Envireg Digests 1-31

INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS

MERIDA V. PEOPLE G.R. No. 158182 June 12, 2008 Ponente: Carpio FACTS: Petitioner was charged in the RTC of Romblon with violation of Section 68 of PD 705for "cutting, gathering, collecting and removing a lone narra tree inside a private land over which private complainant Oscar Tansiongco claims ownership. When confronted during the meeting about the felled narra tree, petitioner admitted cutting the tree but claimed that he did so with the permission of one Vicar Calix who, according to petitioner, bought the Mayod Property from Tansiongco in October 1987 under a pacto de retro sale. It was later found out that he converted the narra trunk into lumber. He was found guilty by the Trial Court but he appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his defense of denial. Petitioner also contended that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case because it was based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a forest officer as provided under Section 80 of PD 705. CA affirmed the lower court’s ruling, but ordered the seized lumber confiscated in the government's favor. Also, it sustained the trial court's finding that petitioner is bound by his extrajudicial admissions of cutting the narra tree in the Mayod Property without any DENR permit. ISSUE:

1) W/N the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2207 even though it was based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a DENR forest officer. – YES.

2) W/N petitioner is liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705. – YES. RATIO: 1. The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure list the cases which must be initiated by a complaint filed by specified individuals, non-compliance of which ousts the trial court of jurisdiction from trying such cases. However, these cases concern only defamation and other crimes against chastity and not to cases concerning Section 68 of PD 705. Further, Section 80 of PD 705 does not prohibit an interested person from filing a complaint before any qualified officer for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. Moreover, here, it was not "forest officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest Development” who reported to Hernandez the tree-cutting in the Mayod Property but Tansiongco, a private citizen who claims ownership over the Mayod Property. Thus, Hernandez cannot be faulted for not conducting an investigation to determine "if there is prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report." At any rate, Tansiongco was not precluded, either under Section 80 of PD 705 or the Revised Rules, from filing a complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor for petitioner's alleged violation of Section 68 of PD 705. 2) Petitioner is guilt of the second paragraph of section 80, which is the cutting, gathering, collecting, or removing of timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authority. The court also said that the lumber or “processed log “is covered by the “forest products” term in PD 705, as the law does not distinguish between a raw and processed timber.

PROVIDENT TREE FARMS V. BATARIO

ATTY. VILLEGAS

1

INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS

G.R. No. 92285 March 28, 1994 Ponente: Bellosillo FACTS: Petitioner PTFI is a Philippine corporation engaged in industrial tree planting. It grows gubas trees in its plantations which it supplies to a local match manufacturer solely for production of matches. In consonance with the state policy to encourage qualified persons to engage in industrial tree plantation, Sec. 36, par. (1), of the Revised Forestry Code confers on entities like PTFI a set of incentives among which is a qualified ban against importation of wood and "wood-derivated" products. On 5 April 1989, private respondent A. J. International Corporation (AJIC) imported 4 containers of matches from Indonesia and 2 or more containers of matches from Singapore. On 25 April 1989, upon request of PTFI, Secretary Factoran of the DENR issued a certification that "there are enough available softwood supply in the Philippines for the match industry at reasonable price." In light of this, PTFI filed with the RTC of Manila a complaint for injunction and damages with prayer for a TRO against respondents Commissioner of Customs and AJIC to enjoin the latter from importing matches and "wood-derivated" products, and the Collector of Customs from allowing and releasing the importations. The case was raffled to respondent Judge Demetrio M. Batario. Lower court ruled in favor of respondents, stating that it had "no jurisdiction to determine what are legal or illegal importations." ISSUE: W/N The Commissioner of Customs under Sec. 1207 of the Tariff and Customs Code and not the regular court, has "exclusive jurisdiction to determine the legality of an importation, and other incidental matters relating to such. – YES. RATIO: The enforcement of the importation ban under Sec. 36, par. (l), of the Revised Forestry Code is within the exclusive realm of the Bureau of Customs, and direct recourse of petitioner to the Regional Trial Court to compel the Commissioner of Customs to enforce the ban is devoid of any legal basis. An order of a judge to impound, seize or forfeit must inevitably be based on his determination and declaration of the invalidity of the importation, hence, an usurpation of the prerogative and an encroachment on the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. Also, PTFI's correspondence with the Bureau of Customs contesting the legality of match importations may already take the nature of an administrative proceeding the pendency of which would preclude the court from interfering with it under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

PEOPLE V. CFI

ATTY. VILLEGAS

2

INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS

G.R. No. L-46772 February 13, 1992 Ponente: Medialdea FACTS: The private respondents were charged with the crime of qualified theft of logs, defined and punished under Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines. The information provided that Godofredo Arrozal and Luis Flores, together with 20 other John Does whose identities are still unknown, the first-named accused being the administrator of the Infanta Logging Corporation, conspired and entered the privately-owned land of one Felicitacion Pujalte, titled in the name of her deceased father, Macario Prudente, and proceeded to illegally cut, gather, and take, therefrom, without the consent of the said owner and without any authority under a license agreement, 60 logs of different species. On March 23, 1977, the named accused filed a motion to quash the information on 2 grounds, to wit: (1) that the facts charged do not constitute an offense; and, (2) that the information does not conform substantially to the prescribed form. Trial court thus dismissed the information based on the respondent’s grounds. ISSUE: W/N the information correctly and properly charged an offense and WON the trial court had jurisdiction over the case. – YES. RATIO: The elements of the crime of qualified theft of logs are: 1) That the accused cut, gathered, collected or removed timber or other forest products; 2) that the timber or other forest products cut, gathered, collected or removed belongs to the government or to any private individual; and 3) that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removing was without authority under a license agreement, lease, license, or permit granted by the state. The failure of the information to allege that the logs taken were owned by the state is not fatal. It should be noted that the logs subject of the complaint were taken not from a public forest but from a private woodland registered in the name of complainant's deceased father, Macario Prudente. The fact that only the state can grant a license agreement, license or lease does not make the state the owner of all the logs and timber products produced in the Philippines including those produced in private woodlands. Thus, ownership is not an essential element of the offense as defined in Section 60 of P.D. No. 705. As to the second issue raised, the regular courts still has jurisdiction. Sec. 80 of PD 705 covers 2 specific instances when a forest officer may commence a prosecution for the violation of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines. The first authorizes a forest officer or employee of the Bureau of Forestry to arrest without a warrant, any person who has committed or is committing, in his presence, any of the offenses described in the decree. The second covers a situation when an offense described in the decree is not committed in the presence of the forest officer or employee and the commission is brought to his attention by a report or a complaint. In both cases, however, the forest officer or employee shall investigate the offender and file a complaint with the appropriate official authorized by law to conduct a preliminary investigation and file the necessary informations in court. Unfortunately, the instant case do not fall under any of the situations covered by Section 80 of P.D. 705. The alleged offense was committed not in the presence of a forest officer and neither was the alleged commission reported to any forest officer. The offense was committed in a private land and the complaint was brought by a private offended party to the fiscal. As such, the OSG was correct in insisting that P.D. 705 did not repeal Section 1687 of the Administrative Code giving authority to the fiscal to conduct investigation into the matter of any crime or misdemeanor and have the necessary information or complaint prepared or made against persons charged with the commission of the crime. In short, Sec. 80 does not grant exclusive authority to the forest officers, but only special authority to reinforce the exercise of such by those upon whom it is vested by general law.

LAGUA V. CUSI

ATTY. VILLEGAS

3

INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS

G.R. No. L-44649 April 15, 1988 Ponente: Guiterrez, Jr. FACTS: This is a mandamus case filed against respondents for closing a logging road without authority. The private respondents extended that as the acts complained of by the petitioners arose out of the legitimate exercise of respondent Eastcoast Development Enterprises’ rights as a timber licensee, more particularly in the use of its logging roads, therefore, the resolution of this question is properly and legally within the Bureau of Forest Development, citing as authority Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705. The lower court affirmed the respondent’s defense, stating that the petitioners must first seek recourse with the Bureau of Forest Development to determine the legality of the closure of the logging roads, before seeking redress with the regular courts for damages. ISSUE: W/N the regular courts can take cognizance of the damages case without first seeking the determination of the Bureau regarding the legality of the closure. – YES. RATIO: P.D. No. 705 upon which the respondent court based its order does not vest any power in the Bureau of Forest Development to determine whether or not the closure of a logging road is legal or illegal and to make such determination a pre-requisite before an action for damages may be maintained. Moreover, the complaint instituted by the petitioners is clearly for damages based on the alleged illegal closure of the logging road. Whether or not such closure was illegal is a matter to be established on the part of the petitioners and a matter to be disproved by the private respondents. This should appropriately be threshed out in a judicial proceeding. It is beyond the power and authority of the Bureau of Forest Development to determine the unlawful closure of a passage way, much less award or deny the payment of damages based on such closure. Not every activity inside a forest area is subject to the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development.

MUSTANG LUMBER V. CA G.R. No. 104988

ATTY. VILLEGAS

4

INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS

June 18, 1996 Ponente: Davide, Jr. FACTS: A consolidation of three cases. Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in a lumber dealer registered with the Bureau of Forest Development. Respondents are DENR Sec. Factoran and Atty. Robles of the Special Actions and Investigations Division (SAID) of the DENR. Acting based on an information, the SAID team went to the lumberyard of petitioner and based on a search warrant, were able to execute an administrative seizure of different kinds of lumber, to which the petitioner failed to produce upon demand the documents such as corresponding certificate of lumber origin and auxiliary invoices which shall prove the legitimacy of their source and origin. Robles then submitted a memorandum report to Factoran, ordering the cancellation of petitioner’s Dealers Permit, filing of criminal charges, and confiscation of the trucks and lumbers. Lower court ruled in favor of respondents, stating that possession of lumber without permit or authority is not a crime. ISSUE: W/N a lumber cannot be considered timber and that petitioner should not be held for illegal logging under Sec. 68 of the Revised Forestry Code. – NO. RATIO:While PD 705 explicitly provides that timber is included in the term “forest products”, the term lumber is found in paragraph (aa) of Section 3 which states that the latter is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the law uses the word “lumber” in its plain and common usage, and in the absence of a legislative intent to the contrary, it shall be interpreted as such. Hence, it is safe to conclude that the law makes no distinction whether the forest product is processed or not. Therefore, Judge Teresita Capulong committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case.

ATTY. VILLEGAS

5

INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS

TIGOY V. CA G.R. No. 144640 June 26, 2006 Ponente: Azcuna FACTS: On August 3, 1993, Nestor Ong, who had been engaged in the trucking business in Iligan City since 1986, was allegedly introduced by his friend Gamad Muntod to Lolong Bertodazo who signified his intent to rent the trucks of Ong to transport construction materials from Lanao del Norte to Dipolog City. A Contract to Transport was supposedly entered into between Ong and Bertodazo. Petitioner Tigoy and a certain Sumagang were then employed as truck drivers of Ong. Due to a dispatch, policemen apprehended the trucks driven by Tigoy, based on a suspicion that “hot items” were loaded therein. Upon inspection, the police officers discovered piles of sawn lumber beneath the cement bags in both trucks, and upon inquiry, the drivers could not produce any permit for the lumber. Thereafter the Forester of the DENR named Dingal investigated and then charged petitioner with violation of Section 68 of PD 705 for illegal possession of lumber without permit. ISSUE: W/N Tigoy is guilty of conspiracy in possessing or transporting lumber without permit. – YES. RATIO: There are two ways of violating Section 68 of the above Code: 1) by cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest products without a license; and, 2) by possessing timber or other forest products without the required legal documents.Petitioner was charged with and convicted of transporting lumber without a permit which is punishable under Section 68 of the Code. He, Sumagang and the rest of their companions were apprehended by the police officers in flagrante delicto as they were transporting the subject lumber from Larapan to Dipolog City. Petitioner maintains that he could not have conspired with Lolong Bertodazo as he did not know about the unlicensed lumber in the trucks. He believed that what he was transporting were bags of cement in view of the contract between Ong and Bertodazo. Also, he was not around when Bertodazo loaded the trucks with the lumber hidden under the bags of cement, however, the court is unconvinced because Tigoy refused to stop at a checkpoint and when accosted, even offered grease money to the policemen. In offenses considered as mala prohibita, the commission of the prohibited act is the crime itself. It is sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law, and that it is done knowingly and consciously.

