Edited Case Digests in Civ1

PRELIMINA RY CONSIDERA T IONS

T A ÑA DA V S. T UV ERA G.R. No. L-63915. A pr il 24, 1985 Doct r in e: T h e publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applica bilit y " is a r equirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must fir st be officia lly a n d specifica lly in for m ed of it s con t en t s. Fa ct s: T h e petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette various presidential decrees, letters of instruct ion s, g eneral orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation and administ r a t iv e or der s. T h e respondents contend that the publication in the Official Gazette is not a requirement for the effectivity of the laws where the laws provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submit t ed t hat since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as t o t h e da t e t h a t t h ey are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity ba sed on A r t icle 2 of t h e Civ il Code. T h e interpretation of the respondent is in accord with the Court‘s construction of said article. In a long line of decisions, the Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in ca ses where the legislation itself does not provide for a n effect iv it y da t e - for t h e da t e of pu blication is material in determining its date of effectivity which is the 15 th da y follow in g it s pu blication - but not when the law it self pr ov ides for t h e da t e w h en it g oes in t o effect . Issu e: W h ether there is still a need for publication of the presidential decrees with specified da t es of effect iv it y . Held: Y es, there is still a need for publication. A r t icle 2 does n ot pr eclu de t h e r e qu ir em en t of pu blication in the Officila Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of it s effect iv it y . Sect ion 1 of CA 6 3 8 pr ov ides t h a t : Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1 ] all important legislat iv e a ct s a n d r esolutions of a public nature of the, Con g r ess of t h e Ph ilippin es; [2 ] a ll ex ecu t iv e a n d a dm inistrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no g en er a l a pplica bilit y ; [3 ] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of A ppea ls a s m a y be deem ed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have genera l a pplica bilit y a n d leg a l effect , or w h ich h e m a y a u t h or ize so t o be pu blish ed. T h e clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the v arious laws which are t o regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and pu blication, there would be no basis for the application of the ma x im "ig n or a n t ia leg is n on ex cusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherw ise bu r den a cit izen for t h e t ransgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever , n ot ev en a con st r u ct iv e on e. T h e very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be publish ed in t h e Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon r esp on den t officia ls a n im perative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constit u t ion a l r ig h t of t h e people t o be in formed on matters of public concern is t o be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazet t e. Su ch list in g , t o ou r m in d, lea v es r espondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded fr om su ch pu blica t ion .

T h e publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applica bilit y " is m andated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or pena lt ies for their violation or otherwise impose a bur den or t h e people, su ch a s t a x a n d r ev en u e m easures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to part icu la r per sons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on t h e a ssu m pt ion t h a t t h ey h a v e been cir cu la r ized t o a ll con cer n ed. It is n eedless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a pu blic n a t u r e" or "of g eneral applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must fir st be officia lly a n d specifica lly in for m ed of it s con t en t s. T h e Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which ha v e n ot been pu blish ed, sh a ll h a v e n o for ce a n d effect .

T A ÑA DA V S. T UV ERA G.R. No. L-63915 Decem ber 29, 1986 Fa ct s: 1 . In the first Tanada case the petitioners were invoking due process in demanding the disclosure of a number of presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as r equ ir ed by law, which is Art. 2 of the Civil Code. The government a r g u ed t h a t w h ile pu blica t ion w a s n ecessary as a rule, it was not so when it wa s "ot h er w ise pr ov ided," a s w h en t h e decr ees t h emselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approv al. In t h e decision of the case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for t h e pu blica t ion of som e of t h ese decr ees, decl a r in g in t h e disposit iv e por t ion a s follow s: W HEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents t o pu blish in t h e Officia l Ga zet t e a ll u npublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so pu blish ed, t h ey sh a ll h a v e n o bin din g for ce a n d effect . 2 . Petitioners are now moving for a reconsideration/clarification of the aforementioned decision. Issu e: 1. Whether or not the clause ―UNLESS IT IS OTHERWISE PROVIDED‖ solely r efer s t o t h e fift een -da y per iod a n d n ot t o t h e r equ ir em en t of pu blica t ion . 2 . Whether or not the word ―LAWS‖ refer t o all laws or only to those of g en er a l a pplica t ion . 3 . W h er e sh ou ld pu blica t ion of sa id la w s be m a de? Held: 1 . The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" r efers to the date of effect iv it y a n d n ot t o t h e r equirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be om itted. T h is cla u se does n ot m ean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other da t e, w it h ou t it s pr ev iou s pu blica t ion . Pu blication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide t h a t t h e usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed ou t by t h e pr esent Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, is the Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Ga zet t e bu t "on e y ear after such publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided. " It is n ot correct to say that under the disputed clau se pu blica t ion m a y be dispen sed w it h a ltogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would den y t h e public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern t h e leg isl a t u r e cou ld v a lidly pr ov ide that a law be effective immediately upon its approva l n ot w it h st a n din g t h e la ck of

pu blication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication ), it is n ot u n likely t h a t per sons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result and they would be so n ot beca u se of a fa ilu r e t o com ply w it h bu t sim ply beca u se t h ey did n ot kn ow of it s ex ist en ce. It m ust be noted at this point the conclusive presumption that ever y per son kn ow s t h e la w , w hich of course presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is t o hav e a n y legal justification at all. It is no less important t o remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rig h t s r ecognizes "the right of the people t o information on m a t t er s of pu blic con cer n ," a n d t h is certainly applies t o, among others, and indeed especially, the leg isla t iv e en a ct m en t s of t h e g ov er n m en t . 2 . The t erm "laws" should refer t o all laws and not only to t h ose of g en er a l a pplica t ion , for st r ictly speaking all laws relate to the people in g eneral albeit there are some that do not apply to t h em dir ect ly . T hus, all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be publish ed a s a con dition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a differ en t effect iv it y da t e is fix ed by t h e leg isla t u r e. Cov er ed by t h is r u le a r e: a . Presidential decrees and executive orders prom ulgated by the President in the exercise of leg islative powers whenever t h e sa m e a r e v alidly delegated by t h e leg isla t u r e or , a t pr esen t , dir ect ly con fer r ed by t h e Con st it u t ion ; b. A dministrative rules and regulations, if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing la w pu r su a n t a lso t o a v a lid deleg a t ion ; c. Ch a r t er of a cit y ; d. Circulars issued by the Monetary Board if meant t o ―fill in the det a ils‖ of t h e Cen t r a l Ba n k A ct w h ich t h a t body is su pposed t o en for ce. How ev er , n o pu blica t ion is r equ ir ed for t h e follow in g : a . Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the per sonnel of the a dm in ist r a t iv e a g en cy a n d n ot t h e pu blic; b. Letters of instructions issued by administrative su per ior s con cer n in g t h e r u les or g u idelines t o be followed by their subordina t es in t h e per for m a n ce of t h eir du t ies; c. Mun icipa l or din a n ces, w h ich a r e cov er e d by t h e Loca l Gov er n m en t Code. 3 . Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of t h e contents of the laws, and publication is t o be made in the Official Gazette as decided upon in t h e fir st T a n a da ca se, h ow ev er , t h e Cou r t m a de t h is pr on ou n cem en t : T h ere is much to be said of the view that the publicat ion n eed n ot be m a de in t h e Officia l Ga zette, considering its erratic releases and limited readership. Un dou bt edly , n ewspapers of g eneral circulation could better perform the function of communicating, the laws t o t h e people a s such periodicals are more easily available, hav e a w ider r eadership, and come out regularly. T h e trouble, though, is that this kind of publication is not the one requ ir ed or a u t h or ized by ex isting law. As far as we know, no amendment has been made of Article 2 of the Civil Code. The Solicitor General has not pointed t o such a law, and we have no information that it ex ist s. If it does, it obv iou sly h a s n ot y et been pu blish ed. A t any rate, the Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if we find it impractical. That is not our function. That function belongs t o t h e leg isla t u r e. Our task is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and appr ov ed by t h e polit ica l departments of the government in accordance w it h t h e pr escr ibed pr ocedu r e. Con sequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of t h e Civ il Code, t h e pu blication of laws must be made in the Official Gazett and not elsewhere, as a requiremen t for

t h eir effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or after a different period pr ov ided by t h e leg isla t u r e.

PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT a n d SERV ICES CORPORA T ION v T HE HON. SECRET A RY OF LA BOR A ND EMPLOYMENT , V IV ENCIO DE MESA , RODRIGO MIKIN a n d CEDRIC LEYSON G.R. No. 103144. A pr i l 4, 2001 Doct r in e: A ll statutes, including those of local application and pr iv a t e la w s, sh a ll be pu blish ed a s a con dition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a differ en t effect iv it y da t e is fix ed by t h e leg isla t u r e. Cov ered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the Presiden t in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, a t present, directly conferred by the Constitution: Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implemen t ex ist in g la w pu r su a n t t o a v a lid deleg a t ion . In t erpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, t h a t is, r eg u la t in g on ly t h e per sonnel of the administrative agency and the pu blic, n eed n ot be pu blish ed. Neit h er is pu blication required of the so-called letter of instructions issued by the administrative superior s con cerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in th e per for m a n ce of t h eir du t ies Fa ct s: Pet itioner Philsa International Placement and Services Corporation is a domestic cor por a t ion en gaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment. Sometime in Janu a r y 1 9 8 5 , pr ivate respondents, who were recruited by petitioner for employment in Saudi A r a bia , w er e r equired t o pay placement fees in the amount of P5 ,000.00 for private responden t Rodr ig o L. Mikin and P6,500.00 each for private respondents Vivencio A. de Mesa and Cedric P. Ley son . A fter the execution of their respective work contracts, private respondents left for Saudi Ar a bia on January 29, 1 985. They then began work for Al-Heja ila n Con su lt a n t s A /E, t h e for eig n pr in cipa l of pet it ion er . W h ile in Saudi Arabia, private respondents were allegedly made to sign a secon d con t r a ct on February 4, 1985 which changed some of the provisions of their original contract resulting in the r eduction of som e of their benefits and privileges. On April 1, 1985 , t h eir for eig n em ploy er a llegedly forced them to sign a third contract which increased their work hours from 48 hours t o 6 0 hours a week without any corresponding increase in their basic monthly salary. W h en t h ey r efused to sign this third contract, the services of private respondents were t erm in a t ed by A l Heja ila n a n d t h ey w er e r epa t r ia t ed t o t h e Ph ilippin es. Upon their arrival in the Philippines, private respondents demanded from petitioner Philsa t h e r eturn of their placement fees and for the payment of their salaries for the unexpired por t ion of t h eir contract. When petitioner refused, they filed a case before the POEA a g a in st pet it ion er Ph ilsa a n d it s for eig n pr in cipa l, A l -Heja ila n . Sev eral hearings were conducted before the POEA Hearing Officer. On the aspect s of t h e ca se inv olving money claims arising from the employer-employee relations and illegal dismissal, t h e POEA r en der ed a decision da t ed A u g u st 3 1 , 1 9 8 8 , or der in g r espon den t PHILSA INT ERNATIONAL PLACEMENT AND SERVICE CORPORATION t o pay complainants, join t ly a n d severally with its principal Al – Hejailan. Almost simultaneous with the pr om u lg a t ion of A ugust 31, 1988 decision of the POEA on private respon den t s m on ey cla im , POEA issu ed separate Order dated August 29, 1988 resolving the recruitment v iola t ion a spect of pr iv a t e r espondents‘ complaint. In this order, POEA found petitioner liable for three (3) counts of illegal

ex action, two (2) counts of contract substitution and one count of w it h h oldin g or u n la w fu l dedu ct ion fr om sa la r ies of w or ker s. Fr om the said Order, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration wh ich w a s su bsequ en t ly den ied. After the denial of its motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed to the Secretary of La bor and Em ployment. However, public respondent Secretary of La bor a n d Em ploy m en t a ffirmed en toto the assailed Order. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration bu t t h is w a s likew ise den ied. Hen ce, t h e in st a n t Pet it ion for Cer t ior a r i. Pet itioner insists, however , t h a t it ca n n ot be h eld lia b le for illeg a l ex a ct ion a s POEA Mem orandum Circular No. 11, Series of 1 983, which enumerated the allowable fees which m a y be collect ed fr om a pplica n t s, is v oid for la ck of pu blica t ion . Issu e: W h ether or not POEA Memorandu m Cir cu la r No. 1 1 Ser ies of 1 9 8 3 is v oid for la ck of pu blica t ion ? Held: Y es, t h e sa id m em or a n du m cir cu la r is v oid for la ck of pu blica t ion . In T a ñ a da v s. T u v er a , t h e Cou r t h eld, a s follow s: "W e h old therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be pu blished as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen day s a ft er pu blica t ion u n less a differ en t effect iv it y da t e is fix ed by t h e leg is la t u r e. Cov ered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the Presiden t in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, a t present, directly conferred by the Constitution: Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implemen t ex ist in g la w pu r su a n t t o a v a lid deleg a t ion . In t erpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, t h a t is, r eg u la t in g on ly t h e per sonnel of the administrative agency and the pu blic, n eed n ot be pu blish ed. Neit h er is pu blication required of the so-called letter of instructions issued by the administrative superior s con cerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in th e per for m a n ce of t h eir du t ies." POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1 983 must likewise be declared ineffective a s t h e sam e was never published or filed w it h t h e Na t ion a l A dm in ist r a t iv e Reg ist er . POEA Mem orandum Order No. 2, Series of 1983 provides for the applicable schedule of placement and documentation fees for private em ployment agencies or authority holders. Under the said Order, t h e maximum amount which may be collected from prospective Filipin o ov er sea s w or ker s is P2 ,500.00. The said circular was apparently issued in compliance with the provisions of Art icle 3 2 of t h e La bor Code. It is t hus clear that the administrative circular under consideration is on e of t h ose issu a n ces w hich should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and im plem en t a n ex isting law pursuant to a valid delegation. Considering that POEA Administrative Circula r No. 2 , Series of 1983 has not as yet been published or filed with the National Administrative Register, t h e sa m e is in effect iv e a n d m a y n ot be en for ced. T h e Office of the Solicitor General argues however t h a t t h e im posit ion of a dm in ist r a t iv e sa nctions on petitioner was based not on the questioned administrative circular but on Article 32 a n d A r t icle 3 4 (a ) 2 8 of t h e La bor Code. T h e argument is not meritorious. The said articles of the Labor Code were never cited, much less discussed, in the body of the questioned Orders of t h e POEA a n d Secr et a r y of La bor a n d Em ployment. In fact, the said Orders were consistent in mentioning that petitioner's violation of A dm inistrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 was the basis for the im position of administra t iv e sa nctions against petitioner. Furthermore, ev en assuming that petitioner was held liable u n der

t h e said provisions of the Labor Code, Articles 32 and 34 (a) of the Labor Code presupposes t h e pr om ulgation of a valid schedule of fees by t h e Depa r t m en t of La bor a n d Em ploy m en t . Con sidering that, as, previously discussed, Administra t iv e Cir cu la r No. 2 , Ser ies of 1 9 8 3 em bodying such a schedule of fees never t ook effect, there is thus no basis for the imposit ion of t h e a dm in ist r a t iv e sa n ct ion s a g a in st pet it ion er T h e Office of the Solicitor General likewise argues that the questioned administrative circula r is n ot among those requiring publication contemplated by Tañada vs. Tuver a a s it is a ddr essed on ly t o a specific g r ou p of per son s a n d n ot t o t h e g en er a l pu blic. A gain, there is no merit in this argument. The fact that the said circular is addr essed on ly t o a specified group, namely private employment agencies or authority holders, does not take it away fr om the ambit of our ruling in Tañada vs. Tuvera. In the case of Phil. A ssocia t ion of Ser v ice Ex porters vs. Torres, the administrative circulars questioned therein were addressed to an ev en sm aller group, namely Philippine and Hong Kong agencies en g a g ed in t h e r ecr u it m en t of w orkers for Hong Kong, and still the Court ruled therein that, for lack of proper publication, t h e sa id cir cu la r s m a y n ot be en for ced or im plem en t ed. Our pronouncement in Tañada vs. Tuvera is clear and categorical. Admin ist r a t iv e r u les a n d r egulations must be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursua n t t o a valid delegation. The only exceptions are interpretative regulations, those merely internal in n ature, or those so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors con cer n in g t h e rules and guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their dut ies. A dm inistrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 has not been shown t o fa ll u n der a n y of t h ese ex cept ion s.

Un cia n o Pa r a m edica l Col l ege c CA G.R. No. 100335; A pr i l 7, 1993 Doct r in e: Set tled is the rule that when a doctrine of this Court is ov erruled and a different view is adopted, t h e new doctrine is applied prospectively, and should not apply t o parties who relied on t h e old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof Thus, the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction w a s issu ed by t h e t r ia l cou r t w it h g r a v e a bu se of discr et ion . Fa ct s: On April 16, 1990, private respondents Elena Villegas and Ted Magallanes, thru their m ot h er s, V ictoria Villegas and Jacinta Magallanes, respectively, filed before the Reg ion a l T r ia l Cou r t , Na tional Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, a petition for injunction and damages with pr a y er for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against petitioners Unciano Paramedical College, In c., Mirando C. Unciano, Sr., Dom inador Santos, Editha Mora, Dr. Evelyn Moral and Laureana V it u g , t h ey a lleg ed t h er ein t h a t : On July 1989, the above-named students initiated a petition proposing to the school authorit ies t h e organization of a student council in the school. They solicited support of their petition fr om t h e studentry by asking the students t o endorse the same with their signatures. They were able to g et a t lea st 1 8 0 sig n a t u r es. On August 18, 1 989, the student s w er e su m m on ed t o t h e Office of Dr . Mor a l a n d w er e a dm onished not to proceed with the proposal because, according to h er , t h e sch ool does n ot a llow a n d h a d n ev er a llow ed su ch a n or g a n iza t ion . On October 28, 1989, in compliance with an announcement t o see t h e Dea n of Nu r sin g , t h e a bove-named students met with Dean Vitug and Dr. Moral who informed them that they w ou ld be barred from enrollment for the second semester because the sch ool does n ot a llow t h eir st udents t o put up a student council. Dr. Moral advised them to get their Honorable Dism issa l.

On November 6, 1989, the students again approached Dr. Moral who informed them tha t t h ey w ere no longer allowed to enroll because they are allegedly members of the Nat ion a l Un ion of St udents of the Philippines (NUSP) and the League of Filipino Students (LFS), officer s of t h e st udent organization they organized, and, moreover 'drug addicts.' The students asked for pr oof of t h ese a ccu sa t ion s b u t w er e n ot g iv en a n y . On 29 November 1989, the students were informed that the President had unilaterally refused to a llow them to enroll and it was up t o their parents to request or appeal to the school officia ls t o change their decision. Mrs. Victoria Villegas and Mrs. Jacinta Magallanes wr ot e t o t h e sch ool officials to request that their children be allowed to enroll . Dr. Moral informed them t h a t t h e Boa r d of T r u st ees w ill h a v e t o decide on t h ese r equ est s.

T h e contract between the parties was validly terminated upon the end of the fir st sem est er of sch ool year 1989-1990, or in October, 1989. This is the status quo. The trial court gravely abused it s discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction which ordered petition er s t o a llow private respondents "to enroll for the first semester of school yea r 1 9 9 0 -1 1 9 0 ." 1 6 Gu ided by the Capitol case, certainly, this writ will not restore the status quo but w ill g o a st ep ba ckward, then restore the condition preceding the status qu o. Pr iv a t e r espon den t s do n ot possess any clear legal right t o re-enroll, corollarily, petitioners are not oblig ed leg a lly t o r e a dm it t h em .

On 11 December 1989, the students were informed that the Board of Tr u st ees h a d r efu sed t o g r a n t t h e pa r en t s' r equ est ."

Cu i v A r el l a n o Un iv er si t y G.R. No. L-15127; Ma y 30, 1961

T h e trial court issued a temporary restraining order effective May 17, 1990, enjoining petition er sch ool from not enrolling private respondents in its College of Nursing and setting the h ea r in g for t h e issu a n ce of t h e w r it of pr elim in a r y in ju n ct ion on Ju n e 4 , 1 9 9 0 . Pet itioners filed an opposition but the RTC still ordered the sch ool t o a llow t h e st u den t s t o en r oll.

Fa ct s: Pla intiff enrolled in the College of Law of the defendant university from the school y ea r 1 9 4 8 1 949. He finished his law studies in the defendant universit y u p t o a n d in clu din g t h e fir st sem ester of the fourth year. During all the time he was studying law in the defendant university , h e was awarded scholarship grants, for scholastic merit, so that his semestral tuition fees w er e r eturned t o him after the end of each semester and when his scholarship grants were awarded t o h im . The whole amount of tuition fees paid by plaintiff to defendant and refunded to him by t h e la tter from the first semester up to and including the first semester of his last year in the colleg e of law or the fourth year, is in total of P1 ,033.87. However, before defendant awarded t o plaintiff t h e scholarship grants as above stated, he was made to sign the following contract covenant a n d a greement which provides that in consideration of the sch ola r sh ip g r a n t ed t o h im by t h e Un iversity, he waives his right to transfer to another school without h a v in g r efu n ded t o t h e Un iv er sit y (defen da n t ) t h e equ iv a len t of h is sch ola r sh ip ca sh .

T h e Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the RTC and based its the ruling in the recent ca se of A r iel Non, et al. vs. Hon. Sancho Dames II, , May 20, 1990, the Supreme Court, abandoned a n d ov er r u led it s decision in A lcu a z a n d decla r ed t h u s: ― The contract between the school and the student is not an ordinary contract. It is imbued w it h pu blic interest, considering the high priority given by the Constitution to education and the grant t o t he State of supervisory and regulatory powers over all educat ion a l in st it u t ion s. W h en a st udent registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrollin g for t h e en t ir e sch ool y ea r 'Ev ery student has the right t o enroll in any school, college or university upon meeting its specific r equirement and reasonable regulat ion : Pr ov ided, t h a t ex cept in t h e ca se of a ca dem ic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulation, the student is presumed t o be qualified for en rollment for the entire period he is expected to his complete his course without pr eju dice t o h is r ig h t t o t r a n sfer .' Hen ce t h e in st a n t a ppea l. Issu e: If the Ariel Non Doctrine should be applied retroactively t o govern and invalidate the legal effects of the incidents that took place prior to its adoption and which incidents were proper and v alid under t h e A LCUA Z doct r in e pr ev a ilin g a t t h e t im e sa id in ciden t t ook pla ce. Held: No, the Non doctrine should not be applied t o the instant case. Under the then prevailin g A lcuaz doctrine which was promulgated on May 2, 1988, the contract between them and priva t e r espondents was validly t erminated upon the end of the first semester of school year 1 989-1 990. A lthough said doctrine was later abandoned in Non, et al. v. Dames II, et al., supra, this case was pr om ulgated much later, or on May 20, 1990, when the termination of the con t r a ct bet w een t h em had long becom e fait accompli. Settled is the rule that when a doct r in e of t h is Cou r t is ov erruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine is applied prospectively, and sh ou ld n ot apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. Thus, the w r it of pr eliminary mandatory injunction was issued by the trial court with grave abuse of discretion. T h e ruling in the Non case should not be g iven a retroactive effect to cases that arose befor e it s pr om ulgation on May 20, 1990, as in this case, which was filed on Apr il 1 6 , 1 9 9 0 . If it w er e ot h erwise, it would result in oppression to petitioners and other schools similarly situa t ed w h o r elied on the ruling in the Alcuaz case, promulgated on May 2, 19 8 8 , w h ich r ecog n ized t h e t er m in a t ion of con t r a ct t h eor y .

For the last semester of his law studies, plaintiff enrolled in the college of law of the Abad Santos Un iversity and graduated therefrom. After gra du a t in g in la w h e a pplied t o t a ke t h e ba r ex amination. Plaintiff then petitioned the defendant univer sit y t o issu e t o h im t h e n eeded t ranscripts. However, the defendant refused until after he had paid back the P1 ,033 8 7 w h ic h defendant refunded to him as above stated. As he could not take the bar examina t ion w it h ou t t h ose transcripts, plaintiff paid to defendant the said sum under protest. This is the sum w h ich pla in t iff seeks t o r ecov er fr om defen da n t in t h is ca se. Issu e: W h et h er or n ot t h e sa id pr ov ision of t h e con t r a ct is v a lid. Held: No, the stipulation in question is contrary to public policy and, hence, null and void. T h e pr actice of awarding scholarships t o attract students and keep t h em in sch ool is n ot a g ood cu stom nor has it received som e kind of social and practical confirmation except in some private in stitutions as in Arellano University. The University of the Philippin es w h ich im plem en t s Section 5 of Article XIV of the Constitution with reference t o the giving of free sch ola r sh ips t o g ifted children, does not require schola r s t o r eim bu r se t h e cor r espon din g v a lu e of t h e sch olarships if they transfer to other schools. The same goes for leading colleges and universities of t h e United States after which our educational practices or policies ar e pa t t er n ed. In t h ese in stitutions scholarships are granted not t o attract and t o keep brilliant studen t s in sch ool for t h eir propaganda mine but t o reward merit or help gifted studen t s in w h om societ y h a s a n est a blish ed in t er est or a fir st lien .

Peopl e v s Ja bi n a l 55 SCRA 607

V a n Dor n v s. Rom il l i o 139SCRA 139

Fa ct s: On September 5, 1964, the accused was found to be in possession of a r ev olv er w it h ou t t h e r equisite license or permit. He claimed t o be entitled to exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had appointments as Secret A g en t fr om t h e Pr ov in cia l Gov er n or of Ba tangas and as Confidential Agent fr om t h e PC Pr ov in cia l Com m a n der , a n d t h e sa id a ppointments expressly carried with them the authority to possess and carry the said fir ea r m . T h e accused further contended that in view of his appointments, he was entitled to acquitt a l on t h e basis of the Supreme Court‘s decisions in People vs. Macarandang and in People vs. Lucer o.

Doct r in e: It is t rue that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 on ly Ph ilippine nationals are covered by the policy a g a in st a bsolu t e div or ces t h e sa m e bein g con sidered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens m a y obt a in div orces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid accor din g t o t h eir n a t ion a l la w

T h e trial court found the accused crimin a lly lia ble for illeg a l possession of fir ea r m a n d a mmunition on the ground that the rulings in Macarandang* and in Lucero* were reversed a n d a ba n don ed in People v s. Ma pa **. T h e ca se w a s elev a t ed t o t h e Su pr em e Cou r t . Issu e: W h ether or not the appellant should be acquitted on the basis of the Supreme Court‘s ruling s in t h e ca ses of Ma ca r a n da n g a n d of Lu cer o. Held: T h e a ppella n t w a s a cqu it t ed. Decisions of the Supreme Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless ev iden ce of w hat the law means; this is the reason why Article 8 of t h e New Civ il Code pr ov ides t h a t , ― Judicial decisions applying and interpreting the laws or the constitution shall form par t of t h e legal sy stem.‖ The interpretation upon a law by the Supreme Court constitutes in a way a part of t h e law as of the date the law was originally passed, since t h e cou r t ‘s con st r u ct ion m er ely est ablishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that t h e la w t h u s con st r u ed in t en ds t o effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a r est a t em en t of t h e leg a l m axim ―legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet‖—the interpretation placed upon the written law by a com petent court has the force of law. The doctrine laid down in Lucero and in Maca r a n da n g w as part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law of the land, at the time appellant w a s fou n d in possession of the firearm and when he was arraigned by t h e t r ia l cou r t . It is t r u e t h a t t h e doctrine was overruled in Mapa case in 1967,but when a doct r in e of t h e Su pr em e Cou r t is ov erruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and sh ould not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on t h e fa it h t h er eof. Con sidering that the appellant possessed a firea r m pu r su a n t t o t h e pr ev a ilin g doct r in e en unciated in Macarandang and in Lucero, under which no criminal liability would attach to h is possession of said firearm, the appellant should be absolved. The appellant may not be punished for a n a ct w h ich a t t h e t im e it w a s don e w a s h eld n ot t o be pu n ish a ble. *T he accused were acquitted for through their appointment as confidential/secret a g en t t h ey w ere deemed t o be ―peace officers‖. Peace officers had the privilege of carrying firearms withou t licen se. **Mapa was convicted although he was a secret/confidential agent. The court ruled that th ela w did not explicitly provide that secret/confidential agents are among those w h o a r e ex em pt ed fr om a cqu ir in g a licen se t o ca r r y a fir ea r m .

Fa ct s: Pet itioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the United States. T h ey were married in Hongkong in 1972. A fter the marriage, they established their residence in t h e Philippines. They begot two children born on Apr il 4 , 1 9 7 3 a n d Decem ber 1 8 , 1 9 7 5 , r espectively. The parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982 and petitioner h a s r em arried also in Nevada, this t ime t o Theodore Van Dorn. In 1 983, private respondent filed su it a gainst petitioner alleging the petitioner‘s business in Ermita (the Galeon Shop) is a con ju g a l pr operty of the parties and prayed that private respondent be declared with right t o manage said pr operty. Petitioner moved to dismiss the petition on the ground tha t t h e ca u se of a ct ion is ba rred by previous judgement in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court. T h e Cou r t below denied the motion to dismiss since the property involved is located in the Philippin es so t hat the Divorce Decree had no bearing in this ca se. T h e den ia l is n ow t h e su bject of t h is cer t ior a r i pr oceedin g . Issu e: W h ether the foreign divorce on the parties has affected the alleged conju g a l pr oper t y in t h e Ph ilippin es? Held: It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civ il Code, on ly Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divor ces t h e sa m e bein g con sidered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens m a y obt a in div orces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid accor din g t o t heir national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent fr om t h e m arriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolv es t h e m a r r ia g e . T hus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He w ould have no standing to sue in the case below as p etitioner's husba n d en t it led t o ex er cise con trol over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Cou r t , w h ich v alidly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right ov er the alleg ed con ju g a l pr oper t y . T o m aintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has t o be con sider ed st ill married to private respondent and still subject t o a wife's obligations under Article 10 9 , et . seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be oblig ed t o liv e t og et h er w it h , observe respect and fidelity, and render support t o private respondent. The la t t er sh ou ld n ot con tinue t o be one of her heirs with possible rights t o conjugal pr oper t y . Sh e sh ou ld n ot be discr im in a t ed a g a in st in h er ow n cou n t r y if t h e en ds of ju st ice a r e t o be ser v ed.

QUIT A v s. CA Decem ber 22, 1998 G.R. No. 124862

SA N LUIS v s. SA N LUIS (Febr u a r y 6, 2007 G.R. No. 133743)

Fa ct s: Fe Quita and Arturo Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on May 18, 1941, but n ot blessed with any children. Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, USA, submit t in g a s ev idence their agreement to live separately from each other and a settlement of their con ju g a l pr operties. A decree of divorce was granted on July 23, 1 954. After 3 weeks, Fe m a r r ied Felix T u paz in San Francisco, but eventually ended into a divorce. For the third t im e, sh e m a r r ied a g a in in USA . A pril 16, 1972, Arturo died leaving no will. August 31, 1972, Lino Javier Inciong filed w it h RT C QC a petition for issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of t h e Philippine Trust Company. Blandina Dandan, surviving spouse of Arturo, and their children opposed the petition. Later, Ruperto Padlan, claiming t o be t h e sole su r v iv in g br ot h er of deceased Arturo, intervened. October, 7, 1987, Fe moved fot the immediate declaration of h eir s of decea sed A r t u r o a n d dist r ibu t ion of h is est a t e. T h e trial court disregarded the divorce between Fe and Arturo, and expressed the view that their m a r r ia g e su bsist ed u n t il t h e dea t h of A r t u r o in 1 9 7 2 .

Fa ct s: T h e case involves the settlement of Felicisimo‘s estate. During his lifet im e, h e con t r a ct ed 3 m arriages. First was with Virginia, who predeceased him. On May 1 , 1968, Felicisim o m a r r ied Mer ry Lee Corwin, but ended to a divorce, when Merry filed a divorce complaint in Hawa ii a n d w as granted. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married Felicidad. Felicisimo died on December 1 8 , 1 992. Felicidad sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership asset s a n d set t lem en t of Felicisimo‘s estate. She filed with RT C Ma ka t i a pet it ion for let t er s of a dm in ist r a t ion .

Issu es: W h et h er or n ot Bla n din a ‘s m a r r ia g e t o A r t u r o w a s v oid a b in it io. W h et h er or n ot Fe ca n be decla r ed t h e pr im a r y ben eficia r y of A r t u r o‘s est a t e. Held: No, Blandina‘s marriage t o Arturo was valid, thus, Fe ca n n ot be decla r ed a ben eficia r y t o A r t u r o‘s est a t e. A t the t ime Fe obtained a divorce decree against Arturo in San Francisco, she w a s a lr ea dy a n a lien and no longer a Filipino citizen. Hence, the divorce decree is valid in the Philippines, sin ce it is con sider ed v a lid in Fe‘s n a t ion a l la w , w h ich is t h e USA la w .

CA T A LA N v s. BRA GA NZA (Febr u a r y 6, 2007 G.R. No. 167109) Fa ct s: Felicitas Catalan married Orando on June 4 , 1 9 5 0 . T h ey m ig r a t ed t o USA a n d beca m e n a t u r a lized cit izen s t h er eof. On A pr il 1 9 8 8 , t h ey div or ced. Ju ne 16, 1988, Orlando married Merope in Pangasinan. Lat er , Felicit a s filed a pet it ion for declaration of nullity of marriage with RTC Dagupan against Orlando and Merope, cont en din g t hat Merope has a prior subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol. RTC ruled in favor of Felicitas. Issu e: W h ether Felicitas has the personality to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage of Or la n do on t h e g r ou n d of big a m y . Held: T h ere is no specific provision as to who can file a petition t o declare the nullity of marriage under t h e New Civil Code, which is the law governing at the time of marriage betw een Or la n do a n d Mer ope, nor even in the Family Code. however, only a part y w h o ca n dem on st r a t e pr oper in terest can file the same. A petition t o declare the nullity of marriage mu st be pr osecu t ed or defended in the name of the real party in interest and m u st be ba sed on a ca u se of a ct ion . In t he instant case, Felicitas personality to file the petition to declare the n u llit y of m a r r ia g e ca nnot be ascertained due to the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allow in g it . T hus, the case is remanded to trial court for recept ion of a ddit ion a l ev iden ce n ecessa r y .

Rodolfo, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on t h e g r ounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action, alleging that the petition should h ave been filed in the Province of Laguna where Felicisimo‘s pla ce of r esiden ce pr ior t o h is death, and that Felicidad has no legal personality to file the petition beca u se sh e w a s on ly a m ist r ess. Issu e: W h ether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarr y u n der t h e Civ il Code, considering that Felicidad‘s marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or befor e t h e effect iv it y of t h e Fa m ily Code. Held: T h e divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry , w ould have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as the surviving spou se of Felicisimo. But there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the div orce decree obt ained by Merry, as well as the marriage of Felicidad and Felicisimo under the la w s of USA . Pr esentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficien t , pr oof of it s a u t h en t icit y a n d du e ex ecution must also be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or documen t m ay be proven as a public or official record of a for eig n cou n t r y by eit h er (1 ) a n officia l pu blication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the documen t . If t h e record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompan ied by a cer t ifica t e issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in t h e foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by t h e sea l of h is office. W ith regard to Felicidad‘s marriage to Felicisimo solem n ized in Ca lifor n ia USA , sh e on ly su bmitted photocopies of the Marriated Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of Ca lifornia. The Court, however, cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws a s t h ey m u st be a lleg ed a n d pr ov ed. T h erefore, this case was remanded to the trial court for further recept ion of ev iden ce on t h e div or ce decr ee obt a in ed by Mer r y a n d t h e m a r r ia g e of Felicida d a n d Felicisim o.

A ZNA R V S. GA RCIA (Ja n u a r y 31, 1963 7 SCRA 95) Fa ct s: CIF of Davao directed the executor t o reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,6 0 0 pa id by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy Ch r ist en sen en titled t o the residue of the property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, a n d in ca se of dea t h w ithout issue, ½ of said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C Borton, etc, in accordance w ith the provisions of the will of the testator Edward E. Christensen. Helen Christensen Ga r cia filed an opposition, as it deprives her of her legitime as an acknowledg ed n a t u r a l ch ild, sh e h aving been declared by the Court as one. The court ruled that Edward E. Ch r ist en sen w a s a cit izen of the United States of America and of the State of California at the time of his death a n d h e w a s dom iciled in t h e Ph ilippin es.

Issu e: W h ether or not the Philippine Law shall govern the a dm in ist r a t ion of t h e w ill of Edw a r d Ch r ist en sen . Held: T h e Court ruled that the Philippine Law shall gov ern the testamentary di sposit ion of Edw a r d Ch r ist en sen . A rticle 1 6 of the Civil Code provides that the national law shall govern intestate and testamentary su ccessions. National law refers to the private law of the state of which the decedent is a citizen , in the case at bar, the private law of the State of California. Article 94 of the Civil Code of State of Ca lifornia refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the la w of h is dom icile, t h e Ph ilippin es in t h e ca se a t ba r .

BELLIS v s. BELLIS (Ju n e 6, 1967 20 SCRA 358) Fa ct s: A m os Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas, United States. He had 5 legitimate children w it h h is first wife, 3 legitimate children with hi second wife, and had 3 illeg it im a t e ch ildr en . On A ugust 5, 1952, Amos Bellis executed a will in th e Ph ilippin es. Ju ly 8 , 1 9 5 8 , A m os died. On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Pa lm a Bellis filed t h eir r espect iv e oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children of Amos Bellis, and therefore, com pulsory heirs of the deceased. Under t h e La w s of T ex a s, t h er e a r e n o for ced h eir s of leg it im es.

in accordance with the laws of the state of Nevada. Out of his total estate of P211,639.33 in cash , t h e testator gave his grandson P90,819.67 and ½ of a ll sh a r es of st ock of sev er a l m in in g com panies and to his brother and sister the same amount. To his children, he gave a leg a cy of on ly P6,000 each. Magdalena, his wife, a n d h er 2 ch ildr en opposed t h e v a lidit y of t h e t estamentary prov ision s con t en din g t h a t t h e w ill depr iv ed t h em of t h eir leg it im e. Ma g dalena alleged that the trial court erred in recognizing the Reno div or ce secu r ed by t h e t estator from his Filipino wife Magdalena, and that divorce should be declared a nullit y in t h is ju r isdict ion . A ccording to the laws of the State of Nevada, no right to share in the inherita n ce in fa v or of a div or ced w ife. T h e div or ce w a s g r a n t ed t o t h e t est a t or on Ma y 2 0 , 1 9 2 2 . Issu e: W h et h er Ph ilippin e la w s or t h e la w of t h e St a t e of Nev a da sh ou ld a pply . Held: T h e testator died in 1944, thus, the old Civil Code governs. The old Civ il Code pr ov ides t h a t su ccessional rights t o personal property are to be earned by the national law of the person whose su ccession is in qu est ion . T h e foreign law, specifically Section 9905, compiled Newada Laws, was introduced as eviden ce. T hat law can be taken judicial notice by the Court, without proof of such law having been offered a t t h e h ea r in g of t h e pr oject of pa r t it ion . A ccording to Article 10 of the Old Civil Code, the validity of t est a m en t a r y disposit ion s a r e g ov erned by the national law of the testator, and it has been decided without dispu t e t h a t t h e n ational law of the t estator is that of the State of Nevada, which allows a testator to dispose of all h is pr oper t y a ccor din g t o h is w ill.

Issu e: W h ich la w m u st a pply – T ex a s La w or Ph ilippin e La w ? Held: The decedent‘s national law, which is the Texas law, governs the order of succession , t h e a m ount of successional rights, the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will and the capacit y t o su cceed. It is n ot disputed that the decedent was both a national of T exas and a domicile t h er eof a t t h e t im e of h is dea t h . A provision in a foreigner‘s will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance w ith Philippine Law and not with his national law cannot be ignored in regard t o those ma t t er s t h a t A r t icle 1 6 of t h e Civ il Code st a t es sa id n a t ion a l la w sh ou ld g ov er n . Since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional right s a r e t o be determined under Texas Law, the Philippine law on legitimes ca n n ot be a pplied t o t h e t est a cy of A m os Bellis.

T EST A T E EST A T E OF BOHA NA N v s. BOHA NA N (Ja n u a r y 30, 1960 G.R. No. L-12105) Fa ct s: On April 24, 1950, admitting to probate C. O. Bohanan‘s last will and testamen t , ex ecu t ed on A pril 23, 1944 in Manila, CFI found that the t estator was born in Nebr a ska a n d a cit izen of Ca lifornia, but temporarily stayed in the Philippines for a long period of time. At the time of h is death, he was a citizen of the United States and of the State of Nevada, and his will was executed

LLORENT E v s. COURT OF A PPEA LS (Nov em ber 23, 2000 G. R. No. 124371) Fa ct s: Lor enzo (enlisted serviceman of the US Navy from March 10, 1927 – Septermber 30, 1957 ) a n d Pa ula were married on February 22, 1937. Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo wen t ba ck to the US while Paula stayed in the conjugal home at Camarines Sur. On Nov em ber 3 0 , 1 943, Lorenzo was naturalized as an American citizen. He visited the Philippines and discovered t h a t h is w ife, Pa u la w a s pr eg n a n t a n d w a s liv in g in w it h h is br ot h er Cefer in o. On November 1, 1951, Lorenzo filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California a n d w a s g r a n t ed. On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia in Manila and begot 3 children. On March 13, 1981, Lor enzo executed a notarized Last Will and Testament. On December 14, 1983, Loren zo filed a pet ition with the RTC for the probate and allowance of his last will and testament, movin g t h a t A licia be appointed as Special Administratrix of his estate, but was denied because Lorenzo w a s st ill alive. On January 24, 1984, trial court admitted the will t o proba t e. On Ju n e 1 1 , 1 9 8 5 , Lor enzo died. On September 4, 1 985, Paula filed with the same court a pet it ion for let t er s of a dm inistration ov er Lorenzo‘s estate in her favor, contending that she was Lorenzo‘s surv iv in g spou se and that the testamentary provisions in Lorenzo‘s will encroached on her legitime and ½ sh a r e in t h e con ju g a l pr oper t y . Issu e: W h et h er or n ot Pa u la is en t it led t o in h er it fr om Lor en zo‘s est a t e.

Held: For eign law should apply. Loren zo‘s div or ce decr ee w it h Pa u la is r ecog n ized a s v a lid.

in solvent's property depriving the latter and the Assignee tha t w a s la t t er a ppoin t ed, of t h e oppor t u n it y t o r ecov er sa id pla n e.

For eign laws must be alleged and proved. Our cour t s do n ot t a ke ju dicia l n ot ice of t h em .

Chapter 2 of the PRELIMINARY TITLE of the Civil Code, dealing on Human Relations, provides t h e follow in g :

T h e fact is Lorenzo became an American citizen long before and at the time of 1) his divorce from Pa ula; 2) marriage to Alicia; 3) execution of his will; and 4) death. Issu es a r isin g fr om t h ese in ciden t s a r e g ov er n ed by for eig n la w . Bot h RTC and CA decisions in hastily applying Philippine la w a r e er r on eou s. Her e‘s w h y : A liens may obtain divorces abroad provided they are valid according to their national law. In this ca se, LORENZO‘s divorce from PAULA was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matt er of com it y . LORENZO‘s will is valid. Article 17 The forms and solemnities of contr a ct s, w ills, a n d ot h er pu blic instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are ex ecu t ed. In t h is case, whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is answer ed by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated. The trial court should not tha t Congress did not intend to extend the same succession (system of legitime) to foreign nationals.

HUMA N RELA T IONS

A LFREDO M. V ELA YO v s. SHELL G.R. No. L-7817. Oct ober 31, 1956. FA CT S: CA LI, a domestic airline corporation, met with its creditors to inform them that the corporat ion w as on the verge of insolvency and had to stop operations. To ensure payment of t h eir cla im s a gainst CALI, the creditors agreed that it would be advantageous not to presen t su it s a g a in st CA LI but to strive for a fair pro-rata division of its assets, although CALI announced that in ca se of n on-agreement of the creditors on a pro-rata division of the assets, it would file in solv en cy pr oceedings. Right after the meeting, defendant Shell Philippines, one of CALI‘s credit or s w h o w as present in the meeting and who agreed t o the pro-rata division, a ssig n ed it s cr edit t o it s sist er company, Shell USA. Shell USA then filed with a California court an action for collection of t h e assigned credit and applied for a writ of attachment again st CA LI‘s Dou g la s C -5 4 pla n e w hich was in California. Prior to the meeting with creditors, CALI had already offered the pla n e t o Shell Philippine but the offer was rejected. Velayo, as assignee of the other creditors of CA LI, filed this action for damages against defendant Shell Philippines. He claims that that fraudulen t a ssignment of Shell Philippines‘ credit to Shall USA prejudiced th e ot h er cr edit or s a n d w a s con t r a r y t o t h e a g r eed pr o-r a t a div ision of a sset s. ISSUE: W ON Shell Philippines, taking advantage of its knowledge of the existence of CALI's airplane in t h e US, acted in bad faith in assigning its credit to its sister company effectively defea t in g t h e a g r eed pr o-r a t a div ision of a sset s a m on g t h e cr edit or s of CA LI. HELD: PROVISIONS ON HUMAN RELATIONS INTENDED AS CATCH-ALL PROVISIONS FOR A NY W RONG FOR W HICH NO SPECIFIC REMEDY IS PROV IDED FOR BY LA W . Defendant schemed and effected the transfer t o its sister corporation in the United States, where CA LI's plane C- 54 was. By that swift and unsuspected operation efficaciously disposed of sa id

"A r t 19. Any person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performances of his duties, a ct w it h ju st ice, g iv e ev er y on e h is du e a n d obser v e h on est y a n d g ood fa it h ". It m aybe said that this article only contains a mere declaration of prin ciples a n d w h ile su ch st atement may be is essentially correct, yet We find that such declaration is im plem en t ed by A r t icle 2 1 a n d sequ en ce of t h e sa m e Ch a pt er w h ich pr escr ibe t h e follow in g : "A r t. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary t o m orals, good customs or pu blic policy sh a ll com pen sa t e t h e la t t er for t h e da m a g e". A nother rule is expressed in Article 24 which compels the return of a thing acquired 'w ithout just or legal grounds'. This provision em bodies the doctrine that no person should unjust ly en r ich h im self at the expense of another, which has been one of the mainstays of every legal sy stem for centuries. It is most needful that this ancient principle be clearly and specifically consecrated in t h e Civil Code to the end that in cases not foreseen by the lawmaker, no one may unjustly benefit h im self to the prejudice of another. Now, if Article 23 of the Civil Code goes as far as to pr ov ide th at: "Ev en if an act or event causing damage to another's pr oper t y w a s n ot du e t o t h e fa u lt or n egligence of the defendant, the latter shall be liable for indemnity if through the act or event h e w as benefited." with much more reason the Defendant should be liable for indemnity for a ct s it com m it t ed in ba d fa it h a n d w it h bet r a y a l of con fiden ce.

A l ben son En t er pr ises Cor por a t i on v s. Cou r t of A ppea l s G.R. No. 88694 Ja n u a r y 11, 1993 FA CT S: Pet itioner Albenson Enterprises delivered to Guaranteed Industries, located at 3267 V. Mapa St. St a.Mesa, Manila, mild steel plates. As part payment, Albenson was given a check drawn against t h e account of E.L. Woodworks. However, when the check was presented for pay m en t , it w a s dishonored because of lack of funds. This led Albenson to trace the origin. T h is led t h em t o a certain Eugenio Baltao. They made afterwards an extrajudicial demand to priva t e r espon den t Ba ltao. But he denied that he signed on the check because Guaranteed Industries w a s a lr ea dy in existent. This led Albenson t o file a criminal complaint for violation of BP 22. However, it w a s la ter found out that his namesake, Eugenio Baltao III, his son, was the one who m a n a g es E.L. W oodworks located on the ground floor of the Baltao Building. Nevertheless, A ssist a n t Fisca l Sum away filed the information. But Prov incial Fiscal Castro instructed the trial fiscal to dismis s t h e information. Because of the unjust filing of the criminal complaint, Baltao filed a com pla in t for damages against Albenson Enterprises. The trial court ruled in favor of Baltao. The Cou r t of A ppea ls a ffir m ed t h e decision of t h e low er cou r t . ISSUE: W h ether or not the filing of the criminal complaint by Albenson En t er pr ises con st it u t ed a n a bu se of r ig h t ? RULING: T h e Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Under Article 19 of the Civil Code, the following are the r equisites for abuse of right: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith ; (3 ) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Article 20 speaks of the general sanction for a ll other prov isions of law which do not especially provide for their own sanction. Article 2 1

dea ls with acts contra bonus mores, and has the following elements: 1) There is an act w h ich is legal; 2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; 3) and it is don e with intent to injure. A closer look at the said articles and it can be revealed that Articles 19 a n d 21 share a common element: that the act is intentional. A r t icle 2 0 , h ow ev er , does n ot dist inguish. It is dependent on the circumstances of the case. By applying th ese t o t h e ca se a t h and, it cannot be said that Albenson Enterprises was abusing the righ t s of Ba lt a o. T h e t r ia l court and the appellate court made a mistake of lumping the three articles a n d u sed t h em a s ba ses for the award of damages in a civil com plaint filed against the petitioners. A lben son w a s pr om pted by its natural instinct and right t o file a criminal com plaint because it was not a ble t o collect the payment of the mild steel plates it had delivered. It had every right to exhaust all legal r em edies t o collect it s u n pa id cr ed it .

