Evidence Case Digest 2

Evidence Evidence is the means, sanctioned by these rules, of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the truth respecting a matter of fact. Sec. 1 Rule 128, Rules of Court

Foreword The journey towards becoming a great litigation lawyer starts with how well the student has grasped the laws on Evidence. More than clearly defining evidentiary relevance and competence, these laws also establish several doctrines which guide lawyers in assessing the admissibility of their available evidence. But most importantly, these rules provide the steps which the lawyer has to take in order for the court to take cognizance of what he has to offer – steps which are essential in the protection of rights in our adversarial system of justice. We understand how complex the study of evidence can be. To obtain mastery of the rules, numerous cases are to be read, and those who are capable of reading them all are considered as legends. This compilation seeks to lessen the burden for students who will succeed us in the study of evidence. We made sure that each case is concise yet informative, so that readers are immediately directed towards the pertinent doctrines in the study of the subject. Nonetheless, we recognize that nothing beats patience and hard work. Whether or not students choose to read full cases or resort to this compilation is a completely personal choice. What is important is that they be able to find the hunger to learn, as well as the passion to chase after their dreams. Because above all, the journey towards becoming great lawyers start within ourselves. [Jyrevie Mae A. Fernandez]

Dedication To our beloved professor and mentor

Hon. Judge Mel-Gerald N. Nieva who has unceasingly challenged our minds in appreciating the core logic behind the all-important subject of evidentiary matters: We shall be forever grateful!

A Compilation of Cases for Evidence ________________________________________________ A Project of Class 3A SY 2017-2018 Contributors: John Carlo B. Barcela Louie Z. Belgica Noel Melvin B. Bitas Jann Carlo A. Columna Rafael B. Dayap III Romulo T. Espalmado, Jr. Vhiena May D. Estrellado Jyrevi Mae A. Fernandez Marissa G. Fortes Roxanne B. Lanzuela Ma. Theresa Jessica B. Luzuriaga John Mark M. Masamoc Marion Rico M. Opeda Victor Jeric B. Soliman

T he rules of evidence shall be the same in all courts and in all trials and hearings, except as otherwise provided by law or these rules. (Sec. 2 Rule 128) ROMERO REYES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, defendant. 216 SCRA 25 (1993)

FACTS: Juan Mendoza, the father of defendant Olympio is the owner of Farm Lots Nos. 46 and 106 devoted to the production of palay. The lots are tenanted and cultivated by Julian de la Cruz, the husband of plaintiff Eufrocina de la Cruz. In her complaint, Eufrocina alleged that upon the death of her husband she succeeded him as a bona fide tenant. However, Olympio in conspiracy with the other defendants prevented her daughter Violeta and her workers from entering and working on the farm lots. Defendants likewise refused to vacate and surrender the lots which prompted Eufrocina to file a case for the recovery of possession and damages with a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. The petitioners in this case and the defendants Reyes, Parayao Aguinaldo and Mananghaya are duly elected and appointed Barangay Officials of the locality who denied their interference in the tenancy relationship existing between Olympio and Eufrocina. Olympio o his part raised abandonment sublease and mortgage of the farm lots without his consent and non-payment of rentals as his defenses. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Agrarian Court’s decision with modification which ordered the defendants to restore possession of the farm lots to plaintiff Eufrocina. The CA likewise ruled that the petitioners are solidarily liable to pay to Eufrocina the value of cavans of palay until they have vacated the area. On appeal, the petitioners questioned the favorable consideration given to the affidavits of Eufrocina and Efren Tecson since the affiants were not presented and subjected to cross-examination. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred when it gave favorable consideration to the affidavits of plaintiff even if the affiant was not presented and subjected to cross-examination. RULING: The trial court did not err when it favourably considered the affidavits of Eufrocina and Efren Tecson although the affiants were not presented and subjected to cross-examination. Section 16 of P.D. No. 946 provides that the Rules of Court shall not be applicable in Agrarian cases even in a suppletory character. The same provision states that in the hearing investigation and determination of any question or controversy, affidavits and counter-affidavits may be allowed and are admissible in evidence. _____________________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee vs RODEGELIO TURCO, JR., aka "TOTONG”, Accused-appellant GR. No. 137757 August 14, 2000

FACTS: Accused raped his 12 year old neighbor Escelea Tabada. When the victim was about to sleep, she heard the voice of the accused calling from outside the house. When she opened the door, the accused threw a towel on her head and raped her near their house. The accused was then charged of rape but argues that he must be released because of the following: 1. They were sweethearts 2. Inconsistencies to the testimonies given by the victim. 3. Whether the medical certificate was erroneously admitted since the doctor was not presented at the trial.

ISSUE: 1. Whether the accused should be acquitted on the ground of inconsistency on the testimony of the complainant. 2. Whether the medical certificate should be admitted as evidence. RULING: NO. - Minor lapses in a witness' testimony should be expected when a person recounts details of an experience so humiliating and so painful to recall as rape. Rape, as a harrowing experience, is usually not remembered in detail. These lapses do not detract from the overwhelming testimony of a prosecution witness positively identifying the malefactor. Moreover, minor inconsistencies in the testimonies given by a child of tender age destroy the suspicion that the testimony was rehearsed. It is when the testimony is seemingly perfect that the Court must take it with caution. YES. - The certificate could be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule. The entry in official records is an exception since it involved an opinion of one who is an expert witness. However an admission of evidence does not follow that it must be given weight. It is up to the Court to give weight or not. When the medical certificate is not corroborated by the positive identification of the physician who made the same, still it can be admitted but it is up to the Court whether or not to give weight or not. Thus it must be admitted. _____________________________________________________________________________________ ROLANDO SASAN, SR. ET AL., Petitioners, vs NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION 4th DIVISION, EQUITABLE PCI BANK & HELPMATE, INC., Respondents, G.R. No. 176240

October 17, 2008

FACTS: Petitioners filed with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC separate complaints against E-PCIBank and HI for illegal dismissal. In their position papers, petitioners claimed that they had become regular employees of E-PCIBank with respect to the activities for which they were employed, having continuously rendered janitorial and messengerial services to the bank for more than one year; that EPCIBank had direct control and supervision over the means and methods by which they were to perform their jobs; and that their dismissal by HI was null and void because the latter had no power to do so since they had become regular employees of E-PCIBank. For its part, E-PCIBank averred that it entered into a Contract for Services with HI, an independent job contractor which hired and assigned petitioners to the bank to perform janitorial and messengerial services thereat. HI, on the other hand, asserted that it was an independent job contractor engaged in the business of providing janitorial and related services to business establishments, and E-PCIBank was one of its clients. On the basis of the parties’ position papers and documentary evidence, Labor Arbiter Gutierrez rendered a Decision finding that HI was not a legitimate job contractor on the ground that it did not possess the required substantial capital or investment to actually perform the job, work, or service under its own account and responsibility as required under the Labor Code. HI is therefore a labor-only contractor and the real employer of petitioners is E-PCIBank which is held liable to petitioners. Aggrieved by the decision of Labor Arbiter Gutierrez, respondents E-PCIBank and HI appealed the same to the NLRC, 4th Division. The NLRC modified the ruling of Labor Arbiter Gutierrez. The NLRC took into consideration the documentary evidence presented by HI for the first time on appeal and, on the basis thereof, declared HI as a highly capitalized venture with sufficient capitalization, which cannot be considered, engaged in "labor-only contracting."Distressed by the decision of the NLRC, petitioners sought recourse with the CA by filing a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. In its Decision, the CA affirmed the findings of the NLRC that HI was a legitimate job contractor and that it did not illegally dismiss petitioners. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON the submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed in labor cases. RULING: The submission of additional evidence before the NLRC is not prohibited by its New Rules of Procedure. After all, rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are not controlling in labor cases. The NLRC and labor arbiters are directed to use all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law and procedure all in the interest of substantial justice. In keeping with this directive, it has been held that the NLRC may consider evidence, such as documents and affidavits, submitted by the parties for the first time on appeal. The submission of additional evidence on appeal does not prejudice the other party for the latter could submit counterevidence. The NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence, even for the first time on appeal, because technical rules of procedure are not binding in labor cases. _____________________________________________________________________________________ PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff/Appellee, vs. ROLANDO "Botong" MALIBIRAN Accused, and BEVERLY TIBO-TAN, Accused/Appellant. G.R. No. 178301 April 24, 2009

FACTS: In 1995 Reynaldo Tan and Beverly Tan were Greenhills with their children for their usual Sunday gallivant. Later the family stepped out of the shopping mall and Reynaldo proceeded to the parking lot to get his red Honda Accord, while the rest of his family stayed behind and waited. An explosion was heard, in the direction where Reynaldo car was park. They saw the car was burning, and Reynaldo badly injured, which later died because of the injuries sustained in the explosion. A case was filed against Beverly Tan, Rolandon Malibaran and 3 others of a crime of Parricide and murder respectively. One of the co-accused Oswaldo Banaag was later discharged and utilized as one of the prosecution witnesses having overheard a conversation between Rolando and appellant that they would fetch a man in Bulacan who knew how to place a bomb in a vehicle. Janet Pascual, a friend of Beverly Tan, also testified that as to when the killing would take place, she heard that they will do it during the baptism of the child of Gloria, Rolando Malibiran’s sister. The RTC convicted the accused of the crime charged and impose the maximum penalty,which is Death sentence. The CA affirmed the decision with Modification in that the supreme penalty of deathimposed on both accused-appellants is hereby reduced to RECLUSION PERPETUA. ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of OswaldoBanaag and Janet Pascual should be accepted as evidence. RULING: Yes. The testimony of Oswaldo Banaag should be accepted as evidence. . Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact.The witness who testifies thereto is competent because he heard the same, as this is a matter of fact derived from his own perception, and the purpose is to prove either that the statement was made or the tenor thereof. In this case, Oswaldo's testimony that he overheard a conversation between Rolando and appellant that they would fetch a man in Bulacan who knew how to place a bomb in a vehicle is admissible, if only to establish the fact that such statement was made and the tenor thereof. Likewise, Janet may testify on matters not only uttered in her presence, since these may be considered as independently relevant statements, but also personally conveyed to her by appellant and Rolando.

E vidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules. (Sec. 3 Rule 128)

HERMOGENES BAUTISTA, Petitioner, vs. APOLONIO APARECE, Respondent, 51 O.G. 805 (1995)

FACTS: Nicolas Anasco was the owner of the lot subject of the controversy, sold the same to Valentin Justiniani. Valentin sold this property to Claudio Justiniani in the same year thereof. Claudio Justiniani executed a public instrument on the 12nd of October 1935 whereby he sold the same property for P100 to Apolonio Aparece in whose name it was assessed since 1935. While Aparece was in possession, Hermogenes Bautista illegally entered a part of the land and took possession thereof. In effect, Aparece filed a complaint with the guerilla forces then operating in the province of Bohol. When the case was called for hearing, and after inspection was made by a guerilla officer, Bautista executed a public instrument wherein he promised to return the land to Aparece in good will, and thereby recognized Aparece’s lawful ownership over the land. Thus, possession of the land was returned again to Aparece. However, Bautista believeing that the property was his and alleging that with the aid of armed and by pretending to be the owner of the said land, Bautista filed a complaint against Aparece in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Bohol. The CFI rendered judgment declaring Aparece as owner of said land. On appeal, Bautista raised as a defense the error of the trial court in admitting the public instrument which he executed as evidence. He contended that the document was executed under duress, violence, and intimidation, and that the guerilla officer before whom it was executed, had no jurisdiction over the matter. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting as evidence, a public document executed before an officer who had no jurisdiction over the matter. RULING: This argument is beside the point. The test for the admissibility or inadmissibility of a certain document is whether or not it is relevant, material or competent. The public document is not only relevant, but is also material and competent to the issue of ownership between the parties’ litigants. Relevant evidence is one that has any value in reason as tending to prove any matter probable in ac action. And evidence is said to be material when it is directed to prove a fact in issue as determined by the rules of substantive law and pleadings, while competent evidence is one that s not excluded by law in a particular case. With these criteria in mind, we hold that the mere fact that the public document was executed before a guerilla officer does not make the same as irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent to the main issue raised in the pleadings. The public document, considered together with the other evidence, documentary and oral, satisfies the Court that the portions of land in question really belong to defendant Aparece. _____________________________________________________________________________________ • Admissibility is determined, first, by relevancy—an affair of logic and not of law; second, but only indirectly, by the law of evidence which, in strictness, only declares whether matter which is logically probative is excluded. • Relevant evidence – evidence which has a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or nonexistence; evidence which tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in issue. Dean Riano

Jesse G. Lopez, Plaintiff-Appellant vs. Robert Heesen and Sears, Roebuck and Company, a corporation, Defendants-Appellees 365 P. 2D 448 (1961)

FACTS: In the early afternoon of October 14, 1958, appellee, Heesen, an Air Force officer, purchased a J.C. Higgins Model 51, 30.06 rifle from the store of appellee, Sears. Said rifle has a bolt action known more particularly as a "Mauser type action" with which Heesen was familiar. Heesen, although experienced in hunting, was not familiar with the Higgins Model 51 and had never used such a rifle. Immediately after the purchase of the rifle, Heesen left for a deer hunting trip in an area known as Ute Park near the town of Eagle Nest in Colfax County. He arrived at Ute Park that night and began hunting the next morning on October 15, 1958. Heesen hunted without success and had seen no game up until the time his gun discharged and appellant was wounded shortly after 3:00 P.M. Appellant, Jesse G. Lopez, then filed a suit against appellee, Robert Heesen, alleging that on October 15, 1958, Heesen unlawfully, violently, maliciously and feloniously assaulted and shot appellant with a shotgun, thereby inflicting dangerous and painful wounds and injuries to him. In the course of the trial, several companies were called to testify that the rifle was indeed safe and was not defective. However, the appellant contends that the trial court committed error in permitting testimony as to the general reputation of other firearms companies who use the same modified leaf safety device as the Higgins Model 51. A witness for appellee, Sears, Paul A. La Violette, Jr., qualified as an expert in gun designing and testified *452 that the following companies had an excellent reputation in the small arms field: FabriqueNationale of Belgium, Marlin Firearms Company, Weatherby Corporation, Colt Firearms Company, and Jefferson Corporation. Objection was made to this testimony on the ground that it was wholly immaterial and irrelevant to any issue in the case. Appellee, Sears, introduced testimony of witnesses who were either experts in the small arms field or experts in gun designing. The witness, Paul A. La Violette, Jr., testified that he is a gun designer employed by High Standard Manufacturing Company who manufacture the Higgins Model 51 for Sears. He qualified as an expert gun designer with many years' experience with other rifle manufacturers and in factories designing and building weapons of the small arms design. La Violette has two gun patents pending. La Violette testified that the safety device on the Higgins Model 51 is supplied to High Standard Manufacturing Company by Fabrique Nationale of Belgium. He also testified extensively as to the advantages of the safety device of the Higgins Model 51 and stated that six different makes of guns have the same modified leaf safety device as does the Higgins Model 51. The manufacturers of these guns are F.N. Mauser, Colt, Marlin, Nato and Weatherby. The evidence also shows that since 1951, 75,572 Higgins Model 51 rifles with the modified leaf safety device have been sold by High Standard Manufacturing Company to appellee, Sears. High Standard Manufacturing Company has never been sued by reason of the design of the Higgins Model 51 rifle. There is also opinion evidence that the Higgins Model 51 rifle is safe by all commercial sporting goods standards. ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony as to the reputation of the Fabrique National is relevant in the determination whether the rifle was dangerous and defective RULING: Yes, it is relevant in the issue of the case. In United States Smelting Co. v. Parry, 8 Cir., 166 F. 407, "It is true that in trials by jury it is their province to determine the ultimate facts, and that the general rule is that witnesses are permitted to testify to the primary facts within their knowledge, but not to their opinions. And it is also true that this has at times led to the statement that witnesses may not give their opinions upon the ultimate facts which the jury are to decide, because that would supplant their judgment and usurp their province. But such a statement is not to be taken literally. It but reflects the general rule, which is subject to important qualifications, and never was intended to close any reasonable avenue to the truth in the investigation of questions of fact. Thus, applying the above principles we hold that the testimony as to the reputation of Fabrique Nationale, who manufacture the safety device on the Higgins Model 51, and the reputation of Marlin Firearms Company, Weatherby Corporation, Colt Firearms Company and Jefferson Corporation, who manufacture rifles which have the same modified leaf safety device as the Higgins Model 51, was relevant to the issue of whether the safety device on the Higgins Model 51 was unsafe or safe, and *454 that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this testimony. _____________________________________________________________________________________

State of Missouri, Respondent, v. William Arthur BALL, Appellant. Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc. 339 S.W.2d 783 November 14, 1960.

FACTS: In the afternoon of October 15, 1958, two colored men, one of them tall and the other short, entered the Krekeler Jewelry Store at 1651 South 39th Street. The taller man spent ten or fifteen minutes selecting and buying a cigarette lighter, he also talked about buying and looked at watches and rings. As the taller man looked at jewelry and made his purchase the shorter man looked in the cases and moved about in the store. Later in the day, as John Krekeler was placing rings and watches in the safe preparatory to closing the store two men entered, one of them tall and the other short, and Krekeler immediately recognized them as the two men who had been in the store earlier. He recognized the taller man's narrow-brimmed, tall hat, brown jacket, gray stirt and particularly a scar on his face. The shorter man started to walk behind the counter and as Krekeler intercepted him he "drew a long barreled blue .38 and stuck it in my face." Both men followed Krekeler, the shorter man with the gun in "his back," directing him to the watch repair department and finally into the rest room in the rear of the store. He was told not to turn around and stood facing the wall. He could hear jewelry being dumped into a bag and the "jingle" of the cash register. The two men left Krekeler in the rest room and after hearing the door slam he called the police. The two men had taken watches and rings of the stipulated value of $4,455.21 and $140 in cash from the register. Krekeler identified the appellant from pictures, and three weeks later, after his capture, in a hospital and upon the trial positively identified him as the taller of the two holdup men. In his motion for new trial, Ball objected to the fact that a police officer who arrested him was allowed to testify that $258.02 in currency and two pennies were taken from him. It is said that the introduction of these exhibits were immaterial and irrelevant neither tended to prove nor disprove any issues involved in the case; that said money as seized at the time of the arrest was neither identified by Krekeler or by any other person as the money which was allegedly stolen from the A.L. Krekeler & Sons Jewelry Company on Oct. 15; and that said evidence was considered by the jury to the prejudice of the appellant. ISSUE: Whether or not the effects confiscated from Ball should be admissible in evidence. RULING: The effects confiscated from ball are not admissible. Not only was Krekeler unable to identify the money or any of the items on Ball’s person as having come from the jewelry store so that in fact they were not admissible in evidence, the charge here was that Ball and his accomplice took jewelry of the value of $4,455.21 and $140 in cash from the register. There was no proof as to the denomination of the money in the cash register, it was simply a total of $140. Here 19 days have elapsed, there was no proof that Ball had suddenly come into possession of the $258.02 and in all these circumstances the mere possession of a quantity of money is in itself no indication that the possessor was the taker of money charged as taken, because in general all money of the same denomination and material is alike, and the hypothesis that the money found is the same as the money taken is too forced and extraordinary to be receivable. In the absence of proof or of a fair inference from the record that the money in Ball’s possession at the time of his arrest came from or had some connection with the robbery and in the absence of a plain showing of his impecuniousness before the robbery and his sudden affluence, the evidence was not in fact relevant and in the circumstances was obviously prejudicial for if it tend to prove the offense for which the appellant was on trial, the jury may have inferred that he was guilty of another robbery. The admission of the evidence in the circumstances of this record infringed the right to a fair trial and for that reason the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded. _____________________________________________________________________________________ PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOERAL GALLENO, accused-appellant. GR No. 123546 July 2, 1998

FACTS: Evelyn Garganera, 5 years old, and Eleazar, 3 years old, was left under the care and custody of their uncle, Emetario Obligar, and aunt, Penicola Obligar. On August 16, 1994, Emetario and Penicola left their residence to work at sugarcane plantation owned by Magdalena Dasibar. The only persons left in

the house were niece Evelyn and nephew Eleazar. According to the prosecution, appellant took advantage of the situation by sexually molesting Evelyn. As Evelyn was only five-years old while appellant was fully-grown man, the penetration caused the child's vagina to bleed, making her cry in pain. On the other hand, Galleno denied the allegations and presented his own version of the story. According to him, he was merely playing with the two children. He cajoled Evelyn by throwing her up and down, his right hand holding the child and his left hand covering her vagina. Upon lifting up the child the first time, his left ring finger was accidentally inserted into the vagina of child since his fingernail was long and the child was not wearing any underwear. Consequently, Evelyn began to cry because her vagina started to bleed. The trial court did not accord credence to the version of the defense, and thus convicted him of rape. The case has been elevated to the Supreme Court for automatic review, and one of the contentions of the accused-appellant Galleno was that his testimony should have been admitted by the trial court. ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of the accused is admissible in evidence. RULING: The testimony of Joeral Galleno is inadmissible. Section 4, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court provides that "evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or nor-existence." This simply means that relevancy is determinable by the rules of logic and human experience. There is no precise and universal test of relevancy provided by law. However, the determination of whether particular evidence is relevant rests largely at the discretion of the court, which must be exercised according to the teachings of logic and everyday experience. There is no explanation how the left ring finger (allegedly with long fingernail) of accusedappellant penetrated the victim's vagina by a depth of one fourth of an inch. Accused-appellant likewise failed to explain why after injuring Evelyn, he left her in the company of an even younger child, the victim's 3-year old brother. He did not even make an effort to immediately inform Emeterio and Penicola of what happened. Instead, he went home and kept mum about the incident. All of these loopholes are palpable and manifest, and clearly work against the credibility of accused-appellant's story on which his defense is based.

E vidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or nonexistence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in issue. (Sec. 4 Rule 128) FELIPE NAVARRO, Petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. G.R. No. 121087,August 26, 1999

FACTS: Radio reporters, Stanley Jalbuena and Enrique “Ike” Lingan, together with Mario Ilagan, went to Entertainment City to verify on the veracity of reports that the said establishment is showing nude dancers. While inside, Jalbuena took pictures which prompted the floor manager, Dante Liquin, together with a security guard, Alex Sioco, to ask why he is taking pictures. An altercation ensued between Jalbuena and Liquin. When Jalbuena saw that Sioco is about to pull out his gun, he and his companions ran to the police station. Liquin and Sioco then followed Jalbuena and his companions. In the police station, Jalbuena went directly to the desk officer, Sgt. Añonuevo, to have the incident be put into police blotter. When Liquin and Sioco arrived, policeman, Felipe Navarro, petitioner in this case, talked with them. Upon knowing of the matter, Navarro turned to Jalbuena and pushed the latter to the wall. Lingan tried to stop them. But Navarro asked Sgt. Añonuevo to put on record the behavior of Jalbuena and Lingan which angered the latter. Thus, he challenged Navarro to a fistfight.Navarro hit the latter’s eyebrow with the handle of his pistol and thus, Lingan fell on the floor

with blood oozing from his face. Navarro gave him another fist blow and he again fell on the floor. He was brought to the hospital but he died immediately thereafter. Meanwhile, unknown to Navarro, Jalbuena was able to record the conversation that transpired between him and the deceased Lingan. Petitioner Navarro was charged with the crime of homicide for the death of Lingan. Both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals adjudged him guilty. In this petition, he questions the credibility of the witness, Jalbuena, who, according to him, is a biased witness for having a grudge against him. Also, he is asserting that it was the deceased who tried to hit him twice and that the latter was so drunk that he fell on the floor twice thus, hitting his head on the concrete. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Stanley Jalbuena is a credible witness; and 2. Whether or not the tape recording made by Jalbuena is admissible as evidence in view of the prohibition under R.A. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Act. RULING: Yes, Jalbuena is a credible witness. It is a well-settled principle that the testimony of a witness who has an interest in the conviction of an accused is by itself, cannot be regarded as unreliable. The trial court did not find any ill motive on the part of Jalbuena to make false accusation against Navarro. Jalbuena’s testimony was further buttressed by the post-mortem report done by Dra. Eva Yamamoto who performed the autopsy of the body of the deceased. Said post-mortem report, along with Jalbuena’s testimony, belie petitioner’s claim that the head injuries suffered by the deceased were due to his falling down on the concrete pavement. The findings show that those injuries were not caused by an accidental fall. Dra. Yamamoto testified that it may be caused by a blow of a hard object. Yes, the tape recording made by Jalbuena is admissible as evidence and does not come within the prohibition under R.A. 4200. R.A. 4200 declares it unlawful the secret overhearing, intercepting, or recording of “private communications.” In the case at bar, the heated argument between Navarro and Lingan is not within the purview of a private communication. Therefore, the tape recording made is not prohibited and thus, can be validly admitted as evidence. As to the authentication of the tape recording by the testimony of a witness, the following must be satisfied: (1) that he personally recorded the conversation; (2) that the tape played in court was the one he recorded; and (3) that the voices on the tape are those of the persons such are claimed to be. In the instant case, Jalbuena testified that he personally made the voice recording, that the tape played in court was the one he recorded, and that the voices contained in the tape recording are those of Navarro and Lingan. Therefore, Jalbuena successfully complied the foregoing requirements for authentication. On the other hand, petitioner Navarro’s penalty will be reduced in view of the two mitigating circumstances namely, sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party, because it was Lingan who provoked him, and the other one is that the offender, Navarro, had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed. He had no intent to kill Lingan. But an aggravating circumstance of commission of a crime in a place where the public authorities are engaged in the discharge of their official duties shall be taken against petitioner Navarro. _____________________________________________________________________________________

S tatutory Rules of Exclusion EDGARDO A. GAANAN, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986

FACTS: Complainant Atty. Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the living room of the complainant’s residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the proposed conditions, complainant made a telephone call to Laconico. That same morning, Laconico telephoned Atty. Gaanan to come to his office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case. When Atty. Pintor called, Laconico requested Atty. Gaanan to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the

proposed conditions for the settlement. Twenty minutes later, Atty. Pinto called up again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions. Laconico agreed. An amount of P5,000 as settlement money was agreed upon. He was instructed to give the money to give the money to Atty. Pintor’s wife at the office of the Department of Public Highways. However, Laconico insisted that Atty. Pintor himself should receive the money. However, when Atty. Pintor received the money, he was arrested by agents of the Philippine Constabulary. On the following day, Atty. Gaanan executed an affidavit that he heard complainant Atty. Pintor demand P8,000 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit to the complaint for robbery/extortion which he filed against Atty. Pintor. Since Atty. Gaanan listened to the telephone conversation without Atty. Pintor’s consent, Atty. Pintor charged Atty. Gaanan and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act (R.A. No. 4200). Atty. Gaanan and Laconico were found guilty by the trial court. The decision was affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) stating that the “extension telephone” which was used to overhear the telephone conversation was covered in the term “device” as provided in R.A. No. 4200. ISSUE: Whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited device in Section 1 of the AntiWiretapping Act, such that its use to overhear a private conversation would constitute unlawful interception of communications between the two parties using a telephone line. RULING: The main issue revolves around the meaning of the phrase “any other device or arrangement.” The law refers to a “tap” of a wire or cable or the use of a “device or arrangement” for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words. An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other device enumerated un Section 1 of R.A. No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as “tapping” the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. The phrase “device or arrangement”, although not exclusive to that enumerated, should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting, or recording a telephone conversation. An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially now when the extended unit does not have to be connected by wire to the main telephone but can be moved from place to place within a radius of a kilometer or more. An extension telephone is not among such device or arrangements covered by Section 1 of R.A No. 4200. _____________________________________________________________________________________ TERESITA SALCEDO-ORTANEZ, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ROMEO F. ZAMORA, Presiding Judge, Br. 94, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and RAFAEL S. ORTANEZ, Respondents. G.R. No. 110662

August 4, 1994

FACTS: Private respondent Rafael Ortanez filed with the Quezon City RTC a complaint for annulment of marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner. Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons.

Teresita submitted her Objection/Comment to Rafael’s oral offer of evidence. However, the trial court admitted all of private respondent’s offered evidence and later on denied her motion for reconsideration, prompting petitioner to file a petition for certiorari with the CA to assail the admission in evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes. These tape recordings were made and obtained when private respondent allowed his friends from the military to wiretap his home telephone. CA denied the petition because (1) Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. They and any other variant thereof can be admitted in evidence for certain purposes, depending on how they are presented and offered and on how the trial judge utilizes them in the interest of truth and fairness and the even handed administration of justice; and (2) A petition for certiorari is notoriously inappropriate to rectify a supposed error in admitting evidence adduced during trial. The ruling on admissibility is interlocutory; neither does it impinge on jurisdiction. If it is erroneous, the ruling should be questioned in the appeal from the judgment on the merits and not through the special civil action of certiorari. The error, assuming gratuitously that it exists, cannot be any more than an error of law, properly correctible by appeal and not by certiorari. Petitioner then filed the present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the recordings of the telephone conversations are admissible in evidence. HELD: No. Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes” expressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence thus: Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described. . . . Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained, obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation. Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200. _____________________________________________________________________________________ PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner vs HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 18, RTC, Manila, and LAWRENCE WANG Y CHEN, Respondents. G.R. No. 128587 March 16, 2007

FACTS: The three (3) separate Informations were filed against Lawrence C. Wang in the court of origin respectively for Criminal Case No. 96-149990 (Violation of Dangerous Drugs Act); Criminal Case No. 96-149991 (Illegal Possession of Firearms); and, Criminal Case No. 96-149992 (Violation of Comelec Gun Ban). During his arraignment, accused Wang refused to enter a plea to all the Informations and instead interposed a continuing objection to the admissibility of the evidence obtained by the police operatives. On 6 December 1996, the prosecution rested its case and upon motion, accused Wang was granted 25 days from said date within which to file his intended Demurrer to Evidence. On 19 December 1996, the prosecution filed a Manifestation to the effect that it had rested its case only in so far as the charge for Violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act in Criminal Case No. 96-149990 is concerned, and not as regards the two cases for Illegal Possession of Firearms (Crim. Case No. 96-149991) and Violation of the Comelec Gun Ban (Crim. Case No. 96-149992). Accordingly, trial continued. On 9 January 1997, Wang filed his undated Demurrer to Evidence, praying for his acquittal and the dismissal of the three (3) cases against him for lack of a valid arrest and search warrants and the

inadmissibility of the prosecution’s evidence against him. Considering that the prosecution has not yet filed its Opposition to the demurrer, Wang filed an Amplification to his Demurrer of Evidence on 20 January 1997. On 12 February 1997, the prosecution filed its Opposition alleging that the warrantless search was legal as an incident to the lawful arrest and that it has proven its case, so it is now time for the defense to present its evidence. On 13 March 1997, the respondent judge, the Hon. Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr., issued the herein assailed Resolution granting Wang’s Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him of all charges for lack of evidence. ISSUE: Whether there was lawful arrest, search and seizure by the police operatives in this case despite the absence of a warrant of arrest and/or a search warrant. RULING: There are actually two (2) acts involved in this case, namely, the warrantless arrest and the warrantless search. There is no question that warrantless search may be conducted as an incident to a valid warrantless arrest. The law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made; the process cannot be reversed. However, if there are valid reasons to conduct lawful search and seizure which thereafter shows that the accused is currently committing a crime, the accused may be lawfully arrested in flagrante delicto without need for a warrant of arrest. Finding that the warrantless arrest preceded the warrantless search in the case at bar, the trial court granted private respondent's demurrer to evidence and acquitted him of all the three charges for lack of evidence, because the unlawful arrest resulted in the inadmissibility of the evidence gathered from an invalid warrantless search. Clearly therefore, the warrantless arrest of the accused and the search of his person and the car were without probable cause and could not be licit. The arrest of the accused did not fall under any of the exception to the requirements of warrantless arrests, (Sec. 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court) and is therefore, unlawful and derogatory of his constitutional right of liberty. x x x The trial court resolved the case on the basis of its findings that the arrest preceded the search, and finding no basis to rule in favor of a lawful arrest, it ruled that the incidental search is likewise unlawful. Any and all pieces of evidence acquired as a consequence thereof are inadmissible in evidence. Thus, the trial court dismissed the case for lack of evidence. _____________________________________________________________________________________

• Evidence is also secured by resorting to modes of discoveries, such as: a) Taking of depositions of any person, oral or written (Rule 23); b) Serving of interrogatories to parties (Rule 25); c) Serving of requests for admission by the adverse party (Rule 25); d) Production and inspection of documents (Rule 27); and e) Examination of physical and mental conditions of persons (Rule 28).

A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions. (Sec. 1 Rule 129)

J udicial Notice CITY OF MANILA, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GERARDO GARCIA, et al, defendants-appellants. 19 SCRA 413

1967

FACTS: Plaintiff is the owner of certain parcels of land. Without the knowledge and consent of plaintiff, defendants occupied the property and built their houses. Having discovered, plaintiff through its mayor gave each defendant written permits, each labeled as “lease contract” to occupy specific areas. For their occupancy, defendants were charged nominal rentals. After sometime, plaintiff, through its treasurer, demanded payment of their rentals and vacate the premises for the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School’s expansion. Despite the demand, defendants refused to vacate the said property. Hence, this case was filed for recovery of possession. The trial court ruled in favor of plaintiff taking judicial notice of Ordinance 4566, appropriating P100k for the construction of additional building of Epifanio De Los Santos Elementary School. Defendants appealed. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court properly found that the city needs the premises for school purposes. RULING: The CFI of Manila properly found that the city needs the premises for school purposes. It is beyond debate that a court of justice may alter its ruling while the case is within its power, to make it conformable to law and justice. Such was done here. The defendants’ remedy was to bring the attention of the court to its contradictory stance. Not having done so, the Supreme Court will not reopen the case solely for this purpose. On the other hand, the elimination of the certification as evidence would not benefit the defendants. For in reversing his stand, the trial judge could have well taken because he was duty bound to take judicial notice of Ordinance 4566. The reason being that the city charter of Manila requires that all courts sitting therein to take judicial notice of all ordinances passed by the municipal board of Manila. _____________________________________________________________________________________ GABRIEL BAGUIO, appellant vs. TEOFILA Vda de JALAGAT, defendant 42 SCRA 337 (1971)

FACTS: The case started with the complaint for the quieting of title to real property filed by the plaintiff, now appellant, Gabriel Baguio. A motion to dismiss filed by defendants now appellees on the ground that the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment. This was the argument advanced. The instant complaint or case besides being clearly unfounded and malicious is identical to or the same as that Civil Case No. 1574 filed by the same plaintiff and against Melecio alias maning jalagat, now deceasedand whose legal heirs and successor-in-interest are the very defendants in the instant complaint for recovery of possession and ownership of Real Estate involving practically the same property and the same parties as defendants are the widow and the children respectively thus the legal or forced heirs of the deceased Melecio Jalagat. That the said case, which is identical t or is the same case as the instant one has already been duly

and finally terminated as could be clear from an order of this court. There was an opposition on the part of the plaintiff made on the ground that for prior judgment or res judicata to suffice as a basis for dismissal it must be apparent on the face of the complaint. ISSUE: Whether a lower court may take judicial notice of such previous cases decided by him resulting in the judgment relied upon. RULING: Yes. The law would lend itself to a well-deserved reproach if the Rules of Court would sanction such a proceeding distinguished by nothing but its futility. It ought to be clear even to appellant that under the circumstances the lower court certainly could take judicial notice of the finality of a judgment in a case that was previously pending and thereafter decided by it. It was done by the lower court in decreeing the dismissal. Certainly such an order is not contrary to law. A citation from the comments of former Chief Justice Moran is relevant, thus: Courts have also taken judicial notice of previous cases to determine whether or not the case is pending is a moot one or whether or not a previous ruling is applicable in the case under consideration. In addition appellant undoubtedly had recourse to a remedy which under the law in force could be availed of. It would have served the cause of justice better not to mention the avoidance of needless expense on his part and the vexation to which appellees were subjected if he did not reflect a little more on the matter. _____________________________________________________________________________________ GABRIEL P. PRIETO, plaintiff-appellant vs MEDEN ARROYO, JACK ARROYO, NONITO ARROYO and ZEFERINO ARROYO, JR, defendants-appellees G.R. No. L-17885 June 30, 1965

FACTS: Arroyo, Sr. (Deceased) registered a parcel of land in his name. After the proper proceedings OCT No. 39 was issued in his name. The same year, and in the same Court, Gabriel P. Prieto filed a petition for registration of an adjoining parcel of land. As a result OCT No. 11 was issued in his name. When Arroyo Sr. died, OCT No.39 was cancelled and TCT No. 227 was issued of the heirs, herein respondents. The heirs then claimed an error as to the technical description set forth in their TCT and that it did not conform to the decision of the LRC and was less in area by some 157 square meters. The heirs then obtained a favorable judgment from the Court. Prieto then filed a motion to annul the order. At the hearing, both Prieto and counsel did not appear. The Court dismissed the case. The motion for reconsideration was also denied. On appeal appellant pointed out that the Court should not have dismissed the case. He argues that no parole evidence is needed to support it since the matters alleged therein are already supported by evidence presented and relied upon by the Court at the time of the litigation concerning the registration of the land of Arroyo Sr. and/or Prieto. The Court should have taken judicial notice of the same. ISSUE: Whether the Court should take judicial notice of the evidence presented and used during the litigation concerning the registration of the land. RULING: NO. - Courts are not authorized to take judicial notice in the adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been tried or are actually pending before the same judge. Secondly, if appellant had really wanted the court to take judicial notice of such records, he should have presented the proper request or manifestation to that effect instead of sending, by counsel, a telegraphic motion for postponement of hearing, which the court correctly denied.

YAO KEE, SZE SOOK WAH, SZE LAI CHO, & SY CHUN YEN, Petitioners, vs AIDA SY-GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE, RODOLFO SY, & HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents, G.R. No. L-55960

November 24, 1988

FACTS: Sy Kiat, a Chinese national died in Caloocan City, leaving behind his real and personal properties in the Philippines worth P 300,000 more or less. Aida Sy-Gonzales, et. al., filed a petition for the grant of letters of administration claiming among other things that they are children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego, a Filipina. The petition was opposed by Yao Kee who alleged that she is the lawful wife of the deceased whom he married in China and that one of her children, Sze Sook Wah, should be the administrator of the deceased. The CFI decided in favor of Yao Kee’s petition but was modified and set aside by the Court of Appeals. ISSUE: Whether or not Sy Kiat’s marriage to Yao Kee in accordance with Chinese Law and Custom conclusive. RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that evidence may prove the fact if marriage between Sy Kiat and Yao Kee is valid, but it is not sufficient to establish the validity of said marriage in accordance with Chinese law and custom. A custom must be proved as a fact according to the rules of evidence and that a local custom as a source of right cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence. In the case at bar, petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law of China on marriage. In the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should be presumed that it is the same as that of the Philippines. The Supreme Court affirmed (all of them were acknowledged as natural children, hence given equal rights) the decision of the Court of Appeals. _____________________________________________________________________________________ JOSE TABUENA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIANO TABERNILLA, JR., respondents. G.R. No. 85423 May 6, 1991

FACTS: In 1973, an action for recovery of ownership of a parcel of residential land in Makato, Aklan, was filed in the RTC of Aklan by the estate of Alfredo Tabernilla against Jose Tabuena. The trial court found that the lot was sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. to Tabernilla while they were in the United States. Peralta’s mother conveyed the land to Tabernilla upon the latter’s return. At the same time, she asked to be allowed to stay thereon as she had been living there all her life. Tabernilla agreed provided she paid the realty taxes on the property, which she did. Upon her death, Tabuena, the half-brother of Peralta, took possession of the property. He refused demands made Tabernilla to surrender the property, claiming it as his own. The trial court took judicial notice of Tabuena's testimony in a case it had previously heard which was closely connected with the case before it in Civil case no. 1327. The trial court ruled for the estate and ordered Tabuena to vacate the property. Tabuena protested that the trial court erred in taking cognizance of documents which had never been formally submitted in evidence and in considering the proceedings in another case involving the same parties but a different parcel of land in resolving the ownership of the subject lot. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of Tabuena’s testimony in Civil Case No. 1327?

RULING: Yes. The trial court erred when it relied on the evidence submitted in Civil Case No. 1327 and took judicial notice thereof without the consent or knowledge of the petitioner, in violation of existing doctrine. It conceded that as a general rule "courts are not authorized to take judicial notice, in the adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually pending b before the same judge. Nevertheless, it applied the exception that: “in the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or when the original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives by the court's direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending. It is clear, though, that this exception is applicable only when, "in the absence of objection," "with the knowledge of the opposing party," or "at the request or with the consent of the parties," the case is clearly referred to or "the original or part of the records of the case are actually withdrawn from the archives" and "admitted as part of the record of the case then pending." These conditions have not been established here. On the contrary, the petitioner was completely unaware that his testimony in Civil Case No. 1327 was being considered by the trial court in the case then pending before it. As the petitioner puts it, the matter was never taken up at the trial and was "unfairly sprung" upon him, leaving him no opportunity to counteract. _____________________________________________________________________________________ PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. DANNY GODOY, Defendant, 250 SCRA 676 (1995)

FACTS: Danny Godoy was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of rape and kidnapping with serious illegal detention against Mia Taha who is the private offended party to this case. Godoy was sentenced to a maximum penalty of death in both cases by the Regional Trial Court. The private complainant Mia Taha allegedly said that her teacher Danny Godoy (Appellant) by means of force, threat and intimidation, by using a knife and by means of deceit, having carnal knowledge with her and kidnapped and detained her. In his defense, Godoy presented a different version of what actually transpired. His defense was that he and private complainant were lovers, as evidenced by the letters wrote by the private complainant to the accused and the same corroborated by the testimonies of the defense witnesses. Other witnesses were presented by the defense attesting that they saw the two together in a manner that was affectionate and cordial, prior to the said “kidnapping” and even during such. ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused RULING: The Supreme Court acquitted Danny Godoy. Three guiding principles in the appellate review of the evidence of the prosecution for the crime of rape, namely: a) while rape is a most detestable crime, it must be borne in mind that it is an accusation easy to be made, hard to be proved, but harder to be defended by the party accused, though innocent; b) the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and c) that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.

Mia claimed that the appellant always carried a knife but it was never explained how she was threatened with the same in such a manner that she was allegedly always cowed into giving in to his innumerable sexual demands. In taking judicial notice, the Supreme Court said that it is not unaware that in rape cases, the claim of the complainant of having been threatened appears to be a common testimonial expedient and facesaving subterfuge. But it had not been duly corroborated by other evidence nor proved that the accused indeed always carried a knife. The SC also takes judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas (such as in Palawan) young ladies are strictly required to act with circumspection and prudence. Great caution is observed so that their reputations shall remain untainted. Any breath of scandal which brings dishonor to their character humiliates their entire families. It could precisely be that complainant’s mother wanted to save face in the community where everybody knows everybody else, and in an effort to conceal her daughter’s indiscretion and escape wagging tongues of their small rural community, she had to weave the scenario of this rape drama. _____________________________________________________________________________________ BPI-FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, Inc., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX APPEALS and the COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents. G.R. No. 122480 April 12, 2000

FACTS: This case involves a claim for tax refund in the amount of P112,491.00 representing petitioners tax withheld for the year 1989. It appears from the foregoing 1989 Income Tax Return that petitioner had a total refundable amount of P297,492 inclusive of the P112,491.00 being claimed as tax refund in the present case. However, petitioner declared in the same 1989 Income Tax Return that the said total refundable amount of P297,492.00 will be applied as tax credit to the succeeding taxable year. The petitioner filed a written claim for refund in the amount of P112,491.00 with the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue alleging that it did not apply the 1989 refundable amount of P297,492.00 (including P112,491.00) to its 1990 Annual Income Tax Return or other tax liabilities due to the alleged business losses it incurred for the same year. Without waiting for respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue to act on the claim for refund, petitioner filed a petition for review with respondent Court of Tax Appeals, seeking the refund of the amount of P112,491.00. The respondent Court of Tax Appeals dismissed petitioners petition on the ground that petitioner failed to present as evidence its Corporate Annual Income Tax Return for 1990 to establish the fact that petitioner had not yet credited the amount of P297,492.00 (inclusive of the amount P112,491.00 which is the subject of the present controversy) to its 1990 income tax liability. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration, however, the same was denied by respondent court in its Resolution dated May 6, 1994. Petitioner now calls the attention of this Court, as it had done before the CTA, to a Decision rendered by the Tax Court in CTA Case No. 4897, involving its claim for refund for the year 1990. In that case, the Tax Court held that "petitioner suffered a net loss for the taxable year 1990. Respondent, however, urges this Court not to take judicial notice of the said case. ISSUE: Whether or not the court can take judicial notice of the records of the present case. RULING: Yes. Under Section 2, Rule 129 of Rules of Court provides that courts may take judicial notice of matters ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. In this case, the Court notes that a copy of the Decision in CTA Case No. 4897 was attached to the Petition for Review filed before this Court. Significantly, respondents do not claim at all that the said Decision was fraudulent or nonexistent. Indeed, they do not even dispute the contents of the said decision, claiming merely that the Court cannot take judicial notice thereof; in the same way that it refused to controvert the same fact established by petitioners other documentary exhibits. In any event, the Decision in CTA Case No. 4897 is not the sole basis of petitioners case. It is merely one more bit of information showing the stark truth: petitioner did not use its 1989 refund to pay its taxes for 1990.

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO and BONIFACIO S. TUMBOKON, petitioners, vs. HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila, respondent. x----------------------x CHEVRON PHILIPPINES INC., PETRON CORPORATION and PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, movants-intervenors. x----------------------x DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, movant-intervenor. G.R. No. 156052

February 13, 2008

FACTS: Chevron is engaged in the business of importing, distributing and marketing of petroleum products in the Philippines while Shell and Petron are engaged in the business of manufacturing, refining and likewise importing, distributing and marketing of petroleum products in the Philippines. The DOE is a governmental agency created under Republic Act (RA) No. 76383 and tasked to prepare, integrate, coordinate, supervise and control all plans, programs, projects and activities of the government relative to energy exploration, development, utilization, distribution and conservation. On November 20, 2001, The Sangguniang Panglunsod of Maynila enacted Ordinance No. 8027. Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr. approved the said ordinance on November 28, 2001. and it became effective on December 28, 2001. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area of Pandacan and Sta. Ana from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies Caltex, Petron and Shell. On June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy entered into a memorandum of understanding with the oil companies in which they agreed that scaling down of Pandacan Terminals was the most viable and practicable option. Under the memorandum of understanding, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy permits the Oil Companies to continuously operate in compliance with legal requirements, within the limited area resulting from the joint operations and the scale down program. The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the memorandum of understanding in Resolution No. 97. In that resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the memorandum of understanding was effective only for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002. Thereafter, on January 30, 2003, the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 13 extending the validity of Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing Mayor Atienza to issue special business permits to the oil companies. Resolution No. 13, s. 2003 also called for a reassessment of the ordinance. ISSUES: Whether or not the June 26, 2002 memorandum of understanding and the resolutions ratifying it can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027. Whether or not the judicial admissions is applicable to the respondent. RULING: The Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as City Mayor of Manila, to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city. One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to put into effect Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or negated by the courts. On the other hand assuming that the terms of the memorandum of understanding were contradictory with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30, 2003. There is nothing that legally hinders respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027. Wherefore the Court Ordered Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., as mayor of the city of Manila to immediately enforce Ordinance No. 8027. The Rule On Judicial Admissions Is Not Applicable Against Respondent. The oil companies assert that respondent judicially admitted that Ordinance No. 8027 was repealed by Ordinance No. 8119 in civil case no. 03-106379 (where Petron assailed the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 8027) when the parties in their joint motion to withdraw complaint and counterclaim stated that the issue ...has been rendered moot and academic by virtue of the passage of [Ordinance No. 8119]. They contend that such admission worked as an estoppel against the respondent.

Respondent countered that this stipulation simply meant that Petron was recognizing the validity and legality of Ordinance No. 8027 and that it had conceded the issue of said ordinances constitutionality, opting instead to question the validity of Ordinance No. 8119.The oil companies deny this and further argue that respondent, in his answer in civil case no. 06-115334 (where Chevron and Shell are asking for the nullification of Ordinance No. 8119), expressly stated that Ordinance No. 8119 replaced Ordinance No. 8027: ... Under Ordinance No. 8027, businesses whose uses are not in accord with the reclassification were given six months to cease [their] operation. Ordinance No. 8119, which in effect, replaced Ordinance [No.] 8027, merely took note of the time frame provided for in Ordinance No. 8119.... Ordinance No. 8119 thus provided for an even longer term, that is[,] seven years; (Emphasis supplied) Rule 129, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides: Section 4. Judicial admissions. ― An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. (Emphasis supplied) While it is true that a party making a judicial admission cannot subsequently take a position contrary to or inconsistent with what was pleaded, the aforestated rule is not applicable here. Respondent made the statements regarding the ordinances in civil case nos. 03-106379 and 06-115334 which are not the same as this case before us. To constitute a judicial admission, the admission must be made in the same case in which it is offered. Hence, respondent is not estopped from claiming that Ordinance No. 8119 did not supersede Ordinance No. 8027. On the contrary, it is the oil companies which should be considered estopped. They rely on the argument that Ordinance No. 8119 superseded Ordinance No. 8027 but, at the same time, also impugn its (8119s) validity. We frown on the adoption of inconsistent positions and distrust any attempt at clever positioning under one or the other on the basis of what appears advantageous at the moment. Parties cannot take vacillating or contrary positions regarding the validity of a statute or ordinance. Nonetheless, we will look into the merits of the argument of implied repeal. ____________________________________________________________________________________ GREENHILLS EAST ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by its President JOSEFINA J. CASTILLO, Petitioner, vs. E. GANZON, INC., represented by its President EULALIO GANZON, Respondent G.R. No. 169741 January 20, 2010

FACTS: Sometime in April or May 1997, respondent EGI fenced its land site, a 4,109-square meter at the corner of EDSA and Ortigas Avenue in Barangay Wack-Wack. Said property was located on a site classified as C-2 or highly commercial zone. EGI wanted to build on the property a 77-storey mixed-used building with an 8-storey basement for a total of 85 storeys, to be known as the SKYCITY Condominium. On July 10, 1997 the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) issued to EGI a Certificate of Locational Viability and on August 11, 1997 the City of Mandaluyong issued to it an Excavation and Ground Preparation Permit. On September 15, 1997 the HLURB further issued to EGI a Preliminary Approval and Locational Clearance for its project. But sometime in January 1998 petitioner GEA, whose R-1 property was adjacent to the project site, wrote the HLURB and opposed respondent EGIs project. GEA invokes Section 10, Article V of MMZO 81-01 which provides height restrictions on a C-2 property that adjoins an R-1 property. However, MMZO 81-01 applies to a situation where an R-1 property adjoins a C-2 property. This has ceased to be the case between the land site and the subdivision after the Mandaluyong City government enacted Ordinance 128 in 1993, which converted certain R-1 zones to C-2 zones and these included those on the western side of respondent EGIs land site. Consequently, the subject land site ceased to be adjacent to an R-1 zone and no longer suffered from height restrictions. HLURB denied the GEA’s opposition, after reviewing the Revised Zoning Map of Mandaluyong City. The color-coded map shows identical color and captions for the lots stretching at some depth from EDSA, but running parallel to it, on both sides of Ortigas Avenue, including Lot 11, Block 4, and Lot 11, Block 20 on the Greenhills East Subdivision side. The map tags both sides of Ortigas Avenue with the same C-2 classification. Motions for reconsiderations and appeals by the GEA were all denied. Hence, the issue reached the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the HLURB erred in depending on the Revised Zoning Map of Mandaluyong city. RULING: As a quasi-judicial body, which enjoys an expertise in land zoning classifications, the HLURB can take judicial notice of such official maps as are generated and used in government zoning activities. The Court has no reason to disturb its findings in this case. In relying on the Mandaluyong zoning map, the HLURB took note of the standard procedure observed in fixing the boundaries of lands, where the preparation and drafting of the illustrative maps precede the drafting of the text that describes those boundaries. Although the text of the ordinance is controlling, any doubt or vagueness in the meaning of its provisions may be cleared up by a reference to the official map. Invariably, the Court must respect the factual findings of administrative agencies which have expertise on matters that fall within their jurisdiction. Here, since the HLURB has the expertise in applying zonal classifications on specific properties and since petitioner GEA fails to make out a clear case that it has erred, the Court must rely on its finding that respondent EGIs land site does not, for the purpose of applying height restrictions, adjoin an R-1 zone. ____________________________________________________________________________________

J udicial Admissions LEONARDO LUCIDO, Plaintiff and Appellee, vs. GELASIO CALUPITAN ET AL., Defendants and Appellants. G.R. No. 8200,March 14, 1914

FACTS: Some chattels and real estate owned by plaintiff, Leonardo Lucido, were sold at an execution sale. Several conveyances ensued thereafter until the same were transferred to defendant, GelasioCalupitan. Lucido and Calupitan reduced their agreement in a public document wherein it was stated that the former would have to wait after three (3) years from the date of the execution of the document before he is allowed to redeem the subject properties from defendant, Calupitan. However, when Lucido tried to redeem the properties, Calupitan refused to deliver the same to him and questioned the nature of the transaction and the period of redemption. It was also found out that Calupitan had sold the land in question to his co-defendant, Macario Dorado. Thus, the former instituted this action. During the presentation of evidence, Lucido offered as evidence the original answer to the complaint filed by the defendant over the objection of the latter. In that original answer, Calupitan admitted that the transaction between him and Lucido is a sale with right to conventional redemption. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the original answer is admissible as evidence; and 2. Whether or not statements contained therein are considered admissions of the defendant, GelasioCalupitan. RULING: Yes, the original answer is admissible as evidence and can be taken as an admission against defendant, Calupitan. According to Jones on Evidence, where amended pleadings have been filed, allegations in the original pleadings are held admissible provided the original pleadings are formally offered as evidence. And statements contained therein are considered admissions of the parties, having weight according to the circumstances of each case. Hence, the admission of the original answer is proper especially since Calupitan himself, acting as his own counsel, signed the same. The transaction is one of a sale with the right to repurchase and the period to redeem has not yet expired when Lucido tendered the amount equivalent to the redemption price.

MACARIA A. TORRES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, VICENTE SANTILLAN, ALFREDO NARCISO, TOMAS NARCISO, AMADO NARCISO, SALUD NARCISO, DEMETRIA NARCISO and ADELINA NARCISO, respondents. G.R. No. L-37421 July 31, 1984

FACTS: This is a Petition for Review, treated as a special civil action praying that the decision of the CA be set aside. Lot no. 551 was originally owned by Margarita Torres. Margarita was married to Claro Santillan and out of this union were begotten Vicente and Antonina. Claro died. Antonina married and had six children, who, together with Vicente are the private respondents. After Claro’s death, Margarita cohabited with Leon Arbole, and out of this, petitioner Macaria Torres was born. Lot no. 551, an urban lot, was leased to Margarita, who was the actual occupant of the lot. A Sale Certificate was issued to Margarita by the Director of Lands. The purchase price was to be paid in installments. According to testimonial evidence, Leon paid the installments out of his own earnings. Before his death, Leon sold and transferred all his rights to ½ portion of the lot in favor of petitioner Macaria. Subsequently, Vicente executed an Affidavit claiming possession of Lot no. 551 and petitioned the Bureau of Lands for the issuance of title in his name. A title was then issued in the name of the legal heirs of Margarita (private respondents). On June 3, 1954, respondents filed a complaint against petitioner for forcible entry alleging that petitioner entered a portion of Lot no. 551 without their consent and constructed a house therein. The case was decided against the petitioner. On June 8, 1954, petitioner instituted an action for Partition of Lot. N0. 551 alleging that said lot was conjugal property and the she is the legitimated child of Margarita and Leon. The ejectment case and the partition case was consolidated. The trial court ruled that the lot was paraphernal property of Maragarita and adjudicated 2/3 of the lot to respondents and 1/3 to petitioner Macaria. On Motion for Reconsideration, the decision was amended with Macaria being entitled to 4/6 of the lot. On appeal to the CA, the CA changed Macaria’s share to ½ of the lot and declared that she is not a legitimated child. Petitioner now alleges that although the CA is correct in declaring that she is not a legitimated child of the spouses, it has overlooked to include in its findings of facts the admission made by the respondents that she and Vicente and Antonina are brothers and sisters and they are the legal heirs and nearest of relatives of Maragarita. The admission adverted to appears in paragraph 3 of respondents’ original complaint in the Ejectment Case, which was however subsequently amended. ISSUE: Whether or not said statement in the original complaint must be treated as a judicial admission despite the fact that the same statements no longer appears in the amended complaint? RULING: No, in the Amended Complaint filed by respondents in the same ejectment case, the supposed admission was deleted and in fact the statement simply read, “That plaintiffs are the legal heirs and nearest of kin of Margarita.” By virtue thereof, the amended complaint takes the place of the original. The latter is regarded as abandoned and ceases to perform any further function as a pleading. The original complaint no longer forms part of the record. If petitioner had intended to utilize the original complaint, she should have offered it in evidence. Having been amended, the original complaint lost its character as a judicial admission, which would have required no proof, and became merely an extrajudicial admission of which as evidence, required its formal offer. Contrary to petitioner’s submission, therefore, there can be no estoppel by extrajudicial admission in the original complaint, for the failure to offer it in evidence. Teehankee, separate opinion: Such admission did not cease to be a judicial admission simply because respondents subsequently deleted the same in their amended complaint. The original complaint, although replaced by an amended complaint, does not cease to be part of the judicial record, not having been expunged therefrom.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JESSIE MALIAO y MASAKIT, NORBERTO CHIONG y DISCOTIDO and LUCIANO BOHOL y GAMANA, Accused, JESSIE MALIAO y MASAKIT, Accused-Appellant. G.R. No. 178058

July 31, 2009

FACTS: AAA left her house one night to watch a television show in the adjacent house. Both her mother and aunt left to go to a mini-carnival. When they returned, AAA was no longer there. They looked for her in their neighbourhood but they did not find her. The following day, the naked and lifeless body of AAA was found between two banana plants in a vacant lot near her house. A blood stained shirt was found in a vacant lot which was being used as a carnival. As the police officers were conducting an investigation in the area, they noticed a man who looked like the person in the cartographic sketch of the suspect. The police officers arrested the man who turned out to be accused-appellant Jessie Maliao. Maliao pointed Bohol and Chiong as the perpetrators. Maliao confessed he just stood beside a cabinet and masturbated. He watched Chiong take a small stool and hit AAA on the chest and head. Bohol and Chiong then carried the bloodied body of AAA and told Maliao to clean the room. He wiped the bloodstains in the room. ISSUE: Whether or not the extrajudicial confession of the accused-appellant is admissible in evidence. HELD: NO. The Court of Appeals correctly held that despite the inadmissibility of his extrajudicial confession, Maliao is not entitled to an acquittal. Citing People v. Culala, the Court of Appeals rightfully noted that the extrajudicial confession of an accused who was assisted by a Municipal Attorney during the custodial investigation is not admissible in evidence because the latter cannot be considered an independent attorney. However, in spite of the inadmissibility of his extrajudicial confession, Maliao is not entitled to an acquittal because when he testified on cross-examination, he admitted that all the answers he gave to the questions propounded on him by the police investigator are true and correct of his own personal knowledge. _____________________________________________________________________________________

WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVED (RULE 129) MATTERS OF JUDICIAL NOTICE a. MANDATORY -- A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions. b. DISCRETIONARY -- A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. EFFECT OF JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS • A judicial admission cannot be contradicted unless previously shown to have been made thru palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. • An admission in a pleading on which a party goes to trial is conclusive against him unless the court in its reasonable discretion allows the pleader to withdraw, explain or modify it if it appears to have been made by improvidence or mistake or that no such admission was made.

O bjects as evidence are those addressed to the senses of the court. When an object is relevant to the fact in issue, it may be exhibited to, examined or viewed by the court. (Sec. 1 Rule 130)

Documents as evidence consist of writing or any material containing letters, words, numbers, figures, symbols or other modes of written expression offered as proof of their contents.(Sec. 2 Rule 130) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, - versus – JESSIE MALIAO y MASAKIT, NORBERTO CHIONG y DISCOTIDO and LUCIANO BOHOL y GAMANA, Accused, 594 SCRA 669

FACTS: AAA left her house one night to watch a television show in the adjacent house. Both her mother and aunt and left to go to a mini-carnival. When they returned, AAA was no longer there. They looked for her in their neighborhood but they did not find her The following day, the naked and lifeless body of AAA was found between two banana plants in a vacant lot near her house. A bloodstained shirt was found in a vacant lot which was being used as a carnival. As the police officers were conducting an investigation in the area, they noticed a man who looked like the person in the cartographic sketch of the suspect. The police officers arrested the man who turned out to be accused-appellant Jessie Maliao. Maliao pointed Bohol and Chiong as the perpetrators. Maliao confessed he just stood beside a cabinet and masturbated. He watched Chiong take a small stool and hit AAA on the chest and head. Bohol and Chiong then carried the bloodied body of AAA and told Maliao to clean the room. He wiped the bloodstains in the room.He wiped the bloodstains in the room, on the clothes of AAA, and on the wooden bed and small stool. He threw the t-shirt of AAA at the lot behind his house and placed her short pants inside a sack which contained garbage. He also threw the curtains he used in wiping bloodstains at his house and hid the small stool. He did not know where Bohol and Chiong brought the body of AAA but was aware that the body was found the following day in a vacant lot in front of his house. After AAA was found, Bohol approached him and told him not to say anything or else he would be killed. He saw Chiong standing near a store. Maliao identified the t-shirt, curtains, small stool and wooden bench and human figures representing Bohol and AAA while the former was on top of the latter. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE ALLEGED EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT. RULING: NO. Appellant Maliao's conviction as accomplice in the crime of rape with homicide must be sustained. The Court of Appeals correctly held that despite the inadmissibility of his extrajudicial confession, Maliao is not entitled to an acquittal. The court rightfully noted that the extrajudicial confession of an accused who was assisted by a Municipal Attorney during the custodial investigation is not admissible in evidence because the latter cannot be considered an independent attorney.However, in spite of the inadmissibility of his extrajudicial confession, Maliao is not entitled to an acquittal because when he testified on cross-examination, he admitted that all the answers he gave to the questions propounded on him by the police investigator are true and correct of his own personal knowledge. Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court on Evidence provides that an admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. Maliao admitted he saw Bohol and Chiong rape AAA; that Chiong picked up a

wooden stool and hit AAA with it on the chest and head; that Bohol and Chiong carried the bloodied body of AAA, instructed him to clean the floor and then they went out of the house; that he cleaned the room by wiping the bloodstains; and that he threw the t-shirt of AAA, placed the latter's short pants inside a sack containing garbage, threw the curtains which he used in wiping the bloodstains, and hid the wooden stool. He likewise admitted that he led the police officers to the place where he threw the pieces of clothes which he used in wiping the bloodstains in his house and that he accompanied the police officers to his house and pointed to them the wooden stool which he hid. _____________________________________________________________________________________

ROMEO SISON, NILO PACADAR, JOEL TAN, RICHARD DE LOS SANTOS, and JOSELITO TAMAYO, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. G.R. Nos. 108280-83 November 16, 1995 xxx ----------------------------------------------xxx

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANNIE FERRER, accused, ROMEO SISON, NILO PACADAR, JOEL TAN, RICHARD DE LOS SANTOS, and JOSELITO TAMAYO, accused-appellants. G.R. Nos. 114931-33 November 16, 1995

FACTS: The case before us occurred at a time of great political polarization in the aftermath of the 1986 EDSA Revolution. This was the time when the newly-installed government of President Corazon C. Aquino was being openly challenged in rallies, demonstrations and other public fora by "Marcos loyalists," supporters of deposed President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Tension and animosity between the two (2) groups sometimes broke into violence. On July 27, 1986, it resulted in the murder of Stephen Salcedo, a known "Coryista." Several informations were filed in court against eleven persons identified as Marcos loyalists charging them with the murder of Salcedo. The cases were consolidated and raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX, Manila. All of the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and trial ensued accordingly. The prosecution presented twelve witnesses, including two eyewitnesses, Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo, and the police officers who were at the Luneta at the time of the incident. In support of their testimonies, the prosecution likewise presented documentary evidence consisting of newspaper accounts of the incident and various photographs taken during the mauling. The mauling of Salcedo was witnessed by bystanders and several press people, both local and foreign. The press took pictures and a video of the event which became frontpage news the following day, capturing national and international attention. For their defense, the principal accused denied their participation in the mauling of the victim and offered their respective alibis. The other accused, specifically Attys. Lozano and Nuega and Annie Ferrer opted not to testify in their defense. The trial court rendered a decision finding Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan, Richard de los Santos and Joselito Tamayo guilty as principals in the crime of murder qualified by treachery and sentenced them to 14 years 10 months and 20 days of reclusion temporal as minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum. Annie Ferrer was likewise convicted as an accomplice. The court, however, found that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the other accused and thus acquitted Raul Billosos, Gerry Nery, Rolando Fernandez, Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega. The Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court by acquitting Annie Ferrer but increasing the penalty of the rest of the accused, except for Joselito Tamayo, to reclusion perpetua. The appellate court found them guilty of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength, but convicted Joselito Tamayo of homicide because the information against him did not allege the said qualifying circumstance.

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in reaching a conclusion of fact utilizing speculations, surmises, nonsequitur conclusions, and even the disputed decision of the trial court, to uphold the validity of the very same judgment, all contrary to the Rules of Evidence. RULING: We sustain the appellate and trial courts' findings that the witnesses' testimonies corroborate each other on all important and relevant details of the principal occurrence. Their positive identification of all petitioners jibe with each other and their narration of the events are supported by the medical and documentary evidence on record. The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented in evidence, must be identified by the photographer as to its production and testified as to the circumstances under which they were produced. The value of this kind of evidence lies in its being a correct representation or reproduction of the original, and its admissibility is determined by its accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of the crime. The photographer, however, is not the only witness who can identify the pictures he has taken. The correctness of the photograph as a faithful representation of the object portrayed can be proved prima facie, either by the testimony of the person who made it or by other competent witnesses, after which the court can admit it subject to impeachment as to its accuracy. Photographs, therefore, can be identified by the photographer or by any other competent witness who can testify to its exactness and accuracy. This court notes that when the prosecution offered the photographs as part of its evidence, appellants, through counsel Atty. Alfredo Lazaro, Jr. objected to their admissibility for lack of proper identification. However, when the accused presented their evidence, Atty. Winlove Dumayas, counsel for accused Joselito Tamayo and Gerry Neri used Exhibits "V", "V-1" to "V-48" to prove that his clients were not in any of the pictures and therefore could not have participated in the mauling of the victim. The photographs were adopted by appellant Joselito Tamayo and accused Gerry Neri as part of the defense exhibits. And at this hearing, Atty. Dumayas represented all the other accused per understanding with their respective counsels, including Atty. Lazaro, who were absent. At subsequent hearings, the prosecution used the photographs to cross-examine all the accused who took the witness stand. No objection was made by counsel for any of the accused, not until Atty. Lazaro appeared at the third hearing and interposed a continuing objection to their admissibility. The objection of Atty. Lazaro to the admissibility of the photographs is anchored on the fact that the person who took the same was not presented to identify them. We rule that the use of these photographs by some of the accused to show their alleged non-participation in the crime is an admission of the exactness and accuracy thereof. That the photographs are faithful representations of the mauling incident was affirmed when appellants Richard de los Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan identified themselves therein and gave reasons for their presence thereat. An analysis of the photographs vis-a-vis the accused's testimonies reveal that only three of the appellants, namely, Richard de los Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan could be readily seen in various belligerent poses lunging or hovering behind or over the victim. Appellant Romeo Sison appears only once and he, although afflicted with hernia is shown merely running after the victim. Appellant Joselito Tamayo was not identified in any of the pictures. The absence of the two appellants in the photographs does not exculpate them. The photographs did not capture the entire sequence of the killing of Salcedo but only segments thereof. While the pictures did not record Sison and Tamayo hitting Salcedo, they were unequivocally identified by Sumilang and Banculo. Appellants' denials and alibis cannot overcome their eyeball identification. _____________________________________________________________________________________ The requisites for admissibility of object (real) evidence are as follows: a) The object must be relevant to the fact in issue – There must be a logical connection between the evidence and the point at which it is offered; b) The object must be competent – It should not be excluded by law or the rules; c) The object must be authenticated before it is admitted – Authentication normally consists of showing that the object is the object that was involved in the underlying event; d) The authentication must be made by a competent witness; and e) The object must be formally offered in evidence.

JACK J. ADAMCZUK, plaintiff, vs. ELMER HOLLOWAY, defendant. 13 A. 2d 2

1940

FACTS: Due to a vehicular accident, Adamczuk filed a suit for trespass against Holloway for personal injuries and damage to property. During trial, a photograph was shown identifying the locus of the accident and Adamczuk was able to identify the roads and building in the area stating that the conditions represented by that picture truly represent the conditions of the crossing at the time of this accident except for the fact of daylight or dark. However, on cross- examination he stated that he did not know who took the picture, when it was taken, at what distance it was from the intersection, and that he has no experience in photography. Thus, the court sustained an objection to the introduction of the picture because Adamczuk was not able to procure the original taker of the photograph and establish it in a legal way with the right of cross-examination to defendants' counsel of the photographer. The jury ruled in favor of Holloway. ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in refusing to admit in evidence some photographs about of the locus of the accident and the approach to it on Highway Route 6. RULING: No, the court didn’t err in refusing the photograph in evidence. In this case Adamczuk had sufficient time to procure the original taker of this photograph and present him to be cross-examined by the defendants, however, he failed to do so. The rule is well settled that a photograph may be put in evidence if relevant to the issue and if verified. It does not have to be verified by the taker. Its verification depends on the competency of the verifying witness and as to that the trial judge must in the first instance decide, subject to reversal for substantial error. A photograph can falsify just as much and no more than the human being who takes it or verifies it. If no witness has thus attached his credit to the photograph, then it should not come in at all, any more than an anonymous letter should be received as testimony. The map or photograph must first, to be admissible, be made a part of some qualified person's testimony. Someone must stand forth as its testimonial sponsor; in other words, it must be verified. ____________________________________________________________________________________ State of Washington, respondent vs. Ralph Tatum, appellant FACTS: Ralph Tatum was convicted of the crime of first degree forgery and was sentenced to life imprisonment as habitual criminal. One William Tousin of Pasco received monthly welfare checks from the State of Washington. In February 1960, Tousin did not receive his check (the checks were generally mailed to a rooming house in Pasco where tousin resided). The mail was normally left on a window ledge in the hallway of the rooming house. Appellant resided at the same place. Tousin’s February check for $28.90 was endorsed and cashed at Sherman’s Food Store in Pasco by someone other than the payee, Tousin. An employee of the store, Caroline Pentecost testified that although she could not physically recall the above-mentioned transaction the initials appearing on the face of the check were hers. She also testified that whenever a check was presented to her for payment, the store manager had instructed her to initial it and then insert it into a Regis cope Machine. When it was discovered that the endorsement of the payee was a forgery, the Regis cope film of the transaction was sent to the Regis cope distributor in Portland to be developed. The processed film shows both the check and the person of appellant with the food store in the background. Upon trial, both the negative and the print therefrom are admitted in evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Regis cope films are sufficiently authenticated to warrant their admission into evidence.

RULING: Yes, with respect to the question of the admissibility of the Regis cope films it should be noted that this court has for many years encouraged the admission and use of demonstrative evidence including photographs. There is equally well-established precedent for the proposition that that the admission or rejection of photographs as evidence lies within the sound discretion of the court. It also held the trial court’s discretion extends to the sufficiency of identification. In order to be admissible in evidence it requires that some witness be able to give some indication as to when and where and under what circumstances the photograph was taken and that the photographs accurately portray the subject illustrated. The photograph need only be sufficiently accurate to be helpful to the court and the jury. Witness Pentecost testified that she recognized the background shown in the picture as that the food store and as mentioned previously she also testified as to the standards procedure of Regis coping each individual who cashed a check at the store. Phillip Dale testified at length concerning the Regis cope process. The testimony of these two witnesses taken together amounted to a sufficient authentication to warrant the admission of the photograph into evidence. _____________________________________________________________________________________ PEOPLE OF THE PHLIPPINES, Appellee vs SIMPLICIO DELANTAR, Appellant G.R. No. 169143 February 2, 2007

FACTS: The accused was charged of violating RA 7610. AAA testified that the accused procured her as a child prostitute for at least two clients. The accused then raised the defense that he did not force or coerce the victim. ISSUE: Whether the accused should be held liable for violating RA 7610. RULING: YES. The law punishes not only the person who commits the acts of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with the child, but also those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution. In fact the appellant did not deny that he brought AAA to the two clients. Moreover, the evidence against the accused was further strengthened when it was corroborated by the medical certificate by the physician who made the physical examination on the victim. Lastly, even if AAA had consented, the accused may still be held liable for child prostitution under Section 5, Article III of R.A. No. 7610 because the child's consent or lack of it is not an element of the offense. _____________________________________________________________________________________ INTEL TECHNOLOGY PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioners, vs COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent, G.R. No. 166732

April 27, 2007

FACTS: Silicon Philippines, Inc. is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. It is registered with the BIR das a VAT-taxpayer and with the BOI as a preferred pioneer enterprise. Then, on May, 1999, Silicon filed with the CIR an application for credit/refund of unutilized input VAT for the period of Oct. 1, 1998 to Dec. 31, 1998. Due to the inaction of the CIR, Silicon, on Dec. 27, 2000, filed a Petition for Review with the CTA Division. Silicon alleged that the 4th quarter of 1998, it generated and recorded zero-rated export sales paid to Silicon in acceptable foreign currency and that for the that period, Silicon paid input VAT in the total amount which have not been applied to any output VAT.

The CIR, on the other hand, raised the defenses that: 1. Silicon did not show that it complied with the provisions of Sec. 229 of the Tax Code; 2. That claims for refund are construed strictly against the claimant similar to the nature of exemption from taxes; and that Silicon failed to prove that is entitled for refund. The CTA Division granted Silicon’s claim for refund of unutilized input VAT on capital goods. However, it denied Silicon’s claim for credit/refund of input VAT attributable to its zero-rated export sales. It is because Silicon failed to present an Authority to Print (ATP) from the BIR neither did it print on its export sales invoices the ATP and the word zero-rated. Silicon moved for reconsideration claiming that it is not required to secure an ATP since it has a “Permit to Adopt Computerized Accounting Documents such as Sales Invoice and Official Receipts from the BIR. And that the printing of the word “zero-rated” on its export sales invoices is not necessary because all its finished products are exported to its mother company, Intel Corp., a non-resident corporation and a non-VAT registered entity. ISSUE: WON a claimant for unutilized input VAT on zero-rated sales is required to present proof that it has secured an ATP from the BIR prior to the printing of its invoices or receipts. RULING: YES. Since ATP is not indicated in the invoices or receipts, the only way to verify whether the invoices or receipts are duly registered is by requiring the claimant to present its ATP from the BIR. Without which, the invoices would have no probative value for the purpose of refund. Failure to print the word “zero-rated” on the sales invoices is fatal to a claim for refund of input VAT. In compliance with Sec. 4.108-1 of RR 7-95, requiring the printing of the word “zero-rated” on the invoice covering zero-rate sales is essential as this regulation proceeds from the rule making authority of the Secretary of Finance under Sec. 244of the NIRC. In this case, Silicon failed to present its ATP and to print the word “zero-rated” on its export sales invoices. Thus, the claim for credit/refund of input VAT attributable to its zero-rated sales must be denied. _____________________________________________________________________________________ THE HEIRS OF MARCELINO DORONIO, NAMELY: REGINA AND FLORA, BOTH SURNAMED DORONIO, Petitioners, Vs. HEIRS OF FORTUNATO DORONIO, NAMELY: TRINIDAD ROSALINA DORONIOBALMES, MODING DORONIO, FLORENTINA DORONIO, AND ANICETA ALCANTARAMANALO, Respondents G.R. No. 169454 December 27, 2007

FACTS: Spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante, now both deceased, were the registered owners of a parcel of land located at Asingan, Pangasinan covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 352. Marcelino Doronio and Fortunato Doronio, now both deceased, were among their children and herein represented by their heirs, petitioners and respondents respectively. Petitioners now claim ownership of the land in view of the private deed of donation propter nuptias in favor of their predecessors, Marcelino Doronio and wife. Respondents, on the other hand, contends that they acquired one-half of the property covered by OCT No. 352 by tradition and/or intestate succession; that the deed of donation was null and void; that assuming that the deed of donation was valid, only one-half of the property was actually donated to Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico; and that respondents acquired ownership of the other half portion of the property by acquisitive prescription and that the subject land is different from what was donated as the descriptions of the property under OCT No. 352 and under the private deed of donation were different.. Petitioners filed before RTC in Urdaneta, Pangasinan a petition "For the Registration of a Private Deed of Donation". Petition was granted and TCT

4481 issued to petitioners. Respondent’s MR denied. Respondents, in turn, filed an action for reconveyance and damages with prayer for preliminary injunction against petitioner. RTC ruled in favor of petitioner heirs of Marcelino Doronio. CA reversed RTC. ISSUE: Whether or not the Original certificate is admissible as evidence despite of lack of translation RULING: Yes the Original certificate is admissible. The argument is untenable. The requirement that documents written in an unofficial language must be accompanied with a translation in English or Filipino as a prerequisite for its admission in evidence must be insisted upon by the parties at the trial to enable the court, where a translation has been impugned as incorrect, to decide the issue. Where such document, not so accompanied with a translation in English or Filipino, is offered in evidence and not objected to, either by the parties or the court, it must be presumed that the language in which the document is written is understood by all, and the document is admissible in evidence. In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified. Since petitioners did not object to the offer of said documentary evidence on time, it is now too late in the day for them to question its admissibility. The rule is that evidence not objected may be deemed admitted and may be validly considered by the court in arriving at its judgment. This is true even if by its nature, the evidence is inadmissible and would have surely been rejected if it had been challenged at the proper time. As a matter of fact, instead of objecting, petitioners admitted the contents of Exhibit A, that is, OCT No. 352 in their comment on respondent’s formal offer of documentary evidence. In the said comment, petitioners alleged, among others, that Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, F and G, are admitted but not for the purpose they are offered because these exhibits being public and official documents are the best evidence of that they contain and not for what a party would like it to prove. Said evidence was admitted by the RTC. Once admitted without objection, even though not admissible under an objection, We are not inclined now to reject it. Consequently, the evidence that was not objected to became property of the case, and all parties to the case are considered amenable to any favorable or unfavorable effects resulting from the said evidence. _____________________________________________________________________________________ FLORENTINO PINEDA, Petitioner, vs Heirs of ELISEO GUEVARA et al, Respondents 515 SCRA 627

FACTS: On September 7 1995, Respondents Guevara heirs filed an action for the nullification of the Certificates of title of a parcel of land measuring approximately 2,304 hectares situated in Marikina. The Guevara heirs alleged in the complaint that they were the owners of a property originally covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) NO. 386 issued on December 7, 1910 in favor of the spouses Emiliano Guevara and Matilde Crimen. The couple’s son, and the Guevara heirs’ predecessors-in-interest, Eliseo Guevara, allegedly purchased the property on January 1, 1932 and had exercised ownership over the property since then by selling and donating portions thereof to third persons. The Guevara heirs averred that the sale of the property to Eliseo Guevara was annotated at the back of OCT NO. 386. According to the Guevara heirs, the defendants illegally claimed ownership and possession over a certain portion of the property. Defendant Pineda filed an answer with counterclaim, raising the defenses of lack of causes action, prescription, laches and estoppel. He also averred that he was a buyer in good faith and had been in actual possession of the land since 1970 initially as a lessor and subsequently as an owner. He registered the property in his name and was issued TCT No. 257272.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court correctly dismissed the action on the ground of laches without conducting trial on the merits. RULING: Well settled is the rule that the elements of laches must be proved positively. Laches is evidentiary in nature which could not be established by mere allegations in the pleadings and cannot be resolved in a motion to dismiss. At this stage therefore, the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of laches is premature. Those issues must be resolved at the trial of the case on the merits wherein both parties will given ample opportunity to prove their respective claims and defenses. The element of laches are (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which the complaint seeks a remedy, (2) delay in asserting the complainants rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendants conduct as having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit, (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant the complaint would assert the right in which he basis his suit, and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complaint, or the suit is not held barred. Whether or not the elements of laches are present is a question involving a factual determination by the trial court. _____________________________________________________________________________________ DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE • Demonstrative evidence is tangible evidence that merely illustrates a matter of importance in the litigation. Common types of demonstrative evidence include photographs, motion pictures and recordings, x-ray pictures, scientific tests, demonstrations and experiments, maps, diagrams, models, summaries, and other materials created especially for the litigation. • In contrast to demonstrative evidence, object evidence is a tangible object that played some actual role in the matter that gave rise to the litigation. For instance, the knife used in the altercation that forms the basis for the lawsuit. The distinction between object and demonstrative evidence is important because it helps determine the standards that the evidence must meet to be admissible. In particular, the foundation that must be laid for object evidence is generally somewhat different from that needed for demonstrative evidence. • The foundation for demonstrative evidence does not involve showing that the object was the one used in the underlying event. Rather, the foundation generally involves showing that the demonstrative object fairly represents or illustrates what it is alleged to illustrate. CATEGORIES OF OBJECT EVIDENCE ➢For purposes of authentication of an object or for laying the foundation for the exhibit, object evidence may be classified into the following: a) Object that have readily identifiable marks (unique objects); b) Objects that are made readily identifiable (objects made unique); and c) Objects with no identifying marks and cannot be marked (non-unique objects). VIEW OF AN OBJECT OR SCENE • Objects as evidence are those addressed to the senses of the court. When an object is relevant to the fact in issue, it may be exhibited to, examined or viewed by the court. • The inspection may be made inside or outside the courtroom. An inspection or view outside the courtroom should be made in the presence of the parties or at least with previous notice to them. It is error for the judge for example, to go alone to the land in question, or to the place where the crime was committed and take a view without the previous knowledge of the parties. Such inspection or view is part of the trial since evidence is thereby being received. DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE • A document is defined as a deed, instrument or other duly notarized paper by which something is proved, evidenced or set forth. Any instrument notarized by a notary public or a competent public official, with the solemnities required by law, is a public document. • Pleadings filed in a case and in the custody of the clerk of court are public documents. All other documents are private documents.

