Espionage

ESPIONAGE

Contents 1

2

3

4

5

Agent handling

1

1.1

Human intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

1.2

Case officer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

1.3

Agents, spotting, and recruitment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

1.4

Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2

1.5

Communications Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2

1.6

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2

1.7

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2

1.8

External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2

Asset (intelligence)

3

2.1

3

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Black bag operation

4

3.1

Use by the FBI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4

3.2

Use by the CIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4

3.3

Use by other governments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4

3.4

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4

3.5

References

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4

3.6

External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5

Black operation

6

4.1

Etymology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6

4.2

Reported examples of black operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6

4.3

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6

4.4

External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7

Clandestine cell system

8

5.1

History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8

5.1.1

Provisional Irish Republican Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8

5.1.2

World War II French Resistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8

5.1.3

National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9

5.2

Parallel organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9

5.3

External support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9

i

ii

CONTENTS 5.4

Models of insurgency and associated cell characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9

5.5

Classic models for cell system operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10

5.5.1

Operations under official cover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10

5.5.2

Clandestine presence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11

5.5.3

Fault-tolerant cellular structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11

Non-traditional models, exemplified by al-Qaeda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12

5.6.1

Infrastructure cells . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

13

5.6.2

Operational cells . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

14

5.6.3

Indirect support networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

14

5.6.4

A possible countermeasure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

14

5.7

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

15

5.8

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

15

5.9

External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

15

5.6

6

Clandestine HUMINT

16

6.1

Legal aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

16

6.2

Major HUMINT organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

17

6.3

Penetrations of foreign targets by people loyal to their own country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

17

6.3.1

Clandestine Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

17

6.3.2

Dangled Mole . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

17

Human sources who changed allegiance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

18

6.4.1

Recruitment through Money . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

18

6.4.2

Recruitment through Ideology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

18

6.4.3

Recruitment through Compromise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

19

6.4.4

Recruitment through Ego . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

19

Recruit Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

19

6.5.1

Mole . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

19

6.5.2

Double Agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

20

6.5.3

Multiply Turned Agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

23

Support Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

24

6.6.1

Couriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

24

6.6.2

Safehouses and Other Meeting Places . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

24

6.6.3

Finance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

25

6.7

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

26

6.8

External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

27

6.4

6.5

6.6

7

Clandestine HUMINT and covert action

28

7.1

Historical background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

28

7.1.1

United Kingdom prewar operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

28

7.1.2

United States background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

28

Surging additional capability for the Second World War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

29

7.2.1

30

7.2

United Kingdom World War II Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CONTENTS 7.2.2

United States World War II operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

30

7.2.3

USSR World War II Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

30

7.2.4

German World War II Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

30

Separate functions during peacetime? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

31

7.3.1

UK postwar change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

31

7.3.2

US postwar change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

31

7.4

Controversies remain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

34

7.5

Current operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

35

7.5.1

US doctrine and operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

35

7.5.2

Afghanistan and US doctrinal conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

35

7.5.3

Joint UK-US operations in Operation Desert Storm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

35

7.5.4

Russian operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

36

7.5.5

Israeli operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

36

7.5.6

French operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

36

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

36

7.3

7.6 8

Clandestine HUMINT operational techniques

38

8.1

Staff and Skills in a Clandestine HUMINT Operations Station . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

38

8.1.1

Station under diplomatic cover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

38

8.1.2

Stations under official but nondiplomatic cover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

39

8.1.3

Stations under non-official cover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

39

8.1.4

Support services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

41

8.2

Basic agent recruiting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

42

8.3

Basic agent operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

43

8.3.1

Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

43

8.3.2

Continued testing during operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

43

8.3.3

Operating the agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

43

8.3.4

Agent communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

44

8.3.5

Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

46

Special clandestine services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

46

8.4.1

Agents of influence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

46

8.4.2

Strategic deception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

46

8.5

Direct action services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

47

8.6

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

48

8.7

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

48

8.4

9

iii

Concealment device

49

9.1

Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

49

9.1.1

Ammunition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

49

9.1.2

Books . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

49

9.1.3

Candles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

49

9.1.4

Cans and jars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

49

iv

CONTENTS 9.1.5

Coins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

49

9.1.6

Diversion safe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

50

9.1.7

Electrical outlet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

50

9.1.8

Painting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

50

9.1.9

Computers and consumer electronics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

50

9.2

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

50

9.3

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

50

10 Cryptography

51

10.1 Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

51

10.2 History of cryptography and cryptanalysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

52

10.2.1 Classic cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

52

10.2.2 Computer era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

54

10.3 Modern cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

55

10.3.1 Symmetric-key cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

55

10.3.2 Public-key cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

56

10.3.3 Cryptanalysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

57

10.3.4 Cryptographic primitives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

58

10.3.5 Cryptosystems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

58

10.4 Legal issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

59

10.4.1 Prohibitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

59

10.4.2 Export controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

59

10.4.3 NSA involvement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

59

10.4.4 Digital rights management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

60

10.4.5 Forced disclosure of encryption keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

60

10.5 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

60

10.6 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

61

10.7 Further reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

62

10.8 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

63

11 Cut-out (espionage)

64

11.1 Outside espionage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

64

11.2 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

64

11.3 References

64

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12 Dead drop

65

12.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

65

12.2 Modern techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

65

12.3 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

65

12.4 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

66

12.5 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

66

12.6 Further reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

66

CONTENTS

v

13 Denial and deception

67

13.1 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

68

13.2 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

68

14 Direct action (military)

69

14.1 Risk factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

69

14.2 Operational techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

70

14.2.1 Infiltration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

70

14.2.2 Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

70

14.2.3 Exfiltration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

70

14.3 Examples of direct action missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

70

14.3.1 Norwegian and SOE attacks on German heavy water production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

70

14.3.2 Prisoner of war rescue raids in the Philippines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

71

14.3.3 Israeli raid on Soviet radar used by Egypt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

71

14.3.4 Attempted prisoner of war rescue in North Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

71

14.3.5 US prisoner in Panama rescued by Delta Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

71

14.3.6 Killing of Osama bin Laden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

72

14.3.7 Physical destruction of propaganda facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

72

14.4 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

73

15 Eavesdropping 15.1 Etymology

74 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

74

15.2 Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

74

15.3 References

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

74

15.4 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

75

15.5 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

75

16 Espionage

76

16.1 History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

76

16.1.1 Ancient history . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

76

16.1.2 Arabia during Muhammad’s era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

76

16.1.3 Modern history . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

77

16.2 Targets of espionage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

77

16.3 Methods and terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

77

16.3.1 Technology and techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

78

16.4 Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

78

16.5 Industrial espionage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

79

16.6 Agents in espionage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

79

16.7 Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

80

16.8 Use against non-spies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

80

16.9 Espionage laws in the UK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

81

16.9.1 Government intelligence laws and its distinction from espionage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

81

vi

CONTENTS 16.10Military conflicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

81

16.11List of famous spies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

82

16.11.1 World War I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

83

16.11.2 World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

84

16.11.3 Post World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

84

16.12Spy fiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

84

16.12.1 World War II: 1939–1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

85

16.12.2 Cold War era: 1945–1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

85

16.13See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

85

16.14References

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

85

16.15Further reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

87

16.16External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

87

17 False flag

88

17.1 Use in warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

88

17.1.1 Naval warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

88

17.1.2 Air warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

88

17.1.3 Land warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

89

17.2 As pretexts for war . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

90

17.2.1 Russo-Swedish War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

90

17.2.2 Second Sino-Japanese War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

90

17.2.3 World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

90

17.2.4 Cold War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

90

17.3 As a tactic to undermine political opponents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

91

17.3.1 Reichstag fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

91

17.3.2 Project TP-Ajax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

91

17.3.3 2008 Kurcha incident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

92

17.4 Pseudo-operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

92

17.5 Espionage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

93

17.6 Civilian usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

94

17.6.1 Businesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

94

17.6.2 Political campaigning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

94

17.6.3 Ideological . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

94

17.7 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

94

17.7.1 Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

94

17.7.2 Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

95

17.8 Notes and references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

95

18 Field agent

97

18.1 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

97

18.2 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

97

CONTENTS

vii

19 Industrial espionage

98

19.1 Competitive intelligence and economic or industrial espionage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

98

19.2 Forms of economic and industrial espionage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

98

19.3 Target industries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

98

19.4 Information theft and sabotage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

99

19.5 Agents and the process of collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

99

19.6 Use of computers and the Internet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

99

19.6.1 Personal computers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

99

19.6.2 The Internet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 19.6.3 Opportunities for sabotage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 19.6.4 Malware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 19.6.5 Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 19.7 History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 19.7.1 Origins of industrial espionage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 19.7.2 The 20th Century . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 19.7.3 The legacy of Cold War espionage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 19.8 Notable cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 19.8.1 France and the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 19.8.2 Volkswagen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 19.8.3 Hilton and Starwood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 19.8.4 GhostNet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 19.8.5 Google and Operation Aurora . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 19.8.6 CyberSitter and Green Dam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 19.8.7 USA v. Lan Lee, et al. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 19.8.8 Dongxiao Yue and Chordiant Software, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 19.9 Concerns of national governments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 19.9.1 Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 19.9.2 United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 19.9.3 United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 19.9.4 Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 19.10See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 19.11References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 19.12Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 19.13External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 20 Intelligence assessment

108

20.1 Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 20.2 Target-centric intelligence cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 20.3 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 20.4 Further reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 20.5 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

viii

CONTENTS

21 Intelligence cycle management

112

21.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 21.1.1 Intelligence defined . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 21.1.2 Management of the intelligence cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 21.1.3 Planning and direction overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 21.2 Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 21.2.1 National/strategic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 21.2.2 Military/operational . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 21.3 Intelligence architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 21.3.1 Budgeting

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114

21.3.2 Policy factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 21.3.3 Balancing law enforcement and national security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 21.3.4 Public versus private . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 21.4 Collection planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 21.4.1 CCIRM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 21.5 Issuance of orders and requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 21.5.1 Prioritization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 21.6 Other topics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 21.6.1 Political misuse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 21.6.2 Clandestine intelligence versus covert action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 21.7 Failures in the intelligence cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118 21.8 Other cycles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118 21.8.1 Boyd OODA Loop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118 21.9 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 22 Interrogation

120

22.1 Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120 22.1.1 Suggestibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120 22.1.2 Deception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120 22.1.3 Good cop/bad cop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 22.1.4 Pride-and-ego down . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 22.1.5 Reid technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 22.1.6 Mind-altering drugs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 22.1.7 Torture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 22.2 Around the world . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122 22.2.1 United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122 22.2.2 United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122 22.2.3 Inquisition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 22.3 Resistance training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 22.4 Movement for increased recording of interrogations in the U.S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 22.5 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 22.6 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

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ix

22.7 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124 23 Non-official cover

125

23.1 History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 23.2 Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 23.3 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126 23.4 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126 23.5 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126 24 Numbers station

127

24.1 Suspected origins and use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 24.1.1 Identifying and locating

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128

24.2 The Atención spy case evidence

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128

24.3 Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 24.4 Transmission technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 24.5 Interfering with numbers stations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 24.5.1 Documented instances of interference to broadcasts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 24.5.2 Attempted jamming of numbers stations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 24.6 Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 24.7 Recordings

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

24.8 References in mass media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 24.9 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 24.10References

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

24.11Further reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 24.12External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 25 Official cover

134

25.1 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 25.2 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 26 One-way voice link

135

26.1 Historical context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 26.2 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 27 Resident spy

136

27.1 Types of resident spies

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

27.2 Comparison of illegal and legal resident spies 27.3 References

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

27.3.1 Cross-reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 27.3.2 Sources used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 27.4 Further reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 28 Special reconnaissance

138

28.1 History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138

x

CONTENTS 28.2 A spectrum of reconnaissance capabilities: LRS and SR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 28.3 Appropriate missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 28.3.1 Intelligence related missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140 28.3.2 Offensive missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142 28.4 Operational techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145 28.4.1 Infiltration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145 28.4.2 Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145 28.4.3 Exfiltration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146 28.5 SR Communications-Electronics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146 28.6 Reporting during and after the mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147 28.7 Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147 28.8 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148 28.9 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148 28.10External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149

29 Steganography

150

29.1 History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150 29.2 Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150 29.2.1 Physical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150 29.2.2 Digital messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151 29.2.3 Network

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152

29.2.4 Printed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153 29.2.5 Using puzzles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153 29.3 Additional terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153 29.4 Countermeasures and detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153 29.5 Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154 29.5.1 Use in modern printers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154 29.5.2 Example from modern practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154 29.5.3 Alleged use by intelligence services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154 29.5.4 Distributed steganography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154 29.5.5 Online challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154 29.6 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154 29.7 Citations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154 29.8 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 29.9 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 30 Surveillance

157

30.1 Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 30.1.1 Computer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 30.1.2 Telephones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158 30.1.3 Cameras . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159 30.1.4 Social network analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160

CONTENTS

xi

30.1.5 Biometric . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161 30.1.6 Aerial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161 30.1.7 Data mining and profiling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162 30.1.8 Corporate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163 30.1.9 Human operatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163 30.1.10 Satellite imagery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164 30.1.11 Identification and credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164 30.1.12 RFID and geolocation devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164 30.1.13 Human Microchips . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165 30.1.14 Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165 30.1.15 Postal services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166 30.2 Controversy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166 30.2.1 Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166 30.2.2 Opposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166 30.3 Counter-surveillance, inverse surveillance, sousveillance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168 30.4 Popular culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168 30.4.1 In literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168 30.4.2 In music . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168 30.4.3 Onscreen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168 30.5 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169 30.5.1 United States government

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169

30.6 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170 30.7 Further reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173 30.8 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174 30.8.1 General information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174 30.8.2 Historical information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174 30.8.3 Legal resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174 30.9 Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175 30.9.1 Text . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175 30.9.2 Images . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182 30.9.3 Content license . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187

Chapter 1

Agent handling In intelligence organizations, agent handling is the management of agents, principal agents, and agent networks (called “assets”) by intelligence officers typically known as case officers.

If principles of intelligence tradecraft have not been strictly observed, it is also possible that compromised agents can reveal information that exposes other members of the network. In the real world of espionage, human lapses are very much the norm, and violations of the principles of tradecraft are common. It is for this reason that agents are ideally trained to resist interrogation for a defined period of time.

1.1 Human intelligence

If an agent is able to resist interrogation for a defined peA primary purpose of intelligence organizations is to pen- riod of time, the odds that other members of the network etrate a target with a human agent, or a network of hu- can be alerted to the compromise improve. man agents. Such agents can either infiltrate the target, or be recruited “in place”. Case officers are professionally trained employees of intelligence organizations that manage human agents and human agent networks. Intel- 1.2 Case officer ligence that derives from such human sources is known A case officer is an intelligence officer who is a as HUMINT. trained specialist in the management of agents and agent Sometimes, agent handling is done indirectly, through networks.[1] Case officers manage human agents, and hu“principal agents” that serve as proxies for case officers. man intelligence networks. Case officers spot potenIt is not uncommon, for example, for a case officer to tial agents, recruit prospective agents, and train agents manage a number of principal agents, who in turn hanin tradecraft. Case officers emphasize those elements of dle agent networks, which are preferably organized in a tradecraft which enable the agent to acquire needed incellular fashion. In such a case, the principal agent can formation, as well as to enable the case officer to comserve as a “cut-out” for the case officer, buffering him or municate with and supervise the agent. Most of all, case her from direct contact with the agent network. officers train agents in methods of avoiding detection by Utilizing a principal agent as a cut-out, and ensuring that host nation counter-intelligence organizations. the human agent network is organized in a cellular fashion, can provide some protection for other agents in the network, as well as for the principal agent, and for the 1.3 Agents, spotting, and recruitcase officer in the event that an agent in the network is ment compromised. Assuming that standard principles of intelligence tradecraft have been strictly observed by the principal agent and the agents in the network, compro- By definition, an “agent” acts on behalf of another, mised agents will not be able to identify the case officer, whether another individual, an organization, or a foreign nor the other members of the network. Ideally, agents government. Agents can be considered either witting or may work side by side in the same office, and conduct unwitting, and in some cases, willing or unwilling. Agents their clandestine collection activities with such discipline, typically work under the direction of a principal agent or that they will not realize that they are both engaged in es- a case officer. When agents work alone, and are not mempionage, much less members of the same network. bers of an agent network, they are termed “singletons”. Since an agent can sometimes identify his or her principal agent, however, or reveal information under interrogation that can lead to the identification of a principal agent, the protection provided by cellular network organization can be time-sensitive.

The identification of potential agents is termed “agent spotting” (also termed “talent spotting”). Identifying potential agents, and investigating the details of their personal and professional lives, involves the granular verification of their bona fides. Such activities can include 1

2

CHAPTER 1. AGENT HANDLING

uncovering personal details that leave potential agents vulnerable to coercion, blackmail, or other inducements, such as sexual approaches. Approaches to potential agents can be multitudinous and considerable time can pass before the potential agent is maneuvered into a position where a recruitment “pitch” can be hazarded.

1.4 Training Agent training often includes techniques of tradecraft such as clandestine communications, including cryptography, the use of one-time pads, the construction of concealment devices, and the employment of dead drops. Other elements of tradecraft include elicitation, surveillance and countersurveillance, photography and the emplacement of audio devices, sensors, or other transmitters. Case officers generally train agents one at a time, in isolation, including only those elements of tradecraft needed to penetrate the target at hand. Case officers will also teach agents how to develop cover for status, and cover for action, meaning how to establish credible pretexts for their presence and behavior while engaged in collection activities. A well-trained and competent agent can conduct his or her clandestine tasks while under close surveillance, and still evade detection. More advanced agent training can include resistance to interrogation.

1.5 Communications Method Random e-mail ID’s

1.6 See also • Category:Spies by role • Motives for spying

1.7 References [1] case officer, thefreedictionary.com, retrieved 4 March 2009

1.8 External links • Human Intelligence: From Sleepers to Walk-ins, Thomas Patrick Carroll, Syllabus, 5 September 2006 – 24 October 2006—many good definitions with historic examples and timely discussion of problems; in outline form.

Chapter 2

Asset (intelligence) In intelligence, assets are persons within organizations or countries that are being spied upon who provide information for an outside spy. They are sometimes referred to as agents, and in law enforcement parlance, as confidential informants, or 'CI' for short. There are different categories of assets, including people that: • Willingly work for a foreign government for ideological reasons such as being against their government, but live in a country that doesn't allow political opposition. They may elect to work with a foreign power to change their own country because there are few other ways available. • Work for monetary gain. Intelligence services often pay good wages to people in important positions that are willing to betray secrets. • Have been blackmailed and are forced into their role. • Do not even know they are being used. Assets can be loyal to their country, but may still provide a foreign agent with information through failures in information safety such as using insecure computers or not following proper OPSEC procedures during day-to-day chatting.

2.1 See also • Vetting

3

Chapter 3

Black bag operation This article is about the espionage technique. For the 3.2 Use by the CIA cryptanalysis technique, see black-bag cryptanalysis. For the fictional character, see Black Bag. For the disposable The CIA has used black-bag operations to steal cryptogbag used to contain garbage, see black bag (container). raphy and other secrets from foreign government offices outside the United States. The practice dates back at least Black bag operations (or black bag jobs) are covert or as far as 1916.[2] clandestine entries into structures to obtain information for human intelligence operations.[1] This usually entails breaking and entering into denied areas. Some of the tactics, techniques and procedures associated with black bag 3.3 Use by other governments operations are: lock picking, safe cracking, key impressions, fingerprinting, photography, electronic surveillance The British, Israeli, Russian, and other intelligence agen(including audio and video surveillance), mail manipula- cies are known to use black-bag operations to steal setion (flaps and seals), forgery, and a host of other related crets. When the technique is used to obtain codes it may skills. The term “black bag” refers to the little black bag be called Black-bag cryptanalysis. in which burglars carry their tools.[2] “The CIA remains responsible for conducting these highly classified operations overseas, while the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) performs the exact same function inside the U.S. 3.4 See also and its territories.”[2] • Black operation • COINTELPRO

3.1 Use by the FBI

3.5 References

In black bag operations, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents illegally entered offices of targeted individuals and organizations, and photographed information found in their records. This practice was used by the FBI from 1942 until 1967. In July 1966, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover ordered the practice discontinued.[3] The use of “black bag jobs” by the FBI was declared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court on 19 June 1972 in the Plamondon case, United States v. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. 297. The FBI still carries out numerous “black bag” entry-and-search missions, in which the search is covert and the target of the investigation is not informed that the search took place. If the investigation involves a criminal matter a judicial warrant is required; in national security cases the operation must be approved by a secret body called the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.[4]

[1] “Tallinn government surveillance cameras reveal black bag operation”. Intelnews. 16 December 2008. Retrieved 3 December 2012. [2] “The CIA Code Thief Who Came in from the Cold”. matthewald.com. Retrieved 3 December 2012. [3] Federal Bureau of Investigation - Freedom of Information Privacy Act [4] Rood, Justin (15 June 2007). “FBI to Boost ‘Black Bag’ Search Ops”. ABC News. Retrieved 3 December 2012.

• Peter Wright. Spy Catcher: The Candid Autobiography of a Senior Intelligence Officer. Penguin USA, 1987. ISBN 0-670-82055-5. 4

3.6. EXTERNAL LINKS

3.6 External links • Warrantless Surreptitious Entries: FBI “Black Bag” Break-ins And Microphone Installations • 11 Terms Used by Spies at HowStuffWorks — article explaining espionage terminology

5

Chapter 4

Black operation “Black op” and “Black ops” redirect here. For other meanings, see Black Ops (disambiguation).

1970s. CIA Director General Michael Hayden explained why he released the documents, saying that they provided a “glimpse of a very different time and a very different agency”.[9]

A black operation or black op is a covert operation by a government, a government agency, or a military organization. This can include activities by private companies or groups. Key features of a black operation are that it is clandestine, .. overtones, and it is not attributable to the organization carrying it out.[1] The main difference between a black operation and one that is merely clandestine is that a black operation involves a significant degree of deception, to conceal who is behind it or to make it appear that some other entity is responsible ("false flag" operations).[2][3]

• In May 2007 ABC News, and later the Daily Telegraph, reported that United States president George W. Bush had authorized the CIA to undertake “black operations” in Iran in order to promote regime change as well as to sabotage Iran’s nuclear program.[10][11] ABC News was subsequently criticized for reporting the secret operation, with 2008 presidential candidate Mitt Romney saying he was “shocked to see the ABC News report regarding covert action in Iran,” but ABC said the CIA and the Bush Administration knew of their plans to publish the information and raised no objections.[12]

A single such activity may be called a “black bag operation";[1] that term is primarily used for covert or clandestine surreptitious entries into structures to obtain information for human intelligence operations.[4] Such operations are known to have been carried out by the FBI,[5] the Central Intelligence Agency,[6] Mossad, MI6, MSS, Research and Analysis Wing and the intelligence services of other nations.[4]

4.3 References [1] Smith, Jr., W. Thomas (2003). Encyclopedia of the Central Intelligence Agency. New York, NY: Facts on File, Inc. p. 31. ISBN 0-8160-4666-2.

4.1 Etymology

[2] Popular Electronics, Volume 6, Issue 2–6. Ziff-Davis Publishing Co., Inc. 1974, p. 267. “There are three classifications into which the intelligence community officially divides clandestine broadcast stations. A black operation is one in which there is a major element of deception.”

“Black” may be used as a generic term for any government activity that is hidden or secret. For example, some activities by military and intel agencies are funded by a classified "black budget,” of which the details, and sometimes even the total, are hidden from the public and from most congressional oversight.[7][8]

[3] Djang, Chu, From Loss to Renewal: A Tale of Life Experience at Ninety, Authors Choice Press, Lincoln, Nebraska, p. 54. "(A black operation was) an operation in which the sources of propaganda were disguised or mispresented in one way or another so as not to be attributed to the people who really engineered it.”

4.2 Reported examples of black operations

[4] “Tallinn government surveillance cameras reveal black bag operation”. Intelnews. December 16, 2008. Retrieved 3 December 2012.

• In 2007 the Central Intelligence Agency declassified secret records detailing illegal domestic surveillance, assassination plots, kidnapping, and infiltration and penetration of other “black” operations undertaken by the CIA from the 1950s to the early

[5] Rood, Justin (June 15, 2007). “FBI to Boost ‘Black Bag’ Search Ops”. ABC News. Retrieved 3 December 2012. [6] “The CIA Code Thief Who Came in from the Cold”. matthewald.com. Retrieved 3 December 2012.

6

4.4. EXTERNAL LINKS

[7] “Dirty Secrets Of The “Black Budget"". Business Week. February 27, 2006. Retrieved June 12, 2012. [8] Shachtman, Noah (February 1, 2010). “Pentagon’s Black Budget Tops $56 Billion”. Wired. Retrieved June 12, 2012. [9] Tisdall, Simon (June 22, 2007). “CIA to release cold war 'black files’". The Guardian. Retrieved June 7, 2012. [10] Ross, Brian; Esposito, Richard (May 22, 2007). “Bush Authorizes New Covert Action Against Iran”. ABC News. Retrieved June 7, 2012. [11] Shipman, Tim (May 27, 2007). “Bush sanctions 'black ops’ against Iran”. The Telegraph. Retrieved June 7, 2012. [12] Montopoli, Brian (May 23, 2007). “ABC News Comes Under Fire For Iran Report”. CBS News. Retrieved January 26, 2014.

4.4 External links

7

Chapter 5

Clandestine cell system “Sleeper cell” redirects here. For other uses, see Sleeper going back to Irish revolutionary forces in the early 20th cell (disambiguation). century, but has little external control. Its doctrine and organization have changed over time, given factors such as the independence of 26 of Ireland’s 32 counties, the conA clandestine cell structure is a method for organizing a group of people in such a way that it can more effectively tinued British control of Northern Ireland and the simple passage of time and changes in contemporary thinking resist penetration by an opposing organization. Depend[1] ing on the group’s philosophy, its operational area, the and technology. communications technologies available, and the nature of the mission, it can range from a strict hierarchy to an extremely distributed organization. It is also a method used by criminal organizations, undercover operatives, and unconventional warfare (UW) led by special forces. Historically, clandestine organizations have avoided electronic communications, because signals intelligence is a strength of conventional militaries and counterintelligence organizations.

Officially, the PIRA is hierarchical, but, especially as British security forces became more effective, changed to a semiautonomous model for its operational and certain of its support cells (e.g., transportation, intelligence, cover and security).[2] Its leadership sees itself as guiding and consensus-building. The lowest-level cells, typically of 2-5 people, tend to be built by people with an existing personal relationship. British counterinsurgents could fairly easily understand the command structure, but In the context of tradecraft, covert and clandestine are not the workings of the operational cells. not synonymous. As noted in the definition (which has The IRA has an extensive network of inactive or sleeper been used by the United States and NATO since World cells, so new ad hoc organizations may appear for any War II) in a covert operation the identity of the sponsor is specific operation. concealed, while in a clandestine operation the operation itself is concealed. Put differently, clandestine means “hidden”, while covert means “deniable”. The adversary is aware that a covert activity is happening, but does not 5.1.2 World War II French Resistance know who is doing it, and certainly not their sponsorship. Clandestine activities, however, if successful, are In World War II, Operation Jedburgh teams parachuted completely unknown to the adversary, and their function, into occupied France to lead unconventional warfare such as espionage, would be neutralized if there was any units.[3][4] They would be composed of two officers, one awareness of the activity. Saying a "covert cell structure” American or British, and the other French, the latter is tantamount to tautology, because the point of the cell preferably from the area into which they landed. The structure is that its details are completely hidden from the third member of the team was a radio operator. opposition. Especially through the French member, they would conA sleeper cell refers to a cell, or isolated grouping of tact trusted individuals in the area of operation, and ask sleeper agents that lies dormant until it receives orders them to recruit a team of trusted subordinates (i.e., a subor decides to act. cell). If the team mission were sabotage, reconnaissance, or espionage, there was no need to meet in large units. If the team was to carry out direct action, often an unwise mission unless an appreciable number of the locals 5.1 History had military experience, it would be necessary to assemble into units for combat. Even then, the hideouts of the 5.1.1 Provisional Irish Republican Army leadership were known only to subcell leaders. The legitimacy of the Jedburgh team came from its known afAs opposed to the French Resistance, the modern filiation with Allied powers, and it was a structure more Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) has a history appropriate for UW than for truly clandestine operations. 8

5.3. EXTERNAL SUPPORT

5.1.3

9

National Front for the Liberation of 5.3 South Vietnam

Also known as the Viet Cong, this organization grew from earlier anticolonial groups fighting the French, as well as anti-Japanese guerillas during World War II.[5] Its command, control, and communication techniques derived from the experiences of these earlier insurgent groups. The group had extensive support from North Vietnam, and, indirectly, from the Soviet Union. It had parallel political and military structures, often overlapping. See Viet Cong and PAVN strategy and tactics.

External support

Many cell systems still receive, with due attention to security, support from the outside. This can range from leaders, trainers and supplies (such as the Jedburgh assistance to the French Resistance), or a safe haven for overt activities (such as the NLF spokesmen in Hanoi). External support need not be overt. Certain Shi'a groups in Iraq, for example, do receive assistance from Iran, but this is not a public position of the government of Iran, and may even be limited to factions of that government. Early US support to the Afghan Northern Alliance against the Taliban used clandestine operators from both the CIA and United States Army Special Forces. As the latter conflict escalated, the US participation became overt. Note that both unconventional warfare (UW) (guerrilla operations) and foreign internal defense (FID) (counterinsurgency) may be covert and use cellular organization. In a covert FID mission, only selected host nation (HN) leaders are aware of the foreign support organization. Under Operation White Star, US personnel gave covert FID assistance to the Royal Lao Army starting in 1959, became overt in 1961, and ceased operations in 1962.

A dual, but sometimes overlapping, Party and Military structure was top-down

5.4 Models of insurgency and associated cell characteristics

The lowest level consisted of three-person cells who operated quite closely, and engaging in the sort of self- While different kinds of insurgency differ in where they criticism common, as a bonding method, to Communist place clandestine or covert cells, when certain types of inorganizations. surgency grow in power, the cell system is deemphasized. Cells still may be used for leadership security, but, if overt violence by organized units becomes significant, cells are less important. In Mao’s three-stage doctrine,[7] cells are 5.2 Parallel organizations still useful in Phase II to give cover to part-time guerillas, but, as the insurgency creates full-time military units in The NLF and PIRA, as well as other movements, have Phase III, the main units are the focus, not the cells. The chosen to have parallel political and military organiza- Eighth Route Army did not run on a cell model. tions. In the case of the NLF, other than some individuals When considering where cells exist with respect to the with sanctuary in North Vietnam, the political organizaexisting government, the type of insurgency needs to be tion could not be overt during the Vietnam War. After considered. One US Army reference was Field Manual the war ended, surviving NLF officials held high office. 100-20, which has been superseded by FM3-07.[8] DrawIn the case of the PIRA, its political wing, Sinn Féin, be- ing on this work, Nyberg (a United States Marine Corps came increasingly overt, and then a full participant in pol- officer) extended the ideas to describe four types of cell itics. Hamas and Hezbollah also have variants of overt system, although his descriptions also encompass types of political/social service and covert military wings. insurgencies that the cell system supports.[9] At present, The overt political/social–covert military split avoided the there is a new type associated with transnational terrorist inflexibility of a completely secret organization. Once an insurgencies. active insurgency began, the secrecy could limit freedom of action, distort information about goals and ideals, and restrict communication within the insurgency.[6] In a split organization, the public issues can be addressed overtly, while military actions were kept covert and intelligence functions stay clandestine.

1. Traditional: the slowest to form, this reflects a principally indigenous insurgency, initially with limited goals. It is more secure than others, as it tends to grow from people with social, cultural or family ties. The insurgents resent a government that has failed to

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CHAPTER 5. CLANDESTINE CELL SYSTEM recognize tribal, racial, religious or linguistic groups “who perceive that the government has denied their rights and interests and work to establish or restore them. They seldom seek to overthrow the government or control the whole society; however, they frequently attempt to withdraw from government control through autonomy or semiautonomy.” The Mujahideen in Afghanistan and the Kurdish revolt in Iraq illustrate the traditional pattern of insurgency. al-Qaeda generally operates in this mode, but if they become strong enough in a given area, they may change to the mass-oriented form.

revolution[11] and is referred to as the foco (or Cuban model) insurgency. This model involves a single, armed cell which emerges in the midst of degenerating government legitimacy and becomes the nucleus around which mass popular support rallies. The insurgents use this support to establish control and erect new institutions.” 4. Mass-oriented: where the subversive and covertcell systems work from within the government, the mass-oriented builds a government completely outside the existing one, with the intention of replacing it. Such “insurgents patiently construct a base of passive and active political supporters, while simultaneously building a large armed element of guerrilla and regular forces. They plan a protracted campaign of increasing violence to destroy the government and its institutions from the outside. They have a well-developed ideology and carefully determine their objectives. They are highly organized and effectively use propaganda and guerrilla action to mobilize forces for a direct political and military challenge to the government.” The revolution that produced the Peoples’ Republic of China, the American Revolution, and the Shining Path insurgency in Peru are examples of the mass-oriented model. Once established, this type of insurgency is extremely difficult to defeat because of its great depth of organization.

2. Subversive: Usually driven by an organization that contains at least some of the governing elite, some being sympathizers already in place, and others who penetrate the government. When they use violence, it has a specific purpose, such as coercing voters, intimidating officials, and disrupting and discrediting the government. Typically, there is a political arm (such as Sinn Féin or the National Liberation Front) that directs the military in planning carefully coordinated violence. “Employment of violence is designed to show the system to be incompetent and to provoke the government to an excessively violent response which further undermines its legitimacy.” The Nazi rise to power, in the 1930s, is another example of subversion. Nazi members of parliament and street fighters were hardly clandestine, but the overall plan of the Nazi leadership to gain control of the nation was hidden. “A subversive insurgency is suited to a more permissive political environment 5.5 Classic models for cell system which allows the insurgents to use both legal and iloperations legal methods to accomplish their goals. Effective government resistance may convert this to a criticalDifferent kinds of cell organizations have been used for cell model. different purposes. This section focuses on clandestine 3. Critical-cell: Critical cell is useful when the po- cells, as would be used for espionage, sabotage, or the litical climate becomes less permissive than one organization for unconventional warfare. When unconthat allowed shadow cells. While other cell types ventional warfare starts using overt units, the cell systry to form intelligence cells within the govern- tem tends to be used only for sensitive leadership and ment, this type sets up "shadow government" cells intelligence roles.[7] The examples here will use CIA that can seize power once the system is destroyed cryptonyms as a naming convention used to identify both by external means and the internal subversion. members of the cell system. Cryptonyms begin with a This model fits the classic coup d'etat,[10] and of- two-letter country or subject name (e.g., AL), followed ten tries to minimize violence. Variants include with an arbitrary word. It is considered elegant to have the the Sandinista takeover of an existing government code merge with the other letters to form a pronounceable weakened by external popular revolution. “Insur- word. gents also seek to infiltrate the government’s institutions, but their object is to destroy the system from within.” Clandestine cells form inside the govern- 5.5.1 Operations under official cover ment. “The use of violence remains covert until the government is so weakened that the insurgency’s Station BERRY operates, for country B, in target counsuperior organization seizes power, supported by try BE. It has three case officers and several support ofthe armed force. One variation of this pattern is ficers. Espionage operation run by case officers under when the insurgent leadership permits the popu- diplomatic cover, they would have to with the basic relar revolution to destroy the existing government, cruiting methods described in this article. Case officer then emerges to direct the formation of a new gov- BETTY runs the local agents BEN and BEATLE. Case ernment. Another variation is seen in the Cuban officer BESSIE runs BENSON and BEAGLE.

5.5. CLASSIC MODELS FOR CELL SYSTEM OPERATIONS

Representative diplomatic-cover station and networks

Some recruits, due to the sensitivity of their position or their personalities not being appropriate for cell leadership, might not enter cells but be run as singletons, perhaps by other than the recruiting case officer. Asset BARD is a different sort of highly sensitive singleton, who is a joint asset of the country B, and the country identified by prefix AR. ARNOLD is a case officer from the country AR embassy, who knows only the case officer BERTRAM and the security officer BEST. ARNOLD does not know the station chief of BERRY or any of its other personnel. Other than BELL and BEST, the Station personnel only know BERTRAM as someone authorized to be in the Station, and who is known for his piano playing at embassy parties. He is covered as Cultural Attache, in a country that has very few pianos. Only the personnel involved with BARD know that ARNOLD is other than another friendly diplomat. In contrast, BESSIE and BETTY know one another, and procedures exist for their taking over each other’s assets in the event one of the two is disabled. Some recruits, however, would be qualified to recruit their own subcell, as BEATLE has done. BESSIE knows the identity of BEATLE-1 and BEATLE-2, since he had them checked by headquarters counterintelligence before they were recruited. Note that a cryptonym does not imply anything about its designee, such as gender.

5.5.2

Clandestine presence

The diagram of “initial team presence” shows that two teams, ALAN and ALICE, have successfully entered an area of operation, the country coded AL, but are only aware of a pool of potential recruits, and have not yet actually recruited anyone. They communicate with one another only through headquarters, so compromise of one team will not affect the other.

11

Initial team presence by 2 separate clandestine teams with no official cover

team, ALBERT, recruits ALLOVER. When ALPINE recruited two subcell members, they would be referred to as ALPINE-1 and ALPINE-2. ALPINE and ALTITUDE only know how to reach ALISTAIR, but they are aware of at least some of other team members’ identity should ALISTAIR be unavailable, and they would accept a message from ALBERT. Most often, the identity (and location) of the radio operator may not be shared. ALPINE and ALTITUDE, however, do not know one another. They do not know any of the members of team ALICE. The legitimacy of the subcell structure came from the recruitment process, originally by the case officer and then by the cell leaders. Sometimes, the cell leader would propose subcell member names to the case officer, so the case officer could have a headquarters name check run before bringing the individual into the subcell. In principle, however, the subcell members would know ALPINE, and sometimes the other members of the ALPINE cell if they needed to work together; if ALPINE-1 and ALPINE-2 had independent assignments, they might not know each other. ALPINE-1 and ALPINE-2 certainly would not know ALISTAIR or anyone in the ALTITUDE or ALLOVER cells. As the networks grow, a subcell leader might create his own cell, so ALPINE-2 might become the leader of the ALIMONY cell.

5.5.3 Fault-tolerant cellular structures

Modern communications theory has introduced methods to increase fault tolerance in cell organizations. In the past, if cell members only knew the cell leader, and the leader was neutralized, the cell was cut off from the rest of the organization. Game theory and graph theory have Assume that in team ALAN, ALISTAIR is one of the of- been applied to the study of optimal covert network deficers with local contacts, might recruit two cell leaders, sign (see Lindelauf, R.H.A. et al. 2009. The influence ALPINE and ALTITUDE. The other local officer in the of secrecy on the communication structure of covert net-

12

CHAPTER 5. CLANDESTINE CELL SYSTEM model). Trust and personal relationships are an essential part of the Al-Qaida network (a limiting factor, even while it provides enhanced security). Even while cell members are trained as ‘replaceable’ units, ‘vetting’ of members occurs during the invited training period under the observation of the core group.[13]

Clandestine teams have built initial subcells

works. Social Networks 31: 126-137). If a traditional cell had independent communications with the foreign support organization, headquarters might be able to arrange its reconnection. Another method is to have impersonal communications “side links” between cells, such as a pair of dead drops, one for Team ALAN to leave “lost contact” messages to be retrieved by Team ALICE, and another dead drop for Team ALICE to leave messages for Team ALAN. These links, to be used only on losing contact, do not guarantee a contact. When a team finds a message in its emergency drop, it might do no more than send an alert message to headquarters. Headquarters might determine, through SIGINT or other sources, that the enemy had captured the leadership and the entire team, and order the other team not to attempt contact. If headquarters can have reasonable confidence that there is a communications failure or partial compromise, it might send a new contact to the survivors.

Cells of this structure are built outwards, from an internal leadership core. Superficially, this might be likened to a Western cell structure that emanates from a headquarters, but the Western centrality is bureaucratic, while structures in other non-western cultures builds on close personal relationships, often built over years, perhaps involving family or other in-group linkages. Such in-groups are thus extremely hard to infiltrate; infiltration has a serious chance only outside the in-group. Still, it may be possible for an in-group to be compromised through COMINT or, in rare cases, by compromising a member. The core group is logically a ring, but is superimposed on an inner hub-and-spoke structure of ideological authority. Each member of the core forms another hub and spoke system (see infrastructure cells), the spokes leading to infrastructure cells under the supervision of the core group member, and possibly to operational groups which the headquarters support. Note that in this organization, there is a point at which the operational cell becomes autonomous of the core. Members surviving the operation may rejoin at various points.

When the cut-off team has electronic communications, such as the Internet, it has a much better chance of eluding surveillance and getting emergency instructions than by using a dead drop that can be under physical surveillance. Core group, with contact ring and ideological hierarchy

5.6 Non-traditional models, exemplified by al-Qaeda Due to cultural differences, assuming the al-Qaeda Training Manual[12] is authentic, eastern cell structures may differ from the Western mode. “Al-Qaida’s minimal core group, only accounting for the leadership, can also be viewed topologically as a ring or chain network, with each leader/node heading their own particular hierarchy. “Such networks function by having their sub-networks provide information and other forms of support (the ‘many-to-one’ model), while the core group supplies ‘truth’ and decisions/directions (the ‘one-to-many’

Osama, in this model, has the main responsibility of commanding the organization and being the spokesman on propaganda video and audio messages distributed by the propaganda cell. The other members of the core each command one or more infrastructure cells. While the tight coupling enhances security, it can limit flexibility and the ability to scale the organization. This in-group, while sharing tight cultural and ideological values, is not committed to a bureaucratic process. “Members of the core group are under what could be termed 'positive control'—long relationships and similar mindsets make 'control' not so much of an issue, but there are distinct roles, and position (structural, financial, spiritual) determines authority, thus making the core group a

5.6. NON-TRADITIONAL MODELS, EXEMPLIFIED BY AL-QAEDA hierarchy topologically.[13] In the first example of the core, each member knows how to reach two other members, and also knows the member(s) he considers his ideological superior. Solid lines show basic communication, dotted red arrows show the first level of ideological respect, and dotted blue arrows show a second level of ideological respect.

13

trusted to some extent, but they may not know the contents of their messages or the actual identity of sender and/or receiver. The couriers, depending on the balance among type and size of message, security, and technology available, may memorize messages, carry audio or video recordings, or hand-carry computer media.

If Osama, the most respected, died, the core would reconstitute itself. While different members have an individual ideological guide, and these are not the same for all members, the core would reconstitute itself with Richard as most respected. Assume there are no losses, and Osama can be reached directly only by members of the core group. Members of outer cells and support systems might know him only as “the Commander”, or, as in the actual case of al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden’s face is recognizable worldwide, but only a few people know where he was or even how to contact him. Core group and infrastructure cells; military cells in training

“These cells are socially embedded (less so than the core group, however), structurally embedded, functionAny clandestine or covert service, especially a non- ally embedded (they are specialized into a domain), and national one, needs a variety of technical and adminis- knowledge base-specific (there does not seem to be a great deal of cross-training, or lateral mobility in the orgatrative functions. Some of these services include:[13] nization). Such cells are probably subjected to a mixture of positive and negative control (“do this, do these sorts 1. Forged documents and counterfeit currency of things, don’t do that”).”[13] 2. Apartments and hiding places The leaders of military cells are responsible for training

5.6.1

Infrastructure cells

3. Communication means 4. Transportation means 5. Information 6. Arms and ammunition 7. Transport

them, and, when an operation is scheduled, selecting the operational commander, giving him the basic objective and arranging whatever support is needed, and then release him from tight control to execute the meeting. Depending on the specific case, the military leaders might have direct, possibly one-way, communications with their cells, or they might have to give Kim the messages to be transmitted, by means that Anton and Hassan have no need to know.

Other functions include psychological operations, train- Note that Anton does not have a direct connection to ing, and finance. Kim. Under normal circumstances, he sacrifices efficiency for security, by passing communications requests [14] A national intelligence service has a support organization to deal with services such as finance, logistics, fa- through Hassan. The security structure also means that cilities (e.g., safehouses), information technology, com- Hassan does not know the members of Anton’s cells, and munications, training, weapons and explosives, medical Kim may know only ways to communicate with them but services, etc. Transportation alone is a huge function, in- not their identity. Kim operates two systems of cells, one for secure communications and one for propaganda. To send out a propaganda message, Osama must pass it to Kim. If Kim were compromised, the core group might have significant Some of these functions, such as finance, are far harder to problems with any sort of outside communications. operate in remote areas, such as the FATA of Pakistan, Terrorist networks do not match cleanly to other cell systhan in cities with large numbers of official and unofficial tems that regularly report to a headquarters. The apparent financial institutions, and the communications to support al-Qaeda methodology of letting operational cells decide them. If the financial office is distant from the remote on their final dates and means of attack exhibit an operheadquarters, there is a need for couriers, who must be ational pattern, but not a periodicity that could easily be cluding the need to buy tickets without drawing suspicion, and, where appropriate, using private vehicles. Finance includes the need to transfer money without coming under the suspicion of financial security organizations.

14

CHAPTER 5. CLANDESTINE CELL SYSTEM

used for an indications checklist appropriate for a warning center. Such lists depend on seeing a local pattern to give a specific warning.[15] Note that Hassan has two subordinates that have not yet established operational cells. These subordinates can be considered sleepers, but not necessarily with a sleeper cell.

5.6.2

Operational cells

For each mission are created one or more operational cells. If the al-Qaeda signature of multiple concurrent attacks is used, there may be an operational cell for each target location. It will depend on the operation if they will need any support cells in the operational area. For example, it may be more secure to have a local cell build bombs, which will be delivered by cells coming from outside the area. “Operational cells are not created, but instead 'seeded' utilizing individuals spotted or that request assistance (both groups are 'vetted' by being trained under the observation of the core group, which dramatically restricts the opportunity for passing off walk-ins under false flag). Categorization of operational cells appears to be by capabilities, region, and then task/operation. Operational cells are composed of members whose worldview has been firmly tested—necessary to front-load, because such cells are dispersed back to their own local control (or negative control—proscribed behavior—with positive control only coming in the form of contact for synchronization or support).”[13] If operational cells routinely are “released” curved dotted lines on link to military cells to select their final operational parameters, they use a different paradigm than governmental clandestine or covert operations. On a number of cases, US special operations forces had to wait for Presidential authorization to make an attack, or even move to staging areas. Admittedly, a country would have to face the consequences of an inappropriate attack, so it may tend to be overcautious, where a terror network would merely shrug at the world being upset. Assuming that the al-Qaeda operational technique is not to use positive control, their operations may be more random, but also more unpredictable for counterterror forces. If their cells truly need constant control, there are communications links that might be detected by SIGINT, and if their command can be disrupted, the field units could not function. Since there is fairly little downside for terrorists to attack out of synchronization with other activities, the lack of positive control becomes a strength of their approach to cell organization. The operational cells need to have continuous internal communication; there is a commander, who may be in touch with infrastructure cells or, less likely from a security standpoint with the core group.

Core group, with contact ring and ideological hierarchy

Al-Qaeda’s approach, which even differs from that of earlier terrorist organizations, may be very viable for their goals: • Cells are redundant and distributed, making them difficult to ‘roll up’ • Cells are coordinated, not under “command & control”—this autonomy and local control makes them flexible, and enhances security • Trust and comcon internally to the cell provide redundancy of potential command (a failure of Palestinian operations in the past), and well as a shared knowledgebase (which may mean, over time, that ‘cross training’ emerges inside a cell, providing redundancy of most critical skills and knowledge).[13]

5.6.3 Indirect support networks In the above graphic, note the indirect support network controlled by Richard’s subcell. “While Al-Qaida has elements of the organization designed to support the structure, but such elements are insufficient in meeting the needs of such an organization, and for security reasons there would be redundant and secondary-/tertiary-networks that are unaware of their connection to Al-Qaida. These networks, primarily related to fundraising and financial activities, as well as technology providers, are in a ‘use’ relationship with AlQaida—managed through cut-outs or individuals that do not inform them of the nature of activities, and that may have a cover pretext sufficient to deflect questions or inquiry.”[13]

5.6.4 A possible countermeasure In 2002, U.S. News & World Report said that American intelligence is beginning to acquire a sufficiently critical mass of intelligence on al-Qaida indicating, “Once thought nearly impossible to penetrate, al Qaeda is proving no tougher a target than the KGB or the Mafia--closed

5.9. EXTERNAL LINKS societies that took the U.S. government years to get inside. “We're getting names, the different camps they trained at, the hierarchy, the infighting,” says an intelligence official. “It’s very promising.”[16] The report also said that the collected data has allowed the recruiting of informants. Writing in the U.S. Army journal Military Review, David W. Pendall suggested that a “catch-and-release program for suspected operatives might create reluctance or distrust in such suspects and prevent them from further acts or, perhaps more important, create distrust in the cell leaders of these individuals in the future.” The author noted the press release describing Ramzi Binalshib’s cooperation with the United States “are sure to prevent reentry into a terrorist cell as a trusted member and most likely limits the further trust and assignments of close cell associates still at large. The captor would determine when to name names and when to remain silent.”[17] Indeed, once intelligence learns the name and characteristics of an atlarge adversary, as well as some sensitive information that would plausibly be known to him, a news release could be issued to talk about his cooperation. Such a method could not be used too often, but, used carefully, could disturb the critical trust networks. The greatest uncertainty might be associated with throwing doubt onto a key member of an operational cell that has gone autonomous.

5.7 See also • Leaderless resistance • Lone wolf (terrorism)

5.8 References [1] Leahy, Kevin C. (2005). “The Impact of Technology on the Command, Control, and Organizational Structure of Insurgent Groups” (PDF). Retrieved 2007-12-04. [2] Irish Republican Army. “The Green Book”. Archived from the original on 2007-06-16. Retrieved 2007-12-04. [3] Hall, Roger (1964). You're Stepping on my Cloak and Dagger. Bantam Books. [4] Hogan, David W. (1992). “Chapter 3: Special Operations in the European Theater”. U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II. Washington, D.C.: United States Army Center of Military History. CMH Pub 70-42. [5] Pike, Douglas (1970). Viet Cong: Organization and Technique of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. MIT Press. [6] US Department of the Army (December 2006). “FM 324: Counterinsurgency” (PDF). [7] Mao, Zedong (1967). On Protracted War. Foreign Language Press, Beijing.

15

[8] US Department of the Army (20 February 2003). “FM 307 (formerly FM 100-20): Stability Operations and Support Operations”. [9] Nyberg, Eric N. (1991). “Insurgency: The Unsolved Mystery”. US Marine Corps University Command and Staff College. [10] Luttwak, Edward (1968). Coup d'etat: A Practical Handbook. Harvard University Press. [11] Guevara, Ernesto “Che” (1961). On Guerilla Warfare. Praeger. [12] “al-Qaeda training manual” (PDF). US Southern District Court, US New York City Attorney’s Office, entered as evidence in Africa embassy bombings. [13] Decision Support Systems, Inc. (2001-12-31). “Hunting the Sleepers: Tracking al-Qaida’s Covert Operatives” (PDF). Retrieved 2007-11-17. [14] US Central Intelligence Agency. “Support to Mission: Who We Are”. Retrieved 2007-11-19. [15] Fellman, Philip Vos; Wright, Roxana. “Modeling Terrorist Networks - Complex Systems at the Mid-Range” (PDF). Retrieved 2007-11-02. [16] Kaplan, David E. (22 September 2002). “Run and Gun: Al Qaeda arrests and intelligence hauls bring new energy to the war on terrorism”. U.S. News & World Report. [17] Pendall, David W. (January–February 2004). “EffectsBased Operations and the Exercise of National Power”. Military Review (United States Army Combined Arms Center). Find the article by going through the Military Review directories

5.9 External links • An Introduction To Terrorist Organisational Structures

Chapter 6

Clandestine HUMINT This article is a subset article under Human Intelligence. For a complete hierarchical list of articles, see the intelligence cycle management hierarchy. Concepts here also are intimately associated with counterintelligence. This article deals with the what of clandestine HUMINT, and is a prerequisite for the how in the Clandestine HUMINT operational techniques article.

HUMINT is in a constant battle with counterintelligence, and the relationship can become very blurry, as one side tries to “turn” agents of the other into reporting to the other side. Recruiters can run false flag operations, where a citizen of country A believes they are providing intelligence to country B, when they are actually providing it to country C.

Unlike other forms of intelligence collection disciplines, espionage usually involves accessing the place where the desired information is stored, or accessing the people who know the information and will divulge it through some kind of subterfuge. There are exceptions to physical meetings, such as the Oslo Report, or the insistence Clandestine HUMINT (HUMan INTelligence) is intel- of Robert Hanssen in never meeting the people to whom ligence collected from human sources using clandestine he was selling information. espionage methods. These sources consist of people working in a variety of roles within the intelligence com- This article does not cover military units that penetrate munity. Examples include the classic spy (known by deep between enemy lines, but generally in uniform, professionals as an asset or agent), who collects intel- to conduct special reconnaissance. Such military units ligence, couriers and related personnel, who handle an can be on the border of the line, in international law, intelligence organization’s (ideally) secure communica- which defines them as spies, if they conduct informations, and support personnel, such as access agents, who tion in civilian clothes. In some circumstances, the unimay arrange the contact between the potential spy and formed personnel may act in support to the actual agents, the case officer who recruits them. The recruiter and su- providing communications, transportation, financial, and pervising agent may not necessarily be the same individ- other support. Yet another discipline is covert operations, ual. Large espionage networks may be composed of mul- where personnel, uniformed or not, may conduct raids, tiple levels of spies, support personnel, and supervisors. sabotage, assassinations, propaganda (i.e., psychological Espionage networks are typically organized as a cell sys- operations), etc. tem, in which each clandestine operator knows the people in his own cell, perhaps the external case officer, and an emergency method (which may not necessarily involve 6.1 Legal aspects another person) to contact higher levels if the case officer or cell leader is captured, but has no knowledge of people Black’s Law Dictionary (1990) defines espionage as: in other cells. "...gathering, transmitting, or losing...information related Espionage involves a human being obtaining (i.e., us- to the national defense.” ing human intelligence (HUMINT) methods) informa- In the UK, “Under the 1911 Act, a person commits the tion that is considered secret or confidential without the offence of 'spying' if he, for any purpose prejudicial to the permission of the holder of the information. Espionage safety or interests of the State; is inherently clandestine, and the legitimate holder of the information may change plans or take other countermea(a) approaches, inspects, passes over or is in sures once it is known that the information is in unauthothe neighbourhood of, or enters any prohibited rized hands. See the articles such Clandestine HUMINT place, operational techniques and Clandestine HUMINT asset (b) makes any sketch, plan, model, or note recruiting for discussions of the “tradecraft” used to collect this information. which is calculated to be or might be or is in16

6.3. PENETRATIONS OF FOREIGN TARGETS BY PEOPLE LOYAL TO THEIR OWN COUNTRY

17

tended to be directly or indirectly useful to an enemy; or

6.3 Penetrations of foreign targets by people loyal to their own country

(c) obtains, collects, records, or publishes, or communicates to any other person any secret official code word, or pass word, or any sketch, plan, model, article, or note, or other document which is calculated to be or might be or is intended to be directly or indirectly useful to an enemy. [Note: “an enemy” apparently means a potential enemy, so could theoretically include all foreign governments]

Not all clandestine human sources change their loyalties to the country to which they were born, or owed their first allegiance. In this section we are talking of the classical and actually rare “spy”, who really is a loyal citizen of country A but obtains information from country B, either through informal means (e.g., fake news reporting) or actually going to work for country B.

“The offence of spying covers all such acts committed by any person within Her Majesty’s dominions, and such acts committed elsewhere by British Officers or subjects. It is not necessary for the person concerned to have been warned beforehand that they were subject to the Official Secrets Act. The 1920 Act creates further offences of doing any “act preparatory” to spying, or of soliciting, inciting, seeking to persuade, or aiding and abetting any other person to commit spying.[1]

A special case is of the Country B loyalist who controls agents or provides other supporting or managerial functions against Country A.

6.3.1 Clandestine Reporting Richard Sorge was a Soviet citizen (i.e., country A), who posed as a German (country C) journalist in Tokyo, to report on Japan (country B) back to the Soviet Union. Sorge was eventually caught and executed by the Japanese, who generally honored his bravery. Especially in wartime, while a country may need to execute an agent, they sometimes respect them.

It is a truism that a live captured spy has more potential value than a dead one, since a live one can still be interrogated, or perhaps turned into a double agent. There have been cases where countries have announced the execution The US defines espionage towards itself as “The act of ob- of people who are actually alive. taining, delivering, transmitting, communicating, or receiving information about the national defense with an intent, or reason to believe, that the information may be 6.3.2 Dangled Mole used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation. Espionage is a violation of 18 Dangled moles start out being loyal to one country B, but United States Code 792-798 and Article 106, Uniform go to work for another service A, reporting back to their Code of Military Justice.[2] " original service. Such operations can become “infinities of mirrors”[3] as the mole may be detected and the service by which they are employed tries to double them, which may or may not work. One of the best-known, and apparently most successful, 6.2 Major HUMINT organizations was the early Soviet recruitment of Kim Philby (i.e., service B), who was then dangled to the British Secret Intelligence Service (i.e., service A), for whom Philby went to See List of intelligence agencies for a more complete list work and rose to high rank. Philby is discussed further Espionage is usually part of an institutional effort (i.e., below. governmental or corporate espionage), and the term is As far as is known from public sources, the only mole, most readily associated with state spying on potential already loyal to a foreign service, who went to work for or actual enemies, primarily for military purposes, but the CIA (i.e., in the service A role) was Karl Koecher, this has been extended to spying involving corporations, who actually was loyal to the Czechoslovakian intelliknown specifically as industrial espionage. Many nations gence service (service B1), while Czechoslovakia was a routinely spy on both their enemies and allies, although Soviet (i.e., service B) satellite state. Koecher became a they maintain a policy of not making comment on this. In CIA translator and a good source of information to the addition to utilizing agencies within a government many Czechs and Soviets. While, as far as is known in pubalso employ private companies to collect information on lic sources, still loyal to his original agency, Koecher was their behalf such as SCG International Risk and others. ordered to report to Moscow by Oleg Kalugin, longtime

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CHAPTER 6. CLANDESTINE HUMINT

legal resident of the USSR in the US. Kalugin accused Koecher of being a US double agent. Koecher retired from the CIA and went to work in academia, but was subsequently reactivated by the KGB and went to work, part-time, for the CIA. During this period, he was discovered by the FBI, who attempted to double him against the KGB, but the FBI considered him unreliable and eventually arrested him. The arrest was legally tainted, and Koecher was eventually exchanged for Soviet prisoners, both sides apparently not wanting the affair to be in a public court. The US used Katrina Leung as a dangled mole to the PRC, although the true loyalty of Leung, who came to the US on a Taiwanese passport, is not known with certainty. She may have had a long-term allegiance to the PRC, been loyal to the US and then been turned by the PRC, or primarily been loyal to herself.

6.4 Human sources who changed allegiance With the exception of penetration moles, other human sources start out as highly trusted by their services. What causes an individual to betray service A, typically his country of birth? The most common shorthand for changing allegiance is MICE, an acronym for: • Money: Low salary? Greedy? Needs money for family crisis? In debt? • Ideology: Hates his system, admires ours? • Compromise (or coercion): Vulnerable to blackmail? Emotional relationship with an access agent? • Ego (or excitement): Lonely? Looking for a friend? Passed over for a promotion? Not appreciated by peers and superiors? Seeking praise and recognition? Adventurous? Looking for personal challenge? Wants to be James Bond? Egomaniac? Wants to prove he can get away with it?

It “examines espionage by interviewing and psychologically assessing actual espionage subjects. Additionally, persons knowledgeable of subjects are contacted to better understand the subjects’ private lives and how they are perceived by others while conducting espionage .[4] According to a press report about Project Slammer and Congressional oversight of counterespionage, one fairly basic function is observing one’s own personnel for behavior that either suggests that they could be targets for foreign HUMINT, or may already have been subverted. News reports indicate that in hindsight, red flags were flying but not noticed. [5] In several major penetrations of US services, such as Aldrich Ames, the Walker ring or Robert Hanssen, the individual showed patterns of spending inconsistent with their salary. Some people with changed spending may have a perfectly good reason, such as an inheritance or even winning the lottery, but such patterns should not be ignored. By 1997, the Project Slammer work was being presented at public meetings of the Security Policy Advisory Board.[6] While a funding cut caused the loss of impetus in the mid-nineties, there are research data used throughout the security community. They emphasize the “essential and multi-faceted motivational patterns underlying espionage. Future Slammer analyses will focus on newly developing issues in espionage such as the role of money, the new dimensions of loyalty and what seems to be a developing trend toward economic espionage.” According to a 2008 Defense Department study, financial incentives and external coercion have played diminishing roles in motivating Americans to spy against the United States, but divided loyalties are increasingly evident in recent espionage cases. The study said, “Two thirds of American spies since 1990 have volunteered. Since 1990, spying has not paid well: 80% of spies received no payment for espionage, and since 2000 it appears no one was paid. ... Offenders since 1990 are more likely to be naturalized citizens, and to have foreign attachments, connections, and ties, and therefore they are more likely to be motivated to spy from divided loyalties.” Despite this trend, the report says that the majority (65%) of American spies are still native born.[7][8]

Sometimes more than one factor applies, as with Robert 6.4.1 Recruitment through Money Hanssen, an FBI counterintelligence agent who was a “write-in” to the KGB. While he received large amounts Ames seems to have been motivated primarily by money. of money, he apparently felt unappreciated in his own service and spying on it satisfied his ego. Psychological factors can apply to people changing allegiance for reasons other than coercion or ideology. To go beyond slogans, Project Slammer was an effort of the Intelligence Community Staff, under the Director of Central Intelligence, to come up with characteristics of Project Slammer, an Intelligence Community sponsored study of espionage.

6.4.2 Recruitment through Ideology Among the most important moles, a senior officer already in place when he started reporting, for ideological reasons, to service B (actually two B’s, SIS and CIA), was Col. Oleg Penkovsky [9]

6.5. RECRUIT TYPES

6.4.3

Recruitment through Compromise

19 Leaves and goes to B

Recruitment can be done through personal relationships, Philip Agee is an example of a US CIA officer who came from casual sex and blackmail to friendship or romance to the belief that he was working on behalf of an ideology he had come to hate. Eventually, he resigned, and clandestinely went to Cuba, telling their intelligence service 6.4.4 Recruitment through Ego everything he knew, with the stated goal [11] of damaging the CIA. Agee claims the CIA was satisfied with his work Personnel in sensitive positions, who have difficulty getand did not want him to leave, although the author, John ting along with peers, may become risks for being comBarrow, claims that he was close to being discharged for promised with an approach based on ego. William improper personal conduct .[12] Kampiles, a low-level worker in the CIA Watch Center, sold, for a small sum, the critical operations man- Soviet, and now Russian, doctrine has some interesting ual on the KH-11 reconnaissance satellite. To an inter- insights that might well be useful to the West. For examviewer, Kampiles suggested that if someone had noted ple, rather than use the term “defector”, which has a neghis “problem”—constant conflicts with supervisors and ative connotation, they use the Russian word dobrozhelaco-workers—and brought in outside counseling, he might tel, “well-wisher,” as used here virtually the equivalent of “walk-in.” This term has a positive connotation, and may not have stolen the KH-11 manual.[5] reflect how the service views such people, as described by Ivan Serov, [13] former chief of GRU (Soviet military intelligence) 6.5 Recruit Types While the term “well-wisher” may be positive, in Serov’s view, he does not assume a well-wisher has value to offer. 6.5.1 Mole The majority actually turn out to be offering material of Other than the dangled moles described above, moles no significant value. The first task is to determine if they start out as loyal to their own country A. They may or are random sympathizers who fail to understand the subject they propose to discuss, or are active provocations may not be a trained intelligence officer. being run by foreign counterintelligence. Note that some intelligence professionals reserve the term mole to refer to enemy personnel that personally know Provocateurs obtain some value if they can simply idenimportant things about enemy intelligence operations, tify the intelligence officers in an embassy, so the initial technology, or military plans. A person such as a clerk interviews are, unless there is a strong reason to the conor courier (e.g., Jack Dunlap, who photographed many trary, conducted by low-level staff. Serov points out that documents but was not really in a position to explore en- even if some walk-ins have no material of value, “Some emy thinking), is more generically an asset. To be clear, are ideologically close to us and genuinely and unselfishly anxious to help us; some are in sympathy with the Soviet all moles are assets, but not all assets are moles. Union but want at the same time to supplement their inAnother special case is a “deep cover” or “sleeper” mole, come; and some, though not in accord with our ideas and who may enter a service, possibly at a young age, but def- views, are still ready to collaborate honestly with us for initely not reporting or doing anything that would attract financial reasons.” A genuine sympathizer without usesuspicion, until reaching a senior position. Kim Philby is ful material still may become useful as an access agent, an example of an agent actively recruited by the British courier, or support agent. Secret Intelligence Service while he was already committed to Communism. Philby, at first, concentrated on do- Other walk-ins simply are trying to get money, either for ing a good job for the British, so he could rise in trust and nonsense information or for real information with which authority .[10] Philby was motivated by ideology before he they have been entrusted. Physical walk-ins are not the only kind of volunteer “well-wisher,” who may commujoined SIS. nicate through the mail, by telephone, or direct contact. If, for example, contact is made with someone who really is an intelligence officer, there is immediate reason Defector to believe the person does have intelligence contacts— An individual may want to leave their service at once, but further investigation is necessary to see if they are perhaps from high-level disgust, or low-level risk of hav- real or if they are provocateurs from counterintelligence. ing been discovered in financial irregularities and is just A provocateur can be from the local agency, or even from ahead of arrest. Even so, the defector certainly brings a third country false-flag provocation. knowledge with him, and may be able to bring documents “Persons wanting to make money usually produce a large or other materials of value. quantity of documents and talk much and willingly about Starts in A

themselves, trying to make a favorable impression. Extortioners and blackmailers usually act impudent, making

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CHAPTER 6. CLANDESTINE HUMINT

their offer in the form of an ultimatum and even resorting found dead under mysterious circumstances, had believed to open threats.” they had been recruited by Wilson, “under the pretense that he was still a CIA executive.” According to Epstein, “Wilson maintained a close association with two of the Defector in place agency’s top executives-Thomas G. Clines, the director of training for the clandestine services, and Theodore G. Another method is to directly recruit an intelligence of- Shackley, who held the No. 2 position in the espionage ficer (or terrorist member) from within the ranks of the branch. Both of these men sat in on meetings that Wiladversary service (terrorist group) and having that officer son held with his operatives and weapon suppliers and, by (terrorist) maintain their normal duties while spying on doing so, helped further the illusion that his activities had their parent service (organization); this is also referred to the sanction of the CIA— an illusion crucial to keeping as recruiting an “agent” or defector in place.[14] his false flag attractive.”[15] Wilson was involved in thenbanned arms sales to Libya, and it is unclear who actually Starts in A sponsored these sales. Stays working in A but reporting to B He was in Libya in 1982, but came to the Dominican Republic in 1982, where he was arrested for illegal arms As mentioned, Oleg Penkovsky was a key US-British sales, and sentenced, in 1984, to 52 years in prison. He agent, apparently detected through Soviet counterintel- was 55 years old at the time. ligence work. Adolf Tolkachev, an electronic engineer Continuing Freedom of Information Act and other reworking on Soviet radar, was another defector in place for search by his attorney caused a federal judge to throw the US, who was exposed by the CIA defector, Edward out the conviction,[16] on the basis that prosecutors “deLee Howard, who fled to the KGB before being arrested. liberately deceived the court”, in the words of the judge, Penkovsky and Tolkachev, both motivated by ideology, “America will not defeat Libyan terrorism by doublewere executed by the Soviets. crossing a part-time, informal government agent.” To give a sense of the “infinity of mirrors” involved in agent work, Howard was exposed by an apparent Soviet walk-in defector, Vitaly Yurchenko, who walked into 6.5.2 Double Agent the US Embassy in Rome and defected to the United States. While Yurchenko also identified Ronald Pel- The first thing to consider about a double agent is that he ton as a Soviet defector-in-place working in the NSA, is, at least minimally, a trained intelligence asset. He may Yurchenko himself re-defected back to the USSR within not be a full case officer of the other side, but he may, at a few months. It is possible that Yurchenko was acting as least, have been an agent of theirs. They had some reaa double agent, sent by the Soviets to sacrifice less impor- son to trust him. Like all other intelligence operations, tant Soviet assets in order to protect the more important double agent cases are run to protect and enhance the national security. They serve this purpose principally by CIA defectors in place, e.g. Aldrich Ames. providing current counterintelligence about hostile intelligence and security services and about clandestine subFalse Flag Penetrator versive activities. The service and officer considering a double agent possibility must weigh net national advanA special case of a mole is a false flag recruitment of a tage thoughtfully, never forgetting that a double agent is, penetrator: in effect, a condoned channel of communication with the enemy .[17] Starts in C Before even considering double agent operations, a serBelieves being recruited by A vice has to consider its own resources. Managing that agent will take skill and sophistication, both at the loActually is recruited by B and sends false inforcal/case officer and central levels. Complexity goes up mation to C astronomically when the service cannot put physical conFalse flag recruitments, admittedly for covert action trols on its doubles, as did the Double Cross System in rather than pure HUMINT, were reported [15] as a tech- WWII. In the Double Cross System, the double agents nique used by Edwin P. Wilson, who left CIA in 1971, were motivated by coercion: they knew they would be exand then went to work for a Navy HUMINT unit, Task ecuted if they did not cooperate. Few of them were highly Force 157 until 1976, when he went private.[16] During trained intelligence officers, but opportunists to start. his time working for CIA, he was both officially and unofficially involved in arms sales. “His assignments sometimes required him to establish and use “front” companies to gain access to information and to support CIA operations here and abroad commercially.”[16] Three men,

For predictive purposes the most important clue imbedded in the origins of an operation is the agent’s original or primary affiliation, whether it was formed voluntarily or not, the length of its duration, and its intensity. The effects of years of clandestine association with the adver-

6.5. RECRUIT TYPES sary are deep and subtle; the Service B case officer working with a double agent of service A is characterized by an ethnicity or religion may find those bonds run deep, even if the agent hates the government of A. The service B officer may care deeply for the double. Another result of lengthy prior clandestine service is that the agent may be hard to control in most operations the case officer’s superior training and experience give him so decided an edge over the agent that recognition of this superiority makes the agent more tractable. But add to the fact that the experienced double agent may have been in the business longer than his U.S. control his further advantage in having gained a first-hand comparative knowledge of the workings of at least two disparate services, and it is obvious that the case officer’s margin of superiority diminishes, vanishes, or even is reversed. One facet of the efforts to control a double agent operation is to ensure that the double agent is protected from discovery by the parent intelligence service; this is especially true in circumstances where the double agent is a defector-in-place. Double agent operations must be carefully planned, executed, and above all, reported. One of the problems with double agent operations in the US, run by the FBI, is that the FBI culture has been very decentralized to the field office level. This is, perhaps, an overreaction to the extremely centralized culture under J. Edgar Hoover. Prior to 9/11, information in one field office, which might reveal problems in a HUMINT operation, is not necessarily shared with other offices. FBI Director Robert Mueller cited the changes since 9/11: “We then centralized coordination of our counterterrorism program. Unlike before, when investigations were managed primarily by individual field offices, the Counterterrorism Division at Headquarters now has the authority and the responsibility to direct and coordinate counterterrorism investigations throughout the country. This fundamental change has improved our ability to coordinate our operations here and abroad, and it has clearly established accountability at Headquarters for the development and success of our Counterterrorism Program.” [18] “The amount of detail and administrative backstopping seems unbearable at times in such matters. But since penetrations are always in short supply, and defectors can tell less and less of what we need to know as time goes on, because of their cut-off dates, double agents will continue to be part of the scene .[19] " Services functioning abroad-and particularly those operating in areas where the police powers are in neutral or hostile hands—need professional subtlety as well. The agent handlers must have full knowledge of [the agent’s] past (and especially of any prior intelligence associations), a solid grasp of his behavior pattern (both as an individual and as a member of a national grouping), and rapport in the relationship with him.[17] Case officers must know the agent’s area and have a nuanced under-

21 standing of his language; this is an extremely unwise situation for using interpreters, since the case officer needs to sense the emotional content of the agent’s communication and match it with the details of the information flowing in both directions. Depending on whether the operation is being run in one’s own country, an allied country, or hostile territory, the case officer needs to know the relevant laws. Even in friendly territory, the case officer needs both liaison with, and knowledge of, the routine law enforcement and security units in the area, so the operation is not blown because an ordinary policeman gets suspicious and brings the agent in for questioning. If at all possible, the service running the double agent have complete control of communications, which, in practice, need to be by electronic means or dead drop. Meetings between the double and his Service A handler are extremely risky. Even text communication can have patterns of grammar or word choice, known to the agent and his original service, that can hide a warning of capture, by the use of a seemingly ordinary word. Some controlling services may paraphrase the double’s text to hide such warnings, but run into the possibility of being detected by sophisticated analysis of the double’s normal choice of words. Basic Double agent Starts in A Recruited by B Defects and tells B all he knows (defector) operates in place (Agent doubled in place) and continues to tell B about A Redoubled Agent A service discovering an adversary agent, who entered one’s own service either as a penetrator or an asset in place may offer him employment as a double. His agreement, obtained under open or implied duress, is unlikely, however, to be accompanied by a genuine switch of loyalties. The so-called redoubled agent whose duplicity in doubling for another service has been detected by his original sponsor and who has been persuaded to reverse his affections again -also belongs to this dubious class. Many detected and doubled agents degenerate into what are sometimes called “piston agents” or “mailmen,” who change their attitudes with their visas as they shunt from side to side.[17] Operations based on them are little more than unauthorized liaison with the enemy, and usually time-wasting exercises in futility. A notable exception is the detected and unwillingly doubled agent who is relieved to be found out in his enforced service to the adversary.[17]

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CHAPTER 6. CLANDESTINE HUMINT

False flag double agent Starts in A Assigned to C B creates a situation where agent believes he is talking to C, when actually receiving B disinformation

(A may also send disinformation directly through Y, since B should assume A doesn't know line of communication Y is compromised) Passive provocateur Passive provocations are variants involving false-flag recruiting.

Active provocateur There can be active and passive provocation agents. A double agent may serve as a means through which a provocation can be mounted against a person, an organization, an intelligence or security service, or any affiliated group to induce action to its own disadvantage. The provocation might be aimed at identifying members of the other service, at diverting it to less important objectives, at tying up or wasting its assets and facilities, at sowing dissension within its ranks, at inserting false data into its files to mislead it, at building up in it a tainted file for a specific purpose, at forcing it to surface an activity it wanted to keep hidden, or at bringing public discredit on it, making it look like an organization of idiots. The Soviets and some of the Satellite services, the Poles in particular, are extremely adept in the art of conspiratorial provocation. All kinds of mechanisms have been used to mount provocation operations; the double agent is only one of them.[17] An active provocateur is sent by Service A to Service B to tell B that he works’ for A but wants to switch sides. Or he may be a talk-in rather than a walk-in. In any event, the significant information that he is withholding, in compliance with A’s orders, is the fact that his offer is being made at A’s instigation. He is also very likely to conceal one channel of communication with A-for example, a second secret writing system. Such “side-commo” enables A to keep in full touch while sending through the divulged communications channel only messages meant for adversary eyes. The provocateur may also conceal his true sponsor, claiming for example (and truthfully) to represent an A1 service (allied with A) whereas his actual control is the A-a fact which the Soviets conceal from the Satellite as carefully as from us.[17] Starts in A and is actually loyal to A Goes to B, says he works for A, but wants to switch sides. Gives B access to his communications channel with A (channel Y) Keeps second communications channel, X with A, about which B knows nothing Reports operational techniques of B to A via X Provides disinformation from A, via X, which he disseminates to B

In Country C, Service A surveys the intelligence terrain through the eyes of Service B (a species of mirrorreading) and selects those citizens whose access to sources and other qualifications make them most attractive to B. Service A officers, posing as service B officers, recruit the citizens of country C. At some point, service A then exposes these individuals, and complains to country C that country B is subverting its citizens. The stake-out has a far better chance of success in areas like Africa, where intelligence exploitation of local resources is far less intensive, than in Europe, where persons with valuable access are likely to have been approached repeatedly by recruiting services during the postwar years.[17] A does an analysis of C and determines what targets would be attractive to B A then recruits citizens of C, which A believes will be more loyal to B The A recruit, a citizen of C, volunteers to B A can then expose B’s penetration of C, hurting B-C relations. This may be extremely difficult to accomplish, and even if accomplished the real difficulty is maintaining control of this “turned asset”. Controlling an enemy agent who has been turned is a many-faceted and complex exercise that essentially boils down to making certain that the agent’s new-found loyalty remains consistent, which means determining whether the “doubled” agent’s turning is genuine or false. However, this process can be quite convoluted and fraught with uncertainty and suspicion.[14] Where it concerns terrorist groups, a terrorist who betrays his organization can be thought of and run as a doubleagent against the terrorist’s “parent” organization in much the same fashion as an intelligence officer from a foreign intelligence service. Therefore, for sake of ease, wherever double-agents are discussed the methodologies generally apply to activities conducted against terrorist groups as well.[14] Fake double agent Peddlers, fabricators, and others who work for themselves rather than a service are not double agents because they

6.5. RECRUIT TYPES

23

are not agents. Almost certainly motivated by money, it the large landings came at Normandy, deception operais unlikely they can maintain the deception for very long. tions continued, convincing the Germans that Operation They may be uncovered by a headquarters check, as they Neptune at Normandy was a feint, so that they held back their strategic reserves. By the time it became apparmay well have tried the same game elsewhere. ent that Normandy was indeed the main invasions, the strategic reserves had been under heavy air attack, and the lodgment was sufficiently strong that the reduced reUnwitting double agent serves could not push it back. “Witting” is a term of intelligence art that indicates that There are other benefits to analyzing the exchange of inone is not only aware of a fact or piece of information, but formation between the double agent and his original seralso aware of its connection to intelligence activities. An vice, such as learning the priorities of service A through unwitting double agent thinks that he is still working for the information requests they are sending to an individhis own Service A, but Service B has somehow managed ual they believe is working for them. If the requests all what, in communications security, is called a man-in-theturn out to be for information that service A could not use middle attack. Service A believes it is in contact with its against B, and this becomes a pattern, service A may have own agent, and the agent believes he is communicating realized their agent has been turned. with his true control. This is extremely difficult to conSince maintaining control over double agents is tricky at tinue for more than a very brief period of time. best, it is not hard to see how problematic this methodolCreating an unwitting double agent is extremely rare. The ogy can become. The potential for multiple turnings of manipulative skill required to deceive an agent into thinkagents and perhaps worse, the turning of one’s own ining that he is serving his team when in fact he is damaging telligence officers (especially those working within counits interests is plainly of the highest order. terintelligence itself), poses a serious risk to any intelligence service wishing to employ these techniques. This may be the reason that triple-agent operations appear not 6.5.3 Multiply Turned Agent to have been undertaken by U.S. counterintelligence in A triple agent can be a double agent that decides his true some espionage cases that have come to light in recent loyalty is to his original service, or could always have been years, particularly among those involving high-level penloyal to his service but is part of an active provocation of etrations. Although the arrest and prosecution of Aldrich your service. If managing a double agent is hard, agents Ames of the CIA and Robert Hanssen of the FBI, both of that turned again (i.e., tripled) or another time after that whom were senior counterintelligence officers in their reare far more difficult, but in some rare cases, worthwhile. spective agencies who volunteered to spy for the Russians, hardly qualifies as conclusive evidence that triple-agent Any service B controlling, or believing it controls, a dou- operations were not attempted throughout the commuble agent, must constantly evaluate the information that nity writ large, these two cases suggest that neutralization agent is providing on service A. While service A may operations may be the preferred method of handling adhave been willing to sacrifice meaningful information, or versary double agent operations vice the more aggressive even other human assets, to help an intended penetration exploitation of these potential triple-agent sources.[14] agent establish his bona fides, at some point, service A may start providing useless or misleading information as part of the goal of service A. In the WWII Double Cross Triple agent System ,[20] another way the British controllers (i.e., serStarts out working for B vice B in this example) kept the Nazis believing in their agent, was that the British let true information flow, but Volunteers to be a defector-in-place for A too late for the Germans to act on it. The double agent Discovered by B might send information indicating that a lucrative target was in range of a German submarine, but, by the time the Offers his communications with A to B, so B information reaches the Germans, they confirm the report may gain operational data about A and send was true because the ship is now docked in a safe port disinformation to A that would have been a logical destination on the course reported by the agent .[21] While the Double Cross Sys- A concern with triple agents, of course, is if they have tem actively handled the double agent, the information changed loyalties twice, why not a third or even more sent to the Germans was part of the overall Operation times? Consider a variant where the agent remains funBodyguard deception program of the London Control- damentally loyal to B: ling Section. Bodyguard was meant to convince the Germans that the Allies planned their main invasion at one of several places, none of which were Normandy. As long Quadruple agent as the Germans found those deceptions credible, which Starts out working for B they did, they reinforced the other locations. Even when

24

CHAPTER 6. CLANDESTINE HUMINT Volunteers to be a defector-in-place for A. Works out a signal by which he can inform A that B has discovered and is controlling him

6.6 Support Services 6.6.1 Couriers

Discovered by B Offers his communications with A to B. B actually gets disinformation about A’s operational techniques A learns what B wants to know, such as potential vulnerabilities of A, which A will then correct

A courier has no responsibilities other than clandestine communications. Any involvement of the courier in activities that may draw attention from counterintelligence is unwise. For example, if there is a political party, friendship society, or other organization that would be considered favorable to Service B, couriers, under no circumstances, should be identified with them.

