Evidence Final Digest

G.R. No. 184606

September 5, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
 CALEXTO DUQUE FUNDALES, JR. Facts: On the evening of December 2, 2003, the Chief of the Intelligence Unit of the Station Anti-Illegal Drug Special Task Force of Parañaque City Police, Police Superintendent Alfredo Valdez (P/Supt. Valdez), received an information from a confidential informant about the illegal drug trade operations conducted by the Fundales brothers. The group then proceeded to 008 Jordan Street, Sitio Nazareth, Barangay San Isidro, Parañaque City for the buy-bust operation. The informant then introduced PO1 Soquiña to the appellant as the person interested in buying shabu worth P 500.00. After PO1 Soquiña handed the P 500.00 marked money to the appellant, the latter then went inside his house and when he reappeared, he handed to PO1 Soquiña five plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance. PO1 Soquiña then lit a cigarette which was the prearranged signal to inform the rest of the team that the buy-bust operation had been consummated.Hence, the team of back-up police officers proceeded to appellant's house to apprehend him.Inside the house, the police officers saw Jerico, Ricardo, Chulo, and Joel who appeared to be engaged in a pot session hence they were also arrested along with the appellant. The five sachets of white crystalline substance sold by appellant, together with one sachet obtained from the group and the drug paraphernalia, were immediately marked and inventoried. The same were then submitted to the crime laboratory of the Philippine National Police (PNP) for examination. After conducting a forensic examination, P/Insp. Mangalip, Chief of the Physical Science Section and Forensic Chemical Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory, issued Physical Science Report No. D-1402-03S confirming that the specimen submitted yielded positive for the presence of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride. On December 8, 2003, appellant was charged with violations of Section 5 (illegal sale of dangerous drugs), Section 11 (illegal possession of dangerous drugs), and Section 12 in relation to Section 14 (illegal possession of drug paraphernalia) of Article II, RA No. 9165. During arraignment, the appellant and his co-accused pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, the parties agreed to terminate the pre-trial and set the case for trial on the merits. On March 18, 2006, the RTC rendered its Decision convicting appellant in Criminal Case No. 03-1425 for illegal sale of shabu and dismissing Criminal Case No. 03-1426 for illegal possession of dangerous drugs and Criminal Case

MIFAÑA, DIVINE GRACE M.

1

Evidence

No. 03-1427 for illegal possession of drug paraphernalia, for insufficiency of evidence. In finding appellant guilty of illegal sale of shabu, the RTC gave due consideration to the testimonies of the law enforcement officers. It held that "no ill-motive or wrongdoing could be ascribed to the herein police officers with respect to the buy-bust operation x x x." It gave full credit and weight to the testimony of PO1 Soquiña who positively identified the appellant as the person from whom he bought five plastic sachets of shabu during the buy-bust operation. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court's. Not satisfied with the Decision of the CA, the appellant is now before this Court adopting the same issues he raised in the appellate court, viz: Issue: The main issue for resolution is whether the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5, Article II of RA No. 9165. Held: The appeal lacks merit. This Court is convinced that the prosecution sufficiently discharged the burden of establishing the elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs and in proving the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. "Conviction is proper in prosecutions involving illegal sale of dangerous drugs if the following elements are present: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereto." The identity of the buyer and the seller were both established by the prosecution, appellant being the seller and PO1 Soquiña as the poseur-buyer. The object of the transaction was the five sachets of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu and the consideration was the P 500.00 marked money. Both such object and consideration have also been sufficiently established by testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the prosecution. As to the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor, PO1 Soquiña caught appellant in flagrante delicto selling and delivering the prohibited substance during a buy-bust operation. He also personally handed to appellant the marked money as payment for the same. Clearly, the above-mentioned elements are present in this case.

MIFAÑA, DIVINE GRACE M.

2

Evidence

G.R. No. 191062

September 19, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
 MOHAMAD ANGKOB y MLANG Facts: That on or about the 5th day of February 2005, in the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding each other, they not being authorized by law, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully sell, trade, deliver and give away to another, Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, weighing 45.47 grams contained in one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet, placed in one (1) white plastic bag in violation of the above-cited law. On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. In a pre-trial conference conducted on 11 November 2005, the following facts were stipulated: 1. The identity of the accused whose name appears in the Information and the correctness of the spelling of his first, middle and last names. 2. The jurisdiction of the court, the alleged crime having been committed in Metropolis, Alabang, Muntinlupa City. 3. That the accused was the subject of inquest proceedings before Assistant City ProsecutorVicente Francisco. 4. That Abraham Tecson, a chemist from the PNP Crime Laboratory, examined the subject evidence taken from the accused which turned out to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride with a weight of 45.47 grams. 5. The existence of initial chemistry report number D-86-05. Based on the narration of prosecution witnesses, who were members of the buybust team, the following incident occurred. An informant disclosed the illegal drug activities of a certain Mhods of Maharlika Village, Taguig City, to the Special Enforcement Service at Philippine Drug. At around 12:00 p.m. of 5 February 2005, the buy-bust team and the informant went to Metropolis Mall in Alabang, Muntinlupa City. Sistemio and the informant proceeded to a Jollibee restaurant at the ground floor of the mall while the two other police officers were posted strategically within in the vicinity. The informant called up Mhods to inform him that he and the alleged buyer had arrived. When Mhods and a female companion came to the restaurant, introductions were made. The informant introduced Mhods, who was using a wooden crutch, to Sistemio as the buyer, while Mhods introduced his female companion as Sar, his

MIFAÑA, DIVINE GRACE M.

3

Evidence

business partner. Sistemio then asked Mhods for the price of 50 grams of shabu to which the latter replied P 150,000.00. Sistemio questioned the high price of the shabu which prompted Sar to answer: "Mataas talaga ang presyo ng Shabu ngayon magandang klase ito sa susunod na kuha mo babawas[a]n ko na ang presyo." Sar then asked Sistemio and the informant to walk with them outside the restaurant for the exchange. While they were walking, Sar handed Sistemio a white plastic bag containing one white plastic sachet. Sistemio, in turn, gave the marked genuine money and the boodle money to Mhods. Sistemio gave the pre-arranged signal of tapping Mhods on his shoulder. Yu immediately rushed towards the group and arrested Mhods and Sar.They were first brought to the Security Office of the mall where they revealed their real names as Mohamad Angkob Mlang and Sarkiya Daub. Thereat, Sistemio prepared the Certificate of Inventory of the items confiscated. They then proceeded to the PDEA office where markings were made. Sistemio prepared and brought the request for a laboratory examination and specimen to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, and the specimen submitted yielded positive results for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu. Sarkiya was released during the preliminary investigation when she presented a fake birth certificate stating that she was only 17 years old at the time of her arrest. She remains at large. After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision finding appellant guilty of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the RTC. The Court of Appeals favored the integrity of the drug offered in evidence by ruling that there was sufficient compliance with the chain of custody rule. The appellate court was satisfied with the prosecution’s presentation of "a complete picture detailing the buy-bust operation." The appellate court however deleted the imposition of a subsidiary penalty on the ground that life imprisonment does not carry with it any accessory penalty. Issue: Whether or not the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Held: The Court held that the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are: (1) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of

MIFAÑA, DIVINE GRACE M.

4

Evidence

corpus delicti. Sistemio, the poseur-buyer, positively testified that the sale of shabu actually took place when he himself parted with the marked money and received the shabu from appellant. To ascertain the identity of the illegal drugs presented in court as the ones actually seized from the accused, the prosecution must show that: (a) the prescribed procedure under Section 21(1), Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 has been complied with or falls within the saving clause provided in Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9165; and (b) there was an unbroken link in the chain of custody with respect to the confiscated items. The prosecution has established beyond doubt an unbroken link in the chain of custody. The unbroken link in the chain of custody also precluded the possibility that a person, not in the chain, ever gained possession of the seized evidence.