W hen the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself… (Sec. 3 Rule 130)

B est Evidence Rule BASILIO DE VERA, LUIS DE VERA, FELIPE DE VERA, HEIRS OF EUSTAQUIA DE VERAPAPA represented by GLICERIA PAPA-FRANCISCO, et al., petitioners, vs. SPOUSES MARIANO AGUILAR and LEONA V. AGUILAR, respondents. G.R. No. 83377 February 9, 1993

FACTS: Petitioners Basilio, Luis, Felipe, Eustaquia and Maria, all surnamed de Vera and respondent Leona, married to respondent Mariano Aguilar, are the children and heirs of the late MarcosaBernabe who died on May 10, 1960. In her lifetime, MarcosaBernabe owned the disputed parcel of land situated in Camalig, Meycauayan, Bulacan, with an area of 4,195 square meters, designated as Cadastral Lot No. 3621, Cad. 337, Case No. 4, MeycauayanCadastre. The disputed property was mortgaged by petitioners Basilio and Felipe de Vera to a certain Atty. Leonardo Bordador. When the mortgage had matured, the respondents redeemed the property from Atty. Leonardo Bordador and in turn MarcosaBernabe sold the same to them as evidenced by a deed of absolute sale dated February 11, 1956. On February 13, 1956, the respondents registered the deed with the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan resulting in the cancellation of the tax declaration in the name of MarcosaBernabe and the issuance of another in the name of the Aguilars. Since then and up to the present, the Aguilars have been paying taxes on the land. Respondent Mariano Aguilar was then issued a free patent to the land on the basis of which Original Certificate of Title No. P-1356(M) was issued in his name. On September 1, 1980, the petitioners wrote to the respondents claiming that as children of MarcosaBernabe, they were co-owners of the property and demanded partition thereof on threats that the respondents would be charged with perjury and/or falsification. The petitioners also claimed that the respondents had resold the property to MarcosaBernabe on April 28, 1959. The respondents wrote in reply to the petitioners that they were the sole owners of the disputed parcel of land and denied that the land was resold to MarcosaBernabe. True to petitioners' threat, they filed a falsification case against the respondents. However, on March 31, 1981, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Arsenio N. Mercado of Bulacan recommended dismissal of the charge of falsification of public document against the respondents for lack of a prima facie case. On March 26, 1981, petitioners filed a suit for reconveyance of the lot covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-1356(M). Trial Court rendered decision in favor with the petitioners. Not contented with the decision, respondents contended that since the petitioners have failed to produce the original of the alleged deed of sale dated April 28, 1959, the same was not the best evidence of the alleged sale hence it should have been excluded and should not have been accorded any evidentiary value. On the other hand, the petitioners claimed that the existence of the document of sale dated April 28, 1959 had been duly established by the testimony of the notary public before whom it was acknowledged and by Luis de Vera who was present during its execution and that the loss of the original document had been proven by the testimony of the representatives of the offices of the National Archives and the Provincial Assessor of Bulacan. On November 29, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision reversing the trial court's decision. It found that the loss or destruction of the original deed of sale has not been duly proven by the petitioners. Hence, secondary evidence, i.e., presentation of the xeroxed copy of the alleged deed of sale is inadmissible. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have satisfactorily proven the loss of the original deed of sale so as to allow the presentation of the xeroxed copy of the same. RULING: No. The petitioners didn’t sufficiently satisfy the court that the original deed of sale was lost. In accordance with the Rules of Court, secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were actually lost or destroyed. But prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the former existence of the instrument which the petitioners failed to do. Also, all duplicates or counterparts must be accounted for before using photocopies. For, since all the duplicates

or multiplicates are parts of the writing itself to be proved, no excuse for non-production of the writing itself can be regarded as established until it appears that all of its parts are unavailable. In the case at bar, Atty. Emiliano Ibasco, Jr., notary public who notarized the document testified that the alleged deed of sale has about four or five original copies. Hence, all originals must be accounted for before secondary evidence can be given of any one. _____________________________________________________________________________________ MANILA MINING CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. MIGUEL TAN, doing business under the name and style of MANILA MANDARIN MARKETING, Respondent. G.R. No. 171702

February 12, 2009

FACTS: Miguel Tan, doing business under the name and style of Manila Mandarin Marketing, was engaged in the business of selling electrical materials. Manila Mining Corporation (MMC) ordered and received various electrical materials from Tan valued at P2,347,880. MMC agreed to pay the purchase price within 30 days from delivery, or be charged interest of 18% per annum, and in case of suit to collect the same, to pay attorney’s fees equal to 25% of the claim. MMC made partial payments in the amount of P464,636. But despite repeated demands, it failed to give the remaining balance of P1,883,244, which was covered by nine invoices. Tan filed a collection suit against MMC at the Manila RTC. After Tan completed presenting evidence, MMC filed a Demurrer to Evidence, which the RTC denied. RTC further directed MMC to present evidence. MMC offered as sole witness Rainier Ibarrola, its accountant from year 2000 to 2002. Ibarrola confirmed that it was standard office procedure for a supplier to present the original sales invoice and purchase order when claiming to be paid. He testified that the absence of stamp marks on the invoices and purchase orders negated receipt of said documents by MMC’s representatives. On rebuttal, Tan presented Wally de los Santos, his sales representative in charge of MMC’s account. De los Santos testified that he delivered the originals of the invoices and purchase orders to MMC’s accounting department. As proof, he showed three customer’s acknowledgment receipts bearing the notation: “I/We signed below to signify my/our receipt of your statement of account with you for the period and the amount stated below, together with the corresponding original copies of the invoices, purchase order and requisition slip attached for purpose of verification, bearing acknowledgment of my/our receipt of goods”. The RTC ruled for Tan and ordered defendant to pay the principal amount with interest and liquidated damages. MMC moved for reconsideration, but its motion was denied by the RTC. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s decision, hence the present petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner contends, among others, that respondent’s claim for payment was premature inasmuch as the original invoices and purchase orders were not sent to its accounting department. Consequently, Tan’s claims were not verified and processed. MMC believes that mere delivery of the goods did not automatically give rise to its obligation to pay, in light of Article 1545 of the Civil Code, which provides that, “where the obligation of either party to a contract of sale is subject to any condition which is not performed, such party may refuse to proceed with the contract or he may waive performance of the condition.…” Petitioner also assails the probative value of the documentary evidence presented during trial, claiming that the unauthenticated photocopies of invoices and purchase orders did not satisfy the Best Evidence Rule and that by Tan’s failure to yield the original documents, he was presumed to have suppressed evidence under Section 3(e),15 Rule 131 of the Rules of Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the best evidence rule applies only if the contents of the writing are directly in issue.

RULING: As regards respondent’s failure to present the original documents, suffice it to say that the best evidence rule applies only if the contents of the writing are directly in issue. Where the existence of the writing or its general purport is all that is in issue, secondary evidence may be introduced in proof. MMC did not deny the contents of the invoices and purchase orders. Its lone contention was that Tan did not submit the original copies to facilitate payment. But we are in agreement that photocopies of the documents were admissible in evidence to prove the contract of sale between the parties. Neither is there merit to petitioner’s contention that respondent was guilty of delay in filing the collection case. A careful examination of the records shows that Tan brought suit against MMC less than a year after the latter stopped making partial payments. Tan is, therefore, not guilty of laches. Laches is the neglect to assert a right or claim which, taken together with lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to adverse party, operates as bar in a court of equity.21 Here, Tan had no reason to go to court while MMC was paying its obligation, even if partially, under the contracts of sale. _____________________________________________________________________________________ EDSA SHANGRI-LA HOTEL AND G.R. No. 145842 RESORT, INC., RUFO B. COLAYCO, RUFINO L. SAMANIEGO, KUOK KHOON CHEN, and KUOK KHOON TSEN, Petitioners, vs. BF CORPORATION, Respondent. GR No. 145873 June 27, 2008

FACTS: Petitions stemmed from a construction contract denominated as Agreement for the Execution of Builders Work for the EDSA Shangri-la Hotel Project that ESHRI and BF executed for the construction of the EDSA Shangri-la Hotel starting May 1, 1991. Among other things, the contract stipulated for the payment of the contract price on the basis of the work accomplished as described in the monthly progress billings. Under this arrangement, BF shall submit a monthly progress billing to ESHRI which would then re-measure the work accomplished and prepare a Progress Payment Certificate for that month’s progress billing. After several futile attempts to collect the unpaid billings, BF filed, on July 26, 1993, before the RTC a suit for a sum of money and damages. The trial court rule in favor of BF, which was affirmed by the CA. On appeal, petitioners fault the CA, and necessarily the trial court, on the matter of the admission in evidence of the photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19 for being contrary to the best evidence rule. ISSUE: Whether or not the photocopies are admissible in evidence. RULING: The photocopies are admissible. BF complied with the laying-the-basis requirement. The only actual rule that the term best evidence denotes is the rule requiring that the original of a writing must, as a general proposition, be produced and secondary evidence of its contents is not admissible except where the original cannot be had. Rule 130, Section 3 of the Rules of Court enunciates the best evidence rule: “SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases: a. When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror; b. When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;” Complementing the above provision is Sec. 6 of Rule 130, which reads: “SEC. 6. When original document is in adverse party’s custody or control. If the document is in the custody or under control of the adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If

after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the document, secondary evidence may be presented as in the case of loss.” Secondary evidence of the contents of a written instrument or document refers to evidence other than the original instrument or document itself. A party may present secondary evidence of the contents of a writing not only when the original is lost or destroyed, but also when it is in the custody or under the control of the adverse party. In either instance, however, certain explanations must be given before a party can resort to secondary evidence. In other words, the conditions sine qua non for the presentation and reception of the photocopies of the original document as secondary evidence have been met. These are: (1) there is proof of the original documents execution or existence; (2) there is proof of the cause of the original documents unavailability; and (3) the offeror is in good faith. _____________________________________________________________________________________ PACIFICO B. ARCEO, JR., Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. G.R. No. 142641, July 17, 2006

FACTS: Petitioner, Pacifico B. Arceo, Jr., obtained a loan from JosefinoCenizal. He issued a postdated check to secure the payment of the loan but promised the latter that he would replace the check with cash. Arceo reneged on his promise. Thus, Cenizal brought the check to the bank for encashment but only to find out that it does not have sufficient funds. Cenizal informed Arceo of the dishonor of the check through a demand letter executed by his lawyer. However, Arceo still did not pay. Therefore, Cenizal filed a complaint for estafa and violation of BP 22 before the city prosecutor of Quezon City. During the preliminary investigation, he presented the original of the check, the return slip, and other pertinent documents in support of his complaint. But the said check and return slip were lost in a fire which happened near the residence of Cenizal. Thus, he executed an Affidavit of Loss in lieu of the lost documents. After trial, petitioner was found guilty as charged. He appealed to the Court of Appeals but the same was denied in its resolution dated April 28, 1999. His reconsideration was also denied.Thus, he filed this petition invoking the Best Evidence Rule and insisting that the presentation of the check in evidence is a condition sine qua non for conviction under BP 22. ISSUE: Whether or not the Best Evidence Rule shall apply in this case. RULING: No, the Best Evidence Rule does not apply in this case. Thus, testimonial evidence may be admitted in order to prove the issuance of the subject check. It is a well-settled principle that the Best Evidence Rule applies only where the subject of the inquiry is the content of the document. But when the issue is the execution or existence of the document or the circumstances surrounding its execution, the rule will not apply and in that case, testimonial evidence may be admitted. In cases involving violation of BP 22, the gravamen is the act of drawing or issuance of the worthless check. Hence, the subject of the inquiry is the fact of the issuance or execution of the check, and not its content. In the case at bar, Cenizal already presented the original of the check during preliminary investigation. And after its loss, he was able to adequately establish its due execution in the Affidavit of Loss as well as his testimony during trial. Furthermore, Arceo himself admitted that he issued the check. He did not deny that the same was presented for payment and that it was dishonored for insufficiency of funds. All other elements of the crime being present, the check being issued in consideration of a loan, the issuance of notice of dishonor to petitioner satisfied, and petitioner’s knowledge of insufficiency of his funds at the time he issued the check as well as its subsequent dishonor sufficiently established , the Court has no reason to rule otherwise.

MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. SSANGYONG CORPORATION, respondents. G.R. No. 170633 October 17, 2007

FACTS: Petitioner is engaged in the business of importing and wholesaling stainless steel products. One of its suppliers is the responded, an international trading company with head office in Seoul, South Korea and regional headquarters in Makati City, Philippines. The two corporations conducted business through telephone calls and facsimile or telecopy transmissions. Respondent would send the pro forma invoices containing the details of the steel product order to petitioner; if the latter conforms thereto, its representative affixes his signature on the faxed copy and sends it back to the respondent, again by fax. Respondent filed a civil action for damages due to breach of contract against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. In its complaint, respondent alleged that defendants breached their contract when they refused to open the letter of credit in the amount of US$170,000.00 for the remaining 100MT of steel under Pro Forma Invoice. After respondent rested its case, petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging that respondent failed to present the original copies of the pro forma invoices on which the civil action was based. Petitioner contends that the photocopies of the pro forma invoices presented by respondent Ssangyong to prove the perfection of their supposed contract of sale are inadmissible in evidence and do not fall within the ambit of R.A. No. 8792, because the law merely admits as the best evidence the original fax transmittal. On the other hand, respondent posits that, from a reading of the law and the Rules on Electronic Evidence, the original facsimile transmittal of the pro forma invoice is admissible in evidence since it is an electronic document and, therefore, the best evidence under the law and the Rules. Respondent further claims that the photocopies of these fax transmittals (specifically ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2) are admissible under the Rules on Evidence because the respondent sufficiently explained the non-production of the original fax transmittals. ISSUE: Whether the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions admissible under the best evidence rule. RULING: Electronic document shall be regarded as the equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, as long as it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means, showing to reflect the data accurately. Thus, to be admissible in evidence as an electronic data message or to be considered as the functional equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, the writing must foremost be an “electronic data message” or an “electronic document. The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 8792 defines the “Electronic Data Message” refers to information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or similar means, but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy. The phrase “but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy” in the IRR’s definition of “electronic data message” is copied from the Model Law on Electronic Commerce adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), from which majority of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792 were taken. While Congress deleted this phrase in the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, the drafters of the IRR reinstated it. The deletion by Congress of the said phrase is significant and pivotal. Moreover, when Congress formulated the term “electronic data message,” it intended the same meaning as the term “electronic record” in the Canada law. This construction of the term “electronic data message,” which excludes telexes or faxes, except computer-generated faxes, is in harmony with the Electronic Commerce Law’s focus on “paperless” communications and the “functional equivalent approach” that it espouses. Facsimile transmissions are not, in this sense, “paperless,” but verily are paper-based.

In an ordinary facsimile transmission, there exists an original paper-based information or data that is scanned, sent through a phone line, and re-printed at the receiving end. … [I]n a virtual or paperless environment, technically, there is no original copy to speak of, as all direct printouts of the virtual reality are the same, in all respects, and are considered as originals. Ineluctably, the law’s definition of “electronic data message,” which, as aforesaid, is interchangeable with “electronic document,” could not have included facsimile transmissions, which have an original paper-based copy as sent and a paper-based facsimile copy as received. These two copies are distinct from each other, and have different legal effects. While Congress anticipated future developments in communications and computer technology when it drafted the law, it excluded the early forms of technology, like telegraph, telex and telecopy (except computer-generated faxes, which is a newer development as compared to the ordinary fax machine to fax machine transmission), when it defined the term “electronic data message.” The terms “electronic data message” and “electronic document,” as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence. _____________________________________________________________________________________ CONCEPCION CHUA GAW, Petitioner Vs. SUY BEN CHUA and FELISA CHUA, Respondents. GR No. 160855 APRIL, 16, 2008

FACTS: Petitioner Concepcion Chua Gaw and her husband, Antonio Gaw (Spouses Gaw), borrowed P200,000 from Suy Ben Chua to be used for the construction of their house. Suy Ben Chua issued a check for the amount. The parties agreed that the loan will be payable in 6 months without interest. Chua SiocHuan executed a Deed of Sale over all her rights and interests in Hagonoy Lumber for P255,000 in favor of respondent Suy Ben Chua. Gaw failed to pay the amount they borrowed within the designated period. Suy Ben Chua filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against the Spouses Gaw. In their Answer, the Spouses Gaw contend that Concepcion asked Suy Ben Chua for an accounting and payment of her share in the profits of the 3 business enterprises but Suy Ben Chua persuaded Concepcion to temporarily forego her demand as it would offend their mother who still wanted to remain in control of the family businesses. To insure that she will defer her demand, Suy Ben Chuaallegedly gave her P200,000.00 as her share in the profits of Hagonoy Lumber. During trial, Spouses Gaw called Suy Ben Chua to testify as an adverse witness under Rule 132, Section 10. On cross-examination, Suy Ben Chua explained that he ceased to be a stockholder of Capitol Sawmill when he sold his shares of stock to the other stockholders. He further testified that Chua SiocHuan acquired Hagonoy Lumber by virtue of a Deed of Partition, executed by the heirs of Chua Chin. He, in turn, became the owner of Hagonoy Lumber when he bought the same from Chua SiocHuan through a Deed of Sale. On re-direct examination, Suy Ben Chua stated that he sold his shares of stock in Capitol Sawmill for P254,000.00, which payment he received in cash. He also paid the purchase price of P255,000.00 for Hagonoy Lumber in cash. RTC ruled in favor of Suy Ben Chua and ordered Concepcion Gaw (her husband Antonio had passed away) to pay P200,000. RTC held that the P200,000.00 was a loan advanced by the Suy Ben Chuafrom his own funds and not remunerations for services rendered to Hagonoy Lumber nor Concepcion’s advance share in the profits of their parents’ businesses. Concepcion appealed to the CA alleging that the TC erred in considering evidence for Concepcion, Suy Ben Chua’s testimony when he was called to testify as an adverse party. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. CA found Concepcion’s argument that the RTC should not have included respondent’s Suy Ben Chua as part of petitioner Concepcion’s evidence as baseless.

ISSUE: Whether or not Concepcion was unduly prejudiced when RTC treated Suy Ben Chua’s testimony as adverse witness during cross-examination by his own counsel as part of Concepcion’s evidence. RULING: NO. A party who calls his adversary as a witness is, therefore, not bound by the latter’s testimony only in the sense that he may contradict him by introducing other evidence to prove a state of facts contrary to what the witness testifies on. A rule that provides that the party calling an adverse witness shall not be bound by his testimony does not mean that such testimony may not be given its proper weight, but merely that the calling party shall not be precluded from rebutting his testimony or from impeaching him. This, Concepcion failed to do as in her own testimony, she failed to discredit the Suy Ben Chua’s testimony on how Hagonoy Lumber became his sole property. In arriving at a decision, the entirety of the evidence presented will be considered, regardless of the party who offered them in evidence. The testimony of an adverse witness is evidence in the case and should be given its proper weight, and such evidence becomes weightier if the other party fails to impeach the witness or contradict his testimony. _____________________________________________________________________________________

MEANING OF THE RULE • The best evidence rule is that rule which requires the highest grade of evidence obtainable to prove a disputed fact. It cannot be invoked unless the contents of a writing is the subject of judicial inquiry, in which case the best evidence is the original writing itself. • The best evidence refers to that which the law or the rules consider as the best evidence to prove the fact in dispute. The best evidence is the evidence which the case in its nature is susceptible and which is within the power of the party to produce. Evidence cannot be received which indicates on its face that it is secondary, that is, merely substitutionary in its nature, and that the original source of information is in existence and accessible. The underlying purpose is the prevention of fraud.

WHEN APPLICABLE ➢When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases: a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror; b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice; c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole; and d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office. MEANING OF ORIGINAL • The original does not necessarily mean the one first written; its meaning is relative only to the particular issue. The original is the document whose contents are to be proved. • Sec. 4, Rule 130 has clarified what constitutes the original of a document: a) The original of a document is one the contents of which are the subject of inquiry; b) When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time, with identical contents, all such copies are equally regarded as originals; and c) When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being copied from another at or near the time of the transaction, all the entries are likewise equally regarded as originals.

P arol Evidence Rule LUCIO R. CRUZ, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND CONRADO Q. SALONGA, Respondents. G.R. No. 79962 December 10, 1990

FACTS: The private respondent Conrado Salonga filed a complaint for collection and damages against petitioner Lucio Cruz alleging that in the course of their business transactions of buying and selling fish, the petitioner borrowed from him an amount of P35,000.00, evidenced by a receipt. The plaintiff claimed that of this amount, only P20,000.00 had been paid, leaving a balance of P10,000.00; that in August 1982, he and the defendant agreed that the latter would grant him an exclusive right to purchase the harvest of certain fishponds leased by Cruz in exchange for certain loan accommodations; that pursuant thereto, Salonga delivered to Cruz various loans totaling P15,250.00, evidenced by four receipts and an additional P4,000.00, the receipt of which had been lost; and that Cruz failed to comply with his part of the agreement by refusing to deliver the alleged harvest of the fishpond and the amount of his indebtedness. Cruz denied having contracted any loan from Salonga. By way of special defense, he alleged that he was a lessee of several hectares of a fishpond owned by Nemesio Yabut and that he entered into an agreement with Salonga whereby the latter would purchase (pakyaw) fish in certain areas of the fishpond. They also agreed that immediately thereafter, Salonga would sublease (bubuwisan) the same fishpond for a period of one year. Cruz admitted having received the amount of P35,000.00 and on several occasions an aggregate amount of P15,250.00. He contended however, that these amounts were received by him not as loans but as consideration for their "pakyaw" agreement and payment for the sublease of the fishpond. The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner and ordered the private respondent to pay the former. Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. found that the transactions between the petitioner and the private respondent were indeed "pakyaw" and sublease agreements. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was reversed. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in disregarding parol evidence. RULING: A distinction should be made between a statement of fact expressed in the instrument and the terms of the contractual act. The former may be varied by parol evidence but not the latter. 5 Section 7 of Rule 130 clearly refers to the terms of an agreement and provides that "there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the contents of the writing." Even if it were assumed that Exhibits D and I are covered by the parol evidence rule, its application by the Court of Appeals was improper. The record shows that no objection was made by the private respondent when the petitioner introduced evidence to explain the circumstances behind the execution and issuance of the said instruments. The rule is that objections to evidence must be made as soon as the grounds therefor become reasonably apparent. In the case of testimonial evidence, the objection must be made when the objectionable question is asked or after the answer is given if the objectionable features become apparent only by reason of such answer. For failure of the private respondent to object to the evidence introduced by the petitioner, he is deemed to have waived the benefit of the parol evidence rule. Thus, in Abrenica v. Gonda, this Court held: . . . “The proper time to make a protest or objection is when, from the question addressed to the witness, or from the answer thereto, or from the presentation of proof, the inadmissibility of evidence is, or may be inferred. It is also settled that the court cannot disregard evidence which would ordinarily be incompetent under the rules but has been rendered admissible by the failure of a party to object thereto.”

VICTORIA LECHUGAS, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MARINA LOZA, SALVADOR LOZA, ISIDRO LOZA, CARMELITA LOZA, DAVID LOZA, AMPARO LOZA, ERLINDA LOZA and ALEJANDRA LOZA, respondents. 143 SCRA 335

1986

FACTS: Petitioner filed an unlawful entry case against private respondent “the Loza’s”. Another case was filed for recovery and possession of the same property and both cases was tried jointly. Petitioner testified that she bought the land from Lasangue in 1950. Private respondent contended that the same land in question was bought by their father from the father of petitioner in 1941. Plaintiff’s vendor testified for the defendant stating that she sold the south part of the land which is lot 5522 not lot 5456 which plaintiff claims. ISSUE: Whether or not the court of appeals erred in considering, parol evidence over the objection of petitioner. RULING: The appellate court acted correctly in upholding the trial court’s action in admitting the testimony of Leoncia. Petitioner alleges that lot 5522 was sold to her by Leonora, not Leoncia, who was never presented as witness in any proceeding in the lower court. The parol evidence rule does not apply and may not properly be involved by either party to litigation against the other, where at least one of the parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to a written instrument in the question and does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation established thereby. The rule is not applicable where the controversy is between one of the parties to the document and third persons. Through the testimony of Leoncia, it was shown that what she really intended to sell is lot 5522 but not being able to read and write and fully relying on the good faith of her cousin, petitioner, she just placed her thumb mark on a piece of paper. _____________________________________________________________________________________ Baldomero Inciong, petitioner vs. Court of Appeals and Philippine Bank of Communications, respondents 257 SCRA 578 (1996)

FACTS: In February 1983, Rene Naybe took out a loan from Philippine Bank of Communicatons in the amount of P50,000. For that he executed a promissory note in the same amount. Naybe was able to convince Baldomero Inciongand Gregoria Pantanosas to co-sign with him as co-makers. The promissory note went due and it was left unpaid. PBC demanded payment from the three but still no payment was made. PBC then sue the three but PBC later released Pantanosas from its obligations. Naybe left for Saudi Arabia were can’t issue summons and the complaint against him was subsequently dropped. Inciong was left to face the suit. He argued that since the complaint against naybe was dropped and that Pantanosas was released from his obligations, he too should have been released. Petitioner contends that in signing the promissory note his consent was vitiated by fraud as contrary to their agreement that the loan was only P5,000, the promissory note stated the amount of P50,000. ISSUE: Whether or not Inciong should be held liable under the Parol Evidence Rule. RULING: Yes, The assertion of the petitioner that since the promissory note is not a public deed with the formalities prescribed by law but a mere commercial paper which does not bear a signature of attesting witnesses parol evidence may overcome the contents of the promissory note is unmeritorious. Parol evidence states that when the terms of the agreement have been reduced to writing it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the agreement. The rule does not specify that the written agreement be a public document.

For the parol evidence to apply, a written contract need not be in any particular form or be signed by both parties. Fraud must be established by clear and convincing evidence mere preponderance of evidence not even being adequate. Petitioner’s attempt to prove fraud must therefore fail as it was evidenced only by his own corroborated and self-serving testimony. _____________________________________________________________________________________ RAFAEL S. ORTAÑES, petitioner vs THE COURT OF APPEALS, OSCAR INOCENTES AND ASUNCION LLANES INOCENTES, respondents G.R. No. 107372 January 23, 1997

FACTS: Private respondent sold to Ortanes, 2 parcels of land. Respondent received the payments for the 2 lots, but failed to deliver the titles to petitioner. Ortanes demanded the delivery of said titles but respondent, refused on the ground that the title of the first lot is in the possession of another person, and petitioner's acquisition of the title of the other lot is subject to certain conditions. Petitioner sued private respondents for specific performance before the RTC. In their answer with counter-claim private respondents merely alleged the existence of several oral conditions which were never reflected in the deeds of sale. ISSUE: Whether the oral conditions raised by the respondent is binding and admissible. RULING: NO. - Spoken words could be notoriously unreliable unlike a written contract which speaks of a uniform language. Under the rule, when the terms of an agreement were reduced to writing, as in this case, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of such terms can be admitted other than the contents thereof. Considering that the written deeds of sale were the only repository of the truth, whatever is not found in said instruments must have been waived and abandoned by the parties. Examining the deeds of sale, we cannot even make an inference that the sale was subject to any condition. As a contract, it is the law between the parties. Private respondents' oral testimony on the alleged conditions, coming from a party who has an interest in the outcome of the case, depending exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary evidence. _____________________________________________________________________________________ SOLEDAD LEONOR PEA SUATENGCO & ANTONIO ESTEBAN SUATENGCO, Complainants, vs CARMENCITA O. REYES, Respondent, G.R. No. 162729

December 17, 2008

Doctrine: Liquidated damages, such as attorney's fees stipulated in a promissory note, are those agreed upon by the parties to a contract to be paid in case of breach thereof. Said fees so provided are awarded in favor of the litigant in the nature of a penalty or liquidated damages, not a compensation for the respondent's counsel. FACTS: Congressman Reyes, herein respondent, lends petitioners approximately P1.3 Million. In the loan contract, it is stipulated that in the event of default, Suatengco must pay the balance plus 12% interest per annum plus 5% attorney's fees for the total award. Atty. Edmundo Reyes, son of the respondent, appeared as the attorney-in-fact of the respondent, and files a case for collection of sum of money, the 12% interest

and 20% attorney's fees. The lower and appellate courts award the same. The petitioners countered alleging that the stipulated attorney's fee is only 5%. ISSUE: Whether or not 20% of the outstanding balance prevails over the 5% stipulated in the promissory note as basis for the attorney's fees. RULING: The attorney's fees herein litigated are in the nature of liquidated damages and not the attorney's fees recoverable as between attorney and client enunciated and regulated by the Rules of Court. Liquidated damages are those agreed upon by the parties to a contract to be paid in case of breach thereof. The stipulation on attorney's fees contained in the said Promissory Note constitutes what is known as a penal clause. A penalty clause, expressly recognized by law, is an accessory undertaking to assume greater liability on the part of the obligor in case of breach of an obligation. The obligor would then be bound to pay the stipulated indemnity without the necessity of proof on the existence and on the measure of damages caused by the breach. It is well-settled that so long as such stipulation does not contravene law, morals, or public order, it is strictly binding upon the obligor. The attorney's fees so provided are awarded in favor of the litigant, not his counsel. It is improper for both the RTC and the CA to increase the award of attorney's fees despite the express stipulation contained in the said Promissory Note since it is not intended to be the compensation for the respondent's counsel but was rather in the nature of a penalty or liquidated damages. _____________________________________________________________________________________ SPS. MANUEL AND VICTORIA SALIMBANGON, Petitioners, - versus SPS. SANTOS AND ERLINDA TAN, Respondents. G.R. No. 185240 January 20, 2010

FACTS: Petitioner Victoria Salimbangon, together with her brothers and sister, inherited the subject property from her father. They divided the lot into Lot A, B, C, D, and E. Lots A, B, and C were adjacent to a city street while D and E were interior lots. To give these interior lots access to the street, the heirs established in their extrajudicial partition an easement of right of way that ran exclusively along the southwest boundary of Lot B from Lots D and E to the street. Petitioner Victoria became the owner of Lot A and constructed therein a residential house and two garages. The other portions were sold by petitioner’s co-heirs to the Tan’s. The Tans built improvements on Lot B that spilled into the easement area. They also closed the gate that the Salimbangons built. Unable to use the old right of way, the Salimbangons lodged a complaint with the City Engineer of Mandaue against the Tans, while the Tan’s filed an action with the Regional Trial Court for the extinguishment of the easement on Lot B and damages with application for preliminary injunction. The RTC upheld the Salimbangons easement of right of way over the alley on Lot B, the lot that belonged to the Tans. CA reversed the RTC decision, extinguished the easement of right of way established on the alley in Lot B of the Tans, and denied the Salimbangons claim for damages. The court ruled that based on the testimony of one of the previous owners, Eduardo Ceniza, the true intent of the parties was to establish that easement of right of way for the benefit of the interior lots, namely, Lots D and E. Consequently, when ownership of Lots B, D, and E was consolidated into the Tans, the easement ceased to have any purpose and became extinct. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in admitting in evidence contrary to the parol evidence rule Eduardo Cenizas testimony respecting the true intent of the heirs in establishing the easement of right of way as against what they stated in their written agreement.

RULING: NO. The parol evidence rule, said the Salimbangons, precluded the parties from introducing testimony that tended to alter or modify what the parties had agreed on above. But the exclusionary provision of the parol evidence rule admits of exceptions. Section 9, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence states: “Sec. 9.Evidence of written agreements. - When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading: (a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement; (b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto; (c) The validity of the written agreement; or (d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the execution of the written agreement. The term agreement includes wills.” Here, the Tans had put in issue the true intent and agreement of the parties to the partition when they alleged in their complaint that, contrary to what paragraph 2 quoted above seems to imply, the easement was actually for the benefit of Lots D and E only. At any rate, as the CA said, the Salimbangons did not object at the hearing to admission of Eduardo Cenizas testimony even when this seemed at variance, as far as they were concerned, with the partition agreement among the heirs. Consequently, the Salimbangons may also be deemed to have waived their right to now question such testimony on appeal. _____________________________________________________________________________________ FINANCIAL BUILDING CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs RUDLIN INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION ET AL., Respondents, G.R. No. 164186

xxxx-----------------------------------------------------------------xxxx RUDLIN INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION ET AL., Petitioners, vs FINANCIAL BUILDING CORPORATION, Respondents, G.r. No. 164347,

October 4, 2010

FACTS: This is consolidated petition involving Rudlin International Corp. (Rudlin) and Financial Building Corporation (FBC). Sometime in October 1895, Rudlin invited proposals from several contractors to undertake the construction of a three-storey school building. The contract was eventually awarded to FBC and they soon executed a Construction Agreement which provided for the total consideration and liability for delay. The contract also provided a completion date not later than April 30, 1896 unless the extension of time has been authorized and approved by the owner and the architect in writing. Then it appears that the construction was not finished on said date as Rudlin and FBC had agreed upon. On June 5, 1986, Rudlin and FBC made amendments to their Construction Agreement through a letter-agreement changing the deadline on or before 10 June 1986 and the manner of the payment of the balance due on the contract price. On June 15, 1986, the subject building, Bloomfield academy was inaugurated and utilized by Rudlin. From the exchange of correspondence between Rudlin and FBC, there was no reconciliation of accounts that should took place pursuant to the letter-agreement. FBC demanded payment of the balance of the adjusted price per its computation but it was not heeded by Rudlin. FBC then filed in the RTC a suit for collection of sum of money with a prayer for preliminary attachment against Rudlin. FBC alleged that Rudlin still owes it a balance of P2,449,208.30. Rudlin denies the allegations and contends that the Construction agreement did not reflect the true contract price

agreed upon, which is P6,006,965.00. The amount of P6,933,268.00 which is the FBC’s bid price, was indicated in the construction agreement solely for the purpose of obtaining a higher amount of loan from the Bank of Philippine Islands (BPI). The execution of the said document was made with the understanding between the two that the contract price stated therein would be decreased to a mutually acceptable contract price. However, due to inadvertence, the parties forgot to sign an agreement fixing the true contract price. ISSUE: Whether or not the Contract agreement executed by FBC And Rudlin does not express the true intention of the parties regarding the true contract price. RULING: No, on the issue of the correct total contract price, we hold that Rudlin failed to substantiate its claim that the contract price stated in the Construction Agreement (P6,933,268.00) was not the true contract price because it had an understanding with FBC they would decrease the said amount to a mutually acceptable amount. Under the general rule in section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, when the terms of an agreement were reduced in writing, as in this case, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of such terms can be admitted other than the contents thereof. Rudlin argues that under Section 9, Rule 130, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if it is put in issue in the pleading, the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and the agreement of the parties thereto. Assuming as true Rudlin’s claim that Exhibit 7 failed to accurately reflect an intent of the parties to fix the total contract price at P6,006,965.00, Rudlin failed to avail of its right to seek the reformation of the instrument to the end that such true intention may be expressed. _____________________________________________________________________________________ APPLICATION OF THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE • The parol evidence rule is a rule which states that when the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon, and there can be between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. • It seeks to preserve what the parties have reduced in writing and prohibits evidence alliunde or oral testimonial evidence from being presented to vary the terms of, or add stipulations to, the written agreement. In other words, any oral evidence of an agreement should be excluded when the existing agreement is already in writing. • Parol evidence forbids any addition to or contradiction of the terms of a written instrument by testimony purporting to show that, at or before the signing of the document, other or different terms were orally agreed upon by the parties. • Oral testimony cannot prevail over a written agreement of the parties, the purpose being to give stability to written agreements and to remove the temptation and possibility of perjury, which would be afforded if parol evidence were admissible. • The rule is based on the presumption that the parties have made the written instrument the only repository and memorial of the truth and whatever is not found in the instrument must have been waived and abandoned by the parties. Hence, parol evidence cannot serve the purpose of incorporation into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing, unless the case falls under any of the exceptions to the rule. WHEN PAROL EVIDENCE CAN BE INTRODUCED ➢Introducing parol evidence means offering extrinsic or extraneous evidence that would modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement. Parol evidence can be introduced as long as the pleader puts in issue in the pleading any of the matters set forth in the rule such as: a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement; b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto; c) The validity of the written agreement; or d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the execution of the written agreement. ✓The terms "agreement" includes wills.

I nterpretation of Documents- The language of a writing is to be interpreted according to the legal meaning it bears in the place of its execution, unless the parties intended otherwise. (Sec. 10 Rule 130) LEON J. LAMBERT, plaintiff-appellant, vs. T. J. FOX, defendant-appellee. G.R. No. L-7991 January 29, 1914

FACTS: This is an action brought to recover a penalty prescribed on a contract as punishment for the breach thereof. It was alleged that early in 1911 the firm known as John R. Edgar & Co., engaged in the retail book and stationery business, found itself in such condition financially that its creditors, including the plaintiff and the defendant, together with many others, agreed to take over the business, incorporate it and accept stock therein in payment of their respective credits. This was done, the plaintiff and the defendant becoming the two largest stockholders in the new corporation called John R. Edgar & Co., Incorporated. A few days after the incorporation was completed plaintiff and defendant entered into the following agreement: That they mutually and reciprocally agree not to sell, transfer, or otherwise dispose of any part of their present holdings of stock in said John R. Edgar & Co. Inc., till after one year from the date hereof and that either party violating this agreement shall pay to the other the sum of one thousand (P1,000) pesos as liquidated damages, unless previous consent in writing to such sale, transfer, or other disposition be obtained. Notwithstanding this contract the defendant Fox on October 19, 1911, sold his stock in the said corporation to E. C. McCullough of the firm of E. C. McCullough & Co. of Manila, a strong competitor of the said John R. Edgar & Co., Inc. This sale was made by the defendant against the protest of the plaintiff and with the warning that he would be held liable under the contract hereinabove set forth and in accordance with its terms. In fact, the defendant Fox offered to sell his shares of stock to the plaintiff for the same sum that McCullough was paying them less P1,000, the penalty specified in the contract. The learned trial court decided the case in favor of the defendant upon the ground that the intention of the parties as it appeared from the contract in question was to the effect that the agreement should be good and continue only until the corporation reached a sound financial basis, and that the defendant accordingly discharged of his obligation thereunder. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court erred in the construction of the contract. RULING: Yes. The contention is sound. The intention of parties to a contract must be determined, in the first instance, from the words of the contract itself. It is to be presumed that persons mean what they say when they speak plain English. Interpretation and construction should by the instruments last resorted to by a court in determining what the parties agreed to. Where the language used by the parties is plain, then construction and interpretation are unnecessary and, if used, result in making a contract for the parties. In the case at bar the parties expressly stipulated that the contract should last one year. No reason is shown for saying that it shall last only nine months. Whatever the object was in specifying the year, it was their agreement that the contract should last a year and it was their judgment and conviction that their purposes would not be subversed in any less time. _____________________________________________________________________________________ THE CAPITAL INSURANCE and SURETY CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs. ESTEBAN M. SADANG and MARIA LACHICA, defendants-appellees. G.R. No. L-18857

December 11, 1967

FACTS: Plaintiff Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., subscribed on June 21, 1954 to a bond (Exhibit A) in the amount of P42,000.00 in behalf of Mateo Pinto and in favor of the Macondray Farms, Inc., the purpose of which was to guarantee the payment of rentals of the fishpond and other obligations of Mateo Pinto as contained in the lease agreement marked as Exhibit A-1.

To protect the interest of plaintiff Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. from any liability that may arise from the above-mentioned bond, Mateo Pinto and the defendants in this case, Esteban M. Sadang and Maria Lachica, executed an idemnity agreement (Exhibit B) and a deed of real of real estate mortage (Exhibit C) on the property of the defendants located in the Province of Nueva Vizcaya and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2216 issued by the Register of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya. Mateo Pinto failed to pay the rentals of the leased fishpond to Macondray Farms, Inc., in the total amount of P24,668.83.1 Because of the failure of Mateo Pinto to pay the said amount of P24,668.83 to Macondray Farms, Inc., plaintiff in the instant case as surety had to pay, as it did pay Macondray Farms, Inc., the amount of P24,668.83 on May 14, 1956 to settle the obligation of Mateo Pinto with the said Macondray Farms, Inc. Notwithstanding repeated demands, Mateo Pinto and his indemnitors including herein defendants failed to reimburse the Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., the the said amount of P24,688.83. Because of such failure to make reimbursement, the Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., filed Civil Case No. 30061 against Mateo Pinto and his indemnitors including the defendants in this instant case for the collection of the above-mentioned amount. Two executions were issued by the court for the enforcement of the above-mentioned decision in Civil Case No. 30061 and after applying the proceeds of the sale of the properties in public auction there is still a deficiency in the amount of P14,456.44 which, in view of the failure of the herein dependants to pay in spite of plaintiff's repeated demands, had to become the subject of this instant case. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision, albeit modifying it to include the stipulated interest. It stated that the testimony of Sadang was clear enough that he agreed to be a merely an indemnitor only on condition that he would answer for the “first P20,000 of the total P42,000 bond,” and that “the moment the first P20,000 is paid the bonding company automatically releases my responsibility to them.” The trial court found the testimony to be uncontradicted. If the mortgage contract as actually drafted seems to be vagued or ambiguous, the doubt must be resolved against Capital insurance, whose layer prepared the document, and in accordance with the real intention of the parties as explained by Sadang and Lachica. ISSUE: Whether or not the real intention of the parties is revealed by the testimony of appellee Esteban Sadang concerning the circumstances which led to the inclusion of the particular stipulation aforequoted. RULING: The foregoing testimony is clear enough. Esteban Sadang agreed to be an indemnitor only on condition that he would answer for the "first P20,000.00 of the total P42,000.00 bond," and that "the moment the first P20,000.00 is paid the bonding company automatically releases my responsibility to them." The trial court found the said testimony to be uncontradicted. If the mortgage contract as actually drafted seems to be vague or ambiguous, the doubt must be resolved against appellant, whose lawyer prepared the document, and in accordance with the real intention of the parties as explained by defendants-appellees. The trial court correctly held said defendants-appellants liable only for the sum of P300.00. However, it failed to provide for the stipulated interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum, which if not paid would be liquidated and added to the capital, quarterly, and to order foreclosure of the mortgaged properties in case of non-payment. _____________________________________________________________________________________ HOW TO EXPLAIN ALTERATIONS IN A DOCUMENT • Alterations in document, how to explain – The party producing a document as genuine which has been altered and appears to have been altered after its execution, in a part material to the question in dispute, must account for the alteration. He may show that the alteration was made by another, without his concurrence, or was made with the consent of the parties affected by it, or was otherwise properly or innocently made, or that the alteration did not change the meaning or language of the instrument. If he fails to do that the document shall not be admissible in evidence. DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE IN AN UNOFFICIAL LANGUAGE • Documentary evidence in an unofficial language – Documents written in an unofficial language shall not be admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a translation into English or Filipino. To avoid interruption of proceedings, parties or their attorneys are directed to have such translation prepared before trial.

E xcept as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be ground for disqualification. (Sec. 20 Rule 130)

Q ualification of Witnesses PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MITSUEL L. ELARCOSA and JERRY B. ORIAS, Accused-Appellants. GR No. 186539 June 29, 2010 FACTS: Mitsuel L. Elarcosa was charged and convicted of robbery with multiple homicide. One of the witnesses presented was Rosemarie de la Cruz, whose parents and brother were killed by accused. According to Rosemarie, Elarcosa and his companion Orias, both CAFGU members, entered the house and requested that supper be prepared for them as they were roving. Segundina and Rosemarie immediately went to the kitchen to prepare food, while Jose and Jorge stayed in the living room to engage in conversation with Elarcosa and Orias. Suddenly thereafter, Elarcosa and accused-appellant Orias stood up and fired their guns at Jose and Jorge. Segundinaran towards the living room and embraced her son, Jose, who was already lying on the floor. During this time, Rosemarie escaped through the kitchen and hid in the shrubs, which was about six (6) extended arm’s length from their house. She heard her mother crying loudly, and after a series of gunshots, silence ensued. She sought refuge in the house of her cousin, GualbertoMechabe. The following morning, Rosemarie returned to their house where she found the dead bodies of her parents and her brother. The money in the amount of PhP 40,000, as well as the certificate of registration of large cattle, were also gone. Both the RTC and the CA found the accused guilty. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the accused questions incredibility of the testimony of the star witness, as her recollection of the incident is uncertain and insufficient. ISSUE: Whether or not Rosemarie is a credible witness. RULING: Rosemarie is a credible witness. As found by both the RTC and the CA, the detailed testimony of Rosemarie is clear, consistent and convincing. Settled is the rule that testimonial evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must foremost be credible in itself. Hence, the test to determine the value or credibility of the testimony of a witness is whether the same is in conformity with common knowledge and is consistent with the experience of mankind. In the instant case, Rosemarie was able to convincingly testify that she was present when accused-appellant Orias and Elarcosa shot to death her brother and her father in the living room, since during that time, she and her mother were preparing supper for accused-appellant Orias and Elarcosa in the kitchen, which was only an arm’s length away from the living room. From where she was standing, Rosemarie could not have any difficulty identifying the malefactors, since she knew them beforehand and the living room was sufficiently lighted when the incident happened. Moreover, accused-appellant Orias did not present any evidence which would show that Rosemarie was driven by any improper motive in testifying against him. Pertinently, the absence of such improper motive on the part of the witness for the prosecution strongly tends to sustain the conclusion that no such improper motive exists and that her testimony is worthy of full faith and credit. Indeed, there is no reason to deviate from the factual findings of the trial court.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ADEL TUANGCO, NELSON PINEDA, JR. and SONNY TUANGCO, Accused. ADEL TUANGCO and SONNY TUANGCO, Accused-Appellants. G.R. No. 130331, November 22, 2000

FACTS: Nelson Pineda, Jr., Adel Tuangco and his brother, Sonny Tuangco, were charged with the crimes of rape with homicide and theft committed against the person of Aurea Eugenio committed on January 3, 1995 in Apalit, Pampanga. The principal evidence for the prosecution consists of the testimony of an eyewitness, Silvestre Sanggalan, a deaf-mute. Sanggalan gave his testimony through sign language with the help of a sign language expert, Eva Sangco. According to him, he was with the three accused in a beerhouse before the incident happened. After their drinking spree, they left the place and walked through the rice field near the highway. When the three saw the victim walking, they followed her, got hold of her bag, pushed her against a tree, stabbed her on the neck several times, inserted a bottle of Pidol cough syrup in her private part and they raped the victim, one after the other. Thereafter, they took the contents of her bag consisting of a camera and some cash along with the victim’s ring, earring, and watch. All of these were witnessed by Sanggalan who was then hiding behind the grasses and trees, about three and a half (3 1/2) meters away from the three accused after failing to heed the advice of the latter to leave while they were still walking through the rice field and just before the incident happened. On the other hand, for the defense, Adel Tuangco testified that he was at home on the day of the commission of the offense. His common-law wife, Liza Reyes Tuangco, and his mother, Erlinda Dizon Tuangco, corroborated his testimony. On the part of Sonny Tuangco, he claimed that he was alone in his house in Bulacan during the aforementioned date. Furthermore, in trying to destroy the credibility of witness Sanggalan, they reasoned out that the latter could not convey truthfully what he saw because he does not have any formal schooling. They also attacked his character showing that he is a drunkard, a drug addict and had once been accused of rape. The trial court found the accused guilty as charged. But only the siblings, Adel and Sonny, all surnamed Tuangco, appealed. Nelson Pineda, Jr. remains at large. ISSUE: Whether or not Silvestre Sanggalan, a deaf-mute, is competent to testify as a witness. RULING: Yes, Silvestre Sanggalan is a competent witness even if he is a deaf-mute. As a rule, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, and can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. And deaf-mutes are competent witnesses if it is shown that: (1) they can understand and appreciate the sanctity of an oath; (2) they can comprehend facts they are going to testify on; and (3) they can communicate their ideas through a qualified interpreter. In the case at bar, the sign language expert, Sangco, is a certified sign language interpreter possessing special education and training on interpreting sign language. Although there were some inconsistencies in the testimony of Sanggalan due to the fact that there is some difficulty in eliciting the testimony of a witness who is a deaf-mute, the same does not destroy his credibility. What is important is he personally knew the accused-appellants,he was with them when the incident happened which is only three and a half (3 1/2) meters away from the scene and he successfullyidentified correctly the accused despite rigorous examinations. His testimony was even strengthened by the testimony of the doctor who performed the autopsy of the body of the victim. The defense of alibi must yield to the positive identification of the accused by witness Sanggalan. Moreover, no evidence was adduced in order to prove the physical impossibility of the accused being in the crime scene. The fact of prior criminal conviction does not operate to discredit the witness. _____________________________________________________________________________________ QUALIFICATIONS OF A WITNESS • A person is qualified or is competent to be a witness, if 1) he is capable of perceiving, and 2) he can make his perception known. • It should be noted however, that loss of the perceptive sense after the occurrence of the fact does not affect the admissibility of the testimony. Hence, a blind man can testify to what he saw prior to his blindness or a deaf man, to what he heard prior to his deafness. But a person incapable of perception is pro tanto incapable of testifying. • A witness may have been capable of perceiving, yet incapable of narration. He may have no powers of speech, and have no means of expressing himself by signs. He may have become insane since the occurrence he is called upon to relate. A person incapable of narration is pro tanto incapable of testifying.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ROMEO DIVINAFLOR, respondents. G.R. No. 116372. January 18, 2001

FACTS: Lot 10739 is one of the uncontested lots. It is a parcel of riceland situated at Maramba, Oas, Albay containing an area of 10,775 square meters. Originally, the land was owned by Marcial Listana who began possession and occupying the same in the concept of owner, openly, continuously, adversely, notoriously and exclusively since 1939. He planted palay and harvested about 60 cavans of palay every harvest season. He declared the land in his name under Tax Dec. No. 1987. Romeo Divinaflor acquired ownership of the land by means of deed of absolute sale. He caused the same to be declared in his name under Tax Dec. No. 1442. There was another reassessment under Tax Dec. No. 35. He continued planting on the land and all the products are used for the benefit of his family. The land was surveyed in the name of the previous owner per certification of the CENRO. There are no liens or encumbrances and neither are there persons claiming adverse ownership and possession of the land. The lot does not infringe the public road, river or stream. It is not part of a military reservation, public park, watershed or the governments forest zone. The lot has not been utilized as a bond in civil or criminal cases or as collateral for a loan in any banking institution. There is no pending petition for its registration under Act 496 known as the Land Registration Act or an application for the issuance of free patent with the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO). Romeo Divinaflor is not legally disqualified from owning disposable property of the public domain. Finding that the claimant, together with his predecessor-in-interest, has satisfactorily possessed and occupied this land in the concept of owner, openly, continuously, adversely, notoriously and exclusively since 1939 very much earlier to June 12, 1945, the court ordered the registration and confirmation of Lot 10739 in the name of the Spouses Romeo Divinaflor and Nenita Radan. The Director of Lands appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that the finding of the trial court that Romeo Divinaflor and his predecessor-in-interest have possessed Lot 10739 since 1939 is not sufficiently supported by the evidence. The Director contended that the earliest tax declaration presented by claimant took effect only in 1980 and the certificate of real estate tax payment is dated 1990. It was further contended that the testimony of Romeo Divinaflor was largely self-serving, he being the applicant. ISSUE: Whether or not Romeo Divinaflor is a competent witness given that he was only 4 years in 1945. RULING: Be that as it may, a person is competent to be a witness if (a) he is capable of perceiving at the time of the occurrence of the fact and (b) he can make his perception known. True, in 1939, Divinaflor was not born yet, but in 1945, he was four years old, residing in Maramba, Oas, Albay, where the subject lot is located. As his testimony goes, he and Marcial Listana were barrio mates, and that he usually passes by the subject land. The fact that Divinaflor was only a child at the required inception of possession does not render him incompetent to testify on the matter. It is wellestablished that any child regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he can perceive, and perceiving can make known his perception to others and that he is capable of relating truthfully facts for which he is examine. The requirements of a child’s competence as a witness are: (a) capacity of observation; (b) capacity of recollection; and (c) capacity of communication. There is no showing that as a child, claimant did not possess the foregoing qualifications. It is not necessary that a witness knowledge of the fact to which he testifies was obtained in adulthood. He may have first acquired knowledge of the fact during childhood, that is at the age of four, which knowledge was reinforced through the years, up until he testified in court in 1990. There is reason to reject petitioners claim that Divinaflor is incompetent to testify regarding Listanas possession since it appears undisputed that Divinaflor grew up in Maramba, Oas, Albay, and had occasion to see Listana possessing the land.

M ental Incapacity and Immaturity THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROGELIO DE JESUS y QUIZON, alias "ELIONG," Accused-appellant. G.R. No. L-39087 April 27, 1984

FACTS: Clara Mina, however, is feeble-minded. She is unable to comb her hair, bathe herself and wash her clothes. Because of her mental condition, she just stayed in the house, doing no household chores. The accused, Rogelio de Jesus, a 19-year old farmer, who lived in the house of his sister some 15 meters away from the victim's house, knew of Clara's mental infirmity, and has often seen her left alone in the house. At about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of Jan. 3, 1974, Pastora Simon went out to the field in order to plant palay, leaving her daughter Clara Mina alone in the house. Her husband (Clara's father), had gone to a place called Soliven four days before, while the other members of the household had also left for the field. That afternoon, Clara Mina was seated on top of a trunk when Rogelio de Jesus suddenly entered the house, carried her in his arms and laid her on the floor. Objecting to what was being done to her, Clara gave an outcry "Madi! Madi!" (Which translated means "I don't like! I don't like!") Rogelio, ignoring her cries, removed her panties as well as his own trousers. He lay on top of her, inserted his penis into her vagina and performed the sexual act. Meanwhile, Pastora Simon, who had already walked some 150 meters away from their house, when sensing it was about to rain, hurried back to the house to get cellophane with which to shield her from the rain. Upon her return to the house, she found Rogelio de Jesus naked lying on top of Clara Mina whose legs were spread apart. Seeing them in that position, she rushed to the kitchen to get a club but Rogelio spotted her and ran away. The next day, Clara Mina, accompanied by her parents, denounced Rogelio de Jesus to the police authorities. Clara Mina was examined. According to Dr. Babaran, the abrasions were possibly inflicted the day prior to the examination and that the contusion on the left temporal area of the girl's head could have been caused when her head was pushed against a hard object. Subsequently, Rogelio de Jesus was surrendered by his brother-in-law, a councilor to the Alicia Police Department. He executed an affidavit, Exhibit "D" subscribed before Alicia Municipal Judge Flor Egipto on January 5, 1974, admitting that he had sexual intercourse once with Clara Mina, but denying that he raped her. ISSUE: Whether or not the complainant is competent witness on the ground that being feeble minded is not a competent witness in contemplation of the rules. RULING: No. Despite the fact that complainant was feeble-minded and had displayed difficulty in comprehending the questions propounded on her is an undisputed fact, there is no showing that she could not convey her Ideas by words or signs. It appears in the records that complainant gave sufficiently intelligent answers to the questions propounded by the court and the counsels. The court is satisfied that the complainant can perceive and transmit in her own way her own perceptions to others. She is a competent witness. That complainant possesses such a low mental capacity, to the extent of being incapable of giving consent, could be gleaned from the fact, as testified to by her mother, that she is unable to do the simple tasks of combing her hair and bathing herself. Thus, even granting it to be true, as counsel has insinuated, that complainant had submitted to the sexual act without resistance such cannot be construed as consent on her part, so as to preclude it from being rape. Incapable of giving consent, she could not thus consent in intelligently.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROGELIO DE JESUS y QUIZON, alias "ELIONG", accused-appellant. 129 SCRA 4 (1984)

FACTS: Clara Mina, a feeble--minded single woman of 28, lived with her parents in barrio Amistad, Alicia, Isabela. At around 2:00 in the afternoon of January 3, 1974, Clara was left in the house when members of the household went farming. Rogelio de Jesus, a neighbor entered Clara’s house and with the use of force, raped the feeble minded woman. Pastora Simon, Clara’s mother happened to return to the house and caught De Jesus in the act. The latter managed to escape. Simon reported the incident to the police and her daughter examined by the municipal health officer. De Jesus subsequently surrendered. During trial, De Jesus testified in his defense. He claimed that he only admitted to the authorities that he had sexual intercourse with Clara due to his maltreatment by the jail guards. De Jesus also testified that he only inserted his finger into Clara’s vagina to cure her mental malady. Clara other hand testified for the prosecution and narrated the events leading to her rape albeit with some difficulty because of her mental condition. Giving great weight to the testimony of Clara, the Circuit Criminal Court of Isabela found De Jesus guilty of rape. The accused appealed to the Supreme Court challenging the competency of Clara as a witness. ISSUE: Whether the feeble-minded Clara qualifies as a competent witness? RULING: It is undisputed that Clara is mentally-ill. It appears in the records that complainant gave sufficiently intelligent answers to the questions propounded by the court and the counsels. The court is satisfied that the complainant can perceive and transmit in her own way her own perceptions to others. She is a competent witness. _____________________________________________________________________________________ PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROLANDO MENDOZA, accused-appellant. G.R. No. 113791 February 22, 1996

FACTS: Maria Gina Avila Mendoza, a mother of three young children, was put to fire in her home in Balasing, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, on 22 November 1989. She suffered extensive second to fourth degree burns and died of hypostatic pneumonia and infected fourth degree burns on 30 November 1989. Her husband, accused-appellant Rolando Mendoza, was charged with the crime of parricide. The prosecution presented as its witnesses Paul Michael Mendoza, a five-year old child of the victim and the accused-appellant; Jhun Avila, Teofisto Avila, and Rodora Avila, the victim's brother, father, and sister, respectively; and Dr. Nieto M. Salvador, the Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). On its part, the defense presented the accused-appellant himself and Erlinda Porciuncula, a childhood friend. As to how Gina was burned, only five-year old Paul Michael could testify thereon. During his rebuttal testimony on 12 October 1992, Paul Michael categorically declared that it was his father who "burned" his mother. The accused-appellant, who was drunk at that time, first tied the victim's hands behind her back, then "poured kerosene" on the front of her body and set her aflame. The court a quo gave full credence to the testimony of eyewitness Paul Michael while rejecting the version of the accused.

ISSUE: Whether or not conviction was proper based on the child's competency to testify and the credibility of his testimony. RULING: Yes. With respect to the disqualification of children to be witnesses, Section 21(b) Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads: “The following persons cannot be witnesses: xxx (b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully”. It is thus clear that any child, regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he can perceive, and perceiving, can make known his perception to others and of relating truthfully facts respecting which he is examined. The requirements then of a child's competency as a witness are the: (a) capacity of observation, (b) capacity of recollection, and (c) capacity of communication. And in ascertaining whether a child is of sufficient intelligence according to the foregoing requirements, it is settled that the trial court is called upon to make such determination. The trial court has adjudged Paul Michael competent to testify. We agree. A close and careful examination of the testimony of Paul Michael shows that at the time he testified, he could be deemed a child of above average intelligence, i.e., capable of giving responsive answers to the questions asked of him by the trial judge, as well as recalling events and relating them to such recollections. _____________________________________________________________________________________ LESTER BENJAMIN S. HALILI, Petitioner, vs. CHONA M. SANTOS-HALILI and THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. GR. No. 165424

April 16, 2008

FACTS: Lester Benjamin S. Halili filed a petition to declare his marriage to respondent Chona M. SantosHalili null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage in the RTC. He alleged that he wed respondent in civil rites thinking that it was a joke. After the ceremonies, they never lived together as husband and wife, but maintained the relationship. However, they started fighting constantly a year later, at which point petitioner decided to stop seeing respondent and started dating other women. Immediately thereafter, he received prank calls telling him to stop dating other women as he was already a married man. It was only upon making an inquiry that he found out that the marriage was not fake. The RTC found petitioner to be suffering from a mixed personality disorder, particularly dependent and self-defeating personality disorder, as diagnosed by his expert witness, Dr. Natividad Dayan. The court a quo held that petitioners personality disorder was serious and incurable and directly affected his capacity to comply with his essential marital obligations to respondent. It thus declared the marriage null and void. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court on the ground that the totality of the evidence presented failed to establish petitioners psychological incapacity. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court via a petition for review under Rule 45 who affirmed the CAs decision and resolution upholding the validity of the marriage. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration reiterating his argument that his marriage to respondent ought to be declared null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity. He stressed that the evidence he presented, especially the testimony of his expert witness, was more than enough to sustain the findings and conclusions of the trial court that he was and still is psychologically incapable of complying with the essential obligations of marriage. ISSUE: Whether or not decision of the Regional Trial Court should be reinstated.

RULING: YES. The Court reiterated that courts should interpret the provision on psychological incapacity (as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage) on a case-to-case basis guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines and by decisions of church tribunals. In the case of Te, this Court defined dependent personality disorder as: a personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive behavior. Such individuals usually lack selfesteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by others comments. At times they actually bring about dominance by others through a quest for overprotection. Dr. Dayan stated in her report that petitioners dependent personality disorder was evident in the fact that petitioner was very much attached to his parents and depended on them for decisions. Petitioner’s mother even had to be the one to tell him to seek legal help when he felt confused on what action to take upon learning that his marriage to respondent was for real. Ultimately, Dr. Dayan concluded that petitioner’s personality disorder was grave and incurable and already existent at the time of the celebration of his marriage to respondent. From the foregoing, it has been shown that Dr. Dayan’s testimony that petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity is more than sufficient as basis for the declaration of nullity of the marriage. Accordingly, the marriage between petitioner and respondent is declared null and void. _____________________________________________________________________________________ People of the Philippines, appellee vs. Orlando Ubina, appellant 527 SCRA 307 July 10, 2007

FACTS: Appellant Orlando Urbina was charged with rape of his 15-year old niece. The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. After trial the Regional Trial Court. Found him guilty of rape. The Appellate Court affirmed the ruling of the RTC. However, the appellate court disregarded the aggravating circumstance of craft and special qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship of the parties in the imposition of penalty because it noted that they were not alleged in the information. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the court err in disregarding the qualifying circumstance of relationship and minority. RULING: The twin circumstances of minority and relationship under Article 335bof the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. No.7659 are in the nature of qualifying circumstances because they alter the nature of the crime of rape and increase the penalty. As special qualifying circumstances they must be specifically alleged with certainty in the information. The specific relationship must be alleged in the information. The information in the instant case only mentioned appellant as AAA’s uncle without specifically stating that he is a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity. Even granting that during trial it was proved that the relationship was within the third civil degree still such proof cannot be appreciated because appellant would thereby denied of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Appellant cannot be charged with committing the crime of rape in its simple form and then be tried and convicted of rape in its disqualified form. Thus, the CA correctly disregarded the qualifying circumstance of minority. _____________________________________________________________________________________ DISQUALIFICATION BY REASON OF MENTAL CAPACITY OR IMMATURITY ➢The following persons cannot be witnesses: a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others; b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully. c) ➢Regardless of the nature or cause of mental disability, the test of competency to testify is as to whether the individual has sufficient understanding to appreciate the nature and obligation of an oath and sufficient capacity d) to observe and describe correctly the facts in regard to which he is called to testify. ➢Basic requirements of a child‘s competency as a witness: a) Capacity of observation; b) Capacity of recollection; c) Capacity of communication. e) • In ascertaining whether a child is of sufficient intelligence according to the foregoing requirements, it is settled rule that the trial court is called upon to make such determination.

M arital Disqualification AVELINO ORDOÑO, petitioner vs HON. ANGEL DAQUIGAN, presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch I and CONRADO V. POSADAS, First Assistant Provincial Fiscal of La Union and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents G.R. No. L-39012 January 31, 1975

FACTS: Ordono was charged of rape committed against his 2 daughters. When the rape was first committed against Leonora, no charges were filed because of the threats made by the accused against his daughter and wife. When the second rape was committed against his daughter Rose, his wife filed a complaint against him. When the mother was offered to give her oral testimony, the accused objected on the ground of marital disqualification. ISSUE: Whether the wife should be disqualified as a witness on the ground of marital disqualification. RULING: NO. - According to the Court, “where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails”. In such a case identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of private life which the law aims at protecting will be nothing but ideals which, through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home. The wife is no longer disqualified by the rules. While it is true that the rules merely sought to protect the sanctity and peace of the family, when such reasons ceases to exist, the rule need no longer applied. Thus, the wife is not disqualified by the rules to testify. _____________________________________________________________________________________ PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs HON. MARIANO C. CASTANEDA, JR., AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PAMPANGA, BRANCH III, & BENJAMIN F. MANALOTO, Respondents, G.R. No. L-46306 February 27, 1979

FACTS: This is a case of falsification of public document. The document falsified was a Deed of Sale of a house and lot. The one who falsified was the husband knowing very well that the object sold was a conjugal property in need of mutual consent in order to effect a valid contract of sale. The one suing was the wife herself alleging that her husband executed a Deed of Sale making it appear that she the spouse gave her marital consent to the said sale. Here’s the court scene. Prosecution called wife to the witness stand. Defense moved to disqualify her as a witness invoking Sec. 20 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Prosecution defended its stand resting on the exception to that rule. Notwithstanding such opposition the respondent judge favored the husband and granted the defense’ motion to disqualify the wife to testify. The wife elevated the case to the CA. CA affirmed the lower court and the case was brought to the Supreme Court for Certiorari.

ISSUES: 1. May a crime of Falsification of Public Document be considered as a criminal case committed by a husband against the wife. 2. And if it is, may it therefore come under the exception to the rule of the marital disqualification. RULING: Court answered on the affirmative. When the offense directly attacks or impairs the conjugal relation, then it clearly comes within the exception. You see in this case it’s the husband’s breach of his wife’s confidence that gave rise to the offense. So the court said “Therefore with more reason the exception must apply since the one directly prejudiced is not a third person but the wife herself” who is a party to the conjugal property being purported dubiously to be sold. The wife wins the case. _____________________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUAN FRANCISCO, defendant-appellant. G.R. No. L-568 July 16, 1947

FACTS: On March 4, 1945, defendant, who had been previously arrested on charges of robbery, was being held as detention prisoner in the municipal jail of Mansalay, Mindoro. On that date he requested permission from the chief of police, and he was allowed to go with Sergeant Pacifico Pimentel, who was detailed to guard him. Upon their reaching the house, the sergeant allowed the prisoner to see his wife who was at the time in a room of said house, while said sergeant remained at the foot of the stairs. After a few moments, Pimentel heard the scream of a woman. Running upstairs, he met defendant's wife running out of the room and holding her right breast which was bleeding. Still moments later, Pimentel saw defendant lying down with his little son Romeo, aged one year and a half, on his breast. Pimentel also found defendant to have a wound in his belly while his child had a wound in the back. Pimentel found the child dead. Juan Francisco was charged with parricide. In the course of the proceeding the wife testifies against Francisco. The Defense contends that’s such testimony should not be admissible as evidence against the defendant. ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of the wife of Francisco against him is inadmissible as evidence. RULING: The testimony of the wife of is admissible. As a general rule the wife is prohibited to testify against his husband however it accepts certain exceptions: in civil actions between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are backed by sound reasons which, in the excepted cases, outweigh those in support of the general rule. It will be noted that the wife only testified against her husband after the latter, testifying in his own defense, imputed upon her the killing of their son. By all rules of justice and reason this gave the prosecution, which had theretofore refrained from presenting the wife as a witness against her husband, the right to do so, as it did in rebuttal; and the wife herself the right to so testify, at least, in self defense, not of course, against being subjected to punishment in that case in which she was not a defendant but against any or all of various possible consequences which might flow from her silence, namely: (1) a criminal prosecution against her which might be instituted by the corresponding authorities upon the basis of her husband's aforesaid testimony; (2) in the moral and social sense, her being believed by those who heard the testimony orally given, as well as by those who may read the same, once put in writing, to be the killer of her infant child. It has been aptly said that the law of evidence is the law of common sense.

JOSE MANUEL LEZAMA & PAQUITA LEZAMA, Petitioners, vs HON. JESUS RODRIGUEZ, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ILOILO, JOSE DINEROS, IN HIS CAPACITY AS RECEIVER OF THE LA PAZ ICE PLANT & COLD STORAGE CO., INC., & AND THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents 23 SCRA 1166 (1968)

FACTS: La Paz Ice Plant Inc. located in Iloilo was led by its President, Jose Manuel Lezama. Unfortunately the Ice plant was going bankrupt and so the company was placed under receivership under Jose Dineros. A collection for sum of money was filed by Marciano Roque in the CFI of Manila being a resident thereof, he supposedly had lent to the company the amount of P150, 000. Jose Dineros who was the acting as the receiver of the La Paz Ice plant after receiving an unfavorable judgement in the CFI of Manila upon the collection case, filed an action in the CFI of Iloilo for the annulment of the judgment of the CFI of Manila. In the filed action, he named Marciano Roque and the spouses Jose Manuel and Paquita Lezama as defendants alleging that because of the mismanagement of the Lezamas, the La Paz Ice Plant was placed under receivership and that through the collusion of the Lezamas, Roque had obtained a favorable decision against the company. He also contend that the summons by the CFI of Manila was served not on him who is the receiver but on the spouses Lezama‘s, therefore the CFI of Manila acquired no jurisdiction of the case and the decision being void. Spouses Lezama, while admitting that the company was placed under receivership, they maintained that Jose Lezama nevertheless remained President even while on receivership and as such he had the authority to receive court summons in behalf of the company and he denied entering into collusion with Roque and averred that the reason they never contested Roque’s claim because they knew it to be legitimate pursuant to a board of director’s resolution. Dineros then asked the court to subpoena testificandum Paquita Lezama who was the wife of Jose Manuel Lezama to testify as a hostile witness. The request was granted by the court over the objection of the petitioners invoking the Marital Disqualification Rule. ISSUE: Whether or not a wife who is a co-defendant of her husband in an action, may be examined as a hostile witness by the adverse party without infringing on her marital privilege not to testify against her husband. RULING: No. She may not be examined as a hostile witness. The Supreme court said that the Marital Disqualification Rule is two edged. 1) the disqualification of husband and wife to testify in each other’s behalf and 2) As well as the privilege not to testify against each other. _____________________________________________________________________________________ DISQUALIFICATION BY REASON OF MARRIAGE (SPOUSAL IMMUNITY) • During their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants. • The spouses must be legally married to each other to invoke the benefit of the rule; it does not cover an illicit relationship. When the marriage is dissolved on the grounds provided for by law like annulment or declaration of nullity, the rule can no longer be invoked. A spouse can already testify against the other despite an objection being interposed by the affected spouse. If the testimony for or against the other spouse is offered during the existence of the marriage, it does not matter if the facts subject of the testimony occurred before the marriage. It only matters that the affected spouse objects to the offer of testimony. • The testimony covered by the marital disqualification rule not only consists of utterances but also the production of documents.

D ead Man’s Statute Guerrero vs. St. Claire’s Realty & Corporation 124 SCRA 553, 1983

FACTS: Spouses Isidoro Guerrero and Panay Ramos were the absolute owners of the disputed property, which is a parcel of land located at San Dionisio, Parañaque, Rizal, with an area of 42,299 square meters, more or less. The spouses had six children, named Andres, Juliana, Aurelio, Leona, Jose and Cristina, and all surnamed Guerrero. Panay Ramos predeceased Isidoro Guerrero. Before his demise, Isidoro Guerrero verbally willed and ordained that the questioned lot be assigned and adjudicated to Andres Guerrero as his share in the inheritance, the other children having been assigned other lots. . Shortly after the beginning of the Japanese occupation, Andres Guerrero entrusted the land to his sister, Cristina Guerrero, and allowed her to have the property cultivated and to retain the owner's share in the harvests. The arrangement between brother and sister was that Cristina Guerrero could continue in the cultivation of the land and enjoyment of the owner's share in the produce for as long as she needed the property. Sometime in July 1943, Andres Guerrero died survived by his widow, Segunda Laquindanum, and their children, who are the petitioners in this case. Cristina Guerrero continued as trustee of the deceased Andres Guerrero. The complaints further alleged that as early as December 10, 1957, the land was surveyed by the Bureau of Lands for and in the name of Andres Guerrero as Lot No. 4752, Case No. 4, Cadastre No. 229 of the Parañaque Cadastre. Sometime during the latter part of 1971 certain people who introduced themselves as agents or buyers of the land ap¬proached some of the plaintiffs in order to secure their consent to the sale of the property. Said plaintiffs were informed that the land was titled in the name of their cousin, Manuel Guerrero. The court ruled that Manuel Guerrero owned the lot; that despite oppositors' appeal to a higher court, the Register of Deeds issued Original Certificate of Title No. 4591 to the applicant; that on September 14, 1971, there was filed with the Register of Deeds of Rizal a "Deed of Absolute Sale" purportedly executed by Manuel Guerrero in favor of the defendants Guerreros; that the Register of Deeds gave due course to the registration of that deed, cancelled OCT No. 4591 and was issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 339629 in its stead; that on the same day that the deed of sale was registered, the defendants Guerreros caused to be notarized an "Articles of Partnership" of St. Clare's Realty Company, Ltd., constituting themselves as partners; that on September 28, 1971, the defendants Guerreros sold the disputed lot in a "Deed of Absolute Sale" to the St. Clare's Realty Company, Ltd.; that by virtue thereof, the Register of Deeds issued TCT No. 340842 in the name of said realty company. However, the Deed of Sale in favor of Manuel Guerrero was discovered to be fraudulent, simulated and falsified for the reason, among others, that Cristina Guerrero was not the owner of the land at the time she purportedly sold it; that Manuel Guerrero obtained OCT No. 4591 in fraud of the plaintiffs; that the Deeds of Sale to the defendants Guerreros and St. Clare's Realty Company, Ltd. and the transfer certificates of title in their favor are fraudulent and simulated, and ineffective against the plaintiffs for the reason, among others, that at the time of execution of the Deeds of Sale, the defendants Guerreros knew that the property belonged to Andres Guerrero; that long after the complaint in the present case has been filed, the plaintiffs came to know that the St. Clare's Realty Company, Ltd. executed a "Joint Venture Agreement" with the United Housing Corporation under which the latter bound itself to develop the property into a residential subdivision; and that the said agreement was entered into in gross and evident bad faith. ISSUE: Whether or not the Dead Man’s Statute will apply in the present case. RULING: No. The Dead Man’s rule is not applicable in the case at bar.

