evidence case digests-escolin - draft.doc

EVIDENCE CASES (Escolin) DNA Case 1. Agustin vs. CA

GR 162571 June 15, 2005

Wire-Tapping 2. Gaanan vs. IAC 3. Salcedo vs. CA 4. Ramirez v. CA

GR L-69809 October 16, 1986 G.R. No. 110662. August 4, 1994. 248 s 590

Judicial Admissions 5. Torres vs. CA

G.R. No. L-37421. July 31,

Judicial Notice 6. Tabuena vs. CA 7. Lucido v. Calupihan 8. Baguio v. Dejalagat On Tax Cases 9. BPI-FB vs. CA 10. Calamba Steel Center vs. CIR

G.R. No. 85423. May 6, 1991 G.R. No. L-28100. November 29, 1971 G.R. No. 122480. April 12, 2000 G.R. No. 151857. April 28, 2005

Rule 130 A. Object Evidence Photographs 11. Sison v. People, 250 SCRA 58, November 6, 1995 Facts: On July 27, 1986, in the aftermath of the 1986 EDSA Revolution, a rally was scheduled to be held at the Luneta by the Marcos loyalists. Despite being denied a permit, three thousand of them gathered at the Rizal Monument of the Luneta and started an impromptu singing contest, recited prayers and delivered speeches in between. When the authorities arrived and no permit could be produced, they were told to disperse. One of the leaders, Atty. Oliver Lozano, turned to his group and said “Gulpihin ninyo ang lahat ng mga Cory infiltrators,” and a commotion ensued. They eventually fled, and later, some of them converged at the Chinese garden of Luneta. Another commotion ensued and the loyalists started attacking persons in yellow, the color of the “Coryistas,” one of which was Salcedo. He was chased, boxed, kicked and mauled. One Ranulfo Sumilang was able to tow Salcedo away from them, but several accused came forward and resumed mauling Salcedo despite his pleas for mercy. He died upon arrival at the Philippine General Hospital of “hemorrhage, intracranial traumatic.” Issue: Were the photographs of the incident presented properly given evidentiary weight despite lack of proper identification by their respective photographers? Held: Yes. Photographs, when presented in evidence, must be identified by the photographer as to its production and testified as to the circumstances under which they were produced. The value of this kind of evidence lies in its being a correct representation or reproduction of the original, and its admissibility is determined by its accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of the crime. The photographer, however, is not the only witness who can identify the pictures he has taken. The correctness of the photograph as a faithful representation of the object portrayed can be proved prima facie, either by the testimony of the person who made it or by other competent witnesses, after which the court can admit it subject to impeachment as to its accuracy. Photographs, therefore, can be identified by the photographer or by any other competent witnesses who can testify to its exactness and accuracy. In this case, the counsel for two of the accused used the same photographs to prove that his clients were not in any of the pictures and therefore could not have participated in the mauling of the victim. When the prosecution used the photographs to cross-examine all the accused, no objection was made by the defense, not until Atty. Lazaro interposed at the third hearing a continuing objection to their admissibility. The use of these photographs by some of the accused to show their alleged non-participation in the crime is an admission of the exactness and accuracy thereof. That the photographs are faithful representation of the mauling incident was affirmed when some of the accused identified themselves therein and gave reasons for their presence thereat. The absence of two of the accused in the photographs, meanwhile, does not exculpate them. The photographs did not capture the entire sequence of the killing of Salcedo but only segments thereof. However, the accused were unequivocally identified by two witnesses. Doctrine: Photographs, when presented in evidence, must be identified by the photographer as to its production and testified as to the circumstances under which they were produced. The photographer, however, is not the only witness who can identify the pictures he has taken. They can be identified by the photographer or by any other competent witnesses who can testify to its exactness and accuracy.

12. Adams Schook v. Hollaway (US Case), 13 A.2d 2 (1940)

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Facts: The plaintiffs brought an action in trespass against the defendants for personal injuries and property damage arising out of a collision between a car owned and operated by plaintiff, Jack Adamczuk, and a car owend by defendant, Morris Cohen, and driven by Elmer Holloway. A photograph was presented as evidence for the plaintiffs, and Adamczuk identified the roads and buildings appearing in the picture, stating that “the conditions presented by that picture truly represent the conditions of the crossing at the time of this accident except for the fact of daylight or dark.” The photograph was offered in evidence several times, but in each case, no proof could be given as to “who took it, or any identity as to the picture, other than the physical view thereon” or “where the camera was standing, under what conditions it was taken, and whether it was taken with a view to distorting it or not.” The court ruled against Adamczuk, commenting that he had two days “since adjournment last Friday, to procure the original taker of this photograph and thus establish it in the legal way with the right of crossexamination to defendants’ counsel of the photographer.” Issue: Was the picture presented in evidence properly denied evidentiary weight due to the absence of proof as to its photographer and the conditions under which it was taken? Held: No. The rule is well-settled that a photograph may be put in evidence if relevant to the issue and if verified. It does not have to be verified by the taker. Its verification depends on the competency of the verifying witness and as to that the trial judge must in the first instance decide, subject to reversal for substantial error. The objection that a photograph may be so made as to misrepresent the object is genuinely directed against its testimonial soundness; but it is of no validity. While a photograph can be deliberately so taken as to convey the most false impression of the object, so also can any witness lie in his words. A photograph can falsify just as much and no more than the human being who takes it or verifies it. There is no more reason to exclude it on such ground. If a witness is familiar with the scene photographed and is competent to testify that the photograph correctly represents it, it should, if relevant, be admitted. Doctrine: A photograph may be put in evidence if relevant to the issue and if verified. It does not have to be verified by the taker. Its verification depends on the competency of the verifying witness and as to that the trial judge must in the first instance decide, subject to reversal for substantial error.

13. State of Washington v. Tatum

360 P 2nd ed. 754 1961, j. Donworth Facts: William Tousin of Pasco received monthly welfare checks from the state of Washington. In February, 1960, however, Tousin did not receive his check, which was usually mailed to and left on a window ledge in the hallway of the rooming house where he resided. The check turned out to have been endorsed and cashed at Sherman’s Food Store in Pasco by someone other than Tousin. Caroline Pentecost, a employee at the store, testified that the initials appearing on the check were hers, though she could not specifically recall the above-mentioned transaction. According to her, whenever a check was presented to her for payment at the store, she was instructed by the store manager to initial it and then insert it into a “Regiscope” machine, which is designed to simultaneously photograph, through two separate lenses, both the check and the person facing the machine. Upon discovery of the forgery of the endorsement on the check, the Regiscope film of the transaction was sent to the Regiscope distributor in Portland to be developed. The processed film showed both the check and Ralph Tatum, who lived in the same rooming house as Tousin, with the food store in the background. Both the negative and the print therefrom were admitted in evidence, above Tatum’s objection. Issue: Were the authenticated Regiscope negative and print properly admitted as evidence? Held: Yes. Pentecost testified that the background shown in the photograph was that of the food store and that “regiscoping” each individual who cashed a check at the store was its standard procedure everytime a check was presented for encashment. Another witness, Phillip Dale, meanwhile, testified as to the Regiscope process. These testimonies amounted to a sufficient authentication to warrant the admission of the negative and the print into evidence. Tatum was not precluded from attempting to prove that the individual portrayed in the Regiscope print was not him, that it was inaccurate in any respect and that he was somewhere else at the time the photograph was taken. However, these arguments go to the weight rather than to the admissibility of said negative and print. The Regiscope films, coupled with the other evidence presented, are sufficient to establish a prima facie case of first degree forgery. Doctrine: The admission and use of demonstrative evidence, including photographs, have for many years been encouraged. Such admission or rejection of photographs as evidence lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Such discretion extends to the sufficiency of identification. As to the required quantum of authentication of a photograph, some witness (not necessarily the photographer) may be able to give some indication as to when, where, and under what circumstances the photograph was taken, and that the

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photograph accurately portray the subject or subjects illustrated. The photograph need only be sufficiently accurate to be helpful to the court and the jury. 14. Mendoza vs. Alarma G.R. No. 151970. May 7, 2008 Facts: The accused in a criminal case failed to appear in person before the court. Accordingly, the trial court declared his bail forfeited. The trial court gave the bondsmen a 30-day period to produce the accused or a reasonable explanation for their non-production. However, two years had passed from the time the court ordered the forfeiture and still no judgment had been rendered against the bondsmen for the amount of the bail. Instead, anorder of execution was issued and the property was put up for sale and was awarded to the highest bidders in good faith. Issue/Answer: WON the bondsmen still go after the property, on the ground that the trial court did not render a judgment against them/Yes. Ratio: Section 21, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure clearly provides for the procedure to be followed before a bail bond may be forfeited and a judgment on the bond rendered against the surety. There are two requisites before the trial court judge may rule adversely against the bondsmen in cases when the accused fails to appear in court. First, the non-appearance by the accused is cause for the judge to summarily declare the bond as forfeited. Second, the bondsmen, after the summary forfeiture of the bond, are given 30 days within which to produce the principal and to show cause why a judgment should not be rendered against them for the amount of the bond. It is only after this 30-day period (during which the bondsmen are afforded the opportunity to be heard by the trial court) that the trial court may render a judgment on the bond against the bondsmen. Judgment against the bondsmen cannot be entered unless such judgment is preceded by the order of forfeiture and an opportunity given to the bondsmen to produce the accused or to adduce satisfactory reason for their inability to do so. In this case, no such judgment was ever issued and neither has an amount been fixed for which the bondsmen may be held liable. The law was not strictly observed and this violated the bondsmen’s right to procedural due process. The issue of good faith in buying the property at the auction sale is not material. Since the execution and sale of the land was invalid, the basis for which title to the land had been issued has no more leg to stand on. 15. People vs. Tan G.R. No. L-14257. July 31, 1959 Facts: Pacita Madrigal-Gonzales and her co-accused were charged with the crime of falsification of public documents, in their capacities as public officials and employees, for having made it appear that certain relief supplies and/or merchandise were purchased by Gonzales for distribution to calamity indigents, in such quantities and at such prices, and from such business establishments or persons as written in said public documents. The truth was, no such distributions of such relief and supplies as valued and as supposedly purchased had ever been made. The prosecution presented as evidence a booklet of receipts from the Metro Drug Corporation in Magallanes, Cebu City. Said booklet contained triplicate copies, the original invoices of which were sent to the company’s Manila office, the dupicates given to customers, and the triplicates left attached to the booklet. One of the Metro Drug’s salesmen who issued a receipt further explained that, in preparing receipts for sales, two carbon copies were used between the three sheets, so that the duplicates and the triplicates were filed out of the use of the carbons in the course of the preparation and signing of the originals. The trial court judge, Hon. Bienvenido Tan, interrupted the proceeding, holding that the triplicates were not admissible unless it was proven that the originals were lost and cannot be produced. Another witness was presented, and he alleged that the former practice of keeping the original white copies no longer prevails as the originals are given to the customers, while only the duplicates are submitted to the Manila office. Issue: Are the triplicates of the receipts admissible as evidence? Held: Yes. Under the law on evidence, the best evidence rule is that rule which requires the highest grade of evidence obtainable to prove a disputed fact. The admissibility of duplicates or triplicates under this rule has long been settled. “When carbon sheets are inserted between two or more sheets of writing paper so that the writing of a contract upon the outside sheet, including the signature of the party to be charged thereby, produced 2 facsimile upon the sheets beneath, such signatures being thus reproduced by the same stroke of the pen which made the surface or exposed impression, all of the sheets so written on are regarded as duplicate originals and either of them may be introduced in evidence as such without accounting for the nonproduction of the others.”

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Doctrine: The best evidence rule is that rule which requires the highest grade of evidence obtainable to prove a disputed fact. Carbon copies, however, when made at the same time and on the same machine as the original, are duplicate originals, and have been held to be as much primary evidence as the originals. Best Evidence Rule 16. People vs. Tandoy G.R. No. 80505. December 4, 1990 Facts: On May 27, 1986, Makati Police detectives organized a buy-bust operation, whereby Detective Singayan was to pose as the buyer. The target area was a store along Solchuaga St. in Barangay Singkamas, Makati. Detective Singayan stood alone near the store, waiting until three men approached him. One of them, Mario Tandoy, asked “Pare, gusto mo bang umiskor?” To this, Detective Singayan asnwered yes. Two P5.00 bills, each marked ANU (Anti-Narcotics Unit), were exchanged for two rolls of marijuana. Upon consummation of the deal, the team moved in and arrested Tandoy. The marked money, as well as eight foils of marijuana were confiscated from Tandoy and an information was filed against him. Tandoy was found guilty of violation of R.A. 6425. Hence, he appealed, alleging that the money was actually bet money, and that, under the best evidence rule, the Xerox copy of the marked bills were inadmissible in court. Issue: Does the best evidence rule apply to the marked bills? Held: No. The best evidence rules applies only when the contents of the document are the subject of inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether or not such document was actually executed or exists, or in the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible. The marked money is not an ordinary document falling under Sec. 2, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which excludes the introduction of secondary evidence, except in five specified instances. In this case, the marked money was presented solely for the purpose of establishing its existence and not its contents. Therefore, other substitutionary evidence, such as a Xerox copy, is admissible without need for the accounting of the original. Besides, the presentation at the trial of the buy-bust money was not indispensable to the conviction of Tandoy since the sale of the marijuana had been sufficiently proven by the testimony of the police officers involved in the operation, and the marijuana actually sold had been submitted as evidence. Doctrine: The best evidence rules applies only when the contents of the document are the subject of inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether or not such document was actually executed or exists, or in the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible.

17. Meyers v. US

171 F. 2nd Ed. Page 800 Nov. 8, 1948

18. Syller v. George Lucas and Co., Ltd. 797 F. 2nd ed 1504 august 26, 1986 19. US v. Balistoy G.R. No. 5791 December 17, 1910 Facts: Pedro Salazar filed a suit for the collection of a sum of money against Eustaquio Balistoy. Judgment was rendered in favor of the former, and Balistoy was ordered to pay him P275.92, plus interest. Two rural properties belonging to Balistoy were attached and set for sale at a public auction on May 27, 1908. Before the auction, Bernardo Gregorio requested the deputy sheriff to exclude one of the properties from attachment as he owned said property, having acquired it by purchase from Balistoy in 1905, prior to the filing of the complaint. Gregorio presented to the sheriff a document, at the end of which appears a memorandum stating that Balistoy bought the land referred to from Luis Balistoy and subsequently sold it to Gregorio. Salazar filed a complaint for falsification against Gregorio and Balistoy for having simulated the conveyance of the property in favor of Gregorio in order to avoid its attachment and sale. Salazar further alleged that, though the said memorandum was dated February 1905, it was actually written in April 1908. However, the original document setting forth the memorandum was not presented, and only a copy thereof was produced in court. Issue: Can a person be convicted of falsification of a document without the original of said falsified document? Held: No. The issue in this case is whether the subject memorandum was falsified, having been made to appear to have been written on a date prior to the one when it was actually prepared and simulating the sale to a third party of a land, with the intent to defraud the creditor who, through proper judicial process, solicited and obtained the attachment and sale of said land. Though the sheriff testified to having seen the original of the document wherein the memorandum was written, or at least the original memorandum of the conveyance, the mere exhibition of a copy of an unauthenticated private document cannot legally produce the effect of suspending the sale of said land inasmuch as such copy is not sufficient proof of the right of Gregorio, being a mere copy of a private

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document whose legality has not been proven. He was not able to compare the copy of the memorandum with that written on the original document, having only seen the original for a few moments. As the original document setting forth said memorandum was not presented, but merely a copy thereof, and as it could not be ascertained who had the original of said document, nor the exact date when it was written, doubt arises as to whether the original of the document really existed at all and whether the memorandum is an exact copy of that alleged to have been written at the end of said original document. Consequently, Gregorio and Balistoy cannot be convicted of its falsification. Doctrine: In a criminal case for the falsification of a document, it is indispensable that the judges and the courts have before them the document alleged to have been simulated, counterfeited, or falsified, in order that they may find, pursuant to the evidence produced at trial, whether or not the crime of falsification was actually committed; in the absence of the original document, it is improper to conclude, with only a copy of said original in view, that there has been a falsification of a document which was neither found nor exhibited, because, in such a case, even the existence of such original may be doubted 20. Compania Maritima vs. Allied Free Works Union G.R. No. L-28999. May 24, 1977 Facts: On August 11, 1952, the Compañia Maritima and the Allied Free Workers Union entered into a written contract whereby the union agreed to perform arrastre and stevedoring work for Compañia Maritima’s vessels at Iligan City. The contract was to be effective for one month. The company could revoke the contract before its expiration if the union failed to render proper service, and it could be renewed by agreement of the parties. The company would also not be liable for the payment of the services of the union “for the loading, unloading and delivery of cargoes,” which should be paid for “by the owners and consignees of the cargoes.” The shippers and consignees paid the union only for the arrastre work (handling and hauling of cargo on the wharf or between the establishment of the consignee or shipper and the ship’s tackle), but refused to pay for the stevedoring service (handling of the cargo in the holds of the vessel or between the ship’s tackle and the holds of the vessel). They claimed that the shipowner was the one obligated to pay for the stevedoring service because the bill of lading provided that the unloading of the cargo was at the shipowner’s expense. However, the company refused to pay for the stevedoring service on the basis of the contract. As the union workers were in dire need of work, the contract was not terminated, and was verbally renewed upon its expiration. The union requested recognition as the exclusive bargaining unit, but was denied. Hence, the union filed with the CIR a petition for certification. The company terminated the contract and entered into a new stevedoring contract with Iligan Stevedoring Association. The union filed an Unfair Labor Practice suit and picketed the wharf to prevent the Iligan Stevedoring from performing the arrastre and stevedoring work. The company then sued the union, and the trial court awarded in favor of the company actual damages and other damages based on auditor’s reports showing alleged losses sustained by the company due to the acts of the union members. The union assailed the admissibility of said reports, alleging that they were hearsay evidence. Issue: Were the auditor’s reports admissible in evidence as proof of the original records, books of accounts, reports or the like? Held: No. The exception to the best evidence rule, which states that “when the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole, the original writings need not be produced,” cannot be applied in this case. The voluminour character of the records on which the accountant’s reports were based was not duly established. Moreover, in order for said rule to be applied, the records and accounts should be made accessible to the adverse party so that the correctness of the summary may be tested on cross-examination. The general rule is that “an audit made by or the testimony of a private auditor is inadmissible in evidence as proof of the original records, books of accounts, reports or the like.” The company failed to show the difficulty or impossiblity of producing the records in court and their examination and analysis as evidence by the court. Doctrine: The general rule is that an audit made by or the testimony of a private auditor is inadmissible in evidence as proof of the original records, books of accounts, reports or the like, unless it is proved that there would be difficulty or impossibility in producing the records in court and the examination and analysis thereof.

