration of an appointment in court Non-issuance of receipt for cash bond received Infidelity in the custody of detained prisoners, and Requiring payment of filing fees from exempted entities

Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the requisite of marriage license. Thus, several couples were able to get married by the simple expedient of paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy, despite the absence of marriage license. As a consequence, their marriage contracts did not reflect any marriage license number. In addition, the respondent judge did not sign their marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the reason being that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which was usually several days after the ceremony. Indubitably, the marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil registrar.

Issue: Whether or not respondent judge is liable of illegal solemnization of marriage.

to appear. Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court but this time defendant’s counsel informed the court that chances of settling case amicably were nil. Issue:

Ruling: On the charge regarding illegal marriages, the Family Code pertinently provides that the formal requisite of marriage, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for therein. Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. Thus, respondent judge is liable for illegal solemnization of marriage.

Whether or not the trial court erred in ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff damages. Ruling: The case at bar is not a mere breach of promise to marry because it is not considered an actionable wrong. The mere fact the couple have already filed a marriage license and already spent for invitations, wedding apparels, gives the plaintiff reason to demand for payment of damages. The court affirmed the previous judgment and ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff moral damages for the humiliation she suffered, actual damages for the expenses incurred and exemplary damages because the defendant acted fraudulently in making the plaintiff believe that he will come back and the wedding will push through.

Wassmer vs. Velez 12 SCRA 648 Facts: Francisco Velez, defendant, and Beatriz Wassmer, plaintiffappellant, following their mutual love, decided to get married on September 4, 1954. Two days before the wedding, defendant left a note to Beatriz stating therein the postponement of their wedding due to opposition of defendant’s mother and that he will be leaving. But on September 3, 1954, defendant sent another telegram stated that he will be returning very soon for the wedding. However, defendant did not appear nor was he heard from again. Beatriz sued defendant for damages and in silence of the defendant, trial court granted the petition and ordered the defendant to pay Beatriz actual, moral and exemplary damages. On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a “petition for relief from orders, judgments and proceedings and motion for new trial and reconsideration.” Beatriz moved to strike it cut but the court ordered the parties and their attorneys to appear for the stage of possibility of arriving at an amicable settlement. Defendant wasn’t able to appear but instead on the following day his counsel filed a motion to defer for two weeks the resolution on defendant’s petition for relief. It was granted but again defendant and his counsel failed

Navarro vs. Judge Domagtoy A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996 Facts: Mayor Rodolfo Navarro filed an administrative case against Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy. Complainant contended that Domagtoy displayed gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law when he solemnized the weddings of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife, and Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario, which was solemnized at the respondent’s residence which does not fall within his jurisdictional area. Respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar,

confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven years. With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and Del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code and that article 8 thereof applies to the case in question. Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge may be held liable for solemnizing marriages which did not comply with the requisites in the FC. Ruling: The Court held that even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the present spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage. In this case, Tagadan was not able to present a summary proceeding for the declaration of the first wife’s presumptive death thus, he is still considered married to his first wife. A marriage can only be considered beyond the boundaries of the jurisdiction of the judge in the following instances: (1) at the point of death; (2) in remote places; or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. None of these were complied with therefore there is an irregularity.

illegal acts and unethical misrepresentations, which caused her so much hardships, embarrassment and sufferings. The case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to the Office of the Court Administrator, which required the respondent to comment on the complaint. Respondent averred, among others, that before starting the ceremony, he examined the documents submitted to him by the petitioner and he discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage license so he refused to solemnize the marriage. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of the provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. After the solemnization, respondent reiterated the need for the marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured the respondent that they would give the license to him, but they never did. He attributed the hardships and embarrassment petitioner suffered as due to her own fault and negligence. Issue: Whether or not respondent’s guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a marriage license and outside his territorial jurisdiction. Ruling: Respondent judge should be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license. In People vs. Lara, the Supreme Court held that a marriage, which preceded the issuance of the marriage license, is void, and that subsequent issuance of such license cannot render or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to conduct marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of the petitioner. Judges, who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.

Arañes vs. Judge Occiano A.M. No. MTJ-02-1309 April 11, 2002 Facts: Petitioner Mercedita Mata charged respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law, via a sworn Letter-Complaint, for solemnizing the marriage between petitioner and her late groom (Ret.) Commodore Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license, among others. Since the marriage is a nullity, petitioner’s right, upon Orobia’s death, to inherit the “vast properties” left by Orobia was not recognized. Petitioner was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia. Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent for his

Vda. De Chua vs. CA G.R. No. 116835 March 5, 1998 Facts: Roberto Chua was the common-law husband of Florita A. Vallejo and had two illegitimate sons with her. On 28 May 1992, Roberto Chua died intestate in Davao City. Upon the death of Roberto, Vallejo filed with

the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City a petition for the guardianship and administration over the persons and properties of the two minors. Herein petitioner filed for its dismissal, claiming that she was the sole surviving heir of the decedent being his wife; and that the decedent was a resident of Davao City and not Cotabato City, which means that the said court was not the proper forum to settle said matters. The petitioner failed to submit the original copy of the marriage contract and the evidences that she used were: a photocopy of said marriage contract, Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of Roberto L. Chua married to Antonietta Garcia, and a resident of Davao City; Residence Certificates from 1988 and 1989 issued at Davao City indicating that he was married and was born in Cotabato City; Income Tax Returns for 1990 and 1991 filed in Davao City where the status of the decedent was stated as married; passport of the decedent specifying that he was married and his residence was Davao City. The trial court ruled that she failed to establish the validity of marriage, and even denied her petition. This was latter appealed to the appellate court, but it decided in favor of herein respondents.

Facts: On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro’s parents. Defendant Cardenas personally attended to the processing of the documents required for the celebration of the marriage, including the procurement of the marriage license. In fact, the marriage contract itself states that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in the name of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila. The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage was unknown to Castro’s parents. Thus, it was only in March 1971, when Castro discovered she was pregnant, that the couple decided to live together. However, their cohabitation lasted only for four (4) months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. On October 19, 1971, Castro gave birth. The baby was adopted by Castro’s brother, with the consent of Cardenas. Issue:

Issue: Whether or not the trial and appellate court is correct on their ruling on the validity of marriage of Antonietta Garcia to Roberto Chua. Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the lower court and the appellate court are correct in holding that petitioner herein failed to establish the truth of her allegation that she was the lawful wife of the decedent. The best evidence is a valid marriage contract which the petitioner failed to produce. Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence Certificates, passports and other similar documents cannot prove marriage especially so when the petitioner has submitted a certification from the Local Civil Registrar concerned that the alleged marriage was not registered and a letter from the judge alleged to have solemnized the marriage that he has not solemnized said alleged marriage. The lower court correctly disregarded the Photostat copy of the marriage certificate which she presented, this being a violation of the best evidence rule, together with other worthless pieces of evidence. A valid, original marriage contract would be the best evidence that the petitioner should have presented. Failure to present it as evidence would make the marriage dubious.

Republic of the Philippines vs. CA and Castro G.R. No. 103047 September 12, 1994

Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidences presented by private respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of the marriage of private respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas. Ruling: The law provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a local registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence to the parties is not adequate to prove its non-issuance. The above rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not being found in a registrar. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage license, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data. The certification of due search and inability to find issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of due search and inability to find sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no. 1396182 to the contracting parties. There being no marriage license, the marriage of Angelina and Edwin is void ab initio.

Garcia vs. Recio G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001

law governing his status. Together with other evidences submitted, they don’t absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry.

Facts: Article 26; The respondent, Rederick Recio, a Filipino was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Rizal in 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. In 1989, the Australian family court issued a decree of divorce supposedly dissolving the marriage. In 1992, respondent acquired Australian citizenship. In 1994, he married Grace Garcia, a Filipina, herein petitioner, in Cabanatuan City. In their application for marriage license, respondent was declared as “single” and “Filipino.” Since October 1995, they lived separately, and in 1996 while in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided. In 1998, petitioner filed Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy, claiming that she learned of the respondent’s former marriage only in November. On the other hand, respondent claims that he told petitioner of his prior marriage in 1993, before they were married. Respondent also contended that his first marriage was dissolved by a divorce a decree obtained in Australia in 1989 and hence, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. The trial court declared that the first marriage was dissolved on the ground of the divorce issued in Australia as valid and recognized in the Philippines. Hence, this petition was forwarded before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not respondent has legal capacity to marry Grace Garcia. Ruling: In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is “validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.” A divorce obtained abroad by two aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective laws. Therefore, before our courts can recognize a foreign divorce, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. In this case, the divorce decree between the respondent and Samson appears to be authentic, issued by an Australian family court. Although, appearance is not sufficient, and compliance with the rules on evidence regarding alleged foreign laws must be demonstrated, the decree was admitted on account of petitioner’s failure to object properly because he objected to the fact that it was not registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City, not to its admissibility. Respondent claims that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted as evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law. Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes, still restrict remarriage. Respondent also failed to produce sufficient evidence showing the foreign

Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera 174 SCRA 653 Facts: Article 26; On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Geiling, a German national, were married in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila. Thereafter, marital discord set in, followed by a separation de facto between them. After about three and a half years of marriage, private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April 1982. On January 15, 1986, Schoneberg Local Court promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila on January 23, 1983. More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named James Chua sometime in 1983". On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash. Issue: Whether or not the criminal cases filed by the German ex-spouse may prosper. Ruling: Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. Hence, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons. Private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

petitioner husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is also estopped by his own representation before the Nevada court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. He should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.

Van Dorn vs. Romillo Jr. 139 SCRA 139 Facts: Alice Reyes, a Filipina, married Richard Upton, an American, in Hongkong in 1972. They established residence in the Philippines and had two children. In 1982, the wife sued for divorce in Nevada, U.S.A., on the ground of incompatibility. She later married Theodore Van Dorn in Nevada in 1983. Upton sued her before RTC, Branch LXV in Pasay City asking that she be ordered to render an accounting of her business, which Upton alleged to be conjugal property. He also prayed that he be declared with a right to manage the conjugal property. The defendant wife moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the cause of action was barred by a previous judgment in the divorce proceedings wherein he had acknowledged that the couple had no “community property”.

Republic vs. Orbecido 472 SCRA 114 Facts:

Whether or not absolute divorce decree granted by U.S. court, between Filipina wife and American husband held binding upon the latter.

Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros M. Villanueva were married with two children. Lady Myros the left for the United States with one son and 1st became a naturalized American citizen, 2nd obtained a valid divorce decree in 2000 capacitating her to remarry, and 3rd contracted a marriage with Innocent Stanley, an American. Cipriano then filed a petition for authority to remarry under Article 26(2) of the Family Code The Office of the Solicitor General contends that the invoked article was not applicable and raises this pure question of law, they further posit that Orbecido should file for Legal Separation or Annulment instead.

Ruling:

Issue:

Issue:

The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada Divorce of the parties. There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any states of the U.S. The decree is binding on Upton as an American citizen. Hence, he cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any state of the United States. It is true that owing to the nationality principle under article 15 of the civil code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released Upton from the marriage from the standards of American law. Thus, pursuant to his national law, he is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case as

Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26(2). Ruling: YES. Article 26(2) should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. For the application of Article 26(2), there must have been (1) a valid marriage celebrated between a Filipino and a foreigner, and that (2) a

valid divorce decree is obtained by the alien spouse capacitating her to remarry. Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the following must be proven: (1) divorce as a fact, (2) foreign law, (3) divorce decree capacitated one to remarry. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained by the alien spouse. Annulment or Legal Separation need not be the proper remedies for such would be in the case of the former, long, tedious, and infeasible, and in the case of the latter, is futile to sever marital ties.

of the 5-year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license. Ruling: The 5-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity-meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity is unbroken. Any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void, subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. In this case, at the time Pepito and respondent’s marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least 5 years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about 20 months had elapsed. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there is was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as “husband and wife”. Having determined that the second marriage involve in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.

Niñal vs. Bayadog 328 SCRA 122 Facts: Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Pepito resulting to her death on April 24, 1985 shot Teodulfa. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 24, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Bayadog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least 5 years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. After Pepito’s death on February 19, 1997, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. Issue: What nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code (now Article 34 of the Family Code) to warrant the counting

Manzano vs. Sanchez A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329 March 8, 2001 Facts: Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to him in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. Four children were born out of that marriage. However, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were "separated."

Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims that when he officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit. According to him, had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed merely to harass him. After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely. Issues: 1) Whether or not convalidation of the second union of the respondent falls under the purview of Article 34 of the Family Code. 2) Whether or not Respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law. Ruling:

For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must concur: 1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage; 2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other; 3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage; 4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years and are without legal impediment to marry each other; and 5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage. Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were "separated." Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.

