Faltering Steps: Independence Movements in East Timor - 1940s to the early 1970s

Faltering Steps Independence Movements in East Timor 1940s to the early 1970s

May 1964

URT-D HQ Batugade ?

Rebellion ?

Viqueque Rebellion 1959 Silvester Nai Buti Codes Timde Bobonaro ?

Ernest Chamberlain – Point Lonsdale, 2010

2 Preface With the opening in Dili on 7 December 2005 of the Resistensia Timorense – Arkivu ho Muzeu (The Archive and Museum of the Timorese Resistance), a large range of previously unpublished documents can be expected to become available on the recent history of Timor-Leste. Similarly, Chega !, the Final Report of the Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação - CAVR (Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation) has provided comprehensive and important information on the struggle and suffering of the Timorese people. However, both the Archive and Museum and CAVR records principally cover the period from 1974 to 1999 (inclusive). This brief work of about 165,000 words is offered as a contribution towards the understanding of the history of an earlier period - ie covering Timorese independence movements and Indonesian involvement in Portuguese Timor from the pre-World War II period to the early-mid 1970s. The independence movements in those times were not successful. Indeed, some could be considered to be but nominal attempts. Indonesian efforts at infiltration and subversion were also desultory and generally ineffective before 1975. Nevertheless, in particular, the period between World War II and the Indonesian occupation in late 1975 merits closer attention for a fuller understanding of the totality of Timor-Leste’s modern history. Regrettably, many of the participants in these events have passed on – and the remainder are now elderly. Hopefully, this book – despite its many acknowledged shortcomings, will encourage others to examine the period and offer their interpretations. This work was first published as a monograph in December 2007 and again in October 2008 – but with limited distribution. This edition includes a more comprehensive coverage of the 1959 Viqueque Rebellion and also incorporates material more recently sourced in the archives in Lisbon and London. It also includes extensive footnotes to provide additional insights, context and texture – and, to facilitate further research, a number of original documents have been annexed. This edition also includes an index. I would particularly like to thank my Timorese friends and work colleagues in Dili, Iliomar, Viqueque and Oecusse for their encouragement and support during my service in Timor-Leste (1999-2006).

Ernie Chamberlain Point Lonsdale 14 October 2010

Note: This monograph has been presented in A4-size paging – principally to retain the original format of photocopied reference documents that are annexed.

3 Published in Australia in 2010 by Ernest Chamberlain, Point Lonsdale VIC 3225. Copyright  Ernest Chamberlain 2010

email [email protected]

This monograph is copyright. Apart from any fair dealing for the purposes of private study, research, criticism or review as permitted under the Copyright Act, no part may be reproduced by any process, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical photocopying or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the author. Inquiries should be made to the publisher. The author has also published: The Struggle in Iliomar: Resistance in rural East Timor; Editions - 2003, 2004 and 2008 (ISBN 9780980562309). Perjuangan di Iliomar: Perlawanan di Pedesaan di Timor-Leste, 2004 (ISBN 09750350-1-0). Faltering Steps – Independence Movements in East Timor in the 1950s and 1960s; 2005 (ISBN 0 97500350 2 9). Faltering Steps: Independence Movements in East Timor – 1940s to the early 1970s; Editions - 2007 and 2008 (ISBN 978 0 9750350 4 7). Rebellion, Defeat and Exile: The 1959 Uprising in East Timor; Editions - 2007 and 2009 (ISBN 9780980562316). Forgotten Men: Timorese in Special Operations during World War II, 2010 (ISBN 978-0-9805623-2-3) National Library of Australia : Cataloguing-in-Publication Entry Chamberlain, Ernest, 1944 – Faltering Steps: Independence Movements in East Timor – 1940s to the early 1970s Bibliography; Index. ISBN 9780980562330 Political parties – East Timor East Timor – History – Autonomy and independence movements Dewey number:

320.95987

Every effort has been made by the publisher/author to contact holders of copyright to obtain permission to reproduce copyright material. However, if any permissions have been inadvertently overlooked, apologies are offered, and should the rightful party contact the publisher, all due credit and necessary and reasonable arrangements will be made at the earliest opportunity.

FALTERING STEPS: INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS IN EAST TIMOR - 1940s to the early 1970s TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Preface Introduction Independence - Contending Proclaimers Some Notes on Sources

1 3-6

Pre-War and Wartime The Deportados – pre-War Unrest The Japanese Occupation Native Uprisings and Wars The Maubisse “Uprising” Massacre at Aileu “Filhos do Timor” (Sons of Timor)

7 9 10 13 13 14

Early Post-War Period Returning Communists – and a Revolution ? Early Indonesian Views on Portuguese Timor – “Incorporation” A Rebellion and “Massacre” in Los Palos ? A “border rebellion” ? – and Japanese Collaborators Increased Native Head Tax – and Discontent The Proposed “Nova Dili” Concern at “Indonesian Nationalism” Incursion Fears on the South Coast – “Incidente Vicarda” A “Secret War” in Portuguese Timor ? Relations with Indonesia – Major Meneses Recalled Chinese Communists ? Portuguese Timor - Malay, Mestiço and Workers’ Grievances An Appeal to President Sukarno Criticisms from Jakarta The Bandung Conference – 1955 1955 – “Forced” Labour and Punishment The Moluccas, Kisar, Wetar, Liran and Ataúro The Anti-Colonial Movement of Indonesia (GPKI)

16 17 18 18 20 20 21 22 24 25 25 26 28 28 30 31 32 33

The “Viqueque Rebellion” – 1959 Beginnings The “Ex-Permesta 14” Security Concerns on the Lautem Coast Conditions in the Baucau and Viqueque Circunscrições The Rebel Leadership – and its Direction

35 36 49 50 53

2 The Plan Arrests in Dili The “Movimento de Aileu: Paulo de Castro” The Uprising in Viqueque and Baucau Ethno-linguistic Divisions and Violence Casualties and Aftermath Into Exile Imprisoned and Exiled in Lisbon, Angola and Mozambique After-Effects In Exile Some Exiles Return Reports of Unrest in Portuguese Timor An End to African Exile 1974-1975 – and Apodeti Rebel Exiles in Africa and Portugal More Exiles Return Recognition, Reunions, Memorials – and claims against Portugal The Popular Consultation of 1999 – and Militia Group “59/75” Compensation Claims - “Caso de Grupo 59” Counting the Exiles Recent Indonesian Interpretations of the Rebellion The Memorial at the Bebui River Continuing Ethnic Violence in Viqueque

55 58 60 61 76 78 84 90 92 94 97 99 100 101 105 106 107 112 113 114 115 115 115

Threats: The URT-D, Coup Plotters and Indonesia The Founding Declarations of the Union of the Republic of Timor Dilly (URT-D) Army Disquiet in Portuguese Timor – and a planned Coup Security Concerns Increase – PIDE Established; an Australian Treaty Mooted Fears of Indonesian Interest Australia Expresses Concerns to Portugal Quadripartite Meeting on Indonesia – February 1963 Fears of Indonesian Subversion The URT-D’s Islamic and Pan-Malay Elements Activity in “Indonesian Timor” - Silvester Martins Nai Buti The Question of Indonesian Involvement Indonesian Acts ? Encouragement by the USSR Appeals to the United Nations The “Declaration of Independence” The URT-D Constitution 1965 - Sukarno Declares Support; New Order Disinterest More URT-D Letters and Proclamations Mohammad Saleh Akbar (M.S.A.) Balikh - as “Mao Klao” URT-D Activities from 1968 Divisions in the URT-D – Alamsyah Hasibuan as “Mao Klao”

118 121 122 124 129 131 132 133 135 136 139 145 145 146 148 149 153 154 158 160

3 The “Dawning of Political Consciousness” in Dili The Movimentos Democratisation in Portuguese Timor – and Apodeti Portuguese Military Ineffectiveness Apodeti – and ABRI Preparations

166 170 175 176

Jakarta-Based Independence Movements React URT-D’s Reaction in 1974 to “Decolonisation” in Timor Collective Democratic Students of Timor Delly (Codes Timde) Balikh Takes Control – and a URT-D “East Timor Constitution” Responding to Events in Portuguese Timor Timor Students Association of Central Java and Jogyakarta

179 182 185 186 188

The Indonesian Invasion and Occupation From Infiltration and Raids – to Amphibious/Airborne Attack The URT-D Seeks a Role – and Foreign Support Arrest, Trial and Detention of URT-D Cadre The URT-D’s “Inactive” Decades

190 197 199 200

Towards Independence – and Beyond M.S.A. Balikh Returns to Timor – October 1999 The 2004 Timor Post “Proklamasi” Declaration – and The 1,000 Pataca Note Proklamasi – a 2006 Version M.S.A. Balich’s “Declaration 1” – and TIME Timor, October 2007 TIME Timor, November 2007 – Interview with “Mau-Klao” M.S.A. Balikh – and the URT-D Flag A “new” URT-D – and the “Greater Timor” (Negara Timor Raya) ? Republica Timor Tasi Mane (RTTM) – Short-lived Separatism

202 202 204 204 207 208 209 211

Summary and Discussion Los Palos Uprising and Massacre The 1959 Viqueque Rebellion The Union of the Republic of Timor-Dilly (URT-D) Silvester Martins Nai Buti (Seço) Collective Democratic Students of Timor Delly (Codes Timde) Indonesian Involvement Apodeti Preferred Resurrection ? A Future History --------------------------------------------------------

212 212 218 224 245 225 227 229 229

4 Annexes:

Not included with electronic Scribd version

A.

Map - Circunscrição de Viqueque.

B.

Sejarah Perjuangan Timor-Timur Untuk Sekolah Menengah Atas (History of the East Timor Struggle for Senior High School), Anhar Gonggong & Susanto Zuhdi, Direktorat Pendidikan Menengah Umum, Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, Jakarta, 1992 - translated extract in English by author.

C.

Declaration/Request for Political Asylum by the “Permesta 14” – 27 March 1958; 20 June 1958.

D.

Araújo, A. (Armando) L.J. de, O Célebre Massacré de Uato-Lari e Uato-Carbau Verificado no Ano de 1959 (The Truth of the Infamous Massacre at Uatolari and Uato-Carabau in 1959), Jakarta/Kupang, 1974 – including: Araújo, A. (Armando) L.J. de (et al), Memorandum – Assunto: Sobre o acontecimento ocorrido em 7 de Junhe [sic] de 1959, na Cirrcunscriçõe [sic] de Viqueque – Timor (Memorandum – Report: On the event that occurred on 7 June 1959 in the Circumscription of Viqueque - Timor), six pages, Cólonia Penal do Bié (Angola), 21 April 1960.

E.

Deportees – 1959 Rebellion.

F.

Costa, F.A.S. da, Os Nomes dos Detidos Timorenses para Angola do Ano de 1959 (The Names of the Timorese Detainees in Angola in 1959), Silva Porto (Bié, Angola), 6 June 1960 – in Portuguese (initialled/authenticated by Evaristo da Costa, Salem Musalam Sagran, Frederico Almeida Santos da Costa and Juman bin Basirun).

G.

TERJEMAHAN: Pejuang Perintis Integrasi Timor Timur Ke Dalam Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (TRANSLATION: Pioneer Fighters for the Integration of East Timor into the Unitary Republic of Indonesia), Dili, 8 December 1995 - in Bahasa Indonesia with an English translation.

H.

Pinto, L. dos Santos, Certidão - Estado-Maior General das Forças Armadas Serviço de Coordenação de Extinção da PIDE/DGS e LP (Armed Forces Chief of Staff’s Office for the Coordination of the Disbandment of the PIDE/DGS & LP) Lisbon, 22 March 1983 – in Portuguese.

I.

Second Announcement: Freedom Throughout Timor-Dilly ! – Drive the Portuguese into the Sea !, Liberation Bureau – Union of the Republic of Timor-Dilly, 10 December 1960 – in English.

J.

The Declaration of Independence, Batugade, 9 April 1961 – in English, with the stamp of the URT-D Foreign Ministry in Bahasa.

5 K.

Constitution, Batugade, 4 May 1965 - in English.

L.

Menyambut hangat atas akan Merdeka Nya Papua dan New Guinea 1967 ini, (Warmly welcoming the forthcoming Independence of Papua and New Guinea in 1967), URT-D, Nr. III/Prespu-URT/IV/67, Batugade, 2 April 1967 – in Bahasa Melayu.

M.

Pernyataan Sambutan – Menyambut Missi Adam Malic [sic] kembali dengan succes dari Pacific (Congratulatory Statement – Welcoming Adam Malik on his Return from a Successful Mission in the Pacific), Number 019/PP-URT/VI/68, URT-D, Djakarta, 26 April 1968 – in Bahasa Melayu.

N.

Hubungan Diplomatic dan kerjasama menuju Melanesia Raya yang jaya (Diplomatic relations and cooperation towards a glorious Greater Melanesia), Number 0545/ZULK/Prespu-URT/1392 H/1972 M., Batugade, 8 December 1972 (Letter to H.E. Mr Somare, Chief Minister, Papua New Guinea) in Bahasa Melayu.

O.

Pernyataan Kemerdekaan (Declaration of Independence), 9 April 1961 – in Bahasa Melayu. Clearer copy retyped by author is overpage.

P.

Timor Merdeka (Independent Timor), 18 August 1963, (“Anthem” of the URT-D) – in Bahasa Melayu, with English translation.

Q.

Timor Union Republic (Union of the Republic of Timor), (A-4 copy of the original A-3 size map of Timor Island with inserted photograph of “A. Mao Klao”).

R.

Note – Collective Democratic Students of Timor Delly (Codes Timde) to the United Nations Secretary General, 14/VII/V/FC/74, 10 July 1974 (less Memorandum attachment) – in English.

S.

Pernyataan Dukungan (Statement of Support), Codes Timde 01/ICT/XII/74, Tanjung Priok – Jakarta, 23 December 1974 – in Bahasa Indonesia, with English translation.

T.

Pernyataan situasi di Timport (Statement on the Situation in Portuguese Timor), No: 0128/PP-URTD/VIII/75, Jakarta, 30 August 1975 – in Bahasa Indonesia, with English translation.

U.

Surat - Keputusan Tentang Perobahan Status Pembebasan Para Tahanan/Tawanan Peristiwa U.R.T. (Unie Republik Timor) Dari Bebas – Dikenakan Wajib Lapor Menjadi Bebas Penuh (Directive on the Change of Release Status for Detainees of the U.R.T. Affair (United Republic of Timor) from Released with Reporting Status to Full Release), Kopkamtib, Jakarta, 11 August 1976 – in Bahasa Indonesia, with English translation.

6 V.

Memproklamasikan: Kemerdekaan Timor Timur (Proclamation of the Independence of East Timor), Batugade, 9 April 1961 – in Bahasa Indonesia, with English translation.

W.

Surat Pernyataan I (Letter of Declaration I), Mau Klao M.S.A. Balich (sic), Gugleur – Maubara, Timor Leste,19 April 2007 – in Bahasa Indonesia, with an English translation.

X.

Kemerdekaan Timor Timor Diproklamasikan (East Timor Independence is Proclaimed) – as included in the Timor Post (25 November 2004); and in TIME Timor, No.11, Tahun II, November 2007, Dili, pp.19-24 in the article: “Mau-Klao Siap Mempertanggungjawabkan Kebenaran Proklamasi Uni Republik Timor (URT)” (“MauKlao is Ready to Accept Responsibility for the Truth about the Proclamation by Union of the Republic of Timor (URT)”). Typed Bahasa version and an English translation – with notes.

Bibliography Union of the Republic of Timor-Dilly (URT-D) – Documents Reviewed. Indonesian Official Documents Reviewed. Collective Democratic Students of Timor Delly (Codes Timde) Documents Reviewed. Books. Selected Internet Websites/“Blogs”. Selected Theses, Reports and Articles. Index - not included with electronic Scribd version

FALTERING STEPS: INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS IN EAST TIMOR - 1940s TO THE EARLY 1970s INTRODUCTION Independence - Contending Proclaimers In any nation’s history, the “fathers” of its independence struggle hold a special and venerated status. In Indonesian history, the proclaimers of independence from Dutch colonial rule - Sukarno and Hatta, are given special prominence and venerated. In East Timor (Timor-Leste), the appellation of “proclaimer/proklamator/ proklamador” has likewise held a similarly honoured status. Timor-Leste’s modern-day declaration of independence, as the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (RDTL), was made in Dili on 28 November 1975 by Fretilin’s President, Francisco Xavier do Amaral – just nine days before the Indonesian military attack and seizure of Dili. With Amaral estranged for several decades from the Fretilin party, attempts were made by Fretilin in 2005 to challenge Amaral’s title and credit as the “Proklamator”1 – which were not resolved until midJuly 2007.

28 November 1975: The Unilateral Declaration of Independence 2 1

Lem, “Xavier Amaral: ‘Dunia akui saya proklamator’ ” (“Xavier Amaral: ‘The world acknowledges me as the proclaimer’ ”), A Voz de Suara Timor Lorosae (STL), Dili, 20 May 2005. This was followed in November 2005 by a series of articles in STL - eg on 15, 16, 17, 21, 23, 24 November 2005 including “Xavier laos proklamador” (15 November), “Proklamador RDTL: Xavier eh Lu-Olo ?” (21 November 2005). However, on 28 November 2006, Francisco Xavier do Amaral was publicly affirmed by President Xanana Gusmão as the nation’s proklamador – STL, Dili, 29 November 2006. Following the 2007 elections, Fretilin also agreed to a Parliamentary resolution (No. 91/1/5a) declaring Amaral as proklamador – “Fretilin Rekonese Xavier Hanesan Proklamador …”, STL, Dili, 18 July 2007. In May 2008, Amaral headed a listing by the Government of Timor-Leste of “the 15 leading figures of the liberation” as the “Proclamator of the Republic and First President of the Republic” – Lusa, 13 May 2008. 2 Francisco Xavier do Amaral (President) at the microphone; Nicolau Lobato (Prime Minister) looks on.

2 However, this was not the first dispute in claiming status as the modern-day initiator of the struggle for Timor-Leste’s independence - or for recognition and standing as its “Proclaimer”.3 A brief, and unsuccessful, uprising against Portuguese rule broke out in June 1959 – the “Viqueque Rebellion”. The aims of that Rebellion included integration with the then still infant Republic of Indonesia – although this has been disputed at times by Portugal and several Timor-Leste political parties (principally Fretilin). Indeed, the CAVR Final Report states that the background to the 1959 uprising “remains largely unexplained”.4 The 1959 Rebellion exacerbated ethno-linguistic tensions in Viqueque that linked to violence in the period 1975-1978, 1999-2002, in mid-2007 and in early 2009. 1961 has also been publicly claimed as the year of East Timor’s declaration of independence. A few days before the 28 November 2004 anniversary of Fretilin’s 1975 Declaration of Independence, Dili’s Timor Post daily newspaper carried a frontpage item on the 1961 “Declaration of Independence” by the Union of the Republic of Timor-Dilly (URT-D)5. A then 66 year-old Timorese, Mohammad Saleh Akbar (M.S.A.) Balikh claimed that, as “Mao Klao” - the President of the URT-D, he had proclaimed the independence of “Timor-Dilly” at Batugadé, near the West Timor border, on 9 April 1961. More recently, in October and November 2007, M.S.A.Balikh again claimed in a Dili magazine that he was “first proclaimer”.6 The magazine, TIME Timor, noted that “Polemics on who was Timor-Leste’s Proklamator have been a quite crucial discussion since this country gained its independence from the grip of Indonesia.” However, Balikh’s credentials as an independence pioneer are challenged – including by Fretilin, and several of his statements on his role in the URT-D, and its activities, are clearly false. Further, at least two seminal documents presented publicly by M.S.A. Balikh are seemingly fabrications. The 1959 Viqueque Rebellion and the Union of the Republic of Timor-Dilly are only lightly covered, if at all, in most English-language writings on Timor-Leste’s history.7 While not claiming to be a comprehensive, all-revealing and authoritative 3

The several earlier uprisings against Portuguese occupation - in the 19th century and the major revolt by Dom Boaventura ending in 1912, are well covered in Pélissier, R., Timor en guerre: le Crocodile et les Portugais (1847-1913), Orgeval, France, 1996; and Gunn, G.C., Timor Loro Sae 500 Years, Livros do Oriente, Macau, 1999. For the little-known “alleged revolt” in Suro in 1935 that resulted in the dismissal of the régulo of Alas, Dom Carlos Borromeu Duarte – see Cardoso, A.M., Timor na 2ª Guerra Mundial – O Diário do Tenente Pires, CEHCP ISCTE, Lisboa, 2007, pp.29-30. Madjiah, L.E., “What could be worse than East Timor refugee camps ?”, Jakarta Post Online, Jakarta, 23 November 2000 – claims “Throughout Portuguese rule, there were 550 large and small-scale rebellions recorded in East Timor.” 4 Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (Comissão de Alcolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação – CAVR), Chega ! - The Final Report of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation, Dili, 2005, Part 3.2, para 28 – see also para 64 on “disputed” Indonesian involvement. 5 Ximenes, J.M., “1961, Proklamasaun Independesia URT – Ramos Horta tama estrutura” (“1961, The Independence Proclamation by the URT – Ramos Horta offered a position”), Timor Post, Dili, 25 November 2004, p.1 and 15 – in Tetum. 6 “Proklamasi Timor Leste Sebenarnya Sudah Terjadi Pada Tahun 1961 ?” (“Did Timor-Leste’s Proclamation Really Occur in 1961 ?”), TIME Timor, No.10, Tahun II, October 2007, p.49 and “MauKlao Siap Mempertanggungjawabkan Kebenaran Proklamasi Uni Republik Timor (URT)” (“Mau Klao is Ready to Accept Responsibility for the Truth about the Proclamation by the Union of the Republic of Timor (URT)”), No.11, Tahun II, November 2007, pp.19-24 – in Bahasa Indonesia. 7 Chamberlain, E.P., The Struggle in Iliomar – Resistance in rural East Timor, Point Lonsdale, 2004/2008 – provided brief coverage of both the 1959 Viqueque Rebellion and the URT-D at pp.1719/pp. 41-42. Expanded coverage was included in Chamberlain, E.P., Faltering Steps: Independence Movements in East Timor in the 1950s and 1960s, Point Lonsdale, December 2005. Subsequently the

3 history of the period, this work attempts to shed some further light on the independence movements that emerged in the late 1950s to the mid-1970s in TimorLeste – with some related coverage of the years preceding and following those twoand-a-half decades. Coverage of Indonesian attempts at involvement in Portuguese Timor before their invasion and occupation in late 1975 is also included. Many records and statements related to these independence movements, and also to Indonesian involvement, are patently tendentious and “self-serving” – and sometimes quite inaccurate. Accordingly, this work concludes with a discussion section that offers the author’s opinions on a range of interesting inconsistencies and anomalies in the currently available records. SOME NOTES ON SOURCES Pre-War and Wartime Editions of the weekly government journal Boletim Oficial de Timor (BOdT) which include pronouncements from both Lisbon and Dili, are only a quite limited source of information on “Política Indígena”. However, António Cardoso’s 2007 book on Lieutenant Manuel Pires does provide some very useful information on the pre-War exile of several hundred Portuguese deportados to Portuguese Timor and their activities on the Colony.8 Reports by visiting British consuls – E.T. Lambert in November-December 19379 and C.H. Archer in March-April 194110, are the most comprehensive English-language reports available on the immediate pre-War period – albeit focusing on economic aspects and “Japanese influence”. From April 1941 until the Japanese landing, the regular reports by the Australian Consul David Ross provide a view of developments. For the wartime period – including the “native wars”, reports from the Australian forces in the Colony and post-War memoirs by Portuguese officers – particularly Governor Carvalho, are quite valuable. 1959 Rebellion In relating the 1959 Viqueque Rebellion, the sources used in this book are principally memoranda to Canberra from Australian Consuls in Dili during the period 1956-1963 (held in the National Archives of Australia - NAA); documents in the Archives in Lisbon ie the Torre do Tombo (TdT) and the Arquivo Histórico

1959 Rebellion was discretely treated in Chamberlain, E.P., Rebellion, Defeat and Exile: The 1959 Uprising in East Timor, Point Lonsdale, February 2007/June 2009 – accessible on the Internet at: http://www.scribd.com/doc/26857195/Rebellion-Defeat-and-Exile-The-1959-Uprising-in-East-Timor ; and both the Rebellion and the URT-D were addressed in Faltering Steps: Independence Movements in East Timor – 1940s to the early 1970s, Point Lonsdale, 2008. 8 Cardoso, A.M., Timor na 2ª Guerra Mundial – O Diário do Tenente Pires, CEHCP ISCTE, Lisboa, 2007. For the wartime activities of the deportados – particularly of those evacuated to Australia, see Chamberlain, E.P., Forgotten Men: Timorese in Special Operations during World War II, Point Lonsdale, 2010 - http://www.scribd.com/doc/29688334/Forgotten-Men-Timorese-in-SpecialOperations-during-World-War-II 9 Lambert, E.T. (British Consul, Batavia), Report on Portuguese Timor, Batavia, 18 December 1937 (NAA: A1838, 376/1/1; A981, TIM P 4 Part 2). 10 Archer, C.H. (British Consul-General, Taiwan), Report on Portuguese Timor, Canberra, 3 May 1941, para 29 (NAA: A981, TIM D 1 Part 2, pp.38-76, and his draft report of 29 April 1941 at A981, TIM P 9).

4 Ultramarino (AHU)11; reports of interviews by the Surabaya/Jakarta-based journalist, Peter A. Rohi - and the author’s discussions with him; the author’s interviews with surviving rebels (Evaristo da Costa, Salem Sagran, Frederico Almeida Santos da Costa – see below); and a book published in 1998 by General Filipe Themudo Barata – the Governor of Portuguese Timor in the period mid-1959 to 1963.12 The book “Pulau Timor” by the Timorese author António Vicente Marques Soares is also a useful source.13

Former 1959 rebels: Evaristo da Costa, Frederico Almeida Santos da Costa and Salem Sagran ; Kuluhan – Dili, 4 April 2007 Some official Portuguese Government correspondence of the time – provided on an Internet website “blog”, by Janet Gunter has been helpful.14 Her March 2007 article15, based on field research in Viqueque was also an important contribution to an understanding of events – and her yet-to-be-published master’s degree thesis is expected to provide further insights. Additionally, an article by Professor Geoffrey Gunn, first made available on the Internet in February 2006, contains some useful information on the exile of the “1959 rebels” in Angola – including some information on their pre-Rebellion backgrounds.16 11

For a useful review of Archives sources in Lisbon for the period 1974-1975, see Fernandes, M.S., “O Processo de Descolonização do Timor Português nos Arquivos Portugueses, 1974-1975”, IV Seminário Internacional de Arquivos e Tradição Ibérica, Lisbon, October 2005. 12 Barata, F.T., Timor contemporâneo: Da primeira ameaça da Indonésia ao nascer de uma nação (Contemporary Timor: From the first threat by Indonesia to the birth of a nation), Equilíbrio Editorial, Lisboa, 1998. 13 Soares (Mali-Lequic), A.V.M., Pulau Timor – Sebuah Sumbangan Untuk Sejarahnya, 2003 – see pp.99-105. Viqueque-born (Lacluta, 1947), Sr. António Soares served as a teacher and administrator. 14 Gunter, J., Haree Ba Uluk: Timor Portuguese Pre-1974 – A Post-Colonial Forum for Learning and Debate. http://raiketak.blogspot.com/timorhistory/index.html 15 Gunter, J., “Communal Conflict in Viqueque and the ‘Charged’ History of ‘59”, The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology, Vol 8, No 1, March 2007, pp. 27-41. 16 Gunn, G.C., “Revisiting the Viqueque (East Timor) Rebellion of 1959”, Diversidade Cultural Na Construção Da Nação E Do Estado Em Timor-Leste, Universidade Fernando Pessoa, Porto, 2006, pp.

5 In the mid-1990s, the Indonesian Government sought to resurrect, revise and “reconstruct” the history of the Rebellion - promoting the uprising as the beginning of a struggle by the people of Portuguese Timor to integrate into the Republic of Indonesia. Coverage in the Jakarta, Surabaya and Dili press of the reception of the returning rebel exiles - and an “official” history17 published by the Indonesian Government were elements of this campaign. Much of this information however needs to be examined critically. On 5 June 2009, Nobel Prize laureate Dom Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo published a six-page article: “A Revolta de 1959 em Viqueque, Watolari e Watocarbau”18 that included discussion of the “causas remotas” and “causas proximas” of the 1959 Rebellion. That article has the potential to alter Timorese attitudes towards that uprising. The 1959 Rebellion has most recently been discretely related in some detail in the monograph “Rebellion, Defeat and Exile” – 200919. On the Union of the Republic of Timor-Dilly (URT-D), communications from the Australian Department of External/Foreign Affairs in Canberra, their Embassy in Jakarta and the Consulate in Dili have been a major source of information on that movement and Indonesian involvement in Portuguese Timor in the 1960s and early 1970s. However, not all the records of the Department of External/Foreign Affairs in the National Archives of Australia are accessible - as many interesting folios have been removed from files and certified as “exempted”, “in confidence”, and/or “intelligence information – the release of which would risk damage to the security of the Commonwealth”. Similarly, a few passages within some reports on the available files have been “expunged” – and consequently are currently not readable. The National Archives in Kew (London) have also provided some useful documents on the URT-D – and also on Indonesia-Portuguese Timor relations in the 1960s. Union of the Republic of Timor-Dilly In late 2003, when writing a monograph on aspects of the Resistance struggle against the Indonesian occupation of Timor-Leste (1975-1999), I had included brief mention (about 600 words) of the Union of the Republic of Timor-Dilly movement (see footnote 7). This was based principally on references in the National Archives of Australia. On 26 November 2004, following the item in the Timor Post mentioned above, I met with its author and subsequently first interviewed Muhammad Saleh Akbar Balikh (“Mao Klao”) - the former “President” of the URT-D, at his home in Dili in early December 2004. Balikh also provided me with copies of several

27-53. Professor Gunn cites reports by the Portuguese Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado (PIDE) on the exiled rebels. – the draft of the article was available earlier on the Internet as Gunn, G.C., “Revisiting the Viqueque Rebellion of 1959” (Draft), Nagasaki, 9 February 2006. 17 Gonggong A. & Zuhdi, S., Sejarah Perjuangan Timor-Timur Untuk Sekolah Menengah Atas (History of the East Timor Struggle for Senior High School), Direktorat Pendidikan Menengah Umum, Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, Jakarta, 1992 – see translated extract at Annex B. 18 Belo, C.F.X. Dom, “A Revolta de 1959 em Viqueque, Watolari e Watocarbau”, Porto, 5 Junho de 2009 (six pages). http://forum-haksesuk.blogspot.com/2009/06/revolta-de-1959-em-viqueque-watolari-e.html 19 Chamberlain, E.P., Rebellion, Defeat and Exile: The 1959 Uprising in East Timor, Point Lonsdale, 18 June 2009 - http://www.scribd.com/doc/26857195/Rebellion-Defeat-and-Exile-The-1959-Uprisingin-East-Timor .

6 documents20 in substantiation of his claim to be “Mao Klao”, the President of the URT-D. I met again with M.S.A. Balikh in Dili in August 2006 and October 2008. This brief work also attempts to examine the background and activities of this littleknown movement – the URT-D, and its leader, Mao Klao. “Political Awakening” - Indonesian Intervention For Indonesian intervention in Portuguese Timor, sources for the early 1960s period include Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado (PIDE) documents in the Lisbon Archives (Torre do Tombo – TdT) and Australian diplomatic reports in the National Archives of Australia (Canberra). On political developments in Portuguese Timor in the 1970s, several of the senior participants have published works – including Abílio de Araújo, Francisco Lopes da Cruz, José Ramos-Horta, Mário Lemos Pires, and Mário Viegas Carrascalão. Part 3 of Chega ! - The Final Report of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR), also provides a description of the events of the early 1970s. For the period 1974-1975, cables from the Australian Embassy in Jakarta provide useful information – together with accounts in books written from the mid1990s by Indonesian journalists who accompanied the Indonesian troops in 1975, ie principally Hendro Subroto and M. Saleh Kamah. As noted above, some passages in Australian diplomatic correspondence and intelligence-related reports in the National Archives of Australia have been expunged or redacted. Most of this omitted material appears to be related to intercepted signals communications or occasional meetings between Australian and Indonesian intelligence agencies in the early-mid 1970s.21 .

20

URT-D documents are listed discretely in the first section of the Bibliography. Those provided to the author by M.S.A. Balikh are annotated with an asterisk, ie *. 21 A large number (483) of relevant Australian diplomatic reports – together with some background and commentary, are contained in the official publication: Way, W. (ed), Australia and the Indonesian Incorporation of Portuguese Timor 1974-1976 (Documents on Australian Foreign Policy – Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade), Melbourne University Press, Carlton South, 2000. However, as noted, Australian intelligence material considered sensitive – principally related to intercepted Indonesian communications, has been “expunged” from accessible Australian records. Since mid-2007, submissions by Dr. C. Fernandes (Canberra) to access 1975 classified material have been unsuccessful – see Dorling, P., “Govt sets up new obstacle in Balibo case”, Canberra Times, Canberra, 11 September 2010.

7 PRE-WAR AND WAR TIME The Deportados – pre-War Unrest Large numbers of Portuguese men were deported to the Portuguese colonies in the mid-1920s to the early 1930s following anarchist, communist and other left-wing activities - principally in Portugal, but some were also arrested in several African colonies. 65 deportados arrived in Dili aboard the Pero de Alenquer on 25 September 1927; 358 on the Pedro Gomes on 16 October 1931 (connected with the “revolt” of 26 August 1931); and 30 arrived on the Gil Eanes on 21 October 1931. The arrival data of a further 25 deportados is unclear. This brought the total of deportados in Portuguese Timor to over 50022 – far more than the resident Portuguese administrators and the very few settlers. Within a short time, the presence of the deportados was a major contribution to the growth of the mestizo – ie mixed race23, population in the Colony. In Timor, several of the deportados were imprisoned for their continued political activity. Arnaldo Simões Januário – an anarchist from Coimbra, began a newsletter and founded the Aliança Libertária de Timor.24 This precipitated a “rigorous inquiry” by the Government in November 1933 into “the activities of political and social deportados” to address their “profoundly anti-nationalist endeavours”.25 The inquiry led to several arrests of deportados and their imprisonment on Ataúro - an island of Portuguese Timor, 22 kilometres off the coast ie north of Dili. One deportado – Raul dos Santos, had been imprisoned in Batugadé near the Dutch Timor border for writing about the “conditions of the natives” – and later also imprisoned on Ataúro as a member of the Aliança. However, following an amnesty declared by Lisbon in December 1932, all but a handful of those deported to Timor aboard the Pedro Gomes in October 1931 returned to Portugal in 1933. In October 1935, the Portuguese authoritities suppressed an “alleged revolt” in Suro, dismissing the régulo (traditional ruler) of Alas - Dom Carlos Borromeu Duarte and displacing those involved to other areas.26 In mid-1937, the displaced population was allowed to return – but régulo Duarte’s restricted residence continued.27 However, following an investigation, Duarte was exonerated in 1939 and his privileges were reinstated.28 In late 1937, a visiting British diplomat – E.T. Lambert reported that “a few deportados … still constitute a real problem for the Government. Only recently an attempt was made by some deportados in an internment camp on the island of Ataúro to incite the natives against one of their chiefs and organize a general insurrection against the government. The movement was easily suppressed and the men in 22

These arrivals of ship-loads of deportados to Portuguese Timor – with 528 deportados named, are found in Cardoso, A.M., Timor na 2ª Guerra Mundial …, op.cit., 2007, pp. 235-259. 23 For the 1950 population figures that include numbers for “Mixed Race” – ie Mestiço/Mestizo (malae oan in Tetum) see footnote 113. 24 Cardoso, A.M., Timor na 2ª Guerra Mundial …, op.cit., p.43. While the aims of the Aliança are not wholly clear, it appears to have been associated with the Federación Anaquarista Ibérica (founded in 1927) – a Pan-Iberian organization of anarchists and communists. 25 BOdT (Boletim Oficial de Timor), No.50, Portaria No.84-A, 16 December 1933, p.266. 26 For this little-known revolt, see Cardoso, A.M., Timor na 2ª Guerra Mundial …, 2007; op.cit., pp.29-30. 27 BOdT, No.20, Despachos, 15 May 1937, p.181. 28 The alleged revolt appears to have been re-assessed as “disturbance of public order” and a local “inter-indigenous dispute” – BOdT, No.12, Política Indígena – Despacho, 21 March 1939, pp.252-254.

8 question transferred elsewhere …”.29 On the native Timorese, Lambert also commented that the “passive attitude of the Government towards education has inevitably left its mark on the mental and economic status of the people, many of whom are still in a hopelessly backward and primitive state and, never having tasted better things, are content to eke out their meagre, under-nourished existence without any desire to improve their lot.”30 Describing Portuguese Timor’s pre-War “European” population, Governor Manuel d’Abreu Ferreira de Carvalho (1940-1945) wrote: "The core of the largest European group was composed of about ninety deported, social and affiliates, sent to us after the revolt in Guinea in 1927 and others in 1931. There were about a dozen European settlers - or former military employees, pensioners, who had come to Timor and were dedicated to agriculture and livestock. Besides these there were the employees of the Sociedade Agrícola Pátria e Trabalho, about five or six, and two traders, and former convicts, on the brink of bankruptcy."31 While the results of the 1940 census were not available, in 1941 Governor Carvalho told a visiting British diplomat – C.H. Archer, that the population of Portuguese Timor comprised: 300 Portuguese – including slightly under 100 deportados, over 2,000 Chinese, 13 Japanese, and “about 450,000 natives”. There were “less than a dozen other Europeans, Indians & c. Of the total, the majority of the Portuguese, about 1,100 Chinese and 1,800 natives are in Dili.”32 In April 1941 - eight months before the outbreak of war in the Pacific, the visiting British consul – C.H. Archer, wrote critically of the administration and authorities in Portuguese Timor. On the Timorese, he commented that: “The natives are devoid of the most rudimentary political consciousness, and their condition is so primitive that I imagine few would be able even of grasping the idea that a world war is going on.”33 At about this time, wary of Japanese political and economic “infiltration” into Portuguese Timor, in April 1941 Australia appointed an official – David Ross, as a representative in Dili. Ross’ tasks included: “to report to the Australian Government on Intelligence questions and on the commercial opportunities offering in that area.”34 Ross was joined in June 1941 by an “undeclared” Australian intelligence officer –

29

Lambert, E.T. (British Consul, Batavia), Report on Portuguese Timor, Batavia, 18 December 1937, para 89 (NAA: A1838, 376/1/1; A981, TIM P 4 Part 2). Soon after, further regulations were promulgated on the fixed residence and control of deportados – BOdT, No.48, Portaria No.580, 24 November 1937, pp.447-448. 30 Lambert, E.T., (British Consul, Batavia), Report …, op.cit., 1937, p.20, para 98 (NAA: A981, TIM P 4 Part 2, p.122). Lambert however also commented positively on recently-arrived Governor Fontoura’s “constant solicitude for the natives” – p.21, para 101. 31 Carvalho, M. de Abreu Ferreira, Relatório …, 1947, op.cit., p.5. The 1941 report by the visiting British Consul-General (Taiwan) C.H. Archer stated there were “slightly under 100” deportados in a total Portuguese population of about 300. The deportados were reportedly living “in liberty” in Portuguese Timor – of whom “about 60 percent were ‘democrats’, 30 percent communists and 10 percent other criminals” – see Archer, C.H., Report on Portuguese Timor, Canberra, 3 May 1941, para 29 (NAA: A981, TIM D 1 Part 2, pp.38-76, and his draft report of 29 April 1941 at A981, TIM P 9). Portugal ceased sending deportados to Timor in 1949. 32 Archer, C.H. (British Consul-General, Taiwan), Report on Portuguese Timor, Canberra, 3 May 1941, p.9 (NAA: A981, TIM D 1 Part 2, p.45). 33 Ibid., p.25, para 120 (NAA: A981, TIM D 1 Part 2, p.61). 34 War Cabinet Minute 782, Sydney, 12 February 1941 (NAA: A2676, 782, p.3).

9 F.J.A. Whittaker.35 Making contact with deportados, and other “anti-fascist” Portuguese in the administration, Whittaker reported to Australia that “a number of Portuguese in Timor, the majority of whom are stationed in Dili, have formed a group whose object, in the event of the Axis powers occupying Portugal, would be to seize power here and declare the colony independent of Portugal.”36 On 17 December 1941 – in a “pre-emptive” operation, Australian and Dutch troops occupied Portuguese Timor in violation of Portuguese sovereignty - ie a “strategical exigency necessitated the Allied action”.37 Governor Carvalho formally directed Portuguese officials not to cooperate with the Allied forces, and the Australian Consul David Ross reported in early January 1942: “It must not be forgotten that there are here in Timor a number of political deportees who are violently hostile to the Salazar regime in Portugal and who are just waiting for an opportunity to revolt. An internal revolution can be started here at almost any time, and our forces could then take full military control to preserve order. In such event, which could be taken only as a last resort to guard effectively against Japanese occupation, a guarantee of safety would have to be given to the deportees who would start internal trouble, and they would also have to be protected against the Portuguese Government so long as Salazar is in control.” 38 The Japanese Occupation Japanese forces landed in both Dutch Timor and at Dili just before midnight on 19 February/in the very early hours of 20 February 1942.39 While the Allied forces in Dutch Timor were soon defeated, Australian commandos in Portuguese Timor (“Sparrow Force” – and later “Lancer Force”) conducted guerrilla-style warfare against the Japanese until early 1943.

35

For personal detail on Whittaker, see Chamberlain, E.P., Forgotten Men …, 2010, op.cit., Annex F. Director of Naval Intelligence, N.I.D. 485/IIB – Internal Political Conditions in Portuguese Timor, Melbourne, 11 July 1941 (NAA: A981, TIM P 11, pp.106-108). Whittaker provided a list of the 20 “leading members of the group”. For detail on Australian pre-War intelligence collection activities in Timor, see Chamberlain, E.P., Forgotten Men …, 2010, op.cit., pp.3-8. 37 For background and detail, see Chamberlain, E.P. Forgotten Men …, 2010, op.cit., pp.8-10. According to the official British statement, a “strategical exigency necessitated the Allied action” that was reportedly precipitated when “On December 15th Japanese submarines were identified in immediate vicinity of Timor. One of them was attacked on December 16th. The danger was thus immediate …” – Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, Cable I.29078 G. No.97, London, 21 December 1941 (NAA: A981, WAR 72, pp.69-70). The British statement was reported widely eg “Why Allies Acted in Timor”, The Argus, Melbourne, 23 December 1941, p.5. From 7 February 1942, all Dutch and Australian forces in Timor were placed under General Sir Archibald Wavell’s Bandoengbased American-British-Dutch-Australian (ABDA) Command. 38 Ross, D., Report, Timor Dilli, 6 January 1942 (NAA: A981, TIM P 11, pp.9-11). 39 Two Japanese aircraft first attacked Dili with machinegun fire on 8 February 1942 – no casualties or damage were reported – Ross, D., Cable 651, Dili, 8 February 1942 (NAA: A981, WAR 72, p.56). For a brief Japanese account see “Dutch East Indies Operation” – Translation, Doc No.404, May 1948 (AWM54, 556/4/11); for a Dutch account, see “The Action in Timor from December 1941 – December 1942, (AWM 54, 573/4/1); for a detailed Australian account, see Wray, C.C.H., Timor I942, Hutchinson Australia, Hawthorn, 1987, pp.22-77 and also Ross, D., Report, 29 July 1942 (NAA: A6779, 21, pp.3-9). Japanese aircraft from four aircraft carriers and land-based aircraft from Kendari (Sulawesi) and Ambon attacked Darwin earlier on 19 February. 36

10 Soon after occupying Dili, the Japanese forces sought the collaboration of a number of “arabs”40 and Chinese merchants.41 Among the Timorese, the Japanese proselytized their policy of a “Greater Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere”, fraternity among all Asians, and the ejection of Europeans and their influence.42 However, during the Japanese occupation (February 1942 - September 1945), the Japanese appear not to have promoted independence for Portuguese Timor. This was probably because - officially, the Japanese Government respected Portuguese sovereignty – albeit nominally; and a Japanese consulate was maintained in Dili unlike in other territories under Japanese occupation. However, the Japanese Navy established a Timor branch of their Otori Kikan intelligence organisation43 which included local operatives, and the Japanese also recruited and directed the “colunas negras” (“black columns”) – ie armed Timorese elements that harassed the small Australian military force in Portuguese Timor and the Portuguese administration. Native Uprisings and Wars44 In late March 1942, unrest against the Portuguese45 arose in the Posto of Hatolia southwest of Ermera – and the Portuguese chefe de posto, Sergeant Mortágua, exiled four local chiefs. Further to the southwest near the border with Dutch Timor, Faic - the régulo of Fohorém (in the Cova Lima area – about 40km west-southwest of Bobonaro) regularly crossed the border into Dutch Timor to visit relatives at Atambua. However, on his return, he was beaten and imprisoned by a Portuguese official – but escaped to Atambua with some followers. The Administrator of the

40

A number of Malays and “arabs” were reportedly “forced” to work for the Japanese as “soldiers, interpreters and police” – and several dozen were imprisoned by the Portuguese after the War as collaborators – see Bazher, A.B., Islam di Timor Timur, Gema Insani Press, Jakarta, 1995, pp.40-41. 41 Chinese welcomed the Japanese in Lautém and Baucau – see ISD, T/14 – Project 24, Melbourne, 21 October 1942 (NAA: A3269, D6/A, p.38). Encarnação, D. de (?), Letter - Natives (probably to F.J.A. Whittaker), Australia, 25 January 1943 (NAA: A373, 4058A) – provides a listing of Chinese who collaborated with the Japanese. Encarnação notes that when the Japanese entered Lautém in November 1942, they were welcomed by the Chinese residents. An Australian officer also noted that “Japs were friendly to the Chinese and use them eg in Lautém.” - McCabe, P.P. Lieutenant, Report on Portuguese Timor, 8 December 1942 (AWM54, 571/1/3). Post-war, four Chinese were later exiled from Portuguese Timor for five years – BOdT No.38, Portaria 1:285, 20 September 1947, p.343. 42 “The Japanese knew how to appeal to the natives; they simplified their propaganda and made it ‘antiwhite-man’ which of course included the Portuguese who were theoretically neutral” - Callinan, B.J., Independent Company, William Heinemann Ltd, Melbourne, 1953, p.154. “get rid of the white man”, ISD, T14 – Project 24, Melbourne, 21 October 1942 (NAA: A3269, D6/A, p.37). In Viqueque, Japanese propaganda “we ((Timorese and Japanese)) both have coloured skins, let us get rid of the white man and then you can enjoy your own land instead of working for the Portuguese and being exploited by them.” - ISD, T/14 – Project 24, Melbourne, 21 October 1942 (NAA: A3269, D6/A, p.37). 43 Affiliated to the Japanese Imperial Navy, the Otori Kikan’s civilian operatives were active in - at least, Aileu, Lautém, Baguia and Ossú. They established rapport with the local liurais (chiefs) to gather information, and to pacify and mobilize the Timorese to assist the Japanese occupation – see Takahashi, S., “The Japanese Intelligence Organization in Portuguese Timor”, Understanding TimorLeste: Research Conference, Dili, 3 July 2009. 44 A more comprehensive account of the “Native Uprisings and Assistance to Australian Forces” is included as Annex G to Chamberlain, E.P. Forgotten Men …, 2010, op.cit., – with Appendix 1 illustrating “Native Attitudes” (ie the December 1942 map by Lieutenant P.P. McCabe). See also Cleary, P., The Men Who Came Out of the Ground, Hachette Australia, Sydney, 2010. 45 In a speech to the National Assembly in Lisbon on 26 November 1943, Portuguese Prime Minister Salazar claimed: “there were revolts among the native population who had been in perfect tranquility under our rule.” – NAA: A989, 1943/731/3, p.54.

11 Fronteira Circumscription/Circunscrição46 - António Policarpo de Sousa Santos, who had been supporting the Australian Sparrow Force elements, accused régulo Faic of rebellion. Santos arrested numbers of the régulo’s family and followers and exiled them to eastern areas of the Colony ie to Manatuto, São Domingos and Lautém –

Portuguese Timor – 1942 47 (for name-changes of towns and villages – see footnote below)

46

A Circunscrição was a modern-day District comprising several Postos, ie modern-day Sub-Districts. Based on a map in Fontoura, Á. da, O Trabalho dos Indígenas de Timor, Agência Geral das Colónias, Lisboa, 1942. The Portuguese enclave of Oecussi-Ambeno is inserted. In 1936, the Portuguese authorities renamed several towns and villages from their indigenous titles: Baucau town was renamed Vila Salazar (27 May 1936); Aileu: Vila General Carmona; Atabai: Atalaia; Atsabe: Nova Ourém; Baaguia: Baguía; Batugadé: Caxias do Extremo; Bazar-Tete: Vila Eduardo Marques; Bobonaro: Vila Armindo Monteiro; Com: Nova Nazaré; Fuiloro: Vila de Avis; Laivai: Nova Ancora; Lautém: Vila Nova Malaca; Loré: Silvicolas; Maubesse: Mindelo; Ossú: Belas; PanteMakassar: Vila Taveiro; Same: Vila Filomeno de Câmara; Tibar: Nova Algés; Tutuala: Nova Sagres; Uato-Carabau/Watu Carbau: Nova Bemfica; Uatolari: Leça; Venilale: Vila Viçosa - BOdT, No. 21/25, Diploma Legislativo 85/90, 27 May/20 June 1936, p.1/pp.142-143. However, the changes were not “popularized”, and by the early 1950s had reverted to their earlier titles - Felgas, H.A.E. Capitão, Timor Português, 1956, pp.348-350. 47

12 “with orders that they were to be liquidated.”48 Several of the Faic clan dissidents were brought back to Bobonaro and executed. At the end of the first week of August 1942, the Japanese forces – advancing from both Dili and from Dutch Timor, began a four-column offensive against the Australians in the western districts. The “objective for the Japanese military was to eliminate both native Timorese and Portuguese support for the Australian and associated troops.”49 For this campaign, the Japanese strengthened their forces with colunas negras ie “black columns” – Timorese auxiliaries initially recruited mainly from West Timor.50 To intimidate the Portuguese and natives in the countryside, on 9 August 1942 Japanese aircraft bombed and strafed the postos of Mape and Beaço (in Fronteira) and Maubisse and Same (in Suro).51 Under Japanese pressure, on 11 August, the headquarters of the Australian Sparrow Force was forced to move, by a circuitous route, eastward from Mape to Same – and “in the process of moving, all Sparrow’s long distance radio facilities had been sabotaged by unfriendly natives.”52 In the southwest, a Japanese-directed column of heavily-armed natives from Dutch Timor advanced on the Posto of FatuLulic and killed the chefe Corporal Alfredo Baptista.53 Other columns advanced to Mape, Beaço, Suai, Maucatar and Bobonaro.54 On 11 August – threatened by the “revolt of the people of Cova Lima and Balibo”, Administrator Sousa Santos abandoned his Fronteira Circumscription headquarters at Bobonaro and fled with his family eastward to the Baucau area. 48

Cardoso, A.M., Timor …, 2007, op.cit., pp.63-64. The cause and nature of the régulo’s resistance to the Portuguese is unclear. Sousa Santos also reportedly raided the lulic (ie sacred ancestral) house of the Faic clan and removed “jewels of the kingdom and other sacred objects” to his headquarters in Bobonaro “which shocked the population.” The “rebellion” of the régulo Faic is also related in Santa, J.D., Australianos e Japoneses em Timor na II Guerra Mundial 1941-1945, Notícias Editorial, Lisboa, 1997, pp.36-38. Immediately post-War, Faic – the régulo of Fohorem and Cova Lima, presented himself voluntarily to the Portuguese authorities at Bobonaro – Carvalho, M. de Abreu Ferreira, Relatório …, 1947, op.cit., p.658. In 1946, Sousa Santos was charged by a Portuguese Disciplinary Court with several offences including that he “was responsible for the rebellion at Fohorem” and for “wrongly killing some natives at Bobonaro” - see NAA: A1838, 377/3/3/6 Part 1, p.161, p.194. 49 Horton, W.B., “Ethnic Cleavage in Timorese Society: The Black Columns in Occupied Portuguese Timor”, Journal of International Development, 6 (2), Takushoku University, Tokyo, March 2007, p.43. 50 The Governor of Portuguese Timor noted the arrival by boat in Dili on 8 or 9 August 1942 of 300 heavily armed “indígenas de Atambua” – ie a “black column” – Carvalho, M. de Abreu Ferreira, Relatório …, 1947, op.cit., pp.308-309. For views on the origin of the term “black columns/colunas negras”, see Horton, W.B., “Ethnic Cleavage …”, op.cit., March 2007, p.43. According to Portuguese Lieutenant António Liberato: “the black columns were initially recruited from native populations of Dutch Timor and neighbouring islands, their numbers were soon increased by hundreds of natives from our land, mainly from the regions of Fronteira, Maubisse, Manufai and later from other areas of the colony. … they became the Australians’ worst enemy, the real adversary who forced them to leave Timor.” - Liberato, A. de Oliveira, O Caso de Timor, Invasões estrangeiras, revoltas indígenas, Portugália Editora, Lisboa, 1947. 51 On 10 August, Bobonaro, Mape and Beaço were bombed; and on 11 August, Aileu, Mape and Beaço were bombed. 52 The Official History of the Operations and Administration of ‘Special Operations Australia’ (SOA) under the cover-name of ‘Services Reconnaissance Department’, Volume II – Operations, Melbourne, 8 March 1946, p.13 (NAA: A3269, O8/A, p.26). Sparrow Force used the SRD LIZARD I radio set which was later left with Sparrow Force when the LIZARD I party was evacuated to Australia on 17 August 1942. 53 The estimated strength of the “black columns” that entered Fronteira from West Timor was “around 3,000 … along with some Menadonese with experience as colonial troops.” - Horton, W.B., “Ethnic Cleavage …”, March 2007, op.cit., p.43. 54 For detail on the Japanese border campaign, see Carvalho, M. de Abreu Ferreira, Relatório …, 1947, op.cit., pp.310-311.

13 On 21 August 1942, a Portuguese column led by Sergeant António Joachim Vicente left Dili to suppress the rebellion in the southwest – followed by a column from Aileu led by Lieutenant António de Oliveira Liberato.55 The Portuguese forces reportedly “had a kind of liassez-passer ((salvo-conduto)), a document signed by the Japanese Consul, that identified the reason for their operation. … Lieutenant Liberato encountered Australian and Dutch troops who did not intervene. While identifying with the Portuguese, who provided a quiet and working population, the Australians remained neutral because, as Callinan admitted: ‘One war was enough for us’.”56 The Maubisse “Uprising” Following the bombing by the Japanese of the Posto at Maubisse on 9 August 1942, Corporal Francisco Martins Coelho - the chefe de posto, while reportedly enroute to Same, took refuge with a local village head, but was brutally murdered by him. In retaliation, a Portuguese force – including large numbers of Timorese arraiais (warriors) and moradores57, was mobilized by the Administrator of Manatuto to suppress the “revolt of 3,000” at Maubisse and Turiscai. The main Portuguese column led by Lieutenant António Ramalho left Aileu on 23 August – with the force including 3,100 arraiais, and the bloody campaign concluded on 3 September.58 Massacre at Aileu On 1 October 1942, Timorese colunas negras – under Japanese direction59, attacked the Portuguese barracks at Aileu killing six soldiers. The force then attacked the residence of the commander of the Portuguese forces in Timor - resulting in the deaths of the commander, his wife and seven other Portuguese.60 Japanese troops 55

For detail on the campaign, see Liberato, A. de Oliveira, O Caso …, 1947, op.cit., pp.109-112. A map of the campaign by the two Portuguese columns can be found in Santos, A. P. de Sousa, Duas palvaras ao capitão Liberato a propósito de “O Caso de Timor”, Minerva Central, Lourenço Marques, 1973, p.65. The columns - including the later expedition to Maubisse, included deportado volunteers, some of whom later evacuated to Australia. 56 Cardoso, A.M., Timor …, 2007, op.cit., pp.64-65. Cardoso includes quotes from Callinan, B.J., Independent Company …, 1953, op.cit., p.155. 57 Moradores were “native troops enlisted by the kingdoms (“reinos”) and equipped by the chiefs (“chefes”) - Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., p.33, footnote 1. 58 Takahashi, S., emails to author, 18 and 24 July 2009. Shigehito Takahashi’s field research includes detailed Timorese accounts of the campaign. Timorese refer to the Maubisse “revolt” as the “ManetuManelobas War”. The Timorese arraiais were mobilized from a wide area – Manatuto (Fatu Berliu, Samoro, Fatu Maquerec, Laclubar), Aileu (Aileu, Lequidoi, Dailor), Ermera (Letefoho), and Suro (Ainaro, Hato Builico). José Duarte Santa - a Portuguese administrator, assessed native casualties “as a result of tribal warfare, the extermination action of ‘black columns’ and the performance of the Portuguese troops and the "militia" subject to administrative authorities, in operations to restore order and policing - the death toll was put at around 2000.” - Santa, J.D., Australianos e Japoneses …, op.cit., 1997, p.164. 59 Shigehito Takahashi’s in-country research has established that the Japanese civilian intelligence agency – Otori Kikan, managed the “Aileu case”, see Takahashi, S., “The Japanese Intelligence Organization in Portuguese Timor”, Understanding Timor-Leste: Research Conference, Dili, 3 July 2009. The Timorese involved - a “black column” (“colunas negras”), were reportedly mostly from Netherlands Timor. Australia reported the killings at Aileu to London on 22 November 1942 (for advice to Lisbon) – Department of External Affairs, Cablegram No.375, Canberra, 22 November 1942 (NAA: A981, TIM P 16, p.47). 60 Captain Freire da Costa – the military commander, his wife and three other Portuguese committed suicide – see Santa, J.D., Australianos e Japoneses …, op.cit., 1997, pp.61-67; Carvalho, Dos Santos J., Vida e Morte em Timor, Livraria Portugal, Lisbon, 1972, pp.128-130; Liberato, C. dos Santos

14 who were nearby in Aileu giving “full coverage to the massacre”61 by the colunas negras, escorted the surviving Portuguese to Dili the next day.62 Soon after, in late October 1942, the Portuguese accepted the Japanese edict for “protective concentration” and moved to “internment” areas on the northern coast west of Dili at Liquiçá, Maubara and the nearby hill village of Bazar Tete – ie for protection against the “rebeliões de indígenas”.63 “Filhos do Timor” (Sons of Timor) During the War, the Australian military recruited and employed Timorese in its Services Reconnaissance Department (SRD)/Z Special Unit for re-insertion into Portuguese Timor and operations against the Japanese.64 In mid-November 1943, H.B. Manderson – the head of SRD’s Timor Section, suggested promoting the creation of an “underground movement” in Portuguese Timor among the Timorese – to be termed: “Filhos do Timor” (“Sons of Timor”).65 The catalyst for the movement would be the Timorese trainees at the SRD’s training camp in Darwin – and: “the idea should stem in the first instance from the trainees themselves. As a so-called ‘secret’ Organization, I am sure these youngsters will cleave to the general idea like limpets. In a variety of ways it should make a valuable contribution to the institution of the TIMOR Webb [sic] by producing NOT emissaries from AUSTRALIA, but “SONS OF TIMOR” hell-bent as the spearheads of recovery of their land by their own efforts etc. etc. The MISEIN-SCENE might include such slogans as ‘WE WILL REPAY’ ”. The scheme has interesting possibilities.”

Oliveira, Quando Timor foi notícia – Memórias, Editora Pax, Braga, 1972; Brito, F.G. de, Tata-mailau: Timor contra o Japão 1941-45, Iniciativas Editoriais, Lisbon, 1977; and also eye-witness accounts at NAA: A989, 1944/731/1, pp.123-127. 61 Cardoso, A.M., Timor …, 2007, op.cit., p.66. 62 Callinan, B.J., Independent Company …, 1953, op.cit., pp.172-173. Portuguese Sergeant António Lourenço Martins had been detained by the Japanese at Aileu after the massacre and taken to Dili, but escaped. He provided the Australians with a comprehensive report on the situation in Dili covering the period 3-16 October that precipitated successful RAAF B-24 bombing raids - The Official History … , Vol II – Operations, 1946, op.cit., p.20 (NAA: A3269, O8/A, p.33; D6/A, pp.41-42). 63 Carvalho, M. de Abreu Ferreira, Relatório …, 1947, op.cit., pp.406-412. See also Liberato, A. de Oliveira, Os Japoneses Estiveram Em Timor II – A Zona De Concentração, Empresa Nacional da Publicade, Lisboa, 1951, pp.153-208. A detailed account of the campos de concentração is included in Santa, J.D., Australianos e Japoneses …, op.cit., 1997 – the author, José Duarte Santa (secretário de Concelho de Dili) was the “administering authority” at the camp at Liquiçá until imprisoned by the Japanese on Alor in July 1944. “Interned in concentration camps at Liquica and Maubara were 521 Portuguese (287 male and 234 female) of all ages and all kinds of jobs, mostly consisting of public servants both active and retired … 14 died.” – Santa, J.D., op.cit., 1997, p.164. 64 The total number of “Porto/Natives” who were employed by SRD in the period 1942-1945 was probably 71 – who could be categorized as: Operational personnel (“operatives”): 39; General Duties (GD) personnel: 32 – see Chamberlain, E.P. Forgotten Men …, 2010, op.cit., p.50. 65 SRD – 450 to Director SRD, 9/J, Brisbane, 19 November 1943, p.2 (NAA: A3269, D/3G, p.29).

15

Timorese at the SRD/Z Special Unit Commando School – Fraser Island (Queensland), November 194266 In December 1943, Manderson wrote to the Director of SRD in Melbourne on the need to “build up the spirit of the Timorese” at the Darwin facilities. Manderson related: “To this end, by subterranean means, I had instituted before I left, through the students themselves, an underground movement styled “TIEIA TIMOR” or the “Timor Network” which is hoped to be the operating section of a national resistance organization to be called “Filhos de Timor” (“Sons of Timor”). A fancy oath and other secret furbishments likely to appeal to the native mind have been designed.”67 In March 1944, Manderson advised the SRD Darwin base of the proposal for the “creation of a force to be known as the ‘Timor Territorials’ ” - adding “Appropriate documentary fanfare in preparation.”68 However, it does not appear that this proposal was developed further.69 There is no mention of “independence” in the document – and it may well have merely been Manderson’s intention to appeal to Timorese loyalty to Portugal. Moreover, Australian Government policy at the time would probably not have supported any incitement of independence for Portuguese Timor – particularly in the light of the British and Australian assurances on the sovereignty of Portuguese Timor given to

66

Rear - left to right: Armindo Fernandes, José Carvalho, José Rebelo; Front - left to right: Câncio Noronha, Bernardino Noronha, João Almeida - ie as identified to author by Câncio dos Reis Noronha – March 2009, January 2010. The photograph was taken by H.B. Manderson and is in the Australian War Memorial (AWM) collection – PR91/101 Part, L15. 67 Manderson, H.B., 10 December 1943 (AWM, PR91/101). 68 SRD, T19, Melbourne, 23 March 1944 (NAA: A3269, L7). 69 A Timorese SRD operative (1942-1945) – Câncio dos Reis Noronha, had not heard of the proposed “Filhos do Timor” movement. While there was sometimes occasional brief mention of “independence” among Timorese operatives, the matter was apparently not taken seriously - author’s interview with Câncio dos Reis Noronha, Melbourne, 6 December 2008.

16 Portugal on 14 September 1943 ie the Aide-Memoire No. 16 to Prime Minister Salazar70 that also included proposals for future discussion of common defence issues. EARLY POST-WAR PERIOD Returning Communists – and a Revolution ? During the War, 28 men who had been evacuated from Portuguese Timor were interned in Australia by the authorities as they were considered – probably unjustly, to be a risk to the security of SRD/Z Special Force operations in Timor. 22 of those interned had been deportados 71 – and, prior to their internment, several had been in contact with trade unions in the city of Newcastle and the local branch of the Communist Party – and had become politically active.72 A number also declared themselves to be “communists”, and several of the Portugal-born deportado internees remained politically active after their release – as evidenced in a January 1945 article in the Communist Party newspaper “The Tribune” titled: “Portuguese Exiles Need Better Deal”.73 In late 1945, five Portuguese men formally sought to remain in Australia – but their applications were rejected.74 The Australian Security Service reported allegations that two “were remaining in Australia in order to obtain the help of Communists to further the revolution in Timor” and that “Bezerra dos Santos who joined the ship, is to be the Communist agent in Timor … They are recognized as dangerous men politically; that, probably of course, as far as the Portuguese Authorities are concerned.”75 However, in the early post-War years, communism does not appear to have emerged as a threat to stability in Portuguese Timor. Concerns were only to arise in the mid-1950s. 70

British Embassy – Lisbon, Aide-Memoire No.16, 14 September 1943 (NAA: A6779, 19, p.39). The Australian High Commissioner in London informed Canberra that he had assured the Portuguese Ambassador “that he could advise his Government that they need have no misapprehensions whatsoever about Portuguese Timor. The Commonwealth Government had given certain undertakings and the Portuguese Government could rest assured that we would live up to them.” – Cablegram 189, London, 21 October 1943 (NAA: A6779, 19, p.37). The “Pacific Affairs” conference in Canberra in January 1944 subsequently considered Portuguese Timor sovereignty issues – Pacific Affairs Conference, Notebook No 1, Section 1, paras 45-50 – and included “qualifications” at paras 51-53 (NAA: M2319, 4). Paragraph 26 noted: “any claim for unconditional return of the colony of Portuguese sovereignty is inadmissible”. The Portuguese account is expressed in “Timor: Semi-Official Statement”, Dr A. de Oliveira Salazar - President of the Council, Lisbon, 29 September 1945 (NAA: A981, TIM D 1 Part 2, pp.1-10; A1838, 377/3/1 Part 1, pp.215-223) and promulgated as President of the Council, Official Note Regarding Timor, 6 October 1945 in Boletim – Secretariado Nacional da Informação, Lisboa, 31 October 1945 (NAA: A1838, 377/3/1 Part 1, pp.198-205). For a discussion of plans for an Australian-based Portuguese expeditionary force (4,000-strong) to participate in the reoccupation of Portuguese Timor, see also Chamberlain, E.P., The Struggle in Iliomar, Point Lonsdale., 2008, pp.36-37; and Chamberlain, E.P., Forgotten Men …, 2010, op.cit., pp.70-72. 71 For profiles of the interned deportados, see Chamberlain, E.P., Forgotten Men …, 2010, op.cit., Annex A. 72 “Who Blundered ? Allies Rebuffed, Not Allowed to Aid War Effort”, Tribune, No.112, 3 March 1943 (NAA: A373, 3685A). 73 The Tribune, “Portuguese Exiles Need Better Deal”, Sydney, 11 January 1945 (NAA: MP742/1, 115/1/245). 74 Over 600 men, women and children were evacuated from Portuguese Timor to Australia during the War – of whom 562 were repatriated aboard the SS Angola from Newcastle on 27 November 1945. For detail on the evacuees – including those interned, see Chamberlain, E.P., Forgotten Men …, 2010, op.cit., pp.37-47 and pp.70-79. 75 Attorney-General’s Department, N.37100, Sydney, 30 November 1945 (NAA: A367, C63656, p.29).

17 Early Indonesian Views on Portuguese Timor – “Incorporation” In the last months of World War II, the Japanese actively encouraged, and organised, Indonesian nationalists in seeking independence from the Netherlands. Mohammad Yamin, as a member of the Body for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence (Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia BPUPKI), produced a paper on 31 May 1945 on the “Territory of Indonesia” that included the proposal to incorporate Portuguese Timor as part of a future independent Indonesia.76 On 11 July 1945, Sukarno – soon to be Indonesia’s first President, expressed his view: “I am 100 % in agreement with the view held by Mr Yamin” ie with Mohammad Yamin’s “Pan-Malay” proposal including the inclusion of Portuguese Timor.77 Following Indonesia’s independence, Mohammad Yamin continued his call for the incorporation of Portuguese Timor – including through his newspaper “Mimbah Indonesia”.78 However, in a speech in Jogjakarta on 20 July 1953, President Sukarno declared that the Republic of Indonesia had made no demands for, nor was she striving for, the inclusion of Portuguese Timor - but only West Irian.79 Later as Education Minister, Mohammad Yamin modified his position, by declaring that Indonesia did “not lay any claim” to Portuguese Timor80. However, in late 1957, the issue of Portuguese Timor’s possible incorporation into Indonesia was again raised during Constituent Assembly deliberations in Jakarta on the definition of “Indonesian territory”. “All parties were of course agreed that Indonesian territory included West Irian and representatives from certain other parties, viz: Murba (Trotskyist) and I.P.K.I. (Proclamation of the Upholders of Indonesian Independence) Parties, suggested that the definition of Indonesian territory include the British territories in Borneo and Portuguese Timor. … They based their arguments for these claims on the fact that the divisions in Borneo and in Timor were made under colonial regimes without references to the people concerned and without 76

A copy of the paper, “The Territory of Indonesia”, can be found at NAA: A1838, 3034/7/1 Part 5. The paper and Mohammad Yamin’s “incorporationist” views - ie to include Portuguese Timor, were first publicly reported in Australia in an article titled “All New Guinea in Indonesian Wartime Hopes” in The Sydney Morning Herald, Sydney, 20 June 1959. Earlier suggestions of Indonesian suzerainty over Timor during the Sriwijaya and Majapahit empires are related in Nahar, M., “Some Historical Notes on Timor”, Home News/Feature, Jakarta, 15 October 1975, pp.12-14 and 16 October 1975, pp.11-13 (NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1 Part 3). For the Apodeti’s political party’s reference to a Majapahit’s suzerainty over Timor see footnote 860. 77 Record of the Meeting of the Committee held on 11 July 1945, p.5. Sukarno noted however that the “hands of the Imperial Japanese Government will decide what shall form the future state of Indonesia.” (NAA: A1838, 3034/7/1 Part 5). A modern “Pan-Malay” or Melayu Raya (Greater Malay) movement was founded in Kuala Lumpur by Ibrahim Yaacob/Yaakub in 1938 as the Kesatuan Melayu Muda (KMM – Malay Youth Union). Under Japanese military auspices, Yaacob met with Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta in Taiping (Perak, Malaya) in mid-August 1945 – but the movements Melayu Raya and Indonesian Raya did not merge. Yaacob fled to Indonesia in late August 1945, became a supporter of President Sukarno, died in 1979 and is buried in the Heroes’ Cemetery at Kalibata (Jakarta). 78 Mohammad Yamin - when the former Finance Minister, urged incorporation of Portuguese Timor in speeches on 22 June 1952 (Summary of World Broadcasts, 1 July 1952) and in Makassar on 26 August 1952 (Digest of Events in Indonesia, No 57). 79 Digest of Events in Indonesia, No 55, 31 July 1952. 80 On Minister Yamin’s statement in Kupang on 29 January 1954 see Antara, Jakarta, 30 January 1954 as reported in Australian Embassy – Jakarta, Memo 121, 30 January 1954 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 1); and also The Times of Indonesia, 1 February 1954, p.4. In a speech on 28 October 1958, Yamin declared: “Greater Indonesia has a wider territory and greater authority than the former Dutch East Indies” – Persbiro Indonesia, 3516A, 29 October 1958 (NAA: A1838, 303/4/1/1 Part 2). However, for a subsequent repudiation by Foreign Minister Subandrio of an “incorporationist” remark by Yamin in Bandung in February 1960 see footnote 611.

18 the true interests of both Borneo and Timor being taken into account. Nevertheless the Constituent Assembly did not accept these arguments … .”81 A Rebellion and “Massacre” in Lospalos ? A small number of Indonesian sources82 refer to a “Lospalos Rebellion 19451949” (for location, see map on front cover - Lospalos/Los Palos replaced Vila Nova Malaca/Lautém as the capital of the Lautém Circunscrição in 1946). These sources also claim that the Portuguese authorities put down the “Rebellion” and perpetrated a “Lospalos Massacre” – but no detail is offered on these alleged events. Discussions with elders in Lospalos in 2008 did not corroborate the foregoing Indonesian claims of a “rebellion” or “massacre” in the area in the period 1945-1949.83 Undoubtedly, some retribution was taken in the Lospalos area by the Portuguese on their return to power as - for example, on 15 November 1942, the Portuguese Administrator of the Lautém Circunscrição, Manuel de Barros, his wife, and three Portuguese civilians had been killed by Timorese collaborators incited by the Japanese military.84 A “border rebellion” ? – and Japanese Collaborators According to an Indonesian press item, an uprising against the Portuguese broke out in the border area in 1945: “At the same time as the independence revolution of the Indonesian Republic in 1945, there was also an uprising against the Portuguese authorities led by Bere Pak and Bele Boa from Lakus and Hoololo. This revolt was quelled by the Portuguese colonial authorities, and thousands of people – including Bere Pak and Bele Boa, fled as refugees into Indonesian Timor, and to this day remain in the Kabupaten ((Regency)) of Belu.”85 Following the end of the war in the Pacific, the Portuguese re-established administration and control in their colony of Timor in September 1945 – although 81

Australian Embassy - Jakarta, Memo 1733, 29 November 1957 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 4). The Constituent Assembly unanimously resolved to define Indonesian territory as “all area belonging to the former Dutch East Indies at the moment of the outbreak of the Pacific War in December 1941” ie not including Portuguese Timor. The Constituent Assembly was dissolved on 5 July 1959. 82 Soekanto, Integrasi – Kebulatan Tekad Rakyat Timor Timur (Integration - The Determined Will of the People of East Timor), Yayasan Parakesit, Jakarta, 1976, p.75 – this publication, which includes an introduction by Lieutenant General Yoga Soegomo, the Head of the Indonesian State Intelligence Coordination Agency ie Bakin, claims the “Rebellion” was inspired by Indonesia’s proclamation of independence and its participants sought integration with Indonesia – p.79. The claims of a “Lospalos Rebellion 1945-1949” and a “Massacre” are repeated in Rusdie, H., Suratama K. & Soares, A.J.O., Perjuangan Kemerdekaan Rakyat Timor Loro Sa’e, 1997 at p.20 and p.27. A “Lospalos rebellion” is also mentioned briefly at p.37 in Cruz, F.X. Lopes da, Kesaksian – Aku dan Timor Timur (A Testimony – East Timor and I), Yayasan Tunas Harapan Timor Lorosae, 1999, Jakarta. 83 Author’s discussions with Justino Valentim – former CNRT official and local historian/linguist, Lospalos, 27-30 October 2008. 84 Duarte, a Timorese collaborator, reportedly replaced Barros. For World War II events in Lautém, see Chamberlain E.P., 2004, The Struggle …, op.cit., 2008, pp.28-35. A “Portuguese half-caste” who was “responsible for Timorese collaboration in the Lautém area … received a sentence of 10 years – the evidence available did not allow for a heavier sentence”: see Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 12/1/1, 8 February 1954 (NAA: A1838, 3038/7/1 Part 1). 85 Soamole, A.D., “Persatuan Timor-Timur – Kembalinya Si Anak Hilang, Antara, Jakarta, 22 July 1976, p.71 in Dokumentasi – Kliping tentang Integrasi Timor Timur 1976 (I), 68/P/XI/1983, CSIS, Jakarta, November 1983.

19 precluded by the victorious Allies from participating in the ceremony for the surrender of regional Japanese forces in Kupang.86 On their return to power, the Portuguese also dealt with Timorese who had collaborated with the Japanese – particularly those who had been involved in killings of Portuguese officials and civilians.87 In early April 1946, the Governor reportedly ordered the imprisonment of 1,150 people accused of war crimes.88 This included some members of Portuguese Timor’s “Arab” community – “who had been forced to assist the Japanese as soldiers, police and interpreters … and who were imprisoned for several years … ((ie postWWII by the Portuguese authorities as Japanese collaborators)) on Ataúro and at Ainaro.”89 At the end of World War II, a number of Timorese who had collaborated with the Japanese in Portuguese Timor reportedly fled to Dutch Timor and settled in the border districts. In May 1946, the Australian Consul, Group Captain C. Eaton, reported “250 natives who collaborated with the Japanese have recently been deported to Kambing Island”90 (ie Ataúro). He also noted that the Fronteira Circunscrição “was the Province where most of the collaboration with the Japanese occurred and, according to the Portuguese, was caused by the infiltration of natives from Dutch Timor.”91 86

Japanese Surrender – Arrangements in Respect of Portuguese Timor (NAA: A1838, TS377/3/3/2 Part 1). Portuguese Governor Carvalho took “control” of the remaining 110 Japanese troops in Portuguese Timor on 5 September 1945, but the surrender of all Japanese military forces in Timor was taken by an Allied officer (Australian Brigadier L.G.H. Dyke – Commander Timforce) in Kupang on 11 September. On 12 September, Lisbon advised that Portugal was “unable to assent” to the landing of Australian troops in Dili. However, Brigadier Dyke and his party travelled to Dili on 23 September, advised Governor Carvalho of the surrender arrangements concluded in Kupang, and assumed control of the Japanese military in Portuguese Timor. A detailed description of events can be found in Forsyth, W.D. (political advisor to Brigadier Dyke), “Timor – II: The World of Dr. Evatt”, New Guinea, Australia, the Pacific and South East Asia, May/June 1975, pp. 31-37 (NAA: A1838, 3038/1/1 Part 2, pp.82-88). A Portuguese Expeditionary Force – commanded by Brigadier Roque de Sequeira Varejão, arrived in Dili on 27-29 September 1945 (aboard the naval sloops Gonçalves Zarco and Bartolomeu Dias; and the merchant vessel N/M Angola – with "2,223 troops, including infantry and artillery”) Bessa, C., A libertação de Timor na II Guerra Mundial: importãncia dos Açores para os interesses dos Estados Unidos: subsídios históricos, Academia Portuguesa da Historia, Lisboa, 1992. The N/M Sofala arrived in Dili on 9 October 1945 with the 10th Companhia de Caçadores Indígena (Mozambique) which moved to Bobonaro to control the border area. 87 Brigadier Varejão reportedly “conquered the capital Dili and led a second military expedition into the interior of Portuguese Timor.” 88 Cardoso, A.M., Timor na 2ª Guerra Mundial …, op.cit., 2007, p.118. For collaborators, see also footnotes 35, 36, 82-83, 156, 157. 89 Bazher, A.B., Islam di Timor Timur, Gema Insani Press, Jakarta, 1995, pp. 40-41 lists 19 men of the Islamic faith who, “together with others”, were detained and reportedly mistreated. 90 Australian Consulate – Dili, Despatch No 1, 5 May 1946 (NAA: A1838, 377/1/3 Part 3). See also his earlier “Report on Portuguese Timor”, 20 February 1946, p.7 (NAA: A1838, 376/1/1). According to Relatorio sobre os tribunais judiciais de Timor, only 45 cases were processed against Timorese collaborators in 1946 – increasing to 243 in 1947 and 372 in 1948, then declining to 78 in 1949, 70 in 1950 and 56 in 1951 (email to author from Takahashi Shigehito, 26 June 2008). By early 1954, according to the Chief Justice of Portuguese Timor, about 1,000 Timorese who had collaborated with the Japanese had been tried and sentenced – most of whom had been associated with massacres at Aileu, Ermera and Lautém. A further 100 were awaiting trial – see Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 12/1/1, 8 February 1954 (NAA: A1838, 3038/7/1 Part 1). For articles on administration and society in Portuguese Timor immediately post-WWII, see Landman, J.R. & Plant H.T., “Notes on Portuguese Timor I & II”, Vol 2 No 11 & Vol 3 No 1; South Pacific, Sydney, August & September 1948 (NAA: A1838, 376/1/1). 91 Australian Consulate – Dili, Despatch No 2, 19 May 1946 (NAA: A1838, 377/1/3 Part 3). In late August 1942, the tribes of Maubisse – reportedly inspired by Japanese propaganda, rebelled against the

20 Increased Native Head Tax – and Discontent The Australian Consul reported in early December 1946 that “the initial enthusiasm of the natives to the Portuguese Authorities, which was very evident after the Japanese occupation, is now on the wane. This is on account of the head tax imposition of 16 patacas per year ((about ₤1.5.-. per year)). After what had been said by the Portuguese Authorities when they again took over the Administration of the Colony, the amount of the tax has come as a shock and grumblings can be distinctly heard. However, there is no organised opposition to the tax at the present time.”92 Following a visit to the western districts, the Consul reported that: “Approximately 50% of the natives in the districts visited have paid their taxes, but considerable difficulty is being experienced by district administrative officers in the collection of the outstanding taxes. Some natives have gone bush to avoid payment and others are brought before the Chefes de Postos for explanations regarding nonpayment. In some districts many natives who have not made their payment were stated to be bad men who cooperated with the Japanese during the war and they receive corporal punishment for non-payment.”93 The Consul also reported that, west of Dili: “During 1948 most of the able-bodied males from Maubara crossed the border to avoid ‘voluntary’ labour on the construction of a new road. The road was completed by women and children under police guard.”94 The Proposed “Nova Dili” In January 1947, Acting Governor Óscar Freira de Vasconcelos Ruas95 directed the re-establishment of the town of Dili - ie as “Nova Dili”, at Cutulau on the hills to the south at a height of 800 metres above-sea-level (ASL). Governor Ruas cited Dili’s “completamente destruida” during the War - and the need for a more Portuguese and killed the Chefe de Posto, Francisco Martins Coelho and two deportados: José Faria Braga and Fernando Augusto Mariz – see Carvalho, Dos Santos J., Vide e Morte …, op.cit., 1972, p.53. Portuguese-led natives from Ainaro, Same and Manatuto soon crushed the rebellion – Wray, C.C.H., Timor 1942, op.cit., 1987, pp.131-132. The Japanese subsequently instigated the massacre at Aileu of the Portuguese military commander, Captain Freire da Costa, his wife and several officials on 1-2 October 1942 – see preceding footnotes 59-63. 92 Australian Consulate – Dili, Despatch No.16, 4 December 1946 (NAA: A1838, 377/1/3 Part 1) and paraphrased in Intelligence Digest No.13, 25 March 1947 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 1). The “Regulations of Census and Native Head Tax” were included as an attachment from the Consul’s Despatch No.2 of 26 February 1947 – the Regulations included the four cumulative criteria by which some natives could be classified as “similar to Europeans” and the ten categories of exemption. The Consul noted that the head tax was 14 and 16 patacas per annum “according to the district in which the natives reside.” (NAA: A1838, 377/1/3 Part 1; 3038/2/1 Part 1). In mid-1948, in a total native population of 420,430 - 105,273 were enrolled for the native head tax with a further 22,948 exempt: Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 53, 15 March 1949 (NAA: A1838, 3038/1/1 Part 1). The “pre-war” head/poll tax was “a basic rate of 6 patacas per annum. Besides this, coolies working for employers other than the government, pay an additional 5 patacas, thus making a total of 11 patacas per annum. Besides this again, higher-paid workers such as in-door servants pay another five patacas as ‘Professional Tax’, making a total of 16 patacas per annum. The wages of a coolie are 3 to 4 patacas a month, plus his food. … in terms of sterling, the pataca is equal to about 1s 2 ½ d officially, and procurable as low as 11d on the black market.” - Archer, C.H. (British Consul-General, Taiwan), Report on Portuguese Timor, Canberra, 3 May 1941, para 31-34. (NAA: A981, TIM D 1 Part 2. pp.3876). 93 Australian Consulate – Dili, Despatch No.17, 18 December 1946 (NAA: A1838, 377/1/3 Part 1). 94 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 221, 20 December 1949 – the Consul added that “the men are now returning.” (NAA: A1838, 378/15/3) 95 Governor Óscar Freire Vasconcelos Ruas was appointed on 23 June 1946.

21 healthy locality (“local salubre”).96 Most of the commercial infrastructure and activities however, were to remain in the "old" Dili by the bay. However, during the 1950s, the plan faltered - and central Dili remained at its 1769 location. Concern at “Indonesian Nationalism” In April 1947, following a discussion with Governor Óscar Ruas, the Australian Consul reported that: “His Excellency is also very much concerned with Dutch Timor; he feels keenly the possibility of Indonesian nationalist agitation in the Dutch colony spreading to Portuguese Timor and he is very anxious to avoid this if possible, however, up to the present time there is no indication of any special steps being taken with the exception of strengthening the frontier province guard.” 97 A few months later, in August 1947, the Australian Embassy in The Hague advised the Australian Department of External Affairs in Canberra of a “strictly confidential report” that the Netherlands Government had approached the Portuguese Government to enlist “their support in the prevention of any possible anti-Dutch propaganda in Timor ((ie Netherlands “West Timor”)). It would appear that the Dutch fear agent provocateurs from the Indonesian Republic will launch a campaign of incitement against the Dutch among the Timorese and that they will possibly conduct their activities from the Portuguese part of Timor. … The Portuguese, possibly fearing repercussions in their territory, readily agreed and even advanced a proposal of joint action by the combined gendarmeries, should trouble occur in any part of Timor, whether Dutch or Portuguese. This proposal was regarded by the Dutch Government as too drastic and negotiations are still proceeding. The Dutch hope for an agreement in line with their original approach.”98 Soon after, the recently-arrived Australian Consul in Dili discussed the matter with Governor Óscar Ruas who dismissed the report - noting that he “had no doubt whatsoever of the loyalty of the Timorese to the Portuguese and, in support of this, quoted that all taxes have been collected where resistance might be most expected – that is in Oecussi and the Fronteira circumscription.”99 In August 1947, the Portuguese Administrator in the Oecusse enclave sent an urgent message to Dili stating that some “Japanese and Javanese had entered his territory from Dutch Timor and asked for soldiers and machine guns” (ie the Oecusse Administrator asked Dili for Portuguese reinforcements to be sent to Oecusse).100 In response, two aircraft (an Anson and a Dragon) - carrying military personnel and machine guns, were hastily despatched from Dili to Oecusse on the morning of 19 August. No contact was made with the party of “Japanese and Javanese” in Oecusse – 96 BOdT, No.4, Portaria 1:177 (signed 5 April 1946), 25 January 1947, pp.23-24. The Portaria cited Decreto No.35:048 of 22 October 1945 and included a short history of earlier attempts to relocate Dili due to problems of sanitation – and the “80 percent incidence of paludismo ((malaria)) among workers”. “Delli” had been cited in Joseph Conrad’s 1915 novel “Victory: An Island Tale” (Chapter 2) as: “that highly pestilential place” and “a god-forsaken spot”. “Nova Dili” was to be in the hills about 16km by road from the port. In late December 1941, malaria was “rife” among Australian troops in the Dili area – until they were moved to the higher altitude of Railaco – Wray, C.C.H., Timor 1942, pp.3132; AWM54, 571/3/3 Part 4; MP508/1, 211/776/101. 97 Australian Consulate – Dili, Despatch No. 6, 27 April 1947 (NAA: A1838, 377/1/3 Part 1). 98 Australian Embassy – Den Haag, Ministerial Despatch 26/47, 8 October 1947 (NAA: A1838, 378/15/3). 99 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 151, 26 November 1947 (NAA: A1838, 378/15/3). 100 Australian Consulate – Dili, Ministerial Despatch No. 4/47, 19 August 1947 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 1).

22 however, a Japanese officer from a party of POW escapees from Kupang was later captured west of Liquiça.101 Post-war, security remained a concern in Portuguese Timor. The first “postwar” Timorese infantry company, 230-strong, was recruited from 1,000 volunteers in November 1947, with the flag swearing-in ceremony on 29 March 1948.102 However, it was reliably reported that “eight companies, fully trained and equipped are held in readiness in Lourenço Marques ((Mozambique)) to meet any contingency that may arise in any Portuguese colony.”103 In September 1948, wharf labourers in Kupang (West Timor) went on strike demanding higher pay – and this delayed the arrival of the routinely-scheduled Dutch ship to Dili. Portuguese authorities reportedly concealed news of this industrial unrest in Kupang lest it influence workers in Dili. The Australian Consul reported: “The Governor has always expressed himself as being convinced of the complete loyalty of the natives, but statements made at the recent ceremony of swearing-in the flag of the 2nd Timorese infantry company indicate that he may now be entertaining some doubts. His argument was that if the natives are loyal, troops are unnecessary, whereas if they are not, two or three companies would be quite adequate. Emphasis was given to this later by an incomplete and perhaps thoughtless remark by the Governor’s aide-de-camp – ‘If we have trouble with the natives, as we may …’. My own impression is that the natives are unlikely to resist the Portuguese, even though they may resent individual administrators or Chefe de Posto, unless they were roused and organized by an outsider. This view may be held by some of the Portuguese themselves, as I was told by the Administrator of Dili that Murjani was under constant supervision because of his suspected connection with the Indonesians. Illiteracy would probably be a factor also – I have heard of an estimate, which is probably high, that 10% of the natives are literate to some extent, although it has been suggested that the Chinese keep the natives informed about international developments. If this is really so, the meaning of international political developments should probably be limited to the possibility of war. ”104 Incursion Fears on the South Coast – “Incidente Vicarda” A few years later, a brief scare in Portuguese Timor saw large numbers of troops deployed to the south coast to repel a feared foreign military incursion. In early March 1950, the Portuguese authorities in Dili received reports of landings from a 101

Australian Consulate – Dili, Ministerial Despatch No. 6/47, 16 September 1947 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 1). 102 For information on the “pre-war” Timorese company, see Lambert, E.T. (British Consul, Batavia), Report on Portuguese Timor, Batavia, 18 December 1937, para 95 (NAA: A981, TIM P 4 Part 2; A1838, 376/1/1); and for its capability and equipment, see Archer, C.H. (British Consul-General, Taiwan), Report on Portuguese Timor, Canberra, 3 May 1941, paras 121-124 (NAA: A981, TIM D 1 Part 2. pp.38-76). 103 Australian Consulate – Dili, Ministerial Despatch No.15/48, 25 April 1948 (NAA: A5954, 2269/4). In mid-1949, two Timorese companies were prepared for movement to Macau following the Communist Chinese advance to Nanking. However, in July 1949, the “Macau task” was reportedly undertaken by an “expeditionary force” from Portugal and troops from Angola. 104 Australian Consulate – Dili, Departmental Despatch No. 21/48, 27 October 1948 (NAA: A5954, 2269/4). “Murjani” is not identified – however, it is likely that Murjani was a businessman or trader with a British India or Goan background.

23 submarine on the south coast of “80-150 Indonesian and Dutch troops”.105 Armed Portuguese reinforcements were flown to the Viqueque and Barique regions - about 160 km east-southeast of Dili, and Governor Óscar Ruas also flew to the area to manage the response. Local Timorese chiefs “guaranteed not only the existence of an armed group – they indicated various numbers from a hundred to many hundreds – of whom twenty five were Europeans, white and blonde … they were convinced that these were Dutchmen.”106 The Governor added that “the information came from natives of different regions and was in agreement in all points and so could not have been invented, not even by the fertile imagination of the Timorese.” Military detachments, including Timorese troops and police, were deployed to search for the reported intruders: from Viqueque – a platoon of regular troops and 150 moradores107; from Barique – a force including companies from Manatuto and Lacló; and from Alas and Fato-Berliu – native troops from the Circunscrição of Suro with 140 armed moradores and a platoon of regular troops. The Governor also dispatched a request to Lisbon that the Minister for Overseas Territories arrange “to despatch as soon as possible a Portuguese warship from those which are stationed at Macau to keep watch on the coast and, above all, the south coast.”108 However, despite over two weeks of extensive searches, no trace was found of the alleged “foreign military force”, and the Portuguese troops and Timorese auxiliaries returned to their home bases by 6 April 1950.109 The Australian Consul cited a senior Portuguese official who, after “close questioning of natives from Barique and Viqueque”, opined that “if foreigners had landed in those districts, they would be hidden by the natives out of resentment against the administrator ((of Viqueque)) Peão. Peão has long been notorious for his harsh, if not brutal administration, and has apparently incurred greater resentment recently by rifling natives’ tombs for gold ornaments. As a result, the natives are in a frame of mind to welcome any foreigners who promised improved conditions.”110 However, the Portuguese concerns may not have been unfounded. It appears that there may have been brief incursions by a small group of Indonesians in December 1949 and March 1950. A former Portuguese deportado living near the south coast at Alas later admitted meeting six or seven Indonesians at these times – 105

Australian Consulate – Dili, Cable I.4230, 22 March 1950 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 1; A5954, 2269/4). In a memorandum (23 May 1950) to the Australian Minister of External Affairs, his Department noted the “infiltration” and advised that such “underlines the need for interest by Australia in this island” (NAA: A1838, 377/3/1 Part 1). 106 Ruas, Ó. F., de V. Governor & Ferreira, M. Secretary, Act No.5 – Extra-ordinary Session of the Government Advisor Board, Dili, 23 March 1950. This four-page document details the Government’s reaction and authorises an allocation of 50,000 patacas for the operation (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 1). Governor Ruas’ correspondence of 23 and 29 March 1950 is available at Gunter, J., Haree Ba Uluk (blogsite), 23 March 2004 – which describes the event as the “Incidente Vicarda.” 107 Moradores were “native troops enlisted by the kingdoms (“reinos”) and equipped by the chiefs (“chefes”) - Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., p.33, footnote 1. 108 Ruas, Ó. F., de V. Governor & Ferreira, M., Secretary, op.cit., p.3. 109 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo, 12 April 1950 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 1).The Incidente Vicarda event has also been cited as the “pro-Indonesian revolt at Vicarda in 1950” – at footnote 1 in Fernandes, M.S., “A União da República de Timor: o atrófico movimento nacionalista islâmico-malaio Timorense, 1960-1975” at pp.355-431 in Guedes, A.M. & Mendes N.C. (eds), Ensaios sobre nacionalismos em Timor-Leste, Collecção Biblioteca Diplomática do MNE – Série A, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros Portugal, Lisbon, 2005. 110 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 70, 8 May 1950 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 1). “Peão” was Adminstrator Manuel Dias Peão (b. 23 October 1920) appointed as the Secretário in Viqueque in November 1946 – and who subsequently served in Dili from May 1956 and was appointed the Administrator of the Suro Circunscrição in late April 1958.

24 and a “native chief, who was completely loyal to the Portuguese during the last war, corroborated the story under torture.”111 Governor Óscar Ruas returned to Portugal on 6 June 1950, and an Acting Governor officiated until the arrival of his replacement, Captain César Maria de Serpa Rosa, on 31 December 1950. The Australian Consul in Dili provided a nine–page critique to Canberra on “The Administration of Governor Óscar Ruas” noting: “… there is no denying the Governor’s zeal and very real interest in the Colony, … Without question he has been the hardest working official in the Colony. … For dealing with the native population as a whole, the system of divide and rule has been adopted. Rather than attempt to settle tribal or district rivalries, these are actively encouraged. Exploitation of the natives by administrators and lower officials is widespread, and in most cases provides the means for the transference of money … The wretched physical condition of many natives is clear evidence of a very low standard of living. … It is not surprising therefore, that the administrator with the longest experience in the Colony once gave the opinion that, in an emergency, the Portuguese could count on the loyalty of only 10% of the natives. To my mind the lack of organization and initiative amongst the natives would suggest a much higher figure, although there is no lack of reason for discontent.”112 In 1950, the population of Portuguese Timor was officially reported as 442, 378 – of whom 7,471 were classified as “civilized” (1.7 percent) and 434,907 as “non-civilized” (98.3 percent).113 During an interview in Canberra on 1951, the visiting Governor of Portuguese Timor - Captain César Maria de Serpa Rosa, explained to the Secretary of the Department of External Affairs that: “he was confident that, up to the present, there had been no Indonesian infiltration into Portuguese Timor. … The Governor stressed his assurances in this regard by referring to the small size of the colony which made it possible for the Governor to be informed of day-to-day activities throughout the country, and to the fact that his predecessor in office had concentrated particularly on native affairs.”114 A “Secret War” in Portuguese Timor ? In mid-1951, an Australian weekly magazine published an article alleging that a “Secret War” was being waged in Portuguese Timor against Indonesiansupported guerrillas:

111

Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 74, 10 May 1950 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 1). Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 3/50, 14 June 1950 (NAA: A1838, 378/3/1). 113 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 34/52, 23 July 1952 citing Government figures for the 1950 “general census” presented to the visiting Portuguese “Minister for Overseas” in May 1952 (NAA: A1838, 3038/1/1 Part 1). Of the total population of 442,378, the “civilized” population (1.7 percent) comprised: “568 Whites; 1,541 Timorese; 2,022 Mixed; 3,128 Asiatics; 110 Arabs, 48 Indians; and 54 Negroes” – while the “non-civilized population” (98.3 percent) numbered 434,907. A later Consulate report indicated the “Indonesian population of Portuguese Timor” as “possibly about 100 of the Islamic faith referred to as Arabs … mostly engaged in the piecegoods trade. … There are a few real Malay types originally from Kupang but there would not be more than 30 of these …” – Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 68/54, 23 February 1954 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 1). 114 Department of External Affairs - Canberra, Interview (Extract) – Indonesian Infiltration, 27 April 1951 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 1). 112

25 “A strict news censorship has kept quiet the guerilla battles that have flared up continuously there since the end of the war and only Portugal’s top officials know the full facts. … The sporadic flareups have devastated the land. … Two-thirds of the reinforcements sent last summer from Mozambique to Macao were diverted to Dilli to strengthen the battle-tried garrison on the island. Another 4000 have just been despatched. There are no signs that the fighting will fizzle out or decrease in ferocity. The guerillas are well supplied with instructors and arms. Reinforcements are regularly sluiced [sic] across the Indonesian side of the border.”115 No other reporting – including from the Australian Consulate in Dili, indicates any such conflict in Portuguese Timor in the immediate post-War years. As noted in the preceding paragraphs, there had been “incursion fears on the south coast” in early 1950 - and forces were mobilised by the Dili authorities in response. However, no trace was ever found of the alleged foreign military incursion. It is possible that the aberrant and inaccurate “Secret War” article may have been catalysed by the claims of 1950 – and extensively “embroidered” by its author. Relations with Indonesia – Major Meneses Recalled In mid and late 1953, there were several clashes in the border area - with Indonesian military elements reportedly firing on Portuguese Angolan troops who returned fire. The Portuguese Army commander, Major Arnaldo Dionisio Carneiro de Sousa e Meneses, replaced the Angolan troops with Timorese soldiers in the “25 mile strip” adjacent to the border to reduce tension and, in his reports to the Minister of Defence in Lisbon, requested that the Army’s strength in Portuguese Timor be increased from about 900 to 2,000 - and that Portuguese African troops be equipped with sub-machine guns.116 However on 3 January 1954, at the request of Governor Serpa Rosa, Major Meneses was recalled from Timor. According to the Chief Justice of the Colony, Major Meneses was “too militaristic for the political situation on the border and went out of his way to antagonise the Indonesians with whom at present the country is enjoying reasonably cordial relations. Major Meneses also mixed politics with soldiering and His Excellency the Governor had no option but to request his recall.” 117 Chinese Communists ? Communist-inspired unrest does not appear to have been a significant concern for the authorities in Portuguese Timor.118 The few Portuguese political deportados in the Province119 were controlled and mostly lived in the rural areas.

115

Feldman, F., “Portugal’s Secret War”, The World’s News, Sydney, 7 July 1951, p.3. The World’s News was published in the period from 1901 to 1955. 116 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo, 27 December 1953 (NAA: A1838, TS656/1/2/3). 117 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 4/54, 5 January 1954 (NAA: A1838, TS656/1/2/3). 118 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 93/55, 6 April 1955 (NAA: A1838, 3038/10/11/2) commenting on a fanciful press item by Hogg, L., “Portuguese make sure TIMOR too happy for Reds”, Courier Mail, Brisbane, 6 March 1955 (also published in newspapers in Sydney and Melbourne). 119 The status of Portuguese Timor changed from a colony to an overseas province/territory on 11 June 1951. In 1949, two years earlier, Portugal had ceased exiling political deportados to Portuguese Timor. In December 1960, the United Nations General Assembly declared Portugal’s overseas provinces,

26 However, in 1954, the Consul for Nationalist China (Taiwan) in Dili complained to the Governor that the leading Chinese merchants in Portuguese Timor were communists – although the Consul was unable to provide any evidence for his accusations.120 In mid-July 1956, the Nationalist Chinese Government in Taipeh despatched a “Special Envoy” to Dili to investigate these charges. After a month-long investigation, the Envoy found no evidence of communist leanings – and the Chinese Consul - described as “an eccentric scholar”, was recalled to Taiwan. The Australian Consul reported that the Chinese were “strongly in favour of Nationalist China” – while there was “only a hint” that “there are perhaps a few Chinese Communists, they do not reside in Dili, but in the interior, where they are in business.”121 Australian Government officials however, were wary of the potential for communist infiltration into Timor. An intelligence assessment of November 1954 reviewed the situation in both Indonesian and Portuguese Timor and concluded: “there is no internal security problem in either part. However, two Area Commanders in the Eastern Indonesian Territorial Command are known to have pro-Communist leanings and the possibility should not be excluded of these Commanders conniving at a revolt against Central Government control.”122 Portuguese Timor - Malay, Mestiço123 and Workers’ Grievances In mid-1954, the Australian Consul in Dili prepared a memorandum – “Portuguese Timor – Political”, that described an emerging discontent among some groups in Dili. The Consul related that: “the Malay and Malay-speaking population of Portuguese Timor – a relatively small percentage of course – can be said to have some knowledge of the political scene in South and South East Asia, and are in general a fairly intelligent class of people. Some members of this section of the community have made frequent contact with the Consul for Indonesia. … ((They)) usually work as mechanics and truck drivers for the Government and commercial circles. However there is not always full employment for these people, except during the coffee season, and at times their living is very precarious indeed. There have been reports over the past two weeks, passed to me in strict confidence, that some of these subjects harbour animosity towards the local Government, and have on occasion expressed their grievances to the Consul for Indonesia. Further, that this section of the community is joined by the many poorer class of half caste ((mestiço/mestizo)), born in Timor, who in many cases obtain only temporary employment with the Government as occasion offers, and when no such Government employment is offering take odd jobs as may be available. The general complaint from this section of the half caste community is that without permanent Government employment, including Timor, to be “non-self-governing territories” – 15th Session, Agenda Item 38, Resolution A/HES/1542 (W) of 21 December 1960 (NAA: A4359, 221/5/19). 120 A Chinese Consulate was established in Dili in late October 1947 – but closed briefly in mid-May 1950 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/5/1). For the Chinese Consul’s complaint, see also Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 9, 23 June 1954 (NAA: A11604, 605/15). The Chinese population in the mid-1950s was about 3,800. Most Chinese were of Kek (Hakka) ethnicity from Canton and Macau. 121 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 182/56, 28 August 1956 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/2/2). 122 Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), “Strategic Importance of Timor – Appreciation”, Canberra, 11 November 1954, paragraph 7 (NAA: A1838, 383/7/1 - and papers in A7942, P62). 123 As detailed at footnote 113, official Portuguese Timor population statistics for 1950 showed a “Civilised Population” of 7,471 – including “2,022 Mixed” - ie Mestiço/Mestizo (malae oan in Tetum).

27 they can have no fixed livelihood, that the Government continues to bring out Portuguese from Portugal for work which could and should be done by many of these half castes. Actually, the complaint from these people extends somewhat deeper within the country’s political scene, in the sense of the following: ‘… the indigenous native still continues to pay head tax and is still conscripted for cheap labour …should there at anytime be a plebiscite as to the continuance under Portuguese rule, or otherwise, the indigenous native would vote to come within the framework of Indonesia …’.” However, in reference to the above quote from an unidentified source, the Australian Consul added that he “would most certainly discount the opinion regarding a plebiscite, which I believe exists only in the disgruntled and unhappy minds of this section of people, who are at times living under conditions which, according to their own standards, are not compatible with their rights and dues … However, whilst appreciating that the behaviour and loyalties of some native elements … is perhaps at best an uncertain quantity in regard to some of them in times of emergency and stress, the present circumstances of those who inhabit Portuguese Timor is satisfactory if one thinks only in terms of physical well being, food and other requirements to their particular standard. It would not be so regarded by other Asian peoples who have gained independence of course.”124 A year later in 1955, the Australian Consul in Dili reported on a similar theme that: “It has recently been confirmed beyond any reasonable doubt that the local Authority has introduced certain repressive measures designed to stifle free expression of thought, in open discussion, if relating to local political, social or economic conditions in Portuguese Timor … particularly in regard to social conditions and benefits for lower category employees. … The poorer class of Portuguese, chiefly half-castes, are employed in what is regarded by them as insufficiently paid positions and their living conditions are certainly not very good. It is understood that the repressive measures take the form of a stern warning to a person or persons concerned whose expressed opinions have come under notice, and in future to avoid discussions of a political nature if connected with Portuguese affairs. … There has been no suggestion, so far, that communism is involved in anti-government statements which may have been expressed by certain people – merely a criticism of their lot and the belief that their conditions of pay and advancement and living could and should be better. … The number of disgruntled persons are few indeed, there are no secondary industries in Portuguese Timor which, if they did exist would employ numbers of workers, amongst which it could be expected that some political activity would eventually emerge … Furthermore, the indigenous native is very primitive, and it is usually considered that his intelligence is far below that which would be required to absorb communist doctrines or any other form of political thought. … he is generally regarded as a very loyal person and obedient to the Native Chiefs who in turn are responsible to the Administration. The loyalty of these Native Chiefs is unquestioned. … However, it is known that the local government is apprehensive in regard to

124

Australian Consulate – Dili, Despatch No 9, 23 June 1954 (NAA: A11604, 605/15; TS656/1/2/3).