ATTY. VILLEGAS

6

INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS

PEOPLE V. QUE G.R. No. 120365 December 17, 1996 Ponente: Puno FACTS: Accused-appellant Wilson Que appeals from his conviction for violation of Section 68 of PD 705. The facts show that two weeks before March 8, 1994, a member of the Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging, received an information that a ten-wheeler truck loaded with illegally cut lumber will pass through Ilocos Norte. Acting on said information, members of the Provincial Task Force went on patrol several times within the vicinity of General Segundo Avenue in Laoag City and eventually saw the truck. There were three persons on board the truck: driver Cacao, Wilson Que, who was the owner of said truck, and an unnamed person. The police then checked the cargo and found that it contained coconut slabs, but inserted therein where sewn lumber, as admitted by Que himself. When required to show a permit, Que failed to do so and thus was charged for violation of Sec. 68 of PD 705. ISSUE: W/N petitioner violated Section 68 of P.D. 705 because E.O. 277 that amended Section 68, which penalizes the possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents, did not indicate the particular documents necessary to make the possession legal, and considering that other laws and regulations did not exist at the time of the enactment of said E.O. – YES. Held: Appellant interprets the phrase “existing forest laws and regulations” to refer to those laws and regulations which were already in effect at the time of the enactment of E. O. 277. The suggested interpretation is strained and would render the law inutile. Statutory construction should not kill but give life to the law. The phrase should be construed to refer to laws and regulations existing at the time of possession of timber or other forest products. DENR Administrative Order No. 59 series of 1993 specifies the documents required for the transport of timber and other forest products. Thus Que’s possession of the subject lumber without any documentation clearly constitutes an offense under Section 68 of P.D. 705. Also, the court rejected Que’s argument that the law only penalizes possession of illegal forest products and that the possessor cannot be held liable if he proves that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removal of such forest products is legal. There are 2 distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of P.D. 705, to wit: (1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authority; and (2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under existing forest laws and regulations. In the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality of the acts of cutting, gathering, collecting or removing timber or other forest products by presenting the authorization issued by the DENR. In the second offense, however, it is immaterial whether the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of the forest products is legal or not. Mere possession of forest products without the proper documents consummates the crime. Whether or not the lumber comes from a legal source is immaterial because E.O. 277 considers the mere possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents as malum prohibitum.

ATTY. VILLEGAS

7

INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS

CALUB V. CA G.R. No. 115634 April 27, 2000 Ponente: Quisumbing FACTS: the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR apprehended 2 motor vehicles wherein Constancio Abuganda and Pio Gabon, the drivers of the vehicles, failed to present proper documents and/or licenses. Thus, the apprehending team seized and impounded the vehicles and its load of lumber. Petitioner, Felipe Calub, Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer, then filed a criminal complaint against Abuganda, for violation of Section 68 of PD 705 as amended by Executive Order 277, (Revised Forestry Code). Lower court ruled in favor of accused, and even granted recovery of possession to them via replevin. Upon petitioner’s appeal, the Court of Appeals denied said petition, stating that the mere seizure of a motor vehicle pursuant to the authority granted by Section 68 of P.D. No. 705 as amended by E.O. No. 277 does not automatically place said conveyance in custodia legis. According to the appellate court, such authority of the Department Head of the DENR or his duly authorized representative to order the confiscation and disposition of illegally obtained forest products and the conveyance used for that purpose is not absolute and unqualified. It is subject to pertinent laws, regulations, or policies on that matter, added the appellate court. The DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, is one such regulation, the appellate court said. Additionally, respondent CA noted that the petitioners failed to observe the procedure outlined in DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990. They were unable to submit a report of the seizure to the DENR Secretary, to give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle, and to render a report of their findings and recommendations to the Secretary. Moreover, petitioners’ failure to comply with the procedure laid down by DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, was confirmed by the admission of petitioners’ counsel that no confiscation order has been issued prior to the seizure of the vehicle and the filing of the replevin suit. Therefore, in failing to follow such procedure, according to the appellate court, the subject vehicles could not be considered in custodia legis ISSUE: W/N said motor vehicles are in custodial legis pursuant to Section 68 of PD 705. – YES. RATIO: Upon apprehension of the illegally-cut timber while being transported without pertinent documents that could evidence title to or right to possession of said timber, a warrantless seizure of the involved vehicles and their load was allowed under Section 78 and 89 of the Revised Forestry Code. Note further that petitioners’ failure to observe the procedure outlined in DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990 was justifiably explained. Petitioners did not submit a report of the seizure to the Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle because on the 3rd day following the seizure, Gabon and Abuganda, drivers of the seized vehicles, forcibly took the impounded vehicles from the custody of the DENR. Then again, when one of the motor vehicles was apprehended and impounded for the second time, the petitioners, again were not able to report the seizure to the DENR Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle because private respondents immediately went to court and applied for a writ of replevin. The seizure of the vehicles and their load was done upon their apprehension for a violation of the Revised Forestry Code. It would be absurd to require a confiscation order or notice and hearing before said seizure could be effected under the circumstances. Hence, since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was in accordance with law, in our view the subject vehicles were validly deemed in custodia legis. It could not be subject to an action for replevin. For it is property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and considered in the custody of the law, and not otherwise

ATTY. VILLEGAS

8

INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS

FACTORAN V. CA G.R. No. 93540 December 13, 1999 Ponente: De Leon, Jr. FACTS: On August 9, 1988, 2 police officers of the Marikina intercepted a six-wheeler truck, carrying narra lumber as it was cruising along the Marcos Highway. They apprehended the truck driver, private respondent Jesus Sy, and brought the truck and its cargo to the Personnel Investigation Committee/Special Actions and Investigation Division (PIC/SAID) of the DENR Office in Quezon City. There, petitioner Atty. Vicente Robles of the PIC/SAID investigated them, and discovered the discrepancies in the documentation of the narra lumber. Due to the failure of respondents to show the required documents, petitioner Factoran, then Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources issued an order for the confiscation of the narra lumber and the six-wheeler truck. Private respondents neither asked for reconsideration of nor appealed, the said order to the Office of the President. Consequently, these items were then forfeited in favor of the government. They were subsequently advertised to be sold at public auction on March 20, 1989. Respondents then filed for preliminary injunction and replevin, to which the trial court acceded. Petitioner then refused to obey the writ of seizure and filed a counterbond, to which the court denied because of lack of service to the respondents. Court of appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision. ISSUE: WON respondents can validly be restored possession of their trucks and lumber based on the writ of replevin. – NO. RATIO: Firstly, herein respondents never appealed the confiscation order of petitioner Secretary to the Office of the President as provided for in Sec. 8 of P.D. No. 705. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for reasons of law, comity and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies have first been resorted to and the proper authorities have been given an appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum. However, petitioners waived this ground for failure to raise such in their motion to dismiss. Nevertheless, in order for replevin to prosper, the wrongful detention by the defendant of the properties sought in an action for replevin must be satisfactorily established. If only a mechanistic averment thereof is offered, the writ should not be issued. In the case at bar, the subject narra lumber and six-wheeler truck were confiscated by petitioner Secretary pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 277. Property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process is deemed to be in custodia legis. When a thing is in official custody of a judicial or executive officer in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ, replevin will not lie to recover it. Otherwise, there would be interference with the possession before the function of law had been performed as to the process under which the property was taken. Lastly, Sec. 80 of P. D. No. 705 which requires delivery of the seized forest products within 6 hours from the time of the seizure to the appropriate official designated by law to conduct preliminary investigations applies only to criminal prosecutions provided for in Sec. 68, and not to administrative confiscation provided for in Section 68-A.

ATTY. VILLEGAS

9

INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS

PAAT V. CA G.R. No. 111107 January 10, 1997 Ponente: Torres, Jr. FACTS: On May 19, 1989, the truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman while on its way to Bulacan from Cagayan, was seized by DENR personnel in Nueva Vizcaya because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest products found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) in Aritao, Cagayan, issued an order of confiscation of the truck and gave the owner 15 days within which to submit an explanation why the truck should not be forfeited. Private respondents, however, failed to submit the required explanation. Later, the Regional Executive Director of DENR sustained petitioner Layugan’s action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277. Respondents then appealed. Pending resolution however of the appeal, a suit for replevin was filed by the private respondents against petitioner Layugan and Executive Director, which thereafter issued a writ ordering the return of the truck to private respondents. Petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan filed a motion to dismiss with the trial court contending, inter alia, that private respondents had no cause of action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, which the CA affirmed upon petitioner’s appeal. ISSUES: 1. W/N an action for replevin prosper to recover a movable property which is the subject matter of an administrative forfeiture proceeding in the DENR pursuant to Section 68-A of P. D. 705. – NO. 2. W/N the Secretary of DENR and his representatives empowered to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products in favor of the government. – YES. RATIO: Firstly, the Court held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. The premature invocation of court’s intervention is fatal to one’s cause of action. In the case at bar, there is no question that the controversy was pending before the Secretary of DENR when it was forwarded to him following the denial by the petitioners of the motion for reconsideration of private respondents through the order of July 12, 1989. In their letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989, private respondents clearly recognize the presence of an administrative forum to which they seek to avail, as they did avail, in the resolution of their case. Secondly, as to the power of the DENR to confiscate, “SECTION 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly Authorized Representative To Order Confiscation. In all cases of violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and policies on the matter.” It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his duly authorized representatives are given the authority to confiscate and forfeit any conveyances utilized in violating the Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations. Lastly, as to the contention that since they are not liable for qualified theft, then they should not have necessarily have committed a crime under Sec. 68. This is unmeritorious. With the introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending Section 68 of P.D. 705, the act of cutting, gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forest products without authority constitutes a distinct offense independent now from the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that provided for under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised

ATTY. VILLEGAS

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INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS

Penal Code. This is clear from the language of Executive Order No. 277 when it eliminated the phrase “ shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code ” and inserted the words “ shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code ”.

ATTY. VILLEGAS

11

INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS

ALVAREZ V. PICOP G.R. No. 162243 December 3, 2009 Ponente: Chico-Nazario FACTS: PICOP (Paper Industries Corp of the Phil) filed with the DENR an application to have its Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43 converted into an IFMA (Integrated forest management agreement). In the middle of the processing of PICOP’s application, however, PICOP refused to attend further meetings with the DENR. Instead, on 2 September 2002, PICOP filed before the RTC of Quezon City a Petition for Mandamus1 against then DENR Secretary Heherson T. Alvarez. PICOP seeks the issuance of a privileged writ of mandamus to compel the DENR Secretary to sign, execute and deliver an IFMA to PICOP. Lower court ruled in favor of respondents, CA affirmed, but upon appeal to the Supreme Court, it reversed the judgment of the CA. Now PICOP files a Motion for Reconsideration. ISSUE: W/N PICOP is entitled to the IFMA by way of mandamus and due to the non-impairment clause of the Constitution in relation to Document 1969. – NO, Document 1969 is not a contact, but a mere collateral undertaking pursuant to the TLA. RATIO: An examination of the Presidential Warranty (Doc. 1969) at once reveals that it simply reassures PICOP of the government’s commitment to uphold the terms and conditions of its timber license and guarantees PICOP’s peaceful and adequate possession and enjoyment of the areas which are the basic sources of raw materials for its wood processing complex. The warranty covers only the right to cut, collect, and remove timber in its concession area, and does not extend to the utilization of other resources, such as mineral resources, occurring within the concession. The Presidential Warranty cannot be considered a contract distinct from PTLA No. 47 and FMA No. 35. It is merely a collateral undertaking which cannot amplify PICOP’s rights under its timber license. The ruling in Oposa v. Factoran that a timber license is not a contract within the purview of the nonimpairment clause is edifying. Also, PICOP failed to secure NCIP Cerification based on R.A. 8371 and Sanggunian consultation and approval for environmentally critical projects based on the Local Government Code.