MIFAÑA, DIVINE GRACE M.

5

Evidence

G.R. No. 191753

September 17, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
 RONALD DE JESUS y APACIBLE and AMELITO DELA CRUZ y PUA Facts: The records show that the District Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Task Force (DAID, stationed at Camp Karingal) received a tip from its asset about the illegal drug activities of a certain Amel on Cartier St., Villa Carina Subdivision, Barangay Pasong Tamo, Quezon City. Acting on the tip, the DAID chief formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation. The asset introduced the appellants to PO Hamdani who expressed his intention to buy shabu, but no sale took place as the appellants had no stock of shabu at that time. At the instructions of De Jesus, the asset and PO Hamdani (together with the other members of the buy-bust team) returned the next day. On their return, the asset and PO Hamdani again approached the appellants. De Jesus told them that he already had the "stuff." PO Hamdani handed the marked money to De Jesus, and Dela Cruz handed the shabu to PO Hamdani. After the exchange, PO Hamdani made the pre-arranged signal; the buy-bust team then immediately converged for the operation. PO Hamdani arrested De Jesus while PO2 Edmond Paculdar arrested Dela Cruz who was found in possession of two plastic sachets of suspected shabu and of the marked money. PO Hamdani and PO Paculdar placed their initials "AH," "EP" and "EP-1" on the plastic sachets of suspected shabu they seized. The appellants and the items were brought to the DAID’s office at Camp Karingal for booking and investigation. The confiscated materials were inventoried and photographed, and thereafter taken to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for chemical examination, all tested positive for shabu. In its decision, the RTC convicted both appellants of violating Section 5, Article II of RA No. 9165 for selling shabu, and Dela Cruz of violating Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165 for possessing shabu. On appeal, the CA sustained the appellants’ convictions and ruled that the prosecution’s evidence duly established the crimes of sale and possession of shabu. Contrary to the appellants’ assertions, the CA found that the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti had been duly preserved in light of evidence duly recording the movements of the seized drugs and the identities of the custodians of these drugs, from the time of their seizure until their presentation in court. Likewise, the CA found no reason to disturb the RTC’s evaluation of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses – PO Hamdani and PO Paculdar – whose testimonies were strengthened by the documentary evidence showing the details of the buy-bust operation and the physical evidence of the confiscated shabu.

MIFAÑA, DIVINE GRACE M.

6

Evidence

Issues: The appellants ultimately question the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence. The appellants argue that the CA erred in its conclusions when it failed to consider the following matters: (1) the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses relating to the sale of shabu; (2) the proper worth of Dela Cruz’ testimony which was corroborated by other testimonial evidence; and (3) the absence of the corpus delicti for both the sale and possession of shabu as these were not proven with reasonable certainty. Held: The appeal was dismissed for lack of merit. The settled rule is that factual findings of the trial court and its evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal, unless the trial court is shown to have overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied any fact or circumstance of weight and substance. A careful study of the records in this regard shows no compelling reason to overturn the lower courts’ factual findings and their evaluation of the presented evidence. First, the matter of assigning values to the testimonies of witnesses is best and most competently performed by the trial judge who, unlike the appellate courts, has the direct opportunity to observe and assess the conduct and demeanor of witnesses. Under the circumstances, the RTC judge committed no reversible error when he accorded greater evidentiary weight to the prosecution’s version of the events. Buy-bust operations are recognized methods of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in drug-related crimes. These are the time-tested operations that have yielded positive results for the police. Upon due consideration of these drug cases realities, the testimonies of PO Hamdani and PO Paculdar on the buy-bust operation were clear, positive and unequivocal. PO Hamdani testified that he bought shabu from the appellants, while PO Paculdar testified that he found shabu in Dela Cruz’s possession when he was frisked. The testimonies of PO Hamdani and PO Paculdar were corroborated by both the documentary evidence and the physical evidence which outlined the detailed steps in the pre-operation, on-operation and post-operation activities of the police operations. Thus, the totality of the prosecution’s evidence, showing the actual occurrence of a buy-bust operation leading to the appellants’ arrest for sale and possession of prohibited drugs, simply must prevail over the defense’s evidence and theory of denial and frame-up. For a successful prosecution of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like shabu, the following elements must first be established: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and consideration of the sale; and (2) the delivery

MIFAÑA, DIVINE GRACE M.

7

Evidence

of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material is proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti. Clearly, the commission of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like shabu, merely requires the consummation of the selling transaction, which happens the moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller. As long as the police officer went through the operation as a buyer, whose offer was accepted by appellant, followed by the delivery of the dangerous drugs to the former, the crime is already consummated. In this case, the prosecution has amply proven all the elements of the drugs sale beyond moral certainty. Under the same standards, Dela Cruz’ possession of prohibited drugs was duly proven by the prosecution’s evidence. All the essential elements of illegal possession of prohibited drugs, namely, that – (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.All these were directly testified to by PO Paculdar who identified Dela Cruz as the person who had on his person two plastic sachets of shabu when he was arrested. Third, the corpus delicti in both the offenses of sale and of possession of shabu were proven with reasonable certainty as the police substantially complied with the prescribed procedure under Section 21(a), Article II of RA No. 9165, its implementing rules, and the chain of custody rule. What assumes primary importance in drug cases is the prosecution’s proof, to the point of moral certainty, that the prohibited drug presented in court as evidence against the accused is the same item recovered from his possession.In this case, the prosecution achieved this level of proof through evidence sufficiently establishing the links in the chain of custody of the seized shabu from the time of its seizure until it was presented in court. Parenthetically, the Court also considers as significant the appellants’ failure during the trial to raise and prove any attendant irregularity affecting the integrity and identity of the shabu seized and presented in court.. The law itself lays down certain exceptions to the general compliance requirement – "as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team," the seizure of and the custody over the dangerous drugs shall not be rendered void and invalid. From the evidence presented, the prosecution proved that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the shabu seized from the appellants had been duly preserved under the precautionary handling measures the police undertook after the shabu was confiscated.

MIFAÑA, DIVINE GRACE M.

8

Evidence

G.R. No. 103800.

January 19, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AUGUSTO CHING

Facts: On April 6, 1990, an information for rape, 1 based upon a sworn written complaint of the victim, was filed against accused-appellant Augusto Ching for having carnal knowledge of one Maria Theresa Decolongon, with force and violence and against the latter's will, on the evening of December 14, 1989 in Barangay Debangan, Taytay, Palawan. The additionally lamentable and repulsive fact is that the complainant was then only ten years old. Anchored on the testimony of the alleged rape victim herself, Maria Teresa Decolongon, who claimed that at around midnight of December 14, 1989, she was sleeping inside their house in Barangay Debangan, Taytay, Palawan with her nine-year old brother, Rustom. There were no other persons in the house because her parents had gone to Liminangcong to earn a living, bringing with them her other younger siblings. All of a sudden, she was awakened when somebody, later identified as herein appellant, covered her nose and mouth. She struggled but she was slapped on her left cheek, which made her lose her senses. When she regained consciousness, appellant was already on top of her, his short pants lowered to his knees and his organ inserted in hers. While appellant was satisfying his lust, he was holding her two hands. After she was deflowered, appellant proceeded to the side of the door and made an opening on the "sawali" wall for his egress. Just then, her neighbor, Teofisto Labarosa, called her name and inquired as to who the intruder was, to which she replied, "Kuya Dodoy did me something wrong, he raped me." Labarosa, though, did nothing and left. Thereafter, she stood up and saw stains of blood on her panty. As she felt her stomach aching, she lay down and, when the bleeding of her organ stopped, she changed her underwear. An hour later, at about 1:00 o'clock in the morning, her parents arrived at the shore line. However, only her father went inside the house while her mother was left at the banca ashore. Her father informed her that her mother had seriously broken her arm and had to be brought to the hospital immediately. Hence, she failed to muster enough courage nor did she have the opportunity to tell him about the misfortune that had befallen her. The next day, she went to her "Auntie Inday," her father's cousin, and told her about the incident. The latter advised her not to inform her father as the latter might do something against the law. A month later, she went to Taytay where her parents were temporarily staying and there, she was eventually able to tell her mother, Emily, in her father's presence, what had happened to her. Thinking that it would be better to first be armed with evidence, her mother brought her to the Taytay District Hospital for medico-legal examination.