GLOBE MA CKAY CABLE AND RA DIO CORPORA T ION V . COURT OF A PPEA LS GR No. 81262, A u gu st 25, 1983 FA CT S: Pr ivate respondent Tobias was employed by Globe Mackay in a dual capacity a s a pu r ch a sin g a g ent and administrative assistant. Petitioner discov er ed fict it iou s pu r ch a ses a n d ot h er fr audulent transactions for which it lost several thousands of pesos. Tobias was im plicated as the n umber one suspect. Police investigation s w er e con du ct ed a s a r esu lt of sa id a n om a ly . T h e police reports exculpated Tobias from any pa r t icipa t ion in t h e offen se. Un sa t isfied , pet itioner still hired private investigators. Pending the investigation of the priva t e det ect iv es, pet it ion er filed a com pla in t for est a fa a g a in st T obia s. La t er, Tobias was t erminated. Hence, he filed an action for illega l dism issa l. W h ile h is ca se a waits resolution, he sought employment with RETELCO. However, petitioner, wit h ou t bein g a sked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter st a t in g t h a t T obia s w a s dism issed du e t o dish on est y . T hus, T obias filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious and abusiv e a ct s of pet it ion er . ISSUE: W h et h er or n ot pet it ion er sh ou ld in dem n ify pr iv a t e r espon den t for da m a g es. HELD: A rticle 1 9 of the Civil Code known to contain what is commonly referred to as t h e pr in ciple of a buse of rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exe r cise of on e's r ights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act wit h ju stice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. Violation of Ar t icle 1 9 ca n r esu lt t o r ig h t t o da m a g es pu r su a n t t o A r t icle 2 1 or A r t icle 2 2 . T h is article was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statut es, w h ich lea v e so m a n y v ictims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered materia l a n d m or a l in ju r y . In t he case at bar, petitioners claim that they did not violate any provision of law since they were m er ely ex er cisin g t h eir leg a l r ig h t t o dism iss pr iv a t e r espon den t . Nev ertheless, the Court, after examining the record and circumstances of t h e ca se r u led t h a t pet itioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing damage to private respondent. Notwithstanding the fact that it was private responden t T obia s w h o r epor t ed t h e possible ex istence of anom alous transactions, petitioner Hendry showed belligerence and t old pla in t iff t hat he was the number one suspect and to take a one week vacation leave, not to communica t e

w ith the office, to leave his table drawers open, and t o leave his keys to petitioner Hendr y . T h e h igh-handed treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners was certainly u n c a lled for . A n d t h is r eprehensible attitude of petitioners was to continue when private respondent returned to w or k a ft er his one week forced leave. Upon reporting for work, Tobias was confronted by Hendry wh o sa id. "T obby , y ou a r e t h e cr ook a n d sw in dler in t h is com pa n y ." T h e imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of T obias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code. T h e Court has already ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an em ploy ee sh ou ld n ot be con fused with the manner in which the right is exercised and the effect s flow in g t h er efr om . T h er efor e, pet it ion er s a r e lia ble for da m a g es.

BA RONS MA RKET ING V S COURT OF A PPEA LS GR NO 126486, Febr u a r y 9, 1998 FA CT S Pr ivate respondent Phelps Dodge, Phil. Appointed petitioner Barons Marketing Cor p a s on e of it s dealers of electrical wires and cables. As such, petitioner was given by private respondent 6 0 day s credit for its purchases reckoned from the date of delivery. During the per iod Decem ber 1 986 to August 1987, defendant purchased on credit from plaintiff various electrical w ir es a n d ca bles in the total amount of P4,102,438.3. Of this amount, P3 0 0 ,0 0 0 w a s pa id lea v in g a ba lance of P3,802,748.2. Respondent wrote petitioner dema n din g pa y m en t of it s u n pa id obligation. In response, petitioner requests to pay the amount in m on t h ly in st a llm en t s of P5 00,000 plus 1% interest. Said offer was reject ed by r espon den t . T h er ea ft er , pr iv a t e r espondent filed a com plain t befor e t h e Pa sig RT C a g a in st pet it ion er for r ecov er y of P3 ,802,748.2, including interest with 25% attorney‘s fees, exemplary damages of P1 00,000 a n d cost of litigation. In its answer, petitioner admitted the purchase made but disputed the amount. Pet itioner likewise interposed a counterclaim on the ground of abuse of rights since it su ffer ed in ju r y t o it s r epu t a t ion . T h e trial court rendered its decision in favor of private respondent, which decision was affirmed by t h e Cou r t of A ppea ls. ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent is guilty of a bu se of r ig h t s or w h et h er pr iv a t e r espondent intended to prejudice or injure petitioner when it rejected petitioner‘s offer and filed t h e a ct ion for collect ion . HELD: No. It is an elementary rule in jurisdiction that good faith is pr esu m ed a n d t h a t t h e burden of proving bad faith rests upon the party alleging the same. In the case at bar, petitioner h a s fa iled t o pr ov e ba d fa it h on t h e pa r t of pr iv a t e r espon den t . Pr ivate respondent was driven by legitima t e r ea son s for r eject in g pet it ion er ‘s offer a n d in stituting the action for collection before the trial court. As pointed out by private responden t . T h e corporation had its own ―cash position to protect in order t o pa y it s ow n oblig a t ion s‖ . Clearly, this would be inimical t o the interests of any enterprise, especially profit-or ien t ed on e like private respondent. It is plain to see that this is a case of an exercise of rights, not an a bu se t h ereof. As such, private respondent has not acted in a m a n n er con t r a r y t o m or a ls, g ood cu st om s or pu blic policy a s t o v iola t e A r t icle 2 1 of t h e Civ il Code.

MWSS v s. A ct T h ea t er G.R. No. 147076 Ju n e 17, 2004

t o h er duties, petitioner discovered that the pieces of jewelry which she placed inside the comfort r oom in a pa per ba g w er e lost .

FA CT S: On September 22, 1988, four employees of the respondent Act Theater, Inc., n a m ely , Rodolfo T a bian, Armando Aguilar, Arnel Concha and Modesto Ruales, were apprehended by members of t h e Quezon City police force for allegedly tampering a water meter in violation of P.D. No. 4 0 1 , a s amended by B.P. Blg. 876. On account of the inciden t , t h e r espon den t ‘s w a t er ser v ice connection was cut off. Consequently, the respondent filed a complain t for in ju n ct ion w it h da m a g es a g a in st t h e pet it ion er MW SS.

T h e bags and personal belongings of all the people inside the room were searched. Valmonte was a llegedly bodily searched, interrogated and trailed by a security guard throughout the even in g . La t er, police officers arrived and interviewed all per son s w h o h a d a ccess t o t h e su it e a n d fingerprinted them including Valmonte. During all the time Valmonte was being interrogated by t h e police officers, petitioner kept on saying the words "Siya lang a n g lu m a ba s n g kw a r t o." V almonte‘s car which was parked at the hotel premises was also searched but the search yielded n ot h in g .

In t he civil case, the respondent alleged in its complaint filed w it h t h e cou r t a qu o t h a t t h e pet itioner acted arbitrarily, whimsically and capriciously, in cutting off the respondent ‘s w a t er service connection without prior notice. Due t o lack of water, the health and sanitation, not only of t h e respondent‘s patrons but in the surrounding premises as well, were adv er sely a ffect ed. T h e r espon den t pr a y ed t h a t t h e pet it ion er be dir ect ed t o pa y da m a g es.

A fter a futile attempt for a formal apology, Valmonte filed a suit for damag es a g a in st Ca r pio.

T h e petitioner insists that in cutting off the respondent‘s water service connection, the petitioner m erely exercised its proprietary right under Article 429 of the Civil Code, which prov ides that the ow ner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposa l t h er eof.

T h e CA reversed, holding that petitioner‘s verbal assault upon Valmonte was done with m a lice a n d in bad faith since it was made in the presence of many people without any solid proof except pet itioner‘s suspicion. Such unfounded accusation entitles Valm on t e t o a n a w a r d of m or a l da m a g es for sh e w a s pu blicly h u m ilia t ed, deeply in su lt ed, a n d em ba r r a ssed.

ISSUE: W h ether or not the petitioner validly exercised its right under Article 4 2 9 of t h e Civ il Code.

ISSUE: Sh ou ld V a lm on t e be en t it led t o Da m a g es?

HELD: No, the petitioner did not validly exercise its right under Article 429 of the Civil Code. A right is a power, privilege, or immunity guaranteed under a constitution, statute or decision a l la w , or r ecognized as a result of long usage, constitutive of a legally enforceable cla im of on e per son a gainst the other. Concededly, the petitioner, as the owner of the utility providing water supply t o certain consumers including the respondent, had the right to exclude any per son fr om t h e en joyment and disposal thereof. However, the exercise of rights is n ot w it h ou t lim it a t ion s. Having the right should not be confused with the manner by which such right is to be exercised. W h en a right is exercised in a manner, which discards these nor m s r esu lt in g in da m a g e t o a n other, a legal wrong is committed for which actor can be held accountable. In t h is ca se, t h e pet itioner failed t o act with justice and give the respondent what is due t o it when the petition er u n cer em on iou sly cu t off t h e r espon den t ‘s w a t er ser v ice con n ect ion .

HELD: Y es. The victim of a wrongful act or omission, whether done willfully or negligently , is n ot left w ithout any remedy or recourse to obtain r elief for t h e da m a g e or in ju r y h e su st a in ed. In corporated into our civil law are not only principles of equity but also universal moral precepts w hich are designed t o indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good con scien ce a n d which are meant to serve as guides for human conduct. First of these fundamental precept s is t he principle commonly known as "abuse of rights" under A r t icle 1 9 of t h e Civ il Code. It pr ov ides that "Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the perform ance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith." On e is n ot a llowed t o exercise his right in a manner which would cause unnecessary prejudice to another or if h e w ou ld t h er eby offen d m or a ls or g ood cu st om s.

Ca r pi o v s. V a l m on t e G.R. No. 151866, Sept em ber 9, 2004 FA CT S: Respondent Leonora Valmonte is a wedding coordinator. Michelle del Rosario an d Jon Sier r a en gaged her services for their church wedding. At about 4:30 p.m. on that day, Valmonte went to t h e Manila Hotel where the bride and her family were billet ed. W h en sh e a r r iv ed, sev er a l per sons were already there. Among those present was petitioner Soledad Carpio, an aunt of t h e br ide w h o w a s pr epa r in g t o dr ess u p for t h e occa sion . A fter reporting to the bride, Valmonte went out of the suite. Sh e pr oceeded t o t h e Ma y n ila Restaurant where the reception was to be held. She paid the suppliers, gave the meal allowa n ce t o t he band, and went back to the suite. Upon entering the suite, Valmonte not iced t h e people st aring at her. It was at this juncture that petitioner allegedly uttered t h e follow in g w or ds t o V almonte: "Ikaw lang ang lum abas ng k w arto, nas aan ang dala m ong bag? Saan k a pum unta? Ikaw lang and lumabas ng kwarto, ikaw ang kumuha." Petitioner then ordered on e of t h e ladies to search Valmonte‘s bag. It turned out that after Valmonte left the room to a t t en d

T h e trial court rendered dismissed Valmonte‘s complaint for da m a g es. It r u led t h a t w h en pet itioner sought investigation for the loss of her jewelry, she was merely exercisin g h er r ig h t a n d if damage results from a person exercising his legal right , it is dam num abs que injuria.

In t he case at bar, petitioner‘s verbal reproach against respondent was certa in ly u n ca lled for con sidering that by her own account nobody knew that she brought such kind a n d a m ou n t of jewelry inside the paper bag. This being the case, she had no right to attack respondent with h er in nuendos which were not merely inquisitive but outrightly accusatory . By open ly a ccu sin g r espondent as the only person who went out of the room before the loss of t h e jew elr y in t h e pr esence of all the guests therein, and ordering that she be im m edia t ely bodily sea r ch ed, pet itioner virtually branded respondent as the thief. True, petitioner had the right to a scer t a in t h e identity of the malefactor, but to malign respondent without an iota of proof that she was the on e who actually stole the jewelry is an act which, by a n y st a n da r d or pr in ciple of la w is im permissible. Petitioner had willfully caused injury t o r espon den t in a m a n n er w h ich is con trary to morals and good customs. Her firmness and resolve t o fin d h er m issin g jew elr y ca nnot justify her acts toward respondent. She did n ot a ct w it h ju st ice a n d g ood fa it h for a pparently, she had no other purpose in mind but to prejudice respondent. Certainly, petition er t ransgressed the prov isions of Article 19 in relation t o Article 21 for which sh e sh ou ld be h eld a ccou n t a ble.

RCPI V S CA GR No. L-44748, A u gu st 29, 1986 FA CT S: Pla intiff-respondent Loreto Dionela alleges that the defamatory words on the t elegra m sen t t o h im not only wounded his feelings but also caused him undue emba r r a ssm en t a n d a ffect ed a dv ersely his business as well because other people have come t o kn ow of sa id defa m a t or y w ords. Defendant-corporation as a defense, alleges that the additional words in Tag a log w a s a pr ivate joke between the sending and receiving operators and that they were not addressed to or in tended for plaintiff and therefore did not form part of the telegram and that the Tagalog words a r e not defamatory. The telegram sent through its facilities was received in its station at Legaspi City. Nobody other than the operator manned the teletype machine which autom atically receives t elegrams being transmitted. The said telegram was detached from th e m a ch in e a n d pla ced in side a sealed envelope and delivered to plaintiff, obviously a s is. T h e a ddit ion a l w or ds in T aga log w er e n ev er n ot iced a n d w er e in clu ded in t h e t eleg r a m w h en deliv er ed. T h e trial court ruled that in favor of the plaintiff holding that the liability of petitioner-companyem ployer is predicated on Articles 1 9 and 20 of the Civil Code. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision , u pon a ppea l. ISSUE: W h ether or not petitioner-company-employer is liable for damages under Articles 19 an d 2 0 of t h e Civ il Code. HELD: Y es. The cause of action of the private respondent is based on Arts. 19 and 20 of the New Civ il Code. As well as on respondent's breach of contract thru the negligence of its ow n em ploy ees. Pet itioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of receiv in g a n d t r a n sm it t in g m essages. Ev ery time a person transmits a message through the facilities of t h e pet it ion er , a con tract is entered into. Upon receipt of the rate or fee fix ed, t h e pet it ion er u n der t a kes t o t ransmit the message accurately. There is no question that in the case at bar, libelou s m a t t er s w ere included in the message transmitted, without the consent or kn ow ledg e of t h e sen der . T h ere is a clear case of breach of contract by the petitioner in adding extran eou s a n d libelou s m atters in the message sent to the private respondent. As a corporation, the petitioner ca n a ct on ly through its employees. Hence the acts of its employees in r eceiv in g a n d t r a n sm it t in g m essa g es a r e t h e a ct s of t h e pet it ion er . T o h old that the petitioner is not liable directly for the acts of its employ ees in t h e pu r su it of pet itioner's business is to deprive the general public availing of the services of the pet it ion er of a n effective and adequate remedy. In most cases, negligence m u st be pr ov ed in or der t h a t pla intiff may recover. However, since negligence may be hard to substantiate in some cases, w e m ay apply the doctrine of RES IPSA LOQUITUR (the thing speaks for itself), by considering t h e pr esen ce of fa c t s or cir cu m st a n ces su r r ou n din g t h e in ju r y . T h e decision is a ffir m ed.

MERA LCO v s. COURT OF A PPEA LS No. L-39019. Ja n u a r y 22, 1988 FA CT S: Pet itioner Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) is a public utility corporation providing electric pow er for the consumption of the general public in Metro Manila. Petitioner Pedro Yamba o is a bill collect or of MERA LCO.

Pr ivate respondents Isaac Chaves and Juana O. Chaves, husband and wife, filed the com pla in t for damages, together with their children, Isaac Chaves Jr. and Rosendo Chaves. Isaac Sr . A n d Isa ac Jr. and Rosendo were members of the Philippin e Ba r ; Isa a c Sr . A n d Isa a c Jr . w er e pr acticing lawyers and Rosendo was a legal officer at the Agricultural Productivity Commission . Ju a n a O. Ch a v es w a s a pu blic sch ool t e a ch er . Pr ivate respondents became the customer of petitioner MERALCO in the year 1 953. At or abou t t h e end of March, 1965, petitioner Yambao went to the residence of priva t e r espon den t s a n d pr esented two overdue bills, one for January 11 to February 9, 1965, for the sum of P7 .9 0 , a n d t h e ot h er for Febr u a r y 9 t o Ma r ch 1 0 , 1 9 6 5 , for t h e su m of P7 .2 0 . On April 2, 1965, Isaac Chaves went to the main office of petitioner but paid only on e bill, for Ja nuary 11 to February 9, 1965, leaving the other bill unpaid. Thereafter , on A pr il 2 1 , 1 9 6 5 , pet itioner caused the electric service in private respondent‘s residence to be discon t in u ed a n d t h e power line cut off. On the following day, Rosendo went to petitioner‘s main office a n d pa id t h e u n pa id bill. T h e pow er lin e w a s r est or ed a t a bou t 7 :0 0 pm on t h e sa m e da y . Pr ivate respondents filed an action for recovery of damages for embarrassment , h u m ilia t ion , w ounded feelings and hurt pride by reason of the disconnection of their electric service by t h e pet it ion er . T h e CFI ordered rendered decision in favor of private respondent, ordering pet it ion er t o pa y pr iv a t e r espon den t m or a l da m a g es, ex em pla r y da m a g es a n d a t t or n ey ‘s fees. T h e Court of Appeal, affirmed in toto the trial court‘s decision. Respondent Court st r essed t h e im portance and necessity of 48 hour advance written notification before the discon n ect ion of ser v ice m a y be effect ed. ISSUE: W h ether advance written notification before the disconnection of ser v ice m a y be effect ed? RULING: Y es. Petitioner being a public Utility having monopoly of the supply of electrical power in Met r o Ma n ila and some nearby municipalities. Being such, the State may regulate the conditions under w hich the manner by which a public utility such as MERALCO may effect a discon n ect ion of service to delinquent customer. Among others, a prior written notice to the custom er is required before disconnection of ser v ice. Fa ilu r e t o g iv e su ch pr ior n ot ice a m ou n t s t o a t or t .

CUST ODIO v s. COURT OF A PPEA LS G.R. No. 116100. Febr u a r y 9, 1996. FA CT S: Herein private respondents owned a parcel of land wherein a two-storey apartment building was con stituted therein, for this, tenants then were occupying the latter building. Such property w a s su rrounded by other immovables (houses) owned by herein petitioners, Cust idio a n d Sa n t os. Befor e reaching the property of the private respondents from the P. Burgos St. ther e w er e t w o pa ssage ways in between the said other immovable, but however, they were only narrow pa t h s. A fter sometimes, the petitioners constructed adobe fence in the first pa ssa g ew a y m a kin g it n arrower in width. Said adobe fence was first constructed by defendants Sant oses a lon g t h eir pr operty which is also along the first passageway. Defendant Morat o con st r u ct ed h er a dobe fen ce and even extended said fence in such a way that the entire passageway was enclosed. A s a r esult, the tenants left the apartment because there was no longer a permanent access -in g r ess a n d en g r ess t o t h e pu blic st r eet . T h e private respondents filed an action for the grant of an easement of right of w a y . T h e t r ia l court ordered the petitioner to give plaintiff permanent access — ingress and egress, to the public

st r eet and that in turn, the private respondent will pay a sum of Php 8000 t o the petitioner as an in demnity for the permanent use of the passageway. On appeal by the private respondent to t h e CA , the latter Court affirmed the decision of the lower court as t o g iv e a r ig h t of w a y t o t h e pr ivate respondents and awarded the latter actual, moral and exemplar y da m a g es. For t h is, pet it ion er a ppea led t o t h e SC qu est ion in g t h e a w a r d of da m a g es. ISSUE: W h et h er or n ot t h e a w a r d of da m a g es is pr oper ? RULING: No. A reading of the decision of the Court of Appeals will show that the award of dam a g es w a s ba sed solely on the fact that the original plaintiff, Pacifico Mabasa, incurred losses in the form of u nrealized rentals when the t enants vacated the leased premises by reason of the closur e of t h e pa ssageway. However, the mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a righ t t o r ecover damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong w ithout damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages a r e merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or w r on g . T h er e is a m aterial distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a leg a l r ig h t ; dam age is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury, and damages are the recompense or com pensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in t h ose instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. T h ese sit uations are often called damnum absque injuria. In order that a plaintiff may m a in t a in a n a ction for the injuries of which he com plains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a br each of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff — a con cu r r en ce of in ju r y t o t h e pla in t iff a n d leg a l r espon sibilit y by t h e per son ca u sin g it . In t he case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to the claim of pr ivate respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right. In or der that the principle of abuse of right provided in Ar t icle 2 1 of t h e Civ il Code ca n be a pplied, it is essential that the following requisites concur: (1) The defendant should have a ct ed in a manner that is contrary t o morals, good customs or public policy; (2) T h e a ct s sh ou ld be w illful; and (3) There was damage or injury t o the plaintiff. The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners, hence not contrary to mor a ls, g ood customs or public policy. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a t hing, without other limitations than those esta blish ed by la w . It is w it h in t h e r ig h t of pet itioners, as owners, to enclose and fence their property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides t hat ―(e)very owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dea d hedges, or by any other means without detriment to servit u des con st it u t ed t h er eon .‖ A t the t ime of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any servitudes. There w a s n o easement of way existing in favor of private respondents, either by law or by contract. The fact t hat private respondents had no existing right ov er the said passageway is confirmed by the very decision of the trial court granting a compulsory right of way in their favor after payment of ju st com pensation. It was only that decision which gave private respondents the right t o use the said pa ssageway after payment of the compensation and im posed a corresponding duty on petitioners n ot t o in t er fer e in t h e ex er cise of sa id r ig h t .

GA SHEM v s. COURT OF A PPEA LS G.R. No. 97336. Febr u a r y 19, 1993. FA CT S: On 27 October 1 987, private respondent, without the a ssist a n ce of cou n sel, filed w it h t h e a foresaid trial court a complaint for damages against the petitioner for the alleged v iola t ion of t h eir agreement to get married. She alleges in said complaint that: she is 22 y ea r s old, sin g le,

Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral chara ct er a n d r epu t a t ion du ly r espect ed in h er community; petitioner, on the other h a n d, is a n Ir a n ia n cit izen r esidin g a t t h e Loza n o A partments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a medica l cou r se a t t h e Ly ceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; that the plaintiff is an employee a t Ma bu h a y Lu ncheonette, Fernandez Avenue, Dagupan City and that the parties happen ed t o kn ow ea ch ot h er when the Manager of the Mabuhay Lun ch eon et t e, Joh n n y Ra bin o in t r odu ced t h e defendant to the plaintiff; the latter courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on t h e condition that they would get married; they therefore agreed t o get married after the en d of t h e school semester, which was in October of that year; petition er t h en v isit ed t h e pr iv a t e r espondent's parents in Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marria g e; som etime in 20 August 1987, th e pet it ion er for ced h er t o liv e w it h h im in t h e Loza n o A partments; she was a virgin before she began livin g w it h h im ; a s a r esu lt of t h is liv e -in r elationship, plaintiff became pregnant, but defendant gave her some m edicin e t o a bor t t h e foetus. Still plaintiff continued t o live with defendant and kept reminding him of his prom ise t o m arry her until he told her that he could not do so because he was already married t o a g ir l in Ba colod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner t o pa y h er dam ages in the amount of not less than P45,000.00, r eim bu r sem en t for a ct u a l ex pen ses a m ounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, an d g r a n t in g h er su ch ot h er r elief a n d r em edies a s m a y be ju st a n d equ it a ble. In h is Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner claimed that he never pr oposed m a r r ia g e t o or a greed to be married with the private respondent; he neither sought the consent and approval of h er parents nor forced her to live in his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only told h er t o st op coming to his place because he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money a n d pa sspor t . A fter trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 2 1 of t h e Civ il Code, r en der ed a decision favoring the private respondent. The petitioner was thu s or der ed t o pa y t h e la t t er da m a g es a n d a t t or n ey 's fees. T h e decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a ) pet it ion er a n d pr ivate respondent were lovers, (b) private responden t is n ot a w om a n of loose m or a ls or qu estionable virtue who rea dily su bm it s t o sex u a l a dv a n ces, (c) pet it ion er , t h r ou g h m achinations, deceit and false pretenses, promised to marry private respondent, (d) beca u se of h is persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself t o be deflowered by him, (e) by r ea son of t hat deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents — in accor da n ce w it h Filipin o cu stoms and traditions — m ade some preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens, inviting friends and relatives and contra ct in g spon sors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner, w ho is a foreigner and who has abused Philippine hospit a lit y , h a v e offen ded ou r sen se of m or a lit y , g ood cu st om s, cu lt u r e a n d t r a dit ion s. T h e CA affirmed in toto the trial court's ruling. Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the in st a n t pet it ion . ISSUE: W h et h er or n ot A r t icle 2 1 of t h e Civ il Code a pplies t o t h e ca se a t ba r . RULING: It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not commit t ed a n y m oral wrong or injury or violated any good custom or public policy; he has not professed love or pr oposed marriage to the private respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He criticizes t h e t r ial court for liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions and culture, and ignorin g t h e fa ct t hat since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipin o cu st om s, t r a dit ion s a n d cu lture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways. He st r esses t hat even if he had made a prom ise to marry, the su bsequ en t fa ilu r e t o fu lfill t h e sa m e is ex cusable or t olerable because of his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes t o t h e Mu slim Code w hich purportedly allows a Muslim to take four (4) wives a n d con clu des t h a t on t h e ba si s t h ereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does not possess good moral character. Moreover , h is controv ersial "common law wife" is now his legal wife as their marriage had been solemnized

in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Em bassy. As to his unlawful cohabitation w it h t h e pr iv a t e r espondent, petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be pinned on him for t h e liv e -in r elationship, the private respon den t sh ou ld a lso be fa u lt ed for con sen t in g t o a n illicit a rrangement. Finally, petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be assumed arguendo t h a t h e h a d professed his love to the private respondent and had also promised to marry her, such a ct s w ould not be actionable in view of the special circumstances of the case. T h e m er e br ea ch of pr om ise is n ot a ct ion a ble. The existing rule is that a breach of promis e to m arry per s e is not an actionable w rong . Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the prov isions that wou ld h ave made it so. The reason therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate Com m it t ee on t h e Pr oposed Civ il Code, fr om w h ich W e qu ot e: "T h e elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise t o marry is not act ion a ble h a s been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia. The history of breach of pr om ise su its in the United States and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily t o a buse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led t o t h e a bolition of rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many of the American st a t es .." T h is notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand t h e concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for t h e u ntold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for h u m a n for esig h t t o specifica ll y en u m er a t e a n d pu n ish in t h e st a t u t e books. A r t icle 2 1 7 6 , of t h e Civ il Code, w h ich defin es a qu a si -delict t h u s: "W h oever by act or omission causes damage to another, there bein g fa u lt or n eg lig en ce, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fau lt or n eg lig en ce, if t h er e is n o pr e -ex ist in g con tractual relation between the parties, is ca lled a qu a si -delict a n d is g ov er n ed by t h e pr ov isions of this Chapter." is limited to negligent acts or om issions and excludes the n ot ion of w illfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civ il law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is m u ch br oa der t han culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but intentional criminal acts as well su ch a s a ssa u lt a n d ba t t er y , fa lse im pr ison m en t a n d deceit . In t he general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission respon sible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts with certain exceptions, are to be g ov erned by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or om ission s a r e t o be cov er ed by A rticle 2176 of the Civil Code. In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which , in t h e absence of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is ev en postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 2 1 h a s g r ea t ly br oadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and adapta ble t h a n t h e A n g lo-A m er ica n la w on t or t s. In t he light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, t h a t w here a man's promise t o marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a w om an and his representation t o fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cau se of t h e giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no int en t ion of m arrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive dev ice t o en t ice or inv eigle her to accept him and t o obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the awa r d of dam ages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise t o marry but because of t h e fr a u d a n d deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner con t r a r y t o m or a ls, g ood cu st om s or pu blic policy . In t he instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive pr otestations of love for and prom ise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virt u e a n d w om anhood to him and t o live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said pr om ise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made pla in t iff's pa rents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory t o their supposed marriag e." In sh ort, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every sing le Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction — t he kind illustrated by t h e Code

Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The pet it ion er cou ld n ot be h eld lia ble for cr iminal seduction punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Pen a l Code because the private respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction. W e are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect that g r a n t in g , for argument's sake, that he did promise to m a r r y t h e pr iv a t e r espon den t , t h e la t t er is n ev ertheless also at fault. According to him, both parties are in pari delicto; hence, pursu a n t t o A rticle 1 412(1) of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Batarra vs. Marcos, t h e pr iv a t e r espondent cannot recover damages from the petitioner. The latter even goes as fa r a s st a t in g t hat if the private respondent had "sustained any injury or damage in their r ela t ion sh ip, it is pr im a r ily beca u se of h er ow n doin g ." T h ese statements reveal the true character and motive of t h e pet it ion er . It is clea r t h a t h e h arbors a condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on a ccou n t of t h e la tter's ignoble birth, inferior educational background, pover t y a n d, a s per ceiv ed by h im , dishonorable employment. Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all moved by g ood faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so circumstanced could not have even r em otely occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry were empty w or ds dir ectly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor wom an into believin g t h a t in deed, he lov ed her and would want her to be his life partner. His was nothin g bu t pu r e lu st w hich he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by accept in g h is pr offer of lov e and proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security. Pet it ion er clearly violated the Filipino's concept of morality and so brazenly defied the traditional r espect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said that the petitioner committed such deplorable a cts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every per son t o a ct w it h ju stice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in t h e per for m a n ce of h is oblig a t ion s. No for eigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions. T h e pa r i delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent m a y n ot h a v e been impelled by the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in sex u a l congress not out of lust, but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is a ppa r en t t h a t sh e h a d qu alms of conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she found out that t h e pet it ion er w as not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari delict o w it h t h e pet itioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in g u ilt or in leg a l fa u lt ." A t m ost , it cou ld be con ceded t h a t sh e is m er ely in delict o. W e should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not be said t h a t t h is Court condones the deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and the petitioner sta y t og ether in the same room in their house after giving approval to their marriage. It is the solemn du ty of parents to protect the honor of their daughters and infuse upon them the higher values of m or a lit y a n d dig n it y .

RELLOSA v s. PELLOSIS G.R. No. 138964 A u gu st 9, 2001. FA CT S: Respondents were lessees of a parcel of land, owned by one Marta Rey es, loca t ed a t Ma la t e, Ma n ila. Respondents had built their houses on the land which, ov er t h e y ea r s, u n der w en t con tinuous improvements. After the demise of Marta, the land was inherited by her son V ict or Rey es. Sometime in 1986, Victor informed respondents that, for being lessees of t h e la n d for m ore than twenty (20) years, they would have a right of first refusal to buy the land. Sometime in t h e early part of 1989, without the knowledge of respondents, the land occupied by t h em w a s sold t o petitioner Cynthia Ortega who was able to ultimately secure title to the proper t y in h er n a m e.

On 31 May 1 989, respondents filed with the Region a l T r ia l Cou r t of Ma n ila a su it for t h e "Declaration of Nullity of the Sale," made in favor of petitioner Cynthia Ortega predicated u pon t h eir r ig h t of fir st r efu sa l. T h e Office of the Building Official issued a resolution ordering the demolition of t h e h ou ses of r espondents. The following day Cynthia Ortega, together with her fa t h er a n d co-pet it ion er , V icente Rellosa, hired workers t o commence the demolition of respondents' houses. Du e t o t h e t im ely intervention of a mobile unit of the Western Police District, the intended demolit ion did n ot take place following talks between petitioner Rellosa and cou n sel w h o plea ded t h a t t h e dem olition be suspended since the order sought to be implem en t ed w a s n ot y et fin a l a n d ex ecutory. On 11 December 1989, respondents filed their appeal con t est in g t h e or der of t h e Office of the Building Official. On 12 December 1989, petitioners once again hired worker s a n d pr oceeded w it h t h e dem olit ion of r espon den t s' h ou ses. Respondents filed Civil Case before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, praying that petit ion er s be or dered to pay moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney‘s fees, for t h e u n t im ely dem olit ion of t h e h ou ses. T h e RTC dismissed the complaint of respondents and instead ordered them t o pay pet it ion er s m or a l da m a g es. T h e Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and or der ed pet it ion er s t o pa y r espon den t s of m or a l da m a g es, ex em pla r y da m a g es a n d A t t or n ey 's fees. ISSUE: W h et h er or n ot t h er e is a pr em a t u r e dem olit ion RULING: T h e Court upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals that there was a premature dem olit ion . Hen ce, t h e pet it ion er s sh ou ld pa y da m a g es t o t h e lessees. A r ight is a power, privilege, or immunity guaranteed under a constitution, statute or decisi on a l law, or recognized as a result of long usage, constitutive of a legally en for cea ble cla im of on e per son a g a in st a n ot h er . T h e exercise of these rights is not without limitations. The abuse of rights r u le est a blish ed in A rticle 1 9 of the Civil Code requires every person to act with justice, to give everyone his due; and t o observe honesty and good faith. When a right is exercised in a manner which disca r ds t h ese n orms resulting in damage t o another, a legal wrong is committed for which t h e a ct or ca n be h eld a ccou n t a ble. A t the t ime petitioners implemented the order of demolition, barely five days after responden t s r eceived a copy thereof, the same was not yet final and executory. The law provided for a fifteen day appeal period in favor of a party aggrieved by an adverse ruling of the Office of the Buildin g Official but by the precipitate action of petitioners in demolishing the h ou ses of r espon den t s (prior to the expiration of the period to appeal), the latter wer e effect iv ely depr iv ed of t h is r ecourse. The fact that the order of demolition was later affirmed by the Departmen t of Pu blic W orks and Highways was of no moment. The action of petitioners up to the point w h er e t h ey w ere able to secure an order of demolition was not condemnable but implemen t in g t h e or der u nmindful of the right of respondents t o contest the ruling was a different matter and could only be h eld u t t er ly in defen sible.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORA T ION v s. PHILIPP BROT HERS OCEA NIC, INC. G.R. No. 126204 Nov em ber 20, 2001 FA CT S: On May 1 4, 1 987, the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) issued invitations to bid for t h e su pply and delivery of 120,000 metric tons of imported coal for its Batangas Coal-Fired Thermal Pow er Plant in Calaca, Batangas. The Philipp Brothers Oceanic, Inc. (PHIBRO) prequalified and w as allowed to participate as one of the bidders. After t h e pu blic biddin g w a s con du ct ed, PHIBRO's bid was accepted. NAPOCOR's acceptance was conveyed in a letter dated July 8, 1 987, w h ich w a s r eceiv ed by PHIBRO on Ju ly 1 5 , 1 9 8 7 . On July 10, 1 987, PHIBRO sent word to NAPOCOR that industrial disputes might soon pla g u e A ustralia, the shipment's point of origin, which could seriously h a m per PHIBRO's a bilit y t o su pply the needed coal. From July 23 t o July 31, 1987, PHIBRO again apprised NA POCOR of the sit uation in Australia, particularly informing the latter that the ship ow n er s t h er ein a r e n ot w illing to load cargo unless a "strike-free" clause is incorporated in the ch a r t er pa r t y or t h e con tract of carriage. In order to hasten the transfer of coal, PHIBRO proposed to NAPOCOR that t h ey equ a lly sh a r e t h e bu r den of a "st r ike -fr ee" cla u se. NA POCOR r efu sed. On August 6, 1 987, PHIBRO received from NAPOCOR a confirmed and workable letter of credit. In st ead of delivering the coal on or before the thirtieth day after receipt of the Letter of Credit, as a greed upon by the parties in the July contract, PHIBRO effected it s fir st sh ipm en t on ly on Nov em ber 1 7 , 1 9 8 7 . Con sequently, in October 1 987, NAPOCOR once more advertised for the delivery of coa l t o it s Ca laca thermal plant. PHIBRO participated anew in this subsequent bidding. On November 2 4 , 1 987, NAPOCOR disapproved PHIBRO's application for pre -qualification to bid for not meetin g t h e minimum requirements. Upon further inquiry, PHIBRO found that th e real r ea son for t h e disapproval was its purported failure t o satisfy NAPOCOR's demand for da m a g es du e t o t h e dela y in t h e deliv er y of t h e fir st coa l sh ipm en t . T h is prompted PHIBRO to file an action for damages with application for in ju n ct ion a g a in st NA POCOR with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 57, Makati City. In it s com pla in t , PHIBRO a lleged that NAPOCOR's act of disqualifying it in the October 1987 bidding and in all subsequent biddin g s w a s t a in t ed w it h m a lice a n d ba d fa it h . ISSUE: W h ether or not NAPOCOR abused its right or acted unjustly in disqualifying PHIBRO from t h e pu blic biddin g . RULING: No. NAPOCOR was not bound under any contract t o a ppr ov e PHIBRO's pr e -qu a lifica t ion r equirements. In fact, NAPOCOR had expressly reserved its right to reject bids as provided in its In struction to Bidders found in the "Post-Qualification Documents/Specifications for the Supply a n d Deliv er y of Coa l for t h e Ba t a n g a s Coa l -Fir ed T h er m a l Pow er Pla n t I.

FRENZEL v s. CA T IT O G.R. No. 143958 Ju l y 11, 2003 FA CT S: Pet itioner Alfred Fritz Frenzel is an Australian citizen of German descent who wa s m a r r ied t o T eresita Santos, a Filipino citizen. He works as a pilot for New Guinea Airlin es. On t h e ot h er h and, private respondent Ederlina P. Catito was married to Klaus Muller, a Germa n n a t ion a l. Sh e worked as a masseuse in the King‘s Cross nightclub in Sydney, Australia. The two met when A lfred went on a vacation in Sydney. They met again and this time, Alfred was able to con v in ce Eder lina t o stop working and t o g o ba c k t o t h e Ph ilippin es. W h en sh e r et u r n ed t o t h e

Ph ilippines, she was given money by Alfred t o put up a beauty salon . La t er on , h e a lso g a v e m oney to her to be able to purchase a house and lot in San Francisco del Monte, Qu ezon Cit y . Bu t since he was aware that aliens were prohibited to purchase lands, he agreed to have Ederlina a s the sole vendee. Later also, they opened two bank accounts with the Hong Kong and Shanghai Ba nking Corporation in Kowloon, Hong Kong. Also, there were subsequent purcha ses of ot h er r eal and personal properties. These were made on the anticipation on the part of Alfred t h a t h e a n d Ederlina will get married soon. However, this failed to materialize because of the fa ct t h a t Eder lina was still married to Klaus. Ederlina fa iled t o secu r e a div or ce fr om Kla u s. T h is ex asperated Alfred and eventually their relationship started to fade. La t er on , A lfr ed filed a com plaint before the RTC of Davao City for recover y of r ea l a n d per son a l pr oper t ies. H e dem anded from Ederlina that she return all the money that were used to purchase the properties a n d also the properties which were bought, especially the house and lot a n d t h r ee ot h er lot s. However, the complaint of Alfred was dismissed by the RTC. On appeal, the Cou r t of A ppea ls a ffir m ed t h e decision of t h e RT C in t ot o. ISSUE: W h et h er or n ot A lfr ed is en t it led t o r ecov er t h e sa id pr oper t ies? RULING: T h e Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The contention of petitioner Frenzel that t o ba r h im fr om recovering the properties would be in violation of Article 22 of the Civ il Code on u n ju st en richment did not hold water. It must be remembered that a con t r a ct w h ich v iola t es t h e Con stitution and the laws is void and vests no rights and crea t es n o oblig a t ion s. It does n ot pr oduce any legal effect. His reliance on Article 22 is misplaced because in this case, the action is pr oscribed by the Constitution or the parties are in pari delicto. This is founded on the g en er a l pr inciples of public policy. It must be remembered that Alfr ed kn ew a ll a lon g t h a t h e w a s disqualified from purchasing lands. His contention that he entered into the transaction beca u se h e was expecting that he and Ederlina will get married in the future is not a valid on e. He a lso kn ew that he cannot get married to Ederlina because he still had a valid existing marriag e w it h T er esit a Sa n t os.

REYES v s. LIM G.R. No. 134241

A u gu st 11, 2003

FA CT S: Pet itoner Reyes and private respondent Lim entered into a Cont r a ct t o sell a pa r cel of la n d located in F.B. Harrison, St. The parties stipulated that Lim shall pay a down pa y m en t of P1 0 Million of the P28 Million purchase price. On one hand, Reyes shall ensure that the lessee of the pr operty, Harrison Lumber, shall h a v e v a ca t ed t h e lot u pon pa y m en t of t h e ba la n ce. T h e day t o consummate the contract arrived however Harrison Lumber has still not vacated t h e la nd. Worse, Lim found out that Reyes had already sold the lot to Line One Food Cor por a t ion . A ggrieved, Lim filed an action for specific performance and nu llifica t ion of t h e su bsequ en t con tract of sale plus damages. The trial court and Cou r t of A ppea ls r u led in fa v or of Lim . Hence, the present petition. Reyes primarily contends that the CA erred in affir m in g t h e RT C Decision when it was based on equity. Petitioner argues that it is Rule 57 t o 61 of t h e Ru les on Civ il Pr ocedu r e w h ich sh ou ld be a pplied. ISSUE: W h et h er or n ot t h e con t en t ion of pet it ion er i s t en a ble. RULING: A ccording to the Supreme Court, the case involves an issue left unanswerable due t o silen ce or in sufficiency of the law and the rules of court. At this in st a n ce, A r t icle 9 of t h e Civ il Code

ex pressly mandates the Court t o make a ruling despite the silence, obscurity or insufficien cy of t h e la w . T h is ca lls for equ it y w h ich fills open spa ces in t h e la w . Befor e rescission of the contract can be had, the parties must be restored to their status quo ante. T h is w a s or der ed by t h e Cou r t . T o rule otherwise would improve Reyes to the detriment of Lim contrary to Article 22 of the Civil Code which provides that ―no person shall unjustly enrich himself at the expense of a n ot h er .‖ A r t icle 2 2 a pplies t o su bst a n t iv e a s w ell a s pr ocedu r a l r em edies. T h er efor e, t h e decision of t h e Cou r t of A ppea ls is a ffir m ed.

NA T IONA L DEV ELOPMENT COMPA NY v s. MA DRIGA L WA N HA I LINES CORPORA T ION [G.R. No. 148332. Sept em ber 30, 2003] FA CT S: T h e National Development Com pany, petitioner, is a g ov er n m en t -ow n ed a n d con t r olled cor poration. petitioner‘s Board of Directors approved the privatization plan of the NSCP. In May 1 993, the Board offered for sale t o the public its one hundred percent (100%) stock ownership in NSCP as well as its three (3) ocean-going vessels (M/V National Honor, M/V National Pride and M/V Na t ion a l Dig n it y ). Con sequently, petitioner released to the public an In formation Pa cka g e con t a in in g NSCP‘s ba ckg r ou n d, a sset s, oper a t ion a l a n d fin a n cia l st a t u s. Du r ing the public bidding the lone bidder was herein respondent , Ma dr ig a l W a n Ha i Lin es Cor poration, a domestic private corporation. Mr. W illie J. Uy , r espon den t ‘s Con su lt a n t , su bm it t ed a bid of $1 5 m illion t h r ou g h t h e Pr oposa l Let t er For m . T h e r espon den t ‘s bid w a s r eject ed by pet it ion er a n d t h e Com m ission on A u dit . Bu t since there was no other bidder, petitioner entered into a negotiated sale with r espon den t . A fter several negotiations, respondent increased its offer to $1 8.5 million which was accepted by pet it ion er . A ccordingly, petitioner issued a Notice of Award to respondent of the sale of t h e NSCP sh a r es a n d vessels for $1 8.5 million.petitioner and respondent executed the corresponding Contra ct of Sa le, and the latter acquired NSCP, its assets, personnel, r ecor ds a n d it s t h r ee (3 ) v essels. A fter a while, respondent was surprised t o receive from the US Department of Treasury, Internal Rev enue Service (US IRS), a Notice of Final Assessment against NSCP for deficien cy t a x es on g r oss transportation income derived from US sources for the years end ing 1 990, 1991 and 199 2 . A nxious that the delay in the payment of the deficien cy t a x es m a y h a m per it s sh ippin g operations ov erseas, assumed and paid petitioner‘s tax liabilities, including the tax du e for t h e y ear 1993.Eventually, respondent demanded from petitioner reimbursement for the amoun t s it pa id to the US IRS. But petitioner refused despite repeated demands. Hence, responden t filed w ith the Regional Trial Court complaint against petitioner for reimbursement and damages t h e RT C rendered a Decision in favor of respondent and against petitioner. The trial cou r t fou n d, a m ong others, that even before the sale, petitioner knew that NSCP had tax liabilities w it h t h e US IRS, y et it did n ot in for m r espon den t a bou t it . Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming the trial court‘s judgment with m odifica t ion . Hen ce t h is pet it ion . ISSUE: W h ether or not petitioner is legally bound t o reimburse respondent for t h e a m ou n t s it pa id cor r espon din g t o t h e for m er ‘s t a x lia bilit ies t o t h e US IR S.

HELD: T h e case at bar calls to mind the principle of unjust enrichment – Nemo cum alterius detrimento locupletari potest. No person shall be allowed to enrich himself u n ju st ly a t t h e ex pen se of ot h ers. This principle of equity has been enshrined in ou r Civ il Code, A r t icle 2 2 of w h ich pr ov ides:

Ex t inction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extin ct ion pr oceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did n ot exist. In other cases, the person entitled t o the civil action may institute it in the Jurisdiction a n d in the manner provided by law against the person who may be liable for rest it u t ion of t h e t h in g a n d r epa r a t ion or in dem n it y for t h e da m a g e su ffer ed.

― Art. 22. Ev ery person who through an act or performance by another or by any ot h er m ea n s, a cquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or leg a l g r ou n d, sh a ll r et u r n t h e sa m e t o h im .‖

T h e judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for da m a g es on ly w h en it in cludes a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil lia bility is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt (PNB v. Ca tipon, 98 Phil. 286) as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil ca ses; w h er e t h e court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in n a t u r e (De Guzman v. Alvia, 96 Phil. 558; People v. Pantig, supra) as, for instance, in t h e felon ies of est afa, theft, and malicious mischief committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civ il lia bility (See Art. 332, Revised Penal Code); and, where the civil liability does not arise from or is n ot based upon the criminal act of which the accused was a cqu it t ed (Ca st r o v . Collect or of In t ernal Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093; See Regalado, Remedial Law Com pendium, 1983 ed., p. 6 2 3 ). A r t icle 2 9 of t h e Civ il Code a lso pr ov ides t h a t :

Ju stice and equity thus oblige that petitioner be h eld lia ble for NSCP‘s t a x lia bilit ies a n d r eimburse respondent for the amounts it paid. It would be unjust enrichm en t on t h e pa r t of pet it ion er t o be r eliev ed of t h a t oblig a t ion .

ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO and JOSE FA RLEY BEDENIA v s. COURT OF A PPEA LS G.R. No. L-39999 Ma y 31, 1984 FA CT S: T hat on or about February 8, 1964 at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning, in the municipality of Jose Panganiban, province of Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdict ion of t h is Hon orable Court, the above- named accused, Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdones, Pepito Beden ia , Y olly Rico, David Bermundo, Villanoac, Roberto Rosales, Villania, Romeo Garrido, Jose Ortega , Jr ., Ricardo Celestino, Realingo alias Kamlon, John Doe alias Tato, and Fourteen Richard Does, by confederating and mutually helping one another, and acting without any authority of law, did t h en and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, by means of thre a t s, for ce a n d v iolen ce pr event Antonio Vergara and his family to close their stall located at the Public Market, Building No. 3, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and by subsequently forcibly opening the door of said st a ll and thereafter brutally demolishing and destroying said stall and the furnitures therein by a x es and other massive instruments, and carrying away the goods, wares and mer ch a n dise, t o t h e damage and prejudice of the said Anton io V er g a r a a n d h is fa m ily in t h e a m ou n t of P3 0,000.00 in concept of actual or compensatory and moral damages, and further t h e su m of P2 0 ,0 0 0 .0 0 a s ex em pla r y da m a g es. T hat in committing the offense, the accused took advan t a g e of t h eir pu blic posit ion s: Roy Pa dilla, being the incumbent municipal mayor, and the rest of the accu sed bein g policem en , ex cept Ricardo Celestino who is a civilian, all of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and t h a t it w a s com m it t ed w it h ev iden t pr em edit a t ion . T h e Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, rendered a decision finding the accuse d guilt y . T h e petitioners appealed the judgment of conviction t o t h e Cou r t of A ppea ls. t h e Cou r t of A ppea ls a ffir m ed t h e low er cou r t decision bu t w it h m odifica t ion h en ce t h is pet it ion . ISSUE: w hether or not the respondent court committed a reversible error in requiring the petitioners t o pay civil indemnity to the complainants after acquittin g t h em fr om t h e cr im in a l ch a r g e. HELD: T h e extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the criminal case refers exclusively t o civ il liability ex delicto founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. (Elca n o v . Hill, 7 7 SCRA 98; Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472). In other w or ds, t h e civ il lia bilit y w h ich is a lso ex tinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the civil liability arising from the a ct a s a cr im e.