The present case is not a claim or demand against the estate of the deceased Manuel Guerrero. The defendants Guerreros are not the executors or administrators or representatives of such deceased. They are being sued as claimants of ownership in their individual capacities of the disputed lot. The lot is not a part of the estate of Manuel Guerrero. "It has been held that statutes providing that a party in interest is incompetent to testify where the adverse party is dead or insane, must be applied strictly in accordance with their express wording, irrespective of their spirit. The law uses the word 'against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person.' It should be noted 'that after the mention of an executor or administrator the words or other representative follows, which means that the word 'representative' includes only those who, like the executor or administrator, are sued n their representative, not personal, capacity. And that is emphasized by the law by using the words 'against the estate of such deceased persons', which convey the idea of an estate actually owned by the deceased at the time the case was brought and that, therefore, it is only his rights that are to be asserted and defendant in the litigation by the person representing him, not the personal rights of such representative." _____________________________________________________________________________________ FLORENCIA Q. DE ABRAHAM, ALFONSO ABRAHAM, and JESUS ABRAHAM, petitioners, vs. INTESTATE ESTATE OF JUAN C. YSMAEL, PRISCILLA RECTO-KASTEN, respondent. G.R. No. L-16741

January 31, 1962

FACTS: On September 3, 1943, Juan C. Ysmael, obtained a loan from Alfonso Abraham, Sr. in the amount of P12,500.00 in Japanese currency notes, and executed a promissory note in favor of the latter promising to pay the loan within 90 days with interest at the rate of 10% per annum. The note was executed in the presence of Florencia Q. Abraham, the creditor's wife, who affixed her signature at the bottom thereof as a witness thereto. Upon the maturity of the note, a demand was made for its payment, but the debtor failed to pay. On February 9, 1945, Alfonso Abraham, Sr. died. On the other hand, Juan C. Ysmael died intestate on April 23, 1952 leaving the note still unpaid. On November 13, 1954, in Special Proceedings No. Q-285 for the settlement of the intestate estate of Juan Ysmael, pending before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, Florencia Q. Vda. de Abraham, together with her sons, Alfonso and Jesus, all surnamed Abraham, filed a pleading entitled "Reclamation" demanding payment of the amount represented by the note. Because no regular administrator of the estate had yet been appointed by the court, the "Reclamation" was not acted upon. However, as soon as Priscilla Recto-Kasten was appointed administratrix, the claimants reproduced their "Reclamation" before the lower court and the same was finally set for hearing. As agreed upon by the parties, the reception of evidence was delegated to a commissioner. During the hearing before the commissioner, the counsel for the administratrix interposed a general and continuing objection to the testimony of Florencia Vda. de Abraham invoking the provisions of Section 26(c), Rule 123 of the Rules of Court. However, after the claimant had testified, he lengthily cross-examined her on the very matters against which he interposed a general objection. The appellate court concluding that "the lower court erred in finding that the claimants have established a just and valid claim, and in allowing the claim — supposing it was a claim with consideration — when the same had been barred by prescription, estoppel and laches," reversed the Order-Decree appealed from. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have established a just and valid claim. And if the answer is in the affirmative, whether the same is already barred by prescription and laches. RULING: The record shows that petitioners have established the due execution and genuineness of the promissory note and that respondents failed to present any evidence to destroy the same. It is interesting to note that the promissory note executed by the deceased was produced before the Court and marked as

Exhibit B-1, and the circumstances under which the same was executed was extensively described by Florencia Q. de Abraham during the hearing, who, strikingly is one of the witnesses to the said instrument. Much to the surprise of the Court this description was more vividly given by the said witness not in answer to the questions propounded by her lawyer but on cross-examination of counsel for the administratrix, who feebly attempted to destroy the due execution and genuineness of the said document. It is indeed unfortunate that counsel for the administratrix did not choose to present evidence to destroy the alleged genuineness of the promissory note (Exhibit B-1) in support of his theory, despite his insinuation during the course of the trial that he might try to secure the services of an expert to determine the genuineness of the signature of the late Juan C. Ysmael mentioned therein. Again counsel manifested that if Exhibit B-1 is a genuine document the same has been fully paid already, (t.s.n., p. 83), however, counsel did not present any proof to support this contention. It is true that Section 26(c), Rule 123 of the Rules of Court provides: (c) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind; The reason for the rule apparently is that a litigant cannot be permitted to speculate as to what his examination of a witness may bring forth. Having made his selection of one of two courses which he may pursue, he has no right, after he discovers that the course selected is not to his advantage, and after he has put the opposite party to the expense, and has consumed the time of the courts in a trial of the case in accordance with the course selected, to change his position and make another and different selection. Such course would be unfair both to the opposite party and to the court and should not be countenanced in any court of justice. _____________________________________________________________________________________ GENARO GOÑI, RUFINA P. vda. DE VILLANUEVA, et al, petitioners-appellants, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and GASPAR VICENTE, respondents-appellees GR No. L-27434 September 23, 1986

FACTS: Praxedes Villanueva was interested in buying the haciendas of San Sebastian, Sarria, and Dulce Nombre de Maria owned by Tabacalera. Due to insufficiency of funds, Gaspar Vicente stood as guarantor for Villegas in favor of Tabacalera. Villanueva further promised to sell field nos. 3, 4, and 13 of Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria for P13, 807.00 in favor of Vicente. This agreement was reduced to writing and signed by herein petitioner Genaro Goni as the attorney-in-fact of Villanueva. Shortly after the execution of the promise to sell, Villanueva was able to raise the funds needed for the payment of the haciendas which prompted him to rescind the agreement. However, since the amount has already been credited from Vicente’s account, it was agreed that lots 4 and 13 would be leased to the latter for five years. Villanueva thereafter died, and intestate proceedings followed. Vicente instituted an action for recovery of property and damages against Goni in his capacity as the administrator of the estate of Villanueva. Said complaint was based from the promise to sell executed by the deceased. Full trial ensued, for which Vicente testified on matters of fact occurring before the death of Villanueva. The opposing party was likewise given the opportunity to cross examine him. ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of Vicente is barred by the Dead Man’s Statute. RULING: Under ordinary circumstances, private respondent Vicente would be disqualified by reason of interest from testifying as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of Praxedes T. Villanueva, such

disqualification being anchored on Section 20(a) of Rule 130, commonly known as the Survivorship Disqualification Rule or Dead Man Statute, which provides as follows: Section 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship.-The following persons cannot testify as to matters in which they are interested, directly or indirectly, as herein enumerated: (a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind. The object and purpose of the rule is to guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party and further to put the two parties to a suit upon terms of equality in regard to the opportunity of giving testimony. It is designed to close the lips of the party plaintiff when death has closed the lips of the party defendant, in order to remove from the surviving party the temptation to falsehood and the possibility of fictitious claims against the deceased. The case at bar, although instituted against the heirs of Praxedes Villanueva after the estate of the latter had been distributed to them, remains within the ambit of the protection. The reason is that the defendants-heirs are properly the "representatives" of the deceased, not only because they succeeded to the decedent's right by descent or operation of law, but more importantly because they are so placed in litigation that they are called on to defend which they have obtained from the deceased and make the defense which the deceased might have made if living, or to establish a claim which deceased might have been interested to establish, if living. Such protection, however, was effectively waived when counsel for petitioners cross-examined private respondent Vicente. "A waiver occurs when plaintiff's deposition is taken by the representative of the estate or when counsel for the representative cross-examined the plaintiff as to matters occurring during deceased's lifetime. It must further be observed that petitioners presented a counterclaim against private respondent Vicente. When Vicente thus took the witness stand, it was in a dual capacity as plaintiff in the action for recovery of property and as defendant in the counterclaim for accounting and surrender of field nos. 4 and 13. Evidently, as defendant in the counterclaim, he was not disqualified from testifying as to matters of fact occurring before the death of Praxedes Villanueva, said action not having been brought against, but by the estate or representatives of the estate/deceased person. _____________________________________________________________________________________ INTESTATE ESTATE OF MARCELINO TONGCO, represented by JOSEFA TONGCO, administratrix, Plaintiff and Appellant, vs. ANASTACIO VIANZON, Defendant and Appellee. G.R. No. 27498, September 20, 1927

FACTS: MarcelinoTongco died leaving his widow, Anastacia Vianzon. But before his death, in a cadastral case, he was able to have some of his properties titled in the name of the conjugal partnership. However, within the one-year period provided under the Land Registration Law, Vianzon asked for revision of certain decrees in the same cadastral case.It was opposed bythe niece of the deceased, Josefa Tongco, who is also the administratrix of the estate of Marcelino Tongco. The cadastral case was decided in favor of Vianzon. The original certificates of title were annulled and new titles were issued making the subject lots the exclusive properties of Anastacia Vianzon. Thereafter, Josefa Tongco filed an action for recovery of specific property with damages against Vianzon. But defendant therein, Vianzon, was absolved. From the judgments of the above cases, Josefa Tongco appealed. The two cases were tried together. The first action, the cadastral case, becomes the last in number, 27499, whereas, the first action, the property case, becomes the first in number, 27498. The two cases taken together, Tongco assigned as error the competency of the widow, Vianzon, to testify in order to prove that she indeed owned exclusively the properties in question in view of the provision under the Code of Civil Procedure prohibiting parties or assignors of parties in whose behalf an action is prosecuted from testifying against an executor or administrator or other representative of the deceased person upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person.

ISSUE: Whether or not Anastacia Vianzon is competent to testify in order to prove exclusive ownership over the properties alleged to be in the name of conjugal partnership. RULING: Yes, Vianzon is competent to testify that the properties in question exclusively belong to her. The purpose of the law is to guard against giving false testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party. It is noteworthy to emphasize that it was designed to arrive at the truth and not to suppress it. Furthermore, the law makes use of the word “against” twice. In the case at bar, the actions were not brought either “against” the administratrix of the estate or upon claims “against” the estate. In the first case, the action is made by the administratrix to enforce a demand “by” the estate. In the second case, the claim was presented in a cadastral proceeding wherein there is neither plaintiff nor defendant involved. In addition, there was a waiver to question the competency of the witness when the adverse party proceeded to cross-examine her regarding the prohibited matters. Thus, the court is of the opinion that the witness is competent to testify and therefore, findings and rulings of the trial judge must be sustained. _____________________________________________________________________________________ Estate of RICHARD THOMAS FITZSIMMONS, deceased, MARCIAL P. LICHAUCO, administrator-appellee, vs. ATLANTIC, GULF and PACIFIC COMPANY OF MANILA, claimant-appellant. G.R. No. L-2016

August 23, 1949

FACTS: Richard T. Fitzsimmons was the president and one of the largest stockholders of said company when the Pacific war broke out on December 8, 1941. As such president he was receiving a salary of P3,000 a month. He held 1,000 shares of stocks, of which 545 shares had not been fully paid for, but for which he had executed promissory notes in favour of the company aggregating P245,250, at the rate P450 a share. In 1941 the sum of P64,500 had been credited in his favour on account of the purchase price of the said 545 share of stock out of bonuses and dividends to which he was entitled from the company. Under his agreements with the company dated April 4 and July 12, 1939, should he die without having fully paid for the said 545 shares of stock, the company, at its option, may either reacquire the said 545 shares of stock by returning to his estate the amount applied thereon, or issue in favour of his estate the corresponding number of the company's shares of stock equivalent to the amount paid thereon at P450 a share. Soon after the Japanese army occupied Manila in January, 1942, it seized and took possession of the office and all the properties and assets of the appellant corporation and interned all its officials, they being American citizens. Richard T. Fitzsimmons died on June 27, 1944, in the Santos Tomas internment camp, and special proceeding No. 70139 was subsequently instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the settlement of his estate. ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of the officers or stockholders in the corporation admissible against the estate of the deceased. RULING: The weight of authority sustains appellant's first assignment of error. Inasmuch as section 26(c) of Rule 123 disqualifies only parties or assignors of parties, we are constrained to hold that the officers and/or stockholders of a corporation are not disqualified from testifying, for or against the corporation which is a party to an action upon a claim or demand against the estate of a deceased person, as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person.

ENRIQUE RAZON, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and VICENTE B. CHUIDIAN, in his capacity as Administrator of the Estate of the Deceased JUAN T. CHUIDIAN, respondents. 2007 SCRA 234 (1992)

FACTS: Vicente Chuidian (administrator of the estate of his deceased father) filed a complaint for thedelivery of the certificates of stocks representing the 1,500 share holdings of his deceased father, Juan Chuidian, in the E. Razon, Inc. (organized for the purpose of bidding for the arrastre services in South Harbor, Manila). In the answer, Razon alleged that he owned the shares and the same remained in his possession. It was alleged that the late Juan Chuidan did not pay any amount whatsoever for the 1,500 shares in question. CHUIDIAN’s EVIDENCE: On April 23, 1966, stock certificate No. 003 for 1,5000 shares of stock of defendant corporation was issued in the name of Juan Chuidian (Juan). Razon had not questioned (not until the demand was made) Juan’s ownership of the shares and had not brought any action to have the certificate of stock over the said shares cancelled. RAZON’s EVIDENCE (In the answer and in his oral Testimony): After organizing E. Razon, Inc., Razon distributed shares, previously placed in the names of the withdrawing nominal incorporators, to some friends including Juan. The shares of stock were registered in the name of Juan only as nominal stockholder and with the agreement that the said shares were owned and held by the Razon (as he was the one who paid for all the subscription). Juan was given the option to buy the same but did not do so. CFI (RTC) declared that Enrique Razon is the owner of the said shares. IAC (CA) reversed and ruled that Juan Chuidian is the owner. IAC excluded the testimony of Razon under the deadman’s statute rule (DMS) under Section 20 (a) Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, although such testimony was not objected to during trial. ISSUE: Whether or not Razon’s testimony is within the prohibition under Dead Man Statute Rule. RULING: No. The case was not filed against the administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon claims against the estate. The purpose of DMS Rule is that “if persons having a claim against the estate of the deceased or his properties were allowed to testify as to the supposed statements made by him (deceased person), many would be tempted to falsely impute statements to deceased persons as the latter can no longer deny or refute them, thus unjustly subjecting their properties or rights to false or unscrupulous claims or demands. The purpose of the law is to 'guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party. ”However, the rule is only applicable to “a case against the administrator or its representative of an estate upon a claim against the estate of the deceased person.” _____________________________________________________________________________________

DEAD MAN’S STATUTE – Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind. (Sec. 23 Rule 130)

P rivileged Communication – Marital Communication THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FAUSTO V. CARLOS, defendant-appellant. G.R. No. L-22948 March 17, 1925

FACTS: It appears from the evidence that the victim of the alleged murder, Dr. Pablo G. Sityar, performed a surgical operation upon the defendant's wife for appendicitis and certain other ailments and after her release therefrom she was required to go several times to the clinic of Doctor Sityar for the purpose of dressing the wounds caused by the operation. On these occasions she was accompanied by her husband, the defendant. The defendant states that on one of the visits, Doctor Sityar sent him out on an errand to buy some medicine, and that while defendant was absent on this errand Doctor Sityar outraged the wife. The defendant further states that his wife informed him of the outrage shortly after leaving the clinic. The defendant, suffering from some stomach trouble, entered the Philippine General Hospital where he was under the care of two other physicians. While in the hospital he received a letter (Exhibit 5) from Doctor Sityar asking the immediate settlement of the account for the professional services rendered his wife. Shortly after his release from the hospital the defendant sought an interview with Doctor Sityar and went to the latter's office several times without finding him in. In the afternoon of May 26th the defendant again went to the office of the deceased and found him there alone. According to the evidence of the prosecution, the defendant then, without any preliminary quarrel between the two, attacked the deceased with a fan knife and stabbed him twice. The deceased made an effort to escape but the defendant pursued him and overtaking him in the hall outside the office, inflicted another wound upon him and as a consequence if the three wounds he died within a few minutes. The defendant made his escape but surrendered himself to the Constabulary at Malolos, Bulacan, in the evening of the following day. ISSUE: Whether or not the letter offered as evidence can be considered conclusive of the crime committed with premeditation and therefore constituted murder. RULING: No. Counsel for the defendant argues vigorously that the letter was a privileged communication and therefore not admissible in evidence. The numerical weight of authority is, however, to the effect that where a privileged communication from one spouse to another comes into the hands of a third party, whether legally or not, without collusion and voluntary disclosure on the part of either of the spouses, the privilege is thereby extinguished and the communication, if otherwise competent, becomes admissible. The letter Exhibit L must, however, be excluded for reasons not discussed in the briefs. The letter was written by the wife of the defendant and if she had testified at the trial the letter might have been admissible to impeach her testimony, but she was not put on the witness-stand and the letter was therefore not offered for that purpose. If the defendant either by answer or otherwise had indicated his assent to the statements contained in the letter it might also have been admissible, but such is not the case here; the fact that he had the letter in his possession is no indication of acquiescence or assent on his part. The letter is therefore nothing but pure hearsay and its admission in evidence violates the constitutional right of the defendant in a criminal case to be confronted with the witnesses for the prosecution and have the opportunity to cross-examine them. In this respect there can be no difference between an ordinary communication and one originally privileged. The question is radically different from that of the admissibility of testimony of a third party as to a conversation between a husband and wife overheard by the witness. Testimony of that character is admissible on the ground that it relates to a conversation in which both spouses took part and on the further ground that where the defendant has the opportunity to answer a statement made to him by his spouse and fails to do so, his silence implies assent. That cannot apply where the statement is contained in an unanswered letter.

JUDGE UBALDINO A. LACUROM, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Cabanatuan City, Branch 29 and Pairing Judge, Branch 30, Complainant, vs. ATTY. ELLIS F. JACOBA and ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA, Respondents. 484 SCRA 206

FACTS: This administrative case arose from a complaint filed by Judge Ubaldino A. Lacurom against spouses Jacoba and Velasco-Jacoba for violation of Rules 11.03,1 11.04,2 and 19.013 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Lacurom issued a Resolution reversing the earlier judgments rendered in favor of Veneracion. Veneracion’s counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration, however was suddenly reversed. In her Explanation, Comments and Answer, Velasco-Jacoba claimed that His Honor knows beforehand who actually prepared the subject Motion; records will show that the undersigned counsel did not actually or actively participate in this case. Velasco-Jacoba disavowed any "conscious or deliberate intent to degrade the honor and integrity of the Honorable Court. Judge Lacurom found Velasco-Jacoba guilty of contempt and penalized her with imprisonment for five days. Velasco-Jacoba moved for reconsideration order. She recounted that on her way out of the house for an afternoon hearing, Atty. Ellis Jacoba ("Jacoba") stopped her and said "O, pirmahan mo na ito kasi last day na, baka mahuli” She signed the pleading handed to her without reading it, in "trusting blind faith" on her husband of 35 years with whom she "entrusted her whole life and future Velasco-Jacoba lamented that Judge Lacurom had found her guilty of contempt without conducting any hearing. She accused Judge Lacurom of harboring "a personal vendetta," ordering her imprisonment despite her status as "senior lady lawyer of the IBP Nueva Ecija Chapter, already a senior citizen, and a grandmother many times over." Judge Lacurom issued another order this time directing Jacoba to explain why he should not be held in contempt. Jacoba complied by filing an Answer with Second Motion for Inhibition, wherein he denied that he typed or prepared the 30 July 2001 motion and invoked the marital privilege rule in evidence. Judge Lacurom later rendered a decision finding Jacoba guilty of contempt of court and sentencing him to pay a fine of P500. IBP Commissioner recommended the suspension IBP Board of Governors adopted Recommendation, except for the length of suspension which the IBP Board reduced to three months. ISSUE: Whether or not the marital privilege rule can apply to Jacoba. RULING: The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be waived by failure of the claimant to object timely to its presentation or by any conduct that may be construed as implied consent. This waiver applies to Jacoba who impliedly admitted authorship of the 30 July 2001 motion. _____________________________________________________________________________________

A ttorney-Client Privilege Hickman, petitioner, vs. Taylor, respondent 329 US 495 (1947)

FACTS: A tugboat sank killing five of the nine members on board. The tug owners employed a law firm to represent them against potential suits. An attorney from the firm interviewed the four surviving crew members. One of the dead crew member’s families filed a suit against the tug owners and asked opposing counsel to turn over the content of the interviews with the surviving crew members as well as any notes or memos about the case made by the counsel. ISSUE: To what extent may a party inquire into oral and written statements of witnesses or other information secured by an adverse party’s counsel in the course of preparation for possible litigation.

RULING: Discovery of written materials obtained or prepared by an adversary’s counsel with an eye toward litigation may not be had unless party seeking discovery can establish that relevant and non-privileged facts remain hidden in an attorney’s file and where production of those facts is essential to the preparation of one’s case. _____________________________________________________________________________________ Upjohn Co. vs. US 449 U.S. 383January 13, 1981

FACTS: The counsel of respondent corporation made an investigation regarding the company’s international offices because there are reports that some foreign managers were making “questionable payments” to various foreign government officials in violation of U.S. law. When the Internal Revenue Service attempted to obtain copies of questionnaires, memoranda, and interview transcripts from the corporation in relation to the investigation. Respondent’s maintained objection on the ground that these files and interview transcripts are protected by the attorney-client relationship. However it was overruled by the appellate Court, stating that attorney-client privilege does not extend to communications made by employees not in Upjohn’s “control group”. ISSUE: Whether the communication made by the counsel to low rank employees are protected by the attorney-client privilege. RULING: YES. - The counsel of Upjohn represents the entire corporation and is not limited to certain groups of persons such as its officers alone. If a lawyer is to become a counsel for a corporation, the lowest of ranks should be included. Any communication made to by the counsel to them in relation to his work should be protected by the attorney-client privilege. _____________________________________________________________________________________ In Re Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35, 723 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1983) U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit - 723 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1983) Argued June 23, 1983. Decided Dec. 7, 1983 Richard Durant, Detroit, Mich., for appellant. Leonard R. Gilman, U.S. Atty., Detroit, Mich., F. William Soisson, Asst. U.S. Atty., for appellee. Before ENGEL and KRUPANSKY, Circuit Judges, and CELEBREZZE, Senior Circuit Judge. KRUPANSKY, Circuit Judge. FACTS: Attorney Richard Durant (Durant) appeals a finding of contempt for failure to disclose to the grand jury upon order of court the identity of his client. On March 1, 1983, Special Agent Edwards (Edwards), of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), visited Durant's office and explained that the FBI was investigating the theft of numerous checks made payable to International Business Machines, Inc. (IBM). He advised that a number of the stolen checks had been traced and deposited into various banking accounts under names of non-existent organizations, at least one of which included the initials "IBM". Edwards produced a photo static copy of a check drawn upon one of these fictitious accounts which check was made payable to Durant's law firm. Upon FBI inquiry, Durant conceded that this check for $15,000 had been received and endorsed by his firm for services rendered to a client in two cases, one of which was "finished" and the other of which was "open". Durant refused to disclose the identity of his client to whose credit the proceeds had been applied, asserting the attorney-client privilege.

Durant was subpoenaed to appear before the grand jury the following day, March 2, 1983, where he again refused to identify his client, asserting the attorney-client privilege. The government immediately moved the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan for an Order requiring Durant to provide the requested information. At a hearing that same afternoon, Durant informed the court that disclosure of his client's identity could incriminate that client in criminal activity so as to justify invoking the attorney-client privilege. Durant additionally stated that "I do not know any of the facts about this theft or anything else", and suggested that the requested information should be obtained through other methods.1 The court adjudged that the privilege did not attach and ordered Durant to identify his client. Upon refusal to comply with this Order, Durant was held in contempt. Further proceedings (e.g. bond) were stayed until March 16, 1983, and subsequently stayed until March 22, 1983. ISSUE: WON finding Durant in contempt was proper RULING: Confronting the applicability of the attorney-client privilege as urged by Durant, it is initially observed that the privilege is recognized in the federal forum. The attorney-client privilege exists to protect confidential communications between a lawyer and his client in matters that relate to the legal interests of society and the client. In order to promote freedom of consultation of legal advisors by clients, the apprehension of compelled disclosure from the legal advisors must be removed; hence the law must prohibit such disclosure except on the client's consent. Since the attorney-client privilege may serve as a mechanism to frustrate the investigative or factfinding process, it creates an inherent tension with society's need for full and complete disclosure of all relevant evidence during implementation of the judicial process. See: In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Jones), 517 F.2d 666, 671-72, (5th Cir. 1975) ("the purpose of the privilege--to suppress truth--runs counter to the dominant aims of law"). In particular, invocation of the privilege before the grand jury may jeopardize an effective and comprehensive investigation into alleged violations of the law, and thereby thwart that body's dual functions of determining "if there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and of protecting citizens against unfounded criminal prosecutions. These competing societal interests demand that application of the privilege not exceed that which is necessary to effect the policy considerations underlying the privilege, i.e., "the privilege must be upheld only in those circumstances for which it was created." In re Walsh, supra, 623 F.2d at 492. Accord: Fisher, supra, 425 U.S. at 403, 96 S. Ct. at 1577 ("it applies only where necessary to achieve its purpose.") As a derogation of the search for truth, the privilege is to be narrowly construed. The federal forum is unanimously in accord with the general rule that the identity of a client is, with limited exceptions, not within the protective ambit of the attorney-client privilege. The Circuits have embraced various "exceptions" to the general rule that the identity of a client is not within the protective ambit of the attorney-client privilege. The name of the client will be considered privileged matter where the circumstances of the case are such that the name of the client is material only for the purpose of showing an acknowledgement of guilt on the part of such client of the very offenses on account of which the attorney was employed. A significant exception to this principle of non-confidentiality holds that such information may be privileged when the person invoking the privilege is able to show that a strong possibility exists that disclosure of the information would implicate the client in the very matter for which legal advice was sought in the first case. It should be observed, however, that the legal advice exception may be defeated through a prima facie showing that the legal representation was secured in furtherance of present or intended continuing illegality, as where the legal representation itself is part of a larger conspiracy. Another exception to the general rule that the identity of a client is not privileged arises where disclosure of the identity would be tantamount to disclosing an otherwise protected confidential communication. If the identification of the client conveys information which ordinarily would be conceded to be part of the usual privileged communication between attorney and client, then the privilege should extend to such identification in the absence of other factors.

The privilege may be recognized where so much of the actual communication has already been disclosed [not necessarily by the attorney, but by independent sources as well ] that identification of the client [or of fees paid ] amounts to disclosure of a confidential communication. Turning to the facts at bar, it is observed that Durant asserted three justifications for invocation of the attorney-client privilege. First, at the March 2 hearing, he stated that disclosure might possibly implicate the client in criminal activity. As this justification has no roots in concepts of confidentiality or communication, it cannot be advanced to support an abdication of the general rule that identity of a client is not privileged. Second, at the March 22 hearing, Durant informed the Court that the FBI had informed him that an arrest would be effected upon disclosure of the identity of Durant's client. This is simply an assertion that disclosure would provide the last link of evidence to support an indictment as articulated in Pavlick --a precedent which is herein rejected. Third, at the March 22 hearing, Durant submitted that disclosure was justified under the "legal advice" exception embraced by the Ninth Circuit. Seeking to invoke this exception, it was incumbent upon Durant to "show that a strong possibility existed that disclosure of the information would implicate the client in the very matter for which legal advice [had been] sought in the first case". In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum (Marger/Merenbach), supra, 695 F.2d at 365 (emphasis added). A well recognized means for an attorney to demonstrate the existence of an exception to the general rule, while simultaneously preserving confidentiality of the identity of his client, is to move the court for an in camera ex parte hearing. Since the burden of establishing the existence of the privilege rests with the party asserting the privilege, it is incumbent upon the attorney to move for an in camera ex parte hearing if one is desired. In the action sub judice, Durant failed to so move. Rather, he rested on his blanket assertion that his client had initially sought legal advice relating to matters involving the theft of IBM checks. Such unsupported assertions of privilege are strongly disfavored.. Further, it is pertinent to observe that at the first hearing on March 2 Durant had expressly disavowed knowledge of the existence of stolen IBM checks. This statement significantly diminishes the credibility of Durant's subsequent March 22 representation that his client had indeed engaged Durant's services for past activity relating to stolen IBM checks. Accordingly, Durant clearly failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating a "strong possibility" that disclosure of the identity of his client would implicate that client in the very manner for which legal advice had been initially sought. Last, it is observed that Durant did not represent to the district court that disclosure of the identity of his client would amount to a disclosure of a confidential communication. See: NLRB v. Harvey, supra; United States v. Jeffers, supra. Not having advanced this exception to the general rule, it follows axiomatically that Durant failed to satisfy the burden of establishing its existence. Nor does the record suggest the viability of this exception so as to justify a remand. In sum, Durant has failed to establish the existence of any exception to the general rule that disclosure of the identity of a client is not within the protective ambit of the attorney-client privilege. Therefore the contempt Order of the district court issued against Durant is hereby AFFIRMED. _____________________________________________________________________________________ U.S. v. McPARTLIN 595 F.2d 1321 April 23, 1979

FACTS: Legislator McPartlin and the Ingram Corporation entered into a deal wherein the latter would give the former, political contributions amounting to $450000 so that the company would be awarded a multi¬million dollar contract for the hauling of sewage. Benton, a vice president of Ingram Corp., was privy to all the exchanges of money between the McPartlin group and Ingram and in certain instances was the go between. A federal grand jury investigated these dealings. Benton was an unindicted co-¬defendant who served as a witness for the prosecution. The prosecution relied heavily on testimonies of Benton and the contents of a business calendar he kept detailing the transactions.

An investigator for Ingram’s counsel interviewed Mc. Partlin with the consent of his counsel for the purpose of determining whether there was a basis to challenge Benton’s entries. Ingram counsel used this in court to which McPartlin’s counsel objected arguing that they fell under the attorney-client privilege. ISSUE: Whether or not McPartlin is entitled to the attorney-client privilege in objecting to the inclusion of the statement he gave to Ingram’s investigator? RULING: Yes McPartlin was entitled to the attorney-client privilege because his statements were made in confidence to the counsel of a co-defendant for a common purpose related to both defenses. In fact Ingram’s lawyer acknowledged communications by a client to his own lawyer remain privileged even when the lawyer subsequently shares them with co-defendant for the purpose of common defense. Uninhibited communication among joint parties and their counsel about matters of common concern is often important to the protection of their interests. In criminal cases, it can be necessary to a far opportunity to defend. Its waiver cannot be inferred from the disclosure in confidence to a co-party’s attorney to a common purpose. If the case was be decided locally, the decision rendered would be the same. The application of American jurisprudence holds suggestive influence and guidance in deciding local cases especially in cases where our locally law is similar to or culled from US law. If the case was to be decided under the proposed revised rules of evidence, the decision will still be the same for the same reason mentioned above. _____________________________________________________________________________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs ANA LUISA GORDON-NIKKAR, Defendant-Appellant, 518 F. 2d 972 (5th Cir 1975)

FACTS: Appellant, Gordon-Nakar, was convicted by the jury of 3 counts of an indictment charging her with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute approximately four kilograms of cocaine, and the substantive charges of possession with the intent to distribute and the distribution of the cocaine. On her appeal, appellant argues that her conviction should be reversed because the district court permitted a government witness, Brenda Marchand, to give testimony regarding allegedly privilege communications between appellant’s attorney and his clients. Brenda Marchand was also charge as a co-defendant with the crimes for which appellant was convicted. Prior to entering her plea, Marchand had two meetings in the office of appellant’s attorney, Mr. Estrumsa. On each of the occasions, several other co-defendants were present. Marchand, however was not a client of Mr. Estrumsa and it is unclear whether all the other persons in these meetings were clients of Estrumsa. ISSUE: Whether or not the statements in the office of Mr. Estrumsa were protected by the attorney- client privilege.

RULING: No. there were at least five persons at Estrumsa’s office on this occasion, at least one of the persons, Brenda Marchand and perhaps others were not clients of Mr. Estrumsa. A communication divulged to “strangers” or outsiders can scarcely be considered a confidential communication between attorney and client. Therefore, this communication is not protected by the attorney-client privilege. _____________________________________________________________________________________ UNITED STATES v. NOBLES No. 74-634 June 23, 1975

FACTS: The defendant in this case was tried in a federal court and sentenced for robbing a bank. The only evidence which point him to the crime was the identification testimony of a bank teller and salesman who were present at the time of the robbery. The defense tried to impeach these eyewitnesses and hired an investigator. This investigator interviewed both eyewitnesses and preserved some written notes. When testifying at trial, defense counsel used these notes to attempt to impeach the witnesses during cross-examination. With the bank teller, the defense asked if he remembered telling the investigator that he had seen only the back of the head of the person identified as the perpetrator. When he replied that he did not remember making that statement, he was allowed, despite the defense’s objections, to refresh his recollection by looking at a part of the investigator’s notes. The prosecution too was allowed to examine the relevant part of the notes. The witness then testified that although the report says that he saw only the back of the head, he still had seen more than that and insisted that Nobles was the robber. With the salesman, defense asked whether he remembered making the statement that “all blacks look alike to me.” After denying making this statement, the prosecution asked to see the document, defense objected, and the court refused the prosecution’s request. The court added that it would order disclosure of the document if the investigator testified concerning the witnesses’ alleged statements. Nobles called the investigator to the stand. The court said that a copy of the report (inspected and edited) would have to be submitted to the prosecution at the end of the investigator’s impeachment testimony. The defense refused to produce the report, and the court did not allow the impeachment testimony. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit said that the lower court decision was reversible error, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not the disclosure of the investigator’s report is still under the work product doctrine. RULING: No, the disclosure of the investigator’s report does not form part under the said doctrine. Thus, release of the relevant portions of the defense investigator's report would not impinge on the fundamental values protected by the Fifth Amendment. The privilege derived from the work-product doctrine is not absolute. Like other qualified privileges, it may be waived. Here, respondent sought to adduce the testimony of the investigator and contrast his recollection of the contested statements with that of the prosecution's witnesses. Respondent, by electing to present the investigator as a witness, waived the privilege with respect to matters covered in his testimony. Respondent can no more advance the work-product doctrine to sustain a unilateral testimonial use of work-product materials than he could elect to testify in his own behalf and thereafter assert his Fifth Amendment privilege to resist cross-examination on matters reasonably related to those brought out in direct examination.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, MANSUETO V. HONRADA, CEFERINO S. PAREDES, JR. and GENEROSO S. SANSAET, respondents. G.R. Nos. 115439-41 July 16, 1997

FACTS: The records show that during the dates material to this case, respondent Honrada was the Clerk of Court and Acting Stenographer of the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court, San Francisco-BunawanRosario in Agusan del Sur. Respondent Paredes, was the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, then Governor of the same province and is at present a Congressman. Atty. Sansaet is a practicing attorney who served as counsel for Paredes in several instances. In 1976, Paredes applied for a free patent over a piece of land and it was granted to him. But later, the Director of Lands found out that Paredes obtained the same through fraudulent misrepresentations in his application. A civil case was filed and Sansaet served as counsel of Paredes. A criminal case for perjury was subsequently filed against Paredes and Sansaet also served as counsel. Later, Teofilo Gelacio, a taxpayer who had initiated the perjury and graft charges against respondent Paredes, sent a letter to the Ombudsman seeking the investigation of the three respondents herein for falsification of public documents. He claimed that respondent Honrada, in conspiracy with his herein co-respondents, simulated and certified as true copies certain documents purporting to be a notice of arraignment, dated July 1, 1985, and transcripts of stenographic notes supposedly taken during the arraignment of Paredes on the perjury charge. These falsified documents were annexed to respondent Paredes' motion for reconsideration of the Tanodbayan resolution for the filing of a graft charge against him, in order to support his contention that the same would constitute double jeopardy. Later, Teofilo Gelacio initiated perjury and graft charges against Paredes and Sansaet, claiming that they acted in conspiracy, by not filing an arraignment in the criminal case. To evade responsibility for his own participation, he claimed that he did so upon the instigation and inducement of Paredes, and to discharge himself as a government witness. The Sandiganbayan claimed that there was an attorney-client privilege and resolved to deny the discharge. ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of Atty. Sanset is barred by the attorney-client privilege RULING: The Court reprobates the last assumption which is flawed by a somewhat inaccurate basis. It is true that by now, insofar as the falsifications to be testified to in respondent court are concerned, those crimes were necessarily committed in the past. But for the application of the attorney-client privilege, however, the period to be considered is the date when the privileged communication was made by the client to the attorney in relation to either a crime committed in the past or with respect to a crime intended to be committed in the future. In other words, if the client seeks his lawyer's advice with respect to a crime that the former has theretofore committed, he is given the protection of a virtual confessional seal which the attorney-client privilege declares cannot be broken by the attorney without the client's consent. The same privileged confidentiality, however, does not attach with regard to a crime which a client intends to commit thereafter or in the future and for purposes of which he seeks the lawyer's advice. Statements and communications regarding the commission of a crime already committed, made by a party who committed it, to an attorney, consulted as such, are privileged communications. Contrarily, the unbroken stream of judicial dicta is to the effect that communications between attorney and client having to do with the client's contemplated criminal acts, or in aid or furtherance thereof, are not covered by the cloak of privileges ordinarily existing in reference to communications between attorney and client. Moreover, Sansaet himself was a conspirator in the commission of the falsification. For the communication to be privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end. The existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from attaching.

P hysician-Patient Privilege Nelly Lim, Petitioner vs. TheCourt of Appeals, Respondent GR No. 91114 September 25, 1992

FACTS: A petition for annulment of marriage was filed by Juan Sim against his lawful spouse, petitioner Nelly Lim, on the ground that the latter has been suffering schizophrenia before, during, and after the marriage. Among the witnesses presented by Sim was Dr. Lydia Acampado. Nelly Lim’s counsel opposed the testimony of Dr. Acampado since it was the latter who examined Lim, thus making the testimony privileged. On the other hand, Sim contended that Dr. Acampado was to be presented, and did testify, as an expert witness. She never released any information about the illness she examined Nelly Lim for, nor did she disclose the results of the examinations. Only hypothetical questions were asked ISSUE: Whether or not the physician-patient privilege applies. RULING: No. Dr. Acampado may be allowed to testify as an expert witness. This rule on the physician-patient privilege is intended to facilitate and make safe full and confidential disclosure by the patient to the physician of all facts, circumstances and symptoms, untrammeled by apprehension of their subsequent and enforced disclosure and publication on the witness stand, to the end that the physician may form a correct opinion, and be enabled safely and efficaciously to treat his patient. 11 It rests in public policy and is for the general interest of the community. Since the object of the privilege is to protect the patient, it may be waived if no timely objection is made to the physician’s testimony. In order that the privilege may be successfully claimed, the following requisites must concur: 1. the privilege is claimed in a civil case; 2. the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; 3. such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his professional capacity; 4. the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and 5. the information was confidential, and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation (formerly character) of the patient. The physician may be considered to be acting in his professional capacity when he attends to the patient for curative, preventive, or palliative treatment. Thus, only disclosures which would have been made to the physician to enable him "safely and efficaciously to treat his patient" are covered by the privilege. The mere fact of making a communication, as well as the date of a consultation and the number of consultations, are therefore not privileged from disclosure, so long as the subject communicated is not stated. _____________________________________________________________________________________ MA. PAZ FERNANDEZ KROHN, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and EDGAR KROHN, JR.,Respondents. G.R. No. 108854, June 14, 1994

FACTS: Edgar Krohn, Jr. and petitioner, Ma. Paz Fernandez Krohn, were married in 1964. They had been experiencing marital problems prompting petitioner to undergo a psychological testing in order to ease their tension. However, the same proved futile. In 1975, the husband was able to secure a decree nullifying their church marriage. Subsequently, he also filed a petition before the trial court asking for the annulment of their marriage. He testified on the

witness stand regarding the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report issued to petitioner when the latter underwent a psychological evaluation. Petitioner objected on the ground of privileged communication between physician and patient. But the trial court admitted said report. The case reached the Court of Appeals through petition for certiorari but the same was dismissed. ISSUE: Whether or not the prohibition on privileged communication between physician and patient is applicable in the case at bar. RULING: No, the prohibition on privileged communication between physician and patient does not find application in the case at bar. Physician-patient privilege protects the privacy of the patient in order that he may disclose freely to his physician all information regarding his ailment without fear of humiliation or embarrassment from the public as the same is deemed confidential. The case of Lim v. Court of Appeals which was decided on September 25, 1992, lays down the requisites for the privilege to apply: (a) the privilege is claimed in a civil case; (b) the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; (c) such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his professional capacity; (d) the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and (e) the information was confidential and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation of the patient. In the case at bar, the person against whom the privilege is claimed is not one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics as it is the husband and not the doctor who examined petitioner and made the psychiatric report. Therefore, this case will not fall within the acknowledged prohibition. If at all, the husband’s testimony could have squarely fallen into the hearsay rule and can be thus, excluded. But since that objection was not raised, the same is deemed waived. _____________________________________________________________________________________

S tate Secrets US v. Nixon (AB) 418 US 683 (1974)

FACTS: In November 1972, Richard Nixon won a second term as president, decisively defeating the Democratic candidate, George McGovern. But toward the end of the campaign a group of burglars broke into the Democratic Party campaign headquarters in Washington's Watergate complex. Thanks in large part to the determined investigative reporting of the Washington Post, what had been a small news story soon expanded, as reporters uncovered tracks leading to high government officials. The Nixon administration denied any wrongdoing, but it soon became clear that it had tried to cover up the burglary and connections to it, connections that might even include the president. Under congressional and public pressure, Nixon appointed a special prosecutor. When it was learned that the president had secretly taped conversations in the Oval Office, the prosecutor filed a subpoena to secure tapes he believed relevant to the criminal investigation. In March 1974, a federal grand jury indicted seven associates of President Nixon for conspiracy to obstruct justice and other offenses relating to the Watergate burglary. The president himself was named as an unindicted coconspirator. The District Court, upon the motion of the special prosecutor, issued a subpoena to the president requiring him to produce certain tapes and documents relating to precisely identified meetings between the president and others. Although President Nixon released edited transcripts of some of the subpoenaed conversations, his counsel filed a "special appearance" and moved to quash the subpoena on the grounds of executive privilege. When the District Court denied the motion, the president appealed and the case was quickly brought to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the President can invoke absolute privilege of confidentiality for all Presidential communications that he could choose to withhold materials germane to a criminal investigation.

RULING: Chief Justice Burger reaffirmed the rulings of Marbury v. Madison and Cooper v. Aaron that under the Constitution the courts have the final voice in determining constitutional questions, and that no person, not even the president of the United States, is above the law. Although there had been some speculation as to whether Nixon would obey the Court, within eight hours after the decision had been handed down the White House announced it would comply. On August 5, 1974, transcripts of sixty-four tape recordings were released, including one that was particularly damaging in regard to White House involvement in the Watergate cover-up. Three days later, his support in Congress almost completely gone, Nixon announced that he would resign. However, neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of high level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances. The President's need for complete candor and objectivity from advisers calls for great deference from the court. However, when the privilege depends solely on the broad, undifferentiated claim of public interest in the confidentiality of such conversations, a confrontation with other values arises. Absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets, we find it difficult to accept the argument that even the very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly diminished by production of such material for in camera inspection with all the protection that a district court will be obliged to provide. The allowance of the privilege to withhold evidence that is demonstrably relevant in a criminal trial would cut deeply into the guarantee of due process of law and gravely impair the basic function of the courts. A President's acknowledged need for confidentiality in the communications of his office is general in nature, whereas the constitutional need for production of relevant evidence in a criminal proceeding is specific and central to the fair adjudication of a particular criminal case. Without access to specific facts a criminal prosecution may be totally frustrated. The President's broad interest in confidentiality of communications will not be vitiated by disclosure of a limited number of conversations preliminarily shown to have some bearing on the pending trials. We conclude that when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interests in confidentiality; it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice. The generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial. _____________________________________________________________________________________ BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK, Petitioner, vs. THE MONETARY BOARD, CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, JOSE B. FERNANDEZ, CARLOTA P. VALENZUELA, ARNULFO B. AURELLANO and RAMON V. TIAOQUI, Respondents. G.R. No. 70054

December 11, 1991

FACTS: Top Management Programs Corporation and Pilar Development Corporation are corporations engaged in the business of developing residential subdivisions. Top Management and Pilar Development obtained several loans from Banco Filipino all secured by real estate mortgage in their various properties in Cavite. The Monetary Board by Ramon Tiaoqui, Special Assistant to the Governor and Head, SES Department III submitted a report finding that the bank is insolvent and recommending the appointment of a receiver. The Monetary Board, based on the Tiaoqui report, issued a resolution finding Banco Filipino insolvent and placing it under receivership. Subsequently, the Monetary Board issued another resolution placing the bank under liquidation and designated a liquidator. By virtue of her authority as liquidator, Valenzuela appointed the law firm of Sycip, Salazar, et al. to represent Banco Filipino in all litigations. Banco Filipino filed the petition for certiorari questioning the validity of the resolutions issued by the Monetary Board authorizing the receivership and liquidation of Banco Filipino .A temporary restraining order was issued enjoining the respondents from executing further acts of liquidation of the bank. However, acts and other transactions pertaining to normal operations of a bank are not enjoined. Subsequently, Top Management and Pilar Development failed to pay their loans on the due date. Hence, the law firm of Sycip, Salazar, et al. acting as counsel for Banco Filipino under authority of the liquidator,

applied for extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgage over Top Management and Pilar Development’s properties. Thus, the Ex-Officio Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite issued a notice of extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the properties. Top Management and Pilar Development filed two separate petitions for injunction and prohibition with the respondent appellate court seeking to enjoin the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, the ex-officio sheriff of said court and Sycip, Salazar, et al. from proceeding with foreclosure sale which were subsequently dismissed by the court. ISSUE: Whether or not the general public is entitled to know the assets and liquidation of the banking institution when it is confirmed by the Monetary Board of its insolvency or cannot resume business. RULING: Yes. Section 29 of the Republic Act No. 265, as amended known as the Central Bank Act, provides that when a bank is forbidden to do business in the Philippines and placed under receivership, the person designated as receiver shall immediately take charge of the bank’s assets and liabilities, as expeditiously as possible, collect and gather all the assets and administer the same for the benefit of its creditors, and represent the bank personally or through counsel as he may retain in all actions or proceedings for or against the institution, exercising all the powers necessary for these purposes including, but not limited to, bringing and foreclosing mortgages in the name of the bank. If the Monetary Board shall later determine and confirm that banking institution is insolvent or cannot resume business safely to depositors, creditors and the general public, it shall, when public interest requires, order its liquidation and appoint a liquidator who shall take over and continue the functions of receiver previously appointed by the Monetary Board. Such acts of liquidation, as explained in Sec. 29 of the Central Bank Act are those which constitute the conversion of the assets of the banking institution to money or the sale, assignment or disposition of to the creditors and other parties for the purpose of paying debts of such institution. There is no doubt that the prosecution of suits collection and the foreclosure of mortgages against debtors of the bank by the liquidator are among the usual and ordinary transactions pertaining to the administration of a bank. Our order in the same resolution dated August 25, 1985 for the designation by the Central Bank of a comptroller Banco Filipino alter the powers and functions; of the liquid insofar as the management of the assets of the bank is concerned. The mere duty of the comptroller is to supervise counts and finances undertaken by the liquidator and to determine the propriety of the latter's expenditures incurred in behalf of the bank. Notwithstanding this, the liquidator is empowered under the law to continue the functions of receiver is preserving and keeping intact the assets of the bank in substitution of its former management, and to prevent the dissipation of its assets to the detriment of the creditors of the bank. These powers and functions of the liquidator in directing the operations of the bank in place of the former management or former officials of the bank include the retaining of counsel of his choice in actions and proceedings for purposes of administration. _____________________________________________________________________________________

N ewsman’s Privilege In Re Farber (State v. Jascalevich) 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978)

FACTS: MOUNTAIN, J. In these consolidated appeals The New York Times Company and Myron Farber, a reporter employed by the newspaper, challenge judgments entered against them in two related matters--one a proceeding in aid of a litigant (civil contempt), the other for criminal contempt of court. The proceedings were instituted in an ongoing murder trial now in its seventh month, as a result of the appellants' failure to comply with two subpoenas duces tecum, directing them to produce certain documents and materials compiled by one or both of these appellants in the course of Farber's investigative reporting of certain allegedly criminal activities.

Impelled by appellants' persistent refusal to produce the subpoenaed materials for in camera inspection, Judge Arnold issued an order returnable before Judge Theodore W. Trautwein, directing appellants to show cause why they should not be deemed in contempt of court. ISSUE: Whether or not the materials subpoenaed are privileged communication. RULING: No. Appellants claim a privilege to refrain from revealing information sought by the subpoenas duces tecum essentially for the reason that were they to divulge this material, confidential sources of such information would be made public. Were this to occur, they argue, newsgathering and the dissemination of news would be seriously impaired, because much information would never be forthcoming to the news media unless the persons who were the sources of such information could be entirely certain that their identities would remain secret. They contend further that this privilege to remain silent with respect to confidential information and the sources of such information emanates from the "free speech" and "free press" clauses of the First Amendment. In our view the Supreme Court of the United States has clearly rejected this claim and has squarely held that no such First Amendment right exists. "The issue in these cases is whether requiring newsmen to appear and testify before state or federal grand juries abridges the freedom of speech and press guaranteed by the First Amendment. We hold that it does not." Branzburg v. Hayes, supra, 408 U.S. at 667 (1972). "There is no present authority in this Court either that newsmen are constitutionally privileged to withhold duly subpoenaed documents material to the prosecution or defense of a criminal case or that a defendant seeking the subpoena must show extraordinary circumstances before enforcement against newsmen will be had." New York Times and Farber v. Jascalevich, 439 U.S. 1317, 1322 (1978). [A]mong the many First Amendment protections that may be invoked by the press, there is not to be found the privilege of refusing to reveal relevant confidential information and its sources to a grand jury which is engaged in the fundamental governmental function of "[f]air and effective law enforcement aimed at providing security for the person and property of the individual...." 408 U.S. at 690. The reason this is so is that a majority of the members of the United States Supreme Court have so determined. _____________________________________________________________________________________ NEWSMAN’S PRIVILEGE -- Without prejudice to his liability under the civil and criminal laws, the publisher, editor, columnist or duly accredited reporter of any newspaper, magazine or periodical of general circulation cannot be compelled to reveal the source of any news-report or information appearing in said publication which was related in confidence to such publisher, editor or reporter unless the court or a House or committee of Congress finds that such revelation is demanded by the security of the State (RA 1477); BANK DEPOSITS -- All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office, except upon written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation (RA 1405). OTHER PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION SANCTITY OF THE BALLOT – voters may not be compelled to disclose for whom they voted. TRADE SECRETS INFORMATION CONTAINED IN TAX RETURNS (RA 2070, as amended by RA 2212).

T he act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact, may be given in evidence against him. (Sec. 26 Rule130)

A dmissions Against Interest GUILLERMO VIACRUCIS, LUISA DE VIACRUCIS, CLAROS MARQUEZ, and RUSTICA AREVALO MARQUEZ, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ANASTACIO ORAIS and CELESTINA MALAZARTE, respondents. 44 SCRA 176

1972

FACTS: Spouses Orais filed a suit against Viacrucis to establish their title to a land in Leyte. They alleged that it is part of a bigger lot sold to them by its registered owner, Sanchez, by virtue of a deed of sale. Viacrucis claims that the deed of sale was simulated. The lower court and the appellate court ruled in favor of Orais, considering, among others, the admission of one Mrs. Costelo. Mrs. Costelo stated that although the land in dispute was physically in the possession of her deceased husband, they still recognized Orias as the owner of the land. The court also considered the admission of Mr. Costelo which is in a public document. Viacrucis assails the court’s use of the Costelo spouses’ admissions, claiming that he cannot be prejudiced by an act or declaration of another. ISSUE: Whether or not the admission of Mrs. Costelo was binding on Viacrucis. RULING: The testimony and the public document constitute declarations of the Costelos adverse to their interest which is admissible in evidence, pursuant to the rule on declarations against interests. Viacrucis has no reason whatsoever to object to the consideration in favor of Orais of said admission, the same having been made in 1936, more than 5 years before Viacrucis’ predecessors in interest entered the picture. Such admission may be received in evidence, not only against the party who made it or his successor’s interest, but also against third persons. _____________________________________________________________________________________ Edward Keller and Corporation Limited, petitioner-appellant vs. COB Group Marketing Incorporated, Jose E.Bax, respondents-appellees 141 SCRA 86 (1986)

FACTS: Edward Keller and Corporation Limited appointed COB Group marketing as distributor of its household products, Brite and Nuvan in Panay and Negros as shown in the agreement dated March 14, 1970. As security for COB Group marketing’s credit purchases up to the amount of P35, 000 one Asuncion Manahan mortgaged her land to Keller. Manahan assumed solidarity with COB Group the faithful performance of all terms and conditions of the sales agreement. In July 1970 the parties executed a second sales agreement whereby COB Group Marketing’s territory was extended to Northern and Southern Luzon. As security for the credit purchases up to P25, 000 of COB Group marketing for that area Tomas Lorenzo Jr. and his father executed a mortgaged on their land on Nueva Ecija. Like Manahan, the Lorenzo’s were solidarily liable with COB. On May 8, the Board of Directors of COB Group where appraised by Jose Bax, the firm’s president and general manager that the firm owed keller about P179, 000. Bax was authorized to negotiate Keller for the settlement of his firm’s liability. ISSUE: Whether or not respondents are solidarily liable on the credit. RULING: Yes, the respondents are solidarily liable. Section 26 of the Rules of Court provides that the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him as

admissions of a party. The admissions of the respondent are supported by documentary evidence. It is noteworthy that all the invoices with delivery receipts were presented by Keller together with tabulation thereof. _____________________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee vs BIENVENIDO PARAGSA, alias "BENBEN", defendant-appellant G.R. No. L-44060 July 20, 1978

FACTS: The accused was charge of rape committed against a 12 year old victim. The victim was alone in their house when suddenly the accused entered and intimidated her with a knife. After the rape was committed, the accused heard someone knocking at the door, it was the victim’s Aunt Lita. Incidentally, she saw the accused exiting from the house. When she asked Mirasol(victim) what the accused did to her, she did not say anything. It was only after a few days she revealed what the accused did to her. The accused interposed the defense that they are “sweethearts” ISSUE: Whether the defense of sweetheart is more credible than the testimony of complainant. RULING: YES. - A careful scrutiny of the record reveals that the prosecution's evidence is weak, unsatisfactory and inconclusive to justify a conviction. Certain circumstances negate the commission by the appellant of the crime charged and point to the conclusion that the sexual intercourse between the appellant and the complaining witness was voluntary. Force and intimidation were not proven. Mirasol did not offer any resistance or vocal protestation against the alleged sexual assault. She could have easily made an outcry or resisted the appellant's advances without endangering her life. But she did not. If, indeed, she was raped under the circumstances narrated by her, she could have revealed the same the very moment she was confronted by her aunt Lita. Another circumstance is the fact that Mirasol did not bother at all to rebut the testimony of the appellant and his witnesses to the effect that the accused and Mirasol were actually sweethearts; and that they had had two previous sexual communications before. The rule allowing silence of a person to be taken as an implied admission of the truth of the statements uttered in his presence is applicable in criminal cases. But before the silence of a party can be taken as an admission of what is said, it must appear: (1) that he heard and understood the statement; (2) that he was at liberty to interpose a denial; (3) that the statement was in respect to some matter affecting his rights or in which he was then interested, and calling, naturally, for an answer; (4) that the facts were within his knowledge; and (5) that the fact admitted or the inference to be drawn from his silence would be material to the issue. These requisites of admission by silence all obtain in the present case. Hence, the silence of Mirasol on the facts asserted by the accused and his witnesses may be safely construed as an admission of the truth of such assertion. _____________________________________________________________________________________ PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs RAMIRO ALEGRE y CERDONCILLO ET AL., Defendant-Appellants, G.R. No. L-30423

November 7, 1979

FACTS: This case is an automatic review after the accused Melecio Cudillan, Jesus Medalla, Ramiro Alegre, and Mario Comayas was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE, committed with four (4) aggravating circumstances, not offset by any mitigating

circumstance, and hereby sentences all of them to suffer the penalty of DEATH, to be carried out pursuant to the applicable provisions of law, to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of Adlina Sajo in the amount of P350,000.00, representing the value of the pieces of jewelry unrecovered, to pay jointly and severally also the heirs of Adelina Sajo the amount of P12,000.00., and to pay the costs. During the pendency of the appeal, Melecio Cudillan died. The basis for the conviction of the rest of the accused turned guilty of the crime in the lower court was an extra judicial confession by Melencio Cudillan during the custodial investigation when he was apprehended by police officers while in the act of pawning a bracelet which was a product of the robbery to which they were convicted and appealing from. Alegre et. al., kept quiet and did not rebut the confession of Cudillan. ISSUE: Whether the extrajudicial confession of an accused implicating other co-accused absent independent evidence of conspiracy admissible in evidence against the others? RULING: The extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan, on the basis of which the trial court was able to reconstruct how Melecio Cudillan committed the crime in question, cannot be used as evidence and are not competent proof against appellants Ramiro Alegre and Jesus Medalla, under the principle of "res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet" there being no independent evidence of conspiracy. As a general rule, the extrajudicial declaration of an accused, although deliberately made, is not admissible and does not have probative value against his co- accused. It is merely hearsay evidence as far as the other accused are concerned. While there are recognized exceptions to this rule, the facts and circumstances attendant in the case at bar do not bring it within the purview of such exceptions. The only evidence, therefore, linking the appellants to the crime would be their purported tacit admissions and/or failure to deny their implications of the crime made by Melecio Cudillan, and/or their purported verbal confessions to Hernando Carillo, an inmate of the Pasay City jail. The settled rule is that the silence of an accused in criminal cases, meaning his failure or refusal to testify, may not be taken as evidence against him, and that he may refuse to answer an incriminating question. It has also been held that while an accused is under custody, his silence may not be taken as evidence against him as he has a right to remain silent; his silence when in custody may not be used as evidence against him, otherwise, his right of silence would be illusory. The leading case of Miranda v. Arizona held that the prosecution may not use at trial the fact that an individual stood mute, or claimed his privilege against self-incrimination, in the face of an accusation made at a police custodial interrogation. Prior to Miranda, it was the view of many authorities that a man to whom a statement implicating him in a crime is directed may fail to reply if he is in custody under a charge of the commission of that crime, not because he acquiesces in the truth of the statement, but because he stands on his constitutional right to remain silent, as being the safest course for him to pursue and the best way out of his predicament. Other courts have held that the circumstance that one is under arrest by itself does not render the evidence inadmissible, and that an accusation of a crime calls for a reply even from a person under arrest or in the custody of an officer, where the circumstances surrounding him indicate that he is free to answer if he chooses. We hold that the better rule is that the silence of an accused under custody, or his failure to deny statements by another implicating him in a crime, especially when such accused is neither asked to comment or reply to such implications or accusations, cannot be considered as a tacit confession of his participation in the commission of the crime. We hold, therefore, that it was error for the trial court to draw from appellants' silence while under police custody, in the face of the incriminatory statements of Melecio Cudillan, the conclusion that the aforesaid appellants had tacitly admitted their guilt. We hold, further, that in view of the inadmissibility of the extrajudicial confession of Melecio Cudillan implicating herein appellants, the remaining evidence against them, consisting in the testimonies of Sgt. Mariano Isla and Hernando Carillo, is insufficient to sustain the judgment of conviction. Indeed, it is inherently improbable that herein appellants would have readily confessed their participation in the commission of a heinous crime to a casual acquaintance in a prison detention cell, considering that on the same occasion they strongly denied any involvement in such crime before the police authorities.

Griffin vs California 380 U.S. 609 (1965)

FACTS: Edward Dean Griffin was convicted of the murder of Essie Mae Hodson before a jury in a California court. Griffin had been invited into an apartment shared by Hodson and her boyfriend, Eddie Seay. After going to bed, Seay was awakened by noise; he saw Griffin and Hodson struggling, and Hodson said Griffin had tried to force her to have sex. After Seay locked Griffin outside the apartment, Griffin broke back into the apartment and struck Seay, who ran to a bar for help. Upon returning, Griffin and Hodson were gone. In the morning, a witness saw Griffin, buttoning up his pants, coming out of a very large trash box in an alley about 300 feet from Hodson's apartment. The witness found Hodson in the trash box, bleeding and apparently in shock. She died at a hospital the next day from her injuries. Griffin, who already had multiple felony convictions, did not testify at the trial. He chose to invoke his Fifth Amendment Privilege against self-incrimination and remained silent throughout the trial. At the closing of trial, the court instructed the jury that it may infer that the defendant’s silence was a probable indication of guilt. The death penalty was imposed, and it was upheld by the California Supreme Court. Under a writ of certiorari, the United States’ Supreme Court decided to take the case at hand. ISSUE: Whether a jury instruction on the accused’s silence is reversible error. RULING: The Court that a prosecutor's or judge's comment to the jury about a defendant's refusal to testify is a remnant of the 'inquisitorial system of criminal justice', which the Fifth Amendment outlaws. It is a penalty imposed by courts for exercising a constitutional privilege. It cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion costly." The Court then noted that an objection to this logic might be that a jury might find it "natural and irresistible" to infer the guilt of a defendant who refused to testify while possessing facts about the evidence against him, and so a judge's commenting upon the refusal did not magnify that inference into a penalty for asserting a constitutional privilege; but went on to state that a judge's comment on the refusal "solemnizes the silence of the accused into evidence against him. _____________________________________________________________________________________ ALEJANDRO S. LAZARO ET AL., Petitioners, vs MODESTO AGUSTIN ET AL, Respondents, G.R. No. 152364

April 15, 2010

FACTS: The petitioners (plaintiffs) filed a complaint against the respondents for claiming as one of the coowners of a parcel. They alleged that Alberto, Leoncio and Alejandra, all surnamed Santos consented that the parcel of land which is the subject of the controversy be titled in the name of Basilisa, the latter being the eldest of the children of Simeon Santos. Thus the original certificate of title No. 20742 in the name of Basilisa Santos was acquired although the children of the late Simeon Santos agreed collectively that it did not and does not necessarily mean that Basilisa Santos is the sole and exclusive owner of the parcel land. The title of the lot with Original Certificate of Title No. 20742 was transferred into another title which is now TCT No. T-20695 in the names of the respondents without the knowledge and consent of the plaintiffs. The during the lifetime of Basilisa Santos-Agustin, plaintiff Alejandra Santos-Lazaro informed the former, who are sisters, that the transfer of the title in the of Basilisa Santos into the names of her children would erroneously imply that the lost is solely and exclusively owned by Basilisa Santos-Agustin’s children, the latter then told her sister not to worry because an affidavit was already executed by her recognizing and specifying that her brothers Alberto Santos and Leoncio Santos and her sister Alejandra Lazaro would each get ¼ share of the lot.

The MTCC ruled that among others that no evidentiary value could be given to the affidavit allegedly executed by Basilisa, wherein she purportedly acknowledged her co-ownership of the subject property with her siblings Alberto, Leoncio and Alejandra, because the affiant was not presented on the witness stand such that all the statements made in her affidavit were hearsay. The RTC affirmed the decision with modification. The CA affirmed also the decision of the MTCC with modification. ISSUE: Whether or not the sworn statement of Basilisa Agustin is a declaration against interest. RULING: No, it is not a declaration against interest. Instead, it is an admission against interest. Admission against interest are those made by a party to a litigation or by one in privity with or identified in legal interest with such party, and are admissible whether or not the declarant is available as a witness. Declarations against interest are those made by a person who is neither a party nor in privity with a party to the suit, are secondary evidence, and constitute an exception to the hearsay rule. They are admissible only when the declarant is unavailable as a witness. In the present case, since Basilisa is the respondents’ predecessor-in- interest and is, thus, in privity with the latter’s legal interest. The former’s sworn statement, if proven to be genuine and duly executed, should be considered as an admission against interest. _____________________________________________________________________________________ People of the Philippines vs. Renato Espanol GR. No. 175603 February 13, 2009

FACTS: At about 2:00 a.m. of February 2, 2000, Domingo Petilla was waiting for his companions at Pantal Road, Dagupan City. They were on their way to Manila. All of a sudden, he heard two successive gunshots. A few moments later, a yellow tricycle sped past him along Pantal Road headed towards SitioGuibang, Dagupan City. The tricycle was driven by a man wearing a dark-colored long-sleeved shirt. Petillas companions arrived shortly thereafter on board a van. As they started loading their things, they saw, through the lights of their vehicle, a person lying on the pavement along Pantal Road. Upon closer scrutiny, they discovered the lifeless body of Gloria Espaol. They immediately reported the matter to the police. The gunshots were also heard by Harold Villanueva, a boatman working at the Pantal River, while he was waiting for passengers at the dock about 100 meters away from the crime scene. The shots were followed by the sound of a motorcycles revving engine. He then saw a speeding yellow tricycle. The tricycle bore the name Rina in front of its cab. Its driver was wearing a dark jacket and blue pants. The boatman was later told by a tricycle driver that there was a dead body nearby. Out of curiosity, he (the boatman) went there and recognized the victim as one of his regular passengers. Felicidad Pascua Ferrer, sister of the victim, was told by the police and neighbors that her sister was dead. She immediately proceeded to the place. Upon confirming that it was indeed her sister, she asked bystanders to inform appellant about the death of his wife. A few minutes later, appellant arrived. Meanwhile, Villanueva noticed that the appellant seemed to be wearing the same clothes as those worn by the driver of the speeding tricycle he saw along Pantal Road right after he heard the gunshots. At around 3:00 a.m., appellant went to the house of Mateo Pascua, brother of Gloria, to inform him that Gloria was held up and killed. They then proceeded to the scene of the crime using the yellow tricycle of their brother-in-law, Federico Ferrer. The tricycle had the name Rina emblazoned in front. On the way, Mateo noticed that the seats and floor of the tricycle were wet. When asked about it, appellant did not answer. During the victims wake in their house, appellant hardly looked at his wifes remains. He chose to remain secluded at the second floor. He repeatedly asked for Felicidad’s forgiveness during the first night of the wake. At one point, Delfin Hernandez, a nephew of the victim, approached appellant and asked why the latter killed his aunt. Appellant just kept silent. ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant’s silence and constant asking of forgiveness is an admission of guilt for the crime charged against him.

RULING: Yes. Appellant’s actions greatly show his guilt for the killing of his own wife. Under Section 32, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, Admission by silence is an act or declaration made in the presence and within the hearing observation of a party who does or says nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for action or comment if not true, and when proper and possible for him to do so, may be given in evidence against him. The appellant doesn’t in any manner deny the accusations of his nephew, thus, it constitutes an admission of his guilt. In addition, appellant’s act of pleading for his sister-in-laws forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an attempt to compromise, which in turn can be received as an implied admission of guilt under Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. _____________________________________________________________________________________ LYNN MAAGAD and the DIRECTOR OF LANDS, Petitioners, vs. JUANITO MAAGAD, Respondent. G.R. No. 171762 June 5, 2009

FACTS: The parcel of land in dispute (Lot 6297) located in Bulua, Cagayan de Oro City, formed part of the estate of Proceso Maagad. Upon his death, he was survived by his children Amadeo, Adelo (father of petitioner Lynn), Loreto and Juanito). The heirs executed an Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate dividing among themselves their father's properties. Lot 6297 was conveyed to Adelo while Lot 6270 was allotted to respondent Juanito. Juanito claimed that there was a mistake in the allotment, wherein Lot 6270 was supposed to be allotted to Adelo and Lot 6297 to him for the following reasons: he had been in continuous possession of Lot 6297 even before Proceso's death, the lot was given to him when he got married in 1952, he had been religiously paying the realty taxes, Adelo (up to his death in 1989) possessed and paid the realty taxes for Lot 6271 and recognized and respected Juanito's possession and ownership of Lot 6297. To rectify the mistake, Juanito and the children of Adelo (Dina, Ely, Lynn) executed a memorandum of exchange. However, due to a mistake in the assignment of the "Party of the First Part" and the "Party of the Second Part," Lot 6297 was again allotted to the heirs of Adelo and Lot 6270 to Juanito (as if no exchange happened). Juanito only found out about the mistake when Lynn caused the publication of the partition in a local newspaper. Without Juanito's knowledge, Lynn, representing his siblings, applied for a free patent over Lot 6297. Subsequently, he demanded from Juanito that he surrender the possession of Lot 6297 which was ignored by Juanito, believing that the demand had no basis. The free patent application was granted in the name of 'Heirs of Adelo Maagad represented by Lynn Maagad. Juanito filed a complaint for Annulment of Title with damages, which was later amended to include a prayer for alternative relief of reconveyance of title. Lynn filed a demurrer to evidence. RTC granted the demurrer and dismissed the case for lack of evidence. RTC stated in its decision that the allegation of the witnesses for Juanito that Lot 6297 was only mistakenly adjudicated to Adelo is belied by the fact that he signed the extrajudicial partition. He waived whatever right he may have had to the lot by signing the document. Although a Deed of Exchange was executed, it was done so 18 years after the partition, and it clearly stated that Lot 6297 belonged to Adelo and Lot 6270 to Juanito. The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to or contradiction of the terms of a written agreement by testimony purporting to show that at or before the signing of the document, other or different terms were orally agreed upon by the parties. Evidence falls short of justifying the reformation. CA reversed RTC decision ISSUE: Whether or not parol evidence can correct the mistake in the partition of the parties sought to correct. RULING: The parol evidence rule, as relied on by the RTC to decide in favor of Lynn Maagad, proscribes any addition to or contradiction of the terms of a written agreement by testimony purporting to show that, at or before the signing of the document, other or different terms were orally agreed upon by the parties. However, the rule is not absolute and admits of exceptions. Thus, among other grounds, a party may present evidence to modify, explain, or add to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his

pleading a mistake in the written agreement. For the mistake to validly constitute an exception to the parol evidence rule, the following elements must concur: (1) the mistake should be of fact; (2) the mistake should be mutual or common to both parties to the instrument; and (3) the mistake should be alleged and proved by clear and convincing evidence. We find that all the elements are present in the case at bar and there was indeed a mistake in the terms of the Partition, thus exempting respondent Juanito from the general application of the parol evidence rule. We agree with the CA that "[i]t would be highly illogical and absurd for the parties to execute a Memorandum of Exchange in the first place if there was nothing to exchange at all, unless the purpose of said exchange was precisely to rectify and effect the correct adjudication of the two lots in question." The mere fact of execution of a Memorandum of Exchange itself indicates the existence of a mistake in the Partition which the parties sought to correct. _____________________________________________________________________________________ Pentagon Steel Corporation, Petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals, Respondent. GR No. 174141 June 26, 2009

FACTS: Perfecto Balogo was an employee of Pentagon Steel Corporation for 23 years. Without prior notice, he took a leave from work which prompted Pentagon to considered Balogo on AWOL. Balogo filed before the Labor Arbiter a complaint for underpayment and non-payment of wages, as well as overtime pay, holiday pay, service incentive leave, 13th month pay, and ECOLA. According to him he failed to report for work because he contracted the flu, but returned after ten days when he was already feeling better. Pentagon refused to take him back. Conciliation proceedings ensued wherein Pentagon insisted that it was Balogo who refused to work and demanded for separation pay to which Pentagon did not agree to. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint. However, this was reversed by the NLRC and affirmed by the CA. Pentagon claims that the CA erred in basing its decision on what had transpired during the conciliation proceedings. ISSUE: Whether or not the admissions made during the conciliation proceedings are admissible. RULING: The agreements made at conciliation proceedings are privileged, thus cannot be used in evidence. Article 233 of the Labor Code states that information and statements made at conciliation proceedings shall be treated as privileged communication and shall not be used as evidence in the Commission. Conciliators and similar officials shall not testify in any court or body regarding any matters taken up at conciliation proceedings conducted by them. This was the provision we cited in Nissan Motors Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor when we pointedly disallowed the award made by the public respondent Secretary; the award was based on the information NCMB Administrator Olalia secured from the confidential position given him by the company during conciliation. In the present case, we find that the CA did indeed consider the statements the parties made during conciliation; thus, the CA erred by considering excluded materials in arriving at its conclusion. The reasons behind the exclusion are two-fold. First, since the law favors the settlement of controversies out of court, a person is entitled to buy his or her peace without danger of being prejudiced in case his or her efforts fail; hence, any communication made toward that end will be regarded as privileged. Indeed, if every offer to buy peace could be used as evidence against a person who presents it, many settlements would be prevented and unnecessary litigation would result, since no prudent person would dare offer or entertain a compromise if his or her compromise position could be exploited as a confession of weakness. Second, offers for compromise are irrelevant because they are not intended as admissions by the parties making them. A true offer of compromise does not, in legal contemplation, involve an admission on the part of a defendant that he or she is legally liable, or on the part of a plaintiff, that his or her claim is groundless or even doubtful, since it is made with a view to avoid controversy and save the expense of litigation. It is the distinguishing mark of an offer of compromise that it is made tentatively, hypothetically, and in contemplation of mutual concessions.

Compromises EL VERADERO DE MANILA, Plaintiff and Appellant, vs. INSULAR LUMBER COMPANY, Defendant and Appellee. G.R. No. 21911, September 15, 1924

FACTS: El Varadero de Manila, plaintiff herein, completed repairs on Tatlo, a lighter owned by the defendant, Insular Lumber Company. There was no express agreement as to the price, only the understanding that the same should be lower than what the other companies would charge. Believing that the bill presented by El Varadero de Manila was exorbitant, defendant brought the matter to court. Judgment was rendered awarding to El Varadero de Manila the amount of P5,310.70, with legal interest. Still dissatisfied, the latter appealed asking the amount to be raised to P12,412.62. During the course of the negotiations, plaintiff was willing to accept the amount of P10,241.37. On the other hand, the defendant expressed willingness to pay the plaintiff the amount of P8,070.12. ISSUE: Whether or not the offer of compromise of Insular Lumber Company to El Varadero de Manila should be excluded as evidence. RULING: Under the general rules of evidence, an offer of compromise must be excluded, except as the amounts named in the offer appear to have been arrived at as a fair estimate of value; the same is considered relevant. In the case at bar, there was no denial of liability. The only question was the amount to be paid. The defendant admits that El Varadero de Navotas would have done the work for P8,000.00. On the foregoing considerations, it is concluded that the reasonable value of the repairs performed by El Varadero de Manila on the Tatlo owned by Insular Lumber Company is something less than P8,000.00. The sum is fixed at P7,700.00. WHEREFORE, judgment is modified. In lieu of the judgment rendered in the lower court, another shall issue in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for the recovery of P7,700.00 with legal interest which will begin to run from the date when the judgment shall become final and continue until payment, without costs. _____________________________________________________________________________________ THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. REGINO TORRES AND PABLO PADILLA, Defendants-Appellants. G.R. No. 10566. August 20, 1915

FACTS: George W. Walker and Juan Samson are secret service agents of the Cebu Customhouse. George W. Walker testified that he had received information that Regino Torres would go to the house of the widow of one Franco to get some opium. That evening they stationed themselves in Calle de Colon, where the said house stood. And a short while afterwards, he saw the two defendants come out of the door of the garage on the premises. Samson seized Torres, and as Padilla started to run away Walker went in pursuit of him and on passing by Samson and Torres saw two tins of opium. Walker ordered Padilla to halt three times but Padilla continued to run. Walker fired a shot into the air, whereupon Padilla stopped, after he had thrown one tin over a fence. After the arrest of both defendants, Walker and Samson set out with lights to search for the tins and found the one thrown by Padilla inside the enclosure. They also found two other tins, about a meter from the place where Samson had been holding Torres. When questioned by the defense as to whether Walker had said anything on his return from his pursuit of Padilla, Walker did say that he saw Regino Torres throw away two tins and that he was looking for them. He was also asked by the defense whether Walker had proposed to the defendants that they pay

a fine in the form of a compromise, to which he replied that he had not. On the contrary, it was the defendants who made this offer. ISSUE: Whether or not an offer of compromise in criminal cases is an admission of guilt. RULING: The Court ruled that the weight both of authority and reason sustains the rule which admits evidence of offers to compromise in criminal cases. Nonetheless, it permits the accused to show that such offers were not made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason which would justify a claim by the accused that the offer to compromise was not in truth an admission of his guilt and an attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would ordinarily ensue therefrom. _____________________________________________________________________________________ PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee, vs. DANNY GODOY, Accused-appellant. G.R. Nos. 115908-09 December 6, 1995

FACTS: Godoy was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of rape and kidnapping with serious illegal detention, and sentencing him to the maximum penalty of death in both cases by the Regional Trial Court. The private complainant allegedly said that her teacher Godoy by means of force, threat and intimidation, by using a knife and by means of deceit, have carnal knowledge with her and kidnap or detained her. The defense presented a different version of what actually transpired, his defense was that they were lovers, as evidenced by the letters wrote by the complainant to the accused and the same was corroborated by the testimonies of the defense witnesses. ISSUE: Whether or not Godoy be convicted of rape and kidnapping with illegal detention. HELD: No. They were in fact lovers. This notwithstanding, the basic rule remains that in all criminal prosecutions without regard to the nature of the defense which the accused may raise, the burden of proof remains at all times upon the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If the accused raises a sufficient doubt as to any material element, and the prosecution is then unable to overcome those evidence, the prosecution has failed to carry its burden of proof of the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt and the accused must beac3uitted! There are three well4known principles that guide an appellate court in reviewing the evidence presented in a prosecution for the crime of rape. While rape is a most detestable crime, and ought to impartially punished, it must be borne in mind that it is an accusation easy to be made, hard to be proved, but harder to be defended by the party accused, though innocent that in "view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutini8ed with extreme caution and that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. In the case at bar, several circumstances exist which amply demonstrate and ineluctably convince the Court that there was no rape committed. In finding that the crime of rape was committed, the lower court took into account only that portion of the testimony of complainant regarding the January 21, 1994 incident and conveniently deleted the rest. Taken singly, there would be reason to believe that she was indeed raped. But if we are to consider the other portions of her testimony concerning the events which transpired thereafter, which unfortunately the court a quo wittingly or unwittingly failed or declined to appreciate, the actual truth could have been readily exposed.