Courier work is among those things that consist of hours of boredom punctuated with moments of sheer terror. Keeping a courier, who is not a member of your service Successes such as the British Double Cross System or the and/or has diplomatic cover, is challenging. German Operation North Pole show that these types of Occasionally, it may be practical to transfer a courier operations are indeed feasible. Therefore, despite the ob- to other, more challenging duties. Once that transfer is viously very risky and extremely complex nature of dou- made, however, the individual should never be reassigned ble agent operations, the potentially quite lucrative intel- to courier duty, as the probability of that person having ligence windfall – the disruption or deception of an ad- become known to counterintelligence is much higher. versary service – makes them an inseparable component There may be occasions where diplomats, or even memof exploitation operations .[14] bers of diplomats’ families who have diplomatic immuIf a double agent wants to come home to Service A, how nity, may serve as couriers. Their value in the diplomatic can he offer a better way to redeem himself than recruit- service must be weighed against the near certainty that if ing the Service B case officer that was running his double discovered, they will be expelled as persona non grata. agent case, essentially redoubling the direction of the opDrivers, especially those trained to receive car tosses, are eration? If the case officer refuses, that is apt to be the a variant of couriers, and to which the same constraints end of the operation. If the attempt fails, of course, the apply. Using persons with diplomatic immunity may be whole operation has to be terminated. A creative agent slightly more sensible in the case of drivers, since their can tell his case office, even if he had not been tripled, that cars are usually immune to search. On the other hand, he had been loyal all along, and the case officer would, at a diplomatic car will have distinctive license plates and best, be revealed as a fool. may be under surveillance whenever it leaves diplomatic “Occasionally a service runs a double agent whom it premises. Counterintelligence services may take the risk, knows to be under the control of the other service and given the potential reward, of putting electronic tracking therefore has little ability to manipulate or even one who devices on diplomatic vehicles. it knows has been successfully redoubled. The question why a service sometimes does this is a valid one. One reason for us is humanitarian: when the other service has 6.6.2 Safehouses and Other Meeting gained physical control of the agent by apprehending him Places in a denied area, we often continue the operation even though we know that he has been doubled back because Safehouses may not be literal stand-alone houses. Indeed, we want to keep him alive if we can. in an urban area, the anonymity of an apartment house or “Another reason might be a desire to determine how the office building may give greater security. other service conducts its double agent operations or what it uses for operational build-up or deception material and In more rural areas, houses may indeed be needed. This from what level it is disseminated. There might be other is especially the case if the country team needs storage of advantages, such as deceiving the opposition as to the ser- bulky supplies (e.g., weapons, sabotage materials, propavice’s own capabilities, skills, intentions, etc. Perhaps the ganda), printing presses, etc. service might want to continue running the known redou- In general, communications, as well as equipment clearly bled agent in order to conceal other operations. It might associated with clandestine operations, should be portable want to tie up the facilities of the opposition. It might and not fixed in a safehouse used for meetings. If this is use the redoubled agent as an adjunct in a provocation done, there is a chance that a counterintelligence search being run against the opposition elsewhere. Running a of the premises might not turn up anything incriminating. known redoubled agent is like playing poker against a pro- On the other hand, things that must be carried around fessional who has marked the cards but who presumably is may be discovered if a person or vehicle is searched. unaware that you can read the backs as well as he can.[17] The safehouse should have emergency communications

6.6. SUPPORT SERVICES so that it can be reached to call off a meeting or to warn of surveillance or an impending raid, preferably with a wrong-number dialogue or other deniable communications method.

25 Additional requirements for bank reporting were in the PATRIOT act, and intended to help catch terrorists preparing for operations. It is not clear, however, if terrorist operations will involve highly visible cash transactions. The 9/11 operations cells were reported to have required somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 in operating funds, and there were indeed wire transfers in the $100,000 range. Still, the question remains if a relatively small expenditure, compared with the enormous amounts in the illegal drug trade, will draw counterintelligence/counterterrorist attention.

It is a difficult call as to whether a safehouse should have destruction facilities. Modern forensic laboratories can reconstruct papers that are merely burned or shredded, although shredders are no longer exotic items, especially if the safehouse serves a mundane office function. More definitive destruction capabilities will confirm the clandestine use of the premises, but they may be a reasonable protection if the safehouse is being overrun and critical Wire transfers and bank deposits go through formal communications or other security material is in jeopardy. value transfer systems where there is reporting to government. Especially terrorist groups, however, have access to informal value transfer systems (IVTS), where there is no reporting, although FinCEN has been suggesting indi6.6.3 Finance rect means of detecting the operation of IVTS.[22] Industrialized nations, with complex financial systems, have a variety of reporting systems about money transfer, from which counterintelligence potentially can derive patterns of operations and warnings of operations in progress. Money laundering refers to methods for getting cash in and out of the financial system without it being noticed by financial counterintelligence.

For clandestine networks where the case officers are under non-official cover, handling large sums of cash is more difficult and may justify resorting to IVTS. When the cover is under a proprietary (owned by the intelligence agency) aviation company, it can be relatively simple to hide large bundles of cash, and make direct payments.

The need for money, and challenge of concealing its transfer, will vary with the purpose of the clandestine system. If it is operated by a case officer under diplomatic cover, and the money is for small payments to agent(s), the embassy can easily get cash, and the amounts paid may not draw suspicion. If, however, there will be large payments to an agent, getting the money still is not a problem for the embassy, but there starts to be a concern that the agent may draw attention to himself by extensive spending.

Formal Value Transfer Systems

The question remains if sudden wealth is likely to be detected. More extensive bank reporting, partially as a result of the US PATRIOT Act and other reporting requirements of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), the latter established before 9/11, may make receiving payments easier to catch.

detectives. There is a conflict of interest and lack of law enforcement training when bank employees are asked to monitor the legality of their customers’ acts. Stay aware of the status of court tests of legislation and regulation in this area, as well as new legislation. While it is possible to teach many investigative skills, every experienced

In the US, financial transactions begin with mutual identification between the customer and the financial institution. Although there are many Internet frauds involving fake financial institutions or criminals masquerading as a financial institution (i.e., phishing), the more difficult requirement is for the prospective customer to show acceptable identification to the bank. For basic relationships, a government-issued identification document, such as a US security systems, about which the most public infor- passport or driver’s license, usually suffices. For foreign nationals, their country’s equivalent may be accepted, almation is known, usually include a credit check as part of a security clearance, and excessive debt is a matter of though it may be harder to verify. concern. It may be the case that refusing to clear peo- Going beyond the basics becomes much more difficult. ple with known financial problems has stopped a poten- Were the relationship one that involved classified intial penetration, but, in reality, the problem may well be at formation, there would be an extensive personal histhe other side. Aldrich Ames, Robert Hanssen, and John tory questionnaire, fingerprint check, name search with Walker all spent more money than could be explained by law enforcement and intelligence, and, depending on the their salaries, but their conspicuous spending did not draw clearance level, additional investigations. attention; they were detected because variously through Credit bureaus and other financial information services investigations of leaks that threw suspicion on their ac- may be helpful, although the accuracy of some of these cess to information. Suspicion did fall on Jack Dunlap, is questionable. There are Federal requirements to check who had his security clearance revoked and committed names against lists of possible terrorists, financial crimsuicide. Perhaps Dunlap was more obvious as a low-level inals and money launderers, etc. In many respects, we courier and driver than the others, while the others were have a problem where financial institution employees, officers in more responsible positions. without law enforcement training, are being asked to be

26

CHAPTER 6. CLANDESTINE HUMINT

and successful investigator speaks of instinct, which takes Another means of transferring assets is through commeryears to develop. cial shipment of conventional goods, but with an artificially low invoice price, so the receiver can sell them and recover disbursed funds through profit on sales. Money Laundering and subverting formal value transfer systems Money laundering is more associated with domestic crime than with clandestine operations, and is less likely to be involved in clandestine operations. Nevertheless, a brief mention of its potential benefits are in order. The basic principle of money laundering is that someone is in a business that has large cash income, such as drug sales or gambling. The receiving organization needs to find a way that these get into usable bank accounts, so they can be accessed for large purchases. The most common way to do money laundering is to find a legal business that naturally receives much of its income in cash. These could include hair and beauty shops, small groceries, and, ironically, laundries and dry cleaners. The legal business, or more likely multiple businesses, receive the illegal cash as well as normal receipts, and draw amounts that do not attract suspicion. Periodically, the launderer may have the cash-receiving firm buy something for him, or, less commonly, to write a large check that goes into his legal account. Care is taken that the amounts in the legal accounts do not hit the limits that cause automatic reporting.

Informal value transfer systems [22]

Informal value transfer systems (IVTS) , however, exist in a number of cultures, and bypass regular financial channels and their monitoring systems (see financial intelligence). These are known by regional and cultural names including:

6.7 References [1] UK Security Service (MI5). “Espionage and the Law” (– SCHOLAR SEARCH ). [2] US Department of Defense (2007-07-12). “Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms” (PDF). Retrieved 2007-10-01. [3] Condon, Richard (1964). An infinity of mirrors. Random House. [4] Intelligence Community Staff (1990-04-12). “Project Slammer Interim Progress Report”. Slammer 1990. Retrieved 2007-11-04. [5] Stein, Jeff (1994-07-05). “The Mole’s Manual”. New York Times. Retrieved 2007-11-04. [6] Security Policy Advisory Board (1997-12-12). “Security Policy Advisory Board Meeting Minutes”. SPAB 1997. Retrieved 2007-11-04. [7] Herbig, Katherine L. (2008-03-01). “Changes in Espionage by Americans: 1947-2007” (PDF). Defense Personnel Security Research Center, with Counterintelligence Field Activity. Retrieved 2008-0407. [8] Shane, Scott (2008-04-20). “A Spy’s Motivation: For Love of Another Country”. The New York Times. Retrieved 2008-04-20. [9] Schecter, Jerrold L.; Deriabin, Peter S. (1992). The Spy Who Saved the World: How a Soviet Colonel Changed the Course of the Cold War. Scribner. ISBN 0-684-19068-0. Schecter 1992.

• hawala (Middle East, Afghanistan, Pakistan)

[10] Philby, Kim (1968). My Silent War. Macgibbon & Kee Ltd.

• hundi (India)

[11] Agee, Philip (1975). Inside the Company. Penguin Books. ISBN 0-14-004007-2. Agee 1975.

While details differ by culture and specific participants, [12] Barron, John (1983). KGB Today: The Hidden Hand. Readers Digest Assn. ISBN 0-88349-164-8. the systems work in a comparable manner. To transfer value, party 1 gives money (or other valuta) to IVTS agent [13] Serov, Ivan A.. “Work with Walk-Ins” (– SCHOLAR SEARCH 1-A. This agent calls, faxes, or otherwise communicates ). Studies in Intelligence. CIA-Serov. the amount and recipient of the funds to be transferred, to IVTS agent 2-A, who will deliver the funds to party [14] Gleghorn, Todd E. (September 2003). “Exposing the Seams: the Impetus for Reforming US Counterintelli2. All the systems work because they are valuable to the gence” (PDF). Naval Postgraduate School. Retrieved culture, and failure to carry out the agreement can invite 2007-11-02. savage retribution. Reconciliation can work in a number of ways. There [15] “Edwin Wilson: The CIA’s Great Gatsby”. Parade. September 18, 1993. Retrieved 2007-11-10. can be physical transfer of cash or valuables. There can be wire transfers in third and fourth countries, countries [16] Hughes, Lynn N. (October 27, 2003). “Opinion on Conwithout strong reporting requirements, which the IVTS viction [US District Court, Southern District of Texas]" (PDF). Hughes 2003. Retrieved 2007-11-10. agents can verify.

6.8. EXTERNAL LINKS

[17] Begoum, F.M. (18 September 1995). “Observations on the Double Agent” (– SCHOLAR SEARCH ). Studies in Intelligence. Retrieved 2007-11-03. [18] Mueller, Robert (2004-04-14). “Statement of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, FBI Before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States”. Retrieved 2007-11-10. [19] Matschulat, Austin B. (2 July 1996). “Coordination and Cooperation in Counerintelligence” (– SCHOLAR SEARCH ). Studies in Intelligence. Retrieved 200711-03. [20] Masterman, J. C. (1982). The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939–1945. Ballantine, 1982. ISBN 0-34529743-1. [21] Brown, Anthony Cave (1975). Bodyguard of Lies: The Extraordinary True Story Behind D-Day. HarperCollins. ISBN 0-06-010551-8. [22] United States Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (March 2003). “Informal Value Transfer Systems, FinCEN Advisory Issue 33” (PDF).

6.8 External links • Why the West can't infiltrate al-Qaida by Craig Whitlock of the Washington Post March 20, 2008

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Chapter 7

Clandestine HUMINT and covert action National governments deal in both intelligence and military special operations functions that either should be completely secret (i.e., clandestine: the existence of which is not known outside the relevant government circles), or simply cannot be linked to the sponsor (i.e., covert: it is known that sabotage is taking place, but its sponsor is unknown). It is a continuing and unsolved question for governments whether clandestine intelligence collection and covert action should be under the same agency. The arguments for doing so include having centralized functions for monitoring covert action and clandestine HUMINT and making sure they do not conflict, as well as avoiding duplication in common services such as cover identity support, counterespionage, and secret communications. The arguments against doing so suggest that the management of the two activities takes a quite different mindset and skills, in part because clandestine collection almost always is on a slower timeline than covert action.

7.1 Historical background During the Second World War, the United States Office of Strategic Services (OSS; the predecessor to the Central Intelligence Agency and to part of United States Army Special Forces) worked closely with the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), Special Operations Executive (SOE), and Political Warfare Executive (PWE). The latter two organizations were wartime, and their functions were merged back into SIS after the war. The U.S. has generally followed the British model of a single civilian agency with close cooperation with military intelligence and military special operations forces. Many countries follow this model, but there are often calls to reorganize it, splitting off various functions into independent agencies. Historically, since the British clandestine intelligence, in recognizable form, goes back to the First World War, and their Second World War covert operations organization preceded U.S. entry into the war, it makes sense to present them first. There has always been a close relationship between the U.K. and U.S. organizations.

7.1.1 United Kingdom prewar operations Prior to World War II, the British covert action function was in Section D of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). SIS also had the clandestine HUMINT responsibilities. Indeed, the United Kingdom had a recognizable HUMINT function, obvious less formal than the 20th century versions, going back to Sir Francis Walsingham in 1583.[1][2]

7.1.2 United States background The American system tends to require more legal formalism than the British, so it became necessary to define “covert action”. As a practical definition, covert action is something of which the target is aware, but either does not know, or cannot prove, who is influencing political, military, scientific, or economic factors in the target country. Plausible deniability is another way to say that the sponsor cannot be proven. Clandestine actions, in contrast, are actions of which the target remains unaware, such as espionage. .[3] In the years immediately preceding the Second World War, the U.S. had no standing clandestine HUMINT or covert action organizations. There were certainly examples of both, such as Marine Major Earl Ellis' series of visits, in the 1920s, to Japanese islands in the Pacific. Ellis, who died under mysterious circumstances while on duty, created the basic plan for U.S. “island hopping” operations in the Pacific Theater of the Second World War.[4] Used wisely, a covert action, also called “special activities” in the military budget, can deliver a stronger message than diplomacy, and cause full-scale war to be avoided. This was the original concept of George Kennan, which followed the Second World War and became the basic policy of the U.S. in 1947:

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[5]

“Political warfare is the logical application of Clausewitz’s doctrine in time of peace. In broadest definition, political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nation’s com-

7.2. SURGING ADDITIONAL CAPABILITY FOR THE SECOND WORLD WAR mand, short of war, to achieve its national objectives. Such operations are both overt and covert. They range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures ..., and “white” propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine support of “friendly” foreign elements, “black” psychological warfare and even encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states. “Understanding the concept of political warfare, we should also recognize that there are two major types of political warfare--one overt and the other covert. Both, from their basic nature, should be directed and coordinated by the Department of State. Overt operations are, of course, the traditional policy activities of any foreign office enjoying positive leadership, whether or not they are recognized as political warfare. Covert operations are traditional in many European chancelleries but are relatively unfamiliar to this Government. “Having assumed greater international responsibilities than ever before in our history and having been engaged by the full might of the Kremlin’s political warfare, we cannot afford to leave unmobilized our resources for covert political warfare. We cannot afford in the future, in perhaps more serious political crises, to scramble into impromptu covert operations... The principle of Kennan’s proposal was regarded favorably by all of the agencies discussing it, but none wanted control due to the potential embarrassment of having an operation compromised. As the junior agency, CIA lost the bureaucratic fight, and received, In 1948 National Security Council Directive 10/2 formed, from some interim organizations, the Office of Policy Coordination, responsible for covert operations. .[6] The Office of Special Operations had been autonomously doing clandestine intelligence gathering, and, in 1952, Director of Central Intelligence Walter Bedell Smith joined the two to form the euphemistically named Directorate of Plans. In the US more than in other countries, there is a continuing battle between military and intelligence organizations, with different oversight procedures, about who should control covert action. Far from being avoided as it was in 1948, organizations actively want authority over it. Both among intelligence and special operations organizations, there are a variety of views of whether covert and clandestine activities should be in the same organization. Those that argue for complete separation tend to be from the clandestine side, and distrustful of the ability of covert action organizations to maintain the appropriate level of secrecy. On the other hand, there have been cases where covert and clandestine organizations, unaware of one another, approach the same target in different ways, with

29

both failing due to interference. As an example, OSS attempted to steal or copy a codebook from the World War II Japanese embassy in Lisbon, Portugal. [7] Their actions were discovered, and the Japanese changed the code. Unfortunately, the clandestine communications intelligence organization had broken the code and were routinely reading traffic in it. The OSS action required them to start all over again in cryptanalyzing the new system. There is no consensus on whether it is, or is not, advisable to intermingle espionage and covert action organizations, even at the headquarters level. There is much more argument for doing so at headquarters, possibly not as one unit but with regular consultation. Certain services, such as name checks, communications, cover identities, and technical support may reasonably be combined, although the requirements of a particular field network should be held on a need-to-know basis. If the OSS operatives in Lisbon had asked permission for their proposed operation against the Japanese, their operation would not have been approved. They might have guessed the reason, but would not have known. On the other hand, if headquarters approval is necessary for every action, some fleeting opportunities may be missed. Further, if the communications used to contact headquarters are compromised, the enemy could learn about all upcoming operations.

7.2 Surging additional capability for the Second World War During World War II, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States all formed ad hoc organizations for unconventional warfare (UW), psychological operations and direct action (DA) functions. Other countries, such as occupied France, formed related units under their governments in exile. There was close cooperation between the US and UK special operations, counterintelligence, and deception organizations. Cooperation was less tight between the more sensitive clandestine intelligence gatherers.

Rough US-UK wartime equivalents

None of these new organizations continued to function, in the same form, after World War II ended. Many of their personnel, techniques, and operations continued, but in reorganized form during official peace, and very real Cold War.

30

7.2.1

CHAPTER 7. CLANDESTINE HUMINT AND COVERT ACTION

United Kingdom World War II Op- ity; to prevent duplication, wasted effort, crossing of operational wires, friction, and consequent insecurity; and erations

to tailor the size of the covert action staff to the greatly The Ministry of Economic Warfare was a wartime op- reduced scale of peacetime needs. The peacetime condieration responsible for UW/DA, economic warfare, and tion also added a new factor which greatly increased the [9] psychological operations. It contained the Special Oper- importance of consolidation. ations Executive (SOE) and Political Warfare Executive. Before World War II, paramilitary and covert action caWhile Section D of SIS became the nucleus of SOE, in pabilities were the responsibility of the variously named World War II, the British separated the unconventional Organs of State Security. warfare from SIS, putting it into SOE .[8] It has been the conventional wisdom that this is the basic British doctrine, but, as with so many things in the clandestine and 7.2.2 United States World War II operacovert worlds, it is not that straightforward .[9] tions Prior to World War II, the US had no standing paramilitary or espionage services. Missions were taken on a caseby-case basis, such as Major Earl Hancock Ellis' survey of potential Japanese bases in Micronesia .[4] During World War II, the US Office of Strategic Services contained both a secret intelligence (SI) (i.e., clandestine intelligence) and several covert operations branches, including operational groups (OG), maritime units, morale [psychological] operations and special operations (SO). World War II wartime & permanent UK

7.2.3 USSR World War II Operations

SOE conducted competent training in parachuting, sabotage, irregular warfare, etc. It could check language and marksmanship skills, as well as examining clothing and personal effects for anything that could reveal British manufacture, SOE trained agents in the distinguishing uniforms, insignia, and decorations of the Germans, “But it could not teach them the organization, modus operandi, and psychology of the German intelligence and security services; and it did not call upon the MI-5 and MI-6 experts who did know the subject...”[9] those services also were reluctant to provide SOE with access to their own sensitive sources. While isolating SOE from the clandestine services provided some mutual passive security, it also failed to provide proactive counterintelligence.

After Operation Barbarossa, Soviet Partisans arose spontaneously, from cut-off regular troops, and from ordinary citizens. Such a spontaneous uprising against an invader is accepted in international law, under the Third Geneva Convention.

“The consequences of this shortcoming are evident in the German counterintelligence coups in France, Belgium, and Holland...While the Security Service maintained an extensive name index, the Registry (partially destroyed by German bombing, but otherwise irreplaceable), SOE apparently did not maintain a counterintelligence index against which prospective field recruits could be checked. SOE received help from the British police, but not the security experts.

Nazi Germany had multiple and poorly coordinated organizations, not surprisingly given Adolf Hitler's tendency to duplicate functions and cause bureaucratic conflict, so he was the only person with the full picture. It was common to have a military, a Party, and a state organization with the same function, which was true, to a lesser extent, in the Soviet Union.

“At the end of the war the Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff agreed to return the responsibility for covert operations to the jurisdiction of the Secret Intelligence Service. There were three reasons for the change: to ensure that secret intelligence and special operations were the responsibility of a single organization under a single author-

A Central Command of the Partisan Movement formed, and various behind-the-lines groups were formed by the “Organs of State Security” and the Red Army. SMERSH was primarily under NKVD control but acted as military counterintelligence.

7.2.4 German World War II Operations

Military intelligence/counterintelligence, the Abwehr, ran some clandestine intelligence, but so did the Ausland (foreign) Sicherheitsdienst (SD), the intelligence service of the party organization, the Schutzstaffel (SS). The Venlo Incident was run by the Gestapo, an internal State organization. The direct action Brandenburgers started out as an Abwehr organization, but eventually reported to OKH, the Army high command.

7.3. SEPARATE FUNCTIONS DURING PEACETIME?

7.3 Separate functions peacetime?

during

There is an enormous difference in DA/UW during an overt war and in peacetime. “The covert operations conducted during the war did not have to be unattributable. On the contrary; saboteurs, for example, in order to avoid precipitating reprisals on the local population, would leave behind evidence which tended to indicate that [external] agents were responsible. Security and secrecy were important, but only tactically important.” It was important that the [enemy] should not know the identities and homes of the resistance workers, but it never mattered at all that the [enemy] should know that operations were directed from outside occupied territory (i.e., the operations were covert, not clandestine). Publicizing the external support, in fact, helped the underground in its recruiting.

7.3.1

UK postwar change

“In time of peace ... governments cannot acknowledge the fact that they are undertaking clandestine operations, there has been déveloped a whole new, delicate technique, the technique of nonattributability. A successful nonattributable operation is a long, tedious, touchy, and complicated affair which, the British recognized, not only requires background intelligence but, more importantly, cannot be undertaken except by experienced case officers.

31 could call on SAS, outside contractors, or other UK military personnel. UK Military Special Forces It was at this stage that the relationship with the SAS, seconded and retired, as well as a number of 'private' specialist companies became ever more important and by 1987 a Special Forces Directorate was formed to coordinate the activities of the SAS and SBS and ensure closer collaboration with the SIS.[1] United Kingdom Special Forces (UKSF) was formed in 1987 to draw together the Army’s Special Air Service (SAS) and the Special Boat Squadron Royal Marines (SBS), which was renamed the Special Boat Service at the same time, into a unified command, based around the former Director SAS who was given the additional title of Director Special Forces. The Directorate has been expanded by the creation of the Joint Special Forces Aviation Wing, the Special Reconnaissance Regiment and the Special Forces Support Group. Current SIS paramilitary capabilities

Britain certainly uses military special operations forces directly, but, by 2003, they had a working relationship with SIS to assist the General Support Branch (GSB). GSB is a coordinating rather than an operational branch, which allows it to call upon 22 Special Air Service Regiment (especially its Counter-Revolutionary Wing), the “Thus the SOE-SIS disharmony and its consequences led RAF “S&D” flight, and M Troop (counter-terror) of the the British to a firm postwar conviction—that a single ser- Special Boat Service (SBS).[1] vice should be responsible for all clandestine and covert RAF S&D pilots are qualified to fly special operations activity undertaken by the nation.” versions of the C-130 Hercules and Puma helicopter. “Although the British special operations organization was independent of MI6 from 1940 to the end of the war, MI6 had the responsibility for these operations before that period and has had it since, and second, that the record of the wartime SOE, although it scored some brilliant successes, was over all not such as to inspire emulation. Some of its most conspicuous failures are directly traceable to its separation from the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS or MI6) and the British Security Service (MI5).”[9]

SIS can also call on the Special Reconnaissance Regiment, which absorbed 14 Intelligence Company as well as Intelligence Corps and Royal Military Police personnel, including female officers.

7.3.2 US postwar change

Immediately after World War II, a number of groups were broken up, and bureaucratically housed in an assortment of interim organizations. The OSS was broken up shortly SOE abolished; partial reabsorption by SIS after World War II, on September 20, 1945, with funcWhile SOE was abolished after World War II, SIS, in tions scattering into a series of interim organizations: 1946, absorbed selected SOE personnel and organiza• OSS X-2 (counterintelligence) and tions, to form a new SIS section called the Directorate of Secret Intelligence (i.e., clandestine War Planning (D/WP). D/WP had the SIS general charHUMINT) went into the Strategic ter for special operations, and liaison with UK and allied Services Unit (SSU) of the (then) War special operations forces. D/WP, however, was replaced, Department. The covert action and black in 1953, by the Special Political Action Section (SPA), propaganda functions, however, split off known [1] as the “jolly fun tricks department”, and operated until being shut down in the mid-seventies. SPA in 1948.

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CHAPTER 7. CLANDESTINE HUMINT AND COVERT ACTION • Paramilitary direct action (DA) and psychological operations were in a series of interim organizations, becoming the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) in 1948. • Research and Analysis went to the Department of State.

Even before the OPC split, the SSU was an organizational anomaly, since it reported to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, rather than G-2, the Intelligence Directorate of the Army Staff.[10] In January 1946, President Truman, who was concerned with “building up a Gestapo” [11] and distrusted William Donovan, head of the OSS, created the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) which was the direct precursor to the CIA.[10] The assets of the SSU, which now constituted a streamlined “nucleus” of clandestine intelligence was transferred to the CIG in mid-1946 and reconstituted as the Office of Special Operations (OSO). CIA (1947) The National Security Act of 1947 created the Central Intelligence Agency as the successor to the OSS and America’s first peacetime intelligence agency.

• “The United States should provide itself with the organization and the means of supporting foreign resistance movements in guerrilla warfare to the advantage of United States national security during peace and war. • “Guerrilla warfare should be supported under policy direction of NSC. • “Agencies for conducting guerrilla warfare can be established by adding to the CIA’s special operations functions the responsibility for supporting foreign resistance movements and by authorizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff to engage in the conduct of such operations. Primary interest in guerrilla warfare should be that of CIA in peacetime and [Department of Defense] in wartime. • "A separate guerrilla warfare school and corps should not be established[emphasis added]. Instead, [Department of Defense], in coordination with State Department and CIA, should select personnel, give them necessary training in established Army schools, supplemented by courses in other military and State Department schools.

The Act also merged the Department of War and the Department of the Navy into a single National Military Establishment, which was later renamed the Department Korean War Paramilitary Operations of Defense in 1949. (OPC, however, remained outside When the Korean War broke out in 1950, United States the Department of Defense). Army Special Forces were not yet operational. ParamilThe Act also formalized several national security insti- itary functions in Korea suffered from bureaucratic intutions, including the National Security Council (NSC), fighting between the Army’s G-2 intelligence division, the modern Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Office of Emer- and CIA. A heavily redacted history of CIA operations in gency Preparedness (OEP), the precursor to the Federal Korea [14] indicates that the agency used US Far East Air Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Force resources, eventually designated “Flight B” of the Fifth Air Force. This unit provided air support for both military and CIA special operations. When CIA guerilOPC, OSO and interim covert solutions 1948-1951 las were attacked in 1951-1952, the air unit had to adapt U.S. covert psychological operations and paramilitary ac- frequently changing schedules. According to the CIA history, “The US Air Force-CIA relationship during the war tions organizations, formerly in the OSS, went into a unit called the Office of Special Projects, and then renamed was particularly profitable, close, and cordial.” the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) until the two were merged in 1951. OPC was created in 1948 by the National Security Council under a document called NSC 10/2. The OPC’s directors included representatives of the State and Defense departments and the CIA. It was largely administered and supplied by the Central Intelligence Agency .[12] While State and the intelligence community wanted to avoid covert operations, there was a quite different perspective among the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On 17 August 1948, JCS memorandum 1807/1 went to the Secretary of Defense.[13] Its recommendations included:

Unconventional warfare, but not HUMINT, worked smoothly with the Army. Korea had been divided into CIA and Army regions, with the CIA in the extreme northeast, and the Army in the West. In addition to its own resources, the Eighth US Army Korea (EUSAK) G-3 Operations Division had approximately 8,000 South Korean guerillas, who formed as a levée en masse. The Army guerillas, however, had no bases on the Korean mainland, and their island support bases were largely wiped out by 1952. CIA advisors worked with the Army guerillas between January and April 1952, and the history treats the relationship as cooperative.

7.3. SEPARATE FUNCTIONS DURING PEACETIME? During the Korean War, United Nations Partisan Forces Korea operated on islands and behind enemy lines. These forces were also known as the 8086th Army Unit, and then as the Far East Command Liaison Detachment, Korea, FECLD-K 8240th AU. These troops directed North Korea’s partisans in raids, harassment of supply lines and the rescue of downed pilots. Since the initial Special Forces unit, 10 Special Forces Group (Airborne) was activated on 19 June 1952, but the Korean War broke out on June 25, 1950, Army Special Forces did not operate as a unit in that war. Experience gained in that war, however, influenced the development of Special Forces doctrine.

33 After the end of the war, the US Army created a PWD. While there had been pressure to put PWD under the newly revitalized Intelligence Division, McClure was strongly opposed. “A great part of my difficulty in carrying out what I felt was my mission was with G-2. The G 2’s all felt that they had a monopoly on intelligence and were reluctant in the earlier stages to give any of that intelligence to Psychological Warfare knowing that it would be broadcast or used in print.[13] There was also a sensitivity about providing intelligence to units working behind enemy lines and subject to capture. McClure believed that PWD either should report to Operations, or, as was eventually done, as a special staff for the Chief of Staff. While McClure himself was a psychological operations specialist, his work with OSS had made him appreciative of UW. Since no other Army agency seemed interested in the UW mission, McClure was granted staff authority over UW, with a mission to:

General US flow from wartime OSS to 1952

“formulate and develop psychological warfare and special operations plans for the Army in consonance with established policy and to recommend policies for and supervise the execution of Department of the Army programs in these fields.”

While General Charles A. Willoughby, intelligence officer (G-2) at Douglas MacArthur's headquarters asked CIA, in the absence of an Army HUMINT function, to establish special reconnaissance (SR) teams. This worked until the ceasefire talks began, but the CIA history speaks OPCW had three major divisions: of severe conflict with G-2 over support resources and security. There was a continuing tension over CIA pro• Psychological Warfare viding tactical support to EUSAK, and carrying out its • Requirements national-level missions. The Army and CIA never worked • Special Operations. The latter was parout effective counterintelligence cooperation. ticularly significant, because it formulated plans for creation of the US Army’s first formal unconventional warfare capaPWD and the Creation of US Army Special Forces bility: Special Forces. After World War II, the regular Army had a largesse of officers that had successfully run large UW operations, McClure brought officers with World War II or Korean without any doctrine to guide them. The Army also had War experience in UW or long-range penetration, instrong psychological operations capabilities, and a new cluding COL Aaron Bank, LTC Russell Volckmann, and CPT Donald Blackburn. Bank had been assigned to the Army Staff element was created to manage them. During World War II, the Psychological Warfare Divi- OSS and fought with the French Maquis. Volckmann sion (PWD) of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expe- and Blackburn had both been guerillas in the Philippines, ditionary Force (SHAEF) was created to conduct overt and Volckman had also led UW in Korea. McClure saw psychological warfare against German troops in Europe. one of his responsibilities as “selling” UW, in spite of A joint UK-US organization, it was commanded by US resistance from the Army and CIA. He was able to reBrigadier-General Robert A. McClure .[15] McClure had cruit qualified personnel from the Ranger units that had commanded psychological operations in North Africa, been disbanded in Korea. With personnel spaces availagain under the command of Dwight D. Eisenhower, and able from disbanding the Ranger companies in Korea, the enjoyed his confidence. SHAEF PWD’s staff came from Army activated Special Forces in early 1952. the US Office of War Information (OWI), the US OSS, Special Forces, both in their original form and as a comand the British PWE. ponent of the current United States Special Operations

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CHAPTER 7. CLANDESTINE HUMINT AND COVERT ACTION

Command, have provided the nucleus of US paramilitary The Cold War CIA takes shape capabilities, both under direct military, CIA, and joint control. Some Special Forces personnel left the Army In 1952, the OPC and OSO, along with assorted supand went to work as CIA employees. port offices, were merged to what was originally called The US Special Forces was established out of several spe- the “Directorate of Plans”, then, more honestly, the “Dicial operations units that were active during World War II. rectorate of Operations.” It has recently been reorganized Formally, its lineage comes from the 1st Special Service into the National Clandestine Service. Force (Devil’s Brigade), but that unit was more a Special Reconnaissance (SR) and Direct Action (DA) command, which operated in uniform without augmentation by local soldiers. Some of the Office of Strategic Services units have much more similarity, in mission, with the original Army Special Forces mission, Unconventional Warfare (UW), or acting as cadre to train and lead guerillas in occupied countries. The Special Forces motto, de oppresso liber (Latin: “To free from oppression”) reflects this historical mission of guerilla warfare against an occupier. Specifically, the 3-man Operation Jedburgh units provided leadership to French Resistance units. The larger OSS Operational Groups (OG) were more associated with SR/DA missions, although they did work with Resistance units. COL Aaron Bank, commander of the first Special Forces group, served in OSS during World War II. Other OSS guerilla units included Detachment 101 in Burma, under the China-Burma-India Theater, which, among other missions, screened the larger Ranger unit, Merrill’s Marauders

7.4 Controversies remain

While the US has consolidated clandestine operations, there is still an argument as to what level of covert operation should be under military control, especially in military theaters of operations. In the Kennedy Administration, National Security Action Memorandum 57 spoke to paramilitary operations, which can be clandestine only until there are survivors, or at least evidence, from combat operations [17] following a study by an interagency committee, “the Department of Defense will normally receive responsibility for overt paramilitary operations. Where such an operation is to be wholly covert or disavowable, it may be assigned to CIA, provided that it is within the normal capabilities of the agency. Any large paramilitary operation wholly or partly covert which requires significant numbers of militarily trained personnel, amounts of military equipment which exceed normal CIA-controlled stocks and/or military experiences of a kind and level peDouglas MacArthur did not want the OSS to operate culiar to the Armed Services is properly the primary rein his South West Pacific theater of operations ,[16] so sponsibility of the Department of Defense with the CIA paramilitary operations there were at first ad hoc, formed in a supporting role.” by Filipinos, with Americans who refused to surrender. Before long, however, the CIA was training Cuban guerilWhile Fil-American guerilla operations in the Japaneselas. Part of the reason the Bay of Pigs Invasion operation occupied Philippines are not part of the direct lineage of failed was disagreement between senior military people Army Special Forces, some of the early Special Forces and the CIA paramilitary staff about what was necessary leadership were involved in advising and creating the for an invasion to work; there were also pure political ismodern organization. sues that helped doom it. US Army Special Forces (SF) are, along with psychoThings were a little clearer when the military was putting logical operations detachments and Rangers, the oldcovert advisors into Laos and then Vietnam. The Military est of the post-World War II Army units in the curAssistance Command Vietnam Studies and Observation rent United States Special Operations Command (USGroup (MACV-SOG), commanded by a military officer SOCOM). Their original mission was to train and lead with a CIA deputy, did conduct both covert DA misUnconventional Warfare (UW) forces, or a guerilla force sions and sometimes-clandestine SR, and tried but failed in an occupied nation. 10th Special Forces Group was the to put clandestine espionage/SR teams into North Vietfirst deployed unit, intended to operate UW forces behind nam [18] .[19] MACV-SOG had additional challenges, as enemy lines in the event of a Warsaw Pact invasion of it was only informally under the command of the MACV Western Europe. As the US become involved in Southcommander. Its real chain of command went to the Speeast Asia, it was realized that specialists trained to lead cial Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Affairs guerillas also could help defend against hostile guerillas, (SACSA) in the Pentagon,[18] and then to the Joint Chiefs so SF acquired the additional mission of Foreign Internal of Staff, and either the National Security Council or less Defense (FID), working with Host Nation (HN) forces formal White House decisionmakers. in a spectrum of counterguerilla activities from indirect During the Nixon Administration, paramilitary operasupport to combat command. tions were assumed to be assigned to the CIA unless the President ordered a different command structure, after review by the "Forty Committee" .[20] Covert actions were defined not to include direct combat by the armed

7.5. CURRENT OPERATIONS

35

forces of the US, or cover & deception for the armed There is the potential for conflict between the NCS, DCS, forces. and USSOCOM, especially the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), as well as an organization, originally called the Intelligence Support Activity (ISA). ISA changes its (classified) official name every two years and 7.5 Current operations its code names approximately every 6 months.[6] Different countries have different legal and political constraints on covert operations, and whether they are carried out by military special operations under military command (in or out of uniform), by military special operations personnel under the command of an intelligence agency, or by paramilitary personnel under intelligence command. The United Kingdom does have not a rigid a legal separation between the two, but also does not appear to have a major bureaucratic conflict between the intelligence community and military special operations. While the legalities also may not be as strict for Russia, there is a historical conflict among the security organizations and the military, and among different security agencies such as the FSB and OMON.

The transference of covert operations from the CIA to the military has serious implications, which extend beyond whether the Secretary of Defense or the Director of National Intelligence is in charge. When the CIA undertakes a covert action, under the provision of the Hughes–Ryan Act, as amended by the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980 that reduced the number of legislators that needed to be notified, that action must be justified by a presidential finding provided to Congress; however, there are no comparable procedures for approving military special operators on very similar missions.

7.5.2 Afghanistan and US doctrinal conflict In the US, different oversight programs and legal authorities apply to operations under Department of Defense and The early fighting in Afghanistan, with the defeat of regintelligence community control. ular Taliban forces by special operators with substantial air support, then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, known for a commitment to force transformation, was re7.5.1 US doctrine and operations ported to be upset with the roles assigned to the CIA and The US has consolidated espionage, as well as small to USSOCOM. The rule had been that military special paramilitary and information operations into the National operators “were not permitted to enter the country until Clandestine Service (NCS), formerly the CIA Direc- the CIA had prepared the area for them in terms of contorate of Operations. More recently, the United States tacts and landing sites. Department of Defense consolidated its global espionage “Rumsfeld viewed the dichotomization of the operation assets into the Defense Clandestine Service (DCS) un- as an impediment to its rapidity and ultimate success. der the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The CIA Further, he saw a potential for impairment to future ophas some responsibility for direct action (DA) and erations. Therefore, Rumsfeld used the glittering success unconventional warfare (UW), when such operations are of SOFs in Afghanistan as persuasive evidence in his arof any appreciable size, are the responsibility of the mil- gument that SOFs could control their own missions. This itary. NCS contains a Special Operations Group (SOG), was part of his greater plan to transform the military and, with a strength of several hundred and concentrates on in effect, wrest control of covert operations away from flexibility. It can take advantage of CIA relationships the CIA without having to endure any corresponding inwith foreign intelligence services, and is less regulated telligence oversight.” emphasis added [6] than the military.[6] Military organizations perform HUMINT that is directly related to their mission, such as local informants in a peacekeeping or occupation assignment. If a military unit obtains a HUMINT asset of national interest, the National Clandestine Service (NCS) or the Defense Clandestine Service (DCS) should oversee it. There may be special cases, especially related to USSOCOM, where they may run assets directly related to operations, but the national agencies are to be informed.

7.5.3 Joint UK-US operations in Operation Desert Storm

GEN Norman Schwarzkopf, commanding the coalition forces in 1990-1991, was known as a critic of special operations forces. When the “Great SCUD Hunt” became a significant problem, the ranking British officer, LTG Peter de la Billière, sent SAS units into Iraq before conThe CIA charter for “Support of Military Operations”, ventional ground units had entered that country. De la however, is intended to avoid conflict. [21] The reference Billiere had spent a good deal of his career in SAS and cited preceded the formation of the NCS. Since USSO- other British special operations units. COM and NCS often exchange personnel, especially in Under Israeli pressure to send its own SOF teams into paramilitary operations, the conflict may be more theo- western Iraq, and the realization that British SAS were alretical than practical. ready hunting Scuds, US Secretary of Defense Dick Ch-

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CHAPTER 7. CLANDESTINE HUMINT AND COVERT ACTION

eney proposed using US SR teams as well as SAS .[22] While Schwarzkopf was known to be a general opponent of SOF, Cheney approved the use of US SOF to hunt for the launchers.[23] On February 7, US SR teams joined British teams in the hunt for mobile Scud launchers .[24] Open sources contain relatively little operational information about U.S. SOF activities in western Iraq. Some basic elements have emerged, however. Operating at night, Air Force MH-53J Pave Low and Army MH-47E helicopters would ferry SOF ground teams and their specially equipped four-wheel-drive vehicles from bases in Saudi Arabia to Iraq .[25] The SOF personnel would patrol during the night and hide during the day. When targets were discovered, Air Force Special Operations Combat Controllers accompanying the ground forces would communicate over secure radios to AWACS battle staff, who would direct attack aircraft against the targets.

7.5.4

Russian operations

Recent Russian doctrine can only be inferred from Soviet practice, unconventional warfare, and some special reconnaissance, seems to be subordinated to major military commands. Spetsnaz special operations forces are under the GRU, although units are attached to major commands.[26]

7.5.5

Israeli operations

7.6 References [1] “SIS Paramilitary/Covert Action Sections”. 2004-06-01. Retrieved 2007-12-08. [2] “Secret Intelligence Service MI6 - UK Intelligence Agencies”. 2004-01-17. Retrieved 2007-12-08. [3] Manget, Frederic F. (1996), “Intelligence and the Rise of Judicial Intervention: Another System of Oversight”, Studies in Intelligence [4] Ellis, Earl H. (23 July 1921), Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia, retrieved 2007-11-01 [5] Kennan, George F. (May 4, 1948). “Policy Planning Staff Memorandum: The inauguration of organized political warfare”. Foreign Relations of the United States: 1945– 1950 Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment. [6] John,Jessica Ryane (2006-01-30). “A Difference with (or without) Distinction: Evading Congressional Oversight of Covert Action through the Use of Special Operations Forces” (PDF). George Washington University. [7] Kahn, David (1996). The Codebreakers - The Story of Secret Writing. Scribners. ISBN 0-684-83130-9. Kahn. [8] “Secret Intelligence Service MI6”. Retrieved 2007-12-08. [9] Riffice, Albert E. (18 September 1995), “Intelligence and Covert Action” (– SCHOLAR SEARCH ), Studies in Intelligence, retrieved 2007-11-18 [10] Finnegan, John Patrick (1998). “Chapter 7: The Cold War and Korea”. Army Lineage Series, Military Intelligence. United States Army Center of Military History. CMH Pub 60-13.

Israel has both clandestine collection and some covert ac[11] Taylor, Karen M. (2003). “Identifying the Traitor among tion in the Mossad, although their larger paramilitary opUs: The Rhetoric of Espionage and Secrecy” (PDF). Unierations are assigned to what they call “reconnaissance versity of Pittsburgh. Retrieved 2007-12-08. units”, the premier one being Sayeret Matkal[27] [12] Berger, D. H, The Use of Covert Paramilitary Activity as

To retaliate for the Munich massacre at the 1972 Summer a Policy Tool: An Analysis of Operations Conducted by Olympics, Mossad set up Operation Wrath of God, to asthe United States Central Intelligence Agency, 1949-1951, sassinate militants believed responsible. For some time, Marine Corps Command and Staff College the operation was successful, although eventually killed an innocent individual who had been incorrectly identi- [13] Paddock, Alfred H. Jr (1982). US Army Special Warfare: Its Origins. Psychological and Unconventional Warfare, fied; see the Lillehammer affair. 1941-1952 (PDF). National Defense University Press.

7.5.6

French operations

[14] Central Intelligence Agency (17 July 1968), Clandestine Services History: The Secret War in Korea 1950-1952 (PDF), retrieved 2007-12-06

The Directorate-General for External Security [15] Paddock, Alfred H. Jr., Major General Robert Alexis McClure: Forgotten Father of US Army Special Warfare, re(DGSE)[28] is responsible for intelligence analysis trieved 2007-12-09 and clandestine collection, but also has an operations division and an action service within it, the Division [16] Finnegan, John Patrick (1998). “Chapter 6: World War Action. The Sinking of the Rainbow Warrior, a covert II Intelligence in the Field”. Military Intelligence. Army action against Greenpeace, was an example of no service Lineage Series. United States Army Center of Military being perfect. History. Note that the French worked closely with Operation Jed- [17] Kennedy, John F. (1961-06-28), National Security Action burgh during World War II. Some 3-man Jedburgh teams Memorandum No. 57: Responsibility for Paramilitary Ophad a French, US, and UK member. erations, retrieved 2007-11-21

7.6. REFERENCES

[18] Kelley, Danny M. II (2005), The Misuse of the Studies and Observation Group as a National Asset in Vietnam, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, retrieved 2007-11-21 [19] Shultz, Richard H., Jr. (1999). The Secret War Against Hanoi. HarperCollins. [20] Nixon, Richard M. (February 17, 1980), National Security Decision Memorandum 40: Responsibility for the Conduct, Supervision and Coordination of Covert Action Operations [21] Central Intelligence Agency, “Support to Military Operations”, 2002 Annual Report, retrieved 2007-12-19 [22] Gordon, Michael R.; Trainor, Bernard E. (1995). The Generals’ War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf. Little, Brown and Company. [23] Rosenau, William (2000), Special Operations Forces and Elusive Enemy Ground Targets: Lessons from Vietnam and the Persian Gulf War. U.S. Air Ground Operations Against the Ho Chi Minh Trail, 1966-1972 (PDF), RAND Corporation, retrieved 2007-11-11 [24] Ripley, Tim, Scud Hunting: Counter-force Operations against Theatre Ballistic Missiles (PDF), Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, Lancaster University, retrieved 2007-11-11 [25] Waller, Douglas C. (1994). The Commandos: The Inside Story of America’s Secret Soldiers. Dell Publishing. [26] Suvorov, Viktor (1990). SPETSNAZ: The Inside Story Of The Special Soviet Special Forces. Pocket. ISBN 0-67168917-7. [27] Tucker, Jonathan B. (March 2003), “Strategies for Countering Terrorism: Lessons from the Israeli Experience1”, Journal of Homeland Security (Homeland Security Institute) [28] DGSE - General Directorate for External Security; Direction Generale de la Securite Exterieure, Federation of American Scientists

• • • •

37

Chapter 8

Clandestine HUMINT operational techniques The Clandestine HUMINT page deals with the functions of that discipline, including espionage and active counterintelligence. This page deals with Clandestine HUMINT operational techniques, also called “tradecraft”. It applies to clandestine operations for espionage, and for a clandestine phase prior to direct action (DA) or unconventional warfare (UW). Clandestine HUMINT sources may also act as local guides for special reconnaissance (SR). Many of the techniques here are important in counterintelligence. Defensive counterintelligence personnel need to know them to recognize espionage, sabotage, etc. in process. Offensive counterintelligence specialists may actually use them against foreign intelligence services (FIS). While DA and UW can be conducted by national military or paramilitary organizations, al-Qaeda and similar non-state militant groups appear to use considerably different clandestine cell system structure, for command, control, and operations, than do national forces. Cell systems are evolving to more decentralized models, sometimes because they are enabled by new forms of electronic communications.

try, there may be significant, or very few, restrictions on domestic HUMINT. The most basic question will be whether criminal prosecution, or stopping operations, is the goal. Typically, criminal prosecution will be the primary goal against drug and slavery groups, with breaking up their operations the secondary goal. These priorities, however, are apt to reverse in dealing with terrorist groups. If there are separate organizations with diplomatic and nonofficial cover, there may be two chiefs. Sufficiently large stations may have several independent, compartmented groups.

8.1.1 Station under diplomatic cover Nations vary as to how well hidden they choose to have all, part, or none of their intelligence personnel under the guise of diplomatic immunity. Frequently, at least one individual is known to the host country, so there can be a deniable channel of communications. If the nations are allies, many of the intelligence personnel may be known and actively cooperating.

This page deals primarily with one’s own assets. See double agent for additional information adversary sources Certain diplomatic titles were often assumed to be cover jobs. With the United Kingdom, "passport control ofthat a country has turned to its own side. ficer" was, much of the time, an intelligence position.[1] Today, it may be confusing that some passport control actually control passports. With other countries, 8.1 Staff and Skills in a Clandes- officers “cultural attaché" was often a cover job, although, again, tine HUMINT Operations Sta- it might be legitimate. An intelligence officer covered as a cultural attaché might still do some cultural things.

tion

This description is based around the foreign intelligence service, of country B, operating in and against country A. It may also include operations against non-state organizations operating in country B, with or without country B support. It may also involve offensive counterintelligence against country D assets operating in country B. The basic structure here can be pertinent to a domestic service operating against a non-national group within its borders. Depending on the legal structure of the coun38

• Chief of station or rezident. There may also be multiple chiefs if “country B” has both military and civilian human intelligence. Fairly recently, the US consolidated military and civilian into the National Clandestine Service. Russia still probably separates GRU military and SVR civilian, and the KGB, the USSRera predecessor of the SVR, ran both illegal and legal residencies.

8.1. STAFF AND SKILLS IN A CLANDESTINE HUMINT OPERATIONS STATION • Operations Officer, also called case officer: interacts with local assets or leaders of local agent subnetwork. Israel’s Mossad refers to these as katsas. • Collection Management Officer (aka Reports Officer,Intelligence Officer): does preliminary report categorization and organization. May be the administrative chief. • Communications and encryption personnel • Drivers and guards • Operational Targeting Officer: not always used. May be more focused on access agents and recruiting, handing off recruited agents to case officers. Might make the decision to use non-HUMINT collection, such as SIGINT based in the embassy. • Technical collection specialists (e.g., the US Special Collection Service, a joint NSACIA operation)

8.1.2

Stations under official but nondiplomatic cover

An intermediate approach has the officers clearly working for their country, but without diplomatic immunity and with a cover role that does not immediately suggest intelligence affiliation. For example, the Soviet GRU covered some intelligence officers under the TASS news agency, or as part of a trade or technical mission, or even as diplomats. The last might seem surprising, but this was under a GRU assumptions that military attaches would always be assumed to be intelligence officers, but that members of the civilian part of an embassy might actually be diplomats rather than intelligence officers.[2]

39

• A journalist. • A member of the civilian government, such as a Member of Parliament.[3] An example of civilian cover for an American officer involved a German refugee, with the pseudonym “Stephan Haller”, who had widely ranging interests and special skills in mathematics and physics, as well as native language skill. His overt role, in 1949, was directing a program that paid subsidies to German scientists, part of a larger program of denying German talent to the Soviets. Initially, he was based in Pforzheim, (West) Germany.[4] After two years in Pforzheim, he had a well-established cover, and had been collecting political and scientific intelligence to the scientists, and also Germans that he knew in political circles before emigrating. In 1951, he moved to Berlin, directing overall “operations against scientific targets in the East Zone of Germany”, while still managing the subsidy program. His new work included encouraging defection of key craftsmen working for the Soviets. He was considered a master craftsman, He did not grow careless or conceited with success. Here remained a meticulous craftsman. Before he debriefed a source, he mastered the subject to be discussed. His agents were made comfortable not only by his cigars and beer but also by the easy flow of communication. And he did not end until he had every last scrap of useful information. He never failed, moreover, to remain alert for operational leads-potential agents, counterintelligence indicators, propaganda possibilities. When Haller was finished, there were no more questions to be asked. And though he groaned over the chore of putting it on paper, his reporting became thorough-and more than thorough, illuminating-for he rarely failed to make interpretive comments.

It was easier, of course, for the socialist USSR to assign people to state agencies. Western sensitivities tend to be 8.1.3 Stations under non-official cover much greater about using, for example, journalistic cover. The US has been emphatic in prohibiting any relationship According to Victor Suvorov, the Soviet reaction to losing networks operated from diplomatic missions, after the between intelligence and the Peace Corps. countries in which those embassies were overrun in the US military intelligence doctrine forbids a HUMINT speSecond World War, was to emphasize “illegal” (i.e., what cialist to pose as: the US calls non-official cover) stations (i.e., residencies) for HUMINT networks. The illegal residencies were pre• A doctor, medic, or any other type of ferred to be in safe locations, perhaps of allies such as the medical personnel. United States, Great Britain and Canada. • Any member of the International ComSoviet operations were tightly compartmented, with strict mittee of the Red Cross (ICRC) or its afneed-to-know an absolute rule. “Undercover residencies filiates. Such a ruse is a violation of treaty support illegals, but only on instructions from the Centre obligations. without having any idea for whom they are working. All • A chaplain or clergyman.

operations in support of illegals are worked out in such

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CHAPTER 8. CLANDESTINE HUMINT OPERATIONAL TECHNIQUES

a way that the officers of the GRU undercover residency that are self-organizing and have preexisting ties, making do not have one crumb of information which is not neces- them virtually impossible to infiltrate, has survived the sary. Operations are planned in such a way that there is no GRU and is common in terrorist networks. possibility of the illegals becoming dependent on the actions of the undercover residency.” A lesson learned from Other agents recruited by residencies are the loss of espionage networks was to keep them small, gradually organised into agent groups of three subdividing them, with independent reporting to Center, to five men each. Usually, agents working in when more agents were recruited.[5] one particular field of espionage are put together in one group. Sometimes a group consists of agents who for various reasons are Moving new agents into illegal residencies known to each other. Let us suppose that one agent recruits two others. ... Thus to a certain Suvorov explained that new agents were separated from extent the members of agent groups are comofficial Soviet institutions only after the agent has completely isolated from Soviet diplomatic reprepromised himself, by giving Soviet Intelligence a signifsentation. The agent group is in contact with icant quantity of secret material, that is, made it imposthe undercover residency for a period of time, sible for himself to go to the police. The separated agent then gradually the system of contact with the comes in three guises: the separated acting agent, the residency comes to an end and orders begin to agent group and the agent residency. be received directly from Moscow. By various channels the group sends it material directly to Moscow. Finally the contact with Moscow Separated acting agent The most resources are debecomes permanent and stable and the agent voted to the agents that provide the most important magroup is entirely separated from the residency. terial. Once the central headquarters assesses the agent’s With gradual changes in personnel at the resiinformation as highly valuable, the doctrine is to stop, dency, like the resident himself, the cipher oftemporarily, obtaining new material, and improving his ficers and the operational officers with whom security and education in espionage tradecraft. The trainthere was once direct contact, nobody outside ing is preferably done in a third country, from which he the Centre will know of the existence of this might or might not be moved to the Soviet Union. His particular group. Should it happen that operatabsence typically would be covered by taking a vacation ing conditions become difficult, or that the emor holiday. bassy is blockaded or closed down, the group will be able to continue its activities in the same Thence he will go back to his own country, way as before.[5] but as an independently acting agent. He will be run exclusively by the Centre, in concrete terms the head of a section, even, in special Agent residency When the GRU attaches one or more cases, the head of a directorate and in extreme illegals (i.e., Soviet officer under an assumed identity), the cases the deputy head of the GRU or the head residency changes from “an agent residency into an illegal himself. The running of such an agent is thus residency. This process of increasing the numbers and carried out exactly as the running of illegals is. the gradual self-generation of independent organisations continues endlessly.” Suvorov uses a medical metaphor Agent group The next category of agent, less valuable of quarantine designed to contain infection to describe than a separated acting agent but still of importance, was separating agents for improved security. the agent group, which migrated from diplomatic or civil- The GRU kept certain officers immediately ready to go ian contact, to the in-country illegal rezidentura (resident into illegal status, should the host nation intensify secuand infrastructure), to direct communications with the rity. Center. The leader of such a group is called, in Soviet terminology, a gropovod, and is conceptually the only These officers are in possession of previmember of the group that communicates with Moscow. ously prepared documents and equipment, and In reality, clandestine communications personnel may be gold, diamonds and other valuables which will aware of the direct contact, but newer electronics allow be of use to them in their illegal activities will the leader to manage his or her only communications. have been hidden in secret hiding-places beSuvorov makes the important point that “A group automatically organises itself. The GRU obviously considers family groups containing the head of the family and his wife and children to be more secure and stable. The members of such a group may work in completely different fields of espionage.” The pattern of having groups

forehand. In case of war actually breaking out, these officers will unobtrusively disappear from their embassies. The Soviet government will register a protest and will for a short time refuse to exchange its diplomats for the diplomats of the aggressive country. Then it will

8.1. STAFF AND SKILLS IN A CLANDESTINE HUMINT OPERATIONS STATION capitulate, the exchange will take place and the newly fledged illegals will remain behind in safe houses and flats. Afterwards they will gradually, by using the system of secret rendezvous, begin to establish the system of contacts with agents and agent groups which have recently been subordinated to the undercover residency. Now they all form a new illegal residency. The new illegals never mix and never enter into contact with the old ones who have been working in the country for a long time. This plainly makes life more secure for both parties.[5] Again, Suvorov emphasizes that the process of forming new illegal residencies was the Soviet doctrine for imposing compartmentation. Western countries, especially those in danger of invasion, have a related approach, the stay-behind network. The US military definition, used by most NATO countries, is Agent or agent organization established in a given country to be activated in the event of hostile overrun or other circumstances under which normal access would be denied.[6]

41

the larger the possibility it may be detected by counterintelligence organizations. Beyond the station chief, the most likely person to be associated with the station, not as a case officer, is a communicator, especially if highly specialized secure communication methods are used.

8.1.4 Support services Some clandestine services may have additional capabilities for operations or support. Key operational agents of influence are apt to be run as singletons, although political considerations may require communication through cutouts. Useful idiots can be run by diplomatic case officers, since there is no particular secrecy about their existence or loyalty. Valuable volunteers, depending on the size of the volunteer group, may work either with case officers, or operations officers brought clandestinely into the area of operations. Transportation, Infiltration, exfiltration, logistics Proprietaries, which can be large businesses (e.g., the CIA proprietary airlines such as Air America, which, in the interest of cover, often had the latest aircraft and flew commercial as well as secret cargo), often are not controlled from the local area, but by headquarters. Especially when the proprietary is a multinational company, and has some commercial business of its own, central control makes the most sense.

In such an approach, both clandestine intelligence and covert operations personnel live normal lives, perhaps carrying out regular military or government functions, but have prepared documentation of assumed identities, safehouses, secure communications, etc. In looking at internal as well as external assets, remember the fundamental rule of clandestine operations: the more secure, the less efficient. Because espionage operations A representative illegal residency need rigorous security, they are always inefficient — they take a lot of time, energy, and money. Proprietaries can Vilyam Genrikhovich Fisher, usually better known by be an exception, but, even though they make money, they his alias, Rudolf Abel, was a Soviet intelligence officer can require additional capital to be able to expand in the who came to the US under the false identity of a US same way a comparable private business would do so.[7] citizen, Emil Robert Goldfus, who had died in infancy but was used by the USSR to create an elaborate legend for Fisher. On coming to the US, entering through Volunteer and proprietary support Canada, Fisher/Abel took over the control of several existing Soviet HUMINT assets, and also recruited new asSayanim are Jews living outside Israel as foreign citizens sets. Key assets for whom he was the case officer in- that volunteer to provide assistance to the Mossad. This cluded Lona Cohen and Morris Cohen, who were not assistance includes facilitating medical care, money, lodirect intelligence collectors but couriers for a number gistics, and even overt intelligence gathering, yet sayanim of agents reporting on US nuclear information, including are only paid for their expenses. No official number is Julius Rosenberg, Ethel Rosenberg, David Greenglass, known, but estimates put the number of sayanim in the and Klaus Fuchs. thousands. The existence of this large body of volunteers His role was that of the “illegal” resident in the US, under nonofficial cover. Soviet practice often was to have two rezidents, one illegal and one a diplomat under official cover. He was betrayed to the US by an alcoholic assistant who defected to the FBI.

is one reason why the Mossad operates with fewer case officers than fellow intelligence agencies.

Another kind of resource could include foreign offices owned or operated by nationals of the country in question. A step farther is a proprietary, or business, not That Fisher/Abel only had one assistant, with operational just individuals, under non-official cover. Both kinds of responsibilities, is not surprising. Unless a clandestine business can provide information from recruitment, unstation has a strong cover identity, the larger the station, witting agents, or support functions. Small and medium

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CHAPTER 8. CLANDESTINE HUMINT OPERATIONAL TECHNIQUES

aviation-related businesses have been popular US propri- struction to Moses to send spies into the land of Canaan. etaries, including Air America and Southern Air Trans- The account of the harlot Rahab sheltering Israelite spies port. and betraying the city of Jericho might be the first docu[10] Once the service has a presence in aviation, it may be- mented instance of a “safe house.” come aware of persons, in private business, civil service, or the military, who fly to destinations of interest. They may mention it in innocent conversation, such as at the airport’s restaurant or bar. They also may be assumed to be going there, based by analysis of flight departure times, aircraft type, duration of trip, and their passengers or cargo.

The term is not strictly limited to houses, although many intelligence services use rural houses for extended functions such as debriefing defectors. In a city, a safehouse may be an apartment or house that is not known to be associated with an intelligence service.

Another usage refers to mailing addresses (postal and electronic) and telephone numbers, to which messages Having routine access to an airport can reveal: “Who’s can be sent with a reasonable chance of not coming into coming and going, on and off the record? What’s in the the awareness of counter-intelligence. hangars and warehouses? What are the finances? Political connections and loyalties? Access to planes on the ground? Flight plans?" It must be emphasized that Useful idiots a transportation-related proprietary—truck stops, boat Useful idiot is a term attributed to Lenin, principally in maintenance, and other industry-specific businesses, have Soviet use, for a person overtly supporting the interests to operate as a real business. Occasionally, they may proof one country (e.g., the USSR) in another (e.g., a memduce a profit, and that can be confusing for headquarters ber of the overt Communist Party of the second country). financial managers, provide a local but perhaps traceable Soviet intelligence practice was to avoid such people in [8] source of funds, or both. the actual clandestine operations, regarding them at most Public relations firms have long been useful useful as distractions to the counterintelligence services. proprietaries.[9] In a given country of operations, or Agents of influence, who were witting of Communist perhaps adjacent countries that are concerned about plans and intended to influence their own country’s acthe actions of their neighbor, news releases placed by tions to be consistent with Soviet goals, went to great experienced public relations professionals can help lengths to conceal any affiliation. “Witting” is a term of mold relevant opinion. Care must be taken that the intelligence art that indicates that one is not only aware news release does not “blow back” on the clandestinely of a fact or piece of information, but also aware of its sponsoring country. connection to intelligence activities. the Venona project Another viable industry for proprietaries is natural re- communications intelligence exposes that Alger Hiss and sources exploration. If, hypothetically, a mining com- Harry Dexter White, accused of Communist sympathies, pany operated in a country where there are both resources were indeed Soviet spies. They were Communist agents, deposits and non-national group sanctuaries, a propri- and the Soviets certainly did not treat them as useful idetary company could get information on both, and also iots. There were communications with them, and the diprovide access and support services. If the proprietary alogues were clandestine. began mining operations, it would naturally have access Gus Hall also had overt Communist affiliation, and it is to explosives, which might be made available to sabotage extremely unlikely Soviet clandestine operatives would groups in neighboring areas. have had anything to do with him. Still, in situations such Use of nongovernmental organizations (NGO) is polit- as emergency exfiltration, Party members in a Western ically sensitive and may require approval at the highest country might be called upon as a last desperate resort. level of an agency. Sometimes, there is a broader policy need not to have the possibility of drawing suspicion onto an NGO. For example, in WWII, it was occasion- 8.2 Basic agent recruiting ally necessary to send supplies to Allied POWs, but Red Cross parcels were never ever used for this purpose. The decision had been made that Red Cross parcels were im- This section deals with the recruiting of human reportant to the survival of the POWs and could never be sources who do not work for a foreign intelligence service (FIS). For techniques of recruiting FIS personnel, jeopardized. see Counterintelligence. In principle and best practice, all country B officers in country A report to an executive function in their home Safehouses country. In CIA terms, this might be a head of a country “Safehouse” is a term of intelligence tradecraft whose desk or a regional desk. Russian practice was to refer to origins may be lost in antiquity. “The Bible is also re- “Center”. plete with instances of espionage, including Yahweh’s in- Actual recruiting involves a direct approach by a case offi-

8.3. BASIC AGENT OPERATIONS cer who has some existing access to the potential recruit, an indirect approach through an access agent or proprietary, or has reason to risk a “cold” approach. Before the direct recruitment, there may be a delicate period of development. For details, see Clandestine HUMINT asset recruiting.

8.3 Basic agent operations This section deals with the general structure of running espionage operations. A subsequent section deals with Specialized Clandestine Functions, and another with Support Services for both basic and specialized operations

43 Once the information is captured, it must be transmitted. The transmission may be impersonal, as with dead drops or car tosses. It may involve carriers. It may be electronic. If there is a need for personal meetings, the agent must know how to request them, and also to alert the network leader or case officer that the agent may be under suspicion. Teaching countersurveillance techniques to agents is a calculated risk.[12] While it may be perfectly valid for an agent to abort a drop or other relatively innocent action, even at the cost of destroying valuable collected material, it is much more dangerous to teach the agent to elude active surveillance. The ability to elude professional counterintelligence personnel following the agent, for example, may confirm the counterintelligence organization’s suspicion that they are dealing with a real agent.

The agent may join, or even create, a new network. In Still, the agent may need to have an emergency escape the latter case, the agent may be called a lead agent or procedure if he confirms he is under surveillance, or even a principal agent. The latter term is also refers to access if he is interrogated but released. agents, who only help in recruiting. Well-managed agent relationships can run for years and even decades; there are cases where family members, children at the time their parents were recruited, became full members of the network. Not all agents, however, operate in networks. A Western term for agents controlled as individuals is singleton. This term usually is reserved for the first or most sensitive recruitments, although specialized support personnel, such as radio operatives acting alone, are called singletons.[11] In Soviet tradecraft, the equivalent of a singleton is a separated acting agent. Professional intelligence officers, such as Robert Hanssen, may insist on being singletons, and go even farther, as with Hanssen, refuse in-person meetings. Even as a singleton, the agent will use security measures such as secure communications.

8.3.2 Continued testing during operations

Case officers should constantly test their agents for changes in motivation or possible counterintelligence compromise. While “name traces cannot be run on every person mentioned by the agent, do not be stingy with them on persons who have familial, emotional, or business ties with him” to detect any linkages to hostile counterintelligence.[12] Until an agent is well established as reliable, meetings, which always must be done with care to avoid detection, are “the prime emphasis is put on vigilance and checking-has he been planted by the local counterintelligence, are his motives in agreeing to collaborate sincere? The need for personal meetings with such give the opportunity to asAgents also may operate in networks, for which the classic an agent is increased, for they [13] sess him more completely.” security structure is the cell system. The agent may join a proprietary, although that is more An experienced US operations officer emphasized that field operations personnel should report status and likely to be for access or support agents. progress often. Only with such reporting can a headquarters staff looking globally for penetrations, and aware of political implications. Reporting and headquarters advice 8.3.1 Training is critical for joint operations (i.e., with the intelligence service of another country). Headquarters, aware of all Before the agent actually starts to carry out assignment, joint operations with that service, can give advice from training in tradecraft may be necessary. For security rea- a broader viewpoint, without compromising the need for sons, this ideally will be done outside the agent’s own local initiative.[12] " country, but such may not always be possible. Increasingly less desirable alternatives might be to conduct the training away from the operational area, as in a safe house 8.3.3 Operating the agent in a resort, and then a safe house inside the operational area. Even with the most sensitive agents, occasional personal Among the first things to be taught are communications tradecraft, beginning with recording the material of interest. Skills here can include the operation of cameras appropriate for espionage, methods of carrying out documents without detection, secret writing.

meetings are important in maintaining psychological control. Nevertheless, some agents, especially trained intelligence officers like Robert Hanssen, will almost never meet, but provide material good enough to prove their bona fides. A Soviet officer commented, whatever an

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agent’s role in the intelligence net, personal contact should move. If neither is feasible, it is better to have Headquarbe made with him only when it is impossible to manage ters dispatch an officer to a third country, either legally without it. The number of meetings should be kept as low or illegally, for the meeting.”[13] as possible, especially with sources of valuable information. Clandestine transfer operated by humans Personal meetings may be held to give an agent his next assignment and instructions for carrying it out, to train him in tradecraft or the use of technical or communications equipment, to transmit documents, reports, technical equipment, money, or other items, or to fulfill several of these purposes. In actual practice several purposes are usually served by a meeting. In addition to its particular objectives more general needs can be filled. A meeting held for training purposes may be a means for clarifying biographic data on the agent or his views on various subjects. At every meeting with an agent one should study him and obtain new data on his potential and talents, thereby providing a better basis for judging his sincerity and deciding how much trust to place in him.[13]

It is a case-by-case decision whether the material exchanged should have safeguards against accessing it in other than a precise manner. One straightforward protection method is to have the material on exposed photographic film, in a container that does not suggest that it contains film and might be, innocently, opened in a lighted room. Self-destruct devices also are possibilities, but they confirm that the transfer involved sensitive material.

Brush pass and other physical exchange with couriers Under the general term “brush pass” is a wide range of techniques in which one clandestine operative passes a physical item to another operative.[15] “Brush” implies that the two people “brush” past one another, typically in a public place and preferably a crowd, where random people interfere with any visual surveillance. In a properly executed brush pass, the agents do not even stop walking; Agents, to varying extents, need reinforcement. Salary is at most, they may appear to bump into one another. important and also gives a lever of compromise, although During the brief contact, a common means of executing pressing it too hard can offend a truly ideologically mo- the exchange is for both to be carrying otherwise identical tivated agent. Some agents benefit from recognition that objects, such as a newspaper, briefcase, or magazine. The they can never show, such as a uniform of your service, information being exchanged is in one of them. As the or decorations from it. two people separate, they still appear to be holding the Agents will be more comfortable if they believe that they will have protection, preferably exfiltration, if compromised. Protecting their families may be even more important. When the agent operates in a country with a particularly brutal counterintelligence service, providing them with a “final friend”, or means for suicide, can be comforting even if they never use it.[14]

8.3.4

Agent communications

same object in the same hand. More challenging versions are reminiscent of passing a baton in a relay race, and would be most commonly done with small objects such as a photographic film cartridge. In this more dangerous method, the transfer is from hand to hand, or from hand into a pocket. While this technique obviously takes better manual dexterity and is more prone to error, it has the countersurveillance advantage that the operatives are not carrying anything after the transfer, and can blend into a crowd even more easily.

This section deals with skills required of individuals, ei- A variation of the brush pass is the live letter drop, in ther agents or support personnel. Most skills are con- which one agent follows a predefined route, on foot, with a prepared report hidden in a pocket. En route, a second cerned with communications. agent unknown to the first agent picks his/her pocket and then passes the report on unread, either to a cut-out or to Meeting places for personal meetings an intelligence officer. This technique presents opportunities both for plausible deniability and for penetration by A Soviet officer commented, perhaps counterintuitively, hostile agents. that it is harder to have longer meetings with agents when the case officer is under diplomatic cover. The reason is that local counterintelligence is aware of the case officer, Dead drop A dead drop is a container not easily found, where the existence of an illegal (i.e., nonofficial cover such as a magnetized box attached to a metal rack in an in US terms) officer may not be known to them. For out-of-sight alley. The box could be loosely buried. It the legal officer, “here it is best either to have reliable should be possible to approach the container to fill or safehouses or to deliver the agent discreetly to the offi- empty it, and not be easily observed from a street or wincial residency building. The latter is a serious operational dow.

8.3. BASIC AGENT OPERATIONS Typically, a clandestine collector will put espionage material, perhaps in encrypted form, into the box, and use some prearranged signal to let a courier know that something needs to be taken out of the box and delivered to the next point on the route to the case officer. Such a route might have several dead drops. In some cases, the dead drop might be equipped with a device to destroy its contents unless it is opened properly.

45 ratories have chemical and photographic techniques that detect the disturbance of paper fibers by the act of writing, so the invisible ink will not resist systematic forensic analysis. Still, if its existence is not suspected, the analysis may not be done. Microphotography Another technique, for hiding content that will resist casual examination, is to reduce the message to a photographic transparency or negative, perhaps the size of the dot over the letter “i” in this article. Such a technique needs both a laboratory and considerable technical skill, and is prone to damage and to accidentally falling off the paper. Still, it does have a countersurveillance value.[16]

Representative dead drop device

Signals to tell a courier, or a case officer if there is no intermediate courier, that the dead drop needs service can be as simple as a piece of colored tape on a lamp post or perhaps a set of window shades raised and lowered in a specific pattern. While “wrong number” calls with a predefined apology can be used, they are more vulnerable to surveillance if the phone in question is tapped.

Encryption Encryption, especially using a theoretically secure method, when properly executed, such as the one-time pad,[17] is highly secure, but a counterintelligence agent seeing nonsense characters will immediately become suspicious of the message that has been captured. The very knowledge that a dead drop exists can cause it to be trapped or put under surveillance, and the member of a brush pass that carries it will be hard-pressed to explain it.

Car tosses A car toss can take many forms, one of which can be considered a moving dead drop. An agent or courier can put a magnetized box inside a bumper on a parked car.

One-time pad encryption has the absolute requirement that the cryptographic key is used only once. Failure to follow this rule caused a serious penetration into Soviet espionage communications, through the Venona project analysis.[18]

In some cases, if a car can drive slowly down a street or driveway not easily observed, a courier can toss a message container into an open window, making the transfer method intermediate between a brush pass and a dead drop.

It is extremely difficult for a nonprofessional to develop a cryptosystem, especially without computer support, that is impervious to the attack by a professional cryptanalyst, working for an agency with government resources, such as the US NSA or Russian Spetssvyaz.[17] Still, when the message is very short, the key is random or nearly random, some methods, like the Nihilist Straddling checkerboard may offer some resistance. Improvised methods are most useful when they only have to protect the information for a very short time, such as changing the location or time of an agent meeting scheduled in the same day.

Cars with diplomatic immunity have advantages and disadvantages for tosses. They cannot be searched if the toss is observed, but they also are followed more easily. Diplomatic cars usually have distinctive markings or license plates, and may be equipped with electronic tracking devices. Counterintelligence could wait until the car is out of sight following a toss, then apprehend and interrogate the courier, or simply keep the courier under surveillance to discover another link in the message route. Plain language code Less suspicious when examined, although very limited in its ability to transfer more than simple content, is plain language code. For example, the Methods of protecting message content final attack order for the Battle of Pearl Harbor came in a radio broadcast of the Japanese phrase, “Climb A message left in a dead drop, or dropped during an imMount Niitaka”. Subsequent espionage communications properly executed brush pass, is quite incriminating if referred to ships as different types of dolls at a doll repair counterintelligence personnel can immediately see suspishop. cious information written on it. The ideal material for Plain language code is most effective when used to trigger transfer looks quite innocuous. a preplanned operation, rather than transfer any signifiAt one time, invisible ink, a subset of steganography, was cant amount of information. popular in espionage communications, because it was not visible to the naked eye without development by heat or chemicals. While computer-based steganographic tech- Steganography, covert channels, and spread specniques still are viable, modern counterintelligence labo- trum Steganography, in the broadest sense of the word,

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CHAPTER 8. CLANDESTINE HUMINT OPERATIONAL TECHNIQUES

is a technique of hiding information “in plain sight” within a larger message or messaging context. It is hard to detect because the secret message is a very small component of the larger amount, such as a few words hidden in a Web graphic.

definitively terminated. This need rarely eliminates the need for protecting the fact of espionage, the support services, and the tradecraft and tools provided. One of the most difficult challenges is ending an emotional relationship between the case officer and agent, which can exist in both directions. Sometimes, an agent is unstable, and this is a major complication; perhaps even requiring the evacuation of the agent. More stable agents may be happy with termination bonuses, and perhaps a future emigration opportunity, that do not draw attention to their own side’s counterintelligence. In some instances, an intelligence agency may issue a "burn notice,” indicating to other such agencies that an individual is an unreliable source of information.

Even more sophisticated computer-dependent methods can protect information. The information may or may not be encrypted. In spread-spectrum communications, the information is sent, in parallel, at very low level through a set of frequencies. Only when the receiver knows the frequencies, the time relationship on when a given frequency or other communications channel will carry content, and how to extract the content, can information be recovered. Basic spread spectrum uses a fixed set of frequencies, but the signal strength in any one frequency is too low to de- Especially in the case of non-national organizations, tertect without correlation to other frequencies. mination can be very literal, ranging from having a trusted Frequency-hopping spread spectrum is a related tech- operative kill the problematic agent, or, when culturally nique, which can use the parallel transmission of true appropriate, sending the agent on a suicide mission. spread spectrum, not using any one frequency long When the clandestine phase is preparation for a DA misenough for plausible interception. The pattern of varia- sion such as the 9/11 attacks, or the assassination attacks, tion among channels may be generated and received using using suicide bombers, by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil cryptographic methods. Eelam, termination of the operational cells is rather obvious. If there are support cells in the operational area, Methods of protecting against electronic detection of they may be vulnerable, but it would be good tradecraft to withdraw them shortly before the attack. the fact of messaging Avoiding detection of radio signals means minimizing the clandestine transmitter’s exposure to hostile directionfinding. Modern techniques generally combine several methods: • Burst transmission or otherwise minimizing • High-gain antenna and/or directional antenna • Receiver or relay away from detectors, as, for example, satellites. Exploring agent information often meant a good deal of interaction, in which the home service would clarify what the agent reported, give new orders, etc. One approach used in WWII was the Joan-Eleanor system, which put the case officer into an aircraft at high altitude. From that altitude, there could be fast interaction in voice, so that they get to the key issues faster than with many separately encrypted and transmitted messages.[19] The modern equivalent is a small, low probability of intercept radio transceiver, using a directional antenna aimed at an orbiting satellite communications relay. Avoiding detection of radio communications involves all the principles of transmission and reception security.

8.4 Special clandestine services 8.4.1 Agents of influence An agent of influence, being witting or unwitting of the goals of a foreign power B, can influence the policy of Country A to be consistent with the goals of Country B. In Soviet theory, influencing policy was one aspect of what they termed active measures (aktivnyye meropriyatiya). Active measures have a different connotation than the Western concept of direct action (DA), although Soviet active measures could include “wet affairs” (mokrie dela) conducted by Department V of the KGB, “wet” referring to the spilling of blood.