28 communist activity and anti-colonial feelings in Indonesia and elsewhere in South East Asia.”125 The Portuguese Government’s concern was evidenced in the 1955 budget for the Province that included funding for the establishment in Portuguese Timor of the PIDE (Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado) – the regime’s secret security and intelligence agency. A PIDE staff - comprising five personnel at a salary cost of 45,600 patacas, was planned for 1956 to strengthen the existing “public security police” force in Dili of 54.126 An Appeal to President Sukarno In May 1954, President Sukarno travelled to Indonesian West Timor. During his visit to the towns of Atapupu and Atambua near the border with Portuguese Timor, “Timorese from the Portuguese half of the island” came to see the President and, after executing war dances and offering gifts, they requested Sukarno “not to forget those who were still sighing under the colonial yoke of Portugal.”127 According to a report from the Australian Consul in Dili, Sukarno “also toured the villages adjacent to the Portuguese frontier, and that during this tour he was approached by some of the native peoples from the Portuguese territory who submitted a petition inviting Indonesia to absorb the peoples of Portuguese Timor.”128 The Consul continued: “should there be any truth in the report, then the local Government would undoubtedly be aware of the fact, but there would certainly be a close blanket of secrecy imposed on those officials who had knowledge of the alleged incident, and it is the policy of the Government to endeavour to prevent all information on political matters within the province reaching outside peoples and foreign governments.” Criticisms from Jakarta In late 1954, an item in the Jakarta press warned of the strategic danger to the Republic of Indonesia presented by Portuguese Timor: “It has become clearer every day how dangerous Portuguese Timor is for the security of Indonesia, the more so after it has turned out that certain foreign powers have included Portuguese Timor in their scheme to strengthen their strategic defence systems in South East Asia. This situation has drawn the attention of the Indonesian government which is planning to take speedy steps to meet this threat.”129

125

Australian Consulate – Dili, Despatch No 3, 14 April 1955 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 1). Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 312/55, 16 November 1955 (NAA: 3038/1/1 Part 1). The PIDE proposal was based on Decree Law 39749, Lisbon, 9 August (BOdT, No.38, 18 September 1954, pp.494-500) on the “reorganization” of the PIDE service. Funding for 1956 detailed in BOdT, No.53 Suplemento, 31 December 1955, p.1044. However, a PIDE “delegation” was not established in Portuguese Timor until March 1961 – ie after the 1959 “Viqueque Rebellion”. 127 Australian Embassy – The Hague, Memo 411/54, 20 May 1954 reporting on an item in the Netherlands newspaper Het Parool (Independent Labour) of 18 May 1954 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 1). 128 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 9, 23 June 1954 (NAA: A11604, 605/15). 129 The Times of Indonesia, Jakarta, 17 December 1954 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 1). 126

29 One source of Indonesian complaint was the illicit trafficking of copra from the islands of Eastern Indonesian to Portuguese Timor - and thence to Singapore, that avoided Indonesian taxes and duties.130 In February 1954, the Australian Consul was told by the Portuguese police chief in Dili that “on one occasion there were approximately 87 Indonesian copra boats in the port and their respective crews exceeded 900 Indonesians.”131 In January 1955, following representations by the Indonesian Government, Lisbon directed the authorities in Dili to cease the clandestine copra trade by debarring further ship visits – and all copra vessels in the port were ordered to leave on 16 January. The Australian Consul commented that the cessation of the copra trade would have “a very adverse effect on the finances of the merchants of Dili … many of whom conducted a very lucrative contraband trade with the captains of the Indonesian sailing vessels … cigarettes, piece-goods, tinned goods and miscellaneous items.”132 However, copra smuggling through Portuguese Timor had reportedly all but ceased by mid-1955 following the Government’s direction.133 Visiting Indonesian copra vessels had also traded in explosives and ammunition recovered from Japanese wartime caches in north-eastern Portuguese Timor.134 The Bandung Conference – 1955 The inaugural Afro-Asian Conference hosted by Indonesia in Bandung, West Java (18-24 April 1955), is also cited as an inspiration for the nascent independence movement in Portuguese Timor – “the uprising did not just have a strong connection with the Afro-Asian Conference itself, but was a direct result of the development of the ‘Spirit of Bandung’ in the Portuguese colony.”135 Although the issue of Portuguese Timor was not formally raised at the Bandung Conference, its final communiqué declared that “colonialism in all its manifestations is an evil which should speedily be brought to an end.” 130

Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 138/51, 18 September 1951 (NAA: A1838, TS656/1/2/3) describes the illicit copra trade including the “handsome profit” of Chinese traders in Dili - and noted that “Timor’s Government finances benefit by import and export tax, and the Colony’s Financial Fund benefits … There is no doubt that the Local Authorities know what is going on but are loath to enforce laws that would make so many people unhappy.” 131 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 67/54, 23 February 1954 (NAA: A1838, 3038/4/1). The Chief of Police added that “for a day or two, he did feel a certain amount of uneasiness, because had they been in possession of a few sub-machine guns and had they been so inclined, they could have taken Dili within a few minutes. However, … in actual fact of course, they are here only for selling the copra and do not give the slightest trouble.” 132 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 12/55, 17 January 1955 (NAA: A1838, 3038/4/1; TS656/1/2/3). 133 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 356, 20 November 1957 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 1). 134 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 12/6, 23 March 1954 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 1). On 10 March 1954, the Australian Consul had visited Japanese war-time storage caves south of Venilale containing small arms ammunition and mortar bombs and reported that the Portuguese authorities were “indifferent to these stocks of ammunition” that were being traded by “Arabs in Dili” to visiting Indonesian copra boats – Australian Consulate – Dili, Cable Sav.1 I.3591, 19 March 1954 (NAA: A1838, 3038/1/1 Part 1; TS656/1/2/3). In Lautém on 15 March 1954, an Indonesian – attempting to remove “explosive charges from heavy bombs” was fatally shot by a “Portuguese constable” during a confrontation (NAA: A1838, TS656/1/2/3). 135 “Uprising” – is a reference to the subsequent “1959 Rebellion” - Rohi, P. A., “Soekarno, KAA, dan Timor-Leste”, Kongres, Jakarta, 28 April 2005 & marhaenis.org, 9 May 2005, p.1. See also Rohi, P.A., Pemberontakan Rakyat Timor Timur 1959, Mutiara, Edition 775, Jakarta, 29 August – 4 September 1995, p.14 – in which José Manuel Duarte relates that the Africa-Asia Conference’s “Deklarasi Bandung” inspired the “gerakan bawah tanah” (“underground movement”). Peter Apollonious Rohi (“Kore Rohi” - born Sabu, 14 November 1942) served in the TNI/ABRI (Marinir) before commencing a career in journalism in 1970.

30

Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai addressing the Bandung Conference According to a press report, President Sukarno arranged for three Timorese youth to travel secretly from Portuguese Timor to Bandung and attend the Conference as “observers”.136 Their participation was reportedly managed by Indonesia’s Consul in Dili, Leopoldo Lasut - and the three Timorese were reportedly “smuggled” into West Timor and then flown to Bandung. Reportedly quoting one of the observers, Marcelino, the press item related that the group met with Sukarno on the “sidelines”of the Conference and: “Bung Karno directed us to struggle for Independence – there was no order for us to integrate with the Republic of Indonesia … but we realized that it would be impossible for us to stand alone.” On their return to Timor from their reported attendance, while maintaining the secrecy of their visit, the observers reportedly joined informal antiPortuguese underground movements.137 Marcelino Guterres - Dili 2007

136

Rohi, P. A., “Soekarno …, 2005, marhaenis.org, 9 May 2005, p.2 – citing an interview with Marcelino – pictured above in 2007 (a purported “youth observer” in Bandung from Portuguese Timor), in Venilale (East Timor) in 1996; and Rohi, P.A., email to author, 19 January 2007. In the article, Rohi stated that his interview with Marcelino was “in the context of reconstructing the Viqueque Rebellion of 3 June 1959.” According to Rohi, Marcelino had brought back a “painting of President Soekarno by Basoeki Abdoellah from the 1955 Africa-Asia Conference as a souvenir” measuring about 100cm x 65cm. To date, articles/emails by P.A. Rohi are the only known written source on Marcelino and the reported visit of three Timorese youth to Bandung as observers in 1955. Rohi also briefly related Marcelino’s visit to Bandung and advice from President Sukarno in “Kemenangan Fretilin dan Dampak Politik bagi Indonesia”, Sinar Harapan, Jakarta, 5 September 2001. 137 An official Indonesian publication: Brahmana, R., Buku 20 Tahun Timor Timur Membangun, Jakarta, 1996 – makes a brief allusion to activity in this period at p.27 as follows: “In 1955 in fact, there was a planned resistance rebellion by youth in the territory in Dili. This plan was then widely spread to all the districts of the territory.” This passage is also quoted verbatim in Wila, M.R.C., Konsepsi Hukum …, Bandung, 2006. In September 1955, the Portuguese Administration reacted to

31 In 2007, the author met three times with Marcelino – ie Marcelino António Fausto Guterres138, in Dili on 3 and 10 April - and in Baucau on 28 June. Marcelino related that in 1955, the Indonesian Consul in Dili, Leopoldo Lasut, had “recruited” three “top-achieving” Timorese students to attend the 1955 Bandung Conference: Marcelino, Januario dos Reis139 and “Chiquito”140. They visited the Indonesian Consulate in Dili, completed forms and were photographed. However, they did not travel to Bandung as planned - due to “tensions between Indonesia and Portuguese Timor”. The Consul advised them to return to their homes and await further contact – but, according to Marcelino, none occurred.141 1955 – “Forced” Labour and Punishment In mid-1955, the Australian Consul reported that a number of senior Portuguese officials and “some native chiefs are concerned at … the harsh administrative system of the Portuguese, with special reference to recent and progressively heavy calls on conscripted labour for the Dili new works programme and the alleged harsh measures taken by some Administrative officials against natives for misdeamenours, in many cases committed in ignorance, and those who might protest against the heavy demand for labour away from home, with the consequent affect on domestic life and agricultural processes. These measures frequently take the form of severe beatings and life, under the Administrator of the Manatuto area ((Antóniode Oliveira Morais)) in particular, is described by natives as ‘worse than under the Japanese’. Conscripted labourers are paid the equivalent of eighteen shillings per month plus food.”142 The Consul added that the Administrator of the Baucau Circunscrição – António Ramos do Amaral, had opined “unless the Portuguese adopt a more enlightened and realistic policy, consequent on the present day political thoughts in Asia and the abandonment of their almost medieval methods, reports of a submarine allegedly landing personnel on the south coast, but no intruders were discovered: see Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 189/56, 5 September 1956 (NAA: A5954, 2269/4). 138 Marcelino was born in Venilale on 25 February 1931 – and was 24 years old at the time of contact with the Consul. His father, Dom Cristóvão Fausto Guterres (died September 1992, aged 87), was the traditional head of the Venilale “jurisdição” – a grouping of six villages. “Cristóvão Fausto Guterres” is identified as the Chefe de Suco of Uato Haco (Venilale) in 1952 – Sherlock, K., East Timor: Liurais and Chefes de Suco; Indigenous Authorities in 1952, Kevin Sherlock, Darwin 1983, p.19. The dedication and merit of Cristóvão Fausto Guterres during WWII as a chefe de jurisdição was formally acknowledged in BOdT, No.1, 1 January 1963, p.7. In 1937, Cristóvão da Silva Guterres – the chefe de suco of Uato-Huco was appointed a captain in the Segunda Linha – vide BOdT , No.37, Portaria 524, 11 September 1937, pp.357-358. According to Marcelino, a forefather - Dom Cristobal Guterres, had been the raja of Venilale. 139 Born in Baucau - according to Marcelino, Januario dos Reis subsequently became a member of the regional parliament (DPRD I) in Dili during the Indonesian period. 140 Marcelino could not recall Francisco’s family name, but knew that he was from Manatuto and had been killed by Fretilin in Aileu in early 1976. It is highly probable that “Chiquito” was João Pereira da Silva – who was subsequently a leader of the 1959 Rebellion and, in 1974-75, a founding and senior member of the Apodeti political party (see footnotes 186, 269, 270, 506, 515, 523, 528, 547 and 867). 141 Marcelino visited Bandung for nine days in December 1996 with an Indonesian-sponsored party of 60, including a tour of the “Gedung Merdeka” – the site of the 1955 Asia-Africa Conference (author’s discussions with Marcelino in Dili on 3 and 10 April 2007 – and 28 June 2007 in Baucau). Marcelino confirmed that he had possessed a large portrait of Indonesian President Sukarno (see footnote 136) – but he had purchased it in Dili. In 2007, the author also discussed the purported 1955 visit to Bandung with Marcelino’s son, Joni (in Dili), and Marcelino’s younger brother, Virgílio Cristóvão Fausto Guterres - b. 21/5/1941, resident in Melbourne (Australia). 142 Australian Consulate – Dili, SAV.3/I.1103, 15 August 1955 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 1).

32 they will eventually sow the seeds of discontentment, and open the way to a subversive approach.” In late September 1955, the Consul reported that he believed the “disproportionate demand for labour was due to the Governor’s wish to complete major new works during his [sic] tenure of office.” However, a halt appeared to have been called “to this abnormal demand for labour. Work on two projects has temporarily ceased and some labour gangs have been returned to their respective districts where agricultural and social organization had been seriously affected.”143 In December, the Consul reported on severe punishments in Baucau ordered by the local Portuguese Circunscrição Secretary when road repairs “did not come up to expectations” – following which several “responsible” native chiefs were “thrashed” and “in some cases the ‘Palmatoria’ was also applied. … The above incident is by no means isolated and one must feel that the overall administration has so far been most fortunate in that the indigenous Timorese in Portuguese Timor has a very patient and placid nature, and his mental capacity is of a poor standard. However, if such administrative methods persist, I fear they could have serious political results in the event of an emergency in South East Asia.”144 The Moluccas, Kisar, Wetar, Liran and Ataúro In the mid-1950s, separatist movements in Eastern Indonesia also had some impact on Portuguese Timor. In October 1955, the Republic of the South Moluccas reportedly sent an emissary to Lautém – hoping that the authorities would on-forward a message from their movement to the United Nations.145 Of more immediate and long-running concern for the Portuguese authorities was the Rabuta movement on Ataúro - an island of Portuguese Timor, 22 kilometres north of Dili. Rabuta - meaning “close your eyes” in the rahêssuc dialect of Ataúro’s villages of Biqueli and Beloi, was a local Protestant cult founded by Franz and Juliana Braz in the late 1940s that sought union with the Republic of Indonesia.146 Indonesian officials, traditional leaders and police had often visited Ataúro from the small island of Lisan (about 10 kilometres northeast of Ataúro), the adjacent large island of Wetar, and also from Kisar – ie further to the east, about 25 kilometres north of the eastern

143

Australian Consulate – Dili, SAV.3 Part 2, 25 September 1955 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 1). Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 22, 5 December 1955 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 1). The Consul commented that: “The punitive measures taken by the Secretary at Baucau are in actual fact against the tenets of the new Constitution and Citizenship Rights for the peoples in Portugal’s Overseas Dependencies.” 145 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 20, 22 October 1955 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 1). The Republic of the South Moluccas, or Republik Maluku Selatan (RMS), was a self-proclaimed republic declared on 25 April 1950 comprising Amboina, Buru, Ceram and adjoining islands. Interestingly, RMS maps included islands immediately north of Portuguese Timor as within RMS territory – including Wetar and Kisar; as well as the Portuguese Timor island of Ataúro (NAA: A1838, 3038/11/63 Part 1). 146 Duarte, J.B. Padre, “O fenomeno dos movimentos nativistas”, Garcia de Orta, Ser. Antropobiol, 5 (1-2) 1987/88, Lisboa, 1988, p.46. See also Duarte, J.B., Timor – Ritos e Mitos Ataúros, Instituto de Cultura e Língua Portuguesa, Lisboa, 1984, pp.15-19 – that notes that Protestanism was actively proselytized in the Netherlands East Indies islands adjacent to Ataúro in the 1930s by a Javanese – “Martens”, and a number of adherents established themselves in Ataúro’s villages of Beloi and Biqueli. “But after World War II, the movement took a new increment, with the couple Franz and Juliana Braz, coming from the island of Alor.” – p.16. 144

33 end of Portuguese Timor.147 In late 1955, it was reported that the “senior native chief” of Ataúro was beaten and jailed by the Portuguese authorities for “clandestine contact over several months with officials of the neighbouring Indonesian island of Kisar … and that the purpose of this clandestine contact was to encourage a separatist movement against the Portuguese.”148 In 1959, Dom Martinho da Costa Lopes – a Roman Catholic priest and a Deputy to the National Assembly in Lisbon (see footnote 326) declared that “the shadow of Protestanism in the villages of Beloi, Biqueli and Macdada” presaged “a danger to our national sovereignty” through “deleterious and anti-national propaganda” and also represented an “evident danger to public morality”.149 Converting local Catholic and animist villagers, by 1961 the Rabuta movement reportedly had 1,350 followers among the 3,397 inhabitants of Ataúro – compared with only 396 declared Catholics.150 The movement encouraged the learning of Malay and used Malay in their liturgy and folkloric songs. The Rabuta movement also had more direct political elements – with one song exhorting the “bringing down and sending home of the Portuguese”.151 In late March 1961, when four Indonesian naval vessels visited Dili, the followers of the Rabuta movement believed that this “hopefully heralded their ‘proxima libertação’.”152 On 1 January 1964, Rabuta followers held celebratory parades carrying white and also red-andwhite flags (ie red and white being the colours of the Indonesian national flag) – displayed as “an omen for Portugal’s mourning at the loss of its colony of Timor, including also Atauro”.153 The movement was reportedly “still very alive, with its own schools and chapels and “gúrus” (“teachers”) in the late 1980s.154 The Anti-Colonial Movement of Indonesia (GPKI) In April 1956 - and seemingly in reaction to a visit to Jakarta by a Portuguese passenger and merchant vessel (the N/M Niassa), a strongly-worded article appeared in The Times of Indonesia. The article referred to Portugal as “a fifth-rate, ramshackle dictatorship … swimming against the tide of the times” and cited “half of the Indonesian island of Timor stolen by the Portuguese from us … and still unreturned to us … We should stand solidly behind the Spirit of Bandung”.155 However, while in Canberra for consultations, the Australian Consul was asked for his view on “unrest 147

Duarte, J.B. Padre, “O fenomeno dos movimentos nativistas”, 1988, op.cit., pp.48-49 describes visits in August 1955, December 1957 and October 1959. 148 The chief’s “son was secretly taken to Kisar by the Indonesians to observe conditions under Indonesian administration.” - Australian Consulate – Dili, Cable I.11073, 15 August 1955 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 1). 149 Lopes, D. M. da Costa, Breve resenha de alguns factos ocorrido em Viqueque e Uatolari (1959), Dili, October 1959. 150 This represents a Protestant percentage of 39.7 percent – with animists at about 48.6 percent and Catholics at 11.6 percent. Protestantism – brought by missionaries from the Moluccas, reached Ataúro before Catholicism which only spread from mainland Portuguese Timor in the 1950s. In 2004, Ataúro was 57 percent Protestant – ie compared with the figures in the 2004 Census for the nation of TimorLeste of: 96 percent Catholic, 2.24 percent Protestant/Evangelical, .33 percent Islam, and .8 percent “traditional”. 151 Duarte, J.B. Padre, “O fenomeno…, op.cit., p.49 – “vinde depressa, expulsai-os (aos portugueses) para a terra deles”. 152 Ibid., p.49. For detail of the visit of Indonesian naval Task Force 123.1, see footnote 633. 153 Ibid., p.48. 154 Ibid., p.41. 155 “Let us have no truck with it”, The Times of Indonesia (English language), Jakarta, 4 April 1956.

34 among the native population” - and replied that the Portuguese dealt “very promptly and severely with any sign of disaffection. It could be said that there was in fact no pro-Indonesian movement amongst the natives.”156 On 9 October 1956, a group was established in Jakarta by Indonesian students to press for a plebiscite in “Portuguese-occupied Timor.”157 The group, the AntiColonial Movement of Indonesia (Gerakan Penentang/Penghapusan Kolonialisme Indonesia – GPKI)158, was led by two students: Indra Suyakawesi (General Chairman) and Ida Hachidayat Sukardi. Suyakawesi declared that the group was not particularly directed against Portuguese colonialism in Timor, but “against any form of colonialism which can still be found within or bordering the Indonesian archipelago.” In response to the Movement’s declaration, an Indonesian Foreign Ministry spokesman, Arnold Mononuto, stated that “Indonesia has no territorial claims but its claim to West Irian.”159 The Australian Embassy in Jakarta reported however that: “The existence of the group has excited the Portuguese Legation considerably.”160 Little more was heard of the Movement. However, in December 1956, the Australian Consul in Dili reported that the Indonesian Consul161 had recently hosted an “elaborate dinner party” with the aim of assuaging Portuguese concerns regarding the Movement. The Australian Consul reported that: “In general, the Portuguese officials, and others here, are not unduly concerned by the press reports relating to the sentiments expressed by the Anti-Colonial Group.”162 In mid-1957, in commenting on an Australian Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB) assessment on Portuguese Timor, the Australian Consul in Dili reported: “it is correct to say there is no real Internal Security problem in the Portuguese half of the Island.”163 The Consul was dismissive of the JIB’s comments on occasional friction between “Indonesian and Portuguese patrols in the border area” - noting instead that “relations between the Indonesian half of the Island and the Portuguese are at present most friendly.”

156

Shaw, P., Memo/Record of Conversation, Australian Department of External Affairs, Canberra, 4 April 1956 (NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1 Part 1). 157 “Movement Calls For Plebiscite in Portuguese Occupied Timor”, Persbiro Indonesia (PIA), Jakarta, 10 October 1956 – see also “Group is formed aimed at liberation of Eastern Timor”, 10 October 1956 covered by Australian Embassy – Jakarta, Memo 424, 11 October 1956 (NAA: A11604, 605/15A). The Movement also cautioned that Portuguese Timor constituted a danger to Indonesia - as Portuguese Timor “might be used as a war base by the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, of which Portugal is a member” … and the Netherlands, also a NATO member, “would be able make use of such a base … in the dispute … over West Irian”. This fear of the Netherlands exploiting NATO to access Portuguese Timor was also later raised in the Jakarta communist daily, Bintang Timor, on 8 July 1961 and in Harian Rakyat of 23 September 1965. 158 The Movement’s address was given as “4 Djalan Kawi, Djakarta”. 159 “Indonesia has no territorial claim”, Persbiro Indonesia (PIA), Jakarta, 11 October 1956. 160 Australian Embassy – Jakarta, Cable 424, 11 October 1956 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 1). 161 The Indonesian Consulate opened on 20 May 1954. Leopoldo Lo de Wijk Lasut (born in Menado), the first Indonesian Consul, served 23 April 1954 – 3 February 1956. He was replaced by Dominggus Octavianus Lahallo (born in Ambon) who arrived in Dili on 31 December 1955. 162 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 259/56, 3 December 1956 (NAA: A1838, File 3006/4/3 Part 1). 163 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 153/57, 19 July 1956, p.2 (NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1 Part 1).

35 THE 1959 “VIQUEQUE REBELLION” 164 Inspiration165 In the late 1930s/early 1940s, Francisco “Ciko”(“Siku/Siko”) Lopes166 – a “nationalist” and independence activist, was reportedly forced to flee Dutch Timor and entered Portuguese Timor.167 During the WWII Japanese occupation of PortugueseTimor, Francisco Lopes – together with Arnaldo dos Reis Araújo168, collaborated with the Japanese military. Following the Japanese surrender in Timor in September 1945, Francisco Lopes was prosecuted by the Portuguese Timor authorities and imprisoned on Ataúro Island (22km north of Dili).169 On his release, Lopes reportedly returned to Atambua in Dutch Timor and continued to agitate for the independence of Portuguese Timor.170 Lopes met with young educated men in 164

A discrete study of the rebellion has been published as: Chamberlain, E.P., Rebellion, Defeat and Exile: The 1959 Uprising in East Timor, Point Lonsdale, June 2009 http://www.scribd.com/doc/26857195/Rebellion-Defeat-and-Exile-The-1959-Uprising-in-East-Timor . 165 Much of the information for this “Inspiration” section is sourced from Rohi, P.A., Pemberontakan Rakyat Timor Timur 1959, Mutiara, Edition 775, Jakarta, 29 August – 4 September 1995; and interviews with the few surviving rebels in Dili. 166 Known as Francisco Lopes, his full name was “Inácio André Francisco Lopes – alias Siku Lopes” – see footnotes 169, 170, 172, 535 and 1009. 167 Rohi, P.A., Pemberontakan …, Mutiara 775, 1995, op.cit, p.14. 168 Arnaldo dos Reis Araújo - born 1913, had been jailed by the Portuguese for 29 years in February 1946 for collaboration with the Japanese during World War II – and was reportedly only released on 25 April 1974. However, a press report – White, K., “War criminal now leads provisional Timor govt”, Northern Territory News, Darwin, 5 February 1976 – claims that Arnaldo Araújo, a “catequista” (religious teacher) who had led “Black Columns” against the Australians in Timor during World War II, was tried for collaboration with the Japanese in 1946, sentenced to nine years “exile” on Ataúro, was released in the early 1960s and became a teacher in Dili, and “acquired a large cattle property at Zumalai on Timor’s south coast” (NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1 Part 21). White’s source on Araújo’s background is probably interviews with José Ramos-Horta. In Ramos-Horta, J., Funu, The Unfinished Saga of East Timor, Red Sea Press, Trenton, 1987, p.32, Ramos-Horta claims that Arnaldo Araújo was “the only Timorese to be given a prison sentence for war crimes.” – but see also earlier footnotes 90 and 91. Araújo was the founding chairman of the Apodeti political party (27 May 1974) and became East Timor’s first Governor after the Indonesian occupation ie for the period 1976-1978. See also footnotes 169, 527, 859, 863, 874, and 875. 169 Francisco Lopes worked as an interpreter – “jurubahasa”, in Baucau for the Japanese during the War - according to Frederico Almeida Santos da Costa (discussions with author, Audian - Dili, 1 July 2009). A 1975 press article related that “Sitko Lopes”, a Dutch national, collaborated with the Japanese in Dili – working as an interpreter and translator. After the war, he “returned to Europe” – but on his return to Dili in 1948, he was arrested, tried as a collaborator and sentenced to 10 years on Ataúro. When his appeal was heard in Goa in 1958, he was sentenced to an additional six years – but remained imprisoned for a further 16 years ie totalling 26 years: Seah, C.N., “Island of Death”, The Straits Times, Singapore, late October 1975 (NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/3 Part 3, p.279). The article also briefly mentioned the incarceration of Arnaldo Araújo (footnote 168 above). In September 1959, the Indonesian Consul in Dili sought clarification of the status of the sentence of Inácio André Francisco Lopes, querying his sentence of “16 years 4 months imprisonment and an indemnity of $ 3 000 – to the relatives of the victims”: Indonesian Consul – Dili, No. 192/I, 8 September 1959. In November 1959, the Consul sought to interview Francisco Lopes in prison. 170 Gonggong A. & Zuhdi, S., Sejarah …, 1994, p.42 also makes brief mention of “Ciko Lopes in Atambua” as providing information on independence to “several community leaders” in Portuguese Timor in 1953 – see Annex B. However, these reported activities of Francisco Lopes in the early 1950s are difficult to reconcile – particularly any return to Atambua, as he appears to have been imprisoned on Ataúro throughout the 1950s. However, according to Salem Musalam Sagran (in an interview with Takahashi Shigehito in Dili on 19 July 2008), Lopes was in Dili in the mid-1950s and was a regular caller at the Indonesian Consulate. This suggests that Lopes may perhaps have been on

36 Portuguese Timor and “the idea for integration ((of Portuguese Timor into Indonesia)) actually began in 1953/1954.”171 The few independence activists172 in Portuguese Timor reportedly maintained contact with Lopes through Protestant pastors in the border area.173 Within Portuguese Timor, lacking “intellectuals with leadership ability”, these disaffected young men met with the Indonesian Consul in Dili, “Lasutna Suwarno”, who reportedly “promised to act as the intermediary with the Indonesian central government if the movement demanding independence was successful.”174 Beginnings In the mid-1950s, the small group of independence activists in Portuguese Timor – mostly junior civil servants in Dili, had a range of aims. All resented the excesses, exploitation and human rights injustices inflicted by the Portuguese regime in Timor. In November-December 1956, the Portuguese Under-Secretary of State for Overseas Affairs, Carlos Krus Abecassis, made an extensive visit to Portuguese Timor175. Before his departure from Dili, he passed a 17-page instruction to Governor Captain César Maria Serpa Rosa directing that abuses and social injustices be corrected - including the “immediate abolition of corporal punishment used to compel natives to work or to increase their pace of work” by “overseers, Posto chiefs or anyone else”.176 However, conditions did not improve, and the continuing abuses were subsequently detailed in a “Memorandum” produced by exiled rebels in Angola in 1960 177 – see Annex D. some form of “conditional release” in Dili in the mid-1950s – ie until probably some time in 1958. For Francisco Lopes’ pro-Apodeti activities in the mid-1970s, see footnote 535. 171 Diatmika, A.G., “(Ternyata) Merah Putih Berkibar di TimTim Sejak 1959” (“The Red and White Flag Really Flew in East Timor in 1959”), Vista, No.57, Jakarta, 20-29 August 1989, p.20 – quoting one of the Timorese rebel leaders, José Manuel Duarte. Duarte also implies meeting with Francisco “Ciko” Lopes in Dili in the early 1950s. Salem Musalam Sagran, one of the deported 1959 Rebellion exiles, also cited the 1945 Indonesian Proclamation of Independence as “driving the outbreak of the Viqueque Rebellion” - Subroto, H., Saksi Mata Perjuangan Integrasi Timor Timur, Pustaka Sinar Harapan, Jakarta, 1996, p.172. 172 According to Frederico Almeida Santos da Costa, “Francisco Lopes of Atambua – an orang pendek (ie of short stature), was seen around Dili and at the Indonesian Consulate”, but as he was a far older man – and the young Timorese plotters were reticent in approaching him (a cultural phenomenon) – discussions with the author, Audian - Dili, 1 July 2009. 173 “70% of the population of Indonesian Timor is Christian, mainly Protestant. It came as a surprise to me that there should be a much higher percentage of Christians there than in Portuguese Timor where the figure is only about 15%” – see Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 158/60: Visit to Kupang (by Consul W.A. Luscombe), 23 November 1960, p.8 (NAA: A1838, 3038/10/6 Part 1; A4359, 201/2/8/12). The report also noted that there was a Roman Catholic church and seminary in Atambua (population about 5,000). Later official figures (1968) showed 74 percent of Indonesian Timor as Christian: 41 percent Catholic, 33 percent Protestant – with 11 percent Muslim and 14 percent animist. 174 Diatmika, A.G., “(Ternyata) Merah Putih…”, Vista 57, 1989, op.cit., p.20. José Manuel Duarte’s reference to contact with “Lasutna Suwarno” is probably Indonesian Consul, Leopoldo Lo de Wijk Lasut (see footnote 161). A “Suwarno” also served in the Indonesian Consulate as the Chancellor in 1959 – see footnote 184. 175 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 267/56, 7 December 1956 (NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1 Part 1). 176 Abecassis, C.K., Extractos das Instruções ao Governo de Timor, Dili, 19 December 1956 - Annex II in Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., pp. 199-203 and discussed at pp. 17-22. Governor Barata noted that “ironically, such reactionary instruments as the palmatória and the azorragues were referred to ((by local authorities)) as education devices.” – p.20. 177 Araújo, A.L.J. de (et al), Memorandum – Assunto: Sobre o acontecimento ocorrido em 7 de Junhe [sic] de 1959, na Cirrcunscrição [sic] de Viqueque – Timor (Memorandum – Report: On the event that

37

Sr. Eng. Carlos Abecassis (right) meeting the widow of Régulo Dom. Aleixo Corte Real at Ainaro. Governor Serpa Rosa is on the left.178 Some of the independence activists sought the installation of a Timorese “native” regime that would still have strong links to Portugal – while others, the majority, reportedly favoured integration with Indonesia. The Dili group continued their contact with the Indonesian Consul in Dili (ie Leopoldo Lasut until December 1955, Dominggus Lahallo to late 1956, and then Nazwar Jacub Sutan Indra) including through members of the local staff in the Consulate: David Verdial who had been born in Atambua (Indonesian Timor), Salem Sagran, and Mu Then Siong/ Celestino Peter Guterres.179 Several of the activists in Portuguese Timor also had occurred on 7 June 1959 in the Circumscription of Viqueque - Timor), six pages, Cólonia Penal do Bié (Angola), 21 April 1960 – in Araújo, A.L.J. de, O Célebre Massacré de Uato-Lari e Uato-Carbau Verificado no Ano de 1959 (The Truth of the Infamous Massacre at Uatolari and Uato-Carabau in 1959), Jakarta/Kupang, 1974 – attached as Annex D to this publication. The Memorandum focuses on injustices in the countryside – it was written by the “Viqueque group” before the “Dili group” of leaders, who had departed Dili in early June 1959 for Lisbon, arrived in Angola (together with the four Indonesians) in early June 1960. The Memorandum was signed, in order, by Amaro Loyola Jordão de Araújo, Mateus Sarmento Jordão de Araújo, José Manuel Duarte, Joaquim Ferreira, António da Costa Soares (António Metan), Fernando Pinto, João Lisboa, Armindo Amaral, Paulo Amaral and Domingos Soares. The content of de Araújo’s 1974 (120mm x 205mm) booklet (at Annex D), including the Memorandum, was later included in a larger format booklet of the same title ie Costa, E. da (et al), O Célebre Massacré de Uato-Lari e Uato-Carbau Verificado no Ano de 1959 (The Truth of the Infamous Massacre at Uatolari and Uato-Carabau in 1959), Dili, 2005. This larger A-4 2005 publication contains additional material including discrete declarations (declaração) by several “Dili group” former rebels citing injustices (see also footnote 587). José Manuel Duarte, a signatory to the Memorandum of 21 April 1960, repeated many of the allegations in his Memorandum - Duarte, J.M., “Memorandum sobre o acontecimento em Timor em 1959”, Colónia Penal de Bié (Angola), 31 August 1960 (TdT, Lisbon: AOS/CO/UL-32A2, Part 7). 178 Boletim Geral do Ultramar, No.378, Lisbon, December 1956, p.19. A memorial to Régulo D. Aleixo Corte Real – killed by Japanese troops in May 1943, was inaugurated at Ainaro during the visit. 179 Rohi, P.A., Pemberontakan …, 1995, op.cit., p.14. Subsequently - from the early-mid 1980s, H. Salem/Salim Musalam Sagran/Syagran was prominent in Islamic affairs in East Timor eg as the Chairman of the Majelis Ulama Indonesia – Timor Timur (MUI, Indonesian Scholars’ Council – East

38 family contacts in West Timor.180 Acknowledging their inspiration from West Timor, the group in Portuguese Timor reportedly adopted a Tetum-language slogan: “Hamutuk ho manu alin sira, ita sadere sa sira, sira sae ita mir sae, sira tun ita mir tun.” (“Uniting with our brothers elsewhere, we depend on them – they advance and we will also, they fall and we will too.”)181. In July 1956, José Manuel Duarte (1934-2003), who was to become one of the movement’s Timorese leaders – and later in the 1990s, the principal spokesman of the surviving rebel veterans, moved with his family from his government position (assistant observer) in the meteorological office in Dili to a regional post in the Viqueque Circunscrição.182 The Indonesian Consul, Nazwar Jacub Sutan Indra, invited several of the Timorese activists to the Consulate – including Luís da Costa Rego, João Pereira da Silva, José Beny Joaquim, Fernando Woodhomal183 and, together “with ‘elementos árabes’ , began a pro-Indonesia propaganda campaign among the natives” – assisted by the Chancellor at the Consulate, Suwarno. 184 One of the leaders of the “Dili group” was reportedly Francisco Maria Xavier Jesus de Araújo - a Timorese with considerable land holdings, who was a member of the Conselho de Governo in Dili.185 His ambitions to become the Governor of the

Timor) and an author (see bibliography). His later activities are noted in Chega !, CAVR Final Report, Chapter 7.8, para 383-384. Bazher, A.B., Islam di Timor Timur, Gema Insani Press, Jakarta, 1995, p.21 notes that David Verdial, a “non-Muslim” was from Bobonaro - and that Muhammad Sidin was also employed at the Consulate. For Mu Then Siong see footnotes 336, 458 and 518; and Berlie, J.A., East Timor: A Bibliography, les Indes savantes, Paris, 2001, p.197 refers to Mu Then Siong/Celestino Peter Guterres as a driver at the Indonesian Consulate (and later deported to Angola). 180 The parents-in-law of José Manuel Duarte - who was later to become prominent in the attacks at Viqueque and Baguia in June 1959, reportedly came from the island of Roti/Rote, about 25 km southwest of Kupang. 181 Rohi, P.A., Pemberontakan …, Mutiara 775, 1995, op.cit, p.14. 182 Duarte, J.M., “Memorandum sobre o acontecimento em Timor em 1959”, Colónia Penal de Bié (Angola), 31 August 1960 (TdT, Lisbon: AOS/CO/UL-32A2, Part 7). Notice of his move to Viqueque in 1956 was promulgated in BOdT, No.31, 4 August 1956, p.506. 183 Fernando “Woodhomal” was probably “Fernando Wosdimal” – of “Indian background” – advice to author by former rebels Evaristo da Costa (aged 73 years), Frederico Almeida Santos da Costa (75 years) and Salem Sagran (78 years) in Dili, 2 April 2007. “A.H. Wadhoomal, a Hindu merchant” arrived in Portuguese Timor from India in 1925 - Archer, C.H. (British Consul-General, Taiwan), Report on Portuguese Timor, Canberra, 3 May 1941, para 111 (NAA: A981, TIM D 1 Part 2). 184 Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., p.51 and pp.217-218 – Annex V, Report of the Police Superintendent, Abílio da Paixão Monteiro, 25 July 1959. 185 Francisco Maria Xavier Jesus de Araújo was born in Luca (Viqueque) on 12/1/1893 and, with effect 26 March 1946, was appointed as the Secretary for the Administrative Council for Social and Public Assistance (BOdT, No.9, 21 December 1946, p.57). He was elected to the Conselho do Governo in 1955 for the period 1955-1958 vide BOdT, No.38, Declaração, 17 September 1955, p.757. Francisco de Araújo had substantial coffee holdings in Ermera. He was the patron of the popular Sporting (Group/Club) de Timor – a club for the elite and “integrated/assimilated” Timorese, and provided land in the suburb of Vila Verde for the Club. When arrested in June 1959, the PIDE claimed that “red and white” (ie Indonesian) flags had been found in his Dili residence. For his dismissal from the Conselho de Governo and remarks in 2007 by rebels on his innocence see footnotes 401-403. The extent of his involvement in the rebel movement has yet to be established with certainty. Former rebel Evaristo da Costa has however declared that Francisco de Araújo “was involved” – discussions with author, Dili, 29 October 2008. In discussions with the author on 6 December 2008, Câncio dos Reis Noronha was also adamant that Francisco de Araújo had been involved – see footnote 403.

39 Province had been frustrated, and he reportedly joined the independence activists in their efforts for greater rights and freedoms for the indigenous Timorese. The group expanded – reportedly proselytising from “door-to-door”, and by late 1958/early 1959 had reportedly gained adherents across Portuguese Timor with the following organization186: • Dili (“Central Sector”): Luís da Costa Rego (leader)187, Joaquim Ferreira, Francisco de Araújo (see footnote 185). • Aileu: Paulo da Conceição Castro (see footnotes 297-303). • Ermera: Eduardo de Araújo, Alexandria Viana de Jesus, Cripim [sic] Borges de Araújo. • Same: Francisco Dias da Costa. • Manatuto: Germano das Dores Alves da Silva, João Pereira Sikito [sic] da Silva. • Baucau: Abel da Costa Belo. • Manufahi: Matheus Ferreira. • Viqueque: Amaro Loyola Jordan [sic] de Araújo188. • Uatolari: Antonius Metan (António da Costa Soares). • Lospalos: José dos Ramos da Sousa Gama. The Governor of Portuguese Timor (1959-1963) – Filipe José Freire Themudo Barata, later noted that in early 1959, the rebels had “links in Remexio, Aileu, Lete Foho, Ermera, Same and Ainaro” and used festivities such as weddings and other social gatherings to disguise their activities.189 The “Ex-Permesta 14” In March 1957, a separatist rebellion against Jakarta arose in Sulawesi - the Permesta190 Movement. The Movement demanded greater autonomy for eastern 186

As listed in Rohi, P.A., Pemberontakan …, Mutiara 775, 1995, op.cit., p.14. Some Indonesian reports have also claimed that the 1959 Rebellion was also supported in the Aileu, Same and Ermera areas – ie south and south-west of Dili; see Gonggong A. & Zuhdi, S., Sejarah …, 1992, op.cit., p.44. Sarong, F., “Pejuang Timtim yang Kesepian”, op.cit., Kompas Cybermedia, Jakarta, 21 May 1999 reports that one of the rebel leaders, João Pereira da Silva, was killed in Aileu – but João Pereira da Silva is noted as being among those arrested on 3 June 1959 (see footnote 292). João Pereira da Silva was reportedly killed in the Aileu area by Fretilin – but in very early 1976. Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., p. 59 relates the conspirators’ “infiltration of the interior of the Province” with “links in Remexio, Aileu, Lete Foho, Ermera, Same and Ainaro.” 187 Luís da Costa Rego (also known as Luís Cina/China) was a civil servant (driver) in the Serviços de Agricultura. His father was Chinese and his mother, Timorese. He and Frederico Almeida Santos da Costa were related – both living in the same residential compound off Kuluhan Road in Audian/ Bemori (Dili). 188 Amaro de Araújo had been a civil servant in the Treasury Department from 1919 until dismissed for corruption in August 1948 – see detail at Annex E. Amaro de Araújo, together with his brother Mateus, is listed as a retired civil servant in Costa, F.A.S. da, Os Nomes dos Detidos Timorenses para Angola do Ano de 1959 (The Names of the Timorese Detainees in Angola in 1959), Silva Porto (Bié, Angola), 6 June 1960 – see Annex F. Aged 58 years, Amaro was the oldest of the rebel leaders and reportedly a grandson of the 1912 rebel leader Dom Boaventura. Amaro died in exile in Angola in April 1969 – see footnotes 467 and 521 for further background. 189 Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., p.59. 190 Permesta (Perjuangan Semesta – Total Struggle). The Movement’s Charter (Piagam) was signed in Makassar (now Ujung Pandang), Sulawesi/Celebes on 2 March 1957 by the Region VII/Wirabuana military commander, Lieutenant Colonel Herman Nicolas Ventje Sumual. The Permesta Movement had been defeated by September 1961. See Harvey, B. S., Permesta: pemberontakan setengah hati,

40 Indonesia and opposed the growing influence of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI Communist Party of Indonesia) on President Sukarno and his government. Soon after, Permesta representatives arrived in Kupang (the capital of Indonesian “West Timor”) and were welcomed by several of the local leaders and gained support from youth, schoolteachers and some military personnel191 – where “support for Permesta was certainly linked to a fear of Muslim domination” and resentment of rule by officials from Java.192 On 3 April 1957, pro-Permesta military personnel and youths in Kupang seized control of the security forces and detained public officials – and, while “there was no blood spilt”, “for many months the situation was somewhat uncertain.”193 On 13 April 1957, Lieutenant Colonel Sumual, the Permesta leader, visited Kupang from Makassar (Sulawesi) and was warmly welcomed.194 The Indonesian “army estimated that about 100 of its soldiers in Kupang supported the movement”, and “there was support also from some members of the police and some schoolteachers and their students.”195 However, in March 1958, Sukarno government forces moved against the Permesta Movement in the Lesser Sundas196 and, soon after, Yonif (Batalyon Infanteri) 701 was despatched to restore control in Flores and Indonesian Timor.197 The Indonesian armed forces - ie Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI)198, arriving in 1984 for reference to Permesta in the Lesser Sundas at p.83 and p.228 – and, more generally also: Conboy, K., Kopassus – Inside Indonesia’s Special Forces, 2003, pp.37-59; Conboy, K. & Morrison, J., Feet to the fire: CIA covert operations in Indonesia 1957-1958, 1999; and the Permesta Information Office website at http://permesta.8m.net/. For the “companion” PRRI rebellion in Sumatra see footnotes 196, 203, 225-226 and 263. 191 “Many of the soldiers involved in Kupang were ex-KNIL Christians from Manado and Timor” – KNIL ie Koninklijk Nederlandsch Indisch Leger (Royal Netherlands East Indies Army) - Farram, S.G., From ‘Timor Koepang’ to ‘Timor NTT’: A Political History of West Timor 1901-1967 (unpublished PhD thesis), Darwin, 2004, p.298. Termed the “4 April Incident”, the Permesta supporters forced the resignation of the Yonif 712 commander, Major Abdul Latief – see Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (ABRI) – Kodam IX/Udayana, 42 Tahun Pengabdian Kodam IX/Udayana (42 Years of Service by Military Region IX/Udayana), Kodam IX/Udayana, Denpasar, 1999, p.76. 192 Farram, S.G., From ‘Timor Koepang’ …, op.cit., 2004, p.298. 193 Ibid, p.299. 194 ABRI, 42 Tahun …, op.cit.,1999, p.77. At this time, Lieutenant Colonel Sumual was the “Head of the Military Government” – and became Chairman of the Permesta Supreme Council and Chief-ofStaff of the Permesta Revolutionary Army. 195 Farram, S.G., From ‘Timor Koepang’ …, op.cit., 2004, p.300. An official Indonesian military history records that “between one and two companies of Yonif 712, together with its headquarters and the Kompi Pemuda (Youth Company) supported the Permesta movement.” – ABRI, 42 Tahun …, op.cit., 1999, p.77. 196 The Lesser Sundas (Sunda Ketjil) – or Nusa Tenggara, comprised the island groups from Lombok to Timor inclusive, but not the Moluccas or Sulawesi to the north and east. In October 1958, the Lesser Sundas was formally divided into the regions of Bali, Nusa Tenggara Barat (NTB) and Nusa Tenggara Timor (NTT). The Permesta movement had established a nominal command in Nusa Tenggara (ie the Lesser Sundas) on 5 May 1957 with a “Regional Military Command” under “Military Governor” Lieutenant Colonel R. Minggu. For Permesta activity in Eastern Nusa Tenggara – initially on the island of Flores, see “Permesta di Nusa Tenggara” in Permesta Membangun sourced from Leirissa, R., PRRI Permesta - http://permesta.8m.net/relates/artikel_permesta_membangun.html . 197 C Company of Yonif 701 under Captain Soegiri was the principal sub-unit deployed to Kupang that “detained and internally cleansed Yonif 712 personnel … that was achieved smoothly without recourse to armed violence.” – see ABRI, 42 Tahun …, op.cit., 1999, p.77. Following its “cleansing”, Yonif 712 was used against the rebels ie to “neutralise sympathisers … and disarm civilians” and, in a reorganisation to limit opportunities for further unrest, several of its companies were swapped with elements from Bali and Flores – pp.77-78. 198 The TNI was retitled Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (Indonesian Armed Forces – ABRI) on 21 June 1962 – and formally reverted to TNI in 2000.

41 Kupang met little resistance. Several hundred Permesta supporters led by a police officer - Kotadia199, initially fled into the countryside but soon surrendered to the authorities. However, eleven dissident soldiers from the resident Yonif 712 fled in a seized military truck. “Following a pursuit, nine surrendered with their weapons, but the other two fled into Portuguese Timor together with twelve civilians.”200 In March 1958, the Jakarta press reported that 14 Indonesians – all military personnel, had fled from Indonesian West Timor and sought asylum in Portuguese Timor. One press report related that: “As a result of the ban against the Permesta Movement, a few days ago, and as a consequence of the local purge carried out by the 26th Regiment, all supporters of the so-called Permesta Movement have fled into Portuguese Timor”201, and Portuguese Timor has “granted asylum to one officer, two sergeants and 11 soldiers from Nusa Tenggara.”202 Several contemporary reports – including statements by an Indonesian Consul in Dili, and several later English-language publications have suggested however that the “14” came from Sulawesi.203 An “official” Indonesian version of the “14” was 199

Kotadia (-1991), while serving with the Netherlands Indies police at Ende (Flores), had befriended Sukarno who had been exiled on the island in the period 1934-1938. In 1958, Kotadia reportedly surrendered his group to avoid bloodshed – and pledged loyalty to the new Republic. Several of the pro-Permesta officers, including Lieutenant Sine (Army) and Lieutenant Stall (Air Force), were reportedly imprisoned in Denpasar (Bali). The foregoing information was provided to the author by Peter A. Rohi (Jakarta) – email 25 October 2006. 200 ABRI, 42 Tahun …, op.cit., 1999, p.77. 201 “Penjokong2 ‘Permesta’ kabur ke Timor Portugis” (“Permesta Supporters Run Away to Portuguese Timor”), Merdeka, Jakarta, 3 April 1958, p.1. 202 “Pem. Portugis Tim beri asyl politik pada 14 orang ‘Permesta’ dari Nusatenggara” (“Portuguese Timor Government Grants Political Asylum to 14 Permesta Fugitives from Nusa Tenggara”), Merdeka, Jakarta, 16 April 1958, p.1. See also Casey, R.G. (Minister for External Affairs, Australian Department of External Affairs), Record of Conversation with the Australian Consul – Dili (F.J.A. Whittaker), Canberra, 29 April 1958 (NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1 Part 1; A10302, 1958/769) – the Consul reported “two N.C.Os and 11 O.R. … had come by small boat … they said they had come from the ‘Eastern Indonesian Movement’ ” … “presumably from the South Moluccan Republic” (see footnote 145 for background) – ie totalling the figure of “13” first reported in Merdeka on 3 April 1958. Minister Casey’s discussion with Consul Whittaker is also briefly mentioned in Millar, T.B. (ed), Australian foreign minister: the diaries of R.G. Casey, Collins, London, 1972, p.295. The erroneous belief that the 14 Permesta fugitives were “RMS” and had come from the Moluccas is also included in the editor’s preface to Araújo, Abílio de (Jolliffe, J. & Reece, B. eds), Timorese Elites, Canberra, 1975 (NAA: A1838, 3038/1/1 Part 2) ie “As recently as 1959, several hundred Timorese were killed in an uprising led by Moluccan separatists.” Similarly, the Governor of Portuguese Timor 1974-1975 – Mário Lemos Pires, incorrectly wrote that the Indonesians had entered Portuguese Timor following the “failed revolt in Ambon and the Southern Moluccas and sought asylum in Timor” - Pires, M.L., Descolonização de Timor – Missão impossível ?, Círculo de Leitores – Lda, Lisboa, 1991, p.115. 203 Tengku Usman Hussin (Indonesian Consul - Dili, who replaced Nazwar Jacub on 3 June 1959) initially declared to the Australian Consul that the “Permesta 14” had come from “Manado” (Northern Sulawesi) as reported in Australian Consulate - Dili, Saving 25, 19 April 1960 and Memo 78/60, 18 June 1960 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 1 and 3038/2/9). For English-language publications that address the 1959 Viqueque Rebellion in general terms see Jolliffe, J., Cover-Up, 2001, pp.45-46; Jolliffe, J., Balibo, 2009, pp.62-63; Dunn, J., East Timor – a rough passage to independence, 2003, pp.27-28; Gunn, G., Timor Loro Sae 500 Years, 1999, p.260; Taylor J.G., Indonesia’s Forgotten War, 1991, pp.21-22. Taylor, J.G., East Timor: The Price of Freedom, 1999, p.21 states that the Permesta group had come “from southeast Sulawesi” as does Nicol B., Timor - A Nation Reborn, Equinox Publishing, Jakarta, 2002, p.33 ie “fled from Sulawesi”. Dunn, J., East Timor …, 2003, p.27 discusses the “14” seeking political asylum and implies that “Among the remnants were Lubis, Kawilarang from Jakarta, Simbolon and Hussin from Sumatra and Warouw, five colonels, and Major Sumual.” However, this should not be misinterpreted - the detailed bio-datas of these senior PRRI/Permesta officers do not indicate that any entered Portuguese Timor after the failure of their separatist movements. For PRRI background, see footnotes 190, 196, 225-226 and 263.

42 published in a high school text-book in 1992.204 This briefly related that in 1958, 14 “youths” from Kupang crossed into Portuguese Timor, made contact with Timorese youth205 and “proselytised the spirit of independence as enjoyed in the Republic of Indonesia.” In 1960, an Australian Methodist Minister in Kupang, the Reverend G.S. Dicker, related the following to the Australian Consul in Dili on “the escape of the Army deserters to Portuguese Timor in 1958”: “He ((Dicker)) came across the party of deserters at a river crossing in the Soe area ((about 110 kilometres east of Kupang, on the main road to Dili)). They had just crossed the river when their pursuers arrived on the scene. Dicker expected some sort of fight. However, the pursuing force halted in full view of the deserters and made no attempt to capture them or molest them in any way. Dicker’s interpretation of this is that both the parties were heavily under the influence of the Permesta which, he says, was very strong in Kupang at the time.”206 From Indonesian Timor, the fleeing Permesta 14 crossed into the Portuguese Timor enclave of Oecusse – but their route is unclear. The 14 may have entered the Oecussi enclave from the west – ie taking a route from Kupang along the northern coast through Lelogama district. On their arrival in Oecussi, the group reportedly robbed a Chinese trader, taking his radio – a “very well-known incident that created negative attitudes to the escapees.”207 They met with the Acting Administrator of Oecusse, Fernando Plínio dos Santos Tinoco208 on 23 March 1958 and sought “assistance (political asylum)”.209 The Permesta 14 – with their ages and declared “PRRI” military ranks (see Annex C) were: Lambertus Ladon210, 28 years, Lieutenant; Gerson Pello, 26, Lieutenant; Jobert Moniaga, 25, First Sergeant; Eddy Welong, 22, First Sergeant; Albert Ndoen, 36, Second Sergeant; Jeheskial Folla, 29, Second Sergeant; Ambrocius Dimoe Logo, 27, Corporal; Urias Daniel, 23, Corporal; Dominggus Adoe, 29, soldier; Lourenz Tangsi, 29, soldier; Paulus Adoe, 29, soldier; Anderias Therik, 21, soldier; Jonathan Nenotek, 21 soldier; and Jermias Pello, 18, civilian.211 204

Gonggong A. & Zuhdi, S., Sejarah Perjuangan Timor-Timur Untuk Sekolah Menengah Atas (History of the East Timor Struggle for Senior High School), Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, Jakarta, 1992 – see translated extract at Annex B. 205 Ibid, “such as José Peirera Da Costa, Abel Bello [sic] as well as with Ricardo, Germano Peirera Da Costa and others.” p.43. 206 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 158/60: Visit to Kupang (by Consul W.A. Luscombe), 23 November 1960, p.6 (NAA: A1838, 3038/10/6 Part 1). 207 Rohi, P.A. (Jakarta), email to author, 27 October 2006. 208 Secretary Fernando Plínio dos Santos Tinoco (b. 31 August 1914) – with long service in Oecusse and a fluent Bahasa speaker, was promoted to Administrator of the Oecusse Circunscrição on 11 October 1958. 209 A translation of their formal written request for political asylum ie “Declaration” signed in Dili on 27 March 1958 is at Annex C. This was forwarded to Lisbon under cover of a letter from Governor Serpa Rosa - No 11, Dili, 1 July 1958 (AHU, Lisbon: MU/GM/GNP/084, Part 15). 210 A typing/translation error – should be “Lambertus Ladow”. 211 In interviews in late July 1995, three of the “Permesta 14” related that they had all been resident in Kupang – and that their group comprised: “Gerson Tom Pello, Jezkial Fola, Jermias Toan Pello, Paul Adu, Albert Ndoen, Eddy Welong, Am Dimulogo, Dominggus Adu, Yuber [sic] Moniaga, Lambert Kling Ladaw, Orias Daniel, Andrias Therik, Laurens, and Jonathan Neno Ta Ek”. See Rohi, P.A., “Apa Kata Pelaku Pemberontakan Rakyat Timor Timur 1959 – Integrasi itu Tekad Historis dan Etnis”, Mutiara, Edition 776, Jakarta, 5-11 September 1995, pp. 14-15 – interviews of Gerson Pello, Jeremias Pello, Jezkial Fola and José Manuel Duarte. The article related that the Pello brothers and Am Dimologo were from Camplong – about 45 km east of Kupang. “Yuber” (ie Jobert) Moniaga was Manadonese ie from Northern Sulawesi. See also Sarong, F., “Pejuang Timtim yang Kesepian” (“The Loneliness of an East Timorese Warrior”), Kompas Cybermedia, Jakarta, 21 May 1999 – when

43

All were born in Nusa Tenggara Timor (NTT) – most in Kupang, except for: Lambertus Ladow - Surabaya (East Java); Jobert Moniaga - Menado (Sulawesi); and Eddy Welong - Malang (East Java) A few days later, the 14 were transferred to Dili and initially accommodated in the harbour aboard the small coastal freighter N/M Dom Aleixo - and their 13 weapons212 were secured in the Depósito de Material de Guerra. On 28 April 1958, the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a note verbale213 to the Portuguese Legation in Jakarta advising that: “according to reports received by this Ministry, fourteen members of the Indonesian Armed Forces had, on the 23rd March, 1958, crossed the Indonesian Territory of Timor and entered the Portuguese Territory of Timor, Oe-Kussi, from where they have been transferred by the Portuguese Authorities to Baucau. The fourteen members of the Armed Forces are believed to consist of: one First Lieutenant, one Second Lieutenant, two Sergeants and ten soldiers. The Ministry will greatly appreciate any cooperation from the Government of Portugal in returning the fourteen Indonesian nationals to the Government of Indonesia, as the Ministry is convinced that they have been misguided by propagandists of the anti Government rebellious groups and therefore not conscious of what they were doing. The Ministry also requests that the weapons carried by the fourteen Indonesian nationals mentioned above be returned to the Government of Indonesia.” Subsequently, the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs “noted with pleasure of the best consideration the Government of Portugal have given to the requests made by the Government of the Republic of Indonesia” – and again sought the return of “two brenguns, two stenguns and five Lee Enfield rifles”. That note verbale also advised that “after thorough investigation, it appear that only 2 (two) of the 14 (fourteen) men who entered the Portuguese Territory of Timor are members of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia, e.g.: 1. Ladouw, Lambertus – Corporal; 2. Welong, Udy – Private; while the other 12 men do not belong to the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia.”.214 A few days after the arrival of the Permesta 14, the Indonesian Consul in Dili, Nazwar Jacub (sometimes as “Yacub”) Sutan Indra215, called on the Australian interviewed in the Kupang area in mid-May 1999, “Jeremias” Pello did not admit to service in either the Indonesian military or the Permesta movement before fleeing with the group to Portuguese Timor. 212 The weapons comprised: a Dutch machine gun, a Bren machine gun, an Australian sub-machine gun, a Sten sub-machine gun, a Browning automatic pistol, eight Lee Enfield rifles – together with bayonets and 1,603 rounds of 7.7mm and 9mm ammunition. This listing was compiled by the Chief of Administrative Services in Dili (Intendente L. Lisboa Santos) and forwarded to Lisbon under cover of a letter from Governor Serpa Rosa - No 11, Dili, 1 July 1958 (AHU, Lisbon: MU/GM/GNP/084, Part 15). 213 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Note Verbale No. 23118/I, Djakarta, 28 April 1958. 214 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Note Verbale No. 33007 II-a, Djakarta, 14 June 1958. However, note that according to Rohi, P.A. (journalist, Jakarta), Lambertus Ladow - the leader of the group, and “Yuber” (ie Jobert) Moniaga, had been junior personnel in Yonif 712 (email to author, 25 October 2006). 215 Nazwar Jacub/Yacub Sutan Indra (born in Padang Panjang, West Sumatra – 2 June 1925) served as the Indonesian Consul in Dili from 3 November 1956 until 4 June 1959 – having reportedly completed his designated tour of duty. Nazwar Jacub spoke “excellent English, German and Dutch”. He had a close association with the Islamic community in Dili, funding the refurbishment of the An-Nur mosque

44 Consulate and sought to travel to Australia – for urgent medical treatment. He arrived in Darwin on 1 April 1958 and, having “undergone a thorough check in Darwin, … had been given a clean bill of health on all possible counts” – despite his claims that he was suffering from malaria.216 Consul Jacub also complained of a sore shoulder – however while the “physiotherapist at the hospital in Darwin could find nothing wrong”, Yacub persisted in his assertion and asked for permission to travel to Sydney for specialist examination.” The escape of the 14 Indonesians to Portuguese Timor – and Consul Nazwar Jacub’s sudden visit to Darwin and Sydney, apparently precipitated concerns in the Australian Department of External Affairs on “Political Asylum for Indonesians”:217 “If the revolt in Sumatra is suppressed, it is just conceivable that we will be confronted with isolated requests for political asylum by Indonesians belonging to the dissident movement. Another contingency, although the likelihood of it is very slight, is that we may receive requests for political asylum from Indonesian officials serving in or visiting in Australia.” Within a few days of their arrival in Dili, the 14 Indonesians were soon settled in Baucau - the Province’s second-largest town about 135 kilometres by road east of Dili. The Government provided the Indonesian “asilados políticos” (Portuguese political exiles) with a “daily subsidy of seven patacas per day (43$.75 escudos).” “At the time, this was a generous amount considering the very modest lifestyle of the Timorese – and a worker with the construction service did not receive a weekly wage of much more than this.”218 “They lived without great problems, in a climate of idleness, the majority of them in the company of local girls.”219 However, the Indonesian Consul, Nazwar Jacub Sutan Indra, is also reported to have provided funds to the Indonesian exiles in Baucau as “subsistence” - as they were “neither paid enough by the Portuguese nor allowed to earn enough to live on.”220 in 1957. He was a widower with three children – his wife had died of illness in Dili on 7 January 1957, and his mental stability was questioned by his successor (for Nazwar Jacub, see footnotes 216, 220, 257, 263, 268, 274, 275, 278, 440 and 518). 216 Department of External Affairs – Canberra, 1529/11, 23 April 1958 (NAA: A1838, 1529/11). The Australian Consul - F.J.A. Whittaker, was absent on recreation leave in Australia, and Consul Nazwar Jacub reportedly “stood over” the locally-engaged clerk/interpreter at the Australian Consulate (C.J. Sequeira) on 29 March demanding an authorization to travel to Darwin – Whittaker, F.J.A., Letter to Secretary, Melbourne, 14 April 1958 (NAA: A1838, 1529/11). 217 Department of External Affairs – Canberra, Memo, 16 April 1958 (NAA: A1838, 1529/11) 218 Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., p.53. At pp. 90-92, Barata provides comparative salaries in Timor in 1959, in escudos, together with prices for rice, sugar, potatoes and tobacco. The weekly wage for a civil construction worker is cited as 48 escudos. The pataca was replaced in early 1959 by the escudo – at a rate of one pataca = 5.6 escudos. In 1958, one pataca was the equivalent of 21.5 Australian pence. In 1958, at USD 76, Timor had the lowest per capita GDP of Portugal’s colonies eg: Macau at USD 232; Mozambique: USD 121; Cabo Verde: USD 97. In 1959, Portugal’s per capita GDP was USD 246 – such economic statistics of the period are related in Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., pp. 87-93. 219 Ibid, p.53. 220 As advised to the Australian Consul by the “replacement” Indonesian Consul, Tengku Usman Hussin: Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 78/60, 18 June 1960 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/9). The Australian Consul also reported that the Portuguese police alleged “much larger sums were drawn from the bank than the Consulate would normally need” and that “the rebels, after arrest, had admitted receiving money from the Consul.” Governor Barata also indicated that the Portuguese stipend was not always paid on time and the asilados were in debt to local storekeepers in Baucau - Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., p.79. Consul Nazwar Jacub’s alleged disbursement of funds is also related in an affidavit submitted to the UN Secretary General by José Martins (b. 29 September 19411996, see footnotes 526 and 960), President of the KOTA political party: Implicação da Republica da

45 A few months after the arrival of the ex-Permesta group, the Australian Consul in Dili met with three of the “Indonesian political refugees” when visiting Baucau in early July 1958 and reported221 that the group comprised: “two majors, one first lieutenant, one second lieutenant, two sergeants, and seven other ranks” (ie a total of 13); they were all living in a recently-constructed guest house in Baucau owned by “Mr Ricardo”222; were “all staying in Baucau on the bounty of the Portuguese Government”; and that their spokesman, the First Lieutenant, “mentioned that they were extremely grateful to the Portuguese Government for having granted them asylum, and for the kind way they were being looked after.” The First Lieutenant also

The Estalagem de Santiago – Baucau, 1958 related to the Australian Consul that “at the time they made their break from Kupang, a much larger group set off for Portuguese Timor by another route but were overtaken and captured.”223 According to the Australian Consul, “this First Lieutenant went on to say that if only they could contact Menado [sic] ((ie, the Permesta headquarters in northern Indonesia na Vida de Timor Português [sic], stamped Provisório and Secreto, 23 March 1976 – paragraphs 4-15 cover the 1959 Rebellion (NAA: A1838, 3038/10/13/1 Part 2). 221 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 109/58, 4 July 1958 (NAA: A11604, 605/15A). On ranks, see footnote 214. According to Rohi P.A., the other ranks cited above were “semacam pengakuan di antara mereka sendiri” (“a type of rank self-granted among their group”) – email to author, 27 October 2006. Note that a listing of all deportees - prepared in Angola by the exiled rebels in June 1960, shows Gerson Pello as an alferes (second lieutenant), Albertus Nundun (sic – ie Ndoen/Ndun) as a sarjento da Aviassão (Air Force sergeant), Jeremias Pello as a soldado (soldier) and Lambertus Ladow as a tenente (lieutenant) – and refers to all 14 Indonesians as “homens Armados” (military men) - Costa, F.A.S. da, Os Nomes dos Detidos Timorenses para Angola do Ano de 1959 (The Names of the Timorese Detainees in Angola in 1959), Silva Porto (Bié, Angola), 6 June 1960 – see Annex F. 222 José dos Santos Ricardo – who reportedly bought the land from Venâncio Boavida and built a guest house and small soap and cheese factories (author’s discussions with Marcelino Guterres, Baucau, 28 June 2007). The guest house/hotel, “Estalagem de Santiago”, was acquired by the Government in the mid-late 1960s – correspondence to the author, Sherlock, K., Darwin, 5 October 2007. The “guest house” is now the Pousada de Baucau – ie renamed from the “Hotel Flamboyant” during the Indonesian period. The photographs at the Estalagem were provided by the family of José dos Santos Ricardo to the author in 2007. 223 This may have been a reference to the far larger group led by Kotadia – see footnote 199.

46 Sulawesi)), Menado would most certainly find a means of transporting them to that Port by ship.” The Consul noted his impression that all members of the ex-Permesta group in Baucau “were of the Christian faith”, and the three personnel that he had met impressed him “by their intelligence and courteous bearing.”

Seven of the “Permesta 14” – Estalagem de Santiago, Baucau – 1958 Albert Ndun – second from the left (black trousers) Lambertus Ladow – third from the left (in white, seated); with children of the Ricardo family. As noted earlier, the “replacement” Indonesian Consul, Tengku Usman Hussin, initially contended that the “14” had come from “Manado” (see footnote 203) – but subsequently, in late 1960, the Consul changed his earlier claim and asserted that the 14 had deserted from the Indonesian Army in Kupang and, after committing a series of robberies, had fled to Portuguese Timor and sought asylum.224 In 1958, a meeting of Australian “Heads of Mission” serving in South East Asia concluded: “it is not in Australia’s interests for the Revolutionary Government ((in Sumatra)) to be suppressed.”225 It has been implied that the Australian Government - that was allegedly providing limited clandestine support to the PRRI/Permesta rebels, made a request to the authorities in Portuguese Timor to accept

224

Australian Consulate - Dili, Memo 144/60, 20 October 1960 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 1) – the Indonesian Consul also related that the “full details of the case were forwarded to the Portuguese with a request to return the men as fugitive criminals. However no reply was ever received from the Portuguese; presumably they preferred the political refugee story of the deserters themselves.” Earlier, the Portuguese Army Chief-of-Staff in Dili, Captain Manuel Herculano Chorão de Carvalho, had told the Australian Consul that the Indonesians were part of a group of “385 rebels” from “Indonesian Timor” who had been granted asylum in mid-1958 and relocated to three areas in Portuguese Timor in 1959 – Australian Consulate – Dili, Sav 2, 11 December 1959 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 1). 225 Consensus of Opinion on Main Issues, Meeting of Australian Heads of Mission in South East Asia 1958, Singapore, March 1958, p.3 (NAA: A1838, TS383/1/2/2). For discussion on continuing “to sustain the dissidents by clandestine means” by the United Kingdom and the US, see United Kingdom High Commission – Canberra, Memorandum to Prime Minister R.G. Menzies, 12 March 1958 (NAA: A6705, 34).

47 the 14 Indonesians who had fled from Kupang.226 However, this claim has yet to be substantiated by credible evidence. Immediately after the 14 Indonesians were settled by the Portuguese administration in Baucau (as noted, the Province’s second-largest town, east of Dili), Marcelino (from Venilale, 35 kilometres by road south of Baucau - see footnote 138) reportedly visited the group. Gerson Pello - a leader of the “Indonesian 14”, and Marcelino - a local bangsawan (Bahasa Indonesia - “noble”), became close friends and Gerson regularly visited Marcelino’s home where – according to an Indonesian journalist, they “discussed efforts to struggle to free Timor from Portuguese colonialism as had been suggested by Sukarno. As an initial step, they set up a soccer ((ie football)) coaching programme under which youth - whose nationalist spirit had been awakened, were recruited. Marcelino provided a truck for the training and for travel to matches outside the local area. These soccer matches however were only a cover. The real objective was to establish an underground movement to drive out the Portuguese from East Timor. It was agreed to form two groups. The first group would engage in physical acts using armed force. The smaller second group, as the ‘konseptor’, would prepare a government for when independence was achieved by the first group. Contact between the two groups was conducted secretly – so that if the first group failed and were captured, they could not reveal the role of the second group, enabling the second group to continue the struggle.”227 In the author’s 2007 interviews with Marcelino (Marcelino António Fausto Guterres), Marcelino related meeting Gerson Pello at a Baucau hospital in late 1959 while seeking medical assistance for his (Marcelino’s) young blind daughter and developing a friendship with Gerson – and both played football together. However, 226

The PRRI (Pemerintah Revolusionir Republik Indonesia) was declared at Bukittinggi (Sumatra) on 15 February 1958. While there were also regional autonomy issues, the secessionist PRRI led by dissident Army officers was opposed to the growing influence of communists in the Sukarno Government in Jakarta. The Permesta movement aligned itself with PRRI on 17 February 1958 – and the two rebellions subsequently proposed amalgamation into a united front - ie the Federal Republic of Indonesia. United States covert support to the PRRI/Permesta (Operation HAIK: CIA with US Navy and Air Force support) is well documented – see Kennedy, D.B., Operation HAIK …, 1996. For alleged Australian involvement see Slater, S. and Waterford, J., “Finger in the Pie”, The Canberra Times, Canberra, 17 February 1991, p.1 and pp.17-18. This press item cites Australian Department of External Affairs cables and contends that the Australian External Affairs Minister - Richard Casey, directed the Secretary of the Department of External Affairs - Arthur Tange, to “get in touch” with Portuguese authorities ie with a view to using Portuguese Timor as a “communications base” and monitoring events in “Ambon and the Moluccas” – p.17. The foregoing is also cited extensively in an Indonesian publication: Soebadio, H., Keterlibatan Australi dalam Pemberontakan …, 2002, pp.226 251 and in a reviewing article by Piliang, I.J., Australia Terlibat dalam Pemberontakan PRRI/ Permesta, Jakarta, 14 August 2002. Moreover, a report by the Australian Senate – citing the press article “Finger in the Pie” by Slater and Waterford (above), asserts: “The officers had come to Portuguese Timor as a result of a request by the Menzies Government to Portugal in March 1958 for co-operation in assisting a rebel movement (Permesta) in Sulawesi and Maluku.”: Australian Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, Final Report on the Inquiry into East Timor, Canberra, 7 December 2000, p,116, paragraph 6.16, footnote 21. However, as yet, there appears to be no direct or credible evidence that Australia specifically requested the Portuguese authorities to accept the 14 “Permesta asylum seekers” – see also the concluding Summary and Discussion section of this monograph. 227 Rohi, P.A., email to author, 19 January 2007. Peter Rohi - then a Surabaya-based journalist, and Gerson Pello reportedly visited Marcelino in Venilale in 1996. Rohi’s interview with Marcelino is related briefly in Rohi, P. A., “Soekarno, KAA, dan Timor-Leste”, Kongres, Jakarta, 28 April 2005 & marhaenis.org, 9 May 2005. For Marcelino’s alleged attendance at the 1955 Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung, see footnotes 136-141. The veracity of Rohi’s account of Marcelino’s involvement is further considered in the concluding “Discussion” section of this monograph.

48 Marcelino denied any involvement with the 1959 Rebellion or any “underground movement” – although he was acquainted with Abel da Costa Belo of Baucau and several other Timorese who were actively involved. Rather, according to Marcelino, he remained committed to the concept and ideals of the 1955 Asia-Africa Conference and its “Movement” – and continued to await further contact from the Indonesian Consul.228 Some months later, on 21 December 1958, following an internal argument among the Indonesian group, five were relocated by the Portuguese authorities from Baucau Town further south to the Viqueque Circunscrição 229 ie about 205 kilometres by road east-southeast of Dili. According to Gerson Pello: “because I quarrelled with Lambert Kling Ladaw [sic], the 14 of us from Kupang were divided into two groups. Five were sent to Uatolari and exiled there.”230 This “Uatolari Group” comprised: Gerson Pello, Jeremias Pello, Albert Ndoen, Jezkial Fola and Jobert Moniaga. In the 1950s, the Uatolari (Leça) Posto administrative centre was located in Afaloicai village, about 47 kilometres by road from Viqueque Town ie in the hills - (altitude 257 metres) about three kilometres to the north of the south coast road and about three km east of the Bebui River – see the map of the Viqueque Circunscrição at Annex A.231 However, despite being termed the “Uatolari” group, the five Indonesians resided in the centre of Viqueque Town – in houses on the eastern side of the Town’s main square ie opposite the Posto headquarters and residence of the Portuguese Administrator (see map at page 64). Soon after their arrival, all five Indonesians began to openly criticize the excesses of Portuguese rule and proselytize the success and advances of Indonesian independence – with Gerson Pello the most active. The Indonesians also attracted the attention and admiration of Timorese youth by teaching pencak silat – an Indonesian form of martial arts, and by their skilled participation in local football matches including in Luca, Ossú, Uatolari and Uato-Carabau.232

228

During discussions with the author in Baucau (28 June 2007), Marcelino proudly displayed a copy of a 1980 handbook on the Bandung Conference and again related his visit to Bandung in December 1996 – see footnote 141. Marcelino also stated that Gerson Pello had visited him in Venilale in 1983 and 1994. Marcelino admitted that he had owned a “painting” of President Sukarno – but that he had bought it in Dili, not Bandung (ie contrary to Peter Rohi’s press item - see footnote 136). Marcelino had been employed as a driver by his father – and subsequently by a Chinese merchant. In mid-1974, he was noted as a “mototoriste mecânico” [sic] employed by the Câmara Municipal de Baucau – BOdT, No.30, 27 July 1974, p.583 and No.31, 3 August 1974. 229 As noted earlier, a Circunscrição was a modern-day District comprising several Postos - ie modernday Sub-Districts. Note that “Viqueque” was a Circunscrição, a Posto and a town. 230 Rohi, P.A., “Apa Kata …”, Mutiara 776, 1995, op.cit., p.14. The “Uatolari” Group in the Viqueque Circunscrição comprised: Gerson Pello, Jeremias Pello, Albert Ndoen/Ndun, Jezkial Fola – whose parents-in-law were all from Rote/Roti island; and “Yuber” (ie Jobert) Moniaga from Manado in northern Sulawesi. Barata, F.T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., p.53 notes the five moved to Viqueque on 21 December as comprising “Gerson Pello, Albert Ndoen, Jehsekial Follo, Jeremias Pello and Jobert Moniaga”. 231 In 1978-79, the Posto/Kecamatan offices were relocated by the Indonesian administration to Matahoi village on the coast road - ie about seven kilometres to the south-west of the original Posto location. 232 See maps at pages 62 and 70 - author’s discussions with Hermenegildo da Cruz, Constantino de Oliveira Simões, António Pinto and Rogério Pinto in Viqueque Town – 29 June 2007.

49 Security Concerns on the Lautém Coast On 14 July 1958, the Governor of Portuguese Timor, César Serpa Rosa233, departed Dili for Lisbon - and the Military Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Aguiar234, was appointed as Encarregado de Governo (Acting Governor). Lieutenant Colonel Aguiar was described as dedicated and conscientious – “but of a reserved temperament” and “less accustomed to the subtleties of politics.”235 However, according to the Australian Consul in Dili, Governor Serpa Rosa’s “successor as Acting Governor would not accept any responsibility with the result that Timorese affairs stagnated and the various Administrators in the interior were left to their own devices.”236 The Acting Governor was faced with several security concerns: - in late 1958, 16 rifles were stolen from the military storehouse in Dili (13 of which were eventually recovered); - to the east, Indonesian contraband copra traders were continuing to visit the northern coast of the Lautém Circunscrição; - and weapons and explosives were being traded to Indonesian vessels from Japanese wartime caches in the Lautém and Viqueque Circunscrições.237 In May 1959, the Army Chief-of-Staff in Dili reported that Indonesian boats from the Celebes (Sulawesi) and the nearby island of Kisar, crewed by “Celebes rebels” (ie Permesta – see footnote 190) were continuing to visit the Lautém north coast and “intimidate the local administrative authority.”238 Accordingly, in May, a military detachment - commanded by Portuguese Army Sergeant Carneiro Cirineu, was stationed at Lospalos as a security measure. In late May, an Indonesian vessel (“prau” or “corcóra”) landed on the Lautém coast and its crew came ashore. Several rifles were seized from the Indonesians – and the weapons were flown from Baucau to

233

Captain César Maria de Serpa Rosa served as Governor from 31 December 1950 to July 1958 – he had previously served as the Governor of Zambesia Province, Mozambique. A replacement Governor, Major (Engineer - Materiel Services) Filipe José Freire Themudo Barata (1918-2003), arrived in Dili on 22 June 1959 and assumed his appointment – ie a few days after the end of the military action against the rebels in the Viqueque Circunscrição. He should not be confused with Brigadier Francisco António Pires Barata - the commander of military forces in Portuguese Timor from 1961, who became Acting Governor in April 1963 on the departure of Governor (then) Lieutenant Colonel F.J.F.T. Barata. 234 Lieutenant Colonel (Infantry) Manuel Albuquerque Gonçalves de Aguiar – arrived in Portuguese Timor on 7 May 1957 and relinquished his position as Acting Governor to F.J.F.T Barata in late June 1959 and his appointment as Military Commander in October 1959 to Lieutenant Colonel (Cavalry) Serpa Soares. 235 Barata, F.T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., p. 42, p.50 – comment by Governor F.T. Barata. 236 Australian Department of External Affairs, “Indonesia and Portuguese Timor” (Brief by J.A. Benson), Canberra, May 1964 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 3). “Fillipe Ribeiro” [sic], the Administrator of the Baucau Circunscrição, was described by a visiting United States official as “reportedly inept, corrupt and slightly unbalanced.” - US Embassy - Djakarta, Despatch 138, 19 August 1960 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 1). For the career of Administrator 2nd Class José Maria Ribeiro Filipe (b. 11 June 1910) see BOdT, No.51, 26 December 1959, p.844. Filipe was transfered from Baucau to Ermera on 12 March 1960. 237 Barata, F.T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., p.51. 238 Carvalho, M.H.C. de, Captain, “Incidents with Indonesian Rebel Boats”, Report 2/59, Dili, 14 May 1959. For earlier landings of Moluccan RMS rebels in the Lautém area in 1955, see footnote 145.

50 Dili.239 The Acting Governor despatched the Chief of Administrative Services, Intendente Dr Lisboa Santos, to the area to investigate matters – including to the Laivai area (about 60 km east of Baucau town), but his report was inconclusive.240 Subsequently, the Australian Consul reported that the confiscated rifles “were of the old Dutch NEI pattern” and confirmed that “the crew members were returned to their prau, and ordered put to sea. The authorities now believe, as one of the crew members said, that those who possess rifles carry them on their trading ventures as there is very little security in their areas and a rifle is a necessary possession. However, the authorities also believe that these Indonesians intended contacting local Chinese in the Lautém district with a view to bartering copra for manufactured goods.”241 Conditions in the Viqueque and Baucau Circunscrições The Viqueque Circunscrição (see map at Annex A) comprised four Postos: Ossú (1st class Posto); Uatolari (2nd Class Posto); and Lacluta and Uato-Carabau (3rd Class Postos). Viqueque Town - the location of the Administrador and the offices of the Circunscrição, also functioned as a Posto Sede (Central Posto) administering the Town and a surrounding area.242 The Viqueque Circunscrição had an “administrative management”243 of civil servants – in order of rank: an Administrator (Administrador); a Secretary (Secretário); a Chefe de Posto (1st class) – at Ossú; an Aspirante; an Encarregado de Posto (ie Posto Administrator) (2nd class) – at Uatolari; two Encarregado de Posto (3rd class) – at Lacluta and Uato-Carabau; an Intérprete; a First Corporal Sipai244; four Second Corporal Sipais; and 13 Sipais.245 Conditions in the Viqueque Circunscrição in the mid-late 1950s246 have been described at the time as follows: “Conditions were notoriously bad … even though whipping and the use of the palmatória247 had been outlawed three years before, these practices continued 239

Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 123/59, 7 June 1959 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 1). The Consul reported that there were no casualties in the clash - and also reported seeing eight of the seized rifles being off-loaded from the Portuguese aircraft in Dili on 30 May 1959. 240 Barata, F.T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., p.51. 241 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 155/59, 3 August 1959, p.4 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 1). 242 The boundaries of the Viqueque Circunscrição and its Postos (Divisão Administrativa) were detailed in Diploma Legislativo No 555, BOdT, No.22 – Suplemento, 5 June 1959, pp.391- 393. 243 “Administrative management” refers to personnel of the Civil Administrative Services. A small number of civil servants from other government agencies and services - eg the meteorological, health, public works, and agricultural and veterinary services, also served in the Circunscrição. 244 Sipai (plural: Sipais) were indigenous police – appointed as members of the Corpo de Polícia. Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., p.55, footnote 13 describes “sipaio” (also as “cipaio” in some documents) as “Timorese guards with a police function and rudimentary training.” The “Corpo de Cipaios” was established on 28 December 1945 as promulgated in Legislative Diploma No.247 (BOdT, No.9, 21 December 1946, pp.55-56). This provided for a first corporal and six privates at each Circunscrição centre - and a second corporal and two privates at each Posto. 245 As provided for in the Provincial Budget for 1959 (BOdT, No.52, Suplemento 2, 31 December 1958, p.808), the “total annual salaries” for each of these appointments, in escudos, were: Administrador: 14,256; Secretário: 8,496; Aspirante: 5,760; Chefe de Posto - 1st class: 7,200; Encarregado de Posto – 2nd Class: 4,608; Encarregado de Posto - 3rd Class: 3,648; Intérprete: 1,920; First Corporal Sipai: 720; Second Corporal Sipai: 624; Sipai: 528. Sipais were phased out in the early 1970s when replaced by guardas auxiliares of the Corpo Polícia de Segurança Pública de Timor (founded in 1963) and the Polícia Municipal (BOdT, No.52, Suplemento, 31 December 1974). 246 As noted earlier at footnote 177, abuses in the countryside – including in Viqueque, were detailed by a group of rebels in Araújo, A. de (et al), Memorandum – Assunto: Sobre o acontecimento …, 21 April 1960 – see Annex D. See also Duarte, J.M., “Memorandum sobre o acontecimento em Timor em 1959”, 31 August 1960, op.cit. For Viqueque, see also footnote 110.

51 there. People had to work for paltry wages. The administration had cut the wages offered to the local labourers by the Australian-owned Timor Oil Company to less than one third of what the company had offered.”248 Further, and more specifically – “the rebellion … was triggered by dissatisfaction of local villagers against the corruption by the Portuguese administrador (district head). One of his corrupt practices was to reduce the wages provided by Timor Oil for villagers involved in the company’s oil production activities in Aliambata. The corrupt district head reduced the A$300 and A$90 wages provided by the company to A$21, and pocketed the lion [sic] share. Yet the villagers still had to work for Timor Oil. Those who refused, were locked up. Eventually, the people could not stand this exploitative behaviour of their colonial master, and the 1959 Viqueque rebellion started.”249 The movement of Timorese between areas was restricted as “every Timorese was legally required to obtain a transit pass (guia de transito) if he wished to leave his posto, either temporarily or permanently. Therefore, the Timorese did not travel between postos as much as they might otherwise have done.”250 An exiled Timorese rebel leader, José Manuel Duarte – writing from the Bié penal colony in Angola in 1960, claimed “all this ill-treatment and abuse practised in Timor … put the idea in our heads to plan a revolt and demand our rights as free citizens.”251 Duarte stated that he “had been complaining since 1953 against the 247

The palmatória was a stick (a “ferule”) – about 2cm thick and about 40cm long, with a disc at the end (with holes so as not to cushion the blow). The palmatória was used to strike the palm of the hand repeatedly – “It’s really painful. Sometimes they would beat someone’s hand until the hand became swollen and was bleeding. If they hit you a lot, you couldn’t use your hand for weeks. … Sometimes people got it simply because they could not afford to pay the imposto ((head tax)).” - Pinto, C. and Jardine, M., East Timor’s Unfinished Struggle: Inside the Timorese Resistance – A Testimony, South End Press, Boston, 1997, pp.33-34. See also Belo, C.F.X. Dom, “A Revolta de 1959”, op.cit., 2009, p.1. For the Australian military’s revulsion at such punishment during World War II see Ayris, C., All The Bull’s Men, PK Print Pty Ltd, Hamilton Hill, 2006, p.84; and Callinan, B.J., Independent Company …, 1953, op.cit., pp.127-128. 248 Lennox, R., Fighting Spirit of East Timor – the life of Martinho da Costa Lopes, Pluto Press, Annandale, 2000, p.63. 249 Aditjondro, G.J., Is oil thicker than blood ?, 1999, footnote 10 - cites interviews to support the above. His references indicate that his indirect source on this misappropriation of wages however is Araújo, A.L.J. de (et al), Memorandum – Assunto: Sobre o acontecimento, op.cit, p.3 – included in Annex D, that details this corrupt activity by the “Administrador da Circunscrição”. Accordingly, the “A$” figure cited by Aditjondro should be $ as “escudos” – ie at a rate of escudos per month (compare with figures at footnote 218). Timor Oil Limited had held concessions on the south coast since 1908 (see, Timor Development Syndicate, A Few Impressions of Portuguese Timor, Sydney, 1912 - NAA: A1336, 2526; and references in Chamberlain E.P., The Struggle …, 2004/2008, op.cit.). Post-WWII, the company was re-established in early 1957, and a company work camp was established in Uatolari near the Posto offices. Drilling recommenced at Aliambata in mid-October 1957 but was moved westward to Beaco several months later. In September 1960, Timor Oil’s operations ceased in Viqueque, and drilling operations recommenced at a site in Suai. When drilling commenced at Aliambata in 1957, the Administrator of Viqueque was Francisco de Salles d’Andrade e Castro Botelho Torrezão (since at least 1955 until mid-July 1958) – and replaced by Artur Marques Ramos (b. 9 October 1928) on 10 October 1958 (NAA: A1838, 3038/10/12/2 Part 2; 756/2/4/1). 250 Hicks, D., “Unachieved Syncretism: the local level political system in Portuguese Timor”, Anthropos Institut, 78, Edition St-Augustin, Switzerland, 1983, p.24, footnote 8 – focusing specifically on Viqueque. 251 “Todos estes maus tratos e abusos praticados pelos mandantes de Timor, à sombre da sua autoridade, levaram-nos à cabeça a ideia de planear a revolta para reclamar os nossos direitos de cidadãos livres.” - Duarte, J.M., “Memorandum sobre o acontecimento em Timor em 1959”, 31 August 1960, op.cit,, p.7. Jolliffe, J., Cover-Up, 2001, pp.45-46 and 325-326 quotes from Duarte’s

52 Portuguese use of forced labour, whipping and other forms of corporal punishment, and wage discrimination against Timorese.”252 Duarte also wrote of Timorese being “beaten with whips (called chouriços - or ‘sausages’, in Timorese slang)” and noted that the “many abuses in Timor are the reason for the planning of a revolt to ask for our rights as free citizens.”253 He also related a clash in 1958 between him and the then recently-arrived Secretary/Acting Administrator of the Viqueque Circunscrição, Artur Marques Ramos.254 Indignant at Portuguese oppression and injustices, it appears that some of the Indonesian exiles - with the encouragement and some funds from the Indonesian Consul, collaborated with local dissident Timorese and planned an uprising in the Viqueque Circunscrição (and possibly the Baucau Circunscrição to the north) in support of the main effort to be undertaken in Dili. Jeremias Pello - the youngest of the 14 Indonesians, related that “after we mixed with the local people, we joined in their struggle against the Portuguese … they all felt oppressed and therefore had to fight to free themselves from their colonial shackles.”255 At about this time, the Australian Consul in Dili summarised the seemingly benign security situation in Portuguese Timor, noting: Memorandum that “described whippings, torture, arbitrary injustices and racial discrimination” – see also Jolliffe, J., Balibo, 2009, p.62. Duarte’s Memorandum was forwarded by the PIDE Delegation in Angola to Lisbon – then sent by the Director of the PIDE to the President of the Council of Ministers (PIDE, No. 7.434-S.R., Lisbon, 2 November 1960). Duarte’s statement is also related in Jolliffe, J., “Indonesia now wants all the gory details”, The Canberra Times, Canberra, 19 August 1995, p.17. 252 Australian Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, Final Report on the Inquiry into East Timor, p.116, paragraph 6.16. See also Australian Consulate – Dili, SAV.3, 15 August 1955 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1, Part 1) – as noted earlier (at footnote 142) in mid-1955, the Australian Consul - citing a senior Portuguese administrator, had reported: “recent calls on conscripted labour …, life under the Administrator of Manatuto ((to the northwest of Viqueque)) was worse than under the Japanese.” For later descriptions, see Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 158/60 “Visit to Kupang”, 23 November 1960 (NAA: A4359, 201/2/8/12); Memo 73/61 “Conditions in Portuguese Timor”, 10 May 1961 (NAA: A1838, 3038/1/1 Part 1 & 3038/2/1 Part 3) – including on race and class relations; and Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 172, 20 September 1963 – later disseminated as Dunn, J.S., “The Timorese under Portuguese Administration” – five pages, Digest of Despatches, Serial No. 19, Department of External Affairs, Canberra, 13 December 1963 (NAA: A1838, 756/2 Part 1). José Alexandré (Xanana) Gusmão also recounted whippings and other abuses by functionaries of the Portuguese administration – although use of the whip and cane had, in theory, been banned by the Government in 1956: Gusmão, X. (Niner, S. ed), To Resist is to Win !, 2000, p.6. and Chega !, CAVR Final Report, Part 3, para 27. Such practices contrasted with the concept of a benign “civilizational plurality” and harmonious racial interaction espoused in the concept of Lusotropicalismo (Gilberto Freyre, 1900-1987 and António de Almeida, 1900-1984) – see Sousa, I.C. de, “The Portuguese Colonization and the Problem of East Timorese Nationalism”, pp.183-194 in Lusotopie 2001, Paris, 2001 and also related articles analysing this concept and its practice in Lusotropicalisme - Lusotopie 1997, Paris, 1997. 253 Duarte, J.M., “Memorandum sobre o acontecimento em Timor em 1959”, 31 August 1960, op.cit., p. 5 and Berlie, J., email to author, 13 December 2006. See also footnote 413, for Francisco Xavier do Amaral’s similar criticisms of corporal punishment by Portuguese using the “chicote” (a two-tailed hand whip) and also Pinto, C. and Jardine, M., East Timor’s Unfinished Struggle, op.cit., 1997, p.33. 254 Ibid (Duarte, J.M.), p.9 – Acting Administrator Ramos tore up Duarte’s submission – “to show who was the boss”. Artur Marques Ramos (b. 9 October 1928) was appointed a trainee (estagiario) Chefe de Posto in May 1955 vide BOdT, No.19, 7 May 1955, p.415, and his first appointment was as the Chefe de Posto at Laga in July 1955 vide BOdT, No.31, 30 July 1955, p.672, and transferred to Laclubar in May 1956. A “diplomado” of the “Overseas Administration Course”, he does not appear to have served as an aspirante or sat the Chefe de Posto examinations. Secretary Artur Marques Ramos – who had been transferred to Viqueque on promotion from Ermera, was appointed Acting Administrator of the Viqueque Circunscrição on 10 October 1958 (BOdT, No.43, 25 October 1958, p.653). 255 Sarong, F., “Pejuang …”, 1999, op.cit., p.2.

53 “There are no political factors in Portuguese Timor and therefore no political leaders … no Secondary Industry – therefore there are no labour troubles.”256 The Rebel Leadership – and its Direction The principal Timorese rebels were Luís da Costa Rego (Luís Cina/China) in Dili and Amaro de Araújo in Viqueque – assisted by José Ramos de Sousa Gama (Zeca), Domingos da Conceição Pereira, João Pereira da Silva (Chiquito), José Manuel Duarte, David Verdial (known as “Garuda”), and Germano das Dores Alves da Silva – while the leaders of the Indonesian exiles involved in the Rebellion were Gerson Pello and, possibly, Lambertus Ladow. According to the analysis of the Australian diplomatic service: “apparently, the revolt was fomented by the Indonesian Consul in Dili, Nazwar Jacub257, who organised and presided at secret meetings in Dili of certain discontented elements of the population. The half-castes and the assimilated Timorese who were employed in the lower grades of the Civil Service were undoubtedly dissatisfied by pitifully inadequate wages … It seems certain that the Consul was not acting under instructions from Jakarta: this much was admitted by the Portuguese Government.”258 Soon after the uprising, the Australian Consul had reported to Canberra that “the ADC to the Governor has informed me that they do not intend to make any issue with Djakarta concerning the activities of the Indonesian ‘Political Refugees’ and their former Consul Nazwar Jacub. They will merely ask Djakarta to take the Indonesians now held in custody as being unwanted here.”259 Two weeks later, the recentlyarrived Governor, Major Filipe José Freire Themudo Barata, wrote to the Ministry of the Interior in Lisbon reporting that: “The former Indonesian Consul (Nazwar Jacub) and Consulate personnel had taken a preponderant and active part in the preparations; and the Indonesian political refugees (at least the senior ones) had links with Indonesian authorities (Government rebels ?) … and expected armed support via the north coast … ((and)) were, without doubt, the heads of the insurgency, and at least for some of the time acted in accordance with Consul Jacub.” Importantly, however, Governor Barata noted: “Nothing was found that allowed us to confirm or deny that the Indonesian Government had instigated or was aware of the event.”260 Governor 256

Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 45/59: “Biographical Notes on Personalities in Portuguese Timor”, 2 March 1959 (The National Archives – Kew: FO 371 143954). 257 Nazwar Jacub/Yacub Sutan Indra (born Padang Panjang, West Sumatra – 2 June 1925) served as the Indonesian Consul in Dili from 3 November 1956 until recalled on 4 June 1959 (see footnotes 215, 263, 275 and 440) – having reportedly completed his designated tour of duty. His replacement Tengku Usman Hussin, claimed that Nazwar Jacub had been “mentally deranged” and that Jacub was later reprimanded by the Indonesian authorities for his involvement with the uprising : see Australian Consulate – Dili, Saving 25, 19 April 1960 and Sav 37, 10 June 1960 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 1). 258 Australian Department of External Affairs, “Indonesia and Portuguese Timor” (Brief by J.A. Benson), Canberra, May 1964 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 3). 259 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 143/59, 14 July 1959, p.2 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 1). The Governor of Portuguese Timor, Major Filipe José Freire Themudo Barata (footnote 233) took up his post on 22 June 1959 – about two weeks after the uprising in Viqueque. Several years later - in October 1969, as a Colonel, Barata was elected to the National Assembly in Lisbon as the representative of Portuguese Timor. 260 Barata, F. J. F. T. Governor, Letter No.15 to the Minister of the Interior, Dili, 27 July 1959, paragraph 2. However, Portuguese authorities reportedly informed United States officials that the Rebellion “had been caused by Indonesians given asylum from the revolts in Sumatra and Celebes”: Australian Embassy - Washington, Cable, 25 July 1959 (NAA: A11604, 605/15A). Connect with later personal views by Barata on official Indonesian involvement described at footnotes 1019-1022.

54 Barata also noted that the majority of the natives that supported the rebels were naïve and had been influenced by reports of a “secret revelation” by “Lucia, the clairvoyant of Fátima” that “1960 would be the era of liberation for Timor.”261 However, the Army Chief-of-Staff in Dili, Captain Carvalho, in discussion with the Australian Consul, “speculated that they were either under orders from Jakarta to test Timorese reaction to the prospect of the country becoming Indonesian, or from the Indonesian rebel movement who might have been trying to embarrass the Central Government by making it appear that they were interfering in Portuguese affairs.”262 The Chief of Police in Dili “did not believe the Indonesian Consul was acting under instruction from the Djakarta Government, but was working for the Indonesian rebels combined with a hatred for the Portuguese” – he also noted that the Indonesian Consul, Nazwar Jacub, was a Sumatran from “Kotta Tingghi”, the early centre of the PRRI rebellion.263 Several years later, then ex-Governor Barata wrote that “the investigators thought that Consul Nazwar Jacub took the full initiative for events in solidarity with the rebels in Sumatra – seeing success in an uprising in Timor as a consolidation for its party. Perhaps this has a great deal of truth … .”264 However, the Australian Consul noted that there was “nothing to support Carvalho’s suggestion that the Indonesian rebel movement might have been behind the trouble except that Jacub was a Sumatran who professed little love for the Javanese. The selection of Usman, another Sumatran, to take Jacub’s place may be an indication that Jakarta did not subscribe to this theory.”265 In August 1960, Governor Barata discussed events with the Australian Consul who summarised the Governor’s remarks as follows: “There has been no acceptable evidence produced that Indonesia had anything to do with last year’s unrest although the Portuguese feel that Djakarta’s rather overdone concern for the welfare of the Indonesians who had been arrested showed where their sympathies lay (the Governor was referring to the efforts of the present Indonesian Consul, Tengku Usman Hussin, to obtain details of the charges against these people and his protests at the way they were being held without trial). In the Governor’s view, Djakarta was probably not the instigator but was, nevertheless, willing to exploit the situation to the full once it had developed, presumably with the object of discrediting the Portuguese system. … Nor was there any evidence to suggest that these refugees were other than genuine rebels as they had claimed. The fact that the Consul had been distributing money to the refugees proved nothing, he said, because the sums involved were not so large as to suggest that special funds, outside normal consular requirements, had been made available to him. The stories of arms being brought in, he dismissed as baseless rumours which had doubtless been started by the refugees to gain adherents to their 261

Ibid, Barata, F.J.F.T., Letter No. 15, paragraph 3. This is a reference to the prophecies of Lucia dos Santos - one of the children who reportedly spoke with an apparition of the Virgin Mary at Fátima, Portugal, in 1917. 262 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 78/60, 18 June 1960, p.1 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 1). 263 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 155/59, 3 August 1959, p.1 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 1). The PRRI was proclaimed at “Bukit Tinggi”, Sumatra – see preceding footnote 226; and for data on Indonesian Consul Nazwar Jacub Indra - see footnotes 215, 216, 257, 263, 268, 274, 275, 278, 440 and 518. 264 Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., p.73. 265 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 78/60, 18 June 1960, p.4 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 1). In mid-1960, Tengku Usman Hussin commented that “Djakarta … used Sumatrans for posts such as Dili, while all the popular ones went to Javanese officers … Sumatrans had to either go where they were posted or resign.” : Australian Consulate – Dili, Sav 38, 10 June 1960 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 1). The first “Javanese” Consul to serve in Dili, Raden Emas Jonopranoto, replaced Tengku Usman Hussin in August 1961.

55 cause.”266 At about this time, a United States diplomat visiting from Jakarta noted that the Indonesian Chancellor in Dili, Sastrawidjaja, “spoke quite frankly about the role of the previous Consul General, Mr. JACUB in fomenting and exploiting [sic] the insurrection of 1959.”267 Jacub’s replacement as the Indonesian Consul in Dili, Tengku Usman Hussin, later told the Australian Consul that Jacub “simply hated the Portuguese ((he blamed them for the death of his wife, Asma Yunus – died 7 January 1957, buried at Taibessi)) and may have encouraged the Indonesians privately. He was certain to help them financially, but this could be explained by the fact that the Portuguese neither gave them enough, nor allowed them to earn enough money to live on.”268 The Tengku also related that “Jacub apparently had the Indonesians using the ‘Merdeka’ ((‘Freedom’)) cry”, and “he ((the Tengku)) said that Jacob had behaved oddly in a number of ways before his departure and implied he had become perhaps a little unbalanced at the shock of his wife’s death.” The Australian Consul also reported: “As for the suggestion that the Indonesian Government was behind the affair, the Tengku dismissed this as a convenient invention by the Portuguese to hide the fact that there is genuine discontent in the country.” Much later, in a 1999 interview – as related earlier, Jeremias Pello, one of the “Indonesian 14” exiled to Lisbon and Angola, indicated that the Indonesian role in the uprising in the countryside was not pre-eminent eg “Under the coordination of a number of local identities such as João Pereira da Silva (killed in Aileu), Luís da Costa Rego, David Verdial, Salem Sagran, and Domingos da Conceição Pereira – we ((ie the Indonesians)) were given tasks.”269 The Plan In November and December 1958, the Indonesian Consul Nazwar Jacub reportedly sent João Pereira da Silva - a Timorese medical assistant employed by the Health Services, to Baucau in order to brief the Indonesian asilados on the plan for the uprising. In December, the Indonesian Consul himself visited Baucau. In early February 1959, Luís da Costa Rego - a driver employed by the Agricultural and Vetinerary Service, travelled to Viqueque to explain the plans for the attack to Gerson Pello and Albert Ndoen – two of the five Indonesians who had been relocated to the

266

Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 114/60, 25 August 1960, p.1 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 1). Connect also with Governor Barata’s later views on official Indonesian involvement at footnotes 10191022. 267 United States Embassy – Jakarta, Despatch 138, 19 August 1960, p.2 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 1). 268 Australian Consulate – Dili, Saving 25, 19 April 1960 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 1). Jacub’s wife had died of illness in Dili, and Jacub apparently blamed the poor medical treatment at the Dili Hospital as causing his wife’s death. The Australian Consul added that “Whatever the truth of the Tengku’s version, in my opinion he believes it. For my part, I am prepared to accept it, pending my receiving something official on the outcome of the Lisbon enquiry.” 269 Sarong, F. “Pejuang …”, 1999, op.cit., p.2. However, contrary to Jeremias’ statement above, João Pereira da Silva (from Manatuto) was not killed in Aileu in 1959 – but transported to Lisbon on 8 June 1959, later exiled to Angola, returned to East Timor and was a founder of the Apodeti political party and Ketua Cabang (Branch Chairman) in 1974 (see footnotes 526 and 527). However, João Pereira da Silva was detained by Fretilin in Dili in August 1975, taken from prison in December – see Australian Embassy – Jakarta, Memo 389, 15 March 1976 (NAA: A10463, 801/13//11/1 Part 21), and killed by Fretilin in the Aileu area in early 1976. For other references to João Pereira da Silva, see also footnotes 140, 186, 270, 506, 515, 523, 528, 547 and 867.

56 Viqueque Circunscrição in late December 1958.270 Following these visits by the Indonesian Consul and his “emissaries”, two of the Indonesian group, “Lieutenant” Lambertus Ladow and “Lieutenant” Gerson Pello reportedly travelled “frequently and clandestinely” throughout the Circunscrições of Baucau and Viqueque – with Lambertus visiting villages in Baucau, Laga (35 kilometres by road east of Baucau), and Ossú (21 kilometres by road north of Viqueque town); and Gerson visiting villages in the Postos of Uatolari and Uato-Carabau (northeast of Viqueque town).271 In Dili, two of the conspirators, accompanied by a “corporal” (probably Francisco Orlando de Fátima Soares), reportedly made a reconnaissance of the Portuguese military headquarters at Taibessi – noting the locations of military stores, guard posts, sentries, and the duty officer.272 By early March 1959, the plan for the uprising had reportedly been completed.273 The Timorese conspirators originally planned the uprising for 28 May 1959 – when the two major recreational clubs in Dili, the Sporting Club de Timor and Sporting Club e Benfica, would be holding functions to celebrate the anniversary of their founding. However, in the first days of May 1959, Indonesian Consul Nazwar Jacub reportedly convened a planning meeting at Areia Branca - a beach area on Dili’s eastern outskirts, attended by “tens” of the conspirators274, and convinced them to delay the date of the revolt until the night of 31 December when the uprising could exploit Portuguese unpreparedness during the New Year celebrations.275 He noted that any noise of the revolt would then be covered by the sound of “panchoes” - ie fireworks and rockets. However, the meeting was reportedly tense – several of the Timorese disagreed with the deferment of the revolt and left the meeting. Before 270

Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., p. 218 – Annex V, Report of the Police Superintendent, Abílio da Paixão Monteiro, 25 July 1959. The visit to Viqueque in February 1959 by Luís da Costa Rego is also referred to in Araújo, A.L.J. de (et al), Memorandum – Assunto: Sobre o acontecimento ocorrido em 7 de Junhe [sic] de 1959, na Cirrcunscrição [sic] de Viqueque – Timor, six pages, Cólonia Penal do Bié (Angola), 21 April 1960 in Araújo, A.L.J. de, O Célebre Massacré de Uato-Lari e Uato-Carbau Verificado no Ano de 1959 (The Truth of the Infamous Massacre at Uatolari and Uato-Carabau in 1959), Dili, 2005. A copy of the Memorandum is included in Annex D. 271 Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., p.54. Governor Barata refers to both as “Lieutenants”. 272 Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., p.56. According to one Timorese source, there were reportedly “factions” within the rebel movement in Dili in early 1959 – as related in Lisbon in 2002 by the deported rebel Matias Guterres de Sousa (of Uatolari) to his cousin Carlos da Silva (email to author – 12 June 2009) – ie contending that assistance would only be sought from Indonesia if Portugal rejected the rebels’ demands for the dismissal of “corruptors” and improved social and economic conditions. 273 Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., p. 218 – Annex V, Report of the Police Superintendent, Abílio da Paixão Monteiro, 25 July 1959. 274 Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., p.59 – also notes the attendance of Jacub’s children. However, in discussions in Dili with the author on 2 April 2007, former rebels Evaristo da Costa, Frederico de Almeida Santos da Costa and Salem Sagran insisted that the only meeting at Areia Branca attended by the subsequent rebels was hosted by Crispim Borges de Araújo to thank Vicente Vidal and Mário Martins for their assistance in facilitating “trade certificates”. Evaristo joined the “movement” in April 1959, Frederico in May 1959 – while Salem stated that he was never involved with the movement - but rather was an “innocent”. 275 For the deferment of the uprising, see also “Kepulangan Pejuang Integrasi Timtim”, (“Return of East Timor Integration Fighters”), Republika Online, Jakarta, 11 November 1995; “Pejuang Timtim: Saya Tidak Pernah Menduga …” (East Timor Fighter: I Never Imagined …”), Kompas/Kompas Online, Jakarta, 7 January 1996, p.1 & p.8; and Rohi, P.A., “Soekarno …”, 9 May 2005, op.cit. quoting Marcelino (footnote 138) on the change of dates. It is perhaps relevant to note that Consul Nazwar Jacub was scheduled to conclude his appointment as Consul and depart Portuguese Timor in June 1959.

57 closing the meeting, the Consul reportedly stated: “We are all Indonesians, we all have the same flag.”276 The deferral of the uprising until December 1959 is also noted in a “Memorandum” by one of the rebels - Frederico Almeida Santos da Costa277, a seaman, as follows: “On the night of March of the last year … I met with Mr Luís da Costa Rego … at his house … I began to tell about the treatment I received in my job. I told him that I had had enough of working and never having enough money and never having the possibility to live well. … he told me that in December, there will be a surprise and they ((our governors)) will all be taken and all be sent off to Lisbon. Some days passed, and on one morning … he gave me some papers to look after, together with some letters. … Out of curiosity, I glanced over them and observed a plan drawn with all of the points marked with various numbers and relating the names involved, and mine also – and the letters, I was not able to read.”278 According to Governor Barata, the revised plan envisaged the following phases: “On the night of 31 December, Indonesian lieutenants Lambertus and Gerson, a sergeant and six other exiles would march to Dili and seize the military installations, including the paiol ((weapons and ammunition storehouse)): - One of the plotters, a driver, would take control of the vehicle compound. - Another one of the main cabecilhas ((ringleaders)) would take account of the police and distribute the catanas ((machetes)) in the Agriculture Department warehouse to the prisoners – and with the support of other rebels, they would fall upon people in their clubs, slaughtering them. - Other previously assigned personnel would seize road intersections, buildings etc. - Other phases were envisaged in the countryside: in Aileu, for example, a party was to be planned in one of the plotters’ homes to which all the garrison’s officers, sergeants and civilian employees would be invited. They would soon be without their heads. - All would be completed in an hour, and Indonesian flags then flown at all the seized locations.”279 However, the plan had already been compromised. The Government had apparently first received information about the rebel movement “at the end of March and the beginning of April 1959 from a Timorese closely associated with the rebels – but who disagreed with their plans.”280 According to the Australian Consul in Dili, the 276

Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., p.59. Frederico Almeida Santos da Costa was related to Luís da Costa Rego – both living in the same residential compound off Kuluhan Road (about 200metres to the south) in Audian/Bemori (Dili). 278 Costa, F.A.S. da. (Prisoner No 52), Memorandum, Bié (Angola), 6 May 1960 – and as discussed by Frederico with the author in Dili on 2 and 6 April 2007. Frederico’s Memorandum implies that the deferral of the uprising to December was known in March – while Governor Barata (footnote 274) relates that Nazwar Jacub convinced the conspirators “in the first days of May” to delay the revolt until 31 December. 279 Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., p.59. 280 Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., p.52. Governor Barata related that the informant “cautiously” reported the rebels’ plan to a “well-respected intermediary” in the informant’s region and “sought advice”. However, the intermediary did not take the information seriously, and “it 277

58 Acting Governor had reportedly received anonymous letters in March and April warning of the planned uprising, but had decided not to react in order to “give enough rope” to the plotters.281 The Australian Consul’s report also related that the Indonesian Consul, Nazwar Jacub, had also presided over “secret meetings” in Dili in the first half of 1959, and that his locally-employed staff had been noted photographing public buildings.282 So, the plan for the uprising was known to the Portuguese authorities in Dili – with some sources reporting that it had been disclosed by a vengeful female Timorese informant to the Chief of Police (ie “cherchez la femme” – ie betrayed by a woman).283 In 2007, a group of former rebels related to the author that the plot was disclosed by Inácio Fernandes - the son of the liurai of Betano (João Batista) in the Alas/Same area. Inácio Fernandes had originally been one of the conspirators but “became afraid” and revealed the plans to Pantaleão (a mestizo of African descent), who informed the Portuguese authorities.284 However, Father Jorge Barros Duarte contends that “the son of the régulo of Lacló (D. Luís dos Reis Noronha) – Câncio dos Reis Noronha, heard of the plans through family connections and denounced the rebel movement to the Government through Bishop D. Jaime G. Goulart in May 1959”.285 In 2008, Câncio Noronha286 related to the author that he had been informed of the plot in November 1958 by Inácio Fernandes287 – a disaffected member of the rebel group who was employed as a driver for the Agricultural Service. Câncio Noronha passed the information to the Bishop of Dili, Dom Jaime Goulart. Arrests in Dili While aware that the date of planned revolt had been delayed until December, the Acting Governor - Lieutenant Colonel Aguiar, was worried that some of the more was a delay of some months” before the Government was told of the plan and the Indonesian Consul’s meetings. 281 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 155/59, 3 August 1959 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 1). Also related by Governor Barata in Barata, F.T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., pp. 52-53. 282 In May 1958, the Indonesian Consul had received six “commercial” cameras that, after an initial impounding by the Portuguese authorities, were released to the Consul in July 1958: see Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 109/58, 4 July 1958 (NAA: A11604, 605/15A). Governor Barata also noted the clandestine photography and the discreet, but active, anti-Portuguese campaign by the Indonesian Consul - Barata, F.T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., p.51. 283 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 130/59, 29 June 1959 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 1; A1828, 383/7/1) and as also related by José Manuel Duarte - ie who contended that one of the rebel group in Dili, a low-level civil servant, revealed the plan to his mistress who informed the Portuguese authorities - Diatmika, A.G., “(Ternyata) Merah Putih…”, Vista 57, 1989, op.cit., p.20. Gunter, J., “Communal Conflict in Viqueque …”, 2007, op.cit., p.31 relates that an “angry wife … denounced her husband’s subversive activities to officials in Baucau.” A later Australian Consulate – Dili Memo (12 February 1963 – NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1 Part 2) suggested the plotters’ failed attempt to acquire arms from the Army Ordnance Depot in Dili compromised their plans. 284 Email from Evaristo da Costa to author - 28 March 2007 and 3 March 2009; and author’s discussions with former rebels Evaristo da Costa, Francisco Almeida Santos da Costa and Salem Sagran in Dili on 2 April 2007 and Evaristo da Costa on 29 October 2008. Evaristo stated that Inácio – a “Tropas” (soldier), was the driver for a Portuguese major. Evaristo and Inácio had been long-term friends. 285 Duarte, J.B., Em Terras de Timor, Tiposet, Lisboa, 1987, p.137. 286 Discussion with Câncio dos Reis Noronha, Melbourne, 6 December 2008. Câncio knew of Pantaleão, but stated that Pantaleão was not involved in the disclosure of the rebels’ plans. 287 Inácio Fernandes was recorded as a driver “second class” in the Agriculture and Forestry Service in 1974 – BOdT, No.4, 26 January 1974, p.54; and as “lugar da guarda florestal” – BOdT , No.28, 13 July 1974, p.549.