ATTY. VILLEGAS

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ALVAREZ V. PICOP G.R. No. 162243 November 29, 2006 Ponente: Chico-Nazario FACTS: This is a consolidation of three cases. On 23 December 1999, then DENR Secretary Cerilles promulgated DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 99-53 which had for its subject, the "Regulations Governing the Integrated Forest Management Program (IFMP)."In a 28 August 2000 letter to the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), PICOP signified its intention to convert its TLA No. 43 into an Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) invoking the provisions of Section 9, Chapter III of DAO No. 99-53. Pursuant to the application for conversion, the Performance Evaluation Team of DENR conducted a report indicating violations by PICOP of existing DENR Rules and Regulations governing TLA No. 43, such as the non-submission of its five-year forest protection plan and seven-year reforestation plan as required by the DENR rules and regulations, as well as overdue and unpaid forest charges. Upon submission of the memorandum to the DENR Secretary, negotiations were held to assure PICOP’s compliance with DAO 99-53, however PICOP later claimed that the conversion had already been completed pursuant to Sec. Alvarez’ letter of clearance. PICOP then filed for a petition for mandamus against petitioner which was granted by the trial court. Later on, Gozun was substituted in the case as the new DENR Secretary. Court of Appeals eventually affirmed the lower court’s ruling, to which herein petitioners now appeal. ISSUE: W/N PICOP is entitled by way of mandamus to the conversion of its TLA to IFMA, and WON there was compliance with DAO No. 99-53 and thus conversion had already been effected. – NO. RATIO: A timber license agreement is not a contract, neither is the presidential warranty of President Marcos a contract. The argument that the Presidential Warranty is a contract on the ground that there were mutual considerations taken into account consisting in investments on PICOP’s part is preposterous. All licensees put up investments in pursuing their businesses. To construe these investments as consideration in a contract would be to stealthily render ineffective the settled jurisprudence that "a license or a permit is not a contract between the sovereignty and the licensee or permittee, and is not a property in the constitutional sense, as to which the constitutional proscription against the impairment of contracts may extend." As to the compliance with the DAO, the following are the requisites for the automatic conversion of the TLA into an IFMA, to wit: 1. The TLA holder had signified its intent to convert its TLA into an IFMA prior to the expiration of its TLA; 2. Proper evaluation was conducted on the application; and 3. The TLA holder has satisfactorily performed and complied with the terms and conditions of the TLA and the pertinent rules and regulations. In the case at bar, PICOP failed to comply with DAO, as evidenced by the memorandum submitted to the DENR Secretary by the Performance Evaluation Team. Finally, the DENR, by withholding the conversion of PICOP’s TLA No. 43 into an IFMA, has made a factual finding that PICOP has not yet complied with the requirements for such a conversion. Findings of facts of administrative agencies are generally accorded great respect, if not finality, by the courts because of the special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction. Lastly, as to whether or not conversion already took place, the court ruled in the negative. By giving this clearance for the conversion of PICOP’s TLA into an IFMA, the DENR Secretary cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be claimed to have granted the conversion itself. The letter is clear that the "conversion" could not be final since its conditions and details still have to be discussed as stated in the second paragraph of said letter; hence, the same letter could not have reduced to a mere formality the approval of the conversion of PICOP’s TLA No. 43 into an IFMA. Even assuming, however, that the IFMA has already been converted, this is all purely academic because of the above-discussed settled jurisprudence that logging permits are not contracts within the NonImpairment Clause and thus, can be amended, modified, replaced or rescinded when the national

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interest so requires. If the DENR Secretary, therefore, finds that the IFMA would be in violation of statutes, rules and regulations, particularly those protecting the rights of the local governments and the indigenous peoples within the IFMA area, then it behooves the DENR Secretary to revoke such IFMA. These same statutes, rules and regulations are the very same requirements mentioned above for the conversion of the TLA No. 43 into an IFMA.

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DY V. CA G.R. No. 121587 March 9, 1999 Ponente: Mendoza FACTS: On May 31, 1993, the Mayor of Butuan City issued Executive Order No. 93-01 creating Task Force Kalikasan to combat “illegal logging, log smuggling or possession of and/or transport of illegally cut or produced logs, lumber, flitches and other forest products” in that city. The team was composed of personnel of the Philippine Army, PNP, DENR and the Office of the City Mayor of Butuan. Respondent Odel Bernardo Lausa, who was the acting chief of civilian security in the mayor’s office, was a member of the team. On July 1, 1993, the members of the task force received confidential information that two truckloads of illegally cut lumber would be brought to Butuan City from the Ampayon-Taguibe-Tiniwisan area. Accordingly, the team set up a checkpoint along kilometer 4 in Baan, Butuan City. Therafter upon catching up with the two cars in the latter’s compound, the caretaker of the compound was not able to produce any documents proving the legality of possession of the forest products. DENR officers then seized the truck and lumber, and since there were no claimants after posting the notice of confiscation, it was deemed forfeited in favor of the government. 2 months after the said forfeiture, petitioner herein filed a suit for replevin to recover the trucks and lumber, to which respondent Lausa filed a motion for approval of counterbond and dismissal of the replevin since the seizure was pursuant to the Revised Forestry Code. Trial court for petitioner, but was reversed in the CA in favor of Lausa. Hence this petition. ISSUE: WON the Regional Trial Court could in fact take cognizance of the replevin suit, considering that the object was the recovery of lumber seized and forfeited by law enforcement agents of the DENR pursuant to P.D. No. 705 (Revised Forestry Code), as amended by Executive Order No. 277. – NO. RATIO: The rule is that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies before he can resort to the courts. In a long line of cases, we have consistently held that before a party may be allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed himself of all the means afforded by the administrative processes. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before a court’s judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of a court’s intervention is fatal to one’s cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel, the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action. As petitioner clearly failed to exhaust available administrative remedies, the Court of Appeals correctly set aside the assailed orders of the trial court granting petitioner’s application for a replevin writ and denying private respondent’s motion to dismiss. Having been forfeited pursuant to P.D. No. 705, as amended, the lumber properly came under the custody of the DENR and all actions seeking to recover possession thereof should be directed to that agency. The appellate court’s directive to the trial court judge to allow the respondent agent of the DENR to file a counterbond in order to recover custody of the lumber should be disregarded as being contrary to its order to dismiss the replevin suit of petitioner. For, indeed, what it should have done was to dismiss the case without prejudice to petitioner filing her claim before the DENR .

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PICOP V. BASE METALS G.R. No. 163509 December 6, 2006 Ponente: Tinga FACTS: In 1987, the Central Mindanao Mining and Development Corporation (CMMCI for brevity) entered into a Mines Operating Agreement with Banahaw Mining and Development Corporation whereby the latter agreed to act as Mine Operator for the exploration, development, and eventual commercial operation of CMMCI's 18 mining claims located in Agusan del Sur. Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Banahaw Mining filed applications for Mining Lease Contracts over the mining claims with the Bureau of Mines. On April 29, 1988, Banahaw Mining was issued a Mines Temporary Permit authorizing it to extract and dispose of precious minerals found within its mining claims. Since a portion of Banahaw Mining's mining claims was located in petitioner PICOP's logging concession in Agusan del Sur, Banahaw Mining and petitioner PICOP entered into a MOA whereby petitioner PICOP allowed Banahaw Mining an access to its mining claims. In 1991, Banahaw Mining converted its mining claims to applications for Mineral Production Sharing Agreements (MPSA for brevity). While the MPSA were pending, Banahaw Mining, on December 18, 1996, decided to sell/assign its rights and interests over 37 mining claims in favor of private respondent Base Metals Mineral Resources Corporation. The transfer included those covered by its mining operating agreement with CMMCI. Upon being informed of the development, CMMCI, as claim owner, immediately approved the assignment made by Banahaw Mining in favor of private respondent Base Metals, thereby recognizing private respondent Base Metals as the new operator of its claims. On March 10, 1997, private respondent Base Metals amended Banahaw Mining's pending MPSA applications with the Bureau of Mines to substitute itself as applicant and to submit additional documents in support of the application. Area clearances from the DENR Regional Director and Superintendent of the Agusan Marsh and Wildlife Sanctuary were submitted, as required. On November 18, 1997, petitioner PICOP filed with the Mines Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB), an Opposition to private respondent Base Metals' application because it violate the non-impairment clause and will be prejudicial to herein petitioner. The Panel Arbitrator initially ruled for petitioner, but upon appeal to the Mines Adjudication Board, judgment was in favor of respondent, CA affirmed stating that the Presidential Warranty of September 25, 1968 issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos merely confirmed the timber license granted to PICOP and warranted the latter's peaceful and adequate possession and enjoyment of its concession areas. It was only given upon the request of the Board of Investments to establish the boundaries of PICOP's timber license agreement. The Presidential Warranty did not convert PICOP's timber license into a contract because it did not create any obligation on the part of the government in favor of PICOP. Thus, the non-impairment clause finds no application. Issue: W/N the concession area of petitioner is closed to mining activities and that the conversion of the agreement into MPSA will run counter to the non-impairment clause of the Constitution. – NO, a Timber license agreement is not a contract, but a mere privilege. RATIO: We should state at this juncture that the policy of multiple land use is enshrined in our laws towards the end that the country's natural resources may be rationally explored, developed, utilized and conserved. In like manner, RA 7942, recognizing the equiponderance between mining and timber rights, gives a mining contractor the right to enter a timber concession and cut timber therein provided that the surface owner or concessionaire shall be properly compensated for any damage done to the property as a consequence of mining operations. Firstly, assuming that the area covered by Base Metals' MPSA is a government reservation, defined as proclaimed reserved lands for specific purposes other than mineral reservations, such does not necessarily preclude mining activities in the area. Sec. 15(b) of DAO 96-40 provides that government reservations may be opened for mining applications upon prior written clearance by the government agency having jurisdiction over such reservation. Sec. 6 of RA 7942 also provides that mining operations in reserved lands other than mineral reservations may be undertaken by the DENR, subject to certain limitations. Secondly, RA 7942 does not disallow mining applications in all forest reserves but only those proclaimed as watershed forest reserves. There is no evidence in this

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case that the area covered by Base Metals' MPSA has been proclaimed as watershed forest reserves. DENR Memorandum Order No. 03-98, which provides the guidelines in the issuance of area status and clearance or consent for mining applications pursuant to RA 7942, provides that timber or forest lands, military and other government reservations, forest reservations, forest reserves other than critical watershed forest reserves, and existing DENR Project Areas within timber or forest lands, reservations and reserves, among others, are open to mining applications subject to area status and clearance. Lastly, PICOP failed to present any evidence that the area covered by the MPSA is a protected wilderness area designated as an initial component of the NIPAS pursuant to a law, presidential decree, presidential proclamation or executive order as required by RA 7586.

