Election Law - Digested 1. Badelles vs. Cabili, G.R. No. L-29333, February 27, 1969 2. Macalintal vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003 5. US vs. Cueto, G.R. No. L-13626, October 29, 1918 6. Rulloda vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 154198, January 20, 2003 8. Claudio vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 140560, May 4, 2000 10. People vs. Corral, G.R. No. L-42300, January 31, 1936 12. Banaga vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 134696, July 31, 2000

I. MARIANO LL. BADELLES v. CAMILO P. CABILI FACTS: Two election protests against the duly proclaimed Mayor and Councilors of Iligan City, after the elections, based on the allegations of flagrant violations of certain mandatory provisions of the Election Code, to be more specifically set forth hereafter, were dismissed in a single order by the Court of First instance of Lanao del Norte. In one of them, the election of Honorable Camilo P. Cabili to the Office of City Mayor of Iligan City, was contested by protestant, Mariano Badelles. In the other, the protestants are the now appellants, Bonifacio P. Legaspi and Cecilio T. Barazon, who along with the five protestees were among those who were registered candidates voted for in such election for councilors in the City of Iligan, with the protestees being credited with the five highest number of votes, with protestants Legaspi and Barazon obtaining sixth and seventh places respectively. In the petition of protestant Badelles, it was stated that both he and protestee Camilo P. Cabili were the duly registered candidates for the Office of City Mayor of Iligan City, both having filed their respective certificates of candidacy in accordance with law and as such candidates voted for in the November 14, 1967 election. It was then alleged that the Board of Canvassers, on November 25, 1967, proclaimed as elected protestee. Protestant would impugn the election of Cabili on the ground that there were "flagrant violations of mandatory provisions of law relating to or governing elections . . ." in that more than 200 voters were registered per precinct contrary to the provision limiting such number of 200 only and that no publication of the list of voters for each precinct was made up to the election day itself, enabling persons who under the law could not vote being allowed to do so. As a result of such alleged "flagrant violations of the laws relative to or governing elections" around 8,300 individuals were allowed to vote illegally. It was likewise asserted that not less than 8,000 qualified voters were unable to exercise their right of suffrage in view of their failure, without any fault on their part, to have the proper identification cards or the non-listing of their names in the list of voters. It was stated further that even in the case of those individuals provided with identification cards with their names included in the list of voters, they could not avail themselves of their right of suffrage as their applications for registration could not be found. Mention was also made of the fact that the final lists of voters and the applications for registration were delivered to their respective precincts late on election day itself thus preventing them from voting. Moreover, confusion, so it was alleged, was caused by the excessive number of voters being listed and many having been assigned to precincts other than the correct ones. What was thus objected to is the fact that illegal votes were cast by those not qualified to do so, numbering 8,300 or more and that an approximately equal number, who were duly registered with the Commission on Elections, Iligan City, were unable to vote due to the above circumstances. The proclamation then could not have reflected the true will of the electorate as to who was the mayor elected, as the majority of protestee Cabili over the protestant consisted of only 2,344 votes. The prayer was for the proclamation of protestee as well as other candidates for elective positions being set aside and declared null and void, protestant pleading further that he be granted other such relief as may be warranted in law and equity. The protest of the candidates for councilor Legaspi and Barazon, in the other case against protestees was in substance similarly worded. In the first case, protestee Cabili moved to dismiss the petition on the following grounds: "1. That the protest was filed beyond the reglementary period; 2. That the lower court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the COMELEC being the proper body to hear the same; 3. That the complaint states no cause of action."

The single order of dismissal in both cases as indicated was based on the lack of a cause of action. The reasoning followed by the lower court in reaching the above conclusion that there was no cause of action proceeded along these lines: "Mere irregularities or misconduct on the part of election officers which do not tend to affect the result of the elections are not of themselves either ground for contest or for proper matters of inquiry. . . .There is no allegation in the protest that the alleged irregularities committed by the election officers would tend to change the result of the election in favor of the protestants and against the protestees. ISSUE: WON the trial court’s dismissal was valid. HELD: Without the lower court having so intended, the dismissal would amount to judicial abnegation of a sworn duty to inquire into and pass upon in an appropriate proceeding allegations of misconduct and misdeeds of such character. Accordingly, we reverse. Why an election protest is more fitly and appropriately the procedure for determining whether irregularities or serious violations of the electoral law vitiated the conduct of elections was clearly and succinctly explained in the Moscoso decision, the opinion coming from Justice Makalintal. Thus: "The question of whether or not there had been terrorism, vote-buying and other irregularities in the 1959 elections in Tacloban City should be ventilated in a regular election protest, pursuant to Section 174 of the Election Code, and not in a petition to enjoin the city board of canvassers from canvassing the election returns and proclaiming the winning candidates for municipal offices." It would follow then that if the grievance relied upon is the widespread irregularities and the flagrant violations of the election law, the proper remedy is the one availed of here, the protest. That such should be the case should occasion no surprise. If that right be disregarded or frittered away, then popular sovereignty becomes a myth. A republic then to be true to its name requires that the government rests on the consent of the people, consent freely given, intelligently arrived at, honestly recorded, and thereafter counted. Only thus can they be really looked upon as the ultimate sources of established authority. It is their undeniable right to have officials of their unfettered choice. The election law has no justification except as a means for assuring a free, honest and orderly expression of their views. It is of the essence that corruption and irregularities should not be permitted to taint the electoral process. It may not always be thus unfortunately. That should be the ideal however. If there be a failure to observe the mandates of the Election Code, the aggrieved parties should not be left remediless. Under the law as it stands, it is precisely an election protest that fitly serves that purpose. It was sought to be thus utilized in these two cases, perhaps in a rather awkward and far from entirely satisfactory manner. That in itself is no reason for the courts to slam the door against any opportunity for redress. Yet, that is what would happen if the order of dismissal complained of were not set aside. Hence the inevitability of its reversal. The scope of our decision must not be misinterpreted however. All that it directs is that the protestees in both cases be required to answer. Thereafter, if, as is not unlikely, there be a denial of the serious imputations made as to the alleged irregularities, the lower court could properly inquire into what actually transpired. After the facts are thus ascertained in accordance with the accepted procedural rules, then the appropriate law could be applied. It must be clearly emphasized that we do not at this stage intimate any view as to the merit, or lack of it, of either protest. That would be premature to say the least. All we do is to set aside the order of dismissal. WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal of March 23, 1968, is reversed and the two cases remanded to the lower court for proceeding and trial in accordance with this opinion and the law. Without costs.