59 radical conspirators might still launch attacks at the end of May. On the morning of 27 May, he informed the Army Chief-of-Staff, Captain Carvalho, of his concerns – who then ordered heightened security measures: military patrols and picquets, a stand-by army detachment, and increased police patrols.288 Captain Carvalho also briefed the two Army company commanders in the Dili barracks on security contingency plans. However, the festivities planned for the night of 27 May at the two clubs in Dili were amended but not cancelled – with a ball scheduled at the Club Benfica. Military personnel attending the ball were advised to go in civilian clothing, but to remain “armed”. News of the possibility of unrest became known to the public “with the topic being argued openly in a restaurant.”289 The Australian Consul in Dili attended the Club Benfica ball on the evening of 27 May and reported that beforehand “stories were circulating to the effect that subversive elements would attempt to throw bombs into the Benfica Club … Nothing eventuated at the Club, or elsewhere in Dili, and the festivities ended at 3 a.m. without any bangs … .”290 However, many people cancelled their attendance at the Club Benfica ball – including Francisco de Araújo, a suspected conspirator and member of the Conselho de Governo (see footnote 185). Having precipitated “panic among the population”, the Acting Governor now felt forced to initiate a “repressive phase” against the conspirators. The first to be arrested was reportedly the rebel who had been tasked with action against the police and who had been planning to leave Dili – the authorities were fearful that an early attempt might be made to seize arms from the military depot.291 On the afternoon of 3 June, the Portuguese police reportedly arrested 15 of the cabecilhas da revolta (leaders of the revolt) in Dili: João Pereira da Silva, Valentim da Costa Pereira, João de Sousa Gama, Evaristo da Costa, David Verdial, Luís da Costa Rego, José Beny Joaquim, Francisco Orlando de Fátima Soares, Carlos Salvador de Sousa Gama, Gervásio Soriano, Abel da Costa Belo, José Ramos de Sousa Gama, Tomaz da Costa Belo, Saleh bin Hamad [sic – ie Ahmad] Bassarewan (see footnotes 446 and 562 for alternative spellings) and Crispim Borges de Araújo.292 During his interrogation by Abílio da Paixão Monteiro293 - Director of Civil Administration in Dili, Luís da Costa Rego readily admitted the rebels’ plans and described their geographic extent. He explained that their intention was only to detain

288

Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., p.60. The Acting Governor/Military Commander had apparently earlier consulted with the Chefe de Gabinete (Head of the Cabinet Department) - Lieutenant Daniel Rudolfo Sottomayor Carvalho Braga, on the developing plot – but not the Army Chief-of-Staff, Captain Carvalho. Lieutenant Braga also functioned as the aide-de-camp to the Acting Governor/Military Commander. The rivalry and jealousy between Lieutenant Braga and the Army Chief-of-Staff, Captain Carvalho, is noted by Governor Barata at pp.42-43 and p.60. Daniel Braga retired from the military in the mid-1960s (BOdT, No.32, 6 August 1960, p.428; BOdT, No.43, 22 October 1960, p.595) with a “louvado” (commendation) - and served as a senior civil servant in Dili, receiving a medal for his service in late 1974 (BOdT, No.46, 16 November 1974, p.840). 289 Ibid, pp. 60-61. 290 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 123/59, 7 June 1959, p.1 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 1). 291 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 155/59, 3 August 1959 claimed arrests began on 27 May and all the Dili conspirators had been arrested by 30 May (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 1). 292 Barata, F.T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., pp. 218-219 – Annex V, Report of the Police Superintendent Abílio da Paixão Monteiro, 25 July 1959. 293 Abílio da Paixão Monteiro, an Administrator 3rd Class, was apparently also appointed Superindente da Polícia.

60 Portuguese officials – not kill them, and that violence would only have been necessary if the rebels had been resisted.294 On 4 June, Frederico Almeida Santos da Costa - a 25 year-old sailor, was arrested in Dili. Further arrests followed including the arrest of three men in Letefoho (about 80 km southwest of Dili in Ermera Circunscrição): Alexandré Viana de Jesus/Maia, José Maria Maia and Eduardo de Araújo.295 When questioned, Frederico Almeida da Costa initially denied any involvement – but was told by the rebel leader Luís da Costa Rego to give the Portuguese the papers that Luís had passed to him a few days earlier (see footnote 278). Frederico was escorted back to his house in Audian/Bemori by four Portuguese – including the Chief of Police (Manuel Vieira Câmara Júnior), and retrieved the documents from where he had placed them in a gap in the banana-leaf wall of his house.296 The “Movimento de Aileu: Paulo de Castro”297 In early 1959, the Portuguese authorities reportedly became concerned about a “bizarre organisation”298 led by a local chieftain in Aileu (in the mountains, about 42 km by road south of Dili). This group reportedly “extorted money from the more credulous local population” by selling “safe conduct” amulets with “supernatural powers” that would protect wearers against harm during the “approaching war”. The police saw such “profit-making as great highway robbery.” Suspecting a connection with the plans for the uprising, Lieutenant Braga - the Chefe de Gabinete of the Government in Dili (see footnote 288), followed developments in Aileu closely but did not move against the “organisation”. However, once the arrests of rebels began in Dili, the organisation in Aileu was broken up and several people detained. These included António da Costa Araújo – a local notable and coffee plantation owner (the father of Abílio de Araújo – see footnote 299); “the brother in law of Dom João, the liurai of the Kingdom of Aileu, Inesman; António Soriano; Pablo Castro; representatives of the noble houses of Aileu; and Master Francisco Dias of Alas” - both Francisco Dias da Costa and António da Costa Araújo were also Catholic catechists.299 According to Abílio de Araújo, “the 294

Author’s discussions with Frederico Almeida Santos da Costa, Audian - Dili, 1 and 7 July 2009. Frederico was related to Luís da Costa Rego – and both lived in the same residential compound off Kuluhan Road in Audian/Bemori (Dili). 295 Evaristo da Costa – email to author, 24 January 2007. Evaristo da Costa declared that he was arrested on 2 June. Arrests in Dili continued into June – eg Frederico Almeida Santos da Costa was arrested on 4 June: see his Memorandum, Penal Colony of Bié (Angola), 6 May 1960; Juman bin Bachirum was arrested on 11 June; and Salem Musalam Sagran was arrested on 11 August 1959. 296 Author’s discussions with Frederico Almeida Santos da Costa, Audian - Dili, 1 and 7 July 2009. 297 Barata, F.T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., p.213 – Annex IV, Report by Lieutenant R.C. Braga. Lieutenant Braga used “Movimento …” as the title for Section 4.5 of his Report - but this Section was omitted from F.T. Barata’s 1998 book (Timor contemporâneo …, op.cit.). 298 Barata, F.T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., pp.55-56. 299 The arrest of these Aileu notables is related in Araújo, A. (Abílio) de, As Duas Margens da Ribeira de Aileu, Lisbon, 2007. As noted above, Abílio de Araújo’s father - António da Costa Araújo, was briefly detained in Dili before returning to his plantation in Aileu. António was killed during the Indonesian occupation in December 1978 in the Aileu area, and his remains are yet to be recovered. Dr Abílio da Conceição Abrantes de Araújo was the Fretilin Minister of State for Economic and Social Affairs in late 1975 and subsequently a senior leader of the external Resistance (Head of the External Delegation) until expelled from Fretilin in August 1993/May 1994. In July 1999, he founded the Partido Nacionalista Timorense – which contested parliamentary elections in Timor-Leste in 2007.

61 police repression in Dili was terrible and nobody dared to speak the names of those detained … a true terror” directed by “Sergeant Camara” (ie the Chief of Police, Manuel Vieira da Camâra Júnior) - and “although not formally imprisoned, the heads of all the detainees were shaved like criminals.”300 According to one report, Paulo de Castro and António Soriano - “who had planned a revolt against Portuguese sovereignty” in 1959, were associated with a Catholic cult, the Hoho Ulu movement, and had held “several meetings with the people of Aileu”.301 Of the Aileu detainees, only “Pablo Castro” (ie Paulo da Conceição Castro), António Soriano and Francisco Dias da Costa302 were later exiled – departing Dili for Angola aboard the N/M India in early October 1959 and, subsequently, transferred to Mozambique.303 The Uprising in Viqueque and Baucau304 The first indications of unrest in the Viqueque area apparently arose at the end of May 1959 when the Administrator of the Baguia Posto (about 50 kilometres directly southeast of Baucau Town - see the following map) reported to the Baucau Circunscrição that two of the exiled Indonesians in the Viqueque Circunscrição had held clandestine night-time meetings with village chiefs in the Uatolari and UatoCarabau Postos to plan a revolt.305 On 1 June, while enroute to a meeting in Dili, the Administrator of the Baucau Circunscrição, José Maria Ribeiro Filipe, was contacted at Manatuto by the Secretary of the Baucau Circunscrição, Francisco Menezes306, and advised that, in Dili, “a

300

Ibid. For the dismissal of Chief of Police, Manuel Vieira da Camâra, see footnote 477. The Hoho Ulu movement, named after a sub-village between Aileu and Maubisse, was founded in the last quarter of the 19th century - see Duarte, J.B., “O fenomeno dos movimentos nativistas”, op.cit., pp.43-46. The movement had reportedly evidenced anti-Portuguese activities during World War II including the “Maubisse uprising” in late August 1942 (see footnotes 57-58). In 1967, the movement conducted an activity on the outskirts of Dili at Fatu Metan that “expressed abhorrence for the sovereignty of Portugal and sympathy for Indonesia”. One of their cult symbols, the Menino Jesus (Baby Jesus) was reportedly “affiliated” with the Apodeti political party in 1975. 302 According to Frederico Almeida Santos da Costa, Francisco Dias da Costa was not connected with the Rebellion, but was confused with one of the plotters who was not arrested ie – Francisco Dias Ximenes of Laleia, a nurse with the veterinary service. 303 In April 2007, three of the returned rebels declared to the author that Paulo de Castro and the “Movimento de Aileu” had no connection with the plot or the uprising. Rather, they opined that his “troublesome group” was falsely implicated by the Portuguese in the “1959 Rebellion” as a convenient means of ridding themselves of the group. In Angola, Paulo was among those classified as “Não considerado culpado” (“not considered guilty”) – see the listing at Annex F. According to several returned rebels, two Timorese were killed in Aileu during Portuguese suppression operations – author’s discussions with Evaristo da Costa, Frederico de Almeida Santos da Costa and Salem Sagran, Dili, 2 April 2007. According to Frederico Almeida Santos da Costa, none of the “Aileu group” were connected with the Rebellion movement. Rather, “Lieutenant Braga wanted to eliminate the group” – discussions with author, Audian - Dili, 1 and 7 July 2009. 304 The following description of the Rebellion draws principally from the following sources: Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit; a report written in 1959 by Monsignor Martinho da Costa Lopes; a report to Lisbon by Governor F.T. Barata dated 6 October 1959; interviews by Indonesian journalists (Rohi, Diatmika, Sarong, Herman) of Indonesian and Timorese participants in the Rebellion; and memoranda from the Australian Consulate – Dili. 305 Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., p. 228 – Annex VIII, Report of the Administrator of the Circunscrição of Baucau (José Maria Ribeiro Filipe), 3 February 1961. 306 Secretary Francisco Xavier Aleixo Santana de Menezes (b. 14 August 1929) had earlier served an attachment in Viqueque as Acting Administrator after Viqueque Administrator’s Torrezão’s departure 301

62 revolt had been spoiled, and the ringleaders imprisoned.” 307 The next day in Dili, Administrator José Filipe was ordered by the Acting Governor to fly back to Baucau, arrest Abel de Costa Belo (in charge of the Baucau Postal Office) and “Zeca Gama” (José Ramos de Sousa Gama) - a resident of Laga, and return with them to Dili.

In Viqueque, at the beginning of June, the Acting Administrator of the Viqueque Circunscrição, Artur Marques Ramos, received a message from Secretary Francisco Menezes in Baucau that a “revolutionary movement had been discovered in Dili, intended to stage an uprising on 28 May – and, in concert, the Indonesian political exiles in Viqueque had been holding meetings in Luca.”308 However, Administrator Ramos later noted that he found the report “not believable”- as he regularly saw the Indonesian exiles, and neither the moradores (local militia) nor sipaios (local police) – who had been instructed to watch the Indonesians, had reported any suspicious activity to him. Further, although “believing these reports to be untrue”, he had interviewed four of the Indonesians who had “signed a stamped declaration appealing to be returned to Indonesia.”309 Soon after, the Administrator of the Baucau Circunscrição - on instructions from Dili, sent a message to advise the Indonesians that a vehicle would be sent for them and matters would be investigated in Dili – ie the nine Indonesians in Baucau and the five in Viqueque would be officially escorted to Dili. On 5 or 6 June, Viqueque Administrator Artur Ramos met with the Secretary of the Baucau Circunscrição, Francisco Menezes, at Ossú and was told that António

to Portugal in July 1958. On the appointment of Secretary Artur Marques Ramos to Viqueque on 10 October 1958, Menezes returned to his post in Baucau. 307 Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., p.227. For comment on Baucau Administrator José Maria Ribeiro Filipe, see footnote 236. 308 Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., p.223 – Annex VII, Report of the Administrator of the Circunscrição of Viqueque, 23 January 1961. Luca is located southwest of Viqueque Town - note however that Zeferino dos Reis Amaral, the village chief of Luca, was reportedly involved – see footnote 312. “Leça”, a name used for the Posto site in Uatolari, is also a location known to have been visited by Gerson Pello. 309 Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., p.63 and pp.223-224.

63 Metan (António da Costa Soares)310, a chefe de povoação (sub-village head) in Uatolari, had been given a pistol and 100 rounds of ammunition by Abel da Costa Belo – and that Joaquim Ferreira was also involved in the plot. Ramos immediately telephoned the Uatolari Posto – the Encarregado de Posto (Posto Administrator) Eduardo Caeiro Rodrigues311 was absent in Dili, and directed that António Metan - as well as Joaquim Ferreira (the son of the raja of Uma Kiik village) and Zeferino dos Reis Amaral (the régulo and village chief of Luca), report to the authorities (ie the Administração) in Viqueque Town as soon as possible.312 On the morning of Sunday, 7 June, António Metan – together with Joaquim Ferreira and Zeferino dos Reis Amaral, were interviewed in Viqueque Town, with all denying any knowledge of a plot. António Metan was ordered to stay in the moradores quarters in Viqueque Town until the investigation concluded – but was permitted to return beforehand to the house of Amaro de Araújo (a former civil servant) in the Town to collect some clothing. There, he met Gerson Pello – the leader of the Indonesian exiles in the Viqueque Circunscrição, who directed António Metan to return immediately to Uatolari - about 47 kilometres by road northeast of Viqueque Town, and begin the uprising.313 António Metan - a sub-village head (chefe de povoação) and a descendant of the liurais of Afaloicai, reportedly “had grievances” against the acting Encarregado de Posto of Uatolari, Eduardo Caeiro Rodrigues.314 On arrival at Uatolari, António Metan called the six village chiefs together – including

310

The background of António Metan (António da Costa Soares) is unclear. “António Metan” is mentioned in Hicks, D., “Unachieved Syncretism …”, op.cit., pp.28-29 - as heading the principally Tetum-speaking “princedom” of the seven-village suku of Caraubalo in the Viqueque Posto (ie on the eastern edge of Viqueque Town) and domiciled in the village of Lamaclaran. Hicks notes that by 196667, because of António Metan’s “previous disastrous dealings with the Administration, the political authority and influence of his descent group had vanished” and was “scarcely royal at all”. Metan was replaced by João da Sá Viana – see Hicks, D., Roh Orang Timor (Tetum Ghosts and Kinship), Pustakaan Sinar Harapan, Jakarta, 1983. However, João da Sá Viana is listed in Sherlock, K., 1983, op.cit., p.41 as the Chefe de Suco of Caraubalo in 1952, suggesting that the António Metan mentioned by Hicks may not be the António Metan involved in the 1959 Rebellion. For the Rebellion’s António Metan’s connection with Afaloicai (Uatolari) see footnotes 315, 316 and 548. 311 Eduardo Caeiro Rodrigues (b. 20 February 1927) - Encarregado 3rd class, was first appointed to Uatolari in May 1956 vide BOdT, No.19, 12 May 1956, p.227. He returned to Uatolari on 1 July 1957 (vide BOdT, No.27, 6 July 1957, p.477) following the suspension and subsequent dismissal of the Encarregardo de Posto of Uatolari, Policarpo Soares on 6 May 1957. Policarpo Soares (b. 26 January 1916 – of the Mascarenhas Ingles clan), was appointed amanuese [sic] in the Health and Hygiene Department on 18 July 1946, and became an Encarregado do Posto 3rd Class vide BOdT, No.40, 4 October 1952, p.574. The suspension of Policarpo Soares under a Penal Code provision was promulgated in February 1957 - BOdT, No.8, 23 February 1957, p.112; BOdT, No.16, 20 April 1957, p.249; BOdT, No.19, 11 May 1957. Policarpo Soares was dismissed vide BOdT, No.24, 15 June 1957, p.437 for an offence apparently related to his previous service at Lacló (Manatuto). For Eduardo Caeiro Rodrigues, see also footnotes 315 and 434. 312 Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., p.224 – Annex VII, Report of the Administrator of the Circunscrição of Viqueque (Administrator 3rd Class Artur Marques Ramos), 23 January 1961. Zeferino dos Reis Amaral - as the liurai of Luca was commended for his wartime loyalty by the Portuguese administration ie Louvando - BOdT, No.15, Portaria 1:197, 12 April 1947 (signed 5 September 1946), p.127. Zeferino dos Reis Amaral is also identified as the Chefe de Suco of Luca village in 1952 in Sherlock, K., 1983, op.cit., p.40. Beginning in late 1959, he was imprisoned on Ataúro Island for two-three years for his involvement in the 1959 Rebellion. 313 Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., p.224. It appears that a group of moradores had been assembled to guard a quantity of money awaiting disbursement to local vendors for copra that had recently been purchased by the Government. 314 Gunter, J., “Communal Conflict in Viqueque …”, 2007, op.cit., p.30. Gunter notes that Eduardo Caeiro Rodrigues was a “mestizo” ie of mixed race.

64 Abílio Meneses of Afaloicai315, and convinced them and the local Timorese police (sipaios) to support the uprising.

Footnote

316

According to José Manuel Duarte (see footnotes 174, 177, 180, 182, 251), “when the arrests occurred in Dili, those of us in Viqueque became worried. Sooner or later, we would surely be caught also. But we didn’t want to just surrender. Finally, we decide to take action. If we remained quiet – we would still surely be arrested. So to demonstrate our resolve, we took direct action … we were aware that we wouldn’t be successful, but through our Movement we wanted to tell the international community that we did not want to be under Portuguese colonial rule.”317 Accordingly, the uprising in the Viqueque and Baucau Circunscrições began on the late afternoon of Sunday 7 June 1959318 with a raid by a small rebel group led by António Metan and Abílio Meneses - aided by several local sipaios and villagers, on the Posto administration offices at Uatolari – during which they cut the telephone line to Viqueque Town. As noted earlier, the Encarregado de Posto of Uatolari -, Eduardo Caeiro Rodrigues, was absent in Dili. There were no casualties in the seizure of the Uatolari Posto, and 12 rifles were reportedly seized by the rebels. That afternoon, according to Governor Barata, several of the Indonesians in the Viqueque Circunscrição who were not involved in Uatolari attack “peacefully played football – when the national ((ie, Portuguese)) flag had already been pulled down in

315

See however footnote 310 on António Metan’s reported connection with the suku of Caraubalo. Abílio Meneses is noted as the Chefe de Suco of Afaloicai in 1952 in Sherlock, K., 1983, op.cit., p.41. 316 This sketch map of Viqueque Town is based on Map 27 “Viqueque” in Terrain Study No 50: Area Study of Portuguese Timor, Allied Geographic Section and Directorate of Intelligence - AAF SWPA, 27 February 1943 (NAA: A6779, 20). Amendments include the location of the “Secretária/Office” building. 317 Diatmika, A.G., “(Ternyata) Merah Putih…”, Vista 57, 1989, op.cit., p.21. 318 Abílio de Araújo incorrectly cites the date of the revolta in Uatolari and Uato-Carabau as 11 May 1959 - and does not mention the arrests in Dili nor any involvement by the Indonesian Consul – Araújo, A. (Abílio) de, Timor Leste: Os Loricos Voltaram a Cantar: Das Guerras Independentistas à Revolução do Povo Maubere, Trama, Lisbon, June 1977, p.165 and p.182.

65 Uatolari.”319 From Uatolari, the rebels sent a messenger eastward to two villages in the neighbouring Posto of Uato-Carabau (sometimes as “Uato-Carbau”)320 with instructions to seize the Uato-Carabau Posto headquarters.321 However, as noted above, not all the Indonesians in the Viqueque Circunscrição participated in the seizure of the Uatolari Posto – or the subsequent late evening attack on the offices in Viqueque Town. One of the Indonesians, Jezkial Fola, later explained that, although a member of the “Uatolari group”, he was playing football with the son of the Portuguese Posto chief on the afternoon of the Uatolari raid – which subsequently provided him with “an alibi”; and Albert Ndoen also did not participate because “he was at the house of his girlfriend.”322 Accordingly, it appears that the late afternoon attack at Uatolari was led by Abílio Meneses, the village chief of Afaloicai (Uatolari Posto) and António Metan (António da Costa Soares), a sub-village head – who were later joined by Jobert Moniaga, the Indonesian “Permesta 14”exile from Manado. On the evening of Sunday 7 June, the rebel group in Viqueque Town led by Amaro de Araújo and Gerson Pello sent messages to several surrounding villages to raise further support. According to Gerson Pello, the leadership of this rebel group comprised: Amaro de Araújo, José Manuel Duarte, Jeremias Pello and himself323 – and their aim was to seize weapons and ammunition from the administrative offices (Secretária da Administração) of the Viqueque Circunscrição in Viqueque Town.324 José Manuel Duarte subsequently stated that, while he was subordinate to Amaro de Araújo in the rebel movement, he operated as Araújo’s “right hand” in Viqueque. According to Governor Barata, an Indonesian - Jobert Moniaga, was also a key figure as Moniaga advised the nine Indonesian asilados políticos in Baucau Town, by telephone, of the plans for the uprising.325 This date for the start of the uprising in Viqueque, ie Sunday 7 June, was also cited in a report written by the Roman Catholic priest, Monsignor Martinho da Costa

319

Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., p.64. The local police at Uatolari apparently did not resist the rebels – and two were later dismissed and imprisoned on Ataúro – see footnotes 423 and 424. 320 In 1959, the Uato-Carabau Posto administrative centre was located in the village of Afaloikai/ Afaloicai in the hills (altitude 426 metres) about eight kilometres north from the south coast road – the Posto centre was moved to Uaniuma village on the south coast road in 1979. The position of Encarregado de Posto at Uato-Carabau in 1959 had been vacant for about one year ie since the posting of Francisco da Sousa back to Lacluta on 13 May 58 – Da Sousa had moved from Lacluta to UatoCarabau in August 1956. Note: there are three villages called “Afaloikai/Afaloicai” – ie one each in the Postos of Baguia, Uato-Carabau and Uatolari (see map at Annex A) - These were formerly “united” and ruled by Dom Feliciano. 321 Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., p.64. 322 Rohi, P.A., “Apa Kata …”, Mutiara 776, 1995, op.cit., p.15. Jezkial also added: “However, like Lambert Kling Ladaw who led the Viqueque group, Albert ((Ndoen/Ndun)) was also regarded as responsible for the Uatolari group – so both of them were sent to Angola.” For the activities of Jezkial Fola and Albert Ndoen/Ndun on 7 June, see also footnotes 331 and 346. 323 Governor Barata cites Gerson Pello as the leader – referring to him as “Tenente” (Lieutenant) Gerson. In his 1998 book, Governor Barata also implied that Jobert Moniaga was involved in the attack in Viqueque Town – although in later interviews with Indonesian journalists, Moniaga’s participation in the Viqueque Town raid is not mentioned by Gerson Pello, Jeremias Pello, Jezkial Fola or José Manuel Duarte. The Governor does not name the Timorese participants – rather, referring only to “three or four Timorese of a certain cultural level” - Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., pp. 64-65. 324 Rohi, P.A., “Apa Kata …”, Mutiara 776, 1995, op.cit., p.13. 325 Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., p.64.

66 Lopes326, who visited the Viqueque area a few months – and most of his account was repeated in Governor Barata’s initial report to Lisbon on the Rebellion.327 However, in interviews many years later, some rebel participants in the attacks in Viqueque have also cited (mistakenly) the date as “3 June 1959”.328 In Viqueque Town on Sunday 7 June, Administrator Ramos was unaware of events in Uatolari that afternoon and, “in a spirit of extreme confidence beyond the limits of prudence”, excused from duty two of the armed Timorese police (sipaios) who, with a few irregular militia (moradores), were responsible for guarding the Secretária da Administração ie the Viqueque Circunscrição headquarters complex in Viqueque Town.329 Administrator Ramos assessed that “the area was calm” and “the movement had already been uncovered in Dili, arrests made, and the Indonesians were to be sent to Dili the next morning.”330 During the evening of 7 June, two of the Indonesians, Jezkial Fola and Albert Ndoen were reportedly drinking tuak (palm wine) at the house of Manuel Pinto in Viqueque Town – and did not participate in the any of the attacks. Separately, Gerson Pello, Jeremias Pello and several others were drinking tuak at the home of Mau Rubik – and the attack on the Viqueque Circunscrição headquarters was “launched” from that house.331 Very late in evening of 7 June, Jeremias Pello and José Manuel Duarte cut the telephone lines from Viqueque Town to the Ossú Posto - about 21 kilometres to the north, and established a small blocking position at a bridge north of Viqueque Town to disrupt any movement of government forces from Ossú or Baucau.332 At about midnight, the rebels’ main group surprised the sipaios and moradores in the 326

Monsignor Martinho da Costa Lopes (a Timorese priest, 1918-1991) had been appointed a Deputy to the National Assembly in Lisbon representing Portuguese Timor from November 1957 - in May 1977, he was appointed the Apostolic Administrator of Dili. His report in October 1959 - “Breve resenha de alguns factos ocorrido em Viqueque e Uatolari (1959)” provides a brief chronology and recounting of the Rebellion – together with “Breve comentario” and “Sugestões”. The report was released in July 1995 in Lisbon as part of the “Arquivo Salazar” (see the report at TdT, Lisbon: PIDE/DGS/AOS/CO/ UL-36, Part 5) – but the Monsignor’s authorship was deleted from the report as required by the release conditions. Monsignor Martinho Lopes’ report is also referred to in Jolliffe, J., “Indonesia now wants all the gory details”, The Canberra Times, Canberra, 19 August 1995, p.17. – which also notes the release of the Arquivo Salazar papers; and Jolliffe, J., Balibo, 2009, p.62. 327 The report by Governor Barata acknowledged Monsignor Martinho’s report as the principal source of information for his (Barata’s) report and repeated the same chronology and events - Barata, F. J. F. T. Governor, letter to the Ministry of Overseas Territories, Dili, 6 October 1959 – but does not include Monsignor Martinho Lopes’ “Comments” and “Suggestions”. A copy of Governor Barata’s report No. 34 of 6 October 1959 – in Portuguese, and related material, can be found at Gunter, J., Haree Ba Uluk: Timor Portuguese Pre-1974 – A Post-Colonial Forum for Learning and Debate: http://raiketak. blogspot.com/timorhistory/index.html. Governor Barata’s report concluded with a comment that - “due to his background and tendencies of his spirit”, the Monsignor had “concerned himself more with possible excesses of repression than with the criminal acts of the sublevados ((rebels))”. Governor Barata’s report was forwarded by the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Director of the PIDE in Lisbon – Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Lisbon, No.181 36-A, 14 January 1960 (TdT, Lisbon: PIDE/DGS N.T. 8971). 328 Gerson Pello apparently mistakenly cited “3 June 1959” when interviewed in 1995 - Rohi, P.A., “Apa Kata …”, Mutiara 776, 1995. op.cit., p.13; and others have stated 1 June and 3 June. These references however are probably meant to relate to the first arrests of the conspirators in Dili. 329 Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., pp. 64-65. 330 Ibid, p.55. 331 Author’s discussions with Hermenegildo da Cruz, Constantino de Oliveira Simões, António Pinto and Rogério Pinto in Viqueque – 29 June 2007. This account of the activities of Jezkial Fola and Albert Ndoen/Ndun differs somewhat from that related at footnote 322. 332 Soares (Mali-Lequic), A.V.M., Pulau Timor – Sebuah Sumbangan Untuk Sejarahnya, 2003, p.102 – names the bridge as the “Luca-To’in bridge”.

67 Viqueque Circunscrição offices ie the Secretária da Administração (see map and photographs below), “knocking them over one-by-one” and “rolling them out the windows.”

Gerson Pello commented: “luckily, the building was high, so they were rendered unconscious or died – we didn’t know. We seized 67 weapons of four different types333 – but the ammunition was different. So, although the raid wasn’t very successful, we did surprise them.” Those participating in the attack included Gerson Pello, João Lisboa and Leki “Bure” Rubic (also as “Leque Rubic”).334 During the attack, Leki Rubic stabbed and wounded a sipaio, Jacinto Pinto.335 The group reportedly carried a “merah putih” (Bahasa: “red and white” – ie Indonesian) flag – Gerson Pello related that “I had a Chinese woman, a bread seller in Viqueque, make the flag.”336 The handful of rebels also wore red and white-coloured “atribut” (Bahasa: “insignia”).337 The Indonesians also reportedly wore red bandanas – 333

José Manuel Duarte cites seizing “50 rifles, pistols and ammunition” and also “46 weapons” Diatmika, A.G., “(Ternyata) Merah Putih …”, Vista 57, 1989, op.cit. Other reports indicate 24 weapons were seized in Viqueque Town and 12 each at the Uatolari and Uato-Carabau Postos ie totalling 48. The weapons were mostly 1886-model Kropatschek 8mm-calibre bolt-action rifles – but also included bolt-action Lee Enfield and Garand rifles. The Australian Consul – Dili’s initial cable to Canberra reported a “sub-administrative post near Baucau raided by four men June 7th who stole 48 rifles. Later two men apprehended, 22 rifles recovered.” – Cable 17, 9 June 1959 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 1). 334 According to José Manuel Duarte, “the leadership of the group comprised about 50 people. However, it could be said that the whole of people in Viqueque participated in the revolt. At the time, the population of Viqueque was about 20,000. They were all followers.” - Diatmika, A.G., “(Ternyata) Merah Putih…”, Vista 57, 1989, op.cit., p.21. It is unclear whether the Indonesian Jobert Moniaga participated in the attack in Viqueque Town - or had departed earlier for Uatolari with António Metan and participated in the attack on the Uatolari Posto earlier on Sunday afternoon. 335 Author’s discussions with Hermenegildo da Cruz, Constantino de Oliveira Simões, António Pinto and Rogério Pinto in Viqueque – 29 June 2007. 336 Rohi, P.A., “Apa Kata …”, Mutiara 776, 1995, op.cit., p.15. Gerson Pello added that “the Chinese also wanted integration ((with Indonesia)) – and consequently there was a Chinese, Mu Teng Siong, who was also exiled to Angola” – see also earlier footnote 106, and also footnotes 336, 458, and 518. An interview in early November 1992 with the newly appointed Governor of East Timor, Abílio Osório Soares – a nephew of the rebel José Manuel Duarte who as a 13-year old in 1959 had known three of the Indonesian participants, refers to the rebels as “attacking and carrying the Red and White flag” – Forum Keadilan, No. 327, Jakarta, 6 November 1992. Following a visit to the Viqueque area in early July 1959, the Australian Consul reported on the background to the uprising and included: “it is known to me, however, that there were many natives in that area who were in possession of small Indonesian flags”: Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 143/59, 14 July 1959, pp.1-2 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 1) – see footnote 404. 337 “Pejuang Integrasi Timtim di LN Presiden Minta Menlu Urus Kepulangan Mereka” (“East Timor Integration Fighters Overseas – President Asks Foreign Minister to Arrange their Return”), Republika Online, Jakarta, 11 November 1995, p.2. José Manuel Duarte also related rebels and supporters

68 embroidered on the front with a buffalo, in white, a “symbol of strength”.338 In 1995, Gerson Pello also stated that “the underground” movement had prepared “red and white” flags and “uniforms” – but the claim of uniforms is discounted.339 A little after midnight (ie early on 8 June), the rebels moved to attack the adjacent residence of the Administrator of the Viqueque Circunscrição, Artur Ramos.340 However, the Administrator – together with his family, a junior civil servant (aspirante administrativo) – João Hermenegildo da Costa341, and an injured sipaio escaped in a jeep. At the bridge north of the Town, the Administrator’s vehicle was initially blocked by several tree trunks felled by the Jeremias Pello/José Duarte group and fired upon by Jeremias Pello. However, driving off the road into a gully, the vehicle reached Ossú without further injuries to its occupants.342 At 0300hrs on 8 June, Administrator Ramos spoke with the Chefe de Gabinete, (Lieutenant Daniel Rudolfo Sottomayor Carvalho Braga – see footnote 288) in Dili and, having described the events, was directed to drive north to Baucau (about 43 kilometres by road) and await further orders. At about 0400hrs, João Hermenegildo da Costa - the Viqueque aspirante administrativo, telephoned the Administrator of the Baucau Circunscrição, related the situation in Viqueque, and passed Administrator Ramos’ request for 50 moradores to accompany him (Ramos) back to Viqueque Town. The Baucau Administrator, José Maria Ribeiro Filipe, immediately ordered the arrest of the nine Indonesian exiles resident in Baucau – and “this was achieved without any difficulty as they were still asleep at that hour.”343 Administrator José Filipe also ordered local village chiefs in Baucau to assemble all able-bodied men and, armed with “zagaias” (spears), to watch the coastline and to conduct patrols in their areas. In Viqueque Town, early on the morning of Monday 8 June, Gerson Pello’s group seized a light truck and travelled to the Uatolari Posto (about 47 kilometres by wearing red and white “badges” - Diatmika, A.G., “(Ternyata) Merah Putih…”, Vista 57, 1989, op.cit., p.21. The claim of wearing Indonesian flags as the “panji perjuangan” (banners of the struggle) is also made in Lopes da Cruz, F., Kesaksian …, 1999, op.cit., p.61; and in the Indonesian school text-book ie Gonggong, A. & Zuhdi, S., Sejarah …, 1992, op.cit. – see translated extract at Annex B. See also Governor Barata’s reference to rebels wearing “the colours of the Indonesian flag” in Uatolari – footnote 344. 338 As described to the author by Constantino de Oliveira Simões, Viqueque Town, 29 June 2007. Constantino related meeting Gerson Pello on 8 June - and being berated by him for not having participated in the attack on the Viqueque Circunscrição office. 339 Rohi, P.A., Pemberontakan Rakyat Timor Timur 1959, Mutiara, Edition 775, Jakarta, 29 August – 4 September 1995, p.14 – which includes a mid-1990s photograph of José Manuel Duarte displaying a “uniform worn by the 1959 rebel unit” – ie a military-style shirt. These are the only known references to a rebel “uniform”- and it is considered highly improbable that the rebels in Viqueque had prepared, or worn, uniforms. 340 According to one version, Acting Administrator Artur Ramos “was reading a newspaper in his residence when he was fired upon by Domingos Amaral – from a noble clan of Luca, but was not hit and fled from Viqueque to Baucau.” – see Soares (Mali-Lequic), A.V.M., Pulau Timor …, 2003, op.cit., p.102. 341 Aspirante João Hermenegildo da Costa Hornai (b. 23 August 1925) was the son of the eminent luirai of Oecusse and had been posted to Viqueque on 22 July 1958. He was promoted on 18 January 1960 to become the Encarregado de Posto at Baguia. 342 However, José Manuel Duarte contended that the Administrator leapt from the vehicle and escaped into a ravine – and was later assisted by a local Chinese to return to his (Administrator’s) house. Jezkial Fola states that he later saw bullet holes in Administrator Ramos’ vehicle - Rohi, P.A., “Apa Kata …”, Mutiara, Edition 776, 1995, op.cit., p.15. Joaquim Fereira was also reportedly a member of the blocking group at the bridge - author’s discussions with Hermenegildo da Cruz, Constantino de Oliveira Simões, António Pinto and Rogério Pinto, Viqueque Town, 29 June 2007. 343 Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., p. 228 – Annex VIII, Report of the Administrator of the Circunscrição of Baucau (José Maria Ribeiro Filipe), 3 February 1961.

69 road) where they were met enthusiastically by local “amontinados” (“rebels”) “wearing cloth ribbons on their chests with the colours of the Indonesian flag.”344 The leaders then moved on to Uato-Carabau northeast of Uatolari (about 46 kilometres by road) where the Posto headquarters had also been seized – the position of Encarregado de Posto of Uato-Carabau had been vacant for about one year.345 According to Jezkial Fola – an Indonesian asilado who appears not to have participated in the attacks, the streets of Viqueque Town were empty when he awoke on Monday morning, 8 June – and he was alone. Many of the residents of the town had fled their homes and, according to Jezkial, he encouraged a local Chinese merchant to transport several of the injured guards to a medical post in his (the Chinese merchant’s) vehicle.346 Soon after midday on 8 June, Administrator Artur Ramos returned to Viqueque Town with a small lightly-armed force of an officer (Lieutenant Ferreira), a sergeant (Sergeant Pires) and nine soldiers. The Chinese driver of the light truck taken to Uatolari by the rebels had returned to Viqueque Town, and Administrator Ramos was told of the situation in Uatolari and Uato-Carabau where local leaders had rallied their tribal warrior militias (arraiais) in support of the Rebellion. Ramos responded by mobilizing loyal arraiais in the three Postos of Viqueque, Ossú and Lacluta347. According to Governor Barata, on Monday 8 June, two of the Indonesians who had remained in the Viqueque Town area were captured in Ossú – probably Jezkial Fola and Albert Ndoen. The Portuguese administration in Dili planned to fly 50 troops - commanded by Captain Manuel João Fajardo, from Dili to Baucau as reinforcements on the morning of Tuesday 9 June using a recently acquired Heron aircraft.348 However, at the last moment, the group was transported by Unimog truck to Baucau – about 135 kilometres by road. The initial operational plan preferred by the Acting Governor and the Army Chief-of-Staff, Captain Carvalho, was for the Portuguese forces to move in 344

Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., p.65: “recebidos pelos amotinados que tinham ao peito tiras de pano com as cores da bandeira indonésia”. 345 The position of Encarregado de Posto at Uato-Carabau in 1959 had been vacant since the posting of Francisco da Sousa back to Lacluta on 13 May 58. In early 1959, four Chefe/Encarregado de Posto positions were unfilled ie “vago” – BOdT, No.3, 17 January 1959, pp. 44-46. A replacement Encarregado de Posto, Joaquim Pereira da Silva (born 3 January 1928), was not posted from Mape (Bobonaro) to Uato-Carabau until 16 Jun 1959 – BOdT, No.26, 27 June 1959, p.447. A description of the seizure of the Uato-Carabau Posto can be found in Gunter, J., “Majesty yet no mercy”, 7 December 2002 - http://raiketak.wordpress.com/category/power/page/4/ . 346 Rohi, P.A., “Apa Kata …”, Mutiara, Edition 776, 1995, op.cit., p.15. Jezkial noted that his actions “gained the sympathy of the Portuguese.” He implied that Gerson excluded him from involvement in the attack, because he (Jezkial) was married and “someone had to carry the news back to Kupang ” – connect with reports at footnotes 322 and 331. Subsequently, Jezkial was not exiled to Lisbon or Angola – but repatriated from Portuguese Timor to Indonesian Timor in October 1960 with eight other Indonesians. 347 Laurentino António Pires had been appointed the Encarregado de Posto in December 1958. He mobilized a small band of selected Segunda Linha from Lacluta and joined the Government forces at Viqueque, Uatolari and Uato-Carabau for about two weeks. In his absence, the liurais of Lacluta gathered at the Posto with batukis – dancing and chanting traditional songs for the entire period while awaiting the apprehension of the rebels (Maria Francisca Pires – widow of Laurentino António Pires, email to author, 21 June 2009). 348 Military forces in Portuguese Timor in 1959 reportedly comprised 650 Timorese regular troops with 30 Portuguese officers and 50 Portuguese NCOs – plus a Timorese reserve (Segunda Linha) force: Australian Consulate – Dili, Cable 18, 1 July 1959 (NAA: A1209, 1959/612). The official regular establishment, as promulgated in the 1959 Provincial Budget, was: 1009 personnel including 43 Portuguese officers and 55 Portuguese sergeants – about 85 percent of the other ranks were Timorese. – BOdT, No.3, 17 January 1959, p.84.

70 strength from Baucau southward into the Viqueque Circunscrição – to restore order and consolidate control in Viqueque Town before moving against the rebels in Uatolari and Uato-Carabau.

However, the Chefe de Gabinete, Lieutenant Daniel Braga, feared that the rebels might move north from the Uatolari/Uato-Carabau area and attack the Laga Posto on the north coast (35 kilometres east of Baucau by road) where he believed the rebels might find further supporters – and, perhaps, assistance from the Indonesian island of Wetar about 60 kilometres to the north across the Wetar Strait. Lieutenant Braga convinced the Acting Governor of his preferred plan. Accordingly, in order to block any rebel advance to Laga, it was decided to reinforce the Posto at Baguia349 (in Baucau Circunscrição about 50 kilometres southeast of Baucau Town) with a military detachment that had been guarding the Baucau radio station. Captain Manuel João Farjado was placed in charge of local military operations in the two Circunscrições. 349

The area of the Baguia Posto was 207 sq km. The population of about 5,000 were predominantly Makassae-speakers (about 85 percent), but the villagers of Afaloicai and Ossú Huna in the south-west of the Posto were Naueti-speakers – ie representing about 15 percent of the Posto’s population.

71 As noted earlier, the local raja in Uato-Carabau, Fernando Pinto, and his followers had joined the Rebellion and seized the Posto.350 However, realising that a victory over the Portuguese forces was not possible, the rebel leaders planned to attack the Posto at Baguia (about 18 kilometres by road north of Uato-Carabau) before attempting to withdraw westwards and cross the border into Indonesian Timor.351 Their advance to Baguia from the Uato-Carabau area however was interrupted by heavy monsoon-season rains that had flooded the rivers across their route, and the rebel force was delayed in Uato-Carabau “for four nights” - giving time for the Portuguese to reinforce and defend the Baguia Posto.352 The defenders in the small fort (tranqueira) at Baguia were equipped with machine guns and easily repulsed the rebels’ first attack at about 1100hrs on 11 June.353 During the attack, a small force of Portuguese reinforcements (a corporal and two Timorese privates) arrived from Baucau equipped with a “lança-granadas Bazuka” (grenade-launching bazooka)354 and immediately joined the engagement while a rebel attack was underway. The rebels’ bolt-actioned rifles were no match for the defenders’ firepower. Much of the rebels’ ammunition was also faulty - or of an incorrect calibre, resulting in many misfires and explosions in the breeches of their rifles. José Manuel Duarte subsequently related that “when pulling the triggers, we were forced to face away from our targets.”355 Governor Barata also commented on this, later writing: “Happily for us, the weapons and ammunition that they had stolen were of weak quality (many cartridges did not go off).”356 After several attempted assaults lasting about two hours, the rebels withdrew towards Uato-Carabau – with the retreating rebels “becoming afraid as the support of the people began to wane.”357 Governor Barata later noted that “in the Baucau Circunscrição only two village chiefs had supported the rebels, and they had not suborned the local people.”358 Meanwhile, the force led by Captain Manuel Fajardo had advanced from Baucau to Viqueque and moved northeast towards Uatolari. A linesman had repaired the break in the telephone line near Ossú and, having contacted a colleague in Uato-

350

The Chefe de Posto of Uato-Carabau - Joaquim Pereira da Silva, was reportedly absent in Dili. In an interview in 1995, Gerson Pello stated that Thomas Cabo Sipai [sic] raised the Indonesian flag in UatoCarabau on 18 June - Rohi, P.A., “Pemberontakan …”, Mutiara, Edition 775, 1995, op.cit, p.15, but it is likely that the flag-raising occurred several days earlier. The family name of Thomas Cabo Sipaio (ie Cabo Sipaio – local police corporal) was reportedly “Pinto”. 351 As related by José Manuel Duarte in Diatmika, A.G., “(Ternyata) Merah Putih…”, Vista 57, 1989, op.cit., p.22. 352 Ibid, p.22. 353 The rebels’ attack at Baguia is also described in Gunter, J., “Majesty but no mercy”, 7 December 2002 - http://raiketak.wordpress.com/category/power/page/4/ . 354 Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., p.68. Probably either a 2.36 inch (60.07mm) or 3.5 inch (89mm) recoilless rocket launcher. 355 As related by José Manuel Duarte in Diatmika, A.G., “(Ternyata) Merah Putih…”, Vista 57, 1989, op.cit., p.22. Duarte also notes that while Portuguese forces were equipped with machine guns, “we only had Lee Enfield and Garand rifles.” 356 Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., p.68. 357 As related by José Manuel Duarte in Diatmika, A.G., “(Ternyata) Merah Putih…”, Vista 57, 1989, op.cit., p.22. A description of the attack Posto can also be found in Gunter, J., “Majesty yet no mercy”, 7 December 2002 - http://raiketak.wordpress.com/category/power/page/4/ . 358 Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., p.68 and Annex VIII, p.228. The rebel villages in the Baucau Circunscrição were the Naueti-speaking villages of Afaloicai and Osso Huna – see footnote 349.

72 Carabau, reported that the rebels had returned from Baguia and dispersed into the surrounding countryside.359 On 11 June, the Portuguese force - together with loyal arraiais and mortar support, recaptured the Uatolari Posto and began a series of arrests.360 On the following day, 12 June, the Portuguese authorities arrested three village chiefs in the Uatolari area: Paulo da Silva of Makadiki village; Celestino da Silva - Matahoi village361; and Tomé Leal of Uaitame-Vessouro village - (see village locations at Annex A). Further arrests were made on 13 June: Alberto Ribeiro - the fuc-mean (red-haired) of Afaloicai village; the village chief of Afaloicai - Abílio de Meneses; António Metan362 - a sub-village head of Uatolari; the brothers Amaro de Araújo and Mateus de Araújo; and – according to the reports of Monsignor Martinho da Costa Lopes and Governor Barata, an Indonesian named “Joubert” (ie Jobert Moniaga). Jobert was apparently killed by Portuguese troops soon after his capture. According to Marcelino, Jobert was “shot and killed on the spot”.363 However, Gerson Pello related: that “Yubert [sic], who was acting on my orders, was captured. Tragically, Portuguese soldiers immediately crushed his skull with a rock.”364 According to several elders in Viqueque Town, Moniaga was struck on the head with a bamboo pole by arraiais and subsequently died of his wounds in the hospital in Baucau.365 Meanwhile, the rebels in the Uato-Carabau area - who had assembled to the east in the area of the estuary of the Irabere River, were attacked by a 400-500 strong force of loyal arraiais from the Lautém Circunscrição to the east led by the Lautém Administrador, José Esteval Calado de Serra Frazão366. The mobilisation of this force from Lautém was assisted by the small Portuguese Army detachment at Lospalos under Sergeant Carneiro Cirineu. While Captain Manuel Fajardo remained in command at Uatolari, Capt Barreiros – with a civil servant familiar with the area, was 359

Diatmika, A.G., “(Ternyata) Merah Putih…”, Vista 57, 1989, op.cit., p.22 – Duarte related that “unarmed” rebels surrendered, but those with weapons stayed in the jungle, initially building shelters about two kilometres from the Posto town – probably Uatolari. The defeated rebels may have hoped for extraction by boat – “through the Indonesian refugees, Sukarno had promised (?) support for the revolt – but when it occurred, no boat came from Sukarno to support it.” - Araújo, A. (Abílio) de, Timor Leste: Os Loricos…, 1977, op.cit., p.182/footnote 203. 360 In an interview in 1995, Gerson Pello stated that “Yuber” (ie Jobert) Moniaga had raised the Indonesian flag in Uatolari on 11 June - Rohi, P.A., Pemberontakan …,, Mutiara 775, 1995, op.cit, p.15, but it is likely that the flag-raising occurred a few days earlier. 361 Sherlock, K., 1983, op.cit., p.41 lists Paulo da Silva and Celestino da Silva as Chefes de Suco respectively of “Macadique” and “Mata Hoi” villages in 1953. Jolliffe, J., “Indonesia now wants all the gory details”, The Canberra Times, Canberra, 19 August 1995, p.17 – reports her conversation with an eye-witness who stated that he had given first aid to Celestino da Silva and other Timorese involved: “He said the skin on Da Silva’s back was in shreds from a whipping and he had also seen the death certificate of a fourth Indonesian, called George, who he said had died under torture.” 362 António Metan is also referred to by his formal baptismal name ie António da Costa Soares. 363 Rohi, P.A., “Soekarno …”, 9 May 2005, op.cit., p.2 – as recounted by Marcelino (of Venilale – see footnotes 136 and 138) in 1996 (Gerson Pello was also reportedly present during the interview of Marcelino). 364 Herman, J., “Pejuang Timtim Akan Tuntut Portugal – Atas Pembantaian 2,000 Orang di Viqueque”, Jawa Pos, 16 November 1995, p.13. Gerson Pello was attending a reunion in Dili on 15 November 1995 in the home of José Manuel Duarte (see footnote 566). Note also footnote 361 above – “George” is very probably a reference to Jobert Moniaga. 365 Author’s discussions with Hermenegildo da Cruz, Constantino de Oliveira Simões, António Pinto and Rogério Pinto, Viqueque, 29 June 2007. Moniaga was reportedly easily recognizable as he had a gold front tooth. 366

José Esteval Calado de Serra Frazão – Administrator 3rd Class (b. 19 November 1923) was later commended for his action – see BOdT, No.41, 10 October 1959, p.640. His career profile is outlined in BOdT, No.40, 4 October 1958, p.622.

73 despatched with a force to Uato-Carabau to engage the rebels. On the evening of 13 June, the arraiais force from Lautém retook the Uato-Carabau Posto, and the rebels dispersed – “every man for himself.”367 On 16 June, the Government forces failed in an attack on the “revoltosos” position at “Afalebe”368, but were successful the following day and captured Armindo - the village chief of Osso-Huna (Baguia), and two Indonesians: the brothers Gerson Pello and Jeremias Pello.369 According to Gerson Pello, following the rebels’ defeat, he and his younger brother Jeremias Pello had hidden in the WWII “Japanese caves” in the hills north of Ossú. The Portuguese reportedly used a staff member from the Indonesian Consulate to convince them to surrender – after which they were shackled, transported to Baucau and then flown to Dili.370 According to Viqueque elders, when captured, Gerson declared himself to be a “Lieutenant” – but when challenged by Portuguese officers to prove such by reading a map, Gerson was unable to do so.371 The reports of both Monsignor Martinho da Costa Lopes and Governor Barata noted that the campaign against the rebels finished on 18 June.372 According to José Manuel Duarte, following the defeat at Baguia, he was still determined to seek sanctuary in Atambua, Indonesian Timor – but all routes were blocked by locals collaborating with the Portuguese authorities.373 With an injured leg that limited his movement, he hid in the forest with a fellow rebel - Fernando Pinto, the raja of Uato-Carabau. According to José Duarte, “a reward of 500 patacas – the monthly wage of a senior Portuguese official … was offered for who-ever brought in my head. The reward for the heads of those who had only just participated in the Rebellion was 20 patacas … many killings occurred for the money … children were beheaded just for the reward from the colonial government – the killers were the poor and very ignorant villagers.”374 José Duarte also related that the Administrator of Viqueque, Artur Ramos, had reported that he (Duarte) had been killed – but Governor Barata “had questioned this, saying that if I had been killed why was there still rebellion in Same and Betano ?”. The Governor then ordered that “I must be captured alive – as all the rebels captured in Viqueque said that I was the leader of the movement. The Governor needed me for questioning – that’s the reason that I was saved, otherwise I would surely have been killed by the soldiers.”375 To stop the bloodshed, José Manuel Duarte and Fernando Pinto decided to surrender and, through an elder (Paul Waragea) who had connections with the Portuguese military, negotiated to surrender in Ossú – but only to a Portuguese official. On 1 July, they surrendered at Ossú – and were badly beaten, including by the Viqueque Administrator, Artur Ramos. Soon after, they were transported to Baucau and then flown to Dili. 367

“Salve-se quem puder” - Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., p.69. “Afalebe” means “flat rock” in the Makassae language, but this site has not been identified possibly Aba Dere sub-village of Babulo; or Afaloicai. 369 Barata, F. J. F. T. Governor, Letter to the Minister of Overseas Territories, Dili, 6 October 1959, p.1. 370 Rohi, P.A., “Apa Kata …”, Mutiara, Edition 776, 1995, op.cit., p.14. The capture of Gerson and Jeremias Pello probably occurred on 20 June 1959 – not 17 June as indicated in the reports by Monsignor Martinho da Costa Lopes and Governor Barata. 371 Author’s discussions with Hermenegildo da Cruz, Constantino de Oliveira Simões, António Pinto and Rogério Pinto, Viqueque, 29 June 2007. 372 Barata, F. J. F. T. Governor, Letter to the Minister of Overseas Territories, Dili, 6 October 1959, p.2 : “Terminou a campanha … regressam os arraias as suas terras.” 373 Diatmika, A.G., “(Ternyata) Merah Putih…”, Vista 57, 1989, op.cit., p.23. 374 Ibid, p.24. 375 Ibid, p.24. 368

74 The Portuguese Government had also despatched regular troops from Portugal to reinforce their armed presence in the areas of the disturbances. On 17 June, 80 military police arrived in Baucau – having flown to Portuguese Timor in two Skymaster aircraft via Goa, Ceylon and the Cocos Islands.376 On 26 July 1959, the Portuguese navy Velho-class sloop, F 476 NRP Gonçalves Zarco, arrived in Dili from Macau to reinforce a sense of security. This may have been precipitated by the claims of the Chief of Police in Dili that an unidentified submarine had been sighted on 1, 2 and 3 July off Aliambata – on the south coast about 53 kilometres by road east of Viqueque Town and about 10 kilometres from the Uatolari Posto.377 In concluding their reports, Monsignor da Costa Lopes and Governor Barata also described summary executions of rebels in the Posto of Uatolari.378 While their reports did not specify the date of the incident, these events probably occurred on 17 June. The reports related that the Acting Administrator of the Viqueque Circunscrição (Artur Marques Ramos) and Senior Captain Barreiros were transporting three prisoners – mentioned above ie: Alberto Ribeiro, Abílio de Meneses and Armindo, in the vicinity of the Bebui River a few kilometres west of the Uatolari Posto headquarters - when the prisoners reportedly escaped. Following a pursuit by local loyal Timorese militia, Armindo was killed - and Alberto and Abílio were captured. Soon after, according to the reports, Abílio and Alberto were joined at the banks of the Bebui by a group of prisoners brought by jeep from the Uatolari Posto: João Soares of Uatolari; Feliciano, a former soldier; Naha-Leque (of Uma Ain de Baixo, Viqueque Posto); and three unnamed civilians.379 The seven were reportedly killed by automatic weapons fired by Administrator Artur Ramos and Captain Barreiros - and their bodies mutilated with spears and machetes and then thrown into the flooded river. Both reports listed three eyewitnesses to the killings: Miguel da Costa Soares, the régulo (traditional ruler) of Viqueque; António da Costa Rangel, the village chief of Uai-Mori; and Miguel Amaral, the village chief of Uma Ki’ic.380 These killings 376

Australian Consulate – Dili, Savin 22, 22 June 1959 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 1). A further 80 military police and about 16 artillery pieces later arrived in Dili port on 30 September – Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 203/59, 11 October 1959 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 1). 377 Australian Consulate – Dili, Cable 28, 7 July 1959 (NAA: A1209, 1959/612). 378 There is no reference at all to these summary executions in the main body of Governor’s Barata’s subsequent book ie Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit.. As annexes, the book includes reports by several officials including Lieutenant Braga, Administrator José Filipe Ribeiro (Baucau) and Administrator Artur Ramos (Viqueque) – but these reports are incomplete, and the details of the killings at the Bebui River are not included. In mid-1960, the Baucau Administrator José Filipe was transferred to the position of Administrator of the Bobonaro Circunscrição. United States Embassy – Jakarta, Despatch 138, 19 August 1960 , described Administrator Filipe as “reportedly inept, corrupt and slightly unbalanced” (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 1). 379 The killings at the Bebui River are also related in Soares (Mali-Lequic), A.V.M., Pulau Timor …, 2003, op.cit, pp.102-104 – that lists the following as having been killed: Alberto Ribeiro (Uatolari), Anselmo (Uato-Carabau), Abilio Menezes (village head, Afaloicai), Feliciano da Silva (Uatolari), Naha-Lequik (Viqueque), Lequi-Rubik (Viqueque), João Henrique (Luca), Paulo da Silva (Uatolari). “Feliciano Soares”, and “Paulo” are also suggested as two of the un-named civilians - Gunter, J., “Communal Conflict in Viqueque …”, 2007, op.cit., p.39. Thomas Cabo Sipaio/Cipaio of UatoCarabau was also reportedly executed (footnote 380) – and may have been one of these un-named prisoners. Thomas is also cited as having raised the Indonesian flag in Uato-Carabau on 18 June Rohi, P.A., Pemberontakan …, Mutiara, Edition 775, 1995, op.cit, p.15 – see footnote 350. Elders in Iliomar – who had participated as in the campaign in Uato-Carabau as arraiais from the Lautém Circunscrição, also related the killing of Thomas Cabo Sipaio. 380 Both the reports by Monsignor Martinho da Costa Lopes and Governor Barata gave no date for the killings, and the number killed is unclear – ie reporting “seven”, but implying these comprised Alberto, Abílio Meneses, João Soares, Feliciano, Naha-Leque, and three un-named civilians ie eight. Note also that, according to the Memorandum (footnote 382), Abílio Meneses was reported as being killed in the

75 were also later described by surviving rebels: “Moreover, seven of the people’s leaders were hailed as heroes – including Thomas Cabo Sipai [sic] (ie, Cabo Sipaio – local police corporal), Antonius Metan and a local noble, Abilir [sic] (ie, Abílio) Afaloicai. Together with another four, they were shot with pistols while prisoners.”381 A “Memorandum” (copy at Annex D)382 written in Angola by rebel leaders in 1960 states that Abílio de Meneses, the village chief of Afaloicai (Uatolari) was shot and killed by Administrator Artur Ramos in the grounds of the Uatolari Posto on 19 June 1959 (ie not on the bank of the Bebui River as related above). Abílio’s daughter, Elda Sousa Meneses, also described her father’s death: “after he was shot and killed in the Posto Administrador, the family only found the body without the head. After some time however, the head was found and buried with the rest of the body.”383 The rebels’ 1960 “Angola” Memorandum also related that João Mariano, a sipaio, was shot and killed in the Secretária of the Uato-Carabau Posto by the Lautém Administrador, José Esteval C. de Serra Frazão. João Mariano had surrendered – draped in a Portuguese flag, but was summarily executed.384 According to the Memorandum, the following were killed in the headquarters of the Viqueque Circunscrição: Domingos da Costa Amaral (known as Domingos Jeremias – see also footnote 342) and António Ferreira – both of Luca, and Leque-Rubic (married) of Caraubalo. Elders in Viqueque related that Leque-Rubic – who had participated in the 7 June attack on the Circunscrição office, was shot by Administrator Artur Ramos and then decapitated by a Timorese, Arlindo.385 According to the Memorandum written in Angola, the Administrator of the Baucau Circunscrição, José Maria Ribeiro Filipe, ordered the killings of João Henrique of Uatolari, and Lourenço and Castilho of Baguia. The liurai of Afaloicai (Baguia), Aparicio Pedro Ximenes was also reportedly beheaded.386 This grounds of the Uatolari Posto on 19 June. Summarising a report from Administrator Ramos, Barata cites “seven killed from the Posto of Uatolari” – see following footnote 389. These killings are also related in Jolliffe, J., Cover-Up, 2001, pp.45-46, 325-326 citing a report to Portuguese Prime Minister Dr António de Oliveira Salazar based on complaints from the Monsignor Martinho da Costa Lopes in which Monsignor Martinho purportedly “suggested criminal charges” against Ramos and Barreiros. As noted in footnote 378 above, Governor Barata’s 1998 book, Timor contemporâneo…, op.cit. provides no details on these killings at the Bebui River. On the witnesses, Sherlock, K., 1983, op.cit., pp.41-42 lists the following as Chefes de Suco in 1953: “Miguel da Costa Soares – of Umuain de Baixo, António da Costa Rangel – of Uai Mori, and Miguel da Costa Amaral – of Uma Quic”. 381 Rohi, P.A., Pemberontakan …, Mutiara, Edition 775, 1995, op.cit, p.15. 382 Araújo, A.L.J. de (et al), Memorandum – Assunto: Sobre o acontecimento ocorrido em 7 de Junhe [sic] de 1959, na Cirrcunscrição [sic] de Viqueque – Timor, six pages, Cólonia Penal do Bié (Angola), 21 April 1960 in Araújo, A.L.J. de, O Célebre Massacré …, 1974, op.cit. 383 Gonçalves, J.L.R., Gente de Timor-Leste – Primeiro ano da Independência, Tipografia União Folha do Domingos Lda, Faro, 2004, p.66. 384 The circumstances of the killing of João Mariano are also related in Gunter, J., “Communal Conflict in Viqueque …”, 2007, op.cit., p.33. The killing of João Mariano was witnessed by Francisco Ruas Hornay (of Iliomar) – and related to his son, Constantino Hornay – interviewed by the author in Dili on 26 June 2007. João Mariano’s son - Armindo Soares Mariano (sometimes as “Armindo Mariano Soares”), was an early member of Apodeti (its Information Secretary) and appointed Administrator of Dili in the late 1970s and later Chairman/ Speaker of the DPRD I (Parliament) in Dili in July 1997. A prominent pro-integration leader, Armindo moved to Kupang in September 1999. On 1 August 1959, João Baptista was appointed as segundo-cabo de sipais at Uato-Carabau to replace João Mariano, and Agostinho da Costa Pinto and Feliciano Soares were recruited as sipai at Uato-Carabau – BOdT, No.31, 1 August 1959, p.511. 385 Note that according to Soares (Mali-Lequic), A.V.M., Pulau Timor …, 2003, “Lequi-Rubik” of Viqueque) was among those killed at the Bebui River –see earlier footnote 379. 386 “Pedro Soares (Liurai of Baguia)”, “Lourenco” and “Castilho” are also listed as being killed in Baucau – and “João Henriques of Naha-Reca, Ossú” as disappearing at “Bui-Bela” in Soares (Mali-

76 Memorandum, written by deported rebel leaders, summarised those killed as “more than 500.” A suspected rebel, Carlos de Carvalho of Nunumalau village (Uatolari), was also shot and killed on the outskirts of Baguia by a Timorese local policeman (sipaio) – reportedly while attempting to escape from police custody.387 In Viqueque, a Portuguese cabo (corporal) – Cabo Lisboa, was responsible for the detention of the surrendered and captured rebels – ie as the carcereiro (jailer). Lisboa was “reknown for his particular lack of humanity towards the rebels.”388 A subsequent report by Viqueque Administrator Artur Ramos on the Viqueque uprising was included as an annex in Governor Barata’s 1998 book – but reference to the detail of incidents or casualties at Uatolari, Uato-Carabau and Baguia was omitted. Rather, in lieu, Governor Barata inserted the following passage, as comment, into Administrator Artur Ramos’ “bowdlerised” report: “(A list of 21 names follows – the first seven from the Posto of Uatolari who died as witnessed by the signatory ((ie Administrator Artur Ramos)); and 14 others - including one from Uatolari who died in hospital, and the majority of the others were from Uato-Carabau).” Administrator Artur Ramos concluded his report as follows: “In conclusion, the signatory ((ie I, Administrator Artur Ramos,)) still wish to say that, in my modest opinion, the repression of this movement was much too benevolent and can encourage the repetition of such an event. The actions were as directed by the superior authority - by telephone from Lieutenant Braga. I believe that Captains Fajardo and Barreiros received the same instructions.”389 Ethno-linguistic Divisions and Violence In mid-1960, the Portuguese Army Chief-of-Staff - Captain Carvalho, told the Australian Consul that “only a hundred or two of the total Timorese population” had

Lequic), A.V.M., Pulau Timor …, 2003. Sherlock, K., 1983, op.cit., p.20 lists Pedro Ximenes as Chefe de Suco of Afaloicai village (Baguia) in 1952. Berlie, J., email to author, 13 December 2006 – also notes the beheading of Lorenço. The revered tombs of Aparicio and Lorenço are in the aldeia (subvillage) of Bui Bela, one of the highest villages in the Matebian Mountains. 387 Related in the reports by Monsignor Martinho da Costa Lopes and Governor Barata – Carlos de Carvalho had been detained and treated for injuries in the Baucau hospital, returned to Baguia, and immediately before his death had been interrogated by the Encarregado de Posto of Baguia (ie Amadeu Coelho – b. 14/4/1922, Encarregado since May 1957) and the Encarregado de Posto of UatoCarabau (the newly-appointed Joaquim Pereira da Silva). The dates of the interrogation and the death of Carlos de Carvalho are not recorded. Carvalho’s younger brother - Napoleão de Carvalho, participated in the attack at Uatolari and the seizure of weapons. Carvalho’s son - Gregorio Basilio (Lobo Dara) joined Fretilin in 1974 on his return from studies in Lisbon and military service in Africa, and was a member of the Central Committee – also a Falintil commander, he was later killed in combat with the Indonesian armed forces. 388 António Pires - email to author, 5 July 2009 (relating recollections of his mother - Maria Francisca Pires, the widow of the Lacluta Encarregado de Posto Laurentino António Pires). 389 Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., p.225 – Annex VII, Report of the Administrator of the Circunscrição of Viqueque (Administrator 3rd Class Artur Marques Ramos) , 23 January 1961. Artur Ramos had earlier been appointed/promoted to “Administrator 3rd Class” of the Viqueque Circunscrição – ie from Acting Administrator, on 25 August 1959 vide BOdT, No.35, 29 August 1959, p.558.

77 been involved – and that the conflict “had been more a question of one tribe working off old scores against another than anti-Portuguese feeling.”390 As noted earlier, the Portuguese had been “aided by native auxiliaries” (arraiais) against the rebels – principally “(loyal natives from Ossu), they converged on the area from two points – Lautem and Viqueque, using mortars, bazookas and machine guns.”391 On 5 August, the Portuguese Army Chief-of-Staff in Dili, Captain Carvalho, commenting on casualties, told the Australian Consul that there had been “quite a few … but this was unavoidable, and we had great difficulty in restraining the native auxiliaries from Ossu … the natives of Ossu were greatly angered at the disloyalty of Uatolari and Baguia peoples – very few were involved, really, and wished only to punish them … and once military action was taken, other peoples in the Uatolari and Baguia area were glad to assist in capturing remaining leaders in their area.”392 As described earlier, the Portuguese also mobilised arraiais from the neighbouring Circunscrição of Lautém under the Lautém Administrador, José Esteval C. de Serra Frazão. This force, numbering 400-500, marched into the Uato-Carabau and Uatolari Postos where they laid waste to villages.393 The Lautém force also seized property and livestock before withdrawing eastward. The Government force from Lautém was predominantly from the Fataluku ethno-linguist group - with lesser numbers from the Makalero-speaking Posto of Iliomar394 bordering Uato-Carabau. The Fataluku and the Makalero were traditional enemies of the Naueti speakers who inhabited the Uato-Carabau Posto, the eastern half of the Uatolari Posto, and two villages in the southwest of the Baguia Posto that had supported the uprising.395 Following a visit to the Viqueque Circunscrição in 1960, the Australian Consul reported on “killings by the Army or officially-encouraged Lautem tribesmen” noting that the Government gave “a free hand to Lautem people to move into the UatoCarabau area under Army protection and kill as many of their enemies as they could find; some dozens of Uato-Carabau people are reported to have died.”396 Apart from the depredations of the Fataluku and Makalero auxiliaries from Lautém into Viqueque’s Uato-Carabau Posto397, there were also other significant ethno-linguistic – or tribal, elements to the conflict within the Baucau and Viqueque Circunscrições.398 Of the five villages in the Uatolari Posto (291 sq km), the three 390

Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 78/60, 18 June 1960, p.1 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/9). Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 143/59, 14 July 1959, p.1 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 1). 392 Australian Consulate – Dili, Record of Conversation, 5 August 1959 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 1). 393 For detail see Chamberlain, E.P., The Struggle in Iliomar, op.cit., 2008, pp. 41-42. 394 It is unclear whether the force from Iliomar was accompanied by the Encarregado do Posto of Iliomar - Filomeno da Cruz Miranda Branco (b. 17 December 1910). Filomeno Branco was the longserving Encarregado at Iliomar ie from 1954 to to 23 July 1959. 395 See Chamberlain, E.P., The Struggle in Iliomar, op.cit., 2008, pp.34-36 for Fataluku forays as Japanese auxiliaries during World War II westward into both Makalero (Iliomar Posto) and Naueti territories (Uato-Carabau and Uatolari Postos). 396 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 143/60 - “Tour of Viqueque Area”, 20 October 1960 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/9) – the Australian and Chinese (ie Taiwan) Consuls accompanied the Governor on a visit to the area. The Governor’s visit to Lacluta,Viqueque, Iliomar and Lospalos was briefly reported in the Portuguese Government’s foreign affairs monthly bulletin ie Boletim Geral do Ultramar, No. 426, Lisbon, December 1960, p.642. 397 Gunn, G.C., A Critical View …, 1994, pp.86-87; and Gunn, G., Timor Loro Sae 500 Years, 1999 p.145 note that the raising of militia in the Lospalos area by the Portuguese for action in Viqueque exacerbated ethnic tensions among the Timorese. 398 Within the Viqueque Circunscrição (estimated population in 1959 of 37,150 - area: 1,850 km), the largest number spoke Makassae (about 46 percent), about 25 percent spoke Tetum (Viqueque Town 391

78 villages in the eastern half of the Posto were Naueti-speaking: ie Afaloicai, Uaitame/ Vessoro, and Babulo; while the two western villages were mainly Makassae/Makasaispeaking: ie Matahoi and Makadiki. In the period 1952-1958 - with the permission of the traditional ruler of Uatolari, Don Humberto (of Uaitame), the villagers of Afaloicai had expanded their rice fields into the Uaitame and Naedala areas, drawing water from the Bebui River. The villagers from the three Naueti-speaking villages appear to have been the basis of the 1959 Rebellion in Uatolari – and, although the village chiefs of Makadiki and Matahoi were detained by the Portuguese on 12 June (as related earlier), the Makassae-speaking people of those two villages appear to have joined the Portuguese in attacking the rebels with “the Makassae-speaking community joining volunteers raised by the Portuguese and conducting violence against other communities … seizing land and domestic animals from the Afaloikai community.”399 Casualties and Aftermath On 25 June 1959, with the operations against the rebels in the Baucau and Viqueque Circunscrições concluded, the Director of Civil Administration in Dili Abílio da Paixão Monteiro, recommenced the investigation in Dili of the 45 detained Timorese implicated in the revolt. For “ethical and political considerations”, Governor Barata directed that the number of “detentions be scaled down” so as not to “aggravate the wounds in the social fabric.”400 Governor Barata noted that his views were opposed by several sectors - particularly by the military who advocated “exemplary punishment” and “implacable toughness” in suppressing the uprising. According to Governor Barata, “trustworthy information” had indicated that a Timorese member of the Conselho de Governo, Francisco de Araújo, had been involved in the uprising – including in its preparatory phase. Due to the “political and social considerations” - and following direction from Lisbon, Francisco de Araújo appeared before an investigating session of the Conselho. Francisco defended himself and to the south and southwest), and about 20 percent spoke Naueti (including about 40 percent of the Uatolari Posto and all villagers in the Uato-Carabau Posto). The foregoing figures are estimated by the author on calculations using the 1960 census figures and the 2001 Suco Survey. Metzner, J.K., Man and Environment in Eastern Timor, op.cit., 1977 notes a 1954 census survey that showed 34 percent of the Uatolari Posto were Naueti speakers and 66 percent spoke Makassae. Metzner’s 1969 work is an important reference, but his study only covers a transect from the northern coast to the southern coast between the longitudes of 126° 15′ and 126° 35′ ie only as far east as Aliambata on the southern coast. 399 Tilman, M. & Pereira, D., “Tanah Dan Perumahan Di Timor Lorosae Antara Harapan Dan Kenyataan” (“Land and Housing in Timor Lorosae – Between Hope and Fact”), East Timor Law Journal, Article 14, 2004. This study, done in 2002, also relates the disempowerment of the Naueti – who had supported UDT (União Democrática Timorense – Timorese Democratic Union) and Apodeti in 1974-75 (see footnotes 538, 539, 549) and who subsequently retook their lands in Uatolari from the Makassae during the Indonesian occupation period (beginning in early 1979 after the fall of the Falintil Matebian Mountain resistance base). However, land and property conflicts in Uatolari have still to be satisfactorily resolved. On the causes for the Rebellion, see also Babo Soares, D., “Building a foundation for an effective civil service in Timor Leste”, Pacific Economic Bulletin, May 2003, p.13 who contends that “the essence of the protest was merely to insist that the colonial government pay more attention to the social welfare of the locals, who until that time, had lacked access to education and other government services.” 400 Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., pp. 69-70. In assessing Barata’s tenure as Governor, the Australian Consul reported that Governor Barata “was widely regarded as the most popular and most energetic governor in the recent history of the province” – and although he could “hardly be described as a liberal, he was more tolerant of ‘oppositionist’ opinions than were his predecessors”: Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 67, 6 Apr 1963 (NAA: A3092, 221/11/18, Part 1).

79 - but following a secret vote by the Council members, he was dismissed from the Council and detained.401 However, according to a group of rebels, Francisco de Araújo was not involved in the movement. Rather, he was falsely implicated in the plot by Câncio dos Reis Noronha402, a long-time rival. Câncio Noronha reportedly pressured the police to force false confessions of Francisco de Araújo’s involvement from two of Francisco’s employees: Crispim Borges de Araújo and Belarmindo de Araújo.403 In early July 1959, a few weeks after the violence, the Australian Consul visited the Baucau and Viqueque Circunscrições and reported: “I met very few natives on the road ((from Baucau)) to Venilale - the route to Viqueque, but they were to be seen in the fields, carrying out the various agricultural processes. However, at Ossu there were many on the roads, all very bright and cheerful. Viqueque presented a different picture – hardly a native to be seen – I felt it to be depressing. The Uato Lari area had been ‘swept clean’ – not a village left standing, completely burnt out and all livestock driven off. Time did not permit continuing to Baguia, but I understand that a similar situation obtains in that area. The actual disturbances where the troops took military action was confined to the Uato Lari – Baguia area. Aided by native auxiliaries (loyal natives from Ossu) they converged on the area from two points – Lautem and Viqueque, using mortars, bazookas and machine guns. … talking to the military Chief of Staff ((on 13 July in Dili)) … he volunteered the information relating to the military action and the measures taken. The Chief of Staff said that the actual shooting, and the use of mortars etc, was more for the moral effect than anything else, but of course the native auxiliaries were difficult to restrain. I have no doubt, however, that brief as the action was, it was equally ruthless and complete. The Chief of Staff went on to say that the natives implicated in the disturbances had no heart for any further opposition to Portuguese authority once their leaders had been taken. … It is known to me, however, that there were many natives in that area in possession of small Indonesian flags … On the face of it, everything now appears to be

401

Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., pp. 70-71 – for Francisco de Araújo’s background, see footnote 185. His PIDE/DGS case file is PIDE/DGS Lisboa PC 636/59 NT 5292 (TdT, Lisbon). A vacancy on the Conselho de Governo was declared on 21 September 1959, and voting by the “electoral college” to fill the vacancy was conducted on 15 November. Câncio Noronha – an empregado bancário, was appointed as a member of the Conselho – BOdT, No.3, 16 January 1960, p.2. 402 Câncio dos Reis Noronha was a son of the luirai/régulo of Lacló (Dom Luís dos Reis Noronha) – see footnotes 185, 286 and 401. Câncio Noronha - and his brother, Bernardino, had been evacuated to Australia in August 1942 and served, in Australia, in the Australian military’s “Z Special Unit” until early 1945 (see footnotes 66 and 69). Returning to Portuguese Timor in late 1945, Câncio Noronha joined the Health and Hygiene Service as a civil servant – but soon after joined the Banco Nacional Ultramarino (BNU). As noted above, he was a member of the Conselho de Governo from 1960 and also served in the Conselho Legislitavo from its founding in April 1965 - – including as a member of the revised 13-member Government Council in December 1974 (as the BNU representative). 403 Author’s discussions in Dili with Evaristo da Costa, Frederico de Almeida Santos da Costa and Salem Sagran, 2 April 2007 – who also noted that Francisco’s wife was Indonesian. However, according to Câncio Noronha, Francisco de Araújo was involved – and had written a letter to his friend, António Senanes (the accountant at the Sociedade Agrícola Pátria e Trabalho - SAPT), in which he accused the following of involvement in the plot: Câncio dos Reis Noronha, Bernardino dos Reis Noronha, Alarico Fernandes (b. 31 December 1904, father of 1975 Fretilin Minister Alarico Fernandes), Domingos Soares (of SAPT) and six others (author’s discussion with Câncio dos Reis Noronha, Melbourne, 6 December 2008).

80 normal – but I can sense that the authorities are not entirely happy – arrests continue as interrogations progress … .”404 Estimates of casualties among the rebels and villagers vary widely and are difficult to assess accurately. Some English-language publications have suggested that the number of deaths was as high as 1,000.405 While official Indonesian publications relate that “hundreds of people were killed”, some Indonesia writers have claimed 10,000 or 40,000 were killed.406 As noted earlier, in April 1960, rebel leaders deported to Angola summarised: “the number of those deceased was calculated as more than 500.”407 Other published estimates were “about 1,500 killed”408 and “more than 2,000”.409 In her March 2007 article (see the preceding footnote 15), Ms Janet Gunter has estimated “between 50 and 500” deaths. One of the Timorese leaders of the Rebellion in Viqueque, José Manuel Duarte, claimed that 545 Timorese were killed during the uprising – noting: “I myself witnessed the brutality, and have sufficient evidence with which to win the case” and that there were “at least nine others who can testify on what happened.”410 The National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM) however, cited a far lower figure in 1995: “the badly planned rebellion failed, causing the expulsion of the Indonesians, some 150 casualties and 60 Timorese deported to Angola and Mozambique by the Portuguese colonial authorities.”411 Timor-Leste’s first President, Francisco Xavier do Amaral, stated: “in 1959, in the aftermath of the uprising, a good number of women, children and old people were gunned down by the Portuguese soldiers on the beaches of Watulari and Waturkabau. Some were killed in Dili, Baucau, Weikeke ((Viqueque)). Others were deported to Angola.”412 Amaral was training as a Jesuit priest in Macau at the time of the

404

Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 143/59, 14 July 1959, pp.1-2 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 1). Taylor, J.G., Indonesia’s Forgotten War, 1991, p.21 – “between 160 and 1,000”; Gunn, G., Timor Loro Sae 500 Years, 1999, p.260 – “between 500 and 1,000 killed”. 406 Brahmana, R., Buku 20 Tahun Timor Timur Membangun, Jakarta, 1996, pp.28-30 cites “hundreds”. Soekanto, Integrasi – Kebulatan Tekad Rakyat Timor Timur (Integration - The Determined Will of the People of East Timor), Yayasan Parakesit, Jakarta, 1976, p.75 states: “According to records, more than 10,000 people were slaughtered by the Portuguese colonialists”. See also Kamah, M.S., “Seroja”: pengalaman seorang wartawan di medan tempur Timor Timur, Eko’s, Palu (Sulawesi), 1997, p.25 that claims “makan korban 40,000 jiwa” (“the loss of 40,000 lives”) in the 1959 uprising. 407 “… o número de mortos calcula-se acima de quinhentos !” - Araújo, A. de (et al), Memorandum – Assunto: Sobre o acontecimento …, 21 April 1960, op.cit., p.5 – included in Annex D. 408 Rohi, P.A., “Timor-Portugis dari Masa-kemasa”, Kompas, Jakarta, 4 October 1974, p.V; and Rohi, P.A., Pemberontakan …, Mutiara, Edition 775, 1995, op.cit, p.15. 409 Herman, J., “Pejuang Timtim Akan Tuntut Portugal – Atas Pembantaian 2,000 Orang di Viqueque”, Jawa Pos, 16 November 1995, p.13. José Manuel Duarte claimed: “Portugal killed more than 2,000 citizens of Viqueque at the Bebui river”. Note however, Duarte’s previous claims of “about 500” and “545” – see the following footnote 329. 410 Sampaio, A., “Portugal Accused of Human Rights Violations”, Publico, Lisbon, 4 January 1996 – Duarte was speaking at a press conference in Dili in November 1992 when a member of the Indonesian East Timor (Timor Timur) provincial parliament (DPRD I) in Dili. Earlier, Duarte had cited “about 500” - Mali Mau, M., “José: Saya merasakan kejamnya Portugal”, Surya, Jakarta, 14 November 1992, p.13. 411 Conselho Nacional de Resistência Maubere (National Council of Maubere Resistance - CNRM), “Indonesia’s desperate attempt to revise East Timor history”, Media Release, 3 July 1995, p.1. 412 Amaral, F. X. do, “My Response to the Film ‘Death of a Nation: The Timor Conspiracy’ ”, London, 2 July 1994 – his public statement after attending a debate in London on 30 June 1994. 405

81 Rebellion and contends that, due to his pro-rebel sympathies, he was not appointed a Catholic priest by the Portuguese authorities on his return to Timor in 1963.413 A large number of Timorese were arrested, together with 13 of the 14 Indonesian asilados reportedly involved – Jobert Moniaga had apparently been killed in Uatolari on 11 June as noted earlier. Most of the Timorese formally detained appear to have been minor civil servants and workers in Dili – as well as three Timorese staff of the Indonesian Consulate, including the Consul’s “right-hand man” and also his driver.414 The Australian Consul reported on “wholesale arrests on little or no evidence and great emphasis on the extortion of ‘confessions’ by torture.”415 Many of the prisoners were initially held in the Portuguese armoury in Dili and, following interrogation, were imprisoned aboard the unseaworthy coastal freighter, Dom Aleixo, in Dili harbour.

Conditions aboard the vessel were very poor – with the prisoners sleeping on the floor without blankets.416 Governor Barata noted that “despite the cool season”, the heat aboard the Dom Aleixo was “unbearable.” He “considered it urgent to remove these men from the Province - despite the human cost of separating them from their families, as to keep them in those conditions was intolerable.”417 According to José Manuel Duarte, a number of the captured Timorese rebels were also imprisoned on the island of Ataúro for three years – and some in Baucau for

413

Nicol, B., Timor – A Nation Reborn, 2002, op.cit., p.107. See also Hill, H. M., Gerakan Pembebasan Nasional Timor Lorosae, Sahe Institute/Yayasan HAK, Dili, 2000, pp.63-64; and Subroto, H., Saksi Mata …, 1996, op.cit., p.190 that relates Amaral telling the Bishop of Dili that he (Amaral) was not “anti-Portuguese” – but “anti the system” that the Portuguese implemented. In a 2009 interview, Amaral related his refusal to be ordained – citing the abuses of the Portuguese colonial regime, in particularly the use of the chicote (a two-tailed hand whip) to punish the Timorese (Anderson, C., “East Timor’s First President Recalls His 9-Day Term”, Jakarta Globe, Jakarta, 18 March 2009). Francisco Xavier do Amaral (b. 3 December 1937) joined the public service in Dili on 13 August 1965 and served as a “tesoureiro” (“treasurer”) second-class in the Customs Service until early 1975. 414 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 173/59, 30 August 1959 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 1). The “right-hand man”- an “Arab”, was deported but released in 1961 and returned to Portuguese Timor see also Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 98/65, 12 July 1965, p.2 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 4). 415 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 78/60, 18 June 1960, paragraph 10 (NAA; A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 1; 3038/2/9). 416 Costa, F.A.S. da. (Prisoner No 52), Memorandum, Bié (Angola), 6 May 1960. 417 Barata, F.T., Timor contemporâneo …, op.cit., pp. 69-70. Conditions aboard the Dom Aleixo were also described by José Manuel Duarte in Diatmika, A.G., “(Ternyata) Merah Putih…”, Vista 57, 1989, op.cit., p.24.

82 two years.418 An “Islamic account” lists members of Portuguese Timor’s Islamic community imprisoned for four-six months in Dili, Liquiça, Batugadé and Ataúro.419 In the Viqueque Circunscrição, 18 males – almost all from villages in Luca and Carau-Balo, were arrested and imprisoned in Baucau420: Carau-Balo Village, Viqueque Posto: Vicente Soares, Estevão de Araújo, Leki Loic, Lela Vomuc, João Soares, Inácio Soares, Rubi Nahac, João Soares, Lacu Caic, Mau Loic. Luca Village, Viqueque Posto: António Soares, Nanu Alves, Duarte Soares, Adalino Soares, Mateus Soares, Luís Soares, José Soares. Viqueque Town: Manuel Pinto. Additionally, several of the key rebels in Viqueque were also imprisoned elsewhere in Portuguese Timor, including421: Zeferino dos Reis Amaral (aged in his 50s – see footnote 308) - the régulo of Luca who had attended pre-uprising meetings with Gerson Pello – imprisoned on Ataúro Island for two-three years. Celestino da Silva - the Chefe de Suco422 of Matahoi village – imprisoned on Ataúro; Celestino Amaral - imprisoned on Ataúro; Tomé Amaral (village chief of Uai Tame); Armando da Silva, of Uatolari – imprisoned on Ataúro; Fernando Soares Amaral (cabo-sipaio ie local police corporal) of Uatolari – imprisoned on Ataúro423; Julio da Silva424 (sipaio ie local policeman) of Uatolari – imprisoned on Ataúro; 418

Duarte, J.M., Memorandum, Dili, 4 February 1994. Duarte stated that 16 rebels from the Viqueque Circunscrição (“one from Uato-Carabau, one from Uatolari and 14 from Viqueque”) were “captured and taken to Dili, and together with 52 from Dili, sent to Angola.” 419 Bazher, A.B., Islam di Timor Timur, Gema Insani Press, Jakarta, 1995, p.34 lists Ahmad bin Abdullah Balafif, Muhammad bin Mahfud Bazher, Ambarak bin Mahfud Bazher, Salim bin Said alKatiri (Liquiça), Awad bin Bade al-Katiri, Saleh Duru, Abdul Pirus Husen Bima, Umar bin Mussallam Syagran, Muhamad bin Mussallam Syagran - and refers to “others”. 420 From a list – “Naran Ema Nebe Castigo iha Baucau Tempo 1959 Viqueque”, drafted by Vicente Soares (of Viqueque) and provided to the author by Virginia Pinto (younger sister of exiled rebel Domingos Hornay Soares), Dili, 3 April 2007. Dom Ximenes Belo related - as a school child in Baucau, “hearing the piercing screams and despair” (os gritos lancinantes e desesperados) of the tortured prisoners - Belo, C.F.X. Dom, A Revolta …, op.cit., 2009, p.5. 421 Author’s discussions with Hermenegildo da Cruz, Constantino de Oliveira Simões, António Pinto and Rogério Pinto, Viqueque, 29 June 2007 – with additional names from lists in Soares (Mali-Lequic), A.V.M., Pulau Timor …, 2003, op.cit, pp.102-104. At p.103, Soares (Mali-Lequic) also records that Domingos Jeremias and António Pereira of Viqueque “disappeared” at Mali-Aba-Ulun, Viqueque; and José Pinto and Luís “disappeared” at Uato-Carabau. 422 From 1912 until about 1966, the term “suco/suku” referred to a “princedom” or grouping of villages – see Metzner, J.K., Man and Environment in Eastern Timor, Development Studies Centre – Monograph No. 8, The Australian National University, Canberra, 1977 - that focuses on central Viqueque. 423 Fernando Soares Amaral (“segundo-cabo”) and Julio da Costa Amaral – “sipais da guaranição” at Uatolari were formally dismissed from the administrative service with effect 1 June 1959 - vide BOdT, No.31, 1 August 1959, p.511. Both were reportedly imprisoned on Ataúro – and subsequently at Ermera (author’s discussion with Gaspar Mascarenhas, Matahoi, 24 October 2008). The following were recruited on 1 August as replacement sipais for Uatolari: Guilherme da Cruz (segundo-cabo de sipais) to replace Fernando Amaral, and Armando da Cruz as sipai to replace Julio Amaral – BOdT, No.31, 1 August 1959, p.511.

83 João Ennes Pascoal of Uatolari – imprisoned on Ataúro. Duarte Ximenes of Laga – imprisoned on Ataúro. José Henriques of Uatolari – imprisoned in Baucau, escaped but killed (stoned to death) in the street (near the Baucau church) by pro-Portuguese Timorese. Joaquim Trinidade of Aliambata - imprisoned in Uatolari.425 Several rebels and supporters were also reportedly “punished locally” eg Francisco (Chico-Berek-Debu-Inan) and Mabe’oc – both of Crarec-Maruc were punished at Uma Tolu, Lacluta; and “Pedro of Railaco” was similary punished.426 Monsignor Martinho da Costa Lopes, serving as a delegate to the National Assembly in Lisbon, returned to Dili in October 1959 and “was able to plead for clemency” for the rebels.427 As noted earlier (footnote 326), his account of the violence in the Viqueque and Baucau Circunscrições was reported in Governor Barata’s letter to the Ministry of Overseas Territories (footnote 327) – in particular, the killings on the banks of the Bebui River in Uatolari. The report written by Monsignor da Costa Lopes also included comments and suggestions not repeated in Governor Barata’s letter to Lisbon. While Monsignor Lopes cited the executions on the banks of the Bebui River in Uatolari, he was reluctant to unequivocally describe the killings as “criminal”.428 His report also queried the circumstances of the death of Carlos de Carvalho at Baguia. Monsignor Lopes offered some explanations for the discontent that led to the Rebellion, including: a lack of schooling in the countryside429, shortages of government administrative staff430, and unfair practices such as the obligatory sale of livestock by villagers at low prices. Apart from a reference to the capture of “o indonésio Joubert” and “os indonésios Gerson and Jeremias”, Monsignor Lopes does not mention in his report any involvement in the 424

Although recorded as “Julio da Silva, Cipaio, Uatolari” in Soares (Mali-Lequic), A.V.M., Pulau Timor …, 2003, op.cit, p.103, this is likely to be Julio da Costa Amaral – see preceding footnote. 425 Author’s discussions with Joaquim Trinidade (b. 1935), Aliambata, 24 October 2008. 426 Soares (Mali-Lequic), A.V.M., Pulau Timor …, 2003, op.cit, pp.102-104. 427 Lennox, R., Fighting Spirit … , 2000, p.64. Monsignor Martinho da Costa Lopes had returned to Portuguese Timor from Lisbon during the National Assembly’s “regular northern summer recess”. Lennox also notes that Monsignor Martinho Lopes “saw himself as a Portuguese patriot” … “defended Portugal against insidious slander at the UN” … “and for him the Portuguese colonies were the crowning glory of the Portuguese nation” - p.66. 428 “dificilmente deixará do ser qualificado de criminoso” - Lopes, da Costa, M., “Breve resenha …, op.cit., Lisbon, 1959, p.3. 429 On education and social welfare failings, see also Babo Soares, D., “Building a foundation for an effective civil service in Timor Leste”, Pacific Economic Bulletin, May 2003, p.13 who contends that “the essence of the protest was merely to insist that the colonial government pay more attention to the social welfare of the locals, who until that time, had lacked access to education and other government services.” 430 Monsignor Martinho Lopes’ report was not specific on these “shortages”. However, Artur Marques Ramos – a Secretário, was the Acting Administrator of the Viqueque Circunscrição and the Secretário position was not filled. There were also vacancies in the Postos. As noted at footnote 266, at the time of the uprising, the position of Encarregado de Posto at Uato-Carabau had been vacant for about one year since the posting of Francisco da Sousa to Lacluta on 13 May 58 – with a replacement Encarregado de Posto, Joaquim Pereira da Silva not posted from Mape (Bobonaro) to Uato-Carabau until 16 Jun 59. At Lacluta, Encarregado Francisco da Sousa had been in bad health and was hospitalised in Dili in November 1958 - and replaced in December 1958 by Laurentino António Pires. A PIDE report discussing the “Motives for Discontent” noted that the “Mascarenhas Ingles (Mousinho)” family – a notable and well-established Timorese family, was in dispute with the authorities due to appropriation of property and the dismissal of family members from senior government administrative posts - including four Chefe/Encarregado de Posto positions (PIDE – Timor, Report, Dili, 23 October 1959 – TdT, Lisbon: PIDE/DGS NT 8971 Part 1).

84 revolt of Indonesians, the Indonesian Consul or Indonesia. Subsequently, on his return to Lisbon, Monsignor Lopes wrote to Governor Barata in November 1959 to thank the Governor for his “humane and Christian role in the events in Timor.”431 In 2007, several former rebels stated their belief that the Bishop of Dili in 1959 - Dom Jaime Garcia Goulart, and Monsignor Martinho da Costa Lopes had pressed for the exile of the arrested rebels – believing that a just trial for the rebels was more likely outside Portuguese Timor.432 Both Dom Jaime Goulart and Monsignor Martinho Lopes later visited the rebels imprisoned in Lisbon and sought improved conditions for them. Governor Barata made several changes to the administration in Viqueque. Acting Administrator Artur Marques Ramos was appointed Administrator - ie “Administrator 3rd Class” of the Viqueque Circunscrição, on 25 August 1959.433 Earlier in mid-late June, the Encarregado de Posto of Uatolari, Eduardo Caeiro Rodrigues – who had been absent from Posto at the time of the rebels’ attack on 7 June, was posted to Mape (Bobonaro). His replacement from Laclubar (Manatuto), Aspirante Saul Nunes Catarino, was older (born 2/7/1904) and two grades more senior. As noted earlier, Joaquim Pereira da Silva (born 3/1/1928), was posted from Mape (Bobonaro) to Uato-Carabau to fill the long-vacant Encarregado de Posto position in mid-late June 1959.434 Into Exile Reporting on the fate of the 13 detained Indonesians, the Australian Consul commented that in early June 1959 the then Acting Governor (the Military Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Aguiar) “initiated the question of their being handed back to Djakarta. However, soon after the new Governor ((Barata)) had taken office, he ((Barata)) vetoed this, and said that the Indonesians, by their actions, had forfeited all rights under which they were granted political asylum in Portuguese Timor, and now became subject to the Portuguese criminal law and as such must be tried and dealt with under Portuguese law. Negotiations are now proceeding between Lisbon and Djakarta to resolve this question.”435 According to one of the exiled Timorese rebels, Evaristo da Costa, 11 of the Timorese - including the “pemikir” (Bahasa Indonesia = “brains”) of the Rebellion and Evaristo, left Dili by ship on 5 June 1959 for prison in Portugal via the Suez

431 Lennox, R., Fighting Spirit …, 2000, p.66: Letter – Flight Timor to Portugal, 12 November 1959. Jolliffe, J., Cover-Up, 2001, p.45; p.325 also notes that Monsignor Martinho Lopes wrote to Portuguese Prime Minister Dr A. de Oliveira Salazar. See footnote 248 for detail on Monsignor Martinho da Costa Lopes and his 1959 report on the Rebellion. 432 Statements to the author by Evaristo da Costa, Frederico Almeida Santos da Costa and Salem Sagran, Dili, 2 April 2007. Dom Jaime Garcia Goulart (1908-1997) was evacuated to Australia in 1942 and returned to serve as Bishop of Dili from October 1945 to January 1967. 433 BOdT, No.35, 29 August 1959, p.558. 434 The postings of Eduardo Caeiro Rodrigues to Mape, Saul Nunes Catarino to Uatolari, and Joachim da Silva to Uato-Carabau were promulgated in BOdT, No.26 of 27 June 1959, p.447 – to have taken effect on 16 June 1959. Governor Barata – who arrived in Dili from Lisbon on 20 June, was unlikely to have been involved in these movements as they were approved by the Administrative Tribunal in Dili on 19 June 1959. Subsequently on 18 June 1960, Eduardo Caeiro Rodrigues was suspended for “disciplinary infractions committed during his tenure as Chefe do Posto at Uatolari … contrary to the interests, prestige and dignity of the State” – belatedly promulgated in BOdT, No.10, 11 March 1961, p.114. He was “dismissed at his request” on 16 April 1962 - vide BOdT, No.21, 26 May 1962, p.429. 435 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 155/59, 3 August 1959 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 1).

85 Canal.436 The report of the Portuguese police superintendent in Dili listed the 11 departing on the Portuguese passenger vessel N/M India437 as: João Pereira da Silva, Valentim da Costa Pereira, Evaristo da Costa, David Verdial, Luís da Costa Rego, José Beny Joaquim, Francisco Orlando de Fátima Soares, Carlos Salvador de Sousa Gama, Gervásio Soriano, Abel da Costa Belo and José Ramos de Sousa Gama.438

N/M India The Australian Consul noted “nine of the principal ringleaders … with some others, were taken away in the Portuguese ship ‘India’ to Lisbon.”439 According to Governor Barata, to avoid “panic” among the population, the 11 prisoners were taken aboard the N/M India “with great secrecy at dawn on 7 June” – with the “normal passengers” (including the departing Indonesian Consul, Nazwar Jacub) embarking in the evening, and the vessel departed Dili at dawn on 8 June.440 This departure of the initial group of exiles is also related in statements by José Manuel Duarte: “those who had been arrested on 3 June 1959 had already been taken to Portugal, while the remainder who had been captured outside Dili were incarcerated with me in the hold of the Don Alezu [sic] … those sent first to Lisbon, were also sent to Angola.”441 The 11 Timorese deportees were disembarked in Lisbon from the N/M India on 20 July

436

Statement by Evaristo da Costa on his return to Jakarta on 5 January 1996 – reported in “Pejuang Timtim: Saya Tidak Pernah Menduga …” (“I Never Imagined …”), Kompas/Kompas Online, Jakarta, 7 January 1996, p.1 & p.8. The N/M India was scheduled to depart Dili on 5 June, but its departure was delayed until 8 June to embark the rebel prisoners. Evaristo was transported from Lisbon to Angola in May 1960, and later exiled in Mozambique – before returning to Portugal and working in menial jobs in the period 1983-1995. 437 The N/M India, of 7,631 tons, was built in 1951 and had a capacity for 387 passengers. Operated by the Companhia Nacional de Navegação, it transported passengers (principally public servants and troops) and cargo to/from Portugal’s colonial territories. Photographs of N/M India, Niassa and Moçambique can be found at http://www.simplonpc.co.uk/Portugal_Nacional.html 438 Barata, F.T., Timor contemporâneo …, op.cit., pp. 218-219 – Annex V, Report of the Police Superintendent Abílio da Paixão Monteiro, 25 July 1959. 439 Australian Consulate – Dili, Cable 20, 16 June 1959 (NAA: A1209, 1959/612). 440 Barata, F.T., Timor contemporâneo …, op.cit., p.61. Governor Barata also notes that Nazwar Jacub’s replacement, Tengku Hussin, had arrived on the N/M India a few days earlier. 441 Diatmika, A.G., “(Ternyata) Merah Putih…”, Vista 57, 1989, op.cit., p.24.

86 1959 and, as “Traição A Pátria”, imprisoned in De Forte do Reduto Norte in Caxias.442 On 4 October 1959, the majority of the rebel prisoners443 to be exiled were embarked on the N/M India bound from Dili to Lisbon via Macau, Singapore, Mormugão (Goa), Aden, Port Said and the Suez Canal.444 These prisoners comprised: - 52 Timorese – including four of “Arab descent” (“de origem arabes”)445: Salem bin Mussallam Syagran (Salem Sagran), Usman bin Manduli Loly, Saleh bin Ahmad Basyarewan [sic], Jum’an bin Basyirun 446; - the four Indonesian “ringleaders”: Gerson Tom Pello, Lambertus Ladow, Jeremias Toan Pello, and Albert Ndoen (also as “Albertus Ndung”, “Alberto L. Ndoen”, “Albert Ndun”).447 The N/M India also carried one “special status” Timorese prisoner, Francisco M. X. J. de Araújo, who had been a member of the Conselho de Governo in Dili. A consolidated listing of all deportees – ie those who departed Dili in both June and October 1959, is at Annex E (alphabetical) and Annex F (Os Nomes dos Detidos Timorenses para Angola do Ano de 1959 - prepared by deportees in Angola in June 1960, that also notes their pre-arrest vocations and employment detail)448. 442

Costa, E. da, Declaração, Dili, 17 June 2001 – in Costa, E. da (et al), O Célebre Massacré …, 2005, op.cit. 443 Their completed pro-forma “Boletim Registo Polícial” – with fingerprints on the reverse, can be found on file PIDE/DGS, PC 634/59 Caixa 5291 (TdT, Lisbon). 444 N/M India arrived in Dili on 30 September 1959 and, as noted above, disembarked an additional 80 military police and 16 artillery pieces : Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 203/59, 11 October 1959 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 1). José Manuel Duarte related that “Bupati … Monteiro” (Bahasa – “Bupati” = “Circunscrição Administrator”) - a friend from soccer/football activities, visited him aboard the N/M India and offered to help his family in Viqueque – which he later did: Diatmika, A.G., “(Ternyata) Merah Putih…”, Vista 57, 1989, op.cit., p.24. It is highly likely that “Monteiro” was Administrator (2nd Class) Abílio Maria da Paixão e Morte de Jesus Ferreira Monteiro. According to Abel da Costa Belo, the rebels believed that they would be tried in Goa - Subroto, H., Saksi Mata …, 1996, op.cit., p.172. A comprehensive account of that part of the voyage from Macau to Lisbon is provided in Gata, A. C. L.G., Captain, Relatorio da Viagem do Navio India de Macau para Lisboa – 1959, 11 December 1959. The ship’s voyage was subsequently diverted from Aden via Lourenço Marques (Mozambique) and Lobito (Angola) – to Lisbon. The voyage to Lisbon is also partly related in Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., pp. 229-234 – Annex IX, Extract of the Letter by Chief of Police (Manuel Vieira Câmara Júnior) “Aboard the Vessel India …”, 15 November 1959. 445 In Portuguese Timor, there were “only about 100 of the Islamic faith … mostly engaged in the piecework trade”: Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 68/54, 23 February 1954 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 1); and “Islam … has a handful of adherents among a small community of Arab descent”: Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 73 “Conditions in Timor”, 10 May 1961 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 3). 446 Bazher, A.B., Islam di Timor Timur, Gema Insani Press, Jakarta, 1995, p.34 – this publication uses Islamic-style spellings of names that differ slightly from those in other reports. 447 The 52 Timorese and four Indonesians are listed – together with personal details, in the “Guia” (“Pass”) by Lieutentant D.R.C. Braga (Chefe de Gabinete), Dili, 3 October 1959 (TdT, Lisbon: PIDE/DGS Lisboa, PC 604/59, Caixa 5288) ie “special status” Francisco de Araújo is not listed. José Manuel Duarte stated that 68 rebels were deported to Angola - Duarte, J.M., Memorandum, Dili, 4 February 1994 – this comprised 64 Timorese and 4 Indonesians. However, Duarte is also quoted as citing “47” departing Dili on 4 October 1959 in Mali Mau, M., “José …”, 14 November 1992, op.cit., p.13. For a “primary source” listing prepared by the exiled rebels see the following footnote 365 (and attached as Annex F) - and also the list of deportees at Annex E. Note however an “error” in Annex F ie “22. Mateus Pereira” should be “Matias Guterres de Sousa”. 448 Costa, F.A.S. da, Os Nomes dos Detidos Timorenses para Angola do Ano de 1959 (The Names of the Timorese Detainees Sent to Angola in 1959), Silva Porto (Bié, Angola), 6 June 1960 – Annex F. Those arrested and deported were predominantly from the Timorese “educated” class: more than 30

87 When the N/M India reached Macau, “one of the prisoners – Senhor Araújo – reportedly managed to send a message to a relative, Dr Pedro José Lobo, President of the Macao Senate and the island’s most powerful citizen.”449 The senior Portuguese police officer on the N/M India reported that the son of Francisco de Araújo - ie Constâncio de Araújo, came aboard the vessel to visit his father – accompanied by Constâncio’s wife and child. Subsequently, the son-in-law of Dr Pedro Lobo also visited Francisco and “passed his father-in-law’s compliments.”450 Francisco de Araújo protested his innocence – claiming that he was the victim of an intrigue initiated by one of the rebels, Crispim Borges de Araújo, his godson.451 Early on 20 October 1959, as the N/M India was entering Singapore to offload a cargo of coffee, the four Indonesians escaped from their cell, leapt overboard and were picked up by a German freighter, the MS Bayernstein, at about 0500hrs.452 During the Indonesians’ subsequent detention by the Singapore immigration authorities, their circumstances were reported in the local press.453 On 22 October, the Indonesians spoke briefly with two Straits Times reporters and declared: “We are Indonesian army officers – please inform the Indonesian Consulate here that we need their help … we are all Sukarno’s men.”454 The Singapore maritime police called upon the Indonesian Consul in Singapore to verify the status of the four Indonesian escapees – but the Consul “declined to recognise them as his citizens.”455 Consequently, the Indonesians were returned to the N/M India by the Singapore Immigration Police at 0635hrs on 23 October, and the vessel departed Singapore soon after. percent appear to have been “funcionario” (civil servants), several were in commercial employment, at least three were village chiefs - others were mechanics, drivers, sailors etc and only three were noted as “desenpregado” (“unemployed”). However, almost all of the Timorese participants in the Rebellion in the Viqueque and Baucau Circunscrições would be classified as “villagers”. Gunn, G.C., “Revisiting the Viqueque (East Timor) Rebellion of 1959, 2006, op.cit., provides an analysis of the employments and vocations of some of the exiles. Annex E – Deportees 1959 Rebellion, summarises “all-source” data on each of the rebels. 449 “Trouble in Timor”, Foreign Report, The Economist, London, 25 April 1963 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 2; 3006/4/3 Part 3). The main topic of the Report was the announcement in mid-April 1963 by the Ministry of the “United Republic of Timor – Dilly” – to which the Economist article appended reference to the “abortive uprising in Timor at the end of 1961” (ie incorrect date) and the relationship between Dr Pedro José Lobo (Presidente do Leal Senado de Macau) and the transiting Francisco de Araújo. This relationship is also mentioned at p.406 in Fernandes, M.S., “A União da República de Timor: o atrófico movimento nacionalista islâmico-malaio Timorense, 1960-1975” at pp.355-431 in Guedes, A.M. & Mendes N.C. (eds), Ensaios sobre nacionalismos em Timor-Leste, Collecção Biblioteca Diplomática do MNE – Série A, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros Portugal, Lisbon, 2005. Dr Lobo (born Manatuto, 12 January 1892; died 1 October 1965) was President of the Maucau Senate (4 November 1959 – 9 May 1964). Apparently an orphan of probably Chinese or Chinese/Timorese parents, he was adopted by a Portuguese official and was sent to study at the Seminário de S. José in Macau (1901-1908) – letter to the author from Sherlock, K., Darwin, 5 October 2007. See also footnote 602. 450 Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., pp. 229-234 – Annex IX, Extract of the Letter by Chief of Police (Manuel Vieira Câmara Júnior) “Aboard the Vessel India …”, 15 November 1959, pp. 230-231. 451 Ibid, p.71 & p.231 - It was apparently alleged that Francisco de Araújo had abused a woman connected to Crispim Borges de Araújo. See also footnote 399 for allegations that Crispim was forced to implicate Francisco de Araújo in the plot. For background on Francisco de Araújo see footnote 185. 452 Gerson Pello describes exiting a porthole and using bed sheets as a makeshift escape rope - Rohi, P.A., “Apa Kata …”, Mutiara, Edition 776, 1995, op.cit., p.15. 453 “Riddle of 4 Men Saved from the Sea”, The Straits Times, Singapore, 21 October 1959; “All Portuguese on way to Lisbon: Mystery Deepens”, The Straits Times, Singapore, 22 October 1959. 454 “4 Rescued Men: New Riddle Now”, The Straits Times, Singapore, 23 October 1959. 455 Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., p.72.