W h en the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground tha t h is g u ilt h a s n ot been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same a ct or om ission m ay be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon mot ion of t h e defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damag es in ca se t h e com pla in t sh ou ld be fou n d t o be m a liciou s. If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from t h e t ex t of t h e decision w h et h er or n ot t h e a cqu it t a l is du e t o t h a t g r ou n d. T h ere is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision in the rendition of a judgment of acquit t a l a n d a judgment awarding damages in the same criminal action. The two can stand side by side. A ju dgment of acquittal operates to extinguish the crim in a l lia bilit y . It does n ot , h ow ev er , ex tinguish the civil liability unless there is clear showing that the act from which civ il lia bilit y m ig h t a r ise did n ot ex ist . A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be established or m or e ev idence must be adduced or where the criminal case has been fully terminated and a sepa r a t e com plaint would be just as efficacious or even more expedient than a t imely remand to the t r ia l court where the criminal action was decided for further hearings on the civil aspects of the ca se. T h e offended party may, of course, choose to file a separate action. These do n ot ex ist in t h is ca se. Considering moreover the delays suffered by the case in the trial, appella t e, a n d r ev iew st ages, it would be unjust to the complainants in this case to require at this time a separate civ il a ct ion t o be filed. W ith this in mind, we therefore hold that the r espon den t Cou r t of A ppea ls did n ot er r in a w a r din g da m a g es despit e a ju dg m en t of a cqu it t a l. W HEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals and dismiss t h e pet it ion for la ck of m er it . SO ORDERED.

PREJUDICIA L QUEST ION DONA T O V S. LUNA 160 SCRA 441 FA CT S: Pa z Abayan filed an information for Bigamy against petitioner Leonilo Don a t o. Sh e a lso filed w ith the Juvenile and Dom estic Relations Court a civil a ct ion for decla r a t ion of n u llit y of m arriage to petitioner because of a prior marriage of petitioner. In his answer petitioner claimed t hat his 2nd marriage was void because it was solemnized without a valid marriage licen se a n d t hat violence, intimation and undue influence were employed by Pa z t o obt a in h is con sen t . Pr ior to the date set for the trial of the criminal case, petitioner filed a mot ion t o su spen d t h e pr oceedings of the case because the civil action raises a prejudicial question which must fir st be det er m in ed befor e t h e cr im in a l ca se ca n pr oceed. ISSUE: Does a criminal case for bigamy suspend the civil case of annulment of marriage on the g r ou n d t h a t t h e la t t er con st it u t es a pr eju dicia l qu est ion ? HELD: T h e requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. I m ust be noted that t h e issue before the JDRC touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is not determina t iv e of pet itioner Donato's guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy. Furthermore, it was pet it ion er 's 2 nd wife, the herein private respondent Paz Abayan who filed the complaint for an n u lm en t of t h e 2 n d m a r r ia g e on t h e g r ou n d t h a t h er con sen t w a s obt a in ed t h r ou g h deceit . He who contracts a 2nd marriage before the judicial declaration of n u llit y of fir st m a r r ia g e a ssu m es t h e r isk of bein g pr osecu t ed for big a m y .

RICA RDO QUIA MBA O v s. HON. A DRIA NO OSORIO, ZENA IDA GA ZA BUENSUCERO, JUST INA GA ZA BERNA RDO, a n d FELIPE GA ZA , LA ND A UT HORIT Y G.R. No. L-48157 Ma r ch 16, 1988 FA CT S: In a complaint for forcible entry filed by herein private respondents Zenaida Gaza Buen su cer o, Ju stina Gaza Bernardo and Felipe Gaza against herein petitioner Ricardo Quiambao befor e t h e t h en Municipal Court of Malabon, Rizal,it was alleged t h a t pr iv a t e r espon den t s w er e t h e leg itimate possessors of a 30,835 sq. m. lot known as Lot No. 4, Block 12, Bca 2039 of the Longos Est ate situated at Barrio Longos, Malabon Rizal, by virtue of the Agreemen t t o Sell No. 3 4 8 2 ex ecuted in their favor by the former Land Tenure Administration ; that under cover of darkness, pet itioner surreptitiously and by force, intimidation, strategy and stealth, entered into a 400 sq. m . portion thereof, placed bamboo posts "staka" ov er said portion and t h er ea ft er beg a n t h e con st r u ct ion of a h ou se t h er eon ; A fter hearing, the municipal court denied the motion to dismiss. It ruled that inasmuch a s t h e issue involved in the case was the recovery of physical possession, the court had jurisdict ion t o t r y a n d h ea r t h e ca se. Dissatisfied with this ruling, petitioner filed before the then Court of First Inst a n ce of Riza l, a pet ition for certiorari with injunction against public respondent Judge and private respondent s, pr aying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary inju n ct ion or der in g r espon den t ju dg e t o su spend the hearing in t h e eject m en t ca se u n t il a ft er t h e r esolu t ion of sa id pet it ion

Pr ivate respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition, maintaining that the admin ist r a t iv e ca se did not constitute a prejudicial question as it involved the question of ownership, unlike the eject m en t ca se w h ich in v olv ed m er ely t h e qu est ion of possession . Mea nwhile, the Land Authority filed an Urgent Motion for Leave to Intervene in Civil Ca se No. C-1 576 alleging the pendency of an administrative case between the same parties on t h e sa m e su bject matter and praying that the petition for certiorari be granted, the ejectment complaint be dism issed and the Office of the Land Authority be allowed t o decide the m a t t er ex clu siv ely . ISSUE: w hether or not the administrative case between the private parties inv olv in g t h e lot su bject m atter of the ejectment case constitutes a prejudicial question which would operate a s a ba r t o sa id eject m en t ca se. HELD: A prejudicial question is understood in law t o be that which arises in a ca se t h e r esolu t ion of w hich is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case a n d t h e cog n iza n ce of w h ich pertains to another tribunal.The doctrine of prejudicial question comes into play generally in a sit uation where civil and criminal actions are pending and the issues involved in both ca ses a r e sim ilar or so closely related that an issue must be pre-emptively resolved in the civil case befor e t h e criminal action can proceed. Thus, the existence of a prejudicial question in a civ il ca se is a lleged in the criminal case to cause the suspension of the latter pending final determina t ion of t h e for m er . T h e essential elements of a prejudicial question as provided under Section 5 , Ru le 1 1 1 of t h e Rev ised Rules of Court are: [a] the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately r ela t ed t o t h e issue in the criminal action; and [b] the resolution of such issue determines whether or n ot t h e cr im in a l a ct ion m a y pr oceed. T h e actions involved in the case at bar being respectively civil and administrative in character, it is obv ious that technically, there is no prejudicial qu est ion t o spea k of. Equ a lly a ppa r en t , h owever, is the intimate correlation between said two [2] proceedings, stemming from t h e fa ct t hat the right of private respondents to eject petitioner from t h e dispu t ed por t ion depen ds pr imarily on the resolution of the pending administrative case. For while it m a y be t r u e t h a t pr ivate respondents had prior possession of the lot in question, at the time of the instit u t ion of t h e ejectment case, such right of possession had been terminated, or at the very least, suspended by the cancellation by the Land Authority of the Agreement t o Sell ex ecu t ed in t h eir fa v or . W h ether or not private respondents can continue to exercise their right of possession is bu t a n ecessary, logical consequence of the issue involved in the pending administrative case assailing t h e validity of the cancellation of the Agreement t o Sell a n d t h e su bsequ en t a w a r d of t h e disputed portion to petitioner. If the cancellation of the Agreement to Sell and th e su bsequ en t a ward to petitioner are voided, then private responden t s w ou ld h a v e ev er y r ig h t t o eject pet itioner from the disputed area. Otherwise, private respondent's light of possession is lost an d so w ou ld t h eir r ig h t t o eject pet it ion er fr om sa id por t ion . Fa ced with these distinct possibilities, the more prudent course for the trial court to have t a ken is t o h old the ejectment proceedings in abeyance until after a determination of the administrative ca se. Indeed, logic and pragmatism, if not jurisprudence, dictate such move. T o allow the parties t o undergo trial notwithstanding the possibility of petitioner's right of possession being u ph eld in the pending administrative case is t o needlessly require not only the parties but the cou r t a s w ell to expend time, effort and money in what may turn out to be a sheer ex er cise in fu t ilit y . T h u s, 1 A m Ju r 2 d t ells u s: T h e court in which an action is pending may, in the exercise of a sound discretion, upon pr oper a pplication for a stay of that action, hold the action in abeyance t o abide the outcom e of another pen ding in another court, especially where the parties and the issues are the same, for t h er e is pow er inherent in every court t o control the disposition of causes on its dockets with economy of t im e and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. Where the rights pa r t ie s t o t h e secon d

a ction cannot be properly determined until the questions raised in the first action are settled the secon d a ct ion sh ou ld be st a y ed. W h ile this rule is properly applicable t o instances involving two [2] court actions, the ex ist en ce in the instant case of the same considerations of Identity of parties and issues, economy of t im e a n d effort for the court, the counsels and the parties as well as the need to resolv e t h e pa r t ies' r ight of possession before the ejectment case may be properly determined, ju st ifies t h e r u le's a n a log ou s a pplica t ion t o t h e ca se a t ba r . If a pending civil case may be considered to be in the nature of a pr eju dicia l qu est ion t o a n a dm inistrative case, We see no reason why the reverse may not be so considered in t h e pr op er ca se, su ch a s in t h e pet it ion a t ba r . W HEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANT ED. Civ il Ca se No. 2 5 2 6 of t h e t h en Mu n icipa l Cou r t of Ma la bon , Riza l is h er eby or der ed DISMISSED. No Cost s.

ISA BELO APA, MANUEL APA and LEONILO JA CA LA N, pet it ion er s, v s. HON. RUMOLDO R. FERNANDEZ, HON. CELSO V. ESPINOSA, a n d SPS. FELIXBERT O T IGOL, JR. a n d ROSIT A T A GHOY T IGOL, r espon den t s. G.R. No. 112381 Ma r ch 20, 1995 FA CT S: t h e above-named accused [herein petitioners Isabelo Apa, Manuel Apa and Dionisio Ja ca la n ], con spiring, confederating and mutually helping with one another, without the kn ow ledg e a n d con sent of the owner, ROSITA TIGOL, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully a n d felon iou sly t a ke advantage of the absence or tolerance of the said owner by occu p y in g or possessin g a por tion of her real property, Lot No. 3635-B. wher eon t h ey con st r u ct ed t h eir r espect iv e r esidential houses against the will of Rosita T igol, which acts of the said accused have depr iv ed t h e latter of the use of a portion of her land, to her dama g e a n d pr eju dice beca u se despit e r epeated demands the said accused failed and refused, as they still fail and refuse to vaca t e t h e pr em ises a bov e-m en t ion ed. Pet itioners mov ed for the suspension of their arraignment on t h e g r ou n d t h a t t h er e w a s a pr ejudicial question pending resolution in another case being tried in Bran ch 2 7 of t h e sa m e court. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 2247-L and entitled "Anselmo Taghoy a n d V icen t e A pa versus Felixberto Tigol, Jr. and Rosita T. Tigol, et al.," concerns the own er sh ip of Lot No. 3 635-B. 1 In that case, petitioners seek a declaration of the nullity of TCT No. 1 3250 of Rosita T . T igol and the partition of the lot in question among them and private respondent Rosita T. Tigol a s h eirs of Filomeno and Rita Taghoy. The case had been filed in 1990 by petitioners, three years before May 27, 19 9 3 w h en t h e cr im in a l ca se for squ a t t in g w a s filed a g a in st t h em . T h e trial court denied the petitioners' m otion and proceeded with their arraignment. Petitioners, t h er efor e, h a d t o en t er t h eir plea (n ot g u ilt y ) t o t h e ch a r g e. Pet itioners filed a motion for reconsideration but their motion was denied by t h e cou r t in it s or der da t ed Sept em ber 2 1 , 1 9 9 3 . Hen ce, t h is pet it ion . ISSUE: w hether the question of ownership of Lot No. 3635-B, which was pen din g , in Civ il Ca se No. 2 247-L, is a prejudicial question justifying suspension of the proceedings in the cr im in a l ca se a g a in st pet it ion er s. HELD:W e h old t h a t it is. A prejudicial question is a question which is based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime bu t so intimately connected with it that its resolution is determinative of the guilt or inn ocen ce

of t h e accused. T o justify suspension of the criminal action, it must appear not only that the civil ca se involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution is based bu t a lso that the decision of the issue or issues raised in the civil case would be decisive of the guilt or in n ocen ce of t h e a ccu sed. 2 Ru le 1 1 1 , §5 pr ov ides: Sec. 6. Elements of prejudicial question. — The two (2) essen t ia l elem en t s of a pr eju dicia l qu estions are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intima t ely r ela t ed t o t h e issu e r a ised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not t h e cr im in a l a ct ion m a y pr oceed. In t he criminal case, the question is whether petitioners occupied a piece of land not belonging to t h em but to private respondent and against the latter's will. As already noted, the in for m a t ion a lleges that "without the knowledge and consent of the owner , ROSIT A T IGOL" pet it ion er s occupied or took possession of a portion of "her property" by building their houses thereon a n d "depr iv ed [h er ] of t h e u se of por t ion of h er la n d t o h er da m a g e a n d pr eju dice. Now the ownership of the land in question, known as Lot 3635-B of the Opon cadastre cov er ed by TCT No. 13250, is the issue in Civil Case 2247-L now pending in Bra n ch 2 7 of t h e RT C a t La pulapu City. The resolution, therefore, of this question would necessarily be determinati v e of pet it ion er s cr im in a l lia bilit y for squ a t t in g . W HEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and respondent judge is or der ed t o SUSPEND t h e pr oceedings in Criminal Case No. 012489 until the question of ownership in Civil Case No. 2247 L h a s been resolved with finality and thereafter proceed with the trial of the criminal case if t h e civ il case is decided and terminated adversely against petitioners. Otherwise he should dism iss t h e cr im in a l ca se. SO ORDERED.

BELT RA N V S. PEOPLE 334 SCRA 106 FA CT S: Pet itioner Maynardo Beltran and Charmaiene Felix were marr ied on Ju n e 1 6 , 1 9 7 3 a t t h e Im m aculate Concepcion Parish Church in Cubao, Quezon City. After 24 years of mar r ia g e a n d fou r children, petitioner filed, in the RTC of Quezon City, Br. 87, a petition for nullity of marriage on t he ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. In her Answer t o sa id petition, petitioner‘s wife alleged that it was petitioner who abandoned the conjug a l h om e a n d lived with a certain wom an named Milagros Salting. She t h en filed a cr im in a l ca se for con cubinage against petitioner and his paramour before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Br . 61. Petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant for his arrest, filed a Mot ion t o Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of the W a r r a n t of A r r est in t h e cr im in a l ca se. Pet itioner argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of h is m a r r ia g e posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case. Judge Alden Cer v a n t e s den ied the motion, so was with a Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner then went to the RTC of Ma kati, on certiorari , questioning the Orders issued by Judge Cervantes. The RT C den ied t h e pet it ion a lso a Mot ion for Recon sider a t ion . Hen ce, t h is pet it ion . ISSUE: Does t he declaration of nullity of marriag e a pr eju dicia l qu est ion in a cr im in a l ca se for con cu bin a g e? HELD: T h e rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting decisions. It h a s t w o (2) essential elements: a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not t h e cr im in a l a ct ion m a y pr oceed.

T h e pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner‘s marriage is not a pr eju dicia l qu estion to the concubinage case. For a civil case t o be considered prejudicial to a criminal action a s t o cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it m u st a ppear not only that the said civil case involves t h e sa m e fa ct s u pon w h ich t h e cr im in a l pr osecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issu es r a ised in t h e a foresaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be det er m in ed.

r espondent bank as the highest bidder. A certificate of sale was executed by Ex-Officio Sheriff in fa v or of t h e r espon den t a n d w a s r eg ist er ed w it h t h e Reg ist er of Deeds.

In DOMINGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS ( 226 SCRA 572) , the SC ruled that the import of Article 4 0 of the Family Code is that for purposes of remarriage, the only legally accept a ble ba ses for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment declarin g su ch pr ev iou s m arriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other eviden ce is a ccept a ble.

A fter the expiration of the one-year redempt ion per iod, t h e r espon den t con solida t ed it s ow nership over the foreclosed property. Consequently, T CT No. 4 4 6 6 8 w a s issu ed by t h e Reg ister of Deeds in its name. On July 23, 1999, the respon den t filed a Pet it ion for W r it of Possession .

So, that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner need not present a final ju dgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the cr im in a l ca se of t h e n ullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can a dduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other t h a n pr oof of a fin a l ju dg m en t decla r in g h is m a r r ia g e v oid.

ISSUE: w hether or not the complaint of the petitioners in Civil Case No. MA N-3454 for a n n u lm en t of ex trajudicial sale is a prejudicial question t o the petition of the respondent bank for the issuance of a w r it of possession in LRC Ca se No.

W ith regard to petitioner‘s argument that he could be acquitted of the charg e of con cu bin a g e sh ould his marriage be declared null and void, su ffice it t o st a t e t h a t ev en a su bsequ en t pr on ou n cem en t t h a t h is m a r r ia g e is v oid fr om t h e beg in n in g is n ot a defen se. A nalogous to this case is that of LANDICHO VS. RELOVA ( 22 SCRA 731), cited in DONATO VS. LUNA (160 SCRA 441), where the SC held that: ―xxx Assuming that the first marriage w a s n u ll a n d void on the ground alleged by petitioner, that fact would not be material t o the ou t com e of t h e criminal case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for t h em selv es it s n ullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the com petent courts and on ly wh en t h e nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as th er e is n o su ch declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who cont r a ct s a secon d m arriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of bein g pr osecu t ed for big a m y . T hus, in the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage should not be permitt ed t o judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be su bm it t ed t o t h e ju dg m en t of t h e com petent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, a n d so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marr ia g e ex ist s for a ll in tents and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the ju dicia l declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage. T h e low er court therefore, has not erred in affirming the Orders of the judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court ruling that pendency of a civil action for nullity of marriage does not pose a pr eju dicia l qu est ion in a cr im in a l ca se of con cu bin a g e

SPOUSES A NTONIO S. PAHANG and LOLITA T. PAHANG, pet it ion er s v s. HON. A UGUSTINE A. VESTIL, Presiding Judge of Region a l T r ia l Cou r t - Br a n ch 56, Ma n da u e Ci t y , DEPUT Y SHERIFF, Region a l T r ia l Cou r t -Br a n ch 56 a n d MET ROPOLIT A N BA NK a n d T RUST COMPA NY, r espon den t s. G.R. No. 148595 Ju l y 12, 2004 FA CT S: t h e petitioners, Spouses Antonio and Lolita Pahang, received a short-term loan of on e m illion fiv e hundred thousand pesos (P1,500,000.00) from the respondent Metropolitan Bank & T r u st Com pany. The loan was covered by Non-Negotiable Promissory Note and was, likewise, secured by a real estate mortgage on a parcel of land covered . As the p etitioners failed to pay t h e loa n , t h e interest and the penalties due thereon, the respondent foreclosed the real estat e m or t g a g e ex trajudicially. As a consequence, the mortgaged property was sold at pu blic a u ct ion t o t h e

T h e respondent wrote the petitioners that the one-year redemption period of the property would ex pire on January 27, 1999. Instead of redeeming the property, the petitioners filed, a complaint for annu lm en t of ex t r a ju dicia l sa le a g a in st t h e r espon den t ba n k a n d t h e Sh er iff.

HELD: T h e con t en t ion s of t h e pet it ion er s h a v e n o m er it . A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of t h e issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It generally com es into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are bot h p en din g a n d t h ere exists in the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action m ay proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in t h e civ il a ct ion is r esolv ed w ou ld be det erminative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the crimina l ca se. T h e r ationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to a v oid t w o con flict in g decision s. In t he present case, the complaint of the petitioners for Annulment of Extrajudicial Sale is a civil a ction and the respondent‘s petition for the issuance of a writ of possession of Lot No. 3 -A, Block 1 , Psd-07-021410, TCT No. 44668 is but an incident in the land registration case and, therefor e, n o pr eju dicia l qu est ion ca n a r ise fr om t h e ex ist en ce of t h e t w o a ct ion s. It bears stressing that the proceedings in a petition and/or motion for the issuance of a w r it of possession, after the lapse of the statutory period for redemption, is summary in nature.The trial court is mandated to issue a writ of possession upon a finding of the lapse of the statutory period for r edemption without the redemptioner having redeemed the property. It cann ot be v a lidly a rgued that the trial court abused its discretion when it merely complied with its ministerial duty t o issu e t h e sa id w r it of possession . IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE. T h e a ssa iled decision of t h e Cou r t of A ppea ls is A FFIRMED.Cost a g a in st t h e pet it ion er s. SO ORDERED.

A BA CA N v s. NORT HWEST ERN UNIV ERSIT Y, INC G.R. No. 140777. A pr i l 8, 2005 FA CT S: T wo opposing factions within respondent Northwestern University, Inc. (NUI), the ―Castro‖ and t h e ―Nicolas‖ factions, seek control as the legitimate board thereof. These two factions are parties t o Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Case No. 12-96-5 469, which is an action filed by t h e ―Nicolas faction‖ t o nullify the election of the directors of NUI belon g in g t o t h e ― Ca st r o fa ction‖ and SEC Case No. 12-96-5511 which is a counter-suit initiated by the ―Ca st r o fa ct ion ‖ seeking the nullification of sev er a l boa r d r esolu t ion s pa ssed by t h e ― Nicola s fa ct ion .‖ On December 19, 1996, SEC Hearin g Officer Rola n do G. A n da y a , Jr ., issu ed a n Or der a uthorizing the ―Castro faction‖ and the Metropolitan Bank Laoag City branch to withdra w t h e

a m ount of P2.5M from the account of NUI with said bank. Metrobank thru Petitioner A ba ca n , com plied and released P1.4 M in favor of the ―Castro fact ion .‖ T h e ― Nicola s fa ct ion ‖ t h en in itiated a criminal complaint for estafa against the ―Castro faction‖ as well a s t h e pet it ion e r s h erein who are officers of Metrobank, however the criminal case was later dismissed in sofa r a s pet it ion er s a r e con cer n ed. Nicolas faction filed a suit for damages against Castro faction and petitioner on the ground t h a t t h e corporate funds of NUI deposited with said bank in the su m of P1 .4 M w a s w it h dr a w n w ithout the knowledge, consent or approval of NUI to t h e g r a v e a n d ser iou s da m a g e a n d pr eju dice of t h e la t t er . Ma r ieta Y. Palanca filed a motion t o dismiss alleging that SEC Case No. 12-96-5 469 m u st t a ke pr ecedence ov er the civil case since it is a logical antecedent t o the issue of standing in said case. Pet itioners then prayed for the dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case No. 112 9 6 -1 4 a g a in s t t h em, or in the alternative, to hold in abeyance the proceedings ther ein u n t il a ft er t h e fin a l det ermination of SEC Case No. 12-96-5 469. However, NUI avers that the r u le on pr eju dicia l qu estion finds no application between the civil complaint below and the case before t h e SEC a s t h e rule presupposes the pendency of a civil action and a criminal action; and ev en a ssu m in g a rguendo that the issues pending before the SEC bear a similarity t o the cause of act ion below , t h e com plaint of NUI can stand and proceed separately from the SEC case inasmuch as t h er e is n o iden t it y in t h e r eliefs pr a y ed for . ISSUE: W h et h er or n ot t h er e is pr eju dicia l qu est ion in t h is ca se. RULING: Y es. Considering the rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question, being t o a v oid t w o con flicting decisions, prudence dictates that we apply the principle underlying the doctrine to the ca se a t ba r . A prejudicial question is that which arises in a ca se, t h e r esolu t ion of w h ich is a log ica l a ntecedent of the issue involved therein and the cogn iza n ce of w h ich per t a in s t o a n ot h er t r ibunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before t h e cou r t bu t t h e ju r isdict ion t o t r y a n d r esolv e it m u st be lodg ed in a n ot h er cou r t or t r ibu n a l. In t he case at bar, the question of which between the Castro and the Nicolas factions ar e t h e de ju re board of directors of NUI is lodged before the SEC. The complaint before the RTC of Laoa g m eanwhile alleges that petitioners, together with their co-defendants, comprised of the ―Ca st r o fa ction,‖ wrongfully w it h dr ew t h e a m ou n t of P1 .4 M fr om t h e a ccou n t of NUI w it h Met robank. Moreover, whether or not Roy Nicolas of the ―Nicolas fact ion ‖ is a du ly elect ed m ember of the Board of NUI and thus with capacity to institute the herein complaint in behalf of t h e NUI depends on the findings of the SEC in the case pendin g befor e it . It w ou ld fin a lly det ermine whether Castro, et al. legally withdrew the subject amount from the bank and whether Nicolas lawfully initiated the complaint in behalf of herein respondent NUI. It is pet it ion er s‘ claim, and we agree, that the presence or absence of their liability for allowing the withdrawal of P1 .4 M from the account of NUI with Metrobank in favor of the ―Castro faction‖ is reliant on t h e fin dings of the SEC as to which of the two factions is the de jure board. Since the determinat ion of t h e SEC as to which of the two factions is the de jure board of NUI is crucial t o the resolu t ion of t h e case before the RTC. Hence, the trial court should suspend its proceedings unt il t h e SEC com es ou t w it h it s fin din g s.

CIV IL PERSONA LIT Y

A n t on io Gel u s v . Cou r t of A ppea l s No. L-16439. Ju l y 20, 1961 Doct rine: Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertain s pr imarily to the one injured, it is easy to see t h a t if n o a ct ion for su ch da m a g es cou ld be in stituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, n o su ch r ig h t of a ction could deliberately accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguish ed by it s pr e-n a t a l dea t h , sin ce n o t ransmission t o anyone can take place from one that lacked of juridical personality under Article 4 0 of the Civil Code, which expressly limits such prov ision a l per son a lit y by im posin g t h e con dit ion t h a t t h e ch ild sh ou ld be su bsequ en t ly a liv e. FA CT S: Nita Villanueva came t o know the petitioner, a physician, for the first time in 1948 — through her a unt Paula Yambot. The said physician made three abortions on Villanuev a on t h e follow in g circumstances: (1) In 1950, when she became pregnant by her present h u sba n d, Osca r La zo, before they were legally married, and she deisred t o conceal her pregnancy from her parents; (2) a ft er their marriage, her second pregnancy proved to be inconvenient as she was then w or kin g for the COMELEC; and lastly (3) on February 21, 1955 – she was aborted of a 2-month old fet u s for t h e a m ou n t of P5 0 .0 0 . Upon knowing of the last abortion, Lazo filed a complaint for damages against Geluz, cla im in g t h a t h e did n ot kn ow of, n or g a v e h is con sen t , t o t h e a bor t ion . T h e trial court rendered judgment in favor of Lazo and against Geluz, ordering the latter to pa y P3 ,000.00 as damages, P7 00.00 attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. On appeal, the Court of A ppea ls su st a in ed t h e a w a r d. ISSUE: W /N t h e a w a r d of da m a g es w a s pr oper . HELD: NO. the Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of da m a g es in t h e su m of P3 ,000.06 upon the provisions of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civ il Code of t h e Ph ilippines. This the Court believes to be error, for the said article, in fixing a minimum award of P3 ,000.00 for the death of a person, does not cover the case of an u n bor n foet u s t h a t is n ot en dow ed w it h per son a lit y ; bein g in ca pa ble of h a v in g r ig h t s a n d oblig a t ion s. Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily t o t he one injured, it is easy t o see that if no action for such dama g es cou ld be in st it u t ed on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such rig h t of a ct ion cou ld deliberately accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, ev en if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of t h e unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre -natal death, since n o t r a n sm ission t o a nyone can take place from one that lacked of juridical personality under Article 40 of the Civ il Code, which expressly limits such provisional personality by im posing the con dit ion t h a t t h e ch ild sh ou ld be su bsequ en t ly a liv e. Bot h the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found any basis for a n a w a r d of m or a l dam ages, evidently because of Lazo‘s indifference to the previous a bor t ion s of h is w ife, a lso caused by the petitioner herein, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of h is parental hopes and affections. The lower court expressly found, and the majority opin ion of t h e Court of Appeals did not contradict it, that the a ppellee La zo w a s a w a r e of t h e secon d a bortion; and the probabilities are that he was likewise a w a r e of t h e fir st . Y et despi t e t h e su spicious repetition of the event, he appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or pinpoin t t h e causes thereof, and secure the punishment of the respon sible pr a ct it ion er . Ev en a ft er

learning of the third abortion, the appellee does n ot seem t o h a v e t a ken in t er est in t h e a dm inistrative and criminal cases against the appellant. His only concern appears to have been dir ected at obtaining from the doctor a large money payment, since he su ed for P5 0 ,0 0 0 .0 0 dam ages and P3,000.00 attorney's fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the circumst a n ces of r ecor d, w a s clea r ly ex a g g er a t ed. It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion of appellee's wife, without m edical necessity t o warrant it, was a criminal and morally reprehensible act, that can not be too sev erely condemned; and the consent of the woman or that of her husband does n ot ex cu se it . Bu t the immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an award of damage th a t , u n der t h e cir cu m st a n ces on r ecor d, h a v e n o fa ct u a l or leg a l ba sis.

CIT IZENSHIP

Mer ca do v s. Ma n za n o G.R. No. 135083. Ma y 26, 1999 Doct r in e: Du a l citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises wh en , a s a r esu lt of t h e con current application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is sim u lt a n eou sly con sidered a national by the said states. Dual allegia n ce, on t h e ot h er h a n d, r efer s t o t h e sit uation in which a person simultaneously owes, by som e positive act, loyalty t o t w o or m or e st ates. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the r esu lt of a n in div idu a l‘s v olit ion . FA CT S: Pet itioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for v ice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel V. Daza III. T h e proclamation of private respondent was suspen ded in v i ew of a pen din g pet it ion for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a cit izen of t h e Ph ilippin es bu t of t h e Un it ed St a t es. COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of t h e cer t ifica t e of ca ndidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under §40(d) of t h e Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from r u n n in g for a n y elect iv e posit ion . T h e respondent admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Im m ig r a t ion u nder Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-31632 and alleged t h a t h e is a Filipin o cit izen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mot h er . He w a s bor n in t h e Un ited States, San Francisco, California, on September 14, 1955, and is considered an America n cit izen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did n ot lose h is Filipin o cit izen sh ip. It w ould appear that respondent Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen. In other words, he h olds du a l cit izen sh ip. ISSUE: W h ether or not Private Respondent Manzano is disqualified from the position for which he filed h is cer t ifica t e of ca n dida cy . HELD:

NO. He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, a s h is father and mother were Filipinos at the t ime of his birth. At the age of six (6), his paren t s br ought him to the Philippines using an American passport as travel document. His parents also r egistered him as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration. He was issu ed a n a lien certificate of registration. This, however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizen sh ip, a s h e did not renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the United St a t es. It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority, he registered himself a s a voter, and voted in the elections of 1 992, 1 995 and 1998, which effectively renounced his US cit izenship under American law. Under Philippine law, he n o lon g er h a d U.S. cit izen sh ip. Du a l citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises wh en , a s a r esu lt of t h e con current application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is sim u lt a n eou sly con sidered a national by the said states. Dual allegia n ce, on t h e ot h er h a n d, r efer s t o t h e sit uation in which a person simultaneously owes, by som e positive act, loyalty t o t w o or m or e st ates. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the r esu lt of a n in div idu a l‘s v olit ion . T h e phrase ―dual citizenship‖ in R.A. No. 7160, §40(d) and in R.A . No. 7 8 5 4 , §2 0 m u st be u nderstood as referring to ―dual allegiance.‖ Consequently, persons with mere dual citizen sh ip do n ot fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be su bject to strict process with respect t o the termination of their status, for candidates with du a l cit izenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certifica t es of ca n dida cy , t h ey elect Ph ilippine citizenship t o t erminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that t h eir condition is the unavoida ble con sequ en ce of con flict in g la w s of differ en t st a t es. T h e filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed t o r en ou n ce h is A m er ica n cit izen sh ip, effect iv ely r em ov in g a n y disqu a lifica t ion h e m ig h t h a v e a s a du a l cit izen . By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent r esident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Ph ilippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto an d t h a t h e does so w it h ou t m en t a l r eservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectiv ely r epudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may h a v e sa id befor e a s a du a l cit izen .Pet it ion dism issed

Repu bl ic v . Ch u l e Li m G.R. NO. 153883, Ja n u a r y 13, 2004 Fa ct s: Chule Lim claimes that she was born on October 29, 1954 in Buru-an, Iligan City. Her birth w a s r egistered in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte but the Municipal Civ il Reg ist r a r of Ka u sw a g a n t ransferred her record of birth t o Iligan City. She alleged that both her Kauswag a n a n d Ilig a n City records of birth hav e fou r er r on eou s en t r ies, a n d pr a y s t h a t t h ey be cor r ect ed. Du r in g t h e h ea r in g , r espon den t t est ified t h u s: Fir st, she claims that her surname "Yu" was misspelled as "Y o". She has been usin g "Y u " in a ll h er school records and in her marriage certificate. 2 She presented a clearance from the Nation a l Bu reau of Investigation (NBI)3 to further show the consistency in her use of the surna m e "Y u ". Second, she claims that her father‘s name in her birth record wa s w r it t en a s "Y o Diu T o (Co T ia n )" w h en it sh ou ld h a v e been "Y u Dio T o (Co T ia n )." T h ird, her nationality was entered as Chinese when it should have been Filipino considering that h er father and mother never got married. Only her deceased fath er w a s Ch in ese, w h ile h er

m other is Filipina. She claims that her being a registered voter attests t o the fa ct t h a t sh e is a Filipin o cit izen .

a utomatically became a Filipino upon birth. Stated differently , sh e is a Filipin o sin ce bir t h w ithout havin g t o elect Filipin o cit izen sh ip w h en sh e r ea ch ed t h e a g e of m a jor it y .

Finally, it was erroneously indicated in her birth certificate that she was a legitimate child wh en sh e should have been described as illegitimate considering that her parents were never married. Pla cida Anto, respondent‘s mother, testified that she is a Filipino citizen a s h er pa r en t s w er e bot h Filipinos from Camiguin. She added that she and her daughter‘s father were never married beca u se t h e la t t er h a d a pr ior su bsist in g m a r r ia g e con t r a c t ed in Ch in a .

In Ching, Re: Application for Admission to the Bar,11 citing In re Florencio Malla r e, 12 w e h eld: Est eban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a Filipino, a n d n o ot h er act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights and privileges attached to Philippine cit izenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos Co vs . Go vernm ent of the Philippine Is lands, 42 Phil. 543; Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952; Sy Quimsuan vs . Republic , L4 693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5 111, June 28, 1954). Neither cou ld a n y a ct be t a ken on the erroneous belief that he is a non-Filipino divest him of the citizenship privileg es t o w h ich h e is r ig h t fu lly en t it led. 13

In t his connection, respondent presented a certification attested by officia ls of t h e loca l civ il r egistries of Iligan City and Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte that there is n o r ecor d of m a r r ia g e bet w een Pla cida A n t o a n d Y u Dio T o fr om 1 9 4 8 t o t h e pr esen t . T h e Republic, through the City Prosecutor of Iligan City, did not present any evidence although it a ctively participated in the proceedings by attending hearings and cross-examining respon den t a n d h er w it n esses. On February 22, 2000, the trial court granted respondent‘s petition and render ed ju dg m en t . Issu e: W h et h er or n ot lim ‘s cit izen sh ip sh ou ld be ch a n g ed fr om Ch in ese t o Filipin o? Held: Y es. To digress, it is just as well that the Republic did not cite as error respondent‘s recou r se t o Ru le 108 of the Rules of Court to effect what indisputably a r e su bst a n t ia l cor r ect ion s a n d changes in entries in the civil register. To clarify, Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides t h e procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings under sa id rule may either be summary or adversary in nature. If the correction sought to be m a de in t h e civil register is clerical, then the procedure t o be adopted is summary. If t h e r ect ifica t ion a ffects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed su bst a n t ia l, a n d t h e pr ocedure to be adopted is adversary. This is our ruling in Republic v. Valencia 7 where w e h eld t hat even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the tru e fa ct s est a blish ed u nder Rule 108 provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appr opr ia t e a dv ersary proceeding. An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the tria l cou r t h a s conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully a n d pr oper ly dev eloped, w here opposing counsel have been given opportunity t o demolish the opposite party‘s case, a n d w h er e t h e ev iden ce h a s be en t h or ou g h ly w eig h ed a n d con sider ed. 8 A s likewise observed by the Court of Appeals, we take it that the Republic‘s failu r e t o cit e t h is er ror amounts to a recognition that this case properly falls under Rule 108 of the Revised Ru les of Court considering that the proceeding can be a ppr opr ia t ely cla ssified a s a dv er sa r ia l. In st ead, in its first assignment of error, the Republic avers that respondent did not comply w it h t h e constitutional requirement of electing Filipino citizenship w h en sh e r ea ch ed t h e a g e of m ajority. It cites Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitu t ion , w h ich pr ov ides t h a t t h e cit izenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother a n d a n a lien fa t h er follow ed t h e cit izenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippin e cit izenship.9 Likewise, the Republic invokes the provision in Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 6 25, that legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Ph ilippin e cit izen sh ip by ex pressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by t h e pa r t y con cer n e d before any officer authorized t o administer oaths, and sha ll be filed w it h t h e n ea r est civ il r egistry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of alleg ia n ce t o t h e Con st it u t ion a n d t h e Gov er n m en t of t h e Ph ilippin es."10 Pla inly, the above constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship apply on ly t o legitimate children. These do not apply in the case of respondent who was concededly an illegitimate child, considering that her Chinese father and Filipino mother were never mar r ied. A s such, she was not required t o comply with said constitutional and statutory requiremen t s t o become a Filipino citizen. By being an illegitimate ch ild of a Filipin o m ot h e r , r espon den t

T h is notwithstanding, the records show that respondent elected Filipino citizensh ip w h en sh e r eached the age of majority. She registered as a voter in Misamis Oriental when she was 18 years old. 14 The exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitut e a posit iv e a ct of elect ion of Ph ilippin e cit izen sh ip. 15 In it s second assignment of error, the Republic assails the Court of Appeals‘ decision in allowing r espondent to use h er fa t h er ‘s su r n a m e despit e it s fin din g t h a t sh e is illeg it im a t e. T h e Republic‘s submission is misleading. The Court of Appeals did not allow respondent t o u se h er father‘s surname. What it did allow was the correction of her father‘s misspelled su r n a m e w hich she has been using ever since she can remember. In this regard, respondent does not need a cou r t pr on ou n cem en t for h er t o u se h er fa t h er ‘s su r n a m e. Cou r t of A ppea ls is w a s cor r ect w h en it h eld: Fir stly, Petitioner-appellee is now 47 years old. T o bar her at this time from using h er fa t h er ‘s su rname which she has used for four decades without any known objection from anybody, would on ly sow confusion. Concededly, one of the reasons allowed for changing one‘s name or surname is t o a v oid con fu sion . Secondly, under Sec. 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 1 42, the law regulating t h e u se of a lia ses, a per son is a llow ed t o u se a n a m e "by w h ich h e h a s been kn ow n sin ce ch ildh ood." W h ile judicial authority is required for a chan g e of n a m e or su r n a m e, 18 t h er e is n o su ch r equirement for the continued use of a surname which a person has already been u sin g sin ce ch ildh ood. 19 T h e doctrine that disallows such change of name as would give the false impr ession of fa m ily r elationship remains valid but only to the extent that the proposed chang e of n a m e w ou ld in g r eat probability cause prejudice or future mischief to the family whose su r n a m e it is t h a t is inv olved or to the community in general. 20 In this case, the Republic has not shown that t h e Y u fam ily in China would probably be prejudiced or be the object of future mischief. In respondent‘s ca se, the change in the surname that she has been using for 40 years would even avoid confusion t o h er com m u n it y in g en er a l.

MA RRIA GE Ba l ogbog v s. CA G.R. No. 83598 Ma r ch 7, 1997 FA CT S: *Ba silio Ba log bog (1 9 5 1 ) @ *Gen ov ev a Ba log bog (1 9 6 1 ) – died in t est a t e. A. Leon cia (p) B. Ga u dioso (p) C. *Gavino (1935) @ Catalina Ubas (got separated) and lived wit h Eleu t er io Ker ia do. a. Ram onito (r) *Patronilo (died at 6 yrs old) and Generoso (r) – brought action for pa rtition and accounting as legitimate children of Gavino-Catalina. Cla im s 1 /3 sh a r e of Ga v in o in est a t e of Ba silio-Gen ov ev a Pet itioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of Basilio Balogbog and Gen ov ev a A rnibal who died intestate in 1951 and 1961, respectively. They had an older broth er , Ga v in o, bu t he died in 1935, predeceasing their parents. In 1968, private responden t s Ra m on it o a n d Generoso Balogbog brought an action for partition and accounting against petitioners, claimin g t hat they were the legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that, as such, t h ey w er e en titled t o the one-third share of Gavino in the estate of their grandparents. In t h eir a n sw er , pet itioners denied knowing private respondents. They alleged that their broth er Ga v in o died sin g le a n d w it h ou t issu e in t h eir pa r en t s‘ r esiden ce a t A st u r ia s, Cebu . T o su pport their claim, the petitioners obtained a certificate from the Local Civ il Reg ist r a r of A sturias to the effect that that office did not have a record of the names of Gavino and Catalin a . T h e certificate was prepared by Assistant Municipal Treasurer Juan Maranga, who testified tha t t h ere was no record of the marria g e of Ga v in o a n d Ca t a lin a in t h e Book of Ma r r ia g es. On the other hand, the private respondents presented several pieces of t estimonial eviden ce t o bolster their claim. Matias Pogoy, 3 a family friend of private respondent s, w h o t est ified t h a t pr ivate respondents are the children of Gavino and Catalina. He knew this because he att en ded t h eir wedding and was in fact asked by Gavino to accompany Catalina and carry h er w eddin g dr ess from her residence in Camanaol t o the poblacion of Asturia s befor e t h e w eddin g da y . Pog oy said he was a carpenter and he was the one who had made the coffin of Gav in o. He a lso m a de t h e coffin of t h e cou ple's son , Pet r on ilo, w h o died w h en h e w a s six . RT C: Partition and Accounting granted. 1/3 of g r a n dpa r en t s‘ est a t e be deliv er ed t o (r ). CA : Affirmed RTC decision. It held that private r espon den t s fa iled t o ov er com e t h e leg a l pr esumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband a n d w ife a r e in fa ct m arried, that a child is presumed to be legitimate, and that thing s h a ppen a ccor din g t o t h e or din a r y cou r se of n a t u r e a n d t h e or din a r y h a bit s of life. ISSUE: Whose claim, as supported by their r espect iv e pieces of ev iden ce, w ill pr ev a il? HELD: T h e cla im of t h e pr i v a t e r espon den t s w ill pr ev a il. Un der the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as h usband and wife are legally married. This presumption may be rebutted only by cogent proof to t h e contrary. In this case, petitioners‘ claim that the pieces of evidence pr esen t ed by pr iv a t e r espondents was belied by the production of the Book of Marriages by the assistant m u n icipa l t r easurer of Asturias. Petitioners argue that this book does not contain any entry pertain in g t o t h e alleged marriage of private respondents‘ parents. This contention has no merit. In Pugeda v. T r ias, the defendants, who questioned the marriage of the plaintiffs, produced a photostatic copy of t h e record of marriages of the Municipality of Rosario, Cavite for the month of January, 1916 , t o sh ow that there was no record of the alleged marriage. Nonetheless, evidence con sist in g of t h e testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the marriag e. In deed, a lt h ou g h a m arriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, the failur e t o pr esen t it is n ot pr oof that no marriage took place. Other evidence may be presented to prove marriag e. Her e, pr ivate respondents proved, through testimonial evidence, tha t Ga v in o a n d Ca t a lin a w er e

m arried in 1929; that they had three children, one of whom died in infancy; that their marr ia g e su bsisted until 1935 when Gavino died; and that their children , pr iv a t e r espon den t s, w er e r ecognized by Gavino‘s family and by t h e pu blic a s t h e leg it im a t e ch ildr en of Ga v in o. Neither is there merit in the argument of the petitioners that the ex ist en ce of t h e m a r r ia g e ca nnot be presumed because there was no evidence showing in par t icu la r t h a t Ga v in o a n d Ca talina, in the presence of two witnesses, declared that they were taking each other as husban d a n d wife. An exchange of vows can be presumed t o have been made from the testimonies of t h e w itnesses who state that a wedding took place, since the very purpose for having a wedding is t o ex change vows of marital commitment. It would indeed be unusual to have a wedding w it h ou t a n ex ch a n g e of v ow s a n d qu it e u n n a t u r a l for people n ot t o n ot ice it s a bsen ce. In a nother case, Gaudioso admitted in court that Ramonito was the son of his elder brother a n d a s su ch h is n eph ew . T h e law favors the validity of marriage, because the State is interested in the preservation of t h e fa m ily a n d t h e sa n ct it y of t h e fa m ily is a m a t t er of con st it u t ion a l con cer n .

V DA . De Ja cob V . CA 312 SCRA 772 FA CT S: Pla intiff-appellant [petitioner herein] claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Ja cob and was appointed Special Administratix for the various est a t es of t h e decea sed by v ir t u e of a r econ st r u ct ed Ma r r ia g e Con t r a ct bet w een h er self a n d t h e decea sed. Defendant-appellee on the other hand, claimed to be the lega lly -a dopt ed son of A lfr edo. In su pport of his claim, he presented an Order dated 1 8 July 1 961 issued by then Presidin g Ju dg e Jose L. Moya, CFI, Camarines Sur, granting the petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo in fa v or of Pedr o Pila pil. Du r ing the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Alfredo in Case No. T -4 6 (entitled "T omasa vda. de Jacob v. Jose Centenera, et al) h er ein defen da n t -a ppellee Pedr o sou ght to intervene therein claiming his share of the deceased‘s estate as Alfredo's adopt ed son a n d as his sole surviving heir. Pedro questioned the validity of the marriage between a ppella n t T om a sa a n d h is a dopt iv e fa t h er A lfr edo. A ppellant Tomasa opposed the Motion for Intervention and filed a complaint for injunction with dam ages (Civil Case No. T -83) questioning a ppellee's cla im a s t h e leg a l h eir of A lfr edo. a ppellant claims that the marriage between her and A lfr edo w a s solem n ized by on e Msg r . Flor encio C. Yllana, CBCP, Intramuros, Manila som etime in 1975. She could not h owever present t h e original copy of the Marriage Contract stating that the original docu m en t w a s lost w h en Msg r. Yllana allegedly gave it to Mr. Jose Centenera for registrat ion . In lieu of t h e or ig in a l, T om asa presented as secondary evidence a reconstructe d Marriage Contract issued in 197 8 . No copy of the Marriage Contract was sent t o the local civil registrar by the solemnizing officer thu s g iv ing the implication that there was no copy of the marriage cont r a ct sen t t o, n or a r ecor d ex ist in g in t h e civ il r eg ist r y of Ma n ila ; In signing the Marriage Contract, the late Alfredo Jacob merely placed his "thumbmark" on said con tract purportedly on 16 September 1975 (date of the m a r r ia g e). How ev er , on a Sw or n A ffidavit executed between appellant Tomasa and Alfredo a da y befor e t h e a lleg ed da t e of m arriage or on 15 September 1975 attesting that both of them lived together as husband and wife for five (5) years, Alfredo [af]fixed his custom ary signature. Thus the trial court concluded t h a t t h e "thumbmark" was logica ll y "n ot g en u in e". In ot h er w or ds, n ot of A lfr edo Ja cob‘s;

Issu e: Whether the marriage between the plaintiff-appellant and deceased A lfr edo Ja cob w a s v a lid? Held: Doct rinally, a void marriage may be subjected t o collateral attack, while a voidable one m a y be a ssailed only in a direct proceeding. 8 Aware of this fundamental distinction, Respondent Pila pil con tends that the marriage between Dr. Alfredo Jacob and petitioner was void ab initio, because t h ere was neither a marriage license nor a mar r ia g e cer em on y . 9 W e ca n n ot su st a in t h is con t en t ion . T o st art with, Respondent Pedro Pilapil argues that the marriage was void because t h e pa r t ies h a d no marriage license. This argument is misplaced, because it has been establish ed t h a t Dr . Ja cob and petitioner lived t ogether as husband and wife for at least five years. 10 An affida v it t o t h is effect was executed by Dr. Jacob and petitioner. 11 Clearly then, the marriage was exceptional in character and did not require a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code.12 The Civil Code governs this case, because the questioned marriage and the assailed adopt ion t ook pla ce pr ior t h e effect iv it y of t h e Fa m ily Code. "It is settled that if the original writing has been lost or destroyed or ca n n ot be pr odu ced in court, upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction, or unavailability, its contents ma y be pr ov ed by a copy or a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by r ecollect ion of w itnesses."13 Upon a showing that the document was duly execu t ed a n d su bsequ en t ly lost , w ithout any bad faith on the part of the offeror, secondary evidence may be adduced to prove it s con t en t s. 14 T h e trial court and the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when they (1) exclu ded t h e t estimonies of petitioner, Adela Pilapil and Msgr. Florencio Yllan a a n d (2 ) disr eg a r ded t h e following: (a) photographs of the wedding ceremony; (b) documentary eviden ce, su ch a s t h e let ter of Monsignor Yllana stating that he had solemnized the marriage between Dr. Ja cob a n d pet itioner, informed the Archbishop of Manila that the wedding had not been r ecor ded in t h e Book of Marriages, and at the same time requested the list of parties t o the m a r r ia g e; (c) t h e su bsequent authorization issued by the Archbishop — through his vicar general and chancellor , Msg r. Benjamin L. Marino — ordaining that the union between Dr . Ja cob a n d pet it ion er be r eflected through a corresponding entry in the Book of Marr ia g es; a n d (d) t h e A ffida v it of Mon signor Yllana st a t in g t h e cir cu m st a n ces of t h e loss of t h e m a r r ia g e cer t ifica t e. It sh ould be stressed that the due execution a n d t h e loss of t h e m a r r ia g e con t r a ct , bot h con stituting the conditio sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, w ere shown by the very evidence they have disregarded. They have thus confused the evidence to sh ow due execution and loss as "secondary" evidence of the marriage. In Hernaez v. Mcgrath, 15 t h e Cou r t cla r ified t h is m iscon cept ion t h u s: . . . [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of the execution of the in strument was barred. The court confounded the execution and the contents of the document. It is t he contents, . . . which may not be prove[n] by secondary evidence when the instrument itself is a ccessible. Proofs of the execution are not dependent on the existence or non-existence of t h e document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs precede proofs of the contents: du e ex ecu t ion , besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence of the con t en t s. T h e Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this issue by relying on Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete.16 But even there, we said that "m arriage ma y be pr ov e[n ] by ot h er com pet en t ev iden ce."17 T ruly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by t h e sw ea r in g officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by t h ose t o w hom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof. 18 The Court has also held t h a t "[t ]he loss may be shown by any person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one who ha[s] m ade, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or pla ces w h er e t h e

document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in w h ose cu st ody t h e document lost was, and has been unable t o find it; or who has made any ot h er in v est ig a t ion w hich is sufficient to satisfy the cou r t t h a t t h e in st r u m en t [h a s] in deed [been ] lost ." 19 In t he present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, w h o w a s pr esent during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a part y t o t h e ev en t . T h e su bsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor Y llana, as well as by petitioner's own declaration in court. These are relevant , com pet en t a n d a dm issible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clea r ly sh own by the evidence presented, secondary evidence — t estimonial and documentary — m ay be a dm it t ed t o pr ov e t h e fa ct of m a r r ia g e. T h e trial court pointed out that on the face of the reconstructed marriage contract were cer t a in ir regularities suggesting that it had fraudulently been obtained. 20 Ev en if we were to agree w it h t h e trial court and to disregard the reconstructed marriage contract, we must emphasize that this cer t ifica t e is n ot t h e on ly pr oof of t h e u n ion bet w een Dr . Ja cob a n d pet it ion er . Respondent Pedro Pilapil misplaces emphasis on the absence of an entry pertaining t o 1 9 7 5 in t h e Books of Marriage of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila and in th e Na t ion a l Cen su s a n d St atistics Office (NCSO).26 He finds it quite "bizarre" for petitioner to have waited t h r ee y ea r s before registering their marriage.27 On both counts, he proceeds from the wrong premise. In t h e fir st place, failure to send a copy of a marriage certificate for record purposes does not invalidate t h e marriage.28 In the second place, it was not t h e pet it ion er ‘s du t y t o sen d a copy of t h e m arriage certificate to the civil registrar. Instead, this charge fell upon the solemnizing officer . 29 T h e basis of human society throughout the civilized world is . . . of marriage. Ma r r ia g e in t h is ju risdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of w hich the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the abs ence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact m arried . T h e r eason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not wh a t t h ey t h u s h old themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decen cy a n d of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedu r e is "t h a t a m a n a n d w om a n deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful con t r a ct of m a r r ia g e." Sem per praes um itur pro m atrim onio — A lw a y s pr esu m e m a r r ia g e. T h is jurisprudential attitude31 towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption tha t a m an and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of m arriage.32 Given the undisputed, ev en accepted,33 fact that Dr. Jacob and pet it ion er liv ed t og ether as husband and wife,34 we find that the presumption of marriage was not r eb u t t ed in t h is ca se.