8.4.2 Strategic deception

Intelligence organizations occasionally use live, or even dead, persons to deceive the enemy about their intentions. One of the best-known such operations was the British Operation Mincemeat, in which a dead body, bearing carefully misleading documents, was put in British uniform, and floated onto a Spanish beach. In WWII, Spanish security services, while officially neutral, often passed information to the Germans, which, in this case, is exactly 8.3.5 Termination what the British wanted done. This operation was under For any number of reasons, a human source operation the control of the Twenty Committee, part of the British may need to be suspended for an indefinite time, or strategic deception organization, the London Controlling

8.5. DIRECT ACTION SERVICES

47

Section. A related British operation in WWI was run by a controversial military officer, Richard Meinertzhagen, who prepared a knapsack containing false military plans, which the Ottoman allies of the Germans were allowed to capture. The plans related to false British strategy for the Sinai and Palestine Campaign, setting up a successful surprise attack in the Battle of Beersheba and the Third Battle of Gaza. Active measures, however, reflected a national effort to influence other countries to act in concert with Soviet goals. These measures could involve state organizations up to and including the Politburo, much as the WWII British organization for strategic deception, the London Controlling Section, and its US counterpart, Joint Security Control, could get direct support from the head of government. Much of the Soviet responsibilities for active measures was focused in the KGB. Its “First Chief Directorate uses active measures such as agents of influence, propaganda, and disinformation to promote Soviet Russian concepts involve the full scope of grand strategy goals.” In the present political context of Western democracies, the sensitivity, and separation, of clandestine and open “The Second Chief Directorate”, whose responsibilities contacts do not lend themselves to the process of building are now primarily in the Russian FSB, is responsible for the recruitment of agents among foreigners stationed in agents of influence. the Soviet Union. The KGB influences these people un“Active measures is not exclusively an intelligence activ- wittingly, as most regard themselves too sophisticated to ity, and in this sense it differs from the similar American be manipulated. concept of covert action. There are many differences between active measures and covert action. One is the So- “The second deception program is counterintelligence, viet ability to mesh overt and covert influence activities which aims to neutralize the efforts of foreign intelligence through centralized coordination of party, government, services. It achieves this through the use of non-Soviet and ostensibly private organizations dealing with foreign- double agents and Soviet double agents. Non-Soviet douers. Despite interagency coordination mechanisms, the ble agents are foreign nationals who have been “turned”. United States is too pluralistic to achieve full coordina- A Soviet double agent is a Soviet with access to classition between all the overt and covert means of exercising fied information. These officials may be used as false [20] influence abroad. Other major differences are in scope, defectors.... intensity, and importance attributed to active measures “Influence operations integrate Soviet views into leaderand covert action, and in immunity from legal and politi- ship groups. The agent of influence may be a well- placed, cal constraints.” “trusted contact” who While deception and influence operations could involve the highest levels of Allied governments in WWII, it • consciously serves Soviet interests on is worth noting that while the West generally speaks some matters while retaining his integrity of military deception, strategic deception operates at a on others higher level. A Soviet, and presumably Russian, term of • an unwitting contact who is manipulated art, maskirovka or 'denial and deception', is much broader to take actions that advance Soviet interthan the current Western doctrine of deception being run ests on specific issues of common conby lower-level staff groups. cern. In the military, responsibility for maskirovka easily can be at the level of a deputy chief of the General Staff, who can call upon all levels of government.

8.5 Direct action services

Returning to KGB doctrine, presumably still present in the SVR, “Influence operations integrate Soviet views into foreign leadership groups. Propaganda operations take the form of disinformation articles placed in the foreign press. Disinformation operations are false documents designed to incite enmity toward the United States.”

There is no consensus on whether it is, or is not, advisable to intermingle espionage and direct action organizations, even at the headquarters level. See Clandestine HUMINT and Covert Action for more history and detail. A terminology point: current US terminology, ignoring an occasional euphemism, has now consolidated espionage into

48

CHAPTER 8. CLANDESTINE HUMINT OPERATIONAL TECHNIQUES

the National Clandestine Services. These are part of the [11] “Agent Radio Operation During World War II”, Studies in Intelligence CIA Directorate of Operations, which has some responsibility for Direct Action (DA) and Unconventional War[12] Begoum, F.M. (18 September 1995), “Observations on fare (UW), although the latter two, when of any apprethe Double Agent”, Studies in Intelligence, retrieved 3 ciable size, are the responsibility of the military. November 2007 There is much more argument for doing so at headquar[13] Bekrenev, (GRU officer) L. K., Operational Contacts ters, possibly not as one unit but with regular consultation. (– SCHOLAR SEARCH ), Center for the Study of InCertain services, such as name checks, communications, telligence, Central Intelligence Agency cover identities, and technical support may reasonably be combined, although the requirements of a particular field [14] Hall, Roger (1957), You're Stepping on my Cloak and Dagger, W. W. Norton & Co. network should be held on a need-to-know basis. Other countries might have the functions under the same [15] Decision Support Systems, Inc. “An Analysis of Al-Qaida Tradecraft”. Retrieved 2007-11-19. organization, but run them in completely different networks. The only commonality they might have is emer[16] John Barron (1974), KGB: the secret work of Soviet secret gency use of diplomatic facilities. agents, Readers Digest Press

8.6 See also • Tradecraft • Undercover

8.7 References [1] Paterson, Tony (25 November 2004), “Berlin plaque pays tribute to “Schindler of Stourbridge"", Independent, the (London) [2] Rogov, (GRU officer) A.S., “Pitfalls of Civilian Cover” (– SCHOLAR SEARCH ), Studies in Intelligence (Central Intelligence Agency) [3] US Department of the Army (September 2006), FM 222.3 (FM 34-52) Human Intelligence Collector Operations (PDF), retrieved 2007-10-31 [4] Beller, Patrick R., “The Life and Work of Stephan Haller”, Studies in Intelligence (Central Intelligence Agency) [5] Suvorov, Victor (1984), “Chapter 6, The Practice of Agent Work”, Inside Soviet Military Intelligence, MacMillan Publishing Company [6] US Department of Defense (12 July 2007), Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (PDF), retrieved 2007-10-01 [7] Carroll, Thomas Patrick (5 September 2006), Human Intelligence: From Sleepers to Walk-ins (PDF) [8] Prouty, L. Fisher (1973), The Secret Team: The CIA and Its Allies in Control of the United States and the World, Prentice-Hall, ISBN 0-13-798173-2 [9] “R.F. Bennett”. [10] U.S. Department of Justice,Commission for Review of FBI Security Programs (March 2002), A Review of FBI Security Programs

[17] David Kahn (1974), The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing, Macmillan, ISBN 0025604600 [18] National Security Agency. “VENONA”. Archived from the original on 2007-10-28. Retrieved 2007-11-18. [19] The SSTR-6 and SSTC-502 - “Joan-Eleanor”, 2007, retrieved 2007-11-17 [20] Edward J. Campbell. “Soviet Strategic Intelligence Deception Organizations”.

Chapter 9

Concealment device Concealment devices or diversion safes are used to hide things for the purpose of secrecy or security. They are made from an ordinary household object such as a book, a soda can, a candle, a can, or something as small as a coin. The idea is that such an inconspicuous object would not be expected to contain anything of worth. Examples in espionage include dead drop spikes for transferring items to other people, and hollowed-out coins or hollowed out teeth for concealing something - such as microfilm or a suicide pill. Examples in smuggling include suitcases with false bottoms for hiding contraband.

9.1.3 Candles A new type, the hollow candle looks like a large scented candle but is mostly hollow. The bottom comes off and rolled papers or small objects can be placed and hidden inside. Some of the most clever of these contraptions looked like large, ordinary black candles with a felt base concealing the opening. To open them, two metal needles are poked through the felt at certain points and an electric current passed through, causing them to open.

During World War II MI9 was responsible for creat- 9.1.4 Cans and jars ing many concealment devices for “escape aids” to assist prisoners of war to escape. Also a new form of concealment device, mock cans of various household chemicals or food and drinks can be purchased. A wide variety of commonly used personal 9.1 Examples care, household products and food containers with removable tops and bottoms are available. Valuables can be discreetly stored inside these lookalike containers and 9.1.1 Ammunition kept in their seemingly rightful places. Each of these diStarting in the First World War and still continuing version safes are indistinguishable from the genuine proddetection, and they may even be today, military personnel use ammunition casings to uct, and can thus avoid [1] weighted to feel full. hide small amounts of critical information e.g. encryption/recognition codes or navigational grid references etc. The hiding place is very easy to prepare: the bullet is removed from the cartridge and the propellant powder 9.1.5 poured away. A small piece of paper with writing on it can be stored inside. Given that ammunition can be found everywhere in a combat zone, it is very easy to hide or discard such items because they blend in easily. Similarly, if a soldier is captured, the enemy expects that soldiers will have ammunition in their pockets, so little attention is paid, beyond confiscating and discarding it.

9.1.2

Coins

Books

Main article: Concealing objects in a book Books are possibly the most common concealment devices in usage. They are easily made and can contain quite large objects. They are also very difficult for outsiders to spot but easy to recognize for those that are looking for a American dollar coin used for concealment specific book on a shelf. 49

50

CHAPTER 9. CONCEALMENT DEVICE

A hollow container, fashioned to look like an Eisenhower dollar, is still used today to hide and send messages or film without being detected. Because it resembles ordinary pocket change, it is virtually undetectable as a concealment device. If a hollow coin is suspected, it sometimes can be easily confirmed by weighing against a normal coin on a simple balance. However, more sophisticated hollow coins have had their weight adjusted to match an unaltered coin by including a ring of a dense metal such as lead inside the coin. Typically coins that have no gold or silver content are used so as to further avoid suspicion.

goods to be concealed. Some of the more common devices used for this purpose are video players such as VHS, DVD and Blu-ray players, computer accessories such as DVD-ROM drives and hard disk drives, battery packs or even a laptop computer itself. More often than not, the majority of the components will be removed to allow more space to conceal an item, but that will render the device inoperable and may arouse suspicion, and it may be of more benefit to preserve the operation of the device at the sacrifice of space. Additionally, the electronic device itself may be subject to theft, thereby defeating the Such hollow coins were created from two ordinary coins, purpose of such a concealment device. by milling out one face and the interior of both coins (to create a cavity), and the edges of one (so it could slide into the other). The half coin with intact edges would 9.2 See also also have a pin-prick size hole drilled through its face, so the device could be opened by inserting a pin. A • Rudolph Abel scratch may be added to help line up the faces while clos• Dead drop ing it—although it is very difficult to detect a slight misalignment by casual inspection. A device of this nature was famously discovered by a paper boy in the "Hollow Nickel Case". U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers was issued 9.3 References with a hollow silver dollar containing a tiny, saxitoxinimpregnated needle,[2] to be used to commit suicide in [1] Diversion Safes at the Wayback Machine (archived February 21, 2009) case of capture by enemy forces.

9.1.6

Diversion safe

A device whereby a safe-looking safe is left open but has a hidden compartment (e.g., in the door) where small valuable articles can be hidden. As an alternative variant, a safe may be “stocked” with some lesser valuables, with the expectation that it will be burgled, but that the real safe or hiding place for the important valuables will be missed.

9.1.7

Electrical outlet

A fake electrical outlet, which can be pulled out from the wall and which contains a hidden compartment for storage.

9.1.8

Painting

Thin objects such as papers/money can be concealed in or behind the frame of a painting.

9.1.9

Computers and consumer electronics

Computer equipment and consumer electronics can easily be used for concealing goods and information. Usually the only tool required is a screwdriver, the device can be opened up, have the majority of the electronic and mechanical components removed and replaced with the

[2] Unauthorized Storage of Toxic Agents. Church Committee Reports 1. The Assassination Archives and Research Center (AARC). 1975-176. p. 7. Check date values in: |date= (help)

Chapter 10

Cryptography “Secret code” redirects here. For the Aya Kamiki album, see Secret Code. “Cryptology” redirects here. For the David S. Ware album, see Cryptology (album). Cryptography (or cryptology; from Greek κρυπτός

German Lorenz cipher machine, used in World War II to encrypt very-high-level general staff messages

application more widespread. Modern cryptography is heavily based on mathematical theory and computer science practice; cryptographic algorithms are designed around computational hardness assumptions, making such algorithms hard to break in practice by any adversary. It is theoretically possible to break such a system, but it is infeasible to do so by any known practical means. These schemes are therefore termed computationally secure; theoretical advances, e.g., improvements in integer factorization algorithms, and faster computing technology require these solutions to be continually adapted. There exist information-theoretically secure schemes that provably cannot be broken even with unlimited computing power—an example is the one-time pad—but these schemes are more difficult to implement than the best theoretically breakable but computationally secure mechanisms. The growth of cryptographic technology has raised a number of legal issues in the information age. Cryptography’s potential for use as a tool for espionage and sedition has led many governments to classify it as a weapon and to limit or even prohibit its use and export.[5] In some jurisdictions where the use of cryptography is legal, laws permit investigators to compel the disclosure of encryption keys for documents relevant to an investigation.[6] Cryptography also plays a major role in digital rights management and piracy of digital media.[7]

kryptós, “hidden, secret"; and γράφειν graphein, “writing”, or -λογία -logia, “study”, respectively)[1] is the practice and study of techniques for secure communication in the presence of third parties (called adversaries).[2] More generally, it is about constructing and analyzing protocols that block adversaries;[3] various aspects in information security such as data confidentiality, data integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation[4] are central to modern cryptography. Modern cryptography ex- 10.1 Terminology ists at the intersection of the disciplines of mathematics, computer science, and electrical engineering. Appli- Until modern times cryptography referred almost exclucations of cryptography include ATM cards, computer sively to encryption, which is the process of converting passwords, and electronic commerce. ordinary information (called plaintext) into unintelligiCryptography prior to the modern age was effectively ble text (called ciphertext).[8] Decryption is the reverse, synonymous with encryption, the conversion of informa- in other words, moving from the unintelligible ciphertion from a readable state to apparent nonsense. The text back to plaintext. A cipher (or cypher) is a pair originator of an encrypted message shared the decoding of algorithms that create the encryption and the reverstechnique needed to recover the original information only ing decryption. The detailed operation of a cipher is with intended recipients, thereby precluding unwanted controlled both by the algorithm and in each instance persons from doing the same. Since World War I and by a "key". This is a secret (ideally known only to the advent of the computer, the methods used to carry the communicants), usually a short string of characters, out cryptology have become increasingly complex and its which is needed to decrypt the ciphertext. Formally, a 51

52 "cryptosystem" is the ordered list of elements of finite possible plaintexts, finite possible cyphertexts, finite possible keys, and the encryption and decryption algorithms which correspond to each key. Keys are important both formally and in actual practice, as ciphers without variable keys can be trivially broken with only the knowledge of the cipher used and are therefore useless (or even counter-productive) for most purposes. Historically, ciphers were often used directly for encryption or decryption without additional procedures such as authentication or integrity checks.

CHAPTER 10. CRYPTOGRAPHY (attempt to) ensure secrecy in communications, such as those of spies, military leaders, and diplomats. In recent decades, the field has expanded beyond confidentiality concerns to include techniques for message integrity checking, sender/receiver identity authentication, digital signatures, interactive proofs and secure computation, among others.

10.2.1 Classic cryptography

In colloquial use, the term "code" is often used to mean any method of encryption or concealment of meaning. However, in cryptography, code has a more specific meaning. It means the replacement of a unit of plaintext (i.e., a meaningful word or phrase) with a code word (for example, “wallaby” replaces “attack at dawn”). Codes are no longer used in serious cryptography—except incidentally for such things as unit designations (e.g., Bronco Flight or Operation Overlord)—since properly chosen ciphers are both more practical and more secure than even the best codes and also are better adapted to computers. Cryptanalysis is the term used for the study of methods for obtaining the meaning of encrypted information without access to the key normally required to do so; i.e., it is Reconstructed ancient Greek scytale, an early cipher device the study of how to crack encryption algorithms or their implementations. The earliest forms of secret writing required little more Some use the terms cryptography and cryptology inter- than writing implements since most people could not changeably in English, while others (including US mili- read. More literacy, or literate opponents, required actary practice generally) use cryptography to refer specifi- tual cryptography. The main classical cipher types are cally to the use and practice of cryptographic techniques transposition ciphers, which rearrange the order of letters and cryptology to refer to the combined study of cryp- in a message (e.g., 'hello world' becomes 'ehlol owrdl' in a tography and cryptanalysis.[9][10] English is more flexible trivially simple rearrangement scheme), and substitution than several other languages in which cryptology (done by ciphers, which systematically replace letters or groups of cryptologists) is always used in the second sense above. letters with other letters or groups of letters (e.g., 'fly at RFC 2828 advises that steganography is sometimes in- once' becomes 'gmz bu podf' by replacing each letter with the one following it in the Latin alphabet). Simple vercluded in cryptology.[11] sions of either have never offered much confidentiality The study of characteristics of languages that have some from enterprising opponents. An early substitution cipher application in cryptography or cryptology (e.g. frequency was the Caesar cipher, in which each letter in the plaintext data, letter combinations, universal patterns, etc.) is was replaced by a letter some fixed number of positions called cryptolinguistics. further down the alphabet. Suetonius reports that Julius Caesar used it with a shift of three to communicate with his generals. Atbash is an example of an early Hebrew 10.2 History of cryptography and cipher. The earliest known use of cryptography is some carved ciphertext on stone in Egypt (ca 1900 BCE), but cryptanalysis this may have been done for the amusement of literate observers rather than as a way of concealing information. Main article: History of cryptography The Greeks of Classical times are said to have Before the modern era, cryptography was concerned solely with message confidentiality (i.e., encryption)— conversion of messages from a comprehensible form into an incomprehensible one and back again at the other end, rendering it unreadable by interceptors or eavesdroppers without secret knowledge (namely the key needed for decryption of that message). Encryption was used to

known of ciphers (e.g., the scytale transposition cipher claimed to have been used by the Spartan military).[12] Steganography (i.e., hiding even the existence of a message so as to keep it confidential) was also first developed in ancient times. An early example, from Herodotus, was a message tattooed on a slave’s shaved head and concealed under the regrown hair.[8] More modern examples of steganography include the use of invisible ink,

10.2. HISTORY OF CRYPTOGRAPHY AND CRYPTANALYSIS

53

microdots, and digital watermarks to conceal information. In India, the 2000-year old Kamasutra of Vātsyāyana speaks of two different kinds of ciphers called Kautiliyam and Mulavediya. In the Kautiliyam, the cipher letter substitutions are based on phonetic relations, such as vowels becoming consonants. In the Mulavediya, the cipher alphabet consists of pairing letters and using the reciprocal ones.[8]

16th-century book-shaped French cipher machine, with arms of Henri II of France

First page of a book by Al-Kindi which discusses encryption of messages

Ciphertexts produced by a classical cipher (and some modern ciphers) always reveal statistical information about the plaintext, which can often be used to break them. After the discovery of frequency analysis, perhaps by the Arab mathematician and polymath Al-Kindi (also known as Alkindus) in the 9th century,[13] nearly all such ciphers became more or less readily breakable by any informed attacker. Such classical ciphers still enjoy popularity today, though mostly as puzzles (see cryptogram). Al-Kindi wrote a book on cryptography entitled Risalah fi Istikhraj al-Mu'amma (Manuscript for the Deciphering Cryptographic Messages), which described the first known use frequency analysis cryptanalysis techniques.[13][14] Essentially all ciphers remained vulnerable to cryptanalysis using the frequency analysis technique until the development of the polyalphabetic cipher, most clearly by Leon Battista Alberti around the year 1467, though there is some indication that it was already known to AlKindi.[14] Alberti’s innovation was to use different ciphers (i.e., substitution alphabets) for various parts of a message (perhaps for each successive plaintext letter at the limit). He also invented what was probably the first automatic cipher device, a wheel which implemented a partial realization of his invention. In the polyalphabetic Vigenère cipher, encryption uses a key word, which controls letter substitution depending on which letter of the

Enciphered letter from Gabriel de Luetz d'Aramon, French Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, after 1546, with partial decipherment

key word is used. In the mid-19th century Charles Babbage showed that the Vigenère cipher was vulnerable to Kasiski examination, but this was first published about ten years later by Friedrich Kasiski.[15] Although frequency analysis can be a powerful and general technique against many ciphers, encryption has still often been effective in practice, as many a would-be cryptanalyst was unaware of the technique. Breaking a message without using frequency analysis essentially required knowledge of the cipher used and perhaps of the key involved, thus making espionage, bribery, burglary, defection, etc., more attractive approaches to the cryptanalytically uninformed. It was finally explicitly recognized in the 19th century that secrecy of a cipher’s algorithm is not a sensible nor practical safeguard of message security; in fact, it was further realized that any adequate cryptographic scheme (including ciphers) should remain secure even if the adversary fully understands the cipher algorithm itself. Security of the key used should alone be sufficient for a good cipher to maintain confidentiality under an attack. This fundamental principle was first explicitly stated in 1883 by Auguste Kerckhoffs and is generally called Kerckhoffs’s Principle; alternatively and more bluntly, it was restated by Claude Shannon, the inventor of information theory and the fundamentals of the-

54

CHAPTER 10. CRYPTOGRAPHY

oretical cryptography, as Shannon’s Maxim—'the enemy Extensive open academic research into cryptography is knows the system'. relatively recent; it began only in the mid-1970s. In recent Different physical devices and aids have been used to times, IBM personnel designed the algorithm that became assist with ciphers. One of the earliest may have been the Federal (i.e., US) Data Encryption Standard; WhitHellman published their key agreethe scytale of ancient Greece, a rod supposedly used by field Diffie and Martin [18] ment algorithm; and the RSA algorithm was published the Spartans as an aid for a transposition cipher (see in Martin Gardner's Scientific American column. Since image above). In medieval times, other aids were inthen, cryptography has become a widely used tool in comvented such as the cipher grille, which was also used for a munications, computer networks, and computer security kind of steganography. With the invention of polyalphabetic ciphers came more sophisticated aids such as Al- generally. Some modern cryptographic techniques can only keep their keys secret if certain mathematical probberti’s own cipher disk, Johannes Trithemius' tabula recta scheme, and Thomas Jefferson's multi cylinder (not pub- lems are intractable, such as the integer factorization or the discrete logarithm problems, so there are deep conlicly known, and reinvented independently by Bazeries around 1900). Many mechanical encryption/decryption nections with abstract mathematics. There are very few cryptosytems that are proven to be unconditionally sedevices were invented early in the 20th century, and several patented, among them rotor machines—famously in- cure. The one-time pad is one. There are a few important cluding the Enigma machine used by the German govern- ones that are proven secure under certain unproven asment and military from the late 1920s and during World sumptions. For example, the infeasibility of factoring exWar II.[16] The ciphers implemented by better quality ex- tremely large integers is the basis for believing that RSA is amples of these machine designs brought about a substan- secure, and some other systems, but even there, the proof is usually lost due to practical considerations. There are tial increase in cryptanalytic difficulty after WWI.[17] systems similar to RSA, such as one by Michael O. Rabin that is provably secure provided factoring n = pq is impossible, but the more practical system RSA has never been 10.2.2 Computer era proved secure in this sense. The discrete logarithm problem is the basis for believing some other cryptosystems Cryptanalysis of the new mechanical devices proved to are secure, and again, there are related, less practical sysbe both difficult and laborious. In the United King- tems that are provably secure relative to the discrete log [19] dom, cryptanalytic efforts at Bletchley Park during WWII problem. spurred the development of more efficient means for car- As well as being aware of cryptographic history, cryptorying out repetitious tasks. This culminated in the devel- graphic algorithm and system designers must also sensiopment of the Colossus, the world’s first fully electronic, bly consider probable future developments while working digital, programmable computer, which assisted in the on their designs. For instance, continuous improvements decryption of ciphers generated by the German Army’s in computer processing power have increased the scope Lorenz SZ40/42 machine. of brute-force attacks, so when specifying key lengths, Just as the development of digital computers and electronics helped in cryptanalysis, it made possible much more complex ciphers. Furthermore, computers allowed for the encryption of any kind of data representable in any binary format, unlike classical ciphers which only encrypted written language texts; this was new and significant. Computer use has thus supplanted linguistic cryptography, both for cipher design and cryptanalysis. Many computer ciphers can be characterized by their operation on binary bit sequences (sometimes in groups or blocks), unlike classical and mechanical schemes, which generally manipulate traditional characters (i.e., letters and digits) directly. However, computers have also assisted cryptanalysis, which has compensated to some extent for increased cipher complexity. Nonetheless, good modern ciphers have stayed ahead of cryptanalysis; it is typically the case that use of a quality cipher is very efficient (i.e., fast and requiring few resources, such as memory or CPU capability), while breaking it requires an effort many orders of magnitude larger, and vastly larger than that required for any classical cipher, making cryptanalysis so inefficient and impractical as to be effectively impossible.

the required key lengths are similarly advancing.[20] The potential effects of quantum computing are already being considered by some cryptographic system designers; the announced imminence of small implementations of these machines may be making the need for this preemptive caution rather more than merely speculative.[4] Essentially, prior to the early 20th century, cryptography was chiefly concerned with linguistic and lexicographic patterns. Since then the emphasis has shifted, and cryptography now makes extensive use of mathematics, including aspects of information theory, computational complexity, statistics, combinatorics, abstract algebra, number theory, and finite mathematics generally. Cryptography is also a branch of engineering, but an unusual one since it deals with active, intelligent, and malevolent opposition (see cryptographic engineering and security engineering); other kinds of engineering (e.g., civil or chemical engineering) need deal only with neutral natural forces. There is also active research examining the relationship between cryptographic problems and quantum physics (see quantum cryptography and quantum computer).

10.3. MODERN CRYPTOGRAPHY

55

10.3 Modern cryptography The modern field of cryptography can be divided into several areas of study. The chief ones are discussed here; see Topics in Cryptography for more.

10.3.1

Symmetric-key cryptography

K1

K2

K3

K4

K5

Main article: Symmetric-key algorithm Symmetric-key cryptography refers to encryption methK6

Bob Hello Alice!

Encrypt

6EB69570 08E03CE4

Alice Hello Alice!

One round (out of 8.5) of the IDEA cipher, used in some versions of PGP for high-speed encryption of, for instance, e-mail

Secret key

Decrypt

Symmetric-key cryptography, where a single key is used for encryption and decryption

ods in which both the sender and receiver share the same key (or, less commonly, in which their keys are different, but related in an easily computable way). This was the only kind of encryption publicly known until June 1976.[18] Symmetric key ciphers are implemented as either block ciphers or stream ciphers. A block cipher enciphers input in blocks of plaintext as opposed to individual characters, the input form used by a stream cipher.

with the plaintext bit-by-bit or character-by-character, somewhat like the one-time pad. In a stream cipher, the output stream is created based on a hidden internal state which changes as the cipher operates. That internal state is initially set up using the secret key material. RC4 is a widely used stream cipher; see Category:Stream ciphers.[4] Block ciphers can be used as stream ciphers; see Block cipher modes of operation. Cryptographic hash functions are a third type of cryptographic algorithm. They take a message of any length as input, and output a short, fixed length hash which can be used in (for example) a digital signature. For good hash functions, an attacker cannot find two messages that produce the same hash. MD4 is a long-used hash function which is now broken; MD5, a strengthened variant of MD4, is also widely used but broken in practice. The US National Security Agency developed the Secure Hash Algorithm series of MD5-like hash functions: SHA-0 was a flawed algorithm that the agency withdrew; SHA-1 is widely deployed and more secure than MD5, but cryptanalysts have identified attacks against it; the SHA-2 family improves on SHA-1, but it isn't yet widely deployed; and the US standards authority thought it “prudent” from a security perspective to develop a new standard to “significantly improve the robustness of NIST’s overall hash algorithm toolkit.”[26] Thus, a hash function design competition was meant to select a new U.S. national standard, to be called SHA-3, by 2012. The competition ended on October 2, 2012 when the NIST announced that Keccak would be the new SHA-3 hash algorithm.[27]

The Data Encryption Standard (DES) and the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) are block cipher designs which have been designated cryptography standards by the US government (though DES’s designation was finally withdrawn after the AES was adopted).[21] Despite its deprecation as an official standard, DES (especially its still-approved and much more secure triple-DES variant) remains quite popular; it is used across a wide range of applications, from ATM encryption[22] to e-mail privacy[23] and secure remote access.[24] Many other block ciphers have been designed and released, with consider- Message authentication codes (MACs) are much like able variation in quality. Many have been thoroughly bro- cryptographic hash functions, except that a secret key can ken, such as FEAL.[4][25] be used to authenticate the hash value upon receipt;[4] this Stream ciphers, in contrast to the 'block' type, create an additional complication blocks an attack scheme against arbitrarily long stream of key material, which is combined bare digest algorithms, and so has been thought worth the

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CHAPTER 10. CRYPTOGRAPHY

effort.

In a groundbreaking 1976 paper, Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman proposed the notion of public-key (also, more generally, called asymmetric key) cryptography in 10.3.2 Public-key cryptography which two different but mathematically related keys are used—a public key and a private key.[28] A public key Main article: Public-key cryptography system is so constructed that calculation of one key Symmetric-key cryptosystems use the same key for en- (the 'private key') is computationally infeasible from the other (the 'public key'), even though they are necessarily related. Instead, both keys are generated secretly, Bob as an interrelated pair.[29] The historian David Kahn described public-key cryptography as “the most revolutionHello ary new concept in the field since polyalphabetic substiEncrypt Alice! tution emerged in the Renaissance”.[30] Alice's public key

6EB69570 08E03CE4

Alice Hello Alice!

Decrypt Alice's private key

Public-key cryptography, where different keys are used for encryption and decryption

cryption and decryption of a message, though a message or group of messages may have a different key than others. A significant disadvantage of symmetric ciphers is the key management necessary to use them securely. Each distinct pair of communicating parties must, ideally, share a different key, and perhaps each ciphertext exchanged as well. The number of keys required increases as the square of the number of network members, which very quickly requires complex key management schemes to keep them all consistent and secret. The difficulty of securely establishing a secret key between two communicating parties, when a secure channel does not already exist between them, also presents a chicken-and-egg problem which is a considerable practical obstacle for cryptography users in the real world.

In public-key cryptosystems, the public key may be freely distributed, while its paired private key must remain secret. In a public-key encryption system, the public key is used for encryption, while the private or secret key is used for decryption. While Diffie and Hellman could not find such a system, they showed that public-key cryptography was indeed possible by presenting the Diffie–Hellman key exchange protocol, a solution that is now widely used in secure communications to allow two parties to secretly agree on a shared encryption key.[18] Diffie and Hellman’s publication sparked widespread academic efforts in finding a practical public-key encryption system. This race was finally won in 1978 by Ronald Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Len Adleman, whose solution has since become known as the RSA algorithm.[31] The Diffie–Hellman and RSA algorithms, in addition to being the first publicly known examples of high quality public-key algorithms, have been among the most widely used. Others include the Cramer–Shoup cryptosystem, ElGamal encryption, and various elliptic curve techniques. See Category:Asymmetric-key cryptosystems. To much surprise, a document published in 1997 by the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), a British intelligence organization, revealed that cryptographers at GCHQ had anticipated several academic developments.[32] Reportedly, around 1970, James H. Ellis had conceived the principles of asymmetric key cryptography. In 1973, Clifford Cocks invented a solution that essentially resembles the RSA algorithm.[32][33] And in 1974, Malcolm J. Williamson is claimed to have developed the Diffie–Hellman key exchange.[34]

Padlock icon from the Firefox Web browser, which indicates that TLS, a public-key cryptography system, is in use.

Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman, authors of the first published paper on public-key cryptography

Public-key cryptography can also be used for implementing digital signature schemes. A digital signature is reminiscent of an ordinary signature; they both have the characteristic of being easy for a user to produce, but difficult for anyone else to forge. Digital signatures can also

10.3. MODERN CRYPTOGRAPHY

57

be permanently tied to the content of the message being signed; they cannot then be 'moved' from one document to another, for any attempt will be detectable. In digital signature schemes, there are two algorithms: one for signing, in which a secret key is used to process the message (or a hash of the message, or both), and one for verification, in which the matching public key is used with the message to check the validity of the signature. RSA and DSA are two of the most popular digital signature schemes. Digital signatures are central to the operation of public key infrastructures and many network security schemes (e.g., SSL/TLS, many VPNs, etc.).[25] Public-key algorithms are most often based on the computational complexity of “hard” problems, often from number theory. For example, the hardness of RSA is related to the integer factorization problem, while Diffie–Hellman and DSA are related to the discrete logarithm problem. More recently, elliptic curve cryptography has developed, a system in which security is based on number theoretic problems involving elliptic curves. Because of the difficulty of the underlying problems, most public-key algorithms involve operations such as modular multiplication and exponentiation, which are much more computationally expensive than the techniques used in most block ciphers, especially with typical key sizes. As a result, public-key cryptosystems are commonly hybrid cryptosystems, in which a fast high-quality symmetrickey encryption algorithm is used for the message itself, while the relevant symmetric key is sent with the message, but encrypted using a public-key algorithm. Similarly, hybrid signature schemes are often used, in which a cryptographic hash function is computed, and only the resulting hash is digitally signed.[4]

10.3.3

Cryptanalysis

Main article: Cryptanalysis The goal of cryptanalysis is to find some weakness or insecurity in a cryptographic scheme, thus permitting its subversion or evasion. It is a common misconception that every encryption method can be broken. In connection with his WWII work at Bell Labs, Claude Shannon proved that the onetime pad cipher is unbreakable, provided the key material is truly random, never reused, kept secret from all possible attackers, and of equal or greater length than the message.[35] Most ciphers, apart from the one-time pad, can be broken with enough computational effort by brute force attack, but the amount of effort needed may be exponentially dependent on the key size, as compared to the effort needed to make use of the cipher. In such cases, effective security could be achieved if it is proven that the effort required (i.e., “work factor”, in Shannon’s terms) is beyond the ability of any adversary. This means it must be shown that no efficient method (as opposed to the time-consuming brute force method) can be found to break the cipher. Since no such proof has been found

Variants of the Enigma machine, used by Germany’s military and civil authorities from the late 1920s through World War II, implemented a complex electro-mechanical polyalphabetic cipher. Breaking and reading of the Enigma cipher at Poland’s Cipher Bureau, for 7 years before the war, and subsequent decryption at Bletchley Park, was important to Allied victory.[8]

to date, the one-time-pad remains the only theoretically unbreakable cipher. There are a wide variety of cryptanalytic attacks, and they can be classified in any of several ways. A common distinction turns on what an attacker knows and what capabilities are available. In a ciphertext-only attack, the cryptanalyst has access only to the ciphertext (good modern cryptosystems are usually effectively immune to ciphertext-only attacks). In a known-plaintext attack, the cryptanalyst has access to a ciphertext and its corresponding plaintext (or to many such pairs). In a chosen-plaintext attack, the cryptanalyst may choose a plaintext and learn its corresponding ciphertext (perhaps many times); an example is gardening, used by the British during WWII. Finally, in a chosen-ciphertext attack, the cryptanalyst may be able to choose ciphertexts and learn their corresponding plaintexts.[4] Also important, often overwhelmingly so, are mistakes (generally in the design or use of one of the protocols involved; see Cryptanalysis of the Enigma for some historical examples of this). Cryptanalysis of symmetric-key ciphers typically involves looking for attacks against the block ciphers or stream ciphers that are more efficient than any attack that could be against a perfect cipher. For example, a simple brute force attack against DES requires one known plaintext and 255 decryptions, trying approximately half of the

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CHAPTER 10. CRYPTOGRAPHY work with cryptosystems or the messages they handle (e.g., bribery, extortion, blackmail, espionage, torture, ...) may be the most productive attacks of all.

10.3.4 Cryptographic primitives Much of the theoretical work in cryptography concerns cryptographic primitives—algorithms with basic cryptographic properties—and their relationship to other cryptographic problems. More complicated cryptographic tools are then built from these basic primitives. These primitives provide fundamental properties, which are used to develop more complex tools called cryptosystems Poznań monument (center) to Polish cryptologists whose breakor cryptographic protocols, which guarantee one or more ing of Germany's Enigma machine ciphers, beginning in 1932, high-level security properties. Note however, that the disaltered the course of World War II tinction between cryptographic primitives and cryptosystems, is quite arbitrary; for example, the RSA algorithm is sometimes considered a cryptosystem, and sometimes a possible keys, to reach a point at which chances are better primitive. Typical examples of cryptographic primitives than even that the key sought will have been found. But include pseudorandom functions, one-way functions, etc. this may not be enough assurance; a linear cryptanalysis attack against DES requires 243 known plaintexts and approximately 243 DES operations.[36] This is a consid- 10.3.5 Cryptosystems erable improvement on brute force attacks. Public-key algorithms are based on the computational One or more cryptographic primitives are often used difficulty of various problems. The most famous of to develop a more complex algorithm, called a cryptothese is integer factorization (e.g., the RSA algorithm graphic system, or cryptosystem. Cryptosystems (e.g., is based on a problem related to integer factoring), but El-Gamal encryption) are designed to provide particthe discrete logarithm problem is also important. Much ular functionality (e.g., public key encryption) while public-key cryptanalysis concerns numerical algorithms guaranteeing certain security properties (e.g., chosenfor solving these computational problems, or some of plaintext attack (CPA) security in the random oracle them, efficiently (i.e., in a practical time). For instance, model). Cryptosystems use the properties of the underthe best known algorithms for solving the elliptic curve- lying cryptographic primitives to support the system’s sebased version of discrete logarithm are much more time- curity properties. Of course, as the distinction between consuming than the best known algorithms for factor- primitives and cryptosystems is somewhat arbitrary, a ing, at least for problems of more or less equivalent size. sophisticated cryptosystem can be derived from a combination of several more primitive cryptosystems. In Thus, other things being equal, to achieve an equivalent strength of attack resistance, factoring-based encryption many cases, the cryptosystem’s structure involves back and forth communication among two or more parties in techniques must use larger keys than elliptic curve techniques. For this reason, public-key cryptosystems based space (e.g., between the sender of a secure message and its receiver) or across time (e.g., cryptographically proon elliptic curves have become popular since their inventected backup data). Such cryptosystems are sometimes tion in the mid-1990s. called cryptographic protocols. While pure cryptanalysis uses weaknesses in the algorithms themselves, other attacks on cryptosystems are Some widely known cryptosystems include RSA encrypbased on actual use of the algorithms in real devices, and tion, Schnorr signature, El-Gamal encryption, PGP, etc. [38] are called side-channel attacks. If a cryptanalyst has ac- More complex cryptosystems include electronic cash cess to, for example, the amount of time the device took systems, signcryption systems, etc. Some more 'theoretproof systems,[39] to encrypt a number of plaintexts or report an error in a ical' cryptosystems include interactive [40] zero-knowledge proofs), systems for secret sharpassword or PIN character, he may be able to use a timing (like[41][42] etc. ing, attack to break a cipher that is otherwise resistant to analysis. An attacker might also study the pattern and length Until recently, most security properties of most crypof messages to derive valuable information; this is known tosystems were demonstrated using empirical techniques as traffic analysis[37] and can be quite useful to an alert ad- or using ad hoc reasoning. Recently, there has been conversary. Poor administration of a cryptosystem, such as siderable effort to develop formal techniques for estabpermitting too short keys, will make any system vulner- lishing the security of cryptosystems; this has been generable, regardless of other virtues. And, of course, social ally called provable security. The general idea of provable engineering, and other attacks against the personnel who security is to give arguments about the computational dif-

10.4. LEGAL ISSUES

59

ficulty needed to compromise some security aspect of the 10.4.2 Export controls cryptosystem (i.e., to any adversary). The study of how best to implement and integrate cryp- Main article: Export of cryptography tography in software applications is itself a distinct field (see Cryptographic engineering and Security engineer- In the 1990s, there were several challenges to US exing). port regulation of cryptography. After the source code for Philip Zimmermann's Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) encryption program found its way onto the Internet in June 1991, a complaint by RSA Security (then called RSA Data Security, Inc.) resulted in a lengthy criminal inves10.4 Legal issues tigation of Zimmermann by the US Customs Service and the FBI, though no charges were ever filed.[45][46] Daniel See also: Cryptography laws in different nations J. Bernstein, then a graduate student at UC Berkeley, brought a lawsuit against the US government challenging some aspects of the restrictions based on free speech grounds. The 1995 case Bernstein v. United States ultimately resulted in a 1999 decision that printed source code for cryptographic algorithms and systems was pro10.4.1 Prohibitions tected as free speech by the United States Constitution.[47] Cryptography has long been of interest to intelligence In 1996, thirty-nine countries signed the Wassenaar Argathering and law enforcement agencies. Secret commu- rangement, an arms control treaty that deals with the exnications may be criminal or even treasonous. Because of port of arms and “dual-use” technologies such as crypits facilitation of privacy, and the diminution of privacy tography. The treaty stipulated that the use of cryptogattendant on its prohibition, cryptography is also of con- raphy with short key-lengths (56-bit for symmetric ensiderable interest to civil rights supporters. Accordingly, cryption, 512-bit for RSA) would no longer be exportthere has been a history of controversial legal issues sur- controlled.[48] Cryptography exports from the US berounding cryptography, especially since the advent of in- came less strictly regulated as a consequence of a maexpensive computers has made widespread access to high jor relaxation in 2000;[49] there are no longer very many quality cryptography possible. restrictions on key sizes in US-exported mass-market In some countries, even the domestic use of cryptogra- software. Since this relaxation in US export restricphy is, or has been, restricted. Until 1999, France signif- tions, and because most personal computers connected icantly restricted the use of cryptography domestically, to the Internet include US-sourced web browsers such though it has since relaxed many of these rules. In China as Firefox or Internet Explorer, almost every Internet and Iran, a license is still required to use cryptography.[5] user worldwide has potential access to quality cryptogMany countries have tight restrictions on the use of cryp- raphy via their browsers (e.g., via Transport Layer Setography. Among the more restrictive are laws in Belarus, curity). The Mozilla Thunderbird and Microsoft OutKazakhstan, Mongolia, Pakistan, Singapore, Tunisia, and look E-mail client programs similarly can transmit and receive emails via TLS, and can send and receive email Vietnam.[43] encrypted with S/MIME. Many Internet users don't reIn the United States, cryptography is legal for domestic alize that their basic application software contains such use, but there has been much conflict over legal issues re- extensive cryptosystems. These browsers and email prolated to cryptography. One particularly important issue grams are so ubiquitous that even governments whose inhas been the export of cryptography and cryptographic tent is to regulate civilian use of cryptography generally software and hardware. Probably because of the impor- don't find it practical to do much to control distribution tance of cryptanalysis in World War II and an expecta- or use of cryptography of this quality, so even when such tion that cryptography would continue to be important laws are in force, actual enforcement is often effectively for national security, many Western governments have, impossible. at some point, strictly regulated export of cryptography. After World War II, it was illegal in the US to sell or distribute encryption technology overseas; in fact, encryp10.4.3 NSA involvement tion was designated as auxiliary military equipment and [44] put on the United States Munitions List. Until the development of the personal computer, asymmetric key al- See also: Clipper chip gorithms (i.e., public key techniques), and the Internet, this was not especially problematic. However, as the In- Another contentious issue connected to cryptography in ternet grew and computers became more widely available, the United States is the influence of the National Security high-quality encryption techniques became well known Agency on cipher development and policy. The NSA was involved with the design of DES during its development at around the globe.

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CHAPTER 10. CRYPTOGRAPHY

IBM and its consideration by the National Bureau of Standards as a possible Federal Standard for cryptography.[50] DES was designed to be resistant to differential cryptanalysis,[51] a powerful and general cryptanalytic technique known to the NSA and IBM, that became publicly known only when it was rediscovered in the late 1980s.[52] According to Steven Levy, IBM discovered differential cryptanalysis,[46] but kept the technique secret at the NSA’s request. The technique became publicly known only when Biham and Shamir re-discovered and announced it some years later. The entire affair illustrates the difficulty of determining what resources and knowledge an attacker might actually have. Another instance of the NSA’s involvement was the 1993 Clipper chip affair, an encryption microchip intended to be part of the Capstone cryptography-control initiative. Clipper was widely criticized by cryptographers for two reasons. The cipher algorithm (called Skipjack) was then classified (declassified in 1998, long after the Clipper initiative lapsed). The classified cipher caused concerns that the NSA had deliberately made the cipher weak in order to assist its intelligence efforts. The whole initiative was also criticized based on its violation of Kerckhoffs’s Principle, as the scheme included a special escrow key held by the government for use by law enforcement, for example in wiretaps.[46]

10.4.4

Digital rights management

Main article: Digital rights management Cryptography is central to digital rights management (DRM), a group of techniques for technologically controlling use of copyrighted material, being widely implemented and deployed at the behest of some copyright holders. In 1998, U.S. President Bill Clinton signed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), which criminalized all production, dissemination, and use of certain cryptanalytic techniques and technology (now known or later discovered); specifically, those that could be used to circumvent DRM technological schemes.[53] This had a noticeable impact on the cryptography research community since an argument can be made that any cryptanalytic research violated, or might violate, the DMCA. Similar statutes have since been enacted in several countries and regions, including the implementation in the EU Copyright Directive. Similar restrictions are called for by treaties signed by World Intellectual Property Organization member-states. The United States Department of Justice and FBI have not enforced the DMCA as rigorously as had been feared by some, but the law, nonetheless, remains a controversial one. Niels Ferguson, a well-respected cryptography researcher, has publicly stated that he will not release some of his research into an Intel security design for fear of prosecution under the DMCA.[54] Both Alan Cox

(longtime number 2 in Linux kernel development) and Edward Felten (and some of his students at Princeton) have encountered problems related to the Act. Dmitry Sklyarov was arrested during a visit to the US from Russia, and jailed for five months pending trial for alleged violations of the DMCA arising from work he had done in Russia, where the work was legal. In 2007, the cryptographic keys responsible for Blu-ray and HD DVD content scrambling were discovered and released onto the Internet. In both cases, the MPAA sent out numerous DMCA takedown notices, and there was a massive Internet backlash[7] triggered by the perceived impact of such notices on fair use and free speech.

10.4.5 Forced disclosure of encryption keys Main article: Key disclosure law In the United Kingdom, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act gives UK police the powers to force suspects to decrypt files or hand over passwords that protect encryption keys. Failure to comply is an offense in its own right, punishable on conviction by a two-year jail sentence or up to five years in cases involving national security.[6] Successful prosecutions have occurred under the Act; the first, in 2009,[55] resulted in a term of 13 months’ imprisonment.[56] Similar forced disclosure laws in Australia, Finland, France, and India compel individual suspects under investigation to hand over encryption keys or passwords during a criminal investigation. In the United States, the federal criminal case of United States v. Fricosu addressed whether a search warrant can compel a person to reveal an encryption passphrase or password.[57] The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) argued that this is a violation of the protection from selfincrimination given by the Fifth Amendment.[58] In 2012, the court ruled that under the All Writs Act, the defendant was required to produce an unencrypted hard drive for the court.[59] In many jurisdictions, the legal status of forced disclosure remains unclear.

10.5 See also • List of cryptographers • Encyclopedia of Cryptography and Security • List of important publications in cryptography • List of multiple discoveries (see “RSA”) • List of unsolved problems in computer science • Outline of cryptography

10.6. REFERENCES • Global surveillance

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• Strong cryptography

[18] Diffie, Whitfield; Hellman, Martin (November 1976). “New Directions in Cryptography” (PDF). IEEE Transactions on Information Theory. IT-22: 644–654.

10.6 References

[19] Cryptography: Theory and Practice, Third Edition (Discrete Mathematics and Its Applications), 2005, by Douglas R. Stinson, Chapman and Hall/CRC

[1] Liddell, Henry George; Scott, Robert; Jones, Henry Stuart; McKenzie, Roderick (1984). A Greek-English Lexicon. Oxford University Press. [2] Rivest, Ronald L. (1990). “Cryptology”. In J. Van Leeuwen. Handbook of Theoretical Computer Science 1. Elsevier. [3] Bellare, Mihir; Rogaway, Phillip (21 September 2005). “Introduction”. Introduction to Modern Cryptography. p. 10. [4] Menezes, A. J.; van Oorschot, P. C.; Vanstone, S. A. Handbook of Applied Cryptography. ISBN 0-8493-85237.

[20] Blaze, Matt; Diffie, Whitefield; Rivest, Ronald L.; Schneier, Bruce; Shimomura, Tsutomu; Thompson, Eric; Wiener, Michael (January 1996). “Minimal key lengths for symmetric ciphers to provide adequate commercial security”. Fortify. Retrieved 26 March 2015. [21] “FIPS PUB 197: The official Advanced Encryption Standard” (PDF). Computer Security Resource Center. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Retrieved 26 March 2015. [22] “NCUA letter to credit unions” (PDF). National Credit Union Administration. July 2004. Retrieved 26 March 2015.

[5] “Overview per country”. Crypto Law Survey. February 2013. Retrieved 26 March 2015.

[23] “RFC 2440 - Open PGP Message Format”. Internet Engineering Task Force. November 1998. Retrieved 26 March 2015.

[6] “UK Data Encryption Disclosure Law Takes Effect”. PC World. 1 October 2007. Retrieved 26 March 2015.

[24] Golen, Pawel (19 July 2002). “SSH”. WindowSecurity. Retrieved 26 March 2015.

[7] Doctorow, Cory (2 May 2007). “Digg users revolt over AACS key”. Boing Boing. Retrieved 26 March 2015.

[25] Schneier, Bruce (1996). Applied Cryptography (2nd ed.). Wiley. ISBN 0-471-11709-9.

[8] Kahn, David (1967). The Codebreakers. ISBN 0-68483130-9.

[26] “Notices”. Federal Register 72 (212). 2 November 2007. Archived 28 February 2008 at the Wayback Machine

[9] Oded Goldreich, Foundations of Cryptography, Volume 1: Basic Tools, Cambridge University Press, 2001, ISBN 0521-79172-3

[27] “NIST Selects Winner of Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA3) Competition”. Tech Beat. National Institute of Standards and Technology. October 2, 2012. Retrieved 26 March 2015.

[10] “Cryptology (definition)". Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed.). Merriam-Webster. Retrieved 26 March 2015. [11] “RFC 2828 - Internet Security Glossary”. Internet Engineering Task Force. May 2000. Retrieved 26 March 2015. ︠ ︡ shchenko, V. V. (2002). Cryptography: an introduc[12] IA tion. AMS Bookstore. p. 6. ISBN 0-8218-2986-6. [13] Singh, Simon (2000). The Code Book. New York: Anchor Books. pp. 14–20. ISBN 9780385495325. [14] Al-Kadi, Ibrahim A. (April 1992). “The origins of cryptology: The Arab contributions”. Cryptologia 16 (2): 97– 126. [15] Schrödel, Tobias (October 2008). “Breaking Short Vigenère Ciphers”. Cryptologia 32 (4): 334–337. doi:10.1080/01611190802336097. [16] Hakim, Joy (1995). A History of US: War, Peace and all that Jazz. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 019-509514-6. [17] Gannon, James (2001). Stealing Secrets, Telling Lies: How Spies and Codebreakers Helped Shape the Twentieth Century. Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s. ISBN 1-57488-3674.

[28] Diffie, Whitfield; Hellman, Martin (8 June 1976). “Multiuser cryptographic techniques”. AFIPS Proceedings 45: 109–112. [29] Ralph Merkle was working on similar ideas at the time and encountered publication delays, and Hellman has suggested that the term used should be Diffie–Hellman– Merkle aysmmetric key cryptography. [30] Kahn, David (Fall 1979). “Cryptology Goes Public”. Foreign Affairs 58 (1): 153. [31] Rivest, Ronald L.; Shamir, A.; Adleman, L. (1978). “A Method for Obtaining Digital Signatures and PublicKey Cryptosystems”. Communications of the ACM (Association for Computing Machinery) 21 (2): 120–126. Archived November 16, 2001 at the Wayback Machine Previously released as an MIT “Technical Memo” in April 1977, and published in Martin Gardner's Scientific American Mathematical recreations column [32] Wayner, Peter (24 December 1997). “British Document Outlines Early Encryption Discovery”. New York Times. Retrieved 26 March 2015. [33] Cocks, Clifford (20 November 1973). “A Note on 'NonSecret Encryption'" (PDF). CESG Research Report.

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[34] Singh, Simon (1999). The Code Book. Doubleday. pp. 279–292. [35] Shannon, Claude; Weaver, Warren (1963). The Mathematical Theory of Communication. University of Illinois Press. ISBN 0-252-72548-4. [36] Junod, Pascal (2001). “On the Complexity of Matsui’s Attack” (PDF). Selected Areas in Cryptography. [37] Song, Dawn; Wagner, David A.; Tian, Xuqing (2001). “Timing Analysis of Keystrokes and Timing Attacks on SSH” (PDF). Tenth USENIX Security Symposium. [38] Brands, S. (1994). “Untraceable Off-line Cash in Wallets with Observers”. Advances in Cryptology—Proceedings of CRYPTO (Springer-Verlag). [39] Babai, László (1985). “Trading group theory for randomness”. Proceedings of the Seventeenth Annual Symposium on the Theory of Computing (Association for Computing Machinery). [40] Goldwasser, S.; Micali, S.; Rackoff, C. (1989). “The Knowledge Complexity of Interactive Proof Systems”. SIAM Journal on Computing 18 (1): 186–208. [41] Blakley, G. (June 1979). “Safeguarding cryptographic keys”. Proceedings of AFIPS 1979 48: 313–317. [42] Shamir, A. (1979). “How to share a secret”. Communications of the ACM (Association for Computing Machinery) 22: 612–613. [43] “6.5.1 WHAT ARE THE CRYPTOGRAPHIC POLICIES OF SOME COUNTRIES?". RSA Laboratories. Retrieved 26 March 2015. [44] Rosenoer, Jonathan (1995). “CRYPTOGRAPHY & SPEECH”. CyberLaw. Archived December 1, 2005 at the Wayback Machine [45] “Case Closed on Zimmermann PGP Investigation”. IEEE Computer Society's Technical Committee on Security and Privacy. 14 February 1996. Retrieved 26 March 2015. [46] Levy, Steven (2001). Crypto: How the Code Rebels Beat the Government—Saving Privacy in the Digital Age. Penguin Books. p. 56. ISBN 0-14-024432-8. OCLC 244148644 48066852 48846639. [47] “Bernstein v USDOJ”. Electronic Privacy Information Center. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 6 May 1999. Retrieved 26 March 2015. [48] “DUAL-USE LIST - CATEGORY 5 – PART 2 – “INFORMATION SECURITY"" (DOC). Wassenaar Arrangement. Retrieved 26 March 2015. [49] “6.4 UNITED STATES CRYPTOGRAPHY EXPORT/IMPORT LAWS”. RSA Laboratories. Retrieved 26 March 2015. [50] Schneier, Bruce (15 June 2000). “The Data Encryption Standard (DES)". Crypto-Gram. Retrieved 26 March 2015.

CHAPTER 10. CRYPTOGRAPHY

[51] Coppersmith, D. (May 1994). “The Data Encryption Standard (DES) and its strength against attacks” (PDF). IBM Journal of Research and Development 38 (3): 243. doi:10.1147/rd.383.0243. Retrieved 26 March 2015. [52] Biham, E.; Shamir, A. (1991). “Differential cryptanalysis of DES-like cryptosystems” (PDF). Journal of Cryptology (Springer-Verlag) 4 (1): 3–72. Retrieved 26 March 2015. [53] “The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998” (PDF). United States Copyright Office. Retrieved 26 March 2015. [54] Ferguson, Niels (15 August 2001). “Censorship in action: why I don't publish my HDCP results”. Archived December 1, 2001 at the Wayback Machine [55] Williams, Christopher (11 August 2009). “Two convicted for refusal to decrypt data”. The Register. Retrieved 26 March 2015. [56] Williams, Christopher (24 November 2009). “UK jails schizophrenic for refusal to decrypt files”. The Register. Retrieved 26 March 2015. [57] Ingold, John (January 4, 2012). “Password case reframes Fifth Amendment rights in context of digital world”. The Denver Post. Retrieved 26 March 2015. [58] Leyden, John (13 July 2011). “US court test for rights not to hand over crypto keys”. The Register. Retrieved 26 March 2015. [59] “ORDER GRANTING APPLICATION UNDER THE ALL WRITS ACT REQUIRING DEFENDANT FRICOSU TO ASSIST IN THE EXECUTION OF PREVIOUSLY ISSUED SEARCH WARRANTS” (PDF). United States District Court for the District of Colorado. Retrieved 26 March 2015.

10.7 Further reading Further information: Books on cryptography

• Becket, B (1988). Introduction to Cryptology. Blackwell Scientific Publications. ISBN 0-63201836-4. OCLC 16832704. Excellent coverage of many classical ciphers and cryptography concepts and of the “modern” DES and RSA systems. • Cryptography and Mathematics by Bernhard Esslinger, 200 pages, part of the free open-source package CrypTool, PDF download at the Wayback Machine (archived July 22, 2011). CrypTool is the most widespread e-learning program about cryptography and cryptanalysis, open source. • In Code: A Mathematical Journey by Sarah Flannery (with David Flannery). Popular account of Sarah’s award-winning project on public-key cryptography, co-written with her father.

10.8. EXTERNAL LINKS

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• James Gannon, Stealing Secrets, Telling Lies: How Spies and Codebreakers Helped Shape the Twentieth Century, Washington, D.C., Brassey’s, 2001, ISBN 1-57488-367-4.

• Crypto Glossary and Dictionary of Technical Cryptography

• Oded Goldreich, Foundations of Cryptography, in two volumes, Cambridge University Press, 2001 and 2004.

• Overview and Applications of Cryptology by the CrypTool Team; PDF; 3.8 MB—July 2008

• Introduction to Modern Cryptography by Jonathan Katz and Yehuda Lindell. • Alvin’s Secret Code by Clifford B. Hicks (children’s novel that introduces some basic cryptography and cryptanalysis). • Ibrahim A. Al-Kadi, “The Origins of Cryptology: the Arab Contributions,” Cryptologia, vol. 16, no. 2 (April 1992), pp. 97–126. • Christof Paar, Jan Pelzl, Understanding Cryptography, A Textbook for Students and Practitioners. Springer, 2009. (Slides, online cryptography lectures and other information are available on the companion web site.) Very accessible introduction to practical cryptography for non-mathematicians. • Introduction to Modern Cryptography by Phillip Rogaway and Mihir Bellare, a mathematical introduction to theoretical cryptography including reductionbased security proofs. PDF download. • Johann-Christoph Woltag, 'Coded Communications (Encryption)' in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press 2009). *“Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law”., giving an overview of international law issues regarding cryptography. • Jonathan Arbib & John Dwyer, Discrete Mathematics for Cryptography, 1st Edition ISBN 978-1907934-01-8. • Stallings, William (March 2013). Cryptography and Network Security: Principles and Practice (6th ed.). Prentice Hall. ISBN 978-0133354690.

10.8 External links • The dictionary definition of cryptography at Wiktionary • Media related to Cryptography at Wikimedia Commons • • Cryptography on In Our Time at the BBC. (listen now)

• NSA’s CryptoKids.

• A Course in Cryptography by Raphael Pass & Abhi Shelat - offered at Cornell in the form of lecture notes. • Cryptocorner.com by Chuck Easttom - A generalized resource on all aspects of cryptology. • For more on the use of cryptographic elements in fiction, see: Dooley, John F., William and Marilyn Ingersoll Professor of Computer Science, Knox College (23 August 2012). “Cryptology in Fiction”. • The George Fabyan Collection at the Library of Congress has early editions of works of seventeenthcentury English literature, publications relating to cryptography.

Chapter 11

Cut-out (espionage) In espionage parlance, a cut-out is a mutually trusted intermediary, method or channel of communication, facilitating the exchange of information between agents. Cutouts usually only know the source and destination of the information to be transmitted, but are unaware of the identities of any other persons involved in the espionage process. Thus, a captured cutout cannot be used to identify members of an espionage cell.

11.1 Outside espionage Some computer protocols, like Tor, use the equivalent of cutout nodes in their communications networks. Due to the use of multiple layers of encryption, nodes on networks like this do not usually know the ultimate sender or receiver of the data. In computer networking Darknets can and do have some cut out functionality. Darknets are distinct from other distributed P2P networks as sharing is anonymous (that is, IP addresses are not publicly shared and nodes often forward traffic to other nodes). Thus, with a Darknet, users can communicate with little fear of governmental or corporate interference.[1] For this reason, Darknets are often associated with dissident political communications, as well as various illegal activities. More generally, the term “darknet” can be used to describe all non-commercial sites on the Internet,[2] or to refer to all “underground” web communications and technologies, most commonly those associated with illegal activity or dissent.[1]

11.2 See also • Dead drop

11.3 References [1] Wood, Jessica (2010). “A Digital Copyright Revolution” (PDF). Richmond Journal of Law and Technology 16 (4). Retrieved 25 October 2011.

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[2] Lasica, J. D. (2005). Darknets: Hollywood’s War Against the Digital Generation. Hoboken, NJ: J. Wiley & Sons. ISBN 0-471-68334-5.

Chapter 12

Dead drop For a USB device used as a public dead drop, see USB into the ground or placed in a shallow stream to be redead drop. trieved at a later time. A dead drop or dead letter box is a method of espionage tradecraft used to pass items between two individuals using a secret location thus not requiring them to meet directly. Using a dead drop permits a case officer and agent to exchange objects and information while maintaining operational security. The method stands in contrast to the live drop, so called because two persons meet to exchange items or information.

12.1 Overview Spies (covert intelligence agents) and their handlers have been known to perform dead drops using various techniques to hide items (such as money, secrets or instructions), and to signal that the drop has been made. Although the signal and location by necessity must be agreed upon in advance, the signal may or may not be located close to the dead drop itself, and the operatives may not necessarily know one another, or ever meet. The location and nature of the dead drop must enable retrieval of the hidden item without the operatives being spotted by a member of the public, the police or other security forces—therefore, common everyday items and behavior are used to avoid arousing suspicion. Any hidden location could serve, although often a cut-out device is used, such as a loose brick in a wall, a (cut-out) library book, or a hole in a tree.

The signaling devices can include a chalk mark on a wall, a piece of chewing-gum on a lamppost, or a newspaper left on a park bench. Alternately, the signal can be made from inside the agent’s own home, by, for example, hanging a distinctively-colored towel from a balcony, or placing a potted plant on a window sill where it is visible to anyone on the street. Convicted CIA mole and Soviet spy Aldrich Ames left chalk marks on a mail box in Washington, D.C. to signal his Russian handlers that he had made a dead drop. While the dead drop method is useful in preventing the instantaneous capture of either an operative/handler pair or an entire espionage network, it is not foolproof. If one of the operatives is compromised, they may reveal the location and signal for that specific dead drop. Counterintelligence can then use the signal while keeping the location under surveillance, and may capture the other operative.

12.2 Modern techniques See also: Short-range agent communications On January 23, 2006, the Russian FSB accused Britain of using wireless dead drops concealed inside hollowedout rocks to collect espionage information from agents in Russia. According to the Russian authorities, the agent delivering information would approach the rock and transmit data wirelessly into it from a hand-held device, and later his British handlers would pick up the stored data by similar means.[1]

12.3 See also Dead drop spike

• Espionage

The dead drop spike is a concealment device similar to a microcache. It has been used since the late 1960s to hide money, maps, documents, microfilm, and other items. The spike is water- and mildew-proof and can be pushed 65

• USB dead drop • PirateBox

66

12.4 Notes [1] Nick Paton Walsh, The Guardian (23 January 2006). “Moscow names British 'spies’ in NGO row”. Retrieved 8 April 2012.

12.5 References • “Russians accuse 4 Britons of spying”.International Herald Tribune. January 24, 2006. News report on Russian discovery of British “wireless dead drop”. • “Old spying lives on in new ways”. BBC. 23 January 2006. • Madrid suspects tied to e-mail ruse. International Herald Tribune. April 28, 2006. • Military secrets missing on Ministry of Defence computer files

12.6 Further reading • Robert Wallace and H. Keith Melton, with Henry R. Schlesinger, Spycraft: The Secret History of the CIA’s Spytechs, from Communism to al-Qaeda, New York, Dutton, 2008. ISBN 0-525-94980-1.

CHAPTER 12. DEAD DROP

Chapter 13

Denial and deception Denial and deception (D&D) is a Western theoretical framework[1] for conceiving and analyzing intelligence techniques pertaining to secrecy and deception.[2] Originating in the 1980s, it is roughly based on the more pragmatic Soviet practices of maskirovka (which preceded the D&D conceptualization by decades) but it has a more theoretical approach compared to the latter.[1] In the D&D framework, denial and deception are seen as distinct but complementary endeavors.[2] Denial most often involves security and concealment to prevent foreign agents, photographic surveillance, electronic monitoring, or even the media from revealing secretive diplomatic or military matters. Deception is the construction of a false reality for the adversary through intentionally "leaked" false information, false stories implanted in the media, dummy or decoy structures or military formations, or numerous other measure.[3] For example, in the Japanese information warfare campaign that preceded the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the D&D approach identifies as a denial measure the twice-repeated change in naval call signs effected by the Imperial Navy between 1 November and 1 December, but identifies as a deception measure the Japanese Foreign Office announcement that a large Japanese liner would sail to California on December 2 to evacuate Japanese citizens.[4] A denial and deception campaign is most effective when numerous denial and deceptive efforts are coherently coordinated to advance a specific plan; however, the most effective such operations are very complex, involving numerous persons or organizations, and this can prove exceedingly difficult. A single failed denial measure or deception can easily jeopardize an entire operation.[3] According to Abram Shulsky, democracies, like the United States, had difficulty employing denial and deception campaigns. This is largely due to the open media of most such societies which frequently expose any major operations undertaken militarily or diplomatically. Also, legal restrictions tend to hamper governments and particularly intelligence services in democratic societies. The exception to these restrictions occurs in wartime, when some measure of martial law is imposed and legal impediments are relaxed. Authoritarian systems of government, however, frequently employ denial and deception campaigns both domestically and abroad to manipulate

domestic opposition and foreign governments. These operations are unhampered by legal restrictions or an open media. Non-state actors, such as terrorist organizations, frequently use denial and deception to influence governments and the public opinion of target societies.[5] Other authors illustrate the D&D topic with Operation Fortitude and consider it one of the most successful such examples in history.[6][7][8] According to Donald C.F. Daniel democratic societies have more qualms with deception than they have with denial (in the technical sense used in this article); Daniel contrasts the little public controversy that surrounded the secretive way in which Nixon’s rapprochement with China was negotiated (as example of secrecy/denial that did not cause a public outrage) with the uproar caused by the announcement of 2001 announcement of the Office of Strategic Influence (an institution that had among its stated goals the planing of false stories in the foreign press).[2] According to United States Department of Defense definitions, military deception includes both denial and deception (as defined in the D&D framework).[9] Canadian OPSEC officer John M. Roach notes that “Deception used as a broad, general term includes the elements of both denial and deception, each having distinct actions that are either active or passive.”[10] D&D is not the only terminology used to make this distinction; according to Roach “passive deception” is another technical term for denial.[10] Western writers see the Soviet (and post-Soviet) maskirovka practices as not drawing a sharp or significant distinction between the two components of denial and deception.[1][10] The Islamic concepts of kitman and taqiyya, or at least the jihadist interpretations thereof, have been seen by Westerners as the equivalents of the two components of denial and (respectively) deception.[10][11] Since taqiyya is a word with Shiite connotations, Sunni militants sometimes prefer to use the word iham instead, roughly with the meaning “deception of unbelievers”.[12] Although the Chinese deception theory literature is vast and uses rather different terminology (relative to Western works), some recent surveys have identified that "seduction"— understood as convincing the enemy to make fatal mistakes—is considered the highest form of deception while confusing or denying information to the enemy are considered lesser forms.[13]

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13.1 See also • Disinformation • False flag

13.2 References [1] Hutchinson, William. (2004) “The Influence of Maskirovka on Contemporary Western Deception Theory and Practice.” Proceedings of the 3rd European Conference on Information Warfare and Security. ISBN 09547096-2-4. [2] Donald C.F. Daniel (2005). “Denial and Deception”. In Jennifer E. Sims and Burton L. Gerber. Transforming U. S. Intelligence. Georgetown University Press. pp. 134– 141. ISBN 1-58901-477-4. [3] Abram Shulsky, “Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception,” in Strategic Denial and Deception: The TwentyFirst Century Challenge, ed. Roy Godson and James J. Wirtz (Piscataway: Transaction Publishers, 2002), 1517; Roy Godson and James J. Wirtz, “Strategic Denial and Deception,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 13 (2000): 425-426. [4] James B. Bruce and Michael Bennett (2008). “Foreign Denial and Deception”. In Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce. Analyzing Intelligence. Georgetown University Press. p. 124. ISBN 1-58901-239-9. [5] Ibid., 427-428. [6] Michael I. Handel (2012). “Intelligence and Deception”. In John Gooch. Military Deception and Strategic Surprise!. Routledge. p. 127. ISBN 978-1-136-28202-7. [7] Glenn P. Hastedt, ed. (2011). Spies, Wiretaps, and Secret Operations: A-J. ABC-CLIO. p. 305. ISBN 978-185109-807-1. [8] H. Wentworth Eldredge (2013). “Biggest Hoax of the War. Operation FORTITUDE: The Allied deception plan that fooled the Germans about Normandy”. In Hy Rothstein and Barton Whaley. The Art and Science of Military Deception. Artech House. p. 241. ISBN 978-1-60807551-5. Article previously published in Air Power History, vol. 37, no. 3, Fall 1990, pp. 15-22 [9] Johnson, Mark, and Jessica Meyeraan. "Military deception: Hiding the real-showing the fake". Joint Forces Staff College, Joint and Combined Warfighting School, p. 4 [10] John M. Roach, DECEPTION: Can information superiority be achieved with or without it?, Newsletter of the OPSEC Professionals Society, July 2012, Volume 3, Issue 2, p. 7. Also published in The Canadian Army Journal Vol. 10.3 Fall 2007, p. 117-120 [11] Devin R. Springer, James L. Regens, David N. Edger (2009). Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad. Georgetown University Press. p. 51. ISBN 1-58901-578-9.

CHAPTER 13. DENIAL AND DECEPTION

[12] Bassam Tibi (2008). Political Islam, World Politics and Europe: Democratic Peace and Euro-Islam Versus Global Jihad. Routledge. p. 145. ISBN 978-1-134-07263-7. [13] Michael Pillsbury (2013). “Chinese Deception Doctrine: A View from Open Sources”. In Hy Rothstein and Barton Whaley. The Art and Science of Military Deception. Artech House. p. 212. ISBN 978-1-60807-551-5.

Chapter 14

Direct action (military) For other uses, see Direct action (disambiguation).

14.1 Risk factors

In the context of special operations, direct action (DA) consists of: “Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and which employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets. Direct action differs from conventional offensive actions in the level of physical and political risk, operational techniques, and the degree of discriminate and precise use of force to achieve specific objectives.”[1]

DA, conducted by special operations forces, uses a small ground team, possibly with air and naval support, which maintains a high degree of secrecy about the intended action. It relies on surprise and skill, rather than mass, and has a "hit-and-run" approach:

The United States and many allied countries consider DA one of the basic special operations missions. Some units specialize in it, such as Rangers of the 75th Ranger Regiment, while other units, such as US Army Special Forces, have DA capabilities but focus more on other operations. Unconventional warfare, special reconnaissance and direct action roles have merged through the decades and are typically performed primarily by the same units. For instance, while American special operations forces were originally created for the unconventional warfare (UW) mission and gradually added other capabilities, the United States Navy SEALs, and the UK Special Air Service (SAS) and Special Boat Service (SBS) continue to perform a primary DA role with special reconnaissance (SR) as original missions. SEALs, SAS, and SBS added additional capabilities over time, responding to the needs of modern conflict. Russian Spetsnaz are DA and SR units. Some countries may have standing units for deniable DA operations, and others may put together ad hoc volunteer groups for such missions. Under the US Central Intelligence Agency's National Clandestine Service, there is a Special Activities Division that operates without apparent national identification. It is possible that units of the Joint Special Operations Command or the frequently-renamed Intelligence Support Activity may do ad hoc operations.

• clandestine approach to the target • short, precise, and violent force • exfiltration as soon as the objective is completed, making the team’s exit as hidden as possible. Direct action is not a suicidal attack. If the political situation so requires, the DA team may operate completely or partially out of proper uniform. In some cases, which international law accepts as a legitimate ruse of war, a direct action force may infiltrate to the target area in disguise, but must make some distinguishing insignia visible before taking any combat actions. While the entire mission was not completed due to a lack of helicopters, the DA force, in Operation Eagle Claw, which was to make the actual attack on the occupied American Embassy in Tehran, would wear nondescript clothing until they reached the assembly point for the attack. At that time, before using any weapons, they would remove black coverings over American flags, putting them in compliance with having a proper insignia or uniform.[2][3] In practice, any military force that operates at least partially out of proper uniform may be considered unlawful combatants. Formally, being out of proper uniform while approaching the target is considered a legitimate ruse of war, rather than spying, according to the language of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949.[4] This continues the language of the Hague Convention of 1907.[5] Countries do not always honor this legal protection, as with the Nazi Commando Order of WWII, which was held illegal at the Nuremberg Trials. The status of guerrillas acting under a distinct chain of command, wearing at least a distinctive armband or other insignia, carrying arms openly while in combat, and com-

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CHAPTER 14. DIRECT ACTION (MILITARY)

plying with the laws and customs of war is that they tech- 14.2.2 Attack nically are legal combatants, but this, historically, is respected even less than for regular military personnel mak- To reduce their chance of detection, if the target could ing a clandestine approach to the target. be destroyed by demolition charges, set on a delayed fuse so the team can exfiltrate before the explosion, this would be far preferable to having to fight their way to the target, place demolition charges, and fight their way out of the 14.2 Operational techniques now-alerted target area. Techniques that minimize the chance of detection during Skill with explosives and demolition, therefore, is a critical skill for DA units. They also may employ long-range infiltration, attack, and exfiltration are preferred. sniper fire. Properly uniformed forces that kill other There is a blurry line between Special Reconnaissance properly uniformed soldiers, firing from cover and never units that never directly attack a target with their own revealing themselves to enemy troops, are in compliance weapons, instead directing air and missile strikes onto a with the laws of war, but, especially if at least part of target, and Direct Action, where the soldiers will physthat operation was conducted out of proper uniform or inically attack the target with their own resources, and signia (e.g., by guerillas), the force is likely to be treated possibly with other support. Some special operations as unlawful combatants. forces have doctrine that allowed them to attack targets of opportunity; Soviet Spetsnaz, while on SR during a war, were expected to attack any tactical nuclear delivery systems, such as surface-to-surface missiles, that they 14.2.3 Exfiltration encountered.[6] The team will leave the attack area using any of the means they used to infiltrate, although they will have to deal with 14.2.1 Infiltration the problem of an alerted enemy. Rather than going imDirect action teams, depending on training and resources, mediately to the means of exfiltration, they may have prepared a safe house or some other hiding place near the may enter the area of operations in many ways: target, and make a delayed exfiltration. • Infiltration: Used when enemy troops does not have full view of their own lines, such that skilled soldiers can move through their own front lines and, as a small unit, penetrate those of the enemy. Such movement is most often by night. • Tactical ground vehicles: The British Special Air Service pioneered in-vehicle SR, going back to North Africa in WWII. In Desert Storm, US special reconnaissance forces used medium and heavy helicopters to carry in vehicles for the Scud Hunt. • Helicopter: Using rapid disembarkation by rope, ladder, or fast exit, at night; • Parachute: Typically by night, and using the HALO or HAHO jump technique so their airplane does not alert the enemy; • Boat: Across inland water or from a surface ship or even a helicopter-launched boat • Underwater: By swimming or means from a submarine or an offshore surface ship. Some highly trained troops, such as US Navy SEALs or British Special Boat Service may parachute into open water, go underwater, and swim to the target.

14.3 Examples of direct action missions 14.3.1 Norwegian and SOE attacks on German heavy water production A series of DA missions during WWII involved Allied sabotage of German heavy water production in Norway. Operation Grouse successfully delivered, by parachute, four SOE-trained Norwegian soldiers. They were intended to act as an advanced reconnaissance and guide party for the next group of British personnel, who would actually carry out the demolitions at the Rjukan in the Telemark area of Norway. Operation Freshman, the next phase, was a disastrous failure. Two teams of Royal Engineers, carried in towed Airspeed Horsa gliders, either were killed in crashes, or captured, tortured, and executed under the German Commando Order. A followup, Operation Gunnerside, successfully parachuted in another six Norwegian soldiers. The combined teams were able to place demolition charges in the plant and make their escape. As is not uncommon for DA, a follow-up bombing mission completed the destruction of the plant.

14.3. EXAMPLES OF DIRECT ACTION MISSIONS

14.3.2

71

Prisoner of war rescue raids in the ternees were rescued. Two guerillas and two paratroopers were killed, and a small number wounded. Philippines

Afterwards, the Japanese retaliated by killing 1,500 FilThe US command had become increasingly concerned ipinos, who were not involved in the raid and rescue. The that the Japanese intended to kill all prisoners, and al- Japanese commander was later convicted of war crimes ready had been alerted to several killings. They exe- and hanged. cuted multiple rescue raids. Documents and prisoner interrogation subsequently proved that the concern was 14.3.3 Israeli raid on Soviet radar used by fully justified. A combination of Filipino guerillas, Alamo scouts (6th US Army Special Reconnaissance force) and US 6th Ranger Battalion paratroopers carried out a successful DA raid on the Cabanatuan prison camp, destroying the Japanese guard force and freeing the prisoners. As is frequently done in DA, the infiltration was in phases: the guerillas were already in the area, but the Alamo Scouts came in early, and were guided to the target area by the local fighters. Reconnaissance of the camp provided information to finalize the final raid, which was deferred a day due to a larger enemy presence. The Rangers parachuted to a landing zone a distance from the camp, aware they would need to crawl to their final jump-off points. Another method often used in DA was to provide a distraction to the defenders, in this case with a low-level pass by a fighter aircraft. The guards were looking to the sky when the Rangers rushed the camp.

Egypt

In 1969, Israel became aware that Egypt was using an advanced Soviet radar. Originally, an air attack was planned to destroy it. The air attack was cancelled, however, and the mission assigned to helicopter-carried Sayeret Matkal special operations troops, who believed they could capture the radar, and return at least significant pieces. In Operation Rooster 53, the raiders quickly suppressed the local security, and then began taking apart the radar to return critical components for technical intelligence analysis. After consultation between the ground special operations soldiers and the helicopter pilots, they packaged the entire radar and successfully carried it as external loads on their CH-53 helicopters, operating at the edge of the helicopters’ lift capability .[7]

After the guards were neutralized, the rescue force ran 14.3.4 Attempted prisoner of war rescue in North Vietnam into another problem common in prisoner rescues: many prisoners were confused or so terribly afraid that they needed to be forcibly removed. Others were sick and un- Operation Ivory Coast was a long-range US raid, in 1970, to rescue POWs believed to be held in the Son Tay prison able to walk. Nevertheless, the rescue was successful. camp. The rescue force, of 56 Army Special Forces perThe Raid at Los Baños was also a success. Prior to the atsonnel plus Air Force special operations personnel, flew tack, Filipino guerillas had established clandestine comclandestinely from Thailand into North Vietnam, while munications with prisoners, and had precise information Naval aircraft conducted diversionary activities. about the camp. This was a considerably larger operation for a larger number of prisoners, with a much stronger Although the ground force fought a sharp engagement Japanese presence in the area. Operations began, as is with North Vietnamese and a never-identified, probably often typical, with reconnaissance. 11th Airborne’s Pro- foreign unit, near the camp, they took no casualties (other visional Reconnaissance Platoon jumped in and linked up than a broken ankle from a hard landing). The prisoners with guerillas. Two days later, they marked the drop and had been moved to other camps, but the raiders successlanding zones, and then killed the gate guards, as a guer- fully exfiltrated. rilla regiment encircled the camp and attacked Japanese Even though the raid failed in its specific purpose, its tacthey could see. tical execution was near perfect. It did have a significant Next, a paratrooper company jumped into a marked drop strategic effect on the North Vietnamese, who became zone, linked up with additional guerillas, killed the re- concerned about other raids behind their own lines and reallocated significant resources to internal security .[8] maining guards, and secured the prisoners. The remainder of the paratroop battalion moved, by water using amphibious tractors, to a point 2 miles from the 14.3.5 camp. They would land and then move to the camp, and take the prisoners onto the vehicles. A fourth phase protected the actual escape, diverting the remaining Japanese troops with a strong force including artillery and tank destroyers. Additional guerrilla units formed ambushes to stop Japanese reinforcements from moving into the area. 2,147 former Allied POWs and in-

US prisoner in Panama rescued by Delta Force

During the 1989 invasion of Panama, one of the many objectives was to free Kurt Muse, an American suspected, by the Panamanians, of working for the CIA. Operation Acid Gambit was one of the few acknowledged operations by the US Delta Force.[9]

72 The DA force landed on Modelo prison at night, carried by light MH-6 special operations helicopters. AH-6 helicopter gunships suppressed potential snipers on nearby building, while AC-130 fixed-wing gunships put heavy fire into other military buildings of the complex. The Delta operators secured the roof, and a team fought to Muse’s cell, where they blew down the door and rescued him.

CHAPTER 14. DIRECT ACTION (MILITARY) quests to UN military headquarters from the on-scene commander, MG Roméo Dallaire, included seizing a broadcast facility, which he considered the chief inciter of violence. He was told such action was outside his authority.[12] Another multinational operation, NATO SFOR in Bosnia was operating under peace enforcement, not peacekeeping rules of engagement. It was cleared, in 1997, to neutralize Serb radio-television facilities.[13] It should be noted that taking control of television falls under the mission of information operations as well as direct action.