Cosca vs. Palaypayon 237 SCRA 249

Facts: Same. Article 27-34; Emphasis to the marriage of Abellano and Edralin, Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized their marriage, but he claims that it was under Article 34 of the Family Code, so a marriage license was not required. The contracting parties here executed a joint affidavit that they have been living together as husband and wife for almost six (6) years already. Issue: Whether or not respondent judge solemnization of such marriage with the exception of a marriage license under Article 34 of the Family Code is valid. Ruling: In their marriage contract which did not bear any date either when it was solemnized, it was stated that Abellano was only 18 years, 2 months and 7 days old. If he and Edralin had been living together as husband and wife for almost 6 years already before they got married as they stated in their joint affidavit, Abellano must have been less than 13 years old when he started living with Edralin as his wife and this is hard to believe. Judge Palaypayon should have been aware of this when he solemnized their marriage as it was his duty to ascertain the qualification of the contracting parties who might have executed a false joint affidavit in order to have an instant marriage by avoiding the marriage license requirement. This act of Judge Palaypayon of solemnizing the marriage of Abellano and Edralin for the second time with a marriage license already only gave rise to the suspicion that the first time he solemnized the marriage it was only made to appear that it was solemnized under exceptional character as there was not marriage license and Judge Palaypayon had already signed the marriage certificate.

Mariategui vs. CA G.R. No. L-57062 January 24, 1992 Facts: Lupo Mariategui contracted three marriages during his lifetime. On his first wife, Eusebia Montellano, who died on November 8, 1904, he begot four children, Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbana and Ireneo. With his second wife, Flaviana Montellano, he begot a daughter named Cresenciana. And his third wife, Felipa Velasco, he begot three children, namely Jacinto, Julian and Paulina. At the time of Lupo’s death he left certain properties with which he acquired when he was still unmarried. Lupo died without a will. Upon his death, descendants from his first and second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition on Lot No. 163. However, the children on Lupo’s third marriage filed with the lower court an amended complaint claiming that they were deprive on the partition of Lot No. 163 which were owned by their common father. The petitioners, children on first and second marriage, filed a counterclaim to dismiss the said complaint. Trial court denied the motion to dismiss and also the complaint by the respondents, children on third marriage. Respondents elevated the case on CA on the ground that the trial court committed an error for not finding the third marriage to be lawfully married and also in holding respondents are not legitimate children of their said parents. CA rendered a decision declaring all the children and descendants of Lupo, including the respondents, are entitled to equal shares of estate of their father. However, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision.

Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.

Domingo vs. CA 226 SCRA 572 Facts: Delia Domingo, private respondent, filed a petition before RTC of Pasig for the declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property against Roberto Domingo, petitioner. She alleged that they were married at Carmona, Cavite with evidences of marriage certificate and marriage license, unknown to her, petitioner had a previous marriage with Emerlina dela Paz which is still valid and existing. She came to know the prior marriage when Emerlina sued them for bigamy. She prays that their marriage be declared null and void and, as a consequence, to declare that she is the exclusive owner of all properties she acquired during the marriage and to recover them from him. Roberto moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the marriage being void ab initio, the petition of declaration of nullity is unnecessary. It added that private respondent has no property which in his possession. Issue:

Issue:

Whether or not respondent may claim for the declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property against petitioner on the ground of bigamy.

Whether or not respondents were able to prove their succession rights over the said estate.

Ruling:

Ruling: With respect to the legal basis of private respondents' demand for partition of the estate of Lupo Mariategui, the Court of Appeals aptly held that the private respondents are legitimate children of the deceased. Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to have been lawfully married in or about 1930. This fact is based on the declaration communicated by Lupo Mariategui to Jacinto who testified that "when his father was still living, he was able to mention to him that he and his mother were able to get married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig, Rizal." The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such. Although no marriage certificate was introduced to this effect, no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present.

There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent celebrated while the former's previous marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting is bigamous. As such, it is from the beginning. Petitioner himself does not dispute the absolute nullity of their marriage. The Court had ruled that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void, bigamous marriage. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of property relations governing them. It stands to reason that the lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions regarding the couple's properties.

Niñal vs. Bayadog 328 SCRA 122 Facts: Same. Article 35 Issue: Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with defendant is null and void ab initio. Ruling: Any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void, subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. The subsistence of the marriage even where there is was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as “husband and wife”. Having determined that the second marriage involve in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.

Republic vs. CA and Molina February 13, 1997 Facts: On April 14, 1985, plaintiff Roridel O. Molina married Reynaldo Molina which union bore a son. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father as he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends, depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them. The RTC granted Roridel petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage which was affirmed by the CA. Issue: Whether or not irreconcilable differences personalities constitute psychological incapacity.

and

conflicting

Ruling: The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.

Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more than five years are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. Issue: Whether or not Julia is psychologically incapacitated under Article 36 of the FC. Ruling: The use of the phrase “psychological incapacity” under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity and like circumstances. Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be construed independently of but must stand in conjunction with existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus, correlated, psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.

Leouel Santos vs. CA G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995 Facts: Leouel first met Julia in Iloilo City. The meeting later proved to be an eventful day for both of them for they got married on September 20, 1986. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter’s parents. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia’s parents into the young spouses’ family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a “quarrel” over a number of things like when and where the couple should start living independently from Julia’s parents or whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel’s spending a few days with his own parents. On May 18, 1988, Julia finally left for the U.S. to work as a nurse despite his husband’s pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, Julia called Leouel for the first time. She promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract but she never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the U.S., where he underwent a training program under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with Julia, but all his efforts were of no avail.

Republic vs. Quintero-Hamano G.R. No. 149498 May 20, 2004 Facts: Respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity. Respondent alleged that she and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan. They later lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987, she gave birth to their child.

On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M. Balderia of the Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest only after the marriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but he never responded. Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their child. Issue:

Leni Choa, petitioner, and Alfonso Choa, respondent, were married on March 15, 1981. Out of this union, two children were born. On October 27, 1993, respondent filed a complaint for the annulment of his marriage to petitioner. Also filed an amended complaint for the declaration of nullity of his marriage based on her alleged psychological incapacity. The case went on trial with the respondent presenting his evidence. However, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the evidence. RTC denied petitioner’s demurrer to evidence on the ground that petitioner must controvert the established quantum evidence of respondent. Petitioner elevated the case to CA after the motion of reconsideration was denied. CA held that denial of the demurrer was merely interlocutory and petitioner in her defense must present evidence.

Whether or not abandonment by one spouse tantamount to psychological incapacity.

Issue:

Ruling: The court find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder. Abandonment is also a ground for legal separation. There was no showing that the case at bar was not just an instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation. It cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness. There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage. In proving psychological incapacity, the court finds no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. It cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality.

Choa vs. Choa G.R. No. 143376 November 26, 2002 Facts:

Whether or not petitioner’s obligated to present her evidence despite the inadequate evidence of respondent in the annulment of marriage case grounded on psychological incapacity. Ruling: The petition is meritorious. However, the evidence against petitioner is grossly insufficient to support any finding of psychological incapacity that would warrant a declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage. Respondent claims that the filing by petitioner of a series of charges against him are proof of the latter’s psychological incapacity to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. These charges included Complaints for perjury, false testimony, concubinage and deportation. The documents presented by respondent during the trial do not in any way show the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife. It is the height of absurdity and inequity to condemn her as psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her marital obligations, simply because she filed cases against him. The evidence presented merely establishes the prosecution of the cases against him. To rule that the filings are sufficient to establish her psychological incapacity is not only totally erroneous, but also grave abuse of discretion bordering on absurdity. Court clearly explained that "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability. The evidence adduced by respondent merely shows that he and his wife could not get along with each other. There was absolutely no showing of the gravity or juridical antecedence or incurability of the problems besetting their marital union.

Antonio vs. Reyes G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006 Facts: Leonilo Antonio, petitioner, filed a petition to have his marriage to Marie Reyes, respondent, declared null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondent’s incapacity existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the present. As manifestations of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things. In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist, and Dr. Lopez, a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed that respondent’s persistent and constant lying to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect. They further asserted that respondent’s extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair with another woman. They concluded based on the foregoing that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations. After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner’s evidence and held that respondent’s propensity to lying about almost anything−her occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her income, among others−had been duly established. According to the trial court, respondent’s fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage. The trial court thus declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void. Issue: Whether or not there is sufficient basis/showing of psychological incapacity as to render the marriage null and void. Ruling:

It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false pretenses in order to induce petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioner’s witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on respondent’s inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to them, were revelatory of respondent’s inability to understand and perform the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy

and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments. Clearly in this case, there was no categorical averment from the expert witnesses that respondent’s psychological incapacity was curable or incurable. From the totality of the evidence, however, the court is sufficiently convinced that the incurability of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been established by the petitioner.

Chi Ming Tsoi vs. CA G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997 Facts: Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao were married on May 22, 1988. Until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them. Hence, Gina (wife) filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage. Medical examinations showed that the wife was healthy, normal and still a virgin, while the husband was found to be capable of having sexual intercourse since he was not impotent. The wife claimed that her husband was impotent, and was a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis and since he was using his mother’s eyebrow pencil and cleansing cream. She also claimed that her husband married her, a Filipino citizen, in order to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man. On the other hand, the husband claimed that it was his wife who was psychologically incapacitated to perform basic marital obligations. He asserts that his wife avoided him whenever he wants to have sexual intercourse with her. He further claimed that his wife filed the case because she was afraid that she would be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and that he might consummate their marriage. He also insisted that their marriage would remain valid because they are still very young and there is still a chance to overcome their differences. The trial court declared their marriage void on account of psychological incapacity of the husband. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Issue: Whether or not the prolonged refusal of the husband to have sexual cooperation for the procreation of children with his wife is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Ruling: Yes. The prolonged refusal of the husband to have sexual cooperation for the procreation of children with his wife is equivalent to psychological incapacity. If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, the Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. The husband’s

senseless and protracted refusal to fulfill his marital obligations is equivalent to psychological incapacity. One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is to “procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage. Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. Decision affirmed and petition denied for lack of merit.

Morigo vs. People of the Philippines G. R. No. 145226 February 6, 2004 Facts: Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, for a period of four years. After school year, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other. In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts. In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they maintained constant communication. In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married. Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind. On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition for divorce against appellant which was granted by the court. Appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago at Tagbilaran City. Lucio filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. The complaint seeks among others, the declaration of nullity of Lucio’s marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. Appellant was charged with Bigamy in information filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran City, with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. Lucio Morigo moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, Lucio pleaded not guilty to the charge. Issue:

Whether or not Lucio Morigo committed bigamy even with his defense of good faith. Ruling: A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as "void." In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which Lucio might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage. The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case, Supreme Court held that petitioner has not committed bigamy and that it need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic. Lapuz-Sy vs. Eufemio 43 SCRA 177 Facts: Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio, married civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically on September 30, 1943. In 1943, her husband abandoned her. Carmen discovered Eufemio cohabiting with a Chinese woman, Go Hiok. Carmen prayed for the issuance of the decree of legal separation. Eufemio amended answer to the petition and alleged affirmative. Before the trial could be completed, petitioner died in a vehicular accident. With these respondent moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on two grounds; the petition was filed beyond 1-year period and the death of petitioner abated the acted for legal separation. Issue: Whether or not the death of plaintiff in action for legal separation before final decree abated the action. Ruling: An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of the spouses is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse and no one else to claim legal separation; and in its Article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation

already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself actio personalis moritur cum persona.

Ruling: Petition is dismissed. A civil action for legal separation based on concubinage may proceed ahead of or simultaneously with a criminal action for concubinage for the action for legal separation is not to recover civil liability arising from the offense. Civil action is not one “to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense” even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense. Support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an action for legal separation and granted at the discretion of the judge.

Gandionco vs. Peñaranda G.R. No. L-72984 November 27, 1987 Facts: Teresita Gandionco, legal wife of the petitioner, Froilan Gandionco, filed with the RTC of Misamis Oriental a complaint against petitioner for legal separation on the ground of concubinage with a petition for support and payment of damages. Teresita also filed a complaint for concubinage against petitioner with MTC of General Santos City. And again for the application for the provisional remedy of support pendente lite. The respondent Judge Peñaranda ordered the payment of support pendente lite. Petitioner contends that the civil action for legal separation and the incidents thereto should be suspended in view of the criminal case for concubinage. Issue: Whether or not the civil action for legal separation shall be suspended on the case of concubinage.

Bugayong vs. Ginez G.R. No. L-10033 December 28, 1956 Facts: Benjamin Bugayong, serviceman in the US Navy was married to defendant Leonila Ginez in Pangasinan, while on furlough leave. After marriage, the couples live with the sisters of the husband, before the latter left to report back to duty, the couple came to an agreement that Leonila would stay with Benjamin’s sisters. Leonila left the dwelling of her sisters-in-law which she informed her husband by letter that she had gone to reside with her mother in Pangasinan. Early in July 1951, Benjamin receive letters from his sister Valeriana Polangco that her wife informing him of alleged acts of infidelity.

Benjamin went to Pangasinan and sought for his wife whom he met in the house of Leonila’s godmother. They lived again as husband and wife and stayed in the house of Pedro Bugayong, cousin of the plaintiff-husband. On the second day, he tried to verify from his wife the truth of the information he received but instead of answering, Leonila packed up and left him which Benjamin concluded as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity. After he tried to locate her and upon failing he went to Ilocos Norte. Benjamin filed in CIF of Pangasinan a complaint for legal separation against Leonila, who timely filed an answer vehemently denying the averments of the complaint. Whether or not the acts charged in line with the truth of allegations of the commission of acts of infidelity amounting to adultery have been condoned by the plaintiff-husband.