Repu bl ic Of T h e Ph il i ppi n es v . Cou r t of A ppea l s G.R. No. 92326 Ja n u a r y 24, 1992 Fa ct s: On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition t o adopt Jason Condat, then six (6) y ears old and who had been living with her family since he was four (4) months old, befor e t h e Reg ion a l T r ia l Cou r t of Leg a spi Cit y . T h e petition for adoption was filed by private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles on Febr u a r y 2 , 1 988, when the law applicable was Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child and Y ou t h W elfa r e Code. Under said code, a petition for adoption may be filed by either of the spouses or by both of t h em. However, after the trial court rendered its decision and while the ca se w a s pen din g on

a ppeal in the Court of Appeals, Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code, t ook effect on August 3 , 1988. Under the said new la w , join t a dopt ion by h u sba n d a n d w ife is m a n da t or y .

SILV ERIO v s. REPUBLIC G.R. No. 174689 Oct ober 22 2009

Pet itioner contends that the petition for adoption should be dismissed outright for it w a s filed solely by private respondent without joining her husband, in viola t ion of A r t icle 1 8 5 of t h e Fam ily Code which requires joint adoption by the spouses. It argues that the Family Code m u st be a pplied retroactively t o the petition filed by Mrs. Bobiles, as the latter did not acquire a vested r ig h t t o a dopt Ja son Con da t by t h e m er e filin g of h er pet it ion for a dopt ion .

FA CT S Pet itioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first n a m e a n d sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The petition impleaded the civil r egistrar of Manila as respondent. Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the Cit y of Ma nila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His n ame was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live bir t h (bir t h certificate). His sex was registered as "m ale." He further alleged that he is a male t r a n ssex u a l, t hat is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts a s a fem a le" a n d t h a t h e h a d a lw a y s identified himself with girls since childhood. Feeling trapped in a m a n ‘s body , h e con su lt ed sev eral doctors in the United States. He underwent psych olog ic a l ex a m in a t ion , h or m on e t r eatment and breast augmentation. His attempts t o transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, T h a ila n d. He w as thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (pet it ion er ) h a d in fa ct u ndergone the procedure. From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engag ed t o be m arried. He then sought t o have his name in his birth certificate ch a n g ed fr om "Rom m el Ja cinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "m ale" to "female." On t h e sch edu led in it ia l h ea r in g , ju risdictional requirements were established. No opposition to the petition was m a de. Du r in g t r ial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and h is A m er ica n fiancé, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses. On June 4, 2003, the trial court r en der ed a decision in fav or of petitioner. Its relevant portions read: Petitioner filed the present petition n ot t o ev a de a ny law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawfu l m ot iv e bu t solely for t h e pu rpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex. Firstly, the cour t is of t h e opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance with the principles of justice and equ ity. With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a w om an, now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioner‘s misfortune to be trapped in a man‘s body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him. Likewise, t h e cou r t believes that no harm, injury or prejudice will be caused to a n y body or t h e com m u n it y in g ranting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would brin g t h e m u ch -a w a it ed h a ppiness on the part of the petitioner and her [fiancé] and the rea liza t ion of t h eir dr ea m s. Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny t h e pr esen t pet it ion despite due notice and publication thereof. Ev en the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit t o in t er pose a n y opposit ion .

Issu es: Ca n the Family Code be applied retroactively to the petition for adoption filed by Zen a ida C. Bobiles a n d; Granting that the FC should be applied retroactively should the adoption in fa v or of pr iv a t e r espon den t on ly , h er h u sba n d n ot bein g a pet it ion er . Held: 1 .)Article 246 of the Family Code provides for r et r oa ct iv e effect of a ppr opr ia t e r elev a n t pr ov isions thereof, subject t o the qualification that such ret r osp ect iv e a pplica t ion w ill n ot pr ejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or ot h er la w s. A v ested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon ev ents foreign t o t he will of the holder. The term expresses the concept of present fixed interest which in r ig h t r eason and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately ju st a n d imperative right which enlightened free society, sensitive t o in h er en t a n d ir r efr a g a ble in dividual rights, cannot deny. Vested rights include not only leg a l or equ it a ble t it le t o t h e en forcement of a demand, but also an exemption from new obligations created after the right has v est ed. Un der the Child and Youth Welfare Code, private respondent had the right to file a pet it ion for a doption by herself, without joining her husband therein. When Mrs. Bobiles filed h er pet it ion , sh e was exercising her explicit and unconditional right under said law. Upon her filing t h er eof, h er right to file such petition alone and to have the same pr oceed t o fin a l a dju dica t ion , i n a ccordance with the law in force at the t ime, was already vested and can n ot be pr eju diced or im pa ir ed by t h e en a ct m en t of a n ew la w . W h en private respondent filed her petition in Special Proceedin g No. 1 3 8 6 , t h e t r ia l cou r t a cquired jurisdiction thereover in accordance with the gov erning law. Jurisdiction being a matter of su bstantive law, the established rule is that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by t h e st atute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. We do not fin d in t h e pr esen t ca se su ch fa ct s a s w ou ld con st it u t e it a s a n ex cept ion t o t h e r u le. 2 .)Petitioner argues that, even assuming that the Family Code should not apply retroa ct iv ely , t h e Court of Appeals should have modified the trial court's decision by granting the adoption in fav or of private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles only, her husband not being a petitioner . W e do n ot con sider t h is a s a t en a ble posit ion a n d, a ccor din g ly , r eject t h e sa m e. A lthough Dioscoro Bobiles was not named as one of the petitioners in the petition for a dopt ion filed by his wife, his affidavit of consent, attached t o the petition as A n n ex "B" a n d ex pr essly m ade an integral part thereof, shows that he himself actually joined his w ife in a dopt in g t h e ch ild. The pertinent parts of his written consent a n d t h e for eg oin g decla r a t ion s, a n d h is su bsequent confirmatory testimony in open court, are sufficient to make him a co-pet it ion er . Un der the circumstances then obtaining, and by reason of his foreign residence, he m u st h a v e y ielded to the legal advice that an affidavit of consent on his part sufficed to make him a party t o t h e petition. This is evident from the text of his affidavit. Pu n ct iliou sn ess in la n g u a g e a n d pedantry in the formal r equ ir em en t s sh ou ld y ield t o a n d be esch ew ed in t h e h ig h er con siderations of substantial justice. The future of an innocent child must not be compr om ised by arbitrary insistence of rigid adherence t o pr ocedu r a l r u les on t h e for m of plea din g s.

ISSUE W h ether or not sex reassignment is a ground for chang e of en t r y in t h e bir t h cer t ifica t e? HELD No, there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment and its effect . T h e sex of a per son is det ermined at birth, visually done by the birth a t t en da n t (t h e ph y sicia n or m idw ife) by ex amining the genitals of the infant Civil Register Law (Act 3753). If t h e det er m in a t ion of a per son‘s sex made at the time of his or her birth is not attendant by error, the same is immutable a n d m a y n ot be ch a n g ed by r ea son of a sex r ea ssig n m en t su r g er y .

SY v s. COURT OF A PPEA LS G.R. No. 127263. A pr il 12, 2000 FA CT S: Pet itioner and respondent contracted marriage on November 15, 1973. both were then 22 y ea r s old. Their union was blessed with two children. Respondent left their conjugal dwellin g , sin ce t h e t h ey liv ed sepa r a t ely . Pet itioner filed a petition for legal separation. Judgment was rendered dissolving their conjug a l pa rtnership of gains and appr ov in g a r eg im e of sepa r a t ion of pr oper t ies ba sed on t h e Mem orandum of Agreement executed by the spouse. The trial cour t g r a n t ed cu st ody of t h e ch ildr en t o Filipin a . Pet itioner filed a criminal action for attempted parricide aga in st h er h u sba n d, w h ich RT C con v ict ed h im for lesser offen se of slig h t ph y sica l in ju r ies. Pet itioner filed a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage on the ground of psy chological incapacity. RTC denied. CA affirmed. The petitioner for the first time on a ppea l, t h e issu e w it h r eg a r d t o t h e a bsen ce of m a r r ia g e licen se. ISSUE: W h et h er or n ot t h e m a r r ia g e is v a lid? HELD: No. The marriage is not valid on t h e g r ou n d t h a t t h er e is n o m a r r ia g e licen se. A lthough, the petitioner raises the issue for the first time on appeal the issue on lack of marriage license. The petitioner states that though she did n ot ca t eg or ica lly st a t e h er pet it ion for a nnulment of marriage before the trial court that the inconguinoty in the dates of the mar r ia g e license and the celebration of the marriage itself would lead to the conclusion that her marria g e t o r espondent was void from the beginning, she pointed ou t t h a t t h ese cr it ica l da t es w er e con t a in ed in t h e docu m en t s sh e su bm it t ed befor e t h e Cou r t .

However, Perlita Mercader, Registration Officer III of t he Local Registry of San Juan, identified t h e Certificates issued by Rafael Aliscad, Jr., the Local Civil Registrar, and test ified t h a t t h eir office failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 may have been register ed. ISSUE: W h et h er or n ot t h e m a r r ia g e is v oid for la ck of a v a lid m a r r ia g e licen se? HELD: No. It has been held by the Court that the certificates issued by the Local Civil Registra r w ere not sufficient as to invalidate the marriage license no. 2770792 which had been secured by t h e parties. It could be easily implied from the said statement that the Office of the Loca l Civ il Reg istrar could not exert its best efforts to locate and determ in e t h e ex ist en ce of Ma r r ia g e License No. 2770792 due to its "loaded work‖ and that they failed to locate the book in which the m arriage license was entered. Likewise, both certifications failed to state with absolute certainty w h et h er or n ot su ch licen se w a s issu ed. T h is implication is confirmed in the testimony of the representative from the Office of the Loca l Civ il Registrar of San Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader, who stated that they cannot locate the logbook du e t o the fact that the person in charge of the said logbook had already retir ed. Fu r t h e r , t h e t estimony of the said person was not presented in evidence. It does not appear on record that the form er custodian of the logbook was deceased or missing, or that his test im on y cou ld n ot be secured. This belies the claim that all efforts to locate the logbook or prove the material content s t h er ein , h a d been ex er t ed. It is r equired that the custodian of the document is authorize to certify t h a t despit e dilig en t sea rch, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified t enor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil r eg ist r a r s a r e pu blic officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book wher e t h ey a r e r equired t o enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the a pplica n t s, t h e da t e t h e m a r r ia g e licen se w a s issu ed a n d su ch ot h er r elev a n t da t a .

T h e marriage license was issued one year after the ceremony t ook place. Hence the marriage was celebr a t ed w it h ou t t h e m a r r ia g e licen se. Pet it ion g r a n t ed.

SEV ILLA v s. CA RDENA S G.R. No. 167684. Ju l y 31, 2006. FA CT S: Herein petitioner, Jaime Sevilla and respondent Carmelita Cardenas were a lleg edly m a r r ied w ithout a valid marriage license. The former contended that his marriage wit h t h e la t t er w a s con tracted through machinations, duress and intimidation employed upon him by Carmelita N. Ca rdenas and the latter's father, retired Colonel Jose Car den a s of t h e A r m ed For ces of t h e Ph ilippines. That they never applied or obtained a marriage license for their supposed marriage, t hus no marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer. In support for his contention, pet itioner further argued that although marriage license no. 2770792 allegedly issu ed in Sa n Ju an, Rizal on May 19, 1 969 was indicated in the marriage contract, the same was fict it iou s for h e never applied for any marriage license, Upon verifications made by him through his la w y er , A t ty. Jose M. Abola, with the Civil Registry of San Juan, a Certification was issued by Ra fa el D. A liscad, Jr., Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, that "no marriage license no. 2770792 w a s ev er issu ed by sa id office."

OSCA R P. MA LLION v s. EDIT HA A LCA NT A RA G.R. No. 141528. Oct ober 31, 2006 FA CT S: On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar P. Mallion filed a petition with the RTC, Branch 29, of San Pa blo City seeking a declaration of nullity of his marriage t o respondent Editha Alcantara under A rticle 36 of the Family Code, citing respondent's alleged psychological incapacity. After trial on t h e merits, the RTC denied the petition in a decision dated November 11, 1997 upon the fin din g t hat petitioner "failed t o adduce preponderant evidence to warrant the grant of t h e r elief h e is seeking." The appeal filed with the Court of Appea ls w a s likew ise dism issed for fa ilu r e of pet itioner t o pay t h e docket a n d ot h er la w fu l fees w it h in t h e r eg lem en t a r y per iod. A fter the decision in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95 attained finality, petitioner filed on July 12, 1999 a n other petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC of San Pablo City, this t im e a lleging that his marriage with respondent wa s n u ll a n d v oid du e t o t h e fa ct t h a t it w a s celebrated without a valid marriage license. For her part, respondent filed a n a n sw er w it h a m otion to dismiss, praying for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of r es ju dica t a a n d for u m sh oppin g . In a n order dated October 8, 1999, the RTC granted respondent's motion to dismiss. Petitioner 's m ot ion for r econ sider a t ion w a s a lso den ied. Pet itioner argues that while the relief prayed for in the two cases w a s t h e sa m e, t h a t is, t h e declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent, the cause of action in the ear lier ca se w a s dist inct and separate from the cause of action in the present case because t h e oper a t iv e fa ct s

u pon which they were based as well as the evidence required to sustain either w e r e differ en t . Because there is no identity as to the cause of action, petitioner claims that res judicata does n ot lie t o bar the second petition. In this connection, petitioner maintains that there was no violation of t h e rule on forum shopping or of the rule which proscribes the splitting of a cau se of a ct ion . On the other hand, respondent, in her comment counters that while the present suit is anchored on a different ground, it still involves the same issue raised in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95, that is, t h e validity of petitioner and respondent's marriage, and prays for the same remedy, that is, t h e declaration of nullity of their marriage. Respondent thus contends that petitioner v iola t ed t h e r u le on forum shopping. Moreover, respondent asserts that pe t it ion er v iola t ed t h e r u le on m ultiplicity of suits as the ground he cites in this petition could have been raised during the trial in Civ il Ca se No. SP 4 3 4 1 -9 5 . ISSUE: T h e issue before this Court is one of first impression. Should the matter of th e in v a l idit y of a m arriage due to the absence of an essential requisite prescribed by Article 4 of the Family Code be raised in the same proceeding where the marriage is being impu g n ed on t h e g r ou n d of a pa r t y 's psy ch olog ica l in ca pa cit y u n der A r t icle 3 6 of t h e Fa m ily Code? HELD: Pet itioner insists that because the action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the g r ou n d of psy chological incapacity and the action for declaration of nullity of marriage on t h e g r ou n d of a bsence of marriage license constitute separate causes of action, the present case would not fa ll u nder the prohibition against splitting a single cause of action nor would it be ba r r ed by t h e pr in ciple of r es ju dica t a . T h e contention is untenable. Res judicata is defined as "a matter adjudged; a t h in g ju dicia lly a cted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. It also refers to the rule that a final ju dgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the righ t s of t h e parties or their privies in all later suits on points and matters determined in t h e for m er su it ." T h is doctrine is a rule which pervades every well-regulated sy st em of ju r ispr u den ce a n d is fou nded upon the following precepts of common law, namely: (1) public policy a n d n ecessit y , w hich makes it t o the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation, a n d (2 ) t h e h ardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause. A contrary doctrine w ould subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individu a ls a n d pr efer t h e g ratification of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the preservat ion of t h e pu blic t r a n qu ilit y a n d h a ppin ess. Res judicata in this sense requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1 ) t h e for m er ju dgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the pa rties; (3) it is a judgment or an order on the merits; and (4) there is — between t h e fir st a n d t h e second act ion s — iden t it y of pa r t ies, of su bject m a t t er , a n d of ca u ses of a ct ion . Pet itioner does not dispute the existence of the first three requisit es. W h a t is in issu e is t h e pr esence of the fourth requisite. In this regard, the t est to determine whether the causes of action a r e identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain both a ct ion s, or w h et h er t h ere is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions. If the same fa ct s or ev idence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same, and a judgment in t h e fir st ca se is a ba r t o t h e su bsequ en t a ct ion . Ba sed on this test, petitioner would contend that the two petitions brought by him seekin g t h e declaration of nullity of his marriage are anchored on separate causes of action for the eviden ce n ecessary to sustain the first petition which was anchored on the alleged psychological incapacity of r espondent is different from the evidence necessary t o sustain the present petit ion w h ich is a n ch or ed on t h e pu r por t ed a bsen ce of a m a r r ia g e licen se. Pet itioner, however, forgets that he is simply invoking different grounds for the sa m e ca u se of a ction. By definition, a cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates the right of

a n other. In both petitions, petitioner has the same cause — the decla r a t ion of n u llit y of h is m arriage to respondent. What differs is the ground upon which the cause of action is predicated. T h ese grounds cited by petitioner essentially split the various aspects of the pivot a l issu e t h a t h olds the key to the resolution of this controversy, that is, the actual sta t u s of pet it ion er a n d r espon den t 's m a r r ia g e. Fu rthermore, the instant case is premised on the claim that t h e m a r r ia g e is n u ll a n d v oid because no valid celebration of the same t ook place due to the alleged lack of a marriage license. In Civil Case No. SP 4341-95, however, petitioner im pliedly conceded that the marriage had been solem nized and celebrated in accordance with law. Petitioner is now bound by this a dm ission . T h e alleged absence of a marriage license which petitioner raises now could have been presented a n d heard in the earlier case. Suffice it to state that parties are bound not only as regards ev er y m atter offered and received to sustain or defeat their claims or dem a n d bu t a s t o a n y ot h er a dm issible matter which might have been offered for that purpose and of all other matter s t h a t cou ld h a v e been a dju dg ed in t h a t ca se. It m us t be emphasized that a party cannot evade or avoid the application of res judicata by s im ply varying the form of his action o r adopting a different method of presenting his cas e. It bears stressing that a party cannot divide the grounds for recovery. A plaintiff is mandated to place in issue in his pleading, all the issues existing when the suit began. A law s uit cannot be tried piecemeal. The plaintiff is bound to set forth in his firs t action every ground for relief w hich he claims to exist and upon which he relied, and cannot be permitted to rely upon them by piecem eal in s ucces s ive action to recover for the s am e w rong or injury.

RODOLFO G. NA V A RRO v s. JUDGE HERNA NDO C. DOMA GT OY. A .M. No. MT J-96-108. Ju l y 19, 1996 FA CT S: T h e com plainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Nor t e, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific act s com m it t ed by r espondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Dom agt oy , w h ich , h e con t en ds, ex hibits gross miscondu ct a s w ell a s in efficien cy in office a n d ig n or a n ce of t h e la w . Fir st, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the weddin g bet w een Ga spa r A . T agadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from h is fir st w ife. Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Su m a y lo a n d Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1 9 9 4 . Respon den t ju dge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circu it T r ia l Cou r t of St a . Mon ica Bu rgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's residen ce in t h e municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the municipalit ies of St a. Monica and Burgos, located som e 40 to 45 kilometers away from t h e m u n icipa lit y of Da pa , Su r ig a o del Nor t e. Respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having solemnized the mar r ia g e bet w een Ga spar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating t h a t h e m erely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confir m in g t h e fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for a lm ost sev en y ea r s. W ith respect to the second charge, he maintains that in solemnizin g t h e m a r r ia g e bet w een Sum aylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Fa m ily Code w h ich st ates that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within t h e court's ju r isdict ion ;" a n d t h a t a r t icle 8 t h er eof a pplies t o t h e ca se in qu est ion .

T h e marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga states t h a t T a g a da n 's civ il st atus is "separated." Despite this declaration, the weddin g cer em on y w a s solem n ized by r espondent judge. He presented in evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A . La ba do, Sr . a n d Eu g enio Bullecer, subscribed and sworn t o before Judge Demost h en es C. Du qu illa , MT C of Ba sey, Samar. In their affidavit, the affiants stated that they knew Gaspar Tagadan to have been civ illy married t o Ida D. Peñaranda in September 1983; that after thirteen years of cohabita t ion a n d having borne five children, Ida Peñaranda left the conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidn on a n d that she has not returned nor been heard of for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the pr esu m pt ion t h a t sh e is a lr ea dy dea d.

t h ere is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite, which while it may not affect the validit y of t h e m a r r ia g e, m a y su bject t h e officia t in g officia l t o a dm in ist r a t iv e lia bilit y . Respondent judge's jurisdiction cov ers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was not clothed with authority t o solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Suriga o del Nor t e.

ISSUE: 1 .Whether or not the joint affidavit is su fficien t pr oof of t h e w ife's pr esu m pt iv e dea t h ? 2 .Whether or not the respondent judge erred when he solemnized the m a r r ia g e ou t side h is cou r t 's ju r isdict ion ?

T h e marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void, ther e bein g a su bsist in g m a r r ia g e bet w een Ga spa r T a g a da n a n d Ida Peñ a r a n da .

HELD: 1 . The Supreme Court ruled that the joint a ffida v it is in su fficien t pr oof t o decla r e w ife's pr esu m pt iv e dea t h . A rticle 41 of the Family Code expressly provides t h a t ― for t h e pu r pose of con t r a ct in g t h e su bsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, th e spou se pr esen t m u st in st it u t e a sum mary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptiv e dea t h of t h e a bsen t ee, w it h ou t pr eju dice t o t h e effect of r ea ppea r a n ce of t h e a bsen t spou se.‖ Ev en if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dea d, a sum mary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a su bsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been precisely incorporated int o t h e Fam ily Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it is n ot pr ov en t h a t t h e pr ev iou s m arriage has been dissolved or a missing spou se is fa ct u a lly or pr esu m pt iv ely dea d, in a ccor da n ce w it h per t in en t pr ov ision s of la w . Ga spar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declarat ion of h is fir st w ife's pr esumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains m a r r ied t o Ida Peñ a r a n da . W h ether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge t o h a v e a ccepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignoran ce of t h e la w h a s r esu lt ed in a big a m ou s, a n d t h er efor e v oid, m a r r ia g e. 2 . The Supreme Court ruled that Judge Domagtoy erred when h e soem n ized t h e m a r r ia g e ou t side his court's jurisdiction. According to article 8 of the Familiy Code ―The marriage shall be solem nized publicly in the chambers the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or t emple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or v ice-con su l, a s t h e ca se m a y be, a n d n ot elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remot e pla ces in a ccordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer in w riting in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sw or n st a t em en t t o t h a t effect .‖ T h ere is no proof that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in t h e r em ot e place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by on ly on e pa r t y , Gem m a del Rosa r io. On e of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer." A r t icle 8 , w hich is a directory provision, refers only t o the venue of the marriage ceremony a n d does n ot a lter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding pr ov ision . Non -com plia n ce h er ew it h w ill n ot in v a lida t e t h e m a r r ia g e. Ju dges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only w it h in sa i d a r eas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside h is cou r t 's ju r isdict ion ,

T h e Supreme Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignora n ce of t h e la w . T h e leg a l pr inciples applicable in the cases brought t o our attention are elementary and uncom plica t ed, pr om pting us to conclu de t h a t r espon den t 's fa ilu r e t o a pply t h em is du e t o a la ck of com prehension of the law. Ju dg e Dom a g t oy is SUSPENDED for a per iod of 6 m on t h s.

BESO v s. DA GUMA N A .M. No. 99-1211, Ja n u a r y 28, 2000 FA CT S: On August 28, 1997, the marriage between Zenaida Beso and Bernardito Yman was solemn ized by Judge Juan Daguman at J.P.R. Subdivision in Calbayog City, Samar. After the wedding, Yman a bandoned Petitioner. Thereafter, Petitioner found that her marriage was not registered a t t h e Civ il Registry. She then filed an administrative com plaint against the Respondent charging h im w ith Neglect of Duty and Abuse of Authority for solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdiction a n d of negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering the marria g e con t r a ct w it h t h e office of t h e Loca l Reg ist r a r . In h is Comment, Respondent averred that the civil marriage had t o be solemnized ou t side h is t erritory because on that date respondent was physically indisposed and unable t o report t o h is st ation in Sta. Margarita and that Beso and Yman unexpectedly cam e t o h is h ou se u r g en t ly r equesting the celebration of their marriage rites since the complaina n t , w h o is a n ov er sea s w orker, would be out of the country for a long period and their marriag e licen se w ou ld la pse before she could return to the Philippines. He further averred that after handling t o Y m a n t h e fir st copy of the marriage certificate, he left the three remaining copies on t op of the desk i n h is pr ivate office intending later to register the duplicate and triplicate copies and to keep the fourth in his office but said copies were lost; that he diligently searched for them and even su bpoen a d Y m an to further inquire but was told that Com plainant put the copies of the marriage certificat e in her bag during the weddin g pa r t y a n d t h a t Com pla in a n t a lr ea dy left for a br oa d. ISSUE: W h ether or not the respon den t is g u ilt y of Neg lect of Du t y a n d A bu se of A u t h or it y ? HELD: Y es. As presiding judge of the MCTC Sta. Margarita Tarangnan-Pagsanjan, Samar, his authorit y t o solemnize marriage is only limited to those municipalities under his jurisdiction. Considering t hat respondents Judge's jurisdiction covers the municipality of St a . Ma r g a r it a -T a r a n g a n Pa gsanjan, Samar only, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the Cit y of Ca lbayog. As provided by Article 8 of the Family Code, wherein a marriage may be solemnized by a judge outside his chamber[s] or at a place other than his sala, to wit:(1) when either or bot h of t h e contracting parties is at the point of death;(2) when the residence of either party is located in a r emote place; (3) where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in wh i ch ca se the marriage may be solemnized at a house or pla ce desig n a t ed by t h em in a sw or n st atement to that effect. The foregoing circumstances a r e u n a v a ilin g in t h e in st a n t ca se. Mor eover, as solemnizing officer, respondent Judge neglected his duty when he failed t o register t h e marriage. Such duty is entrusted upon him pursuan t t o A r t icle 2 3 of t h e Fa m ily Code

r equiring the same not later than fifteen days after the marriage. The records show that th e loss w as occasioned by carelessness on respondent Judge's part. Hence, Respon den t is g u ilt y of n eg lect of du t y a n d a bu se of a u t h or it y .

REPUBLIC v s. IYOY G.R. No. 152577 Sept em ber 21, 2005 FA CT S: Pr ivate respondent Crasus Iy oy filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of m a r r ia g e du e t o psy chological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code, in relation with Articles 68, 70, and 7 2, with Fely Ada Rosal. According to him, they got married in 1961. The marriage produced five ch ildren. But the marriage faded because Fely was a nagger, extravagant and hot-temper ed. In 1 984, Fely left for the United States. Barely a year after she left, Crasus received a letter from her r equesting that he sign the divorce papers. But he ignored the request Sometime in 1985, he was in formed that Fely had already married an American. In 1987, she came back t o the Philippin es w ith her American family. In 1990, she came back to attend the wedding of their eldest son, bu t in the invitations, she used the surname of her American husband. She returned in 1992 for t h e operation of their fourth child. In her Answer to the Complaint, she asserted that she was already a n American citizen in 1988, that she was no longer hot-tempered, nagger and extravagant a n d t hat the only reason she went to the United States was that their in com e w a s n ot en ou g h t o su stain their family, that it was Crasus who was irresponsible and in fact livin g w it h a n ot h er w om an who bore her a child. She also denied that she sent a letter requesting h im t o sig n t h e div orce papers. After hearing both sides, the RTC rendered a decision declaring t h e m a r r ia g e n ull and void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code. On appea l, t h e Cou r t of A ppea ls a ffirmed the decision of the lower court but this time it had added a ratiocination, sta t in g t h a t A r t icle 2 6 , 2 nd pa r a g r a ph of t h e Fa m ily Code is a pplica ble a lso t o t h is ca se. ISSUES: 1 . W h et h er or n ot t h er e w a s psy ch olog ica l in ca pa cit y on t h e pa r t of Fely ? 2 . Whether or not the second paragraph of A r t icle 2 6 of t h e Fa m ily Code is a pplica ble? HELD

REPUBLIC v s. ORBECIDO III GR No. 154380 Oct ober 5, 2005 FA CT S: In 1 981, Cipriano Orbecido and Lady My ros Villanueva were married in Oza m is Cit y . T h eir m arriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Krsitoffer and Kimberly. In 1986, Lady My r os left for the US bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that h is w ife h a d been n a t u r a lized a s a n A m er ica n cit izen . Som etime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a div or ce decr ee a n d then married an American, Innocent Stanley. Thereafter, Cipriano filed with the trial court a pet ition for authority t o remarry invoking paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. Findin g m erit on the petition, the court granted the same. The Repu blic, t h r ou g h t h e Office of t h e Solicit or Gen er a l (OSG), sou g h t r econ sider a t ion bu t it w a s den ied. In t his petition, the Republic contends that Par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code is not applicable t o t he instant case because it only applies to a valid m ix ed m a r r ia g e; t h a t is, a m a r r ia g e celebr a t ed bet w een a Filipin o a n d a n a lien . ISSUE: W h ether or not respondent can r em a r r y pu r su a n t t o A r t icle 2 6 of t h e Fa m ily Code? HELD: T h e Supreme Court was unanimous in holding that par. 2, Art. 26 of the Family Code should be in terpreted t o allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spou se w h o h a d a cqu ir ed for eig n cit izen sh ip a n d r em a r r ied, a lso t o r em a r r y . T h e twin elements of Par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code are a s follow s: (1 ) t h er e is a v a lid m arriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreig n er a n d (2 ) a v a lid div orce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The reckoning point is not the citizenship at the time of the celebration of marriage, but their citizenship at t h e t im e a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter t o remarry. In t h is case, when Lady My ros was naturalized as an American cit izen , t h er e w a s st ill a v a lid m arriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. Subsequently, the wife obtain ed a div orce capacitating him to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites are both presen t in t h e ca se. T h u s, Cipr ia n o, t h e ‗div or ced‘ Filipin o spou se, sh ou ld be a llow ed t o r em a r r y .

1 . The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Article 36 contemplates downrigh t in ca pa cit y or in ability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations, not a mer e r efu sa l, n eglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. It was h eld in pr ev iou s r u lings that irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emot ion a l im m a t u r it y a n d ir responsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sex u a l in fidelit y or per v er sion , a n d a bandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the sa id A r t icle.

However, for respondent‘s plea to prosper, he must prove that his wife was n a t u r a lized a s a n A m erican citizen and must show sufficient proof of the divorce decree. Cipriano failed to do th is so t h e pet it ion of t h e Repu blic w a s g r a n t ed.

2 . The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The second paragraph of Article 26 is not applicable. A s plainly worded, the provision refers to a special situation wherein a foreigner divorces h is or h er Filipino spouse. However, in this case, it cannot be applied because of the simple fact that a t t h e time Fely secured a divorce decree, she was still a Filipino. Fely admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she married her American spouse in 1985 but she also adm it t ed t h a t sh e became and American citizen only in 1988. Thus, she was still a Filipino citizen and Article 15 of t h e Civil Code applies, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, con dit ion a n d leg a l ca pa c it y , ev en t h ou g h sh e w a s a lr ea dy liv in g a br oa d.

A t ien za v s. Br il l a n t es A .M. No. MT J-92-706, 29 Ma r ch 1995 Qu ia son , J.: FA CT S: A com plaint file by complainant Lupo A. A t ien za (― A t ien za ‖ ) for g r oss im m or a lit y a n d a ppearance of impropriety against respondent Judge Francisco Brillantes, Jr . (― Br illa n t es‖ ). A t ienza has two children with Y olanda De Castrp (―De Castro‖). There was a time when Atien za chanced upon Brillantes sleeping on his bedroom and was later on informed by their h ou seboy t h a t Br illa n t es is coh a bit in g w iot h De Ca st r o. A t ienza claims that Brillantes was married t o Zenaida Ongkiko (―Ongkiko‖) whom the latter h a s fiv e ch ildr en .

Br illantes denied having married Ongkiko, because it was celebrated without a marriage license, t h e same incident also happened on their second marriage. Brillantes was thereafter abandoned by On g kiko sev en t een y ea r s a g o. Br illantes claims that when he married De Castro in Los Angeles, California, he believed in g ood fa ith and for all legal purposes that he was single because h is m a r r ia g e w it h On g kiko w a s celebr a t ed w it h ou t a licen se. ISSUE: W ether a judicial declaration that the previous marriage was void is u n der A r t icle 4 0 of t h e Fa m ily Code r equ ir ed befor e en t er in g in t o a secon d m a r r ia g e. RULING: Y ES, respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him con sidering that his first marriage t ook place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of t h e Ph ilippines, while the second marriage t ook place in 1991 and governed by t h e Fa m ily Code. A rticle 40 of the Family Code is applicable to marriages entered into after the effectively of t h e Fam ily Code on 3 August 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 2 5 6 of the Family Code, said article is given ―retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or im pair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civ il Code or ot h er La w s.‖ T h is is pa rticularly true with Article 40 of the Family Code, which is a rule of procedu r e. Respon den t h a s not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of A r t icle of t h e Fa m ily Code in t h is ca se. >Dig est by : A lla n Ma t t h ew G. Bu eser

Bor ja -Ma n za n o v s. Sa n ch ez A .M. No. MT J-00-1329, 8 Ma r ch 2001 Da v id, Jr . C,.J.: FA CT S: Com plainant-petitioner Herminia Borja-Manzano (―Herminia‖) was the lawful wife of t h e la t e Da v id Manzano being married on 21 May 1966. On 22 nd of March 1993, her husband contract ed a n other marriage with one Luzv iminda Payao before r espon den t Ju dg e Roqu e R. Sa n ch ez (― Judge Sanchez‖). That Judge Sanchez should have known that the marriage was a big a m ou s on e as the marr ia g e clea r ly st a t ed t h a t bot h con t r a ct in g pa r t ies w er e ― Sepa r a t e‖ . Ju dge Sanchez claims innocence as to the fact of the previous marriage, and solem n ized t h eir m a r r ia g e in a ccor da n ce w it h A r t icle 3 4 of t h e Fa m ily Code. ISSUE: W h et h er Ju dg e Sa n ch ez sh ou ld be h eld lia ble. RULING: Y ES, for Article 31 of the Family Code to apply the provision on legal r a t ifica t ion of m a r it a l coh a bit a t ion t o a pply , t h e follow in g r equ isit es m u st a pply : T h e man and wom an have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years befor e t h e m a r r ia g e; T h e parties must have no legal impediment t o marry each other;Th e fa ct of a bsen ce of leg a l im pedim en t bet w een t h e pa r t ies m u st be pr esen t a t t h e t im e of m a r r ia g e; T h e parties must execute an affidavit stating that they lived together for at least five y ea r s a n d a r e w it h ou t leg a l im pedim en t t o m a r r y ea ch ot h er .

T h e solemnizing officer must execu t e a sw or n st a t em en t t h a t h e h a d a scer t a in ed t h e qu alifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impedim en t t o t h eir m a r r ia g e. Not a ll this requirement are present in the case at bar. It is sign ifica n t t o n ot e t h a t in t h eir separate affidavits executed on 22nd of March 1993 and sw or n t o befor e r espon den t Ju dg e h im self. David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior ex ist in g m arriage. Also in their marriage con t r a ct , it w a s in dica t ed t h a t bot h w er e sepa r a t ed. Dig est by : A lla n Ma t t h ew G. Bu eser

V OID MA RRIA GES

Su n t a y v s. Coju a n gco-Su n t a y G.R. No. 132524, 29 Decem ber 1998 Ma r t in ez, J: FA CT S: Em ilio Aguinaldo Suntay (―Emilio‖), son of petitioner Federico Suntay (―Federico‖), was married t o Isa bel Cojuangco-Suntay (―Isabel:‖) their marriage was celebrated in the Portuguese Colony of Ma ca o. Su bsequ en t ly it w a s decla r ed a s v oid a b in it io or n u ll a n d v oid. T h e basis of the Court of First Instance for such a ruling was that Em ilio suffers from a m en t a l a ber r a t ion kn ow n a s sch izoph r en ia . Em ilio predeceased his mother, decedent Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay. Isabel, herein responden t , t h e daughter of Em ilio and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay, filed before the Reg ion a l T r ia l Cou r t a pet ition for letters of administration of the intestate estate of her late g r a n dm ot h er Cr ist in a A g u in a ldo Su n t a y . Pet itioner Federico moved to dismiss the case on the ground of Article 922 of the Civil Code a n illegitimate child has no right to succeed by right of representation the legitimate relatives of her fa ther or mother. Federico contends that Em ilio Aguinaldo Suntay, respondent Isa bel‘s fa t h er pr edeceased his mother, the late Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay. It opened a path to su ccession by r epresentation, as a consequence of declaration by the Court of First Instance that the marria g e of r espondent Isabel‘s parents is null and void. Making Isabel an illegitimate child a n d h a s n o r ig h t n or in t er est in t h e est a t e of h er pa t er n a l g r a n dm ot h er – t h e deceden t . ISSUE: W h ether Isabel Aguinaldo Cojuangco-Suntay is a legitimate child despite the declaration that her pa rent‘s marriage was void ab initio denying her succession r ig h t fr om h er g r a n dm ot h er . RULING: Y ES. the marriage of Em ilio Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay was annulled on t h e ba sis of A rticle 85 par. 3 of the Civil Code which refers to marriages which are considered voidable. Being con ceived and born of a voidable marriage before the decree of annulment , sh e is con sider ed leg it im a t e. T h e status of children born in voidable marriages is governed by the second paragraph of Article 8 9 w h ich pr ov ides t h a t : ― Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered as leg it im a t e‖

T h e annulment of the marriage by the court abolishes the legal character of the society for m ed by the putative spouses, but It cannot destroy consequences which m a r it a l u n ion pr odu ced du r in g it s con t in u a n ce. Dig est by : A lla n Ma t t h ew G. Bu eser

Ev en before the decree was issued nullifying the marriage, private respondent Edgardo M. Reyes m arried Ofelia P. Ty, herein petitioner, on 4 April 1 979. The decree of nullity of his marr ia g e t o A nna Maira was rendered only on 4 August 1980, while his civil marriage t o petitioner Ofelia P. T y t ook pla ce on 4 A pr il 1 9 7 9 . ISSUE: W h ether the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before a subsequent marriage ca n be en t er ed in t o v a lidit y .

Ni ñ a l v s. Ba y a da og G.R. No. 133778, 14 Ma r ch 2000 Y n a r es Sa n t ia g o, J.: FA CT S: Pepito Niñal (―Pepito‖) and Teodulfa Bellones was married on September 26, 1 9 7 4 w h er eby pet itioners Babyline, Ingrid, Archie and Pepito Jr., a;; surnamed Niñal were bor n . Pepit o sh ot T eodulfa resulting to the latter‘s death. One year and eight months after the incident Pepito a n d Norm a Bayadog, herein respondent (―Bayadog‖) got married without an y m a r r i a g e licen se. Pepito and Bayadog executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 state t h a t t h ey h a d liv ed t og ether as husband and wife for at least five years thus ex em pt in g t h em fr om secu r in g a m arriage license. Pepito died in a car accident. Thereafter petitioner‘s question the validity of the su bsequent marriage of Pepito and Bayadog due to the absence of a marriage licen se a s it w a s v oid.

RULING: Y ES, a declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a ca u se of a ction or a ground for defense. (Art. 39 of the Family Code). Where th e a bsolu t e n u llit y of a pr evious marriage is sought t o be invoked for purposes of contacting a second marriage, the sole ba sis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from leg a l in fir m it y is a fin a l ju dg m en t decla r in g pr ev iou s m a r r ia g e v oid. In t he present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered in t o 1 9 7 9 , befor e W iegel, at that t ime the prevailing rules was found In Odayat, Mendoza and Ara g on . T h e fir st m arriage of private respondent being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for ju dicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a secon d m a r r ia g e. In t h is ca se, t h erefore, we conclude that private respondent‘s second ma r r ia g e t o pet it ion er w a s v a lid. >Dig est by : A lla n Ma t t h ew G. Bu eser

ISSUE: W h ether the cohabitation of Pepito and Bayadog is th a t on e in con t em pla t ion of t h e la w . RULING: No, the five year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marr ia g e a n d it sh ould be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity -m ea n in g n o t h ir d pa r t w a s in v olv ed a t a n y t im e w it h in t h e fiv e y ea r s a n d con t in u it y – t h a t is u n br oken . In t his case, at the t ime of Pepito and respondent‘s marriage, it cannot be said tha t t h ey h a v e liv ed with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to this wedding day. Fr om t h e time Pepito‘s first marriage was dissolved to the t ime of his marriage with respondent, on ly a bout twenty months had elapsed. Ev en assuming that Pepito and respondent had started living w ith each other the fact remains that their fiv e y ea r per iod of coh a bit a t ion w a s n ot t h e cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect u n ion t h a t is v a lid u nder the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of a marriage contract. Pepit o h a d a su bsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that w hen they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separa t ed in fa ct fr om h is la w fu l spou se. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was act u a l sev er a n ce of t h e filia l com panionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse w it h a n y t h ir d pa r t y a s bein g a s ― h u sba n d a n d w ife‖ . Dig est by : A lla n Ma t t h ew G. Bu eser

T er r e v s. T er r e A .M. No 2349, 3 Ju l y 1992 Per Cu r ia m FA CTS: Complaint Dorothy B. Terre met respondent Atty. Jordan Terre for the first time in 1979 a s fourth year high school classmates; Dorothy was then married t o Merillo Bercellina. Doroth y a n d Atty. Jordan went to manila to pursue their education of personal choosing. A t t y . Jor da n t ook up law at Lyceum Univsersity, still courting Dorothy on the process this t im e w it h m or e per sistence. Jordan explained t o Dorothy that their marriage is void ab initio due to the r ea son t hat Dorothy and Merlito were first cousins, convince by his explanation and having secu r ed a fav orable advice from her mother and ex in-laws, Dorothy agreed t o marry Atty. Jordan. In their m arriage license Atty. Jordan wrote ―single‖ as her status explaining that since her marriage was v oid ab initio, no need to go to court for a declaration. Later on Dorothy foun d ou t t h a t A t t y . Jor da n w a s a lr ea dy m a r r ied t o on e Helin a Ma licdem . W h en Atty. Jordan prior marriage with Dorothy was subsisting, no judicia l decla r a t ion w a s obt ained as to nullity of or any judicial declaration obtained as to nullity of such prior marr ia g e of r espon den t w it h com pla in a n t . ISSUE: W h et h er A t t y . Jor da n T er r e sh ou ld be l ia ble for g r oss im m or a lit y .

T y v s. Cou r t of A ppea l s G.R. No. 127406, 27 Nov em ber 2000 Qu isu m bin g , J.: FA CT S: Pr ivate Respondent Edgardo M. Reyes married in a civ il cer em on y A n n a Ma r ia Reg in a V illanueva thereafter a church wedding was celebrated. The marriage was subsequently declared n ull and void ab initio for la ck of m a r r ia g e licen se a n d la ck of con sen t of t h e pa r t ies.