21. Villarey Transit v. Ferrer G.R. No. L-23893 Oct 29 1968 Facts: Jose Villarama, the operator of the Villa Rey Transit bus company pursuant to certificates of public convenience (CPC) granted to him by the Public Service Commission, sold two of the CPCs to the Pangasinan Transportation Company (Pantranco), with the condition that Villarama shall not, for 10 years, apply for any TPU service identical or competing with the buyer. Three months later, the Villa Rey Transit Inc. (VRTI) was formed, with Villarama’s wife and relatives as stockholders and incorporators. VRTI bought 5 CPCs from Valentin Fernando, two of which was levied pursuant to a writ of execution in favor of Eusebio Ferrer, a creditor of Fernando. The CPCs were sold at auction, of which Ferrer was the highest bidder.

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Ferrer then sold the CPCs to Pantranco. VRTI filed a complaint for annulment of the sheriff’s sale in favor of Ferrer and the subsequent sale of the CPCs to Pantranco. Pantranco, on its part, alleged that Jose Villarama and VRTI were one and the same; hence, the non-competition clause in the abovementioned deed of sale executed by Villarama is also binding to VRTI. As evidence, Pantranco presented photostatic copies of ledger entries and vouchers, the admissibility of which was assailed by Villarama on the ground that the best evidence were the originals themselves. Issue: Were the photostatic copies of the ledger entries and vouchers of VRTI sufficient to prove Pantranco’s allegations, and thereby are admissible as evidence? Held: Yes. The photostatic copies of the ledger entries and vouchers showing that Villarama had comingled his personal funds and transactions with those made in the name of VRTI are very illuminating evidence. The requisites for the admissibility of secondary evidence when the original is in the custody of the adverse party are: a) the adverse party’s possession of the original; b) reasonable notice to the adverse party to produce the same; c) satisfactory proof of its existence; and d) the failure or refusal of the adverse party to produce the original in court. Villarama himself admitted the previous existence of the files of VRTI. He said that the originals were missing and that VRTI was no longer in possession of the same. However, it is not necessary for a party seeking to introduce secondary evidence o show that the original is in the actual possession of the adversary. It is enough that circumstances show that the writing is in his possession or under his control. It is also not required that the party entitled to the custody of the instrument, upon notice to produce it, admit having it in his possession. The party seeking its production may introduce a copy thereof as in the case of loss because among the exceptions to the best evidence rule is “when the original has been lost, destroyed or cannot be produced in court.” The original of the vourchers in this case must be deemed to have been lost, thus, secondary evidence are admissible. Doctrine: The requisites for the admissibility of secondary evidence when the original is in the custody of the adverse party are: a) the adverse party’s possession of the original; b) reasonable notice to the adverse party to produce the same; c) satisfactory proof of its existence; and d) the failure or refusal of the adverse party to produce the original in court. However, it is not necessary for a party seeking to introduce secondary evidence o show that the original is in the actual possession of the adversary. Neither is it required that the party entitled to the custody of the instrument, upon notice to produce it, admit having it in his possession. 22. De Vera v. Aguilar GR 83377; February 9, 1983 Facts: Marcosa Bernabe’s children mortgaged Bernabe’s land. Upon maturity of the mortgage, the Spouses Mariano and Leona Aguilar redeemed the property, and were able to acquire a title to said property. The title in the name of Bernabe, meanwhile, was cancelled. Three years later, however, Bernabe’s heirs wrote to the Spouses Aguilar, claiming that, as Bernabe’s children, they were co-owners of the property and, hence, entitled to the partition thereof. They also claimed that the Sps. Aguilar had resold the property to Bernabe. They filed a suit for reconveyance of the lot and presented a Xerox copy of an alleged deed of sale executed by the Sps. Aguilar, selling, transferring and conveying back to Bernabe the disputed lot. The trial court ruled in their favor. The Sps. Aguilar assailed the admissibility of the Xerox copy of the deed of sale on the ground that it was not the best evidence of the alleged sale and, hence, should be excluded. Issue: Was the Xerox copy of the deed of sale properly admitted as evidence? Held: No. Under the Rules of Court, “when the original writing has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the recollection of witnesses.” Prior to the introduction of secondary evidence, therefore, the proponent must first establish the former existence of the instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, contents, although this order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court. The sufficiency of proof for the admission of an alleged lost deed lies within the judicial discretion of the trial court. In this case, the trial court merely ruled on the existence and due execution of the alleged deed of sale. Existence was sufficiently proved by the xeroxed copy of the alleged deed of absolute sale. Execution, meanwhile, may be established by the person or persons who executed it, by the person before whom its execution was acknowledged, or by any person who was present and saw it executed or who, after its execution saw it and recognized the signatures; or by a person to whom the parties to the instrument had previously confessed the execution thereof. However, the loss or destruction of the originals were not proved. This may be done through the testimony of any person who knew the fact of its loss or by anyone who had made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place(s) where papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument is indeed lost. However, all duplicates of such document must first be accounted for before using copies. Since all the duplicates are parts of the writing itself to be proved, no excuse for non-production of the writing itself can be regarded

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as established until it appears that all of its parts are unavailable. Here, the notary public testified that there were 4 or 5 original copies of the alleged deed of sale. The petitioners, however, failed to account for all these copies. Therefore, secondary evidence cannot be admitted. Doctrine: Prior to the introduction of secondary evidence, therefore, the proponent must first establish the former existence of the instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, contents, although this order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court.

23. Magdayao v. People G.R. No. 152881, 17 August 2004 Facts: On September 16, 1993, Engr. Magdayao was charged with violation of B.P. Blg. 22 for having issued to Ricky Olvis a check dates September 30, 1991, in the amount of P600,000.00, despite not having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank, the Philippine National Bank, Dipolog Branch. Olvis alleged that, upon learning that the check was dishonored, Magdayao pleaded for time to pay the amount by retrieving the check and replacing it with two other checks. Magdayao, however, reneged on his promise. Despite repeated demands by Olvis, Magdayao failed to make good the check’s value. As evidence for the prosecution, a photocopy of PNB Check No. 399967 was admitted by the court. The trial court eventually ruled in favor of Olvis. Issue: Was the photocopy of the subject check inadmissible in evidence for failure of the prosecution to produce the original dishonored check? Held: No. The law says that “the making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.” It was incumbent upon the prosecution to adduce in evidence the original copy of PNB Check No. 399967 to prove the contents thereof, especially the names of the drawer and endorsee, the date and amount and the dishonor thereof, as well as the reason for such dishonor. Under the Rules on Evidence, when the subject of inquiry is the contents of the document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original thereof. This rule requiring the production of the best evidence is to prevent fraud. If a party is in possession of such evidence and withholds it and presents inferior or secondary evidence in its place, the presumption is that the best evidence was withheld from the court and the adverse party for a fraudulent or devious purpose which its production would expose and defeat. In case the original is in the custody or control of the adverse party, the latter must be given reasonable notice, and if he still fails or refuses to produce the original in court, only then may secondary evidence be presented. In this case, Magdayao never produced the original of the check, much less offered to produce the same. He deliberately withheld the original of the check as a bargaining chip for the court to grant him an opportunity to adduce evidence in his defense, which he hailed to do due to numerous unjustified postponements. Doctrine: As long as the original evidence can be had, the court should not receive in evidence that which is substitutionary in nature, such as photocopies, in the absence of any clear showing that the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court. To warrant the admissibility of secondary evidence when the original of a writing is in the custody or control of the adverse party, Section 6 of Rule 130 provides that the adverse party must be given reasonable notice, that he fails or refuses to produce the same in court.

24. Hutchison v. Buscas G.R. No. 158554, May 26, 2005 Facts: On October 1, 1987, the Spouses Ronald and Valentine Hutchison bought from V.A. Development Enterprises, Inc. a land in San Juan, Lubao, Pampanga, and occupied said land after a title was issued in their names. On August 2, 1989, Juanita Arrastia, the owner of the adjacent lot, sold a portion of her land to Enrique Buscas, as evidenced by a Quitclaim Deed in favor of Buscas. Though Buscas occupied said land, he failed to register his portion in his name and title remained in the name of Arrastia. On January 10, 1995, Buscas commissioned geodetic engineer Narciso Manansala to survey his property. The survey revealed that a portion of Buscas land was occupied the Sps. Hutchison. Despite a demand latter to vacate sent to the Sps. Hutchison, however, the latter refused and insisted that the area was part of their land. A complaint for accion reinvindicatoria was filed. Buscas presented in evidence the Quitclaim Deed to prove his title over the disputed area, as well as testified on the survey conducted by Manansala. Another geodetic engineer confirmed the first survey with a verification plan and report which had been made as directed by the MTC judge in the previous unlawful detainer case which had been dismissed. Issue: Was the Quitclaim Deed sufficient to prove Buscas ownership of the disputed area? Held: No. The law requires that the party who alleges a fact and substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proving it. Art. 434 of the New Civil Code provides that “to successfully maintain an action to recover the ownership of a real proeprty, the person who claims a better right to it

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must prove two things: first, the identity of the land claimed, and; second, his title thereto.” In this case, Buscas failed to establish both requirements. A cursory reading of the Quitclaim Deed reveals that it specified only the extent of the area sold. Annex “A” of the Deed, where the entire lot of Arrastia was particularly described and where the specific portion of the property sold to Buscas was marked, was not presented at the trial. The Deed itself failed to mention the metes and bounds of the land subject of the sale. Thefore, it cannot be successfully used to identify the area Buscas was claiming and prove his ownership thereof. The presentation of the Annex “A” is essential as what defines a piece of land is not the size mentioned in the instrument but the boundaries thereof which enclose the land and indicate its exact limits. The surveys cannot be given evidentiary weight to prove the identity of the land sold to Buscas and his ownership thereof, as they merely relied on the self-serving statement of Buscas that he owns the portion of the lot adjacent to that of the Sps. Hutchison. Moreover, the rules on evidence provide that where the contents of the document are the facts in issue, the best evidence is the instrument itself. Here, the identity of the land claimed and Buscas’ ownership thereof are the very facts in issue. The best evidence to prove such is the Quitclaim Deed and its Annex “A” where Buscas derives his title and where the land from which he purchased a part was described with particularity, indicating the metes and bounds thereof. Failure to adduce Annex “A” in evidence or produce secondary evidence after proof of the loss of the former is fatal to his cause. Doctrine: The rules on evidence provide that where the contents of the document are the facts in issue, the best evidence is the instrument itself. Failure to adduce such in evidence or to produce secondary evidence upon proof of loss or destruction of the former is fatal to the cause of action. 25. Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga vs. Reyes G.R. No. 35366. August 5, 1931 Facts: The provincial fiscal of Pampanga filed two informations for libel against Andres Guevarra, alleging that the latter, with malicious intent, published on page 9 of the July 13, 1930 issue of the weekly paper Ing Magumasid a sqib in verse, of which a Spanish translation was included, intended to impeach the honesty, integrity and reputation of Clemente Dayrit and of Mariano Nepomuceno. The criminal cases were set for a joint trial. As evidence, the fiscal attempted to present copies of the Ing Magumasid issue which contained the libelous article with the innuendo, another article in the vernacular published in the same weekly, and its translation into Spanish. The trial court held the copies as inadmissible, saying that, inasmuch as the libelous articles were not quoted in the information, said evidence cannot be admitted without amending the information. The court denied the petition to amend the information on the ground that it would impair the rights of Guevarra, holding that the omission of the libelous article in the original was fatal to the prosecution. Issue: Are the copies of the weekly where the libelous article was published the best evidence of the crime of libel? Held: Yes. The general rules regarding admissibility of evidence are applicable to cases of libel or slander. The evidence must be relevant, and not hearsay. This being so, the rule of procedure which requires the production of the best evidence, is applicable to the present case. The copies of the weekly where the libelous article was published, and its translation, constitute the best evidence of the libel charged. The newspaper itself is the best evidence of a published article. Doctrine: The general rules regarding admissibility of evidence are applicable to cases of libel or slander. The copies of the weekly where the libelous article was published, and its translation, constitute the best evidence of the libel charged. 26. Ebreo v. Ebreo GR 160065 Feb. 28, 2006 Facts: Felipe Ebreo died intestate in 1926, leaving behind as his heirs his 5 children, Gil, Flaviano, Felino, Ignacio and Felipa. He also left behind an untitled parcel of land in Barangay Sampaga, Batangas City, which, pursuant to the subdivision made by him, was subdivided into six lots, identified as Lots A, B, C, D, E and F. On September 11, 1967, Felipe’s heirs executed and asigned a document entitled, “Kasulatan ng Pagbabahagi ng Lupa,” whereby they extrajudicially partitioned the property, except the portion known as Lot No. 9046-F. They agreed that said Lot F would remain under the co-ownership of Gil, Flaviano, Felino, Ignacio and the heirs of Felipa, who had already died. However, the plaintiffs were surprised to discover that Lot F was declared for taxation purposes in the name of Antonio Ebreo, Felino’s son. The defendants alleged that, after the execution of the partition agreement, Lot F was sold by the heirs to Santiago Puyo, by virtue of which, the corresponding Real Property Tax Declaration was transferred in the latter’s name. The lot was allegedly subsequently sold by Puyo to Antonio Ebreo, for which a new tax declaration was issued. However, the deed of sale evidencing the alleged transaction between the heirs and Puyo, which was claimed to have been executed and ratified in 1968 before Atty. Doroteo Chavez, was never presented.

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Issue: Was the defendants’ failure to present the Deed of Absolute Sale of the land to Puyo fatal to their claims? Held: Yes. The defendants claim that the Deed of Sale could not be presented because the copy on file with the Office of the City Assessor was lost in the fire which occurred in May 23, 1979. They presented the testimonies of Antonio Pajilan, an employee at the City Assessor’s Office, Felino Ebreo, and Asuncion Aguado, the stepdaughter of Santiago Puyo. However, the testimonies are at most secondary evidence which are inadmissible considering that the defendants failed to prove any of the exceptions provided in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court and to establish conditions for their admissibility. Under this rule, before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original of a deed or document, the party has to prove with the requisite quantum of evidence, the loss or destruction or unavailability of all the copies of the original of said deed or document. The offeror must prove a) the execution and existence of the original; b) the loss and destruction of the original or its non-production in court; and c) unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith on the part of the offeror. The annotation of the Deed of Sale in a tax declaration is not sufficient proof of the transfer of property and inasmuch as the subject of inquiry is the Deed of Sale, it was incumbent on the defendants to adduce in evidence the original or a copy of the deed consistent with Sec. 3, Rule 130 of the Ruloes of Court. Doctrine: Under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original of a deed or document, the party has to prove with the requisite quantum of evidence, the loss or destruction or unavailability of all the copies of the original of said deed or document. The annotation of the Deed of Sale in a tax declaration is not sufficient proof of the transfer of property. PAROL EVIDENCE 27. Yu Tek v. Gonzales GR No. 9935 Feb. 1, 1915 Facts: Yu Tek & Co. and Basilio Gonzales entered into a Purchase Agreement covering 600 piculs of sugar at any place within the municipality of Santa Rosa for P3,000, to be paid in advance. The validity of the Purchase Agreement was from January 1, 1912 up to March 31, 1912 only. It was also stipulated that failure of Gonzales to deliver the 600 piculs of sugar within 3 months would rescind the contract, thereby obligating Gonzales to return the P3,000 to Yu Tek & Co., along with another P1,200 as indemnity for loss and damages. Due to total failure of his sugar crop that year, Gonzales failed to comply with his obligation. As a defense, he claimed that the agreement between him and Yu Tek required delivery of the sugar from his own plantation and nowhere else. Yu Tek & Co., however, claimed that there was no such restriction as to the source of the sugar to be delivered. Gonzales was free to buy the sugar from the market or raise it himself, so long as he complied with his obligation. Issue: Should parole evidence be allowed to determine the true intent of the agreement between Yu Tek & Co. and Gonzales? Held: No. This case appears to be one to which the rule excluding parol evidence to add to or vary the terms of a written contract is decidedly applicable. There is not the slightest intimation in the contract that the sugar was to be raised by the defendant. Parties are presumed to have reduced to writing all the essential conditions of their contract. While parole evidence is admissible in a variety of ways to explain the meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions not mentioned at all in the contract, in the absence of fraud or mistake. In this case, Gonzales undertook to deliver a specified quantity of sugar within a specified time. No restriction was placed as to matter of obtaining the sugar. He was equally at liberty to purchase it on the market or raise it himself. Though Gonzales owned a plantation and expected to raise the sugar himself, he did not limit his obligation to his own crop of sugar. Therefore, the condition which Gonzales seeks to add to the contract by parole evidence cannot be considered. The rights of the parties must be determined by the writing itself. Doctrine: Parties are presumed to have reduced to writing all the essential conditions of their contract. While parol evidence is admissible in a variety of ways to explain the meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake. 28.

Ortanez v. Inocentes

GR No. 107372 Jan. 23, 1997

29.

Pastor v. Gaspar

GR No. 1256

30.

Eveland v. Eastern Mining Company

GR No. 4976 Nov. 27, 1909

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31.