The rule, therefore, that this Supreme Court generally desists from disturbing the conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses will not apply where the evidence of record fails to support or substantiate the lower court's findings of fact and conclusions; or where the lower court overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, would affect the outcome of the case; or where the disputed decision is based on a misapprehension of facts. _____________________________________________________________________________________ PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CRISPIN YPARRAGUIRRE, accused-appellant. G.R. No. 117702. February 10, 1997

FACTS: Crispin Yparraguirre was charged with the crime of rape of Rosita Bacaling, a housemaid of appellant and his wife. One evening, accused-appellant arrived from work and found (his) two children asleep. He approached Rosita and gave her a small white envelope said to contain medicine for her skin disease. Rosita opened the envelope and counted fifteen (15) tablets inside. As instructed by appellant, Rosita took all the tablets. A few minutes later, she felt weak and fell down. Suddenly, she realized that appellant was dragging her to the spouses' bed. She tried to get up but appellant pushed her down the bed and pointed a hunting knife at her neck. He ordered Rosita not to move or he would kill her. Then he removed her clothes and went on top of her. He kissed her face, breasts, stomach and private parts and then entered her. Rosita cried out in pain but appellant continued entering her. After satisfying his lust, appellant pulled out and punched Rosita in the stomach. She lost consciousness. Rosita did not say a word about the incident. She continued serving the Yparraguirres for one month before leaving them to return to her mother's house in Barrio Cagangohan. Her mother found Rosita in a state of shock. She could not eat nor talk, neither could she perform ordinary daily functions such as dressing herself. In short, Rosita became helpless. Upon the Municipal Health Officer's advice, Rosita was confined at the Davao City Mental Hospital for observation and treatment. After a week of treatment, Rosita began to talk and revealed that she was raped by appellant. ISSUE: Whether or not an offer of compromise is a tacit admission of guilt. RULING: Yes. There is evidence that after Rosita revealed the rape to her mother, appellant's wife, Mary Ann Yparraguirre, offered the victim's mother, Merlyn Bacaling, fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) to dissuade her from filing the complaint. When Merlyn refused, Mary Ann increased the offer to twentyfive thousand pesos (P25,000.00). Still Merlyn refused to accept it. As pointed out by appellant, no criminal complaint had been filed at the time the compromise offer was made. Nevertheless, the rape incident was already known to appellant's wife. Mary Ann herself testified that Merlyn told her about it on November 3, 1990, the day when Mary Ann first offered the money. An offer to compromise does not require that a criminal complaint be first filed before the offer can be received in evidence against the offeror. What is required is that after committing the crime, the accused or his representative makes an offer to compromise and such offer is proved. _____________________________________________________________________________________

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUAN MAQUI, defendant-appellant. Phil. 97

1914

FACTS: Maqui was convicted in the trial court of theft of a caraballa (female carabao) and her calf. He was sentenced to imprisonment for 5 years, to pay accessory penalties and to pay his share for the costs of the proceedings. Hence, this appeal. Maqui's counsel contends that the extrajudicial statements made by Maqui should be excluded on the ground that there is no formal proof on the record that they were made voluntarily, and are therefore inadmissible as proof insofar as they can be construed as a confession of guilt. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting certain extrajudicial admissions alleged to have been made by Maqui, including an offer to compromise the case by payment of a sum of money. RULING: No. The Court ruled that there was no suggestion in the trial court's record to indicate that these extrajudicial statements by Maqui were NOT made volunatarily. As long as the evidence as to the circumstances under which the said incriminating statements were made to be accepted as true, it clearly rebuts the possibility that they were made involuntarily or were extorted. In this case, the record clearly discloses that Maqui's extrajudicial statements were made in the course of his offer to compromise and that they were voluntarily made by Maqui in the hope that if accepted, he would escape prosecution. If the accused, under a guilty conscience, repays or satisfies the original owner of the goods he stole, this is admissible as evidence. But if the accused did this merely to avoid the convenience of imprisonment and not under a consciousness of guilt, it is not evidence. Since Maqui made the extrajudicial statements voluntarily, then his statements can be admitted. An offer of compromise of a crime, unaccepted by the prosecutor, may be proven by the State as an admission of guilt, or as disclosing possession of the property which is the subject of the burglary and larceny challenged in the indictment. _____________________________________________________________________________________

Res Inter Alios Acta People of the Philippines, plaintiff vs. Ramiro Alegre, defendant 44 SCRA 109 (1979)

FACTS: This case arose from the death of Adelina Sajo y Maravilla, 57 years old where body was found in her bathroom inside her house at the Maravilla compound Pasay City in the early morning of July 26, 1966. According to the necropsy report she died of asphyxia by manual strangulation. Her bedroom was ransacked. The drawers and several cabinets were open and several garments and papers were scattered on the floor. No witness saw the commission of the crime. During the latter part of July 1966, Melecio Cudillan was apprehended in Tacloban City Leyte in the act of pawning a bracelet one of the pieces of jewelry taken from the victim. In explaining how he came into possession of the stolen pieces of jewelry he admitted his participation in the killing and robbery of Adina Sajo. This appears in his extrajudicial confession before the police authorities of Tacloban City. In this statement, he implicated a certain Esok of Calubian Leyte, Jesus Medalla and others. When brought to Mania and he was inside the Pasay City Police Headquarters he again executed an extrajudicial confession. This was sworn to before the Assistant Prosecutor of Pasay City. In this second statement he narrated in detail the participation in the commission of the crime including Ramiro Alegre. ISSUE: Whether or not the other appellants are liable under the extrajudicial confessions ofMelecio Cudillan.

RULING: No. The extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan on the basis of which the trial court was able to reconstruct how Melecio Cudillan committed the crime in question cannot be used as evidence and are not competent proof against appellants Ramiro Alegre and Jesus Medalla under the principles of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. There being no independent evidence of conspiracy. As a general rule, the extrajudicial declaration of an accused although deliberately made is not admissible and does not have probative value against his co-accused. It is merely hearsay evidence as far as the other accused are concerned. _____________________________________________________________________________________ PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee vs SABAS RAQUEL, VALERIANO RAQUEL and AMADO PONCE, accused, SABAS RAQUEL and VALERIANO RAQUEL, accused-appellants G.R. No. 119005 December 2, 1996

FACTS: Spouses Juliet and Agapito was awakened by a person knocking at the backdoor of their kitchen. When he opened the door, heavily armed men emerged, declared a hold-up and fired their guns at him. Juliet went out of their room and saw her husband lifeless. Then a man took her husband’s gun and left hurriedly. As she shouted for help, she saw a man fall beside their water pump while two (2) other men ran away. She did not saw their faces. The police came and found one of the perpetrators wounded and lying at about 8 meters from the victim’s house. He was identified as Amado Ponce. Ponce revealed that Sabas and Raquel were the perpetrators of the crime. During the arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty. However before Ponce could give his testimony at the trial he escaped. ISSUE: Whether the admission made by Ponce is admissible against Sabas and Raquel RULING: NO. The extra-judicial statements of Ponce implicating a co-accused may not be utilized against Sabas and Raquel, unless these are repeated in open court. Since the appellants never had the opportunity to cross-examine Ponce on the latter’s extra-judicial statements, it is elementary that the same are hearsay as against the two accused. According to the res inter alios acta rule, an extra-judicial confession is binding only upon the declarant and is not admissible against his co-accused, unless such extra-judicial confession is repeated in open court and the accused had the opportunity to cross-examine the other co-accused. _____________________________________________________________________________________ PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs MICHAEL BOKINGO alias “MICHAEL BOKINGCO” & REYNANTE COL, Accused-Appellants, G.R. No. 187536

August 10, 2011

FACTS: The victim, Noli Pasion (Pasion) owned a pawnshop which formed part of his house. He also maintained two (2) rows of apartment units at the back of his house, one of which is Apartment No. 5 and was being leased to Dante Vitalicio (Vitalicio), Pasion’s brother-in-law, while Appellants were staying in Apartment No. 3. Vitalicio was spin-drying his clothes inside his apartment when Pasion passed by him and went out of the back door. He heard a commotion from Apartment No. 3. He peeped through a screen door and saw Bokingco hitting something on the floor. Upon seeing Vitalicio, Bokingco attacked him with a hammer in his hand. Vitalicio was hit several times but managed to push him away. Vitalicio proceeded to his house and was told by his wife that Pasion was found dead. Vitalicio went back to

Apartment No. 3 and saw Pasion’s body lying flat on the kitchen floor. Pasion and Vitalicio were brought to the hospital. Pasion expired a few hours late. Elsa, the wife of Pasion, testified that she was in the master’s bedroom when she heard banging sounds and her husband’s moans. She immediately got off the bed and went down. Before reaching the kitchen, Col blocked her way. Col then instructed her to open the vault of the pawnshop but Elsa informed him that she does not know the combination lock. Elsa tried offering him money but Col dragged her towards the back door but before they reached the door, Elsa saw Bokingco open the screen door and heard him tell Col: “tara, patay na siya.” Col immediately let her go and ran away with Bokingco. Michael Bokingco (Bokingco) and Reynante Col (Col) were charged for the crime of Murder. , Bokingco entered a guilty plea while Col pleaded not guilty. The trial court rendered judgment finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder. They appealed to the CA but the decision of the trial court was affirmed with modification finding REYNANTE COL is found GUILTY as conspirator beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, qualified by treachery and evident premeditation and with the attendant aggravating circumstances of nighttime and abuse of confidence, with no mitigating circumstances. Appellants maintain that they could not be convicted of murder. They question the presence of treachery in the commission of the crime considering that no one from the prosecution witnesses testified on how Pasion was attacked by Bokingco. They also submit that evident premeditation was not proven in the case. They belittled Bokingco’s extrajudicial admission that he and Col planned the killing. ISSUES: 1) Whether the qualifying circumstances were properly appreciated to convict appellant Bokingco of murder and 2) Whether appellant Col is guilty beyond reasonable doubt as a co-conspirator. RULING: 1. NO. We agree with appellants that treachery cannot be appreciated to qualify the crime to murder in the absence of any proof of the manner in which the aggression was commenced. For treachery to be appreciated, the prosecution must prove that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself, and that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by him. Nobody witnessed the commencement and the manner of the attack. While the witness Vitalicio managed to see Bokingco hitting something on the floor, he failed to see the victim at that time. Bokingco admitted in open court that he killed Pasion. But the admitted manner of killing is inconsistent with evident premeditation. To warrant a finding of evident premeditation, the prosecution must establish the confluence of the following requisites: (a) the time when the offender was determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient interval of time between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. It is indispensable to show how and when the plan to kill was hatched or how much time had elapsed before it was carried out. In the instant case, no proof was shown as to how and when the plan to kill was devised. Bokingco admitted in court that he only retaliated when Pasion allegedly hit him in the head. Despite the fact that Bokingco admitted that he was treated poorly by Pasion, the prosecution failed to establish that Bokingco planned the attack. 2. NO. In order to convict Col as a principal by direct participation in the case , it is necessary that conspiracy between him and Bokingco be proved. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit an unlawful act. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused evincing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest. Unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective are essential to establish the existence of conspiracy. As a rule, conspiracy must be established with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself and must be shown as clearly as the commission of the crime.

The finding of conspiracy was premised on Elsa’s testimony that appellants fled together after killing her husband and the extrajudicial confession of Bokingco. Nobody witnessed the commencement of the attack. Col was not seen at the apartment where Pasion was being attacked by Bokingco. In fact, he was at Elsa’s house and allegedly ordering her to open the pawnshop vault, thus: Based on these acts alone, it cannot be logically inferred that Col conspired with Bokingco in killing Pasion. At the most, Col’s actuations can be equated to attempted robbery, which was actually the initial information filed against appellants before it was amended, on motion of the prosecution, for murder. Elsa testified that she heard Bokingco call out to Col that Pasion had been killed and that they had to leave the place. This does not prove that they acted in concert towards the consummation of the crime. It only proves, at best, that there were two crimes committed simultaneously and they were united in their efforts to escape from the crimes they separately committed. _____________________________________________________________________________________

Exception To The Res Inter Alios Acta Rule MAHLANDT, Petitioner, vs WILD CANID SURVIVAL & RESEARCH CENTER, INC., Respondents, 588 F. 2d 626 (8th Cir. 1978)

FACTS: Plaintiff Mahlandt brought suit on behalf of his minor son, Daniel, for injuries Daniel sustained in an alleged attack by a wolf. The wolf was owned by the Wild Canid Survival & Research Center, Inc. and was being kept at the house of its Director of Education, Defendant Kenneth Poos. Mahlandt sought to introduce into evidence three statements, two made by Poos, and one of the minutes of a meeting of the Directors of the Center. The first statement by Poos was a note he left on his boss’s door that said that the wolf bit a child. The second statement was a verbal statement made by Poos to his boss that the wolf had bitten a child. The minutes of the Center’s meeting reflect that a significant amount of discussion was held about the legal implications of the wolf biting a child. The trial court excluded all three statements as hearsay, and the jury favored with Poos and the Center. Mahlandt then appealed. ISSUE: Whether or not the note left by the employee is considered a matter within the scope of his agency or employment, custody of the wolf, and were made during the existence of that relationship to render it admissible as a vicarious admission. RULING: Yes. A statement is not hearsay if the statement is offered against a party and a statement by the party’s servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship. The employee did have actual physical custody of the wolf, and his opinions, conclusions were adopted by the Board of Directors as the basis for the action by his principal. Once in an agency and making the statement while the relationship continues are established, the statement is exempt from the hearsay rule as long as it related to a matter within the scope of the agency.

Co-conspirator’s Statements THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROSARIO CABRERA and CONRADO VILLANUEVA, defendants, CONRADO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant. G.R. No. L-37398

June 28, 1974

FACTS: At about 11:00 in the evening of January 17, 1972 Police Sgt. Mario Tanfelix of Valenzuela, Bulacan, while on a patrol duty received an instruction from his superior Lt. Carlos Palomares to proceed immediately to Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital at Manila to investigate an abandoned person who was found at the North Diversion Road suffering from stab wounds. This abandoned and wounded person was identified as Luis de la Cruz. He gave an ante mortem statement. In the ante-mortem statement the deceased named defendant Rosario Cabrera as the person who hired his jeep but did not know the names of the three men who stabbed him and took his money and the jeep. In the morning of January 18, 1972, defendant Rosario Cabrera was arrested by the police officers. On January 20, 1972 she executed an extra-judicial confession. In the said extra-judicial confession she pointed to appellant Conrado Villanueva as the mastermind of the robbery. She merely hired the jeep upon instruction of appellant but the robbery and the killing of the deceased were done by appellant and his two unidentified companions. Lt. Carlos Palomares of the Valenzuela Police Department who took the extra-judicial confession of defendant Rosario Cabrera testified to identify and to read the contents of the said extra-judicial confession. Dr. Ernesto G, Brion of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) testified regarding the post-mortem examination conducted on the body of the deceased. Reynaldo Santos Jr. testified on the ownership and value of the jeep stolen. Alejandro de la Cruz testified on the expenses and damages suffered by the family of the deceased. The only evidence that would support the judgment of conviction of appellant Villanueva was the extra-judicial confession of his co-accused Rosario Cabrera which was read into the record over the continuing objection of appellant's counsel. Appellant reiterated his objection when the said extra-judicial confession was being offered in evidence. ISSUE: Whether or not the extra judicial confession by Rosario can be admitted as evidence in court. RULING: No, it is inadmissible. Said statement was not made during the existence of the alleged conspiracy between her and appellant, but after said supposed conspiracy had already ceased and when she was already in the hands of the authorities, Section 27 of Rule 130 cannot be availed of. Said provision reads: Admission by conspirator.— The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the coconspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. _____________________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HON. NICASIO YATCO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, and JUAN CONSUNJI and ALFONSO PANGANIBAN, respondents. G.R. No. L-9181

November 28, 1955

Facts: Juan Consunji, Alfonso Panganiban, and another whose identity is still unknown, were charged with having conspired together in the murder of one Jose Ramos (Criminal Case No. Q-1637 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City). Trial of the case started on May 3, 1955, and in several hearings the prosecution had been presenting its evidence. During the progress of the trial on May 18, 1955, while the prosecution was questioning one of its witnesses, Atty. Arturo Xavier of the National Bureau of Investigation, in connection with the making of a certain extra-judicial confession (allegedly made before him) by defendant Juan Consunji to the witness, counsel for the other defendant Alfonso Panganiban interposed a general objection to any evidence on such confession on the ground that it was hearsay and

therefore incompetent as against the other accused Panganiban. The Court below ordered the exclusion of the evidence objected to, but on an altogether different ground: that the prosecution could not be permitted to introduce the confessions of defendants Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban to prove conspiracy between them, without prior proof of such conspiracy by a number of definite acts, conditions, and circumstances. The court state that it would be premature because there is already a ruling of the Court that you cannot prove a confession unless you prove first conspiracy thru a number of indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances as required by law. MR denied. This petition for certiorari was brought before this Court by the Sol Gen, for the review and annulment of the lower Court's order completely excluding any evidence on the extrajudicial confessions of the accused Consunji and Panganiban without prior proof of conspiracy. ISSUE: Whether or not the court has the power to exclude the proferred confessions. RULING: The court does not have the said power. The lower Court committed a grave abuse of discretion in ordering the complete exclusion of the prosecution's evidence on the alleged confessions of the accused Juan Consunji at the stage of the trial when the ruling was made. Section 14, Rule 123, Rules of Court, is specific as to the admissibility of the extrajudicial confession of an accused, freely and voluntarily made, as evidence against him. SEC. 14. Confession. — The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging the truth of his guilt as to the offense charged, may be given in evidence against him. Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, even if Consunji's confession may not be competent as against his co-accused Panganiban, being hearsay as to the latter, or to prove conspiracy between them without the conspiracy being established by other evidence, the confession of Consunji was, nevertheless, admissible as evidence of the declarant's own guilt and should be admitted. The exclusion of the proferred confessions was not made on the basis of the objection interposed by Panganiban's counsel, but upon an altogether different ground, which the Court issued motu proprio. Panganiban's counsel objected to Consunji's confession as evidence of the guilt of the other accused Panganiban, on the ground that it was hearsay as to the latter. But the Court, instead of ruling on this objection, put up its own objection to the confessions — that it could not be admitted to prove conspiracy between Consunji and Panganiban without prior evidence of such conspiracy by a number of indefinite acts, conditions, circumstances, etc. and completely excluded the confessions on that ground. By so doing, the Court overlooked that the right to object is a mere privilege which the parties may waive; and if the ground for objection is known and not reasonably made, the objection is deemed waived and the Court has no power, on its own motion, to disregard the evidence. _____________________________________________________________________________________ PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CHAW YAW SHUN @ GEORGE CHUA, VICTORIO ALVAREZ, DIONISIO CARASIG, and JOHN DOES, accused, CHAW YAW SHUN @ GEORGE CHUA and VICTOR ALVAREZ, appellants. GR No. L-19590 April 25, 1968

FACTS: A complaint for murder was filed against Victorio Alvarez and two John Does for the killing of one Hector Crisostomo. In the course of the investigation, Alvarez made several inconsistent statements, one of which gave a detailed narration of the participation of Chaw Yaw Shun @ George Chua and Lim Bun Ping @ Johnny Yao. Chua pleaded not guilty during the trial, but was nonetheless convicted. On appeal, Chua questions the admissibility of the confessions made by Alvarez in one of his statements, wherein the latter imputed the former as a conspirator in the murder of Crisostomo. ISSUE: Whether or not the confessions of Alvarez should be taken against Chua?

RULING: The confessions should not be taken against Chua. The admissibility of a confession by one accused against the other in the same case, must relate to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful enterprise (or during its existence) and in furtherance of its objects, and not to a confession made, as in this case, long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end. Conspiracy must be real and not presumptive. It must be proved as the crime itself, independent from the confession. But in the case at bar, the trial court admitted the conflicting confession of Alvarez which are not binding on the appellant for being hearsay, aside from having been repudiated by Alvarez himself during the trial. There is, therefore, no inter-locking confession so to say, for there being no independent evidence establishing an overt act of appellant Chua connected to the crime, conspiracy must necessarily be discarded. _____________________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. CENON SERRANO alias PIPING, ET AL., Defendants. DOMINGO CADIANG, SANTIAGO YUMUL and FILEMON CENZON, Defendants-Appellants. G.R. No. L-7973

April 27, 1959

FACTS: In the evening of October 16, 1950, Eulogio Serrano told Cenon Serrano alias Piping and company that they should neutralize Pablo Navarro because he had been prompting people to call on Senator Pablo Angeles David and testify on the Maliwalumassacre. Eulogio instructed them to wait for Pablo in the town of Bacolor, lure him to barrio Dolores and kill him. The next day, they all waited for Pablo at the gambling casino and Chinese stores in the town of Bacolorwhere Pablo used to hang around but Pablo did not show up. They finally succeeded in making contact with Pablo on October 20 when he arrived at the gambling casino. Cenon asked Pablo for one drinks and suggested that they should go to San Fernando for a “good time," to which Pablo agreed. Before reaching San Fernando, Cenon suggested that they should instead proceed to Angeles for the “good time" which Pablo approved. Upon reaching a small road near the schoolhouse of barrio San Isidro, Cenon told the driver to proceed to barrio Dolores. There, the group tied, interrogated, shot, and then buried Pablo. All the members of the group were tried and were held guilty for the murder of Pablo. One of them, however, Anastacio Reyes, was discharge as an accused and testified as a witness for the prosecution. The statements ofAnastacio were admitted by the Court which ruled against all the accused. The group now contends that the statements of Anastacio cannot be admitted against them. They opine that it must appear and be shown by evidence other than the admission itself that the conspiracy actually existed and that the person who is to be bound by the admission was a privy to the conspiracy. ISSUE: Whether or not the statements of Anastacio may be admitted against Serrano and the other defendants. RULING: The contention does not merit serious consideration, because the rule that "the act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration," applies only to extra-judicial acts or declaration, but not to testimony given on the stand at the trial, where the defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. And while the testimony of accomplices or confederates in crime is always subject to grave suspicion, "coming as it does from a polluted source," and should be received with great caution and doubtingly examined, it is nevertheless admissible and competent. The trial court did not err in convicting the appellants. For lack of sufficient number of votes to impose the death penalty, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the proportionate costs against the appellants.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. ELMER DE LA CRUZ and TRANQUILINO MARTINEZ, Appellants. G.R. No. 173308, June 25, 2008

FACTS: Accused-appellant, Elmer de la Cruz, was employed as the family driver of Erwin Ong. He brings the eight-year old son of the latter, Aaron Dennis Ong, to and from Claret School. As relayed by accused-turned-into-state witness, AldrinTano (Tano), De la Cruz was the one who brought the idea of kidnapping Aaron during their meeting on November 4, 1998 together with another accused, Tranquilino Martinez (Martinez). On November 9, 1998, the group decided to carry out their plan. De la Cruz fetched Aaron from school. The child was seated at the front passenger seat of the car. While driving, he told the child that the car was overheating. He opens the hood and the rear compartment. And suddenly, Martinez got inside the car and handcuffed Aaron. De la Cruz then boarded the car and he was also handcuffed by Martinez to Aaron.Tano went inside the car and sat beside De la Cruz. Martinez drove the car to Batasan Hills and fetched Romeo Dano (Dano). Thereafter, they proceeded to a vacant house in San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.They removed Aaron’s handcuffed. De la Cruz told Aaron that he was also able to untie himself. Martinez and Tano went to the house of Rex Tarnate. Then, Martinez, Tano, Dano, and Tarnate went back to Batasan Hills leaving behind De la Cruz and Aaron. Instead of escaping, De la Cruz rather took a nap. On the other hand, Erwin Ong received a phone call from a man telling him that he does not need to look for his son anymore as Aaron is with him. Thereafter, Martinez ordered Tano to call Erwin Ong to demand three million pesos (P3million) for his son’s safety. Meanwhile, a certain Quinano, along with the common-law wife of Tarnate, found De la Cruz and Aaron in the vacant house and brought them to the barangay hall. Erwin Ong was informed that his son is already in the custody of the barangay officials in Barangay Minuyan, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. RTC convicted De la Cruz and Martinez with the crime of kidnapping with ransom and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of death. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. On review, De la Cruz questions the act of the trial court in discharging Tano to be a state witness contending that the latter did not appear to be the least guilty. He also questions the necessity for Tano’s testimony. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the act of discharging accused Tano as a state witness is proper; and 2. Whether or not his testimony is necessary for the prosecution of the crime charged. RULING: Yes, the act of discharging accused Tano to be a state witness is proper. And his testimony is necessary in order to prove conspiracy between the accused. Under the Rules of Court, for one or more of the accused to be discharge as witnesses for the state, said accused does/do not appear to be the guiltiest. However, that does not mean that a state witness should appear to be the “least guilty” among the accused. Rather, it provides that “he does not appear to be the most guilty.” Based on the findings of the lower court, Tano merely facilitated the commission of the crime. He was not the mastermind who planned the kidnapping. Thus, he did not appear to be the guiltiest among the accused. Therefore, it was proper for the trial court to discharge Tano as a state witness. Anent the necessity of his testimony, the same was absolutely necessary as it was the only direct evidence that would establish the presence of conspiracy from the planning stage up to the commission of the crime. The prosecution was able to prove that the conduct of all the accused shows unanimity in design and purpose in the commission of the offense. With regard to De la Cruz, it was proved that he was a co-conspirator of the other accused because his actuations were not consistent with a victim of a kidnap-for-ransom gang. It was not shown that he was forced to board the car, yet he did not escape. And while in the vacant house with no one guarding them, he did not also escape and even decided to take a nap as if it was the most natural thing to do at that time. Evidence is sufficient to prove the guilt of accused-appellants, De la Cruz and Martinez. Butas to the penalty, RA 9346 mandates that reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole should be imposed instead of the death penalty.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs JERRY SANTOS y MACOL and RAMON CATOC y PICAYO,Accused-Appellants. G.R. No. 176735 June 26, 2008

FACTS: The Pasig City Police conducted a buy-bust operation in a residential area along Dr. Sixto Antonio Avenue, Brgy. Rosario, Pasig City. It was based on the reports that a certain alias Monching Labo was selling illegal drugs in the said locality. The police team proceeded to the target area at around 1:15 to 1:20 am. PO3 Carlo Luna was to act as the poseur-buyer, whereas the other members of the team were to serve as his backup. Upon reaching the designated place, PO3 Luna and the informant alighted from their vehicle, while the rest of the team were left inside. The informant then pointed to two persons standing along the target area: Jerry Santos and Ramon Catoc y Picayo. The informant introduced PO3 Luna as a shabu customer. Santos in received the marked money from PO3 Luna and handing the same to appellant Catoc, who in turn gave a sachet containing shabu to appellant Santos to give the policeman; then the two accused were arrested. Afterwards, Santos and Catoc were brought to the Pasig City Police Station at Pariancillo Park, Pasig City, for proper investigation. Appellant Jerry Santos y Macol testified that at around 12:00 midnight to 1:00 a.m., while he was watching television at and was about to sleep, five male persons in civilian clothing suddenly entered and handcuffed him. Santos claimed that he voluntarily went with the men when they tried to arrest him because his ailing mother, who was then awakened, was already becoming nervous. Santos was brought outside and placed in a tricycle, and the entire group left for the police station. It was also at that time in the police station where he first met appellant Catoc. For his part, appellant Ramon Catoc y Picayo narrated that between the hours of 11:00 p.m. and 12:00 midnight, he awoke to a loud sound at the door of their house. When Catoc opened the door, five male persons with guns entered their house. The men frisked Catoc and searched his house. After being likewise awakened, Catocs mother asked the men what his sons fault was. They replied that they were looking for the drugs that Catoc was selling. When their search yielded nothing, the men mauled Catoc. Afterwards, Catoc was placed in a tricycle and the group headed for a gasoline station. There, Catoc was transferred to a parked van; inside the vehicle was appellant Jerry Santos y Macol, whom the former saw for the first time. ISSUE: Whether or not the conspiracy exist in this case. RULING: The conflicting testimony of the appellants did not help their case. What is quite important to note at this point is the fact that the defense failed to point out any single mistake or inconsistency in the testimonies of either policeman. There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The same degree of proof necessary to prove the crime is required to support a finding of criminal conspiracy. Direct proof, however, is not essential to show conspiracy. It need not be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a common design. Proof of concerted action before, during and after the crime, which demonstrates their unity of design and objective is sufficient. As correctly held by the trial court, the act of appellant Santos in receiving the marked money from PO3 Luna and handing the same to appellant Catoc, who in turn gave a sachet containing shabu to appellant Santos to give the policeman, unmistakably revealed a common purpose and a community of interest indicative of a conspiracy between the appellants. In light of the foregoing, we rule that the guilt of appellants Santos and Catoc has been established beyond reasonable doubt.

HAROLD V. TAMARGO, vs ROMULO AWINGAN, LLOYD ANTIPORDA and LICERIO ANTIPORDA, JR., GR No. 177727 JAN. 19, 2010

FACTS: Atty. Franklin V. Tamargo and eight-year-old daughter, Gail Franzielle, were shot and killed. Reynaldo Geron executed an affidavit and states that a certain Lucio Columna told him during a drinking spree that Tamargo was ordered killed by respondent Lloyd Antiporda and that Columna was the one who did the killing. Columna admitted his participation as "look out" during the shooting and implicated respondent Romulo Awingan as the gunman and one Richard Mecate. He also tagged as masterminds respondent Licerio Antiporda, Jr. and his son, Lloyd Antiporda. When the killing took place, Licerio Antiporda was in detention for a kidnapping case in which Atty. Tamargo was acting as private prosecutor. Licerio presented Columna’s unsolicited handwritten letter to respondent Lloyd, sent from Columna’s jail. In the letter, Columna disowned the contents of his affidavit and narrated how he had been tortured until he signed the extrajudicial confession. He stated that those he implicated had no participation in the killings. Licerio also submitted an affidavit of Columna dated wherein the latter essentially repeated the statements in his handwritten letter. Columna categorically admitted the authorship and voluntariness of the unsolicited letter. He affirmed the affidavit and denied that any violence had been employed to obtain or extract the affidavit from him. In another handwritten letter, Columna said that he was only forced to withdraw all his statements against respondents during the clarificatory hearing because of the threats to his life inside the jail. ISSUE: Whether or not Columna’s extrajudicial confession in his affidavit is admissible as evidence against respondents in view of the rule on res inter alios acta. RULING: Columna’s extrajudicial confession in his March 8, 2004, affidavit was not admissible as evidence against respondents in view of the rule on res inter alios acta. The rule on res inter alios acta provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-accused and is considered as hearsay against them. An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under Section 30 Rule 130 of the Rules of Court: Admission by conspirator. — The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. _____________________________________________________________________________________ CONFESSION is an acknowledgment in express words, by the accused in a criminal case, of the truth of the offense charged, or of some essential parts thereof. To be valid, confessions must be voluntarily and freely made. ➢ Exceptions to the rule that confessions of an accused may be given in evidence against him and incompetent against his co-accused: a) When several accused are tried together, confession made by one of them during the trial implicating the others is evidence against the latter. b) When one of the defendants is discharged from the information and testifies as a witness for the prosecution, the confession made in the course of his testimony is admissible against his co- defendants, if corroborated by indisputable proof. c) If a defendant after having been apprised of the confession of his co-defendant ratifies or confirms said confession, the same is admissible against him. d) Interlocking confessions -- Where several extra-judicial confessions had been made by several persons charged with an offense and there could have been no collusion with reference to said several confessions, the facts that the statements therein are in all material respects identical, is confirmatory of the confession of the co-defendant, and is admissible against his other co-defendants. e) A statement made by one defendant after his arrest, in the presence of this co-defendant, confessing his guilt and implicating his co-defendant who failed to contradict or deny it, is admissible against his co-defendant. f) When the confession is of a conspirator and made after conspiracy in furtherance of its object, the same is admissible against his coconspirator; and g) The confession of one conspirator made after the termination of a conspiracy is admissible against his co-conspirator if made in his presence and assented to by him, or admitted its truth or failed to contradict or deny it.

A dmission By Privies ELADIO ALPUERTO, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE PEREZ PASTOR and MANUEL ROA, provincial sheriff of Cebu, defendants-appellants. G.R. No. L-12794 October 14, 1918

FACTS: The three parcels of real property which constitutes the subject matter of the contention in this case formerly belonged to Juan Llenos, and both the interested parties in this action claim titled under, the plaintiff as party in possession under a contract of sale with pacto de retro, and the defendant as purchaser at a public sale under an execution directed against Llenos. The plaintiff, Eladio Alpuerto, asks the court to make a declaration against the defendant, Jose Perez Pastor, to the effect that the plaintiff is the owner thereof in full and absolute dominion. He also prays that the sale of the property effected by the sheriff, Manuel Roa, to said defendant be declared null. The defendant Pastor denies the right of the plaintiff to the relief sought, and asserts that the transaction by which the plaintiff claims to have acquired titled was simulated or fictitious and that the supposed conveyance was effected for the purpose of defrauding the defendant as creditor of Juan Llenos. This defendant therefore in turn prays the court to declare that he himself is the true owner of the property and that a judgment be entered condemning the plaintiff to surrender possession to him. From a judgment entered in the Court of First Instance of Cebu in favor of the plaintiff, the defendants have appealed. ISSUE: Whether or not a privy is bound to a transaction. RULING: Yes. At the time of the supposed sale to Eladio Alpuerto there had been pending for nearly two years, in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, an action in which Jose Perez Pastor was plaintiff and Juan Llenos was defendant. In this action the plaintiff sought to recover from Juan Llenos a considerable sum of money; and Eladio Alpuerto, as son-in-law of Juan Llenos, was aware of this litigation from the beginning. On January 27, 1913, or about six months after the alleged sale of the property in question to Eladio Alpuerto judgment was rendered in said action in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P3,789.13, with interest and costs. This judgment was affirmed upon appeal to the Supreme Court on November 20, 1914. An execution was thereafter issued on April 12, 1915, from the Court of First Instance upon said judgment was levied upon the property in question as the property of Juan Llenos. Before the sale was effected the plaintiff herein, Eladio Alpuerto, notified the sheriff that he claimed the property as his own. Nevertheless, the sheriff proceeded under indemnification and sold the property at public sale to Jose Perez Pastor for the sum of P1,100. The argument against the validity of the conveyance from Juan Llenos to Eladio Alpuerto is based on two propositions, namely: (1) that said conveyance must, under the second paragraph of article 1297, in connection with article 1227, of the Civil Code, be presumed to be fraudulent; and (2) that furthermore is shown by the evidence to have been fraudulent in fact. Concerning the meaning of the expression "privies" (causabientes), in this article, the following passage is found in the Commentary of Manresa: The said word denotes the idea of succession, not only be right of heirship and testamentary legacy, but also that of succession by singular title, derived from acts inter vivos, and for special purposes; hence, an assignee of a credit, and one subrogated to it, etc., will be privies; in short, he, who by succession is placed in the position of one of those who contracted the juridical relation and executed the private document and appears to be substituting him in his personal rights and obligations, is a privy. (Manresa, Codigo Civil, pp. 492 and 492.) Under the interpretation thus placed upon the meaning of the term "privies", it is clear that Jose Perez Pastor, the purchaser at the public sale under an execution directed against Juan Llenos, must be considered a privy or successor in interest of the execution debtor. He is therefore undoubtedly bound by the instrument which conveyed the property to Eladio Alpuerto — and this from the date of the execution

of that instrument as a private document-unless this result is prohibited by article 1227 of the Civil Code, which reads as follows: The date of a private instrument shall be considered, with regard to third persons, only from the date on which it may have been filed or entered in a public registry, from the date on which it may have been delivered to a public official by virtue of his office. In considering this article it is important to bear in mind that it has reference merely to the probative value of the document with respect to the date of its execution, and is not intended to lay down any rule concerning the efficacy of the act or acts evidenced by the document. (Manresa, Codigo Civil, vol. 8, p. 501.) The importance of the rule here declared is therefore most conspicuously revealed in the situation where the document itself contains the only competent evidence before the court bearing upon the date upon which the instrument in question was executed as a private document. _____________________________________________________________________________________ CITY OF MANILA, petitioner; vs. JACINTO DEL ROSARIO, respondent. 5 Phil. 227

1905

FACTS: This is an action to recover the possession of the 2 lots described in the complaint, located in Calles Clavel and Barcelona, district of Tondo, at present occupied by Del Rosario. At the trial, after City of Manila rested, Del Rosario moved for the dismissal of the case upon the ground that City of Manila had failed to establish the allegations in the complaint. CFI of Manila entered judgment in favor of the City of Manila and against Del Rosario for possession and damages in the sum of $2,500, United States currency, and costs. This was overruled by the court, to which ruling Del Rosario duly excepted. Del Rosario now puts in issue the trial court's finding that City of Manila was entitled to the ownership and possession of the land in question. ISSUE: Whether or not the City of Manila was entitled to the ownership and possession of the land in question. RULING: No. The Court scrutinized and struck out documentary and oral evidence presented by the City of Manila. The City of Manila introduced both documentary and oral evidence which failed to establish the allegations in the complaint. The testimony of Villegas was merely hearsay. It consisted of what he had learned from some of the oldest residents in that section of the city. His testimony was introduced by City of Manila apparently for the purpose of proving that the city was generally considered the owner of the land, drawing from this fact the presumption of actual ownership under paragraph 11, section 334, of the Code of Civil Procedure. Such testimony, however, does not constitute the "common reputation" referred to in the section mentioned. "Common reputation," as used in that section, is equivalent to universal reputation. The testimony of this witness is not sufficient to establish the presumption referred to. From the foregoing it appears that the evidence introduced by City of Manila does not prove its claim of title to the land in question. Neither the testimony of the witnesses presented by City of Manila nor the documentary evidence introduced show that the City of Manila is the owner of the land, or that it has a right to its possession as claimed in the complaint. Some of the documents introduced, as well as the two public instruments referred to as having been executed in 1900, tended to support the contentions of Del Rosario rather than those of City of Manila. The City of Manila itself admits in the complaint that Del Rosario's possession of the land in Calle Barcelona was recorded since March, 1901, and his possession of that in Calle Clavel since February, 1893. This shows that Del Rosario had been in the adverse possession of the land. According to article 448 of the Civil Code he must be presumed to hold under a just title, unless the contrary is shown.

Confessions People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellant vs. Marlo Compil, accused-appellant 244 SCRA 135 (1995)

FACTS: Respondent was convicted of Robbery with Homicide after he, together with his co-accused, robbed MJ Furniture’s in Sta. Cruz, Manila and leaving Manuel Jay killed as a consequence of the robbery. Several days after the incident, respondent was caught in Quezon Province by the police authorities. He was found lying on the couch and was immediately frisked and placed under arrest. According to Jenelyn, the wife of the deceased Manuel Jay, respondent turned pale and became speechless and was trembling. However, after gaining composure & upon being interrogated, he readily admitted his guilt. He was then brought to the Tayabas Police Station where he was further investigated. On their way back to Manila, he was again interrogated until he confessed his involvement in the crime. The day after his arrest, respondent, after conferring with CLOA lawyer Claroz and in the presence of his sister Leticia, executed a sworn statement admitting his participation as a lookout in the crime. ISSUE: Whether or not there was violation of his Miranda Rights which will render his extrajudicial confession inadmissible. RULING: Yes. It is evident that the respondent was immediately subjected to an interrogation upon his arrest in Quezon Province. And the same goes upon his transfer from Tayabas to Manila Police Station. The arresting officers already elicited incriminating questions and he confessed to the commission of the crime and admitted his participation. All these, he was not assisted by counsel. The belated arrival of the CLOA Lawyer the following day will not cure the defect even if the actual signing of the uncounseled confession was made in the presence of the counsel. The operative act is that when the police investigation is no longer asking a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect who has been taken into custody by the police to carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, and not the signing of the extrajudicial confession. But the court still finds other sufficient factual circumstances to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. _____________________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee vs WONG CHUEN MING, AU WING CHEUNG, TAN SOI TEE, LIM CHAN FATT, CHIN KOK WEE, CHIN KIN YONG, YAP BOON AH, CHIN KONG SONG, CHIN KIN FAH, CHAI MIN HUWA, and LIM NYUK SUN, accused-appellants G.R. Nos. 112801-1. April 12, 1996

FACTS: All the accused was charged with violation or RA 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. When they arrived at the airport, 34.5 kg of Shabu was found in their possession. The officers then made them sign the boxes containing the shabu. ISSUE: Whether the boxes containing shabu, signed by the accused is admissible in evidence. RULING: NO. The Court holds that the signatures of accused on the boxes, as well as on the plastic bags containing "shabu", are inadmissible in evidence. A careful study of the records reveals that accused were never informed of their fundamental rights during the entire time that they were under investigation.

When they were made to affix their signatures on the boxes of Alpen Cereals while they were at the NAIA and again at Camp Crame, accused were not informed of their Miranda Rrights, such as the right to remain silent, right to counsel and that any statement they might make could be used against them. By affixing their signatures on the boxes and on the plastic bags, accused in effect made a tacit admission of the crime charged for mere possession of "shabu" is punished by law. These signatures of accused are tantamount to an uncounselled extra-judicial confession which is not sanctioned by the Bill of Rights. They are, therefore, inadmissible as evidence for any admission wrung from the accused in violation of their constitutional rights is inadmissible against them. The fact that all accused are foreign nationals does not preclude application of the "exclusionary rule" because the constitutional guarantees embodied in the Bill of Rights are given and extend to all persons, both aliens and citizens. _____________________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RAMIRO ALEGRE y CERDONCILLO, MARIO COMAYAS y CUDILLAN, MELECIO CUDILLAN y ARCILLAS, and JESUS MEDALLA y CUDILLAN, defendants-appellants. G.R. No. L-30423 November 7, 1979

FACTS: The case arose from the death of Adelina Sajoa spinster, 57 years old, whose body was found in her bathroom inside her house. Her bedroom was in "shambles," evidently indicating that it was ransacked. Appellant Ramiro Alegre, who was then living with relatives in one of the rented rooms on the ground floor of the victim's house, was taken to the Pasay City police headquarters for investigation in connection with the case, but was later released that same day for lack of any evidence implicating him in the crime. Melecio Cudillan was apprehended in Tacloban City, Leyte, in the act of pawning a bracelet, one of the pieces of jewelry taken from the victim. In explaining how he came into possession of the stolen pieces of jewelry, he admitted his participation in the killing and robbery of Adlina Sajo. This appears in his extrajudicial confession before the police authorities of Tacloban. This was his first extrajudicial admission. Second admission was made in Pasay wherein he named his companions in the killing; Alegre, Medalla and Comaya. The prosecution presented SGT. Marianao Isla of the Pasay City Police who testified that when he was investigating Cudillan, he pointed out Alegre, Medalla and Comaya and said nothing. ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged silence of the accused when allegedly pointed to by Cudillan as his companions in the commission of the crime, is an admission of guilt. RULING: No, the silence of an accused or his refusal to testify may not be taken in evidence against him, and that he may refuse to refuse to answer an incriminating question. While an accused is in custody, his silence may not be taken in evidence again him as he has right to remain silent, his silence when in custody may not be used as evidence against him. Thus, silence of an accused under custody, or his failure to deny statements by another implicating him a crime; especially when such accused is neither asked to comment or reply to such implications or accusations; cannot be considered a tacit confession of his participation in a commission of the crime. Such an inference of acquiescence drawn from silence or failure to deny the statement would appear incompatible with the right of an accused against selfincrimination.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. YIP WAI MING, accused-appellant. G.R. No. 120959. November 14, 1996

FACTS: Yip Wai Ming and victim Lam Po Chun, both Hongkong nationals, came to Manila on vacation. The two were engaged to be married. On July 11 1993 Lam Po Chun was brutally beaten up and strangled to death in their hotel room. Yip Wai Ming, was touring Metro Manila with Filipino welcomers while Lam Po Chun was left in the hotel room allegedly because she had a headache and was not feeling well enough to do the sights. The RTC ruled that that Yip Wai Ming killed his fiancee before he left for the Metro Manila tour. There was no eyewitness to the actual killing of Lam Po Chun. All the evidence about the killing is circumstantial. Yip Wai Ming admitted to the crime charged and participated in a reenactment, and signed an extrajudicial statement, but he contends that this was under duress because the police men beat him up to obtain such confession. ISSUE: Whether or not the confession of Yip Wai Ming is admissible as evidence RULING: The court ruled in the negative. He was not informed of his right to remain silent nor did he have counsel of his choice to assist him in confessing the crime. The custodial interrogation of accusedappellant was violative of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. The Constitution provides that (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this section or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible against him. Section 17, Article III provides: No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any confession, including a re-enactment without admonition of the right to silence and to counsel, and without counsel chosen by the accused is inadmissible in evidence. The degree of intimidation needed to coerce a person to confess to the commission of a crime he did not commit would be much less if he is in a strange land. Accused-appellant states that his lawyers told him not to file any charges against the policemen. He followed their advice, obviously not wanting to get into more trouble. The desire of a police officer to solve a high profile crime which could mean a promotion or additional medals and commendations is admirable. However, an investigator must pursue various leads and hypotheses instead of singlemindedly pursuing one suspect and limiting his investigation to that one possibility, excluding various other probabilities. The killing of a tourist is a blot on the peace and order situation in the Philippines and must be solved. Still, concentrating on pinning down an alien companion of the victim and not pursuing the possibilities that other persons could have killed the victim for her money and valuables does not speak well of our crime detection system. It is not enough to solve a crime. The truth is more important and justice must be rendered. _____________________________________________________________________________________ PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs HECTOR MAQUEDA, Accused-Appelant 242 SCRA 565

FACTS: British Horace William Barker was slain inside his house in Tuba, Benguet while his Filipino wife, Teresita Mendoza was badly beaten with lead pipes on the occasion of a robbery. Their two household helpers testified and identified Rene Salvamante who was a former houseboy of the spouses Barker and Hector Maqueda as the robbers. Two other persons testified seeing the two accused person walking a kilometer away from the house of the victims.

The two accused asked them for directions implying that they were not familiar of the place. While Rene Salvamante still remains at large, Hector Maqueda was soon caught and arrested by the authorities in Guinyangan, Quezon. He was then taken to Caluag, Quezon where he then signed a SinumpaangSalaysay wherein he stated his participation in the crime. Before signing the document, SPO3 Molleno informed Maqueda of his constutional rights. He was then brought to the Benguet Provincial Jail. While under detention, Maqueda then filed a motion for bail. He stated that he is willing and volunteering to be a state witness in the above entitled case because he contemplates that he was the least guilty among the accused in this case. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the Sinumpaang salaysay made by Maqueda is an extrajudicial confession. 2. Whether or not the trial court was correct in holding that the Sinumpaang salaysay is admissible as evidence. RULING: 1. No. A perusal of the Sinumpaang Salaysay fails to convince us that it is an extrajudicial confession. It is only an extrajudicial admission. In a confession, there is an acknowledgement of guilt. The term admission is usually applied in criminal cases to statements of fact by the accused which do not directly involve an acknowledgement of his guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is charged. 2. No. The Sinumpaang salaysay is inadmissible in evidence because it was in clear violation of the constitutional rights of the accused. First he was not informed of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel. Second, he cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself. ____________________________________________________________________________________ Parker v. Randolph 442 U.S. 62 (1979)

FACTS: Respondents were convicted, after a joint trial in a Tennessee court, of murder committed during the commission of a robbery. None of the respondents took the witness stand, and their oral confessions, found by the trial court to have been freely and voluntarily given, were admitted into evidence through police officers' testimony. Respondent Pickens' written confession was also admitted into evidence over his objection that it had been obtained in violation of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona. The trial court instructed the jury that each confession could be used only against the defendant who gave it and could not be considered as evidence of a codefendant's guilt. Ultimately, the Tennessee Supreme Court upheld the convictions, holding that admission of respondents' confessions did not violate the rule of Bruton v. United States, which held that a defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment were violated by the admission, at a joint trial, of the confession of a co-defendant who did not take the stand. Respondents subsequently obtained writs of habeas corpus in a Federal District Court, which held that respondents' rights under Bruton had been violated, and that introduction of respondent Pickens' written confession had violated his rights under Miranda. The Court of Appeals affirmed. ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment were violated by the admission of his co-defendant. RULING: Yes. Introduction at a joint trial of a non-testifying codefendant's confession had a "devastating" effect on the non-confessing defendant's case. Introduction of such incriminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant will seldom, if ever, have the same "devastating" consequences to a defendant who has himself confessed. The constitutional right of cross-examination protected by Bruton has far less practical value to a defendant who has confessed to the crime than to one who has consistently maintained his innocence. The Confrontation Clause does not bar admission into evidence of every relevant extrajudicial statement by a non-testifying

declarant simply because it in some way incriminates the defendant. And an instruction directing the jury to consider a codefendant's extrajudicial statement only against its source is generally sufficient to avoid offending the implicated defendant's confrontation right. _____________________________________________________________________________________ PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. JERRY RAPEZA y FRANCISCO, Appellant. G.R. No. 169431 April 3, 2007 [Formerly G.R. Nos. 149891-92]

FACTS: Rapeza together with Regino were charged with the murder of the spouses Cesar Ganzon and Priscilla Libas. Information narrates that the accused conspired, confederating together and mutually helped each other, with evident premeditation, treachery and abuse of superior strength and feloniously attacked and killed with bladed weapons the victims. Regino was at large, so Rapeza was the only one arraigned and pleaded not guilty. The RTC held that the accused is guilty with conspiracy. Case was elevated to the CA for review but RTC was affirmed. Rapeza testified that he did not know the victims and that he has nothing to do with their deaths. Rapeza is a native of Samar, illiterate and was staying with Regino in Regino's house, 40 meters away from the victims' house.Several days after Rapeza's arrival, the killings took place. Rapeza,, along with Regino and Macabili was asked by the police officer to help load the bodies of the victims kn a banca. Shortly, Rapeza was arrested and brought to the municipal hall. Regino too was arrested with him. While in detention, Rapeza told the police that it was Regino who did the killing but the police did not believe him. Rapeza was told to sign a certain document for his release. Because Rapeza cannot sign, the officer took his thumb, dipped it in ink and marked it on the document. Rapeza denied going to the house of Atty. Reyes or meeting the alleged interpreter. When he was brought to the MTC, the counsel did not assist him, he was later brought to a hut in the mountain where he was told to go farther, which he refused for fear of being shot. On the basis of appellant's extrajudicial confession, the RTC found him guilty. ISSUES: Whether or not the accused guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt RULING: There is no direct evidence of appellant’s guilt except for the alleged confession and the corpus delicti. Upon careful examination of the alleged confession and the testimony of the witnesses, we hold that the alleged confession is inadmissible and must perforce be discarded. Thus, the Court has consistently held that an extrajudicial confession, to be admissible, must conform to the following requisites: 1) the confession must be voluntary; 2) the confession must be made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel, preferably of the confessant’s choice; 3) the confession must be express; and 4) the confession must be in writing. In order to comply with the constitutional mandates, there should likewise be meaningful communication to and understanding of his rights by the appellant, as opposed to a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital thereof. Since comprehension is the objective, the degree of explanation required will necessarily depend on the education, intelligence, and other relevant personal circumstances of the person undergoing investigation. In this case, it was established that at the time of the investigation appellant was illiterate and was not well versed in Tagalog. This fact should engender a higher degree of scrutiny in determining whether he understood his rights as allegedly communicated to him, as well as the contents of his alleged confession. The extra-judicial confession was allegedly made in Tagalog when accused-appellant is admittedly not well versed in said language. Even if the confession was made in the presence of an interpreter, there is no showing that the rights of a person under investigation were effectively explained and/or interpreted to accused-appellant. The interpreter was not even presented in Court to prove that said rights were translated in a language understood by accused-appellant.

Conduct and Character as Evidence UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SANTIAGO PINEDA, defendant-appellant. GR No. L-12858

FACTS: Feliciano Santos bought medicine for his sick horses from the drug store owned by Santiago Pineda. However, the horses died shortly after the administration of the medicine. This prompted Santos to take the remaining packages to the Bureau of Science for investigation. Drs. Pena and Darjuan conducted the examination and discovered that the packages contained barium chlorate instead of potassium chlorate. They also went to Pineda’s drug store but was similarly given potassium chlorate. During the trial, both Pena and Darjuan testified as to the negligence of Santiago Pineda. ISSUE: Whether or not the testimonies of Drs. Pena and Darjuan are admissible? RULING: The testimonies are admissible. As a general rule, the evidence of other offenses committed by a defendant is inadmissible. But appellant has confused this maxim and this rule with certain exceptions thereto. The effort is not to convict the accused of a second offense. Nor is there an attempt to draw the mind away from the point at issue and thus to prejudice defendant's case. The purpose is to ascertain defendant's knowledge and intent, and to fix his negligence. If the defendant has on more than one occasion performed similar acts, accident in good faith is possibly excluded, negligence is intensified, and fraudulent intent may even be established. It has been said that there is no better evidence of negligence than the frequency of accidents. On the trial of a criminal case the question relates to the tendency of certain testimony to throw light upon a particular fact, or to explain the conduct of a particular person, there is a certain discretion on the part of the trial judge which a court of errors will not interfere with, unless it manifestly appear that the testimony has no legitimate bearing upon the question at issue, and is calculated to prejudice the accused. Whenever the necessity arises for a resort to circumstantial evidence, either from the nature of the inquiry or the failure of direct proof, objections to the testimony on the ground of irrelevancy are not favored. Evidence is admissible in a criminal action which tends to show motive, although it tends to prove the commission of another offense by the defendant. _____________________________________________________________________________________ PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. BENJAMIN IRANG, ET AL., Defendants. BENJAMIN IRANG, Appellant. G.R. No. L-45179,

March 30, 1937

FACTS: Benjamin Irang appeals the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of robbery with homicide. On November 2, 1935, between 7 and 8 pm, seven individuals with white stripes upon their faces, two of whom were armed with guns and two with bolos went to the house of spouses Perfecto Melocotones and MaximinianaVicente. Perfecto was attacked with bolos and died thereafter. The wife, who was struck in the face with the butt of a gun, regained consciousness and saw her husband already dead. Maximiniana, gave the money and jewelry ordered by one of the assailants, who she remembers to have pockmarks and a scar on the eyelid.

That same night, malefactors assaulted the house of Juana dela Cruz. All of the assailants had white stripes upon their faces and De la Cruz noticed that one of them had pockmarks and scar on the left eyelid and was dressed in a maong colored suit. With the description made by Maximiniana, the police arrested and presented a group of suspects. Benjamin Irang was identified by Maximiniana to be the one who struck her. Irang was also identified by De la Cruz. It was alleged that the accused made an affidavit in Tagalog wherein he admitted participation in the robbery after being coerced by a certain Fidel Estrella. The accused denied executing the affidavit, and said that the contents thereof are not true and that the soldiers maltreated him. Accused raises alibi as his defense, saying that at the time of the commission of the crime, he was in his rice field. ISSUE: Whether or not BenjaminIrang was correctly identified as one of the perpetrators. RULING: Yes, Irang was correctly identified as one of the perpetrators of the crime. The victim, Maximiniana, gave a description of one of the assailants, and on the basis thereof, police presented three groups of persons. In the third group, the victim pointed at the accused as her assailant. The testimony of Dela Cruz corroborates Maximiniana’s testimony albeit indirectly that the man of the same description was the one who went to her house and demanded delivery of her money and jewelry. While evidence of another crime, as a general rule, is not admissible in a prosecution for robbery, it is admissible when it is otherwise relevant, as where it tends to identify defendant as the perpetrator of the robbery charged or tends to show his presence at the scene of the crime at the time charged, or when it is evidence of a circumstance connected with a crime. The court also found that the aforementioned testimonies were corroborated by the admission of the accused in his affidavit, which the Court found to have been made under oath. The affidavit can thus, be considered to have been made voluntarily; therefore, it is admissible against the person making it. Consequently, the defense of alibi cannot stand as it was contradicted by the testimony of Dela Cruz and the accusedappellant’s own admission under oath. _____________________________________________________________________________________ PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. GERONIMO SOLIMAN Y BUENAVENTURA alias EMONG and SOFRONIO PALIN Y PAZ alias POLONIO, Defendants-Appellants. G.R. No. L-9723, June 28, 1957

FACTS: At around 2:00 o’clock in the morning of April 29, 1955, the victim, Ernesto Basa, was sleeping in a pushcart along with Ernesto Balaktaw who was also sleeping in a box near the pushcart. After a short while, Balaktaw saw accused-appellants, Geronimo Soliman and Sofronio Palin, approached Basa, stabbed the latter with a balisong many times then, immediately ran away. Balaktaw brought Basa to the police station then subsequently to the hospital but the latter was pronounced dead. Soliman and Palin were charged with murder and were sentenced to suffer the extreme penalty of death. The two interposed self-defense as their main argument. Soliman insisted that he and the deceased, Basa, had a fight and in the course of which he stabbed the latter. The conviction was based mainly on the testimony of the eyewitness, Balaktaw, along with some circumstantial evidence. The court found his testimony credible because it was supported by the findings of Dr. Mariano Lara who conducted the autopsy on the body of the deceased especially with regard to the nature of the wounds suffered by the victim. The wounds were inflicted while the deceased was in a lying position, contrary to accused-appellants contention that the same were due to the struggle between Soliman and the deceased. However, the defense impugns the credibility of the eyewitness, Balaktaw, due to his prior criminal conviction. It also alleges that the deceased had a violent and quarrelsome character.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Ernesto Balaktaw’s prior criminal conviction is a ground to disqualify him as a witness in this case; and 2. Whether or not Ernesto Basa’s violent character may be taken as evidence to prove the probability or improbability of the crime charged. RULING: No, the fact that a person has been previously convicted of a crime does not necessarily disqualify him as a witness for he may still prove to be a truthful one. Anent the second issue, although good or bad character may tend to prove the probability or improbability of the offense charged, the same rule does not apply in cases of murder where the killing is committed through treachery and premeditation, as in this case. The proof of such character may be allowed only in homicide cases to show that it has produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a justifiable conviction that a prompt defensive action is necessary. This rule does not apply to cases of murder. Nevertheless, while the evidence is sufficient to convict both appellants of the crime charged, some members of the Court have expressed doubt in the propriety of imposing the extreme penalty of death. Thus, the Court resolved to impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua. _____________________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CLEMENTE BABIERA, JUSTO BABIERA and DOMINGA BORES, defendants-appellants. G.R. No. 28871

September 19, 1928

FACTS: Severino Haro had leased from Basilio Copreros two parcels of land the ownership of which had passed to him due to Justo Babiera's failure to repurchase them within the stipulated period. Nor is there any question that the latter tried to recover them, first, by an accion publiciana (action for unlawful detainer), and then by an action for the recovery of possession. There is likewise no question that Severino Haro paid the expenses of the defendant Basilio Copreros for the reason that he was already in possession of said lands as lessee. There is also no question that Clemente Babiera's cow damaged the plantings of Fermin Bruce, for which reason the letter caught said cow, tied it, and notified his master of the matter when the latter went to visit the lands leased by him. Neither is there any question that there was an agreement between Clemente Babiera and Severino Haro whereby the latter ordered his co-partner on shares Fermin Bruces, to take the cow near Clemente Babiera's house and tie it up there. In like manner there is no question that at about 7 o'clock in the evening of August 21, 1927, when Severino Haro and his companions were returning to the town of Oton, and upon their coming near Rosendo Paycol's house, in which were Clemente Babiera, his father Justo Babiera, and his mistress Dominga Bores, said Severino Haro had an encounter with Clemente Babiera in which Severino Haro received several wounds in consequence of which he died a week later in Saint Paul's Hospital of Iloilo. Severino Haro made a sworn statement before the deputy fiscal, relating the occurrence and mentioning the persons who were present. This sworn statement was ratified by him before the same deputy fiscal when he had given up all hope of recovery. It has been contended by the defense that the defendant-appellant, Clemente Babiera, only acted in defense of his life and property, having been obliged to resort to arms on seeing his life endangered, contending that the provocation consisted in that after Severino Haro had agreed to an indemnity of P2 for the damage caused, the latter wanted to take Clemente Babiera's cow to the town, and that the attack consisted in that Margarito Mediavilla gave him a bolo blow on the little finger of the right hand, and that Severino Haro threatened him with his revolver and fired several shots at him. The defense attempted also to prove that Severino Haro was of a quarrelsome disposition, provoking, irascible, and fond of starting quarrels in the municipality of Oton, but the trial judge would not permit it. ISSUE: Whether or not the presentation of evidence that the victim was of quarrelsome disposition admissible.

RULING: While it is true that when the defense of the accused is that he acted in self-defense, he may prove the deceased to have been of a quarrelsome, provoking and irascible disposition, the proof must be of his general reputation in the community and not of isolated and specific acts (Underhill Criminal Evidence, par. 325, p.570), such as the accused Clemente Babiera tried to prove, and hence the lower court did not err in not admitting such proof. But even if it had been proved by competent evidence that the deceased was of such a disposition, nevertheless, it would not have been sufficient to overthrow the conclusive proof that it was the said accused who treacherously attacked the deceased. _____________________________________________________________________________________ THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PIO MERCADO, TOMAS MERCADO, and CATALINO MERCADO, defendants-appellants 26 PHIL. 127 (1913)

FACTS: These defendants Pio Mercado, Tomas Mercado, and Catalino Mercado were charged with the crime of coaccion in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Bulacan for using force and violence on the person of Claro Mercado to prevent him from rendering aid to Maria Mateo, who was being maltreated by Santiago Mercado. During trial, Santiago Mercado was presented as a witness. He was asked how many times had he been convicted for assault. Tomas Mercado objected on the ground that the question was impertinent. The only argument which the appellant presents in support of his assignment of error is that the question had no relation to the question which was being discussed by the court and did not tend to show that the defendants were either guilty or not guilty of the crime charged; that questions tending to disclose the character of a witness are immaterial. ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in allowing the question to impugn the witness credibility. RULING: YES. Generally speaking, a witness cannot be impeached by the party against whom he has been called, except by showing a) that he has made contradictory statements or b) that his general reputation for truth, honesty or integrity is bad. In this case, the question propounded by the prosecution neither attempted to show that the witness made contradictory statements nor that his general reputation for honesty, truth or integrity is bad. Evidence may be presented that the witness had been convicted of a high crime. However, in this case, the offense Santiago Mercado was convicted of (assault and battery) is not a high crime. The objection of the defense should have been sustained. Whether the witness had been convicted of other crimes is of no matter to the present case. _____________________________________________________________________________________ CHARACTER EVIDENCE • Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions. – In Criminal Cases: • The accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged. • Unless in rebuttal, the prosecution may not prove his bad moral character which is pertinent it to the moral trait involved in the offense charged. • Note that in criminal cases, the prosecution goes first. Hence, it cannot present evidence on the bad moral character of the accused on its evidence in chief. • The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved if it tends to establish in any reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the offense charged. In Civil Cases: • Evidence of the moral character of a party in a civil case is admissible only when pertinent to the issue of character involved in the case.

A

witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal

knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules. (Sec. 36 Rule 130)

Hearsay Rule PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUAN BRIOSO and MARIANO TAEZA, defendants-appellants. G.R. No. L-28482 January 30, 1971

FACTS: Defendants Juan Brioso and Mariano Taeza, were charged with the crime of murder of Silvino Daria under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Cecilia Bernal, a niece and neighbor of the spouses, was alarmed by the barking of dogs. She peeped through a crack in the wall of her house and saw appellants herein pass southward in the direction of the house of Silvino Daria that was six meters away. Brioso was carrying a long gun. Her suspicions awakened, she went downstairs and, shielded by the fence, witnessed each appellant point a gun at the bamboo wall of Daria's house. Two detonations followed, and thereafter she heard Daria moaning and his wife call for help, saying her husband had been shot. Bernal went to the house and found the victim prostrate, wounded and unable to speak. The widow, however, testified that right after being shot, she rushed to her husband's side and he told her that he was shot by Juan Brioso and Mariano Taeza. Silvino Daria expired one hour later as a result of gunshot wounds in the abdomen and leg. A few days later, Cecilia Bernal and the widow, Susana Tumalip, executed affidavits pointing to the two accused as the killers. ISSUE: Whether the testimonial knowledge of the witness is sufficient to establish the facts of the case. RULING: Yes. We find no discrepancy in the testimony of Cecilia Bernal on the material points. The house of Cecilia Bernal was only six meters away from that of Silvino Daria's. The night was brightly illuminated by the moon. Cecilia Bernal had known both accused for a long time and it is admitted that they also know her. There could have been no difficulty in identifying the accused under the circumstances. Cecilia Bernal had no motive to impute falsely this heinous charge of murder against the abovesaid accused, considering that Mariano Taeza is a nephew of the deceased by a first degree cousin. Even Juan Brioso specifically said that he knew of no reason why she should testify against him. Hence, her statement that she came to court only to tell the truth should be believed. Moreover, the testimony of Cecilia Bernal finds corroboration in the declaration of the victim, who told his wife that it was Juan Brioso and Mariano Taeza who shot him. This statement does satisfy the requirements of an ante mortem statement. Judged by the nature and extent of his wounds, Silvino Daria must have realized the seriousness of his condition, and it can be safely inferred that he made the same under the consciousness of impending death, considering that he died only one hour after being shot.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. VICENTE N. CUSI JR., Presiding Judge, Branch I, Court of First Instance of Davao, ARCADIO PUESCA alias Big Boy, et al, respondents. 14 SCRA 944

1965

FACTS: Puesca, Apa, Gustilo, Macalinao, Dairo, and Montano were charged with robbery in band with homicide, to which they pleaded not guilty. While Sgt. Bano was testifying as prosecution witness regarding the extrajudicial confession made to him by Puesca, he said that the latter, aside from admitting his participation in the commission of the offense charged, revealed that other persons conspired with him to commit the offense, mentioning the name of each and every one of them. The prosecuting officer asked the witness to mention in court the names of Puesca's alleged coconspirators. Counsel for the accused Macalinao, Gustilo and Dairo objected to this, upon the ground that whatever the witness would say would be hearsay as far as his clients were concerned. The respondent judge resolved the objection directing the witness to answer the question but without mentioning or giving the names of the accused who had interposed the objection. The witness was allowed to answer the question and name his co-conspirators except those who had raised the objection. The prosecuting officer's motion for reconsideration of this ruling was denied. ISSUE: Whether or not Sgt. Bano have been allowed to answer the question in full. RULING: Yes. Hearsay evidence, if timely objected to, may not be admitted. But while the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another person, if intended to establish the truth of facts asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such statement (People vs. Lew Yon). In the present case, the purpose of the prosecuting officer is nothing more than to establish the fact that the accused Puesca had mentioned to Sgt. Bano the names of those who conspired with him to commit the offense charged, without claiming that Puesca's statement or the answer to be given by Sgt. Bano would be competent and admissible evidence to show that the persons so named really conspired with Puesca. The question propounded to the witness was proper and the latter should have been allowed to answer it in full, with the understanding, however, that his answer shall not to be taken as competent evidence to show that the persons named really and actually conspired with Puesca and later took part in the commission of the offense. _____________________________________________________________________________________ People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee vs. Nerio Gaddi y Catubay, defendant-appellant G.R. No. 74065 February 27, 1989

FACTS: The accused with intent to kill without any justifiable cause qualified with treachery and evidentpremeditation attack and employ personal force upon the person of one Augusto Esguerra y Navarro by stabbing him several times with a knife hitting him in the different parts of the body which were the direct and immediate cause of his death. After arraignment, wherein Gaddi pleaded not guilty, and Trial Judge Maximo Asuncion handed down a verdict of guilt for the crime charged. On appeal to this court, Gaddi assigns error of giving credence to the testimony of Guzman. Guzman testified that he saw Gaddi and the victim Augusto Esguerra drinking gin. In the morning of the following day, appellant told Ernesto Guzman that he killed his drinking partner Augusto Esguerra and dumped his body in a toilet pit. Guzman advised appellant to surrender to the police. After work, Guzman went to the police and reported what the appellant told him. ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in giving credence to the testimony of Guzman.

RULING: No. Proof that a person confessed to the commission of the crime can be presented in evidence without violating the hearsay rule which only prohibits testimonies as to those facts which he merely learned from other persons but not as those facts which he knows of his own knowledge that is which are derived from his own perception. A confession constitutes evidence of high order since it is supported by the strong presumption that no person of normal mind would knowingly and deliberately confessed to a crime unless prompted by truth and his conscience. While a testimony of a witness regarding the statement made by another person, if intended to establish the truth of the fact asserted in the statement is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement in the records is merely to establish the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such statement. When Guzman testified that the appellant who, probably bothered by his conscience, admitted the killing to him there was no violation of the hearsay rule as Guzman was testifying to a fact which he knows of his personal knowledge. _____________________________________________________________________________________ Leake, plaintiff-appellant vs Hagert, defendant-respondent 175 N.W.2d 675 1970

FACTS: Leake was driving his tractor when Hagert bumped the rear of his tractor hitting the plow being towed. Leake sued Hagert for negligence. Hagert filed a counter-claim alleging that it was Leake who was negligent. During the trial, the Court admitted the testimony of Gros, an investigator who claims that he spoke to the son of Leake and told him that the rear red light of the tractor was broken for some time already. ISSUE: Whether the testimony given by Gros is admissible as evidence. RULING: No. According to the rules, any person who offers his testimony must have personal knowledge of the same. In this case Gros did not have personal knowledge of the alleged broken red light of the tractor. He merely relied on the alleged testimony given by the son of Leake. Thus the testimonial evidence given by Gros constitute as hearsay and is not admissible as evidence. _____________________________________________________________________________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, vs ALBERT CHARLES ZENNI, JR., ET AL., Defendants, 492 F. Supp. 464

July 3, 1980

Brief Fact Summary. During a lawful search for evidence of illegal bookmaking activity, conducted pursuant to a valid search warrant, law enforcement answered the phone several times. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Implied assertions, though they were considered hearsay at common law, are not considered hearsay under F.R.E 801 because they are not assertions, but non-assertive verbal conduct. FACTS: During a lawful search for evidence of illegal bookmaking activity, conducted pursuant to a valid search warrant, law enforcement answered the phone several times. They seek to introduce evidence that individuals who called during that time placed bets, and thus believed that the premises was used for such purposes, and was thus likely used for such a purpose.

ISSUE: Whether implied assertions are hearsay? RULING: No. To be hearsay an assertion must be made, and in this case the statements made by the gamblers on the telephone were non assertive verbal conduct. They were not made to prove that the place they were calling was a bookmaking establishment, but simply made to place bets. DISCUSSION: The dangers inherent in hearsay do not exist in the context of non-assertive verbal conduct, or implied assertions. The declarant’s veracity is not at issue, and so one of the reasons that it is so important to have an out of court declarant available for cross examination is not present. The statement was not made to show the truth or falsity of something, and so the veracity is not in issue. _____________________________________________________________________________________ PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff/Appellee, vs. ROLANDO "Botong" MALIBIRAN Accused, and BEVERLY TIBO-TAN, Accused/Appellant. G.R. No. 178301 April 24, 2009

FACTS: In 1995 Reynaldo Tan and Beverly Tan were Greenhills with their children for their usual Sunday gallivant. Later the family stepped out of the shopping mall and Reynaldo proceeded to the parking lot to get his red Honda Accord, while the rest of his family stayed behind and waited. An explosion was heard, in the direction where Reynaldo car was park. They saw the car was burning, and Reynaldo badly injured, which later died because of the injuries sustained in the explosion. A case was filed against Beverly Tan, Rolandon Malibaran and 3 others of a crime of Parricide and murder respectively. One of the co accused Oswaldo Banaag was later discharged and utilized as one of the prosecution witnesses. Which he stated that, he overheard a conversation between Rolando and appellant that they would fetch a man in Bulacan who knew how to place a bomb in a vehicle. Janet Pascual a friend of Beverly tan also testified that as to when the killing would take place, she heard that they will do it during the baptism of the child of Gloria, Rolando Malibiran’s sister. The RTC convicted the accused of the crime charged and impose the maximum penalty, which is Death sentence. The CA affirmed the decision with Modification in that the supreme penalty of death imposed on both accused-appellants is hereby reduced to RECLUSION PERPETUA. ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of Oswaldo Banaag and Janet Pascual should be classified as hearsay and should not be accepted as Evidence. RULING: NO. Contrary to the claim of appellant, the testimonies of Oswaldo and Janet are not covered by the hearsay rule. The hearsay rule states that a witness may not testify as to what he merely learned from others either because he was told, or he read or heard the same. This is derived from Section 36, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court, which requires that a witness can testify only to those facts that he knows of or comes from his personal knowledge, that is, that are derived from his perception. The law, however, provides for specific exceptions to the hearsay rule. One is the doctrine of independently relevant statements, where only the fact that such statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial. The hearsay rule does not apply; hence, the statements are admissible as evidence. In this case, Oswaldo's testimony that he overhead a conversation between Rolando and appellant that they would fetch a man in Bulacan who knew how to place a bomb in a vehicle is admissible, if only to establish the fact that such statement was made and the tenor thereof. Likewise, Janet may testify on matters not only uttered in her presence, since these may be considered as independently relevant

statements, but also personally conveyed to her by appellant and Rolando. The testimony of Janet as corroborated by Oswaldo, though circumstantial, leaves no doubt that appellant had in fact conspired with Rolando in bringing about the death of her husband Reynaldo. Circumstantial evidence suffices to convict, only if the following requisites concur: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. _____________________________________________________________________________________ RESORTS HOTEL CORPORATION, RODOLFO M. CUENCA & CUENCA INVESTMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners, vs DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES & SM INVESTMENT CORPORATION, Respondents, G.R. No. 180439

FACTS: Resorts Hotel Corporation (RHC) was the previous owner and operator of several hotels located outside Metro Manila; namely Baguio Pines Hotel in Baguio City, Taal Vista Lodge Hotel in Tagaytay City, and Hotel Mindanao in Cagayan de Oro City. Among RHC’s stockholders were Cuenca Investment Corporation and Rodolfo Cuenca, who was also the President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the said Corporation. On the other hand, Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) was RHC’s major creditor that eventually foreclosed the disputed hotels upon the latter’s default. SM Investment Corporation (SMIC) was the subsequent owner of Taal Vista Lodge Hotel and Baguio Pines Hotel. It appears that from 1969 up to 1981, RHC obtained from DBP several loans, aggregating approximately P157 million, for the purpose of expanding hotel capacities, operations and services nationwide. To secure payment of these loans, RHC executed real estate mortgages in favor of DBP covering all the properties mentioned herein. When the loans become due and demandable, RHC failed to pay. RHC proposed to DBP that part of its obligations be converted into equity inasmuch as it was experiencing financial difficulties. DBP subsequently acceded. With the approval of the Board of Directors of RHC, which was then headed by its Chairman, Rodolfo Cuenca, DBP obtained shareholdings, equivalent to 55% of RHC’s total stockholders’ equity, in exchange for the reduction of RHC’s obligation to DBP by as much as P47 million. As a result of the debt-to-equity conversion, DBP acquired two board seats in the eleven-member Board of Directors of RHC. Then DBP applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate and chattel mortgages pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 385, intending to block the impending foreclosure, RHC filed a complaint against DBP. During the hearing, RHC presented as witnesses Bayani Santos, the Senior Manager of DBP, Roberto Cuenca and his father, Rodolfo Cuenca they testified against the invalidity of the foreclosure proceedings ISSUE: Whether or not the testimonies of both Rodolfo and Roberto Cuenca sufficient to successfully challenge the validity of the foreclosure proceedings for alleged non-compliance with the notice, posting and publication requirements provided in Act No. 3135. RULING: No. We are in complete accord with the appellate court’s ruling that the dearth of evidence presented by petitioners inevitably failed to establish their claim that DBP did not comply with the statutory requirements on extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages. The CA had ruled and agreed that the testimonies of Rodolfo and Roberto Cuenca with respect to the absences of posting and publication of notices of foreclosure sale, consisting in the words I don’t believe, I don’t remember, I don’t think and If I recall, without being supported by any convincing and substantial evidence, were not sufficient to prove lack of compliance on the part of DBP with the requirements of notice, posting and publication prescribed in Act. No. 3135.