RULING: Y es, respondent T erre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that such an agreemen t r a n counter t o the prevailing case law of the court which holds that for pu r poses of det er m in in g w hether a person is legally free t o contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first a m arriage was null and void ab initio is essential. Ev en if we are t o assume , arguendo m er ely , t hat Jordan Terre held that mistaken belief in good faith, the same result will follow . For if w e a r e to hold Jordan Terre to his own argument, his first marriage to complainant Dorothy T er r e m ust be deemed valid, with the result that his second marriage to Helin a Ma licdem m u st be r eg a r ded a s big a m ou s a n d cr im in a l in ch a r a ct er . >Dig est by : A lla n Ma t t h ew G. Bu eser

PSCYHOLOGICA L INCA PA CIT Y

Sa n t os v s. T h e Hon or a bl e Cou r t of A ppea l s G.R. No. 112019, 4 Ja n u a r y 1995 En Ba n c: FA CT S: Pet itioner Leouel Santos (―Leouel‖), a first lieutenant in the Ph ilippin e A r m y , a n d pr iv a t e r espondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos (―Julia‖) were married. The ecst a sy did n ot la st lon g because of the frequent interference of Julia‘s parents into the young spou ses fa m ily a ffa ir s. Ju lia left for United States of America t o work as a Nurse despite Leouel‘s pleas to dissuad e her . Sev en months after her departure, Julia called up Leoule for the fir st t im e by lon g dist a n ce t elephone. She prom ised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1 9 8 9 . Sh e n ev er did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States during a training program un der t h e auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, he desperately tried t o locate Julia bu t h is effor t s w er e in v a in . Having failed, Leouel filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for ―Voiding of m a r r ia g e u n der A r t icle 3 6 of t h e Fa m ily Code‖ . ISSUE: W h ether Leouel‘s petition to declare their marriage with Julia void ab initio under Article 3 6 of t h e Fa m ily Code w ill pr osper . RULING: No, Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independent ly of, bu t m u st st and in conjunction with, existing pr ecept u n ou r la w on m a r r ia g e. T h u s cor r ela t ed, ― psychological incapacity‖ should refer t o no less than a mental (not physical) inca pa cit y t h a t causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly mu st be a ssumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by A r t icle 6 8 of t h e Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live t ogether, obser v e lov e, r espect a n d fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of t h e la w h a s been t o confine the meaning of ―psychological incapacit y ‖ t o t h e m ost ser iou s ca ses of per sonality disorder clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability t o give m ea n in g a n d significance to the marriage. This psycholigic condition must exist at the time the marr ia g e is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other h a n d, a n in a bilit y of t h e spou se t o have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 5 4 of the Fam ily Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the v oid m a r r ia g e t o be ― leg it im a t e‖ . T h e factual setting in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can com e close t o t h e st a n da r d s r equired t o decree nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, ev en desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself ca n a lw a y s pr ov ide a ll t h e specific a n sw er s t o ev er y in div idu a l pr oblem . Dig est by : A lla n Ma t t h ew G. Bu eser

Ch i Mi n g T soi v s. Cou r t of A ppea l s G.R. No. 119190, 16 Ja n u a r y 1997 T or r es, Jr .: FA CT S: Pet itioner Chi Ming Tsos (―Petitioner) and private respondent Gina Lao-Tsoi (― Respon den t ‖ ) w ere married at the Manila Cathedral. They went and proceeded to t h e h ou se of pet it ion er ‘s

m other and slept together on the same room in the first night of their marr ied life. In st ea d of en joying the night of their marriage, petitioner just went to bed and slept on his side then turned h is back and went t o sleep. There was no sexual intercourse between them during the first night. T h e sa m e t h in g h a ppen ed on t h e secon d , t h ir d a n d fou r t h n ig h t s. In a n effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy t og et h er du r in g t h eir first week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so t ogether with her m other, uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all invited to join t h em . T h er e w a s n o sexual intercourse between them, since petitioner avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta t im e or just by sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room. Respondent claims that she n ev er seen h er h u sba n d‘s pr iv a t e pa r t s. T h ey submitted themselves to medical examinations, respondent was found t o be hea lt h y a n d st ill a virgin but petitioner was told to return but never did. It w a s fou n d t h a t pet it ion er is ca pa ble of h a v in g sex u a l in t er cou r se w it h a w om a n . Respondent claims that petitioner is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. ISSUE: W h ether their marriage can be declared a s n u ll a n d v oid a b in it io du e t o psy ch olog ica l in ca pa cit y . RULING: Y es, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is ― t o pr ocr ea t e ch ildr en ba sed on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperat ion is t h e ba sic end of marriage. ―Constant non-fulfillment of this oblig a t ion w ill fin a lly dest r oy t h e in tegrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of on e of the parties to fulfill th e a bov e m a r it a l oblig a t ion s is equ iv a len t t o in ca pa cit y . It is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a pa rticipation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procr ea t ion a n d en su r es t h e con t in u a t ion of fa m ily r ela t ion s. It a ppears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is – a shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experien ced n ot on ly by h a v in g spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a t w ow ay process. An expressive interest in each other‘s feelings at a time is needed by the oth er ca n g o a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for t w o consenting adults who view the relationship with love, amor gignit amore, respect, sacrifice a n d a continuing commitment to compromise, con sciou s of it s v a lu e a s a su blim e socia l in st it u t ion . >Dig est by : A lla n Ma t t h ew G. Bu eser

REPUBLIC V S. COURT OF A PPEA LS a n d MOLINA GR No. 1 0 8 7 6 3 . Febr u a r y 1 3 , 1 9 9 7 FA CT S: Ror idel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila, and gave birth to a son a year after. Reynaldo showed signs of ―immaturity and irresponsibility‖ on the early st a g es of t h e marriage, observed from his tendency t o spend t ime with his friends and squandering h is m oney with them, from his dependency from his par en t s, a n d h is dish on est y on m a t t er s in v olv in g h is fin a n ces. T h ereafter, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in 1986. Roridel became the sole breadwinner of the fam ily. In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and proceeded to Ba g u io Cit y .

Rey naldo left her and their child a week later. The couple are separated-in-fact for m or e t h a n t h r ee y ea r s.

A dm inistrative Circular No. 04-94 on forum shopping. Respondent Tadeo opposed the Mot ion t o w h ich pet it ion er Dia n a filed A ddit ion a l A r g u m en t s in Su ppor t of t h e Mot ion .

On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her mar r ia g e t o Rey naldo Molina. Ev idence for Roridel consisted of her ow n t est im on y , t h a t of t w o of h er fr iends, a social worker, and a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Cen t er . Rey naldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during th e pr e-t r ia l con fer en ce. On 14 May 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. T h e Solicit or General appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the appeals and affirmed in t ot o t h e RT C‘s decision . Hen ce, t h e pr esen t r ecou r se.

T h e trial court issued on 18 September 1996 an Order deferring resolution of the Mot ion u n t il t h e parties ventilate their argument s in a h ea r in g . Pet it ion er Dia n a filed a m ot ion for r econsideration. However, the tria l cou r t issu ed on secon d or der den y in g t h e m ot ion .

ISSUE: W h ether opposing or conflicting personalities should be construed as psychological inca pa cit y HELD: In Santos v. Court of Appeals, where psychological incapacity should r efer t o n o less t h a n a m ental (not physical) incapacity, existing at the time the marriage is celebrated, and that there is h ardly any doubt that the in t en dm en t of t h e la w h a s been t o con fin e t h e m ea n in g of ‗psy chological inca pa cit y ‘ t o t h e m ost ser iou s ca ses of per son a lit y disor der s clea r l y dem onstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give mea n in g a n d sig n ifica n ce t o t h e m arriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, a n d in curability. In the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psy ch olog ica l defect spoken of is an incapacity; but appears to be more of a ―difficulty,‖ if not outrigh t ― r efu sa l‖ or ― n eglect‖ in the performance of some marital obligations. Mer e sh ow in g of ― ir r econ cila ble differences‖ and ―conflicting personalities‖ in no wise constitutes psy ch olog ica l in ca pa cit y . T h e Court, in this case, promulgated the guidelines in the interpr et a t ion a n d a pplica t ion of A rticle 36 of the Family Code, removing any v isa g es of it bein g t h e m ost liber a l div or ce pr ocedure in the world: (1) The burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff; (2 ) t h e r oot ca u se of psy chological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleg ed in t h e com pla in t , su fficiently proven by expert, and clearly explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity m u st be pr ov en existing at the time of the celebration of marriage; (4) the incapacity must be clinically or m edically permanent or incurable; (5) such illness must be grave en ou g h ; (6 ) t h e essen t ia l m arital obligation must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as regards husban d a n d wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the same code as regards parents and t h eir ch ildr en ; (7 ) in terpretation made by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church, and (8 ) the trial must order the fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appeal as counsels for t h e St a t e. T h e Supreme Court granted the petition, and reversed a n d set a side t h e a ssa iled decision ; con cluding that the marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

DIA NA M. BA RCELONA vs . COURT OF A PPEA LS a n d T A DEO R. BENGZON G.R. No. 130087. Sept em ber 24, 2003 FA CT S: On 29 March 1995, private respondent Tadeo filed a Petition for Annulment of Marriage against pet itioner petitioner Diana before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87. On 9 May 1 995, respondent Tadeo filed a Motion t o Withdraw Petition which t h e t r ia l cou r t g r a n t ed. On 21 July 1995, respondent Tadeo filed anew a Petition for Annulment of Ma r r ia g e a g a in st pet itioner Diana. Petitioner Diana filed a Motion t o Dismiss the second petition on two grounds. Fir st, the second petition fails to state a cause of action. Second, it v iola t es Su pr em e Cou r t

Pet itioner Diana filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus before the Cou r t of A ppeals assailing the trial court‘s first order deferring action on the Motion and the second order denying the motion for reconsideration on 1 4 February 1997. The Court of Appea ls dism issed t h e pet it ion a n d den ied t h e m ot ion for r econ sider a t ion . T h e Court of Appeals agreed with petitioner Diana that the trial court in its first order er r ed in deferring action on the Motion until after a hearing on whether the com plaint states a ca u se of a ction. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals pointed out t h a t t h e t r ia l cou r t ‘s secon d or der corrected the situation since in denying the motion for reconsideration, the trial court in effect den ied the Motion. The appellate court agreed with the trial court that the a lleg a t ion s in t h e second petition state a cause of action sufficient to sustain a valid judgment if proven to be tru e. T h e Court of Appeals also held that there was no violation of Circular No. 04 -94. To determ in e t h e existence of forum shopping, the elements of litis pendentia must exist or a final judgment in on e case must amount t o res judicata in the other. In t h is ca se, t h er e is n o litis pendentia because respondent Tadeo had caused the dismissal without prejudice of the first petition before filing the second petition. Neither is there res judicata because there is no final decision on t h e m er it s. ISSUE: W h ether the allegations of the second petition for annulment of marriage su fficien t ly st a t e a ca u se of a ct ion . HELD: T h e petition has no merit. Petitioner Diana‘s contention that the second petition fails t o st a t e a ca u se of a ct ion is u n t en a ble. W e find the second petition sufficiently alleges a ca u se of a ct ion . T h e pet it ion sou g h t t h e declaration of nullity of the marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. The petition alleged t hat respondent Tadeo and petitioner Diana were legally married at the Holy Cross Parish after a w hirlwind courtship as shown by the marriage contract attached t o the pet it ion . T h e cou ple est ablished their residence in Quezon City. The union begot five children, Ana Maria, born on 8 Nov ember 1964; Isabel, born on 28 October 1968; Ernesto Tadeo, bor n on 3 1 Ma r ch 1 9 7 0 ; Reg ina Rachelle born on 7 March 1974; and Cristina Maria born in February 1978. The petit ion fu rther alleged that petitioner Diana was psychologically in ca pa cit a t ed a t t h e t im e of t h e celebration of their marriage to com ply with the essential obligation s of m a r r ia g e a n d su ch in ca pa cit y su bsist s u p t o t h e pr esen t t im e. Pet itioner Diana argues that the second petition falls short of the guidelines set forth in Santos a n d Molina. Specifically, she contends that the second petition is defective beca u se it fa ils t o a llege the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. The second pet it ion a lso fa ils t o st ate that the alleged psychological incapacity existed from the celebration of the marria g e a n d t hat it is permanent or incurable. Further, the second petition is devoid of any reference of t h e g rave nature of the illness to bring about the disability of the petitioner to assume the essen t ia l obligations of marriage. Lastly, the second petition did not even state the marit a l oblig a t ion s w hich petitioner Dia n a a lleg edly fa il ed t o com ply du e t o psy ch olog ica l in ca pa cit y . T h e com plete facts should allege the physical man ifest a t ion s, if a n y , a s a r e in dica t iv e of psy chological incapacity at the t ime of the celebration of the marriage but expert opin ion n eed n ot be a lleg ed. Pr ocedural rules apply to actions pending and unresolved at th e t im e of t h eir pa ssa g e. T h e obv ious effect of the new Rules providing that ― expert opinion need not be alleged” in t h e

pet ition is that there is also no need to allege the root cause of the psychological incapacity. Only ex perts in the fields of neurological and behavioral sciences are competent to determine the root cause of psychological incapacity. Since the new Rules do not require the petition to allege expert opinion on the psychological incapacity, it follows that there is a lso n o n eed t o a lleg e in t h e pet it ion t h e r oot ca u se of t h e psy ch olog ica l in ca pa cit y . T h e second petition states a cause of action since it states the legal right of respondent Tadeo, the correlative obligation of petitioner Diana, and the act or om ission of petitioner Diana in violation of t h e leg a l r ig h t .

BRENDA B. MA RCOS vs . WILSON G. MA RCOS G.R. No. 136490. Oct ober 19, 2000 FA CT S: A ppellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973. Later on, he was t ransferred to the Presidential Security Command in Malacañang during the Ma r cos Reg im e. A ppellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other hand, joined the Women's Auxilliary Corps un der t h e Ph ilippine Air Force in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of them sought a discha r g e fr om t h e m ilit a r y ser v ice. T h ey first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacañang Palace, she a s an escort of Im ee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of Presiden t Fer din a n d Ma r cos. T hrough telephone conversations, they became acquainted and eventually became sweethear t s. A fter their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy St r eet , Hu lo Bliss, Ma n daluyong, a housing unit which she acquired from the Bliss Development Corporation when sh e w a s st ill sin g le. A fter the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1 987 and then enga g ed in different business ventures that did not however prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to look for work so that their children would see him, instead of her, as the head of the family and a good pr ov ider. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarr el a n d a s a consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would even force her t o h a v e sex w it h h im despite her weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mist a ke a n d was so severe in the way he ch a st ised t h em . T h u s, for sev er a l t im es du r in g t h eir cohabitation, he would leave their house. In 1992 , t h ey w er e a lr ea dy liv in g sepa r a t ely .

In t he case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children described their father a s cruel and physically abusive to them. The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A . Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological evaluation while the appellant on the ot h er h a n d, did n ot . T h e court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his m a r it a l obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to support h is fa m ily a n d h is v iol en t a t t it u de t ow a r ds a ppellee a n d t h eir ch ildr en . CA reversed the RTC and held that psychological incapacity had not been est a blish ed by t h e t otality of the evidence presented on the basis that there is no evidence at all tha t w ou ld sh ow t hat the appellant was suffering from an incapacity which was psycholog ica l or m en t a l - n ot phy sical to the extent that he could not have known the obligations he was assumin g : t h a t t h e in ca pa cit y w a s g r a v e, h a d pr eceded t h e m a r r ia g e a n d w a s in cu r a ble." Hen ce, t h is Pet it ion . ISSUES: 1 ) Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside the findings by t h e Reg ion a l T r ial Court of psychological incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for declaration of nullit y of m arriage simply because the respondent did not subject himself t o psychologica l ev a lu a t ion . 2 ) Whether or not the t otality of evidence presented and the dem ea n or of a ll t h e w it n esses sh ou ld be t h e ba sis of t h e det er m in a t ion of t h e m er it s of t h e Pet it ion . HELD: 1 )The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier manda t ed by t h e Cou r t in Santos v. Court of Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gr a v it y (b) ju ridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing g u idelin es do n ot r equ ir e t h a t a phy sician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause m ay be "m edically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of eviden ce t h a t ca n adequately establish the party's psychological condit ion . For in deed, if t h e t ot a lit y of ev idence presented is enough t o sustain a finding of psychologica l in ca pa cit y , t h en a ct u a l m edica l ex a m in a t ion of t h e per son con cer n ed n eed n ot be r esor t ed t o. 2 ) We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to pr ov ide material support t o the fa m ily a n d m a y h a v e r esor t ed t o ph y sica l a bu se a n d a bandonment, the t otality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on h is part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the incept ion of t h e m a r r ia g e or t h a t t h ey a r e in cu r a ble.

A ll the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "m agic uling" and chickens. When sh e w as discharged from the military service, she concentrated on her business. Then, she became a su pplier in the Armed Forces of the Philippines until she wa s a ble t o pu t u p a t r a din g a n d con struction company, NS Ness Tradin g a n d Con st r u ct ion Dev elopm en t Cor por a t ion .

V erily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job a n d w a s n ot gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was durin g t h is per iod t h a t h e became intermittently drunk, failed t o g ive material and moral support, and even left the family h om e.

On October 16, 1994 the spouses had a bitter quarrel. As they were already living separately, sh e did not want him to stay in their house anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their hou se, sh e was so angry that she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her a n d even on her mother who came to her aid. The following day, October 17, 1 994, she and their ch ildr en left t h e h ou se a n d sou g h t r efu g e in h er sist er 's h ou se.

T hus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the incept ion of t h e marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is in cu r a ble, especia lly n ow t h a t h e is g a in fu lly em ploy ed a s a t a x i dr iv er .

On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examin a t ion a t t h e Ma n da lu y on g Medical Center where her injuries were diagnosed as contusions. Sometime in August 1995, sh e t og ether with her two sisters and driver, went to him at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look for t h eir missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad. After knowing t h e r ea son for t h eir u nexpected presence, h e r a n a ft er t h em w it h a sa m u r a i a n d ev en bea t h er dr iv er . A t the t ime of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a h ou se in Ca m ella , Pa r a ñ a qu e, w h ile t h e a ppella n t w a s r esidin g a t t h e Bliss u n it in Ma n da lu y on g .

A rticle 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law t h a t cu t s t h e m arital bond at the t ime the causes ther efor m a n ifest t h em selv es. It r efer s t o a ser iou s psy chological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so g rave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and respon sibilit ies of t h e matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obliga t ion s a r e t h ose pr ov ided u n der A r t icles 6 8 t o 7 1 , 2 2 0 , 2 2 1 a n d 2 2 5 of t h e Fa m ily Code. Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in wh ich t h e g r ou n ds n eed n ot be r oot ed in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral cor r u pt ion , civ il interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonmen t a n d t h e

like. At best, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only t o grounds for legal separation, not for decla r in g a m a r r ia g e v oid. Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divor ce la w , t h is Cou r t la id dow n t h e pr ocedural requirements for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however, h a s n ot fa it h fu ll y obser v ed t h em .

ISSUE: W h ether or not the mere abandonment by Toshio of his family and his insen sit iv it y t o t h em con st it u t e psy ch olog ica l in ca pa cit y . HELD: W e r u le in fa v or of pet it ion er .

In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to show t hat the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical anteceden ce a n d in cu r a bilit y ; a n d for h er fa ilu r e t o obse r v e t h e g u idelin es ou t lin ed in Molina.

T h e Court is mindful of the policy of the 1 987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the fam ily a s the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family . T h u s, a n y dou bt sh ou ld be r esolv ed in fa v or of t h e v a lidit y of t h e m a r r ia g e. W hat is important is the presence of evidence t h a t ca n a dequ a t ely est a blish t h e pa r t y ‘s psy chological condition. For indeed, if the t otality of evidence presented is enough to su st a in a fin ding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the per son con cer n ed n eed n ot be r esor t ed t o.

REPUBLIC OF T HE PHILIPPINES v s. LOLIT A QUINT ERO-HA MA NO G.R. No. 149498. Ma y 20, 2004

W e find that the t otalit y of ev iden ce pr esen t ed fell sh or t of pr ov in g t h a t T osh io w a s psy chologically inca pa cit a t ed t o a ssu m e h i s m a r it a l r espon sibilit ies. T osh io‘s a ct of a bandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged n or pr ov en t o be du e t o som e kind of psychological illness. After respondent t estified on h ow T osh io a ba n don ed h is fam ily, no other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual medical examination, it would have g r eatly helped respondent‘s case had she presented eviden ce t h a t m edica lly or clin ica lly identified his illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. This respondent did n ot do.

FA CT S: On June 17, 1 996, respondent Lolita filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage to h er husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological in ca pa cit y . In October 1986, she and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan. They later lived in t h e Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for h a lf of 1 9 8 7 . On Nov em ber 1 6 , 1 9 8 7 , sh e g a v e bir t h t o t h eir ch ild. On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M. Balderia of the Municipal T r ial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated t o a ssume his marital responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest only after the marriage. On e month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and prom ised to return by Christma s t o celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending money to respondent for t w o m on t h s, T oshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several t imes but he never r espon ded. Som etime in 1991, respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did n ot bot h er t o see h er a n d t h eir ch ild. T h e summons issued to Toshio remained unserved because he was no lon g er r esidin g a t h is g iv en address. Because Toshio failed to file a responsive pleading after the lapse of 60 days from pu blication, respondent filed a motion dated Nov em ber 5 , 1 9 9 6 t o r efer t h e ca se t o t h e pr osecutor for investigation. The trial court g r a n t ed t h e m ot ion on Nov em ber 7 , 1 9 9 6 . On November 20, 1996, prosecutor Rolando I. Gonzales filed a report finding that no collu sion ex isted between the parties. On February 13, 1997, the trial court granted respondent‘s motion to pr esent her evidence ex parte. She then testified on how T oshio a ba n don ed h is fa m ily . S h e t h er ea ft er offer ed docu m en t a r y ev iden ce t o su ppor t h er t est im on y . T h e trial court rendered a decision declaring the marriage between petitioner Lolita and T osh io n ull and void on the basis of the records that respondent spouses failed to fulfill his oblig a t ion s a s husband of the petitioner and father to his daughter. Respondent remained irresponsible and u n con cer n ed ov er t h e n eeds a n d w elfa r e of h is fa m ily . T h e Office of the Solicitor General, representing herein petitioner Republic of the Ph ilippin e s, a ppea led t o t h e Cou r t of A ppea ls bu t t h e sa m e w a s den ied. T h e appellate court thus concluded that respondent was psy ch olog ica lly in ca pa cit a t ed t o per form his marital obligations to his family, and to "observe mutual love, respect and fidelit y , a n d render mutual help and support" pu r su a n t t o A r t icle 6 8 of t h e Fa m ily Code of t h e Ph ilippines. The appellate court emphasized that this case could not be equated w it h Republic vs . Court of Appeals and Molina and Santos vs. Court of Appeals. In those ca ses, t h e spou ses w ere Filipinos while this case involved a "m ixed marriage," t h e h u sba n d bein g a Ja pa n ese n a t ion a l. Hen ce, t h is pet it ion ,

W e m ust remember that abandonment is also a ground for leg a l sepa r a t ion . T h er e w a s n o sh owing that the case at bar was not just an instance of abandonment in t h e con t ex t of leg a l separation. We cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandon ed h is family immediately after the celebration of the marriage. As we r u led in Molina, it is n ot en ough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so du e t o som e psy ch olog ica l, not physical, illness. There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, a n a dv erse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from a ccept in g a n d com ply in g w it h t h e oblig a t ion s essen t ia l t o m a r r ia g e. A ccording to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina an d Santos do n ot a pply h er e because the present case involves a "m ixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese n a t ion a l. W e disagree. In prov ing psychological incapacity, we find no distinction between an alien spouse a n d a Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely beca u se t h e spou se alleged t o be psychologically incapacitated happens t o be a foreign national. The medical a n d clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of st u dies of h uman behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacit y sh ou ld a pply t o a n y per son r eg a r dless of n a t ion a lit y .

DEDEL vs . COURT OF APPEALS an d SHA RON L. CORPUZ-DEDEL a .k.a . JA NE IBRA HIM G.R. No. 151867. Ja n u a r y 29, 2004 FA CT S: Pet itioner David met respondent Sharon while he was working in the advertising business of h is fa ther. Ev entually, their relationship resulted in the exchange of marital vows befor e t h e Cit y Court of Pasay on September 28, 1966 and followed by civil marriage in a chur ch w eddi n g on Ma y 20, 1 967. The union produced four children. The con ju g a l pa r t n er sh ip, n on et h eless, a cqu ir ed n eit h er pr oper t y n or debt .

Pet itioner avers that during the marriage, Sha r on t u r n ed ou t t o be a n ir r espon sible a n d im mature wife and mother. She had extra-marital affairs with several men: a dentist in the AFP; a Lieutenant in the President ia l Secu r it y Com m a n d a n d la t er a Jor da n ia n n a t ion a l. Sh aron was once confirmed in the Manila Medical City for treatment by Dr. Lou r des La pu z, a clinical psychiatrist. Petitioner alleged that despite the treatment, Sharon did not stop her illicit r elationship with the Jordanian national named Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she married and w it h w hom she had two children. When Mustafa Ibrahim left t h e cou n t r y , Sh a r on r et u r n ed t o pet itioner bringing along her two children by Ibrahim. Petitioner accepted her back a n d ev en con sidered the two illegitimate children as his own. Thereafter, on December 9, 19 9 5 , Sh a r on a bandoned petitioner to join Ibrahim in Jordan with their two children . Sin ce t h en , Sh a r on w ou ld on ly r et u r n t o t h e cou n t r y on specia l occa sion s. T h ereafter, petitioner filed a petition seeking the declaration of nullity of his m a r r i a g e on t h e g r ound of psychological incapacity, as defined in Article 36 of the Family Code, before the RTC of Ma kati City, Branch 149. Summons was effected by publication in the Pilipino Star Ngayon, a n ewspaper of general circulation in the country considering that Sharon did not reside and could n ot be fou n d in t h e Ph ilippin es. Pet itioner presented Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, who testified that she conducted a psy ch olog ica l ev aluation of petitioner and found him to be conscientious, hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist w ho wants all tasks and projects completed up to the final detail a n d w h o ex er t s h is best in w h a t ev er h e does. On the other hand, Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social Person a lit y Disor der exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several indiscr et ion s a n d had no capacity for remorse, even bringing with her the two children of Mustafa Ibrahim t o liv e with petitioner. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling th e m a r r ia g e like h er r epeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of h er fa m ily a r e in dica t ion s of A n t i -Socia l Per sonality Disorder amounting t o psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligation s of m a r r ia g e. T h e trial court declared the marriage between the spouses Dedel null and void on the grou n d of psy chological incapacity on the part of respondent. Respondent Republic of t h e Ph ilippin es, t hrough the Solicitor Genera l, a ppea led a lleg in g t h a t T HE LOW ER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A DECISION WITHOUT A CERTIFICATION HAVING BEEN ISSUED BY T HE SOLICIT OR GENERA L A S REQUIRED IN T HE MOLINA CA SE.

Un til further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance t h a t m ay have some bearing on the degree, extent and other conditions of that incapacit y m u st , in ev ery case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinion of psychiatrists, psychologists and persons w it h ex per t ise in psy ch olog ica l disciplin es m ig h t be h elpfu l or ev en desir a ble. Respondent‘s sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or psychically ill t o su ch a n ex tent that she could not have known the obligations she was assuming, or knowing them, could n ot have given a valid assumption thereof. It appears that respondent‘s promiscuity did not exist prior t o or at the inception of the marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the records is a blissful m arital union at its celebration, later affirmed in church rites, and which produced four children. Respondent‘s sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constit u t e psy chological incapacity within the contemplation of the Fa m ily Code. Neit h er cou ld h er em otional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity. It must be sh own that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which ma ke r espon den t completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely du e t o h er y ou t h , im m a t u r it y or sex u a l pr om iscu it y .

JUA NIT A CA RA T ING-SIA YNGCO v s. MA NUEL SIA YNGCO G.R. NO. 158896. Oct ober 27, 2004 FA CT S: Pet itioner Juanita and respondent Manuel were married at civil rites on 2 7 Ju n e 1 9 7 3 a n d before the Catholic Church on August 11 1973. After discovering that they could not have a ch ild of t h eir own, the couple decided to adopt a baby boy in 1 9 7 7 , w h o t h ey n a m ed Jer em y . On 25 September 1997, or after twenty-four (24) years of married life t og et h er , r espon den t Ma nuel filed for the declaration of its nullity on the grou n d of psy ch olog ica l in ca pa cit y of pet itioner Juanita. He alleged that all throughout their marriage, his w ife ex h ibit ed a n ov er dom in eer in g a n d selfish a t t it u de t ow a r ds h im . In h er Answer, petitioner Juanita alleged that respondent Manuel is still living with her at t h eir con jugal home in Malolos, Bulacan; that he invented malicious stories again st h er so t h a t h e cou ld be free t o marry his paramour. The trial court denied respondent Ma n u el‘s pet it ion for decla r a t ion of n u llit y of h is m a r r ia g e t o pet it ion er Ju a n it a .

T h e Court of Appeals recalled and set aside the judgment of the trial court and ordered dismissal of t h e petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.Petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration w a s den ied in a Resolu t ion da t ed Ja n u a r y 8 , 2 0 0 2 . Hen ce, t h e in st a n t pet it ion .

T h e Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision, relying mainly on the p sychiatric evaluat ion of Dr . Garcia finding both Manuel and Juanita psychologically incapacitated. Hence, this pet it ion for r ev iew on cer t ior a r i of t h e decision of t h e Cou r t of A ppea ls.

ISSUE: W h ether or not the totality of the evidence presen t ed is en ou g h t o su st a in a fin din g t h a t r espon den t is psy ch olog ica lly in ca pa cit a t ed

ISSUE: W h ether or not the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychologica l in ca pa cit y a g a in st pet it ion er Ju a n it a a n d/or r espon den t Ma n u el.

HELD: No. T h e pet it ion is DENIED.

HELD: T h e pet it ion for r ev iew is h er eby g r a n t ed.

T h e other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the st a t e of a pa r t y being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursu a n t t o A r t icle 4 6 , Fa m ily Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality shou ld occu r on ly du ring the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation un der A r t icle 5 5 of t h e Fam ily Code. These provisions, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibilit y of t h ese v arious circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disor der , indicia of psy ch olog ica l in ca pa cit y .

T h e presumption is always in favor of the validity of m a r r ia g e. Sem per pr a esu m it u r pr o m atrimonio. In the case at bar, respondent Manuel failed to prove that his wife‘s lack of respect for him, her jealousies and obsession with cleanliness, her outbursts and h er controlling natur e, a n d her inability to endear herself t o his parents are grave psychological maladies that para ly ze h er from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. Neither is there any showing that t h ese ―defects‖ were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incur a ble. In fa ct, the psychiatrist reported that petitioner was psychologically capacitated t o comply w it h t h e ba sic a n d essen t ia l oblig a t ion s of m a r r ia g e.

T h e Court of Appeals committed reversible er r or in h oldin g t h a t r espon den t Ma n u el is psy chologically incapacitated. The psychological report of Dr. Ga r cia , w h ich is r espon den t Ma nuel‘s own evidence, contains candid admissions of petitioner Juanita, the person in the best position t o gauge whether or not her husband fulfilled the essen t ia l m a r it a l oblig a t ion s of m a r r ia g e. Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psycholog ica l in ca pa cit y w it h in t h e con templation of the Family Code. It must be shown that respondent Manuel‘s unfaithfulness i s a m anifestation of a disordered personality, which makes him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state and not merely due to his ardent wish to have a child of h is own flesh and blood. In herein case, respondent Manuel has admitted th a t : "I h a d [ex t r a m a r it a l] a ffa ir s beca u se I w a n t ed t o h a v e a ch ild a t t h a t pa r t icu la r poin t T h e psychological report of respondent Manuel‘s witness, Dr. Garcia, showed that the root cause of pet itioner Juanita‘s behavior is traceable – not from t h e in cept ion of t h eir m a r r ia g e a s r equired by law – but from her experiences during the marriage, e.g., her in-laws‘ disapproval of h er as they wanted their son to enter the priesthood, her husband‘s philandering, a dm it t ed n o less by him, and her inability to conceive. Thus, from the totality of the evidence adduced by both pa rties, we have been allowed a window into the Siayngcos‘s life and have perceived therefrom a sim ple case of a married couple drifting apart, becoming stra n g er s t o ea ch ot h er , w it h t h e h u sba n d con sequ en t ly fa llin g ou t of lov e a n d w a n t in g a w a y ou t . A n unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a n u ll a n d v oid m a r r ia g e. Mer e sh ow in g of ― irreconcilable differences‖ and ―conflicting personalities‖ in no wise constitutes psych olog ic a l in ca pa cit y .

JA IME F. V ILLA LON V S. MA . CORA ZON V ILLA LON G.R. No. 167206. Nov em ber 18, 2005 FA CTS: Petitioner was married to respondent for 1 8 y ea r s. Pet it ion er filed a pet it ion for a nnulment of his marriage t o respondent, citing psychological incapacity on his part as a ground. Pet itioner alleged the psychological disorder as that of ―Narcissist ic Hist r ion ic Per son a lit y Disor der ‖ w it h ― Ca ssa n ov a Com plex ‖ . On July 12, 1996, petitioner Jaime filed a pet it ion for t h e a n n u lm en t of h is m a r r ia g e t o r espondent Ma. Corazon before the RTC of Pasig City on the ground of petitioner‘s psychological in ca pa cit y w h ich h e cla im ed ex ist ed ev en pr ior t o h is m a r r ia g e. A ccording to petitioner, the manifestations of his psychological incapacity were: (a) his ch r on ic r efusal to maintain harmonious family relations and his lack of interest in h a v in g a n or m a l m arried life; (b) his immaturity and irrespon sibilit y in r efu sin g t o a ccept t h e essen t ia l obligations of marriage as husband to his wife; (c) h is desir e for ot h er w om en a n d a life u nchained from any spousal obligation; and (d) his fa lse a ssu m pt ion of t h e fu n da m en t a l obligations of com panionship and consortium towards respondent. Petitioner thus prayed t h a t h is m a r r ia g e t o r espon den t be decla r ed n u ll a n d v oid ab initio. Respondent filed an answer denying petitioner‘s allegations. She asser t ed t h a t h er 1 8 -y ea r m arriage to petitioner has been ―fruitful and characterized by joy, contentmen t a n d h opes for m ore growth in their relationship‖ and that their marital squ a b bles w er e n or m a l ba sed on community standards. Petitioner‘s success in his professional life aided him in perform in g h is r ole as husband, father, and provider. Respondent claimed that petitioner‘s commitment t o h is pa t er n a l a n d m a r it a l r espon sibilit ies w a s bey on d r epr oa ch .

On October 7, 1 996, the trial court directed the prosecutor t o con du ct a n in v est ig a t ion on w hether there was collusion between the parties. As a result of the report, there was no collusion. T h e OSG opposed t o t h e pet it ion . T h er ea ft er , t r ia l on t h e m er it s en su ed. Pet itioner testified that he met respondent sometime in the early seventies when he applied for a job at Metrobank, where respondent was employed as a foreign exchange trader. T h ey beg a n da ting in 1975 and had a romantic relationship soon thereafter. After going steady for about t w o y ears, petitioner and respondent were married at the San Pancracio Chapel in Paco, Ma n ila on A pril 22, 1978. In the middle of 1993, petitioner decided t o separate from responden t beca u se t h eir marriage reached a point where there was no longer any communication between them and t h eir relationship became devoid of love, affection, support and respect due to his constant ur g e t o see other women. Moreover, their relationship t ended to be ―one-sided‖ since respondent was u n r espon siv e a n d h a r dly ev er sh ow ed h er lov e, n eeds, w a n t s a n d em ot ion s. Pet itioner admitted that on certain occasions before his marriage, he had two girlfriends a t t h e sam e time. He also saw other wom en even when he became engaged to and, later on, m a r r ied r espondent. Respondent learned of his affairs but reacted in a subdued m a n n er . Pet it ion er su r m ised t h a t it w a s r espon den t ‘s n a t u r e t o be silen t a n d w it h dr a w n . In January 1 994, petitioner left the conjugal abode and moved into an apartment located five t o t en minutes away. Before he left, he and his wife spoke to their three children who, at that time, w ere 14, 8, and 6 years old, respectively. Petitioner consulted a child psychologist before talking t o h is children. He considered himself as a good and loving father and described his relationship w ith the children as ―great‖. Despite the separation, petitioner would regularly visit his childr en w ho stayed with him on alternate weekends, voluntarily gave monthly support to t h e c h ildr en a n d paid for their tuition fees and also shouldered the children‘s medical expenses as well as th e m a in t en a n ce a n d m iscella n eou s fees for t h e con ju g a l a bode. Pet itioner presented Dr. Natividad Dayan, a clinical psych olog ist , t o t est ify on h is a lleg ed psy chological disorder of ―Narcissistic Histrionic Per son a lit y Disor der ‖ w it h ― Ca sa n ov a Com plex‖. Dr. Dayan submitted a psychological report on both petitioner and respondent based on clin ica l in t er v iew s a n d psy ch olog ica l t est s. Respondent testified that she first learned of her husband‘s infidelity in 1980. Sh e discov er ed t hat he was having an affair with one of her friends who worked as a trader in h er h u sba n d‘s com pany . T h e a ffa ir w a s cu t sh or t w h en t h e w om a n left for t h e Un it ed St a t es t o w ork. Ev entually, she and petitioner were able to rebuild their relationship and over com e t h e cr isis. W h en asked about the womanizing ways of her husband, respondent averred t h a t sh e did n ot kn ow whether her husband‘s acts could be deemed ―wom anizing‖ since t h er e w er e on ly t w o in stances of infidelity which occurred 13 years apart. She also theorized that petitioner wanted to h ave their marriage annulled so he could marry her old friend. She stated that she has not closed h er doors to petitioner but the latter would have to give up h is ex t r a -m a r it a l r ela t ion sh ip. T o controvert the findings of petitioner‘s expert witness, respondent presented a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas, who t estified that Dr. Dayan‘s findings w er e in com plet e beca u se a ― t ea m a pproach‖ was necessary in evaluating an individual‘s persona lit y . A n ev a lu a t ion of on e‘s psy chological capa cit y r equ ir es t h e ex per t ise of a psy ch ia t r ist a n d socia l w or k er . T h e trial court declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null a n d v oid on t h e g r ound of psychological incapacity on the part of petitioner. Thereafter. The respondent and th e OSG sea son a bly filed a n a ppea l fr om t h e decision of t h e t r ia l cou r t . T h e Court of Appeals rendered a Decision reversed and set a side t h e t r ia l cou r t ‘s decision . Con trary to the trial court‘s findings, the appellate court held that petitioner failed t o prov e t h e ju r idica l a n t eceden ce, g r a v it y a n d in cu r a bilit y of h is a lleg ed psy ch olog ica l in capacity. Petitioner‘s sexual infidelity was ma de t o a ppea r a s sy m pt om a t ic of a g r a v e psy chological disorder when, in reality, the same merely resulted from a general dissatisfa ct ion w it h t h e m a r r ia g e.

Pet itioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the appellate court‘s decision but it was den ied. Hen ce t h is pet it ion . ISSUE: W h ether or not the petitioner was indeed psychologically incapacitated to ren der h is m a r it a l oblig a t ion s HELD: T h e pet it ion h a s n o m er it . T h e totality of the eviden ce in t h is ca se does n ot su ppor t a fin din g t h a t pet it ion er is psy ch olog ica lly in ca pa cit a t ed t o fu lfill h is m a r it a l oblig a t ion s. T h e illness must be shown as downright incapacity or in a bilit y , n ot a r efu sa l, n eg lect or difficu lt y , m u ch less ill w ill. Sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psych olog ica l in capacity. It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disor der ed per sonality which make petitioner completely unable to discharge the essentia l oblig a t ion s of m a r r ia g e Pet itioner failed to establish the incurability and gravity of his alleged psychological disorder. He sim ply fall out of love and has consequently refused t o stay married t o her. Refu sa l t o com ply w ith the essential obligations of marriage is not psychological incapacity within the mean in g of la w .

A . A RMIDA PEREZ-FERRA RIS V S. BRIX FERRA RIS G.R. No. 162368 Ju l y 17, 2006 FACTS: On February 20, 2001, the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 151 rendered a Decision den y in g t h e petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner‘s marriage with Brix Ferraris. The trial cou r t n ot ed that suffering from epilepsy does not amount to psychological incapacity under Article 3 6 of t h e Civil Code and the evidence on record were insufficient to prove infidelit y . Pet it ion er ‘s m otion for reconsideration was denied in an Order dated April 20, 2001 where th e t r ia l cou r t r eiterated that there was no evidence that respondent is mentally or physica lly ill t o su ch a n ex tent that he could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them , cou ld n ot h a v e g iv en v a lid a ssu m pt ion t h er eof. Pet itioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed in toto the ju dg m en t of t h e t r ia l court on the basis that the ev idence on record did not convincingly establish that respondent was su ffering from psychological incapacity or that his ―defects‖ were incurable and already presen t a t the inception of the marriage. The Court of Appeals also found that Dr. Day a n ‘s t est im on y fa iled t o establish the substance of respondent‘s psychological incapa cit y ; t h a t sh e fa iled t o ex plain how she arrived at the conclusion that the respondent has a mixed personality disorder ; t hat she failed t o clearly demonstrate that there was a natal or supervening disabling factor or an a dv erse integral element in respondent‘s character that effectively in ca pa cit a t ed h im fr om a ccept in g a n d com ply in g w it h t h e essen t ia l m a r it a l oblig a t ion s. Pet itioner‘s motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit; thus, she filed a petition for r ev iew on cer t ior a r i w it h t h is Cou r t . Pet itioner filed the instant motion for reconsideration. The Court r equ ir ed r espon den t Br ix Ferraris to file comment but failed to comply; thus, he is deemed to have waived the opportunity

t o file comment. Further, the Court directed t h e Office of t h e Solicit or Gen er a l (OSG) t o comment on petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration which it com plied on Ma r ch 2 , 2 0 0 6 . A fter considering the arguments of both the petitioner and the OSG, the Court resolves t o den y pet it ion er ‘s m ot ion for r econ sider a t ion . ISSUE: W h ether or not Brix is psychologically incapacitated as to render his marriage with A m y v oid. HELD: No. The Court found Brix‘s alleged mixed personality disorder, the"leaving-the-ho use" a ttit u de w henever he and Amy quarreled, the violent tendencies during epilept ic a t t a cks, t h e sex u a l in fidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with h is ba nd mates than his family, are not rooted on som e debilitating psychological con dit ion bu t a m er e r efu sa l or u n w illin g n ess t o a ssu m e t h e e ssen t ia l oblig a t ion s of m a r r ia g e. A m ere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise const it u t e psy chological incapacity; it is not enoug h t o pr ov e t h a t t h e pa r t ies fa iled t o m eet t h eir r esponsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that t h ey m u st be sh ow n t o be in ca pa ble of doin g so du e t o som e psy ch olog ica l, n ot ph y sica l, illn ess. T h e intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of ―psychological incapacity‖ t o t h e m ost serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utt er in sen sit iv it y or in a bilit y t o g iv e m ea n in g a n d sig n ifica n ce t o t h e m a r r ia g e.

BERNA RDINO ZA MORA V S. COURT OF A PPEA LS a n d NORMA ZA MORA [G.R. NO. 141917. Febr u a r y 7, 2007] Fa ct s: Ber nardino Zamora and Norma Zamora were married on June 4, 1970. T h eir u n ion w a s n ot blessed of a child. Two years after, Norma left the country and went to the US to work as a nurse. A fter two years she did come back in the Philippines and thereafter she made periodic visits until sh e w a s a lr ea dy a US cit izen . Ber nardino filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marria g e a n ch or ed on t h e a lleg ed ― psychological incapacity‖ of Norma. To support his position , h e a lleg ed t h a t h is w ife w a s ― h orrified‖ by the mere thought of having children as evidenced by the fa ct t h a t sh e h a d n ot borne him a child. Furthermore, he also alleged that she abandoned him by living in the US a n d t hat throughout their marriage they live t ogether for not more than three years. He alleged t h a t A rt.36 of the Family Code provides that the marriage contracted by any party who at that time of t h e celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the marital obligation s of t h e m arriage, shall likewise be void even if such in ca pa cit y becom es m a n ifest on ly a ft er it s solem nization and that one of the essential marital obligations is t o procreate children thr ou g h sex u a l cooper a t ion w h ich is t h e ba sic en d of m a r r ia g e. On the other hand, Norma denied that she refused to have a child. She portrayed herself a s on e w ho lov es children as she is a nurse by profession and that she would from time to time bor r ow h er h u sba n d‘s n iece a n d n eph ew s t o ca r e for t h em . Issu e: W h ether or not Norma was suffering from psychological incapacity, hence t h eir m a r r ia g e be decla r ed v oid? Held: No. Nor m a w a s n ot psy ch olog ica lly in ca pa cit a t ed.

Un der the law, the facts alleged in the petition and the evidence presented, considered tota lit y , sh ould be sufficient to convince the court of the psychological incapacity of the party concerned. In t he case at bar the petition filed by Bernardino was not su fficien t a s t o su bst a n t ia t e h is a llegations that Norma is psychologically incapacitated. His allegations relating to her refusal t o cohabit with him and to bear a child was strongly disputed, as the records undeniably bear ou t . Fu rthermore, the acts and behavior of Norma that Ber n a r din o cit ed occu r r ed du r in g t h e m arriage, and there is no proof that the former exhibited a similar predilection ev en befor e or t h e in cept ion of t h e m a r r ia g e.

ROBERT O DOMINGO v s. COURT OF A PPEA LS a n d DELIA SOLEDA D A V ERA r epr esen t ed by h er A t t or n ey -i n -Fa ct MOISES R. A V ERA [G.R. No. 1 0 4 8 1 8 . Sept em ber 1 7 , 1 9 9 3 .] FA CT S: Delia Soledad A. Dom ingo filed a petition on May 29, 1991 before the Region a l T r ia l Cou r t of Pa sig entitled "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property" again st Rober t o Dom ingo. The petition alleged among others that: they were married on November 29, 19 7 6 a t t h e YMCA Youth Center Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage Contract Registry No. 1 277K-76 w it h Ma rriage License issued at Carmona, Cavite; unknown to her, he had a previous marriag e w it h on e Em erlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still existing; sh e ca m e t o kn ow of the prior marriage only som etime in 1 983 when Em er lin a dela Pa z su ed t h em for bigamy; from January 23, 1979 up to the present, she has been working in Saudi Arabia and sh e u sed to com e to the Philippines only when she would avail of the one-month ann u a l v a ca t ion leave granted by her foreign em ployer; since 1983 up t o the present, he has been u n em ploy ed a n d completely dependent upon her for support and subsistence; out of her personal ear n in g s, sh e purchased real and personal properties with a total amount of approximately P350,000.0 0 , w hich are under the possession and administration of Roberto; som etime in June 1989, while on h er one-month vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting with another wom an; she further discovered that he had been disposing of some of her properties w it h ou t h er kn ow ledg e or con sent; she confronted him about this and thereafter appointed her brother Moises R. Avera a s h er attorney-in-fact to take care of her properties; h e fa iled a n d r efu sed t o t u r n ov er t h e possession and administration of said properties to her brother/attorney -in-fact. T h e pet it ion pr ayed that a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from exercising any act of administration and ownership ov er sa id pr oper t ies; t h eir m arriage be declared null and void and of no force and effect; and Delia Soledad be declared th e sole and exclusive owner of all properties acquired at the time of their void marriag e a n d su c h pr operties be placed under the proper management and administration of the attorney -in -fa ct . ISSUE: W h ether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void m a r r ia g e is n ecessa r y . If in t h e a ffir m a t iv e, w h et h er t h e sa m e sh ou ld be filed on ly for pu r poses of r em a r r ia g e. HELD: Y es, a judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary and it can be filed even if n ot for t h e pu r pose of r em a r r ia g e. Un der the law, parties t o a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void ev en if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage befor e t h ey ca n be a llow ed t o m a r r y a g a in . A r t icle 4 0 of t h e Fa m ily Code pr ov ides:

"A RT . 40.The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for pur poses of remarriage on t he basis solely of a fin a l ju dg m en t decla r in g su ch pr ev iou s m a r r ia g e v oid." (n ). T hat Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clau se den ot es t h a t su ch fin a l ju dgment declaring the previous marriage void need n ot b e obt a in ed on ly for pu r poses of r em arriage. Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party might well in v oke t h e absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of a n action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property between the erstwhile spou ses, as well as an action for the custody and support of their com m on ch ildr en a n d t h e deliv er y of t h e la t t er 's pr esu m pt iv e leg it im es. T h erefore, in the instance where a party who has previously con t r a ct ed a m a r r ia g e w h ich r em ains subsisting desires t o enter into another marriage which is legally u n a ssa ila ble, h e is r equired by law to prove that the previous one was an absolute nullity. But this he may do on the ba sis solely of a fin a l ju dg m en t decla r in g su ch pr ev iou s m a r r ia g e v oid. MEY NA RDO L. BELT RA N v s. PEOPLE OF T HE PHILIPPINES, a n d HON. JUDGE FLORENT INO T UA ZON, JR.,t h e Ju dg e of t h e RT C, Ma ka t i Cit y , [G.R. No. 1 3 7 5 6 7 . Ju n e 2 0 , 2 0 0 0 ] Fa ct s: Mey nardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix were married on June 16, 1973 at the Immaculate Con cepcion Parish Church in Cubao, Quezon City. They were blessed with four children. After 24 y ears of marriage, Beltran filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psycholog ica l in ca pa cit y u n der A r t icle 3 6 of t h e Fa m ily Code befor e t h e RT C of Qu ezon Cit y . Charmaine Felix‘ answer she alleged that it was Meyanard who abandoned the conju g a l h om e a n d lived with a certain wom an named Milagros Salting. C h a r m a in e su bsequ en t ly filed a cr iminal complaint for concubinage against Mey n a r d a n d h is pa r a m ou r befor e t h e Cit y Pr osecutor's Office of Makati who, in a Resolution found probable cause and ordered the filin g of a n In formation against them. The case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2 3 6 1 7 6 , w a s filed befor e t h e MT C of Ma ka t i Cit y . On March 20, 1 998, Meynard filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of t h e W arrant of Arrest in the criminal case. He argued t h a t t h e pen den cy of t h e civ il ca se f or declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial question t o the determ in a t ion of t h e cr im in a l ca se. Issu e: W h ether or not the pending case involving a declaration of nullity of marriage based on a r t icle 3 6 is a prejudicial question to a criminal action of concubinage inv olv in g iden t ica l pa r t ies. Held: No. It is n ot a pr eju dicia l qu est ion . Un der the law, the pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is not a pr ejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case t o be considered pr eju dicia l t o a cr iminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determin a t ion of t h e civ il case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which t h e cr iminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues ra ised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or in n ocen ce of t h e a ccu sed w ou ld n ecessa r ily be det er m in ed. In t he case at bar, the parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its n ullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the com petent courts and only wh en t h e nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as th er e is n o su ch declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who cont r a ct s a secon d

m arriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of bein g pr osecu t ed for big a m y ." T h erefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of t h e m a r r ia g e a ssu m es t h e r isk of bein g pr osecu t ed for con cu bin a g e.