Chiu Chiong v. National City Bank

GR No. L-7485 August 23, 1956

COLLATERAL AGREEMENT 32. Zacarias Robles v. Lizarraga Hermanos GR No. 26173 July 13, 1927 Facts: As administratrix of the estate of her husband Zacarias Robles, Sr., Anastacia de la Rama she leased the hacienda “Nahalinan” to Zacarias Robles, Jr. for six years. Robles, Jr., at his expense and without any right of indemnity at the end of the term, made various improvements and additions to the plant, such as new hydraulic press, reconstruction of dwelling house, building of camarins, reconstruction of ovens, and others. Three years before the lease was to expire, Lizarraga Hermanos, a mercantile partnership, proposed to buy all of the property belonging to the hacienda. As Robles, Jr., still had over two years in his lease contract, he was asked to surrender such last two years and permit Lizarraga Hermanos to take possession as buyer. Lizarraga Hermanos agreed to pay him the value of all betterments made on the hacienda and to buy from him all that belonged to him personally on the hacienda. However, no reference of such surrender of Robles’ rights as lessee, except in fixing the date when the lease should end, nor of anything said concerning the improvements or property of a personal nature, was placed in the instrument of conveyance later executed. Robles, Jr., eventually filed a complaint against Lizarraga Hermanos for the recovery of compensation for improvements made by him on the hacienda and the value of implements and farming equipment supplied by him, as well as damages for breach of contract. As evidence, he presented a letter written by Severiano Lizarraga to him, in which a reference is made to an appraisal and liquidation. Lizarraga Hermanos, however, assailed the admission of the letter as being prohibited parole evidence. Issue: Is the letter admissible as evidence apart from the instrument of conveyance? Held: Yes. The purpose of the parole evidence is to enforce an independent or collateral agreement constituting an inducement ot the making of the sale, or part of the consideration therefor. There is no rule of evidence of wider application than that which declares intrinsic evidence inadmissible either to contradict or vary the terms of a written contract, such being deemed to supersede all oral negotiations or stipulations concerning its terms and the subject-matter which preceded the execution of the instrument, in the absence of accident, fraud or mistake of fact. However, such rule does not extend so far as to preclude the admission of extrinsic evidence to show prior or contemporaneous collateral parole agreements between the parties, but such evidence may be received, regardless of whether or not the written agreement contains any reference to such collateral agreement, and whether the action is at law or in equity. In this case, the deed of conveyance purports to transfer to Lizarraga Hermanos only such interests in certain properties as had come to the conveyors by inheritance, not those which Robles, Jr. had acquired by lease or purchase, or those that he had placed thereon by way of improvement. The verbal contract established in this case is therefore clearly independent of the main contract of conveyance, and evidence of such is admissible under the doctrine above stated. The written contract is complete in itself, the oral agreement is also complete in itself, and it is a collateral to the written contract, notwithstanding the fact that it deals with related matters. Doctrine: The rule against the admission of parole evidence does not extend so far as to preclude the admission of extrinsic evidence to show prior or contemporaneous collateral parole agreements between the parties, but such evidence may be received, regardless of whether or not the written agreement contains any reference to such collateral agreement, and whether the action is at law or in equity. 33. PNB v. Benito Seeto GR L-4388 August 13, 1952 Facts: On March 13, 1948, Benito Seeto presented to the Philippine National Bank at Surigao a check in the amount of P5,000, payable to cash or bearer, and drawn by one Gan Yek Kiao against the Cebu branch of the Philippine National Bank of Communications. After consultation with the bank employees, Seeto made a general and unqualified endorsement of the check, which was accepted by PNB’s agency, which paid Seeto the value of the check therefore. Upon being presented to the drawee bank for payment, however, the check was dishonored for “insufficient funds.” PNB demanded refund from Seeto. Seeto, however, refused, claiming that at the time of the negotiation of the check, the drawer had sufficient funds in the drawee bank, and had not PNB delayed in forwarding the check until the drawer’s funds were exhausted, the same would have been paid. PNB alleged that Seeto gave assurances that the drawer of the check had sufficient funds with the bank, and that Seeto had made a general and unqualified indorsement thereon. As evidence, PNB presented two witnesses at the trial, who testified that the check was cashed due to assurances given by Seeto and the promise that he would refund the amount paid by PNB should the check be dishonored.

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Issue: Should parole evidence with respect to the verbal assurances made by Seeto be admitted as evidence? Held: Yes. It has been held that any prior or contemporaneous conversation in connection with a note or its indorsement may be proved by parole evidence. An extrinsic agreement between indorser and indorsee which cannot be embodied in the instrument without impairing its credit is provable by parole. If, therefore, the supposed assurances that the drawer had funds and that the Seeto would refund the amount of the check if the drawer had no funds, were the considerations or reasons that induced the branch agency of PNB to go out of its ordinary practice of not cashing out of town checks and accept the check and to pay its face value, the same would be provable by parole, provided, of course, that the assurances or inducements offered would not vary, alter, or destroy the obligations attached by law to the indorsement. However, in this case, there was no express obligation assumed by Seeto that the drawer would always have funds, or that he would refund the amount of the check even if there was delay in its presentation. Therefore, though the supposed assurances given were part of Seeto’s obligation as an indorser, such assurances were discharged by the unreasonable delay in the presentation of the check for payment. Doctrine: Any prior or contemporaneous conversation in connection with a note or its indorsement may be proved by parole evidence. An extrinsic agreement between indorser and indorsee which cannot be embodied in the instrument without impairing its credit is provable by parole. 34. Charles Woodhouse v. Fortunato Halili GR L-4811 July 31, 1953 Facts: Charles Woodhouse and Fortunato Halili entered into a written agreement organizing a partnership for the bottling and distribution of Mission Soft Drinks. Woodhouse was to secure the Mission Soft Drinks franchise for and in behalf of the proposed partnership, having had already informed the Mission Dry Corporation of California, before the agremeent, that Halili was willing to invest in the bottling and distribution of said beverages. Woodhouse was give “a thirty days’ option on exclusive bottling and distribution rights for the Philippines.” Formal negotiations between Woodhouse and Halili began, and Halili was eventually granted exclusive right, license, and authority to produce, bottle, distribute and sell the beverages in the Philippines. Upon operation of the bottling plant, Woodhouse demanded that the partnership papers be executed. Halili hedged, promising to do so after the sales of the products had been increased. Halili kept delaying and refusing to give further allowances to Woodhouse. He alleged that his consent to the agreement was secured by the representation of Woodhouse that he owned, or was about the own an exclusive bottling franchise. Such representation was false since the franchise had already expired and was given to Halili himself, who claimed his consent to the agreement was vitiated by fraud. As evidence, Halili presented, among others, drafts of the agreement prior to the final one, which drafts are presumed to have already been integrated in the final agreement. The prior drafts allegeldy showed that Woodhouse presented himself as the exclusive grantee of the franchise. Issue: Do the prior drafts fall under the prohibition against parole evidence? Held: No. As the purpose of considering the prior drafts is not to vary, alter, or modify the agreement, but to discover the intent of the parties thereto and the circumstances surrounding the execution of the contract, the principle of integration of jural acts is inapplicable in this case. The factual issue in this case is whether Woodhouse misrepresented himself to Halili. Hence, his acts or statements prior to the agreement are essential and relevant to the determination of the issue. Previous acts or statements are not being introduced as evidence to change or alter the terms of the agreement, but to prove how Woodhouse induced Halili to enter into it, to prove the representations or inducements, or fraud, with which or by which he secured the other party’s consent thereto. Such are expressly excluded from the parole evidence rule. Fraud and false representation are an incident to the creation of a jural act, not to its integration, and are not governed by the rules on integration. Were parties prohibited from proving said representations or inducements, on the ground that the agreement had already been entered into, it would be impossible to prove misrepresentation or fraud. Furthermore, the parole evidence rule expressly allows the evidence to be introduced when the validity of the instrument is put in issue by the pleadings. Doctrine: Fraud and false representation, being an incident to the creation of a jural act, not to its integration, are not governed by the rules on integration. Furthermore, the parole evidence rule expressly allows the evidence to be introduced when the validity of the instrument is put in issue by the pleadings. EXCEPTIONS TO PAROL EVIDENCE RULE 35. Canuto v. Mariano GR L-11346 March 21, 1918 Facts: Espiridonia Canuto and Juan Mariano entered into a contract of sale with a right to repurchase over a parcel of land for P360. Such right of repurchase was to expire on December 4, 1914, one year after. Two

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days before such expiration, Canuto begged an extension of tiem to repurchase the land as she would only be able to get the money to pay Mariano within the end of the month. Mariano agreed to extend it till December 31, as witnessed by Severino Pascual. The following Sunday, Canuto went to the house of Mariano, who promised to meet her at the house of an Atty. Mercado the next afternoon. However, when Canuto went to the meeting place the next day, Mariano didn’t show up. Since then, Mariano has refused to carry out the alleged oral agreement, insisting that the redemption period as set in the deed of sale. Issue: Was there an oral agreement extending the redemption period, and should parole evidence as to such extension be allowed? Held: Yes. Mariano had extended the time within which Canuto could repurchase the land on the condition that she would find the money and make repurchase within the extended period. He cannot be permitted to repudiate his promise, it appearing that Canuto stood ready to make the payment within the extended period and was only prevented from doing so by the conduct of Mariano himself. The rule forbidding the admission of parole or extrinsic evidence to alter, vary, or contradict a written instrument does not apply so as to prohibit the establishment by parole of an agreement between the parties to a writing, entered into subsequent to the time when the written instrument was executed, notwithstanding such agreement may have the effect of adding to, changing, modifying, or even altogether abrogating the contract of the parties as evidenced by the writing. Such parole evidence does not in any way deny that the original agreement of the parties was that which the writing purports to express, but merely goes to show that the parties have exercised their right to change or abrogate the same, or to make a new and independent contract. It is immaterial how soon after the execution of the written contract the parole agreement was made. If it was in fact subsequent and is otherwise unobjectionable, it may be proved and enforced. Doctrine: The rule forbidding the admission of parole or extrinsic evidence to alter, vary or contradict a written instrument does not apply to an agreement between the parties, entered into subsequent to the time when the written instrument was executed. 36. Enriquez vs. Ramos G.R. No. L-18077. September 29, 1962 Facts: Plaintiffs entered into a contract of conditional sale with Pedro del Rosario over a land in QC for P600K, to be paid within 2 years. Upon a performance bond, Del Rosario was given possession of the land for development as a subdivision. He also undertook to pay for the subdivision survey, the construction of roads, the installation of light and water and the payment of whatever income tax may be required. Unable to pay, and to avoid court litigation, a contract of rescission was entered into. To release the performance bond, Del Rosario’s partner, Socorro Ramos, was allowed to buy 20 of the lots on condition that she assume the payment of P50K as her share in the construction of roads and other improvements required in the subdivision. A new deed of sale was executed in consideration of P235,056.00, of which an initial payment of P35,056 was made, the balance secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over the 20 lots and a ½ interest on a parcel of land in Bulacan. Ramos failed to pay the balance. Ramos claimed that the contract failed to mention certain important conditions agreed upon, such as the plaintiffs’ promise to construct roads in the lands to be subdivided for sale. Such condition was allegedly a superfluity, there being an ordinance in QC requiring the construction of roads in a subdivision before lots therein could be sold, and said ordinance was deemed part of the contract. Ramos also claims that the true purchase price of the sale was P185,000.00, not P235,056.00, the difference being the voluntary contribution of Ramos to the cost of the construction of the roads which plaintiffs allegedly assumed to do. Issue: Was there an oral agreement or understanding between the parties as claimed by Ramos, and should parole evidence regarding such agreement be allowed? Held: Yes. The construction of the roads was a condition precedent to the enforcement of the terms of the deed of sale for the reason that the subdivision regulations of QC requires, as a matter of law, that the sellers of land therein to be converted into subdivision lots construct the roads in said subdivision before the lots could be sold. The construction of roads in the prospective subdivision must have been uppermost in the mind of Ramos for her purpose in purchasing the property was to develop it into a subdivision. Such is proven by the execution by the plaintiffs of a so-called “Explanation” along with the deed of sale, stating that P50K was advanced as Ramos’ contribution to the construction of the roads. The document specifically states that the P50K would be deducted from the purchase price appearing in the deed of sale. The Rules provide that, when the terms of an agreement had been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as containing all that has been agreed upon and that no evidence other than the terms there can be admitted between the parties. This holds true only if there is no allegation that the agreement does not express the true intent of the parties. If there is and this claim is in issue in the pleadings, the same may be the subject parole evidence. Ramos has specifically pleaded in her answer that the contract of sale in question does not express the true intent of the parties with regard to the construction of the roads. Doctrine: When the terms of an agreement has been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as containing all that has been agreed upon, and no evidence other than the terms there can be admitted

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between the parties. However, this holds true only if there is no allegation that the agreement does not express the true intent of the parties. 37. Madrigal v. CA GR No. 142944 April 15, 2005 Facts: In order to finance his wife Fermina’s travel to the U.S., Jose Mallari assigned to his son, Virgilio, a portion of a residential property situated at Olongapo City, upon assurance by the latter that Jose could remain in the property and that his sister Elizabeth could continue operating a store thereat. Virgilio would occupy one of the rooms in the house whenever he would go to Olongapo City on vacation, and he would renovate the other room and reserve it for his mother when she comes back from the U.S. It was also agreed upon that the property would not be disposed of without Jose’s consent and that Jose could redeem the same as soon as he could. A Deed of Absolute Sale was executed, conveying to Virgilio the said property for P50,000.00, though it was worth much more at that time. Worse, the deed described the property as a one-storey residential house sitting on a 135-square meter lot, though it was actually a 2storey residential house sitting on a 340-square meter land. Eight months later, without Jose’s knowledge, Virgilio, by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale, sold the same property for P50,000.00 to Edenbert Madrigal, a longtime neighbor of the Mallaris. Jose was shocked when Madrigal demanded that he vacate said property. Jose then filed agianst Virgilio and Madrigal a complaint for annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by him and his wife or for redemption of the property at a reasonable price. Issue: Did the court err in receiving parole evidence to establish that the Deed of Absolute Sale is actually one of equitable mortgage? Held: No. The Deed of Absolute Sale cannot be viewed in isolation of the circumstances under which the same was executed by Virgilio’s parents, more so in the light of Jose’s disavowal of what the document, on its face, purports to state. It has been held that, even if the document appears to be a sale, parole evidence may be resorted to if the same does not express the true intent of the parties. “Even when a document appears on its face to be a sale, the owner of the property may prove that the contract is really a loan with mortgage by raising as an issue the fact that the document does not express the true intent of the parties. Parole evidence then becomes competent and admissible to prove that the instrument was in truth and in fact given merely as a security for the repayment of a loan. And upon proof of the truth of such allegations, the court will enforce the agreement or understanding in consonance with the true intent of the parties at the time of the execution of the contract.” (Lustan v. CA) Doctrine: Even if the document appears to be a sale, parole evidence may be resorted to if the same does not express the true intent of the parties. Parole evidence becomes competent and admissible to prove that the instrument was in truth and in fact given merely as a security for the repayment of a loan. 38. Maulini v. Serrano GR No. 8844 Dec. 16, 1914 Facts: Don Antonio Serrano loaned P3,000 to Padern, Moreno & Co. in behalf of Don Fernando Maulini. The loan was covered by a promissory note signed by F. Moreno in behalf of his own behalf and in behalf of his partner Jose Padern, payable to Serrano. Said promissory note was indorsed by Serrano in favor of Maulini, who is the real creditor. Padern & Co. failed to pay at the time of the due date so Maulini instituted an action against the the company and Serrano for the collection of a sum of money. Serrano presented parole evidence, claiming that he was merely negotiating as agent in behalf of Maulini to loan money to the company, and that he received no other consideration for the said note other than a small amount for his services. Hence, he could not be held liable as an indorser. As there was no consideration, Serrano could not be deemed an indorser. Maulini claimed that all parole evidence should not have been admitted, the terms of the agreement having been deemed reduced to writing. The promissory note, as it serves as evidence that there was a contract of indorsement, should be the only evidence admitted to determine the facts and circumstances of the case. Issue: Should parole evidence be admitted to show the true intent of the parties? Held: Yes. The prohibition in Section 285 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to this case. The purpose of that prohibition is to prevent alteration, change, modification or contradiction of the terms of a written instrument, admittedly existing, by the use of parole evidence, except in the cases specifically named in the section. In this case, the evidence offered was not for the purpose of varying, altering, modifying or contradicting the terms of the contract of indorsement admittedly existing between the parties, but to deny that there ever existed any agreement whatever. In other words, the purpose of the parole evidence was to demonstrate that a relation of any kind whatever was created or existed between him and the indorsee by reason of the writing on the back of the instrument and that no consideration ever passed to sustain an indorsement of any kind whatsoever.

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Where an indorser claims that his name was forged, it is clear that parole evidence is admissible to prove that fact, and, if he proves it, it is a complete defense, the fact being that the indorser never made any such contract, that no such relation ever existed between him and the indorsee, and that there was no consideration whatever to sustain such a contract. In this case, while the indorser does not claim that his name was forged, he does claim that it was obtained from him in a manner which, between the parties themselves, renders the contract as completely inoperative as if it had been forged. Doctrine: The purpose of the prohibition against parole evidence is to prevent alteration, change, modification or contradiction of the terms of a written instrument, admittedly existing, by the use of parole evidence, except in the cases specifically named in the section. Where an indorser claims that his name was forged, however, it is clear that parole evidence is admissible to prove that fact, and if he proves it, it is a comlete defense.

39. Inciong v. CA, PBCom G.R. No. 96405. June 26, 1996 Facts: Baldomero Inciong, Jr., along with Rene Naybe and Gregorio Pantanosas, signed a promissory note in the amount of P50,000.00, holding themselves jointly and severally liable to the Philippine Bank of Communications (PBC). Having failed to pay their obligation on the expiration date of the note, PBC sent letters to both Inciong and Naybe, demanding payment of the debt. When neither Inciong nor Naybe respondend, PBC filed a complaint for the collection of a sum of money against the three debtors, of whom only Inciong was served summons. In his answer, Inciong attempted to adduce evidence in order to defeat the terms of the promissory note, claiming that parole evidence may should be allowed as the note was not a public deed but a mere commercial paper which did not bear the signature of attesting witnesses. Inciong alleged that he was only persuaded by third parties to act as a co-maker to the loan incurred by Naybe, who was allegedly interested ina certain falcata logs operation business but was unable to procure money to buy a chainsaw to be contributed thereto. Inciong claimed he only signed as co-maker for the loan of P5,000.00, not P50,000.00, stressing that he indicated such in one of the five copies of the blank promissory note which he signed. He claimed that, through trickery, fraud and misrepresentation, he was made liable for P50,000.00. Issue: Does a promissory note fall under the Parole Evidence Rule? Held: Yes. The first paragraph of the parole evidence rule states: “When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.” Clearly, the rule does not specify that the written agreement be a public document. What is required is that such be in writing. Thus, for the parole evidence rule to apply, a written contract need not be in any particular form or signed by both partes. As a general rule, bills, notes and other instruments of a similar nature are not subject ot be varied or contradicted by parole or extrinsic evidence. In this case, however, Inciong can adduce parole evidence to prove a contemporaneous agreement that was the inducing and moving cause of the written agreement. Inciong can prove by alleging fraud that he agreed to a loan of only P5,000.00. However, fraud must be established by clear and convincing evidence, which Inciong failed to do. Doctrine: For the parole evidence rule to apply, a written contract need not be in any particular form or signed by both partes. As a general rule, bills, notes and other instruments of a similar nature are not subject ot be varied or contradicted by parole or extrinsic evidence. 40. Cruz vs. CA G.R. No. 79962. December 10, 1990 Facts: Salonga filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money in the amount of P35,000, which Cruz allegedly borrowed and of which loan only P20,000 had been paid. Cruz also allegedly failed to comply with his part of a “pakyawan” agreement, whereby Salonga would be given an exclusive right to purchase the harvest of certain fishponds being leased by Cruz. Cruz, however, claims that the P35,000 had been received, not as a loan, but as consideration for their “pakyaw” agreement. It was Salonga who owed him money for actually occupying the fishpond, but failing to pay rentals for the 10-month period. Salonga denied this, claiming that, aside from the P35,000 which he gave Cruz, he also paid P28,000 as consideration for the “pakyaw” agreement, which was evidenced by a receipt. Cruz, as well as two other witnesses, testified that the receipt explained the transaction behind the “pakyawan” agreement. However, it was argued that, the receipt being very clear in its language in its non-reference to the transaction referring to the agreement, its tenor must not be clouded by any parole evidence which may be introduced by Cruz. Issue: Should parole evidence be admitted to explain the relationship between the receipt and the “pakyawan” agreement? Held: No. The parole evidence rule is predicated on the existence of a document embodying the terms of an agreement. As the receipt only attested to Cruz’s receipt of P35,000 from Salonga without even