During the exfiltration, one of the MH-6 helicopters crashed, wounding everyone besides Muse.[10] Taking cover, they signalled to one of the gunships, and were soon retrieved by an armored personnel carrier from the 5th Infantry Division extracted Muse and the retrieval In the section “Physical Destruction Operations in team. Task Force Eagle: The Seizure of Bosnian-Serb Radio/Television Towers,” a Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) analyst observed that after the Bosnian 14.3.6 Killing of Osama bin Laden civil war, few broadcast media remained, but were extremely influential. “In May 1997, the North Atlantic Main article: Death of Osama bin Laden Council granted authority to SFOR to take actions against any media undermining the peace accords.” On 1 May 2011, Red Squadron from the United States “During the early summer of 1997, a power struggle Navy's elite Naval Special Warfare Development Group, erupted between the rival factions of the Bosnian Serb also known as DEVGRU, undertook a covert mission to leadership...The struggle caused a split within state televicapture al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, acting on in- sion, with journalists and editors from the Banja Luka stutelligence suggesting that he was located at a compound dio deciding to split away from [one faction] direction afin Abottabad, deep inside Pakistan. Launching the mis- ter [its leader] manipulated a broadcast on SFOR searches sion from neighbouring Afghanistan, US helicopters flew in police stations. SFOR and OHR tried to exploit these across Pakistani airspace at very low altitude to avoid developments to their advantage...” offering to keep the radar detection, and the DEVGRU operators were deliv- stations open if the faction reduced its inflammatory proered to the courtyard of the compound, descending from paganda, but continuing to do so would result in miliropes. After a brief firefight, bin Laden was located and tary action. The propaganda continued, such as accuskilled by the US forces. The forces then retreated, tak- ing SFOR of using “low-intensity nuclear weapons,” during bin Laden’s remains with them, and they were back ing the 1995 attacks on VRS positions around Sarajevo, in Afghan airspace before the Pakistani forces could re- Gorazde, and Majevica in 1995. In another propaganda spond to the unknown disturbance. Bin Laden’s body was piece, Serbian Radio Television (SRT) showed alternatimmediately taken to a US Navy ship and buried at sea, to ing images of WWII German Army and present-day guard against the possibility that his grave could become NATO forces while the commentator drew the comparia shrine or a focal point for unrest. The whole opera- son, likening SFOR soldiers to a Nazi occupation force. tion inside Pakistan was monitored from Washington in NATO officials have expressed concerns that such “venreal time by the Obama administration, and lasted for 40 omous propaganda” threatens the safety of the NATO-led minutes in total. Subsequent revelations of the success of peace operations force.” this bold and daring operation were to draw praise from across the political spectrum and from around the world. Eventually, “under the authority of the GFAP and orders from the NATO Council and the Office of the High Representative, SFOR seized four SRT transmission towers, 14.3.7 Physical destruction of propaganda considerably reducing the footprint of SRT. The seizure of these towers was a physical destruction mission in that facilities SFOR targeted the TV transmitter towers for neutralization, which is a condition achieved by physical destrucDirect action has been used, or planned and not authotion operations...On October 1, 1997, TFE units executed rized, against radio and television facilities used for prothe physical destruction operation, securing the Bosnianpaganda, or even for tactical coordination, in several opSerb television/radio transmitter complexes on Hill 619 erations. During the 1989 US invasion of Panama, spein Duga Njiva, Hill 562 near Ugljevik, Trebevica (near cial operations teams removed critical components from a Sarajevo) and Leotar. In pre-dawn raids, SFOR French, television station, doing minimum damage. They did so, Polish, Scandinavian and American soldiers secured the however, a day into the operation; greater speed would sites and immediately fortified them against anticipated have had greater effect .[11] resistance.” In 1994, during the Rwandan Genocide, part of the re-

14.4. REFERENCES

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[10] “The Caldwell Family”. [11] “Just Cause: how well did we do? - invasion of Panama”. National Review. 1990-01-22. [12] Ringle, Kenbg (2002-06-15). “The Haunting: He Couldn't Stop the Slaughter in Rwanda. Now He Can't Stop the Memory”. Washington Post: C01. [13] Tulak, Arthur N. (1999-03-15). “Physical Attack Information Operations in Bosnia: Counterinformation in a Peace Enforcement Environment”. Air & Space Power Journal - Chronicles Online Journal. Retrieved 2007-1124.

TV station secured by SFOR

“At Hill 619, US Engineers operating Armored Combat Excavators (M-9 ACE) constructed protective berms for the troops, and cleared fields of fire, while other engineers emplaced a triple-standard concertina barrier around the site. At Hill 562, 200 Bosnian-Serb protesters staged a 15-hour confrontation in which the protesters hurled rocks and attacked with clubs, damaging several vehicles.

14.4 References [1] US Department of Defense (2007-07-12). “Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms” (PDF). Retrieved 2007-10-01. [2] Smith, Michael (2007). Killer Elite: The Inside Story of America’s Most Secret Special Operations Team. New York, New York: St. Martin’s Press. ISBN 0-312-362722. [3] Beckwith, Charlie A.; Knox, Donald (2003). Delta Force: The Army’s Elite Counterterrorist Unit. Avon. ISBN 0380-80939-7. [4] “Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949, Article 29”. International Red Cross. Retrieved 2007-11-11. [5] “Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Article 29”. International Red Cross. 18 October 1907. Retrieved 2007-1111. [6] Suvorov, Viktor (1990). SPETSNAZ: The Inside Story Of The Special Soviet Special Forces. Pocket. ISBN 0-67168917-7. [7] “Operation “Rooster”— Israel Captures Egyptian Radar In War of Attrition”. Retrieved 2007-11-21. [8] Manor, Leroy J. “The Son Tay Raid, November 21, 1970”. [9] Powell, Colin (March 2003). My American Journey. p. 145. ISBN 0-345-46641-1.

Chapter 15

Eavesdropping

Cardinals in the Vatican, by Henri Adolphe Laissement, 1895

A fiber-optic splitter, a modern method of eavesdropping.

(“the dripping of water from the eaves of a house; the ground on which such water falls”). An eavesdropper was one who stood at the eavesdrop (where the water fell, i.e., near the house) so as to overhear what was said inside.[3][4] “Belly-buster” hand-crank audio drill, used during the late 1950s and early 1960s to drill holes into masonry for implanting audio devices

15.2 Techniques

Eavesdropping is secretly listening to the private conversation of others without their consent, as defined by Black’s Law Dictionary.[1] This is commonly thought to be unethical and there is an old adage that “eavesdroppers seldom hear anything good of themselves... eavesdroppers always try to listen to matters that concern them.”[2]

Eavesdropping can also be done over telephone lines (wiretapping), email, instant messaging, and other methods of communication considered private. (If a message is publicly broadcast, witnessing it is not considered eavesdropping.) VoIP communications software is also vulnerable to electronic eavesdropping via infections such as trojans.

15.1 Etymology

15.3 References

The verb eavesdrop was originally a back-formation of the noun eavesdropper (“a person who eavesdrops”) which was formed from the unrelated noun eavesdrop 74

[1] Garner, p. 550 [2] Ronald R. Kline (2000). Consumers in the Country. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press. p. 46.

15.5. EXTERNAL LINKS

[3] Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (6th ed.), Oxford University Press, 2007, ISBN 978-0-19-920687-2 [4] “eavesdrop”. Online Etymology Dictionary.

15.4 See also • Computer surveillance • ECHELON • Espionage • Fiber tapping • Katz v. United States (1967) • Keystroke logging • Magic (cryptography) • Man-in-the-middle attack • Mass surveillance • NSA warrantless surveillance controversy (December 2005 – 2006) • Opportunistic encryption • Privacy • Secure communication • Surveillance • Telephone tapping • Ultra

15.5 External links • The dictionary definition of eavesdropping at Wiktionary • Media related to Eavesdropping at Wikimedia Commons

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Chapter 16

Espionage “Spy” and “Secret agent” redirect here. For other uses, tion. see Spy (disambiguation) and Secret agent (disambiguation). For other uses, see Espionage (disambiguation). 16.1 Espionage or, casually, spying involves a spy ring, government and company/firm or individual obtaining information considered secret or confidential without the permission of the holder of the information.[1] Espionage is inherently clandestine, as it is taken for granted that it is unwelcome and in many cases illegal and punishable by law. It is a subset of “intelligence gathering”, which otherwise may be conducted from public sources and using perfectly legal and ethical means. It is crucial to distinguish espionage from "intelligence" gathering, as the latter does not necessarily involve espionage, but often collates open-source information. Espionage is often part of an institutional effort by a government or commercial concern. However, the term is generally associated with state spying on potential or actual enemies primarily for military purposes. Spying involving corporations is known as industrial espionage. One of the most effective ways to gather data and information about the enemy (or potential enemy) is by infiltrating the enemy’s ranks. This is the job of the spy (espionage agent). Spies can bring back all sorts of information concerning the size and strength of enemy forces. They can also find dissidents within the enemy’s forces and influence them to defect. In times of crisis, spies can also be used to steal technology and to sabotage the enemy in various ways. Counterintelligence operatives can feed false information to enemy spies, protecting important domestic secrets, and preventing attempts at subversion. Nearly every country has very strict laws concerning espionage, and the penalty for being caught is often severe. However, the benefits that can be gained through espionage are generally great enough that most governments and many large corporations make use of it to varying degrees. Further information on clandestine HUMINT (human intelligence) information collection techniques is available, including discussions of operational techniques, asset recruiting, and the tradecraft used to collect this informa-

History

16.1.1 Ancient history Events involving espionage are well documented throughout history. The ancient writings of Chinese and Indian military strategists such as Sun-Tzu and Chanakya contain information on deception and subversion. Chanakya’s student Chandragupta Maurya, founder of the Maurya Empire in India, made use of assassinations, spies and secret agents, which are described in Chanakya’s Arthasastra. The ancient Egyptians had a thoroughly developed system for the acquisition of intelligence, and the Hebrews used spies as well, as in the story of Rahab. Spies were also prevalent in the Greek and Roman empires.[2] During the 13th and 14th centuries, the Mongols relied heavily on espionage in their conquests in Asia and Europe. Feudal Japan often used ninja to gather intelligence. More recently, spies played a significant part in Elizabethan England (see Francis Walsingham). Many modern espionage methods were well established even then.[3] Aztecs used Pochtecas, people in charge of commerce, as spies and diplomats, and had diplomatic immunity. Along with the pochteca, before a battle or war, secret agents, quimitchin, were sent to spy amongst enemies usually wearing the local costume and speaking the local language, techniques similar to modern secret agents.[4]

16.1.2 Arabia during Muhammad’s era Main article: List of battles of Muhammad The Islamic Prophet Muhammad made extensive use of spies. His first use of spies was during the Invasion of Hamra al-Asad. A little before Muhammad set out in the pursuit of the departing Meccan army, he sent three spies, all belonging to Banu Aslam, to track the departing Meccan army. Two of them met the Meccan army at Hamra al-Asad, about eight miles from Medina. Abu Sufyan had

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16.2. TARGETS OF ESPIONAGE already learned about Muhammad’s venture to pursue the Meccans. The two spies heard the discussion among the Quraysh: whether they should go back and finish off the Muslims once and for all or to continue their journey to Mecca. Abu Sufyan was in favor of inflicting a deciding blow to the Muslims, but on the counsel of Safwan ibn Umayyah, he decided against it and, instead, proceeded towards Mecca. This happened a day before the Meccans arrived at Hamra al-Asad. Prior to their departure from Hamra al-Asad, the Quraysh spotted the two Muslim spies, and caught and killed them, leaving their corpses on the road. Nothing is known about the whereabouts of the third Muslim spy. [5][6]

77 weapons secrets. Recently, espionage agencies have targeted the illegal drug trade and terrorists. Since 2008 the United States has charged at least 57 defendants for attempting to spy for China.[18] Different intelligence services value certain intelligence collection techniques over others. The former Soviet Union, for example, preferred human sources over research in open sources, while the United States has tended to emphasize technological methods such as SIGINT and IMINT. Both Soviet political (KGB) and military intelligence (GRU[19] ) officers were judged by the number of agents they recruited.

During the Expedition of 'Abdullah ibn 'Atik in Decem- 16.2 Targets of espionage ber 624,[7] he sent one his followers to assassinate Abu Rafi' ibn Abi Al-Huqaiq for mocking Muhammad with Espionage agents are usually trained experts in a specific his poetry and for helping the troops of the Confederates targeted field so they can differentiate mundane informaby providing them with money and supplies[8] tion from targets of intrinsic value to their own organiIn the Expedition of Abdullah Ibn Unais, also known as sational development. Correct identification of the taris the sole purpose of the espionage the Assassination of Khaled bin Sufyan, Muhammad get at its execution [20] operation. sent Abdullah ibn Unais to assassinate the leader of the Banu Lahyan tribe. Muhammad alleged that Khaled bin Broad areas of espionage targeting expertise include:[21] Sufyan Al-Hathali, considered an attack on Madinah and that he was inciting the people on Nakhla or Uranah to • Natural resources: strategic production identififight Muslims. So Muhammad sent Abdullah ibn Uncation and assessment (food, energy, materials). ais to assassinate him. Which he did successfully. AfAgents are usually found among bureaucrats who ter cutting off his head at night,[9] he brought it back to administer these resources in their own countries Muhammad.[10][11][12][13] • Popular sentiment towards domestic and foreign Abdullah ibn Unais found Hudayr in the company of his policies (popular, middle class, elites). Agents ofwife, when asked about his identity. Unais replied: “I am ten recruited from field journalistic crews, exchange an arab tribesman who has heard of you and the Army postgraduate students and sociology researchers you are raising to fight Muhammad, so I have come to join your ranks”.[11] Sufyan bin Khalid trusted him. Then • Strategic economic strengths (production, research, Unais asked to talk to him privately, once, while conversmanufacture, infrastructure). Agents recruited from ing, Abdullah ibn Unais walked a short distance with ibn science and technology academia, commercial enKhalid, and when an opportunity came he struck him with terprises, and more rarely from among military techhis sword and killed him. After killing ibn Khalid, he cut nologists off his head, brought that to Muhammad,[9] • Military capability intelligence (offensive, defensive, During the Expedition of Al Raji in 625.[14] Some men maneuver, naval, air, space). Agents are trained by requested that Muhammad send instructors to teach them special military espionage education facilities, and Islam,[14] but the men were bribed by the two tribes of posted to an area of operation with covert identities Khuzaymah who wanted revenge for the assassination to minimize prosecution of Khalid bin Sufyan by Muhammad’s followers.[15] Ac• Counterintelligence operations specifically targetcording to William Montgomery Watt, the seven men ing opponents’ intelligence services themselves, Muhammad sent may have been spies for Muhammad such as breaching confidentiality of communicaand instructors for Arab tribes.[16] Watt’s claim that they tions, and recruiting defectors or moles were spies and not missionaries is mentioned in the Sunni hadith collection Sahih al-Bukhari.[17]

16.3 Methods and terminology 16.1.3

Modern history

Although the news media may speak of “spy satelThe Cold War involved intense espionage activity be- lites” and the like, espionage is not a synonym for all tween the United States and its allies and the Soviet Union intelligence-gathering disciplines. It is a specific form and China and their allies, particularly related to nuclear of human source intelligence (HUMINT). Codebreaking

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(cryptanalysis or COMINT), aircraft or satellite photography, (IMINT) and research in open publications (OSINT) are all intelligence gathering disciplines, but none of them are considered espionage. Many HUMINT activities, such as prisoner interrogation, reports from military reconnaissance patrols and from diplomats, etc., are not considered espionage. Espionage is the disclosure of sensitive information (classified) to people who are not cleared for that information or access to that sensitive information. Unlike other forms of intelligence collection disciplines, espionage usually involves accessing the place where the desired information is stored or accessing the people who know the information and will divulge it through some kind of subterfuge. There are exceptions to physical meetings, such as the Oslo Report, or the insistence of Robert Hanssen in never meeting the people who bought his information. The US defines espionage towards itself as “The act of obtaining, delivering, transmitting, communicating, or receiving information about the national defense with an intent, or reason to believe, that the information may be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation”. Black’s Law Dictionary (1990) defines espionage as: "... gathering, transmitting, or losing ... information related to the national defense". Espionage is a violation of United States law, 18 U.S.C. §§ 792–798 and Article 106a of the Uniform Code of Military Justice".[22] The United States, like most nations, conducts espionage against other nations, under the control of the National Clandestine Service. Britain’s espionage activities are controlled by the Secret Intelligence Service.

16.3.1

• Numbers messaging • Non-official cover • Official cover • One-way voice link • Safe house • Side channel attack • Steganography • Surveillance • Surveillance aircraft [23]

16.4 Organization

Technology and techniques

See also: Tradecraft and List of intelligence gathering disciplines

• Agent handling • Concealment device • Covert agent • Covert listening device • Cut-out • Cyber spying • Dead drop • False flag operations • Honeypot • Interrogation

An intelligence officer’s clothing, accessories, and behavior must be as unremarkable as possible — their lives (and others’) may depend on it.

A spy is a person employed to seek out top secret information from a source. Within the United States Intelligence Community, “asset” is a more common usage. A case officer, who may have diplomatic status (i.e., official cover or non-official cover), supports and directs the human collector. Cutouts are couriers who do not know the

16.5. INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE

79

agent or case officer but transfer messages. A safe house 16.5 Industrial espionage is a refuge for spies. Spies often seek to obtain secret information from another source. Main article: Industrial espionage In larger networks the organization can be complex with many methods to avoid detection, including clandestine Reportedly Canada is losing $12 billion[25] and German cell systems. Often the players have never met. Case of- companies are estimated to be losing about €50 billion ficers are stationed in foreign countries to recruit and to ($87 billion) and 30,000 jobs[26] to industrial espionage supervise intelligence agents, who in turn spy on targets in every year. their countries where they are assigned. A spy need not be a citizen of the target country—hence does not automatically commit treason when operating within it. While 16.6 Agents in espionage the more common practice is to recruit a person already trusted with access to sensitive information, sometimes a person with a well-prepared synthetic identity (cover In espionage jargon, an “agent” is the person who does background), called a legend in tradecraft, may attempt the spying; a citizen of one country who is recruited by a second country to spy on or work against his own country to infiltrate a target organization. or a third country. In popular usage, this term is often These agents can be moles (who are recruited before they erroneously applied to a member of an intelligence serget access to secrets), defectors (who are recruited af- vice who recruits and handles agents; in espionage such a ter they get access to secrets and leave their country) or person is referred to as an intelligence officer, intelligence defectors in place (who get access but do not leave). operative or case officer. There are several types of agent A legend is also employed for an individual who is not in use today. an illegal agent, but is an ordinary citizen who is “relocated”, for example, a “protected witness”. Nevertheless, • Double agent, “is a person who engages in clansuch a non-agent very likely will also have a case officer destine activity for two intelligence or security serwho will act as controller. As in most, if not all synthetic vices (or more in joint operations), who provides identity schemes, for whatever purpose (illegal or legal), information about one or about each to the other, the assistance of a controller is required. and who wittingly withholds significant information Spies may also be used to spread disinformation in the organization in which they are planted, such as giving false reports about their country’s military movements, or about a competing company’s ability to bring a product to market. Spies may be given other roles that also require infiltration, such as sabotage. Many governments routinely spy on their allies as well as their enemies, although they typically maintain a policy of not commenting on this. Governments also employ private companies to collect information on their behalf such as SCG International Risk, International Intelligence Limited and others. Many organizations, both national and non-national, conduct espionage operations. It should not be assumed that espionage is always directed at the most secret operations of a target country. National and terrorist organizations and other groups are also targets.[24] This is because governments want to retrieve information that they can use to be proactive in protecting their nation from potential terrorist attacks. Communications both are necessary to espionage and clandestine operations, and also a great vulnerability when the adversary has sophisticated SIGINT detection and interception capability. Agents must also transfer money securely.[24]

from one on the instructions of the other or is unwittingly manipulated by one so that significant facts are withheld from the adversary. Peddlers, fabricators, and others who work for themselves rather than a service are not double agents because they are not agents. The fact that doubles have an agent relationship with both sides distinguishes them from penetrations, who normally are placed with the target service in a staff or officer capacity.”[27] • Re-doubled agent, an agent who gets caught as a double agent and is forced to mislead the foreign intelligence service. • Unwitting double agent, an agent who offers or is forced to recruit as a double or re-doubled agent and in the process is recruited by either a third party intelligence service or his own government without the knowledge of the intended target intelligence service or the agent. This can be useful in capturing important information from an agent that is attempting to seek allegiance with another country. The double agent usually has knowledge of both intelligence services and can identify operational techniques of both, thus making third party recruitment difficult or impossible. The knowledge of operational techniques can also affect the relationship between the Operations Officer

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CHAPTER 16. ESPIONAGE (or case officer) and the agent if the case is transferred by an Operational Targeting Officer to a new Operations Officer, leaving the new officer vulnerable to attack. This type of transfer may occur when an officer has completed his term of service or when his cover is blown. • Triple agent, an agent that is working for three intelligence services.

• Intelligence agent: Provides access to sensitive information through the use of special privileges. If used in corporate intelligence gathering, this may include gathering information of a corporate business venture or stock portfolio. In economic intelligence, “Economic Analysts may use their specialized skills to analyze and interpret economic trends and developments, assess and track foreign financial activities, and develop new econometric and modeling methodologies.”[28] This may also include information of trade or tariff. • Access agent: Provides access to other potential agents by providing profiling information that can help lead to recruitment into an intelligence service. • Agent of influence: Someone who may provide political influence in an area of interest or may even provide publications needed to further an intelligence service agenda. The use of the media to print a story to mislead a foreign service into action, exposing their operations while under surveillance.

report to a local station. A non official cover operative is a type of cover used by an intelligence operative and can be dubbed an “Illegal”[29] when working in another country without diplomatic protection.

16.7 Law Espionage is a crime under the legal code of many nations. The risks of espionage vary. A spy breaking the host country’s laws may be deported, imprisoned, or even executed. A spy breaking his/her own country’s laws can be imprisoned for espionage or/and treason (which in the USA and some other jurisdictions can only occur if he or she take ups arms or aids the enemy against his or her own country during wartime), or even executed, as the Rosenbergs were. For example, when Aldrich Ames handed a stack of dossiers of U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agents in the Eastern Bloc to his KGBofficer “handler”, the KGB “rolled up” several networks, and at least ten people were secretly shot. When Ames was arrested by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), he faced life in prison; his contact, who had diplomatic immunity, was declared persona non grata and taken to the airport. Ames’s wife was threatened with life imprisonment if her husband did not cooperate; he did, and she was given a five-year sentence. Hugh Francis Redmond, a CIA officer in China, spent nineteen years in a Chinese prison for espionage—and died there—as he was operating without diplomatic cover and immunity.[30]

In United States law, treason,[31] espionage,[32] and • Agent provocateur: This type of agent instigates spying[33] are separate crimes. Treason and espionage trouble, or may provide information to gather as have graduated punishment levels. many people as possible into one location for an arThe United States in World War I passed the Espionage rest. Act of 1917. Over the years, many spies, such as • Facilities agent: A facilities agent may provide ac- the Soble spy ring, Robert Lee Johnson, the Rosenberg [34] [35] cess to buildings such as garages or offices used for ring, Aldrich Hazen Ames, Robert Philip Hanssen, Jonathan Pollard, John Anthony Walker, James Hall III, staging operations, resupply, etc. and others have been prosecuted under this law. • Principal agent: This agent functions as a handler for an established network of agents usually “Blue Chip”. 16.8 Use against non-spies • Confusion agent: May provide misleading information to an enemy intelligence service or attempt to However, espionage laws are also used to prosecute nondiscredit the operations of the target in an operation. spies. In the United States, the Espionage Act of 1917 was used against socialist politician Eugene V. Debs (at • Sleeper agent: A sleeper agent is a person who is that time the act had much stricter guidelines and amongst recruited to an intelligence service to wake up and other things banned speech against military recruiting). perform a specific set of tasks or functions while liv- The law was later used to suppress publication of periing under cover in an area of interest. This type of odicals, for example of Father Coughlin in World War agent is not the same as a deep cover operative, who II. In the early 21st century, the act was used to proscontinually contacts a case officer to file intelligence ecute whistleblowers such as Thomas Andrews Drake, reports. A sleeper agent is not in contact with any- John Kiriakou, and Edward Snowden, as well as officials one until activated. who communicated with journalists for innocuous rea[36][37] • Illegal agent: This is a person who is living in an- sons, such as Stephen Jin-Woo Kim. other country under false credentials that does not As of 2012, India and Pakistan were holding several hun-

16.10. MILITARY CONFLICTS dred prisoners of each other’s country for minor violations like trespass or visa overstay, often with accusations of espionage attached. Some of these include cases where Pakistan and India both deny citizenship to these people, leaving them stateless. The BBC reported in 2012 on one such case, that of Mohammed Idrees, who was held under Indian police control for approximately 13 years for overstaying his 15-day visa by 2–3 days after seeing his ill parents in 1999. Much of the 13 years was spent in prison waiting for a hearing, and more time was spent homeless or living with generous families. The Indian People’s Union for Civil Liberties and Human Rights Law Network both decried his treatment. The BBC attributed some of the problems to tensions caused by the Kashmir conflict.[38]

16.9 Espionage laws in the UK

81 However, espionage and intelligence can be linked. According to the MI5 website, “foreign intelligence officers acting in the UK under diplomatic cover may enjoy immunity from prosecution. Such persons can only be tried for spying (or, indeed, any criminal offence) if diplomatic immunity is waived beforehand. Those officers operating without diplomatic cover have no such immunity from prosecution”. There are also laws surrounding government and organisational intelligence and surveillance. Generally, the body involved should be issued with some form of warrant or permission from the government, and should be enacting their procedures in the interest of protecting national security or the safety of public citizens. Those carrying out intelligence missions should act within not only RIPA, but also the Data Protection Act and Human Rights Act. However, there are specific spy equipment laws and legal requirements around intelligence methods that vary for each form of intelligence enacted.

Espionage is illegal in the UK under the Official Secrets Acts of 1911 and 1920. The UK law under this legislation considers espionage as actions “intend to help an 16.10 Military conflicts enemy and deliberately harm the security of the nation”. According to MI5, a person will be charged with the crime of espionage if they, “for any purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State": approaches, enters or inspects a prohibited area; makes documents such as plans that are intended, calculated, or could directly or indirectly be of use to an enemy; or “obtains, collects, records, or publishes, or communicates to any other person any secret official code word, or pass word, or any sketch, plan, model, article, or note, or other document which is calculated to be or might be or is intended to be directly or indirectly useful to an enemy”. The illegality of espionage also includes any action which may be considered 'preparatory to' spying, or encouraging or aiding another to spy.[39] French spy captured during the Franco-Prussian War. An individual convicted of espionage can be imprisoned for up to 14 years in the UK, although multiple sentences In military conflicts, espionage is considered permissible as many nations recognizes the inevitability of opposing can be issued. sides seeking intelligence each about the dispositions of the other. To make the mission easier and successful, sol16.9.1 Government intelligence laws and diers or agents wear disguises to conceal their true identity from the enemy while penetrating enemy lines for intelliits distinction from espionage gence gathering. However, if they are caught behind enGovernment intelligence is very much distinct from es- emy lines in disguises, they are not entitled to prisoner-ofpionage, and is not illegal in the UK, providing that the war status and subject to prosecution and punishment— organisations of individuals are registered, often with the including execution. ICO, and are acting within the restrictions of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA). 'Intelligence' is considered legally as “information of all sorts gathered by a government or organisation to guide its decisions. It includes information that may be both public and private, obtained from many different public or secret sources. It could consist entirely of information from either publicly available or secret sources, or be a combination of the two.”[40]

The Hague Convention of 1907 addresses the status of wartime spies, specifically within “Laws and Customs of War on Land” (Hague IV); October 18, 1907: CHAPTER II Spies”.[41] Article 29 states that a person is considered a spy who, acts clandestinely or on false pretenses, infiltrates enemy lines with the intention of acquiring intelligence about the enemy and communicate it to the belligerent during times of war. Soldiers who penetrates enemy lines in proper uniforms for the purpose of ac-

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quiring intelligence are not considered spies but are lawful 16.11 List of famous spies combatants entitled to be treated as prisoners of war upon capture by the enemy. Article 30 states that a spy cap- See also: Intelligence agency, Special Operations Executured behind enemy lines may only be punished follow- tive and United States government security breaches ing a trial. However, Article 31 provides that if a spy successfully rejoined his own military and is then captured by the enemy as a lawful combatant, he cannot be punished for his previous acts of espionage and must be treated as a prisoner of war. Note that this provision does not apply to citizens who committed treason against their own country or co-belligerents of that country and may be captured and prosecuted at any place or any time regardless whether he rejoined the military to which he belongs or not or during or after the war.[42][43] The ones that are excluded from being treated as spies while behind enemy lines are escaping prisoners of war and downed airmen as international law distinguishes between a disguised spy and a disguised escaper.[23] It is permissible for these groups to wear enemy uniforms or civilian clothes in order to facilitate their escape back to friendly lines so long as they do not attack enemy forces, collect military intelligence, or engage in similar military operations while so disguised.[44][45] Soldiers who are wearing enemy uniforms or civilian clothes simply for the sake of warmth along with other purposes rather than engaging in espionage or similar military operations while so attired is also excluded from being treated as unlawful combatants.[23] Saboteurs are treated as spies as they too wear disguises behind enemy lines for the purpose of waging destruc- Howard Burnham (1915) tion on enemy’s vital targets in addition to intelligence gathering.[46][47] For example, during World War II, eight German agents entered the U.S. in June 1942 as part of Operation Pastorius, a sabotage mission against U.S. economic targets. Two weeks later, all were arrested in civilian clothes by the FBI thanks to two German agents betraying the mission to the U.S. Under the Hague Convention of 1907, these Germans were classified as spies and tried by a military tribunal in Washington D.C.[48] On August 3, 1942, all eight were found guilty and sentenced to death. Five days later, six were executed by electric chair at the District of Columbia jail. Two who had given evidence against the others had their sentences reduced by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to prison terms. In 1948, they were released by President Harry S. Truman and deported to the American Zone of occupied Germany. The U.S. codification of enemy spies is Article 106 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. This provides a mandatory death sentence if a person captured in the act is proven to be “lurking as a spy or acting as a spy in or about any place, vessel, or aircraft, within the control or jurisdiction of any of the armed forces, or in or about any shipyard, any manufacturing or industrial plant, or any other place or institution engaged in work in aid of the prosecution of the war by the United States, or elsewhere”.[49] FBI file photo of the leader of the Duquesne Spy Ring (1941)

16.11. LIST OF FAMOUS SPIES • Reign of Elizabeth I of England Sir Francis Walsingham Christopher Marlowe • American Revolution Thomas Knowlton, The First American Spy Nathan Hale John Andre James Armistead Benjamin Tallmadge, Case agent who organized of the Culper Spy Ring in New York City • Napoleonic Wars Charles-Louis Schulmeister William Wickham • American Civil War One of the innovations in the American Civil War was the use of proprietary companies for intelligence collection by the Union; see Allan Pinkerton. Confederate Secret Service Belle Boyd[50] • Aceh War Dutch professor Snouck Hurgronje world leading authority on Islam was a proponent of espionage to quell Muslim resistance in Aceh in the Dutch East Indies. In his role as Colonial Advisor on Oriental Affairs, he gathered intelligence under the name “Haji Abdul Ghaffar”. He used his knowledge of Islamic and Aceh culture to devise strategies that significantly helped crush the resistance of the Aceh inhabitants and impose Dutch colonial rule, ending the 40 year Aceh War. Casualty estimates ranged between 50,000 and 100,000 inhabitants dead and about a million wounded. Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje • Second Boer War Fritz Joubert Duquesne Sidney Reilly • Russo-Japanese War Sidney Reilly Ho Liang-Shung Akashi Motojiro

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16.11.1 World War I See also: Espionage in Norway during World War I

• Fritz Joubert Duquesne • Jules C. Silber • Mata Hari • Howard Burnham • T.E. Lawrence • Sidney Reilly 11 German spies were executed in the Tower of London during WW1.[51] • Executed :- Carl Hans Lody on 6 November 1914, in the Miniature Rifle Range. • Executed :- Carl Frederick Muller on 23 June 1915, in Miniature Rifle Range. Prepared bullets were used by the execution party. • Executed :- Haicke Marinus Janssen & Willem Johannes Roos both executed on 30 July 1915, both in the Tower ditch. • Executed :- Ernst Waldemar Melin on 10 September 1915, Miniature Rifle Range. • Executed :- Augusto Alfredo Roggen on 17 September 1915, in Miniature Rifle Range. • Executed :- Fernando Buschman on 19 October 1915, in Miniature Rifle Range. • Executed :- George Traugott Breeckow, otherwise known as Reginald Rowland or George T. Parker on 26 October 1915, in Miniature Rifle Range. Worked with a lady called Lizzie Louise Wertheim who was sentenced to ten years penal servitude. Later on 17 January 1918 was certified as insane and died in Broadmoor criminal lunatic asylum on 29 July 1920. • Executed :- Irving Guy Ries on 27 October 1915, in Miniature Rifle Range. • Executed :- Albert Mayer on 2 December 1915, in Miniature Rifle Range. • Executed :- Ludovico Hurwitz-y-Zender on 11 April 1916 in Miniature Rifle Range. Carl Hans Lody has his own grave and black headstone in the East London Cemetery, Plaistow. The others are buried about 150 yards away under a small memorial stone alongside a pathway.

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CHAPTER 16. ESPIONAGE and begin employing them in April 1942.[52] Their task was to transmit information from Nazi occupied France back to Allied Forces. The main strategic reason was that men in France faced a high risk of being interrogated by Nazi troops but women were less likely to arouse suspicion. In this way they made good couriers and proved equal to, if not more effective than, their male counterparts. Their participation in Organization and Radio Operation was also vital to the success of many operations, including the main network between Paris and London. See also: Clandestine HUMINT asset recruiting § Love, honeypots and recruitment

16.11.3 Post World War II Further information: Cold War espionage

Imagined German Intelligence Officer thanks British Forces for giving away details of operations, (Graham & Gillies Advertising)

16.11.2

World War II

In the United States, there are seventeen[53] federal agencies that form the United States Intelligence Community. The Central Intelligence Agency operates the National Clandestine Service (NCS)[54] to collect human intelligence and perform Covert operations.[55] The National Security Agency collects Signals Intelligence. Originally the CIA spearheaded the US-IC. Pursuant to the September 11 attacks the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) was created to promulgate information-sharing. • Kim Philby

• Ray Mawby Informants were common in World War II. In November 1939, the German Hans Ferdinand Mayer sent what is called the Oslo Report to inform the British of German technology and projects in an effort to undermine the 16.12 Spy fiction Nazi regime. The Réseau AGIR was a French network developed after the fall of France that reported the start Main article: Spy fiction of construction of V-weapon installations in Occupied France to the British. An early example of espionage literature is Kim by the Counterespionage included the use of turned Double English novelist Rudyard Kipling, with a description of Cross agents to misinform Nazi Germany of impact the training of an intelligence agent in the Great Game points during the Blitz and internment of Japanese in the between the UK and Russia in 19th century Central Asia. US against “Japan’s wartime spy program”. Additional An even earlier work was James Fenimore Cooper's clasWWII espionage examples include Soviet spying on the sic novel, The Spy, written in 1821, about an American US Manhattan project, the German Duquesne Spy Ring spy in New York during the Revolutionary War. convicted in the US, and the Soviet Red Orchestra spy- During the many 20th century spy scandals, much inforing on Nazi Germany. The US lacked a specific agency mation became publicly known about national spy agenat the start of the war, but quickly formed the Office of cies and dozens of real-life secret agents. These sensaStrategic Services (OSS). tional stories piqued public interest in a profession largely Spying has sometimes been considered a gentlemanly pursuit, with recruiting focused on military officers, or at least on persons of the class from whom officers are recruited. However, the demand for male soldiers, an increase in women’s rights, and the tactical advantages of female spies led the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) to set aside any lingering Victorian Era prejudices

off-limits to human interest news reporting, a natural consequence of the secrecy inherent to their work. To fill in the blanks, the popular conception of the secret agent has been formed largely by 20th and 21st century literature and cinema. Attractive and sociable real-life agents such as Valerie Plame find little employment in serious fiction, however. The fictional secret agent is more often a loner,

16.13. SEE ALSO sometimes amoral—an existential hero operating outside the everyday constraints of society. Loner spy personalities may have been a stereotype of convenience for authors who already knew how to write loner private investigator characters that sold well from the 1920s to the present. Johnny Fedora achieved popularity as a fictional agent of early Cold War espionage, but James Bond is the most commercially successful of the many spy characters created by intelligence insiders during that struggle. His less fantastic rivals include Le Carre’s George Smiley and Harry Palmer as played by Michael Caine. Most postVietnam era characters were modeled after the American, C.C. Taylor, reportedly the last sanctioned “asset” of the U.S. government. Taylor, a true “Double 0 agent”, worked alone and would travel as an American or Canadian tourist or businessman throughout Europe and Asia, he was used extensively in the Middle East toward the end of his career. Taylor received his weapons training from Carlos Hathcock, holder of a record 93 confirmed kills from WWII through the Viet Nam conflict. According to documents made available through the Freedom of Information Act, his operations were classified as “NOC” or Non-Official Cover. Jumping on the spy bandwagon, other writers also started writing about spy fiction featuring female spies as protagonists, such as The Baroness, which has more graphic action and sex, as compared to other novels featuring male protagonists. It also made its way into the videogame world, hence the famous creation of Hideo Kojima, the Metal Gear Solid Series. Espionage has also made its way into comedy depictions. The 1960s TV series Get Smart portrays an inept spy, while the 1985 movie Spies Like Us depicts a pair of nonetoo-bright men sent to the Soviet Union to investigate a missile.

16.12.1

World War II: 1939–1945

16.12.2

Cold War era: 1945–1991

• Anderson, Nicholas NOC Enigma Books 2009 Post Cold War era • Ishmael Jones The Human Factor: Inside the CIA’s Dysfunctional Intelligence Culture Encounter Books 2008, rev. 2010 • Michael Ross The Volunteer: The Incredible True Story of an Israeli Spy on the Trail of International Terrorists McClelland & Stewart 2007, rev. 2008 • Jean-Marie Thiébaud, Dictionnaire Encyclopédique International des Abréviations, Sigles et Acronymes, Armée et armement, Gendarmerie, Police, Services de renseignement et Services secrets français et

85 étrangers, Espionnage, Contrespionnage, Services de secours, Organisations révolutionnaires et terroristes, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2015, 827 p

16.13 See also • Animals used in espionage • Chinese intelligence operations in the United States • Classified information • Clandestine operation • Covert United States foreign regime change actions • Dumpster diving • History of Soviet espionage • Human intelligence (intelligence gathering) • Intelligence assessment • Labor spies • List of cryptographers • List of intelligence agencies • List of intelligence gathering disciplines • Military intelligence • Ninja • Operation Snow White • Security clearance • Spymaster

16.14 References [1] “WHAT IS ESPIONAGE?". [2] "Espionage in Ancient Rome". HistoryNet. [3] “Henrywotton.org.uk”. Henrywotton.org.uk. Retrieved 2012-07-07. [4] Soustelle, Jacques (2002). The Daily Life of the Aztecas. Phoenix Press. p. 209. ISBN 1842125087. [5] Al-Mubarakpuri, Saifur Rahman (2002), Sealed Nectar, Dar us Salam, p. 340 [6] Abū Khalīl, Shawqī (2003), Hamra al assad, Dar us Salam, p. 273, ISBN 9960-897-54-0 [7] William Muir, The life of Mahomet and history of Islam to the era of the Hegira, Volume 4, p. 14 [8] Mubarakpuri, The Sealed Nectar, p. 204. (online)

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[9] Gabriel, Richard A. (2008), Muhammad, Islam’s first great general, University of Oklahoma Press, p. 126, ISBN 978-0-8061-3860-2 [10] Mubarakpuri, The sealed nectar: biography of the Noble Prophet , p. 349.

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[27] “Double Agent”. cia.gov. [28] Cia.gov [29] Illegal Mi5.gov -How spies operate.

[11]

[30] “CIA Status Improves Contractor’s Case for Immunity”. New America Media.

[12] Za'd Al-Ma'ad p. 2/109; Ibn Hisham p. 2/619

[31] treason

[13] Hawarey, Dr. Mosab (2010). The Journey of Prophecy; Days of Peace and War (Arabic). Islamic Book Trust. ISBN 9789957051648.Note: Book contains a list of battles of Muhammad in Arabic, English translation available here

[32] espionage

[14] Mubarakpuri, The Sealed Nectar, p. 187. (online) [15] Watt, W. Montgomery (1956). Muhammad at Medina. Oxford University Press. p. 33. ISBN 978-0195773071. The common version, however, is that B. Lihyan wanted to avenge the assassination of their chief at Muhammad’s instigation, and bribed two clans of the tribe of Khuzaymah to say they wanted to become Muslims and ask Muhammad to send instructors. (online) [16] Watt, W. Montgomery (1956). Muhammad at Medina. Oxford University Press. p. 33. ISBN 978-0-19577307-1. The common version, however, is that B. Lihyan wanted to avenge the assassination of their chief at Muhammad’s instigation, and bribed two clans of the tribe of Khuzaymah to say they wanted to become Muslims and ask Muhammad to send instructors. (online) [17] Kailtyn Chick, Kailtyn Chick, p. 338, Hamlet Book Publishing , 2013 [18] Arrillaga, Pauline. “China’s spying seeks secret US info.” AP, 7 May 2011. [19] Suvorov, Victor (1987). Inside the Aquarium. Berkley. ISBN 0-425-09474-X. [20] US Military Intelligence Handbook. USA International Business Publications. p. 12. [21] US Military Intelligence Handbook. USA International Business Publications. p. 13. [22] US Department of Defense (2007-07-12). “Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms” (PDF). Retrieved 2007-10-01. [23] Igor Primoratz (August 15, 2013). New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts: Commentary on the Two 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Nijhoff Classics in International Law). Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. p. 214. [24] US Military Intelligence Handbook. USA International Business Publications. p. 15. [25] "Defectors say China running 1,000 spies in Canada". CBC News. June 15, 2005. [26] "Beijing’s spies cost German firms billions, says espionage expert". The Sydney Morning Herald. July 25, 2009.

[33] spying [34] “Aldrich Ames Criminal Complaint”. jya.com. Retrieved 2011-03-19. [35] “USA v. Robert Philip Hanssen: Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint, Arrest Warrant and Search Warrant”. fas.org. Retrieved 2011-03-19. [36] Gerstein, Josh (11.3.7). “Despite openness pledge, President Obama pursues leakers”. politico.com. Retrieved 2011-03-19. Check date values in: |date= (help) [37] See the article on John Kiriakou [38] Your World: The Nowhere Man, Rupa Jha, October 21, 2012, BBC (retrieved 2012-10-20) (Program link:The Nowhere Man) [39] https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/the-threats/espionage/ espionage-and-the-law.html [40] https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/the-threats/espionage/ what-is-espionage.html [41] “Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18 October 1907.”. International Committee of the Red Cross. [42] Paul Battersby, Joseph M. Siracusa Ph.D, Sasho Ripiloski (January 19, 2011). Crime Wars: The Global Intersection of Crime, Political Violence, and International Law. Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 125. [43] Charlesworth, Lorie (2006). “2 SAS Regiment, War Crimes Investigations, and British Intelligence: Intelligence Officials and the Natzweiler Trial". The Journal of Intelligence History 6 (2): 41. doi:10.1080/16161262.2006.10555131. [44] “United States of America, Practice Relating to Rule 62. Improper Use of Flags or Military Emblems, Insignia or Uniforms of the Adversary”. International Committee of the Red Cross. [45] 2006 Operational Law Handbook [46] Leslie C. Green (February 1, 2000). The Contemporary Law Of Armed Conflict 2nd Edition. Juris Publishing. p. 142. ISBN 1-929446-03-9. [47] George P. Fletcher (September 16, 2002). Romantics at War: Glory and Guilt in the Age of Terrorism. Princeton University Press. p. 106.

16.16. EXTERNAL LINKS

87

[48] Dr. J. H. W. Verziji (1978). International Law in Historical Perspective: The laws of war. Part IX-A. Brill Publishers. p. 143. ISBN 90-286-0148-1.

• Lerner, K. Lee and Brenda Wilmoth Lerner, eds. Encyclopedia of Espionage, Intelligence and Security 2003 1100 pages.

[49] Article 106—Spies [50] February 21, 2001 (2001-02-21). “Famous Spies in History, CNN”. Archives.cnn.com. Retrieved 2012-07-07.

• Knightley, Philip The Second Oldest Profession: Spies and Spying in the Twentieth Century Norton 1986

[51] Sellers, Leonard (2009). Shot in the Tower: The Story of the Spies Executed in the Tower of London During the First World War. Pen & Sword Military. ISBN 9781848840263.

• Kahn, David. The Codebreakers: The Comprehensive History of Secret Communication from Ancient Times to the Internet 1996 Revised edition. First published in 1967.

[52] “Special Operations Executive”. Spartacus Educational.

• Johnson, Robert. Spying for Empire: The Great Game in Central and South Asia, 1757–1947 London: Greenhill 2006

[53] http://www.intelligence.gov/ about-the-intelligence-community/ (nota bene: They say it’s 17 agencies, in fact, taking military intelligence into consideration, it’s 22 agencies) [54] “Offices of CIA > Clandestine Service > Who We Are”. cia.gov. Retrieved 2010-06-18. [55] “Offices of CIA > Clandestine Service > Our Mission”. cia.gov. Retrieved 2010-06-18. [56] http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=106805285

16.15 Further reading • Jenkins, Peter. Surveillance Tradecraft: The Professional’s Guide to Surveillance Training ISBN 978-09535378-2-2 • Felix, Christopher [pseudonym for James McCarger] “Intelligence Literature: Suggested Reading List”. US CIA. Retrieved 9/2/2012. Check date values in: |accessdate= (help) A Short Course in the Secret War, 4th Edition. Madison Books, November 19, 2001. • West, Nigel. MI6: British Secret Intelligence Service Operations 1909–1945 1983 • Smith Jr., W. Thomas. Encyclopedia of the Central Intelligence Agency 2003 • Richelson, Jeffery T. The U.S. Intelligence Community 1999 fourth edition • Richelson, Jeffery T. A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century 1977 • Owen, David. Hidden Secrets: A Complete History of Espionage and the Technology Used to Support It • O'Toole, George. Honorable Treachery: A History of U.S. Intelligence, Espionage, Covert Action from the American Revolution to the CIA 1991 • Lerner, Brenda Wilmoth & K. Lee Lerner, eds. Terrorism: essential primary sources Thomas Gale 2006 ISBN 978-1-4144-0621-3

• Friedman, George. America’s Secret War: Inside the Hidden Worldwide Struggle Between the United States and Its Enemies 2005 • Doyle, David W., A Memoir of True Men and Traitors (2000) • Tunney, Thomas Joseph and Paul Merrick Hollister Throttled!: The Detection of the German and Anarchist Bomb Plotters Boston: Small, Maynard & company 1919 | available on Wikisource: s:Throttled! • Beesly, Patrick. Room 40, 1982. • Burnham, Frederick Russell Taking Chances 1944 • May, Ernest (ed.) Knowing One’s Enemies: Intelligence Assessment before the Two World Wars 1984 • Tuchman, Barbara W. The Zimmermann Telegram Ballantine Books 1966 • Words: Matt Bolton; photographs: Matt Munro. “The Tallinn Cables: A Glimpse into Tallinn’s Secret History of Espionage”. Lonely Planet Magazine, December 2011

16.16 External links • Interactive Rosenberg Timeline • History of an espionage in Russia

Chapter 17

False flag “False colors” redirects here. For the imaging technique, gaging in battle.[5] Auxiliary cruisers operated in such a see False-color. fashion in both World Wars, as did Q-ships, while merchant vessels were encouraged to use false flags for proFalse flag (or black flag) describes covert operations de- tection. The 1914 Battle of Trindade was between the auxiliary cruisers RMS Carmania and SMS Cap Trafalsigned to deceive in such a way that the operations appear as though they are being carried out by entities, groups, gar, in which Cap Trafalgar had been altered to look like Carmania. or nations other than those who actually planned and executed them. Operations carried out during peace-time One of the most notable examples was in World War II by civilian organizations, as well as covert government when the German commerce raider Kormoran, disguised agencies, may by extension be called false flag operations as a Dutch merchant ship, surprised and sank the Ausif they seek to hide the real organization behind an op- tralian light cruiser HMAS Sydney in 1941, causing the eration. Geraint Hughes uses the term to refer to those greatest recorded loss of life on an Australian warship. acts carried out by “military or security force personnel, Kormoran was also fatally damaged in that encounter and which are then blamed on terrorists.”[1] its crew was captured, but it was a considerable psycho[6] In its most modern usage, the term may also refer to those logical victory for the Germans. events which governments are cognizant of and able to stop but choose to allow to happen (or “stand down”), as a strategy to entangle or prepare the nation for war. Furthermore, the term “false flag terrorism” may even be used in those instances when violence is carried out by groups or organizations which, whether they know it or not, are being supported or controlled by the “victim” nation. deHaven-Smith argues that the terminology has become looser in recent years due to the increasingly complex levels of “duplicity” and “international intrigue” between states.[2] Some argue that false flags are methods used by deep states as a form of deep politics.[3] The name “false flag” has its origins in naval warfare where the use of a flag other than the belligerent’s true battle flag as a ruse de guerre, before engaging the enemy, has long been accepted.[4] Such operations are also accepted in certain circumstances in land warfare, to deceive enemies in similar ways providing that the deception is not perfidious and all such deceptions are discarded before opening fire upon the enemy.

The British used a Kriegsmarine ensign in the St Nazaire Raid and captured a German code book. The old destroyer Campbeltown, which the British planned to sacrifice in the operation, was provided with cosmetic modifications, cutting the ship’s funnels and chamfering the edges to resemble a German Type 23 torpedo boat The British were able to get within two miles (3 km) of the harbour before the defences responded, where the explosive-rigged Campbeltown and commandos successfully disabled or destroyed the key dock structures of the port.[7][8]

17.1.2 Air warfare In December 1922–February 1923, Rules concerning the Control of Wireless Telegraphy in Time of War and Air Warfare, drafted by a commission of jurists at the Hague regulates:[9] Art. 3. A military aircraft must carry an exterior mark indicating its nationality and its military character.

17.1 Use in warfare 17.1.1

Art. 19. The use of false exterior marks is forbidden.

Naval warfare

This practice is accepted in naval warfare, provided the This draft was never adopted as a legally binding treaty, false flag is lowered and the true flag raised before en- but the ICRC states in its introduction on the draft that 88

17.1. USE IN WARFARE “To a great extent, [the draft rules] correspond to the customary rules and general principles underlying treaties on the law of war on land and at sea”,[10] and as such these two non–controversial articles were already part of customary law.[11]

17.1.3

Land warfare

In land warfare, the use of a false flag is similar to that of naval warfare. The most widespread assumption is that this practice was first established under international humanitarian law at the trial in 1947 of the planner and commander of Operation Greif, Otto Skorzeny, by a U.S. military tribunal at the Dachau Trials. In this trial, the tribunal did not find Skorzeny guilty of a crime by ordering his men into action in American uniforms. He had passed on to his men the warning of German legal experts, that if they fought in American uniforms, they would be breaking the laws of war, but they probably were not doing so just by wearing American uniforms. During the trial, a number of arguments were advanced to substantiate this position and the German and U.S. military seem to have been in agreement on it. In the transcript of the trial,[12] it is mentioned that Paragraph 43 of the Field Manual published by the War Department, United States Army, on 1 October 1940, under the title “Rules of Land Warfare”, says: “National flags, insignias and uniforms as a ruse – in practice it has been authorized to make use of these as a ruse. The foregoing rule (Article 23 of the Annex of the IVth Hague Convention), does not prohibit such use, but does prohibit their improper use. It is certainly forbidden to make use of them during a combat. Before opening fire upon the enemy, they must be discarded.” Also The American Soldiers’ Handbook, was quoted by Defense Counsel and says: “The use of the enemy flag, insignia, and uniform is permitted under some circumstances. They are not to be used during actual fighting, and if used in order to approach the enemy without drawing fire, should be thrown away or removed as soon as fighting begins.” The outcome of the trial has been codified in the 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Protocol I): Article 37. – Prohibition of perfidy

89 1. It is prohibited to kill, injure, or capture an adversary by resort to perfidy. Acts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that confidence, shall constitute perfidy. The following acts are examples of perfidy: (a) The feigning of an intent to negotiate under a flag of truce or of a surrender; (b) The feigning of an incapacitation by wounds or sickness; (c) The feigning of civilian, non-combatant status; and (d) The feigning of protected status by the use of signs, emblems or uniforms of the United Nations or of neutral or other States not Parties to the conflict. 2. Ruses of war are not prohibited. Such ruses are acts which are intended to mislead an adversary or to induce him to act recklessly but which infringe no rule of international law applicable in armed conflict and which are not perfidious because they do not invite the confidence of an adversary with respect to protection under that law. The following are examples of such ruses: the use of camouflage, decoys, mock operations and disinformation. Article 38. – Recognized emblems 1. It is prohibited to make improper use of the distinctive emblem of the red cross, red crescent or red lion and sun or of other emblems, signs or signals provided for by the Conventions or by this Protocol. It is also prohibited to misuse deliberately in an armed conflict other internationally recognized protective emblems, signs or signals, including the flag of truce, and the protective emblem of cultural property. 2. It is prohibited to make use of the distinctive emblem of the United Nations, except as authorized by that Organization. Article 39. – Emblems of nationality 1. It is prohibited to make use in an armed conflict of the flags or military emblems, insignia or uniforms of neutral or other States not Parties to the conflict. 2. It is prohibited to make use of the flags or military emblems, insignia or uniforms of adverse Parties while engaging in attacks or in order to shield, favour, protect or impede military operations.

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CHAPTER 17. FALSE FLAG 3. Nothing in this Article or in Article 37, paragraph 1 ( d ), shall affect the existing generally recognized rules of international law applicable to espionage or to the use of flags in the conduct of armed conflict at sea.

17.2 As pretexts for war 17.2.1

Russo-Swedish War

In 1788, the head tailor at the Royal Swedish Opera received an order to sew a number of Russian military uniforms. These were then used by the Swedes to stage an attack on Puumala, a Swedish outpost on the RussoSwedish border, on 27 June 1788. This caused an outrage in Stockholm and impressed the Riksdag of the Estates, the Swedish national assembly, who until then had refused to agree to an offensive war against Russia. The Puumala incident allowed King Gustav III of Sweden, who lacked the constitutional authority to initiate unprovoked hostilities without the Estates’ consent, to launch the Russo-Swedish War (1788–1790)[13] Alfred Naujocks

17.2.2

Second Sino-Japanese War

Japanese experts inspect the scene of the 'railway sabotage' on South Manchurian Railway

Gleiwitz incident The Gleiwitz incident in 1939 involved Reinhard Heydrich fabricating evidence of a Polish attack against Germany to mobilize German public opinion for war and to justify the war with Poland. Alfred Naujocks was a key organiser of the operation under orders from Heydrich. It led to the deaths of Nazi concentration camp victims who were dressed as German soldiers and then shot by the Gestapo to make it seem that they had been shot by Polish soldiers. This, along with other false flag operations in Operation Himmler, would be used to mobilize support from the German population for the start of World War II in Europe.[15]

The operation failed to convince international public opinion of the German claims, and both Britain and In September 1931, Japanese officers fabricated a pretext France—Poland’s allies—declared war two days after for invading Manchuria by blowing up a section of rail- Germany invaded Poland.[16] way. Though the explosion was too weak to disrupt operations on the rail line, the Japanese nevertheless used this Mukden incident to seize Manchuria and create a puppet Winter War government for what they termed the “independent” state of Manchukuo.[14] On November 26, 1939, the Soviet army shelled Mainila, In 1937, in the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, they based a Russian village near the Finnish border. Soviet authortheir invasion of China proper on the false claim that ities blamed Finland for the attack and used the incident one of their soldiers had been kidnapped, initiating the as a pretext to invade Finland, starting the Winter War, four days later.[17] Second Sino-Japanese War.

17.2.3

World War II

17.2.4 Cold War

17.3. AS A TACTIC TO UNDERMINE POLITICAL OPPONENTS Operation Northwoods

91

17.3.1 Reichstag fire Main article: Reichstag fire The Reichstag fire was an arson attack on the Reichstag building in Berlin on 27 February 1933. The fire started in the Session Chamber,[22] and, by the time the police and firemen arrived, the main Chamber of Deputies was engulfed in flames. Police searched the building and found Marinus van der Lubbe, a young Dutch council communist and unemployed bricklayer, who had recently arrived in Germany to carry out political activities. The fire was used as evidence by the Nazis that the Communists were beginning a plot against the German government. Van der Lubbe and four Communist leaders were subsequently arrested. Adolf Hitler, who was sworn in as Chancellor of Germany four weeks before, on 30 January, urged President Paul von Hindenburg to pass an emergency decree to counter the “ruthless confrontation of the Communist Party of Germany".[23] With civil liberties suspended, the government instituted mass arrests of Communists, including all of the Communist parliamentary delegates. With their bitter rival Communists gone and their seats empty, the National Socialist German Workers Party went from being a plurality party to the majority; subsequent elections confirmed this position and thus allowed Hitler to consolidate his power.

Operation Northwoods memorandum (13 March 1962).[18]

Historians disagree as to whether Van der Lubbe acted alone, as he said, to protest the condition of the German working class, or whether the arson was planned and The planned, but never executed, 1962 Operation Northordered by the Nazis, then dominant in the government woods plot by the U.S. Department of Defense for a themselves, as a false flag operation.[24][25] war with Cuba involved scenarios such as fabricating the hijacking or shooting down of passenger and military planes, sinking a U.S. ship in the vicinity of Cuba, burning crops, sinking a boat filled with Cuban refugees, 17.3.2 Project TP-Ajax attacks by alleged Cuban infiltrators inside the United States, and harassment of U.S. aircraft and shipping Main article: 1953 Iranian coup d'état and the destruction of aerial drones by aircraft disguised as Cuban MiGs.[19] These actions would be blamed on Cuba, and would be a pretext for an invasion of Cuba On 4 April 1953, the CIA was ordered to undermine the and the overthrow of Fidel Castro's communist govern- government of Iran over a four-month period, as a precurment. It was authored by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but sor to overthrowing Prime Minister Mohammad Mosad[26] then rejected by President John F. Kennedy. The sur- degh. One tactic used to undermine Mosaddeh was to prise discovery of the documents relating to Operation carry out false flag attacks “on mosques and key public Northwoods was a result of the comprehensive search for figures”, to be blamed on Iranian communists loyal to the [26] records related to the assassination of President John F. government. Kennedy by the Assassination Records Review Board in The CIA project was code-named TP-Ajax, and the tactic the mid-1990s.[20] Information about Operation North- of a “directed campaign of bombings by Iranians posing woods was later publicized by James Bamford.[21] as members of the Communist party”,[27] involved the bombing of "at least" one well known Muslim’s house by CIA agents posing as Communists.[27] The CIA determined that the tactic of false flag attacks added to the “positive outcome” of Project TPAJAX.[26]

17.3 As a tactic to undermine political opponents

However, as "[t]he C.I.A. burned nearly all of its files on its role in the 1953 coup in Iran”, the true extent of the tactic has been difficult for historians to discern.[28]

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17.3.3

CHAPTER 17. FALSE FLAG

2008 Kurcha incident

In 2008 there was a shooting against two minibuses driving along in a volatile area right on the border between Abkhazia and the republic of Georgia. The buses were carrying Georgians who lived in Abkhazia and wanted to cross the border so they could go and vote in the parliamentary election that day.

forces are usually best suited to intelligence tasks; however, military provide the structure needed to back up such pseudo-ops with military response forces. According to US military expert Lawrence Cline (2005), “the teams typically have been controlled by police services, but this largely was due to the weaknesses in the respective military intelligence systems.”

The country had been experiencing internal political turmoil for the last year, and in an attempt to calm the situation, president Mikheil Saakashvili moved forward both presidential and parliamentary elections. However the presidential election in January that year was strongly contested, with hundreds of thousands attending protest rallies. When the parliamentary election came up in May, the mood was still tense. On mid day 21 May the two minibuses came under attack with small arms and grenades, and though there were no casualties, three people were taken to a hospital in Zugdidi, where president Saakashvili later arrived and was filmed by TV at the patients’ bedside. In his comments on TV, which dominated the news during election day, Saakashvili indicated that the attack had been an attempt to disrupt the election, implying that it had been Abkhaz or Russian forces who had been behind it. This provided for a favorable opportunity for the president to focus the nation’s attention on an external enemy, thereby leading attention away from his domestic critics, as well as making use of his position as leader to rally the Georgians around his candidates in the election. An investigation by the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia found that the attackers were located on the Georgian side of the ceasefire line, about 100m from the buses, and that although hard evidence of the attackers’ identities was lacking, inconsistencies merited further investigation, particularly the suggestion that the filming of the attack seemed anticipatory.[29]

Charlemagne Péralte of Haiti was assassinated in 1919, after checkpoints were passed by military disguised as guerrilla fighters

The State Political Directorate (OGPU) of the Soviet A Georgian investigative TV documentary later found Union set up such an operation from 1921 to 1926. that camera crew from the government-friendly channel During Operation Trust, they used loose networks of Rustavi 2 had been in position with their equipment be- White Army supporters and extended them, creating the pseudo-"Monarchist Union of Central Russia” (MUCR) fore the shooting took place. in order to help the OGPU identify real monarchists and anti-Bolsheviks.

17.4 Pseudo-operations Pseudo-operations are those in which forces of one power disguise themselves as enemy forces. For example, a state power may disguise teams of operatives as insurgents and, with the aid of defectors, infiltrate insurgent areas.[30] The aim of such pseudo-operations may be to gather short or long-term intelligence or to engage in active operations, in particular assassinations of important enemies. However, they usually involve both, as the risks of exposure rapidly increase with time and intelligence gathering eventually leads to violent confrontation. Pseudo-operations may be directed by military or police forces, or both. Police

An example of a successful assassination was United States Marine Sergeant Herman H. Hanneken leading a patrol of his Haitian Gendarmerie disguised as enemy guerrillas in 1919. The Patrol successfully passed several enemy checkpoints in order to assassinate the guerilla leader Charlemagne Péralte near Grande-Rivière-duNord. Hanneken was awarded the Medal of Honor and was commissioned a Second Lieutenant for his deed. During the Mau Mau uprising in the 1950s, captured Mau Mau members who switched sides and specially trained British troops initiated the pseudo-gang concept to successfully counter Mau Mau. In 1960 Frank Kitson, (who was later involved in the Northern Irish conflict and is now

17.5. ESPIONAGE a retired British General), published Gangs and Countergangs, an account of his experiences with the technique in Kenya; information included how to counter gangs and measures of deception, including the use of defectors, which brought the issue a wider audience. Another example of combined police and military oversight of pseudo-operations include the Selous Scouts in the former country Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), governed by white minority rule until 1980. The Selous Scouts were formed at the beginning of Operation Hurricane, in November 1973, by Major (later Lieutenant Colonel) Ronald Reid-Daly. As with all Special Forces in Rhodesia, by 1977 they were controlled by COMOPS (Commander, Combined Operations) Commander Lieutenant General Peter Walls. The Selous Scouts were originally composed of 120 members, with all officers being white and the highest rank initially available for black soldiers being colour sergeant. They succeeded in turning approximately 800 insurgents who were then paid by Special Branch, ultimately reaching the number of 1,500 members. Engaging mainly in long-range reconnaissance and surveillance missions, they increasingly turned to offensive actions, including the attempted assassination of Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army leader Joshua Nkomo in Zambia. This mission was finally aborted by the Selous Scouts, and attempted again, unsuccessfully, by the Rhodesian Special Air Service.[31] Some offensive operations attracted international condemnation, in particular the Selous Scouts’ raid on a Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) camp at Nyadzonya Pungwe, Mozambique in August 1976. ZANLA was then led by Josiah Tongogara. Using Rhodesian trucks and armored cars disguised as Mozambique military vehicles, 84 scouts killed 1,284 people in the camp-the camp was registered as a refugee camp by the United Nations (UN). Even according to Reid-Daly, most of those killed were unarmed guerrillas standing in formation for a parade. The camp hospital was also set ablaze by the rounds fired by the Scouts, killing all patients.[32] According to David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, who visited the camp shortly before the raid, it was only a refugee camp that did not host any guerrillas. It was staged for UN approval.[33]

93 operations, or “the use of organized teams which are disguised as guerrilla groups for long- or short-term penetration of insurgent-controlled areas.” Pseudo Operations should be distinguished, notes Cline, from the more common police or intelligence infiltration of guerrilla or criminal organizations. In the latter case, infiltration is normally done by individuals. Pseudo teams, on the other hand, are formed as needed from organized units, usually military or paramilitary. The use of pseudo teams has been a hallmark of a number of foreign counterinsurgency campaigns.”[30] Similar false flag tactics were also employed during the Algerian civil war, starting in the middle of 1994. Death squads composed of Département du Renseignement et de la Sécurité (DRS) security forces disguised themselves as Islamist terrorists and committed false flag terror attacks. Such groups included the Organisation of Young Free Algerians (OJAL) or the Secret Organisation for the Safeguard of the Algerian Republic (OSSRA)[35] According to Roger Faligot and Pascal Kropp (1999), the OJAL was reminiscent of “the Organization of the French Algerian Resistance (ORAF), a group of counterterrorists created in December 1956 by the Direction de la surveillance du territoire (Territorial Surveillance Directorate, or DST) whose mission was to carry out terrorist attacks with the aim of quashing any hopes of political compromise”.[36]

17.5 Espionage Main article: False flag penetrator

In espionage the term “false flag” describes the recruiting of agents by operatives posing as representatives of a cause the prospective agents are sympathetic to, or even the agents’ own government. For example, during the Cold War, several female West German civil servants were tricked into stealing classified documents by agents of the East German Stasi intelligence service, pretending to be members of West German peace advocacy groups (the Stasi agents were also described as "Romeos,” indicating that they also used their sex appeal to manipulate According to a 1978 study by the Directorate of Military their targets, making this operation a combination of the Intelligence, 68% of all insurgent deaths inside Rhodesia false flag and "honey trap" techniques).[37] could be attributed to the Selous Scouts, who were disThe technique can also be used to expose enemy agents in banded in 1980.[34] one’s own service, by having someone approach the susIf the action is a police action, then these tactics would pect and pose as an agent of the enemy. Earl Edwin Pitts, fall within the laws of the state initiating the pseudo, but if a 13-year veteran of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigasuch actions are taken in a civil war or during a belligerent tion and an attorney, was caught when he was approached military occupation then those who participate in such by FBI agents posing as Russian agents. actions would not be privileged belligerents. The principle of plausible deniability is usually applied for pseudo- British intelligence officials in World War II allowed douteams. (See the above section Laws of war). Some ble agents to fire-bomb a power station and a food dump false flag operations have been described by Lawrence E. in the UK to protect their cover, according to declassified Cline, a retired US Army intelligence officer, as pseudo- documents. The documents stated the agents took precautions to ensure they did not cause serious damage.

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CHAPTER 17. FALSE FLAG

One of the documents released also stated: “It should be “If you could employ an associate who pretends to be recognised that friends as well as enemies must be com- sympathetic to the unions’ cause to physically attack you pletely deceived.”[38] (or even use a firearm against you), you could discredit the unions,” read the email. It went on to say that the effort “would assist in undercutting any support that the media may be creating in favor of the unions.” The press 17.6 Civilian usage had acquired a court order to access all of Walker’s emails and Lam’s email was exposed. At first, Lam vehemently While false flag operations originate in warfare and govdenied it, but eventually admitted it and resigned.[43] ernment, they also can occur in civilian settings among certain factions, such as businesses, special interest groups, religions, political ideologies and campaigns for 17.6.3 Ideological office. Proponents of political or religious ideologies will sometimes use false flag tactics. This can be done to discredit 17.6.1 Businesses or implicate rival groups, create the appearance of enemies when none exist, or create the illusion of organized In business and marketing, similar operations are beand directed opposition when in truth, the ideology is ing employed in some public relations campaigns (see simply unpopular with society. Astroturfing). Telemarketing firms practice false flag type behavior when they pretend to be a market research firm (referred to as "sugging"). In some rare cases, members of an unsuccessful business will destroy some of their own property to conceal an unrelated crime (e.g., safety violations, embezzlement) but make it appear as though the destruction was done by a rival company.

17.6.2

Political campaigning

Political campaigning has a long history of this tactic in various forms, including in person, print media and electronically in recent years. This can involve when supporters of one candidate pose as supporters of another, or act as “straw men” for their preferred candidate to debate against. This can happen with or without the candidate’s knowledge. The Canuck letter is an example of one candidate creating a false document and attributing it as coming from another candidate in order to discredit that candidate.

A bomb threat forged by Scientology operatives

In retaliation for writing The Scandal of Scientology, some members of the Church of Scientology stole stationery from author Paulette Cooper's home and then used that stationery to forge bomb threats and have them mailed to a Scientology office. The Guardian’s Office also had a plan for further operations to discredit Cooper known as Operation Freakout, but several Scientology operaIn the final days of the 1994 campaign, Governor Lawton tives were arrested in a separate investigation and the plan Chiles' ran a false flag operation that paid for tens of thoufailed.[44] sands of calls to elderly voters using false organization names. The calls purported to be from Republican groups and told voters that Jeb Bush was against Social Security and seniors. Chiles’ denied his campaign was behind the 17.7 See also calls. After winning re-election and facing an investigation, Chiles admitted the truth in November 1995.[39] 17.7.1 Concepts In 2006, individuals practicing false flag behavior were discovered and “outed” in New Hampshire[40][41] and New Jersey[42] after blog comments claiming to be from supporters of a political candidate were traced to the IP address of paid staffers for that candidate’s opponent. On 19 February 2011, Indiana Deputy Prosecutor Carlos Lam sent a private email to Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker suggesting that he run a "'false flag' operation” to counter the protests against Walker’s proposed restrictions on public employees’ collective bargaining rights:

• Agent provocateur • Black propaganda • Casus belli • Covert operation • Denial and deception • Front organization

17.8. NOTES AND REFERENCES • Joe job, a similar online concept • Mimicry • State terrorism

17.7.2

Examples

• 1950–51 Baghdad bombings where Iraqi Zionist underground members targeted the Baghdad Jewish community • Bloed, Bodem, Eer en Trouw (Flemish neo-Nazi group preparing false flag attacks) • Canuck letter • Celle Hole • CIA Operation Ajax (United States overthrowing of Mohammed Mossadeq, Prime Minister of Iran, in 1953)[27] • Gleiwitz incident aka Operation Himmler • Lavon Affair Israeli attempt to plant bombs in Western targets in Egypt, in blaming Arab elements • Marxist-Leninist Party of the Netherlands (fake party set up by the Dutch security service) • Masada Action and Defense Movement (French white supremacists, under the guise of a fake extremist Zionist movement, conducted bombings of Arab targets in France in an attempt to start a war between French Arabs and Jews.) • Operation Gladio

17.8 Notes and references [1] Hughes, Geraint (2011): The Military’s Role in Counterterrorism: Examples and Implications for Liberal Democracies, Letort Paper, Strategic Studies Institute, May. p.105 http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army. mil/pdffiles/PUB1066.pdf [2] deHaven-Smith, Lance (2013). Conspiracy Theory in America, Austin: University of Texas Press. pp.225-226 http://utpress.utexas.edu/index.php/books/dehcon [3] Scott, Peter Dale (2007). The Road to 9/11: Wealth, Empire, and the Future of America, Berkeley: University of California Press. pp.267-268 (http://www.ucpress.edu/ book.php?isbn=9780520258716)

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[6] Squires, Nick. "HMAS Sydney found off Australia’s west coast", The Telegraph, 17 March 2008. [7] Guinness World Records (2009), p.155 [8] Young, P (Ed) (1973) Atlas of the Second World War (London: The Military Book Society) [9] The Hague Rules of Air Warfare, 1922-12 to 1923-02, this convention was never adopted (backup site) [10] “Rules concerning the Control of Wireless Telegraphy in Time of War and Air Warfare. Drafted by a Commission of Jurists at the Hague, December 1922 – February 1923.: Introduction”. ICRC. Retrieved December 2010. [11] Gómez, Javier Guisández (20 June 1998). “The Law of Air Warfare”. International Review of the Red Cross 38 (323): 347–63. doi:10.1017/S0020860400091075. [12] Source: Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals. United Nations War Crimes Commission. Vol. IX, 1949: Trial of Otto Skorzeny and others General Military Government Court of the U.S. zone of Germany 18 August to 9 September 1947 [13] (Finnish) Mattila, Tapani (1983). Meri maamme turvana [Sea safeguarding our country] (in Finnish). Jyväskylä: K. J. Gummerus Osakeyhtiö. ISBN 951-99487-0-8. (), p. 142. [14] Weland, James (1994). “Misguided Intelligence: Japanese Military Intelligence Officers in the Manchurian Incident, September 1931”. Journal of Military History 58 (3): 445–460. doi:10.2307/2944134. [15] Bradley Lightbody, The Second World War: Ambitions to Nemesis, Routledge, 2004, ISBN 0-415-22405-5, Google Print, p.39 [16] Steven J. Zaloga, Poland 1939: The Birth of Blitzkrieg, Osprey Publishing, 2002, ISBN 1-84176-408-6, p. 39 [17] Turtola, Martti (1999). “Kansainvälinen kehitys Euroopassa ja Suomessa 1930-luvulla”. In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti. Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen. pp. 44– 45. [18] U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS)", U.S. Department of Defense, 13 March 1962. The Operation Northwoods document in PDF format on the website of the independent, non-governmental research institute the National Security Archive at the George Washington University Gelman Library, Washington, D.C. Direct PDF links: here and here.

[4] deHaven-Smith, Lance (2013). Conspiracy Theory in America, Austin: University of Texas Press. p.225

[19] Excerpts from declassified 1962 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Memo “Operation Northwoods: Justification for U.S. Military Intervention in Cuba”

[5] “the use of a false flag has always been accepted as a legitimate ruse de guerre in naval warfare, the true battle flag being run up immediately before engaging” (Thomas, Rosamund M., ed. (1993), Teaching Ethics: Government ethics, Centre for Business and Public, p. 80, ISBN 9781871891034).

[20] Horne, Douglas P., Chief Analyst for Military Records, Assassination Records Review Board (2009). Inside the Assassination Records Review Board: The U.S. Government’s Final Attempt to Reconcile the Conflicting Medical Evidence in the Assassination of JFK. self published. ISBN 098431444X. Retrieved April 2014.

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[21] James Bamford (2002). Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency. Anchor Books. pp. 82–91. ISBN 978-0-385-49907-1. [22] Tobias, Fritz, The Reichstag Fire. New York: Putnam, 1964, pages 26–28. [23] History of the Reichstag Fire in Berlin Germany [24] “The Reichstag Fire”. Holocaust Encyclopedia. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. Retrieved 12 August 2013. [25] DW Staff (27 February 2008). “75 Years Ago, Reichstag Fire Sped Hitler’s Power Grab”. Deutsche Welle. Retrieved 12 August 2013. [26] Callanan, James (2009). Covert Action in the Cold War: US Policy, intelligence and CIA operations, London: I.B. Tauris. p.115 [27] Risen, James. Secrets of History: The C.I.A. in Iran – A Special Report; How a Plot Convulsed Iran in '53 (and '79). The New York Times, 16 April 2000 [28] Weiner, Tim (1997). C.I.A. Destroyed Files on 1953 Iran coup, The New York Times, 29 May. [29] “Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia” (PDF). United Nations Security Council. 23 July 2008. Retrieved 21 August 2008. [30] Cline, Lawrence E. (2005) Pseudo Operations and Counterinsurgency: Lessons from other countries, Strategic Studies Institute. [31] Cline (2005), p. 11. [32] Cline (2005), quoting Reid-Daly, Pamwe Chete: The Legend of the Selous Scouts, Weltevreden Park, South Africa: Covos-Day Books, 1999, p. 10 (republished by Covos Day, 2001, ISBN 978-1-919874-33-3) [33] Cline (2005), who quotes David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe: the Chimurenga War, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1981, pp. 241–242. [34] Cline (2005), p. 8–13. For 1978 study, quotes J. K. Cilliers, Counter-insurgency in Rhodesia, London: Croom Helm, 1985, pp. 60–77. Cline also quotes Ian F. W. Beckett, The Rhodesian Army: Counter-Insurgency 1972– 1979 at selousscouts [35] Lounis Aggoun and Jean-Baptiste Rivoire (2004). Françalgérie, crimes et mensonges d’Etats, (FrancoAlgeria, Crimes and Lies of the States). Editions La Découverte. ISBN 2-7071-4747-8. Extract in English with mention of the OJAL available here. [36] Luonis Aggoun and Jean-Baptiste Rivoire, ibid., quoting Roger Faligot and Pascal KROP, DST, Police Secrète, Flammarion, 1999, p. 174. [37] Crawford, Angus (20 March 2009). “Victims of Cold War 'Romeo spies’". BBC Online. Retrieved 10 April 2009. [38] “Britain 'bombed itself to fool Nazis’". BBC. 28 February 2002. Retrieved 4 November 2008.

CHAPTER 17. FALSE FLAG

[39] http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1346& dat=19951211&id=gZosAAAAIBAJ&sjid= wfwDAAAAIBAJ&pg=4981,49418 Lakeland Times 1995 [40] Steele, Allison, "Bass staffer in D.C. poses as blogger: Bogus posts aimed at his political opponent", Concord Monitor, 26 September 2006 (URL last accessed 24 October 2006). [41] Saunders, Anne, “Bass aide resigns after posing as opponent’s supporter online”, The Boston Globe, 26 September 2006 (URL last accessed 24 October 2006). [42] Miller, Jonathan, “Blog Thinks Aide to Kean Posted Jabs At Menendez”, New York Times, 21 September 2006 (URL last accessed 24 October 2006). [43] Montopoli, Brian (25 March 2011). “Indiana prosecutor resigns for encouraging fake attack on Wisconsin governor”. CBS News. [44] United States of America v. Jane Kember, Morris Budlong, Sentencing Memorandum; pp. 23–25.

Chapter 18

Field agent In espionage, a field agent is an agent who works in the field as opposed to one who works at the office or headquarters. A field agent can work alone or in a group but usually has a case officer who is in charge. Field agents can be undercover, and travel using fake passports that may be under the name of a front organization or shell corporation. Field agents are often present in fiction,[1][2] though their duties and actions can be quite different in reality.[3]

18.1 See also • Espionage • Agent handling • Double agent • Special agent • Non-official cover (NOC)

18.2 References [1] Mazzetti, Mark; Elliott, Justin (9 December 2013). “Spies Infiltrate a Fantasy Realm of Online Games”. New York Times. Retrieved 2015-03-28. [2] Alex Garofalo (18 February 2015). "'The Americans’ Creators Blend Family Drama With Espionage For A Different Kind Of Spy Show”. International Business Times. Retrieved 2015-03-28. [3] Vaughn Sherman (2013-01-10). “How Accurate Are Bourne and Bond? Ask an Ex-CIA Officer”. The Huffington Post. Retrieved 2015-03-28.

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Chapter 19

Industrial espionage plication of principles and practices from military and national intelligence to the domain of global business";[5] it is the business equivalent of open-source intelligence. The difference between competitive intelligence and economic or industrial espionage is not clear; one needs to understand the legal basics to recognize how to draw the line between the two.[6][7] Others maintain it is sometimes quite difficult to tell the difference between legal and illegal methods, especially if considering the ethical side of information gathering, making the definition even more elusive.

19.2 Forms of economic and industrial espionage

Teapot with Actresses, Vezzi porcelain factory, Venice, c. 1725. The Vezzi brothers were involved in a series of incidents of industrial espionage. It was these actions that led to the secret of manufacturing Meissen porcelain becoming widely known.