IMELDA MA RBELA -BOBIS v s. ISA GA NI BOBIS [G.R. No. 1 3 8 5 0 9 Ju ly 3 1 , 2 0 0 0 ] FA CT S: On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria Du lce B. Ja v ier . W ithout said marriage having been annulled, nullified or t ermina t ed, t h e sa m e r espon den t con tracted a second marriage with petitioner Im elda Marbella-Bobis on January 25, 1 9 9 6 a n d a llegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. Based on petitioner's com plaint a ffidavit, an information for bigamy was filed against respondent on February 25, 1998 , w h ich w as docketed as Criminal Case No. Q98-75611 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 226, Qu ezon City. Som etime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for t h e ju dicia l decla r a t ion of a bsolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated with ou t a m a r r ia g e license. Respondent then filed a motion t o suspend the proceedings in t h e cr im in a l ca se for bigamy invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial qu est ion t o t he criminal case. The trial judge granted the motion to suspend the criminal case in an Order da t ed Decem ber 2 9 , 1 9 9 8 . ISSUE: W h ether the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous m a r r ia g e con st it u t es a pr eju dicia l qu est ion t o a cr im in a l ca se for big a m y . HELD: No, it is n ot a pr eju dicia l qu est ion . Un der Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration of the second m arriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage befor e a pa r t y m ay remarry. The clear implication of this is that it is not for t h e pa r t ies, pa r t icu la r ly t h e a ccused, to determine the validity or invalidity of the marriage. Whether or not the first marriage w as void for lack of a license is a matter of defense because there is still no judicial declaration of it s nullity at the time the second marriage was contracted. It should be remembered that bigamy ca n successfully be prosecuted provided all its elements concur, two of w h ich a r e a pr ev iou s m arriage and a subsequent marriage which would have been v a lid h a d it n ot been for t h e ex ist en ce a t t h e m a t er ia l t im e of t h e fir st m a r r ia g e. T h erefore, Isagani cannot be permitted to use his own malfeasance t o defeat the criminal act ion a gainst him. The court should then immediately proceed with the criminal case without waitin g for t h e r esu lt of t h e civ il ca se. V INCENT PA UL MERCA DO v s. CONSUELO T A N [G.R. No. 1 3 7 1 1 0 A u g u st 1 , 2 0 0 0 ] FA CT S: Ma . Consuelo Tan and Vincent Mercado were married in 1 991. How ev er , a t t h e t im e of t h e m arriage of Tan with Mercado, the latter was actually a married man, hav in g been in la w fu l w edlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva on 1976. In the first marriage he have two children a n d in t h e secon d m a r r ia g e h e h a s on e ch ild. On October 5, 1992, a complaint for bigamy was filed by Tan against Mercado. A month lat er , a Pet ition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was filed by Mercado against Oliv a . On Ma y 6 , 1 993, the trial court declared the marriage of Mercado and Oliva as void ab initio. Nevertheless,

t h e lower court found accused Mercado guilty of the crime of bigamy under Article 3 4 9 of t h e Rev ised Penal Code. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court by stating that a ccu sed Mer ca do fa iled t o com ply w it h A r t icle 4 0 of t h e Fa m ily Code. ISSUE: W h ether or not accused Mercado is guilty of bigamy despite of his having obt a in ed a ju dicia l decla r a t ion of n u llit y of m a r r ia g e? RULING: Y es, Mer ca do is g u ilt y of big a m y . Un der Article 40 of the Family Code and the rulings enunciated in Wiegel vs. Sem pio-Diy a n d Dom ingo vs. Court of Appeals which expressly state that in order to re -marr y , on e m u st fir st obt a in a ju dicia l decla r a t ion of n u llit y of t h e pr ev iou s m a r r ia g e. In t he case at bar, accused Mercado failed to comply with the requirement because he m a r r ied T an without first securing a judicial declaration of his marriage with Oliva. He only filed for such a m on t h a ft er h e w a s ch a r g e w it h t h e cr im e of big a m y . T h erefore, the crime of bigamy was already consummated when he contracted a second marriage w hile the first was still subsisting. The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of t h e fir st m a r r ia g e w a s im m a t er ia l.

LUCIO MORIGO Y CA CHO V . PEOPLE OF T HE PHILIPPINES [GR No. 1 4 5 2 2 6 Febr u a r y 6 , 2 0 0 4 ] Fa ct s: Lu cio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates four years.. After the school year 197 7 -1 9 7 8 t h ey lost contact with each other. Y et, after som e time, when Lucia was in Singapore she sen t a let ter to Lucio, their friendship was rekindled. They became sweethear t s a n d on 1 9 8 6 Lu cia r eturned t o the Philippines. On 1990 they eventu a lly g ot m a r r ied. A ft er t h eir m a r r ia g e celebration, Lucia once again left for Canada. After a year, Lucia filed with the Ontar io Cou r t a pet it ion for div or ce a g a in st Lu cio w h ich w a s g r a n t ed on Ja n u a r y 1 7 , 1 9 9 2 . In October of the same year, Lucio married Maria Lumbago. Thereafter, he filed a pet it ion for n ullity of his marriage to Lucia on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. In 1 993, an Information for Bigamy was filed against Lucio. He moved for the su spen sion of t h e a rraignment alleging that the civil case for judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a pr eju dicia l qu est ion in t h e big a m y ca se. His m ot ion w a s den ied. Su bsequently, Lucio was convicted by the Trial Court an d on a ppea l, t h e Cou r t of A ppea ls a ffirmed the conviction of Bigamy. It ruled that what is sought t o be punished by Article 3 4 9 of t h e Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage before the first marriage h a d been dissolv ed. Issu e: W h ether or not Lucio is guilty of bigamy by contracting a marriage with Maria, considering tha t t h er e w a s n o m a r r ia g e cer em on y t ook pla ce w it h h is m a r r ia g e w it h Lu cia . Held: No, h e is n ot g u ilt y . Un der the law, the first element of Bigamy is that the offender has been leg a lly m a r r ied a n d u nder the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void a b in it io, t h e t w o w er e n ev er married "from the beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bea r s n o leg a l effect .

In t he case at bar, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizin g officer. Lucio and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on t h eir ow n . T h e m er e pr ivate act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs n o judicial declaration of nullity. Legally speaking, Lucio was never married t o Lu cia Ba r r et e. T h u s, t h er e is n o fir st m a r r ia g e t o spea k of. T h erefore, Lucio is acquitted by the Supreme Court from the charge of Bigamy beca u se Lu cio w a s n ot m a r r ied t o Lu cia a t t h e t im e h e con t r a ct ed h is m a r r ia g e w it h Ma r ia ,

3 90 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases un t il decla r ed n u ll a n d v oid by a com pet en t cou r t . Un der the foregoing provisions a judicial declaration of absence of the absen t ee spou se is n ot n ecessary as long as the prescribed period of absence is met. It is equally notewort h y t h a t t h e m arriage in these exceptional cases are, by the explicit mandate of Article 83, to be deemed valid "u n til declared null and void by a competent court." It follows that the burden of proof would be, in t h ese ca ses, on t h e pa r t y a ssa il in g t h e secon d m a r r ia g e. T h erefore, it remained undisputed that Marietta‘s first husband, James Bounds, had been absent or had disappeared for more than eleven years before she entered into a second marriage in 1958 w ith the deceased Theodorico Calisterio. This second marriage, having been contracted du r in g t h e r eg im e of t h e civ il code sh ou ld t h u s be deem ed v a lid.

A RMA S Y CA LIST ERIO v s. MA RIET T A CA LIST ERIO [G.R. No. 1 3 6 4 6 7 A pr il 6 , 2 0 0 0 ] Fa ct s: On 24 April 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving several par cels of la n d w it h a n est imated value of P604,750.00. Teodorico was survived by h is w ife, Ma r iet t a Ca list er io. T eodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had previou sly been m a r r ied t o Ja m es W illiam Bounds. James Bounds disappeared without a trace on 11 February 1947. Teodorico and Ma r ietta were married eleven years later, or on 08 May 1 958, without Marietta havin g pr ior ly secu r ed a cou r t decla r a t ion t h a t Ja m es w a s pr esu m pt iv ely dea d. On 09 October 1992, Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a surviving sister of Teodorico, filed w it h t h e Reg ional Trial Court a petition entitled, "In the Matt er of In t est a t e Est a t e of t h e Decea sed T eodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos,‖ Antonia Armas claiming t o be t h e sole su r v iv in g h eir of T eodorico Calisterio, and that the marriage between the latter and Marietta Espinosa Calist er io being allegedly bigamous and thereby null and void. Marietta opposed the pet it ion . Ma r iet t a st ated that her first marriage with James Bounds had been dissolved due to the latter's absence, h is whereabouts being unknown, for more than eleven years before she contracted h er secon d m arriage with Teodorico. Contending to be the surviv in g spou se of T eodor ico, sh e sou g h t pr ior it y in t h e a dm in ist r a t ion of t h e est a t e of t h e deceden t . On 17 January 1996, the lower court handed down its decision in favor of petitioner Antonia and declared the latter as the sole heir of the estate of Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos. Responden t Ma r ietta appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals which ruled in her favor. Issu e: W h ether or not the second marriage, having been contracted during the regime of the Civil Code, sh ould be deemed valid notwithstanding the absence of a judicial d eclaration of pr esu m pt iv e dea t h of Ja m es Bou n ds. Held: T h e marriage between the deceased Teodorico and Marietta was solemnized on 08 Ma y 1 9 5 8 . T h e law in force at that time was the Civil Code, not the Family Code which took effect on ly on 0 3 August 1988. Article 256 of the Family Code itself limited its retroactive governance on ly t o ca ses where it thereby would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired righ t s in a ccor da n ce w it h t h e Civ il Code or ot h er la w s. V erily, the applicable specific provision in the instant controversy is Article 83 (2 ) of t h e New Civ il Code which provides: Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person durin g t h e lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse sh a ll be illegal and void from its performance, unless: (2) The first spouse had been absent for sev en con secutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having n ew s of t h e absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven yea r s, is g enerally considered as dead and believed to be so by t h e spou se pr esen t a t t h e t im e of con tracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to articles

REPUBLIC v s. NOLA SCO 2 2 0 SCRA 2 1 FA CT S: On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the RTC of Antique a pet it ion for t h e declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, invoking Article 41 of t h e Fam ily Code. The petition prayed that respondent's wife be declared presumptively dea d or , in t h e alternative, that the marriage be declared null and void. The Repu blic of t h e Ph ilippin es opposed the petition through the Provincial Prosecutor of Antique who had been depu t ized t o a ssist the Solicitor-General in the instant case. The Republic argued, first, that Nolasco did n ot possess a "well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead," 2 and second, Nolasco's a t tempt to have his marriage annulled in the same proceeding w a s a "cu n n in g a t t em pt " t o circumvent the law on marriage. During trial, respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman a n d that he had first met Janet Monica Parker, a British subject, in a bar in England during on e of h is ship's port calls. From that chance meeting onwards, Janet Mon ica Pa r ker liv ed w it h r espondent on his ship for six (6) months until they returned to respondent's hometown of Sa n Jose, Antique after his seaman's contract expired. Respondent married Janet Monica Parker in Sa n Jose, Antique, in Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the Cathedr a l of Sa n Jose. Respondent further testified that after t h e m a r r ia g e celebr a t ion , h e obt a in ed a n ot h er em ployment contract as a seaman and left his wife with h is pa r en t s in Sa n Jose, A n t iqu e. Som etime in January 1983, while working ov erseas, responden t r eceiv ed a let t er fr om h is m other informing him that Janet Monica had given birth to his son. The same letter in for m ed h im that Janet Monica had left Antique. Respondent claim ed h e t h en im m edia t ely a sked permission to leave his ship t o return home. He a r r iv ed in A n t iqu e in Nov em ber 1 9 8 3 . Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself whenever his ship dock ed in En g land proved fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he had sent to his missing spou se a t No. 38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of the bar where h e a n d Ja n et Mon ica first met, were all returned to him. He also claimed that he inquired from among friends bu t they too had no news of Janet Monica. On cross-examination, respondent stated that he had liv ed with and later married Janet Monica Parker despite his lack of knowledge as to her famil y ba ckground. He insisted that his wife continued to refuse to give him such information even after t h ey were married. He also testified that h e did n ot r epor t t h e m a t t er of Ja n et Mon ica 's disa ppea r a n ce t o t h e Ph ilippin e g ov er n m en t a u t h or it ies. Respondent presented his mother, Alicia Nolasco, as his witness. She testified that her daughterin -law Janet Monica had expressed a desire to return t o England even before she had given birth t o Gerry Nolasco. When asked why her daughter-in-law might have wished t o lea v e A n t iqu e, r espondent's mother replied that Janet Monica never got used t o the rura l w a y of life in Sa n Jose, Antique. Alicia Nolasco also said that she had tried to dissuade Janet Monica from leavin g

a s she had given birth to her son just fifteen days before, but when she (Alicia ) fa iled t o do so, sh e gave Janet Monica P22,000.00 for her expenses before she left for Eng la n d. Sh e fu r t h er claimed that she had no information as to the missing person's present whereabout s.T h e t r i a l court granted Nolasco's petition declaring Janet Monica Parker Nolasco as presumptively dea d, w ithout prejudice to her reappeara n ce. T h e Repu blic a ppea led t o t h e Cou r t of A ppea ls con tending that the trial court erred in declaring Janet Monica Par ker pr e su m pt iv ely dea d because respondent Nolasco had failed to show that there existed a well founded belief for su ch decla r a t ion . T h e Court of Appeals affirmed the trial cour t 's decision . Hen ce t h is Pet it ion for Rev iew . ISSUE: W h et h er or n ot Nola sco h a s a w el l-fou n ded belief t h a t h is w ife is a lr ea dy dea d. HELD: Fou r (4) requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code: T hat the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive y ea r s if t h e disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in A r t icle 3 9 1 , Civ il Code; T h a t t h e pr esen t spou se w ish es t o r em a r r y ; T h a t t h e pr esen t spou se h a s a w ell -fou n ded belief t h a t t h e a bsen t ee is dea d; a n d T hat the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive deat h of t h e a bsen t ee. T h e Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missing wife w it h su ch dilig en ce a s t o g iv e r ise t o a "w ell -fou n ded belief" t h a t sh e i s dea d. In t he case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by respon den t in his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a r easonable or well-founded belief that she was already dead. When he a r r iv ed in Sa n Jose, A ntique after learning of Janet Monica 's depa r t u r e, in st ea d of seekin g t h e h elp of loca l a uthorities or of the British Em bassy, he secured another seaman's contract and went to London, a v ast city of many millions of inhabitants, to look for her there. In Respon den t 's t est im on y , h owever, showed that he confused London for Liverpool and this casts doubt on h is su pposed efforts to locate his wife in England. The Court of Appeal's justification of the m ist a ke, t o w it : W ell, while the cognoscente would readily know the geographical difference bet w een Lon don a n d Liverpool, for a humble seaman like Gregorio the two places could m ea n on e — pla ce in En g land, the port where his ship docked and where he found Janet. Our own prov in cia l folks, ev ery time they leave hom e to visit relatives in Pasay City, Kalookan City, or Parañaqu e, w ou ld a nnounce to friends and relatives, "We're going to Manila." This apparent err or in n a m in g of places of destination does not appear t o be fatal. Is not well taken. There is no analogy bet w een Ma n ila and its neighboring cities, on one hand, and London and Liverpool, on the other, which , a s pointed out by the Solicitor-General, are around three hundred fifty (350) kilometer s a pa r t . W e do not consider that walking into a major city like Liverpool or London with a simple hope of som ehow bumping into one particular person there — which is in effect what Nolasco says he did — ca n be r eg a r ded a s a r ea son a bly dilig en t sea r ch . T h e Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined t o give any informa t ion a s t o h er personal background even after she had married respondent 17 too convenient an excuse to ju stify his failure to locate her. The same can be said of the loss of the alleged letters respon den t h a d sent to his wife which respondent claims were all returned to him. Respondent said h e h a d lost these returned letters, under unspecified circumstances. Neither can this Court giv e m u ch cr edence to respondent's bare assertion t h a t h e h a d in qu ir ed f r om t h eir fr ien ds of h er w hereabouts, considering that respondent did not identify those friends in his testim on y . T h e Court of Appeals ruled that since the prosecutor failed to rebut this evidence durin g t r ia l, it is g ood evidence. But this kind of evidence cannot, by it s n a t u r e, be r ebu t t ed. In a n y ca se, a dm issibility is not sy nonymous with credibility. As noted before, there a r e ser iou s dou bt s t o

r espondent's credibility. Moreover, even if admitted as ev idence, said testimony merely t en de d t o sh ow that the missing spouse h a d ch osen n ot t o com m u n ica t e w it h t h eir com m on a cqu a in t a n ces, a n d n ot t h a t sh e w a s dea d. Respondent testified that immediately after receiving his mother's letter sometime in Ja n u a r y 1 983, he cut short his employment contract to return to San Jose, Antique. However, he did n ot ex plain the delay of nine (9) months from January 1983, when he allegedly asked leave from h is ca ptain, to Nov ember 1983 when be finally reached San Jose. Respondent, moreover, claimed he m arried Janet Monica Parker without inquiring about her parents and their place of residence. 19 A lso, respondent failed t o explain why he did not even try to get the help of the police or ot h er a uthorities in London and Liverpool in his effort to find his wife. The circu m st a n ces of Ja n et Mon ica's departure and respondent's subsequent behavior make i t very difficult t o r eg a r d t h e cla im ed belief t h a t Ja n et Mon ica w a s dea d a w ell -fou n ded on e. T h e spouses should not be allowed, by the simple expedient of agreeing that one of them lea v e t h e conjugal abode and never to return again, to circumvent the policy of the laws on marr ia g e. T h e Court notes that respondent even tried to have his marriage annulled before the trial cou r t in t h e sa m e pr oceedin g . W h ile the Court understands the need of respondent's young son, Gerry Nolasco, for m a t er n a l ca re, still the requirements of the law must prevail. Since respondent failed to satisfy t h e clea r r equirements of the law, his petition for a judicial declaration of presumpt iv e dea t h m u st be den ied. In fine, respondent failed t o establish that he had the well-founded belief required by law t hat his absent wife was already dead that would sustain the issuance of a court order declar in g Ja n et Mon ica Pa r ker pr esu m pt iv ely dea d.

REPUBLIC V S. LORINO G.R. No. 1 6 0 2 5 8 Ja n u a r y 1 9 , 2 0 0 5 FA CT S: Respondent Gloria Bermudez-Lorino filed, On August 14, 2000, nine (9) years after she left h er h usband, a verified petition with the RTC under the rules on Summary Judicial Proceedin g s in t h e Family Law provided for in the Family Code, for a Court declaration t h a t h er h u sba n d is ju dicially presumed dead for the pu r pose of r em a r r ia g e. Sh e a lleg ed t h a t : A ) sh e a n d FRA NCISCO LORINO, JR. were married on June 12, 1987 and beg ot t h r ee (3 ) ch ildr en . B) Befor e they got married she was unaware that her husband was a habitual dr in ker , posse ssed w ith violent character/attitude, and had the propensity to go out with friends t o t h e ex t en t of being unable to engage in any gainful work. C) Because of her husband‘s violent character, Gloria fou nd it safer to leave him behind and decided to go back to her parents together with her t h r ee (3 ) children. D) From the time of her physical separation from her husband in 1991, Glor ia h a s n ot heard of him at all. She had absolutely no communications with h im , or w it h a n y of h is r elatives. She believes that he is already dead and is now seeking through this petition for a Court declaration that her husband is judicially presumed dead for the pur pose of r em a r r ia g e. On A ugust 28, 2000, the RTC issued an order direct in g , t h e pu blica t ion of t h e pet it ion in a n ewspaper of general circulation. On September 16, 2000, the order for hearing was publish ed in a newspaper of general circulation in this province once a week for three consecutiv e w eeks a n d be posted in the bulletin boards of the Hall of Justice and the Mu nicipal Ha ll, Sa n Ma t eo, Riza l. Finding the said petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the same is hereby set for h earing before the Court on September 18, 2000. The trial court ruled declaring the presumptive death/absence of Francisco Lorino, Jr. pursuant to Art. 41 of the New Family Code but subject to a ll restrictions and conditions provided therein. The judgment being im m edia t ely fin a l a n d ex ecutory under the provisions of Article 247 of the Family Code, thus: Art. 247. The judgment of t h e court shall be immediately final and executory, Despite the decision of the trial court havin g become final, the Office of the Solicitor General, nevertheless filed a Notice of Appeal. T h e RT C

h a d the records elevated to the Court of Appeals. The Court of A ppeals, treating th e ca se a s a n or dinary appealed case under Rule 41 of the Revised Rules on Civ il Pr ocedu r e, den ied t h e Repu blic‘s a ppea l a n d a ccor din g ly a ffir m ed t h e a ppea led decision . ISSUE: W h ether or not the Court of Appeals duly acquired jurisdiction ov er the appeal on a fin a l a n d ex ecu t or y ju dg m en t of t h e Reg on a l T r ia l Cou r t . HELD: No. In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementa r y per iod w ithin which to perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered thereunder, by express pr ov ision of Section 247, Family Code, are "immediately final and executory". It was erroneou s, t h erefore, on the part of the RTC to give due course to the Repu blic‘s a ppea l a n d or der t h e t ransmittal of the entire records of the case t o the Court of Appeals. An appellate court acqu ir es n o jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by express provision of law, is immediately final and ex ecutory. The right to appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it is merely a st atutory privilege." Since, by express mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code, all judgments r endered in summary judicial proceedings in Family Law are "immediately final and executory", t h e right t o appeal was not granted to any of the parties therein. The Republic of the Philippines, a s oppositor in the petition for declaration of pr esu m pt iv e dea t h , sh ou ld n ot be t r ea t ed differently. It had no right to appeal the RTC decision of November 7, 2001 . Not h in g is m or e set tled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory it becomes immutable and u nalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if t h e m odifica t ion is m eant to correct what is perceived t o be an erroneous conclusion of fact or la w , a n d w h et h er m ade by the highest court of the But, if only to set the r ecor ds st r a ig h t a n d for t h e fu t u r e g u idance of the bench and the bar, let it be stated that the RTC‘s decision dat ed Nov em ber 7 , 2 001, was immediately final and executory upon notice t o the parties. It was erroneou s for t h e OSG to file a notice of appeal, and for the RTC to give due course thereto. The Court of A ppea ls a cquired no jurisdiction over the case, and should have dismissed the appeal outr ig h t on t h a t g r ou n d.

T Y V S. COURT OF A PPEA LS G.R. NO. 127406. No vem ber 27, 2000 FA CT S: A s shown in the records of the case, private respondent married Anna Maria Regina Villanu ev a in a civil ceremony on March 29, 1977, in Manila. Then they had a church wedding on A u g u st 27 , 1977. However, on August 4, 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relation s Cou r t of Qu ezon City declared their marriage null and void ab initio for lack of a valid m a r r ia g e licen se. T h e church wedding on August 27, 1 977, was also declared null and void ab initio for lack of consen t of t h e pa r t ies. Ev en before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria, priv a t e r espon den t w ed Ofelia P. Ty, herein petitioner, on April 4, 1 979, in ceremonies officiated by the judge of t h e City Court of Pasay. On April 4, 1982, they also had a church wedding in Makati, Metro Manila . Pr ivate respondent filed a petition, which alleged that his marriage with petitioner was v oid for la ck of m a r r ia g e licen se a n d h is m a r r ia g e w it h A n n e Ma r ia w a s st ill su bsist in g . ISSUE: W h ether or not nullit y of fir st m a r r ia g e is r equ ir ed befor e obt a in in g 2 nd m a r r ia g e. HELD: In W iegel v. Sempio-Diy (1986), the Court held that there is a need for a judicial decla r a t ion of n ullity of a void marriage. In Wiegel, Lilia married Maxion in 1 97 2 . In 1 9 7 8 , sh e m a r r ied a n other man, Wiegel. W iegel filed a petition with the Juvenile Dom est ic Rela t ion s Cou r t t o

declare his marriage to Lilia as void on the ground of her previous valid marriage. T h e Cou r t , ex pr essly r ely in g on Con su eg r a , con clu ded t h a t : T h ere is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of h er fir st h usband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though v oid st ill n eeds a ccording to this Court a judicial declaration (citing Consuegra) of such fa ct a n d for a ll leg a l in tents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contract ed h er marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; accordingly, the marriage of pet it ion er a n d r espon den t w ou ld be r eg a r ded V OID u n d er t h e la w . A t any rate, the confusion under the Civil Code was put to rest under t h e Fa m ily Code. Ou r r u lings in Gom ez, Consuegra, and Wiegel were eventually embodied in Article 40 of the Fam ily Code. Article 40 of said Code expressly required a judicial declaration of n u llit y of m a r r ia g e A rt. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarria g e on t h e ba sis solely of a fin a l ju dg m en t decla r in g su ch pr ev iou s m a r r ia g e v oid. In T erre v. T erre (1992) the Court, applying Gom ez, Consuegra and Wiegel, categorically st a t ed t hat a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary. Thus, we disbarred a lawyer for contracting a bigamous marriage during the subsistence of his first marriag e. He cla im ed t hat his first marriage in 1977 was void since his first wife was already married in 1968. We held t hat Atty. Terre should have known that the pr ev a ilin g ca se la w is t h a t ― for pu r poses of det ermining whether a person is legally free t o contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration t h a t t h e fir st m a r r ia g e w a s n u ll a n d v oi d a b in it io is essen t ia l. In t he present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered into in 1979, befor e W iegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. T h e fir st m arriage of private respondent being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for ju dicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a secon d m a r r ia g e. In t h is ca se, t h erefore, we conclude that private responden t ‘s secon d m a r r ia g e t o pet it ion er is v a lid.

CA RINO v s. CA RINO 3 5 1 SCRA 1 3 1 FA CT S: SPO4 Santiago S. Carino contracted two marriages during his lifetime, the first was on June 2 0 , 1 969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao, with whom he had two children, a n d t h e secon d w a s on Nov ember 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee and had no children at all in their 1 0 y ea r s of cohabitation. On November 23, 1992, SPO4 Santiago Carino passed away in the ca r e of Su sa n Y ee who paid the medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed cla im s for m onetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various governmen t a g encies, petitioner was able to collect a t otal of P1 46,000.00 and r espon den t h a s collect ed P2 1 ,0 0 0 .0 0 On December 14, 1993, respondent filed the instant case for the collect ion of m on ey a g a in st pet itioner t o return to respondent at least one half of the money sh e h a s collect ed fr om t h e g ov ernment agencies. Petitioner failed t o file h er a n sw er a n d w a s decla r ed in defa u lt . Respondent then admitted that her m a r r ia g e w it h t h e decea sed t ook pla ce du r in g t h e su bsistence of, and without the judicial declaration of nullity of the 1 st marriage. She also claimed t hat she was not aware that the deceased has a previous marriage a n d on ly fou n d ou t w h en pet itioner introduced herself as the w ife. T o bolst er h er a ct ion for collect ion of m on ey , r espondent contended that the marriage of petitioner with the deceased is void ab initio because t h e same was solemnized without the required marriage license. In support thereof, responden t pr esented: 1) the marriage certificate of the deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number, and 2) a certification dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Ju a n , Met r o Ma n ila .

RT C ruled in favor of respondent. And on appeal, CA affirmed the decision of the lower court in t ot o. Hen ce, t h e in st a n t pet it ion . ISSUE: W h et h er or n ot t h e t w o m a r r ia g es con t r a ct ed by t h e decea sed a r e v a lid

Fa iling in its attempt t o have the parties reconciled, the court set the case for trial on 26 Au g u st 1 966 but it was postponed. Thereafter, while reviewing the expendiente, the court realized t h a t A urora's allegation of the fraud was legally insufficient to invalidate her ma r r ia g e. T h e cou r t dism issed t h e com pla in t .

HELD: Un der Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgm en t decla r in g su ch pr ev iou s m arriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a pr ev iou s m a r r ia g e is sou g h t t o be inv oked for the purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable by la w , for sa id projected marriage t o be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous m arriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessa r y t o decla r e a m a r r ia g e a n a bsolu t e n u llit y .

ISSUE: W h ether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship wit h a n ot h er w om a n is a g r ou n d for a n n u lm en t of m a r r ia g e.

In t he case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and deceased does not fa ll w ithin the marriages exempt from the marriage license r equ ir em en t . A m a r r ia g e licen se, t h erefore, was indispensible to the validity of their marriage. Such being the case, the presum ed v alidity of the marriage of petitioner and deceased has been su fficien t ly ov er com e. It t h en became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and that they secu r ed t h e v a lid m a r r ia g e licen se.

A RT. 85. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the t ime of t h e m a r r ia g e: xxx xxx xxx

It does not follow from the foregoing disposition , however, that since the marriage of petitioner a n d the deceased is declared void ab initio, the ―death benefits‖ under the scrutiny would now be a warded t o respondent. Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous m arriage of the deceased and the petitioner does not v a lida t e t h e secon d m a r r ia g e of t h e deceased with respondent. The fact remains that their marriage was solem n ize w it h ou t fir st obt aining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner and the deceased void. Hence, the m arriage of respondent and the deceased is likewise, void ab initio. As to the ―dea t h ben efit s‖ t hat the deceased obtained from the government agencies, it should be given t o his legal heirs a s it was declared an intestate succession. The children from the first marriage sh a ll be t h e on es obt aining the sa id ben efit s.

V OIDA BLE MA RRIA GES

A NA YA v s. PA LA ROA N 3 6 SCRA 9 7 FA CT S: Pla intiff Aurora and defendant Fernando were married on 4 December 1 953 ; t h a t defen da n t Fernando filed an action for annulment of the marriage on 7 January 1954 on the ground that his con sent was obtained through force and intimidation; that judgment was rendered th erein on 23 September 1959 dismissing the complaint of Fernando, upholding the validity of the m a r r ia g e a n d granting Aurora's counterclaim; t h a t (per pa r a g r a ph IV ) w h ile t h e a m ou n t of t h e counterclaim was being negotiated "t o settle the judgment," Fernando had divulged t o A u r or a t hat several months prior t o their marriage he had pre-m arital relationship with a close relat iv e of h is; and that "the non-divulgement to her of the aforementioned pre-marital secret on the part of defendant that definitely wrecked their marriage, which apparently doomed to fail even before it had hardly commenced ... frank disclosure of which, certitude precisely pr eclu ded h er , t h e Pla intiff herein from going thru the marriage that was solemnized between t h em con st it u t ed 'FRA UD', in obtaining her consent, within the contemplation of No. 4 of Article 85 of t h e Civ il Code" (sic) (Record on Appeal, page 3). She prayed for the annulment of the marr ia g e a n d for m or a l da m a g es.

HELD: W e m ust agree with the lower court that it is not. For fraud as a vice of con sen t in m a r r ia g e, w hich may be a cause for its annulment, comes under Article 85, No. 4, of the Civil Code, wh ich pr ov ides:

(4 ) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full kn owledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as her husba n d or h is w ife, a s t h e ca se m a y be; T h is fraud, as vice of consent, is limited exclusively by law to those kin ds or species of fr a u d en u m er a t ed in A r t icle 8 6 , a s follow s: A RT. 86. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred t o in number 4 of the pr ecedin g a r t ic le: Misr epr esen t a t ion a s t o t h e iden t it y of on e of t h e con t r a ct in g pa r t ies; Non -disclosure of the previous conviction of the ot h er pa r t y of a cr im e in v olv in g m or a l t u r pit u de, a n d t h e pen a lt y im posed w a s im pr ison m en t for t w o y ea r s or m or e; Con cealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a m a n ot h er t h a n h er h u sba n d. No ot her misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity shall con st it u t e su ch fr a u d a s w ill g iv e g r ou n ds for a ct ion for t h e a n n u lm en t of m a r r ia g e. T h e intention of Congress t o confine the circumstances that can constitute fraud as g r ou n d for a nnulment of marriage to the foregoing three cases may be deduced from the fact that, of all t h e causes of nullity enumerated in Article 85, fraud is the only one given specia l t r ea t m en t in a su bsequent article within the chapter on void and voidable mar r ia g es. If it s in t en t ion w er e ot h erwise, Congress would have stopped at Article 85, for, anyway, fraud in general is a lr ea dy m entioned therein as a cause for annulment. But Article 86 was also en a ct ed, ex pr essly a n d specifically dealing with "fraud referred to in number 4 of the preceding article," and proceeds by en umerating the specific frauds (misrepresentation as to identity, non-disclosure of a pr ev iou s conviction, and concealment of pregnancy), making it clear that Congress intended to exclude all ot h er frauds or deceits. To stress further such intention, the enumeration of the specific fr a u ds w as followed by the interdiction: "No other misrepresentation or deceit as to char a ct er , r a n k, for tune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulm en t of m a r r ia g e." Non -disclosure of a husband's pre-m arital relationship with another wom an is n ot on e of t h e en umerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annu lm en t ; a n d it is fu r t h er ex cluded by the last paragraph of the article, providing that "n o oth er m isr epr esen t a t ion or deceit as to ... chastity" shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage. While a woman ma y det est such non-disclosure of premarital lewdness or feel having been t h er eby ch ea t ed in t o g iv ing her consent t o the marriage, nevertheless the law does not assuag e h er g r ief a ft er h er con sent was solemnly given, for upon marriage she entered into an institution in which societ y ,

a n d not herself alone, is interested. The lawmaker's intent being plain, the Court's duty is to give effect t o t h e sa m e, w h et h er it a g r ees w it h t h e r u le or n ot . On the merits of this second fraud charge, it i s enough t o point out that any secret inten t ion on t h e husband's part not to perform his marital duties must have been discovered by the wife soon a ft er the marriage: hence her action for annulment based on t h a t fr a u d sh ou ld h a v e been br ought within four years after the marriage. Since appella n t 's w eddin g w a s celebr a t ed in Decem ber of 1953, and this ground was only pleaded in 1966, it must be declared already barred.

A QUINO v s. DELIZO 1 0 9 Ph il. 2 1 FA CT S: T h is is a petition for certiorari t o review a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming tha t of t h e Court of First Instance of Rizal which dismissed petitioner's complaint for a n n u lm en t of h is m a r r ia g e w it h r espon den t Con ch it a Delizo. T h e dismissed complaint, which was filed on September 6, 1955, was ba sed on t h e g r ou n d of fr aud, it being alleged, among other things, that respondent, at t h e da t e of h er m a r r ia g e t o pet itioner Aquino, on December 27, 1 954, concealed from the la t t er t h a t fa ct t h a t sh e w a s pr egnant by another man, and sometime in April, 1955 , or a bou t fou r m on t h s a ft er t h eir m arriage, gave birth t o a child. In her answer, defendant claimed that the child wa s con ceiv ed ou t of la w fu l w edlock bet w een h er a n d t h e pla in t iff. A t the trial, the attorney's for both parties appeared and t h e cou r t a qu o or der ed A ssist a n t Pr ov incial Fiscal Jose Goco to represent the State in the proceedings to prevent collusion. On ly t h e plaintiff however, testified and the only documentary evidence presented was the ma r r ia g e con tract between the parties. Defendant neither appeared nor presented any eviden ce despit e t h e reservation made by her cou n sel t h a t h e w ou ld pr esen t ev iden ce on a la t er da t e. On June 16, 1956, the trial court, noting that no birth certificate was presented to show that t h e ch ild was born within 180 days after the marriage bet w een t h e pa r t ies, a n d h oldin g t h a t con cealment of pregnancy as alleged by the plaintiff does not constitute such fraud t h a t w ou ld a nnul a marriage, dismissed the complaint. Through a verified "petition to reopen for recept i on of a dditional evidence", plaintiff tried to present the certificates of birth and delivery of the child born of the defendant on April 26, 1955, which documents, according to him, h e h a d fa iled t o secure earlier and produce before the trial court thru e x cu sa ble n eg lig en ce. T h e pet it ion , h ow ev er , w a s den ied. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, that court held that there ha s been ex cu sa ble n eg lect in pla intiff's inability to present the proof of the child's birth, through her birth certificate, a n d for t hat reason the court a quo erred in denying the motion for reception of additional evidence. On t h e theory, however, that it was not impossible for plaintiff and defendant t o ha v e h a d sex u a l in tercourse during their engagement so t h a t t h e ch ild cou ld be t h ei r ow n , a n d fin din g u nbelievable plaintiff's claim that he did not notice or even suspect that defendant was pregnant w hen he married her, the appellate court, nevertheless, affirmed the dismissal of the complain t . Pla intiff filed a motion praying that the decision be reconsidered, or, if such reconsidera t ion be den ied, t h a t t h e ca se be r em a n ded t o t h e low er cou r t for n ew t r ia l. T h e Court of Appeals denied the motion. From that order, the plaintiff brought the ca se t o t h is Cou r t t h r u t h e pr esen t pet it ion for cer t ior a r i. ISSUE:

W h ether or not the concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she w a s pr egnant by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is ground for a n n u lm en t of m a r r ia g e. HELD: T h e cou r t h eld t h a t t h e dism i ssa l of pla in t iff's com pla in t ca n n ot be su st a in ed. Un der the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the ma r r ia g e, sh e was pregnant by a man other than her h u sba n d con st it u t es fr a u d a n d is g r ou n d for a nnulment of marriage. The defendant wife was alleged to be on ly m or e t h a n fou r m on t h s pr egnant at the time of her marriage t o plaintiff. At that stage, we are not prepared t o sa y t h a t h er pregnancy was readily apparent, especially since she was "naturally plump" or fat as alleg ed by plaintiff. According to medical authorities, ev en on t h e 5 t h m on t h of pr eg n a n cy , t h e en largement of a woman's abdom en is still below the umbilicus, that is to say, the enlargement is lim ited to the lower part of the abdomen so that it is hardly noticeable and may, if n ot iced, b e a t tributed only t o fat formation on the lower part of the abdomen. It is only on the 6th month of pr egnancy that the enlargement of the woman's abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicu s, m aking the roundness of the abdom en more general and apparent. If, as claimed by pla in t iff, defendant is "naturally plump", he could hardly be expected to know, merely by looking, whether or n ot she was pregnant at the time of their marriage more so because she must have attempt ed t o conceal the true state of affairs. Ev en physicians and surgeons, with t h e a id of t h e w om a n h erself who shows and gives her subjective and objective symptom s, can on ly cla im posit iv e dia g n osis of pr eg n a n cy in 3 3 % a t fiv e m on t h s. a n d 5 0 % a t six m on t h s. T h e appellate court also said that it was not impossible for plaintiff and defendant t o h a v e h a d sexual intercourse before they got married and therefore the child cou ld be t h eir ow n . T h is st atement, however, is purely conjectural and finds no support or justifica t ion in t h e r ecor d. Upon the other hand, the evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial, taken together w it h w hat has already been adduced would, in our opinion, be sufficient to sustain the fraud a lleg ed by plaintiff. The Court of Appeals should, therefore, not have denied the motion praying for new t r ial simply because defendant failed to file her answer thereto. Such failure of t h e defen da n t ca nnot be taken as evidence of collusion, especially since a provincial fiscal has been order ed t o r epresent the Government precisely to prevent such collusion. As to the veracity of the cont en t s of t h e motion and its annexes, the same can best be determined only after hearing ev iden ce. In t h e circumstance, we think that justice would be better served if a n ew t r ia l w er e or der ed.

JIMENEZ v s. REPUBLIC 1 0 9 PHIL 2 7 3 FA CT S:

T h e plaintiff Joel Jimenez prays for a decree annulling his marriage t o the defen da n t Rem edios Cazares contracted on 3 August 1 950 befor e a ju dg e of t h e m u n icipa l cou r t of Zam boanga City, upon the ground that the office of her genitals or vagina was to small t o a llow t h e penetration of a male organ or penis for copulation; that the condit ion of h er g en it a ls a s described above existed at the time of marriage and continues to exist; and that for that r ea son h e left the conjugal home two nights and one day after they had been ma r r ied. T h e w ife w a s sum moned and served a copy of the complaint. She did not file an answer. On 2 9 Sept em ber 1 956, pursuant t o the provisions of article 88 of the Civil Code, t h e Cou r t dir ect ed t h e cit y a t torney of Zamboanga t o inquire whether there was a collusion, to intervene for the State t o see t hat the evidence for the plaintiff is not a frame-up, concocted or fabricated. On 1 7 Decem ber 1 956 the Court entered an order requiring the defendant to submit t o a physical examination by a com petent lady physician to determine her physical capacity for copula t ion a n d t o su bm it , w ithin t en days from receipt of the order, a medical certificate on the result thereof. On 14 March 1 957 the defendant was granted additional five days from notice to comply with the order of 1 7 Decem ber 1956 with warning that her failure to undergo medical examination and su bm it t h e

r equired doctor's certificate would be deemed lack of interest on her part in the ca se a n d t h a t ju dg m en t u pon t h e ev iden ce pr esen t ed by h er h u sba n d w ou ld be r en der ed. A fter hearing, at which the defendant was not present, on 11 April 195 7 t h e Cou r t en t er ed a decree annulling the marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant. The city attorney filed a m otion for reconsideration of the decree thus entered, upon the ground, among others, that t h e defendant's impotency has not been satisfactorily established as required by law; t h a t sh e h a d n ot been physically examined because she had refused t o be examined; that instead of annulling t h e marriage the Court should have punished her for contempt of court and com pelled h er t o u ndergo a physical examination and submit a medical certificate; and that the decree soug h t t o be r econsidered would open the door t o married couples, who want t o end t h eir m a r r ia g e t o collude or connive with each other by just alleging impotency of one of them. He prayed that the com plaint be dismissed or that the wife be subjected t o a ph y sica l ex a m i n a t ion . Pen din g r esolution of his motion, the city attorney timely appealed from the decree. On 13 May 1957 t h e m ot ion for r econ sider a t ion w a s den ied. ISSUE: W h ether or not the marriage in question may be annulled on t h e st r en g t h on ly of t h e lon e t estimony of the husband who claimed a n d t est ified t h a t h is w ife w a s a n d is im pot en t . HELD: T h e law specifically enumerates the legal grounds, that must be proved to exist by in du bit a ble ev idence, to annul a marriage. In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question wa s decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband who was expected to give testimony tendin g or a im ing at securing the annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether the wife is really im potent cannot be deemed t o hav e been sa t isfa ct or ily est a blish ed, beca u se fr om t h e commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the decree she had abstained from t a kin g pa rt therein. Although her refusal t o be examined or failure to appear in court show indifference on h er part, yet from such attitude the presumption arising out of the suppression of ev iden ce cou ld not arise or be inferred because women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and sh y a n d would not submit to a physical examination unless compelled to by competent a u t h or it y . T h is the Court may do without doing v iolen ce t o a n d in fr in g in g in t h is ca se is n ot self in crimination. She is not charged with any offense. She is not being compelled t o be a w it n ess a gainst herself. "Im potency being an abnor m a l con dit ion sh ou ld n ot be pr e su m ed. T h e pr esumption is in favor of potency." The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically in capable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the t ies tha t h a v e bou n d t h em t og et h er a s h u sba n d a n d w ife. T h e decree appealed from is set aside and the case remanded t o t h e low er cou r t for fu r t h er pr oceedings in a ccor da n ce w it h t h is decision , w it h ou t pr on ou n cem en t a s t o cost s.

LEGA L SEPA RA T ION

JOSE DE OCA MPO v s. SERA FINA FLORENCIA NO G.R. No. L-1 3 5 5 3 Febr u a r y 2 3 , 1 9 6 0 FA CT S: In 1 938, Jose and Serafina were married and lived together as husband a n d w ife. T h ey w er e blessed of several children who are now living with plaintiff. In March, 1951, Jose discovered on sev eral occasions that Serafina was maintaining illicit relation s w it h Jose A r ca la s. For t h is r eason, Jose sent his wife Serafina to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty cult u r e, w h er e sh e st ayed for a year. However, Jose discovered that his wife, while in Manila wa s g oin g ou t w it h sev eral other men, aside from Jose Arcalas. After Serafina finished her study in 1952, she and her h usband lived separately. On June 18, 1955, Jose surprised his wife in the act of h a v in g illicit

r elations with another man by the name of Nelson Orzame. Jose signified his intention of filing a pet ition for legal separation, to which Serafina agreed provided she is will not be char g ed w it h a dultery. On July 5 , 1 955, a petition for legal separation was filed by Jose in conformity with t h e con dit ion r equ est ed by Ser a fin a . T h e Court of Appeals found that in the night of June 18, 1955, the husband upon discov ering the illicit happening has expressed his wish to file a petition for legal sepa r a t ion a n d defen da n t r eadily agreed to such filing. And when she was questioned by th e Fisca l u pon or der s of t h e court, she reiterated her conformity to the legal separation even as she adm it t ed h a v in g h a d sexual relations with one Nelson Orzame. Interpreting these facts virtually t o mean a confession of ju dgment the Appellate Court declared that under Art. 101, leg a l sepa r a t ion cou ld n ot be decr eed. ISSUE: W h et h er or n ot t h e a ppella t e cou r t com m it t ed a r ev er sible er r or . RULING: Y es. As we understand the article, it does not exclude, as evidence, any admission or con fession m ade by the defendant outside of the court. It merely prohibits a decree of sepa r a t ion u pon a con fession of judgment. Confession of judgment usually happens when the defendant appears in court and confesses the right of plaintiff t o judgment or files a pleading expressly agreeing t o the pla in t iff's dem a n d. Y et, even supposing that the above statement of defendant constituted practically a confession of ju dgment, inasmuch as there is evidence of the adultery independently of such stat em en t , t h e decree may and should be granted, since it would not be based on h er con fession , bu t u pon ev idence presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclu siv ely or m ainly on defendant's confession. If a confession defeats the action ipso facto, a n y defen da n t w ho opposes the separation will immediately confess ju dg m en t , pu r posely t o pr ev en t it . T h e mere circumstance that defendants t old the Fiscal that she "like also" to be legally separated fr om her husband, is no obstacle t o the successful prosecution of the action. When she refused to a n swer the complaint, she indicated her willingness to be separated. Yet, the law does not or der t h e dismissal. Allowing the proceeding t o continue, it takes precautions against collusion, which im plies m or e t h a n con sen t or la ck of opposit ion t o t h e a g r eem en t .

WILLIA M H. BROWN v s. JUA NIT A YA MBA O G.R. No. L-1 0 6 9 9 Oct ober 1 8 , 1 9 5 7 FA CT S: W illiam H. Brown filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila t o obtain leg a l sepa r a t ion fr om his lawful wife Juanita Yambao. He alleged under oath that while interned by the Japanese inv aders, from 1942 to 1945, at the University of Sto. Tom as internment camp, his wife engag ed in adulterous relations with one Carlos Field of whom she begot a baby girl that Brown lea r n ed of h is wifes misconduct only in 1945, upon his release from internmen t ; t h a t t h er ea ft er t h e spou se lived separately and later executed a document liquidating their conjugal partnership and a ssigning certain properties to the er r in g w ife a s h er sh a r e. T h e com pla in t pr a y ed for con firmation of the liquidation agreement; for custody of the children issued of the m a r r ia g e; t hat the defendant be declared disqualified t o succeed the plaintiff; a n d for t h eir r em edy a s m ight be just and equitable. Upon petition of the plaintiff, the court subsequently decla r ed t h e w ife in default, for failure to answer in due time, despite service of summons; and dir ect ed t h e City Fiscal or his representatives to—investigate, in accordance with Article 101 of the Civil Code, w hether or not a collusion exists between the parties and to report to this Court the result of h is inv estigation within fifteen (15) days from receipt of copy of this order. The Cit y Fisca l or h is r epr esen t a t iv e is a lso dir ect ed t o in t er v en e in t h e ca se in beh a lf of t h e St a t e.

A s ordered, Assistant City Fiscal Rafael Jose appeared at the trial, and cross-examined pla in t iff Br own. His questions (strenuously objected to by Brown's counsel) elicited the fa ct t h a t a ft er liberation, Brown had lived maritally with another woman and had begotten childr en by h er . T h ereafter, the court rendered judgment denying the legal separation asked, on the ground that, w hile the wife's adultery was established, Brown had incurred in a misconduct of similar natu r e t h a t ba r r ed h is r ig h t of a ct ion u n de r A r t icle 1 0 0 of t h e n ew Civ il Code.

Mor eover, on opposition of the respondent , the Court of Appeals dismissed such petition of t h e pet it ion er .

ISSUE: W h ether or not the court erred in permitting the Assistant Fiscal Rafel Jose of Manila t o a ct a s cou n sel for t h e defen da n t , w h o defa u lt ed.

RULING: Y es. The probable failure of the respondent's suit for legal separation can be foreseen since she is n ot an innocent spouse, having been convicted of adultery by the Court of Fir st In st a n ce. It is t rue that the judgment of conviction is on a ppea l in t h e Cou r t of A ppea ls, bu t t h e sa m e u ndoubtedly satisfies the standard of provisional showing set by t h e a for esa id Ru le. If leg a l separation cannot be claimed by the guilty spouse in the first place, the fact tha t a n a ct ion for t hat purpose is filed anyway should not be permitted t o be used as a means t o obt a in su ppor t pen dente lite, which, without such action, would be denied on the strength of t h e decision s of t h is Court recognizing adultery as a good defense. Otherwise, as pointed out by the petitioner, all t hat an erring spouse has t o do to circumvent such defen se w ou ld be t o file a su it for leg a l sepa r a t ion n o m a t t er h ow g r ou n dless.