E xceptions to the Hearsay Rule – Dying Declaration THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GREGORIO LAQUINON, alias "JOLLY", defendant-appellant. G.R. No. L-45470 February 28, 1985

FACTS: On November 13, 1972, at about 11:30 o'clock in the evening, Samama Buat, Barrio captain of Clib, Hagonoy, Davao del Sur, was at his residence in Barrio Clib. In a short while he heard gunshots coming from the bank of a river some three hundred meters to the south of his house. Then, his brother, LeocarioBuat, arrived and told him that a man was shouting for help at the bank of the river. Samama Buat told his brother to call the barrio councilman. Thereafter, he proceeded to the place where the unidentified man was. His brother, Leocario and the barrio councilman also arrived there. Samama Buat found the man lying on the sand and asked who he was. The man answered, "I am Pablo Remonde". Remonde's two hands were tied on his back. He was lying face down. Samama Buat then took the "ante mortem" statement of Pablo Remonde. He asked him who he was to which he answered that he was Pablo Remonde. Samama Buat asked "who shot you" and Remonde said that it was Gregorio Laquinon. He asked Pablo Remonde whether from the gunshot wounds he suffered he would survive to which the victim answered "I do not know". After that, barrio captain Buat went to the municipality of Hagonoy and reported to Vice Mayor Antonio Biran the shooting of Pablo Remonde. Vice Mayor Biran went to the scene of the incident and asked the victim who shot him to which the latter answered that he was shot by Gregorio. Pablo Remonde was placed on a jeep of the Vice Mayor and brought to the hospital. Pablo Remonde was admitted to the Canos Hospital in Digos, Davao del Sur where he was attended to by Dr. Alfonso Llanos. Dr. Llanos performed an operation on the victim from whose body a slug was recovered. The accused Gregorio Laquinon denied having killed the deceased. ISSUE: Whether or not the victim’s ante-mortem declaration shall be admissible as evidence. RULING: No. It cannot be admitted as a dying declaration under the rules on evidence. The dying declaration of the deceased Pablo Remonde is not admissible as an ante-mortem declaration since the deceased was in doubt as to whether he would die or not. The declaration fails to show that the deceased believed himself in extremist, "at the point of death when every hope of recovery is extinct, which is the sole basis for admitting this kind of declarations as an exception to the hearsay rule." It may be admitted, however, as part of the res gestae since the statement was made immediately after the incident and the deceased Pablo Remonde had no sufficient time to concoct a charge against the accused. _____________________________________________________________________________________ PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, vs. RODULFO SABIO, alias "PAPU", defendant. G.R. No. L-26193 January 27, 1981

FACTS: Catalino Espina, 80-years old, single, owner of a small sari-sari store located in his house was found on the second floor of his dwelling wounded on the forehead, from which injury he died three days later. Prosecution witness JESUSA BIRONDO a fish vendor, testified that at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of October 5, 1965, as she was preparing to go to the seashore, she heard a shout for help coming from the house of her neighbor, Catalino Espina, which was located just across the street from her house. She recognized the voice as Catalino's. When she looked out of the window she saw the accused Rodulfo Sabio, who is nicknamed "Papu", coming out of the door of the store at the victim's house. The accused was wearing a black shirt with sleeves up to the elbow and dark trousers. She had known the accused since his birth because his house is located at the seashore in Barrio Looc, just about 40 meters from her own house, and she is familiar with his appearance because she used to see him everyday passing by her house or at the seashore. Jesusa felt scared so she retreated from the window. Then she shouted for help. Shortly thereafter, she saw from her window that many persons, about 50 to 100 neighbors, went to

Catalino's house. The following day after the incident, or on October 6, 1965, Jesusa told Police Sergeant Jesus Alberca about what she heard and saw. She executed a sworn statement on the same date. Sabio, a 13 year old, was charged with Robbery with Homicide for robbing and causing the death of Espina, an 80 year old owner of a sari-sari store. Catralino Espina was found by his grandnephew in his house lying and wounded. Espina asked for the police. When police officers arrived, they asked Espina “who slashed and robbed” him. Espina answered that it was Sabio. His declaration was taken down and thumbmarked by him. Sabio was charged and convicted of robbery with homicide. Sabio questions the admissibility of the declaration on the ground that it was not made under the consciousness of an impending death because the victim had hopes of recovery for his first word to his grandnephew was for the latter to fetch the police. ISSUE: Whether or not the dying declaration is admissible. RULING: Statement is admissible. The seriousness of the injury on the victim's forehead which had affected the brain and was profusely bleeding; the victim's inability to speak unless his head was raised; the spontaneous answer of the victim that "only Papu Sabio is responsible for my death"; and his subsequentdemise from the direct effects of the wound on his forehead, strengthen the conclusion that the victim must have known that his end was inevitable. That death did not ensue till 3 days after the declaration was made will not alter its probative force since it is not indispensable that a declarant expires immediately thereafter. It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of death, that renders the dying declaration admissible. The fact that the victim told his grandnephew to fetch the police, does not negative the victim's feeling of hopelessness of recovery but rather emphasizes the realization that he had so little time to disclose his assailant to the authorities. However, only homicide was proved. The evidence supportive of the charge of robbery is at best circumstantial and does not establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had carried away personality belonging to the offended party. There was no eyewitness to the alleged robbery, nor was any part of the alleged missing objects recovered. The consummation of the robbery cannot he inferred nor presumed from the circumstance that the accused was seen running "with his hands inside his shirt", or that the "barro", alleged to have contained cash amounting to about P8, was seen on the floor, open and empty, or that the things and merchandise inside the house were in disarray. Nor can the dying declaration of the victim be admitted to establish the fact of robbery. The admission of dying declarations has always been strictly limited to criminal prosecutions for homicide or murder as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of death. Interval of time may be taken into account where the declaration was ambiguous as to whether the declarant believed that his death was imminent when he made the declaration. _____________________________________________________________________________________ PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. REY SALISON, JR., TIRSO ANDIENTE, RUFINO DIGNARAN and LEONILO FEDILES, accused, REY SALISON, JR., accused-appellant. GR No. 115690 February 20, 1996

FACTS: On November 30, 1990, a fistfight transpired between accused Rey Salison, Rolando Valmoria, and three other accused. The fight dispersed when a witness tried to pacify the parties. However, Salison and company picked up pieces of wood and hit Valmoria at the back of his nape and the rear part of his head. Valmoria was still able to return home, but his head was already bleeding and felt dizziness and pain. He requested his parents to take him to the house of purok leader Patricia Alcoseba. He further asked the purok leader to write down his declaration regarding the incident. Valmoria was thereafter brought to the hospital but died after three days. The trial court convicted Salison. On appeal, he argues that the declaration made by the victim before the purok leader cannot be admitted as a dying declaration because it was not made by the deceased "under the consciousness of an impending death." ISSUE: Whether or not the declaration before the purok leader is admissible as a dying declaration.

RULING: At the time the deceased made the declaration he was in great pain. He expressed a belief on his imminent death and the hope that his declaration could be used as evidence regarding the circumstances thereof. A person would not say so if he believes he would recover and be able to testify against his assailants. At all events, assuming that declaration is not admissible as a dying declaration, it is still admissible as part of the res gestae, since it was made shortly after the startling incident and, under the circumstances, the victim had no opportunity to contrive. The Court thus concluded that appellant is guilty of murder since the killing was qualified by the circumstance of the accused having taken advantage of their superior strength. The victim was unarmed and defenseless at the time when all of the accused mercilessly bludgeoned his back and head with big pieces of wood. The number of assailants and the nature of the weapons used against the hapless victim show a notorious inequality of force between the latter and the aggressors, assuring a superiority of strength advantageous to Salison and his co-accused in the commission of the crime. The accused purposely used excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. _____________________________________________________________________________________ PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Apellee, vs BENNY CABTALAN, Appellant. G.R. No. 175980

FACTS: Wilfredo Pacayra narrated that when he went to the store, Benny and Adriano asked him to join them in their drinking spree to which Wilfredo obliged. In the course of their drinking spree, Wilfredo noticed that Benny and Adriano had bolos tucked on their waists. He also heard the two talking about their plan to assault someone that same night. Sensing that something wrong would happen, Wilfredo left them and walked home. Upon reaching his house, Wilfredo soon noticed Benny and Adriano circling the house of Elena Raypan, daughter of the victim. Later on, he saw Jesus, the victim and his 9-year-old granddaughter Jonalyn walking towards the house of Elena. When Jesus stopped and turned towards a grassy area to urinate, Benny and Adriano suddenly emerged from their hiding place. They held Jesus by his shoulders and alternately stabbed him. At that moment, Jesus shouted “I am wounded, please help me because I was stabbed by Benny and Adriano.” Jesus then fell to the ground while Benny and Adriano immediately fled. ISSUE: Whether or not the declaration of Jesus as dying declaration admissible. RULING: According the the Court, it is the victim himself who pointed to Benny as one of his assailants. Such statement of Jesus before his death is a dying declaration that is admissible in evidence against Benny. A dying declaration is an evidence of the highest order; it is entitled to the utmost credence on the premise that no x x x person who knows of his impending death would make a careless and false accusation. At the brink of death, all thoughts on concocting lies disappear. __________________________________________________________________________________________ DYING DECLARATION • The declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of an impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death. • Dying declarations are the statements made by a person after the mortal wounds have been inflicted, under the belief that death is certain, stating the facts concerning the cause of, and the circumstances surrounding the homicide. ➢Requisites: 1) That death is imminent and the declarant is conscious of that fact; 2) That the declaration refers to the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death; 3) That the declaration relates to facts which the victim is competent to testify to; and 4) That the declaration is offered in a case wherein the declarant’ s death is the subject of the inquiry.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JAY MANDY MAGLIAN Y REYES, Accused-Appellant. G.R. No. 189834, March 30, 2011

FACTS: Accused-appellant, Jay Mandy Maglian y Reyes, a businessman, is the lawfully wedded husband of the deceased Mary Jay Rios Maglian, a lawyer. They were married on January 29, 1999. They had a son named Mateo Jay. On the evening of January 4, 2000, the spouses had a heated argument when the accused did not want his wife, Mary Jay, to go to a party. The angry Jay Mandy expressed his intention to burn his clothes given by Mary Jay during Christmas. Mary Jay tried to stop her husband but the latter still poured kerosene on the clothes and also over his wife and consequently, sets both, the clothes and Mary Jay, on fire. Mary Jay suffered third degree burns on 90% of her body. She was transferred from one hospital to another just to make her recover from the burns but she passed away more than a month after the incident happened. However, just before she expired, she was able to make a dying declaration to her mother, Lourdes Rios, and their laundrywoman, Norma Saballero, stating that it was Jay Mandy who burned her. The latter were produced as witnesses for the prosecution. The RTC, Branch 22, of Imus, Cavite, found accused, Jay Mandy, guilty of parricide. Said ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In this appeal, accused-appellant contends that the dying declaration of Mary Jay to her mother should not be admitted as evidence and that it should be her dying declaration in front of Atty. Rosemarie Perey-Duque and PO3 Celestino San Jose while she was then confined at the East Avenue Medical Center on January 13, 2000 saying that what happened to her was an accident, should instead be admitted. He also avers that the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and having no intent to commit so grave a wrong must be appreciated in his favor to lower the imposable penalty. ISSUE: Whether or not the dying declaration of Mary Jay Rios spoken to her mother, Lourdes Rios, should be the one admitted as evidence and not the dying declaration made by the former in the presence of Atty. Rosemarie Perey-Duque and PO3 Celestino San Jose. RULING: Yes, it was Mary Jay’s dying declaration intimated to her mother that should be considered admissible as evidence and not the one given in the presence of Atty. Duque and PO3 San Jose. The Rules of Court provides that for a dying declaration to be admissible as evidence, the following conditions must be satisfied: (a) it concerns the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) it is made when death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a consciousness of impending death; (c) the declarant would have been competent to testify had he or she survived; and (d) the dying declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves the declarant’s death. In the instant case, it was the dying declaration made by Mary Jay to her mother that satisfies the requisites. Both Lourdes Rios and Norma Saballero are credible witnesses and do not have any motive to lie regarding Mary Jay’s dying declaration. Although Lourdes Rios was the mother of Mary Jay, such relationship does not destroy his credibility to be a witness. Accused-appellant may have averred that his mother-in-law does not approve of him ever since he and the deceased got married but he could not give any improper motive on the part of Saballero to falsely accuse him. Moreover, it is noteworthy to state that although the dying declaration made by the deceased in the presence of Atty. Duque and PO3 San Jose was handwritten, the same was not executed under oath. Also, it was not made with the knowledge of an impending death since it was done more than a month before Mary Jay died. _____________________________________________________________________________________

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. RODRIGO SALAFRANCA y BELLO, Accused-Appellant G.R. No. 173476

February 22, 2012

FACTS: At about midnight, Bolanon was stabbed near the Del Pan Sports Complex in Binondo, Manila; that after stabbing Bolanon, his assailant ran away. Bolanon was still able to walk to the house of his uncle Rodolfo B. Estaño in order to seek help; that his uncle rushed him to the Philippine General Hospital by taxicab; that on their way to the hospital Bolanon told Estaño that it was Salafranca who had stabbed him. Bolanon eventually succumbed at the hospital at 2:30 am despite receiving medical attention. The stabbing of Bolanon was personally witnessed by Augusto Mendoza, then still a minor of 13 years, who was in the complex at the time. Salafranca fled after stabbing Bolanon. He evaded arrest for a long period, despite the warrant for his arrest being issued. He was finally arrested on April 23, 2003, and detained at the Manila City Jail. ISSUE: Whether the declaration of the victim to his uncle considered admissible under res gestae, dying declaration, or both? RULING: A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay character, may nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur, namely: (a) that the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) that at the time the declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an impending death; (c) that the declarant is competent as a witness; and (d) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim. All the requisites were met herein. Bolanon communicated his ante-mortem statement to Estaño, his uncle, identifying Salafranca as the person who had stabbed him. At the time of his statement, Bolanon was conscious of his impending death, having sustained a stab wound in the chest and, according to Estaño, was then experiencing great difficulty in breathing. Bolanon succumbed in the hospital emergency room a few minutes from admission, which occurred under three hours after the stabbing. There is ample authority for the view that the declarant’s belief in the imminence of his death can be shown by the declarant’s own statements or from circumstantial evidence, such as the nature of his wounds, statements made in his presence, or by the opinion of his physician. Bolanon would have been competent to testify on the subject of the declaration had he survived. Lastly, the dying declaration was offered in this criminal prosecution for murder in which Bolanon was the victim. A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res gestae concur herein. Surely, when he gave the identity of the assailant to Estaño, Bolanon was referring to a startling occurrence, i.e., his stabbing by Salafranca. Bolanon was then on board the taxicab that would bring him to the hospital, and thus had no time to contrive his identification of Salafranca as the assailant. His utterance about Salafranca having stabbed him was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence. The statement was relevant because it identified Salafranca as the perpetrator. The term res gestae has been defined as "those circumstances which are the undesigned incidents of a particular litigated act and which are admissible when illustrative of such act. In a general way, res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the crime when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony. Hence, it is admissible under res gestae, dying declaration, or both.

D eclaration Against Interest THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee vs. AIROL ALING Y MAJURI, accused 96 SCRA 474 (1980)

FACTS: Accused AirolAling was accused of parricide for allegedly stabbing his wife NorijaMohamad, in the chest. Norija was brought to the hospital but later on died of the stabs she received. AirolAling was investigated by the police. He declared in the Chavacano dialect (his declaration was translated into English) that he killed his wife (whom he married according to Muslim rites because he was informed in prison by his relatives that his wife was living with another man and fooling around with other men. Before arraignment, accused Airol was willing to plead guilty, however he had no lawyer so acounsel de officio was appointed for him. At arraignment, he pleaded guilty to the accusation that he killed his wife. He said that he was not coerced nor cajoled into entering a plea of guilty. He admitted that he was a prisoner in the penal colony. He said that his purpose was to be reconciled with his wife but when she saw him, instead of waiting for him, she ran away. He had information that his wife was guilty of infidelity or had a "kabit". That was a grievous offense under Muslim customs. The trial court found Airol guilty of parricide. By automatic review, counsel de oficio contends that the marriage of Airol and Norija was not proven and therefore, Airol cannot be held guilty of parricide. ISSUE: Whether Airol is liable for parricide even without evidence introduced to prove marriage. RULING: The testimony of the accused that he was married to the deceased was an admission against hispenal interest. It was a confirmation of the maxim semper praesumitur matrimonio and the presumption "that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage" . He and the deceased had five children. He alluded in his testimony to his father--in--law. That implies that the deceased was his lawful wife. The fact that he bitterly resented her infidelity, her failure to visit him in prison and her neglect of their children are other circumstances confirmatory of their marital status. The fact that he escaped from confinement in order to kill his wife shows a high degree of perversity and incorrigibility His being a non--Christian cannot serve to extenuate the heinousness of his offense. He understood the gravity of his crime because he had attained some education. He reached first year high school and he used to be a checker in a stevedoring firm. However, he was sentenced only to reclusion perpetua, not the death penalty because of lack of one vote from the justices. ____________________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EUGENIO TOLEDO and SISENANDO HOLGADO, defendants. EUGENIO TOLEDO, appellant. G.R. No. L-28655 August 6, 1928

FACTS: Sisenando Holgado and Filomeno Morales had disputes about the occupation of certain land situated in the municipality of Pinamalayan, Province of Mindoro. On the morning of June 15, 1927, the two men happened to meet. The argument was renewed, and they agreed to fight. They did engage in a bolo duel with a fatal result for Filomeno Morales, who was killed almost instantly. Sisenando Holgado was also seriously wounded but was able to proceed to a neighboring house. From there Sisenando

Holgado was taken to the municipal building where he made a sworn statement before the municipal president, in which he declared that only he and Filomeno Morales fought. About one month later, Sisenando Holgado died from the wounds received in the fight. The prosecution and the defense alike agree on the facts above outlined. The disputable point is whether the accused Eugenio Toledo intervened in the quarrel and dealt a mortal blow to Filomeno Morales. For the prosecution, there was presented the witness Justina Villanueva, the querida of Filomeno Morales, who testified to the presence and participation of Eugenio Toledo. Her testimony was partially corroborated by that of the witness Justina Llave. On the other hand, the theory for the defense was that Toledo was in another place when the fight between Morales and Holgado occurred and that his only participation was on meeting Holgado, who was his landlord or master, in helping him to a nearby house. To this effect is the testimony of the accused and of Conrado Holgado, the son of Sisenando Holgado. The defense also relied upon the affidavit of Sisenando Holgado, Exhibit 1, which was identified by the municipal president of Pinamalayan. ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence presented constitute a declaration against interest. RULING: Yes. Hearsay evidence, with a few well recognized exceptions, it has been said on high authority, is excluded by courts in the United States that adhere to the principles of the common law. One universally recognized exception concerns the admission of dying declarations. Another exception permits the reception, under certain circumstances, of declarations of third parties made contrary to their own pecuniary or proprietary interest. But the general rule is stated to be that the declarations of a person other than accused confessing or tending to show that he committed the crime are not competent for accused on account of the hearsay doctrine. A study of the authorities discloses that even if given application they are not here controlling. Most of them do not concern the confessions of declarants shown to be deceased. Practically all of them give as the principal reason for denying the admission of a confession of a third person that he committed the crime with which the accused is charged, that it was not made under oath. Here the declarant is deceased and his statements were made under oath. They also read in such a way as to ring with the truth. When Sisenando Holgado declared "When we fought, there was nobody present," it was at the end of just such a rambling statement as a wounded man would be expected to make. When Sisenando Holgado declared "I met one of my workers named Eugenio Toledo, who accompanied me to the house of Dalmacio Manlisic," he did so in response to a question by the municipal president. Exhibit 1 should have been received not as conclusive evidence of innocence, but as evidence to be taken into consideration in connection with the other proven facts. Any man outside of a court and unhampered by the pressure of technical procedure, unreasoned rules of evidence, and cumulative authority, would say that if a man deliberately acknowledged himself to be the perpetrator of a crime and exonerated the person charged with the crime, and there was other evidence indicative of the truthfulness of the statement, the accused man should not be permitted to go to prison or to the electric chair to expiate a crime he never committed. Shall Judges trained and experienced in the law display less discerning common sense that the layman and allow precedent to overcome truth? _____________________________________________________________________________________ ALEJANDRO FUENTES, JR., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. 253 SCRA 430

1996

FACTS: While attending a benefit dancer, Fuentes, called Malaspina who was with his three friends and put his arm around the former’s shoulder, saying: “Before, I saw you with your long hair, but now you have short hair.” He then stabbed the Malaspina with a hunting knife and fled.

Before Malaspina’s death, he muttered that Fuentes, Jr. was the culprit. However, Fuentes alleged the defense of mistaken identity. He claimed that it was Zolio Fuentes Jr. alias “Jonie” who was the perpetrator and not him. ISSUE: Whether or not Alejandro Fuentes was indeed positively identified as the killer of Malaspina. RULING: Yes. The alleged declaration against interest attributed to Zoilo is inadmissible in evidence as an exception to hearsay. It has not been demonstrated that Zoilo is unable to testify. There is no showing that he is dead, mentally incapacitated or physically incompetent. His mere absence from the jurisdiction does not make him ipso facto unavailable under the Rules. The records show that the defense did not exert any serious effort to produce Zoilo as a witness. An innocent declaration by the real culprit should be admissible as evidence. But this can be open to abuse as when the extrajudicial statement is not even authenticated, thereby increasing the probability of its fabrication. For this case, at least, the prudent course is its exclusion. _____________________________________________________________________________________ ALEJANDRO FUENTES, JR., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. 253 SCRA 430

1996

FACTS: While attending a benefit dancer, Fuentes, called Malaspina who was with his three friends and put his arm around the former’s shoulder, saying: “Before, I saw you with your long hair, but now you have short hair.” He then stabbed the Malaspina with a hunting knife and fled. Before Malaspina’s death, he muttered that Fuentes, Jr. was the culprit. However, Fuentes alleged the defense of mistaken identity. He claimed that it was Zolio Fuentes Jr. alias “Jonie” who was the perpetrator and not him. ISSUE: Whether or not Alejandro Fuentes was indeed positively identified as the killer of Malaspina. RULING: Yes. The alleged declaration against interest attributed to Zoilo is inadmissible in evidence as an exception to hearsay. It has not been demonstrated that Zoilo is unable to testify. There is no showing that he is dead, mentally incapacitated or physically incompetent. His mere absence from the jurisdiction does not make him ipso facto unavailable under the Rules. The records show that the defense did not exert any serious effort to produce Zoilo as a witness. An innocent declaration by the real culprit should be admissible as evidence. But this can be open to abuse as when the extrajudicial statement is not even authenticated, thereby increasing the probability of its fabrication. For this case, at least, the prudent course is its exclusion. _____________________________________________________________________________________ MEYNARDO SABILI, petitioner vs COMELEC, respondent G.R. No. 193261

April 24, 2012

FACTS: COMELEC denied Sabili’s Certificate of Candidacy for mayor of Lipa due to failure to comply with theone year residency requirement. When petitioner filed his COC for mayor of Lipa City for the 2010 elections, he stated therein that he had been a resident of the city for more than two years.

However, it is undisputed that when petitioner filed his COC during the 2007 elections, he and his family were then staying at his ancestral home in Barangay (Brgy.) Sico, San Juan, Batangas. Librea (private respondent) filed a "Petition to Deny Due Course and to cancel Certificate of Candidacy and to Disqualify a candidate for possessing some grounds for disqualification. ISSUE: Whether the information contained in the COC filed by Sabili is a declaration against interest. RULING: NO. The exception will not apply where the declarant is available as a witness. The declarant must be dead or is unable to testify for the exception to apply. _____________________________________________________________________________________

P edigree PEDRO GRAVADOR, Petitioner-Appellee, vs EUTIQUIO MAMIGO ET AL., Respondents-Appellants, G.R. No. L-24989

July 21 1967

FACTS: The petitioner Pedro Gravador was the principal of the Sta. Catalina Elementary School in Sta. Catalina, Negros Oriental on August 15, 1964 when he was advised by the then Superintendent of Schools Angel Salazar, Jr., through the respondent Supervisor Teodulfo E. Dayao, of his separation from the service on the ground that he had reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 according to his prewar records as a teacher in the public schools, including his Employee’s Record Card. He was advised of his separation from service “effective immediately unless you can show valid proof in the form of a baptismal or birth certificate that you are below 65 years of age today” (excerpt from the advice given). On August 31, 1964 the petitioner wrote the Director of Public Schools, protesting his forced retirement on the ground that the date of his birth is not November 26, 1897 but December 11, 1901. Attached to his letter was the affidavit, executed on July 26, 1962, of Lazaro Bandoquillo and Pedro A. Sienes both of Amlan Negros Oriental, in which these two affiants declared that they knew that the petitioner "was born on December 11, 1901, in the Municipality of Amlan formerly known as New Ayuquitan Province of Negros Oriental, Philippines" because, "we were the neighbors of the late spouses, NEPOMUCENO GRAVADOR and AGUEDA REGOROSA [petitioner's parents], and we were present when said PEDRO GRAVADOR was born; furthermore, we were also invited during the baptismal party a few weeks after the birth of said PEDRO GRAVADOR ." On July 6, 1967 the petitioner asked for the dismissal of the appeal on the ground that the issues posed thereby had become moot with his retirement from the service on December 11, 1966 and the payment to him of the corresponding retirement benefits. We deem it necessary, however, to review the trial court's decision on the merits, considering that the computation of retirement annuities is based among other things, on the number of years of service of a retiree, and that payment of benefits already made to the petitioner on the basis of December 11, 1901 as the date of his birth would not exempt him from the obligation to make a refund should this Court ultimately rule that he was actually born November 26, 1897, as the respondents claim. ISSUE: WON the trial court erred in placing full reliance on the post-war records to establish the date of birth of the petitioner.

RULING: NO. The court gave three cogent reasons: 1. As Moran states, although a person can have no personal knowledge of the date of his birth, he may testify as to his age as he learned it from his parents and relatives and his testimony in such case is an assertion of a family tradition. 2. The import of the declaration of the petitioner’s brother contained in a verified pleading in a cadastral case way back in 1924, to the effect that the petitioner was then 23 years old, cannot be ignored. Made ante litem motam by a deceased relative, this statement is at once a declaration regarding pedigree within the intendment and meaning of Section 33 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. 3. The parties are agreed that the petitioner has a brother, Constantino, who was born on June 10, 1898 and who retired on June 10, 1963 with full retirement pay. The petitioner then could not have been born earlier than Constantino, say in 1897 as pre-war records indicate, because Constantino is admittedly older than he. _____________________________________________________________________________________ PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALFREDO ALEGADO Y DELIMA, accused-appellant. G.R. No. 93030-31 August 21, 1991

FACTS: On April 14, 1988, Alfredo Alegado took Cristina Deang to the second floor of the public market. He then ordered masturbate him then forcibly pushed her to the floor. He lay on top of her and inserted his penis but it did not penetrate fully before he ejaculated. The appellant gave her P2.00 and then left. Fearing that he might kill her, the victim told no one. On April 20,1988 Alegado again asked Christina to go second floor, however Christina resisted, the accused shoved her and inserted his penis into the girl’s vagina that eventually bled. The appellant gave her P2.00 and then left. Patrolwoman Evangeline Alfaro saw appellant coming down the stairs and then the victim followed a minute later. She was pale with blood flowing from her thigh and legs. He was charged with two counts of statutory rape by the RTC. One of the contentions of the accused is that the prosecution failed to prove with certainty the actual age of the offended party. ISSUE: Whether or not the age of the offended party was duly proven to be below twelve years old in order for the RPC provision on statutory rape to apply. RULING: Yes. The fact that the victim was below twelve years old at the time of the rape was duly proved. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the offended party herself and her maternal grandfather, Cornelio Villarosa, as to the fact that the victim was born on September 5, 1976 do not constitute hearsay evidence as claimed by the accused-appellant but rather fall under the exceptions to the hearsay rule as provided under Section 39 and 40 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. The word “pedigree” under Section 39 includes relationship. Family, genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and places where these facts occurred and the name of the relatives. The said provision contains three requisites for its admissibility, namely, (1) that there is controversy in respect to the pedigree of any member of the family; (2) that the reputation or tradition of the pedigree of the person concerned existed previous to the controversy; and (3) that the witness testifying to the reputation or tradition must be a member of the family of the said person.

All these preconditions are obtaining in the case at bar considering that the date of birth of the rape victim is put in issue; that the declaration of the victim’s grandfather relating to tradition existed long before the rape case was filed; and that the witness testifying to the said tradition is the maternal grandfather of the rape victim. Moreover, the offended party herself categorically stated in open court that she was born on September 5, 1976. Although a person can have no personal knowledge of the date of his birth, he may testify as to his age as he learned it from his parents and relatives and his testimony in such case is an assertion of a family tradition. Inasmuch as the accused-appellant failed to present contrary evidence to dispute the prosecution’s claim that the victim was below twelve years old at the time of the rapes under consideration, we affirm the trial court’s finding that the victim in these rape cases was under twelve years old. _____________________________________________________________________________________ CORAZON DEZOLLAR TISON & RENE R. DEZOLLER, Petitioners, vs COURT OF APPEALS & TEODORA DOMINGO, Respondents 276 SCRA 582 (1997)

FACTS: This case stems from an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land and an apartment. Teodora Guerrero died and left a parcel of land and an apartment. Her husband, Martin Guerrero adjudicates the said land to him and thereafter sold it to Teodora Domingo. The petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are the niece and nephew respectively of the deceased Teodora Dezollar Guerrero, who appears to be the sister of their father Hermogenes Dezoller. Teodora Guerrero died without any ascendants or descendants, and was survived only by her husband, Martin Guerrero and the herein petitioners. The petitioners hence seek to inherit from Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by right of representation. Martin Guerrero died and subsequently, the herein petitioners filed an action for reconveyance claiming that they are entitled to inherit one half of the property in question by right of representation. They presented documentary evidence to prove filial relation. Teodoro Domingo however, attacks the admissibility of the said documents/evidence presented by the petitioners for being hearsay since the affiants were never presented for cross-examination. ISSUE: Whether or not the documents/evidence presented is hearsay evidence and thus inadmissible in evidence. RULING: The evidence submitted does not conform to the rules on their admissibility; however the same may be admitted by reason of private respondent’s failure to interpose any timely objection thereto at the time they were being offered in evidence. It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document is offered in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, since the right to object is merely a privilege which the party may waive. The primary proof that was considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties concerned is the testimony of Corazon Dezollar Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezollar Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically declared that the former is Teodora’s niece. Such statement is considered a declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is subject of inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration and; (4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before any controversy has arisen thereon.

BEN-HUR NEPOMUCENO, Petitioner, vs. ARHBENCEL ANN LOPEZ, represented by her mother ARACELI LOPEZ, Respondent. G.R. No. 181258, March 18, 2010

FACTS: Respondent Arhbencel Ann Lopez (Arhbencel), represented by her mother Araceli Lopez (Araceli), filed a Complaint1 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City for recognition and support against Ben-HurNepomuceno (petitioner). Born on June 8, 1999, Arhbencel claimed to have been begotten out of an extramarital affair of petitioner with Araceli; that petitioner refused to affix his signature on her Certificate of Birth; and that, by a handwritten note dated August 7, 1999, petitioner nevertheless obligated himself to give her financial support in the amount of ₱1,500 on the 15th and 30th days of each month beginning August 15, 1999. Arguing that her filiation to petitioner was established by the handwritten note, Arhbencel prayed that petitioner be ordered to: (1) recognize her as his child, (2) give her support pendente lite in the increased amount of ₱8,000 a month, and (3) give her adequate monthly financial support until she reaches the age of majority. Petitioner countered that Araceli had not proven that he was the father of Arhbencel; and that he was only forced to execute the handwritten note on account of threats coming from the National People’s Army. By Order of July 4, 2001, Branch 130 of the Caloocan RTC, on the basis of petitioner’s handwritten note which it treated as "contractual support" since the issue of Arhbencel’s filiation had yet to be determined during the hearing on the merits, granted Arhbencel’s prayer for support pendente lite in the amount of ₱3,000 a month. After Arhbencel rested her case, petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence which the trial court granted by Order dated June 7, 2006, whereupon the case was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent’s petition should be given credence. RULING: The decision is on the negative. Under Article 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a parent shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. To be effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the putative father himself and the writing must be the writing of the putative father. A notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation is admitted by the putative father was considered acceptable evidence. Letters to the mother vowing to be a good father to the child and pictures of the putative father cuddling the child on various occasions, together with the certificate of live birth, proved filiation. However, a student permanent record, a written consent to a father's operation, or a marriage contract where the putative father gave consent, cannot be taken as authentic writing. Standing alone, neither a certificate of baptism nor family pictures are sufficient to establish filiation. In the present case, Arhbencel relies, in the main, on the handwritten note executed by petitioner, by which such note does not contain any statement whatsoever about Arhbencel’s filiation to petitioner. It is, therefore, not within the ambit of Article 172(2) vis-à-vis Article 175 of the Family Code which admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned.

________________________________________________________________ JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ and minor CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ "AQUINO," represented by JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ, Petitioners, vs. RONALD PAUL S. GRACIA, in his capacity as City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, Respondent. G.R. No. 177728 July 31, 2009

FACTS: For several months in 2005, then 21-year old petitioner Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz (Jenie) and then 19-year old Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino (Dominique) lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They resided in the house of Dominique’s parents Domingo B. Aquino and Raquel Sto. Tomas Aquino at Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal.

On September 4, 2005, Dominique died. After almost two months, or on November 2, 2005, Jenie, who continued to live with Dominique’s parents, gave birth to her herein co-petitioner minor child Christian Dela Cruz "Aquino" at the Antipolo Doctors Hospital, Antipolo City. Jenie was denied the registration of her child's birth because the document attached to the Affidavit to use the Surname of the Father (AUSF) entitled "Autobiography," did not include the signature of the deceased father, and “because he was born out of wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the child.” Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for injunction/registration of name against Gracia. The trial court held that even if Dominique, the father, was the author of the unsigned handwritten Autobiography, the same does not contain any express recognition of paternity. ISSUE: Whether or not the unsigned handwritten statement of the deceased father of minor Christian dela Cruz can be considered as a recognition of paternity in a “Private Handwritten Instrument” within the contemplation of Art. 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255 which entitles the said minor to use his father’s surname. RULING: Petitioners contend that Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not expressly require that the private handwritten instrument containing the putative father’s admission of paternity must be signed by him. They add that the deceased’s handwritten Autobiography, though unsigned by him, is sufficient, for the requirement in the above-quoted paragraph 2.2 of the Administrative Order that the admission/recognition must be "duly signed" by the father is void as it "unduly expanded" the earlierquoted provision of Article 176 of the Family Code. Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her father if the latter had previously recognized him/her as his offspring through an admission made in a pubic of private handwritten instrument. Article 176, as amended, does not explicitly state that there must be a signature by the putative father in the private handwritten instrument. The following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made: 1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and 2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence. _____________________________________________________________________________________

Family Tradition RAFAEL J. FERRER, ET AL., Plaintiffs and Appellants, vs. JOAQUIN J. DE INCHAUSTI, ET AL., Defendants and Appellees. G.R. No. 12993,October 28, 1918

FACTS: Deceased Isabel Gonzalez first married Ramon Martinez Viademonte. They begot a child, Ramon Viademonte, Jr. After the death of her husband, she again married to Don Jose Joaquin de Inchausti. They had three children namely Clotilde, Rafael and Joaquin all surnamed Inchausti y Gonzalez. When Isabel Gonzalez died, she left a property valued at P191,284.81. Don Jose Joaquin de Inchausti made an extrajudicial partition of said property. Each of the children received one-fourth of the estate.

Ramon Viademonte, Jr. became the administrator of the fourth part of the estate. Upon his death, his property was transferred by will to the son of his brother, Rafael de Inchausti. Meanwhile, plaintiffs Rafael and Maria Angelina, all surnamed Ferrer, children of deceased Rosa MatildeViademonte, asked that they be entitled to one-fifth part of the estate. They alleged that their mother is a child of Isabel Gonzalez from the first marriage of the latter to Ramon Martinez. And as such, they should be entitled to that part of the estate corresponding to their mother, them being the heirs of the latter. However, the de Inchausti’s denied said allegation. As proof, they presented the day-book of the deceased Ramon Martinez Viademonte, Jr. which says that on September 1, 1852, a child named Rosa Matilde Robles based on the baptismal certificate duly issued, was delivered to their mother. And in that baptismal certificate, it was written that the child was of unknown parents. Furthermore, Joaquin de Inchausti testified that his half-brother, Ramon Martinez Viademonte, Jr., while still living, intimated to him that Rosa Matilde was not his sister but only a protégée of theirparents and that the true name of the latter is Rosa Matilde Robles. The judge of the Court of First Instance held that Rosa Viademonte could not have been a legitimate daughter of deceased Isabel Gonzalez. It further held that plaintiffs should not be entitled to what they demandedand that they should pay the costs. Thus, this appeal was taken through bill of exceptions. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the testimony of Joaquin de Inchausti is admissible as evidence to prove the filiation of Rosa Matilde Robles/Rosa MatildeViademonte; and 2. Whether or not the day-book of Ramon Martinez Viademonte, Jr. is admissible as evidence. RULING: Anent the first issue, yes, Joaquin de Inchausti’s testimony can be admitted as evidence to prove the real filiation of Rosa Matilde Robles/Rosa MatildeViademonte. In view of the fact that Ramon Martinez Viademonte, Jr. is now dead, the testimony of Joaquin de Inchausti, referring to the said deceased is admissible for they are members of the same family. Consequently, the conclusion is that Rosa Matilde is the same Rosa Matilde Robles named in the certificate of birth of the latter. And because she was born in 1852, in no manner canshe be a legitimate daughter of Ramon Viademonte and Isabel Gonzalez whose marriage was dissolved in 1836 by the death of the husband. On the second issue, plaintiffs argued that the day-book cannot be admitted as evidence for being only a memorandum wherein the entries were not made the same time that the events mentioned therein occurred. According to the Code of Civil Procedure, evidence of monuments and inscriptions in public places may be given upon trial as evidence of common reputation. And entries in family Bibles or other family books or charts, engravings or rings, family portraits, and the like, are considered as evidence of pedigree. The law does not require that theentries be made at the same time that the events happened. Moreover, the witness Joaquin de Inchausti declared affirmatively that the memorandum was in the handwriting of his brother Ramon Martinez Viademonte, Jr. whose handwriting he is familiar with. The testimony of said witness contains some reference to a member of the family who is already dead and concerns their family genealogy. Therefore, it can be admitted as evidence. On the other hand, even assuming that Rosa Matilde is a natural child, she could not still inherit from her supposed mother because according to the Law of Toro which is the operative law on the date of death of Isabel Gonzalez, natural children have no right to succeed to their natural mother if upon the death of the latter, she leaves legitimate children, as in the case at bar. Furthermore, the action for partition was brought beyond the reglementary period of ten years and hence, the same had already prescribed. _____________________________________________________________________________________ FAMILY REPUTATION OR TRADITION REGARDING PEDIGREE • The reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree. ➢Requisites for the exception to apply: a) There is a controversy in respect to the pedigree of any members of a family; b) The reputation or tradition of the pedigree of the person concerned existed ante litem motam or pervious to the controversy; and c) The witness testifying to the reputation or tradition regarding the pedigree of the person concerned must be a member of the family of said person, either by consanguinity or affinity.

ROSENDO HERRERA, Petitioner, vs. ROSENDO ALBA, MINOR, REPRESENTED BY HER MOTHER, ARMI A. ALBA, Respondents. G.R. No. 148220 FACTS: Thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba, represented by his mother Armi Alba, filed before the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and damages against petitioner. Rosendo Herrera filed his answer with counterclaim where he denied that he is the biological father of respondent. He also denied physical contact with respondents mother. Armi Alba offered corroborative proof in the form of letters and pictures. Petitioner, on the other hand, denied Armi Albas assertion. He denied ever having sexual relations with Armi Alba and stated that respondent is Armi Albas child with another man. Armi Alba countered petitioner’s denial by submitting pictures of respondent and petitioner side by side, to show how much they resemble each other. Respondent also filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the proceedings. To support the motion, respondent presented the testimony of Saturnina C. Halos, Ph.D. Dr. Halos was an Associate Professor at De La Salle University where she taught Cell Biology. She was also head of the University of the Philippines Natural Sciences Research Institute (UP-NSRI), a DNA analysis laboratory. She was a former professor at the University of the Philippines in Diliman, Quezon City, where she developed the Molecular Biology Program and taught Molecular Biology. In her testimony, Dr. Halos described the process for DNA paternity testing and asserted that the test had an accuracy rate of 99.9999% in establishing paternity. Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability. Petitioner further argued that DNA paternity testing. ISSUE: Whether or not DNA testing admissible in establishing paternity or filiation. RULING: While it is true that in Pe Lim v. CA, we stated that the issue of paternity still has to be resolved by such conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating verbal and written acts by the putative father. Under Article 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a parent shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. To be effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the putative father himself and the writing must be the writing of the putative father. A notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation is admitted by the putative father was considered acceptable evidence. Letters to the mother vowing to be a good father to the child and pictures of the putative father cuddling the child on various occasions, together with the certificate of live birth proved filiation. However, a student permanent record, a written consent to a fathers operation, or a marriage contract where the putative father gave consent, cannot be taken as authentic writing. Standing alone, neither a certificate of baptism nor family pictures are sufficient to establish filiation. However, advances in science show that sources of evidence of paternity and filiation need not be limited to incriminating acts. The Court agrees with the trial court that forensic DNA typing has gained general acceptance in the scientific community. It holds that admissibility of specific test results in a particular case hinges on the laboratory compliance with appropriate standards and controls, and the availability of their testing data and results. Likewise, in Tijing, Vallejo and Yatar, the court ruled that DNA analysis is admissible as evidence. Hence, it shall be admissible in the case at bar. _____________________________________________________________________________________ COMMON REPUTATION • Common reputation existing previous to the controversy, respecting facts of public or general interest more than thirty years old, or respecting marriage or moral character, may be given in evidence. Monuments and inscriptions in public places may be received as evidence of common reputation. ➢Requisites for the admissibility of the exception: a) The facts must be of public or general interest and more than thirty years old; b) The common reputation must have been ancient (more than 30 years old or one generation old); c) The reputation must have been one formed among the class of persons who were in a position to have some sources of information and to contribute intelligently to the formation of the opinion; and d) The common reputation must have been existing previous to the controversy. ➢Requisites for the admissibility of common reputation respecting marriage: a) The common reputation must have been formed previous to the controversy; and b) The common reputation must have been formed in the community or among the class of persons who are in a position to have sources of information and to contribute intelligently to the formation of the opinion. ➢Requisites for the admissibility of common reputation respecting moral character: a) That it is the reputation in the place where the person in question is best known; b) That it was formed ante litem motam.

C ommon Reputation THE CITY OF MANILA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, vs. JACINTO DEL ROSARIO,DEFENDANT-APPLELLANT. G.R. No. 1284. November 10, 1905

FACTS: The City of Manila filed an action to recover the possession of the two lots described in the complaint, located in Calles Clavel and Barcelona, district of Tondo, at present occupied by the defendant. At the trial, after the plaintiff rested, the defendant moved for the dismissal of the case upon the ground that the plaintiff had failed to establish the allegations in the complaint. The question thus raised puts in issue the trial court’s finding that the City of Manila was entitled to the ownership and possession of the land in question. The City of Manila introduced both documentary and oral evidence. It consisted of the testimony of John R. Lorenzo del Rosario, and Modesto Reyes, the city attorney. The first witness testified that he did not know of his own knowledge if the land in question belonged to the city. The next witness testified that the land included in Calles Clavel and Barcelona was formerly part of Plaza Divisoria, which belonged to the Central Government (not the city), and that he did not know to whom it now belongs. It must be borne in mind that this witness referred to the land included in Calles Clavel and Barcelona, and not to the lots described in the complaint. These lots abut upon the streets referred to, but do not form a part of either. According to the complaint, they are building lots. The third witness, Juan Villegas, testified that the land in question was formerly included in the Gran Divisoria, and that all the land included in it belonged to the city. In this particular his testimony is at variance with that of the precediing witness, who testified that the land belonged to the Central Government. Villega’s testimony was merely hearsay. It consisted of what he had learned from some of the oldest residents in that section of the city. His testimony was introduced by the plaintiff apparently for the purpose of proving that the city was generally considered the owner of the land. The fourth witness (Sotera Roco) testified that Lorenzo del Rosario acquired the land from Cipriano Roco and sold it to his brother Jacinto del Rosario. Assuming that the hearsay testimony of Sotera Roco is admissible, we do not see how it can be inferred from her testimony that the plaintiff is the real owner of the property. The witness Modesto Reyes and Lorenzo del Rosario said nothing as to the ownership of the land. They simply testified as to the authenticity of some of the documentary evidence introduced by the plaintiff. The plaintiff also introduced in evidence a map of the city of Manila. The reliability of the map was not proven at the trial. The only witness examined with regard to it was the city attorney. He was unable to say who made it or who caused it to be made, or when it was made. He said only that he believed the map had been drawn in the month of July, 1880, or prior to May, 1893. Neither this nor his statement that the map was found among the archives of the city of Manila is of itself sufficient to show that the map is authentic. No one appears to certify as to its correctness. The map identified by the witness John R. Wilson was introduced by the plaintiff for the sole purpose of showing the location of the land in question. It has, therefore, no value in establishing the right of possession claimed by the plaintiff. ISSUE: Whether or not the testimonies presented are considered common reputation. RULING: Such testimony does not constitute the "common reputation". "Common reputation," is equivalent to universal reputation. The testimony of this witness is not sufficient to establish the presumption referred to.

Furthermore, this witness stated that the land in Calle Azcarraga had been partitioned between the municipality and the Central Government, share and share alike, and that the Central Government (not the city) retained Calles Gabriel de Rivera and Barcelona, which are precisely the streets on which the property. From the foregoing it appears that the evidence introduced by the plaintiff does not prove its claim of title to the land in question. Neither the testimony of the witnesses presented by the plaintiff nor the documentary evidence introduced show that the City of Manila is the owner of the land, or that it has a right to its possession as claimed in the complaint. Some of the documents introduced, as well as the two public instruments referred to as having been executed in 1900, tended to support the contentions of the defendant rather than those of the plaintiff. Furthermore, the plaintiff itself admits in the complaint that the defendant’s possession of the land in Calle Barcelona was recorded since March, 1901, and his possession of that in Calle Clavel since February, 1893. This shows that the defendant had been in the adverse possession of the land. According to article 448 of the Civil Code he must be presumed to hold under a just title, unless the contrary is shown. _____________________________________________________________________________________ CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. ALLYSON BELAGAN, respondent. 132 SCRA 164 OCTOBER 19, 2004

FACTS: Magdalena Gapuz filed an application with DEC’s office in Baguio City for permit to operate a preschool. One of the requisites for the issuance of the permit was the inspection of the school premises by the DEC’S Division Office. Respondent and complainant visited the school. In the course of inspection, while both descending the stairs, respondent suddenly placed his arms around complainant’s shoulders and kissed her cheek. She then wrote a letter complaint for sexual indignities and harassment to former DEC’s Secretary Gloria. Respondent was then placed under suspension. Meanwhile Ligaya Annawi alleged in her complaint accusing respondent of several sexual harassment acts and imputation of dereliction of duty. DEC’s conducted joint investigation of the complaints of Magdalena and Ligaya, of which respondent was found guilty and was ordered dismissed from service. Respondent filed MR contending that he has never been charged of any offense in his 37 years of service, and by contrast, Magdalena was charged with several offenses of Defamation, Light Physical Injuries, Grave Threats, Malicious Mischief, Unjust vexation, Light Threats, and Grave Oral Threats on separate occasions. Thus, the numerous cases filed against Magdalena cast doubt on her character, integrity and credibility. ISSUE: Whether or not the derogatory record of Magdalena undermines the verity of her charge. RULING: NO. Rules on character evidence provision pertain only to criminal cases, not to administrative offenses. Even if it is applicable to admin cases, only character evidence that would establish the probability or improbability of the offense charged may be proved. Character evidence must be limited to the traits and characteristics involved in the type of offense charged. In this case, no evidence bearing on Magdalena’s chastity. What were presented were charges for grave oral defamation, grave threats, unjust vexation, physical injuries, malicious mischief, etc. filed against her. Regarding Magdalena’s credibility as a witness, the charges and complaints against her happened way back in the70s and 80s while the act complained of happened in 1994, thus, the said charges are no longer reliable proofs of Magdalena’s character or reputation. Evidence of one’s character or reputation must be confined to a time not too remote from the time in question. In other words, what is to be determined is the character or reputation of the person at the time of the trial and prior thereto, but not at a period remote from the commencement

of the suit. “It is unfair to presume that a person who has wandered from the path of moral righteousness can never retrace his steps again. Certainly, every person is capable to change or reform.” The general rule prevailing in a great majority of jurisdictions is that it is not permissible to show that a witness has been arrested or that he has been charged with or prosecuted for a criminal offense, or confined in jail for the purpose of impairing his credibility. _____________________________________________________________________________________

R es Gestae THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, vs. CEFERINO LUNGAYAN, accused. G.R. No. L-64556 June 10, 1988

FACTS: Rape is a serious offense against chastity. Its essential element is involuntariness. More often than not, the credibility of the offended party is vital. Failing in this, the prosecution cannot make out a case. Ceferino Lungayan was charged for the crime of rape of Agripina Juan Vda. de Garzota, then 52 years old and a widow. She was allegedly asleep in her room and with her were her two married daughters Silveria and Leticia, the latter's husband Berting Garcia and the children of said daughters. At about 10:00 o'clock of that evening, Silveria heard someone knock at their door and when she opened it she saw the accused who was then the barangay captain of Barangay Oscariz. He asked Silveria if her mother was in. She answered in the affirmative and added that her mother was asleep. Nevertheless, the accused entered the room where complainant was sleeping and woke up the complainant. He invited her to join him to observe the persons drinking wine in the market stall identified as Linda's canteen in violation of the barangay ordinance prohibiting the same after 10:00 o'clock in the evening. When she reached home about 12:00 midnight, Silveria asked her what happened and she revealed that the accused abused her. When Silveria pressed for details, the complainant replied that she will tell her the following morning. ISSUE: Whether or not the victim’s revelation form part of res gestae. RULING: No. The incident happened at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening. She went home only at about 12:00 o'clock that evening. Apparently, she still moved around or spent some time alone for about one hour. She must have contemplated what to do with her clothes all muddy. When she reached home she was confronted by her daughter as to what happened. She had no choice but to tell her that she was abused by appellant but she was not prepared to reveal everything. She promised to tell all the details to her daughter the following day. She thought about her predicament the whole night. She had no choice. She must have to tell everything the following day. The trial court considered the revelation of the complainant to her daughter Silveria of what happened to her when she returned home as part of the res gestae. It is important to stress that her statement must not only be spontaneous. It must also be made at a time when there was no opportunity for her to concoct or develop her own story. As the Court observed, the complainant did not immediately go home after the sexual encounter. She took a walk. She spent some time thinking of what to do. Her clothes were muddy. She had some bruises on her body and back because she was lying down on the ground during the sexual intercourse and their passionate interlude. She had enough time to make a decision on what will be the nature of her story. Her revelation cannot thus be categorized as part of the res gestae.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GUILLERMO PUTIAN, alias GUIRMO accused-appellant. 74 SCRA 133

1976

FACTS: A case for murder was filed against Putian. The witnesses presented for the prosecution were the doctor who treated the victim and the policeman who arrested the suspect. The victim (Panimdim) revealed an ante mortem statement identifying Putian as the perpetrator. ISSUE: Whether or not Panimdim’s testimony may be admitted as part of dying declaration o res gestae. RULING: The court held that the declaration is not of a dying declaration because it was not made under expectation of an impending death. However, although a declaration does not appear to have been made by the declarant under the expectation of a sure and impending death, and, for the reason, is not admissible as a dying declaration, yet if such declaration was made at the time of, or immediately after, the commission of the crime, or at a time when the exciting influence of the startling occurrence still continued in the declarant's mind, it is admissible as a part of the res gestae. _____________________________________________________________________________________ People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee vs. Manolito Tolentino alias “Bong-bong”, Carlito Tala alias “Boy”, Rodolfo Matawaran and John Doe, accused-appellants G.R. No.87085 February 2, 1993

FACTS: Adelaida Lingad left her niece Grace Paule and her three children at home to attend the wake of her uncle. The children were the only ones left at home. In the afternoon, accused Tala, Matawaran and an unknown person whose face was covered entered the house of lingad by forcibly breaking the window grill of the comfort room and demanded to know from the children where their mother hid her money. After Tolentino took the P4,000 he stabbed Grace Paule with a scythe while the three accused held the three other children who were then stabbed one after the other by Tolentino. During the stabbing incident, Grace Paule lost consciousness but was able to regain it after five minutes and shouted for help. Her mother and grandmother who lived nearby heard her and immediately proceeded to said house but the four accused had already left. Adelaida upon reaching Geraldine who was lying at the porch she asked her the identities of the person responsible for stabbing them with the latter answering “Bong-bong” and also mentioning the names of Tala and Matawaran. Grace Paule was the only surviving victim. She positively identified the three accused because accused Manolito Tolentino is her uncle as well as her barrio mate and accused-appellant Carlito Tala is a relative of her mother while accused Rodolfo Matawaran is the “barkada” of accused Tala.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in admitting the statement of Geraldine.

RULING: No. The court had correctly applied the principle of res gestae, namely: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae be a startling occurrence; (2) that the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) that the statements made must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances which are all present in the case at bar as Geraldine named as one of the perpetrators in the commission of the crime immediately after the occurrence of the stabbing incident.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee vs PABLO CUDAL, accused-appellant G.R. No. 167502 October 31, 2006

FACTS: About 2:00 o’clock in the morning, accused, while intoxicated, went home to ask money for his father. When the latter told the accused he has no money, it resulted to an altercation. Camillo, cousin of the accused heard the altercation and proceeded to the house. When he entered, he saw the father of the accused near the bed and his head full of blood. He inquired what happened and the latter told him that his son (Pablo) hit him with a rock. Camillo brought the victim to the house of his brother Segundo. Segundo also inquired what happened and the latter told him that his son hit him with a rock. ISSUE: Whether the testimony of Camillo and Pablo be admitted as evidence. RULING: YES. Although they were not eyewitnesses to the incident, it does not render their testimonies inadmissible, for they may be considered part of the res gestae, an exception to the hearsay rule. According to the rules, for a statement to be made part of the res gestae, the following must concur: (1) the principal act or res gestae must be a startling occurrence; (2) the statement is spontaneous or was made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise a false statement, and the statement was made during the occurrence or immediately prior or subsequent thereto; and (3) the statement made must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. Since the declaration of the victim was made immediately after a startling occurrence, having no time to fabricate or make a false statement, it is correct to properly take the declaration of the victim as part of the res gestae. Thus the testimony of the witnesses is admissible. _____________________________________________________________________________________ PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs ROMY FALLONES y LABANA, Appellant, G.R. No. 190341

March 16, 2011

FACTS: In the morning of June 29, 2004 Amalia was told by her mother to look for her sister Alice. Alice was an 18 years old girl with the mind of a 5 year old. Amalia looked for Alice all over the neighborhood until she neared the house of Romy Fallones. As she approached the house of Fallones, she heard a familiar cry: “Tama na! Tama na!” It was Alice’s voice. Immediately, she ran up to Fallones’ door and knocked repeatedly until Fallones opened the door. Behind Fallones she saw Alice. Alice said: “Amalia, may napkin na binigay si Romy o.” Alice grabbed her sister who had a bloodied shorts. They went to the barangay office where Alice was able to positively identify Fallones as the person who sexually abused her. A rape case was filed against Fallones. During trial, Alice died. Amalia testified on what she heard during the incident. Eventually, Fallones was convicted of rape. On appeal, Fallones argued that the testimony of Amalia on what she heard was hearsay for she only heard the cry of Alice but did not see the act of rape. ISSUE: WON the testimony of Amalia is admissible despite being hearsay.

RULING: Yes. It is exempted from the hearsay rule under the principle of Res Gestae. Res gestae refers to statements made by the participants or the victims of, or the spectators to, a crime immediately before, during, or after its commission. These statements are a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion, without any opportunity for the declarant to fabricate a false statement. An important consideration is whether there intervened, between the occurrence and the statement, any circumstance calculated to divert the mind and thus restore the mental balance of the declarant; and afford an opportunity for deliberation. For spontaneous statements to be admitted in evidence, the following must concur: 1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; 2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and 3) the statements concerned the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. In this case, the utterances of Alice “Tama na! Tama na!” were made during a startling event (when Fallones was penetrating her). When Fallones opened the door upon Amalia’s incessant knocking, Alice came out from behind him, uttering “Amalia, may napkin na binigay si Romy o.” The admissibility of Alice’s spontaneous statements rests on the valid assumption that they were spoken under circumstances where there had been no chance to contrive. It is difficult to lie in an excited state and the impulsiveness of the expression is a guaranty of trustworthiness. _____________________________________________________________________________________

E ntries in the Course of Business Palmer vs. Hoffman 318 U.S. 109 (1943) FACTS: The respondent and his spouse were injured at a railroad crossing. The jury deliberated whether the train failed to blow a whistle, ring a bell or have a light burning in the front of a train. The petitioner attempted to admit statements from the train engineer made in an interview two days after the accident. The engineer died before the trial. The petitioner attempted to admit the engineer’s statements as a business record, arguing that they were made in the course of a routine accident report. The trial court did not allow the statements to be admitted and found the petitioner liable. ISSUE: Whether or not the report is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule being an entry in the course of business. RULING: No. It is not an entry in the regular course of business. The Act which allows the admission of business entries refers only to records kept in the regular course of business and not those kept in the regular course of conduct related to business. The petitioners are in the railroad business. In this case, the reports were not for the systematic conduct of the enterprise as a railroad business. Unlike payrolls, account receivables, accounts payable, bills of lading and the like, the reports were calculated essentially for use in the court. Their primary utility is for litigating and not for railroading. _____________________________________________________________________________________ ENTRIES IN THE COURSE OF BUSINESS • Entries made at, or near the time of the transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty. ➢Requisites for admissibility: a) Entries must have been made at or near the time of the transaction to which they refer; b) Entrant must have been in a position to know the facts stated in the entries; c) Entries must have been made by entrant in his professional capacity or in the performance of his duty; d) Entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business of duties; e) Entrant must be deceased or unable to testify.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner vs. MONETS EXPORT AND MANUFACTURING CORP.,VICENTE V. TAGLE, SR. and MA. CONSUELO G. TAGLE, respondents. G.R. No. 184971, April 19, 2010

FACTS: On June 25, 198, petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank) and respondent Monets Export and Manufacturing Corporation (Monet) executed an Export Packing Credit Line Agreement (Agreement) under which the bank gave Monet a credit line of P250,000.00, secured by the proceeds of its export letters of credit, promissory notes, a continuing guaranty executed by respondent spouses Vicente V. Tagle, Sr. and Ma. Consuelo G. Tagle (the Tagles), and a third-party mortgage executed by one Pepita C. Mendigoria. Land Bank renewed and amended this credit line agreement several times until it reached a ceiling of P5 million. Land Bank claims that by August 31, 1992 Monets obligation under the Agreement had swelled to P11,464,246.19. Since Monet failed to pay despite demands, the bank filed a collection suit against Monet and the Tagles before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. In their answer, Monet and the Tagles claimed that Land Bank had refused to collect the US$33,434.00 receivables on Monets export letter of credit against Wishbone Trading Company of Hong Kong while making an unauthorized payment of US$38,768.40 on its import letter of credit to Beautilike (H.K.) Ltd. This damaged Monets business interests since it ran short of funds to carry on with its usual business. In other words, Land Bank mismanaged its client’s affairs under the Agreement. After trial, the RTC ordered petitioners to pay Land Bank the same. ISSUE: Whether or not the Consolidated Billing Statements can be admitted as evidence to prove the indebtedness of the respondents. RULING: Yes, it is admissible as evidence. Under Section 43, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, entries prepared in the regular course of business are prima facie evidence of the truth of what they state. The billing statement reconciles the transaction entries entered in the bank records in the regular course of business and shows the net result of such transactions. Entries in the course of business are accorded unusual reliability because their regularity and continuity are calculated to discipline record keepers in the habit of precision. If the entries are financial, the records are routinely balanced and audited. In actual experience, the whole of the business world function in reliance of such kind of records. In the case at bar, Monet and the Tagles can of course dispute the banks billing statements by proof that the bank had exaggerated what was owed it and that Monet had made more payments than were reflected in those statements. They can do this by presenting evidence of those greater payments. Notably, Monet and the Tagles have consistently avoided stating in their letters to the bank how much they still owed it. But, ultimately, it is as much their obligation to prove this disputed point if they deny the banks statements of their loan accounts. _____________________________________________________________________________________ DEOGRACIAS CANSINO, Petitioner, vs. PRUDENTIAL SHIPPING AND MANAGEMENT CORP. (in substitution for MEDBULK MARITIME MANAGEMENT CORP.) and SEA JUSTICE, S.A., Respondents. G.R. No. 155338

February 20, 2007

FACTS: On July 18, 1996, pursuant to a contract of employment, Deogracias Cansino, petitioner, worked as a seaman in the Medbulk Maritime Management Corporation, a local manning agent of Sea Justice, S.A., a Greek shipping company. Under the contract, petitioner will serve on board the vessel M/V Commander for a term of twelve (12) months with a monthly basic salary of US$470.00, fixed overtime pay of US$141.00 for 120 hours, and vacation leave with pay of US$63.00 per month, or a total monthly

compensation of US$674.00. The contract was then processed and approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). While on board the M/V Commander, the ship’s master, Captain Nikolaos Kandylis, unilaterally altered the terms and conditions of the employment contract. Petitioner’s position as seaman was changed to pumpman. Actually this was a promotion considering that his initial monthly pay of US$674.00 was raised to US$1,164.00. Later, Captain Kandylis received several derogatory reports against petitioner, such as drunkenness, insubordination, abandonment of post, and disorderly behavior. These were duly recorded in the ship’s logbook. On August 10, 1996, seven (7) members of the crew of M/V Commander (including petitioner) submitted a request to Captain Kandylis for early repatriation because of family problems. Their requests were granted. After disembarking, they were furnished hotel accommodations and repatriation expenses. Petitioner then returned to the Philippines. On November 18, 1996, Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Medbulk and Sea Justice before the NLRC. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner Cansino was illegally dismissed. RULING: Appendix 2 of the POEA Standard Employment Contract for Filipino migrant workers contains a list of offenses with corresponding sanctions. This list includes drunkenness. The Masters Report dated October 6, 1996 signed by Captain Kandylis contains these entries: the illegal consumption of alcoholic drinks by the Philippine crew put in danger the crew, the vessel, her cargo, the other nearby sailing vessels as well as environment from eventual destruction. One of the crew members named therein was petitioner. The Report shows that he was always drunk, disorderly and disobedient; and that the Conformity for Sobriety which every member of the crew was made to sign was violated every day. In the earlier case of Seahorse Maritime Corporation vs. NLRC, which likewise involved a seaman who was prone to intoxication and creating trouble aboard ship when drunk, we held that serious misconduct in the form of drunkenness and disorderly and violent behavior, habitual neglect of duty, and insubordination or willful disobedience to the lawful orders of his superior officer, are just causes for dismissal of an employee under Article 282 of the Labor Code, and that where the dismissal is for cause, the erring seaman is neither entitled to separation pay or to the salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract. We likewise cannot sustain petitioner’s claim that he was underpaid. In fact, Captain Kandylis increased his monthly compensation from US$674.00 to US$1,164.00 which he received. While the contract as altered was not approved by the POEA, however, the lack of such approval is inconsequential since the alteration redounded to petitioner’s benefit. _____________________________________________________________________________________

O fficial Records ENTRIES IN OFFICIAL RECORDS • Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. (Sec. 44 Rule 130) ➢Requisites for admissibility: a) That it was made by a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so; b) It was made by a public officer in the performance of his duty, of by another person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; c) The public officer or the other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated which must have been acquired by him personally or through official information.

THE SPOUSES BERNABE AFRICA and SOLEDAD C. AFRICA, and the HEIRS OF DOMINGA ONG, petitioners-appellants, vs. CALTEX (PHIL.), INC., MATEO BOQUIREN and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondentsappellees. GR No. L-12986 March 31, 1966

FACTS: A fire broke out at the Caltex service station at the corner of Antipolo Street and Rizal Avenue. The fire spread and burned neighboring houses, including the house of herein petitioners. Petitioners submitted in evidence were reports, namely, a Police Document Report and a Fire Department Report prepared by a certain Captain Tinio of the Armed Forces of the Philipppines, and a Police Report by one Capt. Leoncio Mariano. Both the trial court and the CA ruled that the reports constitute as double hearsay, and therefore inadmissible in evidence. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the reports in question constitute an exception to the hearsay rule. RULING: The reports made by Captain Tinio are inadmissible. There are three requisites for admissibility under the rule just mentioned: (a) that the entry was made by a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official information. Of the three requisites just stated, only the last need be considered here. Obviously the material facts recited in the reports as to the cause and circumstances of the fire were not within the personal knowledge of the officers who conducted the investigation. To qualify their statements as "official information" acquired by the officers who prepared the reports, the persons who made the statements not only must have personal knowledge of the facts stated but must have the duty to give such statements for record. Thus, the reports prepared by Capt. Tinio do not constitute an exception to the hearsay rule; the facts stated therein were not acquired by the reporting officers through official information, not having been given by the informants pursuant to any duty to do so. However, the report made by Capt. Mariano, having been submitted by a police officer in the performance of his duties on the basis of his own personal observation of the facts reported, may properly be considered as an exception to the hearsay rule. _____________________________________________________________________________________ PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JOSEPH LEONES Y DUCUSIN alias JESSIE, Defendant-Appellant. G.R. No. L-48727

September 30, 1982

FACTS: Irene Dulaywas a salesgirl employed in the store of spouses Leones. She filed a criminal complaint against Joseph Leones, son of her employer, allegingthat with the help of Joseph’s sister, Elizabeth, Joseph was able to have carnal knowledge with her. According to Dulay, she was made to take three (3)tablets, which she believed to be aspirin tablets, that made her feel dizzy. She was found without her panties on and was immediately taken to the hospital for examination. The accused denied the allegation of Dulay arguing that he was at the beach resort with his family at the time the alleged rapehappened. The trial court found the accused guilty of having raped Dulay. ISSUE: Whether or not the guilt of Joseph Leones was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING: There are a number of significant facts from the recorded evidence of the prosecution which materially and substantially debunked and derailed the theory of Dulay. Based from the clinical records, the lacerations on the hymen of Dulaywere regarded as “healed” on the same day when the rape against her was committed. It would have been recorded as a “fresh laceration”. It was also found out that Dulay was having her menstrual period on the day of the alleged rape. Thus, it was impossible that accused Joseph Leones could have committed rape against her person. _____________________________________________________________________________________ EMILIO MANALO and CLARA SALVADOR, Plaintiffs and Appellees, vs. ROBLES TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., Defendant and Appellant. G.R. No. L-8171, August 16, 1956

FACTS: Robles Transportation Company, Inc. owned a taxicab which collided with a passenger truck which ran over an eleven-year old child, Armando Manalo. Manalo suffered injuries that caused his death. The driver, Edgardo Hernandez, was found guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence. He was able to serve his sentence but failed to pay the indemnity to the heirs of deceased Manalo. Two writs of execution issued against him were returned unsatisfied with the sheriff certifying that no property, real or personal, in Hernandez’ name could be found. Thus, the parents of the deceased child, Emilio Manalo and his wife Clara Salvador, proceeded against defendant company to enforce the latter’s subsidiary liability in accordance with Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code. Along with the copy of the decision in the criminal case convicting Hernandez, the parents, plaintiffs herein, presented the writs of execution and the sheriff’s return showing that the writs were not satisfied because of Hernandez’ insolvency. But defendant company objected to the admissibility of the sheriff’s return contending that the sheriff should testify in court, otherwise, it will be deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine said sheriff. And it filed a motion to dismiss the complaint alleging that Hernandez is an indispensable party and should therefore be included as party defendant. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss holding that Hernandez was not an indispensable party defendant. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the sheriff’s return is admissible as evidence; and 2. Whether or not the sheriff needs to testify in court on his return. RULING: Yes, the sheriff’s return is admissible as evidence and the sheriff need not testify in court to establish the veracity of the contents of the same. A sheriff’s return is an official statement made by a public official in the performance of a duty specially enjoined bylaw. It forms part of official records and is prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. Thus, the sheriff making the return need not testify in court as to the facts stated in his entry. In the case of Antillon v. Barcelon, 37 Phil. 151, the court said that the manner of proving public documents executed before and certified to under the hand and seal of certain public officials constitutes an exception to the manner of proving private documents. It went on to saying that litigation will become unlimited if the testimony of these officials will be needed always, the officials to be summoned from their ordinary duties to be declared as witnesses. In effect, they would find themselves devoting much of their time attending in court than in delivering their duties as public officers. Consequently, that would make the administration of government suffer to the detriment of the public. Public officers are presumed to discharge their duties with accuracy and fidelity and thus, whatever acts they do in the discharge of that public duty may be given in evidence and shall be taken as true albeit under a degree of caution depending on the nature and circumstances of each case. Furthermore, absent any collusion between the defendant and the offended party, a judgment of conviction is binding upon the party subsidiarily liable. Thus, in the case at bar, the sheriff’s return will be admitted as evidence without requiring the sheriff to testify. The document is a public record and is prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. And the sheriff is a public official who is presumed to discharge his duty with utmost fidelity and accuracy.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, vs. MODESTO CABUANG y FLORES, NARDO MATABANG y SALVADOR, JOHN DOE and RICHARD DOE, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS G.R. No. 103292 January 27, 1993

FACTS: Evelyn De Vera and her cousin Maria Victoria Parana, both 19 years of age, having come from a house of a common friend, were walking home along an uninhabited place in Bayambang, Pangasinan. Suddenly, from out of the rice paddies along the road, Modesto Cabuang emerged with a flashlight and asked them where they were going. Evelyn became very anxious and started walking faster. Upon the other hand, Maria Victoria started talking to Modesto. When Evelyn was about ten (10) feet ahead of the two, she looked back and saw Modesto the figure of Nardo Matabang, who had also suddenly appeared behind them from the rice fields alongside the road. Modesto then grabbed Maria Victoria and covered her mouth. Nardo Matabang in turn pursued Evelyn, who had started to run away. She ran and ran until she entered the yard of a house along the road and hid in the shadows of the plants and shrubs inside the yard. After some time, having lost sight of Evelyn, Nardo went back and rejoined Modesto. Sometime later, Evelyn from her hiding place saw a tricycle pass by with her cousin, the two accused, the tricycle driver and another person who was seated at the back of the tricycle. Evelyn heard her cousin crying and pleading for help. After the tricycle had passed by, Evelyn emerged from her hiding place and proceeded to the house of her sister. There she was scolded by her sister for coming home late. Evelyn, confused by the scolding and frightened by what she had just seen and experienced, was not able to tell her sister what had just occurred. The following morning, Maria Victoria was found dead along the road. The police investigator, who initially questioned witness De Vera that morning, noticed that she was in a state of shock. He accordingly chose to defer further questioning until the afternoon of the same day when Evelyn had calmed down sufficiently to be able to give a sworn statement to the police. Thus, there was the initial report prepared and recorded in the police blotter at around 11 o'clock in the morning, stating that the assailants were still unidentified. Evelyn de Vera's sworn statement made and completed in the afternoon of the same day, where she revealed the identities of the men she had seen the night before and who she believed were responsible for the rape and death of her cousin Maria Victoria. ISSUE: Whether or not the police blotter regularly done in the course of performance of official duty are conclusive proof of the truth of such entries. RULING: It remains only to note that entries in a police blotter, though regularly done in the course of performance of official duty are not conclusive proof of the truth of such entries. In People v. Santito, Jr.,this Court held that entries in official records like a police blotter are only prima facie evidence of the facts therein set out, since the entries in the police blotter could well be incomplete or inaccurate. Testimony given in open court during the trial is commonly much more lengthy and detailed than the brief entries made in the police blotter and the trial court cannot base its findings on a police report merely, but must necessarily consider all other evidence gathered in the course of the police investigation and presented in court. In the case at bar, we conclude that prosecution witness Evelyn de Vera did positively and clearly identify Modesto Cabuang and Nardo Matabang as among those who had raped and killed and robbed the hapless Maria Victoria Parana. _____________________________________________________________________________________

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RICARDO SAN GABRIEL y ORTIZ, defendant-appellant. GR No. l 107735 FEBRUARY 1, 1996

FACTS: At around seven o’clock in the evening of 26 November 1989, within the vicinity of Pier 14 at North Harbor along Marcos Road, Manila, a fistfight ensued between Jaime Tonog on one hand and the accused Ricardo San Gabriel together with Ramon Doe on the other. The fight was eventually broken up when onlookers pacified the protagonists. Ricardo and Ramon then hastened towards Marcos Road but in no time were back with bladed weapons. They approached Tonog surreptitiously, surrounded him and simultaneously stabbed him in the stomach and at the back, after which the assailants ran towards the highway leaving Tonog behind on the ground. He was then brought to Mary Johnston Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival. During the trial, the accused leans heavily on the Advance Information Sheet 6 prepared by Pat. Steve Casimiro which did not mention him at all and named only "Ramon Doe" as the principal suspect. ISSUES: Whether the Advance Information Sheet is admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule. RULING: NO. Entries in official records, as in the case of a police blotter, are only prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. They are not conclusive. The entry in the police blotter is not necessarily entitled to full credit for it could be incomplete and inaccurate, sometimes from either partial suggestions or for want of suggestions or inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may be unable to recall the connected collateral circumstances necessary for the correction of the first suggestion of his memory and for his accurate recollection of all that pertain to the subject. It is understandable that the testimony during the trial would be more lengthy and detailed than the matters stated in the police blotter. Significantly, the Advance Information Sheet was never formally offered by the defense during the proceedings in the court below. Hence any reliance by the accused on the document must fail since the court cannot consider any evidence which has not been formally offered. The Advance Information Sheet does not constitute an exception to the hearsay rule, hence, inadmissible. The public officer who prepared the document had no sufficient and personal knowledge of the stabbing incident. Any information possessed by him was acquired from Camba, the alleged eyewitness who reported the crime to the police, which therefore could not be categorized as official information because in order to be classified as such the persons who made the statements not only must have personal knowledge of the facts stated but must have the duty to give such statements for the record. _____________________________________________________________________________________ PETER TARAPEN y CHONGOY, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. G.R. No. 173824 August 28, 2008

FACTS: Petitioner was charged before the RTC of Baguio City with Frustrated Homicide for attacking and assaulting James Lacbao Pangoden. The day after, the victim died from the injuries he sustained. As a consequence, an amended information was filed charging petitioner with Homicide. Patricia S. Pangoden testified on the events that happened to her husband from the time he was bought to the hospital until the time he died. She also testified on the expenses she incurred as a result of the incident.

The prosecution formally offered Exhibits "A" to "H," inclusive, with sub-markings which the trial court admitted. The trial court gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses Molly J. Linglingen, Silmana Linglingen and Virginia Costales as against the testimonies of defense witnesses Jimmy Pugoy, petitioner Peter Tarapen and Edmond Ferrer. The trial court found the prosecution’s version of the incident credible. The trial court said Virginia Costales saw the first part of the incident, which was the heated argument between petitioner and the victim involving the victim’s soiled goods, while Molly J. Linglingen and Silmana Linglingen witnessed the second part of the incident when petitioner went to the back portion of the garbage truck and got a shovel with which he hit the victim from the back, twice on the head, resulting in his death. Having had the opportunity to observe them, it was convinced that they were telling the truth vis-à-vis the defense witnesses who were lying, as can be seen from their hesitant answers and evasive looks when they testified for the petitioner who was a co-employee. However, two seemingly conflicting medico-legal certificates were presented. ISSUE: Whether a medical certificate issued, corroborated by other evidence, is sufficient to establish the facts of a crime. RULING: Yes. This Court believes in the findings made by Dr. Cala as contained in the medico-legal certificate he issued showing that the victim suffered injuries on the right side of his head, consistent with the declarations of prosecution witnesses that the victim was, from behind, struck with a shovel twice on the right side of the head. We give more weight to this medical certificate, because the same was issued by a government doctor. By actual practice, only government physicians, by virtue of their oaths as civil service officials, are competent to examine persons and issue medical certificates which will be used by the government. As such, the medical certificate carries the presumption of regularity in the performance of his functions and duties. Moreover, under Section 44, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court, entries in official records made in the performance of official duty are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. Dr. Cala’s findings that the victim sustained injuries on the right side of his head are, therefore, conclusive in the absence of evidence proving the contrary, as in this case. We cannot consider the contents of the medical certificate issued by Dr. Mensalvas sufficient to controvert the findings of Dr. Cala. As held by this Court, an unverified medical certificate not issued by a government physician is unreliable. Even assuming arguendo that we give more weight to the medical certificate issued by Dr. Mensalvas, this does not mean that the testimonies of Molly and Silmana Linglingen shall be disbelieved. It is noted that Dr. Mensalvas testified that the victim sustained a wound on the right side of his head, possibly caused by a steel shovel. Such a finding is consistent with the claim of Molly and Silmana Linglingen that the victim was hit on the right side of the head. Though there can be inconsistencies of the testimonies of the witnesses with Dr. Mensalvas’s other findings (i.e., injuries on the left portion of the head) this does not mean that we should totally doubt and discard the other portions of their testimonies. _____________________________________________________________________________________ JERRY VALEROSO, accused; vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESS, complainant. G.R. No. 164815

September 3, 2009

FACTS: Petitioner was charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition under P.D. 1866 and was found liable as charged before the RTC of Quezon City. On July 10, 1996, the Central District Command served a duly issued warrant of arrest to Sr. Insp. Jerry Valeroso in a case of kidnapping for ransom. Valeroso was found and arrested in INP Central Station in Culiat, Quezon City where he was about to board a tricycle. He was bodily searched and after which a firearm with live ammunition was found tucked in his waist. The subject firearm was later verified by the Firearms and Explosive Division

at Camp Crame and was confirmed and revealed to havenot been issued to the petitioner but to another person. The defense on the other hand contended that Valeroso was arrested and searched in the boarding house of his children in New Era Quezon City. He was aroused from his slumber when four heavily armed men in civilian clothes bolted the room. The pointed their guns on him and pulled him out of the room as the raiding team went back inside, searched and ransacked the room. Moments later an operative came out of the room exclaiming that he has found a gun inside. Adrian Yuson, an occupant to the adjacent room testified for the defense. SPO3 Timbol, Jr. testified that the firearm with live ammunition was issued to Jerry Valeroso by virtue of a Memorandum Receipt. The petitioner was found guilty as charged by the RTC. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the same. Hence this petition. Petitioner raised the issue of illegalilty of the search and the admissibility and validity of the evidence obtained as the same was the “fruit of the poisonous tree”. ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless search and seizure of the firearm and ammunition valid. RULING: From the foregoing narration of facts, we can readily conclude that the arresting officers served the warrant of arrest without any resistance from Valeroso. They placed him immediately under their control by pulling him out of the bed, and bringing him out of the room with his hands tied. To be sure, the cabinet which, according to Valeroso, was locked, could no longer be considered as an "area within his immediate control" because there was no way for him to take any weapon or to destroy any evidence that could be used against him. Hence, the evidence presented by the prosecution cannot be admitted in evidence. _____________________________________________________________________________________

Commercial Lists STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, vs LAWRENCE LUNGSFORD, Defendant-Appellant, 400 A. 2d 843 (1947)

FACTS: Defendant was arrested and found in his possession of a 1968 Plymouth Road Runner two-door hardtop. The state alleged that the road runner was stolen on January 8, 1987 from James Wilton. However, the state failed to produce Wilton at trial to identify the vehicle or testify that it was stolen from him. Defendant testified at trial that he purchased the car from a certain James Law in January 1973. Although he had a title and registration, he could not corroborate the purchase. Both sides attempted to locate Law but were unsuccessful. The claims of trial error focus on the manner in which the police attempted to prove that the Road Runner in defendant’s possession when he was arrested was the allegedly stolen vehicle of Mr. Wilton. At the trial, the state alleged that defendant obtained possession of the car stolen from Mr. Wilton and then took the VIN tag from a similar model car and screwed it on to the dashboard of the stolen car. The state also conteded the packing slip number found in the back seat coils, when traced, proved that the seats came from a stolen 1969 Plymouth. In addition to the various number traces the State produced a criminal investigation report which showd that James Wilton reported his car stolen on January 8, 1975. The incident report contained obviously an incorrect VIN. Sergeant Barett of the Edison Police testified that he contacted Wilton by phone within a wekk of the incident and obtained the correct VIN which the factory-trace undertaken though the NATB ultimately revealed to be the VIN compatible with the confidential serial number on the radiator brace of the subject Road Runner. In Order to attempt to prove its case the State was required to reply on the National Automobile Theft Bureau (NATB) factory-trace information to establish that the car in defendant’s possession when he was arrested with the car reported stolen by Wilton. The NATB information led the police to the Wilton car-theft incident report through the not quite perfect matchup with the Division of Motor Vehicle VIN information. Although the judge did not permit the State to prove exactly what NATB told Detective

Walsh, the entire process in effect was crucial in the State’s attempt to link the car in defenant’s possession to the allegedly stolen Wilton vehicle. The record, however, contains no information about the probable reliability of the NATB. Defendant’s appellate claims emphasize the hearsay nature of certain evidence admitted at trial over this objection. ISSUE: Whether or not the NATB’s information is inadmissibile in court for being hearsay evidence. RULING: Yes. We are constrained to hold that this conviction must be reversed. The critical aspect of the case – this crucial link, was effectively evidential against defendant. Without the use of the NATB process no potential nexus between Wilton’s car and defendant’s car could have possibly been established. But the record is devoid of any proof of the reliability of the NATB procedures and therefore of any proper evidential basis for admission of data derived therefrom. In our opinion the NATB procedures for tracing the identification of motor vehicles could be properly be held by a trial court to be evidential in a criminal case if compliance with this provision of law is established. This rule states: Evidence of a statement of matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register, periodical or other published compilation is admissible to prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated if the compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them. _____________________________________________________________________________________ PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation, petitioner vs. Court of Appeals and Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation, respondents G.R. No. 107518 October 8, 1998

FACTS: M/V Maria Efigenia XV collided with the vessel “Petroparcel”, owned at that time by Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LSC).The Board of Marine Inquiry found the Petroparcel at fault for the collision and based on this and after unsuccessful demands on petitioner, private respondent sued LSC and Petroparcel captain Edgardo Doruelo for actual and compensatory damages. During the pendency of the proceedings, PNOC Shipping Transport Corporation acquired ownership of Petroparcel and replaced LSC in the trial.CFI Caloocan ruled in favor of private respondent, awarding it: the sum of P6,438,048.00 representing the value of the fishing boat with interest of 6% per annum; P50,000 attorney’s fees and the cost of suit. Petitioner (PNOC) questioned the admissibility and competency of private respondent’s documents as basis for damages. The documents were not sufficient evidence to support the extent and actual damages incurred by respondent. The price quotations were not duly authenticated and that the witness (Del Rosario) for the respondent did not have personal knowledge on the contents of the writings and neither was he an expert on the subjects thereof. ISSUE: Whether the documents falls under Sec 45 Rule 130 of the ROC and thus sufficient to establish the amount of actual and compensatory damages. RULING: NO. For actual and compensatory damages, the injured party is required to prove the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence available.