MIFAÑA, DIVINE GRACE M.

9

Evidence

Issue: Whether or not the testimony of the rape victim is enough to support the conviction. Held: Yes. The SC consistently held that in crimes of rape, conviction or acquittal virtually depends entirely on the credibility of the victim's testimony because of the fact that usually only the participants can testify to its occurrence. The lone testimony of the victim in a prosecution for rape, if credible, is sufficient to sustain a verdict of conviction. Also, it is well-settled that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great weight on appeal as it is in a better position to decide the question of credibility, having seen and heard the witnesses themselves and observed their behavior and manner of testifying. In the instant case, the trial court justifiedly gave more credence to the testimony of Maria than that of appellant for being sufficiently credible, convincing and unrebutted by the defense. The string of events lucidly and logically conduce to the conclusion that appellant did have carnal knowledge of Maria as she claimed. She was able to clearly establish that she was raped by appellant since she actually saw him lying on top of her, wearing a colored sando and with his shorts lowered to his knees while her dress was pulled up to her abdomen. She felt his penis inserted into her sexual organ, which caused her to feel pain, and after the coitus she saw blood on her underwear. The medico-legal examination further corroborated this account of Maria since it established that the latter sustained a hymenal laceration inflicted about 3 to 4 weeks before the examination, coinciding with the date when the rape took place. The prosecution need not present the testimonies of persons other than the offended party herself if the same is accurate and credible. The Court has frequently held that a conviction for rape may issue upon the sole basis of the complainant's testimony. This is so because no decent and sensible woman will publicly admit being a rape victim and thus run the risk of public contempt — the dire consequence of a rape charge — unless she is, in fact, a rape victim. The Court has scrupulously gone over the other supposed inconsistencies catalogued by appellant and is persuaded that these are not vital or significant but are only minor and inconsequential lapses which do not affect Maria's credibility. Clearly, she could not be expected to respond with flawless accuracy to questions regarding the ugly incident, especially so because she was still in her tender years. On the contrary, these minor errors tend to buttress, rather than weaken, her credibility since thereby one could hardly doubt that her testimony was not contrived.

MIFAÑA, DIVINE GRACE M.

10

Evidence

In fact, during the hearing of the case, her cross-examination had to be suspended when she gave way to convulsive weeping under emotional stress. Evidently, the crime of statutory rape is not disproved by the young victim's failure to give a detailed account of how she was abused and the events thereafter. Instead, such testimony of the victim actually shows the naivete and sincerity of childhood.

MIFAÑA, DIVINE GRACE M.

11

Evidence

G.R. No. 150439

July 29, 2005

AMELITA DELA CRUZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Facts: Accused-petitioner was charged with the crime of estafa through misappropriation or conversion as defined in and penalized under Article 315 paragraph 1 (b), of the Revised Penal Code. The said accused being then the payroll clerk of Great Mandarin Villa Seafoods Village, Inc., and Hock Wan Restaurant Corporation, existing domestic corporations primarily engaged in the restaurant business, with principal places of business at 798 Ongpin St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, and 489 Nueva St., Binondo, Manila, respectively, and by virtue of her position as such, received from said corporations in trust, during the said period a total sum of P471,166.11 representing the excess amount paid to the employees of said corporations as salaries under the obligation of accounting and turning over the said excess to said corporations, but she did not do so in violation of the trust relationship existing between her and said corporations, which amount, once in her possession, far from complying with her obligation aforesaid, went into hiding and failed and refused, and still fails and refuses to return the same whereby misappropriating, misapplying and converting the said amount to her personal use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of the said corporation represented by their common personnel manager Manuel M. Matammu in the total amount of P471,166.11 The first witness presented by the prosecution was the personnel manager of the complaining corporations, Manuel M. Matammu, who testified that he is responsible for the hiring of employees, monitoring the rules and regulations, violations in the rules and also, enforcing the president's instruction from time to time; It was the duty of the accused to compute the payroll based on the time card, request the treasurer for the issuance and encashment of the corresponding checks, placed the money on the pay slip and afterwards distribute the same to the employees. He further testified that the accused stopped working on the second week of January 1995, when she failed to comply with the instruction to submit a report on the computations she made. Considering that the payroll record were no longer in the office, he computed the total of the acknowledged pay slips and compared it with the total amount of the checks withdrawn for that particular period, he found out that there was an overdrawn amount of P352,427.31. The second witness is King Eng Kiat the treasurer of the Great Mandarin Restaurant. He stated that he has been in the company for almost ten (10) years and his duties are to deposit and withdraw money from the bank intended for the payroll; that the accused has been with the company for five (5) or six (6) years as a payroll clerk or pay master; that the salaries are given every fifteenth (15th) and thirtieth (30th) of the month; that the computation was made and given to

MIFAÑA, DIVINE GRACE M.

12

Evidence

him by the accused. After withdrawing the money intended for salaries he hands it over to the accused at the Mandarin Villa office without receipt from the accused. The third witness for the prosecution was Teresita Ng de Egano. She is a clerk at the Finance Division of the Mandarin Seafood Villa Restaurant, in charge of the accounts payable, paying the suppliers and also help in inserting the money in the pay envelope. Aside from this, she check Restaurant receipts and computations. She stated that the accused holds office with her in the same room. According to the witness, the accused is the one who computes the salaries of the employees, such computation will then be given to Mr. King Eng Kiat. The latter will then withdraw the total amount of the payroll, then afterwards give the encashed amount to the accused. She, together with two other persons, one for Hock Wan and another for Mandarin Villa assist the accused in inserting the money in the pay envelopes. The salaries for the employees of the two (2) corporations were not divided, but the corresponding amount, as indicated in the pay slips, were inserted in the envelope until all the names of the employees indicated in the pay slips were completed. The pay envelopes were then placed in a box. The witness, however, noticed that there were extra money left in the tray and she does not know if these money were returned to Mr. King Eng Kiat. In holding the accused-petitioner guilty of the crime charged, the trial court relied on circumstantial evidence as proved by the prosecution. Thus, applying the provisions of Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, particularly, that with the trust given to her, she really defrauded her employer by over-computing the payroll and converting or misappropriating the excess (amount) to her own personal use to the prejudice and damage of the private complainants. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court finding the circumstances aforequoted were consistent with the hypothesis that the accused-petitioner is guilty of the crime charged and held that the fact of the shortage of funds was clearly established without opposition from the accused-petitioner. The accused-petitioner initially questions the sufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution, which the trial court leaned on when it found her guilty of estafa beyond reasonable doubt. She alleges that the findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, are "just mere erroneous conclusion(s) unsupported by evidence on record or if there is any, is too inadequate to support a finding of conviction on circumstantial evidence." According to her, "there is absolutely no evidence on record that petitioner made an over computation of the salaries of employees for a given period . . . and that she took the difference/excess from which an inference of over withdrawal and misappropriation could have been made."

MIFAÑA, DIVINE GRACE M.