ASAPHIL V. TUASON G.R. NO. 134030

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April 25, 2006 Ponente: Austria-Martinez FACTS: On March 24, 1975, respondent Vicente Tuason, Jr. entered into a Contract for Sale and Purchase of Perlite Ore with Induplex wherein Induplex agreed to buy all the perlite ore that may be found and mined in Tuason’s mining claim located in Taysa, Daraga, Albay. In exchange, Induplex will assist Tuason in securing and perfecting his right over the mining claim . Thereafter, Tuason executed an Agreement to Operate Mining Claims in favor of petitioner Asaphil Construction and Development Corporation. Later, Tuason filed with the Bureau of Mines, DENR a complaint against Asaphil and Induplex for declaration of nullity of the said Contracts. Tuason alleged in his complaint that the stockholders of Induplex formed and organized Ibalon Mineral Resources, an entity whose purpose is to mine any and all kinds of minerals, that this is in violation of the condition imposed by the Board of on Induplex in its Joint Venture Agreement with Grefco, Inc, prohibiting Induplex from mining perlite ore, through an operating agreement or any other method; that Induplex acquired the majority stocks of Asaphil and that 95% of Ibalon’s shares were also transferred to Virgilio R. Romero, who is a stockholder of Induplex, Asaphil and Ibalon. Tuason claimed that said acts adversely affected, not only his interest as claimowner, but the government’s interest as well. Asaphil filed its Answer, praying for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the DENR has no jurisdiction over the case. Induplex filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint, also on ground of lack of jurisdiction. Induplex contended that to fall within the jurisdiction of the DENR, the controversy should involve a mining property and the contending parties must be claimholders and/or mining operators; and that the dispute in this case involves “mineral product” and not a mining property, and the protagonists are claimholders (Tuason) and a buyer (Induplex). DENR affirmed, but the Mines Adjucation Board reversed, stating that the complaint is for the cancellation and revocation of the Agreement to Operate Mining Claims, which is within the jurisdiction of the DENR under Section 7 of PD 1281. The MAB also found that the acquisition by Induplex of the majority stocks of Asaphil, and Induplex’s assumption of the mining operation violated the BOI prohibition. Issue: W/N the DENR has jurisdiction over Tuason’s complaint for the annulment of the Contract for Sale and Purchase of Perlite Ore between Tuason and Induplex, and the Agreement to Operate Mining Claims between Tuason and Asaphil; and second, WON the MAB erred in invalidating the Agreement to Operate Mining Claims. – YES. RATIO: In several cases on mining disputes, the Court recognized a distinction between (1) the primary powers granted by pertinent provisions of law to the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (and the bureau directors) of an executive or administrative nature, such as granting of license, permits, lease and contracts, or approving, rejecting, reinstating or canceling applications, or deciding conflicting applications, and (2) controversies or disagreements of civil or contractual nature between litigants which are questions of a judicial nature that may be adjudicated only by the courts of justice.The allegations in Tuason’s complaint do not make out a case for a mining dispute or controversy within the jurisdiction of the DENR. While the Agreement to Operate Mining Claims is a mining contract, the ground upon which the contract is sought to be annulled is not due to Asaphil’s refusal to abide by the terms and conditions of the agreement, but due to Induplex’s alleged violation of the condition imposed by the BOI in its Joint Venture Agreement with Grefco, Inc.. Also, Tuason sought the nullity of the Contract for Sale and Purchase of Perlite Ore, based on the same alleged violation. Obviously, this raises a judicial question, which is proper for determination by the regular courts. The DENR is not called upon to exercise its technical knowledge or expertise over any mining operations or dispute; rather, it is being asked to determine the validity of the agreements based on circumstances beyond the respective rights of the parties under the two contracts. Thus, the DENR Regional Executive Director was correct in dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over Tuason’s complaint; consequently, the MAB committed an error in taking cognizance of the appeal, and in ruling upon the validity of the contracts. DIDIPIO EARTH SAVERS V. GOZUN G.R. No. 157882 March 30, 2006

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Ponente: Chico-Nazario FACTS: In 1987, Cory promulgated EO 279 which empowered DENR to stipulate with foreign companies regarding technical or financial large scale exploration or mining. In 1995, Ramos signed into law RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act. In 1994, Ramos already signed an FTAA with Arimco Mining Co, an Australian company. The FTAA authorized AMC (later CAMC) to explore 37,000 hectares of land in Quirino and Nueva Vizcaya including Brgy .Didipio. After the passage of the law, DENR then issued its Implementing Rules and Regulations. In seeking to nullify Rep. Act No. 7942 and DAO 96-40 as unconstitutional, petitioners reasoned that these in effect allow the unlawful and unjust “taking” of property for private purpose in contravention with Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, mandating that private property shall not be taken except for public use and with the corresponding payment of just compensation. They assert that public respondent DENR, through the Mining Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, cannot, on its own, permit entry into a private property and allow taking of land without payment of just compensation. Public respondents on the other hand avers that Section 76 is not a taking provision but a valid exercise of the police power and by virtue of which, the state may prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. This government regulation involves the adjustment of rights for the public good and it endeavors potential for the use or economic exploitation of private property. Public respondents concluded that “to require compensation in all such circumstances would compel the government to regulate by purchase.” Issue: W/N RA 7942 and the DENR RRs are valid. – YES. RATIO: The SC noted the requisites of eminent domain. They are following: (1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period. (3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. In the case at bar, Didipio failed to show that the law is invalid. Indeed there is taking involved but it is with just compensation. Sec. 76 of RA 7942 provides for just compensation as well as section 107 of the DENR RR. To wit: Section 76. xxx Provided, that any damage to the property of the surface owner, occupant, or concessionaire as a consequence of such operations shall be properly compensated as may be provided for in the implementing rules and regulations. Section 107. Compensation of the Surface Owner and Occupant- Any damage done to the property of the surface owners, occupant, or concessionaire thereof as a consequence of the mining operations or as a result of the construction or installation of the infrastructure mentioned in 104 above shall be properly and justly compensated. Further, mining is a public policy and the government can invoke eminent domain to exercise entry, acquisition and use of private lands.

PEOPLE VS ROSEMOOR G.R. No. 149927 March 30, 2004

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Ponente: Panganiban FACTS: Rosemoor Mining And Development Corporation Corporation (Rosemoor), after having been granted permission to prospect for marble deposits in the mountains of Biak-na-Bato, Bulacan, succeeded in discovering marble deposits of high quality and in commercial quantities. They applied with the Bureau of Mines (now Mines and Geosciences Bureau), for the issuance of the corresponding license to exploit said marble deposits, which was issued to them, giving them the right to quarry 330 hectares of land. After Ernesto Maceda was appointed Minister of DENR, he cancelled Rosemoor’s license. Rosemoor filed for injunctive relief from the RTC, which ruled in their favor. The RTC said that Rosewood’s respondents’ license had already ripened into a property right, which was protected under the due process clause, and such right was supposedly violated when the license was unjustifiably cancelled without notice and hearing. Petitioners aver that the license contravenes PD 463 because it exceeds the maximum area that may be granted to a Licensee for quarrying (100 hectares), which renders the license void. The CA sustained the RTC decision because the license was embraced by four (4) separate applications, and that the 100 hectare limitation was superseded by RA 7942. The CA also said that Proclamation 84, which confirmed the cancellation of the license, impaired the non-impairment clause of contracts, a bill of attainder and an ex post facto law. ISSUE: W/N Rosemoor’s license was validly cancelled. – YES. RATIO: Validity of License PD 463, as amended, pertained to the old system of exploration, development and utilization of natural resources through licenses, concessions or leases, but was omitted in the 1987 Constitution as it was deemed violative of its provisions. This was replaced by RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 repealed or amended all laws, executive orders, presidential decrees, rules and regulations -- or parts thereof -- that are inconsistent with it. While RA 7942 has expressly repealed provisions of mining laws that are inconsistent with its own, it nonetheless respects previously issued valid and existing licenses. In this case, the terms of Rosemoor’s license was subject to PD 463, the existing law when it was granted. And under such law, it is clear that a license should only cover 100 hectares without exceptions or consideration to the number of applications. The intent of the law would be brazenly circumvented by ruling that a license may cover an area exceeding the maximum by the mere expediency of filing several applications. Such ruling would indirectly permit an act that is directly prohibited by the law. Validity of Proclamation No. 84 Rosemoor’s license may be revoked or rescinded by executive action when the national interest so requires, because it is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. This condition to the license was acknowledged by Rosemoor in its permit. Moreover, granting that Rosemoor’ license is valid, it can still be validly revoked by the State in the exercise of police power. The exercise of such power through Proclamation No. 84 is clearly in accord with the regalia doctrine which reserves to the State ownership of all natural resources. Proclamation 84 does not impair the non-impairment clause because the license is not a contract. Even if the license were, it is settled that provisions of existing laws and a reservation of police power are deemed read into it, because it concerns a subject impressed with public welfare. PN 84 is also not a bill of attainder because the declaration that the license was void is not a punishment. It is also not an ex post facto law because the proclamation does not fall under any of the enumerated categories of an ex post facto law. And an ex post facto law is limited in its scope only to matters criminal in nature. LA BUGAL B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC., ET AL. V. RAMOS G.R. No. 127882 27 January 2004 Ponente: Carpio-Morales

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FACTS: On July 25, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 279 authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent. On March 3, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved R.A. No. 7942 to "govern the exploration, development, utilization and processing of all mineral resources." R.A. No. 7942 defines the modes of mineral agreements for mining operations, outlines the procedure for their filing and approval, assignment/transfer and withdrawal, and fixes their terms. Similar provisions govern financial or technical assistance agreements. On April 9, 1995, 30 days following its publication on March 10, 1995 in Malaya and Manila Times, two newspapers of general circulation, R.A. No. 7942 took effect. Shortly before the effectivity of R.A. No. 7942, however, or on March 30, 1995, the President entered into an FTAA with WMCP covering 99,387 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 95-23, s. 1995, otherwise known as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7942. This was later repealed by DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996 which was adopted on December 20, 1996. On January 10, 1997, counsels for petitioners sent a letter to the DENR Secretary demanding that the DENR stop the implementation of R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40, giving the DENR fifteen days from receipt to act thereon. The DENR, however, has yet to respond or act on petitioners' letter. Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. They pray that the Court issue an order: (a) Permanently enjoining respondents from acting on any application for Financial or Technical Assistance Agreements; (b) Declaring the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 or Republic Act No. 7942 as unconstitutional and null and void; (c) Declaring the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Philippine Mining Act contained in DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40 and all other similar administrative issuances as unconstitutional and null and void; and (d) Cancelling the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement issued to Western Mining Philippines, Inc. as unconstitutional, illegal and null and void. In January 2001, MMC – a publicly listed Australian mining and exploration company – sold its whole stake in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, 60% of which is owned by Filipinos while 40% of which is owned by Indophil Resources, an Australian company. DENR approved the transfer and registration of the FTAA in Sagittarius’ name but Lepanto Consolidated assailed the same. WMCP contends that the annulment of the FTAA would violate a treaty between the Philippines and Australia which provides for the protection of Australian investments. ISSUE: W/N the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing fully foreign-owned corporations to exploit Philippine mineral resources. – YES. RATIO: RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for permitting fully foreign owned corporations to exploit Philippine natural resources. Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian doctrine which states that “All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State.” The same section also states that, “exploration and development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.” Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions authorizing the State to grant licenses, concessions, or leases for the exploration, exploitation, development or utilization of natural resources. Y such omission, the utilization of inalienable lands of

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public domain through license, concession or lease is no longer allowed under the 1987 Constitution. Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct equity investment for the purpose of exploiting a particular natural resource within a given area. The concession amounts to complete control by the concessionaire over the country’s natural resource, for it is given exclusive and plenary rights to exploit a particular resource at the point of extraction. The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the phrase “management or other forms of assistance” in the 1973 Charter. The present Constitution now allows only “technical and financial assistance.” The management or operation of mining activities by foreign contractors, the primary feature of service contracts was precisely the evil the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to avoid. The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is an exception to the rule that participation in the nation’s natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly such provision must be construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore RA 7942 is invalid insofar as said act authorizes service contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase “financial and technical agreements” in accordance with the 1987 Constitution, its pertinent provisions actually treat these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law. The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that the foreign contractor manages the mineral resources just like the foreign contractor in a service contract. By allowing foreign contractors to manage or operate all the aspects of the mining operation, RA 7942 has in effect conveyed beneficial ownership over the nation’s mineral resources to these contractors, leaving the State with nothing but bare title thereto. The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a circumvention of the constitutionally ordained 60-40% capitalization requirement for corporations or associations engaged in the exploitation, development and utilization of Philippine natural resources. When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions, considerations, inducements or compensations for each other as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, then if some parts are unconstitutional, all provisions that are thus dependent, conditional or connected must fall with them. Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned corporations are limited only to merely technical or financial assistance to the State for large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils. ISSUE: W/N the FTAA between WMCP and the Pgilippines is a service contract. – YES. The FTAA between WMCP and the Philippine government is likewise unconstitutional since the agreement itself is a device contract. Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP, a fully foreign owned corporation, the “exclusive right to explore, exploit, utilize and dispose of all minerals and by-products that may be produced from the contract area.” Section 1.2 of the same agreement provides that WMCP shall provide “all financing, technology, management, and personnel necessary for the Mining Operations.” These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the FTAA taken together, grant WMCP beneficial ownership over natural resources that properly belong to the State and are intended for the benefit of its citizens. These stipulations are abhorrent to the 1987 Constitution. They are precisely the vices that the fundamental law seeks to avoid, the evils that it aims to suppress. Consequently, the contract from which they spring must be struck down. LA BUGAL B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC., ET AL. V. RAMOS G.R. No. 127882. December 1, 2004 Ponente: Panganiban FACTS: In the January Decision, the Court en banc promulgated its Decision, granting the Petition and declaring the unconstitutionality of certain provisions of RA 7942 (Philippine Mining Act), DENR

