Esguerra Notes (Criminal Law)
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ESGUERRA NOTES – CRIMINAL LAW
CRIMINAL LAW I I. DEFINITION AND SOURCES A.
DEFINITION
Criminal law is that branch or division of law which defines crimes, treats of their nature, and provides for their punishment. B.
STATE AUTHORITY TO PUNISH CRIMES
1. SOURCES OF PHILIPPINE CRIMINAL LAW (REYES) 1. The Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815) and its amendments 2. Special penal laws passed by the Philippine Commission, Philippine Assembly, Philippine Legislature, National Assembly, the Congress of the Philippines, and the Batasang Pambansa. 3. Penal Presidential Decrees issued during Martial Law. ¤ 1987 Constitution Article II, Section 5 Declaration of Principles and State Policies. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy. ¤ 1987 Constitution Article VI, Section 1 The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum. People v. Santiago (1922) Facts: Santiago was driving an automobile at a high speed notwithstanding the fact that he had to pass a narrow space between a wagon standing on one side of the road and a heap of stones on the other side where there were two boys standing. He ran over Parondo who was instantly killed as a result of the accident. Santiago was convicted by the lower court of the crime of homicide by reckless imprudence. The accused appealed challenging the validity of Act No. 2886 which amended General Order no. 58 (which provides that all prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the name of the United States against the persons charged with the offenses), claiming that the legislature is not authorized to amend the latter because its provisions have the character of Constitutional Law. Sec. 2 of Act No. 2866 contains that “all prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the name of the People of the Philippine Islands against the person charged with the offense.” Held: The procedure in criminal matters is not incorporated in the Constitution of the States, but is left in the hands of the legislature, so it that it falls within the realm of public statutory law. The states, as part of its police power, have a large measure of discretion in creating and defining criminal offenses. It is urged that the right to prosecute and punish crimes is an attribute of sovereignty, but by reason of the principle of territoriality as applied in the
suppression of crimes, such power is delegated to subordinate government subdivisions such as territories. The Philippine Legislature by virtue of the Jones Law, like other territories of the US, has the power to define and punish crimes. The present government of the Philippines created by the US Congress is autonomous. It is within the power of the legislature to prescribe the form of the criminal complaint as long as the constitutional provision of the accused to be informed of the nature of the accusation is not violated. US v. Pablo (1916) Facts: Pablo, a policeman, arrested Dato who was found in a vacant lot where a jueteng game was conducted. He presented a memorandum to his chief claiming that he saw Malicsi and Rodrigo leaving the area. However, during the trial, he changed his statement and claimed that he did not see Malicsi nor Rodrigo leaving the area. As a result, the two accused were acquitted. Pablo was charged with the crime of perjury and was convicted under Act. No. 1697. It was claimed that the Act repealed the provisions of the Penal Code relative to perjury, and the last provision of the Administrative Code repealed the Act, thus, there is no penal sanction for the crime of false testimony or perjury. Held: Notwithstanding that the Act no. 1697 has been interpreted by this court in its decisions to have repealed provisions of the Penal Code relating to false testimony, it did not expressly repeal the pertinent provisions of the RPC. Also, the Administrative Code, in totally repealing Act no. 1697, did not expressly repeal the said articles of the Penal Code. Hence, the provisions of the Penal Code relative to perjury remain in force. The reason behind such interpretation is that crimes should not go unpunished or be freely committed without punishment of any kind. 2. LIMITATIONS TO STATE AUTHORITY TO PUNISH CRIMES 1987 Constitution, Art. III Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. Sec. 14. No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to gave compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. Sec. 18. No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations. No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted. Sec. 19. Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
LEX SOCIETAS Veritas. Vnitas. Virtvs.
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ESGUERRA NOTES – CRIMINAL LAW
The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law. Sec. 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax. Sec. 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted. 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 115 Section 1. Rights of accused at trial. – In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the following rights: (a) To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt. (b) To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. (c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of the judgment. The accused may, however, waive his presence at the trial pursuant to the stipulations set forth in his bail, unless his presence is specifically ordered by the court for purposes of identification. The absence of the accused without justifiable cause at the trial of which he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present thereat. When an accused under custody escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his right to be present on all subsequent trial dates until custody over him is regained. Upon motion, the accused may be allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly protect his rights without the assistance of counsel. (d) To testify as a witness in his own behalf but subject to cross-examination on matters covered by direct examination. His silence shall not in any manner prejudice him. (e) To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against himself. (f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either party may utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of or can not with due diligence be found in the Philippines, unavailable, or otherwise unable to testify, given in another case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, the adverse party having the opportunity to cross-examine him. (g) To have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of witnesses and production of other evidence in his behalf. (h) To have speedy, impartial and public trial. (i) To appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner prescribed by law. Civil Code, Article 2 Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in the Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty stipulations. Pesigan v. Angeles (1984) Facts: Anselmo and Marcelo Pesigan were transporting carabaos in the evening of April 2, 1982 from Camarines Sur to Batangas when the carabaos were confiscated purportedly in accordance with E.O. No. 626-A which prohibits transportation of carabao and carabeef from one province to another. Held: The E.O. should not be enforced against the Pesigans because it is a penal regulation (because of
its confiscation and forfeiture provision) and was published only in the Official Gazette on June 14, 1982. Justice and fairness dictate that the public must be informed of that provision by means of publication in the Gazette before violators of the executive order can be bound thereby. The summary confiscation was not in order. The carabaos must be returned. However, the Pesigans cannot transport the carabaos to Batangas because they are now bound by the said E.O. Tañada v. Tuvera (1985) Facts: The petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish or cause the publication of various PD’s, EO’s, LOI’s etc. invoking the Constitutional right of the people to information on matters of public concern. Held: The publication of all presidential issuances of a public nature or of general applicability is mandated by law. It is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application which have not been published shall have no force and effect. However, the implementation of the PDs prior to its publication is an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. From the report submitted by the clerk of court, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented by the government. PENOLOGICAL OBJECTIVES a. Prevention – This assumes that man has a tendency to commit crime and punishing offenders will prevent them from doing so again. Suppression can only be made possible through penal jurisprudence. b. Deterrence/Exemplarity – This assumes that man is endowed with free will and of his awareness of the sanctions against crimes and his fear of such. Especially if there is: 1. Certainty - that all crimes will be punished. 2. Celerity – that punishment will come swiftly 3. Severity – that punishment is proportionate to his crime. It is also assumed that punishing the offender with cruel and conspicuous penalties will make an example of him to deter others from doing the same in the future. c. Self-Defense – This is probably a conclusion reached by the social contract theorists who hold that there is an unwritten contract between men and their society where individuals agree to give up certain rights in exchange for the protection and benefits offered by a community. If individuals violate this contract, then the society, through the State, has the right to enforce its laws and protect its own existence. d. Reformation – This assumes that punishment is capable of changing/rehabilitating individuals. e. Retribution – This rests on the basic premise that justice must be done: the offender shall not go unpunished. This belongs to that which maintains that punishment is inherent in the very nature of a crime and is thus its necessary consequence.
LEX SOCIETAS Veritas. Vnitas. Virtvs.
C.
BASIC PRINCIPLES
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ESGUERRA NOTES – CRIMINAL LAW
Criminal law has three main characteristics: 1) general, 2) territorial, and 3) prospective.
personnel subject to the military law of the US in relation to: (1) offenses solely against the property or security of the US or offenses solely against the property or person of US personnel; and (2) offenses arising out of any act or omission done in performance of official duty.
1. GENERALITY of Criminal Law ¤ 1987 Constitution, Article VI, Section 11 A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof. ¤ Civil Code, Article 14 Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all those who live or sojourn in the Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty stipulations. General Rule: The jurisdiction of the civil courts is not affected by the military character of the accused. a Civil courts have concurrent jurisdiction with general court-martial over soldiers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines even in times of war, provided that in the place of the commission of the crime no hostilities are in progress and civil courts are functioning. a When the military court takes cognizance of the case involving a person subject to military law, the Articles of War apply, not the RPC or other penal laws. a The prosecution of an accused before a court-martial is a bar to another prosecution of the accused for the same offense. a Offenders accused of war crimes are triable by military commission. A military commission has jurisdiction even if actual hostilities have ceased as long as a technical state of war continues. Exceptions to the general application of criminal law Art. 2, RPC, “Except as provided in the treatise or laws of preferential application…” Art. 14, Civil Code, “…subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty stipulations.” a An example of a treaty or treat stipulation is the Bases Agreement entered into by the Philippines and the US on Mar. 14, 1947 and expired on Sept. 16, 1991. a Another example would be the VFA signed on Feb. 10, 1998 where the Philippines agreed that: a. US military authorities shall have the right to exercise within the Philippines all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the military law of the US over US personnel in RP; b. US authorities exercise exclusive jurisdiction over US personnel with respect to offenses, including offenses relating to the security of the us punishable under the law of the US, but not under the laws of RP; c. US military authorities shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over US
a An example of a law of preferential application would be R.A. No. 75 which penalizes acts which would impair the proper observance by the Republic and inhabitants of the Philippines of the immunities, rights, and privileges of duly accredited foreign diplomatic representatives in the Philippines. a Persons exempt from the operation of our criminal laws by virtue of the principles of public international law (1) Sovereigns and other chiefs of state. (2) Ambassadors, ministers, plenipotentiary, ministers resident, and charges d’affaires. * a consul is not entitled to the privileges and immunities of an ambassador or minister. * under the Constitution, members of Congress are not liable for libel or slander in connection with any speech delivered on the floor of an house during regular or special session. US v. Sweet (1901) Facts: Sweet was an employee of the US army in the Philippines. He assaulted a prisoner of war for which he was charged with the crime of physical injuries. Sweet interposed the defense that the fact that he was an employee of the US military authorities deprived the court of the jurisdiction to try and punish him. Held: The case is open to the application of the general principle that the jurisdiction of the civil tribunals is unaffected by the military or other special character of the person brought before them for trial, unless controlled by express legislation to the contrary. 2. TERRITORIALITY of Criminal Law ¤ 1987 Constitution, Article I The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domain including the territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines. a The provisions of the RPC are enforceable to all crimes committed within the limits of Philippine territory but it may also apply outside of the Philippine jurisdiction against who: 1. should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship; 2. should forge or counterfeit an coin or currency note of the Philippines or obligations and securities issued by the Philippine government; 3. should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into the country of the obligations and securities aforestated;
LEX SOCIETAS Veritas. Vnitas. Virtvs.
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ESGUERRA NOTES – CRIMINAL LAW
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while being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of their functions; and should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations defined in Title I, Book II of the Code.
civilian employee cannot be considered a member of the US Army as stated in the agreement. Lastly, no waiver of jurisdiction can be made either b the prosecuting attorney or by the Secretary of Justice.
a The RPC has therefore territorial and extraterritorial application. The maritime zone extends to three miles from the outermost coastline. Beyond that is the “high seas” which is outside the territorial waters of the Philippines.
¤ RPC, Art.21. Penalties that may be imposed.No felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission.
5.
a There are two rules as to jurisdiction over crimes committed aboard merchant vessels while in the territorial waters of another country. French rule – Such crimes are not triable in the courts of that country unless their commission affects the peace and security of the territory or the safety of the state is endangered. English rule – Such crimes are triable in that country unless they merely affect things within the vessel or they refer to the internal management thereof. • We observe the English Rule. a Disorders which disturb only the peace of the ship or those on board are to be dealt with exclusively by the sovereignty of the home of the ship, but those which disturb the public peace may be suppressed, and, if need be, the offenders punished by the proper authorities of the local jurisdiction. a Smoking opium aboard a foreign vessel in Philippine waters constitutes a breach of public order because it causes such drug to produce its pernicious effects within our territory. a Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over offenses committed on board foreign warships in territorial waters. Warships are always reputed to be the territory of the country to which they belong and cannot be subjected to the laws of another state. US v. Ah Sing (1917) Facts: Defendant is a subject of China who bought eight cans of opium in Saigon and brought them on board the steamship Shun Chang during the trip to Cebu. When the steamer anchored in the port of Cebu, the authorities in making the search found the 8 cans of opium. Defendant admitted being the owner but did not confess as to his purpose in buying the opium. Held: Bringing opium in local territory even if it is merely for personal use and does not leave the foreign merchant vessel anchored in Philippine waters is subject to local laws particularly under Sec. 4 Act. No. 2381 a.k.a. Opium Law. Under the said law, importation includes merely bringing the drug from a foreign country to Philippine port even if not landed. Miquiabas v. Philippines-Ryukus command (1948) Facts: Petitioner is a Filipino citizen and a civilian employee of the US army. He has been charged with disposing in the Port of Manila area things belonging to the US army. He is under the custody of Commanding General, Philippines-Ryukus command and an appointed General Court Martial found him guilty and sentenced him to 15 years imprisonment. Held: Gen. Court-Martial has no jurisdiction because the Port of Manila is not a base under the Bases Agreement entered into by the Philippines and the US. The Port area is merely a temporary quarters. Also, a
3. PROSPECTIVITY of Criminal Law
¤ RPC, Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. – Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same. ¤ Civil Code, Art. 4 Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. General Rule: Ex post facto law is prohibited. Ex post facto law is one that is specifically made to retroact to cover acts before it became effective to the prejudice of the accused; or to make a certain crime graver or prescribe a heavier penalty for it. a The law does not have any retroactive effect EXCEPT if it favors the offender unless he is a habitual delinquent or the law otherwise provides. a This is consistent with the general principle that criminal laws, being a limitation on the rights of the people, should be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. Different effects of repeal of penal law. 1. If the repeal makes the penalty lighter in the new law, the new law shall be applied, except when the offender is a habitual delinquent or when the new law is made not applicable to pending action or existing causes of action. 2. If the new law imposes a heavier penalty, the law in force at the time of the commission of the offense shall be applied. 3. If the new law totally repeals the existing law so that the act which was penalized under the old law is no longer punishable, the crime is obliterated. a When the repeal is absolute the offense ceases to be criminal. a When the new law and the old law penalize the same offense, the offender can be tried under the old law. a When the repealing law fails to penalize the offense under the old law, the accused cannot be convicted under the new law. a A person erroneously accused and convicted under a repealed statute may be punished under the repealing statute. Gumabon v. Director of Prisons (1971) Facts: Petitioners who were serving their sentence of life imprisonment for the complex crime of rebellion with murder and other crimes seek the retroactive application of the Hernandez doctrine which was promulgated after their conviction. The Hernandez ruling negated the existence of the crime charged
LEX SOCIETAS Veritas. Vnitas. Virtvs.
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ESGUERRA NOTES – CRIMINAL LAW
stating that rebellion cannot be complexed with other crimes. Thus, the accused in the Hernandez case was sentenced only to 10 years of imprisonment. Held: Both RPC and the Civil Code allow for the retroactive application of judicial decisions. While reference in Art. 22 of the Civil Code is made to legislative acts, it would be merely an exaltation of the literal to deny its application to a case like the present. The Civil Code provides that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the constitution, as well as legislation form part of our legal system. 4. Nullum Crimen Nulla Poena Sine Lege Art. 3. Definitions. — Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos). Art. 21. Penalties that may be imposed. — No felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission. a There is no crime when where is no law punishing it. a The phrase “punished by law” should be understood to mean “punished by the Revised Penal Code”, and not by special law. Bernardo v. People (1983) Facts: The accused were charged and convicted for violating PD No. 772 for possessing and squatting on a parcel of land owned by Cruz. Held: Conviction is null and void. PD No. 772 does not apply to pasture lands because its preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities. It is a basic principle of criminal law that no person should be brought within the terms of a penal statute who is not clearly within them nor should any act be pronounced criminal which is not clearly made so by the statute. People v. Pimentel (1998) Facts: Respondent Tujan was charged with subversion under RA 1700. When he was arrested 7 years after he was charged, an unlicensed revolver and ammunition was found in his possession. As such, he was also charged with Illegal Possession of Firearms under PD 1866. Held: Tujan was not placed in double jeopardy because the issue had not yet arisen for he had not yet been actually convicted. RA 7636 totally repealed RA 1700 making subversion no longer a crime. Based on Art. 22 of RPC, this law should be given retroactive effect since the law is favorable to the accused and since he is not a habitual delinquent. The Court convicted Tujan with simple illegal possession of firearm and ammunition but since Tujan’s length of detention is greater than the penalty prescribed, the court ordered immediate release. 5. STRICT CONSTRUCTION of penal laws against the State ¤ 1987 Constitution, Article III, Sec. 14(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved…. Rules of Construction of Penal Laws 1. Criminal statutes are liberally construed in favor of the offender. This means that no person shall
be brought within their terms of the law who is not clearly within them, nor should any act be pronounced criminal which is not clearly made so by statute. 2. The original text in which a penal law is approved will govern in case of a conflict with an official translation. Hence, the RPC, which was approved in Spanish text, is controlling over its English translation. 3. Interpretation by analogy has no place in criminal matters. - reasoning by analogy is applied only when similarities are limited and it is admitted that significant differences also exist. Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners (1969) Facts: Pascual was charged in an administrative case for immorality and was announced by counsel of complainants to be their first witness. Held: The Board of Medical examiners cannot, consistently with the self-incriminating clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent. A proceeding for malpractice possesses a criminal or penal aspect in the sense that the respondent would suffer the revocation of his license as a medical practitioner which is even a greater form of deprivation than forfeiture of property. While crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objective should not be accomplished according to means offensive to high sense of respect accorded to human personality. More and more in line with the democratic creed, the deference accorded to an individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight.
D.
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Art. 1 Time when Act takes effect. This code shall take effect on the first day of January, nineteen hundred and thirty. ♣ The RPC consists of two books: Book One consists of 1) basic principles affecting criminal liability and 2) the provisions on penalties including criminal and civil liability; Book Two defines felonies with the corresponding penalties. ♣ Two theories in criminal law a. CLASSICAL b. POSITIVIST a The RPC is based mainly on principles of old or classical school. ♣ Characteristics of the classical theory 1. The basis of criminal liability is human free will and the purpose of the penalty is retribution. 2. That man is essentially a moral creature with an absolutely free will to choose between good and evil thereby placing more stress upon the effect or result of the felonious act than upon the man, the criminal himself. 3. It has endeavored to establish a mechanical and direct proportion between crime and penalty. 4. There is a scant regard to the human element. ♣ Characteristics of the positivist theory
LEX SOCIETAS Veritas. Vnitas. Virtvs.
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ESGUERRA NOTES – CRIMINAL LAW
1.
2.
That man is subdued occasionally by a strange and morbid phenomenon which constrains him to do wrong, inspite of or contrary to his volition. That crime is essentially a social and natural phenomenon, and as such, it cannot be treated and checked by the application of abstract principles of law and jurisprudence nor by the imposition of a punishment which is fixed and determined a priori; but rather through the enforcement of individual measures in each particular case after a thorough, personal and individual investigation conducted by a competent body of psychiatrists and social scientists.
Art. 2. Application of its provisions. — Except as provided in the treaties and laws of preferential application, the provisions of this Code shall be enforced not only within the Philippine Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction, against those who: 1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship 2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or obligations and securities issued by the Government of the Philippine Islands; 3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the obligations and securities mentioned in the presiding number; 4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of their functions; or 5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations, defined in Title One of Book Two of this Code.
of nations while treason and espionage are crimes against national security. II. FELONIES Art. 3. Definitions. — Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos). Felonies are committed not only be means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa). There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent and there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill. ♣ Felonies are acts and omissions punishable by the Revised Penal Code. ♣ Elements of Felonies 1. There must be an act or omission 2. That the act or omission must be punishable by the RPC 3. That the act is performed or the omission incurred by means of dolo or culpa. ♣ Definition of terms ACT – must be overt or external (mere criminal thought or intent is not punishable) OMISSION – failure to perform a duty required by law ex. Failure to render assistance, failure to issue receipt, non-disclosure of knowledge of conspiracy against the government. A.
HOW COMMITTED
♣ Classification of felonies according to the means by which they are committed (IN GENERAL ONLY)
♣ This has been discussed in the Territoriality principle of criminal law.
1. INTENTIONAL / DOLO (by means of deceit, malice)
♣ Explanation of the exceptions 1. The Philippine ship or airship must be duly registered under the Philippine laws with the Philippine Bureau of Customs. Such vessel when beyond the 3mile limit is considered and extension of Philippine national territory. BUT if said Philippine vessel or aircraft is within the territory of a foreign country when the crime is committed, the laws of that country will apply as a rule. The Philippine court has no jurisdiction over the crime of theft committed on the high seas on board a vessel not registered or licensed in the Philippines. 2. Any person who makes false or counterfeit coins or forges treasury or bank notes or other obligations and securities in a foreign country may be prosecuted before our civil courts for violation of Art. 163 or Art. 166 of the RPC. 3. The reason for the exceptions in paragraph (b) and (c) is to maintain and preserve the financial credit and stability of the state. 4. The offense committed by a public officer abroad, like a consular official, must refer to the discharge of his functions i.e. bribery, malversation or falsification. 5. The reason for the exception regarding crimes against national security and the law of nations is to safeguard the existence of the state. Piracy is triable anywhere. Piracy and mutiny are crimes against the law
- the offender in performing the act or incurring the omission, has the intention to cause an injury to another - the word “deceit” in par. 2 of Art. 3 is not the proper translation of the word “dolo”. Dolus is actually equivalent to malice which is the intent to do an injury to another. 2. CULPABLE (by means of fault or culpa) - an act performed without malice but at the same time punishable though in a lesser degree and with an equal result imprudence - lack of precaution to avoid injury, usually involves lack of skill negligence - failure to foresee impending danger, usually involves lack of foresight 1. DOLO
LEX SOCIETAS Veritas. Vnitas. Virtvs.
REQUISITES OF DOLO OR MALICE 1. freedom – that the act or omission was voluntary and without external compulsion. 2. intelligence – knowledge needed to determine the morality and consequences
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ESGUERRA NOTES – CRIMINAL LAW
3.
of an act. The imbecile, insane and minors have no criminal liability. intent – intent to commit the act with malice, being purely a mental process, is presumed and the presumption arises from the proof of the commission of the unlawful act.
♣ Intent presupposes the exercise of freedom and the use of intelligence ♣ The existence of intent is shown by the overt acts of a person ♣ Criminal intent is presumed from the commission of an unlawful act BUT the presumption of criminal intent does not arise from the proof of the commission of an act which is not unlawful. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea “the act itself does not make a man guilty unless his intention were so” A crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing to act complained be innocent. It must be borne in mind that the act from which the presumption of existence of criminal intent springs must be a criminal act. Actus me invito factus non est meus actus “an act done by me against my will is not my act” INTENT V. MOTIVE MOTIVE is the moving power which impels one to action for a define result. INTENT is the purpose to use a particular means to effect such result. ♣ Motive is not an essential element of a crime, and, hence need not be proved for purposes of conviction. ♣ Motive is essential only when there is doubt as to the identity of the assailant. It is immaterial when the accused has been positively identified. ♣ Proof of motive alone is not sufficient to support a conviction but lack of motive may be an aid in showing the innocence of the accused. ♣ There is no felony by dolo if there is no intent People v. Temblor (1988) Facts: Cagampang and his wife were conversing in the store adjacent to their house when Temblor arrived and asked to buy cigarettes. Temblor, then, shot Cagampang and demanded the wife to bring out her husband’s firearm. Months after, the wife was summoned to the police station and there she identified the accused. The accused’s defense was alibi and lack of motive. Held: The knowledge of the accused that Cagampang possessed a firearm was enough motive to kill him as killings were perpetrated by members of the NPA for the sole purpose of acquiring more arms and ammunition. Their group is prevalent not only in Agusan del Norte but elsewhere in the country. It is known as the NPA’s “agaw armas” campaign. Moreover, proof of motive is not essential when the culprit has been positively identified. People v. Hassan (1988)
Facts: The accused, an illiterate, 15-year-old pushcart cargador, was convicted of the crime of murder for the death of Ramon. The lone eyewitness claimed he saw the accused stab Ramon only once at the back. He identified the accused alone at the funeral parlor without being placed in a police line-up. Held: The testimony of witness was weak. It conflicted with the findings of the Medico-legal officer who identified 2 stab wounds which were inflicted while assailant was in front of the victim. The manner by which the witness was made to identify the accused was pointedly suggestive and activated visual imagination when there was none. The method of identification became just a confrontation and was made in violation of the constitutional right of the accused. The court noted the total absence of motive ascribed to the accused for stabbing Ramon who is a complete stranger to him. While as a general rule, motive is not essential for purposes of complying with the requirement that a judgment of guilty must stem from proof beyond reasonable doubt, the lack of motive on the part of the accused plays a pivotal role towards his acquittal. This is especially true where there is doubt as to the identity of the culprit as when the identification is extremely tenuous as in this case. People v. Delos Santos (2003) Facts: Delos Santos stab Flores with a kitchen knife hitting him on the different parts of his body, inflicting upon him mortal wounds which directly caused his death. Delos Santos then argues that since the prosecution witnesses testified that there was no altercation between him and Flores, it follows that no motive to kill can be attributed to him. Held: The court held that the argument of Delos Santos is inconsequential. Proof of motive is not indispensable for a conviction, particularly where the accused is positively identified by an eyewitness and his participation is adequately established. In People vs. Galano, the court ruled that in the crime of murder, motive is not an element of the offense, it becomes material only when the evidence is circumstantial or inconclusive and there is some doubt on whether the accused had committed it. In this case, the court finds that no such doubt exits as witnesses, De Leon and Tablate positively identified Delos Santos. MISTAKE OF FACT It is a misapprehension of fact on the part of the person who caused injury to another. He is not, however, criminally liable, because he did not act with criminal intent. ♣ Requisites: 1. That the act done would have been lawful had the facts been as the accused believed them to be. 2. That the intention of the accused in performing the act should be lawful 3. That the mistake must be without fault or carelessness on the part of the accused. People v. Ah Chong (1910) A houseboy who stabs his roommate in the dark, honestly mistaking the latter to be a robber responsible for a series of break-ins in the area, and after crying out sufficient warnings and believing himself to be under attack, cannot be held criminally liable for homicide. Stabbing the victim whom the accused
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believed to be an intruder showed a mistake of fact on his part which led him to take the facts as they appear to him and was pressed to take immediate action. People v. Oanis (1988) Police officers who shot a sleeping man in the back mistaking him for a notorious escaped convict wanted dead or alive, could still be held liable for the killing since they did not take reasonable precautionary measures. Police officers are still liable because they are not justified in killing a man whose identity they did not ascertain. The third requisite of mistake of fact is lacking. In this case, self-defense is not tenable as a defense as there was no unlawful aggression but they may avail of the defense of fulfillment of duty as a mitigating circumstance. ♣ Criminal intent is replaced by negligence and imprudence in felonies committed by means of culpa. 2. CULPA RPC, Art. 365 par 7 Reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place. Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage impending to be cause is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest. Requisites of culpa: 1. freedom 2. intelligence 3. imprudence, negligence foresight and skill
or
lack
of
♣ in culpable felonies, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed without malice. People v. Buan (1968) Facts: The accused was driving a passenger bus. Allegedly because of his recklessness, the bus collided with a jeep injuring the passengers of the latter. A case was filed against the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence for which he was tried and acquitted. Prior to his acquittal, a case for serious physical injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence was filed. Accused claimed that he was placed in twice in jeopardy. Held: The second case must be dismissed. Once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for the same act. For the essence of the quasi-offense under Art. 365 of the RPC lies in the execution of an imprudent act which would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes the negligent act and not the result. The gravity of the consequences is only taken into account to determine the penalty. It does not qualify the substance of the offense. A.
CRIMES DEFINED AND PENALIZED BY SPECIAL LAWS
Art. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. — Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary. There are 3 classes of crimes. The RPC defines and penalizes the first two classes: 1) intentional and 2) culpable felonies. The third class of crimes is those defined and penalized by special laws which include crimes punished by municipal or city ordinances. ♣ The provisions of this Code are not applicable to offenses punished by special laws especially those relating to the requisite of criminal intent; the stages of commission; and the application of penalties. ♣ However, when the special law is silent, the Code can give suppletory effect. ♣ Dolo is not required in crimes punished by special laws because these crimes are mala prohibita. ♣ In those crimes punished by special laws, the act alone irrespective of its motives, constitutes the offense. ♣ Good faith and absence of criminal intent are not valid defenses in crimes punished by special laws MALA IN SE and MALA PROHIBITA Mala in se - an act, by its very nature, is inherently and morally wrong; it should be done with criminal intent Malum prohibitum – an act is wrong only because there is a law punishing it. It is enough that the prohibited act was voluntarily committed and need not be committed with malice or criminal intent to be punishable. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan (2001) Facts: Estrada is challenging the plunder law. One of the issues he raised is whether plunder is a malum prohibitum or malum in se. Held: Plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal of criminal intent. Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed “willfully, unlawfully and criminally.” It thus alleges guilt knowledge on the part of the petitioner. RELATION OF RPC TO SPECIAL LAWS RPC, Art. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. — Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary. Padilla v. Dizon (1988) Facts: Padilla filed an administrative complaint against RTC Judge Dizon for rendering a manifestly erroneous decision acquitting Lo Chi Fai of the offense charged for smuggling foreign currency out of the country in violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960. The Circular prohibits transmission of foreign currency out of the Philippines without authorization from the Central Bank. Penal sanction for such violation is provided in PD No. 1883. Judge Dizon acquitted accused
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because of lack of intent to violate and benefit from the act alone. Held: Judge showed gross ignorance of the law. He ought to know that proof of malice or mens rea is not essential in offense punished by special laws which are mala prohibita. The judge did not take into consideration the admission of the accused that he was a “carrier” of foreign currency for other people but chose to give credence to the fantastic tale of the accused that he and his alleged business associate were using the money for a particular investment.
7659 is prison correccional to be taken from the medium period thereof pursuant to Art. 64 of the RPC, there being no aggravating and mitigating circumstance. Dissent: It is thus clear that an offense is punished by the RPC if both its definition and the penalty therefore are found in the special law. That the latter imports or borrows from the RPC its nomenclature of penalties. In short, the mere use by a special law of a penalty found in the RPC can by no means make an offense thereunder an offense “punished or punishable” by the RPC.
Padilla v. CA (1997) Facts: Padilla, driving his Pajero at high speed despite the bad weather, hit a balot vendor. A chase took place and eventually, Padilla’s vehicle was stopped. He was arrested and several firearms were found inside his vehicle. He admitted possession claiming he used them for shooting but was not able to produce any permit to carry. Held: Pd 1886 provides only 2 requisites to establish crimes involving illegal possession of firearm: (1) existence of subject firearm and (2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the firearm does not have the corresponding permit to possess. Either the testimony of a representative of or a certification from the PNP Firearms and explosives office would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of illegal possession. PD 1866 is constitutional. To justify nullification, there must be a clear breach of the constitution. The contention that the penalty of simple illegal possession is cruel and excessive in contravention of the constitution does not merit serious consideration. The severity of a penalty does not ipso facto make the same cruel and excessive. The court cited People v. Simon doctrine as to the penalties to be imposed although PD 1866 is a special law, the penalties therein were taken from the RPC, hence the rules in the said code for graduating by degrees or determining the proper period should be applied.
Ladonga v People (2005) Facts: Spouses Ladonga were convicted by the RTC for violation of BP. Blg. 22 (3 counts). The husband applied for probation while the wife appealed arguing that the RTC erred in finding her criminally liable for conspiring with her husband as the principle of conspiracy is inapplicable to BP Blg. 22 which is a special law. Held: B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly prescribe the suppletory application of the provisions of the RPC. Thus, in the absence of contrary provision in B.P. Blg. 22, the general provisions of the RPC which, by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily. The court cited the case of Yu vs. People, where the provisions on subsidiary imprisonment under Article 39 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22 was applied suppletorily. The suppletory application of the principle of conspiracy in this case is analogous to the application of the provision on principals under Article 17 in U.S. vs. Ponte. For once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals. The Court in this case however ruled in favor of Ladonga(wife) as the prosecution failed to prove that she performed any overt act in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy.
People v. Saley (1998) Facts: Saley was convicted of 16 cases of illegal recruitment, one of which was on the large scale. She was also convicted of 11 counts of estafa. She claims that she was not engaged in recruitment but is merely acting as an agent. She also claimed that she was merely aiding the processing of the complainant’s visas. Held: Saley is guilty of illegal recruitment and estafa. She has no valid license or authority to engage in placement of workers. There is no double jeopardy in this case. Conviction under the Labor Code for illegal recruitment is malum prohibita while estafa under the RPC is malum in se.
People v. Bustinera (2004) Facts: Bustinera was convicted by the trial Court for qualified theft under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code for the unlawful taking of the taxi cab driven by him which is owned and operated by Cipriano and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Held: The unlawful taking of motor vehicles is now covered by the anti-carnapping law (RA No. 6539) and not by the provisions on qualified theft or robbery. The trial court having convicted Bustinera of qualified theft instead of carnapping, erred in the imposition of the penalty. While the information alleges that the crime was attended with grave abuse of confidence, the same cannot be appreciated as the suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code to special laws, as provided in Article 10 of said Code, cannot be invoked when there is a legal impossibility of application, either by express provision or by necessary implication. Moreover, when the penalties under the special law are different from and are without reference or relation to those under the Revised Penal Code, there can be no suppletory effect of the rules, for the application of penalties under the said Code or by other relevant statutory provisions are based on or applicable only to said rules for felonies under the Code. The court cited the case of People v. Panida which involved the crime of carnapping and the penalty
People v. Simon (1994) Facts: The accused was arrested after a buybust operation conducted by the police wherein the accused sold 2 tea-bags of marijuana to a poseur buyer for P40. Held: To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs under the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, the sale must be clearly established. The commission of the offense of illegal sale of prohibited drugs requires merely the consummation of the selling transaction. The court held that in the instant case the imposable penalty under RA 6425 as amended by RA
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imposed was the indeterminate sentence of 14 years and 8 months, as minimum, to 17 years and 4 months, as maximum, this Court did not apply the provisions of the Revised Penal Code suppletorily as the anticarnapping law provides for its own penalties which are distinct and without reference to the said Code. Bustinera was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 14 years and 8 months as minimum, to 17 years and 4 months, as maximum for the crime of carnapping under RA 6539, as amended.
Art. 4. Criminal liability. — Criminal liability shall be incurred: 1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. 2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or an account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means. B. 1. WRONGFUL INTENDED
PUNISHABLE CONDUCT ACT
DIFFERENT
FROM
THAT
♠ One who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the consequences which may naturally and logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or not. ♠ Rationale: el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado “He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused” ♠ When a person has not committed a felony, he is not criminally liable for the result which is not intended. ♠ The causes which may produce a result different from that which the offender intended are: a. ERROR IN PERSONAE – mistake in the identity of the victim; injuring one person mistaken for another (this is a complex crime under Art. 49) b. ABERRATIO ICTUS – mistake in the blow, that is, when the offender intending to do an injury to one person actually inflicts it on another; and c. PRAETER INTENTIONEM – the act exceeds the intent, that is, the injurious result is greater than that intended. ♠ The felony committed must be the proximate cause of the resulting injury. PROXIMATE CAUSE – the cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. ♠ When death is presumed to be the natural consequence of physical injuries inflicted: 1. That the victim at the time the physical injuries were inflicted was in normal health. 2. That the death may be expected from the physical injuries inflicted. 3. That death ensued within a reasonable time. ♠ The felony committed is not the proximate cause of the resulting injury when:
a. There is an active force that intervened between the felony committed and the resulting injury, and the active force is a distinct act or fact absolutely foreign from the felonious act of the accused; or b. The resulting injury is due to the intentional act of the victim. People v. Sabalones (1988) Facts: Two vehicles proceeded to the house of Stephen Lim when Sabalones et. al. fired towards the vehicles killing 2 of the passengers and seriously injuring 3 others. The lower court convicted the accused. Appellants accuse the trial court of engaging in conjecture in ruling that there was aberratio ictus in this case. Held: The allegation does not advance the cause of the appellants. It must be stressed that the trial court relied on the concept of aberratio ictus to explain why the appellants staged the ambush, not to prove that appellants did in fact commit the crimes. In any event, the lower court was not engaging in conjecture because the conclusion that the appellants killed the wrong persons was based on the extrajudicial statement of appellant Beronga and the testimony of one witness. Nonetheless, the fact that they were mistaken does not diminish their culpability. Mistake in the identity of the victim carries the same gravity as when the accused zeroes in on his intended victim. 2.
OMISSION
Art. 116. Misprision of treason. — Every person owing allegiance to (the United States) the Government of the Philippine Islands, without being a foreigner, and having knowledge of any conspiracy against them, conceals or does not disclose and make known the same, as soon as possible to the governor or fiscal of the province, or the mayor or fiscal of the city in which he resides, as the case may be, shall be punished as an accessory to the crime of treason. Art. 137. Disloyalty of public officers or employees. — The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon public officers or employees who have failed to resist a rebellion by all the means in their power, or shall continue to discharge the duties of their offices under the control of the rebels or shall accept appointment to office under them. Art. 208. Prosecution of offenses; negligence and tolerance. — The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period and suspension shall be imposed upon any public officer, or officer of the law, who, in dereliction of the duties of his office, shall maliciously refrain from instituting prosecution for the punishment of violators of the law, or shall tolerate the commission of offenses. Art. 223. Conniving with or consenting to evasion. — Any public officer who shall consent to the escape of a prisoner in his custody or charge, shall be punished: 1. By prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and temporary special disqualification in its maximum period to perpetual special disqualification, if the fugitive shall have been sentenced by final judgment to any penalty. 2. By prision correccional in its minimum period and temporary special disqualification, in case the fugitive shall not have been finally convicted but only
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held as a detention prisoner for any crime or violation of law or municipal ordinance. Art. 234. Refusal to discharge elective office. — The penalty of arresto mayor or a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who, having been elected by popular election to a public office, shall refuse without legal motive to be sworn in or to discharge the duties of said office. Art. 275. Abandonment of person in danger and abandonment of one’s own victim. — The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon: 1. Any one who shall fail to render assistance to any person whom he shall find in an uninhabited place wounded or in danger of dying, when he can render such assistance without detriment to himself, unless such omission shall constitute a more serious offense. 2. Anyone who shall fail to help or render assistance to another whom he has accidentally wounded or injured. 3. Anyone who, having found an abandoned child under seven years of age, shall fail to deliver said child to the authorities or to his family, or shall fail to take him to a safe place. 3. PROPOSAL AND CONSPIRACY Art. 8. Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony. — Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony are punishable only in the cases in which the law specially provides a penalty therefore. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. There is proposal when the person who has decided to commit a felony proposes its execution to some other person or persons. Art. 115. Conspiracy and proposal to commit treason; Penalty. — The conspiracy or proposal to commit the crime of treason shall be punished respectively, by prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P10,000 pesos, and prision correccional and a fine not exceeding P5,000 pesos. Art. 136. Conspiracy and proposal to commit coup d’etat, rebellion or insurrection. — The conspiracy and proposal to commit coup d’etat shall be punished by prision mayor in minimum period and a fine which shall not exceed eight thousand pesos (P8,000.00). Art. 141. Conspiracy to commit sedition. — Persons conspiring to commit the crime of sedition shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium period and a fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos Art. 186. Monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade. — The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon: 1. Any person who shall enter into any contract or agreement or shall take part in any conspiracy or combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, in restraint of trade or commerce or to prevent by artificial means free competition in the market;
Art. 306. Who are brigands; Penalty. — When more than three armed persons form a band of robbers for the purpose of committing robbery in the highway, or kidnapping persons for the purpose of extortion or to obtain ransom or for any other purpose to be attained by means of force and violence, they shall be deemed highway robbers or brigands. Persons found guilty of this offense shall be punished by prision mayor in its medium period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period if the act or acts committed by them are not punishable by higher penalties, in which case, they shall suffer such high penalties. If any of the arms carried by any of said persons be an unlicensed firearm, it shall be presumed that said persons are highway robbers or brigands, and in case of convictions the penalty shall be imposed in the maximum period. Art. 340. Corruption of minors. — Any person who shall promote or facilitate the prostitution or corruption of persons underage to satisfy the lust of another, shall be punished by prision mayor, and if the culprit is a pubic officer or employee, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, he shall also suffer the penalty of temporary absolute disqualification. ♠ Conspiracy and proposal to commit a felony are two different acts or felonies: (1) conspiracy to commit a felony, and (2) proposal to commit a felony. GENERAL RULE: Conspiracy and proposal to commit a felony are not punishable EXCEPTION: They are punishable only in the cases in which the law specially provides a penalty therefore. RATIONALE: Conspiracy and proposal to commit a crime are only preparatory acts and the law regards them as innocent or at least permissible except in rare and exceptional cases. CONSPIRACY - exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felon and decide to commit it. ♠ The RPC specially provides a penalty for mere conspiracy in treason, coup d’etat, rebellion or sedition. Treason, coup d’etat, rebellion or sedition must not actually be committed or else conspiracy shall no longer be punishable because it is not a separate offense from the felony itself. ♠INDICATIONS OF CONSPIRACY - for a collective responsibility among the accused to be established, it is sufficient that at the time of the aggression, all of them acted in concert, each doing his part to fulfill their common design to commit the felony. ♠ REQUISITES OF CONSPIRACY a. That two or more persons came to an agreement: - agreement presupposes meeting of the minds of two or more persons b. That the agreement concerned the commission of a felony; and - the agreement must refer to the commission of a crime. It must be an agreement to act, to
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c.
effect, to bring about what has already been conceived and determined That the execution of the felony be decided upon. - the conspirators have made up their minds to commit the crime. There must be a determination to commit the crime of treason, rebellion or sedition.
People v. Fabro (2000) Facts: Petitioner Fabro together with her common-law husband Pilay and Irene Martin was charged with the crime of "violation of Section 21 (b) Art. IV, in relation to Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended, for selling to PO2 Apduhan, who acted as poseur buyer, one kilo of dried marijuana leaves. Fabro contends that her guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt as based on the testimony of the NBI, the real possessor of the confiscated properties was her co-accused Martin. Held: Fabro’s contention that Martin was the real curlprit being the source of the contraband does not in any way absolve her of the crime of selling marijuana. While it is true that it was Martin who took the money, it was Fabro who negotiated with the poseur buyers, fetched her co-accused; and carried and handed over the marijuana to Apduhan. The acts of Martin and Fabro clearly show a unity of purpose in the consummation of the sale of marijuana. It is clear that Section 21 (b) of R.A. 6425 punishes the mere conspiracy to commit the offense of selling, delivering, distributing and transporting of dangerous drugs. Conspiracy herein refers to the mere agreement to commit the said acts and not the actual execution thereof. While the rule is that a mere conspiracy to commit a crime without doing any overt act is not punishable, the exception is when such is specifically penalized by law, as in the case of Section 21 of Republic Act 6425. Conspiracy as crime should be distinguished from conspiracy as a manner of incurring criminal liability the latter being applicable to the case. People v. Bello (2004) Facts: Accused Bello et. al. mapped out a plan to rob a moneychanger. Calling the moneychanger from a motel room, Bello misrepresented that she came from Japan and would like to convert her 40 pieces of yen to pesos. She requested that the currency conversion be made in her room as she did not want to carry around a huge sum of money. During the occasion of the robbery, Andasan, the messenger who brought the money to Bello was killed. The trial court ruled that Bello conspired with the other accused and was found guilty as principal for the crime of robbery with homicide. Bello, argued that her alleged conspiracy with the other accused was not sufficiently established by circumstantial evidence as there was no showing that she had the same purpose and united with the other accused in the execution of the crime. She alleged that her mere presence in the crime scene is not per se a sufficient indiqium of conspiracy. She insists that she acted against her will due to the irresistible force employed by her co-accused. Held: The Court held that Bello conspired with her co-accused to commit the crime. Records clearly reveal that Bello was part of the plan to rob the moneychanger. The chain of events and the conduct of Bello lead to no other conclusion than that she conspired with her co-accused to commit the crime. Conspiracy exists where the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the crime and decide
to pursue it. Conspiracy is predominantly a state of mind as it involves the meeting of the minds and intent of the malefactors. Consequently, direct proof is not essential to establish it. The existence of the assent of minds of the co-conspirators may be inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together, indicate that they are parts of the complete plan to commit the crime. Li v. People (2001) Facts: Because of an altercation between Arugay and Li, the latter armed himself with a baseball bat and used the same to hit Arugay on the arm. Arugay armed with a bolo, retaliated by hacking Li on the head causing the bat to fall from his hand and leaving him unconscious or semi-unconsious. At this point in time, Sangalang, who was also present stabbed Arugay several times which resulted to the latter’s death. The lower court held that there was conspiracy in the present case Held: The existence of conspiracy should be ruled out. Sangalang was the main actor in stabbing Arugay to death. As Li was incapacitated or probably unconscious at the time Sangalang stabbed Arugay, it cannot be assumed that Sangalang did what he has done with the knowledge or assent of Li, much more in coordination with each other. Based on the circumstances, the Court is hard put to conclude that Sangalang and Li had acted in concert to commit the offense. In fact, the stabbing of Arugay could very well be construed as a spur-of-the-moment reaction by Sangalang upon seeing that his friend Li was struck on the head by Arugay. From such a spontaneous reaction, a finding of conspiracy cannot arise. Proving conspiracy is a dicey matter, especially difficult in cases such as the present wherein the criminal acts arose spontaneously, as opposed to instances wherein the participants would have the opportunity to orchestrate a more deliberate plan. Spontaneity alone does not preclude the establishment of conspiracy, which after all, can be consummated in a moment’s notice — through a single word of assent to a proposal or an unambiguous handshake. Yet it is more difficult to presume conspiracy in extemporaneous outbursts of violence; hence, the demand that it be established by positive evidence. A conviction premised on a finding of conspiracy must be founded on facts, not on mere inferences and presumption. People v. Bagano (2002) Facts: Jeremias and his wife Merlinda were sleeping in their home when they were awakened by someone repeatedly calling Jeremias' name. Jeremias went to the window to see who it was and thereafter left their room to go outside. Merlinda remained in their room, but peering through the window, she saw Cañete suddenly embrace Jeremias as the latter was opening the gate. Thereupon, Bagano with ice pick in hand stabbed Jeremias on the chest. Jeremias struggled to free himself from Cañete's clasp and ran, but Bagano gave chase. Jeremias died upon arrival at the hospital. Held: Conspiracy is attendant in the commission of the crime. For conspiracy to exist, it is sufficient that at the time of the commission of the offense the accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution. Proof of an actual planning of the perpetuation of the crime is not a condition precedent. From the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, and as can be inferred from their acts, it is evident that Bagano and Cañete were one in their intention to kill Jeremias. Hence, in accordance with the principle that in conspiracy the act
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of one is the act of all, the fact that it was Bagano who delivered the fatal blow on Jeremias and Cañete's participation was limited to a mere embrace is immaterial. Conspiracy bestows upon them equal liability; hence, they shall suffer the same fate for their acts.
burned. And after attaining their purpose, she fled with the other accused. The above circumstances clearly show the common purpose and concerted efforts on the part of appellant and her co-accused.
People v. Bangcado (2000) Facts: SPO1 Bangcado together with SPO1 Banisa frisked and searched Cogasi, Clemente, Adawan and Lino to see if they were concealing any weapons. After making sure that the victims were unarmed, Bangcado directed the victims to form a line against a Ford Fierra. Because Bangcado and Banisa were holding handguns, Cogasi and his friends did as they were told and were caught unaware when they were shot by Bangcado. Adawan and Lino died of gunshot wounds in the head, while Cogasi and Clemente sustained head wounds. The lower court convicted both Bangcado and Banisa for 2 counts of murder and 2 counts of frustrated murder. Held: There being no finding of Conspiracy with Bangcado, the Court acquitted Banisa of all the charges against him. In the absence of any previous plan or agreement to commit a crime, the criminal responsibility arising from different acts directed against one and the same person is individual and not collective, and that each of the participants is liable only for his own acts. Consequently, Banisa must be absolved from criminal responsibility for the assault on the victims. It is clear that neither the victims nor Banisa could have anticipated Bangcado's act of shooting the victims since the attack was sudden and without any reason or purpose. Thus, the criminal design of Bangcado had not yet been revealed prior to the killings.
PROPOSAL
People v. Ramos (2004) Facts: The trial court found appellant Eulalia San Roque guilty for conspiring and confederating with her co-accused for the murder of her live-in-partner Lomida. Lomida was stabbed, shot and burned resulting to his death. Appellant argues that the fact of such conspiracy has not been satisfactorily proven during the trial of the case. She vigorously contends that she did not participate in the killing of the victim. Held: In determining the existence of conspiracy, it is not necessary to show that all the conspirators actually hit and killed the victim. The presence of conspiracy among the accused can be proven by their conduct before, during or after the commission of the crime showing that they acted in unison with each other, evincing a common purpose or design. There must be a showing that appellant cooperated in the commission of the offense, either morally, through advice, encouragement or agreement or materially through external acts indicating a manifest intent of supplying aid in the perpetration of the crime in an efficacious way. In such case, the act of one becomes the act of all, and each of the accused will thereby be deemed equally guilty of the crime committed. The series of events in this case convincingly show that appellant and her co-accused acted in unison and cooperated with each other in killing Lomida. Appellant was the one who opened the door and allowed the other accused to enter the house. She joined them in bringing the victim to the residence of Ramos, her brother-in-law. While her co-accused dragged the helpless victim, tied him to a santol tree, stabbed him twice by a bladed knife, and shot him 5 to 7 times, appellant merely watched intensely. She even “turned her back” as the lifeless body of the victim was being
Requisites: a. That a person has decided to commit a felony; and b. That he proposes its execution to some other person or persons. ♠ There is no criminal proposal when: a. The person who proposes is not determined to commit the felony. b. There is no decided, concrete and formal proposal. c. It is not the execution of a felony that is proposed. ♠ It is not necessary that the person to whom the proposal is made agrees to commit treason or rebellion. US v. Bautista (1906) Facts: During the latter part of 1903, a junta was organized and a conspiracy entered into by a number of Filipino residents in HK for the purpose of overthrowing the government of the US in the Philippines and replacing it with Republica Universal Democratica Filipinas. Defendant Ricarte was recognized as chief of military forces to be organized in the Philippines. Defendant Bautista was an intimate friend of Ricarte and was present in several meetings. Defendant Puzon admitted that he accepted employment as chief of signal corps of such junta. Held: The fact that one accused of conspiracy to overthrow the government has actually and voluntarily accepted appointment by the conspirators as an officer of armed forces raised or to be raised in furtherance of the designs of the conspirators may be taken into consideration as evidence of the criminal connection of the accused with the conspiracy. People v. Vengco (1984) The conspiracy between Constantino Leneses and Leon David is discernible from the way in which the assaulted Celaderna and their conduct sometime before and immediately after the stabbing that clearly show that they had agreed to kill him. The rule is that “if it is proven that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part that their acts, although apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among them is proven. People v. Valdez (1988) Facts: Eleno was about to stand up to accompany a relative to a prayer meeting when he was shot at the back. The mother looked at the direction from where the gunshot came from and was able to identify the 2 defendants as they turned and ran down the hill from the bamboo grove from which the two hid behind. The brother of the victim also testified that he
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positively identified Valdez as the one carrying the gun and that it was Orodio who was running with him. Held: If conspiracy is proved to exist in the commission of the felony, it is not necessary to prove that participation of each conspirator of all are liable as any act of a co-conspirator becomes the act of the other regardless of the precise degree of participation in the act. The evidence is more than adequate to show conspiracy between two accused even if prosecution failed to show who actually pulled the trigger of the shotgun; the act of one is the act of all. People v. Escober (1988) Facts: Alorte, Escober and Punzalan were convicted of having killed the children of spouses Chua while robbing Bee Seng Electrical Supply owned by the spouses. Abuyen was the former security guard of the store while Escober was the present one. Punzalan is a friend of Abuyen. Escober and Punzalan were charged as principals by indispensable cooperation. Held: Escober was acquitted. Escober being on duty that fateful night and opening the gate to persons who turned out to be robbers and killers make him an easy suspect. However, the fact that accused was at the scene of the crime is not by itself sufficient to establish his criminal liability. To hold the accused as co-principal in the crime charged, the existence of conspiracy between the accused and the actual killers must be shown and the same degree of proof required for establishing the crime is required to support a finding of the presence of the conspiracy. Punzalan, on the other hand, is guilty as principal. His participation is to act as a look-out and even if he did not participate in the actual killing, he cannot evade responsibility for the crime. People v. Elijorde (2003) Facts: Hierro and Visbal went to the sari-sari store where they encountered Elijorde, Punzalan and Menes. Menes reacted to a comment made by Hierro by punching him in the face followed by Elijorde who also boxed him, and Punzalan who kicked him in the back. The two victims ran away. Another confrontation ensued. Punzalan kicked Hierro at the back and the latter ran away but pursued by Elijorde. Elijorde, then. Stabbed Hierro at the back with a knife resulting to his death. Elijorde and Punzalan were charged with murder. Held: No conspiracy between the 2 because there is no evidence to show unity of purpose and design in the execution of the killing. Punzalan only kicked Hierro twice after which he did not cooperate with Elijorde in pursuing and killing the victim. Mere kicking does not necessarily prove intent to kill. Thus, each of the accused is liable only for his own acts. Punzalan is acquitted. STAGES OF COMMISSION OF A CRIME Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. — Consummated felonies as well as those which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable. A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly or over
acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than this own spontaneous desistance. DEVELOPMENT OF A CRIME a.
b. c.
d.
internal acts – such as mere ideas in the mind of a person, are not punishable even if, had they been carried out, they would constitute a crime external acts – cover a) preparatory and b) acts of execution preparatory – acts tending toward the crime; ordinarily not punishable unless specifically provided for; these acts do not yet constitute even the first stage of the acts of execution; intent not yet disclosed acts of execution – acts directly connected to the intended crime; varies with the crime and is punishable under the code; usually overt acts with a logical relation to a particular concrete offense
STAGES OF COMMISSION 1. Attempted – there is an attempt when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. 2. Frustrated – it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. 3. Consummated – a felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present. ATTEMPTED FELONY Elements: 1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts; 2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony; 3. The offender’s act is not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance; 4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. ♠ The commission of the felony is deemed commenced directly by overt acts when 1) there be external acts; 2) such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be committed. OVERT ACT – some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried to its complete termination following its natural curse, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. ♠ Drawing or trying to draw a pistol or raising a bolo as if to strike the offended party with it is not an overt act of homicide.
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INDETERMINATE OFFENSE – It is one where the purpose of the offender in performing an act is not certain. Its nature in relation to its objective is ambiguous. ♠ The intention of the accused must be viewed from the nature of the acts executed by him, and not from his admission. SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE PHASES OF A FELONY 1. SUBJECTIVE PHASE - That portion of the execution of the crime starting from the point where the offender still has control over his acts. - If the offender reaches the point where he has no more control over is acts, the subjective phase is passed. - If it is already passed but the felony is not produced, it is frustrated. 2. OBJECTIVE PHASE - the result of the acts of execution, that is, the accomplishment of the crime. - If the subjective and objective phases are present, there is consummated felony. People v. Lamahang (1935) Facts: The accused was caught in the act of making an opening with an iron bar on the wall of a store where the owner was sleeping. The accused had only succeeded in breaking one board and in unfastening another from the wall, when the policeman showed up, who instantly arrested him. The trial court convicted him of attempted robbery. Held: The conviction is erroneous. It is the opinion of the SC that the attempt to commit an offense which the Penal code punishes is that which has a logical relation to a particular, concrete offense; that, which is the beginning of the execution of the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and consummation. What we have here is an attempt to commit an indeterminate offense. There is no doubt that it was the intention of the accused to enter the store by means of violence, passing through the opening which he had started to make on the wall, but it is not sufficient, for the purpose of imposing penal sanction to make an assumption that the act was in preparation for the commission of robbery. There is no logical and natural relation between the act of entering and robbery. Thus, he should be guilty of attempted trespass to dwelling. People v. Dio (1984) Facts: The appellant and his companion tried to divest Crispulo of his Seiko wrist watch but Crispulo resisted their attempt and fought the robbers. The victim was stabbed and later died. The Seiko watch was still strapped to his wrist. The lower court convicted the appellant of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. Held: The decision of the lower court was erroneous. The accused were unsuccessful in their criminal venture since the watch was still securely strapped to the victim’s wrist. The crime of robbery was therefore not consummated. The killing may be considered as merely incidental to the plan to carry out the robbery. The accused must be convicted of attempted robbery with homicide.
People v. Trinidad (1989) Facts: Deceased Soriano and Laroa together with Tan were inside a Ford Fierra Trinidad asked for a ride. The accused shot the two deceased. Tan got off the Fierra and rode a jeepney which just passed by. When he saw the accused riding at the back of the jeep, he tried to run but when the jeep started driving away, he clung to its side. The accused fired two shots at Tan, one hitting him on his thigh. The lower court convicted him of frustrated murder. Held: The accused can only be convicted of Attempted Murder because the accused was unable to perform all acts of execution which would have produced the murder. The victim’s wound in the right thigh was not fatal and the doctrinal rule is that where the wound is inflicted on the victim is not sufficient to cause his death, the crime is only attempted murder. People v. Campuhan (2000) Facts: The mother of the 4-year-old victim caught the houseboy Campuhan in the act of almost raping her daughter. The hymen of the victim was still intact but since in previous Orita ruling, entry into labia is considered rape even without rupture of hymen and full penetration is not necessary, question arises whether what transpired was attempted or consummated rape. Held: Attempted rape only. Mere touching of external genitalia by penis is already rape. However, touching should be understood as inherently part of entry of penis into labia and not mere touching of the pudendum. There must be clear and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labia and slid into the female organ and NOT MERELY STROKED THE EXTERNAL SURFACE. Some degree of penetration beneath the surface must be achieved and the labia major must be entered. Prosecution did not prove that the Campuhan’s penis was able to penetrate victim’s vagina because the kneeling position of the accused obstructed the mother’s view of the alleged sexual contact. The testimony of the victim herself claimed that penis grazed but did not penetrate her organ. There was only a shelling of the castle but no bombardment of the drawbridge yet. People v. Listerio (2000) Facts: Brothers Jeonito and Marlon were passing by Tramo, Muntinlupa when a group composed of Agapito Listerio, Samson, George, and Marlon, all surnamed Dela Torre and Bonifacio Bancaya blocked their path and attacked them with lead pipes and bladed weapons. Listerio, Marlon and George, who were armed with bladed weapons, stabbed Jeonito from behind. Jeonito’s brother, Marlon, was hit on the head by Samson and Bancaya with lead pipes and momentarily lost consciousness. When he regained his senses, he saw that Jeonito was already dead. Their assailants then fled after the incident. Marlon who sustained injuries in the arm and back, was thereafter brought to a hospital for treatment. The lower court found Listerio guilty for the “attempt” to kill Marlon. Held: The SC held that the crime is a frustrated felony not an attempted offense considering that after being stabbed and clubbed twice in the head as a result of which he lost consciousness and fell, Marlon's attackers apparently thought he was already dead and fled. A crime cannot be held to be attempted unless the offender, after beginning the commission of the crime by overt acts, is prevented, against his will, by some outside cause from performing all of the acts
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which should produce the crime. In other words, to be an attempted crime the purpose of the offender must be thwarted by a foreign force or agency which intervenes and compels him to stop prior to the moment when he has performed all of the acts which should produce the crime as a consequence, which acts it is his intention to perform. If he has performed all the acts which should result in the consummation of the crime and voluntarily desists from proceeding further, it cannot be an attempt. ] Valenzuela v. People (2007) Facts: A grocery boy was caught trying to abscond a box of Tide Ultrabar laundry soap from the Super Sale Club. The guards apprehended him at the store parking lot while trying to board a taxi. He claimed the theft was merely frustrated for he was not able to dispose of the goods. Held: The Revised Penal Code provisions on theft have not been designed in such fashion as to accommodate the Adiao, Dino and Empelis rulings. Again, there is no language in Article 308 that expressly or impliedly allows that the “free disposition of the items stolen” is in any way determinative of whether the crime of theft has been produced. We thus conclude that under the Revised Penal Code, there is no crime of frustrated theft.
FRUSTRATED FELONY Elements: 1. The offender performs all the acts of execution; 2. All the acts performed would produce the felony as a consequence; 3. But the felony is not produced; 4. By reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. ♠ In frustrated felony, the offender must perform all the acts of execution. Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because he has performed the last act necessary to produce the crime. FRUSTRATED FELONY VS. ATTEMPTED FELONY 1. In both, the offender has not accomplished his criminal purpose. 2. While in frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence, in attempted felony, the offender merely commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution.
ATTEMPTED OR IMPOSSIBLE CRIME FRUSTRATED The evil intent of the offender is not accomplished The evil intent of the The evil intent of the offender is possible of offender cannot be accomplishment accomplished The evil intent cannot be The evil intent of the accomplished because of offender cannot be the intervention of certain accomplished because it is cause or accident in which inherently impossible of the offender had no part accomplishment or because the means
employed by the offender is inadequate or ineffectual People v. Eriña (1927) Facts: The victim of the crime was a child of 3 years and 11 months. There are doubts whether the accused succeeded in penetrating the vagina before being disturbed in the timely intervention of the mother and sister. The physician found a slight inflammation of the exterior parts of the organ, indicating an effort had been made to enter the vagina but it is doubtful whether the entry had been effected. Held: Though complete penetration is not necessary, penetration of the labia is sufficient. However, since there is no sufficient evidence of such penetration, the act is merely frustrated. Dissent: It is consummated rape. People v. Orita (1990) Facts: The victim was a 19-year old college student. She arrived at her boarding house early morning coming from a late-night party. The accused suddenly held her and poked a knife to her neck. They entered a room and the victim was ordered to lie down. The accused made the victim hold his penis and insert it in her vagina. Because of their position, the accused cannot fully penetrate her. Only a small part of his penis inserted her vagina. The victim was able to escape and report to the police what happened. The lower court convicted the accused of frustrated rape. Held: Perfect penetration is not essential for the consummation of rape. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction. Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim, he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential elements of the offense have been accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because he has performed the last act necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the felony is consummated rape. Taking into account the nature, elements and manner of execution of the crime of rape and jurisprudence on the matter, it is hardly conceivable how the frustrated stage in rape can ever be consummated. People v. Caballero (2003) Facts: As Eugene walked by the gate of the Mondragon Compound, Armando Caballero suddenly grabbed Eugene towards the compound. Eugene resisted. Spontaneously, Armando’s brothers Ricardo, Marciano, Jr., and Robito joined Armando and assaulted Eugene. Armando took the wooden pole supporting the clothesline and hit Eugene with it. Eugene’s sister, Myrna, saw the Caballero brothers assaulting Eugene and shouted for help. Arnold saw the commotion and rushed to the scene to pacify the protagonists. However, Ricardo accosted Arnold and stabbed the latter on the left side of his body. Forthwith, Robito, Marciano, Jr. and Armando ganged up on Arnold. Two of them stabbed Arnold on his forearm. Arnold fled for his life and hid under the house of a neighbor. Leonilo, who likewise rushed to the scene was stabbed by Robito. Eugene and Leonilo eventually died from the stab wounds they sustained. Dr. Quisumbing, who attended to and operated on Arnold, testified that the stab wound sustained by Arnold on the left side of his body was
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mortal and could have caused his death were it not for the timely and effective medical intervention: Held: A crime is frustrated when the offender has performed all the acts of execution which should result in the consummation of the crime. The offender has passed the subjective phase in the commission of the crime. Subjectively, the crime is complete. Nothing interrupted the offender while passing through the subjective phase. He did all that is necessary to consummate the crime. However, the crime is not consummated by reason of the intervention of causes independent of the will of the offender. In homicide cases, the offender is said to have performed all the acts of execution if the wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and could cause the death of the victim barring medical intervention or attendance.
CONSUMMATED FELONY Requisites: 1. All the acts of execution are present 2. The result is achieved. ♠ Every crime has its own elements which must all be present to constitute a culpable violation of a precept of law. How to determine whether the felony is attempted, frustrated or consummated? 1. the nature of the offense ex. In arson, it is not necessary that the property is totally destroyed by fire. The crime of arson is therefore consummated even if only a portion of the wall or any other part of the house is burned. 2. the elements constituting the felony ex. In theft, the mere removal of the personal property belonging to another with intent to gain is sufficient to consummate the offense. In estafa, the offended party must actually be prejudiced or damaged. (Adiao case vs. Domiguez case) 3.
the manner of committing the crime a. formal crimes – those which are consummated by a single act (ex. Slander, adultery) • There can be no ATTEMPT in a formal crime. b. crimes consummated by mere attempt (ex. Attempt to flee to an enemy country, treason) • There is not ATTEMPTED crime because the overt act in itself consummates the crime.