Industrial espionage, economic espionage or corporate espionage is a form of espionage conducted for commercial purposes instead of purely national security.[1] Economic espionage is conducted or orchestrated by governments and is international in scope, while industrial or corporate espionage is more often national and occurs between companies or corporations.[2]

19.1 Competitive intelligence and economic or industrial espionage

Economic or industrial espionage takes place in two main forms. In short, the purpose of espionage is to gather knowledge about (an) organization(s). It may include the acquisition of intellectual property, such as information on industrial manufacture, ideas, techniques and processes, recipes and formulas. Or it could include sequestration of proprietary or operational information, such as that on customer datasets, pricing, sales, marketing, research and development, policies, prospective bids, planning or marketing strategies or the changing compositions and locations of production.[3]

It may describe activities such as theft of trade secrets, bribery, blackmail and technological surveillance. As well as orchestrating espionage on commercial organizations, governments can also be targets — for example, to determine the terms of a tender for a government contract "Competitive intelligence" levels out two scenarios of deso that another tenderer can underbid. scription as the legal and ethical activity of systematically gathering, analyzing and managing information on industrial competitors becomes beneficial.[3] It may include activities such as examining newspaper articles, cor- 19.3 Target industries porate publications, websites, patent filings, specialised databases, information at trade shows and the like to de- Economic and industrial espionage is most commonly termine information on a corporation.[4] The compila- associated with technology-heavy industries, includtion of these crucial elements is sometimes termed CIS ing computer software and hardware, biotechnology, or CRS, a Competitive Intelligence Solution or Competi- aerospace, telecommunications, transportation and entive Response Solution. With its roots in market research, gine technology, automobiles, machine tools, energy, “competitive intelligence” has been described as the “ap- materials and coatings and so on. Silicon Valley is known 98

19.6. USE OF COMPUTERS AND THE INTERNET

99

priates information to advance their own interests or to damage the company or, secondly, a competitor or foreign government seeks information to advance its own technological or financial interest.[11] "Moles" or trusted insiders are generally considered the best sources for economic or industrial espionage.[12] Historically known as a “patsy,” an insider can be induced, willingly or under duress to provide information. A patsy may be initially asked to hand over inconsequential information and once compromised by committing a crime, bribed into handing over material which is more sensitive.[13] InDuring testing, automakers commonly disguise upcoming car dividuals may leave one company to take up employmodels with camouflage paint patterns, padded covers, or de- ment with another and take sensitive information with ceptive decals. them.[14] Such apparent behavior has been the focus of numerous industrial espionage cases that have resulted in legal battles.[14] Some countries hire individuals to do to be one of the world’s most targeted areas for espionage, spying rather than make use of their own intelligence though any industry with information of use to competiagencies.[15] Academics, business delegates and students [8] tors may be a target. are often thought to be utilized by governments in gathering information.[16] Some countries, such as Japan, have been reported to expect students be debriefed on return19.4 Information theft and sabo- ing home.[16] A spy may follow a guided tour of a factory then get “lost”.[13] A spy could be an engineer, a maintage tenance man, a cleaner, an insurance salesman or an inspector - basically anyone who has legitimate access to Information can make the difference between success and the premises.[13] failure; if a trade secret is stolen, the competitive playing field is leveled or even tipped in favor of a competitor. A spy may break into the premises to steal data. They may waste paper and refuse, known as “dumpAlthough a lot of information-gathering is accomplished search through [17] ster diving”. Information may be compromised via unlegally through competitive intelligence, at times corpo[9] solicited requests for information, marketing surveys or rations feel the best way to get information is to take it. Economic or industrial espionage is a threat to any busi- use of technical support, research or software facilities. Outsourced industrial producers may ask for information ness whose livelihood depends on information. outside of the agreed-upon contract.[18] In recent years, economic or industrial espionage has taken on an expanded definition. For instance, attempts Computers have facilitated the process of collecting into sabotage a corporation may be considered industrial formation, due to the ease of access to large amounts of espionage; in this sense, the term takes on the wider con- information, through physical contact or via the internet. notations of its parent word. That espionage and sabotage (corporate or otherwise) have become more clearly associated with each other is also demonstrated by a num- 19.6 Use of computers and the Inber of profiling studies, some government, some corpoternet rate. The United States government currently has a polygraph examination entitled the “Test of Espionage and Sabotage” (TES), contributing to the increasingly popu- 19.6.1 Personal computers lar, though not consensus, notion, by those studying espionage and sabotage countermeasures, of the interrela- Computers have become key in exercising industrial estionship between the two.[10] In practice, particularly by pionage due to the enormous amount of information they “trusted insiders,” they are generally considered function- contain and its ease of being copied and transmitted. The ally identical for the purpose of informing countermea- use of computers for espionage increased rapidly in the sures. 1990s. Information has been commonly stolen by being copied from unattended computers in offices, those gaining unsupervised access doing so through subsidiary 19.5 Agents and the process of col- jobs, such as cleaners or repairmen. Laptops were, and still are, a prime target, with those traveling abroad on lection business being warned not to leave them for any period of time. Perpetrators of espionage have been known Economic or industrial espionage commonly occurs in to find many ways of conning unsuspecting individuals one of two ways. Firstly, a dissatisfied employee appro- into parting, often only temporarily, from their posses-

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CHAPTER 19. INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE

sions, enabling others to access and steal information.[19] 19.6.5 Distributed denial of service A “bag-op” refers to the use of hotel staff to access data, (DDoS) attack such as through laptops, in hotel rooms. Information may be stolen in transit, in taxis, at airport baggage counters, The distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack uses baggage carousels, on trains and so on.[17] compromised computer systems to orchestrate a flood of requests on the target system, causing it to shut down and deny service to other users.[25] It could potentially be 19.6.2 The Internet used for economic or industrial espionage with the purpose of sabotage. This method was allegedly utilized by The rise of the internet and computer networks has ex- Russian secret services, over a period of two weeks on a panded the range and detail of information available cyberattack on Estonia in May 2007, in response to the and the ease of access for the purpose of industrial removal of a Soviet era war memorial.[26] espionage.[20] Worldwide, around 50,000 companies a day are thought to come under cyberattack with the rate estimated as doubling each year.[21] This type of operation is generally identified as state backed or sponsored, because the “access to personal, financial or analytic re- 19.7 History sources” identified exceed that which could be accessed by cybercriminals or individual hackers. Sensitive military or defense engineering or other industrial informa- 19.7.1 Origins of industrial espionage tion may not have immediate monetary value to criminals, compared with, say, bank details. Analysis of cyberattacks suggests deep knowledge of networks, with targeted attacks, obtained by numerous individuals operating in a sustained organized way.[22]

19.6.3

Opportunities for sabotage

The rising use of the internet has also extended opportunities for industrial espionage with the aim of sabotage. In the early 2000s, it was noticed that energy companies were increasingly coming under attack from hackers. Energy power systems, doing jobs like monitoring power grids or water flow, once isolated from the other computer networks, were now being connected to the internet, leaving them more vulnerable, having historically few built-in security features.[23] The use of these methods of industrial espionage have increasingly become a concern for governments, due to potential attacks by terrorist groups or hostile foreign governments.

19.6.4

Malware

One of the means of perpetrators conducting industrial espionage is by exploiting vulnerabilities in computer software. Malware and spyware as “a tool for industrial espionage”, in “transmitting digital copies of trade secrets, customer plans, future plans and contacts”. Newer forms of malware include devices which surreptitiously switch on mobile phones camera and recording devices. In attempts to tackle such attacks on their intellectual property, companies are increasingly keeping important information off network, leaving an “air gap”, with some companies building “Faraday cages” to shield from electromagnetic or cellphone transmissions.[24]

The work of Father Francois Xavier d'Entrecolles to reveal to Europe the manufacturing methods of Chinese porcelain in 1712, is sometimes considered an early case of industrial espionage

Economic and industrial espionage has a long history. The work of Father Francois Xavier d'Entrecolles in Jingdezhen, China to reveal to Europe the manufacturing methods of Chinese porcelain in 1712 is sometimes considered an early case of industrial espionage.[27] Historical accounts have been written of industrial espionage between Britain and France.[28] Attributed to Britain’s emergence as an “industrial creditor,” the second decade of the 18th century saw the emergence of a large-scale state-sponsored effort to surreptitiously take British industrial technology to France.[28] Witnesses confirmed both the inveigling of tradespersons abroad and the placing of apprentices in England.[29] Protests by those such as iron workers in Sheffield and steel workers in Newcastle, about skilled industrial workers being enticed abroad, led to the first English legislation aimed at preventing this method of economic and industrial espionage.[30][29]

19.8. NOTABLE CASES

19.7.2

The 20th Century

101

The Soviet military was recognised as making much better use of acquired information, compared to civilian inEast-West commercial development opportunities after dustry, where their record in replicating and developing World War I saw a rise in Soviet interest in American industrial technology was poor.[32] and European manufacturing know-how, exploited by Amtorg Corporation.[31] Later, with Western restrictions on the export of items thought likely to increase military capabilities to the USSR, Soviet industrial espionage was 19.7.3 The legacy of Cold War espionage a well known adjunct to other spying activities up until the 1980s.[32] BYTE reported in April 1984, for example, that Following the demise of the Soviet Union and the although the Soviets sought to develop their own micro- end of the Cold War, commentators, including the US electronics, their technology appeared to be several years Congressional Intelligence Committee, noted a redibehind the West’s. Soviet CPUs required multiple chips rection amongst the espionage community from miland appeared to be close or exact copies of American itary to industrial targets, with Western and former communist countries making use of “underemployed” products such as the Intel 3000 and DEC LSI-11/2.[33] spies and expanding programs directed at stealing such information.[37][38] “Operation Brunnhilde” The legacy of Cold War spying included not just the redirection of personnel but the use of spying apparatus such Some of these activities were directed via the East Ger- as computer databases, scanners for eavesdropping, spy man Stasi (Ministry for State Security). One such oper- satellites, bugs and wires.[39] ation, known as “Operation Brunnhilde” operated from the mid-1950s until early 1966 and made use of spies from many Communist Bloc countries. Through at least 20 forays, many western European industrial secrets were 19.8 Notable cases compromised.[34] One member of the “Brunnhilde” ring was a Swiss chemical engineer, Dr. Jean Paul Soupert (also known as “Air Bubble”), living in Brussels. He 19.8.1 France and the United States was described by Peter Wright in Spycatcher as having been “doubled” by the Belgian Sûreté de l'État.[34][35] Between 1987 and 1989, IBM and Texas Instruments He revealed information about industrial espionage con- were thought to have been targeted by French spies with ducted by the ring, including the fact that Russian agents the intention of helping France’s Groupe Bull.[40] In had obtained details of Concorde's advanced electronics 1993, US aerospace companies were also thought to have system.[36] He testified against two Kodak employees, liv- been targeted by French interests.[41] During the early ing and working in Britain, during a trial in which they 1990s, France was described as one of the most aggreswere accused of passing information on industrial pro- sive pursuers of espionage to garner foreign industrial and cesses to him, though they were eventually acquitted.[34] technological secrets.[40] France accused the U.S. of attempting to sabotage its high tech industrial base.[40] The government of France has been alleged to have conducted Soviet spetsinformatsiya system ongoing industrial espionage against American aerodynamics and satellite companies.[42] A secret report from the Military-Industrial Commission of the USSR (VPK), from 1979–80, detailed how spetsinformatsiya (Russian: специнформация i.e. “special records”) could be utilised in twelve different military 19.8.2 Volkswagen industrial areas. Writing in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Philip Hanson detailed a spetsinformatsiya sys- In 1993, car manufacturer Opel, the German divitem in which 12 industrial branch ministries formulated sion of General Motors, accused Volkswagen of indusrequests for information to aid technological development trial espionage after Opel’s chief of production, Jose in their military programs. Acquisition plans were de- Ignacio Lopez, and seven other executives moved to scribed as operating on 2 year and 5 year cycles with Volkswagen.[14] Volkswagen subsequently threatened to about 3000 tasks under way each year. Efforts were sue for defamation, resulting in a four-year legal battle.[14] aimed at civilian as well as military industrial targets, such The case, which was finally settled in 1997, resulted in as in the petrochemical industries. Some information was one of the largest settlements in the history of industrial garnered so as to compare levels of competitor to Soviet espionage, with Volkswagen agreeing to pay General Motechnological advancement. Much unclassified informa- tors $100 million and to buy at least $1 billion of car parts tion was also gathered, blurring the boundary with “com- from the company over 7 years, although it did not explicpetitive intelligence”.[32] itly apologize for Lopez’s behavior.[43]

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19.8.3

CHAPTER 19. INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE

Hilton and Starwood

In April 2009 the US based hospitality company Starwood accused its rival Hilton of a “massive” case of industrial espionage. After being purchased by private equity group Blackstone, Hilton employed 10 managers and executives from Starwood. Under intense pressure to improve profits, Starwood accused Hilton of stealing corporate information relating to its luxury brand concepts, used in setting up its own Denizen hotels. Specifically, former head of its luxury brands group, Ron Klein, was accused of downloading “truckloads of documents” from a laptop to his personal email account.[44]

19.8.4

GhostNet

viduals or organised criminals, the level of sophistication of the attack was thought to have been “more typical of a nation state”.[46] Some commentators speculated as to whether the attack was part of what is thought to be a concerted Chinese industrial espionage operation aimed at getting “high-tech information to jump-start China’s economy”.[51] Critics pointed to what was alleged to be a lax attitude to the intellectual property of foreign businesses in China, letting them operate but then seeking to copy or reverse engineer their technology for the benefit of Chinese “national champions”.[52] In Google’s case, they may have (also) been concerned about the possible misappropriation of source code or other technology for the benefit of Chinese rival Baidu. In March 2010 Google subsequently decided to cease offering censored results in China, leading to the closing of its Chinese operation.

GhostNet was a “vast surveillance system” reported by Canadian researchers based at the University of Toronto in March 2009. Using targeted emails it compromised 19.8.6 CyberSitter and Green Dam thousands of computers in governmental organisations, enabling attackers to scan for information and transfer The US based firm CyberSitter announced in January this back to a “digital storage facility in China”.[45] 2010 that it was suing the Chinese government, and other US companies, for stealing its anti pornography software, with the accusation that it had been incorporated into 19.8.5 Google and Operation Aurora China’s Green Dam program, used by the state to censor children’s internet access. CyberSitter accused Green On 13 January 2010, Google Inc. announced that oper- Dam creators as having copied around 3000 lines of code. ators, from within China, had hacked into their Google They were described as having done 'a sloppy job of copyChina operation, stealing intellectual property and, in ing,' with some lines of the copied code continuing to diparticular, accessing the email accounts of human rights rect people to the CyberSitter website. The attorney actactivists.[46][47] The attack was thought to have been part ing for CyberSitter maintained “I don't think I have ever of a more widespread cyber attack on companies within seen such clear-cut stealing”.[53] China which has become known as Operation Aurora.[47] Intruders were thought to have launched a zero-day attack, exploiting a weakness in the Microsoft Internet Explorer browser, the malware used being a modification of 19.8.7 USA v. Lan Lee, et al. the trojan “Hydraq”.[24] Concerned about the possibility of hackers taking advantage of this previously unknown The United States charged two former NetLogic Inc. enweakness in Internet Explorer, the governments of Gergineers, Lan Lee and Yuefei Ge, of committing ecomany and, subsequently France, issued warnings not to nomic espionage against TSMC and NetLogic, Inc. A use the browser.[48] jury acquitted the defendants of the charges with regard There was speculation that “insiders” had been involved to TSMC and deadlocked on the charges with regard to in the attack, with some Google China employees being NetLogic. In May 2010, a federal judge dismissed all the denied access to the company’s internal networks after espionage charges against the two defendants. The judge the company’s announcement.[49][50] In February 2010, ruled that the U.S. Government presented no evidence of computer experts from the U.S. National Security Agency espionage.[54] claimed that the attacks on Google probably originated from two Chinese universities associated with expertise in computer science, Shanghai Jiao Tong University and the Shandong Lanxiang Vocational School, the latter having 19.8.8 Dongxiao Yue and Chordiant Softclose links to the Chinese military.[45] ware, Inc. Google claimed at least 20 other companies had also been targeted in the cyber attack, said by the London Times, to have been part of an “ambitious and sophisticated attempt to steal secrets from unwitting corporate victims” including “defence contractors, finance and technology companies”.[47][46][48] Rather than being the work of indi-

In May 2010, the federal jury convicted Chordiant Software, Inc., a U.S. corporation, of stealing Dongxiao Yue’s JRPC technologies and used them in a product called Chordiant Marketing Director. Yue previously filed lawsuits against Symantec Corporation for a similar theft.[55]

19.10. SEE ALSO

19.9 Concerns of national governments 19.9.1

Brazil

103 most active in the use of internet spying, up to 120 other countries were said to be using similar techniques.[63] The Chinese government responded to UK accusations of economic espionage by saying that the report of such activities was 'slanderous’ and that the government opposed hacking which is prohibited by law.[64]

Revelations from the Snowden documents have provided information to the effect that the United States, notably vis-à-vis the NSA, has been conducting aggressive 19.9.4 Germany economic espionage against Brazil.[56] Canadian intelligence has apparently supported U.S. economic espionage German counter-intelligence experts have maintained the German economy is losing around €53 billion or efforts.[57] the equivalent of 30,000 jobs to economic espionage yearly.[65]

19.9.2

United States

According to Edward Snowden, The National Security Agency spies on foreign companies.[58] A recent report to the US government, by aerospace and defense company Northrop Grumman, describes Chinese economic espionage as comprising “the single greatest threat to U.S. technology”.[22] Joe Stewart, of SecureWorks, blogging on the 2009 cyber attack on Google, referred to a “persistent campaign of 'espionage-by-malware' emanating from the People’s Republic of China (PRC)" with both corporate and state secrets being “Shanghaied” over the past 5 or 6 years.[59] The Northrop Grumann report states that the collection of US defense engineering data through cyberattack is regarded as having “saved the recipient of the information years of R&D and significant amounts of funding”.[22] Concerns about the extent of cyberattacks on the US emanating from China has led to the situation being described as the dawn of a “new cold cyberwar”.[60] In response to these and other reports, Amitai Etzioni of the Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies has suggested that China and the United States should agree to a policy of mutually assured restraint with respect to cyberspace. This would involve allowing both states to take the measures they deem necessary for their selfdefense while simultaneously agreeing to refrain from taking offensive steps; it would also entail vetting these commitments.[61]

19.10 See also • NSA • Business intelligence • Competitive intelligence • Cyber spying • FBI • The American Economic Espionage Act of 1996 • Trade secret

19.11 References [1] “Unusual suspects: Cyber-spying grows bigger and more boring”. The Economist. 25 May 2013. Retrieved 25 May 2013. [2] Nasheri 2005, p. 10. [3] Nasheri 2005, p. 73. [4] Nasheri 2005, p. 74. [5] Walker 1996.

19.9.3

United Kingdom

[6] “The Economic Espionage Act: The Rules Have Not Changed, Competitive Intelligence Review, July/August 1998” (PDF). Retrieved 2012-02-12.

In December 2007, it was revealed that Jonathan Evans, head of the United Kingdom's MI5, had sent out confi- [7] “Competitive Intelligence, Law, and Ethics: The EEA Redential letters to 300 chief executives and security chiefs visited Again (and Hopefully for the Last Time), Comat the country’s banks, accountants and legal firms warnpetitive Intelligence Magazine, July/September 2011” ing of attacks from Chinese 'state organisations’.[62] A (PDF). Retrieved 2012-02-12. summary was also posted on the secure website of the Centre for the Protection of the National Infrastruc- [8] Nasheri 2005, p. 9. ture, accessed by some of the nation’s 'critical infras- [9] Scalet 2003, p. 3. tructure' companies, including 'telecoms firms, banks and water and electricity companies’.[63] One security expert [10] Department of Defense 2002. warned about the use of 'custom trojans,' software specif- [11] Nasheri 2005, p. 7. ically designed to hack into a particular firm and feed back data.[63] Whilst China was identified as the country [12] Nasheri 2005, pp. 80-81.

104

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[13] Palmer 1974, p. 12.

[47] Branigan 2010.

[14] Reuters 1996.

[48] Ahmed 2010.

[15] Nasheri 2005, p. 80.

[49] Beaumont 2010.

[16] Nasheri 2005, p. 88.

[50] Reuters Shanghai 2010.

[17] Nasheri 2005, p. 82.

[51] Lawson 2010.

[18] Nasheri 2005, p. 84.

[52] Rogin 2010.

[19] Boggon 1996.

[53] Newman 2010.

[20] DeWeese et al. 2009.

[54] Levine 2010.

[21] Glover 2010. [22] DeWeese et al 2009. [23] Piller 2002. [24] Lohr 2010. [25] Nasheri 2005, p. 112. [26] Anderson 2007. [27] Rowe & Brook 2009, p. 84. [28] Harris 1998, p. 7. [29] Harris 1998, p. 9. [30] Harris 1998, p. 8. [31] Zelchenko, Henry L. (Feb 1952). “Stealing America’s Know-How: The Story of Amtorg”. American Mercury 74 (338): 75–84. Retrieved 9 November 2012. [32] Hanson 1987. [33] Heuertz, Ruth (April 1984). “Soviet Microprocessors and Microcomputers”. BYTE. p. 348. Retrieved 23 October 2013. [34] Palmer 1974, p. 13.

[55] Dongxiau Yue, et al., v. Chordiant Software, Inc. 2010. [56] “NSA spying on Petrobras, if proven, is industrial espionage: Rousseff”. Reuters. 9 September 2013. [57] CBC News http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ brazil-canada-espionage-which-countries-are-we-spying-on-1. 1930522. Missing or empty |title= (help) [58] Edward Snowden says NSA engages in industrial espionage - World - CBC News [59] Stewart 2010. [60] Navarro & Autry 2010. [61] Etzioni, Amitai, “MAR: A Model for US-China Relations,” The Diplomat, 20 September 2013, . [62] “Beware Chinese cyber spys, MI5 tells firms”. Daily Mail (London). 1 December 2007. Retrieved 1 December 2007. [63] Blakely 1 December 2007. [64] Blakely 5 December 2007. [65] Connolly, Kate. “Germany accuses China of industrial espionage”. Guardian News and Media Limited. Retrieved 22 July 2009.

[35] Wright 1987, p. 183. [36] Wright 1987, p. 184. [37] Nodoushani & Nodoushani 2002. [38] Nasheri 2005, p. 53. [39] Nasheri 2005, pp. 53-54. [40] New York Times: Paris 1991. [41] Jehl 1993. [42] John A. Nolan. “A Case Study in French Espionage: Renaissance Software” (PDF). US Department of Energy: Hanford. [43] Meredith 1997. [44] Clark 2009. [45] Markoff & Barboza 2010. [46] Harvey 2010.

19.12 Bibliography Ahmed, Murad (2010-01-18). “Google cyber-attack from China 'an inside job'". The Times. Retrieved 2010-01-22. Anderson, Nate (2007-05-14). “Massive DDoS attacks target Estonia; Russia accused”. Ars Technica. Retrieved 2010-04-05. Barry, Marc; Penenberg, Adam L (2000). Spooked: Espionage in Corporate America. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Perseus Publishing. p. 208. ISBN 978-0-7382-0593-9. “Chinese stealth fighter jet may use US technology”. The Guardian

19.12. BIBLIOGRAPHY (London). Associated Press. 201101-23. Retrieved 2011-01-23. BBC, News (2010-09-26). “Stuxnet worm hits Iran nuclear plant staff computers”. BBC. Retrieved 2010-09-27. Beaumont, Claudine (2010-01-18). “Google China hacks 'a possible inside job'". The Daily Telegraph (London). Retrieved 2010-01-30. Blakely, Rhys (2007-12-01). “MI5 alert on China’s cyberspace spy threat”. The Times. Retrieved 2010-01-30. Blakely, Rhys (2007-12-05). “China says it is cyber-espionage victim”. The Times. Retrieved 2010-01-30. Boggon, Steve (1996-01-01). “The spy who loved me (and my laptop)". The Independent (London). Retrieved 2010-02-13. Branigan, Tania (2010-01-13). “Google to end censorship in China over cyber attacks”. The Guardian (London). Retrieved 2010-01-22. Clark, Andrew (2009-04-17). “Starwood sues Hilton for 'stealing trade secrets’". The Guardian (London). Retrieved 2010-02-24. Connolly, Kate (2009-07-22). “Germany accuses China of industrial espionage”. The Guardian (London). Retrieved 2010-01-18. DeWeese, Steve; Krekel, Bryan; Bakos, George; Barnet, Christopher (9 October 2009). Capability of the People’s Republic of Conduct Cyber Warfare and Computer Network Exploitation: Prepared for The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (PDF). McLean, Virginia, USA: Northrop Grumman Corporation. Dongxiau Yue, et al., v. Chordiant Software, Inc., No. C08-00019 JW U.S. (In the United States District Court for the Northern District of California San Jose Division. 2010-05-14). Fink, Steven (2002). Sticky Fingers: Managing the Global Risk of Economic Espionage. Chicago: Dearborn Trade. p. 368. ISBN 978-07931-4827-1. Fitchett, Joseph (1995-07-19). “French Report Accuses U.S. of

105 Industrial Sabotage Campaign”. New York Times. Retrieved 2010-02-13. Glover, Tony (2010-01-17). “Chinese hackers blamed for cyber attack wave”. This is Money. Retrieved 2010-01-31. Guynn, Jessica (2010-01-15). “Chinese hackers pose a growing threat to U.S. firms”. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved 2010-01-31. Hanson, Philip (April 1987), “Soviet industrial espionage”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 43 (3): 25–29 Byron, Betty (2013). The Iris Covenant. New York: Tate Publishing. p. 454. ISBN 978-162295-014-0. Harris, John (1998). Industrial Espionage and Technology Transfer: Britain and France in the Eighteenth Century. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited. p. 680. ISBN 07546-0367-9. Harvey, Mike (2010-01-16). “China accused of cyber attack on Google and 'global industrial targets’". The Times. Retrieved 2010-01-30. Helft, Miguel; Markoff, John (2010-01-13). “In Rebuke of China, Focus Falls on Cybersecurity”. New York Times. Retrieved 2010-01-30. Javers, Eamon (2010). Broker, Trader, Lawyer, Spy: The Secret World of Corporate Espionage. New York: Harper Collins Business. p. 320. ISBN 978-0-06169720-3. Jehl, Douglas (1993-04-30). “U.S. Expanding Its Effort to Halt Spying by Allies”. New York Times. Retrieved 2010-02-13. Keizer, Gregg (2010-12-09). “Pro-WikiLeaks cyber army gains strength; thousands join DDoS attacks”. Computer World. Retrieved 2010-12-11. Kennedy, John (2010-12-10). “Is your kid part of the ‘Operation Payback’ army?". Silicon Republic. Retrieved 2010-12-11. Lawson, Dominic (2010-01-17). “Be afraid, China, the Google

106

CHAPTER 19. INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE dragon stirs”. The Times. Retrieved 2010-01-22. Levine, Dan (2010-05-24). Federal Judge_Trashes Novel Economic Espionage Case “Federal Judge Trashes Novel Economic Espionage Case”. Law.com. Retrieved 2010-12-11. Lawson, Dominic (2010-01-17). “Be afraid, China, the Google dragon stirs”. The Times. Retrieved 2010-01-22. Lohr, Steve (2010-01-18). “Companies Fight Endless War Against Computer Attacks”. New York Times. Retrieved 2010-0122. Markoff, John; Barboza, David (2010-02-18). “2 China Schools Said to Be Tied to Online Attacks”. The New York Times. Retrieved 2010-04-06. Macartney, Jan (2010-02-09). “Chinese police arrest six as hacker training website is closed down”. The Times. Retrieved 2010-02-13. Meredith, Robyn (1997-01-09). “VW Agrees To Pay G.M. $100 Million in Espionage Suit”. New York Times. Retrieved 2010-02-24. Murphy, Samantha (2010-12-09). “WikiLeaks Hactivism is Not Cyberwarfare, Experts Say”. Tech News Daily. Retrieved 2010-1211. Nasheri, Hedieh (2005). Economic Espionage and Industrial Spying. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 270. ISBN 0-521-543711. Navarro, Peter; Autry, Greg (201001-15). “China’s war on the U.S. economy”. San Francisco Chronicle. Retrieved 2010-01-31. Newman, Alex (2010-01-07). “Communist Pirates Stealing For Censorship?". The John Birch Society. Retrieved 2010-01-31. New York Times, Archive (no author) (1991-09-14). “Air France Denies Spying on Travellers”. New York Times. Retrieved 2010-02-13. Nodoushani, Omid; Nodoushani, Patricia A (April 2002), “Industrial Espionage: The Dark Side of the “Digital Age"", Competitiveness Review: An International Business

Journal incorporating Journal of Global Competitiveness 12 (2), doi:10.1108/eb046445 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) (2002 Fiscal Year). “Annual Polygraph Report to Congress”. Department of Defense. Retrieved 2010-04-03. Check date values in: |date= (help) Palmer, Raymond (1974), “Espionage threat to British industry: Spies don't only operate in books and films. They can be for real. And their target might be your industrial secrets”, Industrial Management and Data Systems 74 (7/8) Piller, Charles (2002-07-08). “Hackers Target Energy Industry”. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved 2010-02-24. Pitorri, Peter (2010). Counterespionage for American Business. Chicago: Butterworth-Heinemann Limited. p. 144. ISBN 978-07506-7044-9. Reuters (1996-05-12). “Volkswagen Sues GM for $6.6 Million, Accusing U.S. Firm of Defamation”. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved 2010-02-24. Shanghai, Reuters (2010-01-13). “Google probes possible inside help on China attack”. The Globe and Mail (Toronto). Retrieved 201001-22. Rogin, Josh (2010-01-14). “China’s expansion of economic espionage boils over”. Foreign Policy. Retrieved 2010-04-05. Rowe, William; Brook, Timothy (2009). China’s Last Empire: The Great Qing. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. p. 368. ISBN 0-674-03612-3. Rustmann, F.W. Jr. (2002). CIA, INC.: Espionage and the Craft of Business Intelligence. Dulles, VA: Potomac Books. p. 240. ISBN 978-1-57488-520-0. Scalet, Sarah D (1 May 2003). “Corporate Spying: Snooping, by Hook or by Crook” (WEB PAGE).

19.13. EXTERNAL LINKS CSO Security and Risk. Retrieved 2010-03-21. Stewart, Joe (2010-01-20). “Operation Aurora: Clues in the Code”. Secureworks - The information security experts. Retrieved 2010-01-23. Swinford, Steven (2010-12-10). “WikiLeaks hackers threaten British Government”. The Daily Telegraph (London). Retrieved 2010-12-11. Walker, Nick (1996-01-01). “Marketing: Know your enemy”. The Independent (London). Retrieved 2010-02-13. Winker, Ira. (1997). Corporate Espionage: What It Is, Why It’s Happening in Your Company, What You Must Do About It. Darby, PA: Darby, PA. p. 240. ISBN 978-07881-6529-0. Wright, Peter (1987). Spycatcher. New York: Viking. p. 270. ISBN 0-521-54371-1.

19.13 External links • Comparing Insider IT Sabotage and Espionage: A Model-Based Analysis • Spooky Business: Corporate Espionage Against Nonprofit Organizations • Spooky Business: U.S. Corporations Enlist ExIntelligence Agents to Spy on Nonprofit Groups • Pt 2: U.S. Corporations Enlist Ex-Intelligence Agents to Spy on Nonprofit Groups • Corporate Espionage Undermines Democracy • Intelligence Online – Investigative news and reporting on industrial espionage and business intelligence (subscription and pay-per-article site)

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Chapter 20

Intelligence assessment This article is about evaluating sensitive state, military, The RFI may indicate in what format the requester prefers commercial, or scientific information. For other uses, to consume the product. see Intelligence (disambiguation). The RFI is reviewed by a Requirements Manager, who will then direct appropriate tasks to respond to the reIntelligence assessment is the development of forecasts quest. This will involve a review of existing material, the of behavior or recommended courses of action to the tasking of new analytical product or the collection of new leadership of an organization, based on a wide range of information to inform an analysis. available information sources both overt and covert. As- New information may be collected through one or more sessments are developed in response to requirements de- of the various collection disciplines; human source, clared by the leadership in order to inform decision mak- electronic and communications intercept, imagery or ing. Assessment may be carried out on behalf of a state, open sources. The nature of the RFI and the urgency military or commercial organization with a range of avail- placed on it may indicate that some collection types are able sources of information available to each. unsuitable due to the time taken to collect or validate An intelligence assessment reviews both available information and previous assessments for relevance and currency. Where additional information is required, some collection may be directed by the analyst.

the information gathered. Intelligence gathering disciplines and the sources and methods used are often highly classified and compartmentalized, with analysts requiring an appropriate high level of security clearance. The process of taking known information about situations and entities of importance to the RFI, characterizing what is known and attempting to forecast future events is termed “all source” assessment, analysis or processing. The analyst uses multiple sources to mutually corroborate, or exclude, the information collected, reaching a conclusion along with a measure of confidence around that conclusion.

20.1 Process

Where sufficient current information already exists, the analysis may be tasked directly without reference to further collection. The analysis is then communicated back to the requester in the format directed, although subject to the constraints on both the RFI and the methods used in the analysis, the format may be made available for other uses as well and disseminated accordingly. The analysis will be written to a defined classification level with alternative versions potentially available at a number of classification levels for further dissemination.

The Intelligence Cycle

Intelligence assessment is based on a customer requirement or need, which may be a standing requirement or tailored to a specific circumstance or a Request for Information (RFI). The “requirement” is passed to the assessing agency and worked through the intelligence cycle, a structured method for responding to the RFI. 108

20.4. FURTHER READING

109 • Andrew, Christopher. For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (1996) • Black, Ian and Morris, Benny Israel’s Secret Wars: A History of Israel’s Intelligence Services (1991) • Bungert, Heike et al. eds. Secret Intelligence in the Twentieth Century (2003) essays by scholars • Dulles, Allen W. The Craft of Intelligence: America’s Legendary Spy Master on the Fundamentals of Intelligence Gathering for a Free World (2006)

Target-centric intelligence cycle

20.2 Target-centric intelligence cycle Where the subject of the assessment is clearly identifiable and provisions exist to make some form of intervention against that subject, the target-centric assessment approach may be used. This approach, known as F3EA, is complementary to the intelligence cycle and focused on the intervention itself. The subject for action, or target, is identified and efforts are initially made to find the target for further development. This activity will identify where intervention against the target will have the most beneficial effects. When the decision is made to intervene, action is taken to fix the target, confirming that the intervention will have a high probability of success and restricting the ability of the target to take independent action. During the finish stage, the intervention is executed, potentially an arrest or detention or the placement of other collection methods. Following the intervention, exploitation of the target is carried out, which may lead to further refinement of the process for related targets. The output from the exploit stage will also be passed into other intelligence assessment activities.

20.3 See also • Intelligence cycle • List of intelligence gathering disciplines

• Kahn, David The Codebreakers: The Comprehensive History of Secret Communication from Ancient Times to the Internet (1996), 1200 pages • Lerner, K. Lee and Brenda Wilmoth Lerner, eds. Encyclopedia of Espionage, Intelligence and Security (2003), 1100 pages. 850 articles, strongest on technology • Odom, Gen. William E. Fixing Intelligence: For a More Secure America, Second Edition (Yale Nota Bene) (2004) • O'Toole, George. Honorable Treachery: A History of U.S. Intelligence, Espionage, Covert Action from the American Revolution to the CIA (1991) • Owen, David. Hidden Secrets: A Complete History of Espionage and the Technology Used to Support It (2002), popular • Richelson, Jeffery T. A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century (1997) • Richelson, Jeffery T. The U.S. Intelligence Community (4th ed. 1999) • Shulsky, Abram N. and Schmitt, Gary J. “Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence” (3rd ed. 2002), 285 pages • West, Nigel. MI6: British Secret Intelligence Service Operations 1909–1945 (1983) • West, Nigel. Secret War: The Story of SOE, Britain’s Wartime Sabotage Organization (1992) • Wohlstetter, Roberta. Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (1962) World War I

• Military intelligence • Surveillance

20.4 Further reading Surveys

• Beesly, Patrick. Room 40. (1982). Covers the breaking of German codes by RN intelligence, including the Turkish bribe, Zimmermann telegram, and failure at Jutland. • May, Ernest (ed.) Knowing One’s Enemies: Intelligence Assessment before the Two World Wars (1984)

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• Tuchman, Barbara W. The Zimmermann Telegram (1966)

• Ambrose, Stephen E. Ike’s Spies: Eisenhower and the Intelligence Establishment (1981).

• Yardley, Herbert O. American Black Chamber (2004)

• Andrew, Christopher and Vasili Mitrokhin. The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB (1999)

World War II 1931–1945 • Babington Smith, Constance. Air Spy: the Story of Photo Intelligence in World War II (1957) - originally published as Evidence in Camera in the UK • Beesly, Patrick. Very Special Intelligence: the Story of the Admiralty’s Operational Intelligence Centre, 1939–1945 (1977) • Hinsley, F. H. British Intelligence in the Second World War (1996) (abridged version of multivolume official history)

• Andrew, Christopher, and Oleg Gordievsky. KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev (1990). • Bogle, Lori, ed. Cold War Espionage and Spying (2001), essays by scholars • Boiling, Graham. Secret Students on Parade: Cold War Memories of JSSL, CRAIL, PlaneTree, 2005. ISBN 1-84294-169-0 • Dorril, Stephen. MI6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty’s Secret Intelligence Service (2000).

• Jones, R. V. Most Secret War: British Scientific Intelligence 1939–1945 (2009)

• Dziak, John J. Chekisty: A History of the KGB (1988)

• Kahn, David. Hitler’s Spies: German Military Intelligence in World War II (1978)

• Elliott, Geoffrey and Shukman, Harold. Secret Classrooms. An Untold Story of the Cold War. London, St Ermin’s Press, Revised Edition, 2003. ISBN 1-903608-13-9

• Kahn, David. Seizing the Enigma: the Race to Break the German U-Boat Codes, 1939–1943 (1991) • Kitson, Simon. The Hunt for Nazi Spies: Fighting Espionage in Vichy France, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, (2008). ISBN 978-0-226-43893-1

• Koehler, John O. Stasi: The Untold Story of the East German Secret Police (1999)

• Lewin, Ronald. The American Magic: Codes, Ciphers and the Defeat of Japan (1982)

• Persico, Joseph. Casey: The Lives and Secrets of William J. Casey-From the OSS to the CIA (1991)

• May, Ernest (ed.) Knowing One’s Enemies: Intelligence Assessment before the Two World Wars (1984) • Smith, Richard Harris. OSS: the Secret History of America’s First Central Intelligence Agency (2005) • Stanley, Roy M. World War II Photo Intelligence (1981) • Stevenson, William. A Man Called Intrepid: The Incredible WWII Narrative of the Hero Whose Spy Network and Secret Diplomacy Changed the Course of History (2009) • Wark, Wesley K. The Ultimate Enemy: British Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1933–1939 (1985) • Wark, Wesley K. “Cryptographic Innocence: the Origins of Signals Intelligence in Canada in the Second World War”, in: Journal of Contemporary History 22 (1987) Cold War Era 1945–1991 • Aldrich, Richard J. The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence (2002).

• Ostrovsky, Viktor By Way of Deception (1990)

• Prados, John. Presidents’ Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations Since World War II (1996) • Rositzke, Harry. The CIA’s Secret Operations: Espionage, Counterespionage, and Covert Action (1988) • Trahair, Richard C. S. Encyclopedia of Cold War Espionage, Spies and Secret Operations (2004), by an Australian scholar; contains excellent historiographical introduction • Weinstein, Allen, and Alexander Vassiliev. The Haunted Wood: Soviet Espionage in America—The Stalin Era (1999).

20.5 External links • Intelligence Literature: Suggested Reading List (CIA) • The Literature of Intelligence: A Bibliography of Materials, with Essays, Reviews, and Comments by J. Ransom Clark, Emeritus Professor of Political Science, Muskingum College

20.5. EXTERNAL LINKS • Intelligence Online Investigative news and reporting on intelligence activities worldwide, including secret service and industrial espionage (subscription required).

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Chapter 21

Intelligence cycle management Intelligence cycle management refers to the overall acwithin a secret socio-cultural context. tivity of guiding the intelligence cycle, which is a set of processes used to provide decision-useful information • Intelligence errors are factual inaccura(intelligence) to leaders. The cycle consists of several cies in analysis resulting from poor or processes, including planning and direction (the focus of missing data. Intelligence failure is systhis article), collection, processing and exploitation, analtemic organizational surprise resulting ysis and production, and dissemination and integration. from incorrect, missing, discarded, or inThe related field of counterintelligence is tasked with imadequate hypotheses. peding the intelligence efforts of others. Intelligence organizations are not infallible (intelligence reports are often referred to as “estimates,” and often include measures 21.1.2 Management of the intelligence cyof confidence and reliability) but, when properly mancle aged and tasked, can be among the most valuable tools of management and government. Main article: Intelligence cycle The principles of intelligence have been discussed and One basic model of the intelligence process is called the developed from the earliest writers on warfare[1] to the most recent writers on technology.[2] Despite the most powerful computers, the human mind remains at the core of intelligence, discerning patterns and extracting meaning from a flood of correct, incorrect, and sometimes deliberately misleading information (also known as disinformation).

21.1 Overview 21.1.1

Intelligence defined

By “intelligence” we mean every sort of information about the enemy and his country—the basis, in short, of The Intelligence Process or Cycle our own plans and operations. Carl Von Clausewitz - On War - 1832

“intelligence cycle”. This model can be applied[4] and, like all basic models, it does not reflect the fullness of One study of analytic culture[3] established the following real-world operations. Intelligence is processed information. The activities of the intelligence cycle obtain and as“consensus” definitions: semble information, convert it into intelligence and make it available to its users. The intelligence cycle comprises • Intelligence is secret state or group activfive phases: ity to understand or influence foreign or domestic entities. 1. Planning and Direction: Deciding what is to be • Intelligence analysis is the application of monitored and analyzed. In intelligence usage, individual and collective cognitive meththe determination of intelligence requirements, deods to weigh data and test hypotheses velopment of appropriate intelligence architecture, 112

21.2. REQUIREMENTS

113 production phase, the information is converted into intelligence.[5]

21.1.3 Planning and direction overview The planning and direction phase of the intelligence cycle includes four major steps: 1. Identification and prioritization of intelligence requirements; 2. Development of appropriate intelligence architecture; Relationship of Data, Information and Intelligence

preparation of a collection plan, issuance of orders and requests to information collection agencies. 2. Collection: Obtaining raw information using a variety of collection disciplines such as human intelligence (HUMINT), geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) and others. 3. Processing: Refining and analyzing the information 4. Analysis and production: The data that has been processed is translated into a finished intelligence product, which includes integrating, collating, evaluating, and analyzing all the data. 5. Dissemination: Providing the results of processing to consumers (including those in the intelligence community), including the use of intelligence information in net assessment and strategic gaming.

3. Preparation of a collection plan; and 4. Issuance of orders and requests to information collection agencies.[5] The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff described planning & direction in 2013 as: "...the development of intelligence plans and the continuous management of their execution. Planning and direction activities include, but are not limited to: the identification and prioritization of intelligence requirements; the development of concepts of intelligence operations and architectures required to support the commander’s mission; tasking subordinate intelligence elements for the collection of information or the production of finished intelligence; submitting requests for additional capabilities to higher headquarters; and submitting requests for collection, exploitation, or allsource production support to external, supporting intelligence entities.”[5]

A distinct intelligence officer is often entrusted with managing each level of the process.

21.2 Requirements

In some organisations, such as the UK military, these phases are reduced to four, with the “analysis and production” being incorporated into the “processing” phase. These phases describe the minimum process of intelligence, but several other activities also come into play. The output of the intelligence cycle, if accepted, drives operations, which, in turn, produces new material to enter another iteration of the intelligence cycle. Consumers give the intelligence organization broad directions, and the highest level sets budgets.

Leaders with specific objectives communicate their requirements for intelligence inputs to applicable agencies or contacts. An intelligence “consumer” might be an infantry officer who needs to know what is on the other side of the next hill, a head of government who wants to know the probability that a foreign leader will go to war over a certain point, a corporate executive who wants to know what his or her competitors are planning, or any person or organization (for example, a person who wants to know if his or her spouse is faithful).

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) describes an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. This is an integrated intelligence and operations function.[5] Sensors (people or systems) collect data from the operational environment during the collection phase, which is then converted into information during the processing and exploitation phase. During the analysis and

21.2.1 National/strategic “Establishing the intelligence requirements of the policymakers ... is management of the entire intelligence cycle, from identifying the need for data to delivering an intelligence product to a consumer,” according to a report by the U.S. Intelligence Board. “It is the beginning and the end of the cycle—the beginning because it involves drawing up specific collection requirements and the end

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because finished intelligence, which supports policy deci- sider either counterintelligence or covert action.[7] " The sions, generates new requirements. OODA loop developed by military strategist John Boyd, “The whole process depends on guidance from public discussed in the context of the Intelligence Cycle, may officials. Policy-makers—the president, his aides, the come somewhat closer, as OODA is action-oriented and National Security Council, and other major departments spiraling, rather than a continuing circle. and agencies of government—initiate requests for intelligence. Issue coordinators interact with these public of21.3.1 Budgeting ficials to establish their core concerns and related information requirements. These needs are then used to guide The architectural design must then be funded. While each collection strategies and the production of appropriate innation has its own budgeting process, the major divisions [6] telligence products ". of the US process are representative:

21.2.2

Military/operational

Intelligence requirements are determined by the commander to support his operational needs. The commander’s requirement, sometimes called “essential elements of intelligence” (EEIs), initiates the intelligence cycle. Operational and tactical intelligence always should help the commander select an action. Each intelligence source has different characteristics that can be used, but which may also be limiting. Imagery intelligence (IMINT), for instance, may depend on weather, satellite orbits or the ability of aircraft to elude ground defenses, and time for analysis. Other sources may take considerable time to collect the necessary information. Measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) depends on having built a library of signatures of normal sensor readings, in order that deviations will stand out.

• National intelligence, often excluding specifically national-level military intelligence, • National-level military intelligence, • Military tactical intelligence, • Transnational intelligence, often involving law enforcement, for terrorism and organized crime, and • Internal counterintelligence and antiterrorism.

Depending on the nation, at some level of detail, budgetary information will be classified, as changes in budget indicate changes in priorities. After considerable debate, the U.S. now publishes total budgets for the combination of its intelligence agencies. Depending on the sensitivity In rare cases, intelligence is taken from such extremely of a line item, it may be identified simply as “classified sensitive sources that it cannot be used without expos- activity,"not broken out, but briefed to full oversight coming the methods or persons providing such intelligence. mittees, or only revealed to a small number of officials. One of the strengths of the British penetration of the German Enigma cryptosystem was that no information “It should be possible to empower a committee composed learned from it was ever used for operations, unless there of mid-level officials (or aides to senior officials) from the was a plausible cover story that the Germans believed was intelligence and policy-making communities to convene the reason for Allied victories. If, for example, the move- regularly to determine and revise priorities. The key is ment of a ship was learned through Enigma COMINT, a to try to get policymakers to provide guidance for both reconnaissance aircraft was sent into the same area, and collection and analysis, to communicate not just what they allowed to be seen by the Axis, so they thought the result- want but also what they do not.” ing sinking was due to IMINT. The CFR proposed a “market constraint” on consumers, in which they could only get a certain amount of intelligence from the intelligence community, before they had to provide additional funding.[8] A different constraint 21.3 Intelligence architecture would be that an agency, to get information on a new The intelligence cycle is only a model. Budgetary and topic, must agree to stop or reduce coverage on somepolicy direction are hierarchically above it. In reality, it thing currently being monitored for it. Even with this is not a cycle, but a series of parallel activities. Accord- consumer-oriented model, the intelligence community iting to Arthur S. Hulnick, author of What’s Wrong with self needs to have a certain amount of resources that it the Intelligence Cycle, “Collection and analysis, which are can direct itself, for building basic intelligence and idensupposed to work in tandem, in fact work more properly tifying unusual threats. in parallel. Finally, the idea that decision-makers wait for the delivery of intelligence before making policy decisions is equally incorrect. In the modern era, policy officials seem to want intelligence to support policy rather than to inform it. The Intelligence Cycle also fails to con-

“It is important that intelligence officers involved in articulating requirements represent both analysts and collectors, including those from the clandestine side. In addition, collection should be affected by the needs of policymakers and operators. All of this argues strongly against

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any organizational reforms that would isolate the collec- policy to sort out individual cases. One now exists; the tion agencies further or increase their autonomy.” challenge is to make it work. Especially in nations with advanced technical sensors, there is an interaction between budgeting and technology. For example, the US has tended, in recent years, to use billion-dollar SIGINT satellites, where France has used “swarms” of “microsatellites”. The quantity versus quality battle is as evident in intelligence technology as in weapons systems. The U.S. has fought a stovepipe battle, in which SIGINT and IMINT satellites, in a given orbit, were launched by different agencies. New plans put SIGINT, MASINT, and IMINT sensors, corresponding to a type of orbit, on common platforms.

“At home, law enforcement should have priority and the intelligence community should continue to face restraints in what it can do vis-à-vis American citizens.” The protection of civil liberties remains essential. National organizations intended for foreign operations, or military support, should operate within the home country only under specific authorization and when there is no other way to achieve the desired result ... Regardless, the ability of intelligence agencies to give law enforcement incidentally acquired information on U.S. citizens at home or overseas ought to be continued. There should be no prohibition (other than those based on policy) on the intelligence community collecting information against foreign persons or entities. The question of what to do with the 21.3.2 Policy factors information, however, should be put before policymakers [8] Western governments tend to have creative tension among if it raises foreign policy concerns. their law enforcement and national security organizations, President Harry S. Truman had legitimate concerns about foreign-oriented versus domestic-oriented organizations, creating a “Gestapo,” so he insisted that the new CIA not and public versus private interests. There is frequently have law enforcement or domestic authority. In an era of a conflict between clandestine intelligence and covert ac- transnational terrorism and organized crime, there may tion, which may compete for resources in the same orga- not be clean distinctions between domestic and foreign nization. activities.[9]

21.3.3

Balancing law enforcement and na- 21.3.4 Public versus private tional security

There is an opposition between law enforcement and intelligence, because the two entities are very different. Intelligence is oriented toward the future and seeks to inform policy-makers. It lives in an area of uncertainty where the truth may be uncertain. Because intelligence strives to protect its sources and methods, intelligence officials seek to stay out of the chain of evidence so they will not have to testify in court. By contrast, law enforcement’s business is the prosecution of cases, and if law enforcement is to make a case, it must be prepared to reveal how it knows what it knows. The Council on Foreign Relations[8] recommended that “foreign policy ought to take precedence over law enforcement when it comes to overseas operations. The bulk of U.S. intelligence efforts overseas are devoted to traditional national security concerns; as a result, law enforcement must ordinarily be a secondary concern. FBI and DEA agents operating abroad should not be allowed to act independently of either the ambassador or the CIA lest pursuit of evidence or individuals for prosecution cause major foreign policy problems or complicate ongoing intelligence and diplomatic activities. (The same should hold for any Defense Department personnel involved in intelligence activity overseas.) There are likely to be exceptions, and a degree of case-by-case decisionmaking will be inevitable. What is needed most is a Washington-based interagency mechanism involving officials from intelligence, law enforcement, and foreign

“During the Cold War, national security was a federal government monopoly. To be sure, private citizens and corporations were involved, but there was a neat correspondence between the threat as defined and the federal government’s national security machinery that was developed to meet that threat. The war against terrorism and homeland security will be much less a federal government monopoly. Citizens of democracies and the economy are already suffering the inconvenience and higher business costs of much tighter security. And tragically, more ordinary citizens are likely to die from transnational terrorism."(Treverton 2003)

Public and private interests can both complement and conflict when it comes to economic intelligence. Multination corporations usually have a form of capable intelligence capabilities in their core business. Lloyd’s of London has extensive knowledge of maritime affairs. Oil companies have extensive information on world resources and energy demands. Investment banks can track capital flow. These intelligence capabilities become especially difficult when private organizations seek to use national capabilities for their private benefit. Sometimes, a quid pro quo may be involved. Secret economic information can be collected by several means-mostly SIGINT and HUMINT. The more sensitive reconnaissance satellites may not be needed to get substantially correct imagery. Earth resources satellites may give adequate, or even better detail—reconnaissance satellites tend not to have the

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multispectral scanners that are best for agricultural or other economic information. The private sector may already have good information on trade policy, resources, foreign exchange, and other economic factors. This may not be “open source” in the sense of being published, but can be reliably bought from research firms that may not have the overhead of allsource security. The intelligence agencies can use their all-source capability for verification, rather than original collection. Intelligence agencies, working with national economic and diplomatic employees, can develop policy CCIRM takes information requests and routes them to collection alternatives for negotiators. One subtle aspect of the role of economic intelligence is the interdependence of the continental and world economies. The economic health of Mexico clearly affects the United States, just as the Turkish economy is of concern to the European Community. In a post-Cold War environment, the roles of Russia and China are still evolving. Japan, with a history of blurred lines between industry and government, may regard a policy (for them) as perfectly ethical, which would be questionable in North America or Eastern Europe. New groupings such as the Shanghai Cooperative Organization are principally economic. Economic measures also may be used to pressure specific countries—for example, South Africa while it sustained a policy of apartheid, or Sudan while there is widespread persecution in Darfur.

21.4 Collection planning Collection planning matches anticipated collection requirements with collection capabilities at multiple organizational levels (e.g., national, geographic theater, or specific military entities). It is a continuous process that coordinates and integrates the efforts of all collection units and agencies. This multi-level collaboration helps identify collection gaps and redundant coverage in a timely manner to optimize the employment of all available collection capabilities.[5]

21.4.1

CCIRM

The collection coordination intelligence requirements management (CCIRM) system is the NATO doctrine for intelligence collection management, although it differs from U.S. doctrine.[10] From the U.S. perspective, CCIRM manages requests for information (RFI), rather than the collection itself, which has caused some friction when working with U.S. collection assets. Within NATO, requests for information flowed through the chain of command to the CCIRM manager. Where the U.S. sees collection management as a “push” or proactive process, NATO sees this as “pull” or reactive.

elements

the force commander. Senior NATO commanders receive intelligence information in the form of briefings, summaries, reports and other intelligence estimates. According to authors Roberto Desimone and David Charles, “Battlefield commanders receive more specific documents, entitled intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB).” While these reports and briefings convey critical information, they lack the full context in which the intelligence cell assembled them. In coalition warfare, not all sources may be identified outside that cell. Even though the material presented gives key information and recommendations, and assumptions for these interpretations are given, the context "...not in a strong evidential sense, pointing exactly to the specific intelligence information that justifies these interpretations. As a result, it is not always easy for the commander to determine whether a particular interpretation has been compromised by new intelligence information, without constant interaction with the intelligence analysts. Conversely, security constraints may prevent the analyst from explaining exactly why a particular command decision might compromise existing intelligence gathering operations. As a result, most of the detailed intelligence analyses, including alternative hypotheses and interpretations, remain in the heads of intelligence officers who rely on individual communication skills to present their brief and keep the commander informed when the situation changes.”[11] Experience in Bosnia and Kosovo demonstrated strain between CCIRM and U.S. procedures, although the organizations learned by experience. Operation Joint Endeavor began in 1995, with Operation Deliberate Force going to a much higher level of combat. Operation Allied Force, a more intense combat situation in Kosovo, began on 24 March 1999. At the highest level of direction, rational policies, the effects of personalities, and culture can dominate the assignments given to the intelligence services.

Another aspect of analysis is the balance between current intelligence and long-term estimates. For many years, the culture of the intelligence community, in particular that In NATO doctrine, CCIRM joins an intelligence analy- of the CIA, favored the estimates. However, it is in longsis (including fusion) to provide intelligence services to term analysis of familiar subjects and broad trends where

21.6. OTHER TOPICS secret information tends to be less critical and government analysts are, for the most part, no better and often not as good as their counterparts in academia and the private sector. Also, many estimates are likely to be less relevant to busy policy-makers, who must focus on the immediate. To the extent long-term estimates are produced, it is important that they be concise, written by individuals, and that sources justifying conclusions be shown as they would in any academic work. If the project is a group effort, differences among participants need to be sharpened and acknowledged. While it is valuable to point out consensus, it is more important that areas of dispute be highlighted than that all agencies be pressured to reach a conclusion that may represent a lowest common denominator.[8]

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21.6.1 Political misuse There has been a great amount of political abuse of intelligence services in totalitarian states, where the use of what the Soviets called the “organs of state security” would take on tasks far outside any intelligence mission.[12] “The danger of politicization-the potential for the intelligence community to distort information or judgment in order to please political authorities-is real. Moreover, the danger can never be eliminated if intelligence analysts are involved, as they must be, in the policy process. The challenge is to develop reasonable safeguards while permitting intelligence producers and policy-making consumers to interact.”[8]

21.5 Issuance of orders and re- 21.6.2 Clandestine intelligence covert action quests

versus

Clandestine and covert operations share many attributes, but also have distinct differences. They may share, for example, a technical capability for cover and forgery, and require secret logistical support. The essence of covert action is that its sponsor cannot be proven. One term of art is that the sponsor has “plausible deniability.” In some cases, such as sabotage, the target indeed may not 21.5.1 Prioritization be aware of the action. Assassinations, however, are immediately known but, if the assassin escapes or is killed Upper managers may order the collection department to in action, the sponsor may never be known to any other focus on specific targets and, on a longer-term basis (espe- than to the sponsor. cially for the technical collection disciplines), may prioritize the means of collection through budgeting resources See a Congressional study, Special Operations Forces CIA Paramilitary Operations: Issues for for one discipline versus another and, within a discipline, (SOF) and [13] Congress, for one policy review. one system over than another. Not only must collection be prioritized, but the analysts need to know where to begin in what is often a flood of information. Coordination of HUMINT and covert action Once the intelligence effort has been planned, it can then be directed, with orders and requests issued to intelligence collection agencies to provide specific types of intelligence inputs.

“Intelligence collection priorities, while reflecting both national interests and broader policy priorities, need to be based on other considerations. First, there must be a demonstrated inadequacy of alternative sources. Except in rare circumstances, the intelligence community does not need to confirm through intelligence what is already readily available.” In most intelligence and operations watch centers, a television set is always tuned to the Cable News Network. While initial news reports may be fragmentary, this particular part of OSINT is a powerful component of warning, but not necessarily of detailed analyses.

Experience has shown that high level government needs to be aware of both clandestine and covert field activities in order to prevent them from interfering with one another, and with secret activities that may not be in the field. For example, one World War II failure occurred when Office of Strategic Services (OSS) field agents broke into the Japanese Embassy in Lisbon, and stole cryptographic materials, which allowed past communications to be read. The net effect of this operation was disastrous, as the particular cryptosystem had been broken by cryptanalysis, who were reading the traffic parallel with the intended recipients. The covert burglary—the Japanese did not “Collection priorities must not only be those subjects catch the OSS team, so were not certain who committhat are policy-relevant, but also involve information ted it—caused the Japanese to change cryptosystems, inthat the intelligence community can best (or uniquely) validating the clandestine work of the cryptanalysts.[14] In ascertain.”[8] World War II, the United Kingdom kept its Secret Intelligence Service principally focused on HUMINT, while the Special Operations Executive was created for direct ac21.6 Other topics tion and support of resistance movements. The Political Warfare Executive also was created, for psychological

118 warfare. HUMINT resources have been abused, even in democracies. In the case of the U.S., these abuses of resources involved instances such as Iran-Contra and support to the “plumbers unit” of the Nixon campaign and administration, as well as infiltrating legal groups using a justification of force protection. British actions in Northern Ireland, and against terror groups in Gibraltar and elsewhere, have been criticized, as have French actions against Greenpeace. "... Contrary to widespread impressions, one problem with the clandestine services has been a lack of initiative brought about by a fear of retroactive discipline and a lack of high-level support. This must be rectified if the intelligence community is to continue to produce the human intelligence that will surely be needed in the future.”[8]

CHAPTER 21. INTELLIGENCE CYCLE MANAGEMENT lection plan.”[15]

21.7 Failures in the intelligence cycle Main article: Failure in the intelligence cycle Any circular cycle is as weak as its weakest component. At one time or another, a national or organizational intelligence process has broken down, thus causing failure in the cycle. For example, failures in the intelligence cycle were identified in the 9/11 Commission Report.

Each of the five main components of the cycle has, in For a detailed discussion, see Clandestine HUMINT and different countries and at different times, failed. Policymakers have denied the services direction to work on critCovert Action. ical matters. Intelligence services have failed to collect critical information. The services have analyzed data incorrectly. There have been failures to disseminate intelCommon risks and resources ligence quickly enough, or to the right decision-makers. Clandestine collection entails many more risks than the There have been failures to protect the intelligence protechnical collection disciplines. Therefore, how and cess itself from opposing intelligence services. when it is used must be highly selective, responding to A major problem, in several aspects of the enhanced cycarefully screened and the highest priority requirements. cle, is stovepiping or silos. In the traditional intelligence It cannot be kept “on the shelf” and called upon whenever use of the term, stovepiping keeps the output of differneeded. There must be some minimal ongoing capabil- ent collection systems separated from one another. This ity that can be expanded in response to consumer needs. has several negative effects. For instance, it prevents one This has become increasingly difficult for clandestine ser- discipline from cross-checking another or from sharing vices, such as diplomats, in response to budget pressures, relevant information. and has reduced its presence that could otherwise provide official cover. In 1996, the House Committee on Intelligence[15] recom21.8 mended that a single clandestine service should include those components of the Defense HUMINT Service (DHS) that undertake clandestine collection, as well. The 21.8.1 congressional concern about strategic military HUMINT, however, may not apply to military special operations forces or to force protection. “This is not meant to preclude the service intelligence chiefs from carrying out those clandestine collection activities specifically related to the tactical needs of their military departmental customers or field commanders.” Clandestine HUMINT and covert action involve the only part of governments that are required, on a routine basis, to break foreign laws. “As several former DCIs have pointed out, the clandestine services are also the DCI’s most important 'action arm,' not only running covert action programs at the direction of the president (a function whose utility we believe will continue to be important), but also in managing most the IC’s liaison with foreign government leaders and security services. A House staff report is of the opinion that analysis should be separate from both covert action and clandestine HUMINT, or other clandestine collection that breaks foreign laws. HUMINT is and should be part of a larger IC-wide col-

Other cycles Boyd OODA Loop

Interactions between commanders and the Boyd loop

Military strategist John Boyd created a model of decision and action, originally for air-to-air fighter combat, but which has proven useful in many areas of conflict. His model has four phases, which, while not usually stated in terms of the intelligence cycle, do relate to that cycle:

21.9. REFERENCES

119

[4] US Department of Defense (12 July 2007). “Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms” (PDF). Retrieved 2007-1001. [5] “Joint Publication 2-0, Joint Intelligence” (PDF). Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC). Department of Defense. 22 June 2007. pp. GL–11. Retrieved February 22, 2013. [6] US Intelligence Board (2007). “Planning and Direction”. Archived from the original on 2007-09-22. Retrieved 2007-10-22. Interactions between the intelligence cycle and the Boyd loop

1. Observe: become aware of a threat or opportunity. 2. Orient: put the observation into the context of other information. 3. Decide: make the best possible action plan that can be carried out in a timely manner. 4. Act: carry out the plan.

[7] Hulnick, Arthur S. (6 December 2006). “What’s wrong with the Intelligence Cycle (abstract)". Intelligence & National Security 21 (6): 959–979. doi:10.1080/02684520601046291. [8] Council on Foreign Relations. “Making Intelligence Smarter: The Future of US Intelligence”. Retrieved 2007-10-21. [9] Treverton, Gregory F. (July 2003). “Reshaping Intelligence to Share with “Ourselves"". Canadian Security Intelligence Service. Treverton 2003. Retrieved 2007-1023. [10] Wentz, Larry. “Lessons From Bosnia: The IFOR Expe-

After the action, the actor observes again, to see the efrience, IV. Intelligence Operations”. Retrieved 2007-10fects of the action. If the cycle works properly, the actor 26. has initiative, and can orient, decide, and act even faster in the second and subsequent iterations of the Boyd loop. [11] Desimone, Roberto; David Charles. “Towards an On-

tology for Intelligence Analysis and Collection Manage-

Eventually, if the Boyd process works as intended, the ment” (PDF). Desimone 2003. Retrieved 2007-10-26. actor will “get inside the opponent’s loop”. When the actor’s Boyd cycle dominates the opponent’s, the actor is [12] Sudoplatov, Pavel; Anatoli Sudoplatov, Jerrold L. Schecter, Leona P. Schecter (1994). Special Tasks: The acting repeatedly, based on reasoned choices, while the Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness—A Soviet Spymaster. opponent is still trying to determine what is happening. Little, Brown and Company. ISBN 0-316-77352-2.

While Boyd treated his cycle as self-contained, it could be extended to meet the intelligence cycle. Observation [13] Congressional Research Service (December 6, 2006). “Special Operations Forces (SOF) and CIA Paramilitary could be an output of the collection phase, while orientaOperations: Issues for Congress” (PDF). tion is an output of analysis. Eventually, actions taken, and their results, affect the se- [14] Kahn, David (1996). The Codebreakers - The Story of Secret Writing. Scribners. ISBN 0-684-83130-9. nior commanders. The guidelines for the preferred decisions and actions come from the commanders, rather than [15] Staff Study, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, from the intelligence side. House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourth Congress (1996). “IC21: The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century”. Retrieved 2007-10-26.

21.9 References [1] Sun Tzu (6th Century BCE). "The Art of War". multiple publications and translations. Check date values in: |date= (help) [2] Richelson, Jeffrey T. (2001). The Wizards of Langley: Inside the CIA’s Directorate of Science and Technology. Westview Press. ISBN 0-8133-6699-2. [3] Johnston, Rob (2005). “Analytic Culture in the US Intelligence Community: An Ethnographic Study”. Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency. Retrieved 2007-10-29.

Chapter 22

Interrogation For other meanings of this and similar words (words starting “Interrog...”) see Interrogation (disambiguation).

Interrogations in Jail, by Alessandro Magnasco, c. 1710

22.1.1 Suggestibility A person’s suggestibility is how willing they are to accept and act on suggestions by others. Interrogators seek to increase a subject’s suggestibility. Methods used to increase suggestibility may include moderate sleep deprivation, exposure to constant white noise, and using GABAergic drugs such as sodium amytal or sodium thiopental. It should be noted that attempting to increase a subject’s suggestibility through these methods may violate local and national laws concerning the treatment of detainees, and in some areas may be considered torture. Sleep deprivation, exposure to white noise, and the use of drugs may greatly inhibit a detainee’s ability to provide truthful and accurate information. A police interrogation room in Switzerland.

22.1.2 Deception Interrogation (also called questioning) is interviewing as commonly employed by law enforcement officers, military personnel, and intelligence agencies with the goal of eliciting useful information. Interrogation may involve a diverse array of techniques, ranging from developing a rapport with the subject, to outright torture.

Deception can form an important part of effective interrogation. In the United States, there is no law or regulation that forbids the interrogator from lying about the strength of their case, from making misleading statements or from implying that the interviewee has already been implicated in the crime by someone else. See case law on trickery and deception (Frazier v. Cupp).[1]

22.1 Techniques

As noted above, traditionally the issue of deception is considered from the perspective of the interrogator enSee also: Enhanced interrogation techniques gaging in deception towards the individual being interThere are multiple techniques employed in interroga- rogated. Recently, work completed regarding effective tion including deception, torture, increasing suggestibil- interview methods used to gather information from indiity, and the use of mind-altering drugs. viduals who score in the medium to high range on mea120

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121

sures of psychopathology and are engaged in deception directed towards the interrogator have appeared in the literature.[2] [3] The importance of allowing the psychopathic interviewee to tell one lie after another and not confront until all of the lies have been presented is essential when the goal is to use the interview to expose the improbable statements made during the interview in future court proceedings.

watch the body language of suspects to detect deceit) has been criticized for being difficult to apply across cultures and eliciting false confessions from innocent people.[4]

22.1.3

Main articles: Torture and Third degree (interrogation) The history of the state use of torture in interroga-

Good cop/bad cop

22.1.6 Mind-altering drugs 22.1.7 Torture

Main article: Good cop/bad cop Good cop/bad cop is an interrogation technique in which

Omar Khadr pulling his hair in frustration during an interrogation by Canadian officials, February 2003

the officers take different sides. The 'bad cop' takes a negative stance on the subject. This allows for the 'good cop' to sympathize with and defend the subject. The idea is to get the subject to trust the 'good cop' and provide him with the information they are looking for.

22.1.4

Pride-and-ego down

Main article: Pride-and-ego down Pride-and-ego down is a U.S. Army term that refers to techniques used by captors in interrogating prisoners to encourage cooperation, usually consisting of “attacking the source’s sense of personal worth” and in an “attempt to redeem his pride, the source will usually involuntarily provide pertinent information in attempting to vindicate himself.”

Half-hanging of suspected United Irishmen by government troops in 1798

tions extends over more than 2,000 years in Europe— though it was recognized early on as the Roman imperial jurist Ulpian in the third century A.D. cautioned, that information extracted under duress was deceptive and untrustworthy.[5] There is “no means of obtaining the truth” from those who have the strength to resist says Ulpian, while others unable to withstand the pain “will tell any lie rather than suffer it.”[6]

The use of torture as an investigative technique waned with the rise of Christianity since it was considered “antithetical to Christ’s teachings,” and in 866 Pope Nicholas Main article: Reid technique I banned the practice.[6] But after the 13th century many European states such as Germany, Italy, and Spain beThe Reid technique is a trademarked interrogation tech- gan to return to physical abuse for religious inquisition, nique widely used by law enforcement agencies in North and for secular investigations.[6] By the 18th century the America. The technique (which requires interrogators to spreading influence of the Enlightenment led European

22.1.5

Reid technique

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CHAPTER 22. INTERROGATION

nations to abandon officially state-sanctioned interroga- 22.2.1 United Kingdom tion by torture. By 1874 Victor Hugo could plausibly claim that “torture has ceased to exist.”[7] Yet in the 20th British legislation that applies to interrogation activities century authoritarian states such as Mussolini’s Fascist include: Italy, Hitler’s Third Reich, and Lenin’s and Stalin’s Soviet Union once again resumed the practice, and on a massive • Human Rights Act 1998 scale.[7] • Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 The most recent and most prominent instance of the use • Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 of torture in interrogation is that of the American CIA. After the defeat of the Axis powers in World War II, • Terrorism Act 2006 the CIA became both student and teacher of torture, propagating torture techniques worldwide to support antiAll police officers are trained in interview techniques durCommunist regimes during the Cold War.[8] The CIA ing basic training, further training in detailed interviewadopted methods used by the Gestapo, KGB and North ing or specialist interviewing is received in specialist or Koreans from their involvement in the Korean War such advanced courses, such as criminal investigation, fraud as waterboarding, sleep deprivation, and the use of elecinvestigation or child protection. tric shock, and researched new ideas: so-called 'no-touch' torture involving sensory deprivation, self-inflicted pain, Military interrogation takes two forms, Tactical Quesand psychological stress.[9] The CIA taught its refined tioning or Detailed Interviewing. Tactical Questioning is techniques of torture through police and military train- the initial screening of detainees, Detailed Interviewing ing to American-supported regimes in the Middle East, in is the more advanced questioning of subjects. Southeast Asia during the bloody Phoenix program, and Training for all personnel engaged in both TQ and DI throughout Latin America during Operation Condor.[10] takes place at the Defence Intelligence and Security CenTorture also became widespread in some Asian nations tre, Chicksands. and South Pacific nations, in Malasia, the Philippines and elsewhere, both for interrogation and to terrorize oppo- British military personnel were found to have misused a nents of the regime. “In its pursuit of torturers across number of techniques during the detention of suspects in the globe for the past forty years,” writer Alfred Mc- Northern Ireland in the early 1970s. Investigations into Coy notes, “Amnesty International has been, in a certain these techniques resulted in the publication of policy directives that prohibited the use of hooding, stress posisense, following the trail of CIA programs.”[11] tions or wall-standing, noise, sleep deprivation and depriAfter the revelation of CIA sponsored torture in the vation of food and drink. 1970s and the subsequent outcry, the CIA largely stopped its own interrogations under torture and throughout the During the early stages of Operation Telic in Iraq during 1980s and 1990s “outsourced” such interrogation through 2003 and 2004 some infantry units have been found to renditions of prisoners to third world allies, often called have applied these techniques in contravention of standtorture-by-proxy.[12] But in the furor over the September ing orders. 11 attacks, American authorities cast aside scruples,[13] The use of torture is explicitly prohibited. However, Hulegally authorizing some forms of interrogation by torture man Rights Watch and Amnesty International have acunder euphemisms such as "enhanced interrogation"[14] cused officers of the British Intelligence and Security Seror “interrogation in depth”[15] to collect intelligence on vices of being at least complicit in the extraction of inforAl Qaeda, starting in 2002.[16] Ultimately the CIA, the mation from subjects under torture by second parties. US military, and their contract employees tortured untold thousands at Abu Ghraib, Bagram, and secret black site prisons scattered around the globe, according to the 22.2.2 United States Senate Intelligence Committee report on CIA torture and the bipartisan U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee See also: U.S. Army and CIA interrogation manuals, report[17][18] Whether these interrogations under torture Central Intelligence Agency § Declassified CIA interrogation manuals, Bagram torture and prisoner abuse, produced useful information is hotly disputed.[19] Enhanced interrogation techniques, Pride-and-ego down The administration of President Obama in 2009 prohiband George W. Bush’s second term as President of the ited so-called enhanced interrogation, and as of March United States § Interrogation 2012 there is no longer a nation which openly admits to deliberate abuse of prisoners for purposes of War On Terror interrogation.[20][21]

22.2 Around the world

During the War on Terror, torture has never been authorized or permitted for use at Guantanamo Bay detainment camp or any other U.S. Department of Defense detention/internment facility on captives, whether

22.3. RESISTANCE TRAINING

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they are enemy prisoners of war, detainees, and unlawful 22.3 Resistance training enemy combatants, though there have been people who have reported being tortured at Guantanamo Bay. Main article: Resistance to interrogation Torture, in this context, is a war crime. Specifically, a See also: Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape grave violation of the Law of Land Warfare. War crimes are punishable under U.S. Code as well as the U.S. Code Resistance training is often a prerequisite for some milof Military Justice. There is no statute of limitations for itary personnel since prisoners of war (POWs) routinely war crimes. Instances of criminal behavior by military, undergo interrogation. civilian, and contract personnel of the U.S. Department of Defense has happened and has happened with regard to Geneva Category regarding prisoners and detainees. for increased Criminal behavior in this context may range from mis- 22.4 Movement handling to abuse to torture. Military Commanders inrecording of interrogations in vestigate rigorously any accusation of prisoner mishanthe U.S. dling, abuse, or torture. The military continues to vigorously prosecute any such unlawful activity. Army regulations and policy have always been clear, the Currently, there is a movement for mandatory elecof all custodial interrogations in the torture or coercion of an enemy prisoner of war during tronic recording [22] United States. “Electronic recording” describes the interrogation, or in any other circumstance, is not only process of recording interrogations from start to finish. unlawful but also an unproductive and unreliable method This is in contrast to a “taped” or “recorded confesfor gaining information. In addition, U.S. Army interrosion,” which typically only includes the final statement gation procedures continue to stress that all detained or of the suspect. “Taped interrogation” is the traditional captured persons will be treated as Geneva Category Enterm for this process; however, as analog is becoming emy Prisoners of War until determined otherwise by a less and less common, statutes and scholars are referduly constituted military tribunal. ring to the process as “electronically recording” interU.S. Air Force General Jack L. Rives (Deputy Judge Ad- views or interrogations. Alaska,[23] Illinois,[24] Maine,[25] vocate General) advised a U.S. government task force Minnesota,[23] and Wisconsin[26] are the only states to rethat many of the extreme methods of interrogation would quire taped interrogation. New Jersey’s taping requireleave service personnel open to legal sanction in the U.S. ment started on January 1, 2006.[23][27] Massachusetts and foreign countries. allows jury instructions that state that the courts prefer taped interrogations.[28] Commander Neil Nelson of the St. Paul Police Department, an expert in taped interrogation,[29] has described taped interrogation in Minnesota as the “best thing ever rammed down our 22.2.3 Inquisition throats”.[30] Main article: Inquisition

22.5 See also • Covert interrogation • Interrogation of Saddam Hussein • Third degree (interrogation) • Water cure (torture)

22.6 References [1] J. D. Obenberger (October 1998). “Police Deception: The Law and the Skin Trade in the Windy City”. Inquisition torture chamber. Mémoires Historiques (1716)

[2] Perri, Frank S.; Lichtenwald, Terrance G. (2008). “The Arrogant Chameleons: Exposing Fraud Detection Homicide” (PDF). Forensic Examiner. All-aboutpsychology.com. pp. 26–33.

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[3] Perri, Frank S.; Lichtenwald, Terrance G. (2010). “The Last Frontier: Myths & The Female Psychopathic Killer” (PDF). Forensic Examiner. All-about-forensicpsychology.com. pp. 19:2, 50–67. [4] Kassin, Saul; Fong, Christina (1999). "'I'm Innocent!': Effects of Training on Judgments of Truth and Deception in the Interrogation room”. Law and Human Behavior 23 (5): 499–516. doi:10.1023/a:1022330011811.

CHAPTER 22. INTERROGATION

[25] 223A: Recording of Interviews of Suspects in Serious Crimes [26] Wisconsin Supreme Court rules that all custodial interrogations of juveniles must be recorded. (In the Interest of Jerrell C.J.) (05-3-25). at the Wayback Machine (archived August 20, 2010) Texas Juvenile Probation Commission. [27] New Rule 3:17 – Electronic Recordation. ciary.state.nj.us. Retrieved on 2011-03-04.

Judi-

[5] McCoy, Alfred (2007). A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation, from the Cold War to the War on Terror. Henry Holt & Co. pp. 16–17. ISBN 978-0-8050-8248-7.

[28] See Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 813 N.E.2d 516, 533–34 (Mass. 2004).

[6] (McCoy, a Question of Torture 2007, p. 16)

[29] Neil Nelson & Associates Home Page. Neilnelson.com. Retrieved on 2011-03-04.

[7] (McCoy, a Question of Torture 2007, p. 17) [8] (McCoy, a Question of Torture 2007, p. 11; 59) [9] (McCoy, a Question of Torture 2007, p. 59)

[30] Wagner, Dennis (December 6, 2005). “FBI’s policy drawing fire”. The Arizona Republic. Retrieved October 16, 2013.

[10] (McCoy, a Question of Torture 2007, pp. 18; 60–107) [11] (McCoy, a Question of Torture 2007, p. 11)

22.7 External links

[12] (McCoy, a Question of Torture 2007, pp. 99, 109–110)

• Interrogation techniques from GlobalSecurity.org

[13] Froomkin, Dan (7 November 2005). “Cheney’s Dark Side is Showing”. Washington Post. Retrieved 29 March 2012.

• Limits to Interrogation – The Man In The Snow White Cell, how Nguyen Tai resisted interrogation and torture for years.

[14] “Transcript of interview with CIA director Panetta”. MSNBC. 2011-05-03. Retrieved 2011-08-21. Enhanced interrogation has always been a kind of handy euphemism (for torture) [15] (McCoy, a Question of Torture 2007, p. 152) [16] (McCoy, a Question of Torture 2007, pp. 108, 117, 120– 123, 143–144) [17] “Report by the Senate Armed Services Committee on Detainee Treatment”. Documents.nytimes.com. Retrieved 2014-04-23. [18] Knowlton, Brian (April 21, 2009). “Report Gives New Detail on Approval of Brutal Techniques”. New York Times. (report linked to article) [19] Will, George (1/11/2013). “Facing up to what we did in interrogations”. Washington Post. Retrieved 12 January 2013. Check date values in: |date= (help) [20] “Obama: U.S. will not torture - politics - White House | NBC News”. MSNBC. 2009-01-09. Retrieved 2014-0423. [21] http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/16/us/politics/ 16holdercnd.html [22] New Jersey Courts. Judiciary.state.nj.us. Retrieved on 2011-03-04. [23] Electronic Recording of Interrogations, Center for Policy Alternatives [24] text of the new Illinois law (SB15) requiring electronic recording of custodial interrogations in murder case (The Illinois Criminal Justice Information Act) at the Wayback Machine (archived September 26, 2007)

• 'In the Box': Go Inside the Interrogation Room (See what tactics police use to extract confessions from suspects, solve crimes) from ABCNews.go.com

Chapter 23

Non-official cover In espionage, agents under non-official cover (NOC) are operatives who assume covert roles in organizations without ties to the government for which they work. Such agents or operatives are typically abbreviated in espionage lingo as a NOC (pronounced “knock”).[1] These agents are also known as “illegals”.[2] Non-official cover is contrasted with official cover, where an agent assumes a position at an otherwise benign department of their government, such as the diplomatic service. This provides the agent with official diplomatic immunity, thus protecting them from the steep punishments normally meted out to captured spies. Upon discovery of an official cover agent’s secret hostile role, the host nation often declares the agent persona non grata and orders them to leave the country.

official cover: the CIA, for example, has at times been prohibited from disguising agents as members of certain aid organizations, or as members of the clergy.

An agent sent to spy on a foreign country might, for instance, work as a businessperson, a worker for a nonprofit organization (such as a humanitarian group), or an academic. For example, the CIA's Ishmael Jones spent nearly two decades as a NOC.[3]

Michael Ross, a former Mossad officer, operated as a Mossad NOC or “combatant” as described in his memoir, The Volunteer: The Incredible True Story of an Israeli Spy on the Trail of International Terrorists, Skyhorse Publishing, September 2007, ISBN 978-1-60239-132-1.