Concepcion Alanis filed with the court below a complaint for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal separation (between Alanis and Pacete), accounting and separation of property. In her complaint, she averred that she was married to Pacete before the Justice of the Peace of Cotabato; that they had a child named Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently contracted in 1948 a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion in North Cotabato; that she learned of such marriage only on 1979; that during her marriage to Pacete, the latter acquired vast property consisting of large tracts of land, fishponds and several motor vehicles; that he fraudulently placed the several pieces of property either in his name and Clarita or in the names of his children with Clarita and other "dummies;" that Pacete ignored overtures for an amicable settlement; and that reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita.

Ruling:

Issue:

Granting that infidelities amounting to adultery were commited by the wife, the act of the husband in persuading her to come along with him and the fact that she went with him and together they slept as husband and wife deprives him as the alleged offended spouse of any action for legal separation against the offending wife because his said conduct comes within the restriction of Article 100 of Civil Code.

Whether or not RTC of Cotabato City gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioners' motion for extension of time to file their answer on the decree of legal separation.

Issue:

Pacete vs. Cariaga 231 SCRA 321 Facts:

Ruling: Petition is granted. The special prescriptions on actions that can put the integrity of marriage to possible jeopardy are impelled by no less than the State's interest in the marriage relation and its avowed intention not to leave the matter within the exclusive domain and the vagaries of the parties to alone dictate. It is clear that the petitioner did, in fact, specifically pray for legal separation. That other remedy, whether principal or incidental, have likewise been sought in the same action cannot dispense, nor excuse compliance, with any of the statutory requirements aforequoted. An action for legal separation must "in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition," obviously in order to provide the parties a "cooling-off" period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.

Macadangdang vs. CA 108 SCRA 314 Facts: Respondent Elizabeth Mejias is a married woman, her husband being Crispin Anahaw. She allegedly had intercourse with petitioner Antonio Macadangdang sometime in March, 1967. She also alleges that due to the affair, she and her husband separated in 1967. She gave birth to a baby boy who was named Rolando Macadangdang in baptismal rites. Respondent, then plaintiff, filed a complaint for recognition and support against petitioner, then defendant, with the CIF of Davao. Defendant, now petitioner, Macadangdang filed his answer, opposing plaintiff's claim and praying for its dismissal. The lower court in a pre-trial conference, issued a Pre-trial Order formalizing certain stipulations, admissions and factual issues on which both parties agreed. Correspondingly, upon agreement of the parties, an amended complaint was filed by plaintiff. In its decision rendered, the lower court dismissed the complaint. The decision invoked positive provisions of the Civil Code and Rules of Court and authorities. Issue: Whether or not the wife may institute an action that would bastardize her child without giving her husband, the legally presumed father, an opportunity to be heard. Ruling: SC find no merit in petitioner’s submission that the questioned decision had not become final and executory since the law explicitly and clearly provides for the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership as among the effects of the final decree of legal separation. It also appears that her claim against petitioner is a disguised attempt to evade the responsibility and consequence of her reckless behavior at the expense of her husband, her illicit lover and above all her own son. For this Court to allow, much less consent to, the bastardization of respondent's son would give rise to serious and far-reaching consequences on society. This Court will not tolerate scheming married women who would indulge in illicit affairs with married men and then exploit the children born during such immoral relations by using them to collect from such moneyed paramours. This would be the form of wrecking the stability of two families. This would be a severe assault on morality.

Potenciano vs. CA G.R. No. 139789, 139808 July 19, 2001 Facts: Erlinda Ilusorio, the matriarch who was so lovingly inseparable from her husband some years ago, filed a petition with the Court of Appeals for habeas corpus to have custody of her husband in consortium. However, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision dismissing the petition for lack of unlawful restraint or detention of the subject, Potenciano Ilusorio. Erlinda Ilusorio filed with the Supreme Court an appeal via certiorari pursuing her desire to have custody of her husband Potenciano Ilusorio. This case was consolidated with another case filed by Potenciano Ilusorio and his children, Erlinda Bildner and Sylvia Ilusorio appealing from the order giving visitation rights to his wife, asserting that he never refused to see her. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus for lack of merit, and granted the petition to nullify the Court of Appeals' ruling giving visitation rights to Erlinda Ilusorio. Issue: Whether or not petitioner can assert Article 68 and 69 of Family Code to have custody of her husband in consortium. Ruling: The Supreme Court agrees that as spouses, they are duty bound to live together and care for each other as provided by Article 68 and 69. However, there was absence of empathy between spouses Erlinda and Potenciano, having separated from bed and board since 1972. Only the moral obligation of the spouses constitutes the motivating factor for making them observe the said duties and obligations which are highly personal. Therefore, they deny the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda 35 Phil. 252 Facts: Same. Article 68 Issue:

Ty vs. CA G.R. No. 127406 November 27, 2000

Whether or not petitioner may claim support from her husband outside of the conjugal domicile. Ruling: The law provides that defendant, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill this obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. The law provides that defendant, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill this obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, the option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the defendant to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assaults of the defendant, Article 68 emphasize mutual love, respect and fidelity among husband and wife.

Facts: Edgardo Reyes, private respondent, married to Anna Maria Villanueva both in a civil and church ceremony respectively. However, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City declared their marriage null and void ab initio for lack of marriage of license. Before the decree of was issued in nullifying the marriage of said spouses, private respondent wed Ofelia Ty, petitioner, in the City Court of Pasay and thereafter in a church wedding in Makati. Out of their union bore two daughters. Until private respondent petition that their marriage be declared null and void for lack of marriage of license and that at the time they got married, he was still married to Anna Maria. He stated that at the time he married petitioner the decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria had not been issued. Ofelia defended that lack of marriage license in their marriage is untrue. She submitted the marriage license in court and private respondent did not question the evidence. However, RTC and CA affirmed their decision in favor of private respondent. Issue: Whether or not petitioner may claim damages for failure to comply with marital obligations of the respondent. Ruling: There can be no action for damages merely because of a breach of marital obligation. Supreme Court also viewed that no damages should be awarded in the present case, but for another reason. Petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held valid and subsisting. She is suing to

maintain her status as legitimate wife. In the same breath, she asks for damages from her husband for filing a baseless complaint for annulment of their marriage which caused her mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her parents. Should they grant her prayer, they would have a situation where the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or common funds. To do so, would make the application of the law absurd. Logic, if not common sense, militates against such incongruity.

Ruling: The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral. No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman’s free choice. Therefore, a petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.

Ilusorio vs. Bildner G.R. No. 139789 May 12, 2000 Facts: Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony and lived together for a period of thirty years. Out of their marriage, the spouses had six children. In 1972, they separated from bed and board for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived in Makati when he was in Manila and in Ilusorio penthouse when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo City. When Potenciano arrived from United States and lived with Erlinda in Antipolo City for five months. The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that their mother overdosed their father with an antidepressant drug which the latter’s health deteriorated. Erlinda filed with RTC of Antipolo City a petition for guardianship over the person and property of her husband due to the latter’s advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. Potenciano did not return to Antipolo City and instead lived in a condominium in Makati City after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City. With these, Erlinda filed with CA a petition for habeas corpus to have custody of her husband and also for the reason that respondent refused petitioner’s demands to see and visit her husband and prohibiting Potenciano from living with her in Antipolo City.

Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC 248 SCRA 300 Facts: Article 69; Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of Leyte First District. On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilio Montejo, also a candidate for the same position, filed a petition for disqualification of the petitioner with COMELEC on the ground that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an amended certificate of candidacy, changing the entry of seven months to “since childhood” in item no. 8 in said certificate. However, the amended certificate was not received since it was already past deadline. She claimed that she always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile and residence. The Second Division of the COMELEC with a vote of 2 to 1 came up with a resolution finding private respondent’s petition for disqualification meritorious.

Issue: Whether or not Erlinda Ilusorio may secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in conjugal bliss.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Marcos. Ruling: It cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law. The presumption that the wife automatically gains the husband's domicile by operation of law but never automatically loses her domicile of origin. The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of the law to strengthen and unify the family, recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring into the marriage different domiciles of origin. This difference could, for the sake of family unity, be reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a single place of actual residence.

application of private respondents, the lower court issued a temporary restraining order to prevent Magsajo from proceeding with the enforcement of the writ of execution and with the sale of the said properties at public auction. Issue: Whether or not loan acquired by PBM from Ayala Investments as guaranteed by Alfredo Ching be redounded to the conjugal partnership of the spouses. Ruling: The husband and the wife can engage in any lawful enterprise or profession. While it is but natural for the husband and the wife to consult each other, the law does not make it a requirement that a spouse has to get the prior consent of the other before entering into any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity. The exercise by a spouse of a legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity is always considered to redound to the benefit of the family. But an isolated transaction of a spouse such as being guarantor for a third person’s debt is not per se considered as redounding to the benefit of the family. Therefore, to hold the absolute community or the conjugal partnership property liable for any loss resulting from such isolated activity, proofs showing a direct benefit to the family must be presented.

Ayala Investments vs. CA G.R. No. 118305 February 12, 1998 Facts: Article 73; Philippine Blooming Mills loan from petitioner Ayala Investment. As an added security for the credit line extended to PBM, respondent Alfredo Ching – Exec. VP, executed security agreements and making himself jointly and severally answerable with PBM’s indebtedness to Ayala Investments. PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, Ayala Investments filed a case for sum of money against PBM and Alfredo Ching. The lower court issued a writ of execution of pending appeal. Thereafter, deputy sheriff Magsajo caused issuance and service upon respondents-spouses of a notice of sheriff sale on three of their conjugal properties. Private respondents, spouses Ching, filed a case of injunction against petitioners alleging that petitioners cannot enforce the judgment against conjugal partnership levied on the ground that the subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. Upon

Agapay vs. Palang 276 SCRA 341 Facts: Article 87; Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage to Carlina Vallesterol in the church at Pangasinan. A few months after the wedding, he left to work in Hawaii. Out their union was born Herminia Palang, respondent. Miguel returned to the Philippines but he stayed in Zambales with his brother during the entire duration of his year-long sojourn, not with his wife or child. Miguel had also attempted to divorce Carlina in

Hawaii. When he returned for good, he refused to live with his wife and child. When Miguel was then 63 yrs. old, he contracted his second marriage with a nineteen year old Erlinda Agapay, petitioner. As evidenced by deed of sale, both jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at Binalonan. A house and lot was likewise purchased allegedly by Erlinda as the sole vendee. To settle and end a case filed by the first wife, Miguel and Cornelia executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement. The parties agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of six parcels of land to their only child, Herminia Palang. Miguel and Erlinda’s cohabitation produced a son and then two years later Miguel died. Thereafter, Carlina filed a complaint of concubinage on the previous party. Respondents sought to get back the riceland and the house and lot allegedly purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner. Petitioner contended that she had already given her half of the riceland property to their son and that the house and lot is her sole property having bought with her own money. RTC affirmed in favor of the petitioner while CA reversed the said decision. Issue: Whether or not petitioner may own the two parcels of land acquired during the cohabitation of petitioner and Miguel Palang. Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the conveyance of the property was not by way of sale but was a donation and therefore void. The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was clearly void and inexistent by express provision of law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation.

Zosima, Francisco and his mother-in-law executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, in which the latter waived her ¼ share of the property. Thereafter, Francisco registered the lot in his name. Having no children to take care of him after his retirement, Francisco asked his niece Leticia, the latter’s cousin Luzviminda and petitioner Cirila Arcaba, to take care of his house and store. Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the relationship between Cirila and Francisco. Leticia said that the previous party was lovers since they slept in the same room while Erlinda claimed that Francisco told her that Cirila was his mistress. On the other hand, Cirila said she was mere helper and that Francisco was too old for her. A few months before Francisco’s death, he executed an instrument denominated “Deed of Donation Inter Vivos” in which he ceded a portion of the lot together with is house to Cirila, who accepted the donation in the same instrument. The deed stated that the donation was being made in consideration of the “faithful services she had rendered over the past ten years.” Thereafter, Francisco died and the respondents filed a complaint against Cirila for declaration of nullity of a deed of donation inter vivos, recovery of possession and damages. Respondents, who are nieces, nephews and heirs by intestate succession of Francisco, alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco and the donation inert vivos is void under Article 87 of the Family Code. Issue: Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by the late Francisco Comille be declared void under Article 87 of the Family Code. Ruling: Where it has been established by preponderance of evidence that two persons lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by one in favor of the other is void under Article 87 of the Family Code. Therefore, respondents having proven by preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the donation inter vivos is considered null and void.

Arcaba vs. Tabancura Vda. De Batocael G.R. No. 146683 November 22, 2001 Facts: Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of two lots in Zamboanga del Norte. After the death of

Uy vs. CA G.R. No. 109557 November 29, 2000

Facts: Teodoro Jardeleza, petitioner, filed a petition in the matter of the guardianship of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., upon learning that one piece of real property belonging to the latter spouses was about to be sold. The petitioner averred therein that the present physical and mental incapacity of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza Sr. prevent him from competently administering his properties, in order to prevent the loss and dissipation of the Jardeleza’s real and personal assets, there was a need for a courtappointed guardian to administer said properties. Gilda Jardeleza, respondent, filed a petition regarding the declaration of incapacity of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza Sr., assumption of sole powers of administration of conjugal properties and authorization to sell the property. She alleged that her husband’s medical treatment and hospitalization expenses were piling up and that she need to sell one piece of real property and its improvements. She prayed for authorization from the court to sell said property. RTC of Iloilo City rendered its decision, finding that it was convinced that Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza Sr. was truly incapacitated to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties. However, Teodoro filed his opposition to the proceedings being unaware and not knowing that a decision has already been rendered on the case. He also questioned the propriety of the sale of the lot and its improvements thereon supposedly to pay the accumulated financial obligations and hospitalization. Issue: Whether or not Gilda Jardeleza may assume sole powers of administration of the conjugal property. Ruling: The CA, which the SC affirmed, ruled that in the condition of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza Sr., the procedural rules on summary proceedings in relation to Article 124 of the Family Code are not applicable. Because he was unable to take care of himself and manage the conjugal property due to illness that had rendered him comatose. In such case, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceeding under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court.