- There are three stages of consummation: attempted, frustrated and consummated. US v. Adiao (1955) Facts: Adiao is a customs inspector. He abstracted a leather belt from the luggage of a Japanese and secreted the belt under his desk in the Customs House where it was found by other customs employees. Adiao was convicted of frustrated theft. Held: Since the defendant performed all the acts of execution necessary for the accomplishment of the felony, he is guilty of consummated crime of theft. The fact that he was under observation during the entire transaction and was unable to get the merchandise out of the Customs House is not decisive; all the elements of the completed crime of theft are present. People v. Hernandez (1925) Facts: The accused, a 70-year-old man was convicted by the trial court of frustrated rape for having intercourse with his granddaughter who was at that time only 9 years of age. The lower court claimed that there can be no consummated rape without a complete penetration of the hymen. Held: Finding the hymen intact is not always proof that no rape has been committed. The law may now indeed be considered as settled that while the rupturing of the hymen is not indispensable to a conviction, there must be proof of some degree of entrance of the male organ within the labia of pudendum. In the present case, the physician found the labia and the opening of the vagina inflamed together with an abundance of semen. Child even testified that defendant succeeded partial penetration. The accused is guilty of consummated rape. D. CLASSIFICATION OF FELONIES Art. 9. Grave felonies, less grave felonies and light felonies. — Grave felonies are those to which the law attaches the capital punishment or penalties which in any of their periods are afflictive, in accordance with Art. 25 of this Code. Less grave felonies are those which the law punishes with penalties which in their maximum period are correctional, in accordance with the abovementioned Art. ♠ Art. 9 classifies felonies according to their gravity. a. GRAVE FELONIES – those in which the law attaches a capital punishment or afflictive penalty. ♠ Capital punishment is death penalty
c. felonies by omission • There can be no attempted stage because the offender does not execute acts. He omits to perform an act which the law requires him to do. d. crimes committed by mere agreement - The offer made by one of the parties to the other constitutes attempted felony, if the offer is rejected. - In view of this rule, it would seem that there is no frustrated bribery but in People v. Diego Quin, SC ruled that if the public officer returned the money given by the defendant, there is frustrated bribery. e. material crimes
♠ The afflictive penalties in accordance with Art. 25 of this code are: reclusion perpetua reclusion temporal perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification perpetual or temporary special disqualification prision mayor b.
LESS GRAVE FELONIES – those in which their maximum period are correctional ♠ When the penalty prescribed for the offense is composed of two or more distinct penalties, the
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higher or highest of the penalties must be a correctional penalty. ♠ The following are correctional penalties prision correccional arresto mayor suspension destierro c.
LIGHT FELONIES – those infractions of law in which the penalty is arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200 or both. ♠ A felony punishable by a fine not exceeding P200 and censure is a light felony, because public censure, like arresto menor, is a light felony.
Art. 7. When light felonies are punishable. — Light felonies are punishable only when they have been consummated, with the exception of those committed against person or property. Light felonies are those infractions of law for the commission of which a penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos or both; is provided. ♠ This should be seen in the light of articles prescribing penalties for crimes in their different stages of commission. This means that light felonies which are only attempted or frustrated are not punishable by law. ♠ However, in the commission of crimes against persons and property, every stage of execution is punishable but only the principals and accomplices are liable in light felonies, the accessories are not. ♠ Rationale: Light felonies produce such slight or insignificant moral and material injuries that public conscience is assuaged b not providing for penalty for light felonies which are not consummated and to mere accomplices.
REQUISITES: a. That an intentional felony has been committed; and b. That the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct and natural and logical consequence of the felony. ♣ Any person who creates in another’s mind an immediate sense of danger, which causes the latter to do something resulting in the latter’s injuries, is liable for the resulting injuries. ♣ Wrong done must be the direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony committed. - where it clearly appears that the injury would not have cased death, in the ordinary course of events, but would have healed in so many days and where it is shown beyond all doubt that the death was due to the malicious or careless acts of the injured person or a third person, the accused is not liable for homicide. ♣ The offended party is not obliged to submit to a surgical operation to relieve the accused from the natural and ordinary results of his crime. ♣ The felony committed must be the proximate cause of the resulting injury. ♠ The causes which may produce a result different from that which the offender intended are: a. ERROR IN PERSONAE - mistake in the identity of the victim; injuring one person mistaken for another (this is a complex crime under Art. 49) b. ABERRATIO ICTUS - mistake in the blow, that is, when the offender intending to do an injury to one person actually inflicts it on another; and c. PRAETER INTENTIONEM – the act exceeds the intent, that is, the injurious result is greater than that intended.
III. CRIMINAL LIABILITY
* RPC, Art. 13 Mitigating circumstance – 3) That the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed.
A. HOW INCURRED Art. 4. Criminal liability. — Criminal liability shall be incurred: 1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. 2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or an account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means. ♣ This article has no reference to the manner criminal liability is incurred. The manner incurring criminal liability under the RPC is stated under Art. 3, that is, performing or failing to do an act, when either is punished b law, by means of deceit or fault. ♣ Art. 4 merely states that criminal liability is incurred by those mentioned by the said article. 1. By any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or an account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means. Quinto v. Andres (2005) Facts: Garcia, a Grade 4 elementary school pupil, and his playmate, Wilson Quinto, who was about 11 yrs old saw Andres and Pacheco who invited them to go fishing inside a drainage culvert. Wilson assented but Garcia seeing that it was dark inside opted to remain seated in a grassy area about 2meters from the entrance of the drainage system. Pacheco, Andres and Quinto, entered the drainage system which was covered by concrete culvert about a meter high and a meter wide, with water about a foot deep. After a while, respondent Pacheco, who was holding a fish, came out of the drainage system and left without saying a word. Andres also came out, went back inside, and emerged again, this time, carrying Wilson who was already dead. Andres laid the boy's lifeless body down in the grassy area. Shocked at the sudden turn of events, Garcia fled from the scene. For his part, Andres went to the house
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of petitioner Melba Quinto, Wilson's mother, and informed her that her son had died. Melba Quinto rushed to the drainage culvert while respondent Andres followed her. Held: The court ruled that respondents cannot be held criminally nor civilly liable for the death of Wilson. In this case, the petitioner failed to adduce proof of any ill-motive on the part of either respondent to kill the deceased before or after the latter was invited to join them in fishing. Indeed, the petitioner testified that respondent Andres used to go to their house and play with her son before the latter's death. When the petitioner's son died inside the drainage culvert, it was respondent Andres who brought out the deceased. He then informed the petitioner of her son's death. Even after informing the petitioner of the death of her son, respondent Andres followed the petitioner on her way to the grassy area where the deceased was. People v. Valledor (2002) Facts: Roger was in his house working on a lettering job inside his bedroom together with his first cousin, Elsa and his friends, Simplicio and Antonio. All of a sudden, Valledor entered the room, uttered Roger's nickname ("Jer") and immediately attacked him with a knife. Valledor then stabbed Elsa on the chest and said, "Ako akabales den, Elsa." (I had my revenge, Elsa). Thereafter, Valledor fled, leaving Simplicio and Antonio unharmed. Roger and Elsa were immediately brought to the hospital. On their way out, Antonio noticed a commotion and saw that Ricardo, a neighbor of the victim, who was likewise stabbed by Valledor was wounded. Elsa was declared dead on arrival. Roger on the other hand was treated for the 5-centimeter wound sustained by him on his right forearm. Valledor invoked the defense of insanity. Held: Valledor failed to discharge the burden of overcoming the presumption of sanity at the time of the commission of the crime. Judging from his acts, Valledor was clearly aware and in control of what he was doing as he in fact purposely chose to stab only the two victims. Two other people were also inside the room, but Valledor went for the victims. His obvious motive of revenge against the victims was accentuated by calling out their names and uttering the words, "I had my revenge" after stabbing them. Finally, his act of immediately fleeing from the scene after the incident indicates that he was aware of the wrong he has done and the consequence thereof. As consistently held by this Court, "A man may act crazy but it does not necessarily and conclusively prove that he is legally so. Then, too, the medical findings showing that Valledor was suffering from a mental disorder after the commission of the crime, has no bearing on his liability. What is decisive is his mental condition at the time of the perpetration of the offense. Failing to discharge the burden of proving that he was legally insane when he stabbed the victims, he should be held liable for his felonious acts.
Intent Recuerdo v. People (2006) Held: General criminal intent is an element of all crimes but malice is properly applied only to deliberate acts done on purpose and with design. Evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be a felony. A deliberate and unlawful act gives rise to a presumption of malice by intent. On the other hand,
specific intent is a definite and actual purpose to accomplish some particular thing. The general criminal intent is presumed from the criminal act and in the absence of any general intent is relied upon as a defense, such absence must be proved by the accused. Generally, a specific intent is not presumed. Its existence, as a matter of fact, must be proved by the State just as any other essential element. This may be shown, however, by the nature of the act, the circumstances under which it was committed, the means employed and the motive of the accused
IMPOSSIBLE CRIMES REQUISITES: 1. That the act performed would be an offense against persons or property. FELONIES AGAINST PERSONS ARE: a. Parricide b. Murder c. Homicide d. Infanticide e. Abortion f. Duel g. Physical Injuries h. Rape FELONIES AGAINST PROPERTY ARE: a. Robbery b. Brigandage c. Theft d. Usurpation e. Culpable Insolvency f. Swindling and other deceits g. Chattel Mortgage h. Arson and other crimes involving destruction i. Malicious Mischief 2. That the act was done with evil intent. The offender must have intent to do injury to another. 3. That its accomplishment is inherently impossible, or that the means employed is either inadequate or ineffectual. In impossible crime, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against persons or property because: a. the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment - The act intended by the offender is by its nature one of impossible accomplishment. - There must either 1) LEGAL IMPOSSIBILITY, or 2) PHYSICAL IMPOSSIBILITY - examples: 1) when one tries to kill another by putting in his substance which he believes to be arsenic when in fact it is common salt; 2) when one tries to murder a corpse. b. the means employed is either inadequate or ineffectual - example: when one tries to poison another but the quantity of arsenic added in his substance was not sufficient to kill a person - but where the means employed is adequate and the result expected is not produced, it is not an impossible crime, but a frustrated felony.
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4. That the act performed should not constitute a violation of another provision of the RPC - example: A pointed a gun at B to rob the latter of a watch but B was not wearing a watch. It is not an impossible crime because A’s pointing his gun at B already constituted at least the crime of grave threats. Why is an impossible crime punishable? It is punishable in order to suppress criminal tendencies. Objectively, the offender has not committed a felony, but subjectively, he is a criminal. Urbano v. IAC (1988) Facts: Urbano went to his rice field and found his palay flooded with water. Urbano found out that it was Javier who was responsible for the opening of the irrigation canal. He got angry and tried to hack Javier but the latter tried to parry the attack and in the process, a two-inch incised wound was inflicted on the right palm of Javier’s hand. The wound was treated and incapacitation was diagnosed to be from 7-9 days. 22 days after, Javier was rushed to the hospital in a very serious condition caused by tetanus toxin. Javier died the next day. Urbano was convicted of homicide. Held: Urbano is acquitted because the infection was distinct and foreign to the crime. The proximate cause of Javier’s death was due to his own negligence as he went back to work even if his wound had not yet healed properly. The evidence on record also shows that the wound inflicted by Urbano did not exhibit any signs of being infected with tetanus; at most, it was only infected with a mild form of tetanus and not the severe form that killed him. Intod v. CA (1992) Facts: Intod et al. went to Palangpangan’s house, all armed with firearms. They went the bedroom and began firing their weapons. However, Palangpangan was in another city and her home was occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired their weapons. RTC convicted the accused of attempted murder. Held: The accused is guilty of an impossible crime. The factual situation in the case presents a physical impossibility which rendered the intended crime impossible of performance. B. CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY
IMPUTABILITY Quality by which an act may be ascribed to a person as its author or owner. Implies that a deed may be imputed to a person.
RESPONSIBILITY Obligation of suffering the consequences of the crime. Implies that the person must take the consequence of such deed.
1. JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES • Those where the act of a person is said to be in accordance with law, so that such person is deemed not to have transgressed the law and is free from both criminal and civil liability.
• The law recognizes the non-existence of a crime by expressly stating in the opening sentence of Art. 11 that the person therein mentioned “DO NOT INCUR CRIMINAL LIABILITY.”
Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. — The following do not incur any criminal liability: 1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur; First. Unlawful aggression Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it. Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. 2. Any one who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants, descendants, or legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or his relatives by affinity in the same degrees and those consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, provided that the first and second requisites prescribed in the next preceding circumstance are present, and the further requisite, in case the revocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making defense had not part therein. 3. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of a stranger, provided that the first and second requisites mentioned in the first circumstance of this Article are present and that the person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive. 4. Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does not act which causes damage, provided that the following requisites are present: First. That the evil sought t be avoided actually exists. Second. That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it; Third. That there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it. 5. Any person who acts in fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. 6. Any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose.
• Article 11 recognizes the acts of such persons as justified. Such persons are not criminals, as there is no crime committed
Par. 1 – SELF-DEFENSE • Self-defense includes not only the defense of the person or body of the one assaulted but also that of his rights, that is, those rights the enjoyment of which is protected by law. REQUISITES: a. There must be unlawful aggression • This is an indispensable requisite.
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• If there is no unlawful aggression, there is nothing to prevent or repel. • Unlawful aggression is equivalent to assault or at least threatened assault of an immediate and imminent kind. • There must be an ACTUAL PHYSICAL assault upon a person, or at least a THREAT to inflict real injury. • When there is no peril to one’s life, limb or right, there is no unlawful aggression.
• The means employed by the person making a defense must be rationally necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression. • The reasonableness of the means used will depend upon the NATURE and QUALITY of the weapon used by the aggressor, his PHYSICAL CONDITION, SIZE and other circumstances, and those of the person defending himself, and also the place and occasion of the assault.
PERIL TO ONE’S LIFE 1. ACTUAL – that the danger must be present, that is, actually in existence. 2. IMMINENT- that the danger is on the point of happening. It is not required that the attack already begins, for it may be too late. • A slap on the face constitutes unlawful aggression since the face represents a person and his dignity. Slapping it is a serious personal attack. • Retaliation is different from an act of self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression that was begun by the injured party already ceased to exist when the accused attacked him. In self-defense, the aggression was still existing when the aggressor was injured or disabled by the person making a defense.
*** THE FIRST TWO REQUISITES ARE COMMON TO THREE KINDS OF LEGITIMATE DEFENSE: 1) SELFDEFENSE, 2) DEFENSE OF A RELATIVE AND 3) DEFENSE OF A STRANGER. c. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself • The third requisite of self-defense is present: 1. When no provocation at all was given to the aggressor by the person defending himself; or 2. When, even if a provocation was giver, it was not sufficient; or 3. When, even if the provocation was sufficient, it was not given by the person defending himself; or 4. When, even if a provocation was given by the person defending himself, it was not proximate and immediate to the act of aggression.
• In self-defense, the person must have no time nor occasion for deliberation and cool thinking. BATTERED WOMAN DEFENSE (RA 9262) • The unlawful aggression must come from the person who was attacked by the accused. • There is no unlawful aggression when there is agreement to fight because where the fight has been agreed upon, each of the protagonists is at once assailant and assaulted. But when the aggression is ahead of the stipulated time and place, it is unlawful. • The rule now is STAND GROUND WHEN IN THE RIGHT. So, where the accused is where he has the right to be, the law does not require him to retreat when his assailant is rapidly advancing upon him with a deadly weapon. • The belief of the person may be considered in determining the existence of unlawful aggression. Ex. If the aggressor used a toy pistol but the accused believed it was a real gun, he may claim selfdefense. b. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it • The second requisite presupposes the existence of unlawful aggression. • The law protects not only the person who repels an aggression (meaning actual), but even the person who tries to prevent an aggression that is expected (meaning imminent). • The reasonableness of the necessity depends upon the circumstances particularly the time and location where the aggression took place.
People v. Genosa, 419 SCRA 537 (2004) Facts: Ben was found dead in a rented apartment he shared with his pregnant wife Marivic and their two children. Marivic admitted in court having killed her husband. She confessed hitting Ben’s nape with a metal pipe and of shooting him at the back of his head when the latter went to bed after attacking her. The trial court found Marivic guilty of parricide. She now invokes, self defense and/or defense of her unborn child. In claiming self defense, Marivic raised the theory of the “battered woman syndrome (BWS).” Held: Battered woman has been defined as a woman "who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern for her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman." In any event, the existence of BWS in a relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-defense. Crucial to the BWS defense is the state of mind of the battered woman at the time of the offense — she must have actually feared imminent harm from her batterer and honestly believed in the need to kill him in order to save her life. The one who resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on one's life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely imaginary. Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual, sudden
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and unexpected attack — or an imminent danger thereof — on the life or safety of a person. In the present case, however, according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their children's bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety. Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she came out of their children's bedroom — and based on past violent incidents, there was a great probability that he would still have pursued her and inflicted graver harm — then, the imminence of the real threat upon her life would not have ceased yet. Where the brutalized person is already suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual physical assault at the time of the killing is not required. Incidents of domestic battery usually have a predictable pattern. To require the battered person to await an obvious, deadly attack before she can defend her life "would amount to sentencing her to 'murder by installment.'" Still, impending danger (based on the conduct of the victim in previous battering episodes) prior to the defendant's use of deadly force must be shown. Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the required imminence of danger. Considering such circumstances and the existence of BWS, selfdefense may be appreciated. The Court reiterated the principle that aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant selfdefense. In the absence of such aggression, there can be no self-defense — complete or incomplete — on the part of the victim. Thus, Marivic's killing of Ben was not completely justified under the circumstances. The Court futher however held that the severe beatings repeatedly inflicted on Marivic constituted a form of cumulative provocation that broke down her psychological resistance and self-control. This "psychological paralysis" she suffered diminished her will power, thereby entitling her to the mitigating factor under paragraphs 9 and 10 of Article 13 of the RPC In addition, Marivic was also credited with the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation. The acute battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that she was eight months pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid emotional and mental state, which overcame her reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and her unborn child's. Toledo v. People (2004) Facts: Toledo saw his nephew, Ricky, and the latter's friends about 5 m away from his house, having a drinking spree. He ordered them not to make loud noises, and they obliged. He then went to his house and went to sleep. After some time, Ricky and his friends also went to sleep. They had not laid down for long when he heard stones being hurled at the roof of the house. Ricky saw Toledo stoning their house and asked him why he was doing the same. Toledo did not answer but met Ricky at the doorstep of his house and without warning stabbed Ricky on the abdomen with a bolo which resulted to his death. In the lower courts, Toledo defended himself by alleging that his bolo accidentaly hit the stomach of the victim and that he was able to prove all the essential elements of self defense.
Held: The Court ruled that it is an aberration for Toledo to invoke the two defenses at the same time because the said defenses are intrinsically antithetical. There is no such defense as accidental self-defense in the realm of criminal law. The court further ruled that Toledo was not justified in stabbing Ricky. There was no imminent threat in his life necessitating his assault. Records reveal that there is no unlawful agression, a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of self defense, on the part of Ricky. Ricky arrived at Toledo’s house unarmed. With no weapon to attack Toledo or defend himself, no sign of hostility may be deduced from him. People v. Enfectana(2002) Facts: While Adelaida and her husband Leo were on their way home, they were sideswiped by a tricycle driven by appellant Erwin with Efren both surnamed Enfectana as passenger. As a result, her husband fell in a crouching position. When he was about to get up, Eusebio also surnamed Enfectana came from behind to stab him. Then Erwin and Efren took turns in stabbing Leo. He died as a result. In court, Eusebio Enfectana admitted that he killed Leo. He, however, alleged that he acted in self-defense Held: It is an established principle that once this justifying circumstance is raised, the burden of proving the elements of the claim shifts to him who invokes it. The elements of self-defense are: (1) that the victim has committed unlawful aggression amounting to actual or imminent threat to the life and limb of the person claiming self-defense; (2) that there be reasonable necessity in the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) that there be lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming self-defense or, at least, that any provocation executed by the person claiming self-defense be not the proximate and immediate cause of the victim's aggression. The condition of unlawful aggression is a sine qua non; otherwise stated, there can be no selfdefense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim has committed unlawful aggression against the person defending himself. Given the fact that the relationship between the parties had been marred by ill will and animosities, and pursuant to the rule on the burden of evidence imposed by law on the party invoking self-defense, the admission of Eusebio that he killed Leo made it incumbent upon appellant to convincingly prove that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim which necessitated the use of deadly force by Eusebio. Unfortunately, Eusebio miserably failed to prove the existence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Eusebio is guilty of murder. Cano v. People (2003) Facts: Conrado and his deceased brother were rivals in the Rush ID Photo business and had booths along the sidewalk of Rizal Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila. Condrado borrowed the permit of the deceased and had it photocopied without the latter’s permission. The deceased confonted Conrado and tried to stab him with a fan knife. The latter locked himself in the dark room of his booth to protect himself but was followed by the deceased and they ended up attacking each other. During the scuffle, the scissors which Orlando was able to grab fell from his hands. He then grabbed the knife of the deceased who in turn picked the scissors. They again attacked each other which resulted to the death of the other.
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Held: Conrado’s act of killilng his brother was attended by a justifying circumstance of self-defense. It was the deceased who purposely sought and initially attacked Orlando with a knife. The act of a person armed with a bladed weapon pursuing another constitutes unlawful agression because it signifies the pursuers intent to commit an assault with his weapon. There was also lack of sufficient provocation on the part of Condrado. His act of photocopying the permit of his brother without the latters permission can hardly be conidered as provocation to merit so deadly an assault with a bladed weapon. Balunueco v. CA (2003) Facts: Amelia was coddling her youngest child in front of her house when she saw accused Reynaldo, his father Juanito, brothers Ricardo and Ramon, all surnamed Balunueco, and one Flores chasing her brother-in-law Servando. With the 5 individuals in hot pursuit, Servando scampered into the safety of Amelia's house. Meanwhile, Senando, who was then cooking supper, went out of the house unaware of the commotion going on outside. Upon seeing Senando, Reynaldo turned his attention on him and gave chase. Senando instinctively fled towards the fields but he was met by Armando who hit him with a stone, causing Senando to feel dizzy. Reynaldo, Ricardo, and Armando cornered their quarry near a canal and ganged up on him. Armando placed a can on top of Senando's head and Ricardo repeatedly struck Senando with an ax on the head, shoulder, and hand. At one point, Ricardo lost his hold on the ax, but somebody tossed him a bolo and then he continued hacking the victim who fell on his knees. To shield him from further violence, Amelia put her arms around her husband but it was not enough to detract Ricardo from his murderous frenzy. Amelia was also hit on the leg. The RTC and CA convicted Ricardo of Homicide. He now imputes errors to the CA in not taking into consideration the fact that if indeed he participated, he had acted in defense of his relatives. Held: Of the three (3) requisites of defense of relatives, unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non, for without it any defense is not possible or justified. In order to consider that an unlawful aggression was actually committed, it is necessary that an attack or material aggression, an offensive act positively determining the intent of the aggressor to cause an injury shall have been made; a mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not sufficient to justify the commission of an act which is punishable per se, and allow a claim of exemption from liability on the ground that it was committed in self-defense or defense of a relative. In the case at bar, petitioner Ricardo utterly failed to adduce sufficient proof of the existence of a positively strong act of real aggression on the part of the deceased Senando.. It was he and his kin who had inititated the unlawful agression and not Senando. Further, the natural impulse of any person who has killed someone in defense of his person or relative is to bring himself to the authorities and try to dispel any suspicion of guilt that the authorities might have against him. Ricardo failed to do the same. With the exception of his self-serving allegations, there is nothing on record that would justify his killing of Senando. People v. Dijan (2002) Facts Silvestre and Hilario were at a store to buy some cigarettes when they saw the group of Dijan, Paglinawan and Lizardo, passing by the store. Paglinawan suddenly confronted Hilario for purportedly
giving him a "bad stare." Silvestre apologized and explained that it was the natural way Hilario gazed at people. Dijan, Paglinawan and Lizardo then left the place while Silvestre and Hilario proceeded home. While Silvestre and Hilario were walking, the 3 accused, ganged up on, and took turns in stabbing, Hilario. At that point, Hilario, who was walking slightly ahead of Silvestre, cried out and told the latter to flee. Silvestre ran away until he was able to cling to a passing passenger jeepney. Hilario was found to have sustained several stab wounds, punctured and incised wounds, and abrasion in various parts of the body which caused his death. Appealing his conviction in court, Dijan invoked the justifying circumstance of “defense of a stranger.” Held: In order to successfully put up this defense an accused must show the existence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. The unlawful aggression must be a continuing circumstance or must have been existing at the time the defense is made. Once unlawful aggression is found to have ceased, the one making the defense of a stranger would likewise cease to have any justification for killing, or even just wounding, the former aggressor. From the defense account, it would appear that Hilario was already disarmed and the unlawful aggression by Hilario (if indeed he was the aggressor) to have by then been abated, when Dijan still delivered the fatal thrusts on the victim. The number of wounds sustained by the victim would itself likewise negate Dijan’s claim of defense of a stranger. The autopsy conducted on the corpse would show that the deceased sustained 14 injuries consisting of 9 stab wounds, 3 punctured wounds, an incised wound and an abrasion. Certainly, the nature and number of wounds inflicted by an accused on the victim should be significant indicia in determining the plausibility of the defense plea. Marzonia v. People (2006) Held: As the Court previously held, mortally wounding an assailant with a penknife is not a reasonably necessary means to repel fist blows.
Par. 2 – DEFENSE OF RELATIVES RELATIVES THAT CAN BE DEFENDED 1. Spouse 2. Ascendants 3. Descendants 4. Legitimate, natural or adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity in the same degrees. 5. Relatives by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree. • Relatives by affinity, because of marriage, are parentsin-law, son or daughter-in-law, and brothers or sistersin-law. • Death of the spouse terminates the relationship by affinity; unless the marriage has resulted in issue who is still living, in which case the relationship of affinity continues. • Consanguinity refers to blood relatives. Brothers and sisters are within the second civil degree; uncle and niece or aunt and nephew are within the third civil
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degree; and first cousins are within the fourth civil degree. REQUISITES OF DEFENSE OF RELATIVES: 1. Unlawful aggression; • Unlawful aggression may not exist as a matter of fact, it can be made to depend upon the honest belief of the one making a defense. Ex. The sons of A honestly believed that their father was the victim of an unlawful aggression when in fact it was their father who attacked B. If they killed B under such circumstance, they are justified. 2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; • The gauge of reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the aggression as against one’s self or in defense of a relative is to be found in the situation as IT APPEARS TO THE PERSON REPELLING THE AGGRESSION (the defender). 3. In case the provocation was given by the person attacked, the one making a defense had no part therein. • There is still legitimate defense of relative even if the relative being defended has given provocation, provided that the one defending such relative has no part in the provocation. • Reason for the rule: Although the provocation prejudices the person who gave it, its effects do not reach the defender who took no part therein, because the latter was prompted by some noble or generous sentiment in protecting and saving a relative. Par. 3 – DEFENSE OF STRANGER REQUISITES: 1. Unlawful aggression; 2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; 3. The person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment or other evil motive. Who are deemed strangers? Any person not included in the enumeration of relatives mentioned in paragraph 2 of this article, is considered stranger for the purpose of paragraph 3. BASIS: What one may do in his defense, another may do for him. The ordinary man would not stand idly by and see his companion killed without attempting to save his life. People v. Narvaez (1983) Facts: Narvaez was taking his rest inside his house when he heard that the wall of his house was being chiseled. He saw that Fleischer and Rubia, together with their laborers, were fencing the land of the father of the deceased Fleischer. If the fencing would go on, Narvaez would be prevented from getting into his house and the bodega of his ricemill so he asked the group to stop but they refused. The accused got mad so he got his shotgun and shot Fleischer. Rubia ran towards the jeep and knowing there is a gun on the jeep, the accused fired at Rubia as well. Narvaez claimed he acted in defense of his person and rights. Held: The court took into consideration the fact that the 2 deceased were accompanied with three
laborers and that the were using tools which could be lethal weapons such as nail and hammer, bolo, etc. and that the jeep the deceased used contained a gun leaning near the steering wheel. There was aggression on the part of the victims not on the person of the accused but on his property rights when Fleischer angrily ordered the continuance of the fencing. The third element of self-defense is also present because there was no sufficient provocation on the part of Narvaez since he was sleeping when the deceased where fencing. However, the second element was lacking. Shooting the victims from the window of his house is disproportionate to the physical aggression by the victims. Thus, there is incomplete self-defense and the accused is entitled to a penalty lower by one or two degrees. Dissent: Defense of property is not of such importance as the right to life and defense of property can only be invoked when it is coupled with some form of attack on the person of one entrusted with said property. In this case before us, there is no evidence that an attack was attempted. The utterance, “no, gaddemit, proceed, go ahead” is not unlawful aggression which entitles him neither to a plea of self-defense nor to a mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense. People v. Boholst-Caballero (1974) Facts: Boholst (wife) and Caballero (husband) are married to each other. But since their marriage was an unhappy one, they separated. One evening, the wife went caroling with her friends and she was seen by her husband standing in a corner of the yard of Barabad. She accused her of prostituting and threatened to kill her as he held her by the hair, slapped her face until her nose bled. He, then, choked her and at the same time continuously saying that he will kill her. The wife then pulled out the knife of her husband tucked inside the belt line and stabbed him. When she was released, she ran home. The wife is claiming self-defense. Held: The wife who being strangled and choked by a furious aggressor had no other recourse but to get hold of any weapon within her reach to save herself. The claim that it was not proper for the wife to be standing in the middle of the night outside a yard giving the impression that she is prostituting herself, is not sufficient provocation. All that the accused did was to provoke an imaginary commission of a wrong in the mind of her husband which is not a sufficient provocation under the law of self-defense. People v. Alconga (1947) Facts: The deceased Barion was the banker in the game of black jack. Raposo played the game while the accused posted himself behind the Barion acting as a spotter of the cards of the latter and communicating it to his partner Raposo. When Barion learned about what Raposo and Alconga, an exchange of words ensued. One morning, when Alconga was in the guardhouse, Barion arrived and swung his pingahan but the former the accused was able to avoid the blow. In a crawling position, Alconga avoided the following blows and was able to draw his revolver and shoot Barion. He was able to crawl out of the guardhouse and a hand-to-hand fight ensued. Having sustained several wounds, Barion ran away but was followed by the accused and another fight took place. Alconga then slashed Barion’s head with a bolo which caused the latter’s death. The accused pleaded self-defense. Held: An accused was no longer acting in selfdefense when he pursued and killed a fleeing adversary,
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though originally the unlawful aggressor, there being no more aggression to defend against, the same having ceased from the moment the deceased took to his heels. People v. Sumicad (1932) Facts: Sumicad was hauling logs when Cubol suddenly struck him with his fist. Sumicad tried to escape but Cubol continued to strike him with his fists. Sumicad receded until he found himself cornered by a pile of logs which prevented him from further retreat. As Cubol advanced towards him, Sumicad drew out his bolo and struck him. Cubol tried to wrest the bolo from Sumicad and to prevent this, the latter struck him again twice which broke his Cubol’s cranium resulting to his death. Held: As a general rule, a man is not justified in killing an assailant who is not armed with any dangerous weapon. This rule applies only when the contending parties are in the open and the person assaulted can escape. However, where one has no means of escaping, the one who is assaulted can use a weapon in any way reasonably necessary to his protection against the aggressor. The deceased here is a bull of known violent character and although unarmed, he attempted to take from the accused a bolo which is the only means of defense possessed by the latter. It would have been an act of suicide on the part of the accused to allow the bolo to pass into the hands of his antagonist. People v. Luague (1935) Facts: The deceased tried to rape the accused while her husband was away. The deceased threatened the accused with a knife to compel her to have sex with him. As the deceased was preparing to lie down with her, he placed the knife on the floor and so the accused took advantage of the situation by getting the knife and stabbing the deceased with it. Held: An attempt to rape is a sufficient aggression for a legitimate claim of self-defense. We have the right to HONOR. Woman’s honor is a right as precious as her very existence because chastity once defiled cannot be restored. People v. Dela Cruz (1935) Facts: Accused was found guilty of homicide for stabbing and killing Rivera. Prosecution claimed that Dela Cruz and Rivera had a relationship and that the accused was madly in love with the deceased and was extremely jealous of another woman with whom Rivera also had a relationship. Dela Cruz claimed, on the other hand, that on her way home one evening, Rivera followed her, embraced and kissed her and touched her private parts. She didn’t know that it was Rivera and that she was unable to resist the strength of Rivera so she got a knife from her pocket and stabbed him in defense of her honor. Held: She is justified in using the pocketknife in repelling what she believed to be an attack upon her honor. It was a dark night and she could not have identified Rivera. There being no other means of selfdefense. People v. Juarigue (1946) Facts: Amado (deceased) has been courting the accused Avelina in vain. On the day of the crime, Avelina and Amado were in Church. Amado sat beside Avelina and placed his hand on her thigh. Thereafter, Avelina took out her knife and stabbed Amado in the neck, causing the death of Amado.
Held: Although the defense of one’s honor exempts one from criminal liability, it must be proved that there is actual danger of being raped. In this case, 1) the church was well-lit, 2) there were several people in the church, including the father of the accused and other town officials. In light of these circumstances, accused could not have possibly been raped. The means employed in defense of her honor was evidently excessive. US v. Bumaglang (1909) Facts: Bumanglang was missing 40 bundles of palay. Later, accompanied by his co-defendants, he awaited the culprit and caught Ribis so they confronted him assaulted him with sticks and other cutting and stabbing weapons. As a result, Ribis died. Defendants declared that during the fight they only beat the deceased with sticks and Ribis unsheathed his bolo. Bumanglang et al were convicted of homicide. Held: The bolo of the deceased was sheathed when the body was discovered. There was no unlawful aggression on the part of Ribis. Thus, there can be no claim of self-defense. Separate Opinion: A man who ambushed one he suspects to be a thief can claim defense of property. Not only was there unlawful aggression against Bumanglag, there was also a wrongful invasion of his habitat and attempt to commit a felony against his property. With the imminence of danger to his life, he realized that he had to ask assistance from his friends, considering Ribis’ criminal record, character and unusual strength. Par. 4 – AVOIDANCE OF A GREATER EVIL ♣ Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does an act which causes damage to another. DAMAGE TO ANOTHER – the term covers injury to persons and damage to property. 1.
REQUISITES: That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists; - The evil must actually exist and not merely expected or anticipated or may happen in the future.
2.
That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it; Note: The instinct of self-preservation will always make one feel that his own safety is of greater importance than that of another. - The greater evil should not be brought about by the negligence or imprudence of the actor. - The evil which brought about the greater evil must not result from a violation of law by the actor.
3.
That there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.
General rule: No liability in justifying circumstances because there is no crime. Exception: There is CIVIL LIABILITY under this paragraph. It is borne by the persons benefited by the act. They shall be liable in proportion to the benefit which they may have been received.
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People v. Ricohermoso (1974) Facts: The land Ricohermoso cultivated belonged to Geminiano. When the latter went to the house of the former, as if by prearrangement, Ricohermoso unsheathed his bolo and approached Geminiano from the left while Severo (Rico’s father-inlaw) got an axe and approached from the right. Rico stabbed Geminiano first and while in a helpless position, the latter was hacked on the back by Severo. At that same place and time while the killing of Geminiano was taking place, Juan (son of Severo) suddenly embraced Marianito (son of Geminiano), who had a gun slung on his shoulder, from behind. They grappled and rolled downhill towards the camote patch. Marianito passed out and when he regained consciousness, his rifle was gone. He walked uphill and saw his father. Geminiano died later. Juan invoked the justifying circumstance of greater necessity in explaining his act of preventing Marianito from shooting Rico and Severo. Held: The act of Juan was designed to insure the killing of Geminiano without any risk to his assailants. Juan was not avoiding any evil but his malicious intention was to forestall any interference in the felonious assault. He acted in conspiracy with Rico and Severo. Ty v. People (2004) Facts: Ty's mother Chua Lao So Un was confined at the Manila Doctors' Hospital from October 1990 until June 1992. Being the patient's daughter, Ty signed the "Acknowledgment of Responsibility for Payment" in the Contract of Admission. Ty's sister, Judy Chua, was also confined at the same hospital. The total hospital bills of the two patients amounted to P1,075,592.95. Ty executed a promissory note wherein she assumed payment of the obligation in installments. To assure payment of the obligation, she drew 7 postdated checks against Metrobank payable to the hospital which were all dishonored by the drawee bank and returned unpaid to the hospital due to insufficiency of funds. For her defense, Ty claimed that she issued the checks because of “an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury” She averred that she was forced to issue the checks to obtain release for her mother who was being inhumanely and harshly treated by the hospital. She alleged that her mother has comtemplated suicide if she would not be discharged from the hospital. Ty was found guilty by the lower courts of 7 counts of violation of BP22. Held:The court sustained the findings of the lower courts. The evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated. If the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated or may happen in the future, the defense of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury” is not applicable. Ty could have taken advantage of an available option to avoid committing a crime. By her own admission, she had the choice to give jewelry or other forms of security instead of postdated checks to secure her obligation. Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity to be availing, the greater injury feared should not have been brought about by the negligence or imprudence, more so, the willful inaction of the actor. In this case, the issuance of the bounced checks was brought about by Ty's own failure to pay her mother's hospital bills.
Par. 5 – FULFILLMENT OF A DUTY OR LAWFUL EXERCISE OF RIGHT OR OFFICE.
REQUISITES: 1. That the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office Art. 429. Civil Code. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property. (doctrine of self-help) ♣ If in protecting his possession of the property he injured (not seriously) the one trying to get it from him, he is justified. ♣ The actual invasion of property may consist of a mere disturbance of possession or of a real dispossession. 2. That the injury caused or the offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. ♣ Shooting an offender who refused to surrender is justified but shooting a thief who refused to be arrested is not justified. People v. Delima (1922) Facts: Napilon escaped from the jail where he was serving sentence. Some days afterwards the policeman, Delima, who was looking for him found him in the house of Alegria, armed with a pointed piece of bamboo in the shape of a lance. Delima demanded the surrender of the weapon but Napilon refused. Delima fired his revolver to impose his authority but the bullet did not hit him. The criminal ran away and Delima went after him and fired again his revolver this time hitting and killing him. Held: The killing was done in the performance of a duty. The deceased was under the obligation to surrender and had no right, after evading service of his sentence, to commit assault and disobedience with a weapon in his hand, which compelled the policeman to resort to such extreme means, which, although it proved to be fatal, was justified by the circumstance. People v. Oanis (1943) Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using such force as is reasonably necessary to secure and detain the offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself from bodily harm, yet he is never justified in using unnecessary force or in treating him with wanton violence or in resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be effected otherwise. Pomoy v. People (2004)
:
Fats Police sergeant Pomoy, went near the door of the jail where Balboa was detained for robbery and directed the latter to come out, purportedly for tactical interrogation at the investigation room. At that time, petitioner had a gun, a .45 caliber pistol, tucked in a holster which was hanging by the side of his belt. The gun was fully embedded in its holster, with only the handle of the gun protruding from the holster. Balboa
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tried to remove Pomoy’s gun and the two grappled for possession of the gun. Thereafter, 2 gunshots were heard. When the source of the shots was verified, petitioner was seen still holding a .45 caliber pistol, facing Balboa, who was lying in a pool of blood. Pomoy invoked the defense of accident for his defense. Held: Pomoy is acquitted. At the time of the incident, petitioner was a member — specifically, one of the investigators — of the Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed at the Iloilo Provincial Mobile Force Company. Thus, it was in the lawful performance of his duties as investigating officer that, under the instructions of his superior, he fetched the victim from the latter's cell for a routine interrogation. The participation of petitioner, if any, in the victim's death was limited only to acts committed in the course of the lawful performance of his duties as an enforcer of the law. The removal of the gun from its holster, the release of the safety lock, and the firing of the two successive shots — all of which led to the death of the victim — were sufficiently demonstrated to have been consequences of circumstances beyond the control of petitioner. At the very least, these factual circumstances create serious doubt on the Pomoy’s culpability.
Held: To be sure, acts in the fulfillment of a duty, without more, do not completely justify the petitioner’s firing the fatal gunshot at the victim. True, petitioner, as one of the policemen responding to a reported robbery then in progress, was performing his duty as a police officer as well as when he was trying to effect the arrest of the suspected robber and in the process, fatally shoot said suspect, albeit the wrong man. However, in the absence of the equally necessary justifying circumstance that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty, there can only be incomplete justification, a privileged mitigating circumstance under Articles 13 and 69 of the Revised Penal Code. There can be no quibbling that there was no rational necessity for the killing of Contreras. Petitioner could have first fired a warning shot before pulling the trigger against Contreras who was one of the residents chasing the suspected robber.
People v. Ulep (2000) Accused-appellant and the other police officers involved originally set out to perform a legal duty: to render police assistance, and restore peace and order at Mundog Subdivision where the victim was then running amuck. There were two (2) stages of the incident at Mundog Subdivision. During the first stage, the victim threatened the safety of the police officers by menacingly advancing towards them, notwithstanding accused-appellant's previous warning shot and verbal admonition to the victim to lay down his weapon or he would be shot. As a police officer, it is to be expected that accused-appellant would stand his ground. Up to that point, his decision to respond with a barrage of gunfire to halt the victim's further advance was justified under the circumstances. After all, a police officer is not required to afford the victim the opportunity to fight back. Neither is he expected – when hard pressed and in the heat of such an encounter at close quarters – to pause for a long moment and reflect coolly at his peril, or to wait after each blow to determine the effects thereof. However, he cannot be exonerated from overdoing his duty during the second stage of the incident — when he fatally shot the victim in the head, even after the latter slumped to the ground due to multiple gunshot wounds sustained while charging at the police officers. Sound discretion and restraint dictated that accused-appellant, a veteran policeman, should have ceased firing at the victim the moment he saw the latter fall to the ground. The victim at that point no longer posed a threat and was already incapable of mounting an aggression against the police officers. Shooting him in the head was obviously unnecessary. The law does not clothe police officers with authority to arbitrarily judge the necessity to kill- it must be stressed that their judgment and discretion as police officers in the performance of their duties must be excercised neither capriciously nor oppressively, but within reasonable limits.
purpose.
Mamagun v. People (2007) Facts: A policeman in pursuit of a snatcher accidentally shot one of the bystanders who was actually helping him chase the robber.
Par. 6 – OBEDIENCE TO AN ORDER ISSUED FOR SOME LAWFUL PURPOSE REQUISITES: 1. That an order has been issued by a superior. 2. That such order must be for some lawful 3. That the means used by the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful. ♣ When the order is not for a lawful purpose, the subordinate who obeyed it is criminally liable. ♣ The subordinate is not liable for carrying out an illegal order of his superior, if he is not aware of the illegality of the order and he is not negligent. People v. Beronilla (1955) Facts: Borjal was the elected mayor of La Paz, Abra at the outbreak of war and continued to serve as Mayor during Japanese occupation. Beronilla was appointed later as Military Mayor. Later, while the operations for the liberation of Abra was in progress, Beronilla, pursuant to his instructions, placed Borjal in his custody and asked the residents to file charges of espionage, aiding the enemy, and abuse of authority against him. After trial, Borjal’s execution took place. Later, Beronilla, together with a priest, executioner, graver digger, etc. were indicted for murder. The prosecution claimed that Col. Volkmann transmitted a radiogram message stating that the jury system organized by the municipality is illegal and cannot order execution of Borjal. Held: There is no proof that Beronilla was able to receive the radiogram message. The records are ample to sustain the claim of the accused that the arrest, prosecution and trial were done pursuant to express orders of the 15th Infantry HQ. Where the accused acted upon orders of superior officers that the, as military subordinates, could not question, and obeyed in good faith, without being aware of their illegality, without any fault or negligence on their part, the act is not accompanied by criminal intent. A crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the ac be innocent. Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan (1997) Facts: Pres. Marcos instructed Tabuena over the phone to pay directly to the Office of the President in cash what MIAA owes the Phil. National Construction Corporation (PNCC) which later was reiterated in writing.
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The Marcos’ memo indicated the amount of P55m for partial payment of the obligation to PNCC as mentioned in Ongpin’s memo. In obedience to Marcos’ instruction, the accused withdrew the amount by means of 3 separate issuances of manager’s check and encashment in 3 separate dates as well. The money withdrawn were placed in peerless boxes and duffle bags and delivered to the private secretary of Marcos also in 3 separate days. According to the accused, the disbursement was not in the normal procedure since it is paid in cold case, there were no vouchers supporting it and no receipt from PNCC. Tabuena and Peralta were convicted by the Sandiganbayan of malversation as defined in Art. 217, RPC for misappropriating funds of Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) worth P55M. Held: The accused are acquitted. The accused is entitled to the justifying circumstance of obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose. Sandiganbayan claimed that Marcos’ memo was unlawful because it orders disbursement of P55M when the Ongpin memo reveals that the liability is only 34.5M. Granting this to be true, it will not affect Tabuena’s good faith as to make him criminally liable. Thus, even if the order is illegal if it is patently legal and subordinate is not aware of its illegality, the subordinate is not liable, for then there would only be a mistake of fact committed in good faith. 2. EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES ♣ Exempting circumstances (non-imputability) are those grounds for exemption from punishment because there is wanting in the agent of the crime any of the condition which make the act voluntary or negligent. ♣ The exemption from punishment is based on the COMPLETE ABSENCE of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or on the absence of negligence on the part of the accused. Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. — the following are exempt from criminal liability: 1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval. When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony (delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court. 2. A person under nine years of age. 3. A person over nine years of age and under fifteen, unless he has acted with discernment, in which case, such minor shall be proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of Art. 80 of this Code. When such minor is adjudged to be criminally irresponsible, the court, in conformably with the provisions of this and the preceding paragraph, shall commit him to the care and custody of his family who shall be charged with his surveillance and education otherwise, he shall be committed to the care of some institution or person mentioned in said Art. 80.
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it. 5. Any person who act under the compulsion of irresistible force. 6. Any person who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury. 7. Any person who fails to perform an act required by law, when prevented by some lawful insuperable cause. • One who acts by virtue of any of the exempting circumstances commits a crime, although by the complete absence of any of the conditions which constitute free will or voluntariness of the act, no criminal liability arise. Par. 1 – AN IMBECILE OR INSANE PERSON, UNLESS THE LATTER HAS ACTED DURING A LUCID INTERVAL IMBECILE - one who, while advanced in age, has a mental development comparable to that of children between 2 and 7 years of age. – one who is deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime. - exempt in all cases from criminal liability INSANE - there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act but capable of having lucid intervals. During a lucid interval, the insane acts with intelligence and thus, not exempt from criminal liability. PROCEDURE WHEN AN IMBECILE OR INSANE COMMITTED A FELONY - The court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the court. The court must obtain the opinion of the Director of Health before permitting his release. • When the person is sane at the time of the commission of the crime but he becomes insane at the time of the trial, he is liable criminally. The trial, however, shall be suspended until mental capacity of the accused be restored to afford him a fair trial. • Evidence of insanity must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its execution. If the evidence points to insanity subsequent to the commission of the crime, the accused cannot be acquitted. • Feeblemindedness is not imbecility because a feebleminded person can distinguish right from wrong. • Cases covered under this article: a. Dementia praecox b. Kleptomania – if found by a competent psychiatrist as irresistible c. Epilepsy d. Somnambulism – sleep-walking e. Malignant malaria – which affects the nervous system
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In Re M’Naghten (1843) Guidelines A man who shot someone claimed insanity. Held: Every man is presumed to be sane. It must be clearly proved that at the time of committing the act, A was under a defect of reason that he did not know the nature of act or if he did know what he was doing, he did not know he was wrong. The question to be asked is whether the accused at the time of doing the act knew the differences between right and wrong? The emphasis is on reason or cognition. People v. Tubogoca (1998) Facts: Jacqueline, together with her sisters, lived with their father after their mother died. One night, she was roused by her father who asked her to scratch his back but later she was forced to have intercourse with him. Her sister Jinky also experienced the same with his father 2 years after. When their grandmother found out about the incident, they filed charges against the accused. The accused claim that he cannot remember anything because he often drinks liquor at home. Held: The law presumes every man to be sane. The accused failed to overthrow the presumption of sanity. Failure to remember is in itself no proof of the mental condition of the accused when the crime was performed. His charade of amnesia is a desperate gambit for exculpation. People v. Madarang (2000) Facts: Fernando and his wife quarreled. In the heat of the fight, the accused stabbed his wife causing her death. The accused declared that he had no recollection of the stabbing incident. Further, he alleges that he did not know where he was that day. Court ordered the accused’s confinement in a mental institution where it was found that he was inflicted with schizophrenia. He was submitted to treatment for 2 years, after which, he faced the charges against him. Held: The accused failed to prove that he was completely deprived of intelligence in committing the act. He did not show any signs of insanity prior to and immediately after the act. He was only diagnosed of schizophrenia months after the incident. Also, schizos have lucid intervals. People v. Bonoan (1937) A person suffering from dementia praecox pleaded insanity as a defense for committing murder. In dementia praecox, the crime is usually preceded by much complaining and planning. in these people, homicide attacks are common because of delusions that they are being interfered with sexually or that their property is being taken. During period of excitement, such person has no control whatever of his acts. An irresistible homicide impulse was considered embraced in the terms of “insanity”. People v. Taneo (1933) Facts: A fiesta was being celebrated in the barrio and visitors were being entertained at the house of Taneo and his wife. That afternoon, Taneo went to sleep and while sleeping, he suddenly got up, left the room with a bolo in his hand. He wounded his wife who was pregnant at that time in the abdomen when she tried to stop him. He attacked two of his visitors and his father, after which, he wounded himself. 5 days later,
his wife died because of the wound. He was charged of parricide. Held: The accused acted while in a dream and his acts, with which he is charged, were not voluntary in the sense of entailing criminal liability. People v. Formigones (1950) Held: One day, the accused stabbed his wife from the back who was sitting at the top of the stairs in their house. Accused admitted the killing and that he was jealous and had suspicions that his wife and his brother were having a relationship. Counsel for accused interposed the defense of insanity stating that in prison, the accused behaved like an insane person, would go stark naked in the presence of his inmates, remain indifferent to his surroundings and sang chorus with inmates or by himself. Held: At most, the accused is found to be feeble-minded but this does not exempt him from liability but may serve as a mitigating circumstance. The accused admitted to his motive for the killing which is jealousy so he must know what he was doing at that time. His actions immediately after he struck his wife and his behavior in prison may only be due to remorse at having killed his wife or his feeblemindedness. People v. Madarang (2000) Facts: Fernando and his wife quarreled. In the heat of the fight, the accused stabbed his wife causing her death. The accused declared that he had no recollection of the stabbing incident. Further, he alleges that he did not know where he was that day. Court ordered the accused’s confinement in a mental institution where it was found that he was inflicted with schizophrenia. He was submitted to treatment for 2 years, after which, he faced the charges against him. Held: The accused failed to prove that he was completely deprived of intelligence in committing the act. He did not show any signs of insanity prior to and immediately after the act. He was only diagnosed of schizophrenia months after the incident. Also, schizos have lucid intervals. People v. Valledor (supra) Facts: Roger was in his house working on a lettering job inside his bedroom together with his first cousin, Elsa and his friends, Simplicio and Antonio. All of a sudden, Valledor entered the room; uttered Roger's nickname ("Jer") and immediately attacked him with a knife. Valledor then stabbed Elsa on the chest and said, "Ako akabales den, Elsa." (I had my revenge, Elsa). Thereafter, Valledor fled, leaving Simplicio and Antonio unharmed. Roger and Elsa were immediately brought to the hospital. On their way out, Antonio noticed a commotion and saw that Ricardo, a neighbor of the victim, who was likewise stabbed by Valledor was wounded. Elsa was declared dead on arrival. Roger on the other hand was treated for the 5-centimeter wound sustained by him on his right forearm. Valledor invoked the defense of insanity. Held: Valledor failed to discharge the burden of overcoming the presumption of sanity at the time of the commission of the crime. Judging from his acts, Valledor was clearly aware and in control of what he was doing as he in fact purposely chose to stab only the two victims. Two other people were also inside the room, but Valledor went for the victims. His obvious motive of revenge against the victims was accentuated by calling out their names and uttering the words, "I had my revenge" after stabbing them. Finally, his act of immediately fleeing from the
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scene after the incident indicates that he was aware of the wrong he has done and the consequence thereof. As consistently held by this Court, "A man may act crazy but it does not necessarily and conclusively prove that he is legally so. Then, too, the medical findings showing that Valledor was suffering from a mental disorder after the commission of the crime, has no bearing on his liability. What is decisive is his mental condition at the time of the perpetration of the offense. Failing to discharge the burden of proving that he was legally insane when he stabbed the victims, he should be held liable for his felonious acts. Par. 2. – A PERSON UNDER NINE YEARS OF AGE • FIFTEEN YEARS OR LESS – presumed to be incapable of committing a crime, and this presumption is an absolute one which cannot be overcome by any evidence. (R.A. NO. 9334) • Senility, although said to be the second childhood, is only mitigating. 4 PERIODS OF THE LIFE OF A HUMAN BEING a. 15 years and below – AGE OF ABSOLUTE IRRESPONSIBILITY b. between 15 and 18 years AGE OF CONDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITY c. 18 or over to 70 years AGE OF FULL RESPONSIBILITY d. over 70 years of age – AGE OF MITIGATED RESPONSIBILITY. Par. 3. – A PERSON OVER 9 YEARS OF AGE AND UNDER 15 UNLESS HE HAS ACTED WITH DISCERNMENT, IN WHICH CASE, SUCH MINOR SHALL BE PROCEEDED AGAINST IN COORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 80 OF THIS CODE. • A minor over 15 and under 18 years of age must have acted without discernment to be exempted from criminal liability. DISCERNMENT – means the mental capacity of a minor between 15 and 18 years of age to fully appreciate the consequences of his lawful act. DISCERNMENT Moral significance that a person ascribes to the said act
INTENT Desired act of the person
• Discernment may be shown by 1) the manner the crime was committed or 2) the conduct of the offender after its commission. People v. Doquena (1939) A 13-year old student stabs the school bully, and is convicted for having shown discernment through his responsible demeanor and school performance. Doquena’s discernment is gleaned from his academic records, leadership qualities and demeanor while testifying in court. The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under fifteen years of age but over nine, is his mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong, and such capacity may be known by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by
the records in each case, the very appearance, the very attitude of said minor not only before and during the commission of the act but also after and even during trial. Jose v. People (2005) Facts: Jose, 13 yrs old was in a car with his cousin Zarraga, when the latter inquired from the poseur buyer SPO1 Guevarra if he could afford to buy shabu. Guevarra replied in the affirmative afterwhich Zarraga called the petitioner to bring out and hand over the shabu wrapped in plastic and white soft paper. Jose handed over the plastic containing the shabu to Zarraga who handed the same to Guevarra. The trial court rendered judgment convicting both Jose and Zarraga. Held: Jose is acquitted. The prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he acted with discernment relative to the sale of shabu. Aside from bringing out and handing over the plastic bag to Zarraga, Jose merely sat in the car and had no other participation in the transaction between his cousin and the poseur buyer. There is no evidence that Jose knew what was inside the plastic and soft white paper before and at the time he handed the same to Zarraga. Llave v. People (2006) Facts: A 12 year old honor student was charged with raping his seven year old neighbor. When caught, the accused ran away and hid for a few days at his grandparent’s house. He claimed that he acted without discernment. Held: Article 12, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a person over nine years of age and under fifteen is exempt from criminal liability, unless he acted with discernment. The basic reason behind the exempting circumstance is complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action of the offender which is an essential element of a felony either by dolus or by culpa. Intelligence is the power necessary to determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act. On the other hand, discernment is the mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong. The prosecution is burdened to prove that the accused acted with discernment by evidence of physical appearance, attitude or deportment not only before and during the commission of the act, but also after and during the trial. The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew what he was doing and that it was wrong. Such circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the crime and the minor’s cunning and shrewdness. In the present case, the petitioner, with methodical fashion, dragged the resisting victim behind the pile of hollow blocks near the vacant house to insure that passersby would not be able to discover his dastardly acts. When he was discovered by Teofisto Bucud who shouted at him, the petitioner hastily fled from the scene to escape arrest. Upon the prodding of his father and her mother, he hid in his grandmother’s house to avoid being arrested by policemen and remained thereat until barangay tanods arrived and took him into custody. Art. 80. Suspension of sentence of minor delinquents. — Whenever a minor of either sex, under sixteen years of age at the date of the commission of a grave or less grave felony, is accused thereof, the court, after hearing the evidence in the proper proceedings, instead of pronouncing judgment of conviction, shall suspend all further proceedings and shall commit such minor to the
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custody or care of a public or private, benevolent or charitable institution, established under the law of the care, correction or education of orphaned, homeless, defective, and delinquent children, or to the custody or care of any other responsible person in any other place subject to visitation and supervision by the Director of Public Welfare or any of his agents or representatives, if there be any, or otherwise by the superintendent of public schools or his representatives, subject to such conditions as are prescribed herein below until such minor shall have reached his majority age or for such less period as the court may deem proper. The court, in committing said minor as provided above, shall take into consideration the religion of such minor, his parents or next of kin, in order to avoid his commitment to any private institution not under the control and supervision of the religious sect or denomination to which they belong. The Director of Public Welfare or his duly authorized representatives or agents, the superintendent of public schools or his representatives, or the person to whose custody or care the minor has been committed, shall submit to the court every four months and as often as required in special cases, a written report on the good or bad conduct of said minor and the moral and intellectual progress made by him. The suspension of the proceedings against a minor may be extended or shortened by the court on the recommendation of the Director of Public Welfare or his authorized representative or agents, or the superintendent of public schools or his representatives, according as to whether the conduct of such minor has been good or not and whether he has complied with the conditions imposed upon him, or not. The provisions of the first paragraph of this article shall not, however, be affected by those contained herein. If the minor has been committed to the custody or care of any of the institutions mentioned in the first paragraph of this article, with the approval of the Director of Public Welfare and subject to such conditions as this official in accordance with law may deem proper to impose, such minor may be allowed to stay elsewhere under the care of a responsible person. If the minor has behaved properly and has complied with the conditions imposed upon him during his confinement, in accordance with the provisions of this article, he shall be returned to the court in order that the same may order his final release. In case the minor fails to behave properly or to comply with the regulations of the institution to which he has been committed or with the conditions imposed upon him when he was committed to the care of a responsible person, or in case he should be found incorrigible or his continued stay in such institution should be inadvisable, he shall be returned to the court in order that the same may render the judgment corresponding to the crime committed by him. The expenses for the maintenance of a minor delinquent confined in the institution to which he has been committed, shall be borne totally or partially by his parents or relatives or those persons liable to support him, if they are able to do so, in the discretion of the court; Provided, That in case his parents or relatives or those persons liable to support him have not been ordered to pay said expenses or are found indigent and cannot pay said expenses, the municipality in which the offense was committed shall pay one-third of said expenses; the province to which the municipality belongs shall pay one-third; and the remaining one-third shall be borne by the National Government: Provided,
however, That whenever the Secretary of Finance certifies that a municipality is not able to pay its share in the expenses above mentioned, such share which is not paid by said municipality shall be borne by the National Government. Chartered cities shall pay two-thirds of said expenses; and in case a chartered city cannot pay said expenses, the internal revenue allotments which may be due to said city shall be withheld and applied in settlement of said indebtedness in accordance with section five hundred and eighty-eight of the Administrative Code. • When the minor is adjudged criminally irresponsible – duty of court is to commit him to custody of his family or some institution. • The allegation of “with intent to kill” in the information is sufficient allegation of discernment. PD 603 THE CHILD AND YOUTH WELFARE CODE Article 189. Youthful Offender Defined. - A youthful offender is one who is over nine years but under twenty-one years of age at the time of the commission of the offense. A child nine years of age or under at the time of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability and shall be committed to the care of his or her father or mother, or nearest relative or family friend in the discretion of the court and subject to its supervision. The same shall be done for a child over nine years and under fifteen years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, unless he acted with discernment, in which case he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Article 192. The provisions of Article 80 of the Revised Penal Code shall be deemed modified by the provisions of this Chapter. Article 190. Physical and Mental Examination. - It shall be the duty of the law-enforcement agency concerned to take the youthful offender, immediately after his apprehension, to the proper medical or health officer for a thorough physical and mental examination. Whenever treatment for any physical or mental defect is indicated, steps shall be immediately undertaken to provide the same. The examination and treatment papers shall form part of the record of the case of the youthful offender. Article 191. Care of Youthful Offender Held for Examination or Trial. - A youthful offender held for physical and mental examination or trial or pending appeal, if unable to furnish bail, shall from the time of his arrest be committed to the care of the Department of Social Welfare or the local rehabilitation center or a detention home in the province or city which shall be responsible for his appearance in court whenever required: Provided, That in the absence of any such center or agency within a reasonable distance from the venue of the trial, the provincial, city and municipal jail shall provide quarters for youthful offenders separate from other detainees. The court may, in its discretion, upon recommendation of the Department of Social Welfare or other agency or agencies authorized by the Court, release a youthful offender on recognizance, to the custody of his parents or other suitable person who shall be responsible for his appearance whenever required. Article 192. Suspension of Sentence and Commitment of Youthful Offender. - If after hearing the evidence in the proper proceedings, the court should find that the youthful offender has committed the acts charged against him the court shall determine the imposable penalty, including any civil liability chargeable against him. However,
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instead of pronouncing judgment of conviction, the court shall suspend all further proceedings and shall commit such minor to the custody or care of the Department of Social Welfare, or to any training institution operated by the government, or duly licensed agencies or any other responsible person, until he shall have reached twenty-one years of age or, for a shorter period as the court may deem proper, after considering the reports and recommendations of the Department of Social Welfare or the agency or responsible individual under whose care he has been committed. The youthful offender shall be subject to visitation and supervision by a representative of the Department of Social Welfare or any duly licensed agency or such other officer as the Court may designate subject to such conditions as it may prescribe. Article 193. Appeal. - The youthful offender whose sentence is suspended can appeal from the order of the court in the same manner as appeals in criminal cases. Article 194. Care and Maintenance of Youthful Offender. - The expenses for the care and maintenance of the youthful offender whose sentence has been suspended shall be borne by his parents or those persons liable to support him: Provided, That in case his parents or those persons liable to support him can not pay all or part of said expenses, the municipality in which the offense was committed shall pay one-third of said expenses or part thereof; the province to which the municipality belongs shall pay one-third; and the remaining one-third shall be borne by the National Government. Chartered cities shall pay two-thirds of said expenses; and in case a chartered city cannot pay said expenses, part of the internal revenue allotments applicable to the unpaid portion shall be withheld and applied to the settlement of said indebtedness. All city and provincial governments must exert efforts for the immediate establishment of local detention homes for youthful offenders. Article 195. Report on Conduct of Child. - The Department of Social Welfare or its representative or duly licensed agency or individual under whose care the youthful offender has been committed shall submit to the court every four months or oftener as may be required in special cases, a written report on the conduct of said youthful offender as well as the intellectual, physical, moral, social and emotional progress made by him. Article 196. Dismissal of the Case. - If it is shown to the satisfaction of the court that the youthful offender whose sentence has been suspended, has behaved properly and has shown his capability to be a useful member of the community, even before reaching the age of majority, upon recommendation of the Department of Social Welfare, it shall dismiss the case and order his final discharge. Article 197. Return of the Youth Offender to Court. - Whenever the youthful offender has been found incorrigible or has wilfully failed to comply with the conditions of his rehabilitation programs, or should his continued stay in the training institution be inadvisable, he shall be returned to the committing court for the pronouncement of judgment. When the youthful offender has reached the age of twenty-one while in commitment, the court shall determine whether to dismiss the case in accordance with the next preceding article or to pronounce the judgment of conviction. In any case covered by this article, the youthful offender shall be credited in the service of his sentence with the full time spent in actual commitment and detention effected under the provisions of this Chapter. Article 198. Effect of Release of Child Based on Good Conduct. - The final release of a child pursuant to
the provisions of this Chapter shall not obliterate his civil liability for damages. Such release shall be without prejudice to the right for a writ of execution for the recovery of civil damages. Article 199. Living Quarters for Youthful Offenders Sentence. - When a judgment of conviction is pronounced in accordance with the provisions of Article 197, and at the time of said pronouncement the youthful offender is still under twenty-one, he shall be committed to the proper penal institution to serve the remaining period of his sentence: Provided, That penal institutions shall provide youthful offenders with separate quarters and, as far as practicable, group them according to appropriate age levels or other criteria as will insure their speedy rehabilitation: Provided, further, That the Bureau of Prisons shall maintain agricultural and forestry camps where youthful offenders may serve their sentence in lieu of confinement in regular penitentiaries. Article 200. Records of Proceedings. - Where a youthful offender has been charged before any city or provincial fiscal or before any municipal judge and the charges have been ordered dropped, all the records of the case shall be destroyed immediately thereafter. Where a youthful offender has been charged and the court acquits him, or dismisses the case or commits him to an institution and subsequently releases him pursuant to this Chapter, all the records of his case shall be destroyed immediately after such acquittal, dismissal or release, unless civil liability has also been imposed in the criminal action, in which case such records shall be destroyed after satisfaction of such civil liability. The youthful offender concerned shall not be held under any provision of law, to be guilty of perjury or of concealment or misrepresentation by reason of his failure to acknowledge the case or recite any fact related thereto in response to any inquiry made of him for any purpose. "Records" within the meaning of this article shall include those which may be in the files of the National Bureau of Investigation and with any police department, or any other government agency which may have been involved in the case. Article 201. Civil Liability of Youthful Offenders. - The civil liability for acts committed by a youthful offender shall devolve upon the offender's father and, in case of his death or incapacity, upon the mother, or in case of her death or incapacity, upon the guardian. Civil liability may also be voluntarily assumed by a relative or family friend of the youthful offender. Article 202. Rehabilitation Centers. - The Department of Social Welfare shall establish regional rehabilitation centers for youthful offenders. The local government and other non-governmental entities shall collaborate and contribute their support for the establishment and maintenance of these facilities. Article 203. Detention Homes. - The Department of Local Government and Community Development shall establish detention homes in cities and provinces distinct and separate from jails pending the disposition of cases of juvenile offenders. Article 204. Liability of Parents or Guardian or Any Person in the Commission of Delinquent Acts by Their Children or Wards. - A person whether the parent or guardian of the child or not, who knowingly or wilfully, 1. Aids, causes, abets or connives with the commission by a child of a delinquency, or 2. Does any act producing, promoting, or contributing to a child's being or becoming a juvenile delinquent, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding five hundred pesos or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years, or both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court.