13

Evidence

Issue: Whether or not the evidence presented against petitioner is sufficient to convict her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa with abuse of confidence as charged in the information.

Held: The contention of the accused-petitioner is well placed. Accused-petitioner was charged with the crime of estafa through misappropriation or conversion as defined in and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 1(b), of the Revised Penal Code. 16 The elements of the said crime are: 1) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same; 2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; 3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and 4) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender. The trial court, as well as the appellate court, relied heavily on circumstantial evidence to convict the accused-petitioner. Under the Rules of Court, the requirements for circumstantial facts to be able to withstand the tribulation of a conviction of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, are: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Decided cases expound that the circumstantial evidence presented and proved must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. After thoroughly reviewing the records of this case and weighing the testimonial evidence on the scale creditworthiness and materiality, however, the Court finds that the circumstantial evidence present in the case at bar are grossly insufficient to sustain a conviction. Unfortunately, in the case at bar, the circumstances relied upon by the trial court do not lead to an inference exclusively consistent with the guilt of the accusedpetitioner beyond reasonable doubt. The court a quo leaned immensely on circumstantial evidence, which, even if taken collectively, does nothing to engender a belief of guilt that can withstand the test of moral certainty.

MIFAÑA, DIVINE GRACE M.

14

Evidence

G.R. No. 118320

October 15, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RODOLFO CABODOC Facts: On May 28, 1991, at about 5:00 a.m., Danilo Matira and victim Randy Pendel went to the house of Lucy Razon at Sitio Mainit, Barangay Pulangbato, San Juan, Batangas to attend a fiesta. There were many people at that house. At about 12:00 noon, appellant arrived and ate at the house of Lucy. At about 1:00 p.m., appellant opened his balisong and uttered the words "I will kill him (referring to Randy Pendel)." At that time, appellant was about two (2) arms stretch away from Pendel. Matira took the balisong away from appellant. Later, Matira returned the balisong to appellant who then left the place. At about 4:30 p.m. of the same day (i.e., May 28, 1991), Virgilio Galang was walking along the road at Sitio Mainit. Galang then saw Pendel walking inside the fence of the house of Renato Samarita. Galang called and invited Pendel to walk with him. At that point, Galang suddenly saw appellant coming from behind Pendel with an open balisong. Pendel happened to turn and thus face appellant ("napaharap). Appellant suddenly stabbed Pendel with his balisong, hitting him (Pendel) on the left side of the chest. Pendel stepped backwards with his arms raised until he reached a "santol" tree. Appellant again stabbed Pendel with the balisong, hitting Pendel once more on the left side of the chest. As Pendel fell down near the "santol" tree, appellant tried to stab him for the third time. However, appellant's balisong hit the "santol" tree instead which cause it to break. Appellant then ran outside the fence of Samarita and fled to the south, taking with him the handle of his balisong. The blade or pointed portion of appellant's balisong was left on the "santol" tree. The people in the vicinity shouted that help be extended to Pendel. Pendel was brought to San Juan Emergency Hospital for treatment. He was operated on but died during the operation. Meanwhile, PO2 William Perez who was then in the house of his brother-in-law, which is about six (6) meters away from the place of the incident, heard the shouts of the people and went to the place of the incident. When PO2 Perez reached the place of the incident, the people pointed to appellant who was then running as the one who stabbed the victim. PO2 Perez arrested appellant. Matira arrived and handed to PO2 Perez a balisong and told him that "this is the balisong taken at the scene of the incident" The trial court held that the killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery because the victim was unarmed and the attack was sudden, unexpected, without warning, and without provocation. It disregarded the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation, which was also alleged in the

MIFAÑA, DIVINE GRACE M.

15

Evidence

information, because the prosecution "failed to show that the accused had a prior plan to kill Pendel." Issues: (a) Whether the original counsel of the accused was incompetent or otherwise had committed gross negligence in waiving the presentation of the evidence for the defense. (b) Whether such incompetence or gross negligence can be a ground for new trial. Held: As to the first, the accused has no proof whatsoever of the incompetence of his previous counsel. The transcripts of the stenographic notes of the testimony of the prosecution witnesses show that the counsel for the accused lengthily crossexamined the witnesses to raise doubts on their credibility. The incompetence or gross negligence of the accused's original counsel cannot be deduced from the latter's decision not to present any evidence on behalf of the accused. In the absence of any evidence to support it, that deduction would be nothing more than an unadulterated speculation. In favor of the said counsel is the presumption that, as an officer of the court, he regularly performs the duties imposed upon him by his oath as a lawyer and by the Code of Professional Responsibility. It must be stressed in this connection that on 8 March 1994, after the prosecution had finally rested its case, the original counsel, without objection on the part of the accused, informed the trial court of the accused's desire to change his plea of not guilty to that of guilty to the lesser offense of homicide. The trial court promulgated its decision only on 14 July 1994. The accused had more than four months to rectify any perceived error of his counsel in waiving the presentation of evidence either by asking leave of court to withdraw the waiver or to secure the services of a new counsel who could take the appropriate action on the accused's behalf. The accused did not. Neither did he ask for a reconsideration of the judgment on ground of denial of due process. In the second assigned error, the accused assails the finding of the trial court that the evidence of the prosecution has not established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He injects doubts on such evidence by asserting that motive was not proved. Well-entrenched is the rule that the prosecution need not prove motive on the part of the accused when the latter has been positively identified as the author of the crime. As this Court previously said, lack of motive for committing the crime does not preclude conviction, considering that, nowadays, it is a matter of judicial knowledge that persons have been killed or assaulted for no reason at all.

MIFAÑA, DIVINE GRACE M.

16

Evidence

The accused likewise submits that the prosecution failed to establish corpus delicti, there being no showing of any direct link between the accused and the weapon alleged to have been used in the crime in that none of its witnesses testified, much less identified, such weapon. For conviction of an accused in criminal cases, it is enough for the prosecution to establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that a crime was committed and the accused is the author thereof. The production of the weapon used in the commission of the crime is not a condition sine qua non for the discharge of that burden, for the weapon may not have been recovered at all.

MIFAÑA, DIVINE GRACE M.

17

Evidence

G.R. No. 109939

June 8, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GLORIA MITTU AND GERVACIO SOLIDAD Facts: In an information filed before the Regional Trial Court of Kaloocan City, herein appellants were charged with the crime of kidnapping for ransom for having unlawfully and feloniously taken and carried away with the use of force, threat, stealth and intimidation, the minors Vik Ramjit Singh and Mary Gene Cona without their consent. On November 10, 1992, appellants entered their respective pleas of not guilty upon arraignment. Thereafter, trial ensued. On March 15, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision finding the appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Aggrieved by the decision, both appellants filed their respective appeal questioning the decision of the lower court. Issue: Whether or not the two minor victims are credible witnesses. Held: Yes. Countless times have we ruled that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to the highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which would have affected the result of the case. The trial court is in a better position to decide the question of credibility, having seen and heard the witnesses themselves and observed their behavior and manner of testifying. In the present case, the 4 year-old boy and his nursemaid testified on the circumstances of the kidnapping. Their testimonies were duly corroborated by the testimonies of the Singh spouses and the NBI agents who entrapped appellants. Against this array of categorical testimonies, appellants could only offer their feeble denials and excuses. Categorical, consistent and positive identification, without any ill motive on the part of the eyewitness, prevails over unconvincing alibi and unsubstantiated denials. These latter testimonies are self-serving statements, undeserving of weight in law.

MIFAÑA, DIVINE GRACE M.