88 The four Indonesians were placed under greater security for the rest of the voyage, and the four Timorese “arabes” were also isolated from the main body of Timorese prisoners. Conditions during the voyage were described by one of the prisoners - Frederico Almeida Santos da Costa, as follows: “During the trip from Timor to Angola, I received only 52 cigarettes, a fresh water bath only once and was able to take in the sun only twice.”456 After a voyage of eight days from Singapore, the N/M India arrived at the port of Mormugão in Portuguese Goa457 on 30 October. The local police came aboard the vessel to strengthen security, military personnel patrolled the wharf and erected barbed wire, and a police patrol launch guarded the harbour waters. While checking the passenger manifest, an immigration official queried the presence of a ChineseTimorese, Mu Theng Siong [sic]. The India’s captain explained that Mu Then Siong (Indonesian Consul Nazwar Jacub’s driver who had been arrested in June) was a Portuguese government contracted worker returning to Portugal – and no further action was taken.458 The India then sailed to Aden where if off-loaded a 257-ton cargo of timber taken aboard in Singapore. Immediately after its departure from Aden on 6 November, the India’s captain, Comandante Contreiras, announced that the vessel was required to sail to the port of Lourenço Marques (Mozambique) to take cargo on board for Lisbon - ie rather than transiting the Suez Canal direct to Lisbon. This diversion caused “great consternation” among the India’s passengers.459 Once at sea and “out of the arab world”, the four Timorese “arabes” were moved to less harsh accommodation, and a Catholic mass was celebrated for the prisoners on 12 November at the request of Rev. Ramiro Dias Branco. On 17 November while in Lourenço Marques, one of the prisoners (Eduardo Francisco da Costa) passed a 100 pataca note to a crew member to purchase sugar and tea for him. Discovered, Eduardo was taken ashore for interrogation, but was later returned to the ship. While in the Atlantic Ocean on 25 November, Captain Contreiras received a ciphered message from Lisbon requiring him to call at the Angolan port of Lobito (about 400km south of the capital, Luanda) and to contact the local security authorities for further instructions. On the N/M India’s arrival in Lobito on 26 November, 52 Timorese prisoners were disembarked into the custody of the local Portuguese military commander. Initially, the prisoners were transported and detained at the military base in Nova Lisboa (now Huambo, about 250 kilometres east of Lobito), but after two days were divided into two groups - with 30 remaining in the Companhia Militar in Nova Lisboa and 22 sent to the Bié penal colony at Capolo (about 70 kilometres south of Silva Porto on Angola’s central highlands plateau).460 At the beginning of 1960, those at Nova Lisboa were moved to join their comrades in the Bié penal colony.

456

Costa, F.A.S. da (Prisoner No 52), Memorandum, Bié (Angola), 6 May 1960. Frederico also described his arrest in Dili on 4 June 1959 and his predeparture incarceration aboard the Dom Aleixo. 457 Goa – together with Damão and Diu, were incorporated into the Republic of India on 19 December 1961. 458 Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., pp. 229-234 – Annex IX, Extract of the Letter by Chief of Police (Manuel Vieira Câmara Júnior) “Aboard the Vessel India …”, 15 November 1959, p.233. 459 Ibid, p.234. 460 Gata, A.C.L.G., op cit. includes a listing at Annex 16 of the 52 prisoners disembarked at Lobito (Angola) – not sighted by the author of this monograph. Costa, F.A.S. da, Declaração, Dili, November 2005, op.cit. describes detention with the Companhia Militar at Nova Lisboa.

89

Central Angola: showing Lobito, Nova Lisboa, Silva Porto, Vila Luzo461 From Angola, the N/M India continued its voyage to Lisbon, disembarking the four Indonesian prisoners and Francisco de Araújo into the custody of the security police (Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado – PIDE) on 11 December 1959.462 Initially, this group was imprisoned separately from the 11 Timorese who had arrived in Lisbon in July 1959 – but subsequently joined them in the prison in Caxias. In early December 1959, the Portuguese authorities decided that the 11 Timorese would be sent to Angola – but they were to remain in Lisbon for a further five months.463 In late December 1959 – about two weeks after their arrival, the four Indonesians were questioned to confirm their earlier statements made in Dili. Lambertus Ladow explained that “he had not met Major Mustafine at his house, but rather had only met him casually in the Port of Baucau and their interaction had nothing to do with the revolutionary movement.”464 Lambertus denied strongly that he had told Joaquim Ferreira that “Indonesian forces would soon take part in the occupation of Timor.” Lambertus also stated that - while he had requested in Dili not to be repatriated to Indonesia, he now wished to return to Indonesia for the sake of his wife and children – and now that President Sukarno had granted a general amnesty to 461

Boletim Geral das Colónias, No.97, July 1933, p.112. Gata, A.C.L.G., op cit., Annex 18 details the handover of the four Indonesian prisoners and a single “special status” prisoner from Dili, Francisco M. X. J. Araújo - ie separate from the “52 Timorese”. Rohi, P.A., “Soekarno …”, 9 May 2005, op.cit., p.2 notes that the four Indonesians were subsequently imprisoned for some time in Angola before their release and return to Indonesia in 1962. 463 PIDE – Lisbon, 383/59-D.Inv., Lisbon, 17 December 1959 – to PIDE Luanda (TdT, Lisbon: PIDE/DGS, PC 634/59, Caixa 5291). 464 Ladow, L., Auto de Perguntas, Caxias (Lisbon), 26 December 1959 (TdT, Lisbon: PIDE/DGS Lisbon, PC 604/59, Caixa 5288). The identity of “Major Mustafine” is not clear. 462

90 all political prisoners and refugees. In July 1960, commenting on the fate of the deportees, the Army Chief-of-Staff in Dili – Captain Carvalho, commented to the Australian Consul that he was “quite certain that nothing has come out of the Lisbon inquiry into the 1959 disturbances to indicate that Djakarta was involved in any way.”465 Imprisoned and Exiled in Lisbon, Angola and Mozambique In late April 1960, Lambertus Ladow – the senior of the four Indonesians imprisoned in Caxias (Lisbon), wrote to the Indonesian Consul in Dili on behalf of the Indonesian group and requested financial assistance.466 At about the same time, ten of the senior exiles in Angola from Viqueque, led by Amaro de Araújo, produced a Memorandum detailing the causes and events of the Rebellion467 - see Annex D. This Memorandum noted the leadership of the “500”-strong rebel group in Dili – but made no mention of Indonesia, nor the 14 Indonesian Permesta exiles. Soon after, on 31 May 1960, the 11 Timorese imprisoned in Portugal who had arrived in Lisbon in July 1959 – together with the four Indonesians (Lambertus Ladow, Gerson Pello, Jeremias Pello and Albert Ndoen) and Francisco de Araújo, were transported from Lisbon to Vila Luso, Angola.468 Evaristo da Costa recalled “on 31 May 1960, the 11 Timorese in Lisbon were re-transported to Angola, together with the four Indonesian officers” – and arrived in Vila Luso (Lwena) on 4 June 1960.469 Later in 1960, to facilitate continuing surveillance, the PIDE in Angola drew up a list of the eight ringleaders of Rebellion: Joaquim Ferreira, João Pereira da Silva, António Metan (António da Costa Soares), Fernando Pinto, Amaro de Araújo, Mateus de Araújo and Luís da Costa Rego.470 PIDE records also indicated that Fernando Pinto, “a former régulo of Uato-Carabau, was deemed influential and not to have changed his ideas”, and the report noted that he “displayed a photograph of the Indonesian Consul and chief organiser of the revolt in his house.”

465

Australian Consul – Dili, Memo 99/60, 30 July 1960 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 1). Ladow, L., Caixas [sic, ie Caxias] Lisbon, 24 April 1960 – original in Tetum (AHD, PAA-809-94846). Ladow comments that the group had arrived in Lisbon “in the winter.” 467 Araújo, A.L.J. de (et al), Memorandum – Assunto: Sobre o acontecimento ocorrido em 7 de Junhe [sic] de 1959, na Cirrcunscrição [sic] de Viqueque – Timor (Memorandum – Report: On the event that occurred on 7 June 1959 in the Circumscription of Viqueque - Timor), six pages, Cólonia Penal do Bié (Angola), 21 April 1960 – in Araújo, A.L.J. de, O Célebre Massacré …, Dili, 1974 (at Annex D). The Memorandum was signed, in order, by Amaro Loyola Jordão de Araújo, Mateus Sarmento Jordão de Araújo, José Manuel Duarte, Joaquim Ferreira, António da Costa Soares (António Metan), Fernando Pinto, João Lisboa, Armindo Amaral, Paulo Amaral and Domingos Soares. 468 Following vaccinations, the Guia de Marcha (Travel Pass) for their journey was signed on 31 May 1960 by the PIDE Director in Lisbon (TdT, Lisbon: PIDE/DGS, PC 634/59, Caixa 5291). 469 Statement by Evaristo da Costa on his return to Jakarta on 5 January 1996 – reported in “Pejuang Timtim: Saya Tidak Pernah Menduga …” (“I Never Imagined …”), Kompas/Kompas Online, Jakarta, 7 January 1996; and information emailed to the author from Evaristo da Costa on 11 January 2007. Evaristo was one of the “11 Timorese” transported to Lisbon in early June 1959. As noted above, Francisco de Araújo was also in the group moved from Lisbon to Angola - ie totalling 12. Evaristo subsequently confirmed Francisco’s inclusion - email to author by Evaristo da Costa, 26 January 2007 and confirmed in discussions on 2 April 2007. Gunn, G.C., “Revisiting the Viqueque (East Timor) Rebellion of 1959”, 2006, op.cit., p.44 - cites a PIDE report which can be interpreted to indicate that “four Indonesians and 12 Timorese arrived at the port of Vila Luso in Angola on 3 June 1960” - ie including Francisco de Araújo . 470 Gunn, G.C., “Revisiting the Viqueque (East Timor) Rebellion of 1959”, 2006, op.cit., pp.45-46 cites the PIDE report and lists these seven – plus, by implication, Francisco de Araújo. 466

91

According to Gerson Pello, the four Indonesians had not been put on trial in Lisbon – but were sent to Angola where they were allowed to “live freely and choose their own work.”471 Jeremias Pello chose to tend cattle so that he could act as a courier each morning for messages from Angolan nationalists without the knowledge of the police. “We used a code created by Lambert who was clever at such things as he had previously been a radio operator. In 1961, with the assistance of the International Red Cross, we returned to Indonesia – but travelling to Switzerland first.”472 President Sukarno had reportedly requested the release of the four Indonesians during talks in Lisbon with Portugal’s Prime Minister Dr António de Oliveira Salazar.473 There appears to have been no mention in the Portuguese media of the Rebellion or its aftermath. However, with increasing international criticism of Portugal’s colonial policies – including at the XV General Assembly of the United Nations, Prime Minister Salazar stated in December 1960 that: “Any person of good faith can see for himself that peace and complete calm reign in our overseas territories, without the use of force and merely by the habit of peaceful living in common.”474 Following an investigation in Lisbon, Francisco M. X. J. Araújo was released and moved from Angola to live in Macau.475

471

Rohi, P.A., “Apa Kata … “, Mutiara, Edition 776, 1995. op.cit., p.15 Ibid, p.15 – quoting Gerson Tom Pello. Rohi, P.A., “Soekarno …”, 9 May 2005, op.cit., p.2 notes that while in Angola they were considered by fellow prisoners to be “heróis da Asia” and relates the activities of Jeremias Pello - then reportedly 17 years of age, as a clandestine prison “courier”. 473 Rohi, P.A., “Soekarno …”, 9 May 2005, op.cit., p.2. states that Sukarno negotiated with Portugal’s Prime Minister Salazar for the release of the four Indonesians during Sukarno’s visit to Lisbon – this probably occurred in early May 1960 (Sukarno arrived in Lisbon on 7 May 1960). 474 “Portugal e a Campanha Anticolonialista” (“Portugal and the Anti-Colonial Campaign”) – speech delivered by Prime Minister Oliveira Salazar to the National Assembly, Lisbon, 30 November 1960, Boletim Geral do Ultramar, No.426, Lisbon, December 1960, p.21 (Portuguese), p.713 (English). India was cited as “eagerly assuming in the U.N.O. the leading role in the Afro-Asiatic opposition to Portugal … for its claims on Goa. It also wishes to hand over Macao to China and Portuguese Timor to the Indonesian Republic, which has more than once stated that it has not claims to it.” – p.24, p.716. 472

92 After-Effects Immediately after the uprising, the Portuguese administration in Dili established a “coast-watching organisation” of “200 natives” supervised by police to cover the northern coast - principally from Dili westward to Liquiça, with a less intensive coverage from Baucau eastward to Com.476 Small military detachments were also established at Laga and Lautém – ie additional to Lospalos, by August 1959. In early August 1959, at the request of Governor Barata and in response to the Rebellion, a PIDE inspector from Lisbon (Mário Ferreira da Costa) visited the Province to advise on security issues. As a consequence, the Chief of Police, Manuel Vieira da Camâra Júnior, was dismissed – “an earlier confidential report had already related his improper behaviour”, and replaced by an administrative official, Agapito dos Anjos.477 The Governor and Inspector da Costa also developed a proposal to establish a local PIDE “subdelagação” in the Province.478. A few weeks later in midNovember 1959, the Governor commented to the Australian Consul: “I shall be happier when the five Metropolitan security police officers arrive – one cannot make intelligence officers out of Administrators.”479 Some weeks after the arrests in Dili, the premises of a “Timorese-only” club in Balide, the Associação Desportiva e Recreativa União, were burnt down. “It’s said that the headquarters of the Club had been set on fire by the Portuguese colonial authorities as it was considered a centre of anti-colonial subversion.”480 The Indonesian Government “had reportedly protested about the ‘disappearance’ of 12 of its nationals captured during the fighting.”481 On 26 September 1959, the Indonesian Consul in Dili wrote to Governor Barata seeking “particulars regarding the death of one of the Indonesian detainees”.482 In response, Governor Barata cited a Corpo de Polícia de Dili report that: “an Indonesian, Jobert Moniaga, 26 years of age, single, the son of Frederik Moniaga and Marga Berlaar, of Saelewere, Ntara ([sic] – ie, Sulawesi Utara = North Sulawesi), Menado, a first sergeant in the Revolutionary Party of the Republic of Indonesia, died in the hospital at Baucau on 17 June of this year as a consequence of injuries received after having taken up arms against Portuguese sovereignty.”483 475

In April 1963, Francisco de Araújo greeted Governor Barata in Hong Kong when Barata was returning to Lisbon at the end of his gubernatorial tenure in Timor. Francisco later corresponded with ex-Governor Barata in Lisbon - Barata, F.T., Timor contemporâneo …, op.cit., p.71. 476 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 155/59, 3 August 1959 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 1). 477 Barata, F.T., Timor contemporâneo …, op.cit., p.30, p.44. On 4 October, Manuel Vieira da Camâra Júnior departed Dili for Lisbon on N/M India escorting the rebel deportees. 478 Ibid, p.30, p.44 and pp.125-127. The PIDE staff was not operational in the Province until 2 March 1961 – see footnote 631. 479 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 224/59, 18 November 1959 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 1; 49/2/1/1 Part 1). The Governor noted that one of the PIDE officers would be fluent in Chinese – and of considerable help in combating any infiltration from Indonesian territory. A PIDE presence in Portuguese Timor had been earlier proposed in its 1955 budget, but not implemented – see footnote 126. 480 Araújo, A. (Abílio) de, As Duas Margens da Ribeira de Aileu, Lisbon, 2007. See also footnote 511. 481 Percival, J., “The Portuguese outpost the world forgot for 250 years”, The Sun Herald, Sydney, 13 August 1961. 482 Indonesian Consul – Dili, Note Verbale 203/I-b/59, Dili, 26 September 1959. 483 Governor of the Province of Timor, No. 285, Dili, 7 November 1959. For other accounts of the circumstances of Jobert Moniaga’s death, see footnotes 361 and 363-365.

93

In January 1960, the Indonesian Embassy in Lisbon wrote to the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs lodging a “strong protest against the actions taken by the local authorities of Portuguese Timor” and calling the attention of the Ministry to: - the arrests in 1959 of local staff of the Indonesian Consulate in Dili ie David Verdial (“an Indonesian national”), Salem bin Musallam Sagran and Mu Theng Siong – which “took place without previous notice … departing from the common international practice between souvereign [sic] nations.” - The spreading by the local authorities of Portuguese Timor of “accusations against Mr. Nazwar Jacub Sutan Indra, the former Indonesian Consul in Timor-Dilly, that he was involved in subversive activities collaborating with some of the Indonesians, who have taken refuge in Portuguese Timor. Such accusations are without any grounds.”484 In October 1960, the Indonesian Consul in Dili, Tengku Usman Hussin, advised the Australian Consul that the nine remaining Indonesians who had been imprisoned in Dili had recently been taken by sea to Oecusse by the Portuguese authorities – and “simply pushed across the border from the enclave.”485 The Indonesian Consul added that “the nine men are in custody in Kupang and are to be charged with armed robbery and probably other offences against the criminal law – apart from any action the Army might be taking against them for desertion.”486 He added that “the method of handing the men over was irregular and is bound to be resented in Djakarta. It appears that the Indonesian Government was not notified in advance … and caused considerable adverse comment there ((Kupang)) regarding the Portuguese methods … regarding the four men still in Portuguese hands … Djakarta will continue its efforts to have them brought to trial or returned to Indonesia.”487 Australian officials in the Department of External Affairs in Canberra discussed whether Consul Nazwar Jacub had operated unilaterally – or had been operating under instructions from the Indonesian Government.488 The Australian Embassy in Jakarta was subsequently tasked to obtain “discreetly” any information on the “present whereabouts and activities of Naswar [sic] Jacub Sutan Indra … Our

484

Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia, No. B4/1/1/60, Lisbon, 4 January 1960. The letter also complained of intimidation of local people from accepting employment at the Indonesian Consulate and the “shadowing” of Consul Tengku Usman Hussin by local police that “prevented him from the proper performance of his duties”. 485 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 144/60, 20 October 1960 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 1) ie as reported to the Australian Consul by the Indonesian Consul. 486 Australian Consulate – Dili, ibid – the Australian Consul also reported that the return of the Indonesians had been “independently confirmed by a member of the staff of the civil prison in Dili who has also verified the Tengku’s account of how it was done. It is assumed that this informal method was adopted to avoid embarrassment of having to acknowledge Djakarta’s 1958 representations on the subject” – connect with footnote 224 on “full details” of the 14 Indonesians having been forwarded to the Portuguese authorities by Indonesian officials in 1958. 487 Australian Consulate – Dili, ibid - the Indonesian Consul, Tengku Usman Hussin, was in Kupang at the time of the transfer of the nine Indonesians. Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 255, 26 December 1966 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 4) noted that the Dili-Kupang telephone link was closed by the Portuguese administration in 1959 – but might “possibly re-open” in 1967. 488 Australian Department of External Affairs - Canberra, Manuscript Note, 1 July 1960 – in response to Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 78/60, 18 June 1960 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/9).

94 particular interest is in whether, as has been speculated in some quarters, he no longer enjoys the confidence of his superiors.”489 To further strengthen security – primarily in response to the 1959 Viqueque Rebellion, in 1961 Governor Barata formally re-established (ie “renascer”) a regional Timorese militia under Portuguese command – the Segunda Linha (Second Line).490 In October 1961, the Australian Consul reported: “The target of 20,000 irregulars has been reached and, after completing a few weeks of training, the bulk of the force is to be stood down and sent back to their tribes. … Firearms will not be retained by the individuals.”491 Sara Niner – José Alexandré (Xanana) Gusmão’s biographer, has related that: “For the Portuguese authorities, the feelings of discontent it ((the Rebellion)) highlighted became the impetus for an upgrade of schools, health and other government services. Xanana says they understood the increase in the military, compulsory national service, and the creation of army reserves, as ‘tactics necessary to contain the eventual rebellion of the Timorese’.” Niner added: “Xanana and other East Timorese nationalists later came to see the 1959 rebellion around Ossu, along with the Great Rebellion of 1912, as defining moments in their unique identity as East Timorese people and their growing sense of nationalism.”492 In Exile Those exiled in Angola do not appear to have been mistreated. Several reports note that they were referred to as “Os Heróis da/de Asia”.493 According to José Manuel Duarte: “we remained prisoners, but the judicial process did not start immediately as the charges prepared in Dili did not meet their prerequisites. So, we were again interrogated in Angola … I took the opportunity to relate the actions of the Portuguese colonial government, explaining all their errors. Because the conduct of the Portuguese colonialists was beyond our tolerance, we felt that it would be better to unite with Indonesia which had been independent since 489

Australian Department of External Affairs - Canberra, Memo 800, 7 July 1960 – acknowledged by Australian Embassy – Djakarta, Memo 820, 21 July 1960 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 1). 490 Barata, F. J. F. T., Timor - esse desconhecido, Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais & Política Ultramarina, Lisboa, 1963, pp.25-26. Barata planned a force of 20,000 – essentially to replace the moradores, beginning on the western frontier and in Manatuto (to reward the “people’s loyalty”). The Segunda Linha was planned to be led by “traditional chiefs” – with régulos given the rank of major, chefe de sucos (village chiefs) as captains and lieutenants, and chefe de povoação (sub-villages) as “sargento-ajudante” - Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., pp. 136-141. Local auxiliaries had also previously been termed “Segunda Linha” in the 19th century – see Oliveira, L. de, Timor na história de Portugal, Vol I-III, Agência Geral do Ultramar, Lisboa, 1949-1952. See also footnote 348. A useful history of Segunda Linha, including its re-organisation in the 1960s, can be found in Sales Grade, E.A., “Timor: O Corpo Militar de Segunda Linha”, Revista Militar, 26 (4-5), February 1974, Lisboa, pp.198-215. 491 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 188/61, 23 October 1961 (NAA, A1838, 696/5 Part 2). 492 Niner, S., Xanana – Leader of the Struggle for an Independent Timor-Leste, Australian Scholarly Publishing, North Melbourne, 2009, p.10, p.251 (Endnote 19). Gusmão’s remarks on the Rebellion – and subsequent Portuguese reforms and security strengthening measures, are mirrored by Abílio de Araújo – see footnote 550, and Dionísio da Costa Babo Soares at footnotes 399 and 429. 493 Rohi, P.A., “Soekarno …”, 9 May 2005, op.cit. – see footnote 472; Araújo, A.L.J. de, O Célebre Massacré …, 1974, op.cit. – “Heróis” in the title of a photograph; Herman, J., “Pejuang Timtim Akan Tuntut Portugal – Atas Pembantaian 2,000 Orang di Viqueque”, Jawa Pos, 16 November 1995, p.13.

95 1945 … I related the reality of the situation – for example, there were no schools, hospitals, the people had to hand over their food crops, there were no roads, forced labour everywhere etc – all as background to the Rebellion … The conduct of our interrogators in Angola was far different from that in Dili. In Angola, there was no torture. They just asked us to explain what we had done, and the background to events. After we had revealed all, they weren’t game enough to prosecute us. … Our dossiers were sent to the Portuguese Minister for the Interior and, after a while, a decision was made that we had to be released. To guard against further demands for integration and to disempower us, we were divided into two groups. One was allowed to remain in Angola, and the other was relocated to Mozambique. … Although we were declared to be free men, we weren’t able to enjoy the same freedom as Portuguese – and we continued to be watched closely.”494

Standing: Front:

1959 Rebels’ Football Team – Bié, Angola, 1961 Valentim da Costa Pereira, Manuel Alim, Gerson Pello, José Manuel Duarte, David Verdial, Albertus Ndun. Germano das Dores da Silva, Lambertus Ladow, Carlos da Sousa Gama, Evaristo da Costa, Luís da Costa Nunes

494 Diatmika, A.G., “(Ternyata) Merah Putih …”, Vista 57, 1989, op.cit., p.24. Jolliffe, J., Cover-Up, 2001, op.cit., pp.45-46, pp.325-326 (endnote 19) quotes extracts from José Manuel Duarte’s written submission on human rights abuses by the Portuguese administration in Timor - see earlier footnotes 251-253. Pinto, dos Santos, L., Certidão - …, 22 March 1983, (see Annex H) indicates that Duarte appeared before the Tribunal Militar Territorial de Luanda on 25 June 1960. Some of the rebels were processed earlier by the Tribunal in mid-May 1960 - Gunn, G.C., “Revisiting the Viqueque (East Timor) Rebellion of 1959”, 2006, op.cit., p.44.

96 In Bié, Usman bin Manduli was reportedly placed in charge of the Timorese prisoners’ rations and feeding arrangements – and the director of the prison arranged that the Muslim deportees had access to halal food.495 José Manuel Duarte declared that in Angola and Mozambique there were 64 Timorese political prisoners and “four from NTT” (ie Nusa Tenggara Timor – ie the Indonesians from Kupang, West Timor).496 This is confirmed by a listing (Os Nomes dos Detidos Timorenses para Angola do Ano de 1959) produced in Silva Porto (Bié) by Frederico Almeida Santos da Costa (“Detido Numero 52”) in June 1960 – Annex F.497 That document noted the previous employment of each exile (with the exception of a few from Viqueque) and grouped them as: • I. De Dili Não Considerado culpado (From Dili, considered not guilty) – 32 (including Francisco de Araújo). • II. De Dili considerado como culpado (From Dili, considered guilty) – 16. • III. Os que assaltaram Secretária de Viqueque, Uatu-Lari e UatuCarbau, Causaram mortes na ribeira mota Webui (Those who attacked the Secretariat in Viqueque, Uatolari and Uato-Carabau – Resulting in the deaths at the Bebui River) – 16. • IV. … quarto Indonesios (four Indonesians) – 4, all with military ranks (but see footnotes 211, 213, 214 and 221). After 15 months of imprisonment in Angola, 32 of the deportees – essentially those “not considered guilty” – see above, were released in February 1961 – with “liberdade condicional”, but were required to reside and seek employment in the Bié province capital, Silva Porto (now Kuito)498. Interestingly, those “considered not guilty” and released conditionally included those from Aileu, Baucau, Letefoho – and most of those from Dili. On 27 May 1961, a further group of 31 – “the most responsible for the incident” including Evaristo da Costa were similarly released499 and all reportedly received a monthly subsídio of 120 escudos. A few months later, on 29 August 1961, a group of the previously released deportees, including Evaristo da Costa and Salem Musalam Sagran, were embarked on the vessel N/M Moçambique and transported to the Colonato do Limpopo (Limpopo resettlement zone) in southern

495

Email to author from Dr. J. Berlie, 22 July 2009. Rohi, P.A., “Apa Kata …”, Mutiara, Edition 776, 1995, op.cit., p.14. 497 Costa, F.A.S. da, Os Nomes dos Detidos Timorenses para Angola do Ano de 1959 (The Names of the Timorese Detainees Sent to Angola in 1959), Silva Porto (Bié, Angola), 6 June 1960 – Annex F. The title of the document is not quite correct as the list also includes those Timorese sent initially to Lisbon (departing Dili in early June 1959) and arriving in Angola in early June 1960 – as well as Francisco de Araújo and the four Indonesians who were disembarked in Lisbon on 11 December 1959. 498 The 32 are listed in PIDE-Angola, No.43/61-S.INV., Luanda, 9 March 1961 (TdT, Lisbon: PIDE/DGS PC 604/59 Caixa 5288). Their release was proposed in September 1960 by PIDE Luanda and agreed by the Governor-General of Angola - Dr Silva Tavares, following an assessment that “the investigation in Dili was undertaken in conditions that were unclear - and the nature of the facts investigated with the resulting prejudice to the determination of the degree of responsibility of each of the defendants.” – PIDE Angola, No. 398/61-S.INV., Luanda, 9 August 1961 (TdT, Lisbon: PIDE/DGS PC 604/59 Caixa 5288). 31 of the 32 who were released are listed as “De Dili Não Considerado Culpado” (see footnote 497 above) – and José Soares (“attacked the Secretariat in Viqueque …”) was also among those released. 499 The 31 are listed in PIDE Angola, No. 398/61-S.INV., Luanda, 9 August 1961 (TdT, Lisbon: PIDE/DGS PC 604/59 Caixa 5288). 496

97 Mozambique.500 According to Evaristo, 31 of the deportees were sent to Mozambique, with 32 remaining in Bié – including the four Indonesians and Francisco de Araújo.501 Those selected for transfer to Mozambique were the “inocente” – but, following the intervention of Francisco da Costa Dias (the brother of Evaristo), two of the “culpados” (Evaristo da Costa and Vicente Vidigal) were included in the group sent to Mozambique.502 At Limpopo in Mozambique, the deportees became rural “transmigrants”. In October 1961, several of the transmigrants – including Evaristo da Costa, received a despacho from the Portuguese Minister for Overseas Affairs directing that they remain in Limpopo for five years pending a review of their situation. According to a PIDE report of mid-October 1963, most of the former Timorese rebels in Africa “took up with ‘mulheres de raça negra’ or local women deemed mancebada (concubines or mistresses) and started families.”503 In 1967, José Manuel Duarte applied for his wife and children in Portuguese Timor to join him in Angola – and, “with the assistance of a member of the Portuguese Parliament representing Timor and the intervention of a pastor”, his family arrived in Angola in 1969.504 Some Exiles Return At the outbreak of the war in Angola in early 1961, due to an influx of Angolan detainees, most of the Timorese prisoners in Angola’s Bié penal colony had been released - but remained confined to the Bié provincial capital, Silva Porto. However, a number of the “tidak terlalu bersalah” (Bahasa – “not so guilty ones”) were returned to Portuguese Timor.505 This group probably included Crispim Borges de Araújo, Joaquim dos Santos and “Francisco Periero Ou Chiquito.”506 The four Indonesians: Gerson Pello, Lambertus Ladow, Albert Ndoen and Jeremias Pello were transferred from Angola to Lisbon on 12 July 1961. They remained in Lisbon until April 1962 and were then flown to Zurich before arriving in Jakarta by air on 7 April 1962. Three of the four accepted offers to serve in the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI – “Indonesian Armed Forces”) – Jeremias Pello 500

Costa, E. da, Declaração, Dili, 17 June 2001 – in Costa, E. da (et al), O Célebre Massacré …, 2005, op.cit. 501 Emails to author, 24 and 26 January 2007. Those sent to Mozambique appear to have comprised the group of 31 “not so culpable” released in February 1961 – plus Evaristo da Costa. 502 Evaristo da Costa – discussions with the author in Dili, 2 April 2007. The listing of deportees at Annex E indicates those deportees transferred from Angola to Mozambique – based on the recollections of Evaristo da Costa, Salem Sagran and Frederico Almeida Santos da Costa on 2 April 2007. 503 As cited in Gunn, G.C., “Revisiting the Viqueque (East Timor) Rebellion of 1959”, 2006, op.cit., p.46. 504 Diatmika, A.G., “(Ternyata) Merah Putih …”, Vista 57, 1989, op.cit., p.24. 505 Statement by Germano das Dores da Silva in Jakarta on 6 January 1996 when greeting returning exiles (Evaristo, Armindo and Domingos) – reported in “Pejuang Timtim: Saya Tidak Pernah Menduga …” (“I Never Imagined …”), op.cit. , Kompas/Kompas Online, Jakarta, 7 January 1996. Germano had returned to East Timor in April 1970, was a founding member of the Apodeti party, and served as a member of the regional parliament (DPRD II) in Same (Manufahi, East Timor). 506 Rohi, P.A., “Timor-Portugis dari Masa-kemasa”, Kompas, Jakarta, 4 October 1974, p.V. “Francisco Periero Ou Chiquito” is not listed as one of the deported rebels – however, note that “João Pereira da Silva – alias Chiquito” was still in Angola in 1964 (footnotes 513, 514) and returned to Timor in April 1970, see footnotes 522 and 523. Frederico de Almeida da Costa returned in 1963 – and may have been accompanied by Agostinho dos Santos and Vital Ximenes.

98 however declined and returned to Kupang in 1963 to care for his aged parents.507 Gerson Pello was reportedly “parachuted into Irian Barat ((Dutch New Guinea)) - but when Irian Barat finished, Gerson just left the military and wandered around … Lambert and Albert remained in Jakarta.”508 In November 1961, a sub-group of the deportees in Mozambique – including Salem Sagran, were transferred to Lisbon, before returning to Timor a few years later.509 A group of seven Timorese – reportedly “cleared” of involvement in the Rebellion, arrived back in Dili aboard the vessel Arbiru on 23 April 1963.510 On 10 August 1963, another group of eight - including Juman bin Bachirun and Salem Musalam Sagran, arrived in Dili aboard the vessel Timor. For many Timorese, “the returnees from Angola were ‘heroes’.”511 Fernando Pinto, a former régulo of Uato-Carabau reportedly desired to “save face” with the people of his district before returning from Angola to Timor. Accordingly, he requested compensation from the Portuguese authorities for cattle and other goods seized by the colonial administration from his father who had been killed in Uato-Carabau during the uprising in 1959. Pinto’s claim comprised “23 buffaloes, ten horses, 20 goats, two gold horns (lua), three ropes of 300gm each (essential to restrain cattle), 50 swords (essential items of bride wealth to negotiate marriages and for funerals) - and among other items: four table knives, four shirts, six items of men’s clothing and five items of women’s clothing … . Pinto also asked that 22 buffaloes, 20 goats - as well as many other items, be given back to his sister-in-law whose property was seized by the troops after her husband, João Gaspar from UatoCarbau, was killed.”512 In the mid-1960s, although no longer imprisoned, the deportees in Angola were still watched closely by the PIDE and their agents. An official report in October 1964 indicated that: “Joaquim Ferreira, João Pereira da Silva, António da Costa 507

Sarong, F., Pejuang …, 1999, op.cit., p.2. The three who joined the TNI were “Klein Lado, Albert Ndoen and his ((Jeremias’)) older brother, Gerson Pello.” Jeremias however was classified as a purnawirawan (Bahasa – retired Indonesian military officer) and received a pension as a veteran and an “independence pioneer”. 508 Rohi, P.A., “Apa Kata …”, Mutiara, Edition 776, 1995, op.cit., p.15. 509 Sagran, M.S., Declaração, Dili, November 2005 – in Costa, E. da (et al), O Célebre Massacré …, 2005, op.cit. 510 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 85, 26 April 1963 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 3). 511 Gusmão, X. (Niner, S. ed), To Resist Is To Win !, 2000, p.16. Gusmão continued: “I had always enjoyed stories – told in whispers by the older residents of Dili – the old elite made up of nurses, employees of the printing industry and a few old retirees – about the 1959 case in Dili when the clubhouse of the União was burnt down and why that club had become a symbol of anti-colonial and sometimes racist sentiments against the Portuguese and Chinese.” Niner adds in an explanatory footnote (f.18) on the 1959 uprising that “Around 160 lives were lost and 60 Timorese were exiled for their part in the rebellion. Both UDT (União Democrática Timorense – Timorese Democratic Union) and Fretilin claim this event as a formative influence.” The Fretilin President’s Discurso on 22 January 1975 for the “Coligação UDT-Fretilin” (see footnote 885) lauded the sacrifices of the “Guerras como os de Manu Fahi, Cotubaba e Uato Lari” – p.57 in Carrascalão, M.V., Timor – Antes do Futuro, Mau Huran Printing, Timor-Leste, 2006. As noted earlier, reportedly Gusmão “and other East Timor nationalists later came to see the 1959 Rebellion around Ossu, along with the Great Rebellion of 1912, as defining moments in the development of their unique identity as East Timorese people and their growing sense of nationalism.” - Niner, S., Xanana – Leader of the Struggle …, op.cit., 2009, p.251 (Endnote 19). José Alexandré (later “Xanana”) Gusmão served as a junior civil servant in the Administrative Service in Dili in the period January 1966-July 1974 – completing his obligatory military service from mid-1969 to mid-1971. 512 Berlie, J., email to author, 13 December 2006, citing “A Written Report in the National Archives in Lisbon”. Fernando Pinto’s claim was not resolved, and he reportedly died in exile in Angola.

99 Soares, Fernando Pinto, Amaro Jordão Loyola de Araújo, Manuel Rodrigues Alin, Luís da Costa Rego, and Gama keep the same attitude as they had in Timor and which had led to their deportation to the Province.”513 “Chiquito” (João Pereira da Silva) was noted as listening to radio broadcasts from Moscow and Peking and passing information to other deportees. Both Chiquito and Joaquim Ferreira were “encouraging the natives against the Portuguese”. A few months later, a similar report accused these two “of listening to broadcasts from Moscow, Peking, Brazzaville and Tangiers” – disseminating the information to other Timorese, and noted that they “were optimistic that Timor would be annexed by Indonesia.”514 Comments were also made on the activities of eight of the deportees – adding that “besides the eight referenced, the rest are practically harmless - and there was no ‘political organisation’ … In general, almost all live with blacks (“pretas”) and have children. There are a few who have cooperated with the authorities – and, as such, are viewed poorly by the others resulting in divisions into groups.”515 Reports of Unrest in Portuguese Timor In late February 1965, there were rumours in Dili of “unrest among the Uatolari tribes” including “blood-letting ceremonies and other gatherings normally not permitted by the authorities.”516 The Governor, the military commander and the head of the civil administration made a hastily organised visit to the region - despite the hazardous road conditions in the wet season, and the reported unrest abated. In early July 1965, eight men suspected of plotting to “assassinate the Governor and perhaps other senior officials with hand grenades” were arrested – two in Dili and “six in the border area attempting to escape into Indonesia”.517 Each of the three principal conspirators reportedly had close relatives connected with the 1959 Rebellion – arrested or deported.518 No details of this event were apparently made 513

Governo do Distrito do Bié, No 64, Silva Porto, 6 October 1964 (TdT, Lisbon: PIDE/DGS 1507a, NT 2080). “Gama” was José dos Ramos de Sousa Gama (“Zeca”). 514 PIDE – Silva Porto, No 33/65-S.R., Silva Porto, 8 February 1965 (TdT, Lisbon: PIDE/DGS 1507a, NT 2080). 515 Ibid. – the eight deportees reviewed were, in order: Joaquim Ferreira, João Pereira da Silva (O Chiquito), Fernando Pinto, António da Costa Soares, Amaro Loyola Jordão de Araújo, Manuel Rodrigues Alim, Luís da Costa Rego, and José dos Santos de Sousa Gama (married to a white European woman). All the “28 deportees” were living in Silva Porto – except for Luís da Costa Rego (living on a farm about 40km outside the town); and Gervásio Soriano Aleixo and Venancio da Costa Soares (living in the Colonata da Chicava about 40km from the town). Luís da Costa Rego’s contact with an American evangelical missionary in the area - Charles Donald Cole, was viewed suspiciously by PIDE. 516 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 50/65, 8 March 1965 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 3). 517 Australian Consulate – Dili, Cable 51, 8 July 1965 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 3). 518 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 98/65, 12 July 1965 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 4; 3038/2/1 Part 3). The Consul speculated that this plot might be connected with the activities of the United Republic of Timor-Dilly (URT-D), but senior officials in the Australian Department of External Affairs in Canberra noted that there was no evidence to suggest that the URT-D operated outside Jakarta – see marginal notes on the copy of Dili’s Memo 98/65 on NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 3. The Australian Consul’s Memo 98/65 – noted above, provided information on three of the eight arrested. One was an “Arab/Timorese whose father, Abdullah, was the driver of the local judge, when he was arrested for his part in the 1959 uprising … now dead” – but this description does not fit any of the four exiled “arabes” – see footnotes 445 and 446. However, “Abdullah” may have been imprisoned in Portuguese Timor – see footnote 419. Another of those arrested was “Kim Lim Yeong/Acoet” – the “younger brother of the Indonesian Consul’s driver”, ie probably the younger brother of 1959 rebel Mu Then Siong. The third was Castello – whose father had been “arrested in 1960 for his part in the previous uprising and deported … from where he has not returned.” The Australian Consul’s Memo also relates

100 public. At the end of 1965, a Timorese second sergeant – Manuel Vladimiro Osório Soares, was transferred to Portugal “as a security measure”. Sergeant Osório Soares had “been in contact with the Indonesian Consul and not advised his superior officers of his conversations”.519 An End to African Exile In mid-1966 – apparently following a request from Dili, the PIDE Delegation in Angola, completed an investigation into the status of the remaining 35 deportees ie 27 in Angola and eight in Mozambique.520 Of the 27 in Angola - 14 were in employment, 11 were unemployed and living on government subsidies, and two were self-employed. Seven of those in Angola, “showed no desire to return to Timor” : Luís da Costa Rego, Valentim da Costa Pereira, Jorge Anselmo de Lima Machado ([sic] – ie, Maher), Luís Soares da Costa Nunes, José Manuel Duarte – all five were employed; Venancio da Costa Soares (unemployed) and Fernando Pinto (selfemployed). All 11 of those who were receiving a government subsidy “have in mind to one day return to Timor”. José Manuel Duarte noted that on 3 April 1969, in Angola, the rebel exiles went into mourning at the death of one of the Timorese leaders of the Rebellion, Amaro de Araújo.521 On 21 March 1970, 12 of the exiles – most with family members, returned to Portuguese Timor from Angola aboard the N/M India : António da Costa Soares, Gervásio Soliano Aleixo, Domingos dos Reis Amaral, João Lisboa, João Pereira da Silva, Joaquim Ferreira, José Sarmento, Miguel Pinto, Nicodemus dos that, in mid-July 1965, a returned 1959 exile - an “Arab” who had been Indonesian “Consul Jacub’s right hand man”, had sought employment at the Australian Consulate. The applicant had reportedly learnt English in Lisbon – this was probably either Salem Sagran, an “Arab” (see footnote 446) who had been exiled in Africa but spent several months in Lisbon before returning to Portuguese Timor (footnotes 179, 509 and 511); or perhaps – but less likely, David Verdial, a non-Muslim, who had been imprisoned in Lisbon (footnotes 179, 209, 292, 438 and 484). 519 PIDE – Timor, Documento No.2 (TdT, Lisbon: PIDE/DGS CI(2), NT 4874). Sergeant Osório Soares departed Dili on the N/M Timor on 22 October or 22 November 1965. Five years earlier, he had joined the public service as an aspirante administravo acting as a chefe de posto - vide BOdT, No.6, 11 February 1961, p.62. He was released from the public service on 3 April 1961 in order to undertake his military service obligations – vide BOdT, No.16, 22 April 1961, p.248. Manuel Vladimiro Osório Soares was a younger brother of José Fernando Osório Soares – who became the Secretary General of the Apodeti party (see footnote 529). Manuel Soares was reportedly transferred to the Azores “as a result of his opposition (ie “pembangkannya”) – namely his friendship with the younger brother of the Indonesian Consul” in Dili. - Rusdie, H. et al, op.cit., Perjuangan …, March 1997, op.cit., p.9. 520 PIDE – Angola, “Assunto: Timorenses Fixados em Angola”, No. 237/66-SR-2a, Luanda, 5 August 1966 (TdT, Lisbon: PIDE/DGS 1507a, NT 2080). 521 Mali Mau, M., “José …”, 14 November 1992, op.cit., p.13. Amaro de Araújo was the leader of the Timorese rebels in Viqueque and had participated in the raid on the Viqueque Circunscrição buildings on 7 June 1959. Amaro and fellow rebel Eduardo de Araújo – who died in Mozambique, were reportedly grandsons of the leader of the 1912 Rebellion, Dom Boaventura. According to some Indonesian sources - including Rohi, P.A., Pemberontakan …, Mutiara, Edition 775, 1995, op.cit, Dom Boaventura fled to Kefamenanu in West Timor and died in 1969. However, Portuguese sources and Chega !, CAVR Final Report (Part 3, para 21) contend that he was captured near Betano in October 1912 and died in prison on Ataúro. Indonesian sources may be confused with Dom João da Cruz Hornay, the raja of Ambeno (Oecusse), who rebelled in 1910-1913 and later resided in Kefamenanu until his death – see Hagerdal, H., Historical Notes on the Topass Leaders in Oecusse, Vaxjo (Sweden), pp.31.32 who cites the “major revolt” by Dom João as “an offshoot of the great revolt of Dom Boaventura of Manufai in 1911-12.” The rebellion by João de Hornay/Hornai in Oecusse is also related in Oliveira, L. de, Timor na história de Portugal, Vol II, Agência Geral do Ultramar, Lisboa, 1952, pp. 115-121.

101 Reis Amaral, Manuel Rodrigues Alin, Germano das Dores Alves Santana da Silva, and Duarte Soares.”522 On their return, João Pereira da Silva and Germano das Dores da Silva reportedly then “fled to Indonesia”.523 An Indonesian publication claims that, following increased security by the authorities in Portuguese Timor in response to the 1959 Rebellion: “East Timorese resistance leaders concentrated their movement overseas … The leaders of the East Timor movement began preparations for their activities by organising their forces in the East Timor-Indonesian Timor border area. They even began to organise cells in Australia.”524 1974-1975 – and Apodeti Following the April 1974 “Carnation Revolution” in Portugal525, a period of “political development” began in Timor as Portugal sought to disengage from the Province. Several of the former rebels who had returned from exile to Timor were among the 36 “Os fundadores” (founders) of the Apodeti political party (Associação Popular Democrática Timorense – Timorese Popular Democratic Association)526 , that pressed for integration into Indonesia. These former 1959 rebels527 were: Abel da 522

“Relação dos Timorenses e Famílias a Repatriar”, 21 March 1970 – an annex lists former rebels and the dependants returning with them (TdT, Lisbon: PIDE/DGS 1507-A, NP 2080). Germano das Dores is mentioned incorrectly in “Pejuang Timtim: Saya Tidak Pernah Menduga …” (“I Never Imagined …”), Kompas/Kompas Online, Jakarta, 7 January 1996, as returning to Timor in 1986. See Annex E for a consolidated listing, spelling of names, and returning family members. 523 Tomodok, E.M. ((Indonesian Consul – Dili: 1972-1976)), Hari-Hari Akhir Timor Portugis, Pustaka Jaya, Jakarta, 1994, p.96. 524 Soekanto, Integrasi … ,1976, op.cit., p.76. While these claims may be an oblique reference to the activities of Silvester Martins Nai Buti (footnotes 681-690) in the border areas in the early 1960s – no further information has been noted on the claimed “cells” in Australia. 525 For the transitional constitutional structure, see Junta de Salvação Nacional, Lei 3/74, 14 May 1974 – BOdT, No.26, 29 June 1974, pp.488-497. The Australian Embassy in Jakarta advised Canberra: “Portuguese Timor has never, so far as we can ascertain, surfaced in either foreign affairs or ((expunged – a probable reference to Bakin/Joint Intelligence Organisation (JIO) talks that began in the early 1970s)). … We have not had any indication of an interest in discussing the question with us.” – Australian Embassy – Jakarta, O.JA2391, 17 May 1974 (NAA: A1838, 935/17/3 Part 2). It appears that Portuguese Timor was subsequently a topic initiated by Australian officials at the Bakin/JIO talks in Jakarta in late June 1974 – Australian Embassy-Jakarta, “Indonesia: Clandestine Operation …”, 3 July 1974 – see footnote 731. 526 Apodeti was founded in Dili on 27 May 1974 (see also footnotes 859-867 for detail – and footnotes 856, 874, 877, 878, 883, 891 and 1047). The 36 Apodeti “fundadores” are listed in the Apodeti Manifesto promulgated by the Committee for the Self-Determination of Timor on 19 June 1974 – see attachment to Department of Foreign Affairs – Canberra, File 3038/3/1, 8 August 1974 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/2 Part 2). Note that the English translation, in error, only lists the first seven of the Apodeti fundadores. Also, only 35 “pendiri” (Bahasa - founders) are listed at p.33 in Rusdie, H., Suratama K. & Soares, A.J.O., Perjuangan Kemerdekaan Rakyat Timor Loro Sa’e, 1997 – ie omitting Domingos Pinto Soares. The 36 are also listed in Soekanto, Integrasi …, 1976, op.cit., pp.81-82 , and Tomodok, E.M., Hari-Hari Akhir ..., op.cit., 1994, pp.96-97. Several works incorrectly include “José Martins” (of KOTA) - ie instead of “João Martins Corbafo” (see footnotes 960 and 961), among the 36 founders – including those of Tomodok; Soekanto; Gunn, G., Timor Leste – 500 Years; Chrystello, C.J., 2000; Fernandes, M.S., “A Preponderância dos Factores Exógenos”, 2007, op.cit., p.158; Jolliffe, J., Balibo, 2009, op.cit., p.67; and Chega, CAVR Final Report, Part 3, History of the Conflict, p. 16, para 49 which states, incorrectly: “José Martins defected from Apodeti, of which he had been one of the founders.” A concise history of Apodeti is at Nicol, B., Timor – A Nation Reborn, 2002, op.cit., p.7982. 527 These former rebels are listed among the 36 “fundadores” in the Apodeti Manifesto cited in the footnote above and in Pires, M.L. Governador, Relatório do Governo de Timor, Lisboa, 1981, p.31.

102 Costa Belo (a member of the Apodeti Party Presidium), Germano das Dores Alves da Silva (see footnotes 505, 522, 548), Vital Ximenes528, João Pereira da Silva (“Chiquito”), Frederico Almeida da Costa, Gervásio Soriano Aleixo and Francisco Orlando de Fátima. José Duarte also asserted that in 1974 or 1975, he was contacted in Angola by José Fernando Osório Soares529, the Secretary General of the Apodeti Party in Dili, and appointed as “Apodeti Representative for Angola and Mozambique.”530 In explaining the origins of Apodeti to an Australian journalist, José Osório Soares related that the party’s real leaders were the former members of the “movimento de ‘59’ ” – or more bitterly, “the massacre of ‘59’ ”- ie the Viqueque Rebellion of 1959.531 An Apodeti newsletter in September 1974 printed a letter from nine “leaders of the 1959 Rebellion” supporting Apodeti’s policy of integration into Indonesia.532 An Indonesian source also contends that “many of the personalities behind the founding of Apodeti were veterans of the people’s rebellion of 1945-1949 in Lospalos and also veterans of the 1959 independence struggle in Viqueque.”533 In a public address on 12 November 2008, the former Bishop of Dili - Dom. C.F.X. Belo, stated that Apodeti’s “members came from those dissatisfied with the Portuguese Government who had been involved in the revolt of 1959 in Viqueque, Uato-Carabau and Uatolari – and some members of the Arab community in Dili who had asked the Consul of Indonesia for integration … the mentor of the ideals of Apodeti was the Portuguese major Arno Metelo ([sic] – see footnote 856), the Armed Forces Movement’s delegate in Timor”.534 Araújo, A. (Arnaldo) de (Governo Provisorio Timor Loro Sae), Matanza em timor oriental, March 1976, Dili – cites the deaths in 1976 of Apodeti, UDT and Trabalhista members later killed by Fretilin including: Osório Soares on 28 February 1976 - and “Chiquito, Gervásio Aleixo, António Soares (Metan), and Vital Ximenes”. 528 Vital Ximenes - an Apodeti “founder”, was arrested by Fretilin in August 1975, imprisoned, and later removed into the countryside by Fretilin in December – see Australian Embassy – Jakarta, Memo 389, 15 March 1976 (NAA: A10463, 801/13//11/1 Part 21), and presumably killed. 529 José Fernando Osório Soares was born in Same on 3 November 1938 – his wife was reportedly a daughter of a former Governor of Portuguese Timor (1946-1950), Óscar Ruas. Two of his uncles (Joaquim Osório and José Manuel Duarte) were reportedly Timorese principals in the 1959 Rebellion. José Soares trained as a priest in Macau but, on his return to Timor, served as a civilian official in the Portuguese administration – including as a Sub-District (Posto) Administrator in several locations. Background detail can be found in Rusdie, H. et al, op.cit., Perjuangan …, March 1997, op.cit., pp.711 and in Ramos-Horta, J., Funu, op.cit., 1987, p.32. Ramos-Horta claims José Fernando Osório Soares, a “colonial official”, was dismissed from his Sub-District appointment over a rape charge, posted to Dili, and three years later fired for fraud. However, Ramos-Horta also notes that he suspected “there was some truth” in Soares’ claims that he (Soares) had been “framed by the Portuguese authorities for his pro-Indonesian sympathies”. For José Osório Soares - see footnotes 519, 527, 543, 545, 859, 862, 875, 876). 530 Rohi, P.A., “Apa Kata …”, Mutiara, Edition 776, 1995, op.cit., p.14. 531 Juddery, B., “East Timor: which way to turn ?”, The Canberra Times, Canberra, 18 April 1975. According to an Australian intelligence report: “Its followers include relatives and friends of the Timorese who were involved in the insurrection of 1959, and Timorese priests.” – Joint Intelligence Organisation (JIO), “A Descriptive Survey of Portuguese Timor”, JIO Study No. 3/75, Canberra, 1975 (NAA: A1838, 3038/1/1 Part 2). Following a visit to Timor in June 1974, Australian officials had reported: “Apodeti is seen as the political heir of the 1959 rising against the Portuguese in Viqueque which was instigated by refugees from the Permesta/PRRI revolt.”- Australian Department of External Affairs, Cable O.CH79457, Canberra, 3 July 1974 (NAA: A1838, 3038/10/11/2 Part 2). For Fretilin and UDT positive attitudes towards the 1959 Rebellion as a “formative influence” – see footnote 511. 532 Hill, H.M., Gerakan Pembebasan Nasional Timor Lorosae, 2000, p.62 – footnote 22 cites the Apodeti publication ie O Arauto de Sunda, No.3, 18 September 1974. 533 Soekanto, Integrasi … ,1976, op.cit., p.79. 534 “12 de Novembro de 1991 – por D. Carlos Ximenes Belo” – text on Forum Hakesuk blogspot, Dili, 13 November 2008/Uma Lulik blogspot, Dili, 14 November 2008.

103 In 1974, a group of the ex-rebel members of Apodeti arranged for the production of a booklet : O Célebre Massacré de UatoLari e Uato-Carbau Verificado no Ano de 1959 (The Truth of the Infamous Massacre at Uatolari and Uato-Carabau in 1959) – Annex D, that included the six-page “Memorandum” (cited earlier) written by Amaro Araújo in Angola in 1960 titled “Memorandum – Assunto: Sobre o acontecimento ocorrido em 7 de Junhe [sic] de 1959, na Cirrcunscrição [sic] de Viqueque – Timor” (Memorandum – Report: On the event that occurred on 7 June 1959 in the Circumscription of Viqueque - Timor).535 The thin 12cm x 21cm booklet also included a frontispiece photograph of “Chiquito, Membro de Apodeti, Um Dos Desterrados de 59” – ie João Pereira da Silva ; and a group photograph of about 50 of the rebels at the prison in Bié (Angola) in 1960 as “Os Heróis de ‘59’ De Sterrados [sic] em Angola” (see page 91). The booklet was intended to promote Apodeti’s links to the earlier 1959 rebellion – but made no mention of the involvement of the Indonesian Consul - Nazwar Jacub, nor of any of the 14 Indonesian “Permesta” exiles. In early 1975, several of the exiles who had left Angola and Mozambique to live in Portugal sought to return to Portuguese Timor. According to Armindo Amaral, they sought the assistance of the Indonesian Embassy in Lisbon – including through the Indonesian Ambassador, Ben Mang Reng Say, but the Indonesian Embassy was closed in December 1975 before all the arrangements for their return had been finalized.536 In 1975, support for the Apodeti party was strong in northeastern Viqueque. A visiting Australian journalist, Bill Nicol, noted: “In Uatolari, for instance, the scene of the 1959 ‘massacre’, there was growing animosity between the Fretilin and Apodeti supporters. Both parties had equal support in the area. The Portuguese intelligence officer, Captain António Ramos537, explained the Uatolari problem at the end of our meeting on 8 April 1975. ‘The people do not easily forget the trouble there in 1959’, he said. ‘People revolted against the government and were sent to Angola. They returned to Timor in 1968 … The main problem now is the land and the cattle. They want everything that was theirs returned to them. But it has since been taken over by the other people there, who are now Fretilin (and) who want to keep it.’ What had begun as basically a local domestic issue had become a clash between the two political parties, with some violence resulting.”538 Mário Viegas Carrascalão - a leader of the UDT political party (União Democrática Timorense - Timorese Democratic Union) and later Governor of East Timor 1982-1992, commented on party political loyalties in 1974-1975 as follows: 535

The “Memorandum – Assunto: Sobre o acontecimento…” is included as Annex D to this monograph – less the multi-coloured front cover which is shown above (ie a booted bayonet-thrust into Viqueque and spurting blood). According to Frederico Almeida Santos da Costa, in 1974, Francisco Lopes (see footnotes 166 and 169-172) met regularly with the Apodeti pendiri (founders) in Dili and managed the production of the booklet, probably in Kupang – discussions with the author in Dili, 1 July 2009. 536 “Pejuang Timtim: Saya Tidak Pernah Menduga …”, Kompas/Kompas Online, Jakarta, 7 January 1996, p.1 & p.8. 537 Captain António Luciano Fontes Ramos – see BOdT, No.13, 28 March 1975, p.211. 538 Nicol, B., Timor – A Nation Reborn, 2002, op.cit., p.292.

104 “if you looked at Uatolari, everyone was Fretilin, and in Uato-Carabau, everyone was Apodeti.”539 The tensions in Uatolari were acknowledged in June 1975 when the authorities in Dili appointed Second Sergeant Albino dos Santos Brandão as the “Military Commander of the Uatolari Zone” and administrator of the Uatolari Posto.540 On 11 August 1975, the União Democrática Timorense (UDT) - as the MAC (Movimento Anti-Comunista), mounted a successful coup in Dili541 – but was defeated by Fretilin’s “counter-coup” in the following week.542 Late on the evening of 26 August, the Portuguese Governor, his staff, and about 95 military personnel evacuated from Dili to Ataúro (see later footnote 926). The Apodeti leadership and its few supporters in Dili joined with Fretilin against the UDT543 – and by the end of August, the UDT forces had been driven westward from the city.544 However, following increased ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia – Indonesian Armed Forces) attacks in the border area, on 4 October Mari Alkatiri ordered the arrest of the Apodeti leaders.545 The Apodeti President Arnaldo do Reis de Araújo and ex-1959 rebel Frederico Almeida Santos da Costa were held in the Comarca (prison) at Balide 539

Chega !, Final Report of the CAVR, op.cit., Part 3, para 81. Mário Carrascalão’s remarks were made during an interview on 15 December 2003. 540 BOdT, No.26, 28 June 1975, p.450. 541 The objectives of the UDT’s “Operação Sakonar” are detailed in Pires, M.L., Descolonização …, 1991, op.cit., pp.193-195 eg: “Objectivo Final – Erradicação total de comunismo e libertação nacional unidade de todos os timorenses a [sic] independência total.” Events are related in Fisher, D.J., “Assessment of Political Development in Portuguese Timor from 11-18 August”, 28 August 1975, by visiting Australian diplomats (NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1 Part 13, pp.220-228). A separate report on that file – Fisher, D.J., “Evacuation from Portuguese Timor 16-19 August 1975”, 29 August 1975, describes the evacuation of 303 civilians from Portuguese Timor who arrived in Darwin in the period 14 August (Macdili) to 19 August 1975 inclusive. 542 A former UDT leader, Mário Carrascalão, wrote in 2006: “Everything would have been easily avoided if Governor Lemos Pires had the courage to make use of ‘their’ paratroopers to seize the MAC ((Movimento Anti-Comunista)) Operational Commander and his subordinates, as well as SecondLieutenant Rogério Lobato and some of the more radical leaders of Fretilin” - Carrascalão, M.V., Timor – Antes …, 2006, op.cit., p.92. 543 Apodeti had reportedly earlier provoked the UDT by holding a flag-raising ceremony in the grounds of the Indonesian Consulate at Farol on Indonesian National Day (17 August) and conducting reconnaissance on UDT/MAC locations in Dili – Carrascalão, M.V., Timor – Antes …, 2006, op.cit., p.89. Apodeti’s activities of 17 August were observed and described by Fisher, D. in his 28 August 1975 report – see footnote 541 above. The Apodeti leadership in Dili was isolated from its “partisan” force being prepared by ABRI in West Timor - and reportedly sided with Fretilin reluctantly. See the discussions between Apodeti Secretary General José Osório Soares and ABRI Lieutenant Colonel Soebijakto (Commander of the Indonesian Prihatin relief mission to Dili that brokered a brief ceasefire in late August and evacuated refugees by sea) – “Versi Sejarah Soebijakto #2” and #3, Kompas Online, Jakarta, 9 March 1996. An Apodeti telegram to the President of Portugal – signed by Guilherme M. Gonçalves (the luirai of Atsabe) as “President of Apodeti” at Atsabe on 17 September 1975, declared that Apodeti was fighting against Fretilin and complained of intimidation and violence against Apodeti leaders and members in Fretilin-held areas - including “six thousand people” isolated in Dili. 544 Fretilin and UDT reportedly fought a week-long battle at “Rai Cortu” - 20km west of Dili, and evacuated dependants by sea from Maubara – described at pp.34-35 in Subroto, H., Saksi Mata …, 1996, op.cit. Fretilin forces seized Baucau (4 September) and Liquiça (7 September) by “negotiation” with the surrender of numbers of UDT troops. According to Jolliffe, “full scale fighting erupted throughout the territory, leaving 1500-2000 people dead in five weeks.” – Jolliffe, J., Balibo, 2009, op.cit., pp.76-77. 545 Chega !, Final Report of the CAVR, op.cit., Chapter 7.4, para 125 and paras 183-184. Mari Alkatiri was the Fretilin Minister of State for Political Affairs. The ABRI Prihatin mission – see footnote 543 above, and the arrest of José Osório Soares are described in Subroto, H., Saksi Mata …, 1996, op.cit., pp.47-50.

105 (Dili) – but escaped to the Indonesian Consulate on 7 December 1975 during the ABRI airborne and amphibious assault on Dili.546 Many others who had been held in, or taken into, the countryside were subsequently killed by Fretilin - including Apodeti’s Secretary General José Fernando Osório Soares who was killed at Hat Nipah near Hola Rua (Same) on 27 January 1976547; and former 1959 rebels – including António Metan and João Pereira da Silva (Chiquito), reportedly killed by Fretilin in Aileu. During the Indonesian occupation many of the ex-rebels and supporters of the 1959 Rebellion collaborated with the Indonesian administration of the Province of Timor Timur. Several held senior positions including that of Bupati – ie District/ Kabupaten Administrator, and Camat – ie Sub-District/Kecamatan Administrator. Some became members of the Timor Timur Legislative Assembly – ie DPRD I, and the District Legislative Assemblies – ie DPRD II. Others became civil servants and successful businessmen.548 Areas of land in northeastern Viqueque District seized following the 1959 Rebellion (footnote 399) were returned to Naueti.549 In 1977, Abílio de Araújo, the Head of Fretilin’s External Delegation, declared: “The revolt of 1959 was a landmark of great importance in the history of anticolonial resistance by the Timorese people.”550 Abílio de Araújo contended that the uprising in 1959 forced “significant transformations” in the administration of the Province by the Portuguese authorities including improvements in education and an increase in public works activity. However, he noted that “while the 1959 revolt compelled the colonialists to make concessions, on the other hand, it forced them to refine their methods of repression” – citing an increase in military forces in the Province and the establishment of a PIDE delegation. Rebel Exiles in Africa and Portugal Following the Indonesian occupation of East Timor that began in early December 1975, Fretilin established embassies and delegations in Portugal, Mozambique and Angola. However, according to several former rebels, there was no 546

Ibid (Chega !), para 138 and p.53. For Frederico’s subsequent service in Apodeti from 1974 and his unsuccessful nomination in late 1982 for the position of Governor of East Timor, see Annex E. 547 Ibid (Chega !), para 212. 548 Abel da Costa Belo was the Bupati of Baucau – ie appointed provisional chairman of the Baucau region on 7 January 1976: Antara, Jakarta, 8 January 1976. António Metan’s son, Eugenio Metan, was the first Camat (Sub-District Administrator) of Uatolari during the Indonesian period. Eugenio was reportedly killed by Falintil in the 1990s. DPRD members included: José Manuel Duarte, Nicodemus dos Reis Amaral and Germano das Dores da Silva. See the listing of vocations at footnote 562 and further detail at Annex E. 549 Tilman, M. & Pereira, D., “Tanah Dan Perumahan …”, East Timor Law Journal, Article 14, 2004; Yayasan HAK, Konflitu Rai No Natar Iha Uatolari – Akuza, Direito 27, Edition 27 June 2004. 550 Araújo, A. (Abílio) de, Timor Leste: Os Loricos…, 1977, op.cit., pp.182-183. Abílio de Araújo had been a member of the Fretilin Central Committee, the Fretilin Minister for Economic and Social Affairs in late 1975 and subsequently the Head of the External Delegation. His father had been detained briefly in 1959 in connection with the Rebellion – see footnote 299. De Araújo’s remarks – including on the significance of the Rebellion to nationalists – and the subsequent reforms and security strengthening by the Portuguese administration, are similar to those of José Alexandré (Xanana) Gusmão, see footnote 492.

106 contact in either Angola or Mozambique between the exiled rebels and Fretilin’s overseas officials.551 Similarly, in Portugal, the former rebels were viewed with suspicion by Fretilin, and there was little if any contact. Most of the former rebels and their families lived in Lisbon’s Quinta do Balteiro area, a shanty town.552 In November 1978 in Lisbon, Australian journalist Jill Jolliffe interviewed José Manuel Duarte who, on the objectives of the 1959 Rebellion, reportedly stated: “We are [sic] not interested in the government of Indonesia, but in the integration of East and West Timor. We have [sic] ancient links – we never had a border before Portugal colonized Timor.”553 In December 1983, a number of the deportees still in Angola and Mozambique - including Evaristo da Costa, were permitted to travel to, and reside in, Portugal where they were able to engage in menial employment and received a small government allowance.554 During their time in Portugal, the former rebels had no contact with Fretilin or other pro-independence groups as the former rebels were regarded as “supporters of Indonesia” – and they feared reprisals by Fretilin and others.555 More Exiles Return In 1986, José Manuel Duarte, one of the deported Timorese principals involved in the June 1959 attacks in Viqueque and Baguia, returned to Timor. José Duarte – who was the uncle of a later East Timor Governor (Abílio Osório Soares East Timor Governor 1992-1999), became a member of the East Timor Provincial Parliament in Dili (ie DPRD I – “Fraksi Karya Pembangunan”) and established a trading and construction business in Dili ie C.V. Neusa. He also acted as spokesman for the veterans of the Viqueque Rebellion in East Timor in his appointment as Ketua Legiun Veteran RI Daerah Timtim (Chairman of the Veterans’ Legion – East Timor Region). In November 1992, José Duarte announced at a press conference in Dili that he was preparing a case against Portugal on “human rights abuses in East Timor” – and that this initiative was supported by his nephew, the Governor.556 This action

551

Author’s discussions with Evaristo da Costa, Francisco Almeida Santos da Costa and Salem Sagran in Dili on 2 April 2007. 552 Most of the Timorese who left in 1975 also lived in this area - until the shanty town was closed in the early 1990s. Some of the former rebels moved to a housing estate at Carnaxide where living conditions were much better – email to author from Estavão Cabral, 23 June 2009. 553 Ms Jill Jolliffe’s interview of 11 November 1978 is cited in Taylor, J.G., East Timor: The Price of Freedom, Zed Books, London, 1999, p.21 & p.24. 554 “Pejuang Timtim: Saya Tidak Pernah Menduga …”, Kompas/Kompas Online, Jakarta, 7 January 1996, p.1 & p.8: Evaristo da Costa was accompanied by his children – but not his wife, Maumisse Amido, who remained in Mozambique. In Portugal, Evaristo was employed for a time as a truck driver. He and Armindo Amaral related other employment as security guards, goods carriers, guards at tennis courts - with monthly incomes equivalent to 700,000-1.3m Indonesian rupiah – insufficient to maintain a family in Portugal (high costs of accommodation, food, and transport were cited). A monthly allowance (“uang saku” – pocket money) paid by the Portuguese Government, equivalent to 165,000 Indonesian rupiah, was also inadequate – “Jati Diri: Pejuang Timtim; Jangan Beri Mimpi”, Jawa Pos, 10 January 1996, p.4. 555 Statements by Evaristo da Costa to the author, Dili, 2 April 2007. 556 Sampaio, A., op.cit., pp.1-2 and “Warga Timtim akan tuntut Portugal”, Surya, Jakarta, 14 November 1992. The issue was again raised in August 1995 by the chairman of the East Timor Provincial Parliament (DPRD I), António Freitas Parada; and in mid-November 1995 by José Manuel Duarte (see footnote 566). Subsequently, in April 1996, Parada indicated that a claim had been made to the International Court of Justice (Den Haag) on 28 June 1995 citing Portuguese colonial oppression –

107 appears to have been precipitated by a statement made by the Portuguese President, Mário Soares, over Radio Nederland on 30 October 1992 to the effect that no human rights violations had occurred in Timor during Portuguese rule. In early 1994, José Manuel Duarte drafted a two-page “Memorandum” that related the history of the Rebellion, cited the statement by Mário Soares and sought pensions and emoluments from the Indonesian Government for the 1959 veterans and their dependants.557 Following a letter to President Soeharto by several Timorese exiles in 1994, arrangements were made for further returns to Indonesia – eight were reportedly still in Portugal, two in Mozambique, and two in Australia. In July 1995, the National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM) reported that the Indonesian Government was in the process of “now trying to rewrite history, attempting to force the surviving 1959 deported to state that their rebellion had been aimed at integration with Indonesia, so as to be able to claim that pro-Indonesian integration feelings have been present for a long time among many East Timorese.”558 The CNRM media release reported that - at a meeting organised by Governor Abílio Soares in Dili on 8 June 1995, returned exiles were told that they must assist in the writing of a history of the Rebellion that would state that the people of East Timor already wished integration as far back as 1959 559 – and any documentation held by the returned exiles was to be made available to the Indonesian authorities. Attendees were also reportedly told of the Indonesian Government’s intention to build a memorial to those killed in the Rebellion on the banks of the “Watu Lari” river (ie the Bebui River) – with plans to inaugurate the monument by 10 November 1995.560 Recognition, Reunions – and claims against Portugal In mid-late 1995, the Indonesian media included several lengthy articles on the Rebellion and the former rebels – with articles by journalists Peter Rohi in the magazine Mutiara, and by J. Herman in the Jawa Pos in which former rebels were interviewed.561 On 10 November 1995 - on Indonesia’s “Hari Pahlawan” (Heroes’ Day), 13 former Timorese exiles of the Viqueque Rebellion were awarded veterans’ decorations (Tanda Penghargaan Veteran RI Pejuang Perintis Integrasi TimorTimur) in Jakarta by the Indonesian Defence Minister, General Edi Sudrajat – “in recognition of their service in the struggle to integrate Timor Timur into Indonesia.”562 In discussion with the Defence Minister, José Manuel Duarte stated

“Rakyat Timor Timur Gugat Pemerintah Portugal” (“The People of East Timor Accuse the Portuguese Government”), Jayakarta, 11 April 1996. 557 Duarte, J.M., Memorandum, Dili, 4 February 1994 – in Bahasa Indonesia. 558 Conselho Nacional de Resistência Maubere (National Council of Maubere Resistance - CNRM), “Indonesia’s desperate attempt to revise East Timor history”, Media Release, 3 July 1995, p.1. 559 This claim has been made in several books published in Indonesia, including by the Indonesian Consul in Dili in 1975 – Tomodok, E.M., Hari-Hari Akhir…, 1994, op.cit., p.95. 560 CNRM Media Release op.cit. – see footnote 558 above. The media release was based on a signed report dated 15 June provided by an un-named attendee. José Manuel Duarte spoke at the meeting and offered documents. P.A. Rohi’s (“Soekarno …”, 9 May 2005, op.cit.) subsequent meetings with Marcelino in 1996 – see footnotes 136, 227, 275 and 363 - conducted “within the framework of reconstructing the 1959 Rebellion”, may have been an element of this Indonesian Government project. 561 Information extracted from these articles has been cited earlier. See the Bibliography – Selected Reports and Articles, for detail on articles by P.A. Rohi and J. Herman. 562 “13 Pejuang Integrasi Timtim Terima Penghargaan Veteran” (13 Timorese Integration Fighters Receive Veterans’ Awards), Kompas, Jakarta, 11 November 1995, p.15; and “Kepulangan Pejuang

108 that his “one remaining wish was to see Portugal prosecuted in the International Court – as he regarded them as war criminals for detaining him without trial.”563

A meeting was chaired in Dili by the Sekwilda (Regional Area Secretary) in early November 1995 to plan a monument to the Rebellion in Viqueque Town. A statue of a man standing “tegak” (“upright/boldy”) was proposed – with a similar statue in Uatolari.564

In Viqueque Town on 10 November 1995, East Timor Governor - Abílio José Osório Soares, laid the foundation stone for the “Viqueque Struggle” monument in Integrasi Timtim” (“Return of East Timor Integration Fighters”), Republika Online, Jakarta, 11 November 1995. The recipients of the “Integration Pioneer” medal were listed as: José Manuel Duarte (aged 61, retired civil servant – ex Civil Servant “Korpri” Secretariat), Salem Musalam Sagran (67, businessman and manager of the East Timor Majelis Ulama Indonesia), Germano das Doras Alves da Silva (57, member DPRD II Manufahi), Dominggos da Conceição Pereira (68, retired civil servant), Nicodemus dos Reis Amaral (70, retired member of DPRD), Joaquim Ferreira (62, village chief, Uma Uain Leter), Lourenço Rodrigues Pereira (64, retired civil servant), Dominggos dos Reis Amaral (62, farmer), Alexandré de Jesus (67, unemployed), Usman bin Manduli Sangaji (60, former village chief, Alor – West Dili), Saleh bin Ahmad Bassawan (60, businessman), José Sarmento (53, farmer), and Vernando [sic] Pinto (who had died in exile) – this appears to be a reference to Fernando Pinto of UatoCarabau. Other 1959 veterans had also reportedly been proposed, but a timely decision had not been reached on their inclusion. 563 “Anak Saya di Cijantung, Jadi Kopassus” (“My Son is at Cijantung to become a Kopassus member”), Jawa Pos, Surabaya, 11 November 1995, p.13. José Duarte also related that two of the former rebels were then resident in Australia, and eight in Portugal – of whom three planned to return to Indonesia. 564 “1959, Rakayat Timtim Sudah Merah Putih”, (“In 1959, East Timor was already Red and White”), Jawa Pos, Surabaya, 7 November 1995, p.13.

109 the Town’s Freedom Square (Lapangan Merdeka).565 The ceremony was attended by “traditional units” from each of Viqueque’s five districts. Governor Abílio Soares asserted that “even while in exile, the deported rebels had declared their support for Apodeti in written statements.” The monument - a tall column topped by a large metal Garuda (a mythical Hindu bird, Indonesia’s national symbol), was completed in early 1999 – see photograph, but panels and engraving were not finished before the withdrawal of the Indonesian administration later that year. Soon after the withdrawal of the Indonesian forces, the base of the monument was covered with grafitti. However, as at mid-2010, the Garuda remained atop the monument In Dili in mid-November 1995, José Manuel Duarte hosted a “bernostalgia” reunion for former rebels at his home in Motael – those attending included three of the Indonesians: “Gerson Tom Pello, Jezkial Folla and Jeremias To’an Pello” from Kupang; and Dili-resident Timorese: “Nicodemos Amaral, Dominggus Geronimoa Amaral, Joaquim Perreira and José Sarmento.”566 During an interview, José Duarte claimed that “more than 2,000 citizens of Viqueque had been killed by the Portuguese at the Bebui River during the 1959 Resistance.” He also declared that the 1959 Rebellion was “the earlier uprising that wished to unite the people of East Timor with Indonesia.” Duarte also again spoke of prosecuting Portugal before the International Court - noting that he had raised the issue earlier in 1992 (see footnote 556). “While previously there had not been a response on assistance from the Indonesian Government”, Duarte believed that recent support from the Chairman of the East Timor Regional Parliament (DPRD I) - António Freitas Parada, improved prospects for progress. On 5 December 1995, a “former exiles’ organisation” in Dili (Pejuang Integrasi Timor Timur Ke Dalam Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia – The Fighters for the Integration of East Timor into the Unitary Republic of Indonesia) sent a Pernyataan Sikap (Position Statement) to the visiting UN Human Rights Commissioner that expressed their disappointment that the UN had never paid attention to human rights violations by the Portuguese in quelling the 1959 Rebellion – and appealed to the UN Secretary General not to take notice of “opportunist traitors” outside East Timor who “pretend to speak for the people of East Timor.”567 The following day, the former exiles’ group held a meeting in Dili’s Mahkota Hotel (now Hotel Timor) and sent a letter (Annex G) to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva declaring that the objective of the 1959 Viqueque Rebellion had been to integrate Portuguese Timor with Indonesia – and that “the aspiration of the East Timorese People to unite with Indonesia had been in the soul of the East Timorese People from 1950 and was later brought into sharper focus by the outcomes of the Asia-Africa Conference held in Bandung in 1955.”568 As evidence of Portugal’s

565

Herman, J., “Integrasi 1976, Realisasi Perjuangan Viqueque 1959” (“The Integration of 1976, the Realisation of the 1959 Viqueque Struggle”), Jawa Pos, Surabaya, 11 November 1995, p.13. 566 Herman, J., “Pejuang Timtim Akan Tuntut Portugal – Atas Pembantaian 2,000 Orang di Viqueque”, Jawa Pos, 16 November 1995, p.13. The reunion in Dili was the initiative of the then Surabaya-based journalist, Peter A. Rohi. For earlier consideration of taking Portugal to the International Court, see footnote 556. 567 Pernyataan Sikap - Pejuang Integrasi Timor Timur Ke Dalam Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia, Dili, 5 December 1995 – the letter was signed by: José Manuel Duarte, Joaquim Ferreira, José Sarmento, Germano das Dores Alves da Silva, Salem M. Sagran, Saleh Bassarewan, Lourenço Rodrigues Pereira, and Domingos da Conceição Pereira. 568 Pejuang Perintis Integrasi Timor Timur Ke Dalam Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia, Dili, 8 December 1995 (in Bahasa Indonesia and Portuguese). Copies were also sent to the UN Secretary

110 official acknowledgement of the Rebellion’s intent, the letter included a photocopy of a “Certidão” (“Certificate” – in Portuguese, see Annex H) from the Portuguese “Armed Forces Chief of Staff’s Office for the Coordination of the Disbandment of the PIDE/DGS & LP” that attested: “José Manuel Duarte participated in the seizure and occupation of the Viqueque Circunscrição headquarters on 7 June 1959 with the objective of delivering up the Province to the Republic of Indonesia.”569 On 5 January 1996, accompanied by several of their children, three exiles returned to Jakarta from Portugal: Armindo Amaral (57 years), Evaristo da Costa (61), and Domingos Hornay Soares (57) – and the three similarly received veterans’ titles from the Indonesian Defence Minister at a ceremony on 10 January. In Portugal, the group had been assisted in preparations for their return by the PortugueseIndonesia Friendship Association (PIFA) chaired by Manuel Macedo.570 Venancio da Costa Soares had been intended to return with the group - but was “ill” and remained in Portugal.571 On the group’s subsequent arrival in Dili on 14 January 1996, Evaristo da Costa declared: “For me, integration ((with Indonesia)) began from 1959.”572 Soon after in a media interview, José Manuel Duarte and Salem Sagran spoke of the 1959 Rebellion as the “embrio” of the process leading to East Timor’s incorporation into Indonesia – and of plans for reunions, the writing of a book, and the establishment of a “1959 Viqueque Movement Yayasan” (in Bahasa, Yayasan = Foundation).573 Evaristo, Domingos and Armindo were provided with adjacent houses by the provincial authorities in the western Dili suburb of Aimutin. Also – during an interview in 1996, Marcelino António Fausto Guterres (who had been reported apparently incorrectly, as attending the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung in 1955) stated in reference to 1959: “We saw West Timor as a historical reason for integrating

General in New York. Signatories were: José Manuel Duarte, Salem M. Sagran, and Germano das Dores Alves da Silva. See Annex G for a copy in Bahasa Indonesia and an English translation. 569 Pinto, L. dos Santos, Certidão - Estado-Maior General das Forças Armadas Serviço de Coordenação de Extinção da PIDE/DGS e LP, Lisbon, 22 March 1983 – see Annex H. The indictment before the Territorial Military Tribunal in Angola in May 1960 also cited the rebels’ aim to “annex Timor to the Republic of Indonesia” – see Gunn, G.C., “Revisiting the Viqueque (East Timor) Rebellion of 1959”, 2006, op.cit., p.44. 570 Related to the author by Evaristo da Costa, Dili, 2 April 2007. PIFA was founded on 20 October 1993. Its counterpart organisation in Jakarta, the Indonesia-Portugal Friendship Association (founded 17 January 1994), was chaired by President Soeharto’s daughter, Siti Hardiyanti Rakmana – “Tutut”. 571 “Jati Diri: Pejuang Timtim; Jangan Beri Mimpi”, Jawa Pos, Surabaya, 10 January 1996, p.4. Evaristo was accompanied by his children: Evaristo Gomes Costa (36), Romeu da Conceição Costa (16) and Eva Amido da Costa (13) – Ramos Quintão Costa (17) remained in Portugal to continue his education. Venancio da Costa Soares declined to return to Timor - reportedly fearful that he would be killed on arrival in Dili – email information to the author from Evaristo da Costa, 8 February 2007. Evaristo had suggested returning to Timor – and this was proposed in a letter drafted by Evaristo and signed by Armindo Amaral to Armindo’s friend Germano das Dores da Silva in Same who was serving as a member of the local Parliament (ie DPRD II Manufahi). 572 “Tangis Sambut Tiga Pejuang TimTim” (“Tears Greet Three East Timor Fighters”), Kompas, Jakarta, 15 January 1996, p.15. The three returnees were escorted by José Manuel Duarte and Germano das Dores da Silva – and met by Salem Sagran and local officials. 573 “Pejuang 1959 TimTim Akan Reuni dan Menulis Buku Sejarah” (“1959 East Timor Fighters Will Re-Unite and Write a History Book”), Antara, Jakarta, 15 January 1996. As noted above, the “Garudatopped” monument to the 1959 Rebellion stands in the main square (actually a “triangle”) of “old” Viqueque Town. A far smaller monument (height about two metres) is located at the northern apex of the “triangle” – erected by ABRI Yonif (infantry battalion) 408 on 10 December 1990, dedicated to that battalion’s operations during a tour-of-duty in Viqueque.

111 into Indonesia. Above all, it would have been impossible for us ((East Timor)) to stand alone.”574 In Dili on 30 March 1996, the Indonesian Defence Minister awarded Veteranus Perintis Integrasi (Integration Pioneer Veteran) medals to 27 of the participants in the 1959 Rebellion. Of the 23 Timorese recipients, 20 were deceased, and their posthumous awards were accepted by their close relatives. 575 Three Timorese veterans accepted their awards: “Juman bin Bachirum, Manuel Rodrigues Alin, and Manuel Alves”. Four Indonesians were also awarded the medal: Gerson Tom Pello, “known as Tinenti” (ie Lieutenant); Jeremias To’an Pello; Albert Ndun; and the late Lambert Klin Landauw [sic] – “Lambert, who had passed away in Bangkok (Thailand) in 1983 was represented by his fourth daughter, Luciana Ladow.” In an interview, Jeremias explained that, at 19, he was the youngest of those deported in 1959 – and, as such, was given the nickname of “the little one” by his comrades. In a further ceremony in Jakarta on 11 November 1996, the Indonesian Social Affairs Minister, Inten Soeweno, awarded the Satyalancana Perintis Pergerakan Kemerdekaan (Independence Pioneer Medal) to 16 “patriots” of the Viqueque Rebellion – including three of the four Indonesians (names underlined below): José Manuel Duarte, Domingos Soares, Evaristo da Costa, Armindo Amaral, Joaquim Pereira [sic], Germano Alves da Silva, Nicodemos dos Reis Amaral, José Sarmento, Usman bin Mandully Lolly Sangaji, Gerson Tom Pello, Jeremias Toan Pello, Alberto L. Ndun, Mateus Sarmento Jordão de Araújo (deceased), António da Costa Soares (deceased), Miguel Pinto (deceased) and Vital Ximenes (deceased).576 Subsequently, the Independence Pioneer Medal was also awarded to: Alexandré de Jesus, Alexandrinou Boromeu, Domingos da Conceição Pereira,

574

Rohi, P.A., “Soekarno …”, 9 May 2005, op.cit., p.2 – for information on Marcelino, connect with footnotes 136, 138, 141, 227, 228 and 363. 575 “27 Pejuang Viqueque Peroleh Gelar Veteran”, Jawa Pos, Surabaya, 1 April 1996, p.5. The deceased former Timorese rebels were: “António da Costa Soares, António Soriano, Alberto Rodrigues Perreira, Duarte Soares, Francisco Maria Xavier de Araújo, Crispin Borges de Araújo, Gervasao [sic] Soriano Alexio, Joaquim Agustodos Santos, João Perreira da Silva, José Soares, João Lisboa, José Gama, José Maria Esposito Maia, Mario José Hendriques Martins, Manuel da Silva, Miguel Pinto, Mateus Jordão de Araújo, Paulo da Silva, Paulo da Conceição Castro, Vital Ximenes”. 576 “13 Perintis Integrasi Terima Penghargaan”, Jawa Pos, Surabaya, 6 November 1996, p.5 – published before the ceremony ; “Satyalancana untuk 16 Tokoh Timtim” (“Independence Pioneer Medals for 16 Prominent East Timorese”), Kompas Online, Jakarta, 12 November 1996 – “69 of the rebels were captured, one sentenced to death, and the remaining 68 were exiled … at present, 34 are still living (24 in Indonesia and 10 in other countries) while 35 have died (27 in Indonesia and eight overseas).”; Setyalencan [sic] dan Rp 1,5 Juta untuk Pejuang Timtim, Jawa Pos, Surabaya, 12 November 1996, p.5 – under Presidental Decree 111/TK/1996 – the “omitted” Indonesian was Lambertus Ladow (deceased, Bangkok, 1983). Minister Soeweno noted that surviving Perintis Kemerdekaan (Independence Pioneers) numbered 338 – together with about 2,000 widows. The awards were also later reported by the United Nations in “Sixteen East Timorese patriots received medal of independence movement”, UNSG Report on the Situation in Timor, E/CN. 4/1997/51, UN Economic and Security Council, 21 February 1997. In reference to the 1959 exiles, the UN report also cited an Indonesian statement: “Following the fall of the dictatorship in Portugal, they had repeatedly appealed to the Portuguese Government to be returned to Indonesia, but to no avail. Their eventual return was facilitated by the ICRC. No news coverage or announcements about their return to Indonesia and their current well-being were ever made by Portugal … 34 are still alive, living both inside and outside Indonesia.”

112 Domingos Jeronimo Amaral, Fernando Pinto (deceased), Juman bin Bachirun, Lourenço Rodrigues Pereira, Saleh bin Ahmad Bassarewan, and Salem Sagran.577 Minister Soeweno noted that 69 rebels had been captured in 1959 – of whom one had been killed; and 24 survivors were then currently resident in Indonesia and a further ten lived overseas. The Social Welfare Department in Dili announced in early November that each veteran would receive a monthly living allowance from the Indonesian Government of 300,000 rupiah - while widows would receive 150,000 rupiah. Each of the veterans was also to receive a sum of 1.5m rupiah each year for home renovations. In May 1999, when interviewed at his home near Kupang, Jeremias Pello related that he was receiving his monthly pension of 360,000 rupiah “as an Independence Pioneer” – but he had not been paid his “veteran’s pension” since 1977. Further, he had yet to receive any housing allowance as promised by the Minister for Social Affairs in November 1996.578 The Popular Consultation of 1999 – and Militia Group “59/75” In late January 1999, the Indonesian Government offered the people of East Timor the choice of “wider autonomy” (“otonomi yang diperluas”) within the Republic – ie continued integration; or “separation from Indonesia” (“berpisah dengan Negara Kesatuan RI”) – ie independence, through a “Popular Consulation” to be conducted on 30 August 1999.579 In May 1999, a pro-integration militia group: “59 Senior/75 Junior” (sometimes referred to also as Naga Merah – Red Dragon) was formed in Viqueque Town by the Viqueque District Bupati, Martinho Fernandes.580 Chega !, the Final Report of the CAVR, notes that the “59/75 Junior/Naga … led by Alvaro de Jesus” had its “roots in the 1959 Viqueque Rebellion”.581 “The militia group 59/75 Junior –

577 Sekretariat Militer Presiden, Daftar warga negara Republik Indonesia Yang Menerima Anugerah Tanda Kehormatan Satyalancana Perintis Pergerakan Kemerdekaan Satyalancana Kebudayaan Dan Satyalancana Pendidikan, Biro Tanda-Tanda Jasa/Kehormatan, Jakarta, 2005 – lists a total of 25 East Timorese recipients of the Independence Pioneer Medal in a total of 988 recipients (ie 2.5 percent). All except “Alexandrinou Boromeu” (a member of the Apodeti Party Presidium in 1974, an Apodeti signatory to the 30 November 1975 “Balibo Declaration”, and the Bupati in Manufahi 1976-1984) were involved in the 1959 Rebellion. An “Alexandrino Borromeu” served in the civil service in Dili in the early-mid 1970s as a laboratory assistant 2nd-class – vide BOdT, No.32, 7 August 1971, p.717; and BOdT, No.13, 28 March 1975, p.214 578 Sarong, F., “Pejuang Timtim yang Kesepian”, op.cit. – Jeremias lived in Pariti village, about 63km from Kupang. In 1997, he had been offered a very small house in Kupang – but had declined. Officials had visited him in Pariti to plan improvements to his home, but no work had commenced by May 1999. 579 For a contemporary article on Indonesian President Habibie’s decision, see Anwar, D.F., “Habibie dan Timor Timur”, Tempo, Jakarta, 8 February 1999, pp.30-31. 580 Martinho Fernandes had been appointed Bupati in March 1999 and had previously served as the Camat of Ossú Sub-District. Martinho also reportedly founded the large militia group in Viqueque Makikit (Eagle), led by Lafaek Saburai (Afonso Henriques Pinto). Raimundo Soares and Francelino Soares are also listed as “59/75” leaders in McDonald, H. (et al), Masters of Terror – Indonesia’s Military and Violence in East Timor in 1999, Canberra Papers on Strategy & Defence No. 145, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 2002. 581 Chega !, Final Report of the CAVR, op.cit., Part 4, p.29. An article by Gunter, J., “Communal Conflict in Viqueque …”, 2007, op.cit., p.37 states that Eurico Guterres “created the Viqueque militia” in April 1999 and “unambiguously linked the pro-Indonesia side to the rebellion forty years before by naming the group ‘59/75’.”

113 … took its name from the year of an abortive anti-Portuguese uprising in the district (1959), and the year of Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor (1975).”582 The militia groups in Viqueque - ie Makikit (based in Lacluta) and 59/75 (based in Beobe/Rai Um sub-village of Uma Kiik, three kilometres west of old Viqueque Town) were - when “compared to militia groups in the western Districts, neither was especially strong. In three of the five sub-districts (ie kecamatan) – Ossú, Uatolari and Uato-Carabau, they were virtually absent. By one estimate, there were fewer than 100 militiamen in the entire District in mid-1999.”583 According to local elders, the nominal leader of 59/75 was Joaquim Ferreira (aged 66 years) who had been a participant in the 1959 rebellion and later exiled to Angola – while the active leaders of the 59/75 militia included “Comandante” Antero, who had been earlier wounded by Falintil, and Filomeno Amaral.584 Killings and other violence committed by the 59/75 militia group included attacks on 10 and 11 August 1999 on the offices of a student organization and on the Conselho Nacional Resistência da Timorense (CNRT) in Viqueque Town.585 Eurico Guterres was one of the most prominent pro-integration militia leaders in 1999 and the commander of the Dili-based Aitarak militia group. He has contended that his grandfather was killed by the Portuguese in Viqueque during the 1959 Rebellion.586 Following the violence after the 30 August 1999 Popular Consultation, several of the former 1959 rebels left Timor-Leste – many initially to West Timor. These included José Manuel Duarte and Joaquim Ferreira. Domingos Hornay Soares reportedly returned to Portugal in 2000. Compensation Claims – “Caso Grupo 59” As noted earlier, in 1992 returned exiles and Indonesian officials in Dili had proposed legal action against Portugal (see footnote 556). In Lisbon, beginning in mid-1992, the 1959 exiles resident in Portugal had begun seeking compensation from the Portuguese Government for lack of due process and other “injustices” associated with the 1959 Rebellion and their exile - initially corresponding with the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and subsequently with the Provedoria de Justiça. In December 2000, the group sought the assistance of the National Council for Timorese Resistance (Conselho Nacional Resistência da Timorense – CNRT). Beginning in January 2004, they – the “Grupo 59”, requested support for their claims from the Timor-Leste authorities through the President of the National Parliament and met with the President of the Timor-Leste Parliament’s Committee A 582

Robinson, G., East Timor 1999: Crimes Against Humanity, University of South Los Angeles, July 2003. Part IV, District Summary 9.13, Viqueque (Kodim 1630). 583 Ibid. 584 Author’s discussions with Hermenegildo da Cruz, Constantino de Oliveira Simões, António Pinto and Rogério Pinto in Viqueque Town – 29 June 2007. 585 Robinson, G., East Timor 1999: Crimes …, 2003, op.cit., and Judicial System Monitoring Program, SPSC Case Information, Case 3/2004. The Council for Timorese Resistance (Conselho Nacional Resistência da Timorense – CNRT) was formed on 23 April 1998. 586 “Anak Muda Bangkit Dari Wacana Berbahaya”, Gamma, No. 34.2, 17 October 2000 – “kakeku dibunuh Portugues pada 1959” and similar claims on 28 March 2007. Guterres was reportedly born in Uatolari on 17 July 1974 (or 1971). Gunter, J., “Communal Conflict in Viqueque …”, 2007, op.cit., p.37 relates that Guterres is “António Metan’s nephew” and named “59/75” – but both these claims have been disputed by local sources. Remarkably, in early 2009, Eurico Guterres claimed that family members were entitled to RDTL Resistance-era medals ie Ordem Nicolau Lobato and Ordem Dom Boaventura – TIME Timor, No 23, Tahun IV, January 2009.

114 (Committee for Constitutional Affairs, Human Rights and Civil Freedom) on 28 September 2005.587 Their last formal correspondence to the President of the National Parliament – with copies to the Timor-Leste President and Prime Minister, (ie Assunto: Pedido de indemnização por danos sofridos em 1959 – Subject: Order for the Indemnification of Damages Suffered in 1959) was signed by “Os Representantes das Vítimas de 1959” (Evaristo da Costa, Frederico Almeida Santos da Costa, Salem Musalam Sagran, Juman Bin Basirun and Lourenço Rodrigues Pereira). On 12 June 2008, three of the former rebels (Evaristo da Costa, Frederico Almeida Santos da Costa and Salem Sagran) met in Dili with the Timor-Leste Minister for Foreign Affairs (Zacarias Albano da Costa), the Portuguese Ambassador (João Ramos Pinto), the Vice Prime Minister (José Luís Guterres) and two departmental officials to discuss the former rebels’ case for “indemnification” ie the Caso Grupo 59. The Portuguese Ambassador stated that their case could not be considered as the “National Committee of Inquiry” - established in August 1974 to inquire into events in the period 28 March 1926 to 25 April 1974, had concluded its deliberations in 1977.588 The Group however asserted its determination to continue to pursue the case until it was resolved.589 Counting the Exiles Indonesian reporting during the 1990s - and statements by José Manuel Duarte, have declared that 68 (or sometimes 66) persons involved in the Rebellion had been exiled from Timor.590 With variations in some listings and the spelling of names, it is sometimes difficult to reconcile these with complete accuracy. However those exiled appear to have comprised the 68 listed at Annexes E and F – in summary: •

•

587

11 Timorese, including the “ringleaders” – principally those arrested in Dili and Baucau in early June, who departed Dili on the N/M India on 8 June 1959 for Portugal and were later exiled to Angola in late May 1960 (several were subsequently transferred to Mozambique). 52 Timorese who were embarked on the N/M India on 4 October 1959 - together with the four Indonesians and the “special status” prisoner, Francisco M. X. J. Araújo. The 52 were disembarked in Angola on 24 November 1959 – while the four Indonesians and Francisco de Araújo were imprisoned in Lisbon (arriving 11 November 1959) before being transferred to Angola in late May 1960.

The correspondence has been collated in Costa, E. da (et al), O Célebre Massacré de Uato-Lari e Uato-Carbau Verificado no Ano de 1959 (The Truth of the Infamous Massacre at Uatolari and UatoCarabau in 1959), Dili, 2005. That portfolio-type document also contains discrete declarations (Declaração) by Luís da Costa Rego (22 June 1993), Evaristo da Costa (17 June 2001), Juman bin Bachirum (20 October 2005), Salem Musalam Sagran (November 2005) and Frederico Almeida Santos da Costa (November 2005). 588 The Group had received a similar written response to their claims from the Portuguese Provedoria de Justica (R-0002/93 (A6) – 017838, 3 October 2000). Correspondence up to November 2005 was included in Costa, E. da (et al), O Célebre Massacré de Uato-Lari e Uato-Carbau Verificado no Ano de 1959 (The Truth of the Infamous Massacre at Uatolari and Uato-Carabau in 1959), Dili, 2005. 589 Email advice to the author - 3 November 2008. The Grupo 59 termed their campaign: “Revolução e Reclamação de Direitos Humanos de 1959” – advice from Evaristo da Costa and Frederico Almeida Santos da Costa (email 3 March 2009). 590 For example: “Kepulangan Pejuang Integrasi Timtim” (“Return of East Timor Integration Fighters”), op.cit., Republika Online, Jakarta, 11 November 1995.

115 Recent Indonesian Interpretations of the Rebellion In the early 1990s, official Indonesian history texts for primary and secondary schools included sections on the “Viqueque Rebellion of 1959” – see Annex B.591 On 10 November 2002 (Indonesian National Heroes’ Day), President Megawati Sukarnoputri inaugurated a monument in the grounds of the TNI headquarters at Cilangkap (Jakarta) to memorialise Indonesian losses during the occupation of East Timor. The Monumen Seroja lists the names of 3,804 ABRI/TNI personnel who died in combat in East Timor in the period 1975-1999592 and includes a series of ten relief panels - principally illustrating aspects of ABRI/TNI service in East Timor. One panel however depicts the “Suffering of the People of East Timor During the Portuguese Colonization” (“Penderitaan Rakyat Timor Timur Pada Masa Penjajahan Portugis”) – see below:

In an oblique reference to the 1959 Rebellion, text on the TNI’s Monumen Seroja webpages593 associated with that panel relates that “people resisting were exiled to Mozambique and Angola”. The Memorial at the Bebui River In the Independence period, a very simple sepultura (sepulchre/grave site) was established on the left bank of the Bebui River as a memorial to the rebels killed at that site. The memorial is a square of smooth river stones about about two metres by two metres – with no formal “marker” or lettering .594 Continuing Ethnic Violence in Viqueque Following the Popular Consultation in 1999 and the withdrawal of the Indonesian administration, inter-ethnic disputes became more tense in northeastern 591

According to a 2004 study, although 1996 editions of Indonesian school history texts referred to the 1959 Rebellion, from 2000 only the 1910 rebellion by Dom Boaventura was mentioned – Gratton, A., Perkembangan dalam Pendidikan Sejarah di Malang sejak Zaman Reformasi, Universitas Muhammadiyah, Malang (Indonesia), 2004. 592 Comprising 2,277 soldiers and police – and 1,527 East Timor irregulars/auxiliaries. 593 The TNI Center for Military History website is: http://www.sejarahtni.mil.id/index.php?cid=1756 594 A photograph of the memorial is at Gonçalves, J.L.R., Gente de Timor-Leste – Primeiro ano da Independência, Tipografia União Folha do Domingos Lda, Faro, 2004, p.158.

116 Viqueque as pro-independence villagers, principally Makassae from the villages of Makadiki and Matahoi, sought to recover land and property from Naueti who had been advantaged during the Indonesian occupation period (see footnote 399)595. UNTAET established a “Mediation Council” in June 2000, but little progress was made on the over 130 registered disputes.596 On 28 October 2002, inter-group violence and theft of livestock broke out in Uatolari. Prime Minister Alkatiri stated that “these cases are, in truth, a continuation of such incidents that have occurred over tens of years in the past.” Clementino dos Reis Amaral, a KOTA party parliamentarian from Viqueque stated: “The events in Uatolari are an inheritance from our forefathers that is difficult to eradicate. The culture of violence in the area where the majority are Makasae and Nau-Oti [sic] speakers, has occurred over three periods (Portuguese, Indonesian and Independence). … Studies by Portuguese academics evidence that in the past hundreds of years that Portugal occupied the region, they identified the characteristics of the people in three categories: hot-blooded, normal and minus. The hot-blooded were the Makasae and the Bunaq – while the minus were the people of Oecusse and Manatuto, and the other districts were regarded as normal. The culture of violence in Viqueque occurs in the areas of Ossú, Uatolari and Viqueque – while the Sub-Districts of Uato-Kerbau and Lacluta are invariably secure and peaceful. … The incidents at Uatolari are an expression of the hatred, enmity and revenge related to the events of 1959-1974 (the Portuguese period) and 1975-1999 (the Indonesian occupation).”597 In following years, attempts were made by the Timor-Leste Government, UNTAET (and subsequent UN missions) and parliamentarians to resolve these longstanding disputes – but with limited success, and there were occasional outbreaks of violence.598 In late March 2007, in the lead-up to the first round of the 9 April 2007 Presidential Election, tensions between pro-Fretilin elements (principally Makassae speakers) and Ramos-Horta/Xanana Gusmão supporters resulted in clashes in Viqueque. Violence escalated in mid-April, and several hundred villagers fled into the hills from the Naueti villages of “Besoro, Babulo, Afaloikai and Kadilale” in Uatolari Sub-District. Several Fretilin militants were subsequently arrested for “spreading ethnic conflict between the Makassae and Naueti”.599 In the second week of August, 110 homes in Uatolari were set on fire – and former Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri, in a television interview, explained that “the violence was a result of ethnic conflict between Uatolari Naueti and Makassae”.600 Hundreds of Naueti villagers from eastern 595

Tilman, M. & Pereira, D., “Tanah Dan Perumahan …”, East Timor Law Journal, Article 14, 2004, op.cit.. This article relates the different versions - ie by the Makassae and Naueti groups, on the ownership, development and seizure/re-seizure of land in Uatolari Sub-District. 596 Oliveira, J.L. de, “Sengketa Tanah Uatolari” (Land Conflict in Uatolari), Cidadaun, No.26, July 2002, p.6. 597 “Kasus Uatu-Lari warisan nenek moyang” (“The Uatolari case is a legacy from our forefathers”), Suara Timor Lorosae, Dili, 7 November 2002, p.1. 598 Tilman, M. & Pereira, D., “Tanah …”, 2004 op.cit.; and Yayasan HAK, Konflitu Rai No Natar Iha Uatolari – Akuza, Direito 27, Edition 27 June 2004. 599 “Sebarkan Isu Perang Antar Suku 10 Warga Uato Lari Ditangkap” (“Spreading Inter-Ethnic War – 10 from Uatolari Arrested”), Suara Timor Lorosae, Dili, 25 April 2007. 600 Timor Post, Dili, 14 August 2007 – citing a TV Timor-Leste interview on 13 August 2007. The violence was probably precipitated by the swearing-in on 8 August 2006 of the IV Constitutional

117 Uatolari Sub-District reportedly fled eastward into the adjacent Naueti “heartland” of Uato-Carabau Sub-District. Inquiries into the violence were subsequently undertaken by the National Parliament’s Committee B and the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT). In late June 2008, an element of the Timor-Leste Police Reserve Unit (PRU) – ie “field police”, was established at “Webui” in Uatolari.601 Following violence in January 2009, a traditional “nahe biti bo’ot” (“spreading the large mat”) meeting was held in Viqueque Town on 28 February to reduce tension and facilitate the re-integration of displaced people. A UN report commented: “Conflict in Viqueque dates back to 1959 when there was an uprising against Portuguese colonialists. Rivalries between pro- and anti-independence groups during periods of Portuguese and Indonesian occupation have never been quelled.”602 On 5 June 2009, Nobel Prize laureate Dom Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo published a six-page article: “A Revolta de 1959 em Viqueque, Watolari e Watocarbau”603 that included discussion of the “causas remotas” and “causas proximas” of the Rebellion. Interestingly, Dom Belo closed his article with: “To all those who lost their lives because of the so-called ‘Revolt of 1959’, I – as a Timorese who witnessed with my own eyes and ears the physical and mental violence in my hometown of Baucau, bow my head as a sign of respect and solidarity. To some extent, I take the liberty to affirm “they also have contributed to the Independence of our Motherland – to them I offer my prayers and respect.”