De La Cruz vs. De La Cruz 130 Phil 324 Facts: Estrella de la Cruz, petitioner, was married to Severino de la Cruz, defendant, at Bacolod City. During their coverture they acquire seven parcels of land in Bacolod Cadastre and three parcels of land at Silay Cadastre. They are also engaged in varied business ventures. The defendant started living in Manila, although he occasionally returned to Bacolod City, sleeping in his office at the Philippine Texboard Factory in Mandalagan, instead of in the conjugal home at Bacolod City. Estrella then filed a petition on the ground of abandonment upon the defendant who had never visited their conjugal abode. She also began to suspect the defendant in having an illicit relation while in Manila to a certain Nenita Hernandez, which she confirmed upon getting several pieces of evidence on the defendant’s polo shirt and iron safe. The defendant denied the allegations of the petitioner and that the reason he transferred his living quarters to his office in Mandalagan, Bacolod City was to teach her a lesson as she was quarrelsome and extremely jealous of every woman. He decided to live apart from his wife temporarily because at home he could not concentrate on his work. The defendant, with vehemence, denied that he has abandoned his wife and family, averring that he has never failed, even for a single month, to give them financial support. In point of fact, his wife and children continued to draw allowances from his office and he financed the education of their children, two of whom were studying in Manila. Issue: Whether or not respondent abandoned his family and failed to comply with his obligations. Ruling: The SC have made a searching scrutiny of the record, and it is considered view that the defendant is not guilty of abandonment of his wife, nor of such abuse of his powers of administration of the conjugal partnership, as to warrant division of the conjugal assets. There must be real abandonment, and not mere separation. The abandonment must not only be physical estrangement but also amount to financial and moral desertion. Therefore, physical separation alone is not the full meaning of the term "abandonment", if the husband, despite his voluntary departure from the society of his spouse, neither neglects the management of the conjugal partnership nor ceases to give support to his wife. The fact that the defendant never ceased to give support to his wife and children negatives any intent on his part not to return to the conjugal abode and resume his marital duties and rights.

Partosa-Jo vs. CA 216 SCRA 692

BA Finance Corporation vs. CA 161 SCRA 608

Facts: Jose Jo, respondent, cohabited with three women and fathered fifteen children. The first woman, petitioner Prima Partosa-Jo claims to be his legal wife by whom he begot a daughter. Petitioner filed a complaint against Jo for judicial separation of conjugal property and an action for support. The complaint for support was granted by the lower court but the judicial separation of conjugal property was never entertained. Jo elevated the decision for support to the CA but retain its affirmation on trial court’s ruling. When their motions for reconsideration were denied, both parties appeal to SC for the complaint of judicial separation of conjugal property. The SC, through the definite findings of the trial court, holds that the petitioner and respondent were legally married and that the properties mentioned by the petitioner were acquired by Jo during their marriage although they were registered in the name of an apparent dummy. Issue: Whether or not the judicial separation of conjugal property be granted to the petitioner on the ground of abandonment. Ruling: SC granted the petition. The record shows that respondent had already rejected the petitioner. The fact that she was not accepted by Jo demonstrates all too clearly that he had no intention of resuming their conjugal relationship. The respondent also refuses to give financial support to the petitioner. The physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the respondent to give support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal property.

Facts: Augusto Yulo, respondent, secured a loan from the petitioner, BA Finance Corp., as evidenced by his signature on a promissory note in behalf of the A & L Industries. About two months prior to the loan, however, Augusto Yulo had already left Lily Yulo and their children and had abandoned their conjugal home. When the obligation became due and demandable, Augusto Yulo failed to pay the same. Petitioner filed its amended complaint against the spouses on the basis of the promissory note. They also prayed for the issuance of a writ of attachment that the said spouses were guilty of fraud in contracting the debt. The trial court issued the writ of attachment thereby enabling the petitioner to attach the properties of A & L Industries. Private respondent Lily Yulo filed her answer with counterclaim, alleging that Augusto had already abandoned her and their children five months before the filing of the complaint and that they were already separated when the promissory note was executed. She also alleged that her signature was forged in the special power of attorney procured by Augusto. Petitioner contends that even if the signature was forged or even if the attached properties were her exclusive property, the same can be made answerable to the obligation because the said properties form part of the conjugal partnership of the spouses Yulo. Issue: Whether or not the exclusive property of private respondent forms part of the conjugal partnership of the spouses and be made answerable to the obligation. Ruling: SC ordered the release of the attachment of the said property. Though it is presumed that the single proprietorship established during the marriage is conjugal and even if it is registered in the name of only one of the spouses. However, for the said property to be held liable, the obligation contracted by the husband must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. In the case at bar, the obligation which the petitioner is seeking to enforce against the conjugal property managed by the private respondent was undoubtedly contracted by Augusto Yulo for his own benefit because

at the time he incurred the obligation he had already abandoned his family and had left their conjugal home.

defendant-wife redound to the benefit of the family. Hence, the conjugal partnership, as well as the defendant-husband cannot be held liable. Only the defendant-wife and her paraphernal property can be held liable. The conjugal properties and the capital of the defendant-husband cannot be levied upon.

Johnson & Johnson Inc. vs. CA 262 SCRA 298 Facts: Delilah Vinluan, defendant and owner of Vinluan Enterprises, engaged in the business of retailing Johnson products incurred an obligation to the said company. She issued checks amounting to the payment of the obligation but the checks bounced. Johnson & Johnson, petitioner, demands for the payment and even offered accommodations to pay the obligation but failed. With these, respondent filed a complaint against defendant spouses Vinluan for collection of the principal obligation plus interest with damages. RTC granted the complaint and ordered defendant to pay. However, after meticulously scrutinizing the evidence on record that there was no privity of contract between respondent and defendanthusband regarding the obligations incurred by the defendant-wife, they held that defendant-husband must not be legally held liable for the said obligation. Thus, they issued a writ of execution against the properties of the defendant-wife but the two notices of levy on execution covered also the real and personal properties of the conjugal partnership. Defendant-husband filed a third-party claim seeking the lifting of the levy on the conjugal properties. Subsequently, petitioner filed a motion to fix the value of the levied properties. Defendant-husband moved to quash the levy on execution but as expected petitioner opposed the motion. Issue: Whether or not defendant-husband be held liable for the debts of his wife which were incurred without his consent. Ruling: SC denied petition based on the respondent Court’s original findings which had already become final and indisputable. The defendanthusband did not give his consent neither did the obligation incurred by the

Spouses Laperal vs. Spouses Katigbak 90 Phil 77 Facts: The plaintiffs, Roberto Laperal Jr. and his wife Purificacion M. Laperal sued Ramon Katigbak, who acted as an agent in the sale on the commission of jewels, and his wife Evelina Katigbak to recover the total sum P113,500 plus interest and costs. The defendant Evelina moved to dismiss, on the ground that the complaint failed to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action against her. The plaintiff opposed the motion but the court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint. Hence this appeal. Two causes of action were set forth in the complaint. The first transcribed four promissory notes for various sums and the notes are not signed by Evelina. The only allegations that may affect her liability if any, are that Ramon signed the notes for value received "while married to her", and that both defendants refused to pay the notes. Issue: Whether or not Evelina may be held liable for the debts of her husband against the spouses Laperal. Ruling: The defendant Evelina is not personally liable. Ramon was not her agent, and he did not contract for her. For the repayment of the sums borrowed by him, Ramon Katigbak was personally responsible with his own

private funds, and at most the assets of the conjugal partnership. To reach both kinds of property it is unnecessary for plaintiffs to implead the wife Evelina Katigbak. "Where the husband is alone liable, no action lies against the wife, and she is not a necessary party defendant.” The husband cannot by his contract bind the paraphernal property unless its administration has been transferred to him, which is not the case. Neither can the paraphernal property be made to answer for debts incurred by the husband.

they be declared co-owners of the land. They ground their cause of action upon their alleged discovery on two wills executed by Modesto Aranas and his wife Victoria. Victoria’s will stated that her interests, rights and properties, real and personal as her share from the conjugal partnership be bequeathed to Consolacion and Raymundo and also to Dorothea and Teodoro in equal shares. Modesto’s will, on the other hand, bequeathed to his two illegitimate children all his interest in his conjugal partnership with Victoria as well as his own capital property brought by him to his marriage. Issue: Whether or not the property mortgaged be a conjugal property of the spouses Modesto and Victoria. Ruling: Even if it be assumed that the husband’s acquisition by succession of the lot in question took place during his marriage, the lot would nonetheless be his “exclusive property” because it was acquired by him “during the marriage by lucrative title”. Certain it is that the land itself, which Modesto had inherited from his parents, Graciano and Nicolasa, is his exclusive and private property. The property should be regarded as his own exclusively, as a matter of law.

Villanueva vs. IAC 192 SCRA 21 Facts: Spouses Graciano Aranas and Nicolasa Bunsa owned a parcel of land in Capiz. After they died, their surviving children, Modesto and Federico Aranas adjudicated the land to themselves under a deed of extrajudicial partition. Modesto Aranas obtained a Torrens title in his name from the Capiz Registry of Property. Modesto was married to Victoria Comorro but they had no children. After the death of Modesto, his two surviving illegitimate children named Dorothea and Teodoro borrowed P18,000 from Jesus Bernas. As a security they mortgaged to Bernas their father’s property. In the loan agreement executed between the parties, a relative Raymundo Aranas, signed the agreement as a witness. Dorothea and Teodoro failed to pay their loan. As a result, Bernas caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage and acquired the land at the auction sale as the highest bidder. About a month later, Consolacion Villanueva and Raymundo Aranas filed a complaint against spouses Bernas praying that the property entered in the loan agreement be cancelled and

BPI vs. Posadas 56 Phil 215 Facts: The estate of Adolphe Oscar Schuetze is the sole beneficiary named in the life-insurance policy for $10,000, issued by the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada. During the following five years the insured paid the premiums at the Manila branch of the company. The deceased Adolphe Oscar Schuetze married the plaintiff-appellant Rosario Gelano. The plaintiff-appellant, the Bank of the Philippine Islands, was appointed administrator of the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze's testamentary estate by an order, entered by the Court of First Instance of Manila. The

Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, whose main office is in Montreal, Canada, paid Rosario Gelano Vda. de Schuetze upon her arrival at Manila, the sum of P20,150, which was the amount of the insurance policy on the life of said deceased, payable to the latter's estate. On the same date Rosario Gelano Vda. de Schuetze delivered the money to said Bank of the Philippine Islands, as administrator of the deceased's estate, which entered it in the inventory of the testamentary estate, and then returned the money to said widow. The appellee alleges that it is a fundamental principle that a life-insurance policy belongs exclusively to the beneficiary upon the death of the person insured. Issue: Whether or not the life insurance policy belongs to the conjugal partnership. Ruling: SC holds, (1) that the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the insured's estate, on which the premiums were paid by the conjugal partnership, constitute community property, and belong one-half to the husband and the other half to the wife, exclusively; and (2) that if the premiums were paid partly with paraphernal and partly conjugal funds, the proceeds are likewise in like proportion paraphernal in part and conjugal in part. That the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the insured's estate as the beneficiary, if delivered to the testamentary administrator of the former as part of the assets of said estate under probate administration, are subject to the inheritance tax according to the law on the matter, if they belong to the assured exclusively, and it is immaterial that the insured was domiciled in these Islands or outside.

City while the latter lived in Manila. During the marriage, Romarico bought parcel of land in Angeles City from his father, with money borrowed from an officemate. Meanwhile in Hongkong, Katrina entered into an agreement with Anita Chan whereby the latter consigned to Katrina pieces of jewelry for sale. When Katrina failed to return the pieces of jewelry within the 20-day period agreed upon, Anita Chan demanded payment of their value. Katrina issued in favor of Anita Chan a check, however, was dishonored for lack of funds. Hence, Katrina was charged with estafa. Trial court dismissed the case on the ground that Katrina's liability was not criminal but civil in nature. Anita Chan and her husband Ricky Wong filed against Katrina and her husband Romarico Henson, an action for collection of a sum of money. After trial, the court promulgated decisions in favor of the Wong’s. A writ of execution was thereafter issued, levied upon were four lots in Angeles all in the name of Romarico Henson married to Katrina Henson. Romarico filed an action for the annulment of the decision as well as the writ of execution, levy on execution and the auction. Romarico alleged that he was "not given his day in court" because he was not represented by counsel as Attys. Albino and Yumul appeared solely for Katrina. That he had nothing to do with the business transactions of Katrina as he did not authorize her to enter into such transactions; and that the properties levied on execution and sold at public auction by the sheriff were his capital properties. Issue: Whether or not the properties levied on execution are exclusive properties of Romarico. Ruling: The presumption of the conjugal nature of the properties subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the properties are exclusively owned by Romarico. While there is proof that Romarico acquired the properties with money he had borrowed from an officemate, it is unclear where he obtained the money to repay the loan. If he paid it out of his salaries, then the money is part of the conjugal assets and not exclusively his. Proof on this matter is of paramount importance considering that in the determination of the nature of a property acquired by a person during coverture, the controlling factor is the source of the money utilized in the purchase.