RULING: NO. Appellant Brown argues that in cross-examining him with regard to his marital relation with Lilia Deito, who was not his wife, the Assistant Fiscal acted as counsel for the defa u lt in g w ife, "w hen the power of the prosecuting officer is limited t o finding ou t w h et h er or n ot t h er e is collusion, and if there is no collusion, which is the fact in the case at bar, t o in t er v en e for t h e st ate which is not the fact in the instant case, the truth of the matter being that he intervened for Ju anita Yambao, the defendant-appellee, who is private citizen and who is far fr om b ein g t h e st a t e. T h e court below also found, and correctly held that the appellant's action was alrea dy ba r r ed, because Brown did not petition for legal separation proceedings until ten years after he lea r n ed of h is wife's adultery, which was upon his release from internment in 1945. Under Article 102 of t h e new Civil Code, action for legal separation can not be filed except within one (1 ) y ea r fr om a n d after the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years fr om a n d a ft er t h e da te when such cause occurred. Appellant's brief does not even contest the correctn ess of su ch fin din g s a n d con clu sion . It is t rue that the wife has not interposed prescription as a defense. Nevertheless, the courts ca n t a ke cognizance thereof, because actions seeking a decree of legal separation, or ann u lm en t of m arriage, involve public interest and it is the policy of our law that no such decr ee be issu ed if a n y leg a l obst a cles t h er et o a ppea r u pon t h e r ecor d.

T EODORO E. LERMA v s.COURT OF A PPEA LS a n d CONCEPCION DIA Z G.R. No. L-3 3 3 5 2 Decem ber 2 0 , 1 9 7 4 FA CT S: Pet itioner Lerma and respondent Diaz are husband and wife. Petitioner filed a com pla in t for a dultery against the respondent and a certain Teodoro Ramirez. Respondent a complaint against t h e petitioner for legal separation and/or separation of properties, custody of their children a n d su pport, with an urgent petition for support pendente lit e for h er a n d t h eir y ou n g est son , Gr egory, who was then and until now is in her custody. The respondent's com pla in t for l eg a l separation is based on two grounds: concubinage and attempt against her life.T h e pet it ion er filed his opposition t o the respondent's application for support pen den t e lit e, set t in g u p a s defense te adultery charge he had filed against the respondent.Ju dg e Lu cia n o of CFI of Riza l g ranted the respondent's application for support pendente lite to the followin g effect : (1 ) t h e r espondent was declared entitled to support pendente lite from t h e da t e of t h e filin g of t h e com plaint; and (2) the amount of such monthly suppor t w a s r edu ced fr om P2 ,2 5 0 .0 0 t o P1 ,8 2 0 .0 0 . Pet itioner appealed to the Court of Appeals and requested for proh ibit ion a n d pr elim in a r y in junction to annul the aforementioned orders. Court of Appeals gave due course t o the petition a n d issued a writ of preliminary injunction to stop Judge Luciano from enforcin g sa id or der s.

ISSUE: W h ether or not adultery is a good defense against the respondent's claim for support pen den t e lit e.

T h e right t o separate support or maintenance, even from the conjugal part n er sh ip pr oper t y , pr esupposes the existence of a justifiable cause for the spou se cla im in g su ch r ig h t t o liv e separately. This is im plicit in Article 1 04 of the Civil Code, which states that after the filing of the pet ition for legal separation the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from ea ch ot h er . A pet ition in bad faith, such as that filed by one who is himself or herself guilty of a n a ct w h ich con stitutes a ground for legal separation a t t h e in st a n ce of t h e ot h er spou se, ca n n ot be con sidered as within the intendment of the law granting separate su pport. In fact under Ar t icle 3 03 of the same Code the obligation to give support shall cease "when t h e r ecipien t , be h e a for ced heir or not, has committed some act which gives rise t o disinheritance;" and under Article 9 21 one of the causes for disinheriting a spouse is "when the spouse has given ca u se for leg a l separation." The loss of the substantive right to support in such a situation is incompatible wit h a n y cla im for su ppor t pen den t e lit e.

BENJA MIN BUGA YONG v s. LEONILA GINEZ G.R. No. L-1 0 0 3 3 Decem ber 2 8 , 1 9 5 6 FA CT S: Ben jamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the United States Navy, was married t o defendant Leonila Ginez on August 27, 1949, at Asingan, Pangasinan, while on leave. Im m edia t ely a ft er t h eir m arriage, the couple lived with their sisters who later moved t o Sampaloc, Manila. A ft er som e t im e, or about July, 1951, Leonila Ginez left the dwelling of her sister-in-law and infor m ed h er h usband by letter that she had gone to reside with her mother in Asingan, Pa n g a sin a n , fr om w h ich pla ce sh e la t er m ov ed t o Da g u pa n Cit y t o st u dy in a loca l colleg e t h er e. A s early as July, 1951, Benjamin Bugayong began receiving letters from Valeriana Polangco a n d som e from anonymous writers informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife which he did n ot even care to mention. In August, 1 952, plaintiff went to Asingan, Pangasinan, and sought for h is wife whom he met in the house of one Mrs. Malalang, defendant's g odm ot h er . Sh e ca m e a long with him and both proceeded to the house of Pedro Bugayong, a cousin of t h e pla in t iffh usband, where they stayed and lived for 2 nights and 1 day as husband an d w ife. T h en t h ey r epaired to the plaintiff's house and again passed the night therein as husband and wife. On t h e second day, Benjamin Bugayong tried to verify from his wife the truth of t h e in for m a t ion h e r eceived that she had committed adultery but Leonila, instead of answering his quer y , m er ely pa cked up and left, which he took as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity imputed on her. After

t hat and despite such belief, plaintiff exerted efforts to locate her and failing t o find her, he went t o Ba ca r r a , Ilocos Nor t e, "t o soot h e h is w ou n ded feelin g s". On November 18, 1952, Benjamin Bugayong filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasina n a com plaint for legal separation against his wife. The motion to dismiss was answered by plain t iff a n d the Court, considering only the second ground of the motion to dismiss i. e., condonation, or der ed t h e dism issa l of t h e a ct ion . ISSUE: Whether or not there is condonation on the part of the husband with respect to the lega l sepa r a t ion ca se on a ccou n t of a du lt er y of t h e w ife. RULING: Y es. The Court considered plaintiff's lin e of con du ct under the as s um ption that he really believed his wife guilty of adultery. What did he do in such state of mind. In August, 1 9 5 2 , h e w ent to Pangasinan and looked for his wife and after finding her they lived together as husba n d a n d wife for 2 nights and 1 day, after which he says that he tried to verify from her t h e t r u t h of t h e news he had about her infidelity, but failed to attain his purpose because his wife, instea d of a n swering his query on the matter, preferred to desert him, probably enraged for being subjected t o su ch h u m ilia t ion . A n d y et h e t r ied t o loca t e h er , t h ou g h in v a in . A detailed examination of the testimony of the plaintiff-husban d, especia lly t h ose por t ion s qu ot ed above, clearly shows that there was a condonation on the part of t h e h u sba n d for t h e su pposed "acts of rank infidelity amounting t o a du lt er y " com m it t ed by defen da n t -w ife. A dm itting for the sake of argument that the infidelities amounting t o adultery were comm it t ed by the defendant, a reconciliation was effected between her and the plaintiff. The act of the latter in persuading her to come along with him, and the fact that she went with him and consented t o be brought t o the house of his cousin Pedro Bugayong and together they slept there as husba n d a n d wife for one day and one night, and the further fact that in the second night they again slept t og ether in their house likewise as husband and wife — a ll these facts have no other meanin g in t h e opinion of this court than that a reconciliation between them was effected and that there was a condonation of the wife by the husband. The reconciliation occurred almost ten month s a ft er h e ca m e t o kn ow of t h e a ct s of in fidelit y a m ou n t in g t o a du lt er y . T h ere is no merit in the contention of appellant that the lower cou r t er r ed in en t er t a in in g con donation as a ground for dismissal inasmuch as same was not raised in the a n sw er or in a m ot ion t o dism iss, beca u se in t h e secon d g r ou n d of t h e m ot ion t o dism iss.

ISSUE: W h et h er or n ot t h e pet it ion for t h e ch a n g e of n a m e sh ou ld be g r a n t ed. RULING: No, Art. 372 of New Civil Code is written in a language that is mandatory, tha t t h e w ife, ev en a ft er the legal separation has been decreed should continue u sin g h er n a m e a n d su r n a m e em ployed before legal separation. This is so because her married statu s is u n a ffect ed by t h e separation, there being no severance of the vinculum. It seems to be the policy of the law that the w ife should continue to use the name indicative of her unchanged status for t h e ben efit of a ll con cer n ed. T h e Supreme Court decided that from the petition quoted in fu ll a t t h e beg in n in g of t h ese opinion, the only reason relied upon for the change of name is the fact that petitioner is leg a lly separated from her husband and has, in fact, ceased to live w it h h im for m a n y y ea r s. It is dou btful, to say the least, whether Rule 103 which refers to change of na m e in g en er a l, m a y pr evail ov er the specific provisions of Article 372 of the New Civil Code with regards to mar r ied w om en legally separated from their husbands. Ev en, however, applying Rule 103 to this case, the fa ct of legal separation alone which is the only basis for the petition at bar is, in t h e opin ion of t h e Court, not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of herein petitioner, for to hold ot h erwise would be to provide an easy circumvention of the mandatory provisions of Article 372.

ONG ENG KIA M a .k.a . WILLIA M ONG v s. LUCIT A G. ONG G.R. No. 1 5 3 2 0 6 Oct ober 2 3 , 2 0 0 6 FA CT S: On g Eng Kiam, also known as William Ong (William) and Lucita G. Ong (Lucita) were ma r r ied on July 13, 1975 at the San Agustin Church in Manila. They hav e t h r ee ch ildr en : Kin g st on , Charleston, and Princeton who are now all of the ag e of m a jor it y . In 1 9 9 6 , L u cit a filed a Com plaint for Legal Separation alleging that her life with William w a s m a r ked by ph y sica l v iolen ce, t h r ea t s, in t im ida t ion a n d g r ossly a bu siv e con du ct .

ELISEA LA PERA L v s. REPUBLIC OF T HE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. L- 1 8 0 0 8 . Oct ober 3 0 , 1 9 6 2

Lu cita claimed that she and William quarreled almost every day, with physical v iolen ce be in g in flicted upon her; William would shout invectives at her like "putang ina mo", "gago", "tanga", a n d he would slap her, kick her, pull her hair, bang her head against concrete wall and throw a t h er whatever he could reach with his hand; the causes of these fights were petty things regarding t h eir children or their business.William would also scold and beat the children at different par t s of t h eir bodies using the buckle of his belt; whenever she tried to stop William from hitt in g t h e ch ildr en , h e w ou ld t u r n h is ir e on h er a n d box h er

FA CT S: A fter several years of marriage with Enrique Sta. Maria, a decree of legal separation was granted by the court. On the other hand, Elisea Laperal has also cea sed t o liv e w it h h im . A specia l pr ocedure for change of name and /or permission t o r esu m e t h e m a id en n a m e of h er ein pet itioner Elisea Laperal, was filed. The petition was opposed on t h e g r ou n d t h a t t h e sa m e v iolates the provisions of Art. 372 of the New Civil Code. The court however granted the petition on t he ground that her continued use of her married name will giv e r ise t o con fu sion in h er a ffairs and in the even t u a l liqu ida t ion of t h eir con ju g a l a sset s. T h e St a t e a ppea led.

In 1 995, after she protested with William‘s decision to allow their eldest son Kin g st on t o g o t o Ba colod, William slapped her and said, "it is none of your business". In the same year, she asked W illiam to bring Kingston back from Bacolod; a violent quarrel ensued and William h it h er on h er head, left cheek, eye, stom ach, and arms; when William hit her on the stomach and she ben t down because of the pain, he hit her on the head then pointed a gun at her and asked her to leave t h e house; she then went to her sister‘s house in Binondo where she was fetched by h er ot h er siblings and brought to their parents house in Dagupan; the follow in g da y , sh e w en t t o h er pa r en t ‘s doct or , Dr . V icen t e Elin za n o for t r ea t m en t of h er in ju r ies.

T hat in view of the fact that she has been legally separated from Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria a n d h a s likewise ceased t o live with him for many years, it is desirable that she be allowed to cha n g e h er name and/or be permitted to resume using her maiden name to ELISEA LA PERA L. In it s decision of October 31, 1960, the court denied the petition for the reason that Article 372 of t h e Civ il Code requires the wife, even after she is decreed legally separated from h er h u sba n d, t o con tinue u sin g t h e n a m e a n d su r n a m e sh e em ploy ed befor e t h e leg a l sepa r a t ion .

W illiam for his part denied that he ever inflicted physical har m on h is w ife, u sed in su lt in g la nguage against her, or whipped the children with the buckle of h is belt . RT C r en der ed it s Decision decreeing legal separation. It found that "it is indubitable that plaint iff (Lu cit a ) a n d defendant (William) had their frequent quarrels and misunderstanding which made both of their liv es miserable and hellish. This is even admitted by the defendant when he said that ther e w a s n o day that he did not quarrel with his wife. Defendant had regarded the plaintiff negligent in the

per formance of her wifely duties and had blamed h er for n ot r epor t in g t o h im a bou t t h e w rongdoings of th eir ch ildr en ." T h e CA fou n d t h a t t h e t est im on ies for Lu cit a w er e st raightforward and credible and the ground for legal separation. Willia m filed a m ot ion for r econ sider a t ion w h ich w a s den ied by t h e CA . ISSUE: W h ether a decree of legal separation should not be granted following Art. 56(4) of the FC which pr ov ides that legal separation shall b e denied when both parties have giv en g r ou n d for leg a l sepa r a t ion . HELD: A decree of legal separation should be granted in this case. The abandonment referred to by t h e Fam ily Code is abandonment without justifiable cau se for m or e t h a n on e y ea r . A s it w a s est ablished that Lucita left William due to his a bu siv e con du ct , su ch does n ot con st it u t e a bandonment contemplated by the said provision. As correctly obser v ed by t h e t r ia l cou r t , W illiam himself admitted that there was no day that he did not quarrel w it h h is w ife, w h ich m ade his life miserable, and he blames her for being negligent of her wifely dut ies a n d for n ot r epor t in g t o h im t h e w r on g doin g s of t h eir ch ildr en . Lu cita and her sister, Linda Lim, also gave numerous accounts of the instances wh en W illi a m displayed violent temper against Lucita and their children; such as: when William threw a st eel chair at Lucita threw chairs at their children slapped Lucita and utter insulting words at her u se t h e buckle of the belt in whipping the children; pinned Lu cita against the wall w it h h is st r on g a rms almost strangling her, and sm ashed the flower vase and brick rocks and moldings lea v in g t h e bedroom in disarray shouted at Lucita and threw a directory at her, in front of Linda and the em ployees of their business, because he could not find a draft letter on h is t a ble g ot m a d a t Charleston for cooking steak with vetchin prompting William to smash the plate with steak a n d h it Charleston, then slapped Lucita and shouted a t h er "putang ina m o, gago, w ala k ang pak ialam , tarantado " w h en sh e sided w it h Ch a r lest on . W illiam also posits that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case for legal separation is in order for her side of the family to gain control of the conjugal properties; that Lucit a w a s w illin g t o destroy his reputation by filing the legal separation case just so her par en t s a n d h er siblin g s cou ld control the properties he worked hard for. The Court finds such reasoning hard t o believe. T h e claim of William that a decree of legal separation would taint his reputation and label him as a w ife-beater and child-abuser also does not elicit sympathy from this Court. If ther e w ou ld be su ch a smear on his reputation then it would not be because of Lucita‘s decision t o seek r elief fr om the courts, bu t beca u se h e g a v e Lu cit a r ea son t o g o t o cou r t in t h e fir st pla ce.

w as more to blame than his wife and that his continued ill-treatment of her furnished sufficien t ju stification for her abandonment of the conjugal home and the per m a n en t br ea kin g off of m a r it a l r ela t ion s w it h h im . T h e Court has carefully examined and weighed every line of the proof, and is of the opinion tha t t h e conclusion stated is wholly untenable. The evidence shows that the wife is a fflict ed w it h a disposition of jealousy towards her husband in an aggravated degree; and to his cause are chiefly t raceable without a doubt the many miseries that have attended their married life. Du r in g t h e t r ial it was found out that the husband was not cruel t o the wife. Furthermore, it w a s t h e w ife w ho was excessively jealous without any proof of infidelity of the husband. Therefore the wife is m or a lly a n d leg a lly oblig a t ed t o liv e w it h h er h u sba n d. ISSUE: W h ether or not the wife can be ordered by the court t o live with her husband and failure of which w ill con st it u t e con t em pt of cou r t ? RULING: No. The Supreme Court in this case is unable t o hold that Mariano B. Arroyo is en t it led t o t h e u nconditional and absolute order for the return of the wife to the marit a l dom icile, w h ich is sou ght in the petitory part of the complaint though he is, without doubt, entit led t o a ju dicia l declaration that his wife has presented herself without sufficient cause and that it is her dut y t o r eturn. Moreover, upon examination of the authorities the court ruled that it is convinced that it is n ot within the province of the courts of this country t o attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights t o, the other. Of course where the property rights of one of t h e pair are invalid, an action for restitution of such rights can be ma in t a in ed. Bu t w e a r e disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible by process of con t em pt , m a y be en t er ed t o com pel t h e r est it u t ion of t h e pu r ely per son a l r ig h t s of cons ortium . A t best such an order can be effective for no other purpose than to compel t h e spou ses t o liv e u nder the same roof; and the experience of these countries wher e t h e cou r t of ju st ice h a v e a ssumed t o compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of t h e pr a ct ice is ex t r em ely qu est ion a ble T h erefore, reversing the judgment appealed from, in respect both t o the original com plaint a n d t h e cross-bill, it is declared that Dolores Vasquez de Arroy o h a s a bsen t ed h er self fr om t h e m arital home without sufficient cause; and she is admonished that it is her dut y t o r et u r n No. T h e court ruled in the negative. The authorities are convinced that it is not within the province of t h e court t o compel the wife to live with her husband because such obligation is purely person a l in nature. However the court can declare her to be absent fr om t h e m a r it a l h om e w it h ou t su fficien t ca u se. Sh e is fu r t h er a dm on ish ed t h a t it is h er du t y t o r et u r n .

RIGHT S A ND OBLIGA T IONS BET WEEN HUSBA ND A ND WIFE A RT URO PELA YO, v s. MA RCELO LA URON, ET A L. G.R. No. L-4 0 8 9 Ja n u a r y 1 2 , 1 9 0 9 MA RIA NO A RROYO v s. DOLORES V A SQUEZ DE A RROYO G.R. No. L-1 7 0 1 4 A u g u st 1 1 , 1 9 2 1 FA CT S: In 1 910 Mariano and Dolores married each other and lived t ogether as h u sba n d a n d w ife. In 1 920 Dolores went away and left their common home with the intention of living separately from h er husband Mariano. After failing to convince and induce Dolores to come back and resume her m arital obligations, Mariano filed an action t o compel her t o live with him. Dolores answered by claiming that her husband was very cruel and in turn prayed for a decree of separation. The tria l ju dge, upon consideration of the evidence before him, reached the conclusion that the hu sba n d

FA CT S: A rturo Pelayo, a physician, filed a complaint against Marcelo Lauron and Juana Abella set t in g for th that on or about the 1 3th of October of said year, at night, the plaintiff w a s ca lled t o t h e h ouse of the defendants, situated in San Nicolas, and that upon arrival he was requested by them t o r ender medical assistance t o their daughter-in-law who was about to give birth t o a child; that t h erefore, and after consultation with the atten din g ph y sicia n , Dr . Esca ñ o, it w a s fou n d n ecessary, on account of the difficult birth, to remove the fet u s by m ea n s of for ceps w h ich operation was performed by the plaintiff, who also had to remov e t h e a ft er bir t h , in w h ich services he was occupied until the following morning, and that afterwards, on the same da y , h e

v isited the patient several t imes; that the just and equitable value of the services rendered by him w as P5 00, which the defendants refuse t o pay without alleging any good reason therefor ; t h a t . In a nswer to the complaint counsel for the defendants den ied a ll of t h e a lleg a t ion t h er ein con tained and alleged as a special defense, that their daughter-in-law had died in consequence of t h e said childbirth, and that when she was alive she lived with her husband independently and in a separate house without any relation whatever with them, and that, if on the day when she gave birth she was in the house of the defendants, her stay their was accidental and due to fortuit ou s cir cu m st a n ces ISSUE:

On February 25, 1998, Erlinda filed with the RTC Antipolo City a petition for guardianship ov er t h e person and property of Potenciano Ilusorio due t o the latter's advanced age, frail health, poor ey esig h t a n d im pa ir ed ju dg m en t . On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City, Potenciano Ilusorio did not r et u r n t o A n t ipolo Cit y a n d in st ea d liv ed a t Clev ela n d Con dom in iu m , Ma ka t i. On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed with the CA a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. She alleged that respondents refused petitioner's demands to see and v isit h er h u sba n d a n d pr oh ibit ed Pot en cia n o fr om r et u r n in g t o A n t ipolo Cit y .

W h ether or not father and mother-in-law may be compelled to pay the fees concerning t h e ser v ices per for m ed w it h t h e da u g h t er -in -la w .

CA granted visitation rights in favor of Erlinda thou g h sh e did n ot pr a y for su ch a n d t h e a dm in ist r a t ion of t h e Clev ela n d Con dom in iu m

RULING: No. In the face of the above legal precepts it is unquestionable that the person bound to pay t h e fees due t o the plaintiff for the professional services that he rendered to the daughter -in -la w of t h e defendants during her childbirth, is the husband of the pa t ien t a n d n ot h er fa t h er a n d m other- in-law, the defendants herein. Father and mother-in-law are strangers with r espec t t o t h e obligation that devolves upon the husband to provide support, among which is the furnishing of m edical assistance to his wife at the time of her confinement; and, on the other hand, it does n ot appear that a contract existed between the defendants and the plaintiff physician, for wh ich r eason it is obvious that the former can not be compelled to pay fees which they a r e u n der n o lia bility to pay beca u se it does n ot a ppea r t h a t t h ey con sen t ed t o bin d t h em selv es.

ISSUE: May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husba n d t o liv e w it h h er in con ju g a l bliss?

T h e foregoing suffices t o demonstrate that the first and second errors assigned to the judgm en t below are unfounded, because, if the plaintiff has no right of action against the defendant s, it is n eedless to declare whether or not the use of forceps is a surgical operation. From the foregoin g it m ay readily be understood that it was improper t o h a v e br ou g h t a n a ct ion a g a in st t h e defendants simply because they were the parties who called the plaintiff and request ed h im t o a ssist the patient during her difficult confinement, and also, possibly, becau se t h ey w er e h er fa ther and mother-in-law and the sickness occurred in their house. The defendants were not, nor a r e they now, under any obligation by virtue of any legal provision, to pay the fees claimed, n or in consequence of any contract entered into between them and the plaintiff fr om w h ich su ch oblig a t ion m ig h t h a v e a r isen .

ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO V. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO, JOHN DOE a n d JA NE DOE [GRN 1 3 9 7 8 9 Ma y 1 2 , 2 0 0 0 ] FA CT S: Er lin da Ka la w Ilu sor io is t h e w ife of la w y er Pot en cia n o Ilu sor io. Pot enciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age possessed of extensive property valued at millions of pesos. For many years, lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio was Chairman of the Board and Presiden t of Ba g u io Cou n t r y Clu b. On July 11, 1 942, Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contr a ct ed m a t r im on y a n d liv ed t og ether for a period of thirty (30) years. In 1 9 7 2 , t h ey sepa r a t ed fr om bed a n d boa r d . Pot enciano lived at Urdaneta Condom inium, Ayala Ave., Makati City when he was in Manila and a t Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On t h e ot h er h a n d, Er linda lived in Antipolo City. Out of th eir m a r r ia g e, t h e spou ses h a d six (6 ) ch ildr en . On December 30, 1997, upon Potenciano's arrival from the United States, he stayed with Erlinda for a bout five (5) months in Antipolo City. The children, Sylvia and Erlinda, alleged that dur in g t h is time, their mother gave Potenciano an ov erdose of an antidepressant drug prescribed by his doct or . A s a con sequ en ce, Pot en cia n o's h ea lt h det er ior a t ed.

HELD: T h e answer is no. Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may n ot b e en forced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus. A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from t h e on e en t it led t h er et o. "Ha beas corpus is a writ directed to the person detaining another, commanding him to produ ce t h e body of the prisoner at a designated time and place, with the day and cause of h is ca pt u r e a n d detention, to do, submit t o, and receive whatsoever the court or judge awa r din g t h e w r it sh a ll con sider in t h a t beh a lf. T h e evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or depriva t ion of la w y e r Pot enciano Ilusorio's liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. T h e fa ct t h a t la w y er Pot enciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or under medication does not necessa r ily r en der h im m en t a lly in ca pa cit a t ed. A fter due hearing, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was no unlawful rest r a in t on h is liberty. Likewise, Potenciano Ilusorio did not request t h e a dm in ist r a t or of t h e Clev ela n d Con dominium and not to allow his wife and other children from seeing or visiting him. He made it clea r t h a t h e did n ot object t o seein g t h em . Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to make choices. In t h is ca se, t h e crucial choices revolve on his residence and the people he opts to see or live with. The choices he m ade may not appeal to some of his family members but these are choices wh ich ex clu siv ely belong to Potenciano. He made it clear before the Court of Appeals that he was n ot pr ev en t ed fr om lea v in g h is h ou se or seein g people. W ith his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the su bject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his rig h t t o pr ivacy. Needless to say, this w ill r u n a g a in st h is fu n da m en t a l con st it u t ion a l r ig h t . In case the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty t o do so w it h ou t t h r ea t of a n y pen a lt y a t t a ch ed t o t h e ex er cise of h is r ig h t . No court is empowered as a judicial authority t o com pel a h u sba n d t o liv e w it h h is w ife. Cov erture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man a n d w om a n 's fr ee ch oice.

a pproving the same. It , therefore, becomes effective on y upon judicial approval, without which it is v oid. Furthermore, Article 192 of said Code explicitly provides that the conjugal partnership is dissolv ed on ly u pon t h e issu a n ce of a decr ee of sepa r a t ion of pr oper t y PROPERT Y RELA T IONS MOISES JOCSON V . C.A 1 7 0 SCRA 3 3 3 FA CT S: Em ilio Jocson during his lifetime sold parcels of land to his daughter Agustina. One said parcels of la nd bears and entry in the TCT Em ilio Jocson, married t o Alejandra Poblete. These parcels of la nd are claimed by one of the surviving heirs of Em ilio to have been sold fictitiously and without a ny or insufficient consideration. Futhermore he claimed that when his fath er sold on e of t h e la nd, it was still part of the conjugal property of their parents which has n ot been liqu ida t ed. A gustina on the otherhand claim that the sale was with sufficient consideration and rebutted the a llegation that she has no source of income by alleging she is engaged in playa buying busin ess. T h is w a s n ot con t r ov er t ed by Moises. ISSUE: W ill the presumption that a property is conjugal arise based on the entry in the registr y w h ich st a t es t h a t t h e ow n er ― is Ma r r ied t o‖ t h er eby m a kin g it con ju g a l. HELD; In or der for the presumption to apply, it must first be proven that the proper t y w a s a cqu ir ed du ring the marriage. The description ―married t o‖ does not v est t it le bu t m er ely ser v es t o describe the civil status. Registration does not vest ownership bu t merely confirms one alr ea dy v ested. The allegation that the sale is fictitious due to insufficient consideration must be prov en by the one who allege the same. In this case Moises failed to prove this fact which likewise fails to ov er com e t h e pr esu m pt ion t h a t a sa le is w it h su fficien t con sider a t ion .

BENIGNO T ODA JR V . ROSEMA RIE T UA SON -T ODA 1 5 3 SCRA 7 1 3 FA CT S: Ben igno Toda, Jr and Rose Marie Tuason-Toda were married on June 9, 1951 and were blessed w ith two children. Individual differences and the alleged infidelity of Benigno, however, marr ed t h e conjugal union thereby prompting Rose Marie to file on December 18, 1 9 7 9 in t h e CFI of Riza l, a petition for t ermination of conjugal partnership for a lleg ed m ism a n a g em en t a n d dissipa t ion of con ju g a l fu n ds a g a in st Ben ig n o. In or der not to lengthen the proceedings, the parties entered into a compr om ise a g r eem en t . However said agreement caused further litigation due to the question on its effectivit y . T h is is m a t er ia l t o det er m in e w h en a n d h ow m u ch cer t a in sh a r es of st ock is pa y a ble. ISSUE: W h en is the effectivity of a compromise agreement entered into by the husband an d w ife? Is it w h en t h e cou r t a ppr ov es of t h e sa m e or w h en t h e spou ses sig n ed it ? HELD: T h e com promise agreement separating their properties is given effect only upon the approv al of t h e court. Under Article 190 of the Civil Code, "(i)n the absence of an express declaration in t h e m arriage settlements, the separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall n ot t a ke place save in virtue of a judicial order." Hence, the separation of property is not effected by t h e mere execution of the contract or agreement of the parties, but by the decr ee of t h e cou r t

SPOUSES RICKY WONG a n d A NIT A CHA N, LEONA RDO JOSON, JUA NIT O SA NTOS, EMERITO SICAT and CONRA DO LA GMA N V . HON. INT ERMEDIA T E A PPELLA T E COURT a n d ROMA RICO HENSON (A UGUST 1 9 , 1 9 9 1 ) FA CT S: Rom arico Henson married Katrina Pineda on January 6, 1 964. They have thr ee ch ildr en bu t ev en during the early years of their marriage, Romarico and Katrina had been most of t h e t im e liv ing separately. The former stayed in Angeles City while the latter lived in Manila. Durin g t h e m arriage or on January 6, 1 971, Rom arico bought a 1,787 square-m eter parcel of land in Angeles City for P11,492 from his father, Dr. Celestino L. Hen son w it h m on ey bor r ow ed fr om a n officem a t e. Mea nwhile, in Hongkong sometime in June 1972, Katrina entered into an agreement with Anit a Chan whereby the latter consigned to Katrina pieces of jewelry for sa le v a lu ed a t 1 9 9 ,8 9 5 Hongkong dollars or P321,830.95. 4 When Katrina failed to return the pieces of jewelry w it h in t h e 2 0 -da y per iod a g r eed u pon , A n it a Ch a n dem a n ded pa y m en t of t h eir v a lu e. T h ereafter Anita and her husband filed an action for collection of sum of money. A fter trial, t h e court promulgated a decision in favor of the Wongs. It ordered Katrina and Rom arico Henson to pa y t h e W on g s. A writ of execution was thereafter issued. Levied upon were four lots in Angeles Cit y a ll in t h e n a m e of Rom a r ico Hen son . .. m a r r ied t o Ka t r in a Hen son . ISSUE: W ON the ju dg m en t of ex ecu t ion ex t en ds t o t h e pr oper t ies ow n ed by t h e h u sba n d HELD: T h e Court disagrees with the CA that the said properties are exclusively own ed by Rom a r ico. Having been acquired during the marriage, they are still presumed to belon g t o t h e con ju g a l pa r t n er sh ip ev en t h ou g h Rom a r ico a n d Ka t r in a h a d been liv in g sepa r a t ely . T h e presumption of the conjugal nature of the proper t ies su bsist s in t h e a bsen ce of clea r , sa t isfactory and convincing ev idence to ov ercome said presumption or t o prove that Rom a r ico ex clusively owns the properties. While there is proof that Romarico acquired the properties with m oney he had borrowed from an officemate, it is unclear where he obtained the money to repa y t h e loan. If he paid it out of his salaries, then the money is part of the conjug a l a sset s a n d n ot ex clusively his. Proof on this matter is of paramoun t im por t a n ce con sider in g t h a t in t h e det ermination of the nature of a property acquired by a person during covertrue, the controlling fa ct or is t h e sou r ce of t h e m on ey u t ilized in t h e pu r ch a se. T h e conjugal nature of the properties notwithstanding, Katrina's indebtedness may not be pa id for with them her obligation not having been shown by the petitioners to be one of the ch a r g es a gainst the conjugal partnership. In addition t o the fact that her rights over the pr oper t ies a r e m erely inchoate prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the consent of her husba n d a n d her authority t o incur such indebtedness had not been alleged in the complaint and prov en a t t h e t r ia l. Fu rthermore, under the Civil Code (before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1 988), a w ife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases t h in g s n ecessa r y for t h e su pport of the family or when she borrows money for the purpose of purchasing things necessary for the support of the family if the husban d fa ils t o deliv er t h e pr oper su m ; 32 w h en t h e a dm inistration of the conjugal partnership is transferred t o the wife by the cou r t s 33 or by t h e

h usband 34 and when the wife gives moderate donations for charity. 35 Having failed to establish t hat any of these circumstances occurred, the Wongs may not bind the conjugal assets to answer for Ka t r in a 's per son a l oblig a t ion t o t h em . JOSEPHINE B. BELCODERO V . T HE HONORA BLE COURT OF A PPEA LS, ET (OCT OBER 2 0 , 1 9 9 3 ) FA CT S: A layo D. Bosing, married Juliana Oday on 27 July 1927, with whom he had three ch ildr en . In 1 946, he left the conjugal hom e, and he started to live instead with Josefa Rivera with whom h e la t er beg ot on e ch ild, n a m ed Joseph in e Bosin g , n ow Joseph in e Belcoder o. On 23 August 1 949, Alayo purchased a parcel of land on installment basis from the Ma g da len a Est ate, Inc. In the deed, he indicated his civil status a s, "m a r r ied t o Josefa R. Bosin g ," t h e common-law wife. In a letter which he addressed to Magdalena Estate, Inc., he author ized t h e la tter t o transfer the lot in the name of his "wife Josefa R. Bosing." The fina l deed of sa le w a s ex ecuted by Magdalena Estate, Inc. A few days later, or on 0 9 Nov em ber 1 9 5 9 , T r a n sfer Certificate of Title No. 48790 was issued in the name of "Josefa R. Bosing, . . . married to A la y o Bosin g , . . ." On 06 June 1958, Alayo married Josefa while his prior marriage with Juliana was still subsisting. A layo died on 11 March 1 967. About three years later , or on Sept em ber 1 9 7 0 , Josefa a n d Josephine executed a document of extrajudicial partition and sale of the lot in question , w h ich w as there described as "conjugal property" of Josefa and deceased Alayo. In this deed, Josefa 's su pposed one-half (1 /2) interest as surviving spouse of Alayo, as well as her on e -fou r t h (1 /4 ) in terest as heir, was conveyed to Josephine for a P10,000.00 consideration, thereby completin g for herself, along with her one-fourth (1/4) interest as t h e su r v iv in g ch ild of A la y o, a fu ll "ow nership" of the property. A new TCT No. 198840 was issued on June 1974 in t h e n a m e of Joseph in e. On October 1980, Juliana (deceased Alayo's real widow) and her three legitimate children filed w ith the court a quo an action for reconveyance of th e pr oper t y . T C r u led in fa v or of t h e pla in t iffs. CA a ffir m ed. ISSUE: W ON THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION BELONGS EX CLUSIV ELY T O T HE PET IT IONERS. HELD: It cannot be seriously contended that, simply because the Property was t it led in t h e n a m e of Josefa at Alayo's request, she should t h er eby be deem ed t o be it s ow n er . T h e pr oper t y u nquestionably was acquired by Alayo. Alayo's letter, dated 06 October 1 9 5 9 , t o Ma g da len a Est ate, Inc., merely authorized the latter to have the title to the property transferred to her name. Mor e importantly, she implicitly recognized Alayo's ownership when, three years after the death of A layo, she and Josephine executed the deed of extrajudicial partition and sale in w h ich sh e a sser t ed a on e-h a lf (1 /2 ) in t er est . T h e property remained as belonging to the conjugal partnership of Alayo and his legitimate wife Ju liana. Under both the new Civil Code (Article 160) and the old Civil Code (Article 140 7 ), "a ll pr operty of the marriage is presumed t o belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be pr ov ed t hat it pertains exclusively t o the husband or to the wife." T h is pr esu m pt ion h a s n ot been con v in cin g ly r ebu t t ed. A s r egards the property relation between common-law spouses, Article 14 4 of t h e Civ il Code m erely codified the law established through judicial precedents under t h e old code. In bot h r egimes, the co-ownership rule had more than once been repudiated when either or both spouses su ffered from an impediment t o marry. The present provisions under Article 147 and Article 148 of t h e Family Code did not much deviate from the old rules; in any case, its prov ision s ca n n ot a pply to this case without interdicting pr ior v est ed r ig h t s (A r t icle 2 5 6 , Fa m ily Code).

It w as at the time that 'the adjudication of ownership was made following Alay o's dem ise (n ot w hen Alayo merely allowed the property to be t itled in Josefa's name w h ich clea r ly w a s n ot in tended to be adversarial to Alayo's interest), that a constructive trust was deemed t o have been cr eated by oper a t ion of la w u n der t h e pr ov ision s of A r t icle 1 4 5 6 of t h e Civ il Code. A rticle 1 456. If the property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by for ce of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the pr oper t y com es. A FFIRMED.

A NTONIO A. S. VALDEZ V. REGIONA L T RIA L COURT , BRA NCH 102, QUEZON CIT Y a n d CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-V A LDEZ (JULY 3 1 , 1 9 9 6 ) FA CT S: A ntonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in January 1971 and had five children . In a pet ition, dated 22 June 1992, Valdez sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to A rticle 36 of the Family code. After the hearing the parties fol lowing the joinder of issu es, t h e t r ial court, in its decision of 29 July 1 994, granted the petition, declaring among others th a t (1 ) t h e marriage of petitioner Antonio Valdez and respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdez null and void u nder Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of their mutual psychological inca pa cit y t o com ply with their essential marital obligations; and (2) the petitioner and the r espon den t a r e dir ected to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as defined by Article 1 47 of the Family Code, and t o comply with the provisions of Articles 5 0, 51, and 52 of the sa m e code, w it h in t h ir t y (3 0 ) da y s fr om n ot ice of t h is decision . Con suelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing compliance w it h A rticles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that t h e Fa m ily Code con t a in ed n o pr ov isions on the procedure for the liquidation of com m on pr oper t y in "u n ion s w it h ou t m arriage." In an order, the TC made the following clarification: Consequently, considering t h a t A rticle 1 47 of the Family Code explicitly provides that the property acqu ir ed by bot h pa r t ies du ring their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed t o have been obta in ed t hrough the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, plain t iff a n d defendant will own their "family hom e" and all their properties for that matter in equal sh a r es. In t he liquidation and partition of properties owned in common by the plaintiff and defen da n t , t h e pr ov ision s on ow n er sh ip fou n d in t h e Civ il Code sh a ll a pply . T h e TC said that considering that this Court has alr ea dy decla r ed t h e m a r r ia g e bet w een pet itioner and respondent as null and void ab initio, pursuant to Art. 1 47, the property regime of pet it ion er a n d r espon den t sh a ll be g ov er n ed by t h e r u les on co-ow n er sh ip. In h is recourse to this Court, petitioner submits that Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Fa m ily Code sh ou ld be h eld con t r ollin g . ISSUE: W ON Article 147 of the Family Code apply to cases wher e t h e pa r t ies a r e psy ch olog ica lly in ca pa cit a t ed. HELD: The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriag e, r eg a r dless of t h e ca u se t h ereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the pr ov isions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 1 4 7 pr ov ides: A rt. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, liv e ex clu siv ely w ith each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void mar r ia g e,

t h eir wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property a cqu ir ed b y bot h of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the ru les on co-ow n er sh ip. In t he absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived t og et h er sh a ll be pr esumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be ow n ed by t h em in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a pa r t y w h o did n ot pa r t icipa t e in t h e a cquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in t h e a cquisition thereof in the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of t h e fa m ily a n d of t h e h ou seh old. Un der this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry sh all be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is pr ima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A pa r t y w h o did n ot pa rticipate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contribut ed t h er et o jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family h ou seh old. " Un like the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separ a t e pr oper t y a r e n ot in clu ded in t h e co-ow n er sh ip. T hus, petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" and all their common proper t y in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partit ion of t h e pr oper t y ow ned in common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, n ot A r t icles 5 0, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129, of the Family Code, sh ou ld a pt ly pr ev a il. A FFIRMED.

SPS. T RINIDAD S. ESTONINA and PAULINO ESTONINA V .COURT OF A PPEA LS JA NUA RY 2 7 , 1 9 9 7 FA CT S: T h e controversy involves Lot C situated in Barrio Santisima Cruz, Sta. Cruz, Laguna with an area of 27 3 square meters. The said parcel of land was in the name of Santiago Garcia w h o died on October 2, 1967. Some six years after Santiago Garcia's death, or on March 10, 1973, the then CFI of Ma nila issued an order granting Trinidad Estonina's application for a w r it of pr elim in a r y a t tachment. Consequently, a notice of attachment was inscribed in favor of Trinida d Est on in a cov ering all the rights, title, interest, and participation that Con su elo Ga r cia , t h e w idow of Sa ntiag o Ga r cia , m a y h a v e in a n d t o t h e pa r cel of la n d cov er ed by t h e sa id t it le. On August 14, 1977, the children of Santiago Garcia with his first wife, Adela Isor et a , n a m ely Ofelia, Remedios, Elvira and Castor all surnamed Garcia, executed a deed selling, tra n sfer r in g a n d conveying unto the spouses Celso Atayan and Nilda Hicban their "t itle, rights, inter est a n d pa rticipation which is four t enths (4/1 0) pro indiviso share" in the said parcel of land c overed by T CT No. T -82229. About a year after, Santiago Garcia's second wife and widow, Consuelo Garcia a n d their children, Virgilio, Marilou and Lolita, all surnamed Garcia, followed suit and also sold t o t he spouses Atayan, their four-tenths (4/1 0) pro indidviso share in the same parcel of land. On February 22, 1 980, Estrella R. Garcia, the widow of Santiago Garcia, Jr. (Santiago Ga r cia 's son fr om his first marriage), and their children, Roderick, Elizabeth, Dorothy and Erlinda, likew ise sold t o the spouses Atayan, their one-tenth (1/1 0) pro indiviso share in the parcel of land covered by T CT No. T -8 2 2 2 9 . Su bsequent to a favorable decision obtained by Trinidad Estonina ag a in st Con su elo Ga r cia , ex ecution pending appeal was made on the parcel of land formerly covered by TCT No. T-82229 on July 20, 1979. The said parcel of land was sold at a public auction where Trinida d Est on in a w as the highest bidder. Consuelo Garcia appealed the decision in Civ il Ca se befor e t h e IA C w hich, however, ruled in favor of Trinidad Estonina. Upon the finality of the said decision, T CT No. T -82229 was cancelled by the Register of Deeds of Laguna and in lieu ther eof, T CT No. T 9 9 9 6 1 w a s issu ed in fa v or of "T r in ida d Est on in a m a r r ied t o Pa u lin o Est on in a ".

On July 25, 1985, the spouses Atayan filed a complaint for a n n u lm en t of sh er iff's sa le a n d t ransfer certificate of title with damages before Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Cour t (RT C) of Sa nta Cruz, Laguna, impleading as defendants ther ein t h e spou ses T r in ida d a n d Pa u lin o Est onina , Nicanor E. Silvano, Reynaldo G. Javier, Edm und R. Solidum, the Register of Deeds of La guna, and the heirs of Santiago Garcia who sold t o the spouses At a y a n t h eir pr o in div iso sh a r es in t h e pa r cel of la n d cov er ed by T CT No. T -8 2 2 2 9 . RT C:dismissed the complaint. It found the lot covered by T CT No. T-82229, was acquired during t h e marriage of Santiago Garcia and Consuelo Gaza, and is presumed to be conjugal in n a t u r e. Upon the death of Santiago Garcia on October 2, 1967, his conjugal share of one-half (l/2) of th e sa id parcel of land was transmitted t o his heirs by intestate succession. By the law on in t est a t e su ccession, his nine children, five by his first wife and four out of the subsequent marriage, a n d Con suelo Garcia, his second wife and widow, inherited the same at one-tenth (1 /1 0 ) ea ch pr o in diviso. The remaining one-half (1/2) pertained to the conjugal share of Consuelo Garcia. Thus, in asmuch as Consuelo Garcia inherited one-tenth (1/1 0) of her husband's conjugal share in t h e sa id property and is the owner of one-half (1/2) thereof as her conjugal share, she owns a t otal of 5 5 % (or 1/10 plus 1 /2) of the said parcel of land. What could be attached by the spouses Estonina a n d later levied on execution and sold at public auction was only Consuelo Garcia's r ig h t s a n d in t er est s w h ich is fift y fiv e per cen t (5 5 %) of t h e pr oper t y . CA : the parcel of land in question was not the conjugal proper t y of Sa n t ia g o a n d Con su elo Garcia, but was the former's exclusive property. It was therefore the entire property that formed pa rt of Santiago Garcia's estate upon his death. When Santiago Garcia died, his n in e ch ildr en a n d Consuelo Garcia inherited the said property each t o the ex t en t of on e -t en t h (1 /1 0 ) pr o in diviso share. Hence, it was only Consuelo Garcia's one-tenth(l/l0) pro indiv iso sh a r e in t h e pa rcel of land in question which could be validly attached, levied and sold in execution t o satisfy t h e judgment against her and in fa v or of T r in ida d Est on in a in Civ il Ca se No. 8 8 4 3 0 . ISSUE: W ON t h e la n d is a con ju g a l pr oper t y of Sa n t ia g o a n d Con su elo HELD: T h e property involved in this dispute is indeed the exclusive property of the deceased Sa n t ia g o Garcia. It has been repeatedly held that the presumption under Article 1 60 of the Civil Code that a ll property of the marriage belong to the conjugal partnership applies only when there is pr oof t hat the property was acquired during the marriage. Other w ise st a t ed, pr oof of a cqu isit ion du ring the marriage is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of t h e conjugal partnership. In the case at bench, the petitioners have been unable to present a n y pr oof that the property in question was acquired during the marriage of Santiago and Consuelo. T h ey anchor their claim solely on the fact that when the title ov er t h e la n d in qu est ion w a s issued, Santiago was already married to Consuelo as evidenced by the registration in the name of "Sa ntiago Garcia married t o Consuelo Gaza". This, according t o the spouses Estonina, suffices t o est a blish t h e con ju g a l n a t u r e of t h e pr oper t y . In t he case of Jocson v. Court of Appeals The fact that the properties were registered in the name of "Em ilio Jocson, married t o Alejandra Poblete" is no proof that the properties wer e a cqu ir ed du ring the spouses' coverture. Acquisition of t itle and registration thereof are two different act s. It is w ell settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already erdstin g . T h e words "m arried to" preceding "Alejandra Poblete" are merely descriptive of the civil status of Em ilio Jocson. In other words, the import from the certificates of t itle is that Em ilio Jocson is t h e owner of the properties, the same having been registered in his name alone, an d t h a t h e is m a r r ied to A leja n dr a Poblet e. Being the exclusive property of Santiago Garcia, it was the entire parcel of land in question t h a t form ed part of his estate and which passed to his t en heirs by compulsory succession u pon h is death. And as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, what could therefore be attached a n d sold a t public auction in Civil Case No. 88430 was only the one-tenth (1/1 0) pr o in div iso sh a r e of

Con suelo Garcia in the said parcel of land. The sale at public auction of the disputed property in it s entirety by the Sheriff in favor of Trinidad Estonina over and above the one-tenth (1/1 0) share of Con suelo Garcia is null and void, belonging as it does to the other heirs of Santiago Garcia and la t er t o t h e spou ses A t a y a n . A nent the contention that the spouses Atayan are guilty of laches, suffice it t o st a t e t h a t t h is r esidual argument deserves scant consideration. Being strangers to Civil Case No. 88430 wh er e t h e writ of execution over the land in question was issued, they cannot be faulted for filin g t h e "pr oper action" only in 1985 or six (6) years after the levy on execution. Besides, it w a s on ly in 1 984 that the Court of Appeals render ed a decision fin a lly ca n cellin g t h e t it le of t h eir pr edecessors-in-interest and issuing another one in favor of Trinidad Estonina. The action filed by the spouses Atayan seeking the annulment of the sheriffs sale and the transfer cer t ifica t e of t itle with damages immediately thereafter or on July 25, 1985 cannot be consider ed a s u n du e delay nor does it imply a lack of interest to enforce their claim ov er t h e dispu t ed p r oper t y .

A YA LA INV EST MENT & DEV T CORP V S. CA & SPS. SHING GR NO. 1 1 8 3 0 5 FEBRUA RY 1 2 , 1 9 9 8 DOCT RINE: If t h e money or services are given to another person or entity, and the husband acted on ly a s a su rety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as fa llin g w it h in t h e con text of "obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partner sh ip." T h e con t r a ct of loa n or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the su r et y or h is fa m ily . FA CT S: Ph ilippine Blooming Mills (―PBM‖) obtained a P5 0,3 0 0 ,0 0 0 loa n fr om pet it ion er A y a la In v estment and Development Corporation (―AIDC‖). As a dded secu r it y for t h e cr edit lin e ex tended to PBM, respondent Alfredo Ching, Executive Vice President of PBM, executed security a greements, making himself jointly and severally answerable with PBM's indebtedness t o AIDC. PBM fa iled t o pay the loan. Thus, A IDC filed a ca se for su m of m on ey a g a in st PBM a n d r espon den t -h u sba n d A lfr edo Ch in g w it h t h e CFI of Pa sig . A fter trial, the court rendered judgment ordering PBM and respondent-husband Alfredo Ch in g t o jointly and severally pay AIDC the principa l a m ou n t of P5 0 ,3 0 0 ,0 0 0 w it h in t er est s. Upon motion of AIDC, the lower court issued a writ of execution pending appeal. Upon A IDC's pu tting up of an P8,000,000 bond, a writ of execution w a s issu ed. T h er ea ft er , pet it ion er A belardo Magsajo, Sr., Deputy Sh er iff of Pa sig , ca u sed t h e issu a n ce a n d ser v ice u pon r espondents-spouses of a notice of sheriff sale on 3 of their con ju g a l pr oper t ies. Pet it ion er Ma g sa jo t h en sch edu led t h e a u ct ion sa le of t h e pr oper t ies lev ied. Pr ivate respondents filed a case of injunction against petition er s t o en join t h e a u ct ion sa le a lleging that petitioners cannot enforce the judgment against the conjugal partnership levied on t h e ground that, among others, the subject loan did n ot r edou n d t o t h e ben efit of t h e sa id con ju g a l pa r t n er sh ip. T h e low er cou r t issu ed a t em por a r y r est r a in in g or der . A IDC filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, quest ion in g t h e or d er of t h e low er court enjoining the sale. Court of Appeals issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining t h e lower court from enforcing its Order, thus paving the way for the scheduled auct ion sa le of r espon den t s-spou ses con ju g a l pr oper t ies. T h e auction sale took place. AIDC being the only bidder, was issued a Certificate of Sa le. Upon ex piration of the redemption period, petitioner sheriff issued the final deed of sa le w h ich w a s r eg ist er ed.