The documents presented by private respondent are regarded as hearsay evidence. Del Rosario could not have testified on the veracity of the documents as he was not the author of them. He can only testify as to facts of his personal knowledge. As such, the price quotations were considered ordinary private writings which under the Revised Rules of Court should be proffered along with the testimony of the writers thereof. _____________________________________________________________________________________ GREGORIO ESTRADA, Plaintiff, vs PROCULO NOBLE, Defendant, G.R. No. L-2726

September 29, 1950

FACTS: Proculo Noble received from his father, Maximo Noble, a land through a public deed of sale after payment of certain amount. The sale was subject to a condition wherein the vendor, his heirs and assigns shall have the right to repurchase the said land in a specific time. After the lapse of the period agreed upon, the right to repurchase is extinguished and the vendee shall be the absolute and unconditional owner of the said land without executing an instrument. Proculo alleged that the sale entered into was an absolute sale of land and it was only named as a sale with right to repurchase to prohibit him from disposing the property. After some time, Maximo Noble sell the said land to Gregorio Estrada. A case arises between Noble and Estrada. Trial court ruled in favor of Estrada and ordered defendant to execute a deed of resale in favor of Estrada for the amount of P700 which plaintiff offered for repurchase and in case defendant refuses to execute a deed of resale, Register of Deeds of Camarines Sur is ordered to execute a deed of resale of the same property in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P700 in Philippine currency and the defendant is ordered to pay the cost of the suit. The appellant questions the decision rendered by the Court as it the amount to be paid for the resale of the land does not commensurate to the amount paid by the defendant at the time he bought the property. ISSUE: Whether the transaction entered into by Maximo and Proculo Noble was an absolute sale? RULING: This is an action to redeem a parcel of land worth about P3,000. The Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. In the notice of appeal filed on November 22, 1948, the defendant announced his intention to appeal to the Supreme Court "inasmuch as the issues involved therein are mostly questions of law." The record was accordingly elevated to this Court. Several errors assigned in the brief for defendant-appellant unquestionably refer to questions of fact. Among the cases over which the Supreme Court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction, are those in which only errors or questions of law are involved. Conformably to this constitutional and statutory precept, the Rules of Court (see. 3, Rule 42) provide that "where the appeal is based purely on questions of law, the appellant shall so state in his notice of appeal, and then no other questions shall be allowed, and the evidence need not be elevated." The case at bar is clearly not one falling under the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. In the first place, the appellant expressly stated in his notice of appeal that the issues involved in the appeal are "mostly questions of law," an expression plainly not synonymous to "only errors or questions of law." In the second place, in accordance with his notice of appeal, the appellant has assigned in his brief several errors involving questions of fact. This, the appellant has undoubtedly the right to do, because in his notice of appeal he did not state that the appeal is "based purely on questions of law," as provided in section 3 of Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. The present appeal, involving questions of fact and of law, falls within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals (sec. 29, Rep. Act No. 296) and must therefore be certified to said court, pursuant to section 31 of Republic Act No. 296 which provides that "all cases which may be erroneously brought to the Supreme Court or to the Court of Appeals shall be sent to the proper court, which shall hear the same, as if it had originally been brought before it.” Wherefore, let this case be forwarded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.

Learned Treaties – A published treatise, periodical or pamphlet on a subject of history, law, science, or art is admissible as tending to prove the truth of a matter stated therein if the court takes judicial notice, or a witness expert in the subject testifies, that the writer of the statement in the treatise, periodical or pamphlet is recognized in his profession or calling as expert in the subject. (Sec. 46 Rule 130)

P rior Testimony CARMELITA TAN and RODOLFO TAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FRANCISCO TAN (alias Tan Uh Bak and Tan Seng Ka), respondents. G.R. No. L-22793 May 16, 1967

FACTS: Francisco Tan was sued for acknowledgement and support by Carmelita and Rodolfo Tan through their mother Celestina Daldo. However, after petitioners have presented their evidence, an amicable settlement was reached which led to Carmelita to move the case to be dismissed. She also subscribed to an affidavit stating that Tan “is not the father of my said minor children named Carmelita and Rodolfo but another person whose name I cannot divulge” and that she prepared said affidavit “to record what is true and correct what misinterpretation may arise in the future.” RTC dismiss the action. After some time after the dismissal of the case, petitioners through their maternal grandfather Servillano Daldo as guardian ad litem filed action for acknowledgment and support involving the same parties, cause of action and subject matter. RTC dismissed the case based on res judicata. Tan appealed to the CA, which reversed RTC decision and dismissed the complaint. ISSUE: Whether or not the testimonies made by petitioner’s witnesses in the former case may be admissible as evidence under Section 41 of Rule 130. RULING: No. The witnesses are available. They are not dead nor are they outside the Philippines. They just refused to testify. Thus, they do not come within the legal purview of those “unable to testify.” Petitioners also failed to avail court remedies to secure their attendance. Petitioners tried to prove that Daldo and Tan lived together as husband and wife for more than 8 years. Carmelita and Rodolfo were allegedly fruits of such cohabitation. Respondent denies such and alleges that he is very much a married man with several children. Daldo by her own admission, had been a nursemaid (yaya) in the respondent’s residence but for a short period of not less than one year. Carmelita was born on May 8, 1942 and Rodolfo on September 11, 1944. The validity of the testimony of petitioner’s witnesses was downgraded by the affidavit of Celestina. In such affidavit, Daldo deposed that petitioners were not fathered by Tan but by another person whose name she could not divulge. SC affirmed judgment of CA. _____________________________________________________________________________________ OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs HERSCHEL ROBERTS, Defendant-Appellant, 448 US 56 (1980)

FACTS: Defendant Roberts had stayed at Anita Isaacs apartment for a few days. During his stay, defendant used checks and credit cards under Bernard Isaacs’s name. At the preliminary hearing, Anita was called by defendant’s counsel and asked at length about granting permission to defendant.

She denied granting permission and thereafter during the trial, Anita was not available despite an extensive search by the prosecution and her family. Therefore, the prosecution submitted her preliminary hearing testimony as 1evidence. Defendant objected but the trial judge allowed the evidence. Defendant was convicted, but the appellate court and the Supreme Court of Ohio sided with defendant in not allowing the admissibility of the evidence presented by the prosecution. ISSUE: Whether or not the preliminary hearing testimony made by an unavailable witness is admissible in evidence. RULING: Yes, the introduction in evidence of the testimony of the daughter in the preliminary hearing was constitutionally permissible. The admission of the preliminary hearing testimony does not violate defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution. The witness was unavailable, but the prosecution made a good-faith effort in trying to locate her. There were also several factors that demonstrated the reliability of her testimony such as defendant’s counsel asker her leading questions at length during the preliminary hearing. The daughter’s prior testimony at the preliminary hearing bore sufficient “indicia of reliability”. ____________________________________________________________________________________

TESTIMONY OR DEPOSITION AT A FORMER TRIAL • The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him. ➢Requisites for admissibility: a) The witness whose testimony is offered in evidence is either dead, unable to testify, insane, mentally incapacitated, lost his memory through old age or disease, physically disabled, kept away by contrivance of the opposite party and despite diligent search cannot be found; b) Identity of parties in the previous and the present case or proceeding; c) Identity of issues; d) Opportunity of cross-examination of witness. ➢If the witness has been subjected to cross-examination in a former trial, the rule is satisfied, and the former testimony may now be used. In applying this proposition, the following details may arise for settlement: a) Was the testimony given before a court allowing cross-examination by adverse parties and having power to compel answer? If not, the testimony cannot be used. b) If the testimony was given as a deposition, was the opponent given reasonable notice and opportunity to attend and cross-examine? c) Whether at a former trial or before a deposition officer, were the then issues and parties so nearly the same as now that the opportunity to cross-examine on the present issues was inadequate? If not, the testimony cannot be used. d) Was cross-examination prevented by the death or illness or refusal of the witness, after giving his direct testimony? If it was, the direct examination cannot be used.

O pinion Rule – The opinion of a witness is not admissible, except as indicated in the following sections. (Sec. 48-50 Rule 130) DILAG & CORPORATED VS. MERCED 45 OG 5536 (1949)

FACTS: This case stemmed when Dilag & Co. filed a case for the theft of a truck bought from International Harvester Company. The incident happened during the Japanese occupation. After deliberation, Dilag saw the truck parked outside a restaurant. Dilag had it seized and filed complaint of theft against Merced. Merced claimed that he bought the truck in good faith and he relied on the copy of the certificate of registration. Dilag presented Jose Aguilar of the Bureau of Public works on the fact of tampering of the motor vehicle number. The court ruled in favor of Dilag and ordered Merced to pay damages. Merced attacked the competency of the testimony of Jose Aguilar ISSUE: Whether or not Aguilar’s testimony shall be admissible as evidence in court as an expert testimony. RULING: Yes. Aguilar’s testimony should be given weight and value. The law provides that there is no precise requirement as to the mode in which skill or experience shall have been acquired. Scientific study and training are not always essential to the competency of a witness as an expert. A witness may be competent to testify as an expert although his knowledge his knowledge was acquired through the medium of practical experience rather than scientific study and research. _____________________________________________________________________________________ THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee, vs. VALENTIN TRONO, ET AL., defendants-appelants. G.R. No. 1344

January 19, 1904

FACTS: The defendants, charged with the murder of Benito Perez, were convicted by the trial court of the offense of lesiones menos graves, and sentenced to six months of arresto mayor, the payment of 100 Mexican pesos as damages to the heirs of the deceased, and to the costs of the trial. From the evidence introduced at the trial it appears that late at night on February 4, 1903, the deceased, Benito Perez, Policarpio Guevarra, and Felipe Bautista, were arrested in their respective houses by the defendants Valentin Trono, subinspector of the municipal police of the town of Hagonoy, accompanied by Jose and Agustin who were municipal policemen and Maximo Angeles. The deceased and his companions were suspected of the theft of a revolver belonging to Maximo Angeles. The three were taken to a place called Sapang-Angelo and there were beaten and illtreated. They were then brought to the municipal building of the town where Benito Perez who has suffered much of the beatings were complaining of severe pain and was not able to properly walk. Nothing was adduced from the investigation of the theft, the three were subsequently released from custody. Benito Perez died the next morning. An investigation ensued and the defense contends that the death of Benito Perez was not due to the wounds inflicted during the beatings, but to a serious illness, from which the deceased had been suffering for a long time, basing such allegation on the certificate and testimony of the physician, Don Andres Icasiano. The trial court convicted the accused of murder. The defendants appealed decisions, relying on the testimony of the expert witness.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in not giving credence to the expert testimony.

RULING: The court did not erred in not giving credence to the expert testimony. Expert testimony no doubt constitutes evidence worthy of meriting consideration, although not exclusive, on questions of a professional character. The courts of justice, however, are not bound to submit their findings necessarily to such testimony; they are free to weight them, and they can give or refuse to give them any value as proof, or they can even counterbalance such evidence with the other elements of conviction which may have been adduced during the trial. In the present case there are to be found sufficient data which show in a conclusive manner the seriousness of the wounds inflicted upon the deceased, which from the very first moment prevented him from keeping on his feet, and caused him continuous and sharp pains in the abdomen and retention of the urine — symptoms which constantly showed themselves until death came — which in the absence of satisfactory proof to the contrary may be attributed to these causes, which undoubtedly were sufficient in themselves to bring about the death of the deceased. We therefore reverse the judgment appealed from and sentence the defendants Maximo Angeles and Valentin Trono to the penalty of fourteen years eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, and Timoteo Natividad to the penalty of eight years and one day of prision mayor, and all three to the payment of an indemnity consisting of 500 pesos, Philippine currency, to the heirs of the deceased, and to the payment of the costs in this instance. _____________________________________________________________________________________ PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PABLO ADOVISO, defendant-appellant. GR Nos. 116196-97June 23, 1999

FACTS: At around 8:00 in the evening on February 18, 1990, Emeterio uttered that he had been shot. Their son Bonifacio, who was living in an adjacent house, heard the gunshot and went to their front yard to investigate. Bonifacio saw his father being shot by several persons from the outside, but he could only recognize accused Pablo Adoviso since he was the only one not wearing a mask and that the light from the gas lamp inside the camaligilluminated his face clearly. On the other hand, Bonifacio’s son Elmer rushed to his grandfather’s house where he also saw several assailants shoot his cousin, Rufino. After seeing Elmer, the gunmen fled the place. Both Emeterio and Rufino were taken to the hospital, but died soon thereafter. Trial ensued, and the main witnesses presented were Bonifacio and Elmer. However, the accused claims that he was not properly identified by said witnesses due to the darkness of the night. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused had been properly identified. RULING: Yes. Visibility is indeed a vital factor in the determination of whether or not an eyewitness could have identified the perpetrator of a crime. However, it is settled that when conditions of visibility are favorable, and the witnesses do not appear to be biased, their assertion as to the identity of the malefactor should normally be accepted. Illumination produced by kerosene lamp or a flashlight is sufficient to allow identification of persons. Wick lamps, flashlights, even moonlight or starlight may, in proper situations be considered sufficient illumination, making the attack on the credibility of witnesses solely on that ground unmeritorious. In this case, not one but two gas lamps illuminated the place the one placed inside the camalig and that held by Emeterio as he descended from the stairs after the first volley of gunfire. Appellants contention therefore that one particular gas lamp could not have lighted the place because it was placed inside a can is puerile. Further, the bamboo slats of the camalig could not have effectively obstructed the eyewitnesses' view of appellant, considering that the slats were built four meters apart. Besides, it is the natural reaction of relatives of victims to strive to observe the faces and appearance of the assailants, if not ascertain their identities, and the manner in which the crime is committed. A relative will naturally be interested in identifying the malefactor to secure his conviction to obtain justice for the death of his relatives. It must remembered that appellant was not a complete stranger to the eyewitnesses. Bonifacio had known him for ten years, while Elmer had been acquainted with him for four years. Elmer recalled

that appellant used to join the rabuz at the barracks. Familiarity with appellants face and appearance minimized if not erased the possibility that they could have been mistaken as to his identity. The case also discussed the inadmissibility of polygraph tests in the Philippines. A polygraph is an electromechanical instrument that simultaneously measures and records certain physiological changes in the human body that are believed to be involuntarily caused by an examinees conscious attempt to deceive the questioner. The theory behind a polygraph or lie detector test is that a person who lies deliberately will have a rising blood pressure and a subconscious block in breathing, which will be recorded on the graph. However, American courts almost uniformly reject the results of polygraph tests when offered in evidence for the purpose of establishing the guilt or innocence of one accused of a crime, whether the accused or the prosecution seeks its introduction, for the reason that polygraph has not as yet attained scientific acceptance as a reliable and accurate means of ascertaining truth or deception. The rule is no different in this jurisdiction. ____________________________________________________________________________________ STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ROBERT EDGAR GARVER, Defendant-Appellant. 225 P.2d 771 December 19, 1950

FACTS: Robert Garver met his accomplices Norman Andrus and Leland Marshall in tavern in downtown Portland, and proposed that they rob one Ancell Abbott, who was a janitor in the Fred Meyer Store. Garver claimed to have information that Abbott would be leaving the store late in the evening carrying about $5,000 in a shopping bag. Acting upon Garver’s suggestion, Andrus and Marshall stole an automobile, secured two guns, and rejoined Garver at about nine o’clock in the evening in the vicinity of the store. Garver armed himself with one of the guns. They waited until Abbott appeared carrying the shopping bag, and followed him several blocks in the stolen automobile. Andrus remained in the car while the other two got out and held up Abbott with guns in hand. The defendant Garver shot Abbott three times. The three fled, carrying with them the shopping bag, which, as it turned out, contained no money but only some clothes. Garver raised the defense of insanity. It was shown during the trial that Garver was admitted twice in mental institutions, namely Veteran’s Hospital at Roseburg, Oregon and Oregon State Hospital, as a mentally diseased person. A provisional diagnosis of “psychoneurosis hysteria” was made. Later while on parole, at his mother’s request, he was examined by Dr. Gerhard B. Haugen, a psychiatrist. Dr. Haugen reported that the basic pattern present in Garver is Psychopathic Inferiority. In addition to Dr. Haugen’s testimony, the defense also presented the testimony of Garver’s mother, Mrs. Mitchell, and lay testimonies of others tending to show the defendant’s chronic condition of mental abnormality. Mrs. Mitchell related to the jury the history of her son from infancy to the day of the alleged crime including his illnesses, both mental and physical; his hospitalizations; his moral delinquencies; and his crimes, throw light on his mental condition. She used the expression “in such terrible shape” and “physically ill”. The Court struck these phrases and Garver was later convicted of murder by the lower court. ISSUE: Whether or not Mrs. Mitchell can testify as to the mental condition of defendant Garver. RULING: Yes, the general rule is that a lay witness may testify only to facts and not to opinions or conclusions. But lay witnesses are frequently permitted to use so-called short hand descriptions, in reality opinions, in presenting to the court their impression of the general physical condition of a person. The court has held it proper in a personal injury case to permit laymen, who were intimately acquainted with

the plaintiff prior to her injury and observed her condition thereafter, to testify that her health and general physical condition had materially changed for the worse. It leaves the witness free to speak his ordinary language, not bewildered by admonitions from the judge to testify to facts, when all the while the witness is sure in his own mind that he is testifying to facts. The jury understands that what the witness means, and the right of cross-examination remove the likelihood of harm to the other side. Too strict adherence to the opinion rule is undesirable. _____________________________________________________________________________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ORVILLE E. STIFEL, Defendant-Appellant. 433 F.2d 431, October 29, 1970

FACTS: Daniel Ronec, the victim in this case, had just graduated from Ohio State University and was about to marry Cheryl Jones. On July 8, 1968, barely a month before his wedding, Ronec received a package through the United States mail which consistsof a mailing tube and a screw on top. When Ronec unscrew the top of the package, an explosion occurred killing him instantly. It was found out that the package contained a bomb and the same when off upon opening. Ronec’s murder was attributed to Orville Stifel, an employee working at the laboratory of Procter & Gamble, whom Cheryl Jones had a tempestuous relationship in 1965 to 1966, prior to being engaged to Ronec in 1967. Miss Jones attempted to terminate the relationship in the fall of 1966 but Stifel sent her several threats in the form of letters. The government presented evidence regarding Stifel’s experience in handling firearms, fireworks, and small rockets. Employees of the Procter & Gamble also testified that the screw top mailing cylinders, mailing stickers, and tape used in the bomb package were similar to that which were found in the stockroom of the company to which Stifel had access. Expert testimony was introduced to compare the materials found in the bombsite with the materials available at Procter & Gamble. James Scott, a chemist and micro-analyst from the Identification Bureau of the Post Office Department Inspection Service in Washington, D.C., was presented as to his findings of the various fragments of the bomb package through the method called “neutron activation analysis.” This nuclear method is able to detect traces of elements in minute samples to solve many problems of identification. By this means, itseeks to establish whether the pieces of cardboard, vinyl tape, metal top, and paper gummed label were or could have been from the same manufacturer and the same batches with the similar items found in the Procter & Gamble inventory. Scott testified that in his opinion, the mailing label and the cardboard tube fragments were of the same “elemental composition” as their Procter & Gamble counterparts and that “within reasonable scientific certainty” they were “of the same type and same manufacturer.” The District Judge admitted Scott’s expert testimony over Stifel’s objection, the latter contending that it was inadmissible because neutron activation analysis is too new and unreliable and has not yet gained wide acceptance from scientists in its particular field. Stifel’s motion for acquittal was also denied. He was convicted after jury trial and was meted the penalty of life sentence. Thus, he appeals his conviction. ISSUE: Whether or notthe expert testimony of James Scott is admissible as evidence. RULING: Yes, James Scott’s testimony is admissible as evidence. According to R.M. Watkins and J.C. Watkins in their work “Identification of Substances by Neutron Activation Analysis,” in determining admissibility of evidence based on this disputed process, it is up to the trial judge’s discretion whether or not to admit proffered expert testimony. And on questions of science, skill, or trade, or others of the same kind, persons of skill, sometimes called experts, may not only testify to facts but are allowed to give their opinions in evidence. Any disputes regarding the technique employed by the expert or the results of his test are for the jury to decide. In this case, appellant Stifel attacked Scott’s test procedures as being inadequate. He contends that neutron activation analysis was too new and untried to provide conclusive proof of identity of the tested materials. However, neither newness nor lack of absolute certainty in a test renders it inadmissible

in court. Every useful new development must have its first day in court. Also, conclusiveness is not a requirement for admissibility of scientific evidence. It is important to note that appellant’s criticism as to Scott’s test methods concerns about the weight of Scott’s testimony, not to its admissibility. In addition, testimony based on neutron activation analysis has not been rejected by any appellate for the reason that the same was “too new,” “too unreliable,” or lacking in “general acceptance.” Nine (9) cases involving samples of soil, adhesive tape, charcoal, paints, woods, hairs, and human, involved evidence on neutron activation analysis. Along with the article of Watkins and Watkins, it can thus, be concluded that neutron activation analysis offers a genuine advance in scientific identification of materials which the courts should not ignore. Hence, based on the record and on the authorities cited, it cannot be said that test results based on neutron activation analysis are inadmissible as a matter of law or that the District Judge abused his discretion in admitting the testimony of Mr. Scott. _____________________________________________________________________________________ DAUBERT v. MERRELL DOW PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. 113 S. CT. 2786 (1993)

FACTS: Petitioners, two minor children and their parents, alleged in their suit against respondent that the children's serious birth defects had been caused by the mothers' prenatal ingestion of Bendectin, a prescription drug marketed by respondent. The District Court granted respondent summary judgment based on a well-credentialed expert's affidavit concluding, upon reviewing the extensive published scientific literature on the subject, that maternal use of Bendectin has not been shown to be a risk factor for human birth defects. Although petitioners had responded with the testimony of eight other wellcredentialed experts, who based their conclusion that Bendectin can cause birth defects on animal studies, chemical structure analyses, and the unpublished "reanalysis" of previously published human statistical studies, the court determined that this evidence did not meet the applicable "general acceptance" standard for the admission of expert testimony. The Court of Appeals agreed and affirmed, citing Frye v. United States, 54 App. D.C. 46, 47, 293 F. 1013, 1014, for the rule that expert opinion based on a scientific technique is inadmissible unless the technique is "generally accepted" as reliable in the relevant scientific community. ISSUE: Whether or not scientific testimony shall be admissible in Federal trial. RULING: The Federal Rules of Evidence, not Frye, provide the standard for admitting expert scientific testimony in a federal trial. The plaintiffs successfully argued that after Congress adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, Frye was no longer the governing standard for admitting scientific evidence in trials held in federal court. The Supreme Court agreed and had already ruled that where common law rules conflicted with provisions of the Rules, the enactment of the Rules had the effect of supplanting the common law. Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides (in part): “If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise...” The text of Rule 702 did not make admissibility of expert testimony depend on general acceptance, and there was no evidence that Congress intended to incorporate a general acceptance standard into Rule 702. "Given the Rules' permissive backdrop and their inclusion of a specific rule on expert testimony that does not mention 'general acceptance,' the assertion that the Rules somehow assimilated Frye is unconvincing. Frye made 'general acceptance' the exclusive test for admitting expert testimony. That austere standard, absent from, and incompatible with, the Federal Rules of Evidence, should not be applied in federal trials. The standard governing expert testimony Three key provisions of the Rules governed admission of expert testimony in court. First, scientific knowledge, meaning that the testimony must be scientific in nature and must be grounded in "knowledge." Of course, science does not claim to know anything with absolute certainty; science "represents a process for proposing and refining theoretical explanations about the world that are subject

to further testing and refinement." The "scientific knowledge" contemplated by Rule 702 had to be arrived at by the scientific method. Second, the scientific knowledge must assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or determining a fact in issue in the case. The trier of fact is often either a jury or a judge; but other fact finders may exist within the contemplation of the federal rules of evidence. To be helpful to the trier of fact, there must be a "valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a prerequisite to admissibility." For example, although it is within the purview of scientific knowledge, knowing whether the moon was full on a given night does not typically assist the trier of fact in knowing whether a person was sane when he or she committed a given act. Third, the Rules expressly provided that the judge would make the threshold determination regarding whether certain scientific knowledge would indeed assist the trier of fact in the manner contemplated by Rule 702. "This entails a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue." This preliminary assessment can turn on whether something has been tested, whether an idea has been subjected to scientific peer review or published in scientific journals, the rate of error involved in the technique, and even general acceptance, among other things. It focuses on methodology and principles, not the ultimate conclusions generated. The Court stressed that the new standard under Rule 702 was rooted in the judicial process and intended to be distinct and separate from the search for scientific truth. "Scientific conclusions are subject to perpetual revision. Law, on the other hand, must resolve disputes finally and quickly. The scientific project is advanced by broad and wide-ranging consideration of a multitude of hypotheses, for those that are incorrect will eventually be shown to be so, and that in itself is an advance." Rule 702 was intended to resolve legal disputes and, thus, had to be interpreted in conjunction with other rules of evidence and with other legal means of ending those disputes. Cross examination within the adversary process is adequate to help legal decision makers arrive at efficient ends to disputes. "We recognize that, in practice, a gatekeeping role for the judge, no matter how flexible, inevitably on occasion will prevent the jury from learning of authentic insights and innovations. That, nevertheless, is the balance that is struck by Rules of Evidence designed not for the exhaustive search for cosmic understanding but for the particularized resolution of legal disputes." _____________________________________________________________________________________ UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, vs. Barry Lamar BONDS, Defendant–Appellant. No. 11–10669. Decided: September 13, 2013 12F 3D 540 (1993)

FACTS: Three individuals Wayne Yee, Mark Verdi and John Ray Bonds were indicted in connection with the crime, tried, and convicted of conspiracy and federal firearms offenses for gunning down David Hatlaub in his van as he topped at a bank near the Sandusky Mall in Ohio. The police later found the getaway van abandoned with its engine still running and the lights still on. The gun used in the shooting, a MAC--11 9--mm semi--automatic pistol fitted with a homemade silencer. Both the gun and vans carpet were splattered with blood. Serology test showed that the blood was not Hartlaub’s but rare enzymes identified in the splattered blood which only appear in about 1% of Caucasian males, matched those found in Bond’s blood. Agents prepared an affidavit seeking to obtain a search warrant for blood and hair samples from Bonds. The federal magistrate judge of Toledo issued a warrant based on the finding of probable cause. The agents seized the samples from Bonds. These samples were the basis for evidence that the DNA in Bond’s blood matched the DNA from the blood found in the backseat of the van. The defendants question the judgment. They contended that the testimony about the DNA evidence was not based on principles of generally accepted in the scientific community. ISSUE: Whether or not the DNA evidence was properly admitted as evidence.

RULING: YES. The Court held that although the findings of the magistrate judge and the district court were based only on the pre--Daubert Frye hearing and the general acceptance test, these findings are relevant to our examination under a Daubert analysis, first because, as the district court noted, neither the defendants nor the Government challenge the magistrate judge's findings regarding the substance of the expert testimony presented at the Frye hearing or his characterization of the testimony, and second, because general acceptance is still one factor the Supreme Court has said can impact on a court's scientific validity determination and the defendants' arguments on appeal focus on these findings and their general acceptance determination. After a thorough review of the record, we hold that these findings are not clearly erroneous, and we adopt the magistrate's findings as conclusive. The Court held that the expert testimony meets the "relevance" prong of the admissibility test: that the evidence or testimony assists the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. This requirement merely looks at whether the evidence and testimony is relevant to any issue in the case. The testimony must be "sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will aid the jury in resolving a factual dispute." The evidence that Bonds's DNA matched at least to some extent the DNA found in the crime--scene sample learly is relevant to whether defendant Bonds was present in the victim's van on the night of the murder. Thus, the DNA evidence was helpful to the jury in determining whether defendants were guilty of the charges. With respect to the reliability of the technique used by the FBI, the court held that the FBI's principles and methodology have in fact been tested. The FBI performed internal proficiency testing as well as validation studies and environmental insult studies to determine whether the lab could produce reliable, reproducible results from samples that had been mixed with contaminants or subjected to environmental insults such as sun. Finally, the Court said that when reviewed in light of the four Daubert factors (testing, peer review, rate of error, and general acceptance), the underlying principles and methodology used by the FBI to declare matches and make statistical probabilities are scientifically valid. The methodology was valid in that it resulted from sound and cogent reasoning, and was well--grounded or justifiable and applicable to the matter at hand. Thus, the methodology clearly had "a grounding in the methods and procedures of science" and was based on "more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation." _____________________________________________________________________________________ AUGUSTO GOMEZ, as Special Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Consuelo Gomez, Petitioner, vs. MARIA RITA GOMEZ-SAMSON, MARCIAL SAMSON, JESUS B. GOMEZ, and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF PASIG and MARIKINA, RIZAL, Respondents. G.R. No. 156284 February 6, 2007

FACTS: Which came first, the chicken or the egg? This age-old question has spurned millions of debates in scientific and religious circles, and has stimulated the imagination of generations of children and adults. Many profess that they are certain of the answer, and yet their answers are divergent. The case at bar involves a similarly baffling question, but in significantly lesser proportions of philosophical mystery. The case revolves allegedly that after the death of Consuelo, defendants Rita and Jesus fraudulently prepared and/or caused to be prepared a Deed of Donation Intervivos; that in the said document, Consuelo donated the several real and personal properties to private defendants; that the said defendants forged or caused to be forged the signature of the donor, Consuelo; that the notarial acknowledgement on the said document was antedated to April 21, 1979; that on the basis of the said document defendants sought the cancellation of the certificates of title in the name of Consuelo and the issuance of new ones in the names of defendants Rita and Jesus. Petitioner claims that, in the two Deeds of Donation he is impugning, the signatures of the donee were jotted down before the bodies of the Deeds were typewritten. Respondents maintain that the bodies of the Deeds were encoded first, and then, a clashing presentation of expert witnesses and circumstantial

evidence ensued. Petitioner’s expert claims she is certain of the answer: the signature came first. Respondents’ expert, on the other hand, says that it is impossible to determine which came first accurately. As both the trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of respondents, petitioner is furious how these courts could adopt an opinion that was "neither here nor there." ISSUE: Whether the opinion rule is tenable under the circumstances. RULING: Experience has shown that it is rarely possible for any definite opinion as to the order of appearance on the paper for intersecting ink lines and typescript to be justified on the [meager] amount of evidence which generally available. The trial court again sided with Francisco Cruz who testified, citing authorities, that it is impossible to determine accurately which came first, because there were no intersections at all. The trial court added: "[i]n fact, common sense, without more, dictates that if there are no intersections (between the typewritten and the handwritten words), it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine which came first." The Court of Appeals found nothing erroneous in these findings of the trial court. On the first point, we agree with petitioner that positive evidence is, as a general rule, more credible than negative evidence. However, the reason for this rule is that the witness who testifies to a negative may have forgotten what actually occurred, while it is impossible to remember what never existed. Expert witnesses, though, examine documentary and object evidence precisely to testify on their findings in court. It is, thus, highly improbable for an expert witness to forget his examination of said evidence. Consequently, whereas faulty memory may be the reason for the negative testimonies delivered by ordinary witnesses, this is unlikely to be so with respect to expert witnesses. While we, therefore, cannot say that positive evidence does not carry an inherent advantage over negative evidence when it comes to expert witnesses, the process by which the expert witnesses arrived at their conclusions should be carefully examined and considered. In the case at bar, therefore, the expert testimony that "no finding or conclusion can be arrived at," was found to be more credible than the expert testimony positively stating that the signatures were affixed before the typing of the Deeds of Donation. The former expert testimony has proven to be more in consonance with the authorities cited by both experts. Thus, while the expert witness’ possible bias in favor of the side for whom he or she testifies, and the fact that he or she is a paid witness, may be considered by the trial court, the latter should weigh the same with all the other evidence adduced during trial, as well as with the witness’ deportment, actions, ability, and character upon the witness stand. The trial court is consequently given the discretion in weighing all these circumstances in its determination of the expert witness’ credibility, as it is in a better position than the appellate courts to observe the demeanor of these witnesses. As there is no evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in such determination, the latter is not reviewable by this Court. _____________________________________________________________________________________ CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and VALLEY GOLF and COUNTRY CLUB, INC., respondents. 149 P. 2d 152

1944

FACTS: Sometime on August 1974, Galicano Calapatia, Jr. a stockholder of private respondent Valley Golf & Country Club, Inc., pledged his Stock Certificate No. 1219 to petitioner China Banking Corporation. Petitioner wrote VGCCI requesting that the aforementioned pledge agreement be recorded in its books which the latter approved and noted in its corporate books. On 3 August 1983, Calapatia obtained a loan of P20,000.00 from petitioner, payment of which was secured by the aforestated pledge

agreement. Due to Calapatia's failure to pay his obligation, petitioner, on 12 April 1985, filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the pledged stock. On 1985, petitioner informed VGCCI of the abovementioned foreclosure proceedings and requested that the pledged stock be transferred to its name and the same be recorded in the corporate books. However, VGCCI wrote petitioner expressing its inability to accede to petitioner's request in view of Calapatia's unsettled accounts with the club. VGCCI sent Calapatia a notice demanding full payment of his overdue account. Subsequently, VGCCI caused to be published in the newspaper a notice of auction sale of a number of its stock certificates, included therein was Calapatia's own share of stock. Through a letter dated 15 December 1986, VGCCI informed Calapatia of the termination of his membership due to the sale of his share of stock in the 10 December 1986 auction. Thereafter, on 1989, petitioner advised VGCCI that it is the new owner of Calapatia's Stock Certificate No. 1219 by virtue of being the highest bidder in the 17 September 1985 auction and requested that a new certificate of stock be issued in its name. Subsequently, on 1990, petitioner protested the sale by VGCCI of the subject share of stock and thereafter filed a case with the Regional Trial Court of Makati for the nullification of the 10 December 1986 auction and for the issuance of a new stock certificate in its name. The Regional Trial Court of Makati dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter on the theory that it involves an intra-corporate dispute. September of the same year, petitioner filed a complaint with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for the nullification of the sale of Calapatia's stock by VGCCI; the cancellation of any new stock certificate issued pursuant thereto; for the issuance of a new certificate in petitioner's name; and for damages, attorney's fees and costs of litigation. SEC Hearing Officer rendered a decision in favor of VGCCI, stating in the main that "considering that the said share is delinquent, (VGCCI) had valid reason not to transfer the share in the name of the petitioner in the books of (VGCCI) until liquidation of delinquency." Petitioner appealed to the SEC en banc and the Commission issued an order reversing the decision of its hearing officer. Because that appellant-petitioner has a prior right over the pledged share and because of pledgor's failure to pay the principal debt upon maturity, appellant-petitioner can proceed with the foreclosure of the pledged share. VGCCI to seek redress from the Court of Appeals and the later rendered its decision nullifying and setting aside the orders of the SEC on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter .The Court of Appeals declared that the controversy between CBC and VGCCI is not intra-corporate. ISSUES: Whether or not the SEC has the jurisdiction over the controversy. RULING: P.D. No. 902-A conferred upon the SEC jurisdiction over controversies arising out of intracorporate or partnership relations, between and among stockholders, members, or associates; between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members or associates, respectively; and between such corporation, partnership or association and the State insofar as it concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as such entity. There is no question that the purchase of the subject share or membership certificate at public auction by petitioner transferred ownership of the same to the latter and thus entitled petitioner to have the said share registered in its name as a member of VGCCI. It is readily observed that VGCCI did not assail the transfer directly and in fact it expressly recognized the pledge agreement executed by the original owner, Calapatia, in favor of petitioner and has even noted said agreement in its corporate books. By virtue of the afore-mentioned sale, petitioner became a bona fide stockholder of VGCCI and, therefore, the conflict that arose between petitioner and VGCCI aptly exemplifies an intra-corporate controversy between a corporation and its stockholder. _____________________________________________________________________________________ OPINION RULE ❖GENERAL RULE: the opinion of a witness is not admissible. Upon the question of the existence or non- existence of any fact in issue, whether a main fact or evidentiary fact, opinion evicence as to its existence or nonexistence is inadmissible. The witness must testify to facts within their knowledge and may not state their opinion, even on their cross-examination. ❖EXCEPTIONS: opinion of expert witness under Sec. 49, and opinion of ordinary witnesses under Sec. 50 (Sec. 48, Rule 130): a) On a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he possesses, that is, when he is an expert thereon; b) Regarding the identity or the handwriting of a person, when he has knowledge of the person or handwriting, whether he is an ordinary or expert witness. c) On the mental sanity or a person, if the witness is sufficiently acquainted with the former or if the latter is an expert witness; d) On the emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a person which he has observed; and On ordinary matters known to all men of common perception, such as the value of ordinary household articles. ❖The reason is that it is for the court to form an opinion concerning the facts in proof of which evidence is offered. This in turn is based upon the fact that even when witnesses are limited in their statements to detailed facts, their bias, ignorance, and disregard of the truth are obstacles which too often hinder in the investigation of the truth, so that if witnesses might be allowed to state the opinions they might entertain about the facts in issue, the administration of justice would become little less than a farce.

B urden of Proof – Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. (Sec. 1 Rule 131) Hacienda Bigaa Incorporated, petitioner vs. Epifanio Chavez (deceased) substituted by Santiago Chavez, respondent G.R. No. 174160 April 20, 2010

FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for ejectment case and damages against respondent. The complaint alleged that respondent Chavez entered the premises by force, stealth and strategy by cutting of the barbed wire fence and destroying the lock of one of the gates and subsequently built a house on the premises against the will of the Hacienda Bigaa as successor-in-interest by Ayala and Zobel. Respondent contention that he is the successor-interest of his late mother Zoila de Chavez who is a lessee of a fishpond and had a permit for it issued by the Bureau of Fisheries. After trial, the court found out that the subject parcels of land is under the Public domain and the Subdivision Titles of the land covering that area of the respondent are null and void. ISSUE: Who was the burden of proof to prove ownership over the land which is the subject matter of the case. RULING: The Supreme Court took cognizance of the fact that Zoilas de Chavez’s fishpond permit is within the land covered by the decision. Moreover, the Supreme Court has shifted the burden of proof in this regard to Zobel or Ayala when it declared that, clearly the burden of proof lies on Zobel and other transferees to show that his Subdivision Titles are not among the unlawful expanded subdivision titles declared null and void by the said 1965 judgment. _____________________________________________________________________________________ HUBERT NUÑEZ, petitioner vs SLTEAS PHOENIX SOLUTIONS, INC., through its representative, CESAR SYLIANTENG, respondent G.R. No. 180542

April 12, 2010

FACTS: The spouses Sylianteng executed a deed of assignment over their parcel of land in favor of SLTEAS. The land remained idle and unguarded for some time. In 2003, SLTEAS found out that Nuñez and other individuals were occupying the land and refused to vacate despite several demands. SLTEAS filed a complaint for forcible entry against Nuñez. The latter interposed the defense that he has a subsisting lease agreement over the land with Maria. ISSUE: Whether there is an existing lease contract between petitioner and certain Maria. RULING: NO. According to the Rules, when a party successfully proved his claim, the burden of evidence shifts to the adverse party. In this case, the respondent successfully proved that indeed there was forcible entry. The burden now shifts to the petitioner to prove the existence of a lease contract. Since petitioner failed to prove its claim, the defense raised by him should fail.

SEGUNDA PORNELLOSA & JOSE ANGELES, Petitioners, vs THE LAND TENURE ADMINISTRATION & HERMINIO GUZMAN, Respondents, G.R. No. L-14040

January 31, 1961

FACTS: The lot in controversy is a part of the Santa Clara Estate on which many families have settled through the consent of its owner, each paid a rental. In May 1941, the said Estate was acquired by the Government & was entrusted to an office known as the Rural Progress Admin., which was later abolished & its functions was transferred to the Bureau of Lands. Recently, such duties were given to the Land Tenure Administration. The plaintiff acquired by purchase the right of occupation of the lot in question from Vicente San Jose, predecessor-in-interest. After the purchase of the Santa Clara Estate by the Government, the plaintiffs were allowed to make payments on account of the purchase price of the lot as fenced, included (200) square-meters. Thereafter, the plaintiffs found out that the lot had been subdivided into two (2) smaller lots, No. 44 and 78. Lot No. 44 had been sold to Herminio Guzman. The plaintiffs then filed a complaint to compel the Director of Lands to execute a Deed of Sale in their favor & declare null and void the Deed of Sale of Lot No. 44, executed in favor of respondent Herminio. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff, but was reversed by the Court of Appeals, dismissing the petitioner’s complaint. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to purchase from the Government the lot, allegedly includes 200 square –meters. RULING: The judgment under review was affirmed. The lot on which San Jose’s house stood had not been specified, nor had the boundaries thereof been mentioned. Significantly, the plaintiff cannot show a contract whereby the Rural Progress Admin., has sold or promised to sell them a lot of 200 square meters. A party claiming a right granted or created by law must prove his claim by competent evidence. He must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of that of his opponent. Moreover the Deed of Sale allegedly executed by Vicente San Jose in favor of Pornellosa is a mere private document and does not conclusively establish their right to the parcel of land. Acts and contracts which have for their subject the creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property must appear in a public document. _____________________________________________________________________________________ INDUSTRIAL FINANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. CASTOR TOBIAS, respondent. G.R. No. L-41555 July 27, 1977

FACTS: Tobias bought on installment 1 Dodge truck from Leelin Motors, Inc. To answer for his obligation he executed a promissory note in favor of the latter. To secure payment of the promissory note, respondent Tobias executed in favor of Leelin Motors, Inc. a chattel mortgage on the Dodge truck. Leelin Motors, Inc. indorsed the promissory note and assigned the chattel mortgage to Industrial Finance Corporation. As a consequence respondent Tobias paid 6 installments on the promissory note directly to the petitioner Industrial Finance Corporation. IFC’s counsel wrote to Tobias stating that IFC has referred Tobias account for appropriate legal action. Tobias replied saying that he was willing to surrender the truck and the truck has been with Leelin motors ever since it met an accident and that he is not satisfied with the repair of the finished portions. Upon learning that the truck had been in an accident, IFC decided not to get the truck anymore and instituted this action to recover the unpaid balance on the promissory note.

ISSUE: Whether or not IFC can still choose to exact payment for the obligation, instead of foreclosing the truck (because Tobias insists that IFC is now estopped from claiming balance when it demanded the surrender of the truck securing the obligation)? RULING: NO. To hold the petitioner in estoppel, it must be shown that when it gave the respondent the choice of either paying the balance of the purchase price or of surrendering the truck, it had already knowledge of the accident and the consequent damage to the truck. Petitioner claims it had no knowledge of the accident when it gave the respondent the choice of either paying the balance of the promissory note or of surrendering the truck. Besides the allegation of petitioner that it had no knowledge of the accident is a negative allegati on and needs no evidence to support it, not being an essential part of the statement of the right on which the cause of action is founded. It is therefore the respondent Tobias who has the burden of disproving the claim of petitioner that he has no knowledge of the accident when it made the offer to respondent either to pay the balance on the promissory note or to surrender the truck. Respondent failed in this. Aside from the fact that the truck being surrendered met an accident petitioner was not satisfied with the repair of the finished portion of the truck in question. Petitioner therefore was justified refusing to accept such surrender and in bringing suit to recover the balance of the purchase price. A negative averment only needs to be proved by the party alleging it if it is an element of a criminal offense charged. Averment of having no knowledge in civil cases need not be proved by the party asserting it. Under the proposed revised rules, the burden of going forward with the evidence will still fall on the party alleging the positive of a fact, in this case, one asserting presence of knowledge. _____________________________________________________________________________________ PERFECTA CAVILE, JOSE DE LA CRUZ & RURAL BANK OF BAYAWAN, INC., Petitioners, vs JUSTINA LITANIA-HONG ET AL, Respondents, G.R. No. 179540

March 13, 2009

FACTS: A deed of partition was entered into by the heirs of the spouses Bernardo Cavile and Tranquilina Galon. Subject of the Deed of partition were several parcels of land situated in the Municipality of Tolong, Negros Occidental, which were then covered by Tax declarations No. 5615, No. 2729, No. 7143, No. 7421 and No. 7956, all under the name Bernardo. In accordance with the Deed of partition, the conjugal properties of Bernardo and Tranquiliana were divided into two parts. The first part, corresponding to Bernardino’s share was further divided into six equal shares. The second part, corresponding to Tranquiliana’s share, was subdivided only into three shares.Also stated in the deed of partition was the sale by the other aforementioned legal heirs to their co-heir, thus making Castor the sole owner of the said properties. Fourteen years after respondents filed on December 23, 1974 a complaint for reconveyance and recovery of property with damages before the RTC against Perfecta Cavile. In 1962, Castor sold to petitioner Perfecta the lots covered by tax declarations No. 7421 and No. 7956 which corresponded to the subject lots in the complaint. Following the sale, petitioner Perfecta took possession of the subject lots and filed with the Bureau of Lands an application for the issuance of the title over the same. The RTC further subscribed to the testimony of perfecta that the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition was executed by Castor solely to accommodate Susana, enabling her to obtain a bank loan using the subject lots as collateral. It noted that Susana did not bother to apply for the issuance of title to the subject lots in her name. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The CA agreed in the respondent’s contention that the confirmation of extrajudicial partition was not simulated document.

The said document should be entitled to utmost respect, credence, and weight as it was executed by and between parties who had firsthand knowledge of the Deed of Partition of 1937. Moreover, the confirmation of extrajudicial partition constituted evidence that was of the highest probative value against the declarant, Castor, because it was a declaration against his proprietary interest. Perfecta herself admitted that she only started paying real estate taxes for the subject lots in 1993. It was Susana and later, her children, respondents Justina and genoveva, who had been paying for the realty taxes on the subject lots since 1937. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners has the better right to the property. RULING: Yes, it is the petitioners. There being no issue raised on the matter, that the subject lots covered by tax declarations No. 07408 and No. 07409 described in the complaint in Civil Case No. 6111 are the very same lots covered by the tax declarations No. 7956 and No. 7421 included in the deed of partition. The confirmation of extrajudicial partition is just one piece of evidence against petitioner spouses. The court is still convinced that the evidence adduced by the petitioner spouses preponderated over that of the respondents. In analyzing the two vital documents in this case, the court discerns that while the Deed of Partition clearly explained how Castor came to fully own the subject lots, the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition, even though confirming Susana’s ownership of the subject lots, failed to shed light on why or how the said properties wholly pertained to her when her parents, Bernardino and Tranquilina clearly had other heirs who also had shares in the inheritance. _____________________________________________________________________________________ LOLITA REYES doing business under the name and style, SOLID BROTHERS WEST MARKETING, petitioner vs. CENTURY CANNING CORPORATION, respondent. G.R. No. 165377, February 16, 2010

FACTS: Lolita Reyes had applied for and was granted a credit line from the respondent allowing the latter to obtain and secure Century tuna canned goods. And when the defendant's obligation to pay became due and demandable, the same failed to pay as she refused to pay her unsettled accounts in the total amount of P787,191.27. However, due to the constant and diligent efforts exerted by the representatives of the plaintiff to collect the alleged unpaid obligations of the defendant, the latter returned some unsold Century tuna canned goods, the value of which at P323,697.64 was deducted from the principal obligation thereby leaving the amount of P463,493.63 as the unsettled account of defendant Reyes. That because of the refusal of the defendant to satisfactorily and completely settle her unpaid account, the plaintiff was constrained to refer the matter to its legal counsel, who consequently sent a demand letter, and accordingly filed the instant case in Court after the defendant failed to comply and satisfy the demand letter to pay. In her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, defendant averred that she had no transaction with the plaintiff for the purchase of the alleged canned goods in question, inasmuch as she is not engaged in the canned goods business but in auto airconditioning, parts and car accessories in Banaue, Quezon City ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly found that petitioner was liable to pay respondent's claim. RULING: Yes. The Court of Appeals was correct. It is a basic rule in evidence that each party to a case must prove his own affirmative allegations by the degree of evidence required by law. In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by preponderance of evidence, or that evidence that is of greater weight or is more convincing than that which is in opposition to it. It does not mean absolute truth; rather, it means that the testimony of one side is more believable than that of the other side, and that the probability of truth is on

one side than on the other. The testimonies of respondent's witnesses were further bolstered by the absence of any motive on their part to falsely testify against petitioner; thus, their testimonies are hereby accorded full faith and credit. Petitioner's defense consists of denial. The Court held that denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a negative and self-serving evidence that has no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters. _____________________________________________________________________________________ ERMELINDA C. MANALOTO, et al, Petitioners, vs. ISMAEL VELOSO III, Respondent. G.R. No. 171365

October 6, 2010

FACTS: This case is an off-shoot of an unlawful detainer case filed by herein petitioners against respondent. In said complaint for unlawful detainer, it was alleged that they are the lessors of a residential house located at No. 42 Big Horseshoe Drive, Horseshoe Village, Quezon City which was leased to respondent at a monthly rental of ₱17,000.00. The action was instituted on the ground of [respondent's] failure to pay rentals from May 23, 1997 to December 22, 1998 despite repeated demands. Respondent denied the non-payment of rentals and alleged that he made an advance payment of ₱825,000.00 when he paid for the repairs done on the leased property. On appeal to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) [Branch 88, Quezon City], the MeTC decision was reversed. Respondent was ordered to pay arrearages from May 23, 1997 up to the date of the decision but he was also given an option to choose between staying in the leased property or vacating the same, subject to the reimbursement by [petitioners] of one-half of the value of the improvements which it found to be in the amount of ₱120,000.00. [Respondent] was also given the right to remove said improvements pursuant to Article 1678 of the Civil Code, should [petitioners] refuse to pay ₱60,000.00. When both parties moved for the reconsideration of the RTC decision, the RTC issued an Order dated February 23, 2001 modifying its previous ruling by increasing the value of the improvements from ₱120,000.00 to ₱800,000.00. After successive appeals to the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, the decision of the RTC dated November 29, 2000 which reversed the decision of the MeTC, became final and executory. Petitioners reason that respondent has no cause of action against them since the MTC decision in the unlawful detainer case was part of public records. On appeal, the CA decreed that although court decisions are public documents, distribution of the same during the pendency of an appeal was clearly intended to cause respondent some form of harassment and/or humiliation so that respondent would be ostracized by his neighbors. ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence presented is merely an allegation. RULING: The finding of the Court of Appeals of bad faith and malice on the part of petitioners has no factual basis. Good faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. Good faith refers to the state of the mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. Bad faith, on the other hand, does not simply connote bad judgment to simple negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty due to some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. We cannot subscribe to respondent's argument that there is no more need for the presentation of evidence by the parties since petitioners, in moving for the dismissal of respondent's complaint for damages, hypothetically admitted respondent's allegations. The hypothetical admission of respondent's allegations in the complaint only goes so far as determining whether said complaint should be dismissed on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. A finding that the complaint sufficiently states a cause of action does not necessarily mean that the complaint is meritorious; it shall only result in the reinstatement of the complaint and the hearing of the case for presentation of evidence by the parties.

C riminal Cases THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. OPENIANO PAJENADO @ PEMING, defendant-appellant. GR Nos L-27680-81 February 27, 1970

FACTS: Epifanio Cabe saw Openiano Pajenado apparently wrestling with Carlos Tapong. Tapong was later overpowered by Pajenado with the help of the latter’s cousin, who pinned the former down to the floor. When Tapong was already helpless on the floor, Pajenado drew a gun a shot at Tapong. The Pajenado cousins thereafter ran away from the scene of the crime. Tapong died as a result of the gunshot wound. A case was filed against accused Pajenado for murder, as well as illegal possession of firearm. The trial court found accused guilty for both murder and illegal possession of firearm. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution established that the firearm was not properly licensed. RULING: No. Under the provisions of Section 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, in criminal cases, the burden of proof as to the offense charged lies on the prosecution and that a negative fact alleged by the prosecution must be proven if "it is an essential ingredient of the offense charged", the burden of proof was with the prosecution in this case to prove that the firearm used by appellant in committing the offense charged was not properly licensed. It cannot be denied that the lack or absence of a license is an essential ingredient of the offense of illegal possession of a firearm. The information filed against appellant in the lower court specifically alleged that he had no "license or permit to possess" the .45 caliber pistol mentioned therein. Thus it seems clear that it was the prosecution's duty not merely to allege that negative fact but to prove it. Although in view of the difficulty of proving a negative allegation, the prosecution, under such circumstance, need only establish a prima facie case from the best evidence obtainable. In the case before Us, both appellant and the Solicitor General agree that there was not even a prima facie case upon which to hold appellant guilty of the illegal possession of a firearm. Thus, the appealed decision is reversed and set aside in so far as it finds appellant guilty of illegal possession of a firearm, with the result that he is hereby acquitted of said charge. Appellant is nonetheless found guilty of murder, with the aggravating circumstance of use of superior strength, without any mitigating circumstance to offset the same. _____________________________________________________________________________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, vs. ROLAND WILLIAM DUBE, JR., Defendant-Appellant. 520 F.2d 250, June 30, 1975

FACTS: The jury held defendant Dube guilty for the crime of robbery committed against a federally insured bank. Dube did not deny his participation in the robbery but alleges insanity as his defense, that he was insane when he committed the crime. He introduced two expert witnesses namely Dr. Voss, a psychiatrist, and Dr. Bishop, a psychologist. For the part of the prosecution, no expert witness was presented. It relied primarily on the crossexamination specifically on the testimonies of two bank tellers and Dube’s girlfriend, Mrs. Kyllonen, who acted as an accomplice to the crime. According to Dube, the prosecution failed to discharge the burden of proof to establish his sanity beyond reasonable doubt. ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution satisfactorily discharged the burden of proving defendant Dube’s sanity.

RULING: Yes, the prosecution satisfactorily discharged the burden of proving defendant Dube’s sanity during the commission of the robbery notwithstanding the absence of expert witnesses to rebut defendant’s claim. In criminal cases, the presumption favors defendant’s sanity. But when there is evidence to prove insanity, it is the prosecution that has the burden of proof to establish sanity. However, the prosecution is not mandatorily required to present expert opinion to bolster its claim. Expert testimony is not rendered conclusive and it is upon the jury to determine the weight and credibility of such evidence considering other countervailing evidence aside from an expert opinion. In the case at bar, even in the absence of expert testimony on the part of the prosecution, Dube’s sanity was still clearly established. First, with regard to the opinion of the experts presented by the defendant showing Dube’s schizophrenic history, it is noteworthy to emphasize that the diagnoses of such experts were concluded almost five (5) months after the robbery was committed. Second, based from the testimony of the two bank tellers, it would appear that the commission of the crime was carefully planned before it was carried out. Third, Mrs. Kyllonen testified that defendant Dube displayed no unusual behavior after the commission of the robbery. _____________________________________________________________________________________ Patterson vs. New York 432 U.S. 197 (1977)

FACTS: Appellant, Patterson was charged with and convicted of the second-degree murder of his estranged wife. In December of 1970, Patterson borrowed a rifle and went to his father-in-laws house where he witnessed his wife through a window half-dressed in the presence of another man. Patterson entered the house and killed the man by shooting him in the head. At trial, Appellant raised the defense of extreme emotional disturbance. The jury was instructed on the elements of the crime of murder. Appellant sought to invalidate the statutory scheme by claiming it violated due process because it improperly shifted the burden of persuasion from the prosecutor to the defendant. Appellant based his argument on Mullaney v. Wilbur, where the court held a Maine statute in violation of the Due Process Clause. ISSUE: Were the defendant’s due process rights violated when he was required under state law to bear the burden of persuasion for his affirmative defense to the crime of murder? RULING: In New York, the two elements to the crime of second-degree murder are: (1) “intent to cause the death of another person; and (2) causing the death of such person or of a third person.” Malice aforethought is not an element of the crime. Additionally, the state permits a person to raise an affirmative defense that he “acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance.” The defendant bears the burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence. New York also recognizes the crime of manslaughter. Under Maine’s statute in Mullaney, a person accused of murder could rebut the statutory presumption that he committed the offense with malice aforethought by proving he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation. New York’s defense of extreme emotional disturbance is an expanded version of the common law defense of heat of passion. Under the common law, the burden of proving this defense and other affirmative defenses rested on the defendant. The Court did not conclude that Patterson’s conviction under the New York law deprived him of due process. The death, intent to kill, and causation are the facts that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. The Due Process Clause does require New York to abandon those defenses or undertake the cause of disproving their existence in order to convict a person of a crime which is otherwise within its constitutional powers to sanction by substantial punishment.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. RICARDO VERZOLA and JOSEFINA MOLINA, Accused-Appellants. G.R. No. L-35022, December 21, 1977

FACTS: Accused-appellant, Ricardo Verzola, is the paramour of another accused-appellant herein, Josefina Molina, the latter being married to Bernardo Molina. One night, while Bernardo is sleeping soundly at their home, his wife left and met secretly with Verzola. And they made love with each other. During that night also, Josefina told Verzola that her husband has plans of killing him. After parting ways, Verzola was bothered by what Josefina had intimated to him prompting him to follow Josefina into their house. And when he saw Bernardo sleeping, he stabbed him with a club resulting to the latter’s instantaneous death. Verzola and Josefina carried the body of Bernardo towards the stairs of the house. Thereafter, Verzola left. Both Verzola and Josefina were convicted by the trial court of the crime of murder, Verzola being the principal while Josefina being an accessory. However, on appeal, Verzola alleged that it was only as a consequence of self-defense that he killed Bernardo Molina. ISSUE: Whether or not Ricardo Verzola was able to overcome the burden of proof in his claim of selfdefense. RULING: No, Verzola was not able to discharge the burden of proof for self-defense. It is a well-settled rule that whoever alleges a justifying circumstance, such as self-defense as in the case at bar, has the burden of proof to establish the circumstances that would tend to exculpate him from liability. However, Verzola failed to discharge this burden. He avers self-defense but failed to adduce evidence that would support such claim. Furthermore, his actuations after the incident were inconsistent of his innocence. Although he did not flee and was instead present at the scene when the police officers are conducting their investigation, he was observed to be very quiet. In addition, the nature and character of the wounds indicate that the victim was attacked while in a lying down position which does not give an opportunity to set up a counter-attack. On the other hand, anent the liability of Josefina, she cannot be said to have acted as an accessory in helping Verzola carry the body of the victim to the stairs where people can openly see it. Such an act did not qualify as an effort of “concealing” the body of the crime to prevent its discovery, as stated under the law. The body was made visible to the public and thus, there could not have been any attempt on the part of Josefina to conceal the body of the crime. _____________________________________________________________________________________ PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. RUFINO UMANITO, Appellant. GR No. 172607 OCTOBER 26, 2007

FACTS: AAA, then below 18 years of age, was accosted by Umanito. He dragged her into the Home Economics Building of Daramungan Elementary School and undressed her while holding a knife against her. He set her down on a bench, put down the knife, and had sex with her. He dressed up and threatened to kill her if she reported the incident. Six months later, AAA’s mother noticed the prominence on her stomach and it was then that she divulged to her mother the alleged rape. Her mother brought her to the police station. 5 years later, Umanito was caught. He pleaded not guilty. RTC rendered judgment against Umanito and sentenced him to suffer reclusion perpertua. Umanito’s appeal was transferred to the CA for intermediate review and the CA affirmed. Umanito seeks acquittal on reasonable doubt, with the belated filing of the case and AAA’s questionable credibility as grounds, given that there were several inconsistencies in her assertions.

ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution has successfully mey the level of proof needed to find the appellant guilty of the crime of rape. RULING: NO. Given the slew of assertions and counter assertions, the fact that AAA bore a child as a result of a purported rape may provide the definitive key to the absolution of Umanito. With the advance in genetics and the availability of the new technology, it can now be determined with reasonable certainty whether the appellant is the father of AAA’s child. If it can be conclusively determined that Umanito did not sire the child, this may cast a shadow of reasonable doubt and allow his acquittal on this basis. The disputable presumption that was established as a result of the DNA testing was not contradicted and overcome by other evidence considering that the accused did not object to the admission of the results of the DNA testing (Exhibits "A" and "B" inclusive of sub-markings) nor presented evidence to rebut the same. Umanito’s defense of alibi, together with his specific assertion that while he had courted AAA they were not sweethearts, lead to a general theory on his part that he did not engage in sexual relations with the complainant. The DNA testing has evinced a contrary conclusion, and that as testified to by AAA, Umanito had fathered the child she gave birth to on 5 April 1990, nine months after the day she said she was raped by Umanito. _____________________________________________________________________________________ PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee vs. LARRY ERGUIZA, accused-appellant. G.R. No. 171348 November 26, 2008

FACTS: The Court is confronted with another case of rape. The victim, a 13-year-old girl. And although the Court may be moved by compassion and sympathy, the Court, as a court of law, is duty-bound to apply the law. Basic is the rule that for conviction of a crime, the evidence required is proof beyond reasonable doubt -- conviction with moral certainty. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, Branch 57, found Larry Erguiza (appellant) guilty of one count of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely: private complainant (AAA), her mother BBB and father CCC, and Dr. James Sison. The defense presented five witnesses, namely: Joy Agbuya, Juanito Macaraeg, Juanita Angeles, Albina Erguiza, and appellant. The prosecution’s version: AAA, a thirteen-year old together with her friends, siblings Joy and Ricky Agbuya, went to the mango orchard located at the back of ZZZ Elementary School to gather fallen mangoes. When they were bound for home at around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, AAA's short pants got hooked on the fence. AAA asked Joy and Ricky to wait for her but they ran away and left her. While AAA was trying to unhook her short pants, Larry suddenly grabbed and pulled her. Poking a knife at her neck, Larry threatened to hurt her if she would make a noise. Dragging her some distance, it was there that Larry raped her. AAA lingered for a while at the place and kept crying. Having spent her tears, she wore her panty and short pants and proceeded to the adjacent store of her Aunt Beth who was asleep. After staying for some time at the store, AAA decided to come (sic) home. Upon reaching home, she directly went to bed. Fearing Larry's threat, AAA kept mum on the incident. Some three months thereafter, BBB brought her daughter AAA to her grandmother (BBB's mother), a hilot residing in XXX, Tarlac, to consult her on the unusual palpitation on the mid-portion of AAA's throat and the absence of her monthly period. After examining AAA, her grandmother told BBB that her daughter was pregnant. BBB asked AAA who was the father of her unborn child but AAA refused to talk. After much prodding, and in the presence of her Uncle, Rudy Domingo, AAA finally revealed that she was raped by accused-appellant.

ISSUE: Whether or not the guilt of the accused was established by the burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt. RULING: No. The prosecution's evidence does not pass the test of moral certainty. This Court has ruled that in the review of rape cases, the Court is guided by the following precepts: (a) an accusation of rape can be made with facility, but it is more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove it; (b) the complainant's testimony must be scrutinized with extreme caution since, by the very nature of the crime, only two persons are normally involved; and (c) if the complainant's testimony is convincingly credible, the accused may be convicted of the crime. After a judicious examination of the records of the case, the Court finds that there is testimonial evidence that contradicts the findings of the RTC and CA on the basis of which no conviction beyond reasonable doubt could arise. It is the unrebutted testimony of a credible defense witness. The testimony of Joy Agbuya (Joy) casts doubt as to the possibility of rape having taken place as narrated by complainant. In addition, the testimony of a disinterested defense witness, Juanita Angeles (Juanita) corroborated the alibi of appellant. The testimony of Joy clearly lays down the following facts which are damaging to the case of the prosecution: first, that Joy did not leave behind AAA when the latter's shorts got hooked to the fence; and secondly, that Joy and AAA left the orchard, went home together and separated at their Aunt Beth's house, indicating that no untoward incident, much less rape, was committed by appellant at the time and place that complainant had testified on. Consequently, in view of the unrebutted testimony of Joy, appellant's defense of alibi and denial assumes considerable weight. It is at this point that the issue as to the time that the rape was committed plays a significant factor in determining the guilt or innocence of appellant. What needs to be stressed is that a conviction in a criminal case must be supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt – moral certainty that the accused is guilty. The conflicting testimonies of Joy and complainant, and the testimony of Juanita that corroborated appellant's alibi preclude the Court from convicting appellant of rape with moral certainty. Faced with two conflicting versions, the Court is guided by the equipoise rule. Thus, where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. The equipoise rule provides that where the evidence in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional presumption of innocence tilts the scales in favor of the accused. _____________________________________________________________________________________ ANTHONY L. NG, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. 20 Phil. 127

1913

FACTS: Sometime on 1997, Ng, then engaged in the business of building and fabricating telecommunication towers under the trade name "Capitol Blacksmith and Builders," applied for a credit line of PhP 3,000,000 with Asiatrust Development Bank, Inc. (Asiatrust). In support of Asiatrust’s credit investigation, Ng voluntarily submitted the following documents: (1) the contracts he had with Islacom, Smart, and Infocom; (2) the list of projects wherein he was commissioned by the said telecommunication companies to build several steel towers; and (3) the collectible amounts he has with the said companies. Thereafter, Asiatrust approved petitioner’s loan application. Ng was then required to sign several documents, among which are the Credit Line Agreement, Application and Agreement for Irrevocable L/C, Trust Receipt Agreements, and Promissory Notes. Though the Promissory Notes matured on September of the same year, the two (2) aforementioned Trust Receipt Agreements did not bear any maturity dates as they were left unfilled or in blank by Asiatrust.

After Ng received the goods, consisting of chemicals and metal plates from his suppliers, he utilized them to fabricate the communication towers ordered from him by his clients which were installed in three project sites, namely: Isabel, Leyte; Panabo, Davao; and Tongonan. As Ng realized difficulty in collecting from his client Islacom, he failed to pay his loan to Asiatrust. Asiatrust then conducted a surprise ocular inspection of petitioner’s business through Villarva S. Linga, Asiatrust’s representative appraiser. Linga thereafter reported to Asiatrust that he found that approximately 97% of the subject goods of the Trust Receipts were "sold-out and that only 3 % of the goods pertaining to PN No. 1963 remained." Asiatrust then endorsed petitioner’s account to its Account Management Division for the possible restructuring of his loan. The parties thereafter held a series of conferences to work out the problem and to determine a way for petitioner to pay his debts. However, efforts towards a settlement failed to be reached. On 1999, Remedial Account Officer Bernardez filed a Complaint-Affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. Consequently, an Information for Estafa, as defined and penalized under Art. 315, par. 1(b) of the RPC in relation to Sec. 3, PD 115 or the Trust Receipts Law, was filed with the RTC. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in allowing the question to impugn the witness’ credibility. RULING: Yes. Generally speaking, a witness cannot be impeached by the party against whom he has been called, except by showing (a) that he has made contradictory statements: or (b) by showing that his general reputation for the truth, honesty, or integrity is bad. (Sec. 342, Act No. 190.) The question to which the defendant objected neither attempted to show that the witness had made contradictory statements nor that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity was bad. While you cannot impeach the credibility of a witness, except by showing that he has made contradictory statements or that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, yet, nevertheless, you may show by an examination of the witness himself or from the record of the judgment, that he has been convicted of a high crime. (Sec. 342, Act No. 190.) In the present case, the other offense to which the question above related was not a high crime, as that term is generally used, and we assume that the phrase "high crime," as used in section 342, is used in its ordinary signification. High crimes are generally defined as such immoral and unlawful acts as are nearly allied and equal in guilt to felonies. We believe that the objection to the above question was properly interposed and should have been sustained. _____________________________________________________________________________________ BURDEN OF PROOF Denotes the duty of establishing the truth of a given proposition or issue by such quantum of evidence as the law demands in the case in which the issue arises, whether civil or criminal. It remains with the party alleging facts and never shifts to the other party. He who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and the same never parts. BURDEN OF EVIDENCE Means the necessity of going forward with the evidence to meet the prima facie case created against him

It shifts from side to side as the trial of the case progresses and evidence is introduced by the respective parties.

_____________________________________________________________________________________

P resumptions PRESUMPTIONS ➢Presumptions are species of evidence which may prove certain issues in dispute. Presumptions are either conclusive or disputable. ➢A conclusive presumption is an inference which the law makes so peremptory that it will not allow it to be overturned by a contrary proof however strong. It is an artificially compelling force which requires the trier of facts to find such fact as conclusively presumed and which renders evidence to the contrary inadmissible. It is sometimes referred to as irrebuttable presumption. ➢A disputable presumption is an inference as to the existence of fact not actually known which arises from its usual connection with another fact is known, which may be overcome by contrary proof. Between a proven fact and a presumption pro tanto, the former stands and the latter falls.

MIGUEL PASCUAL, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs MACARIO ANGELES, Defendant-Appellee, G.R. No. 1511

July 26, 1905

FACTS: On, January 15, 1993, Miguel Pascual brought this action to recover the possession of a certain tract of land unlawfully occupied by the defendant, Macario Angeles, and for the payment of rent due, damages, and cost. It was alleged in the complaint that the defendant then held under a lease a certain tract of land 15 yards square in the barrio of Uaua, municipality of San Jose de Navotas, that the land formerly belonged to Ciriaca Pascual, his sister, from whom he inherited it, that the defendant owed him 30 pesos for the use of the land during the years of 1899, 1900, and 1901 under the terms of the lease written in Tagalog and attached to the complaint. That demand having been made upon the defendant for payment of the rent due for the first two years, he asked for and obtained an extension, that by virtue of this extension the lease was continued in force, that a subsequent demand was made upon the defendant about the end of the year 1901 for the payment of rent due and for the possession of the land, that the defendant refused to do either, and that he had since been in the wrongful possession of the land. The defendant Angeles, entered a general denial to the complaint. He denied specifically under oath the genuineness and due execution of the lease attached to the complaint, alleging as a special defense that he was the actual occupant of the land claimed and had been in adverse, quiet, peaceful, public and uninterrupted possession of the same for more than thirty years, having during that period built houses and planted trees thereon. The court, after hearing the evidence, rendered judgment in favor of the defendant, with costs to the plaintiff. ISSUE: Whether or not Macario Angeles was the right owner of the tract of land in question. RULING: No, this action arises out of the contract of lease and presupposes in the lessor a right to ownership or possession of the property. For this reason he cannot be compelled to prove his title thereto. The tenant cannot deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them Those in the actual possession of land under a claim of ownership, right of usufruct, or any other right entitling them to the use of the same may, maintain an action for ejectment against a wrongful possessor. If the juridical personality of the deceased testatrix is transmitted to the heir and the latter is considered as identified with his devisor, to whose rights, action, and obligations not extinguished by her death, he succeeded, then there is no doubt that the plaintiff, as testamentary successor of his deceased sister Ciriaca, as appears from the will on page 17 of the bill of exceptions, had a right to oust the defendant, Angeles, for failure to pay the stipulated rent.

MANUEL ORMACHEA TIN-CONGCO, deceased, represented by the Chinaman Tiu Tusay, judicial administrator of his estate, plaintiff-appellee vs. SANTIAGO TRILLANA, defendant-appellant G.R. No. L-4776 March 18, 1909

FACTS: Congco filed a complaint against Trillana for payment of the debts. Trillana however alleged that he already completed his payment due to the document signed by Jose Lawa who is the manager of the distillery owned by Congco and Queco. The court ruled that the repayment of a debt must be made to the person in whose favor the obligation is constituted, or to another expressly authorized to receive the payment in his name. Jose Lawa after his definite retirement has no authority to release debtor. ISSUE: Whether the document in possession of Trillana, as delivered to him by Lawa, releases her from the obligation. RULING: NO. The debt can only be presumed to have been paid and an obligation fulfilled when the proof of their existence has been delivered to the debtor, and not when the documents showing the existence of the debt are still in the hands of the creditor. The discharge of a debt given by a managing partner, two years after the partnership had been dissolved does not qualify as a partner`s admission and thus cannot prejudice or bind the other partners. Lawa has no authority to discharge the debtor, having the partnership dissolved two years ago. _____________________________________________________________________________________ PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs NONA SALAZAR PADIERNOS, Defendant-Appellant, G.R. No. L-37284

February 27, 1976

FACTS: Nona Salazar Padiernos, the accused, and Rodolfo Padiernos were husband and wife. Nona was charged and convicted by the lower court for parricide. The death was caused by multiple stabbed wounds and lacerations caused by a knife. One fatal wound that resulted to the death of the deceased was found at the back of the deceased. The accused admitted to the crime but claimed self-defense. The lower court did not believe the claim of the accused. It held that the fatal wound at the back of the deceased could not have been inflicted if it was a case of self-defense. Furthermore, the fact that the accused fled and went into hiding and surrendered only after almost 4 years did not help her claim of selfdefense. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: WON the lower court erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of parricide. RULING: The higher court sustained the ruling of the lower court. The court held that the burden of proof lies on the accused in proving that the crime was due to self-defense. Her flight, taken into consideration plus the fact that the fatal wound was found at the back of the deceased was indication that the deceased was not aware and in fact not attacking the accused contrary to what accused claimed. The court also held that her flight didn’t help her as well as flight is an indication of guilt. The SC dismissed the petition for appeal and sustained the ruling of the lower court with costs on the petitioner

YEE HEM vs US April 27, 1925

FACTS: Yee Hem was convicted of concealing a quantity of smoking opium after importation, with knowledge that it has been imported in violation of Act (Feb. 9, 1909, c. 100, 35 Stat. 614). Yee Hem appeals on the ground that the Act is unconstitutional for violating due process of law and compulsory self-incrimination clauses of the Fifth Amendment based on Sections 2 and 3. The said Sections provide for a presumption that the possession of opium is sufficient evidence for conviction and shifts the burden of proof on the defendant, contrary to the presumption of innocence provided by the Constitution. The Court ruled that Act is not unconstitutional. It is well within the power of the Congress to enact provisions in respect of the presumptions arising from unexplained possession of such opium. The Court ruled that the legislation providing that proof of one fact shall constitute prima facie evidence of the main fact in issue is but to enact a rule of evidence, and quite within the general power of government. A legislative presumption may not constitute a denial of due process of law or a denial of equal protection of law. ISSUE: Whether or not the presumption found in the Act is unconstitutional? RULING: NO. The presumptions thus created are reasonable, and do not contravene the due process of law and the compulsory self-incrimination clauses of the Fifth Amendment. The law of evidence is full of presumptions either of fact or law. The former are, of course, disputable, and the strength of any inference of one fact from proof of another depends upon the generality of the experience upon which it is founded. In order that a legislative presumption of one fact from evidence of another may not constitute a denial of due process of law or a denial of the equal protection of the law, it is only essential that there shall be some rational connection between the fact provided and the ultimate fact presumed, and that the inference of one fact from proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate. So also it must not, under a guise of regulating the presentation of evidence, operate to preclude the party from the right to present his defense to the main fact thus presumed. Furthermore, it was already 14 years since the law was passed, one can reasonably presume that the opium was imported after the law was passed was illegally imported. Therefore, that possession of such opium in the absence of a satisfactory explanation shall create a presumption of guilt, is "so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate", and is unavailing. _____________________________________________________________________________________ COUNTRY COURT OF ULSTER COUNTY, Petitioner, vs ALLEN, Respondent, 442 US 140 (1979)

FACTS: Three adult males were charged together with a 16 year old girl who is not a defendant in the herein case, were jointly tried on charges of possession of two loaded handguns, a machine gun and over one pound of heroin. The defendants were soon acquitted by the jury over the possession of the contents of the truck that they were using for the crime but they were convicted on the possession of the handguns. Defendants contended that the guns were on the possession of the 16 year old girl and they denied that they have possession of the guns mentioned. Defendants challenged the constitutionality of the New York State Statute which allowed a presumption of illegal possession if a gun was found in a car occupied by all individuals charged.