18

Evidence

G.R. No. 111285

January 24, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VICENTE VALLA Facts: Appellant was 28 years old, married, cousin of the victim, and resident of Barangay Tayuman, San Francisco, Quezon, at the time of incident. The victim was an eight year-old girl, who was reported missing and the following day found raped and strangled to death near the riverbank of the Tayuman River in Quezon province. The appellant was charged with the crime of "rape with murder". Upon arraignment, appellant, duly assisted by counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty to the crime charged. The prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Myra Pines, the victim's 12 year-old playmate, who heard the victim's cries as she was being strangled, but became afraid and went home instead; (2) Aristeo Allarey, the Barangay Captain of Ilayang, Tayuman, San Francisco, Quezon, who organized a search party upon report of the mother that her daughter was missing, and before whom, appellant admitted that he raped and killed the victim, and even offered his (appellant's) daughter in return; (3) Gonzalo de la Cruz, father of the victim, who took part in the search party, and who witnessed appellant's confession to the commission of the crime; (4) Reynaldo Merle, Barangay Tanod of Barangay Ilayang, Tayuman, San Francisco, Quezon, another member of the search party; (5) Bayani Samadan, Kagawad of the Barangay, also a member of the search party; (6) Rodolfo Rosales, police investigator of San Francisco, Quezon, Philippine National Police; (7) Dr. Araceli R. Madatu, Senior Resident Physician of Bondoc Peninsula District Hospital, Catanauan, Quezon, who testified that when the cadaver was brought for examination, it was in cadaveric rigidity, the legs were spread like a woman about to give birth ("parang nanganganak"), the tongue sticking out ("nakalawit"), the skull crushed ("basag"), and the pubic area had blisters resulting from cigarette burns, ("pinagpapaso ng sigarilyo"), and the vagina had a laceration up to the anus, evidencing that the child was raped. The trial court rendered a decision finding appellant guilty of the crime of "rape with homicide" and was sentenced to suffer the imprisonment of reclusion perpetua. In his brief, appellant claims that the testimony of prosecution witness Allarey was inconsistent since on direct examination, Allarey narrated that when he summoned appellant, the latter did not immediately appear, 10 but on crossexamination, he said that appellant immediately reported to him. Appellant also contends that Merle's testimony that appellant was "tulala" at the time he confessed to the commission of the crime was inconsistent with appellant's alleged begging for forgiveness for the crime. Further, appellant adds that his statement offering to exchange his own daughter for the victim was made

MIFAÑA, DIVINE GRACE M.

19

Evidence

because of compulsion from the crowd. Appellant further insists that his alibi should be given due consideration since the prosecution failed to overturn his alibi which was duly corroborated by the testimony of his father. Issue: Whether or not the witnesses presented are credible. Held: Yes. In this case, the trial court gave full faith and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. The Court finds no reason to disturb this finding. As consistently held by the Court, the trial judge's evaluation of the testimony of a witness is generally accorded not only the highest respect, but also finality, unless some weighty circumstance has been ignored or misunderstood but which could change the result. Having had the direct opportunity to observe the witness on the stand, the trial judge was in a vantage position to assess his demeanor, and determine if he was telling the truth or not. The alleged inconsistency in the testimony of Allarey as to whether appellant immediately reported to him after being summoned, and in the testimony of Merle that appellant was "tulala" at the time he admitted responsibility for the crime, merely refer to minor details which do not in actuality touch upon the "whys" and "wherefores" of the crime committed. Inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses when referring only to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony. Although there may be inconsistencies on minor details, the same do not impair the credibility of the witnesses where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the assailants. In fact, some minor inconsistencies could show that the witness was not previously coached so as to tailor his testimony, and thus they serve as badges of credibility. More importantly, the declaration of appellant acknowledging his guilt of the offense may be given in evidence against him under Section 33 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court. Note that his extrajudicial confession is corroborated by the corpus delicti as required by Section 3 of Rule 133. The Rules do not require that all the elements of the crime must be clearly established by evidence independent of the confession. Corpus delicti only means that there should be some concrete evidence tending to show the commission of the crime apart from the confession. In this case, the fact of the crime was sufficiently proven through the testimonies by witnesses such as Myra Pines, who heard the cries of the victim, and the other members of the search party who found the body of the victim, and witnessed the confession of the appellant, as well as documentary evidence presented during trial such as the medico-legal certificate attesting that the victim had been raped and killed.

MIFAÑA, DIVINE GRACE M.

20

Evidence

The statement of the accused asking for forgiveness and even offering his own daughter in exchange for his crime 18 may also be regarded as part of the res gestae under Section 42 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Res gestae means "things done". There are three requisites to admit evidence as part of the res gestae: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence, in this case the discovery of the body of the victim; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood, in this case, appellant had begged for forgiveness immediately after the body was found; and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending circumstances, in this case, appellant had admitted to raping and killing the victim, and even "offered" his daughter in exchange for the victim.

MIFAÑA, DIVINE GRACE M.

21

Evidence

STONEHILL vs. DIOKNO Facts: Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers). as ―the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense,‖ or ―used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense,‖ which is described in the applications adverted to above as ―violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code.‖ Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court – because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law – on March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the effects seized as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the respondents, their agents or representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search warrants in question. The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein. As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein

MIFAÑA, DIVINE GRACE M.

22

Evidence

petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby,9 and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity. Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general warrants and that accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and void. In this connection, the Constitution provides: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. Issue: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof, are valid or not; and (2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the negative, whether said documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners herein. Held: Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a ―violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.‖ In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has

MIFAÑA, DIVINE GRACE M.

23

Evidence

performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a ―violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code,‖ – as alleged in the aforementioned applications – without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements. Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights – that the things to be seized be particularly described – as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants. Relying upon Moncado vs. People’s Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even if the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common law rule, that the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely ―because the constable has blundered,‖ upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained, such as the common-law action for damages against the searching officer, against the party who procured the issuance of the search warrant and against those assisting in the execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be provided by other laws. However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand: As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will that wrong be repressed.

MIFAÑA, DIVINE GRACE M.

24

Evidence

Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause. Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general, committed By agents of the party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap under which the minority usually – but, understandably – finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility of securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power of the party for whose benefit the illegality had been committed. In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated June 29, 1962, petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be included among the premises considered in said Resolution as residences of herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck, respectively, and that, furthermore, the records, papers and other effects seized in the offices of the corporations above referred to include personal belongings of said petitioners and other effects under their exclusive possession and control, for the exclusion of which they have a standing under the latest rulings of the federal courts of federal courts of the United States. The SC noted, however, that petitioners’ theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control over the aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged ―personal‖ nature thereof, has Been Advanced, not in their petition or amended petition herein, but in the Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words, said theory would appear to be readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach intimated in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits or copies of alleged affidavits attached to said motion for reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof, contain either

MIFAÑA, DIVINE GRACE M.

25

Evidence

inconsistent allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory now advanced by petitioners herein. Upon the other hand, the Court is not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion for reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or conditions contemplated in the cases relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of the views therein expressed, should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our opinion thereon, it being best to leave the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future. The doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the twentynine (29) places, offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs. CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting: On the question of legal standing, I am of the conviction that, upon the pleadings submitted to this Court the petitioners have the requisite legal standing to move for the suppression and return of the documents, papers and effects that were seized from places other than their family residences. Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In the many years of judicial construction and interpretation of the said constitutional provision, our courts have invariably regarded as doctrinal the pronouncement made on the Fourth Amendment by federal courts, especially the Federal Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for the suppression or return of documents, papers and effects which are the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure, may be summarized as follows; (a) ownership of documents, papers and effects gives ―standing;‖ (b) ownership and/or control or possession – actual or constructive – of premises searched gives ―standing‖; and (c) the ―aggrieved person‖ doctrine where the search warrant and the sworn application

MIFAÑA, DIVINE GRACE M.