II. ROMULO MACALINTAL VS COMELEC, G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003 FACTS: Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions the validity of the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). He questions the validity of the said act on the following grounds, among others: 1. That the provision that a Filipino already considered an immigrant abroad can be allowed to participate in absentee voting provided he executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines, is void because it dispenses of the requirement that a voter must be a resident of the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he intends to vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding the election; 2. That the provision allowing the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to proclaim winning candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates for president and vice-president, is unconstitutional because it violates the Constitution for it is Congress which is empowered to do so. ISSUE: Whether or not Macalintal’s arguments are correct. HELD: No. 1. There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required to physically reside in the Philippines within the period required for non-absentee voters. Further, as understood in election laws, domicile and resident are interchangeably used. Hence, one is a resident of his domicile (insofar as election laws is concerned). The domicile is the place where one has the intention to return to. Thus, an immigrant who executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines is considered a resident of the Philippines for purposes of being qualified as a voter (absentee voter to be exact). If the immigrant does not execute the affidavit then he is not qualified as an absentee voter. 2. The said provision should be harmonized. It could not be the intention of Congress to allow COMELEC to include the proclamation of the winners in the vice-presidential and presidential race. To interpret it that way would mean that Congress allowed COMELEC to usurp its power. The canvassing and proclamation of the presidential and vice presidential elections is still lodged in Congress and was in no way transferred to the COMELEC by virtue of RA 9189.

V. US vs Cueto GR no: L-13626 Facts: In the general election held on June 6, 1916, Elias Cueto, now the defendant and appellant, was an election inspector for an election precinct in the municipality of Tiaong, Province of Tayabas. For the position of municipal president of this municipality, two gentlemen named mayo and Magbiray were candidate. Toribio Briones, a qualified elector, belonged to the Mayor party. He was given a slip containing the slate of the candidates of the Mayo faction for the different offices, such as is circulated at election time, and with this in his possession entered the polling place. Being a disabled person, because of failing sight and rheumatism in his hand, although still able when necessary to read and write, Briones secured the assistance of Cueto to prepare his ballot. Instead, however, of copying the name of Mayo, the candidate for municipal president found on the slip of paper, for whom Briones desired to vote, Cueto inserted the name of Magbiray. When once outside the dark booth, Briones noticed that his ballot contained the name of Magbiray and on his objecting anew ballot with the Name of Mayor was prepared for him by the election inspector. Issue: whether or not Cueto violated the election law. Held: The accused, as already remarked, was an election inspector. To hold this office it was necessary for him to have certain qualifications. He had to be qualified elector of his precinct, of good character, not convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude, and able to read, write, and speak either English, Spanish, or the local dialect understandingly. the accused took an oath honestly and unjustly to administer his duties according to the Election Law without prejudice or favor toward any person, candidate, party, society, or religious sect. One of his functions was, in conjunction, with another inspector to prepare ballots for disabled persons. The made it his duty, and his duty only, with another inspector, to ascertain the wishes of the disabled voter and to prepare the ballot of the voter in proper form according to his wishes. (See sections 417-424, 453, Administrative Code of 1917.) The election inspector in giving assistance to a disable voter has but on function to perform, namely, the mechanical act of preparing the ballot. The exercise of any discretion as to the selection of candidate for the voter assisted is prohibited to the maker, and the substation of his own for the voter's choice in such selection is a flagrant violation of an official trust. (Patton vs. Watskins [1901], 131 Ala., 387; 90 Am. St. Rep., 43; Board vs. Dill [1910], 26 Okla., 104; Ann. Cas. [1912] B, 101; Re Prangley, 21 Ont. L. Rep., 54.) An inspector who fails to write upon the ballot the name or names expressly indicated by the voter is guilty of a fraud practiced against the voter and thus of a violation of the penal provisions of the Election Law. The defendant not only convicts himself out of his own mouth of an attempt to defeat the will of the people of this district in their effort to choose their representatives in the legislative branch of the government, but also violated his oath of office in which he asked God to help him honestly and justly to administer his duties as an inspector of elections without prejudice or favor towards any person, candidate, party, society, or religious sect, which oath must have been taken freely or without evasion or mental reservation whatsoever. (Section 516, Act No. 2657; section 419, Act No. 2711.) In addition to convicting himself of an attempt to violate the rights of the people, together with the violation of a solemn oath, he also convicts himself of the falsification of a public document, and might be punished for the latter offense in a manner very much more severe than for the crime for which he is being tried. (Articles 300 and 301 of the Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 2712.) The law provides as a punishment for an election officer who fails to perform his official duties, imprisonment for not less than one month nor then one year or by fine of not less than P200 nor more than P500 or both. (Section 2639, Administrative Code of 1917.) In the decision above quoted, the maximum penalty was, for good reasons, imposed. There the facts were aggravated because the election officer had manipulated and changed the election totals. Herein, while the inner purpose of