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EN BANC [A.M. No. 02-1-19-SC. February 28, 2002.] RE: PROPOSED RULE ON COMMITMENT OF CHILDREN RESOLUTION Acting on the letter of the Chairman of the Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court submitting for this Court's consideration and approval the Proposed Rule on Commitment Of Children, the Court Resolved to APPROVE the same. The Rule shall take effect on April 15, 2002 following its publication in a newspaper of general circulation not later than March 15, 2002. February 28, 2002. RULE ON COMMITMENT OF CHILDREN SECTION 1. Objective. — The objective of this Rule is to ensure that every effort is exerted to promote the child's welfare and enhance his opportunities for a useful and happy life. Toward this end, this Rule seeks to protect the child from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to his development . SECTION 2. Interpretation. — The best interests of the child shall be the paramount consideration in all actions concerning him, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities and legislative bodies consistent with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. — (a) "Child" is a person below eighteen years of age. (b) "Department" refers to the Department of Social Welfare and Development. (c) "Dependent child" is one who is without a parent, guardian or custodian, or one whose parents, guardian or other custodian for good cause desires to be relieved of his care and custody, and is dependent upon the public for support. (d) "Abandoned child" is one who has no proper parental care or guardianship, or whose parents or guardian has deserted him for a period of at least six (6) continuous months. (e) "Neglected child" is one whose basic needs have been deliberately unattended to or inadequately attended to, physically or emotionally, by his parents or guardian. (f) "Physical neglect" occurs when the child is malnourished, ill-clad and without proper shelter. (g) "Emotional neglect" occurs when a child is raped, seduced, maltreated, exploited, overworked or made to work under conditions not conducive to good health; made to beg in the streets or public places, or when placed in moral danger, or exposed to drugs, alcohol, gambling, prostitution and other vices. (h) "Disabled child" includes mentally retarded, physically handicapped, emotionally disturbed and mentally ill children, children with cerebral palsy and those with similar afflictions. (i) "Mentally retarded child" is one who is (1) socially incompetent, that is, socially inadequate,
occupationally incompetent and unable to manage his own affairs; (2) mentally subnormal; (3) intellectually retarded from birth or early age; (4) retarded at maturity; (5) mentally deficient as a result of constitutional origin through heredity or diseases or (6) essentially incurable. (j) "Physically handicapped child" is one who is crippled, deaf-mute, blind, or otherwise suffers from a defect which restricts his means of action or communication with others. (k) "Emotionally disturbed child" is one who, although not afflicted with insanity or mental defect, is unable to maintain normal social relations with others and the community in general due to emotional problems or complexes, (l) "Mentally ill child" is one with any behavioral disorder, whether functional or organic, which is of such a degree of severity as to require professional help or hospitalization. (m) "Commitment" or "surrender of a child" is the legal act of entrusting a child to the care of the Department or any duly licensed child-placement or child-caring agency or individual by the court, parent or guardian or any interested party. (n) "Involuntarily committed child" is one whose parents have been permanently and judicially deprived of parental authority due to abandonment; substantial, continuous, or repeated neglect; abuse; or incompetence to discharge parental responsibilities in accordance with Section 4 herein. (o) "Voluntarily committed child" is one whose parents knowingly and willingly relinquished parental authority to the Department or any duly licensed child-placement or child-caring agency or individual in accordance with Section 3 herein. (p) "Child-placing or child-placement agency" refers to a private non-profit or charitable institution or government agency duly licensed, and accredited by the Department to provide comprehensive child welfare services, including but not limited to, receiving applications for adoption or foster care, evaluating the prospective adoptive or foster parents and preparing the home study report. (q) "Child-caring agency" refers to a private non-profit or charitable institution or government agency duly licensed and accredited by the Department that provides twenty-four hour residential care services for abandoned, orphaned, neglected, involuntarily or voluntarily committed children. (r) "Guardian ad litem" is a person appointed by the court where the case is pending for a child sought to be committed to protect his best interests. (s) "Case Study Report" is a written report of the result of an investigation conducted by a social worker as to the socio-cultural, economic and legal status or condition of the child sought to be committed. It shall include among others his developmental age, educational attainment, family and social relationships, the quality of his peer group, his family's strengths and weaknesses and parental control over him. The report is submitted to the Family Court to aid it in its. evaluation of whether the child ought to be committed to the care of the Department or any duly licensed childplacement or child-caring agency or individual.
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SECTION 4. Petition for Involuntary Commitment of a Child. — (a) Who may file. — The Secretary of the Department or his authorized representative or any duly licensed child-placement or child-caring agency having knowledge of a child who appears to be dependent, abandoned or neglected, may file a verified petition for involuntary commitment of said child to the care of any duly licensed child-placement or child-caring agency or individual. (b) Venue. — The petition shall be filed with the Family Court of the province or city in which the parent or guardian resides or where the child is found. (c) Contents of Verified Petition. — The petition must state: (1) The names of the parents or guardian and their place of residence. If the child's parents are unknown, petitioner must allege that diligent efforts have been exerted to locate them. If said parents are deceased, petitioner shall attach a certified true copy of their death certificate; (2) The facts showing that the child is dependent, abandoned, or neglected; (3) The facts showing who has custody of the child at the time of the filing of the petition; and (4) The name, address and written consent of the Department or duly licensed child-placement or child-caring agency or individual to whose care the commitment of the child is sought to be entrusted. (d) Summons; Court to Set Time for Hearing. — If the court is satisfied that the petition is sufficient in form and substance, it shall direct the clerk of court to immediately issue summons which shall be served together with a copy of the petition and a notice of hearing, upon the parents or guardian of the child and the office of the public prosecutor not less than five (5) days before the date of the hearing. The office of the public prosecutor shall be directed to immediately transmit the summons to the prosecutor assigned to the Family Court concerned. If it appears from the petition that both parents of the child are dead or that neither parent can be found in the province or city where the court is located and the child has no guardian residing therein, summons may not be issued and the court shall thereupon appoint a guardian ad litem pursuant to Sub-section (f) below and proceed with the hearing of the case with due notice to the provincial or city prosecutor, (e) Social Worker. — After the court sets the petition for hearing in accordance with Sub-section (d) above, it shall direct the social worker to submit, before the hearing, a case study report of the child to aid it in evaluating whether said child should be committed to the care of the Department or any duly licensed child-placement or child-caring agency or individual. The report shall bear the signature of the social worker on every page. (f) Guardian Ad Litem of Child. — If neither of the parents nor the guardian of the child can be
located or does not appear in court despite due notice, or if the court finds them incompetent to protect the best interests of the child, it shall be the duty of the court to appoint a suitable person as guardian ad litem to represent the child. In making the appointment, the court shall consider the background of the guardian ad litem and his familiarity with the judicial process, social service programs and child development. A member of the Philippine Bar may be appointed guardian ad litem. (g) Child's Right to Counsel. — The court, upon request of the child capable of forming his own views or upon request of his guardian ad litem, shall appoint a lawyer to represent him in the proceedings. (h) Duty of Public Prosecutor. — The provincial or city prosecutor shall appear for the State and ascertain if there has been due notice to all parties concerned and that there is justification for the declaration of dependency, abandonment or neglect. (i) Hearing. — The court shall direct the person or agency which has custody of the child to bring the latter to the court on the date of the hearing of the petition and shall ascertain the facts and determine whether the child is dependent, abandoned, or neglected, and if so, the cause and circumstances of such condition. (j) Judgment. — If, after the hearing, the court shall find the child to be dependent, abandoned, or neglected, it shall render judgment committing him to the care and custody of the Department or any duly licensed child-placement or child-caring agency or individual until he reaches the age of eighteen (18). The judgment shall likewise make proper provisions for the custody of the property or money belonging to the committed. child. If the child is committed to the Department, it shall notify the court within thirty (30) days from the order of commitment, the name and address of the duly licensed and accredited child-placement or child-caring agency or individual where the child shall be placed. However, if the court finds that the abandonment or neglect of the child may be remedied, the child may be allowed to stay in his own home under the care and control of his parents or guardian, subject to supervision and direction of the Department. (k) Visitation or Inspection. — Any duly licensed child-placement or child-caring agency or individual to whom a child has been committed by the court shall be subject to visitation or inspection by a representative of the court or of the Department, as the case may be or of both, to determine whether the welfare and interests of the child are being served. (l) Report of Person or Institution. — Any duly licensed child-placement or child-caring agency or individual to whom a child has been committed by judicial order may at any time be required by the court to submit a report, containing all necessary information for determining whether the welfare of the child is being served. (m) Temporary Custody of Child. — The duly licensed child-placement or child-caring agency or individual to whom a child has been committed may
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file a verified motion with the court which granted the petition for involuntary commitment of a child to place him in the care of any suitable person, upon the latter's request, for a period not exceeding one month at a time. The court may order the social worker to submit a case study report to aid it in evaluating whether such temporary custody shall be for the best interests of the child. The period of temporary custody of the child may be extended by the court for a period not exceeding one month at a time upon motion of the duly licensed childplacement or child-caring agency or individual to which the child has been committed. The court, motu proprio, or upon request of the child assisted by his guardian ad litem, or at the instance of the agency or person to whom the child was committed, after due notice and hearing, shall discontinue the temporary custody of the child if it appears that he is not being given proper care. After one month from the date temporary custody of the child was given to another suitable person, the agency or individual shall submit to the court a verified report on whether the temporary custody of the child has promoted his best interests. (n) Change of Custody. — If the child is committed to the Department, it shall have the authority to change the custody of a child it had placed with any duly licensed child-placement or child-caring agency or individual if it appears that such change is for the best interests of the child. The Department shall notify the court of any change in custody of the child. When conflicting interests arise among childplacement or child-caring agencies, the court which granted the involuntary commitment of the child, upon motion of the Department or any of the agencies concerned, shall order the change of commitment of the child. (o) Removal of Custody. — A motion to remove custody of a child may be filed by an authorized representative of the Department with knowledge of the facts against a child-placement or child-caring agency or individual to whose custody a child has been committed by the court on the ground of neglect of such child as defined in Section 3 (e) of this Rule. The court shall set the motion for hearing with notice to the public prosecutor and the courtdesignated social worker. If the court finds after hearing that the allegations of the motion have been established and that it is for the best interests and welfare of the child, the court shall issue an order removing him from the custody of the person or agency, as the case may be, and committing him to the custody of another duly licensed child-placement or child-caring agency or individual. In the same proceeding, the court may suspend or revoke the license of the agency or individual found guilty of such neglect depending upon the gravity or frequency of the offense. (p) Restoration of Parental Authority After Involuntary Commitment. — (i) Who may file; Ground. — The parents or guardian of a child committed to the care of a person, agency or institution by judicial order may file a verified motion for the restoration of his rights over the child with the
court which granted the involuntary commitment on the ground that he is now able to take proper care and custody of said child, provided, however, that the child has not yet been adopted. HDATSI (ii) Notice of Hearing. — The court shall fix the time and date for the hearing of the motion, which shall not be earlier than thirty (30) days nor later than sixty (60) days from the date of the filing of said motion and cause notice of the hearing to be sent to the person, agency or institution to which the child has been committed, the public prosecutor and the court-designated social worker, at least five (5) days before the date of hearing. (iii) Hearing. — At the hearing, any person may be allowed to intervene at the discretion of the court to contest the right to the relief demanded. Witnesses may be called and examined by the parties or by the court motu proprio. (iv) Resolution. — If it is found that the cause for the commitment of the child no longer exists and that the movant is already able to take proper care and custody of the child, the court, after taking into consideration the best interests and the welfare of the child, shall issue a resolution terminating the parental authority of the person, agency or institution to whom the child was committed by judicial order and restoring parental authority to the movant. q) Jurisdiction for Prosecution of Punishable Acts. — The Family Court which granted the involuntary commitment shall have jurisdiction over the prosecution of a child who left without prior permission from the person or institution to which he has been judicially committed or the person under whose custody he has been judicially committed in accordance with Subsection (m) of Section 4 of this Rule. It shall likewise have jurisdiction over the person who induced the child to leave such person or institution, except in case of actual or imminent grave physical or moral danger to the child. The Family Court which granted the involuntary commitment shall also have jurisdiction over the prosecution of parents or guardians of the child who may be held liable under Articles 59 and 60 of P.D. No. 603 and Sections 9, 10 and 31 of R.A. No. 7610. SECTION 5. Voluntary Commitment of a Child to an Institution or Individual. — The parent or guardian of a dependent, abandoned or neglected child may voluntarily commit him to the Department or any duly licensed child-placement or child-caring agency or individual subject to the rules of the Department. However, no child shall be committed unless he is surrendered in writing by his parents or guardian stating such voluntary commitment and specifically naming the office, agency, or individual to whose custody the child is to be committed. Such written instrument should be notarized and signed in the presence of an authorized representative of the Department after counseling and other services have been made
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available to encourage the child's parents to keep the child. (a) Petition for removal of Custody. — (i) Who may file; Ground. — The parents or guardian who voluntarily committed the child, or in their absence or failure, any person with knowledge of the facts, may file a verified petition to remove custody of the child against the child-placement or child-caring agency or individual to whose custody the child has been voluntarily committed on the ground of neglect of such child as defined in Section 3 (e) of this Rule. A child may also be removed from the custody of the child-placement or childcaring agency or individual on the ground that the voluntary commitment of the child was unjustified. (ii) Venue. — The petition shall be filed with the Family Court of the province or city where the child-placement or child-caring agency to which the child has been voluntarily committed is located or where the child may be found. (iii) Contents of Verified Petition — The petition must state: (1) The name and address of the childplacement or child-caring agency or individual to whose custody the child has been voluntarily committed; SEIDAC (2) The facts showing that the child has been neglected by the agency or in cases where the voluntary commitment was unjustified, that the parents of the child are actually capable of taking care and custody of the child; (3) The name, address and written consent of the duly licensed child-placement or child-caring agency or individual to whose care the child may be transferred. (4) The facts showing that petitioner has exhausted the administrative remedies available to him. (iv) Notice of Hearing. — If the petition is sufficient in form and substance, the court shall set the same for hearing with notice to the Department, the public prosecutor, the courtdesignated social worker, the agency or individual to whom the child has been committed and in appropriate cases, the parents of the child. (v) Judgment. — If after hearing the court finds that the allegations of the petition have been established and that it is for the best interests and welfare of the child, it shall issue an order removing the child from the custody of the person or agency concerned, and committing him to the custody of another duly licensed child-placement or child-caring agency or individual. The court, in the same proceeding may, after hearing the comment or recommendation of the Department, suspend or revoke the license of the agency or individual found guilty of such neglect depending upon the gravity or frequency of the offense.
(b) Restoration of Parental Authority After Voluntary Commitment. — The restoration of rights of the parent or guardian over the child who has been voluntarily committed shall be governed by the rules of the Department, provided, however, that the petition for restoration is filed within six (6) months from the date of voluntary commitment. In case the Department refuses to grant legal custody and parental authority to the parent or guardian over the child who has been voluntarily committed to an agency or individual, the parent or guardian may file a petition in court for restoration of parental authority in accordance with Section 4 (p) of this Rule. (c) Jurisdiction for Prosecution of Punishable Acts. — The Family Court of the place where the child may be found or where the duly licensed childplacement or child-caring agency or individual is located shall have jurisdiction over the prosecution of a child who left without prior permission from the person or institution to which he has been voluntarily committed. It shall likewise have jurisdiction over the person who induced the child to leave such person or institution, except in case of grave actual or imminent physical or moral danger, to the child. The same Family Court shall also have jurisdiction over the prosecution of parents or guardians of the child who may be held liable under Articles 59 and 60 of P.D. No. 603 and Sections 9, 10 and 31 of R.A. No. 7610. SECTION 6. Petition for Commitment of a Disabled Child. — (a) Who may file. — Where a child appears to be mentally retarded, physically handicapped, emotionally disturbed, mentally ill, with cerebral palsy or with similar afflictions and needs institutional care but his parents or guardians are opposed thereto, the Department, or any duly licensed child-placement or child-caring agency or individual may file a verified petition for commitment of the said child to any reputable institution providing care, training and rehabilitation for disabled children. The parents or guardian of the child may file a similar petition in case no immediate placement can be arranged for the disabled child when his welfare and interests are at stake. AEHTIC (b) Venue. — The petition for commitment of a disabled child shall be filed with the Family Court of the place where the parent or guardian resides or where the child is found. (c) Contents of Verified Petition. — The petition for commitment must state the following: (1) The facts showing that the child appears to be mentally retarded, physically handicapped, emotionally disturbed, mentally ill, with cerebral palsy or with similar afflictions and needs institutional care; IADCES (2) The name of the parents and their residence, if known, or if the child has no living parent, the name and residence of the guardian, if any; and (3) The fact that the parents or guardian or any duly licensed disabled childplacement or child-caring agency, as the case
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may be, has opposed the commitment of such child; (4) The name and written conformity of the institution where the child is to be committed. (5) An estimate of the costs and other expenses of maintaining the child in the institution. The verified petition shall be sufficient if based upon the personal knowledge of the petitioner. (d) Order of Hearing; Notice. — If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance, the court, by an order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix the date of the hearing thereof, and a copy of such order shall be served on the child alleged to be mentally retarded, physically handicapped, emotionally disturbed, mentally ill, with cerebral palsy or with similar afflictions and on the person having charge of him or any of his relatives residing in the province or city as the court may deem proper. The order shall also direct the sheriff or any other officer of the court to produce, if necessary, the alleged disabled child on the date of the hearing. (e) Hearing and Judgment. — If the court finds that the allegations of the petition have been established and that institutional care of the child is for his best interests or the public welfare and that his parents, or guardian or relatives are unable for any reason whatsoever to take proper care of him, the court shall order his commitment to the proper institution for disabled children. The court shall likewise make proper provisions for the custody of the property or money belonging to the committed child. The expense of maintaining a disabled child in the institution to which he has been committed shall be borne primarily by the parents or guardian and secondarily, by such disabled child, if he has property of his own. In all cases where the expenses for the maintenance of the disabled child cannot be paid in accordance with the immediately preceding paragraph, the Department shall bear the expenses, or such part thereof as may remain unpaid. The court shall furnish the institution to which the child has been committed with a copy of its judgment, together with all the reports and other data pertinent to the case. (f) Discharge of Judicially Committed Disabled Child. — Upon motion of the parent, guardian or institution to which the child has been judicially committed under this rule, the court, after hearing, shall order the discharge of such child if it is established and certified by the Department that: (1) He is no longer a danger to himself and the community; (2) He has been sufficiently rehabilitated, from his physical handicap or if of working age, is already fit to engage in gainful occupation; or (3) He has been sufficiently relieved of his psychological, mental and emotional problems and is ready to assume normal social relations.
SECTION 7. Effectivity. — This rule shall take effect on April 15, 2002 after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation not later than March 15, 2002. [A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. February 28, 2002.] RE: PROPOSED RULE ON JUVENILES IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW RESOLUTION Acting on the letter of the Chairman of the Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court submitting for this Court's consideration and approval the Proposed Rule on Juveniles In Conflict With The Law, the Court Resolved to APPROVE the same. The Rule shall take effect on April 15, 2002 following its publication in a newspaper of general circulation not later than March 15, 2002. February 28, 2002. SECTION 1. Applicability of the Rule. — This Rule shall apply to all criminal cases involving juveniles in conflict with the law. A juvenile in conflict with the law is a person who at the time of the commission of the offense is below eighteen (18) years of age but not less than nine (9) years of age. This Rule shall not apply to an accused who at the time of initial contact as defined in Section 4(p) of this Rule, or at any time thereafter, shall have reached the age of eighteen (18), in which case the regular rules on criminal procedure shall apply without prejudice to the rights granted under Sections 36, 37, 38 and 39 of this Rule. (n) SECTION 2. Objective. — The objective of this Rule is to ensure that the justice system treats every juvenile in conflict with the law in a manner that recognizes and upholds his human dignity and worth, and instills in him respect for the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. The Rule considers his developmental age and the desirability of his reintegration into and assumption of a constructive role in society in accordance with the principle of restorative justice. To attain this objective, the Rule seeks: a) To provide a procedure in the adjudication of juveniles in conflict with the law that takes into account their distinct circumstances and assures the parties of a fair hearing with their constitutional and statutory rights recognized and respected; b) To divert from the justice system juveniles who can be cared for or placed under communitybased alternative programs of treatment, training and rehabilitation in conformity with the principle of restorative justice; c) To deal with the juvenile in a family environment whenever possible, separate him from his parents only when necessary for his welfare or in the interest of public safety; d) To remove from juveniles in conflict with the law the stigma of criminality and the consequences of criminal behavior; and e) To provide for the care, protection and wholesome moral, mental, and physical development of juveniles in conflict with the law.
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SECTION 3. Interpretation. — This Rule shall be interpreted liberally to promote the best interests of the child in conformity with Philippine laws and the United Nations' Convention on the Rights of the Child. SECTION 4. Definitions. — As used in this Rule, (a) To be in conflict with the law means being charged with the commission of an act defined and punished as a crime or offense under the law, including violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations, and ordinances of local government units. (b) Serious offense refers to any offense not covered by Section 1, par. B, Criminal Cases, of the Rule on Summary Procedure, to wit: (1) violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations; (2) violations of the rental law; (3) violations of municipal or city ordinances; (4) all other offenses punished with imprisonment not exceeding six months, or a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability arising therefrom; provided, however, that in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, the imposable fine is not in excess of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00). (c) Youth detention center refers to a government-owned or operated agency providing habilitating and rehabilitative facilities where a juvenile in conflict with the law may be physically restricted pending court disposition of the charge against him. (d) Intake report is a preliminary written report containing the personal and other circumstances of the juvenile in conflict with the law and prepared by the social worker assigned by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) or local government unit to assist him as soon as he enters the justice system. (e) Case study report is a written report of the result of an investigation conducted by the social worker designated by the Family Court on the social, cultural, economic and legal status or condition of the juvenile in conflict with the law. It includes, among others, his developmental age; educational attainment; family and social relationships; the quality of his peer group; the strengths and weaknesses of his family; parental control over him; his attitude toward the offense; the harm or damage done to others resulting from the offense; his record of prior offenses, if any; and the attitude of his parents towards his responsibility for the offense. (f) Diversion refers to an alternative childappropriate process of determining the responsibility and treatment of a juvenile in conflict with the law on the basis of his social, cultural, economic, psychological or educational background without resorting to formal court adjudication. (g) Diversion programs refer to programs that the juvenile in conflict with the law is required to undergo in lieu of formal court proceedings, (h) Disposition conference is a meeting held by the court with the social worker who prepared the case study report together with the juvenile in conflict with the law and his parents or guardian ad
litem, for the purpose of determining the disposition measures appropriate to the personal and peculiar circumstances of the juvenile. (i) Recognizance is an undertaking in lieu of a bond assumed by a parent or custodian who shall be responsible for the appearance in court by the juvenile in conflict with the law when required. (j) Probation is a disposition alternative under which a juvenile in conflict with the law is released and permitted to remain in his home after conviction and sentence. The juvenile is subject to conditions imposed in the sentence and to supervision by the court and a probation officer who has the duty to return the juvenile to the court in case of violation of a condition of his probation. (k) Suspended sentence is the holding in abeyance of the service of the sentence imposed by the court upon a finding of guilt of the juvenile in conflict with the law who will undergo rehabilitation. (l) Community continuum is a communitybased group therapy process that provides continuous guidance and support to the juvenile in conflict with the law upon his release from rehabilitation and his reintegration into society. (m) Age of criminal responsibility is the age when a juvenile who is nine (9) years or over but under fifteen (15) years commits an offense with discernment. (n) Discernment means the mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong and its consequences. (o) Restorative Justice is a principle which requires a process of resolving conflicts with the maximum involvement of the victim, the offender, and the community. It seeks to obtain reparation for the victim, reconciliation of the offender, the offended and the community and reassurance to the offender that he can be reintegrated into society. It. also enhances public safety by activating the offender, the victim and the community in prevention strategies. (p) Initial contact is the apprehension or taking into custody of a juvenile in conflict with the law by law enforcement officers or private citizens. It includes the time when the juvenile receives a subpoena under Section 3 (b) of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or summons under Section 6 (a) or Sec. 9 (b) of the same Rule in cases that do not require preliminary investigation or where there is no necessity to place the juvenile under immediate custody. (q) Corporal punishment is any kind of physical punishment inflicted on the body as distinguished from pecuniary punishment or fine. SECTION 5. Exemption from Criminal Liability. — A minor under nine (9) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. A minor nine (9) years and above but under fifteen (15) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense shall be committed to the care of his father or mother, or nearest relative or family friend; in the sound discretion of the court and subject to its supervision. However, if the prosecution proves that he has acted with discernment; he shall be proceeded against in
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accordance with Sections 24 to 28, or 36 to 40 of this Rule, as the case may be, and subjected to a delinquency prevention program as determined by the court. Exemption from criminal liability does not include exemption from civil liability which shall be enforced in accordance with the provisions of Article 221 of the Family Code in relation to Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code and Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. In case the act or omission of the juvenile involves a quasi-delict, Article 2180 of the Civil Code shall apply. SECTION 6. Procedure in Taking a Juvenile into Custody. — Any person taking into custody a juvenile in conflict with the law shall: (a) Identify himself and present proper identification to the juvenile; (b) Inform the juvenile of the reason for such custody and advise him of his constitutional rights in a language or dialect understood by him; (c) Refrain from using vulgar or profane words and from sexually harassing or abusing, or making sexual advances on the juvenile; (d) Avoid displaying or using any firearm, weapon, handcuffs or other instruments of force or restraint, unless absolutely necessary and only after all other methods of control have been exhausted and have failed; (e) Refrain from subjecting the juvenile to greater restraint than is necessary for his apprehension; (f) Avoid violence or unnecessary force; (g) Notify the parents of the juvenile or his nearest relative or guardian, if any, and the local social welfare officer as soon as the apprehension is made; (h) Take the juvenile immediately to an available government medical or health officer for a physical and mental examination. The examination results shall be kept confidential unless otherwise ordered by the Family Court. Whenever treatment for any physical or mental defect is necessary, steps shall be immediately taken by the said officer to provide the juvenile with the necessary and proper treatment; and (i) Hold the juvenile in secure quarters separate from that of the opposite sex and adult offenders. SECTION 7. Taking Custody of a Juvenile Without a Warrant. — A peace officer or a private person taking into custody a juvenile in conflict with the law without a warrant shall likewise follow the provisions of Sections 5, 8 and 9 of Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and shall forthwith deliver him to the nearest police station. The juvenile shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112. SECTION 8. Conduct of Initial Investigation by the Police. — The police officer conducting the initial investigation of a juvenile in conflict with the law shall do so in the presence of either of the parents of the juvenile; in the absence
of both parents, the guardian or the nearest relative, or a social welfare officer, and the counsel of his own choice. In their presence, the juvenile shall be informed of his constitutional rights during custodial investigation. The right of the juvenile to privacy shall be protected at all times. All measures necessary to promote this right shall be taken, including the exclusion of the media. SECTION 9. Fingerprinting and Photographing of the Juvenile. — While under investigation, no juvenile in conflict with the law shall be fingerprinted or photographed in a humiliating and degrading manner. The following guidelines shall be observed when fingerprinting or photographing the juvenile: (a) His fingerprint and photograph files shall be kept separate from those of adults and shall be kept confidential. They may be inspected by law enforcement officers only when necessary for the discharge of their duties and upon prior authority of the Family Court; TADCSE (b) His fingerprints and photographs shall be removed from the files and destroyed: (1) if the case against him is not filed, or is dismissed; or (2) when the juvenile reaches twenty one (21) years of age and there is no record that he committed an offense after reaching eighteen (18) years of age. SECTION 10. Intake Report by the Social Welfare Officer. — Upon the taking into custody of a juvenile in conflict with the law, the social welfare officer assigned to him by the DSWD shall immediately under take a preliminary background investigation of the juvenile and submit, prior to arraignment of the juvenile, a report on his findings to the Family Court in which the case may be filed. SECTION 11. Filing of Criminal Action. — A criminal action may be instituted against a juvenile in conflict with the law by filing a complaint with the prosecutor or the municipal trial court in cases where a preliminary investigation is required. In Manila and other chartered cities, if their charters so provide, the complaint shall be filed with the Office of the Prosecutor. It may also be filed directly with the Family Court if no preliminary investigation is required under Section 1 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. All criminal actions commenced by complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor assigned to the Family Court. SECTION 12. Prosecution of Civil Action. — When a criminal action is instituted against a juvenile in conflict with the law, the action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be governed by Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. SECTION 13. Preliminary Investigation. — As far as consistent with this Rule, the preliminary investigation of a juvenile in
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conflict with the law shall be governed by Section 3 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. If clarificatory questions become necessary, the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness shall apply. If a preliminary investigation is required before the filing of a complaint or information, the same shall be conducted by the judge of the Municipal Trial Court or the public prosecutor in accordance with the pertinent provisions of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. If the investigating prosecutor finds probable cause to hold the juvenile for trial, he shall prepare the corresponding resolution and information for approval by the provincial or city prosecutor, as the case may be. The juvenile, his parents/nearest relative/guardian and his counsel shall be furnished forthwith a copy of the approved resolution.
agency concerned shall be responsible for the juvenile's appearance in court whenever required. In the absence of any such center or agency within a reasonable distance from the venue of the trial, the juvenile shall be detained in the provincial, city or municipal jail which shall provide adequate quarters for the juvenile separate from adult detainees and detainees of the opposite sex.
SECTION 14. Venue. — Subject to the provisions of Section 15, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, any criminal or civil action involving a juvenile in conflict with the law shall be instituted and tried in the Family Court of or nearest the place where the offense was committed or where any of its essential elements occurred.
SECTION 20. Diversion Proceedings Before Arraignment. — Where the maximum penalty imposed by law for the offense with which the juvenile in conflict with the law is charged is imprisonment of not more than six (6) months, regardless of fine or fine alone regardless of amount, and the corresponding complaint or information is filed with the Family Court, the case shall not be set for arraignment; instead, it shall forthwith be referred to the Diversion Committee which shall determine whether the juvenile can be diverted and referred to alternative measures or services offered by non-court institutions. Pending determination by the Committee, the court shall deliver the juvenile on recognizance to the custody of his parents or legal guardian who shall be responsible for the presence of the juvenile during the diversion proceedings.
SECTION 15. Recognizance. — Before final conviction, all juveniles charged with offenses falling under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure shall be released on recognizance to the custody of their parents or other suitable person who shall be responsible for the juveniles' appearance in court whenever required. SECTION 16. When Bail a Matter of Right. — All juveniles in conflict with the law shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right before final conviction of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In the event the juvenile cannot post bail for lack of financial resources, the Family Court shall commit the juvenile pursuant to Section 18 of this Rule. However, where the juvenile does not pose a threat to public safety, the Family Court may, motu proprio or upon motion and recommendation of the DSWD, release the juvenile on recognizance to the custody of his parents or other responsible person. SECTION 17. When Bail Not A Matter of Right. — No juvenile charged with an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong. SECTION 18. Care of Juveniles in Conflict with the Law. — The juvenile charged with having committed a delinquent act, held for trial or while the case is pending appeal, if unable to furnish bail or is denied bail, shall, from the time of his being taken into custody, be committed by the Family Court to the care of the DSWD, a youth detention center, or a local rehabilitation center recognized by the government in the province, city or municipality within the jurisdiction of the said court. The center or
SECTION 19. Case Study Report. — After the institution of the criminal action, the social worker of the Family Court shall immediately undertake a case study of the juvenile and his family, his environment and such other matters relevant to the proper disposition of the case. His report shall be submitted within the period fixed by the Family Court, preferably before arraignment, to aid it in the proper disposition of the case.
SECTION 21. Diversion Committee. — In each Family Court, there shall be a Diversion Committee to be composed of its branch clerk of court as chairperson, and the prosecutor, a lawyer of the Public Attorney's Office and the social worker assigned to the said Family Court as members. The chairperson of the Committee shall call for a conference with notice to the juvenile, his parents/legal guardian and his counsel, and the private complainant and his counsel, and recommend to the Family Court whether the juvenile should be diverted to a diversion program or undergo formal court proceedings. In making its recommendation, the Committee shall consider the following factors: a) The record of the juvenile on his conflict with the law; b) Whether the imposable maximum penalty of the offense is more than six (6) months, regardless of fine; or only a fine, regardless of amount; c) Whether the juvenile is an obvious threat to himself and/or the community; d) Whether the juvenile is unrepentant; e) Whether the juvenile or his parents are indifferent or hostile; and Whether the juvenile's relationships with his peers increase the possibility of delinquent behavior. If the Committee recommends diversion, it shall submit the diversion program for the juvenile for the consideration and approval of the court.
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The Committee cannot recommend diversion should the juvenile or the private complainant object thereto. If no diversion program is recommended, the court shall include the case in its calendar for formal proceedings. Consent to diversion by the juvenile or payment by him of civil indemnity shall not in any way be construed as admission of guilt and used as evidence against him in the event that his case is included in the court calendar for formal proceedings. SECTION 22. Diversion Programs. — The diversion program designed by the Committee shall be distinct to each juvenile in conflict with the law limited for a specific period. It may include any or a combination of the following: a) Written or oral reprimand or citation; b) Return of property; c) Payment of the damage caused; d) Written or oral apology; e) Guidance and supervision orders; f) Counseling for the juvenile and his family; g) Training, seminars and lectures on (i) anger management skills; (ii) problem-solving and/or conflict resolution skills; (iii) values formation; and (iv) other skills that will aid the juvenile to properly deal with situations that can lead to a repetition of the offense; h) Participation in available community-based programs; i) Institutional care and custody; or j) Work-detail program in the community. SECTION 23. Hearing of Diversion Program. — The Family Court shall set the recommendation and diversion program for hearing within ten (10) days from receipt thereof. SECTION 24. Undertaking. — In all cases where a juvenile in conflict with the law is given the benefit of a diversion program, an undertaking describing the program shall be signed by him, his parents or legal guardian and the complainant, and approved by the Family Court. The program, which shall be enforced under the supervision and control of the Family Court, shall contain the following terms and conditions: a) The juvenile shall present himself to the social worker of the Family Court that approved the diversion program at least once a month for evaluation of its effectiveness. Whenever the juvenile is permitted to reside in a place under the jurisdiction of another Family Court, control and supervision over him shall be transferred to the Family Court of that place, and in such case, a copy of the undertaking, the intake and case study reports and other pertinent records shall be furnished the said court. Thereafter, the Family Court to which jurisdiction over the juvenile is transferred shall have the power with respect to the latter that was previously possessed by the Family Court that approved the diversion and such other conditions as the Committee may deem just and proper under the circumstances. b) The juvenile shall faithfully comply with the terms and conditions in the undertaking. His non-
compliance shall be referred by the Committee to the Family Court where the case has been transferred for a show-cause hearing with notice to the juvenile and private complainant. The court shall determine whether the juvenile should continue with the diversion program or his case returned to the original court for formal proceedings. The Family Court shall exert its best efforts to secure satisfaction of the civil liability of the juvenile and his parents or guardian. However, inability to pay the said liability shall not by itself be a ground to discontinue the diversion program of the juvenile. SECTION 25. Closure Order. — The juvenile subject of diversion proceedings shall be visited periodically by the Family Court social worker who shall submit to the Committee his reports thereon. At any time before or at the end of the diversion period, a report recommending closure or extension of diversion, as the case may be, shall be filed by the Committee with the Family Court. The report and recommendation shall be heard by the Family Court within fifteen (15) days from its receipt thereof, with notice to the members of the Committee, the juvenile and his parents or legal guardian and counsel and the complainant to determine whether the undertaking has been fully and satisfactorily complied with. If the juvenile has complied with his undertaking, the Family Court shall issue the corresponding closure order terminating the diversion program. It may, however, extend the period of diversion to give the juvenile a further chance to be rehabilitated. In the event the court finds that the diversion program will no longer serve its. purpose, it shall include the case of the juvenile in its calendar for formal proceedings. SECTION 26. Duty of the Family Court to Protect the Rights of the Juvenile. — In all criminal proceedings in the Family Court, the judge shall ensure the protection of the following rights of the juvenile in conflict with the law: a) To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt; b) To be informed promptly and directly of the nature and cause of the charge against him, and if appropriate, through his parents or legal guardian; c) To be present at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of judgment. The juvenile may, however, waive his presence at the trial pursuant to the stipulations set forth in his bail, unless his presence at the trial is specifically ordered by the court for purposes of identification. The absence of the juvenile without justifiable cause at the trial of which he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present thereat. When the juvenile under custody escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his right to be present in all subsequent hearings until custody over him is regained; d) To have legal and other appropriate assistance in the preparation and presentation of his defense; e) To testify as a witness in his own behalf and subject to cross-examination only on matters covered by direct examination, provided that the
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Rule on the Examination of a Child Witness shall be observed whenever convenient and practicable. The juvenile shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself and his silence shall not in any manner prejudice him; f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him; g) To have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of witnesses and production of other evidence in his behalf; h) To have speedy and impartial trial, with legal or other appropriate assistance and preferably in the presence of his parents or legal guardian, unless such presence is considered not to be in the best interests of the juvenile taking into account his age or other peculiar circumstances; (i) To appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner prescribed by law; j) To be accorded all the rights under the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness; and k) To have his privacy fully respected in all stages of the proceedings. SECTION 27. Arraignment and Plea. — The provisions of Rules 116 and 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure shall apply to the arraignment of the juvenile in conflict with the law. The arraignment shall be scheduled within seven (7) days from the date of the filing of the complaint or information with the Family Court, unless a shorter period is provided for by law. Arraignment shall be held in chambers and conducted by the judge by furnishing the juvenile a copy of the complaint or information, reading the same in a language or dialect known to and understood by him, explaining the nature and consequences of a plea of guilty or not guilty and asking him what his plea is. SECTION 28. Pre-trial. — The provisions of Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure shall govern the pre-trial of the juvenile in conflict with the law. Agreements or admissions made during the pre trial conference shall be in writing and signed by the juvenile, his parents or guardian and his counsel; otherwise, they cannot be used against him. Whenever possible and practicable, the Family Court shall explore all possibilities of settlement of the case, except its criminal aspect. Plea bargaining shall be resorted to only as a last measure when it will serve the best interests of the juvenile and the demands of restorative justice. SECTION 29. Trial. — All hearings shall be conducted in a manner conducive to the best interests of the juvenile and in an environment that will allow him to participate fully and freely in accordance with the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness. SECTION 30. Guiding Principles in Judging the Juvenile. — Subject to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and other special laws, the judgment against a juvenile in
conflict with the law shall be guided by the following principles: 1. It shall be in proportion to the gravity of the offense, and shall consider the circumstances and the best interests of the juvenile, the rights of the victim, the needs of society in line with the demands of restorative justice. 2. Restrictions on the personal liberty of the juvenile shall be limited to the minimum. Where discretion is given by law to the judge to determine whether the penalty to be imposed is fine or imprisonment, the imposition of the latter should be preferred as the more appropriate penalty. 3. No corporal punishment shall be imposed. SECTION 31. Promulgation of Sentence. — If after trial the Family Court should find the juvenile in conflict with the law guilty, it shall impose the proper penalty, including any civil liability which the juvenile may have incurred, and promulgate the sentence in accordance with Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. SECTION 32. Automatic Suspension of Sentence and Disposition Orders. — The sentence shall be suspended without need of application by the juvenile in conflict with the law. The court shall set the case for disposition conference within fifteen (15) days from the promulgation of sentence which shall be attended by the social worker of the Family Court, the juvenile, and his parents or guardian ad litem. It shall proceed to issue any or a combination of the following disposition measures best suited to the rehabilitation and welfare of the juvenile: 1. Care, guidance, and supervision orders; 2. Community service orders; 3. Drug and alcohol treatment; 4. Participation in group counseling and similar activities; 5. Commitment to the Youth Rehabilitation Center of the DSWD or other centers for juveniles in conflict with the law authorized by the Secretary of the DSWD. The Social Services and Counseling Division (SSCD) of the DSWD shall monitor the compliance by the juvenile in conflict with the law with the disposition measure and shall submit regularly to the Family Court a status and progress report on the matter. The Family Court may set a conference for the evaluation of such report in the presence, if practicable, of the juvenile, his parents or guardian, and other persons whose presence may be deemed necessary. The benefits of suspended sentence shall not apply to a juvenile in conflict with the law who has once enjoyed suspension of sentence, or to one who is convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or when at the time of promulgation of judgment the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or over. SECTION 33. Discharge of Juvenile Subject of Disposition Measure. — Upon the recommendation of the SSCD and a duly authorized
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officer of the DSWD, the head of an appropriate center or the duly accredited child-caring agency which has custody over the juvenile, the Family Court shall, after due notice to all parties and hearing, dismiss the case against the juvenile who has been issued disposition measures, even before he has reached eighteen (18) years of age, and order a final discharge if it finds that the juvenile has behaved properly and has shown the capability to be a useful member of the community. If the Family Court, however, finds that the juvenile has not behaved properly, has been incorrigible, has not shown the capability of becoming a useful member of society, has willfully failed to comply with the conditions of his disposition or rehabilitation program, or should his continued stay in the training institution where he has been assigned be not in his best interests, he shall be brought before the court for execution of his judgment. If the juvenile in conflict with the law has reached the age of eighteen (18) years while in commitment, the Family Court shall determine whether to dismiss the case in accordance with the first paragraph of this Section or to execute the judgment of conviction. In the latter case, unless the juvenile has already availed of probation under Presidential Decree No. 603 or other similar laws, he may apply for probation if qualified under the provisions of the Probation Law. The final release of the juvenile shall not extinguish his civil liability. The parents and other persons exercising parental authority over the juvenile shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of the juvenile living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law. SECTION 34. Probation as an Alternative to Imprisonment. — After promulgation of sentence and upon application at any time by the juvenile in conflict with the law within the period to appeal, the Family Court may place the juvenile on probation, if he is qualified under the Probation Law. SECTION 35. Credit in Service of Sentence. — The juvenile in conflict with the law who has undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of his sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the full time during which he has undergone preventive imprisonment, if he agrees voluntarily in writing to abide by the same or similar disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, except in any of the following cases: 1. When the juvenile is a recidivist or has been convicted previously twice or more times of any crime; or 2. When upon being summoned for execution of sentence, he failed to surrender voluntarily. If the juvenile does not agree to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, he shall be credited in the service of his sentence with four-fifths of the time during which he has undergone preventive imprisonment.
Whenever the juvenile has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period equal to or more than the possible maximum imprisonment of the offense charged to which he may be sentenced and his case is not yet terminated, he shall be released immediately without prejudice to the continuation of the trial thereof or the proceeding on appeal, if the same is under review. In case the maximum penalty to which the juvenile may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be released after thirty (30) days of preventive imprisonment. Any form of physical restraint imposed on the juvenile in conflict with the law, including community service and commitment to a rehabilitation center, shall be considered preventive imprisonment. SECTION 36. Confidentiality of Proceedings and Records. — All proceedings and records involving juveniles in conflict with the law from initial contact until final disposition of the case by the Family Court shall be considered privileged and confidential. The public may be excluded from the proceedings and, pursuant to the provisions of Section 31 of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness, the records shall not be disclosed directly or indirectly to anyone by any of the parties or the participants in the proceedings for any purpose whatsoever, except to determine if the juvenile may have his sentence suspended under Section 25 of this Rule or if he may be granted probation under the Probation Law, or to enforce the civil liability imposed in the criminal action. The Family Court shall take other measures to protect this confidentiality of proceedings including non-disclosure of records to the media, the maintenance of a separate police blotter for cases involving juveniles in conflict with the law and the adoption of a system of coding to conceal material information, which will lead to the juvenile's identity. Records of juveniles in conflict with the law shall not be used in subsequent proceedings or cases involving the same offender as an adult. SECTION 37. Non-liability for perjury or concealment or misrepresentation. — Any person who has been in conflict with the law as a juvenile shall not be held guilty of perjury or of concealment or misrepresentation by reason of his failure to acknowledge the case or recite any fact related thereto in response to any inquiry made to him for any purpose. SECTION 38. Sealing of Records. — The Family Court motu proprio, or on application of a person who has been adjudged a juvenile in conflict with the law, or if still a minor, on motion of his parents or legal guardian, shall, upon notice to the prosecution and after hearing, order the sealing of the records of the case if it finds that two (2) years have elapsed since the final discharge of the juvenile after suspension of sentence or probation, or from the date of the closure order and he has no pending case of an offense or a crime involving moral turpitude. Upon entry of the order, the case shall be treated as if it never occurred. All index references
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shall be deleted and in case of inquiry, the Family Court, prosecution, law enforcement officers and all other offices and agencies that dealt with the case shall reply that no record exists with respect to the juvenile concerned. Copies of the order shall be sent to these officials and agencies named in the order. Inspection of the sealed records thereafter may be permitted only by order of the Family Court upon petition. of the juvenile who is the subject of the records or of other proper parties. This procedure shall be without prejudice to the rule on destruction of video or audio tapes under Section 31 of the Rule on the Examination of a Child Witness. SECTION 39. Prohibition Against Labeling. — In the conduct of proceedings from initial contact with the juvenile in conflict with the law to the final disposition of the case, there shall be no branding or labeling of the latter as a young criminal, juvenile delinquent, prostitute, vagrant, or attaching to him in any manner any derogatory name. Likewise, no discriminatory remarks and practices shall be allowed, particularly with respect to the juvenile's social or economic status, physical disability or ethnic origin. SECTION 40. Contempt Powers. — A person who directly or indirectly disobeys any order of the Family Court or obstructs or interferes with its proceedings or the enforcement of its orders issued under this Rule shall be liable for contempt of court. SECTION 41. Effectivity. — This rule shall take effect on April 15, 2002 after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation not later than March 15, 2002. Par. 4. – ANY PERSON WHO, WHILE PERFORMING A LAWFUL ACT WITH DUE CARE, CAUSES AN INJURY BY MERE ACCIDENT WITHOUT FAULT OR INTENTION OF CAUSING IT. ELEMENTS: 1. A person performing a lawful act; 2. With due care; 3. He causes an injury to another by mere accident; 4. Without fault or intention of causing it. • Striking another with a gun in self-defense, even if it fired and seriously injured the assailant is a lawful act. ACCIDENT – something that happen outside the sway of our will and although it comes about through some act of our will, lies beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable consequences. - If the consequences are plainly foreseeable, it will be a case of negligence. People v. Agliday (2001) Facts: The wife of the accused was washing dishes in the kitchen when her son was shot with a shotgun by her husband. Conchita claimed that she and her husband quarreled before the incident and then her husband left the kitchen got his shotgun and went back to the kitchen to shoot his son.
Accused claimed that it was only an accident. He was merely cleaning his gun and the gun accidentally went off and his son’s buttock was hit. Held: The exemption from criminal liability under the circumstance showing accident is based on the lack of criminal intent. In the case at bar, accused got his shotgun and returned to the kitchen to shoot his son who had intervened in the quarrel between the former and his wife. There was clear intent to fire and not mere accident. US v. Tanedo (1910) Facts: The accused, while hunting, saw wild chickens and fired a shot. The slug, after hitting a wild chicken, recoiled and struck the tenant who was a relative of the accused. The man who was injured died. Held: If life is taken by misfortune or accident while the actor is in the performance of a lawful act executed with due care and without intention of doing harm, there is no criminal liability. People v. Bindoy (1931) Facts: The accused, while in a drinking session, offered some tuba to Pacas’ wife but she refused so the accused threatened to injure her if she didn’t accept. Pacas stepped into defend his wife, attempting to take away from the accused the bolo he carried. In the course of the struggle, accused succeeded in disengaging himself from Pacas, wrenching the bolo from the latter’s hand towards the left behind the accused, with such violence that the point of the bolo reached Emigdio’s chest who was then behind the accused. Held: The accused, in his effort to free himself hit Emigdio in the chest. There is no evidence that this was done deliberately. It is merely accidental. People v. Agliday (2001) Facts: The wife of the accused was washing dishes in the kitchen when her son was shot with a shotgun by her husband. Conchita claimed that she and her husband quarreled before the incident and then her husband left the kitchen got his shotgun and went back to the kitchen to shoot his son. Accused claimed that it was only an accident. He was merely cleaning his gun and the gun accidentally went off and his son’s buttock was hit. Held: The exemption from criminal liability under the circumstance showing accident is based on the lack of criminal intent. In the case at bar, accused got his shotgun and returned to the kitchen to shoot his son who had intervened in the quarrel between the former and his wife. There was clear intent to fire and not mere accident. People v. Concepcion (2002) Facts: Galang got involved in a quarrel at the town plaza. He was brought to the barangay hall for questioning by Brgy Captain Capitli. Shortly after, Concepcion arrived and fired his rifle twice or thrice past the ears of Galang, who was then sitting, but without injuring him. After that, however, Concepcion thrust the barrel of the gun against the abdomen of Galang. Then there was an explosion. Galang was shot in the thigh. At least 3 more shots were fired, hitting him in the chest. Lorenzo died instantly. In his defense Concepcion claimed that the shooting was only accidental. Held: There was no accident. By Concepcion’s own testimony, the victim was unarmed. In contrast, he had an armalite and a handgun. It is highly
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inconceivable that an unarmed man could pose bodily harm to another who is heavily armed. Concepcion’s gun discharged several shots that hit vital parts of the victim's body. As observed by the trial court, recklessly appellant had put his finger on the trigger of his cocked and loaded rifle. In that state, with the slightest movement of his finger, the rifle would fire readily. And it did not just once but several fires. Concepcion is guilty of homicide. Par 5. – ANY PERSON WHO ACTS UNDER THE COMPULSION OF AN IRRESISTIBLE FORCE. ELEMENTS: 1. That the compulsion is by means of physical force. 2. That the physical force must be irresistible. 3. That the physical force must come from a third person • Before force can be considered to be an irresistible one, it must produce such an effect upon the individual that, in spite of all resistance, it reduces him to a mere instrument and, as such, incapable of committing a crime. • The irresistible force can never consist in an impulse or passion or obfuscation. It must consist of an extraneous force coming from a third person. • A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury is exempt from criminal liability because he does not act with freedom. People v. Lising (1998) Facts: Manalili asked Garcia if he could find someone who could effect the arrest of Robert Herrera, the suspect of the killing of his brother. Garcia introduced Lising and they came up with an agreement. Lising’s surveillance group was at the Castanos’ residence in the hope of spotting Herrera. The group saw a man and a woman (the victims) leave the residence and followed them. Alighting from the car, the two were accosted. The abduction of the 2 hit the front pages and two guards told the police that their friends who were employees of Lising informed them that Lising killed the 2 victims. Later, the bodies of the 2 were found. Lower court found that since there was an agreement among Manalili, Garcia and Lising, they were all co-conspirators of the crime and therefore liable principally. Garcia claimed that he acted under compulsion of irresistible force. Held: To be exempt from criminal liability, a person invoking irresistible force must show that the force exerted was such that it reduced him to a mere instrument who acted not only without will but against his will. Garcia’s participation and presence from the time the abduction was hatched upto the killing of the victims is undisputed. Conspiracy has been established. US v. Elicanal (1916) Facts: The accused was a member of the crew of a lorcha and Guiloresa was the chief mate. The latter mentioned that he was going to kill the captain because he was very angry with him and asked him to assist him. The accused took this statement as a joke and he was smiling only when he made the statement. The
following morning, Guillermo assaulted the captain and with the help of the crew (except the accused) seized the captain and tied him with a rope. Guillermo then struck the captain at the back of the neck with an iron bar and then, delivering the weapon to the accused ordered him to come forward and assist. The accused struck the captain on the head which caused the latter’s death. Held: Before one uses the defense of acting under uncontrollable fear, it must appear that the threat which caused the fear was an evil greater than or at least equal to that which he required to commit and that it promised an evil of such gravity and imminence that it might be said that the ordinary man would have succumbed to it. Evidence fails to establish that the threat directed to the accused by the chiefmate, if any, was of such character as to deprive him of all volition and to make him a mere instrument without will. The fear was not insuperable. US v. Caballeros (1905) Facts: The defendants have been sentenced as accessories in the crime of assassination of 4 American school teachers. The defendants took part in the burial of the corpses of the victims. Held: The defendant Baculi is exempt from criminal liability because he only assisted in the burial because he was compelled to do so by the murderers. As to defendant Caballeros, there is no proof that he took part in any way in the execution of the crime. His confession cannot be accepted as proof on a trial because it was not done voluntarily. US v. Exaltation (1905) Facts: Exaltation and Tanchico were convicted with rebellion based on documents found in the house of a certain Contreras, a so-called general of bandits, which contained the signatures of defendants swearing allegiance to the Katipunan. Defendants aver that these documents were signed under duress and fear of death. They allege further that they were abducted by thieves and that these men forced the defendants to sign the documents Held: The duress under which the defendants acted relieved them from criminal liability. Prosecution was unable to prove the guilt of the accused and testimonies of witnesses for the accused further corroborated their defense. People v. Fronda (1993) Facts: Balaan brothers were taken by 7 armed NPA members accompanied by accused Fronda and Padua. The accused are both residents of the same place. The two were convicted of murder. Fronda appealed claiming he was merely taken by the armed men as a “pointer”. Held: Records show that appellant’s participation in the commission of the crime consisted of: 1) leading the members of the armed group to the house where the victims were found, 2) tying the victims’ hands and 3) digging the grave where the victims were buried. He is not a principal by indispensable cooperation but only an accomplice. The defense of uncontrollable fear cannot be accepted because the fact that the accused was seen being handed by and receiving a hunting knife from one of the armed men, as well as, his inexplicable failure to report the incident to the authorities for more than 3 years negates the existence of uncontrollable fear, such acts being indicative of his conscious concurrence with the acts of the assailants.
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Ty v. People (supra) Facts: Ty's mother Chua Lao So Un was confined at the Manila Doctors' Hospital from October 1990 until June 1992. Being the patient's daughter, Ty signed the "Acknowledgment of Responsibility for Payment" in the Contract of Admission. Ty's sister, Judy Chua, was also confined at the same hospital. The total hospital bills of the two patients amounted to P1,075,592.95. Ty executed a promissory note wherein she assumed payment of the obligation in installments. To assure payment of the obligation, she drew 7 postdated checks against Metrobank payable to the hospital which were all dishonored by the drawee bank and returned unpaid to the hospital due to insufficiency of funds. For her defense, Ty claimed that she issued the checks because of “an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury” She averred that she was forced to issue the checks to obtain release for her mother who was being inhumanely and harshly treated by the hospital. She alleged that her mother has comtemplated suicide if she would not be discharged from the hospital. Ty was found guilty by the lower courts of 7 counts of violation of BP22. Held:The court sustained the findings of the lower courts. The evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated. If the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated or may happen in the future, the defense of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury” is not applicable. Ty could have taken advantage of an available option to avoid committing a crime. By her own admission, she had the choice to give jewelry or other forms of security instead of postdated checks to secure her obligation. Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity to be availing, the greater injury feared should not have been brought about by the negligence or imprudence, more so, the willful inaction of the actor. In this case, the issuance of the bounced checks was brought about by Ty's own failure to pay her mother's hospital bills. Par 6. – ANY PERSON WHO ACTS UNDER THE IMPULSE OF AN UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR OF AN EQUAL OR GREATER INJURY. ELEMENTS: 1. That the threat which causes the fear is of an evil greater than or at least equal to, that which he is required to commit; 2. That it promises an evil of such gravity and imminence that the ordinary man would have succumbed to it. • REQUISITES: a. existence of an uncontrollable fear; b. the fear must be real and imminent; and c. the fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal to that committed. • Duress as a valid defense should be based on real, imminent or reasonable fear for one’s life or limb and should not be speculative, fanciful or remote fear. • A threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat. • Speculative, fanciful uncontrollable fear.
and
remote
fear
is
not
• The case of US v. Exaltation is also an example were there is real, imminent or reasonable fear. IRRESISTIBLE FORCE The offender uses violence or physical force to compel another person to commit the crime. JUSTIFYING There is neither a crime nor a criminal.
No civil liability except in no. 4
UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR The offender employs intimidation or threat in compelling another to commit a crime. EXEMPTING There is a crime but no criminal. The act is not justified but the actor is not criminally liable. There is civil liability except no. 4 and 7.
Par. 7 – ANY PERSON WHO FAILS TO PERFORM AN ACT REQUIRED BY LAW, WHEN PREVENTED BY SOME LAWFUL OR INSUPERABLE CAUSE. ELEMENTS: That an act is required by law to be done; That a person fails to perform such act; That his failure to perform such act was due to some lawful or insuperable cause.
1. 2. 3.
US v. Vicentillo (1911) A policeman charged cannot be held liable for illegal detention when after arresting his victims, it took him three days to reach the nearest judge. The distance which required a journey for three days was considered to be an insuperable cause. People v. Bandian (1936) A woman cannot be held liable for infanticide when she left her newborn child in the bushes without being aware that she had given birth at all. Severe dizziness and extreme debility made it physically impossible for Bandian to take home the child plus the assertion that she didn’t know that she had given birth.
3. MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES Mitigating circumstances are those which, if present in the commission of the crime, do not entirely free the actor from criminal liability, but serve only to reduce the penalty. They are based on the diminution of either freedom of action, intelligence or intent or on the lesser perversity of the offender. CLASSES OF MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES -
1. ORDINARY MITIGATING Those mentioned in subsections 1 to 10 of Art. 13. 2.
PRIVILEGED MITIGATING
Art. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age. — When the offender is a minor under eighteen years and his case is one coming under the provisions of the paragraphs next to the last of Article 80 of this Code, the following rules shall be observed:
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1. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who is not exempted from liability by reason of the court having declared that he acted with discernment, a discretionary penalty shall be imposed, but always lower by two degrees at least than that prescribed by law for the crime which he committed. 2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period. Art. 69. Penalty to be imposed when the crime committed is not wholly excusable. — A penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from criminal liability in the several cases mentioned in Article 11 and 12, provided that the majority of such conditions be present. The courts shall impose the penalty in the period which may be deemed proper, in view of the number and nature of the conditions of exemption present or lacking. • Privileged mitigating circumstances which are applicable only to particular crimes: 1. Art. 268, par. 3. Voluntary release of the person illegally detained within 3 days without the offender attaining his purpose and before the institution of criminal action. The penalty is one degree lower. 2. Art. 333, par. 3. Abandonment without justification of the spouse who committed adultery. The penalty is one degree lower. ORDINARY MC Susceptible of being offset by any aggravating circumstance If not offset by aggravating circumstance, produces the effect of applying the penalty provided by law for the crime in its min period in case of divisible penalty
PRIVILEDGED MC Cannot be offset by aggravating circumstance The effect of imposing upon the offender the penalty lower by one or two degrees than that provided by law for the crime.
•• NOTE: Mitigating circumstances only reduce the penalty but do not change the nature of the crime. Art. 13. Mitigating circumstances. — The following are mitigating circumstances; 1. Those mentioned in the preceding chapter, when all the requisites necessary to justify or to exempt from criminal liability in the respective cases are not attendant. 2. That the offender is under eighteen year of age or over seventy years. In the case of the minor, he shall be proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of Art. 80. 3. That the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed. 4. That sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceded the act. 5. That the act was committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the one committing the felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees. 6. That of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation.
7. That the offender had voluntarily surrendered himself to a person in authority or his agents, or that he had voluntarily confessed his guilt before the court prior to the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution; 8. That the offender is deaf and dumb, blind or otherwise suffering some physical defect which thus restricts his means of action, defense, or comm4unications with his fellow beings. 9. Such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the will-power of the offender without however depriving him of the consciousness of his acts. 10. And, finally, any other circumstances of a similar nature and analogous to those above mentioned.
Par. 1- THOSE MENTIONED IN THE PRECEDING CHAPTER, WHEN ALL THE REQUISITES NECESSARY TO JUSTIFY OR TO EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY IN THE RESPECTIVE CASES ARE NOT ATTENDANT. The circumstances of justification or exemption which may give place to mitigation, because not all the requisites necessary to justify the act or to exempt from criminal liability in the respective cases are attendant, are the ff: 1. Self-defense 2. Defense of Relatives 3. Defense of Strangers 4. State of necessity 5. Performance of duty 6. Obedience to order of superior 7. Minority over 9 and under 15 years of age 8. Causing injury by mere accident 9. Uncontrollable fear INCOMPLETE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE 1.
Incomplete self-defense, defense relatives, defense of stranger
of
♣ In these 3 classes of defense, UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION must always be present. It is an indispensable requisite. ♣ Par. 1 of Art. 13 is applicable only when unlawful aggression is present but the other 2 requisites are not present in any of the cases referred to in circumstances number 1, 2 and 3 or Art. 11. ♣ Ex. When the one making defense against unlawful aggression used unreasonable means to prevent or repel it, he is entitled to a privileged mitigating circumstance. 2.
Incomplete justifying circumstance avoidance of greater evil or injury.
of
REQUISITES under par. 4 of Art. 11: a. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists; b. That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it; c. That there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it. ♣ Avoidance of greater evil or injury is a justifying circumstance if all the three requisites mentioned in par. 4 of Art. 11 are present. But if any of the last two
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requisites is lacking, circumstance. 3.
there
is
Incomplete justifying performance of duty.
only
a
mitigating
circumstance
of
REQUISITES under par. 5 of Art. 11: a. That the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office; and b. That the injury caused or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. In People v. Oanis, the SC considered one of the 2 requisites as constituting the majority. It seems that there is no ordinary mitigating circumstance under Art. 13 par. 1 when the justifying or exempting circumstance has 2 requisites only. INCOMPLETE EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE 1. Incomplete exempting circumstance of minority over 9 and under 15 years of age. REQUISITES under par. 3 of Art. 12: a. That the offender is over 9 and under 15 years old; and b. That he does not act with discernment. If the minor over 9 and under 15 years of age acted with discernment, he is entitled only to a mitigating circumstance, because not all the requisites to exempt from criminal liability are present. 2. Incomplete exempting circumstance of accident. REQUISITES under par. 4 of Art. 12 : a. A person is performing a lawful act; b. With due care; c. He causes an injury to another by mere accident; and d. Without fault or intention of causing it. If the 2nd requisite and 1st part of the 4th requisite are absent, the case will fall under Art. 365 which punishes reckless imprudence. If the 1st requisite and 2nd part of the 4th requisite are absent, it will be an intentional felony. 3. Incomplete exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear. REQUISITES under par. 6 of Art. 12: a. That the threat which caused the fear was of an evil greater than, or at least equal to, that which he was required to commit; b. That it promised an evil of such gravity and imminence that an ordinary person would have succumbed to it. If only one of these requisites is present, there is only a mitigating circumstance. Par. 2 – THAT THE OFFENDER IS UNDER 18 YEARS OF AGE OR OVER 70 YEARS. IN THE CASE OF THE MINOR, HE SHALL BE PROCEEDED AGAINST IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF ART. 80.