Many of the agents memorialized without names or dates of service on the CIA Memorial Wall are assumed to have been killed or executed in a foreign country while serving as NOC agents. In nations with established and well-developed spy agencies, the majority of captured non-native NOC agents have, however, historically been repatriated through prisoner exchanges for other captured NOCs as a form of gentlemen’s agreement.

Chuck Barris made a satirical claim to have been a NOC with 33 kills. His story was recounted in the book and movie Confessions of a Dangerous Mind.

The degree of sophistication put into non-official cover stories varies considerably. Sometimes, an agent will simply be appointed to a position in a well-established company which can provide the appropriate opportunities. Other times, entire front companies can be established in order to provide false identities for agents. Examples include Air America, used by the CIA during the Vietnam War, and Brewster Jennings & Associates, used by the CIA in WMD investigations and made public as a result of the Plame affair.

The journalist Udo Ulfkotte made a statement, referring Agents under non-official cover do not have this “safety to his past career at the German newspaper Frankfurter net”, and if captured or charged they are subject to se- Allgemeine Zeitung, that he worked as a non-official [4] vere criminal punishments, up to and including execution. cover for the Central Intelligence Agency. Agents under non-official cover are also usually trained to deny any connection with their government, thus preserving plausible deniability, but also denying them any hope of diplomatic legal assistance or official acknowledgment of their service. Sometimes, entire front companies or 23.2 Examples strawman entities are established in order to provide false identities for agents. Nicholas Anderson is a real NOC who wrote an account of his service in a fictionalized autobiography (as per British law). The original non-fiction manuscript 23.1 History breached the UK Official Secrets Act in 2000 and appeared in a 100 banned books list published in 2003.

Fictional examples are featured in the books Confessions of a Dangerous Mind, Debt of Honor, Ted Bell's Pirate, and The Eleventh Commandment; in the movies Mission: Impossible, Spy Game, The Bourne Identity, Safe House, and The Recruit; and the TV shows The Americans, Burn Some countries have regulations regarding the use of non- Notice, Spooks and Covert Affairs. 125

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23.3 References [1] Shannon, Elaine (February 20, 1995). “Spies for the New Disorder”. Time. Time, Inc. Retrieved 2008-02-19. [2] Clandestine HUMINT operational techniques [3] John Weisman (September 7, 2010). “Tripping Over CIA’s Bureaucratic Hurdles”. Washington Times. Retrieved 2010-03-19. [4] “Dr Udo Ulfkotte, journalist and author, on RT”. September 29, 2014.

23.4 See also • Illegals Program • Secret identity

23.5 External links • nicholasanderson.info

CHAPTER 23. NON-OFFICIAL COVER

Chapter 24

Numbers station A numbers station is a type of shortwave radio station characterized by unusual broadcasts, reading out lists of numbers or incomprehensible morse code messages.[1] The voices are often created by speech synthesis and are transmitted in a wide variety of languages. The voices are usually female, although sometimes men’s or children’s voices are used. Some voices are synthesized and created by machines; however, some stations used to have live readers.[2] Many numbers stations went off the air due to the end of the Cold War in 1989, but many still operate and some have even continued operations but changed schedules and operators.

Kendall Myers with conspiracy to spy for Cuba and receiving and decoding messages broadcast from a numbers station operated by the Cuban Intelligence Directorate to further that conspiracy.[11][12]

The first known use of numbers stations was during World War I, and the first possible listener was Anton Habsburg of Austria.[3] The numbers were most likely sent through the use of Morse code. It is widely assumed that these broadcasts transmit covert messages to spies. The Czech Ministry of Interior and the Swedish Security Service have both acknowledged the use of numbers stations by Czechoslovakia for espionage,[4][5][6] with declassified documents proving the same. With a few exceptions,[7] no QSL responses have been received from numbers stations by shortwave listeners who sent reception reports to said stations, which is the expected behavior of a nonclandestine station.[8]

24.1 Suspected origins and use

It has been reported that the United States used numbers stations to communicate encoded information to persons in other countries.[10] There are also claims that State Department operated stations, such as KKN50 and KKN44, used to broadcast similar “numbers” messages or related traffic.[13][14]

According to the notes of The Conet Project,[15][16] which has compiled recordings of these transmissions, numbers stations have been reported since World War I. If accurate, this would count numbers stations among the earliest radio broadcasts.

It has long been speculated, and was argued in court in one case, that these stations operate as a simple and foolproof method for government agencies to communicate with spies working undercover.[17] According to this theory, the messages are encrypted with a one-time pad, to The best known of the numbers stations was the avoid any risk of decryption by the enemy. As evidence, "Lincolnshire Poacher", which is thought to have been numbers stations have changed details of their broadcasts or produced special, nonscheduled broadcasts coincident run by the British Secret Intelligence Service.[9] with extraordinary political events, such as the August In 2001, the United States tried the Cuban Five on the Coup of 1991 in the Soviet Union.[18] charge of spying for Cuba. That group had received and decoded messages that had been broadcast from Cuban Numbers stations are also acknowledged for espionage numbers stations.[10] Also in 2001, Ana Belen Montes, a purposes in Robert Wallace and H. Keith Melton's Spy[19] senior US Defense Intelligence Agency analyst, was ar- craft: rested and charged with espionage. The federal prosecutors alleged that Montes was able to communicate The one-way voice link (OWVL) dewith the Cuban Intelligence Directorate through encoded scribed a covert communications system that messages, with instructions being received through “entransmitted messages to an agent’s unmodicrypted shortwave transmissions from Cuba”. In 2006, fied shortwave radio using the high-frequency Carlos Alvarez and his wife, Elsa, were arrested and shortwave bands between 3 and 30 MHz at a charged with espionage. The U.S. District Court Florida predetermined time, date, and frequency constated that “defendants would receive assignments via tained in their communications plan. The shortwave radio transmissions”. transmissions were contained in a series of reIn June 2003, the United States similarly charged Walter

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peated random number sequences and could only be deciphered using the agent’s one-time

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CHAPTER 24. NUMBERS STATION pad. If proper tradecraft was practiced and instructions were precisely followed, an OWVL transmission was considered unbreakable. [...] As long as the agent’s cover could justify possessing a shortwave radio and he was not under technical surveillance, high-frequency OWVL was a secure and preferred system for the CIA during the Cold War.

Others speculate that some of these stations may be related to illegal drug smuggling operations.[20] Unlike government stations, smugglers’ stations would need to be lower powered and irregularly operated, to avoid location by triangulated direction finding. However, numbers stations have transmitted with impunity for decades, so they are generally presumed to be operated or sponsored by governments. Additionally, numbers station transmissions in the international shortwave bands typically transmit at high power levels that might be unavailable to ranches, farms, or plantations in isolated drug-growing regions. High frequency radio signals transmitted at relatively low power can travel around the world under ideal propagation conditions, which are affected by local RF noise levels, weather, season, and sunspots, and can then be received with a properly tuned antenna of adequate size, and a good receiver. However, spies often have to work only with available hand-held receivers, sometimes under difficult local conditions, and in all seasons and sunspot cycles.[10] Only very large transmitters, perhaps up to 500,000 watts, are guaranteed to get through to nearly any basement-dwelling spy, nearly any place on earth, nearly all of the time. Some governments may not need a numbers station with global coverage if they only send spies to nearby countries.

a CIA-operated transmitter in Western Europe. Penkovsky listened to these messages on a Panasonic radio—strings of numbers read in a dispassionate voice—and then decoded them using a one-time pad.

24.1.1 Identifying and locating Numbers stations are often given nicknames by enthusiasts, often reflecting some distinctive element of the station such as their interval signal. For example, the "Lincolnshire Poacher", formerly one of the best known numbers stations (generally thought to be run by SIS, as its transmissions have been traced to RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus), played the first two bars of the folk song "The Lincolnshire Poacher" before each string of numbers.[23] The “Atención” station was thought to be from Cuba, as a supposed error allowed Radio Havana Cuba to be carried on the frequency.[24] Several articles in the radio magazine Popular Communications published in the 1980s and early 1990s described hobbyists using portable radio direction-finding equipment to locate numbers stations in Florida and in the Warrenton, Virginia, areas of the United States. From the outside, they observed the station’s antenna inside a military facility, the Warrenton Training Center. The station hunter speculated that the antenna’s transmitter at the facility was connected by a telephone wire pair to a source of spoken numbers in the Washington, D.C., area. The author said the Federal Communications Commission would not comment on public inquiries about American territory numbers stations.

According to an internal Cold War era report of the Polish Ministry of Interior, numbers stations DCF37 (3370 A 1998 article in The Daily Telegraph quoted a kHz) and DFD21 (4010 kHz) transmitted from West [25] spokesperson for the Department of Trade and Indus- Germany since the early 1950s. try (the government department that, at that time, regulated radio broadcasting in the United Kingdom) as saying, “These [numbers stations] are what you suppose they 24.2 The Atención spy case eviare. People shouldn't be mystified by them. They are not dence for, shall we say, public consumption.”[21] On some stations, tones can be heard in the background. In such cases, the voice may simply be an aid to tuning to the correct frequency, with the actual coded message being sent by modulating the tones, using a technology such as burst transmission.

The “Atención” station of Cuba became the world’s first numbers station to be officially and publicly accused of transmitting to spies. It was the centerpiece of a United States federal court espionage trial following the arrest of the Wasp Network of Cuban spies in 1998. The U.S. The use of numbers stations as a method of espionage is prosecutors claimed the accused were writing down numdiscussed in Spycraft:[22] ber codes received from Atención, using Sony hand-held shortwave receivers, and typing the numbers into laptop computers to decode spying instructions. The FBI testiThe only item Penkovsky used that could fied that they had entered a spy’s apartment in 1995, and properly be called advanced tradecraft was copied the computer decryption program for the Atenhis 'agent-receive' communications through a ción numbers code. They used it to decode Atención spy one-way voice-link. These encoded messages, messages, which the prosecutors unveiled in court. known as OWVL, were broadcast over shortwave frequencies at predetermined times from

United States government evidence included the follow-

24.4. TRANSMISSION TECHNOLOGY

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ing three examples of decoded Atención messages.[10] (Not reported whether the original clear texts were in Spanish, although the phrasing of “Day of the Woman” would indicate so.):

usually either four or five digits or radio-alphabet letters. The groups are typically repeated, either by reading each group twice, or by repeating the entire message as a whole.

• “prioritize and continue to strengthen friendship with Joe and Dennis” [68 characters]

Some stations send more than one message during a transmission. In this case, some or all of the above process is repeated, with different contents.

• “Under no circumstances should [agents] German nor Castor fly with BTTR or another organization on days 24, 25, 26 and 27.” [112 characters] (BTTR is the anti-Castro airborne group Brothers to the Rescue)

Finally, after all the messages have been sent, the station will sign off in some characteristic fashion. Usually it will simply be some form of the word “end” in whatever language the station uses (e.g., “End of message; End of transmission”, “Ende”, “Fini”, “Final”, "конец"). Some stations, especially those thought to originate from • “Congratulate all the female comrades for Interna- the former Soviet Union, end with a series of zeros, tional Day of the Woman.” [71 characters] (Probably e.g., “00000” “000 000"; others end with music or other a simple greeting for International Women’s Day on sounds.[2] 8 March) Because of the secretive nature of the messages, the cryptographic function employed by particular stations is At the rate of one spoken number per character per secnot publicly known, except in one (or possibly two[26] ) ond, each of these sentences takes more than a minute to cases. It is assumed that most stations use a one-time pad transmit. that would make the contents of these number groups inThe moderator of an e-mail list for global numbers station distinguishable from randomly generated numbers or dighobbyists claimed, “Someone on the Spooks list had al- its. In one confirmed case, West Germany did use a oneready cracked the code for a repeated transmission [from time pad for numbers transmissions.[27] Havana to Miami] if it was received garbled.” Such codebreaking is possible if a one-time pad decoding key is used more than once.[10] If used properly, however, the 24.4 Transmission technology code cannot be broken.

24.3 Formats

Although few numbers stations have been tracked down by location, the technology used to transmit the numbers has historically been clear—stock shortwave transmitters using powers from 10 kW to 100 kW.

Generally, numbers stations follow a basic format, although there are many differences in details between sta- Amplitude modulated (AM) transmitters with tions. Transmissions usually begin on the hour or half- optionally–variable frequency, using class-C power output stages with plate modulation, are the workhorses hour. of international shortwave broadcasting, including The prelude, introduction, or call-up of a transmission numbers stations. (from which stations’ informal nicknames are often derived) includes some kind of identifier,[2] either for the Application of spectrum analysis to numbers station signals has revealed the presence of data bursts, RTTYstation itself and/or for the intended recipient. This can take the form of numeric or radio-alphabet “code modulated subcarriers, phase-shifted carriers, and other unusual transmitter modulations like polytones.[28] names” (e.g. “Charlie India Oscar”, “250 250 250”, “SixNiner-Zero-Oblique-Five-Four”), characteristic phrases (RTTY-modulated subcarriers were also present on commercial radio transmissions during the (e.g. "¡Atención!", “Achtung!", “Ready? Ready?", some U.S.[29] ) Cold War. “1234567890”), and sometimes musical or electronic sounds (e.g. “The Lincolnshire Poacher”, “Magnetic The frequently reported use of high tech modulations like Fields”). Sometimes, as in the case of the Israeli radio- data bursts, in combination or in sequence with spoken alphabet stations, the prelude can also signify the nature numbers, suggests varying transmissions for differing inor priority of the message to follow (e.g., [hypothetically] telligence operations.[30] “Charlie India Oscar-2”, indicating that no message fol- For spies in the field, low-tech spoken number translows). Often the prelude repeats for a period before the missions continue to have advantages in the 21st cenbody of the message begins. tury. High-tech data receiving equipment is difficult to After the prelude, there is usually an announcement of the number of number-groups in the message,[2] the page to be used from the one-time pad, or other pertinent information. The groups are then recited. Groups are

obtain,[31] and being caught with just a shortwave radio has a degree of plausible deniability that no spying is being conducted whereas possessing equipment more advanced than a civilian shortwave news radio would raise

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CHAPTER 24. NUMBERS STATION A BBC frequency, 7325 kHz, has also been used. This prompted a letter to the BBC from a listener in Andorra. She wrote to the World Service Waveguide programme complaining that her listening had been spoiled by a female voice reading out numbers in English and she asked the announcer what this interference was. The BBC presenter laughed at the suggestion of spy activity. He had consulted the experts at Bush House (BBC World Service headquarters) who declared that the voice was reading out nothing more sinister than snowfall figures for the ski-slopes near the listener’s home. With more research into this case, shortwave enthusiasts are fairly sure that this was a numbers station being broadcast on a random frequency.[32]

Speech/Morse generator

more eyebrows and would more quickly be construed as evidence of spying than something as harmlessly commonplace as an AM radio. Yet governments’ embassies, aircraft, and ships at sea are known to possess complex receiving equipment that could make regular use of encrypted data transmissions from the home country. These probably include charts and photos that require more transmitted data than can be sent efficiently using spoken numbers.

24.5.2 Attempted jamming of numbers stations

Numbers station transmissions have often been the target of intentional jamming attempts. Despite this targeting, many numbers stations continue to broadcast unhindered. Several theories exist that aid in explaining the inability to effectively jam the transmissions. With only a finite number of jamming transmitters available at any given time, it may be more efficient to block clandestine stations intended for a large audience rather than a message intended for a single person. Another theory is 24.5 Interfering with numbers sta- that there may be a "gentlemen’s agreement" in place; i.e., “We won't jam yours if you don't jam ours”. In addition, tions the haphazard nature of some stations, e.g., not having a fixed schedule or frequency, also makes jamming more 24.5.1 Documented instances of interfer- difficult because the broadcast may go undetected. Historical examples of jamming: ence to broadcasts The North Korean foreign language service Voice of Ko• The YHF being jammed by the mysterious “Chinese rea began to broadcast on the Lincolnshire Poacher’s forMusic Station”.[33] mer frequency, 11545 kHz, in 2006, possibly to deliberately interfere with its propagation. However, Lincolnshire Poacher is broadcasting not only on one, but 24.6 Classification on three different frequencies, of which the remaining two have not been interfered and the apparent target zone for the Lincolnshire Poacher signals originating in Cyprus Although many numbers stations have various nicknames was the Middle East, not the Far East which is covered by which usually describe some aspect of the station itself, these nicknames sometimes led to confusion among lisits sister station Cherry Ripe. teners, particularly when discussing stations with simOn 27 September 2006, amateur radio transmissions in ilar traits. M. Gauffman of the E.N.I.G.M.A. numthe 30 m band were affected by an English-language bers stations monitoring group[34] originally assigned a “Russian Man” numbers station at 17:40 UTC. code to each known station. Portions of the original The late “Havana Moon” reported in his own publica- E.N.I.G.M.A. group moved on to other interest in 2000 tion The Numbers Factsheet in October 1990 that “one and the classification of numbers stations was continparticularly dangerous station has been interfering with ued by the follow-on group ENIGMA 2000.[35] The docair to ground traffic on 6577 kHz, a frequency allocated ument containing the description of each station and to international aeronautical communications in the busy its code designation is called the “ENIGMA Control Caribbean sector”. “On at least one monitored transmis- List”,[36] currently in its 25th edition. This classification sion, the air traffic controller at ARINC moved the pilot scheme takes the form of a letter followed by a number to an alternate frequency as the numbers transmission was (or, in the case of some “X” stations, more numbers).[37] The letter indicates the language used by the station in totally blocking the frequency from effective use”.

24.8. REFERENCES IN MASS MEDIA question: • E indicates a station broadcasting in English. • G indicates a station broadcasting in German. • S indicates a station broadcasting in a Slavic language. • V indicates all other languages. • M is a station broadcasting in Morse code.

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24.8 References in mass media • American television series Fringe has an episode (season 3, episode 6) featuring a numbers station,[41] as do the series Scandal (season 2, episode 6), Covert Affairs (season 1, episode 2), Lost (season 1, episode 18) and The Americans (season 1, episode 8 and season 2, episode 2), along with the podcast Welcome to Night Vale (episode 6, “The Drawbridge” and episode 42, “Numbers”).

• X indicates all other transmissions such as polytones in addition to some unexplained broadcasts which may not actually be numbers stations.

• The band Wilco named its album Yankee Hotel Foxtrot (2001) after a segment of a recorded numbers station transmission. The recording is also sampled in the song “Poor Places” on the album.[42]

There are also a few other stations with a specific classification:[2]

• The British-American action thriller The Numbers Station, released in April 2013 and starring John Cusack and Malin Åkerman, features a CIA-run numbers station in the British countryside.[43]

• SK – Digital Mode • HM – Hybrid Mode • DP – Digital-Pseudo Polytone For example, the well known, defunct Lincolnshire Poacher station has the designation E3 (or E03), the Cuban “Atención” station has designation V2 (or V02). The most recent station to be given a designation is the Vietnamese language station V30. Some stations have also been stripped of their designation if they are discovered not to be a numbers station. This was the case for E22 which was discovered in 2005 to be test transmissions for All India Radio.

• In Treyarch and Activision's 2010 PC/console game Call of Duty: Black Ops, the primary character Alex Mason is captured and programmed to understand broadcasts from a Russian numbers station.[44] • The song 'Even Less’ by Porcupine Tree samples a real numbers station at the end of the track.[45]

24.9 See also • Secret broadcast • Letter beacon

24.7 Recordings • The Conet Project: Recordings of Shortwave Numbers Stations is a four-CD set of recordings of numbers stations. It was first released in 1997 by the Irdial-Discs record label. Broadcast of these recordings can be heard here:

• Yosemite Sam (shortwave) • UVB-76 • Warrenton Training Center

24.10 References

• Samples from Conet Project recordings, most idenNotes tifiably that listed as Tcp D1 3 Counting Control Irdial are used by Scottish electronic music outfit [1] Olivia Sorrel-Dejerine (16 April 2014). “The spooky Boards of Canada on their 2002 album Geogaddi, world of the 'numbers stations’". BBC News. most conspicuously on the track “Gyroscope”.[38] • Samples from the track “tcp d4 11 konec konec irdial” as well as “tcp d2 08 the russian man d-va northern russian voice irdial” are also used by American electronic music artist Flying Lotus on his 2008 album Los Angeles.[39] • Samples from the track “tcp d1 1 the swedish rhapsody irdial” are used by the Alternative Rock band Stereolab in the song “Pause” from their 1993 album Transient Random-Noise Bursts with Announcements.[40]

[2] “Intro to Numbers Stations”. Retrieved 13 September 2014. [3] “The First Numbers Stations”. The NSRIC. 30 November 2014. [4] “Lyssna på ett hemligt telegram”. http://www. sakerhetspolisen.se/ovrigt/pressrum/aktuellt/aktuellt/ 2015-01-23-lyssna-pa-ett-hemligt-telegram.html'' (in Swedish). Säkerhetspolisen. [5] “The Swedish Security Service Released Info on a Numbers Station”. Retrieved 24 January 2015.

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[6] Catinka Mannerfelt Agneskog. “Säpos hemliga radiotelegram” (in Swedish). SvD Nyheter. Retrieved 23 January 2015. [7] stations KKN44, BFBX and OLX Mason, Simon. “Shortwave Espionage”. Retrieved 28 October 2011. [8] Helms, Harry L. (1981). “Espionage Radio Activity”. How to Tune the Secret Shortwave Spectrum. Blue Ridge Summit, PA: TAB Books Inc. p. 52. ISBN 0830611851. [9] “E03 The LincolnShire Poacher”. Retrieved 6 September 2014. [10] Sokol, Brett (February 8, 2001). “Espionage Is in the Air”. Miami New Times. Archived from the original on 200102-21.

CHAPTER 24. NUMBERS STATION

[26] In the possible case, the underlying type of encryption might have been stated in the court record of the Atención case when the secretly copied decryption software was introduced into evidence. [27] See If It Had Not Been For 15 Minutes, Chapter 7 for a simplified explanation of decoding West German numbers messages without a computer. [28] Schimmel, Donald W. (1994). The Underground Frequency Guide: A Directory of Unusual, Illegal, and Covert Radio Communications (3 ed.). Solana Beach, California: High Text Publications, Inc. pp. 27–28. ISBN 1-87870717-5. [29] Collins, Barry W. (July 1997). “The day the U.S. Army invaded W4TLV”. QST 81: 48–49. ISSN 0033-4812.

[11] Rijmenants, Dirk (2013). “Cuban Agent Communications” (PDF). Cipher Machines & Cryptology (PDF). Retrieved 2013-12-30.

[30] “NSNL 15 – Voice stations”. Cvni.net. 1999-07-03. Retrieved 2010-08-26.

[12] “United States v. Walter Kendall Myers, United States District Court, District of Columbia, no. xxx.” (PDF). Retrieved 2010-08-26.

[31] Even a non-standard civilian shortwave radio can be difficult to obtain in a totalitarian state. See If It Had Not Been For 15 Minutes, chapter 6 for the problems of obtaining a numbers station receiving radio in East Germany during the Cold War.

[13] Helms, Harry L. (1981). “Government and Military Communications”. How to Tune the Secret Shortwave Spectrum. Blue Ridge Summit, PA: TAB Books Inc. p. 58. ISBN 0830611851. [14] Schimmel, Donald W. (1994). The Underground Frequency Guide: A Directory of Unusual, Illegal, and Covert Radio Communications (3 ed.). Solana Beach, California: High Text Publications, Inc. pp. 88–95. ISBN 1-87870717-5. [15] Segal, David (August 3, 2004). “The Shortwave And the Calling: For Akin Fernandez, Cryptic Messages Became Music To His Ears”. The Washington Post. p. C01. [16] Mason 1991, pp. 5–6

[32] “Secret Signals”. 2010-08-26.

Simonmason.karoo.net.

Retrieved

[33] “Chinese Music Station” (WINDOWS MEDIA AUDIO). Retrieved 2012-07-16. [34] “ENIGMA - The European Numbers Information Gathering and Monitoring Association”. The NSRIC. Retrieved February 24, 2015. [35] “ENIGMA 2000”. enigma2000/''.

http://www.apul64.dsl.pipex.com/

[36] http://www.apul64.dsl.pipex.com/enigma2000/docs/ ECL.pdf

[17] Wagner, Thomas (2004). “Chapter 6 “So here she was with a pillow over her head and over the radio..."". If It Had Not Been for Fifteen Minutes... a true account of espionage and hair-raising adventure. Retrieved 30 October 2013.

[37] Friesen, Christopher (2014). “Spy 'Numbers Stations’ still enthrall”. Radio World 38 (2): 14. ISSN 0274-8541.

[18] The Conet Project (included booklet), Irdial-Discs, p. 59.

[39] “Flying Lotus’s “Los Angeles"". Discogs. Retrieved 25 March 2014.

[19] Wallace & Melton 2008, p. 438 [20] “Secret Radio Frequencies” (TXT). Retrieved 2012-0716. [21] Pescovitz, David (1999-09-16). “Counting spies”. Salon. Retrieved 2012-07-16. [22] Wallace & Melton 2008, p. 37 [23] Mason 1991, pp. 20–21 [24] William Poundstone, Big Secrets, p. 197. [25] Bury, Jan (October 2007). “From the Archives: The U.S. and West German Agent Radio Ciphers”. Cryptologia 31 (4): 343–357. doi:10.1080/01611190701578104. ISSN 0161-1194.

[38] “Boards of Canada’s “Geogaddi"". Discogs. Retrieved 9 May 2012.

[40] “Stereolab’s “Transient Random-Noise Bursts with Announcements"". discogs. Retrieved 14 November 2014. [41] Murray, Noel. “6955kHz – Fringe”. AV Club. Retrieved October 1, 2012. [42] Wired, 23 June 2004: Wilco Pays Up for Spycasts Retrieved 2013-02-28 [43] Matador Pictures: The Numbers Station Retrieved 201302-28 [44] Blitter and Twisted, December 1, 2010 Retrieved 201401-22 [45] “Porcupine Tree - Community”. Retrieved February 4, 2015.

24.12. EXTERNAL LINKS Bibliography

133 • The Numbers Stations Research and Information Center

• Mason, Simon (1991). Secret Signals – The Euronumbers Mystery. Lake Geneva, WI: Tiare Publications. ISBN 0-936653-28-0. Retrieved 2013-1224.

• “The spooky world of the 'numbers stations’", from BBC News Magazine

• Wallace, Robert; Melton, H. Keith (2008). Spycraft: The Secret History of the CIA’s Spytechs, from Communism to al-Qaeda.

• Priyom website

24.11 Further reading • Havana Moon (1987). Uno, Dos, Cuatro – A Guide to the Numbers Stations (PDF). Lake Geneva, WI: Tiare Publications. ISBN 0-936653-06-X. Retrieved 2013-12-24. • Schimmel, Donald W. (1994). “1. Numbers Stations”. The Underground Frequency Guide: A Directory of Unusual, Illegal, and Covert Radio Communications (3rd ed.). Solana Beach, California: High Text Publications, Inc. pp. 1–28. ISBN 1878707-17-5. • Pierce, Langley (1994). Intercepting Numbers Stations. Perth, UK: Interproducts. ISBN 0-95197834-9. • Smolinski, Chris (February 1998). “Spy Numbers Stations – Have you heard them?". Popular Communications (Hicksville, NY: CQ Communications): 8–10. ISSN 0733-3315. • Beaumont, Paul (November 2012). “Numbers Stations — A Modern Perspective (Part 1)". Radio User (Poole, UK: PW Publishing Ltd): 50–53. ISSN 1748-8117. • Beaumont, Paul (January 2013). “Numbers Stations — A Modern Perspective (Part 2)". Radio User (Poole, UK: PW Publishing Ltd): 50–55. ISSN 1748-8117. • Bury, Jan (October 2007). “From the Archives: The U.S. and West German Agent Radio Ciphers”. Cryptologia 31 (4): 343–357. doi:10.1080/01611190701578104. ISSN 01611194. • Friesen, Christopher (2014-01-15). “Spy 'Numbers Stations’ still enthrall”. Radio World 38 (2): 12, 14. ISSN 0274-8541.

24.12 External links • ENIGMA website

• “Numbers stations in popular culture”

Chapter 25

Official cover In espionage, an official cover operative is one who assumes a position in an organization with diplomatic ties to the government for which the operative works. Official cover operatives are granted a set of governmental protections, and if caught in the act of espionage, they can request diplomatic protection from their government. In other words, official cover operatives are agents officially recognized by their country.

25.1 See also • Non-official cover

25.2 References • How the CIA Works - HowStuffWorks article on the Central Intelligence Agency explaining this term.

134

Chapter 26

One-way voice link A one-way voice link (OWVL) is typically a radio based communication method used by spy networks to communicate with agents in the field typically (but not exclusively) using shortwave radio frequencies.

26.2 See also

Shortwave frequencies were and are generally highly preferred for their long range, as a communications link of 1200 km is easily possible. VHF and UHF frequencies can be used for one-way voice circuits, but are generally not preferred as their range is at best 300 km (on flat terrain). Since the 1970s infrared point-to-point communication systems have been used that offer OWVLs, but the number of users was always limited. This communications system often employs recorders to transmit pre-recorded messages in real time or in burst transmissions, which minimize the time that a spy needs to be on the air. Voice-scrambling systems have been selectively used for this kind of communications circuit since the 1980s, based on operational needs. Since personal computers became cheap and readily available in the 2000s, time compressed voice scrambling for one-way and bi-directional circuits is a practically free technology. OWVLs have existed outside of espionage, for example the NICAM transmission system was modified in the UK to allow for an OWVL to BBC mobile units. This OWVL was typically used for sports events, as it was highly flexible.

26.1 Historical context During the mid- to late Cold War the STASI (the East German intelliegence agency) used point-to-point infrared technology for 2-way voice links within the divided city of Berlin. OWVLs were used intermittently. OWVL transmission methods were used during the Falklands War by UK elite forces to provide information about suitable troop landing areas. This fact emerged in the late 1980s when UK veterans of the war were writing their memoirs. Argentina had access to similar technology to communicate with its military, but did not really use it during this conflict. 135

• Numbers station

Chapter 27

Resident spy In espionage, a resident spy is an agent operating within a foreign country for extended periods of time. A base of operations within a foreign country which a resident spy may liaise with is known as a station in English and a rezidentura (residency) in Russian parlance;[1][2] accordingly, what the U.S. would call a station chief, the head spy, is known as a rezident in Russian.[1]

27.1 Types of resident spies In the former Soviet Union and Russian nomenclature, there are two types of resident spies: legal'nye rezidenty (легальные резиденты, legal resident spy) and nelegal'nye rezidenty (нелегальные резиденты, illegal resident spy).[1] In US parlance the same distinction is between official cover and non-official cover.[3]

resident spies.[5] A legal resident spy has the advantage of diplomatic status, but the disadvantage of being a known foreigner to the host country and one of just a few official diplomatic staff, whose intelligence status is thus easy for counterintelligence agencies to discern; whereas an illegal resident spy has the advantage of being unknown as a foreigner to the host country and one amongst millions of the country’s ordinary citizens, but the disadvantage of not having diplomatic immunity to fall back upon. A legal resident spy has opportunities to meet high-level personnel of the host country as part of his/her “official” business, whereas an illegal resident spy does not. But, conversely, illegal resident spies have easier access to a wide range of potential sources who would be put off by having to approach and deal with an openly foreign official, and indeed need not even reveal to those people what country he/she actually works for.[6]

Furthermore: An illegal resident spy can stay in the host country when diplomatic relations break down, whereas legal resident spies are forced to leave with the diplomatic mission. But a legal resident spy is easier to pay, since his/her salary can be openly incorporated into the diplomatic payroll, whereas making arrangements to pay illegal resident spies can be difficult, sometimes involving ruses, more expensive and complex to administer than paying a diplomatic official would be, such as paying a An illegal resident spy operates under a non-official cover; host country organization or corporation to allow the ilthus, he cannot claim immunity from prosecution when legal resident spy to pose as a member of its staff and be arrested. He may operate under a false name and has doc- nominally paid by that organization/corporation.[6] uments making him out to be an actual national or from A legal resident spy has full and aboveboard access to a different country than the one for which he is spying.[1] embassy facilities, for secure communications, meetings, Examples of such illegals include Rudolf Abel who opand other services; whereas an illegal resident spy has literated in the United States and Gordon Lonsdale who tle to no access to such facilities, and communications was born in Russia, claimed to be Canadian and operarrangements are thus more difficult and time consumated in Britain. Famous Soviet “illegals” include Richard ing. An illegal resident spy will usually have a falsified [4] Sorge, Walter Krivitsky, Alexander Ulanovsky, and biography; whereas a legal resident spy may suffer from Anna Chapman, who was also known as a sleeper agent. having an official biography, documenting his/her diplomatic career and providing useful clues to counterintelligence services about his/her intelligence activities and 27.2 Comparison of illegal and le- connections.[6] A legal resident spy operates in a foreign country under official cover (e.g. from his country’s embassy). He is an official member of the consular staff, such as a commercial, cultural or military attaché. Thus he has diplomatic immunity from prosecution and cannot be arrested by the host country if suspected of espionage. The most the host country can do is send him back to his home country as persona non grata.[3]

gal resident spies The advantages and disadvantages of legal resident spies mostly mirror the disadvantages and advantages of illegal

27.3 References

136

27.4. FURTHER READING

27.3.1

Cross-reference

[1] Meier 2010, p. 147. [2] Shulsky & Schmitt 2002, p. 182. [3] Shulsky & Schmitt 2002, p. 12. [4] Shulsky & Schmitt 2002, p. 14. [5] Shulsky & Schmitt 2002, p. 13. [6] Shulsky & Schmitt 2002, p. 12–13.

27.3.2

Sources used

• Meier, Andrew (2010). The Lost Spy. Hachette UK. ISBN 9780297856566. • Shulsky, Abram N.; Schmitt, Gary James (2002). Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence (3rd ed.). Potomac Books, Inc. ISBN 9781574883459.

27.4 Further reading • Andrew, Christopher M.; Gordievsky, Oleg (1991). “Illegals”. Comrade Kryuchkov’s Instructions: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations, 1975–1985. Stanford University Press. ISBN 9780804722285.

137

Chapter 28

Special reconnaissance Convention of 1907,[2] or the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949.[3] However, some countries do not honor these legal protections, as was the case with the Nazi "Commando Orders" of World War II, which were held to be illegal at the Nuremberg Trials.

This article is a subset article under Human Intelligence. For a complete hierarchical list of articles, see the intelligence cycle management hierarchy.

In intelligence terms, SR is a human intelligence (HUMINT) collection discipline. Its operational control is likely to be inside a compartmented cell of the HUMINT, or possibly the operations, staff functions. Since such personnel are trained for intelligence collection as well as other missions, they will usually maintain clandestine communications to the HUMINT organization, and will be systematically prepared for debriefing. They operate significantly farther than the furthest forward friendly scouting and surveillance units; they may be tens to hundreds of kilometers deeper.

US Navy SEALs conducting special reconnaissance on suspected Al-Qaida and Taliban locations in Afghanistan, 2002.

28.1 History

While SR has been a function of armies since ancient Special reconnaissance (SR) is conducted by small units times, specialized units with this task date from the leadof highly trained military personnel, usually from special up to World War II. forces units or military intelligence organizations, who In 1938, the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) and operate behind enemy lines, avoiding direct combat and the War Office both set up special reconnaissance departdetection by the enemy. As a role, SR is distinct from ments. These later formed the basis of the Special Opercommando operations, although both are often carried ations Executive (SOE), which conducted operations in out by the same units. The SR role frequently includes: occupied Europe. covert direction of air and missile attacks, in areas deep behind enemy lines, placement of remotely monitored During the Winter War (1939–40) and the Continuation War (1941–44), Finland employed several kaukopartio sensors and preparations for other special forces. Like other special forces, SR units may also carry out direct (long range patrol) units. action (DA) and unconventional warfare (UW), includ- From 1941, volunteers from various countries formed, ing guerrilla operations. under the auspices of the British Army, the Long Range SR was recognized as a key special operations capability Desert Group and Special Air Service, initially for service by a former US Secretary of Defense William J. Perry: in the North African Campaign. “Special Reconnaissance is the conduct of environmental reconnaissance, target acquisition, area assessment, poststrike assessment, emplacement and recovery of sensors, or support of Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) operations.”[1]

In 1942, following the onset of the Pacific War, the Allied Intelligence Bureau, was set up in Australia. Drawing on personnel from Australian, British, New Zealand and other Allied forces, it included Coastwatchers and “special units” that undertook reconnaissance behind enemy In international law, SR is not regarded as espionage lines. if personnel are in uniform, according to the Hague The US Government established the Office of Strategic 138

28.3. APPROPRIATE MISSIONS

139

Services (OSS), modelled on the British SOE, in June means of collecting technical intelligence, and usually at 1942. Following the end of the war OSS became the basis least one medical technician who can do more than basic for the CIA. first aid. During the Vietnam War, respective division and brigades in-country trained their Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol members (now known as the Long Range Surveillance units). However, the US Army’s 5th Special Forces Group held an advanced course in the art of patrolling for potential Army and Marine team leaders at their Recondo School in Nha Trang, Vietnam, for the purpose of locating enemy guerrilla and main force North Vietnamese Army units, as well as artillery spotting, intelligence gathering, forward air control, and bomb damage assessment.[4]

28.2 A spectrum of reconnaissance capabilities: LRS and SR Conventional military forces, at battalion level, will often have scout platoons that can perform limited reconnaissance beyond the main line of troops. For example, reorganized US Army brigade combat teams, the new US Army Unit of Action, are gaining reconnaissance squadrons (i.e., light battalion sized units). US Army Battlefield Surveillance Brigades (BfSB) have specialized Long Range Surveillance (LRS) companies.[5] Long Range Surveillance 6-man teams (LRS) operate behind enemy lines, deep within enemy territory, forward of battalion reconnaissance teams and cavalry scouts in their assigned area of interest. The duration of an LRS mission depends on equipment and supplies the team must carry, movement distance to the objective area, and resupply availability. LRS teams normally operate up to seven days without resupply depending on terrain and weather.

See Special Reconnaissance organizations for national units. All these organizations have special operations roles, with SR often by specialists within them. Certain organizations are tasked for response involving areas contaminated by chemicals, biological agents, or radioactivity. Since reconnaissance is a basic military skill, “special” reconnaissance refers to the means of operating in the desired area, and the nature of the mission. In US Army doctrine,[1][7] there are five basic factors: 1. Physical distances. The area of operations may be well beyond the forward line of troops, and require special skills to reach the area. 2. Political considerations. Clandestine insertion also may be a requirement. If there is a requirement to work with local personnel, language skills and political awareness may be critical. 3. Lack of required special skills and expertise. The most basic requirement for SR is to be able to remain unobserved, which may take special skills and equipment. If there is a requirement to collect intelligence, skills anywhere from advanced photography to remote sensor operation may be required. 4. Threat capabilities. This usually relates to the need to stay clandestine, potentially against an opposing force with sophisticated intelligence capabilities. Such capabilities may be organic to a force, or be available from a sponsoring third country. 5. Follow-on special forces missions. This is the concept of preparing for other functions, such as Unconventional Warfare (UW) (i.e., guerrilla) or Foreign Internal Defense (FID) (i.e., counterguerrilla) operations.

SR units are well armed, since they may have to defend themselves if they are detected as their exfiltration support needs time to get to them.[6] During the 1991 Gulf War, British SAS and United States Army and Air Force Special Operations Forces units were sent on SR to find mobile Iraqi SCUD launchers, originally to direct air strikes onto them. When air support was delayed, how- 28.3 Appropriate missions ever, the patrols might attack key SCUD system elements with their organic weapons and explosives. See The Great Special forces units that perform SR are usually polySCUD Hunt. valent, so SR missions may be intelligence gathering in [3] While there are obvious risks to doing so, SR-trained support of another function, such as counter-insurgency, units can operate out of uniform. They may use motor- foreign internal defense (FID), guerrilla/unconventional cycles, four-wheel-drive vehicles, or multiple helicopter warfare (UW), or direct action (DA). lifts in their area of operations, or have mountaineering or underwater capability. Most SR units are trained in advanced helicopter movement and at least basic parachuting; some SR will have HAHO and HALO advanced parachute capability.

Other missions may deal with locating targets and planning, guiding, and evaluating attacks against them.

Target analysis could go in either place. If air or missile strikes are delivered after the SR team leaves the AO, the SR aspect is intelligence, but if the strikes are to be deSR will have more organic support capabilities, including livered and possibly corrected and evaluated while the SR long-range communications, possibly SIGINT and other team is present, the SR mission is fires-related.

140

28.3.1

CHAPTER 28. SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE

Intelligence related missions

Every SR mission will collect intelligence, even incidentally. Before a mission, SR teams will usually study all available and relevant information on the area of operations (AO). On their mission, they then confirm, amplify, correct, or refute this information. Assessment, whether by clandestine SR or overt study teams, is a prerequisite for other special operations missions, such as UW or FID. DA or counter-terror (CT), usually implies clandestine SR.

Hydrographic, meteorological and geographic reconnaissance

IMINT Basic photography[7] and sketching is usually a skill for everyone performing SR missions. More advanced photographic technique may involve additional training or attaching specialists. Lightweight unmanned aerial vehicles with imagery and other intelligence collection capability are potentially useful for SR, since small UAVs have low observability. SR team members can be trained to use them, or specialists can be attached. The UAV may transmit what it sees, using one or more sensors, either to the SR team or a monitoring headquarters. Potential sensors include stabilized and highly magnified photography, low-light television, thermal imagers and imaging radar. Larger UAVs, which could be under the operational control of the SR team, could use additional sensors including portable acoustic and electro-optical systems.

Mission planners may not know if a given force can SIGINT (and EW) move over a specific route. These variables may be hydrographic, meteorological, and geographic. SR teams If there is a ground SIGINT requirement deep behind encan resolve trafficability or fordability, or locate obstacles emy lines, an appropriate technical detachment may be [7] or barriers. attached to the SR element. For SIGINT operations, the MASINT sensors exist for most of these requirements. basic augmentation to United States Marine Corps Force The SR team can emplace remotely operated weather in- Reconnaissance (Force Recon) is a 6-man detachment strumentation. Portable devices to determine the depth from a Radio Reconnaissance Platoon. There is a SIGand bottom characteristics of waters are readily available, INT platoon within the Intelligence Company of the new as commercial fishing equipment or more sophisticated Marine Special Operations Support Group.[8] devices for military naval operations. Army Special Forces have the Special Operations TeamRemote-viewing MASINT sensors to determine the traf- Alpha that can operate with a SF team, or independently. ficability of a beach are experimental. Sometimes, sim- This low-level collection team typically has four men.[9] ple observation or use of a penetrometer or weighted cone Their primary equipment is the AN/PRD-13 SOF SIGthat measures how deeply weights will sink into the sur- INT Manpack System (SSMS), with capabilities includface are needed. These however have to be done at the ing direction-finding capability from 2 MHz to 2 GHz, actual site. Beach measurements are often assigned to and monitoring from 1 to 1400 MHz. SOT-As also have naval SR units like the United States Navy SEALs or UK the abilities to exploit computer networks, and sophistiSpecial Boat Service. cated communications systems.[10] Beach and shallow water reconnaissance, immediately before an amphibious landing is direct support to the invasion, not SR. SR would determine if a given beach is suitable for any landing, well before the operational decision to invade.

The British 18 (UKSF) Signal Regiment provides SIGINT[11] personnel, including from the preexisting 264 (SAS) Signals Squadron and SBS Signals Squadron to provide specialist SIGINT, secure communications, and information technology augmentation to operational in There is a blurred line between SR and direct action in units. They may be operating in counterterror roles [12] Iraq in the joint UK/US TASK FORCE BLACK. support of amphibious operations, when an outlying island is captured, with the primary goal of using it as a If the unit needs to conduct offensive electronic warfare, surveillance base and for support functions. While the at- clandestinity requires that, at the very least, any ECM detack by elements of the 77th Infantry Division on Kerama vices be operated remotely, either by the SR force or, Retto before the main battle was a large scale operation preferably, by remote electronic warfare personnel after by SR standards, it is an early example. Operation Trudy the SR team leaves the area.[13] Jackson, the capture of an island in the mouth of the harbor before the Battle of Inchon by a joint CIA/military team led by Navy LT Eugene Clark, landed at Yonghung- MASINT and remote surveillance do is much more in the SR/DA realm. Clark apparently led numerous SR and DA operations during the Korean Passive MASINT sensors can be used tactically by the SR mission. SR personnel also may emplace unmanned War, some of which may still be classified.

28.3. APPROPRIATE MISSIONS MASINT sensors like seismic, magnetic, and other personnel and vehicle detectors for subsequent remote activation, so their data transmission does not interfere with clandestinity. Remote sensing is generally understood to have begun with US operations against the Laotian part of the Ho Chi Minh trail, in 1961. Under CIA direction, Lao nationals were trained to observe and photograph traffic on the Trail.[14] This produced quite limited results, and, in 1964, Project LEAPING LENA parachuted in teams of Vietnamese Montagnards led by Vietnamese Special Forces.

141 TECHINT Capture of enemy equipment for TECHINT analysis is a basic SR mission. Capture of enemy equipment for examination by TECHINT specialists may be a principal part of SR patrols and larger raids, such as the World War II Operation Biting raid on Saint-Jouin-Bruneval, France, to capture a German Würzburg radar. They also captured a German radar technician.

Not atypically for such operations, a technical specialist (radar engineer Flight Sergeant C.W.H. Cox) was atThe very limited results from LEAPING LENA led to tached to the SR unit. Sometimes technical specialists two changes. First, US-led SR teams, under Project without SR training have taken their first parachute jump DELTA sent in US-led teams. Second, these Army teams on TECHINT-oriented missions. worked closely with US Air Force Forward Air ConCox told them what to take, and what that could not trollers (FAC) which were enormously helpful in directbe moved to photograph. Cox had significant knowling US air attacks by high-speed fighter-bombers, BARedge of British radar, and conflicting reports say that the REL ROLL in northern Laos and Operation STEEL force was under orders to kill him rather than let him be TIGER. While the FACs immediately helped, air-ground captured.[18] This was suggested an after-the-action rucooperation improved significantly with the use of remor, as Cox was a technician, and the true radar expert mote geophysical MASINT sensors, although MASINT that could not be captured, Don Preist, stayed offshore had not yet been coined as a term.[15] but in communications with the raiders.[18] Preist also had The original sensors, a dim ancestor of today’s technolo- ELINT equipment to gain information on the radar. gies, started with air-delivered sensors under Operation Publicising this operation helped British morale but was Igloo White, such as air-delivered Acoubuoy and Spikepoor security. Had the force destroyed the site and re[16] buoy acoustic sensors. These cued monitoring aircraft, treated without any notice, the Germans might have suswhich sent the data to a processing center in Thailand, pected what technology had been compromised. So the from which target information was sent to the DELTA Germans fortified their radar sites, and the British, realteams. ising similar raids could target them, moved their radar Closer to today’s SR-emplaced sensors was the Mini- research center, TRE farther inland.[18] Seismic Intrusion Detector (MINISID). Unlike other senA mixture of SR, DA, and seizing opportunities charsors employed along the trail it was specifically designed acterized Operation Rooster 53, originally planned as a to be hand delivered and implanted. The MINISID mission to locate and disable a radar. It turned into an and its smaller version the MICROSID were personnel opportunity to capture the radar and, flying overloaded detection devices often used in combination with the helicopter, bring the entire radar back to the electronic magnetic intrusiondetector (MAGID). Combining senTECHINT analysts. The Sayeret Matkal reconnaissance sors in this way improved the ability of individual senunit was central to this Israeli mission. sors to detect targets and reduced false alarms. Today’s AN/GSQ-187 Improved Remote Battlefield Sensor System (I-REMBASS) is a passive acoustic sensor which Specific Data Collection with other MASINT sensors detects vehicles and humans on a battlefield,[17] multiple acoustic, seismic, and magSR teams may be assigned to observe and measure spenetic sensors combine modes to discriminate real targets. cific site or enemy facility information as done for tarIt will be routine for SR units both to emplace such sengeting, but in this case for ground operations rather than sors for regional monitoring by higher headquarters’ resuppression by fire. Regular ground forces, for example, mote sensing centers, but also as an improvement over might need a road and bridge surveyed to know whether tripwires and other improvised warnings for the patrol. heavy vehicles can cross it. The SR may be able help Passive acoustic sensors provide additional measure- with observation, photography, and other measurements. ments that can be compared with signatures and used to An engineering specialist, preferably from a special opcomplement other sensors. For example, a ground search erations organization may need to augment the team. radar may not be able to differentiate between a tank and SR commanders need to ensure such missions cannot be a truck moving at the same speed. Adding acoustic inforperformed by organic reconnaissance and other elements mation may quickly help differentiate them. of a maneuver force commander supported by the SR organization, as well as other supporting reconnaissance services such as IMINT. For example, during the Falklands War of 1982, UK

142 Special Air Service delivered using helicopters eight 4man patrols deep into enemy-held territory up to 20 miles (32 km) from their hide sites several weeks before the main conventional force landings. Each man carried equipment needed for up to 25 days due to resupply limitations (cf. the 7-day limits of conventional LRS patrols discussed above). These patrols surveyed major centers of enemy activity. The patrols reconnoitered Argentinian positions at night, and then due to the lack of cover moved to distant observation posts (OPs). Information gathered was relayed to the fleet by secure radio not impervious from SIGINT that could locate their OPs. No common understanding of the threat of Argentine direction finding existed, and different teams developed individual solutions. The value of the information and the stress on the SR teams were tremendous. Their activities helped the force, limited in its sensors, develop an accurate operational picture of the opposition.[7]

CHAPTER 28. SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE • Recognizability: Can the target be recognized clearly, by SR and attack forces, under the prevailing weather, light, and in its terrain? If there are critical points within the target, they also must be recognizable by the means of destruction used. Target acquisition There are some differences between the general and the SR process of target acquisition: conventional units identify targets that directly affects the performance of their mission, while SR target acquisition includes identifying enemy locations or resources of strategic significance with a much wider scope. Examples of difficult strategic targets included Ho Chi Minh trail infrastructures and logistic concentrations, and the Scud hunt during Operation Desert Storm.[19]

SR units detect, identify, and locate targets to be engaged by lethal or nonlethal attack systems under the control 28.3.2 Offensive missions of higher headquarters. SR also provides information on weather, obscuring factors such as terrain masking SR units can engage targets of opportunity, but current and camouflage, friendly or civilian presence in the target doctrine emphasizes avoiding direct engagement, con- area, and other information that will be needed in targetcentrating instead on directing air (e.g., GAPS as well as ing by independent attack systems. CAS), artillery, and other heavy fire support onto targets. The doctrine of bringing increasingly more accurate and During Operation Desert Storm, the US senior commanpotent firepower has however been evolving significantly ders, Colin Powell and Norman Schwarzkopf were opposed to using ground troops to search for Iraqi mosince the early days of Vietnam.[14] bile SCUD launchers. Under Israeli pressure to send SR units are trained in target analysis which combines its own SOF teams into western Iraq and the realizaboth engineer reconnaissance and special forces assess- tion that British SAS were already hunting SCUDs, US ment to identify targets for subsequent attack by fire Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney proposed using US support, conventional units, or special operations (i.e., SR teams as well as SAS.[20] The senior British offidirect action or unconventional warfare behind enemy cer of the Coalition, Peter de la Billière was himself a lines). They evaluate targets using the “CARVER” former SAS commander and well-disposed to use SAS. mnemonic:[19] While Schwarzkopf was known to generally oppose SOF, Cheney approved the use of US SOF to hunt for the • Criticality: How important, in a strategic context, launchers.[14] is the target? What effect will its destruction have British teams in the on other elements of the target system? Is it more On February 7, US SR teams joined [21] hunt for mobile Scud launchers. Open sources conimportant to have real-time surveillance of the target tain relatively little operational information about U.S. (e.g., a road junction) than its physical destruction? SOF activities in western Iraq. Some basic elements • Accessibility: Can an SR team reach or sense the have emerged, however. Operating at night, Air Force target, keep it under surveillance for the appropriate MH-53J Pave Low and Army MH-47E helicopters would time, and then exfiltrate after the target is struck? ferry SOF ground teams and their specially equipped four-wheel-drive vehicles from bases in Saudi Arabia to • Recuperability: When the target is destroyed by fire Iraq.[22] The SOF personnel would patrol during the night support or direct action, in the case of DA missions, and hide during the day. When targets were discovered, can the enemy repair, replace, or bypass it quickly Air Force Combat Control Teams with the ground forces using minimum resources? If so, it may not be a would communicate over secure radios to AWACS. viable target. • Vulnerability: do SR (including DA) and supporting Directing fire support units have the capability to destroy the target? • Effect: Beyond pure military effect what are the political, economic, legal, and psychological effects of destroying the target? How would the attack affect local civilians?

SR, going back to Vietnam, was far more potent when it directed external firepower onto the target rather than engaging it with its own weapons. Early coordination between SR and air support in Vietnam depended on vi-

28.3. APPROPRIATE MISSIONS

143

sual and voice communications, without any electronics to make the delivery precise. SR teams could throw colored smoke grenades as a visual reference, but they needed to be in dangerously close range to the enemy to do so. A slightly improved method involved their directing a Forward Air Controller aircraft to fire marking rockets onto the target, but the method was fraught with error.

from it he had been targeting. He passed the coordinates to a B-52 crew, who had no way of knowing it was the wrong position. They entered it as given, and the JDAM flew accurately and unfortunately onto its own controller’s position.[25]

In Vietnam, the support was usually aircraft-delivered, although in some cases the target might be in range of artillery. Today, the distance to which SR teams penetrate will usually be out of the range of artillery, but groundlaunched missiles might support them. In either case, directing any support relies on one of two basic guidance paradigms:

Ground-aided precision strike: initial experience

• Go-Onto-Target (GOT) for moving targets, • Go-Onto-Location-in-Space (GOLIS) for fixed targets For close air support, the assumption had been that rapidly changing tactical situations, including sudden changes in geometry between friendly forces and the target, GOT was assumed. If the attack was to be guided from the ground, the target would be directly illuminated with some equivalent way of putting a virtual “hit me here” indication on the target, such as a laser designator.

It had long been assumed that close air support needed direct target marking by a ground or air observer, typically with a laser. Another approach was to specify the target in relation to a beacon. SR had laser designator capability for the GOT model, but this required they stay in line of sight of the target possibly exposing themselves. Another model, more precise than the smoke grenade, was to place a radio or radar offset beacon near the target, but the SR troops still face the problem of precise angular and distance measurement from the beacon to the target. In the Afghanistan campaign of 2001, a new technique was adopted, only recently believed possible: ground-aided precision strike (GAPS).[25] To put GAPS in practice, MG Daniel Leaf, USAF Director of Operational Requirements for Air and Space Operations said, in 2002, “If you had offered the B-1 with JDAMs in direct support of ground forces as a solution 10 years ago, I would have laughed heartily because it’s not what we envisioned.” The JDAM’s principal guidance mechanism is inertial, with a GPS correction option: a GOLIS model.

Offset GOLIS A less preferred because it was much more error-prone alternative was to put a reference point on the ground that told the weapon “hit over there in relation to my position.” A smoke grenade for instance was a reference point, but imprecise from the air. Offset beacons work reasonably well for direct-fire helicopter and fixed-wing gunships (e.g., AC-130) and for “dumb” bomb drops by fighter-bombers. Offset is not as accurate as straight-line firing, but especially when night or weather effects limit visibility, it may be the only alternative. Offset beacons as well as passive reflectors can be used for radar attack, although it is not as accurate as radar. Gunships typically make multiple passes with the SR team air controller giving corrections by voice. Offset firing is not as accurate as direct mode of fire and are normally used in poor weather conditions with the ground commander or team leader calling misses and corrections to the aircraft. As a rule, the shorter the offset distance, the more accurate the weapon.[23] The early Afghanistan attempts still required voice coordination to give the bomber the coordinates.[24] This led to one “friendly fire” incident that killed three Special Forces soldiers and wounded 19 others. A controller had been using a hand-held GPS receiver, whose battery failed. On replacing the battery, the unit reinitialized to show the controller’s own position, not the offset

“CAS and GAPS operations do not care what color of airpower is delivering the weapons. Certain segments of the USAF wanted to break out the use of heavy bombers and term it “bomber CAS. However, at the joint CAS symposium held at Eglin, the Navy and Marine Corps were successful in not letting the Air Force call this by a different name. “If heavy bombers are supporting ground troops in the traditional CAS role, then a name change for that aspect is not needed. [What is being discussed, however, is a new mission:] “Precision firepower called in by TACPs on the ground [is] GAPS and [needs its own doctrine]. The situation in Afghanistan was unique; there was not a large-standing opposing army that was conducting maneuvers to bring firepower to bear against our forces... Airpower was the maneuvering element that was supported by the small fire support teams on the ground. The small ground units have been instrumental in calling in the precise air strikes [especially when Army Special Forces were augmented with Air Force combat controllers]. This emerging mission goes beyond the joint definition of CAS.[25]

144 At first, US Special Forces teams used COTS device, called the Viper, which combined off-the-shelf Leica Geosystems Viper laser rangefinder binoculars, with integral compass and inclinometer but no GPS, to triangulate targets in Afghanistan. The Viper is capable of a lasing distance from 25 meters to 4,000 meters. The unit runs off of a commercial camera battery.

CHAPTER 28. SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE damage.

Reducing friendly fire incidents The friendly fire incident caused by human factors failures in addition to battery replacement and reinitialization of the GPS (to not to the target location but that of the SR team) could have been avoided if someone on the bomber, on a comGeneral Chuck Horner, the joint air commander during mand & control aircraft, or at an operations center, had Desert Storm, likened it to giving infantrymen a “2000 full awareness of the situation. Situational awareness in pound hand grenade” (i.e., a 2000 pound JDAM guided this case means having positive confirmation of several bomb) from a long-range bomber loitering overhead.[26] key data: Enhanced GAPS In the Air Force GAPS doctrine, Army SR teams are augmented with Air Force combat controllers. While Army SR can call in support, air force combat controllers [improved accuracy] in calling in air strikes to reduce the enemy threat and minimize the ground resistance in the battle for the Balk Valley in northern Afghanistan. The Viper system, however, allowed communications between one team and only one aircraft. More advanced systems allow network-centric warfare that can send the optimal aircraft to the target, using linkages with the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS), especially the Link-16[27] variant that can send information to fighters and Army Enhanced Position-Location Reporting System (EPLRS) terminals. The current combined Modular Advance Reconnaissance System (MARS) combines the Viper laser rangefinder, GPS receiver, and appropriate computing and display. The terminal controller would then transmit the coordinates via voice radio to the aircraft. Systems that give better situation awareness are under development.

Basic fire support safety In fire support, the aircraft does not just need a position to destroy the target. In CAS operations there will always be friendly troops in near proximity to the enemy. In order to bomb the target without killing the friendlies, the aircrew must be in voice contact with the TACP who guides the aircraft to the correct target. In other words, it is not enough just to lase the target and pass the location to the aircrew while calling GAPS. The MARS equipment provided the location of the target and the terminal controller position on a moving map display to the aircraft would greatly benefit situational awareness. After a friendly fire incident, however, deficiencies in giving the bomber the precise location of the SR team became apparent.

1. Positions, and movement if any, of any friendly forces and civilians in the area 2. Positions, and movement if any, of the target 3. Means by which the TACP identified the target and the precision of those means, and positive verification of the TACP’s identity 4. A means of communicating with the TACP, and with the bomber if another center is controlling the attack 5. Location, course, and speed of all aircraft that could deliver the requested attack 6. Nature of the weapon requested, including its delivery precision Accurate situational awareness also requires minimizing human error in data entry. Inputting errors are fallibilities that can be removed from the system. US Air Force Chief of Staff John P. Jumper said data is best fed directly into a weapon and then merely confirmed by the human in the loop. Manual data entry, particularly in the cockpit, should be avoided wherever possible. A radar or other electronic beacon, separate from the targeting system, meets the first requirement. For example, the US is providing the SMP-1000 beacons to TACP teams. It weighs approximately one pound, and the B-52 radar can detect it from 90 miles away within 1000 feet of precision. Another system—the Grenadier beyond line-of-sight reporting and tracking (BRAT) -- provides more information than the simple beacon but is not man-portable. A smaller version, the minitransmitter—MTX—system is under development, and will not rely only on the bomber’s radar but have its own GPS receiver and radio transmitter to send grid location, speed, direction, and mission status of the aircraft and the TACP. Alternate developments also are underway.

To assist the bomber in identifying the target, the Air Force combat controller with the SR could lase prominent terrain features as well as the target.The aircrew could Poststrike reconnaissance watch their aircraft on a display as it flew to the correct target. Other possible applications of this electro-optical Poststrike reconnaissance is the distant or close visual, viewing system could include images of the post-strike photographic, and/or electronic surveillance of a specific

28.4. OPERATIONAL TECHNIQUES point or area of operational or strategic significance that has been attacked to measure results. SR units carry out these missions when no other capabilities, such as conventional ground forces, local scouts and aviation, UAVs and other systems under the control of higher headquarters, and national-level intelligence collection capabilities cannot obtain the needed information.

Doctrinal changes resulting from new weapons

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28.4.1 Infiltration Special reconnaissance teams, depending on training and resources, may enter the area of operations in many ways. They may stay behind, where the unit deliberately stays hidden in an area that is expected to be overrun by advancing enemy forces. They may infiltrate by foot, used when the enemy does not have full view of his own lines, such that skilled soldiers can move through their own front lines and, as a small unit, penetrate those of the enemy. Such movement is most often by night. They may have mechanical help on the ground, such as tactical four-wheel-drive vehicles (e.g., dune buggies or long-wheelbase Land Rovers) or motorcycles. The British Special Air Service pioneered in vehicle SR, going back to North Africa in World War II. In Desert Storm, US SR forces used medium and heavy helicopters to carry in vehicles for the Scud Hunt.

JDAM has brought a new dimension to the GAPS mission, requiring Rules of Engagement changes for unrestricted use.[25] Bombers and other aircraft can deliver the JDAM precisely on known coordinates through the weather, miles away from the target. The terminal controller will not have the delivering aircraft in sight. Different ROE that are flexible enough to support JDAM US Army Special Forces units working with the Afghan deliveries must be instituted to allow future use of this Northern Alliance did ride horses, and there may be other pack or riding animals capabilities. unique capability. The decision to fully develop which system is long over- SR units can move by air. They can use a variety of due. If GAPS is to mature, it requires a positive means helicopter techniques, using fast disembarking by rope, for identifying the friendly ground forces to the attack- ladder, or fast exit, at night. Alternatively, they can ing aircraft. A common system that allows the services parachute, typically by night, and using the HALO or to talk to one another is necessary. This is the only way HAHO jump technique so their airplane does not alert the enemy. to ensure reduction of friendly fire incidents. Appropriately trained and equipped SR personnel can come by sea. They can use boats across inland water or from a surface ship or even a helicopter-launched boat. Another option is underwater movement, by swimming or delivery vehicle, from a submarine or an offshore surface 28.4 Operational techniques ship. Some highly trained troops, such as United States Navy SEALs or British Special Boat Service or Indian Their mission is not to engage in direct combat. It may MARCOS may parachute into open water, go underwabe to observe and report, or it may include directing air ter, and swim to the target. or artillery attacks on enemy positions. If the latter is the case, the patrol still tries to stay covert; the idea is that the enemy obviously knows they are being attacked, but not 28.4.2 Support who is directing fire. While it is rare for a single man to do a special reconnaissance mission, it does happen. More commonly, the smallest unit is a two-man sniper team. Even though snipers teams’ basic mission is to shoot enemy personnel or equipment, they are skilled in concealment and observation, and can carry out pure reconnaissance missions of limited durations. The US Marine Corps often detaches sniper teams organic to combat units, to establish clandestine observation posts.

Units on short missions may carry all their own supplies, but, on longer missions, will need resupply. Typically, SR units are used to the area of operations, and are quite comfortable with local food if necessary. Because even the most secure radios can be detected and located—albeit by technical advanced airborne or spaceborne receivers—it is good practice to make transmissions as short and precise as possible. One way of shortening messages is to define a set of codes, typically two-letter, for various prearranged packages of equipment. Those starting with “A” might be for ammunition, “F” for food, and “M” for medical. Burst transmission is another radio security technique.

Marine Force Recon Greenside Operations are those in which combat is not expected. US Army Special Forces SR operations commonly are built around 12-man “A detachments” or 6-man “split A detachments” and US Army Long Range Surveillance Teams are 6-man teams. UK When long-range or long-duration patrols need resupply, Special Air Service operations build up from four-man a variety of techniques are used, all involving tradeoffs units. of security, resupply platform range and stealth, and the

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CHAPTER 28. SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE

type and amount of resupply needed. When the SR patrol is in an area where the enemy knows there might be some patrol activity, helicopters may make a number of quick touchdowns, all but one simply to mislead the enemy. If it is reasonably certain that the enemy knows some patrols are present, but not where, the helicopters may even make some touchdowns more likely to be observed, but leave boobytrapped supplies. They may need to have wounded personnel replaced, and sometimes evacuated. In some extreme situations, and depending strongly on the particular organization, wounded personnel who cannot travel may be killed by their own side, to avoid capture, with potential interrogation, perhaps under torture, and compromise of the special reconnaissance mission. Killing wounded personnel is described as a feature of Soviet and Russian Spetsnaz doctrine.[6] A variant described for US personnel was explained to a US forward air controller, by a MACV SOG officer, “If I decide that there’s no way we can effect your rescue [in Cambodia], I’ll order the gunships to fire at you to prevent the enemy from getting their hands on you. I can’t risk having any of the [recon] teams compromised if they take you alive.”[15]

28.4.3 Exfiltration Most of the same methods used to infiltrate may be used to exfiltrate. Stay-behind forces may wait until friendly forces arrive in their area. One of the more common means of exfiltration is by special operations helicopters. There are a number of techniques that do not require the helicopter to land, in which the SR team clips harnesses to ropes or rope ladders, and the helicopter flies away to an area where it is safe for them to come aboard. Small helicopters, such as the MH6, have benches outside the cabin, onto which trained soldiers can quickly jump and strap in.

28.5 SR CommunicationsElectronics Without modern military electronics, and occasionally civilian ones, modern SR is fundamentally different from special soldiers that took on such risky missions, but with unreliable communications and a constant danger of being located through them. Human-to-human electronics are not the only critical advance. Navigational systems such as GPS, with backups to them, have immense value. GPS tells the patrol its location, but laser rangefinders and other equipment can tell them the exact location of a target, which they can then send to a fire support unit. Strong encryption, electronic counter-countermeasures, and mechanisms, such as burst transmission to reduce the chance of being located all play a role. Current trends in secure communications, light and flexible enough for SR patrols to carry, are based on the evolving concept of software defined radio. The immensely flexible Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) is deployed with NATO special operations units, and can provide low-probability-of-intercept encrypted communications between ground units, from ground to aircraft, or from ground to satellite. It lets a SR team use the same radio to operate on several networks, also allowing a reduced number of spare radios. Some of the raiders on the Son Tay raid carried as many as five radios. JTRS closely integrates with target designators that plug into it, so that a separate radio is not required to communicate with precision-guided munition launchers. While unmanned aerial vehicles obviously involve more technologies than electronics, the availability of man-portable UAVs for launch by the patrol, as well as communications between the patrol and a high-performance UAV, may result in fundamentally new tactical doctrines.

US Marines from 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion practicing Special Purpose Insert and Extraction (SPIE), 2006.

Software defined radio, along with standard information exchange protocols such as JTIDS Link 16, are enabling appropriate communications and situation awareness, reducing the chance of fratricide, across multiple military services. The same basic electronic device[28] can be an

28.7. EXAMPLES Air Force Situation Awareness Data Link (SADL) device that communicates between aircraft doing close air support, but also can exchange mission data with Army Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS) equipment. Again, the same basic equipment interconnects EPLRS ground units.

147 • Canada: • Canadian Special Operations Regiment • Joint Task Force 2 • Denmark: • Jægerkorpset

28.6 Reporting during and after the mission The debriefing may be done by HUMINT officers of their own organization, who are most familiar with their information-gathering techniques. Information from SR patrols is likely to contribute to HUMINT collection, but, depending on the mission, may also contribute to IMINT, TECHINT, SIGINT, and MASINT Some of those techniques may be extremely sensitive and held on a needto-know basis within the special reconnaissance organization and the all-source intelligence cell. SR personnel generally report basic information, which may be expressed with the “SALUTE” mnemonic • Size • Activity • Location • Unit • Time • Equipment. They will provide map overlays, photography, and, when they have UAV/IMINT, SIGINT or MASINT augmentation, sensor data. SR troops, however, also are trained in much more advanced reporting, such as preparing multiple map overlays of targets, lines of communications, civilian and friendly concentrations, etc. They can do target analysis, and also graph various activities on a polar chart centered either on an arbitrary reference or on the principal target.

• Frømandskorpset • Sirius Patrol (two-man arctic patrols) • Special Support and Reconnaissance Company. • France: • 13th Parachute Dragoon Regiment • 2nd Foreign Parachute Regiment • Commando Parachute Group • India: • Para Commandos • MARCOS • Special Frontier Force • Garud Commando Force • Ghatak Force • Ireland: • Army Ranger Wing (ARW) • Directorate of Intelligence (G2) • Israeli: • Sayeret Matkal • Shaldag Unit • Shayetet 13 • Maglan. • New Zealand: • Special Air Service Group. • Poland: • GROM

28.7 Examples

• 1 Pułk Specjalny Komandosów. • Portugal:

Many countries have units with an official special reconnaissance role, including: • Australia: • Special Air Service Regiment. • Italy: • 185th Parachute Regiment special reconnaissance and target acquisition.

• Tropas de Operações Especiais (Special Operations Troops) • Precursores Aeroterrestres (Air-Land Pathfinders) • Destacamento de Ações Especiais (Naval Special Actions Detachment) • Russia: • 45th Detached Reconnaissance Regiment

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CHAPTER 28. SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE • Razvedchiki personnel/units within larger formations.

• Sri Lanka: • Sri Lanka Army Commando Regiment • Sri Lanka Army Special Forces Regiment • Special Boat Squadron (Sri Lanka) • Sri Lanka Air Force Regiment Special Force • Sweden: • Särskilda Operationsgruppen (Special Operations Task Group) • United Kingdom: • Special Air Service • Special Boat Service • Special Reconnaissance Regiment. • The Pathfinder Platoon • United States: • CIA Paramilitary Operations Teams • US Army Special Forces • 75th Ranger Regiment • US Army Long Range Surveillance Companies (LRS) • US Army Battlefield Surveillance Brigade (BfSB) • US Army Reconnaissance & Surveillance Squadron (R&S Squadrons) • US Army Regimental Reconnaissance Company (RRC, formerly RRD) • US Marine Corps Force Recon • US Marine Corps Special Operations Command • US Navy SEALs • US Army Special Missions Combat Applications Group (CAG), a/k/a Delta Force • United States Naval Special Warfare Development Group, a/k/a DEVGRU and SEAL Team 6

28.8 See also • HUMINT • Intelligence collection management • List of intelligence gathering disciplines • MASINT • Special Activities Division • SEAL Team Six

28.9 References [1] William J. Perry. “1996 Annual Defense Report, Chapter 22, Special Operations Forces”. Retrieved 2007-11-11. [2] “Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Article 29.”. International Red Cross. 18 October 1907. Retrieved 200711-11. [3] “Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949, Article 29.”. International Red Cross. Retrieved 2007-11-11. [4] Ankony, Robert C., Lurps: A Ranger’s Diary of Tet, Khe Sanh, A Shau, and Quang Tri, revised ed., Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Lanham, MD (2009) [5] Department of the Army. Field Manual 7-93 - LongRange Surveillance Unit Operations Reconnaissance and Surveillance Units. [6] Suvorov, Viktor (1990). SPETSNAZ: The Inside Story Of The Special Soviet Special Forces. Pocket. ISBN 0-67168917-7. [7] “Field Manual 31-20-5 - Special Reconnaissance Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces”. 7 March 1990. FM 31-20-5. Retrieved 2007-11-11. [8] “U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command(MARSOC)" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2007-12-16. Retrieved 2007-11-17. [9] “FM 3-05.102 Army Special Forces Intelligence” (PDF). July 2001. [10] L3/Linkabit Communications. “The AN/PRD-13 (V1) Man Portable Signal Intelligence System”. [11] “18 (UKSF) Signals Regiment”. Retrieved 2007-11-16. [12] “TASK FORCE BLACK”. Retrieved 2007-11-16. [13] Department of the Army (30 September 1991). “4: Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Support to Special Forces Group (Airborne)". FM 34-36: Special Operations Forces Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations. [14] Rosenau, William (2000). “Special Operations Forces and Elusive Enemy Ground Targets: Lessons from Vietnam and the Persian Gulf War. U.S. Air Ground Operations Against the Ho Chi Minh Trail, 1966-1972” (PDF). RAND Corporation. Retrieved 2007-11-11. [15] Haas, Michael E. (1997). “Apollo’s Warriors: US Air Force Special Operations during the Cold War” (PDF). Air University Press. Retrieved 2007-11-16. [16] John T. Correll (November 2004). “Igloo White” (– SCHOLAR SEARCH ). Air Force Magazine 87 (11). [17] CACI (9 April 2002). “AN/GSQ-187 Improved Remote Battlefield Sensor System (I-REMBASS)". Retrieved 2007-10-15.

28.10. EXTERNAL LINKS

[18] Paul, James. “Operation Biting, Bruneval, 27th/28th Feb. 1942”. Paul. Retrieved 2007-11-10. [19] Joint Chiefs of Staff (1993). “Joint Publication 3-05.5: Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning Procedures” (PDF). Retrieved 2007-11-13. [20] Gordon, Michael R.; Trainor, Bernard E. (1995). The Generals’ War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf. Little, Brown and Company. [21] Ripley, Tim. “Scud Hunting: Counter-force Operations against Theatre Ballistic Missiles” (PDF). Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, Lancaster University. Retrieved 2007-11-11. [22] Douglas C. Waller (1994). The Commandos: The Inside Story of America’s Secret Soldiers. Dell Publishing. [23] Army Command and General Staff College (9/00). “SOF Reference Manual”. Retrieved 2007-11-12. Check date values in: |date= (help) [24] Erwin, Sandra I. (April 2002). “Air Warfare Tactics Refined in Afghanistan: Planners, air crews fine-tuning targeting techniques and rules of engagement” (– SCHOLAR SEARCH ). National Defense Magazine. Retrieved 2007-11-11. [25] Theisen, Eric E. (2003). “Ground-Aided Precision Strike Heavy Bomber Activity in Operation Enduring Freedom”. Air University Press. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2012-02-02. Retrieved 2007-11-12. [26] Clancy, Tom; Horner, Chuck (2000). Every Man a Tiger. Berkley Trade. ISBN 0-425-17292-9. [27] “JTIDS - Link 16”. The Warfighter’s Encyclopedia. Naval Air Warfare Center. Retrieved 2007-11-11. [28] “Joint Combat ID through Situation Awareness”. Retrieved 2010-08-05.

28.10 External links • Long Range Surveillance: True test for ‘quiet professional’ • Eyes Behind the Lines: US Army Long-Range Reconnaissance and Surveillance Units • US Army Field Manual 7-93 Long Range Surveillance Unit Operations. (FM 7-93) • PDF downloadable version of the US Army’s Long Range Surveillance Unit Operations Field Manual. (FM 7-93) This manual provides doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures on how Long Range Surveillance Units perform combat operations as a part of the Army’s new Battlefield Surveillance Brigades. • LRSU: EYES OF THE COMMANDER by Staff Sergeants Brent W. Dick and Kevin M. Lydon

149 • “Riding With the Posse Part I” by Mike Gifford • International Special Training Center and NATO celebrate 30 years of teaching special forces (July 2, 2009) by Maj. Jennifer Johnson, 7th Army Joint Multinational Training Command Public Affairs

Chapter 29

Steganography 29.1 History

Not to be confused with Stenography. i Steganography (US /ˌstɛ.ɡʌnˈɔː.ɡrʌ.fi/, UK /ˌstɛɡ.ənˈɒɡ.rə.fi/) is the practice of concealing a file, message, image, or video within another file, message, image, or video. The word steganography combines the Ancient Greek words steganos (στεγανός), meaning “covered, concealed, or protected”, and graphein (γράφειν) meaning “writing”.

The first recorded use of the term was in 1499 by Johannes Trithemius in his Steganographia, a treatise on cryptography and steganography, disguised as a book on magic. Generally, the hidden messages appear to be (or be part of) something else: images, articles, shopping lists, or some other cover text. For example, the hidden message may be in invisible ink between the visible lines of a private letter. Some implementations of steganography that lack a shared secret are forms of security through obscurity, whereas key-dependent steganographic schemes adhere to Kerckhoffs’s principle.[1]

The first recorded uses of steganography can be traced back to 440 BC when Herodotus mentions two examples in his Histories.[3] Demaratus sent a warning about a forthcoming attack to Greece by writing it directly on the wooden backing of a wax tablet before applying its beeswax surface. Wax tablets were in common use then as reusable writing surfaces, sometimes used for shorthand. In his work Polygraphiae Johannes Trithemius developed his so-called "Ave-Maria-Cipher" that can hide information in a Latin praise of God. "Auctor Sapientissimus Conseruans Angelica Deferat Nobis Charitas Potentissimi Creatoris" for example contains the concealed word VICIPEDIA.[4]

29.2 Techniques 29.2.1 Physical

The advantage of steganography over cryptography alone is that the intended secret message does not attract atten- Steganography has been widely used, including in recent tion to itself as an object of scrutiny. Plainly visible en- historical times and the present day. Known examples crypted messages—no matter how unbreakable—arouse include: interest, and may in themselves be incriminating in countries where encryption is illegal.[2] Thus, whereas cryp• Hidden messages within wax tablet—in ancient tography is the practice of protecting the contents of a Greece, people wrote messages on wood and covmessage alone, steganography is concerned with concealered it with wax that bore an innocent covering mesing the fact that a secret message is being sent, as well as sage. concealing the contents of the message. Steganography includes the concealment of information within computer files. In digital steganography, electronic communications may include steganographic coding inside of a transport layer, such as a document file, image file, program or protocol. Media files are ideal for steganographic transmission because of their large size. For example, a sender might start with an innocuous image file and adjust the color of every 100th pixel to correspond to a letter in the alphabet, a change so subtle that someone not specifically looking for it is unlikely to notice it.

• Hidden messages on messenger’s body—also used in ancient Greece. Herodotus tells the story of a message tattooed on the shaved head of a slave of Histiaeus, hidden by the hair that afterwards grew over it, and exposed by shaving the head. The message allegedly carried a warning to Greece about Persian invasion plans. This method has obvious drawbacks, such as delayed transmission while waiting for the slave’s hair to grow, and restrictions on the number and size of messages that can be encoded on one person’s scalp. • During World War II, the French Resistance sent

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151

some messages written on the backs of couriers in 29.2.2 invisible ink.

Digital messages

• Hidden messages on paper written in secret inks, under other messages or on the blank parts of other messages • Messages written in Morse code on yarn and then knitted into a piece of clothing worn by a courier. • Messages written on envelopes in the area covered by postage stamps. • In the early days of the printing press, it was common to mix different typefaces on a printed page due to the printer not having enough copies of some letters in one typeface. Because of this, a message could be hidden using two (or more) different typefaces, such as normal or italic. • During and after World War II, espionage agents used photographically produced microdots to send information back and forth. Microdots were typically minute (less than the size of the period produced by a typewriter). World War II microdots were embedded in the paper and covered with an adhesive, such as collodion. This was reflective, and thus detectable by viewing against glancing light. Alternative techniques included inserting microdots into slits cut into the edge of post cards.

Image of a tree with a steganographically hidden image. The hidden image is revealed by removing all but the two least significant bits of each color component and a subsequent normalization. The hidden image is shown below.

• During WWII, Velvalee Dickinson, a spy for Japan in New York City, sent information to accommodation addresses in neutral South America. She was a dealer in dolls, and her letters discussed the quantity and type of doll to ship. The stegotext was the doll orders, while the concealed “plaintext” was itself encoded and gave information about ship movements, etc. Her case became somewhat famous and she became known as the Doll Woman. • Jeremiah Denton repeatedly blinked his eyes in Morse Code during the 1966 televised press conference that he was forced into as an American POW by his North Vietnamese captors, spelling out “TO-R-T-U-R-E”. This confirmed for the first time to the U.S. Military (naval intelligence) and Americans Image of a cat extracted from the tree image above. that the North Vietnamese were torturing American POWs. Modern steganography entered the world in 1985 with the • Cold War counter-propaganda. In 1968, crew mem- advent of personal computers being applied to classical [5] bers of the USS Pueblo intelligence ship held as pris- steganography problems. Development following that oners by North Korea, communicated in sign lan- was very slow, but has since taken off, going by the large guage during staged photo opportunities, informing number of steganography software available: the United States they were not defectors, but captives of the North Koreans. In other photos presented to the US, crew members gave "the finger" to the unsuspecting North Koreans, in an attempt to discredit photos that showed them smiling and comfortable.