the defendant as just as bad, the result was not disastrous. However, believing that either the maximum or a penalty approaching the maximum, should always be imposed on election officers who violate law we must proceed to increase the sentence imposed by the lower court so that the defendant and appellant shall be condemned to six months imprisonment, and to pay a fine of P250, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and with the costs of both instances against him. So ordered.

VI. Petronila S. Rulloda Vs COMELEC GR No. 154198 January 20, 2003 Facts: During the barangay elections on July 15, 2002, Romeo N. Rulloda and Remegio L. Placido were the contending candidates for Brgy. Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan. On June 22, 2002, Romeo suffered a heart attack and passed away. His widow, petitioner Petronila “Betty” Rulloda, wrote a letter to the Commission on Elections seeking permission to run as candidate for Brgy. Sto. Tomas in lieu of her late husband. The Comelec issued a directive to the Chairman and members of the Brgy. Board of Canvassers that, “ the names “Betty” or “Petronila” or “Rolluda” is written on the ballot, read the same as it is written but add the words “Not Counted” like “Betty Not Counted” or “Rolluda Not Counted.” Based on the result of the election, petitioner garnered 516 votes over the 290 votes of Remegio Placido. Despite this, the Board of Canvassers proclaimed Placido as the Brgy. Chairman based on recommendation of the Law Department under Resolution No. 5217, that to deny due course the certificates of candidacy and to delete the name of Petronila Rulloda, and citing Section 9 of Comelec’s Resolution No. 4801, which state “that there shall be no substitution of candidates for barangay and sangguniang kabataan officials.” It argue that since the barangay election is nonpartisan, substitution of candidates is not allowed and petitioner did not file any certificate of candidacy. Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari, seeking to annul the said Resolution Nos. 4801 & 5217, to nullify the proclamation or respondent and to proclaim her as the duly elected Brgy. Chairman. Issue: WON there was grave abuse of discretion when Comelec denied petitioner’s request that she be allowed to run for elections? Ruling: Respondent’s contention that the substitution of candidates in not allowed in barangay elections under Section 77 of the Omnibus Elections Code which states that, “if after the last day of the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified…” Inasmuch as the barangay election is no-partisan, there can be no substitution because there is no political party to speak of. But the Court ruled that the purpose of election laws which is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voters. It is a solemn duty to uphold the clear and unmistakable mandate of the people. It is well-settled that in case of doubt, political laws must be so construed as to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot. Petitioner’s letter-request was considered a certificate of candidacy when Comelec issued its resolution denying the same. In the contested election, it was petitioner who obtained the plurality of votes. Technicalities and procedural niceties in election cases should not be made to stand in the way of the true will of the electorate. Laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections. The Court ordered the proclamation of Placido to set aside and to proclaim the petitioner as the duly elected barangay chairman.