Government led by Xanana Gusmão. In the Baucau District Court on 8 June 2009, three defendants in the “Uatolari case” were each sentenced to three years imprisonment and two were acquitted – Summary of Cases Tried in the Baucau District Court 08-11 June 2009, JSMP, Dili, 26 June 2009. 601 “Polisiz Viqueque Latolera Joven Abut”, Suara Timor Lorosae, Dili, 26 June 2008. The PRU post was established to guard against inter-ethnic violence and clashes between youth martial arts groups. The author met briefly with PRU officers in Uatolari in late October 2008. 602 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Timor-Leste: Villagers seek peace through traditional rituals”, Dili, 4 March 2009. 603 Belo, C.F.X. Dom, “A Revolta de 1959 em Viqueque, Watolari e Watocarbau”, Porto, 5 Junho de 2009 (six pages). The author is responsible for the English translation (from Portuguese and Bahasa) of the passage cited above. http://forum-haksesuk.blogspot.com/2009/06/revolta-de-1959-em-viqueque-watolari-e.html

118 THREATS: THE URT-D, COUP PLOTTERS AND INDONESIA Founding Declarations of the Union of the Republic of Timor – Dilly (URT-D) In 1960, a group appeared in Jakarta calling itself the “Friends of TimorDilly”. Its manifesto stated that “Timor-Dilly is for Timordillians” and not for “Portuguese robbers”. The Portuguese Legation in Jakarta received one or two circulars from “The Friends of Timor-Dilly”, and the matter was reportedly raised in Lisbon with the Indonesian mission.604 In November 1960, under the auspices of the All-Malay Races Union605, a “Liberation Bureau” of the “Union of the Republic of Timor – Dilly” (URT-D)606 was reportedly founded in Jakarta “to drive away the Portuguese colonialists” from Timor. The first public statement by the URT-D - a circular titled “Second Announcement” dated 10 December 1960 (see Annex I), was distributed in early March 1961 to local newspapers in Jakarta and also to foreign news representatives.607 This URT-D Announcement, signed by the General Chairman of the Bureau, “A. Mao Klao”, urged “revolt” by the people of Portuguese Timor – “consisting of the people from Kemak, Marae, Uikusi, Kambing Island, Nusa Besi Island, the Moslems in Timordilly, the Halaik, and all members of the Timor-dilly fighters” to “drive away the Portuguese Colonialists who are greedy and selfish”. The Announcement also urged “all Angola/Mozambique soldiers who are at present in Timor-dilly to fight on the side of the Timor-dilly Freedom Movement”. The Australian Embassy in Jakarta reported: “The Portuguese Legation has, on three occasions, sent someone to the address given at the top of the circular – (( ie Kramat Sawah XIII E 227, Paseban – 604

Fernandes, M. S., A União da República de Timor (URT): o primeiro movimento nacionalista timorense 1960-1974, Lisbon, 2003 - a paper delivered at the Second Congress of the Portuguese Political Science Association, Lisbon, 19-20 January 2003. This paper – currently only available in Portuguese, relates that the “Friends of Timor Dilly … had the sympathy of certain influential individuals in Indonesian political life” but was dissolved following President Sukarno’s visit to Lisbon in early May 1960 – p.1. See also Fernandes, M.S., “A União da República de Timor: o atrófico movimento nacionalista islâmico-malaio Timorense, 1960-1975”, pp.355-431 in Guedes, A.M. & Mendes N.C. (eds), Ensaios sobre naciolismos em Timor-Leste, Collecção Biblioteca Diplomática do MNE – Série A, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros Portugal, Lisbon, 2005 – pp.361-362. 605 The All-Malay Races Union (AMRU), led from an office in Jakarta by Mulwan Shah, claimed the support of 250 million ethnic Malays from “Malagasy to Hawaii” but was assessed as “virtually nonexistent”: see Australian Embassy - Jakarta, Memo 1155, 12 July 1963 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 3). See footnote 77 for earlier supra-national Pan-Malay movements including the KMM – the AMRU’s connection, if any, with Ibrahim Yaacob, the KMM founder who fled to Indonesia from Malaya in August 1945, is not clear. 606 Also as the “United Republic of Timor” – in Bahasa Indonesia as “Uni Republic/k Timor”. The URT-D’s letterhead stated in English “Union of the Republic of Timor”, but English-language texts often used the title “United Republic of Timor”. In 1974, the UDT also “had referred to the territory as Timor-Dili’, a name accepted by a wide range of Timorese” – Nicol, B., Timor – A Nation Reborn 2002, op.cit., pp. 101-102, but adopted the Fretilin-preferred title of “East Timor/Timor-Leste” on 21 January 1975 when joining in a coaltion with Fretilin. When interviewed in December 2004, M.S.A. Balikh/“Mao Klao” was not aware of the founding of the “Liberation Bureau” or the “Second Announcement” circular. 607 Second Announcement: Freedom Throughout Timor-Dilly ! – Drive the Portuguese into the Sea !, Liberation Bureau – Union of the Republic of Timor-Dilly, Kramat Sawah XIII E 227 - Paseban Jakarta, 10 December 1960. The original was in Bahasa. However, as a Bahasa copy is not available, a full orthographic analysis of the Announcement is not yet possible ie in Bahasa Melayu or Bahasa Indonesia (see subsequent explanatory footnote 700). The English translation of this “Second Announcement” was despatched to Canberra as an attachment to Australian Embassy – Jakarta, Memo 561, 25 March 1961 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 1).

119 Djakarta)). There was nothing at this address to indicate that it was the ‘The Seat of Timor-Dilly Fighters’. It was a house situated in a depressed area of Djakarta and noone was about when the calls were made. …so far we have not heard of it ((the Announcement)) being published in any newspaper except the English-language ‘Observer’, a paper of no significance whatsoever … The Portuguese Legation, for the present at least, attaches no significance to this circular which it suspects could be the work of one man. Although this is called a ‘second announcement’, the Portuguese Legation does not recall seeing the first announcement from this Bureau.”608 This early - perhaps the first, public statement by the URT-D contained only limited “Pan-Malay/Islamic” rhetoric. Brief Islamic references included: “On behalf of Allah”, “Allah will give the fruits of freedom” – and the Announcement referred to the “unbelieving Portuguese”. Islamic references seemed incongruous when related to the composition of society in Portuguese Timor. In the early 1960s, about 20 percent of the population in Portuguese Timor were regarded as Roman Catholic - the majority were considered to be “tribal animists”.609 The URT-D Announcement was covered by an Australian Broadcasting Commission (ABC) report on 6 March 1961, by Radio Australia on 7 March, by The Straits Times (Singapore) on 7 March, The Indonesian Observer on 11 March - and in a critical editorial in Dili’s A Voz de Timor newspaper on 12 March.610 The A Voz de Timor item cited the Union’s “Liberation Committee” as “madmen” - and indirectly sought assurances from Indonesia. A response from the Indonesian Consul in Dili, Tengku Usman Hussin – as a letter to the Governor, was subsequently printed in A Voz de Timor No. 83 of 19 March noting Indonesia’s earlier “no territorial claim” position in statements by President Sukarno and Foreign Minister Subandrio - ie “Indonesia could co-exist peacefully and cooperatively with such foreign-controlled territories”.611 The Indonesian Consul’s letter argued: “it is silly and rather groundless to think that Indonesia entertained the idea of annexing Portuguese Timor … the Indonesian Government and people are only fighting to regain West Irian … if there is a ‘Committee for the Liberation of the Republic of Timor’, the sponsors and advocates of the Committee do so at their own risk and full responsibility.” The daily newspaper in Darwin, the Northern Territory News, printed several rather sensational articles related to the URT-D Announcement.612 In “Indies in Threat to Timor” (23 March 1961), it claimed “Indonesia has formed a committee in 608

Australian Embassy – Djakarta, Memo 561, 25 March 1961 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 1). The Indonesian Observer, Djakarta, reported the Announcement on 11 March 1961. 609 Singh, B., East Timor, Indonesia and the World, Singapore Institute of International Affairs, Singapore, 1995, p.23 includes Table 8: “Growth of Church in Timor” indicating 29.4 percent of the population as Catholic in 1974, 42.3 percent in 1980, and 92.3 percent in 1994. On Islam in Portuguese Timor, see footnotes 445 and 446. 610 “Ignorância e Demogogia” (“Ignorance and Demagogy”), A Voz de Timor, No.82, Dili, 12 March 1961. This article and the following letter by the Indonesian Consul (footnote 611 below) were included in the Portuguese Government’s monthly foreign policy publication Boletim Geral do Ultramar, No. 429-430, March-April 1961, pp.391-394. 611 Tengku Usman Hussin, Consul, Indonesian Consulate – Dili, letter to the Governor, 16 March 1961. Such “no claim” statements were made by Foreign Minister Subandrio to the Indonesian Parliament in early February 1959; on 10 March 1960 (to repudiate an “incorporationist” remark in a speech by Mohammad Yamin to an All-Indonesian Youth Meeting in Bandung in February – see The Indonesian Observer, 11 & 12 March 1960: NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 1); and by President Sukarno during his visit to Lisbon in early May 1960 (see also Australian Embassy – Jakarta, Cable AP82 O.11055, “… Indonesian Relations with Portugal”, 17 July 1961, NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1 Part 1) 612 Northern Territory News, Darwin - 23 March, 30 March and 8 April 1961.

120 Djakarta to ‘liberate’ Portuguese Timor” – followed by an editorial: “Timor threat too close for comfort”. In an article in its 8 April 1961 edition titled “Timor Rising”, the News reported comments by Indonesia’s new Ambassador to Australia then transitting Darwin: “The group trying to stir up trouble in Portuguese Timor with a ‘join the liberation’ bid could be ‘typical fortune hunters’, Indonesia’s new Ambassador Brigadier General Saudi said in Darwin on his way to Canberra. ‘Fortune Hunters’ had created trouble in the Celebes … it would probably be the same sort of people.” On 23 April 1961, ABRI General Abdul Haris Nasution – speaking as “Guest of Honour” on an ABC broadcast, stated that “the Indonesian people have no thought at all of, nor any desire for, other territories close to Indonesia like North Borneo, the eastern part of Timor Island or the eastern part of New Guinea which has never been part of the former Dutch East Indies territory.”613 A few weeks later in June 1961, the Australian Consul in Dili reported that two copies of the URT-D’s “proclamation” had been recovered by the PIDE in Portuguese Timor and “the evidence suggests that they came by post from Djakarta to Atamaboea [sic] and were then brought across the border for distribution. The language was Indonesian.”614 On 30 June 1961, the Portuguese Prime Minister - Dr António de Oliveira Salazar, made reference to the URT-D in a speech in the National Assembly in Lisbon – “that small group, of doubtful genuineness, which in Djakarta pretends to be working to free Timor can only want that independence so as to hand Timor to the Indonesian Republic, which would not then feel the scruples it at present feels in accepting the gift. Yet Port Darwin is no more than one hour’s flight from the capital, Dili, so that another would be just as disturbed by such an event as we ourselves.”615 In early August 1961, writing from Kupang, journalist Peter Arnett reported “the Indonesian military are investigating a ‘freedom movement’ which has been distributing pamphlets in the Indonesian portion of Timor calling for support to oust the Portuguese. Military authorities in this tiny white-washed capital city said they had not been in contact with any rebel groups within Portuguese territory. Pamphlets have been distributed here by a Timorese group proclaiming itself ‘Uni Republique Dili Timor’ [sic] (Portuguese Timor).” 616 In September 1961, the leading Australian newsmagazine reported: “Relations between Portugal and Indonesia, which have been severely strained by the Angola bloodbath, have taken a turn for the worse with the emergence of a ‘Freedom Movement’ in the Indonesian half of Timor. The movement has 613

Australian Embassy – Jakarta, Cable AP82 O.11055, “… Indonesian Relations with Portugal”, 17 July 1961 (NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1 Part 1). ABRI = (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia – Indonesian Armed Forces). On the struggle for Irian Barat/West New Guinea, according to General A.H. Nasution - Indonesian Defence and Security Minister, the Indonesian Armed Forces had “groups of men totalling about 1500 at various points along the coast of West New Guinea.” – Record of Conversation with Sir Garfield Barwick, Australian Minister for External Affairs, Jakarta, 4 July 1962 (NAA: A1838, 3034/10/11/7 Part 1). For military detail on the conflict see MacFarling, I., Military Aspects of the West New Guinea Dispute 1958-1962, Working Paper No 212, The Strategic and Defence Study Centre, Canberra, 1990. 614 Australian Consulate – Dili, Savingram 17, 17 June 1961 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 1). 615 Salazar, A de O. Dr, “The Portuguese Overseas Territories and the United Nations Organization”, Lisbon, 30 June 1961 – Boletim Geral do Ultramar, Lisbon, No.432-433, June-July 1961, p.368. Dr Salazar’s speech was made in the context of the UN’s continuing requests for Portugal to provide information on its overseas territories and insurgent operations into northern Angola. Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 123/61, 31 July 1961 – quotes the speech (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 2). 616 “Timor As New Potential Trouble Spot” (Associated Press, Koepang), The Canberra Times, Canberra, 11 August 1961 – appeared earlier in The Washington Post, Washington, 6 August 1961.

121 no official backing from the Djakarta government and has so far confined itself to printing pamphlets calling for support for the more-or-less nonexistent ‘freedom’ struggle in Portuguese Timor. The Indonesian Army is investigating the organisation’s activities, and President Soekarno is wary of any involvement which might weaken his legalistic claim against the Dutch for possession of West New Guinea, but the danger of a flare-up is real.”617 Army Disquiet in Portuguese Timor – and a planned Coup In Portuguese Timor, Governor Barata was critical of the Military Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Serpa Soares618, citing his harsh actions against the people – ie “arrastar da espada” (“use of the sword”) and exhibitions of force to create a fear of the military among the populace.619 In December 1960, Governor Barata was informed by Lisbon that the Military Commander in Dili had sent a report to the Ministry of the Army warning of an “imminent uprising” by native troops and the population – and recommending the withdrawal of Portuguese military families. Governor Barata rejected this assessment as incorrect and alarmist – reporting that the situation was calm, while noting “dissatisfactions between the native and European military.”620 Senior military officers however continued to warn of a “native uprising” and, in the Governor’s view, to challenge his authority. Subsequently, in mid-January 1961, following complaints from Governor Barata to Lisbon, Lieutenant Colonel Serpa Soares and his Chief-of-Staff, Captain Manuel Chorão de Carvalho (promoted to major on 1 February), were recalled to Lisbon to answer charges that the Army had not been cooperating with the Civil Administration.621 However, to the annoyance of Governor Barata, in November 1961, Major Carvalho, was elected as the Deputy for Timor to the National Assembly in Lisbon.622 In 1961, several Portuguese Army officers in Portuguese Timor alleged that the administration in Dili was “losing touch with the Timorese” - citing a “lack of interest, corruption, and poor leadership amongst Government officials in the field and, at a higher level, a total disregard for native welfare and a refusal to recognize the need for even the most elementary reforms.”623 In late 1961, an Australian national intelligence assessment noted: “There is evidence of considerable dissatisfaction among the Portuguese Army officers stationed in Timor with the 617

Willey, K., “Portuguese Timor – The Coming Disaster”, The Bulletin, Melbourne, 16 September 1961 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 2). 618 Lieutenant Colonel (Cavalry) Carlos Alberto Serpa Soares arrived in Portuguese Timor in October 1959 - replacing Lieutenant Colonel (Infantry) Manuel Albuquerque Gonçalves de Aguiar as the Military Commander. 619 Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., pp.120-125 – Governor Barata related his difficulties with Portuguese Army officers - culminating in the recall to Lisbon of Lieutenant Colonel Serpa Soares in mid-January 1961. 620 Two of Governor Barata’s letters to the Secretary of State for the Army noting Governor Barata’s difficulties with the Military Commander and staff are included as annexes in Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., pp.235-242. 621 Australian Consulate – Dili, Cable SAV.2, 18 January 1961 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 1). Lieutenant Colonel Serpa Soares was replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Luís Mário do Nascimento who served until 18 June 1961. 622 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 203/61, 15 November 1961. Only 2,640 of Portuguese Timor’s estimated population of 500,000 voted in the election for the União Nacional candidate (ie of the sole political party) – NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 2. 623 Australian Consulate – Dili, Cable SAV.2, 18 January 1961 and Memo 13/61, 23 January 1961 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 1).

122 present character and aim of the civil administration … concerned not only at conditions in the territory but also at the growing international isolation of Portugal resulting from its adherence to rigid centralised colonial policies. The Army’s attempts to influence the civil administration to liberalize its policies, however, have been flatly rejected by the Governor.”624 In early 1962, several Portuguese officials and Army officers in Dili disaffected with the Salazar regime in Lisbon, reportedly planned a coup against the local Government, hoping to establish a Portuguese “Liberal Provisional Government” in exile in Portuguese Timor.625 Led by the Chief Judge of Portuguese Timor, Dr Rui Alberto Fernandes, they proposed inviting General Humberto Delgado626 to head the new Government in Dili - which they thought would precipitate the downfall of the Government in Lisbon. The policies of this planned Provisional Government “would include the establishment of democratic institutions and the granting of self-determination to colonial peoples within a specified time. If Delgado accepted the invitation, according to the Judge, in Timor he could anticipate support from 50% of Army officers and NCOs and 50% of the senior administration officials.”627 Chief Judge Fernandes also commented to the Australian Consul that “some of his colleagues were showing reluctance because of their fear that a revolt would precipitate seizure of this territory by Indonesia.”628 However, by late July 1962, the plot had petered out629 - and in early September, the Australian Consul reported that “open criticism of the Salazar regime appears to have diminished” and “the morale of the local oppositionists has accordingly declined.”630 Security Concerns Increase – PIDE Established; an Australian Treaty Mooted The PIDE subdelagação was established in Portuguese Timor on 2 March 1961. Soon after, its commander - Inspector Manuel José de Cunha, called on the Australian Consul. Inspector de Cunha related that “the Portuguese felt they were ‘living on a volcano which might erupt at any time’ and that the setting up of an efficient intelligence system was regarded as the highest priority. By ‘volcano’, he meant Indonesia, and he suggested that as Australia must also have a considerable interest in that, it might be possible to develop some measure of cooperation. … Although Cunha referred only to the Indonesian problem, it can be taken for granted

624

Joint Intelligence Committee (Australia), JIC(AUST)(61)75, “Military Importance of Portuguese Timor to Australia”, Canberra, September 1961, p.2/paragraph 9 (NAA: A1945, 248/9/2). 625 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memos 45/62 - 20 March 1962 and 101/62 - 26 June 1962 (NAA 1838, 3038/2/1 Part 2). 626 General Humberto Delgado was an unsuccessful candidate for the Portuguese Presidency in 1958. In 1961, he was involved in planning the hijacking of the tourist steamer “Santa Maria” and a failed Army revolt at Beja in southern Portugal. In 1962, he was in Brazil – and later moved to Algeria. General Delgado was assassinated by the PIDE in Spain in 1965. 627 Australian Consulate – Dili, Cable No. 37, 21 June 1962 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 2). 628 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 101/62, 26 June 1962 (NAA, A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 2). The Australian Consul commented that the Chief Judge’s remark “shows that the proposal was far from receiving unqualified support.” 629 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 119/62, 24 July 1962 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 2). One of the plotters – Major (Artillery) Augusto Gomes Pastor Fernandes (the Military Commander of Dili and Inspector of Second Line Troops) was removed from his position which “reduced the likelihood of a local coup because his was a key position in the plans of the conspirators.” 630 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 133, 1 September 1962 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 2).

123 that the ‘Santa Maria’ incident and recent differences between the Army and the civil administration have also played a part in the decision to tighten up security here.”631 Reflecting Portuguese concern, in mid-March 1961, the Australian Consul was told informally by a senior Portuguese Army officer in Dili that the Ministry of Defence in Lisbon “was working on proposals for a Defence Agreement with Australia. The draft proposals had not been finalised” … “but the Ministry had a Military Treaty in mind, aimed at setting up a common front against possible Indonesian encroachment and including provision for the exchange of officers and training facilities.” The Consul’s informant “did not say whether this was anything more than a pure Defence Ministry project at this stage and gave no indication that the political implications of such an agreement had been considered by the Government.”632 In the period 27-29 March 1961, a four-vessel Indonesian naval task force made a “goodwill visit” to Dili. The Australian Consul reported that: “the inhabitants followed the various aspects of the visit with keen interest and undoubtedly received a favourable impression. … The impact was greatest on the semi-educated class (clerks, truck drivers, skilled labourers etc) whose loyalties the Portuguese have long distrusted and who made up the bulk of the detainees in the 1959 disturbances. These people are comparing what they saw of the Indonesians with evidence about them showing Portugal’s naval strength (to the latter’s detriment) and showing a tendency now to question the accuracy of their superior’s longstanding portrayal of the Indonesians as second-rate and uncouth. … These naval officers were the first Indonesians the majority of the local officials had come in contact with on 631

Australian Consulate – Dili, SAV.7., “Reorganisation of security in Portuguese Timor”, 10 March 1961 (NAA: A1838, 3038/10/6). For Governor Barata’s description of the PIDE establishment and role, see: Barata, F.T., Timor contemporâneo …, op.cit., p.30 and pp.125-127. For the “Santa Maria Incident”, see footnote 626. The Australian Consul subsequently wrote critically of Inspector da Cunha’s activities – see Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 186/61, 23 October 1961 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/9), and the Portuguese Charge d’Affaires in Djakarta also had a low opinion of the performance of the PIDE in Portuguese Timor: see Australian Embassy – Djakarta, Memo 1640, 26 August 1961 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 2). It has been contended that the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) established a presence in the Dili Consulate in late 1959 ie that the Consul was an ASIS officer - see: Toohey, B. & Pinwill, W., Oyster: the story of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service, Heinemann, Melbourne, 1989, p.169; Gunn, G., Timor Loro Sae 500 Years, 1999 - p.261 (p.146 in the Internet edition); and Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., p.99. The Australian Consul, W.A. Luscombe, served in Dili from late November 1959 to late February 1962 – when he was replaced by J.S. Dunn. 632 Australian Consulate – Dili, Cable SAV.8, 23 March 1961 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 1). Soon after his arrival in Portuguese Timor in mid-June 1961, the Military Commander, Brigadier Francisco António Pires Barata confirmed to his staff that closer defence cooperation with Australia “was being discussed at the highest levels in the Defence Ministry” – Australian Consulate-Dili, Memo 95/61, 20 June 1961. However, Brigadier Barata’s submissions on “closer ties with Australia” were initially rejected by Governor Themudo Barata – Australian Consulate-Dili, Memo 112/61, 1961. Subsequently, in September 1961, Governor Barata confirmed to the Australian Consul that “the Military Commander’s plans for closer links with Australia are going ahead” – and that “he ((the Governor)) is now working on a series of proposals for Lisbon to put to Canberra for closer trade, defence and other ties with Australia as a logical development stemming from the position of Portugal and Australia as European powers with similar outlook adjacent to an increasingly hostile Asia … Timor was in an isolated and precarious position” – Australian Consulate-Dili, Memo 112/61, 17 September 1961 (NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1 Part 1). The Consul’s memoranda precipitated an inter-departmental reexamination in Canberra of Australia’s policy towards Portuguese Timor. See also footnote 661 for Portuguese Prime Minister Dr António de Oliveira Salazar’s views on Portugal-Australia security cooperation in late February 1963.

124 equal terms, and the professional competence and general educational standards displayed have caused many opinions to be revised. From now on, the Indonesians will be regarded with much more respect than in the past. However, there is concern at the impression the Indonesians made on the local people and resentment at the timing, which brought such an impressive display of Indonesian strength to Timor, with the Santa Maria incident and the troubles in Angola still very much in people’s thoughts.”633 Soon after, in April 1961, The Australian Consul reported on the strengthened security measures in Portuguese Timor: “The local authorities, in the present climate of doubt and fear created by events in Angola, the United States’ changed attitude and the general unfavourable publicity Portugal is receiving in the foreign press and because of increasing uncertainty regarding the loyalty of the local native people, are engaged in all-round tightening of security aimed primarily at stifling all criticism of the regime. … According to the Governor, the new U.S. Administration’s views on colonialism are indistinguishable from Moscow’s … There is no indication of serious native unrest but unsettling rumours, presumably inspired by the ((Indonesian Navy)) Task Force’s visit, of an Indonesian take-over are increasing and the inference is that there are elements who would welcome this. The semi-educated class whose loyalties have been suspect since the 1959 disturbances, in which some of them were involved, are also causing concern. Again, there has been no indication of serious disaffection but it is very obvious that numbers of these people do not share the depression of the upper-class Portuguese at each new embarrassment; indeed some are manifestly delighted. Although I do not wish to overemphasize the point at this stage, it is becoming more and more apparent that there is little strength based on loyalty to the Portuguese in Timorese society as a whole and that criticism, leading to agitation, could, if unchecked, wreak havoc. For this reason the current steps to strengthen security are, from the Portuguese point of view, well justified.” 634 Fears of Indonesian Interest The Portuguese authorities appear to have been very concerned in the second half of 1961 that Indonesia would move against Portuguese Timor – particularly following Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio’s public warning on 3 July 1961 before the Indonesian Gotong Royong Parliament. An Australian assessment noted: “Drawing attention to Indonesia’s proximity to Portuguese Timor, Subandrio added the threat that the Portuguese should not wait until public anger in Indonesia became acute” - and commented that Subandrio’s “somewhat threatening remark of 3 July may mark the beginning of a new phase of Indonesian policy towards the Portuguese regime in Timor.”635 Portuguese diplomats were greatly concerned and sought 633

Australian Consulate – Dili, Cable SAV.9, 31 March 1961 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 1). Task Force 123.1, from Surabaya, comprised: KRI Siliwangi (Pennant No. 201), Singamangradaja (202) – both destroyers; Surapati (251) – a frigate; and Sambu (903) – a tanker. Connect with footnote 152 on the reaction of the Rabuta movement on Ataúro. For the Santa Maria incident, see footnotes 626, 631. 634 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 56/61, 13 April 1961 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/9). 635 Australian Department of External Affairs, Savingram AP82 0.11055, Canberra, 17 July 1961 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 2; A1838, 49/2/1/1 Part 1). This assessment was repeated in the

125 expressions of support from several nations – claiming that the invasion of Portuguese Timor by Indonesia was “imminent”.636 In a related event evidencing tension, in July 1961, the Indonesian Foreign Ministry refused to allow its Indonesian Consul in Dili to attend a scheduled bridgeopening ceremony at Batugadé (on the Indonesian West Timor/Portuguese Timor border, a few kilometres inside Portuguese Timor). The Governor of West Timor explained to the Indonesian Consul that leaflets from the so-called Committee for the Liberation of Timor were circulating freely in the border area, and it would therefore be confusing to the local people to see Portuguese and Indonesian officials mingling amicably - and such was “not in keeping with the new policy of more active opposition to the Portuguese colonial system.”637 Soon after, the Governor of Portuguese Timor remarked to the Australian Consul that there was “increased evidence of the ‘Liberation Committee’s’ leaflets in Indonesian Timor … but they could have little or no impact here because they were in Indonesian and full of references to Allah which would not be understood in Portuguese Timor.”638 In August 1961, the Australian Department of External Affairs sent a cable to all of its overseas posts summarising Indonesia-Portuguese Timor relations noting: “The Indonesian Consul in Dili ((Tengku Usman Hussin)) has told the Australian Consul that early Indonesian action to ‘dis-establish’ the Portuguese in Timor is likely. The Indonesian Consul expressed the opinion that a policy of subversion rather than of military invasion will be pursued by Indonesia, with the aim of creating awareness amongst the Timorese in Portuguese territory that they had a powerful friend of their own race nearby, who could be relied on for support in a revolutionary struggle. Such support might, despite the risk of hostilities, include the provision of funds and weapons”.639 Soon after, senior Australian officials called for a comprehensive strategic study of the prospects for Portuguese Timor “because of the recent anti-colonial pressure against Portugal and signs of a hardening attitude towards Portuguese Timor

Australian Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), Weekly Report No 29/1961 of 19 July 1961 as “would appear to mark the beginning of a new phase”, and also in the Department of External Affairs, Memo 955, 26 July 1961: “contains an element of threat and suggests a new and sharp turn in Indonesian policy” (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 2). The Australian Embassy in Jakarta however questioned the Canberra assessment: “your interpretation of the immediate situation is too alarmist” - precipitating a review - Australian Embassy – Jakarta, Memo 1459 - “Portuguese Timor”, 29 July 1961 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 2). 636 Australian High Commission – London, Savingram 4651 I.23128, 26 September 1961 (NAA: A1945, 248/9/2). Portuguese officials’ fears of an imminent Indonesian attack had also been influenced by a number of reports of an Indonesian military build-up in Indonesian Timor – that were later discounted (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 2). 637 Australian Department of External Affairs, Savingram AP 82 0.11459, Canberra, 25 July 1961 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 2; A1945, 248/9/2). 638 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 161/61, 29 September 1961 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 2). 639 Australian Department of External Affairs, Savingram AP 100 O.12176 - “Portuguese Timor”, Canberra, 9 August 1961 (NAA: A4359, 221/5/19; A1838, 49/2/1/1 Part 1). The cable concluded however that “neither the Australian Consulate in Dili nor the Australian Embassy in Djakarta believes that an Indonesian attack on Portuguese Timor is planned, and this belief appears to be shared by the Portuguese authorities in Timor. (The Australian Embassy has drawn attention to the Indonesian need to avoid action which might distract attention from the Indonesian claim to West New Guinea or confuse the issue in that claim by laying Indonesia open to charges of territorial ambition elsewhere)”.

126 … the possibility of the island falling under Indonesian control.”640 In its political assessment, the Study concluded: “Notwithstanding security disturbances engineered by a few Indonesians in 1959 in which the Portuguese suspected – but were unable to prove at the time – official Indonesian complicity, there is at present no evidence of significant discontent among the Timorese”.641 However, in January 1962, the Australian High Commissioner in London commented to the Department of External Affairs in Canberra: “I was also shown some evidence that Indonesia is already engaged in subversive activities. This evidence will, I assume, be available to you”.642 In January 1962, the Portuguese Charge d’Affairs in Canberra sought “a definition of the Australian Government’s position in case of Indonesian aggression against Portuguese Timor” and “whether the interests of the Australian Government would be so strong that it would consider the possibility of helping Portugal to resist such aggression by giving it support political, military or logistic ?”. The following month, during discussions, the Secretary of the Australian Department of External affairs passed a Bout de Papier643 to the Portuguese Charge d’Affairs. The Papier declared that “The Australian Government would naturally take a serious view of any Indonesian aggression against Portuguese Timor” – but, noted that the event was “hypothetical” and particular steps would be decided “in the light of all circumstances at that time”, and only offered that “it could be expected that political action by the Government would include support of proposals in the United Nations for a cease-fire and for a withdrawal of Indonesian forces.”644 In March 1962, the Indonesian Government sent an Aide-Memoire to the Portuguese as a strong protest against alleged border transgressions in 1960, 1961 and early 1962 – in which the Indonesian Government “reserved the right to undertake restrictive and preventive actions to protect its subjects and preserve the security of its territory.”645 However, during a visit to the United States in September 1962, Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio told the US Assistant Secretary of State W. Averell Harriman that: “Indonesia had no designs on Portuguese Timor – but if there should be a national liberation movement, Indonesia would of course support it.” When asked whether this would be military support, Dr Subandrio replied: “No, no but in the UN and elsewhere.”646 640

Joint Intelligence Committee (Australia), JIC(AUST)(61)75 - “Military Importance of Portuguese Timor to Australia”, Canberra, September 1961, paragraph 1 (NAA: A1945, 248/9/2; A1838, TS666/61/75). The Study was endorsed by the Chiefs of Staff Committee on 27 September 1961 and superseded JIC Appreciation No. 11/1954. At paragraph 25, the Study concluded: “whether controlled by Portugal or Indonesia, Portuguese Timor has no military importance to Australia; the acquisition of the territory by Indonesia would not significantly affect any threat to Australia.” 641 Ibid, paragraph 10. 642 Australian High Commission – London, Savingram 54, 5 January 1962 (NAA: A4359, 221/5/19). 643 A “Bout de Papier” (literally “a piece of paper”) is, in diplomatic terms, a record of factual material typed on unheaded paper with no courtesies, date, signature or official stamp – ie it is a less formal initiative or response than a Note Verbale or an Aide Memoire. 644 Australian Department of External Affairs – Canberra, Record of Conversation – with attached Bout de Papier, 8 February 1962 (NAA: 3038/10/1 Part 2, 49/2/1/1 Part 1). 645 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 133, 1 September 1962 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 2). The Australian Consul was shown a copy of the document dated 22 March 1962 by the Indonesian Consul. It “accused the Portuguese military and civil authorities of permitting and ‘in some cases assisting’ acts of transgression accompanied by killing and ill-treatment of Indonesian citizens.” Claims of border violations in the period 1961-70 by the Portuguese – including the westward movement of “pal pal” (Bahasa Indonesia = border markers), are also related in Soekanto, Integrasi … , 1976, op.cit., p.14. 646 Australian Embassy – Washington, Cable 2532, 30 September 1962 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 2).

127 In late 1962, an Australian journalist visiting Dili, Patrick Burgess, claimed to the Australian Consul that he had met briefly with a group of Timorese youth who professed to represent the “Movement of United Timor Before June” with a “membership of about 200”.647 They reportedly told Burgess that they were planning to send a delegation to Indonesian Timor “where they had relatives” to seek help in overthrowing the Portuguese regime. Burgess commented that the members of the Movement appeared very young - only 16 or 17 years of age, and that most were employed as junior clerks or technicians.648 On his return to Australia, Burgess wrote a series of articles in The Sun newspaper highly critical of the government in Portuguese Timor. In one item, based on interviews with disaffected young conscript Portuguese Army officers, he noted that there were “three distinct underground oppositions in Timor. The first is their own composed of Army officers and oppositionist members of the Administration. The Second is among the soldiers and NCOs. The third, with the backing of Indonesia, operates among the Timorese themselves. None of these rings, not even the officers and the soldiers, has any connection with the other.”649 Soon after, in December 1962, the Australian Consul in Dili was warned by a “friendly Army Lieutenant Colonel” that PIDE officers had an interest in the Consul due to: his suspected “contact with the underground movement referred to in articles in the Sydney Sun” newspaper (see above); his friendship with “the Indonesian Consul and with certain Portuguese officials who are known to hold opinions opposed to Salazar”; and the Consul’s attempts to entice Portuguese soldiers to emigrate to Australia.650 The Australian Consul advised Canberra that he “had no contact with any underground” - and his “friendships are not based on politics, let alone conspiracy.” He also noted that “on the question of immigrants, we have not attempted to recruit or even attract them. We have even tried to discourage many of them, but already more than 200 have shown interest in immigrating to Australia. Most of them are soldiers.” More substantively, towards the end of 1962, Australian and United States foreign affairs officials reportedly received credible intelligence that Indonesia was undertaking subversive activity in Portuguese Timor and concluded that “there was some evidence that the Indonesians are laying the ground for such action”651 but had no indication “when the Indonesians intended to put their plans into operation”.652 647

Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 175, 3 December 1962 (NAA: A4359, 221/5/19; A1838, 3038/2/9 and 49/2/1/1 Part 1). The Consul commented: “It is difficult to know how seriously to take this movement. I am inclined to think that their membership is greatly exaggerated and that it is doubtful whether a mission to Indonesia would be taken seriously by the Indonesians. It is also possible that the scheme was magnified for the benefit of the journalist.” 648 This “Movement” did not appear linked to the URT-D, and it is not known whether the incident had any links to the later plot to kill the Governor in July 1965 (see footnotes 517 and 518 - ie discussed in earlier paragraphs in relation to the 1959 Viqueque Rebellion). 649 Burgess, P., “You hear these secret words in the dead of night”, The Sun, Sydney, November 1962 (NAA: A4359, 221/5/19). A rebuttal appeared as “The Cancer of Bad Faith”, A Voz de Timor, Dili, 9 December 1962 (NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1 Part 2). “Timorese wait for invasion”, The Herald, Melbourne, 19 November 1962, also reported on low morale among Portuguese and Timorese military personnel and the fear of an Indonesian invasion (NAA: A4359, 221/5/19). Earlier reports of disquiet among Portuguese Army officers in 1960-1962 are related at footnotes 621-630. 650 Australian Consulate – Dili, Cable 73 I.32119, 19 December 1962 (NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1 Part 2). 651 Australian Embassy – Washington, Cable 373, 7 February 1963 (NAA: A1209, 1968/9055) – relating Quadripartite Talks on Indonesia in Washington (involving US, Australian, UK and NZ officials): “Although the Indonesian Government has proclaimed that the acquisition of West New Guinea has satisfied its territorial ambitions, its recent activities have given rise to serious concerns that

128 This may have been related to a “secret report” received by the Australian Department of External Affairs in late 1962/early 1963 indicating that: “Magenda, the Chief of the Intelligence of the Indonesian Combined Forces Staff had recently visited Indonesian Timor concerting [sic] Indonesian activities there directed at Portuguese Timor.”653 The Departmental staff assessed that the report suggested “border tensions would be increased preparing the way for larger scale incidents which would ultimately justify annexation of Portuguese Timor. Although a small scale build-up has occurred in Timor, forces to be used against the Portuguese would be drawn on from Mandala Command in Makassar. No timetable is known to exist, but there is reported to be a belief among army officers that activities against Timor would be launched while attention is still fixed on North Borneo.” The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) reviewed the situation in early January 1963 and concluded that: “we have a clear treaty obligation ‘to defend and protect all conquests or colonies belonging to the Crown of Portugal against all his enemies, as well future as present” – but at the Athens NATO meeting in May 1962, we told the Portuguese “in general terms our power to fulfil our treaty commitments all over the world was limited. Meanwhile our intelligence shows that the Indonesians are undoubtedly plotting some action against Portuguese Timor although we still cannot predict how or when they might act.”654 Soon after an FCO brief assessed that: “Indonesian action against Timor may come sooner than expected. Neither the continuation of Portuguese Colonial rule nor an independent Timor make any political or economic sense. The territory should go to the Indonesians and it is not worth having a row about it on its own merits.”655 An associated FCO brief noted: “Recently we have received further Secret reports that the Indonesian Armed Forces are making efforts to obtain recent maps of the territory and that they have put in a request for the staff of the Indonesian Consulate Dili to be increased. There have also been secret reports: a. that the eventual Indonesian takeits ambitions are, in fact, still unsatisfied especially with respect to Portuguese Timor and the Borneo territories.” 652 Australian Embassy – Washington, Cable 184, 18 January 1963 (NAA: A1209, 1968/9055) – this cable refers to the intelligence report on Indonesian activities, but the detail has been “expunged”. 653 Australian Department of External Affairs, Cablegram O.796 (amended copy), Canberra, 11 January 1963 (NAA: A1209, 1974/9010; A1838, 3038/10/1 Part 2) to the Australian High Commission – London, repeated to the Australian Embassy – Washington as Cable 103 on 17 January 1963 (NAA: A3092, 221/11/18, Part 1). A draft Submission “Future of Portuguese Timor” by Australian Department of External Affairs staff dated 8 November 1962 noted “according to secret reports … there has been a recent build-up of army units there ((Indonesian Timor)) (an increase to two companies of crack paratroops has been mentioned).” - (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 2). 654 Warner, F.A., Brief, FCO London, 4 January 1963 (The National Archives – Kew: FO 371 169801 – Indonesian Intentions Against Portuguese Timor). The “treaty” referred to by the British was probably the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of Alliance for “perpetual friendship” signed in 1373 and reinforced by a secret declaration of 1899. For British analysis of the situation, including consideration of supporting Portugal - see a summary in Australian High Commission – London, Cable 5503, 15 October 1963 (A1209, 1974/9010); and the British Foreign Office paper “Portuguese Timor”, 1 January 1965 (NAA: A7942, P62; A1945, 248/9/2), 655 FCO, “Brief for Quadripartite Talks on Indonesia - Washington February 1963”, Brief No 1 – Steering Brief, VIII Timor , Section 13 (The National Archives – Kew: FCO 371/169908 - DH 107/1). Later in the Brief however, it was noted that the preferred British solution for Portuguese Timor would be a peacefully-negotiated settlement to allow an Indonesian take-over. For subsequent British analyses of the situation, including consideration of supporting Portugal - see their Foreign Office paper “Portuguese Timor”, 1 January 1965 (NAA: A7942, P62; A1945, 248/9/2), and as earlier summarised in Australian High Commission – London, Cable 5503, 15 October 1963 (A1209, 1974/9010).

129 over would be the responsibility of Mandala command; b. the present airstrip in Indonesian Timor is to be refurbished and a naval base established; c. the PKI are penetrating the Colony and setting up an apparatus in anticipation of a possible takeover.”656 Australian officials in London had discussed their concerns with their British counterparts. The British officials responded that they would not warn Portugal of “secret reports of Indonesian plans” as “this would be open invitation to ((the)) Portuguese to invoke ((the)) treaty and, in any case, Portuguese intelligence could be expected to be well enough aware of Indonesian intentions.”657 Soon after, a national-level Australian intelligence assessment on the “Outlook for Indonesia” concluded that: “In Timor, there will be increased anti-Portuguese propaganda, engineered border incidents, and diplomatic and clandestine support for revolutionary movements.”658 Australia Expresses Concerns to Portugal Portugal maintained that Portuguese Timor was not a colony but a province of metropolitan Portugal – and, as such, was not covered by the deliberations of the United Nations Special Committee on the Implementation of the Declaration on Decolonization founded on 23 January 1962. On 18 January 1963, the US Assistant Secretary of State W. Averell Harriman – speaking on Timor, had privately “denounced Portugal’s Government as the worst form of colonialism and that the United States could not support it, and urged Britain and Australia to bring pressure to bear on Salazar to give expression to some enlightened plans and policies concerning health, education and future selfdetermination.”659 In early February 1963, in preparation for Quadripartite Talks in Washington, the Australian Cabinet: “accepted the view that in the current state of world opinion, no practicable alternative to eventual Indonesian sovereignty over Portuguese Timor presented itself. It would not be acceptable to Australia or the West for Indonesia to proceed against Portuguese Timor with arms, and this must be brought home to Indonesia. But otherwise the course which it seemed best to follow is for Australia to bring such quiet pressure as it can upon Portugal to cede peacefully and in addition to explore ways by the international community might bring pressure on Portugal.”660 656 FCO, “Brief for Quadripartite Talks – Washington February 1963 – Portuguese Timor”, Brief No 15 (The National Archives – Kew: FCO 371/169908 - DH 107/1). 657 Australian High Commission – London, Cable 184 (expunged detail released to author – 10 July 2007), 11 January 1963 (NAA: A1209, 1974/9010). The Australian position in early 1963 is stated in Barwick, G. (Minister for External Affairs), Cabinet Submission – Portuguese Timor (see following footnote 660; and the Department of External Affairs Working Group Report – “The Future of Portuguese Timor”, Canberra, 4 April 1963 (NAA: A1838, 3038/1/1 Part 2) – see also the following footnotes 666 and 669. 658 Australian Department of External Affairs, Cablegram SAV.29, 0.1827, 29 January 1963 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 2) reporting on JIC(AUST)(63)(43) dated 25 January 1963. 659 Australian Embassy – Washington, Cablegram 217, 22 January 1963 – remarks to the British Ambassador (NAA: A1838, 935/17/3). Harriman had made similar remarks on 17 January to the Australian Ambassador, see Australian Embassy - Washington, Cablegram 184, 18 January 1963 (NAA: A1838, 49/2/1/1 Part 1). 660 Cabinet Decision 632, Canberra, 5 February 1963, paragraph 4. (NAA: A4943, 632); and repeated at paragraph 14 of Cabinet Submission No.575, 21 February 1963 (NAA: A4740, C3725, p.14) which also notes that the Australian Foreign Minister had “warned the Indonesian Foreign Minister in New

130

Subsequently, in early February 1963, Australian Prime Minister Menzies wrote to Portugal’s Prime Minister Dr António de Oliveira Salazar forewarning that “this Special Committee (Committee of Twenty-Four) - of which Australia was a member, would again be paying attention to Portuguese African territories in 1963 and might also discuss the future of Portuguese Timor.” Menzies pointed out that the Australian Government was “concerned that in the absence of any intention ((by Lisbon)) of allowing the Timorese people to express a choice as to the international relationships and status that they desire, there will arise a serious threat to the peace of the Territory.” Dr Salazar’s reply to Prime Minister Menzies in late February 1963 included the following: “However good and intimate Australian relations with Indonesia may be, a Portuguese Timor seems incomparably safer and more attentive to the interests of Australia than the same Timor integrated in that Republic. We continue to see the problem in the light of our relations and of the official statements made by the Australian Government during the Second World War. … ((In)) September 1943, we were told that His Majesty’s Government in the Commonwealth of Australia trusted that the Portuguese Government would share the view that the two Governments should concert between them measures for the common defence of Timor and Australia. This was the line of thought of the Australian Government of those days, and it does not appear that the world situation enables it now to think differently. … Given the expansionist fever ((from Indonesia)) which we witness in many quarters, there is always a possibility of national or foreign agents undertaking the work of preparing manifestations of popular will to that end. Your Excellency has perhaps been informed that this has been and is being tried and, since the Consul for Australia in Dili has maintained intimate relations with his Indonesian colleague, I presume that he could not have failed to convey to Your Excellency all the details of those attempts. In these circumstances, I would myself be very grateful if Your Excellency thought it possible, and useful to the Portuguese Government, to acquaint the latter with what Your Excellency’s Consul may have found out in that respect.”661 - ((ie regarding “the work of subversion”)).

York last September ((1962)), that, quite apart from any other consideration, Australian public opinion would not accept any violent move by Indonesia in regard to Timor.” 661 Salazar, A. de Oliveira Dr., (President of the Council of Ministers), Lisbon, 27 February 1963 – in response to Australian Prime Minister Menzie’s letter of 8 February 1963 (NAA: A1209, 1974/9010, pp.145-150 (Portuguese) and pp.109-115 (English – incorrectly dated “1 March 1962”; A1838, 3038/10/1 Parts 2 and 3). For the reaction of senior officials of the Australian Department of External Affairs to Dr Salazar’s letter, see NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1 Part 3 including comment that Dr Salazar’s letter was “a thoroughly unpleasant one, with its innuendoes of possible Australian desire to take over Portuguese Timor … the ‘intimate relations’ maintained by the Australian Consul in Dili with his Indonesian colleague … This seems to mean that the Portuguese already are regarding us as a hostile influence.” See also footnotes 710 and 711 for the continuation of correspondence between Prime Minister Salazar and Prime Minister Menzies in late 1963/early 1964. The Menzies-Salazar correspondence in 1963-1964 is also contained in Way, W. (ed), 2000, op.cit., pp.27-38 and correspondence between October 1961 and March 1964 is also briefly reviewed in Jolliffe, J., Balibo, 2009, op.cit., pp.77-80 in the context of an incorrect allegation by former Prime Minister Whitlam to a 1999 Senate hearing in Canberra that Dr Salazar had proposed a Portuguese-Australian “condominium” over Portuguese Timor in March 1963.

131 Quadripartite Meeting on Indonesia – February 1963 Prior to the Quadripartite Meeting on Indonesia in Washington in early-mid February 1963, the Australian Department of External Affairs advised its attending officials: “It is difficult to see a practicable alternative to the Timorese people joining Indonesia. Vague talk of raising standards of living will not achieve a permanent solution. We must be at pains to impress on Indonesia our disapproval of a military attack on Timor.”662 In a following cable, the Department added: “we consider the best course is for Australia to bring such quiet presssure as it can upon Portugal to cede peacefully and in addition to explore ways by which the international community might bring pressure on Portugal.”663 In a subsequent message to its delegation, Canberra cabled: “The meeting could well consider how Indonesia could be dissuaded from taking military action while we are working to bring Portugal to cede the territory peacefully.”664 Subsequently from the Meeting, the Secretary of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs (Sir Arthur Tange) reported that: “The US regard Australia as required by geography and circumstance to get the Portuguese out of Timor by a decent international process before the Indonesians move. US have a ‘millstone’ of keeping bases in the Azores and keeping the Indonesians happy with Western association”: the United States and the United Kingdom noted that as they were renegotiating their military rights in the Azores, and as “neither the United States nor Britain was in a position to exert any useful influence on Portugal to amend its attitude to Timor”, urged an approach by Australia.665 In summarising the Meeting, Tange reported: “On Timor, all were agreed that it seemed likely that sooner or later Indonesia would take over the Portuguese side of the island and everyone around the table made it clear that their governments were not prepared to commit forces to prevent this happening. Harriman seemed to think that it was Australia’s particular duty to exercise what influence it could with Salazar to persuade him to effect reforms. I mentioned the steps we had already taken and said there was little more we could do. Ormsby Gore indicated that the British were powerless to influence Salazar because they were already extremely unpopular with ‘their oldest ally’, and Harriman said the Unites States could not move because of current negotiations about the Azores bases which still appeared to be an essential element in N.A.T.O. defence.”666 662

Department of External Affairs – Canberra, Cablegram 217, 4 February 1963 (NAA: A1209, 1968/9055). The principal concern at the Quadripartite Meeting on Indonesia (11-12 February 1963) was prospective Indonesian military aggression against the “Borneo Territories” and Malaysia (to be formed in August 1963) – ie Portuguese Timor was a minor topic for discussion. 663 Department of External Affairs – Canberra, Cablegram 234, 6 February 1963 (NAA: A1209, 1968/9055). This statement reflected the Cabinet Decision 632 – see footnote 660. 664 Department of External Affairs – Canberra, Cablegram 296, 11 February 1963 (NAA: A1209, 1968/9055). 665 Australian Embassy – Washington, Cable 410, 12 February 1963 (NAA: A3092, 221/11/18, Part 1). 666 Australian Embassy – Washington, Cable 423/I.4004, 13 February 1963 (NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1, Part 2). In mid-November 2007, at a presentation at a seminar at Oxford University, Portuguese academic Dr Moisés Silva Fernandes stated that Australia – and the other three “Anglophone” countries had abandoned Portuguese Timor to Indonesia in the early 1960s – “Timor-Leste: Acordo secreto entregava territorio à Indonésia”, and “Acordo secreto entre anglófonos entregava TimorLeste à Indonésia”, Lusa, Lisbon, 16 November 2007. Dr Fernandes cited the 1963 Quadripartite Talks on Indonesia in Washington and portions of the above-cited Australian diplomatic cable dated 13 February 1963 – see above. A few days later, Timor-Leste President José Ramos-Horta agreed with Dr Moisés Fernandes’ assessment and cited the 13 February 1963 cable – “Timor: Ramos Horta compara

132 In subsequent discussions, the US Assistant Secretary of State W. Averell Harriman and Australian Ambassador Beale agreed on “concerted action well before the event” (“Indonesian trouble-making” ?), and Harriman “commented that when it comes ‘we should at least be singing the same song even if it’s a dirge’.”667 In May 1963, the Australian Cabinet rejected a proposal from Foreign Minister Barwick that Australia should “seek to engage the United Nations” on Portuguese Timor. Supporting briefing papers to Prime Minister Menzies had counselled that such an initiative at the UN risked that Australia might be seen as acting in a “pro-Indonesian way”, publicly legitimizing Indonesia’s interest - or that Australia might be cited for having “connived at opening the way for her ((Indonesia)) to exert a claim over Timor.”668 Fears of Indonesian Subversion While Indonesian ambitions against the North Borneo territories were a priority interest in early 1963, the Australian Cabinet also reviewed a submission on Portuguese Timor from the Minister of External Affairs in early March 1963 that included an assessment that: “So far the Indonesian Government has not to our knowledge given encouragement to dissident Timorese although there is some secret evidence to suggest that Indonesian military forces are preparing the groundwork for eventual ‘incidents’ and the support of a revolutionary movement.”669 Similarly, in May 1963, the Australian Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) Report on “The Future of Portuguese Timor” included a section on “Indonesian Infiltration and Subversion”. 670 The report noted: “10. Covert action being taken by the Indonesians in Timor seems to indicate that preparations are being made to encourage border incidents and the development of a revolutionary movement. Therefore, if a revolution should break out, whether Indonesian inspired or not, the Indonesians would give support to the rebels. There is no evidence, however, that the Indonesian acordo secreto à Cimeira de Berlim”, Diário Digital – Lusa, Lisbon, 16 November 2007. In 2010, Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão similarly cited Australia as secretly agreeing to “East Timor’s integration into Indonesia in 1963” – Murdoch, L., “East Timor leader accuses Australia over war”, The Age, Melbourne, 12 April 2010. As noted at footnote 653, a summary of the Quadripartite positions is discussed in the Department of External Affairs Working Group Report – “The Future of Portuguese Timor”, Canberra, 4 April 1963 (NAA: A1838, 3038/1/1 Part 2). 667 Australian Embassy – Washington, Cable 459, 19 February 1963 (NAA: A1209, 1974/9010). 668 Cabinet Decision No.823 (FAD). Canberra, 23 May 1963 – and supporting briefs (NAA: A4940, C3797). A brief for the ANZUS Council meeting in Wellington in June 1963 noted “as far as possible we want to carry Indonesia with us in looking for a solution through international peace processes.” (NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1 Part 3) 669 Barwick, G., Minister for External Affairs, “Portuguese Timor and the North Borneo Territories”, Cabinet Submission No. 575, Canberra, 21 February 1963 (NAA: A4940, C3725, p.14 – draft on 935/17/3 Part 2) – also included in Whitlam, G., Abiding Interests, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1997, Appendix 5: “Barwick’s Advice on Portuguese Timor”. The Submission was considered on 5 March 1963. 670 Joint Intelligence Committee (Australia), JIC(AUST)(63)75, “The Future of Portuguese Timor”, Canberra, May 1963 (NAA: A1209, 1974/9010; 3038/2/1 Part 2) – in most copies, paragraphs 22 and 24 covering “Indonesian Infiltration and Subversion” are expunged. However, see footnote 693 for material in paragraph 22 related to the Catholic Church. The contemporary assessment of the Australian Department of External Affairs can be found in “The Future of Portuguese Timor – Report of Working Group of Departmental Officers”, Department of External Affairs (authors: Jockel, G.; Doig, W.T.; Brown, A.), Canberra, 4 April 1963 (NAA: A1838, 3038/1/1 Part 2) that noted “evidence that Indonesian military agencies are already active in planning for future interference.”

133 Government has decided on precise measures, including a time-table, to eject the Portuguese. … 24. The Director of Intelligence of the Indonesian Armed Forces Staff, Brigadier-General Magenda, visited Kupang in December 1962, presumably to plan activities directed against Portuguese Timor. He instructed a special army intelligence unit to intensify counter-intelligence efforts to minimize advance knowledge by the Portuguese of forthcoming Indonesian moves, and to provoke small-scale border incidents in order to increase tension and create an atmosphere for large-scale incidents to justify eventual annexation of Portuguese Timor. Propaganda and other activities were to be organized so that they could not be traced back to official Indonesian inspiration. However, we have no evidence to date that any activity along these lines has taken place.”671 The URT-D’s Pan-Malay and Islamic Elements On 14 April 1963, the URT-D disseminated a circular - an “Announcement” dated 3 April 1963, declaring that a 12-member Cabinet had been formed at the “Emergency Place of Struggle” at Batugadé.672 The Announcement was signed by “Abdullah Malao” [sic] as the “General Director of the Presidium”. On behalf of the Central Presidium, “First Vice President” “A. Mao Klao”673 appointed the members of the Cabinet on the evening of 2 April 1963 “vide the Letter of Appointment” – which included Mr T.E. Maly Bere674 as Prime Minister and Madame Immany as Deputy Prime Minister. Of the twelve listed Cabinet members, three had clearly identifiable Islamic/Malay names ie Datok Palimo Kayo, Inche Mohammed Quossim Al-Haj and Mohammed Abbay Ridwan Maly. The URT-D Announcement was reported in mid-April 1963 by the Jakartabased representative of the AFP news agency, included in The Economist (London) in its “Foreign Report” of 25 April 1963675, and covered by media in Jakarta and

671

The Magenda visit is noted earlier – see footnote 653. Paragraph 24 of the Report was précised in a cable from Washington as: “propaganda and other activities were to be organised by a special Indonesian Army intelligence unit so that they could not be traced back to official Indonesian inspiration - Australian Embassy – Washington, Sav 759, 4 July 1963 (NAA: A1838, 935/17/3). 672 Announcement on the formation of new Cabinet of Central Government … for the period 19631965, General Directorate of the Central Presidium, No. P.T./IV/DG- Prespo – URTD/63, Batugadé, 3 April 1963 – as an attachment to Australian Embassy – Djakarta, Memo 1155, 12 July 1963 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 3). 673 A. Mao Klao had previously been noted in March 1961 as the “General Chairman of the Bureau” in the URT-D’s “Second Announcement” document of 10 December 1960 – see footnote 607 and Annex I. In September 1963, the PIDE chefe in Dili reported that A. Mao Klao was “Gaspar Kalau – a descendant of a Portuguese couple in Suai ((southwestern Portuguese Timor)), who had been a secondary school teacher in Toe ((possibly Soe)), NTT”. He “spoke English, Dutch and German” and was “apparently ‘deeply involved’ ” – Fernandes, M.S., 2005, op.cit., p.376 and footnote 66 citing a PIDE Dili report of 3 September 1963. 674 A PIDE Dili report of September 1963 (Fernandes, M.S., 2005, op.cit., p.376) identified T.E. Maly Bere as Tomás Malibere, the brother-in-law of “Silvestre Martins Nai Buti Seço” (see following footnote 681). Silvester/Silvestre Martins’ father - Franciscus Xavier de Martins Naileto (1872-1953), was reportedly a former traditional ruler ie régulo or liurai of Ailelo/Lameia (Hatolia - Ermera) who, because of his “treason to the ((Portuguese)) Flag” fled to Dutch Timor following the Dom Boaventura uprising in 1912. See also footnote 978 for “Curasa Effendi” – alias Mali Bere. 675 “Trouble in Timor”, Foreign Report, The Economist, London, 25 April 1963 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 2).

134 overseas.676 This brief April 1963 URT-D circular (one page) contained no “PanMalay” rhetoric – but concluded by describing the Republic of Timor-Dilly as “one of the Countries in the Pacific”. Islamic phrases in the circular included: “In the name of Allah the Most Beneficent and Merciful”, “May Allah bestow his blessings …”, and “May Allah Accept It ! Amen”. The Antara newsagency in Jakarta reported on 21 June 1963 that the AllMalay Races Union (AMRU – in Bahasa Indonesia: Persatuan Seluruh Bangsa Melaju) had expressed “full support for the formation of an emergency government of the Timor-Dili in its capital of Batugadé. Malay peoples give their support to any action to destroy Portuguese Fascist imperialist rule.”677 The Australian and British Embassies in Jakarta reported that they regularly received circulars from the AMRU which had “extravagant claims of support from 250-million ethnic Malays drawn from Hawaii to Malagassey678 [sic]”, and summarised that the AMRU “is virtually non-existent, and is the creation of one man with a small circle of associates to assist him. This self-styled president of the presidium of the All-Malay Race Union is one Mulwan Shah, an Indonesian of apparent Malay stock, who claims to have lived most of his life in Portuguese Timor. He has explained his presence in Djakarta as pertaining to his role as the ‘official representative of the struggling masses in Portuguese Timor’.”679 The Australian Embassy report also noted that the AMRU had made a number of statements supporting Indonesia’s Confrontation (Konfrontasi) 680 with Malaysia – but “in recent weeks the tenor of the organisation’s comments changed from an anti-Malaysia tone, and have concentrated on Portuguese Timor, the most sensational of which was the statement dated 3rd April 1963 proclaiming the 676

Merdeka, Djakarta, 24 April 1963; and “Struggle for Portuguese Timor Intensifies”, by Marinov in Sovjetskaya Russia (USSR) on 7 May 1963 and New Times (USSR) of 3 April 1963 – and repeated in several Indonesian-language newspapers in Jakarta on 9 May including in Merdeka as “Mao Klao Presiden REP. Persatuan Timor”, p.3 – citing the US and Portugal as being “truly worried”. 677 “All Malay Race Union supports Timor Dilli Union Republic”, Antara News Bulletin, Jakarta, 21 June 1963. The report noted that the AMRU claimed to represent “two-hundred and fifty million people in an area stretching from Hawaii to Madagascar and from Formosa to the Cocos Islands”. 678 The Malagasy people of the island of Madagascar off the African coast are believed to be descendent from a wave of immigration from the islands of Indonesia. The roots of the Malagasy language are Malayo-Polynesian. 679 Australian Embassy – Djakarta, Memo 1155, 12 July 1963 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 3). The Memo noted that the official location of the headquarters of the AMRU was given as “Djalan Pos Utara 4” which was also the address of the Unitary Government of Kalimantan Utara. The Embassy also noted that recent URT-D circulars had been signed by Abdullah Mao Klao and Alexander Salim (Deputy President) and had shown the organization’s Jakarta address as Djalan Paseban 25. An earlier Embassy report in mid-1963 (Savingram 39, I.16741 – NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 3) had noted that the US Embassy believed that the AMRU was “active two years ago in distributing leaflets directed against Portuguese rule in Timor”. The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) advised its Jakarta Embassy that the AMRU had sent a letter to the President of the Maldivian Republic on 17 March 1963 supporting Philippines President Macapagal’s “Confederation of Greater Malaysia” – and noted that, at that time, Mulwan Shah was the AMRU President and its address was Djalan Paseban 25, Djakarta – and that the AMRU’s “new address is the same as the ‘Central Presidium of the Unitary Republic of Tibor [sic]’.” The FCO concluded that despite its “extreme Muslim sentiments” … “We agree however that the organisation ((the AMRU)) need not be taken too seriously.” (FCO, All Malay Union, London, 16 January 1970 – The National Archives – Kew: FWP 1/1 FCO 24/867). 680 Malaysia – an association of Malaya, Singapore and the British Borneo territories, was conceived by Malayan Prime Minister Tengku Abdul Rahman on 27 May 1961. Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio announced a policy of confrontation on 20 January 1963, and President Sukarno declared the Ganyang (Crush) Malaysia campaign on 27 July 1963. Malaysia was formed on 16 September 1963 (less Brunei). Konfrontasi wound down in late 1965 – and formally ended at the Bangkok Conference on 28 May 1966.

135 formation of the Cabinet” of the URT-D – “normally such press statements have been ignored locally but in this case, its substance was sent out by the local A.F.P. representative.” Activity in “Indonesian Timor” - Silvester Martins Nai Buti According to a PIDE report, in May 1963, there was an “infiltration” from Indonesian Timor into the Maliana area by the followers of a former resident of Portuguese Timor, “Silvestre Martins Nai Buti Seço”.681 Nai Buti’s followers, principally former residents of Portuguese Timor - and their descendants, were based in the Atambua area of Indonesian Timor.682 A subsequent PIDE document reported that Silvester Martins Nai Buti, accompanied by several elderly “Lia Na’in” (“counsellors”) visited Jakarta in June 1963 (via Makassar) to “exhort President Sukarno to take Portuguese Timor by force”.683 The group was reportedly accompanied by the Governor of Southern Sulawesi, Andi A. Rivai684 who supported Nai Buti’s proposal. However, Sukarno reportedly rejected this approach, noting that such was not a priority in Indonesia’s foreign policy. According to the son of Silvester Martins Nai Buti – ie Fransiscus Martins Nai Buti, his father met “face-to-face” with President Sukarno and received a “surat KOTI” (“Supreme Operational Command 681

According to PIDE reports, “Silvestre/Sylvester Martins (‘Nai Buti’) Seço” was the son of a former traditional ruler (liurai) of Lameia (Hatolia, Ermera) who, because of his “treason to the ((Portuguese)) Flag” fled to Dutch Timor following the Dom Boaventura uprising in 1912. PIDE assessed that “Nai Buti is an important element as he keeps an informal net of informers in the markets in the border zone of Portuguese Timor” - Fernandes, M.S., 2005, op.cit., pp.376-377 and footnotes 67-71 citing PIDE Dili reports of 7 May and 3 September 1963, 11 August 1964, 12 October and 21 December 1965. Silvester Martins Nai Buti (born 31 December 1914, Tenubot; died 23 May 1991, Tenubot) was the son of Dom Franciscus Xavier de Martins Naileto (born 1872, Aileo; died 18 November 1953, Tenubot) – see footnote 674, who led a significant number of people in 1911-1912 from the reino of Deribate/Diru Hati (Portuguese Timor) to the Atambua area (Tohe, then Tenubot) in Dutch Timor – ie “fugiram para a territorio hollandez”, BOdT, No.16, 16 November 1912, p.261. The foregoing information was provided to the author by Takahashi Shigehito and Nug Katjasungkana following their focused interviews with Nai Buti clan members in Kupang and Atambua in August and September 2008. The exodus of Raja Naileto and the people of “Diru Hati” is also related in Martins Nai Buti, D.S. (et al), Upacara Adat Pelantikan Raja Suku Kemak Diru Hati …, Atambua, 2006, pp.1-2. Aspects of the history of Deribate from 1895-1900 can be found in Davidson, K.G., The Portuguese Colonisation of Timor: The Final Stage, 1850-1912, University of NSW, Sydney, 1994. During WWII, Silvester Martins Nai Buti provided some assistance to the Japanese forces in the Atambua area in “native pacification” and the provision of supporting services such as agriculture and warehousing – email to author from Takahashi Shigehito 28 December 2008 citing a published memoir by Captain Maeda Toru, Paymaster of the Japanese Army’s 48th Reconnaissance Regiment. During the War, the Japanese Otori Kikan intelligence service reportedly attempted to return the reino of Deribate/Diru Hati in Portuguese Timor to the Martins/Nai Buti clan at Tenubot. 682 A report by an Australian Consul noted “2,000 natives” in the vicinity of “Atamboea” who included “descendants of natives who crossed the border after the abortive uprising of 1911-12.” – Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 154/49, 26 August 1949 (NAA: A1838, 378/15/3). Groups from Portuguese Timor – principally of the Kemac and Bunaq ethnic groups near the border, who had been involved in the Japanese-sponsored “colunas negras” groups during WWII also fled to Indonesian Timor when Portuguese authorities re-established their administration in 1945-1946. Silvestre [sic] Nai Buti was reported as the “head” of the Kemac in Indonesian Timor (see PIDE – Dili, Report 394-SC/CI(2), 14 April 1966 – TdT, Lisbon: PIDE/DGS CI(2) NT 4874). The PIDE had operational staff in Dili, Baucau, Balibo and Suai – with their appointments promulgated in the Boletim Oficial de Timor. 683 PIDE - Balibo, “Frontier Report No. 20/63”, 17 July 1963 (TdT, Lisbon: PIDE/DGS, SC-CI(2) DSI2, NT 8972) - also cited in Fernandes, M.S., 2005, p.395. The PIDE report does not mention the URTD. The PIDE had established an office in Balibo in April 1963. 684 Brigadier General Andi A. Rivai/Rifai was the Governor of Sulawesi Selatan in 1960-1966.

136 directive” – KOTI = Komando Operasi Tertinggi) for operations against Portuguese Timor – of “about three pages”.685 Soon after, in 1963, the followers of Silvester Martins Nai Buti commenced training with “Kopassus”686. Following the URT-D announcements in 1963, several PIDE reports in mid1963 confusingly associated - and conflated, the URT-D’s “A. Mao Klao” and “T. E. Malibere” with Silvester Martins Nai Buti and his group – including citing familial connections in the border areas.687 Several PIDE reports relate that an Indonesian Army officer, Lieutenant Prawiro Slamat/Slamet of “KOTI” was involved in providing support to Nai Buti from December 1962 to, at least, mid-1966.688 Nai Buti was often reported in the company of Indonesian military and civilian officials – in July 1964, Nai Buti was reported as having acquired a statue of “Our Lady of Fátima” and to have visited families in Indonesian Timor “door-to-door” to proselytize his cause.689 Silvester Martins Nai Buti was again reportedly in Jakarta in October 1965 – “with a passport valid for three months”, where he was engaged in “anti-Portuguese propaganda”.690 The Question of Indonesian Involvement In January 1963, the Indonesian Deputy First Minister and Armed Forces Chief-of-Staff, General A.H. Nasution, stated in an address to military and civilian officials in Purwokerto (Java) that “around us there are still oppressed peoples; even worse than oppressed peoples - enslaved people; among them in Timor (Portugal), North Kalimantan etc … every struggle of an oppressed people to free itself from oppression will always enjoy our support.”691 In February, the Chairman of the Partai Katolik Indonesia (Indonesian Catholic Party), Dr Francis Xavier Seda, stated he saw no alternative to the early removal of the Portuguese from Eastern Timor - but noted that General Nasution, “who was the principal spokesman for the Government on Timor”, had cautioned him not to make any statement “critical of Portuguese policy

685

Email to author from Takahashi Shigehito, 18 October 2008 – relating his interview with Fransiscus [sic] Martins Nai Buti on 30 August 2008. 686 From 1955, the Indonesian Army’s special forces were titled RPKAD (Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat) – changing to Kopassandha on 17 February 1971 and Kopassus on 26 December 1986. Many Indonesians and Timorese refer to all three as “Komando” or “Kopassus”. 687 PIDE – Dili, Report 9/63-GU, 7 May 1963, p.3; Report 11/63-GU, 4 June 1963, p.2; and PIDE Dili Report, 3 September 1963, p.8 (TdT, Lisbon: PIDE/DGS SC-CI(2)/DSI-2 NT 8972). When queried by the author in Dili on 27 October 2008, M.S.A. Balikh (“Mao Klao”) had no knowledge of Silvester Martins Nai Buti or Indonesian-supported anti-Portuguese operations in the border area in the early 1960s. 688 “KOTI” or “Koti” is “Komando Tertinggi” ie the ABRI High Command. Slamat is mentioned in PIDE – Dili Report 11/63-GU, 4 June 1963, p.2 (TdT, Lisbon: PIDE/DGS SC-CI(2)/DSI-2 NT 8972); PIDE – Dili, Report 394-SC/CI(2), 14 April 1966 (TdT, Lisbon: PIDE/DGS CI(2) NT 4874, pp.59-61); and PIDE – Dili, “Informação” Report of May (?) 1966 (TdT, Lisbon: PIDE/DGS CI(2) NT 4874, p.62). The last PIDE report cited above also referred to the anti-Portuguese activities of Indonesian “Padre Matutino, a teacher at the Dom Bosco school and assistant chaplain to the Indonesian Army at Atambua” – who was a “brother of the Commissioner-General of the Public Security Police in Kupang”. That report also cited the Indonesian Consul in Dili as the “principal fomentor of these intrigues”. 689 PIDE – Dili, Report, 7 July 1964 (TdT, Lisbon: PIDE/DGS SC-CI(2)/DSI-2 NT 8973). 690 PIDE – Dili, Report 10/65 (TdT, Lisbon: PIDE/DGS SC-CI(2)/DSI-2 NT 8973). 691 “Nasution on Oppression around Indonesia”, Antara, Purwokerto, 22 January 1963 (NAA: A4359, 221/5/19) – reported by Australian Embassy – Djakarta, Memo 337, 20 February 1963.

137 for the time being”.692 In May 1963, a high-level Australian intelligence assessment noted: “the Indonesian Catholic Party (ICP) has agreed to work secretly with Nasution for the peaceful removal of the Portuguese from Timor in one to three years. This will involve working on the Roman Catholic population on both sides of the border. One condition is that no other political groups should be allowed to work in the campaign to arouse the Timorese to demand independence. Nasution has cautioned the ICP against critical statements on Portuguese policy for the time being.”693 In early July 1963, several items appeared in the Western press claiming, incorrectly, that martial law had been proclaimed in Dili and referred to the threat of the URT-D eg: “The Indonesian Government-controlled media is publishing manifestos by a representative of socalled [sic] ‘United Republic of Timor’ … No one here doubts the ‘liberation’ movement is directed by Indonesia.”694 In mid-1963, the Australian Department of External Affairs assessed: “we do not have any reason to believe that the Indonesian Government was behind the alleged establishment of ‘United Timor Republic’. Their silence about this movement suggests they had no hand in its creation … similarly we do not the regard the ‘AllMalay Race Union’ as being significantly connected with the Government … at the same time of course we believe that Indonesia, through Army intelligence or other bodies, is proceeding with activities directed at the ultimate overthrow of the Portuguese regime.”695 Soon after, the Australian Embassy in Jakarta reported their view that the Indonesian “Ministry of Foreign Affairs considers this organization ((the URT-D)) as an embarrassment to its official ‘no interference’ policy in Timor, and that it would be more than happy if the Union were to sink into oblivion.”696 According to a Jakarta-based Western security analyst writing in 2003, in mid1963, the Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio authorised the Indonesian Central Intelligence Agency (Badan Pusat Intelijen – BPI) “to initiate a covert project to bring all of Timor under Jakarta’s control. As a first step, a 22-person rebel Timorese cabinet mysteriously appeared in the Indonesian capital during August. A circular, bearing the stamp of the ‘Directorate General of the Central Presidium of the United Republic of Timor’ claimed that it would soon be sending an envoy to the United Nations. In reality, the BPI-inspired rebel cabinet was notional. It contained no actual members.”697

692

Australian Embassy – Djakarta, Record of Conversation, 1 February 1963; Memo 288, 13 February 1963 (NAA: A1838, 3034/2/2/8 Part 1). The Embassy official commented that “the implication was that when the time was ripe, Dr Seda would be asked to make public statements critical of Portuguese policy.” 693 Joint Intelligence Committee (Australia), JIC(AUST)(63)75, “The Future of Portuguese Timor”, Canberra, May 1963, paragraph 22 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 2). The Assessment noted that the source of the information was “probably reliable”. 694 Hughes R. (Singapore), “Timor on Sukarno’s ‘free’ list”, The Daily Mirror, Sydney, 1 July 1963. Hughes referred to the URT-D’s “manifesto” with “a woman as Deputy Prime Minister” ie the URT-D Announcement of 3 April 1963. Hughes’ articles also appeared in The London Sunday Times and The Washington Post of 2 July 1963. 695 Australian Department of External Affairs, Savingram 0.13968, Canberra, 6 July 1963 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 3). 696 Australian Embassy – Jakarta, Memo 1155, 12 July 1963 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 3). 697 Conboy, K., Intel: Inside Indonesia’s Intelligence Service, Equinox Publishing, Jakarta, 2004, pp. 39-40. Conboy also relates that a BPI officer was deployed to West Timor in late 1963, visited Portuguese Timor, and made “low-key attempts at indoctrination” - but was withdrawn soon after. Conboy summarises that “during the BPI era, there had been the brief, inconsequential flirtation with sowing integration seeds” - p.88.

138 In the second half of 1963, the URT-D issued an Announcement that listed the composition of its 25-member Military Council (“Dewan Meliter”) - which it claimed had been formed in Batugadé on 10 June 1963.698 The Military Council was headed by President A. Mao Klao as its General Chairman - with Junior President II Maly Tae as Deputy General Chairman. All other members of the Council had military ranks from Major to Major General – including Brigadier General Mohammed Shaleh Pakkeh [sic]699 as Chief of the General Staff. The Announcement declared the formation of the Armed Forces of the URT-D - with 10 June announced as Armed Forces Day. While the Announcement lacked extensive “Pan-Malay” rhetoric, it described the URT-D as a “Malay country in the Pacific” – and Islamic phrases praising Allah were included. Of interest, the spelling in the Announcement is in Bahasa Melayu (Malay) – not Bahasa Indonesia.700 This suggests a controlling influence by the All-Malay Race Union over the URT-D and a desire to promote “Timor-Dilly” as a discrete Malay/Melanesian entity - ie distinct from Indonesia. This URT-D Announcement was reported by the United Press International newsagency on 1 August 1963 - referring to a “mimeographed circular dropped in editorial mailboxes here this week” and noting “similar circulars … have been circulated regularly in Djakarta for several months.”701 The report continued: “A young man named Wulwan [sic] Shah, who says he is an exile from Timor, haunts the newsrooms of newspapers and agencies here issuing statements on behalf of the ‘All Malay Race Union’. Local officials said privately they are watching his activities but do not take him seriously. ‘We think he is an adventurer’, one top Indonesian Army officer said.” In mid-September 1963, the URT-D’s Minister for Information, Mohd. A.R. Maly, speaking in Bandung (West Java), requested attention and “moreel” [sic] help by Indonesian to the URT-D “as for Kalimantan Utara” (North Borneo) – and also sought recognition for the URT-D.702 Maly claimed the Chief-of-Staff of the URTD’s Military Council - Major General Abubakar Ilemandiry, and others had been 698

Announcement on the Formation of the Military Council, P. II/VI/DG-Prespu-URTD/63, Batugadé, 10 June 1963. This document, in Bahasa, “Pembentukan Dewan Meliter [sic] …” was provided to the author in Dili by Muhammad Saleh Akbar (M.S.A.) Balikh (“Mao Klao”) on 4 December 2004. This document, in English, is also found in Fernandes, M.S., 2005, op.cit., 2005, Annex III, pp. 424-426 and in TdT , Lisbon: PIDE/DGS 1287/63, NT 3292. 699 In an interview with M.S.A. Balikh on 4 December 2004, Balikh stated to the author that he (Balikh) was the listed “Chief of the General Staff - Brigadier General Mohammed Shaleh Pakkeh” and was also “General Chairman - A. Mao Klao”. Brigadier General M.S. Pakkeh was subsequently also listed as the Minister for Education and Universities in the URT “Government” for the period 9 April 1965 – 9 April 1967 and 9 April 1969 – 9 April 1971 – see Fernandes, M.S., op.cit., 2005, Annex II, pp.421-422. However, “M.S. Pakkeh” was subsequently omitted from the Military Council for the period 1972-1975 – see footnotes 814 and 820. In interviews with author, Balikh commented about both being “retired brigadiers”. 700 Prior to August 1972, there were distinct spelling differences between Bahasa Melayu and Bahasa Indonesia. Following a joint study by Indonesia and Malaysia, spelling was unified under the Ejaan Yang Disempurnakan (The Updated and Improved Spelling) – see Prentice, D., “Malay (Indonesian and Malaysian)”, pp. 917-919 in Comrie, B. (ed), The World’s Major Languages, Croom Helm, London, 1987. In this monograph, where possible, URT-D documents are described as Bahasa Melayu or Bahasa Indonesia – with the appropriate notation applied in the Bibliography. Subsequently, a URTD document in December 1972 declared that Bahasa Melayu was the “national language” of the URTD – see footnote 810 and Annex N. 701 United Press International, UPI-209, 1 August 1963 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 2). 702 “Timor Portugis Mulai Bergolak: Pem. Portugis Lebih Kedjam Dari Kolonialis Belanda dan Inggris” (“Upheaval Begins in Portuguese Timor: The Portuguese Government is More Cruel than the Dutch or British Colonialists”), Merdeka, Djakarta, 16 September 1963, p.1 and 10.

139 captured and sentenced to death in Portuguese Timor – others had been imprisoned in underground cells on “Kambing” (ie Ataúro Island).703 Queried by the Merdeka newspaper, the Indonesian Armed Forces spokesman, Captain Jusuf Sirath, responded that ABRI had no knowledge of the URT-D – or of Mohammed Maly and his statements in Bandung.704 In October 1963, in discussion with an Australian Embassy official in Jakarta, the Portuguese Charge d’Affaires expressed his belief that “the Indonesian authorities were unhappy about the Timor/Dili Union Republic and All-Malay Race Union. They did not want a small independent Republic in eastern Indonesia.”705 During 1963, some Portuguese officials suggested a relationship between Dr Pedro José Lobo, the President of the Macau Senate – reportedly a “sino-malaio”(Chinese-Malay), and the URT-D. However in late 1963, the file was closed as “there was no evidence of support for the URT-D from the Timorese Creole elite.”706 Indonesia Acts ? Signs of Indonesian hostility towards Portuguese Timor were evidenced publicly in late 1963. A Surabaya newspaper, the Manifesto, published a front-page map of Timor in its edition of 21 August 1963 showing Portuguese Timor’s Oecussi enclave as Indonesian territory. The accompanying article claimed the URT-D had been established in Batugadé and was engaged in warfare against the Portuguese with primitive weapons – adding that the URT-D was appealing for help from friendly governments.707 On 14 September 1963, a moderate Muslim newspaper in Jakarta, Duta Masyarakat, included an editorial titled “Give Attention to Timor” that called Portuguese Timor “a malignant tumour … sticking to Timor’s body” – and urged that “though we are busy with other activities, it is not right for us to neglect this sore point in the East.”708 In September 1963, the Australian Government reportedly received “what is believed to be a genuine document concerning Indonesian preparations for subverting Portuguese Timor … The document stated that subversion was to continue parallel with the anti-Malaysia campaign in Northern Borneo provided that the two fronts had not to be faced at the same time. It suggested that subversion should be conducted through the Catholic Mission in Portuguese Timor, in which there was some dissatisfaction with the arbitrary actions of the government. The document went on to warn about the danger inherent in the constitutional changes in Portuguese Timor. It suggested also that infiltration might be used through the tribal relationships along the border.” 709 703

Major General Ilemandiry had been included in the URT-D’s announcement of its Military Council (dated 10 June 1963 – see footnote 698) as “the late” ie “deceased”. Mohd A. R. Maly, as a “Brigadier”, was listed as the Council’s Deputy Chief-of-Staff. 704 “S A B Tidah Tidak Tahu Menahu” (S A B Has No Knowledge), Merdeka, Jakarta, 17 September 1963. 705 Australian Embassy – Jakarta, Record of Conversation, 4 October 1963 (NAA: A4359, 221/5/19 Part 2). 706 Fernandes, M. S., 2005, op.cit., pp.405-407. Both “A. Mao Klao” and Dr Lobo were described as “sino-malaio” (Chinese-Malay). For Dr Pedro José Lobo, see also earlier footnotes 449 and 450. “Creole” (“mixed race”) has the same meaning as mestiço/mestizo (Portuguese) or malae oan (Tetum). 707 Australian Embassy – Washington, Savingram 1154 I.24650, 12 September 1963 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 3; 3038/2/1 Part 2). 708 Duta Masyarakat, Djakarta, 14 September 1963. 709 Australian Department of External Affairs, draft brief – “Indonesia and Portuguese Timor”, Canberra, mid-1964 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 3). The quotations cited above are from a final draft of the brief – not from the final document.

140 In mid-October 1963, the Australian Prime Minister wrote a personal letter to the Portuguese Prime Minister, Dr António de Oliveira Salazar, that included: “Your notice will no doubt have been drawn to reports in the Indonesian official news agency in September of a rebel movement in Timor asking Indonesia’s recognition and help. These and other statements seem to me to make clear that if there is what Indonesia regards as an ‘independence’ movement in Portuguese Timor, Indonesia would believe, or at any rate say, that she had an obligation to support it. It therefore seems to me worthy of consideration whether Portugal would not be wise to secure the interest of the United Nations in Portuguese Timor before such an ‘independence’ movement developed rather than after it is claimed to exist.”710 Prime Minister Salazar’s “powerful” reply declared that: “there is no independence movement in Portuguese Timor nor is there the least desire for union with Indonesia, which would only bring disadvantages to a population whose living standard, though modest, is higher than that of their neighbours on the other side of the island.”711 Subsequently, in November 1963, Portugal’s Minister for Foreign Affairs – Alfredo Franco Nogueira, told an Australian diplomat in New York that Portugal regarded Prime Minister Menzies’ “representations as amounting to pressure on Portugal to hand over Portuguese Timor to Indonesia … and everyone knew that Portuguese Timor could never become a viable independent state … there was no question of Portugal’s leaving Portuguese Timor at any time; and that, although Portuguese Timor was economically a liability to Portugal, Portugal would fight to remain in Timor.”712 In March 1964, the Australian Consul in Dili reported that the recently-arrived Indonesian Consul, Dr Roeslan Soeroso, had stated that he (Soeroso) had “established contact with some ‘anti-colonial Timorese elements’ but that he is keeping them at a distance until he has had time to study the situation … he did not want to become involved ‘in anything subversive’ but that he could not remain unaffected by the plight of the Timorese whose conditions he described as appalling.”713 In late May 1964, a group of eight armed Indonesians reportedly travelled from Kisar Island (in Indonesia, about 25 kilometres off the north-east coast of Portuguese Timor) and landed in the Lautém area on the northeast coast 714 - see map 710 Menzies, R.G. Sir (Prime Minister of Australia), Canberra, 15 October 1963 – see Department of External Affairs – Canberra, Cable O.22964, 16 October 1963 (NAA: A1209, 1974/9010). 711 Salazar, A. de Oliveira Dr., (President of the Council of Ministers), Lisbon, 5 March 1964 (NAA: A1209, 1974/9010). Prime Minister Menzies made a manuscript note that Dr Salazar’s letter was “powerful”. 712 Australian Mission to the United Nations – New York, Memo No.1780/63, 12 November 1963 (NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1 Part 3). Subsequently, Foreign Minister Nogueira suggested that “Australia work for a condominium in Timor between herself and Portugal with the object of ultimately taking over the island from Portugal. This Portugal would not mind and would fully understand.” - Australian Mission to the United Nations – New York, Memo No.1932/63, 19 December 1963 (NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1 Part 3). 713 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 5, 7 March 1964 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 3). The Indonesian Consul, Dr Roeslan Soeroso, had taken up his appointment on 8 January 1964. 714 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 111, 5 July 1964 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 3) and Australian Department of External Affairs, internal memo (manuscript) drafted by the former Consul – Dili, Canberra, late August 1964 (NAA: A1828, 3038/2/1 Part 3; 3006/4/3 Part 3). A few weeks later, the Indonesian Consul stated that Indonesian “warships including submarines were now patrolling Ombai

141 on cover. The group were reportedly carrying “subversive literature” and, according to the Portuguese authorities, there was “clear evidence they had been sent to carry out subversive acts.” Their presence was reported to the authorities by local Timorese villagers, and the Indonesians were soon “captured”. The Indonesian Consul, Dr Roeslan Soeroso “had reacted aggressively, charging that the Indonesians had been ill-treated and demanding that they be given into his custody pending repatriation.” The Indonesians were “repatriated as quickly as possible” - “quietly shipped back to Indonesia.” The Australian report of this event also noted: “The new Indonesian Consul is also causing the Portuguese some anxiety … has actively been seeking contact with Timorese suspected of disloyalty. The Governor has recently ordered that he be kept under closer surveillance.”715 In mid-May 1964, the Governor of Portuguese Timor made a request to the Indonesian authorities, through the Indonesian Consul in Dili, for the “return of a rebel leader who had fled to Indonesian Timor.”716 The Indonesian Consul commented to the Australian Consul that there was little likelihood of Jakarta complying with the request. In early July 1964, the Australian Consul reported that there had been “reports of an incident at Batugadé, where a meeting of Timorese from both sides of the border is said to have taken place two or three weeks ago. I have not been able to get any information from Portuguese sources on what transpired, but according to the Indonesian Consul, an independence movement, called Gerakan Timor Merdeka (Timor Independence Movement), was formed. According to other reports, when Portuguese police and troops arrived at the scene, the malcontents retreated over the border into the Indonesian sector.”717 A related intelligence summary by an Australian agency also noted that the Portuguese authorities “have been trying to keep secret” an Indonesian landing in Lautém “at the end of May” – as well as “a meeting in June between Timorese from both sides of the border, at which, according to the Indonesian Consul in Dili, a Free Timor movement was formed.”718 An Australian national intelligence report in July 1964 had noted: “12. Over the past two years, there have been indications (including visits to the area by the Armed Forces Director of Intelligence and other senior army officers) of covert Indonesian preparation for border infiltration, the encouragement of border incidents, and the development of a rebel government organization. It can be expected that the timing of the proclamation of such a government’s “struggle for independence” would be controlled by Indonesia. Indonesia would probably consider that the AfroAsian bloc would feel obliged to support such an indigenous dissident movement against the Portuguese, and would applaud any assistance Indonesia might give to the rebels. … Straits regularly to prevent escape to Portuguese Timor of rebels in the Celebes.” – Australian Consulate – Dili, Cable 36, 11 August 1964 (NAA: A1838, TS696/2/3 Part 1). A PIDE report of April 1966 summarising “The Situation in the Province of Timor” refers to infiltration into the “Los Palos” area in November 1963 by “indonésios” from Kisar – but does not mention the above May 1964 incident (PIDE – Dili, Report 394-SC/CI(2), 14 April 1966 – TdT, Lisbon: PIDE/DGS CI(2) NT 4874). 715 Ibid, ie manuscript memo by the former Australian Consul - Dili, Canberra, late August 1964. 716 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 93, 26 May 1964 (NAA: A4359, 221/5/19 Part 2). It is unclear whether this un-named “rebel leader” had been associated with the 1959 Viqueque Rebellion. It is more likely that it may be a reference to Silvester Martins Nai Buti (Seço) – see footnotes 674 and 681. 717 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 111, 5 July 1964 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 3). 718 Current Intelligence Report (CIR) 29, Canberra, 15 July 1964 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 3). This Report was based on Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 111, 5 July 1964 (footnote 717 above).

142 15. The Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI - Partai Komunis Indonesia) has been operating in Indonesian Timor for several years, and in 1960 it was reported that support for it had increased as a result of local dissatisfaction with the deteriorating economic situation. In 1962 it was reported that the PKI was carrying out regular infiltrations into Portuguese Timor in order to create centres of popular support for an Indonesian take-over of the territory. The PKI’s position was said to be strongest in the Ocussi [sic] Enclave. There is no doubt that should the Indonesian Government decide to attempt to acquire Portuguese Timor, the PKI would offer its support in the form of propaganda and practical aid from its organization in Indonesian Timor, but it is expected that any covert operations would initially be controlled by the Armed Forces Intelligence Staff (DINSAB) and later by the army.” 719 A few months later in November 1964, the Australian Minister of External Affairs – then visiting Washington, was advised by his senior officials in Canberra that “there is evidence to suggest that Indonesia may be intending to take some form of action against Portuguese Timor in the near future … may be intending covert operations the framework for which has already been established … the political environment has changed markedly since 1963.”720 Perhaps related to the above nonspecific “evidence”, in December 1964 the Indonesian military’s Frogman Unit Headquarters (Kopaska - Komando Pasukan Katak) in Surabaya reportedly received a “secret assignment” from the ABRI High Command to conduct covert operations into Portuguese Timor. A Kopaska team was established in Atambua and, using the “cover” of “pedagang kuda” (horse traders), reportedly operated into Portuguese Timor for five months “to provoke the masses to rise up against the Portuguese.”721 In early 1965, the Australian Consul in Dili received information that two or three Chinese communists in Indonesian Timor were acting as advisers in villages near the border – and, at a meeting in Atambua, the people were told that “Indonesia did not intending attacking Portuguese Timor, but that Indonesia, and they the

719

Joint Intelligence Committee (Australia), JIC(AUST) (64)75, “The Outlook for Portuguese Timor”, Canberra, July 1964. p.4, paras 12 and 15 – the following para 16 has been “expunged” (NAA: A1209, 1974/9010). Reports by PIDE - Dili in the early-mid 1960s often cited activity in the border area by PKI agents eg “Attempt by the Indonesian Communist Party to Annex Timor”, 10 January 1963; and “Immediate Preparations for the Liberation of Portuguese Timor”, 1963 – “by infiltration, acts of terrorism … almost all will be done by MOBRIG” ie Mobile Brigade (TdT, Lisbon: PIDE/DGS, SCCI(2) DSI-2, NT 8972). 720 Australian Department of External Affairs, Savingram 292, Canberra, 24 November 1964 (NAA: A1838, 696/5 Part 2 and 3038/10/1 Part 3) – the “evidence” was highly classified - ie its detail could not be included in a Secret-level briefing to the Acting Minister on 18 November, but added as a discrete attachment. A few months later in February 1965, Jakarta downgraded its diplomatic relations with Lisbon. A supporting brief, “Possible Indonesian Action Against Portuguese Timor”, 11 November 1964 – added that “in formal and informal communication to that ((ie Portuguese)) Government over the past few years, we have made it reasonably clear that Portugal cannot rely on us to defend her position in Timor. The British have also told Portugal that British support would not be forthcoming, and the Portuguese Government is unlikely to expect assistance from the United States of America.” (NAA: A1838: 3038/10/1 Part 3). 721 Faisal, M. Lieutenant Colonel (TNI Navy), “Refleksi 45 Tahuh Kopaska”, Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) website, 3 April 2007; and confidential email to the author, Jakarta, 8 April 2007. The Kopaska team was reportedly led by Second Sergeant Suwarno and Seaman Sutas – a Kopaska team is usually about nine men. The activities of this reported Kopaska group are not definitively reflected in any other reporting sighted by the author ie relating to late 1964 or in 1965 (but see footnote 727).

143 Indonesian Timorese, must give all encouragement and possible support to any Timorese national uprising in the Portuguese controlled area of Timor.”722 In early February 1965, Indonesia broke off diplomatic relations with Portugal – withdrawing their ambassador from Lisbon but both sides retaining their respective consular relations. The Australian Department of External Affairs noted that this was: “solely as a result of the resolution adopted at the Cairo Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries last October, which called on all participants to sever relations with Portugal. … Negotiations seem to have gone on without much rancour, and the Indonesian attitude suggests that they have no present intention of using the breach as a pretext for confronting the Portuguese in Timor. Presumably they want to retain their Consulate in Dili (which is abnormally large) for intelligence purposes, though it has of course also genuine consular and trade functions to perform. Latest reports from our Consulate in Dili say that the Indonesians there are not making contacts which could have subversive implications. In any case, the Portuguese secret police (P.I.D.E.) keep a close watch on them.”723 In the preceding few years to the mid-1960s, Indonesia appears to have had little real or immediate interest in materially supporting the overthrow of the regime in Portuguese Timor. Successively, Indonesia’s focus had been the transfer of West Irian to Indonesian sovereignty and Indonesia’s Confrontation with Malaysia.724 In early 1965, an Australian national intelligence assessment had concluded: “The Indonesian Government is unlikely to pay serious attention to Portuguese Timor until a Malaysian settlement is reached or unless another diversion is needed in the event of confrontation of Malaysia starting to fail. However, the regime might assess that by acting against the Portuguese, it would stimulate African enthusiasm for Indonesia’s cause against Malaysia, as well as bolstering its internal position through an easy and popular victory. It will attempt to inspire and support any dissident movements in Portuguese Timor, and will probably prefer covert support for an insurgent movement to overt attack.”725 In late April 1965, United States officials reportedly warned Portuguese authorities in Lisbon that “the Indonesians are training special troops for action in Timor at a base near Djakarta. Sukarno is said to have decided on a cheap military

722

Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 30/65, 6 February 1965 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 3). Australian Department of External Affairs, Draft Brief for the Minister, 26 January 1965 (A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 3). The Indonesian Consulate staff in Dili comprised: Consul, Vice-Consul, Chancellor, Secretary (male), Consular Clerk (wife of the Secretary) – “No locally engaged clerical staff are now employed.” : Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 6/65, 4 January 1965 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 3). 724 Malaysia’s Permanent Secretary for External Affairs, Ghazali Shafie, complained that while Indonesia had “attacked Portuguese colonialism in Africa” (presumably at the Cairo Conference), Indonesia had done nothing “to arouse the conscience of the world against the perpetuation of Portuguese colonialism in the heart of the Indonesian islands” – yet, while opposed to Malaysia, remained “silent on Timor, the stronghold of medieval colonialism in what is the Angola of SEA.” – Australian High Commission – Kuala Lumpur, Memo 1738, 27 November 1964 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 3). 725 Joint Intelligence Committee (Australia), “Outlook for Indonesia”, JIC(AUST)(65)43, Canberra, March 1965, paragraph 42. The last sentence of that paragraph is expunged (NAA: A1838, 3034/2/1 Part 48; A1945, 248/9/2). 723

144 victory in view of the lack of military success in confrontation.”726 At about the same time, Australian officials in Canberra appeared aware of a “Bali-trained group” and an element in eastern Indonesian Timor at Atambua which had been prepared for action against Portuguese Timor.727 In late 1965, the Australian Consulate in Dili reported that “the native chief of a large tribe east of Atambua ((ie in Indonesian Timor)) close to the Portuguese Timor border has twice been called to Djakarta for consultations” and that the Indonesian Consulate in Dili “collects their safe-hand mail from a courier at the enclave of Oecusse”.728 The Australian Consul’s report also related Portuguese concern at “increased movement of Indonesians from Kisar Island to the Lautém area of eastern Portuguese Timor and from other islands to Ataúro.” The detail of these events related above may be the subject of several other Australian reports – the detail of which is still classified and yet to be released, that cover Indonesian clandestine operations against Portuguese Timor during the period of Indonesia’s Confrontation with Malaysia (1963-1965).729 A brief for the Australian Prime Minister in 1974 noted: “During Confrontation, the Indonesians made halfhearted efforts at subversion in Portuguese Timor but, at that time, and subsequently, they have made it clear that they make no legal claim to the territory.”730 Also, a report on “Indonesia: Clandestine Operations in Portuguese Timor”731 prepared by the Australian Embassy in Jakarta notes that Harry Tjan Silalahi, the Director of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta732, “mentioned that 726

Australian High Commission in Malaysia – Singapore Office, Memo 534, Singapore, 1 May 1965 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 3). Soon after, at the ANZUS Council Meeting in Washington in late June 1965, Australian Minister of External Affairs Paul Hasluck stated “none of us would go to war should Sukarno walk into Portuguese Timor.” US Secretary of State Dean Rusk added: “The U.S. is not looking for business in that direction.” – Summary Record of Discussions – 28 June 1965, p.7 (NAA: A1838, TS270/2/14/1 Part 1). The principal topic of discussion was the Vietnam War. 727 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 66/65, 8 April 1965: manuscript notes by External Affairs Canberra staff (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 3). These “groups” appear to have been Indonesian regular troops. The Atambua group may have included Kopaska – see footnote 721. 728 Australian Consulate – Dili, Cablegram 85 I.43055, 29 September 1965 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 4, p.293). This activity may have been connected with earlier reported Indonesian attempts at clandestine involvement in Portuguese Timor beginning in late 1963 – see footnotes 707-709 inclusive. For suggestions of Indonesian covert operations against Portuguese Timor in 1962, see footnotes 651658 inclusive. It is probable that the “native chief of a large tribe east of Atambua” who had been “called” to Djakarta might be a reference to Silvester Martins Nai Buti of Tenubot (Atambua, West Timor) - although his tribe had moved from Deribate in Portuguese Timor to the Atambua area in about mid-1912 (see footnotes 674 and 681). Silvester Martins reportedly visited Jakarta in June 1963 accompanied by ABRI Brigadier General Andi Rivai (footnotes 683-684 inclusive). 729 As noted earlier, while the Australian Department of External/Foreign Affairs files are a very useful source of information, many folios have been removed as “exempted”, “in confidence”, and/or classified as “intelligence information” – the release of which would risk “damage to the security of the Commonwealth”. Similarly, occasionally passages within some reports on files have been “expunged”. 730 Way, W. (ed), Australia and the Indonesian Incorporation of Portuguese Timor 1974-1976, Carlton South, 2000 - see “Prime Minister’s Visit to Indonesia”, 2 September 1974, p.91. 731 Australian Embassy – Jakarta, “Indonesia: Clandestine Operation in Portuguese Timor”, 3 July 1974. The file copy includes a manuscript marginal note: “1964/65 files – the confrontation operation was not a great success” (NAA: A11443, 1). 732 Harry Tjan Silalahi was a member of the “Palace Group” and worked closely with Bakin (Badan Ko-ordinasi Intelijen Negara - State Intelligence Co-ordination Agency) and Opsus (Special Operations) on planning for the incorporation of Portuguese Timor. CSIS was founded in 1971 by Major General Ali Moertopo (footnotes 872, 874 and 912) and Soedjono Hoemardani of President Soeharto’s personal staff. CSIS is also discussed in Ball, D. and McDonald. H., Death in Balibo …, op.cit., 2000, pp.65-71. In September 1974, Tjan reportedly submitted a “Grand Design” for Portuguese Timor to President Soeharto: Australian Embassy – Jakarta, Cable JA5137, 1 October 1974 (NAA: A1838, 935/17/3 Part 2). Tjan had earlier been a source of information for the Embassy in

145 Indonesia had a clandestine operation of some sort going in Portuguese Timor during Confrontation.” Encouragement by the USSR Cold War politics were also evidenced in propaganda pressure by the Soviet Union in early 1964 with a series of radio broadcasts encouraging Indonesian action against Portuguese Timor - citing that: “the nest of colonialism in Timor is becoming more and more dangerous because the island, being strengthened by the NATO countries, is located near important points in Indonesia … The Soviet people hope that their Indonesian friends complete their struggle to eradicate the vestiges of colonialism as soon as possible.”733 The USSR’s urgings were also reported in the Australian media eg “Reds Urge Indo - Grab Control of Timor”.734 The People’s Republic of China was less overtly critical of Indonesia’s failure to oppose Portuguese colonialism in Timor. Interestingly, it has been suggested that: “East Timor was never a serious target of Sukarno during the controversies around West Irian and Malaysia. One theory is that Sukarno was trying to get better relations with China, and a move against Portuguese Timor in the name of fighting colonialism would have embarrassed China, which was tolerating the continued presence of Hong Kong and Macau.”735 Appeals to the United Nations On 9 December 1964, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the URT-D forwarded a letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations on the occasion of the UN General Assembly’s 19th Session. The letter explained that the “Union Timor Republic had been declared by the leaders of the Timor people on 9 April 1961 in Batugadé (State Capital) … under the leadership of President A. Malklao [sic]” and called upon the Secretary General “and all Revolutionary Countries to give concrete

1965-66 and also during the “Malari Affair” of mid-January 1974 – and, according to an Australian Embassy official, was “our most valued contact” - Arriens, J., 6 February 1974 (NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1 Part 5, pp.52-53.). Harry Tjan visited Australia in August 1974 – for his discussions “as a private citizen” with the Department of Foreign Affairs, see NAA: A1838, 696/5 Part 3. Tjan was “warned” of the “repercussions on Australian and international opinion of a crude Indonesian campaign in Portuguese Timor aimed at incorporation of the province by stealth.” For background on CSIS, Harry Tjan Silalahi (born Tjan Tjoen Hok, 11 February 1934), and Lim/Liem Bian Kie (Yusuf Wanandi, born West Sumatra 15 November 1937 – General Ali Moertopo’s private secretary) see Monk, P.M., “Secret Intelligence and Escape Clauses – Australia and the Indonesian Annexation of East Timor 1963-76”, Critical Asian Studies, 33, Issue 2, Routledge, Cedar – Michigan, June 2001, pp.181-208; and also footnote 952. For a contemporary summary of the assessed bona fides, access of - and implications of the reporting by, Tjan and Bian Kie, see Australian Embassy – Jakarta, Letter, 21 July 1975 and Canberra - Minute, 31 July 1975 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 5, Part 6 – also in Way, W. (ed), 2000, op.cit., pp.294-295 and 296-297). 733 Radio Moscow, Commentary in Bahasa Indonesia, 25 April 1964 – and an earlier broadcast of 14 September 1962 (“Timor is Thirsty for Independence”). See footnote 157 for earlier Indonesian suspicions of possible NATO utilisation or exploitation of Portuguese Timor. 734 “Reds Urge Indo - Grab Control of Timor – Radio Hate”, The Sun, Sydney, 24 July 1964. The following year, Harian Rakyat - a Jakarta daily, in an item “Looking at our Brothers under Portuguese Oppression” (23 September 1965), warned that “the territory of Timor might be used by NATO and SEATO for construction of a military base”. 735 The Sukarno years: 1950-1965, Sejarah Indonesia – An Online Timeline of Indonesian History: 1962, http://www.gimonca.com/sejarah/sejarah09.shtml

146 support towards the freedom struggle of the Timor people.”736 Signed by the URT-D Minister of Foreign Affairs - “Brig. General Inf. Abbay R. Malay”, there were no Islamic phrases evident in the letter. Upon receipt, at the suggestion of the Australian Mission to the United Nations, the United Nations Sub-Committee on Petitions (of the Committee of Twenty-Four) decided to “hold over” consideration of the letter until the Sub-Committee’s next meeting – pending “more information on the people involved and on Batugade.”737 On 28 April 1965, the Sub-Committee on Petitions decided to take no action on the URT-D petition. Its Chairman stated that, despite the efforts of the Secretariat, it had not been possible “to unearth the Timor Republic.”738 In December 1964, the URT-D disseminated a circular, “Peace on Earth & Happy New Year, 1965”, to foreign diplomatic missions in Jakarta.739 The document, in Bahasa Melayu and signed by the President of the Central Presidium, A. Mao Klao, noted that “the United Republic of Timor is a Melanesian Malay State in the Pacific that belongs to the Oceanian family” and hoped for cooperation “especially with Pacific countries because Timor is one of them.” There were no Islamic phrases in the circular. Although ostensibly signed in Batugadé, the circular’s letterhead showed the URT-D’s Jakarta address as “C/o J.B. Assa, Djalan Paseban 6 pav.” The Australian Embassy in Jakarta commented that the circular’s envelope was “postmarked Djakarta with an Indonesian stamp” and “the Indonesian press occasionally carries articles referring to the ‘Government’, but we have not noticed any for some time.”740 The “Declaration of Independence” On 9 April 1965, the Australian Embassy in Jakarta – and several other embassies in the city, received three URT-D documents741: • •

736

“The Declaration of Independence” dated 9 April 1961 – in English (See Annex J);742 “The Formations of the Reshuffle of the first period (9 April 1961 – 9 April 1969) of the Central Presidium” dated 7 August 1964;743 and

URT-D, Communication 683 ((?)), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Union of Timor Republic, Batugade, 9 December 1964. 737 Australian Mission to the United Nations, Memo 452/65, New York, 9 April 1965 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 3). 738 Australian Department of External Affairs, Memo, Canberra, 11 May 1965 (NAA A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 3). 739 Damai Di Bumi – Selamat Natal & Tahun Baru 1 January 1965, Batugadé, 19 December 1964. The circular - in Bahasa Melayu (with an English translation by the Australian Embassy – Jakarta), commented: “In 1959/60 there are 500 Timor patriots massacred by the Portuguese imperialists. Hundreds of Timor patriots are still in gaol and many of them are kept in underground cells”. 740 Australian Embassy – Jakarta, Memo 101, 14 January 1965 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 3). 741 Despatched to Canberra under cover of Australian Embassy – Jakarta, Memo 441, 15 April 1965 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 3). 742 The copy of the Declaration of Independence - in English (see Annex J), received at the Australian Embassy in Jakarta on 9 April 1965, did not include any URT-D reference or serial numbers, but included a stamp in the form of a “cogged wheel” (see above) with the wording (in Bahasa) “Kementerian Luar Negeri – Uni Republic Timor” (Foreign Ministry of the Union of the Republic of Timor) – and one large star and eight small stars in the centre portion . This Declaration may have been produced in late 1964 – ie not 1961, and “back-dated” to 1961 – see the subsequent discussion section of this monograph. Portugal’s security police (PIDE) first acquired a copy of the Declaration “in the mid-1960s forwarded by the Portuguese Consulate in Jakarta” - Fernandes, M. S.., 2003, op.cit., p.3 footnote 11; Fernandes, M.S., 2005, op.cit., p.370 - footnote 49; and Fernandes, M.S. - email to author dated 14 May 2006.