• Concealing messages within the lowest bits of noisy images or sound files. • Concealing data within encrypted data or within random data. The message to conceal is encrypted, then

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CHAPTER 29. STEGANOGRAPHY used to overwrite part of a much larger block of encrypted data or a block of random data (an unbreakable cipher like the one-time pad generates ciphertexts that look perfectly random without the private key).

• Chaffing and winnowing. • Mimic functions convert one file to have the statistical profile of another. This can thwart statistical methods that help brute-force attacks identify the right solution in a ciphertext-only attack. • Concealed messages in tampered executable files, exploiting redundancy in the targeted instruction set. • Pictures embedded in video material (optionally played at slower or faster speed).

• Using hidden (control) characters, and redundant use of markup (e.g., empty bold, underline or italics) to embed information within HTML, which is visible by examining the document source. HTML pages can contain code for extra blank spaces and tabs at the end of lines, and colours, fonts and sizes, which are not visible when displayed. • Using non-printing Unicode characters ZeroWidth Joiner (ZWJ) and Zero-Width Non-Joiner (ZWNJ).[8] These characters are used for joining and disjoining letters in Arabic and Persian, but can be used in Roman alphabets for hiding information because they have no meaning in Roman alphabets: because they are “zero-width” they are not displayed. ZWJ and ZWNJ can represent “1” and “0”.

• Injecting imperceptible delays to packets sent over the network from the keyboard. Delays in key- Social steganography presses in some applications (telnet or remote desktop software) can mean a delay in packets, and the In communities with social or government taboos or censorship, people use cultural steganography—hiding mesdelays in the packets can be used to encode data. sages in idiom, pop culture references, and other messages they share publicly and assume are monitored. This • Changing the order of elements in a set. relies on social context to make the underlying messages • Content-Aware Steganography hides information in visible only to certain readers.[9][10] Examples include: the semantics a human user assigns to a datagram. These systems offer security against a nonhuman ad• Hiding a message in the title and context of a shared versary/warden. video or image • Blog-Steganography. Messages are fractionalized • Misspelling names or words that are popular in the and the (encrypted) pieces are added as comments media in a given week, to suggest an alternate meanof orphaned web-logs (or pin boards on social neting work platforms). In this case the selection of blogs is the symmetric key that sender and recipient are using; the carrier of the hidden message is the whole 29.2.3 Network blogosphere. All information hiding techniques that may be used to ex• Modifying the echo of a sound file (Echo change steganograms in telecommunication networks can Steganography).[6] be classified under the general term of network steganography. This nomenclature was originally introduced by • Steganography for audio signals.[7] Krzysztof Szczypiorski in 2003.[11] Contrary to typical • Image bit-plane complexity segmentation steganog- steganographic methods that use digital media (images, audio and video files) to hide data, network steganograraphy phy uses communication protocols’ control elements and • Including data in ignored sections of a file, such as their intrinsic functionality. As a result, such methods are after the logical end of the carrier file. harder to detect and eliminate.[12] Typical network steganography methods involve modification of the properties of a single network protocol. Such modification can be applied to the PDU (Protocol [13][14][15] to the time relations between the ex• Making text the same color as the background Data Unit), [16] [17] in word processor documents, e-mails, and forum changed PDUs, or both (hybrid methods). posts. Moreover, it is feasible to utilize the relation between two

Digital text

• Using Unicode characters that look like the standard ASCII character set. On most systems, there is no visual difference from ordinary text. Some systems may display the fonts differently, and the extra information would then be easily spotted, of course.

or more different network protocols to enable secret communication. These applications fall under the term interprotocol steganography.[18] Network steganography covers a broad spectrum of techniques, which include, among others:

29.4. COUNTERMEASURES AND DETECTION • Steganophony — the concealment of messages in Voice-over-IP conversations, e.g. the employment of delayed or corrupted packets that would normally be ignored by the receiver (this method is called LACK — Lost Audio Packets Steganography), or, alternatively, hiding information in unused header fields.[19]

153 up in software specifically, and are easily confused. These are most relevant to digital steganographic systems.

The payload is the data covertly communicated. The carrier is the signal, stream, or data file that hides the payload—which differs from the channel (which typically means the type of input, such as a JPEG image). The resulting signal, stream, or data file with the encoded payload is sometimes called the package, stego file, or covert • WLAN Steganography – transmission of message. The percentage of bytes, samples, or other sigsteganograms in Wireless Local Area Networks. A nal elements modified to encode the payload is called the practical example of WLAN Steganography is the encoding density, and is typically expressed as a number HICCUPS system (Hidden Communication System between 0 and 1. for Corrupted Networks)[20] In a set of files, those files considered likely to contain a payload are suspects. A suspect identified through some type of statistical analysis might be referred to as a can29.2.4 Printed didate. Digital steganography output may be in the form of printed documents. A message, the plaintext, may be first encrypted by traditional means, producing a ciphertext. Then, an innocuous covertext is modified in some way so 29.4 Countermeasures and detecas to contain the ciphertext, resulting in the stegotext. For tion example, the letter size, spacing, typeface, or other characteristics of a covertext can be manipulated to carry the hidden message. Only a recipient who knows the tech- Detecting physical steganography requires careful physinique used can recover the message and then decrypt it. cal examination—including the use of magnification, deFrancis Bacon developed Bacon’s cipher as such a tech- veloper chemicals and ultraviolet light. It is a timeconsuming process with obvious resource implications, nique. even in countries that employ large numbers of people The ciphertext produced by most digital steganography to spy on their fellow nationals. However, it is feasible methods, however, is not printable. Traditional digital to screen mail of certain suspected individuals or institumethods rely on perturbing noise in the channel file to tions, such as prisons or prisoner-of-war (POW) camps. hide the message, as such, the channel file must be transmitted to the recipient with no additional noise from the During World War II, prisoner of war camps gave pristransmission. Printing introduces much noise in the ci- oners specially treated paper that would reveal invisible phertext, generally rendering the message unrecoverable. ink. An article in the 24 June 1948 issue of Paper Trade There are techniques that address this limitation, one no- Journal by the Technical Director of the United States Government Printing Office, Morris S. Kantrowitz, detable example is ASCII Art Steganography.[21] scribes, in general terms, the development of this paper. They used three prototype papers named Sensicoat, Anilith, and Coatalith. These were for the man29.2.5 Using puzzles ufacture of post cards and stationery provided to GerThe art of concealing data in a puzzle can take advantage man prisoners of war in the US and Canada. If POWs of the degrees of freedom in stating the puzzle, using the tried to write a hidden message, the special paper renstarting information to encode a key within the puzzle / dered it visible. The U.S. granted at least two patents related to this technology—one to Kantrowitz, U.S. Patent puzzle image. 2,515,232, “Water-Detecting paper and Water-Detecting For instance, steganography using sudoku puzzles has as Coating Composition Therefor,” patented 18 July 1950, many keys as there are possible solutions of a sudoku and an earlier one, “Moisture-Sensitive Paper and the puzzle, which is 6.71×1021 . This is equivalent to around Manufacture Thereof”, U.S. Patent 2,445,586, patented 70 bits, making it much stronger than the DES method, 20 July 1948. A similar strategy is to issue prisoners with which uses a 56 bit key.[22] writing paper ruled with a water-soluble ink that runs in contact with water-based invisible ink. In computing, steganographically encoded package detection is called steganalysis. The simplest method to detect modified files, however, is to compare them to Discussions of steganography generally use terminology known originals. For example, to detect information beanalogous to (and consistent with) conventional radio and ing moved through the graphics on a website, an analyst communications technology. However, some terms show can maintain known-clean copies of these materials and

29.3 Additional terminology

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compare them against the current contents of the site. The differences, assuming the carrier is the same, comprise the payload. In general, using extremely high compression rate makes steganography difficult, but not impossible. Compression errors provide a hiding place for data—but high compression reduces the amount of data available to hold the payload, raising the encoding density, which facilitates easier detection (in extreme cases, even by casual observation).

29.5 Applications 29.5.1

electronics that digitize an analog signal suffer from several noise sources such as thermal noise, flicker noise, and shot noise. This noise provides enough variation in the captured digital information that it can be exploited as a noise cover for hidden data. In addition, lossy compression schemes (such as JPEG) always introduce some error into the decompressed data; it is possible to exploit this for steganographic use as well. Steganography can be used for digital watermarking, where a message (being simply an identifier) is hidden in an image so that its source can be tracked or verified (for example, Coded Anti-Piracy), or even just to identify an image (as in the EURion constellation).

Use in modern printers

Main article: Printer steganography

29.5.3 Alleged use by intelligence services

Some modern computer printers use steganography, including HP and Xerox brand color laser printers. These printers add tiny yellow dots to each page. The barelyvisible dots contain encoded printer serial numbers and date and time stamps.[23]

In 2010, the Federal Bureau of Investigation alleged that the Russian foreign intelligence service uses customized steganography software for embedding encrypted text messages inside image files for certain communications with “illegal agents” (agents under non-diplomatic cover) stationed abroad.[24]

29.5.2

29.5.4 Distributed steganography

Example from modern practice

The larger the cover message (in binary data, the number of bits) relative to the hidden message, the easier it is to hide the latter. For this reason, digital pictures (which contain large amounts of data) are used to hide messages on the Internet and on other communication media. It is not clear how commonly this actually is. For example: a 24-bit bitmap uses 8 bits to represent each of the three color values (red, green, and blue) at each pixel. The blue alone has 28 different levels of blue intensity. The difference between 11111111 and 11111110 in the value for blue intensity is likely to be undetectable by the human eye. Therefore, the least significant bit can be used more or less undetectably for something else other than color information. If this is repeated for the green and the red elements of each pixel as well, it is possible to encode one letter of ASCII text for every three pixels. Stated somewhat more formally, the objective for making steganographic encoding difficult to detect is to ensure that the changes to the carrier (the original signal) due to the injection of the payload (the signal to covertly embed) are visually (and ideally, statistically) negligible; that is to say, the changes are indistinguishable from the noise floor of the carrier. Any medium can be a carrier, but media with a large amount of redundant or compressible information are better suited. From an information theoretical point of view, this means that the channel must have more capacity than the “surface” signal requires; that is, there must be redundancy. For a digital image, this may be noise from the imaging element; for digital audio, it may be noise from recording techniques or amplification equipment. In general,

There are distributed steganography methods,[25] including methodologies that distribute the payload through multiple carrier files in diverse locations to make detection more difficult. For example, U.S. Patent 8,527,779 by cryptographer William Easttom (Chuck Easttom).

29.5.5 Online challenge The online mechanism Cicada 3301 incorporates steganography with cryptography and other solving techniques since 2012.[26]

29.6 See also 29.7 Citations [1] Fridrich, Jessica; M. Goljan and D. Soukal (2004). “Searching for the Stego Key” (PDF). Proc. SPIE, Electronic Imaging, Security, Steganography, and Watermarking of Multimedia Contents VI 5306: 70–82. Retrieved 23 January 2014. [2] Pahati, OJ (2001-11-29). “Confounding Carnivore: How to Protect Your Online Privacy”. AlterNet. Archived from the original on 2007-07-16. Retrieved 2008-09-02. [3] Petitcolas, FAP; Anderson RJ; Kuhn MG (1999). “Information Hiding: A survey” (PDF). Proceedings of the IEEE (special issue) 87 (7): 1062–78. doi:10.1109/5.771065. Retrieved 2008-09-02.

29.8. REFERENCES

[4] Trimenius “Polygraphiae (cf. p. 71f)". Digitale Sammlungen. Retrieved 2012-02-21. [5] The origin of Modern Steganography [6] Echo Data Hiding [7] Secure Steganography for Audio Signals [8] Akbas E. Ali (2010). “A New Text Steganography Method By Using Non-Printing Unicode Characters” (PDF). Eng. & Tech. Journal 28 (1). [9] Social Steganogrphy: how teens smuggle meaning past the authority figures in their lives, Boing Boing, May 22, 2013. Retrieved June 7, 2014. [10] Social Steganography, Scenario Magazine, 2013. [11] Krzysztof Szczypiorski (4 November 2003). “Steganography in TCP/IP Networks. State of the Art and a Proposal of a New System - HICCUPS” (PDF). Institute of Telecommunications Seminar. Retrieved 17 June 2010. [12] Patrick Philippe Meier (5 June 2009). “Steganography 2.0: Digital Resistance against Repressive Regimes”. irevolution.wordpress.com. Retrieved 17 June 2010. [13] Craig Rowland (May 1997). “Covert Channels in the TCP/IP Suite”. First Monday Journal. Retrieved 16 June 2010. [14] Steven J. Murdoch and Stephen Lewis (2005). “Embedding Covert Channels into TCP/IP” (PDF). Information Hiding Workshop. Retrieved 16 June 2010. [15] Kamran Ahsan and Deepa Kundur (December 2002). “Practical Data Hiding in TCP/IP” (PDF). ACM Wksp. Multimedia Security. Retrieved 16 June 2010. [16] Kundur D. and Ahsan K. (April 2003). “Practical Internet Steganography: Data Hiding in IP” (PDF). Texas Wksp. Security of Information Systems. Retrieved 16 June 2010. [17] Wojciech Mazurczyk and Krzysztof Szczypiorski (November 2008). “Steganography of VoIP Streams” (PDF). Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS) 5332, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, Proc. of The 3rd International Symposium on Information Security (IS'08), Monterrey, Mexico. Retrieved 16 June 2010. [18] Bartosz Jankowski, Wojciech Mazurczyk, and Krzysztof Szczypiorski (11 May 2010). “Information Hiding Using Improper Frame Padding”. arXiv:1005.1925 [cs.CR]. [19] Józef Lubacz, Wojciech Mazurczyk, Krzysztof Szczypiorski (February 2010). “Vice Over IP: The VoIP Steganography Threat”. IEEE Spectrum. Retrieved 11 February 2010. [20] Krzysztof Szczypiorski (October 2003). “HICCUPS: Hidden Communication System for Corrupted Networks” (PDF). In Proc. of: The Tenth International MultiConference on Advanced Computer Systems ACS'2003, pp. 31-40. Retrieved 11 February 2010. [21] Vincent Chu. “ASCII Art Steganography”.

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[22] B.r., Roshan Shetty; J., Rohith; V., Mukund; Honwade, Rohan; Rangaswamy, Shanta (2009). “Steganography Using Sudoku Puzzle”. pp. 623–626. doi:10.1109/ARTCom.2009.116. [23] “Secret Code in Color Printers Lets Government Track You; Tiny Dots Show Where and When You Made Your Print”. Electronic Frontier Foundation. 16 October 2005. [24] “Criminal complaint by Special Agent Ricci against alleged Russian agents” (PDF). United States Department of Justice. [25] “Distributed Steganography”. IEEE. October 2011. [26] Jane Wakefield (9 January 2014). “Cicada 3301: The dark net treasure trail reopens”. BBC News. Retrieved 11 January 2014.

29.8 References • Wayner, Peter (2002). Disappearing cryptography: information hiding: steganography & watermarking. Amsterdam: MK/Morgan Kaufmann Publishers. ISBN 1-558-60769-2. • Wayner, Peter (2009). Disappearing cryptography 3rd Edition: information hiding: steganography & watermarking. Amsterdam: MK/Morgan Kaufmann Publishers. ISBN 978-0-123-74479-1. • Petitcolas, Fabien A.P.; Katzenbeisser, Stefan (2000). Information Hiding Techniques for Steganography and Digital Watermarking. Artech House Publishers. ISBN 1-580-53035-4. • Johnson, Neil; Duric, Zoran; Jajodia, Sushil (2001). Information hiding: steganography and watermarking: attacks and countermeasures. Springer. ISBN 978-0-792-37204-2.

29.9 External links • Steganography at DMOZ • Examples showing images hidden in other images • Information Hiding: Steganography & Digital Watermarking. Papers and information about steganography and steganalysis research from 1995 to the present. Includes Steganography Software Wiki list. Dr. Neil F. Johnson. • Detecting Steganographic Content on the Internet. 2002 paper by Niels Provos and Peter Honeyman published in Proceedings of the Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (San Diego, CA, February 6–8, 2002). NDSS 2002. Internet Society, Washington, D.C.

156 • Covert Channels in the TCP/IP Suite—1996 paper by Craig Rowland detailing the hiding of data in TCP/IP packets. • Network Steganography Centre Tutorials. Howto articles on the subject of network steganography (Wireless LANs, VoIP - Steganophony, TCP/IP protocols and mechanisms, Steganographic Router, Inter-protocol steganography). By Krzysztof Szczypiorski and Wojciech Mazurczyk from Network Security Group. • Invitation to BPCS-Steganography. • Steganography by Michael T. Raggo, DefCon 12 (1 August 2004) • File Format Extension Through Steganography by Blake W. Ford and Khosrow Kaikhah • Computer steganography. Theory and practice with Mathcad (Rus) 2006 paper by Konakhovich G. F., Puzyrenko A. Yu. published in MK-Press Kyiv, Ukraine

CHAPTER 29. STEGANOGRAPHY

Chapter 30

Surveillance This article is about observing people’s actions and communications. For the article about monitoring the spread of diseases, see disease surveillance. For other uses, see Surveillance (disambiguation). “Electronic surveillance” redirects here. For surveillance of electronic computer systems, see Computer surveillance. Surveillance (/sərˈveɪ.əns/ or /sərˈveɪləns/)[1] is the

Surveillance is often a violation of privacy, and is opposed by various civil liberties groups and activists.[7][8] Liberal democracies have laws which restrict domestic government and private use of surveillance, usually limiting it to circumstances where public safety is at risk. Authoritarian government seldom have any domestic restrictions; and international espionage is common among all types of countries.

30.1 Types 30.1.1 Computer

A 'nest' of surveillance cameras

monitoring of the behavior, activities, or other changing information, usually of people for the purpose of influencing, managing, directing, or protecting them.[2] This can include observation from a distance by means of electronic equipment (such as CCTV cameras),[3] or interception of electronically transmitted information (such as Internet traffic or phone calls); and it can include simple, relatively no- or low-technology methods such as human intelligence agents and postal interception. The word surveillance comes from a French phrase for “watching Official seal of the Information Awareness Office -- a U.S. agency over” (“sur” means “from above” and “veiller” means “to which developed technologies for mass surveillance watch”), and is in contrast to more recent developments such as sousveillance.[4][5][6] Main article: Computer surveillance Surveillance is used by governments for intelligence gathering, the prevention of crime, the protection of a process, person, group or object, or for the investigation of crime. It is also used by criminal organizations to plan and commit crimes such as robbery and kidnapping, by businesses to gather intelligence, and by private investigators.

The vast majority of computer surveillance involves the monitoring of data and traffic on the Internet.[9] In the United States for example, under the Communications Assistance For Law Enforcement Act, all phone calls and broadband Internet traffic (emails, web traffic, instant messaging, etc.) are required to be available for unim-

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peded real-time monitoring by Federal law enforcement companies such as Verint, and Narus, which search for agencies.[10][11][12] certain words or phrases, to decide whether to dedicate a [22] There is far too much data on the Internet for human in- human agent to the call. vestigators to manually search through all of it. So automated Internet surveillance computers sift through the vast amount of intercepted Internet traffic and identify and report to human investigators traffic considered interesting by using certain “trigger” words or phrases, visiting certain types of web sites, or communicating via email or chat with suspicious individuals or groups.[13] Billions of dollars per year are spent, by agencies such as the Information Awareness Office, NSA, and the FBI, to develop, purchase, implement, and operate systems such as Carnivore, NarusInsight, and ECHELON to intercept and analyze all of this data, and extract only the information which is useful to law enforcement and intelligence agencies.[14] Computers can be a surveillance target because of the personal data stored on them. If someone is able to install software, such as the FBI’s Magic Lantern and CIPAV, on a computer system, they can easily gain unauthorized access to this data. Such software could be installed physically or remotely.[15] Another form of computer surveillance, known as van Eck phreaking, involves reading electromagnetic emanations from computing devices in order to extract data from them at distances of hundreds of meters.[16][17] The NSA runs a database known as “Pinwale”, which stores and indexes large numbers of emails of both American citizens and foreigners.[18][19]

30.1.2

Telephones

Main articles: Phone surveillance and Lawful interception The official and unofficial tapping of telephone lines is widespread. In the United States for instance, the Communications Assistance For Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) requires that all telephone and VoIP communications be available for real-time wiretapping by Federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies.[10][11][12] Two major telecommunications companies in the U.S.— AT&T Inc. and Verizon—have contracts with the FBI, requiring them to keep their phone call records easily searchable and accessible for Federal agencies, in return for $1.8 million per year.[20] Between 2003 and 2005, the FBI sent out more than 140,000 "National Security Letters" ordering phone companies to hand over information about their customers’ calling and Internet histories. About half of these letters requested information on U.S. citizens.[21] Human agents are not required to monitor most calls. Speech-to-text software creates machine-readable text from intercepted audio, which is then processed by automated call-analysis programs, such as those developed by agencies such as the Information Awareness Office, or

Law enforcement and intelligence services in the United Kingdom and the United States possess technology to activate the microphones in cell phones remotely, by accessing phones’ diagnostic or maintenance features in order to listen to conversations that take place near the person who holds the phone.[23][24][25][26][27][28] Mobile phones are also commonly used to collect location data. The geographical location of a mobile phone (and thus the person carrying it) can be determined easily even when the phone is not being used, using a technique known as multilateration to calculate the differences in time for a signal to travel from the cell phone to each of several cell towers near the owner of the phone.[29][30] The legality of such techniques has been questioned in the United States, in particular whether a court warrant is required.[31] Records for one carrier alone (Sprint), showed that in a given year federal law enforcement agencies requested customer location data 8 million times.[32] In response to customers’ privacy concerns in the post Edward Snowden era, Apple’s iPhone 6 has been designed to disrupt investigative wiretapping efforts. The phone encrypts e-mails, contacts, and photos with a code generated by a complex mathematical algorithm that is unique to an individual phone, and is inaccessible to Apple.[33] The encryption feature on the iPhone 6 has drawn criticism from FBI director James B. Comey and other law enforcement officials since even lawful requests to access user content on the iPhone 6 will result in Apple supplying “gibberish” data that requires law enforcement personnel to either break the code themselves or to get the code from the phone’s owner.[33] Because the Snowden leaks demonstrated that American agencies can access phones anywhere in the world, privacy concerns in countries with growing markets for smart phones have intensified, providing a strong incentive for companies like Apple to address those concerns in order to secure their position in the global market.[33] Although the CALEA requires telecommunication companies to build into their systems the ability to carry out a lawful wiretap, the law has not been updated to address the issue of smart phones and requests for access to e-mails and metadata.[34] The Snowden leaks show that the NSA has been taking advantage of this ambiguity in the law by collecting metadata on “at least hundreds of millions” of “incidental” targets from around the world.[34] The NSA uses an analytic tool known as COTRAVELLER in order to track people whose movements intersect and to find any hidden connections with persons of interest.[34] The Snowden leaks have also revealed that the British Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) can access information collected by the NSA on American citizens. Once the data has been collected, the GCHQ

30.1. TYPES

159

can hold on to it for up to two years. The deadline can be In the United States, the Department of Homeland Seextended with the permission of a “senior UK official”.[35] curity awards billions of dollars per year in Homeland Security grants for local, state, and federal agencies to install modern video surveillance equipment. For exam30.1.3 Cameras ple, the city of Chicago, Illinois, recently used a $5.1 million Homeland Security grant to install an additional Main article: Closed-circuit television 250 surveillance cameras, and connect them to a cenSurveillance cameras are video cameras used for the pur- tralized monitoring center, along with its preexisting network of over 2000 cameras, in a program known as Operation Virtual Shield. Speaking in 2009, Chicago Mayor Richard Daley announced that Chicago would have a surveillance camera on every street corner by the year 2016.[36][37]

A surveillance camera in Cairns, Queensland

Surveillance cameras such as these are installed by the millions in many countries, and are nowadays monitored by automated computer programs instead of humans.

pose of observing an area. They are often connected to a recording device or IP network, and may be watched by a security guard or law enforcement officer. Cameras and recording equipment used to be relatively expensive and required human personnel to monitor camera footage, but analysis of footage has been made easier by automated software that organizes digital video footage into a searchable database, and by video analysis software (such as VIRAT and HumanID). The amount of footage is also drastically reduced by motion sensors which only record when motion is detected. With cheaper production techniques, surveillance cameras are simple and inexpensive enough to be used in home security systems, and for everyday surveillance.

In the United Kingdom, the vast majority of video surveillance cameras are not operated by government bodies, but by private individuals or companies, especially to monitor the interiors of shops and businesses. According to 2011 Freedom of Information Act requests, the total number of local government operated CCTV cameras was around 52,000 over the entirety of the UK.[38] The prevalence of video surveillance in the UK is often overstated due to unreliable estimates being requoted;[39] for example one report in 2002 extrapolated from a very small sample to estimate the number of cameras in the UK at 4.2 million (of which 500,000 in London).[40] More reliable estimates put the number of private and local government operated cameras in the United Kingdom at around 1.85 million in 2011.[41][42] As part of China’s Golden Shield Project, several U.S. corporations, including IBM, General Electric, and Honeywell, have been working closely with the Chinese government to install millions of surveillance cameras throughout China, along with advanced video analytics and facial recognition software, which will identify and track individuals everywhere they go. They will be connected to a centralized database and monitoring station, which will, upon completion of the project, contain a picture of the face of every person in China: over 1.3 billion people.[43] Lin Jiang Huai, the head of China’s “Information Security Technology” office (which is in charge of the project), credits the surveillance systems in the United States and the U.K. as the inspiration for what he is doing with the Golden Shield project.[43] The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is funding a research project called Combat Zones That See that will link up cameras across a city to a centralized monitoring station, identify and track individuals and vehicles as they move through the city, and report “suspicious” activity (such as waving arms, looking side-to-side, standing in a group, etc.).[44] At Super Bowl XXXV in January 2001, police in Tampa, Florida, used Identix’s facial recognition software, FaceIt, to scan the crowd for potential criminals and terrorists in attendance at the event [45] (it found 19 people with pending arrest warrants).[46] Governments often[47] initially claim that cameras are

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CHAPTER 30. SURVEILLANCE

A payload surveillance camera manufactured by Controp and distributed to the U.S. government by ADI Technologies

meant to be used for traffic control, but many of them end up using them for general surveillance. For example, Washington, D.C. had 5,000 “traffic” cameras installed under this premise, and then after they were all in place, networked them all together and then granted access to the Metropolitan Police Department, so they could perform “day-to-day monitoring”.[48] The development of centralized networks of CCTV cameras watching public areas – linked to computer databases of people’s pictures and identity (biometric data), able to track people’s movements throughout the city, and identify whom they have been with – has been argued by some to present a risk to civil liberties.[49] Trapwire is an example of such a network.[50]

30.1.4

Social network analysis

One common form of surveillance is to create maps of social networks based on data from social networking sites such as Facebook, MySpace, Twitter as well as from traffic analysis information from phone call records such as those in the NSA call database,[51] and others. These social network “maps” are then data mined to extract useful information such as personal interests, friendships & affiliations, wants, beliefs, thoughts, and activities.[52][53][54][55] Many U.S. government agencies such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the National Security Agency (NSA), and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) are investing heavily in research involving social network analysis.[56][57] The intelligence community believes that the biggest threat to U.S. power comes from decentralized, leaderless, geographically dispersed groups of terrorists, subversives, extremists, and dissidents. These types of threats are most easily countered by finding important nodes in the network, and removing them. To do this requires a detailed map of the network.[55][58][59][60]

A graph of the relationships between users on the social networking site Facebook. Social network analysis enables governments to gather detailed information about peoples’ friends, family, and other contacts. Since much of this information is voluntarily made public by the users themselves, it is often consider to be a form of open-source intelligence

Jason Ethier of Northeastern University, in his study of modern social network analysis, said the following of the Scalable Social Network Analysis Program developed by the Information Awareness Office: The purpose of the SSNA algorithms program is to extend techniques of social network analysis to assist with distinguishing potential terrorist cells from legitimate groups of people.... In order to be successful SSNA will require information on the social interactions of the majority of people around the globe. Since the Defense Department cannot easily distinguish between peaceful citizens and terrorists, it will be necessary for them to gather data on innocent civilians as well as on potential terrorists. —Jason Ethier[58]

AT&T developed a programming language called “Hancock”, which is able to sift through enormous databases of phone call and Internet traffic records, such as the NSA call database, and extract “communities of interest”— groups of people who call each other regularly, or groups that regularly visit certain sites on the Internet. AT&T originally built the system to develop “marketing leads”,[61] but the FBI has regularly requested such information from phone companies such as AT&T without a warrant,[61] and after using the data stores all information received in its own databases, regardless of whether or not the information was ever useful in an investigation.[62]

30.1. TYPES Some people believe that the use of social networking sites is a form of “participatory surveillance”, where users of these sites are essentially performing surveillance on themselves, putting detailed personal information on public websites where it can be viewed by corporations and governments.[52] In 2008, about 20% of employers reported using social networking sites to collect personal data on prospective or current employees.[63]

30.1.5

Biometric

161 facial recognition data, iris/retina (eye) data, fingerprints, palm prints, and other biometric data of people living in the United States. The computers running the database are contained in an underground facility about the size of two American football fields.[67][68][69] The Los Angeles Police Department is installing automated facial recognition and license plate recognition devices in its squad cars, and providing handheld face scanners, which officers will use to identify people while on patrol.[70][71][72] Facial thermographs are in development, which allow machines to identify certain emotions in people such as fear or stress, by measuring the temperature generated by blood flow to different parts of their face.[73] Law enforcement officers believe that this has potential for them to identify when a suspect is nervous, which might indicate that they are hiding something, lying, or worried about something.[73]

30.1.6 Aerial Further information: Surveillance aircraft Aerial surveillance is the gathering of surveillance, usuFingerprints being scanned as part of the US-VISIT program

Main article: Biometrics Biometric surveillance is any technology that measures and analyzes human physical and/or behavioral characteristics for authentication, identification, or screening purposes.[64] Examples of physical characteristics include fingerprints, DNA, and facial patterns. Examples of mostly behavioral characteristics include gait (a person’s manner of walking) or voice. Facial recognition is the use of the unique configuration of a person’s facial features to accurately identify them, usually from surveillance video. Both the Department of Homeland Security and DARPA are heavily funding research into facial recognition systems.[65] The Information Processing Technology Office, ran a program known as Human Identification at a Distance which developed technologies that are capable of identifying a person at up to 500 ft by their facial features.

Micro Air Vehicle with attached surveillance camera

ally visual imagery or video, from an airborne vehicle— such as an unmanned aerial vehicle, helicopter, or spy plane. Military surveillance aircraft use a range of senAnother form of behavioral biometrics, based on sors (e.g. radar) to monitor the battlefield. affective computing, involves computers recognizing a Digital imaging technology, miniaturized computers, and person’s emotional state based on an analysis of their fa- numerous other technological advances over the past cial expressions, how fast they are talking, the tone and decade have contributed to rapid advances in aerial pitch of their voice, their posture, and other behavioral surveillance hardware such as micro-aerial vehicles, traits. This might be used for instance to see if a person forward-looking infrared, and high-resolution imagery is acting “suspicious” (looking around furtively, “tense” capable of identifying objects at extremely long disor “angry” facial expressions, waving arms, etc.).[66] tances. For instance, the MQ-9 Reaper,[74] a U.S. drone A more recent development is DNA profiling, which looks at some of the major markers in the body’s DNA to produce a match. The FBI is spending $1 billion to build a new biometric database, which will store DNA,

plane used for domestic operations by the Department of Homeland Security, carries cameras that are capable of identifying an object the size of a milk carton from altitudes of 60,000 feet, and has forward-looking infrared

162 devices that can detect the heat from a human body at distances of up to 60 kilometers.[75] In an earlier instance of commercial aerial surveillance, the Killington Mountain ski resort hired 'eye in the sky' aerial photography of its competitors’ parking lots to judge the success of its marketing initiatives as it developed starting in the 1950s.[76]

HART program concept drawing from official IPTO (DARPA) official website

The United States Department of Homeland Security is in the process of testing UAVs to patrol the skies over the United States for the purposes of critical infrastructure protection, border patrol, “transit monitoring”, and general surveillance of the U.S. population.[77] MiamiDade police department ran tests with a vertical take-off and landing UAV from Honeywell, which is planned to be used in SWAT operations.[78] Houston’s police department has been testing fixed-wing UAVs for use in “traffic control”.[78] The United Kingdom, as well, is working on plans to build up a fleet of surveillance UAVs ranging from micro-aerial vehicles to full-size drones, to be used by police forces throughout the U.K.[79] In addition to their surveillance capabilities, MAVs are capable of carrying tasers for "crowd control", or weapons for killing enemy combatants.[80] Programs such as the Heterogeneous Aerial Reconnaissance Team program developed by DARPA have automated much of the aerial surveillance process. They have developed systems consisting of large teams drone planes that pilot themselves, automatically decide who is “suspicious” and how to go about monitoring them, coordinate their activities with other drones nearby, and notify human operators if something suspicious is occurring. This greatly increases the amount of area that can be continuously monitored, while reducing the number of human operators required. Thus a swarm of automated, selfdirecting drones can automatically patrol a city and track suspicious individuals, reporting their activities back to a centralized monitoring station.[81][82][83]

CHAPTER 30. SURVEILLANCE

30.1.7 Data mining and profiling Data mining is the application of statistical techniques and programmatic algorithms to discover previously unnoticed relationships within the data. Data profiling in this context is the process of assembling information about a particular individual or group in order to generate a profile — that is, a picture of their patterns and behavior. Data profiling can be an extremely powerful tool for psychological and social network analysis. A skilled analyst can discover facts about a person that they might not even be consciously aware of themselves.[84] Economic (such as credit card purchases) and social (such as telephone calls and emails) transactions in modern society create large amounts of stored data and records. In the past, this data was documented in paper records, leaving a "paper trail", or was simply not documented at all. Correlation of paper-based records was a laborious process—it required human intelligence operators to manually dig through documents, which was timeconsuming and incomplete, at best. But today many of these records are electronic, resulting in an “electronic trail”. Every use of a bank machine, payment by credit card, use of a phone card, call from home, checked out library book, rented video, or otherwise complete recorded transaction generates an electronic record. Public records—such as birth, court, tax and other records—are increasily being digitized and made available online. In addition, due to laws like CALEA, web traffic and online purchases are also available for profiling. Electronic record-keeping makes data easily collectable, storable, and accessible—so that highvolume, efficient aggregation and analysis is possible at significantly lower costs. Information relating to many of these individual transactions is often easily available because it is generally not guarded in isolation, since the information, such as the title of a movie a person has rented, might not seem sensitive. However, when many such transactions are aggregated they can be used to assemble a detailed profile revealing the actions, habits, beliefs, locations frequented, social connections, and preferences of the individual. This profile is then used, by programs such as ADVISE [85] and TALON, to determine whether the person is a military, criminal, or political threat. In addition to its own aggregation and profiling tools, the government is able to access information from third parties — for example, banks, credit companies or employers, etc. — by requesting access informally, by compelling access through the use of subpoenas or other procedures,[86] or by purchasing data from commercial data aggregators or data brokers. The United States has spent $370 million on its 43 planned fusion centers, which are national network of surveillance centers that are located in over 30 states. The centers will collect and analyze vast amounts of data on U.S. citizens. It will

30.1. TYPES

163

get this data by consolidating personal information from sources such as state driver’s licensing agencies, hospital records, criminal records, school records, credit bureaus, banks, etc. -- and placing this information in a centralized database that can be accessed from all of the centers, as well as other federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies.[87]

companies use software to block non-work related websites such as sexual or pornographic sites, game sites, social networking sites, entertainment sites, shopping sites, and sport sites. The American Management Association and the ePolicy Institute also stress that companies “tracking content, keystrokes, and time spent at the keyboard ... store and review computer files ... monitor the blogothe company, Under United States v. Miller (1976), data held by third sphere to see what is being written about and ... monitor social networking sites“.[93] Furthermore, parties is generally not subject to Fourth Amendment about 30% of the companies had also fired employees for warrant requirements. non-work related email and Internet usage such as “inappropriate or offensive language“ and ”viewing, downloading, or uploading inappropriate/offensive content“.[93][94]

30.1.8

Corporate

Corporate surveillance is the monitoring of a person or group’s behavior by a corporation. The data collected is most often used for marketing purposes or sold to other corporations, but is also regularly shared with government agencies. It can be used as a form of business intelligence, which enables the corporation to better tailor their products and/or services to be desirable by their customers. Or the data can be sold to other corporations, so that they can use it for the aforementioned purpose. Or it can be used for direct marketing purposes, such as the targeted advertisements on Google and Yahoo, where ads are targeted to the user of the search engine by analyzing their search history and emails[88] (if they use free webmail services), which is kept in a database.[89] For instance, Google, the world’s most popular search engine, stores identifying information for each web search. An IP address and the search phrase used are stored in a database for up to 18 months.[90] Google also scans the content of emails of users of its Gmail webmail service, in order to create targeted advertising based on what people are talking about in their personal email correspondences.[91] Google is, by far, the largest Internet advertising agency—millions of sites place Google’s advertising banners and links on their websites, in order to earn money from visitors who click on the ads. Each page containing Google advertisements adds, reads, and modifies “cookies” on each visitor’s computer.[92] These cookies track the user across all of these sites, and gather information about their web surfing habits, keeping track of which sites they visit, and what they do when they are on these sites. This information, along with the information from their email accounts, and search engine histories, is stored by Google to use for building a profile of the user to deliver better-targeted advertising.[91] According to the American Management Association and the ePolicy Institute that undertake an annual quantitative survey about electronic monitoring and surveillance with approximately 300 U.S. companies, “more than one fourth of employers have fired workers for misusing email and nearly one third have fired employees for misusing the Internet“.[93] More than 40% of the companies monitor e-mail traffic of their workers, and 66% of corporations monitor Internet connections. In addition, most

The United States government often gains access to these databases, either by producing a warrant for it, or by simply asking. The Department of Homeland Security has openly stated that it uses data collected from consumer credit and direct marketing agencies—such as Google— for augmenting the profiles of individuals whom it is monitoring.[89] The FBI, Department of Homeland Security, and other intelligence agencies have formed an “information-sharing” partnership with over 34,000 corporations as part of their Infragard program. The U.S. Federal government has gathered information from grocery store “discount card” programs, which track customers’ shopping patterns and store them in databases, in order to look for “terrorists” by analyzing shoppers’ buying patterns.[95]

30.1.9 Human operatives Organizations that have enemies who wish to gather information about the groups’ members or activities face the issue of infiltration.[96][97] In addition to operatives’ infiltrating an organization, the surveilling party may exert pressure on certain members of the target organization to act as informants (i.e., to disclose the information they hold on the organization and its members).[98][99] Fielding operatives is very expensive, and for governments with wide-reaching electronic surveillance tools at their disposal the information recovered from operatives can often be obtained from less problematic forms of surveillance such as those mentioned above. Nevertheless, human infiltrators are still common today. For instance, in 2007 documents surfaced showing that the FBI was planning to field a total of 15,000 undercover agents and informants in response to an anti-terrorism directive sent out by George W. Bush in 2004 that ordered intelligence and law enforcement agencies to increase their HUMINT capabilities.[100]

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30.1.10

CHAPTER 30. SURVEILLANCE

Satellite imagery

Main article: Reconnaissance satellite On May 25, 2007 the U.S. Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell authorized the National Applications Office (NAO) of the Department of Homeland Security to allow local, state, and domestic Federal agencies to access imagery from military intelligence Reconnaissance satellites and Reconnaissance aircraft sensors which can now be used to observe the activities of U.S. citizens. The satellites and aircraft sensors will be able to penetrate cloud cover, detect chemical traces, and identify objects in buildings and “underground bunkers”, and will provide real-time video at much higher Hand with planned insertion point for Verichip device resolutions than the still-images produced by programs such as Google Earth.[101][102][103][104][105][106] meters away. They are extremely inexpensive, costing a few cents per piece, so they can be inserted into many types of everyday products without significantly increas30.1.11 Identification and credentials ing the price, and can be used to track and identify these objects for a variety of purposes. Some companies appear to be “tagging” their workers by incorporating RFID tags in employee ID badges. Workers in U.K. considered strike action in protest of having themselves tagged; they felt that it was dehumanizing to have all of their movements tracked with RFID chips.[107] Some critics have expressed fears that people will soon be tracked and scanned everywhere they go.[108] On the other hand, RFID tags in newborn baby ID bracelets put on by hospitals have foiled kidnappings.[107]

A card containing an identification number

One of the simplest forms of identification is the carrying of credentials. Some nations have an identity card system to aid identification, whilst others are considering it but face public opposition. Other documents, such as passports, driver’s licenses, library cards, banking or credit cards are also used to verify identity. If the form of the identity card is “machine-readable”, usually using an encoded magnetic stripe or identification number (such as a Social Security number), it corroborates the subject’s identifying data. In this case it may create an electronic trail when it is checked and scanned, which can be used in profiling, as mentioned above.

30.1.12

RFID and geolocation devices

RFID tagging

RFID chip pulled from new credit card

Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tagging is the use of very small electronic devices (called “RFID tags”) which are applied to or incorporated into a product, animal, or person for the purpose of identification and tracking using radio waves. The tags can be read from several

Verichip is an RFID device produced by a company called Applied Digital Solutions (ADS). Verichip is slightly larger than a grain of rice, and is injected under the skin. The injection reportedly feels similar to receiving a shot. The chip is encased in glass, and stores a

30.1. TYPES “VeriChip Subscriber Number” which the scanner uses to access their personal information, via the Internet, from Verichip Inc.'s database, the “Global VeriChip Subscriber Registry”. Thousands of people have already had them inserted.[108] In Mexico, for example, 160 workers at the Attorney General’s office were required to have the chip injected for identity verification and access control purposes.[109][110] In a 2003 editorial, CNET News.com’s chief political correspondent, Declan McCullagh, speculated that, soon, every object that is purchased, and perhaps ID cards, will have RFID devices in them, which would respond with information about people as they walk past scanners (what type of phone they have, what type of shoes they have on, which books they are carrying, what credit cards or membership cards they have, etc.). This information could be used for identification, tracking, or targeted marketing. As of 2012, this has largely not come to pass.[111]

165 (whether it is being used or not), using a technique known multilateration to calculate the differences in time for a signal to travel from the cell phone to each of several cell towers near the owner of the phone.[29][30] Dr. Victor Kappeler[114] of Eastern Kentucky University indicates that police surveillance is a strong concern, stating the following statistics from 2013:

Of the 321,545 law enforcement requests made to Verizon, 54,200 of these requests were for “content” or “location” information—not just cell phone numbers or IP addresses. Content information included the actual text of messages, emails and the wiretapping of voice or messaging content in real-time.

30.1.13 Human Microchips Global Positioning System

Main Article A human microchip implant is an identifying integrated circuit device or RFID transponder encased in silicate glass and implanted in the body of a human being. A subdermal implant typically contains a unique ID number that can be linked to information contained in an external database, such as personal identification, medical history, medications, allergies, and contact information. Several types of microchips have been developed in order to control and monitor certain individuals such as criminals, political figures and spies, a “killer” tracking chip patent was filed at the German Patent and Trademark Office(DPMA) around May 2009.

30.1.14 Devices Diagram of GPS satellites orbiting Earth

See also: GPS tracking

See also: United States v. Spy Factory, Inc.

Covert listening devices and video devices, or “bugs”, In the U.S., police have planted hidden GPS tracking de- are hidden electronic devices which are used to capture, vices in people’s vehicles to monitor their movements, record, and/or transmit data to a receiving party such as without a warrant. In early 2009, they were arguing in a law enforcement agency. court that they have the right to do this.[112] The U.S. has run numerous domestic intelligence operSeveral cities are running pilot projects to require parolees ations, such as COINTELPRO, which have bugged the to wear GPS devices to track their movements when they homes, offices, and vehicles of thousands of U.S. citizens, get out of prison.[113] usually political activists, subversives, and criminals.[115] Law enforcement and intelligence services in the U.K. and the United States possess technology to remotely activate the microphones in cell phones, by accessing the Mobile phones are also commonly used to collect geolo- phone’s diagnostic/maintenance features, in order to liscation data. The geographical location of a mobile phone ten to conversations that take place nearby the person who (and thus the person carrying it) can be determined easily holds the phone.[24][25][26] Mobile phones

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30.1.15

CHAPTER 30. SURVEILLANCE

Postal services

As more people use faxes and e-mail the significance of surveilling the postal system is decreasing, in favor of Internet and telephone surveillance. But interception of post is still an available option for law enforcement and intelligence agencies, in certain circumstances.

Another common argument is: "If you aren't doing something wrong then you don't have anything to fear.” Which follows that if one is engaging in unlawful activities, in which case they do not have a legitimate justification for their privacy. However, if they are following the law the surveillance would not affect them.[121]

The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation have performed twelve separate mail- 30.2.2 opening campaigns targeted towards U.S. citizens. In one of these programs, more than 215,000 communications were intercepted, opened, and photographed.[116][117]

Opposition

30.2 Controversy

Graffiti expressing concern about proliferation of video surveillance

30.2.1

Support

An elaborate graffito in Columbus, Ohio, depicting state surveillance of telecommunications

Some supporters of surveillance systems believe that With the advent of programs such as the Total Informathese tools protect society from terrorists and criminals. tion Awareness program and ADVISE, technologies such Supporters argue surveillance can reduce crime by three as high speed surveillance computers and biometrics softmeans: by deterrence, by observation, and by reconstruc- ware, and laws such as the Communications Assistance tion. Surveillance can deter by increasing the chance of for Law Enforcement Act, governments now possess an being caught, and by revealing the modus operandi. This unprecedented ability to monitor the activities of their requires a minimal level of invasiveness.[118] Surveillance subjects.[122] Many civil rights and privacy groups, such can give human operatives a tactical advantage through as the Electronic Frontier Foundation and American Civil improved situational awareness, or through the use of au- Liberties Union, have expressed concern that by allowing tomated processes, i.e. video analytics. Surveillance can continual increases in government surveillance of citizens help reconstruct an incident and prove guilt through the we will end up in a mass surveillance society, with exavailability of footage for forensics experts. Surveillance tremely limited, or non-existent political and/or personal can also influence subjective security if surveillance re- freedoms. Fears such as this have led to numerous lawsources are visible or if the consequences of surveillance suits such as Hepting v. AT&T.[122][123] can be felt. Some critics state that the claim made by supporters Other supporters simply believe that there is nothing that can be done about it, and that people must become accustomed to having no privacy. As Sun Microsystems CEO Scott McNealy said: “You have zero privacy anyway. Get over it.”[119][120]

should be modified to read: “As long as we do what we're told, we have nothing to fear.”. For instance, a person who is part of a political group which opposes the policies of the national government, might not want the government to know their names and what they have been read-

30.2. CONTROVERSY

167

ing, so that the government cannot easily subvert their organization, arrest, or kill them. Other critics state that while a person might not have anything to hide right now, the government might later implement policies that they do wish to oppose, and that opposition might then be impossible due to mass surveillance enabling the government to identify and remove political threats. Further, other critics point to the fact that most people do have things to hide. For example, if a person is looking for a new job, they might not want their current employer to know this. Also if an employer wishes total privacy to watch over their own employee and secure their financial information it may become impossible, and they may not wish to hire those under surveillance. The most concern of detriment is securing the lives of those who live under total surveillance willingly, educating the public to those under peaceful watch while identifying terrorist and those who use the same surveillance systems and mechanisms in opposition to peace, against civilians, and to disclose lives removed from the laws of the land. In addition, a significant risk of private data collection stems from the fact that this risk is too much unknown to be readily assessed today. Storage is cheap enough to have data stored forever, and the models using which it will be analyzed in a decade from now cannot reasonably be foreseen.[124]

Totalitarianism Programs such as the Total Information Awareness program, and laws such as the Communications Assistance For Law Enforcement Act have led many groups to fear that society is moving towards a state of mass surveillance with severely limited personal, social, political freedoms, where dissenting individuals or groups will be strategically removed in COINTELPRO-like purges.[122][123] Kate Martin, of the Center For National Security Studies said of the use of military spy satellites being used to monitor the activities of U.S. citizens: “They are laying A traffic camera atop a high pole oversees a road in the Canadian the bricks one at a time for a police state.”[105] Some point to the blurring of lines between public and private places, and the privatization of places traditionally seen as public (such as shopping malls and industrial parks) as illustrating the increasing legality of collecting personal information.[125] Traveling through many public places such as government offices is hardly optional for most people, yet consumers have little choice but to submit to companies’ surveillance practices.[126] Surveillance techniques are not created equal; among the many biometric identification technologies, for instance, face recognition requires the least cooperation. Unlike automatic fingerprint reading, which requires an individual to press a finger against a machine, this technique is subtle and requires little to no consent.[126]

city of Toronto.

Psychological/social effects Some critics, such as Michel Foucault, believe that in addition to its obvious function of identifying and capturing individuals who are committing undesirable acts, surveillance also functions to create in everyone a feeling of always being watched, so that they become self-policing. This allows the State to control the populace without having to resort to physical force, which is expensive and otherwise problematic.[127] The concept of panopticism is a means of indirect control

168 over a large populous through the uncertainty of surveillance. Michel Foucault analyzed the architecture of the prison panopticon, and realized that its success was not just in its ability to monitor but also its ability to not monitor without anyone knowing.[128] Critics such as Derrick Jensen and George Draffan, argue that panopticism in the United States began in World War I when the issuing of passports became important for the tracking of citizens and possibly enemies of the state. Such surveillance continues today through government agencies in the form of tracking internet usage and library usage.[129] Psychologists have shown that merely giving people the “illusion” of being observed can produce significant voluntary changes in a range of pro-social behaviors.[130] For example, studies have shown that people donate more and litter less when they think that they are being watched.

Privacy Numerous civil rights groups and privacy groups oppose surveillance as a violation of people’s right to privacy. Such groups include: Electronic Privacy Information Center, Electronic Frontier Foundation, American Civil Liberties Union There have been several lawsuits such as Hepting v. AT&T and EPIC v. Department of Justice by groups or individuals, opposing certain surveillance activities. Legislative proceedings such as those that took place during the Church Committee, which investigated domestic intelligence programs such as COINTELPRO, have also weighed the pros and cons of surveillance.

CHAPTER 30. SURVEILLANCE Sousveillance is inverse surveillance, involving the recording by private individuals, rather than government or corporate entities.[132]

30.4 Popular culture 30.4.1 In literature • George Orwell’s novel, Nineteen Eighty-Four, portrays a fictional totalitarian surveillance society with a very simple (by today’s standards) mass surveillance system consisting of human operatives, informants, and two-way “telescreens” in people’s homes. Because of the impact of this book, masssurveillance technologies are commonly called “Orwellian” when they are considered problematic. • The novel - mistrust highlights the negative effects from the overuse of surveillance at Reflection House. The central character Kerryn installs secret cameras to monitor her housemates - see also Paranoia • The book The Handmaid’s Tale, as well as a film based on it, portray a totalitarian Christian theocracy where all citizens are kept under constant surveillance. • In the book The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo, Lisbeth Salander uses computers to dig out information on people, as well as other common surveillance methods, as a freelancer.

30.4.2 In music

30.3 Counter-surveillance, inverse surveillance, sousveillance

• The Dead Kennedys' song, “I Am The Owl”, is about government surveillance and social engineering of political groups.

Countersurveillance is the practice of avoiding surveillance or making surveillance difficult. Developments in 30.4.3 Onscreen the late twentieth century have caused counter surveillance to dramatically grow in both scope and com- Main article: List of films featuring surveillance plexity, such as the Internet, increasing prevalence of electronic security systems, high-altitude (and possibly armed) UAVs, and large corporate and government com• The movie, Gattaca, portrays a society that uses puter databases.[131] biometric surveillance to distinguish between people who are genetically engineered “superior” humans Inverse surveillance is the practice of the reversal of and genetically natural “inferior” humans. surveillance on other individuals or groups (e.g., citizens photographing police). Well-known examples are George Holliday's recording of the Rodney King beating and the organization Copwatch, which attempts to monitor police officers to prevent police brutality. Countersurveillance can be also used in applications to prevent corporate spying, or to track other criminals by certain criminal entities. It can also be used to deter stalking methods used by various entities and organizations.

• In the movie Minority Report, the police and government intelligence agencies use micro aerial vehicles in SWAT operations and for surveillance purposes. • HBO's crime-drama series, The Sopranos, regularly portrays the FBI’s surveillance of the DiMeo Crime Family. Audio devices they use include "bugs" placed in strategic locations (e.g., in "I Dream of

30.5. SEE ALSO Jeannie Cusamano" and "Mr. Ruggerio’s Neighborhood") and hidden microphones worn by operatives (e.g., in "Rat Pack") and informants (e.g., in "Funhouse", "Proshai, Livushka" and "Members Only"). Visual devices include hidden still cameras (e.g., in "Pax Soprana") and video cameras (e.g., in "Long Term Parking"). • The movie, THX-1138, portrays a society wherein people are drugged with sedatives and antidepressants, and have surveillance cameras watching them everywhere they go. • The movie, The Lives of Others, portrays the monitoring of East Berlin by agents of the Stasi, the GDR's secret police. • The movie, The Conversation, portrays many methods of audio surveillance.

30.5 See also • Big Brother Watch, a British civil liberties and privacy pressure group • Hepting v. AT&T, a 2006 lawsuit by the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) which alleges that AT&T assisted the National Security Agency (NSA) in unlawfully monitoring communications • Jewel v. NSA, a lawsuit filed by the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) against the National Security Agency (NSA) and several high-ranking U.S. government officials charging an “illegal and unconstitutional program of dragnet communications surveillance” • Informational self-determination, a term for the capacity of the individual to determine in principle the disclosure and use of his/her personal data • List of government surveillance projects • Mass surveillance • Mass surveillance in Australia • Mass surveillance in China • Mass surveillance in East Germany • Mass surveillance in India • Mass surveillance in North Korea • Mass surveillance in the United Kingdom • Mass surveillance in the United States • Panopticon, a type of institutional building designed to allow a watchman to observe (-opticon) all (pan-) inmates of an institution without their being able to tell whether they are being watched • Privacy law

169 • Reconnaissance • Signals intelligence, intelligence-gathering by interception of communications and electronic signals • Sousveillance (inverse surveillance), the recording of an activity by a participant in the activity • Surveillance art, the use of surveillance technology to offer commentary on surveillance or surveillance technology • Surveillance system monitor, a job that consists of monitoring closed circuit surveillance systems in order to detect crimes or disturbances • Trapwire, a U.S. counter-terrorism technology company that produces software designed to find patterns indicative of terrorist attacks

30.5.1 United States government • 2013 mass surveillance disclosures, reports about NSA and its international partners’ mass surveillance of foreign nationals and U.S. citizens • Bullrun (code name), a highly classified U.S. National Security Agency program to preserve its ability to eavesdrop on encrypted communications by influencing and weakening encryption standards, by obtaining master encryption keys, and by gaining access to data before or after it is encrypted either by agreement, by force of law, or by computer network exploitation (hacking) • Carnivore, a U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation system to monitor email and electronic communications • COINTELPRO, a series of covert, and at times illegal, projects conducted by the FBI aimed at U.S. domestic political organizations • Communications Assistance For Law Enforcement Act • Computer and Internet Protocol Address Verifier (CIPAV), a data gathering tool used by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) • Dropmire, a secret surveillance program by the NSA aimed at surveillance of foreign embassies and diplomatic staff, including those of NATO allies • Heterogeneous Aerial Reconnaissance Team (HART), a DARPA project to develop systems for aerial surveillance of large urbanized areas using unmanned aerial vehicles • Magic Lantern, keystroke logging software developed by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation

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• Mail Isolation Control and Tracking and Mail cover, programs to log metadata about all postal mail sent and received in the U.S.

[11] “CALEA: The Perils of Wiretapping the Internet”. Electronic Frontier Foundation (website). Retrieved March 14, 2009.

• NSA call database, a database containing metadata for hundreds of billions of telephone calls made in the U.S.

[12] “CALEA: Frequently Asked Questions”. Electronic Frontier Foundation (website). Retrieved March 14, 2009.

• NSA warrantless surveillance (2001–07)

[13] Hill, Michael (October 11, 2004). “Government funds chat room surveillance research”. USA Today. Associated Press. Retrieved March 19, 2009.

• NSA whistleblowers: William Binney, Thomas Andrews Drake, Mark Klein, Edward Snowden, Thomas Tamm, and Russ Tice

[14] McCullagh, Declan (January 30, 2007). “FBI turns to broad new wiretap method”. ZDNet News. Retrieved September 26, 2014.

• Spying on United Nations leaders by United States diplomats

[15] “FBI’s Secret Spyware Tracks Down Teen Who Made Bomb Threats”. Wired Magazine. July 18, 2007.

• Stellar Wind, code name for information collected [16] Van Eck, Wim (1985). “Electromagnetic Radiation from Video Display Units: An Eavesdropping Risk?" (PDF). under the President’s Surveillance Program • Terrorist Surveillance Program, an NSA electronic surveillance program • Total Information Awareness, a project of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)

30.6 References [1] OED [2] Lyon, David. 2007. Surveillance Studies: An Overview. Cambridge: Polity Press. [3] “The effect of CCTV on public safety: Research roundup - See more at: http://journalistsresource. org/studies/government/criminal-justice/ surveillance-cameras-and-crime#sthash.6OqNkNVq. dpuf". journalistsresource.org. Retrieved 2015-05-06.

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[100] Ross, Brian (July 25, 2007). “FBI Proposes Building Net- [117] Goldstein, Robert. Political Repression in Modern Amerwork of U.S. Informants”. Blotter. ABC News. Retrieved ica. University of Illinois Press. ISBN 978-0-252-06964March 13, 2009. 2. [101] “U.S. Reconnaissance Satellites: Domestic Targets”. Na- [118] Deviant Behaviour - Socially accepted observation of behaviour for security, Jeroen van Rest tional Security Archive. Retrieved March 16, 2009. [102] Block, Robert (August 15, 2007). “U.S. to Expand Do- [119] Sprenger, Polly (January 26, 1999). “Sun on Privacy: 'Get Over It'". Wired Magazine. Retrieved March 20, 2009. mestic Use Of Spy Satellites”. Wall Street Journal. Retrieved March 14, 2009. [120] Baig, Edward; Marcia Stepanek; Neil Gross (April 5, 1999). “Privacy”. Business Week. Retrieved March 20, [103] Gorman, Siobhan (October 1, 2008). “Satellite2009. Surveillance Program to Begin Despite Privacy Concerns”. The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved March 16, [121] Solove, Daniel (2007). "'I've Got Nothing to Hide' and 2009. Other Misunderstandings of Privacy”. San Diego Law Review 44: 745. [104] “Fact Sheet: National Applications Office”. Department of Homeland Security (official website). August 15, 2007. [122] “Is the U.S. Turning Into a Surveillance Society?". AmerRetrieved March 16, 2009. ican Civil Liberties Union. Retrieved March 13, 2009. [105] Warrick, Joby (August 16, 2007). “Domestic Use of Spy [123] “Bigger Monster, Weaker Chains: The Growth of an Satellites To Widen”. Washington Post. pp. A01. ReAmerican Surveillance Society” (PDF). American Civil trieved March 17, 2009. Liberties Union. January 15, 2003. Retrieved March 13, 2009. [106] Shrader, Katherine (September 26, 2004). “Spy imagery agency watching inside U.S.”. USA Today. Associated [124] “Against the collection of private data: The unknown risk Press. Retrieved March 17, 2009. factor”. March 8, 2012. [107] “Two Stories Highlight the RFID Debate”. RFID Journal. [125] Marx, G. T., & Muschert, G. W. (2007). Personal inforJuly 19, 2005. Retrieved March 23, 2012. mation, borders, and the new surveillance studies. Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 3, 375-395. [108] Lewan, Todd (July 21, 2007). “Microchips in humans spark privacy debate”. USA Today. Associated Press. [126] Agre, P. (2003). Your Face is not a bar code: arguRetrieved March 17, 2009. ments against automatic face recognition in public places. Retrieved November 14, 2004, from http://polaris.gseis. [109] Gardener, W. David (July 15, 2004). “RFID Chips Imucla.edu/pagre/bar-code.html planted In Mexican Law-Enforcement Workers”. Information Week. Retrieved March 17, 2009. [127] Foucault, Michel (1979). Discipline and Punish. New York: Vintage Books. pp. 201–202. [110] Campbell, Monica (August 4, 2004). “Law enforcement in Mexico goes a bit bionic”. Christian Science Monitor. [128] Foucault, Michel (1995). Discipline and Punish. New Retrieved March 17, 2009. York: Random House. pp. 200–203. [111] McCullagh, Declan (January 13, 2003). “RFID Tags: Big [129] Jensen, Derrick (2004). , Welcome to the Machine: SciBrother in small packages”. CNET News. Retrieved July ence, Surveillance and the Culture of Control. Vermont: 24, 2012. Chelsea Green Publishing. pp. 112–124. [112] Claburn, Thomas (March 4, 2009). “Court Asked To [130] van der Linden, Sander (March 2011). “How the Illusion Disallow Warrantless GPS Tracking”. Information Week. of Being Observed can Make You a Better Person”. SciRetrieved March 18, 2009. entific American. Retrieved September 10, 2014. [113] Hilden, Julie (April 16, 2002). “What legal questions [131] “The Secrets of Countersurveillance”. Security Weekly. are the new chip implants for humans likely to raise?". June 6, 2007. CNN.com (FindLaw). Retrieved March 17, 2009. [132] Birch, Dave (July 14, 2005). “The age of sousveillance”. [114] Kappeler, Victor. “Forget the NSA: Police May be a The Guardian (London). Retrieved August 6, 2007. Greater Threat to Privacy”. [115] Wolf, Paul. “COINTELPRO”. (online collection of historical documents). Retrieved March 14, 2009. [116] “SUPPLEMENTARY DETAILED STAFF REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS: ... DOMESTIC CIA AND FBI MAIL OPENING PROGRAMS”. SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES UNITED STATES SENATE. April 23, 1976. Retrieved March 13, 2009.

30.7 Further reading • Garfinkel, Simson, Database Nation; The Death of Privacy in the 21st Century. O'Reilly & Associates, Inc. ISBN 0-596-00105-3 • Gilliom, John Overseers of the Poor: Surveillance, Resistance, and the Limits of Privacy, University Of Chicago Press, ISBN 978-0-226-29361-5

174 • Jenkins, Peter Advanced Surveillance Training Manual, Intel Publishing, UK ISBN 0-9535378-1-1

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30.8 External links

• Jensen, Derrick and Draffan, George (2004) Wel- 30.8.1 General information come to the Machine: Science, Surveillance, and the • “Special Issue on Surveillance Capitalism - nine arCulture of Control Chelsea Green Publishing Comticles analyzing financial, social, political, legal, hispany. ISBN 978-1-931498-52-4 torical, security and other aspects of US and international surveillance and spying programs and their re• Lyon, David (2001). Surveillance Society: Monitorlation to capitalism”. Monthly Review. 2014. (Voling in Everyday Life. Philadelphia: Open University ume 66, Number 3, July–August) Press. ISBN 978-0-335-20546-2 • Lyon, David (2007) Surveillance Studies: An Overview. Cambridge: Polity Press. ISBN 978-07456-3591-0 • Fuchs, Christian, Kees Boersma, Anders Albrechtslund, and Marisol Sandoval, eds. (2012). “Internet and Surveillance: The Challenges of Web 2.0 and Social Media”. New York: Routledge. ISBN 9780-415-89160-8 • Parenti, Christian The Soft Cage: Surveillance in America From Slavery to the War on Terror, Basic Books, ISBN 978-0-465-05485-5 • Harris, Shane. (2011). The Watchers: The Rise of America’s Surveillance State. London, UK: Penguin Books Ltd. ISBN 0-14-311890-0 • Matteralt, Armand. (2010). The Globalization of Surveillance. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. ISBN 0-7456-4511-9 • Feldman, Jay. (2011). Manufacturing Hysteria: A History of Scapegoating, Surveillance, and Secrecy in Modern America. New York, NY: Pantheon Books. ISBN 0-375-42534-9

• ACLU, “The Surveillance-Industrial Complex: How the American Government Is Conscripting Businesses and Individuals in the Construction of a Surveillance Society” • Balkin, Jack M. (2008). “The Constitution in the National Surveillance State”, Yale Law School • Bibo, Didier and Delmas-Marty, “The State and Surveillance: Fear and Control” • EFF Privacy Resources • EPIC Privacy Resources • ICO. (September 2006). “A Report on the Surveillance Society for the Information Commissioner by the Surveillance Studies Network”. • Privacy Information Center • “The NSA Files (Dozens of articles about the U.S. National Security Agency and its spying and surveillance programs)". The Guardian (London). June 8, 2013. • Blunden, Bill (April 2015). Mass Surveillance is Driven by the Private Sector, in CounterPunch

• Hier, Sean P., & Greenberg, Joshua (Eds.). (2009). Surveillance: Power, Problems, and Politics. Van- 30.8.2 Historical information couver, CA: UBC Press. ISBN 0-7748-1611-2 • COINTELPRO—FBI counterintelligence programs designed to neutralize political dissidents • Lyon, David (Ed.). (2006). Theorizing Surveillance: The Panopticon and Beyond. Cullompton, • Reversing the Whispering Gallery of Dionysius UK: Willan Publishing. ISBN 978-1-84392-191-2 A Short History of Electronic Surveillance in the United States • Laidler, Keith. (2008). Surveillance Unlimited: How We've Become the Most Watched People on Earth. Cambridge, AU: Icon Books Ltd. ISBN 97830.8.3 Legal resources 1-84046-877-9 • Staples, William G. (2000). Everyday Surveillance: Vigilance and Visibility in Post-Modern Life. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. ISBN 0-7425-0077-2 • Allmer, Thomas (2012). “Towards a Critical Theory of Surveillance in Informational Capitalism”. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang. ISBN 978-3-63163220-8

• EFF Legal Cases • Guide to lawful intercept legislation around the world

30.9. TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

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30.9 Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses 30.9.1

Text

• Agent handling Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agent%20handling?oldid=661941049 Contributors: Bryan Derksen, The Anome, Michael Hardy, Charles Matthews, Robbot, Vardion, Lowellian, Ashley Y, DocWatson42, Everyking, Gadfium, Calm, Sam Hocevar, Joyous!, Truthflux, Viriditas, BM, Pearle, Glaucus, GRider, Talkie tim, Feezo, Richard Arthur Norton (1958- ), Cypocryphy, Mangojuice, Stefanomione, Mrtoodles, BD2412, Vvuppala, Nobs01, Leutha, Welsh, Qirex, Matthew0028, Cerejota, RG2, SmackBot, RedSpruce, Chris the speller, Autarch, Frap, NickPenguin, Marco polo, Robofish, Heqs, Estéban, ShelfSkewed, J-boogie, Cepopaladin, Thijs!bot, Hcberkowitz, RevolverOcelotX, Dinkytown, Nobs02, Dlcj1962, StillTrill, Lamro, Alcmaeonid, GorillaWarfare, Gabos, GlamRock, Paul.j.richardson, Addbot, Lihaas, Terrillja, Lightbot, Donfbreed, AnomieBOT, Thehelpfulbot, FrescoBot, BenzolBot, LittleWink, DexDor, John of Reading, Ahears, Peterh5322, Paggz, Jacobjohnward, EnricX and Anonymous: 39 • Asset (intelligence) Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asset%20(intelligence)?oldid=539467806 Contributors: SimonP, Reinyday, GrundyCamellia, SmackBot, Lochness Monstah, Keycard, MER-C, Traveliter, Dawynn, Zellfaze, Erik9bot and Anonymous: 3 • Black bag operation Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black%20bag%20operation?oldid=644372468 Contributors: Bryan Derksen, Michael Hardy, Skysmith, Julesd, GCarty, The Tom, Necrothesp, Neutrality, Warfieldian, Kaisershatner, Kwamikagami, Darwinek, Eleland, SidP, RJFJR, PullUpYourSocks, Richard Arthur Norton (1958- ), Woohookitty, AndrewWatt, Mangojuice, Waldir, Stefanomione, Petri Krohn, SmackBot, Betacommand, Fuzzform, Frap, Radagast83, Cybercobra, Nabokov, Dontopenyoureyes, Mentifisto, Alphachimpbot, MelanieN, SSZ, DerHexer, Bibliophylax, .V., Trusilver, Uesugi kenshin, Delbert Grady, Luciano Magaldi, Taldozer, Thefreemarket, KWincen, Sfan00 IMG, ClueBot, BWH76, DumZiBoT, Lightbot, Yangvzhen, ClueBot NG, ChrisGualtieri, Tony Mach and Anonymous: 24 • Black operation Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black%20operation?oldid=661905546 Contributors: Edward, Ixfd64, Skysmith, Ed g2s, David.Monniaux, Lowellian, DocWatson42, Halda, MSGJ, Trevor MacInnis, Mike Rosoft, Discospinster, Xezbeth, Bender235, Kross, Iralith, Martey, Tronno, Zupi, Hesperian, Alansohn, Echuck215, Velella, RPH, RJFJR, Kenyon, LOL, MrWhipple, Stefanomione, Patrick2480, Sjö, Steven Hildreth, Jr., SGCommand, SchuminWeb, RobertG, Djrobgordon, Captain Whosit, Lightsup55, DVdm, Mhking, Koveras, Phantomsteve, Petiatil, Kirill Lokshin, C777, Anomalocaris, NawlinWiki, Xyzyxx, Aeusoes1, Moe Epsilon, Marshall, Scope creep, 2over0, Mikael GRizzly, Katieh5584, Nick-D, Tom Morris, DT29, Luk, SmackBot, Ominae, C.Fred, Davewild, Clpo13, Mauls, Kevinalewis, CmdrClow, Westsider, Bluebot, Jprg1966, Audigex, Chr.K., A. B., Emurphy42, Drsmoo, Skidude9950, Rrburke, Sapwood2, Elendil’s Heir, Rcredit, Cybercobra, DMacks, ALR, Ohconfucius, Byelf2007, CIS, Rukario639, Robofish, Minna Sora no Shita, NYCJosh, Mr. Vernon, Slakr, Veritas Panther, PaulGS, Woodroar, TwistOfCain, JoeBot, Valoem, CalebNoble, SkyWalker, FleetCommand, CmdrObot, Yoni bhonker, Mika1h, Harej bot, KnightLago, Supermike42, Besieged, SithiR, Rifleman 82, Gogo Dodo, Otto4711, ST47, Chasingsol, Christian75, DumbBOT, PamD, Thijs!bot, Jedibob5, Marek69, Kathovo, Heroeswithmetaphors, Noclevername, Raff85, Chegis, Seaphoto, Dbrodbeck, Willscrlt, Kent Witham, Ingolfson, CosineKitty, Epeefleche, Blindsnyper, MelanieN, Xeno, Freedom Fighter 1988, That Jason, Magioladitis, Bongwarrior, JamesBWatson, Whamilton, Jvhertum, WLU, Pax:Vobiscum, Xmacro, DGG, J.delanoy, Trusilver, Grendels mom, Svetovid, TrueCRaysball, Skier Dude, Imacphee, SJP, Heyitspeter, Wavemaster447, Bonadea, Andy Marchbanks, Signalhead, Nikthestunned, Deor, Saddy Dumpington, Wolfnix, Philip Trueman, The Original Wildbear, NPrice, Dictouray, Shredder 187, Retpyrc, Wikiisawesome, The Devil’s Advocate, Monty845, Logan, Mr Pie 2006, BonesBrigade, Dawn Bard, Caltas, Xymmax, Bentogoa, Flyer22, Romsey5, KathrynLybarger, Thorncrag, Kanonkas, Fezmar9, Elassint, ClueBot, General Mannino, Gaia Octavia Agrippa, Drmies, XClaudiox, Uncle Milty, Boing! said Zebedee, Buffalosoldier92, Cirt, Brewcrewer, Lartoven, Grey Matter, NuclearWarfare, SoxBot III, DarkInVaderVe, James23a, Eik Corell, XLinkBot, Fastily, Stickee, Airplaneman, CalumH93, Addbot, Some jerk on the Internet, Leszek Jańczuk, Fluffernutter, Cblakesley, Glass Sword, Chzz, Favonian, West.andrew.g, Jaydec, 5 albert square, Tide rolls, PlankBot, Luckasbot, TheSuave, Yobot, Fraggle81, Munchenoriginal, AnomieBOT, TurboGUY, DemocraticLuntz, Jackie Stuntmaster, Jim1138, Keithbob, RandomAct, Materialscientist, E2eamon, Monkey225, ArthurBot, Headlikeawhole, Bellerophon, MiddleSt0rm, N419BH, Prezbo, RightCowLeftCoast, IO Device, Kippenvlees1, Pepper, XnubbXcakeX, Wooly15, RCPayne, Pinethicket, Pink Bull, Phneutral, Hoo man, Blueteamguy, Brandonf22, Shanmugamp7, Wikielwikingo, Vrenator, Reaper Eternal, Diannaa, Suffusion of Yellow, Tbhotch, Reach Out to the Truth, TheMesquito, Minimac, DARTH SIDIOUS 2, Josh9989, DexDor, ChadTycoon1, Slon02, EmausBot, Gfoley4, Katherine, IncognitoErgoSum, Evanfleak, RA0808, RenamedUser01302013, Slightsmile, Hounder4, Tommy2010, Wikipelli, Bssasidhar, Shootgunners, 15turnsm, John Cline, LostAlone, Kiwi128, Aeonx, SporkBot, Ojb0110, Wayne Slam, TyA, Reddestroy7, IGeMiNix, Coasterlover1994, L Kensington, Aresofwar, Orange Suede Sofa, ChuispastonBot, Donalm123, Socialservice, Sonicyouth86, Petrb, Xanchester, ClueBot NG, SpikeTorontoRCP, Smtchahal, Defta, Jack Greenmaven, TheManOfMuchAwesome, Bonqueisha, NOTosama, Dopeguy33, Scarunner, Katiker, Brett solylo, Ambushers55555, Kylelesta, Lvl 17 Newb, Juno123456789, Lahedoniste, Sadsack75, Chuck norris15796, Tcroweisbeast, Narutorox72, MadForPlaid, O.Koslowski, Laker repeat, Kittychange, Bill2007805, Borderlandsguy22, Justin w12, Te1005, Leftgreenday13, XdomX, XKronikz, Chico98, Ill NO SCOPE U, Awesometurds1234, Jk2q3jrklse, Crimebreaker1, Bloodiedyou, Skilledsnow, Shoemakerdalton, Primus202, Oliver521, Simonjames90, Bankboy1257, Cheese190, Shootmehballsoff, 09gibbn, MusikAnimal, Iipeanut, Kdoggy80, Dawnofwar345, Aranea Mortem, BlackOpsComedy12, Bighotbannanas, Wwi79581, Destroyer344, Fuzz IFuzion, Im black ops, MistVillageNinja, Fluxboy6789, Insidiae, Glacialfox, Harry2512, Turnr44, Themacinator, SloppyPoopBag, MofoMofo500, Harlem SWAGG, Teammm, Riza32, Mdann52, Aarongaunt, EuroCarGT, Webclient101, Fasian89, StealthHawk69, Therdrbog, David Penn101, TwoTwoHello, Peronter77, Steve4444 1, Peronter777, Learner4444, Epic proman, Kilek15, Derpy hooves22, Coolhaviet, LaceUpLove, Joeather91, Jonmun, YiFeiBot, Ginsuloft, Cms2013, Gloriousglib, YOLOSWAGG123, WeedMan69, Danielramsay, Plodom, Yoopoo~enwiki, Monkbot, Blackops1251, Its Not Brandon Its Brunden, Jaoiscute, Ruighsuihgiuofad, Sbucksx, Anonymouslolzzz and Anonymous: 465 • Clandestine cell system Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clandestine%20cell%20system?oldid=662042608 Contributors: Edward, Tom harrison, Sherurcij, Hu, Tournesol, GraemeLeggett, Rjwilmsi, VolatileChemical, Kajerm, Allens, SmackBot, Premjs, Chris the speller, Sadads, Colonies Chris, Rogermw, Bigmantonyd, Makyen, CmdrObot, Cydebot, Dougweller, Hcberkowitz, Nick Number, John3103, Erxnmedia, VoABot II, Kyle the bot, RaseaC, Justmeherenow, Laval, StAnselm, Colfer2, ClueBot, Cmmmm, NuclearWarfare, Wprlh, L33tkrew, ApocalypseNow115, Boleyn, Dthomsen8, JimmyPowell323, Addbot, Rejectwater, Profitoftruth85, OlEnglish, Zorrobot, Yobot, Ptbotgourou, AnomieBOT, Galoubet, Xqbot, Noamz, Gighli, FrescoBot, Citation bot 1, Jonathandeamer, RedBot, Captain Screebo, Rocketrod1960, ClueBot NG, Helpful Pixie Bot, Andrew Gwilliam, PhnomPencil, LNCP, LouKay1000, Mogism, KindaSortaInTheArmyOnce, Comp.arch, Monkbot, Jetpax and Anonymous: 34 • Clandestine HUMINT Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clandestine%20HUMINT?oldid=649116508 Contributors: Edward, Chrism, UtherSRG, ALE!, Kingal86, Ari Rahikkala, Danhash, RJFJR, Woohookitty, Rjwilmsi, Jivecat, Jrtayloriv, RussBot, Filippof,