Wong vs. IAC 200 SCRA 792 Facts: Private respondent Romarico Henson married Katrina Pineda. They had been most of the time living separately. The former stayed in Angeles

Ayala Investments vs. CA G.R. No. 118305 February 12, 1998 Facts:

Carlos vs. Abelardo G.R. No. 146504 April 4, 2002 Facts:

Same. Article 121-122 Issue: Whether or not debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone are considered for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Ruling: The respondent directly received the money or services to be used in or for his own business or his own profession, that contract falls within the term “obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership”. Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the time of the signing of the contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan and services, the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial in the, his business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

Honorio Carlos averred in his complaint that in October 1989, respondent and his wife Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo approached him and requested him to advance the amount of US$25,000.00 for the purchase of a house and lot. To enable and assist the spouses conduct their married life independently and on their own, petitioner issued a check in the name of a certain Pura Vallejo, seller of the property, who acknowledged receipt thereof. The amount was in full payment of the property. When petitioner inquired from the spouses in as to the status of the amount he loaned to them, the latter acknowledged their obligation but pleaded that they were not yet in a position to make a definite settlement of the same. Thereafter, respondent expressed violent resistance to petitioner’s inquiries on the amount to the extent of making various death threats against petitioner. Petitioner made a formal demand for the payment of the amount of US$25,000.00 but the spouses failed to comply with their obligation. Thus, petitioner filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money and damages against respondent and his wife before the RTC of Valenzuela. As they were separated in fact for more than a year prior to the filing of the complaint, respondent and his wife filed separate answers. Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo admitted securing a loan together with her husband, from petitioner. She claimed, however, that said loan was payable on a staggered basis so she was surprised when petitioner demanded immediate payment of the full amount. Issue: Whether or not the amount of US$25,000.00 was a loan obtained by private respondent and his wife from petitioner. Ruling: Early in time, it must be noted that payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. The defendants never denied that the check of US$25,000.00 was used to purchase the subject house and lot. They do not deny that the same served as their conjugal home, thus benefiting the family. Hence, defendant-husband and defendant-wife are jointly and severally liable in the payment of the loan. Defendant-husband cannot allege as a defense that the amount of US $25,000.00 was received as his share in the income or profits of the corporation and not as a loan. Defendant-husband does not appear to be a stockholder nor an employee nor an agent of the corporation, H. L. Carlos Construction, Inc. Since he is not a stockholder, he has no right to participate in the income or profits thereof.

Mallilin vs. Castillo G.R. No. 136803 June 16, 2000 Facts: Petitioner Eustaquio Mallilin, Jr. filed a complaint for "Partition and/or Payment of Co-Ownership Share, Accounting and Damages" against respondent Ma. Elvira Castillo. The complaint alleged that petitioner and respondent, both married and with children, but separated from their respective spouses, cohabited after a brief courtship while their respective marriages still subsisted. During their union, they set up the Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation, with petitioner as president and chairman of the board of directors, and respondent as vice-president and treasurer. The business flourished and petitioner and respondent acquired real and personal properties which were registered solely in respondent's name. Due to irreconcilable differences, the couple separated. Petitioner demanded from respondent his share in the subject properties, but respondent refused alleging that said properties had been registered solely in her name. Respondent admitted that she engaged in the customs brokerage business with petitioner but alleged that the Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation was organized with other individuals and duly registered with the SEC. She denied that she and petitioner lived as husband and wife because the fact was that they were still legally married to their respective spouses. She claimed to be the exclusive owner of all real personal properties involved in petitioner's action for partition on the ground that they were acquired entirely out of her own money and registered solely in her name. Issue: Whether or not the parties are considered as co-owners of the properties. Ruling: A co-ownership exists between a man and a woman who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, likewise provides that, if the parties are incapacitated to marry each other, properties acquired by them through their joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their contributions which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal. There is thus co-ownership eventhough the couple are not capacitated to marry each other.

Valdez vs. RTC 260 SCRA 211 Facts: Same. Article 147; Emphasis to the RTC’s judgment on liquidation of properties in connection with the provision of property regime w/o unions of marriage. Issue: Whether or not Article 147 correctly applied on the status of the parties in the liquidation of their properties. Ruling: The Supreme Court stated that, in avoid marriage, the property regimes are those provided for in Article 147 or 148as, the case may be. The liquidation of the co-ownership shall be in accordance with the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code which are not in conflict with Article 147 or 148. The conjugal home shall equally be co-owned by the couple and shall be divided equally during liquidation in accordance with the rules on co-ownership. However, the fruits of couple’s separate property are not included in the co-ownership.

the subject properties as she claimed in her Affidavit of Third Party Claim. Confronted with this reality, she later claimed that the funds were provided by her mother and sister, clearly an afterthought in a desperate effort to shield the subject properties from appellant Master Iron as judgment creditor.

Francisco vs. Master Iron Works Construction Corp. G.R. No. 151967 February 16, 2005 Facts: Josefina Castillo was only 23 years old when she and Eduardo G. Francisco were married. Eduardo was then employed as the vice president in a private corporation. The Imus Rural Bank, Inc. executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Josefina Castillo Francisco, married to Eduardo Francisco, covering two parcels of residential land with a house. The Register of Deeds made of record at the dorsal portion of the said titles. Josefina mortgaged the said property to Leonila Cando for a loan. It appears that Eduardo affixed his marital conformity to the deed. Eduardo, who was then the General Manager and President of Reach Out Trading International, bought 7,500 bags of cement from MIWCC but failed to pay for the same. MIWCC filed a complaint against him in the RTC of Makati City for the return of the said commodities, or the value thereof. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of MIWCC and against Eduardo. Josefina filed the said Affidavit of Third Party Claim in the trial court and served a copy thereof to the sheriff. MIWCC then submitted an indemnity bond issued by the Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. The sale at public auction proceeded. MIWCC made a bid for the property. Josefina filed a Complaint against MIWCC and Sheriff Alejo in the RTC of Parañaque for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. She alleged then that she was the sole owner of the property levied on execution by Sheriff Alejo. Hence, the levy on execution of the property was null and void. Issue: Whether or not the subject property is the conjugal property of Josefina Castillo and Eduardo Francisco. Ruling: The petitioner failed to prove that she acquired the property with her personal funds before her cohabitation with Eduardo and that she is the sole owner of the property. The evidence on record shows that the Imus Bank executed a deed of absolute sale over the property to the petitioner and titles over the property were, thereafter, issued to the latter as vendee after her marriage to Eduardo. It is to be noted that plaintiff-appellee got married at the age of 23. At that age, it is doubtful if she had enough funds of her own to purchase

Agapay vs. Palang 276 SCRA 341 Facts: Same. Article 148. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is co-owner of the riceland acquired by cohabitation between her and Miguel. Ruling: The sale of the riceland was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. The provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing for cases of cohabitation when a man and woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. While Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage, said union was patently void because earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still subsisting and unaffected by the latter’s de facto separation. Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy-and-sell and had a sari-sari store but failed to persuade the SC that she actually contributed money to buy the riceland. Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the riceland, SC finds no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same.

Juaniza vs. Jose 89 SCRA 306 Facts: Eugenio Jose was the registered owner and operator of the passenger jeepney involved in an accident of collision with a freight train of the Philippine National Railways that took place on November 23, 1969 which resulted in the death to seven (7) and physical injuries to five (5) of its passengers. At the time of the accident, Eugenio Jose was legally married to Socorro Ramos but had been cohabiting with defendantappellant, Rosalia Arroyo, for sixteen (16) years in a relationship akin to that of husband and wife. Motion for reconsideration was filed by Rosalia Arroyo praying that the decision be reconsidered insofar as it condemns her to pay damages jointly and severally with her co-defendant, but was denied. Issue: Whether or not Article 144 of the Civil Code (now Article 148 of FC) is applicable in a case where one of the parties in a common-law relationship is incapacitated to marry. Ruling: It has been consistently ruled by this Court that the co-ownership contemplated in Article 144 of the Civil Code requires that the man and the woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. Since Eugenio Jose is legally married to Socorro Ramos, there is an impediment for him to contract marriage with Rosalia Arroyo. Under the aforecited provision of the Civil Code, Arroyo cannot be a co-owner of the jeepney. The jeepney belongs to the conjugal partnership of Jose and his legal wife. There is therefore no basis for the liability of Arroyo for damages arising from the death of, and physical injuries suffered by, the passengers of the jeepney which figured in the collision.

Tumlos vs. Fernandez G.R. No. 137650 April 12, 2000 Facts: Spouses Fernandez filed an action of ejectment against petitioner Guillerma Tumlos, Toto Tumlos, and Gina Tumlos. In their complaint, the said spouses alleged that they are the absolute owners of an apartment building that through tolerance they had allowed the defendants-private respondents to occupy the apartment building for the last 7 years without the payment of any rent; that it was agreed upon that after a few months, Guillerma Tumlos will pay P1,600.00 a month while the other defendants promised to pay P1,000.00 a month, both as rental, which agreement was not complied with by the said defendants. They have demanded several times that the defendants vacate the premises, as they are in need of the property for the construction of a new building. Guillerma Tumlos was the only one who filed an answer to the complaint. She averred therein that the Fernandez spouses had no cause of action against her, since she is a co-owner of the subject premises as evidenced by a Contract to Sell wherein it was stated that she is a covendee of the property in question together with Mario Fernandez. She then asked for the dismissal of the complaint. Upon appeal to the RTC, petitioner and the two other defendants alleged in their memorandum on appeal that Mario and petitioner had an amorous relationship, and that they acquired the property in question as their "love nest." It was further alleged that they lived together in the said apartment building with their 2 children for around 10 years, and that Guillerma administered the property by collecting rentals from the lessees of the other apartments, until she discovered that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of his marriage. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is the co-owner of the property in litis.

Ruling: Petitioner fails to present any evidence that she had made an actual contribution to purchase the subject property. Indeed, she anchors her claim of co-ownership merely on her cohabitation with respondent Mario. Likewise, her claim of having administered the property during the cohabitation is unsubstantiated. In any event, this fact by itself does not justify her claim, for nothing in Article 148 of the Family Code provides that the administration of the property amounts to a contribution in its acquisition. Clearly, there is no basis for petitioner’s claim of co-ownership. The property in question belongs to the conjugal partnership of respondents.

without being joined by his wife. The signing of the attached certificate of non-forum shopping only by the husband is not a fatal defect. The signing petitioner here made the certification in his behalf and that of his wife. The husband may reasonably be presumed to have personal knowledge of the filing or non-filing by his wife of any action or claim similar to the petition for certiorari and prohibition given the notices and legal processes involved in a legal proceeding involving real property.

Docena vs. Lapesura G.R. No. 140153 March 28, 2001 Facts: Casiano Hombria filed a Complaint for the recovery of a parcel of land against his lessees, petitioner-spouses Antonio and Alfreda Docena. The petitioners claimed ownership of the land based on occupation since time immemorial. A certain Guillermo Abuda intervened in the case. The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners and the intervenor Abuda. The CA reversed the judgment of the trial court and ordered the petitioners to vacate the land they have leased from Casiano. The Complaint in Intervention of Abuda was dismissed. A Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was filed by the petitioners with the Court of Appeals, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court judge in issuing the Orders and of the sheriff in issuing the Writ of Demolition. Issue: Whether or not joint management or administration does require that the husband and the wife always act together. Ruling: Each spouse may validly exercise full power of management alone, subject to the intervention of the court in proper cases. It is believed that even under the provisions of the Family Code, the husband alone could have filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition to contest the writs of demolition issued against the conjugal property with the Court of Appeals

Martinez vs. Martinez G.R. No. 162084 June 28, 2005 Facts: The spouses Martinez were the owners of a parcel of land as well as the house constructed thereon. Daniel, Sr. executed a Last Will and Testament directing the subdivision of the property into three lots. He then bequeathed the three lots to each of his sons, namely, Rodolfo, Manolo and Daniel, Jr. Manolo was designated as the administrator of the estate. Rodolfo found a deed of sale purportedly signed by his father, where the latter appears to have sold to Manolo and his wife Lucila. Rodolfo filed a complaint for annulment of deed of sale and cancellation of TCT against his brother Manolo and his sister-in-law Lucila before the RTC. RTC dismissed the complaint for annulment of deed of sale on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the action since there was no allegation in the complaint that the last will of Daniel Martinez, Sr. had been admitted to probate. Rodolfo appealed the order to the CA. In the meantime, the spouses Manolo and Lucila Martinez wrote Rodolfo, demanding that he vacate the property. Rodolfo ignored the letter and refused to do so. This prompted the said spouses to file a complaint for unlawful detainer against Rodolfo in the MTC of Manila. They alleged that they were the owners of the property. The spouses Martinez alleged in their position paper that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made and/or exerted by them, but that the same proved futile.