147 •

“Announcement on the Reshuffle of the Cabinet” dated 2 November 1964.744

The Declaration of Independence (see Annex J), signed at Batugadé by A. Mao Klao as Acting President of the Central Presidium, included the stamp of URT-D’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Kementerian Luar Negeri – Uni Republic Timor). The Declaration cited “revolts commencing the end of the Year 1959”,“the struggle/propaganda of Timor Lovers (Dilly)”, and the “forming of the Bureau of Liberation on November 2, 1960”. It announced the formation of the Union of the Republic of Timor-Dilly and declared Timor’s independence at 9.00 a.m. on 9 April 1961 – “with the capital in PRASZA (DILLY) and … the revolution capital is in BATUGADE”. The Declaration stated that the founding ceremony in Batugadé was attended by nine members of the First Central Presidium. Unlike the URT-D’s documents reviewed previously in this work, the Declaration had a strong Pan-Malay orientation – with Timor as a “socialistic structure being guided by Allah’s Holy Book as a continually ricing [sic]745 the history of Malacca under guidance of Maromak Oan in the Golden Age of ancient Confederate Timor … We struggle for the Greater Malay Confederation.” The Declaration also called for armed struggle – “by force at the point of a weapon” and contained the first noted reference to “Prasza (Dilly)”746 and “Maromak Oan”.747 The geographic range of the URT-D’s interests was evidenced in the passage: “As Malay’s race and country which is sitting in the Malay’s Melanesian Archipelagoes, we struggle for the greatly [sic] Malay Confederation.” The Declaration included three Islamic phrases praising Allah – additional to the above noted reference to “Allah’s Holy Book”.748 743

The Formations, No 013A/VIII/Prespu - URT/64, Batugade, 7 August 1964 – in English. The “Reshuffle” aspect of this document is not clear as it declares membership of the Central Presidium for the “inception” period in 1961 through to 1969 - ie it is unclear who were “new”appointees in August 1964. 744 Announcement, No 016/XI/Prespu – URT/64, Batugade, 2 November 1964 – in English. 745 Subsequently, in December 1972, the Australian Embassy received a copy of the Declaration of Independence in Bahasa Melayu ie Pernyataan Kemerdekaan (footnote 811 and Annex O), that used the word “bangkitnya” which translates as “rising” ie not “ricing” as appears in the English language text. 746 “Prasza (Dilly)” is apparently a reference to Praça (Portuguese: “town square” or “town”), a term used for the town of Dili eg as in the term: Tetum-Praça (“Dili Tetum”). 747 Regarding “Maromak Oan” – the article, “Regnal Chronologies” relates that before Europeans arrived in Timor, “there were numerous petty kingdoms - about 15-20 in West Timor, 50 in East Timor. There was a ritual structure with a high sacral lord in the center of the island (Belu) called Maromak Oan ("child of God"). Under him were three temporal lords, namely Sonbai in the west, Wehale in the center, and Likusaen (Liquiça) in the east” – see Regnal Chronologies at http://elloneloire.net/obsidian/seasiaisl.html#Netherlands%20East%20Indies . “The history of Malacca” is a reference to the Melaku (Malacca) Sultanate that ruled over the Malay Peninsula and Sumatra in the period 1409-1511 ie following the decline of the Indonesian Majapahit empire. 748 As noted above, a Bahasa Melayu version of the Declaration (as Pernyataan Kemerdekaan) appeared subsequently in December 1972 – see footnote 811 and Annex O. A purported photograph of the Declaration - in Bahasa Indonesia as a “short” “Proklamasi”, appeared in the Timor Post newspaper of 25 November 2004 (footnote 982) and in TIME Timor magazine in November 2007 (footnote 987 and Annex X). A slightly different “short” Proklamasi text was provided to the author by M.S.A. Balikh in August 2006 (Annex V). However, both the 2004/2007 and 2006 Proklamasi texts

148 The second document, “The Formations”, announced the membership of the Central Presidium of the URT-D from the URT-D’s founding in April 1961 through to April 1969. A. Mao Klao was named as President of the Central Presidium, S. Seran and T.E. Maly Bere as Acting Vice Presidents – and a further six members of the Presidium were also named. Almost all the names appeared Timorese – A. (ie Abdullah) Mao Klao was the only obviously Islamic/Muslim member of the Central Presidium. “The Formations” document included Islamic phrases praising Allah in its superscription and subscription - and was signed by A. Mao Klao at “Batugade on 7 August 1964”. The third document - the “Announcement”, listed 22 members of the URT-D Cabinet led by Prime Minister Brigadier Boly Mao – with three Vice Prime Ministers: I - Madame Immany, II – Brigadier General Leto Mao, III – Brigadier General Bara Mao. The names of the Cabinet members were both Timorese and Islamic (about 30 percent)749 and, as in the Declaration of Independence, the Announcement included reference to the “struggle to continue the ideal of Maromak Oan with the triumph of Malacca in Timor under guidance of President A. Mao Klao.” At paragraph V, it included “The Union of the Republic of Timor is the Malay’s Melanesian countries which has ethnological, geographical and geopolitical position is included in the Pacific countries, no South East Asia.” The Announcement was signed by Acting Vice President II, T.E. Maly Bere at “Batugade on 2 November 1964”. The URT-D Constitution In May 1965, the Central Presidium of the URT-D produced a Constitution – see Annex K.750 The Constitution declared the “craving” of the URT-D and the Timorese people for “a full independence” and asserted “their resolute standpoint against imperialism, colonialism, neo-imperialism and neo-colonialism of any kind and of any race, whether it is of the white, colored or the yellow-skinned people.” The document also noted that “foreigners have no right to obstruct and slow off the success of the liberation struggle, namely the full independence of Timor”, and that “she ((Timor)) is never prone to be annexed by any neighbouring country.” As in earlier statements, the Constitution declared the URT-D “as a Malay country belonging to the Malay-Melanesian group of islands … requiring a mutual help with with all neighbouring countries, especially with the 250 million Malayans living in the area as far as from Hawaii to Malagasy … the Union of Timor Republic supports resolutely the idea of All Malay Race Union, and will put herself as its first member.”

are far shorter than the English text cited above ie Annex J - or the Bahasa Melayu text provided in December 1972 (footnote 811 and Annex O). Consequently, the provenance of the 2004/2007 and 2006 “short” Proklamasi versions is quite suspect (see the concluding discussion section of this monograph and Annexes V and X). 749 This is probably the 22-member Cabinet referred to by Conboy, K. – see footnote 697. One name on the lists, Inche Mohamad Qosen Al Haj, the “Deputy Minister of Malay’s Countries Relations”, includes a Malay-language title ie “Inche” – first noted in the URT-D Cabinet announced in early April 1963. 750 Fernandes, M.S., 2005, op.cit., pp. 385-386 and footnote 92 – the text of the Constitution, in English and dated 4 May 1965, is included at pp. 428-429 (Anexo V) – as provided to Lisbon by the Portuguese Consulate in Jakarta on 18 September 1965. See footnote 922 for a subsequent URT-D “East Timor” Constitution (Undang Undang Dasar – Uni Republik Timor Timur) produced by M.S.A. Balikh in July 1975.

149 1965 – Sukarno Declares Support; New Order Disinterest On 30 April 1965, the United Press International (UPI) agency reported from Jakarta that “The rebel ‘Union Timor Republic’ is just one of the many rebel groups in Djakarta. They maintain offices and a public relations staff here support [sic] by the Indonesian Government … The ‘Union of Timor Republic’ set up offices here in July of 1963 and occasionally sends mimeographed circulars around to foreign Embassies and news agencies seeking support.”751 In a memorandum to Canberra, the Australian Embassy in Jakarta commented: “We have no evidence that it is ‘supported by the Indonesian Government’ but would not be surprised if it were, as the Indonesians are following a policy of cultivating and providing financial and material support for a number of Malayan dissident groups (eg. KEMAM). Support for the ‘Union of the Republic of Timor’ would be in keeping with this policy of helping expatriate nationalists.”752 In May 1965, the URT-D disseminated a circular announcing the composition of its “Council” for the “third period”: 9 April 1965 to 9 April 1967.753 The 25member Council was led by Prime Minister Brigadier General A.H. Bere with Madame Immany as the First Deputy Prime Minister – about one third of the names were Islamic. The circular continued the broad Pan-Malay theme ie “the ideals of Maromak Oan to return to the golden age of Malacca in Timor … our revolution is a revolution carried out by youths and young women of Malay Melanesia, in tune with the rhythm [sic] of the unique Pacific Ocean, in harmony with the tropical clime of Oceania, and entirely different from the south-east Asian world.” This document also expressed an independent stance - eg “we want to receive material assistance from all countries …”, but “we will continue to struggle, although not helped by any other country, because we are not puppets. And for this reason, it is not foreign or neighbouring countries who have the right to say when we must begin to rise up and fight.” In reporting this circular, the Australian Embassy in Jakarta noted that “the pronouncements … continue to fail to attract press treatment or any official support here.”754 In commenting on the circular, a staff officer of the Australian Department of External Affairs in Canberra (who had formerly served as the Consul in Dili) noted that the current (1965) Indonesian Consul in Dili had indicated in 1964 that “the Indonesians had little enthusiasm for the movement because they doubted whether a Moslem movement could attract support among the Timorese Christians who were after all the elite of the Portuguese province. The Moslems might also antagonise the predominantly Christian peoples of Indonesian Timor and neighbouring islands … the language of the declaration is certainly Islamic.”755 In early July 1965, the Australian Consul in Dili visited Batugadé - “where the Central Presidium of the United Republic of Timor are supposed to have their emergency headquarters.”756 The Consul reported that “the village of Batugade has 751

United Press International (UPI), GT626P, Jakarta, 30 April 1965 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 3). Australian Embassy – Jakarta, Memo 553, 14 May 1965 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 3). For PanMalay movements, including the KMM, see footnotes 77 and 605. 753 Announcement, 051/IV/Central Presidium-URT/65, Batugade, 9 April 1965. 754 Australian Embassy – Jakarta, Memo 655, 2 June 1965 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 4). This memorandum also related that the US Embassy in Jakarta had received a letter addressed to their Ambassador seeking support for the URT-D. The US Embassy reportedly did not propose to acknowledge or take action on the URT-D letter. 755 Dunn, J., Memo – “Portuguese Timor”, Australian Department of External Affairs, Canberra, 10 June 1965 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 4). 756 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 98/65, 12 July 1965 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 4). 752

150 virtually been abandoned by the Portuguese who have encouraged the Timorese to move inland away from the border area. Many small holdings are returning to their natural state, most of the village huts are empty and falling down, the church is no longer used, markets are not permitted and the few inhabitants that remain are under the surveillance of the second line Portuguese troops stationed in the old fort … under the circumstances I do not think that the Emergency Headquarters of the Republic of United Timor are actively operating at Batugade, except by name.” In mid-December 1965, an article in The New York Times – “Portuguese in Timor Are Wary of Jakarta Moves”, noted “occasional manifestos … in the mail of foreign consuls … signed by Mohammed Abray Rewan Maly” - but “in Batugade, a little seaside fishing village, none of the simple villagers had the vaguest notion of what the Republic of Timor was or had any knowledge of its leader.”757 In mid-August 1965, a Ministerial briefing prepared by the Australian Department of External Affairs noted: “Indonesia has established a framework within which to engage in covert operations against Portuguese Timor … not consider that active Indonesian operations, covert or overt, are immediately in prospect unless a significant uprising in Portuguese Timor should occur.”758 At about this time, during his annual Indonesian Independence Day speech in Jakarta on 17 August 1965, entitled “Reach to the Stars – A Year of Self-Reliance”, President Sukarno referred to Portuguese Timor – stating that Indonesia “continues actively to support the independence struggles of the peoples of …. Portuguese Timor” (The countries listed together with Portuguese Timor in this passage included the Portuguese African territories, North Kalimantan, South Arabia, and the Southern African area). The Australian Department of External Affairs commented: “This is the first occasion, as far as we know, on which President Sukarno himself has publicly spoken of Timor in this way. Information currently available does not, however, indicate any acceleration in the tempo of Indonesian activities against Portuguese Timor.”759 A few weeks later on 8 September 1965, the URT-D issued a statement entitled “Resolutions” welcoming President Sukarno’s speech – and claiming that the speech by President “Bung Karno” – as “active support”, had been applauded by the URT-D leadership holding meetings in Batugade in the period 1-7 September.760 The statement was signed by Brigadier General Mohammed Abbay Rewan Maly as Vice Chief-of-Staff of the Military Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs. The “Resolutions” document congratulated the upcoming “Second African-Asian 757

Durdin, T., “Portuguese in Timor Are Wary of Jakarta Moves”, The New York Times, New York, 12 December 1965. 758 Australian Department of External Affairs, “Indonesian Intentions – PPQ Portuguese Timor”, Canberra, 17 August 1965 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 4). 759 Australian Department of External Affairs, Brief for the Minister – “Portuguese Timor”, Canberra, 11 October 1965 (NAA: A1838, 248/9/2; 3006/4/3 Part 3). Reference to Portuguese Timor however was only a very minor element of President Sukarno’s speech – see Australian Department of External Affairs, Savingram AP 103 0.26504, Canberra, 26 August 1965 (NAA: A1838, 49/2/1/1 Part 1). 760 Resolutions, 00402/MFA/URT/65, Batugade, 8 September 1965 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 4). For comment, see also Fernandes, M. S., 2003, op.cit., p.8 and footnote 23. Note however that the URT-D “Resolutions” paper claims the “Central Presidium, Government, Military Council, and Bureau of Liberation” held its meetings in Batugade in this period. The Australian Consul again visited Batugadé in September 1966 (see also footnote 769) and commented that the population did “not exceed 100, including a platoon of Second Line Timorese Infantry … You will remember that this place is said to be the centre of the ‘Independence for Timor Movement’ – the organization could not have chosen a less suitable spot.” – Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 192, 23 September 1966 (NAA: A1838, 3038/1/1 Part 1).

151 Conference” to be held in Algiers in November 1965 and called for support from participating nations. The “International Conference for the Liquidation of Foreign Military Bases (KIAPMA)” - scheduled for Jakarta in October 1965, was also praised, and the Resolution noted the URT-D’s intention to send delegates to both the AfricanAsian Conference and KIAPMA. The document also noted that Independence for Timor had been declared by the URT-D on 9 April 1961 with the capital as “Prazhsa (Dilly)” – and claimed that, because of Portuguese oppression, “the People of Timor are forced to flee to the neighbouring territory of Republic of Indonesia, Philippines and others.” On 18 November 1965, following the attempted Gestapu “Communist” Coup of 30 September in Jakarta - and the subsequent political and economic upheaval in Indonesia, the URT-D issued a “Special Statement of the Central Presidium of the Union Republic of Timor” - signed by T.E. Maly Bere as the URT-D’s Prime Minister II.761 The Statement cited the “attempts by certain groups in opposition in Lisbon who are urging the Government of Salazar to give independence to the countries still colonised” and announced “four conditions” for the independence of Portuguese Timor. The URT-D called for the deployment of a United Nations force, “composed of soldiers from the Arab countries, Mauritania and Tunis [sic] … to establish order and supervise the departure of the Imperialist Portuguese Army.” The text allocated commanders and tasks for the URT’D’s “30,000” military personnel under the command of “Major General Mao Bere and the Chief of Staff (General Staff) Brigadier General M.S. Pekkeh [sic]” – specifically for the occupation of Dili (by the “Sinamutin Malacca Brigade”), Batugadé and Oecussi (by the “Maromac Oan Brigade”). The Statement declared that the URT-D “is certainly not a puppet guided by a foreign country” and announced the URT-D’s hatred of “all forms of colonialism” by Portugal, “or by other European races, or even by the Mongols or by ((in capital letters)) OUR NEIGHBOUR COUNTRY WHICH IS ALSO ONE OF US BEING MALAY” – ie an apparent allusion to Indonesia. On 7 December 1965, a Jakarta-based Australian journalist - Frank Palmos, during an interview on Australian-Indonesian relations with the Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio, queried the Minister on a recent URT-D statement on their political activities. Minister Subandrio responded that as “Timor was a colony, in principle, Indonesia disagreed with its status. The problem of Malaysia however was more urgent. Nevertheless it was highly probable that Timor would be raised in the near future, and we believe that it will resolve itself over time.”762 For the next few years, Portuguese Timor does not appear to have been a priority for the Orde Baru (New Order) government of President Soeharto. A Portuguese academic763 has summarized that: “Relations between Indonesia and Portugal – and Kupang and Dili, improved significantly with the rise to power of Soeharto. Four main reasons contributed to this new situation:

761

URT-D “Number November 1965 – special STATEMENT”, Batugade, 18 November 1965 (TdT , Lisbon: 1287/63-SR, NT 3292). This English-language copy was probably acquired by the Jakartabased Australian journalist/correspondent, Frank Palmos (The Sun). The translator of the original Bahasa document noted “the Malay spelling” and opined that the “writer is clearly Moslem educated in Malay, but not to a high standard.” The Statement is also cited in Fernandes, M. S., 2003, op.cit, p.8 and footnote 24; Fernandes, M.S., 2005, pp. 399-400 and footnote 138. 762 Fernandes, M.S., 2005, op.cit., p.401. 763 Fernandes, M.S., “O Timor Português na Política Externa de Suharto: O Regresso ao Status Quo Ante, 1965-1974”, Revista Negócios Estrangeiros, No.9.2, Instituto Diplomático, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Lisbon, March 2006, p.334. This article deals with each aspect in some detail.

152 -

the complete abandonment of the climate of political tension in the region by the Soeharto regime; the anti-communist orientation of both regimes; primacy given by Soeharto to Indonesia’s economic development with the aim of consolidating his regime; and Portugal’s intransigent refusal to grant political military and logistic support to the liberation movement in western Papua New Guinea.”

.

However, there was a suggestion of material support in 1965 for some reported URT-D elements in Indonesian Timor. According to a PIDE – Dili report, the ABRI Supreme Command (Komando Tertinggi – KOTI) in Jakarta ordered that “Lieutenant Slamet, a liaison officer with the URT-D”, be disciplined for having abused his authority by demanding that the “military commander in Atambua distribute weapons to Nai Buti and his men”.764 In mid-1966 however, indicating improved relations, the Portuguese Timor authorities assisted the Indonesians in the repatriation from Dili of two Indonesian communists – who were believed to be enroute to Australia, one described as a “financial backer” of the PKI. The Australian Consul reported that two Indonesian police travelled to Dili from Oecussi in a Transportes Aéreos de Timor (TAT) charter aircraft to recover the two communists. The Consul noted that “the whole operation appears to have been carried out with the full cooperation of the Portuguese authorities. No extradition agreement exists between the two countries. The Indonesian Consul tells me that the Portuguese could not have been more helpful – this is praise indeed, for he generally avoids any opportunity to praise the Portuguese, his natural tendency being to damn them.”765 This, or a similar incident indicating Indonesia-Portuguese Timor cooperation, was related in a 1977 publication: “In contrast to what happened to the anti-Sukarno Indonesians in 1958 ((ie the granting of asylum to the Permesta 14)), in 1965 Indonesian patriots persecuted by Suharto who sought political asylum in Timor-Leste were delivered back to Suharto. A few years later, an Indonesian aircraft transported Portuguese armed forces personnel from Djakarta to Baucau despite Djakarta’s anti-colonial stance at the United Nations.”766 More URT-D Letters and Proclamations In December 1966, the URT-D sent letters to the New Zealand Legation in Jakarta – for the Prime Minister of New Zealand and for onforwarding to the Prime Minister of Western Samoa, urging that a “Conference of Oceania” be hosted in

764

Fernandes, M.S., 2005, op.cit., pp.401-402 citing a PIDE periodic intelligence report (PERINTREP No. 12/65) covering December 1965 (TdT , Lisbon: SC-CI(2)/DSI-2, NT 8973, folio 62). While Lieutenant Slamet had been noted supporting Silvester Martins Nai Buti since 1962 (see footnote 688), there is no other mention of any association by the Lieutenant with the URT-D. It is more likely that Silvester Martins’ group – being supported by ABRI, was confused by the PIDE as being a URT-D element. 765 Australian Consul – Dili, Memo 115, 19 June 1966 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/9). This incident is also related - citing Portuguese documents, in Fernandes, M.S., “O Timor Português na Política Externa de Suharto…, 2006, op.cit., pp.313-314. 766 Araújo, A. (Abílio) de, Timor Leste: Os Loricos …, 1977, op.cit., p.183/footnote 204.

153 Western Samoa – with the aim of forming an “Ocean Alliance”.767 The letters, with the signature block of “A. Mao Klao” as President, suggested principal attendees at the proposed Conference could be “West Samoa, Tonga, Nauru, Papua, New Zealand and the Timor Union Republic” - while the views of “the Philippines Republic, Japan, Chinese Republic (Taipeh), Canada, United States of America, Mexico, Argentina and other countries would be of great use.” The New Zealand Legation in Jakarta informally sought information on the URT-D from the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. They were told by the Director General of its Political Affairs Division, Dr Anwar Sani, that he had not been aware of the existence of the “Timor Union Republic”, and he noted with interest that Indonesia did not appear to be one of the countries proposed as participants in the Conference. He added that the URT-D had no “locus standi” with the Indonesian authorities, and that he knew no one in the present Government who might have an interest in it. Judging by the address of the organization in Jakarta, he thought it was “not of any great size or significance.”768 Comments on the URT-D were subsequently sought by the Australian Department of External Affairs from their Consulate in Dili. The Consul responded that he had seen previous documents from the URT-D (one in April 1963, and another in April 1965) “purporting to come from this ‘government’; the organization is not evident in Portuguese Timor. Batugade is a tiny, almost deserted area, to the north of Balibo and about three miles distant from the crossing into the Indonesian end of the island. It consists of a detachment of second-line native troops (about 30 under a native officer) and about two dozen subsistence farmers. There are no doubt dissident elements in Portuguese Timor, all communities have them, particularly where there is a foreign power in control; however, control here is such that it is very doubtful whether these elements could ever become organised.”769 A few months later in early April 1967, the Australian Embassy in Jakarta received another letter in Bahasa from the URT-D addressed to the Prime Minister of Australia - with an elaborate letterhead as shown below.

767

Conference of Oceania, 094/XII/Prespu-URT/66, Batugade, 1 December 1966 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 3). Although “issued” at Batugade, the address of the URT-D “Struggle Representative” was given as “C/o Utaria, Kramat Pulo Dalam II, Nr G. 46 A, Jakarta”. 768 New Zealand Legation – Jakarta, Letter 84/47/1, 20 December 1966 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 3). 769 Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 52, 17 March 1967 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 3). As noted earlier, the Australian Consul had visited Batugadé in mid-September 1966 and reported: “Batugade is a small area, almost on the beach, consisting of an old military post and about two to three dozen native houses. Population would not exceed 100, including a platoon of Second Line Timorese infantry. … There are no Europeans stationed in Batugade. … You will remember that this place is said to be the centre of the ‘Independence for Timor Movement’ – the organizers could not have chosen a less suitable spot.” – Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 192, 23 September 1966 (NAA: A1838, 3038/1/1 Part 1).

154 The letter dated 2 April 1967, in Bahasa Melayu and signed by President “A. Mao Klao” and ostensibly issued at Batugadé, welcomed “Australia’s policy in making Papua and New Guinea independent this year, 1967”770 – see Annex L (the document includes a barely legible signature of “Mao Klao” – signed by Alamsyah Hasibuan, see also later footnote 816). The letter repeated the URT-D’s aim of establishing “a nation called Melanesia in the Pacific” and sought Australian protection to “defend ourselves against threats from Asian Countries.” The URT-D hoped that Australia would sponsor a “Conference of Melanesian Countries” as “the only country in the position to pioneer such a Conference is Australia.” Australian Embassy staff in Jakarta analysed this letter – and the URT-D’s preceding “Conference of Oceania” letter of 1 December 1966 (both written in Bahasa), and commented: “the language used in the letters is Malay and not Indonesian. There is a distinct difference in the use of such consonants as ‘j’ instead of ‘y’, ‘dj’ instead of ‘j’, ‘ch’ instead of ‘tj’, and ‘c’ instead of ‘k’. An Indonesian would not spell the name of the capital city as ‘Jacarta’. Word usage is also distinctly Malay.”771 Muhammad Saleh Akbar (M.S.A.) Balikh - as “Mao Klao” 772 Muhammad Saleh Akbar Balikh claims that his birth-name was “Mao Klao”773 – and that, as “Abdullah Mao Klao”, he was the President of the URT-D. Balikh was born in Portuguese Timor in August 1938 in the village of Morai, Maubara – about 65 kilometres west of Dili.774 His “official” birthdate however is 24 August 1942.775 According to Balikh, his grandfather (“arbor/avo”) was Dom Rei Preto776, the raja of the Maubara area who had been connected with the Dom

770

Menyambut hangat atas akan Merdeka Nya Papua dan New Guinea 1967 ini (Warmly Welcoming the Independence of Papua and New Guinea in 1967), URT-D, Nr. III/Prespu-URT/IV/67, Batugade, 2 April 1967 – in Bahasa Melayu spelling (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 3). The address of the “Struggle Representative” in Jakarta was given as “C/o Utaria, Kramat Pulo Dalam II, Nr. G 46 A, Jacarta” – as for footnote 767. 771 Australian Embassy – Jakarta, Memo 753, 21 April 1967 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 3). See explanation of Bahasa Melayu/Malay and Bahasa Indonesia spellings at footnote 700. 772 Almost all the information in this section of the monograph was provided by Muhammad Saleh Akbar Balikh during interviews with the author in Dili in December 2004, January 2005, August 2006 and late October 2008. 773 The author however has not sighted any written records that confirm that M.S.A. Balikh’s name at birth was “Mao Klao”. 774 Indonesian intelligence records however, reportedly assert that Balikh was born in Bukit Tinggi, West Sumatra – email to author of this monograph from Jakarta-based author and analyst, Ken Conboy, 27 September 2005. However, these Indonesian intelligence records - referring to “Mao Klao”, appear to be incorrect and have probably confused M.S.A. Balikh with Alamsyah Hasibuan, a Sumatran, who appears to have used the name “Mao Klao” in the period 1967-1972 (and possibly earlier) – see footnotes 770, 782, 783, 795, 796, 799, 802, 816, 818, 820, 895, 905, 1027, 1031 and 1037. 775 It is not uncommon for Indonesians or Timorese to have an official birthdate “later” than their actual birthdate – this is often a device to more easily qualify for schooling or public service entry. 776 In October 2007, in an interview with the magazine TIME Timor, Balikh stated that his father was “Dom Rebrito Sidoni - the raja of Gugleur Maubara”; and his grandfather was “Dom Kleti Leti Letikari” – with both active in the Maubara area in 1942 during the “transition” period between Dutch and Portuguese sovereignty of the area - “Mau-Klao Siap Mempertanggungjawabkan Kebenaran Proklamasi Uni Republik Timor (URT)” (“Mau-Klao is Ready to Accept Responsibility for the Truth about the Proclamation by Union of the Republic of Timor (URT)”), TIME Timor, No.11, Tahun II, November 2007, Dili, p.23. Note however that the Dutch actually ceded Maubara to the Portuguese in 1859.

155 Boaventura “Great Rebellion” in 1912.777 Balikh’s mother and father were detained in the early 1940s and died soon after. Aged two or three, Balikh was taken to the islands of Alor (in Japanese-occupied Dutch Timor about 80 kilometres north of Maubara) to live with his paternal uncle – traditionally there had been a close cultural association between the Maubara area on Timor and the Alor islands. Balikh was raised in the village of Baranusa on the island of Pulau Pantar - to the immediate west of the main island of Alor. He later moved to Alor Island for education at the Sekolah Guru Bantai Kalabahi – an area 75 percent Christian, 25 percent Muslim. In 1958, Balikh travelled to Jakarta for further education, staying enroute for one or two months with Maubara clan relatives on the island of Flores in the Lesser Sundas. In Jakarta, beginning in 1958, Balikh attended secondary school. On 5 July 1959, Balikh – as a member of the “Delegation of Portuguese-Colonized Timorese”, attended a rally at the Presidential Palace in Jakarta at which President Sukarno called for the liberation of oppressed peoples.778 At the time, Balikh was in Class 2 of senior high school and attended the rally with other students including “Adi Mara” from “Irian” (ie Papua) and “Antasari” from North Borneo. The ceremonies included several flag-raising activities. According to Balikh, “all three of us were given the opportunity to give a speech before the assembled participants … which was broadcast on the radio. … We met with Indonesia’s first President in the Presidential Palace to request support, and Indonesian President Engineer Haji Soekano positively welcomed our struggle.”779 Emanuel Mau Bere780 – a middleaged Timorese mentor of Balikh’s born in Letefoho (Ermera, Portuguese Timor) and connected with the “Rapat Timorese” (Timorese Meeting), did not attend but listened 777

For the “Great Rebellion”, see Gunn, G.C., Timor Loro Sae 500 Years, 1999, pp.94-102; Pélissier, R., 1996, pp.254-301; Davidson, K.G., The Portuguese Colonisation …, Sydney, 1994, op.cit., pp.232-275. The Argus newspaper (Melbourne) of 26 August 1912 reported that rebels “raided the port of Dilly” and looted Government house on 19 February 1912 - Araújo, A. (Abílio) de, (Jolliffe, J. & Reece, B. eds), Timorese Elites, Canberra, 1975, Appendix II (NAA: A1838, 3038/1/1 Part 2). 778 President Sukarno’s decree that began the “Guided Democracy” era was issued on 5 July 1959 at the Presidential (Merdeka) Palace. Balikh also later gave the date of the rally that he attended in Jakarta as “9 July 1959”. In a November 2007 magazine article, Balikh again related this rally – including the attendance of Adimara and Antisari, and stated that all were given the opportunity to make a speech at this event in “1975” (ie probable magazine error) – see page 206. Somewhat confusingly, in the article Balikh also referred to making a speech at the “United Nations Youth Anniversary” in Jakarta. The photograph of Balikh (above) was given to the author by M.S.A. Balikh in December 2004 on a simple promotional-style “pamphlet”, probably prepared in the period 1999-2004 (ie with “modern Bahasa” spelling), that declared “1958 – Status as a part of the delegation from Colonial Portuguese Timor to the Republic of Indonesia in Jakarta” and “aged 18 – Mau Klao Muhammad Saleh Akbar Balikh … since then ready to sincerely volunteer to sacrifice myself for the sake of the struggle for independence for the beloved motherland and legacy of our East Timor forefathers.” 779 “Mau-Klao Siap …”, TIME Timor, No.11, Tahun II, November 2007, Dili, op.cit., pp.21-22. 780 Emanuel Mau Bere was noted as the URT-D Defence Minister in a URT-D document dated 19 December 1975 (see footnote 965) and was imprisoned in Jakarta for some months in early 1976. In December 2004, M.S.A. Balikh advised the author that Emanuel Mau Bere died in the mid-1980s - and his two sons (Yunus, Tomás) lived in Palmerah, Jakarta. Balikh also stated that Emanuel Mau Bere’s wife was a descendant of the Mataram rajas (Indonesia). Emanuel Mau Bere appears as a signatory on two “Proklamasi” versions of the URT-D Declaration of Independence – ie the version in the November 2007 Timor Post/TIME Timor (see footnote 987 and Annex X) and the slightly different “2006” version provided to the author (see page 204 and Annex V). In the November 2007 article in TIME Timor magazine, Balikh stated that Emanuel Maubere was the uncle of the Timorese priest, Domingos Maubere (Domingos Soares) – see footnote 988.

156 to the ceremony on the radio. Balikh’s senior mentor at this time appears to have been Mulwan Shah – mentioned earlier as the principal of the AMRU, who Balikh himself described as a “Malaysian” involved in the senior leadership of the Pan-Malay movement – “Suku Bangsa Persatuan Melayu” (the “Malay Races United Nations” or AMRU)781. According to Balikh, he (ie Balikh as “A. Mao Klao”) was the principal in the URT-D’s 1961 promulgation of its Declaration of Independence. He related that in early April 1961, he travelled by boat to Kupang in Indonesian Timor – and thence to Atambua where he stayed with a relative of his mother. An elder URT-D companion, Alamsyah Hasibuan – a Sumatran involved in the All Malay Race Union, went ahead to Batugadé – just across the border in Portuguese Timor. Together with Simon Serang Pria, they met in Batugadé on 9 April and organised a gathering a few kilometres outside the small town. Balikh related that he made a speech declaring “Independence”782 and, together with Simon Serang Pria, raised a flag.783 Soon after however, Portuguese authorities arrived - the meeting dispersed, and the URT-D members fled. Balikh, who was wearing the uniform of the Resimen Mahajaya Mahasiswa of the University of Indonesia (and carried a student identity card) – and was consequently not questioned or harassed by Indonesian border security elements, returned immediately to Kupang and thence to Jakarta. According to Balikh, Simon Serang Pria was captured by the Portuguese – and Balikh believed that Alamsyah Hasibuan might have been captured also. Balikh stated that the text of the Declaration of Independence that he pronounced at Batugadé was as provided by him to the Timor Post newspaper in Dili and published in that newspaper on 25 November 2004 - ie the short “Proklamasi document” (see footnote 983). On returning to Jakarta, Balikh continued his university studies. During this period, Balikh apparently received unofficial assistance from Indonesian Government officials eg he claimed that, following an “arrangement made by Mulwan Shah”, he was transported to/from his studies in a vehicle driven by Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik’s “adjudan”.784 Balikh claims that his name was included as a member of the URT-D’s Military Council (Dewan Militer) as “Brigadier General Mohammed Shaleh Pakkeh, Chief of

781

According to Indonesian intelligence records, Mulwan Shah (sometimes as “Mulwansjah” or “Marwan Syah”) was from South Kalimantan - email from Ken Conboy (Jakarta-based author), 26 September 2005. See earlier reference to Mulwan Shah as of “apparent Malay stock” at footnote 679. 782 On 20 August 2006, at his home in Fatuhada (Dili), Balikh theatrically “re-enacted” his 1961 “proclamation address” to the author – ie he declaimed, without notes, the content of the document at Annex V. 783 The URT-D’s purported flag was described in a vexillology Internet website “Flags of the World” by Ollé, J., 30 August 1999 – http://y2z.biz/flags/tl%7Dbllt.html. see Bibliography, as “red with a central black disc bordered yellow - and within, a five-pointed star touching the inner edge of the disc”. However, the source of information for such a design is unclear and could not be substantiated – author’s email exchange with Ollé. J., 18 January 2006 and Raeside R., 21 December 2008. In discussions with the author in Dili in December 2004 and August 2006, M.S.A. Balikh was unable to describe the URT-D flag. On 20 August 2006, Balikh stated that the flag was “organised” by Alamsyah Hasibuan. In a later interview on 27 October 2008, Balikh described the flag in detail to the author and sketched the flag – see footnote 995. 784 M. S. A. Balikh – statement to the author, Dili, 5 December 2004. Adam Malik was the Indonesian ambassador in the Soviet Union and Poland until 1963. In November 1963, Malik was appointed Minister of Commerce, and in 1966 was appointed Foreign Minister of Indonesia.

157

Staff” – and that he also functioned as “Mao Klao” ie the URT-D “President” at that time.785 Balikh related that in 1963 or 1964, Alamsyah Hasibuan visited him at the University and asked him to sign the “master copy” of the URT-D’s 1,000 Pataca denomination bank note (actual size: 15cm x 8cm) - see below including “reverse”. Balikh stated that he signed the bank note as “Direktur Bank Revolusi Timor” – but that he did not know who co-signed the note as the “Menteri Keuangan, Ekonomi & Pembangunan” (Minister for Finance, Economy and Development).786

785

See footnotes 698 and 699. That document, provided by Balikh to the author on 4 December 2004, also lists “A. Mao Klao” separately as the General Chairman of the Military Council and as President of the Presidium of the URT-D. 786 Balikh held one copy of the 1,000 Pataca URT-D bank note in December 2004 – which he allowed the author to photocopy. He did not mention the existence of URT-D currency of any other denomination. Balikh provided the 1,000 Pataca bank note for an article in the Timor Post newspaper in November 2004 (footnote 982 and pages 202-203) and an article in the TIME Timor magazine in November 2007 (footnote 987). Apart from the One Pataca (footnote 787) and 1,000 Pataca notes, it is not known whether other denominations of URT-D currency were produced – or the extent of the dissemination, if at all, of the One and 1,000 Pataca URT-D bank notes. The signature of the Direktur Bank Revolusi Timor is not similar to that of M.S.A. Balikh – no confirmed “Mao Klao” signature by Balikh is available (during discussions with the author, Balikh avoided signing a “example signature” of “Mao Klao”). The signature of the Menteri Keuangan, Ekonomi & Pembangunan is somewhat similar to that of Emanuel Maubere. In Portuguese Timor, the pataca was replaced as the official currency by the Timorese escudo in early 1959.

158 A One (1) Pataca note was also produced – as featured in a February 1975 edition of Tempo magazine787 (see below).

Interestingly, the URT-D one and 1,000 Pataca notes (dated 17 July 1964) were far more sophisticated productions than the URT-D’s earlier rudimentary pronouncements and circulars. The URT-D’s circulars and pronouncements were invariably in either English or Bahasa, and only rarely included a Tetum word or phrase eg except “Moris Timor” (“Timor Lives”) in a subscription. The Bahasa spelling on the bank note was in Bahasa Melayu. However, while language used on the bank note was predominantly in Bahasa – it also included a few phrases and a sentence in Tetum on its reverse: ie “All unite in the struggle for a free Timor” (note “for a free Timor” was in Bahasa); “Arise Timor – long live Malaysian Melanesia and Freedom”; and “Defeat Portuguese Oppression and Imperialism.” URT-D Activities from 1968 In May 1968, the Australian Embassy in Jakarta received a letter-headed circular, in Bahasa Melayu, from “The Struggle Delegation of the Union of the Republic of Timor” congratulating the Indonesian Foreign Minister on his “successful visit … to the Pacific Regions, during which meetings and agreements were held with Australia and New Zealand on the future of Papua and New Guinea and West Irian, which will be the pillar of the glorious future of the Malay Nation spreading from Polynesia in the east to Malagasy in the west.”788 – see Annex M. The circular expressed regret that Foreign Minister Malik did not visit “West Samoa, Tonga and Nauru” - where he might have been able to “strengthen the relations between the 787

“Perbatasan – Teriakan Nona Abaiyah”, Tempo, Th IV, No 51, 22 February 1975, pp. 9-10. The URT-D was mentioned in a section sub-titled “Mimpi Yang Berani” (A Brave Dream) that related: “The ‘Uni Republik Timor’ movement was born in 1961 from remnants of the uprising by Timorese Malays of the Islamic religion.” The “Mimpi” section of the Tempo article was repeated in Dokumentasi - Kliping tentang Pra-Integrasi Timor Timur 1975, CSIS, 67/P/XI/1983, Jakarta Pusat, November 1983, p.28. 788 Pernyataan Sambutan – Menyambut Missi Adam Malic kembali dengan succes dari Pacific (Congratulatory Statement – Welcoming Adam Malic [sic] on his Return from a Successful Mission in the Pacific), Number 019/PP-URT/VI/68, URT-D, Jacarta, 26 April 1968 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 3). The Struggle Delegation’s address was given as “Kernolongan Dalam IV, No. 16. Kramat IV, Jacarta.” The letter was not addressed specifically to the Australian Embassy – and appears to have been a “circular”.

159 Malay nations in the Pacific and the other Malay nations in South East Asia. The circular was signed by “MSA Balikh B.A.” as the head of the Struggle Delegation.789 In June 1968, the URT-D’s Struggle Delegation wrote to the Indonesian Minister for Information congratulating him on his appointment – and received a brief letter in reply.790 The Struggle Delegation also wrote to the Minister for Trade, Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, and received a reply signed by the Minister.791 In April 1969, the URT-D issued a “Penetapan” (“Decree”) that announced its Central Government Council for the “V Period” – 9 April 1969 to 9 April 1971.792 The Prime Minister was Brigadier General Boly Mao – with Deputies: Brigadier General Madem [sic] Immany and Colonel Sikky Mao. The listing also included “Brig. General M.S. Pakkeh” as “Minister for Education and Universities”. In late September 1969, the Jakarta daily newspaper, Merdeka, carried a somewhat confusing report that according to “URT-D documents examined in Jakarta, several Portuguese Army officers are striving to establish what is called the URT-D – they had tried several times but failed. This is the fourth time – intensified after the failure of the PKI coup on 30 September 1965 … with the intention of receiving the escaped ringleaders of the PKI and using ((Timor)) as a headquarters for the ‘come-back’ of the communists in Indonesia.”793 Very soon after, any URT-D connection with the PKI was strongly denied by the URT-D. A.B. Lao, an official acting as the Chairman of the General Council of the All Malay Races Union and its “Timor Faction”, explained to Merdeka that: “the URT was established on 9 Apr 61 under President A. Mao Klao … there are absolutely no members of the Portuguese Army participating in the URT’s struggle. The URT has never suffered any defeats … but continues its struggle employing guerrillas, an underground movement and international activities. The URT comprises Islamic, Catholic and Halaik (the Timorese traditional religion) groups … and the struggle is guided by Kitab Allah Jang Suci ((ie the Koran)) ... the URT struggles for the aspirations of Melanesians in particular and Malays in general. Accordingly, it is not possible that the URT would be associated with the issue of the PKI in Indonesia or make itself a base for the PKI – both from the political and military aspects. Its relationships with Malay countries …. would be destroyed if it aligned itself with the PKI.”794 In June 1970, via the Sri Lankan Ambassador in Jakarta, the URT-D sent a letter of “Support for Madame Bandaranayke’s Victory” to the newly-elected “Prime

789

In December 2004, Balikh informed the author that he had graduated from university in Jakarta with a “sarjana ekonomi” (economics degree) in 1968. As noted, the address of the Struggle Delegation on the circular was shown as Kernolong Dalam IV, No 16, Kramat IV, Jacarta. 790 Minister for Information - Republic of Indonesia, 65/SU/K/68, Djakarta, 24 June 1968. 791 Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, Djakarta, 29 June 1968 – in reply to URT-D letter No. 032/PPURT/VI/68 signed by “MSA Balikh B.A.”. 792 URT-D, Penetapan/Pengangkatan Dewan Pemerintah Pusat Uni Republic Timor – Period ke V: 9 April 1969 – 9 April 1971,Penetapan 0395, Number: 0395/Prespu-URT/69, Batugade, 9 April 1969 (The National Archives – Kew: FWP 1/1 FCO 24/867; TdT , Lisbon: PIDE/DGS 1287/63, NT 3292; and Fernandes, M.S., 2005, op.cit., Annexo II, p.422). Note that the numbering and time frames for the “Periods” for the Dewan Pemerintah Pusat (Central Government Council) and the “Presidium Pusat” (Central Presidium) are not “synchronised” – see footnote 812. 793 “Timor Portugis Basis Komunis ?” (“Portuguese Timor as a Communist Base ?”), Merdeka, Jakarta, 29 September 1969, p.1. The Merdeka article was also reported by AAP-Reuter TG (Jakarta - AAP001, 0002, 30 September 1969) - and a similar article had appeared in The Indonesian Observer on 29 September 1969 as “Portuguese Plot to Set Up a Pro-Red Republic in Timor”. 794 “Uni Rep. Timor Bukan Komunis”, Merdeka, Jakarta, 3 October 1969, p.1. Merdeka reported the AMRU as “Persatuan Seluruh Bangsa Melaju”.

160 Minister of Srilangka in Ceylon”.795 The letter sought “moral and material assistance” – and “recognition for our State” although the “emergency Government was currently in the jungle expanse of Timor”. In June, the URT-D also sent a letters to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II and the King of Tonga – King Taufa Ahau Tapu. 796 The letter to Queen Elizabeth referred to Tonga as a “Malay-Negrito” country in the Pacific, and expressed the hope that independence would soon be granted to Fiji, the Solomon Islands, Cocos and Christmas Islands, and Brunei – as well as islands in the Pacific under United States and French administration. In comments on the letters, the British Embassy in Jakarta noted earlier suggestions that “the Organisation ((ie the URT-D)) may well have Communist links”.797 In responding, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London noted the “definite Muslim overtones” in the URT-D “pronouncements” and the “strange confusion in terms” ie: “Malay-Negrito is a contradiction. Malays and Negroids are of quite separate racial origins and the people of Tonga and the other islands are neither Malay nor Negroid but Polynesian. One would expect an independence organisation at least to know the race of the people that are trying to ‘free’.”798 In October 1970, the URT-D sent very similar letters of congratulation to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II and to the Prime Minister of Fiji – Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, on the occasion of the granting of independence to Fiji.799 The letters refered to Fiji as a “Malay-Negrito” country and also expressed the hope that independence would soon be also granted to islands in the Pacific – including Papua New Guinea, and Brunei. Divisions in the URT-D – Alamsyah Hasibuan as “Mao Klao” The URT-D sent a petition to the United Nations in October 1970, and - five months later, received a letter of acknowledgement from the UN’s Division of Human Rights informing the URT-D that the matter would be dealt with under the relevant resolutions of the UN’s Economic and Social Council.800 According to M.S.A. Balikh, 795

Dukungan terhadap kemenangan Madame Bandaranayke (Support for Madame Bandaranayke’s Victory), Number: 00437/Prespu-URT/VI/1970, via Jakarta, 8 June 1970 – in Bahasa (TdT, Lisbon: PIDE/DGS 1287/63, NT 3292). Note – Sri Lanka was known as Ceylon before 1972. The “Mao Klao” signature on the letter was that of Alamsyah Hasibuan – see also footnote 818. 796 Ucapan turut terimakasih atas kemurahan hati Kerajaan Inggris yang telah dengan rela memberikan Kemerdekaan Penoh [sic] kepada Negara Kepulauan Tonga di Pacific (Expression of thanks to the British Empire its generosity in freely granting full independence to the Tongan Islands in the Pacific), Number: 00436/Prespu-URT/VI/1970, Jakarta, 8 June 1970 – in Bahasa (The National Archives – Kew: FWP 1/1 FCO 24/867). This letter to Queen Elizabeth II was signed by Alamsyah Hasibuan as “Mao Klao” – see also footnote 818. It appears that the letter to King Taufa Ahau Tapu was not on-forwarded to Tonga by the British. 797 British Embassy – Djakarta, (1/42), 23 June 1970 (The National Archives – Kew: FWP 1/1 FCO 24/867). Interestingly, this Foreign and Commonwealth (FCO) file holding material on the URT-D is titled “Communist Organisations in Portuguese Timor”. 798 FCO – London, FWP 1/1, 24 July 1970 (The National Archives – Kew: FWP 1/1 FCO 24/867). 799 Ucapan terimakasih atas kemurahan hati Kerajaan Inggris yang telah dengan rela memberikan Kemerdekaan Penoh [sic] kepada Negara Kepulauan Fiji di Pacific (Expression of thanks to the British Empire for freely granting full independence to the Fiji Islands in the Pacific), Number: 0460/Prespu-URT/X/1970, Jakarta, 12 October 1970 – in Bahasa. This letter to Queen Elizabeth II was signed by Alamsyah Hasibuan as “Mao Klao” – see also footnote 818. Support for, and recognition of, the establishment of friendly relations with the free state of Fiji, (to H.E. Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, Prime Minister of Fiji), Batugade, 12 October 1970 – English translation. Both letters can be found in The National Archives – Kew: FWP 1/1 FCO 24/867. 800 Communications Unit – Division of Human Rights (United Nations), SO 215/1 PORT., New York, 15 March 1971. The letter indicates that the URT-D petition was dated 12 October 1970, signed by

161 Alamsyah Hasibuan – a principal in the URT-D and the All Malay Races Union, initially intercepted the correspondence from the UN and attempted to “use it for his own purposes.”801 Balikh regarded Alamsyah Hasibuan as a “benalu” (Bahasa: “parasite”) who “memperalat” (Bahasa: “manipulated”) him and others in the URTD.802 In late December 1970, an Australian journalist writing articles on Portuguese Timor, visited Jakarta and reported: “the only visible evidence in Djakarta of Indonesian interest in Portuguese Timor is a tiny slum building purporting to be the headquarters of the Central Presidium of the Unitary Republic of Timor, president Mr A. Mao Klao. Mr Mao Klao was not in Djakarta when I sought him; he was in Timor perhaps, it was hinted darkly, even in Portuguese Timor. But the organization he heads appears to be Islamic, though the Timorese are not, and appears to come under the sway of another poverty-stricken body, the All-Malay Race Union, although the Timorese are not Malays.”803 In early April 1972, a Jakarta newspaper reported that the Soviet Embassy in Jakarta was financing a “national liberation movement in Portuguese Timor” to set up a “Dilli Timor state” that would side with the USSR as part of their strategy in the Indian Ocean.804 The Soviet Embassy spokesman described this report as a “slander” and, soon after, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Adam Malik dismissed the report as an April Fool “joke”. Minister Malik however, was asked by media representatives what Indonesia would do if the people of PortugueseTimor launched a liberation movement – and replied: “We shall finance them and support them if they really wish it”.805 He added that “Indonesia had once helped a group in Djakarta who called themselves representatives of the Portuguese Timor freedom movement, but no longer did – if they are true fighters they will live … in their own country”. Subsequent newspaper reports on his statement linked his remarks with earlier circulars by the URT-D, including the announcement of a Cabinet.806 Soon after, the Indonesian Embassy in Canberra, in discussions with the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs, claimed that Foreign Minister Malik had been misquoted and misreported, and contended that he had said nothing about “finance” – but, rather, had stated: “If the people in Portuguese Timor really wanted independence, of course we will support them. But

“Mao Klao”, and used Bahasa Melayu spelling. The UN apparently referred the matter to Portugal who reportedly denied the existence of any liberation movement. M.S.A. Balikh also referred to the UN reply in an article in the Timor Post of 25 November 2004 - see footnote 982; and a copy of the letter was included in the TIME Timor magazine of October 2007 – see footnotes 850, 855. For URT-D/UN correspondence, see footnotes 736-738 for the URT-D’s contact with the UN in 1964-65; footnotes 800-801 and 853 for the 1970-1973 period; and 965-966 for 1975. 801 Discussions with the author in Dili, 20 August 2006. 802 Ibid – Balikh described Alamsyah Hasibuan as a West Sumatran from Padang; a devout Muslim who only ate “rice and salt” and only drank “air putih” (Bahasa: “water” - ie not tea or coffee). According to Balikh, Alamsyah Hasibuan had no Timorese friends or associates. 803 Mabbett, H., “Focus on Timor – Timor’s Chinese a dominant power”, The Canberra Times, Canberra, 31 December 1970. 804 Indonesia Raya, Jakarta, 1 April 1972. 805 Australian Embassy – Jakarta, Cable 1456, 7 April 1972 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 4). 806 “Indonesia ‘would aid rising’ ”, The Age, Melbourne, 5 April 1972; and “Indonesian Support for Timor Lib”, The Canberra Times, Canberra, 5 April 1972.

162 this is something that we cannot force upon them especially if the people themselves are passive about it.”807 Commenting on Minister Malik’s remarks, in a mid-1973 brief to the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, his Department noted that “far from fostering a ‘Liberation’ movement or displaying hostility towards the Portuguese authorities in Timor, Indonesia cooperates with the Portuguese. Occasional border incidents, arising out of cross-border cattle rustling or tribal disputes, are settled amicably and without publicity. … there is no serious nationalist movement in Timor. … the status quo in Timor suits Indonesia’s interests.808 In December 1972, “Abdullah Mao Klao” attempted to call on the visiting Papua New Guinea (PNG) Minister for Information, Paulus Arek, at his hotel in Jakarta. This appears to be the only documented appearance of “Abdullah Mao Klao” in Jakarta – ie URT-D documents always indicated Mao Klao was at the “Emergency Headquarters” in Batugadé. “Mao Klao” did not meet with Minister Arek, but left the following in his hotel room809: • a letter810 to the PNG Chief Minister, Michael Somare – signed by “A. Mao Klao” at Batugadé on 8 December 1972 – see Annex N; • a copy of the URT-D’s Pernyataan Kemerdekaan (Declaration of Independence) dated 9 April 1961811 - see Annex O; • a document812 announcing the Central Presidium of the URT-D for the “II Period” ie 9 April 1969 – 9 April 1977; • a document813 announcing the Central Government Council of the URT-D for the “Period VI” ie 9 April 1971 – 9 April 1973; • a document814 announcing the Military Council of the URT-D for the “III Period” ie 11 June 1972 – 10 June 1975; 807

Australian Department of Foreign Affairs, Record of Conversation with Indonesian Embassy official, Canberra, 5 April 1972 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 4). 808 Woolcott, R. - FAS South East Asia Division, “Indonesia and Portuguese Timor”, 1 June 1973 – Minister, 2 June 1973 (NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1 Part 5, pp.184-185). 809 These URT-D documents were acquired by the Australian Embassy – Jakarta and forwarded to Canberra under cover of Memo 2570, 22 December 1972 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 4). 810 Hubungan Diplomatic dan Kerjasama Menuju Melanesia Raya yang jaya (Diplomatic Relations and Cooperation Towards a Glorious Greater Melanesia), URT-D 0545/ZULK/Prespu-URT/1392 H/1972 M, Batugade, 8 December 1972 – in Bahasa (see Annex N). The covering letter by the Australian Embassy – Jakarta (footnote 809) stated: “It is interesting to note that the letter is in Malay, not in Bahasa Indonesia, even though it originates from a Jakarta address.” This comment suggests that while the Bahasa Indonesia and Malay (Melayu) spelling systems had been unified in August 1972 under the Ejaan Yang Disempurnakan program (see footnote 700), the unified spelling had not been popularised in Bahasa Indonesia by late December 1972. However, note also that the URT-D document of 8 December 1972 declared that “Bahasa Melayu dipakai sebagai Bahasa Nasional … di Uni Republic Timor” (“Malay is used as the National Language … in the Union of the Republic of Timor.”). 811 Pernyataan Kemerdekaan (Declaration of Independence), 9 April 1961 – in Bahasa Melayu (see Annex O). The English version of this Bahasa text became available in April 1965 - see Annex J and background at footnotes 742, 745 and 748. Stamped copies of the Bahasa text versions can be found at The National Archives – Kew: FWP 1/1 FCO 24/867 (together with an English-language translation); and TdT , Lisbon: PIDE/DGS 1287/63, NT 3292. Subsequently, M.S.A. Balikh provided two shorter, and different, Bahasa Indonesia “Proklamasi” versions of the “Declaration of Independence” - ie to the Timor Post newspaper in November 2004/TIME Timor magazine in November 2007, and to the author in Dili on 21 August 2006 (Annex V). 812 Formasi Presidium Pusat Uni Republic Timor – Period ke II: 9 April 1969 – 9 April 1977, 9 April 1969 – in Bahasa. 813 Dewan Pemerintah Pusat Uni Republic Timor – Period ke VI: 9 April 1971 – 9 April 1973, 11 June 1972 – in Bahasa.

163 • • •

•

a copy of the URT-D’s anthem “Timor Merdeka” (“Independent/Free Timor”)815 – composed on 18 August 1963, see Annex P; an A3-sized map of the “Timor Union Republic” – noting the URT-D “capital” at Batugadé and including a small inserted photograph of “A. Mao Klao”, see Annex Q; the business card of “A. Mao Klao” – see below:

a photograph of “A. Mao Klao” – endorsed in manuscript on the reverse: “for H.E. Mr Somare, Chief Minister, Papua New Guinea – 8/12/1972 Batugadé” - and signed “A. Mao Klao” – see below816:

The letter to the PNG Chief Minister, Michael Somare, welcomed PNG’s forthcoming independence and sought diplomatic relations between the URT-D and PNG within a future “Glorious Greater Melanesia”. With both the URT-D and PNG as “Melanesian nations in the Western Pacific Ocean”, the letter urged the formation of a “Greater Melanesian Union” comprising “the URT-D, PNG, the Republic of Nauru, Fiji, Tonga, Western Samoa and other new Melanesian countries.” The URTD also proposed Bahasa Melayu (“Malay”) as PNG’s national language – noting that 814

Formasi Dewan Militer Uni Republic Timor – Period ke III: 11 June 1972 – 10 June 1975, 11 June 1972 – in Bahasa. 815 Timor Merdeka (Independent/Free Timor), Batugade, 18 August 1963 – in Bahasa (see Annex P). 816 The photograph was shown by the author to M.S.A. Balikh and Mrs Fatima Balikh (Balikh’s wife) in Dili on 12 and 20 August 2006 – who both identified its subject as Alamsyah Hasibuan.

164 Malay was the language of the URT-D, the Malaysian Federation, the Republic of Singapore, the Republic of Indonesia, Brunei, “the Islamic Republic of Patani 817 – whose struggle was ongoing.” This letter (Annex N) was signed by “A Mao Klao” – and the same signature appears on the reverse of the photograph (footnote 816) – a photograph of Alamsyah Hasibuan.818 The Bahasa-language text of the URT-D Declaration of Independence (Annex O) was almost identical - when translated, to that of the English version noted earlier that had first appeared in 1965 (see footnote 742 and Annex J). Although also unsigned, this “1972” Bahasa-language copy of the Pernayataan Kemerdekaan included the stamp of the Central Presidium of the URT-D – whereas the earlier English-language “1965” text had included a stamp with the wording (in Bahasa) “Kementerian Luar Negeri – Uni Republic Timor” (Foreign Ministry of the United Republic of Timor) – see Annex J . The list of the URT-D Central Presidium for Period II (1969-1977) was headed by “A. Mao Klao” as President - with Sheikh B.M. Mai Laca as “Junior President I”, T.E. Maly Bere as “Junior President II” and listed a further eight members of the Central Presidium. The composition of the Central Government Council for Period VI (19711973) was headed by Brigadier General M.T. Analessy819 as Prime Minister - who was also listed as the Foreign Minister as well as Minister for Information and Propaganda. Of the 16 members listed, all but two had military ranks (from captain to brigadier general) – together with their “branch of service” and “regimental numbers” - eg “M.T. Analessy, Brig Gen (Politic) Nrc. 1321”. The listing for the URT-D’s Military Council for Period III (1972-1975) was headed by President A. Mao Klao as the General Chairman with Junior President II T.E. Malybere as the Deputy – but did not include “M.S. Pakkeh”.820 The other sixteen listed members had military ranks, branch of service and regimental numbers – including Brigadier General M.T. Analessy as First Deputy Chairman. The photograph of “A. Mao Klao” – also included as an insert on the map, was of Alamsyah Hasibuan (see footnote 816). As related earlier, M.S.A. Balikh had stated that Hasibuan – a senior member of the All Malay Races Union, had been involved in the URT-D “Declaration” activities at Batugadé in April 1961; had - a few years later, arranged for Balikh to sign the 1,000 Pataca bank note; and had later attempted to intercept the URT-D’s correspondence with the UN. Five months later, in April 1973, the URT-D’s Struggle Delegation in Jakarta sent a letter of greetings to Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX on his appointment as Vice President of Indonesia. The letter referred to the “good cooperation” between Indonesia and the URT-D that had been “pioneered some time ago” by Minister 817

Patani is a Muslim majority province in southern Thailand contiguous to Malaysia - with a Muslim separatist movement. 818 Hasibuan’s signature as “Mao Klao” is identical with that on the 2 April 1967 document – see footnote 770 and Annex L; this letter to Prime Minister Somare (footnote 810 and Annex N) - and also on letters to Queen Elizabeth II and newly independent countries in 1970 (Tonga, Fiji) and also to the Prime Minister of Ceylon - see footnotes 795, 796 and 799. For background on Alamsyah Hasibuan see footnotes 770, 774, 782, 783, 795, 796, 799, 802, 816, 820, 895, 905, 1027, 1031 and 1037. 819 A Bakin officer advised the Australian Embassy – Jakarta that a “Brig. Gen. Analessy” of the URTD travelled to Kuala Lumpur on a forged passport in March 1975: Australian Embassy – Jakarta, Memo 004, 31 December 1975 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/2 Part 2), footnote 918 refers. 820 “M.S. Pakkeh” was M.S. Balikh – see footnotes 698 and 699. As the document was “sponsored” by Alamsyah Hasibuan, Balikh’s omission is probably a further indication of an “Alamsyah Hasibuan versus M.S.A. Balikh” division in the URT-D in the early-mid 1970s.

165 Adam Malik, and hoped for its continuation by the Sultan.821 The URT-D also called for the Indonesian officials in the areas bordering Timor to “truly follow progressive revolutionary politics pioneered by the Central Government of the Republic of Indonesia”. In mid-1973, the URT-D passed copies of “The Composition of the Central Government Council” for “Period VII – 9 April 1973 to 9 April 75” to several foreign legations in Jakarta.822 As for the preceding “Period VI” (see footnotes 813, 819), Brigadier General M.T. Analessy was listed as the Prime Minister and Brigadier General P.H. Ulamando was among the four Vice Prime Ministers.

821

Uchapan Selamat, dan kerjasama Timor dan Indonesia, dalam rangka Keluarga Bangsa Malayu yang Besar (Greetings and Cooperation between Timor and Indonesia within the Framework of the Greater Malay Family of Nations), No. 004/BAW/PP-URT/1393H/1973M, 16 April 1973 – in Bahasa. The letter, signed by M.S.A. Balikh, included Islamic greetings and dates using the Islamic calendar eg the year 1393 Hijrah. 822 The Composition of the Central Government Council of the Union of the Republic of Timor, Period VII (April 9 1973 A.C. – April 9 1975 A.C.), Number: 588/J-aW/Prespu-URT/1393H/1973M, Batugade, 28 June 1973 – in English (TdT , Lisbon: PIDE/DGS SC-CI(2)/DSI-2a, NT 7826) and in Portuguese (Fernandes, M.S., 2005, op.cit., Annexo II, p.423 – as “VI Governo”).

166 THE “DAWNING OF POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS” 823 IN DILI The Movimentos According to Chega ! - the CAVR Final Report, “a small anti-colonial political group” had been founded in Dili “around 1967” and was “organised in small cells which largely operated in ignorance of each other. This group seemed to have had little real impact.”824 In January 1970, members of the young educated generation825 reportedly started what was initially an anti-colonial discussion group that became “Movimento Libertação de Timor”.826 The leadership of the Movimento comprised Justino Mota, Mari Alkatiri827, César Mau Laka (César Correia Lebre), Borja da Costa – and, with a lesser involvement, Nicolau Lobato828. José Ramos-Horta also reportedly had links to the Movimento.829 To avoid the attention of the Portuguese security services, the group formed a musical band as a “cover” for its meetings – and as a vehicle to proselytise its message among the Timorese youth. The band had several names: Academicos, Eclipse and Cinco do Oriente – and was quite popular. Mari Alkatiri was a guitar player in the band. In the early 1970s, a less influential and less active group, the Movimento Revolucionário de Libertação de Timor (MORELTI) had also reportedly been formed in Dili.830 This apparently was essentially a discussion group founded by João Viegas Carrascalão831.

823

This is the title of the section in Chega ! covering this period - ie Chega !, CAVR Final Report, Part 3, paragraphs 73 –77. 824 Chega ! , CAVR Final Report, Part 3, para 74. 825 These were almost all mestizo and serving as junior civil servants in the Portuguese administration. Mari Alkatiri and Hamis Bassarewan – also civil servants, were “arabes”. 826 Author’s discussions in Dili with (then) former Prime Minister Mari Bim Amude Alkatiri on 22 August 2006 are the basis for much of the information on the Movimento and its activities. Mari Alkatiri claims to have formed the Movimento on 8 January 1970 – and left Timor for post-secondary studies in Angola later that year. The Movimento group is also mentioned in Chega !, CAVR Final Report, Part 3, para 75 – which includes José Ramos-Horta as a member; and in Araújo, A. (Abílio) de, Timor Leste: Os Loricos Voltaram a Cantar: Das Guerras Independentistas à Revolução do Povo Maubere, Trama, Lisbon, June 1977, pp. 186-187. The official Fretilin “chronology” (1 August 2007) states: “January 1970 – A few young Timorese begin discussing plans on how to achieve independence from Portugal. This group included Mari Alkatiri, Nicolau Lobato, Justino Mota and José Ramos Horta.” 827 Mari Bin Amude Alkatiri served as a civil servant in Dili as a topógrafo 1st-class in the Public Works and Transport Service in the early 1970s – BOdT, No.26, 30 June 1973, p.508. 828 Nicolau dos Reis Lobato (b. 24 May 1946) served as an aspirante in the Finance Service in Dili from 13 November 1969 to 1974 – BOdT, No.7, 16 February 1974, p.123; No.29, 20 July 1974, p.561 and was also noted as a secondary school teacher in Dili in 1974. Nicolau Lobato became TimorLeste’s first Prime Minister on 28 November 1975 – and its second President in October 1977. 829 José Ramos-Horta was exiled to Mozambique for two years in 1970 for subversive activities, returning to Timor in late 1972 – see Nicol, B., Timor – A Nation Reborn, 2002, op.cit., pp.121-131 for detail on Ramos-Horta’s activities in the early-mid 1970s; and Ramos-Horta, J., Funu, The Unfinished Saga of East Timor, Red Sea Press, Trenton, 1987. 830 MORELTI reportedly formed the basis for the foundation of the UDT (União Democrática Timorense – Timorese Democratic Union) in April 1974. Ramos-Horta, J., Amanhã em Díli, 1998, p.75 notes a “Movimento do Liberatação de Timor” led by João Carrascalão had been formed but was inactive”. 831 João Viegas Carrascalão served in the civil service in Dili – including as as a topógrafo 1st-class, until mid-1975.

167 Secret approaches were made by the Movimento Libertação de Timor (ie the “Mota/Alkatiri/Mau Laka” group) to the Indonesian Consul in Dili, E.M. Tomodok, seeking “scholarships and other expressions of support” – and also separately by José Ramos-Horta. Despite several invitations, Mari Alkatiri did not have direct contact with the Indonesian Consulate.832 Ramos-Horta has related: “In the early 1970s, an incipient nationalist organization began to take shape. The group, of which I was a member, along with many others in today’s nationalist movement, began to reach out for help in Indonesia – both because we were inspired by Indonesia’s earlier independence struggle against the Dutch, and because of its geographic proximity. I was in liaison with the Indonesians through the Consul in Dili, E.M. Tomodok. I met him on numerous occasions, usually in the middle of the night to avoid Portuguese police detection. With him I discussed our projects for studying and training in Indonesia. He was an enthusiastic supporter of our movement and encouraged us to cross the border into West Timor to seek support. I remember him saying: ‘There the military will be very enthusiastic. Go, cross the border and you will find support there’.”833 From September 1972, a number of the Movimento activists mentioned above – as well as Francisco Xavier do Amaral and Abílio Araújo834, began writing articles on social issues in the publications A Província/Força de Timor (managed by the Army), A Voz de Timor (Government) and Seara (Catholic Diocese). This was a contrived dialogue - ie to keep politico-social issues to the fore, principally by Mari Alkatiri835 and José Ramos-Horta. However, Seara – the magazine published by the Dili Catholic Diocese, was closed under Government pressure in April 1973 following an article by Francisco Xavier do Amaral that critiqued Portuguese colonialism.836 However, these developments were not noted - or given little credence, in Australia. The Australian Consulate in Dili had been closed on 31 August 1971, and no “on-site” assessments were available on political developments.837 However, in mid-1973, in a brief to the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, his Department

832

As related in discussions with the author on 22 August 2006. Hill., H., Fretilin 1974-1978 – Stirrings of Nationalism in East Timor, Otford Press, Otford NSW, 2002, pp.52-53 also cites Mari Alkatiri’s recollections of approaches to the Indonesian Consul in the period January 1970 to 1973 “to gain support for our aims” – noting: “It was a disappointment to the young Timorese Nationalists to realize that they could not count on the support of Indonesia”. 833 Ramos-Horta, J., Funu, 1987, op.cit., pp. 26-27. According to Mari Alkatiri, Ramos-Horta’s involvement in the Movement was less than implied in Funu, noting that Ramos-Horta was “exiled” in Mozambique in the period 1970-72 – discussions with author, 22 August 2006. In Ramos-Horta, J., Amanhã em Díli, 1998. p.75, Ramos-Horta also refers to his (Ramos-Horta’s) contact with the Indonesian Consul in Dili, E.M. Tomodok. 834 Abílio de Araújo wrote a “polemica”: “Balarque – sigilo ou enigma ?” (“Dowry – secret or enigma ?”) for A Provincia … . Nicolau Lobato also wrote for A Provincia and Borja da Costa wrote articles for Seara – see Araújo, A. (Abílio) de, Timor Leste: Os Loricos …, 1977, op.cit., pp.185-186. 835 Mari Alkatiri’s pen-name was “O Peregrino”. 836 Francisco Xavier do Amaral’s article in the Seara edition of 10 February 1973 was titled “Sera Verdadae ?” (“Is it True ?”) and “set out a list of the ills of East Timor under the Portuguese” – Hill, H., FRETILIN 1974-1978 …, pp.53-54. See also Araújo, A. (Abílio) de, Timor Leste: Os Loricos …, 1977, op.cit., pp.187 – Francisco Xavier do Amaral’s pseudonym was “Ramos Paz”. 837 Post-WWII, an Australian Consul had been appointed in 1946 – but was withdrawn on 23 June 1950 and re-instated in January 1951.

168 noted: “there is no serious nationalist movement in Timor. … the status quo in Timor suits Indonesia’s interests.”838 In August 1973, an Australian journalist visiting Dili reported that: “in Dili, I was approached by a young radical who claimed the existence of an organisation called the Timor Liberation Front. He admitted that the group was miniscule, disorganised and unarmed, but he said that it would move against the Portuguese in five to ten years.”839 The Movimento (Mota/Alkatiri/Mau Laka) group and its student supporters occasionally confronted the Portuguese police and, “in 1973, in Dili, clashes broke out between young people and the Portuguese military.”840 In late 1973, the Movimento group reportedly prepared Molotov cocktail “bombs” in anticipation of raids by the Portuguese security police - the Direcção-Geral de Segurança (DGS)841, but the anticipated clashes did not eventuate. However, in December 1973, following this period of tension, Mari Alkatiri travelled to Jakarta and met briefly with Indonesian Foreign Minister, Adam Malik. Alkatiri sought Indonesian assistance with the establishment of a “guerrilla training camp” in Indonesian Timor from which his group might conduct armed activity into Portuguese Timor – but his request was rejected.842 The DGS were aware of Alkatiri’s visit to Jakarta and, on his return to Dili, he was interviewed by the DGS on two occasions. Alkatiri was threatened with exile to Angola - where he had been educated, but the turmoil of the April 1974 “Revolução dos Cravos” (Carnation Revolution) in Lisbon “saved” him from deportation.843 In a mid-1974 press interview that claimed “Ramos-Horta led the underground opposition in Portuguese Timor”, Ramos-Horta stated: “We used to meet informally in a small group in the garden outside the Governor’s Palace to avoid rousing the suspicions of the DGS (the Portuguese secret police).”844 Meanwhile, in Lisbon, a “Casa de Timor”845 had been established in early 1973 as a hostel and meeting place for Timorese students undertaking tertiary studies in Portugal. Here, young people developed their radical ideas and, beginning in mid-

838

Woolcott, R. - FAS South East Asia Division, “Indonesia and Portuguese Timor”, 1 June 1973 – Minister, 2 June 1973 (NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1 Part 5, pp.184-185) – see also footnotes 852-854. 839 Claypole, S., “What about Timor ?”, The Sydney Morning Herald, 23 August 1973, p.7 (NAA: A1838, 49/2/1/1 Part 2). According to Nicol, B., Timor – A Nation Reborn, 2002, op.cit., p.126 : “Although one cannot be certain, there is every likelihood that the young radical mentioned here is Horta.” 840 Chega ! , CAVR Final Report, Part 3, para 77. José Alexandré (“Kay Rala Xanana”) Gusmão was not involved in the Movimentos – only joining Fretilin on 20 May 1975, see Niner, S., Xanana – Leader of the Struggle …, op.cit., 2009, pp.21-26. 841 The PIDE (see footnote 126) was renamed the Direcção-Geral de Segurança (DGS) in 1968 and reformed in 1974, became the Polícia de Informação Militar (PIM). 842 Author’s discussion with (then) former Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri on 22 August 2006 in Dili. Former Defence Minister, Dr Roque Rodrigues, was also present. José Ramos-Horta also claims to have “expressed a desire ((through the Indonesian Consul Eliza M. Tomodok)) for Indonesia’s help with a guerrilla war to expel the Portuguese.” - Nicol, B., Timor – A Nation Reborn, 2002, op.cit., p.140. Nicol also provides comments on Consul Tomodok’s activities at p.62. 843 Author’s discussions in Dili with Mari Alkatiri on 22 August 2006. Subsequently, the Movimento used the Club União opposite (ie west of) the Dili stadium as a basis for its activities. However in 1974 - disappointingly for ASDT/Fretilin, about 90 percent of its membership supported the UDT party. 844 Freney, D., “Ramos Horta on Timor”, Tribune, Melbourne, 6 August 1974 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 4). 845 Located in Rua de S. Bento, Lisbon – not to be confused with the “Casa de Timor” established in Dili in 1939 to display Timorese products (BOdT, No.10, 7 March 1939, pp.222-223).

169 1974, several returned to Timor to support ASDT/Fretilin846 – including: António Duarte Carvarino (Mau Lear)847, Hélio Pina (Mau Kruma), Rosa Bonaparte Soares (Muki), Guilhermia Araújo, Francisco Borja da Costa848, Vicente dos Reis (Vicente Sahe), Hamis Bassarewan (Hata)849, Inácio Fonseca (Solan), Venâncio Gomes da Costa (Mau Seran), Dulce Cruz, Abílio Araújo and Roque Felix de Jesus Rodrigues.850 During this period, the Australian Government was quite sanguine regarding any possible Indonesian threat to Portuguese Timor. In mid-1973, a Department of Foreign Affairs official in Canberra commented that there were “no signs of a liberation movement of any significance which might attract Indonesian support. There is one nut in Jakarta who calls himself a PRG ((Provisional Revolutionary Government)) or something like that.”851 Soon after – as noted earlier, a brief to the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs related that: “Far from fostering a ‘Liberation’ movement or displaying hostility towards the Portuguese authorities in Timor, Indonesia cooperates with the Portuguese. Occasional border incidents, arising out of cross-border cattle rustling or tribal disputes, are settled amicably and without publicity.”852 A few days later, the Minister was advised that a United Nations Secretariat paper issued on 9 May 1973853 “makes no mention of a liberation movement in Portuguese Timor and makes no reference to any developments there. This accords with our understanding that there is no significant political agitation in Portuguese Timor, and that there is no liberation movement active in Timor itself. There is at present no international pressure on Portugal to grant independence to this territory in particular. … At present, relations between Indonesia and the Portuguese administration are good and cooperative. The Indonesian Government is concerned for general policy reasons not to appear expansionist. … It may be noted in this context that an Indonesian airline, Merpati Nusantara, is recently understood to have 846

For the foundings of ASDT and Fretilin, see following footnotes 856 and 857. An earlier “Mau Lear” had been a notorious bandit (quadrilheiro) captured in early April 1959. 848 Francisco Borja da Costa had been a member of the civil service in Dili – serving as a typist until his obligatory military service beginning in September 1968 (BOdT, No.41, 28 September 1968, p.809) and subsequently as an aspirante (BOdT, No.26, 26 June 1971, p.634). 849 Hamis Bin Umar Bassarewan (b. 29 May 1948) joined the civil service in Dili in early 1966 and served as a radio-telegraphist (3rd-class). 850 See Australian Embassy – Lisbon, Memo 98, 2 March 1973 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 4). Later known as “Casa dos Timores” (ie “pluralised”) from 19 May 1974 when - following a major reorganization, António Duarte Carvarino was appointed Director and Abílio Abrantes (ie Abílio de Araújo) as President of the Council. Many of the Casa students were members of a militant Beijingoriented Maoist group, Movimento Reorganizativo do Partido do Proletariado (MRPP). Chega ! CAVR Final Report, Part 3, p.26 also notes their involvement in Lisbon in the Movimento Libertação de Timor Dili and the Frente Unica de Libertação de Timor Dili. Roque Rodrigues, an alferes (second lieutenant) undergoing military national service, had been involved in underground activity against the Caetano regime – see Nicol, B., Timor – A Nation Reborn, 2002, op.cit., pp.116-118; Rodrigues discussions with author 2004. 851 Department of Foreign Affairs – Canberra, Cable O.452224, 7 May 1973 (NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1 Part 5) – manuscript note dated 8 May 1973. 852 Memorandum for the Minister – “Indonesia and Portuguese Timor”, Department of Foreign Affairs, Canberra, 1 June 1973 (NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1 Part 5). 853 This is probably a reference to the United Nations General Assembly (Secretariat Working Paper A/AC.109/L.846), “Territories Under Portuguese Administration - Timor”, 25 May 1973, para 3 that stated: “Little information is available on the activities of liberation movements in Timor. In 1971, Portuguese authorities denied rumours that a liberation movement had declared the independence of Timor.” - (NAA: A1838, 49/2/1/1 Part 2). The United Nations had received a letter from the URT-D in October 1970, replied in March 1971 (see footnote 800) – and apparently referred the issue to Portugal. 847

170 carried 150 Portuguese troops from Singapore to Dili (presumably en route from Portugal).”854 In January 1974, the Indonesian Consul in Dili, Eliza Meskers Tomodok, was quoted extensively in an article by a visiting French journalist – including: “I am certain that there is no organised resistance, but there is a passive opposition. In recent years, there have been spontaneous explosions of social discontent – an important uprising took place in 1959 not far from our border. The Portuguese Army reacted quickly and attacked the villages, massacring the population – men, women and children.”855 Tomodok was also critical of “medieval prison” conditions and the activities of the DGS. Democratisation in Portuguese Timor – and Apodeti Following the 25 April 1974 “Revolução dos Cravos” (Carnation Revolution) coup in Lisbon, political liberalization began in Portuguese Timor in May 1974 – as “a process of decolonisation and democratisation.”856 The major Timorese political parties – or associations, established were: ASDT (Associação Social Democrata Timorense)857 for the “masses”; UDT (União Democrática Timorense – Timorese Democratic Union)858 for the “elite” (village chiefs, civil servants and their families); and Apodeti (Associação Popular Democrática Timorense – Timorese Popular Democratic Association) favouring an association with Indonesia – that was

854

Memorandum for the Minister – “Policy Towards Portuguese Timor”, Department of Foreign Affairs, Canberra, June 1973 (NAA: A1838, 49/2/1/1 Part 2). 855 Schumacher, P., “TIMOR: une enclave portugaise misérable et oubliée”, Le Monde, Paris, 27-28 January 1974, p.10. The article also appeared in several other European newspapers. The Portuguese authorities in Dili were reportedly quite angry with Indonesian Consul Tomodok – see Tomodok, E.M., Hari-Hari Akhir…, op.cit., 1994. 856 The Portuguese Junta’s representative in Dili, Major A.C. M. M. Metello - as the President of the Comissão Para Autodeterminação de Timor (Committee for the Self-Determination of Timor), issued a declaration on 19 June 1974 that formally promulgated the communiqués and manifestos of the three political associations: ASDT, UDT, and Apodeti (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/2 Part 2; 49/2/1/1 Part 3; 695/5 Part 3). For Major Metello’s reported association with Apodeti, see footnote 534. 857 ASDT- founded in Dili on 20 May 1974 (with its founders including Francisco Xavier do Amaral and Nicolau Lobato) was succeeded by Fretilin (Frente Revolucionária de Timor Leste Independente) formed on 11 September 1974. A description of the ASDT’s founding is in Ramos-Horta, J., Funu, 1987, op.cit., pp.34-35. In June 1974, the ASDT principals had an “audience” with Dom Boaventura’s widow – ie ex-rainha de Manufahi (former queen of Manufahi) – see group photo in Araújo, A. (Abílio) de, Timor Leste: Os Loricos …, 1977, op.cit., p.9. Fretilin also appears to have claimed to being “first formed as an underground movement in 1970” – see para 11 of the report by the UN Special Representative for East Timor, Winspeare Guicciardi, 29 February 1976, tabled at the UN on 12 March 1976 – as an annex to United Nations Security Council, S/12011 (NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1 Part 21; A1838, 3038/9/1 Part 1; A1838, 3038/10/13/1 Annex 1). 858 UDT was formed on 11 May 1974, and its founders included Mário Carrascalão (the head of the Agriculture and Forestry Service and later an Indonesian-appointed Governor 1982-1992), Augusto César da Costa Mousinho/Mouzinho, Domingos de Oliveira – and subsequently Francisco Lopes da Cruz (see footnotes 944, 951) and João Viegas Carrascalão (see footnotes 830, 831). The founding of the UDT is described in Ramos-Horta, J., Funu, op.cit., 1987, pp.29-30.

171 initially titled “Associação para a Integração de Timor na Indonésia” (AITI).859 The Apodeti Manifesto sought as its first principle: “the viability, in terms of international law, of integration with autonomy, into the Indonesian Community.”860 The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs noted that “Apodeti was seen as the political heir of the 1959 rising against the Portuguese in Viqueque which was initiated by refugees from the Permesta/PRRI rebellion in Indonesia.”861 Apodeti’s Secretary General, 37 year-old José Fernando Osório Soares,862 was the “principal figure in Apodeti” having “organized the formation of the party (when it broke away from the ASDT as a splinter group) and drafted the party’s manifesto. He took the title of Secretary General, making an older man president ((ie Arnaldo dos Reis Araújo 863)), and arranged the leadership into a dual structure intended to maintain his 859

Apodeti – initially named as AITI, was founded on 27 May 1974, and is discussed earlier at footnotes 526-534. Apodeti’s chairman was Arnaldo dos Reis Araújo (see footnotes 168, 169, 527, 863, 874, and 875) - who became East Timor’s first Governor after the Indonesian occupation ie for the period 1976-1978, and José Fernando Osório Soares was appointed as its Secretary General. A concise history of Apodeti is at Nicol, B., Timor – A Nation Reborn, 2002, op.cit., p.79-82. José Osório Soares had earlier been a founding member of ASDT – but soon left to found AITI/Apodeti. The founding of Apodeti, and Osório Soares’ early involvement with ASDT, is described Rusdie, H., et al, Perjuangan …, March 1997, op.cit; and pp.21-25 in Ramos-Horta, J., Funu, 1987, op.cit., p.32. The guidance of Indonesian intelligence is related in Subroto, H., Perjalanan Seorang Wartawan Perang, Pustaka Sinar Harapan, Jakarta, 1998, p.270 (ie by Kupang-based Bakin agent Luis Taolin) and in “Saya yang Pertama Masuk Tim-Tim” (I Was the First into East Timor), Tempo, 20, XXVII, Jakarta, 22 February 1999, pp.26-29 (by Colonel Aloysius Sugianto/Soegyanto, the executive officer of Opsus – see footnotes 873, 962). One source claims that AITI was itself preceded by “União dos Povos Timorenses (UPT)”, and its principal supporters included the URT-D – Fernandes, M.S., “A Preponderância dos Factores Exógenos na Rejeição do Plano Português de Decolonização para Timor-Leste 1974-1975”, Revista Negócios Estrangeiros, No.10, Instituto Diplomático, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Lisbon, February 2007, p.92, pp.103-104. Similarly, the URT-D’s “integration into Apodeti” is claimed at Fernandes, M.S., 2005, op.cit., pp.357-358. Suggestions of an URT-D association with Apodeti appear to have been based, in part, on an “anti-URT-D” remark by José Ramos-Horta when visiting Jakarta – see footnotes 896, 897; and footnote 898 for the URT-D’s “no integration” statement reported in Diário de Notícias of 13 June 1974. The author is aware of no evidence for URT-D support for AITI/Apodeti. 860 Apodeti, Manifesto – in Comissão Para Autodeterminação de Timor, 19 June 1974 (see footnote 856) – “integração, com autonomia na Comunidade Indonésia” (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/2 Part 2). See also earlier footnotes 860 and 861 on the Manifesto and discussion of the party’s founders. In arguing for integration into Indonesia, Apodeti propaganda claimed that Timor had been part of “Nusantara” during the West Java-based Majapahit empire – citing Empu Prapanca in the Negarakertagama Syair 14:5 (written in 1365) – ie that Timor had provided “upeti” (tribute) to the Majapahits - Lopes da Cruz, F., Kesaksian …, 1999, op.cit., pp.60-61. For claims of Majapahit suzerainty see also footnote 76. 861 Australian Department of External Affairs, Savingram O.CH79457, Canberra, 3 July 1974 (NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1 Part 2). 862 José Fernando Osório Soares was born in Same on 3 November 1938. Two of his uncles (Joaquim Osório and José Manuel Duarte) were Timorese principals in the 1959 Rebellion and were exiled to Angola. José Osório Soares trained as a priest in Macau but, on his return to Timor, served as a civilian official in the Portuguese administration – including several appointments as a Posto (ie Sub-District) Administrator. See footnotes – 519, 527, 529, 543, 545, 859, 875, 876. Detail can be found in Rusdie, H., et al, Perjuangan …, March 1997, op.cit., pp.7-11 and in Ramos-Horta, J., Funu, op.cit., 1987, p.32. 863 Arnaldo Araújo, born 1913, had reportedly been jailed by the Portuguese for 29 years in February 1946 for collaboration with the Japanese during World War II – and was only released on 25 April 1974. See footnotes 168, 169, 527, 859, 874, and 875. However, a press report – White, K., “War criminal now leads provisional Timor govt”, Northern Territory News, Darwin, 5 February 1976 – claims that Arnaldo Araújo, a “catequista” (religious teacher) led “Black Columns” against the

172 influence and keep him out of direct public attention.”864 In explaining the origins of Apodeti to an Australian journalist, José Osório Soares related that the party’s real leaders were the former members of the “movimento de ‘59’ ” – or more bitterly, “the massacre of ‘59’ ”- ie the Viqueque Rebellion of 1959.865 An Apodeti newsletter in September 1974 printed a letter from nine “leaders of the 1959 Rebellion” supporting Apodeti’s integration policy.866 Seven of the returned “1959 rebels” who had been exiled to Angola are listed among the founders of Apodeti: Abel da Costa Belo, Germano das Dores Alves da Silva, Vital Ximenes, João Pereira da Silva, Gervásio Soriano Aleixo, Frederico Almeida Santos da Costa and Francisco Orlando de Fátima 867 - and José Manuel Duarte asserted that he had been appointed as the Apodeti representative in Angola and Mozambique. In April 1974, a Vice President of the Indonesian Parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat), John Naro, welcomed the fall of the Caetano Government in Lisbon and told newsmen: “it is our hope that the ((Indonesian)) government would take preparatory steps for a special appeal for the eventual return of Portuguese Timor to Indonesia” … “our brothers are still deprived of freedom, while economically they are living in destitution.”868 In late May, following discussions with a senior Bakin (Indonesian intelligence agency) official, the Australian Embassy in Jakarta reported that “a comprehensive study has been undertaken by Bakin on Portuguese Timor. The Indonesians do not consider there is any evidence of an indigenous liberation movement in Portuguese Timor. The people there are too backward and are not politically motivated.”869 The Australian Embassy’s “most valued contact”870 in Jakarta - Harry Tjan Silalahi, told a senior Embassy official on 2 July 1974 that he (Tjan) intended: Australians in Timor during World War II, was tried for collaboration with the Japanese in 1946, sentenced to nine years “exile” on Ataúro, was released in the early 1960s and became a teacher in Dili, and “acquired a large cattle property at Zumalai on Timor’s south coast” (NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1 Part 21). 864 Nicol, B., Timor – A Nation Reborn, 2002, op.cit., p.74. This book provides a quite comprehensive history of Apodeti – as well as political events in Portuguese Timor in the period 1974-1975. 865 Juddery, B., “East Timor: which way to turn ?”, The Canberra Times, Canberra, 18 April 1975. According to an Australian intelligence report: “Its followers include relatives and friends of the Timorese who were involved in the insurrection of 1959, and Timorese priests.” – Joint Intelligence Organisation (JIO), “A Descriptive Survey of Portuguese Timor”, JIO Study No. 3/75, Canberra, 1975 (NAA: A1838, 3038/1/1 Part 2). Following a visit to Timor in June 1974, Australian officials had reported: “Apodeti is seen as the political heir of the 1959 rising against the Portuguese in Viqueque which was instigated by refugees from the Permesta/PRRI revolt.”- Australian Department of External Affairs, Cable O.CH79457, Canberra, 3 July 1974 (NAA: A1838, 3038/10/11/2 Part 2). For Fretilin and UDT positive attitudes towards the 1959 Rebellion as a “formative influence” – see footnote 511. 866 Hill, H.M., Gerakan Pembebasan Nasional Timor Lorosae, 2000, p.62 – footnote 21 cites the Apodeti publication ie O Arauto de Sunda, No. 3, 18 September 1974. 867 Rusdie. H. et al, Perjuangan …, March 1997, op.cit., p.33 lists the 36 “pendiri Partai Apodeti”. 1959 veterans associated with Apodeti are also discussed briefly in Tomodok, E.M., 1994, op.cit., pp.95-97. Tomodok, E.M., 1994, op.cit., p.97 claims both Germano da Silva and João Pereira da Silva were executed by Fretilin in late 1975/early 1976 – but Germano da Silva was a DPRD II representative in Manufahi in the 1990s (see footnotes 505, 548, 562 and 571). Soekanto, Integrasi …, 1976, op.cit., p.79 also claims that the Apodeti founders included “fighters from the people’s rebellion in Los Palos in 1945-1949”. 868 Antara newsagency report cited in Australian Embassy – Jakarta, Memo 492, 3 May 1974 (NAA: A1838, 49/2/1/1 Part 2). 869 Australian Embassy – Jakarta, Cable O.JA2479, 22 May 1974 – reporting discussions with Colonel Satari (Bakin) – (NAA: A1838, 935/17/3 Part 2; 49/2/1/1 Part 2; 696/5 Part 2). 870 Arriens, J.W. First Secretary, Memo, 6 February 1974. However, Arriens noted that “what he says requires careful interpretation.” He also remarked that “Liam Bian Kie was particularly suspect.”

173 “to submit a paper to the President this week recommending that Indonesia mount a clandestine operation in Portuguese Timor to ensure that the territory would opt for incorporation into Indonesia. … The paper will include a list of the specific actions that would be possible or required. These would include working through Catholic priests (some of whom are trained in Flores) and other indigenous contacts that exist between Kupang and Dili. Tjan observed that in view of the rudimentary nature of political development in Portuguese Timor effective manipulation should not prove difficult. … The recently established political party favouring incorporation into Indonesia provided a ready-made starting point.”871 In mid-1974, Indonesia’s President Soeharto decided that Portuguese Timor should be integrated into the Republic – and “General Ali Murtopo, who has been instrumental in shaping the President’s thinking on Timor, and his Opsus (Operasi Khusus - Special Operations) were given the task of achieving the objective through means other than force.”872 Moertopo’s executive officer in Opsus, Colonel Aloysius Sugianto, established a forward office in Kupang – travelled to Dili and made contact with each of the three political parties in Portuguese Timor.873 The operation was called Operasi Komodo. Soon after, Apodeti’s President, Arnaldo de Araújo, made a prolonged visit to Jakarta (June-October 1974) during which he met with Indonesian officials, including Foreign Minister Adam Malik and senior intelligence officers.874 In August 1974, Tomás Gonçalves (the son of Apodeti principal and liurai of Atsabe, Guilherme Maria Gonçalves875) spent several weeks in Atambua (Indonesian (NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1 Part 5). This Memo was written soon after the Malari riots in Jakarta in midJanuary 1974 and before the “Carnation Revolution” in Portugal. See footnote 732 for background on Harry Tjan Silalahi and Liem Bian Kie (Yusuf Wanandi). 871 Australian Embassy – Jakarta, “Indonesia: Clandestine Operation in Portuguese Timor”, 3 July 1974 (NAA: A11443, 1). 872 Australian Embassy – Jakarta, Cable O.JA161, 3 September 1975 (NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1 Part 13). The cable related that President Soeharto’s “main reasons were that it would be contrary to Indonesia’s national interests to have a very small, economically feeble independent country within the Indonesian archipelago.” Major General Ali Moertopo was Head of Division III of Bakin (Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara Indonesia - State Intelligence Co-ordination Agency Indonesia) and Head of Special Operations (Opsus) – and promoted to Lieutenant General in October 1974. Bakin and Opsus were “charged with formulating Indonesia’s clandestine response to Timor’s decolonisation”. See also footnote 732 for Harry Tjan Silalahi’s (CSIS) “Grand Design”. 873 Colonel Aloysius Sugianto/Soegianto, the executive officer of Opsus, describes the founding of Opsus and its activities in Timor in “Saya yang Pertama …, 1999, op.cit., pp.26-29. The Kupang office in the Hotel Flobamor was managed by Colonel Alex Dinuth, and a “forward post” was established at Atambua under Major T. Sumardjo. The organisation and activities of Operasi Komodo are described in Subroto, H., Operasi Udara di Timor Timur (Air Operations in East Timor), Pustaka Sinar Harapan, Jakarta, 2005, pp.29-36. The Opsus/Bakin operations used commercial “cover” – including a hotel and trading companies/ businesses (PT Arjuna in Kupang, PT Sarana Gatra in Jakarta). Visits to Portuguese Timor were also made by several Bakin/Opsus/Komodo operatives including Luis Taolin, Colonel Muchammad Ibrahim, Lieutenant Colonel Pitut Soeharto, Major T. Sumardjo and Soekanto (CSIS) – and contact made with the newly-formed political parties in Portuguese Timor. See also Conboy, K., Kopassus, 2003, op.cit., pp.196-197. 874 Conboy, K., Intel, 2004, op.cit., p.88 notes that the Apodeti leaders met with Major General Ali Moertopo. The official TNI history asserts that Arnaldo de Araújo requested integration with Indonesia on 31 August 1974 - Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi TNI, Sejarah TNI (The History of the TNI), Jilid IV, Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi TNI – Markas Besar Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Jakarta, 2000, p.145. 875 Guilherme Maria Gonçalves (1919-1999) was noted as the liurai of Atsabe in 1952 in Sherlock, K., 1983, op.cit., p.29. Gonçalves was a prominent Apodeti leader – a negative view of Guilherme

174 Timor) planning with Bakin-seconded ABRI officers of Komodo for an Apodeti armed force “in case it became necessary in the future”– before travelling to Jakarta and meeting with Indonesian Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, and senior ABRI officers.876 José Osório Soares, the Apodeti Secretary General, visited Jakarta in October-November 1974, and Apodeti became “more and more closely identified with Indonesian interests” – and “by the end of 1974, Apodeti had fallen entirely into Indonesia’s clutches.”877 Tomás Gonçalves moved to Indonesian Timor in late October 1974 and was joined in Atambua by 110 Apodeti members on 3 December 1974.878 According to Tomás Gonçalves, they “commenced military training with a company of Indonesian soldiers in December in a camp about eight kilometres outside Atambua.”879 Meanwhile, within Portuguese Timor, Apodeti had the smallest following of the three major parties - drawing its strongest support from the Atsabe region about 50 kilometres southwest of Dili (see footnote 875) and in the Viqueque region (particularly northeast of Viqueque Town, the centre of the 1959 Rebellion).

Gonçalves (and his sons Tomás and Lucio) can be found in Ramos-Horta, J., Funu, op.cit., 1987, pp.33-34. Guilherme’s father – Cipriano Gonçalves, was also the luirai of Atsabe and killed by the Japanese military (and/or Timorese) in Suro in 1943. Guilherme Gonçalves was reportedly not only the leader of the Atsabe Kemac group (king ie - koronel bote in Kemac) but “had extensive marriage alliance ties within the former kingdom of Atsabe and with other groups allied with this former kingdom. This network extended to the Tetun and Bunaq ethnic groups on both sides of the border (of Indonesia and Portuguese Timor), as well as with the other Kemak groups in the Ainaro and Bobonaro Districts.” – Molnar, A.K., Timor Leste – Politics, history, and culture, Routledge, New York, 2010, p.44. The Gonçalves family reportedly have familial connections with the Nai Buti clan – see footnotes 681, 682. As a member of the Apodeti Presidium, Guilherme Gonçalves signed the Balibo Declaration (the initial “integration” document) for Apodeti on 30 November 1975 – as Apodeti President Arnaldo dos Reis Araújo and the Secretary General José Osório Soares had earlier been imprisoned by Fretilin in Dili. Guilherme Gonçalves later became the second Governor of East Timor during the Indonesian period (1978-1982). José Osório Soares was subsequently killed in the Hola Rua/Hat Nipa area on 8 January 1976 (Tomodok, E.M., Hari-Hari Akhir …, op.cit., 1994, op.cit.) or, more likely, on 27/28 January 1976 (Sinar Harapan, Jakarta, 22 February 1976) by Fretilin principal César Maulaka (Rusdie, H., et al, Perjuangan …, 1997, op.cit.). 876 Statements by Tomás Gonçalves, 17 December 2003 - Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (Comissão de Alcolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação – CAVR), “Internal Political Conflict 1974-1976 – CAVR National Public Hearing 15-18 December 2003” – Appendix 2 in CAVR Update December 2003-January 2004, Dili. According to Jolliffe, J., Balibo, Scribe Publications, Carlton North, 2009, p.75 – Tomás Gonçalves had been directed by Osório Soares to “form militia groups”, was summoned to Jakarta on 23 October 1974, and “consequently led 216 men over the border into East Timor” (compare with 110 Apodeti members cited at the following footnote 878). 877 Nicol, B., Timor – A Nation Reborn, 2002, op.cit., pp.75-79 also relates Apodeti’s disappointment at Indonesia’s insistence that an integrated Timor would not be a special autonomous province of Indonesia (Apodeti had initially sought autonomous status). 878 An annex to a report by Nusa Tenggara Timor Governor El Tari details the movement of Apodeti followers into West Timor – ie Daftar Pelarian (List of Refugees/Fugitives), El Tari, Laporan Khusus Tentang Situasi Perkembangan Terakhir Di Timor Portugis, 277/DKN/III/75-RHS, Kupang, 28 January 1975. 879 Statements by Tomás Gonçalves, 17 December 2003 – CAVR, op.cit., (footnote 876). See also Chega !, CAVR Final Report, Part 3, paras 116-117 for the training and preparation by ABRI of East Timorese “Partisans” in Indonesian West Timor. This “fitness” training was managed by ABRI officers seconded to Opsus/Komodo. An Australian Embassy official made a “guided visit” to a “refugee” camp “of about 200 men located at Nenuk, eight kilometres from Atambua” in April 1975 and expressed suspicion at its activities – Australian Embassy-Jakarta, Cablegram O.JA8887, 15 April 1975 (NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1 Part 9).

175 Portuguese Military Ineffectiveness Morale among the Portuguese military personnel880 in Portuguese Timor had declined rapidly following the April 1974 Carnation Revolution in Lisbon – soldiers demanded to be repatriated, and indiscipline was rife. A military police company was deployed to Portuguese Timor in October 1974 – but itself engaged in “grave acts of indiscipline”. Governor Pires later wrote: “The widespread demands by the privates and NCOs of the metropolitan military for a rapid return to Portugal resulted in the Military Command deciding on a plan of "Timorization" of the ground forces on a wider scale eliminating immediately those elements that could be locally replaced and expediting their return to Lisbon, without substitution.” 881 In November 1974, newly-arrived Portuguese troops presented a written “ultimatum” demanding to be repatriated by April – and “the indiscipline demonstrated by the metropolitan troops provoked panic among the population – principally among the Europeans and the Chinese, and had a significantly negative influence on the Timorese soldiers … This widespread behavior of the European military resulted in the belief that there is no possibility ((irrecuperabilidade)) of their responsible participation in the security and progress of Timor.”882 The Timorese sergeants in Portuguese armed forces – numbering about 80 (50 regular servicemen, 30 undertaking national service), were very influential in Timorese society – but were forbidden by Governor Mário Lemos Pires from joining political parties. On 11 January 1975, the Portuguese authorities established a “Sergeants’ Commission” to manage input from the Timorese sergeants – all of whom had political sympathies, in the decolonization process.883 According to the Indonesian Consul, the aim of the Commission, chaired by Fretilin’s Alferes (Second Lieutenant) Rogério Tiago Lobato, was to “destroy Apodeti”.884 880

Portuguese military forces in Timor are described by Governor Lemos Pires at p.148 in Pires, M.L., Descolonização …,1991, op.cit. – ie in outline: sector commands in Dili, Bobonaro, Maubisse and Baucau; three metropolitan (ie non-indigenous) companies (at Ossu, Maubisse, and Dili – Military Police); six light infantry companies (Lospalos, Baucau, Laclubar, Dili, Ermera, and Oecusse); two cavalry squadrons (Bobonaro, Atabae); an Instructional Centre at Aileu; and headquarters and support elements in Dili. There were also 52 Segunda Linha (reservist) companies – “comprising moradores, and based on a traditional hierarchy, they were a type of militia with a very low efficiency. Three of these companies were committed to surveillance tasks on the border – two in the Bobonaro area and one in Oecusse for periods of approximately three months.” 881 Ibid., p.52. The “Timorization” and “restructuring” plans are related at pp.148-149. See also the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in Timor, Directive No.1, 20 January 1975 at pp.144-145. From the early 1970s to late 1974, “metropolitan” Portuguese troops numbered about 1,550 in the total full-time force in Portuguese Timor of about 3,400. By late August 1975, metropolitan ground troops in Portuguese Timor totalled about 145 – ibid, pp.254-255. 882 Ibid. pp.141-142. 883 Soekanto, Integrasi … ,1976, op.cit., pp.166-167 – lists the six leaders of the Sergeants’ Commission and notes that there were 75 sergeants – 11 of whom were Apodeti supporters (names are listed). According to Francisco Lopes da Cruz, the formation of Sergeant’s Commission began with a meeting on 11 December 1974 and was formed following a demonstration on 18 January 1975 - with Sergeant Inácio dos Santos its General Chairman, Fernando Caeiro as Deputy, and Hermenigildo Alves as its Secretary General – Lopes da Cruz, F., Kesaksian …, 1999, op.cit., pp.50-51. A letter to the three political parties from the “Comissão de Sargentos Timorenses” advising of its creation is annexed to El Tari, Laporan Khusus …, op.cit., 28 January 1975. 884 Tomodok, E.M., Hari-Hari Akhir …, 1994, op.cit. Two Fretilin sergeants and two Apodeti sergeants were reportedly deputy chairmen of the Sergeants’ Commission. Rogério Tiago de Fátima Lobato had

176 Apodeti - and ABRI Preparations Apodeti’s prospects also suffered a major setback when, on 22 January 1975, Fretilin and the UDT announced an alliance (“Coligação UDT-Fretilin”) – partly to frustrate Apodeti, and signed a Communique that, rejecting any integration with Indonesia, called for total independence. The Communique recognised that only Portugal, with UN assistance, as having the right to oversee the decolonisation process.885 In the first months of 1975, ABRI staff in Jakarta prepared contingency plans for conventional military operations into Portuguese Timor involving four brigades. This planning identified readiness, organizational, equipment and financial shortfalls – and 22 August 1975 was set as a provisional date to begin operations.886 The Australian Embassy in Jakarta was aware of these developments, noting: “the Indonesians are getting increasingly into a frame of mind for direct intervention”; and the Joint Intelligence Organization in Canberra reported that: “Plans and preparation for military operations have now been detected. They include planning to deploy Mustang aircraft to Kupang, and the assembly at Surabaya of small, fast surface craft, and training activities of air drops of troops and marine corps landings.”887 Indonesian covert support for Apodeti increased, including Opsus/Komodomanaged radio broadcasts from Kupang888 – and by February 1975, Indonesian Army special forces889 in Indonesian Timor “had a modest cross-border agent network” and reportedly “were running a physical fitness course for several hundred recruits despatched by Apodeti leaders …” ((Subsequently,)) “by late April ((1975)), an Army special forces training team arrived at the border and began a simple paramilitary regimen for 400 Apodeti recruits … special forces personnel also conducted reconnaissance along the border, and even crossed incognito into Portuguese Timor”890 served as a civil servant in Dili from 22 October 1970 - as “third-class official” in the Social Assistance Service, until early February 1975. 885 The Joint Communique demanded that Portugal “eliminate” Apodeti, and also referred to a transitional government comprising Fretilin, UDT and Portuguese authorities. The text and correspondence related to the “Coligação UDT-Fretilin” is at pp.52-67 in Carrascalão, M.V., Timor – Antes …, 2006, op.cit. The text, in English, of the 21 January 1975 Communique can be found at file NAA: A1209, 1974/7573 and in Nicol, B., Timor – A Nation Reborn, 2002, op.cit., pp.98-105. 886 Subroto, H. Operasi Udara …, 2005, op.cit., pp.33-36. 887 Director - Joint Intelligence Organization, “Current Indonesian Attitudes on Intervention in Portuguese Timor”, Canberra, 11 February 1975 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3, Part 4). 888 Conboy, K., Intel, 2004, op.cit., p.95/footnote 19. In the period 1973-75, Australia gifted 23 CA-27 Sabre jet aircraft to Indonesia – however the armament on the aircraft was not operational in 1975. In November 1975, Australia agreed to provide military advisors to train Indonesian personnel on the aircrafts’ weapon systems. Australia also gifted 10 unarmed Nomad maritime reconnaissance aircraft to Indonesia beginning in November 1975. Australian Department of Foreign Affairs officials were keen “not to allow the present circumstances ((ie Portuguese Timor)) to deflect us from maintaining normal relations with Indonesia.” – Brief for the Minister, Canberra, 31 October 1975 (NAA: A1838, 696/2/2/1 Part 11). On 16 December, the Indonesians gave an undertaking that the Nomad aircraft would not be used in Portuguese Timor (Ibid, Part 12). 889 Kopassandha (Komando Pasukan Sandi Yudha) - re-titled “Kopassus” on 26 December 1986. See Conboy, K., Kopassus, 2003, op.cit., for a history of Indonesia’s Special Forces to 1993. 890 Conboy, K., Intel, 2004, op.cit., pp. 90– 91. See also Conboy, K., Kopassus, 2003, op.cit., pp.206208: Captain Yunus Yosfiah - the leader of the ABRI trainers, and his team wore civilian clothes. Disguised Kopassandha officers operating into Portuguese Timor included Lieutenant Untung Suroso and Lieutenant Stevanus Gatot Purwanto – see Conboy, K., Kopassus, 2003, p.207 (Suroso); and “Kami Saat Itu Serba Salah”, Tempo Magazine, No.15/X, Jakarta, 8-14 December 2009 (noting Stevanus Gatot Purwanto operating as a Chinese trader: “Aseng”).

177 On 1 June 1975, Apodeti held a ceremony at the Indonesian Consulate in Dili to celebrate the Party’s first anniversary during which a “Proclamation – 27th Province of the Republic of Indonesia”891 was presented that “formally proclaimed the colony of Timor as the 27th province of the Republic of Indonesia”. The Proclamation was signed by the Apodeti Party’s Presidium – that included 1959 rebel veteran, Abel da Costa Belo; and the Party’s Central Committee. Apodeti’s flag was also reportedly flown publicly for the first time at the ceremony ie coloured red and white – identical to the Indonesian national flag, with “Apodeti” printed in gold lettering horizontally across the flag. The following four political cartoons had appeared in the Jakarta daily newspaper, Merdeka, in February and March 1975 (NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1 Part 8).

891

Tomodok, E.M., Hari-Hari Akhir ..., 1994, op.cit., pp.226-229. The Apodeti flag may have been inaugurated a few days earlier at an Apodeti anniversary function on 27-28 May 1975 at the home of Hermenigildo Martins, the Apodeti Vice-President. On 10 June, the Indonesian official newsagency, Antara, reported the Apodeti proclamation of 1 June.

178

179 JAKARTA-BASED INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS REACT The URT-D’s Reaction in 1974 to “Decolonisation” in Timor On 29 May 1974, the AFP news agency filed a report from Jakarta quoting a URT-D spokesman - “First Secretary Mao Siku”, that restated the aims of the movement and called for “all civilized and peace-loving countries, especially the Malay and the revolutionary Middle-East countries to extend moral and material help for the underground government in its fight against the Portuguese authorities.”892 The statement also criticised an un-named “neighbouring country” for failure to give de facto and de jure recognition to the URT-D. The URT-D spokesman added that it was “up to President António de Spinola of Portugal to hold a summit meeting with President Mao Kalo [sic]” on the future of the island territory. The coverage in a Jakarta daily newspaper - The Indonesian Observer, noted that “ ‘President’ Mao Kalo [sic] of the underground government set up a delegation in Jakarta in 1961 with the blessing of the late President Sukarno. The Soeharto government continued to tolerate the ‘republic’s’ representation in Jakarta.” The Australian Embassy in Jakarta queried the URT-D’s background with the Indonesian national intelligence agency, Bakin (Badan Ko-ordinasi Intelijen Negara - State Intelligence Co-ordination Agency), and was informed that the movement had been set up in Jakarta in 1961 and was “both small and confined to Jakarta.” 893 The United States Embassy in Jakarta also reported on the URT-D article in The Indonesian Observer noting that the URTD was “largely a paper organization” with “no known contacts in Portuguese Timor and limits itself to occasional press releases in Jakarta.”894 The US report further commented that: “There have been reports that it has been offered funds by the Soviet Embassy in Jakarta to finance the travel of Timorese students to plead for independence for Portuguese Timor before the UN. The ‘President’ of this group, Mao Klao, is a West Sumatran who was formerly associated with the now-defunct, leftist Murba Party.895 According to an Embassy contact from Timor, Mao Klao was once arrested by the Government of Indonesian authorities in Indonesian Timor and sent back to Java during his one and only attempt to visit the Portuguese colony.” In mid-1974, according to M.S.A. Balikh, José Ramos-Horta – then Secretary General of the ASDT, when visiting Jakarta, called at the office of the URT-D. Balikh was absent, and the URT-D members present were surprised – and fearful, as they initially thought that Ramos-Horta was Portuguese.896 Balikh related that 892

The AFP item appeared in The Indonesian Observer as: “Underground Timor govt, to continue struggle against Portugal”, The Indonesian Observer, Jakarta, 30 May 1974 (NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1 Part 1). 893 Australian Embassy – Jakarta, O.JA2678, 30 May 1974 (NAA: A1838, 696/5 Part 2). 894 United States Embassy – Jakarta, 6636 E.O 11652:GDS, 30 May 1974. 895 The “West Sumatran” Mao Klao, was probably Alamsyah Hasibuan. M.S.A. Balikh described him to the author on 20 August 2006 as a “Sumatran from Padang” (West Sumatra) – see footnotes 802 and 1037 – but also footnote 774. The Murba Party (Musyawarah Rakyat Banyak - ie People’s Party) was founded in 1948 and, following demands by the PKI, was banned by President Sukarno in 1965. Minister Adam Malik (see footnote 748) was a founder and executive member of the Murba Party. 896 Discussions with the author, Dili, December 2004. Balikh also recounted Ramos-Horta’s visit to the URT-D office in Jakarta in newspaper (2004) and magazine articles (2007) – see footnotes 982 and 993. José Ramos-Horta visited Jakarta for the first time in mid-late June 1974 for meetings with Indonesian Government officials – see Ramos-Horta, J., Funu, 1987, op.cit. Ramos-Horta does not mention the URT-D in Funu. Ramos-Horta, born 1949, is a mestiço - his father, Francisco Horta, was a Portuguese naval gunner deported to Portuguese Timor in 1931. Francisco Horta’s activities – including his internment in Australia, are related in Chamberlain, E.P., Forgotten Men …, 2010, op.cit.