Par. 2 contemplates the ff: 1. An offender over 9 but under 15 of age who acted with discernment. 2. An offender fifteen or over but under 18 years of age. 3. An offender over 70 years old. Art. 80. Suspension of sentence of minor delinquents. — Whenever a minor of either sex, under sixteen years of age at the date of the commission of a grave or less grave felony, is accused thereof, the court, after hearing the evidence in the proper proceedings, instead of pronouncing judgment of conviction, shall suspend all further proceedings and shall commit such minor to the custody or care of a public or private, benevolent or charitable institution, established under the law of the care, correction or education of orphaned, homeless, defective, and delinquent children, or to the custody or care of any other responsible person in any other place subject to visitation and supervision by the Director of Public Welfare or any of his agents or representatives, if there be any, or otherwise by the superintendent of public schools or his representatives, subject to such conditions as are prescribed herein below until such minor shall have reached his majority age or for such less period as the court may deem proper. The court, in committing said minor as provided above, shall take into consideration the religion of such minor, his parents or next of kin, in order to avoid his commitment to any private institution not under the control and supervision of the religious sect or denomination to which they belong. The Director of Public Welfare or his duly authorized representatives or agents, the superintendent of public schools or his representatives, or the person to whose custody or care the minor has been committed, shall submit to the court every four months and as often as required in special cases, a written report on the good or bad conduct of said minor and the moral and intellectual progress made by him. The suspension of the proceedings against a minor may be extended or shortened by the court on the recommendation of the Director of Public Welfare or his authorized representative or agents, or the superintendent of public schools or his representatives, according as to whether the conduct of such minor has been good or not and whether he has complied with the conditions imposed upon him, or not. The provisions of the first paragraph of this article shall not, however, be affected by those contained herein. If the minor has been committed to the custody or care of any of the institutions mentioned in the first paragraph of this article, with the approval of the Director of Public Welfare and subject to such conditions as this official in accordance with law may deem proper to impose, such minor may be allowed to stay elsewhere under the care of a responsible person. If the minor has behaved properly and has complied with the conditions imposed upon him during his confinement, in accordance with the provisions of this article, he shall be returned to the court in order that the same may order his final release. In case the minor fails to behave properly or to comply with the regulations of the institution to which he has been committed or with the conditions imposed upon him when he was committed to the care of a responsible person, or in case he should be found incorrigible or his continued stay in such institution
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should be inadvisable, he shall be returned to the court in order that the same may render the judgment corresponding to the crime committed by him. The expenses for the maintenance of a minor delinquent confined in the institution to which he has been committed, shall be borne totally or partially by his parents or relatives or those persons liable to support him, if they are able to do so, in the discretion of the court; Provided, That in case his parents or relatives or those persons liable to support him have not been ordered to pay said expenses or are found indigent and cannot pay said expenses, the municipality in which the offense was committed shall pay one-third of said expenses; the province to which the municipality belongs shall pay one-third; and the remaining one-third shall be borne by the National Government: Provided, however, That whenever the Secretary of Finance certifies that a municipality is not able to pay its share in the expenses above mentioned, such share which is not paid by said municipality shall be borne by the National Government. Chartered cities shall pay two-thirds of said expenses; and in case a chartered city cannot pay said expenses, the internal revenue allotments which may be due to said city shall be withheld and applied in settlement of said indebtedness in accordance with section five hundred and eighty-eight of the Administrative Code.
LEGAL EFFECTS OF VARIOUS AGES OF OFFENDER: 1. Under 9 years of age, an exempting circumstance. (Art. 12, par. 2) 2. Over 9 and under 15 years of age, also an exempting circumstance, unless he acted with discernment (Art. 12, par. 3) 3. Minor delinquent under 18 years of age, the sentence may be suspended. (Art. 192, PD No. 603 as amended by PD 1179) 4. Under 18 years of age, privileged mitigating circumstance (Art. 68) 5. 18 years or over, full criminal responsibility.
Par. 3 – THAT THE OFFENDER HAD NO INTENTION TO COMMIT SO GR A WRONG AS THAT COMMITTED. ♠ This circumstance can be taken into account only when the facts proven show that there is a notable and evident disproportion between the means employed to execute the criminal act and its consequences. ♠ The intention, as an internal act, is judged not only by the proportion of the means employed by him to the evil produced by his act, but also by the fact that the blow was or was not aimed at a vital part of the body. ♠ Intention must be judged by considering the weapon used, the injury inflicted and his attitude of the mind when the accused attacked the deceased. ♠ This mitigating circumstance is not applicable when the offender employed brute force. ♠ Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong is not appreciated where the offense committed is characterized by treachery. ♠ In crimes against persons who do not die as a result of the assault, the absence of the intent to kill reduces the felony to mere physical injuries, but it does not constitute a mitigating circumstance under Art. 13 par 3.
♠ It is not applicable to felonies by negligence because in these kinds of felonies, there is no intent on the part of the offender which may be considered diminished. ♣ Par. 3 is only applicable to offense resulting in physical injuries or material harm. It is not applicable to defamation or slander. People v. Ural (1974) Facts: Witness Alberto saw policeman Ural inside the jail boxing detention prisoner Napola. As Napola collapsed on the floor, Ural went out to get a bottle. He poured the contents to the dress of Napola and set it on fire. Napola got burned and he asked mercy from Ural. Instead, Ural locked him up and threatened the witness not to tell anyone or else he will burn also. When Napola was already suffering much from the burns, Ural became frightened and he and Siton helped put out the fire. Napola died later because of the burns. Held: Offender is criminally liable although consequence of his felonious act was not intended by him. This is covered by Art. 4 of the RPC. The TC failed to appreciate the mitigating circumstance that the offender has no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed. It is manifest from the facts that the accused had no intent to kill the victim. His only design was only to maltreat him maybe because of his drunken condition. When the accused realized the fearful consequences of his act, he allowed the victim to secure medical treatment. People v. Amit (1970) Facts: Amit pleads guilty to rape with homicide and sentenced to death. Amit appeals claiming that there are 3 mitigating circumstances including lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong. Held: A great disproportion between means employed to accomplish the criminal act on the one hand, and its consequences on the other, must first be shown. Otherwise, the mitigating circumstance could not be considered. Based on the narration given by the accused where he said that he held victim’s neck down as he boxed her in the face, and considering moreover that the victim was 57 years old while the accused was only 32, the court held that the means employed by the accused was sufficient to have caused the death of the victim. Death penalty should be imposed. It is a single indivisible penalty applied regardless of mitigating circumstance, especially when records of the present case evince the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and abuse of superior strength. People v. Regato (1984) Facts: Regato, Ramirez and Salceda robbed the store of Victor Flores. Victor was maltreated to force him to reveal where their money was. The robbers found the money in a place different from where Victor revealed to them. Ramirez got mad and called Victor a liar. Victor retorted, “you robbers!”. With this remark, Ramirez shot Victor and the three rushed out of the house. Held: The SC did not find merit in the contention that there was lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed. Intention is a mental process and is an internal state of mind. The intention must be judged by the ACTION, CONDUCT and EXTERNAL ACTS of the accused. What men do is the
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best index of their intention. In the case at bar, the aforesaid mitigating circumstance cannot be appreciated considering that the acts employed by the accused were reasonably sufficient to produce the result that they actually made – the death of the victim. People v. Callet (2002) Facts: Alfredo, Lecpoy and Eduardo were beside each other as they watched a cara y cruz game. Alfredo sat close to the ground, with his buttocks resting on his right foot. Lecpoy and Eduardo sat on a piece of wood and on a stone, respectively. Out of nowhere, the accused, Callet, appeared behind Alfredo and stabbed the latter on the left shoulder near the base of the neck with a 9-inch hunting knife. Instinctively, Alfredo stood up and managed to walk a few meters. When he fell on the ground, Lecpoy and Eduardo rushed to help him but to no avail. Alfredo died shortly thereafter. Calleto voluntary surrendered. He claims that his liabiity should be mitigated by the fact that he had no intention to commit so grave a wrong. Held: The lack of "intent" to commit a wrong so grave is an internal state. It is weighed based on the weapon used, the part of the body injured, the injury inflicted and the manner it is inflicted. The fact that the accused used a 9-inch hunting knife in attacking the victim from behind, without giving him an opportunity to defend himself, clearly shows that he intended to do what he actually did, and he must be held responsible therefor, without the benefit of this mitigating circumstance. Par. 4. – THAT SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION OR THREAT ON THE PART OF THE OFFENDED PARTY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDED THE ACT PROVOCATION - Any unjust or improper conduct or act of the offended party, capable of exciting, inciting, or irritating anyone. REQUISITES: a. That the provocation must be sufficient b. That it must originate from the offended party c. That the provocation must be immediate to the act, i.e., to the commission of the crime by the person who is provoked. People v. Pagal (1977) Facts: Pagal and Torcelino, employees of Gau Guan, conspired together to take away from their employer P1,281. When Gau Guan refused to open the kaha de yero, they stabbed him with an icepick and clubbed him with an iron pipe which resulted to his death. The two accused were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide. On appeal, they claimed that they are entitled to 2 mitigating circumstances: sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party and having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to produce passion and obfuscation. Held: The 2 mitigating circumstances cannot be considered as 2 distinct and separate circumstances but should only be treated as one because they both arose from the same incident – the alleged maltreatment of Pagal and Torcelino by Gau Guan. The circumstance of passion and obfuscation cannot be mitigating in a crime which is planned and calmly meditated before its execution. Also, provocation in order to be mitigating must be sufficient and immediately preceding the act. In this case, it was
months ago when the incident of alleged maltreatment took place. Romera v. People (2004) Facts: While lying in bed, Romera heard the victim Roy call him and his wife, asking if they had beer and a fighter for sale. He did not answer Roy because he knew that Roy was already drunk. Roy asked for Romera but when the latter's wife told him that he was already asleep, Roy told her to wake her husband up. Romera went down the house and asked who was at the door. Just as he opened the door for Roy, Roy thrust his bolo at him. He successfully parried the bolo and asked Roy what it was all about. Roy answered he would kill Romera. Romera tried to prevent Roy from entering, so he pushed the door shut. As Roy was hacking at the wall, Romera’s wife held the door to allow Romera to exit in another door to face Roy. He hurled a stone at Roy, who dodged it. Roy rushed to him and hacked him, but he parried the blow. Petitioner grappled for the bolo and stabbed Roy in the stomach. Wounded, Roy begged petitioner for forgiveness. Romera ceased harming Roy for fear he might kill him. Held: There was sufficient provocation and the circumstance of passion or obfuscation attended the commission of the offense. Thrusting his bolo at Romera, threatening to kill him, and hacking the bamboo walls of his house are sufficient provocation to enrage any man, or stir his rage and obfuscate his thinking, more so when the lives of his wife and children are in danger. Romera stabbed the victim as a result of those provocations, and while Romera was still in a fit of rage. The court however stressed that provocation and passion or obfuscation are not 2 separate mitigating circumstances. Well-settled is the rule that if these 2 circumstances are based on the same facts, they should be treated together as one mitigating circumstance. From the facts established in this case, it is clear that both circumstances arose from the same set of facts aforementioned. Hence, they should not be treated as two separate mitigating circumstances. Par. 5. – THAT THE ACT WAS COMMITTED IN THE IMMEDIATE VINDICATION OF A GRAVE OFFENSE TO THE ONE COMMITTING THE FELONY (DELITO), HIS SPOUSE, ASCENDANTS, DESCENDANTS, LEGITIMATE, NATURAL OR ADOPTED BROTHERS OR SISTERS, OR RELATIVES BY AFFINITY WITHIN THE SAME DEGREE.
a.
b.
REQUISITES: That there be a grave offense done to the one committing the felony, his spouse, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degree. That the felony is committed in vindication of such grave offense. A lapse of time is allowed between the vindication and the doing of the grave offense.
PROVOCATION It is made directly only to the person committing the offense The cause that brought about the provocation
LEX SOCIETAS Veritas. Vnitas. Virtvs.
VINDICATION The grave offense may be committed also against the offender’s relatives mentioned in the law. The offended party must have done a grave offense
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need not offense.
be
a
grave
It is necessary that the provocation or threat immediately preceded the act.
to the offender or his relatives mentioned in the law. The vindication of the grave offense may be proximate, which admits of an interval of time between the grace offense done by the offended party and the commission of the crime.
Basis to determine the gravity of offense in vindication The question whether or not a certain personal offense is grave must be decided by the court, having in mind the social standing of the person, the place and the time when the insult was made. ♠ Vindication of a grave offense and passion or obfuscation cannot be counted separately and independently. People v. Ampar (1917) Facts: A fiesta was in progress and the accused Ampar went to the kitchen and asked from Patobo some of the roast pig. Patobo replied, “There is no more. Come here and I will make roast pig of you.” Later, while Patobo was squatting down, Ampar struck him on the head with an ax, causing his death the following day. The TC appreciated the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense. Held: The offense which the defendant was endeavoring to vindicate would be to the average person considered as a mere trifle. But to this defendant, an old man, it evidently was a serious matter to be made the butt of a joke in the presence of so many guests. The TC was correct. Peope v. Parana (1937) Facts: The preceding night, Parana and Lamay were at the house of the deceased’s brother playing cards when the two had an exchange of words so the deceased asked them to leave. The accused refused so the deceased slapped him and ordered him to leave. The morning after, Parana was about to surprise the deceased and stab him from behind when the chauffeur shouted to warn the deceased. The deceased, defending himself retreated until he fell into a ditch. The appellant mounted astride of the deceased and continued to stab him with the dagger. The deceased was first brought to the hospital but expired 6 days after. Held: The mitigating circumstance that he had acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense committed against him a few hours before, when he was slapped by the deceased in the presence of many persons, must likewise be taken into consideration. Although this offense (slapping) was not so immediate, the court believes that the influence thereof, by reason of its gravity and the circumstances under which it was inflicted, lasted until the moment the crime was committed. People v. Diokno (1936) Facts: The deceased and the daughter of accused Epifanio eloped. Epifanio and his son, Roman went to look for them. When they were able to find the deceased, they stabbed him several times until he died.
Held: The presence of the 5th mitigating circumstance must be taken into consideration. There was no interruption from the time the offense was committed to the vindication thereof. The herein accused belong to a family of old customs to whom the elopement of a daughter with a man constitutes a grave offense to their honor and causes disturbance of the peace of the home. The fact that the accused saw the deceased run upstairs when he became aware of their presence, as if he refused to deal with them after having gravely offended them, was certainly a stimulus strong enough to produce in their mind a fit of passion which blinded them and led them to commit that crime. People v. Torpio (2004) Facts: While having a drinking spree in a cottage, Anthony tried to let Dennis Torpio drink gin and as the latter refused, Anthony bathed Dennis with gin and mauled him several times. Dennis crawled beneath the table and Anthony tried to stab him with a 22 fan knife but did not hit him. Dennis got up and ran towards their home. Upon reaching home, he got a knife. He went back to the cottage by another route and upon arrival Anthony was still there. Upon seeing Dennis, Anthony avoided Dennis and ran by passing the shore towards the creek but Dennis met him, blocked him and stabbed him. When he was hit, Anthony ran but got entangled with a fishing net beside the creek and fell on his back. Dennis then mounted on him and continued stabbing him resulting to the latters death. Thereafter, Dennis left and slept at a grassy meadow near a Camp. In the morning, he went to Estrera, a police officer to whom he voluntarily surrendered. Held: The mitigating circumstance of having acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense is properly appreciated. Dennis was humiliated, mauled and almost stabbed by the Anthony. Although the unlawful aggression had ceased when Dennis stabbed Anthony, it was nonetheless a grave offense for which the Dennis may be given the benefit of a mitigating circumstance. However, the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation cannot be considered apart from the circumstance of vindication of a grave offense. These two circumstances arose from one and the same incident, i.e., the attack on the appellant by Anthony, so that they should be considered as only one mitigating circumstance. Pelonia v. People (2006) Held: The mitigating circumstance of having acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense was, likewise, properly appreciated. Petitioner was humiliated in front of his guests and kin in his own house. It is settled, however, that the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation cannot be considered apart from the circumstance of vindication of a grave offense. These two circumstances arose from one and the same incident so that they should be considered as only one mitigating circumstance. Par. 6. – THAT OF HAVING ACTED UPON AN IMPULSE SO POWERFUL AS NATURALLY TO HAVE PRODUCED PASSION OR OBFUSCATION. REQUISITES: a. The accused acted upon an impulse. b. The impulse must be so powerful that it naturally produce passion or obfuscation in him.
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♠ Passion or obfuscation may constitute as a mitigating circumstance only when the same arose from LAWFUL SENTIMENTS. It is not applicable when: a. The act committed in a spirit of LAWLESSNESS. b. the act is committed in a spirit of REVENGE. ♠ The crime committed must be the result of a sudden impulse of natural and uncontrollable fury. ♠ The accused who raped a woman is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of “having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion” just because he finds himself in a secluded place with that young ravishing woman, almost naked and therefore, “liable to succumb to the uncontrollable passion of his bestial instinct.” ♠ The mitigating circumstance of obfuscation arising from jealousy cannot be invoked in favor of the accused whose relationship with the woman was illegitimate. ♠ Passion and obfuscation may lawfully arise from causes existing only in the honest belief of the offender. PASSION OR OBFUSCATION Mitigating circumstance Cannot give rise to an irresistible force because the latter requires physical force Passion or obfuscation is in the offender himself Must arise from lawful sentiments
IRRESISTIBLE FORCE Exempting circumstance
Irresistible force must come from a third person The irresistible force is unlawful
PASSION PROVOCATION Produced by an impulse Comes form the injured which may be caused by party provocation Need not be immediate. It Must immediately precede is only required that the the commission of the influence thereof lasts crime until the moment the crime is committed The effect is the loss of reason and self-control on the part of the offender.
People v. Muit (1982) Facts: Rosario Muit was the Brgy. Zone President and Torrero was the zone auditor. They used to meet frequently because they were having an affair which eventually reached the husband of Rosario, Delfin. Delfin shot Torrero 3 times at the front yard of the Muits. Delfin surrendered himself and turned in the pistol he had used. Held: Muit is guilty of murder with mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and passion and obsfuscation. The accused was driven strongly by jealousy. The feeling of resentment resulting from the rivalry in amorous relations with a woman is a powerful stimulant to jealousy and prone to produce anger and obfuscation. US v. HICKS (1909) Facts: For about 5 years, Hicks and Sola lived together as husband and wife when they separated. A few days later, Sola contracted new relations with
another negro named Wallace. Hicks went to Wallace’s house and asked the latter to go out. They talked for awhile and then Hicks shot Wallace Held: Even if it is true that the accused acted with obfuscation because of jealousy, the mitigating circumstance cannot be considered in his favor because the causes which mitigate criminal responsibility for the loss of self-control are such which originate from legitimate feelings and not those which arise from vicious, unworthy and immoral passions. The cause of the passion of the accused was his vexation engendered by the refusal of the woman to continue to live in illicit relations with him, which she had a perfect right to do. US v. DE LA CRUZ (1912) Facts: The evidence clearly discloses that the convict, in the heat of passion, killed the deceased, who had theretofore been his lover upon discovering her in flagrante in carnal communication with a mutual acquaintance. Held: The accused was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation because the impulse was caused by the sudden revelation that she was untrue to him, and his discovery of her in flagrante in the arms of another. • note: when the court used the word “illicit”, it doesn’t mean that it is an illegitimate or bigamous relationship. It means that it is cohabitation without a valid marriage. People v. Germina (1998) Facts: One night, the accused went to the Angeles residence to look for Raymund. He went to verifiy the news that the latter mauled and stabbed the accused’s mentally retarded brother, Rafael. Raymund was not yet at home and the moment he arrived, the accused spotted him and shot him. Held: There is no treachery. Passion cannot coexist with treachery because in passion, the offender loses his control and reason while in treachery the means employed are consciously adopted. One who loses his reason and self-control could not deliberately employ a particular method or form of attack in the execution of the crime. Passion existed in this case because it clearly arose from lawful sentiments or legitimate feelings. The accused committed the crime due to the maltreatment inflicted by the victim on his mentally retarded brother. Romera v. People (2004) Facts: While lying in bed, Romera heard the victim Roy call him and his wife, asking if they had beer and a fighter for sale. He did not answer Roy because he knew that Roy was already drunk. Roy asked for Romera but when the latter's wife told him that he was already asleep, Roy told her to wake her husband up. Romera went down the house and asked who was at the door. Just as he opened the door for Roy, Roy thrust his bolo at him. He successfully parried the bolo and asked Roy what it was all about. Roy answered he would kill Romera. Romera tried to prevent Roy from entering, so he pushed the door shut. As Roy was hacking at the wall, Romera’s wife held the door to allow Romera to exit in another door to face Roy. He hurled a stone at Roy, who dodged it. Roy rushed to him and hacked him, but he parried the blow. Petitioner grappled for the bolo and stabbed Roy in the stomach. Wounded, Roy begged petitioner for forgiveness. Romera ceased harming Roy for fear he might kill him.
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Held: There was sufficient provocation and the circumstance of passion or obfuscation attended the commission of the offense. Thrusting his bolo at Romera, threatening to kill him, and hacking the bamboo walls of his house are sufficient provocation to enrage any man, or stir his rage and obfuscate his thinking, more so when the lives of his wife and children are in danger. Romera stabbed the victim as a result of those provocations, and while Romera was still in a fit of rage. The court however stressed that provocation and passion or obfuscation are not 2 separate mitigating circumstances. Well-settled is the rule that if these 2 circumstances are based on the same facts, they should be treated together as one mitigating circumstance. From the facts established in this case, it is clear that both circumstances arose from the same set of facts aforementioned. Hence, they should not be treated as two separate mitigating circumstances. People v. Gonzalez (2001) Facts: Both of the families of Andres and that of Gonzalez were on their way to the exit of the Loyola Memorial Park. Gonzales was with his grandson and 3 housemaids, while Andres was driving with his pregnant wife, Feliber, his 2yr old son, Kenneth, his nephew Kevin and his sister-in-law. At an intersection, their two vehicles almost collided. Gonzales continued driving while Andres tailed Gonzales’ vehicle and cut him off when he found the opportunity to do so, then got out of his vehicle and knocked on the appellant's car window. Heated exchange of remarks followed. On his way back to his vehicle, he met Gonzales son, Dino. Andres had a shouting match this time with Dino. Gonzales then alighted from his car and fired a single shot at the last window on the left side of Andres' vehicle at an angle away from Andres. The single bullet fired hit Kenneth, Kevin and Feliber which caused the latters death. Held: The mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation is not obtaining. Andres' act of shouting at Gonzales’ son, who was then a nurse and of legal age, is not sufficient to produce passion and obfuscation. Dino was shouting back at Andres. It was not a case wherein Gonzales son appeared helpless and oppressed that Gonzales lost his reason and shot at the vehicle of Andres. The same holds true for Gonzales’ claim of provocation on the part of Andres. Provocation must be sufficient to excite a person to commit the wrong committed and that the provocation must be commensurate to the crime committed. The sufficiency of provocation varies according to the circumstances of the case. The aggressive behavior of Andres towards Gonzales and his son may be demeaning or humiliating but it is not sufficient provocation to shoot at Gonzales’ vehicle. People v. Lab-eo (2002) Facts: After being told to go away by the victim. Lab-eo left and returned to where the victim was selling clothes and then and there stabbed her at the back with a knife. Thereafter, he surrendered to the Chief of Police. Lab-eo argues for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstances of passion and obfuscation, as well as of sufficient provocation, in his favor. Held: For a person to be motivated by passion and obfuscation, there must first exist an unlawful act that would naturally produce an impulse sufficient to overcome reason and self-control. There is passional obfuscation when the crime is committed due to an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts, or due to a legitimate stimulus so
powerful as to overcome reason. In asking Lab—eo to leave, the victim did not do anything unlawful. There is an absolute lack of proof that the Lab-eo was utterly humiliated by the victim's utterance. Nor was it shown that the victim made that remark in an insulting and repugnant manner. The victim's utterance was not the stimulus required by jurisprudence to be so overwhelming as to overcome reason and self-restraint. People v. Bates (2003) Facts: While Edgar, Simon, and Jose are along a trail leading to the house of Carlito Bates, the latter suddenly emerged from the thick banana plantation surrounding the trail, aiming his firearm at Jose who was then walking ahead of his companions. Jose grabbed Carlito's right hand and elbow and tried to wrest possession of the firearm. While the 2 were grappling for possession, the gun fired, hitting Carlito who immediately fell to the ground. At that instant, Marcelo Bates and his son Marcelo Bates, Jr., brother and nephew of Carlito, respectively, emerged from the banana plantation, each brandishing a bolo. They immediately attacked Jose hacking him several times. Jose fell to the ground and rolled but Marcelo and his son kept on hacking him. Held: Passion and obfuscation may not be properly appreciated in favor of the appellant. To be considered as a mitigating circumstance, passion or obfuscation must arise from lawful sentiments and not from a spirit of lawlessness or revenge or from anger and resentment. In the present case, clearly, Marcelo was infuriated upon seeing his brother, Carlito, shot by Jose. However, a distinction must be made between the first time that Marcelo hacked Jose and the second time that the former hacked the latter. When Marcelo hacked Jose right after seeing the latter shoot at Carlito, and if appellant refrained from doing anything else fter that, he could have validly invoked the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation. But when, upon seeing his brother Carlito dead, Marcelo went back to Jose, who by then was already prostrate on the ground and hardly moving, hacking Jose again was a clear case of someone acting out of anger in the spirit of revenge. Par. 7. – THAT THE OFFENDER HAD VOLUNTARILY SURRENDERED HIMSELF TO A PERSON IN AUTHORITY OR HIS AGENTS, OR THAT HE HAD VOLUNTARILY CONFESSED HIS GUILT BEFORE THE COURT PRIOR TO THE PRESENTATION OF THE EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION. 2 MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER THIS PARAGRAPH: 1. Voluntary surrender to a person in authority or his agents; 2. Voluntary confession of guilt before the court prior to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution. REQUISITES OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER: a. That the offender had not been actually arrested. b. That the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or to the latter’s agent. c. That the surrender was voluntary. ♠ Merely requesting a policeman to accompany the accused to the police HQ is not equivalent to voluntary surrender. ♠ Other examples:
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a. The warrant of arrest showed that the accused was in fact arrested. b. The accused surrendered only after the warrant of arrest was served. c. The accused went into hiding and surrendered only when they realized that the forces of the law were closing in on them. ♠ Surrender must be SPONTANEOUS. He surrendered 1) because he acknowledges his guilty or 2) because he wishes to save them the trouble and expenses necessarily incurred in his search and capture. ♠ The surrender must be by reason of the commission of the crime for which he is prosecuted. People v. Pinca (1999) Facts: Pinca and Abenir, after drinking at a bakeshop, hitched a ride with a tricycle driver on their way home. After passing a man who was apparently drunk because he was swaying while he walked, the accused asked the driver to drop them off already. Pinca told Abenir that that was the guy who spilled a drink on him earlier that day. The accused picked up a long piece of wood and waited for the man to pass by. When the latter did, the accused hit him at the back of his head which led to his death. When the police came, the accused readily went with them and proceeded to tell his story that he was innocent and that it was Abenir who killed the man. The accused was convicted of the crime of murder. Held: For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, 3 requisites should be present: 1) the offender has not been actually arrested; 2) the offender surrendered to a person of authority and 3) the surrender was voluntary. The actions of the accused belied this claim. He actually DENIED having committed the crimes. He went on to try and “clear his name.” There is no voluntary surrender. People v. Amaguin (1994) Facts: Celso and Gildo, together with others, attacked the Oros. During the fray, Gildo was armed with a knife and an “Indian target.” And just as they were about to finish off the Oro brothers, Willie, the eldest of the Amaguins, appeared with a revolver and delivered the coup de grace. Held: SC agrees with the accused-appellants’ view that voluntary surrender should be appreciated in their favor. While it may have taken both Willie and Gildo a week before turning themselves in, the fact is, they voluntarily surrendered to the police before arrest could be effected. People v. Dulos (1994) Facts: The accused hired two professional entertainers to entertain his guests. One of the entertainers, Susan, accepted an offer to check in with the accused guests but later on changed her mind and rejected the offer. When she went home with her boyfriend, the accused chased them and asked for the amount paid to Susan by one of his guests. Susan denied this. Susan’s boyfriend was shot by the accused which resulted to his death. Held: VS cannot be appreciated where there was no conscious effort on the part of the accused to voluntarily surrender. Here, there was no conscious effort on the part of the accused to VS to the military authorities when he went to Camp Siongco after the fateful incidents. As he himself admitted, he was not
placed under custody by the military authorities as he was free to roam around as he pleased. There is no VS also where an accused merely surrendered the gun he used in the killing, without surrendering his person to the authorities. REQUISITES OF PLEA OF GUILTY a. That the offender spontaneously confessed his guilt; ♠Plea of guilty on appeal is not mitigating. b. That the confession of guilty was made in open court, that is, before the competent court that is to try the case; and ♠ The extrajudicial confession made by the accused is not voluntary confession. Such confession was made outside the court. The confession must be made in open court. c. That the confession of guilt was made prior to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution. ♠ The change of plea should be made at the first opportunity when his arraignment was first set. ♠ A conditional plea of guilty is not mitigating * Plea of guilty is mitigating because it indicates a moral disposition in the accused, favorable to his reform. It is an act of repentance and respect for the law. People v. Crisostomo (1988) Facts: On Christmas day, while the accused was passing near the house of Romeo, he met the latter and invited him to go drinking. Romeo declined and suddenly, the accused rushed towards Romeo from behind and shot him with a revolver. After the arraignment wherein accused entered a plea of not guilty and again during the trial, the accused signified his intention to withdraw his plea of not guilty to a lesser charge of homicide and prayed that he be allowed to prove the mitigating circumstances. Held: The appellant offered to enter a plea of guilty to the lesser offense of homicide only after some evidence of the prosecution had been presented. He reiterated his offer after the prosecution rested its case. This is certainly not mitigating. People v. Jose et al (1971) Facts: The Maggie De la Riva story. Maggie was driving her car with her maid inside when they were stopped by another car. The appellant, Pineda, together with his 3 companions took Maggie with them leaving the maid behind. Maggie who was blindfolded was brought to a hotel. Inside the room, her blindfold was removed and she was asked to strip for them. Then, the appellants raped her. Held: Pineda contends that because the charge against him and his co-appellants is a capital offense and the amended complaints cited aggravating circumstances, which, if proved, would raise the penalty to death, it was the duty of the court to insist on his presence during all stages of the trial. The contention is untenable. While a plea of guilty is mitigating, at the same time it constitutes an admission of all the material facts alleged in the information, including the aggravating circumstances, and it matters not that the
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offense is capital, for the admission covers both the crime and its attendant circumstances qualifying and/or aggravating the crime. Because of the aforesaid legal effect of Pineda’s plea of guilty, it was not incumbent upon the trial court to receive his evidence, much less to require his presence in court. Andrada v. People (2005) Facts: Inside a restaurant, Andrada approached and scolded Cpl. Ugerio while the latter was talking to a woman who passed by their table. Sgt. Sumabong, identifying himself as a PC noncommissioned officer, advised Andrada to pay his bill and go home as he was apparently drunk. Andrada paid his bill and left the restaurant with his companions. While Sgt. Sumabong was paying his bill, he heard Cpl. Ugerio, seated about a meter away, moaning in pain. When Sgt. Sumabong turned around, he saw Cpl. Ugerio sprawled on the floor. Andrada was hacking him on the head with a bolo. Sgt. Sumabong approached them but Andrada ran away, followed by a companion. He was eventually arrested at a waiting shed and was brought back to the restaurant where they recovered the bolo used in hacking the victim. Andrada invoked the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Held: Andrada, after attacking the victim, ran away. He was apprehended by responding officers at a waiting shed. For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the surrender must be spontaneous, made in such a manner that it shows the interest of the accused to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or wishes to save them the trouble and expenses that would be necessarily incurred in his search and capture. Here, the surrender was not spontaneous. Par. 8. – THAT THE OFFENDER IS DEAF AND DUMB, BLIND OR OTHERWISE SUFFERING FROM SOME PHYSICAL DEFECT WHICH THUS RESTRICTS HIS MEANS OF ACTION, DEFENSE, OR COMMUNICATION WITH HIS FELLOW BEINGS. ♣ This paragraph does not distinguish between educated and uneducated deaf-mute or blind persons. ♣ Physical defect referred to in this paragraph is such as being armless, cripple, or a stutterer, whereby his means to act, defend himself or communicate with his fellow beings are limited. Par. 9. – SUCH ILLNESS OF THE OFFENDER AS WOULD DIMINISH THE EXERCISE OF THE WILLPOWER OF THE OFFENDER WITHOUT HOWEVER DEPRIVING HIM OF CONSCIOUSNESS OF HIS ACTS. REQUISITES: a. That the illness of the offender must diminish the exercise of his will-power. b. That such illness should not deprive the offender of consciousness of his acts. ♣ When the offender completely lost the exercise of willpower, it may be an exempting circumstance. ♣ It is said that this paragraph refers only to diseases of pathological state that trouble the conscience or will. ♣ Ex. A mother who, under the influence of a puerperal fever, killed her child the day following her delivery.
Par. 10. – AND FINALLY, ANY OTHER CIRCUMSTANCE OF A SIMILAR NATURE AND ANALOGOUS OF THOSE ABOVEMENTIONED. ♣ Over 60 years old with failing sight, similar to over 70 years of age mentioned in paragraph 2. ♣ Voluntary restitution of the property stolen by the accused or immediately reimbursing the amount malversed is a mitigating circumstance as analogous to voluntary surrender. ♣ Not resisting arrest is not analogous to voluntary surrender. ♣ Testifying for the prosecution is analogous to plea of guilty. Davalos vs. People (2006) Facts: The accused was charged with misappropriation of public funds. During trial, he offered to return the amount and pleaded that the same is analogous to voluntary surrender. Held: The return of the said amount cannot be considered a mitigating circumstance analogous to voluntary surrender considering that it took petitioner almost seven (7) years to return the amount. Petitioner has not advanced a plausible reason why he could not liquidate his cash advance which was in his possession for several years. CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ARE NEITHER EXEMPTING NOR MITIGATING 1. 2.
3. 4. 5.
Mistake in the blow or aberratio ictus, for under Art. 48, there is a complex crime committed. The penalty is even higher. Mistake in the identity of the victim, for under Art. 4, par. 1, the accused is criminally liable even if the wrong done is different from that which is intended. Entrapment of the accused. The accused is over 18 years of age. If the offender is over 18 years old, his age is neither exempting nor mitigating. Performance of righteous action. 4. AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
¤ Aggravating circumstances are those which, if attendant in the commission of the crime, serve to increase the penalty without, however, exceeding the maximum of the penalty provided by law for the offense. ¤ They are based on the greater perversity of the offender manifested in the commission of the felony as shown by: a. motivating power itself; b. the place of commission; c. the means and ways employed; d. the time; or e. the personal circumstances of the offender, or of the offended party. FOUR KINDS OF AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES 1. GENERIC – Those that can generally apply to all crimes. Nos. 1, 2, 3 (dwelling), 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 14, 18, 19, and 20 except “by means of motor vehicles”. 2. SPECIFIC – Those that apply only to particular crimes. Nos. 3 (except dwelling), 15, 16, 17 and 21.
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3. QUALIFYING –Those that change the nature of the crime. Art. 248 enumerates the qualifying AC which qualify the killing of person to murder. 4. INHERENT – Those that must accompany the commission of the crime. GENERIC AC The effect of a generic AC, not offset by any mitigating circumstance, is to increase the penalty which should be imposed upon the accused to the MAXIMUM PERIOD.
QUALIFYING AC The effect of a qualifying AC is not only to give the crime its proper and exclusive name but also to place the author thereof in such a situation as to deserve no other penalty than that specially prescribed by law for said crime. A qualifying AC cannot be offset by a mitigating circumstance.
A generic aggravating circumstance may be compensated by a mitigating circumstance. According to the new rules, generic and qualifying aggravating circumstances must be alleged in order to be appreciated. AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH DO NOT HAVE THE EFFECT OF INCREASING THE PENALTY AC 1) which in themselves constitute a crime specially punishable by law, or b) which are included by the law in defining a crime and prescribing the penalty therefore shall not be taken into account for the purpose of increasing the penalty (Art. 62, par. 1) ¤ AC which arise: a) from the moral attributes of the offender or b) from his private relations with the offended party, or c) from any other personal cause, shall only serve to aggravate the liability of the principals, accomplices, and accessories as to whom such circumstances are attendant. Art. 14. Aggravating circumstances. — The following are aggravating circumstances: 1. That advantage be taken by the offender of his public position. 2. That the crime be committed in contempt or with insult to the public authorities. 3. That the act be committed with insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank, age, or sex, or that is be committed in the dwelling of the offended party, if the latter has not given provocation. 4. That the act be committed with abuse of confidence or obvious ungratefulness. 5. That the crime be committed in the palace of the Chief Executive or in his presence, or where public authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties, or in a place dedicated to religious worship. 6. That the crime be committed in the night time, or in an uninhabited place, or by a band, whenever such circumstances may facilitate the commission of the offense. Whenever more than three armed malefactors shall have acted together in the commission of an offense, it shall be deemed to have been committed by a band. 7. That the crime be committed on the occasion of a conflagration, shipwreck, earthquake, epidemic or other calamity or misfortune. 8. That the crime be committed with the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity. 9. That the accused is a recidivist.
A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of this Code. 10. That the offender has been previously punished by an offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty or for two or more crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty. 11. That the crime be committed in consideration of a price, reward, or promise. 12. That the crime be committed by means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, stranding of a vessel or international damage thereto, derailment of a locomotive, or by the use of any other artifice involving great waste and ruin. 13. That the act be committed with evidence premeditation. 14. That the craft, fraud or disguise be employed. 15. That advantage be taken of superior strength, or means be employed to weaken the defense. 16. That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia). There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. 17. That means be employed or circumstances brought about which add ignominy to the natural effects of the act. 18. That the crime be committed after an unlawful entry. 19. There is an unlawful entry when an entrance of a crime a wall, roof, floor, door, or window be broken. 20. That the crime be committed with the aid of persons under fifteen years of age or by means of motor vehicles, motorized watercraft, airships, or other similar means. (As amended by RA 5438). 21. That the wrong done in the commission of the crime be deliberately augmented by causing other wrong not necessary for its commissions. People v. Antonio (2002) Facts: Kevin Paul, 7 yr old son of the victim Sergio was lying on the bed beside his father Sergio in the bedroom when he heard a window being opened and the sound of feet stepping on the floor. Then someone kicked open the door to the bedroom. Kevin saw Wilson Antonio carrying a shotgun. Wilson aimed his gun at Sergio who was asleep on the bed and fired hitting Sergio on the chest, shoulder and back. He was also hit on his left thigh. Immediately after firing his gun, Wilson hurriedly left the room. When the police arrived, Sergio was already dead. Wilson surrendered to the police after eluding arrest for more than 1 yr. The trial court convicted him of murder qualified by treachery and aggravated by the circumstance of evident premeditation, dwelling and unlawful entry. The above agrravating circumstances were not alleged in the Information. Held: Pursuant to the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, every Complaint or Information must state not only the qualifying but also the aggravating circumstances. This rule may be given retroactive effect in the light of the well-established rule that statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
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undetermined at the time of their aggravating circumstances of evident dwelling and unlawful entry, not having the Information, may not now be enhance the liability of Wilson.
passage. The premeditation, been alleged in appreciated to
People v. Suela (2002) Facts: Brothers Edgar and Nerio Suela, and Edgardo Batocan sporting ski masks, bonnets and gloves, brandishing handguns and knife barged into the room of Director Rosas who was watching television together with his adopted son, Norman and his friend Gabilo. They threatened Rosas, Norman and Gabilo to give the location of their money and valuables, which they eventually took. They dragged Gabilo downstairs with them. Upon Nerio’s instructions, Batocan stabbed Gabilo 5 times which caused the latter’s death . The trial court sentenced Edgar, Nerio and Batocan to suffer the penalty of death appreciating the aggravating circumstance of disguise which was not alleged in the Information against the three. Held: Following current Rules on Criminal Procedure particularly Section 9 of the new Rule 110, and current jurisprudence, the aggravating circumstance of disguise cannot be appreciated against appellants. Inasmuch as the same was not alleged in the Information, the aggravating circumstance of disguise cannot now be appreciated to increase the penalty to death notwithstanding the fact that the new rule requiring such allegation was promulgated only after the crime was committed and after the trial court has already rendered its Decision. It is a cardinal rule that rules of criminal procedure are given retroactive application insofar as they benefit the accused. People v. Mendoza (2000) Facts: Anchito and Marianito passed by appellant's house and asked for a drink from appellant's wife, Emily. Anchito began talking with Emily and they were about 4 rms-length from Marianito when appellant suddenly appeared. Appellant hacked Anchito on the nape, which prompted Marianito to flee out of fear for his life. Anchito died in a kneeling position with hack wounds at the back of the neck and body. Appellant voluntary surrendere. The trial court ruled that voluntary surrender was "offset by the aggravating circumstance of treachery. Held: The trial court erred in ruling that voluntary surrender was "offset by the aggravating circumstance of treachery. Treachery in the present case is a qualifying, not a generic aggravating circumstance. Its presence served to characterize the killing as murder; it cannot at the same time be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance to warrant the imposition of the maximum penalty. Thus, it cannot offset voluntary surrender. Par. 1. - THAT –ADVANTAGE BE TAKEN BY THE OFFENDER OF HIS PUBLIC POSITION. ¤ The public officer must use the influence, prestige or ascendancy which his office gives him as the means by which he realizes his purpose. The essence of the matter is presented in the inquiry, “did the accused abuse his office in order to commit the crime?” ¤ When a public officer commits a common crime independent of his official functions and does acts that are not connected with the duties of his office, he should be punished as a private individual without this AC.
¤ The mere fact that he was in fatigue uniform and had army rifle at the time is not sufficient to established that he misused his public position in the commission of the crimes (People v. Pantoja) ¤ Even if defendant did not abuse his office, if it is proven that he has failed in his duties as such public officer, this circumstance would warrant the aggravation of his penalty. ¤ Taking advantage of public position, cannot be taken into consideration in offenses where it is made by law an integral element of the crime such as in malversation or in falsification of documents committed by public officers. People v. Capalac (1982) Facts: Magaso stabbed Moises in a cockpit. The aggressor attempting to escape was confronted by 2 brothers of Moises, Jesus (deceased) and appellant Mario Capalac. Magaso, seeing that he was cornered, raised his hands as a sign of surrender. The brothers were not appeased. Mario proceeded to pistol-whip Magaso and after he had fallen, Jesus stabs him. The LC convicted the accused of murder and took into consideration the AC of taking advantage of public office because the accused is a police officer. Held: On the AC that the accused used his public position as a policeman, it was held that the mere fact that he was a member of the police force was insignificant to the attack. He acted like a brother, instinctively. He pistol-whipped the deceased because he had a pistol with him. It came in handy and so he acted accordingly. That he was a policeman is of no relevance. People v. Gapasin (1994) Facts: Gapasin was a member of the Phil. Constabulary. He was issued a mission order to investigate a report regarding the presence of unidentified armed men in one barrio. He was informed that a certain Calpito had an unlicensed firearm. He shot Calpito with the use of an armalite after seeing the latter walking along the road. Gapasin was convicted of murder. Held: The accused took advantage of his public position because as a member of the PC, he committed the crime with an armalite which was issued to him when he received his order. People v. Villamor (2002) Facts: Brothers Jerry and Jelord Velez were on their way home on board a motorcycle. Jerry was driving. As they neared a junction, they heard a speeding motorcycle fast approaching from behind. The brothers ignored the other motorcycle, which caught up with them. As they were about to cross the bridge leading to their home, gunshots rang out from behind them. They abruptly turned the motorcycle around towards the direction of the gunfire. The light of their motorcycle's headlamp fell on their attackers aboard the second motorcycle. The assailants fired at them a second time and fled. Jerry saw PO3 Villamor and Maghilom on board the motorcycle behind them. Maghilom was driving the motorcycle while Villamor was holding a short gun pointed at them. Jerry sustained gunshot wounds but survived. Jelord, however, died on the spot during the first gunburst. Held: There was no showing that Villamor took advantage of his being a policeman to shoot Jelord Velez or that he used his "influence, prestige or ascendancy"
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in killing the victim. Villamor could have shot Velez even without being a policeman. In other words, if the accused could have perpetrated the crime even without occupying his position, there is no abuse of public position. The Court cited the case of People v. Herrera, where the Court emphatically said that the mere fact that accused-appellant is a policeman and used his government issued .38 caliber revolver to kill is not sufficient to establish that he misused his public position in the commission of the crime.
¤ There must be evidence that in the commission of the crime, the accused deliberately intended to offend or insult the sex or age of the offended party.
Par. 2. - THAT THE CRIME BE COMMITTED IN CONTEMPT OR WITH INSULT TO THE PUBLIC AUTHORITIES.
(b) OF THE AGE OF THE OFFENDED PARTY ex. When the aggressor is 45 years old and the victim was an octogenarian. ¤ It is not proper to consider disregard of old age in crimes against property. Robbery with homicide is primarily a crime against property.
a. b. c. d.
REQUISITES: That the public authority is engaged in the exercise of his functions. That he who is thus engaged in the exercise of his functions is not the person against whom the crime is committed. The offender knows him to be a public authority. His presence has not prevented the offender from committing the criminal act.
PUBLIC AUTHORITY / PERSON IN AUTHORITY A public officer who is directly vested with jurisdiction, that is, a public officer who has the power to govern and execute the laws. The councilor, mayor, governor, barangay captain etc. are persons in authority. A school teacher, town municipal health officer, agent of the BIR, chief of police, etc. are now considered a person in authority. ¤ Par. 2 is not applicable if committee din the presence of an agent only such as a police officer. AGENT A subordinate public officer charged with the maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life and property, such as barrio policemen, councilmen, and any person who comes to the aid of persons in authority. ¤ The crime should not be committed against the public authority or else it becomes direct assault. ¤ Lack of knowledge on the part of the offender that a public authority is present indicates lack of intention to insult the public authority. Par. 3. - THAT THE ACT BE COMMITTED (1) WITH INSULT OR IN DISREGARD OF THE RESPECT DUE THE OFFENDED PARTY ON ACCOUNT OF HIS (a) RANK, (b) AGE, OR (c) SEX, OR (2) THAT IS BE COMMITTED IN THE DWELLING OF THE OFFENDED PARTY, IF THE LATTER HAS NOT GIVEN PROVOCATION. ¤ Four circumstances are enumerated in this paragraph, which can be considered single or together. If all the 4 circumstances are present, they have the weight of one aggravating circumstance only. ¤ This circumstance (rank, age or sex) may be taken into account only in crimes against person or honor.
(1) WITH INSULT OR IN DISREGARD OF THE REPECT DUE THE OFFENDED PARTY ON ACCOUNT: (a) OF THE RANK OF THE OFFENDED PARTY ex. An attempt upon the life of a general of the Philippine Army is committed in disregard of his rank.
(c) OF THE SEX OF THE OFFENDED PARTY ¤ This refers to the female sex, not to the male sex (Reyes) ¤ Killing a woman is not attended by this AC if the offender did not manifest any specific insult or disrespect towards her sex. ¤ THIS AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE FOLLOWING: 1. When the offender acted with passion and obfuscation. 2. When there exists a relationship between the offended party and the offender. 3. When the condition of being a woman is indispensable in the commission of the crime i.e. parricide, rape, etc. ¤ Disregard of sex absorbed in treachery. (2) THAT BE COMMITTED DWELLING OF THE OFFENDED PARTY
IN
THE
DWELLING – BUILDING OR STRUCTURE, EXCLUSIVELY USED FOR REST AND COMFORT. ¤ a “combination house and store” or a market stall where the victim slept is not a dwelling. ¤ This is considered an AC primarily because of the sanctity of privacy, the law accords to human abode. Also, in certain cases, there is an abuse of confidence which the offended party reposed in the offender by opening the door to him. ¤ The evidence must show clearly that the defendant entered the house of the deceased to attack him. ¤ The offended party must not give provocation. If the provocation did not take place in the house, dwelling may be considered as an AC. ¤ Dwelling is aggravating, even if the offender did not enter the upper part of the house where the victim was, but shot from under the house. ¤ Even if the killing took place outside the dwelling, it is aggravating provided that the commission of the crime was begun in the dwelling. ¤ Dwelling is aggravating in abduction or illegal detention. ¤ It is not aggravating where the deceased was called down from his house and he was murdered in the vicinity of his house. ¤ Dwelling includes dependencies, the foot of the staircase and the enclosure under the house. If the deceased was only about to step on the first rung of the ladder when he was assaulted, the AC of dwelling will not be applicable.
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DWELLING NOT APPLICABLE: 1. When both offender and offended party are occupants of the same house. 2. When the robbery is committed by the use of force upon things, dwelling is not aggravating because it is inherent to the crime. 3. In the crime of trespass to dwelling, it is also inherent or included by law in defining the crime. 4. When the owner of the dwelling gave sufficient and immediate provocation. 5. When the dwelling where the crime was committed did not belong to the offended party. 6. When the rape was committed in the ground floor of the 2-storey structure, the lower floor being used as a video rental store and not as a private place of abode or residence. ¤ A victim raped in the boarding house where she was a bedspacer. Her room constituted a “dwelling”. ¤ Dwelling may be temporary dwelling. ¤ Note: The Code speaks of dwelling, not domicile. ¤ Dwelling is not aggravating in adultery when paramour also lives in the conjugal home.
Held: The AC of dwelling cannot be considered aggravating where the accused and the victim were living in the same house where the crime was committed. The rationale for considering dwelling an AC is the violation by the offender of the sanctity of the home of the victim by trespassing therein to commit the crime. This reason is entirely absent in this case. People v. Lapaz (1989) Facts: Eulalia Cabunag, a 70-year-old woman who was living alone, was beaten to death by 3 men. Appellant Barleso, Lapaz and Cristoto agreed to kill Eulalia because there was one incident when the victim called Barleso a thief in front of many people. Held: The presence of treachery is clear as Barleso invited two companions to help him execute his plan to beat the victim to death with pieces of wood in the middle of the night insuring the killing of the victim without risk to himself arising from the defense with the offended party might make. While it may be true that nighttime is absorbed in the AC of treachery, the AC of disregard of sex and age cannot be similarly absorbed. Treachery refers to the manner of the commission of the crime. Disregard of sex and age pertains to the relationship of the victim, who is a 70-year old woman, and the appellant who is a young man, 27 years old, at the time of the commission of the offense.
¤ Dwelling is not included in treachery. People v. Rodil (1981) Facts: Lt. Mesana approached Rodil and identifies himself as a PC officer. He asked Rodil whether or not the gun which the latter possessed had a license. Rodil attempted to draw his gun but was prevented by Mesana’s companions. Rodil was asked to sign a document attesting to the confiscation of the gun but he refused. Instead, he drew a dagger and managed to stab Mesana in the chest repeatedly. Held: The AC of disregard of rank should be appreciated because it is obvious that Mesana identified himself as a PC officer to the accused who is merely a member of the Anti-Smuggling Unit and therefore inferior both in rank and social status to the victim. People v. Daniel (1978) Facts: 13-year-old Margarita was at the bus station when the accused, Daniel, started molesting her, asking her name and trying to get her bag to carry it for her. She refused and asked the help of the conductor and driver but they did not help her. She ran to the jeepney stop and rode the jeep. Daniel followed her to the boarding house and he raped her. Held: Although Margarita was merely renting a bedspace in a boarding house, her room constituted for all intents and purposes a “dwelling” as the term is used in Art. 14(3) of the RPC. Be he a lessee, a boarder, or a bedspacer, the place is his home the sanctity of which the law seeks to protect and uphold.
People v. Banez (1999) Facts: The accused was living with his parents. His sisters complained to their father that the accused made trouble whenever he was drunk. They wanted to put up the accuse in another house. That night while they were discussing the plans for the accused, while their father went to his room, the accused, who looked drunk, ran to the kitchen and got 2 knives and then stabbed the father. The father died.
People v. Taboga (2002) Facts: Taboga entered the house of Tubon, a widowed septuagenarian, robbed, stabbed and burned beyond recognition the latter’s house. Held: Anent the circumstance of age, there must be a showing that the malefactor deliberately intended to offend or insult the age of the victim. Neither could disregard of respect due to sex be appreciated if the offender did not manifest any intention to offend or disregard the sex of the victim. In other words, killing a woman is not attended by the aggravating circumstance if the offender did not manifest any specific insult or disrespect towards the offended party's sex. In the case at bar, there is absolutely no showing that Taboga deliberately intended to offend or insult the victim. However, even if disrespect or disregard of age or sex were not appreciated, the four circumstances enumerated in Article 14, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, can be considered singly or together. People v. De Mesa (2001) Facts: Motas, Barangay Chairman of Barangay Sta. Cruz Putol, San Pablo City, was shot by De Mesa while playing a card game with some townmates at a neighborhood store resulting to his death. The trial court, in convicting De Mesa for murder, appreciated the aggravating circumstance of commission of the crime in contempt of or with assault to public authorities. Held: The trial court also erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance that the commission of the crime was in contempt of or with assault to public authorities. The requisites of this circumstance are: (1) the public authority is engaged in the discharge of his duties and (2) he is not the person against whom the crime is committed. None of these circumstances are present in this case. In the first place, the crime was committed against the barangay chairman himself. At the time that he was killed, he was not engaged in the discharge of his duties as he was in fact playing a card game with his neighbors. People v. Montinola (Supra)
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Facts: Montinola boarded a passenger jeepney driven by Hibinioda. Among the passengers was Reteracion. All of a sudden, appellant drew his gun, an unlicensed firearm, .380 cal pistol and directed Reteracion to hand over his money or else he would be killed. Montinola aimed the firearm at the neck of Reteracion and fired successive shots at the latter. As a result Reteracion slumped dead. Montinola was charged with robbery with homicide and illegal possession of firearm. Held: DIsregard of age, sex or rank is not aggravating in robbery with homicide, which is primarily a crime against property, as the homicide is regarded as merely incidental to the robbery. People v. Taño (2000) Facts: Amy was tending a video rental shop owned by Marina. Taño kept going in and out of the shop and on the last time he went inside said shop, he suddenly jumped over the counter, strangled Amy, poked a knife at the left side of her neck, pulled her towards the kitchen where he forced her to undress, and gained carnal knowledge of her against her will and consent. Before they could reach the upper floor, he suddenly pulled Amy down and started mauling her until she lost consciousness; then he freely ransacked the place. Leaving Amy for dead after repeatedly banging her head, first on the wall, then on the toilet bowl, he took her bracelet, ring and wristwatch. He then proceeded upstairs where he took as well the jewelry box containing other valuables belonging to his victim's employer. The trial court appreciated dwelling as an aggravating circumstance because the incident took place supposedly at the residence of private complainant's employer, "which doubles as a video rental shop. Held: Dwelling cannot be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in this case because the rape was committed in the ground floor of a two-story structure, the lower floor being used as a video rental store and not as a private place of abode or residence. People v. Rios (2000) Facts: Rios hurled stones at the house of Ambrocio and Anacita Benedicto. A few minutes later, and while the Benedicto spouses were tending their store, Rios bought cigarettes. Ambrocio confronted Rios about the stoning incident and an altercation ensued between them. Having heard the appellant shout at Ambrocio, Mesa intervened and requested the 2 to part ways and escorted them to their respective residences. A few minutes later, appellant went back to the store. Ambrocio went to the terrace of their house. Appellant suddenly approached Ambrocio and stabbed his right stomach. Mesa and his group saw Anacita weeping while Ambrocio was lying lifeless in the terrace of their house. Ambrocio died before he was brought to the hospital. The trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstance of dwelling. Held: The trial court correctly appreciated the aggravating circumstance of dwelling or morada in this case. The word dwelling includes every dependency of the house that forms an integral part thereof and therefore it includes the staircase of the house and much more, its terrace. When a crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended party and the latter has not given provocation, dwelling may be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. 32 Provocation in the aggravating circumstance of dwelling must be: (a) given by the offended party, (b) sufficient, and (c) immediate to the commission of the crime.
People v. Arizobal (2000) Facts: Arizobal and two others entered the house of spouses Clementina and Laurencio Gimenez. They then ransacked the house and ordered Laurencio to go with them to his son Jimmy’s house. Upon reaching the house of Jimmy, they tied the latter and one Francisco also surnamed Gimenez. They consumed the food and cigarettes Jimmy’s wife Erlinda, was selling. They proceeded to ransacked the household in search of valuables. Thereafter, Erlinda was ordered to produce P100,00 in exchange for Jimmy’s life. Erlinda offered to give a certificate of large cattle but the document was thrown back at her. The 3 then dragged Jimmy outside the house together with Laurencio. One of the culprits returned and told Erlinda that Jimmy and Laurencio had been killed for trying to escape. The trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstance of dwelling. Held: The trial court is correct in appreciating dwelling as an aggravating circumstance. Generally, dwelling is considered inherent in the crimes which can only be committed in the abode of the victim, such as trespass to dwelling and robbery in an inhabited place. However, in robbery with homicide the authors thereof can commit the heinous crime without transgressing the sanctity of the victim's domicile. In the case at bar, the robbers demonstrated an impudent disregard of the inviolability of the victims' abode when they forced their way in, looted their houses, intimidated and coerced their inhabitants into submission, disabled Laurencio and Jimmy by tying their hands before dragging them out of the house to be killed. Par. 4. - THAT THE ACT BE COMMITTED WITH (1) ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE OR (2) OBVIOUS UNGRATEFULNESS. (1) ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE a. b. c.
REQUISITES: That the offended party had trusted the offender. That the offender abused such trust by committing a crime against the offended party. That the abuse of confidence facilitated the commission of the crime.
¤ The confidence between the offender and the offended party must be immediate and personal. ¤ It is inherent in malversation, qualified theft, estafa by conversion or misappropriation and qualified seduction. (2) OBVIOUS UNGRATEFULNESS ¤ The ungratefulness must be obvious – manifest and clear. People v. Mandolado (1983) Facts: Mandolado and Ortillano, with Erinada and Simon are trainees/draftees of the AFP. They got to know each other and had a drinking session at the bus terminal. The accused was drunk. He got his gun and started firing. Erinada and Simon rode a jeep and tried to escape from Mandolado and Ortillano but the two eventually caught up with them. The two accused shot the victims to death. Held: There is no AC of abuse of confidence. In order that abuse of confidence be deemed as aggravating, it is necessary that “there exists a relation
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of trust and confidence between the accused and one against whom the crime was committed and that the accused made use of such a relationship to commit the crime. It is also essential that the confidence between the parties must be immediate and personal such as would give the accused some advantage to commit the crime. It is obvious that the accused and the victims only met for the first time so there is no personal or immediate relationship upon which confidence might rest between them. People v. Arrojado (2001) Facts: Arrojado is the first cousin of the victim, Mary Ann and lived with her and her father. Arrojado helped care for the victim’s father for which he was paid a P1,000 monthly salary. Arrojado killed Mary Ann by stabbing her with a knife. Thereafter he claimed that the latter committed suicide. Held: The aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence is present in this case. For this aggravating circumstance to exist, it is essential to show that the confidence between the parties must be immediate and personal such as would give the accused some advantage or make it easier for him to commit the criminal act. The confidence must be a means of facilitating the commission of the crime, the culprit taking advantage of the offended party's belief that the former would not abuse said confidence. Par. 5. - THAT THE CRIME BE COMMITTED IN THE PALACE OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR IN HIS PRESENCE, OR WHERE PUBLIC AUTHORITIES ARE ENGAGED IN THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR DUTIES, OR IN A PLACE DEDICATED TO RELIGIOUS WORSHIP. PLACE WHER PUBLIC CONTEMPT OR INSULT AUTHORITIES ARE TO PUBLIC ENGAGED IN THE AUTHORITIES DISCHARGE OF THEIR (par. 2) DUTIES (par. 5) The public authorities are in the performance of their duties. The public authorities who The public authorities are are in the performance of performing their duties their duties must be in outside of their offices. their office. The public authority may The public authority be the offended party. should not be the offended party. ¤ If it is the Malacañang palace or a church, it is aggravating, regardless of whether State or official or religious functions are being held. ¤ The President need not be in the palace. His presence alone in any place where the crime is committed is enough to constitute the AC. It also applies even if he is not engaged in the discharge of his duties in the place where the crime was committed. ¤ But as regards the place where the public authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties, there must be some performance of public functions. ¤ Cemeteries are not places dedicated for religious worship. ¤ Offender must have the intention to commit a crime when he entered the place.
Par. 6. - THAT THE CRIME BE COMMITTED (1) IN THE NIGHT TIME, OR (2) IN AN UNINHABITED PLACE, OR (3) BY A BAND, WHENEVER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES MAY FACILITATE THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE. WHENEVER MORE THAN THREE ARMED MALEFACTORS SHALL HAVE ACTED TOGETHER IN THE COMMISSION OF AN OFFENSE, IT SHALL BE DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN COMMITTED BY A BAND. ¤ These 3 circumstances may be considered separately when their elements are distinctly perceived and can subsist independently, revealing a greater degree of perversity. Nighttime, uninhabited place or band is aggravating: 1. When it facilitated the commission of the crime; or 2. When especially sought for by the offender to insure the commission of the crime or for the purpose of impunity; or 3. When the offender took advantage thereof for the purpose of impunity. (1) NIGHTTIME - The commission of the crime must begin and be accomplished in the nighttime. - The offense must be actually committed in the darkness of the night. When the place is illuminated by light, nighttime is not aggravating. (2) UNINHABITED PLACE - One where there are no houses at all, a place at a considerable distance from town, or where the houses are scattered at a great distance from each other. - TEST: WON in the place of the commission of the offense, there was a reasonable possibility of the victim receiving some help. - The fact that persons occasionally passed in the uninhabited place and that on the night of the murder another hunting party was not a great distance away, does not matter. It is the nature of the place which is decisive. - It must appear that the accused SOUGHT THE SOLITUDE of the place where the crime was committed, in order to better attain his purpose. - The offenders must choose the place as an aid either (1) to an easy and uninterrupted accomplishment of their criminal designs or (2) to insure concealment of the offense. (3) BAND - Whenever more than 3 armed malefactors shall have acted together in the commission of an offense, it shall be deemed to have been committed by a band. - The armed men must act together in the commission of the crime. - If one of the four armed persons is a principal by inducement, they do not form a band. - All the armed men, at least four in number, must take direct part in the execution of the act constituting the crime. - Considered in crimes against property and persons and not to crimes against chastity. - It is inherent in brigandage.
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People v. Jose (supra) Facts: The Maggie Dela Riva story. Maggie was on her was home, driving her car accompanied by her maid, when she was stopped by another car boarded by 4 men. Accused Pineda pulled her out of the car and forced her inside the assailants’ car. She was brought to a hotel and there, the 4 raped her. Held: SC found that there was committed forcible abduction with rape. With rape as the more serious crime, the penalty to be imposed is the maximum in accordance with Art. 48 of the RPC. With this finding, the extreme penalty of death was imposed. While the SC found no necessity of considering the AC’s, the Court still considered the AC’s for the purpose of determining the proper penalty to be imposed in each of the other 3 crimes of simple rape. The court claimed that there was an AC of nighttime because of appellants have purposely sought such circumstance to facilitate the commission of these crimes. People v. Desalisa (1994) Facts: Moved by hatred and jealousy, the accused, armed with a sharp pointed instrument, attacked and inflicted physical injuries on the vagina of his wife who was about 5 months pregnant. Thereafter, the accused hanged his wife to a jackfruit tree, causing her death and that of her fetus. He was found guilty of the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion and was sentenced to life imprisonment by the LC. Held: The AC of uninhabited place is present. The uninhabitedness of a place is determined not by the distance of the nearest house to the scene of the crime but whether or not in the place of the commission, there was reasonable possibility of the victim receiving some help. Considering that the killing was done during nighttime and many fruit trees obstruct the view of neighbors and passersby, there was no reasonable possibility for the victim to receive any assistance. The couple lived on a small nipa house on a hill. There are 2 other houses in the neighborhood which are 150 meters away; the house of Norma’s parents and house of Carlito. These cannot, however, be seen from the couple’s house because of the many fruit trees and shrubs prevalent in the area. Gamara v. Valero (1973) Facts: Petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed impugning the order of the judge of the lower court to forward the records of the case to the Military Tribunal. This is claimed to be in accordance with General Orders No. 12 that those involving crimes against persons and property when committed by a syndicate or a band falls under the jurisdiction of the Military Tribunal. Held: While the information charges four persons, it was not, however, shown that all of them were armed when they allegedly acted in concert in the commission of the crime. What is more, the supposed participation of petitioner Gamara was that of principal by inducement, which undoubtedly connotes that he had no direct participation in the perpetration thereof. People v. Silva (2002) Facts: Accused armed with a gun, a bolo, a rope and a flashlight abducted brothers Edmund and Manuel Ceriales while the two were playing a game of cards inside their house in the middle of the night. They tied both their hands and feet with a rope and they brought the brothers at an isolated place. Edmund was stabbed and beheaded causing his instantaneous death.