ISSUE: Whether or not the New York State Statute allowing a presumption of illegal possession was constitutional and valid. RULING: Yes, the state advanced a permissive presumption that is constitutional and did not deprive defendants of due process. There is a rational connection between the basic facts of the case proved by the prosecution and the ultimate fact presumed, in this case the defendants had possession of the guns, and then this ultimate fact is more likely than not to flow from the facts involved. As long as it is clear that the presumption is not the sole and sufficient basis for a finding of guilt, than the above test is the proper analysis. _____________________________________________________________________________________ Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 June 18, 1979

FACTS: Based upon a confession and other evidence, petitioner was charged under a Montana statute with "deliberate homicide," in that he "purposely or knowingly" caused the victim's death. At trial, petitioner argued that, although he killed the victim, he did not do so "purposely or knowingly," and therefore was not guilty of deliberate homicide. The trial court instructed the jury that "the law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts," over petitioner's objection that such instruction had the effect of shifting the burden of proof on the issue of purpose or knowledge. The jury found petitioner guilty, and the Montana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that although shifting the burden of proof to the defendant by means of a presumption is prohibited, allocation of "some burden of proof" to a defendant is permissible. Finding that under the instruction in question petitioner's sole burden was to produce "some" evidence that he did not intend the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts, and not to disprove that he acted "purposely or knowingly," the Montana court held that the instruction did not violate due process standards. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s presumption that he did not purposely kill the victim should be given high credence and value. RULING: No. It must not be given high credence. In any court’s proceedings, the decision shall depend based on the evidence that was presented at the trial. Thus, a presumption needs to have its supporting evidence for it to prosper and should be given weight. A presumption which, although not conclusive, had the effect of shifting the burden of persuasion to petitioner, would have suffered from similar infirmities. If the jury interpreted the presumption in this manner, it could have concluded that, upon proof by the State of the slaying, and of additional facts not themselves establishing the element of intent, the burden was then shifted to petitioner to prove that he lacked the requisite mental state. Such a presumption was found constitutionally deficient. In the case a bar, petitioner failed to present evidence to support his claim that he didn’t intentionally kill the victim and that he executed the act out of his sanity. _____________________________________________________________________________________ ROLANDO SASAN, SR., et al, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION 4TH DIVISION, EQUITABLE-PCI BANK and HELPMATE, INC.,respondents. G.R. No. 176240

October 17, 2008

FACTS: Respondent Equitable-PCI Bank (E-PCIBank), a banking entity duly organized and existing under and by virtue of Philippine laws, entered into a Contract for Services with HI, a domestic

corporation primarily engaged in the business of providing janitorial and messengerial services. Pursuant to their contract, HI shall hire and assign workers to E-PCIBank to perform janitorial/messengerial and maintenance services. The contract was impliedly renewed year after year. Petitioners were among those employed and assigned to E-PCIBank at its branch along Gorordo Avenue, Lahug, Cebu City, as well as to its other branches in the Visayas. Petitioners filed with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC separate complaints against E-PCIBank and HI for illegal dismissal. In their position papers, petitioners claimed that they had become regular employees of E-PCIBank with respect to the activities for which they were employed, having continuously rendered janitorial and messengerial services to the bank for more than one year; that EPCIBank had direct control and supervision over the means and methods by which they were to perform their jobs; and that their dismissal by HI was null and void because the latter had no power to do so since they had become regular employees of E-PCIBank. For its part, E-PCIBank averred that it entered into a Contract for Services with HI, an independent job contractor which hired and assigned petitioners to the bank to perform janitorial and messengerial services thereat. HI, on the other hand, asserted that it was an independent job contractor engaged in the business of providing janitorial and related services to business establishments, and EPCIBank was one of its clients. On the basis of the parties’ position papers and documentary evidence, Labor Arbiter Gutierrez rendered a Decision finding that HI was not a legitimate job contractor on the ground that it did not possess the required substantial capital or investment to actually perform the job, work, or service under its own account and responsibility as required under the Labor Code. HI is therefore a labor-only contractor and the real employer of petitioners is E-PCIBank which is held liable to petitioners. Aggrieved by the decision of Labor Arbiter Gutierrez, respondents E-PCIBank and HI appealed the same to the NLRC, 4th Division. The NLRC modified the ruling of Labor Arbiter Gutierrez. The NLRC took into consideration the documentary evidence presented by HI for the first time on appeal and, on the basis thereof, declared HI as a highly capitalized venture with sufficient capitalization, which cannot be considered engaged in "labor-only contracting." Petitioners sought recourse with the CA by filing a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. In its Decision, the CA affirmed the findings of the NLRC that HI was a legitimate job contractor and that it did not illegally dismiss petitioners. Hence, the petition. ISSUE: Whether or not submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed in labor cases. RULING: The submission of additional evidence before the NLRC is not prohibited by its New Rules of Procedure. After all, rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are not controlling in labor cases. The NLRC and labor arbiters are directed to useevery and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law and procedure all in the interest of substantial justice. In keeping with this directive, it has been held that the NLRC may consider evidence, such as documents and affidavits, submitted by the parties for the first time on appeal. The submission of additional evidence on appeal does not prejudice the other party for the latter could submit counter-evidence. The NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence, even for the first time on appeal, because technical rules of procedure are not binding in labor cases. _____________________________________________________________________________________ CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTIONS -- The following are instances of conclusive presumptions: a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another tobelieve a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it: b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them. (Sec. 2 Rule 131)

BLUE CROSS HEALTH CARE, INC., Petitioner, vs. NEOMI and DANILO OLIVARES, Respondents. GR No. 169737February 12, 2008

FACTS: Respondent Neomi T. Olivares applied for a health care program with petitioner Blue Cross Health Care, Inc., a health maintenance firm. She paid the necessary amounts in full on October 17, 2002. The application was approved on October 22, 2002. In the health care agreement, ailments due to preexisting conditions were excluded from the coverage. On November 30, 2002, or barely 38 days from the effectivity of her health insurance, respondent Neomi suffered a stroke and was admitted at the Medical City, a hospital accredited by petitioner. She incurred hospital expenses amounting to P34, 217.20. Consequently, she requested from the representative of petitioner at Medical City a letter of authorization in order to settle her medical bills. But petitioner refused to issue the letter and suspended payment pending the submission of a certification from her attending physician that the stroke she suffered was not caused by a pre-existing condition. Noemi interposed that the content of the certificate is considered as privileged communication between patient and physician. She was discharged from the hospital on December 3, 2002. On December 5, 2002, she demanded that petitioner pay her medical bill. When petitioner still refused, she and her husband were constrained to settle the bill. They thereafter filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against petitioner in the MeTC. The trial court dismissed their complaint for lack of cause of action. The RTC reversed the decision on appeal, which was affirmed by the CA. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the petitioner invoked that the respondent’s failure to present the certification gave rise to the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner correctly relied on the disputable presumption. RULING: No. A health care agreement is in the nature of a non-life insurance. It is an established rule in insurance contracts that when their terms contain limitations on liability, they should be construed strictly against the insurer. These are contracts of adhesion the terms of which must be interpreted and enforced stringently against the insurer which prepared the contract. This doctrine is equally applicable to health care agreements. Petitioner never presented any evidence to prove that respondent Neomi's stroke was due to a preexisting condition. It merely speculated that Dr. Saniel's report would be adverse to Neomi, based on her invocation of the doctor-patient privilege. This was a disputable presumption at best. Section 3 (e), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court states: Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. ― The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence: (e) That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced. Suffice it to say that this presumption does not apply if (a) the evidence is at the disposal of both parties; (b) the suppression was not willful; (c) it is merely corroborative or cumulative and (d) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege. Here, respondents' refusal to present or allow the presentation of Dr. Saniel's report was justified. It was privileged communication between physician and patient. Furthermore, as already stated, limitations of liability on the part of the insurer or health care provider must be construed in such a way as to preclude it from evading its obligations. Accordingly, they should be scrutinized by the courts with extreme jealousy and care and with a jaundiced eye. Since petitioner had the burden of proving exception to liability, it should have made its own assessment of whether respondent Neomi had a pre-existing condition when it failed to obtain the attending physician's report. It could not just passively wait for Dr. Saniel's report to bail it out. The mere reliance on a disputable presumption does not meet the strict standard required under our jurisprudence.

ROYAL CARGO CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. DFS SPORTS UNLIMITED, INC., Respondent. G.R. No. 158621, December 10, 2008 FACTS: Sometime between April to July 1994, DFS Sports Unlimited, Inc. (DFS for brevity), respondent herein, hired the services of petitioner Royal Cargo Corporation (Royal Cargo for brevity), a freight forwarder, for the shipment of its sporting products. Royal Cargo incurred expenses amounting to P248,449.63 including freight charges, taxes and other fees for its service to DFS. The former demanded payment but DFS refused to pay. Thus, the latter filed this case for collection of sum of money with interest as well as payment of attorney’s fees and the costs of the suit. During trial, Royal Cargo presented several carbon copies of its invoices to DFS proving the latter’s indebtedness. On the other hand, DFS submitted as evidence the original copies of said invoices stamped with the words “PAID” and “AUDITED” for the purpose of proving payment. Both the trial court and the CA failed to give due course to Royal Cargo’s complaint. ISSUE: Whether or not DFS’ possession of original copies of invoices produces the disputable presumption that it had already paid its obligation to Royal Cargo. RULING: No, DFS’ possession of the original copies of invoices does not produce the disputable presumption that it had already paid its obligation to Royal Cargo. An invoice is nothing but an itemized list of goods furnished by the seller to the buyer. It is different from the term “receipts” which is a written acknowledgement of the fact of payment in money. Thus, possession by the debtor of an invoice does not raise the presumption that it had already paid its obligation. Following the distinction abovementioned, it cannot be said that DFS had already paid its obligation to Royal Cargo by its mere possession of the original copies of the invoices, the latter not being considered as receipts evidencing payment. Furthermore, although said invoices bear the words “PAID” and “AUDITED,” close examination of the evidence revealed that the stamp was made by the accounting department of DFS and not by Royal Cargo, as testified to by Adora Co, DFS’ employee who is in charge of all paid accounts. _____________________________________________________________________________________ SPOUSES MORRIS CARPO and SOCORRO CARPO, Petitioners, vs. AYALA LAND, INCORPORATED, Respondent. G.R. No. 166577,February 3, 2010

FACTS: This is a case involving the question as to who between the spouses Morris and Socorro Carpo (Carpos)and Ayala Land, Incorporated (ALI)has the superior right over a parcel of land located in Las Piñas, Manila. The subject property contains 171, 209 square meters covered by Carpos’ TCT No. 296463 which also coincides with that of ALI under TCT No. T-41262 which the latter seek to be developed into a residential subdivision. The Carpos filed the complaint originally for quieting of title but as adjudicated by the Court, it properly qualifies as an action for reconveyance. ALI’s title originated from OCT No. 242 which was issued on May 7, 1950. On the other hand, Carpos’ title was derived from OCT No. 8575 issued in 1970. The Carpos contend that OCT No. 242 is void for being issued without a survey plan that was approved by the Director of Lands, the survey plan being a prerequisite for the issuance of the decree of registration. Consequently, they contend that since the title of ALI’s predecessor-in-interest is void for want of the survey plan, ALI’s title is also considered void.

The trial court rendered a summary judgment invalidating all of ALI”s titles to the subject property. However, the Court of Appeals (CA) ruled that ALI’s title is valid even without the requisite survey plan in view of the presumption of regularity enjoyed by the said title. ISSUE: Whether or not the titleof Ayala Land Incorporated to the subject property is valid considering the avowed presumption of regularity attached to the issuance of said title. RULING: Yes, ALI’s title to the property is valid in view of the presumption of regularity in the issuance of said title. One of the disputable presumptions provided under Section 3 of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court is the presumption of regularity which states “that official duty has been regularly performed.” As pointed out by the CA, upon the issuance of the decree of registration to ALI’s predecessor-in-interest, it can be assumed that the latter complied with the requisite survey plan when it sought the original registration of the property. And it can be further assumed that the officers of the land registration court that had issued the title to ALI’s predecessor-in-interest had carefully ascertained the propriety of issuing the decree, under the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions by public officers. Thus, in the absence of proof to the contrary, OCT No. 242 and its derivatives, including ALI’s TCT No. T-41262, enjoy the presumption of regularity and ALI need not allege or prove that its title was regularly issued. Such is the nature of a presumption, it dispenses with the need for proof. Moreover, an action for reconveyance must be filed within ten (10) years from the issuance of the tile. Since ALI’s title was issued in 1950, that period had already expired in 1960. Thus, the Carpos are now barred from assailing the validity of the same under the principle of laches. And as between the Carpos and ALI, it is that of ALI’s predecessor-in-interest that was issued earlier, twenty (20)years before the title of Carpos’ predecessor-in-interest was issued. In line of the principle of “first in time, stronger in right,” ALI’s title is thus, held to be valid and superior to that of the Carpos’. _____________________________________________________________________________________

P resentation of Evidence EXAMINATION OF A WITNESS (RULE 132) • The examination of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally. • The entire proceedings of a trial or hearing, including the questions propounded to a witness and his answers thereto, the statements made by the judge or any of the parties, counsel, or witnesses with reference to the case, shall be recorded by means of shorthand or stenotype or by other means of recording found suitable by the court. A transcript of the record of the proceedings made by the official stenographer, stenotypist or recorder and certified as correct by him shall be deemed prima facie a correct statement of such proceedings. RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF A WITNESS ➢A witness must answer questions, although his answer may tend to establish a claim against him. However, it is the right of a witness: 1) To be protected from irrelevant, improper, or insulting questions, and from harsh or insulting demeanor; 2) Not to be detained longer than the interests of justice require; 3) Not to be examined except only as to matters pertinent to the issue; 4) Not to give an answer which will tend to subject him to a penalty for an offense unless otherwise provided by law; or 5) Not to give an answer which will tend to degrade his reputation, unless it be to the very fact at issue or to a fact from which the fact in issue would be presumed. But a witness must answer to the fact of his previous final conviction for an offense. ORDER IN THE EXAMINATION OF AN INDIVIDUAL WITNESS ➢The order in which an individual witness may be examined is as follows: 1) Direct examination by the proponent; 2) Cross-examination by the opponent; 3) Re-direct examination by the proponent; 4) Re-cross-examination by the opponent. 5) Recalling the witness

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROGER RAMA, accused-appellant. G.R. No. 136304

January 25, 2001

FACTS: On 12 November 1998, before 5:00 o’clock in the morning, Chief Inspector Muksan briefed PO2 Miñoza, PO1 Cuadra, PO1 Falcasantos and PO1 Valdez on the plan for the buy-bust operation. When Chief Inspector Muksan reached the road, he saw the informant talking to the four women and the boy. The informant introduced Chief Inspector Muksan in the Tausog dialect as the person who would buy the shabu. The informant introduced two of the women as Shaira ("Hairatul") and Ruai ("Ruaina"). According to Chief Inspector Muksan, he handed the buy-bust money to the informant who gave it to Hairatul. Ruaina took the money from Hairatul and placed it inside her shoulder bag. Hairatul then handed to Chief Inspector Muksan a red Jollibee plastic bag. Chief Inspector Muksan opened the red Jollibee plastic bag and saw a transparent plastic pack containing white crystalline substance, which he presumed to be shabu. Chief Inspector Muksan then turned his face and scratched his head as a sign to his men to come out and assist him in arresting the pushers. Chief Inspector Muksan arrested Hairatul and Ruaina by holding them in the arm while waiting for his operatives. The two other women and the young boy ran away and boarded a tricycle. Police Inspector and Forensic Chemist Diestro of the PNP Crime Laboratory testified that on 12 November 1998, around 5:30 in the afternoon, she received a request for laboratory examination to determine the presence of prohibited or regulated drugs on a sample that Chief Inspector Muksan submitted. Police Inspector Diestro conducted the test on the white crystalline substance contained inside the transparent heat-sealed plastic bag Chief Inspector Muksan submitted. The substance weighed 298.2 grams and the tests showed that it contained Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu. Police Inspector Diestro then prepared Physical Science Report No. D-310-9817 on her findings on the tests. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court seriously erred in giving credence to the uncorroborated and inconsistent testimony of Senior Inspector Nickson Muksan. RULING: Yes. In convicting Hairatul, the trial court relied mainly on the testimony of Chief Inspector Muksan as sole eyewitness for the prosecution. The other members of the buy-bust operation did not witness the actual exchange of shabu and buy-bust money between Chief Inspector Muksan, who acted as poseur-buyer, and the pushers. Prosecution witnesses PO2 Miñoza and PO1 Falcasantos repeatedly admitted that they did not witness what happened between Chief Inspector Muksan and the pushers before the actual arrest because they were hiding far from the scene of the crime. There is a material Inconsistencies in the Testimony of Chief Inspector Muksan, the testimony of one eyewitness is sufficient to support a conviction provided it is positive, credible, clear and straightforward. However, the weight of the eyewitness account should be on the fact that the witness saw the accused commit the crime and the witness could positively identify the accused. A scrutiny of Chief Inspector Muksan’s testimony shows that he did not actually see who was carrying the red Jollibee plastic bag containing the shabu or to whom this red Jollibee plastic bag was handed to during the sale. Chief Inspector Muksan testified that when he approached the informant and the pushers, the informant was already holding in her right hand the red Jollibee plastic bag. The rule is that factual findings of the trial court and its evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. However, this rule does not apply where the trial court has overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied any fact or circumstance of weight and substance. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence. An accused in a criminal case is presumed innocent until proven otherwise and the prosecution has the burden of proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence of the prosecution must stand on its own weight and not rely on the weakness of the defense.

E xamination in Open Court PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AMELIA K. DEL ROSARIO and DIONISIO CERBO, petitioners, vs. HON NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO Judge, Court of First Instance of Iloilo, and GREGORIO OJOY, respondents. 72 SCRA 428 (1976)

FACTS: In Criminal Case No. 2891, entitled "People of the Philippines, plaintiff, versus Gregorio Ojoy, accused", of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch III, after the accused himself had testified in his defense, his counsel manifested that for his subsequent witnesses he was filing only their affidavits subject to cross-examination by the prosecution on matters stated in the affidavits and on all other matters pertinent and material to the case. Private prosecutor Atty. Amelia K. del Rosario, one of the petitioners here, objected to the proposed procedure but this notwithstanding, respondent Judge gave his conformity thereto and subsequently issued the questioned Order. Contending that respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion because the aforesaid Orders violates Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court, which requires that the testimony of the witness should be given orally in open court, and there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, petitioners instituted the present petition. ISSUE: Did the judge’s orders violate Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which requires that testimony of witnesses be given orally in open court? RULING: Yes. Sections 1 and 2, Rule 132 and Section 1, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court clearly require that the testimony of a witness shall be given orally in open court. The essential purpose of requiring a witness to appear and testify orally at a trial is to secure for the adverse party the opportunity of cross-examination. Cross-examination cannot be had except by the direct and personal putting of questions and obtaining immediate answers. Personal appearance of the witness before the judge also enables the judge as the trier of facts, to obtain the elusive and incommunicable evidence of a witness' deportment while testifying, and a certain subjective moral effect is produced upon the witness. It is only when the witness testifies orally that the judge may have a true idea of his countenance, manner and expression, which may confirm or detract from the weight of his testimony. Certainly, the physical condition of the witness will reveal his capacity for accurate observation and memory, and his deportment and physiognomy will reveal clues to his character. These can only be observed by the judge if the witness testifies orally in court. Indeed, the great weight given the findings of fact of the trial judge in the appellate court is based upon his having had just that opportunity and the assumption that he took advantage of it to ascertain the credibility of the witnesses. Section 1 of Rule 133 of the Rule requires that in determining the superior weight of evidence on the issues involved, the court, aside from the other factors therein enumerated, may consider the "witness manner of testifying" which can only be done if the witness gives his testimony orally in open court". If a trial judge prepares his opinion immediately after the conclusion of the trial, with the evidence and his impressions of the witnesses fresh in his mind, it is obvious that he is much more likely to reach a correct result than if he simply reviews the evidence from a typewritten transcript, without having had the opportunity to see, hear and observe the actions and utterances of the witnesses.

SATURNINA GALMAN AND REYNALDO GALMAN, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUSTICE MANUEL PAMARAN, et al., respondents. G.R. Nos. 71208-09 August 30, 1985

FACTS: On August 21, 1983, a crime unparalleled in repercussions and ramifications was committed inside the premises of the Manila International Airport (MIA) in Pasay City. Former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., an opposition stalwart who was returning to the country after a long-sojourn abroad, was gunned down to death. The assassination rippled shock-waves throughout the entire country which reverberated beyond the territorial confines of this Republic. The after-shocks stunned the nation even more as this ramified to all aspects of Philippine political, economic and social life. UPON termination of the investigation, two (2) reports were submitted to His Excellency, President Ferdinand E. Marcos. One, by its Chairman, the Hon. Justice Corazon Juliano Agrava; and another one, jointly authored by the other members of the Board — namely: Hon. Luciano Salazar, Hon. Amado Dizon, Hon. Dante Santos and Hon. Ernesto Herrera. 'the reports were thereafter referred and turned over to the TANODBAYAN for appropriate action. After conducting the necessary preliminary investigation, the TANODBAYAN filed with the SANDIGANBAYAN two (2) Informations for MURDER-one for the killing of Sen. Benigno S. Aquino which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 10010 and another, criminal Case No. 10011, for the killing of Rolando Galman, who was found dead on the airport tarmac not far from the prostrate body of Sen. Aquino on that same fateful day. In both criminal cases, private respondents were charged as accessories, along with several principals, and one accomplice. All the private respondents objected to the prosecution's formal offer of evidence on the same ground relied upon by them in their respective motion for exclusion. On June 13, 1985, respondent SANDIGANBAYAN issued a Resolution, now assailed in these two (2) petitions, admitting all the evidences offered by the prosecution except the testimonies and/or other evidence produced by the private respondents in view of the immunity granted by P.D. 1886. The crux of the instant controversy is the admissibility in evidence of the testimonies given by the eight (8) private respondents who did not invoke their rights against self-incrimination before the Agrava Board. ISSUE: Whether or not the evidences offered may be admissible. RULING: No. Immunity statutes may be generally classified into two: one, which grants "use immunity"; and the other, which grants what is known as "transactional immunity." The distinction between the two is as follows: "Use immunity" prohibits use of witness' compelled testimony and its fruits in any manner in connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness. On the other hand, "transactional immunity" grants immunity to the witness from prosecution for an offense to which his compelled testimony relates." Examining Presidential Decree 1886, more specifically Section 5 thereof, which reads: SEC. 5. No person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing books, records, correspondence, documents, or other evidence in obedience to a subpoena issued by the Board on the ground that his testimony or the evidence required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to penalty or forfeiture; but his testimony or any evidence produced by him shall not be used against him in connection with any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he is compelled, after having invoked his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, except that such individual so testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying, nor shall he be exempt from demotion or removal from office.

It is beyond dispute that said law belongs to the first type of immunity statutes. It grants merely immunity from use of any statement given before the Board, but not immunity from prosecution by reason or on the basis thereof. Merely testifying and/or producing evidence do not render the witness immune from prosecution notwithstanding his invocation of the right against self- incrimination. He is merely saved from the use against him of such statement and nothing more. Stated otherwise ... he still runs the risk of being prosecuted even if he sets up his right against self- incrimination. The dictates of fair play, which is the hallmark of due process, demands that private respondents should have been informed of their rights to remain silent and warned that any and all statements to be given by them may be used against them. This, they were denied, under the pretense that they are not entitled to it and that the Board has no obligation to so inform them. It is for this reason that we cannot subscribe to the view adopted and urged upon Us by the petitioners that the right against self incrimination must be invoked before the Board in order to prevent use of any given statement against the testifying witness in a subsequent criminal prosecution. A literal interpretation fashioned upon Us is repugnant to Article IV, Section 20 of the Constitution, which is the first test of admissibility. It reads: “No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence”. With the stand we take on the issue before Us, and considering the temper of the times, we run the risk of being consigned to unpopularity. Conscious as we are of, but undaunted by, the frightening consequences that hover before Us, we have strictly adhered to the Constitution in upholding the rule of law finding solace in the view very aptly articulated by that well-known civil libertarian and admired defender of human rights of this Court, Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee, in the case of People vs. Manalang and we quote: “I am completely conscious of the need for a balancing of the interests of society with the rights and freedoms of the individuals. I have advocated the balancing-ofinterests rule in situations which call for an appraisal of the interplay of conflicting interests of consequential dimensions. But I reject any proposition that would blindly uphold the interests of society at the sacrifice of the dignity of any human being”. _____________________________________________________________________________________ ZENON R. PEREZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents. 161 SCRA 122

1988

FACTS: An audit team conducted a cash examination on the account of petitioner, who was then the acting municipal treasurer of Tubigon, Bohol. In the course of the audit, the amount of P21,331.79 was found in the safe of petitioner. The audit team embodied their findings in the Report of Cash Examination, which also contained an inventory of cash items. Based on the said audit, petitioner was supposed to have on hand the total amount of P94,116.36, instead of the P21,331.79, incurring a shortage of P72,784.57. When asked by the auditing team as to the location of the missing funds, petitioner verbally explained that part of the money was used to pay for the loan of his late brother, another portion was spent for the food of his family, and the rest for his medicine. As a result of the audit, Arlene R. Mandin prepared a memorandum dated January 13, 1989 addressed to the Provincial Auditor of Bohol recommending the filing of the appropriate criminal case against petitioner. Petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with malversation of public funds, defined and penalized by Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner guilty of malversation? RULING: YES. There are four elements that must concur in order that one may be found guilty of the crime. They are: (a) That the offender be a public officer; (b) That he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;(c) That those funds or property involved were public funds or property for which he is accountable; and (d) That he has appropriated, took or misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them. Evidently, the first three elements are present in the case at bar. In malversation, all that is necessary to prove is that the defendant received in his possession public funds; that he could not account for them and did not have them in his possession; and that he could not give a reasonable excuse for its disappearance. An accountable public officer may be found guilty of malversation even if there is no direct evidence of malversation because the law establishes a presumption that mere failure of an accountable officer to produce public funds which have come into his hands on demand by an officer duly authorized to examine his accounts is prima facie case of conversion. Because of the prima facie presumption in Article 217, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused to adequately explain the location of the funds or property under his custody or control in order to rebut the presumption that he has appropriated or misappropriated for himself the missing funds. Failing to do so, the accused may be convicted under the said provision. However, the presumption is merely prima facie and a rebuttable one. The accountable officer may overcome the presumption by proof to the contrary. If he adduces evidence showing that, in fact, he has not put said funds or property to personal use, then that presumption is at end and the prima facie case is destroyed. In the case at bar, petitioner was not able to present any credible evidence to rebut the presumption that he malversed the missing funds in his custody or control. _____________________________________________________________________________________

Leading Questions STATE, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs JACK SCOTT, Accused-Appellant, 149 P. 2d 152 (1994)

FACTS: The Appellant, Jack Scott, was tried before a jury upon the charge that he carnally knew a female child of the age of fourteen years, she not then being his wife. A verdict of guilty was returned, and from the judgment entered, this appeal has been taken. By these assignments of error, the appellant complains that the trial court (1) allowed leading questions to be asked of the complaining witness, (2) allowed the testimony of the witness Emily Bergin to be considered by the jury, and (3) allowed the jury to consider the testimony of the witness Martha Swartz. The questions claimed by the appellant to have been of leading character, and to which timely objections were made, were what is known as the alternative forms of questions, and they and their answers were as follows: “Q. I will ask you whether or not he said why he had down what he did? . . . A. He said that why he done that was because he thought that was the only way of getting me, that he loved me and he wanted to marry me and that he thought that he was the only way to get me. He said he thought ‘if I were to go in and touch you then you would marry me.’ He said, “I thought I wouldn’t have no one as old as me.” Q. I will ask you whether or not he said on the same occasion, he said anything relative to his being the first to touch you?. . . A. Yes. Q. I will ask you whether or not he ever asked you to get examined by a doctor? . . . A. Yes, he did. I mean yes, I mentioned wanting to get examined by a doctor.”

ISSUE: Whether or not Appellant Scott was correct that the questions asked to the complaining witness have been of a leading character. RULING: The questions propounded, as above set forth, were not leading. The rulings made by the trial court upon the objections made are further supported by the fact that the answer to the first questions is as fully explanatory as would have been the case had any other form of question been used, and shows a total lack of suggestion by its form. The record shows that, after an affirmative answer was given to the second question, the witness was asked what was said, and her answer was ordered stricken by the court, and the inquiry was not pursued further. The third question did not suggest any particular answer, as that given by the witness clearly so indicates. In addition, the rule has been announced many times by this court that the trial court has a wide discretion in determining what is a proper form of question and as to permitting the asking of a question that is leading. The trial court in this case properly allowed the about-quoted questions to be asked. _____________________________________________________________________________________

I mpeaching One’s Own Witness WILLIAM BECKER vs LESTER EISENSTODT 60 N.J. Super. 240 March 9, 1960

FACTS: Becker brought an action against Eisenstodt charging him of negligence in administering a caustic during post-operative treatment of Arlene (his daughter) following a rhinoplasty, thereby severely burning and disfiguring her. Becker called the two witnesses for the defense as his witness to prove the negligence of Eisenstodt. However during the proceeding, the testimony given by the two witnesses were in favor of the defense. ISSUE: Whether the Becker may impeach his own witness. RULING: NO. Becker called the witnesses for the defense as his own witnesses. He is thus bound by their testimonies. _____________________________________________________________________________________ LEADING AND MISLEADING QUESTIONS (SEC. 10, RULE 132) ➢A question which suggests to the witness the answer which the examining party desires is a leading question. It is not allowed, except: 1) On cross examination; 2) On Preliminary matters; 3) When there is difficulty in getting direct and intelligible answers from a witness who is ignorant, or a child of tender years, or is of feeble mind, or a deaf-mute; 4) Of an unwilling or hostile witness; or 5) Of a witness who is an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation or of a partnership or association which is an adverse party. 6) In all stages of examination of a child if the same will further the interests of justice (Sec. 20, AM 004-07- SC). • A misleading question is one which assumes as true a fact not yet testified to by the witness, or contrary to that which he has previously stated. It is not allowed (Sec. 10). The adverse party should object thereto or ask the court to expunge the answer from the records, if he has already given his answer.

C ross Examination EMILIO DE LA PAZ, JR. ET AL., Petitioners, vs HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ET AL, Respondents, G.R. No. 71537

September 17, 1987

FACTS: This is a petition for review to nullify the decision of the IAC in a civil case declaring plaintiffs as the true owner owners of a parcel of land covered by CTC No. 901 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal. The court ordered the defendants to surrender the owner's duplicate copy of Original Certificate of Title No. 901 and directed the Register of Deeds of Rizal, Pasig Branch to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. 901 and to issue a new one in the names of the plaintiffs (Loreto's heirs) The records show that Loreto Dela Paz, the mother of the Dela Paz heirs, filed a complaint against the petitioners with the RTC for a judicial declaration of ownership of a 43,830 square meter parcel of land covered by CTC 901. Loreto alleged that the subject land was among the properties adjudicated to her and her mother as a result of a partition submitted by the heirs of Ponciano dela Paz and approved by the court. The petitioners contend that said land was not accounted for in the probate of Ponciano's estate but is actually community property of the parties. The parties were instituted as compulsory heirs. Amicable settlement failed and trial proceeded. Loreto was put on the stand and was examined. After the direct examination of Loreto, the counsel for petitioners did the cross-examination but wasn't able to finish and asked the court for suspension. The court granted and moved the continuation of the cross to a later date. However, the counsel for petitioners asked for successive postponement and later on, Loreto died. Children of Loreto were substituted as heirs. The court denied the petition of petitioners to strike off the record the entire testimony of Loreto and subsequently denied the MR as well. The court ruled on the case in favor of the heirs of Loreto. ISSUE: WON the court erred in ruling in favor of the heirs of Loreto RULING: The higher courts sustained the ruling of the appellate court as to ownership but modified the award on damages. The court held that petitioners were given ample time and opportunity to crossexamine Loreto. The records show that after Loreto's direct examination, she has always been available for the cross-examination and that it was the counsel of the petitioners who consistently asked for postponement of such. The court also held that the lower court did not err in ruling against the motion of the petitioner to strike off the record the entire testimony of Loreto, as interlocutory orders are not subjects of appeal. _____________________________________________________________________________________ RUPERTO FULGADO, substituted by his heirs, JULIANA, JOSE, MAXIMO, PACITA and SEVERO all surnamed FULGADO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RUFINO CUSTODIO, SIMPLICIA CUSTODIO, ARSENIO PIGUING, ISMAEL PORCIUNCULA and DOMINGA MACARULAY, respondents. G.R. No. L-61570 February 12, 1990.

FACTS: Ruperto Fulgado filed a case for annulment of certain contracts of sale and partition with accounting. Defendant and his counsel failed to appear in the set pretrial conference. The defendant was declared in default. They appeal such order to the CA who ruled in their favor and lift such order. During the postponement of the case because the presiding judge went on official leave, Ruperto Fulgado died, and his sole witness Jose Fulgado migrated to the United States. When the hearing resumed, the

defendants moved to strike the testimonies of Ruperto Fulgado and Jose Fulgado off the record on the ground that they were deprived of their right to cross0examine. The counsel for Fulgado opposed the motion but the trial court ruled in favor of the defendants and ordered the testimonies of Ruperto Fulgado and Jose Fulgado be stricken off the record. Since the plaintiff had no more witnesses to present, apart from Ruperto and Jose, the trial court dismissed the case. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the lower court. ISSUE: Whether or not the testimonies of the deceased, RupertoFulgado, and his witness, Jose Fulgado, should be stricken off the record? RULING: NO. The right to cross examine is a personal right which may be forfeited by failure of a party to avail of the ample opportunity given him. Where the failure to obtain cross examination was imputable to the cross examiner fault, the lack of cross examination is no longer a ground for exclusion according to the general principle that an opportunity, though waived, will suffice. In the case at bar, the defendants had enough opportunity to cross examine Ruperto Fulgado before his death, and Jose Fulgado before the migration. Despite their knowledge of Ruperto Fulgados failing health and José’s imminent travel, the defendants did not move swiftly to cross examine the said plaintiff and his witness. As a matter of fact, it took them more than one year from the finality of the judgment of the Court of Appeals lifting the order of default before they asked the trial court to resume the hearing of the case. Further, the tasked of recalling a witness for cross examination is in law, imposed on the party who wishes to exercise the said right because of the fact that it is a personal right and can be waived. In addition, even though Jose Fulgado is out of the country, the defendants should have resorted to the various modes of discovery to cross examine Jose. Defendants even disclosed the fact that they had knowledge that Jose was in the country for a visit and yet they did not exert any effort to have him subpoenaed. The acts of the defendants constitute a waiver of their right to cross examine. The Court ordered the trial court to reinstate the case and allow the direct testimonies of Ruperto Fulgado and Jose Fulgado to remain in the record. _____________________________________________________________________________________ CAPITOL SUBDIVISION, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, vs PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, Defendant-Appellant, 52 OG 4627 (1956)

FACTS: The Provincial Hospital of Occidental Negros, located in the city of Bacolod, capital of the province, was built in 1924 at a cost of about P200, 000. But subsequent improvements brought the total cost to more than half a million pesos. In 1949, The capitol subdivision, Inc., a real estate company, claiming to be the owner of the lot in which the provincial Hospital is located, question the right of the hospital to occupy it, and when its claim of ownership was rejected, it brought the present action in the CFI of Occidental Negros to recover the possession of the lot and reasonable rents for its use. But before filing the action, it had, in May, 1950, the lot declared in its name for assessment purposes. In resisting the action of subdivision, the province put up the defense that it had acquired the lot in question from its former owner, Jose Bernas, and that the subdivision was aware of that fact when it bought the hacienda. In support of his defense, the province endeavoured to prove that in compliance with Act No. 3144, as amended, which required the Province to provide a site for the hospital before the funds for its construction could be released, the province instituted condemnation proceedings against Jose Bernas for the acquirement of the lot in question.

Upon trial, the president and general manager of the subdivision, Mr. Montelibano pretends that the subdivision had no knowledge of the expropriation or deed of sale with donation at the time it bought the land. The fiscal’s efforts to cross-examine him on those matters were frustrated by Plaintiff’s counsel’s objections and the trial court’s ruling sustaining those objections. The court reasoned that Mr. Montelibano was then on the stand as Plaintiff’s own witness and could not be questioned in such way as to make him to defendant’s witness. After the trial, the lower court rendered judgment in favour of plaintiff requiring the defendant to restore possession of the lot to the plaintiff subject to the latter’s right to exercise the option granted in Article 361 of the old Civil Code and further requiring the defendant to pay the rents from November 8, 1935, which all in all would amount to P151, 706.29. From this judgment, defendant appealed directly with this court. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court is correct in sustaining the objection of the counsel of the plaintiff’s in allowing the fiscal to cross examine Mr. Montelibano. RULING: No. The fact alone that Mr. Montelibano was then testifying as Plaintiff’s witness is no justification for not permitting the fiscal to cross-examine him on any matter that would elicit all important facts bearing its issue. In this jurisdiction, the adverse party may cross-examine a witness for the purpose among others, of eliciting all important facts bearing upon the issue. _____________________________________________________________________________________ THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PIO MERCADO, TOMAS MERCADO, and CATALINO MERCADO, defendants-appellants. G.R. No. L-8332, November 13, 1913

FACTS: These defendants were charged with the crime of coaccion in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Bulacan. On March 13, 1912, one Claro Mercado presented a complaint against the defendants in the Court of the Justice of the Peace of Baliuag. The Justice of the Peace conducted a preliminary examination and found that there was probable cause for believing that the defendants were guilty of the crime charged and held them for trial in the Court of First Instance. On the 21st of March, 1912, the prosecuting attorney of said province presented the complaint, which alleged that the said accused on December 22, 1911, in the municipality of Baliuag, Province of Bulacan, P. I., did willfully and criminally, without legitimate authority therefore, and by means of violence or force employed upon the person of Claro Mercado, prevent the latter from rendering aid to Maria R. Mateo in order that Santiago Mercado might at his pleasure maltreat the said Maria R. Mateo, in a violation of law. After hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause, the Honorable Alberto Barretto, judge, found the defendants guilty of the crime in the complaint, without any aggravating or extenuating circumstances, and sentenced each of them to be imprisoned for a period of two months and one day of arresto mayor, with the accessory penalties of the law, to pay a fine of 325 pesetas and in case of insolvency to suffer subsidiary imprisonment, allowing to the defendants one-half of the time they had already suffered in prison, and each to pay one-third part of the costs. ISSUE: Whether or not the character of the witness has an intimate relation or may have a strong relation with the facts being investigated in the present cause. RULING: Yes. It plays an important role in the proper determination of the present case. Generally speaking, a witness cannot be impeached by the party against whom he has been called, except by showing (a) that he has made contradictory statements: or (b) by showing that his general reputation for the truth, honesty, or integrity is bad. (Sec. 342, Act No. 190.) The question to which the defendant objected neither attempted to show neither that the witness had made contradictory

statements nor that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity was bad. While you cannot impeach the credibility of a witness, except by showing that he has made contradictory statements or that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, yet, nevertheless, it may be shown by an examination of the witness himself or from the record of the judgment, that he has been convicted of a high crime. (Sec. 342, Act No. 190.) In the present case, the other offense to which the question above related was not a high crime, as that term is generally used, and we assume that the phrase "high crime," as used in section 342, is used in its ordinary signification. High crimes are generally defined as such immoral and unlawful acts as are nearly allied and equal in guilt to felonies. The objection to the above question was properly interposed and should have been sustained. The evidence clearly shows that the witness committed the assault to which reference is made in the complaint in the present cause. Whether he had committed other assaults or not was a matter of no importance in the present action. The admission or rejection, therefore, of the proof to which such question related could in no way prejudice the rights of the defendants. _____________________________________________________________________________________ United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, vs. Richard Charles Marshall, Defendant-appellant, 762 F.2d 419 (5th Cir. 1985)

FACTS: Marshall was charged with theft of a lawn mower of a value in excess of $100, which was the property of the United States. The lawn mower was allegedly stolen from the Four Seasons Retail Store of the Army and Air Force Exchange Service, the defendant Marshall was supervisor (assistant manager) of that store, where he had worked for about ten years. The other principal actor in the evidentiary facts was Lee, the manager of the entire Post Exchange. After trial by jury, the defendant Marshall was convicted of the offense charged. 18 U.S.C. § 641. Marshall appeals, contending that over his objection hearsay evidence was improperly admitted to prove an essential element of the crime, namely, that in fact a lawn mower had been stolen or was missing from the military post exchange where he worked. Finding merit to this contention, we reverse and remand. Lee saw the driver, whom he testified he recognized as the defendant Marshall, alight and lift one by one two large boxes from the rear of the van and place them in the carport. The van then drove off. Lee drove up to the driveway and recognized the writing on one of the boxes as showing that it was a "Lawn Boy" packing box; the other box, although apparently (when lifted by the driver) lighter in weight, seemed similar to the first, although Lee was unable to decipher any wording on it. Lee made discreet inquiries in order to ascertain the explanation for the activities seen that day. Finding no explanation, he finally, nine days later, called the defendant Marshall in to ask why he had been to Frederick Street. Marshall replied that he had never been there or in that locality, although he had been away from the store premises at another location in Shreveport from shortly after 10:00 a.m. until about 11:00 a.m. that morning. At the trial, the government did not introduce any evidence as to who had received the boxes at the Frederick Street residence, nor did it attempt to prove that the boxes, one of which was marked "Lawn Boy," actually did contain lawn mowers. Instead, it relied upon the following circumstantial evidence and upon the testimony of Ms. Terri Stanlin, an investigator, who testified that, on the basis of her review of the records of the post exchange store, three lawn mowers were unaccounted for and missing during the period of Four Seasons' promotional sale. ISSUE: Whether or not the cross-examination relied upon in determining how many lawn mowers had been sold was correct. RULING: Admitted over defense objection, the convincing and positive testimony of this witness, an investigator for an agency of the United States (with what weight that status might confer), was that the store records showed at least three lawn mowers were unaccounted for. Nevertheless, as our recitation above indicates, her positive conclusory opinion as to the number of lawn mowers missing was based upon a flawed methodology. For a starting figure of lawn mowers on hand, she had relied upon a hearsay "correction" of the actual store record; in determining the number of lawn mowers sold during the period, she had relied upon cash register tapes that were incomplete for the period in question (with the missing tapes quite possibly indicating other lawn mower sales that would make up the shortage she found).

Our basic holding is that reversible error occurred because, over defense objection, the trial court permitted a non-expert witness to give prejudicial hearsay testimony as to the contents of documents that were not themselves introduced into evidence, which documents, moreover, could not have been introduced without prior authentication, including a query into their trustworthiness for the purpose for which introduced. We detailed in Part VI, supra, the unreliability of the testimony thus erroneously admitted only in order to illustrate that, by failing to apply the rules of evidence at issue, not only was their letter ignored but also their functional purpose as designed to assure trustworthiness of the evidence of this nature to be received, as well as to afford a fair opportunity to the opponent of the introduction of the evidence to prevent the trier of fact from being contaminated by unreliable prejudicial testimony. We note also that Bitner, the custodian of the records, was not called by the government to authenticate the business records of Four Seasons as to the lawn mowers, and that from the crossexamination of him by Marshall, it is doubtful that his testimony would have shown that the records used by Ms. Stanlin to deduce that any lawn mowers were missing met the authentication threshold that, for the purposes noted (if they had been offered by the government), "the method or circumstances of preparation indicate ... trustworthiness." _____________________________________________________________________________________

I mpeachment by Bias UNITED STATES vs. ABEL 469 US 45December 10, 1984

FACTS: Abel, Ehle, and Mills were indicted for bank robbery. The cohorts pleaded guilty but respondent went to trial. One of the cohorts, Ehle, agreed to testify against respondent while Mills testified for the respondent. According to Mills, Ehle had admitted to him that he intended to implicate respondent Abel falsely, in order to receive favorable treatment from the Government. The prosecutor disclosed that he intended to discredit Mills' testimony by calling Ehle back to the stand to testify that respondent, Mills, and Ehle were all members of a secret prison gang that was sworn to perjury and self-protection on each member's behalf. On cross-examination, Mills denied knowledge of the prison gang. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because Mills belonged to the gang, he must be lying on the stand. The court further held that Ehle's testimony implicated respondent as a member of the gang, but that since respondent did not take the stand, the testimony could not have been offered to impeach him, and prejudiced Abel "by mere association." ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony by Ehle, to prove the bias of Mills in favor of Abel, may be admitted in evidence. RULING: Yes. The evidence showing Mills' and respondent's membership in the prison gang was sufficiently probative of Mills' possible bias towards respondent to warrant its admission into evidence. While the Federal Rules of Evidence do not by their terms deal with impeachment for "bias," it is clear that the Rules do contemplate such impeachment. It is permissible to impeach a witness by showing his bias under the Rules just as it was permissible to do so before their adoption. Here, Ehle's testimony about the prison gang certainly made the existence of Mills' bias towards respondent more probable, and it was thus relevant to support that inference. A witness' and a party's common membership in an organization, even without proof that the witness or party has personally adopted its tenets, is certainly probative of bias. The District Court did not abuse its discretion under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 in admitting Ehle's full description of the prison gang and its tenets, since the type of organization in which a witness and a party share membership may be relevant to show bias. The attributes of the prison gang bore directly not only on the fact of bias but also on the source and strength of Mills' bias. It was not error under Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) – which allows a cross-examiner to impeach a witness by asking him about specific instances of past conduct, other than crimes covered by Rule 609, which are probative of his veracity – to cross-examine Mills about the prison gang to show, in addition to Mills' bias, his membership in the gang's past conduct bearing on his veracity. Nor was it error

under Rule 608(b) to admit Ehle's rebuttal testimony concerning the gang. The proffered testimony with respect to Mills' membership in the gang sufficed to show potential bias in respondent's favor, and such extrinsic evidence is admissible to show bias. It is true that, because of the gang's tenets that the testimony described, the testimony might also have impeached Mills' veracity directly. But there is no rule of evidence that provides that testimony admissible for one purpose and inadmissible for another purpose is thereby rendered inadmissible. _____________________________________________________________________________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, vs. RONALD WILLIAM HARVEY, Appellant. 547 F.2d 720,

November 24, 1976

FACTS: Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction after a jury trial in which a verdict of guilty was found as to each of the two counts of the indictment, the first charging the appellant with bank robbery and the second with bank larceny. In the afternoon of April 22, 1975, a man dressed as a woman robbed the Main-High branch of the Marine Midland Bank-Western. Mrs. Florida Strickland, a teller at the bank, described the robber as a medium-complexioned black male in his early twenties, 5'11 to 6' in height, 160 lbs., slender-build with broad shoulders, five o'clock shadow and with a prominent Adam's apple. According to Mrs. Strickland, the robber was wearing a straight-haired wig pulled back into a bun, a blue denim hat, which did not obstruct a full view of the robber's face, gold wire framed dark glasses, lipstick, rouge, a dark coat, and was carrying a ten-wide red print cloth shoulder bag. Mrs. Strickland was not able to make a positive identification of the robber, and much of the evidence against appellant at the trial consisted of her description of the robber's personal features and bank surveillance photos which the jury was asked to compare to appellant. The sole identification witness at the trial was Priscilla Martin who testified that on the afternoon of April 22, while passing by on a bus, she observed a man she identified as appellant walked down the steps of the Salvation Army and touch one of the two doors of the Main-High branch of the Marine Midland Bank. Mrs. Martin described the man as wearing red pants, a black coat, black platform shoes and a black floppy hat whose brim obstructed a view of his face from the nose up. She described his hairstyle as a frizzled bush, "an afro," but could not say whether it was a wig. Mrs. Martin stated that the man was not wearing glasses and that she could not recall lipstick but did remember seeing rouge. Mrs. Martin had been acquainted with appellant for a number ofyears. She testified that she knew the appellant for nineteen years and at one time had lived in the same house with him. On cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Mrs. Martin on whether she had ever had any trouble with appellant or ever had any arguments or disagreements with him, and specifically whether she ever accused appellant of fathering her child and then failing to support this child. Mrs. Martin denied these charges. FollowingMrs. Martin's testimony, appellant sought to introduce testimony of Mrs. Harvey which would have shown that Mrs. Harvey was a long-time acquaintance of Mrs. Martin, and that while Mrs. Harvey was on duty as a nurse in a Buffalo hospital, she encountered Mrs. Martin, who was there for treatment of a broken leg. Mrs. Harvey would have testified that during this encounter, Mrs. Martin accused appellant of fathering her child and refusing to support it and that Mrs. Martin further explained that when her husband learned of this he had beaten her and broke her leg, necessitating the hospital treatment. The trial judge refused this proffer of testimony, considering it "collateral" and inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 613(b). It is this ruling whichappellant maintains as error and which requires our consideration. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court committed reversible error in excluding evidence proffered by the defendant as tothe possible bias on the part of the government's chief identification witness.

RULING: The law is well settled in this Circuit, as in others, that bias of a witness is not a collateral issue and extrinsic evidence is admissible to prove that a witness has a motive to testify falsely. The law of evidence has long recognized that a cross-examiner is not required to "take the answer" of a witness concerning possible bias, but may proffer extri1nsic evidence, including the testimony of other witnesses, to prove the facts showing a bias in favor of or against a party. Special treatment is accorded evidencewhich is probative of a special motive to lie "for if believed it colors every bit of testimony given by the witness whose motives are bared. This Circuit follows the rule, applicable in a number of other Circuits, that a proper foundation must be laid before extrinsic evidence of bias may be introduced. Prior to the proffer of extrinsic evidence, a witness must be provided an opportunity to explain the circumstances suggesting bias. We must now consider whether the trial court's error in refusing to admit the testimony of Mrs. Harvey was so prejudicial as to require reversal of appellant's conviction. The right to "place the witness in his proper setting and put the weight of his testimony and his credibility to a test" is an essential safeguard to a fair trial. Exercise of this right is particularly crucial where the witness offers damagingidentification testimony, for in the absence of independent contrary evidence, a defendant mustrely upon impeachment of the witness'credibility. The record reveals that appellant's conviction rests on the testimony of Mrs. Strickland as to the description of the robber, bank surveillance photos which the jury had an opportunity to review and compare to appellant's appearance, and the identification of Mrs. Martin. We are not convinced that Mrs. Martin's testimony was an insignificant part of the case against appellant and therefore find that denial of the opportunity to raise a reasonable doubt as to identification by showing possible bias was prejudicial to appellant's right to a fair trial. Accordingly, we reverse appellant's conviction and remand for a new trial. _____________________________________________________________________________________

I mpeachment by Prior Inconsistent Statement ROMAN R. VILLALON, et al, Petitioners, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE COURT (Fourth Special Cases Division), HON. INOCENCIO D. MALIAMAN (Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch XXIX at San Fernando, La Union), CATALINA NEVAL VDA. DE EBUIZA, et al, Respondents. G.R. No. L-73751, September 24, 1986

FACTS: Atty. Roman R. Villalon served as the counsel for private respondents’ parents in the case entitled “Paulino Ebuiza, et al. v. Patrocinio Ebuiza, et al.” As contingent fee for successfully handling the case, Atty. Villalon caused the transfer of the land owned by the Ebuiza’s in his and his sons’ favor. This resulted to the filing of a disbarment case, Administrative Case No. 1488, by the Ebuiza’s against Atty. Villalon which was also coupled by the filing of Civil Case No. 2799, for the annulment of a Deed of Absolute Sale together with recovery of possession and damages over the subject property located in San Juan, La Union. During the trial of the civil case, petitioners Villalon presented as evidence the testimonies of some of the members of the Ebuiza’s namely Catalina NevalVda. De Ebuiza, Francisco Ebuiza, and Justina Ebuiza San Juan, which were given in the disbarment case in order to impeach their testimonies for being utterly inconsistent. Private respondents moved to strike all the matters related with the disbarment proceedings so as not to be part of the records of the civil case. The trial court granted such motion. On appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court dismissed the petition and said that petitioners should have made a formal offer of those testimonies for it to be considered in the hearing of the civil case. ISSUE: Whether or not the statements made by some of the members of the Ebuiza’s in the disbarment caseshould be admitted to be part of the records of the civil case in order to impeach their inconsistent testimonies.

RULING: Yes, the statements made by some of the private respondents in the disbarment case should be made part of the civil case for the purpose of impeaching the latter’s inconsistent testimonies. As stated under Sections 15 and 16 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a witness of the adverse party may be impeached by contradictory evidence or by evidence that the witness had made prior testimonies inconsistent with his present testimony, provided that such statement must be related to him. In the case at bar, by striking the testimonies made by private respondents in the disbarment case from the records of the civil case, the trial court deprived the petitioner of its right to impeach the credibility of the adverse party’s witnesses notwithstanding the fact that such statements were material to the issues in the civil case as the two cases were rooted from the same cause of action, the alleged falsification of the Deed of Sale in favor of petitioner Villalon. _____________________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ALEJO RESABAL,Defendant-Appellant G.R. No. 26708

September 29, 1927

FACTS: Primo Ordiz died at his own home in the barrio of Bogo, municipality of Maasin, Leyte from the effects of an internal hemorrhage caused by a sharp wound in the left lung. Glicerio Orit testified that the accused, armed with a revolver, invited him to Primo Ordiz's house in order to kill the latter. And on arriving at said house, the accused went into the ground, approached one of the windows of the house less than a meter and a half in height, opened it and looked in. At that moment the witness left the place, and at a distance of 15 brazas heard an explosion. Glicerio Orit's testimony as to the explosion is corroborated by the declaration of the boy Jose Ordiz, who slept with his uncle Primo Ordiz. Jose Ordiz was awakened by the noise of an explosion and saw his uncle Primo Ordiz vomiting blood and unable to speak.cha Glicerio testified, furthermore, that the accused believing him to be still an enemy of the deceased Primo Ordiz, the accused showed the revolver to him. The accused invited him to accompany him to do away with Primo Ordiz. Vicente Ambalong corroborates Glicerio Orit’s testimony to the effect that early in the morning, the accused went to the house where the latter was sleeping to awaken him, and that he then saw the accused on the staircase, calling Glicerio Orit. Nroblesvirtu The defense argues that Glicerio Orit is not a credible witness, because of his having been excluded from the information to be used as a witness for the prosecution. ISSUE: Whether or not Glicerio Orit is a credible witness because of the contradiction in his testimony at the preliminary investigation and during the trial. RULING: The apparent contradiction which may be noted in his declarations before the court of the justice of the peace, and before the court of first instance sufficient to discredit his testimony, for the simple reason that this witness was not given ample opportunity, by a reading to him of his declarations before the court of the justice of the peace, to explain the discrepancies noted by counsel for the accused. The mere presentation of Exhibit 1, without said declaration having been read to the witness while he testified in the Court of First Instance, is no ground for impeaching his testimony. (U. S. vs. Baluyot, 40 Phil., 385, 406.) _____________________________________________________________________________________ HOW THE WITNESS IS IMPEACHED BY EVIDENCE OF INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS (LAYING THE PREDICATE) • Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony: a) the statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of the times and places and the persons present, and b) he must be asked whether he made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing they must be shown to the witness before any question is put to him concerning them. • A witness cannot be impeached by evidence of contradictory or prior inconsistent statements until the proper foundation or predicate has been laid by the party against whom said witness was called. • Laying the predicate means that it is the duty of a party trying to impugn the testimony of a witness by means of prior or subsequent inconsistent statements, whether oral or in writing, to give the witness a change to reconcile his conflicting declaration. • Where no predicate is laid during the trial by calling the attention of a witness to alleged inconsistent statements and asking him to explain the contradiction, proof of alleged inconsistent statements of the witness, whether verbal or written, cannot be admitted on objection of the adverse party, or be pointed out on appeal for the purpose of destroying the credibility of the witness.

United States v. Webster, 734 F.2d 1191, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 22641 (7th Cir. Ill. May 9, 1984)

FACTS: Defendant, Webster, was convicted of aiding and abetting in a bank robbery and for receiving stolen funds. He was sentenced to nine years. The prosecution had the co-defendant, King, testify against the Defendant. However, King gave testimony that exculpated the Defendant. The prosecution was allowed to introduce prior inconsistent statements by King that were incriminating against the Defendant. The court instructed the jury that it could consider the statements only as impeachment evidence. Defendant appeals contending that the prosecution should not have been able to use the out of court statements by King. ISSUE: Was it improper to allow the out of court statement by King to be admitted? RULING: Justice Posner issued the opinion for the United States Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in affirming the conviction and holding that he impeachment evidence was not used to place otherwise inadmissible evidence before the jury because the prosecution did not know that the co-defendant would not give useful evidence. In the case, the Court of Appeals found that prosecution acted in good faith in putting the co-defendant on the stand. Thus, the evidence was not offered to intentionally place inadmissible evidence before the jury. The prosecution first sought to question the co-defendant out of the presence of the jury to find out what information, if any, he would offer. Defendant’s counsel objected and the questioning was not allowed. _____________________________________________________________________________________ PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RUDY BUDUHAN y BULLAN and ROBERT BUDUHAN y BULLAN, defendants-appellants. G.R. No. 178196 August 6, 2008

FACTS: Defendants Robert Buduhan y Bullan and Rudy Buduhan y Bullan were found guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide with respect to the deceased Larry Erese, and of the crime of homicide with respect to the deceased Romualde Almeron. Principal witness Cherry Rose Salazar (Cherry Rose), narrated the incident as follows: She was working as a guest relations officer at the RML Canteen, a beerhouse and a videoke bar, there were only two groups of men inside the beerhouse. The group that went there first was that of the appellants with two others. The second group was composed of Larry Erese and his companions Gilbert Cortez (alias Abe) and Fernando Pera (alias Nanding). While Cherry Rose was entertaining the group of Larry Erese, Robert approached them and poked a gun at Larry. Immediately, the man wearing a blue T-shirt likewise approached Cherry Rose’s Manager Romualde Almeron (alias Eddie), who was seated at the counter. The man in blue poked a gun at Romualde and announced a hold-up. Larry then handed over his wristwatch to Robert. Instantaneously, all four men from Robert’s group fired their guns at Larry and Romualde, which caused them to fall down. Abe and Nanding ran out of the RML Canteen when the shooting occurred, and Cherry Rose hid below the table. Responding policemen later apprehended the first group. The lower court convicted the defendants. ISSUE. Whether or not the conflicting testimony of the witness may be impeached.

RULING: No. As between statements made during the preliminary investigation of the case and the testimony of a witness in open court, the latter deserves more credence. Preliminary investigations are commonly fairly summary or truncated in nature, being designed simply for the determination, not of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, but of probable cause prior to the filing of an information in court. It is the statements of a witness in open court which deserve careful consideration. In any event, Section 13, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, on the matter of inconsistent statements by a witness, is revealing: Section 13. How witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent statements. — Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, the statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of the times and places and the persons present, and he must be asked whether he made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing they must be shown to the witness before any question is put to him concerning them. The rule that requires a sufficient foundation to be first laid before introducing evidence of inconsistent statements of a witness is founded upon common sense and is essential to protect the character of a witness. His memory is refreshed by the necessary inquiries, which enable him to explain the statements referred to and to show that they were made by mistake, or that there was no discrepancy between them and his testimony. In the present case, the statements made by Cherry Rose during the preliminary investigation with respect to the identities of the accused were not related to her during the trial. Indeed, it is only during the appeal of this case that appellants pointed out the supposed inconsistencies in Cherry Rose’s identification of the appellants in order to destroy her credibility as a witness. No opportunity was ever afforded her to provide an explanation. Without such explanation, whether plausible or not, we are left with no basis to evaluate and assess her credibility, on the rationale that it is only when no reasonable explanation is given by a witness in reconciling her conflicting declarations that she should be deemed impeached. _____________________________________________________________________________________ EDUARDO LEYSON, et al, Petitioners, vs. PEDRO LAWA, et al, and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. G.R. No. 150756

October 11, 2006

FACTS: On February 28, 1997, an Information charging petitioners with arson was filed before the RTC of General Santos City. Petitioners aver that respondents failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt for arson. The testimonies of respondent Romeo Jarmin and Bonifacio Batata were inconsistent with the affidavits given to the police investigators. While Jarmin pointed to and identified petitioner Eduardo Leyson during the trial as one of those who burned the houses, in his affidavit, Jarmin failed to mention Leyson, and even erroneously declared that the men were “cowboys.” Petitioners further point out that Jarmin had admitted that he returned to the farm only on September 2, 1996; hence, it was impossible for him to have seen the burning of the houses on September 11, 1996. Bonifacio Batata admitted when he testified that even before the burning of the houses on September 7, 1996 he already knew petitioner Leyson, yet, never identified him as one of the perpetrators in the affidavit which he gave to the police investigators. In fact, Batata, in his affidavit, never identified any of petitioners as the perpetrators. Moreover, Batata and Jarmin could not have seen the burning of the houses so as to properly identify the culprits, considering that the surface of the canal where they claim to have hidden was covered by three feet cogon grass, and Jarmin and Batata were only 5 feet and four inches tall. While Batata declared that he saw petitioners burn the houses of private respondents, he later changed his testimony and declared that he saw only one of them setting the houses on fire. Batata even admitted that he did not see the face of the arsonist. And contrary to the ruling of the CA, Lino Mendi did not see the burning of the houses. Petitioners conclude that conformably with the aphorism falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, the testimonies of Jarmin and Batata have no probative weight.

ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of petitioner, except petitioner Leyson, of the crime of arson under Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code. RULING: The general rule is that inconsistencies and discrepancies between the testimony of a witness in contrast with what he stated in an affidavit do not necessarily discredit him. Affidavits given to police and barangay officers are made ex parte and often incomplete or incorrect for lack or absence of sufficient inquiries by the investigating officer. It is of judicial knowledge that sworn statements are almost incomplete and often inaccurate and are generally inferior to the testimony of a witness in open court. Inconsistencies or discrepancies in the testimony of the witness relative to minor or peripheral matters and not to the significant facts vital to the guilt or innocence of the accused from the crime charged or the elements of such crime are not grounds for the acquittal of the accused. It is not correct for petitioners to claim that Jarmin in his affidavit, did not implicate petitioner Leyson for the burning of the houses. In fact, Jarmin declared therein that petitioner Leyson conspired with his co-petitioners to burn the houses of private respondents because they refused to vacate the ranch. Moreover, petitioner Leyson, with his co-petitioners, was present when the houses were burned on September 7, 1996, as he was even armed with a long firearm. Petitioner Leyson even assured Sumog-oy later that he would pay for the damages sustained by private respondents. The testimony of a witness must be considered in its entirety instead of in truncated parts. The technique in deciphering a testimony is not to consider only its isolated parts and anchor a conclusion on the basis of said parts. In ascertaining the facts established by a witness, everything stated by him on direct, cross and redirect examinations must be calibrated and considered. ____________________________________________________________________________________

I mpeachment by Other Means The United States, plaintiff-appellee vs. Pio, Tomas and Catalino Mercado, defendants-appellants 20 Phil. 127 (1913)

FACTS: The defendants were charged of the crime of coaccion in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan by preventing Claro Mercado in rendering aid to Maria Mateo by way of force and violence in order for the Santiago Mercado to maltreat Maria Mateo. After hearing the evidence adduced, the court found the defendants guilty of the crime charged. The defendants appealed that the trial court erred in overruling the objection of the accused on the Private Prosecutor’s question referring to character of the witness. Private Prosecutor asked the witness for the defense the said Santiago Mercado oft how many times he convicted and assaulted other persons. The defendant Tomas Mercado objected on the ground that the question was impertinent. The court overruled that the character of the witness has an intimate relation or may have a strong relation with the facts being investigated in the present case. ISSUE: Whether or not a witness can be impeached by the party against whom he has been called. RULING: A witness cannot be impeached by the party against whom he has been called except by showing (a) that he has made contradictory statements or (b) by showing that his general reputation for the truth honesty or integrity is bad. You cannot impeach the admissibility of a witness and you may show by an examination of the witness himself from the record of the judgment. ____________________________________________________________________________________ ON IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESS An exception to the rule requiring the laying of foundation for the admissibility of evidence of inconsistent statements has been allowed in the case of dying declarations. Since they are admitted on the ground of necessity, proof of inconsistent or contradictory statements of the deceased may be admitted on the same ground without laying any foundation therefor.

Tommie Lou MOSLEY, appellant vs Commonwealth of Kentucky, appellee 420 S.W.2d 679 1967

FACTS: The accused was charge of rape against Geraldine. On the other hand, the accused raised the defense that the sexual intercourse was consensual. The accused presented Dr. Gay as his expert witness to impeach the credibility of the complainant. However the Court refused to permit the jury to consider the testimony of Dr. Gay. The accused was then convicted of rape. ISSUE: Whether the Court erred in refusing to take the testimony of Dr. Gay to impeach the credibility of the witness. RULING: YES. As supported by evidence Dr. Gay is an expert witness. In fact he was the attending physician of Geraldine. He was in charge of the treatment of Geraldine's mental disorder. He further stated that one of the manifestations of schizophrenic reaction is fantasies, which in Geraldine’s case, extend to the area of sex. Since the Court merely relies upon the uncorroborated testimony of Geraldine, it is insufficient to warrant the conviction of the accused given that, had the testimony of Dr. Gay been admitted, the resolution of the case would have been different. _____________________________________________________________________________________ OLIVER J. COLES, Defendant, vs CHESTER A. HARSCH, Plaintiff, 129 Or. 11, 276 P. 248 (1929)

CASE SYNOPSIS Appellant, a new husband, challenged the judgment of the Circuit Court, Multnomah County (Oregon), which was entered in favor of appellee, an ex-husband, in the amount of $ 17,500 in an action for malicious alienation of the ex-wife's affections by showing "improper attention" to her from 1923 through 1925 after the ex-wife divorced him, and then married the new husband. CASE FACTS A judgment was entered for the ex-husband in the amount of $ 17,550, and an appeal was taken. DISCUSSION • The court held that there was an insufficient foundation before attempting to impeach the principal witness as to an incident at Pudding River. • However, the court stated that before one could find that a witness was untruthful, the attorney cross-examining the witness should have confronted the witness with the alleged statement accompanied by the identifying circumstances. • The court further held that the trial court erred in permitting the ex-husband, over objection, to ask what the former wife had told him about her intention to return to Oregon. • The ex-husband sought this information to catch the new husband in an untruth to a collateral matter.

• The trial court also erred in overruling the new husband's objection to allowing the ex-husband to read in evidence an affidavit signed by the new husband which averred the nonpresence in Oregon of his wife. • Inquiries into the intricacies of the new husband's divorce action, after the agreement as to the new husband's matrimonial status, would import an unnecessary collateral issue. CONCLUSION The court reversed the trial court's judgment entered in favor of ex-husband.

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US vs. MEDICAL THERAPY SCIENCES, INC., AND STANLEY BERMAN 583 F.2d 36 (1978)

FACTS: Stanley Berman, Defendant, and his company, Medical Therapy Sciences, was convicted of filing false Medicare claims. Defendant double billed for the same patients and charge for equipment and supplies either not needed or not delivered. Barbara Russell, a friend and employee of Defendant, testified for the government. Defendant contends that the prosecution should not have been allowed to call character witnesses for Russell. The government brought out prior convictions of Russell on direct examination arguing that they were anticipating impeachment by Defendant. ISSUE: Whether the Government, in questioning Russell on direct as to her prior convictions, is impeaching its own witness, and if it is allowed to do so? RULING: YES. The Court of Appeals noted that the government is allowed to bring out the impeachment facts when it anticipates the defense will do as well. Further, it notes that it is important that the trial court maintain discretion to determine whether the witness’s veracity for truthfulness is being attached on cross-examination. The Government argues that the prosecutor was only anticipating defense impeachment, as it had the right to do, so that the jury would not gain the impression that the Government was attempting to hide information from them. The Supreme Court agrees. Rule 608 itself contains no limitation that precludes a party from offering character evidence under circumstances where it anticipates impeachment. Rather, the event that triggers the applicability of the Rule is an "attack" on the witness' veracity. Under the Federal Rules, a party may impeach his own witness. However, putting that witness' veracity in issue through eliciting impeaching facts should be distinguished from merely revealing the witness' background. Indeed, even in jurisdictions where a party may not discredit his own witness, it has been held that the fact of prior convictions may be brought out on direct examination for non0impeachment purposes. The Supreme Court held that the trial judge has the discretion to permit the use of character witnesses. His proximity to the situation allows him to make the determination of when, and by whom, an attack is made. Were the rule to be otherwise, a party would have to choose between revealing, on direct, the background of a witness and its right to use character evidence if the witness' veracity is subsequently impugned.

NEWTON, Petitioner, vs STATE, Respondent, 127 A. 123 (Md. 1924)

FACTS: The plaintiff in error was tried upon an information charging that on or about the 22 nd day of July 1921, he did “unlawfully have in his possession and under his control intoxicating liquor, to wit, about one gallon of whisky, with the wilful and unlawful intent” to sell the same. The jury returned a verdict finding him guilty and leaving the punishment to the court. By the judgment of the court he was sentenced to be confined in the county jail for 60 days and to pay a fine of $250. Evidence shows that defendant lived on a farm owned by his brother, about 15 miles from Altus; that on the date alleged, officers went to this farm with a search warrant; defendant having been arrested the day before on a charge of intoxication was in the county jail at Altus. The deputy sheriff testified that he found a tin bucket containing about a gallon of corn whisky concealed among some sacks of wool in the barn, and there was about a half barrel of what he judged to be mash in a shed near the hog lot; that he found a tin boiler in the residence and a keg out in the yard, and the boiler appeared to have a dough on it, and he also found a hollow wire about two feet long and that similar copper wires are found in automobiles. Against counsel for defendant’s objections the witness was permitted to testify that he had visited defendant’s place about two months before and found a still, and later again searched the place and found nothing. Eaveret Mckingley was permitted to testify over the objections of defendant that as city marshal of Altus, he arrested the defendant on the 22nd day of July; that defendant was drunk, sitting in a buggy, and he found a bottle of whisky in the buggy. Said bottle and contents were introduced in evidence against the objection of defendant. ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of the witness is admissible. RULING: No, we think this testimony was clearly inadmissible, because it had reference to separate and distinct offenses, clearly disconnected with the offense charged in the information on trial. In our opinion the evidence objected to does not fall within any exception to the general rule. _____________________________________________________________________________________ STATE V. OSWALT 62 Wn.2d 118 (1963)

FACTS: Defendant appeals, upon a short record, from a conviction of robbery and first degree burglary. During trial, a defense of alibi was introduced. Error is assigned to the admission of certain rebuttal testimony, defendant contending such evidence constituted impeachment on a collateral matter. The short record before the court is the testimony of two witnesses which indicates that on July 14, 1961, two armed men entered the King County residence of Frank L. Goodell. One man stood guard over a number of people at the home. The other man took Mr. Goodell to a Tradewell store and forced him to open the safe and turn over the money therein. Defendant was identified as one of the two men. In presenting his defense of alibi, defendant called a Mr. August Ardiss of Portland, Oregon. On direct examination Mr. Ardiss testified in substance that: he and his operated a restaurant in Portland; he was acquainted with the defendant, as a fairly regular patron of the restaurant; defendant was in the restaurant at such times on July 14, 1961, as to render it impossible, as a practical matter, for defendant to be in Seattle at the time of the offense charged; and he remembered this occasion because defendant had accompanied a restaurant employee to work, assisted in a part of her work, and escorted her home. On cross- examination, the police detective which is one of the witnesses, clearly identify that Mr. Oswalt

was there during the happening of the said crime. It is to the rebuttal testimony of the police detective that defendant assigns error. The state, in response, contends such testimony to be admissible not only because it challenges the credibility of witness Ardiss, but also establishes defendant's presence in Seattle preparatory to the offense. ISSUE: Whether or not a witness may be impeached on the ground that his testimonies were only a collateral matter in the present cause. RULING: No. It is a well-recognized and firmly established rule in this jurisdiction, and elsewhere, that a witness cannot be impeached upon matters collateral to the principal issues being tried. The purpose of the rule is basically two-fold: (1) avoidance of undue confusion of issues, and (2) prevention of unfair advantage over a witness unprepared to answer concerning matters unrelated or remote to the issues at hand. In the instant case, the state's charge apparently rested upon an identification of the defendant by witnesses at the scene of the crime. The defense apparently rested upon alibi. The state seemingly considered the testimony of witness Ardiss sufficiently credible to require this attack. The defendant was convicted. It is difficult, therefore, to classify admission of the testimony in question trivial, formal, academic, or harmless, and to conclude that such did not affect the outcome of the case. _____________________________________________________________________________________

R efreshing Recollection STATE of North Carolina vs. Elmer Leroy PEOPLES, Sr. 319 S.E. 2d 177 (1984)

FACTS: In the early morning hours of 26 May 1980, Bruce Crockett Miller participated in the armed robbery of the Borden Chemical Plant in Fayetteville, North Carolina. He, along with two other men, took several buckets of almost pure silver, used by the plant in its manufacture of formaldehyde, valued at over $90,000. Defendant was arrested on 29 April 1981 in connection with the robbery. An eyewitness to the robbery, a shift supervisor at the company whom the perpetrators forced to open the building containing the silver, identified defendant as one of the robbers. Pursuant to a plea agreement in an unrelated case, Miller testified against defendant who was tried with Robert Peele, the third man involved in the Borden Chemical robbery. Miller outlined, in considerable detail, the planning and robbery of Borden Chemical in which he, Peele, and defendant participated. Specifically, he related that defendant, whom Miller had known since high school and had seen occasionally during the ensuing twenty years, called him in April or May 1980; inquired of his interest in making "some easy money"; and arranged a meeting with a third man, Peele. The three men met a number of times to discuss and plan the robbery. However, his testimony arose out of a hypnotic session conducted by Detective Sessoms. It was said that the hypnosis intended to seek additional recall of the robbery which Miller did not have in a normal state. Defendant was eventually tried and convicted for armed robbery and conspiracy to commit armed robbery. ISSUE: Whether or not hypnotically refreshed testimony is admissible. RULING: The basis for the use of hypnotically refreshed testimony hinges on the notion that memory involves the storage of information received by the body's senses in the brain and, therefore, an inability to remember is merely an inability to retrieve previously stored information. Given the problems inherent in the hypnotic process, such as the enhanced suggestibility of the subject, his tendency to confabulate when there are gaps in his recollection, his increased confidence in the truthfulness and accuracy of his post-hypnotic recall which may preclude effective cross-examination, and the inability of either experts or the subject to distinguish between memory and confabulation, hypnotically refreshed testimony is simply too unreliable to be used as evidence in a judicial setting. The Court further concludes that no set of procedural safeguards can adequately remedy this unreliability.

This rule of inadmissibility does not, however, render all testimony of a previously hypnotized witness inadmissible. A person who has been hypnotized may testify as to facts which he related before the hypnotic session. The hypnotized witness may not testify to any fact not related by the witness before the hypnotic session. In this case, the testimony by Detective Sessoms regarding the hypnotic session and the admission and playing before the jury of the video tape of the witness Miller during the hypnotic session were inadmissible. Furthermore, since Miller's statement made before the hypnotic session was not proffered at trial nor is it contained in the record on appeal, none of his testimony was admissible. The case is therefore remanded where defendant will be given a new trial. In this case, the testimony by Detective Sessoms regarding the hypnotic session and the admission and playing before the jury of the video tape of the witness Miller during the hypnotic session were inadmissible under the rules we today announce. Yet they constituted a major portion of the state's case. Miller was, by his own admission, an accomplice of defendant. His testimony, after undergoing hypnosis for the purpose of refreshing his recollection, was in large part responsible for defendant's conviction. Since Miller's statement made before the hypnotic session was not proffered at trial nor is it contained in the record on appeal, none of his testimony was admissible under the rules we today announce. The video tape of the hypnotic session strengthened the credibility of his testimony in the eyes of the jury. It gave an unwarranted aura of reliability to his testimony. These erroneous admissions taken together constitute reversible error because a reasonable possibility exists that a different result would have been reached had this evidence not been admitted at defendant's trial. N.C.Gen.Stat. § 15A-1443(a). We therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to that court for further remand to the superior court where defendant will be given a new trial to be conducted under the rules we today announce. _____________________________________________________________________________________

R ecalling Witness THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MATEO DEL CASTILLO, ET AL., defendants, JOSE ESTRADA, defendant-appellant. GR No. L-16941October 29, 1968

FACTS: Through the suggestion of one Jose Estrada, members of the HUKBALAHAP successfully kidnapped Elvira Prinsipe and received P50, 000.00 as ransom. However, Estrada denied his connivance with the Huks. The prosecution presented Julio Ceribo who was discharged from the case in order to be utilized as state witness. Estrada sought to destroy the credibility of the prosecution witness and asked for the recall of said witness. This request was denied by the trial court. Estrada now claims that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in disallowing the recall of the prosecution witness. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the recall of prosecution witness Ceribo. RULING: Section 14, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that the court may grant or withhold leave to recall a witness, in its discretion, as the interests of justice may require; and We believe that it was the better part of discretion and caution on the part of the trial court to have denied as it did, the request of the defense to recall Ceribo. The record is loaded with circumstances tending to show insidious attempts, too obvious to be overlooked, to tamper with the witnesses for the prosecution. Under the circumstances, to allow such a procedure would only encourage the perversion of truth and make a mockery of court proceedings.