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mentioning the transaction which gave rise to its issuance, it is not and could not have been intended by the parties to be the sole memorial of their agreement. At most, it can only be considered a casual memorandum of a transaction between the parties and an acknowledgement of the receipt of money executed by Cruz in favor of Salonga. Usually, a receipt is merely a written admission of a transaction independently existing, and is not conclusive. Besides, Cruz and his witnesses testified to show when and under what circumstances the amount was received. Though the word “pakyaw” does appear on the receipt, such testimonies do not in any way vary or contradict the terms of the receipt. A deed is not conclusive of every fact stated therein. A distinction should be made between a statement of fact expressed in the instrument and the terms of the contractual act. While the former may be varied by parole evidence, the latter may not. The Parole Evidence Rule refers to the terms of the agreement or the contractual act. In this case, the statement in the receipt is just a statement of fact, a mere acknowledgment of the distinct act of payment made by Salonga. Its reference to the amount as consideration of the “pakyaw” contract does not make it part of the terms of the agreement. Parole evidence may therefore be introduced to explain the receipt, particularly with respect to the date when the money was received. Besides, no objection was made by Salonga when Cruz introduced evidence to explain the circumstances behind the execution and issuance of the instrument. Doctrine: A deed is not conclusive of every fact stated therein. A distinction should be made between a statement of fact expressed in the instrument, which may be varied by parole evidence, and the terms of the contractual act, which may not be varied by such. A receipt is merely a written admission of a transaction independently existing, and is not conclusive. Hence, it does not fall under the Parole Evidence Rule. 41. Victoria Lechugas v. CA, Loza et.al GR No. L-39972 & L-40300 August 6, 1986 Facts: Victoria Lechugas allegedly bought the subject properties from Leoncia Lasangue, as evidenced by a public “Deed of Absolute Sale” which was registered with the Register of Deeds. Lechugas claimed that the Lozas, by means of fraud, intimidation, strategy and stealth, unlawfully entered said properties and appropriated the produce thereof for themselves, refusing to surrender the same despite demands. The Lozas, however, deny that the properties which Lechugas bought from Lasangue in 1950 was the same subject land. They claimed that their predecessor, Hugo Loza, had bought a parcel of land from one Victorina Limor, and another adjoining land from one Emeterio Lasangue. The remaining portion of the lot bought from Limor was allegedly the one bought by Lechugas. This was corroborated by Lasangue in her testimony, who, although illiterate, was able to specifically point out the land sold to Lechugas. Such testimony, however, was contrary to the contents of the deed of sale executed between Lasangue and Lechugas. Issue: Should parole evidence have been admitted to determine the land bought by Lechugas? Held: Yes. The Parole Evidence Rule does not apply where the controversy is between one of the parties to the document and third persons. While the deed of sale was executed between Lasangue and Lechugas, the dispute over what was actually sold was between Lechugas and the Lozas. Lasangue, therefore, is a stranger to the dispute and is not bound by the rule. The Parole Evidence Rule applies only as between parties to the written agreement or their privies, and not to strangers. It does not apply where either one of the parties between whom the question arises is a stranger to the written agreement and does not claim under or through one who is party to it. Doctrine: The parol evidence rule does not apply, and may not properly be invoked by either party to the litigation against the other, where at least one of the parties to the suit is not party or a privy of a party to the written instrument in question and does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation established thereby.

42. Pioneer Savings v. CA

GR No. 105419 September 27, 1993

TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE QUALIFICATIONS OF WITNESSES Husband and Wife; Sec. 22; Exception to the marital disqualification rule 43. Ordono v. Daquigan GR No. L-39012 Jan. 31, 1975 44. People vs. Castaneda

G.R. No. L-46306. February 27, 1979

45. Lezama vs. Rodriguez G.R. No. L-25643. June 27, 1968 Facts: Jose Dineros, as receiver of the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co., filed an action for the annulment of a judgment rendered against La Paz in favor of Marciano Roque and the Spouses Lezama. It was alleged that, due to the mismanagement by the Lezamas, La Paz was placed under receivership, during which, Roque brought an action against La Paz for the collection of P150,000.00, which was supposedly loaned to La Paz. Dineros accused the Sps. Lezama of entering into collusion with Roque in obtaining a judgment by default against La Paz. The Sps. Lezama denied this, claiming that they did not

15

contest Roque’s complaint, knowing it to be a legitimate obligation pursuant to a resolution of the board of directors. During trial, Dineros prayed for Mrs. Lezama to be issued a subpoena to testify as a witness. Such subpoena indicated that Mrs. Lezama was to do no more than testify as an adverse party in the case and that she would be doing so as secretary of the company who signed the minutes of the meeting where her husband was authorized to negotiate the loan. Issue: Does the marital disqualification rule apply in this case? Held: Yes. The complaint charges “fraudulent conspiracy” on the part of the Spouses and Roque to make it appear that La Paz was indebted to Roque. Mrs. Lezama was being called to testify as an adverse party witness on the basis of her participation in the alleged fraudulent scheme, which was as secretary of the company who signed the minutes of the meeting during which her husband was allegedly authorized to negotiate the loan, and who made the entry in the books of the corporation. Evidently, Mrs. Lezama will be asked to testify on what actually transpired during the meeting and will be asked questions on the amtter of the veracity or falsity of the entry in the books of the corporation. Whether her testimony will turn out to be adverse or beneficial to her interest, the inevitable result would be to pit her against her husband. The interests of husband and wife in this case are necessarily interrelated. Testimony adverse to the wife’s own interests would tend to show the existence of collusive fraud between the spouses and would then work havoc upon their common defense that the loan was not fictitious. There is the possibility, too, that the wife, to soften her own guilt, if guilty she is, may unwittingly testify in a manner entirely disparaging to the interests of the husband. It is argued that, when the spouses are parties to an action, there is no reason why either may not be examined as a witness for or against himself or herself alone, and his or her testimony could operate only agianst himself or herself. Even if such view were accepted as an exception to the marital disqualification rule, or even as a separate doctrine, it would be inapplicable in this case where the main charge is collusive fraud between the spouses and a third person and the evident purpose of examination of the wife is to prove that charge. Doctrine: A husband cannot be examined for or against his wife without her consent; nor a wife for or against her husband without his consent, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other. Dead Man’s Statute 46. Reyes vs. Wells

G.R. No. 30587. December 4, 1929

47. Guerrero vs. St. Clare’s Realty G.R. No. L-58164. September 2, 1983 Facts: Isidro Guerrero verbally willed that the subject parcel of land be adjudicated in favor of his son, Andres. By virtue of this verbal will, and upon his father’s death, Andres possessed said alnd and cultivated the same through his tenant, Dominador Ramirez. After the Japanese occupation, he entrusted said land to his sister Cristina, with Dominador continuing his tenancy until Andres’ death. Andres’ heirs subsequently discovered that the land was in the name of their cousin, Manuel Guerrero, by virtue of a deed of sale allegedly executed by Cristina in his favor. Manuel’s heirs, the Guerreros, subsequently sold the same land to St. Clare’s Realty Company. Andres’ heirs are now asking the court ot annul the aforementioned sales and to award the ownership of the land to them. As witness, Laura Cervantes testified as to her mother Cristina’s illness, as to a loan which Manuel had granted Cristina, and as to the fact that the land was lent to Cristina by Andres. The defendants’ counsel objected to Laura’s testimony on the ground of Section 20(a), Rule 130, with respect to the Dead Man’s Statute. Issue: Does the Dead Man’s Statute apply in this case? Held: No. In this case, no claim or demand is being made against the estate of Manuel Guerrero, and the Guerreros are not the executors or administrators or representatives of such deceased. The Guerreros are being sued in their individual capacities as claimants of ownership of the subject lot, which is not a part of Manuel’s estate. The Dead Man’s Statute cannot apply. Statutes which provide that a party in interest is incompetent to testify where the adverse party is dead or insane must be applied strictly in accordance with their express wording, irrespective of their spirit. Section 20(a), Rule 130, expressly uses the phrase “against an executor or administrator or other representative of the deceased person.” The “other representatives” in the statute means only those who, like the executor or administrator, are being sued in their representative, and not personal capacity, as emphasized by the use of the law of the words “against the estate of such deceased persons.” The last phrase convey the idea of an estate actually owned by the deceased at the time the case was brought and that, therefore, it is only his rights that are to be asserted and defended in the litigation by the person representing him, not the personal rights of such representatives.

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Doctrine: The Dead Man’s Statute applies only against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, whose estate is being subjected to claims and demands. 48. Abraham vs. Recto-Kasten G.R. No. L-16741. January 31, 1962 Facts: Juan Ysmael obtained a loan from Alfonso Abraham, Sr., in the amount of P12,500.00 in Japanese currency, for which the former executed a promissory note in favor of the latter, promising to pay the loan wihtin 90 days, plus interest. Alfonso’s wife, Florencio, affixed her signature at the bottom of the note as a witness thereto. Upon maturity of the note, and despite demands, however, Ysmael failed to pay. Both Ysmael and Alfonso died, leaving the note still unpaid. In the settlement of the intestate estate of Juan Ysmael, Florencia and her sons filed a Reclamation demanding payment of the amount represented by the note. Priscilla Recto-Kasten was appointed administratrix, and during the hearing before a commissioner, she objected to the testimony of Florencio, invoking the provisions of the Dead Man’s Statute. Issue: Should Florencia’s testimony have been rejected for being violative of the Dead Man’s Statute? Held: No. It is true that the Dead Man’s Statute under the Rules of Court provides that “parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind.” However, in this case, the prohibition is deemed waived when the counsel for Recto-Kasen extensively cross-examined Florencia on the very matters subject o fthe prohibition. Furthermore, it is difficult to believe that the counsel’s lengthy cross-examination on the prohibition matter was merely for the purpose of establishing the “motive, prejudices and predilection” of the witness. Doctrine: When the party invoking the Dead Man’s Statute extensively cross-examines the allegedly prohibited witness, the prohibition under the Statute is deemed waived. 49. People v. Francisco (78 Phil 694) GR No. L-568 July 16, 1947 Facts: Juan Francisco, who had been previously arrested on charges of robbery, was detained in the municipal jail of Mansalay, Mindoro. Upon asking permission from the chief of police, he was allowed to go with Sergeant Pacifico Pimentel to see his wife. While waiting at the foot of the stairs at the house of Francisco, Pimentel heard a woman scream. Running upstairs, he saw Francisco’s wife running out of the room and holding her bleeding right breast. Moments later, Pimentel saw Francisco lying down with his 1 ½ year-old son, Romeo, on his breast. Francisco had a wound on his belly, while Romeo was dead, with a wound in the back. Francisco confessed to the crime in an affidavit signed and sworn to by him before the justice of the peace, stating that he had lost his senses and tried to wipe out his family because he remembered that his uncle had threatened to order someone to kill him for being a shame and a dishonor to the family. This was corroborated by both Sergeant Pimentel and his wife, Emilia Taladtad. Francisco later retracted his statement and imputed the crime to his wife. Issue: Should Emilia’s testimony against her husband have been admitted as evidence? Held: Yes. The reasons why neither a husband nor a wife shall be in any case a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed by one against the other are: 1) identity of interests; 2) the consequent danger of perjury; 3) the policy of the law which deems it necessary to guard the security and confences of private life even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and which rejects such evidence because its admission would lead to domestic disunion and unhappiness; and 4) the danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other. This rule, however, has exceptions, both in civil actions between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the other. Where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved, peace and tranquility of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent. In such a case, the security and confidences of private life which the law aims at protecting will be nothing but ideals which, through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home. Moreover, in this case, the wife did not testify in the direct evidence for the prosecution but only after Francisco testified in his own defesne, imputing upon her the killing of their son. By all rules of justice and reason, this gave the prosecution, which had therefore refrained from presenting the wife as a witness against her husband, the right to do so, as it did in the rebuttal, and the wife herself the right to testify, at least, in self-defense, not of course, against being subjected to punishment in the case in which she was not a defendant but against any or all of various possible consequences which might flow from her silence. In giving such testimony, the husband must, in all fairness, be held to have intended all such natural and necessary consequences. By his said act, the husband himself, exercising the very right which he would deny to his wife upon the ground of their marital relations, must be taken to have waived all objection to

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the latter’s testimony upon rebuttal, even considering that such objection would have been available at the outset. It is well-settled that the rule of marital incompetency may be waived. Doctrine: A party may waive his objection to the competency of a witness and permit him to testify. Physician-Patient Privilege Communication 50. People v. Carlos (47 Phil 626) GR No. 22948 March 17, 1925 Facts: On March 3, 1924, Dr. Pablo Sityar, of Mary Chiles Hospital, performed a surgical operation upon Carlos’ wife for appendicitis and certain other ailments. She was eventually released from the hospital, but was required to go several times to Dr. Sityar’s clinic to dress the wounds caused by the operation. During one of the visits, Carlos was sent by the doctor to buy some medicine, and while out on such errand, Dr. Sityar outraged his wife. Despite having been informed of the incident, Carlos went back to the clinic to consult with the doctor regarding some lung trouble. While confined at the hospital, a letter was sent to him, demanding immediate settlement of his wife’s account for professional services rendered by Dr. Sityar. Carlos was released from the hospital, but when, one day, he went back to the clinic, he, without any prior quarrel between him and Dr. Sityar, attacked the latter with a fan-knife and stabbed him twice, killing the doctor. On trial, Carlos claimed he killed the deceased, but invoked self-defense. Carlos was however convicted for murder, due to premeditation, upon evidence in the form of a letter allegedly written to Carlos by his wife two days before the commission of the crime, the letter revealing Carlos’s wife’s fear that Carlos would resort to violence in dealing with the accused. Issue: Can the letter be deemed a privileged communication, hence, not admissible as evidence? Held: Yes. Where a privileged communication from one spouse to the other comes into the hands of a third party, whether legally or not, without collusion and voluntary disclosure on the part of either spouse, the privilege is thereby extinguished and the communication, if otherwise competent, becomes admissible. If said documents of communications were obtained from the addressee by voluntary delivery, they should still be privileged for otherwise, the privilege could by collusion be practically nullified for written communications; but if they were obtained surreptitiously or otherwise without the addressee’s consent, the privilege should cease. In this case, the letter should be excluded as such was written by Carlos’s wife. If she had testified at the trial, the letter might have been admissible to impeach her testimony. However, she was not put on the witness stand, hence, the letter was not offered for the purpose of impeaching such testimony. If Carlos, by virtue of an answer or by other means, had indicated his assent to the statements in the letter, such letter might also have been admissible. However, such is not the case here, there being no indication of acquiescence or assent on his part. The letter is therefore nothing but hearsay, and its admission in evidence violates the constitutional right of Carlos in the criminal case to be confronted with the witnesses for the prosecution and have the opportunity to cross-examine. Doctrine: Where the spouse did not testify in the witness stand and a communication between the spouses was not offered as a means of impeaching such testimony, and where the spouse against whom the communication is offered as evidence does not give his consent, such marital communication is deemed privileged. Hence, it is not admissible as evidence. 51. Krohn vs. CA G.R. No. 108854 June 14, 1994 Facts: Ma. Paz Fernandez underwent psychological testing to ease her mental strain. In 1973, she and her husband, Edgar Krohn, with whom she had three kids, separated. Krohn was able to obtain a copy of the Psychiatric Evaluation Report signed by one Dr. Banaeg and one Dr. Reyes. By virtue of such report, he was able to obtain a decree nullifying his church marriage to Fernandez. A voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership was granted by the Pasig RTC, and in 1990, Krohn filed for the annulment of his marriage with the Makati RTC. Krohn used the contents of the aforesaid Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report in his testimony, to which Fernandez objected on the ground of Physician-Patient privilege. Issue: Is the Psychiatric Evaluation Report prohibited as evidence for being violative of the PhysicianPatient privilege? Held: No. The person against whom the privilege is being claimed is not one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics, as he is simply Fernandez’s husband who wishes to testify on a document executed by medical practitioners. He is therefore not barred by the privilege, and neither can his testimony be deemed a circumvention of the prohibition as his testimony cannot have the same force and effect as a testimony made by a physician who examined the patient and executed the report. Doctrine: A person not duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics, who wishes to testify on a document executed by duly licensed medical practitioners is not barred by the Physician-Patient Privilege. 52. Lim v. CA

(214 SCRA 273) GR No. 91114 Sept. 25, 1992

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Facts: Juan Sim filed a suit for annulment against Nelly Lim on the ground that the latter has been suffering from schizophrenia before, during or and after the marriage. As an expert witness, Sim announced his intention to present Dr. Acampado, the Chief of the Female Services of the National Mental Hospital. Lim’s counsel opposed the introduction of said witness as Dr. Acampado had examined and diagnosed Lim, and hence, was bound by the physician-patient confidentiality rule. Sim’s counsel, however, claimed that Dr. Acampado was there as an expert witness and not to testify on any information acquired during Lim’s examination. The RTC judge allowed Dr. Acampado to testify, but the latter was qualified by Sim’s counsel as an expert witness and asked hypothetical questions. Dr. Acampado neither revealed what illness she examined and treated Lim for nor disclosed the results of Lim’s examinations and the medicines prescribed. Issue: Is Dr. Acampado’s testimony violative of the Physician-Patient Privilege? Held: No. The rule on the physician-patient privilege is intended to facilitate and make safe full and confidential disclosure by the patient to the physicians of all facts, circumstances and symptoms, untrammeled by apprehension of their subsequent and enforced disclosure and publication on the witness stand, to the end that the physician may form a correct opinion and be enabled to safely and efficaciously treat his patient. The requisites of the privilege are that: 1) the privilege is claimed in a civil case; 2) the person against whom said privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; 3) such person acquired the information while attending to the patient in his professional capacity; 4) said information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and 5) said information was confidential, and if disclosed, would blacken the reputation of the patient. The privilege, though duly claimed, is not violated by permitting a physician to give expert opinion testimony in response to a strictly hypothetical question in a lawsuit involving the physical and mental condition of a patient whom he has attended professionally, where his opinion is based strictly upon the hypothetical facts stated, excluding and disregarding any personal professional knowledge he may have concerning such patient. Moreover, assuming that Dr. Acampado’s testimony is privileged, the failure to seasonably object thereto constitutes a waiver thereof. Doctrine: The physician-patient privilege is not violated by permitting a physician to give expert opinion testimony in response to a strictly hypothetical question in a lawsuit involving the physical and mental condition of a patient whom he has attended professionally, where his opinion is based strictly upon the hypothetical facts stated, excluding and disregarding any personal professional knowledge he may have concerning such patient. Lawyer-Client 53. Barton v. Leyte Asphalt and Mineral Oil Company (46 Phil 938) GR L-21237 March 22, 1924 Facts: In 1920, William Anderson, president and general manager of Leyte Asphalt & Mineral Oil Co., the owner of a valuable deposit of bituminous limestone and other asphalt products known as the Lucio mine, addressed a letter to Barton, authorizing him to sell the products of said mine in Australia and New Zealand in accordance with a scale of prices provided for in said letter. Barton subsequently filed an action to recover damages, claiming that there was breach of contract and asking for an extension of the sales agency contract. During trial, he offered as evidence a carbon copy of a letter written by him to his lawyer, Atty. Frank. Ingersoll, in which Barton stated, among other things, that his profits from the San Francisco contract would have been at the rate of 85 cents (gold) per ton. This was also subsequently offered in evidency by Leyte Asphalt’s lawyer, to which Barton’s lawyer did not object so long as the Leyte Asphalt’s lawyer explained where the copy was secured. The latter explained that he received the letter from previous lawyers of Leyte Asphalt without explanation of the manner in which the document had come into their possession. Issue: Was the letter properly excluded for being privileged communication between client and attorney? Held: No. Assuming that the letter was covered by the privilege, such privilege was lost when the letter came to the hands of the adverse party, no matter how the latter acquired possession of it. The law protects the client from the effect of disclosures made by him to his attorney in the confidence of legal relation, but when such a document containing admissions of the client, comes to the hand of a third party, and reaches the adversary, it is admissible in evidence. The privilege is a derogation from the general testimonial duty and should be strictly construed. It would be improper, therefore, to extend its prohibition to third persons who obtain knowledge of the communications. One who overhears the communications, with or without the client’s knowledge, is not within the protection of the privilege. The same rule ought to apply to one who surreptitiously reads or obtains possession of a document in original or copy.