Edmund Ceriales was able to escape while the accused were about to kill his brother. The trial court appreciated nighttime as an aggravating circumstance. Held: By and of itself, nighttime is not an aggravating circumstance, however, it becomes aggravating only when: (1) it is especially sought by the offender; or (2) it is taken advantage of by him; or (3) it facilitates the commission of the crime by ensuring the offender's immunity from capture. In this case, the trial court correctly appreciated nighttime as aggravating considering that nighttime facilitated the abduction of the Ceriales brothers, the killing of Manuel and the attempt to kill Edmund. Evidence shows that accusedappellants took advantage of the darkness to successfully consummate their plans. The fact that they brought with them a flashlight clearly shows that they intended to commit the crime in darkness. People v. Ancheta (2004) Facts: Appellant Ulep and his group, robbed Alfredo Roca of 35 sacks of Palay after killing his son, his wife and his mother with their guns. Thereafter, they boarded their jeep and left. Held: The offense was proven to have been executed by a band. A crime is committed by a band when at least four armed malefactors act together in the commission thereof. In this case, all six accused were armed with guns which they used on their victims. Clearly, all the armed assailants took direct part in the execution of the robbery with homicide. People v. Librando (2000) Facts: Edwin and his daughter Aileen, and a relative, Fernando, were traversing a hilly portion of a trail on their way home when they met Raelito Librando, Larry and Eddie. Edwin was carrying a torch at that time as it was already dark. Raelito inquired from Edwin the whereabouts of Fernando and without any warning hit Edwin with a piece of wood. Eddie followed suit and delivered another blow to Edwin. Edwin ran but he was chased by Raelito. Thereafter, the three men took turns hitting Edwin with pieces of wood until the latter fell and died. The trial court considered nighttime and uninhabited place as just one aggravating circumstance. Held: The court did not err in considering nighttime and uninhabited place as just one aggravating circumstance. The court cited the case of People vs. Santos where it has been held that if the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, uninhabited place or band concur in the commission of the crime, all will constitute one aggravating circumstance only as a general rule although they can be considered separately if their elements are distinctly perceived and can subsist independently, revealing a greater degree of perversity. Par. 7. - THAT THE CRIME BE COMMITTED ON THE OCCASION OF A CONFLAGRATION, SHIPWRECK, EARTHQUAKE, EPIDEMIC OR OTHER CALAMITY OR MISFORTUNE. ¤ The reason for the existence of this AC is found in the debased form of criminality met in one who, in the midst of a great calamity, instead of lending aid to the afflicted, adds to their suffering by taking advantage of their misfortune to despoil them. ¤ The offender must take advantage of the calamity or misfortune.
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¤ “OR OTHER CALAMITY OR MISFORTUNE” – refers to other conditions of distress similar to “conflagration, shipwreck, earthquake or epidemic.” Par. 8. - THAT THE CRIME BE COMMITTED WITH THE AID OF ARMED MEN OR PERSONS WHO INSURE OR AFFORD IMPUNITY.
1. 2.
REQUISITES: That the armed men or persons took part in the commission of the crime, directly or indirectly. That the accused availed himself of their aid or relied upon them when the crime was committed.
¤ The armed men must take part directly or indirectly in the offense. ¤ This AC shall not be considered when both the attacking party and the party attacked were equally armed. ¤ This AC is not present when the accused as well as those who cooperated with him in the commission of the crime, acted under the same plan and for the same purpose. WITH AID OF ARMED MEN (par. 8) Aid of armed men is present even if one of the offenders merely relied on their aid, for actual aid is not necessary.
BY A BAND (par. 6) More than 3 armed malefactors that have acted together in the commission of an offense.
¤ If there are 4 armed men, “aid of armed men” is absorbed by “employment of a band” ¤ “Aid of armed men” includes “armed women” Par. 9. - THAT THE ACCUSED IS A RECIDIVIST. Art. 160. Commission of another crime during service of penalty imposed for another offense; Penalty. — Besides the provisions of Rule 5 of Article 62, any person who shall commit a felony after having been convicted by final judgment, before beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving the same, shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony. Any convict of the class referred to in this article, who is not a habitual criminal, shall be pardoned at the age of seventy years if he shall have already served out his original sentence, or when he shall complete it after reaching the said age, unless by reason of his conduct or other circumstances he shall not be worthy of such clemency. ¤ A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of the RPC. REQUISITES: a. That the offender is on trial for an offense; b. That he was previously convicted by final judgment of another crime; c. That both the first and the second offenses are embraced in the same title of the Code; d. That the offender is convicted of the new offense.
¤ What is controlling is the time of trial, not the time of the commission of the crime. ¤ There is no recidivism if the subsequent conviction is for an offense committed before the offense involved in the prior conviction. ¤ Sec. 7 of Rule 120 , Rules of Court, provides that a judgment in a criminal case becomes final (1) after the lapse of the [period for perfecting an appeal, or (2) when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or (3) the defendant has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal, or (4) the accused has applied for probation. ¤ There is recidivism even if the lapse of time between two felonies is more than 10 years. Recidivism must be taken into account no mater how many years have intervened between the 1st and 2nd felonies. ¤ Pardon does not obliterate the fact that the accused was a recidivist; but amnesty extinguishes the penalty and its effects. People v. Molina (2000) Facts: Brothers Joseph and Angelito, along with their cousin, Danny were on their way home when they heard somebody shout “kuba”, referring to Joseph, a hunchback. They asked who said that but no one admitted. As the 3 were about to go, Molina delivered a strong stabbing blow at the back of Joseph. Angelito came to aid his brother but Molina also stabbed him at the back. Joseph was dead on arrival at the clinic. Held: To prove recidivism, it is necessary to allege the same in the information and to attach thereto certified copies of the sentences rendered against the accused. Nonetheless, the trial court may still give such AC credence if the accused does not object to the presentation of evidence on the fact of recidivism. In the case at bar, the accused never voiced out any objection when confronted with the fact of his previous conviction for attempted homicide. Par. 10. - THAT THE OFFENDER HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY PUNISHED BY AN OFFENSE TO WHICH THE LAW ATTACHES AN EQUAL OR GREATER PENALTY OR FOR TWO OR MORE CRIMES TO WHICH IT ATTACHES A LIGHTER PENALTY. Art. 62. Effect of the attendance of mitigating or aggravating circumstances and of habitual delinquency. — Mitigating or aggravating circumstances and habitual delinquency shall be taken into account for the purpose of diminishing or increasing the penalty in conformity with the following rules: 5. Habitual delinquency shall have the following effects: (a) Upon a third conviction the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided by law for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods; (b) Upon a fourth conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods; and (c) Upon a fifth or additional conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided for the
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last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period. Notwithstanding the provisions of this article, the total of the two penalties to be imposed upon the offender, in conformity herewith, shall in no case exceed 30 years. For the purpose of this article, a person shall be deemed to be habitual delinquent, is within a period of ten years from the date of his release or last conviction of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa or falsification, he is found guilty of any of said crimes a third time or oftener. REQUISITES: a. That the accused is on trial for an offense; b. That he previously served sentence for another offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty, or for 2 or more crimes to which it attaches lighter penalty han that for the new offense; and c. That he is convicted of the new offense. REITERACION/ HABITUALITY It is necessary that the offender shall have served out his sentence for the first offense. The previous and subsequent offenses must not be embraced in the same title of the Code. Reiteracion is not always an aggravating circumstance.
RECIDIVISM It is enough that a final judgment has been rendered in the first offense. It is the requirement that the offenses be included in the same title of the Code. Recidivism is not always to be taken into consideration in fixing the penalty to be imposed upon the accused.
FOUR FORMS OR REPETITION: 1. RECIDIVISM 2.
REITERACTION OR HABITUALITY
3.
MULTI-RECIDIVISM OR HABITUAL DELINQUENCY - when a person, within a period of 10 years from the date of his release or last conviction of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robbery, theft, estafa or falsification, is found guilty of any of said crimes a third time or oftener. In habitual delinquency, the offender is either a recidivist or one who has been previously punished for two or more offenses (habituality). He shall suffer an additional penalty for being a habitual delinquent. 4. QUASI-RECIDIVISM - Any person who shall commit a felony after having been convicted by final judgment, before beginning to serve such sentence or while serving the same, shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony. People v. Gaorana (1998) Facts: Marivel, upon instruction of Rowena (common-law wife of the accused) went to the house of Gaorana and saw the couple lying down. Marivel was asked to come it and Rowena stood up to urinate. Gaorana covered her mouth and pointed a hunting knife to her neck and raped her. The second incident of rape occurred while Marivel was sleeping in the sala with her
brother and sister. Marivel did not shout because she was afraid of the accused who was a prisoner and had already killed somebody. Held: The 2 Information alleged that both instances of rape were attended by the aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism. The TC made no express ruling that the appellant was a quasi-recidivist, and rightly so. During the trial, the prosecution manifested that appellant had been convicted by the RTC and was serving sentence for the crime of homicide. However, the prosecution failed or neglected to present in evidence the record of appellant’s previous conviction. Quasi-recidivism, like recidivism and reiteracion, necessitates the presentation of a certified copy of the sentence convicting an accused. The fact that appellant was an inmate of DAPECOL does not prove that final judgment had been rendered against him. People v. Villapando (1989) Facts: The accused was charged before the RTC with the crimes of murder and of attempted homicide. Held: The court does not agree that reiteracion or habituality should be appreciated in this case. The appellant was found by the trial court to have committed offenses prior to and after the incident of Jan. 14, 1979. In habituality, it is essential that the offender be previously punished, that is, he has served the sentence, for an offense in which the law attaches, or provides for an equal or greater penalty than that attached by law to the second offense, or for two or ore offenses, in which the law attaches a lighter penalty. Here, the records do not disclose that the appellant has been previously punished by an offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater or penalty or for two or more crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty. People v. Molina (2000) Facts: Brothers Joseph and Angelito, along with their cousin, Danny were on their way home when they heard somebody shout “kuba”, referring to Joseph, a hunchback. They asked who said that but no one admitted. As the 3 were about to go, Molina delivered a strong stabbing blow at the back of Joseph. Angelito came to aid his brother but Molina also stabbed him at the back. Joseph was dead on arrival at the clinic. Held: To prove recidivism, it is necessary to allege the same in the information and to attach thereto certified copies of the sentences rendered against the accused. Nonetheless, the trial court may still give such AC credence if the accused does not object to the presentation of evidence on the fact of recidivism. In the case at bar, the accused never voiced out any objection when confronted with the fact of his previous conviction for attempted homicide. People v. Dacillo (2004) Facts: Pacot stabbed and strangled Rosemarie leading to the latters death. Dacillo for his part, hold down Rosemarie’s legs to prevent her from struggling. The two men stopped only when they were sure that the victim was already dead. Dacillo then encase her corpse in a cement. The trial court imposed the death penalty on the ground that Dacillo admitted during re-cross examination that he had a prior conviction for the death of his former live-in partner. The fact that Dacillo was a recidivist was appreciated by the trial court as a generic aggravating circumstance which increased the imposable penalty from reclusion perpetua to death
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Held: The aggravating circumstance of recidivism was not alleged in the information and therefore cannot be appreciated against appellant. In order to appreciate recidivism as an aggravating circumstance, it is necessary to allege it in the information and to attach certified true copies of the sentences previously meted out to the accused. 26 This is in accord with Rule 110, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which states: SEC. 8. Designation of the offense. — The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
• Unless used by the offender as a means to accomplish a criminal purpose, any of the circumstances in paragraph 12 cannot be considered to increase the penalty or to change the nature of the offense. • When another AC already qualifies the crime, any of these AC’s shall be considered as generic aggravating circumstance only. • When the crime intended to be committed is arson and somebody dies as a result thereof, the crime is simply arson and the act resulting in the death of that person is not even an independent crime of homicide, it being absorbed.
People v. Cajara (2000) Facts: Accused Cajara raped 16-year old Marita in front of his common-law wife who is the half-sister of the victim and his two small children. The trial court convicted him as charged and sentenced him to death. Held: The records show that the crime was aggravated by reiteracion under Art. 14, par. 10, of The Revised Penal Code, the accused having been convicted of frustrated murder in 1975 and of homicide, frustrated homicide, trespass to dwelling, illegal possession of firearms and murder sometime in 1989 where his sentences were later commuted to imprisonment for 23 years and a fine of P200,000.00. He was granted conditional pardon by the President of the Philippines on 8 November 1991. Reiteracion or habituality under Art. 14, par. 10, herein cited, is present when the accused has been previously punished for an offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty than that attached by law to the second offense or for two or more offenses to which it attaches a lighter penalty. As already discussed, herein accused can be convicted only of simple rape and the imposable penalty therefor is reclusion perpetua. Where the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied regardless of the mitigating or aggravating circumstances attendant to the crime, such as in the instant case.
• It will be noted that each of the circumstances of “fire”, “explosion,” and “derailment of a locomotive” may be a part of the definition of particular crime, such as, arson, crime involving destruction, and damages and obstruction to means of communication. In these cases, they do not serve to increase the penalty, because they are already included by the law in defining the crimes.
Par. 11. - THAT THE CRIME BE COMMITTED IN CONSIDERATION OF A PRICE, REWARD, OR PROMISE. • When this AC is present, there must be 2 or more principals, the one who gives or offers the price or promise and the one who accepts it, both of whom are principals – to the former, because he directly induces the latter to commit the crime, and the latter because he commits it. • When this AC is present, it affects not only the person who received the price or reward, but also the person who gave it. • The evidence must show that one of the accused used money or other valuable consideration for the purpose of inducing another to perform the deed. Par. 12. - THAT THE CRIME BE COMMITTED BY MEANS OF INUNDATION, FIRE, POISON, EXPLOSION, STRANDING OF A VESSEL OR INTERNATIONAL DAMAGE THERETO, DERAILMENT OF A LOCOMOTIVE, OR BY THE USE OF ANY OTHER ARTIFICE INVOLVING GREAT WASTE AND RUIN.
• The killing of the victim by means of such circumstances as inundation, fire, poison or explosion qualifies the offense to murder.
Par. 13. - THAT THE ACT BE COMMITTED WITH EVIDENCE PREMEDITATION. • Evident premeditation implies a deliberate planning of the act before executing it. • The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. • Evident premeditation may not be appreciated absent any proof as to how and when the plan was hatched or what time elapsed before it was carried out. REQUISITIES: The time when the offender determined to commit the crime; 2. An act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination; and When the crime was carefully planned by the offenders; When the offenders previously prepared the means which they considered adequate to carry it out. 3. A sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution, to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow is conscience to overcome the resolution of his will. The offender must have an opportunity to coolly and serenely think and deliberate on the meaning and the consequences of what he planned to do, an interval long enough for his conscience and better judgment to overcome his evil desire and scheme. 1.
• Conspiracy generally presupposes premeditation. • Evident premeditation, while inherent in robbery, may be aggravating in robbery with homicide if the premeditation included the killing of the victim.
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Facts: At around 1:30 pm, Bibat stabbed to death one Lloyd del Rosario as the latter was on his way to school waiting for a ride. The suspect fled while the victim was brought to the hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival. A witness testified that the accused and several others often met in Robles’ house. In one of their meetings, the accused and his companions hid some guns and “tusok” in the house. Also, other witnesses saw the accused at around 11:30 am with some companions and heard the plan to kill someone. Held: There is evident premeditation determination because the 3 requisites are present. There was evident premeditation where 2 hours had elapsed from the time the accused clung to his determination to kill the victim up to the actual perpetration of the crime. People v. Lug-aw (1994) Facts: Pal-loy was fencing the boundary limits of the land he was faming when his daughter, Sonia, heard a shot. Immediately, she went uphill and just as a second gun shot resounded, she saw Bannay and Lugaw from a distance and that her father was bout to draw his bolo when Lug-aw shot him. Held: The SC ruled that there was no evident premeditation because no one witnessed the initial attack. As Sonia herself testified, she heard the first whot, went up a hill, climbed a tree and from ther, saw Lug-aw shooting her father with the shot reverberating as the second gun report. What she did see was her father trying to repel the assault with a bolo but he failed because a second shot hit him. The records are bereft of evidence that the crime was committed with evident premeditation. People v. Camilet (1986) Facts: After a prayer meeting was held at the place of the victim, a deaf-mute boy arrived crying and while making signals, was able to convey that he was strangled and spanked. Accompanied by some of his guests, the victim proceeded to go to the place where the boy said he was accosted. Nearing the place, the victim was suddenly stabbed by the accused in the stomach with a long knife. Held: Evident premeditation was not established by the prosecution. Although the facts tend to show that Camilet might have harbored ill-feelings towards the Camanchos after they took a portion of the land he was farming and, as he himself stated to the police, they also took the produce from his cornfield, there is no proof that Camilet conceived of killing the victim. Indeed, there is no evidence of 1) the time when he determined to commit the crime, 2) an act manifestly indicating that he has clung to his determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will had he desired to hearken to its warnings. People v. Ilaoa (1994) Facts: The 5 accused were charged for the gruesome murder of Nestor de Loyola. The conviction was based on the following circumstances: a) The deceased was seen on the night before the killing in a drinking session with some of the accused; 2) The drunken voices accused Ruben and Nestor were later heard and Nestor was then seen being kicked and mauled by the 5 accused; 3) some of the accused borrowed the tricycle of Alex at about 2 a.m.; 4) blood was found in Ruben’s shirt.
Held: Evident premeditation cannot be considered. There is nothing in the records to show that appellant, prior to the night in question, resolved to kill Nestor, nor is there proof to show that such killing was the result of meditation, calculation or resolution on his part. On the contrary, the evidence tends to show that the series of circumstances which culminated in the killing constitutes an unbroken chain of events with no interval of time separating them for calculation and meditation. People v. Mondijar (2002) Facts:. In a previous incident, Aplacador had stabbed Mondijar, his father in law on the knee. A month after, Mondiijar stabbed and hacked his son-inlaw with the use of a sharp and pointed bolo which resulted to his death. Held: There was no evident premeditation. For the circumstance of evident premeditation to be appreciated, the prosecution must present clear and positive evidence of the planning and preparation undertaken by the offender prior to the commission of the crime. Settled is the rule that evident premeditation, like any other circumstance that qualifies a killing to murder, must be established beyond reasonable doubt as conclusively and indubitably as the killing itself. In the present case, no evidence was presented by the prosecution as to when and how appellant planned and prepared for the killing of the victim. There is no showing of any notorious act evidencing a determination to commit the crime which could prove appellant's criminal intent. People v. Torpio (supra) Facts: While having a drinking spree in a cottage, Anthony tried to let Dennis Torpio drink gin and as the latter refused, Anthony bathed Dennis with gin and mauled him several times. Dennis crawled beneath the table and Anthony tried to stab him with a 22 fan knife but did not hit him. Dennis got up and ran towards their home. Upon reaching home, he got a knife. He went back to the cottage by another route and upon arrival Anthony was still there. Upon seeing Dennis, Anthony avoided Dennis and ran by passing the shore towards the creek but Dennis met him, blocked him and stabbed him. When he was hit, Anthony ran but got entangled with a fishing net beside the creek and fell on his back. Dennis then mounted on him and continued stabbing him resulting to the latters death. Thereafter, Dennis left and slept at a grassy meadow near a Camp. In the morning, he went to Estrera, a police officer to whom he voluntarily surrendered. Held: No evident premeditation exist in this case. There was no sufficient interregnum from the time Dennis was stabbed by the victim, when Dennis fled to their house and his arming himself with a knife, and when he stabbed the victim. In a case of fairly recent vintage, it was ruled that there is no evident premeditation when the fracas was the result, not of a deliberate plan but of rising tempers, or when the attack was made in the heat of anger. People v. Bernal (2002) Facts: Appellant, Fernando, Felix, Rey all surnamed Bernal and the victim Pedrito went to a pubhouse. Pedrito, Rey and appellant went inside while Fernando and Felix waited outside. Fernando later went inside and saw the three in a sleeping position. Fernando then asked Felix to start the tricycle as they would bring home the three. He first brought Pedrito out of the pub and had him seated at the passengers seat inside the
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tricycle. Fernado then got appellant who was roused when they reached the tricycle. While Fernado was fetching Rey, accused positioned himself at the back of Pedrito who was still asleep and discharged his firearm twice hitting the latter on the head. Held: The Court ruled that there was no evidence directly showing any pre-conceived plan or devise employed by accused-appellant to kill the victim. Accused-appellant did not go to Barangay Dangdangla, Bangued to kill the victim but to attend to some important matters. Accused-appellant was just invited by his relatives, whom he had not seen for a while after he changed residence, to have a drinking spree. The probability is that the decision to shoot the victim was made only right there and then. This should at least cast reasonable doubt on the existence of a premeditated plan to kill the victim. Further, the mere existence of illfeeling or grudge between the parties is not sufficient to establish premeditated killing. Hence, it would be erroneous to declare that the killing of the victim was premeditated. People v. Biso (2003) Facts: Dario, a black belt in karate, entered an eatery, seated himself beside Teresita and made sexual advances to her in the presence of her brother, Eduardo. Eduardo contacted his cousin, Biso, an ex-convict and a known toughie in the area, and related to him what Dario had done to Teresita. Eduardo and Pio, and 2 others decided to confront Dario. They positioned themselves in the alley near the house of Dario. When Dario arrived on board a taxicab, the four assaulted Dario. Eduardo held, with his right hand, the wrist of Dario and covered the mouth of Dario with his left hand. The 2 others held Dario's right hand and hair. Pio then stabbed Dario near the breast with a fan knife. Eduardo stabbed Dario and fled with his three companions from the scene. Held: There was no evident premeditation. The prosecution failed to prove that the four intended to kill Dario and if they did intend to kill him, the prosecution failed to prove how the malefactors intended to consummate the crime. Except for the fact that the appellant and his three companions waited in an alley for Dario to return to his house, the prosecution failed to prove any overt acts on the part of the appellant and his cohorts showing that that they had clung to any plan to kill the victim. Par. 14. - THAT THE CRAFT, FRAUD OR DISGUISE BE EMPLOYED. CRAFT – involves intellectual trickery and cunning on the part of the accused. It is employed as a scheme in the execution of the crime. e.x. Where the defendants pretended to be constabulary soldiers to gain entry into the place of the victims. The act of the accused in pretending to be bona fide passengers of the taxicab driven by the deceased, when they were not so in fact, in order not to arouse his suspicion, and then killing him, constituted craft. • Where craft partakes of an element of the offense, the same may not be appreciated independently for the purpose of aggravation.
FRAUD – insidious words or machinations used to induce the victim to act in a manner which would enable the offender to carry out his design. e.x. To enter the house, one of the accused shouted from the outside that they wanted to buy cigarettes. • There is a hairline distinction between craft and fraud. • DISTINCTION: When there is a DIRECT INDUCEMENT by insidious words or machinations, fraud is present; otherwise, the act of the accused done in order NOT TO AROUSE THE SUSPICION of the victim constitutes craft. DISGUISE – resorting to any device to conceal identity. ex. Wearing of masks • The purpose of the offender in using any device must be to conceal his identity. People v. Marquez (1982) Facts: Francisca was in their house together with her children and main when somebody called in front of their window who identified themselves as PC soldiers looking for contraband. The men ordered her to open up otherwise they will shoot up their house. Then accused Marquez went inside together with other armed companions. They took some of their belongings and one of them even raped Francisca, Leticia (daughter of Francisca) and Rufina (maid). Held: The following AC’s were proved a) nighttime; 2) unlawful entry; 3) dwelling of the offended parties; 4) disguise, that is by pretending to be PC officers; and 5) by utter disregard due to victims’ age and sex. People v. Empacis (1993) Facts: Empacis et al. held-up the store of Fidel and his wife. As Fidel was about to give the money, he decided to fight. He was stabbed several times which resulted to his death. Empacis was stabbed by the son of Fidel. When he went to a clinic for treatment, he was arrested. Held: Langomes and Empacis pretended to be bona fide customers of the victim’s store and on this pretext gained entry into the latter’s store and into another part of his dwelling. Thus, there AC of craft was taken into consideration. People v. Labuguen (2000) Facts: Under the pretext of selling 3 cows to the victim, Labuguen convinced the victim to see the cows and bring P40,000 with him. The two rode on the victiim’s motorcycle and Labuguen lured him to where he could divest the victim of his money with the least danger of being caught. He then boarded a bus leaving the motorcycle of the victim on the side of the road. The victim’s dead body was found on the middle of a rice field, 50 meters from the service drop of an irrigation canal. Held: The generic aggravating circumstances of fraud and craft is present in this case. Craft involves intellectual trickery and cunning on the part of the offender. When there is a direct inducement by insidious words or machinations, fraud is present. By saying that he would accompany the victim to see the cows which the latter intended to buy, appellant was able to lure the victim to go with him.
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Par. 15. - THAT (1) ADVANTAGE BE TAKEN OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH, OR (2) MEANS BE EMPLOYED TO WEAKEN THE DEFENSE. (1) SUPERIOR STRENGTH • To TAKE ADVANTAGE of superior strength means to use purposely excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. • One who attacks another with passion and obfuscation dos not take advantage of his superior strength. • An attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his SEX and the WEAPON used in the act afforded him, and from which the woman was unable to defend herself. • No abuse of superior strength in parricide against the wife because it is inherent in the crime. It is generally accepted that the husband is physically stronger than the wife. • There must be evidence that the accused was physically stronger and that they abused such superiority. The mere fact of there being a superiority in numbers is not sufficient to bring the case within the aggravating circumstance. • There is abuse of superior strength when weapon used is out of proportion to the defense available to the offended party. • Abuse of superior strength is absorbed in treachery. • Abuse of superior strength is aggravating in coercion and forcible abduction, when greatly in excess of that required to commit the offense. BY A BAND When the committed by armed regardless comparative the victim.
offense is more than 3 malefactors of the strength of
ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH The gravamen of abuse of superiority is the taking advantage by the culprits of their collective strength to overpower their weaker victims.
(2) MEANS EMPLOYED TO WEAKEN DEFENSE • This circumstance is applicable only to crimes against persons and sometimes against person and property, such as robbery with physical injuries or homicide. • This AC is absorbed in treachery. • Ex. One who, while fighting with another, suddenly casts sand or dirt upon the latter’s eyes and then wound or kills him, evidently employs means which weaken the defense of his opponent. People v. Cabato (1988) Facts: The accused with 2 other men who are still at large, armed with firearms and stones and using face masks, entered the dwelling of the victim. They held the victim tight as well as the wife, who was able to scratch the face of the masked man, as a result was able to identify the accused. Not satisfied with the money given by the couple, the two unknown robbers hit the victim with stone at the back of his head and the accused did the same to the wife which caused her death. The prosecution argued that since the attack was by a robust man of 29 years with a huge stone against
an ageing defenseless human, abuse of superior strength should aggravate the crime. Held: The prosecution failed to prove that there was indeed a notorious inequality between the ages, sizes and strength of the antagonists and that these notorious advantages were purposely sought for or used by the accused to achieve his ends. People v. Ruelan (1994) Facts: Ruelan (20 yrs old) was hired by the spouses Ricardo and Rosa (76 yrs old) to help them sell and deliver rice to their customers. One day, Rosa asked Ruelan to accompany her, in opening their store in the public market; she also ordered him to bring a sack and an axe. When they were about to leave the premises, the house dog got loose and went towards the street. Rosa got angry and scolded Ruelan. Ruelan pleaded her to stop but Rosa did not so Ruelan struck her behind her right ear, causing her to fall face down. He left her to a grassy portion beside the street and fled. He surrendered to the police after 2 days. Held: Although abuse of superior strength was proven since Ruelan was only 20 years old whereas his victim was 76 years old already, this was not pleaded in the information, hence, it shall only be considered as a generic circumstance in the imposition of the correct penalty. People v. Padilla (1994) Facts: Pat. Omega was on duty when Ontuca approached him asking for help claiming he was being maltreated by strangers. They proceeded to the place where they saw 3 men and a woman. An argument ensued between Ontuca and the 3 men, one of which was Sgt. Padilla. Omega left but returned when he saw that the 3 men were ganging up on Ontuca. The latter was stripped of his service revolver. Ontuca was pursued by Padilla. The former, with only a piece of plywood as a defense, was shot by the latter in the head. Held: The killing was qualified by the AC of abuse of superior strength which was alleged in the information and proved during trial. The abuse of superior strength is present not only when the offenders enjoy numerical superiority, or there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, but also when the offender uses a powerful weapon which is out of proportion to the defense available to the victim as in this case. People v. Lobrigas (2002) Facts: Frank, Marlito, both surnamed Lobrigas and Mante mauled and box Taylaran who was already 76 years old. The victim died caused by severe beating and mauling on the chest portion on the victim’s body. Held: The crime committed was murder qualified by the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength. To appreciate abuse of superior strength, there must be a deliberate intent on the part of the malefactors to take advantage of their greater number. They must have notoriously selected and made use of superior strength in the commission of the crime. To take advantage of superior strength is to use excessive force that is out of proportion to the means for self-defense available to the person attacked; thus, the prosecution must clearly show the offenders' deliberate intent to do so. People v. Barcelon (2002) Facts: Barcelon went inside the house of Amador. Thereafter, accused strangled and stabbed the victim with a knife. Amador died as a result. At the time
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the crime was committed, Amador was a 69 year-old woman and Barcelon was only 29 years old. Held: Abuse of superior strength was present in the commission of the crime. The court cited the case of People vs. Ocumen, where an attack by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and the weapon used in the act afforded him, and from which the woman was unable to defend herself. The disparity in age between the assailant and the victim, aged 29 and 69, respectively, indicates physical superiority on appellant's part over the deceased. It did not matter that appellant was "dark" with a "slim body build" or "medyo mataba." What mattered was that the malefactor was male and armed with a lethal weapon that he used to slay the victim. People v. Sansaet (2002) Facts Uldarico was drinking with 15 other men that include the Sansaet brothers, Rogelio, Leopoldo and Silverio. Because of a bad joke that cropped up, verbal exchanges ensued. Thereafter, Rogelio and Uldarico started hacking each other with bolos. Silverio and Leopolo positioned themselves behind the victim and also hacked him. Uldarico retaliated wounding Silverio. Rogelio then hacked Uldarico a 2nd time. Leopoldo and Rogelio continued hacking Uldarico when the latter fell. They then dragged Uldarico towards the river and there they each twice hacked Uldarico resulting to his death. Held: "Mere superiority in number, even assuming it to be a fact, would not necessarily indicate the attendance of abuse of superior strength. The prosecution should still prove that the assailants purposely used excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the persons attacked." "Finally, to appreciate the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, what should be considered is whether the aggressors took advantage of their combined strength in order to consummate the offense. To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means available to the person attacked to defend himself." In the case at bar, the victim Uldarico de Castro was the one who picked a fight with the accusedappellants because he did not like the joke by one of the accused-appellants. There was no evidence to show that the accused-appellants purposely sought and took advantage of their number to subdue the victim. People v. Ventura (2004) Facts: Ventura armed with a .38 Caliber Homemade Revolver and Flores armed with a bladed weapon, entered the house of the Bocatejas by cutting a hole in the kitchen door. Ventura announced a hold-up and hit Jaime on the head and asked for the keys. Jaime called out for help and tried to wrestle the gun away from Ventura. Flores then stabbed Jaime 3 times. Flores also stabbed Jaime’s wife Aileen who had been awakened. Aileen tried to defend herself with an elecrtric cord to no avail. Aileen died on the hospital on the same day. Held: By deliberately employing a deadly weapon against Aileen, Flores took advantage of the superiority which his strength, sex and weapon gave him over his unarmed victim. The fact that Aileen attempted to fend off the attack on her and her husband by throwing nearby objects, such as an electric cord, at appellant Flores does not automatically negate the possibility that the latter was able to take advantage of his superior strength
Par. 16. - THAT THE ACT BE COMMITTED WITH TREACHERY (ALEVOSIA). • TREACHERY means that the offended party was not given opportunity to make a defense. • There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. REQUISITES: That at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and b. That the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by him. • Treachery does not connote the element of surprise alone. • There is no treachery when the attack is preceded by a warning or the accused gave the deceased a chance to prepare. • The qualifying circumstance of treachery may not be simply deduced from presumption as it is necessary that the existence of this qualifying or aggravating circumstance should be proven as fully as the crime itself in order to aggravate the liability or penalty incurred by the culprit. a.
RULES REGARDING TREACHERY a. Applicable only to crimes against persons. b. Means, methods or forms need not insure accomplishment of crime. c. The mode of attack must be consciously adopted. • Mere suddenness of the attack is not enough to constitute treachery. Such method or form of attack must be deliberately chosen by the accused. ATTACKS SHOWN INTENTION TO ELIMITNATE RISK: a. Victim asleep b. Victim half-awake or just awakened c. Victim grappling or being held. d. Attacked from behind • There is treachery in killing a child because the weakness of the victim due to his tender age results in the absence of any danger to the accused. ADDITIONAL RULES: 1. When the aggression is CONTINUOUS, treachery must be present in the BEGINNING of the assault. 2. When the assault WAS NOT CONTINUOUS, in that there was an interruption, it is sufficient that treachery was present AT THE MOMENT THE FATAL BLOW WAS GIVEN. • In treachery, it makes no difference whether or not the victim was the same person whom the accused intended to kill. • When it is NOT SHOWN that the principal by induction directed the killer of the deceased to adopt the means or methods actually used by the latter in accomplishing the murder, because the former left to the latter the details as to how it was to be accomplished, treachery cannot be taken into consideration as to the principal by induction.
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TREACHERY
ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH
The means, methods or forms of attack are employed to make it impossible or hard for the offended party to defend himself.
The offender does not employ means, methods or forms of attack; he only takes advantage of his superior strength.
MEANS EMPLOYED TO WEAKEN DEFENSE The offender, like in treachery, employs means but the means employed only materially weakens the resisting power of the offended party.
• When there is conspiracy, treachery is considered against all the offenders. • Treachery, evident premeditation and use of superior strength are, by their nature, inherent in the offense of treason. • Treachery absorbs abuse of superior strength, aid of armed men, by a band and means to weaken the defense. • Nighttime and craft are absorbed in treachery except if treachery rests upon an independent factual basis. • Treachery is inherent in murder by poisoning. • Treachery obfuscation.
cannot
co-exist
with
passion
and
People v. Castillo (1998) Facts: Velasco was sitting outside the pubhouse talking with his co-worker, Dorie, when one of the customers named Tony went out of the pubhouse. Then, Castillo suddenly appeared and, without warning, stabbed Tony with a fan knife on his left chest. Tony pleaded for help but accused stabbed him once more. Velasco placed a chair between Tony and the accused to stop the latter. Tony ran away but was pursued by the accused. Tony died and his body was found outside the fence of Iglesia ni Cristo Compound. Held: The killing was qualified by treachery. Treachery is committed when two conditions concur, namely, that the person attacked had no opportunity to defend himself and that such means, method, and forms of execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused without danger to his person. These requisites were evidently present in this case when the accused appeared from nowhere and swiftly stabbed the victim just as he was bidding goodbye to his friend, Velasco. Said action rendered it difficult for the victim to defend himself. The presence of “defense wounds” does not negate treachery because, as testified to by Velasco, the first stab, fatal as it was, was inflicted on the chest. The incised wounds in the arms were inflicted when the victim was already rendered defenseless. People v. Sangalang (1974) Facts: Cortez left his nipa hut to gather tuba from a coconut tree nearby. While he was on top of the tree, he was struck by a volley of shots and he fell to the ground at the base of the coconut tree. The accused and his companions shot Cortez several times which resulted to his death. Held: The victim was shot while he was gathering tuba on top of a coconut tree. He was
unarmed and defenseless. He was not expecting to be assaulted. He did not give immediate provocation. The deliberate, surprise attack shows that Sangalang and his companions employed a mode of execution which insured the killing without any risk to them arising from any defense which the victim could have made. The killing can be categorized as murder because of the qualifying circumstance of treachery. People v. Gutierrez (1988) Facts: While drunk, the accused started cursing Matuano and challenged him 2 or 3 times while at the office where the two worked. The accused was holding a balisong. Matuano’s son intervened asking the accused to calm down and the latter seemingly acceded. As soon as the son resumed work, the accused lunged towards Matuano whose back was turned and stabbed him. Held: The claim that the challenging words of the victim precluded the circumstance of treachery because it put him on his guard is untenable. The fact that the accused seemed to be pacified by the son of the victim made it clear that the victim had no reason to expect an attack. As such the attack was sudden and unexpected, from behind and with the victim unarmed without any chance to defend himself against the initial assault, clearly show that treachery was present. People v. Verchez (1994) Facts: A team of government agents of the PC conducted a surveillance on a house reported to be the hideout of a gang of suspected robbers. The agents stopped a car coming out of the house. It was driven by Balane. Balane was prevailed upon into accompanying the agents into the house. They proceeded to the house in 4 cars and when the 1st car approached, they were met with heavy gunfire. A firefight ensued. 3 of the agents were hit; one died and two were injured. The men inside the house later surrendered. Among them was Verchez. Held: The two requisites of treachery were not proven. The lawmen, knowing that they were dealing with a gang of bank robbers, were prepared to deal with any resistance that may possibly be put up. Also, Sgt. Norcio was killed during the gun battle and not during the first volley of shots fired by the robbers. Thus, there is no showing that appellants deliberately and consciously adopted their mode of attack. Neither is there any showing that they intended to ambush the lawmen. People v. Rendaje (2000) Facts: Lennie was a 15-year old deaf-mute. Rendaje, on the other hand, was 23 years old and in the prime of his strength. Rendaje followed Lennie when the latter was on her way home alone. With the use of a knife, he then inflicted 8 stab wounds, 5 of which were fatal on the victim’s back. Lennie died as a result. Her body was found in a sugar cane plantation. Held: Treachery qualified the killing to murder. To constitute treachery, two conditions must concur: (1) the employment of means, methods or manner of execution that would ensure the offender's safety from any defense or retaliatory act on the part of the offended party; and (2) the offender's deliberate or conscious choice of the means, method or manner of execution. No one has positively testified on how Lennie was killed but the victim’s body shows the manner in which she was attacked by her assailant. It eloquently speaks for itself. The injuries established the manner in
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which the killing was cruelly carried out with little or no risk to the assailant. The number of stab wounds, most of which were inflicted at the back of the child — unarmed and alone — shows the deliberateness, the suddenness and the unexpectedness of the attack, which thus deprived her of the opportunity to run or fight back. People v. Umayam (2002) Facts: Umayam and the victim, Mendoza were living as husband and wife in a shanty erected inside a compound owned by Velasquez. During the couple’s stay in the compound, Velasquez would notice them frequently quarelling and Mendoza on occasions would run to Velasquez for help for the beatings inflicted on her by her husband. Velasquez then noticed a foul odor emanating from the couple’s shanty which he at first thought to be that of a poultry feed or kaning baboy. With the assistance of the police who broke the shanty’s walls, the decomposing body of Mendoza was found inside. The trial court found Umayam guilty of murder. Held: The qualifying circumstance of treachery was not established with concrete evidence. The circumstantial evidence on record does not clearly show that there was any conscious and deliberate effort on the part of the accused to adopt any particular means, method or form of attack to ensure the commission of the crime without affording the victim any means to defend herself. The conclusion that there was treachery can hardly be gleaned because the victim and Umayam were inside their shanty and no one witnessed how the killing took place. Notably, the medical findings of the victim's cadaver show, contusions on her arms and legs, indicating that there may have been a quarrel prior to the stabbing. This reasonably negates treachery. People v. Piedad (2002) The essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape. While it is true that the victim herein may have been warned of a possible danger to his person, since the victim and his companion headed towards their residence when they saw the group of accusedappellants coming back for them after an earlier quarrel just minutes before, in treachery, what is decisive is that the attack was executed in such a manner as to make it impossible for the victim to retaliate. In the case at bar, Mateo did not have any chance of defending himself from the accused-appellant's concerted assault, even if he was forewarned of the attack. Mateo was obviously overpowered and helpless when accused-appellants' group numbering around eight, ganged up and mauled him. Luz came to Mateo's succor by embracing him and pacifying his aggressors, but accused-appellants were unrelenting. More importantly, Mateo could not have actually anticipated the sudden landing of a large concrete stone on his head. The stone was thus treacherously struck. Neither could the victim have been aware that Lito came up beside him to stab his back as persons were beating him from every direction. Lito's act of stabbing the victim with a knife, inflicting a 15-cm deep wound shows deliberate intent of using a particular means of attack. Considering the location of the injuries sustained by the victim and the absence of defense wounds, Mateo clearly had no chance to defend himself. People v. Dumadag (2004) Facts: Prudente with his friends including Meliston agreed to meet at a swimming pool to celebrate
the feast of St. John. On their way home, there was heavy downpour so they decided to take a shelter at a store where 2 men, 1 of whom is Dumadag are having some drinks. Dumadag offered Prudente a drink of Tanduay but the latter refused then left. Dumadag followed Prudente and stabbed the victim on his breast with a knife which resulted to his death. Held: As a general rule, a sudden attack by the assailant, whether frontally or from behind, is treachery if such mode of attack was deliberately adopted by him with the purpose of depriving the victim of a chance to either fight or retreat. The rule does not apply if the attack was not preconceived but merely triggered by infuriation of the appellant on an act made by the victim. In the present case, it is apparent that the attack was not preconceived. It was triggered by the appellant's anger because of the victim's refusal to have a drink with the appellant and his companions. People v. De Guzman (2007) Held: d It should be made clear that the essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim without the slightest provocation on his part. This is even more true if the assailant is an adult and the victim is a minor. Minor children, who by reason of their tender years, cannot be expected to put up a defense. Thus, when an adult person illegally attacks a minor, treachery exists. Par. 17. - THAT MEANS BE EMPLOYED OR CIRCUMSTANCES BROUGHT ABOUT WHICH ADD IGNOMINY TO THE NATURAL EFFECTS OF THE ACT. IGNOMINY – it is a circumstance pertaining to the moral order, which adds disgrace ad obloquy to the material injury caused by the crime. • This AC is applicable to crimes against chastity and persons. • When the accused raped a woman after winding cogon grass around his genital organ, he thereby augmented the wrong done by increasing its pain and adding ignominy there to (People v. Torrefiel). * NOTE: According to Professor Ambion, this is not ignominy but cruelty. • The means employed or the circumstances brought about must tend to make the effects of the crime MORE HUMILIATING or TO PUT THE OFFENDED PARTY TO SHAME. ex. When the accused raped a married woman in the presence of her husband. People v. Siao (2000) Facts: Estrella worked as a housemaid of Rene Siao’s family. One day, Rene ordered Reylan, their houseboy, to bring Estrella to a room. While holding a gun, Rene forced Reylan to have sex with Estrella (oral sex, missionary position, and in the manner dogs perform sexual intercourse). Held: The accused was held guilty of rape with the use of a deadly weapon, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. But the trial court overlooked and did not take into account the aggravating circumstance of ignominy and sentenced accused to the single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua. It has been held that where the accused in committing the rape used not only the missionary
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position, the AC of ignominy attended the commission thereof.
broken door. The breaking of the door is covered by paragraph 19.
People v. Cachola (2004) Facts: Jessie was about to leave their house to watch cartoons in his uncle's house next door when accused suddenly entered the front door of their house. They ordered Jessie to drop to the floor, and then hit him in the back with the butt of a long gun. Without much ado, the intruders shot to death Jessie's uncle, Victorino who was then in the living room. Jessie forthwith crawled and hid under a bed, from where he saw the feet of a third man who had also entered the house. The men entered the kitchen and continued shooting. When the rampage was over and after the malefactors had already departed, Jessie came out of his hiding place and proceeded to the kitchen. There he saw his mother, Carmelita; his brother Felix.; and his cousin Rubenson — all slaughtered. The death certificate of Victorino reveals that his penis was excised. Held: Ignominy cannot be appreciated in this case. For ignominy to be appreciated, it is required that the offense be committed in a manner that tends to make its effect more humiliating, thus adding to the victim's moral suffering. Where the victim was already dead when his body or a part thereof was dismembered, ignominy cannot be taken against the accused. In this case, the information states that Victorino's sexual organ was severed after he was shot and there is no allegation that it was done to add ignominy to the natural effects of the act. We cannot, therefore, consider ignominy as an aggravating circumstance.
RATIONALE FOR PAR. 18: One who acts, not respecting the walls erected by men to guard their property and provide for their personal safety, shows a greater perversity, a greater audacity; hence, the law punishes him with more severity.
People v. Bumidang (2000) Facts: Baliwang Bumidang raped Gloria in front of her 80 year old father, Melecio. Melecio helplessly saw the accused rape her daughter but did not move because he was too afraid and weak. Before raping the victim, Baliwang examined the genitals of Gloria with a flashlight. Held: The aggravating circumstance of ignominy shall be taken into account if means are employed or circumstances brought about which add ignominy to the natural effects of the offense; or if the crime was committed in a manner that tends to make its effects more humiliating to the victim, that is, add to her moral suffering. It was established that Baliwang used the flashlight and examined the genital of Gloria before he ravished her. He committed his bestial deed in the presence of Gloria's old father. These facts clearly show that Baliwang deliberately wanted to further humiliate Gloria, thereby aggravating and compounding her moral sufferings. Ignominy was appreciated in a case where a woman was raped in the presence of her betrothed, or of her husband, or was made to exhibit to the rapists her complete nakedness before they raped her. Par. 18. - THAT THE CRIME BE COMMITTED AFTER AN UNLAWFUL ENTRY. THERE IS AN UNLAWFUL ENTRY WHEN AN ENTRANCE OF A CRIME A WALL, ROOF, FLOOR, DOOR, OR WINDOW BE BROKEN. • There is unlawful entry when an entrance is effected by a way not intended for the purpose. • Unlawful entry must be a means to effect entrance and not for escape. • There is no unlawful entry when the door is broken and thereafter the accused made an entry thru the
• This AC is inherent in robbery with force upon things. • Dwelling and unlawful entry is taken separately in murders committed in a dwelling. • Unlawful entry is not aggravating in trespass to dwelling. People v. Baello (1993) Facts: Brgy. Captain Borja awoke one night to find out that their front door was open and that their TV set was missing. He and his wife saw their dead daughter lying in bed. The TV set was recovered by the police at the house of Tadifo, Baello’s brother-in-law. Tadifo claimed that Baello and Jerry had an agreement to rob the house of Borja. It was Jerry who killed Borja’s daughter because it was he who was left inside the house. Held: the AC of unlawful entry was properly appreciated against the accused as he and his companion, Jerry, had entered the Borja residence through the second floor window, a way not intended for ingress. Par. 19 - THERE IS AN UNLAWFUL ENTRY WHEN AN ENTRANCE OF A CRIME A WALL, ROOF, FLOOR, DOOR, OR WINDOW BE BROKEN. • To be considered as an AC, breaking the door must be utilized as a means to the commission of the crime. • It is only aggravating in cases where the offender resorted to any of said means TO ENTER the house. If the wall, etc. is broken in order to get out of the place, it is not aggravating. Par. 20. - THAT THE CRIME BE COMMITTED (1) WITH THE AID OF PERSONS UNDER FIFTEEN YEARS OF AGE OR (2) BY MEANS OF MOTOR VEHICLES, MOTORIZED WATERCRAFT, AIRSHIPS, OR OTHER SIMILAR MEANS. (AS AMENDED BY RA 5438). (1) WITH THE AID OF PERSONS UNDER 15 YEARS OF AGE (2) BY MEANS OF A MOTOR VEHICLE • It is aggravating where the accused used the motor vehicle in going to the place of the crime, in carrying away the effects thereof, and if facilitating their escape. • If the motor vehicle was used only in facilitating the escape, it should not be an aggravating circumstance. • Estafa, which is committed by means of deceit or abuse of confidence, cannot be committed by means of motor vehicle. • Theft, which is committed by merely taking personal property which need not be carried away, cannot be committed by means of motor vehicles. “or other similar means” – the expression should be understood as referring to MOTORIZED vehicles or other efficient means of transportation similar to automobile or airplane.
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Par. 21. - THAT THE WRONG DONE IN THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME BE DELIBERATELY AUGMENTED BY CAUSING OTHER WRONG NOT NECESSARY FOR ITS COMMISSIONS. CRUELTY • There is cruelty when the culprit enjoys and delights in making his victim suffer slowly and gradually, causing him unnecessary physical pain in the consummation of the criminal act. • For cruelty to exist, it must be shown that the accused enjoyed and delighted in making his victim suffer. REQUISITES: 1. That the injury caused be deliberately increased by causing other wrong; 2. That the other wrong be unnecessary for the execution of the purpose of the offender. • Cruelty refers to physical suffering of victim purposely intended by offender. • Plurality of wounds alone does not show cruelty. • There is no cruelty when other wrong was done after the victim was dead. IGNOMINY Involves moral suffering.
Sumalpong picked him up, carried him over his shoulder, and carried Willy to a place where they burned Willy. The latter’s skeletal remains were discovered by a child who was pasturing his cow near a peanut plantation. Held: The circumstance of cruelty may not be considered as there is no showing that the victim was burned while he was still alive. For cruelty to exist, there must be proof showing that the accused delighted in making their victim suffer slowly and gradually, causing him unnecessary physical and moral pain in the consummation of the criminal act. No proof was presented that would show that accused-appellants deliberately and wantonly augmented the suffering of their victim. People v. Guerrero (2002) Appellant first severed the victim's head before his penis was cut-off. This being the sequence of events, cruelty has to be ruled out for it connotes an act of deliberately and sadistically augmenting the wrong by causing another wrong not necessary for its commission, or inhumanely increasing the victim's suffering. As testified to by Dr. Sanglay, and reflected in her medical certificate, Ernesto in fact died as a result of his head being severed. No cruelty is to be appreciated where the act constituting the alleged cruelty in the killing was perpetrated when the victim was already dead.
CRUELTY Refers to physical suffering.
SPECIAL AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
People v. Lacao (1974) Facts: Gallardo, coming from a gathering, decided to go home. As he was descending the stairs Balatazar followed him and stabbed him with a knife at the right side of his body. Baltazar tried to pull out the knife. Gallrado ran. When the latter reached the bamboo grove, he was assaulted by David and his son, Salvador, Jose and Federico. Gallardo sustained 14 wounds by different bladed instruments. His assailants dragged him to the field. He died later. It was found that each of the 9 wounds could have caused his death if there were no timely medical assistance. Held: The numerousness of wound is not the criterion for appreciating cruelty. The test is whether the accused deliberately and sadistically augmented the wrong by causing another wrong not necessary for its commission or inhumanly increased the victim’s suffering or outraged or scoffed at his person or corpse. People v. Ilaoa (supra) The fact that Nestor’s decapitated body bearing 43 stab wounds, 24 of which were fatal, was found dumped in the street is not sufficient for a finding of cruelty where there is no showing that appellant Ilaoa, for his pleasure and satisfaction, caused Nestor to suffer slowly and painfully and inflicted on him unnecessary physical and moral pain. Number of wounds alone is not the criterion for the appreciation of cruelty as an aggravating circumstance. Neither can it be inferred from the mere fact that the victim’s dead body was dismembered. People v. Catian (2002) Facts: Catian repeatedly strike Willy with a "chako" on the head, causing Willy to fall on his knees. Calunod seconded by striking the victim with a piece of wood on the face. When Willy finally collapsed,
Republic Act 8353 An act expanding the definition of the crime of rape, reclassifying the same as a crime against persons, amending for the purpose act no. 3815, as amended, otherwise known as the revised penal code, and for other purposes SECTION 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as "The Anti-Rape Law of 1997". SECTION 2. Rape as a Crime Against Persons. - The crime of rape shall hereafter be classified as a Crime Against Persons under Title Eight of Act 3815, as amended, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, there shall be incorporated into Title Eight of the same Code a new chapter to be known as Chapter Three on Rape, to read as follows: "Chapter Three Rape" Article 266-A. Rape: When and How Committed. - Rape is Committed1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: a) Through force, threat, or intimidation; b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present; 2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into other person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
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Article 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death. The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances: 1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. 2) When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities or any law enforcement of penal institution. 3) When the rape is committed in full view of the spouse, parent, any of the children or other relatives within the third civil degree of consanguinity. 4) When the victim is a religious engaged in legitimate religious vocation or calling and is personally known to be such by the offender before or at the time of the commission of the crime. (5) When the victim is a child below seven (7) years old. (6) When the offender knows that he is afflicted with Human Immune-Deficiency Virus (HIV)/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) or any other sexually transmissible disease and the virus or disease is transmitted to the victim. (7) When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or paramilitary units thereof or the Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency or penal institution, when the offender took advantage of his position to facilitate the commission of the crime. (8) When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim suffered permanent physical mutilation or disability. (9) When the offender knew of the pregnancy of the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime. (10) When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime. Rape under paragraph 2 of the next preceding article shall be punished by prision mayor. Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be prision mayor to reclusion temporal. When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal. When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua. When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua. Reclusion temporal shall also be imposed if the rape is committed by any of the ten aggravating/qualifying circumstances mentioned in this article. Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon - The subsequent valid marriage between the offender and the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed.
In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty. Provided, That the crime shall be extinguish or the penalty shall not be abated if the marriage is void ab initio. Article 266-D. Presumptions. - Any physical overt act manifesting resistance against the act of rape in any degree from the offended party, or where the offended party is so situated as to render her/him incapable of giving valid consent, may be accepted as evidence in the prosecution of the acts punished under Article 266-A." SECTION 3. Separability Clause.- If any part, section, or provision of this Act is declared invalid or unconstitutional, the other parts thereof not affected thereby shall remain valid. SECTION 4. Repealing Clause.- Article 335 of Act No. 3815, as amended, and all laws, acts presidential decrees, executive orders, administrative orders, rules and regulations, inconsistent with or contrary to the provisions of this Act are deemed amended, modified or repealed accordingly. SECTION 5. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after completion of its publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
People v. Balgos (2000) Facts: Balgos was accused of raping a 6-year old child named Criselle. While the victim was playing, the accused asked his nieces to go outside and buy cheese curls. When they left, the accused opened his zipper and made Criselle hold his penis. The 2 girls came back and he asked them to go out and buy more cheese curls. When they left, he locked the door and had carnal knowledge with Criselle. The accused cannot penetrate the victim’s organ. The lower court convicted the accused of qualified rape. Held: The trial court was correct. Under Art. 335 of the RPC as amended by RA 7659 and further amended by RA 8353, the penalty of death shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed against a child below 7 years of age. There is no dispute that the victim was 6 years of age when the accused had carnal knowledge with her. People v. Ladjaalam (2000) Facts: Accused who is maintaining a drug den fired an unlicensed M-14 rifle at the policemen who were about to enter his house to serve a search warrant. Held: If an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if the "other crime" is murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms becomes merely an aggravating circumstance, not a separate offense. Since direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was committed in this case, appellant can no longer be held liable for illegal possession of firearms. Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. In this case, the plain meaning of RA 8294's simple language is most favorable to herein appellant. Verily, no other interpretation is justified, for the language of the new law demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the accused. Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of 2 separate offenses of illegal possession of firearms and direct assault with attempted homicide. Since the crime committed was direct assault and not homicide or murder, illegal possession of firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating circumstance.
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5. ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCES • Alternative circumstances are those which must be taken into consideration as AGGRAVATING or MITIGATING according to the nature and effects of the crime and the other conditions attending its commission. Art. 15. Their concept. — Alternative circumstances are those which must be taken into consideration as aggravating or mitigating according to the nature and effects of the crime and the other conditions attending its commission. They are the relationship, intoxication and the degree of instruction and education of the offender. The alternative circumstance of relationship shall be taken into consideration when the offended party in the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural, or adopted brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degrees of the offender. The intoxication of the offender shall be taken into consideration as a mitigating circumstances when the offender has committed a felony in a state of intoxication, if the same is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit said felony but when the intoxication is habitual or intentional, it shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. The alternative circumstances are: a. RELATIONSHIP b. INTOXICATION c. DEGREE OF INSTRUCTION EDUCATION OF THE OFFENDER
AND
a. RELATIONSHIP This is taken into consideration when the offended party is the: a. spouse b. ascendant c. descendant d. legitimate, natural or adopted brother or sister e. relative by affinity in the same degree of the offender • As a rule, relationship is MITIGATING in crimes against property by analogy to the provisions of Art. 332. - Under Art. 332 of the RPC, no criminal, but only civil, liability shall result from commission of the crime of theft, swindling or malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses, ascendants, and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line; brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if living together. - Relationship becomes actually an exempting circumstance since there is no occasion to consider a mitigating or an aggravating circumstance because there is no criminal liability. ♣ It is aggravating in CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS in cases where the offended party is a relative of a higher degree than the offender, or when the offender and the offended party are relatives of the same level, as killing a brother, a brother-in-law, a half-brother or adopted brother. ♣ When the CRIME AGAINST PERSONS is any of the SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES (Art. 263), even if the
offended party is a descendant of the offender, relationship is an AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE. - But the serious physical injuries must not be inflicted by a parent upon his child by excessive chastisement. ♣ When the crime is less serious physical injuries or slight physical injuries, ordinary rule applies; relationship is MITIGATING if the offended party is a relative of lower degree and AGGRAVATING if the offended party is a relative of a higher degree than the offender. ♣ When the crime against persons is homicide or murder, relationship is aggravating even if the victim of the crime is a relative of lower degree. • Relationship is mitigating in trespass to dwelling. • Relationship is neither mitigating nor aggravating, when relationship is an element of the offense. • In crimes against chastity, relationship is always aggravating. - Because of the nature and effect of the crime committed, it is considered AGGRAVATING although the offended party is a relative of lower degree. People v. Atop (1998) Facts: 11-year-old Regina lives with her grandmother. Atop is the common-law husband of her grandmother. Atop was found guilty of 4 counts of rape which was committed in 1993 (2x), 1994 and 1995. The lower court took into account the AC of relationship. Held: The law cannot be stretched to include persons attached by common-law relations. In this case, there is no blood relationship or legal bond that links Atop to his victim.
People v. Marcos (2001) Facts: Virgilio arrived at the house of the Marcoses and proceeded to the artesian well (jetmatic) located just at the back of the house. Virgilio bent down to put on the ground the tools he was carrying. Cesar then came out of the kitchen door with a bolo in hand and suddenly hacked Virgilio from behind. Virgilio was hit on the nape of the neck which caused him to fall to the ground. Then Cesar hacked him again and this time Virgilio was hit on the right side of the head. Virgilio is the elder brother of Cesar. Held: In order that the alternative circumstance of relationship may be taken into consideration in the imposition of the proper penalty, the offended party must either be the (a) spouse, (b) ascendant, (c) descendant, (d) legitimate, natural or adopted brother or sister, or (e) relative by affinity in the same degree, of the offender. In the case at bar, Cesar and Virgilio Marcos are brothers. Accused likewise declared that Virgilio is his brother. That the victim is the elder brother of Cesar is likewise alleged in the Information. The rule is that relationship is aggravating in crimes against persons as when the offender and the offended party are relatives of the same level such as killing a brother. Thus, relationship was correctly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. b. INTOXICATION
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MITIGATING a. if intoxication is not habitual, or b. if intoxication is not subsequent to the plan to commit a felony. AGGRAVATING a. if intoxication is habitual; or b. if it is intentional (subsequent to the plan to commit a felony) - It is intentional when the offender drinks liquor fully knowing its effects, to find in the liquor a stimulant to commit a crime or a means to suffocate any remorse. • When the offender has committed a felony in a state of intoxication. - This clause means that the offender’s mental faculties must be affected by drunkenness. - The accused’s state of intoxication must be proved. WHEN THE INTOXICATION IS HABITUAL - A habitual drunkard is one given to intoxication by excessive use of intoxicating drinks. The habit should be actual and confirmed, but it is not necessary that it be continuous or by daily occurrence. People v. Renejane (1988) Facts: The accused was convicted for the crime of murder of 1 policeman and his companion. It was found that Renejane was with these 2 persons and some other people and they were having a drinking session when the incident took place. It was also found that the policeman apprehended Renejane a month before the incident of illegal possession of marijuana. Held: Drunkenness is not necessarily an aggravating circumstance. The fact that the accused drank liquor prior to the commission of the crime did not necessarily qualify such action as an aggravating circumstance. Intoxication is aggravating if it is habitual or intentional. There is no finding of either by the lower court. The affair was an ordinary drinking party. Neither can this be considered as a mitigating circumstance in the absence of proof that the intake of alcoholic drinks was of such quantity as to blur the appellant’s reason and deprive him of a certain degree of control. People v. Camano (1982) Facts: After the accused had been drinking liquor, he stabbed twice the victim Pascua with a bolo while the latter was walking along the barrio street. After hacking and stabbing to death the victim, the accused proceeded to the seashore and on finding Buenaflor hacked the latter with the same bolo. Held: Intoxication is mitigating if accidental, not habitual nor intentional, that is, no subsequent to the plan to commit the crime. It is aggravating if habitual or intentional. To be mitigating, it must be indubitably proved. A habitual drunkard is one given to intoxication by excessive use of intoxicating drinks. The habit should be actual and confirmed. It is unnecessary that it be a matter of daily occurrence. It lessens individual resistance to evil thought and undermines will-power making its victim a potential evil doer. The intoxication of the appellant not being habitual and considering that the said appellant was in a state of intoxication at the time of the commission of the felony, the alternative circumstance of intoxication should be considered mitigating.
c. DEGREE OF INSTRUCTION AND EDUCATION OF THE OFFENDER Low degree of instruction and education or lack of it is generally mitigating. High degree of instruction and education is aggravating, when the offender avails himself of his learning in committing the crime. LACK OF INSTRUCTION, AS MITIGATING - Lack of instruction cannot be taken into account where the defendant admitted that he studied in the first grade in a public elementary school. Art. 15 applies only to him who really has not received any instruction. • Not illiteracy alone, but also lack of sufficient intelligence are necessary to invoke the benefit of the alternative circumstance of lack of instruction, the determination of which is left to the trial court. • Lack of sufficient instruction is not mitigating when the offender is a city resident who knows how to sign his name. • Lack of instruction must be proved positively and directly and cannot be based on mere deduction or inference. • The question of lack of instruction cannot be raised for the first time in appellate court. • Ordinarily, LOW DEGREE OR LACK OF INSTRUCTION IS MITIGATING IN ALL CRIMES. Exceptions: (1) crimes against property such as estafa, theft, robbery arson except theft of large cattle and robbery with homicide. (2) crimes against chastity (3) treason – because love of country should be a natural feeling of every citizen, however unlettered or uncultured he may be (4) murder – because to kill is forbidden by natural law which every rational being is endowed to know and feel. HIGH DEGREE OF INSTRUCTION, AS AGGRAVATING Degree of instruction is aggravating when the offender availed himself or took advantage of it in committing the crime. ABSOLUTORY CAUSES AND OTHER SPECIAL SITUATIONS Absolutory causes are those where the act committed is a crime but for reasons of public policy and sentiment there is no penalty imposed. a.
ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION
ENTRAPMENT Ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreaker in the execution of his criminal plan The means originate from the mind of the criminal.
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INSTIGATION The instigator practically induces the would-be accused into the commission of the offense and himself becomes a coprincipal. The law enforcer conceives the commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who adopts the
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A person has planned or is about to commit a crime and ways and means are resorted to by a public officer to trap and catch the criminal. Not a bar to the prosecution and conviction of the lawbreaker.
idea and carries it into execution. A public officer or a private detective induces an innocent person to commit a crime and would arrest him upon or after the commission of the crime by the latter. The accused must be acquitted.
People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Ting (1931) Facts: Samson was the chief of customs secret service in Cebu and Natividad was the former collector of customs. He was instructed to make sure that the shipment containing opium shall be unloaded in the country. He went along the plan and then he informed the Philippine Constabulary of all that had taken place and they discussed a plan to capture the opium owners. Held: The mere fact that the chief of customs secret service pretended to agree to a plan for smuggling illegally imported opium through the customhouse, in order the better to assure the seizure of said opium and the arrest of its importers, is no bar to the prosecution and conviction of the accused. Samson did not induce nor instigate the accused to import the opium but merely pretended to have an understanding with the collector of customs. There is nothing immoral in this or against the public good which should prevent the government from prosecuting and punishing the culprits, for this is not a case where an innocent person is induced to commit a crime merely to prosecute him, but it is simply a trap set to catch a criminal.
Araneta v. CA (1986) Facts: Atty. Araneta was the hearing officer of the Dept. of Labor in Cabanatuan while Mrs. Yoyongco is the widow of a government employee. The latter went to see Araneta regarding her claim for death compensation and Araneta asked for P100 for her claim to be processed. The widow reported this to the PC and the PC decided to entrap Araneta. The entrapment was successful and Atty. Araneta was charged for violating the anti-graft law. Held: Entrapment is not a defense in a criminal case. It is different from instigation. There is instigation when the accused was induced to commit the crime. In entrapment, the mens rea originates from the mind of the criminal. Entrapment does not exempt the criminal from liability. People v. Pacis (2002) Facts: Atty. Yap, supervising agent of the Dangerous Drugs Division-NBI, received information that Pacis was offering to sell ½ kg of "shabu." A buy-bust operation was approved. Yap and Senior Agent Congzon, Jr., were assigned to handle the case. Yap, Congzon and the informant then went to the house of Pacis. The informant introduced Yap to Pacis as interested buyer. They negotiated the sale of ½ kg of shabu. It was agreed that payment and delivery of shabu would be made on the following day. The next day, the NBI agents and the informant went to Pacis's house as agreed. Pacis handed to Yap a paper bag with markings "yellow cab". When he opened the bag, Yap found a
transparent plastic bag with white crystalline substance inside. While examining it, Pacis asked for the payment. Yap instructed Congzon to get the money from the car. Congzon returned and gave the "boodle money" to Atty. Yap who handed the money to Pacis. Upon Pacis' receipt of the payment, the officers identified themselves as NBI agents and arrested him. Held: The operation that led to the arrest of appellant was an entrapment, not an instigation. In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. In instigation on the other hand, instigators practically induce the would-be defendant into the commission of the offense and become co-principals themselves. It has been held in numerous cases by this Court that entrapment is sanctioned by law as a legitimate method of apprehending criminal elements engaged in the sale and distribution of illegal drugs. b.