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CHAPTER 30. SURVEILLANCE

Arado, Stephenb, PanchoS, Abrio, SmackBot, Addshore, Futurepotentate, ShelfSkewed, J-boogie, Hcberkowitz, Postlewaight, Erxnmedia, Magioladitis, R'n'B, AzureCitizen, Billinghurst, SwordSmurf, Xavexgoem, SchreiberBike, Jonverve, Plausible to deny, WikiDao, Addbot, PMLawrence, Citation bot, FrescoBot, Citation bot 1, Skakkle, RjwilmsiBot, H3llBot, Helpful Pixie Bot, ElliotX, Mogism, Monkbot, Thebionicman and Anonymous: 22 • Clandestine HUMINT and covert action Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clandestine%20HUMINT%20and%20covert%20action? oldid=620769789 Contributors: HaeB, Neutrality, Rama, Crosbiesmith, Canderson7, Rjwilmsi, Cassowary, Rxnd, SmackBot, Mauls, Sadads, Colonies Chris, ALR, JohnI, Robofish, Vints, AndrewHowse, Cydebot, Hcberkowitz, Erxnmedia, JaGa, Jevansen, Quisquillian, PeterWD, RTG, Yobot, AnomieBOT, Citation bot, Military photographer, RjwilmsiBot, Al83tito, Helpful Pixie Bot, Fwebel, Monkbot and Anonymous: 8 • Clandestine HUMINT operational techniques Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clandestine%20HUMINT%20operational% 20techniques?oldid=654387220 Contributors: Lowellian, Klemen Kocjancic, Kingal86, Rama, YUL89YYZ, Cagliost, Mashford, Amorymeltzer, Woohookitty, Apokrif, Rajanala83, Neoeinstein, Rjwilmsi, SchuminWeb, Brash, RussBot, Kirill Lokshin, Aeusoes1, Victor falk, SmackBot, Kintetsubuffalo, Autarch, Gamgee, Gobonobo, Robofish, Cydebot, Hcberkowitz, Mk*, Erxnmedia, Destynova, JaGa, Amarand, JamesR, JL-Bot, ImageRemovalBot, Ecjmartin, Pinkpedaller, Richard-of-Earth, Plausible to deny, Lucian Sunday, Graphiurus Ocularis, Yobot, Donfbreed, AnomieBOT, Citation bot, Gilo1969, FrescoBot, Citation bot 1, John of Reading, H3llBot, Snotbot, Helpful Pixie Bot, Tom Pippens, Mdy66, BattyBot, Tentinator and Anonymous: 22 • Concealment device Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Concealment%20device?oldid=656792571 Contributors: Patrick, AndreaPersephone, Dysprosia, Fvw, Securiger, Zigger, Ich, Austin Hair, ArnoldReinhold, Violetriga, Mangojuice, Eyreland, Stefanomione, Siddhant, GraemeL, SmackBot, Mmernex, Hmains, Chris the speller, Bluebot, Moshe Constantine Hassan Al-Silverburg, Frap, Beetstra, Wbadair, Gogo Dodo, Nabokov, Jm3, Ingolfson, EyeSerene, WarthogDemon, Dg2006, Cs302b, Coffee, Polartch, Mild Bill Hiccup, XLinkBot, Exegete48, Lakerfan48, Advancesafes55, Bodysecurity, Regina Jacques, PepperEyes, Mean as custard, Wingman4l7, Arg342, Morris Goldstein and Anonymous: 29 • Cryptography Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptography?oldid=662662018 Contributors: AxelBoldt, WojPob, LC~enwiki, Brion VIBBER, Mav, Uriyan, Zundark, The Anome, Taw, Ap, Tao~enwiki, Ted Longstaffe, Dachshund, Arvindn, Gianfranco, PierreAbbat, Ortolan88, Roadrunner, Boleslav Bobcik, Maury Markowitz, Imran, Graft, Heron, Sfdan, Stevertigo, Nevilley, Patrick, Chas zzz brown, Michael Hardy, GABaker, Dante Alighieri, Liftarn, Ixfd64, Cyde, TakuyaMurata, Karada, Dori, (, Goatasaur, Card~enwiki, Ahoerstemeier, DavidWBrooks, ZoeB, Theresa knott, Cferrero, Jdforrester, Julesd, Glenn, Kylet, Nikai, Andres, Cimon Avaro, Evercat, Delifisek, Dgreen34, Schneelocke, Norwikian, Revolver, Novum, Htaccess, Timwi, Wikiborg, Dmsar, Ww, Dysprosia, Jitse Niesen, Phr, The Anomebot, Greenrd, Dtgm, Tpbradbury, GimmeFuel, K1Bond007, Tempshill, Ed g2s, Raul654, Rbellin, Pakaran, Jeffq, Ckape, Robbot, Fredrik, Chris 73, RedWolf, Donreed, Altenmann, Kuszi, Securiger, Georg Muntingh, MathMartin, Jsdeancoearthlink.net, Academic Challenger, Meelar, Timrollpickering, Rasmus Faber, Cyrius, Mattflaschen, Ludraman, Tobias Bergemann, Dave6, Snobot, Giftlite, Dbenbenn, Jacoplane, HippoMan, Wolfkeeper, Netoholic, Farnik, Peruvianllama, Michael Devore, Yekrats, Per Honor et Gloria, Sietse, Mboverload, Ferdinand Pienaar, Matt Crypto, Mobius, Neilc, Gubbubu, Geni, CryptoDerk, Antandrus, Beland, Vanished user 1234567890, Pale blue dot, Rdsmith4, APH, Mzajac, Euphoria, SimonLyall, Oiarbovnb, TiMike, Ta bu shi da yu, Freakofnurture, Monkeyman, Blokhead, Heryu~enwiki, Mark Zinthefer, Moverton, Discospinster, Rich Farmbrough, Guanabot, MaxMad, ArnoldReinhold, YUL89YYZ, Ivan Bajlo, Paul August, DcoetzeeBot~enwiki, Bender235, TerraFrost, Surachit, JRM, Prsephone1674, Bobo192, Stesmo, Harley peters, AnyFile, John Vandenberg, Myria, Jericho4.0, Davidgothberg, Slipperyweasel, Wrs1864, ClementSeveillac, M5, Stephen G. Brown, LoganK, Msh210, Wereldburger758, Alansohn, JYolkowski, Dhar, Mo0, Fg, Seamusandrosy, Complex01, ABCD, Logologist, InShaneee, Avenue, Snowolf, Super-Magician, Saga City, Zyarb, Daedelus, Egg, H2g2bob, Vadim Makarov, Richwales, Oleg Alexandrov, Zntrip, Woohookitty, Mindmatrix, Justinlebar, Deeahbz, Jacobolus, Madchester, E=MC^2, Brentdax, Duncan.france, Nfearnley, Shmitra, Jok2000, Wikiklrsc, Mangojuice, SDC, Plrk, DarkBard, Cedrus-Libani, Stefanomione, Turnstep, Jimgawn, Tslocum, Graham87, Abach, FreplySpang, Vyse, JIP, Sinar~enwiki, Jorunn, Sjakkalle, Ner102, Rjwilmsi, Demian12358, Adjusting, MarSch, Mike Segal, Edggar, Miserlou, HappyCamper, Brighterorange, The wub, DoubleBlue, Volfy, CBR1kboy, Vuong Ngan Ha, RobertG, Mathbot, Gouldja, PleaseSendMoneyToWikipedia, Crazycomputers, Jameshfisher, RobyWayne, KFP, King of Hearts, Chobot, Manscher, Roboto de Ajvol, Siddhant, Wavelength, Laurentius, Auyongcheemeng, Mukkakukaku, RussBot, Lpmusix, Pigman, Manop, The1physicist, Gaius Cornelius, Chaos, Zeno of Elea, NawlinWiki, Welsh, Joel7687, Exir Kamalabadi, Proidiot, ONEder Boy, Schlafly, DavidJablon, Thiseye, Dhollm, Peter Delmonte, Misza13, Grafikm fr, Xompanthy, Deckiller, BOT-Superzerocool, Jeremy Visser, FF2010, 21655, Papergrl, Closedmouth, Nemu, CharlesHBennett, Aeon1006, Peyna, Bernd Paysan, Echartre, Anclation~enwiki, Wbrameld, Who-is-me, MagneticFlux, Crazyquesadilla, Endymi0n, Dr1819, DVD R W, ChemGardener, Yakudza, A bit iffy, SmackBot, Sean.nobles, Mmernex, Nihonjoe, 1dragon, Impaciente, Uncle Lemon, Jacek Kendysz, Jagged 85, Jrockley, David G Brault, BiT, JohnMac777, Mauls, Peter Isotalo, Gilliam, Ohnoitsjamie, Hmains, Skizzik, Chaojoker, Lakshmin, Chris the speller, Ciacchi, Agateller, Hibbleton, Thumperward, Delfeye, Snori, Alan smithee, PrimeHunter, Iago4096, NYKevin, DevSolar, Vkareh, ZachPruckowski, DrDnar, Wes!, Rashad9607, Alieseraj, Kazov, Wonderstruck, Maxt, DRLB, OutRIAAge, Sovietmah, Bidabadi~enwiki, Chungc, Andrewrabbott, Harryboyles, Dr. Sunglasses, Molerat, Fatespeaks, Ksn, Sidmow, JoshuaZ, Minna Sora no Shita, ManiF, Michael miceli, Jacopo, Ryanwammons, Slayemin, Chrisd87, Eltzermay, Meco, TastyPoutine, Dhp1080, Serlin, DeathLoofah, Drink666, Hectorian, DouglasCalvert, RudyB, Judgesurreal777, Pegasus1138, Detach, Shenron, Nightswatch, Gilabrand, Tawkerbot2, Chetvorno, Jafet, Powerslide, Sansbras, CRGreathouse, Hermitage17, Crownjewel82, BeenAroundAWhile, Thehockeydude44, CWY2190, Saoirse11, Raghunath88, Blackvault, Grandexandi, Cydebot, Ntsimp, Mblumber, John Yesberg, Gogo Dodo, Corpx, Tawkerbot4, XP105, Kozuch, Brad101, Omicronpersei8, Robertsteadman, Antura, Pallas44, Saber Cherry, Oerjan, Mojo Hand, Lotte Monz, Dgies, DPdH, Scircle, AntiVandalBot, Luna Santin, Jj137, Dylan Lake, Oddity-, G Rose, JAnDbot, Monkeymonkey11, Komponisto, WPIsFlawed, Hut 8.5, GurchBot, SCCC, Jahoe, Richard Burr, Acroterion, KooIkirby, Calcton, Hong ton po, MoleRat, CrazyComputers, Heinze~enwiki, MooCowz69, Connormah, Bongwarrior, VoABot II, Nyq, Michi.bo, Nyttend, Homunq, KConWiki, David Eppstein, NoychoH, Havanafreestone, JaGa, Mmustafa~enwiki, BetBot~enwiki, Rettetast, Speck-Made, David Nicoson, Glrx, CommonsDelinker, Artaxiad, J.delanoy, Hans Dunkelberg, Maurice Carbonaro, Syphertext, Cadence-, Darth Mike, Salih, MezzoMezzo, Touisiau, AntiSpamBot, SJP, Wilson.canadian, Chandu iiet, R Math, Treisijs, Ross Fraser, Adam7117, Remi0o, Reddy212, Cralar, Tw mama, Mrstoltz, VolkovBot, Thomas.W, Macedonian, DSRH, JohnBlackburne, Jimmaths, Greatdebtor, Mercurish, TXiKiBoT, Oshwah, GimmeBot, MPA Neto, Xnquist, Qxz, DavidSaff, Ocolon, TedColes, Praveen pillay, Abdullais4u, Msanford, LeaveSleaves, Geometry guy, Bkassay, Rich5411, Symane, Legoktm, NHRHS2010, Radagast3, Botev, SieBot, TJRC, Nihil novi, Moonriddengirl, James Banogon, Caltas, Yintan, Browner87, Mayevski, Yob kejor, Branger~enwiki, Enti342, WannabeAmatureHistorian, Lightmouse, Skippydo, StaticGull, Hamiltondaniel, Secrefy, PerryTachett, Tom Reedy, Joel Rennie, Dlrohrer2003, Leranedo, WikipedianMarlith, ClueBot, Binksternet, The Thing That Should Not Be, JuPitEer, Niceguyedc, Mspraveen, Sv1xv, Excirial, Infomade, Ziko, Lunchscale, Jpmelos, Kakofonous, Unmerklich, Aitias, Johnuniq, MasterOfHisOwnDomain, Skunkboy74, Bletchley, XLinkBot, Hotcrocodile, IAMTrust, Bill431412, Kbdankbot, IsmaelLuceno, B Fizz, Addbot, Ghettoblaster, Some jerk on the Internet, DOI bot, Mabdul, CL, Madmax8712,

30.9. TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

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Ninja1123, JohnDoe4000, Buddy mohit, Claw of Slime, Monkbot, Cayelr, Jordanbailey123456789, BrayLockBoy, Shammie23, Ephemeratta, Hannasnow, Garfield Garfield, Phayzfaustyn, Je.est.un.autre, Redkilla007, Whikie, Suspender guy, TD-Linux, Bagulbol, Crypto Funcault, Sizzy1337, TheCoffeeAddict, Opalraava, JellyPatotie, SoSivr, Gauntman1, Zabineph and Anonymous: 690 • Cut-out (espionage) Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cut-out%20(espionage)?oldid=624926409 Contributors: JamesMLane, Eyreland, NielsenGW, Eponym~enwiki, Alaibot, PamD, Jim.henderson, Laughingyet, Phe-bot, M carteron, TopherGZ, Addbot, Yobot, 1955alan, Deeptext, George Makepeace and Anonymous: 9 • Dead drop Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dead%20drop?oldid=656893493 Contributors: The Anome, Patrick, Karada, Delirium, Zigger, Karn, Sonjaaa, Quarl, Frankieroberto, Zondor, Closeapple, Anthony Appleyard, PeteVerdon, Hypo, RainbowOfLight, Pauli133, Drbreznjev, Richard Arthur Norton (1958- ), Mangojuice, Stefanomione, Jemiller226, Nightscream, Vegaswikian, Ewlyahoocom, VolatileChemical, Anders.Warga, Mikeblas, GeoffCapp, Arthur Rubin, Yvwv, SmackBot, McGeddon, Bonjedward, Marktreut, Bluebot, CrookedAsterisk, Thumperward, Victorgrigas, Bazonka, Yahya PL, Onorem, Gamgee, Ceoil, Al1encas1no, Kencf0618, Wbadair, CmdrObot, Runningonbrains, VaGuy1973, Synergy, Nabokov, NorthernThunder, Thijs!bot, Jm3, Hcberkowitz, Albany NY, LorenzoB, Bo Basil, JhsBot, WereSpielChequers, Oda Mari, Camille Grey, AngelOfSadness, Kanonkas, Socrates2008, Miami33139, Addbot, Hda3ku, Ccacsmss, Favonian, Mfhulskemper, Luckas-bot, Ptbotgourou, Kookyunii, Bobmack89x, LukeSearle, Bit Wrangler, DexDor, EmausBot, ZéroBot, Mikhail Ryazanov, ClueBot NG, Pzenner, Helpful Pixie Bot, IvanGroznij, IronOak, FiveColourMap, BattyBot, Diab0lix42 and Anonymous: 45 • Denial and deception Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denial%20and%20deception?oldid=645323086 Contributors: Skysmith, Bearcat, Malcolma, Victor falk, Penbat, Chiswick Chap, Twinsday, Blaylockjam10, AnomieBOT, Elizabeth Blandra, Hcdc12, EyeTruth, Jrb434, Andrea edits and Anonymous: 4 • Direct action (military) Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Direct%20action%20(military)?oldid=642318892 Contributors: Snorre, Julesd, Cjrother, Klemen Kocjancic, Brianhe, Woohookitty, Jeff3000, Rjwilmsi, RussBot, Filippof, Petiatil, Rwalker, SmackBot, Incnis Mrsi, Hippo43, Gamgee, ALR, Lambiam, JohnI, Iridescent, Hcberkowitz, Heroeswithmetaphors, Erxnmedia, Outdawg, ImageRemovalBot, LordJesseD, Addbot, Download, Yobot, AnomieBOT, Drilnoth, Omnipaedista, DrilBot, RedBot, Adi4094, Bunnyman78, John of Reading, ZéroBot, Saebvn, Helpful Pixie Bot, Charliemurphy80, Mark Arsten, PlasmaTime, Mogism, XXzoonamiXX, Bluewhizard1001, Monkbot and Anonymous: 21 • Eavesdropping Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eavesdropping?oldid=642650964 Contributors: Magnus Manske, Waveguy, Kku, Menchi, TakuyaMurata, Skysmith, Docu, Kingturtle, Kaihsu, John K, Lee M, DJ Clayworth, Kierant, Joy, Khym Chanur, Securiger, Postdlf, Wereon, Zigger, Abu el mot~enwiki, Jh51681, Talkstosocks, Longhair, Jag123, Pearle, Alansohn, Gargaj, AndreasPraefcke, Mangojuice, Stefanomione, BD2412, FlaBot, Ground Zero, YurikBot, Mikeblas, Occono, EEMIV, Elkman, Zzuuzz, Nikkimaria, Ekeb, Rearden9, Junglecat, SmackBot, Betacommand, Rmosler2100, Chris the speller, Bluebot, Shalom Yechiel, Ortzinator, Cybercobra, Givenez, Joystick74, Tazmaniacs, Loodog, Ckatz, 16@r, Colonel Warden, Lord E, McQuack, JForget, CBM, Cydebot, Playtime, Clayoquot, SimonDeDanser, MafiaCapo, M. B., Jr., Luigifan, NigelR, Fayenatic london, Jaysweet, Escorial82, MartinBot, Morki, Keith D, LedgendGamer, Pharaoh of the Wizards, Jeepday, Flatscan, KimiSan, Sağlamcı, Melsaran, SieBot, Dreamafter, Flyer22, Kjtobo, Pinkadelica, Denisarona, Sandy of the CSARs, Martarius, ClueBot, Stevehs, DionysosProteus, Mike Klaassen, Shaliya waya, BOTarate, Vigilius, Mitch Ames, Kbdankbot, Cewvero, Addbot, RFBugExpert, Ielvis, OmgDALE, SamatBot, Herr Gruber, Luckas Blade, Luckas-bot, Yobot, Citation bot, Xqbot, Mononomic, Charles D. Ward, GrouchoBot, SassoBot, Thehelpfulbot, AlexanderKaras, Citation bot 1, Bsandoval, Lotje, MrJackCole, Werieth, Youngeuropean, Cobaltcigs, ClueBot NG, Helpful Pixie Bot, Mark Arsten, Stevenbeaupre, Essam4002, Anonz 8431, Flat Out, Dodi 8238, Abracombie, ChrisHF, Suctioninfo2, Amortias and Anonymous: 128 • Espionage Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Espionage?oldid=661334640 Contributors: AxelBoldt, The Cunctator, WojPob, The Anome, Berek, Fubar Obfusco, Roadrunner, SimonP, Mintguy, AntonioMartin, Lisiate, Stevertigo, Edward, Patrick, Kchishol1970, Infrogmation, Michael Hardy, Erik Zachte, Isomorphic, Tannin, Taras, Zeno Gantner, Karada, Skysmith, (, Chadloder, Stw, Ahoerstemeier, TUF-KAT, SeanO, Aarchiba, Michael, Julesd, Michael Shields, Jiang, Shino Baku, GCarty, Emperorbma, Ww, Jay, Andrewman327, The Anomebot, Birkett, Tpbradbury, Kaare, Mrand, Dogface, Populus, Omegatron, Jusjih, Lumos3, PuzzletChung, Robbot, Frank A, Vardion, RedWolf, Donreed, Modulatum, Securiger, GreatWhiteNortherner, Tobias Bergemann, Dave6, Gobeirne, DocWatson42, Gtrmp, Treanna~enwiki, Taion, Eran, Fastfission, Zigger, Marcika, Ich, Bkonrad, Perl, DO'Neil, Mefisk, Gracefool, Matt Crypto, Rjyanco, Bobblewik, Richard Myers, Btphelps, Andycjp, Fys, H1523702, Sonjaaa, Beland, Onco p53, Loremaster, Robert Brockway, Khaosworks, Billposer, Nzpcmad, Mzajac, Gscshoyru, Neutrality, Urhixidur, Trilobite, M1ss1ontomars2k4, Canterbury Tail, Mennonot, Lacrimosus, Wassim~enwiki, Kingal86, Rfl, N328KF, Lubaf, AlexPU, Discospinster, Rich Farmbrough, Guanabot, Marxmax~enwiki, Misha Stepanov, ArnoldReinhold, Prateep, Darren Olivier, Dbachmann, Paul August, ESkog, Jaberwocky6669, Mr. Billion, Vinsci, Chairboy, Shanes, Palm dogg, Elpuellodiablo, Jpgordon, Bobo192, Ogg, Circeus, Sortior, Robotje, Keron Cyst, R. S. Shaw, Elipongo, Diceman, SpeedyGonsales, Kbir1, Alansohn, ChrisGlew, Polarscribe, Calton, Mrholybrain, Feb30th1712, Hypo, Wtmitchell, Ronark, Cromwellt, M3tainfo, Evil Monkey, RJFJR, IMeowbot, Geraldshields11, Rajprem, HenryLi, BadSeed, Tintin1107, Evolve75, OwenX, Woohookitty, JPiper, RHaworth, Georgia guy, Scriberius, JeremyA, Jeff3000, JRHorse, GregorB, Eras-mus, Eilthireach, KKramer~enwiki, GraemeLeggett, Doge120, Mario Profaca, KrisW6, Graham87, Descendall, Cuchullain, Jetekus, MC MasterChef, JIP, Rjwilmsi, Rogerd, Commander, Eyu100, Pako, Harro5, Ligulem, SeanMack, CAPS LOCK, Mirror Vax, SchuminWeb, CooldogCongo, Ground Zero, Chinfo, Pathoschild,

178

CHAPTER 30. SURVEILLANCE

Ewlyahoocom, Gurch, AndriuZ, Chorny, Alphachimp, LeCire~enwiki, Milomedes, Gareth E Kegg, Phoenix2~enwiki, King of Hearts, VolatileChemical, Wikizen, RussBot, John Quincy Adding Machine, Pburka, Taejo, Briaboru, King Zeal, Nobs01, Crumbsucker, SpuriousQ, Akamad, Stephenb, The Hokkaido Crow, Anomalocaris, Magnoliasouth, Wiki alf, Sjms, Mike18xx, Joshdboz, Aboverepine, Dforest, Rjensen, NYScholar, BirgitteSB, Goffrie, Ruzmanci, JulesH, Alex43223, Aleichem, Cerejota, M3taphysical, Zarboki, WAS 4.250, FF2010, Ninly, Sanmarcos, Breakfastchief, Canley, BorgQueen, David Biddulph, Bdve, Moomoomoo, Tyrhinis, DVD R W, That Guy, From That Show!, Sardanaphalus, SmackBot, Terrancommander, Reedy, KnowledgeOfSelf, Pgk, Lawrie, Yuyudevil, Jagged 85, Midway, Verne Equinox, Antrophica, Mdd4696, William Case Morris, Flamarande, HalfShadow, Mauls, Alsandro, Markeer, Gilliam, Hmains, Durova, KD5TVI, Wuffyz, Swanner, Fplay, Solidusspriggan, Monkeycheetah, Darth Panda, Gracenotes, Blueshirts, Emurphy42, Malosse, Abaddon314159, Can't sleep, clown will eat me, Cobain, KaiserbBot, Squalla, Bisected8, OneEuropeanHeart, Addshore, Hateless, Nakon, KeithB, Clicketyclack, Gryffon, Dbtfz, Kuru, John, AmiDaniel, Theotherness, Gobonobo, Nkcs, Joffeloff, NYCJosh, Suprstr27, Shattered, Ckatz, Stratadrake, Werdan7, Notwist, LuYiSi, Mr Stephen, Dicklyon, Waggers, E-Kartoffel, [email protected], Andrwsc, Zapvet, Darry2385, Hu12, Iridescent, Impy4ever, Dakart, IvanLanin, Esurnir, DEddy, Angeldeb82, Chetvorno, ChrisCork, Heqs, Eastlaw, Coolioom, JForget, Stadler981, CmdrObot, Patchouli, Ninetyone, Charvex, Chmee2, Cwawak, Yopienso, Omnicog, Kirkesque, Jimiruin, Gogo Dodo, Ctatkinson, Otto4711, Akcarver, Optimist on the run, Ppsantos, NorthernThunder, Verstan, Thijs!bot, Epbr123, Bot-maru, StarGeek, Hcberkowitz, BSflipsRus, Sdream93, Mojo Hand, Luigifan, Zman555, CharlotteWebb, Amitauti, Adw2000, OuroborosCobra, Dawnseeker2000, Rompe, Hires an editor, AntiVandalBot, Luna Santin, Puppy Mill, Dylan Lake, Robsmyth40, LibLord, Villy van der Veelen, Leevclarke, Uusitunnus, Fluffbrain, JAnDbot, MER-C, The Transhumanist, PhilKnight, Space Ghost 900, LittleOldMe, RobJWarwick, Anne80, Zapp645, VoABot II, Jeff Dahl, Carom, JanHart, Kierenj, Bzero, KConWiki, SSZ, Bytecount, Ekotkie, Ali masharli, Atulsnischal, MartinBot, Jim.henderson, Maths Spy, R'n'B, AlexiusHoratius, EdBever, Koplimek, Toiyeumattroi, J.delanoy, Pharaoh of the Wizards, Sp3000, Lorductape, Uncle Dick, Maurice Carbonaro, WarthogDemon, DigitalCatalyst, Gurchzilla, Mrg3105, AntiSpamBot, Quarma, NewEnglandYankee, Olegwiki, Kidlittle, Cometstyles, Jamesontai, I like anal with monkeys, Henhellen, Steinberger, Chimaera1001, Sbeletre, Milnivlek, Ericdn, 212HPR, Philip Trueman, TXiKiBoT, Faktados, DBZROCKS, Slysplace, Александр любит мальчики, Supertask, AllGloryToTheHypnotoad, LeaveSleaves, Snowbot, StillTrill, Prof77, CO, Madhero88, Doug, Falcon8765, Karl benjamin, Logan, NHRHS2010, S8333631, Glenjenvey, SieBot, Caltas, Exemplar sententia, Bentogoa, Breawycker, Moonraker12, Camille Grey, Dipakgoyal, Oxymoron83, Mexihcatlacatl, Faradayplank, Lightmouse, Reginmund, 48states, Fishnet37222, Timeandscpace, WikipedianMarlith, Larrybao2299, Martarius, Beeblebrox, ClueBot, LAX, Childear, Timeineurope, Trfasulo, Itskamilo, The Thing That Should Not Be, All Hallow’s Wraith, Dean Wormer, Boing! said Zebedee, CounterVandalismBot, FIT1005, Niceguyedc, Cirt, Excirial, Waiwai933, Torquilmac, Human.v2.0, Dalac, Tyler, NuclearWarfare, Arjayay, Land111, Familyaccount04, JasonAQuest, Lord Cornwallis, Caketastic1, Berean Hunter, Local hero, Souvannaphoum, Averizi, Fantr, Jack Dumpsey, Wikiuser100, Skarebo, WikHead, Navy Blue, Sweeper tamonten, Proofreader77, Gchiste21, Zmpayne2222, Metagraph, Cst17, CarsracBot, Glane23, Favonian, Lucian Sunday, Ivor Storey, Tassedethe, Tide rolls, OlEnglish, OC Ripper, DeadDeers, Legobot, Yobot, 2D, TaBOT-zerem, Reenem, Geezer1942, Ningauble, Eric-Wester, Kookyunii, AnomieBOT, VanishedUser sdu9aya9fasdsopa, DemocraticLuntz, Psantosj, Rubinbot, Jim1138, Lightknights, Materialscientist, Rtyq2, I Feel Tired, Estlandia~enwiki, Literati666, Grim23, DoveNJ, Champlax, Polartec239, Jack Masamune, Malkman, HoundsOfSpring, IShadowed, Fine491, N419BH, Shadowjams, Joxemai, Astatine-210, Prari, FrescoBot, Etrangere, Komitsuki, Tobby72, Ironboy11, The craziest one, Swordsmankirby, Bobmack89x, Scootercatter, Pinethicket, Abductive, Flick88, LittleWink, Locke jr, Calmer Waters, Tinton5, Moonraker, Rochdalehornet, Vinie007, Monkeymanman, Jauhienij, MAJArkay, Lotje, Diannaa, DARTH SIDIOUS 2, Ricanmami10000, Mean as custard, RjwilmsiBot, TjBot, DexDor, Misconceptions2, Pangeanempire, Jack Schlederer, EmausBot, John of Reading, Dexter.Brolls, Nuujinn, Hackydude94, KARL RAN, Mysterygutarman, Tommy2010, Wikipelli, AsceticRose, Sabres87, AvicBot, John Cline, Fæ, Ahears, Wackywace, Blatantspace, Kilpazz, The Nut, Ossquiz, BredoteauU2, Aeonx, EneMsty12, MJkingofpop0000, SporkBot, Makecat, Mokaroux, Whatsthatcomingoverthehill, Peterh5322, ‫أحمد محمد بسيوني‬, L Kensington, Tijfo098, Peter Karlsen, Youarepoopy, Zabanio, Brandonxbrutality, TheVoidmm, Paddingtonbaer, ClueBot NG, Michaelmas1957, AerobicFox, Chester Markel, Dand37, Cntras, O.Koslowski, Suresh 5, Widr, MerlIwBot, Fazilfazil, Helpful Pixie Bot, HMSSolent, Mikeshelton1, BG19bot, Northamerica1000, Arcanicus, PLOCHAD, Mark Arsten, Travelour, Lspiste, RJR3333, Johnny Squeaky, LoneWolf1992, TBrandley, 220 of Borg, Busy Moose, Wannabemodel, Lieutenant of Melkor, BattyBot, W.D., McKeaverSpy, JohnA747, The Illusive Man, Comatmebro, CarrieVS, 2Flows, MadGuy7023, Thiseffinplot, Dexbot, Cwobeel, Gksamsa15, Webclient101, Mogism, XXzoonamiXX, Lugia2453, BDE1982, GabeIglesia, Blaue Max, Stephendcalhoun, PinkAmpersand, Tjwilson442, Vanamonde93, BerFinelli, AmaryllisGardener, Fartfartfartfart, Melonkelon, Irishdude06, Popsiclestick123, ProtossPylon, Singer825, DrManhattan11, Vernmildew, Samlumonag, CaptJack15, Dannyruthe, Blondeguynative, Dinosaursoldier, Dodi 8238, 32RB17, Defalbe, Imdonne, Rezyboy2, BoboMeowCat, Sciophobiaranger, ETBlogs, Gogogone1212121212121212121211, Crystallizedcarbon, Student1234321, TJWilson443, Ecalbier, Drmrc, Cybertex sucks and Anonymous: 647 • False flag Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/False%20flag?oldid=660474509 Contributors: Olivier, Jdlh, Michael Hardy, Ixfd64, IZAK, Skysmith, Kingturtle, Ugen64, GCarty, Wikiborg, Furrykef, Tempshill, AnonMoos, Vardion, PBS, Donreed, ZimZalaBim, Bkell, Carnildo, Tom harrison, Capitalistroadster, Iceberg3k, Tagishsimon, GeneMosher, Tothebarricades.tk, Kevin B12, Asbestos, Neutrality, Klemen Kocjancic, Cab88, D6, Jayjg, Discospinster, Wikiacc, Narsil, Kostja, Antaeus Feldspar, Bender235, El C, Ascorbic, Cacophony, Martey, Mike Schwartz, John Vandenberg, Wiki-Ed, Toh, Hardy, La goutte de pluie, BM, Idleguy, Mrzaius, Alansohn, Uncle.bungle, Hackwrench, Geo Swan, PatrickFisher, Ynhockey, Malo, Bart133, Max rspct, M3tainfo, Lapinmies, Kober, Vuo, Alai, LukeSurl, Zntrip, Hq3473, Richard Arthur Norton (1958- ), OwenX, Woohookitty, Mindmatrix, Timharwoodx, Jeff3000, MONGO, Mangojuice, SDC, Plrk, Stefanomione, Betsythedevine, Mandarax, RedBLACKandBURN, Graham87, A Train, Kbdank71, Dpr, Rjwilmsi, Bill Cannon, Carbonite, Jtpaladin, The wub, Tarc, KiernMoran, Fred Bradstadt, Cassowary, Ground Zero, FrancisDrake, MacRusgail, GagHalfrunt, Tequendamia, Diza, Coolhawks88, Bgwhite, WriterHound, Cornellrockey, Jayme, Subwayguy, YurikBot, Kollision, Jimp, John Quincy Adding Machine, Briaboru, Zafiroblue05, DanMS, Kirill Lokshin, Shaddack, Big Brother 1984, Aryaniae, LaszloWalrus, Grafen, Nutiketaiel, Aaron Brenneman, Lomn, Ospalh, Syrthiss, IceWeasel, BusterD, Miraculouschaos, Closedmouth, E Wing, Petri Krohn, Garybel, Shyam, Ephilei, Kurai, Jeff Silvers, Paul Pieniezny, Victor falk, JohnLeonard, SmackBot, Nicolas Barbier, Stifle, Kintetsubuffalo, Nil Einne, Portillo, GoldDragon, Ksenon, Kaliz, Jprg1966, Hugzz, Sloane, Paulfp, Sb617, AKMask, Tewfik, Xeryus, Ian Burnet~enwiki, Chendy, Ncameron, JRPG, Tim Pierce, Geoffrey Gibson, Bolivian Unicyclist, Robma, Cybercobra, Akral, Xyzzy n, Chrylis, Weregerbil, Doodle77, Xiutwel, Kukini, Tesseran, Crouchbk, Byelf2007, Ser Amantio di Nicolao, Tazmaniacs, Robofish, JoshuaZ, Mgiganteus1, Minglex, Cmh, Karlwiegand, Meco, Dr.K., SmokeyJoe, OnBeyondZebrax, Skandaprasadn, Clarityfiend, Poechalkdust, Hwonder, Joseph Solis in Australia, AlexLibman, Phoenixrod, Lent, Generalcp702, Ehistory, CmdrObot, Megaboz, Olaf Davis, Erik Kennedy, Dgw, Outriggr, Cydebot, Treybien, Goldfritha, Gogo Dodo, Manik52, DumbBOT, Patrick O'Leary, Mathew5000, Septagram, Satori Son, Mamalujo, Malleus Fatuorum, Thijs!bot, Interested2, Ucanlookitup, Hcberkowitz, Bobblehead, Davidhorman, Kingnixon, Oreo Priest, AntiVandalBot, Opelio, JHFTC, Joe Schmedley, Legitimus, Arkan5, Erxnmedia, JAnDbot, MarritzN, Minitrue, Attarparn, Lsi, Acroterion, Bencherlite, Canjth, Parsecboy, NeoJudus, LCJ, SSZ, Bryanpeterson, JaGa, Pax:Vobiscum, Gwern, Dan Dean, Phantomsnake, General Jazza, Ekotekk, KTo288, Nono64, Pharaoh of the Wizards, PCock, Rodrigo braz, PalestineRemembered, JPLeonard, Maurice Carbonaro, Hodja Nasreddin, Cop 663, Gross-

30.9. TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

179

cha, RenniePet, Chiswick Chap, Spartelite, C1010, DadaNeem, Xyl 54, Vanished user 39948282, Julyda4th, WLRoss, Ashcroftgm, Morenooso, Indubitably, Nug, TXiKiBoT, Xenophrenic, Zurishaddai, Room429, EnglishDez, Jaqen, Andrewaskew, Enigmaman, Spadgos, THEODICEAN, AlleborgoBot, GavinTing, Guerillamarketing, StAnselm, DarknessEnthroned, Rabbeinu, Pretest, Jc-S0CO, Fredburks, Cicorp, Tensaijeff, Anakin101, Capitalismojo, ZaneSteez, LarRan, Sab128, Startswithj, Hoplon, MenoBot, ClueBot, MBD123, The thing is, Binksternet, Mild Bill Hiccup, Foofbun, LonelyBeacon, Trivialist, Grandpallama, Geo247, CuandoCubango, P.jasons, Xme, Mlaffs, Tony May, Thingg, Belchfire, 3d-geo, DumZiBoT, Kurdo777, Sannleikur, Ost316, Dominatrixdave, Bazj, Addbot, Mhines54, Heavenlyblue, MrZoolook, Daverogue, Disbelieve, Download, Fogeltk421, Lihaas, SpBot, Numbo3-bot, Peridon, Alanscottwalker, Lightbot, Nhalks, Aadieu, Henri rouge, PMLawrence, Reenem, AnomieBOT, VanishedUser sdu9aya9fasdsopa, Tryptofish, Jim1138, McSaddle, Short Brigade Harvester Boris, Glenfarclas, Ulric1313, Materialscientist, Fuelsaver, Tbvdm, Cliftonian, LilHelpa, Xqbot, MaxPuckett, Thouliha, Catastrophe420, Rbrt21, Srich32977, RibotBOT, A Quest For Knowledge, Shadowjams, LucienBOT, Lothar von Richthofen, Mark Renier, MurfleMan, TurningWork, Haeinous, HJ Mitchell, Liverworth, Citation bot 1, Pinethicket, Bmclaughlin9, RedBot, MastiBot, Nikolas93ts, ARMitre, Ionisiso, Princesssissi, Lotje, Defender of torch, Aoidh, Tbhotch, RjwilmsiBot, Grondemar, EmausBot, John of Reading, WikitanvirBot, GoingBatty, Slightsmile, Acidrain4696, Doelleri, ZéroBot, Ahears, Dpenn89, MRBigdeli, Lhixson, Wingman4l7, Columbia666, Carmichael, Why is pizza so good?, Farizana94, Mcc1789, 8h3d0kg, Whoop whoop pull up, ClueBot NG, Wertydm, Bazuz, CopperSquare, Helpful Pixie Bot, Legoless, Zlisha Khan, Regulov, BG19bot, Londonboy2011, Shurusheero, Shorisharo, Terry Hildebrand, Darkness Shines, Mark Arsten, Great50, Jacob van Maerlant, Harizotoh9, Turnr44, BattyBot, Gauzeandchess, Pratyya Ghosh, Ddcm8991, JYBot, Mogism, Ranze, XXzoonamiXX, Lugia2453, Keptautokeptauto, 93, Pc1985, Halsingpurg, Kabulbuddha, Jgmoneill, Chris troutman, MopSeeker, Lixinheth, GeeBee60, Ter M. Ahn, Damon161, Darkone123, Monkbot, Magma1983, Gdeblois19, Phantomop, Mister Sneeze A Lot and Anonymous: 380 • Field agent Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Field%20agent?oldid=653854580 Contributors: Paul A, Interiot, Deathphoenix, Stefanomione, Malcolma, SmackBot, Frap, Mets501, Hebrides, CSeals, MCTales, BarretB, ChenzwBot, Erik9bot, DexDor, Malcolm18, EdoBot and Anonymous: 12 • Industrial espionage Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Industrial%20espionage?oldid=659023925 Contributors: Robert Merkel, Rmhermen, Nixdorf, Jeejee, Tristanb, Mydogategodshat, Dcoetzee, Ww, WhisperToMe, Tempshill, Joy, ZimZalaBim, Securiger, Lowellian, Michael Snow, Tom harrison, Lode Runner, Niteowlneils, Per Honor et Gloria, Craverguy, Beland, Neutrality, LeoDV, Bender235, Ylee, Maurreen, Diceman, V2Blast, Bobrayner, Richard Arthur Norton (1958- ), Bushytails, Woohookitty, RHaworth, Miss Madeline, Mangojuice, Stefanomione, Xydexx, Rjwilmsi, Nightscream, Stardust8212, Ucucha, FlaBot, Joewithajay, Clintond47, YurikBot, SamuelRiv, BorgQueen, Allens, Sycthos, SmackBot, Ratarsed, McGeddon, Bd84, Eskimbot, Hmains, BesselDekker, Cybercobra, Will Beback, JzG, Rune93, Jimmy Pitt, MTSbot~enwiki, Dl2000, Stevenpam, Eastlaw, Fvasconcellos, Wolfdog, CmdrObot, The Cake is a Lie, Cydebot, Alaibot, Thijs!bot, Adw2000, Rompe, JAnDbot, Albany NY, Geniac, SteveSims, Nytewing07, Edward321, Atulsnischal, CliffC, Maurice Carbonaro, Jevansen, Sbeletre, RJASE1, Venomlord99, Philip Trueman, Chrishepner, Katoa, Shawn Fynn, Enigmaman, Silent52, SieBot, Derekcslater, Netspionage, Knifeplay2, Paintman, Android Mouse Bot 3, ClueBot, Nnemo, Trivialist, Jusdafax, Curious Blue, Ottawa4ever, XLinkBot, PseudoOne, Addbot, Jacopo Werther, Yoenit, SEI Publications, Jukkapaulin, AnnaFrance, Danprzewoz, Zorrobot, Legobot, Luckas-bot, Yobot, DerechoReguerraz, AnomieBOT, Jim1138, 206209nyc, LilHelpa, News4a2, Mr68000, Cnwilliams, Lotje, Minimac, RjwilmsiBot, 7mike5000, John of Reading, Dinhtuydzao, Sabres87, ZéroBot, Michael Essmeyer, H3llBot, EneMsty12, Wingman4l7, Silvermoonspider, Alice Margatroid, Reallawradio, Ipsign, Zabanio, Paddingtonbaer, Will Beback Auto, ClueBot NG, MelbourneStar, Camipedia, Jørdan, Mensch005, Snotbot, Pluign, Widr, Theopolisme, Helpful Pixie Bot, Joolsa123, M0rphzone, Elizabeth Blandra, FxHVC, Jd.leiser, 23W, BattyBot, Mobileteeth, Jacksin23, Mathutton, Mogism, Ecstaticreligion, XXzoonamiXX, DrManhattan11, Dannyruthe, Fixuture, ICPSGWU and Anonymous: 111 • Intelligence assessment Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intelligence%20assessment?oldid=646839174 Contributors: The Epopt, Malcolm Farmer, Stevertigo, Jeejee, Andres, Olathe, DocWatson42, Edcolins, Loremaster, Piotrus, Mzajac, Neutrality, Rich Farmbrough, ArnoldReinhold, YUL89YYZ, *drew, Remuel, Euniana, John Vandenberg, Kjkolb, Ranveig, Duffman~enwiki, Sherurcij, ClockworkSoul, Danthemankhan, Woohookitty, Kelisi, Wikiklrsc, Eras-mus, SDC, Zzyzx11, GraemeLeggett, Jemiller226, Josh Parris, Ryk, Jared Preston, YurikBot, Siddiqui, Rjensen, Suva, Moe Epsilon, Cerejota, M3taphysical, Andrew Lancaster, Gego, Sardanaphalus, SmackBot, Bluebot, Tonyalbers, CSWarren, Dearlove Menzies, OneEuropeanHeart, Cybercobra, ALR, Hmc3590, FlyHigh, Eliyak, Robofish, Green Giant, Isria, Beetstra, [email protected], DabMachine, Simon12, Iridescent, AndrewHowse, Phippi46, Alanbly, Maziotis, PamD, LuckyOne23, Hcberkowitz, Bobblehead, WinBot, Random Acts of Language, JAnDbot, Quijote3000, MER-C, Ph.eyes, Joshua, Zorro CX, Snd3054, Grandia01, CommonsDelinker, Ombudswiki, Maurice Carbonaro, Wxhat1, Lilpinoy 82, Mrg3105, Olegwiki, Dorftrottel, LogicDictates, Pnoble805, Squids and Chips, Deor, DPr77, Enviroboy, SieBot, Gredil, Sanya3, Axiomatica, Carrt81, Zulanka, SchreiberBike, Bunker Boots, Miami33139, XLinkBot, Jack Dumpsey, Th3 P0p3, Wikiuser100, Mm40, Sweeper tamonten, Felix Folio Secundus, Addbot, Lucian Sunday, ‫דוד שי‬, Htews, Luckas-bot, Yobot, Amirobot, Donovan01, Twohoos, Kookyunii, AnomieBOT, Rubinbot, Mlduda, Obersachsebot, TheAMmollusc, Peterdx, CyrParis, Trafford09, Ex13, Hatherington, Nazeem.Mustapha, Xxglennxx, Yappari, Lotje, Ogaryjr, DKDexter999, Sabres87, AvicBot, Kharados, MerlIwBot, Dodi 8238, Mrufianspain, Hannahlore and Anonymous: 76 • Intelligence cycle management Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intelligence%20cycle%20management?oldid=647389671 Contributors: Edward, Paul A, Louis-H. Campagna, HaeB, DocWatson42, GraemeLeggett, Rjwilmsi, Lockley, Ground Zero, RussBot, Madcoverboy, Welsh, SmackBot, Dave314159, Robofish, AdultSwim, Patrickwooldridge, Goatchurch, Alaibot, Hcberkowitz, Aniyochanan, Erxnmedia, Srmoon, Magioladitis, R'n'B, Nono64, Maurice Carbonaro, Chiswick Chap, Jevansen, AzureCitizen, DMCer, Roistacher, Andrewaskew, Farcaster, ForeignerFromTheEast, Mild Bill Hiccup, Dthomsen8, WikiDao, Belatrimmel, Yobot, AnomieBOT, FrescoBot, Skylark2008, Citation bot 1, Citation bot 4, LittleWink, Jonesey95, Jandalhandler, Trappist the monk, RjwilmsiBot, John of Reading, H3llBot, Snotbot, Helpful Pixie Bot, Nickken, BattyBot, ChrisGualtieri, AK456, Mr. Guye, Epicgenius, Aaallen001, Fwebel, Robert4565, JudyCS and Anonymous: 16 • Interrogation Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interrogation?oldid=655621152 Contributors: The Anome, Roadrunner, Patrick, DIG~enwiki, Ciphergoth, Lommer, Dysprosia, Tpbradbury, Altenmann, Hadal, JesseW, DocWatson42, Marcika, Ich, DO'Neil, Toytoy, Calm, Beland, Bodnotbod, Necrothesp, Sam Hocevar, Neutrality, Discospinster, Guanabot, FT2, Vapour, LeeHunter, ESkog, Viriditas, Hooperbloob, Etrigan, DrDeke, Alansohn, Anthony Appleyard, Craigy144, ZeiP, Dr Gangrene, Scriberius, Derktar, Localh77, Carcharoth, Tabletop, Triddle, Mangojuice, Mdog~enwiki, Randy2063, Kanenas, Stefanomione, GraemeLeggett, Graham87, Dwarf Kirlston, Rjwilmsi, SMC, Vegaswikian, Olessi, Crazycomputers, PhilipR, RussBot, Gaius Cornelius, Rsrikanth05, NawlinWiki, Wiki alf, Nescio, WAS 4.250, Sandstein, Modify, SmackBot, Mauls, Xaosflux, Chris the speller, Tito4000, Leoni2, The owner of all, Zvar, COMPFUNK2, Ozdaren, ALR, Acidburn24m, Gobonobo, Peterlewis, Muadd, Meco, Iridescent, Joseph Solis in Australia, Linuxerist, Rimmer, Neelix, Penbat, CPT Spaz, HalJor, Nick Wilson, Anthonyhcole, Lugnuts, Omicronpersei8, Thijs!bot, Edupedro, Mungomba, Marek69, Nick Number, Escarbot, Revolutionary92, Smartse, Alphachimpbot, Magioladitis, DMY, Froid, KConWiki, CliffC, Leyo, Jmm6f488, Teknomunk, RandMC, LordAnubisBOT, McSly, Brian Pearson, Robertgreer, SoundGuy28, Dhaluza, KylieTastic, Idioma-bot, VolkovBot, Crohnie,

180

CHAPTER 30. SURVEILLANCE

Ask123, Charlesdrakew, Wiikipedian, Wthered, Aaron mcd, SieBot, Ouizardus, Flyer22, Nskillen, AMbot, Martarius, ClueBot, Ktr101, DILNN1, DangerousPotential, ZooFari, Pulyemyet, Addbot, Kevzspeare, Raoring, Kwarpws, ‫דוד שי‬, Zorrobot, Aviados, Yobot, THEN WHO WAS PHONE?, KamikazeBot, AnomieBOT, Momoricks, Rjanag, Materialscientist, LilHelpa, GrouchoBot, Locobot, Tobby72, ElijahBosley, Bobmack89x, Yutsi, Jauhienij, Droidekafan, Veron, Lotje, Angers roams, EmausBot, Scottrothstein, Blinx64, GoingBatty, “Primitive Revolutionaries of China, Chickobla, C.rivera11, Emma Frances, H3llBot, Wingman4l7, Benzoyl, Donner60, Chris Gair, Lom Konkreta, ClueBot NG, James.vadackumchery, , Northamerica1000, Rambus1, Hjdaily, LM103, Mogism, XXzoonamiXX, V. Stinson, Schwartzjo, Ipanderi, CW3 Chas and Anonymous: 113 • Non-official cover Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-official%20cover?oldid=630395777 Contributors: Grouse, Mr100percent, Vardion, Donreed, Rfc1394, PBP, Bkonrad, Siroxo, Khaosworks, Ukexpat, Georgemg, LeeHunter, Toh, Mitchowen, Dhartung, Danhash, Deathphoenix, Dismas, Tbsmith, Richard Arthur Norton (1958- ), Woohookitty, Apokrif, Mangojuice, Eyreland, Stefanomione, Doge120, Brownsteve, Calicocat, Nightscream, SchuminWeb, Kanchirk, Shaddack, Bullzeye, Robertvan1, -asx-, NYScholar, Derex, BOTSuperzerocool, Mr j galt, Whobot, SmackBot, Alex earlier account, Portillo, Emufarmers, Hgrosser, Will Beback, Ocatecir, Sifaka, Scribner, Valoem, CmdrObot, Lighthead, Im.a.lumberjack, Oden, Cydebot, Reywas92, Bellerophon5685, Kirk Hilliard, 3R1C, Tstrobaugh, Vudicarus, Misarxist, Nips, M C Y 1008, Andy5421, Baileypalblue, Zach99998, Ask123, Akpoland~enwiki, Cindamuse, Camille Grey, Zeerak88, Dthomsen8, Addbot, PJonDevelopment, Ivor Storey, Lightbot, Evans1982, AnomieBOT, Xufanc, Spamdrop, FrescoBot, Fulldate unlinking bot, Lotje, GregKaye, Wikielwikingo, Skakkle, DexDor, Beyond My Ken, EmausBot, Chuckthompson32, Ὁ οἶστρος, Beck530, Mercuri88, ClueBot NG, Tsj52, Helpful Pixie Bot, Espiobot, RichardMills65, ChrisGualtieri, Dexbot, Ozz242, Tjwilson442, Jan Hense and Anonymous: 69 • Numbers station Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Numbers%20station?oldid=661746809 Contributors: Koyaanis Qatsi, Camembert, Leandrod, Patrick, GABaker, Bewildebeast, Shellreef, Taras, Cyde, Tzaquiel, Karada, Skysmith, Paul A, Tregoweth, CatherineMunro, Vzbs34, Skyfaller, Timwi, Dysprosia, IceKarma, Tempshill, Fibonacci, Elwoz, Scott Sanchez, Hajor, Denelson83, Bearcat, Astronautics~enwiki, Chrism, Tim Ivorson, Spamhog, Cholling, Catbar, Wereon, Scooter~enwiki, Xanzzibar, Cyrius, Dbenbenn, Graeme Bartlett, Haeleth, BenFrantzDale, LLarson, Jfdwolff, Matt Crypto, Bobblewik, Wiki Wikardo, Tom k&e, James Crippen, JeffyJeffyMan2004, AHM, HorsePunchKid, Martin Wisse, Heirpixel, Jmwalsh, Ulflarsen, Jkl, Rich Farmbrough, NickBell, Pmsyyz, Qutezuce, Pie4all88, ArnoldReinhold, Antaeus Feldspar, Jnestorius, Chewie, Mbroooks, Ferret face, Surachit, Madler, Jpgordon, Apyule, Dbchip, Twobells, Gothick, Davidmwilliams, AmbassadorShras, Labyrinth13, Caesura, ByrnedHead, ProhibitOnions, Randy Johnston, Drdefcom~enwiki, Axeman89, Sk4p, Mwalcoff, Woohookitty, Candymoan, Daniel Case, Thorpe, Onlyemarie, Jpers36, Lucienve, Tierlieb, GregorB, Eyreland, Tetraminoe, Pictureuploader, Xiong Chiamiov, MarcoTolo, Teemu Leisti, Graham87, Magister Mathematicae, Cuchullain, Koavf, Jowe (usurped), Jivecat, Johnsolo, BartonM, Ian Dunster, Ucucha, Titoxd, SchuminWeb, AlastairR, Fragglet, RexNL, Pete.Hurd, D.brodale, Milomedes, James2001, Mordicai, Bgwhite, Evilswan, Albrozdude, Kjlewis, YurikBot, Kencaesi, RussBot, Icarus3, Ericorbit, Rintrah, RichardJohn, Blutfink, Arichnad, Nick Roberts, Seegoon, Smartyhall, Mysid, Takeel, MacMog, Abrio, Nikkimaria, Spawn Man, JQF, JeramieHicks, Sprocketeer, AMbroodEY, Poulpy, Monk of the highest order, Thomas Blomberg, Rehevkor, Klassobanieras, DT29, User24, SmackBot, John Lunney, Kherron, Rosicrucian, F, McGeddon, The reverend, C.Fred, Anastrophe, Brossow, ComaDivine, Imzadi1979, Nil Einne, Mauls, Antifumo, CrypticBacon, Master Deusoma, Hmains, Teemu08, Gonzalo84, Jprg1966, Robertissimo, Thumperward, Oli Filth, OrangeDog, Neo-Jay, Colonies Chris, Emurphy42, Brendanmccue, Can't sleep, clown will eat me, Factorylad, Tamfang, Frap, Kevinpurcell, Hateless, BaseTurnComplete, Monotonehell, Treki, Sarahtdl, Charivari, TenPoundHammer, Angela26, JzG, Kevin908, Bucksburg, IronGargoyle, Fedallah, Sfgreenwood, Redeagle688, Dr.K., EEPROM Eagle, SubSeven, Culture jam, Janus303, Tawkerbot2, LSX, Eastlaw, Bitchen, Johnny Zoo, CmdrObot, Sewebster, Filthy Ice Cube Tray, Vectro, Badseed, Crossmr, Papias256, Tanru, Bellerophon5685, Csumnerwiki, Rearviewmirror, Tkynerd, Fifo, Max sang, Nabokov, Jedibob5, Christopherj4321, LachlanA, 21122012, MoogleDan, Alphachimpbot, Milonica, Dr Mango, Hell Pé, Ecphora, Msalt, Cryptical, Gert7, ZPM, KYJustin, S4t00th, SHCarter, WikkanWitch, Not An IP, PEAR, Duggy 1138, CodeCat, Swldxer, Adobetemplar, InvertRect, Pax:Vobiscum, Harriscat, IvoShandor, STBot, Pennywisepeter, Custos0, Filll, Maurice Carbonaro, Yonidebot, R. sparts, DasMustafah, Jtorey, Naniwako, SparsityProblem, Largoplazo, STBotD, RVJ, Guru Larry, Curtis bartok 21, Hystericalwomb, Kayo97, Morefun, Imasleepviking, PDFbot, Wolfrock, Flakblaster, Biggs33, Hakanai, SieBot, Mguerard27, Bedelato, The Parsnip!, Cwkmail, Semitones, Kylswych76, Svick, Rjfost, Owlmonkey, Renfield286, ObfuscatePenguin, Dpdiddy, Sfan00 IMG, ClueBot, Robbiemuffin, Stoney3K~enwiki, Nonobst4nt~enwiki, Drmies, Snoopy21, Trivialist, Sv1xv, Tnxman307, Cexycy, Marko Parabucki, Stepheng3, MelonBot, 89*Book, DumZiBoT, AlanM1, XLinkBot, 68Kustom, Addbot, ERK, KaletheQuick, Doniago, WCPWM, Lightbot, Neurovelho, Team4Technologies, Luckas-bot, Yobot, Themfromspace, Elsayed Taha, AnomieBOT, Cptnono, Piano non troppo, Flopsy Mopsy and Cottonmouth, Eumolpo, Cameron Scott, Xqbot, Wing Dairu, BritishWatcher, GrouchoBot, Dogpup4, FrescoBot, Surv1v4l1st, Schuhpuppe, Staccatoque, Jonesey95, Geogene, Full-date unlinking bot, Xeworlebi, Trappist the monk, TotoCZ, Darrylb500, Dxer1963, Weedwhacker128, Tbhotch, MidgleyC, Boundarylayer, Drthatguy, TheXenomorph1, ZéroBot, Mkratz, Jatkinson100, Rails, Wingman4l7, DJSeaking, Brycehughes, Cgt, ClueBot NG, Themarkdolan, Stiofan88, Lyla1205, Orlando Avare, LastNinja01, BG19bot, Original Token, Kerkeslager, Bruceyang1998, Demag1200, Stapletongrey, MyNameWasTaken, Tosk Albanian, Ssscienccce, Hmainsbot1, Mogism, Vistawhite, GreenHorne101, Rylee55, Wendell890, TrollerMan1337, Chris troutman, Stratojet94, Haminoon, CaptainPedge, DevonX21, Tullamore92, 32RB17, Vainilha, Unilith0, Monkbot, Editorial.ESP, HOT WUK, Doeribs, RB550, Colonel Hatch, VizL00, Shazepe, FF700 and Anonymous: 418 • Official cover Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Official%20cover?oldid=620493371 Contributors: Bryan Derksen, Deathphoenix, Mangojuice, Stefanomione, Graham87, Megapixie, VederJuda, Frap, Bolivian Unicyclist, Magioladitis, DexDor, Prisoner of Zenda and Anonymous: 4 • One-way voice link Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One-way%20voice%20link?oldid=658690479 Contributors: Michael Hardy, JonMoore, Scott Sanchez, Eyreland, Stefanomione, RxS, Toffile, Cobblet, Mmernex, Bluebot, Amalas, Estéban, Alaibot, Rruelas, Jim.henderson, MystBot, Addbot, AnomieBOT, N419BH, Erik9bot, Skyerise, Brambleclawx, Mark Arsten, Springing Up and Anonymous: 3 • Resident spy Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Resident%20spy?oldid=660707061 Contributors: Altenmann, Orangemike, OwenBlacker, Espoo, Jonathan de Boyne Pollard, Stefanomione, SmackBot, Verne Equinox, Marktreut, Bluebot, Arcarius, Trekphiler, Frap, Aboudaqn, Cesium 133, MARK S., Exhummerdude, J-boogie, Siberian Husky, Cole Dalton, CEngelbrecht, Olegwiki, Wikimandia, Hersfold, Steven J. Anderson, Akerbeltz, StillTrill, ClueBot, Addbot, Lucian Sunday, The Bushranger, Yobot, U b 6 i b 9, Rubinbot, Obersachsebot, Xqbot, Cantons-de-l'Est, Carrite, Jesse V., Peacemaker67, Benjitheijneb, Mogism and Anonymous: 16 • Special reconnaissance Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special%20reconnaissance?oldid=662598929 Contributors: Edward, Rl, Cjrother, DocWatson42, Grant65, Klemen Kocjancic, RossPatterson, Bender235, Rackham, Giraffedata, Mpeisenbr, Kenyon, Tabletop, JamesBurns, Rjwilmsi, RussBot, Filippof, TDogg310, Nick-D, Colonies Chris, RomanSpa, Ckatz, Beetstra, RelentlessRecusant, Hcberkowitz, Archangel1, Dawnseeker2000, Erxnmedia, EmericaRon, Hiplibrarianship, R'n'B, CommonsDelinker, Mrg3105, KylieTastic,

30.9. TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

181

AzureCitizen, Eyesbehindthelines, BonesBrigade, WRK, Foofbun, Niceguyedc, FreedomFighterXL, Arjayay, Smidsy999, Pgallert, Addbot, Kman543210, Yobot, Orangepippen, Galoubet, Materialscientist, Citation bot, SFBubba, Xqbot, Tragino, Wholemanne, Armyjoe, FrescoBot, Der rikkk, Citation bot 1, Hellknowz, Alexnip, RjwilmsiBot, IshmaelMarcos, Dewritech, GoingBatty, Danyy0202, H3llBot, Helpful Pixie Bot, Dainomite, BattyBot, Briancarlton, Jordankiljoy6, Rybec, Irish321, Icemanwcs, Lakun.patra, Monkbot, IrishSpook and Anonymous: 46 • Steganography Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steganography?oldid=659576804 Contributors: Tbc~enwiki, WojPob, Bryan Derksen, Koyaanis Qatsi, Eclecticology, Arvindn, PierreAbbat, Valhalla, Heron, Bdesham, Michael Hardy, EvanProdromou, Breakpoint, Wwwwolf, Lquilter, Sannse, TakuyaMurata, Rodzilla, Ahoerstemeier, Cyp, WeißNix, Theresa knott, Smack, Novum, Adam Bishop, Ww, Dysprosia, The Anomebot, Greenrd, Peregrine981, Furrykef, Saltine, Omegatron, Ed g2s, Jose Ramos, Calieber, Robbot, Owain, Donreed, Securiger, Chris Roy, Stewartadcock, Sverdrup, Hadal, Saforrest, Refdoc, Fargoth~enwiki, Giftlite, DocWatson42, Lunkwill, Sj, Inter, Wwoods, Chinasaur, Matt Crypto, SWAdair, Pne, DÅ‚ugosz, Pgan002, Antandrus, Vina, Lynda Finn, Maximaximax, Talrias, Cynix, Kelson, Lazarus666, Intrigue, Thorwald, Takaitra, Mike Rosoft, RossPatterson, Discospinster, Rich Farmbrough, ArnoldReinhold, Minorbob, Pmetzger, El C, Aydee, Meggar, Robotje, Billymac00, Nk, Photonique, Davidgothberg, Themindset, Seared eyes, Alansohn, PaulHanson, Arthena, Thebarrin, Andrewpmk, Blues-harp, Benefros, Theodore Kloba, Kevinp~enwiki, Wtmitchell, Evil Monkey, RainbowOfLight, Egg, Drdefcom~enwiki, Oleg Alexandrov, Lkinkade, Feezo, Camw, Guy M, WPPWAH, Ruud Koot, MrDarcy, Tabletop, Shonzilla, Wikiklrsc, Inventm, Eyreland, [email protected], Stefanomione, Gerbrant, Marudubshinki, Mandarax, Deltabeignet, Grammarbot, EbenVisher, Mlewan, MarkHudson, Rjwilmsi, Strait, Edggar, LjL, AndyKali, Yar Kramer, FlaBot, Authalic, Kammerbulle, Mathbot, Dirkbike, Gurch, Mitsukai, RobyWayne, Intgr, GreyCat, OpenToppedBus, Imnotminkus, Peterl, YurikBot, Hairy Dude, Beltz, Mclayto, Hydrargyrum, Grubber, Pseudomonas, Janke, Codyrank, Cheeselog3000, Tkinkhorst, Mysid, Bota47, Edub, Cstaffa, Ninly, Haddock420, Cojoco, JoanneB, Alasdair, Repayne, Ilmari Karonen, Singingwolfboy, JDspeeder1, Infinity0, AceVentura, True Pagan Warrior, SmackBot, Mmernex, Elonka, Prodego, McGeddon, MeiStone, Alan McBeth, Aphid360, Tommstein, Brianski, Anwar saadat, Saros136, Bluebot, Oli Filth, RayAYang, LukeFerry, Octahedron80, A. B., Shouta, Gilbertera, Petlif, Midnightcomm, Yermiyahu, Maxt, Cybercobra, Akulkis, B jonas, DMacks, Katt, Madeleine Price Ball, Microchip08, JoshuaZ, Robferrer, Peterhoneyman, JoGusto, Aarktica, Lemojk7, Mercan, DabMachine, EmreDuran, Iridescent, JMK, NEMT, Joseph Solis in Australia, Ljlego, Oseransky, Tawkerbot2, Dycedarg, Van helsing, Smoore 500, Shandris, INVERTED, Caliberoviv, Gogo Dodo, Nick2253, Etienne.navarro, Nuwewsco, Fatrabbit, Thijs!bot, Edman274, MrFire, Headbomb, Rfrohardt, AntiVandalBot, Gioto, Dougher, Deflective, Barek, Hut 8.5, Andylindsay, VoABot II, Antipodean Contributor, Sarahj2107, Jancikotuc, Tookiewana, Rohasnagpal, Upholder, Davidmatt, LorenzoB, Cpl Syx, Thibbs, Gappiah, WLU, Jim.henderson, CommonsDelinker, Daeroni, Felipe1982, Slash, Hans Dunkelberg, Moshe szweizer, Crakkpot, Touisiau, KylieTastic, Cometstyles, SmackTacular, Tkgd2007, HeadOffice, Cralar, Deor, TreasuryTag, JoeDeRose, LokiClock, Spihuntr, TXiKiBoT, Raftermast, Newtown11, Boonhead, Dlae, Raymondwinn, Surroundsound5000, Fergie4000, AlleborgoBot, Mpx, Lonwolve, Agvulpine, Dogah, SieBot, AlasdairBailey, Parhamr, Dawn Bard, Vidiii, Vanished user 82345ijgeke4tg, Radon210, Henke37, VanWoods, ‫ترجمان‬05, Wikiguy28272, Joekasper, H8gaR, PerryTachett, Tnolley, Denisarona, XDanielx, ClueBot, Nfj9800, HiddenMind, BenWillard, MartinTheK, Boing! said Zebedee, Wikistegano, DragonBot, Eaglemb, Alexbot, Alexanderwdark, Psinu, Goldfishinapicklejar, Syvaidya, DumZiBoT, XLinkBot, Rror, Steinsomers, Futurevision, Addbot, Mr0t1633, Ghettoblaster, Dunhere, DougsTech, MrOllie, MrVanBot, Rschauer, Iobehmom, OlEnglish, Bartledan, Legobot, Yobot, MarioS, Kusano k, MrBlueSky, Jeffz1, Gjohnson9894, AnomieBOT, KDS4444, Jim1138, Kingpin13, Flewis, Materialscientist, 90 Auto, Citation bot, Xqbot, Ann arbor street, Lele giannoni, GrouchoBot, Teumteum, Jllopezpino, Silvergriphon, Omnipaedista, Brandon5485, Shadowjams, Aaron Kauppi, Chaheel Riens, FrescoBot, Surv1v4l1st, Mohdavary, Welshcorgi, Beanmaster758, Rhalah, AstaBOTh15, Ivangrimm, Thinking of England, Ctrlaltdecimate, Tim1357, Fama Clamosa, Vrenator, Ammodramus, Eeshsidhartha, Suffusion of Yellow, TheMesquito, Stj6, RjwilmsiBot, TankMiche, VernoWhitney, Djfgregory, Aircorn, JackNapierX, EmausBot, Katherine, Spy message, NateEag, Sinfocol, WikiGonz, Anirudh Emani, Cogiati, Fæ, Spacexplosion, Ὁ οἶστρος, A930913, H3llBot, Wingman4l7, Erianna, Donner60, Roshanbrshetty, Blackvisionit, ChuispastonBot, 28bot, ClueBot NG, Muasad, ByScientist, JohnsonL623, Cntras, Lismet, Helpful Pixie Bot, Xdpdc888, Gut informiert, Chafe66, Fonduelover, ZipoBibrok5x10^8, Cndv, Hawaiirules, Nerdsauce, Cheddad, Rbcafe, KATANAGOD, Pillsmith, Librarywild, Chirayu.Chiripal, Dexbot, Ot7, Mogism, Gertie the hertie, WastedMeerkat, Kalex68, Ashikali1607, Mraggo, XndrK, MV360, Raseman~enwiki, Vim nation, Theheisenberg, Ginsuloft, Jianhui67, ‫محمد علي العراقي‬, Ekkt0r, ChrisyHuber, Monkbot, KonigProbst, FursuitYiff, Mattyboy1066, Gauntman1 and Anonymous: 472 • Surveillance Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surveillance?oldid=662118754 Contributors: AxelBoldt, Derek Ross, WojPob, The Anome, Ortolan88, DavidLevinson, Edward, Patrick, Michael Hardy, Kku, Liftarn, Suisui, Kingturtle, Michael Shields, Tristanb, Mxn, Novum, Dysprosia, WhisperToMe, Wik, Hyacinth, Nv8200pa, David.Monniaux, MrJones, ZimZalaBim, Securiger, Lowellian, Chris Roy, Vfrickey, Michael Snow, Mushroom, Zigger, Solipsist, Tagishsimon, Andycjp, Popefauvexxiii, Beland, Glogger, Toshimarise, Izzycohen, N328KF, Discospinster, Rich Farmbrough, Bender235, ZeroOne, JoeSmack, Pedant, JustPhil, El C, Kwamikagami, Leif, Adambro, Harley peters, ZayZayEM, Arcadian, Csabo, Babajobu, Paleorthid, Ejstarchuk, Efortune, Hu, Hohum, Evil Monkey, ~shuri, Bookandcoffee, Walshga, Hq3473, Richard Arthur Norton (1958- ), Alvis, Woohookitty, Pol098, Mangojuice, Stefanomione, Clapaucius, Canderson7, Rjwilmsi, PHenry, Wingover, G Clark, Ground Zero, Old Moonraker, Jrtayloriv, Quuxplusone, Coolhawks88, YurikBot, Wavelength, RussBot, Arado, Hede2000, Raquel Baranow, Hydrargyrum, Stephenb, Gaius Cornelius, Shaddack, Rsrikanth05, Nirvana2013, Aeusoes1, Joel7687, JulesH, SeaFox, Zzuuzz, Jacklee, Petri Krohn, GraemeL, Ajuk, Izayohi, Veinor, MacsBug, SmackBot, Mmernex, Moez, Impaciente, McGeddon, J-beda, Londonlinks, Alex earlier account, Jdfoote, Ohnoitsjamie, Snappa, Chris the speller, Spilla, Oli Filth, Victorgrigas, Scwlong, Chendy, Can't sleep, clown will eat me, Frap, MJBurrage, OOODDD, Gala.martin, COMPFUNK2, YankeeDoodle14, Badgerpatrol, Weregerbil, Ohconfucius, Byelf2007, Quevaal~enwiki, J 1982, Gobonobo, Ckatz, A. Parrot, Beetstra, EKartoffel, Nabeth, Hu12, OnBeyondZebrax, Kencf0618, Agent X2, K0Yaku, Joseph Solis in Australia, Dp462090, Linkspamremover, Tawkerbot2, Chetvorno, Jafet, ChrisCork, Peter1c, CmdrObot, ShelfSkewed, Sdorrance, Bakanov, Myasuda, Drozdp, Cydebot, Mike Christie, Gogo Dodo, Optimist on the run, Maziotis, Thijs!bot, Epbr123, Maximilian Schönherr, PaperTruths, Tobias Baccas, Classic rocker, Dawnseeker2000, AntiVandalBot, Gioto, Mashiah Davidson, Alphachimpbot, Guul~enwiki, CGroup, Yancyfry jr, Res2216firestar, JAnDbot, Deflective, MER-C, SiobhanHansa, Elizabennet, Magioladitis, Bongwarrior, VoABot II, Atalanta86, Soulbot, Nyttend, Froid, Eysen, MCG, DerHexer, WLU, Foregone conclusion, Waytohappiness, Atulsnischal, Jim.henderson, GeorgHH, Évangéline, TheEgyptian, CommonsDelinker, Balaraat, J.delanoy, Jcsurveillance, Siobhan Hansa, Maurice Carbonaro, Jesant13, Brian Pearson, Olegwiki, Xavier Giró, Scranium, TRimester6, Diamondrake, Concaire, Foofighter20x, Ogranut, Sandman619, Scdweb, IHTFP, Crevox, GcSwRhIc, Humair85, Aymatth2, Qxz, PeetMoss, Free0willy, Doc James, Nicksoda21, Interstates, Swliv, Spease, Csblack, Doritosyeah, Moonraker12, Brankow, Mazugrin, RW Marloe, Slmvbs, Svick, Joel Rennie, ClueBot, Mingacorn91, Bigdoole, Tanglewood4, Mild Bill Hiccup, Laudak, SuperHamster, CoolIdeas, Abrech, Rhododendrites, Erunestian, Night-vision-guru, Ellswore, DumZiBoT, Maraparacc, AlanM1, XLinkBot, Abdul2m, Zodon, Activenanda, Addbot, Ashton1983, Download, Sillyfolkboy, Ccacsmss, Tassedethe, MagneH, Wireless friend, Jarble, Tartarus, Artichoke-Boy, Yobot, Granpuff, Alexanderhayes, Fraggle81, TaBOT-zerem, Edoe, Kikbguy, AnomieBOT, VanishedUser sdu9aya9fasdsopa, A Taste of Terre Haute, Rjanag, Piano non troppo, Quantumseven, Mahmudmasri, Materialscientist, Jcs45, Mechamind90, LilHelpa, Mlduda, Xqbot, PhDOnPoint, Capricorn42, Tnyl, ToLLIa, Gabriel1907, Tulaneadam21, Shadowjams, Fres-

182

CHAPTER 30. SURVEILLANCE

coBot, Citation bot 1, Pinethicket, Rochdalehornet, Merlion444, Videoinspector, Cnwilliams, Zevschonberg, Sociologo11, Clirmion, RjwilmsiBot, Davegagner, DexDor, CCTVPro, Wunderpants, EmausBot, John of Reading, Super48paul, Contributor75, Smurfjones, Jenks24, Nyenten, H3llBot, Exhibitions.intern, W163, Jrest, Madisonpadre, ClueBot NG, Mesoderm, Tjepsen, Helpful Pixie Bot, Mdeets, BG19bot, Slater555, Northamerica1000, Wiki13, Paganinip, Elzaibak, MrSidneyReilly, Meclee, Glacialfox, Tristan Lall, Michaelpetercarter, Chrisswanger, BattyBot, Jimw338, Cyberbot II, Khazar2, E.N.Stanway, Artem12345, IjonTichyIjonTichy, The kaper, Stacy Jacobson, Shivajivarma, Mathfreak231, Yulipipin, Donnchacol, Bravoa60, Ugog Nizdast, Watchpocket, Whizz40, Dodi 8238, Petelogger, Danniel Curze, Ibrahim Farid, Monkbot, TechnoTalk, Parktoy, Crazy Aberdeen Guy, Chrisnlorenzo, Wasanajones, AuthenticSam., CaseyMillerWiki, ResearchMinder and Anonymous: 274

30.9.2

Images

• File:16th_century_French_cypher_machine_in_the_shape_of_a_book_with_arms_of_Henri_II.jpg Source: http://upload. wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a2/16th_century_French_cypher_machine_in_the_shape_of_a_book_with_arms_of_Henri_II.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: Own work, photographed at Musee d'Ecouen Original artist: Uploadalt • File:193109_mukden_incident_railway_sabotage.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e8/193109_ mukden_incident_railway_sabotage.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: published in japanese newspaper Rekishi Syashin Original artist: Unknown • File:2008-09_Kaiserschloss_Kryptologen.JPG Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/ad/2008-09_ Kaiserschloss_Kryptologen.JPG License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: Own work Original artist: Ziko • File:2010-05-14-USCYBERCOM_Logo.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/3a/ 2010-05-14-USCYBERCOM_Logo.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: Department of Defense Original artist: http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2010/0410_cybersec/images/cybercom_seal_large1.jpg Department of Defense • File:3-Boyd-and-Command.png Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c1/3-Boyd-and-Command.png License: CC BY 3.0 Contributors: Own work Original artist: Hcberkowitz • File:3-Boyd-and-Initial-Intel.png Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d8/3-Boyd-and-Initial-Intel.png License: CC BY 3.0 Contributors: Own work Original artist: Hcberkowitz • File:Al-kindi_cryptographic.png Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/76/Al-kindi_cryptographic.png License: Public domain Contributors: en:Image:Al-kindi_cryptographic.gif Original artist: Al-Kindi • File:Alessandro_Magnasco_-_Interrogations_in_Jail_-_WGA13849.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/ Public domain Contributors: 1. commons/6/6b/Alessandro_Magnasco_-_Interrogations_in_Jail_-_WGA13849.jpg License: Web Gallery of Art: Image Info about artwork Original artist: Alessandro Magnasco • File:Alfred_Naujocks.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e9/Alfred_Naujocks.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, item number CW-004 Original artist: U.S. Army • File:Ambox_globe_content.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/bd/Ambox_globe_content.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Own work, using File:Information icon3.svg and File:Earth clip art.svg Original artist: penubag • File:Ambox_important.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/b4/Ambox_important.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Own work, based off of Image:Ambox scales.svg Original artist: Dsmurat (talk · contribs) • File:Audio_drill.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a8/Audio_drill.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: ? Original artist: ? • File:BLW_Teapot_with_Actresses.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/b9/BLW_Teapot_with_Actresses. jpg License: CC BY-SA 2.0 uk Contributors: Originally uploaded at http://www.britainloveswikipedia.org/ Original artist: David Jackson • File:Bansky_one_nation_under_cctv.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/8a/Bansky_one_nation_under_ cctv.jpg License: CC BY-SA 2.0 Contributors: One Nation Under CCTV Original artist: oogiboig • File:BodywornSurveillanceEquipment.jpg BodywornSurveillanceEquipment.jpg License: Central Intelligence Agency

Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/87/ Public domain Contributors: Bodyworn Surveillance Equipment Original artist:

• File:Boundless_Informant_data_collection.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/5b/Boundless_Informant_ data_collection.svg License: CC0 Contributors: Own work This file was derived from: BlankMap-World6.svg Original artist: Rezonansowy • File:CCIRM-Info-Tasking-Flow.gif Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/5d/CCIRM-Info-Tasking-Flow.gif License: Public domain Contributors: http://fas.org/irp/ops/smo/docs/ifor/bosch04.htm Original artist: Larry K. Wentz • File:CIA.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/23/CIA.svg License: Public domain Contributors: http://www. law.cornell.edu/uscode/50/403m.html Original artist: United States federal government • File:Cairns-Lagoon.JPG Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a4/Cairns-Lagoon.JPG License: CC-BY-SA-3.0 Contributors: Transferred from en.wikipedia; transferred to Commons by User:Bidgee using CommonsHelper. Original artist: Original uploader was Frances76 at en.wikipedia

30.9. TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

183

• File:Charlemagne_Péralte.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e1/Charlemagne_P%C3%A9ralte.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: Nombreux sites Internet et ouvrages divers Original artist: Unknown • File:Commons-logo.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/4/4a/Commons-logo.svg License: ? Contributors: ? Original artist: ? • File:ConstellationGPS.gif Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/9c/ConstellationGPS.gif License: Public domain Contributors: Transferred from en.wikipedia Original artist: Original uploader was El pak at en.wikipedia • File:Cooper_bomb_threat.gif Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/bf/Cooper_bomb_threat.gif License: Public domain Contributors: Transferred from en.wikipedia; transferred to Commons by User:Liftarn using CommonsHelper. Original artist: Original uploader was ChrisO at en.wikipedia • File:Crypto_key.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/65/Crypto_key.svg License: CC-BY-SA-3.0 Contributors: Own work based on image:Key-crypto-sideways.png by MisterMatt originally from English Wikipedia Original artist: MesserWoland • File:Crystal_Clear_app_kedit.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e8/Crystal_Clear_app_kedit.svg License: LGPL Contributors: Sabine MINICONI Original artist: Sabine MINICONI • File:DSTAMP_Controp_Camera.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/bb/DSTAMP_Controp_Camera.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: Own work Original artist: 320i • File:Dead_drop_spike.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/49/Dead_drop_spike.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: ? Original artist: ? • File:Diffie_and_Hellman.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/88/Diffie_and_Hellman.jpg License: CCBY-SA-3.0 Contributors: ? Original artist: ? • File:EarlyOSStransitions1945-52.png Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/21/EarlyOSStransitions1945-52. png License: CC BY 3.0 Contributors: Own work Original artist: Hcberkowitz • File:Edit-clear.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/f/f2/Edit-clear.svg License: Public domain Contributors: The Tango! Desktop Project. Original artist: The people from the Tango! project. And according to the meta-data in the file, specifically: “Andreas Nilsson, and Jakub Steiner (although minimally).” • File:Encoded_letter_of_Gabriel_Luetz_d_Aramon_after_1546_with_partial_deciphering.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia. org/wikipedia/commons/b/b8/Encoded_letter_of_Gabriel_Luetz_d_Aramon_after_1546_with_partial_deciphering.jpg License: CC BYSA 3.0 Contributors: Own work, photographed at Ecouen Museum Original artist: Uploadalt • File:Enigma.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/ae/Enigma.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: User: Jszigetvari Original artist: ? • File:Fbi_duquesne.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/07/Fbi_duquesne.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: ? Original artist: ? • File:Fiber_optic_tap.png Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/fc/Fiber_optic_tap.png License: GFDL Contributors: Own work Original artist: Roens • File:Flag_of_Australia.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/b/b9/Flag_of_Australia.svg License: Public domain Contributors: ? Original artist: ? • File:Flag_of_Brazil.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/0/05/Flag_of_Brazil.svg License: PD Contributors: ? Original artist: ? • File:Flag_of_Canada.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/c/cf/Flag_of_Canada.svg License: PD Contributors: ? Original artist: ? • File:Flag_of_Cuba.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/bd/Flag_of_Cuba.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Drawn by User:Madden Original artist: see below • File:Flag_of_France.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/c/c3/Flag_of_France.svg License: PD Contributors: ? Original artist: ? • File:Flag_of_Germany.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/b/ba/Flag_of_Germany.svg License: PD Contributors: ? Original artist: ? • File:Flag_of_India.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/4/41/Flag_of_India.svg License: Public domain Contributors: ? Original artist: ? • File:Flag_of_Israel.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d4/Flag_of_Israel.svg License: Public domain Contributors: http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/History/Modern%20History/Israel%20at%2050/The%20Flag%20and%20the%20Emblem Original artist: “The Provisional Council of State Proclamation of the Flag of the State of Israel” of 25 Tishrei 5709 (28 October 1948) provides the official specification for the design of the Israeli flag. • File:Flag_of_New_Zealand.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/3e/Flag_of_New_Zealand.svg License: Public domain Contributors: http://www.mch.govt.nz/files/NZ%20Flag%20-%20proportions.JPG Original artist: Zscout370, Hugh Jass and many others • File:Flag_of_North_Korea.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/51/Flag_of_North_Korea.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Template: Original artist: Zscout370 • File:Flag_of_Pakistan.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/32/Flag_of_Pakistan.svg License: Public domain Contributors: The drawing and the colors were based from flagspot.net. Original artist: User:Zscout370 • File:Flag_of_Romania.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/73/Flag_of_Romania.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Own work Original artist: AdiJapan • File:Flag_of_Russia.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/f/f3/Flag_of_Russia.svg License: PD Contributors: ? Original artist: ?

184

CHAPTER 30. SURVEILLANCE

• File:Flag_of_South_Africa.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/af/Flag_of_South_Africa.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Per specifications in the Constitution of South Africa, Schedule 1 - National flag Original artist: Flag design by Frederick Brownell, image by Wikimedia Commons users • File:Flag_of_South_Korea.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/09/Flag_of_South_Korea.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Ordinance Act of the Law concerning the National Flag of the Republic of Korea, Construction and color guidelines (Russian/English) ← This site is not exist now.(2012.06.05) Original artist: Various • File:Flag_of_the_People’{}s_Republic_of_China.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/fa/Flag_of_the_ People%27s_Republic_of_China.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Own work, http://www.protocol.gov.hk/flags/eng/n_flag/ design.html Original artist: Drawn by User:SKopp, redrawn by User:Denelson83 and User:Zscout370 • File:Flag_of_the_United_Kingdom.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/a/ae/Flag_of_the_United_Kingdom.svg License: PD Contributors: ? Original artist: ? • File:Flag_of_the_United_States.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/a/a4/Flag_of_the_United_States.svg License: PD Contributors: ? Original artist: ? • File:Gnome-mime-sound-openclipart.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/87/ Gnome-mime-sound-openclipart.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Own work. Based on File:Gnome-mime-audio-openclipart. svg, which is public domain. Original artist: User:Eubulides • File:HURT_concept_drawing.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e9/HURT_concept_drawing.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: http://www.darpa.mil/ipto/programs/hart/hart_vision.asp Original artist: Wikipedia: DARPA / Wikipedia: Information Processing Technology Office • File:Hanging.gif Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c9/Hanging.gif License: Public domain Contributors: http: //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Hanging.gif Original artist: Unknown • File:Henri_Adolphe_Laissement_Kardinäle_im_Vorzimmer_1895.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/ 7b/Henri_Adolphe_Laissement_Kardin%C3%A4le_im_Vorzimmer_1895.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: Hampel Kunstauktionen Original artist: Henri Adolphe Laissement (1854-1921) • File:Hollow_dollar.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/75/Hollow_dollar.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: ? 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30.9.3

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