26

Evidence

for search warrant are ―primarily‖ directed solely and exclusively against the ―aggrieved person,‖ gives ―standing.‖ An examination of the search warrants in this case will readily show that, excepting three, all were directed against the petitioners personally. In some of them, the petitioners were named personally, followed by the designation, ―the President and/or General Manager‖ of the particular corporation. The three warrants excepted named three corporate defendants. But the ―office/house/warehouse/premises‖ mentioned in the said three warrants were also the same ―office/house/warehouse/premises‖ declared to be owned by or under the control of the petitioners in all the other search warrants directed against the petitioners and/or ―the President and/or General Manager‖ of the particular corporation. (see pages 5-24 of Petitioners’ Reply of April 2, 1962). The searches and seizures were to be made, and were actually made, in the ―office/house/warehouse/premises‖ owned by or under the control of the petitioners.

MIFAÑA, DIVINE GRACE M.

27

Evidence

PEOPLE VS. ARUTA Facts: Search and Seizure – Informer’s Tip With the pervasive proliferation of illegal drugs and its pernicious effects on our society, our law enforcers tend at times to overreach themselves in apprehending drug offenders to the extent of failing to observe well-entrenched constitutional guarantees against illegal searches and arrests. Consequently, drug offenders manage to evade the clutches of the law on mere technicalities. In the morning of 13 Dec 1988, the law enforcement officers received information from an informant named ―Benjie‖ that a certain ―Aling Rosa‖ would be leaving for Baguio City on 14 Dec 1988 and would be back in the afternoon of the same day carrying with her a large volume of marijuana; At 6:30 in the evening of 14 Dec 1988, Aruta alighted from a Victory Liner Bus carrying a travelling bag even as the informant pointed her out to the law enforcement officers; NARCOM officers approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents; When asked by Lt. Abello about the contents of her travelling bag, she gave the same to him; When they opened the same, they found dried marijuana leaves; Aruta was then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation. ISSUE: Whether or not the conducted search and seizure is constitutional. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Aruta and has noted that some drug traffickers are being freed due to technicalities. Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she about to commit one nor had she just committed a crime. Aruta was merely crossing the street and was not acting in any manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she was committing a crime. It was only when the informant pointed to Aruta and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect. The NARCOM agents would not have apprehended Aruta were it not for the furtive finger of the informant because, as clearly illustrated by the evidence on record, there was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect that accused-appellant was committing a crime, except for the pointing finger of the informant. The SC could neither sanction nor tolerate as it is a clear violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. Neither was there any semblance of any compliance with the rigid requirements of probable cause and warrantless arrests. Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a warrantless search of Aruta’s bag, there being no probable cause and the accused-appellant not having been lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise, the arrest being incipiently

MIFAÑA, DIVINE GRACE M.

28

Evidence

illegal, it logically follows that the subsequent search was similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful arrest. The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure must perforce operate in favor of accusedappellant. As such, the articles seized could not be used as evidence against accused-appellant for these are ―fruits of a poisoned tree‖ and, therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution. In People v. Ramos, 3 this Court held that a search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a search warrant validly issued by a judge as provided in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution which provides: Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. This constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures as it operates only against ―unreasonable‖ searches and seizures. The plain import of the language of the Constitution, which in one sentence prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and at the same time prescribes the requisites for a valid warrant, is that searches and seizures are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental protection accorded by the search and seizure clause is that between person and police must stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants or warrants of arrest. Further, articles which are the product of unreasonable searches and seizures are inadmissible as evidence pursuant to the doctrine pronounced in Stonehill v. Diokno. 5 This exclusionary rule was later enshrined in Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution, thus: Sec. 3(2). Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. From the foregoing, it can be said that the State cannot simply intrude indiscriminately into the houses, papers, effects, and most importantly, on the person of an individual. The constitutional provision guaranteed an impenetrable shield against unreasonable searches and seizures. As such, it protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself against unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint. Therewithal, the right of a person to be secured against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. A statute, rule or situation which allows exceptions to the

MIFAÑA, DIVINE GRACE M.

29

Evidence

requirement of a warrant of arrest or search warrant must perforce be strictly construed and their application limited only to cases specifically provided or allowed by law. To do otherwise is an infringement upon personal liberty and would set back a right so basic and deserving of full protection and vindication yet often violated. The following cases are specifically provided or allowed by law: 1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court 8 and by prevailing jurisprudence; 2. Seizure of evidence in ―plain view,‖ the elements of which are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and (d) ―plain view‖ justified mere seizure of evidence without further search; 3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity; 4. Consented warrantless search; 5. Customs search; 6. Stop and Frisk; 10and 7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances. The above exceptions, however, should not become unbridled licenses for law enforcement officers to trample upon the constitutionally guaranteed and more fundamental right of persons against unreasonable search and seizures. The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted. In instant case, the apprehending officers already had prior knowledge from their informant regarding Aruta’s alleged activities. In Tangliben, policemen were confronted with an on-the-spot tip. Moreover, the policemen knew that the Victory Liner compound is being used by drug traffickers as their ―business address‖. More significantly, Tangliben was acting suspiciously. His actuations and surrounding circumstances led the policemen to reasonably suspect that Tangliben is committing a crime. In instant case, there is no single indication that Aruta was acting suspiciously. This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin where the police received information two days before the arrival of Aminnudin that the latter would be arriving from Iloilo on board the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known, the vehicle was identified and the date of arrival was certain. From the information they had received, the police could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to

MIFAÑA, DIVINE GRACE M.

30

Evidence

justify the issuance of a warrant. Instead of securing a warrant first, they proceeded to apprehend Aminnudin. When the case was brought before this Court, the arrest was held to be illegal; hence any item seized from Aminnudin could not be used against him. In the instant case, the NARCOM agents were admittedly not armed with a warrant of arrest. To legitimize the warrantless search and seizure of accusedappellant’s bag, accused-appellant must have been validly arrested under Section 5 of Rule 113 which provides inter alia: Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; xxx xxx xxx Emphasis is to be laid on the fact that the law requires that the search be incidental to a lawful arrest, in order that the search itself may likewise be considered legal. Therefore, it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings. Where a search is first undertaken, and an arrest effected based on evidence produced by the search, both such search and arrest would be unlawful, for being contrary to law. As previously discussed, the case in point is People v. Aminnudin where, this Court observed that: . . . accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him. In the absence of probable cause to effect a valid and legal warrantless arrest, the search and seizure of accused-appellant’s bag would also not be justified as seizure of evidence in ―plain view‖ under the second exception. The marijuana was obviously not immediately apparent as shown by the fact that the NARCOM agents still had to request accused-appellant to open the bag to ascertain its contents. Neither would the search and seizure of accused-appellant’s bag be justified as a search of a moving vehicle. There was no moving vehicle to speak of in the instant case as accused-appellant was apprehended several minutes after

MIFAÑA, DIVINE GRACE M.