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AO 96-40, as well as of the entire FTAA executed between the government and Western Mining Corp. Philippines, an Australian corporation. (WMCP). The Court said RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 and its implementing rules are unconstitutional for allowing “service contracts” now prohibited by the 1987 Charter. The Court said FTAA is a service contract that grants control or beneficial ownership over the nation’s mineral resources to foreign contractors, leaving the State with nothing but bare title thereto. It was also on this ground that the Court struck down as constitutionally infirm the FTAA between the government and WMCP. ISSUE: Whether or not the phrase “Agreements Involving Either Technical or Financial Assistance” contained in paragraph 4 of Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution was properly interpreted in the previous decision to warrant the unconstitutionality of RA 7942 and the FTAA of WMCP. – YES. RATIO: The Proper Interpretation of the Constitutional Phrase “Agreements Involving Either Technical or Financial Assistance” Section 2 Article XII does not reveal any intention to proscribe foreign involvement in the management or operation of mining activities or to eliminate service contracts, nor does it have express prohibition to this effect. Had the framers intended to prohibit direct participation of an alien corporation in the exploration of the country’s natural resources, they would employed clearly restrictive language barring foreign corporation from directly engaging in the exploration of the country’s natural resources. Foreign corporations may indeed participate in the exploitation, development and use of Philippine natural resources but subject to the full control and supervision of the State. RA 7942, its implementing rules (DAO 96-40) and the FTAA entered into by then Government and WMCP grant the Government full control and supervision over all aspects of planned exploration, development and utilization activities. Sections 7.8 and 7.9 of the FTAA however are objectionable and void for being contrary to public policy. Section 7.8 permits the sum spent by government for the benefit of the contractor to be deductible from the State’s share in the net mining revenues since it constitutes unjust enrichment on the part of the contractor at the government’s expense. Section 7.9, meanwhile, deprives the Government of its share in the net mining revenues in the event the foreign stockholders of a foreign mining company sell 60% or more of their equity to a Filipino citizen or corporation. Thus, with the exception of Sections 7.8 and 7.9 of the subject FTAA, the FTAA, RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 are declared constitutional. The Meaning of “Agreements Involving Either Technical or Financial Assistance” A constitutional provision specifically allowing foreign-owned corporation to render financial or technical assistance in respect of mining or any other commercial activity was clearly unnecessary; the provision meant to refer to more than mere financial or technical assistance. The framers of the Constitution, during its deliberation regarding foreign investment in and management of an enterprise for large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals spoke about service contracts as the concept was understood in the 1973 Constitution. It is obvious from their discussions that they did not intend to ban or eradicate service contracts. Instead, they were intent on crafting provisions to put in place safeguards that would eliminate the abuses prevalent during the martial law regime. They were going to permit service contracts with foreign corporations as contractors – but with safety measures to prevent abuses – as an exception to the general norm established in the first paragraph of Section2 of Article XII, which reserves or limits to Filipino citizens and corporations that are at least 60 percent owned by such citizens the exploration, development and utilization of mineral or petroleum resources. This was prompted by the perceived insufficiency of Filipino capital and the felt need for foreign expertise in the EDU of mineral resources. The drafters, by specifying such agreements involving assistance, necessarily gave implied assent to everything that these agreements entailed or that could reasonably be deemed necessary to make them tenable and effective – including management authority with respect to the day-to-day operations of the enterprise, and measures for the protection of the interests of the foreign corporation, at least to the extent that they are consistent with Philippine sovereignty over natural

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resources, the constitutional requirement of State control, and beneficial ownership of natural resources remains vested in the State. It is clear that agreements involving either technical or financial assistance referred to in paragraph 4 are in fact service contracts, but such new service contracts are between foreign corporations acting as contractors on the one hand, and on the other hand government as principal or “owner” )of the works), whereby the foreign contractor provides the capital, technology and technical know-how, and managerial expertise in the creation and operation of the large-scale mining/extractive enterprise, and government through its agencies (DENR, MGB) actively exercises full control and supervision over the entire enterprise. Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to mineral oils. The grant of such service is subject to several safeguards, among them: (1) that the service contract be crafted in accordance with a general law setting standard or uniform terms, conditions and requirements; (2) the President be the signatory for the government; and (3) the President report the executed agreement to Congress within thirty days. Ultimate Test: Full State Control The primacy of the principle of the State’s sovereign ownership of all mineral resources, and its full control and supervision over all aspects of exploration, development and utilization of natural resources must be upheld. But “full control and supervision” cannot be taken literally to mean that the State controls and supervises everything down to the minutest details, and makes all required actions, as this would render impossible the legitimate exercise by the contractor of a reasonable degree of management prerogative and authority, indispensable to the proper functioning of the mining enterprise. Also, the government need not micro-manage the mining operations and day-today affairs of the enterprise in order to be considered as exercising full control and supervision. The State’s full control and supervision over mining operations are ensured through the different provisions in RA 7942. The government agencies concerned are empowered to approve or disapprove the various work programs and corresponding minimum expenditure commitments for each of the exploration, development and utilization phases of the enterprise. Once they have been approved, the contractor’s compliance with its commitments therein will be monitored. The contractor is also mandated to open its books of accounts and records for scrutiny, to enable the State to determine if the government share has been fully paid. The State may likewise compel compliance by the contractor with mandatory requirements on mine safety, health and environmental protection, and the use of anti-pollution technology and facilities. The contractor is also obligated to assist the development of the mining community, and pay royalties to the indigenous peoples concerned. And violation of any of FTAA’s terms and conditions, and/or noncompliance with statutes or regulations, may be penalized by cancellation of the FTAA. Such sanction is significant to a contractor who may have yet to recover the tens or hundreds of millions of dollars sunk into a mining project. Overall, the State definitely has a pivotal say in the operation of the individual enterprises, and can set directions and objectives, detect deviations and non-compliance by the contractor; and enforce compliance and impose sanctions should the occasion arise. Hence, RA 7942 and DAO 9640 vest in government more than a sufficient degree of control and supervision over the conduct of mining operations. Section 3(aq) of RA 7942 was objected to as being unconstitutional for allowing a foreign contractor to apply for and hold an exploration permit. During the exploration phase, the permit grantee (and prospective contractor) is spending and investing heavily in exploration activities without yet being able to extract minerals and generate revenues. The exploration permit issued under Section 3 (aq), 20 and 23 of RA7942, which allows exploration but not extraction, serves to protect the interests and rights of the exploration permit grantee (and would-be contractor), foreign or local. Otherwise, the exploration works already conducted, and expenditures already made, may end up only benefiting claim-jumpers. Thus, Section 3 (aq) of RA 7942 is not unconstitutional. The provisions of the WMCP FTAA, far from constituting a surrender of control and a grant of beneficial ownership of mineral resources to the contractor in question, vest the State with control and supervision over practically all aspects of the operations of the FTAA contractor, including the charging of pre-operating and operating expenses, and the disposition of mineral products. There is likewise no relinquishment of control on account of specific provisions of the WMCP FTAA.

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The FTAA provisions do not reduce or abdicate State control: No Surrender of Financial Benefits The second paragraph of Section 81 of RA7942 has been denounced for allegedly limiting the State’s share in FTAAs with foreign contractors to just taxes, fees, and duties, and depriving the State of a share in the after-tax income of the enterprise. However, the inclusion of the phrase “among other things” in the second paragraph of Section81 clearly and unmistakably reveals the legislative intent to have the State collect more than just usual taxes, duties and fees. Thus, DAO 99-56, the “Guidelines Establishing the Fiscal Regime of Financial or Technical Assistance Agreements” spells out the financial benefits government will receive from an FTAA, as consisting of not only a basic government share, comprised of all direct taxes, fees and royalties, as well as other payments made by the contractor during the term of the FTAA, but also an additional government share, being a share in the earnings or cash flows of the mining enterprise, so as to achieve a fifty-fifty sharing of net benefits from mining between the government and the contractor. The basic government share and the additional government share do not yet take into account the indirect taxes and other financial contributions of mining projects, which are real and actual benefits enjoyed by the Filipino people; if these are taken into account, total government share increases to 60 percent or higher (as much as 77 percent, and 89 percent in one instance) of the net present value of total benefits from the project. The third or last paragraph of Section 81 of RA7942 is slammed for deferring the payment of the government share in FTAAs until after the contractor shall have recovered its pre-operating expenses, exploration and development expenditures. Allegedly, the collection of the State’s share is rendered uncertain, as there is no time limit in RA 7942 for this grace period or recovery period. But although RA7942 did not limit the grace period, the concerned agencies (DENR and MGB) in formulating the 1995 and 1996 Implementing Rules and Regulation provided that the period of recovery, reckoned from the date of commercial operation, shall be for a period not exceeding five years, or until the date of actual recovery, whichever comes earlier. Since RA 7942 allegedly does not require government approval for the pre-operating, exploration and development expenses of the foreign contractors, it is feared that such expenses could be bloated to wipe out mining revenues anticipated for 10 years, with the result that the State’s share is zero for the first 10 years. The argument is based on incorrect information. Under Section 23 of RA 7942, the applicant for exploration permit is required to submit a proposed work program for exploration, containing a yearly budget of proposed expenditures, which the State passes upon and either approves or rejects; if approved, the same will subsequently be recorded as pre-operating expenses that the contractor will have to recoup over the grace period. The Government is able to know ahead of time the amounts of pre-operating and other expenses to be recovered, and the approximate period of time needed therefore because under Section 24, when an exploration permittee files with the MGB a declaration of mining project feasibility, it must submit a work program for development, with corresponding budget, for approval by the Bureau, before government may grant an FTAA or MPSA or other mineral agreements. The government has the opportunity to approve or reject the proposed work program and budgeted expenditures for development works, which will become the pre-operating and development costs that will have to be recovered. Moreover, there is no concrete basis for the view that, in FTAAs with a foreign contractor, the State must receive at least 60 percent of the after-tax income from the exploitation of its mineral resources, and that such share is the equivalent of the constitutional requirement that at least 60 percent of the capital, and hence 60 percent of the income, of mining companies should remain in Filipino hands. Even if the State is entitled to a 60 percent share from other mineral agreements (CPA, JVA and MPSA), that would not create a parallel or analogous situation for FTAAs. . The Charter did not intend to fix an iron-clad rule of 60 percent share, applicable to all situations, regardless of circumstances. The terms and conditions of petroleum FTAAs cannot serve as standards for mineral mining FTAAs, because the technical and operational requirements, cost structures and investment needs of off-shore petroleum exploration and drilling companies do not have the remotest resemblance to those of on-shore mining companies. To avoid compromising the State’s full control and supervision over the exploitation of mineral resources, there must be no attempt to impose a “minimum 60 percent” rule. It is sufficient that the State has the power and

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means, should it so decide, to get a 60 percent share (or greater); and it is not necessary that the State does so in every case.

METRO ILOILO WATER DISTRICT VS CA G.R. No. 122855 March 31, 2005 Ponente: Tinga FACTS: Metro Iloilo Water District (MIWD), which was granted water rights to extract and withdraw ground water within its jurisdiction. MIWD filed an injunction case against private respondents (Nava et al.) for withdrawing ground water within the former’s jurisdiction without securing a water permit from NWRC, which was still being done upon filing the petition. Private respondents averred that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the matter, as the cases were within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the National Water Resources Council (Water Council). The RTC dismissed the petitions saying it had no jurisdiction and that MWID failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The CA affirmed the RTC Decision, saying that the NWRC has jurisdiction to hear and decide disputes relating to appropriation, utilization and control of water which was the subject matter of the case.

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ISSUE: W/N NWRC had jurisdiction over the case. – NO. RATIO: The petitions filed before the RTC were for the issuance of an injunction order for private respondents to cease and desist from extracting or withdrawing water from MIWD’s well and from selling the same within its service areas. The petitions focus on the violations incurred by private respondents by virtue of their alleged unauthorized extraction and withdrawal of ground water within petitioner’s service area, visa-a-vis MIWD’s vested rights as a water district. At issue is whether or not private respondents’ extraction and sale of ground water within petitioner’s service area violated petitioner’s rights as a water district. The instant case certainly calls for the application and interpretation of pertinent laws and jurisprudence in order to determine whether private respondents’ actions violate MIWD’s rights as a water district and justify an injunction. This issue does not so much provide occasion to invoke the special knowledge and expertise of the Water Council as it necessitates judicial intervention. While initially it may appear that there is a dimension to the petitions which pertains to the sphere of the Water Council, in reality the matter is at most merely collateral to the main thrust of the petitions. MIWD had an approved Water Rights Grant from the Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communications. The trial court was not asked to grant MIWD the right to use but to compel private respondents to recognize that right. Thus, the trial court’s jurisdiction must be upheld where the issue involved is not the settlement of a water rights dispute, but the enjoyment of a right to water use for which a permit was already granted.