EFFECT OF PARDON
RPC, Art. 23. Effect of pardon by the offended party. — A pardon of the offended party does not extinguish criminal action except as provided in Article 344 of this Code; but civil liability with regard to the interest of the injured party is extinguished by his express waiver.
R.A. No. 8353. Anti-Rape Law of 1997. Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon - The subsequent valid marriage between the offender and the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed. In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty. Provided, That the crime shall be extinguish or the penalty shall not be abated if the marriage is void ab initio. ♣ A pardon by the offended party does not extinguish criminal action because a crime is an offense against the State. In criminal cases, the intervention of the aggrieved parties is limited to being witnesses for the prosecution. ♣ Compromise does not extinguish criminal liability. ♣ The offended party in crimes of adultery and concubinage cannot institute criminal prosecution, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders. - the pardon here may be implied, as continued inaction of the offended party after learning the offense. - both offenders must be pardoned by the offended party. c.
ABSOLUTORY CAUSES
Art. 6(3). - There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly or over acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than this own spontaneous desistance. Art. 7. When light felonies are punishable. — Light felonies are punishable only when they have been
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consummated, with the exception of those committed against person or property. Art. 16. Who are criminally liable. — The following are criminally liable for grave and less grave felonies: 1. Principals. 2. Accomplices. 3. Accessories. Art. 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability. — The penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such with respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees, with the single exception of accessories falling within the provisions of paragraph 1 of the next preceding article. Art. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. — Any legally married person who having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro. If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt from punishment. These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents with respect to their daughters under eighteen years of age, and their seducer, while the daughters are living with their parents. Any person who shall promote or facilitate the prostitution of his wife or daughter, or shall otherwise have consented to the infidelity of the other spouse shall not be entitled to the benefits of this article. Art. 280. Qualified trespass to dwelling. — Any private person who shall enter the dwelling of another against the latter's will shall be punished by arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos. If the offense be committed by means of violence or intimidation, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos. The provisions of this article shall not be applicable to any person who shall enter another's dwelling for the purpose of preventing some serious harm to himself, the occupants of the dwelling or a third person, nor shall it be applicable to any person who shall enter a dwelling for the purpose of rendering some service to humanity or justice, nor to anyone who shall enter cafes, taverns, inn and other public houses, while the same are open. Art. 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability. — No criminal, but only civil liability, shall result from the commission of the crime of theft, swindling or malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by the following persons: 1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line. 2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property which belonged to the deceased spouse before the same shall have passed into the possession of another; and
3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if living together. The exemption established by this article shall not be applicable to strangers participating in the commission of the crime. Art. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness. — The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse. The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders. The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above named persons, as the case may be. In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape, the marriage of the offender with the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed upon him. The provisions of this paragraph shall also be applicable to the co-principals, accomplices and accessories after the fact of the above-mentioned crimes. d. ACTS NOT COVERED BY LAW AND IN CASE OF EXCESSIVE PUNISHMENT Art. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. — Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the subject of legislation. In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense. People v. Veneracion (1995) Facts: The accused was found guilty of the crime of Rape with Homicide. The instant petition raised the issue whether or not the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he failed or refused to impose the mandatory penalty of death under RA 7659 Held: The law plainly and unequivocably provides that “when by reason or on the occasion of rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death. Courts are not concerned with wisdom, efficacy or morality of law. The discomfort faced by those forced by law to impose death penalty is an ancient one, but it is a matter upon which judges have no choice. The Rules of Court mandates that after an adjudication of guilt, the judges should impose the proper penalty and civil liability provided for by the law on the accused.
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V. PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE Art. 16. Who are criminally liable. — The following are criminally liable for grave and less grave felonies: 1. Principals. 2. Accomplices. 3. Accessories. The following are criminally liable for light felonies: 1. Principals 2. Accomplices. ♣ The treble division of persons criminally responsible for an offense rests upon the very nature of their participation in the commission of the crime. ♣ The ACCESSORIES are not liable for light felonies because in the commission of light felonies, the social wrong as well as the individual prejudice is so small that penal sanction is deemed not necessary for accessories RULES RELATIVE TO LIGHT FELONIES: a. Light felonies are punishable only when they have been consummated. b. But when light felonies are committed against persons or property, the are punishable even if they are only in the attempted or frustrated stage of the execution. c. Only principals and accomplices are liable for light felonies. d. Accessories are not liable for light felonies, even if they are committed against persons or property. ♣ Only natural persons can be the active subject of crime because of the highly personal nature of the criminal responsibility. ♣ Only a natural person can be the offender because: a. The RPC requires that the culprit should have acted with personal malice or negligence. An artificial or juridical person cannot act with malice or negligence. b. A juridical person, like a corporation, cannot commit a crime in which a willful purpose or a malicious intent is required. c. There is substitution of deprivation of liberty (subsidiary imprisonment) for pecuniary penalties in case of in case of insolvency of the accused. d. Other penalties consisting in imprisonment and other deprivation of liberty like destierro, can be executed only against individuals. ♣ Officers, not the corporation, are criminally liable. ♣ Juridical persons are criminally liable under certain special laws. ♣ In all crimes there are always 2 parties: ACTIVE (the criminal) and PASSIVE (the injured party). A. PRINCIPALS Art. 17. Principals. — The following are considered principals: 1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act; 2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it;
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have been accomplished. • When a single individual commits a crime, there is no difficulty in determining his participation in the commission thereof. • But when 2 or more persons are involved, it is necessary to determine the participation of each. PAR. 1. – PRINCIPALS BY DIRECT PARTICIPATION The principal by direct participation PERSONALLY TAKES PART IN THE EXECUTION OF THE ACT constituting the crime. • Two or more persons who took part in the commission of the crime are principals by direct participation, when the following requisites are present: 1. That they participated in the criminal resolution 2. That they carried out their plan and personally took part in its execution by acts which directly tended to the same end. First requisite – Participation in the criminal resolution • Two or more persons are said to have participated in the criminal resolution when they were in conspiracy at the time of the commission of the crime. • It is well settled that a person may be convicted for the criminal act of another where, between them, there has been conspiracy or unity of purpose and intention in the commission of the crime charged. CONSPIRACY • A conspiracy exists when 2 or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. • The conspiracy contemplated in the first requisite is not a felony, but only a manner of incurring criminal liability. • In order to hold an accused guilty as coprincipal by reason of conspiracy, it must be established that he performed an over act in furtherance of the conspiracy, either by actively participating in the actual commission of the crime, or by lending moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the scene of the crime, or by exerting moral ascendancy over the rest of the conspirators as to move them to executing the conspiracy. • Mere knowledge without cooperation or agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute conspiracy. • Silence does not make one a conspirator • The existence of conspiracy does not require necessarily an agreement for an appreciable length of time prior to the execution of its purpose, since from the legal viewpoint, conspiracy exists if, at the time of the commission of the offense, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution. • Conspiracy arises on the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith decide to pursue it. • Formal agreement or previous acquaintance among several persons not necessary in conspiracy. • Must be established by positive and conclusive evidence. • When there is no conspiracy, each of the offenders is liable only for the act performed by him.
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∞ It is not enough that a person participated in the assault made by another in order to consider him a co-principal in the crime committed. He must also participate in the criminal resolution of the other. ∞ When there is conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. There is collective criminal responsibility. ∞ Conspiracy may cover persons previously undetermined. ∞ A person in conspiracy with others, who had desisted before the crime was committed by the other, is not criminally liable. ∞ When there is conspiracy, it is not necessary to ascertain the specific act of each conspirator. ∞ There could be no conspiracy to commit an offense through negligence. ∞ In cases of criminal negligence or crimes punishable by special law, allowing or failing to prevent an act to be performed by another, makes one a coprincipal. Second requisite – that the culprits “carried out their plan and personally took part in its execution, by acts which directly tended to the same end.” ∞ The principals by direct participation must be at the scene of the crime, personally taking part in its execution. ∞ The acts of each offender must directly tend to the same end. ∞ One serving as guard pursuant to the conspiracy is a principal by direct participation. ∞ When the second requisite is lacking, there is only conspiracy. People v. Nunag (1989) Facts: The victim claimed that while she was standing outside the house of her neighbor peeping through an open window to watch a TV program, Nunag came towards her appearing to be drunk. Nunag, threatening to kill her, led her to a nearby ricefield. Later, they were joined by the other 4 accused. Nunag then undressed her and had sexual intercourse with her. Mandap followed and she lost consciousness after. She regained consciousness only when Manalili was abusing her. Held: Accused Nunag, Mandap and Manalili are found guilty of 3 distinct and separate crimes of rape. They being principals by direct participation while the other 2 accused as principals by indispensable cooperation since there is no sufficient evidence that the latter also had sexual intercourse with the victim. The victim lost consciousness and only assumed that the two also raped her. People v. Dela Cerna (1967) Facts: Rafael filed an ejectment suit against dela Cerna’s father wherein the court ruled in his favor. Later he was shot by the accused while the former and his family were bringing sacks of corn. He was taken away by his family to tend his wounds but Dela Cerna and company followed them and Rafael was shot again resulting to his death. Maquiling, one companion of Dela Cerna, shot Casiano, a relative of Rafael. Held: Dela Cerna cannot be held liable for the death of Casiano because the conspiracy was to kill Rafael only. The rule has always been: co-conspirators are liable only for acts done pursuant to the conspiracy; for other acts done outside the contemplation of the coconspirators or which are not the necessary and logical consequence of the intended crime, only the actual
perpetrators are liable. Although Maquiling got the gun from Dela Cerna, the latter only gave it to the former as per their agreement to shoot Rafael As to the other companions, facts prove their active participation in the killing. They are all principals. People v. Dacillo (supra) Facts: Pacot stabbed and strangled Rosemarie leading to the latters death. Dacillo for his part, hold down Rosemarie’s legs to prevent her from struggling. The two men stopped only when they were sure that the victim was already dead. Dacillo then encase her corpse in a cement. Held:. Two or more persons taking part in the commission of a crime are considered principals by direct participation if the following requisites are present: 1. they participated in the criminal resolution and 2. they carried out their plan and personally took part in its execution by acts which directly tended to the same end. Both requisites were met in this case. Further Dacillo’s admission that he participated in the commission of the crime by holding Rosemarie’s legs made him a principal by direct participation. PAR. 2. – PRINCIPALS BY INDUCTION “Those who directly force or induce others to commit it.” ∞ The principal by induction becomes liable only when the principal by direct participation committed the act induced. 2 WAYS OF BECOMING PRINCIPAL BY INDUCTION 1) BY DIRECTLY FORCING ANOTHER TO COMMIT A CRIME a. By using IRRESISTIBLE FORCE b. By causing UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR 2) BY DIRECTLY INDUCING ANOTHER TO COMMIT A CRIME. a. By giving price, or offering reward or promise. b. By using words of command. REQUISITES: 1. That the inducement be made directly with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime; and a. A thoughtless expression without intention to produce the result is not an inducement to commit a crime. b. The inducement may be by acts of command, advice, or through influence, or agreement for consideration. 2. That such inducement be the determining cause of the commission of the crime by the material executor. - The words of advice of the influence must have actually moved the hands of the principal by direct participation. PRINCIPAL BY PROPOSAL TO COMMIT INDUCEMENT THE FELONY There is an inducement to commit a crime. The principal by The mere proposal to inducement becomes liable commit a felony is only when the crime is punishable in treason and committed by the principal rebellion. The person to
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by direct participation.
The inducement involves any crime
whom the proposal is made should not commit the crime; otherwise, the proponent becomes a principal by inducement. The proposal to be punishable must involve only treason or rebellion.
EFFECTS OF ACQUITTAL OF PRINCIPAL BY DIRECT PARTICIPATION UPON THE LIABILITY OF PRINCIPAL BY INDUCEMENT 1) Conspiracy is negated by the acquittal of codefendant. 2) One cannot be held guilty of having instigated the commission of a crime without first being shown that the crime has been actually committed by another. People v. Dela Cruz (1980) Facts: Dela Cruz met with Salip and a couple of other men when he proposed to them the killing of Antonio Yu and the kidnapping of the latter’s brother for a ransom. A group of men sailed for Basilan where they met with Salip. They proceeded to the accused’s house where the accused informed the group of the whereabouts of the Chinese brothers and other details of the plan. The group was able to kidnap and detain the brother for a short while before he attempted to escape and was shot by one of the men. Held: The contention of the accused that since he did not take part in the commission of the crime, conspiracy does not exist, is untenable. The requisites necessary in order that a person may be convicted as principal by inducement are present. Without Dela Cruz, the crime would not have been conceived, much less committed. Clearly, he was the principal by induction. US v. Indianan (1913) Facts: Indianan was the HEADMAN of the district of Parang. He ordered his subordinates to seize Sariol (victim) and bring the latter to Indianan. The victim was detained by Indianan until nightfall, then Indianan ordered his subordinates to take Sariol to an isolated place and kill him. Indianan bolstered his command by claiming that he had an order from the governor that Sariol be executed. Indianan’s subordinates took Sariol to a cemetery and killed him. Held: Indianan had a very powerful influence over his subordinates based on TRADITION AND CUSTOM as well as his representation that he had an order from the governor. Hence, his power over them was such that any order issued by him had the force and efficacy of physical coercion. The domination of Indianan was such as to make him responsible for whatever they did in obedience to such orders. He is a principal by inducement. PAR. 3. – PRINCIPALS BY INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION “Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have been accomplished.” 1.
REQUISITES: Participation in the criminal resolution, that is, there is either anterior conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and intention immediately
2.
before the commission of the crime charged; and Cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing another act, without which it would not have been accomplished.
v To be liable as principals, the offender must fall under any of the three concepts defined in Article 17. v There is collective criminal responsibility when the offenders are criminally liable in the same manner and to the same extent. The penalty to be imposed must be the same for all. v Principals by direct participation have collective criminal responsibility. Principal by induction, except that who directly forced another to commit a crime, and principal by direct participation have collective criminal responsibility. Principal by indispensable cooperation has collective criminal responsibility with the principal by direct participation. People v. Montealegre (1988) Facts: Abadilla was eating at a restaurant when he detected the smell of marijuana smoke coming from a nearby table. Intending to call a policeman, he went outside and saw a police and reported the matter. The police approached the table and held Montealgre and Capalad. Capalad suddenly pulled out his knife and started stabbing the police at the back. The police released the 2 in order to draw his gun but Montealegre restrained the police so that Capalad may continue stabbing. The 3 grappled and the police was able to draw his gun and fired at the 2 assailants. A chase ensued. Capalad was shot which resulted to his death. The police also died because of the wounds inflicted by Capalad. Held: The accused was correctly considered a co-principal for having collaborated with Capalad in the killing of the police officer. The 2 acted in concert. Even if the accused did not himself commit the act of stabbing, he is nonetheless equally guilty thereof for having prevented the police from resisting the attack against him. The accused was a principal by indispensable cooperation. B. ACCOMPLICES Art. 18. Accomplices. — Accomplices are those persons who, not being included in Art. 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts. ♣ In quasi-collective criminal responsibility, some of the offenders in the crime are principals and the others are accomplices. ♣ The participation of an accomplice presupposes the commission of the crime b the principal by direct participation. ♣ When there is no conspiracy between or among the defendants but they were animated by one and the same purpose to accomplish the criminal objective, those who cooperated by previous or simultaneous act but cannot be held liable as principals are accomplices. ♣ An accomplice does not have a previous agreement or understanding or is not in conspiracy with the principal by direct participation. CONSPIRATOR ACCOMPLICE They know and agree with the criminal design.
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Conspirators know the criminal intention because they themselves have decided upon such course of action. Conspirators decide that a crime should be committed. Conspirators are the authors of a crime
1.
2.
3.
Accomplices come to know about it after the principals have reached the decision and only then do they agree to cooperate in its execution. Accomplices merely assent to the plan and cooperate in it accomplishment Accomplices are merely instruments who perform acts not essential to the perpetration of the offense.
REQUISITES: That there be community of design; that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; That he cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts, with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and That there be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice.
♣ The community of design need not be to commit the crime actually committed. It is sufficient if there was a common purpose to commit a particular crime and that the crime actually committed was a natural or probable consequence of the intended crime. ♣ The cooperation of an accomplice is not due to a conspiracy. ♣ When the acts of the accused are not indispensable in the killing, they are merely accomplices. ♣ The accomplice merely supplies the principal with material or moral aid without conspiracy with the latter. ♣ The wounds inflicted by an accomplice in crimes against persons should mot have caused the death of the victim. RULES: 1. The one who had the original criminal design is the person who committed the resulting crime. 2. The accomplice, after concurring in the criminal purpose of the principal, cooperates by previous or simultaneous acts. When the cooperation is by simultaneous act, the accomplice takes part while the crime is being committed by the principal by direct participation or immediately thereafter. 3. The accomplice in crimes against persons does not inflict the more or most serious wounds. ♣ The moral aid may be through advice, encouragement or agreement. ♣ There must be a relation between the criminal act of the principal and the act of the one charged as accomplice. PRINCIPAL by COOPERATION Cooperation
ACCOMPLICE is
Cooperation
is
not
indispensable in the commission of the act.
indispensable in the commission of the act.
People v. Mandolado (supra) Held: An accomplice cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts, provided he has no direct participation in its execution or does not force or induce others to commit it, or his cooperation is not indispensable to its accomplishment. In the case at bar, Ortillano, by his acts showed knowledge of the criminal design of Mandolado. He was present when the latter tried to attack the driver of the Ford Fiera with a knife and fired at the vehicle hitting a female passenger. When Mandolado cocked his gun and ordered Tenorio to stop the jeep, their 2 other companion, Simon and Erinada, immediately jumped off the jeep and ran away but Ortillano stayed. In a display of unity with Mandolado, Ortillano fired his armalite while they were riding in the jeep of the victim. And Ortillano’s act of firing his gun towards the ground manifested his concurrence with the criminal intent. In other words, his simultaneous acts supplied moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way. His presence served to encourage Mandolado, the principal, or to increase the odds against the victims. People v. Doctolero (1991) Facts: The 3 accused, Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio (all surnamed Doctolero) threw stones at Sagun’s house and called to all the men in the house to come out. Epifiana and Lolita and Jonathan (1 ½ year old child of Lolita) were struck and stabled by the accused inside the house of Sagun. Epifiana and Lolita died while Jonathan was slightly injured. The same accused while already on the road, hacked and stabbed Marcelo which caused his death. Held: There is no question that while the 3 accused were still stoning at the house, they heard the 2 women protesting and Ludovico went inside and brutally killed the 2 women inside the room of the said house. It is impossible to claim that Virgilio and Conrado did not know what their brother was doing. They knew and they just stood by and did nothing to stop their brother. Their presence gave Ludovico encouragement in the commission of the crime. Thus, the 2 are accomplices. Once can be an accomplice even if he did not know of the actual crime intended b the principal provided he was aware that it was an illicit act. People v. Roche (2000) Facts: Roderick and Rodel Ferol were having drinks with a friend named Bobot inside the Ferol compound. Without any warning, Roche and Gregorio barged into the compound. Gregorio tried to hit Rodel with an empty beer bottle but failed because his common-law wife, Helen, pulled him away on time. Roderick however was stabbed on the back with an ice pick by Roche. Roderick ran towards the house of his friend Bobot but outside the compound, Caballes caught up with him. Roderick fell to the ground and was repeatedly stabbed with a knife by Caballes. One Rossel tried to stop Caballes but he was chased by the latter. A brother of the victim, Jon-Jon, threw bottles at Caballes, forcing the latter to run away, and leave his victim behind. Roderick was then taken to his house by Rogelio and Jon-Jon. But at the time, Roderick was already dead. Held: Roche can not be held liable as an accomplice for the crime charged. There is no evidence
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to show that he performed any previous or simultaneous act to assist Caballes in killing Roderick. It has not been proven that he was aware of Caballes’ plan to attack and kill Roderick. Absent any evidence to create the moral certainty required to convict Roche, the court cannot uphold the trial court’s finding of guilt. People v. Pilola (2003) Facs: Joselito, Julian, Edmar and Odilon were having a drinking spree. In the course of their drinking, an altercation between Edmar and Julian ensued. Edmar and Odilon then left the store. Joselito and Julian were also about to leave when Edmar and Odilon returned, blocking their way. Edmar punched Julian in the face. The two then traded fist blows. For his part, Odilon positioned himself on top of a pile of hollow blocks and watched as Edmar and Julian swapped punches. Joselito tried to placate the protagonists but his intervention apparently did not sit well with Odilon. He pulled out his knife with his right hand and stepped down from his perch. He placed his left arm around Joselito's neck, and stabbed the latter. Ronnie and the appellant Pilola, who were across the street, saw their gangmate Odilon stabbing the victim and decided to join the fray. They pulled out their knives, rushed to the scene and stabbed Joselito. The victim fell in the canal. Odilon and the appellant fled. Before running away from the scene, Ronnie picked up a piece of hollow block and with it bashed Joselito's head. Not content, Ronnie got a piece of broken bottle and struck Joselito once more. Joselito died on the spot. Held: To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two elements must concur: (a) the community of criminal design; that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (b) the performance of previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission of the crime. Accomplices come to know about the criminal resolution of the principal by direct participation after the principal has reached the decision to commit the felony and only then does the accomplice agree to cooperate in its execution. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed; they merely assent to the plan of the principal by direct participation and cooperate in its accomplishment. However, where one cooperates in the commission of the crime by performing overt acts which by themselves are acts of execution, he is a principal by direct participation, and not merely an accomplice All things considered, it was ruled that Ronnie and the appellant conspired with Odilon to kill the victim; hence, all of them are criminally liable for the latter's death. The appellant is not merely an accomplice but is a principal by direct participation. Even assuming that the appellant did not conspire with Ronnie and Odilon to kill the victim, the appellant is nevertheless criminally liable as a principal by direct participation. The stab wounds inflicted by him cooperated in bringing about and accelerated the death of the victim or contributed materially thereto. People v. Garcia (2002) Facts: Valler and Garcia kidnapped Atty. Tioleco for the purpose of extorting ransom. Lariba and Rogel were caught by police officers inside the house where a handcuffed and blinfolded Atty. Tioleco was detained. Both were unarmed although guns inside the house are available for their possession. Held: Lariba and Rogel, were merely guarding the house for the purpose of either helping the other accused-appellants in facilitating the successful
denouement to the crime or repelling any attempt to rescue the victim, as shown by the availability of arms and ammunition to them. They thus cooperated in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts by means of which they aided or facilitated the execution of the crime but without any indispensable act for its accomplishment. Under Art. 18 of The Revised Penal Code, they are mere accomplices. C. ACCESSORIES Art. 19. Accessories. — Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any of the following manners: 1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime. 2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery. 3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. An accessory does not participate in the criminal design, nor cooperate in the commission of the felony, but, with knowledge of the commission of the crime, he subsequently takes part in 3 ways: a) by profiting from the effects of the crime; b) by concealing the body, effects or instruments of the crime in order to prevent its discovery; and c) by assisting in the escape or concealment of the principal of the crime, provided he acts with abuse of his public functions or the principal is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilt of some other crime. “knowledge of the commission of the crime” ♣ Mere possession of stolen property does not make the accused an accessory where the thief was already convicted. ♣ Entertaining suspicion that a crime has been committed is not enough. ♣ Knowledge of the commission of the crime may be established by circumstantial evidence “commission of the crime” ♣ the crime committed by the principal must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. “without having participated therein either as principals or accomplices” “take part subsequent to its commission” ♣ The accessory takes part AFTER the crime has been committed. SPECIFIC ACTS OF THE ACCESSORIES 1.
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BY PROFITING THEMSELVES OR ASSISTING THE OFFENDER TO PROFIT BY THE EFFECTS OF THE CRIME
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- The accessory must receive the property from the principal. He should not take it without the consent of the principal, or else, he is not an accessory but a principal in the crime of theft. - When is profiting by the effect of the crime punished as the act of principal, and not the act of accessory? When a person knowingly acquired or received property taken by the brigands. 2.
BY CONCEALING OR DESTROYING THE BODY OF THE CRIME TO PREVENT ITS DISCOVERY.
BODY OF THE CRIME –“corpus delicti” which means that a specific offense was in fact committed by someone 3.
BY HARBORING, CONCEALING ASSISTING IN THE ESCAPE OF PRINCIPAL OF THE CRIME
OR THE
2 CLASSES: a. Public officers who harbor conceal or assist in the escape of the principal of any crime (not light felony) with abuse of his public functions REQUISITES: (1) The accessory is a public officer; (2) He harbors, conceals, or assists in the escape of the principal; (3) The public officer acts with abuse of his public functions. (4) The crime committed by the principal is any crime, provided it is not a light felony. b. Private persons who harbor, conceal or assist in the escape of the author of the crime – guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt against the life of the President, or who is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. REQUISITES: (1) The accessory is a private person. (2) He harbors, conceals or assists in the escape of the author of the crime. (3) The crime committed by the principal is either: (a) treason, (b) parricide, (c) murder, (d) attempt against the life of the president, or (e) that the principal is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1612 ANTI-FENCING LAW OF 1979 WHEREAS, reports from law enforcement agencies reveal that there is rampant robbery and thievery of government and private properties; WHEREAS, such robbery and thievery have become profitable on the part of the lawless elements because of the existence of ready buyers, commonly known as fence, of stolen properties; WHEREAS, under existing law, a fence can be prosecuted only as an accessory after the fact and punished lightly; WHEREAS, is imperative to impose heavy penalties on persons who profit by the effects of the crimes of robbery and theft. NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines by virtue of the powers vested in
me by the Constitution, do hereby order and decree as part of the law of the land the following: Section 1. Title. This decree shall be known as the Anti-Fencing Law. Section 2. Definition of Terms. The following terms shall mean as follows: (a) "Fencing" is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. (b) "Fence" includes any person, firm, association corporation or partnership or other organization who/which commits the act of fencing. Section 3. Penalties. Any person guilty of fencing shall be punished as hereunder indicated: (a) The penalty of prision mayor, if the value of the property involved is more than 12,000 pesos but not exceeding 22,000 pesos; if the value of such property exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, the penalty shall be termed reclusion temporal and the accessory penalty pertaining thereto provided in the Revised Penal Code shall also be imposed. (b) The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the value of the property robbed or stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but not exceeding 12,000 pesos. (c) The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the property involved is more than 200 pesos but not exceeding 6,000 pesos. (d) The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if the value of the property involved is over 50 pesos but not exceeding 200 pesos. (e) The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period if such value is over five (5) pesos but not exceeding 50 pesos. (f) The penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period if such value does not exceed 5 pesos. Section 4. Liability of Officials of Juridical Persons. If the fence is a partnership, firm, corporation or association, the president or the manager or any officer thereof who knows or should have known the commission of the offense shall be liable. Section 5. Presumption of Fencing. Mere possession of any good, article, item, object, or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing. Section 6. Clearance/Permit to Sell/Used Second Hand Articles. For purposes of this Act, all stores, establishments or entities dealing in the buy and sell of any good, article item, object of anything of value obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof, shall before offering the same for sale to the public, secure the necessary clearance or permit from the station commander of the Integrated National Police in the town or city where such store, establishment or entity is located. The Chief of Constabulary/Director General, Integrated National Police shall promulgate such rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of this section. Any person who fails to secure the clearance or permit required by this section or who violates any of the provisions of the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder shall upon conviction be punished as a fence.
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Section 7. Repealing Clause. All laws or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. Section 8. Effectivity. This Decree shall take effect upon approval. Done in the City of Manila, this 2nd day of March, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-nine.
ACCESSORY DISTINGUISHED FROM PRINCIPAL AND FROM ACCOMPLICE 1. The accessory does not take direct part or cooperate in, or induce, the commission of the crime. 2. The accessory does not cooperate in the commission of the offense by acts either prior thereto or simultaneous therewith. 3. That the participation of the accessory in all cases always takes place after the commission of the crime. Art. 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability. — The penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such with respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees, with the single exception of accessories falling within the provisions of paragraph 1 of the next preceding article. ♣ The exemption is based on the ties of blood and the preservation of the cleanliness of one’s name, which compels one to conceal crimes committed by relatives. ♣ An ACESSORY is exempt from criminal liability, when the principal is his: 1. spouse, 2. ascendant, 3. descendant, 4. legitimate, natural or adopted brother, sister or relative by affinity within the same degree. - even if only two of the principals guilty of murder are the brothers of the accessory and the others are not related to him, such accessory is exempt from criminal liability. - a nephew or niece is not included ♣ An accessory is NOT liability even if the principal is accessory (1) PROFITED by the (2) assisted the offender to the crime
EXEMPT from criminal related to him, if such effects of the crime, or profit by the effects of
People v. Talingdan (1978) Facts: Bernardo and Teresa lived together but for quite some time their relationship has gotten bitter. Bernardo knew that Teresa had an illicit relationship with Talingdan. Their child testified that on the day the killing occurred, there were 4 men inside their house and Bernardo knew about it but continued plowing his field. Later, when Bernardo came inside the kitchen, Talingdan and Tobias fired at Bernardo and the 4 climbed the stairs of the Batalan. Seeing that the victim was alive they fired at him again. Teresa came out after from her room and pulled her child to question her. Teresa threatened to kill her if she would reveal the incident. Held: One who conceals or assists in the escape of the principal in the crime can be held guilty as accessory. There is morally convincing proof that Teresa
is an accessory to the offense. She was inside the room when her husband was shot. As she came out after the shooting, she inquired from the child if she was able to recognize the assailants and when the latter identified the 4 accused as the culprits, Teresa did not only enjoin her daughter not to reveal what she knew to anyone but she went to the extent of warning her not to tell anyone or else she would kill her. Later when the police came, she claimed she had no suspects in mind. She, thus, became active in her cooperation with the 4 accused. People v. Tolentino (2002) Facts: Wilfredo Tolentino hit Herman Sagario with a piece of wood and later stabbed him with a bolo. Wilfedo then instructed appellant Jonathan Fabros and Merwin Ledesma to help him bring Hernan out of the house. Wilfredo held him by the neck while both appellant and Merwin grasped his feet. They then carried Hernan towards a creek. Appellant assisted Wilfredo out of fear and when he noticed that Sagario regained conciousness, he ran away towards a banana plantation. Wilfredo then stab Sagario on the different parts of his body causing his death. Thereafter, Wilfredo pushed and waded Sagario on the water. Held: Appellant Jonathan Fabros cannot be convicted as an accessory. Under paragraph 2 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, the concealment or the destruction of the body of the crime or of the effects or the instruments thereof must have been done in order to prevent the discovery of the crime. That, precisely, is wanting in the present case. Appellant was afraid that his co-accused would hurt him if he refused so he agreed to assist the latter in carrying the victim towards the river. The fact that appellant left thereafter likewise indicated his innocence of the charge. Verily, he adequately explained his conduct prior to the stabbing incident as one born of fear for his own life. It is not incredible for an eyewitness to a crime, especially if unarmed, to desist from assisting the victim if to do so would put the former's life in peril. People v. Mariano (2000) Facts: Ruth and their maid Michelle often engaged in a physical fight. The fight usually ends with Ruth pouring boiling water on Michelle. During their fights which number to at least 6 times a month, Ruth would bang Michelle’s head and pull on her hair. Michelle subsequently died as a result. Ruth placed the body of Michelle in a box which she then loaded inside the luggage compartment of her sister Ruby’s car. Ruth and Ruby were both convicted of murder by the trial court. Held: Ruby is the sister of Ruth. As such, their relationship exempts Ruby from criminal liability under Art. 20 of the Revised Penal Code —ARTICLE 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability.—The penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such with respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees, with the single exception of accessories falling within the provisions of paragraph 1 of the preceding article (emphasis supplied). The reason for exemption is obvious; it is based on ties of blood and the preservation of the cleanliness of one's name, which compels one to conceal crimes committed by relatives so near as those mentioned in the above-quoted article. Ruby Mariano is acquitted.
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V. PENALTIES
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Penalty is the suffering that is inflicted by the State for the transgression of a law. Different Juridical Conditions of Penalty: 1. Must be PRODUCTIVE OF SUFFERING, without however affecting the integrity of the human personality. 2. Must be COMMENSURATE with the offense – different crimes must be punished with different penalties. 3. Must be PERSONAL – no one should be punished for the crime of another. 4. Must be LEGAL – it is the consequence of a judgment according to law. 5. Must be CERTAIN – no one may escape its effects. 6. Must be EQUAL for all. 7. Must be CORRECTIONAL. ∗ The purpose of the State in punishing crimes is TO SECURE JUSTICE. Penal justice must therefore be exercised by the State in the service and satisfaction of a duty and rests primarily on the moral rightfulness of the punishment inflicted. Theories justifying penalty: a. PREVENTION – to suppress danger to the State b. SELF-DEFENSE – to protect the society from the threat and wrong inflicted by the criminal. c. REFORMATION – to correct and reform the offender. d. EXEMPLARITY – to serve as an example to deter others from committing crimes. e. JUSTICE – for retributive justice, a vindication of absolute right and moral law violated by the criminal. Purpose of penalty under the RPC: a. RETRIBUTION OR EXPIATION – the penalty is commensurate with the gravity of the offense. b. CORRECTION OR REFORMATION – as shown by the rules which regulate the execution of the penalties consisting in deprivation of liberty. c. SOCIAL DEFENSE – shown by its inflexible severity to recidivist and habitual delinquents. A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES NO ex post facto laws Art. 21. Penalties that may be imposed. — No felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission. ∗ This article prohibits the Government from punishing any person for any felony with any penalty which has not been prescribed by the law. ∗ It has no application to any of the provisions of the RPC for the reason that for every felony defined in the Code, a penalty has been prescribed. ∗ REASON: An act or omission cannot be punished by the State if at the time it was committed there was no law prohibiting it, because a law cannot be rationally obeyed unless it is first shown, and a man cannot be expected to obey an order that has not been given.
1987 CONSTITUTION Section 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations. (2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted. Section 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. Section 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax. Section 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted. In Re: Kay Villegas Kami (1970) Facts: Petition for declaratory relief challenging the validity of Sec. 8 of RA 6132 on the ground that it violates due process, right of association, freedom of expression and that it is an ex post facto law. Held: An ex post facto law is one which: 1. makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act. 2. aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was when committed; 3. changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed; 4. alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense; 5. assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful; and 6. deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. The constitutional inhibition refers only to criminal laws which are given retroactive effect. While it is true that Sec. 18 penalizes a violation of any provision of RA 6132 including Sec. 8 thereof, the penalty is imposed only for acts committed after the approval of the law and not those perpetrated prior thereto. People v. Ferrer (1972) WON the Anti-subversion Act is a bill of attainder? The trial court ruled that the Act is a bill of attainder because it “tars and feathers” the communist party as a “continuing menace to the freedom and security of the country.” Held: A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without a trial. The Act simply declares the Communist Party to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the government. Its focus is not on the individuals but on the conduct. It is not enough that the statute specify persons or groups in order that it may be called a bill of attainder. It is necessary that it must apply retroactively and reach past conduct. This requirement follows from the nature of a bill of attainder as a legislative adjudication of guilt.
OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITIONS
People v. Bracamonte (1996)
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Facts: Violeta and her common law husband, Clark Din, arrived home and 3 men rushing out of the house. Inside the house, they found their maid hands tied with her mouth gagged and bathed in her own blood. Thereafter, they saw their son in the kitchen his head and body immersed in a pail of water, dead. Held: To impose upon the accused the death penalty reimposed by RA 7659 which took effect on Dec. 31, 1993 for a crime committed back on Sep. 23, 1987 would violate the basic rule in criminal law that, if the new law imposes a heavier penalty, the law in force at the time of the commission of the offense shall be applied. People v. Valdez (1999) Facts: Accused was convicted by the RTC and sentenced him to death for the complex crime of Multiple Murder with Double Frustrated Murder, and likewise separately sentenced him to suffer the prison term of reclusion perpetua for the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms (PD 1866) Held: There can be no separate conviction of the crime of illegal possession under PD 1866 in view of the amendments introduced by RA 8294 wherein illegal possession being merely taken as an aggravating circumstance to other crimes committed. Insofar as RA 8294 will spare the accused from a separate conviction for the crime of illegal possession, it may be given retroactive effect. PROSPECTIVITY; EXCEPTION RPC, Art. 21. Penalties that may be imposed. — No felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission. Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. — Penal Laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same. CIVIL CODE, Art. 14. Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in the Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty stipulations. GENERAL RULE: TO GIVE CRIMINAL LAWS PROSPECTIVE EFFECT Exception: to give them retroactive effect when favorable to the accused. Reason for the exception: The sovereign, in enacting a subsequent penal law more favorable to the accused, has recognized that the greater severity of the former law is unjust. The sovereign would be inconsistent if it would still enforce its right under conditions of the former law, which has already been regarded by conscientious public opinion as juridical burdensome. ∗ The favorable retroactive effect of a new law may find the defendant in one of these 3 situations: a. The crime has been committed and prosecution begins; b. Sentence has been passed but service has not begun;
c. The sentence is being carried out. ∗ When the culprit is HABITUAL DELINQUENT, he is not entitled to the benefit of the provisions of the new favorable statute. ∗ A person shall be deemed to be a HABITUAL DELINQUENT if within a period of 10 years from the date of his release of last conviction of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robbery, theft, estafa or falsification, he is found guilt of an said crimes a third time or oftener. ∗ The principle against retroactivity does not apply to civil liability. - but a new law increasing the civil liability cannot be given retroactive effect. ∗ The provisions of this article are applicable even to special laws which provide more favorable conditions to the accused. ∗ Criminal liability under the former law is obliterated when the repeal is absolute. ∗ Criminal liability under the repealed law subsists: a. When the provisions of the former law are REENACTED; or b. When the repeal is by IMPLICATION; c. When there is a SAVING CLAUSE ∗ What penalty may be imposed for the commission of a felony? - Only the penalty prescribed by law prior tot the commission of the felony may be imposed. - Felonies are punishable under the laws in force at the time of their commission. - But the penalty prescribed by law enacted after the commission of the felony may be imposed, if it is favorable to the offender. People v. Gallo (1999) Facts: The accused seeks a modification of his death sentence to reclusion perpetua in line with the new Court rulings which annunciate that the 7 attendant circumstances introduced in Sec. 11 of RA 7659 partake of the nature of qualifying circumstances that must be pleaded in the indictment in order to warrant the imposition of the penalty (Garcia doctrine reiterated in Medina). Held: By operation of law, the appellant is rightfully entitled to the beneficial application of the Garcia or Medina doctrine. Sentence modified. People v. Patalin (1999) Facts: The accused were convicted of Robbery with Physical Injuries and Robbery with Multiple Rape and were sentenced to imprisonment and death penalty respectively for the two convictions. Held: There is no question that the abolition of the death penalty benefits herein accused. The subsequent reimposition of the death penalty will not affect them. The framers of the Constitution themselves state that the law to be passed by Congress reimposing the death penalty (RA 7659) can only have prospective application. A subsequent statute cannot be so applied retroactively as to impair a right that accrued under the old law. DIFFERENT EFFECTS OF REPEAL OF PENAL LAW. a. If the repeal makes the penalty lighter in the new law, the new law shall be applied, except when the offender is a habitual delinquent or when the new law is made not applicable to pending action or existing causes of action.
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b. If the new law imposes a heavier penalty, the law in force at the time of the commission of the offense shall be applied. c. If the new law totally repeals the existing law so that the act which was penalized under the old law is no longer punishable, the crime is obliterated. a When the repeal is absolute the offense ceases to be criminal. a When the new law and the old law penalize the same offense, the offender can be tried under the old law. a When the repealing law fails to penalize the offense under the old law, the accused cannot be convicted under the new law. a A person erroneously accused and convicted under a repealed statute may be punished under the repealing statute. a A new law which omits anything contained in the old law dealing on the same subject, operates as are penal of anything not so included in the amendatory act. People v. Pimentel (supra) Held: Where the repeal of a penal law is total and absolute and the act which was penalized by a prior law ceases to be criminal under the new law, the previous offense is obliterated. With the enactment of RA 7636, the charge of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition qualified by subversion should be amended to simple illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, since subversion is no longer a crime. B. PENALTIES WHICH MAY BE IMPOSED Art. 25. Penalties which may be imposed. — The penalties which may be imposed according to this Code, and their different classes, are those included in the following: Scale PRINCIPAL PENALTIES Capital punishment: Death. Afflictive penalties: Reclusion perpetua, Reclusion temporal, Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification, Perpetual or temporary special disqualification, Prision mayor. Correctional penalties: Prision correccional, Arresto mayor, Suspension, Destierro. Light penalties: Arresto menor, Public censure. Penalties common to the three preceding classes: Fine, and Bond to keep the peace. ACCESSORY PENALTIES
Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification, Perpetual or temporary special disqualification, Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for, the profession or calling. Civil interdiction, Indemnification, Forfeiture or confiscation of instruments and proceeds of the offense, Payment of costs. PRINCIPAL PENALTIES – the court in the judgment of ACCESSORY PENALTIES included in the imposition of
those expressly imposed by conviction. – those that are deemed the principal penalties.
Other classifications of penalties: According to their divisibility: 1. Divisible - those that have fixed duration and are divisible into three periods. 2. Indivisible - those which have no fixed duration. a. Death b. Reclusion perpetua c. Perpetual absolute or special disqualification d. Public censure According to subject-matter 1. Corporal (death) 2. Deprivation of freedom (reclusion, prision, arresto) 3. Restriction of freedom (destierro) 4. Deprivation of rights (disqualification and suspension) 5. Pecuniary (fine) According to their gravity 1. Capital 2. Afflictive 3. Correctional 4. Light NOTE: Public censure is a penalty, thus, it is not proper in acquittal. However, the Court in acquitting the accused may criticize his acts or conduct. • Penalties that are either principal or accessory. Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification, perpetual or temporary special disqualification, and suspension may be principal or accessory penalties, because they formed in the 2 general classes. DURATION OF EACH OF DIFFERENT PENALTIES 1. Reclusion perpetua – 20 years and 1 day to 40 years 2. Reclusion temporal – 12 years and 1 day to 20 years 3. Prision mayor and temporary disqualification - 6 years and 1 day to 12 years except when disqualification is accessory penalty; in which case its duration is that of the principal penalty 4. Prision correccional, suspension and destierro - 6 months and 1 day to 6 years except when suspension is an accessory penalty, in which case its duration is that of the principal penalty.
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5. Arresto Mayor - 1 month and 1 day to 6 months 6. Arresto Menor – 1 day to 30 days.
If it is the public officer who asks or demands such gift or present, he shall suffer the penalty of death." Section 5. The penalty of death for parricide under Article 246 of the same Code is hereby restored, so that it shall read as follows:
C. SPECIFIC PRINCIPAL AND ACCESSORY PENALTIES CAPITAL PUNISHMENT REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659 AN ACT TO IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY ON CERTAIN HEINOUS CRIMES, AMENDING FOR THAT PURPOSE THE REVISED PENAL LAWS, AS AMENDED, OTHER SPECIAL PENAL LAWS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES Section 1. Declaration of Policy. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State to foster and ensure not only obedience to its authority, but also to adopt such measures as would effectively promote the maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the general welfare which are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy in a just and humane society; Section 2. Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows: "Art. 114. Treason. - Any Filipino citizen who levies war against the Philippines or adheres to her enemies giving them aid or comfort within the Philippines or elsewhere, shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death and shall pay a fine not to exceed 100,000 pesos." No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses at least to the same overt act or on confession of the accused in open court. Likewise, an alien, residing in the Philippines, who commits acts of treason as defined in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be punished by reclusion temporal to death and shall pay a fine not to exceed 100,000 pesos." Section 3. Section Three, Chapter One, Title One of Book Two of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows: "Section Three. - Piracy and mutiny on the high seas or in the Philippine waters Art. 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine waters. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be inflicted upon any person who, on the high seas, or in Philippine waters, shall attack or seize a vessel or, not being a member of its complement nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, its equipment or passengers. The same penalty shall be inflicted in case of mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine waters." Art. 123. Qualified piracy. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed upon those who commit any of the crimes referred to in the preceding article, under any of the following circumstances: 1. Whenever they have seized a vessel by boarding or firing upon the same; 2. Whenever the pirates have abandoned their victims without means of saving themselves or; 3. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, physical injuries or rape." Section 4. There shall be incorporated after Article 211 of the same Code a new article to read as follows: "Art. 211-A. Qualified Bribery. - If any public officer is entrusted with law enforcement and he refrains from arresting or prosecuting an offender who has committed a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua and/or death in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present, he shall suffer the penalty for the offense which was not prosecuted.
"Art. 246. Parricide. - Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate of illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death." Section 6. Article 248 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows: "Art. 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: 1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity. 2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise. 3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin. 4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity. 5. With evident premeditation. 6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse." Section 7. Article 255 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows: "Art. 255. Infanticide. - The penalty provided for parricide in Article 246 and for murder in Article 248 shall be imposed upon any person who shall kill any child less than three days of age. If any crime penalized in this Article be committed by the mother of the child for the purpose of concealing her dishonor, she shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods, and if said crime be committed for the same purpose by the maternal grandparents or either of them, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal." Section 8. Article 267 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows: "Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death: 1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days. 2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority. 3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made. 4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer. The penalty shall be death penalty where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even
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if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense. When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed." Section 9. Article 294 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows: "Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons - Penalties. - Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer: 1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson. 2. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua, when or if by reason or on occasion of such robbery, any of the physical injuries penalized in subdivision I of Article 263 shall have been inflicted. 3. The penalty of reclusion temporal, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, any of the physical injuries penalized in subdivision 2 of the article mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, shall have been inflicted. 4. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period, if the violence or intimidation employed in the commission of the robbery shall have been carried to a degree clearly unnecessary for the commission of the crime, or when in the course of its execution, the offender shall have inflicted upon any person not responsible for its commission any of the physical injuries covered by subdivisions 3 and 4 of said Article 263. 5. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period in other cases." Section 10. Article 320 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows: "Art. 320. Destructive Arson. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed upon any person who shall burn: 1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of burning, or as a result of simultaneous burnings, committed on several or different occasions. 2. Any building of public or private ownership, devoted to the public in general or where people usually gather or congregate for a definite purpose such as, but not limited to, official governmental function or business, private transaction, commerce, trade, workshop, meetings and conferences, or merely incidental to a definite purpose such as but not limited to hotels, motels, transient dwellings, public conveyances or stops or terminals, regardless of whether the offender had knowledge that there are persons in said building or edifice at the time it is set on fire and regardless also of whether the building is actually inhabited or not. 3. Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or airplane, devoted to transportation or conveyance, or for public use, entertainment or leisure. 4. Any building, factory, warehouse installation and any appurtenances thereto, which are devoted to the service of public utilities. 5. Any building the burning of which is for the purpose of concealing or destroying evidence of another violation of law, or for the purpose of concealing bankruptcy or defrauding creditors or to collect from insurance. Irrespective of the application of the above enumerated qualifying circumstances, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall likewise be imposed when the arson is perpetrated or committed by two (2) or more persons or by a group of persons, regardless of whether their purpose is merely to burn or destroy the building or the burning merely
constitutes an overt act in the commission or another violation of law. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall also be imposed upon any person who shall burn: 1. Any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or military powder or fireworks factory, ordnance, storehouse, archives or general museum of the Government. 2. In an inhabited place, any storehouse or factory of inflammable or explosive materials. If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under this Article, death results, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed." Section 11. Article 335 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows: "Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: 1. By using force or intimidation; 2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and 3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be death. When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death. The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: 1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law-spouse of the parent of the victim. 2. when the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities. 3. when the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity. 4. when the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old. 5. when the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease. 6. when committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency. 7. when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical mutilation." Section 12. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) is hereby amended to read as follows: "Sec. 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
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extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State." Section 13. Sections 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9, of Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act 1972, are hereby amended to read as follows: "Sec. 3. Importation of Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall import or bring into the Philippines any prohibited drug. "Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed. "Sec. 5. Maintenance of a Den, Dive or Resort for Prohibited Drug Users. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person or group of persons who shall maintain a den, dive or resort where any prohibited drug is used in any form or where such prohibited drugs in quantities specified in Section 20, Paragraph 1 of this Act are found. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, the maximum of the penalty shall be imposed in every case where a prohibited drug is administered, delivered or sold to a minor who is allowed to use the same in such place. Should a prohibited drug be the proximate cause of the death of a person using the same in such den, dive or resort, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed on the maintainer notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary. "Sec. 7. Manufacture of Prohibited Drug. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall engage in the manufacture of any prohibited drug. "Sec. 8. Possession or Use of Prohibited Drugs. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall possess or use any prohibited drug subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof. "Sec. 9. Cultivation of Plants which are Sources of Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall plant, cultivate or culture any medium Indian hemp, opium poppy (papaver somniferum), or any other plant which is or may hereafter be classified as dangerous drug or from which any dangerous drug may be manufactured or derived. The land or portions hereof, and/or greenhouses on which any of said plants is cultivated or cultured shall be confiscated and escheated to the State, unless the owner thereof can prove that he did not know such cultivation or culture despite the exercise of due diligence on his part.
If the land involved in is part of the public domain, the maximum of the penalties herein provided shall be imposed upon the offender." Section 14. Sections 14, 14-A, and 15 of Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, are hereby amended to read as follows: "Sec. 14. Importation of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall import or bring any regulated drug in the Philippines. "Sec. 14-A. Manufacture of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall engage in the manufacture of any regulated drug. "Sec. 15. Sale, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Transportation and Distribution of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a regulated drug involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed." Section 15. There shall be incorporated after Section 15 of Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drug Act of 1972, a new section to read as follows: "Sec. 15-a. Maintenance of a den, dive or resort for regulated drug users. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person or group of persons who shall maintain a den, dive or resort where any regulated drugs is used in any form, or where such regulated drugs in quantities specified in Section 20, paragraph 1 of this Act are found. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed in every case where a regulated drug is administered, delivered or sold to a minor who is allowed to use the same in such place. Should a regulated drug be the proximate cause of the death of a person using the same in such den, dive or resort, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed on the maintainer notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary." Section 16. Section 16 of Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is amended to read as follows: "Sec. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the corresponding license or prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof." Section 17. Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is hereby amended to read as follows: Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime. The penalties for offenses under Section 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III
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of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities : 1. 40 grams or more of opium; 2. 40 grams or more of morphine; 3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride; 4. 40 grams or more of heroin; 5. 750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana; 6. 50 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil; 7. 40 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride; or 8. In the case of other dangerous drugs, the quantity of which is far beyond therapeutic requirements, as determined and promulgated by the Dangerous Drugs Board, after public consultations/hearings conducted for the purpose. Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalty shall range from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity. Every penalty imposed for the unlawful importation, sale, administration, delivery, transportation or manufacture of dangerous drugs, the cultivation of plants which are sources of dangerous drugs and the possession of any opium pipe and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs shall carry with it the confiscation and forfeiture, in favor of the Government, of all the proceeds of the crime including but not limited to money and other obtained thereby and the instruments or tools with which it was committed, unless they are the property of a third person not liable for the offense, but those which are not of lawful commerce shall be ordered destroyed without delay. Dangerous drugs and plant sources of such drugs as well as the proceeds or instruments of the crime so confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government shall be turned over to the Board for proper disposal without delay. Any apprehending or arresting officer who misappropriates or misapplies or fails to account for seized or confiscated dangerous drugs or plant-sources of dangerous drugs or proceeds or instruments of the crime as are herein defined shall after conviction be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos." Section 18. There shall be incorporated after Section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, a new section to read as follows: "Sec. 20-A. Plea-bargaining Provisions. - Any person charged under any provision of this Act where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on plea bargaining." Section 19. Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is hereby amended to read as follows : "Sec. 24. Penalties for Government Official and Employees and Officers and Members of Police Agencies and the Armed Forces, 'Planting' of Evidence. - The maximum penalties provided for Section 3, 4(1), 5(1), 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12 and 13 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15(1), 16 and 19 of Article III shall be imposed, if those found guilty of any of the said offenses are government officials, employees or officers, including members of police agencies and the armed forces. Any such above government official, employee or officer who is found guilty of "planting" any dangerous drugs punished in Sections 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 and 13 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act in the person or in the immediate vicinity of another as evidence to implicate the latter, shall suffer the same penalty as therein provided."
Section 20. Sec. 14 of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended, known as the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, is hereby amended to read as follows: "Sec. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. - Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is defined in Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon things; and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof." Section 21. Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows: "Art. 27. Reclusion perpetua. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be from twenty years and one day to forty years. Reclusion temporal. - The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be from twelve years and one day to twenty years. Prision mayor and temporary disqualification. The duration of the penalties of prision mayor and temporary disqualification shall be from six years and one day to twelve years, except when the penalty of disqualification is imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case, it shall be that of the principal penalty. Prision correccional, suspension, and destierro. The duration of the penalties of prision correccional, suspension, and destierro shall be from six months and one day to six years, except when the suspension is imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case, its duration shall be that of the principal penalty. Arresto mayor. - The duration of the penalty of arresto mayor shall be from one month and one day to six months. Arresto menor. - The duration of the penalty of arresto menor shall be from one day to thirty days. Bond to keep the peace. - The bond to keep the peace shall be required to cover such period of time as the court may determine." Section 22. Article 47 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows: Art. 47. In what cases the death penalty shall not be imposed; Automatic review of the Death Penalty Cases. - The death penalty shall be imposed in all cases in which it must be imposed under existing laws, except when the guilty person is below eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the crime or is more than seventy years of age or when upon appeal or automatic review of the case by the Supreme Court, the required majority vote is not obtained for the imposition of the death penalty, in which cases the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua. In all cases where the death penalty is imposed by the trial court, the records shall be forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review and judgment by the Court en banc, within twenty (20) days but not earlier than fifteen (15) days after promulgation of the judgment or notice of denial of any motion for new trial or reconsideration. The transcript shall also be forwarded within ten (10) days from the filing thereof by the stenographic reporter." Section 23. Article 62 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows :
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"Art. 62. Effects of the attendance of mitigating or aggravating circumstances and of habitual delinquency. Mitigating or aggravating circumstances and habitual delinquency shall be taken into account for the purpose of diminishing or increasing the penalty in conformity with the following rules: 1. Aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime specially punishable by law or which are included by the law in defining a crime and prescribing the penalty therefor shall not be taken into account for the purpose of increasing the penalty. 1(a). When in the commission of the crime, advantage was taken by the offender of his public position, the penalty to be imposed shall be in its maximum regardless of mitigating circumstances. The maximum penalty shall be imposed if the offense was committed by any group who belongs to an organized/syndicated crime group. An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two or more persons collaborating, confederating or mutually helping one another for purposes of gain in the commission of any crime. 2. The same rule shall apply with respect to any aggravating circumstances inherent in the crime to such a degree that it must of necessity accompany the commission thereof. 3. Aggravating or mitigating circumstances which arise from the moral attributes of the offender, or from his private relations with the offended party, or from any other personal cause, shall only serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability of the principals, accomplices and accessories as to whom such circumstances are attendant. 4. The circumstances which consist in the material execution of the act, or in the means employed to accomplish it, shall serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability of those persons only who had knowledge of them at the time of the execution of the act or their cooperation therein. 5. Habitual delinquency shall have the following effects : (a) Upon a third conviction the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided by law for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods; (b) Upon a fourth conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods; and (c) Upon a fifth or additional conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period. Notwithstanding the provisions of this article, the total of the two penalties to be imposed upon the offender, in conformity herewith, shall in no case exceed 30 years. For purposes of this article, a person shall be deemed to be a habitual delinquent, if within a period of ten years from the date of his release or last conviction of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa or falsification, he is found guilty of any of said crimes a third time or oftener. Section 24. Article 81 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows : "Art. 81. When and how the death penalty is to be executed. - The death sentence shall be executed with preference to any other and shall consist in putting the person under sentence to death by electrocution. The death sentence shall be executed under the authority of the Director of Prisons, endeavoring so far as possible to mitigate the sufferings of the person under the sentence
during electrocution as well as during the proceedings prior to the execution. If the person under sentence so desires, he shall be anaesthetized at the moment of the execution. As soon as facilities are provided by the Bureau of Prisons, the method of carrying out the sentence shall be changed to gas poisoning. The death sentence shall be carried out not later than one (1) year after the judgment has become final. Section 25. Article 83 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows: "Art. 83. Suspension of the execution of the death sentence. - The death sentence shall not be inflicted upon a woman while she is pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, nor upon any person over seventy years of age. In this last case, the death sentence shall be commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided in Article 40. In all cases where the death sentence has become final, the records of the case shall be forwarded immediately by the Supreme Court to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power." Section 26. < modified or repealed hereby are Act this of provisions the with inconsistent thereof parts regulations and rules orders, executive issuances, decrees presidential laws,> Section 27. If, for any reason or reasons, any part of the provision of this Act shall be held to be unconstitutional or invalid, other parts or provisions hereof which are not affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and effect. Section 28. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation. The publication shall not be later than seven (7) days after the approval hereof. Approved: December 13, 1993
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8177 AN ACT DESIGNATING DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION AS THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659. SECTION 1. Article 81 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 24 of Republic Act No. 7659 is hereby further amended to read as follows: "Art. 81. When and how the death penalty is to be executed. — The death sentence shall be executed with preference to any other penalty and shall consist in putting the person under the sentence to death by lethal injection. The death sentence shall be executed under the authority of the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, endeavoring so far as possible to mitigate the sufferings of the person under the sentence during the lethal injection as well as during the proceedings prior to the execution. "The Director of the Bureau of Corrections shall take steps to ensure that the lethal injection to be administered is sufficient to cause the instantaneous death of the convict. "Pursuant to this, all personnel involved in the administration of lethal injection shall be trained prior to the performance of such task. "The authorized physician of the Bureau of Corrections, after thorough examination, shall officially make
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a pronouncement of the convict's death and shall certify thereto in the records of the Bureau of Corrections. The death sentence shall be carried out not earlier than one (1) year nor later than eighteen (18) months after the judgment has become final and executory without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executive clemency powers at all times." Sec. 2. Persons already sentenced by judgment, which has become final and executory, who are waiting to undergo the death penalty by electrocution or gas poisoning shall be under the coverage of the provisions of this Act upon its effectivity. Their sentences shall be automatically modified for this purpose. Sec. 3. Implementing Rules. — The Secretary of Justice in coordination with the Secretary of Health and the Bureau of Corrections shall, within thirty (30) days from the effectivity of this Act, promulgate the rules to implement its provisions. Sec. 4. Repealing Clause. — All laws, presidential decrees and issuances, executive orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. Sec. 5. Effectivity. — This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation, whichever comes earlier. Publication shall not be later than ten (10) days after the approval thereof. Approved: March 20, 1996
RULES AND REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8177 Pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8177 entitled "AN ACT DESIGNATING DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION AS THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659", the undersigned, in coordination with the Secretary of Health and the Director of Corrections, hereby issues the following Rules to govern the implementation of said Act: SECTION 1. Objectives. — These Rules seek to ensure the orderly and humane execution of the death penalty by lethal injection. SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. — As used in these Rules, unless the context otherwise requires — a. "Death Convict" or "Convict" shall refer to a prisoner whose death penalty imposed by a Regional Trial Court is affirmed by the Supreme Court en banc; b. "Lethal Injection" refers to sodium thiopenthotal, pancuronium bromide, potassium chloride and such other lethal substances as may be specified by the Director of Corrections that will be administered intravenously into the body of a convict until said convict is pronounced dead; c. "Bureau" refers to the Bureau of Corrections; d. "Director" refers to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections; e. "Secretary" refers to the Secretary of the Department of Justice; SECTION 3. Principles. — The following principles shall be observed in the implementation of these Rules: a. There shall be no discrimination in the treatment of a death convict on account of race, color, religion, language, politics, nationality, social origin, property, birth or other status.
b. In the execution of a death penalty, the death convict shall be spared from unnecessary anxiety or distress. c. The religious beliefs of the death convict shall be respected. SECTION 4. Prison Services. — Subject to the availability of resources, a death convict shall enjoy the following services and privileges to encourage and enhance his self-respect and dignity: a. Medical and Dental; b. Religious, Guidance and Counseling; c. Exercise; d. Visitation; and e. Mail. SECTION 5. Confinement. — Whenever practicable, the death convict shall be confined in an individual cell in a building that is exclusively assigned for the use of death convicts. The convict shall be provided with a bunk, a steel/wooden bed or mat, a pillow or blanket and mosquito net. SECTION 6. Religious Services. — Subject to security conditions, a death convict may be visited by the priest or minister of his faith and given such available religious materials which he may require. SECTION 7. Exercise. — A death convict shall be allowed to enjoy regular exercise periods under the supervision of a guard. SECTION 8. Meal Services. — Meals shall, whenever practicable, be served individually to a death convict inside his cell. Mess utensils shall be made of plastic. After each meal, said utensils shall be collected and accounted. SECTION 9. Visitation. — A death convict shall be allowed to be visited by his immediate family and reputable friends at regular intervals and during designated hours subject to security procedures. SECTION 10. List of Visitors. — A list of persons who may visit a death convict shall be compiled and maintained by the prison authorities. The list may include the members of the convict's immediate family such as his parents, step parents, foster parents, brothers and sisters, wife or husband and children. The list may, upon the request of the convict, include his grandparents, aunts, uncles, in-laws and cousins. Other visitors may, after investigation, be included in the list if it will assist in raising the morale of the convict. SECTION 11. Interviews of Convicts. — Television, radio and other interviews by media of a death convict shall not be allowed. SECTION 12. Handling of Inmate Mail. — The sending and receiving of mail by a death convict shall be controlled to prevent illicit communication. Mail shall be censored in accordance with existing prison rules. SECTION 13. Outside Movement. — A death convict may be allowed to leave his place of confinement only for diagnosis of a life-threatening situation or treatment of a serious ailment, if the diagnosis cannot be done or the treatment provided in the prison hospital. SECTION 14. Court Appearance. — A death convict shall not be brought outside the penal institution where he is confined for appearance or attendance in any court except when the Supreme Court authorizes, upon proper application, said outside movement. A judge who requires the appearance or attendance of a death convict in any judicial proceeding shall conduct such proceeding within the premises of the penal institution where the convict is confined. SECTION 15. How Lethal Injection is to be Administered. — The execution of the death sentence by lethal injection shall be done under the authority of the Director who shall endeavor to mitigate the sufferings of the convict prior to and during the execution. SECTION 16. Notification and Execution of the Sentence and Assistance to the Convict. — The court shall designate a working day for the execution of the death penalty but not the hour thereof. Such designation shall only be communicated to the convict after sunrise of the day of the execution, and the execution shall not take place until
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after the expiration of at least eight (8) hours following the notification, but before sunset. During the interval between the notification and execution, the convict shall, as far as possible, be furnished such assistance as he may request in order to be attended in his last moments by a priest or minister of the religion he professes and to consult his lawyers, as well as in order to make a will and confer with members of his family or of persons in charge of the management of his business, of the administration of his property, or of the care of his descendants. SECTION 17. Suspension of the Execution of the Death Sentence. — Execution by lethal injection shall not be inflicted upon a woman within the three years next following the date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, nor upon any person over seventy (70) years of age. In this latter case, the death sentence shall be commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided in Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code. SECTION 18. Place of Execution. — The execution by lethal injection shall take place in the prison establishment and space thereat as may be designated by the Director. Said place shall be closed to public view. SECTION 19. Execution Procedure. — Details of the procedure prior to, during and after administering the lethal injection shall be set forth in a manual to be prepared by the Director. The manual shall contain details of, among others, the sequence of events before and after the execution; procedures in setting up the intravenous line; the administration of the lethal drugs; the pronouncement of death; and the removal of the intravenous system. Said manual shall be confidential and its distribution shall be limited to authorized prison personnel. SECTION 20. Quantity and Safekeeping of Drugs Purchased. — The exact quantities of the drugs needed for an execution of a death penalty shall be purchased by the Director pursuant to existing rules and regulations not earlier than ten (10) days before the scheduled date of execution. The drugs shall be kept securely at the office of the superintendent of the prison where the death sentence is to be executed. All unused drugs shall be inventoried and disposed of properly under the direct supervision of the Director. SECTION 21. Administering Lethal Drugs. — The injection of the lethal drugs to a death convict shall be made by a person designated by the Director. SECTION 22. Identity of Person Administering Lethal Injection. — The identity of the person who is designated to administer the lethal injection shall be kept secret. SECTION 23. Persons Who May Witness Execution. — The execution of a death convict shall be witnessed only by the priest or minister assisting the offender and by his lawyers, and by his relatives, not exceeding six, if the convict so desires, by the physician and the necessary personnel of the penal establishment, and by such persons as the Director may authorize. A person below eighteen (18) years of age shall not be allowed to witness an execution. SECTION 24. Expulsion of Witness. — Any person who makes unnecessary noise or displays rude or improper behavior during an execution shall be expelled from the lethal injection chamber. SECTION 25. Non-Recording of Execution. — The Director shall not allow the visual, sound or other recording of the actual execution by media or by any private person or group. SECTION 26. Disposition of Corpse of Convict. — Unless claimed by his family, the corpse of a death convict shall, upon the completion of the legal proceedings subsequent to the execution, be turned over to an institution of learning or scientific research first applying for it, for the purpose of study and investigation, provided that such institution shall take charge of the decent burial of the remains. Otherwise, the Director shall order the burial of the body of the convict at government expense, granting
permission to be present thereat to the members of the family of the convict and the friends of the latter. In no case shall the burial of a death convict be held with pomp. SECTION 27. Effectivity. — These Rules shall take effect fifteen (15) days after publication in a newspaper of general circulation. APPROVED. Adopted: April 28, 1997
1987 CONSTITUTION. Section 19. 1. Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. 2. The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law. RPC, Art. 40. Death; Its accessory penalties. — The death penalty, when it is not executed by reason of commutation or pardon shall carry with it that of perpetual absolute disqualification and that of civil interdiction during thirty years following the date sentence, unless such accessory penalties have been expressly remitted in the pardon. RPC, Art. 47. In what cases the death penalty shall not be imposed. — The death penalty shall be imposed in all cases in which it must be imposed under existing laws, except in the following cases: 1. When the guilty person be more than seventy years of age. 2. When upon appeal or revision of the case by the Supreme court, all the members thereof are not unanimous in their voting as to the propriety of the imposition of the death penalty. For the imposition of said penalty or for the confirmation of a judgment of the inferior court imposing the death sentence, the Supreme Court shall render its decision per curiam, which shall be signed by all justices of said court, unless some member or members thereof shall have been disqualified from taking part in the consideration of the case, in which even the unanimous vote and signature of only the remaining justices shall be required. ∗ Majority vote of the SC is required for the imposition of the death penalty. ∗ The 1987 Constitution suspended the imposition of the death penalty but RA 7659 restored it. ∗ Death penalty is not imposed in the following cases: a. When the guilty person is below 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime. b. When the guilty person is more than 70 years of age. c. When upon appeal or automatic review of the case by the SC, the vote of 8 members is not obtained for the imposition of the death penalty. ∗ The death penalty is not excessive, unjust or cruel within the meaning of that word in the Constitution.