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When papers are offered in evidence, a court will take no notice of how they were obtained, whether legally or illegally, properly or improperly; nor will it take from a collateral issue to try that question. Doctrine: The law protects the client from the effect of disclosures made by him to his attorney in the confidence of legal relation, but when such a document containing admissions of the client, comes to the hand of a third party, and reaches the adversary, it is admissible in evidence. 54. Orient Insurance Co. v. Revilla and Teal Motor Co. (54 Phil 919) GR No. 34098 Sept. 17, 1930 Facts: Teal Motor Co. filed a civil action to recover upon 2 fire insurance policies issued by the Orient Insurance Company upon a stock of merchandise, which was allegedly destroyed by a fire. As a defense, Orient claimed that, though it had sent notice rejecting Teal’s claim, the latter failed to institute action within 3 months from such notice, thereby forfeiting all benefits under the terms of the contract. On the other hand, Teal alleged that one E.E. Elser, a representative of the company, expressly requested Teal to defer judicial action as there were possibilities for an extrajudicial compromise. During trial, E.M. Bachrach, president of Teal Motor, said that he received a letter from their attorneys, Attys. Guevarra, Francisco and Recto, urging him to file the case. Orient moved for the reading of said letter, however, upon objection by Teal, the trial judge allowed only the reading of the part on which Bachrach testified. Orient tried again to have the whole letter read, but was denied. Orient then procured a subpoena duces tecum requiring the aforesaid attorneys to produce in court certain papers, including the aforesaid letter. Upon motion by said attorneys, said subpoena was quashed. Issue: Would the reading of the whole letter violate the attorney-client privilege? Held: No. According to Teal, the other, unread, portions of the letter were privileged as they were related to the terms of employment between attorney and client. Irrelevant it might be, under certain circumstances, it is not privileged. On the other hand, assuming the matter contained in the letter and withheld from the inspection of Orient was of a privileged nature, the privilege was waived by the introduction in evidence of part of the letter. Section 283 of the Code of Civil Procedure makes no exception as to privileged matter. When a part of a writing is introduced in evidence by one litigant, his adversary is entitled to use the other parts of the same writing, so far as is relevant to the issues in the case. To this end, the adversary party’s attorney has a right to inspect the writing and to require its production in court. The introduction in evidence of part of a paper writing by one party waives privilege as to the other parts of the same writing. Doctrine: When a part of a writing is introduced in evidence by one litigant, his adversary is entitled to use the other parts of the same writing, so far as is relevant to the issues in the case. To this end, the adversary party’s attorney has a right to inspect the writing and to require its production in court. 55. Hickman v. Taylor

329 US 495 January 13, 1947

56. UpJohn Co. v. US

449 US 383

Jan.13, 1981

57. People vs. Sandiganbayan G.R. Nos. 115439-41 July 16, 1997 Facts: In 1976, Paredes, applied for and was granted a free patent over a certain lot in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur. In 1985, such patent was nullified through a court action instituted by the Director Lands on the ground that Paredes had made fraudulent representations to secure said patent. A case for perjury was subsequently filed against him, though it was later dismissed for having prescribed. However, a preliminary investigation for the violation of the Anti-Graft law was commenced before the Tanodbayan on the ground that Paredes allegedly used his position as Provincial Attorney to secure the patent. The Tanodbayan issued a resolution recommending the filing of charges against Paredes. A criminal case for violation of the Anti-Graft Law was filed with the Sandiganbayan, but the same was later dismissed on the ground of prescription. Gelacio, who initiated the perjury and graft charges against Paredes, sought the investigation of Paredes, his counsel, Atty. Sansaet, and one Honrada regarding alleged falsification of public documents, among which are the notice of arraignments and transcripts of stenographic notes supposedly taken during the arraignment of Paredes in the perjury case previously dismissed. To evade liability, Atty. Sansaet revealed that said falsification was made upon the isntigation and inducement of Paredes, who contrived the scheme to dismiss the anti-graft case. The Ombudsman rejected the governments’ motion for the discharge of Atty. Sansaet as state witness and caused falsification charges to be filed against all the defendants. Another motion filed with Sandiganbayan for the discharge of Sansaet as state witness was denied by the Sandiganbayan on the ground that the proposed testimony would fall under the AttorneyClient privilege. Issue: Is the projected testimony of Atty. Sansaet covered by the Attorney-Client privilege? Held: No. There is a distinction between confidential communications relating to past crimes already committed, and future crimes intended to be committed, by the client. If the client seeks his lawyer’s

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advice with respect to a crime that the former has theretofore committed, he is given the protection of a virtual confessional seal which the attorney-client privilege declares cannot be broken by the attorney without the client’s consent. The same privileged confidentiality, however, does not attach with regard to a crime which a client intends to commit thereafter or in the future and for purposes of which he seeks the lawyer’s advice. Here, the testimony sought from Atty. Sansaet as state witness are communications made to him by the physical acts and/or accompanying words of Paredes at the time he and Honrada, either with active or passive participation of Sansaet, were about to falsify or were in the process of falsifying, the documents, which were later filed with the Tanodbayan. Clearly, therefore, the confidential communications made by Paredes to Atty. Sansaet were for the purpose of a crime not yet committed, and hence, are not barred by the attorney-client privilege. Doctrine: Confidential communications made by a client to his attorney with a respect to a crime which the client intends to commit in the future and for which said client sought the attorney’s advice are not protected by the attorney-client privilege.

58. Uy Chico v. Union Life Insurance Society (29 Phil 163) GR No. 9231 Jan. 6, 1915 Facts: Uy Chico is the son of Uy Layco, who was conducting a business under his own name. In 1897, Uy Layco died, and Uy Chico and his brother took over the business and continued it under the same name. Uy Chico eventually purchased his brother’s share and continued the business. Then, the business burned down. At that time, Uy Layco was heavily indebted and his creditors petitioned for the appointment of an administrator. While the proceedings were ongoing, Uy Chico’s attorney surrendered the policies of insurance issued by Union Life Insurance Surety to the administrator of the estate, who compromised with the insurance company for ½ their face value. Uy Chico filed the present action, claiming that the policies and goods insured belonged to him and not to the estate of Uy Layco and that he was not bound by the compromise effected by the administrator of Uy Layco estate. Union Life introduced evidence indicating that Uy Chico’s attorney had surrendered the policies to the administrator with the understanding that such compromise was to be effected. Uy Chico did not object to the attorney’s testimony, despite being asked, while on the witness stand, whether he wished to do so. The attorney was called for that prupose, but Uy Chico’s counsel formally withdrew the waiver and objected to the attorney’s testimony. Issue: Was the attorney’s testimony privileged? Held: No. It is true that a lawyer must strictly maintain inviolate the confidence and preserve the secrets of his client. He shall not be permited in any court, without his client’s consent, given in open court, to testify as to any facts imparted to him by said client in professional consultation, or for the prupose of obtaining advice upon legal matters. The very essence of the veil of secrecy which surrounds communications made between attorney and the client, is that such communications made between attorney and client are not intended for the information of the third persons or to be acted upon by them, but for the purpose of advising as to his right. In this case, the testimony was to the effect that when the lawyer delivered said policies to the administrator, he is deemed to have understood that a compromise was to be effected. The fact that Uy Chico made no objection upon being informed of the surrender of the policies is sufficient to show that Uy Chico agreed to be compromised. Communications made by a client to his attorney for the purpose of being communicated to others are not privileged after they have been so communicated, and may be proved by the testimony of the attorney. The rule applies to a compromise agreement perfected by the attorney with the authority and under the instructions of his client Doctrine: Communications made by a client to his attorney for the purpose of being communicated to others are not privileged after they have been so communicated, and may be proved by the testimony of the attorney. Public Officer 59. Banco Filipino vs. MB G.R. No. L-70054 July 8, 1986 Facts: RTC, Makati, issued an order granting the motion of Banco Filipino for the production, inspection and copying of certain papers and records allegedly needed by Banco Filipino for the preparation of tis comments, objections, and exceptions to the Conservator’s report dated January 8, 1985, and Receiver’s Report dated March 19, 1985. The documents asked to be produced, inspected, and copied included tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board deliberations on the closure of Banco Filipino and its meeting on July 27, 1984, and March 22, 1985.

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The Monetary Board assailed the order, claiming that the tapes and transcripts of its deliberations are confidential pursuant to Sec. 13 and 15 of the Central Bank Act, and that the deliberations were held after the submission of the Central Bank reports; hence, they did not enter into the making of those reports and can have no materiality to any question of fact that may be raised in relation to their contents. Banco Filipino, meanwhile, asserted that the Monetary Board cannot claim privilege in refusing to produce the Central Bank records as it is based solely on the generalized interest in confidentiality. U.S. v. Nixon was cited, which states that “when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal case is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law. ISSUE: Are the tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board deliberations privileged communications pursuant to Sec. 21, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, and under Sections 13 and 15 of the Central Bank Act? Held: No. The deliberations may be confidential but not necessarily absolute and privileged. There is no specific provision in the Central Bank Act, even in Secs. 13 and 15 thereof, which prohibits absolutely the courts from conducting an inquiry on said deliberations when these are relevant or material to a matter subject of a suit pending before it. Disclosure is not being sought here to obtain information for personal gain, and there is no indication that such disclosure would be detrimental to the government, to the bank or to third parties. As a matter of fact, it is the bank itself that is interested in obtaining what it considers as information useful and indispensably needed by it to support its position in the matter being inquired to by the court below. It is true that Sec. 21(e), Rule 130, of the Rules of Court states that “a public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or afterwards, as to communications made to him in official confidence, when the court finds that the public interest would suffer by disclosure.” However, this privilege is not for the protection of public officers but for the protection of public interest. Where there is no public interest that would be prejudiced the rule will not be applicable. Here, the Monetary Board has failed to establish that public interest would suffer by the disclosure of the papers and documents sought by Banco Filipino. As the bank was already closed as of January 25, 1985, any disclosure of the aforementioned letters, reports, and transcripts at this time pose no danger or peril to our economy. Neither will it trigger any bank run nor compromise state secrets. On the contrary, public interests will be best served by the disclosure of the documents. Not only the banks and its employees but also its numerous depositors and creditors are entitled to be informed as to whether or not there was a valid and legal justification for the bank’s closure. Doctrine: Sec. 21(e), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is not for the protection of public officers but for the protection of public interest. Where there is no public interest that would be prejudiced the rule will not be applicable. 60. US v. Nickson

418 US 683 July 24, 1974

61. People v. Ong 432 SCRA 470 Facts: On July 23, 1998, a confidential informant of the Special Operations Division, PNP Narcotics Group, reported to Chief Inspector Albert Ferro about the alleged illicit drug activities of a certain William Ong and an unidentified Chinese male partner. Upon evaluation of the information, Ferro decided to conduct a buybust operation, with SPO1 Gonzales serving as poseur-buyer. The buy-bust operation was conducted, and William Ong and Ching de Ming a.k.a. Robert Tiu were subsequently charged with violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 for the alleged illegal sale of shabu. During trial, however, the confidential informant who had sole knowledge of how the selling of shabu started and how it was perfected was not presented as a witness. His testimony was given instead by SPO1 Gonzales, who himself had no personal knowledge of the same. When asked, however, the prosecution claimed that the identity of the confidential informant was privileged. Issue: Is the identity of the confidential informant considered privileged? Held: Yes. The Court recognizes the compelling considerations as to why confidential informants are usually not presented by the prosecution. One is the need to hide their identity and to preserve their invaluable service to the police; while another is the necessity to protect them from being objects or targets of revenge by the criminals they implicate once they become known. All these considerations, hwoever have to be balanced with the right of an accused to a fair trial. What is usually referred to as the informer’s privilege is in reality the Government’s privilege to withhold from disclosure the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with enforcement of that law. The purpose is the furtherance and protection of the public interest in effective law enforcement. The privilege recognizes the obligation of citizens to communicate their knowledge of the commission of crimes to law-enforcement officials and, by perserving their anonymity, encourages them to perform that obligation. The scope of the privilege, however, is limited by its underlying purpose. Where the disclosure of the contents of the communication will not tend to reveal the identity of an informer, the contents are not privileged. Likewise, once the identity of the informer has been disclosed to those who would have cause to resent the communication, the privilege is no longer applicable. Moreover,

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where the disclosure of an informer’s identity, or the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give way. Some of the factors which may be considered in balancing the state interest against the individual’s right to prepare his defense are: 1) the crime charged, 2) the possible defenses, 3) the possible significance of the informer’s testimony, and 4) other relevant factors. In this case, the crime charged against Ong and Tiu is capital in character and can result in the imposition of the death penalty. They have foisted the defense of instigation, in sharp contrast to the claim of entrapment by the prosecution. The latter has to prove all the material elements of the alleged sale of shabu and the resulting buy-bust operation. Where the testimony of the informer is indispensable, it should be disclosed. The liberty and the life of a person enjoy high importance in our scale of values. It cannot be diminished except by a value of higher significance. Doctrine: The scope of the informer’s privilege is limited by its underlying purpose. Where the disclosure of the contents of the communication will not tend to reveal the identity of an informer, the contents are not privileged. Likewise, once the identity of the informer has been disclosed to those who would have cause to resent the communication, the privilege is no longer applicable. Moreover, where the disclosure of an informer’s identity, or the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give way. RA 1477 62. In the Matter of Farber

439 US 1331 August 4, 1978

ADMISSION AND CONFESSIONS •

Section 30 Admission by conspirator 57 S 714 Facts: On January 17, 1972, Police Sgt. Mario Tanfelix received an instruction to proceed to Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital to investigate an abandoned person found at the North Diversion Road suffering from stab wounds. The abandoned person was Luis dela Cruz, who gave an ante-mortem statement naming Rosario Cabrera as the person who hired his jeep and who was with the three unidentified men who stabbed him and took his money and jeep. The next morning, Cabrera was arrested, and two days later, executed an extra-judicial confession, pointing to Conrado Villanueva as the mastermind of the robbery. She herself merely hired the jeep upon instructions, but the robbery and killing itself were done by Villanueva and two others. One Dante Marcelo also testified that, on the night of the robbery, he had seen Cabrera riding on the jeep of dela Cruz, but did not notice whether there were other passengers. Cabrera and Villanueva were convicted on the basis of Cabrera’s extra-judicial confession.

63. People v. Cabrera

Issue: Is Cabrera’s extrajudicial statement admissible against Villanueva? Held: No. The extrajudicial statement of Cabrera is inadmissible against Villanueva, who made timely objection thereto. Cabrera’s inculpatory statements were made during the investigation conducted by the Valenzuela police on January 20, 1972, two days after the date of the incident in question. For this reason alone, said statement was not made during the existence of the alleged conspiracy between her and Villanueva, but after said supposed conspiracy had already ceased and when she was already in the hands of the authorites. Hence, Sec. 27, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court, which allows the act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence to be given in evidence against the coconspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration, cannot be availed of. Doctrine: Where the act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy is made after such conspiracy has ceased and the conspirator is already in the hands of the authorities, such act or declaration can no longer be given in evidence against the co-conspirator. • Sec. 31 Admission by privies 64. Albpuerto v. Pastor (38 Phil 785) GR No. 12794 Oct. 14, 1918 Facts: Eladio Alpuerto and Jose Perez Pastor are both claiming title to three parcels of land formerly owned by Juan Llenos, with Alpuerto as party in possession under a contract of sale with pacto de retro, and Pastor as purchaser at a public sale under an execution directed against Llenos. Alpuerto claimed that, by virtue of a contract of sale with right to repurchase, he acquired title to the land for a consideration of P2,500, as paid, with the right to repurchase fixed for a period of two years. Said document was acknowledged before a notary public. Pastor, however, claimed that the transaction by which Alpuerto claims to have acquired title was simulated or fictitious and that the supposed conveyance was effected for the purpose of defrauding Pastor as creditor of Llenos. Pastor asked the court to declare him as the true owner of the property and to order Alpuerto to surrender possession to him. Issue: Who is entitled to the property?