VIII. JOVITO O. CLAUDIO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, COMMISSION ON AUDIT and RICHARD ADVINCULA, respondents. G.R. No. 140560. May 4, 2000 PREPARATORY RECALL ASSEMBLY OF PASAY CITY, herein represented by its Chairman, RICHARD ADVINCULA, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, COMMISSION ON AUDIT and HON. JOVITO O. CLAUDIO, respondents. G.R. No. 140714. May 4, 2000 FACTS: Jovito O. Claudio, petitioner in G.R. No. 140560, was the duly elected mayor of Pasay City in the May 11, 1998 elections. He assumed office on July 1, 1998. Sometime during the second week of May 1999, the chairs of several barangays in Pasay City gathered to discuss the possibility of filing a petition for recall against Mayor Claudio for loss of confidence. Several barangay chairs formed an ad hoc committee for the purpose of convening the PRA. PRA adopted Resolution No. 01, S-1999, entitled RESOLUTION TO INITIATE THE RECALL OF JOVITO O. CLAUDIO AS MAYOR OF PASAY CITY FOR LOSS OF CONFIDENCE. As scheduled, the petition for recall was filed on July 2, 1999, accompanied by an affidavit of service of the petition on the Office of the City Mayor. Pursuant to the rules of the COMELEC, copies of the petition were posted on the required bulletin boards in Pasay City. Subsequently, a verification of the authenticity of the signatures on the resolution was conducted by Ligaya Salayon, the election officer for Pasay City designated by the COMELEC. Oppositions to the petition were filed by petitioner Jovito O. Claudio, Rev. Ronald Langub, and Roberto L. Angeles, alleging procedural and substantive defects in the petition, to wit: (1) the signatures affixed to the resolution were actually meant to show attendance at the PRA meeting; (2) most of the signatories were only representatives of the parties concerned who were sent there merely to observe the proceedings; (3) the convening of the PRA took place within the one-year prohibited period; (4) the election case filed by Wenceslao Trinidad in this Court, seeking the annulment of the proclamation of petitioner Claudio as mayor of Pasay City, should first be decided before recall proceedings against petitioner could be filed; and (5) the recall resolution failed to obtain the majority of all the members of the PRA, considering that 10 were actually double entries, 14 were not duly accredited members of the barangays, 40 sangguniang kabataan officials had withdrawn their support, and 60 barangay chairs executed affidavits of retraction. Slx In its resolution of October 18, 1999, the COMELEC granted the petition for recall and dismissed the oppositions against it. On the issue of whether the PRA was constituted by a majority of its members, the COMELEC held that the 1,073 members who attended the May 29, 1999 meeting were more than necessary to constitute the PRA, considering that its records showed the total membership of the PRA was 1,790, while the statistics of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) showed that the total membership of the PRA was 1,876. In either case, since only a majority is required to constitute the PRA, clearly, a majority had been obtained in support of the recall resolution. Based on the verification made by election officer Ligaya Salayon, the COMELEC found the signatures of 958 members of the PRA sufficient. On whether the pendency of the case questioning the proclamation of petitioner was a prejudicial question which must first be decided before any recall election could be held, the COMELEC ruled that it was not and that petitioner was merely using the pendency of the case to delay the recall proceedings. Finally, on whether the petition for recall violated the bar on recall within one year from the elective official's assumption of office, the COMELEC ruled in the negative, holding that recall is a process which starts with the filing of the petition for recall. Since the petition was filed on July 2, 1999, exactly one year and a day after petitioner Claudio's assumption of office, it was held that the petition was filed on time. Hence, these petitions. COMELEC set the date of the recall elections in Pasay City on April 15, 2000. Consequently, the petition for mandamus in G.R. No. 140714 to compel the COMELEC to fix a date for the recall elections in Pasay City was no longer tenable. Thus, what’s only left to settle is petitioner Claudio's action for certiorari and prohibition. ISSUES: (1) On Whether or not the Word "Recall" in Paragraph (b) of Section 74 of the Local Government Code Includes the Convening of the Preparatory Recall Assembly and the Filing by it of a Recall Resolution; (2) On Whether or not the Phrase "Regular Local Election" in the Same Paragraph (b) of Section 74 of the Local Government Code includes the Election Period for that Regular Election or Simply the Date of Such Election; and (3) On Whether or not the Recall RESOLUTION was signed by a Majority of the PRA and Duly Verified. HELD: The bone of contention in this case is Section 74 of the Local Government Code (LCG) which provides:

Limitations on Recall. - (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence. (b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election. 1. Yes. According to the Supreme Court, Recall is a process which begins with the convening of the preparatory, recall assembly or the gathering of the signatures at least 25% of the registered voters of a local government unit, and then proceeds to the filing of a recall resolution or petition with the COMELEC, the verification of such resolution or petition, the fixing of the date of the recall election, and the holding of the election on the scheduled date. However, as used in paragraph (b) of Section 74, "recall" refers to the election itself by means of which voters decide whether they should retain their local official or elect his replacement. Several reasons can be cited in support of this conclusion. First, Section 74 deals with restrictions on the power of recall. It is in fact entitled "Limitations on Recall." On the other hand, Section 69 provides that "the power of recall ...shall be exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit to which the local elective official belongs." Since the power vested on the electorate is not the power to initiate recall proceedings but the power to elect an official into office, the limitations in Section 74 cannot be deemed to apply to the entire recall proceedings. In other words, the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers only to the recall election, excluding the convening of the PRA and the filing of a petition for recall with the COMELEC, or the gathering of the signatures of at least 25 % of the voters for a petition for recall. Thus, there may be several PRAs held (as in the case of Bataan Province in 1993) or petitions for recall filed with the COMELEC - there is no legal limit on the number of times such processes may be resorted to. These are merely preliminary steps for the purpose of initiating a recall. The limitations in Section 74 apply only to the exercise of the power of recall which is vested in the registered voters. It is this - and not merely, the preliminary steps required to be taken to initiate a recall - which paragraph (b) of Section 74 seeks to limit by providing that no recall shall take place within one year from the date of assumption of office of an elective local official. Indeed, this is the thrust of the ruling in Garcia v. COMELEC where two objections were raised against the legality of PRAs: (1) that even the power to initiate recall proceedings is the sole prerogative of the electorate which cannot be delegated to PRAs, and (2) that by vesting this power in a PRA, the law in effect unconstitutionally authorizes it to shorten the term of office of incumbent elective local officials. Both objections were dismissed on the ground that the holding of a PRA is not the recall itself. With respect to the first objection, it was held that it is the power to recall and not the power to initiate recall that the Constitution gave to the people. With respect to the second objection, it was held that a recall resolution "merely sets the stage for the official concerned before the tribunal of the people so he can justify why he should be allowed to continue in office. [But until] the people render their sovereign judgment, the official concerned remains in office . . . ." If these preliminary proceedings do not produce a decision by the electorate on whether the local official concerned continues to enjoy the confidence of the people, then, the prohibition in paragraph (b) against the holding of a recall, except one year after the official's assumption of office, cannot apply to such proceedings. The second reason why the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers to recall election is to be found in the purpose of the limitation itself. There are two limitations in paragraph (b) on the holding of recalls: (1) that no recall shall take place within one year from the date of assumption of office of the official concerned, and (2) that no recall shall take place within one year immediately preceding a regular local election. The purpose of the first limitation is to provide a reasonable basis for judging the performance of an elective local official. In the Bower case cited by this Court in Angobung v. COMELEC, it was held that "The only logical reason which we can ascribe for requiring the electors to wait one year before petitioning for a recall election is to prevent premature action on their part in voting to remove a newly elected official before having had sufficient time to evaluate the soundness of his policies and decisions." The one-year limitation was reckoned as of the filing of a petition for recall because the Municipal Code involved in that case expressly provided that "no removal petition shall be filed against any officer or until he has actually held office for at least twelve months." But however the period of prohibition is determined, the principle announced is that the purpose of the limitation is to provide a reasonable basis for evaluating the performance of an elective local official. Hence, in this case, as long as the election is held outside the one-year period, the preliminary proceedings to initiate a recall can be held even before the end of the first year in office of a local official. It cannot be argued that to allow recall proceedings to be initiated before the official concerned has been in office for one-year would be to allow him to be judged without sufficient basis. As already stated, it is not the holding of PRA

nor the adoption of recall resolutions that produces a judgment on the performance of the official concerned; it is the vote of the electorate in the Election that does. Therefore, as long as the recall election is not held before the official concerned has completed one year in office, he will not be judged on his performance prematurely. Third, to construe the term "recall" in paragraph (b) as including the convening of the PRA for the purpose of discussing the performance in office of elective local officials would be to unduly restrict the constitutional right of speech and of assembly of its members. The people cannot just be asked on the day of the election to decide on the performance of their officials. The crystallization and formation of an informed public opinion takes time. To hold, therefore, that the first limitation in paragraph (b) includes the holding of assemblies for the exchange of ideas and opinions among citizens is to unduly curtail one of the most cherished rights in a free society. Indeed, it is wrong to assume that such assemblies will always eventuate in a recall election. To the contrary, they may result in the expression of confidence in the incumbent. Our esteemed colleague Justice Puno says in his dissent that the purpose of the one-year period in paragraph (b) is to provide the local official concerned a "period of repose" during which "[his] attention should not be distracted by any impediment, especially by disturbance due to political partisanship." Unfortunately, the law cannot really provide for a period of honeymoon or moratorium in politics. From the day an elective official assumes office, his acts become subject to scrutiny and criticism, and it is not always easy to determine when criticism of his performance is politically motivated and when it is not. The only safeguard against the baneful and enervating effects of partisan politics is the good sense and self restraint of the people and its leaders against such shortcomings of our political system. A respite from partisan politics may, have the incidental effect of providing respite from partisanship, but that is not really the purpose of the limitation on recall under the law. The limitation is only intended to provide a sufficient basis for evaluating and judging the performance of an elected local official. In any event, it is argued that the judgments of PRAs are not "as politically unassailable as recalls initiated directly by the people." Justice Puno cites the "embarrassing repudiation by the people of [Kaloocan City's] Preparatory Recall Assembly" when, instead of ousting Mayor Rey Malonzo, they reelected him. Two points may be made against this argument. One is that it is no disparagement of the PRA that in the ensuing election the local official whose recall is sought is actually reelected. Laws converting municipalities into cities and providing for the holding of plebiscites during which the question of cityhood is submitted to the people for their approval are not always approved by the people. Yet, no one can say that Congress is not a good judge of the will of the voters in the locality. In the case of recall elections in Kaloocan City, had it been shown that the PRA was resorted to only because those behind the move to oust the incumbent mayor failed to obtain the signatures of 25% of the voters of that city to a petition for his recall, there may be some plausibility for the claim that PRAs are not as good a gauge of the people's will as are the 25 % of the voters. Indeed, recalls initiated directly by 25% of the registered voters of a local government unit cannot be more representative of the sentiments of the people than those initiated by PRAs whose members represent the entire electorate in the local government unit. Voters who directly initiate recalls are just as vulnerable to political maneuverings or manipulations as are those composing PRAs. The other point regarding Justice Puno’s claim is that the question here is not whether recalls initiated by 25% of the voters are better. The issue is whether the one-year period of limitation in paragraph (b) includes the convening of the PRA. Given that question, will convening the PRA outside this period make it any more representative of the people, as the petition filed by 25 % of the registered voters is claimed to be? To sum up, the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers to the recall election and not to the preliminary proceedings to initiate recall 1. Because §74 speaks of limitations on "recall" which, according to §69, is a power which shall be exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit. Since the voters do not exercise such right except in an election, it is clear that the initiation of recall proceedings is not prohibited within the one-year period provided in paragraph (b); 2. Because the purpose of the first limitation in paragraph (b) is to provide voters a sufficient basis for judging an elective local official, and final judging is not done until the day of the election; and 3. Because to construe the limitation in paragraph (b) as including the initiation of recall proceedings would unduly curtail freedom of speech and of assembly guaranteed in the Constitution.