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Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or lingering death. ∗ RA 296 providing that eight justices must concur in the imposition of death penalty is retroactive. ∗ Review by the SC of the death sentence is absolutely necessary. ∗ In what crimes is death penalty imposed: 1. Treason 2. Piracy 3. Qualified Piracy 4. Qualified bribery 5. Parricide 6. Murder 7. Infanticide 8. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention 9. Robbery with homicide 10. Destructive arson 11. Rape with homicide 12. Plunder 13. Certain violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act 14. Carnapping RPC, Art. 81. When and how the death penalty is to be executed. — The death sentence shall be executed with reference to any other and shall consist in putting the person under sentence to death by electrocution. The death sentence shall be executed under the authority of the Director of Prisons, endeavoring so far as possible to mitigate the sufferings of the person under sentence during electrocution as well as during the proceedings prior to the execution. If the person under sentence so desires, he shall be anaesthetized at the moment of the electrocution. ∗ Death sentence shall be executed with preference to any other penalty. ∗ Death sentence is executed by lethal injection. ∗ The death sentence shall be carried out not earlier than 1 year nor later than 18 months after the judgment becomes final and executory, without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executive clemency powers. Art. 82. Notification and execution of the sentence and assistance to the culprit. — The court shall designate a working day for the execution but not the hour thereof; and such designation shall not be communicated to the offender before sunrise of said day, and the execution shall not take place until after the expiration of at least eight hours following the notification, but before sunset. During the interval between the notification and the execution, the culprit shall, in so far as possible, be furnished such assistance as he may request in order to be attended in his last moments by priests or ministers of the religion he professes and to consult lawyers, as well as in order to make a will and confer with members of his family or persons in charge of the management of his business, of the administration of his property, or of the care of his descendants. ∗ A convict sentenced to death may make a will. Art. 83. Suspension of the execution of the death sentence. — The death sentence shall not be inflicted upon a woman within the three years next following the date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, nor upon any person over seventy years of age. In this last case, the death sentence shall be
commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided in Article 40. ∗ Death is a: a. b. c. d.
sentence shall be suspended when the accused Woman, while pregnant; Woman, within one year after delivery; Person over 70 years of age; Convict who becomes insane after sentence of death has been pronounced.
final
∗ Art. 47 provides for cases in which death penalty is not to be imposed. On the other hand, Art. 83 provides for suspension only of the execution of death sentence. ∗ RTC can suspend execution of death sentence. ∗ The records of the case shall be forwarded to the Office of the President, when the death sentence has become final, for possible exercise of the pardoning power. Art. 84. Place of execution and persons who may witness the same. — The execution shall take place in the penitentiary of Bilibid in a space closed to the public view and shall be witnessed only by the priests assisting the offender and by his lawyers, and by his relatives, not exceeding six, if he so request, by the physician and the necessary personnel of the penal establishment, and by such persons as the Director of Prisons may authorize. ∗ The execution shall take place in the penitentiary or Bilibid in a space closed to the public view. PERSONS WHO MAY WITNESS EXECUTION: a. priests assisting the offender; b. offender’s lawyers; c. offender’s relatives, not exceeding six, if so requested; d. physician, and e. necessary personnel of penal establishment ∗ a person below 18 years of age may not be allowed to witness an execution. RPC, Art. 85. Provisions relative to the corpse of the person executed and its burial. — Unless claimed by his family, the corpse of the culprit shall, upon the completion of the legal proceedings subsequent to the execution, be turned over to the institute of learning or scientific research first applying for it, for the purpose of study and investigation, provided that such institute shall take charge of the decent burial of the remains. Otherwise, the Director of Prisons shall order the burial of the body of the culprit at government expense, granting permission to be present thereat to the members of the family of the culprit and the friends of the latter. In no case shall the burial of the body of a person sentenced to death be held with pomp. ∗ The burial of the body of a person sentenced to death should not be held with pomp. - The purpose of the law is to prevent anyone from making a hero out of a criminal. People v. Echegaray (1996) Facts: Echegaray was sentenced to death penalty for raping his 10-year–old daughter. On appeal, the accused claimed that the penalty imposed by the court is erroneous under RA 7659 because he is neither
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a father, stepfather nor grandfather of Rodessa although he was a confirmed lover of the Rodessa’s mother. Held: Where the accused is a confirmed lover of the victim’s mother, he falls squarely within Sec. 11 of RA 7659 under the term “common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.” Also, the fact that the victim referred to the accused as “Papa” is reason enough to conclude that the accused is either the farther or stepfather of the victim.
only in so far as it prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and reduces it to reclusion perpetua. The range of the medium and minimum penalties remains unchanged. The problem in an event is addressed not to this Court but to the Congress.
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice (1999) Facts: Upon conviction of Echegaray in People v. Echegaray, the SC temporarily restrained the execution of its own decision. The respondents claim that SC has no more jurisdiction over the case because judgment has become final and it cannot restrain the execution of its decision. Held: The rule on finality of judgment cannot divest the SC of its jurisdiction to execute and enforce the same judgment. Notwithstanding the order of execution and the executory nature thereof on the date set, the date can be postponed. The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction – supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties and compel the courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. The SC did not restrain the effectivity of the law enacted by the Congress. It merely restrained the execution of its judgment to give reasonable time to check its fairness in light of supervening events in Congress.
People v. Bon (2006) Held: Yet in truth, there is no material difference between “imposition” and “application,” for both terms embody the operation in law of the death penalty. Since Article 71 denominates “death” as an element in the graduated scale of penalties, there is no question that the operation of Article 71 involves the actual application of the death penalty as a means of determining the extent which a person’s liberty is to be deprived. Since Rep. Act No. 9346 unequivocally bars the application of the death penalty, as well as expressly repeals all such statutory provisions requiring the application of the death penalty, such effect necessarily extends to its relevance to the graduated scale of penalties under Article 71. The court cannot find basis to conclude that Rep. Act No. 9346 intended to retain the operative effects of the death penalty in the graduation of the other penalties in our penal laws. Munoz cannot enjoin us to adopt such conclusion. Rep. Act No. 9346 is not swaddled in the same restraints appreciated by Muñoz on Section 19(1), Article III. The very Congress empowered by the Constitution to reinstate the imposition of the death penalty once thought it best to do so, through Rep. Act No. 7650. Within the same realm of constitutional discretion, Congress has reversed itself. It must be asserted that today, the legal status of the suppression of the death penalty in the Philippines has never been more secure than at any time in our political history as a nation.
People v. Esparas (1996) Facts: Esparas was charged with violation of RA 6425 as amended by RA 759 for importing into the country 20kg of shabu. As the accused remains at large up to the present time, the issue that confronts the Court is whether or not it will proceed to automatically review her death sentence. Held: The reimposition of the death penalty revived the procedure by which the Supreme Court reviews death penalty cases pursuant to the Rules of Court – it remains automatic and continues to be mandatory and does not depend on the whims of the death convict and leaves the SC without any option. Any court decision authorizing the State to take life must be as error-free as possible. It is not only within the power of the SC but also it is its duty to review all death penalty cases. Sec. 8 of Rule 124 of the Rules of Court which authorizes the dismissal of an appeal when the appellant jumps bail has no application to cases where the death penalty has been imposed. People v. Munoz (1989) Facts: Of the 11 persons who were charged with murder, only 4 were identified and convicted. They were held guilty for killing 3 persons. Held: The advocates of the Masangkay ruling argue that the Constitution abolished the death penalty and thereby limited the penalty for murder to the remaining periods, to wit, the minimum and the medium. However, a reading of the Constitution will readily show that there is really nothing therein which expressly declares the abolition of death penalty. It merely states that the death penalty shall not be imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The Constitution does not change the periods of the penalty prescribed by Art. 248 of the RPC, except
Abolition of the Death Penalty Republic Act No. 9346
AFFLICTIVE PENALTIES Art. 27. Reclusion perpetua. — Any person sentenced to any of the perpetual penalties shall be pardoned after undergoing the penalty for thirty years, unless such person by reason of his conduct or some other serious cause shall be considered by the Chief Executive as unworthy of pardon. Reclusion temporal. — The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be from twelve years and one day to twenty years. Prision mayor and temporary disqualification. — The duration of the penalties of prision mayor and temporary disqualification shall be from six years and one day to twelve years, except when the penalty of disqualification is imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case its duration shall be that of the principal penalty. Art. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal; Their accessory penalties. — The penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
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Art. 42. Prision mayor; Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of prision mayor, shall carry with it that of temporary absolute disqualification and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage which the offender shall suffer although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. RECLUSION PERPETUA Duration: 20 years and 1 day to 40 years Accessory Penalties: a. Civil interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as the case may be. b. Perpetual Absolute Disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. People v. Gatward (1997) Facts: The accused was convicted of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act for unlawfully importing into the Philippines heroin. The trial court sentenced the accused to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for 35 years of reclusion perpetua there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance shown to have attended in the commission of the crime. Held: As amended by RA 7659, the penalty of reclusion perpetua is now accorded a defined duration ranging from 20 years and 1 day to 40 years. The Court held that in spite of the amendment putting the duration of RP, it should remain as an indivisible penalty since there was never an intent on the part of Congress to reclassify it into a divisible penalty. The maximum duration of reclusion perpetua is not and has never been 30 years which is merely the number of ears which the convict must serve in order to be eligible for pardon or for the application of the 3-fold rule. People v. Ballabare (1996) Held: The trial court erred in imposing the penalty of life imprisonment for violation of PD 1866. The crime of illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form is punished by the penalty of death. Since the offense was committed on Sep. 16, 1990, at a time when the imposition of the death penalty was prohibited, the penalty next lower in degree which is reclusion perpetua should be imposed. This is not equivalent to life imprisonment. While life imprisonment may appear to be the English translation of reclusion perpetua, in reality, it goes deeper than that.
Reclusion Perpetua as indivisible penalty People v. Ramirez (2001) Facts: Bañez invited Jojo to a drinking spree in a nearby store. They sat side by side a bench outside the store while exchanging pleasantries and drinking. Ramirez suddenly came in front of them. Ramirez ordered beer then he calmly approached and stabbed Jojo which caused the latters death. The trial court sentenced appellant "to suffer imprisonment of 40 years reclusion perpetua." Held: The SC disagrees with the trial court in sentencing appellant "to suffer imprisonment of forty (40) years reclusion perpetua." There was no justification or need for the trial court to specify the length of imprisonment, because reclusion perpetua is
an indivisible penalty. The significance of this fundamental principle was laid down by the Court in People v. Diquit. "Since reclusion perpetua is an indivisible penalty, it has no minimum, medium or maximum periods. It is imposed in its entirety regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the crime. (Art. 63, Revised Penal Code) Reclusion Perpetua is imprisonment for life but the person sentenced to suffer it shall be pardoned after undergoing the penalty for thirty (30) years, unless by reason of his conduct or some other serious cause, he shall be considered by the Chief Executive as unworthy of pardon (Art. 27, Revised Penal Code)." LIFE IMPRISONMENT Imposed for serious offenses penalized by special laws Does not carry with it accessory penalties Does not appear to have any definite extent or duration
RECLUSION PERPETUA Prescribed under the RPC
Carries with it accessory penalties Entails imprisonment for at least 30 years after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon although the maximum period shall in no case exceed 40 years
RECLUSION TEMPORAL Duration: 12 years and 1 day to 20 years Accessory Penalties: a. Civil interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as the case may be. b. Perpetual Absolute Disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. PRISION MAYOR Duration: 6 years and 1 day to 12 years Accessory Penalties: a. Temporary Absolute Disqualification b. Perpetual Special Disqualification from the right to suffrage which the offender shall suffer although pardoned as to the principal penalty unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. CORRECCIONAL PENALTIES Art. 27 (4). Prision correccional, suspension, and destierro. — The duration of the penalties of prision correccional, suspension and destierro shall be from six months and one day to six years, except when suspension is imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case, its duration shall be that of the principal penalty. Arresto mayor. — The duration of the penalty of arresto mayor shall be from one month and one day to six months. Art. 39. Subsidiary penalty. — If the convict has no property with which to meet the fine mentioned in the paragraph 3 of the nest preceding article, he shall be subject to a subsidiary personal liability at the rate of one day for each eight pesos, subject to the following rules:
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1. If the principal penalty imposed be prision correccional or arresto and fine, he shall remain under confinement until his fine referred to in the preceding paragraph is satisfied, but his subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed one-third of the term of the sentence, and in no case shall it continue for more than one year, and no fraction or part of a day shall be counted against the prisoner. 2. When the principal penalty imposed be only a fine, the subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed six months, if the culprit shall have been prosecuted for a grave or less grave felony, and shall not exceed fifteen days, if for a light felony. 3. When the principal imposed is higher than prision correccional, no subsidiary imprisonment shall be imposed upon the culprit. 4. If the principal penalty imposed is not to be executed by confinement in a penal institution, but such penalty is of fixed duration, the convict, during the period of time established in the preceding rules, shall continue to suffer the same deprivations as those of which the principal penalty consists. 5. The subsidiary personal liability which the convict may have suffered by reason of his insolvency shall not relieve him, from the fine in case his financial circumstances should improve. (As amended by RA 5465, April 21, 1969). Art. 43. Prision correccional; Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of prision correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the disqualification provided in the article although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. Art. 44. Arresto; Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of arresto shall carry with it that of suspension of the right too hold office and the right of suffrage during the term of the sentence. PRISION CORRECCIONAL Duration: 6 months and 1 day to 6 years Accessory Penalties: a. Suspension from public office b. Suspension from the right to follow a profession or calling c. Perpetual Special Disqualification fro the right of suffrage, if the duration of the imprisonment shall exceed 18 months
Art. 39. Subsidiary penalty. — If the convict has no property with which to meet the fine mentioned in the paragraph 3 of the nest preceding article, he shall be subject to a subsidiary personal liability at the rate of one day for each eight pesos, subject to the following rules: 1. If the principal penalty imposed be prision correccional or arresto and fine, he shall remain under confinement until his fine referred to in the preceding paragraph is satisfied, but his subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed one-third of the term of the sentence, and in no case shall it continue for more than one year, and no fraction or part of a day shall be counted against the prisoner. 2. When the principal penalty imposed be only a fine, the subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed six months, if the culprit shall have been prosecuted for a grave or less grave felony, and shall not exceed fifteen days, if for a light felony. 3. When the principal imposed is higher than prision correccional, no subsidiary imprisonment shall be imposed upon the culprit. 4. If the principal penalty imposed is not to be executed by confinement in a penal institution, but such penalty is of fixed duration, the convict, during the period of time established in the preceding rules, shall continue to suffer the same deprivations as those of which the principal penalty consists. 5. The subsidiary personal liability which the convict may have suffered by reason of his insolvency shall not relieve him, from the fine in case his financial circumstances should improve. (As amended by RA 5465, April 21, 1969). Art. 44. Arresto; Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of arresto shall carry with it that of suspension of the right too hold office and the right of suffrage during the term of the sentence. ARRESTO MENOR Duration: 1 day to 30 days Accessory Penalties: a. Suspension of right to hold office b. Suspension of the right of suffrage during the term of the sentence. PUBLIC CENSURE ∗ Censure, being a penalty is not proper in acquittal. PENALTIES COMMON TO AFFLICTIVE, CORRECCIONAL AND LIGHT PENALTIES FINE
ARRESTO MAYOR Duration: 1 month and 1 day to 6 months Accessory Penalties: a. Suspension of right to hold office b. Suspension of the right of suffrage during the term of the sentence. LIGHT PENALTIES Art. 27 (6). Arresto menor. — The duration of the penalty of arresto menor shall be from one day to thirty days.
Art. 26. When afflictive, correctional, or light penalty. — A fine, whether imposed as a single of as an alternative penalty, shall be considered an afflictive penalty, if it exceeds 6,000 pesos; a correctional penalty, if it does not exceed 6,000 pesos but is not less than 200 pesos; and a light penalty if it less than 200 pesos. ∗ This article merely classifies fine and has nothing to do with the definition of light felony. Fine is: 1.
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2. 3.
Correctional – P200 to P6,000 Light Penalty – less than P200
Art. 66. Imposition of fines. — In imposing fines the courts may fix any amount within the limits established by law; in fixing the amount in each case attention shall be given, not only to the mitigating and aggravating circumstances, but more particularly to the wealth or means of the culprit. ∗ The court can fix any amount of the fine within the limits established by law. ∗ The court must consider: a. The mitigating and aggravating circumstances; and b. More particularly, the wealth or means of the culprit. ∗ When the law does not fix the minimum of the fine, the determination of the amount of the fine to be imposed upon the culprit is left to the sound discretion of the court, provided it shall not exceed the maximum authorized by law. ∗ Fines are not divided into 3 equal portions.
2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular office or to be elected to such office. 3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise of any of the rights mentioned. In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article shall last during the term of the sentence. 4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly held. Art. 31. Effect of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification. — The penalties of perpetual or temporal special disqualification for public office, profession or calling shall produce the following effects: 1. The deprivation of the office, employment, profession or calling affected; 2. The disqualification for holding similar offices or employments either perpetually or during the term of the sentence according to the extent of such disqualification.
BOND TO KEEP THE PEACE Art. 35. Effects of bond to keep the peace. — It shall be the duty of any person sentenced to give bond to keep the peace, to present two sufficient sureties who shall undertake that such person will not commit the offense sought to be prevented, and that in case such offense be committed they will pay the amount determined by the court in the judgment, or otherwise to deposit such amount in the office of the clerk of the court to guarantee said undertaking. The court shall determine, according to its discretion, the period of duration of the bond. Should the person sentenced fail to give the bond as required he shall be detained for a period which shall in no case exceed six months, is he shall have been prosecuted for a grave or less grave felony, and shall not exceed thirty days, if for a light felony. ∗ The offender must present 2 sufficient sureties who shall undertake that the offender will not commit the offense sought to be prevented, and that in case such offense be committed they will pay the amount determined by the court; or ∗ The offender must deposit such amount with the clerk of court to guarantee said undertaking; or ∗ The offender may be detained, if he cannot give the bond, for a period not to exceed 6 months if prosecuted for grave or less grave felony, or for a period not to exceed 30 days, if for a light felony. ∗ Bond to keep the peace is different from bail bon which is posted for the provisional release of a person arrested for or accused of a crime. D. ACCESSORY PENALTIES Art. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification. — The penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification for public office shall produce the following effects: 1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may have held even if conferred by popular election.
Art. 32. Effect of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage. — The perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in any popular election for any public office or to be elected to such office. Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification. Art. 33. Effects of the penalties of suspension from any public office, profession or calling, or the right of suffrage. — The suspension from public office, profession or calling, and the exercise of the right of suffrage shall disqualify the offender from holding such office or exercising such profession or calling or right of suffrage during the term of the sentence. The person suspended from holding public office shall not hold another having similar functions during the period of his suspension. Art. 34. Civil interdiction. — Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the time of his sentence of the rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either as to the person or property of any ward, of marital authority, of the right to manage his property and of the right to dispose of such property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos. Art. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal; Their accessory penalties. — The penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. Art. 42. Prision mayor; Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of prision mayor, shall carry with it that of temporary absolute disqualification and that of perpetual
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special disqualification from the right of suffrage which the offender shall suffer although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. Art. 43. Prision correccional; Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of prision correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the disqualification provided in the article although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. Art. 44. Arresto; Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of arresto shall carry with it that of suspension of the right to hold office and the right of suffrage during the term of the sentence. Art. 45. Confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the crime. — Every penalty imposed for the commission of a felony shall carry with it the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instruments or tools with which it was committed. Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government, unless they be property of a third person not liable for the offense, but those articles which are not subject of lawful commerce shall be destroyed. PERPETUAL OR DISQUALIFICATION
TEMPORARY
ABSOLUTE
Effects: a. Deprivation of any public office or employment f offender b. Deprivation of the right to vote in any election or to be voted upon c. Loss of rights to retirement pay or pension ∗ All these effects last during the lifetime of the convict and even after the service of the sentence except as regards paragraphs 2 and 3 of the above in connection with temporary absolute disqualification. PERPETUAL OR TEMPORARY SPECIAL DISQUALIFICATION Effects: For public office, profession or calling: a. Deprivation of the office, employment, profession or calling affected; b. Disqualification for holding similar offices or employments during the period of disqualification; For the exercise of right to suffrage: c. Deprivation of the right to vote or to be elected in an office; d. Cannot hold any public office during the period of disqualification ∗ The penalty for disqualification if imposed as an accessory penalty is imposed for PROTECTION and NOT for the withholding of a privilege. ∗ Temporary disqualification or suspension if imposed as an accessory penalty, the duration is the same as that of the principal penalty.
SUSPENSION FROM PUBLIC OFFICE, THE RIGHT TO VOTE AND BE VOTED FOR, THE RIGHT TO PRACTICE A PROFESSION OR CALLING Effects: a. Disqualification from holding such office or the exercise of such profession or right of suffrage during the term of the sentence; b. Cannot hold another office having similar functions during the period of suspension. CIVIL INTERDICTION Effects: Deprivation of the following rights: 1) Parental authority 2) Guardianship over the ward 3) Marital authority 4) Right to manage property and to dispose of the same by acts inter vivos ∗ Civil interdiction is an accessory penalty to the following principal penalties: a) Death if commuted to life imprisonment; b) Reclusion perpetua c) Reclusion temporal INDEMNIFICATION OR CONFISCATION OF INSTRUMENTS ORPROCEES OF THEOFFENSE ∗ This is included in every penalty for the commission of the crime. ∗ The confiscation is in favor of the government. ∗ Property of a third person not liable for the offense is not subject to confiscation. ∗ If the trial court did not order any confiscation of the procees of the crime, the government cannot appeal from the confiscation as that would increase the penalty already imposed. PAYMENT OF COSTS Includes: a. Fees, and b. Indemnities, in the course of judicial proceedings. ∗ Costs may be fixed amounts already determined by law or regulations or amounts subject to a schedule. ∗ If the accused is convicted; costs may be charged against him. If he is acquitted, costs are de officio, meaning each party bears his own expense. E. MEASURES NOT CONSIDERED PENALTY RPC, Art. 24. Measures of prevention or safety which are nor considered penalties. — The following shall not be considered as penalties: 1. The arrest and temporary detention of accused persons, as well as their detention by reason of insanity or imbecility, or illness requiring their confinement in a hospital. 2. The commitment of a minor to any of the institutions mentioned in Article 80 and for the purposes specified therein. 3. Suspension from the employment of public office during the trial or in order to institute proceedings. 4. Fines and other corrective measures which, in the exercise of their administrative disciplinary powers, superior officials may impose upon their subordinates.
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5. Deprivation of rights and the reparations which the civil laws may establish in penal form. ♠ They are not penalties because they are not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. Those mentioned in par. 3 and 4 are merely preventive measures before conviction of offenders. ♠ The commitment of a minor mentioned in par. 2 is not a penalty because it is not imposed by the court in a judgment of conviction. The imposition of the sentence in such case is suspended. ♠ The succeeding provisions are some examples of deprivation of rights established in penal form: Family Code, Art. 228. Parental authority terminates permanently: (1) Upon the death of the parents; (2) Upon the death of the child; or (3) Upon emancipation of the child. (327a) Family Code, Art. 229. Unless subsequently revived by a final judgment, parental authority also terminates: (1) Upon adoption of the child; (2) Upon appointment of a general guardian; (3) Upon judicial declaration of abandonment of the child in a case filed for the purpose; (4) Upon final judgment of a competent court divesting the party concerned of parental authority; or (5) Upon judicial declaration of absence or incapacity of the person exercising parental authority. (327a) F. APPLICATION AND COMPUTATION OF PENALTIES Art. 28. Computation of penalties. — If the offender shall be in prison, the term of the duration of the temporary penalties shall be computed from the day on which the judgment of conviction shall have become final. If the offender be not in prison, the term of the duration of the penalty consisting of deprivation of liberty shall be computed from the day that the offender is placed at the disposal of the judicial authorities for the enforcement of the penalty. The duration of the other penalties shall be computed only from the day on which the defendant commences to serve his sentence. Rules for the computation of penalties: 1. WHEN THE OFFENDER IS IN PRISON – the duration of temporary penalties is from the day on which the judgment of conviction becomes final. 2. WHEN THE OFFENDER IS NOT IN PRISON – the duration of penalty consisting in deprivation of liberty, is from the day that the offender is placed at the disposal of judicial authorities for the enforcement of the penalty. 3. THE DURATION OF OTHER PENALTIES – the duration is from the day on which the offender commences to serve his sentence Examples of temporary penalties: 1. Temporary absolute disqualification 2. Temporary special disqualification 3. Suspension
♠ If offender is under detention, as when he is undergoing preventive imprisonment, Rule No. 1 applies. ♠ If not under detention, because the offender has been released on bail, Rule No. 3 applies. Examples of penalties consisting in deprivation of liberty: 1. Imprisonment 2. Destierro ♠ When the offender is not in prison, Rule No. 2 applies. ♠ If the offender is undergoing preventive imprisonment, Rule No. 3 applies but the offender is entitled to a deduction of full time or 4/5 of the time of his detention. Art. 29. Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from term of imprisonment. — Offenders who have undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of their sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the full time during which they have undergone preventive imprisonment, if the detention prisoner agrees voluntarily in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, except in the following cases: 1. When they are recidivists or have been convicted previously twice or more times of any crime; and 2. When upon being summoned for the execution of their sentence they have failed to surrender voluntarily. If the detention prisoner does not agree to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, he shall be credited in the service of his sentence with four-fifths of the time during which he has undergone preventive imprisonment. (As amended by Republic Act 6127, June 17, 1970). Whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period equal to or more than the possible maximum imprisonment of the offense charged to which he may be sentenced and his case is not yet terminated, he shall be released immediately without prejudice to the continuation of the trial thereof or the proceeding on appeal, if the same is under review. In case the maximum penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be released after thirty (30) days of preventive imprisonment. (As amended by E.O. No. 214, July 10, 1988). ♠ The accused undergoes preventive imprisonment when the offense charged is nonbailable, or even if bailable, he cannot furnish the required bail. ♠ The convict is to be released immediately if the penalty imposed after trial is less than the full time or four-fifths of the time of the preventive imprisonment. ♠ The accused shall be released immediately whenever he has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period equal to or more than the possible maximum imprisonment for the offense charged. Art. 46. Penalty to be imposed upon principals in general. — The penalty prescribed by law for the commission of a felony shall be imposed upon the principals in the commission of such felony.
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Whenever the law prescribes a penalty for a felony is general terms, it shall be understood as applicable to the consummated felony. GENERAL RULE: The penalty prescribed by law in general terms shall be imposed: a. Upon the principals b. For consummated felony EXCEPTION: The exception is when the penalty to be imposed upon the principal in frustrated or attempted felony is fixed by law. ♠ Whenever it is believed that the penalty lower by one or two degrees corresponding to said acts of execution is not in proportion to the wrong done, the law fixes a distinct penalty for the principal in frustrated or attempted felony. ♠ The graduation of penalties by degrees refers to STAGES OF EXECUTION (consummated, frustrated or attempted) and to the DEGREE OF THE CRIMINAL PARTICIPATION OF THE OFFENDER (whether as principal, accomplice or accessory) ♠ The division of a divisible penalty into three periods, as maximum, medium and minimum, refers to the proper period of the penalty which should be imposed when aggravating or mitigating circumstances attend the commission of the crime. People v. Formigones (1950) Facts: The accused without a previous quarrel or provocation took his bolo and stabbed his wife in the back resulting to the latter’s death. The accused was sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Held: The penalty applicable for parricide under Art. 246 of the RPC is composed only of 2 indivisible penalties, reclusion perpetua to death. Although the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance without any aggravating circumstance to offset them, Art. 63 of the RPC should be applied. The said article provides that when the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied. PRINCIPALS, ACCOMPLICES AND ACCESSORIES IN CONSUMMATED, FRUSTRATED AND ATTEMPTED FELONIES. Art. 46. Penalty to be imposed upon principals in general. — The penalty prescribed by law for the commission of a felony shall be imposed upon the principals in the commission of such felony. Whenever the law prescribes a penalty for a felony is general terms, it shall be understood as applicable to the consummated felony. Art. 50. Penalty to be imposed upon principals of a frustrated crime. — The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principal in a frustrated felony. Art. 51. Penalty to be imposed upon principals of attempted crimes. — A penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principals in an attempt to commit a felony.
Art. 52. Penalty to be imposed upon accomplices in consummated crime. — The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated shall be imposed upon the accomplices in the commission of a consummated felony. Art. 53. Penalty to be imposed upon accessories to the commission of a consummated felony. — The penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the accessories to the commission of a consummated felony. Art. 54. Penalty to imposed upon accomplices in a frustrated crime. — The penalty next lower in degree than prescribed by law for the frustrated felony shall be imposed upon the accomplices in the commission of a frustrated felony. Art. 55. Penalty to be imposed upon accessories of a frustrated crime. — The penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the frustrated felony shall be imposed upon the accessories to the commission of a frustrated felony. Art. 56. Penalty to be imposed upon accomplices in an attempted crime. — The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for an attempt to commit a felony shall be imposed upon the accomplices in an attempt to commit the felony. Art. 57. Penalty to be imposed upon accessories of an attempted crime. — The penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the attempted felony shall be imposed upon the accessories to the attempt to commit a felony. DIAGRAM OF THE APPLICATION OF ARTS. 50-57:
PRINCIPALS ACCOMPLICES ACCESSORIES
CONSUMMATED 0 1 2
FRUSTRATED 1 2 3
ATTEMPTED 2 3 4
“0” represents the penalty prescribed by law in defining a crime, which is to be imposed n the PRINCIPAL in a CONSUMMATED OFFENSE, in accordance with the provisions of Art. 46. The other figures represent the degrees to which the penalty must be lowered, to meet the different situation anticipated by law. EXCEPTIONS: Arts. 50 to 57 shall not apply to cases where the law expressly prescribes the penalty for frustrated or attempted felony, or to be imposed upon accomplices or accessories. BASES FOR THE DETERMINATION OF THE EXTENT OF PENALTY: 1. The stage reached by the crime in its development (either attempted, frustrated or consummated) 2. The participation therein of the person liable. 3. The aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended the commission of the crime. ♠ A DEGREE is one entire penalty, one whole penalty or one unit of the penalties enumerated in the graduated scales provided for in Art. 71. Each of the
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penalties of reclusion perpetua, reclusion temporal, prision mayor, etc., enumerated in the graduated scales of Art. 71 is a degree. ♠ When there is a mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the penalty is lowered or increased by PERIOD only, except when the penalty is divisible and there are two or more mitigating and without aggravating circumstances, in which case the penalty is lowered by degree. ♠ A PERIOD is one of the three equal portions called the minimum, medium and maximum of a divisible penalty. Art. 60. Exception to the rules established in Articles 50 to 57. — The provisions contained in Articles 50 to 57, inclusive, of this Code shall not be applicable to cases in which the law expressly prescribes the penalty provided for a frustrated or attempted felony, or to be imposed upon accomplices or accessories. ♠ Arts. 50 to 57 shall not apply to cases where the law expressly prescribes the penalty for frustrated or attempted felony, or to be imposed upon accomplices or accessories. GENERAL RULE: An accomplice is punished by a penalty one degree lower than the penalty imposed upon the principal. EXCEPTIONS: a. The ascendants, guardians, curators, teachers and any person who by abuse of authority or confidential relationship, shall cooperate as accomplices in the crimes of rape, acts of lasciviousness, seduction, corruption of minors, white slate trade or abduction. (Art. 346) b. One who furnished the place for the perpetration of the crime of slight illegal detention. (Art. 268) GENERAL RULE: An accessory is punished by a penalty two degrees lower than the penalty imposed upon the principal. EXCEPTION: When accessory is punished as principal – knowingly concealing certain evil practices is ordinarily an act of the accessory, but in Art. 142, such act is punished as the act of the principal. When accessories are punished with a penalty one degree lower: a. Knowingly using counterfeited seal or forged signature or stamp of the President (Art. 162). b. Illegal possession and use of a false treasury or bank note (Art. 168). c. Using falsified document (Art. 173 par.3 ) d. Using falsified dispatch (Art. 173 par. 2) Art. 61. Rules for graduating penalties. — For the purpose of graduating the penalties which, according to the provisions of Articles 50 to 57, inclusive, of this Code, are to be imposed upon persons guilty as principals of any frustrated or attempted felony, or as accomplices or accessories, the following rules shall be observed: 1. When the penalty prescribed for the felony is single and indivisible, the penalty next lower in degrees shall be that immediately following that indivisible penalty in the respective graduated scale prescribed in Article 71 of this Code. 2. When the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of two indivisible penalties, or of one or more divisible penalties to be impose to their full extent, the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately
following the lesser of the penalties prescribed in the respective graduated scale. 3. When the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of one or two indivisible penalties and the maximum period of another divisible penalty, the penalty next lower in degree shall be composed of the medium and minimum periods of the proper divisible penalty and the maximum periods of the proper divisible penalty and the maximum period of that immediately following in said respective graduated scale. 4. when the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of several periods, corresponding to different divisible penalties, the penalty next lower in degree shall be composed of the period immediately following the minimum prescribed and of the two next following, which shall be taken from the penalty prescribed, if possible; otherwise from the penalty immediately following in the above mentioned respective graduated scale. 5. When the law prescribes a penalty for a crime in some manner not especially provided for in the four preceding rules, the courts, proceeding by analogy, shall impose corresponding penalties upon those guilty as principals of the frustrated felony, or of attempt to commit the same, and upon accomplices and accessories. ♠ This article provides for the rules to be observed in lowering the penalty by one or two degrees. a. For the principal in frustrated felony – one degree lower; b. For the principal in attempted felony – two degrees lower; c. For the accomplice in consummated felony – one degree lower; and d. For the accessory in consummated felony – two degrees lower. ♠ The rules provided for in Art. 61 should also apply in determining the MINIMUM of the indeterminate penalty under the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The MINIMUM of the indeterminate penalty is within the range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the RPC for the offense. ♠ Those rules also apply in lowering the penalty by one or two degrees by reason of the presence of privileged mitigating circumstance (Arts. 68 and 69), or when the penalty is divisible and there are two or more mitigating circumstances (generic) and no aggravating circumstance (Art. 64). ♠ The lower penalty shall be taken from the graduated scale in Art. 71. The INDIVISIBLE PENALTIES are: a. death b. reclusion perpetua c. public censure The DIVISIBLE PENALTIES are: a. reclusion temporal b. prision mayor c. prision correccional d. arresto mayor e. destierro f. arresto menor * the divisible penalties are divided into three periods: MINIMUM, MEDIUM AND THE MAXIMUM RULES: FIRST RULE: When the penalty is single and indivisible.
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Ex. reclusion perpetua ♠ The penalty immediately following it is reclusion temporal. Thus, reclusion temporal is the penalty next lower in degree. SECOND RULE: When the penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties Ex. reclusion perpetua to death ♠ The penalty immediately following the lesser of the penalties, which is reclusion perpetua, is reclusion temporal. When the penalty is composed of one or more divisible penalties to be imposed to their full extent Ex. prision correccional to prision mayor ♠ The penalty immediately following the lesser of the penalties of prision correccional to prision mayor is arresto mayor.
Minimum When the penalty has one period - If the penalty is any one of the three periods of a divisible penalty, the penalty next lower in degree shall be that period next following the given penalty. Ex. Prision Mayor in its MAXIMUM period ♠ The penalty immediately inferior is prision mayor in its MEDIUM period.
THIRD RULE: When the penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties and the maximum period of a divisible penalty Ex. reclusion temporal in its MAXIMUM period to death
SIMPLIFIED RULES: The rules prescribed in pars. 4 and 5 of Art. 61 may be simplified as follows: 1. If the penalty prescribed by the Code consists in 3 periods, corresponding to different divisible penalties, the penalty next lower in degree is the penalty consisting in the 3 periods down in the scale. 2. If the penalty prescribed b the Code consists in 2 periods, the penalty next lower in degree is the penalty consisting in 2 periods down in the scale. 3. If the penalty prescribed by the Code consists in only 1 period, the penalty next lower in degree is the next period down in the scale.
Death Reclusion Perpetua
Penalty for the principal in consummated murder
EFFECTS OF MITIGATING AND AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Penalty for accomplice; or for principal in frustrated murder
Art. 62. Effect of the attendance of mitigating or aggravating circumstances and of habitual delinquency. — Mitigating or aggravating circumstances and habitual delinquency shall be taken into account for the purpose of diminishing or increasing the penalty in conformity with the following rules: 1. Aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime specially punishable by law or which are included by the law in defining a crime and prescribing the penalty therefor shall not be taken into account for the purpose of increasing the penalty. 2. The same rule shall apply with respect to any aggravating circumstance inherent in the crime to such a degree that it must of necessity accompany the commission thereof. 3. Aggravating or mitigating circumstances which arise from the moral attributes of the offender, or from his private relations with the offended party, or from any other personal cause, shall only serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability of the principals, accomplices and accessories as to whom such circumstances are attendant. 4. The circumstances which consist in the material execution of the act, or in the means employed to accomplish it, shall serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability of those persons only who had knowledge of them at the time of the execution of the act or their cooperation therein. 5. Habitual delinquency shall have the following effects: (a) Upon a third conviction the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided by law for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods; (b) Upon a fourth conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods; and (c) Upon a fifth or additional conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional
Reclusion Temporal Prision Mayor
Maximum Medium Minimum Maximum Medium Minimum
When the penalty is composed of one indivisible penalty and the maximum period of a divisible penalty Ex. Reclusion temporal in its MAXIMUM period to Reclusion perpetua ♠ The same rule shall be observed in lowering the penalty by one or two degrees. FOURTH RULE: When the penalty is composed of several periods - This rule contemplates a penalty composed of at least 3 periods. The several periods must correspond to different divisible penalties. Ex. Prision Mayor in its MEDIUM period to Reclusion temporal in its MINIMUM period. Reclusion temporal Prision Mayor Prision Correccional
Maximum Medium Minimum Maximum Medium Minimum Maximum Medium Minimum
Penalty for the principal in the consummated felony Penalty for the accomplice; or principal in frustrated felony
FIFTH RULE: When the penalty has two periods Ex. Prision correccional in its MINIMUM and MEDIUM periods Prision correccional
Arresto Mayor
Maximum Medium Minimum Maximum Medium
The penalty prescribed for the felony The penalty next lower
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penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period. Notwithstanding the provisions of this article, the total of the two penalties to be imposed upon the offender, in conformity herewith, shall in no case exceed 30 years. For the purpose of this article, a person shall be deemed to be habitual delinquent, is within a period of ten years from the date of his release or last conviction of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa or falsification, he is found guilty of any of said crimes a third time or oftener.
because such law is neither an EX POST FACTO LAW nor an additional punishment for future crimes. It is simply a punishment on future crimes on account of the criminal propensities of the accused. The imposition of such additional penalties is mandatory and is not discretionary. Habitual delinquency applies at any stage of the execution because subjectively, the offender reveals the same degree of depravity or perversity as the one who commits a consummated crime. It applies to all participants because it reveals persistence in them of the inclination to wrongdoing and of the perversity of character that led them to commit the previous crime.
• •
• What are the effects of the attendance of mitigating or aggravating circumstances? a. Aggravating circumstances which are not considered for the purpose of increasing the penalty: 1. Those which in themselves constitute a crime especially punishable by law. 2. Those included by law in defining the crime. 3. Those inherent in the crime but of necessity they accompany the commission thereof. b. Aggravating or mitigating circumstances that serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability of the offender to whom such are attendant. Those arising from: 1. Moral attributes of the offender 2. His private relations with the offended party 3. Any other personal cause c.
Aggravating or mitigating circumstances that affect the offenders only who had knowledge of them at the time of the execution of the act or their cooperation therein. Those which consist: 1. In the material execution of the act - will not affect all the offenders but only those to whom such act are attendant 2. Means to accomplish the crime - will affect only those offenders who have knowledge of the same at the time of the act of execution or their cooperation therein
What are the legal effects of habitual delinquency? 1) Third conviction - the culprit is sentenced to the penalty for the crime committed and to the additional penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum period. 2) Fourth conviction - the penalty is that provided by law for the last crime and the additional penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods. 3) Fifth or additional conviction - the penalty is that provided by law for the last crime and the additional penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period.
Cases where attending aggravating or mitigating circumstances are not considered in the imposition of penalties - Penalty that is single and indivisible - Felonies through negligence - When the penalty is a fine - When the penalty is prescribed by a special law. Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. — In all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed. In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof: 1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied. 2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied. 3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstances and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied. 4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the act, the court shall reasonably allow them to offset one another in consideration of their number and importance, for the purpose of applying the penalty in accordance with the preceding rules, according to the result of such compensation. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties: 1.
Penalty is single and indivisible - The penalty shall be applied regardless of the presence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Ex. reclusion perpetua or death 2.
Note: • In no case shall the total of the 2 penalties imposed upon the offender exceed 30 years. • The law does not apply to crimes described in Art. 155 • The imposition of the additional penalty on habitual delinquents are CONSTITUTIONAL
LEX SOCIETAS Veritas. Vnitas. Virtvs.
Penalty is composed of 2 indivisible penalties: a. One aggravating circumstance present - HIGHER penalty b. No mitigating circumstances present - LESSER penalty c. Some mitigating circumstances present and no aggravating - LESSER penalty d. Mitigating and aggravating circumstances offset each other
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- Basis importance.
of
penalty:
number
and
Art. 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain three periods. — In cases in which the penalties prescribed by law contain three periods, whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three different penalties, each one of which forms a period in accordance with the provisions of Articles 76 and 77, the court shall observe for the application of the penalty the following rules, according to whether there are or are not mitigating or aggravating circumstances: 1. When there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, they shall impose the penalty prescribed by law in its medium period. 2. When only a mitigating circumstances is present in the commission of the act, they shall impose the penalty in its minimum period. 3. When an aggravating circumstance is present in the commission of the act, they shall impose the penalty in its maximum period. 4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall reasonably offset those of one class against the other according to their relative weight. 5. When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem applicable, according to th7e number and nature of such circumstances. 6. Whatever may be the number and nature of the aggravating circumstances, the courts shall not impose a greater penalty than that prescribed by law, in its maximum period. 7. Within the limits of each period, the court shall determine the extent of the penalty according to the number and nature of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the greater and lesser extent of the evil produced by the crime.
Rules for the application of DIVISIBLE PENALTIES a. No aggravating and No mitigating - MEDIUM PERIOD b. One mitigating - MINIMUM PERIOD c. One aggravating (any number cannot exceed the penalty provided by law in its maximum period) - MAXIMUM PERIOD d. Mitigating and aggravating circumstances present - to offset each other according to relative weight e. 2 or more mitigating and no aggravating - one degree lower (has the effect of a privileged mitigating circumstance) NOTE: Art. 64 does not apply to: - indivisible penalties - penalties prescribed by special laws - fines - crimes committed by negligence Art. 67. Penalty to be imposed when not all the requisites of exemption of the fourth circumstance of Article 12 are present.— When all the conditions required in circumstances Number 4 of Article 12 of this Code to exempt from criminal liability are not present, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon the culprit if he shall have been guilty of a grave felony, and arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if of a less grave felony. Penalty to be imposed if the requisites of accident (Art. 12 par 4) are not all present: a. GRAVE FELONY - arresto mayor maximum period to prision correccional minimum period b. LESS GRAVE FELONY - arresto mayor minimum period and medium period Art. 69. Penalty to be imposed when the crime committed is not wholly excusable. — A penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from criminal liability in the several cases mentioned in Article 11 and 12, provided that the majority of such conditions be present. The courts shall impose the penalty in the period which may be deemed proper, in view of the number and nature of the conditions of exemption present or lacking. Penalty to be imposed when the crime committed is not wholly excusable - One or two degrees lower if the majority of the conditions for justification or exemption in the cases provided in Arts. 11 and 12 are present. People v. Lacanilao (1988) Facts: The CFI found the accused, a policeman, guilty of homicide. On appeal before the CA, the CA found that the accused acted in the performance of a duty but that the shooting of the victim was not the necessary consequence of the due performance thereof, therefore crediting to him the mitigating circumstance consisting of the incomplete justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty. The CA lowered the penalty merely by one period applying Art. 64 (2) appreciating incomplete fulfillment of duty as a mere generic mitigating circumstance lowering the penalty to minimum period. Held: CA erred because incomplete fulfillment of duty is a privileged mitigating circumstance which not only cannot be offset by aggravating circumstances but also reduces the penalty by one or two degrees than that prescribed b law. The governing provision is Art. 69 of the RPC. People v. Campuhan (supra) The penalty for attempted rape is two (2) degrees lower than the imposable penalty of death for the offense charged, which is statutory rape of a minor below seven (7) years. Two (2) degrees lower is reclusion temporal, the range of which is twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the maximum of the penalty to be imposed upon the accused shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, the range of which is fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision mayor, the range of which is from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, in any of its periods.
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♣ In complex crime, when the offender executes various acts, he must have a single purpose.
G. SPECIAL RULES COMPLEX CRIMES Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. ♣ Art. 48 requires the commission of at least 2 crimes. But the two or more GRAVE or LESS GRAVE felonies must be the result of a SINGLE ACT, or an offense must be a NECESSARY MEANS FOR COMMITTING the other. ♣ In complex crimes, although two or more crimes are actually committed, they constitute only one crime in the eyes of the law as well as in the conscience of the offender. The offender has only one criminal intent. Even in the case where an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the evil intent of the offender is only one. TWO KINDS OF COMPLEX CRIMES 1. COMPOUND CRIME - When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies 2. COMPLEX CRIME PROPER - When an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. COMPOUND CRIME REQUISITES: 1. That only a SINGLE ACT is performed by the offender 2. That the single acts produces (a) 2 or more grave felonies, or (b) one or more grave and one or more less grave felonies, or (c) two or more less grave felonies ♣ Light felonies produced by the same act should be treated and punished as separate offenses or may be absorbed by the grave felony. Ex. When the crime is committed by force or violence, slight physical injuries are absorbed. ♣ Example of compound crime: - Where the victim was killed while discharging his duty as barangay captain to protect life and property and enforce law and order in his barrio, the crime is a complex crime of homicide with assault upon a person in authority. ♣ When in obedience to an order several accused simultaneously shot many persons, without evidence how many each killed, there is only a single offense, there being a single criminal impulse. COMPLEX CRIME PROPER REQUISITES: 1. That at least two offenses are committed 2. That one or some of the offenses must be necessary to commit the other 3. That both or all the offenses must be punished under the same statute. ♣ The phrase “necessary means” does not mean “indispensable means”
♣ Subsequent acts of intercourse, after forcible abduction with rape, are separate acts of rape. ♣ Not complex crime when trespass to dwelling is a direct means to commit a grave offense. ♣ No complex crime, when one offense is committed to conceal the other. ♣ When the offender had in his possession the funds which he misappropriated, the falsification of a public or official document involving said offense is a separate offense. ♣ No complex crime where one of the offense is penalized by a special law. ♣ There is no complex crime of rebellion with murder, arson, robbery, or other common crimes. ♣ When two crimes produced by a single act are respectively within the exclusive jurisdiction of two courts of different jurisdiction, the court of higher jurisdiction shall try the complex crime. ♣ The penalty for complex crime is the penalty for the most serious crime, the same to be applied in its maximum period. ♣ When two felonies constituting a complex crime are punishable by imprisonment and fine, respectively, only the penalty of imprisonment should be imposed. ♣ Art. 48 applies only to cases where the Code does not provide a definite specific penalty for a complex crime. ♣ One information should be filed when a complex crime is committed. ♣ When a complex crime is charged and one offense is not proven, the accused can be convicted of the other. ♣ Art. 48 does not apply when the law provides one single penalty for special complex crimes. PLURALITY OF CRIMES - consists in the successive execution by the same individual of different criminal acts upon any of which no conviction has yet been declared. KINDS OF PLURALITY OF CRIMES 1. FORMAL OR IDEAL PLURALITY - There is but one criminal liability in this kind of plurality. - divided into 3 groups: a. When the offender commits an of the complex crimes defined in Art. 48 of the Code. b. When the law specifically fixes a single penalty for 2 or more offenses committed. c. When the offender commits continued crimes. 2. REAL OR MATERIAL PLURALITY - There are different crimes in law as well as in the conscience of the offender. In such cases, the offender shall be punished for each and ever offense that he committed. - Ex. A stabbed B. Then, A also stabbed C. There are two crimes committed. PLURALITY OF CRIMES There is no conviction of any of the crimes committed. CONTINUED CRIME
LEX SOCIETAS Veritas. Vnitas. Virtvs.
RECIDIVISM There must be conviction by final judgment of the first or prior offense.
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1.
A single crime consisting of a series of acts but all arising from one criminal resolution. A continuous, unlawful act or series of acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force, however long a time it may occupy. Ex. a collector of a commercial firm misappropriates for his personal use several amounts collected by him from different persons. One crime only because the different appropriations are but the different moments during which once criminal resolution arises and a single defraudation develops.
described in Art. 135, when committed as a means to or in furtherance of the subversive ends described in Art. 134, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and cannot be regarded or penalized as distinct crimes in themselves. Not every act of violence is to be deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion solely because it happens to be committed simultaneously. If the killing, robbing, etc were done for private purposes, the crime would be separately punishable and would not be absorbed by the rebellion.
♣ A continued crime is not a complex crime. ♣ A continued crime is different from a TRANSITORY CRIME which is also called a MOVING CRIME.
court: (b) abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority view in said case that rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes, and that under Art. 48 rebellion may be properly complexed with common offenses, (c) hold Hernandez applicable only to offense committed in furtherance, or as a necessary means for the commission, of rebellion, but not to acts committed in the course of a rebellion which also constitute “common” crimes of grave or less grave character, (d) maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb all other offenses committed in its course, whether or not necessary to its commission or in furtherance thereof. Held: Hernandez doctrine remains binding and operates to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with another offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.
2.
REAL OR MATERIAL CONTINUED CRIME PLURALITY There is a series of acts performed by the offender. Each act performed b the The different acts offender constitutes a constitute only one crime separate crime because because all of the acts each act is generated by a performed arise from one criminal impulse. criminal resolution. People v. Escober (supra) Special complex crime of robbery with homicide. Rule is established that whenever a homicide has been committed as a consequence of or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part as principals in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide although they did no actually take part in the homicide unless endeavored to prevent homicide. While it has been established that Punzalan’s participation in the crime was to act as a look-out, and as such he did not participate in the killing of the two helpless victims, he cannot evade responsibility. People v. Hernandez (1956) Facts: Hernandez and others were charged with the crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies. He was found guilty and sentenced to suffer life imprisonment. Held: Murder, arson and robbery are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion, as a means “necessary” for the perpetration of the offense. Such common offenses are absorbed or inherent in the crime of rebellion. Inasmuch as the acts specified in Art. 135 constitute one single crime, it follows that said acts offer no occasion for the application of Art. 48 which requires therefore the commission of atleast 2 crimes. Principle of pro reo. Art. 48 is intended to favor the culprit: when two or more crimes are the result of a single act, the offender is deemed less perverse than when he commits said crimes through separate and distinct acts. People v. Geronimo (1956) As in treason, where both intent and overt act are necessary, the crime of rebellion is integrated by the coexistence of both the armed uprising for the purposes expressed in Art. 134 of the RPC, and the overt acts of violence described in the first paragraph of Art. 135. That both purpose and overt acts are essential components of one crime and that without either of them the crime of rebellion legally does not exist, is shown by the absence of any penalty attached to Art. 134. It follows, therefore, that any or all of the acts
Enrile v. Salazar (1990) The appellants proposed 3 options to the
People v. Toling (1975) The eight killings and the attempted killing should be treated as separate crimes of murder and attempted murder qualified by treachery. The unexpected surprise assaults perpetrated by the twins upon their co-passengers, who did not anticipate that the twins would act like juramentados and who were unable to defend themselves was a mode of execution that insured the consummation of the twins’ diabolical objective to butcher their co-passengers. The conduct of the twins evinced conspiracy and community of design. The eight killings and the attempted murder were perpetrated by means of different acts. Hence, they cannot be regarded as constituting a complex crime under art. 48 of the RPC which refers to cases where “a single act constitutes two or more grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other.” Monteverde v. People (2002) Facts: Monteverde was purportedly charged with the complex crime of estafa through falsification of a commercial document for allegedly falsifying the document she had submitted to show that the money donated by PAGCOR was used and spent for lighting materials for her barangay. Held: Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, a complex crime refers to (1) the commission of at least two grave or less grave felonies that must both (or all) be the result of a single act, or (2) one offense must be a necessary means for committing the other (or others). Negatively put, there is no complex crime when (1) two or more crimes are committed, but not by a
LEX SOCIETAS Veritas. Vnitas. Virtvs.
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single act; or (2) committing one crime is not a necessary means for committing the other (or others). Using the above guidelines, the acts attributed to petitioner in the present case cannot constitute a complex crime. Specifically, her alleged actions showing falsification of a public and/or a commercial document were not necessary to commit estafa. Neither were the two crimes the result of a single act. People v. Gonzalez (Supra) Facts: Both of the families of Andres and that of Gonzalez were on their way to the exit of the Loyola Memorial Park. Gonzales was driving with his grandson and 3 housemaids, while Andres was driving with his pregnant wife, Feliber, his 2yr old son, Kenneth, his nephew Kevin and his sister-in-law. At an intersection, their two vehicles almost collided. Gonzales continued driving while Andres tailed Gonzales’ vehicle and cut him off when he found the opportunity to do so, then got out of his vehicle and knocked on the appellant's car window. Heated exchange of remarks followed. On his way back to his vehicle, he met Gonzales son, Dino. Andres had a shouting match this time with Dino. Gonzales then alighted from his car and fired a single shot at the last window on the left side of Andres' vehicle at an angle away from Andres. The single bullet fired hit Kenneth, Kevin and Feliber which caused the latter’s death. Held: The rules on the imposition of penalties for complex crimes under Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code are not applicable in this case. Art. 48 applies if a single act constitutes two or more grave and less grave felonies or when an offense is a necessary means of committing another; in such a case, the penalty for the most serious offense shall be imposed in its maximum period. Art. 9 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Art. 25 defines grave felonies as those to which the law attaches the capital punishment or afflictive penalties from reclusion perpetua to prision mayor; less grave felonies are those to which the law attaches a penalty which in its maximum period falls under correctional penalties; and light felonies are those punishable by arresto menor or fine not exceeding two hundred pesos. Considering that the offenses committed by the act of the appellant of firing a single shot are one count of homicide, a grave felony, and two counts of slight physical injuries, a light felony, the rules on the imposition of penalties for complex crimes, which requires two or more grave and/or less grave felonies, will not apply. People v. Comadre (2004) Facts: Robert Agbanlog, Wabe, Bullanday, Camat and Eugenio were having a drinking spree on the terrace of the house of Robert’s father, Jaime Agbanlog, Jaime was seated on the banister of the terrace listening to the conversation of the companions of his son. As the drinking session went on, Robert and the others noticed appellants George and Antonio Comadre and Lozano walking. The 3 stopped in front of the house. While his companions looked on, Antonio suddenly lobbed a hand grenade which fell on the roof of the terrace. Appellants immediately fled. The hand grenade exploded ripping a hole in the roof of the house. Robert died while his father, Jaime, Wabe, Camat, and Bullanday sustained shrapnel injuries.. Held: Antonio is guilty of the complex crime of murder with multiple attempted murder under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. The underlying philosophy of complex crimes in the Revised Penal Code, which follows the pro reo principle, is intended to favor the accused by
imposing a single penalty irrespective of the crimes committed. The rationale being, that the accused who commits two crimes with single criminal impulse demonstrates lesser perversity than when the crimes are committed by different acts and several criminal resolutions. The single act by appellant of detonating a hand grenade may quantitatively constitute a cluster of several separate and distinct offenses, yet these component criminal offenses should be considered only as a single crime in law on which a single penalty is imposed because the offender was impelled by a “single criminal impulse” which shows his lesser degree of perversity. People v. Delos Santos (2001) Facts: Glenn Delos Santos and his 3 friends went to Bukidnon on his Isuzu Elf truck. On their way, they decided to pass by a restaurant where Glenn had 3 bottles of beer. From Bukidnon to Cagayan de Oro City, Glenn’s truck hit, bumped, seriously wounded and claimed the lives of several members of the PNP who were undergoing an endurance run on a highway wearing black shirts and shorts and green combat shoes. Twelve trainees were killed on the spot, 12 were seriously wounded, 1 of whom eventually died and 10 sustained minor injuries. At the time of the occurrence, the place of the incident was very dark as there was no moon. Neither were there lamposts that illuminated the highway. The trial court convicted Glenn of the complex crime of multiple murder, multiple frustrated murder and multiple attempted murder, with the use of motor vehicle as the qualifying circumstance. Held: Considering that the incident was not a product of a malicious intent but rather the result of a single act of reckless driving, Glenn should be held guilty of the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and less serious physical injuries. The slight physical injuries caused by Glenn to the ten other victims through reckless imprudence, would, had they been intentional, have constituted light felonies. Being light felonies, which are not covered by Article 48, they should be treated and punished as separate offenses. Separate informations should have, therefore, been filed People v. Velasquez (2000) Facts: Velasquez, poked a toy gun and forced Karen to go with her at his grandmother’s house. Out of fear and not knowing that the gun that Velasquez was holding is a mere toy, Karen went with Velasquez. Velasquez then raped Karen twice. The trial court convicted Velasquez of two counts of rape. Held: Considering that Velasquez forcibly abducted Karen and then raped her twice, he should be convicted of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape and simple rape. The penalty for complex crimes is the penalty for the most serious crime which shall be imposed in its maximum period. Rape is the more serious of the two crimes and is punishable with reclusion perpetua under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and since reclusion perpetua is a single indivisible penalty, it shall be imposed as it is. The subsequent rape committed by Velasquez can no longer be considered as a separate complex crime of forcible abduction with rape but only as a separate act of rape punishable by reclusion perpetua. SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIMES
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♣ Art. 48 does not apply when the law provides one single penalty for special complex crimes: 1. Robbery with Homicide (Art. 294 (1)) 2. Robbery with Rape (Art. 294 (2)) 3. Kidnapping with serious physical injuries (Art. 267 (3)) 4. Rape with Homicide (Art. 335) People v. Fabon (2000) The trial court inaccurately designated the crime committed as “robbery with homicide and rape.” When the special complex crime of robbery with homicide is accompanied b another offense like rape or intentional mutilation, such additional offense is treated as an aggravating circumstance which would result in the imposition of the maximum of the penalty of death. The proper designation is robbery with homicide aggravated by rape. When rape and homicide co-exist in the commission of robbery, it is the first paragraph of Art. 294 of the RPC which applies, the rape is considered as an aggravating circumstance. People v. Empante (1999) Facts: The accused was found guilty of three counts of rape against his daughter who was then below 18 years old and sentenced him to death and to indemnify his daughter in the amount of P50k with moral damages amounting to another P5ok for each count of rape. On appeal, he claims that the trial court should have appreciated two mitigating circumstances in his favor namely voluntary confession of guilt and intoxication and sentenced him to a lesser penalty. Held: Qualified rape is punishable by the single indivisible penalty of death, which must be applied regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance which may have attended the commission of the deed. CRIME DIFFERENT FROM THAT INTENDED Art. 49. Penalty to be imposed upon the principals when the crime committed is different from that intended. — In cases in which the felony committed is different from that which the offender intended to commit, the following rules shall be observed: 1. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be higher than that corresponding to the offense which the accused intended to commit, the penalty corresponding to the latter shall be imposed in its maximum period. 2. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be lower than that corresponding to the one which the accused intended to commit, the penalty for the former shall be imposed in its maximum period. 3. The rule established by the next preceding paragraph shall not be applicable if the acts committed by the guilty person shall also constitute an attempt or frustration of another crime, if the law prescribes a higher penalty for either of the latter offenses, in which case the penalty provided for the attempted or the frustrated crime shall be imposed in its maximum period. ♣ Art. 49 has reference to Art. 4 (1). It applies only when there is ERROR IN PERSONAE. ♣ In Art. 49 pars. 1 and 2, the LOWER PENALTY in its MAXIMUM PERIOD is always imposed. ♣ In Par. 3, the penalty for the attempted or frustrated crime shall be imposed in its maximum period. This rule
is not necessary and may well be covered by Art. 48, in view of the fact that the same act also constitutes an attempt or a frustration of another crime. IMPOSSIBLE CRIMES Art. 59. Penalty to be imposed in case of failure to commit the crime because the means employed or the aims sought are impossible. — When the person intending to commit an offense has already performed the acts for the execution of the same but nevertheless the crime was not produced by reason of the fact that the act intended was by its nature one of impossible accomplishment or because the means employed by such person are essentially inadequate to produce the result desired by him, the court, having in mind the social danger and the degree of criminality shown by the offender, shall impose upon him the penalty of arresto mayor or a fine from 200 to 500 pesos. ♣ Art. 59 is limited to cases where the act performed would be grave or less grave felonies. ♣ Basis of penalty: 1. social danger 2. degree of criminality shown by the offender ADDITIONAL PENALTY FOR CERTAIN ACCESSORIES Art. 58. Additional penalty to be imposed upon certain accessories. — Those accessories falling within the terms of paragraphs 3 of Article 19 of this Code who should act with abuse of their public functions, shall suffer the additional penalty of absolute perpetual disqualification if the principal offender shall be guilty of a grave felony, and that of absolute temporary disqualification if he shall be guilty of a less grave felony. ♣ Absolute perpetual disqualification if the principal offender is guilty of a grave felony. ♣ Absolute temporary disqualification if the principal offender is guilt of less grave felony. WHERE THE OFFENDER IS BELOW 18 YEARS Art. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age. — When the offender is a minor under eighteen years and his case is one coming under the provisions of the paragraphs next to the last of Article 80 of this Code, the following rules shall be observed: 1. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who is not exempted from liability by reason of the court having declared that he acted with discernment, a discretionary penalty shall be imposed, but always lower by two degrees at least than that prescribed by law for the crime which he committed. 2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period. PD No. 603. ART. 192. Suspension of Sentence and Commitment of Youthful Offender. If after hearing the evidence in the proper proceedings, the court should find that the youthful
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offender has committed the acts charged against him the court shall determine the imposable penalty, including any civil liability chargeable against him. However, instead of pronouncing judgment of conviction, the court shall suspend all further proceedings and shall commit such minor to the custody or care of the Department of Social Welfare, or to any training institution operated by the government, or duly licensed agencies or any other responsible person, until he shall have reached twenty-one years of age or, for a shorter period as the court may deem proper, after considering the reports and recommendations of the Department of Social Welfare or the agency or responsible individual under whose care he has been committed. The youthful offender shall be subject to visitation and supervision by a representative of the Department of Social Welfare or any duly licensed agency or such other officer as the court may designate subject to such conditions as it may prescribe. ♣ Art. 68 applies to such minor if his application for suspension of sentence is disapproved or if while in the reformatory institution he becomes incorrigible in which case he shall be returned to the court for the imposition of the proper penalty. ♣ 9 to 15 years only with discernment: at least 2 degrees lower. ♣ 15 to 18 years old: penalty next lower ♣ Art. 68 provides for two of the PRIVILEGED MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES ♣ If the act is attended by two or more mitigating and no aggravating circumstance, the penalty being divisible, a minor over 15 but under 18 years old may still get a penalty two degrees lower. THE THREE-FOLD RULE Art. 70. Successive service of sentence. — When the culprit has to serve two or more penalties, he shall serve them simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so permit otherwise, the following rules shall be observed: In the imposition of the penalties, the order of their respective severity shall be followed so that they may be executed successively or as nearly as may be possible, should a pardon have been granted as to the penalty or penalties first imposed, or should they have been served out. For the purpose of applying the provisions of the next preceding paragraph the respective severity of the penalties shall be determined in accordance with the following scale: 1. Death, 2. Reclusion perpetua, 3. Reclusion temporal, 4. Prision mayor, 5. Prision correccional, 6. Arresto mayor, 7. Arresto menor, 8. Destierro, 9. Perpetual absolute disqualification, 10 Temporal absolute disqualification. 11. Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for, the right to follow a profession or calling, and 12. Public censure Notwithstanding the provisions of the rule next preceding, the maximum duration of the convict's
sentence shall not be more than three-fold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him. No other penalty to which he may be liable shall be inflicted after the sum total of those imposed equals the same maximum period. Such maximum period shall in no case exceed forty years. In applying the provisions of this rule the duration of perpetual penalties (pena perpetua) shall be computed at thirty years. (As amended). Outline of the provisions of this Article: 1. When the culprit has to serve 2 or more penalties, he shall serve them simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so permit. 2. Otherwise, the order of their respective severity shall be followed. 3. The respective severity of the penalties is as follows: a. Death b. Reclusion perpetua c. Reclusion temporal d. Prision mayor e. Prision correccional f. Arresto mayor g. Arresto menor h. Destierro i. Perpetual absolute disqualification j. Temporary absolute disqualification k. Suspension from public office, the right to vote, and be voted for, the right to follow profession or calling, and l. Public censure The penalties which can be simultaneously served are: 1. Perpetual absolute disqualification 2. Perpetual special disqualification 3. Temporary absolute disqualification 4. Temporary special disqualification 5. Suspension 6. Destierro 7. Public Censure 8. Fine and Bond to keep the peace 9. Civil interdiction 10. Confiscation and payment of costs • •
The above penalties, except destierro, can be served simultaneously with imprisonment. Penalties consisting in deprivation of liberty cannot be served simultaneously by reason of the nature of such penalties.