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Held: Article 1225 declares that a private document legally recognized shall have, with regard to those who signed it and their privies, the same force as a public instrument. The term “legally recognized” must be taken to mean recognized, or acknowledged by the person or persons, executing or emitting the document, in this case, the vendor Juan Llenos and the vendee, Alpuerto. The act of legal recognition occurred when the ddocument was signed by the parties and delivered in the presence of the attesting witnesses, who were called upon to bear witness to the transaction. The term “privies,” meanwhile, denotes the idea of succession, not only by right of heirship and testamentary legacy, but also that of succession by singular title, derived from acts inter vivos, and for special purposes; hence, an assignee of a credit, and one subrogated to it will be privies. In short, he who by succession is placed in the position of one of those who contracted the juridical relation and executed the private document and appears to be substituting him in his personal rights and obligations is a privy. Here, Pastor, the purchaser at a public sale under an execution directed against Llenos, must be considered a privy or successor in interest of the execution debtor. He is therefore undoubtedly bound by the instrument which conveyed the property to Alpuerto, and this from the date of the execution of that instrument as a private document. However, circumstances show that the sale made by Llenos to Alpuerto was one in fraud of creditors; hence, the deed must be annulled and the property delivered to Pastor. Doctrine: a private document legally recognized shall have, with regard to those who signed it and their privies, the same force as a public instrument. The term “privies” denotes the idea of succession, not only by right of heirship and testamentary legacy, but also that of succession by singular title, derived from acts inter vivos, and for special purposes; hence, an assignee of a credit, and one subrogated to it will be privies. • Section 32 Admission by Silence 65. People v. Alegre 84 S 105 66. People v. Raquel 265 S 246 Facts: At midnight of July 4, 1986, Agapito Gambalan answered the door, thinking of a neighbor in need. Instead, heavily armed men came through the door, declared a hold-up and fired their guns at him. Upon hearing the gunshots, Agapito’s wife, Juliet, went out of their room and found his lifeless body while a man took Agapito’s gun and left hurriedly with the others. George Jovillano responded to Juliet’s plea for help and reported the incident to the police, who found Amado Ponce, one of the accused, wounded and lying near the Gambalan’s house. Ponce revealed to the police that Sabas and Valeriano Raquel were the perpetrators of the crime and that they may be found in their residence. The Raquels were later apprehended on different occasions. The trial court found all the accused guilty of the crime. Issue: Can the extrajudicial statement of Ponce pointing at the Raquels as his co-perpetrators of the crime be used as a basis to convict them? Held: No. The lone eyewitness, Juliet, was not able to identify the assailants of her husband. The identification of the accused as the culprits was based chiefly on the extrajudicial statement of Ponce pointing to them as his co-perpetrators of the crime. Ponce himself had escaped from jail before he could testify in court and has been at large since. The extrajudicial statements of an accused implicating a co-accused may not be utilized against the latter, unless they are repeated in open court. If the accused never had the opportunity to cross-examine his coaccused on the latter’s extrajudicial statements, the same are hearsay as against said accused. Extreme caution should be exercised by the courts in dealing with the confession of an accused which implicates his co-accused. A distinction should be made between extrajudicial and judicial confessions. The former deprives the accused of the opportunity to cross-examine the confessant, while in the latter, his confession is thrown wide open for cross-examination and rebuttal. Except for Ponce’s extrajudicial statement, there exists no evidence linking the Raquels to the crime. Said statement was also made in violation of the constitutional rights of Ponce, as admitted in the testimony of the investigating officer. Extrajudicial statements made during custodial investigations without the assistance of counsel are inadmissible and cannot be considered in the adjudication of the case. Doctrine: The res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced an act, declaration, or omission of another. An extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused. 67. People v. Yatco 97 Phil 490 Facts: Juan Consunji, Alfonso Panganiban and another unknown individual, were charged with having conspired together in the murder of Jose Ramos. During the trial, as the prosecution was questioning a witness, Atty. Arturo Xavier of NBI, in connection with the making of a certain extra-judicial confession by Consunji, Panganiban’s counsel interposed a general objection to any evidence on such confession on the

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ground that it was hearsay and therefore incompetent as against Panganiban. The trial court ordered the exlusion of the evidence objected to on the ground that the prosecution could not be permitted to introduce the confessions of Consunji and Panganiban to prove conspiracy between them, without prior proof of such conspiracy by a number of definite acts, conditions, and circumstances. Issue: Was the extrajudicial statement of Consunji properly excluded from the evidence? Held: No. Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, even if Consunji’s confession may not be competent as against his co-accused Panganiban, being hearsay as to the latter, or to prove conspiracy between them without the conspiracy being established by other evidence, the confession of Consunji was, nevertheless, admissible as evidence of his own guilt, and should have been admitted as such. As for the rule providing that “the act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration,” the rule refers to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful enterprises and in furtherance of its object, and not to a confession made, as in this case, long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end. Besides, the prosecution had not yet offered the confessions to prove conspiracy between the two accused, nor as evidence against both of them. The alleged confessions had not yet even been identified, much less offered in evidence. The prosecution might still be able to adduce other proof of conspiracy between Consunji and Panganiban before their confessions are formally offered in evidence. It was premature for the court to exclude them completely on that ground. Doctrine: Sec. 30, Rule 130, applies only to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful enterprises and in furtherance of its object, and not to a confession made, as in this case, long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end. 68. People v. Serrano (105 Phil 531) GR No. L-7973 April 27, 1959 Facts: On October 16, 1950, Eulogio Serrano told Cenon Serrano, and other co-accused that Pablo Navarro had been including and prompting people to call on Senator Pablo Angeles David and testify on the Maliwalu massacre, and for that reason, he manifested to them his desire and plan to do away with Navarro. Eulogio instructed the others to wait for Navarro in Bacolor, lure him to go with them to barrio Dolores and there kill him. Pursuant to this, the accused waited for Navarro, then invited him to drink, after which, they went to Dolores, Bacolor, with the already drunk Navarro. There, they tied Navarro and accued of bringing witnesses to the house of Senator David to testify on the Maliwalu massacre. When he denied the charge, they began beating him up. Later, he was shot to death and his body was shoved into a pit and covered with earth. Another man, Simplicio Manguerra, was also killed and buried in a pit. The accused were charged with illegal detention with murder for the deaths of Pablo Navarro and of Simplicio Manguerra in separate criminal cases. Upon motion of the asst. provincial fiscal, Anastacio Reyes was discharged to testify as witness for the prosecution. They were found guilty of the crime. Of all the accused, only Domingo Cadiang, Santiago Yumul and Filemon Cenzon appealed. The appellants claimed that in order that the testimony of a conspirator (Anastacio Reyes) may be admissible in evidence against his co-conspirators, it must appear and be shown by evidence, other than the admission itself, that the conspiracy actually existed and that the person who is bound by the admission was a privy to the conspiracy. As there is nothing but the lone testimony of Reyes, a coconspirator, conspiracy was not established and the trial court erred in convicting the appellants on the basis of the testimony of Reyes. Issue: Is Reyes’s testimony admissible against his co-conspirators? Held: No. The rule that “the act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration,” applies only to extra-judicial acts or declaration, but not to testimony given on the stand at the trial, where the defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. And while the testimony of accomplices or confederates in crime is always subject to grave suspicion, “coming as it does from a polluted source,” and should be received with great caution and doubtingly examined, it is nevertheless admissible and competent. Doctrine: Where the testimony was given on the stand at trial, where the defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, the rule that requires that conspiracy be shown by evidence other than the act or declaration of the conspirator making the testimony does not apply • Admission of Predecessor 69. City of Manila v. Jacinto Del Rosario 5 Phil 227 The declaration of the predecessor must be made during the time when he was holding property CONFESSION 70. People v. Mario Compil (244 S 135) GR No. 95028 May 15, 1995 Facts: Robbers broke into MJ Furnitures, which also served as the dwelling of its proprietors, the Spouses Manuel and Mary Jay, by detaching the window grills on the second floor where the Jays’ bedroom was

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located. The two maids were herded in the bathroom and Mary was tied and gagged in the bedroom as the robbers ransacked the room, taking P35,000 in cash and jewelry worth P30,000. Upon noticing that the two men guarding them had already left, the two maids rushed to the bedroom and freed Mary, and they all rushed to the ground floor, where they found Manuel, who apparently had just come home from their other furniture store, Best Wood Furniture, sprawled on the floor among pieces of furniture that were in disarray. He eventually died from 13 stab wounds. Jessie Bartolome, who worked at the store, told the police that he and his girlfriend, while inside an ownertype jeep parked near the furniture shop, had seen his co-workers, Marlo Compil, Baltazar Mabini and Jose Jacale, going to the back of the shop. Moreover, Compil, Mabini and Jacale all failed to report for work the day after the incident. Upon being arrested, Compil admitted his guilt and pointed to the arresting officers his co-perpetrators in the heist from a picture of the baptism of the child of Mabini’s sister. Compil was further investigated at the Tayabas Police Station, and again in Manila. He confessed that he had been with the group that robbed MJ Furnitures, claiming he merely served as a lookout, for which he received P1,000, but did not go into the shop since he would be recognized. Compil claimed that his cohorts stabbed Manuel to death. Compil also claimed that, after the robbery, they all met in the house of his coconspirator’s brother to share the loot and drink beer. The owner of said house confirmed the facts in Compil’s confession. The day after his arrest, Compil, in the presence of his lawyer and three relatives, executed a sworn statement admitting his participation in the crime as a lookout and named his six cohorts. The police, however, failed to arrest said cohorts, and an Information for robbery with homicide was later filed against Compil, who entered a plea of not guilty. Issue: Are Compil’s extrajudicial confessions admissible as evidence against him? Held: No. "The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from respondent/accused. At such point or stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting forced or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of the offense." The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means — by telephone if possible — or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. In this case, Compil was subjected to interrogation and confessed to the commission of the crime thrice without the assistance of counsel. The belated arrival of the CLAO lawyer the next day, even if prior to the actual signing of the uncounseled confession, does not cure the defect since the investigators had already extracted incriminatory statements from Compil. The operative act, it has been stressed, is when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect who has been taken into custody by the police to carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting incriminatory statements, and not the signing by the suspect of his supposed extrajudicial confession. However, Compil was still found guilty of the crime, such guilt having been established through circumstantial evidence.

Doctrine: The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from respondent/accused. Extrajudicial confession extracted without the assistance of counsel is inadmissible in evidence, even if such counsel was present at the time of the signing of the supposed confession. 71. People v. Wong Chuen Ming 256 SCRA 182 Facts: The 11 accused, all Malaysian nationals, arrived in Manila from Hong Kong as a tour group arranged by Select Tours International Co., Ltd. Upon reaching Customs, Au Wing Cheung, the tour guide, handed to the Customs examiner, Danilo Gomez, the tour group's passenger's manifest, their baggage declarations and their passports. Upon finding a number of Alpen Cereal boxes in each of the baggage of the accused, however, Gomez became suspicious and opened one of them. The baggage was found to contain a white crystalline substance which was later found to be “shabu.” The group group was then ordered to proceed to the district collector's office, where the baggage of the other members of the tour group were further examined. A total of 30 boxes of Alpen Cereals containing a white crystalline substance were recovered from the baggage of the 11 accused. Gomez bundled said boxes with masking tape and handed them over to Zenaida Reyes Bonifacio, Chief of the Collection Division and Acting Duty Collector of the Customs Office at the NAIA. Bonifacio then called out the names of accused as listed in the passengers' manifest and ordered them to sign on the masking tape placed on the boxes. A field test was conducted, the substance was revealed to be shabu, and the 11 accused were arrested. At Camp Crame, accused were asked to identify their signatures on the boxes and after having identified them, they were again made to sign on the plastic bags containing white crystalline substance inside the boxes bearing their signatures. A further examination by the forensic chemist of the PNP Crime Lab confirmed that the white crystalline substance was shabu.

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Co-accused Lim Chan Fatt admitted being responsible for bringing the boxes of Alpen Cereals into the country, but denied any knowledge that they contained shabu. Lim claimed that a certain Ah Hong, a coboarder and a Hong Kong businessman, had asked him to bring with him boxes of cereals to the Philippines, where a certain Ah Sing would get them from him. In exchange, Ah Sing would see to it that Lim would have a good time in the Philippines. Ah Hong allegedly even opened one box to show that it really contained cereals. Lim acceded to Ah Hong's request, but since his baggage could not accommodate all 30 boxes, he requested two of his co-accused to accommodate some of the boxes in their baggage. The tour guide, Cheung, and Wong Chuen Ming denied that the boxes were recovered from their baggage, claiming they affixed their signatures on the boxes only because they were threatened by police authorities present during the examination inside the collector's office. All the accused were later found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of R.A. 6425. Issue: Are the signatures of the accused on the cereal boxes admissible as evidence against them? Held: No. Accused were not informed of their right to remain silent and to counsel and any statement they might make could be used against them, when they were made to affix their signatures on the boxes of Alpen Cereals while they were at the NAIA and again, on the plastic bags when they were already taken in custody at Camp Crame. By affixing their signatures, accused in effect made a tacit admission of the crime charged for mere possession of shabu is punished by law. These signatures of accused are tantamount to an uncounselled extrajudicial confession which is not sanctioned by the Bill of Rights (Section 12 (1)(3), Article III, 1987 Constitution). They are, therefore, inadmissible as evidence for any admission wrung from the accused in violation of their constitutional rights is inadmissible against them. The fact that all accused are foreign nationals does not preclude application of the "exclusionary rule" because the constitutional guarantees embodied in the Bill of Rights are given and extend to all persons, both aliens and citizens. Among the prosecution witnesses, only Gomez testified that all the seized baggage, including those owned by Chuen Ming and Wing Cheung, contained a box or boxes of shabu. However, Gomez's testimony inculpating accused-appellants was not corroborated by other prosecution witnesses. The presumption of regularity in the performance of duties accorded to Gomez cannot, by itself, prevail over the constitutional right of accused-appellants to be presumed innocent especially in the light of the foregoing testimonies of other prosecution witnesses. Doctrine: Extrajudicial confession extracted in violation of the accused’s constitutional rights is inadmissible as evidence against him. That fact that he is a foreign national does not preclude application of the "exclusionary rule" because the constitutional guarantees embodied in the Bill of Rights are given and extend to all persons, both aliens and citizens. 72. People v. Yip Wai Ming 264 S 224 Facts: Yip Wai Ming and Lam Po Chun, both Hong Kong nationals and engaged to be married, came to Manila on vacation on July 10, 1993. The next day, Chun wa found brutally beaten up and strangled to death in their hotel room. On that day, Ming was allegedly touring Metro Manila with Filipino welcomers while Chun stayed in the hotel room allegedly due to a headache. Ming was charged for murder. As witness for the prosecution, Cariza Destresa, the couple’s hotel neighbor, testified that she heard a loud argument inside the couple’s room and a struggle where there was supposedly a faint cry and a loud thud. The front desk clerk also testified that Ming, at about 10 a.m., came down later to meet with Gwen de los Santos who was to accompany them to a tour around Manila. Ming left his fiancée Chung in their room, giving specific instructions not to disturb her. He was perspiring and kind of in a hurry. During his absence, until his return at 11pm, he did not call Chun to verify her physical condition. When Ming returned, he asked the receptionist for the key of his room, then, together with a room boy, proceeded to Room 210. They found Chun dead, lying face down on the bed covered with a blanket. Ming exclaimed 'My God, she is dead', but did not even embrace his fiancee. Instead, he asked the room boy to go down the hotel to ask someone to call the police. Upon examination of the room and the body of the victim, the police found no signs of forcible entry and observed that no one can enter from the outside without a key. The body, meanwhile, was already in state of rigor mortis, indicating that Chung had been dead for 10 to 12 hours. It was also learned that her life was insured with the Insurance Company of New Zealand in Causeway Bay, Hong Kong, with Ming as the beneficiary. The premium paid for the insurance was more than the monthly salary of the deceased as an insurance underwriter in Hong Kong. Issue: Were the confessions made by Ming during the custodial investigations as to his guilt of the crime of murder admissible in evidence against him? Held: No.The custodial interrogation of Yip Wai Ming was violative of Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, hence, the confessions accused-appellant made during the same are inadmissible as evidence. Any confession, including a re-enactment without admonition of the right to silence and to counsel, and without counsel chosen by the accused is inadmissible in evidence. Here, Ming was arrested without a warrant on the basis of a series of circumstancial evidence. The arresting officer had no personal knowledge of Ming having committed the crime. Ming, meanwhile, claimed he had been tortured and

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beaten up until he admitted the crime charged, participated in a re-enactment, and signed an extrajudicial statement. All the while, he was not informed of his right to remain silent nor did he have counsel of his choice to assist him in confessing the crime. Doctrine: Any confession, including a re-enactment without admonition of the right to silence and to counsel, and without counsel chosen by the accused is inadmissible in evidence. 73. People v. Endino (352 S 307) GR No. 133026 Feb. 20, 2001 Nag wak-wak sya sa ABS-CBN Facts: On a busy street in Puerto Princesa City in the evening of 16 October 1991, Gerry Galgarin, uncle of accused Edward Endino, suddenly and without warning lunged at Dennis Aquino and stabbed him repeatedly on the chest. Aquino managed to free himself and tried to run away, but Endino, who harbored ill-feelings towards Aquino and the latter's girlfriend, Clara Agagas (whose love the two men once shared), shot Aquino. Galgarin and Endino fled, and Aquino expired shortly thereafter. Galgarin was arrested and was interviewed by ABS-CBN reporters, to whom he admitted his guilt while pointing to Endino as the gunman and appealing for the latter to give himself up to the authorities. However, Endino disowned the confession, claiming that it was induced by the threats of the arresting police officers. He asserted that the videotaped confession was constitutionally infirm and inadmissible under the exclusionary rule provided in Sec.12, Art. III, of the Constitution. The video footages, however, was admitted in evidence upon a finding that Galgarin’s confession was made before a group of newsmen that could have dissipated any semblance of hostility towards him. Endino was convicted of murder. Issue: Was the videotaped confession of Galgarin admissible in evidence? Ruling: Yes. The interview was recorded on video and it showed Galgarin unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such confession does not form part of custodial investigation as it was not given to police officers but to media men in an attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public. Besides, if he had indeed been forced into confessing, he could have easily sought succor from the newsmen who, in all likelihood, would have been sympathetic with him. However, because of the inherent danger in the use of television as a medium for admitting one's guilt, and the recurrence of this phenomenon in several cases, it is prudent that trial courts are reminded that extreme caution must be taken in further admitting similar confessions. For in all probability, the police, with the connivance of unscrupulous media practitioners, may attempt to legitimize coerced extrajudicial confessions and place them beyond the exclusionary rule by having an accused admit an offense on television. Such a situation would be detrimental to the guaranteed rights of the accused and thus imperil our criminal justice system. In other words, courts should never presume that all media confessions described as voluntary have been freely given. Doctrine: A confession willingly, openly and publicly given in the presence of newsmen through an interview does not form part of custodial investigation as it was not given to police officers but to media men in an attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public. Hence, it is admissible in evidence. However, courts must exercise caution and should never presume that all media confessions described as voluntary have been freely given. 74. People v. Abulencia (363 S 496) GR No. 138403 Aug. 22, 2001 Nag wak-wak sya sa Bombo Radyo Facts: Ten-year old Rebelyn Garcia’s naked body was found floating in a creek in San Manuel, Pangasinan, with marks of bruises, burns and injuries manifesting that she was defiled and later drowned to death. Rebelyn was last seen with Rolly Abulencia before she was found dead. Abulencia surrendered to Mayor Felipe Sevilleja of San Manuel, Pangasinan. PO3 Randy Bergado, a PNP officer who was then in the mayor’s house, was informed by Abulencia that “he had a small girl companion that he accidentally bumped at the Aburido bridge” and who “might have been dead because the flow of the river is so fast.” Dennis Mojares, a radio commentator of DZWN Bombo Radio, testified that on August 6, 1998, Abulencia admitted to him in a taped interview made at the Municipal Jail having raped Rebelyn and that she fell off the bridge. Abulencia was charged with rape with homicide. In his defense, Abulencia denied the charge. He claimed that on August 4, 1998, he noticed Rebelyn folowing him as he was going to the market to buy dilis, but he just ignored her. However, upon reaching the market, he decided not to buy dilis anymore, and instead proceeded towards San Manuel while Rebelyn continued to follow him closely. Annoyed, he told her he was going to San Manuel, but she insisted on following him because she wanted to go to his house. They then took the provincial road, but upon reaching the Aburido bridge, he distanced himself from the girl. However, she ran towards him. While she was running, he tried to tell her to go home, but in doing so he accidentally tripped (napatid) her off, causing her to fall from the bridge. He got nervous and proceeded to the house of his Auntie Deciang Delfin and asked her to accompany him to the authorities so he could surrender. Abulencia was found guilty of the charges and convicted. Issue: Was the confession made to the radio commentator admissible in evidence against Abulencia?