BF NORTHWEST HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. VS IAC AND BF HOMES, INC. G.R. No. 72370 May 29, 1987 Ponente: Melencio-Herrera FACTS: BF Homes, Inc. (HOMES), which was granted a certificate of public convenience by National Water Resources Council (NWRC) [formerly the Board of Power and Waterworks], increased water rates by authority of the latter. BF Northwest Homeowners Association, Inc (ASSOCIATION) filed a petition enjoin BF Homes, Inc. from collecting from ASSOCIATION members the adjusted water rates for being arbitrary and unreasonable and to annul NWRC’s Order granting HOMES authority to charge the increased water rates on the ground that it was rendered without procedural due process and without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. HOMES filed a motion to dismiss but was denied. However, upon petition by HOMES, the CA reversed and held that the RTC was without jurisdiction to entertain the case since NWRC, which took over the functions of the Public Service Commission, has the rank of a Regional Trial Court and its decision on water rates may only be

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reviewed by the Supreme Court. ISSUE: W/N the RTC has jurisdiction over actions to annul Orders, Resolutions and/or Decisions of the National Water Resources Council (NWRC) relative to water rates. – YES. RATIO: Under PD 1067, it explicitly states that decisions of the NWRC on water rights controversies may be appealed to the Court of First Instance. The NWRC is thus ranked with "inferior courts," which, under the SC Interim Rules and Guidelines are listed as the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. Jurisdiction over actions for annulment of NWRC decisions lies with the Regional Trial Courts, particularly, when we take note of the fact that the appellate jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over NWRC decisions covers such broad and all embracing grounds as grave abuse of discretion, questions of law, and questions of fact and law. The distinction made by the CA between "water rights controversies" which it maintains are appealable to the Regional Trial Courts, and "water rates disputes" which it says are appealable to the Court of Appeals, is not well taken. Considering that rate- fixing is merely an incident to the grant of a certificate of public convenience, it would be irregular if disputes over water rates, should be held appealable to the Court of Appeals while controversies over water rights, the latter being the privilege granted by the government to appropriate and use water and, therefore, a primary right, would be appealable only to the Regional Trial Court. However, it is to be noted that since Decision Orders of the NWRC are assailed, the latter agency should be impleaded as an indispensable party defendant in order that any judgment could be effective and binding on it, and so that complete relief may be accorded to the parties.

AMISTOSO VS ONG AND NERI G.R. No. L-60219 June 29, 1984 Ponente: Cuevas FACTS: Amistoso and Neri are owners of adjoining parcels of agricultural land. An irrigation canal traverses the land of Neri through which irrigation water from the Silmod River passes and and flows to the land of the Amistoso for the latter's beneficial use. Amistoso filed a complaint for Recognition of Basement with Preliminary Injunction and Damages against Neri and Ong(cultivator of Neri’s land) for refusal, despite repeated demands, to recognize the rights and title of the former to the beneficial use of the water passing through the irrigation canal and to have Amistoso's rights and/or claims annotated on the Certificate of Title of Neri. Neri denied any right of Amistoso over the use of the canal, nor was there any contract, deed or encumbrance on their property and assert that they have not performed any act prejudicial to the petitioner that will warrant the filing of the complaint against them. Neri asserts that the complaint should be dismissed because Amistoso’s claim is based on his right to use water coming from the Silmod River and prays that Amistoso’s right to the utilization

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thereof be respected and not be disturbed and/or obstructed by Neri. The dispute is thus on the use, conservation and protection of the right to water and the annotation is merely the relief prayed for on the basis of the claim to the use and protection of water passing through the land of Neri. And since the controversy hinges on the right to use and protect the water from the Silmod River that passes on the land of Neri to Amistoso's property, the proper authority to determine such a controversy is the National Water Resources Council, which is vested with exclusive jurisdiction over such question. The trial court dismissed Amistoso’s complaint for lackof jurisdiction. ISSUE: 1. W/N Amistoso has the right over the use of the canal. – YES. 2. W/N National Water Resources Council has exclusive jurisdiction over the matter. – NO. RATIO: Based from the stipulation of facts between the parties, Neri admits that Amistoso , has an approved Water Rights Grant issued by the Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communications. Neri contends that the said grant does not pertain to the beneficial use of irrigation water from Silmod River. The records, however, do not show any other irrigation water going to petitioner's property passing thru respondents' lot aside from that coming from the Silmod River, making Neri’s allegations invalid. The record clearly discloses an approved Water Rights Grant in favor of Amistoso. The grant was made three (3) years before the promulgation of P.D. 1067 (Water Code of the Philippines). The water rights grant partakes the nature of a document known as a water permit recognized under Article 13 of P.D. 1067. the WATER RIGHTS GRANT of Amistoso does not fall under "claims for a right to use water existing on or before December 31, 1974" which under P.D. 1067 are required to be registered with the National Water Resources Council within two (2) years from promulgation of P.D. 1067, otherwise it is deemed waived and the use thereof deemed abandoned. The grant contradicts the erroneous findings of the respondent Judge, and incontrovertibly entitles petitioner to the beneficial use of water from Silmod River. That right is now a. vested one and may no longer be litigated as to bring petitioner's case within the jurisdiction of the National Water Resources Council. To resurrect that issue will be violative of the rule on res judicata. Amistoso is not asking the court to grant him the right to use but to compel Neri to recognize that right and have the same annotated on the latter’s TCT. The interruption of the free flow of water caused by the refusal to re-open the closed irrigation canal constituted petitioner's cause of action in the court below, which decidedly do not fall within the domain of the authority of the National Water Resources Council.

LONEY et al. VS PEOPLE G.R. No. 152644 February 10, 2006 Ponente: Carpio FACTS: Loney et al., are officers of Marcopper Mining Corporation ("Marcopper"), a corporation engaged in mining in the province of Marinduque. In one of Marcopper’s operations, the corporation discharged millions of tons of tailings (mine waste) into the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. The DOJ separately charged Loney et al. for violating various laws (The Water Code, The Mining act, RPC, and the National Pollution Control Decree). Loney et al. moved to quash the informations claiming that the informations were "duplicitous" as the DOJ charged more than one offense for a single act. The MTC held that Loney et al. is liable under the Philippine Mining Act but dismissed the violation of other laws. On petition to the RTC, it affirmed the decision and ordered the other charges reinstated. The RTC said that there can be no absorption by one offense of the three other offenses, as [the] acts penalized by these laws are separate and distinct from each other. The different laws involve cannot absorb one another as the elements of each crime are different from one another. On petition to the CA, it affirmed the decision of the RTC.

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ISSUE:

1. W/N all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be quashed for duplicity of charges and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property should stand. – NO. 2. W/N Branch 94’s ruling, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, contravenes People v. Relova. RATIO: No Duplicity of Charges There is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information charges more than one offense. Under Section 3(e), Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, duplicity of offenses in a single information is a ground to quash the Information. The Rules prohibit the filing of such Information to avoid confusing the accused in preparing his defense. In this case, however, the prosecution charged each petitioner with four offenses, with each Information charging only one offense. Thus, Loney et al. erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the Informations The Filing of Several Charges is Proper The filing of the multiple charges against petitioners, although based on the same incident, is consistent with settled doctrine that where two different laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other. A comparative analysis between the laws shows that each of these laws on which Loney et al. were charged, there is one essential element not required of the others. Moreover, the offenses punished by special law are mala prohibita in contrast with those punished by the Revised Penal Code which are mala in se.The charge for violation of RPC does not absorb the charges for the other laws because mala in se felonies cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes. People v. Relova not in Point In the case of People v. Relova, the court held that a person charged with theft of electric power under the RPC after being acquitted of violating a City Ordinance penalizing the unauthorized installation of electrical wiring violates the right against double jeopardy because the act giving rise to the charges was punished by an ordinance and a national statute, thus falling within the proscription against multiple prosecutions for the same act. However, such is not the case here because Loney et al.are being prosecuted for an act or incident punished by four national statutes and not by an ordinance and a national statute. Although Loney et al. cannot be for multiple prosecuted for the same offense, they can be charged for offenses arising from the same incident. THE ALEXANDRIA CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION (TACC) VS. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (LLDA) G.R. No. 169228 September 11, 2009 Ponente: Carpio FACTS: Philippine Realty and Holdings, Inc. (PhilRealty), which constructed and developed The Alexandra Condominium Complex, transferred to The Alexandra Condominium Corporation (TACC) such condominium complex by virtue of a Deed of Conveyance. Subsequently (after 5 years), Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) advised TACC that its wastewater did not meet government effluent standards, and informed TACC that it must put up its own Sewage Treatment Plant (STP) for its effluent discharge to meet government standards. Since constructing an STP would be expensive (P15M), TACC tried to experiment with other methods of cleaning its wastewater. However, the wastewater still failed to meet government standards. For this violation, LLDA imposed a P1000 daily fine on TACC until the wastewater discharge complies with the government standard. TACC then entered into an agreement with World Chem Marketing for the construction of the STP for P7.5M. LLDA issued an Order requiring TACC to pay the fine (~P1M) representing the penalty from until the STP was constructed. TACC requested LLDA to condone the imposition of the penalty of P1,000 per day in recognition of the remedial and corrective measures it undertook to

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comply with government standards. TACC further argues that the non-compliance with government standards was due to the omission and fault of PhilRealty. This was denied by LLDA. TACC then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order. The CA denied TACC’s petition. ISSUE: 1. W/N TACC’ complied with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. – NO. 2. W/N TACC is the one liable to pay the fine. – YES. RATIO: Non-Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies The doctrine of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that resort be first made with the administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the controversy may be elevated to a court of justice for review.11 A premature invocation of a court’s intervention renders the complaint without cause of action and dismissible.12 In this case, TACC has an administrative recourse before the DENR Secretary which it should have first pursued before filing a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. This is because under Executive order No. 149 transferred LLDA from the Office of the President to the DENR "for policy and program coordination and/or administrative supervision. And although under the same order, DENR only has administrative power over LLDA, a subsequent EO 192 mandates the DENR to "promulgate rules and regulations for the control of water, air and land pollution" and to "promulgate ambient and effluent standards for water and air quality including the allowable levels of other pollutants and radiations." Powers of the LLDA to Impose Penalty LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas. Under Section 4-A of RA 48501, as amended, LLDA is entitled to compensation for damages resulting from failure to meet established water and effluent quality standards. It is clear that the responsibility to comply with government standards lies with TACC, because PhilRealty turned over the project to TACC five years before LLDA advised TACC that its wastewater did not meet government effluent standards. If, as claimed by TACC, the noncompliance was due to the omission and fault of PhilRealty, TACC’s recourse is to file an action, if warranted, against PhilRealty in a proper court. TACC cannot escape its liability to LLDA by shifting the blame to PhilRealty. Hence, the LLDA did not abuse its discretion in issuing its 4 September 2003 Order.

1 Sec. 4-A. Compensation for damages to the water and aquatic resources of Laguna de Bay and its tributaries resulting from failure to meet established water and effluent quality standards and from such other wrongful act or omission of a person, private or public, juridical or otherwise, punishable under the law shall be awarded to the Authority to be earmarked for water quality control and management.