E xclusion of Witness PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff and Appellee, vs. SANDAL, ARIMAO, LONSING, MAMA, and PAMPANG, Defendants and Appellants. G.R. Nos. 32394, 32395, September 5, 1930

FACTS: The victim, Eleno Lamorena, was in charge of the warehouse of Tomas Permites while the latter was away in Manila. Eleno witnessed how appellants Sandal, Arimao, Lonsing, Mama, and Pampang injured Permites’ carabaos. This resulted to a dispute between Eleno and said appellants. On February 18, 1929, appellants beat Eleno to death. CFI of Lanao convicted appellants of murder. On appeal, they assigned as error the refusal of the trial court to admit a witness for the defense. The exclusion was made on the ground that said witness was present during the hearing when the court had ordered all witnesses to leave the courtroom. ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the trial court excluding the witness of the defense from testifying in the witness stand is valid. RULING: Yes, the order made by the trial court excluding a witness of the defense from taking the witness stand is valid and proper. It is a settled rule that it is within the discretion of the court whether or not to admit the testimony of a witness. In the case at bar, the court does not have any knowledge as to what said witness would be testifying on. Furthermore, there was no finding that such exclusion of a witness affected appellants’ defense. _____________________________________________________________________________________ VICTORIA’S MILLING COMPANY, INC., Petitioner, vs. ONG SU AND THE HONORABLE TIBURCIO S. EVALLE IN HIS CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF PATENTS, Respondents. G.R. No. L-28499,

September 30, 1977

FACTS: Victoria’s Milling Company, Inc., a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of refined granulated sugar, is the owner of the trademark “VICTORIAS” while Ong Su is engaged in the repacking and sale of refine sugar and is the owner of the trademark “VALENTINE.” Petitioner allied that its trademark “Victorias” and diamond design has distinctive of its sugar long before respondent used its trademark; that the registration of “Valentine” and design has caused and will cause great damage to petitioner by reason of mistake, confusion, or deception among the purchasers because it is similar to its “Victorias” trademark; that registration was fraudulently obtained by Ong Su and that “Valentine” falsely suggests a connection with Saint Valentine or with an institution or belief connected therewith. The petition was denied since the alleged infringing trademark of Ong Su did not actually infringes Victoria’s trademark. Victoria’s pleadings relied heavily on diamond design of the logo which in itself did not constitute infringement since common geometric shapes and color patterns are not in themselves patentable. Moreover, the case was an unfair competition case of which the Director of Patents had no jurisdiction. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the recalling of witness under the Rules of Court has been violated by not allowing Ong Su and Ernesto Duran to testify on rebuttal. RULING: No, it does not violate the Rules of Court provisions allowing the recalling of witness. Suffice it to say that Ong Su is recalled only to testify if he has judicial authority to use the alias “Mariano Ang” and such purpose is immaterial since even before the last World War, he has already been using the name Ong Su or Mariano Ang. And as to Ernesto Duran, a witness sought to prove confusion on the trademarks, such testimony even if presented is not sufficient enough to prove the alleged confusion between the two trademarks.

A uthentication and Proof of Documents ConradoBunag, vs. Court of Appeals 158 SCRA 299 (1988)

FACTS: Plaintiff Bunag filed a case against Bautista for recovery of possession of parcel of land in Pampanga. He contends that the property was originally owned by his father Apolonio and that he has been living there with his father until 1920 when they transferred to Tarlac. Jose Bautista, a nephew in law was allowed to build a house and live therein on condition that he would pay the land taxes as compensation for the use of the land. After becoming a widow, he transferred his residence and accompanied his sister Estrudes to stay in that house. Thereafter, he sent written demands to defendant Bruno Bautista to vacate the land. The defendant answered that he is the owner of the land in question by virtue of a deed of sale signed by Apolonio with his thumbmark. Brigida Bautista testified that her brother bought the said property from Apolonio and that she was present when Bunag affixed his thumbmark on the document The trial court decided in favor of Bunag and ordered the defendants to vacate the property and deliver its possession thereof to the plaintiff. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, finding the deed of sale to have been validly executed, set aside the decision of the trial court and dismissed the complaint. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of sale has been properly proved to be authentic and validly executed. RULING: It must be emphasized that the deed of sale was not acknowledged before a notary public and neither are there any signatures in the blank spaces for the signatures of the attesting witnesses. The document is typewritten in English and over the typewritten name of Apolonio is a thumbprint. The deed is not notarized and therefore a private writing whose due execution and authenticity must be proved before it can be received in evidence as required in Sec. 21 Rule 132 (now Sec. 20 Rule 132) of the Rules of Court. The Court upheld the decision of the trial court that private respondents have failed to prove the due execution and authenticity of the deed of sale. It should be noted that the document was written in English and was merely thumbmarked which could be reasonably inferred that he was illiterate. The minimum proof should in the least include evidence that the document was duly read, explained and translated to him. Furthermore, there are no instrumental witnesses to the deed. The mischief that lurks behind accepting at face value a document that is merely thumbmarked without any witnesses to it and not acknowledged before a notary public could be one of the reasons behind the requirement of the rules of evidence. Petition is therefore granted reinstating the decision of the trial court. _____________________________________________________________________________________ HEIRS OF DEMETRIA LACSA, represented by: BIENVENIDO CABAIS, et al., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, AURELIO D. SONGCO, et al., Being Heirs of Inocencio Songco, respondents. G.R. Nos. 79597-98 May 20, 1991

FACTS: Civil Case No. G-1190 is an action for recovery of possession with damages and preliminary injunction filed by herein petitioners, the heirs of Demetria Lacsa, against Aurelio Songco and John Doe based on the principal allegations that petitioners are heirs of deceased Demetria Lacsa who, during her lifetime, was the owner of a certain parcel of land consisting partly of a fishpond and partly of uncultivated open space, located in Bancal, Guagua, Pampanga, evidenced by Original Certificate of Title

No. RO-1038 (11725); that the principal respondent and his predecessor-in-interest who are neither coowners of the land nor tenants thereof, thru stealth, fraud and other forms of machination, succeeded in occupying or possessing the fishpond of said parcel of land and caused the open space therein to be cleared for expanded occupancy thereof, and refused to vacate the same despite petitioner's demands on them to vacate. Civil Case No. G-1332 is an action also by herein petitioners against private respondents before the same lower court for cancellation of title, ownership with damages and preliminary injunction, based on the allegations that they are the heirs of Demetria Lacsa who was the owner of the land also involved in Civil Case No. G-1190; that the herein private respondents and their predecessors-in-interest, thru stealth, fraud and other forms of machination, succeeded in occupying or possessing the fishpond of the said parcel of land, and later abandoned the same but only after the case was filed and after all the fish were transferred to the adjoining fishpond owned by the private respondents; that on 31 October 1923 and 15 March 1924, by presenting to the Register of Deeds of Pampanga certain forged and absolutely simulated documents, namely: "TRADUCCION AL CASTELLANO DE LA ESCRITURA DE PARTICION EXTRAJUDICIAL" and "ESCRITURA DE VENTA ABSOLUTA", respectively, and by means of false pretenses and misrepresentation, Inocencio Songco, the private respondents' predecessorin-interest, succeeded in transferring the title to said property in his name, to the damage and prejudice of the petitioners; and that a preliminary injunction was necessary to prevent the private respondents from disposing of said property. The lower court and the CA found the case in favor of private respondents. ISSUE: Whether the “ancient document rule” is applicable. RULING: Yes. Under the "ancient document rule," for a private ancient document to be exempt from proof of due execution and authenticity, it is not enough that it be more than thirty (30) years old; it is also necessary that the following requirements are fulfilled; (1) that it is produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine; and (2) that it is unblemished by any alteration or circumstances of suspicion. Documents which affect real property, in order that they may bind third parties, must be recorded with the appropriate Register of Deeds. The documents in question, being certified as copies of originals on file with the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, can be said to be found in the proper custody. Clearly, therefore, the first two (2) requirements of the "ancient document rule" were met. The documents in question are "ancient documents" as envisioned in Sec. 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. Further proof of their due execution and authenticity is no longer required. Having held that the documents in question are private writings which are more than thirty (30) years old, come from the proper repository thereof, and are unblemished by any alteration or circumstances of suspicion, there is no further need for these documents to fulfill the requirements of the 1903 Notarial Law. Hence, the other contentions of the petitioners that the documents do not fulfill the mandatory requirements of the Notarial Law and that the proper person or public official was not presented to testify on his certification of the documents in question, need not be resolved as they would no longer serve any purpose. _____________________________________________________________________________________ RESURRECCION BARTOLOME, ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (now Court of Appeals) and HEIRS OF SPOUSES BERNABE BARTOLOME and URSULA CID, respondents. 183 SCRA 102

1990

FACTS: Batara declared a particular parcel of land as his own. It was entrusted to his cousin Bartolome, who owns a portion south of Batara’s property. The property is now the subject of the dispute between Resurreccion, daughter of Batara, and Cid, widow of the son of Bartolome. Cid presented documents alleging that it is the deed of sale of the lot in question.

The IAC ruled in favour of Cid based on the deeds of sale which it considered ancient documents under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of sale presented by Cid considered ancient document. RULING: No. The first two requirements in Section 22 were met. It appearing that it was executed in 1917, it was more than thirty years old when it was offered in evidence in 1983. It was presented in court by the proper custodian thereof who is an heir of the person who would naturally keep it. However the document lost a page which nonetheless affected its authenticity. It allegedly bears the signature of the vendor of the portion of the lot in question and therefore contains vital proof of the voluntary transmission of rights over the subject of the sale. _____________________________________________________________________________________ Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corporation, petitioner vs. National Labor Relations Commission and Teodoro Rances, respondents 161 SCRA 122 (1988)

FACTS: Pacific Asia is an overseas employment agency that provided Rances work abroad. Rances was engaged by Gulf-East Ship Management as radio operator but due to his insubordination he was dismissed. Rances sued Gulf-East in Dubai and the latter compromised with him that instead of paying him $9.k they just pay him $5.5k plus his fare going home to the Philippines plus if in case Rance’s wife does not agree with the amount of the allowance being sent to her in Pacific Asia, Rances is entitled to have $1.5k from Pacific Asia. Back in the Philippines, Rances was sued by Pacific Asia for unbecoming of a marine officer. Rances filed a counterclaim for the $1.5k as his wife did not agree with the monthly allowance sent by the Pacific Asia to her. POEA ruled in favor of Pacific Asia but did not rule on Rances counterclaim. Rances produced the original copy of the Dubai Court decision awarding him the compromised amount of $5.5k. The said decision was in Arabic but it came with an English translation. It also came with a certification from a certain Mohd Bin Sakh who was purported an Honorary Consul for the Philippines. ISSUE: Whether or not the record produced by the respondent is admissible in evidence even if it was not authenticated. RULING: No, it cannot take in evidence the alleged original copy of the record court decision from Dubai as it was not properly authenticated pursuant to Sections 25 and 26 of Rule132 of the Rules of Court. The translation was also not duly authenticated and an Honorary Consul is not authorized to make authentication of Foreign Public Records. _____________________________________________________________________________________ SPOUSES ZALAMEA and LIANA ZALAMEA, petitioner vs. CA and TRANSWORLD AIRLINES, INC, respondents G.R. No. 104235 November 18, 1993

FACTS: Petitioners-spouses and their daughter purchased 3 airline tickets from Manila from an agent of the respondent TransWorld Airlines, Inc. for a flight to New York to Los Angeles. The tickets of petitionersspouses were purchased at a discount of 75% while that of their daughter was a full fare ticket. At the time of boarding, only the father was allowed to board using his daughter’s fully paid ticket. The mother and daughter were denied. Petitioners sued the TWA. TWA on the other hand raised the defense that it is a common practice to overbook. However respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather, its customer service agent, in her deposition that the Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board allows overbooking.

ISSUE: Whether the defense raised by TWA is tenable. RULING: NO. The U.S. law alleged to authorize overbooking was never proved by respondent. Courts are not mandated by law to take judicial notice of foreign laws. Written law may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that such officer has custody. The reliance of TWA solely on the deposition made by Lather is insufficient to prove the existing law. Even if such law exists, the same is not applicable. According to the principle of lex loci contractus the law of the place where the airline ticket was issued should be applied by the court. Thus, since the tickets were sold and issued in the Philippines, the applicable law in this case is the Philippine law. Thus the defense is untenable. _____________________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs COSME MONLEON, Accused-Appellant, G.R. No. L-36282

December 10, 1976

FACTS: On June 1, 1970, Cosme Monleon in his inebriated state asked whether the carabao was already fed. To check the veracity of the statement, he went to see the carabao. He discovered that the carabao had not been adequately fed. He was about to hit Marciano, his 10 year old son, when Concordia, his wife, intervened. Monleon choked her, bashed her head against the post, and kicked her abdomen. Concordia died the following day due to trauma or external violence. ISSUE: WON the accused is criminally liable although he had no intention to kill his wife. RULING: Yes, Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act don be different than that which he intended to do. The maltreatment inflicted by the accused on his wife was the proximate cause of her death. He could have easily killed his wife had he really intended to take her life. He did not kill her outright. The accused was found guilty of parricide sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. _____________________________________________________________________________________ PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. REY SALISON, JR.,* TIRSO ANDIENTE, RUFINO DIGNARAN and LEONILO FEDILES, accused, REY SALISON, JR., accused-appellant. G.R. No. 115690. February 20, 1996

FACTS: Salison, along with his co accused, was charged with the murder of Valmoria. The evidence revealed that the Valmoria was mauled to death by the 4 accused. He was hit on the rear part of his head with wood. Feeling he was close to death, Valmoria went to the house of the purok leader and wrote down a dying declaration wherein he identified the accused. He died 3 days later. This declaration was written entirely in Cebuano. Salison brings this as an error by the trial court2 however, he did not object to its admission in evidence during trail.

ISSUE: Whether or not the declaration should be admitted? RULING: YES. The records do not disclose that the defense offered any objection to the admission of the declaration. Thus, the defense waived whatever infirmity the document had at the time of its submission as evidence. Moreover, while it is true that the Rules does not allow the admission of documents in an unofficial language without a translation, the Court believed that the interest of justice would be preserved since no objection was made and that the parties, judicial authorities, and the personnel concerned appeared to be familiar with or knowledgeable with Cebuano anyway. Also, the written declaration was duly presented and the person who reduced the declaration in writing was thoroughly questioned by the court, the prosecutor, and cross-examined by the defense counsel. More importantly, everything written in the declaration of the victim was confirmed by the eyewitnesses. _____________________________________________________________________________________ PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs APOLINAR LAZARO y SERVANIA, Accused-appellant, 317 SCRA 435 (1999)

FACTS: The accused, Apolinar Lazaro was found guilty of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition by the RTC of Naga City. In his appeal, he raised the issue that the prosecution had failed to prove the second element needed in prosecuting the crime charged against him, which was the “fact that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess the same”. As to the second element, accused –appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove the absence of a license to carry a firearm as the prosecution merely marked in evidence a certification from the Firearms and Explosive Section in Camp Crame without presenting the person who issued the certification himself, a certain Antonio Sierra. Over the objection of accused-appellants counsel, the lower court admitted the exhibit on the ground the ground that the same is an official public record and because the fiscal stated he himself saw the signatory sign the document. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court was wrong for admitting the certification, considering that the person who made the document was not presented in court to testify. RULING: No, there is no merit to the accused-appellants argument. On several occasions, the court has ruled that either the testimony of a representative of, or a certification from, the PNP Firearms and Explosive Office attesting that a person is not a licensee of any firearm would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of possession of illegal firearms. Moreover, the rule on hearsay evidence admits several exceptions. One such exception is that provided for under Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court which states as follows: Rule 130, Section 44. Entries in official records – entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specifically enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. Relative to this provision, Rule 132, Section 28 of the same Rules allows admission of the said document. Thus: Rule 132, Sec. 28. Proof of lack or record- A written statement signed by an officer having custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contains no such record or entry.

In the case at bench, the certification issued by the Commanding Officer of the PNP Firearms and Explosives Office, which is the repository of all records regarding the firearms in the Philippines, is competent and admissible evidence to prove that accused-appellant is not a licensed holder or possessor of a firearm of any kind or caliber. Indeed, the certificate of a custodian that he has diligently searched for a document or an entry of a specified tenor and has been unable to find it ought to be as satisfactory an evidence of its non-existence in his office as his testimony on the stand to this effect would be. _____________________________________________________________________________________ PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner vs. HON. JOSE BURGOS, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 17, respondents. G.R. No. 92739, August 2, 1991

FACTS: On September 2, 1989, an information for violation of Republic Act No. 1700, as amended, was filed against the nine (9) private respondents by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu. The information recommended no bail on the ground that the offense charged in said information was nonbailable, the respondents allegedly being leaders of the Communist Party of the Philippines. After arraignment, private respondents filed petitions for their temporary liberty on bail pending trial of the criminal case. There being no opposition to the petition for bail of private respondent Catalina Peras, who was then in her eighth month of pregnancy, respondent Judge fixed bail for her at P10,000.00. In respect of the other private respondents, their petitions for bail were opposed by the prosecution. Respondent Judge then issued an Order dated April 5, 1990 fixing bail at P30,000.00 each for the temporary liberty. The prosecution opposed the April 5, 1990 order upon the ground that issuance thereof was premature, considering that the prosecution was then still in the process of presenting its evidence in support of its opposition to the applications for bail. Respondent Judge, rather than ruling outright on petitioner's opposition, ordered it to file a motion for reconsideration in writing. In the same proceeding, respondent Judge disallowed petitioner's request for its witness, Eulogio Llego, a computer programmer, to print out in open court the material encoded in certain diskettes seized from private respondents by virtue of a search warrant. Instead of filing a written motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed the present Petition for Certiorari questioning: (1) the Order dated 5 April 1990 granting bail; and (2) the oral order of respondent Judge given in open court during the hearing on the same date preventing the prosecution from holding an actual demonstration in court by printing out data from the seized diskettes. ISSUE: Whether or not the diskettes should be inadmissible in evidence because they were not included in the things mentioned in the search warrant. RULING: No. The diskettes had been sufficiently described in the search warrant. The search warrant states: You are, therefore, hereby commanded to make immediate search at any time of the day or night of Rm. 31 of the third floor of said building where the persons or suspects above-named are presently occupying and to seize and to take possession of the following properties used or intended to be used as the means of committing violation of RA 1700 and/or Art. 142 of the Revised Penal Code: Incendiary or subversive documents, pamphlets; books, computer print-outs and subversive materials, and computer machine used imprinting seditious or subversive literature. (Emphasis supplied) The phrase "computer machine used in printing seditious or subversive literature" is appropriately regarded as necessarily including diskettes into which data is encoded and stored, such as those seized in the present case on the same occasion the computer itself was seized, for indeed a computer system cannot store and print out any data without diskettes. Technically and realistically speaking, diskettes are deemed integral parts of a computer system, the diskettes constituting one of the "input-output devices" or "peripherals," in the same manner that the keyboard is an "input-output device" and the monitor, keyboard and printer are "peripherals" in relation to the memory or central processing unit (CPU) of a computer system.

IBM PHILIPPINES, INC., VIRGILIO L. PEÑA, and VICTOR V. REYES, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ANGEL D. ISRAEL, respondents. G.R. No. 117221 April 13, 1999

FACTS: Petitioner IBM Philippines, Inc. (IBM) is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of selling computers and computer services. Petitioners Virgilio L. Peña and Victor V. Reyes were ranking officers of IBM during the period pertinent to this case. Private respondent Angel D. Israel commenced employment with IBM as Office Products Customer Engineer. For the next sixteen (16) years, he occupied two other positions in the company, received numerous awards, and represented the company in various seminars and conferences in and out of the country. On February 1, 1990, private respondent was assigned to the team supervised by petitioner Reyes. Alleging that his dismissal was without just cause and due process, private respondent filed a complaint with the Arbitration Branch of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) on July 18, 1991. In his position paper filed on September 6, 1991, he claimed that he was not given the opportunity to be heard and that he was summarily dismissed from employment based on charges which had not been duly proven. Petitioners denied private respondent’s claims. It was alleged that several conferences were held by the management with private respondent because of the latter’s unsatisfactory performance in the company and he was given sufficient warning and opportunity to “reform and improve his attitude toward attendance,” but to their regret, he never did. It was alleged that private respondent was constantly told of his poor attendance record and inefficiency through the company’s internal electronic mail (e-mail) system. According to petitioners, this system allows paperless or “telematic”communication among IBM personnel in the company offices here and abroad. An employee is assigned a “User ID” and the corresponding password is provided by the employee himself and, theoretically, known only to him. Employees are then expected to turn on their computers everyday, “log in” to the system by keying in their respective IDs and passwords in order to access and read the messages sent to and stored in the computer system. To reply, an employee types in or encodes his message-response and sends the same to the intended recipient, also via the computer system. The system automatically records the time and date each message was sent and received, including the identification of the sender and receiver thereof. All messages are recorded and stored in computer disks. Private respondent appealed to the NLRC which, on April 15, 1994, reversed the labor arbiter’s decision and found private respondent’s dismissal illegal. The NLRC ruled: (1) that the computer printouts which petitioners presented in evidence to prove that private respondent’s office attendance was poor were insufficient to show that the latter was guilty of habitual absences and tardiness; and (2) that private respondent was not heard in his defense before the issuance of the final notice of dismissal. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner proves that private respondent was sufficiently notified of the charges against him and was guilty thereof because of his failure to deny the said charges. RULING: The supreme Court applied the ruling in Uichico v. NLRC: which states as follows ... xxxxx It is true that administrative and quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical rules of procedure in the adjudication of cases. However, this procedural rule should not be construed as a license to disregard certain fundamental evidentiary rules. While the rules of evidence prevailing in the courts of law or equity are not controlling in proceedings before the NLRC, the evidence presented before it must at least have a modicum of admissibility for it to be given some probative value. The Statement of Profit and Losses submitted by Crispa, Inc. to prove its alleged losses, without the accompanying signature of a certified public accountant or audited by an independent auditor, are nothing but self-serving documents which ought to be treated as a mere scrap of paper devoid of any probative value. Xxxx Hence, in the case at bar, the computer print-outs, which constitute the only evidence of petitioners, afford no assurance of their authenticity because they are unsigned. The decisions of this Court, while adhering to a liberal view in the conduct of proceedings before administrative agencies, have

nonetheless consistently required some proof of authenticity or reliability as condition for the admission of documents. In spite of this finding, petitioners failed to adduce additional evidence when they moved for a reconsideration of the NLRC decision or when they filed the instant petition. Despite the opportunities afforded them, petitioners failed to substantiate their allegations. Neither have they shown sufficient reasons to convince this Court that, if the case were to be remanded to the arbiter or a formal hearing, they would be able to present evidence which they could not have presented during the initial stages of this case. As we held in Megascope General Services v. NLRC: As regards petitioner's contention that a hearing has to be conducted to be fully ventilate the issues in the case, . . . [s]uffice it to state that nonverbal devices such as written explanations, affidavits, position papers or other pleadings can establish just as clearly and concisely an aggrieved party's defenses. Petitioner was amply provided with the opportunity to present evidence that private respondents were not its employees. Indeed, it was petitioner's failure to present substantial evidence to buttress its claims that worked to its disadvantage and not the absence of a full-blown hearing before the public respondent. _____________________________________________________________________________________ UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JOSEPH RUSSO, Defendant-Appellant. 480 F. 2d 1354 6th Cir.July 6, 1973 FACTS: Appellant, Joseph Russo, is an osteopathic physician licensed to practice in Michigan. He and an associate were charged in a single indictment containing 51 counts of violating the mail fraud statute. The indictment narrated that he devised and intended to devise a scheme and artifice to defraud Blue Shield of Michigan by filing claims for services not performed on patients on dates specified and for obtaining money from such organization by false and fraudulent pretenses and representations well knowing at the time that the pretenses and representations would be and were false when made. Blue Shield of Michigan furnishes to the doctors who practice in that state printed forms known as "Doctor Service Reports" (hereafter DSR). In order to be paid by Blue Shield it is necessary for a doctor to complete a DSR for each treatment and submit it for payment. Each doctor is assigned a provider's code number and this and his name are both imprinted on the DSR's furnished to him by Blue Shield. The prosecution did not contend that the appellant submitted DSR's to Blue Shield for patients that he had not seen on the dates indicated. What was contended was that in many cases the treatment received by the patients was of such a nature that it was not covered by Blue Shield and was not compensable under the particular subscriber contract involved and that if the services actually performed had been disclosed on the DSR, no payment would have been due from Blue Shield. Instead of making a charge to the patient for the actual services which were not compensable under the patient's Blue Shield coverage, it was the contention of the prosecution that the defendants caused a DSR to be prepared showing that some procedure had been followed with the patient which would have been compensable. The Director of Service Review of Blue Shield of Michigan, Charles Smith, testified that the prime objective of his department is to insure the integrity of the reporting forms (DSR's). He stated that this is done by various audits and investigative procedures initiated by his department. He considered the DSR to be the basic document in the claims procedure of Blue Shield. It was pointed out that each DSR is examined by several different people to determine that it is complete and proper for payment. If a claims examiner determines that it is in all respects complete and correct the appropriate amount of money for the particular service is recorded and the examiner initials and dates the DSR. From that point the form is taken to the data recording section where the information from it is recorded onto a magnetic tape for further processing. After this information has been stored on magnetic tape the claim form itself is microfilmed and there is a cross reference made between the information on the magnetic tape to be used by the computer and the microfilm copy of the original document. The original DSR is then destroyed. Each two weeks checks are written by the computer based on the information contained on the magnetic tapes. The computer retrieves all of the payments due each doctor under his provider code number and a check is

printed out with a voucher attached which indicates part of the same information which had originally appeared on the DSR. Thus, only computer printouts of these DSRs were presented for trial. Russo now questions the admissibility of said computer printout. ISSUE: Whether or not the computer printout is admissible. RULING: Yes. Computer printouts are not mentioned in the Federal Business Records Act. However, no court could fail to notice the extent to which businesses today depend on computers for a myriad of functions. Perhaps the greatest utility of a computer in the business world is its ability to store large quantities of information which may be quickly retrieved on a selective basis. Assuming that properly functioning computer equipment is used, once the reliability and trustworthiness of the information put into the computer has been established, the computer printouts should be received as evidence of the transactions covered by the input. No evidence was introduced which put in question the mechanical or electronic capabilities of the equipment and the reliability of its output was verified. The procedures for testing the accuracy and reliability of the information fed into the computer were detailed at great length by the witnesses. The district court correctly held that the trustworthiness of the information contained in the computer printout had been established. The Federal Business Records Act was adopted for the purpose of facilitating the admission of records into evidence where experience has shown them to be trustworthy. It should be liberally construed to avoid the difficulties of an archaic practice which formerly required every written document to be authenticated by the person who prepared it. _____________________________________________________________________________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ARNETTA WEATHERSPOON, Defendant-Appellant 581 F. 2d 595, July 12, 1978

FACTS: Defendant, Arnetta Weatherspoon operates Arnetta’s Beauty College in Chicago offering cosmetology and beauty culture courses. Her school was authorized by the Department of Veteran Affairs of the State of Illinois, a contractual agent of the Veterans Administration of the United States (VA), to enroll 42 veteran students. Each veteran student is required to attend thirty (30) hours of classes every week in order to get the maximum monthly allowance ranging from $220 to $500. However, it was found out that Weatherspoon enrolled more than 42 veteran students and had also made false statements in the attendance certificates that it mailed to the VA as part of its compliance of the program. Thus, she was convicted of sixteen counts of violating the racketeering, mail fraud and false statement statues. Such a conviction was based on the computer printouts containing the computerized compilation of the veteran students’ enrollment records which she keypunched and submitted to the VA. Weatherspoon now assails the admissibility of such printouts as evidence against her. ISSUE: Whether or not the reliability of the computer printouts was established so as to warrant its admissibility as evidence. RULING: Yes, the computer printouts are reliable and thus, its admission as evidence against Weatherspoon is warranted. According to the testimony of the VA supervisory employee who is well-versed in the preparation and use of the printouts, the input procedures and printouts are accurate within two percent (2%), the computer is tested for internal programming errors monthly, and the printouts are maintained and relied upon by the VA in the ordinary course of business. There is sufficient proof of the reliability of said printouts and thus, its admission into evidence is warranted under the circumstances. Furthermore, said evidence was available for scrutiny to the defense counsel therefore, the latter also had the opportunity to inspect its accuracy.

PERMA RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COMPANY vs. SINGER COMPANY 542 F. 2d 111(2nd Cir. 1976)

FACTS: The Course of the Action The controversy grew out of two contracts. The first provided Singer with an exclusive license to manufacture the automotive anti-skid device involved here. The second contract superseded the first and provided for the assignment of Perma's patents on the anti-skid device to Singer and the payment of a royalty thereon. The contract also provided for the furnishing of technical assistance by Perma at the request of Singer "in the continuing design and engineering and improvement of the Product and of the equipment for manufacturing the same" for a 6month period at a cost to Singer of $9800 per month. Upon Singer's abandonment of the contract, Perma brought this suit to set aside the second contract and to enforce the earlier one. ISSUE: Are the records presented by the parties sufficient for the judge to come up with sound judgement as to whether Singer’s performance was adequate? RULING: There is no question that Singer did spend considerable time and money in an effort to perfect the product. Indeed, the Court of Appeals noted "there was substantial performance under the December contract, at least until Singer concluded that the product was not `fail-safe' and hence unmarketable. Perrino admitted in his deposition that the parties were engaged in joint efforts to solve the `fail-safe' problem as late as six months after the December contract was negotiated." The issue, however, is not whether there was substantial and adequate performance on Singer's part. For example: (1) Did Singer use its best efforts for a reasonable time in collaboration with Perma to perfect the product under all of the circumstances? (2) In view of the fact that the device was not "fail-safe," was Singer justified in abandoning the contract either because it was impossible to make the device "fail-safe" or because it could not be made "fail-safe" without unreasonable, unwarranted or impractical efforts and expenditures of time and money out of all proportion to engineering and economic realities? Singer's papers on this motion are directed not to a demonstration of the absence of a genuine factual issue respecting its use of its best efforts but to the rejected proposition that the claim is moot as a matter of law because Singer had a right to terminate the contract upon tendering the patents to Perma. Likewise, Perma's papers are not addressed to the issue. Rather, they contain a mass of irrelevancies, arguments, opinions and conclusions. The burden, however, of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of fact is upon Singer, and it has failed to do so. The device which is the subject matter of this litigation has over 100 separate parts and is an extremely complicated mechanism. Much of the voluminous depositions is involved with engineering technicalities. The sheer quantity of the material to be analyzed cautions against the expenditure of judicial time in an effort to sift out and piece together the undisputed facts essential to a summary judgment. We are convinced under the circumstances that sound judicial administration dictates that the court withhold judgment on the involved questions of law and fact presented here until the whole structure stands on a solid foundation established on a trial where the evidence can be directed to the relevant issue, the proof more deeply developed, the ultimate facts definitively found and the issues put into clear focus. Good judicial administration demands that judgment of the ultimate questions involved in this case be withheld until there is a solid basis for findings by a court or jury based on litigation or a comprehensive statement of agreed facts.

HEIRS OF THE DECEASED SPOUSES VICENTE S. ARCILLA and JOSEFA ASUNCION ARCILLA, Petitioners, vs. MA. LOURDES A. TEODORO, Respondent. GR No. 162886 AUGUST, 16, 2008

FACTS: On December 19, 1995, Ma. Lourdes A. Teodoro (respondent) initially filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes an application for land registration of two parcels of land located at Barangay San Pedro, Virac, Catanduanes. The lots, with an aggregate area of 284 square meters, are denominated as Lot Nos. 525-A and 525-B, Csd.-05-010483-D of the Virac Cadastre. Respondent alleged that, with the exception of the commercial building constructed thereon, she purchased the subject lots from her father, Pacifico Arcilla (Pacifico), as shown by a Deed of Sale dated December 9, 1966, and that, prior thereto, Pacifico acquired the said lots by virtue of the partition of the estate of his father, Jose Arcilla evidenced by a document entitled Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate. Through oversight and inadvertence, the applicant failed to include in her application a verification and certificate against forum shopping. The MTC nonetheless admitted the same and eventually granted the application despite the opposition of the Arcillas who claimed ownership of the property. The RTC and the CA affirmed the decision and dismissed the appeal of the Arcillas. ISSUE: Whether or not the certification of non-forum shopping subsequently submitted by respondent does not require a certification from an officer of the foreign service of the Philippines as provided under Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. RULING: There is no merit to petitioners contentions that the verification and certification subsequently submitted by respondent did not state the country or city where the notary public exercised her notarial functions; and that the MTC simply concluded, without any basis, that said notary public was from Maryland, USA; that even granting that the verification and certification of non-forum shopping were notarized in the USA, the same may not be deemed admissible for any purpose in the Philippines for failure to comply with the requirement of Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court that the notarized document must be accompanied by a certificate issued by an officer in the foreign service of the Philippines who is stationed in the country in which a record of the subject document is kept, proving or authenticating that the person who notarized the document is indeed authorized to do so and has custody of the same.om the foregoing provision [referring to Section 24, Rule 132, Rules of Court], it can be gathered that it does not include documents acknowledged before [a] notary public abroad. For foreign public documents to be admissible for any purpose here in our courts, the same must be certified by any officer of the Philippine legation stationed in the country where the documents could be found or had been executed. However, after judicious studies of the rule, Sec. 24, Rule 132 of the 1997 Rules of Court basically pertains to written official acts, or records of the official of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country. This is so, as Sec. 24, Rule 132 explicitly refers only to paragraph (a) of Sec. 19. If the rule comprehends to cover notarial documents, the rule could have included the same. Thus, petitionersoppositors' contention that the certificate of forum shopping that was submitted was defective, as it did not bear the certification provided under Sec. 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, is devoid of any merit. What is important is the fact that the respondent-applicant certified before a commissioned officer clothed with powers to administer oath that she has not and will not commit forum shopping.

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), Petitioner, vs. MARIA TERESA S.A. CORDERO, Respondent. G.R. No. 171378 March 17, 2009

FACTS: Cordero occupied several contractual and casual positions in the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) until she was extended a permanent appointment on May 7, 1990. On December 10, 1996, she was promoted as Senior General Insurance Specialist, her position to date. Cordero filed with the GSIS a claim for compensation benefits under P.D. No. 626, as amended. She stated that in her preemployment physical and medical examinations, she was in perfect health when she entered GSIS in 1987. But later, she was diagnosed with hypertension, and then hospitalized in April 2000, June 2001 and October 2001 because of Chronic Renal Failure secondary to Chronic Glomerulonephritis. To prove that her illness is work-connected, she presented a medical certificate dated December 6, 2001 issued by Dr. Florencio J. Pine, M.D., F.P.C.P., F.P.S.N., Internal Medicine, Kidney Diseases and Hypertension of the UERM Memorial Hospital and National Kidney Institute and a Certification issued by Mr. Arnulfo Q. Canivel, Division Chief III, GSIS Claims Department, stating that "[t]he nature of her work and working conditions outside the outside the office increased the risk and is probably a big factor in the development of her hypertension which led to her End Stage Renal Disease secondary to Chronic Gl[o]merulonephritis requiring three times a week hemodialysis." GSIS denied her claim on the ground that her illness is not work-connected and her duties did not increase the risk of contracting the same. Cordero sought reconsideration, but to no avail. Aggrieved, Cordero appealed to the ECC. On September 6, 2002, the ECC affirmed the Decision of the GSIS and held that: x x x x As Sr. General Insurance Specialist, there was no proof that she was significantly exposed to occupational hazards that would result to kidney injury. Her job does not involve exposure to chemicals implicated in Chronic Glomerulonephritis. Thus, the ailment cannot be considered workrelated. The CA reversed the ECC decision. ISSUE: Whether the evidence adduced by respondent amply supports the quantum of evidence required. RULING: Yes. GSIS contends that Chronic Glomerulonephritis is not an occupational disease; accordingly, Cordero should adduce proof that the risk of contracting her disease was increased by her working conditions. But Cordero failed to do so; hence, her illness is not compensable under the law. Cordero counters that her illness is compensable even if Chronic Glomerulonephritis is not an occupational disease because her working conditions increased the risk of contracting the illness. She contends that she started with the GSIS in perfect health but years later, because of the strenuous nature of her work, she suffered from hypertension, which eventually led to the damage of her kidney resulting to End Stage Renal Disease. Under Section 1(b), Rule III implementing P.D. No. 626, sickness or death is compensable if the cause is included in the list of occupational diseases annexed to the Rules. If not so listed, compensation may still be recovered if the illness is caused or precipitated by factors inherent in the employee’s work and working conditions. Here, strict rules of evidence are not applicable since the quantum of evidence required under P.D. No. 626 is merely substantial evidence, which means "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." What the law requires is a reasonable work-connection and not a direct causal relation. It is sufficient that the hypothesis on which the workmen’s claim is based is probable since probability, not certainty, is the touchstone.

O ffer and Objection – The court shall not consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. (Sec. 34 Rule 132) THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LAURO CARIÑO y GUILLERMO, VIRGILIO DIAZ and JOHN DOE alias "BALINGIT" (At Large), accused- appellants. 165 SCRA 664

1988

FACTS: The prosecution's evidence tends to prove: On September 29, 1980, at about 4:30 p.m., while Lolito Talisic was tending their store at 1312 Muñoz Avenue, Tandang Sora, Quezon City, accused Cariño and Diaz and one Balingit, who were armed with knives, stoned the store and attacked Lolito Talisic. Rosalia Talisic, who was cooking at the time near the store, upon seeing what happened, called for her husband, Melencio Talisic, to help Lolito. Melencio rushed to the scene and tried to pacify the protagonists. While he placed his arms on the shoulders of Diaz, Balingit suddenly stabbed Melencio at the back with a knife, thereby wounding Melencio. After being stabbed, Melencio got a bolo from the kitchen of his house, but Diaz grabbed it from him, and he (Melencio) ran to a room in his store. Diaz then entered the room and, upon seeing Melencio, he hacked him 4 times on the head, wounding Melencio and causing him to fall to the floor, bleeding Lolito tried to run away from the store, but he was intercepted on the way by Cariño, who stabbed him on the chest, causing him to fall to the ground, dead. Diaz then hacked the showcase of Melencio's watches and took away 50 pieces of watches worth P3,000.00 and P5,000.00 of cash money from a drawer in the store. While he was doing this, his companions and co-conspirators Cariño and Balingit waited for him outside the store. After wrapping the watches with his T-shirt, Diaz and his companions Cariño and Balingit hurriedly fled from the crime scene. Melencio's wife (Rosalia), eyewitness to the incident, called for help and a barangay tanod came and helped her bring Melencio to the Quezon City General Hospital where he was treated and confined for about a week. On the other hand, the defense evidence, tends to prove: Accused Lauro Cariño, declared that on September 29, 1980, at about 3:00 p.m., he went to the office of DM Transit, with his wife and child, to collect the payment for his sick leave, as a mechanic in said company. As they failed to get the money, they went home at about 4:30 p.m. On the way, he met a person who was walking in zigzag manner, who fell in front of him. When he was about to look at the face of said person, he was suddenly stabbed by Ricardo Sibay. When he saw blood oozing from the left side of his body, he went to the Mt. Banaue Hospital, in Quezon City, where he was treated. He then went to Police Precinct I, Quezon City, to report the incident. He knows Melencio Talisic, as he frequently eats at his canteen, near DM Transit. At the police station, the police informed him he was a suspect in the killing of Lolito Talisic and wounding of Melencio Talisic, and he was detained since then. He denied having hacked Melencio Talisic on the head. ISSUE: Whether or not conspiracy attended the commission of the crime. RULING: Yes. Appellant made reference to the failure of the trial court to consider the sworn statements of Jenny Arceo, Ricardo Sibay and victim Melencio Talisic which contradicted the finding of conspiracy. We find such argument meritless. A perusal of the entire records of the case shows that the defense did not formally offer in evidence such sworn statements and evidence not formally offered cannot be considered by the court. The trial court only considered what was formally offered to it. From the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses, the trial court established that the three accused acted in concert and with a common design and purpose as shown by their simultaneous arrival at the scene of the crime, mutually helping one another in the killing of Lolito Talisic and in the stabbing of Melencio Talisic and in the robbing of the store and by their simultaneous flight from the scene of the crime.

Interpacific Transit Incorporated, petitioner vs. Rufo and Josephine Aviles, respondents 186 SCRA 394 (1990)

FACTS: This case hinges on the proper interpretation and application of the rules on the admissibility of documentary evidence and the viability of a civil action for damages arising from the same acts imputed to the defendant in a criminal action. The prosecution introduced photocopies of the airway bills supposedly received by the accused for which they had not rendered proper accounting during the trial. The defense objected to their presentation, invoking the best evidence rule. The prosecution said it would submit the original airway bills in due time. The trial court allowed the marking of the said documents as Exhibits. The prosecution did not submit the original airway bills nor did it prove their loss to justify their substitution with secondary evidence. Nevertheless, when the certified photocopies of the said bills formally were offered, in evidence, the defense interposed no objection. The Judge of the Regional Trial Court acquitted the accused and held that the relationship between the petitioner and Rufo Aviles was that of creditor and debtor only. It is also declared that "Under such relationship the outstanding account, if any, of the accused in favor of ITI would be in the nature of indebtedness, the non- payment of which does not Constitute estafa." The court held that the certified photocopies of the airway by were not admissible under the rule and that "there can be no evidence of a writing the content of which is the subject of inquiry other' than the writing itself." However, the petitioner seeks to press the civil liability of the private respondents, on the ground that the dismissal of the criminal action did not abate the civil claim for the recovery of the amount and the evidence of the airways bills should not have been rejected so as to establish sufficiently the indebtedness of the private respondents. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto, and declared that: Since no evidence of civil liability was presented, no necessity existed on the part of the private respondents to present evidence of payment of an obligation, which was not shown to exist. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused has civil obligation to ITI on the basis of the admissibility in evidence of the Xerox copies of the airway bills. RULING: The photocopies were secondary evidence and as such were not admissible unless there was ample proof of the loss of the originals; and other exceptions allowed by the Rules. However, it is the rule that objection to documentary evidence must be made at the time it is formally offered as an exhibit and not before. Objection prior to that time is premature. The first is done in the course of the trial and is accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit. The second is done only when the party rests its case and not before. The mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean it will be or has been offered as part of the evidence of the party. The Identification of the document before it is marked as an exhibit does not constitute the formal offer of the document as evidence for the party presenting it. Objection to the Identification and marking of the document is not equivalent to objection to the document when it is formally offered in evidence. What really matters is the objection to the document at the time it is formally offered as an exhibit.In this case, the photocopies of the airway bills were objected to by the private respondents as secondary evidence only when they were being identified for marking by the prosecution. The defense did not object when the exhibits as previously marked were formally offered in evidence. The earlier objection should be considered a continuing objection under Sec. 37 of Rule 132, for that provision refers to a single objection to a class of evidence (testimonial or documentary) which when first offered is considered to encompass the rest of the evidence. _____________________________________________________________________________________

WHEN TO MAKE AN OFFER ➢

As regards the testimony of a witness, the offer must be made at the time the witness is called to testify.

➢

Documentary and object evidence shall be offered after the presentation of a party's testimonial evidence. Such offer shall be done orally unless allowed by the court to be done in writing.

JUANA DE LOS REYES, petitioner vs HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and SPOUSES CLARO C. YLAGAN and NATIVIDAD P. YLAGAN, respondents G.R. No. 74768 August 11, 1989

FACTS: Reyes obtained a loan from a bank by mortgaging his lot. Petitioner failed to pay the loan and the property was then sold thru a public action. The lot was sold to the spouses Ylagan on April 25 but was registered only on May 4. The next year, April 26, petitioner through a letter tendered payment to the sheriff to redeem the property. However, through a letter, the sheriff refused the payment stating that the period of redemption has prescribed. Petitioner however argued that the period for redemption has not prescribed yet since its expiration should be on May 4. Respondents moved that the letter of communication made by the petitioner to the sheriff, as well as the reply of the sheriff thereto should not be admitted as evidence since there was no formal offer. ISSUE: Whether the letters of communication should be admitted. RULING: YES. By the review of the records of the trial court, this Court finds that there was an offer of evidence. In fact, the record shows that during the trial, there was no objection from the respondents as to the admission of the letters. Moreover, it was only on appeal that the respondents moved to exclude the letters as evidence. Thus the letters of communication should be admitted. _____________________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HON. NICASIO YATCO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, and JUAN CONSUNJI and ALFONSO PANGANIBAN, respondents. G.R. No. L-9181 November 28, 1955

FACTS: In an amended information filed by the City Attorney of Quezon City on March 22, 1955, Juan Consunji, Alfonso Panganiban, and another whose identity is still unknown, were charged with having conspired together in the murder of one Jose Ramos. During the progress of the trial on May 18, 1955, while the prosecution was questioning one of its witnesses, Atty. Arturo Xavier of the National Bureau of Investigation, in connection with the making of a certain extra-judicial confession (allegedly made before him) by defendant Juan Consunji to the witness, counsel for the other defendant Alfonso Panganiban interposed a general objection to any evidence on such confession on the ground that it was hearsay and therefore incompetent as against the other accused Panganiban. The lower court ordered the exclusion of the evidence objected to, but on an altogether different ground: that the prosecution could not be permitted to introduce the confessions of defendants Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban to prove conspiracy between them, without prior proof of such conspiracy by a number of definite acts, conditions, and circumstances. ISSUE: Whether or not the confession made is admissible as evidence.

RULING: Yes. The Court held that the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion in ordering the complete exclusion of the prosecution's evidence on the alleged confessions of the accused Juan Consunji at the stage of the trial when the ruling was made. Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, even if Consunji's confession may not be competent as against his co-accused Panganiban, being hearsay as to the latter, or to prove conspiracy between them without the conspiracy being established by other evidence, the confession of Consunji was, nevertheless, admissible as evidence of the declarant's own guilt, and should have been admitted as such. Manifestly, the rule refers to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful enterprises("during its existence") and in furtherance of its object, and not to a confession made, as in this case, long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end. Besides, the prosecution had not yet offered the confessions to prove conspiracy between the two accused, nor as evidence against both of them. In fact, the alleged confessions (both in writing and in tape recordings) had not yet even been identified (the presentation of Atty. Xavier was precisely for the purpose of identifying the confessions), much less formally offered in evidence. The prosecution might still be able to adduce other proof of conspiracy between Consunji and Panganiban before their confessions are formally offered in evidence. Assuming, therefore, that section 12 of Rule 123 also applies to the confessions in question,it was premature for the respondent Court to exclude them completely on the ground that there was no prior proof of conspiracy. We see no need for the present to discuss the question of the admissibility of the individual extrajudicial confessions of two or more accused for the purpose of establishing conspiracy between them through the identity of the confessions in essential details. After all, the confessions are not before us and have not even been formally offered in evidence for any purpose. Suffice it to say that the lower Court should have allowed such confessions to be given in evidence at least as against the parties who made them, and admit the same conditionally to establish conspiracy, in order to give the prosecution a chance to get into the record all the relevant evidence at its disposal to prove the charges. At any rate, in the final determination and consideration of the case, the trial Court should be able to distinguish the admissible from the inadmissible, and reject what, under the rules of evidence, should be excluded. There is greater reason to adhere to such policy in criminal cases where questions arise as to admissibility of evidence for the prosecution, for the unjustified exclusion of evidence may lead to the erroneous acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the charges, from which the People can no longer appeal. _____________________________________________________________________________________ PHILIPPINE AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE CO., INC. and TAGUM PLASTICS, INC., petitioners, vs. SWEET LINES, INC., DAVAO VETERANS ARRASTRE AND PORT SERVICES, INC. and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. G.R. No. 87434 August 5, 1992

FACTS: The vessel “SS VISHVA YASH,” owned and operated by the foreign common carrier, took on board two consignments of cargoes for shipment to Manila and later for transshipment to Davao City consisting of 600 bags of Low Density Polyethylene-631 and 6,400 bags of Low Density Polyethylene647 both consigned to Far East Bank and Trust Company of Manila. Said cargoes were covered by Bill of Lading No. 6 and 7 issued by the foreign common carrier. Tagum Plastics insured the cargo with plaintiff, Philippine American General Insurance Co, Inc. (Philamgen). Upon arrival in Manila, foreign common carrier made use of the services of “MV Sweet Lines” owned by herein defendant interisland carrier. A survey of the cargo upon its discharge revealed that the same contained shortages, damages, and losses as

to both cargoes. Thereafter, a maritime suit was instituted by herein petitioners to recover the cost of the lost and damaged shipment plus exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs allegedly due to defendant’s negligence. The trial court ruled in favor of petitioners ordering the respondents to indemnify the petitioners for the lost shipment. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court absolving defendants on the ground of prescription of action. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Philamgen contended that it was error for the respondent court to reverse the appealed decision on the ground of prescription when Sweet Lines failed to adduce any evidence in support thereof and the Bills of Lading said to contain the shortened periods for filing claims and instituting court actions were never offered in evidence. ISSUE: Whether or not the non-presentation of the Bills of Lading, evidencing the stipulation of a shorter period for filing claims, bars defendant Sweet Lines from alleging prescription of action. RULING: The Supreme Court held that it is not such fatal defect. In the case at bar, it is already too late a day to overturn the litigation on the ground of non-inclusion of the controverted bills of lading in the formal offer of evidence, for to do so would mean an over-indulgence in technicalities. Respondent court correctly passed upon the matter of prescription since the defense was so considered and controverted by the parties. As petitioners are suing upon Sweet Line’s contractual obligation under the contract of carriage, as contained in the Bills of Lading, such bills can be categorized as actionable documents which under the rules, must be properly pleaded either as causes of action or defenses and the genuineness and due execution of which are deemed admitted unless specifically denied under oath by the adverse party. This, petitioners failed to do. Petitioner’s failure to specifically deny the existence, much less the genuineness and due execution of the instruments, as pleaded, amounts to an admission. Judicial admissions, whether verbal or written, made by the parties in the pleadings or in the course of the trial or the proceedings in the same case are conclusive, no evidence being required to prove the same. Hence, the non-inclusion of the controverted bill of lading in the formal offer of evidence cannot, under the facts of the case, be considered a fatal procedural lapse that would bar respondent from raising the defense of prescription. Petitioner’s feigned ignorance of the provisions of the bills of lading, particularly on the time limitations for filing a claim and commencing a suit in court, as their excuse for non-compliance therewith does not deserve serious attention. Lastly, it is a safe assessment that petitioners acknowledged the existence of the said bills of lading when they made a notation in an application for “Delivery of Cargoes without Original Bill of Lading” that the same corresponds to the controverted bills of lading. Also, by having the cargo shipped on respondent carrier’s vessel and later making a claim for loss on the basis of the bills of lading, petitioners, for all intents and purposes accepted said bills. _____________________________________________________________________________________ CONCEPCION M. CATUIRA, Petitioner, vs COURT OF APPEALS AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents, G.R. No. 105813

September 12, 1994

FACTS: On June 8 June 1990, two (2) informations for estafa were filed against petitioner Conception M. Catuira with the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, for having issued two (2) checks in payment of her obligation to private Complainant Maximo Ocampo when the petitioner had no sufficient funds to cover the same, which checks upon presentment for payment were dishonoured by the drawee bank. After the prosecution had presented its evidence, petitioner Catuira filed a motion to dismiss (by way of a demurrer to evidence) under Sec. 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.

Petitioner contended that the testimony of Private respondent Ocampo was inadmissible in evidence since it was not properly introduced when she was called to testify as mandate in Sec. 35, Rule 132, of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Petitioner also argued that even if the testimony of private respondent was considered, the evidence of the prosecution still failed to prove that the checks were issued in payment of an obligation. On November 4, 1991, Petitioner then elevated her case to the Court of appeals. The appellate court rejected her petition and sustained the trial court in its denial of the motion to dismiss. Hence, this recourse seeking to annul the decision of the Court of Appeals. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred when it accepted the testimony of private respondent despite the undisputed fact that it was not offered at the time she was called to testify. RULING: No. The petition is devoid of merit. The reason for requiring that evidence be formally introduced is to enable the court to rule intelligently upon the objection to the questions which have been asked. As a general rule, the proponent must show its relevancy, materiality and competency. Where the proponent offers evidence deemed by counsel of the adverse party to be inadmissible for any reason, the latter has the right to object, but such right is a mere privilege which can be waived. Necessarily, the object must be made at the earliest opportunity, lest silence when there is opportunity to speak may operate as a waiver of objections. Thus, while it is true that the prosecution failed to offer the questioned testimony when private respondent was called to the witness stand, petitioner waived this procedural error by falling to object at the appropriate time, when the ground for objection became reasonably apparent the moment private respondent was called to testify without any prior offer having been made by the proponent. _____________________________________________________________________________________ SHERATON PALACE VS. QUIJANO 64 OG 9116

FACTS: The plaintiff in this case, Sheraton had instituted a suit for the recovery of a sum of money amounting to $1,257.34 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency from defendant Cristina Quijano for the latter’s alleged unpaid hotel charges when the defendant stayed and lodged in plaintiff’s hotel in San Francisco, California. Plaintiff relies upon Exhibit E-1, which is a letter of Mueller and McLeod, plaintiff’s lawyer in the US, to plaintiff’s counsel in the Philippines, in an attempt to show that it was the defendant who asked that her hotel accounts be charged against Fred Devine and Company, but the latter declined to pay the bills claiming that it had not authorized the defendant to charge any of her hotel bills to it. Such evidence was presented together with the testimony of Atty. Syquia, the plaintiff’s counsel. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint alleging that defendant’s stay at the hotel was as a guest of a certain Fred Devine who had assumed to pay all the costs for his account. ISSUE: Whether or not Exhibit E-1 constitutes proof of facts related therein independent of the testimony of Atty. Syquia. RULING: A document or writing which is admitted not as an independent evidence but merely as part of the testimony of a witness or merely insofar as such witness has made reference thereto in the course of his testimony, does not constitute proof of facts related therein. It was correct for the trial court not to admit the said documentary evidence as an independent piece of evidence but merely as part of the testimony of Atty. Syquia or merely insofar as Atty. Syquia has made reference thereto in the course of his testimony so that it cannot constitute proof the facts related in the said exhibit.

ELVIRA MATO VDA. DE OÑATE, substituted by her heirs MARIA MATO-ALAMEDA, AIDA MATO, ZOE MATO, PACITA MATO and JUAN MATO II, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and EULALIA M. TAGUBA, respondents. G.R. No. 116149 November 23, 1995

FACTS: Petitioners challenge the decision of the trial court, as affirmed by respondent court, for lack of basis. They argue that the lower court and the Court of Appeals erred in considering evidence not formally offered by private respondent in accordance with the Rules of Court. The controversy involves Lot No. 1571, a riceland located at Toran, Aparri, Cagayan covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-5168. On January 10, 1980, an action for specific performance with damages was filed in the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan, Branch II by Eulalia Marcita Taguba in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of the deceased Leonor Taguba against Elvira Mato Vda. de Oñate. As the trial court found, the deceased Leonor Taguba bought a parcel of land from Vda. De Onate in 1976 for 5,000 payable in 4 installments. Taguba successfully paid her obligation however, after full payment, Vda. De Onate failed to reduce their contract in writing. On December 30, 1976 Taguba died. On her death, the heirs of taguba inisiated a case against Vda. De Onate seeking the execution of a public document of sale in favor of Taguba and her heirs in which Vda. De Onate refused to do so. The trial court on its decision ruled in favor of Taguba. On appeal, Vda. De Onate contented the recognition of the trial court to Taguba’s evidence particularly Exhibits “F”, “F-1”, “F-2” and “F-3” which had been marked but was never formally offered as required by the Rules of Court. On sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals still admitted the evidence for having complied with the requisites of for admission; that the evidence must be duly identified by testimony duly recorded and it must be incorporated in the records of the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the documents marked as exhibits but not formally offered should be recognized by the court.

RULING: Section 35 (now Section 34) of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides: “The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified”. From the foregoing provision, it is clear that for evidence to be considered, the same must be formally offered. Corollarily, the mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean that it has already been offered as part of the evidence of a party. In Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles, we had the occasion to make a distinction between identification of documentary evidence and its formal offer as an exhibit. We said that the first is done in the course of the trial and is accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit while the second is done only when the party rests its case and not before. A party, therefore, may opt to formally offer his evidence if he believes that it will advance his cause or not to do so at all. In the event he chooses to do the latter, the trial court is not authorized by the Rules to consider the same. However, in People v. Napat-a citing People v. Mate, we relaxed the foregoing rule and allowed evidence not formally offered to be admitted and considered by the trial court provided the following requirements are present, viz.: first, the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the same must have been incorporated in the records of the case. In the case at bench, we find, as respondent court did, that these requisites have been satisfied.

RAFAEL ARSENIO S. DIZON, in his capacity as the Judicial Administrator of the Estate of the deceased JOSE P. FERNANDEZ, Petitioner vs. COURT OF TAX APPEALS and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondents. GR No. 140944 April 30, 2008

FACTS: Petitioner Dizon has been appointed as administrator of the estate of one Jose Fernandez. He thus requested the probate court's authority to sell several properties forming part of the Estate, for the purpose of paying its creditors. However, the Assistant Commissioner for Collection of the BIR, Themistocles Montalban, demanded the payment of P66, 973, 985.40 as deficiency estate tax. Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the said estate tax assessment, which was denied by the Commissioner who reiterated that the estate is liable for the payment of the deficiency estate tax. On May 3, 1994, petitioner received the letter of denial. On June 2, 1994, petitioner filed a petition for review before respondent CTA. Trial on the merits ensued. The CTA opined that the aforementioned pieces of evidence introduced by the BIR were admissible in evidence. CA affirmed the CTA's ruling. However, it was discovered that the evidence were merely marked and identified, but were not formally offered in evidence. ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence may be admitted in evidence despite absence of formal offer. RULING: No. Under Section 8 of RA 1125, the CTA is categorically described as a court of record. As cases filed before it are litigated de novo, party-litigants shall prove every minute aspect of their cases. Indubitably, no evidentiary value can be given the pieces of evidence submitted by the BIR, as the rules on documentary evidence require that these documents must be formally offered before the CTA.Pertinent is Section 34, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence which reads: SEC. 34. Offer of evidence. The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. In this case, we find that these requirements have not been satisfied. The assailed pieces of evidence were presented and marked during the trial particularly when Alberto took the witness stand. Alberto identified these pieces of evidence in his direct testimony. He was also subjected to crossexamination and re-cross examination by petitioner. But Albertos account and the exchanges between Alberto and petitioner did not sufficiently describe the contents of the said pieces of evidence presented by the BIR. In fact, petitioner sought that the lead examiner, one Ma. Anabella A. Abuloc, be summoned to testify, inasmuch as Alberto was incompetent to answer questions relative to the working papers. The lead examiner never testified. Moreover, while Alberto's testimony identifying the BIR's evidence was duly recorded, the BIR documents themselves were not incorporated in the records of the case. While the CTA is not governed strictly by technical rules of evidence, as rules of procedure are not ends in themselves and are primarily intended as tools in the administration of justice, the presentation of the BIR's evidence is not a mere procedural technicality which may be disregarded considering that it is the only means by which the CTA may ascertain and verify the truth of BIR's claims against the Estate. The BIR's failure to formally offer these pieces of evidence, despite CTA's directives, is fatal to its cause. Such failure is aggravated by the fact that not even a single reason was advanced by the BIR to justify such fatal omission. This, we take against the BIR.

HEIRS OF ROQUE F. TABUENA, Petitioners, vs, LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. G.R. No. 180557 FACTS: Petitioners filed a complaint for determination and payment of just compensation against the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP). They allege that they were the owners of an irrigated riceland in Bibincahan, Sorsogon. A large part of the land was brought by DAR under the coverage of P.D. No. 27 (The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law) and set the total value thereof at P105, 572.48, which is in contravention of their right to a just compensation. They argued that the determination of what constitutes just compensation is inherently a judicial function which cannot and should not be left to administrative officials. LBP alleged that the subject land transfer claim had been settled and extinguished by virtue of the Deed of Assignment of Rights executed by petitioners in favor of LBP. The deed is the best evidence that the land transfer claim had been consummated. Since there has been no action on the part of petitioners to annul the same, they were estopped from assailing its validity. Petitioners claimed that their acceptance of the offered price does not estop them from questioning the valuation since the Deed of Assignment of Rights is not conclusive proof that their claim was extinguished. Petitioners contend that the appellate court erred when it admitted the Deed of Assignment of Rights considering that the said document was not offered in evidence by respondent. They were not given the opportunity to examine the same or to object to its admissibility. And assuming that the said deed may be admitted in evidence, it could not be considered as a binding contract because they executed the same under duress. ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence not formally offered admissible. RULING: Generally, courts cannot consider evidence which has not been formally offered. Parties are required to inform the courts of the purpose of introducing their respective exhibits to assist the latter in ruling on their admissibility in case an objection thereto is made. Without a formal offer of evidence, courts are constrained to take no notice of the evidence even if it has been marked and identified. However, this Court has relaxed the foregoing rule and allowed evidence not formally offered to be admitted and considered by the trial court provided the same must have been identified by testimony duly recorded and incorporated in the records of the case. In the instant case, the Deed of Assignment of Rights was set up by LBP as an affirmative defense in its Answer and was incorporated in the records of the case as an annex. Petitioners however failed to question its existence or due execution. On the contrary, they acknowledged receipt of a portion of the compensation for the property and admitted that the Deed of Assignment of Rights appeared as an encumbrance in their certificate of title. Petitioners failure to specifically deny under oath the existence, authenticity and due execution of the said document is tantamount to a judicial admission of its genuineness and due execution. Hence, Deed of Assignment of Rights shall be admissible although it was not offered as evidence.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. ANTONIO ORTIZ, CHARITO CHAVEZ, EDWIN DASILIO and JERRY DOE, Appellants. G.R. No. 179944

September 4, 2009

FACTS: At around 7:00 o’clock in the evening, Candido Oliva and his son, Dennis, were inside their camalig when they heard BBB’s dog barking. This prompted Candido to go outside and verify what was happening. But before he could enter the camalig, somebody with a revolver pushed him inside. The man who pushed him introduced himself as "Sergeant" and was later identified only as Jerry Doe. Jerry Doe called Dasilio inside the camalig. Dasilio, who was then armed with a sword, ordered Candido to sit beside Dennis, who was interminably crying out of fear. Father and son were then made to lie face down while appellants tied their hands with a tie wire. At about the same time, spouses AAA and BBB were watching television inside their house, which was situated just 12 to 15 meters from the camalig, when they heard Dennis crying. BBB proceeded to Candido’s house to investigate but he was also herded inside Candido’s house where he was tied by Dasilio. Thereafter, Candido, Dennis and BBB were ordered to proceed to BBB’s house. On their way there, BBB saw Ortiz and Chavez. Appellants ransacked the spouses’ house while Jerry Doe held AAA at gunpoint. Subsequently, the four victims were shoved inside the spouses’ bedroom. Jerry Doe and Dasilio continued to loot the house while Chavez and Ortiz acted as lookout. After the looting was over, AAA was asked to get food from the camalig. While in the camalig, the four took turns in raping her in the presence of each other. After succeeding in raping AAA, the four all went back to the house of AAA and BBB and left. During the investigation, SPO2 Nestor Huerno recovered a calculator, which was one of the items taken from AAA and BBB’s house on the night of the robbery, from Asuncion Casiano. Upon the police’s inquiry, Casiano declared that his neighbor, Dasilio, bartered the said calculator in exchange for some grocery items from her store. Additionally, Florentino Bueno, a friend of the appellants, emerged during the investigation. He said that Ortiz and Chavez invited him a week before the incident to join them in robbing private complainants. Bueno also revealed that in a drinking spree, Ortiz and Chavez boasted in his presence about the robbery they committed and the rapes perpetrated on AAA. Appellants argue that the calculator, which was bartered by Dasilio, was not one of the items allegedly stolen from the spouses as the same was not specifically enumerated in the complaint filed by them. They assert that the inclusion of the calculator as a lost item was a mere afterthought to bolster the prosecution’s theory that appellants perpetrated the crime as its possession can be easily traced to one of them. ISSUE: Whether or not the objection raised by the accused as to the admission of the calculator in evidence tenable. RULING: The OSG argues that appellants are now estopped from objecting to the admission of the calculator in evidence as they failed to do so when the prosecution presented SPO2 Huerno, Casiano and AAA to testify on the recovery of the calculator and its identification as one of the things stolen from the spouses. The trial court likewise did not err in admitting and giving weight to the testimony of Asuncion Casiano and SPO2 Nestor Huerno that Dasilio bartered the calculator. Section 36, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that where the proponent offers evidence deemed by counsel of the adverse party as inadmissible for any reason, the latter has the right to object. The failure to object, when there is an opportunity to speak, operates as a waiver of the objection. Here, appellants failed to timely object to the testimonial evidence presented by the prosecution; hence, the same was validly admitted and considered by the trial court in arriving at its judgment.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. RICARDO SANTOS, Accused-Appellant. G.R. No. 171452, October 17, 2008 FACTS: Accused-appellant, Ricardo Santos, is a neighbor of BBB and a drinking buddy of the latter’s second husband. BBB has a thirteen-year old daughter, AAA. One day, AAA was left with her brother in their house when Santos came and enticed her to his house offering her to give something. When they’re already in Santos’ house, Santos poked a gun at her and succeeded in molesting her. Accused-appellant inserted his penis in AAA’s vagina despite AAA’s resistance. The RTC of Rizal convicted Santos for qualified rape. The CA affirmed such a conviction. On review with the Supreme Court, Santos questioned the offer of AAA’s testimony as well as the manner of oral examination conducted to her by the prosecutor. According to him, the offer was made in such a way that AAA did nothing but to affirm whatever the prosecutor has said in its offer. In addition, he objected to the questions propounded to AAA for being leading questions which are prohibited during direct examination. ISSUE: Whether or not Ricardo Santos’ objection as to the offer of AAA’s testimony and the manner of questioning conducted to her by the prosecutor should be sustained. RULING: No, the aforementioned objections raised by accused- appellant should not be sustained. Anent the offer of AAA’s testimony, it cannot be said that AAA was only made to parrot what the prosecutor statedin his offer because it was delivered in English for the indulgence of the court, which AAA could not comprehend correctly for she had only reached Grade 3. Thus, it is not correct to say that it had influenced AAA’s testimony on the witness stand. As to the questions asked, although it may qualify as leading questions, the same were not totally prohibited in view of the allowance provided by the Rules of Court as well as the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness. Section 10 (c) of Rule 132 states that leading questions are allowed when the witness has difficulty in giving intelligible answers due to his level of education, as in the case at bar. And Section 20 of the Rule of Examination of a Child Witness allows the same. Furthermore, it is worth noting that Santos did not raise his objections during the course of AAA’s oral examination. His counsel even proceeded to conducting cross-examination of AAA. Thus, he is now barred from questioning the propriety of such an examination as well as the admissibility of the answers given therein. _____________________________________________________________________________________ PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JIMMY CEDENIO y PERALTA, Accused-Appellant. G.R. No. 201103

September 25, 2013

FACTS: On June 2, 1992, Helen Catadman's daughter was celebrating her birthday at their house. The three accused were present therein drinking and eating. According to her mother's testimony, the victim arrived at the party at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening. He sat down near one table. Thereupon, he was berated by appellant who asked the former why he is mad at them (the three accused). The victim, however, did not respond until after he was asked by appellant for the third time where the former replied "Bakit pinagtutulungan ninyo ako.” When the victim tried to stand, he was slapped by appellant. The latter then pulled the former out of the house. There, appellant again slapped the victim causing the latter to fall and hit his forehead on the pavement. The victim stood up but was slapped for the third time by appellant. Again he fell down, but he

was still able to stand up and ran towards the gate, where accused Ernesto was standing by holding a piece of wood about 18 inches long. At this time, appellant left the scene. Outside the gate Ernesto hit the victim at the back of the latter's neck with the piece of wood he was holding. Danilo also stabbed the victim with a 6-inch icepick. The victim fell face down. When he attempted to stand, Ernesto stabbed the former with a "29 knife" (balisong). Thereafter, Ernesto and Danilo ran away. The 19-year-old victim was placed in a tricycle, but died on the way to the hospital due to the fatal stab wounds he sustained. The Medico Legal report established the cause of death as "cardio-respiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage secondary to stab wound of the chest." Appellant was apprehended and together with the two other accused, were charged before the lower court with murder. During the trial of the case on June 2, 1993 Cresencia Medenilla testified as one of the witnesses for the prosecution. But her testimony was stricken off the record and retaken on June 30, 1993 allegedly because she could not understand some of the counsels' questions during the earlier testimony. The real reason, however, become evident on cross examination when the witness admitted that she sought the assistance of a man whom she met for the first time. She told the mysterious person regarding her problem. The latter in consideration of P75 prepared for her a "manifestation and motion" and told her how to implicate appellant. She signed this Manifestation and Motion and filed it with the lower court on June 14, 1993, alleging that she did not fully understood the questions propounded to her by the prosecution and defense counsels, that she cannot understand some Tagalog and English words, as she uses only the "Waray" dialect, and accordingly prayed that her earlier testimony be stricken off the record for the purpose of retaking the same with the assistance of a Waray interpreter. ISSUE: Whether or not the striking out of the prosecution witness' earlier testimony justifiable. RULING: No. Even assuming arguendo that only the retaken testimony can be considered, the same revealed material inconsistencies not only with her earlier testimony but with her affidavit as well. Besides, the mere presence of a person at the scene of the crime does not make him a co-conspirator. Appellant's escape under the circumstances is indicative of his non-cooperation with the others. Proofs, not mere conjectures or assumptions, should be proffered by the prosecution which would show that appellant had taken part in the planning, preparation and perpetration of the alleged conspiracy to kill the victim. Otherwise, "a careless use of the conspiracy theory (can) sweep into jail even innocent persons who may have (only) been made unwitting tools by the criminal minds" really responsible for the crime. Also the presumption of innocence enjoyed by appellant was not rebutted by the prosecution, who obviously had no evidence that would sustain beyond reasonable doubt appellant's guilt of the crime charged. It was incumbent on the prosecution to discharge the onus probandi of the crime. But it failed to discharge that burden. Even the allegation of conspiracy is scantily supported by evidence on record and we are not convinced that the prosecution was able to establish it by the requisite quantum of proof in criminal cases. Jurisprudence is replete that conspiracy must be proven by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Since conviction rests upon the strength of evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the evidence for the defense, the evidence of appellant, assuming it to be weak is no reason to convict, as the case of the prosecution is not strong enough to sustain a conviction. _____________________________________________________________________________________ OBJECTION • Objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after the offer is made. Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent. An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after notice of the offer unless a different period is allowed by the court. In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified. ➢Grounds for objection: a) Hearsay b) Argumentative c) Leading d) Misleading e) Incompetent

f) Irrelevant g) Best evidence rule h) Parol evidence rule i) Question has no basis

W eight and Sufficiency of Evidence CLIMACO AMORA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. GR. No. 154466 JANUARY 28, 2008

FACTS: On June 27, 1993, a fire broke out in the building used by petitioner as residence and as a bakery and also gutted the nearby houses. Petitioner and the lot owner Adelfa Masl ofTagaytay entered into a contract of lease whereby the former was to use the lot and erect a building thereon for a monthly rental of P50.00, for a period of twenty (20) years. The lease contract provided that, upon the expiration of the contract on July 10, 1993, ownership over the building shall be transferred to the lessor but on January 4, 1993, Adelfa informed petitioner that she would no longer renew the contract of lease. On January 14, 1993, petitioner secured a fire insurance coverage over the subject building from different Insurance Company. It appears that the amounts of insurance coverage were substantially higher than the building’s market value. As found by the trial court, during the actual fire, petitioner was within the premises, heard shouts from his neighbor, ignored the same at first, and only later on did he finally stand up to see what was going on. The authorities submitted an Investigation Report. Thus, petitioner was charged with the crime of Destructive Arson, in Information to which petitioner pleaded “not guilty.” The RTC found petitioner guilty as charged, and was affirmed by the CA. Hence the petition. ISSUE: Whether or not direct evidence will prove petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. RULING: Direct evidence is not the sole means of establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Established facts that form a chain of circumstances can lead the mind intuitively or impel a conscious process of reasoning towards a conviction. Rules on evidence and principles in jurisprudence have long recognized that the accused may be convicted through circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence has been defined as such evidence which goes to prove a fact or series of facts, other than the facts in issue, which, if proved, may tend by inference to establish the fact in issue. Circumstantial evidence may be resorted to when to insist on direct testimony would ultimately lead to setting felons free. But for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient for a conviction, the following requisites must be present, namely: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the one who has committed the crime. Court found that all these circumstances, are consistent with the hypothesis that petitioner is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent. _____________________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MILLANO MUIT, SERGIO PANCHO, JR., EDUARDO HERMANO ALIAS "BOBBY REYES," ROLANDO DEQUILLO, ROMEO PANCHO, and JOSEPH FERRAER, appellants. G.R. No. 181043 October 8, 2008

FACTS: Appellants were charged with kidnapping for ransom with homicide and carnapping in two separate informations. Only Muit, Pancho Jr., Dequillo, Romeo, and Ferraer were arrested and stood trial. However, Ferraer was discharged from the criminal cases by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and was utilized as a state witness.

The defendants, including other persons, now deceased, conspired to kidnap an engineer for ransom. The group’s plan, however, was botched with the timely intervention of the police which resulted in an exchange of gun fire where several members of the group were killed. Unfortunately, their intended victim also died in the process. The driver of the commandeered vehicle of the victim, who turned out to be Muit, was apprehended. ISSUE: Whether conviction may be had based on weight and sufficiency of circumstantial evidence. RULING: Yes. After investigation, the police were able to apprehend appellants Pancho, Jr., Romeo, and Dequillo who all took part in the botched criminal conspiracy to kidnap the victim. During the investigation, Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit, with the assistance of their counsels and family members, executed extra judical confessions divulging their respective roles in the planning and execution of the crimes. Even though Pancho, Jr., Dequillo and Romeo did not participate in the actual abduction of the victim, they should still be held liable, as the courts below did, because of the existence of conspiracy. Conspiracy is a unity of purpose and intention in the commission of a crime. Where conspiracy is established, the precise modality or extent of participation of each individual conspirator becomes secondary since the act of one is the act of all. The degree of actual participation in the commission of the crime is immaterial. The conspiracy to kidnap the victim was proven through circumstantial evidence. The group thoroughly planned the kidnapping in Ferraer’s house and patiently waited for the day when the victim would be at the construction site. Then on 2 December 1997, the group received a call from Romeo so they proceeded to the construction site and carried out their plan. All the appellants took active part in the criminal conspiracy and performed different roles to consummate their common plan. The roles which Muit and his other companions played in the actual abduction were described earlier. As for Dequillo, he was the one who procured the guns used by the group. Pancho, Jr. served as the driver of the back-up vehicle, and Romeo was the group’s informant. Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence states that circumstantial evidence is sufficient if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The rule that an extra judicial confession is evidence only against the person making it recognizes various exceptions. One such exception is where several extra judicial statements had been made by several persons charged with an offense and there could have been no collusion with reference to said several confessions, the fact that the statements are in all material respects identical is confirmatory of the confession of the co-defendants and is admissible against other persons implicated therein. They are also admissible as circumstantial evidence against the person implicated therein to show the probability of the latter’s actual participation in the commission of the crime and may likewise serve as corroborative evidence if it is clear from other facts and circumstances that other persons had participated in the perpetration of the crime charged and proved. These are known as "interlocking confessions." _____________________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROLDAN A. OCHATE alias "Boy," accused-appellant. 385 SCRA 353

FACTS: Sometime on September 1994, the victim Rowena Albiso (8 YEARS OLD) and her older brother Roseller were walking together on their way home from school. Upon reaching the house of the barangay captain, Rowena stopped and went to the communal water pump to wash her food container and her slippers. Roseller went home ahead of her sister. On his way home, he passed by the hut of accused Roldan Ochate where he saw the latter in the yard tucking a scythe on his waist.

The family couldn’t find Rowena so they proceeded to report the incident to barangay. It was only around eight o'clock the following morning that the group found Rowena in a ricefield about fifty meters from Ochate's house. She was already dead due to deep and penetrating incised wounds in the neck and abdomen. Police officers as well as other members of the barangay went to see Ochate at his house but they were not able to find him. Thereafter, a certain Pantallano, a member of the CAFGU, was able to locate Ochate and he took Ochate in his custody and brought him to the Chief of Police of Tampilisan. Consequemtly, an information for Rape with Homicide of Rowena was filed against Ochate. ISSUES: Whether or not the Circumstantial Evidence presented is sufficient for the conviction of the crime. Whether or not verbal admissions allegedly made during custodial investigation is admissible. RULING: No, for mere suspicion, no matter how strong it may be, is not sufficient to sustain conviction. Law and jurisprudence demand proof beyond reasonable doubt before any person may be deprived of his life, liberty, or even property. In his testimony, Crisanto Montano admitted that accused-appellant was considered a suspect because he did not join the search for the missing girl. Appellant testified that he did not participate in the search because he was busy drying copra. It cannot be contradicted that such passive reaction is susceptible to different interpretations. Indeed, it may be construed as an indication of guilt; but, it may also be interpreted as mere indifference or even downright insensibility. No evidence presented to show that appellant was seen with her. At best, it is mere conjecture or speculation which the Court will not subscribe to. Accused-appellant's defenses of alibi and denial are weak. Nevertheless, it is a settled principle in criminal law that a finding of guilt must rest on the strength of the prosecution's own evidence and not on the weakness or absence of evidence for the defense. On the other hand, admissions allegedly made during custodial investigation must be made in a presence of a counsel. His confessions to Bienvenido Pantallano (CAFGU), Dr. Henry Cawley(NBI), and before the barangay captain may not be used in evidence against him as they are in violation of his constitutional right to remain silent and to counsel while under custodial investigation. While it is true that the barangay captain is not a police officer or a law enforcement agent, it is clear from the records that he asked his question in the course of police interrogation without the accusedappellant being informed of his rights under the constitution. In People vs. Morada, this Court held that the confession made by the accused-appellant to the barangay captain is inadmissible because it appeared that the conversation between the two was part of the then ongoing police investigation. _____________________________________________________________________________________ QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE (WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE (RULE 133) ➢

In the hierarchy of evidentiary values, the highest is proof beyond reasonable doubt, followed by clear and convincing evidence, preponderance of evidence, and substantial evidence, in that order.

LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE RULES OF EVIDENCE • Court litigations are primarily for the search of truth, and a liberal interpretation of the rules by which both parties are given the fullest opportunity to adduce proofs is the best way to ferret out the truth. • Liberal interpretation means such equitable construction as will enlarge the letter of rule to accomplish its intended purpose, carry out its intent, or promote justice. It is that construction which expands the meaning of the rule to meet cases which are clearly within the spirit or reason thereof or which gives a rule its generally accepted meaning to the end that the most comprehensive application thereof may be accorded, without doing violence to any of its terms. In short, liberal construction means that the words should receive a fair and reasonable interpretation, so as to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action or proceeding.

NOTICE: ALL QUOTED EXPLANATIONS WERE LFTED FROM A REVIEWER BY DEAN RIANO.