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Held: Yes. Abulencia admitted having raped Rebelyn when he was interviewed by Dennis Mojares, a radio commentator of Bombo Radio. Mojares’ testimony lends support to the finding of guilty. It has been held that “a confession to a radio reporter is admissible where it was not shown that said reporter was acting for the police or that the interview was conducted under circumstances where it is apparent that the suspect confessed to the killing out of fear.” Doctrine: A confession to a radio reporter is admissible where it was not shown that said reporter was acting for the police or that the interview was conducted under circumstances where it is apparent that the suspect confessed to the killing out of fear. 75. People v. Maqueda 242 S 565 March 22, 1995 J. Davide Facts: On August 27, 1991, British Horace William Barker, a consultant of the World Bank, was brutally slain, while his Filipina wife, Teresita, was badly battered with lead pipes on the occasion of a robbery in their home. Prima facie evidence pointed to Rene Salvamante as one of the suspects. Richard Malig and, later, Hector Maqueda, were included in the information for robbery with homicide and serious physical injuries, though Malig was later dropped for lack of sufficient evidence against him. Maqueda was arrested on March 4, 1992, and was brought to the headquarters of the 235th PNP Mobile Force Company. SPO3 Armando Molleno, upon order of Maj. Virgilio F. Renton, got Maqueda's statement, claiming that he informed the latter of his Constitutional rights. Maqueda thereafter signed a Sinumpaang Salaysay wherein he narrated his participation in the crime at the Barker house. On April 9, 1992, Maqueda filed an application for bail, asking to be made a state witness as it appeared that “he is the least guilty among the accused in this case." Prosecutor Zarate then talked to Maqueda regarding such statement, asking him if he was with Salvamante during the robbery. Upon receiving an affirmative answer, Zarate told Maqueda that he would oppose the motion for bail since he was the only accused on trial. In the meantime, Ray Dean Salvosa got permission from Zarate to talk to Maqueda. Maqueda narrated to Salvosa that Salvamante brought him to Baguio City in order to find a job as a peanut vendor but found out later that they were going to rob the Barkers. He initially objected to the plan, but later on agreed to it. He admitted having hit Mrs. Barker with a lead pipe after she came down and in helping Salvamante beat up Mr. Barker who had followed his wife downstairs. When the Barkers were already unconscious on the floor, Salvamante looted the house. They made their escape through Baguio City and then rode a Philippine Rabbit Bus heading for Manila. During trial, however, Maqueda denied having been in Benguet at the time of the robbery and claimed he was working as a caretaker in a polvoron factory in Sukat, Muntinlupa. This was denied however by the owner of the polvoron factory Fredesminda Castrence. The trial court found Maqueda guilty and convicted him "based on the confession and the proof of corpus delicti" as well as on circumstantial evidence. Issue: Was the sinumpaang salaysay admissible as a confession? Held: No. The exercise of the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution are not confined to that period prior to the filing of a criminal complaint or information but are available at that stage when a person is "under investigation for the commission of an offense." Ordinarily, once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court and the accused is thereafter arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest, he must be delivered to the nearest police station or jail and the arresting officer must make a return of the warrant to the issuing judge, and since the court has already acquired jurisdiction over his person, it would be improper for any public officer or law enforcement agency to investigate him in connection with the commission of the offense for which he is charged. If, nevertheless, he is subjected to such investigation, then Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution and the jurisprudence thereon must be faithfully complied with. Here, the sinumpaang salaysay of Maqueda made after his arrest was taken in palpable violation of the said Constitutional provision, contrary to the claim of SPO2 Molleno. As disclosed by a reading thereof, Maqueda was not even told of any of his constitutional rights under the said section. The statement was also taken in the absence of counsel. Such uncounselled Sinumpaang Salaysay is wholly inadmissible pursuant to paragraph 3, Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. Nevertheless, the extrajudicial admissions of Maqueda to Zarate and to Salvosa are not governed by the exclusionary rules under the Bill of Rights. Maqueda voluntarily and freely made them to Zarate not in the course of an investigation, but in connection with Maqueda's plea to be utilized as a state witness; and as to the other admission, it was given to a private person. The provisions of the Bill of Rights are primarily limitations on government, declaring the rights that exist without governmental grant, that may not be taken away by government and that government has the duty to protect, or restrictions on the power of government found "not in the particular specific types of action prohibited, but in the general principle that keeps alive in the public mind the doctrine that governmental power is not unlimited.'' They are the fundamental safeguards against aggressions of arbitrary power, or state tyranny and abuse of authority. In laying down the principles of the government and fundamental liberties of the people, the Constitution did not govern the relationships between individuals.

Doctrine: A sinumpaang salaysay made in palpable violation of the Constitutional right to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such rights is inadmissible in evidence.

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However, such exclusionary rule under the Bill of Rights do not apply to extrajudicial admissions voluntarily and freely made not in the course of an investigation or given to a private person. Offer of Compromise 76. People v. Danny Godoy 250 S 678 Public crimes – offer of compromise not admissible in evidence; Godoy does not know that his mother made the settlement. Hence, does not constitute implied admission of guilt. Facts: Mia Taha accused Danny Godoy of raping her when she went to the boarding house of her cousin, Merlylyn Casantosan, near the school where she was studying. Upon entering through the kitchen door, he grabbed her from behind, poked a knife on her neck and dragged her by the hand, telling her not to shout. She was forced to lie down on the floor and raped at knife-point. Although it was dark, Taha recognized her Physicas teacher, Godoy, as her assailant. Godoy threatened her not to tell anyone or else he would kill her and her family. The next day, Godoy arrived at her parents’ house and asked permission from Taha’s parents for her to accompany him to solicit funds because she was a candidate for “Miss PNS Pulot.” She was forced to go for fear of getting her parents into trouble. She was taken to Sunset Garden and detained for three days, where she was constantly raped at knife-point. Then, she was taken to the house of Godoy’s friend, where she was again raped three times. Upon finding that Taha had been reported as a missing person in the police blotter, Taha was released only after her parents agreed to settle the case with Godoy. Godoy denied the allegations, claiming that they were having an affair, and that it was Taha who repeatedly chased after him and who went with him to the Sunset Garden out of fear of her parents because she thought she was pregnant. It was however alleged that Godoy’s mother gave them P30,000 as settlement in exchange for an affidavit of desistance on the part of Mia Taha. There was also an alleged offer of marriage. Issue: Was the offer of compromise an admission of guilt? Held: No. In criminal cases, an offer of compromise is generally admissible as evidence against the party making it. It is a legal maxim that in the matter of public crimes which directly affect the public interest, no compromise whatever may be entered into as regards the penal action. However, in such cases, the accused is permitted to show that the offer was not made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason which would justify a claim by the accused that the offer to compromise was not in truth an admission of his guilt or an attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would ordinarily ensue therefrom. In this case, the evidence for the defense overwhelmingly proves Godoy’s innocence of the offense charged. Further, the supposed offer of marriage did not come from Godoy, but was actually suggested by an imam who informed him that he could convert into Muslim to be able to marry Taha despite already being married. However, Godoy refused. As for the P30,000 paid by Gody’s mother, Godoy himself was actually unaware of this, not until the trial proper. The only ones present during the negotiations were Taha, her parents, and Godoy’s mother. Where the accused was not present at the time the offer for monetary consideration was made, such offer of compromise would not save the day for the prosecution. No implied admission can be drawn from the efforts to arrive at a settlement outside the court, where the accused did not take part in any of the negotiations and the effort to settle the case was in accordance with the established tribal customs, that is, Muslim practices and traditions, in an effort to prevent further deterioration of the relation between the parties. Doctrine: In criminal cases, an offer to compromise is generally admissible as evidence against the party making it. However, in such cases, the accused is permitted to show that the offer was not made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason which would justify a claim by the accused that the offer to compromise was not in truth an admission of his guilt or an attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would ordinarily ensue therefrom. 77. People v. De Guzman 265 S 228 Dec. 2, 1996 Plea ((of family) for forgiveness – YES. The accused does not disown the act of his family. A plea of forgiveness may be considered as analogous to offer of compromise, hence considered admission. Facts: Gilda Ambray, a sales clerk at the Anson Department Store, was waiting by the gate of Meadow Wood Subdivision in Bacoor, Cavite, for a tricycle ride toward her house when she noticed Gener de Guzman sitting at the guardhouse. After asking him some questions, she started walking, but de Guzman got onto his tricycle and offered her a ride. While on board, Gilda noticed that he took a different route, stopping once in a while to tell her that the tricycle was not in good condition. Upon reaching Phase II of the same subdivision, near an unfinished house, de Guzman told Gilda to push the tricycle. Gilda got out and paid him P5.00, which de Guzman refused. As she was walking away, de Guzman embraced her from behind and threatened her not to shout. Then, he dragged her to a vacant lot near the unfinished house, and raped her as she struggled despite his threats to kill her.

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It was also alleged that de Guzman’s parents, wife and children had gone to Gilda to plead for her forgiveness, which she rejected. Issue: Should the plea for forgiveness made by de Guzman’s parents, wife and children be deemed an admission of guilt? Held: Yes. De Guzman did not disown the acts of his parents, wife and children in pleading for Gilda’s forgiveness, which were testified to by his kumadre, Resurreccion Quiocho, and Gilda herself. He chose not to deny their testimony. Moreover, despite the unequivocal pronouncement by the trial court that his guilt was “strongly established by the acts of his parents, wife and relatives, who had gone to the house of the victim to ask her forgiveness and seek a compromise,” the accused dared not assign that finding and conclusion as an error and his Appellant’s Brief is conspicuously silent thereon. Indubitably then, the accused was a party to the decision to seek for forgiveness, or had prior knowledge of the plan to seek for it and consented to pursue it, or confirmed and ratified the act of his parents, wife, children and sister-inlaw. A plea for forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an attempt to compromise. In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offense or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. No one would ask for forgiveness unless he had committed some wrong, for to forgive means to absolve, to pardon, to cease to feel resentment against on account of wrong committed; give up claim to requittal from or retribution upon an offender. Doctrine: A plea for forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an attempt to compromise. In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offense or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. 78. People v. Yparaguirre The wife of the accused went to the parents of the victim offering 25k. at the time of the offer, no criminal complaint has yet been filed. SC: an offer of compromise does not require that a criminal complaint is already pending. What was required is that the compromise was made after the commission of the offense. Facts: Rosita Bacaling, a housemaid of Crispin Yparraguirre and his wife, was cooking porridge for the spouses’ two children, who were both asleep, when Yparraguirre arrived from work. Yparraguirre handed Rosita a small white envelope said to contain medicine for a skin disease Rosita had allegedly contracted from one of the children. Rosita opened the envelope and found 15 tablets inside, all of which Yparraguirre told her to take. Upon doing so, she felt weak and fell down. Yparraguirre dragged her to the spouses’ bed where he, while pointing a hunting knife at her neck and threatening to kill her if she moved, raped her. Yparraguirre threatened to kill her if she told her parents about the incident. A month later, Rosita left the Yparraguirres and went back home to her mother’s house. She was submitted for medical examination, and then confined at the Davao City Mental Hospital for observation and treatment for a week, after which, she revealed that she was raped. It was also alleged that Yparraguirre’s wife went to the mother of Rosita to negotiate for the dropping of the case. Issue: Did Mrs. Yparraguirre offer to compromise with the mother of Rosita? Held: Yes. There is evidence that after Rosita revealed the rape to her mother, Mrs. Yparraguirre offered Mrs. Bacaling P15,000 to dissuade her from filing the complaint. When Mrs. Bacaling refused, Mrs. Yparraguirre increased the offer to P25,000, which Mrs. Bacaling still refused. It is true that no criminal complaint had yet been filed at that time, but the rape incident was already known to Mrs. Yparraguirre. Mrs. Yparraguirre herself testified that Mrs. Bacaling told her about it the day when the former first offered the money. Doctrine: An offer to compromise does not require that a criminal complaint be first filed before the offer can be received in evidence against the offeror. What is required is that after committing the crime, the accused or his representative makes an offer to compromise and such offer is proved. 79. Edward Keller & Co. v. COB Group Marketing Inc. 141 S 86 January 16, 1986 Facts: COB Group Marketing (COB) was the exclusive distributor of Edward Keller & Co.’s (EKC) household products in Panay and Negros, with EKC selling on credit said products to COB. As security for the credit purchases, a certain Manahan assumed solidary liability with COB by mortgaging her land to EKC. A second sales agreement later extended COB’s territory to Northern and Souther Luzon, with a certain Lorenzo executing a real estate mortgage in favor of EKC. Eventually, COB’s liability to Keller amounted to P179,000. A settlement agreement was entered into, whereby COB executed 2 second chattel mortgages in favor of Keller. However, said mortgages did not become effective as the first mortgagee, Northern Motors, did not consent thereto. Hence, two COB stockholders, Adao and Lorenzo, proposed, via a letter, to pay Keller P5,000 on November 30, 1971, and thereafter every 30th day of the month for 3 years until the obligation is fully satisfied, and to substitute the Manahan mortgage with one on Adao’s lot.

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Issue: Should the documentary evidence above be deemed admissions on the part of COB regarding its liability to EKC? Held: Yes. Under Sec 22, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court, the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him “as admissions of a party.” The second chattel mortgages, though ineffective for lack of consent of the first mortgagee, served the purpose of being admissions of the liability of COB to Keller. The admissions of the president of COB are also supported by the documentary evidence presented by Keller, such as the invoices with delivery receipts, together with a tabulation thereof, and a statement of account showing COB’s liability to Keller, as reflected in the customer’s ledger. COB’s president also admitted that Keller sent COB monthly statement of accounts. Moreover, the stockholder’s letter to EKC also serve as admissions of liability. Doctrine: Pieces of documentary evidence, such as the chattel mortgages and the stockholders’ letter in this case, may be deemed admissions of liability falling under Sec. 22, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provides that the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a releveant fact may be given in evidence against him “as admissions of a party.” Similar Acts as Evidence (Res Inter Alios Acta part2) 80. People v. Pineda 37 Phil Offense committed in the past is not admissible however if the the first offense is not used to prove the second offense but to prove a specific intent etc, such may be received in evidence. 81. People v. Irang 64 Phil EXCEPTIONS TO THE HEARSAY RULE • Sec. 37 Dying declaration People vs. Laquinon G.R. No. L-45470 February 28, 1985 Facts: On the night of November 13, 1972, Barrio Captain Samama Buat heard gunshots coming from the bank of a river near his house. Moments later, Leocario Buat, Samama’s brother arrived and told the latter that a man was shouting for help at the bank of the river. Samama proceeded to the place where the unidentified man was, followed by Leocario who had called a barrio councilman. They found a man lying face down on the sand, with his two hands tied behind his back. The man identified himself as Pablo Remonde. Samama Buat took Remonde’s ante-mortem statement, whereby the latter pointed to Gregorio Laquinon as the one who shot him. When asked whether he would survive, Remonde answered, “I don’t know.” Samama also informed Vice Mayor Biran about the shooting of Remonde. Biran went to the scene of the incident and was also told by Remonde that he had been shot by Laquinon. Remonde died in the hospital 3 days later because of the bullet wounds. Laquinon denied the charges and claimed that it was one Noli Cabardo who killed Remonde. Laquinon, a member of the KM, only brought Remonde to Cabardo. Laquinon, however, was found guilty of murder. Issue: Was the ante-mortem declaration of Remonde inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay? Held: Yes. The dying declaration of Remonde is not admissible as an ante-mortem declaration since Remonde was in doubt as to whether he would die or not. When asked whether he would survive, Remonde answered “I don’t know.” The declaration fails to show that the deceased believed himself in extremis, “at the point of death when hope of recovery is extinct,” which is the sole basis for admitting this kind of declarations as an exception to the hearsay rule. It may be admitted however, as part of the res gestae since the statement was made immediately after the incident and deceased Pablo Remonde had no sufficient time to concoct a story. Moreover, the rest of the evidence presented shows that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder qualified by treachery. Doctrine: For a dying declaration to be admissible in evidence, it must be shown that the deceased believed himself in extremis, “at the point of death when hope of recovery is extinct,” which is the sole basis for admitting this kind of declarations as an exception to the hearsay rule 82. People vs. Sabio

G.R. No. L-26193 January 27, 1981

Facts: Catalino Espina was found on the second floor of his home, wounded on the forehead. Jesusa Birondo testified that around 5am that day, as she was preparing to go to the seashore, she heard cries for help coming from Espina’s house. When she looked outside her window, she saw the accused, Rodulfo Sabio coming out of Espino’s store in his house. Camilo Semilla, Espino’s grandnephew who lived with the Espino, testified that, sometime after he left Espino’s house to go fishing, he saw Sabio from 6 meters away, running past him and towards his (Sabio’s) home, his hands tucked inside his shirt. Minutes later, a certain Enok Calledo told Semilla to go home because his grand-uncle was crying for help. When Semilla arrived, he saw Espina lying wounded upstairs and the latter was only able to speak when his head was raised. Semilla also observed that the tin can containing the cash sales of the store amounting to around 8 pesos was lying empty on the floor.