180 Mulwan Shah had discussions with Ramos-Horta and offered Ramos-Horta the position of URT-D Prime Minister and Foreign Minister – but Ramos-Horta reportedly demurred. According to a report in mid-June 1974, Ramos-Horta – visiting Jakarta as the Secretary General of the ASDT, was seeking the support of UDT and Apodeti “in denouncing the ‘Government for the Union of the Republic of Timor’, a clandestine movement established in Jakarta, as ‘an adulterated group of Indonesian conspirators’.”897 Ramos-Horta’s statement was probably in reaction to Mao Siku’s statement of 29 May (see above and footnote 892), and Ramos-Horta’s reported call on the URT-D offices in Jakarta in June 1974 (footnote 896). On 12 June 1974, the “unofficial representative” of the URT-D in Jakarta Bere Lau, reportedly stated that “there are very few people in Timor who are in favour of joining the island with Indonesia.” He indicated that the URT-D had passed a letter on 7 June to “the Portuguese Consul-General in Jakarta, Sussa Uiraoni ((ie Guilherme de Sousa Girão)), through emissaries coming from the Portuguese sector of Timor” requesting the URT-D’s preferred options: “independence or that of federation with Portugal.”898 In July 1974, the URT-D made an approach to the Netherlands Embassy in Jakarta seeking “information about the Moluccan community in the Netherlands. The URT expressed interest in the settlement of Moluccans in Portuguese Timor after independence. The ((Netherlands)) Embassy did not encourage the URT in its interest, but neither had it informed the Indonesians of the URT approach.” A senior Dutch official in The Hague described the URT-D as “small and silly, carrying Marx in the left hand and the Koran in the right.”899 In mid-October 1974, during the UN General Assembly’s 29th Session, its Fourth Committee considered the issue of Portuguese territories. Regarding Portuguese Timor, the UN Report discussed the formation in 1974 of the principal political parties in the Territory and stated: “No information is available on the activities of the Timor Liberation Front, the only liberation movement known to have been formed in the Territory. According to the Movimento Popular de Liberatação de Angola (MPLA), the Front was formed in September 1971, and the Portuguese authorities have kept silent about its formation, denying reports that a liberation movement had declared the independence of Timor.”900 On 15 October 1974 – five weeks after the Australian Prime Minister’s meeting with President Soeharto at Wonosobo in Central Java, two copies of an URTD “open letter” were delivered to the Australian Embassy in Jakarta – one for the 897

Australian Embassy – Lisbon, Cable O.LB174, 24 June 1974 (NAA: A1838, 49/2/1/1 Part 2) and Memo 203, 27 June 1974 – covering Diário de Notícias, 20 June 1974, p.2: “Postponement of the Referendum Requested” (NAA: A1838, 49/2/1/1 Part 3). 898 Australian Embassy – Lisbon, Memo 203, 27 June 1974 – covering Diário de Notícias, 13 June 1974, p.10: “A Clandestine Government Established in Timor Presents the Portuguese Government with Two Options: Independence or Federation with Portugal” (NAA: A1838, 49/2/1/1 Part 3). 899 Australian Embassy – The Hague, Cable O.TH2679, 5 February 1975 (NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1 Part 6). 900 United Nation General Assembly – 29th Session, Report A/9623/Add.1 (Part 1), Annex I – Timor, p.20, para 6 (NAA: A1838, 3038/7/1 Part 1). The “Timor Liberation Front” appears to be a reference to the URT-D – see preceding footnotes 800 and 853. The foregoing suggests that the UN had provisionally acknowledged the URT-D’s claims of having been “formed” in the Territory – see footnotes 736-738 for URT-D contact with the UN in the period 1964-65, and also footnotes 800, 853 and 965-966. The MPLA is probably referring to the early 1970s “Movimentos” – see pages 166-170.

181 Ambassador, and one for the Prime Minister of Australia.901 The letter’s subject was “A strong protest against the Government of Mr Whitlam, for Australia’s attitude in approving the Portuguese colony become [sic] a Republic of Indonesia Timor colony”. The text of the letter included: “The 4,000 demonstrators of the heroic Timor people against the attitude to incorporate Timor into the territory of the Republic of Indonesia is a factor which has been seen with his own eyes by the Indonesian Consul in Dilly. … Australia, acting as a responsible neighbour, should advise the Republic of Indonesia not to interfere in Timor affairs, advise the leaders of the Republic of Indonesia not to incite disturbances and confusion in Timor: with the Republic of Indonesia’s attitude of helping the Arnaldo Party ((ie Apodeti led by Arnaldo dos Reis Araújo)), which is anti-independence, it is clear that the Republic of Indonesia is involved in disturbances in Timor which is preparing itself to be left by Portugal” … “and if it happens that Timor … absorbed by the Republic of Indonesia using any subterfuge, it will be noted in the history of the world that Australia masterminded the absorption.” On 11 November 1974, a senior official of the Malaysian Embassy in Jakarta called at the Australian Embassy in Jakarta and discussed the URT-D.902 The Malaysian Embassy had received telephone calls from the URT-D seeking guidance and assistance for their “struggle over Portuguese Timor”, and the URT-D had sought a meeting with Malaysian Embassy officials. Queried on what type of assistance was sought, the Malaysians were told by the URT-D that, initially, the most useful help would be diplomatic support by Malaysia for the URT-D cause. The Malaysian Embassy contacted the Indonesian Foreign Ministry to query whether the URT-D was recognised by Indonesian authorities and was advised that the URT-D had no official status. After seeking direction from Kuala Lumpur, the Malaysian Embassy informed the URT-D that the Malaysian Embassy “was not in a position to have any discussions.” A few weeks later, the Australian Embassy in Jakarta was told by an official of the Republic of Singapore Embassy in Jakarta that the URT-D had also approached the Singapore Embassy for assistance.903 In its letter to the Singapore Embassy, the URT-D had reportedly argued that Indonesia “had its eyes on Christmas Island and Portuguese Timor” - and that “Indonesia’s territorial ambitions would not be satisfied until even Singapore was devoured.” The Republic of Singapore Embassy declined any contact with the URT-D – but told the Australian Embassy that they had heard that the URT-D had developed some close ties with militant Muslim bodies in Indonesia. On 19 November 1974, in a discussion with Alex (Ali) Alatas 904 - the Indonesian Foreign Minister’s private secretary, a senior official of Australia’s 901

0618/Presidential Decision – Union of the Timor Republic/RMD/1394H/1974M, Batugade/Jakarta, 25 September 1974 (NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1 Part 3). The letter was signed by A. Mao Klao as President of the Central Presidium – at Batugade, and forwarded through the “Struggle Delegation” at Jalan Kernolong Dalam IV/16, Kramat IV, Jakarta. The letter’s subscription included an Islamic date: “Arab’a Ramadan 1394, 25 September 1974”. 902 Australian Embassy – Jakarta, Memo 1288, 15 November 1974 (NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1 Part 4; A1209, 1974/7573). 903 Australian Embassy – Jakarta, Memo 1333, 20 November 1974 (NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1 Part 4). 904 Alex (Ali) Alatas - a career foreign affairs officer, was later the Indonesian Foreign Minister ie 1987-1999.

182 Embassy in Jakarta queried the status of the URT-D. Mr Alatas responded that the group “was becoming a nuisance”; the Foreign Ministry was aware of its approaches to embassies in Jakarta; and that the Foreign Ministry “knew perfectly well that Indonesia was now the major target for its ((URT-D’s)) propaganda.” For some time, the URT-D had sought an appointment with Foreign Minister Malik, but Alatas and other advisers had recommended against this. Alatas confided to the senior Australian official that he had now come to the conclusion that Minister Malik should see the group and tell them that “Indonesia had no territorial ambitions; that Indonesia would respect the principle of self-determination for the people of Portuguese Timor; and that Portuguese Timor would join Indonesia only if that were the wish of the people themselves.” Alatas added that he was not very confident that this would help to keep the URT-D quiet, and he hinted that “if they became too much of a nuisance other groups within the Indonesian Government might wish to do something about it.” On 20 November 1974, Harry Tjan Silalahi (of the Centre for Strategic Studies – CSIS, footnote 732) told the senior Australian Embassy official that the URT-D had been “used” by Minister Adam Malik in the early years, but that it was now becoming an embarrassment for him. Tjan also said that the URT-D had been “plaguing” the Arab Embassies in Jakarta with requests for assistance. Tjan opined that the leader of the group was a little “mad” and – as an aside, commented to the senior Australian official that “anyone in Indonesia who had the courage to say the sorts of things about Indonesia that this group was now saying must indeed be mad.”905 Tjan concluded by saying that he thought the URT-D were quite insignificant and even ridiculous. The Collective Democratic Students of Timor Delly (Codes Timde) On 19 November 1974, the chairman of a group titled the “Collective Democratic Students of Timor Delly (Codes Timde)” reportedly called on the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Adam Malik.906 Its chairman, Jacob Mabitivol van Belly P. BA, declared that “we want Portuguese Timor to become Indonesian Territory, and we reject the holding of a referendum in Portuguese Timor, and less that the territory remain under Portuguese colonial rule.” Van Belly claimed that his student organization had been established in 1971 with members in Indonesia, Lisbon, Australia and other countries; accepted the Indonesian Panca Sila philosophy; and planned to hold a congress in 1975. According to the Antara press report, Van Belly also had talks with members of the Indonesian Parliament and “other high-ranking government leaders” in Jakarta. A few weeks earlier, the Australian Embassy in Jakarta received copies of two documents from the Presidium of Codes Timde:

905

It is unclear to whom Tjan referred as the “mad” URT-D leader – Mulwan Shah, Alamsyah Hasibuan – or, less likely, M.S.A. Balikh. However, in July 1963, a senior Western press agency manager in Jakarta - who had met Mulwan Shah on several occasions, described Mulwan Shah as an “eccentric crackpot”: Australian Embassy - Jakarta, Memo 1155, 12 July 1963 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 3). 906 “Codes Timde Wants Merger With Indonesia”, Antara, Jakarta, 20 November 1974. The content of the Antara article was also later included in Indonesian Newsletter 35/74, 1 December 1974 as “Students Oppose Referendum In Portuguese Timor” (NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1 Part 14).

183

•

•

A Memorandum addressed to the “President of the Republic of Portuguense” [sic] dated 13 May 1974907; A Note (see Annex R) addressed to the “General Secretary of the United National Organisation in New York” [sic] dated 10 July 1974 - with the above Memorandum as an attachment.908

The Memorandum claimed that Codes Timde had been established on 10 January 1971 following a “closed meeting” at “Atambua Timor Delly”909 and implied that an “envoy” from “General António de Spanola” [sic] had attended the meeting. Codes Timde sought “freedom or united with Indonesia Republic” and noted that “the students of the high schools had given their support to the formation of “AITI (Associacou Intergraciacao de Timor Indonesia)”910 and “ASDT (Associacou Sosialis Demokrata Timorence)”. The Memorandum was signed at “Bobonaroe (Delly)”911 by: the Meeting Chairman, J.B. Mayeke Horta BC; the Secretary, Fransisco Bery; and the Presidium Manager, J.M. van Belly P. BA. Information addressees on the Memorandum included the UN Secretary General; the “Consulates” of Indonesia, Australia, Portugal, and India; the Chairman of the Portuguese Parliament; and the Chairmen of AITI and ASDT. The subsequent Note requested that the UN Secretary General submit the attached Memorandum to the next General Session of the UN – and declared Codes Timde’s support of “Apodeti/A.I.T.I.”. While the Note was signed by J.M. Van Belly P. BA as “Presidium Management as Free Command Regional Timor Delly” at “Bobonaru”, the Codes Timde postal address was given as “P.P. Box 184, Ujung Pandang” – ie the major town in southern Sulawesi, formerly “Makassar”. The Note’s information addressees included the Chairman of Apodeti, the Prime Minister of Australia, the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta, the Portuguese Prime Minister, the Portuguese Foreign Minister, and the Indonesian Foreign Minister. Codes Timde had also sent statements to Indonesian government agencies. On 13 December 1974, the Counsellor of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta was shown a letter from Van Belly by Harry Tjan Silalahi - which included a manuscript notation by Indonesian General Ali Moertopo912 to the effect that Codes Timde, and the URT-

907

Memorandum, 13/III/C.T./FC/74, Presidium Management Collective Democracy Students of Timor Delly (Codes-Timde), Bobonaroe [sic] (Delly) [sic], 13 May 1974 (NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1 Part 4). 908 Note, 14/VII/V/FC/74, Presidium Management Collective Democracy Students of Timor Delly (Codes Timde), Bobonaru [sic], 10 July 1974 – see Annex R. 909 Probably meant to be “Atambua”, the major border town in Indonesian Timor – about 60 kilometres west of the Portuguese Timor border. 910 Apodeti was initially named “AITI” – see also footnote 859. 911 Probably meant to be “Bobonaro”, a major border town in Portuguese Timor in the central border area (see the map at cover). 912 As noted earlier, Major General Ali Moertopo was Head of Division III Bakin (Badan Ko-ordinasi Intelijen Negara Indonesia - State Intelligence Co-ordination Agency Indonesia) and Head of Special Operations (Opsus). Bakin and Opsus were “charged with formulating Indonesia’s clandestine response to Timor’s decolonisation” - Conboy, K., Intel, 2004, op.cit., p.88.

184 D, “were causing confusion and could be communist.”913 As a result of Ali Moertopo’s notes, Tjan stated that the activities of these groups would be stopped. On 23 December 1974, the Codes Timde “First Branch of Indonesia” issued a Pernyataan Dukungan (Statement of Support) for the Codes Timde “Central Committee of Management” in Dili (see Annex S) – with copies to a wide range of addressees including embassies in Jakarta and the United Nations. The statement referred to an agreement of 10 January 1971 between the Codes Timde chairman, J.M. Van Belly P. BA, and “the representative of the Portuguese Government, Francisco da Costa Gomes.”914 Rejecting a referendum to determine the territory’s future, the statement called for “Timor-Dilly’s” independence to be managed by an “International Committee to be appointed by the UN Secretary General” – and strongly opposed communist influence and intimidation in Portuguese Timor. On 7 January 1975, Van Belly called at the Australian Embassy in Jakarta seeking to visit Australia in order to call on the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs – and requesting that Australia cover the travel costs. While in Canberra, Van Belly intended to explain that Codes Timde rejected the concept of a referendum in Portuguese Timor, but instead demanded an “extraordinary congress of representatives of all political parties and other prominent people in the territory to determine what form the future Government should take.”915 Questioned on his organization’s support, Van Belly stated that there were 3,000 Codes Timde members in Portuguese Timor – mostly students and other young people. In other countries, he claimed, there were about three million sympathisers – and that there were branches in Indonesia, Australia (Sydney), Portugal and India. He noted that he had been received by the Indonesian Foreign Minister in November 1974 as a “State Guest”, and Codes Timde had the support of both Fretilin and Apodeti. Van Belly said that Codes Timde supported independence for the territory.916 The Australian Embassy memorandum (footnote 915) added that “there has been some speculation that Mr Van Belly might work for Ali Murtopo”, and that Van Belly had also called on the United States Embassy in Jakarta. Van Belly visited the Australian Embassy again on 5 February 1975 to query the status of his application to travel to Australia – and informed a junior Embassy official that the future status of Portuguese Timor “must be ‘merdeka berdiri sendiri’, free and independent.” When Van Belly subsequently called at the Australian Embassy on 24 February, he was told that “there was no possibility of financial support being given to his trip”, and he would not be able to meet with Australian Government ministers – but that he would be able to meet with Department of Foreign Affairs officials in Canberra if he wished. Van Belly responded that if there was no financial support for the proposed Codes Timde visit, then perhaps only two 913

Australian Embassy – Jakarta, Memo 1445, 17 December 1974 (NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1 Part

5). 914

In 1971, General Francisco da Costa Gomes was the Portuguese military commander in Angola. He later served as the President of Portugal in the period from late September 1974 to late June 1976. 915 Australian Embassy – Jakarta, Memo 41, 14 January 1975 (NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1 Part 5). 916 This was contrary to Van Belly’s statement, ie “the desire to join with Indonesia”, reported in the Antara article, “Codes Timde Wants Merger With Indonesia”, of 20 November 1974 – see footnote 906.

185 members – not five, might make a two or three-day visit. Before departing, Van Belly “expressed some anxiety that the Indonesian Government might know of his visit to Australia.”917 This apparently was the Australian Embassy’s last contact with the Codes Timde organization. Balikh Takes Control – and a URT-D “East Timor Constitution” According to Bakin, in March 1975, “Brig. Gen. Analessy” of the URT-D travelled on a false passport to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. “While in Kuala Lumpur, he had described URT’s aim as that of independence for Portuguese Timor without any connection with Indonesia. However, he did not rule out the possibility that at a later dated an independent East Timor might join Indonesia.”918 After a seeming six months of inaction, M.S.A Balikh issued a URT-D Struggle Delegation directive on “Government Administration” on 10 May 1975 advising that he, ie “M.S.A. Balikh”, had “taken over all activities of the Union of the Republic of Timor after comprehensive investigation and consideration.”919 Balikh announced that he would now hold the position of Prime Minister of the URT-D as well as that of Head of the Struggle Delegation – following the “agreement of all comrades.” The directive concluded with assurances that Balikh had never received “contributions” from anyone – nor sought personal advantage. Rather, he “had sacrificed his career to advance the struggle for his beloved Timor.” According to Indonesian intelligence sources, there had been tension within the URT-D movement between members with Malaysian origins and those with Timorese and/or Christian backgrounds eg Emanuel Mau Bere.920 Balikh’s directive appeared to evidence that schism in the URT-D movement. Balikh related that in early-mid 1975 he was invited to a “political meeting” in Jakarta – in Room 60 of the “Hotel Menteng”, with the invitation specifying “pakaian lengkap” ie the wearing of a suit or equivalent. On arrival, he was met by the “Wali Kota” (Mayor) of Dili921 – but, soon after, an argument broke out among the attendees, and Indonesian security officials entered and broke up the meeting.

917

Australian Embassy – Jakarta, Minute, 24 February 1975 (NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1 Part 7). Van Belly had earlier asked that his proposed visit to see Ministers in Australia not be mentioned to “others in Jakarta” by Australian Embassy staff – see footnote 915 ( Memo 41, para 5). 918 Australian Embassy – Jakarta, Memo 004, 31 December 1975 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/2 Part 2). A “Brigadier General Analessy” was noted as the URT-D Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Minister for Information and Propaganda in the URT-D Central Government Council listing of 11 June 1972 (see footnotes 813, 819). Analessy was also listed as the First Deputy Chairman of the URT-D Military Council on 11 June 1972 (see footnotes 814, 820). 919 Administrasi Pemerintahan – Mengambil oper semua kegiatan (Government Administration Assuming control of all activities), Struggle Delegation of the URT-D, 10 May 1975. In December 2004, Balikh related to the author that he termed his new Cabinet – the “Kabinet Restafel” (ie from the Dutch “rijsttafel” – “rice-table”: a lavish meal served in Java with many side-dishes). 920 Email from Ken Conboy - Jakarta-based author and analyst, 26 September 1965. A Bakin officer also told an Australian Embassy official that a split occurred in 1972: see Australian Embassy – Jakarta, Memo 004, 31 December 1975 (NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1 Part 18; 3038/2/2 Part 2). 921 Augusto César da Costa Mousinho/Mouzinho (b. 28 August 1936) - the Chairman/Vice President of the UDT, and at that time concurrently “Mayor of Dili” - ie Presidente de Concelho/Câmara de Dili, visited Jakarta in late September 1974 and in mid-late April 1975. Augusto César Mousinho was one of three Timorese who held “High” Chefe de Serviços-level positions in the civil service in 1974 Guterres, F. da Costa, Elites and Prospects of Democracy in East Timor (PhD dissertation), Griffith University, Brisbane, January 2006. Balikh also referred to the planned meeting in Menteng in a November 2007 magazine article – see footnote 993.

186 According to Balikh, he returned the next day – but all of the attendees had dispersed, and the Hotel Menteng staff were very apprehensive. A few months later in late July 1975, Balikh issued a one-page URT-D “very simple” Constitution (Undang Undang Dasar – Uni Republic Timor Timur).922 The preamble to the Constitution declared that “the Uni Republic Timor Timur was based on God; responsibility to the homeland and the people of Timor Timur ; and freedom as the right of all the people of Timor Timur, based on humanitarianism and justice.” The preamble continued that “the Government would be strengthened: internally by enriching comradeship for the whole movement and uniting the Timorese; and externally by discussions and agreements with friendly nearby countries, especially the Malay countries from Polynesia to Melanesia and from Madagascar to Formosa.” The Constitution comprised five chapters, totalling 11 paragraphs. The Republic was to have a “Sosialis” structure, and “sovereignty was completely in the hands of the people – effected through the traditional leaders (liuray2), MPR dan DPR” ((MPR = People’s Consultative Assembly; DPR = People’s Representative Council – ie the same nomenclatures as Indonesia’s two parliamentary houses)).923 The President was to be assisted by a Vice President, Prime Minister, and Deputy Prime Minister. This “United Republic of East Timor Constitution” made no reference to the earlier URT-D Constitution of 4 May 1965 (footnote 750 and Annex K). In describing a government structure and process, this “Balikh/East Timor” Constitution was far more specific than the more general and ideological May 1965 Constitution. Further, the Balikh/East Timor version contained no “pan-Malay” rhetoric ie no reference to a “Malay country”, “Malay-Melanesian group of islands”, nor “Malayans … from Hawaii to Malagasy.” Responding to Events in Portuguese Timor The URT-D was ignored by all political parties in Portuguese Timor924 and had been unable to involve itself meaningfully in the swift-moving events in Portuguese Timor in 1975. In late May, the UDT withdrew from the Fretilin-UDT coalition, and Fretilin did not attend the Portuguese-sponsored “decolonisation” talks held in Macau in late June. On 11 July 1975, the Portuguese Government promulgated Law 7/75 for the “self-determination” of Portuguese Timor. This provided for a transitional government to prepare for the election of a Popular Assembly on 17 October 1976 – and the termination of Portuguese sovereignty on 22 October 1978.925 On 11 August 1975, the UDT – as the MAC (Movimento Anti-Comunista), mounted a “coup”, seizing control of Dili – and this was followed a few days later by 922

Undang Undang Dasar –Uni Republik Timor Timur, Jakarta, 22 July 1975. The preamble section was printed on the letterhead of the Central Presidium of the Uni Republic Timor. Balikh passed a copy to the author in December 2004. The status of this document is however unclear - ie the extent to which it was formally promulgated and distributed is not known. 923 The Constitution is confusing in several parts. The “DPR” is described as a component of the MPR. However, the DPR is not treated in a separate paragraph – but paragraph 10 covers a “Dewan Liuray” (Council of Traditional Leaders). 924 José Ramos-Horta’s statements in Jakarta in mid-1974 have been noted previously – see footnotes 896 and 897. 925 Lei Constitucional No. 7/75, de 17 Julho 1975 – is discussed at pp.174-177 in Pires, M.L., Descolonização …, 1991, op.cit – and included at pp.439-453. The Law is also included at pp.34-36 in Krieger, H. & Rauschning, D., East Timor and the International Community – Basic Documents, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997.

187 a successful “counter-coup” by the Fretilin party (beginning on 15 August and completed on 20 August). On 26/27 August, the Portuguese authorities in Dili evacuated to Ataúro Island926 and, by the end of August, Fretilin controlled Dili. Large numbers of UDT and some Apodeti cadre and supporters fled westward to the border areas927 and subsequently crossed into Indonesian Timor – joining the large number of refugees – and Apodeti “partisans”, already there.928 On 22 August 1975, Balikh – in his capacity as Head of the URT-D Struggle Delegation, issued a URT-D circular “on behalf of all overseas Timorese in close neighbouring countries” urging unity between the three major political parties in Portuguese Timor.929 A week later on 30 August, Balikh issued a “Statement on the Situation in Portuguese Timor” addressed to the President of Portugal – see Annex T.930 This demanded that “Portugal resolve the turbulence in Portuguese Timor 926

Governor (Lieutenant Colonel) Mário Lemos Pires, his staff and a group of about 85 Portuguese military personnel “withdrew to Atauro without any explanation … to prevent bloodshed between Timorese and Portuguese. … the only group I could rely on” was two parachute units comprising less than 70 men – Major General (Retd) Lemos Pires statement: CAVR - “Internal Political Conflict 19741976 – CAVR National Public Hearing 15-18 December 2003” – Appendix 2 in CAVR Update December 2003-January 2004, Dili, pp.20-23. “A tranferência para a ilha de Ataúro” is related in Pires, M.L., Descolonização …, 1991, op.cit., pp.245-269. At 0330hrs on 27 August 1975, the freighter MacDili departed the UDT-controlled Dili port and towed “a flotilla” of vessels to Ataúro before continuing to Darwin with several hundred refugees – see Marine Operations – Canberra, Marsar 75/0874, 27 August 1975 and Department of Foreign Affairs – Canberra, Cable O.Ch259550, 27 August 1975 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 8). Enroute to Ataúro, the MacDili met briefly with the incoming ABRI Operasi Prihatin vessels (see footnote 543). 927 As noted earlier, Fretilin and UDT reportedly fought a week-long battle at “Rai Cortu” - 20km west of Dili, and evacuated dependants by sea from Maubara – described at pp.34-35 in Subroto, H., Saksi Mata …, 1996, op.cit. Fretilin forces seized both Baucau (4 September) and Liquiça (7 September) by “negotiation” - with the surrender of numbers of UDT troops. According to Jolliffe, “full scale fighting erupted throughout the territory, leaving 1500-2000 people dead in five weeks.” – Jolliffe, J., Balibo, 2009, op.cit., pp.76-77. 928 See the Merdeka cartoons earlier at pp.177-178. Registered refugees in “West Timor” numbered 31,397 as at 17 September 1975 - according to a Foreign Broadcast Information Service (Bangkok) bulletin of 18 September 1975 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/2 Part 2). See also Keesing’s Contemporary Archives p.27534 reporting that “40,000 refugees fled to West Timor” and were located in “14 camps”. 929 Pimpinan Ketiga Partai Politik Di Timor Dilly (To the Leaders of the Three Political Parties in Timor Dilly), No. 0127/PP-URTD/VIII/15, Jakarta, 22 August 1975. The signature block of the circular was overprinted with the stamp of the “Perwakilan Timor – Jakarta” (Timor Delegation – Jakarta). 930 Pernyataan situasi di Timport (Statement on the Situation in Portuguese Timor), No. 0128/PPURTD/VIII/75, Jakarta, 30 August 1975 – see Annex T, including an English translation. The Statement was certified/signed by Moh Saleh Akbar Balikh – and included the signatures of Emanuel Mau Bere, Simon Serang Prya, and G. Tom Pelo. Information copies were addressed to the Governor of Portuguese Timor, the Portuguese Embassy in Jakarta, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, and the All Malay Race Union in Jakarta – covered by Australian Embassy – Jakarta, Memo 1283, 4 September 1975 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/2 Part 1; A10463, 801/13/11/1 Part 13). Interestingly, “G. Tom Pelo” may have been “Gerson Tom Pello” – one of the “Permesta 14” Indonesians given asylum in Portuguese Timor in 1958; and one of the four later imprisoned in Lisbon and Angola following the failed 1959 Viqueque Rebellion – see footnotes 209, 211, 221, 227, 228, 230, 308, 323, 328, 336, 338, 346, 350, 360, 363, 364, 370, 452, 472 and 507. Gerson Pello was in Jakarta in 1974 – see Rohi, P.A., TimorPortugis dari Masa-kemasa, Kompas, Jakarta, 4 October 1974, p.V. However, P. A. Rohi, a Jakartabased journalist and godson of Gerson Pello, advised the author that it was unlikely that Gerson had been involved with the URT-D as: “Gerson never referred to himself in writing as ‘G. Tom Pelo’ and did not use his middle name ‘Tom’ ” (although P.A. Rohi had inserted “Tom” in a 1995 press interview – see footnote 211) - email from P.A. Rohi, 10 December 2006. Peter Apolonius Rohi (“Kore Rohi”), journalist, was born on the island of Sabu (southwest of Kupang) on 14 November 1942 and served in the Indonesian Marine Corps (Korps Komando Marinir - KKO) in the period 1964-1970.

188 caused by the three political parties that the Portuguese Government had created.” The Statement declared that “no other country could resolve the upheaval – but if Portugal itself could not put an end to the situation, then it would be best if full independence were granted to the people of Timor Dilly”. In concluding, the Statement advised that “the freedom fighters of the Union of the Republic of TimorDilly were ready - and awaiting their Homeland’s independence from the Portuguese Government”. A few weeks later in late October, Balikh addressed an open letter to the President of Portugal and the media that was highly critical of the “three Portuguese-created parties” and “certain people” intentionally causing turbulence in Portuguese Timor and “making victims of the Timorese people.”931 This letter explained the URT-D’s “priority” credentials as a movement promoting Portuguese Timor’s independence - and complained of Portugal’s failure to recognize the URT-D - ie just the “three Portugal-created parties.” This, the URT-D claimed, “meant that the Portuguese Government desired a period of protracted warfare in Portuguese Timor.” The letter noted that since 1960 the URT-D had established contact with a range of organizations - ie “the Malay Races Union, Asia-Africa Organisation, the People’s Alliance, the Asia-Africa Journalists’ Association, the Islamic World Organisation, the International Islamic Struggle Fund Council; and countries including: New Zealand, the Republic of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Republic of Singapore, Australia, the Republic of Sri Lanka, the Democratic Republic of Algeria, Saudi Arabia, the People’s Republic of Yemen, the Kingdom of Jordan, and many more.” However, the letter noted that although the URT-D was “well-known worldwide” and “many countries had promised assistance” - such assistance “had not eventuated.” Timor Students Association of Central Java and Jogyakarta In mid-September 1975, the “Timor Students Association of Central Java and D.I. Jogyakarta” (D.I. = Daerah Istimewa – ie Special Region) sent a “Protest Note” to the “Portuguese Ambassador” in Jakarta. The Note - that declared the Republic of Indonesia 1945 Constitution as a “basic consideration”, “refused fully the policy of Mr. Sr. Almeida Santo [sic], about the Government in Portuguese Timor that will be given to the Fretellin [sic] himself” - and declared that “we support and approve fully all ways of acting of the Indonesian Government in restoring the peace and order in Portuguese Timor.”932 The Note was signed by “seven students from the border of Timor, representing one thousand” of the Association’s students following a meeting in Semarang (Central Java) on 1 September 1975. However, unlike Codes Timde, the Association did not claim to have family members or supporters in Portuguese Timor. However, from the names of the Note’s signatories – see opposite page, it can be inferred that the Association’s members were from Eastern Indonesia (including Nusa Tenggara Timor, the Moluccas and Papua).

931

Untitled – to President of Portugal, ..53/PP-URTD/X, Jakarta, 27 October 1975. The letter’s typed subscription comprised: MSA Balihk [sic] as Head of the URT-D Struggle Delegation – and Simon Soerang Prya and Emneul [sic] Mau bere. Additional copies were addressed to: Adam Malik, Indonesian Foreign Minister; the Governor of Portuguese Timor; the Portuguese Legation in Jakarta; “30 Traditional Leaders in Portuguese Timor”; the World; and File. 932 A copy of the Protest Note, in English, with a covering letter signed by the Association’s President (Gaspar Bas) and General Secretary (Yulius Bria) was received at the Australian Embassy – Jakarta on 14 September 1975 (NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1 Part 14).

189

1. Gaspar Bas

2. Yulius Bria Sr.

3. Michael Kabosu

4. Domi Yos Atok

5. Amos Corputty Mo. 6. Cypri Taolin

7. Herman Fouk

190 THE INDONESIAN INVASION AND OCCUPATION From Infiltration and Raids - to Amphibious/Airborne Attack As related earlier, Indonesia’s destabilization operation against Portuguese Timor, Operasi Komodo, had established it headquarters in Atambua (West Timor) in August 1974 and began training Apodeti recruits there in late 1974 (see footnotes 873-879).933 Beginning in late 1974, Lisbon had begun returning Portuguese troops to “the Metropole” – and the ranks of the regular troops were rapidly filled with Timorese recruits.934 “During the first quarter of 1975, this paltry force was pared down further. All three of the companies comprised of Europeans – the artillerymen and military police – were withdrawn to Portugal with their equipment. Two of the hunter companies ((caçadores – ie light infantry)) – at Dili and Ossú – were disbanded, leaving one apiece at Baucau, Lospalos, Maubisse, and the Oecusse enclave; and the two cavalry squadrons were consolidated into one “agrupamento de cavalaria” at Bobonaro.935 The Portuguese military strength and effectiveness in Portuguese Timor declined markedly over several months, and José Ramos-Horta later remarked that the “troop reduction took place at a time when the country was undergoing a delicate and unpredictable phase of decolonization. Next door, Indonesia saw with relief the diminishing Portuguese military presence in East Timor.”936 Meanwhile, Indonesian preparations accelerated. In February 1975, an assessment by the Australian Joint Intelligence Organisation related: “In November last, President Suharto gave to political and intelligence action groups the main carriage of Indonesian policy for the absorption of Portuguese Timor. But the option of direct military intervention by the Armed Forces appeared to be retained. The political and intelligence action groups have undertaken operations vigorously on a number of fronts. … New radio stations in Indonesian Timor beamed at Portuguese Timor were established. Intelligence agents have gone to Dili and have given material aid and encouragement to the pro-Indonesian political party. Some infiltrations have occurred in the border regions for familiarisation, contact, bribery etc. … Our Embassy in Jakarta reports that the Indonesians are getting increasingly into a 933

According to Subroto, H., Operasi Udara …, op.cit., 2005, p.39 - Captain Yunus Yosfiah’s “Tim Susi/Nanggala 2” arrived in Kupang on 19 April 1975 and were also tasked with infiltration into Portuguese Timor and the establishment of guerrilla bases. For detail, see Conboy, K., Kopassus, 2003, op.cit, pp.206-208; Conboy, K., Elite: The Special Forces of Indonesia 1950-2008, Equinox Publishing (Asia), Jakarta, 2008. For activity by Indonesia’s State Intelligence Coordination Agency (Bakin) in Operations Komodo and Flamboyan - see also Conboy, K., Intel, 2004, op.cit., pp.89-95; and Bakin’s almost exclusion from operations in East Timor in the 1980s and 1990s in favour of ABRI/TNI’s intelligence agency BAIS/BIA (Strategic Intelligence Agency/Armed Forces Intelligence Agency) – p.155, p.199. José Ramos-Horta has related that, in April 1975, he was informed by an Indonesian journalist that in December 1974 “100 Indonesian commandos were sent to West Timor as part of the first phase of a campaign to destabilize East Timor.” - Ramos-Horta, J., Funu, 1987, op.cit., p.65. 934 In a mid-December 1974 address, Governor Lieutenant Colonel Mário Lemos Pires announced a “restructuring” and the “redeployment of metropolitan Army personnel” from Portuguese Timor. The ill-discipline and ineffectiveness of the Portuguese forces was related earlier at page 175. 935 Conboy, K., Kopassus, op.cit., 2003, pp.209-210. In early April 1975, acknowledging internal security difficulties, Portugal dispatched a paratroop detachment – augmented in July and eventually about 70-strong, to Portuguese Timor ie Destacamento de Caçadores Pára-quedistas Nº 1 (armed with Armalite AR-15 rifles). 936 Ramos-Horta, J., Funu, 1987, op.cit., p.48.

191 frame of mind for direct intervention. … Plans and preparations for military operations have now been detected. They include planning to deploy Mustang ground-attack aircraft to Kupang, the assembly at Surabaya of small, fast surface craft, and training activities of air drops of troops and marine corps landings.”937 In February 1975 - as noted earlier, a planning meeting at the Indonesian Defence Department Headquarters in Jakarta examined the requirements for a conventional military seizure of Portuguese Timor – and determined that there were significant shortfalls in ABRI’s operational readiness.938 In March 1975, Australian officials in Kuala Lumpur were informed by Malaysian Foreign Affairs officers that “500 paratroopers from Murtopo’s organisation had been positioned in Portuguese Timor [sic] even before Santos’ visit to the territory, with the task of spreading pro-Indonesia propaganda, harrassing Fretilin, and supporting Apodeti.” The Malaysian officers contended that these Indonesian military personnel “were not undertaking any other than their present psychological warfare operations which involved the 500 paratroopers already mentioned.”939 Soon after, in April 1975, the Komodo training operations conducted at Atambua were taken over by a group of Kopassandha officers led by Colonel Dading Kalbuadi – this accelerated phase was called Operasi Flamboyan/Poinciana.940 A high-level Australian intelligence assessment later summarised as follows: “In early 1975, Indonesia introduced several hundred Special Forces troops into the border areas of Timor for intelligence collection and cross-border familiarization. Training courses began in Java for politico/intelligence cadres who would identify and support pro-Indonesian elements within East Timor. Included among the options was military intervention for which contingency planning was developed. After August 1975, Fretilin gained military ascendancy and took control of the main towns. Remnants of other parties and upwards of 40,000 people took refuge in Indonesian Timor. Indonesia set out to indoctrinate and train the refugees and win over the political elements to pro-Indonesian commitments. Attempts, not successful, were made to

937

Director - Joint Intelligence Organisation, “Current Indonesian Attitudes on Intervention in Portuguese Timor”, Canberra, 11 February 1975 (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 4). 938 The shortfalls (ie in Bahasa: “kebutuhan”) are detailed in Subroto, H., Operasi Udara … 2005, op.cit., p.33 – see also earlier footnote 886. 939 Australian High Commission – Kuala Lumpur, Memo 302/24, 3 April 1975 (NAA: A1838, 3038/7/1 Part 1). The Malaysian officer quoted may have intended to state that the 500 Indonesian paratroopers had been positioned in Indonesian Timor ie not Portuguese Timor , or against Portuguese Timor -which would accord with earlier reports. As noted earlier, Major General Ali Moertopo was Head of Bakin’s Division III and Head of Special Operations (Opsus). Dr António de Almeida Santos the Portuguese Minister for Inter-Territorial Coordination, visited Australia, Portuguese Timor and Indonesia in October 1974 – and later visited Ataúro in the period 28 August-22 September 1975. 940 Flamboyan, initiated by DEPHANKAM’s Brigadier General Benny Moerdani, was initially an operation to gather combat intelligence to support any future military requirements against Portuguese Timor. As such, it ran in parallel with the Opsus Komodo operation whose focus was influencing political developments in Portuguese Timor and strategic intelligence gathering. For a detail on Operasi Flamboyan see Subroto, H., Operasi Udara …, 2005, op.cit., pp.36-41 and Conboy, K., Kopassus, 2003, op.cit., pp.199-235 - and also the subsequent Operasi Seroja at pp.237-253.

192 infiltrate armed groups of refugees back into Portuguese Timor to kindle resistance to Fretilin.”941 In mid-1975, the Indonesian Regional Military Command (Kodam-XVI/ Udayana – Denpasar, Bali) established a new military district headquarters (Koramil) at Atapupu – a port in Indonesian Timor about 12 kilometres west of the Portuguese Timor border and about 25 kilometres north of Atambua, “to prepare facilities in the border area to support subsequent operations”.942 The Koramil commander, Second Lieutenant Kiki Syahnakri, was allocated 13 Kopassandha personnel for cross-border information-gathering missions. At about mid-year, intelligence operations increased and a “handful” of Kopassandha personnel entered Portuguese Timor disguised as traders to collect information.943 With the withdrawal to the border area of UDT forces in late August 1975 – and soon after into Indonesian Timor, UDT declared its support for integration with Indonesia, and its forces came under Indonesian command ie together with Apodeti elements.944 In late August, the Australian Embassy in Jakarta received an “assurance from Sudharmono and Moerdani if Indonesia does decide to ‘move’ then Australia would be informed in advance. Moerdani said at least two hours’ notice.”945 At the end of August 1975, “volunteer” Kopassandha troops – with Apodeti porters and guides, conducted covert operations into East Timor from Indonesian West Timor (ie Operasi Flamboyan/Poinciana) - including minor harassment attacks against Atsabe, Atabae and the outskirts of Fatu Besi (see the 1970s-era map on front cover – Atabae946, a major Fretilin base near Fatularan, was 45km northeast of Batugadé; Fatu Besi is northeast of Atabae and southeast of Liquiça).947

941

Jockel, G.A., Chairman, Assessment of the Timorese Situation, National Intelligence Committee (NIC), Canberra, 27 January 1976, p.2 – submitted as a paper to the Australian Cabinet on 6 February 1976 (NAA: A12934, FAD2). 942 Subroto, H., Operasi Udara …, 2005, op.cit., p.31. 943 These included Lieutenant Untung Suroso and Lieutenant Stevanus Gatot Purwanto – see Conboy, K., Kopassus, 2003, op.cit., p.207 (Suroso); and “Kami Saat Itu Serba Salah”, Tempo Magazine, No.15/X, Jakarta, 8-14 December 2009 (Stevanus Gatot Purwanto as “Aseng”). See footnote 873 for earlier intelligence-collecting visits to Dili by Colonel Sugianto and other ABRI officers. 944 The UDT’s “Lopes da Cruz faction” reportedly passed a written commitment to Indonesia on 1 September – Australian Embassy – Jakarta, Cable O.JA1615, 3 September 1975 (NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1 Part 13). “As we are heading the Anti-Communist Movement of 11 August , we are sure that we chose the right way when we gave up our goal of independence and decided to aim for integration into Indonesia.”- Telegram from the President of the UDT to the President of Portugal, Batugadé, 20 September 1975 (and forwarded to the United Nations). 945 Australian Embassy – Jakarta, Cable O.JA1401, 24 August 1975 (NAA: A1838, 3038/13/2/1 Part 1). The Australian Ambassador informed his British and United States counterparts - British Embassy Jakarta, Telegram 313, 25 August 1975. In August 1975, Brigadier L.B. Moerdani (1932-2004) was the senior intelligence officer at the Defence and Security Headquarters; General Sudharmono (1927-2006) was the State Secretary. See also footnotes 950 and 955 for Bakin/CSIS advice to the Australian Embassy on ABRI operations. 946 In 1975, there was no major road along the north coast from Batugadé eastward to Maubara – that road was constructed by Indonesia in the 1980s. Rather, in 1975, the main road from Batugadé ran inland towards Maliana and Bobonaro – with a road about halfway to Maliana leading northward to Atabae. Atabae was relocated to the coastal road in the 1980s. 947 Conboy, K., Kopassus, 2003, op.cit. pp. 212-216 describes the operations in detail. By September 1975, the Kopassandha force (Combat Detachment 2/Group 1) in the border area numbered about 250 – for detail see Subroto, H., Operasi Udara …, 2005, op.cit., pp.38-39. For the organisation and activities of ABRI “volunteers” and partisans – see also: Pinch, D. Magistrate (Coroner), Inquest into

193 Fretilin’s armed forces – ie “Falintil” (Forças Armadas de Libertação Nacional de Timor Leste – founded on 20 August 1975), reportedly comprised a “hard professional core of some 2,500 regular troops”; 7,000 second-line reservists; 10,000 with previous military training, and villagers who had received rudimentary training.948 While their regular troops were equipped with modern NATO G-3 semiautomatic rifles, Falintil’s former second-line reservists had antiquated rifles.949 In early September 1975, the Australian Ambassador in Jakarta reported that Indonesian military activities in Portuguese Timor were still Opsus-directed “covert” operations - and that President Soeharto “had steadfastly adhered to his decision not to use force despite pressure from many of his senior advisors”, refused “to agree to Indonesian armed intervention in Portuguese Timor”, and was “refusing to be drawn into intervening militarily in Portuguese Timor and risking international approbrium [sic]”.950 A senior Australian Embassy official was also told by the Embassy’s Indonesian interlocutors that “there would be no outright military intervention. Indonesia was now looking to the UDT to bring about integration. On 1 September, they had received from the UDT President, Lopes da Cruz, a statement supporting integration with Indonesia and asking for Indonesian assistance. This statement would not be published now, but would be kept until an appropriate occasion arose. Such an occasion would be a declaration of independence by FRETILIN.”951 Further Indonesian covert operations were followed on 18 September with small raids attempted against Suai, Tilomar, Bobonaro and Maliana.952 At about this time, an Indonesian soldier, Corporal Weli, from a regular ABRI infantry battalion the Death of Brian Ray Peters, Sydney, 16 November 2007; and Ball, D. and McDonald. H., Death in Balibo – Lies in Canberra, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 2000, pp.50-64. 948 Dunn J., 2003, op.cit., p.251. For Segunda Linha reservists, see also footnotes 880 and 881. 949 In an interview in Darwin, Portuguese Major F. Dentinho (formerly the military materiel/ordnance officer in Dili) assessed Falintil/UDT weaponry as: “Falintil G-3 rifles: 3,700 (UDT had seized 1,000), Mauser rifles: 15,000 (UDT 8,000), MG 250: (few), 81mm mortars : 20 ( 6-7), 60mm mortars: 40 (unknown), bazookas: 20 (0), 75mm Atk Gun: 6 (0)” - HQ Darwin Cable O.JA2461, 3 September 1975 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 9). The six "75mm Atk Guns" were either the German-made Rheinmetal-Borsig 75mm P.40 howitzers, or the Italian Obice 75mm L18 Mod 34 - a mountain howitzer. The "bazookas" were the US 3.5" RL. In Lisbon, Portuguese Major Francisco Mota assessed that the weaponry left behind by the Portuguese forces comprised: “15,000 G-3 rifles, 81mm and 60 mm mortars - 12 to 15 each, small number of bazookas, some older artillery - but no Timorese capable of using these (however lots of artillery ammunition with which to create explosives)” – Australian Embassy Lisbon, Cable LB281, 4 September 1975 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1, Part 9). 950 Australian Embassy – Jakarta, Cable O.JA1615, 3 September 1975 (NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1 Part 13, pp.281-288). The Ambassador also noted that: “We now have from Lim Bian Kie (Murtopo’s Private Secretary) and Tjan (CSIS) a detailed account of Indonesia’s planning in this respect” – ie of “a continuation and extension of Indonesia’s covert activities” ie reporting 2 September discussions with Lim and Tjan (NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1 Part 13, pp. 324-326 – see below). Subsequently, an Australian Embassy official remarked in a manuscript note to a 10 September 1975 cable from Canberra that “Indonesian having confided her most secret plans and aims to Australia would justifiably feel double-crossed by us.” – ie relative to “regional endorsement” (NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1 Part 13, pp.55-61. 951 Australian Embassy – Djakarta (A.R. Taylor), Record of Conversation (Harry Tjan & Lim Bian Kie) 2 September 1975 (NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1 Part 13, pp. 324-326). 952 In early September 1975, Harry Tjan Silalahi (of CSIS) noted to an Australian Embassy official in Jakarta that “the OPSUS ((Special Operations)) plan was being implemented, some of the refugees would be replaced with armed ‘volunteers’ who will provide backbone for the UDT and other antiFretilin groups”: Australian Embassy – Jakarta, Cable CH263843, 6 September 1975 (NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1 Part 13). These Flamboyan operations are described in Subroto, H., Operasi Udara …, 2005, op.cit., pp.36-41– including Kopassandha Captain Sutiyoso’s recall from a planned landing on the coast south of Viqueque in south-central Portuguese Timor (see also Conboy, K., Kopassus, 2003, op.cit., p.226).

194 Yonif 317, was captured by Fretilin forces in the Bobonaro area and subsequently imprisoned in Dili.953 “Indonesia also sought to gain Portugal’s agreement for it to intervene either unilaterally or under joint arrangements to restore order. Failure to get agreement, the spread of Fretilin control and concern that Fretilin would proclaim victory as a national independence movement led to direct Indonesian military involvement in October. President Soeharto ordered that it be covert.”954 However, as the Flamboyan Kopassandha troops and the partisans would be unable to dislodge Fretilin positions in the border area and establish enclaves within Portuguese Timor, regular ABRI troops who had deployed to Indonesian Timor in late September joined the operation.955 In early October 1975, an ABRI Combined Task Force with armour, naval and air support, launched Flamboyan Phase II - with anti-Fretilin East Timorese troops under ABRI command, and advanced into Portuguese Timor through Batugadé (7 October), Balibo (16 October)956, Maliana (16 October), Atabae (28 November)957, 953

The capture of an Indonesian corporal at Bobonaro in September 1975 (assumed to be Weli) is described by Alexandrino at pp.87-99 in Turner, M., Telling – East Timor: Personal Testimonies 19421992, New South Wales University Press, Kensington, 1992. J.S. Dunn interviewed Corporal Weli in the prison at Taibessi (Dili) - Dunn, J.S., The Timor Affair – From Civil War to Invasion by Indonesia, Legislative Research Service, Parliament of Australia, 27 February 1976, p.11 (NAA: A1838, 3038/10/13/1 Annex 1). Corporal Weli (as “Sergeant Welly”) was summarily executed in Dili by a Fretilin cadre, Raúl Isaac, on 8 December 1975 – author’s research at CAVR, Balide (Dili), 2 July 2007. Conboy, K., Kopassus, 2003, op.cit., also notes two Kopassandha sergeants missing-in-action in September – Said, p.216; and Suparman, p.220. 954 Jockel, G.A., Chairman, Assessment of the Timorese Situation, National Intelligence Committee (NIC), Canberra, 27 January 1976, p.2. 955 The ABRI force - Komando Tugas Gabungan (Kogasgab - Combined Task Force) had been approved on 31 August – for detail see Subroto, H., Operasi Udara …, 2005, op.cit., pp.41-50; Conboy, K., Kopassus, 2003, op.cit., pp.223-226; and Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi TNI, Sejarah TNI … Jilid IV, 2000, op.cit., p.145. The Australian Embassy – Jakarta was informed by Harry Tjan Silalahi that “up to 3800 Indonesian soldiers from Java would be put into Portuguese Timor gradually. Atsabe would be their base. The king of Atsabe ((Guilherme Gonçalves)) would be the figure-head of the antiFretilin side.” This was a “significant escalation of Indonesian involvement”: Australian Embassy – Jakarta, Cable O.JA2161, 30 September 1975 (NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1 Part 14). Detail of the Indonesian advance – ie “the stepped up operation” to begin on 15 October, was subsequently advised by Tjan to his Australian Embassy interlocutors: Australian Embassy – Jakarta, Cable O.JA2432, 15 October 1975 (NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1 Part 15, p.415). This information described ABRI’s planned advances to begin on 15 October from Batugadé to Balibo-Maliana-Atsabe (with a force of 3,800 to be deployed against Atsabe), then towards Dili through Ermera; and through Suai to SameMaubisse-Aileu and Dili; with an amphibious landing at Maubara, then moving through Liquiça to Dili. Subsequently, in Tjan’s absence, Sujarti of CSIS advised the Australian Embassy on 5 December that Dili would be attacked after President Ford left Jakarta – “as early as the night of 6 Dec 75, but there were also logistic problems” – Australian Embassy – Jakarta, Cable O.JA3508, 5 December 1975 (NAA: A10463, 801/13//11/1 Part 17). In a submission to the Minister, a senior Australian Department of Foreign Affairs official discussed whether it was in “Australia’s interests” for their Embassy in Jakarta to continue to receive “very sensitive information” - “in particular from Mr Harry Tjan and General Moerdani about Indonesian military plans for involvement”, lest “the Indonesians put the ((Australian)) Government in a position of conniving with them in their military intervention in the territory.” – Submission – Canberra, 27 October 1975 (NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1/2 Part 2 – Way, W. (ed), 2000, pp.516-517. For charges of “the connivance ((conivência)) of the Australian government … contributing decisively to the invasion of the former Portuguese colony” – see Fernandes, M.S., “A Preponderância dos Factores Exógenos”, 2007, op.cit., pp.90-91, pp.162-164. 956 For detail, see Pinch, D. Magistrate (Coroner), Inquest into the Death of Brian Ray Peters, Sydney, 16 November 2007. 957 See Subroto, H., Saksi Mata …, 1996, op.cit.,; Subroto, H., Operasi Udara …, 2005, op.cit.; and Kamah, M.S., Seroja: pengalaman …, 1997, op.cit. – Indonesian journalists who accompanied ABRI

195 and Cailaco (4 December). These Indonesian military operations were supported by armed anti-Fretilin Timorese “partisans”958 – principally from Apodeti and UDT, with nominal elements from two minor parties Trabalhista (ie Labour)959 and KOTA (Klibur Oan Timor Aswain – Fighters for Timorese Unity).960 On 28 November 1975, Fretilin unilaterally declared independence in Dili – as the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, with Francisco Xavier do Amaral as its first President. On 29 November, the enclave of Oecusse was occupied by an Indonesian military force without resistance, and its administration taken over by a Timorese Flamboyan/Seroja forces and “partisan” elements. The ABRI attack on Atabae was preceded by four weeks of consolidation - due to heavy Fretilin resistance, difficult terrain, wet season rains, logistic shortfalls and the need for ABRI infantry reinforcements and additional combat support – see also Conboy, K., Kopassus, 2003, op.cit., pp.231-233. 958 Indonesia attempted to maintain a pretence of no involvement by ABRI elements – for example: “Maliana and Bobonaro Fall to Apodeti and MAC”, Berita Yudha (an Army daily newspaper), Jakarta, 17 October 1975, p.1. MAC (Movimento Anti-Comunista – see footnotes 542, 543) was a coalition of UDT (footnote 858), KOTA (see footnote 960) and Trabalhista (see the following footnote). For a description of ABRI volunteers – “Sukarelawan”, and “Os Partisans”, see Carrascalão, M.V., Timor – Antes …, 2006, op.cit., pp.112-117. 959 The Trabalhista party was formed on 17 September 1974 by Paulo Freitas da Silva and Alpidio Abrão Martins. 960 KOTA (Klibur Oan Timor Aswain – Fighters for Timorese Unity), was founded by José Martins (ie José Celestino da Silva Martins ie “José Martins III”, born 29 September 1941) and Leão Pedro dos Reis Amaral in November 1974. It emerged from the earlier Associação Popular Monarquica Timorese (APMT) reportedly founded by Tomás Dias Ximenes on 8 November 1974 – see also “He Wants to be King of Timor – Tomás Maria Ferreira Dias Ximenes”, Indonesia Times, 17 January 1975 (A10463, 801/13/11/1 Part 5). Notes on the founding of APMT/KOTA can be found in Chrystello, C.J., East Timor: The Secret File 1973-1975, eBooksBrasil, 2000, including its founding “premises” with signatories at pp.119-120 and its later manifesto at pp.127-128. Chrystello suggests the visit to Timor by the one-time claimant to the Portuguese throne, Dom Duarte Nuno de Bragança, may have contributed to the formation of the APMT in late 1974. See also Soekanto, Integrasi … , 1976, pp.445447 (including the activities of Ximenes and Martins in Lisbon in April 1975); and the KOTA manifesto at Australian Embassy – Lisbon, Memo 260, 6 June 1975 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/2). José Martins declared that his father, “the former Liurai of Ermera” was “forced to abandon Timor because of his non-acceptance of the colonial regime …” – UN Security Council, S/N 1865, 16 December 1975 (NAA: A1838, 3038/10/13/1 Annex 2; 3038/2/2 Part 2). José Celestino da Silva Martins, after several decades of residence in Portugal, reportedly returned to reside in Portuguese Timor in the period 1959-61 – returned to Portugal and claimed to have been “arrested by the PIDE in 1964 in relation to a liberation movement for the independence of Timor” (UN Security Council, S/N 1865 – see above). In a later statement in mid-1994, José Ma.rtins claimed that in 1962 he was a “political prisoner of the Portuguese colonial power” (Statement by José Martins III, United Nations Decolonization Committee, New York, 13 July 1994). He first came to Australian notice when he called at the Australian Embassy in Lisbon on 11 November 1974 - Australian Embassy – Lisbon, Record of Conversation, 11 November 1974 (NAA: A1838, 935/17/3 Part 3; 3038/10/13/1 Part 1; 3038/2/2 Part 2) when he proposed a “Fourth Solution” whereby Timor would become an Australian “protectorate” or be granted “federated status” with Australia. The movements and activities of José Martins are difficult to confirm. A very critical Indonesian analysis of José Martins can be found at Soekanto, Integrasi … , 1976, op.cit., pp.444-452. This alleges that José Martins did not arrive in Portuguese Timor until after 4 July 1975 – although the Indonesian Consul, E.M. Tomodok, relates meeting José Martins in Dili on 31 May 1975 - Tomodok, E.M., Hari-Hari Akhir ..., op.cit., 1994, p.226. Jolliffe has written: “Martins returned to Timor in June 1975 to form the monarchist party Kota” – Jolliffe, J., Balibo, 2009, op.cit., p.148. José Martins returned to Timor in mid-1975 – and has been incorrectly reported as a member of the Apodeti party in 1974, ie being confused with João Martins Corbafo (see footnotes 526 and 961). Martins was a signatory to the “Balibo Declaration” – but, in early 1976, publicly denounced the Indonesian occupation at a United Nations meeting in New York. In the early 1990s, estranged from the Timorese resistance movement, José Martins founded the Timor Liberation Organisation. He died on 21 August 1996 during a visit to Jakarta to participate in Indonesian National Day activities.

196 “fifth column”.961 On 30 November, the four opposing political parties – UDT, Apodeti, Trabalhista and KOTA, signed the “Balibo Declaration”962 announcing East Timor’s integration with Indonesia. ABRI’s advance eastward into Portuguese Timor had been slowed by Fretilin resistance and heavy wet season rains – and the flooded Loes River north of Atabae was a major obstacle. The Fretilin declaration of 28 November now precipitated a more immediate Indonesian military drive on Dili. On Sunday 7 December 1975, ABRI conducted Operasi Seroja/Lotus with Indonesian airborne and amphibious troops attacking and seizing Dili – followed by the seizure of Baucau on 10/11 December.963 Fretilin’s armed forces – ie Falintil, resisted the Indonesian attacks, but within days had withdrawn south into the mountains of the interior.964 On 17 December, a Provisional Government of East Timor (PGET) was established in Dili comprising elements from UDT, Apodeti, Trabalhista and KOTA – and led by Apodeti’s Arnaldo dos Reis Araújo. 961

João Martins Corbafo (noted as an aspirante in the Police and Crime Archives in September 1973 – BOdT, No.18, 11 March 1974, p.363) was a member of the Apodeti Presidium, and reportedly first raised the Indonesian flag in Pante Makassar (Oecusse): ie “pengibar bendera Merah Putih pertama” – “Pejuang Integrasi Sosialasikan Otonomi Timtim Kepada Masyarakat”, Antara, Dili, 19 November 1998. However, for detail on events – including the flag-raising on 7 December involving the Administrator – Jaime dos Remedios de Oliviera, and José Valente (Tropaz Commander) see Subroto H., Saksi Mata …, 1996, pp.173-180. 962 The “Balibo Declaration” was drafted and signed in Bali (Penida View Hotel) and Atambua – not in Balibo - see Chega !, CAVR Final Report, Part 3, para 278 and Santoso, A., Jejak Jejak Darah – Tragedi dan Pengkhianatan di Timor Timur, Stichting Inham, Amsterdam/Yogyakarta, 1996. Analyses of the Declaration document and its background can be found in several articles by Akihisa Matsuno. Opsus/Komodo Colonel Aloysius Sugianto (see footnotes 859 and 873) admitted to managing the drafting and signing of the Declaration in Bali – Detak, No.38, Th 1, Jakarta, 13-19 April 1999. Signed copies of the Declaration can be found on NAA: A10463, 80113/11/1 Part 16. 963 Operasi Seroja was initiated on 4 December 1975 - for detail see: Subroto, H., Operasi Udara …, op.cit., 2005, pp.46- 52 and 107-167; Conboy, K., Kopassus, 2003, pp.236-253; Conboy, K., Elite: The Special Forces …, 2008, pp.24-34. Madjiah, L.E., “Indonesia’s Military Involvement”, 1999, pp. 6-7, 9-12; and Adrian, B., “Sky Assault on Dili”, Angkasa, No 5, February 1999. See also Subroto, H., 1996; and Ball, D. and McDonald. H., Death in Balibo …, 2000, op.cit., pp.172-177 for detail. The leading elements of ABRI’s amphibious force departed from Tailaco – immediately south of the Loes River, on 6 December – see Kamah, M.S., “Seroja”: pengalaman …, 1997, op.cit. (Kamah accompanied the force). Jolliffe, J. has reported ABRI strength as - “the landing of about 30,000 troops in Dili on 7 December” - Jolliffe, J., Balibo, Scribe, Carlton North, 2009, p.7. 964 The Fretilin leadership withdrew southwards to Aileu, Maubisse, and Same – Xanana Gusmão then moved northeast to the Manatuto area – Gusmão, 2000, pp.39-41. According to Dunn, J., 1996, p.258 and Dunn J., 2003, p.251- Falintil’s strength comprised a “hard professional core of some 2,500 regular troops”; 7,000 second-line reservists; 10,000 with previous military training, and villagers who had received rudimentary training since October 1975 – “It was a people’s army”. For detail on the seizure of Baucau (amphibious landing at Laga to the east and airborne attack at Baucau airfield) - and early ABRI Seroja operations in the Baucau-Viqueque areas see Ahmadi, A (ed), Terbaik …, 1999, pp.345370. ABRI’s Operasi Seroja continued until November 1979. As noted earlier at footnote 926, the Portuguese administration and forces – about 100 strong, had withdrawn to the island of Ataúro on 27/28 August. Two modern Portuguese corvettes were off Dili on 6-8 December supporting the Portuguese administration on Ataúro – F487 NRP João Roby and F488 NRP Afonso Cerqueira (the first corvette had arrived on 1 October; and the corvette NRP F489 Oliveira e Carmo had also earlier been operating in Portuguese Timor waters). The two corvettes noted the approaching ABRI aircraft and naval vessels before dawn on 7 December 1975 but did not engage the Indonesian forces - Pires, M.L., Descolonização …, 1991, op.cit., p.345. Mário Viegas Carrascalão (UDT leader and later East Timor Governor 1982-1992) has speculated that had the two Portuguese vessels moved into the harbour at Dili, the Indonesian airborne and amphibious operation against Dili would have been aborted - and “pages of Portuguese history would have been written in gold” and many thousands of lives saved - Carrascalão, M.V., Timor – Antes …, 2006, op.cit., p.132.

197 The URT-D Seeks a Role – and Foreign Support On 23 December 1975, M.S.A. Balikh called at the Australian Embassy in Jakarta and passed a letter, in Bahasa, to the Embassy’s First Secretary - titled “Standpoint of United Republic of Timor-Dilly.”965 The letter was addressed to the UN Security Council – with copies for “the All Malay Nations Union in Jakarta, other International Organisations, and all Interested States.” The signatories to the letter were: Emanuel Mau Bere - the Minister of Defence; L. Albukhra B. - Foreign Minister; Simon Serang Prya, - Prime Minister; and M. S. A. Balikh as Cabinet Secretary, Minister of State/Head of the Struggle Delegation of the URT-D. The text claimed that the URT-D had held “juridical and historic power” over East Timor since “its proclamation of independence at its emergency headquarters in the Batugade area on 9 April 1961” – while the “three political parties UDT, Apodeti and Fretilin have only recently appeared … and run wild to the point of making the closest neighbouring states become victims because of their actions.” The letter also claimed that “the URT-D is now acting as the Government” and cited a written reply to the URT-D from the United Nations - ie “SO 215/1 PORT” dated 15 March 1971.966 In discussions with the Australian Embassy official967, Balikh explained that the “URT was in fact the progenitor of Fretilin” and “the URT was currently trying to contact Horta with whom URT had not communicated since August.” He stated that copies of the letter had also been delivered to the United States and USSR Embassies in Jakarta. Balikh also reportedly made two requests for assistance while at the Australian Embassy – which were “flatly rejected” by the Australian official ie: to provide Balikh with a “gratis” airline ticket for a member of the URT-D so that their representative “might go to Australia for propaganda activities”; and Balikh also asked if “Australia would be able to assist the organisation’s ‘guerillas’.” Following Balikh’s call, the Australian official sought further information on the URT-D from the Indonesian national intelligence agency, Bakin. The response from Bakin included information that: • the URT-D was “founded in 1961 in Makassar by persons predominantly of Timorese origin”, and that there had been some subsequent “affiliation with PARTINDO (a leftist splinter group of the old PNI).”968 • “During the West Irian ‘Campaign’ prior to the Act of Free Choice ((1969)), members of the URT were used by Indonesian intelligence to gather information on the situation on the ground in West Irian, and as

965

Pendirian Uni Republik Timor (Dilly) (Standpoint of the Union of the Republic of Timor (Dilly)), Batugade – through “Jl Kernolong Dalam IV/16, Kramat IV, Jakarta”, 19 December 1975. 966 This was the “non-commital” United Nations’ letter sent in response to the URT-D’s letter to the United Nations dated 12 October 1970 – see footnote 800. This document “resurfaced” in claims by M.S.A. Balikh in a Dili newspaper in November 2004 (Timor Post - footnote 982) and in a Dili magazine in October 2007 (TIME Timor - footnote 986). 967 The discussion – together with comments and the response from Bakin, was reported to the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs in Canberra in Australian Embassy – Jakarta, Memo 004, 31 December 1975 (NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1 Part 18; A1838, 3038/2/2 Part 2) that included an attached translation of the URT-D letter of 19 December 1975. 968 The same Bakin officer (Colonel) had also claimed in late 1965 that the URT-D had been formed in Makassar in 1961 – while another Bakin officer (Colonel) attached to the Foreign Ministry had stated to an Australian Embassy official in May 1974 that the URT-D had been formed in Jakarta in 1961 (NAA: A1838, 696/5 Part 2).

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informants. Being Timorese, members of the URT could pass easily as West Irianese.”969 “In 1972, a small group of Malays within the URT split off from the original organization. They denounced the Timorese leadership as being too passive in the pursuit of its ideals of independence. It is this Malay splinter group which is responsible for this letter. They operate within a broader organization called the ‘Central Praesidium for the All Malay Race Union’ … an extremist Islamic group.” “The URT was ineffectual and had no followers … there was a possibility that the organization might be of some interest to the Soviet Union if it wanted to counter-balance Chinese influence with Fretilin. The Soviet Union might also regard the URT with some interest because of its Malayan characteristics and the fact that the Soviet Union was interested in getting a foothold in Malaysia – again to counter the Chinese.” Copies of the URT-D letter of 19 December 1975 had not been delivered to other embassies in Jakarta.

According to information gleaned from Indonesian intelligence agency records, “in mid-December 1975, a senior URT-D official named Mau Bere ((ie probably Emanuel Mau Bere)) along with the head of the All-Malay Races Union, Mulwan Shah, mapped out an aggressive plan to meet foreign embassies and court diplomatic support … During the final two days of December, representatives from the URT-D made unannounced calls on the Netherlands, US and Soviet embassies. During the multiple trips to the Soviet Embassy, they met with two known members of the KGB. Significantly, Mulwan Shah gave the URT-D representative a ‘challenge question and a parole’ to be used while identifying themselves to the members of the Soviet embassy. (This seems to suggest that the All-Malay Races Union already had some discrete contact with that embassy). As of the first half of January 1976, the Soviet embassy had provided the URT-D with some funds for administrative purposes. In return, the Soviets had made them promise not to seek assistance from the Chinese.”970 Indonesian intelligence records also indicated that L.E. Duarte, who had only joined the URT-D organization a few weeks earlier, was chosen to make several of the above-mentioned visits to embassies in Jakarta.971

969

The National Front for the Liberation of West Irian (Front Nasional Pembebasan Irian Barat) had been founded in Jakarta on 18 November 1957 (or, according to some sources, January/February 1958). However, Indonesia’s overt campaign against Netherlands New Guinea (ie West Irian/Irian Barat) began in July 1960 (although the Trikora Command under Major General Soeharto was not established until December 1961). The campaign concluded with the signing of an agreement on 15 August 1962. Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 04/Cable I.30077, 16 December 1960 related that men from Indonesian Timor, who had been forcibly recruited for the “liberation” of Netherlands New Guinea, fled into Portuguese Timor - but were repatriated to Indonesia by the Portuguese authorities (NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 1). For information on Indonesian recruitment of Irianese and personnel from Eastern Indonesia for the West Irian campaign – see also Conboy, K., Intel, 2004, op.cit., pp.3135. 970 Email from Mr Ken Conboy (Jakarta-based author and analyst), 26 September 2005. 971 Email from Mr Ken Conboy, 27 September 2005.

199 Arrest, Trial and Detention of URT-D Cadre On 23 December 1975, the United Nations Security Council requested that the Secretary General nominate a Special Representative for East Timor. Soon after, on 29 December, Vittorio Winspeare Guicciardi, a senior UN official (Director General, UN Office – Geneva), was appointed with a mandate to make an “on-the-spot” assessment of the situation in East Timor and to report to the Secretary General. Enroute to East Timor, Winspeare Guicciardi visited Jakarta in the period 15-19 January 1976 to meet with Indonesian Government officials.972 According to Balikh, at about 2200hrs on 14 January 1976, ABRI officers called at his home and ordered him to be present at Halim Perdanakusumah airport in south-eastern Jakarta early the next morning to meet Winspeare Guicciardi. Emanuel Mau Bere was also directed to attend. Balikh arrived at the airfield at 0400hrs on 15 January – equipped with a satchel and a small portable typewriter. When the plane landed some hours later, Balikh was at the rear of the Indonesian reception party – and briefly shook hands with Guicciardi, but “did not have time to tell Guicciardi of my ((Balikh’s)) love of Timor”.973 Balikh also remarked that the other URT-D leader present, Emanuel Mau Bere had “remained in the car” throughout this event. Several days later, during Balikh’s absence at work, Mrs Fatima Balikh974 received an “official letter” addressed to “Saleh Balikh” requiring him to report to security authorities in Jakarta for an “interview.” She informed Balikh on his return – who then “hid around Jakarta” for several weeks avoiding arrest. He fled initially to the home of Abu Bakar Lam Dua, a Muslim Timorese, in the naval residential area of Tanjung Priok port. Subsequently however, he was apprehended in the Setia Budi area in south-central Jakarta on 31 January 1976. Balikh related that he was arrested by two “generals” – including “Sinamora”, a Protestant Batak from Sumatra. Balikh was detained and interrogated at the Penjara Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Armed Forces Prison) in the Tanah Abang camp in central Jakarta.975 He was charged for his involvement with the “Unie Republik Timor” and “other undertakings suspected of disturbing security and public order.”976 At least 12 persons associated with the URT-D were also detained – see the following account of court proceedings. However, those arrested did not apparently include Alamsyah Hasibuan – who, according to M.S.A. Balikh, “had already fled.” According to Balikh, his interrogators offered that he could become a minister in the new government in East Timor if he joined their cause – but Balikh states that he rejected this offer. Balikh was required to complete a “formulir” (form) - in which he declared his nationality as “Timorese.” However, this angered his interrogators 972

Winspeare Guicciardi visited East Timor in the period 20-22 January (Dili, Ataúro, Manatuto, Baucau) – but was unable to visit Fretilin-controlled areas. He returned to Jakarta on 23 January 1976 before travelling to Darwin on 1 February. His initial report, dated 29 February 1976, was tabled at the United Nations on 12 March 1976 – as an annex to United Nations Security Council, S/12011 (NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1 Part 21; A1838, 3038/9/1 Part 1; A1838, 3038/10/13/1 Annex 1). A second report based on subsequent discussions in Europe was tabled on 22 June 1976. 973 As related to the author in Dili on 12 August 2006 – somewhat confusingly, Balikh implied that he may have been invited to travel to Dili with the Guicciardi party, but declined. 974 Balikh’s wife, Fatima, was born in Alor (Baranusa village, Pulau Pantar - Alor). They married on 24 January 1972. 975 According to Balikh, “300” people associated with the URT-D were arrested in Jakarta at this time – interview with the author in Dili on 12 December 2004. 976 As related in the preamble to his Provisional Prisoner Release document: Surat Pembebasan Tahanan Sementara, No. SPTS. 10/SIN/IV/1976 dated 10 April 1976.

200 and, after some resistance, Balikh eventually signed a second statement that omitted this apparently contentious element. Balikh was subsequently put on trial in a “closed court” in Jakarta – together with several other URT-D principals, including Mulwan Shah, Muhamad Tarief Analesy [sic], Emanuel Mau Bere, Simon Serang Prya and Curasa Effendi “alias” Mali Bere - on charges concerning the “Peristiwa U.R.T.” (“U.R.T. Affair”). The court proceedings were apparently conducted under the provisions of the “Special Executive Authority” of the “Command for the Restoration of Security and Public Order of the Greater Jakarta and Surrounding Area.”977 Balikh related his disquiet with the conduct of his URT-D colleague, Analessy – who, Balikh claimed, had corruptly used URT-D funds for his (Analessy’s) private expenditure including for overseas travel. Subsequently, following several months in prison, the 12 URT-D detainees were provisionally released with “Bebas Wajib Lapor” (“Reporting Status”)978 - in four phases, as follows: “22 March 1976: Lajamudin Balikh, Emanuel Mau Bere, Mochamad Saleh Mansur, R.W. Kaseger, Pagaran Raja Simbolon, Loudy Emanuel Duarte. 10 April 1976: Curasa Effendi alias Mali Bere ((see also footnote 674)), Maskhuri, Simon Serang Prya, Mohamad Saleh Akbar Balikh. 30 April 1976: Muhamad Tasrief Analesy ((see footnotes 819, 918)). 11 May 1976: Mulwansjah [sic].” Balikh was required to report on each Monday and Thursday to the Kodam Jaya Intelligence Task Unit in Jakarta and not permitted to leave the Greater Jakarta area without prior authorisation. On 11 August 1976, the above-mentioned URT-D members were granted “Bebas Penuh” (“Full Freedom”) by the Kopkamtib Special Authority - with the qualification that “if any took action that violated public order and security or undertook other negative acts, then further action would be taken against them” – the Kopkamtib document (ie footnote 978) and an English translation are at Annex U. An individual release certification for M.S.A. Balikh was annexed to the document that showed Balikh’s age as 34 years; his employment as “former teacher at the XXIV State Senior High School in Jakarta”; and resident at “Cipinang Lontar 0011/06, Jakarta.” The URT-D’s “Inactive” Decades For the next twenty years, the URT-D appears to have been inactive. Balikh however declared that he remained involved with East Timor issues, produced documents - and that East Timorese students would call at this house in Jakarta. Balikh commented that he did not vote in any Indonesian elections during this period. He claims to have maintained regular contact with the East Timor independence organisations and to have corresponded with José Ramos-Horta in Australia. 977

In Bahasa Indonesia: Pelaksana Khusus, Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban (Laksus, Kopkamtib) – Daerah Jakarta Raya dan Sekitarnya. 978 Laksus Kopkamtib - Daerah Jakarta Raya dan Sekitarnya, Surat Keputusan … - Nomor Skep24/PK/VII/1976, Jakarta, 11 August 1976 – see Annex U, including an English translation by author.

201 Balikh also states that, in early 1999, he wrote to Xanana Gusmão - then detained in Salemba (Jakarta)979, but received no reply.

979

Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão was captured by ABRI in Dili on 20 November 1992. Sentenced to life imprisonment in May 1993 (later commuted to 20 years), he was imprisoned in Semarang (Central Java) and Cipinang (Jakarta) – but was moved to a house in Salemba (Jakarta) in early February 1999. Balikh stated that he held an official receipt for his correspondence to Xanana Gusmão, and implied that he had enclosed earlier URT-D documents – presumably to prove his “independence struggle credentials”, in his correspondence to Xanana Gusmão.

202 TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE – AND BEYOND M.S.A. Balikh Returns to Timor – October 1999 According to Balikh, he returned to East Timor in October 1999 – a few weeks after the UN-supervised popular consultation conducted on 30 August 1999. He was accompanied by two of his sons: Bahudin Balikh and Syofiyan Balikh. On 13 December, Balikh visited the UNTAET980 Political Office in Dili and sought “registration” as a returning citizen of East Timor. He was provided with an UNTAET letter addressed “To whom it may concern” that included a passage: “Please also note that Mr Balikh asserts that he has worked for East Timorese independence for many years, and documents purported to support this claim have been submitted to the UNTAET Political Office.”981 In the following months, Balikh unsuccessfully sought involvement in the emerging East Timorese government and administration structures established under UNTAET. According to Balikh, he also met with José Ramos-Horta at the “Turismo Beach” in eastern Dili during this period - but further association was apparently rebuffed by Ramos-Horta. Balikh also related that he travelled to Same (a district town about 110 kilometres south of Dili) where he was welcomed enthusiastically by the inhabitants as a “resistance figure.” On returning to Timor-Leste in 1999, Balikh re-established contact with his clan and extended family relatives in the Maubara area. He visited Maubara regularly to participate in cultural and other activities. The 2004 Timor Post “Proklamasi” Declaration – and the 1,000 Pataca Note On 23 November 2004, Balikh was interviewed by the editor of the Timor Post, a principal Dili daily newspaper - following which an article appeared in the paper’s 25 November edition entitled: “1961, Proklamasaun Independensia URT – Ramos Horta tama estrutura” (“1961, The Independence Proclamation by the URT – Ramos Horta offered a position”).982 In the article, Balikh declared that he was “Mao Klao” – the “autor” (author) of the URT-D independence proclamation at Batugadé on 9 April 1961. He explained that the URT-D “received considerable support from President Sukarno and Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik.” However, he noted that “support from Indonesia to the URT was short-lived, because Soeharto and the ‘New Order’ did not agree with their ((URT-D’s)) proclamation.” The article mentioned the URT-D’s offer to Ramos-Horta of a senior position in their organization and Balikh’s later attempts to correspond with Ramos-Horta in Australia. Balikh also related in the article that he, colleagues and 300 URT-D supporters had been imprisoned in Jakarta by the Indonesian authorities as a result of the URT-D’s support for Timorese independence. The article in the Timor Post included photographs of a Bahasa “Proklamasi” version of the URT-D’s 1961 Independence

980

UNTAET (United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor) replaced UNAMET (United Nations Mission in East Timor) on 25 October 1999. 981 Hermes, S.G., UNTAET Political Officer, official letter, Dili, 14 December 1999. 982 Ximenes, J. M., “1961, Proklamasaun Independensia URT: Ramos Horta tama estrutura”, Timor Post, Dili, 25 November 2004, p.1 and p.15. The interview with Balikh was conducted in Bahasa Indonesia – with Balikh apologising to Sr. Ximenes for his lack of fluency in Tetum. In the article, Balikh also referred to the UN reply of 15 March 1971 to a URT-D petition – see footnote 800.

203 Declaration – see below; and the Uni Republik Timor 1,000 Pataca bank note - see below and at previous page 157.

The Bahasa Indonesia-language “Proklamasi” document983 is on URT-headed paper: PRESIDIUM PUSAT

UNI REPUBLIC TIMOR DITEMPAT DARURAT – BATUGADE TIMOR (DILLY) Kemerdekaan Timor Timur Diproklamasikan. Kami bangsa Timor Timur dengan ini menyatakan kemerdekaan Timor Timur dan sekitarnya dalam tempo yang sesingkat singkatnya. 983

The text of the Proklamasi document in the Timor Post is not fully legible. Interestingly, the style is very similar – and some phrases are identical, to the Indonesian Declaration of Independence of 17 August 1945 (I am indebted to Nug Katjasungkana for this insight – email to author, 17 December 2008). The 1945 Indonesian Declaration reads: “Kami bangsa Indonesia dengan ini menjatakan Kemerdekaan Indonesia. Hal hal jang mengenai pemindahan kekoeasaan d.l.l. diselenggarakan dengan tjara saksama dan dalam tempo jang sesingkat-singkatja.” The Indonesian Declaration (draft) can be found at NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3 Part 1, p.160. The URT-D “Timor Post” Proklamasi document was also later provided to the TIME Timor magazine and appeared in its November 2007 issue – see footnote 987 and Annex X. This Proklamasi document above is far shorter (ie with only about 70 words) than the earlier Bahasa version of the URT-D Pernyataan Kemerdekaan (Declaration of Independence) disseminated in April 1965 (215 words) – see Annex O. The style and content of the two versions are also markedly different.

204 Hal-hal yang mengenai pemindahan dan lain lain akan diatur di kemudian hari. Tanda tangan kemerdekaan Timor Timur dan sekitarnya.

Atase Militer ((manuscript signature)) Emanuel Mau Bere

Tempat Darurat Batu Gade, 9 April 1961 Panglima Tertinggi ((manuscript signature)) Mao Klao M.S.A. Balikh

In English: CENTRAL PRESIDIUM

UNITED REPUBLIC of TIMOR AT THE EMERGENCY LOCATION – BATUGADE TIMOR (DILLY) The Independence of East Timor is Proclaimed We, the nation of East Timor, hereby declare the independence of East Timor and its environs in the shortest possible time. Matters concerning the transfer ((of power)) etc will be arranged at a later date. Signed for an independent East Timor and its environs.

Military Attache ((manuscript signature)) Emanuel Mau Bere

Emergency Location Batu Gade, 9 April 1961 Supreme Commander ((manuscript signature)) Mao Klao M.S.A. Balikh

Although purportedly signed by Balikh on 19 April 1961, the Bahasa Indonesia orthography of the text is post-August 1972 (see footnote 700). Proklamasi – a 2006 Version On 21 August 2006, M.S.A. Balikh provided the author with a purported copy of the Timor Post Proklamasi document – see Annex V: “Memproklamasikan: Kemerdekaan Timor Timur” (Proclaiming the Independence of East Timor”). However, this “2006 Proklamasi”(at Annex V with English translation) – while similar in length, it is marginally different in “layout” and text from the copy of the Proklamasi shown in the Timor Post newspaper of 25 November 2004 and the TIME Timor edition of November 2007. M.S.A. Balich’s “Declaration 1” – and TIME Timor, October 2007 On 19 April 2007, Balikh as “Mau Klao MSA Balich”984 issued a “Surat Pernyataan I ” (Letter of Declaration I) – see Annex W, that declared:

984

These “new” spellings of Balikh as “Balich” and Mao Klao as “Mau Klao” both appear twice in the document – ie did not appear to be typing errors. The aim, purpose and distribution of the Surat Pernyataan I is not clear - ie before its appearance six months later in TIME Timor (footnote 986).

205 “1.

The Proclamation of the Union of the Republic of Timor (East Timor/Timor Leste) on 9 April 1961 at the emergency location of Batugade, East Timor (Timor-Leste).

2.

The participants in the Proclamation comprised: a. A citizen of East Timor/Timor Leste who had travelled and lived successively in Alor – Flores – Atambua/Kupang – Greater Jakarta and surrounding area ((ie M.S.A. Balikh)); and b. Student colleagues from Jakarta and the surrounding area who were volunteers ((male and female)) from the Mahajaya Regiment985 of Greater Jakarta and Surrounding Area who participated for the success of the Independence Proclamation of their colleague’s country which has always been longed for.”

In October 2007, the Dili magazine “TIME Timor” included an article titled “Proklamasi Timor Leste Sebenarnya Sudah Terjadi Pada Tahun 1961 ?” (“Did Timor-Leste’s Proclamation Occur in 1961 ?”), 986 The article related that “Polemics on who was Timor-Leste’s Proklamator have been a quite crucial discussion since this country gained its independence from the grip of Indonesia” – and cited the contending arguments between Fretilin and Xavier dos Reis Amaral in the period 2005-2007. TIME Timor continued: “Last week, we discovered someone ((M.S.A. Balikh)) who declares himself as the First Proklamator on 9 April 1961. To prove this statement, we have attached one of many important documents that can become historic evidence - that we have received directly from the First Proklamator of the Uni Republik Timor”. Included at the end of the article were photocopies of Balikh’s April 2007 “Letter of Declaration I” mentioned above, and the United Nations’ letter to “A. Mao Klao” of 15 March 1971 (see footnotes 800, 966 and 982). The TIME Timor article indicated that the magazine also planned to publish further documents from M.S.A. Balikh. TIME Timor, November 2007 – Interview with “Mau-Klao” Following sceptical responses by readers to the article on M.S.A. Balikh and the URT-D in the October edition, TIME Timor journalists interviewed Balikh on 27 October and included the interview in the November edition of the magazine987 as “Mau-Klao Siap Mempertanggungjawabkan Kebenaran Proklamasi Uni Republik Timor (URT)” (“Mau-Klao is Ready to Accept Responsibility for the Truth about the Proclamation by Union of the Republic of Timor (URT)”). Several of Balikh’s responses to the interviewer’s questions were notable, as follows:

985

In December 2004, Balikh had related to the author his membership of the Resimen Mahasiswa Mahajaya of the University of Indonesia – and his wearing of the Regiment’s uniform in West Timor in 1961 (see page 156). Note however, that the Resimen Mahajaya did not exist in 1961 – the Regiment was founded following the issue of Directive 062 by the Supreme Military Commander of Greater Jakarta and Surrounding Area on 15 May 1962, with a unit being established at the University of Indonesia soon after. 986 “Proklamasi Timor Leste Sebenarnya Sudah Terjadi Pada Tahun 1961 ?” (“Did Timor-Leste’s Proclamation Occur in 1961 ?”), TIME Timor, No.10, Tahun II, October 2007, Dili, p.49. 987 “Mau-Klao Siap Mempertanggungjawabkan Kebenaran Proklamasi Uni Republik Timor (URT)” (“Mau-Klao is Ready to Accept Responsibility for the Truth about the Proclamation by Union of the Republic of Timor (URT)”), TIME Timor, No.11, Tahun II, November 2007, Dili, pp.19-24.

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988

“The sponsors of the funds for the 9 April 1961 proclamation at Batugade were my student friends in Jakarta.” “Portuguese colonialists attacked the proclamation site immediately – many of the members of the proclamation team and local people were captured and killed by the Portuguese colonialists.” “Many people were involved in the proclamation – but I have forgotten their names except for Manuel [sic] Maubere of Ermera, the uncle of the priest, Domingos Maubere.”988 “I made the speech – as well as the speech at the the United Nations Youth Anniversary in Jakarta.”989 “Soekarno … was very supportive of our struggle. I visited the Presidential Palace with all our documents to request support including a site in Jakarta for an office. Finally, we got Jalan Karnolong Dalam IV, No.16, Jakarta Pusat.” “The permission certificate ((for the office)) was held by friends in Jakarta. … I only have the original proclamation document. … All other documents were burnt in 1975 when Indonesia controlled East Timor. Important documents concerning URT processes were burnt by the Indonesian forces.”990 “I fled to Indonesia on 9 April 1961. … We had no weapons. We were unable to proclaim in Dili as the Portuguese security was too tight.” “Those present ((on 9 April 1961)) came from Flores, Alor, Kupang and Jakarta. … I don’t have personal notes or a list of those who attended. However, I still remember some - such as Imanuel Maubere [sic] and Simon Seran Brian [sic].” “Imanuel [sic] Maubere’s role was as a signatory to the proclamation – as a military person and as vice-president and manager of the proclamation procedures.” “Many people were involved in the management of the URT proclamation at that time. Many have died – having been captured by the Portuguese or by the Indonesian military in the 1975 period. … I can’t remember all their names as I don’t have complete notes – apart from Imanuel Maubere and Simon Seran Brian.” “The idea of the proclamation arose when I was still sitting on a school bench, and became closer to fruition when I left Timor for Indonesian in 1942. … The idea didn’t just arise when I was in Indonesia – but the thought came before I left Timor for Indonesia. I already had a plan at that time.”991 “I personally disseminated the proclamation ((1961)) letters to the whole world asking for support as well as patronage for the proclamation – so that Geneva also understood and eventually I personally received a letter

Father Domingos Maubere Soares – a politically prominent Catholic priest (former head of the Secretariat of the Conselho Nacional Resistência da Timorense - CNRT) born in Ermera, has denied any knowledge of Emanuel Maubere (email to the author, 10 July 2009). 989 There was no “United Nations Youth Anniversary” in the 1950s or 1960s. Balikh may be referring to the “All-Indonesia Youth Pledge (Sumpah Pemuda) Day” – events are held annually on 28 October. The 1959 national “Pledge Day” rally was held in Surabaya. 990 This is confusing as Balikh had never previously claimed that any URT-D documents were held in Portuguese Timor – ie that documents could have been burnt by ABRI troops in 1975 in Timor. 991 Balikh earlier declared to the author that he was taken from the Maubara area of Portuguese Timor to the island of Alor when he was aged about “two or three” – see page 155.

207

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992

of support from the United Nations ((in 1971)). … I burnt that letter at the time of the events of 1975.”992 “I first met Ramos-Horta in 1975, not 1961. … I received a letter from the mayor of Dili, Antonio, to participate in the inauguration of the three parties ((UDT, Fretilin, Apodeti)). I went to meet with the mayor at the Hotel Minang Gondal in central Jakarta. Ramos-Horta called at the office in Jalan Karnolong Dalam, No.16 (Office of the Timor Freedom Struggle) to meet with me. His aim was to establish my name as the manager of the URT.”993 “In 1975 [sic], President Soekarno invited all the Indonesian people to the Presidential Palace to hear his speech. … I was there from East Timor, Adimara was there from Irian ((Papua)), and Antasari was there from Kalimantan Utara ((North Borneo)). We were all given the opportunity to make a speech to the assembled crowd. … President Soekarno spread the news about our declaration. So it wasn’t just the people of Jakarta that heard about the URT declaration, but that broadcast was heard by the whole world. It must be understood that the whole world supported us. We met with the first President of Indonesia in the Palace to request support, and President Soekarno welcomed our struggle positively.”994 “We sought out Timorese in Indonesia and in other countries. … Later, we sent several people to East Timor – both men and women, by boat. … We undertook a number of activities, but those that we sent to East Timor were captured and killed by the Portuguese colonialists.” “At that time, the Portuguese did not have a prison system. They captured Timorese, killed them – and then threw them away.” “I struggled for Timor-Leste’s independence while in Indonesia, as it was very difficult to enter Timor-Leste. … While struggling for Timor-Leste’s freedom, I also was arrested and placed in prison.” “Many of my friends infiltrated Timor-Leste but were captured then killed. Not just one or two were mobilized, but thousands. However, the vicious Portugese military captured and killed some of them.” In reply to questions on the proclamation in November 1975 by Fretilin’s Francisco Xavier do Amaral, Balikh stated that such was not difficult for Amaral as Timor was no longer under colonial oppression at that time. “When I returned to Timor-Leste in 1999, I heard that Francisco Xavier do Amaral was Timor-Leste’s Proclaimer, and I was shocked.” “There has not been attention to the struggle that I led. … However, it doesn’t matter if the Government pays no attention. … The Government did acknowledge me when Ramos-Horta met with me and later introduced me to Xanana, saying: ‘This is the real Mau Klao’. There has been no other acknowledgement since 1999. Moreover, since I have been living

In December 2004, Balikh provided the author with a copy of a United Nations letter dated 1971 ie Communications Unit – Division of Human Rights (United Nations), SO 215/1 PORT., New York, 15 March 1971 – see footnote 800. This letter was also included in the TIME Timor article of October 2008 – see footnote 986. 993 Balikh’s earlier account of Ramos-Horta calling at the URT-D office in Jakarta is at pages 179-180. The meeting at the hotel in Menteng - ie with “Antonio” (ie most likely Augusto César da Costa Mousinho), is also related earlier at page 185 and footnote 921. 994 Balikh’s earlier account of this rally is at pages 155-156.

208 here, there are people who chase me and say that I am a newcomer ((“orang pendatang” – ie “newcomer” or “interloper” in Bahasa))”. The TIME Timor article also included a photocopy of a “Proklamasi” document provided by Balikh (see Annex X) and a photocopy of the 1,000 Pataca URT-D bank note – ie both as provided for the article in the Timor Post of 25 November 2004 (footnotes 982, 983). M.S.A. Balikh – and the URT-D Flag M.S.A. Balikh’s recounting of the URT-D flag-raising at Batugadé has been related earlier at page 156. In interviews in December 2004 and August 2006, although asked, Balikh was unable to describe the URT-D flag. Further, no depiction of a URT-D flag has been noted in any URT-D documents or other URT-D material – eg banknotes. However, when queried during an interview in Dili on 27 October 2008, Balikh described the URT-D flag to the author and illustrated his explanation by making a sketch of the flag – as shown below.995

URT-D Flag – as sketched by M.S.A. Balikh, Dili, 27 October 2008 Balikh described the “Timorese Independence” flag – using Bahasa Indonesia terms, as having ten alternate white and red stripes, with a green “square” in the high hoist corner (ie in the canton quadrant). He explained that the green square was to represent “subur” (Bahasa - “fertility”). The alternate stripes, beginning at the top with white, represented: White: Red: White: Red: White: 995

Adat Berani Tradisional Bertanggungjawab Bahasa

(Custom) (Courage) (Tradition) (Responsibility) (Language)

For the “Flags of the World” late-1990s depiction of the purported URT-D flag, see footnote 783. The “October 2008” version of the flag, shown above (as sketched by M.S.A. Balikh), replaced the late-1990s version on the “Flags of the World” website following email correspondence between the author and António Martins of “Flags of the World” in mid-January 2009.

209 Red: White: Red: White: Red:

Tanah air Sopan santun Bangsa Turun menurun Negara

(Fatherland) (Respect) (Nation, people) (Heredity) (State)

During the discussion with the author, Balikh occasionally referred to a small manuscript note in his shirt pocket to confirm the meanings of the stripes. A “new” URT-D - and the “Greater Timor” (Negara Timor Raya) ? In December 2000, an email (in Bahasa) appeared on a Timorese Internet “blog” webpage from “Mau Brani”, claiming to be the “spokesperson” for the “Uni Republik Timor.”996 Addressed to “all Timorese brothers”, the email was titled - “A New Year’s Message from the Union of the Republic of Timor”. It noted that while East Timor was now free, the western half of the island remained in the “grip” of Indonesia. The email claimed that the Uni Republik Timor continued the struggle of the “1959 Rebellion whose aim had been to unite and free the island of Timor, including Rote, Jako and Ataúro” – and criticised strongly “the small number of Timorese who have attempted to sully the 1959 Struggle with a pretext that the 1959 Struggle sought integration with Indonesia.” Rather, the email continued, “the principal aim of the 1959 Rebellion was to liberate the island of Timor from both Portuguese and Indonesian colonialism. On 9 April 1961, President A. Mauklao [sic] had proclaimed the Uni Republik Timor – but a Portuguese and Indonesian conspiracy had weakened the movement.” The email concluded with a call for unification of the Island as the Uni Republik Timor - with its capital in Dili. In early 1997, the concept of a “Greater Timor” (Negara Timor Raya) had emerged from a seminar at the Political and Social Science Faculty of the Widya Mandira Catholic University in Kupang, West Timor.997 This concept promoted a political entity comprising the Eastern Lesser Sundas (Nusa Tenggara Timur NTT)998, the islands of the Western South East Moluccas (Maluku Tenggara Barat – MTB)999, and East Timor. Highlighting the common ethnicity, culture, religion1000 and socio-economic problems of the Negara Timor Raya area, the movement sought to accelerate the development of the region. The movement had “a significant following among West Timor elites who are attracted to its agenda of secession from

996

Mau Brani (Juru Bicara – ie Spokesperson), Pesan Natal dari Uni Republik Timor (Christmas Message from the Union of the Republic of Timor), 26 December 2000 – in Bahasa Indonesia. 997 A Dewan Rakyat Timor (DRT -Timor People’s Council) was subsequently formed in Kupang in mid-August 2001 – to campaign against the “enforcement” of Javanese culture. The declaration of the Negara Timor Raya emerged from the DRT in late 2001. For background see“Gerakan Separatis Negara Timor Raya Muncul di NTT” (“Negara Timor Raya Separatist Movement Arising in NTT”), Republika, Kupang, 21 December 2001. 998 NTT includes the major islands of Sumba, Flores, Alor, Lomblen, Sawu, Rote, Semau, and Indonesian (“West”) Timor. 999 MTB comprises 133 islands - the largest being Seram, Buru, Ambon, Wetar, Kesar, Yamdena, Kai, and Aru. 1000 NTT is the most Christian of the Indonesian provinces – with the population 53.9 percent Catholic and 33.8 percent Protestant ie 87.7 percent Christian (2004). Kupang is predominantly Protestant (86.56 percent) – with 7.13 percent Catholic and 2.24 percent Moslem/Islam (Kupang Dalam Angka, Badan Pusat Statistik, Kupang, 2003).

210 Indonesia and unification with East Timor.” 1001 Understandably, the Indonesian authorities strongly opposed this separatist movement and briefly detained the movement’s seven “proclaimers” on 8 January 2002.1002 In an email on an Internet blogsite in January 20021003, the Negara Timor Raya honoured the heroes of struggles in both Indonesian Timor and East Timor that pre-dated the Negara Timor Raya movement – including: Dom Boaventura (19101912); “Governor Maukalo who proclaimed the Republik Timor in 1960 in the Maen Tu Maen Lobo region1004 (between Maubisse-Turiskai-Same)”; the late Governor El Tari in Timor Loro Monu (Indonesian Timor); and Fretilin’s Nicolau Lobato and Vicente Sahe. The email extolled the Dewan Rakyat Timor (see footnote 997)/Negara Timor Raya as a continuation of these earlier struggles. On 13 January 2002, the author of that email forwarded the Uni Republik Timor’s “Mau Brani email” of 26 December 2000 to Negara Timor Raya addressees requesting that they “tolong sebar luaskan tulisan ini !” (Bahasa Indonesia = “help by broadly disseminating this email”).1005 To date however, no further “Uni Republik Timor” email messages have been noted. In mid-2006, TNI concern about the Negara Timor Raya movement again surfaced briefly with the Kupang-based military district commander (Danrem 161), Colonel Noch Bola, “regarding it as serious” and warning that “they would be digging their own graves”.1006 The report also related that “Negara Timor Raya activists, some from East Timor, often met in settlements with former East Timorese in the Betun area of South Belu to encourage participation in the movement.” Republica Timor Tasi Mane (RTTM) – Short-lived Separatism On 9 April 2005, in Wetatarare (Welaluhu/Fatuberliu Sub-District, Manufahi), a small gathering declared the establishment of the Republica Timor Tasi Mane (RTTM – Timor Republic of the Southern Sea). Founded by the leader of the Parentil political party - Flaviano Pereira Lopes, the RTTM’s declaration cited the Government for inadequate support of people in the remote areas of the south-western coast.1007 Four of the RTTM office-holders were soon arrested and, following a series

1001

Nixon, R., “Indonesian West Timor: The Political-Economy of Emerging Ethno-Nationalism” Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol 34, Iss 2, Manila, 2004, p.180. 1002 “Polda NTT Periksa Penggagas Negara Timor Raya” (“NTT Police Investigate Negara Timor Raya Founders”), Tempo Interaktif, Kupang, 8 January 2002. The movement appears to have been quiescent in the period 2003-2007 – but see “Cegah Wacana Pembentukan Negara Timor Raya” (“Block the Idea of the Formation of a Negara Timor Raya”), Antara News, Kupang, 19 February 2005. 1003 Bere Nahak, (Permahati Gerakan Timor Raya – Observer, Timor Raya Movement), email, 11 January 2002. 1004 Author’s note - this is the area of the August 1942 “Maubisse” uprising against the Portuguese – see footnote 58. 1005 Bere Nahak, Pesan Natal dari Uni Republik Timor, email, 13 January 2002. 1006 “TNI Antisipasi Berdirinya Negara Timor Raya” (“TNI Anticipates the Establishment of Negara Timor Raya”), Tempo Interaktif, Jakarta, 16 May 2006. 1007 The Parentil party (Partido Republika Nacional Timor Leste) was a youth-based party founded in February 2001 that stood unsuccessfully for the 2001 Constituent Assembly election – winning only 0.54 percent of the vote. The brief RTTM declaration ceremony included a RTTM flag, a red-andwhite flag, and a Parentil flag – “Kasus RTTM resmi disidangkan, KH tolak pasal makar” (“RTTM case officially convened, Judge rejects attack against government”), Suara Timor Lorosae, Dili, 16 May 2005, p.3.

211 of court appearances, on 5 September 2005 were sentenced to periods of imprisonment of from two to four years.1008 Although a small incident, it was of interest that the founding date of the RTTM – ie 9 April, was the same as for the Uni Republik Timor-Dilly (ie 9 April 1961). However, to date, no connections have been noted between the two movements.

1008

The four sentenced were: Flaviano Pereira Lopes/Lopez, Agapito Pereira, Viriato da Costa Fernandes and Saturnino Pereira – “Pendiri negara RTTM masuk bui” (“RTTM founders jailed”), Suara Timor Lorosae, Dili, 9 September 2005.

212 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION This concluding section summarises aspects of the independence movements and activities related earlier – and highlights a number of the inconsistencies, anomalies, fabrications and apparent hyperbole in several of the records and reports. Some comments are also offered. Lospalos Uprising and Massacre By current standards, human rights abuses by the Portuguese authorities in Portuguese Timor continued to be common-place in the period following World War II. However, as yet, there appears to be no substantive evidence of an “uprising” – or any subsequent “massacre”, in the Lospalos area (Lautém Circunscrição) in the period 1945-1949 as alleged in a number of Indonesian publications cited at the beginning of the this work. The 1959 Viqueque Rebellion The major outbreak of indigenous unrest in the post-World War II period in Portuguese Timor - up to the events of 1974-1975, was the failed 1959 “Viqueque Rebellion”. Its origins appear to have been in the discontent felt by many Timorese with the Portuguese administration – lack of development, exploitation, social injustice and human rights abuses. Timorese lower-grade civil servants in Dili – encouraged by the Indonesian Consul, sought to force change through a rebellion. The independence of the neighbouring Republic of Indonesia was an important inspiration and - for educated Timorese, the Asia-Africa Conference held in Bandung in 1955 also provided encouragement. In Viqueque, several of the Indonesian Permesta exiles actively proselytized against the Portuguese administration. An Indonesian source (a school text-book - see Annex B) has cited the activities of Inácio André Francisco “Sitko/Ciko” Lopes as catalysing independence aspirations among Timorese youth in Dili in the mid-1950s (see footnotes 166-172). Although imprisoned by the Portuguese from 1948 until at least the mid-1960s, Francisco Lopes may have been on some form of “conditional release” in Dili in the mid-1950s to some time in 1958 – during which, according to Salem Sagran, Francisco Lopes had regular contact with the Indonesian Consulate.1009 However, Lopes has not been noted in any Portuguese writings on the 1959 Rebellion – eg not mentioned by Governor Barata or Monsignor Martinho da Costa Lopes, or by exiled rebels in Africa. This suggests that Lopes was probably in prison during the 19581959 period - and may not have been directly or actively involved in the 1959 Rebellion itself. The Rebellion did not succeed for a range of reasons – principally because the plan was revealed to the Portuguese authorities who pre-empted any uprising in Dili. The arrests in Dili soon precipitated premature and ill-conceived attacks by the group of inadequately-prepared rebels in Viqueque. However, it is also highly unlikely that any later armed rebellion – ie in December 1959, would have been successful against the forces that the Portuguese administration would have been able to mobilise against the rebels. Moreover, with Consul Nazwar Jacub scheduled to complete his tour of 1009

Both Salem Musallam Sagran (footnote 170) and Frederico Almeida Santos da Costa (footnote 172) have mentioned Francisco Lopes in Dili in the mid-late 1950s and in contact with the Indonesian Consulate.

213 duty in early June 1959, it is very doubtful that his replacement - Tengku Usman Hussin, would have encouraged an uprising at the end of that year. This however does not preclude the possibility that the rebel leaders in Dili might have acted in December – as apparently planned. Regardless, their prospects for success at that later date would also have been poor. In the countryside, the uprising in the Viqueque Circunscrição was launched precipitously, and was poorly planned and ineffectively executed - without any real hope of success. The areas of the Rebellion in the Circunscrições of Baucau and Viqueque were relatively remote and were not ethno-linguistically homogenous. The attacks by the rebels against the Portuguese administration offices in Viqueque Town and in the Postos of Uatolari, Uato-Carabau and Baguia appear to have had only limited popular support – ie from a core group in the Viqueque Town vicinity and in a few villages to the northeast, principally villagers of the Naueti ethno-linguistic group. Importantly, there were traditional antipathies and enmities between tribes, clans and groups in the Viqueque Circunscrição – including residual enmities from the tribal fighting in the areas during World War II.1010 Further, in 1959, some tribes remained loyal to the Portuguese - eg in the Ossú and Lacluta areas, and were successfully employed by the Portuguese authorities against the Rebellion. Consequently, the rebels were unable to mobilise either the necessary large forces or widespread popular support throughout the two Circunscrições. In 1975, Fretilin’s Vice President, Nicolau Lobato remarked that the “Uatelari” [sic] revolt was “ineffective in 1959 due … divisiveness prevailing among our ancestors.”1011 Regardless, the Rebellion had little real chance of success against the forces that the Portuguese would have been able to assemble to quell the unrest. No Portuguese are known to have been killed in the Rebellion. Timorese casualties suffered in the Viqueque and Baucau Circunscrições are difficult to determine accurately (see estimates and claims at pages 80-81) - but up to several hundreds of deaths is probably a reasonably accurate estimate. Portuguese authorities appear to have never published information on casualties. The total number of Timorese imprisoned in Timor following the uprising is unknown, and also merits further research. While ex-Governor Barata’s 1998 book is an important contribution and provides considerable useful information on the 1959 Rebellion, his avoidance of recounting the detail of the killings and summary executions at the Bebui River – overseen by the Viqueque Administrator Artur Marques Ramos and Captain Barreiros, is a significant and disappointing omission (see footnotes 378-380). Several other aspects of the 1959 uprising are also worthy of further examination – including the objectives of the Rebellion, and the aims of the 1010

During World War II, both the Australian and the Japanese military forces mobilised tribesmen as paramilitaries in Portuguese Timor - see Chamberlain, E.P., The Struggle …, op.cit., 2008, pp.30-36; and Chamberlain, E.P., Timorese in Special Operations during World War II, op.cit., 2010. For detail on Australian forces in Portuguese Timor see also Wray, C.C.H., Timor 1942, 1987; Doig, C.D., A History …, 1986; and Powell, A., War by Stealth – Australians and the Allied Intelligence Bureau 1942-1945, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1996. Australian special forces (Z Special Unit) also recruited local support in the Circunscrição of São Domingos (covering the Baucau and Viqueque areas) and in the Lautém Circunscrição. 1011 Lobato, N., Letter to the United Nations Secretary General, Lourenço Marques, 24 April 1975 (NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1 Part 11). Nicolau dos Reis Lobato (b. 24 May 1946) served as an aspirante in the Finance Service in Dili from 13 November 1969 to 1974 – BOdT, No.7, 16 February 1974, p.123; No.29, 20 July 1974, p.561 - and was also noted as a secondary school teacher in Dili in 1974. Nicolau Lobato became Timor-Leste’s first Prime Minister on 28 November 1975 – and its second President in October 1977. Note also Fretilin’s reported positive view of the 1959 Rebellion as a “formative influence” – as cited at footnote 511.