As the recall election in Pasay City is set on April 15, 2000, more than one year after petitioner assumed office as mayor of that city, we hold that there is no bar to its holding on that date. 2. Yes. The law is unambiguous in providing that "[n]o recall shall take place within . . . one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election." Had Congress intended this limitation to refer to the campaign period, which period is defined in the Omnibus Election Code, it could have expressly said so. Petitioner’s contention is untenable. Petitioner contends, however, that the date set by the COMELEC for the recall election is within the second period of prohibition in paragraph (b). He argues that the phrase "regular local elections" in paragraph (b) does not only mean "the day of the regular local election" which, for the year 2001 is May 14, but the election period as well, which is normally at least forty five (45) days immediately before the day of the election. Hence, he contends that beginning March 30, 2000, no recall election may be held. Moreover, petitioner's interpretation would severely limit the period during which a recall election may be held. Actually, because no recall election may be held until one year after the assumption of office of an elective local official, presumably on June 30 following his election, the free period is only the period from July 1 of the following year to about the middle of May of the succeeding year. This is a period of only nine months and 15 days, more or less. To construe the second limitation in paragraph (b) as including the campaign period would reduce this period to eight months. Such an interpretation must be rejected, because it would devitalize the right of recall which is designed to make local government units" more responsive and accountable." Indeed, there is a distinction between election period and campaign period. Under the Omnibus Election Code, unless otherwise fixed by the COMELEC, the election period commences ninety (90) days before the day of the election and ends thirty (30) days thereafter. Thus, to follow petitioner's interpretation that the second limitation in paragraph (b) includes the "election period" would emasculate even more a vital right of the people. To recapitulate the discussion in parts 1 and 2, Section 74 imposes limitations on the holding of recall elections. First, paragraph (a) prohibits the holding of such election more than once during the term of office of an elective local official. Second, paragraph (b) prohibits the holding of such election within one year from the date the official assumed office. And third, paragraph (b) prohibits the holding of a recall election within one year immediately preceding a regular local election. As succinctly stated in Paras v. COMELEC, "[p]aragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local official may be subject to recall election, that is, during the second year of office." 3. Yes. To be sure, this claim is being raised for the first time in this case. It was not raised before the COMELEC, in which the claim made by petitioner was that some of the names in the petition were double entries, that some members had withdrawn their support for the petition, and that Wenceslao Trinidad's pending election protest was a prejudicial question which must first be resolved before the petition for recall could be given due course. The order of the COMELEC embodying the stipulations of the parties and defining the issues to be resolved does not include the issue now being raised by petitioner. The contention of the petitioner has no basis. Petitioner alleges other grounds for seeking the annulment of the resolution of the COMELEC ordering the holding of a recall election. He contends that a majority of the signatures of the members of the PRA was not obtained because 74 members did not really sign the recall resolution. According to petitioner, the 74 merely signed their names on pages 94-104 of the resolution to signify their attendance and not their concurrence. Petitioner claims that this is shown by the word "Attendance" written by hand at the top of the page on which the signatures of the 74 begin. Although the word "Attendance" appears at the top of the page, it is apparent that it was written by mistake because it was crossed out by two parallel lines drawn across it. Apparently, it was mistaken for the attendance sheet which is a separate document. It is absurd to believe that the 74 members of the PRA who signed the recall resolution signified their attendance at the meeting twice. It is more probable to believe that they signed pages 94-104 to signify their concurrence in the recall resolution of which the pages in question are part. The other point raised by petitioner is that the recall petition filed in the COMELEC was not duly verified, because Atty. Nelson Ng, who notarized it, is not commissioned as notary public for Pasay City but for Makati City. As in the case of the first claim, this issue was not raised before the COMELEC itself. It cannot, therefore, be raised now. WHEREFORE, G.R. No. 140560 is DISMISSED for lack of merit, while the petition in G.R. No. 140714 is DISMISSED for having been rendered moot and academic.