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LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (LLDA) VS COURT OF APPEALS (CA) G.R. Nos. 120865-71 December 7, 1995 Ponente: Hermosisima, Jr. FACTS: RA 4850, which created the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA), was partially amended by Marcos due to the rapid expansion of Metro Manila and its impact on the environment. This further defined and enlarged the functions and powers of LLDA. Subsequently, the LGC took effect, where the municipalities in the Laguna Lake Region interpreted the provisions of this law to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters. Municipal governments thereupon assumed the authority to issue fishing privileges and fishpen permits. Fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion which gave rise to sharp increase in unregulated fishpen and fish cages. Because of this, the LLDA notified the public that all unregistered fishpen or fishcages are declared illegal and dismantled otherwise demolition will be effected. The affected fishpen owners filed injunction cases against the LLDA. LLDA’s motions to dismiss were denied by the RTC and affirmed by the CA. The CA held that the power to grant fishing permits is now vested with the LGUs and the provisions of the LLDA charter insofar as fishing privileges in Laguna de Bay are concerned had been repealed by the LGC. ISSUE/S: Which agency of the Government (the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the region) should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance

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of permits for fishery privileges is concerned. – LLDA has jurisdiction. RATIO: The LGC do not necessarily repeal the aforementioned laws creating the Laguna Lake Development Authority and granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region. The LGC does not contain any express provision which categorically expressly repeal the charter of the LLDA. LLDA’s charter constitutes a special law while the LGC is a general law. . It is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law. Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, the special statute should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute. Thus, LLDA’s charter should prevail over the LGC. The power of the local government units to issue fishing privileges was clearly granted for revenue purposes. On the other hand, the power of the LLDA to grant permits for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region and for lake quality control and management. Accordingly, the charter of the LLDA which embodies a valid exercise of police power should prevail over the LGC on matters affecting Laguna de Bay. Thus, the LLDA has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated therein and the authority to exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it.

TANO v. SOCRATES G.R. No. 110249 August 21, 1997 Ponente: Davide, Jr. FACTS: TANO et al. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of Ordinances2 issued by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Puerto Princesa and its Governor (Socrates). Tano et al contend that the said Ordinances deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution and that the Mayor had the absolute authority to determine whether or not to issue the permit. They also claim that it took away their right to earn their livelihood in lawful ways; and insofar as the Airline Shippers Association are concerned, they were unduly prevented from pursuing their vocation and entering

2 (1) Ordinance No. 15-92 "AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVEFISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1,1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF" (2) Office Order No. 23, requiring any person engaged or intending to engage in any business, trade, occupation, calling or profession or having in his possession any of the articles for which a permit is required to be had, to obtain first a Mayor’s and authorizing and directing to check or conduct necessary inspections on cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped out from Puerto Princesa and, (3) Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2 entitled: "A RESOLUTION PROHIBITING THECATCHING, GATHERING , POSSESSING, BUYING, SELLING AND SHIPMENT OF LIVE MARINECORAL DWELLING AQUATIC ORGANISMS”

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"into contracts which are proper, necessary, and essential to carry out their business endeavors to a successful conclusion. Socrates et al. defended the validity of the Ordinances as a valid exercise of the Provincial Government's power under the general welfare clause; they likewise maintained that there was no violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Socrates wt al. reasoned that public hearings were conducted before the enactment of the Ordinance which, undoubtedly, had a lawful purpose and employed reasonable means; while as to the latter, a substantial distinction existed "between a fisherman who catches live fish with the intention of selling it live, and a fisherman who catches live fish with no intention at all of selling it live," i.e., "the former uses sodium cyanide while the latter does not." Further, the Ordinance applied equally to all those belonging to one class. ISSUE: W/N the Ordinances in question are unconstitutional. – NO. RATIO: There is absolutely no showing that any of the Tano et al. qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman to invoke as defense of violation of Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII. Section 7, particularly, speaks not only of the use of communal marine and fishing resources, but of their protection, development and conservation. As hereafter shown, the ordinances in question are meant precisely to protect and conserve our marine resources to the end that their enjoyment may be guaranteed not only for the present generation, but also for the generations to come. IN addition, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the nation's marine wealth. What the provision merely recognizes is that the State may allow, by law, cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays and lagoons. In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted therein to LGU under Section 16 (the General Welfare Clause), and other provisions, the validity of the questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted. It is clear that both Ordinances have two principal objectives or purposes: (1) to establish a "closed season" for the species of fish or aquatic animals covered therein for a period of five years; and (2) to protect the coral in the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa and the Province of Palawan from further destruction due to illegal fishing activities. Furthermore, Ordinances banning the catching of certain species of fishes and corals need not be approved by the DENR before they can be effective because in the exercise of devolved power, such approval is not necessary. The LGC vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters and impose rentals, fees or charges therefor; to penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use of explosives, noxious or poisonous substances, electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious methods of fishing; and to prosecute any violation of the provisions of applicable fishery laws. Further, the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod and the sangguniang panlalawigan are directed to enact ordinances for the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants, which shall include, inter alia, ordinances that "[p]rotect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing and such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes, or of ecological imbalance. One of the devolved powers enumerated in the section of the LGC on devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. This necessarily includes the enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal waters.

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HIZON et al. VS CA G.R. No. 119619 December 13, 1996 Ponente: Puno FACTS: HIZON et al. were charged with violating PD 704 for supposedly fishing without the use of a poisonous substance (sodium cyanide). A report that some fishing boats were fishing by "muro ami" led to the apprehension of such boat (F/B Robinson), where Hizon et al were present. The police (PNP Maritime Command and the Task Force Bantay Dagat) directed the boat captain to get random samples of the fish from the fish cage for testing. The initial results tested the fish positive for sodium cyanide and that was the basis of the information against Hizon et al. However, a second set of fish samples yielded a negative result on the sodium cyanide. Notwithstanding this, the RTC found Hizon et al. guilty and sentenced them to imprisonment and forfeiture of the fishes. The CA affirmed this decision. Hizon et al., together with the Solicitor general now question the admissibility of the evidence against petitioners in view of the warrantless search of the fishing boat and the subsequent arrest of petitioners. ISSUE/S: 1. W/N fish samples seized by the NBI in the F/B Robinson without a search warrant are admissible in evidence. – YES. 2. W/N Hizon et al., are guilty of illegal fishing with the use of poisonous substances. NO. RATIO: As a general rule, any evidence obtained without a judicial warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The rule is, however, subject to certain exceptions. Search and seizure

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without search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for violations of customs laws have been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant. The same exception ought to apply to seizures of fishing vessels and boats breaching our fishery laws. Hizon et al. were charged with illegal fishing penalized under sections 33 and 38 of P.D. 704. These provisions create a presumption of guilt for possession of explosives or poisonous substances. However, this presumption is merely prima facie and the accused has the right to present evidence to rebut this presumption. In this case, the only basis for the charge of fishing with poisonous substance is the result of the first NBI laboratory test on the four fish specimens. The apprehending officers who boarded and searched the boat did not find any sodium cyanide nor any poisonous or obnoxious substance. Neither did they find any trace of the poison in the possession of the fishermen or in the fish cage itself. Under the circumstances of the case, however, this finding does not warrant the infallible conclusion that the fishes in the F/B Robinson, or even the same four specimens, were caught with the use of sodium cyanide. Apparently, it was the police who were the ones engaged in an illegal fishing expedition. "Muro ami", as what was reported the fishermen were doing, is made with "the use of a big net with sinkers to make the net submerge in the water with the fishermen surround[ing] the net." This method of fishing needs approximately two hundred (200) fishermen to execute. What the apprehending officers instead discovered were twenty eight (28) fishermen in their sampans fishing by hook and line. The authorities found nothing on the boat that would have indicated any form of illegal fishing. All the documents of the boat and the fishermen were in order. It was only after the fish specimens were tested, albeit under suspicious circumstances, that petitioners were charged with illegal fishing with the use of poisonous substances.

PROVINCE OF RIZAL, et al. v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et al. GR 129546, 13 December 2005 Ponente: Chico-Nazario FACTS: A Memorandum of Agreement was signed by DPWH, DENR and the Metropolitan Manila Commission (MMC) Governor, allowing DENR to utilize Bocaue, Rizal as a sanitary landfill by MMC. However, the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of San Mateo wrote to MMC, DPWH, the Executive Secretary, and the DENR, informing them of the SB resolution banning creation of dumpsites for Metro Manila within its jurisdiction. SB also asked to suspend all operations with respect to the San Mateo Landfill Dumpsite. No action was taken on these letters. It was also found out that the land subject of the MOA was part of the Marikina Watershed Reservation Area. Thus, the report submitted by the forest officers of the Forest Engineering and Infrastructure Unit of the Community Environment and Natural Resource Office (CENRO), DENR-IV, Rizal Province, revealed that there was no permit issued to MMC to utilize these portions of land for dumping purposes. It further states that the use of the areas as dumping site greatly affects the ecological balance and environmental factors in that community. DENR subsequently granted the Metropolitan Manila Authority (formerly MMC) an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) for the operation of the garbage dumpsite. Less than six months after the issuance of the ECC, DENR suspended the ECC in a letter addressed to the DPWH, stating that it was ascertained that ground slumping and erosion have resulted from improper development of the site. DENR then sent a letter to MMA recommending that the all facilities and infrastructure in the garbage dumpsite in Bocaue be dismantled. Despite the various objections and recommendations raised by the government agencies, the Office of the President, through Executive

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Secretary Ruben Torres, signed and issued Proclamation No. 635, “Excluding from the Marikina Watershed Reservation Certain Parcels of Land Embraced Therein for Use as Sanitary Landfill Sites and Similar Waste Disposal Under the Administration of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority.” Province of Rizal (PROVINCE) filed before the CA a civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for a temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction. CA denied the petition for lack of cause of action. While the appeal was pending, Province filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, pointing out that the effects of the El Niño phenomenon would be aggravated by the relentless destruction of the Marikina Watershed Reservation. As a result, MMDA officials agreed to abandon the dumpsite after six months President Joseph E. Estrada issued a Memorandum ordering the closure of the dumpsite and directed DILG Secretary Alfredo Lim and MMDA Chairman Binay to reopen the San Mateo dumpsite “in view of the emergency situation of uncollected garbage in Metro Manila, resulting in a critical and imminent health and sanitation epidemic.” Claiming the above events constituted a “clear and present danger of violence erupting in the affected areas,” the Province filed an Urgent Petition for Restraining Order. The SC issued the TRO. Meanwhile, RA. 9003, otherwise known as “The Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000,” was signed into law by President Estrada. ISSUE/S: 1. W/N respondent MMDA agreed to the permanent closure of the San Mateo Landfill as of December 2000; and 2. W/N the permanent closure of the San Mateo landfill is mandated by Rep. Act No. 9003. RATIO: San Mateo Landfill will remain permanently closed. Proclamation No. 635 is illegal. The Court held that a mere MOA does not guarantee the dumpsite’s permanent closure. The San Mateo site has adversely affected its environs, and sources of water should always be protected. Adverse effects of the site were reported as early as of June 1989. MMA was also informed that the heavy pollution and risk of disease generated by dumpsites rendered the location of a dumpsite within the Marikina Watershed Reservation incompatible with Laguna Lake Development Authority’s (LLDA) program of upgrading the water quality of the Laguna Lake. Investigation Reports regarding the respiratory illnesses among pupils of a primary school located approximately 100 meters from the site, as well as the constant presence of large flies and windblown debris all over the school’s playground were also submitted. Leachate treatment plant eroded twice already, contaminating the nearby creeks that were sources of potable water for the residents. The contaminated water was also found to flow to the Wawa Dam and Boso-boso River, which in turn empties into Laguna de Bay. Protection of watersheds is an “intergenerational” responsibility that needs to be answered now. Three short months before Proclamation No. 635 was passed to avert the garbage crisis, Congress had enacted the National Water Crisis Act to “adopt urgent and effective measures to address the nationwide water crisis which adversely affects the health and well-being of the population, food production, and industrialization process. One of the issues the law sought to address was the “protection and conservation of watersheds.” Respondents’ actions in the face of such grave environmental consequences defy all logic. The petitioners rightly noted that instead of providing solutions, they have, with unmitigated callousness, worsened the problem. The Reorganization Act of the DENR defines and limits its powers over the country’s natural resources. The Administrative Code of 1987 and Executive Order No. 192 entrust the DENR with the guardianship and safekeeping of the Marikina Watershed Reservation and our other natural treasures. Although the DENR owns the Marikina Reserve, it is but is defined by the declared policies of the state, and is subject to the law and higher authority. Section 2, Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, while specifically referring to the mandate of the DENR, makes particular reference to the agency’s being subject to law and higher authority. With great power comes great responsibility. It is the height of irony that the public respondents have vigorously arrogated to themselves the power to control the San Mateo site, but have deftly ignored their corresponding responsibility as guardians and protectors of this tormented piece of land. The Local Government Code gives to LGUs all the necessary powers to promote the general welfare of their inhabitants. The circumstances under which Proclamation No. 635 was passed also violates R.A. No 7160, or the Local Government Code. Proclamation No. 635, which was passed on