31

Evidence

alighting from the Victory Liner bus. In fact, she was accosted in the middle of the street and not while inside the vehicle. In an attempt to further justify the warrantless search, the Solicitor General next argues that the police officers would have encountered difficulty in securing a search warrant as it could be secured only if accused-appellant’s name was known, the vehicle identified and the date of its arrival certain, as in the Aminnudin case where the arresting officers had forty-eight hours within which to act. This argument is untenable. Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution provides: . . . No search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Emphasis supplied) Search warrants to be valid must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The purpose of this rule is to limit the things to be seized to those and only those, particularly described in the warrant so as to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made. Had the NARCOM agents only applied for a search warrant, they could have secured one without too much difficulty, contrary to the assertions of the Solicitor General. The person intended to be searched has been particularized and the thing to be seized specified. The time was also sufficiently ascertained to be in the afternoon of December 14, 1988. ―Aling Rosa‖ turned out to be accusedappellant and the thing to be seized was marijuana. The vehicle was identified to be a Victory Liner bus. In fact, the NARCOM agents purposely positioned themselves near the spot where Victory Liner buses normally unload their passengers. Assuming that the NARCOM agents failed to particularize the vehicle, this would not in any way hinder them from securing a search warrant. The above particulars would have already sufficed. In any case, this Court has held that the police should particularly describe the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it is feasible. In fine, there was really no excuse for the NARCOM agents not to procure a search warrant considering that they had more than twenty-four hours to do so. Obviously, this is again an instance of seizure of the ―fruit of the poisonous tree,‖ hence illegal and inadmissible subsequently in evidence. The exclusion of such evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizure. The non-

MIFAÑA, DIVINE GRACE M.

32

Evidence

exclusionary rule is contrary to the letter and spirit of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.

[G.R. No. 123553. July 13, 1998] BITONG vs. CA Ownership of Corporate Shares/ Stock Certificates: Valid Issuance Facts: Bitong was the treasurer and member of the BoD of Mr. & Mrs. Corporation. She filed a complaint with the SEC to hold respondent spouses Apostol liable for fraud, misrepresentation, disloyalty, evident bad faith, conflict of interest and mismanagement in directing the affairs of the corporation to the prejudice of the stockholders. She alleges that certain transactions entered into by the corporation were not supported by any stockholder’s resolution. The complaint sought to enjoin Apostol from further acting as president-director of the corporation and from disbursing any money or funds. Apostol contends that Bitong was merely a holder-in-trust of the JAKA shares of the corporation, hence, not entitled to the relief she prays for. SEC Hearing Panel issued a writ enjoining Apostol. After hearing the evidence, SEC Hearing Panel dissolved the writ and dismissed the complaint filed by Bitong. Bitong appealed to the SEC en banc. The latter reversed SEC Hearing Panel decision. Apostol filed petition for review with the CA. CA reversed SEC en banc ruling holding that Bitong was not the owner of any share of stock in the corporation and therefore, not a real party in interest to prosecute the complaint. Hence, this petition with the SC. Issue: Whether or not Bitong was the real party in interest. Held: Based on the evidence presented, it could be gleaned that Bitong was not a bona fide stockholder of the corporation. Several corporate documents disclose that the true party in interest was JAKA. Although her buying of the shares were recorded in the Stock and Transfer Book of the corporation, and as provided by Sec. 63 of the Corp Code that no transfer shall be valid except as between the parties until the transfer is recorded in the books of the corporation, and upon its recording the corporation is bound by it and is estopped to deny the fact of transfer of said shares, this provision is not conclusive even against the corporation but are prima facie evidence only. Parol evidence may be admitted to supply the omissions in the records, explain ambiguities, or show what transpired where no records were kept, or in some cases where such records were contradicted. Besides, the provision envisions a formal certificate of stock which can be issued only upon compliance with certain requisites: (1) certificates must be signed by the president or vice president, countersigned by the secretary or assistant secretary, and sealed with the seal of the corporation, (2) delivery of the certificate;

MIFAÑA, DIVINE GRACE M.

33

Evidence

(3) the par value, as to par value shares, or the full subscription as to no par value shares, must be first fully paid; (4) the original certificate must be surrendered where the person requesting the issuance of a certificate is a transferee from a stockholder. These considerations are founded on the basic principle that stock issued without authority and in violation of the law is void and confers no rights on the person to whom it is issued and subjects him to no liabilities. Where there is an inherent lack of power in the corporation to issue the stock, neither the corporation nor the person to whom the stock is issued is estopped to question its validity since an estoppel cannot operate to create stock which under the law cannot have existence. It is well settled in this jurisdiction that where corporate directors are guilty of a breach of trust, not of mere error of judgment or abuse of discretion, and intracorporate remedy is futile or useless, a stockholder may institute a suit in behalf of himself and other stockholders and for the benefit of the corporation, to bring about a redress of the wrong inflicted directly upon the corporation and indirectly upon the stockholders.[38] The stockholder’s right to institute a derivative suit is not based on any express provision of The Corporation Code but is impliedly recognized when the law makes corporate directors or officers liable for damages suffered by the corporation and its stockholders for violation of their fiduciary duties. Hence, a stockholder may sue for mismanagement, waste or dissipation of corporate assets because of a special injury to him for which he is otherwise without redress.[39] In effect, the suit is an action for specific performance of an obligation owed by the corporation to the stockholders to assist its rights of action when the corporation has been put in default by the wrongful refusal of the directors or management to make suitable measures for its protection.[40] The basis of a stockholder’s suit is always one in equity. However, it cannot prosper without first complying with the legal requisites for its institution. The most important of these is the bona fide ownership by a stockholder of a stock in his own right at the time of the transaction complained of which invests him with standing to institute a derivative action for the benefit of the corporation.[41] WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The 31 August 1995 Decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the complaint of petitioner Nora A. Bitong in CAG.R. No. SP 33291, and granting the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by respondent Edgardo B. Espiritu as well as annulling the 5 November 1993, 24 January 1994 and 18 February 1994 Orders of the SEC En Banc in CA-G.R. No. SP 33873, is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

MIFAÑA, DIVINE GRACE M.

34

Evidence

[G.R. No. 139282. September 4, 2000] DIEGO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN Romeo Diego Y De Joya, herein petitioner, was convicted as principal in the crime of Malversation of Public Property by the Sandiganbayan. ―Accused Romeo Diego started his career in the Philippine National Police as an Auto Mechanic way back in 1950. Through the years, he rose to the rank of Police Superintendent (equivalent rank of Lt. Colonel). At the time of the loss of the ―shabu‖, the accused was the Evidence Custodian of the National Capital Region, Criminal Investigation Service Command at Camp Crame, Quezon City. On November 27, 1992, he received for safekeeping forty (40) self-sealed transparent plastic bags of methamphetamine hydrochloride or ―shabu‖ with an estimated street value of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00). As custodian of the said ―shabu‖, he received a total of three (3) subpoenas from Branch 111, Regional Trial Court, Pasay City, to bring the said ―shabu‖ as evidence in Criminal Case No. 92-2097, entitled People vs. Ong Foo de la Cruz. The first two subpoenas were for the hearings held on January 27, 1993 and January 29, 1993 during which police escorts accompanied the accused to help secure the subject evidence. On these two occasions, he was accompanied by three police officers, namely: Crime Investigator II Zosimo Escobar, SPO3 Oscar Bacani and SPO3 Isalvanor Casissid. Thus, the ―shabu‖ was twice brought to the court but was not presented in evidence since the hearings were postponed. In both instances, the accused also asked Presiding Judge Sayo whether he could turn over the evidence to the custody of the court. The latter, however, refused to accept the ―shabu‖ for the reason that the court did not have a vault to secure the same. In going to the Regional Trial Court at Pasay City, the accused and his companions would leave Camp Crame at about 7:30 a.m. and they would take EDSA to F.B. Harrison, which would lead them to the courthouse. By virtue of the third subpoena, the accused again left his office to go to the RTC at Pasay City with the five-and-a-half kilos (5.5 kgs.) of ―shabu‖ on February 9, 1993, again leaving at around 7:30 a.m. As usual, he took EDSA to F.B. Harrison towards the Pasay City courthouse. Unlike the two previous trips to the said courthouse, however, the accused travelled alone on that fateful day of February 9, 1993. In addition, unlike the two other previous trips, which were uneventful, accused was waylaid by holduppers along F.B. Harrison, about fifty (50) meters from the courthouse. The holduppers blocked the path of accused’s Beetle and two holduppers alighted from their vehicle, a dark blue box type Lancer with plate number PGM or PGN 44? One of the holduppers, armed with a .45 caliber pistol, approached from the passenger side of the accused’s vehicle and told the

MIFAÑA, DIVINE GRACE M.