X. PEOPLE VS. CORRAL, G.R. No. L-42300, JANUARY 21, 1936 Facts: Appellant was charged having voted illegally at the general elections held on June 5, 1934. After due trial, he was convicted on the ground that he had voted while laboring under a legal disqualification. The judgment of conviction was based on section 2642, in connection with section 432 of the Revised Administrative Code. Said Section 432 reads as follows: The following persons shall be disqualified from voting: (a) Any person who, since the thirteenth day of August, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer not less than eighteen months of imprisonment, such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon. (b) Any person who has violated an oath of allegiance taken by him to the United States. (c) Insane of feeble-minded persons. (d) Deaf-mutes who cannot read and write. (e) Electors registered under subsection (c) of the next proceeding section who, after failing to make sworn statement to the satisfaction of the board of inspectors at any of its two meetings for registration and revision, that they are incapacitated for preparing their ballots due to permanent physical disability, present themselves at the hour of voting as incapacitated, irrespective of whether such incapacity be real or feigned. And section 2642 provides: Whoever at any election votes or attempts to vote knowing that he is not entitled so to do, ... shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than one year and by a fine of not less than one hundred pesos nor more than one thousand pesos, and in all cases by deprivation of the right of suffrage and disqualification from public office for a period of not more than four years.

Issue: WON the State has the right to deprive persons, or the appellant, in this case, to the right of suffrage by reason of their having been convicted of crime.

Held:

It is undisputed that appellant was sentenced by final judgment of this court promulgated on March 3, 1910, to suffer eight years and one day of presidio mayor. No evidence was presented to show that prior to June 5, 1934, he had been granted a plenary pardon. It is likewise undisputed that at the general elections held on June 5, 1934, he voted in election precinct No. 18 of the municipality of Davao, Province of Davao. The modern conception of the suffrage is that voting is a function of government. The right to vote is not a natural right but is a right created by law. Suffrage is a privilege granted by the State to such persons or classes as are most likely to exercise it for the public good. In the early stages of the

evolution of the representative system of government, the exercise of the right of suffrage was limited to a small portion of the inhabitants. But with the spread of democratic ideas, the enjoyment of the franchise in the modern states has come to embrace the mass of the audit classes of persons are excluded from the franchise. Among the the generally excluded classes are minors idiots, paupers, and convicts. The right of the State to deprive persons to the right of suffrage by reason of their having been convicted of crime, is beyond question. "The manifest purpose of such restrictions upon this right is to preserve the purity of elections. The presumption is that one rendered infamous by conviction of felony, or other base offense indicative of moral turpitude, is unfit to exercise the privilege of suffrage or to hold office. The exclusion must for this reason be adjudged a mere disqualification, imposed for protection and not for punishment, the withholding of a privilege and not the denial of a personal right. (9 R.C.L., 1042.) Upon the facts established in this case, it seems clear that the appellant was not entitled to vote on June 5 1934, because of section 432 of the Revised Administrative Code which disqualified from voting any person who, since the 13th day of August, 1898, had been sentenced by final judgment to offer not less than eighteen months of imprisonment, such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon. As above stated, the appellant had been sentenced by final judgment to suffer eight years and one day of presidio mayor, and had not been granted a plenary pardon. Counsel for the appellant contend that inasmuch as the latter voted in 1928 his offense had already prescribed, and he could no longer be prosecuted for illegal voting at the general election held on June 5, 1934. This contention is clearly without merit. The disqualification for crime imposed under section 432 of the Revised Administrative Code having once attached on the appellant and not having been subsequently removed by a plenary pardon, continued and rendered it illegal for the appellant to vote at the general elections of 1934. Neither is there any merit in the contention advanced by counsel for the appellant that the disqualification imposed on the latter must be considered as having been removed at the expiration of his sentence. This claim is based upon an erroneous theory of the nature of the disqualification. It regards it as a punishment when, as already indicated, the correct view is that it is imposed, "for protection and not for punishment,. the withholding of a prvilege and not the denial of a personal right." Judicial interpretation and long established administrative practice are against such a view. The judgment appealed from is affirmed with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