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28 August 1995, is subject to the provisions of the Local Government Code, which was approved four years earlier, on 10 October 1991. Section 2(c) of the said law declares that it is the policy of the state “to require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local government units, non-governmental and people's organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions.” Likewise, Section 27 requires prior consultations before a program shall be implemented by government authorities and the prior approval of the sanggunian is obtained. Under the Local Government Code, therefore, two requisites must be met before a national project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be implemented: prior consultation with the affected local communities, and prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian. Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the project’s implementation is illegal. Approved on 26 January 2001, “The Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000” was enacted pursuant to the declared policy of the state “to adopt a systematic, comprehensive and ecological solid waste management system which shall ensure the protection of public health and environment, and utilize environmentally sound methods that maximize the utilization of valuable resources and encourage resource conservation and recovery.” It requires the adherence to a Local Government Solid Waste Management Plan with regard to the collection and transfer, processing, source reduction, recycling, composting and final disposal of solid wastes, the handling and disposal of special wastes, education and public information, and the funding of solid waste management projects. The said law mandates the formulation of a National Solid Waste Management Framework, which should include, among other things, the method and procedure for the phaseout and the eventual closure within eighteen months from effectivity of the Act in case of existing open dumps and/or sanitary landfills located within an aquifer, groundwater reservoir or watershed area. Any landfills subsequently developed must comply with the minimum requirements laid down in Section 40, specifically that the site selected must be consistent with the overall land use plan of the local government unit, and that the site must be located in an area where the landfill’s operation will not detrimentally affect environmentally sensitive resources such as aquifers, groundwater reservoirs or watershed areas. CITY OF BAGUIO VS MASWENG G.R. No. 180206 February 4, 2009 Ponente: Tinga FACTS: The Baguio City Mayor ordered demolition of illegal structures located in Busol Watershed Reservation. Gumangan et al., opposed the demolition, claiming that the lands where their residential houses stand are their ancestral lands which they have been occupying and possessing openly and continuously since time immemorial. They further claim that their ownership over the lands has been expressly recognized Proclamation No. 15 dated April 27, 1922 and recommended by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) for exclusion from the coverage of the Busol Forest Reserve. Masweng, Regional Hearing Officer of the NCIP issued TROs to refrain from enforcing the Demolition, and subsequently the NCIP granted a writ of preliminary injunction. The Mayor contends that the NCIP has no jurisdiction to hear and decide main actions for injunction as it was not a case pending before such Commission. Another contention is that the IPRA that Baguio City shall be governed by its Charter. Thus, private respondents cannot claim their alleged ancestral lands under the provisions of the IPRA. Lastly, the Mayor claims that the Busol Forest Reservation had already been declared by jurisprudence as inalienable and possession thereof, no matter how long, cannot convert the same into private property. The CA upheld the jurisdiction of the NCIP and affirmed the TROs. ISSUE/S: 1. W/N the NCIP has the jurisdiction over the matter. – YES. 2. W/N Baguio City is exempt from IPRA. – NO. 3. W/N Gumangan et al.’s ancestral land claim is recognized by by Proclamation No. 15, in

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which case, their right thereto may be protected by an injunctive writ. – NO. RATIO: The NCIP has jurisdiction In order to determine whether the NCIP has jurisdiction over the dispute, it is necessary to resolve, on the basis of the allegations in their petition, whether private respondents are members of ICCs/IPs. Private respondents, as members of the Ibaloi tribe, were asserting ownership over portions of Busol Forest Reservation which they claim to be their ancestral lands. The petition for injunction sought to prevent the enforcement of the demolition orders issued by the City Mayor. These thus qualifies the action as as a "dispute(s) or controversy(s) over ancestral lands/domains of ICCs/IPs" within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the NCIP. The IPRA, furthermore, endows the NCIP with the power to issue temporary restraining orders and writs of injunction without any prohibition against the issuance of the writ when the main action is for injunction. Baguio City is not exempt from IPRA. Although IPRA states that is governed by its own charter, its exemption from the IPRA, however, cannot ipso facto be deduced because the law concedes the validity of prior land rights recognized or acquired through any process before its effectivity. The IPRA demands that the city’s charter respect the validity of these recognized land rights and titles. Proclamation 15 does not recognize the ancestral land claim Before a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued, petitioners must show that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which injunction is directed are violative of said right. Proclamation No. 15, however, does not appear to be a definitive recognition of private respondents’ ancestral land claim. The proclamation merely identifies the Molintas and Gumangan families, the predecessors-in-interest of private respondents, as claimants of a portion of the Busol Forest Reservation but does not acknowledge vested rights over the same. In fact, Proclamation No. 15 explicitly withdraws the Busol Forest Reservation from sale or settlement. The fact remains, too, that the Busol Forest Reservation was declared by the Court as inalienable by jurisprudence. The declaration of the Busol Forest Reservation as such precludes its conversion into private property. Relatedly, the courts are not endowed with jurisdictional competence to adjudicate forest lands. Although the NCIP has the authority to issue temporary restraining orders and writs of injunction, we are not convinced that private respondents are entitled to the relief granted by the Commission.

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PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO V. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL G.R. No. 183591 October 14, 2008 Ponente: Carpio Morales FACTS: The Philippines and the MILF, through the Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF did not push through because upon motion of petitioners, specifically those who filed their cases before the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the same. The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of negotiation and the concluding of several prior agreements between the two parties beginning in 1996, when the GRP-MILF peace negotiations began. The Solicitor General, who represents respondents, summarizes the MOA-AD by stating that the same contained, among others, the commitment of the parties to pursue peace negotiations, protect and respect human rights, negotiate with sincerity in the resolution and pacific settlement of the conflict, and refrain from the use of threat or force to attain undue advantage while the peace negotiations on the substantive agenda are on-going. On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato and Vice-Governor Emmanuel filed a petition for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD and the holding of a public consultation thereon.

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Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional insofar as by creating and recognizing the Bangsamoro Juridicial Entity as a separate state or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision, it would conflict with Article X, Section 20 of the Constitution, among others. ISSUE: W/N the MOA-AD is constitutional? NO, IT IS NOT BECAUSE ITS ADOPTION WOULD ENTAIL THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLE 10, SECTION 20 OF THE CONSTITUTION, AMONG OTHERS. THE BJE IS NOT JUST AN AUTONOMOUS REGION, IT IS ALMOST LIKE A STATE. RATIO: The MOA-AD is inconsistent with the Constitution and laws as presently worded. In general, the objections against the MOA-AD center on the extent of the powers conceded therein to the BJE. Petitioners assert that the powers granted to the BJE exceed those granted to any local government under present laws, and even go beyond those of the present ARMM. Before assessing some of the specific powers that would have been vested in the BJE, however, it would be useful to turn first to a general idea that serves as a unifying link to the different provisions of the MOA-AD, namely, the international law concept of association. Firstly, what is an association? “[a]n association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic model, one state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the principal, while maintaining its international status as a state. Free associations represent a middle ground between integration and independence.” The MOA-AD it contains many provisions which are consistent with the international legal concept of association, specifically the following: the BJE's capacity to enter into economic and trade relations with foreign countries, the commitment of the Central Government to ensure the BJE's participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies, and the continuing responsibility of the Central Government over external defense. BJE was also granted the right to participate in Philippine official missions bearing on negotiation of border agreements, environmental protection, and sharing of revenues pertaining to the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain. These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it. The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution. No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an "associative" relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence. Even the mere concept animating many of the MOA-AD's provisions, therefore, already requires for its validity the amendment of constitutional provisions, specifically the following provisions of Article X: SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines . These amendments would be necessary because the BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the Constitution. It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states. Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of

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Philippine territory, the spirit animating it - which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association - runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic. The MOA-AD, moreover, would not comply with Article X, Section 20 of the Constitution since that provision defines the powers of autonomous regions as follows: SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over: xxx 9. Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region. (Underscoring supplied)

Again on the premise that the BJE may be regarded as an autonomous region, the MOA-AD would require an amendment that would expand the above-quoted provision. The mere passage of new legislation pursuant to sub-paragraph No. 9 of said constitutional provision would not suffice, since any new law that might vest in the BJE the powers found in the MOA-AD must, itself, comply with other provisions of the Constitution. It would not do, for instance, to merely pass legislation vesting the BJE with treaty-making power in order to accommodate paragraph 4 of the strand on RESOURCES which states: "The BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries: provided, however, that such relationships and understandings do not include aggression against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines x x x." Under our constitutional system, it is only the President who has that power.

BANGUS FRY FISHERFOLK ET AL., VS. JUDGE LANZANAS ET AL. G.R. No. 131442 July 10, 2003 Ponente: Carpio FACTS: DENR Regional Executive Director Principe issued an Environmental Clearance Certificate (ECC) in favor of Napocor, authorizing the corporation to construct a temporary mooring facility in the Minolo Cave in Puerto Galera. The Sangguniang Bayan of Puerto Galera has declared the Minolo Cave which was a mangrove area and breeding ground for bangus fry a eco-tourist zone. The mooring facility would serve as the temporary docking site of Napocor's power barge. The Bangus Fry Fisherfolk, claiming to be fisherfolks from Minolo, Puerto Galera, sought reconsideration of the ECC issuance, which was denied by the DENR. The Bangus Fry Fisherfolk then filed a complaint with the RTC of Manila for the cancellation of the ECC, for the issuance of a writ of injunction to stop the construction of the mooring facility, and further prayed for the demolition of mooring structures that has already been built. By this time, the provincial government of Mindoro manifested that it was the one undertaking the construction of the mooring facility. The Provincial Government of Mindoro moved to dismiss the complaint for the failure to exhaust administrative remedies, rendering the complaint without cause of action, and that Manila RTC had no jurisdiction as the mooring facility is outside its territorial jurisdiction. The RTC dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies since there was no appeal

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before the DENR Secretary prior to filing the case with the trial court. The Bangus Fry Fisherfolk contend that they are exempt from filing an appeal with the DENR Secretary because the issuance of the ECC was a patent violation of existing laws and regulations, one of which was Sections 26 and 27 of the Local Government Code. ISSUE/S: 1. W/N RTC erred in dismissing the complaint for lack of cause action and lack of jurisdiction. – NO. 2. Whether the sangguniang bayan of Puerto Galera was required to approve the construction of a mooring facility – NO, Sections 26 and 27 are inapplicable to projects which are not environmentally critical RATIO: Jurisdiction of the Manila RTC over the Case The Manila RTC has jurisdiction to determine the validity of the issuance of the ECC because the office of the Regional Director Principe is in Manila, within its territorial jurisdiction. However, the jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts to issue injunctive writs is limited to acts committed or about to be committed within their judicial region. Therefore, it could not issue an injunctive writ against the DENR or NAPOCOR. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Under the DENR Procedural Manual, a final decision of a regional Director may be appealed to the Office of the Secretary of DENR. The failure of this method of appeal deprived the DENR Secretary to review the decision of his subordinate. This omission renders the complaint dismissible for lack of cause of action. On the Alleged Patent Illegality of the ECC While the patent illegality of an act exempts a party from complying with the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies, this does not apply in the present case. Congress introduced Sections 26 and 27 in the Local Government Code to emphasize the legislative concern “for the maintenance of a sound ecology and clean environment.” These provisions require every national government agency or government-owned and controlled corporation to hold prior consultations with the local government unit concerned and to secure the prior approval of its sanggunian before implementing “any project or program that may cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of cropland, rangeland, or forest cover and extinction of animal or plant species.” Again, Sections 26 and 27 do not apply to this case because as petitioners admit, the mooring facility itself is not environmentally critical and hence does not belong to any of the six types of projects mentioned in the law. There is no statutory requirement for the concerned sanggunian to approve the construction of the mooring facility. It is another matter if the operation of the power barge is at issue. As an environmentally critical project that causes pollution, the operation of the power barge needs the prior approval of the concerned sanggunian. However, what is before this Court is only the construction of the mooring facility, not the operation of the power barge. Thus, the issuance of the ECC does not violate Sections 26 and 27 of RA No. 7160.

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