214 Indonesian “Permesta 14”. However, it is certain that the “14” were Permesta members and came directly from the Kupang area of Indonesian Timor – driven out by TNI troops suppressing Permesta separatist elements in West Timor. Here, it should be noted that: as early as 1958, the official Indonesian newsagency declared them to be “Permesta”; the Indonesian authorities soon sought their extradition from Portuguese Timor; and only in late 1960 did Indonesia “clarify” that the “14” were deserters from the Indonesian Army in Kupang who had committed robberies before fleeing to Portuguese Timor. The composition of the group of “14” is detailed in their request for asylum (see Annex C) - and also in the 1995 article by Peter A. Rohi (footnote 211) in which all 14 were specifically named. According to the Indonesian authorities, two of the 14 had been Indonesian security force (ie TNI) personnel ie Lambertus Ladow – corporal and “Udy” Welong – private.1012 However, in their asylum request, all but Jermias/ Jeremias Pello declared themselves to have military ranks in the Permesta/PRRI ie from lieutenant down to private soldier. In his book, Governor Barata makes several references to “Lieutenant Gerson” ie Gerson Pello. However, once in Baucau, it appears that almost all members of the party “assumed” higher military ranks – as indicated in the Australian Consul’s meeting with members of the group in Baucau in late 1958 (footnote 221). Only three of the 14 Indonesians appear to have been actively involved in actively proselytising for Timorese independence and participating in the Rebellion itself – ie Gerson Pello, Jeremias Pello, and Jobert Moniaga in Viqueque. However, four were detained and imprisoned in Portugal (and later in Angola) ie Lambertus Ladow, Gerson Pello, Jeremias Pello and Albert Ndoen/Ndun. The remainder - ie nine, were returned by the Portuguese authorities to Indonesian Timor, through Oecusse, in October 1960 – and were reportedly imprisoned for a time in Denpasar (Bali) by the Indonesian authorities. It is still not clear why the Portuguese authorities granted asylum in Portuguese Timor to the “Permesta 14” – an act sure to offend the Indonesian Government. While this was done during the Governorship of Captain César Serpa Rosa, there is no explanation of this aspect in the book by his successor, Governor Themudo Barata. There have been suggestions (see footnote 226) that either the United States – that actively supported the PRRI/Permesta movement, or perhaps Australia, may have pressured the Portuguese to accept the 14, but evidence for such is lacking. Indeed, examination of the classified “record of conversation” between the Australian Minister of External Affairs and the Australian Consul – Dili that related their meeting in Canberra on 29 April 1958 suggests little Australian knowledge of the Permesta 14 and confusion on their origins (see footnote 202). However, in November 1959, a “fulltime” Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) officer was reportedly appointed as the Australian Consul in Dili. This may have been a belated initiative – ie perhaps precipitated by the arrival of the Permesta 14 and the Rebellion, to improve Australia’s intelligence collection on developments in Eastern Indonesia.1013 However, with Portugal a member of the North Atlantic Treaty 1012

As declared by the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1958 - see footnote 214. Note also the email advice by P.A. Rohi that Lambertus Ladow and Jobert Moniaga had been members of Yonif 712 in West Timor. For discussion see footnote 221. 1013 See footnote 631 – and also 226. It has been contended that the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) established a presence in the Dili Consulate in late 1959 ie that the Consul was an ASIS officer - see: Toohey, B. & Pinwill, W., Oyster: the story of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service, Heinemann, Melbourne, 1989, p.169; Gunn, G., Timor Loro Sae 500 Years, 1999 - p.261 (p.146 in the Internet edition); and Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., p.99. Apart from Dili, there were reportedly only two other ASIS-controlled posts outside Australia – Jakarta and Tokyo: see

215 Organisation (NATO), pressure from the US on Portugal to accept the 14 is possibly more plausible than speculation of any Australian influence on the Portuguese in 1958.1014 The suggestion by the rebels that the Indonesians had intended to continue onward to “Irian” - ie Netherlands New Guinea is intriguing and commends further research.1015 While it is possible that the Portuguese authorities accepted the Permesta 14 on the condition that they continue to “Irian”, no such requirement appears in their “Declaration” signed in Dili on 27 March 1958 (see footnote 209 and Annex C). Interestingly, when the four Indonesians being transported to Lisbon escaped briefly in Singapore from the N/M India, they declared themselves to be “Sukarno’s men”1016 and attempted to seek assistance from the Indonesian legation in Singapore – but were rejected. Further, in 1960, President Sukarno appealed for their release and on their return to Indonesia from Portugal in 1962, three of the four entered service in the Indonesian Armed Forces. So, while there is perhaps some possibility that they were part of an Indonesian plan begun in 1958 to foment an uprising in Portuguese Timor, it is far more probable that their eventual “Struggle Veteran” status (from the late 1980s) was awarded to them “post-facto” by Indonesia – ie in support of later Indonesian attempts to justify Indonesian involvement in East Timor by implying a long-standing desire by Timorese for integration into the Republic of Indonesia. Indeed, from the mid-1990s, the Indonesian Government increasingly cited the 1959 Viqueque Rebellion as the earliest of modern-day attempts by the people of Portuguese Timor for integration into Indonesia. This claim was highlighted during the official receptions of the Indonesian-assisted return of Timorese exiles from Portugal and also in “awards” ceremonies in Jakarta and Dili. Central to the Indonesian-preferred interpretation of the 1959 Rebellion is the claim that the Viqueque rebels carried Indonesian flags and wore red-and-white ribbons and insignia – ie as physical evidence of their desire to integrate into Indonesia.1017 This element has also been emphasised by former rebels who returned from exile in the 1980s and 1990s – but their objectivity could be seen as suspect as they were then under Indonesian “sponsorship”, and some served in the local Indonesian legislative structures and civil service in East Timor. While the “flags” issue could therefore be possibly dismissed as a tendentious Indonesian propaganda construct, it is interesting to note that a contemporary and arguably objective source Toohey, B. & Pinwill, W., Oyster …, 1989, op.cit., pp.78-79. The last military company of the Republic Maluku Selatan (RMS) had surrendered in May 1952, and the Permesta Movement (see footnote 190) had been defeated by September 1961. Ibid, p.69 suggests that the ((alleged)) ASIS officer “would later joke to friends. ‘There was bugger all to do’ …” – ((Note: “bugger all” is an Australian slang expression meaning “nothing whatsoever”)). 1014 An email to the author from Peter A. Rohi, a Jakarta-based Indonesian journalist, 27 October 2006, also suggested such NATO considerations. 1015 The document prepared by the exiles in Angola in 1960 notes that the Indonesians “pediram auxilio politico ao Governo Portugues para continuar para Irian, como em Baucau e mais torristica foram mandados para este concelho a espera do transporte” (“had requested political asylum from the Portuguese Government and to continue to Irian ((Netherlands New Guinea)), and had been ordered to Baucau, like tourists, to await transport from that Concelho.”) - Costa, F.A.S. da, Os Nomes dos Detidos Timorenses Para Angola Do Ano De 1959 (The Names of the Timorese Detainees Sent to Angola in 1959), Silva Porto (Bié, Angola), 6 June 1960, p.2 – Annex F. 1016 In her 2009 book – Balibo, Jill Jolliffe has written that the Permesta 14 were “fugitives from Sukarno, but were more probably his intelligence agents.” - Jollife, J., Balibo, Scribe, Carlton North, 2009, p.62. 1017 José Manuel Duarte’s belated 1995 claim – and the display of a “rebel uniform” (see footnote 339) is assessed by the author as a mid-1990s “construction” ie it is considered highly improbable that the rebels in Viqueque wore uniforms in 1959.

216 the Australian Consul in Dili, reported in July 1959: “it is known to me, however, that there were many natives in that area who were in possession of small Indonesian flags.”1018 Governor Barata also described the rebels at Uatolari “wearing … the colours of the Indonesian flag” (footnote 344). Subsequently, in the 1990s, the “Indonesian version” of the Rebellion played down the involvement of the “Indonesian 14” as a catalyst – and, rather, emphasised the indigenous roots of the uprising and highlighted Timorese leadership and participation. For example, an “official” Indonesian version published in 1992 – the high school text-book, declares that the “14” were only “youth from Kupang” who “inspired” the local Timorese to plan and undertake the uprising. Despite a reluctance by the contemporary authorities in Portuguese Timor and Lisbon to admit publicly that the Rebellion’s participants sought unification with Indonesia, subsequent Portuguese investigations more clearly acknowledged this aspect eg the Tribunals in Angola in 1960 (see footnote 494), and in the 1983 Certidão document at Annex H (see also footnote 569). Former Governor Barata’s 1998 book also indicated his belief that the rebels had planned to integrate eastern Timor into Indonesia. Moreover, his view of official Indonesian involvement is also expressed in the title of his 1998 book that has been extensively cited earlier in this work ie: Timor contemporâneo: Da primeira ameaça da Indonésia ao nascer de uma nação (Contemporary Timor: From the first threat by Indonesia to the birth of a nation). In his book, Barata referred to “the movement instigated by Indonesia” and concluded that, “in truth”, the Rebellion represented “the active intervention of Indonesia, through its Consul in Dili and the pseudo-refugees ...”.1019 In an earlier 1963 publication, ex-Governor Barata had indicated also that the uprising was “uma agitação que do exterior foi provocada na província em 1959.”1020 However, this implication by Barata of official Indonesian involvement is markedly different to then Governor Barata’s views expressed in his letter to Lisbon in July 1959: “Nothing was found that allowed us to confirm or deny that the Indonesian Government had instigated or was aware of the event.”1021 ; and Governor Barata’s view - as reported by the Australian Consul in 1960, that there was “no acceptable evidence” for such.1022 It would therefore appear that Barata’s views that Indonesia had been involved in “1959” – ie as expressed in Timor - esse desconhecido in 1963, may have been influenced by events in the early 1960s such as criticism in the United Nations and other forums of Portugal’s overseas possessions, the emergence of the Jakartabased Uni Republik Timor, and post-1959 Indonesian subversive activities against Portuguese Timor. Later, in writing his 1998 book, Barata more explicitly cites official Indonesian involvement – and this review and contradiction of his assessments made in 1959 and 1960 is no doubt related to his very negative views of the Indonesian invasion of 1975 and the subsequent excesses of the Indonesian occupation. It is also interesting to consider whether interference in Portuguese Timor would have been a priority for Indonesia in 1958-59 – a period when the Indonesian 1018

Australian Consulate – Dili, Memo 143/59, 14 July 1959, p.2 (NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1 Part 1). Barata, F. T., Timor contemporâneo …, 1998, op.cit., p.27, p.50. Barata also refers to the “Permesta 14” as “pseudo-refugiados políticos” at p.53 and p.54. 1020 Barata, F. J. F. T., Timor - esse desconhecido, 1963, op.cit., p.12. 1021 “Nada se averiguou, todavia, que permita afirmar ou negar que o assunto era do conhecimento ou instigado pelo Governo da Indonésia”, Barata, F. J. F. T. Governor, Letter No.15 to the Minister of the Interior (Lisbon), Dili, 27 July 1959, paragraph 2 – as noted earlier, see footnote 260. 1022 See footnote 266 – ie: “There has been no acceptable evidence produced that Indonesia had anything to do with last year’s unrest … Nor was there any evidence to suggest that these refugees were other than genuine rebels.” 1019

217 state was facing the major challenges of armed dissident movements in Sumatra and Sulawesi (PRRI/Permesta), the Darul Islam in West Java, was “mopping up” RMS remnants, and was beginning its struggle to incorporate Irian Barat (West Irian – ie modern-day Papua). Also, if Jakarta was directing the Rebellion, why would they have scheduled the replacement of their Consul Nazwar Jacub in June 1959 – ie leaving the incoming Tengku Usman Hussin to develop a relationship with the dissident Timorese and the Permesta 14 ? It is also perhaps relevant that in April 1958 – when the 14 Indonesians had just arrived and sought asylum, Indonesian Consul Nazwar Jacub hurriedly travelled to Australia for “medical treatment”. This suggests that Jacub, a Sumatran, wished to distance himself from events - lest his superiors in Jakarta suspect that he was sympatheic or supportive of the Permesta 14’s separatist politics and asylum bid. Accepting that the “14” were Permesta separatist rebels from Kupang fleeing the Indonesian authorities, why would the three Indonesians directly involved in Viqueque (ie Gerson, Jeremias and Jobert) encourage the Timorese to carry Indonesian flags and seek integration into the Republic of Indonesia - whose government they (ie as Permesta members) had opposed ? As noted earlier, it appears that only a few of the “14” were actively involved in the Rebellion – and these may have been “pro-Republic” or, most likely, “anti-colonial” and supportive of the embryonic plans of the small number of Timorese hoping to oust the Portuguese. Further, and importantly, accounts by Timorese rebels indicate that their plans for revolt – or at least opposition to the authorities, pre-dated by several years the arrival in Portuguese Timor in March 1958 of the Permesta 14. Moreover, the Permesta 14 in Baucau and Viqueque had little contact with the Rebellion principals in Dili – rather, the mentor of the Timorese leadership in Dili appears to have been the quixotic Indonesian Consul, Nazwar Jacub. As noted earlier, Nazwar Jacub was scheduled to end his appointment in early June 1959 and return to Indonesia. Perhaps rethinking the personal implications of his involvement with the incipient rebel movement, he convinced its leadership to defer the uprising from late May to late December 1959 ? Perhaps Nazwar Jacub “got cold feet” – ie wishing to depart Portuguese Timor before any uprising ? How serious a threat were the 1959 rebels to Portuguese rule in Timor ? The investigation and treatment of the Timorese deportees in Lisbon and in Angola indicates that the concerns by the administration in Dili were not shared by the authorities in the Metrópole or Angola. Following their investigations, in February 1961, the Portuguese authorities conditionally released half of the deportees in Angola – ie those não considerado culpado (see footnotes 497-499 and Annex F); and the remainder were similarly released three months later. Only a small handful of the 54 Timorese deportees in Angola were considered active “separatists” warranting close surveillance. Interestingly, a Roman Catholic vice-parish priest, who served in Uatolari for several years up until 1992, has characterised the Rebellion as “a movement to formalise the relationship with West Timor.”1023 This theme of integration with West Timor – and standing separate from the Republic of Indonesia, is also evident in the

1023

Neonbasu, G. SVD, “Building Peace in East Timor: The Role of the Catholic Church”, November 2002. See also José Manuel Duarte’s comments on uniting East and West Timor at page 106, footnote 553. The claim that some rebels supported the concept of an independent “Timor island” merits further investigation. Such a concept might have been attractive to the “Permesta 14” – but its attainment of a united Timor would have faced insurmountable opposition from the Republic of Indonesia.

218 interpretation of the Rebellion by the relatively recent Negara Raya Timor (Greater Timor) movement1024 and the “new” Uni Republik Timor.1025 The Union of the Republic of Timor-Dilly (URT-D) The formation of the URT-D was publicly declared through its “Second Announcement” dated 10 December 1960 – which was disseminated in Jakarta in March 1961. Later, in June and August 1961, there were reports that URT-D “pamphlets” had been distributed in the border areas of Indonesian Timor, and of a few pamphlets appearing in Portuguese Timor (footnotes 614, 616, 637, 638) – probably the “Second Announcement” or based on that document. The URT-D claimed that it declared independence at a flag-raising ceremony at Batugadé on 9 April 1961 attended by nine members of the First Central Presidium (see page 147) – and issued its Declaration of Independence on that date. However, the early reports and URT-D proclamations did not mention any “Declaration of Independence” - nor any reference to Batugadé as the “emergency headquarters” of the URT-D. In particular, URT-D documents dated 3 April 1963, 10 June 1963, and 21 June 1963 still made no reference to the purported earlier 1961 Declaration of Independence at Batugadé. Rather, the Declaration of April 1961 appears to have been first mentioned in a URT-D letter to the United Nations dated 9 December 1964 - and the Declaration itself (dated 9 April 1961) was not made public until distributed in Jakarta in early April 1965. This suggests that the Declaration was probably not written until late 1964 – and then probably retrospectively dated - ie“back-dated” to April 1961 in order to suggest a longer provenance for the URT-D.1026 In the author’s discussions with M.S.A. Balikh in Dili in December 2004, Balikh described the alleged events in the Batugadé area on 9 April 1961 – as related earlier in this work. However, in parts, his description was confused and inconsistent. He had difficulty describing the ceremony and could not describe the URT-D flag with any surety. It was only in October 2008 that he sketched the flag for the author – see page 208. In discussions with the author, Balikh mentioned two URT-D cadre involved with him in the proclamation event at Batugadé: Simon Serang Pria/Prya and Alamsyah Hasibuan.1027 According to Balikh, Simon Serang Pria was captured by the Portuguese; and Balikh believed that Alamsyah Hasibuan might also have been captured. However, it is not plausible that Simon Serang Pria - and possibly Alamsyah Hasibuan, were captured at Batugadé by the Portuguese authorities. If either, or both, had been captured, such information would almost certainly have become known in the Dili diplomatic community – even if the Portuguese had tried to suppress the information. Balikh also later worked with both Simon Serang Pria and Alamsyah Hasibuan in Jakarta in the mid-1960s, and later. Accordingly, he must 1024

As noted earlier, the concept of a “Greater Timor” (Negara Timor Raya) had emerged from a seminar in early 1997 at the Political and Social Science Faculty of the Widya Mandira Catholic University in Kupang, West Timor – see footnotes 996-1003. 1025 Mau Brani (Juru Bicara – Spokesperson), Pesan Natal dari Uni Republik Timor (New Year’s Message from the Union of the Republic of Timor), 26 December 2000 – see footnote 996. This email claimed that the Uni Republik Timor continued the struggle of the “1959 Rebellion whose aim had been to unite and free the island of Timor, including Rote, Jako [sic] and Ataúro”. 1026 This probability was suggested earlier at footnote 741. These observations are based only on the URT-D documents sighted by the author - as listed in the Bibliography. Other documents may exist. 1027 However, when interviewed by TIME Timor magazine in November 2007, Balikh could only recall the names of two participants at Batugadé: Simon Serang Pria and Emanuel Maubere – no mention was made of Alamsyah Hasibuan.

219 surely have known whether Alamsyah Hasibuan had been captured, or not, by the Portuguese. Relatedly, a United States Embassy report (footnotes 894, 895) noted that “Mao Klao” – a “West Sumatran” (most likely Alamsyah Hasibuan) was arrested by the Indonesian authorities in Indonesian Timor – but no year is given. This suggests that Alamsyah Hasibuan may have been involved in an attempted URT-D activity in Indonesian Timor, or even in the Batugadé area, in the early 1960s – but corroborating information is lacking. As noted earlier, Balikh’s relationship with Alamsyah Hasibuan soured in the early 1970s - eg in discussions with the author, Balikh referred to Hasibuan as a “parasite” (footnote 802). However, in the author’s discussions in 2004, Balikh did credit Hasibuan with participation in the purported April 1961 proclamation event at Batugadé (footnote 782) – this suggests that Hasibuan was in West Timor and possibly the Batugadé area. Perhaps Hasibuan - possibly accompanied by Balikh, was in West Timor in mid-1961 distributing the URT-D’s “Second Announcement” pamphlets and other material mentioned earlier. They may have been enroute to (or from) Batugadé when Hasibuan was arrested by the Indonesian authorities in West Timor – and Balikh escaped arrest and returned immediately to Jakarta ? However, if any “Batugadé Declaration/flag-raising” did occur in 1961 – why was it not mentioned by the URT-D until late 1964 ? It is more likely that Alamsyah Hasibuan visited West Timor in mid-1961, distributed URT-D pamphlets, and was arrested in West Timor by the TNI lest he disturb Indonesian plans – and returned to Jakarta. Subsequently in late 1964, an imagined 1961 flag-raising at Batugadé was concocted and included in the URT-D’s “9 April 1961” Declaration of Independence. More recently, Balikh’s 19 April 2007 “Declaration I” - included in the October 2007 edition of TIME Timor, restated his connection with the Resimen Mahajaya at the time of the purported 1961 Batugadé Declaration/Proclamation event – and he “added” the participation of “volunteers” from the Resimen at Batugadé. However, the Resimen Mahajaya was not formed until mid-1962 (see footnote 985). In the November 2007 edition of TIME Timor, when relating the proclamation at Batugadé, Balikh omits any mention of Alamsyah Hasibuan – but rather includes Emanuel Mau Bere and Simon Serang Prya as participants and notes “student friends in Jakarta” as “sponsors of the funds for the 9 April 1961 proclamation”. As discussed above, it is therefore quite unlikely that the suggested URT-D Declaration/Proclamation event at Batugadé occurred as early as 1961. It may have occurred in late June 1964 - when there were unconfirmed reports of the founding of a “Gerakan Timor Merdeka” (“Timor Independence Movement”) at Batugadé “before the malcontents retreated over the border” (see footnotes 717, 718). Any event in 1964 may have involved Alamsyah Hasibuan – and possibly M.S.A. Balikh. In early December 1972, Alamsyah Hasibuan “presented” himself as “A. Mao Klao” in his attempted contact in Jakarta with the Papua New Guinea Minister for Information – ie as evidenced by the photograph of Hasibuan with a manuscript signature: “A. Mao Klao”, on the reverse. That “A. Mao Klao” signature is the same as appeared on a URT-D letter dated 2 April 1967 (Annex L)1028, several 1970 letters to foreign dignitaries1029and the URT-D letter dated 8 December 1972 (Annex N) to

1028 Menyambut hangat atas akan Merdeka Nya Papua dan New Guinea 1967 ini, (Warmly welcoming the forthcoming Independence of Papua and New Guinea in 1967), URT-D, Nr. III/Prespu-URT/IV/67, Batugade, 2 April 1967 – in Bahasa Melayu (see footnote 770 and Annex L). 1029 See footnotes 795, 796 and 799.

220 the Papua New Guinea Chief Minister, Michael Somare1030. As related earlier, M.S.A. Balikh had claimed to the author that Hasibuan was involved with the 9 April 1961 “Declaration” activities in Batugadé – and that Hasibuan was responsible for the URT-D flag and, subsequently, for the production of the URT-D 1,000 pataca bank note. The foregoing suggests strongly that Alamsyah Hasibuan held a very prominent position, if not the leading position, in the URT-D. Certainly from the mid-1960s, Alamsyah Hasibuan appears to have been a more central figure in the movement than the younger M.S.A. Balikh – probably until Balikh’s seeming “take over” of the URT-D in May 1975.1031 As noted earlier, in late November 2004, Balikh provided a copy of what he claimed to be the original April 1961 “Declaration of Independence - ie a short “Proklamasi” in Bahasa, for an article on the URT-D in Dili’s Timor Post newspaper. He also provided a very similar Proklamasi version to the author in Dili in August 2006 (Annex V – Bahasa and English translation). A copy of the Timor Post version was also later included in a TIME Timor article of November 2007. Those Proklamasi versions are markedly different to the “original” – and longer, URT-D Declaration of Independence distributed in Jakarta in April 1965 (see Annex J in English, and Annex O in Bahasa as Pernyataan Kemerdekaan,). Firstly, the text of the 2004 Timor Post/2007 TIME Timor and 2006 Annex V Proklamasi versions, both in Bahasa, are far shorter - ie with only about 70 words, while the earlier Bahasa version disseminated in April 1965 is about 215 words. The style and content of the two (ie “long” and “short”) versions is also markedly different. In particular, the Timor Post/TIME Timor and Annex V Proklamasi versions provided by Balikh in November 2004, August 2006 and late 2007 all omit the Pan-Malay rhetoric and Islamic phrases of the version distributed in April 1965. The Proklamasi versions are written in Bahasa Indonesia (both in spelling and style) – while the Pernyataan Kemerdekaan is in the Bahasa Melayu of that time. Further, the shorter Timor Post/TIME Timor and Annex V Proklamasi versions refer to “Kemerdekaan Timor Timur” (Independence of East Timor) – but the use of the term, “Timor Timur” (ie East Timor), did not appear in the URT-D’s principal documents until Balikh’s “Constitution” of 1975.1032 More generally, the expression “Timor Timur” was not popularised until late 1975. Perhaps most importantly, the version of the Declaration of Independence distributed in April 1965 had a subscription block of “Acting President of the Central Presidium … A. Mao Klao, 9 April 1961”. The Timor Post/TIME Timor Proklamasi version of November 2004/November 2007 and the Annex V Proklamasi version made available to the author in August 2006 are signed by the “Panglima Tertinggi ((ie Supreme Commander))… Mao Klao MSA Balikh – 9 April 1961” and counter-signed by “Atase Militer ((ie Military Attache)) Emanuel Mau Bere.”1033 This appears to be the only occasion where the name “Mao Klao” is

1030

Hubungan Diplomatic dan Kerjasama Menuju Melanesia Raya yang jaya (Diplomatic Relations and Cooperation in a Future Glorious Greater Melanesia), URT-D 0545/ZULK/Prespu-URT/1392 H/1972 M, Batugade, 8 December 1972 – in Bahasa (to H.E. Mr Somare, Chief Minister, Papua New Guinea), see footnote 810 and Annex N. 1031 Administrasi Pemerintahan – Mengambil oper semua kegiatan (Government Administration Assuming control of all activities), Struggle Delegation of the URT-D, 10 May 1975 (in Bahasa provided to the author in December 2004 by M.S.A. Balikh) – see footnote 919. 1032 Undang Undang Dasar – Uni Republik Timor Timur (Constitution – Union of the Republic of East Timor), Jakarta, 22 July 1975 (footnote 922). 1033 Emanuel Mau Bere’s signature on the Timor Post/TIME Timor/Annex V versions of the Proklamasi is similar - but not identical, to Emanuel Mau Bere’s signature on URT-D documents dated

221 formally and directly attributed in URT-D documents to “M.S.A. Balikh.” In interviews in December 2004 and August 2006, Balikh did not mention that Emanuel Mau Bere was present at Batugadé on 9 April 1961 – ie when the Timor Post/TIME Timor and Annex V Proklamasi versions of the Declaration was purportedly signed, including allegedly by Emanuel Mau Bere as “Military Attache”. However, in the TIME Timor interview of November 2007, Balikh asserts that Emanuel Maubere and Simon Serang Pria were with him at Batugadé on 9 April 1961. Further, the Timor Post/TIME Timor and 2006 Annex V versions of the Declaration/Proklamasi appear on URT-D letterhead paper of a style first noted as used for URT-D pronouncements in April 1967 (see Annex L) – ie several years after 1961. In summary, the 2004 Timor Post/2007 TIME Timor and the 2006 Annex V “short” Proklamasi versions of the Declaration/Proclamation “promoted” by Balikh are not the “original” document purportedly signed in Batugadé in 1961. These Proklamasi versions were almost certainly “bogus” and constructed by M.S.A. Balikh since the late 1960s - most probably in the early 2000s (ie after his return to Dili), for purposes of “selfpromotion” ie for acknowledgement and possible engagement in the nascent political processes then emerging in Dili. It is almost certain that the URT-D was an initiative of the All-Malay Race Union (AMRU) in Jakarta in the very late 1950s/early1960. Mulwan Shah, the AMRU founder, appears to have used a Timorese name – that of “Abdullah Mao Klao”, for the URT-D’s nominal, and notional, President; and he possibly appropriated the name “Mao Klao” from the recently-arrived M.S.A. Balikh in order to give the movement a Timorese character. However, it is not yet fully certain that M.S.A. Balikh was called “Mao Klao” at birth – see footnote 773. It is also important to note that URT-D letters and pronouncements issued before mid-1972 were written with a Bahasa Melayu style and spelling (see footnote 700) – evidencing the influence, and almost certainly the control, of the AMRU over the URT-D. Further, the “Islamic bias” evidenced by the URT-D’s declared office holders - and the language and tone of their pronouncements, indicates little realistic understanding of the native cultures in Portuguese Timor or the prospects for effective promotion and proselytising of the URT-D cause in the Province. During his early years in Jakarta as a student (beginning in 1958), the young Balikh probably had only a very minor role in the URT-D. It is also useful to note that, in several discussions in Dili with the author in the period 2004-2008, M.S.A. Balikh had only a very limited knowledge of URT-D formal pronouncements and documents. During interviews with the aged and frail Balikh in Dili in December 2004 and January 2005, Balikh appeared unaware of several early URT-D proclamations and statements eg the announcements of the Liberation Bureau (10 December 1960), the “new” Cabinet (4 April 1963), Cabinet changes (2 November 1964), and the Petition to the United Nations (9 December 1964). He did state however that he was vaguely aware of the “Peace on Earth” declaration (19 December 1964). For all the URT-D documents mentioned immediately above that include “Mao Klao” in the signature block, Balikh claimed that “other people used my name”. Further, in the June 1963 announcement of the URT-D Military Council, while “Mao Klao” appears as the General Chairman, Balikh is also listed separately as a the Chief of the General Staff (as “M.S. Pakkeh”). Importantly, Balikh did not appear to possess a copy of the “longer” and “official” version of the URT-D Declaration of 27 October, 30 August (footnote 930 – Annex T) and 19 December 1975 (ie the beginning and the final “flourish” is quite different).

222 Independence (ie Annex J and O). In summary, he was only familiar with those URTD and associated documents that he provided to the author in late 2004 (marked with an asterisk ie * in the following Bibliography) and documents that he provided to the Timor Post and TIME Timor. It is therefore almost certain that another person (ie other than M.S.A. Balikh) led the URT-D movement in its early years – using the appropriated Timorese appellation of “Mao Klao” for pronouncements. This was almost certainly Mulwan Shah – and later Alamsyah Hasibuan. Despite M.S.A. Balikh’s assertions, it is also yet to be confirmed that Balikh participated in any “Declaration of Independence” and “flag-raising” activity in the Batugadé area in April 1961 – even if such an event did occur (which itself still needs corroboration). Rather, Balikh appears to only have come to some prominence in May 1968 - by which time he had apparently been appointed as the Head of the URT-D’s Struggle Delegation in Jakarta.1034 A “split” appears to have occurred in the URT-D in the early-mid 1970s – with Alamsyah Hasibuan and Analessy (see footnotes 820, 919) heading one group, and Balikh heading the other. As related earlier, a senior Bakin officer stated that the “split” in the URT-D occurred in 1972 between the “Pan Malay/AMRU” and Timorese groups (see footnote 967) – however, the Bakin/Australian Embassy report appears mistaken in crediting the “Malay splinter group” for the URT-D letter of 19 December 1975 signed by M.S.A. Balikh – and by implication, Balikh’s call on the Australian Embassy on 23 December 1975. The split in the URT-D is clearly evidenced in Hasibuan’s attempted approach in December 1972, as “Mao Klao”, to a Papua New Guinea Minister visiting Jakarta (as related at page 162) – and the URT-D documents offered by Alamsyah Hasibuan at that time excluded Balikh (as “M.S. Pakkeh”) as well as Balikh’s associates from positions in the URT-D hierarchy. Later, in May 1975, Balikh apparently attempted to take formal control of the URT-D movement, signing the document that appointed him as Prime Minister – ie additional to his position as Head of the Struggle Delegation in Jakarta. Soon after, he drafted a somewhat amateurish Constitution for the “Union of the Republic of East Timor” – although the status and the extent of this document’s dissemination is unclear. The principals in Balikh’s Timorese URT-D group appear to have been Emanuel Maubere (or “Mau Bere”) and Simon Serang Prya/Pria – ie the regular cosignatories, with Balikh, on several URT-D documents in the mid-1970s. Importantly, Indonesian intelligence records reportedly suggest that Mulwan Shah and Emanuel Mau Bere were still principals in the URT-D in late 1975 and organised the calls on embassies in Jakarta in late December 1975 – although, as noted above, Balikh called on the Australian Embassy at that time also. The “open” document1035 distributed during those calls included Balikh’s signature – but as the “Cabinet Secretary, Minister of State/Head of the Struggle Delegation.” A review of the Kopkamtib release-from-detention document1036 shows that Mulwan Shah was detained for a month longer than Balikh – probably indicating Mulwan Shah’s greater involvement 1034

See footnotes 788, 789 – the circular - congratulating Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik on his visit to the “Pacific Regions”, has a signature block of “MSA. Balikh B.A. (see Annex M). 1035 Pendirian Uni Republik Timor (Dilly) (Standpoint of the United Republic Timor (Dilly) ), Batugade – through “Jl Kernolong Dalam IV/16, Kramat IV, Jakarta”, 19 December 1975 (footnote 965). 1036 Laksus, Kopkamtib – Daerah Jakarta Raya dan Sekitarnya. Surat Keputusan - Nomor Skep24/PK/VII/1976, Jakarta, 11 August 1976. It is highly unlikely that as many as “300” URT-D members and supporters were arrested by Indonesian security authorities in early 1976 as claimed by Balikh.

223 as a founder, principal - or at least éminence grise, of the URT-D. Alamsyah Hasibuan appears to have avoided arrest in Jakarta in early 1976 – for reasons that are not yet clear. He may have left the URT-D movement earlier, avoided arrest in early 1976 – ie “fled” as claimed by Balikh, or perhaps collaborated with the Indonesian authorities.1037 Accordingly, the foregoing indicates that Balikh’s role in the URT-D organisation was not as prominent or important as he asserted in his interview with the Timor Post in Dili in late November 2004 – nor in interviews with the author in December 2004, January 2005, August 2006 or October 2008, nor most recently in the TIME Timor articles of October and November 2007. As noted above, the two short “Proklamasi” versions of the URT-D Declaration of Independence - ie signed by Mao Klao/M.S.A. Balikh (with his “M.S.A. Balikh” signature ie not “Mao Klao”) and (purportedly) by Emanuel Mau Bere, are patently fabrications probably drafted by Balikh after his return to Dili in late 1999. As mentioned earlier, the Bahasa Indonesia orthography of these documents - purportedly signed by M.S.A. Balikh on 9 April 1961, post-dates August 1972 (see footnote 700). Note also that Balikh did not present a “Mao Klao” signature on his April 2007 “Letter of Declaration I” (Annex W) that could be compared with earlier Mao Klao signatures (see footnotes 770, 795, 796, 799, 816, 818 - and discussion at footnote 786). In December 1975, when speaking with an official in the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, Balikh had sought assistance for URT-D “guerillas”. More recently, when interviewed in late October 2007 for the TIME Timor article, Balikh asserted that URT-D members - men and women, were infiltrated into Portuguese Timor but were “captured and killed. Not just one or two were mobilized, but thousands” (see page 207). Such apparent hyperbole is not substantiated by any other sources. It is extremely unlikely that the URT-D ever possessed operational armed elements of any type – and very doubtful that any “Mao Klao” URT-D personnel were ever active within Portuguese Timor. Since returning to Timor-Leste in late 1999, Balikh’s public pronouncements on the Uni Republic Timor – ie the Timor Post article of 25 November 2004, his “Declaration I” of 19 April 2007 and interviews reported in TIME Timor of October and November 2007, have made no mention of Alamsyah Hasibuan nor of Mulwan Shah. Rather, in his “Declaration I”, Balikh contends that “volunteers” from the then yet-to-be-founded Resimen Mahajaya were participants in the URT-D’s 9 April 1961 Independence Declaration at Batugadé. In his late October 2007 interview for TIME Timor, Balikh also related that “the sponsors of the funds for the 9 April 1961 proclamation at Batugadé were my student friends in Jakarta”. The foregoing indicates that Balikh appears determined to “recreate” elements of the story of the purported 1961 Declaration at Batugadé - ie omitting reference to Alamsyah Hasibuan, increasing the alleged role of his university student contemporaries, and claiming arrests and casualties among the participants. Seemingly unfazed by the contradictions and inconsistencies in his accounts of events, the now aged and increasing frail Balikh continues to seek recognition as the URT-D’s “Mao Klao” and Timor-Leste’s first Proklamator of Independence.

1037

Alamsyah Hasibuan’s subsequent activities from the mid-1970s are not known to the author. On 20 December 2005, 83 year-old Kari Sutan Hasibuan Bin Tk. Alamsyah Hasibuan (of Lubuk Bunut, South Tapanuli, North Sumatra) died of a heart attack while on a Haj pilgrimage in Medina, Saudi Arabia – but it is not clear whether he was the Alamsyah Hasibuan prominent in the URT-D (footnotes 770, 774, 782, 783, 795, 796, 799, 802, 816, 818, 820, 895, 905, 1027, and 1031).

224 Silvester Martins Nai Buti (Seço) A small number of PIDE reports in the 1960s (see also footnote 674) link “Silvestre Martins Nai Buti Seço”1038 – of Ermera and Atambua, with the “URT-D” in West Timor. However, it is highly likely that Silvester Martins’organisation was quite separate to the Jakarta-based “Mao Klao” URT-D – and that PIDE officers have mistakenly confused and conflated the two organisations ie naming Martins’ organisation as the “URT-D” or as associated with the URT-D. With its Islamic and Pan-Malay emphases, it is quite unlikely that the URT-D would be welcomed by Silvester Martins’ Christian Kemac-based group. As noted earlier, when queried by the author in Dili on 27 October 2008, M.S.A. Balikh (“Mao Klao”) had no knowledge of Silvester Martins Nai Buti or of any Indonesian-supported antiPortuguese operations in the border area in the early-mid 1960s. No confirmatory press coverage has been noted of Silvester Martins’ PIDEreported visit to Jakarta in June 1963 leading a delegation of elders - and accompanied by Brigadier General Andi Rivai (footnote 684). However, Silvester Martins’ son – Fransiskus Nai Buti, has confirmed that Silvester Martins did receive a “directive” from the Indonesian military “High Command” (ie KOTI) and met “face-to-face” with President Sukarno (see footnote 685). Accordingly, it seems certain that Silvester Martins was directed by TNI/ABRI and was probably the Timorese element of their limited covert operations against Portuguese Timor in the early-mid 1960s (see footnotes 657-658, 669-671, 681-690, 691-693, 709, 713-722, 726-732). The anti-Portuguese activities of Silvester Martins Nai Buti in West Timor in the 1960s merit further research and analysis.

Silvester Nai Buti’s tombstone in Tenubot, West Timor

1038

For background on Silvester/Silvestre Martins Nai Buti (Seço) - see footnotes 524, 671, 674, 681690, 716, 721, 728 and 764. The photograph above of Silvester Nai Buti’s tombstone was provided by Shigehito Takahashi.

225 Collective Democratic Students of Timor Delly (Codes Timde) This “pro-integration” and Indonesia-ophile organisation appears to have first come to notice in mid-late 1974 – despite its fanciful assertions of its earlier establishment at a meeting in Atambua in 1971. Similarly, the claimed location of its “Presidium Management” in the Portuguese Timor border town of Bobonaro is not credible - as that town had a considerable Portuguese administrative and military presence. The Codes Timde Memorandum of May 1974 supported both Apodeti and the ASDT (ie later to become Fretilin), but the Codes Timde Note of July 1974 supported only Apodeti. Accordingly, there may have been some association between Codes Timde and Apodeti in mid-late 1974 – noting that the Apodeti President, Arnaldo dos Reis Araújo, was in Jakarta in the period June-October 1974; and the Apodeti Secretary General, José Fernando Osório Soares, was in Jakarta for a period in October-November 1974. The standard of the three Codes Timde documents reviewed (ie the Memorandum, Note and Statement of Support) is quite poor – in terms of both expression and political knowledge/“savvy”. Accordingly, it appears that Codes Timde may not initially have had any substantive official mentoring or assistance from Indonesian Government agencies in Jakarta. However, the call by two Codes Timde principals on Foreign Minister Adam Malik on 19 November 1974 – and their reported calls on other officials, may have been an Indonesian initiative to establish something like an “expatriate youth wing” for Apodeti – that was later abandoned by Jakarta. Indonesian Involvement From the early 1950s to the early 1970s, any liberation or incorporation of Portuguese Timor into the Republic of Indonesia was not a principal pre-occupation for Jakarta. Separatist challenges from Darul Islam, Republik Maluku Selatan (RMS – Republic of the South Moluccas) and the PRRI/Permesta movement were followed by the Indonesian campaign to incorporate Netherlands New Guinea/West Irian. From late 1962, the “Crush Malaysia” Konfrontasi campaign was the priority – and this was followed by the internal political and economic traumas after the attempted Gestapu “communist” coup of 30 September 1965. However, throughout these years, Jakarta does appear, at times, to have involved itself in somewhat desultory and “halfhearted” activities against Portuguese Timor. The earliest suggestion of Indonesian activity related in this work – ie the allegedly sponsored, but covert, attendance of representatives from Portuguese Timor at the 1955 Bandung Conference, relies on two sources: the Indonesian journalist Peter Rohi who has claimed that three Timorese youth did attend the Conference1039; and Marcelino António Fausto Guterres, one of the three youths – but who has declared that, although completing the travel modalities with the Indonesian Consul, the three did not travel to Bandung in 19551040. These two versions of events have yet to be satisfactorily resolved. However, it is likely that the Rohi-published version of “attendance in Bandung” was either: 1039

Rohi, P.A., “Soekarno, KAA, dan Timor-Leste”, marhaenis.org, 9 May 2005, op.cit., p.2 – an interview with Marcelino (a purported “youth observer” in Bandung), Venilale (East Timor), 1996 – see footnotes 136, 138 and 141. 1040 As clarified in the author’s interviews with Marcelino Guterres in Dili and Baucau in April and June 2007 – see footnote 138.

226 •

•

knowingly “embroidered” in 1996 by Peter Rohi as an element of an Indonesian campaign to fabricate an earlier history of association between Indonesia and young “independentists” in Portuguese Timor (see footnotes 136 and 558); Rohi was misled by Marcelino who, in 1996, claimed falsely to Rohi that the three Timorese had attended the Bandung Conference – and that Marcelino, on his return, had been involved in clandestine activity associated with the 1959 Rebellion.

On the balance of probabilities, the former of the scenarios - ie “fabrication”, is considered the most likely, but further clarifying information may yet emerge. However, subsequent criticism by groups in Jakarta of the Portuguese colonial regime in Timor were probably catalysed by the “Spirit of Bandung” - and did not necessarily require any significant direction or control by the Indonesian Government. The role, if any, of the Indonesian Government in the 1959 Viqueque Rebellion has been discussed at some length earlier. It is highly unlikely that Jakarta directed the “independence activities” of its Consul in Dili - or managed or sponsored the “Permesta 14” – for, as yet, there is no firm - let alone definitive, evidence of any such official Indonesian involvement. Several reports however, indicate that the Indonesian Government was involved in a range of subversive activities against Portuguese Timor beginning at least in late 1962. Examples include: • • •

•

•

•

Limited assistance to the URT-D in the early 1960s – apparently sanctioned by Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik, as related by M.S.A. Balikh and mentioned by Harry Tjan Silalahi of CSIS. The Chief of Intelligence of the Indonesian Army, Magenda, visited Indonesian Timor in late 1962/early 1963 - reportedly “concerning Indonesian activities there directed at Portuguese Timor”; The Australian High Commissioner in London spoke of highly sensitive “evidence” - and “some evidence” of Indonesian “groundwork” was also discussed at the Quadripartite Meeting in Washington in February 1963. In mid-1963, Foreign Minister Subandrio reportedly directed the Indonesian Central Intelligence Agency, the BPI, to initiate a covert project to bring Portuguese Timor under Indonesian control (see Conboy, K.). This may have included assisting the URT-D with its series of documents disseminated in the period 1963 to 1965 – including perhaps a “back-dated” Declaration of Independence. Silvester Martins Nai Buti appears to have been supported by TNI/ABRI elements in the Atambua area in the early 1960s – including by Lieutenant Prawiro Slamet/Slamat. Silvester Martin’s activities however – including a reported visit to Jakarta, were probably quite separate from, and did not have any connection with, the “Mao Klao” Jakarta-based URT-D movement. The Australian Joint Intelligence Committee Report of May 1963 included a discrete section on “Indonesian Infiltration and Subversion” in Portuguese Timor – that noted: “propaganda and other activities were to be organised by a special Indonesian Army intelligence unit so that they could not be traced back to official Indonesian inspiration.”

227 • •

•

•

• •

A “genuine document” relating Indonesian preparations for subversion in Portuguese Timor was reportedly acquired by an Australian intelligence agency in September 1963. In May 1964, eight armed Indonesians departed from Kisar and landed on the northern coast of Portuguese Timor with “subversive literature” - but they were soon captured, and then secretly repatriated by the Portuguese authorities. In 1963-1964 one and 1,000 Pataca currency notes, dated “July 1964” – with Bahasa Melayu spelling, were produced by/for the URT-D. These were markedly more sophisticated items that any preceding URT-D declaratory material – and may have been produced for the URT-D by an Indonesian intelligence agency.1041 An Indonesian academic, Harry Tjan Silalahi of CSIS - with close links to Indonesian intelligence, admitted in mid-1974 that Indonesia “had a clandestine operation of some sort going in Portuguese Timor during Confrontation.” In mid-August 1965, President Sukarno publicly stated “Indonesia continues to actively support the independence struggles of the peoples of … ((including)) Portuguese Timor.” In late 1965, there were reports of Indonesia using tribes near the border in Indonesian Timor to support subversive activities in Portuguese Timor.

From 1966 however, the New Order regime of General Soeharto seems to have had little interest in Portuguese Timor - until the early-mid 1970s. Apodeti Preferred Indonesian attention to the future of Portuguese Timor increased markedly in mid-1974 when the new Spinola/Armed Forces Movement regime in Lisbon indicated that Portugal would divest itself of its colonial possessions. Jakarta probably assessed that the URT-D was an inappropriate, and ineffective, vehicle for Indonesian ambitions related to Portuguese Timor - for a number of reasons. Firstly, the URT-D movement was “ephemeral”. It had no organisation or real influence within Portuguese Timor – and, despite the URT-D’s letter-writing and circulars, had achieved no meaningful international acknowledgement or support. Also, the URTD’s Pan-Malay and Islamic rhetoric1042 – in Bahasa Melayu/Indonesia with only an occasional word of Tetum, would not appeal to the Christian communities in Portuguese Timor – and neither to the territory’s small political elites nor to the general population1043. Further, and most importantly, the URT-D espoused a 1041

Regrettably, to date little is known about these URT-D currency notes - ie their provenance, denominations, purpose or distribution. 1042 Including, from the early 1970s, the use of the Islamic calendar for dates on URT-D documents - ie together with the “Western” calendar. 1043 The majority of the Timorese population were “tribal animists”. In 1973, the Roman Catholic community in Portuguese Timor was assessed as 27.3 percent of the population – but its influence was wider (see footnote 609). On Islam in Portuguese Timor, see the earlier footnotes 113, 445 and 446. A later assessment indicates that Muslims comprised less than 0.5 percent of the population – almost all in towns on the north coast, including a small “Arab” community of about 500 living in western Dili (Kampung Alor) - see Aditjondro, G.J., Menyongsong Matahari Terbit Di Puncak Ramelau, 2000, pp.217-220. A review of eleven URT-D documents that list members of their assemblies and councils

228 Timorese “Republic” that would be independent of Indonesia within a somewhat confused “Greater Malay Melanesia”– a policy and construct quite unacceptable to Jakarta. Understandably, from mid-1974, Jakarta decided to “sponsor” Apodeti as its vehicle for influence and ambition in Portuguese Timor. As early as August 1974, Tomás Gonçalves – the son of Guilherme Gonçalves ie the liurai of Atsabe (Ermera), had met with visiting Indonesian officers in Atsabe and planned for an Apodeti armed force “if necessary”– and was joined by “about 110” Apodeti members in November 1974 who commenced training with ABRI in West Timor in early December (footnotes 875-879). Guilherme Gonçalves “provided a significant power base for the party”1044 and was “not only the leader of the Atsabe Kemak group but had extensive marriage alliance ties with groups within the former kingdom of Atsabe and with groups allied with the former kingdom – thus his ties extended to the Northern Tetun and Bunaq ethnic groups on both sides of the border, as well as with other Kemak groups in Ainaro and Bobonaro districts, and also with southern Tetun groups on both sides of the border.”1045 Apodeti’s policies sought integration with Indonesia1046 – but with an autonomous status. Any such autonomy however was rejected by Indonesia in late 1974 – but Apodeti’s policy remained one of integration. While Apodeti was numerically the weakest of the three major Timorese parties – both in member numbers and assessed support, it did offer Jakarta a far more viable and exploitable foothold in the politics of Portuguese Timor than the very few and Jakarta-centric Timorese expatriates and the Pan-Maly non-Timorese of the URT-D.1047 Indonesian officials had found the URT-D increasingly annoying – particularly its vexatious criticisms of Indonesia’s policy towards Portuguese Timor and the URT-D’s complaints of the Indonesian lack of support for the URT-D (eg see footnotes 892, 898, 901-905 and 965). Indonesian annoyance was evidenced by Ali Alatas’ comments to the senior Australian Embassy official in Jakarta in November 1974 – as well as the reported negative remarks on the URT-D by General Ali Moertopo and Harry Tjan Silalahi. The URT-D’s final attempts to involve itself in a settlement in Timor ie: the denouncement of the three major political parties in Portuguese Timor in August 1975 (footnotes 929, 930); “post-invasion” calls on embassies in Jakarta in late December 1975 (footnotes 965, 970-971) – including the Embassy of the USSR; and apparent difficulties arising during their participation in a delegation meeting the UN’s Winspeare Guicciardi in January 1976 (footnotes 972-973) - all exhausted Jakarta’s patience. Under the rubric of the Peristiwa/Kasus (Affair/Case) Uni Republik Timor, the URT-D’s leaders and cadre were arrested by the Indonesian authorities in early 1976, put on trial and detained for several months – effectively ending the movement. indicates that the names of 34 percent were Islamic/Malay ie 69 of 203; and 8 of the 12 detained by Kopkamtib in Jakarta in early 1976 had Islamic/Malay names – see footnote 978. 1044 Chega ! , CAVR Final Report, Part 3, para 80. 1045 Molnar, A.K., East Timor: An Introduction to the History, Politics and Culture of Southeast Asia’s Youngest Nation, Northern Illinois University, May 2005. 1046 The Apodeti political party also cited the “1959 Viqueque Rebellion” – with its pro-Indonesia connotations, as Apodeti’s “progenitor” – see Rusdie, H., et al, op.cit., Perjuangan …, March 1997 and preceding footnotes 860 and 865-867. 1047 For a discussion of Apodeti’s strength, see Nicol, B., Timor – A Nation Reborn, 2002, op.cit., pp. 75-78. A comprehensive discussion of Jakarta’s selection of Apodeti is contained in Fernandes, M. S., A União da República de Timor (URT): o primeiro movimento nacionalista timorense 1960-1974, op.cit., 2003.

229 Resurrection ? Any “revival” of the pre-1974 movements described in this work is quite unlikely. However, as evidenced by the Mau Brani/Bere Nahak emails of 2000/2002, minor emerging political groups will probably continue to invoke reference to the 1959 Viqueque Rebellion - and perhaps even the URT-D, in attempts to imply a history and lineage of resistance and activism for their nascent movements. More recently, in October 2007, the TIME Timor article on M.S.A. Balikh – including his “Declaration I” - has appeared on an Internet blogsite favoured by young expatriate Timorese. This exposure may engender further reference to, and discussion of, the Uni Republik Timor - and Balikh as “Mao Klao”. A Future History This book began by noting that Fretilin’s 28 November 1975 declaration of independence was preceded by other 20th century attempts at independence and freedom for the people of Timor-Leste. How will Timor-Leste governments, academics, historians, political parties1048, teachers – and future school text-books, treat these early independence movements – particularly the 1959 Rebellion and the URT-D, discussed in this book ? A concern is that history and politics are perhaps inseparable – indeed: “History furnishes to politics all the arguments that it needs, for the chosen cause.” 1049 The 1959 Viqueque Rebellion has been “tainted” by the appropriation of that movement by Indonesian authorities– ie by the Indonesian insistence that the 1959 uprising represented the earliest attempt by the people of Portuguese Timor to integrate into the Republic of Indonesia. As noted earlier, this interpretation of the uprising was actively promoted by the Indonesian Government during their reception of returning Viqueque Rebellion exiles in the mid-1990s. However, any objective assessment of the 1959 Rebellion would acknowledge that the rebels were, not surprisingly, inspired by the independence of Indonesia – and that their movement did seek an association with Indonesia. However, the involvement of several of the 1959 veterans with the pro-Indonesian Apodeti party in the mid-1970s – and the subsequent “collaboration” of several during the Indonesian occupation, has also tarnished the “independence” credentials of the 1959 movement. There have however been occasional positive references to the 1959 Rebellion by Fretilin/Falintil-associated figures – albeit most dated before the increased Indonesian propagandistic exploitation in the 1990s of the uprising.1050 Importantly however – as noted earlier, Dom Ximenes Belo published an article in mid-2009 on the Rebellion that concluded: “To all those who lost their lives because of the so-called ‘Revolt of 1959’, I – as a Timorese who witnessed with my own eyes and ears the physical and mental violence in my hometown of Baucau, bow my head as a sign of respect and solidarity. To some extent, I take the liberty to affirm ‘they also have

1048

For reported Fretilin and UDT (União Democrática Timorense – Timorese Democratic Union) positive attitudes towards the 1959 Rebellion as a “formative influence” – see footnote 511. 1049 Romain Rolland, 1866-1944 - Nobel Prize for Literature 1915. xxxxx 1050 Examples include: Abílio de Araújo (footnote 550 – written in 1977); Francisco Xavier do Amaral (footnotes 412 and 413); and Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão (footnote 511). See also Nicolau Lobato’s comment in May 1975 at footnote 1011.

230 contributed to the Independence of our Motherland – to them I offer my prayers and respect.’ ”1051 Perhaps future reviews and studies of the 1959 Rebellion movement by Timorese scholars may yet more adequately recognise the sacrifices of the rebels and the suffering inflicted on villagers – and the Rebellion might yet find some general recognition and acceptance as a “legitimate” contribution to the independence struggle of Timor-Leste. The URT-D did not seek integration into Indonesia. Rather, it specifically opposed any Indonesian hegemony over East Timor. M.S.A. Balikh and his Timorese colleagues did not collaborate with Indonesia – unlike the Apodeti and UDT leaders who collaborated with Indonesia before, and after, the Indonesian occupation of Timor-Leste. However, the URT-D movement lacks any truly “heroic” struggle phase or significant history of sacrifices – only the relatively brief period of imprisonment in Jakarta of the URT-D senior cadres in early 1976. Also, the “Pan-Malay” and Islamist aspects of the URT-D’s rhetoric – and its evident control by the All-Malay Race Union in the early years, could be expected to militate against any significant acceptance by mainstream Timorese politics and culture. Nevertheless, over time, the URT-D also has some potential for legitimate incorporation into any comprehensive Timor-Leste history of the country’s independence struggle. M.S.A. Balikh’s role as a pioneer for Timor-Leste’s independence may yet be given some recognition. This work has offered a brief, and admittedly incomplete, recounting of some aspects of recent Timorese history. Here, I am mindful of the view that, “compounded by the complexity of internal division following twenty-five years of resistance”, some Timorese consider their history still “too hot to handle” – “maybe leave it for another twenty years.”1052 Regardless, the writing of a definitive and authoritative history of the period is more appropriately left to Timorese.1053 The 50th anniversary of the 1959 Rebellion was a catalyst for some re-examination of the events of that period – as evidenced by Bishop Belo’s above-cited article in June 2009. Nevertheless, we still await the publishing of a comprehensive and objective account of Timor’s independence struggles by a Timorese author.

----------------------------------------------------

1051

Belo, C.F.X. Dom, “A Revolta de 1959 em Viqueque, Watolari e Watocarbau”, Porto, 5 Junho de 2009, p.6 – quoted earlier at page 117 and footnote 603. 1052 Leach, M., “East Timor – History on the Line …”, History Workshop Journal, Spring 2006, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p.235. 1053 The 1959 Rebellion was included a topic for the Timor-Leste Studies Association research conference “Understanding Timor Leste” at the University of Timor-Lorosae (2-3 July 2009) and a related History Workshop at the CAVR offices at Balide (4 July 2009).

231 Annexes:

Not include in the electronic Scribd version.

A.

Map - Circunscrição de Viqueque.

B.

Sejarah Perjuangan Timor-Timur Untuk Sekolah Menengah Atas (History of the East Timor Struggle for Senior High School), Anhar Gonggong & Susanto Zuhdi, Direktorat Pendidikan Menengah Umum, Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, Jakarta, 1992 – translated extract in English by author (Chamberlain).

C.

Declaration/Request for Political Asylum by the “Permesta 14” – 27 March 1958; 20 June 1958 – see footnote 209.

D.

Araújo, A.L.J. de, O Célebre Massacré de Uato-Lari e Uato-Carbau Verificado no Ano de 1959 (The Truth of the Infamous Massacre at Uatolari and Uato-Carabau in 1959), Jakarta/Kupang, 1974 – including: Araújo, A. de (et al), Memorandum – Assunto: Sobre o acontecimento ocorrido em 7 de Junhe [sic] de 1959, na Cirrcunscrição [sic] de Viqueque – Timor (Memorandum – Report: On the event that occurred on 7 June 1959 in the Circumscription of Viqueque - Timor), six pages, Cólonia Penal do Bié (Angola), 21 April 1960 – in Portuguese. “Memorandum – Assunto …” was also included in the 2005 “expanded/A-4” version of the O Célebre …booklet – see footnote 177, which was initialled/authenticated by Evaristo da Costa, Salem Musalam Sagran, Frederico Almeida Santos da Costa and Juman bin Basirun.

E.

Deportees – 1959 Rebellion.

F.

Costa, F.A.S. da, Os Nomes dos Detidos Timorenses para Angola do Ano de 1959 (The Names of the Timorese Detainees in Angola in 1959), Silva Porto (Bié, Angola), 6 June 1960 – in Portuguese (initialled/authenticated by Evaristo da Costa, Salem Musalam Sagran, Frederico Almeida Santos da Costa and Juman bin Basirun); see footnote 497. This document appears as pp.15-17 in Costa, E. da (et al), O Célebre Massacré de Uato-Lari e UatoCarbau Verificado no Ano de 1959 (The Truth of the Infamous Massacre at Uatolari and Uato-Carabau in 1959), Dili, 2005.

G.

TERJEMAHAN: Pejuang Perintis Integrasi Timor Timur Ke Dalam Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (TRANSLATION: Pioneer Fighters for the Integration of East Timor into the Unitary Republic of Indonesia), Dili, 8 December 1995 - in Bahasa Indonesia (see footnote 568). English translation by author (Chamberlain) overpage.

H.

Pinto, L. dos Santos, Certidão - Estado-Maior General das Forças Armadas Serviço de Coordenação de Extinção da PIDE/DGS e LP (Armed Forces Chief-of-Staff’s Office for the Coordination of the Disbandment of the PIDE/DGS & LP) Lisbon, 22 March 1983 – in Portuguese (see footnote 569).

232 I.

Second Announcement: Freedom Throughout Timor-Dilly ! – Drive the Portuguese into the Sea !, Liberation Bureau – Union of the Republic of Timor-Dilly, 10 December 1960 – in English (see footnote 607).

J

The Declaration of Independence, Batugade, 9 April 1961 – in English, with the stamp of the URT-D Foreign Ministry in Bahasa (see footnote 742). Clearer copy retyped by author (Chamberlain) is overpage.

K.

Constitution, Batugade, 4 May 1965 - in English (see footnote 750).

L.

Menyambut hangat atas akan Merdeka Nya Papua dan New Guinea 1967 ini, (Warmly welcoming the forthcoming Independence of Papua and New Guinea in 1967), URT-D, Nr. III/Prespu-URT/IV/67, Batugadé, 2 April 1967 – in Bahasa Melayu (see footnote 770). English translation by author (Chamberlain) overpage.

M.

Pernyataan Sambutan – Menyambut Missi Adam Malic kembali dengan succes dari Pacific (Congratulatory Statement – Welcoming Adam Malic [sic] on his Return from a Successful Mission in the Pacific), Number 019/PPURT/VI/68, URT-D, Djakarta, 26 April 1968 – in Bahasa Melayu (see footnote 788). English translation by author (Chamberlain) overpage.

N.

Hubungan Diplomatic dan kerjasama menuju Melanesia Raya yang jaya (Diplomatic Relations and Cooperation Towards a Glorious Greater Melanesia), Number 0545/ZULK/Prespu-URT/1392 H/1972 M., Batugadé, 8 December 1972 (Letter to H.E. Mr Somare, Chief Minister, Papua New Guinea) in Bahasa Melayu (see footnote 810) . English translation by author (Chamberlain) overpage.

O.

Pernyataan Kemerdekaan (Declaration of Independence), 9 April 1961 – in Bahasa Melayu (see footnote 811). A clearer copy - retyped by author (Chamberlain), is overpage.

P.

Timor Merdeka (Independent Timor), 18 August 1963, (“Anthem” of the URT-D) – in Bahasa Melayu (see footnote 815). English translation by author (Chamberlain) overpage.

Q.

Timor Union Republic (Union of the Republic of Timor), (A-4 copy of the original A-3 size map of Timor Island with inserted photograph of “A. Mao Klao”) – see footnote 809 for the covering letter dated 22 December 1972.

R.

Note – Collective Democratic Students of Timor Delly (Codes Timde) to the United Nations Secretary General, 14/VII/V/FC/74, 10 July 1974 (less Memorandum attachment) – in English (see footnote 908).

S.

Pernyataan Dukungan (Statement of Support), Codes Timde 01/ICT/XII/74, Tanjung Priok – Jakarta, 23 December 1974 – in Bahasa Indonesia. English translation by author (Chamberlain) overpage.

233 T.

Pernyataan situasi di Timport (Statement on the Situation in Portuguese Timor), No: 0128/PP-URTD/VIII/75, Jakarta, 30 August 1975 – in Bahasa Indonesia (see footnote 930). English translation by author (Chamberlain) overpage.

U.

Surat - Keputusan Tentang Perobahan Status Pembebasan Para Tahanan/ Tawanan Peristiwa U.R.T. (Unie Republik Timor) Dari Bebas – Dikenakan Wajib Lapor Menjadi Bebas Penuh (Directive on the Change of Release Status for Detainees of the U.R.T. Affair (United Republic of Timor) from Released with Reporting Status to Full Release), Kopkamtib, Jakarta, 11 August 1976 – in Bahasa Indonesia (see footnote 978). English translation by author (Chamberlain) overpage.

V.

Memproklamasikan: Kemerdekaan Timor Timur (Proclamation of the Independence of East Timor), Batugade, 9 April 1961 – in Bahasa Indonesia (copy provided to the author by M.S.A. Balikh in Dili on 21 August 2006) – in Bahasa Indonesia (see page 204). English translation by author (Chamberlain) overpage.

W.

Surat Pernyataan I (Letter of Declaration I), Mau Klao M.S.A. Balich (sic), Gugleur – Maubara, 19 April 2007 (see footnote 984). In Bahasa Indonesia English translation by author (Chamberlain) overpage. Included in an article in TIME Timor, No.10, Tahun II, October 2007, Dili, p.49 (see footnote 986).

X.

Kemerdekaan Timor Timor Diproklamasikan (East Timor Independence is Proclaimed) – as included in the Timor Post (25 November 2004 - see footnotes 982-983); and in TIME Timor, No.11, Tahun II, November 2007, Dili, p.24 (see footnote 987) in the article: “Mau-Klao Siap Mempertanggungjawabkan Kebenaran Proklamasi Uni Republik Timor (URT)” (“Mau-Klao is Ready to Accept Responsibility for the Truth about the Proclamation by Union of the Republic of Timor (URT)”). This is a very poor photocopy of the original from p.24 of the magazine. The typed Bahasa text and an English translation by the author (Chamberlain) are overpage.

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234 BIBLIOGRAPHY Union of the Republic of Timor-Dilly (URT-D) – Documents Reviewed (Documents provided by M.S.A. Balikh are preceded by an asterisk – ie *) Second Announcement: Freedom Throughout Timor-Dilly ! – Drive the Portuguese into the Sea !, Liberation Bureau – Union of the Republic of Timor-Dilly, Kramat Sawah XIII E 227 - Paseban Jakarta, 10 December 1960 – in English. Announcement on the formation of new Cabinet of Central Government … for the period 1963-1965, General Directorate of the Central Presidium, No. P.T./IV/DGPrespo – URTD/63, Batugadé, 3 April 1963 – in English. * Pengumuman mengenai Pembentukan Dewan Meliter Uni Republik Timor Dilly (Announcement on the Formation of the Military Council of the Union of the Republic of Timor-Dilly), No P. II/VI/DG-Prespu-URTD/63, Batugadé, 10 June 1963. This document, in Bahasa Melayu, was provided to the author by M.S.A. Balikh (“Mao Klao”) on 4 December 2004 in Dili. Damai Di Bumi – Selamat Natal & Tahun Baru 1 January 1965 (Peace on Earth – Merry Christmas and Happy New Year 1 January 1965), Batugadé, 19 December 1964 - in Bahasa Melayu and English. Communication 683 ((?)), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Union of Timor Republic, Batugadé, 9 December 1964 – in English. Constitution, Batugade, 4 May 1965 (see Fernandes, M.S., 2005, op.cit., pp. 385-386 and footnote 92 – the text of the Constitution, in English, is included at pp. 428-429 Anexo V) – as provided to Lisbon by the Portuguese Consulate in Jakarta on 18 September 1965. The Declaration of Independence, Batugadé, 9 April 1961 – in English, with the stamp of the URT-D Foreign Ministry in Bahasa (disseminated in Jakarta in April 1965). Pernyataan Kemerdekaan (Independence Declaration), Batugadé, 9 April 1961 – in Bahasa Melayu (copy issued by Alamsyah Hasibuan in December 1972). Kemerdekaan Timor Timur Diproklamasikan (East Timor Freedom Proclaimed), Batugadé, 9 April 1961 – in Bahasa Indonesia, p.15 in “1961, Proklamasaun Independensia URT: Ramos Horta tama estrutura”, Timor Post, Dili, 25 November 2004. This document was also included in a magazine article: Zec/Felix, “Mau-Klao Siap Mempertanggungjawabkan Kebenaran Proklamasi Uni Republik Timor (URT)” (“Mau-Klao is Ready to Accept Responsibility for the Truth about the Proclamation by Union of the Republic of Timor (URT)”), TIME Timor, No.11, Tahun II, November 2007, Dili, p.24. * Memproklamasikan Kemerdekaan Timor Timur (Proclamation of the Independence of East Timor), Batugadé, 9 April 1961 in Bahasa Indonesia. This shorter document, was provided to the author in Dili by M.S.A. Balikh on 21 August 2006 – and is

235 similar to the Proklamasi document immediately above that appeared in the Timor Post of 25 November 2004 and TIME Timor magazine of November 2007. * 1,000 Pataca TIMOR ((Bank Note)), Uni Republik Timor, 16 – 7- 1964 – in Bahasa Melayu. Copy held by M.S.A. Balikh - bank note examined by author and photocopied on 4 December 2004. The 1000 Pataca note featured in the press item: “1961, Proklamasaun Independensia URT: Ramos Horta tama estrutura”, Timor Post, Dili, 25 November 2004. p.15; and the magazine article: Zec/Felix, “Mau-Klao Siap Mempertanggungjawabkan Kebenaran Proklamasi Uni Republik Timor (URT)” TIME Timor, No.11, Tahun II, Dili, November 2007, p.24. One Pataca TIMOR ((Bank Note)), Uni Republik Timor, 16-7-64 – in Bahasa Melayu – as printed in “Mimpi Yang Berani” (A Brave Dream) within “Perbatasan – Teriakan Nona Abaiyah”, Tempo, Th IV, No 51, Jakarta, 22 February 1975, pp. 9-10. The Formations, No 013A/VIII/Prespu-URT/64, Batugadé, 7 August 1964 – in English. Announcement, No 016/XI/Prespu–URT/64, Batugadé, 2 November 1964 – in English. Announcement, No 051/IV/Central Presidium-URT/65, Batugadé, 9 April 1965 – in English. Resolutions, No 00402/MFA/URT/65, Resolutions, Batugadé, 8 September 1965 – in English. Statement, Number November 1965 – special STATEMENT, Batugadé, 18 November 1965 – in English. Conference of Oceania, 094/XII/Prespu-URT/66, Batugadé, 1 December 1966 – in English. Menyambut hangat atas akan Merdeka Nya Papua dan New Guinea 1967, (Warmly welcoming the forthcoming Independence of Papua and New Guinea in 1967), URTD, Nr. III/Prespu-URT/IV/67, Batugadé, 2 April 1967 – in Bahasa Melayu. Pernyataan Sambutan - Menyambut Missi Adam Malic kembali dengan succes dari Pacific - (Congratulatory Statement - Welcoming Adam Malik on his Return from a Successful Mission in the Pacific), Number 019/PP-URT/VI/68, URT-D, Djakarta, 26 April 1968 – in Bahasa Melayu (signature block “MSA Balikh B.A.”). Penetapan/Pengangkatan Dewan Pemerintah Pusat Uni Republic Timor – Period ke V: 9 April 1969 – 9 April 1971, Penetapan 0395, Number: 0395/Prespu-URT/69, Batugadé, 9 April 1969. Dukungan terhadap kemenangan Madame Bandaranayke (Support for Madame Bandaranayke’s Victory), Number: 00437/Prespu-URT/VI/1970, via Jakarta, 8 June 1970 – in Bahasa. Signed by A. Mao Klao – ie manuscript signature by Alamsyah Hasibuan.

236 Ucapan turut terimakasih atas kemurahan hati Kerajaan Inggris yang telah dengan rela memberikan Kemerdekaan Penoh [sic] kepada Negara Kepulauan Tonga di Pacific (Expression of thanks to the British Empire its generosity in freely granting full independence to the Tongan Islands in the Pacific), Number: 00436/PrespuURT/VI/1970, Jakarta, 8 June 1970 – in Bahasa. This letter to Queen Elizabeth II was signed by Alamsyah Hasibuan as “Mao Klao”. Ucapan terimakasih atas kemurahan hati Kerajaan Inggris yang telah dengan rela memberikan Kemerdekaan Penoh [sic] kepada Negara Kepulauan Fiji di Pacific (Expression of thanks to the British Empire for freely granting full independence to the Fiji Islands in the Pacific), Number: 0460/Prespu-URT/X/1970, Jakarta, 12 October 1970 – in Bahasa. This letter to Queen Elizabeth II was signed by Alamsyah Hasibuan as “Mao Klao”. Support for, and recognition of, the establishment of friendly relations with the free state of Fiji, (to H.E. Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, Prime Minister of Fiji), Batugadé, 12 October 1970 – English translation. * Ceccatto, G.N., SO 215/1 PORT, United Nations, New York, 15 March 1971 (letter from the United Nations Division of Human Rights to “Mr Mao Klao” acknowledging his letter of 12 October 1970). This letter was also included in “Proklamasi Timor Leste Sebenarnya Sudah Terjadi Pada Tahun 1961 ?” (“Did Timor-Leste’s Proclamation Occur in 1961 ?”), TIME Timor, No 10, Tahun II, October 2007, p.49. Hubungan Diplomatic dan Kerjasama Menuju Melanesia Raya yang jaya (Diplomatic Relations and Cooperation in a Future Glorious Greater Melanesia), URT-D 0545/ZULK/Prespu-URT/1392 H/1972 M, Batugadé, 8 December 1972 – in Bahasa Melayu (to H.E. Mr Somare, Chief Minister, Papua New Guinea). Formasi Presidium Pusat Uni Republic Timor – Period ke II: 9 April 1969 – 9 April 1977, 9 April 1969 – in Bahasa Melayu (copy issued in December 1972). Dewan Pemerintah Pusat Uni Republic Timor – Period ke VI: 9 April 1971 – 9 April 1973, 11 June 1972 – in Bahasa Melayu (copy issued in December 1972). Formasi Dewan Militer Uni Republic Timor – Period ke III: 11 June 1972 – 10 June 1975, 11 June 1972 – in Bahasa Melayu (copy issued in December 1972). Timor Merdeka (Independent/Free Timor), Batugadé, 18 August 1963 – in Bahasa Melayu (URT-D “anthem” - copy issued in December 1972). Timor Union Republic (A-3 size map of Timor Island showing “Capital De Union Republic” at “Batugadé” – with inserted photograph of “A. Mao Klao”) – in Portuguese and Bahasa (copy issued in December 1972). * Uchapan Selamat, dan kerjasama Timor dan Indonesia, dalam rangka Keluarga Bangsa Malayu yang Besar (Greetings and Cooperation between Timor and Indonesia within the Framework of the Greater Malay Family of Nations) – to Sultan Hamengkobuwono IX Vice President of Indonesia, No. 004/BAW/PP-

237 URT/1393H/1973M, 16 April 1973 - in Bahasa Indonesia (signed by M.S.A. Balikh provided to the author in December 2004 by M.S.A. Balikh). The Composition of the Central Government Council of the Union of the Republic of Timor, Period VII (April 9 1973 A.C. – April 9 1975 A.C.), Number: 588/JaW/Prespu-URT/1393H/1973M, Batugadé, 28 June 1973 – in English. A strong protest against the Government of Mr Whitlam …, 0618/Presidential decision – Union of the Timor Republic/RMD/1394H/1974M, Batugadé/Jakarta, 25 September 1974 – in English (translation by Australian Embassy – Jakarta) – signature block: “A. Mao Klao”. * Administrasi Pemerintahan – Mengambil oper semua kegiatan (Government Administration - Assuming control of all activities), Struggle Delegation of the URTD, 10 May 1975 - in Bahasa Indonesia (signature block: M S.A. Balikh - provided to the author in December 2004 by M.S.A. Balikh). * Undang Undang Dasar – Uni Republik Timor Timur (Constitution – Union of the Republic of East Timor), Jakarta, 22 July 1975 - in Bahasa Indonesia (with covering “preamble” letter with signature block: M S A Balikh - provided to the author in December 2004 by M.S.A. Balikh). * Pimpinan Ketiga Partai Politik Di Timor Dilly (To the Leaders of the Three Political Parties in Timor Dilly), No. 0127/PP-URTD/VIII/15, Jakarta, 22 August 1975 - in Bahasa Indonesia (signed by MSA Balikh BA - provided to the author in December 2004 by M.S.A. Balikh). Pernyataan situasi di Timport (Statement on the Situation in Portuguese Timor), No. 0128/PP-URTD/VIII/75, Jakarta, 30 August 1975 – in Bahasa Indonesia (to the President, Republic of Portugal – signed by Emanuel Mau Bere, Simon Serang Prya, G. Tom Pelo, Moh Saleh Akbar Balikh). * Untitled letter ‘ Pengumuman Terbuka” (“Public Announcement”) to the President of Portugal, ..53/PP-URTD/X, Jakarta, 27 October 1975 - in Bahasa Indonesia (signed by Simon Soerang Prya, Emanuel Mau Bere, M S A Balikh - provided to the author in December 2004 by M.S.A. Balikh). Pendirian Uni Republik Timor (Dilly) (Standpoint of the United Republic Timor (Dilly)), Batugadé – through “Jl Kernolong Dalam IV/16, Kramat IV, Jakarta”, 19 December 1975 – in Bahasa Indonesia (signed by Emanuel Mau Bere, A. Bakhra B, M S A Balikh). * Hermes, S.G., To whom it may concern, United Nations Transitional Administration for East Timor (UNTAET), 14 Dec 1999 (relating M.S.A. Balikh’s call at the UNTAET office on 13 November 1999 - provided to the author in December 2004 by M.S.A. Balikh). Surat Pernyataan I (Letter of Declaration I), Mau Klao M.S.A. Balich, Gugleur – Maubara, Timor Leste, 19 April 2007 – in Bahasa Indonesia. A copy was included in the article “Proklamasi Timor Leste Sebenarnya Sudah Terjadi Pada Tahun 1961 ?”

238 (“Did Timor-Leste’s Proclamation Occur in 1961 ?”), TIME Timor, No.10, Tahun II, October 2007, p.49. Indonesian Official Documents Reviewed (Documents provided by M.S.A. Balikh are preceded by an asterisk – ie *) * Boediardjo, Air Commodore – Minister for Information, Republic of Indonesia, Letter to the URT-D Struggle Delegation, Jakarta, 24 June 1968 (in Bahasa Indonesia - provided to the author in December 2004 by M.S.A. Balikh). * Djojohadikusumo, S. – Minister for Trade, Republic of Indonesia, Letter to M.S.A. Balikh as Head of the URT-D Struggle Delegation, Djakarta, 29 June 1968 (in Bahasa Indonesia - provided to the author in December 2004 by M.S.A. Balikh). * Surat Pembebasan Tahanan Sementara (Prisoner Provisional Release Document), SPTS/10/SIN/IV/1976, Jakarta, dated 10 April 1976 (in Bahasa Indonesia – provided to the author on 21 August 2006 by M.S.A. Balikh). * Surat - Keputusan Tentang Perobahan Status Pembebasan Para Tahanan/Tawanan Peristiwa U.R.T. (Unie Republik Timor) Dari Bebas – Dikenakan Wajib Lapor Menjadi Bebas Penuh (Directive on the Change of Release Status for Detainees of the U.R.T. Affair (United Republic of Timor) from Released with Reporting Status to Fully Free), Kopkamtib, Jakarta, 11 August 1976 - including a discrete annex covering M.S.A. Balikh (in Bahasa Indonesia- provided to the author in December 2004 by M.S.A. Balikh). Collective Democratic Students of Timor Delly (Codes Timde) – Documents Reviewed Memorandum to President of Portugal, 13/III/C.T./FC/74, Bobonaro, 13 May 1974. Note to Secretary General of the United Nations, 14/VII/V/74, Bobonaro, 10 July 1974. Pernyataan Dukungan (Statement of Support), 01/ICT/ XII/74, Tanjung Priok (Jakarta), 23 December 1974 – in Bahasa Indonesia. Books ----, Kabupaten Viqueque Dalam Angka 1989, BPS, Kantor Statistik Kabupaten Viqueque, Viqueque, October 1990. ----, The Official History of the Operations and Administration of ‘Special Operations Australia’ (SOA) under the cover-name of ‘Services Reconnaissance Department’, Volume II – Operations, Melbourne, 8 March 1946 (NAA: A3269, O8/A). Aditjondro, G.J., Is oil thicker than blood ? : a study of oil companies’ interests and western complicity in Indonesia’s Annexation of East Timor, Nova Science Publications Inc, New York, 1999.

239 Aditjondro, G.J., Menyongsong Matahari Terbit Di Puncak Ramelau, Yayasan HAK dan Fortilos, Jakarta, 2000. Ahmadi, A. (ed), Feisal Tanjung: Terbaik Untuk Rakyat Terbaik Bagi ABRI, Yayasan Dharmapena Nusantara, Jakarta, 1999. Alatas, A., The Pebble in the Shoe: The Diplomatic Struggle for East Timor, Aksara Karunia, Jakarta, 2006 Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (ABRI) – Kodam IX/Udayana, 42 Tahun Pengabdian Kodam IX/Udayana (42 Years of Service by Military Region IX/ Udayana), Kodam IX/Udayana, Denpasar, 1999. Araújo, A. (Abilio) de, (Jolliffe, J. & Reece, B. eds), Timorese Elites, Canberra, 1975 (NAA: A1838, 3038/1/1 Part 2). Araújo, A. (Abílio) de, Timor Leste: Os Loricos Voltaram a Cantar: Das Guerras Independentistas à Revolução do Povo Maubere, Trama, Lisboa, June 1977. Araújo, A. (Amaro) L.J. de, O Célebre Massacré de Uato-Lari e Uato-Carbau Verificado no Ano de 1959 (The Truth of the Infamous Massacre at Uatolari and Uato-Carabau in 1959), Jakarta/Kupang, 1974 – see Annex D. Araújo, A. (Arnaldo) de (Governo Provisorio Timor Loro Sae), Matanza em timor oriental, March 1976, Dili. Ayris, C., All The Bull’s Men, PK Print Pty Ltd, Hamilton Hill, 2006. Ball, D. and McDonald, H., Death in Balibo – Lies in Canberra, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 2000. Barata, F.T., Timor contemporâneo: Da primeira ameaça da Indonésia ao nascer de uma nação (Contemporary Timor: From the first threat by Indonesia to the birth of a nation), Equilíbrio Editorial, Lisboa, 1998. Bazher, A.B., Islam di Timor Timur, Gema Insani Press, Jakarta, 1995. Berlie, J.A., East Timor: A Bibliography, les Indes savantes, Paris, 2001. Bessa, C., A libertação de Timor na II Guerra Mundial: importãncia dos Açores para os interesses dos Estados Unidos: subsídios históricos, Academia Portuguesa da Historia, Lisboa, 1992. Brahmana, R., Buku 20 Tahun Timor Timur Membangun, Korps Pegawai Republik Indonesia – Propinsi Timor Timur/Samsul Bakri, Jakarta, 1996. (Bahasa and English). Brandão, C.C., Funo – Guerra Em Timor, Edicoes aov, Porto, 1953. Brito, F.C. de, tata-mai-lau: timor contra o japão 1941-45, Iniciativas Editoriais, Lisboa, 1977.

240 Callinan, B.J., Independent Company, William Heinemann Ltd, Melbourne, 1953. Cardoso, A.M., Timor na 2ª Guerra Mundial – O Diário do Tenente Pires, CEHCP ISCTE, Lisboa, 2007. Carrascalão, M.V., Timor – Antes do Futuro, Mau Huran Printing, Timor-Leste, 2006. Carvalho, Dos Santos J., Vida e Morte em Timor - Durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial, Livraria Portugal, Lisboa, 1972. Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Dokumentasi - Kliping tentang PraIntegrasi Timor Timur 1975, CSIS, Jakarta Pusat, 67/P/XI/1983, November 1983. Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Dokumentasi - Kliping tentang Integrasi Timor Timur 1976 (I), 68/P/XI/ 1983, CSIS, Jakarta, November 1983. Chamberlain, E.P., Faltering Steps: Independence Movements in East Timor -1940s to the early 1970s, Point Lonsdale - Australia, 2008. Chamberlain, E.P., Forgotten Men: Timorese in Special Operations during World War II, Point Lonsdale, 2010. http://www.scribd.com/doc/29688334/Forgotten-Men-Timorese-in-SpecialOperations-during-World-War-II Chamberlain, E.P., Rebellion, Defeat and Exile: The 1959 Uprising in East Timor, Point Lonsdale - Australia, 2009. http://www.scribd.com/doc/26857195/Rebellion-Defeat-and-Exile-The-1959Uprising-in-East-Timor Chamberlain, E.P., The Struggle in Iliomar: Resistance in rural East Timor, Point Lonsdale - Australia, 2008. Chrystello, C.J., East Timor: The Secret File 1973-1975, eBooksBrasil, 2000. http://www.scribd.com/doc/2629282/East-Timor-The-Secret-File-19731975 Cleary, P., The Men Who Came Out Of The Ground, Hachette Australia, Sydney 2010. Conboy, K., Elite: The Special Forces of Indonesia 1950-2008, Equinox Publishing (Asia), Jakarta, 2008. Conboy, K., Kopassus: Inside Indonesia’s Special Forces, Equinox Publishing, Jakarta, 2003. Conboy, K., Intel: Inside Indonesia’s Intelligence Service, Equinox Publishing, Jakarta, 2004. Conboy, K. & Morrison, J., Feet to the fire: CIA covert operations in Indonesia 19571958, Naval Institute Press, Maryland, 1999.

241 Conrad, J., Victory: An Island Tale, 1915. http://www.gutenberg.org/catalog/world/readfile?fk_files=216416 Costa, E.da; Costa F.A.S. da; Sagran, S.M.; Basirun, J.B. and Pereira, L.R., O Célebre Massacre de Uato-Lari e Uato-Carbau Verificado no Ano de 1959 (The Truth of the Infamous Massacre at Uatolari and Uato-Carabau in 1959), Dili, 2005. Note: This A4 format publication has the same title as the smaller 1974 publication by Araújo, A.L.J. de (see above) and includes the content of that publication – together with later declaração and other material (see footnote 177). Cruz, F. Lopes da, Kesaksian – Aku dan Timor Timur (Witnessing – East Timor and I), Yayasan Tunas Harapan Timor Lorosae, Jakarta, 1999. Dettman, A. & Newbown, L., Bibliography of works on Timor Leste (East Timor) held in the National Library of Australia, National Library of Australia – Asian Collections, Canberra, June 2006. Doig, C.D., A History of the 2nd Independent Company and 2/2 Commando Squadron, Trafalgar (Victoria), Valley Word Processing Service, 1986. Doko, I.H., Pahlawan-Pahlawan Suku Timor, PN Balai Pustaka, Jakarta, 1981. Doko, I.H., Perjuangan Kemerdekaan Indonesia Di Nusa Tenggara Timor, PN Balai Pustaka, Jakarta, 1981. Doko, I.H., Timor – Pulau Gunung Fataleu, Batu Keramat, PN Balai Pustaka, Jakarta, 1982. Duarte, J.B., Em Terras de Timor, Tiposet, Lisboa, 1987. Duarte, J.B., Timor – Ritos e Mitos Ataúros, Instituto de Cultura e Língua Portuguesa, Lisboa, 1984. Dunn, J., Timor - A People Betrayed, ABC Books, Sydney, 1996. Dunn, J., East Timor – a rough passage to Independence, Longueville Books, Double Bay, 2003. Durand, F.B., East Timor: A Country at the Crossroads of Asia and the Pacific – A Geo-historical Atlas, Silkworm Books, Chiang Mai, 2006. El Tari, Monografi Timor Portugis, Kupang, 5 October 1975. Felgas, H.A.E. Capitão, Timor Portugues, Agéncia Geral do Ultramar, Lisboa, 1956. Gonçalves, J.L.R., Gente de Timor-Leste – Primeiro ano da Independência, Tipografia União Folha do Domingos Lda, Faro, 2004. Gonggong A. & Zuhdi, S., Sejarah Perjuangan Timor-Timur Untuk Sekolah Menengah Atas (History of the East Timor Struggle for Senior High School),

242 Direktorat Pendidikan Menengah Umum, Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, (Department of Culture and Education), Jakarta, 1992 (Annex B of this book). Gunn, G.C., A Critical View of Western Journalism and Scholarship on East Timor, Journal of Contemporary Asian Publications, Manila, 1994. Gunn, G.C., Timor Loro Sae 500 Years, Livros do Oriente, Macau, 1999 – on Internet as “History of Timor” at http://pascal.iseg.utl.pt/~cesa/History_of_Timor.pdf Gusmão, M.G. da Silva, Perjalanan Menuju Dekolonisasi Hati-Diri, Penerbit Dioman, Malang, 2003. Gusmão, X. (Niner, S. ed), To Resist Is To Win !: The Autobiography of Xanana Gusmão with selected letters & speeches, Aurora Books, Richmond, 2000. Harvey, B.S., Permesta: pemberontakan setengah hati (Permesta: a half-hearted rebellion), PT Grafiti Pers, Jakarta, 1984. Hack, K. & Rettig, T., Colonial Armies in Southeast Asia, Routledge, Abingdon UK, 2006. Hicks, D., Roh Orang Timor (Tetum Ghosts and Kinship), Pustakaan Sinar Harapan, Jakarta, 1983. Hill, H. M., Fretilin1974-1978 – Stirrings of Nationalism in East Timor, Otford Press, Otford NSW, 2002. Hill, H. M., Gerakan Pembebasan Nasional Timor Lorosae, Yayasan HAK and Sahe Institute for Liberation, Dili, 2000. Imran, A., Timor-Timur Provinsi ke-27 Republik Indonesia, Penerbit Mutiara, Jakarta. Jolliffe, J., Balibo, Scribe, Carlton North, 2009. Jolliffe, J., Cover-Up – The inside story of the Balibo Five, Scribe Publications, Melbourne, 2001 (earlier version of Balibo – 2009, above). Kamah, M.S., “Seroja”: pengalaman seorang wartawan di medan tempur Timor Timur, Eko’s, Palu (Sulawesi), 1997. Krieger, H. & Rauschning, D., East Timor and the International Community – Basic Documents, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997. Lennox, R., Fighting Spirit of East Timor – the life of Martinho da Costa Lopes, Pluto Press, Annandale, 2000. Liberato, A. de Oliveira, O Caso de Timor, Invasões estrangeiras, revoltas indígenas, Portugália Editora, Lisboa, 1947.

243 Liberato, A.de Oliveira, Os Japoneses Estiveram Em Timor II – A Zona De Concentração, Empresa Nacional da Publicade, Lisboa, 1951. Liberato, C. dos Santos Oliveira, Quando Timor foi notícia – Memórias, Editora Pax, Braga, 1972. MacFarling, I., Military Aspects of the West New Guinea Dispute 1958-1962, Working Paper No 212, SDSC - Australian National University, Canberra, 1990. Madjiah, L.E., Timor Timur: Perginya Si Anak Hilang, Antara Pustaka Utama, Jakarta, December 2002. Martins Nai Buti, D.S. (et al), Upacara Adat Pelantikan Raja Suku Kemak Diru Hati – Rumah Adat Bey Leto Kelurahan Manumutin – Kabupaten Belu, Atambua, 2006 Metzner, J.K., Man and Environment in Eastern Timor: a geoecological analysis of the Baucau-Viqueque Area as a possible basis for regional planning, Development Studies Centre – Monograph No. 8, The Australian National University, Canberra, 1977. Millar, T.B. (ed), Australian foreign minister: the diaries of R.G. Casey, Collins, London, 1972. Molnar, A.K., Timor Leste – Politics, history, and culture, Routledge, New York, 2010. Neonbasu, P.G., Peta Politik dan Dinamika Pembangunan Timor Timur, Yanense Mitra Sejati, Jakarta, 1977. Nicol, B., Timor – A Nation Reborn, Equinox Publishing, Jakarta, 2002. Niner, S., Xanana – Leader of the Struggle for Independent Timor-Leste, Australian Scholarly Publishing, North Melbourne, 2009. Ormeling, F.J., The Timor Problem – A Geographical Interpretation of an Underdeveloped Island, J.B. Wolters, Djakarta, 1955. Pélissier, R., Du Sahara à Timor, Pélissier, Orgeval (France), 1991. Pélissier, R., Timor en guerre: le Crocodile et les Portugais (1847-1913), Pélissier, Orgeval (France), 1996. Pires, M.L. Governador, Relatório do Governo de Timor (Período de 13 de Novembro de 1974 a 7 de Dezembro de 1975), Presidência do Conselho de Ministros, Lisboa, 1981, Pour, J. (ed), Renungan dan catatan Mayjen TNI (Purn) Soebijakto, PT Gramedia Widiasarana Indonesia, Jakarta, 1997.

244 Powell, A., War by Stealth – Australians and the Allied Intelligence Bureau 19421945, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1996. Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi TNI, Sejarah TNI – Jilid IV (1966-1983), Markas Besar Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Jakarta, 2000. Ramos-Horta, J., Funu, The Unfinished Saga of East Timor, Red Sea Press, Trenton, 1987. Ramos-Horta, J., Amanhã em Díli, Publicacões Dom Quixote, Lisboa, 1998. Rony, K.R. & Wiarda, I.S., Bibliography – The Portuguese in Southeast Asia, Malacca, Moluccas, East Timor, Asera Verlag, Meyer & Co, Hamburg, 1997. Rusdie, H., Suratama K., Soares, A.J.O., Perjuangan Kemerdekaan Rakyat Timor Loro Sa’e, Percetakan Kanisius/East Timor Students’ Movement, Yogyakarta, March 1997. Sagran, S.M., Da’wah Islamiah di Timor Timur dan Prospectiva, Makalah, Dili, 1983. Santa, J.D., Australianos e Japoneses em Timor na II Guerra Mundial 1941-1945, Notícias Editorial, Lisboa, 1997. Santos, A. P. de Sousa, Duas palvaras ao capitão Liberato a propósito de “O Caso de Timor”, Minerva Central, Lourenço Marques, 1973. Santoso, A., Jejak Jejak Darah – Tragedi dan Pengkhianatan di Timor Timur, Stichting Inham, Amsterdam/Yogyakarta, 1996. http://www.hamline.edu/apakabar/basisdata/1997/01/22/0022.html Sekretariat Militer Presiden, Daftar warga negara Republik Indonesia Yang Menerima Anugerah Tanda Kehormatan Satyalancana Perintis Pergerakan Kemerdekaan , Satyalancana Kebudayaan Dan Satyalancana Pendidikan, Biro Tanda-Tanda Jasa/Kehormatan, Jakarta, 2005. Sherlock, K., Liurais and Chefes de Suco; Indigenous Authorities in 1952, Kevin Sherlock, Darwin, 1983. Singh, B., East Timor, Indonesia and the World: Myths And Realities, Singapore Institute of International Affairs, Singapore, 1995. Smythe, P.A., ‘The Heaviest Blow’ – The Catholic Church and the East Timor Issue, Lit Verlag, Munster, 2004. Soares (Mali-Lequic), A.V.M., Pulau Timor – Sebuah Sumbangan Untuk Sejarahnya, Baucau, 2003.

245 Soebadio, H., Keterlibatan Australi dalam Pemberontakan PRRI/Permesta (Australian Involvement in the PRRI/Permesta Rebellion), PT Gramedia/Pustaka Utama, Jakarta, 2002. Soekanto, Integrasi – Kebulatan Tekad Rakyat Timor Timur (Integration – the Determined Will of the People of East Timor), Yayasan Parakesit, Jakarta, 10 November 1976. Subroto, H., Operasi Udara di Timor Timur, Pustaka Sinar Harapan, Jakarta, 2005. Subroto, H., Perjalanan Seorang Wartawan Perang, Pustaka Sinar Harapan, Jakarta, 1998. Subroto, H., Saksi Mata Perjuangan Integrasi Timor Timur, Pustaka Sinar Harapan, Jakarta, 1996. Taylor, J. G., Indonesia’s Forgotten War – The Hidden History of East Timor, Pluto Press, Leichhardt, 1981. Tomodok, E.M., Hari-Hari Akhir Timor Portugis (The Last Days of Portuguese Timor), Pustaka Jaya, Jakarta, 1994. Toohey, B. & Pinwill, W., Oyster: the story of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service, Heinemann, Melbourne, 1989. Timor Development Syndicate, A Few Impressions of Portuguese Timor, Sydney, 1912. Turner, M., Telling – East Timor: Personal Testimonies 1942-1992, New South Wales University Press, Kensington, 1992. Way, W. (ed), Australia and the Indonesian Incorporation of Portuguese Timor 19741976, Documents on Australian Foreign Policy, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Melbourne University Press, Carlton South, 2000. Webb, R.A.F.P. & Farram S., DI-PKI-KAN: tragedy 1965 dan kaum Nasrani di Indonesia Timur, Syarikat Indonesia, Jakarta, February 2005. Wila, M.R.C., Konsepsi Hukum Dalam Pengaturan dan Pengelolaan Wilayah Perbatasan Antaranegara (Kasus: Wilayah Enklave Negara Timor Leste di dalam Wilayah Negara Indonesia), P.T. Alumni, Bandung, 2006. Wigmore, L., The Japanese Thrust - Australia in the War of 1939-1945. Series 1 – Army - Volume IV, Chapter 21: Resistance in Timor, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1957 (first edition) & 1968. http://www.awm.gov.au/cms_images/histories/20/chapters/21.pdf Wise, A., Exile and Return Among the East Timorese, University of Pennsylvania Press, Pennsylvania, 2006.

246 Wray, C.C.H., Timor 1942: Australian Commandos at War with the Japanese, Hutchinson Australia, Hawthorn, 1987. Selected Internet Websites/“Blogs” Gunter, Janet, Haree Ba Uluk: Timor Portuguese Pre-1974 – A Post-Colonial Forum for Learning and Debate. http://raiketak.blogspot.com/timorhistory/index.html Gunter, Janet, Return to Rai Ketak – Ruminations on Timor my (once) island home. http://raiketak.wordpress.com/category/power/ Ollé, J., “Battle Bureau for the Liberation of Timor (1961)”, 30 August 1999, in Flags of the World website. http://flagspot.net/flags/tl}bllt.html#desc Selected Theses, Reports and Articles ---, “Proklamasi Timor Leste Sebenarnya Sudah Terjadi Pada Tahun 1961 ?” (“Did Timor-Leste’s Proclamation Occur in 1961 ?”), TIME Timor, No.10, Tahun II, October 2007, Dili, p.49. ---, Lusotropicalisme - Lusotopie 1997, Editions Karthala/Brill, Paris/Leiden, 1997. http://www.lusotopie.sciencespobordeaux.fr/somma97.html ---, “Trouble in Timor”, Foreign Report, The Economist, London, 25 April 1963. ---, “Investigador português apresenta novos dados - Acordo secreto entre anglófonos entregava Timor-Leste à Indonésia”, Lusa, Lisbon, 16 November 2007. ---, “Timor: Ramos Horta compara acordo secreto à Cimeira de Berlim”, Diário Digital – Lusa, Lisbon, 16 November 2007. Allied Geographic Section and Directorate of Intelligence AAF SWPA, Terrain Study No 50: Area Study of Portuguese Timor, 27 February 1943. Anderson, C., “East Timor’s First President Recalls His 9-Day Term”, Jakarta Globe, Jakarta, 18 March 2009. Araújo, A. (Armando) L. J. de, (et al), Memorandum – Assunto: Sobre o acontecimento ocorrido em 7 de Junhe [sic] de 1959, na Circunscrição [sic] de Viqueque – Timor, six pages, Cólonia Penal do Bié (Angola), 21 April 1960 in: - Araújo, A.L.J. de, O Célebre Massacré de Uato-Lari e Uato-Carbau Verificado no Ano de 1959 (The Truth of the Infamous Massacre at Uatolari and Uato-Carabau in 1959), Jakarta/Kupang, 1974; and - Costa, E.da (et al), O Célebre Massacre de Uato-Lari e Uato-Carbau Verificado no Ano de 1959 (The Truth of the Infamous Massacre at Uatolari and Uato-Carabau in 1959), Dili, 2005. Araújo, A. (Abílio) de, As Duas Margens da Ribeira de Aileu, 2007. http://pnt-timor-leste.planetaclix.pt/08_BIBLIOGRAFIA/BIBLIOGRAFIA.htm

247

Archer, C.H. (British Consul-General, Taiwan), Report on Portuguese Timor, Canberra, 3 May 1941 – see NAA: A3300, 179, pp.1-55 including covering letter and errata; or Koepang draft of 29 April 1941 at NAA: A981, TIM P 9, pp.3-55 and pp.83-132. A printed copy of the report can also be found at NAA: A981, TIM D 1 Part 2. pp.38-76. Babo Soares, D., “Building a foundation for an effective civil service in Timor Leste”, Pacific Economic Bulletin, May 2003, p.13 Barata, F. J. F. T. Governor, letter to the Ministry of Overseas Territories – MU/GMG/GNP/034 (E.7.1), 6 October 1959 – in Portuguese ((reporting the 1959 Viqueque Rebellion)). http://raiketak.blogspot.com/timorhistory/index.html Barata, F. J. F. T., Timor - esse desconhecido, Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais & Política Ultramarina, Lisboa, 1963 (Separata da Revista, Estudos Políticos e Sociais, Vol. 1 (1963), No. 3, Págs. 659-684). Belo, C.F.X. Dom, “A Revolta de 1959 em Viqueque, Watolari e Watocarbau”, Porto, 5 Junho de 2009 (six pages) http://forum-haksesuk.blogspot.com/2009/06/revolta-de-1959-em-viqueque-watolarie.html Boxer, C.R., “Some Sources For The History Of Timor”, Far Eastern Quarterly, Vol IX No 1, New York, November 1949, pp.63-65. Conselho Nacional de Resistência Maubere (National Council of Maubere Resistance - CNRM), “Indonesia’s desperate attempt to revise East Timor history”, Media Release, 3 July 1995, p.1. Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (Comissão de Alcolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação – CAVR), “Internal Political Conflict 1974-1976 – CAVR National Public Hearing 15-18 December 2003” – Appendix 2 in CAVR Update December 2003-January 2004, Dili. http://www.easttimor-reconciliation.org/cavrUpdate-Dec03Jan04-en.html Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (Comissão de Alcolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação – CAVR), Chega ! The Final Report of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation, Dili, 2005. Costa, F.A.S. da. (Prisoner No 52), Memorandum, Bié (Angola), 6 May 1960 Costa, F.A.S. da, Os Nomes dos Detidos Timorenses para Angola do Ano de 1959, Silva Porto (Bié, Angola), 6 June 1960. Davidson, K.G., The Portuguese Colonisation of Timor: The Final Stage, 1850-1912 (unpublished PhD thesis), University of NSW, Sydney, 1994. Diatmika, A.G., “(Ternyata) Merah Putih Berkibar di TimTim Sejak 1959”, pp.20-25 in Vista, No.57, Jakarta, 20-29 August 1989.

248 Duarte, J.B., “O fenomeno dos movimentos nativistas”, Garcia de Orta, Ser. Antropobiol, 5 (1-2) 1987/88, Lisboa, 1988, pp.41-52. Duarte, J.M., “Memorandum sobre o acontecimento em Timor em 1959”, Colónia Penal de Bié (Angola), 31 August 1960 (TdT, Lisbon: AOS/CO/UL-32A2, Part 7). This seven-page Memorandum , with a covering letter dated 2 November 1960, was forwarded to the Presidente do Conselho de Ministros (Dr. Salazar) by the Director of the PIDE (Lisbon). Duarte, J.M., Memorandum, Dili, 4 February 1994 – in Bahasa. Dunn, J.S., “The Timorese Under Portuguese Administration”, Digest of Despatches, Serial No. 19, Department of External Affairs, Canberra, 13 December 1963 (NAA: A1838, 756/2 Part 1). Dunn, J.S., “The Timor Affair – From Civil War to Invasion by Indonesia”, Legislative Research Service, Parliament of Australia, Canberra, 27 February 1976 (NAA: A1838, 3038/10/13/1 Annex 1). El Tari, Laporan Khusus Tentang Situasi Perkembangan Terakhir Di Timor Portugis, 277/DKN/III/75-RHS, Kupang, 28 January 1975. Farram, S.G., From ‘Timor Koepang’ to ‘Timor NTT’: A Political History of West Timor 1901-1967 (unpublished PhD thesis), Darwin, 2004. Feldman, F., “Portugal’s Secret War”, The World’s News, Sydney, 7 July 1951, p.3. Fernandes, M. S., A União da República de Timor (URT): o primeiro movimento nacionalista timorense 1960-1974, based on a paper delivered at the Second Congress of the Portuguese Political Science Association, Lisbon, 19-20 January 2003 –“A União da República de Timor (URT): o atrófico movimento protonacionalista islâmico-malaio em Timor, 1960-1974”. This paper is currently only available in Portuguese. Fernandes, M.S., “A União da República de Timor: o atrófico movimento nacionalista islâmico-malaio Timorense, 1960-1975”, pp.355-431 in Guedes, A.M. & Mendes N.C. (eds), Ensaios sobre naciolismos em Timor-Leste, Collecção Biblioteca Diplomática do MNE – Série A, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros Portugal, Lisbon, 2005. This article is similar to the earlier article listed above, but includes annexes listing URT-D governments. Fernandes, M.S., “A Preponderância dos Factores Exógenos na Rejeição do Plano Português de Decolonização para Timor-Leste 1974-1975”, pp.90-171 in Revista Negócios Estrangeiros, No.10, Instituto Diplomático, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Lisbon, February 2007. http://www.cultura.gov.tl/sites/default/files/MFernandes_Preponderancia_dos_factore s_exogenos_2007.pdf

249 Fernandes, M.S., “O Processo de Descolonização do Timor Português nos Arquivos Portugueses, 1974-1975”, IV Seminário Internacional de Arquivos e Tradição Ibérica, Lisbon, October 2005. Fernandes, M.S., “O Timor Português na Política Externa de Suharto: O Regresso ao Status Quo Ante, 1965-1974”, pp.272-338 in Revista Negócios Estrangeiros, No.9.2, Instituto Diplomático, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Lisbon, March 2006, p.334 Fernandes, M.S., “The Ongoing Crisis in East-Timor: Analysis of Endogenous and Exogenous Factors”, pp.119-132 in Amineh, M.P. (ed), State, Society and International Relations in Asia, Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam, 2010. Forsyth, W.D., “Timor – II: The World of Dr. Evatt”, New Guinea, Australia, the Pacific and South East Asia, May/June 1975, pp. 31-37 (NAA: A1838, 3038/1/1 Part 2, pp.82-88)). França, P. da, 1972 - Daqui Por Três Anos A Invasão …, 1972. Gata, A. C. L.G., Captain, Relatorio da Viagem do Navio India de Macau para Lisboa – 1959, 11 December 1959. Gratton, A., Perkembangan dalam Pendidikan Sejarah di Malang sejak Zaman Reformasi, Universitas Muhammadiyah, Malang, 2004. Gunn, G.C., “Revisiting the Viqueque (East Timor) Rebellion of 1959”, Diversidade Cultural Na Construção Da Nação E Do Estado Em Timor-Leste, Universidade Fernando Pessoa, Porto, 2006, pp. 27-53. Gunn, G.C., “Revisiting the Viqueque Rebellion of 1959” (Draft), Nagasaki, 9 February 2006 (for publication in Timor-Leste: An Anthology of War and Liberation, Monograph No. 7, Research Institute of South East Asia, Nagasaki). http://www.geoffreycgunn.com/material/draft_viquequerebellion.pdf Gunter, J., “Communal Conflict in Viqueque and the ‘Charged’ History of ‘59”, The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology, Vol 8, No 1, March 2007, pp. 27-41. Gunter, J., “Majesty yet no mercy”, 7 December 2002 http://raiketak.wordpress.com/category/power/page/4/ . Gusmão, J., “Indonesia’s desperate attempt to revise East Timor history”, Media Release, 3 July 1995. Guterres, F. da Costa, Elites and Prospects of Democracy in East Timor (PhD dissertation), Griffith University, Brisbane, January 2006. Hagerdal, H., Historical Notes on the Topass Leaders in Oecusse, Vaxjo (Sweden). Herman, J., “Integrasi 1976, Realisasi Perjuangan Viqueque 1959”, Jawa Pos, Surabaya, 11 November 1995, p.13.

250

Herman, J., “Pejuang Timtim Akan Tuntut Portugal”, Jawa Pos, Surabaya, 16 November 1995, p.13. Herman, J., “27 Pejuang Viqueque Peroleh Gelar Veteran”, Jawa Pos, Surabaya, 1 April 1996, p.5. Hicks, D., “Unachieved Syncretism: the local level political system in Portuguese Timor”, Anthropos Institut, 78, Edition St-Augustin, Switzerland, 1983. Horton, W.B., “Ethnic Cleavage in Timorese Society: The Black Columns in Occupied Portuguese Timor”, Journal of International Development, 6 (2), Takushoku University, Tokyo, March 2007. Jockel, G.A. (Chairman), Assessment of the Timor Situation, National Intelligence Committee (NIC), Canberra, 27 January 1976. Jolliffe, J., “Indonesia now wants all the gory details”, The Canberra Times, Canberra, 19 August 1995, p.17. Jolliffe, J., “Salazar and Ming: the secret letters”, The Canberra Times, Canberra, 12 August 1995, p. C2. Kennedy, D.B., Operation HAIK: The Eisenhower Administration and the Central Intelligence Agency in Indonesia, 1957-1958, MA Thesis, Georgia University, Athens USA, 1996. Lambert, E.T. (British Consul, Batavia), Report on Portuguese Timor, Batavia, 18 December 1937 – copies on NAA: A981, TIM P 4 Part 2, pp. 103-126; and A1838, 376/1/1, pp.288-358. Landman, J.R. & Plant H.T., “Notes on Portuguese Timor I & II”, Vol 2 No 11 & Vol 3 No 1, South Pacific, Sydney, August & September 1948 (NAA: A1838, 376/1/1). Leach, M., “East Timor – History on the Line: East Timorese History after Independence”, History Workshop Journal, Issue 61, Spring 2006, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 222-237. Lopes, M. da Costa, “Breve resenha de alguns factos ocorrido em Viqueque e Uatolari (1959)”, Biblioteca Nasional - Archivo Salazar, Lisbon, 1959 ((Note: the copy of this report is not signed, or dated, by Monsignor Martinho da Costa Lopes – but his authorship can be almost certainly inferred from the subsequent report by Governor F. J. F. T. Barata of 6 October 1959 - see above, which includes most of the text of the Monsignor’s report)). Madjiah, L.E., “East Timor: Indonesia’s Military Involvement”, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta, 1999 – an extract from: Infantry of the Indonesian National Army, Pusat Kesenjataan Infanteri, Bandung, 1999. http://www.thejakartapost.com/special/os 3_history1.asp

251 Madjiah, L.E., “East Timor: Return of the Last Paradise”, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta, 1999 – an extract from: Infantry of the Indonesian National Army, Pusat Kesenjataan Infanteri, Bandung, 1999. http://www.thejakartapost.com/special/os3 history 2.asp Mali Mau, M., “José: Saya merasakan kejamnya Portugal”, Surya, Jakarta, 14 November 1992, p.1 & p.13. Ministry of State Administration, Final Report – Timor-Leste Local Government Options Study, Dili, 2003. http://www.tl.undp.org/undp/pdf_files/decentralisation/Final%20Report%20Parts%20 A&BJully4th.pdf Molnar, A.K., East Timor: An Introduction to the History, Politics and Culture of Southeast Asia’s Youngest Nation, Northern Illinois University, May 2005. http://www.seasite.niu.edu/easttimor/ Monk, P.M., “Secret Intelligence and Escape Clauses – Australia and the Indonesian Annexation of East Timor 1963-76”, Critical Asian Studies, 33, Issue 2, June 2001, Routledge, Cedar – Michigan, , pp.181-208. Nahar, M., “Some Historical Notes on Timor”, Home News/Feature, Jakarta, 15 October 1975, pp.12-14 and 16 October 1975, pp.11-13. Neonbasu, G. SVD, “Building Peace in East Timor: The Role of the Catholic Church”, November 2002. http://www.ishvanikendra.org/docs/articles_gre_neonbasu.htm Nixon, R., “Indonesian West Timor: The Political-Economy of Emerging EthnoNationalism” Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol 34, Iss 2, Manila, 2004, pp.163-186. Oliveira, J.L. de, “Sengketa Tanah Uatolari” (Land Conflict in Uatolari), Cidadaun, No.26, July 2002, p.6. Ospina, D. & Hohe, T., Traditional Power Structures and the Community Empowerment and Local Governance Project – Final Report, Dili, September 2001. http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/139608/finalreport.pdf Piliang, I.J., Australia Terlibat dalam Pemberontakan PRRI/Permesta, Info & Arsip Milis Nasional, Jakarta, 14 August 2002. Pinch, D. Magistrate (Coroner), Inquest into the Death of Brian Ray Peters, Sydney, 16 November 2007. Prentice, D., “Malay (Indonesian and Malaysian)”, pp. 913-935 in Comrie, B. (ed), The World’s Major Languages, Croom Helm, London, 1987. Regnal Chronologies – Southeast Asia: The Islands. http://ellone-loire.net/obsidian/seasiaisl.html#Netherlands%20East%20Indies

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