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Espina asked Semilla to call for the police and Patrolmen Fuentes and Burgos responded. Upon arrival, Fuentes asked Espina questions about his wounding and wrote the answers on torn calendar page. According to Fuentes, Espina identified Sabio as his assailant, the latter having attacked him after demanding money. Fuentes then had Espina thumbmark this “ante-mortem statement” with his own blood, there being no ink available. Fuentes and Burgos signed as witnesses. Espina was then brought to the hospital where he died 3 days later due to his head wounds. In his defense, Sabio testified that at the time of the supposed robbery and homicide, he was asleep at home, which was corroborated by a certain Jacinto Mendez. Sabio was still found guilty of Robbery with Homicide and sentenced him to death. Issue: Was the ante-mortem statement of Espina admissible in evidence against Sabio? Held: With respect to the crime of robbery, the dying declaration is not admissible. Admission of dying declarations has always been strictly limited to criminal prosecutions for homicide or murder as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of death. With respect to the crime of homicide, the ante-mortem statement is admissible against Sabio. That Espinathe victim was under the consciousness of impending death is strengthened by the seriousness of injury to the victim’s forehead, the profuse bleeding, the inability to speak unless his head was raised, the spontaneous answers to Fuentes’ questions, and his subsequent demise from the wounds. The fact that death did not ensue until 3 days later does not alter its probative force since it is not an indispensable requirement that the declarant expire immediately after. It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of death in point of fact, that renders the dying declaration admissible. Neither does the fact that Espina told Semilla to fetch the police negate the former’s feeling of hopelessness of recovery. Rather, it emphasizes the realization that he had little time to disclose his assailant to the authorities. Doctrine: It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of death in point of fact, that renders the dying declaration admissible.

83. People v. Jose Agripa

G.R. No. 72244

May 8, 1992

84. People vs. De Joya

G.R. No. 75028

November 8, 1991

• Sec. 38 Declaration against Interest 85. People v. Toledo and Holgado GR No. L-28655 August 6, 1928 Facts: Sisenado Holgado and Filomeno Morales had a dispute over parcels of land located in Pinamalayan, Mindoro. One morning, Holgado and Morales met, and their argument was renewed. A bolo duel resulted in the death of Morales, while Holgado was seriously wounded and fled to the neighboring house of Dalmacio Manlisic. He then proceeded to the municipal building and made a sworn statement before the municipal president that only two persons fought. A month later, Holgado died of his wounds. The querida of Morales, Justina Villanueva, however, testified that Eugenio Toledo, a worker of Holgado, workers had intervened in the fight and dealt a mortal blow to Morales, such testimony being corroborated partially by a certain Justina Llave. Toledo denied this and claimed that he merely met Holgado after the fight and helped him get to the Manlisic residence. As evidence, Toledo’s counsel presented Holgado’s affidavit made at the municipal building, which affidavit was rejected as evidence for being hearsay. Toledo was convicted of homicide. Issue: Was the affidavit of Holgado inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay? Held: No. The trial court erred in not admitting the affidavit as a statement of fact against penal interest and had it been received, its influence would have been felt by the trial court. Hearsay evidence is generally excluded by the courts. One of the recognized exceptions has been the declarations of third parties contrary to their pecuniary or proprietary interest. Traditionally, this exception has been made only to apply to admissions against a pecuniary or proprietary interest but not a penal interest. The Court however fails to see why a man will be presumed to tell the truth in the former instances and not the latter. To limit the exception to statements against pecuniary interests and not criminal liability cannot be justified on grounds of public policy. The purpose of evidence is to get the truth. The reason for the hearsay rule is that the extrajudicial statements of another are not the best way of serving this purpose. In other words, the great possibility of fabrication and falsehood and the inability to prove such untruths requires the doors to be closed to such evidence. So long therefore as the declarant is available, his extrajudicial statement should not be heard. Where however, the declarant is dead or has disappeared, his previous out-of-court statements are the best evidence, if not inadmissible on other grounds. But they cannot be rendered inadmissible by the mere fact that the declarant is unavailable. One fact that will satisfy this necessity is that the declaration is or

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was against the declarant’s interest and this is because no sane person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his own detriment. Doctrine: Where the declarant is dead or has disappeared, his previous out-of-court statements are the best evidence, if not inadmissible on other grounds. They cannot be rendered inadmissible by the mere fact that the declarant is unavailable. 86. Viacrucis vs. CA G.R. No. L-29831 March 29, 1972 Facts: On June 8, 1936, Pedro Sanchez executed a deed selling the subject lot to Anastacio Orais. Said deed was registered. Sanchez subsequently executed another deed selling a portion of the same lot to Balentin Ruizo, who in turn sold it to Guillermo Viacrucis on October 10, 1945. Orais made oral demands for Viacrucis to vacate said portion and surrender it to him, but Viacrucis refused, and instead executed a deed selling the said portion to his brother-in-law Claros Marquez. The deeds of sale in favor of Ruizo, Viacrucis and Marquez, have not been registered with the Register of Deeds. The Sps. Viacrucis and the Sps. Marquez insist that the failure of Orais to bring the present action earlier constituted an omission that “may be given in evidence against him,” as provided in Sec. 22, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court. They also claim that when Orais had tried to obtain a loan from the PNB, with OCT No. 243 as collateral security, and PNB refused the offer on the ground that the land was not his property, Orais said nothing, which should have been considered an admission in silence, pursuant to Sec. 23, Rule 130. They also objected to the fact that the CA considered in favor of Orais, allegedly in violation of Sec. 25, Rule 130, the admission of Mrs. Beatriz Costelo, to the effect that, although the land was physically in the possession of her now deceased husband, he and she recognized Orais as the owner of said land. Issue 1: Was Orais’s failure to bring an action against the Viacrucises and the Marquezes an omission falling under the coverage of Sec. 22, Rule 130?

Held 1: No.The effect or import of the failure of Orais to file the present action until November 15, 1960, is a matter relevant to the issue of whether the sale attested to by Exhibit B is simulated, as contended by petitioners herein, or is a true and authentic sale, as Orais maintains. The decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming that of the trial court and sustaining the claim of Orais, constitutes a finding of fact, which is final in this proceeding for review on certiorari. Issue 2: Should Orais’s silence when the PNB rejected his offer of collateral on the ground that he did not own the property being offered be deemed an admission in silence? Held 2: No. There is no competent evidence on whether or not Orais had said anything in response to said statement. Moreover, OCT NO. 243 was in the name of Pedro Sanchez, and no matter how real the sale by the latter to Orais may be, the bank would not accept the land in question as security for said loan, unless and until OCT No. 243 shall have been cancelled and a transfer certificate of title issued to Orais. This could not take place before the filing of his loan application because the owner’s duplicate of said OCT, admittedly delivered by Sanchez to Orais, had been lost in the possession of Orais’s counsel, to who Orais had turned it over in connection with a criminal case. Issue 3: Was the admission of Mrs. Costelo properly considered in Orais’s favor? Held 3: Yes. The said testimony of Mrs. Costelo, and this recognition by the now deceased Pelagio Costelo, which were confirmed by a public document, constitute a declaration of the Sps. Costelo adverse to their interest, which is admissible in evidence, pursuant to Sec. 32 of Rule 130. Petitioners have no reason to object to the consideration in favor of Orais of said admission, the same having been made in 1936, more than 5 years before their predecessor in interest, Ruizo, had entered into the picture, when Orais and Costelo were the only parties who had any interest in the object of said admission. Pursuant to said legal provision, such admission “may be received in evidence,” not only against the party who made it “or his successors in interest,” but also “against third persons.” Doctrine: The legal provision regarding admissions adverse to the interest of the one making the admission may be received in evidence, not only against the third party who made it or his successor in interest, but also against third persons. • Sec. 39 Act or Declaration about Pedigree 87. People vs. Alegado G.R. Nos. 93030-31. August 21, 1991 Facts: On April 14, 1988, at the Freedom Square inside the public market of San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, Alfredo Alegado, a market watchman, took Cristina Deang to the second floor of the deserted market building. There, he ordered Cristina to masturbate him then forcibly pushed her to the floor. He lay on top of her and inserted his penis but it did not penetrate fully before he ejaculated. The appellant gave her P2.00 and then left. Fearing that he might kill her, Cristina told no one. Nearly a week later, Alegado again asked Cristina to go with him to the same spot. When she refused, Alegado shoved her to the stairs into the upper floor near the civic center. Initially, she resisted, but Alegado threatened to kill her and was able to rape her. Again, Alegado gave her P2.00, then left. Patrolwoman Evangeline Alfaro saw Alegado coming down the stairs, followed by Cristina a minute later. She was pale, with blood flowing from her thigh and legs.

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Alegado was charged and convicted of two counts of statutory rape and sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua. Alegado claimed that the prosecution failed to prove with certainty the actual age of Cristina to be able to convict him of statutory rape. Issue: Was the declaration of Cristina’s grandfather as to Cristina’s birthdate hearsay evidence? Held: No. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the offended party herself and her maternal grandfather, Cornelio Villarosa, as to Cristina’s birth on September 5, 1976, do not constitute hearsay evidence, contrary to Alegado’s claim. Such testimonies fall under the exceptions to the hearsay rule as provided under Section 39 and 40 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. The word “pedigree” under Section 39 includes relationship, family, genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and places where these facts occurred and the name of the relatives. Three requisites for its admissibility are: (1) that there is controversy in respect to the pedigree of any member of the family; (2) that the reputation or tradition of the pedigree of the person concerned existed previous to the controversy; and (3) that the witness testifying to the reputation or tradition must be a member of the family of the said person. All these preconditions are obtaining in the case at bar considering that the date of birth of the rape victim is put in issue; that the declaration of Villarosa relating to tradition existed long before the rape case was filed; and that the witness testifying to the said tradition is the maternal grandfather of Cristina. Moreover, Cristina herself categorically stated in open court that she was born on September 5, 1976. Although a person can have no personal knowledge of the date of his birth, he may testify as to his age as he learned it from his parents and relatives and his testimony in such case is an assertion of a family tradition. Doctrine: The three requisites for the admissibility of proof of pedigree are: (1) that there is controversy in respect to the pedigree of any member of the family; (2) that the reputation or tradition of the pedigree of the person concerned existed previous to the controversy; and (3) that the witness testifying to the reputation or tradition must be a member of the family of the said person. •

Sec. 40 Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree 88. Ferrer vs. Inchausti G.R. No. 12993. October 28, 1918 Facts: Rafael and Maria Angelina Ferrer claim that their late mother, Rosa Viademonte, had the right to inherit from Isabel Gonzales in the same proportion and capacity as the latter’s four other children, and as Rosa’s only legitimate heirs, Rafael and Maria Angelina are entitled to receive Rosa’s that is, one-fifth of the estate left by Isabel. According to them, Isabel was first married to Ramon Martinez Viademonte, with Rosa as their daughter. Isabel then married Jose Joaquin de Ynchausti, father of Isabel’s other children. Rosa had allegedly been treated and considered as Isabel’s daughter and that on one occasion, Isabel remarked that Rosa’s father was Ramon. It was also alleged that one of Isabel’s sons, Joaquin de Inchausti dedicated a picture to Rosa in the following manner: “To my dear and unforgettable sister Rosa.” College records of the latter at Collegio de Santa Isabel were shown to use establish filiation. The defendants, meanwhile, presented an entry in the notebook of Ramon Viademonte Jr. stating that the Rosa’s true name was Rosa Robles, born of unknown parents in September 1, 1952. Notwithstanding the arguments of the plaintiff, Joaquin also testified that one day he was assured by his half brother Ramon that Rosa was not his sister but a mere protégée, and that on one occasion, Ramon showed him Rosa’s birth certificate taken from a parochial church. A copy of said certificate was offered in evidence. Issue: Are the diary accounts of Ramon Viademonte, Jr. and Joaquin’s testimony admissible? Ruling: Yes. Evidence adduced at the trial to prove the origin of the cause of action shows, in a manner which leaves no room for doubt, that Rosa was not a legitimate daughter of Isabel Gonzales and it follows that her children have no right to a part of the hereditary property of Isabel Gonzales. In view of the fact that Ramon Martinez Viademonte is now dead, the testimony of Joaquin Jose de Inchausti referring to the said deceased is admissible as evidence of family tradition, for they are members of the same family and consequently the conclusion is that Rosa Matilde is the same Rosa Matilde Robles mentioned in Exhibit 6 and because she was born in 1952, in no manner could she be a legitimate daughter of Ramon Viademonte and Isabel Gonzales, whose marriage was dissolved 1n 1936 by the death of the husband. Doctrine: Testimony made by a witness regarding a declaration made by someone deceased, when both the witness and the declarant are members of the same family, is admissible as evidence of family tradition. Issue: Was the daybook kept by Ramon Viademonte, Jr. inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay? Held: No. Section 298, No, 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now section 41, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court) provides that evidence may be given upon trial of monuments and inscriptions in public places as

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evidence of common reputation; and entries in family Bibles or other family books or charts; engravings on rings, family portraits and the like, as evidence of pedigree. Doctrine: Evidence may be given upon trial of monuments and inscriptions in public places as evidence of common reputation; and entries in family Bibles or other family books or charts; engravings on rings, family portraits and the like, as evidence of pedigree •

89. Yaokee vs. Sy-Gonzales

Sec. 44 Entries in Official Records/ Sec. 46 Learned Treatises G.R. No. 55960. November 24, 1988

- Midterms---------------------------------OooO---------------------Part II 1. Regala vs. SB G.R. No. 105938. September 20, 1996 Facts: A complaint was filed by the PCGG against Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. for the recovery of alleged illgotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in certain corporations. Cojuangco’s co-defendants were Teodoro Regala, Edgardo Angara, Avelino Cruz, Jose Concepcion, Rogelio Vinluan, Victor Lazatin, Eduardo Escueta, Paraja Hayudini and private respondent Raul Roco, all then partners of ACCRA Law Firm. They all admitted that they assisted in the organization and acquisition of the aforesaid corporations by acting as nominees-stockholders of the same. Due to Roco’s promise that he would reveal the identity of the pricipal/s for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder, Roco was taken out of PCGG’s amended complaint. The rest of the ACCRA lawyers then insisted that they, too, should be granted the same treatment given to Roco, but the Sandiganbayan denied their exclusion for not acceding to the conditions set by PCGG, which included the disclosure of the identity of its clients and the submission of pertinent documents. Issue: Are the ACCRA lawyers entitled to invoke the attorney-client privilege in this case? Held: Yes. As a matter of public policy, a client’s identity should not be shrouded in mystery. The general rule is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client. However, there are certain exceptions: 1) where a strong probability exists that revealing the client’s name would implicate said client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer’s advice; 2) where disclosure would open the client to civil liability; or 3) where the government’s lawyers have no case against the attorney’s client unless, by revealing the client’s name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime. The present case falls under the aforesaid exceptions, and hence, attorney-client privilege may be invoked. In the constitutional sphere, the privilege gives flesh to one of the most sacrosanct rights available to the accused, the right to counsel. If the price of disclosure is too high, or if it amounts to self-incrimination, then the flow of information would be curtailed thereby rendering the right practically nugatory. Doctrine: The general rule is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client. Certain exceptions are: 1) where a strong probability exists that revealing the client’s name would implicate said client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer’s advice; 2) where disclosure would open the client to civil liability; or 3) where the government’s lawyers have no case against the attorney’s client unless, by revealing the client’s name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime. Part III 2. People vs. Liwanag 3. US vs. Suan 4. IFC vs. Tobias

G.R. No. L-27683. October 19, 1976 G.R. No. 9201. March 3, 1914 G.R. No. L-41555. July 27, 1977

Tobias bought on installment a Dodge truck. He executed a promissory note which is secured by a chattel mortgage on the dodge truck. The seller indorsed the promissory note to IFC. IFC demanded payment of the balance or to surrender the dodge truck. Tobias replied that he will surrender the truck because it met an accident and there was too much delay in the repair. IFC alleged that it had no knowledge of the accident and decided not to get the truck anymore. DOCTRINE: The allegation of IFC is a negative allegation and needs no evidence to support it, not being an essential part of the statement of the right on which the cause of action is founded. 5. People vs. Pajenado G.R. Nos. L-27680-81. February 27, 1970 Pajenado shot a person and was convicted for his murder and for illegal possession of a firearm.

HELD: In criminal cases, the burden of proof as to the offense charged lies on the prosecution and that a negative fact alleged by the prosecution must be proven if “it is an essential ingredient of the offense charged.” The mere fact that the adverse party has the control of the better means of proof of the fact

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alleged should not relieve the party making the averment of the burden of proving it. A party who alleges a fact must be assumed to have acquired some knowledge thereof; otherwise, he could not have alleged the same. 6. People vs. Verzola G.R. No. L-35022. December 21, 1977 Verzola clubbed to Bernardo in the presence of Josefina. His body was carried and left at the foot of the stairs of his house. Verzola changed his clothes and went to the municipal building and reported to the police authorities that Bernardo had died in an accident. Josefina gave a written statement pointing to Verzola as the assailant of Bernardo. Verzola executed a written statement admitting that he clubbed Bernardo several times. Both Verzola and Josefina repudiated their extrajudicial confessions. Verzola claims that he killed Bernardo in self-defense.

DOCTRINE: No such proof of self defense was adduced. Once an accused has admitted the killing of a human being, the burden is on him to establish the existence of any circumstance which may justify the killing or at least attenuate the offense committed. To establish his exculpation, or the justification for the act, he must prove such affirmative allegation by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence. 7. Molina vs. CA 8. People vs. Padiermos 9. People vs. Estenzo 10. Dela Paz vs. IAC 11. People vs. Del Castillo 12. Fulgado vs. CA 13. People vs. Rivera 14. VIllalon vs. IAC 15. People vs. Resabal 16. Bunag vs. CA 17. Bartolome vs. IAC 18. Lacsa vs. CA 19. People vs. Monleon 20. People vs. Mate 21. PBCOM vs. CA 22. Tabuenva vs. CA 23. Interpacific vs. Aviles

G.R. G.R. G.R. G.R. G.R. G.R. G.R. G.R. G.R. G.R. G.R. G.R. G.R.

No. L-14524. October 24, 1960 No. L-37284. February 27, 1976 No. L-41166. August 25, 1976 No. 71537. September 17, 1987 G.R. No. L-16941. October 29, 1968 G.R. No. 61570. February 12, 1990 No. 98376. August 16, 1991 G.R. No. 73751. September 24, 1986 No. 26708. September 29, 1927 No. L-39013. February 29, 1988 No. 76792. March 12, 1990 Nos. 79597-98. May 20, 1991 No. L-36282. December 10, 1976 G.R. No. L-34754. March 27, 1981 No. 92067. March 22, 1991 No. 85423. May 6, 1991 No. 86062. June 6, 1990

Part IV 24. IFC vs. Tobias 25. People vs. Pajenado 26. People vs. Pablo 27. Spouses Sige vs. CA 28. Dela Paz vs. IAC 29. Fulgado vs. CA 30. People vs. Rivera 31. People vs. Salomon 32. Villalon vs. IAC 33. People vs. Resabal

G.R. G.R. G.R. G.R. G.R.

No. L-41555. July 27, 1977 Nos. L-27680-81. February 27, 1970 No. 91129. August 25, 1992 No. 107951. June 30, 1994 No. 71537. September 17, 1987 G.R. No. 61570. February 12, 1990 G.R. No. 98376. August 16, 1991.] G.R. No. 96848. January 21, 1994 G.R. No. 73751. September 24, 1986 G.R. No. 26708. September 29, 1927

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