No amicable settlement was, likewise, reached by the parties during the preliminary conference because of irreconcilable differences.

order of dismissal, but their motion was denied. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:

Issue:

Whether or not the certification to file action and the allegations in the complaint that the case passed through the barangay are sufficient compliance to prove that earnest efforts were made.

Whether or not the complaint on the ground that it does not allege under oath that earnest efforts toward compromise were made prior to filing thereof.

Ruling:

Ruling:

The petition was granted. As pointed out by the Code Commission, it is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than litigation between members of the same family. It is necessary that every effort should be made toward a compromise before litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family and it is known that a lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers. Thus, a party’s failure to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code before filing a complaint against a family member would render such complaint premature.

Petition was granted. The inclusion of private respondent Ayson as defendant and petitioner Maria Hontiveros as plaintiff takes the case out of the ambit of Art. 151 of the Family Code. Under this provision, the phrase "members of the same family" refers to the husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters, whether full or half-blood. Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not given any legal effect in this jurisdiction. Consequently, private respondent Ayson, who is described in the complaint as the spouse of respondent Hontiveros, and petitioner Maria Hontiveros, who is admittedly the spouse of petitioner Augusto Hontiveros, are considered strangers to the Hontiveros family.

Hontiveros vs. RTC G.R. No. 125465 June 29, 1999 Facts: The spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros, filed a complaint for damages against private respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson for damages due to uncollected rentals on a land located at Jamindan, Capiz. Petitioners moved for a judgment on the pleadings on the ground that private respondents’ answer did not tender an issue or that it otherwise admitted the material allegations of the complaint. Private respondents opposed the motion alleging that they had denied petitioners’ claims and thus tendered certain issues of fact which could only be resolved after trial. The trial court denied petitioners’ motion. After an assessment of the diverging views and arguments presented by both parties, pleadings is inappropriate not only for the fact that the defendants in their answer specifically denied the claim of damages against them, but also because the party claiming damages must satisfactorily prove the amount thereof, however an exception to it, that is, that when the allegations refer to the amount of damages, the allegations must still be proved. The court dismissed the case and petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the

Manalo vs. CA G.R. No. 129242 January 16, 2001 Facts: Troadio Manalo died intestate on February 14, 1992. He was survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven children, who are all of legal age. At the time of his death, Troadio Manalo left several real properties located in Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a business under the name and style Manalo's Machine Shop. The eight of the surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo filed a petition with the respondent RTC of Manila of the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof. The trial court issued an order and set the reception of evidence of the petitioners therein. However, the trial court upon motion of set this order of general default aside herein petitioners (oppositors therein) who were granted then 10 days within which to file their opposition to the

petition. Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners, through counsel, culminating in the filling of an Omnibus Motion. Issue: Whether or not the motion for the outright dismissal of the petition for judicial settlement of estate aver that earnest efforts toward a compromise involving members of the same family have been made. Ruling: The petition was denied for lack of merit. petitioners may not validly take refuge under the provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify the invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for the dismissal of the petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo inasmuch as the latter provision is clear enough. This is clear from the term 'suit' that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or other in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity.

concubinage, as the case may be, then the other should refrain from filing an action against the other. Judge Gapusan denied that he drafted the agreement. He explained that the spouses had been separated for a long time when they signed the separation agreement and that the wife had begotten children with her paramour. He said that there was a stipulation in the agreement that the spouses would live together in case of reconciliation. His belief was that the separation agreement forestalled the occurrence of violent incidents between the spouses. Albano in filing the malpractice charge is in effect asking this Court to take belated disciplinary action against Judge Gapusan as a member of the bar or as a notary. Issue: Whether or not respondent judge committed malpractice as a notary. Ruling: To preserve the institutions of marriage and the family, the law considers as void "any contract for personal separation between husband and wife" and "every extrajudicial agreement, during the marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership". A notary should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudically dissolving the conjugal partnership. Notaries were severely censured by this Court for notarizing documents which subvert the institutions of marriage and the family

Albano vs. Gapusan A.M. No. 1022-MJ May 7, 1976 Facts: Redentor Albano in a verified complaint charged Municipal Judge Patrocinio Gapusan of Ilocos Norte with incompetence and ignorance of the law for having prepared and notarized a document providing for tile personal separation of husband and wife and the extrajudicial liquidation of their conjugal partnership. In 1941 or five years before his appointment to the bench, respondent Gapusan notarized a document for the personal separation of the spouses Valentina Andres and Guillermo Maligta of Vintar, Ilocos Norte and for the extrajudicial liquidation of their conjugal partnership. It was stipulated in that document that if either spouse should commit adultery or

Modequillo vs. Breva 185 SCRA 766 Facts: On January 29, 1988, a judgment was rendered by the Court of Appeals entitled "Francisco Salinas, et al. vs. Jose Modequillo, et al.” The said judgment having become final and executory, a writ of execution was issued by the RTC of Davao City to satisfy the said judgment on the goods and chattels of the defendants Jose Modequillo and Benito

Malubay at Davao del Sur. The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Davao del Sur registered in the name of defendant and a parcel of agricultural land located at Malalag, Davao del Sur. A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of execution was filed by defendant Jose Modequillo alleging therein that the residential land located at Poblacion Malalag is where the family home is built since 1969 prior to the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment under Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment debt sought to be enforced against the family home of defendant is not one of those enumerated under Article 155 of the Family Code. An opposition thereto was filed by the plaintiffs. Issue: Whether or not a final judgment in an action for damages may be satisfied by way of execution of a family home constituted under the Family Code. Ruling: Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors should take the necessary precautions to protect their interest before extending credit to the spouses or head of the family who owns the home. In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family home whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family home by operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code.

Petitioner Florante F. Manacop and his wife Eulaceli purchased residential lot with a bungalow. Private Respondent E & L Merchantile, Inc. filed a complaint against petitioner and F.F. Manacop Construction Co., Inc. before the RTC of Pasig, Metro Manila to collect indebtedness. Instead of filing an answer, petitioner and his company entered into a compromise agreement with private respondent. The trial court rendered judgment approving the aforementioned compromise agreement. It enjoined the parties to comply with the agreement in good faith. Private respondent filed a motion for execution which the lower court granted. However, execution of the judgment was delayed. Eventually, the sheriff levied on several vehicles and other personal properties of petitioner. These chattels were sold at public auction for which certificates of sale were correspondingly issued by the sheriff. Petitioner and his company filed a motion to quash the alias writs of execution and to stop the sheriff from continuing to enforce them on the ground that the judgment was not yet executory. Private respondent opposed the motion. The lower court denied the motion to quash the writ of execution and the prayers in the subsequent pleadings filed by petitioner and his company. Finding that petitioner and his company had not paid their indebtedness even though they collected receivables, the lower court held that the case had become final and executory. It also ruled that petitioner's residence was not exempt from execution as it was not duly constituted as a family home, pursuant to the Civil Code. Issue: Whether or not a writ of execution of a final and executory judgment issued before the effectivity of the Family Code be executed on a house and lot constituted as a family home under the provision of Family Code. Ruling: The petition is denied for utter lack of merit. It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153 FC have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the FC and are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the FC. Art. 162 simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the FC, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the FC.

Manacop vs. CA 277 SCRA 941 Facts:

Andal vs. Macaraig 89 Phil 165 Facts: Mariano Andal, assisted by his mother Maria Dueñas, as guardian ad litem, brought an action in the CIF of Camarines Sur for the recovery of the ownership and possession of a parcel of land situated in Camarines Sur. The complaint alleges that Mariano Andal is the surviving son of Emiliano Andal and Maria Dueñas and that Emiliano was the owner of the parcel of land in question having acquired it from his mother Eduvigis Macaraig by virtue of a donation propter nuptias executed by the latter in favor of the former. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs (a) declaring Mariano Andal the legitimate son of Emiliano Andal and such entitled to inherit the land in question; (b) declaring Mariano Andal owner of said land; and (c) ordering the defendant to pay the costs of suit. Defendant took the case to this Court upon the plea that only question of law are involved. Emiliano Andal became sick of tuberculosis. Sometime thereafter, his brother, Felix, went to live in his house to help him work his house to help him work his farm. His sickness became worse, he became so weak that he could hardly move and get up from his bed. Maria Dueñas, his wife, eloped with Felix, and both went to live in the house of Maria's father. Felix and Maria had sexual intercourse and treated each other as husband and wife. Emiliano died without the presence of his wife, who did not even attend his funeral. Maria Dueñas gave birth to a boy, who was given the name of Mariano Andal.

Benitez-Badua vs. CA G.R. No. 105625 January 24, 1994 Facts: Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian owned various properties, upon their death the fight for administration of Vicente’s estate ensued. Vicente’s sister and nephew prayed for the issuance of letters of administration of Vicente’s estate. On the other hand, Marisa BenitezBadua opposed the petition. She alleged that she is the sole heir of the deceased spouses and is capable of administering the estate. In RTC, both parties submit their pieces of evidence. Petitioner Marissa, prove that she is the only legitimate child of the spouses by submitting documentary evidence and that the spouses continuously treated her as legitimate child. On the other hand, respondents proved by testimonial evidence that spouses failed to beget a child during their marriage because the spouse Isabel was treated by an obstetriciangynecologist which prevented her to give birth. The older sister of Vicente also declared that petitioner was not the biological child of the spouses, who were unable to procreate, as she was there at the time the spouses were having this problem. Issue:

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner was the biological child of the spouses and has the right to be the sole heir.

Whether or not the child is considered as the legitimate son of Emiliano.

Ruling:

Ruling: Mariano is the legitimate son of Emiliano. It is already seen that Emiliano and his wife were living together, or at least had access one to the other, and Emiliano was not impotent, and the child was born within 300 days following the dissolution of the marriage. Under these facts no other presumption can be drawn than that the issue is legitimate. It is also seen that this presumption can only be rebutted by clear proof that it was physically or naturally impossible for them to indulge in carnal intercourse. And here there is no such proof.

Petitioner was not the biological child based on facts. Live of Birth Certificate was repudiated by Notarized of Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate. The claim for inheritance of a child who is not the biological or adopted child of deceased was denied, on the ground that Articles 164, 166, 170, and 171 of the Family Code do not contemplate a situation where a child is alleged not to be the child by nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where the husband or his heirs denies as his own a child of his wife.

Concepcion vs. CA G.R. No. 123450 August 31, 2005 Facts: Ma. Theresa Almonte married Gerardo Concepcion, which they begot a child named Jose Gerardo. Gerardo Concepcion found out that his wife was still married to Mario Gopiao. Hence, he filed for annulment on the ground of bigamy. Theresa averred that he married Mario but that was only a sham and she never lived with him at all. RTC ruled that Theresa’s marriage with Mario Gopiao is still valid and subsisting thus the marriage with Gerardo is bigamous and the child born was condemned illegitimate. Custody was then given to Theresa. Theresa felt betrayed and humiliated when Gerardo had their marriage annulled. She argued that a putative father cannot have visitation rights over the illegitimate child and the child’s surname be changed to the mother’s maiden name. Gerardo opposed the motion and insisted on the visitation rights and retention of the father’s surname to the child. Issue: Whether or not the child born out of a bigamous marriage is considered legitimate.

Liyao vs. Liyao G.R. No. 138961 March 7, 2002 Facts: Corazon Garcia is legally married to but living separately from Ramon M. Yulo for more than 10 years at the time of the institution of the said civil case. Corazon cohabited with the late William Liyao from 1965 up to the time of William’s untimely demise. They lived together in the company of Corazon’s two children from her subsisting marriage. Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jr. During her three day stay at the hospital, William Liyao visited and stayed with her and the new born baby, William, Jr. (Billy). All the medical and hospital expenses, food and clothing were paid under the account of William Liyao. William Liyao even asked his confidential secretary to secure a copy of Billy’s birth certificate. He likewise instructed Corazon to open a bank account for Billy with the Consolidated Bank and Trust Company and gave weekly amounts to be deposited therein. William Liyao would bring Billy to the office, introduce him as his good looking son and had their pictures taken together. Respondents, on the other hand, painted a different picture of the story.

Ruling: Jose Gerardo is deemed born legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. The fact that the child was conceived and born at the time the spouses had lived together. The law and only the law determine, who are the legitimate or illegitimate children, for one’s legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised. Not even the birth certificate of the minor can change his status for the information contained therein is merely supplied by the mother and/or the supposed father. It should be what the law says and not what a parent says it is.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner may impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of his supposed father William Liyao. Ruling: SC denied the petition. A child born and conceived during a valid marriage is presumed to be legitimate. The presumption of legitimacy of children does not only flow out from a declaration contained in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded in a policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy. SC finds no reason to discuss the sufficiency of the evidence presented by both parties on the petitioner’s claim of alleged filiation with the late William Liyao. In any event, there is no clear, competent and positive evidence presented by the petitioner that his alleged father had admitted or recognized his paternity.

acknowledging that she is his daughter. By this act alone, Vicente is deemed to have acknowledged his paternity over Maria Theresa.