Three-fold Rule The maximum duration of the convict’s sentence shall not be more than three times the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him. ♣ The phrase “the most severe of the penalties” includes equal penalties. ♣ The three-fold rule applies only when the convict has to serve at least four sentences. ♣ All the penalties, even if by different courts at different times, cannot exceed three-fold the most severe. - The Rules of Court specifically provide that any information must not charge more than one offense. Necessarily, the various offense punished with different penalties must be charged under different informations
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which may be filed in the same court or in different courts, at the same time or at different times. ♣ Subsidiary imprisonment forms part of the penalty. ♣ Indemnity is a penalty. ♣ Court must impose all the penalties for all the crimes of which the accused is found guilty, but in the service of the same, they shall not exceed three times the most severe and shall not exceed 40 years. Mejorada v. Sandiganbayan (1987) Facts: The petitioner was convicted of violating Section 3(E) of RA No. 3019 aka the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. One of the issues raised by the petitioner concerns the penalty imposed by the Sandiganbayan which totals 56 years and 8 days of imprisonment. He impugns this as contrary to the threefold rule and insists that the duration of the aggregate penalties should not exceed 40 years. Held: Petitioner is mistaken in his application of the 3-fold rule as set forth in Art. 70 of the RPC. This article is to be taken into account not in the imposition of the penalty but in connection with the service of the sentence imposed. Art. 70 speaks of “service” of sentence, “duration” of penalty and penalty “to be inflicted”. Nowhere in the article is anything mentioned about the “imposition of penalty”. It merely provides that the prisoner cannot be made to serve more than three times the most severe of these penalties the maximum which is 40 years. WHERE THE PENALTY IS NOT COMPOSED OF 3 PERIODS Art. 65. Rule in cases in which the penalty is not composed of three periods. — In cases in which the penalty prescribed by law is not composed of three periods, the courts shall apply the rules contained in the foregoing articles, dividing into three equal portions of time included in the penalty prescribed, and forming one period of each of the three portions. MEANING OF THE RULE 1. Compute and determine first the 3 periods of the entire penalty. 2. The time included in the penalty prescribed should be divided into 3 equal portions, after subtracting the minimum (eliminate the 1 day) from the maximum of the penalty. 3. The minimum of the minimum period should be the minimum of the given penalty (including the 1 day) 4. The quotient should be added to the minimum prescribed (eliminate the 1 day) and the total will represent the maximum of the minimum period. Take the maximum of the minimum period, add 1 day and make it the minimum of the medium period; then add the quotient to the minimum (eliminate the 1 day) of the medium period and the total will represent the maximum of the medium period. Take the maximum of the medium period, add 1 day and make it the minimum of the maximum period; then add the quotient to the minimum (eliminate the 1 day) of the maximum period and the total will represent the maximum of the maximum period. In the Matter of the petition for Habeas Corpus of Pete Lagran (2001) Facts: The accused was convicted of 3 counts of violating BP22 and was sentenced to imprisonment of 1 year for each count. He was detained on Feb. 24,
1999. On Mar. 19, 2001, he filed a petition for habeas corpus claiming he completed the service of his sentence. Citing Art. 70, RPC, he claimed that he shall serve the penalties simultaneously. Thus, there is no more legal basis for his detention. Held: Art. 70 allows simultaneous service of two or more penalties only if the nature of the penalties so permit. In the case at bar, the petitioner was sentenced to suffer one year imprisonment for every count of the offense committed. The nature of the sentence does not allow petitioner to serve all the terms simultaneously. The rule of successive service of sentence must be applied. H. THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW ACT NO. 4103 AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR AN INDETERMINATE SENTENCE AND PAROLE FOR ALL PERSONS CONVICTED OF CERTAIN CRIMES BY THE COURTS OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; TO CREATE A BOARD OF INDETERMINATE SENTENCE AND TO PROVIDE FUNDS THEREFOR; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same. (As amended by Act No. 4225.) SECTION 2. This Act shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or lifeimprisonment; to those convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason; to those convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition or espionage; to those convicted of piracy; to those who are habitual delinquents; to those who have escaped from confinement or evaded sentence; to those who having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive shall have violated the terms thereof; to those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year, not to those already sentenced by final judgment at the time of approval of this Act, except as provided in Section 5 hereof. (As amended by Act No. 4225.) SECTION 3. There is hereby created a Board of Pardons and Parole to be composed of the Secretary of Justice who shall be its Chairman, and four members to be appointed by the President, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments who shall hold office for a term of six years: Provided, That one member of the board shall be a trained sociologist, one a clergyman or educator, one psychiatrist unless a trained psychiatrist be employed by the board, and the other members shall be persons qualified for such work by training and experience. At least one member of the board shall be a woman. Of the members of the present board, two shall be designated by the President to continue until December thirty, nineteen hundred and sixty-six and the other two shall continue until December thirty, nineteen hundred and sixty-nine. In case of any vacancy in the membership of the Board, a successor may be appointed to serve only for the unexpired portion of the term of the respective members. (As amended by Republic Act No. 4203, June 19, 1965.)
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SECTION 4. The Board of Pardons and Parole is authorized to adopt such rules and regulations as may be necessary for carrying out its functions and duties. The Board is empowered to call upon any bureau, office, branch, subdivision, agency or instrumentality of the Government for such assistance as it may need in connection with the performance of its functions. A majority of all the members shall constitute a quorum and a majority vote shall be necessary to arrive at a decision. Any dissent from the majority opinion shall be reduced to writing and filed with the records of the proceedings. Each member of the Board, including the Chairman and the Executive Officer, shall be entitled to receive as compensation fifty pesos for each meeting actually attended by him, notwithstanding the provisions of Section two hundred and fifty-nine of the Revised Administrative Code, and in addition thereto, reimbursement of actual and necessary travelling expenses incurred in the performance of duties: Provided, however, That the Board meetings will not be more than three times a week. (As amended by Republic Act No. 4203, June 19, 1965.) SECTION 5. It shall be the duty of the Board of Indeterminate Sentence to look into the physical, mental and moral record of the prisoners who shall be eligible to parole and to determine the proper time of release of such prisoners. Whenever any prisoner shall have served the minimum penalty imposed on him, and it shall appear to the Board of Indeterminate Sentence, from the reports of the prisoner's work and conduct which may be received in accordance with the rules and regulations prescribed, and from the study and investigation made by the Board itself, that such prisoner is fitted by his training for release, that there is a reasonable probability that such prisoner will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that such release will not be incompatible with the welfare of society, said Board of Indeterminate Sentence may, in its discretion, and in accordance with the rules and regulations adopted hereunder, authorize the release of such prisoner on parole, upon such terms and conditions as are herein prescribed and as may be prescribed by the Board. The said Board of Indeterminate Sentence shall also examine the records and status of prisoners who shall have been convicted of any offense other than those named in Section 2 hereof, and have been sentenced for more than one year by final judgment prior to the date on which this Act shall take effect, and shall make recommendation in all such cases to the Governor-General with regard to the parole of such prisoners as they shall deem qualified for parole as herein provided, after they shall have served a period of imprisonment not less than the minimum period for which they might have been sentenced under this Act for the same offense. SECTION 6. Every prisoner released from confinement on parole by virtue of this Act shall, at such times and in such manner as may be required by the conditions of his parole, as may be designated by the said Board for such purpose, report personally to such government officials or other parole officers hereafter appointed by the Board of Indeterminate Sentence for a period of surveillance equivalent to the remaining portion of the maximum sentence imposed upon him or until final release and discharge by the Board of Indeterminate Sentence as herein provided. The officials so designated shall keep such records and make such reports and perform such other duties hereunder as may be required by said Board. The limits of residence of such paroled prisoner during his parole may be fixed and from time to time changed by the said Board in its discretion. If during the period of surveillance such paroled prisoner shall show himself to be a law-abiding citizen and shall not violate any of the laws of the Philippine Islands, the Board of Indeterminate Sentence may issue a final certificate of
release in his favor, which shall entitle him to final release and discharge. SECTION 7. The Board shall file with the court which passed judgment on the case, and with the Chief of Constabulary, a certified copy of each order of conditional or final release and discharge issued in accordance with the provisions of the next preceding two sections. SECTION 8. Whenever any prisoner released on parole by virtue of this Act shall, during the period of surveillance, violate any of the conditions of his parole, the Board of Indeterminate Sentence may issue an order for his re-arrest which may be served in any part of the Philippine Islands by any police officer. In such case the prisoner so rearrested shall serve the remaining unexpired portion of the maximum sentence for which he was originally committed to prison, unless the Board of Indeterminate Sentence shall, in its discretion, grant a new parole to the said prisoner. (As amended by Act No. 4225.) SECTION 9. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to impair or interfere with the powers of the Governor-General as set forth in Section 64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code or the Act of Congress approved August 29, 1916 entitled "An Act to declare the purpose of the people of the United States as to the future political status of the people of the Philippine Islands, and to provide a more autonomous government for those Islands." SECTION 10. Whenever any prisoner shall be released on parole hereunder he shall be entitled to receive the benefits provided in Section 1751 of the Revised Administrative Code. Approved and effective on December 5, 1993.
♣ The indeterminate sentence is composed of: 1. a MAXIMUM taken from the penalty imposable under the penal code 2. a MINIMUM taken from the penalty next lower to that fixed in the code. ♣ The law does not apply to certain offenders: 1. Persons convicted of offense punished with death penalty or life imprisonment. 2. Those convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason. 3. Those convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition or espionage. 4. Those convicted of piracy. 5. Those who are habitual delinquents. 6. Those who shall have escaped from confinement or evaded sentence. 7. Those who violated the terms of conditional pardon granted to them by the Chief Executive. 8. Those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year. 9. Those who, upon the approval of the law, had been sentenced by final judgment. 10. Those sentenced to the penalty of destierro or suspension. ♣ Purpose of the law: to uplift and redeem valuable human material and prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of liberty and economic usefulness - It is necessary to consider the criminal first as an individual, and second as a member of the society. - The law is intended to favor the defendant, particularly to shorten his term of imprisonment, depending upon his behavior and his physical, mental
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and moral record as a prisoner, to be determined by the Board of Indeterminate Sentence. ♣ The settled practice is to give the accused the benefit of the law even in crimes punishable with death or life imprisonment provided the resulting penalty, after considering the attending circumstances, is reclusion temporal or less. ♣ ISL does not apply to destierro. ISL is expressly granted to those who are sentenced to imprisonment exceeding 1 year. PROCEDURE FOR DETERMING THE MAXIMUM AND MINIMUM SENTENCE ♣ Is consists of a maximum and a minimum instead of a single fixed penalty. ♣ Prisoner must serve the minimum before he is eligible for parole. ♣ The period between the minimum and maximum is indeterminate in the sense that the prisoner may be exempted from serving said indeterminate period in whole or in part. ♣ The maximum is determined in any case punishable under the RPC in accordance with the rules and provisions of said code exactly as if the ISL had never been enacted. ♣ Apply first the effect of privileged mitigating circumstances then consider the effects of aggravating and ordinary mitigating circumstances. ♣ The minimum depends upon the court’s discretion with the limitation that it must be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed by the Code for the offense committed. NOTE: A minor who escaped from confinement in the reformatory is entitled to the benefits of the ISL because his confinement is not considered imprisonment.
Art. 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain three periods. — In cases in which the penalties prescribed by law contain three periods, whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three different penalties, each one of which forms a period in accordance with the provisions of Articles 76 and 77, the court shall observe for the application of the penalty the following rules, according to whether there are or are not mitigating or aggravating circumstances: 1. When there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, they shall impose the penalty prescribed by law in its medium period. 2. When only a mitigating circumstance is present in the commission of the act, they shall impose the penalty in its minimum period. 3. When an aggravating circumstance is present in the commission of the act, they shall impose the penalty in its maximum period. 4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall reasonably offset those of one class against the other according to their relative weight. 5. When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem applicable, according to the number and nature of such circumstances.
6. Whatever may be the number and nature of the aggravating circumstances, the courts shall not impose a greater penalty than that prescribed by law, in its maximum period. 7. Within the limits of each period, the court shall determine the extent of the penalty according to the number and nature of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the greater and lesser extent of the evil produced by the crime. De la Cruz v. CA (1996) In as much as the amount of P715k is P693k more than the abovementioned benchmark of P22k, then adding one year for each additional P10k, the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor minimum would be increased by 69 years, as computed by the trial court. But the law categorically declares that the maximum penalty then shall not exceed 20 years of reclusion temporal. Under the ISL, the minimum term of the indeterminate penalt should be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed b the Code for the offense committed, which is prision correccional. People v. Campuhan (supra) The penalty for attempted rape is two (2) degrees lower than the imposable penalty of death for the offense charged, which is statutory rape of a minor below seven (7) years. Two (2) degrees lower is reclusion temporal, the range of which is twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the maximum of the penalty to be imposed upon the accused shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, the range of which is fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision mayor, the range of which is from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, in any of its periods. People v. Saley (supra) Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty shall be "that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed" under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum shall be "within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed" for the offense. The penalty next lower should be based on the penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The determination of the minimum penalty is left by law to the sound discretion of the court and it can be anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without any reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence. The fact that the amounts involved in the instant case exceed P22,000.00 should not be considered in the initial determination of the indeterminate penalty; instead, the matter should be so taken as analogous to modifying circumstances in the imposition of the maximum term of the full indeterminate sentence. This interpretation of the law accords with the rule that penal laws should be construed in favor of the accused. Since the penalty prescribed by law for the estafa charge against accused-appellant is prision correccional
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maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next lower would then be prision correccional minimum to medium. Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere within six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months . I. EXECUTION AND SERVICE OF PENALTIES Execution of Penalties Art. 78. When and how a penalty is to be executed. — No penalty shall be executed except by virtue of a final judgment. A penalty shall not be executed in any other form than that prescribed by law, nor with any other circumstances or incidents than those expressly authorized thereby. In addition to the provisions of the law, the special regulations prescribed for the government of the institutions in which the penalties are to be suffered shall be observed with regard to the character of the work to be performed, the time of its performance, and other incidents connected therewith, the relations of the convicts among themselves and other persons, the relief which they may receive, and their diet. The regulations shall make provision for the separation of the sexes in different institutions, or at least into different departments and also for the correction and reform of the convicts. ♠ The judgment must be final before it can be executed, because the accused may still appeal within 15 days from its promulgation. But if the defendant has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal, the judgment becomes final and executory.
Art. 88. Arresto menor. — The penalty of arresto menor shall be served in the municipal jail, or in the house of the defendant himself under the surveillance of an officer of the law, when the court so provides in its decision, taking into consideration the health of the offender and other reasons which may seem satisfactory to it. Service of the penalty of arresto menor: a. In the municipal jail b. In the house of the offender, but under the surveillance of an officer of the law, whenever the court so provides in the decision due to the health of the offender. In the Matter of the petition for Habeas Corpus of Pete Lagran (2001) Facts: The accused was convicted of 3 counts of violating BP22 and was sentenced to imprisonment of 1 year for each count. He was detained on Feb. 24, 1999. On Mar. 19, 2001, he filed a petition for habeas corpus claiming he completed the service of his sentence. Citing Art. 70, RPC, he claimed that he shall serve the penalties simultaneously. Thus, there is no more legal basis for his detention. Held: Art. 70 allows simultaneous service of two or more penalties only if the nature of the penalties so permit. In the case at bar, the petitioner was sentenced to suffer one year imprisonment for every count of the offense committed. The nature of the sentence does not allow petitioner to serve all the terms simultaneously. The rule of successive service of sentence must be applied.
♠ See Rules and regulations to implement RA No. 8177 under Capital Punishment. Art. 86. Reclusion perpetua, reclusion temporal, prision mayor, prision correccional and arresto mayor. — The penalties of reclusion perpetua, reclusion temporal, prision mayor, prision correccional and arresto mayor, shall be executed and served in the places and penal establishments provided by the Administrative Code in force or which may be provided by law in the future. Art. 87. Destierro. — Any person sentenced to destierro shall not be permitted to enter the place or places designated in the sentence, nor within the radius therein specified, which shall be not more than 250 and not less than 25 kilometers from the place designated. ♠ Convict shall not be permitted to enter the place designated in the sentence nor within the radius specified, which shall not more than 250 and not less than 25 km from the place designated. ♠ If the convict enters the prohibited area, he commits evasion of sentence. ♠ Destierro is imposed: a. When the death or serious physical injuries is caused or are inflicted under exceptional circumstances (art. 247) b. When a person fails to give bond for good behavior (art. 284) c. As a penalty for the concubine in the crime of concubinage (Art. 334) d. When after lowering the penalty by degrees, destierro is the proper penalty.
Effects of the Probation Law THE PROBATION LAW Taken from the DOJ website Section 3(a) of Presidential Decrees 968, as amended, defines probation as a disposition under which an accused, after conviction and sentence, is released subject to conditions imposed by the court and to the supervision of a probation officer. It is a privilege granted by the court; it cannot be availed of as a matter of right by a person convicted of a crime. To be able to enjoy the benefits of probation, it must first be shown that an applicant has none of the disqualifications imposed by law. Disqualified Offenders Probation under PD No. 968, as amended, is intended for offenders who are 18 years of age and above, and who are not otherwise disqualified by law. Offenders who are disqualified are those: (1) sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years; (2) convicted of subversion or any offense against the security of the State, or the Public Order; (3) who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one month and one day and/or a fine of not more than Two Hundred Pesos; (4) who have been once on probation under the provisions of this Decree; Post-Sentence Investigation The Post-Sentence Investigation (PSI) and the submission of the Post-Sentence Investigation Report (PSIR) are prerequisites to the court disposition on the application for probation.
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Period of Probation The period of probation is in essence a time-bound condition. It is a condition in point of time which may be shortened and lengthened within the statutory limits and the achievements by the probationer of the reasonable degrees of social stability and responsibility from the measured observation of the supervising officer and the exercise discretion by the court in decisive order. Probation Conditions The grant of probation is accompanied by conditions imposed by the court: • The mandatory conditions require that the probationer shall (a) present himself to the probation officer designated to undertake his supervision at each place as may be specified in the order within 72 hours from receipt of said order, and (b) report to the probation officer at least once a month at such time and place as specified by said officer. • Special or discretionary conditions are those additional conditions imposed on the probationer which are geared towards his correction and rehabilitation outside of prison and right in the community to which he belongs. A violation of any of the conditions may lead either to a more restrictive modification of the same or the revocation of the grant of probation. Consequent to the revocation, the probationer will have to serve the sentence originally imposed. Modification of Conditions of Probation During the period of probation, the court may, upon application of either the probationers or the probation officer, revise or modify the conditions or period of probation. The court shall notify either the probationer or the probation officer of the filing of such an application so as to give both parties an opportunity to be heard thereon. Transfer of Residence Whenever a probationer is permitted to reside in a place under the jurisdiction of another court, control over him shall be transferred to the executive judge of the "Court of First Instance" of that place, and in such case, a copy of the Probation Order, the investigation report and other pertinent records shall be furnished to said executive judge. Thereafter, the executive judge to whom jurisdiction over the probationer is transferred shall have the power with respect to him that was previously possessed by the court which granted the probation. Revocation of Probation At any time during probation, the court may issue a warrant for the arrest of a probationer for any serious violation of the conditions of probation. The probationer, once arrested and detained, shall immediately be brought before the court for a hearing of the violation charged. The defendant may be admitted to bail pending such hearing. In such case, the provisions regarding release on bail of persons charged with crime shall be applicable to probationers arrested under this provision. An order revoking the grant of probation or modifying the terms and conditions thereof shall not be appealable. Termination of Probation After the period of probation and upon consideration of the report and recommendation of the probation officer, the court may order the final discharge of the probationer upon finding that he has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation and thereupon the case is deemed terminated. Programs and Services Post-Sentence
Investigation.
After
conviction
and
sentence, a convicted offender or his counsel files a petition for probation with the trail court, who in turn orders the Probation Officer to conduct a post-sentence investigation to determine whether a convicted offender may be placed on probation or not. The role of the probation officer in this phase is to conduct the post-sentence investigation and to submit his report to the court within the period not later than 60 days from receipt of the order of the Court to conduct the said investigation. Pre-Parole Investigation. The PAROLE AND PROBATION ADMINISTRATION - (PPA) conducts pre-parole investigation of all sentenced prisoners confined in prisons and jails within their jurisdiction. The purpose is to determine whether offenders confined in prisons/jails are qualified for parole or any form of executive clemency and to discuss with them their plans after release. Probation officers submit their preparole assessment reports to the Board of Pardons and Parole. Supervision of Offenders. The Agency supervises two types of offenders under conditional release: (1) probationers, or persons placed under probation by the courts; (2) parolees and pardonees, or prisoners released on parole or conditional pardon and referred by the Board of Pardons and Parole (BPP) to PAROLE AND PROBATION ADMINISTRATION - (PPA) (PPA). The objectives of supervision are to carry out the conditions set forth in the probation/parole order, to ascertain whether the probationer/parolee/pardonee is complying with the said conditions, and to bring about the rehabilitation of the client and his re-integration into the community. Rehabilitation Programs. The treatment process employed by the field officers focused on particular needs of probationers, parolees and pardonees. Assistance is provided to the clientele in the form of job placement, skills training, spiritual/moral upliftment, counseling, etc. Community Linkages Probation/Parole, as a community-based treatment program, depends on available resources in the community for the rehabilitation of offenders. Thus, the Agency, recognizing the important role of the community as a rehabilitation agent, involves the community in probation work through the use of volunteer workers and welfare agencies. Presidential Decree No. 968 permits the utilization of the services of Volunteer Probation Aides to assist the Probation and Parole Officers in the supervision of probationers, parolees and pardonees particularly in the areas where the caseload is heavy and the office is understaff or where the residence of the clientele is very far from the Parole and Probation Office. As defined, a Volunteer Probation Aide is a volunteer who is a citizen of good moral character and good standing in the community, who has been carefully selected and trained to do volunteer probation work. He is appointed by the Administrator after successful completion of the Introductory Training Course for probation volunteers. His term of office is one year but can be renewed thereafter or terminated earlier depending upon his performance and willingness to serve. Further, the PAROLE AND PROBATION ADMINISTRATION (PPA), through its Community Services Division, Regional and Field Offices nationwide, has been tapping government/non-government organizations/individuals for various rehabilitation programs and activities for probationers, parolees and pardonees.
Llamado v. CA (1989) In its present form, Section 4 of the Probation Law establishes a much narrower period during which an application for probation ma be filed with the trial curt: “after the trial curt shall have convicted and sentenced a
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defendant and – within the period for perfecting an appeal”. The provision expressly prohibits the grant of an application for probation if the defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction. Petitioner’s right to apply for probation was lost when he perfected his appeal from the judgment of the trial court. The trial court lost jurisdiction already over the case. Bala v. Martinez (1990) PD 1990 which amends Sec. 4 of PD 968 is not applicable to the case at bar. It went into effect on Jan. 15, 1985 and cannot be given retroactive effect because it would be prejudicial to the accused. Bala was placed on probation on Aug. 11, 1982. Expiration of probation period alone does not automatically terminate probation; a final order of discharge from the court is required. Probation is revocable before the final discharge by the court. Probationer failed to reunite with responsible society. He violated the conditions of his probation. Thus, the revocation of his probation is compelling. Salgado v. CA (1990) There is no question that the decision convicting Salgado of the crime of serious physical injuries had become final and executory because the filing by respondent of an application for probation is deemed a waiver of his right to appeal. The grant of probation does not extinguish the civil liability of the offender. The order of probation with one of the conditions providing for the manner of payment of the civil liability during the period of probation, did not increase or decrease the civil liability adjudged. The conditions listed under Sec. 10 of the Probation law are not exclusive. Courts are allowed to impose practically any term it chooses, the only limitation being that it does not jeopardize the constitutional rights of the accused. Office of the Court Administrator v. Librado (1996) Facts: The respondent is a deputy sheriff who was charged of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act and is now claiming he is in probation. The OCA filed an administrative case against him and he was suspended from office. Held: While indeed the purpose of the Probation Law is to save valuable human material, it must not be forgotten that unlike pardon probation does not obliterate the crime of which the person under probation has been convicted. The image of the judiciary is tarnished by conduct involving moral turpitude. The reform and rehabilitation of the probationer cannot justify his retention in the government service. Suspension in case of Insanity or Minority Art. 79. Suspension of the execution and service of the penalties in case of insanity. — When a convict shall become insane or an imbecile after final sentence has been pronounced, the execution of said sentence shall be suspended only with regard to the personal penalty, the provisions of the second paragraph of circumstance number 1 of Article 12 being observed in the corresponding cases. If at any time the convict shall recover his reason, his sentence shall be executed, unless the penalty shall have prescribed in accordance with the provisions of this Code.
The respective provisions of this section shall also be observed if the insanity or imbecility occurs while the convict is serving his sentence. ♠ Only execution of personal penalty is suspended: civil liability may be executed even in case of insanity of convict. ♠ An accused may become insane: a. at the time of commission of the crime – exempt from criminal liability b. at the time of the trial - court shall suspend hearings and order his confinement in a hospital until he recovers his reason c. at the time of final judgment or while serving sentence – execution suspended with regard to the personal penalty only ♠ see Exempting Circumstance of Minority for PD No. 603 and Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with Law. VI. EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY A. TOTAL EXTINCTION Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally extinguished: 1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. 2. By service of the sentence; 3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects; 4. By absolute pardon; 5. By prescription of the crime; 6. By prescription of the penalty; 7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in Article 344 of this Code. How is criminal liability extinguished? 1. TOTAL 2. PARTIAL ♠ Extinction of criminal liability does not automatically extinguish the civil liability. Causes of extinction of criminal liability: 1. BY DEATH OF THE CONVICT - the death of the convict whether before or after final judgment extinguished criminal liability. - civil liability is extinguished only when death occurs before final judgment. - death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguished his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely on the offense committed; except, the claim for civil liability survives if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict such as law, contracts, quasi-contracts and quasi-delicts. - death of the offended party does not extinguish the criminal liability of the offender. 2.
BY SERVICE OF SENTENCE - crime is a debt incurred by the offender as a consequence of his wrongful act and the penalty is but
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the amount of his debt. When payment is made, the debt is extinguished. Service of sentence does not extinguish civil liability. 3.
BY AMNESTY - amnesty is an act of the sovereign power granting oblivion or a general pardon for a past offense, and is rarely, if ever, exercised in favor of a single individual, and is usually exerted in behalf of certain classes of persons, who are subject to trial but have not yet been convicted. 4.
BY ABSOLUTE PARDON - It is an act of grace proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws which exempts the individual on whom is bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for the crime he has committed. Pardon Includes any crime Given after conviction
Amnesty Generally political offenses Given before conviction or institution of the action Looks forward and forgives Looks backwards and the punishment abolished the offense itself Must be proved as a Being a result of a defense proclamation, the court may take judicial notice of the same Do not extinguish civil liability 5.
BY PRESCRIPTION OF CRIME - the forfeiture or loss of the right of the State to prosecute the offender after the lapse of a certain time. 6.
BY PRESCRIPTION OF PENALTY - the loss or forfeiture of the right of the government to execute the final sentence after the lapse of a certain time. Requisites: a) that there be final judgment b) that the period of time prescribed by law for its enforcement has elapsed. 7.
BY THE MARRIAGE OF THE OFFENDED WOMAN - applicable in the crimes of rape, seduction, abduction or acts of lasciviousness. Marriage must be made in good faith. Art. 90. Prescription of crime. — Crimes punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal shall prescribe in twenty years. Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years. Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten years; with the exception of those punishable by arresto mayor, which shall prescribe in five years. The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year. The crime of oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescribe in six months. Light offenses prescribe in two months. When the penalty fixed by law is a compound one, the highest penalty shall be made the basis of the application of the rules contained in the first, second and third paragraphs of this article. (As amended by RA 4661, approved June 19, 1966).
♠ In computing the period of prescription, the first day is to be excluded and the last day included. ♠ Where the last day of the prescriptive period for filing an information falls on a Sunday or legal holiday, the information can no longer be filed on the next day as the crime has already prescribed. PERIOD OF PRESCRIPTION OF CRIMES PUNISHED BY: 1. death, reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal - 20 years 2. other afflictive penalties - 15 years 3. correctional penalties - 10 years except arresto mayor which prescribes in 5 years 4. libel or similar offense - 1 year (as amended by RA 4661) 5. oral defamation and slander by deed - 6 months 6. light offenses - 2 months PRESCRIPTION OF OFFENSES PUNISHED BY SPECIAL LAWS: a. punished by a fine or imprisonment not more than 1 month or both – 1 year b. punished by imprisonment of more than 1 month but less than 2 years – 4 years c. punished by imprisonment for 2 years but less than 6 years – 8 years d. punished by imprisonment for 6 years or more – 12 years e. Internal Revenue offenses – 5 years f. Municipal ordinances – 2 months (Act. No. 3763, as amended) Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. — The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him. The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago. ♠ Period commences to run from the day the offense is committed or discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents. It does not run if the offender is outside the Philippines. ♠ The fact that the offender is unknown will not interrupt the period of prescription because what the Code requires is the discovery of the crime and not of the offender. ♠ The period is interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information. - The period is not interrupted b the mere act of reporting the case to the fiscal. - The preliminary investigation conducted by the municipal mayor in the absence of the justice of peace partakes of the nature of a judicial proceeding and it does not interrupt the running of the period of prescription.
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♠ The period commences to run again when the proceeding is terminated: - without the accused being convicted or acquitted - the proceeding is unjustifiably stopped for a reason not imputable to the offender. ♠ In continuing crime, the prescription commences to run after the termination of the continuity of the offense. ♠ Period of prescription of election offense begins to run: 1) if discovery of the offense is incidental in a judicial proceeding - from the date of the termination of the proceedings 2) otherwise - from the date of the commission of the offense Art. 92. When and how penalties prescribe. — The penalties imposed by final sentence prescribe as follows: 1. Death and reclusion perpetua, in twenty years; 2. Other afflictive penalties, in fifteen years; 3. Correctional penalties, in ten years; with the exception of the penalty of arresto mayor, which prescribes in five years; 4. Light penalties, in one year. PERIOD 1. 2. 3. 4.
OF PRESCRIPTION OF PENALTIES: death and reclusion perpetua - 20 years other afflictive penalties – 15 years correctional penalties – 10 years except arresto mayor which prescribes in 5 years light penalties - year
Art. 93. Computation of the prescription of penalties. — The period of prescription of penalties shall commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence, and it shall be interrupted if the defendant should give himself up, be captured, should go to some foreign country with which this Government has no extradition treaty, or should commit another crime before the expiration of the period of prescription. ♠ Period commences to run from the date the culprit evades the service of sentence. ♠ The period is interrupted: a. if the defendant surrenders b. if he is captured c. if he should go to a foreign country with which the Philippines has no extradition treaty d. if he should commit another crime before the expiration of the period of prescription ♠ ELEMENTS: a. penalty is imposed by final sentence b. the convict evaded the service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence c. escaped convict has not given himself up, or has been captured d. penalty has prescribed because of the lapse of time
Art. 36. Pardon; its effect. — A pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon. A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence. Monsanto v. Factoran (1989) Monsanto was convicted of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents. She was pardoned. She now seeks reinstatement to her former position as Assistant treasurer, without need of a new appointment. Pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office. A pardon although full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment to anyone deemed of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction. Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee v. Desierto (2001) The applicable law in the computation of the prescriptive period for RA 3019 is Section 2 of Act No. 3326 which provides that prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. People v. Abungan (2000) Facts: Abungan, together with 2 others were charged with murder for the death of Dirilo, Sr. Abungan pleaded not guilty upon his arraignment. After trial on the merits, the trial court sentenced Pedro Abungan to suffer the penalty of reclusion and such penalties accessory thereto. Abungan appealed his case but died during the pendency of his appeal. Held: The death of appellant extinguished his criminal liability. Moreover, because he died during the pendency of the appeal and before the finality of the judgment against him, his civil liability arising from the crime or delict (civil liability ex delicto) was also extinguished. It must be added, though, that his civil liability may be based on sources of obligation other than delict. For this reason, the victims may file a separate civil action against his estate, as may be warranted by law and procedural rules. Recebido v. People (2000) Facts: On September 9, 1990, Dorol went to the house of her cousin, Recebido, to redeem her property, an agricultural land with an area of 3,520 sq meters, which Dorol mortgaged to Recebido sometime in April of 1985. Recebido and Dorol did not execute a document on the mortgage but Dorol instead gave Recebido a copy of the Deed of Sale dated June 16, 1973 executed in her favor by her father. In said confrontation, petitioner refused to allow Dorol to redeem her property on his claim that she had sold her property to him in 1979. Dorol maintained and insisted that the transaction between them involving her property was a mortgage. Dorol verified from the Office of the Assessor in Sorsogon that there exists on its file a Deed of Sale dated August 13, 1979, allegedly executed by Dorol in favor of Recebido and that the property was registered in the latter's name. Upon examination of the said Deed of Sale, it was discovered that Dorol’s signature on said document was falsified by Recebido.
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Recebido then alleged that Juan Dorol sold the said land to him on August 13, 1983. Held: Under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, the period of prescription shall "commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, . . .." In People v. Reyes, The Court has declared that registration in public registry is a notice to the whole world. The record is constructive notice of its contents as well as all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. All persons are charged with knowledge of what it contains. The Court noted that Dorol had no actual knowledge of the falsification prior to September 9, 1990. The alleged sale also could not have been registered before 1983, the year the alleged deed of sale was executed by Dorol. Considering the foregoing, it is logical and in consonance with human experience to infer that the crime committed was not discovered, nor could have been discovered, by the offended party before 1983. Neither could constructive notice by registration of the forged deed of sale, which is favorable to the petitioner since the running of the prescriptive period of the crime shall have to be reckoned earlier, have been done before 1983 as it is impossible for the petitioner to have registered the deed of sale prior thereto. Even granting arguendo that the deed of sale was executed by the private complainant, delivered to the petitioner-accused in August 13, 1983 and registered on the same day, the 10yr prescriptive period of the crime had not yet elapsed at the time the information was filed in 1991. The crime had not prescribed at the time of the filing of the information. Del Castillo v. Torrecampo (2002) Facts: The trial court rendered judgment and declared Torrecampo guilty of violating Section 178 (nn) of PD 1296, otherwise known as the 1978 Election Code, for striking the electric bulb and 2 kerosene petromax lamps during the counting of the votes in a voting center plunging the room in complete darkness, thereby interrupting and disrupting the proceedings of the Board of Election Tellers. Torrecampo appealed his conviction to the CA which eventually affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto. Said decision became final and executory. Thus, the execution of judgment was scheduled on October 14, 1987. During the execution of judgment, petitioner failed to appear which prompted the presiding judge to issue an order of arrest of petitioner and the confiscation of his bond. However, petitioner was never apprehended. He remained at large. Ten years later, on October 24, 1997, Torrecampo filed a motion to quash the warrant issued for his arrest on the ground of prescription of the penalty imposed upon him. Held: Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code provides when the prescription of penalties shall commence to run. Under said provision, it shall commence to run from the date the felon evades the service of his sentence. Pursuant to Article 157 of the same Code, evasion of service of sentence can be committed only by those who have been convicted by final judgment by escaping during the term of his sentence. "Escape" in legal parlance and for purposes of Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC means unlawful departure of prisoner from the limits of his custody. Clearly, one who has not been committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped therefrom. In the instant case, Torrecampo was never brought to prison. In fact, even before the execution of
the judgment for his conviction, he was already in hiding. Now Torrecampo begs for the compassion of the Court because he has ceased to live a life of peace and tranquility after he failed to appear in court for the execution of his sentence. But it was Torrecampo who chose to become a fugitive. The Court accords compassion only to those who are deserving. Torrecampo guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt but he refused to answer for the wrong he committed. He is therefore not to be rewarded therefor. People v. Patriarca (2000) Facts: Patriarca with the alias of Ka Django, an NPA, with ten (10) armed companions, requested permission to rest in the house of Malto. They had with them Arevalo who was hogtied. Patriarca asked that the lights in Malto's house be extinguished. Patriarca then ordered Arevalo to lie down then shot the latter two times. The trial court convicted Patriarca of murder. Patriarca then applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 724 amending Proclamation No. 347, dated March 25, 1994, entitled "Granting Amnesty to Rebels, Insurgents, and All Other Persons Who Have or May Have Committed Crimes Against Public Order, Other Crimes Committed in Furtherance of Political Ends, and Violations of the Article of War, and Creating a National Amnesty Commission." His application was favorably granted by the National Amnesty Board Held: Paragraph 3 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects. The Court takes judicial notice of the grant of amnesty upon Patriarca. Once granted, it is binding and effective. Hence, the grant of amnesty extinguishes the liability of Patriarca in the present case. B. PARTIAL EXTINCTION Art. 94. Partial Extinction of criminal liability. — Criminal liability is extinguished partially: 1. By conditional pardon; 2. By commutation of the sentence; and 3. For good conduct allowances which the culprit may earn while he is serving his sentence. CAUSES OF PARTIAL EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY: 1.
CONDITIONAL PARDON a) when delivered and accepted is considered a contract between the sovereign power and the convict that the former will release the latter upon compliance with the condition b) usual condition “he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines Violations of the conditions: • offender is rearrested and re-incarcerated • prosecution under Art. 159 of the RPC
2.
COMMUTATION OF SENTENCE a) reduce degree of penalty b) decrease the length of imprisonment c) decrease the amount of fine Specific cases where commutation is provided for by the Code: • convict sentenced to death over 70 years old
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10 justices of the SC fail to reach a decision for the affirmance of the death penalty
4. During the eleventh and successive years of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of fifteen days for each month of good behavior.
3.
GOOD CONDUCT ALLOWANCES DURING CONFINEMENT - deduction for the term of sentence for good behavior
4.
PAROLE - consists in the suspension of the sentence of a convict without granting pardon, prescribing the terms upon which the sentence shall be suspended. - May be granted to a prisoner after serving the minimum penalty under the indeterminate sentence law - Consists in the suspension of the sentence of a convict after serving the minimum term of the indeterminate penalty, without granting a pardon prescribing the terms upon which the sentence shall be punished.
GOOD CONDUCT ALLOWANCES OF A PRISONER IN A PENAL INSTITUTION: 1. First 2 years a. 5 days per month of good behavior 2. 3rd – 5th year b. 8 days 3. following years to 10th year c. 10 days 4. 11th year and successive years d. 15 days
•
Conditional Pardon May be given an time before final judgment is granted by the Chief Executive under the Administrative Code For violation, convict may be rearrested or prosecuted under Art. 159
Parole May be given after the prisoner has served the minimum penalty is granted by the Board of Parole and Pardons under the ISL For violation, convict can be rearrested and reincarcerated to serve the unexpired portion of his original penalty
Art. 95. Obligation incurred by person granted conditional pardon. — Any person who has been granted conditional pardon shall incur the obligation of complying strictly with the conditions imposed therein otherwise, his non-compliance with any of the conditions specified shall result in the revocation of the pardon and the provisions of Article 159 shall be applied to him. Art. 96. Effect of commutation of sentence. — The commutation of the original sentence for another of a different length and nature shall have the legal effect of substituting the latter in the place of the former. Art. 97. Allowance for good conduct. — The good conduct of any prisoner in any penal institution shall entitle him to the following deductions from the period of his sentence: 1. During the first two years of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of five days for each month of good behavior; 2. During the third to the fifth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of eight days for each month of good behavior; 3. During the following years until the tenth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of ten days for each month of good behavior; and
♠ These allowances are granted by the Director of Prisons and once given cannot be revoked. Art. 98. Special time allowance for loyalty. — A deduction of one-fifth of the period of his sentence shall be granted to any prisoner who, having evaded the service of his sentence under the circumstances mentioned in Article 58 of this Code, gives himself up to the authorities within 48 hours following the issuance of a proclamation announcing the passing away of the calamity or catastrophe to in said article. SPECIAL TIME ALLOWANCE FOR LOYALTY - it is a deduction of 1/5 of the period of his sentence if he, having evaded the service of his sentence under the circumstances mentioned in Art. 158, gives himself up to the authorities within 48 hours following the issuance of a proclamation announcing the passing away of the calamity. ♠ This article does not apply to prisoners who did not escape. ♠ The deduction of 1/5 is based on the original sentence. ♠ Under Art. 158, a convict who evaded service of his sentence by leaving the penal institution on the occasion of disorder resulting from a conflagration, earthquake, explosion or similar catastrophe or during a mutiny in which he did not participate, is liable to an increased penalty (1/5 of the time still remaining to be served – not to exceed 6 months) if he fails to give himself up within 48 hours following the issuance of a proclamation by the President announcing the passing away of the calamity.
Art. 99. Who grants time allowances. — Whenever lawfully justified, the Director of Prisons shall grant allowances for good conduct. Such allowances once granted shall not be revoked.
VII. CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM FELONY ♣ As a general rule, an offense causes two classes of injuries: 1. SOCIAL INJURY – produced by the disturbance and alarm which are the outcome of the offense - this is sought to be repaired through the imposition of the corresponding penalty.
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2.
PERSONAL INJURY – caused to the victim of the crime who may have suffered damage, either to his person, to his property, to his honor, or to her chastity. - this is sought to be repaired through indemnity which is civil in nature. A. GENERAL RULE
RPC, Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. — Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. ♣ BASIS: A crime has dual character: a) as an offense against the state because of the disturbance of the social order; and b) as an offense against the private person injured by the crime unless it involves the crime of treason, rebellion, espionage, contempt and others wherein no civil liability arises on the part of the offender either because there are no damages to be compensated or there is no private person injured by the crime. ♣ In crimes against persons, like the crime of physical injuries, the injured party is entitled to be paid for whatever he spent for the treatment of his wounds, doctor’s fees etc. as well as for loss or impairment of earning capacity. ♣ Moral damages may be recovered as well. ♣ Exemplary damages as part of the civil liability ma be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. ♣ But if there is no damage caused by the commission of the crime, the offender is not civilly liable. ♣ Civil liability arises from the commission of the felony. It is determined in the criminal action except: a. the offended party waives his right to file a civil action b. the offended party reserves his right to institute it separately, or c. the offended party institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. ♣ A reservation of the right to file a separate civil action only gives the party aggrieved the right to choose under which body of laws he must bring the civil action, either under the: 1. RPC – where the recovery may be defeated by proof that the acts on which the action is based do not exist, or 2. Civil Code – where the same proof is required to preclude recovery, or proof of diligence in the selection and employment of the employee ♣ Effect of ACQUITTAL: As a rule, if the offender is acquitted, the civil liability is extinguished, except: a) if the acquittal is on the ground that the guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt b) the acquittal was due to an exempting circumstance like insanity and c) when the court finds and states in its judgment that there is only civil responsibility. ♣ SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION
The rule is that when the criminal action is instituted, a separate civil action cannot be instituted or if already instituted, it is to be suspended. Said rule applies only when the plaintiff in the civil action is the offended party in the criminal action and both cases arise from the same offense. Exceptions: Independent civil actions may be filed for: a. violations of fundamental rights (Art. 32) b. defamation, fraud and physical injuries (Art. 33) c. failure or refusal of a member of the police force to render aid or protection to any person in case of danger to life or property (Art. 34) PERTINENT PROVISIONS Civil Code, Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. Art. 1161. Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses shall be governed by the penal laws, subject to the provisions of Article 2177, and of the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title, on Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of this Book, regulating damages. (1092a) Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. (n)
RULE 111 PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION 1985 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused. A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the reservation of the right
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to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the others. The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation. In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused. When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such civil action as provided in these Rules shall constitute a first lien on the judgment except in an award for actual damages. In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court for trial. Sec. 2. Institution of separate civil action. Except in the cases provided for in Section 3 hereof, after the criminal action has been commenced, the civil action which has been reserved cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action. (a) Whenever the offended party shall have instituted the civil action as provided for in the first paragraph of Section 1 hereof before the filing of the criminal action and the criminal action is subsequently commenced, the pending civil action shall be suspended, in whatever stage before final judgment it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal action has been rendered. However, if no final judgment has been rendered by the trial court in the civil action, the same may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the criminal action. If the application is granted, the evidence presented and admitted in the civil action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal action, without prejudice to the admission of additional evidence that any party may wish to present. In case of consolidation, both the criminal and the civil actions shall be tried and decided jointly. (b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. In the cases provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action which has been reserved may be brought by the offended party, shall proceed independently of the criminal action, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. Sec. 4. Judgment in civil action not a bar. A final judgment rendered in a civil action absolving the defendant from civil liability is no bar to a criminal action. Sec. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the fiscal or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests. Quinto v. Andres (2005) Facts: Garcia, a Grade 4 elementary school pupil, and his playmate, Wilson Quinto, who was about 11 yrs old saw Andres and Pacheco who invited them to go fishing inside a drainage culvert. Wilson assented but Garcia seeing that it was dark inside opted to remain seated in a grassy area about 2meters from the entrance of the drainage system. Pacheco, Andres and Quinto, entered the drainage system which was covered by concrete culvert about a meter high and a meter wide, with water about a foot deep. After a while, respondent Pacheco, who was holding a fish, came out of the drainage system and left without saying a word. Andres also came out, went back inside, and emerged again, this time, carrying Wilson who was already dead. Andres laid the boy's lifeless body down in the grassy area. Shocked at the sudden turn of events, Garcia fled from the scene. For his part, Andres went to the house of petitioner Melba Quinto, Wilson's mother, and informed her that her son had died. Melba Quinto rushed to the drainage culvert while respondent Andres followed her. The respondents aver that since the prosecution failed to adduce any evidence to prove that they committed the crime of homicide and caused the death of Wilson, they are not criminally and civilly liable for the latter’s death. Held: The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the civil action that the act or omission from where the civil liability may arise does not exist. In the present case, the court ruled that respondents cannot be held criminally nor civilly liable for the death of Wilson. In this case, the petitioner failed to adduce proof of any ill-motive on the part of either respondent to kill the deceased before or after the latter was invited to join them in fishing. Indeed, the petitioner testified that respondent Andres used to go to their house and play with her son before the latter's death. When the petitioner's son died inside the drainage culvert, it was respondent Andres who brought out the deceased. He then informed the petitioner of her son's death. Even after informing the petitioner of the death of her son, respondent Andres followed the petitioner on her way to the grassy area where the deceased was. Chua v. CA (2004) Facts: Hao, treasurer of Siena Realty Corporation, filed a complaint-affidavit with the City Prosecutor of Manila charging Spouses Francis and Elsa Chua, of 4 counts of falsification of public documents pursuant to Article 172 in relation to Article 171 of the RPC. Accused allegedly prepared, certified, and falsified the Minutes of the Annual Stockholders meeting of the BOD of the Siena Realty Corporation by causing it to appear in said Minutes that Hao was present and has participated in said proceedings. During the trial in the MeTC, Atty. Sua-Kho and Atty. Rivera appeared as private prosecutors. Chua moved to exclude
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complainant's counsels as private prosecutors in the case on the ground that Hao failed to allege and prove any civil liability in the case. Petitioner cites the case of Tan, Jr. v. Gallardo, holding that where from the nature of the offense or where the law defining and punishing the offense charged does not provide for an indemnity, the offended party may not intervene in the prosecution of the offense. Held: Petitioner's contention lacks merit. Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate that every man criminally liable is also civilly liable. When a person commits a crime he offends two entities namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity called the State whose law he has violated; and (2) the individual member of the society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property has been actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission. An act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another. Additionally, what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and the moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently. The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the penalty imposed by law for the commission of the crime. The civil action involves the civil liability arising from the offense charged which includes restitution, reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification for consequential damages. Under the Rules, where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense. 31 Rule 111(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that, "[w]hen a criminal action is instituted, the civil action arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action." Hao did not waive the civil action, nor did she reserve the right to institute it separately, nor institute the civil action for damages arising from the offense charged. Thus, we find that the private prosecutors can intervene in the trial of the criminal action. Basilio v. CA (2000) Facts: Pronebo was found guilty by the trial court of Reckless Imprudence resulting to the death of one Advincula. Pronebo then filed an application for probation. Subsequently, the trial court issued an Order granting the motion for execution of the subsidiary liability of his employer Basilio. Basilio now asserts that he was not given the opportunity to be heard by the trial court to prove the absence of an employer-employee relationship between him and accused. Nor that, alternatively, the accused was not lawfully discharging duties as an employee at the time of the incident. Held: The statutory basis for an employer's subsidiary liability is found in Article 103 of the RPC. This liability is enforceable in the same criminal proceeding where the award is made. However, before execution against an employer ensues, there must be a determination, in a hearing set for the purpose of 1) the existence of an employer-employee relationship; 2) that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry; 3) that the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the
discharge of his duties (not necessarily any offense he commits "while" in the discharge of such duties; and 4) that said employee is insolvent. Basilio knew of the criminal case that was filed against his driver because it was his truck that was involved in the incident. Further, it was the insurance company, with which his truck was insured, that provided the counsel for Pronebo, pursuant to the stipulations in their contract. Basilio did not intervene in the criminal proceedings, despite knowledge, through counsel, that the prosecution adduced evidence to show employer-employee relationship. With the convict's application for probation, the trial court's judgment became final and executory. All told, it is our view that the lower court did not err when it found that Basilio was not denied due process. He had all his chances to intervene in the criminal proceedings, and prove that he was not the employer of the accused, but he chooses not to intervene at the appropriate time. Philippine Rabbit v. People (2004) Facts: Accused Roman, an employee of Philippine Rabbit was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property. The court further ruled that Philippine Rabbit, in the event of the insolvency of accused, shall be liable for his civil liabilities. Accused then jumped bail and remained at-large. Philippine Rabbit filed a notice of appeal. It argues that, as an employer, it is considered a party to the criminal case and is conclusively bound by the outcome thereof. Consequently, petitioner must be accorded the right to pursue the case to its logical conclusion — including the appeal. Held: The argument has no merit. Undisputedly, petitioner is not a direct party to the criminal case, which was filed solely against Roman, its employee. The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees. Although in substance and in effect, they have an interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability. While they may assist their employees to the extent of supplying the latter's lawyers, as in the present case, the former cannot act independently on their own behalf, but can only defend the accused. When the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail, the judgment meted out becomes final and executory. The employer cannot defeat the finality of the judgment by filing a notice of appeal on its own behalf in the guise of asking for a review of its subsidiary civil liability. Both the primary civil liability of the accused-employee and the subsidiary civil liability of the employer are carried in one single decision that has become final and executory. People v. Taan (2006) Held: Regarding damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases. B. SPECIAL CASE Art. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. — The exemption from criminal liability
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established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of Article 12 and in subdivision 4 of Article 11 of this Code does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced subject to the following rules: First. In cases of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability for acts committed by an imbecile or insane person, and by a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on their part. Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority, legal guardianship or control, or if such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property, excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance with the civil law. Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of Article 11, the persons for whose benefit the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may have received. The courts shall determine, in sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which each one shall be liable. When the respective shares cannot be equitably determined, even approximately, or when the liability also attaches to the Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events, whenever the damages have been caused with the consent of the authorities or their agents, indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by special laws or regulations. Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of Article 12, the persons using violence or causing the fears shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those doing the act shall be liable, saving always to the latter that part of their property exempt from execution. CIVIL LIABILITY OF PERSONS EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY Exemption from criminal liability does not include exemption from civil liability. Exceptions: 1. There is no civil liability in paragraph 4 of Art. 12 which provides for injury caused by mere accident. 2. There is no civil liability in par. 7 of Art. 12 which provides for failure to perform an act required by law when prevented by some lawful or insuperable cause. ♣ The exemption from criminal liability does not include exemption from civil liability in the cases provided for in pars. 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of Art. 12. Pars. 4 and 7 are not mentioned. Therefore, there is also exemption from civil liability in the cases provided for in pars. 4 and 7 of Art. 12. 1. CIVIL LIABILITY FOR ACTS COMMITTED BY AN INSANE OR IMBECILE OR MINOR UNDER 9 OR OVER 9 AND LESS THAN 15 WHO ACTED WITH DEISCERNMENT ♣ A minor over 15 years of age who acts with discernment is not exempt from criminal liability that is why the RPC is silent as to the subsidiary liability of his parents. The particular law that governs is Art. 2180 of the Civil Code which provides, “the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother are responsible for
damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.” ♣ The final release of a child based on good conduct does not obliterate his civil liability for damages. 2. CIVIL LIABILITY FOR ACTS COMMITTED BY PERSONS ACTING UNDER IRRESISTIBLE FORCE OR UNCONTROLLABE FEAR - The persons using violence or causing the fear are primarily liable. if there be no such persons, those doing the act shall be liable secondarily. 3. CIVIL LIABILITY OF PERSONS ACTING UNDER JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES - There is no civil liability in justifying circumstances except in par. 4 of Art. 11 wherein the person who was benefited by the act which causes damage to another is the one civilly liable. 4. CIVIL LIABILITY OF INNKEEPERS AND SIMILAR PERSONS Art. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments. — In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees. Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses from guests lodging therein, or for the payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect to the care and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper's employees. SUBSIDIARY CIVIL LIABILITY OF INNKEEPERS, TAVERNKEEPERS OR PROPRIETORS OF ESTABLISHMENTS – ELEMENTS OF PAR. 1: 1. That the INNKEEPER, TAVERNKEEPER OR PROPRIETOR of establishment or his employee committed a violation of municipal ordinance or some general or special police regulation. 2. That a crime is committed in such inn, tavern or establishment. 3. That the person criminally liable is insolvent. ♣ When all the above elements are present, the innkeeper, tavernkeeper or any other person or corporation is civilly liable for the crime committed in his establishment. ELEMENTS OF PAR 2. 1. The guests notified in advance the innkeeper or the person representing him of the deposit of their goods within the inn or house. 2. The guest followed the directions of the innkeeper or his representative with respect to the care of the vigilance over such goods.
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3.
Such goods of the guests lodging therein were taken by robbery with force upon things or theft committed within the inn or house. ♣ When all the above elements are present, the innkeeper is subsidiarily liable. ♣ No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons, unless committed by the innkeeper’s employees. ♣ It is not necessary that the effects of the guest be actually delivered to the innkeeper, it is enough that they were within the inn. 5. SUBSIDIARY LIABILITY OF OTHER PERSONS Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. — The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties. ELEMENTS: 1. The employer, teacher, person or corporation is engaged in any kind of industry. 2. Any of their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices or employees commits a felony while in the discharge of his duties. 3. The said employee is insolvent and has not satisfied his civil liability. ♣ Private persons without business or industry are not subsidiarily liable. ♣ The felony must be committed by the servant or employee of the defendant in the civil case. ♣ Employer has the right to take part in the defense of his employee. ♣ No defense of diligence of a good father of a family. Carpio v. Doroja (1989) Ruling upon the enforcement of the subsidiary liability of an employer in the same criminal proceeding without the need of a separate action, the court held that it should be shown that: 1) the employer, etc. is engaged in any kind of industry 2) the employee committed the offense in the discharge of his duties and 3) he is insolvent The subsidiary liability of the employer, however, arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal action. All these requisites present, the employer, becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the employee’s conviction and upon proof of the latter’s insolvency. C. WHAT CIVIL LIABILITY INCLUDES Art. 104. What is included in civil liability. — The civil liability established in Articles 100, 101, 102, and 103 of this Code includes: 1. Restitution; 2. Reparation of the damage caused; 3. Indemnification for consequential damages. ♣ The first remedy granted by law is RESTITUTION of the thing taken away by the offender; if restitution cannot be made by the offender or by his heirs, the law
allows the offended party REPARATION. In either case, indemnity for consequential damages may be required. ♣ When property taken away is not recovered, the court must order the accused to restore it to its owner or, as an alternative, to pay its just value. Art. 105. Restitution; How made. — The restitution of the thing itself must be made whenever possible, with allowance for any deterioration, or diminution of value as determined by the court. The thing itself shall be restored, even though it be found in the possession of a third person who has acquired it by lawful means, saving to the latter his action against the proper person, who may be liable to him. This provision is not applicable in cases in which the thing has been acquired by the third person in the manner and under the requirements which, by law, bar an action for its recovery. ♣ RESTITUTION of the thing itself must be made whenever possible. ♣ The convict cannot, by way of restitution, give to the offended part a similar thing of the same amount, kin or species and quality. ♣ Where the crime committed is not against property, no restitution nor reparation of the thing damaged can be done, although the offended party is entitled to indemnification under Art. 107. ♣ If the accused is acquitted, he cannot be ordered to return the property or amount received EXCEPT if: it is proved that the property belonged to the offended party was in his possession when stolen from him and the identity of the offender is not proved, in which case the acquitted person in whose possession the property was found may be ordered by the court to return it to the owner. ♣ HOW RESTITUTION IS MADE? The thing itself is to be restored, whenever possible, with allowance for deterioration, or diminution of value, even if found in the possession of the 3rd person who acquired it legally, although the latter can file an action against the person who may be liable to him except if the thing has been acquired by the 3rd person in the manner provided by law which bars an action for its recovery. Art. 106. Reparation; How made. — The court shall determine the amount of damage, taking into consideration the price of the thing, whenever possible, and its special sentimental value to the injured party, and reparation shall be made accordingly. HOW IS REPARATION MADE? - The court determines the amount of damages by considering: a) the price of the thing and b) its special sentimental value to the offended party. ♣ If there is no evidence as to the value of the thing unrecovered, there can be no reparation. ♣ The damages are limited to those caused by the crime. ♣ The accused is liable for the damages caused as a result of the destruction of the property after the crime was committed either because it was lost or destroyed
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by the accused himself or that of any other person or as a result of any other cause or causes. ♣ The accused is not relieved of his obligation to satisfy his civil liability if the insurance company has already paid the offended party as the payment of the insurance company was not made on behalf of the accused but because the contract with the insured-offended party. However, the insurance company is subrogated to the right of the offended party to collect damages. Art. 107. Indemnification; What is included. — Indemnification for consequential damages shall include not only those caused the injured party, but also those suffered by his family or by a third person by reason of the crime. ♣ Indemnification for consequential damages includes: a. those caused the injured party b. those suffered by the family, or c. those suffered by 3rd person by reason of the crime ♣ Damages cover not only ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY damages but also MORAL AND EXEMPLARY or CORRECTIVE damages, especially when attended by 1 or more aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime and considering that proof of pecuniary loss is not necessary in order that moral or exemplary damages may be adjudicated as the assessment of such damages is left to the discretion of the court. ♣ Contributory negligence of the offended party reduces the liability of the accused. ♣ Where 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
DEATH results: INDEMNITY: P50,000 Lost of Earning Capacity Support to a non-heir Moral damages for mental anguish… Exemplary damages if attended by 1 or more aggravating circumstances D. PERSONS CIVILLY LIABLE
Art. 108. Obligation to make restoration, reparation for damages, or indemnification for consequential damages and actions to demand the same; Upon whom it devolves. — The obligation to make restoration or reparation for damages and indemnification for consequential damages devolves upon the heirs of the person liable. The action to demand restoration, reparation, and indemnification likewise descends to the heirs of the person injured. ♣ Upon whom does the obligation to make restoration, reparation or indemnification for damages devolve? - upon the HEIRS of the person liable ♣ The heirs of the person liable has no obligation if restoration is not possible and the deceased left no property. ♣ Civil liability is possible only when the offender dies after final judgment. ♣ The action to demand restoration, reparation and indemnification descends to the heirs of the person injured.
Art. 109. Share of each person civilly liable. — If there are two or more persons civilly liable for a felony, the courts shall determine the amount for which each must respond. Art. 110. Several and subsidiary liability of principals, accomplices and accessories of a felony; Preference in payment. — Notwithstanding the provisions of the next preceding article, the principals, accomplices, and accessories, each within their respective class, shall be liable severally (in solidum) among themselves for their quotas, and subsidiaries for those of the other persons liable. The subsidiary liability shall be enforced, first against the property of the principals; next, against that of the accomplices, and, lastly, against that of the accessories. Whenever the liability in solidum or the subsidiary liability has been enforced, the person by whom payment has been made shall have a right of action against the others for the amount of their respective shares. LIABILITY OF PRINCIPALS, ACCOMPLICES AND ACCESSORIES - Each within their respective class is liable in solidum among themselves for their quotas and subsidiarily for those of the other persons liable. ♣ Subsidiary liability is enforced: first, against the property of the principals; second, against that of the accomplices; third, against that of the accessories ♣ The person who made the payment when liability is in solidum or subsidiary liability has been enforced, will have a right of action against the others for the amount of their respective shares.
Art. 111. Obligation to make restitution in certain cases. — Any person who has participated gratuitously in the proceeds of a felony shall be bound to make restitution in an amount equivalent to the extent of such participation. ♣ This refers to a person who has participated gratuitously in the commission of a felony and he is bound to make restitution in an amount equivalent to the extent of such participation. ♣ The third person must be innocent of the commission of the crime; otherwise, he would be liable as an accessory and this article will apply. E. EXTINCTION OF CIVIL LIABILITY Art. 112. Extinction of civil liability. — Civil liability established in Articles 100, 101, 102, and 103 of this Code shall be extinguished in the same manner as obligations, in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Law. ♣ Extinguished in the same manner as other obligations in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. CIVIL CODE, Art. 1231. Obligations are extinguished: (1) By payment or performance: (2) By the loss of the thing due: (3) By the condonation or remission of the
LEX SOCIETAS Veritas. Vnitas. Virtvs.
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ESGUERRA NOTES – CRIMINAL LAW
debt; (4) By the confusion or merger of the rights of creditor and debtor; (5) By compensation; (6) By novation. Other causes of extinguishment of obligations, such as annulment, rescission, fulfillment of a resolutory condition, and prescription, are governed elsewhere in this Code. (1156a) ♣ Loss of the thing due does not extinguish civil liability because if the offender cannot make restitution, he is obliged to make reparation. ♣ Indemnity for damages as a judgment in a criminal case is purely civil in nature and is independent of the penalty imposed. Art. 113. Obligation to satisfy civil liability. — Except in case of extinction of his civil liability as provided in the next preceding article the offender shall continue to be obliged to satisfy the civil liability resulting from the crime committed by him, notwithstanding the fact that he has served his sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty or other rights, or has not been required to serve the same by reason of amnesty, pardon, commutation of sentence or any other reason. ♣ Unless extinguished, civil liability subsists even if the offender has served sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty or other rights or has served the same, due to amnesty, pardon, commutation of sentence or any other reason. ♣ Under the law as amended, even if the subsidiary imprisonment is served for non-payment of fine, this pecuniary liability of the defendant is not extinguished.
LEX SOCIETAS Veritas. Vnitas. Virtvs.
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