35

Evidence

accused, ―Huwag kang papalag. Madidisgrasya ka lang.‖ The holdupper then asked for accused’s ignition keys and eyeglasses, opened the passenger door of the vehicle, grabbed the bag containing the ―shabu‖ placed at the vehicle’s front passenger floor. The holduppers immediately left the scene of the crime and accused reported the incident to Judge Sayo of Branch 111 of the Regional Trial Court and to his office at the CIS, to Major Gil Meneses, in particular. The accused then testified in court before Judge Sayo regarding the loss of the ―shabu‖ and immediately reported the robbery to the Pasay City where he gave his statement (Exhibit ―1‖) regarding the incident on F.B. Harrison St. (sic)‖[2]

WHETHER OR NOT, ASSUMING THAT THE BURDEN OF EVIDENCE WAS PROPERLY SHIFTED TO PETITIONER, THE EXPLANATION HE RELIED UPON FOR THE LOSS OF THE SUBJECT ―SHABU‖ IS SUFFICIENT TO EXONERATE HIM FROM LIABILITY FOR THE OFFENSE CHARGED;

The petition has no merit. . All of the four elements of malversation are present in the case at bar, and these elements are: 1. That the offender is a public officer; 2. That he has the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; 3. That the funds or property are public funds or property for which he is accountable; and 4. That he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them. (Emphasis ours)[12] Petitioner is a public officer who had custody of the shabu by reason of his official duties as Evidence Custodian of the National Capital Regional Office of the Philippine National Police - Criminal Investigation Service Command (NCRO, PNP-CISC). The shabu was public property for which petitioner was accountable. While the evidence on record fail to show that petitioner misappropriated said public property for his personal aggrandizement, the evidence points to the conclusion that the loss of the shabu to armed men was through petitioner’s negligence. Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence.[13] The Sandiganbayan in this case ruled that the loss of the shabu was due to

MIFAÑA, DIVINE GRACE M.

36

Evidence

petitioner’s gross negligence, a factual finding that is as a rule conclusive upon this Court.[14] In cases involving public officials, there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable.[15] What makes petitioner’s gross negligence more pronounced is the fact that he was fully aware of the need to transport the shabu with police escorts but despite the knowledge of the peril involved in the transportation of illegal drugs, petitioner took it upon himself to deliver the subject shabu without police escort, despite the fact that the shabu involved is valued at five million pesos (P5,000,000.00), weighing 5.5 kilograms and packed in 40 sealed transparent plastic bags. The sheer nature, value, and amount of the contraband should have alerted petitioner, an experienced evidence custodian, to the risk that organized criminals might attempt to forcibly take away the shabu. Petitioner’s diligence unmistakably fell short of that required by the circumstances. We cite with approval the following findings of the Sandiganbayan: ―Indeed, the accused had miserably failed to exercise the necessary precautions to secure the safekeeping of the ―shabu‖ under his care. There is no doubt that the accused was aware of the dangers posed in transporting such a large amount of ―shabu‖ subject of the instant case. As a matter of fact, he deemed it indispensable to secure, as he did, the assistance of three police officers in the previous instances as escorts in transporting the ―shabu‖ to and from the courthouse in Pasay City. His knowledge of such dangers was further revealed in his very own testimony before the court, thus: In the case at bench, the accused could have pursued other options to ensure the security of the ―shabu‖. The accused would have waited until alternative escorts arrived at the office. A simple telephone call to the office of Judge Sayo informing the latter that the accused would be late would have sufficed. Under the circumstances, the judge would have understood the accused’s predicament and could have called the case at a later hour. Another option is not to have gone to the court if no escorts could be procured. Again, a telephone call to the office of the judge would again have probably sufficed to allay his fears of being cited for contempt. Simply put, the accused failed to take all possible actions to ensure the security of the ―shabu‖; he left too many stones unturned, so to speak. Furthermore, the court notes that the accused carried only a gun of a mere caliber .22. Indeed, if he were to truly secure his valuable cargo, as was his bounden duty, he should have carried a more powerful firearm and maybe more than one such firearm, the need therefor having become more compelling considering that he was to travel alone. It is a matter of common experience that holduppers normally carry high powered firearms.‖[16] In a last ditch effort to skirt the issue of gross negligence imputed against petitioner, petitioner claims that the robbery was a fortuitous event. This argument must likewise fail since the loss of the shabu to armed men is by no

MIFAÑA, DIVINE GRACE M.

37

Evidence

means a fortuitous event. A fortuitous event is defined as an occurrence which could not be foreseen or which though foreseen, is inevitable.[17] Again, the very nature of the object under the custody of petitioner and its street value posed risks. One of these risks is that the shabu could be taken forcibly by armed men, a risk that petitioner was in fact preparing against. The possibility of losing the shabu to armed men was evidently a foreseeable event. By all accounts, petitioner had previously undertaken certain measures to safeguard the transportation of the shabu. In fact, during his first trip to the court he was accompanied by police escorts; he suggested that the shabu be deposited with the court, which the court denied due to the absence of a vault; petitioner tried to look for a police escort on the day he was rescheduled to deliver the shabu in court, but allegedly to no avail; and he decided to transport the shabu alone and incognito. Petitioner’s actions underscore the fact that he was fully aware of the inherent danger in transporting the shabu, a fact that defeats his claim that the loss of the shabu to armed robbers was a fortuitous event. Concededly, the presence of police escorts would not have necessarily deterred the robbers from taking the shabu, but in such a case, petitioner would have shown due diligence that would controvert his own liability. True, petitioner is not expected to match a holdupper gun for gun. However, what is simply expected of him is to exhibit a standard of diligence commensurate with the circumstances of time, person and place. The scale of the damage sustained by the government because of the loss of the shabu cannot be overemphasized. The estimated street value of the shabu is five million pesos (P5,000,000.00) and the circulation of this illegal substance in the market is a major setback in the effort of government to curb drug addiction. We are thus in complete agreement with the Sandiganbayan that the unnecessary risks taken by petitioner in transporting the subject shabu, leading to the eventual loss of this prohibited substance, cannot be countenanced. Lastly, petitioner contends that the illegal nature of the shabu prevents the courts from basing the penalty on its value. We hold that the Sandiganbayan did not commit a grievous error when it imposed the penalty based on the value of the shabu. In malversation, the penalty for the offense is dependent on the value of the public funds, money or property malversed.[18] Generally, when the value is disputed, the court is proscribed from taking judicial notice of the value and must receive evidence of the disputed facts with notice to the parties.[19] However, in the case at bar, the value of the shabu is not in dispute. Petitioner subscribed to the stipulation of facts that the street value of the shabu is five million pesos (P5,000,000.00). As stated earlier, statements embodied in the stipulation of facts are judicial admissions and are thereby binding on the declarant. There is no indication that the admission as to the value of the shabu was made through palpable mistake and petitioner does not deny having made such an admission.

MIFAÑA, DIVINE GRACE M.

38

Evidence

Thus, the stipulated value of the shabu is not an improper basis for the imposition of the penalty.[20] WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the appealed decision of the Sandiganbayan convicting the accused Romeo Diego Y de Joya of Malversation of Public Property and imposing upon him the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum in view of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender; to pay a fine of five million pesos (P5,000,000.00); and to suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification from holding any public office. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

MIFAÑA, DIVINE GRACE M.

39

Evidence