Eceta vs. Eceta G.R. No. 157037 May 20, 2004 Facts: Petitioner Rosalina P. Vda. De Eceta was married to Isaac Eceta sometime in 1926. During the subsistence of their marriage, they begot a son, Vicente. The couple acquired several properties, among which is the disputed property. Isaac died in 1967 leaving behind Rosalina and Vicente as his compulsory heirs. In 1977, Vicente died. During his lifetime, however, he sired Maria Theresa, an illegitimate daughter. Thus at the time of his death, his compulsory heirs were his mother, Rosalina, and illegitimate child, Maria Theresa. In 1991, Maria Theresa filed a case before the RTC of Quezon City for "Partition and Accounting with Damages" against Rosalina alleging that by virtue of her father’s death, she became Rosalina’s co-heir and coowner of the property. In her answer, Rosalina alleged that the property is paraphernal in nature and thus belonged to her exclusively. Issue: Whether the certified xerox copy from a xerox copy of the certificate of live birth is competent evidence to prove the alleged filiation of the respondent as an "illegitimate daughter" of her alleged father Vicente Eceta.

Constantino vs. Mendez 209 SCRA 18 Facts: Amelita Constantino, petitioner and waitress at Tony’s Restaurant, met Ivan Mendez, respondent. On that first meeting, Ivan invited Amelita to dine with him at Hotel Enrico where he stayed. While dining, Ivan professed his love to Amelita through a promise of marriage and then they have had a sexual intercourse. But after the sexual contact, Ivan confessed that he is a married man. However, they repeated their sexual contact in the months of September and November 1974 whenever Ivan is in Manila, which resulted to Amelita’s pregnancy. Amelita pleas for help and support to Ivan but failed. She then filed for the recognition of the unborn child and payment for damages. However, Ivan rebutted by the petition of the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action. RTC ruled in favor of Amelita, respondent petition the complaint CA that RTC erred in its ruling. CA favored the respondent and dismissed the complaint of petitioner.

Ruling: Notably, what was filed and tried before the trial court and the Court of Appeals is one for partition and accounting with damages only. The filiation, or compulsory recognition by Vicente Eceta of Maria Theresa, was never put in issue. In fact, both parties have already agreed and admitted, as duly noted in the trial court’s pre-trial order, that Maria Theresa is Rosalina’s granddaughter. Notwithstanding, Maria Theresa successfully established her filiation with Vicente by presenting a duly authenticated birth certificate. Vicente himself signed Maria Theresa’s birth certificate thereby

Issue: Whether or not Amelita was able to prove the paternity of Ivan to her son Michael to warrant support. Ruling: SC dismissed the petition. She was inconsistent in her response whether they did or didn’t have any sex in Manila in the 1st and 2nd week of November. At first, she said she remembered during cross-examination. Later in her response, she said she doesn’t remember.

This is relevant because the child Michael is a FULL TERM baby. He was conceived approximately sometime in the 2nd week of November. She wrote to Ivan asking for support around February stating that she was four months pregnant. This means, she thinks she conceived the child on October. She wrote to Ivan’s wife where she revealed her attachment to Ivan who possessed certain traits not possessed by her boyfriend. Moreover, she confided that she had a quarrel with her boyfriend resulting to her leaving work.

the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the new Code a chance to dispute the claim, considering that “illegitimate children are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family being aware of their existence. The putative parent should thus be given the opportunity to affirm or deny the child’s filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he or she is already dead.”

Bernabe vs. Alejo G.R. No. 140500 January 21, 2002 Facts: Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary, Carolina Alejo. The son was born and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal died as well as his legitimate wife, leaving Ernestina Bernabe the sole surviving heir. Carolina, in behalf of her son, filed a complaint praying that Adrian be declared an acknowledged child of the deceased and also be given the share of Bernabe’s estate. RTC dismissed the complaint and that the death of the putative father had barred the action. CA ruled that Adrian be allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe. Petitioner Ernestina averred CA’s ruling to be of error due to RTC’s ruling based on Article 175. Issue: Whether or not respondent has a cause of action to file a case against petitioner for recognition and partition with accounting after the putative father’s death in the absence of any written acknowledgment of paternity by the latter. Ruling: SC ruled in affirmative. an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent. The FC makes no distinction on whether the former was still a minor when

Jison vs. CA G.R. No. 124853 February 24, 1998 Facts: Monina alleged that Francisco had been married to a certain Lilia Lopez Jison. At the end of 1945, however, FRANCISCO impregnated Esperanza Amolar, who was then employed as the nanny of Francisco’s daughter. As a result, Monina was born in Iloilo, and since childhood, had enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as an illegitimate child of Francisco by his acts and that of his family. Monina further alleged that Francisco gave her support and spent for her education, such that she obtained a Master's degree, became a CPA and eventually, a Central Bank examiner. In view of Francisco's refusal to expressly recognize her, Monina prayed for a judicial declaration of her illegitimate status and that Francisco support and treat her as such. Francisco alleged that he could not have had sexual relations with Esperanza Amolar during the period specified in the complaint as she had ceased to be in his employ as early as 1944, and did not know of her whereabouts since then. Further, he never recognized Monina, expressly or impliedly, as his illegitimate child. As affirmative and special defenses, Francisco contended that MONINA had no right or cause of action against him and that her action was barred by estoppel, laches and/or prescription.

He thus prayed for dismissal of the complaint and an award of damages due to the malicious filing of the complaint. Issue:

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner may enforce an action acknowledgment of the natural child from Casiano Abaya.

Whether or not Monina Jison is the recognized illegitimate daughter of Francisco Jison by the latter's own acts and those of his family.

Ruling:

Ruling: SC affirmed the decision of CA in recognizing Monina as illegitimate daughter of Francisco. All told, Monina's evidence hurdled "the high standard of proof" required for the success of an action to establish one's illegitimate filiation when relying upon the provisions regarding "open and continuous possession'' or "any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws". Moreover, Monina proved her filiation by more than mere preponderance of evidence.

in

the

The right of action for legitimacy devolving upon the child is of a personal character and generally pertains exclusively to him. Only the child may exercise it at any time during his lifetime. As exception, and in three cases only, it may be transmitted to the heirs of the child, to wit: if he or she died during his or her minority, or while insane, or after action had already been instituted. Inasmuch as the right of action accruing to the child to claim his or her legitimacy lasts during his or her whole lifetime, he or she may exercise it either against the presumed parents or his or her heirs. The right of action which the law concedes to the natural child is not transmitted to his ascendants or descendants.

Conde vs. Abaya 13 Phil 249 Facts: Casiano Abaya, unmarried, the son of Romualdo Abaya and Sabina Labadia died on the 1899. Paula Conde, as the mother of the natural children Jose and Teopista Conde, whom she states she had by Casiano Abaya moved the settlement of the intestate succession. An administrator has been appointed for the said estate. However, Roman Abaya brother of Casiano, came forward and opposed said appointment and claimed it for himself as being the nearest relative of the deceased. The court declares Roman Abaya to be the sole heir of Casiano Abaya and to be therefore entitled to take possession of all the property of said estate. Paula Conde filed a petition wherein she stated that she acknowledged the relationship alleged by Roman Abaya but that she considered her right was superior to his and moved for a hearing on the matter. She prayed that she be declared to have preferential rights to the property left by Casiano Abaya.

Marquino vs. IAC G.R. No. 72078 June 27, 1994 Facts: Respondent Bibiana Romano-Pagadora filed an action for Judicial Declaration of Filiation, Annulment of Partition, Support, and Damages against petitioner Eutiquio Marquino on the CIF of Negros Occidental. Also impleaded as defendants, were the wife of Eutiquio Marquino and their legitimate children all surnamed Terenal-Marquino. The records show that Bibiana was born of Gregoria Romano and allegedly of Eutiquio Marquino. At that time, Eutiquio was still single. Bibiana became personally known to the Marquino family when she was hired as domestic helper in their household at Dumaguete City. She always received financial assistance from them. Thus, she claimed that she enjoyed continuous possession of the status of an acknowledged natural

child by direct and unequivocal acts of her father and his family. The Marquinos, on the other hand, strongly denied her allegations. During the pendency of the case and before respondent Bibiana could finish presenting her evidence, she died. Her heirs were ordered substituted for her as parties-plaintiffs. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss. They averred that the action for recognition is intransmissible to the heirs being a personal act. The trial court dismissed the case. Respondents appealed to the respondent IAC. Eutiquio Marquino died while the case was pending appeal. Issue: Whether or not the right of action to compel recognition is intransmissible in character.

illegitimate children with Priscilla Baybayan by falsely executing separate affidavits stating that the delayed registration was due to inadvertence, excusable negligence or oversight, when in truth and in fact, respondent knew that these children cannot be legally registered as legitimate. Complainant manifests that the commission by the respondent of the foregoing acts renders him unfit to occupy the exalted position of a dispenser of justice. Respondent, in his comment, declared that his cohabitation with Priscilla Baybayan is not and was neither bigamous nor immoral because he started living with Priscilla Baybayan only after his first wife had already left and abandoned the family home and, since then, and until the present her whereabouts is not known and respondent has had no news of her being alive. Issue:

Ruling: The child can bring the action during his or her entire lifetime, not during the lifetime of the parents, and even after the death of the parents. In other words, the action does not prescribe as long as he lives. In the case at bench, it is evident that Bibiana was a natural child. She was born out of wedlock of Gregoria Romano and allegedly of Eutiquio Marquino who at that time was single. Bibiana sued for compulsory recognition while Eutiquio was still alive. Sadly, she died before she could present her proof of recognition. Her death tolled the action considering its personal nature and intransmissibility.

Whether or not respondent commited deceitful conduct in legitimating his three illegitimate children born out of adulterous relationship. Ruling: SC ruled that respondent commited deceitful conduct and orders his dismissal from the service. As a lawyer and a judge, respondent ought to know that, despite his subsequent marriage to Priscilla, these three children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate since at the time they were born, there was an existing valid marriage between respondent and his first wife. Legitimation is limited to natural children and cannot include those born of adulterous relations.

Abadilla vs. Tabiliran 249 SCRA 447 Facts: Complainant Abadilla, contends that respondent had scandalously and publicly cohabited with a certain Priscilla Baybayan during the existence of his legitimate marriage with Teresita Banzuela. Respondent allegedly shamefacedly contracted marriage with the said Priscilla Baybayan. Complainant claims that this was a bigamous union because of the fact that the respondent was then still very much married to Teresita Banzuela. In respect of the charge of deceitful conduct, complainant claims that respondent caused to be registered as "legitimate", his three

Teotico vs. Del Val 13 SCRA 406 Facts: Rene Teotico, married to the testatrix's niece named Josefina Mortera. The testatrix Josefina Mortera as her sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed of in the will. Vicente Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will before the CIF of

Manila which was set for hearing after the requisite publication and service to all parties concerned. Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the same testatrix, filed an opposition to the probate of the will alleging the following grounds. Vicente B. Teotico, filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the oppositor had no legal personality to intervene. The probate court, allowed the oppositor to intervene as an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, and the oppositor amended her opposition by alleging the additional ground that the will is inoperative as to the share of Dr. Rene Teotico. After the parties had presented their evidence, the probate court rendered its decision admitting the will to probate but declaring the disposition made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico void with the statement that the portion to be vacated by the annulment should pass to the testatrix's heirs by way of intestate succession. Issue:

Dissatisfied with the decision of respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC of Legaspi City granting the petition of herein private respondent to adopt the minor Jason Condat, petitioner seeks the reversal thereof in the present petition for review on certiorari. Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat, then six years old and who had been living with her family since he was four months old. The court a quo, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, issued an order setting the petition for hearing. The order was duly published, with copies thereof seasonably served. A copy of said order was posted on the bulletin board of the court and in the other places it had required for that purpose. Nobody appeared to oppose the petition. The trial court rendered judgment disposing that the minor child, Jason Condat, be freed from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to his natural parents, and be, to all intents and purposes, the child of the spouses Dioscoro and Zenaida Bobiles, and the surname of the child be changed to "Bobiles" which is the surname of the petitioner.

Whether or not oppositor Ana del Val Chan has the right to intervene in this proceeding.

Issue:

Ruling:

Whether or not CA erred in affirming the trial court's decision which granted the petition to adopt Jason Condat in favor of spouses Bobiles.

Oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no interest in the estate either as heir, executor, or administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property affected by the will, because it nowhere appears therein any provision designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of any portion of the estate. She has also no interest in the will either as administratrix or executrix. Neither has she any claim against any portion of the estate because she is not a co-owner thereof. The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted child of Francisca Mortera because under our law the relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and the adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of the adopted child except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is created between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the adopted is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.

Republic vs. CA and Bobiles 205 SCRA 356 Facts:

Ruling: The rights concomitant to and conferred by the decree of adoption will be for the best interests of the child. His adoption is with the consent of his natural parents. The trial court and respondent court acted correctly in granting the petition for adoption and we find no reason to disturb the same. Given the facts and circumstances of the case and considered in the light of the foregoing doctrine, SC holds that the decree of adoption issued by the court a quo would go a long way towards promoting the welfare of the child and the enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy life.

Tamargo vs. CA 209 SCRA 518 Facts: Domestic Adoption Act of 1998; Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages was filed with the RTC of Ilocos Sur by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident. Prior to the incident, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedings before the then CIF of Ilocos Sur. This petition for adoption was granted that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer. Respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the result of the foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting parents, namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed. Petitioners in their reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a petition for adoption. The trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the action.