XII. TOMAS T. BANAGA, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FLORENCIO M. BERNABE, JR., respondents. G.R. No. 134696 July 31, 2000 FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were the candidates for vice-mayor of the City of Parañaque in the May 11, 1998 election. On May 19, 1998, the city board of canvassers proclaimed private respondent, Florencio M. Bernabe, Jr., the winner for having garnered a total of 71,977. On the other hand, petitioner, Tomas T. Banaga, Jr., received the second highest number of votes for the said position, with 68,970. Thus, the difference between the votes received by the private respondent and the petitioner is 3,007 votes. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed with the COMELEC on May 29, 1998, an action denominated as "Petition to Declare Failure of Elections and/or For Annulment of Elections", alleging that: "3. xxx the local elections for the office of Vice-Mayor in the City of Parañaque, Metro Manila, held on 11 May 1998, amounts to a denigration of the expression of the true will of the people, as it was tainted with widespread election anomalies which constitutes election fraud. The local elections for the position of Vice-Mayor in the City of Parañaque, Metro Manila, was replete with election offenses, specifically vote buying and flying voters being allowed to vote. Moreover, during the canvassing of votes before the Board of Canvasser, numerous Election Returns were discovered to contain glaring discrepancies and are replete with blatant omissions, not to mention the fact that numerous election returns appeared to be tampered with. All told, it is readily apparent that the portion of the Election Returns pertaining to the position of Vice-Mayor in the City of Parañaque, appear to be altered, falsified or fabricated. 4. The will of the legitimate voters of the City of Parañaque were denigrated during the 11 May 1998 election as a consequence of the fact that an indeterminable number of flying voters were allowed to vote. xxx 9. Moreover, several Election Returns are found to have glaring discrepancies which may materially alter the results of the election for the office of Vice-Mayor in the City of Parañaque. xxx 10. Finally, what seriously casts doubt on the legitimacy of the elections for the office of the Vice-Mayor in the City of Parañaque is the fact that the results thereof are statistically improbable. A case in point is precinct number 483 where petitioner shockingly is supposed to have received zero (0) votes. Petitioner is the incumbent Vice-Mayor of the City of Parañaque. It is, thus, impossible that he will receive zero (0) votes in any given precinct."2 On June 29, 1998, the COMELEC dismissed petitioner’s suit. It held that the grounds relied upon by petitioner do not fall under any of the instances enumerated in Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code. The election tribunal concluded that based on the allegations of the petition, it is clear that an election took place and that it did not result in a failure to elect.4

Considering that a motion for reconsideration of a COMELEC en banc ruling is prohibited, except in a case involving an election offense,5 and aggrieved by the COMELEC’s dismissal of his suit, petitioner timely filed the instant petition for certiorari with this Court. ISSUE: WON public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner’s petition, in the light of petitioner’s foregoing contentions. HELD: NO. While petitioner may have intended to institute an election protest by praying that said action may also be considered an election protest, in our view, petitioner’s action is a petition to declare a failure of elections or annul election results. It is not an election protest. First, his petition before the COMELEC was instituted pursuant to Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7166 in relation to Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code. Section 4 of RA 7166 refers to "postponement, failure of election and special elections"7 while Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code relates to "failure of election". It is simply captioned as "Petition to Declare Failure of Elections and/or For Annulment of Elections". Second, an election protest is an ordinary action while a petition to declare a failure of elections is a special action under the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure as amended. An election protest is governed by Rule 20 on ordinary actions, while a petition to declare failure of elections is covered by Rule 26 under special actions. In this case, petitioner filed his petition as a special action and paid the corresponding fee therefor. Third, petitioner did not comply with the requirements for filing an election protest. He failed to pay the required filing fee and cash deposits for an election protest. Failure to pay filing fees will not vest the election tribunal jurisdiction over the case. Such procedural lapse on the part of a petitioner would clearly warrant the outright dismissal of his action. Fourth, an en banc decision of COMELEC in an ordinary action becomes final and executory after thirty (30) days from its promulgation, while an en banc decision in a special action becomes final and executory after five (5) days from promulgation, unless restrained by the Supreme Court.8 For that reason, a petition cannot be treated as both an election protest and a petition to declare failure of elections. The COMELEC’s authority to declare a failure of elections is provided in our election laws. Section 4 of RA 7166 provides that the COMELEC sitting en banc by a majority vote of its members may decide, among others, the declaration of failure of election and the calling of special election as provided in Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code. Said Section 6, in turn, provides as follows: Section 6. Failure of Elections. --- If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect."

There are three instances where a failure of election may be declared, namely, (a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes; (b) the election in any polling place has been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes; or (c) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes. In these instances, there is a resulting failure to elect. This is obvious in the first two scenarios, where the election was not held and where the election was suspended. As to the third scenario, where the preparation and the transmission of the election returns give rise to the consequence of failure to elect must as aforesaid, is interpreted to mean that nobody emerged as a winner.10 Before the COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of election two conditions must concur, namely (1) no voting took place in the precinct or precincts on the date fixed by law, or even if there was voting, the election resulted in a failure to elect; and (2) the votes not cast would have affected the result of the election.11 Note that the cause of such failure of election could only be any of the following: force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes. While petitioner contends that the election was tainted with widespread anomalies, it must be noted that to warrant a declaration of failure of election the commission of fraud must be such that it prevented or suspended the holding of an election, or marred fatally the preparation and transmission, custody and canvass of the election returns. These essential facts ought to have been alleged clearly by the petitioner below, but he did not. Finally, petitioner claims that public respondent gravely abused its discretion when it dismissed his petition motu propio. However, the fact that a verified petition has been filed does not mean that a hearing on the case should first be held before COMELEC can act on it. The petition to declare a failure of election and/or to annul election results must show on its face that the conditions necessary to declare a failure to elect are present. In their absence, the petition must be denied outright.18 Public respondent had no recourse but to dismiss petition. Nor may petitioner now complain of denial of due process, on this score, for his failure to properly file an election protest. The COMELEC can only rule on what was filed before it. It committed no grave abuse of discretion in dismissing his petition "to declare failure of elections and/or for annulment of elections" for being groundless, hence without merit.