Javier vs. Lucero 94 Phil 634 Facts: Salud Arca, respondent and Alfredo Javier, defendant had their marriage solemnized at the MTC of Manila. At the time of their marriage, they had already begotten a son named Alfredo Javier Jr. Alfredo Javier left for US on board a ship of US Navy, for he was an enlisted man in the US Navy. Because of defendant’s departure, respondent chose to live with defendant’s parents but left due to frictions having occurred between them. She then stayed to her native place in Tanza, Cavite. With the events transpired, the relationship of the spouses become strained and with that Alfredo Javier filed an action for divorce against Salud Arca at Alabama, USA. Having received the complaint, respondent averred that defendant was not a resident of Alabama but a resident of Naic, Cavite. She also professed that the cause of their separation was not of desertion on her part but of the defendant. And that since his departure to US Navy, he had always supported his spouse and his son through allotments by US Navy Department of US Government. Through these she prayed that the complaint be dismissed. Issue: Whether or not the defendant is still obliged to support his son even if he reaches the age of majority.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners, notwithstanding loss of their right to appeal, may still file the instant petition. Whether the Court may still take cognizance of the case even through petitioners' appeal had been filed out of time. Ruling: SC granted the petition. Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented would be unfair and unconscionable.

Ruling: Unquestionably, Alfredo Javier, Jr. is the son of petitioner Alfredo Javier, and if financial assistance is to be rendered only at the termination of the appeal his education, or the completion thereof, would be unduly delayed. That is good reason for immediate execution. Support also includes the education of the person to be supported "until he complete his education or training for some profession, trade or vocation even beyond the age of majority" and on the basis of this article support was granted to Alfredo Javier Jr.

Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda 35 Phil 252, 262 Facts: Same. Article 204. Emphasis on the options of support. Issue: Whether or not the wife can claim for support outside of the conjugal domicile. Ruling: It has been held that the wife, who is forced to leave the conjugal abode by her husband, without fault on her part, may maintain an action against the husband for separate maintenance when she has no other remedy, notwithstanding the provision of the law giving the person who is obliged to furnish support the option to satisfy it either by paying a fixed pension or by receiving and maintaining in his home the one having the right to the same.

De Asis vs. De Asis 303 SCRA 176 Facts: Private respondent, in her capacity as the legal guardian of the minor, Glen Camil Andres de Asis, brought an action for maintenance and support against petitioner before the RTC of Quezon City, alleging that petitioner is the father of subject minor, and the former refused and/or failed to provide for the maintenance of the latter, despite repeated demands. Petitioner denied his paternity of the said minor alleged and that he cannot be required to provide support for him. The mother’s child sent in a manifestation stating that because of petitioner’s judicial declarations, it was futile and a useless exercise to claim support from him. Hence, she was withdrawing her complaint against petitioner subject to the condition that the latter should not pursue his counterclaim. By virtue of the said manifestation, the parties mutually agreed to move for the dismissal of the complaint. The motion was granted by the trial court, which then dismissed the case with prejudice. Subsequently, another Complaint for maintenance and support was brought against petitioner, this time in the name of Glen Camil Andres de Asis, represented by her legal guardian, herein private respondent. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that res judicata is inapplicable in an action for support for the reason that renunciation or waiver of future support is prohibited by law. The trial court likewise denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari. CA dismissed the same. Issue: Whether or not the lower courts acted in grave abuse of discretion after the first complaint was dismissed and adjudged. Ruling: The right to receive support can neither be renounced nor transmitted to a third person. Furthermore, future support cannot be the subject of a compromise. The manifestation sent by private respondent amounted to renunciation as it severed the vinculum that gives the subject

minor, the right to claim support from his putative parent, the petitioner. Furthermore, the agreement entered into between the petitioner and private respondent for the dismissal of the counterclaim was in the nature of a compromise, which cannot be countenanced. It violated the prohibition against any compromise of the right to support.

Whether or not the petition for a writ of habeas corpus to gain custody over the children be granted. Ruling: SC dismissed the writ of habeas corpus petition by the mother and retain the custody of the children to the father. The illicit or immoral activities of the mother had already caused emotional disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral values against the children. The children are now both over seven years old. Their choice of the parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear from the record. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person. The children understand the unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and have been affected in their emotional growth by her behavior.

Espiritu vs. CA 242 SCRA 362 Facts: Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met in Iligan City where Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel Corporation and Teresita was employed as a nurse in a local hospital. Teresita left for Los Angeles, California to work as a nurse. Reynaldo was sent by his employer, the National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as its liaison officer and Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a common law relationship of husband and wife. On 1986, their daughter, Rosalind Therese, was born. While they were on a brief vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon their return to the United States, their second child, a son, this time, and given the name Reginald Vince, was born on 1988. The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate. Instead of giving their marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California. Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but because his assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent back by his company to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his sister, Guillerma Layug and her family. Teresita, meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines and filed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody over the children, thus starting the whole proceedings now reaching this Court. The trial court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus. It suspended Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind and Reginald and declared Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over them but with rights of visitation to be agreed upon by the parties and to be approved by the Court. Issue:

Amadora vs. CA 160 SCRA 274 Facts: Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was looking forward to the commencement exercises where he would ascend the stage and in the presence of his relatives and friends receive his high school diploma. As it turned out, though, fate would intervene and deny him that awaited experience. While they were in the auditorium of their school, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life as well. Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. Additionally, the herein petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other students, through their respective parents. The complaint against the students was later dropped. After trial, the CIF of Cebu held the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs. On appeal to the respondent court, however, the decision was reversed and all the defendants were completely absolved. Issue: Whether or not teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for the death of Alfredo Amadora. Ruling:

The Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in question (Art. 2180) should apply to all schools, academic as well as nonacademic.

died. Ylarde's parents, petitioners in this case, filed a suit for damages against both private respondents Aquino and Soriano. Issue:

Following the canon of reddendo singular singuli, where the school is academic, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student. This is the general rule. Reason: Old academic schools, the heads just supervise the teachers who are the ones directly involved with the students. Where the school is for arts and trades, it is the head and only he who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. Reason: Old schools of arts and trades saw the masters or heads of the school personally and directly instructed the apprentices. Therefore, the heads are not liable. The teacher-in-charge is not also liable because there’s no showing that he was negligent in enforcing discipline against the accused or that he waived observance of the rules and regulations of the school, or condoned their non-observance. Also, the fact that he wasn’t present can’t be considered against him because he wasn’t required to report on that day. Classes had already ceased.

Whether or not both private respondents can be held liable for the death of Ylarde. Ruling: SC close by categorically stating that a truly careful and cautious person would have acted in all contrast to the way private respondent Aquino did. Moreover, a teacher who stands in loco parentis to his pupils would have made sure that the children are protected from all harm in his company. Were it not for his gross negligence, the unfortunate incident would not have occurred and the child Ylarde would probably be alive today, a grown- man of thirty-five. Due to his failure to take the necessary precautions to avoid the hazard, Ylarde's parents suffered great anguish all these years.

Ylarde vs. Aquino 163 SCRA 697 Facts: Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School, a public educational institution located in Pangasinan, private respondent Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein. As part of work education, private respondent Aquino ordered the pupils to help Banez in the burying of the stones caused by the fittered remnants of World War II. When the depth was right enough to accommodate the concrete block, private respondent Aquino and his four pupils got out of the hole. Private respondent left the children to level the loose soil around the open hole while he went to see Banez to borrow some rope. Before leaving, private respondent Aquino allegedly told the children "not to touch the stone." After private respondent Aquino left, Alonso, Alcantara and Ylarde, playfully jumped into the pit. The remaining Abaga jumped on top of the concrete block causing it to slide down towards the opening. Alonso and Alcantara were able to scramble out of the excavation on time but unfortunately for Ylarde, the concrete block caught him, pinning him to the wall in a standing position. Ylarde sustained injuries, three days later, he

St. Mary’s Academy vs. Carpitanos G.R. No. 143363 February 6, 2002 Facts: Defendant-appellant St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Mary’s Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group. Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School, Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle. Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident. The parents of Sherwin filed a case against James Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and

St. Mary’s Academy before the RTC of Dipolog City and claimed for damages. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner St. Mary’s Academy is liable for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos. Ruling: GRANTED and REMANDED to the RTC for determination of any liability of the school. The Court held that for the school to be liable there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because of negligence, must have causal connection to the accident. There is no showing of such. Hence, with the overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses that the accident occurred because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.

Ruling: GRANTED. The natural parents of Adelberto should be held liable for damages caused by the child following the doctrine of IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE. The simple reason is that the child was still under their care and custody at the time of the incident. Parental liability is a consequence of PARENTAL AUTHORITY. APPLICABLE PROVISIONS: Art. 2176: Quasi-delict – Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being no fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict. Art. 2180: Imputed Negligence – The obligation imposed by Art. 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

Tamargo vs. CA 209 SCRA 518 Facts: Same. Articles 220-233. Emphasis suspension/termination of parental authority.

on

effects

Libi vs. IAC 214 SCRA 16

and Facts:

Issue: Whether or not the effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority is concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make the adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against their adopted child, for acts committed by the latter, when actual custody was yet lodged with the biological parents.

Deceased Julie Ann Gotiong, 18 years old, and deceased Wendell Libi, between 18 to 19 years old, were sweethearts for two years prior to the incident. After the girl decided to end the relationship finding the guy sadistic and irresponsible, the boy incessantly pursued her and prayed that they be together again this made the guy resort to threats. But, the girl hold steadfast to her decision. In order to avoid the guy, the girl lived with her best friend. On the day of the incident, the two were found shot dead

with a Smith and Wesson revolver. The parents of the girl instituted this case against the parents of the guy for damages.

1. That petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the City of Baguio for the last three years prior to the date of the filing of this petition; 2. That petitioner's maiden name is ELISEA LAPERAL; she married Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria; that in a partial decision entered on this Honorable Court, entitled 'Enrique R. Santamaria vs. Elisea L. Santamaria' Mr. Enrique Santamaria was given a decree of legal separation from her; that the said partial decision is now final; 3. That during her marriage to Enrique R. Santamaria, she naturally used, instead of her maiden name, that of Elisea L. Santamaria; that aside from her legal separation from Enrique R. Santamaria, she has also ceased to live with him for many years now; 4. That in view of the fact that she has been legally separated from Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria and has likewise ceased to live with him for many years, it is desirable that she be allowed to change her name and/or be permitted to resume using her maiden name, to wit: ELISEA LAPERAL.

Issue: Whether or not the parents of the Wendell Libi is still liable for the death of Julie Ann Gotiong. Ruling: DENIED. The parents of the guy are held liable for not exercising due diligence, diligentissimi patris familias, (Art. 2180). The father of the guy owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box. The father and the mother each had a key. The guy knew of it. The key must have been negligently left lying around or he had free access to it, such as the bag of his mother. The said gun was missing. The parents were also unable to explain the photograph of their son holding a gun. The said photograph was dedicated to the girl. Moreover, they were remiss in their duties as parents as not being able to know that their son was a Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unite (CANU) agent involved in a dangerous work of as either a drug informer or drug user. The damages is based on Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. Art. 101 of RPC doesn’t apply since the guy is or above 18 years old already.

Petitioner prayed she be allowed to resume using her maiden name. Issue: Whether or not petitioner be allowed to resume using her maiden name of Elisea Laperal. Ruling: The fact of legal separation alone which is the only basis for the petition at bar is, in our opinion, not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of herein petitioner. It is true that in the second decision which reconsidered the first it is stated that as the petitioner owns extensive business interests, the continued used of her husband surname may cause undue confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. This finding is however without basis. In the first place, these were not the causes upon which the petition was based; hence, obviously no evidence to this effect had been adduced.

Laperal vs. Republic G.R. No. L-18008 October 30, 1962 Facts: Elisea Laperal filed in the CIF of Baguio a petition which reads: Llaneta vs. Agrava

G.R. No. L-32504 May 15, 1974 Facts: Teresita's mother, one Atanacia Llaneta, was once married to Serafin Ferrer with whom she had but one child named Victoriano Ferrer. In 1942 Serafin Ferrer died, and about four years later Atanacia had relations with another man out of which Teresita was born. Shortly after Teresita's birth, Atanacia brought her and Victoriano to Manila where all of them lived with Atanacia's mother-in-law, Victoria vda. de Ferrer. Teresita was raised in the household of the Ferrer's, using the surname of Ferrer in all her dealings and throughout her schooling. When she was about twenty years old, she applied for a copy of her birth certificate in Sorsogon, where she was born, as she was required to present it in connection with a scholarship granted to her by the Catholic Charities. It was then that she discovered that her registered surname is Llaneta not Ferrer and that she is the illegitimate child of Atanacia and an unknown father. On the ground that her use thenceforth of the surname Llaneta, instead of Ferrer which she had been using since she acquired reason, would cause untold difficulties and confusion, Teresita petitioned the court for change of her name from Teresita Llaneta to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer. Issue: Whether or not petitioner be allowed to change her surname based on her alleged facts. Ruling: The petition of Teresita Llaneta for change of her name to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer is hereby granted. The petitioner has established that she has been using the surname Ferrer for as long as she can remember. A sudden shift at this time by the petitioner to the name Teresita Llaneta in order to conform to that appearing in her birth certificate would result in confusion among the persons and entities she deals with and entail endless and vexatious explanations of the circumstances of her new surname.