A IDC filed a motion to dismiss the petition for injunction filed before t h e CFI of Pa sig on t h e g r ound that the same had become moot and academic with t h e con su m m a t ion of t h e sa le. Respondents filed their opposition to the motion arguing, among others, that where a third party w ho claim is ownership of the property attached or levied upon, a differen t leg a l sit u a t ion is pr esented; and that in this case, 2 of the real properties are actually in the name of Encarnacion Ch in g , a n on -pa r t y t o t h e civ il ca se. RT C: the conjugal partnership of gains of respondents-spouses Alfredo and Encarnacion Ch in g is n ot liable for the payment of the debts secured by respondent-husband Alfredo Ching . T h u s, t h e sa le on ex ecu t ion n u ll a n d v oid. CA : A ffir m ed decision of t h e t r ia l cou r t . ISSUE: W ON a surety agreement entered into by the husband in favor of his employ er is w it h in t h e con templation of Art. 161 of the Civil Code and con sider ed for t h e ben efit of t h e con ju g a l pa r t n er sh ip? HELD: No. The surety agreement entered into by the husband in favor of his employer is not considered for t h e ben efit of t h e con ju g a l pa r t n er sh ip. W e do not agree with petitioners that there is a difference between the terms "redounded t o t h e benefit of" or "benefited from" on the one hand; and "for the benefit of" on the other. They mean on e and the same thing. Art. 161 (1) of the Civil Code and Art. 121 (2) of t h e Fa m ily Code a r e sim ilarly worded, i.e., both use the term "for the benefit of." On the other hand, Art. 1 2 2 of t h e Fam ily Code provides that "The payment of personal debts by the husband or the wife befor e or du ring the marriage shall not be charged t o the conjugal partnersh ip ex cept in sofa r a s t h ey r edounded t o the benefit of the family." As can be seen, the terms are used in t er ch a n g ea bly . Fr om the jurisprudential rulings of this Court , w e ca n der iv e t h e follow in g con clu sion s: (A ) If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly r eceiv ed t h e m oney and services to be used in or for his own business or his own profession, t h a t con t r a ct fa lls within the term . . . . obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit t o the family is apparent at the t im e of t h e signing of the contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family stands t o benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the business or pr ofession of t h e h usband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fa ils or does n ot su cceed. Sim ply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law pr esumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will r edou n d t o t h e ben efit of t h e con ju g a l pa r t n er sh ip. (B) On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or en t it y , a n d t h e h usband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized a s falling within the context of "obligations for the benefit of the conjug a l pa r t n er sh ip." T h e con tract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or h is family. No presumption can be inferred that, when a husband enters in t o a con t r a ct of su rety or accommodation agreement, it is "for the benefit of the conjugal pa r t n er sh ip." Pr oof m u st be pr esen t ed t o est a bli sh ben efit r edou n din g t o t h e con ju g a l pa r t n er sh ip. T h e provisions of the Family Code is applicable in this case. These pr ov ision s h ig h lig h t t h e u nderlying concern of the law for the conservation of the conjugal partnership; for the husband's du t y t o pr ot ect a n d sa feg u a r d, if n ot a u g m en t , n ot t o dissipa t e it . T h is is the underlying reason why the Family Code clarifies that the obligations entered in t o by on e of the spouses must be those that redounded to the ben efit of t h e fa m ily a n d t h a t t h e m easure of the partn er sh ip's lia bilit y is t o "t h e ex t en t t h a t t h e fa m ily is ben efit ed."

Here, the property in dispute also involves the family home. The loan is a corporat e loa n n ot a per sonal one. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or pr ofession nor a n a ct of a dm in ist r a t ion for t h e ben efit of t h e fa m ily .

obt ained and vitiated through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud. In t h is in stance, private respondent's consent t o the contract of sale of their con ju g a l pr oper t y w a s t ot a lly in ex ist en t or a bsen t .

SPS A NT ONIO A ND LUZV IMINDA GUIA NG V S. CA A ND GILDA COPUZ G.R. No. 1 2 5 1 7 2 / Ju n e 2 6 , 1 9 9 8

T h e contract falls within the ambit of Article 124 of the Family Code, which provides t h a t "... In t h e absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or en cu m br a n ce sh a ll be v oid ..." Fu rthermore, it must be noted that the fraud and the intimidation referred to by petitioners were per petrated in the execution of the document em bodying the amicable settlement. Gilda Corpu z a lleged during trial that barang a y a u t h or it ies m a de h er sig n sa id docu m en t t h r ou g h m isrepresentation and coercion. In any event, its execution does not alter the void char a ct er of t h e deed of sale between the husband and the petitioners-spouses. The fact remain s t h a t su ch con t r a ct w a s en t er ed in t o w it h ou t t h e w ife's con sen t . In sum, the nullity of the contract of sale is premised on the absence of pr iv a t e r espon den t 's con sent. To constitute a valid contract, the Civil Code requires the concurrence of the follow in g elem ents: cause, object, and consent, the last element being indubitably absent in t h e ca se a t ba r .

DOCT RINE: T h e sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the h u sba n d a n d t h e w ife . T h e a bsence of the consent of one renders the sale null and void, while the vitiation thereof makes it m er ely v oida ble. On ly in t h e la t t er ca se ca n r a t ifica t ion cu r e t h e defect . FA CT S: Pr ivate respondent Gilda Corpuz and Judie Corpuz are legally married spouses. They have three ch ildren, namely: Junie (1 8 years old), Harriet (17), and Jodie (15). The couple bought a 42 1 sq. m eter lot in Koronadal, South Cotabato from Manuel Callejo through a conditional deed of sale. T h e consideration was payable in installment. In 1988, the couple sold one-half portion of t h eir Lot t o petitioner-spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang. Since then, Guiang occupied the oneh a lf portion and built their house thereon. They are thus adjoining neighbors of t h e Cor pu zes. Gilda Corpuz left for Manila to look for work abroad. Unfortunately, she became a vict im of a n u nscrupulous illegal recruiter. She was not able to go abroad. She stayed for sometime in Manila. A fter his wife's departure for Manila, Judie Corpuz seldom went home to the conjugal dwellin g . He stayed most of the time at his place of work. Harriet Corpuz learned that her father intended t o sell the remaining one-half portion including their house to Guiangs. She wrote a letter to her m other. Gilda Corpuz replied that she was objecting to the sale. Harriet, however, did not inform h er father about this; but instead gave the letter to Luzviminda Guiang so that she would adv ise h er fa t h er . However, in the absence of his wife Gilda, Judie Corpuz pushed throu g h t h e sa le. He sold t o Lu zv iminda Guiang thru a "Deed of Transfer of Rights" remaining one-half portion of t h eir lot a n d t h e h ou se. Gilda returned home. She found her children staying with other households. On ly Ju n ie w a s st aying in their house. Harriet and Joji were with Mr. Pa n es. Gilda g a t h er ed h er ch ildr en t og ether and stayed at their house. Her husband was nowhere to be found. She was informed by h er ch ildr en t h a t t h eir fa t h er h a d a w ife a lr ea dy . For staying in their house sold by her husband, spouses Guiang complained before the Barangay a uthorities for trespassing. The parties thereat signed a documen t for a m ica ble set t lem en t st ating that Gilda Corpuz and her three children must leave voluntarily the house wit h ou t a n y ch a r g e. T h ereafter, Gilda approached the Barangay Captain for t h e a n n u lm en t of t h e set t lem en t . A nnulment not having been made, they stayed put in her house and lot. Spouses Guiang filed a m ot ion for ex ecu t ion of t h e a m ica ble set t lem en t w it h t h e MT C. However, Private Respondent Gilda Corpuz filed a Complaint against her husband Judie Corpuz a n d Petitioner-Spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guian g . T h e sa id Com pla in t sou g h t t h e declaration of a Deed of Transfer of Right, which involved the conjugal property, null and v oid. T h e t r ia l cou r t r u led in fa v or of pr iv a t e r espon den t . CA a ffir m ed. ISSUE: W ON t h e a ssa iled Deed of T r a n sfer of Rig h t s w a s v a lidly ex ecu t ed. HELD: NO Pet itioners insist that the questioned Deed was validly executed by the parties in good faith a n d for valuable consideration. The absence of private respondent's consent merely r en der ed t h e Deed voidable under Article 1390 of the Civil Code. The provision in par. 2, refers t o con t r a ct s v isited by vices of consent, i.e., contracts which were entered into by a person whose consent was

Doct rinally, a void contract cannot be ratified. By Ar t .1 3 9 0 of t h e Civ il Code, t h e Deed t o T r a n sfer of Rig h t s ca n n ot be r a t ified, ev en by a n a m ica ble set t lem en t . Neither can the amicable settlement be considered a continuing offer th a t w a s a ccept ed a n d per fected by the parties, following the last sentence of Article 124. The order of t h e per t in en t ev ents is clear: after the sale, petitioners filed a complain t for t r espa ssin g a g a in st pr iv a t e r espondent, after which the barangay authorit ies secu r ed a n "a m ica ble set t lem en t " a n d pet itioners filed before the MTC a motion for its execution. The settlement, howev er , does n ot m ention a continuing offer to sell the property or an acceptance of such a continu in g offer . It s t enor was to the effect that private respondent would vacate the property. By no st r et ch of t h e im agination, can the Court interpret this document as the acceptance mentioned in Article 12 4 . Pet it ion den ied.

JOSEFA BAUTISTA FERRER VS. SPS MANUEL FERRER & V IRGINIA FERRER & ISMA EL FERRER A ND FLORA FERRER G.R. No. 1 6 6 4 9 6 Nov em ber 9 , 2 0 0 6 It is t he owner-spouse who has the obligation to reimburse the conju g a l pa r t n er sh ip or t h e spou se w h o ex pen ded t h e a ct s or effor t s, a s t h e ca se m a y be. FA CT S: In h er Complaint for payment of conjugal im provements, sum of money, and accoun t in g w it h pr ayer for injunction and damages, petitioner alleged that she is the widow of A lfr edo Fer r er (A lfredo), half-brother of respondents Manuel M. Fer r er (Ma n u el) a n d Ism a el M. Fer r er (Ism a el). Befor e her marriage t o Alfredo, the latter acquired a piece of lot. He applied for a loan wit h t h e Social Security System (SSS) t o build improvements thereon, including a residential house and a t w o-door apartment building. It was during their marriage that payment of the loan wa s m a de u sing the couple‘s conjugal funds. From t h eir con ju g a l fu n ds, pet it ion er posit ed, t h ey con structed a warehouse on the lot. Moreover, petitioner averr ed t h a t r espon den t Ma n u el occupied one door of the apartment building, as well as the warehouse; however, in Sept em ber 1 991, he stopped paying rentals thereon, alleging that he had a cqu ir ed ow n er sh ip ov er t h e pr operty by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed by Alfredo in favor of respondent s, Ma n u el a n d Ism a el a n d t h eir spou ses.

It is petitioner‘s contention that when her husband was already bedridden, respondents Ism a el a n d Flora Ferrer made him sign a document, purported to be his last will and testa m en t . T h e document, however, was a Deed of Sale covering Alfredo‘s lot and the improvement s t h er eon . Learning of this development, Alfredo filed with the RTC a Complaint for Annulment of the said sa le against respondents. The RTC dismissed the same. The RTC found t h a t t h e t er m s a n d con ditions of the Deed of Sale are not contrary t o law, morals, good customs, and public policy , a n d should be com plied with by the parties in good faith, there bein g n o com pellin g r ea son u nder the law to do other w ise. T h e dism issa l w a s a ffir m ed by t h e Cou r t of A ppea ls.

ISSUE: W h ether or not he Court of Appeals erred in dismissing petitioner‘s Complaint for failure to state a ca u se of a ct ion . HELD: NO.After a reading of the allegations contained in petitioner‘s Complaint, we are convinced tha t t h e sa m e fa iled t o st a t e a ca u se of a ct ion .

Fu rther, in support of her Complaint, petitioner alluded t o a portion of the Decision of the RT C, w hich stated, that in determining which property is the principal and which is the accessory, th e pr operty of greater value shall be considered the principal. In this case, the lot is the pr in cipa l a n d the im provements the accessories. Since Article 1 20 of the Family Code provides t h e r u le t hat the ownership of accessory follows the ownership of the principal, then the subject lot w it h a ll its im provements became an exclusive and capital property of Alfredo with an oblig a t ion t o r eimburse the conjugal partnership of the cost of improvements at the t im e of liqu ida t ion of [t he] conjugal partnership. Clearly, Alfredo has all the rights to sell t h e su bject pr oper t y by h im self w it h ou t n eed of Josefa ‘s con sen t .

A ccording to petitioner, while the RTC recognized that t h e im pr ov em en t s con st r u ct ed on A lfredo‘s lots were deemed as Alfredo‘s exclusive and capital property, the court also h eld t h a t pet itioner, as Alfredo‘s spouse, has the right t o cla im r eim bu r sem en t fr om t h e est a t e of A lfredo. It is argued by petitioner that her husband had no other property, and his only property h a d been sold to the respondents; hence, she has the legal right to claim for reimbursement from t h e respondents who are now the owners of the lot and the improvem en t s t h er eon . In fin e, pet itioner asseverates that the Complaint cannot be dismissed on the ground of failure to state a cause of action because the respondents have the correlative obligation to pay the v a lu e of t h e im pr ov em en t s.

A ccording to petitioner, the ruling of the RTC shows that, when Alfredo died she had the right t o be r eimbursed for the cost of the improvements on Alfredo‘s lot. Hence, one-half thereof should be r eimbursed and paid by respondents as they are now th e r eg ist er ed ow n er s of A lfr edo‘s lot . She averred that respondents cannot claim lack of kn ow ledg e a bou t t h e fa ct t h a t t h e im provements were constructed using conjugal funds as they had occupied one of the apartment bu ildin g s on A lfr edo‘s lot , a n d ev en pa id r en t a ls t o pet it ion er .

Pet itioner was not able t o show that there is an obligation on the pa r t of t h e r espon den t s t o r espect or not to violate her right. While we could concede that Civil Case No. 6 1 3 2 7 m a de a r eference to the right of the spouse as contemplated in Article 12 0 of t h e Fa m ily Code t o be r eimbursed for the cost of the improvements, the obligation to reimburse r est s on t h e spou se u pon whom ownership of the entire property is vested. There is no obligation on the part of t h e pu r ch a ser of t h e pr oper t y , in ca se t h e pr oper t y is sold by t h e ow n er -spou se.

For their part, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss, contending that petitioner had no cause of a ction again st t h em , a n d t h a t t h e ca u se of a ct ion w a s ba r r ed by pr ior ju dg m en t .

In deed, Article 120 provides the solution in determining the ownership of the improvements that a r e made on the separate property of the spouses at the expense of the partnership or t h r ou g h t h e acts or efforts of either or both spouses. Thus, when the cost of the improvemen t a n d a n y r esulting increase in value are m or e t h a n t h e v a lu e of t h e pr oper t y a t t h e t im e of t h e im provement, the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership, su bject to reimbursement of the value of the property of the owner-spouse a t t h e t im e of t h e im provement; otherwise, said property shall be retained in ownership by t h e ow n er -spou se, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the improvement. The subject pr oper t y w a s pr ecisely declared as the exclusive property of Alfredo on the basis of Article 120 of the Fa m ily Code.

RT C rendered a n Or der , den y in g t h e Mot ion t o Dism iss. A ccor din g t o t h e RT C, n o pr onouncement as to the im provements constructed on Alfredo‘s lot has been m a de a n d t h e payment of petitioner‘s share in the conjugal partnership constitutes a separate cause of act ion . A subsequent Order was issued by the RTC, denying respondents‘ Motion for Reconsiderat ion . A ggrieved, respondents elevated the case to the Cour t of A ppea ls by w a y of a Pet it ion for Certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdict ion on t h e RT C in den y in g t h e dism issa l. Court of Appeals rendered a Decision granting the Petition. It held that petitioner‘s Compla in t fa iled t o st a t e a ca u se of a ct ion . T h e a ppella t e cou r t r a t ion a lized a s follow s: [W ]e believe that the instant complaint is not the proper action for the respondent t o enforce her r ight of reimbursement of the cost of the improvement[s] on the subject property. As corr ect ly pointed out by the petitioners, the same should be made and directed in the settlement of esta t e of h er deceased husband Alfredo Ferrer pursuant t o Article 129 of the Family Code. Such bein g t h e case, it appears that the complaint herein fa ils t o st a t e a ca u se of a ct ion a g a in st t h e pet itioners, the latter not being the proper pa r t ies a g a in st w h om t h e su bject a ct ion for r eimbursement must be directed to. xxx Albeit the respondent herein has the legal r ig h t t o be r eimbursed of the cost of the improvements of the subject property, it is not the petitioner s bu t t h e estate of her deceased husband which has the obligation t o pay the same. T h e com pla in t h er ein is t h er efor e dism i ssible for fa ilu r e t o st a t e a ca u se of a ct ion a g a in st t h e pet itioners. Needless to say, the respondent is not without any further recourse as she ma y file h er cla im a g a in st t h e est a t e of h er decea sed h u sba n d. In light of the foregoing, we find that the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in denying t h e pet it ion er s‘ m ot ion t o dism iss for fa ilu r e t o st a t e a ca u se of a ct ion . A ggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereon. Court of Appeals ren der ed a Resolu t ion den y in g t h e m ot ion . Hen ce, t h e pr esen t r ecou r se.

W hat is incontrovertible is that the respondents, despit e t h e a lleg a t ion s con t a in ed in t h e Com plaint that they are the buyers of the subject premises, are not petitioner‘s spouse n or ca n t h ey ever be deemed as the owner-spouse upon whom the obligation t o reimburse petitioner for h er costs rested. It is the owner-spouse who has the obliga t ion t o r eim bu r se t h e con ju g a l pa rtnership or the spouse who expended the acts or efforts, as th e ca se m a y be. Ot h er w ise st ated, respondents do not have the ob ligation t o respect petitioner‘s right t o be r eim bu r sed. It can be said, thus, that respondents‘ act of acquiring the subject property by sa le w a s n ot in v iolation of petitioner‘s rights. The same can also be sa id of t h e r espon den t s‘ object ion t o r eimburse petitioner. Simply, no correlative obligation exists on the part of the respon den t s t o r eimburse the petitioner. Corollary thereto, neither can it be said that their refusal t o reimburse con stituted a violation of petitioner‘s rights. As has been shown in the foregoing, no oblig a t ion by the respondents under the law exists. Petitioner‘s Complaint failed to state a cause of a ct ion a gainst the respondents, and for this reason, the Court of Appeals was not in error in dismissing t h e sa m e.W HEREFORE, t h e Pet it ion is DENIED.

A TONIO DOCENA A ND A LFREDA DOCENA V S. HON. RICA RDO LA PESURA GR NO. 1 4 0 1 5 3 MA RCH 2 8 , 2 0 0 1

FA CT S: On June 1, 1977, private respondent, Casiano Hombria filed a Complaint for the r ecov er y of a pa rcel of land against lessees, petitioner-spouses Docena. The petitioners clamed own er sh ip of t h e land based on occupation since time immemorial. A certain Guillermo Abuda interven ed in t h e case. In a decision dated November 24, 1 989, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioners a n d t h e intervenor Abuda. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the tria l cou r t a n d ordered the petitioners to vacate the land they h a v e lea sed fr om pla in t iff-a ppella n t . On May 22, 19995, Hombria filed a Motion for Execution of t h e a bov e decision w h ich h a s a lready become final and executory. The above motion was granted by judg e La pesu r a a n d a W r it of Execution was issued therefore. An alias Writ of Demolition was then filed by the Sheriff. A Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was filed by the petitioners eith the Court of A ppea ls, a lleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court judge in issuing the orders and the sh eriff in issuing the Alias Writ of Demolition. CA dismissed the petition on the grounds that the pet ition was filed beyond the 60-day period provided under Section 4 of Rule 6 5 of t h e 1 9 9 7 Rev ised Rules of Civil Procedure as amended by Bar Matter No. 803 and that the certification of non-forum shopping attached thereto was signed by the husband alone. t h e T h e Mot ion for r econ sider a t ion w a s a lso den ied. Hen ce t h is pet it ion . ISSUE: W h ether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dism issin g t h e Pet it ion for Cer t ior a r i a n d Pr oh ibit ion . HELD: Y ES. Un der the New Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. In fact , h e is the sole administrator, and the wife is not entitled as a matter of right to join h im in t h is en deavor. The husband may defend the conjugal partnership in a suit or action w it h ou t bein g joined by the wife. Corollarily, the husband alone may execute the necessary certifica t e of n on for um shopping t o accompany the pleading. The husband as the statutory administrat or of t h e con jugal property could have filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition alone, withou t t h e con currence of the wife. If suits to defend an interest in the conjugal prperties may be filed by the h usband alone, with more reason, he may sign the cert fica t e of n on -for u m sh oppin g t o be a t t ch ed t o t h e pet it ion . Un der the Family Code, the administration of the conjugal property belongs to the husband an d t h e wife jointly. However, an act of alienation or encumbrance where the consent of both spouses is r equired, joint management or administration does not re quire that the h u sba n d a n d w ife a lways act together. Each spouse may validly exercise full power of management alone, subject to t h e intervention of the court in proper cases as provided under Article 124 of the Family Code. It is believed taht even under the provisions of the Family Code, the husband alone could have filed t h e petition for certiorari and prohibition to contests the writs of demolition issued against t h e con jugal property with the Court of Appeals without being joined by his wife. The sign ing of t h e a t tached certificate of non-foru m sh oppin g on ly by t h e h u sba n d is n ot a fa t a l defect .

MA NA LO V S. CA MA ISA GR No. 147978, January 23, 2002 FA CT S: T h elma A. Jader-Manalo was interested in buying the two properties of Spouses Camaisa. So she n egotiated for the purchase through a real estate broker, Mr. Proceso Ereno. She made a definite offer to buy the properties to respondent Edilberto Camaisa with the knowledge and conformity of h is w ife, r espon den t Nor m a Ca m a isa in t h e pr esen ce of t h e r ea l est a t e br oker .

A fter Edilberto signed the contracts, Manalo delivered to him two checks as down payments. The con tracts were given to Edilberto for the formal affixing of his wife's signatur e. How ev er , t h e following day, petitioner received a call from respondent Norma, requesting a meeting t o clarify som e provisions of the contracts. To accommodate her queries, petitioner, accompanied by h er lawyer, met with Edilberto and Norma and the real estate broker at Cafe Rizal in Makati. During t h e meeting, handwritten notations were made on the contracts t o sell, so t h ey a r r a n g ed t o in corporate the notations a n d t o m eet a g a in for t h e for m a l sig n in g of t h e con t r a ct s. W h en petitioner met again with respondent spouses and the real estate br oker a t Edilber t o's office for the formal affixing of Norma's signature, she was surprised when respondent spou ses in formed her that they were backing out of the agreement because they needed "spot ca sh " for t h e full amount of the consideration. Petitioner reminded respondent spouses that the contract s t o sell had already been duly perfected and Norma's refusal to sign t h e sa m e w ou ld u n du ly pr eju dice pet it ion er . ISSUE: W h ether or not the husband may validly dispose of a conjugal property of the without the wife‘s w r it t en con sen t . HELD: NO. T h e law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as administra t or in a ppropriate cases requires the written consent of the wife, otherwise, t h e disposit ion is v oid. T h u s, A r t icle 1 2 4 of t h e Fa m ily Code pr ov ides: ― Art. 1 24. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to bot h spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prev a il, su bject t o r ecourse t o the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed of within five yea r s fr om t h e da t e of t h e con t r a ct im plem en t in g su ch decision . T h e properties subject of the contracts in this case were conjugal; hence, for the contracts t o sell t o be effect iv e, t h e con sen t of bot h h u sba n d a n d w ife m u st con cu r . Ev en granting that respondent Norma actively participated in negotiat in g for t h e sa le of t h e su bject properties, which she denied, her written consent to the sale is required by la w for it s v alidity. Significantly, petitioner herself admits that Norma refused to sign the contracts t o sell. Respondent Norma may have been aware of the negotiation s for t h e sa le of t h eir con ju g a l pr oper t ies. How ev er , bein g m er ely a w a r e of a t r a n sa ct ion is n ot con sen t .

CA RLOS V S. A BELA RDO GR NO. 1 4 6 5 0 4 A pr il 9 , 2 0 0 2 DOCT RINE: T h e loa n is t h e lia bilit y of t h e con ju g a l pa r t n er sh ip FA CT S: In October 1989, respondent and his wife Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo approached him a n d r equested him to advance the amount of US$25,000.00 (P625, 000. 00) for the pu r ch a se of a h ouse and lot. To enable and assist the spouses conduct their married life independently and on t h eir own, petitioner, in October 31, 1989, issued a check in the name of a certain Pura V a llejo, seller of t h e pr oper t y , w h o a ckn ow ledg ed r eceipt t h er eof. W h en petitioner inquired from the spouses in July 1991 as to the status of the amount he loaned t o t hem, the latter acknowledged their obligation but pleaded that they were not yet in a position t o m ake a definite settlement of the same. Thereafter, respondent expressed violent resistance t o pet itioner‘s inquiries on the amount t o the extent of making va r iou s dea t h t h r ea t s a g a in st pet it ion er .

Despite formal demand for the payment of the said loan, spouses w er e u n a ble t o pa y t h eir obligation. Hence, this prompted petitioner to institute a collection suit against respondent a n d h is wife. As they were separated in fact for more than a year prior t o the filing of the compla in t , r espondent and his wife filed separate answers. Maria T h er esa Ca r los-A bela r do a dm it t ed securing a loan together with her husband, from petitioner. She claimed, however, that said loan w as payable on a staggered basis so she was surprised when petitioner deman ded im m edia t e pa y m en t of t h e fu ll a m ou n t . In h is separate Answer, respondent admitted receiving t h e a m ou n t of US$2 5 ,0 0 0 .0 0 bu t claimed that the said US$25,000.00 was never intended as loan of defendant. It was his share of in com e on con t r a ct s obt a in ed by defen da n t . RT C r u led in fa v or of t h e pet it ion er . CA r ev er sed. ISSUE: W h et h er or n ot t h e loa n is ch a r g ea ble t o t h e con ju g a l pa r t n er sh ip. HELD: Y es. The loan is the liability of the conjugal partnership pursuant t o Article 1 2 1 of t h e Fa m ily Code: A r t icle 1 2 1 . T h e con ju g a l pa r t n er sh ip sh a ll be lia ble for : (2 ) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated admin ist r a t or spou se for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by one of them w it h t h e con sen t of t h e ot h er ; (3 ) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of t h e ot h er t o t h e ex tent that the family may have been benefited; If the conjugal partner sh ip is in su fficien t t o cov er the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid bala n ce w it h t h eir sepa r a t e pr oper t ies. W h ile respondent did not and refused t o sign the acknowledgment executed and sign ed by h is w ife, undoubtedly, the loan redounded to the benefit of t h e fa m ily beca u se it w a s u sed t o pu rchase the house and lot which became the c onjugal home of respon den t a n d h is fa m ily . Hence, notwithstanding the alleged lack of consent of respondent, under Art. 21 of t h e Fa m ily Code, h e sh a ll be solida r ily lia ble for su ch loa n t og et h er w it h h is w ife. Ea r ly in time, it must be noted that payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or t h e w ife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the con ju g a l pa r t n er sh ip ex cept in sofar as they redounded t o the benefit of the family. The defendants nev er den ied t h a t t h e ch eck of US$25,000.00 was used to purchase the subject house and lot. They do not den y t h a t t h e sa m e ser v ed a s t h eir con ju g a l h om e, t h u s ben efit in g t h e fa m ily . On the same principle, acknowledgment of the loan made by t h e defen da n t -w ife bin ds t h e con jugal partnership since its proceeds r edou n ded t o t h e ben efit of t h e fa m ily . Hen ce, defendant-husband and defendant-wife are jointly and severally liable in th e pa y m en t of t h e loa n .

IMELDA RELUCIO V S. A NGELINA MEJIA LOPEZ G.R. NO. 1 3 8 4 9 7 Ja n u a r y 1 6 , 2 0 0 2 FA CT S: A ngelina Mejia Lopez filed a petition for "APPOINT MENT A S SOLE A DMINIST RA T IX OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF PROPERTIES, FORFEIT URE, ET C.," a g a in st defen da n t

A lberto Lopez and petitioner Im elda Relucio. Angelina alleged that som etime in 1968, defendant Lopez, who is legally married t o her, abandoned the latter and their four legitimate children; that h e arrogated unto himself full and exclusive con t r ol a n d a dm in ist r a t ion of t h e con ju g a l pr operties, that defendant Lopez maintained an illicit relationship and cohabited with petitioner sin ce 1976. It was further alleged that defendant Lopez and petitioner Relu cio, du r in g t h eir per iod of cohabitation have amassed a fortune consisting mainly of st ockh oldin g s in Lopezow ned or controlled corporations, residential, agricultural, commercial lots, houses, apartment s a n d buildings, cars and other motor vehicles, bank accounts and jew elr y . T h ese pr oper t ies, w hich are in the names of defendant Lopez and petitioner Relucio sin g ly or join t ly or t h eir dummies and proxies, have been acqui r ed pr in cipa lly if n ot solely t h r ou g h t h e a ct u a l con tribution of money, property and industry of defendant Lopez with minimal, if not nil, actual con tribution from petitioner Relucio. On December 8, 1993, a Motion to Dism iss t h e Pet it ion w as filed by herein petitioner on the ground that private respon den t h a s n o ca u se of a ct ion a gainst her.An Order dated February 10, 1 994 was issued by herein respondent Judge den y in g pet itioner Relucio's Motion to Dismiss on the ground that she is impleaded a s a n ecessa r y or in dispensable party because som e of the subject properties are r eg ist er ed in h er n a m e a n d defendant Lopez, or solely in her name. Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petit ion for certiorari assailing the trial court's denial of her m ot ion t o dism iss. T h e Cou r t of A ppea ls pr om u lg a t ed a decision den y in g t h e pet it ion . ISSUE: Whether respondent's petition for appointment as sole administratrix of t h e con ju g a l pr operty, accounting, etc. against her husband Alberto J. Lopez established a ca u se of a c t ion a g a in st pet it ion er . HELD:: No. The complaint is by an aggrieved wife a g a in st h er h u sba n d. Now h er e in t h e a llegations does it appear that relief is sought against petitioner. Respondent's causes of a ct ion w ere all against her husband. The first cause of action is for judicial appointment of responden t a s a dministratrix of the conjugal partnership or absolute community property arising fr om h er m arriage to Alberto J. Lopez. Petitioner is a complete stranger t o this cause of action. Article 128 of t h e Family Code refers only to spouses, to wit: "If a spouse without just cause a ba n don s t h e ot h er or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family, t h e a g g r iev ed spou se m a y pet ition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property, or for authority t o be t h e sole a dministrator of the conjugal partnership property xxx". The administration of the property of t h e marriage is entirely between them, to the exclusion of a ll ot h er per son s. Respon den t a lleges that Alberto J. Lopez is her husband. Therefore, h er fir st ca u se of a ct ion is a g a in st A lberto J. Lopez. There is no right-duty relation between petitioner and respon den t t h a t ca n possibly support a cause of action. T h e secon d ca u se of a ct ion is for a n a ccou n t in g "by r espondent husband." The accounting of conjugal partnership arises from or is a n in ciden t of m arriage. Petitioner has nothing to do with the marriage between respondent Alberto J. Lopez. Hence, no cause of action can exist against petitioner on this ground. Respondent's alter n a t iv e cause of action is for forfeiture of Alberto J. Lopez' share in the co-owned pr oper t y "a cqu ir ed du ring his illicit relationship and cohabitation with [petitioner]" and for the "dissolution of t h e con jugal partnership of gains between him [Alberto J. Lopez] and the [respondent]." The t h ir d cause of action is essentially for forfeiture of Alberto J. Lopez' share in property co-owned by him a n d petitioner. It does not involve the issue of validity of the co-ownership between A lber t o J. Lopez and petitioner. The issue is whether there is basis in law t o forfeit Alberto J. Lopez' share, if a ny there be, in property co-owned by him with petitioner. Responden t 's a sser t ed r ig h t t o for feit extends to Alberto J. Lopez' share alone. Failure of Alberto J. Lopez t o su r r en der su ch sh are, assuming the trial court finds in respondent's favor, results in a breach of an obligation t o r espondent and gives rise to a cause of action. Such cause of action, however, pertains t o Alberto J. Lopez, not petitioner. The respondent also sought support. Support cannot be compelled from a st ranger. The action in Special Proceedings M-3630 is, to use respondent Angelin a M. Lopez' ow n w or ds, on e by "a n a g g r iev ed w ife a g a in st h er h u sba n d."

W h ether or not the conjugal partnership is liable for the payment of the loan obtained by the late Ma r celin o Da ilo, Jr . t h e sa m e h a v in g r edou n ded t o t h e ben efit of t h e fa m ily . Hom eown er s Sa v i n gs & Loa n Ba n k vs . Migu el a C. Da il o Ma r ch 1 1 , 2 0 0 5 Fa ct s Du r ing their marriage, respondents Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. purchased a house a n d lot with the Deed of Absolute Sale executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr . a s v en dee. W ithout the knowledge and consent of respondent Miguela Dailo, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. execut ed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Lilibeth Gesmundo, authorizing h er t o obt a in a loan from petitioner Hom eowners Savings and Loan Bank t o be secured by the spou ses Da ilo‘s h ouse and lot. Gesmundo was able to obtain a loan from petitioner and as security ex ecu t ed a Rea l Est a t e Mor t g a g e on t h e su bject pr oper t y in fa v or of pet it ion er . Upon maturity, the loan remained unpaid and as a result, petitioner instit u t ed ex t r a j u dicia l for eclosu r e pr oceedin g s on t h e m or t g a g ed pr oper t y . A fter the death of her husband, during one of her visits to the subject pr oper t y , r espon den t learned that petitioner had already employed a certain Roldan Brion t o clean its pr em ises a n d t hat her car, a Ford sedan, was razed because Brion allowed a boy to play with fir e w it h in t h e pr em ises. Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject property, which w as conjugal in nature, respondent instituted a case for Nullity of Real Es tate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance w ith Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Damages against petitioner. In the latter‘s Answer w ith Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the com pla in t on t h e g r ou n d t h a t t h e pr oper t y in qu est ion w a s t h e ex clu siv e pr oper t y of t h e la t e Ma r celin o Da ilo, Jr . A fter trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a Decision in favor of the respondent, and upon elev ation, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court‘s finding in t h e a bsen ce of clea r a n d convincing evidence to rebut the presumption tha t t h e su bject pr oper t y w a s con ju g a l in n ature. Hence, the appellate court declared as void the mor t g a g e on t h e su bject pr oper t y because it was constituted without the knowledge and consent of respondent, in accordance with A rticle 1 24 of the Family Code. With respect to the damage to respondent‘s car, t h e a ppella t e court found petitioner to be liable because it is responsible for the consequences of t h e a ct s or om issions of the person it hired to accomplish the assigned task. All told, t h e a ppella t e cou r t a ffirmed the trial court‘s Decision, but deleted the award for damages and attorney‘s fees for lack of ba sis. A s a response t o above decision, petitioner filed a petition for review on cer t ior a r i a ssa ilin g t h e Decision of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with m odifica t ion t h e Decis ion of t h e Reg ional Trial Court. Petitioner argues that although Article 124 of the Family Code requires the con sent of the other spouse to the mortgage of conjugal properties, the framers of the law cou ld n ot have intended to curtail the right of a spouse from exercising full ownership ov er the portion of t h e conjugal property pertaining t o him under the concept of co-ownership. Thus, pet it ion er w ould like the Court to uphold the validity of the mortgage t o the extent of the la t e Ma r celin o Da ilo, Jr.‘s share in the conjugal partnership. In addition, petitioner imposes the liability for th e payment of the principal obligation obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr . on t h e con ju g a l pa r t n er sh ip t o t h e ex t en t t h a t it r edou n ded t o t h e ben efit of t h e fa m ily . Issu es W h ether or not the mortgage constituted by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. on the subject property a s co-ow n er t h er eof is v a lid a s t o h is u n div ided sh a r e.

Held On the first issue, the Court cited the case, Guiang v. Court of Appeals, where it wa s h eld t h a t t h e sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and wife and th e sa m e pr in ciple sh a ll squ a r ely a pplies t o t h e in st a n t ca se. Respondent and the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August 8, 1967. In the absence of a m arriage settlement, the system of relative community or con ju g a l pa r t n er sh ip of g a in s g ov erned the property relations between respondent and her late husband. With the effectivit y of t h e Family Code on August 3, 1988, Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains in the Family Code was made applicable to conjugal partnership of g a in s a lr ea dy est a blish ed befor e it s effectivity unless vested rights have already been acquired under the Civil Code or ot h er la w s. T h e rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations of respondent and the late Ma rcelino Dailo, Jr. even in a suppletory manner. The regime of conjugal partnership of gains is a special type of partnership, where the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, pr oducts, fruits and income from their separate properties and those acquired by either or bot h spou ses through their efforts or by chance. Unlike the absolute community of property wherein t h e rules on co-ownership apply in a suppletory manner, the conju g a l pa r t n er sh ip sh a ll be g ov erned by the rules on contract of partnership in all t h a t is n ot in con flict w it h w h a t is ex pressly determined in the chapter (on conjugal partnership of gains) or by the spouses in their m arriage settlements. Thus, the property relations of respondent and her late husband sha ll be g ov erned, foremost, by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Fa m ily Code a n d, su ppletorily, by the rules on partnership under the Civil Code. In case of con flict , t h e for m er pr evails because the Civil Code provisions on partnership apply only when the Fa m ily Code is silen t on t h e m a t t er . T h e basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and con sen t of h is wife, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property, w h ich form ed part of their conjugal partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written consent of the other spou se, a n y disposit ion or en cu m br a n ce of t h e con ju g a l pr oper t y sh a ll be v oid. T h e aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect to the share of the spouse w h o m a kes t h e disposition or encumbrance in the same manner that the rule on co-ownership under Article 4 93 of t h e Civ il Code does. W h er e t h e la w does n ot dist in g u ish , cou r t s sh ou ld n ot dist inguish. Thus, both the trial court and the appellate court are correct in declaring the nullity of t h e real estate mortg a g e on t h e su bject pr oper t y for la ck of r espon den t ‘s con sen t . On the second issue, the Court cited that under Article 121 of the Family Code, ― T h e con ju g a l pa rtnership shall be liable for: . . . (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without t h e consent of the other t o the extent that the family may have been ben efit ed; . . . .‖ For t h e su bject property to be held liable, the obligation contracted by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. must h ave redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. There must be the requisite showin g t h en of some advantage which clearly accrued t o the welfare of the spouses. Certainly, to make a con jugal partnership respond for a liability that should appertain to t h e h u sba n d a lon e is t o defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the new Civil Code to show the utmost concer n for t h e solida r it y a n d w ell -bein g of t h e fa m ily a s a u n it . T h e burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal part n er sh ip of g a ins lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove). Petitioner‘s sweepin g con clu sion t hat the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. to finance the const r u ct ion of h ou sin g u nits without a doubt redounded to the benefit of his family, without adducing adequat e pr oof, does n ot persuade this Court. Other than petitioner‘s bare allegation, there is nothing fr om t h e r ecords of the case to compel a finding that, indeed, the loan obtained by t h e l a t e Ma r celin o Da ilo, Jr. redounded t o the benefit of the family. Consequently, the conjugal partnership cann ot be h eld lia ble for t h e pa y m en t of t h e pr in cipa l oblig a t ion .

t rust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud. To hold otherw ise w ou ld a llow cir cu m v en t ion of t h e con st it u t ion a l pr oh ibit ion . In Re: Petition For Separation Of Property Elena Buenaventura Muller vs. Helmu t Mu l l er A u g u st 2 9 , 2 0 0 6 Fa ct s Pet itioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in Germany. T h e couple resided in Germany at a house owned by respondent‘s parents but decided t o m ov e a n d reside permanently in the Philippines in 1992. By this t ime, respondent had in h er it ed t h e h ouse in Germany from his parents which he sold and used the proceeds for the pu r ch a se of a pa rcel of land in Antipolo Rizal at the cost of P528,000.00 and t h e con st r u ct ion of a h ou se a m ounting to P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo property was registered in the name of pet it ion er . Du e t o incompatibilities, respondent filed a petition for separ a t ion of pr oper t ies befor e t h e Reg ion a l T r ia l Cou r t . T h e trial court rendered a decision which t erminated the regime of a b solu t e com m u n it y of pr operty between the petitioner and respondent. It also decreed the sepa r a t ion of pr oper t ies between them and ordered the equal partition of personal properties located within the country, ex cluding those acquired by gratuitous title du ring the marriage. With regar d t o t h e A n t ipolo pr operty, the court held that it was acquired using pa r a ph er n a l fu n ds of t h e r espon den t . However, it ruled that respondent cannot recov er his funds because the property was purchased in v iola t ion of Sect ion 7 , A r t icle X II of t h e Con st it u t ion . However, pursuant t o Article 92 of the Family Code, properties acquired by gratuit ou s t it le by either spouse during the marriage shall be excluded from the community pr oper t y . T h e r ea l pr operty, therefore, inherited by respondent-petitioner in Ger m a n y is ex clu ded fr om t h e a bsolute community of property of the herein spouses. Necessarily, the proceeds of t h e sa le of sa id real property as well as the personal properties purchased thereby, belong exclusively to the r espondent-petitioner. However, the part of that inheritance used by the respondent-petit ion er for acquiring the house and lot in this country cannot be recovered by the respondent-petitioner, it s acquisition being a violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution which provides t h a t "sa v e in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed ex cept t o individuals, corporations or associations qualified to acqu ir e or h old la n ds of t h e pu blic dom ain." The law will leave the parties in the situation where they are in without prejudice t o a v olu n t a r y pa r t it ion by t h e pa r t ies of t h e sa id r ea l pr oper t y . Hence, as regards the property situated in Antipolo and the improvements thereon , t h e Cou r t sh a ll n ot m a ke a n y pr on ou n cem en t on con st it u t ion a l g r ou n ds. Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered the assailed decision m odify in g t h e trial court‘s Decision. It held that respondent merely prayed for r eim bu r sem en t for t h e pu rchase of the Antipolo property, and not acquisition or transfer of ownership t o h im . It a lso con sidered petitioner‘s ownership over the property in trust for the respondent. As rega r ds t h e h ouse, the Court of Appeals ruled that there is nothing in the Con st it u t ion w h ich pr oh ibit s r espon den t fr om a cqu ir in g t h e sa m e. Issu e W h ether or not the respondent is entitled to reimbursement of the amount used to purchase the la n d a s w ell a s t h e cost s for t h e con st r u ct ion of t h e h ou se. Held T h e Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust was created a n d r esulted by operation of law in view of petitioner ‘s m a r r ia g e t o r espon den t . Sa v e for t h e ex ception provided in cases of hereditary succession, respondent‘s disqualification from ownin g la nds in the Philippines is absolute. Not even an ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, w h er e t h e purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no

In v oking the principle that a court is not only a court of law but also a court of equity is likew ise m isplaced. He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come w it h clean hands. Thus, in the instant case, respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equ ity where it is clear that he willingly and kn ow in g ly bou g h t t h e pr oper t y despit e t h e con st it u t ion a l pr oh ibit ion . Fu rther, the distinction made between transfer of ownership as opposed to recovery of funds is a fu tile exercise on respondent‘s part. To allow reimbursement would in effect permit responden t t o en joy t h e fr u it s of a pr oper t y w h ich h e is n ot a llow ed t o ow n . In v iew of the foregoing, t h e Cou r t or der ed t h e Decision of t h e Cou r t of A ppea ls t o be REV ERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court t erminating the regime of a bsolute community between the petitioner and respondent, decreeing a separation of propert y between them and ordering the partition of the personal properties l ocated in t h e Ph ilippin es equ a lly , is REINST A T ED.

Er l inda A. Agapay vs. Carlina (Cornelia) V. Pala n g a n d Her m i n i a P. Del a Cr u z 2 7 6 SCRA 3 4 1 Fa ct s Mig uel Palang contracted his first marriage with private r espon den t Ca r lin a (or Cor n elia ) V allesterol in 1 949. A few months after the wedding, he left to work in Hawaii. The tria l cou r t fou nd evidence that as early as 1957, Miguel had attempted t o div or ce Ca r lin a in Ha w a ii. On July 15, 1 973, the then sixty-three-year-old Miguel contracted his secon d m a r r ia g e w it h n ineteen-year-old Erlinda Agapay, herein petitioner. Two months earlier , on Ma y 1 7 , 1 9 7 3 , Mig uel and Erlinda, as evidenced by the Deed of Sale, jointly purchased a parcel of agricult u r a l la nd located in Pangasinan. Consequently, a Transfer Certificate of T itle covering said rice la n d w a s issu ed in t h eir n a m es. A h ouse and lot in Pangasinan was likewise purchased on September 23, 1 9 7 5 , a lleg edly by Er linda as the sole vendee. A Transfer Certificate of Title covering said property was later issued in h er n a m e. On October 30, 1 975, Miguel and Cornelia Palang executed a Deed of Don a t ion a s a for m of com prom ise agreement to settle and end a case filed by the latter. The parties therein agreed t o don ate their conjugal property consisting of six parcels of land to their only ch ild, Her m in ia Pa la n g . Mig uel and Erlinda‘s cohabitation produced a son, Kristopher A. Palang. In 1979, Mig u el a n d Er linda were convicted of Concubinage upon Carlina‘s complaint and two yea r s la t er , Mig u el died. On July 11, 1 981, Carlina Palang and her daughter Herminia Palang de la Cruz, her ein pr iv a t e r espondents, instituted an action for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against pet itioner before the Regional Trial Court. Private respondents sought to get back the r icela n d a n d the house and lot allegedly purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation w it h pet it ion er . Pet itioner, as defendant below, contended that while the riceland is registered in t h eir n a m es (Miguel and Erlinda), she had already given her half of the property t o t h eir son Kr ist oph er Pa lang. She added that the house and lot is her sole property, having bought the same with h er ow n money. Er linda added that Carlina is precluded from claiming aforesaid proper t ies sin ce t h e la t t er h a d a lr ea dy don a t ed t h eir con ju g a l est a t e t o Her m in ia .

A fter trial on the merits, the lower court rendered its decision dismissing the com pla in t a ft er declaring that there was little evidence to prove that the subject pr oper t ies per t a in ed t o t h e con ju g a l pr oper t y of Ca r lin a a n d Mig u el Pa la n g . On appeal, respondent court reversed the trial court‘s decision. The Court of Appeals decla r ed t h e plaintiffs-appellants as the owners of the riceland and the house and lot allegedly purcha sed by Mig u el du r in g h is coh a bit a t ion w it h defen da n t a ppellee. Issu e W h ether or not petitioner can be considered as the rightful co-owner of th e r icela n d a n d t h e h ou se a n d lot . Held T h e Court held that under Article 148 of the Family Code, providing for cases of coh a bit a t ion w hen a man and a woman who are not capacitated t o marry each other live exclusively with each ot h er as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marria g e, on ly t h e pr operties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint con t r ibu t ion of m on ey , pr operty or industry shall be owned by them in common in pr opor t ion t o t h eir r espect iv e con tributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision . If t h e a ctual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equ a l sh a r es. In t he case at bar, Erlinda tried t o establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the busin ess of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store but failed to persuade t h e Cou r t t h a t sh e a ct u a lly con tributed money to buy the subject riceland. W orth noting is t h e fa ct t h a t on t h e da t e of conveyance, May 17, 1973, petitioner was only around twenty years of age and Miguel Palang was a lready sixty-four and a pensioner of the U.S. Government. Considering her youthfuln ess, it is u nrealistic to conclude that in 1973 she contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase price of su bject pr oper t y , t h er e bein g n o pr oof of t h e sa m e. Pet itioner again claims that the riceland was bought two months befor e Mig u el a n d Er lin da a ctually cohabited. In the nature of an afterthought, said a dded a sser t ion w a s in t en ded t o ex clude their case from the operation of Article 148 of the Family Code. Proof of the precise date w hen they commenced their adulterous cohabitation not having been adduced, the Court cannot st ate definitively that the riceland was purchased even before they started living t ogether. In any ca se, even assuming that the subject property was bought before cohabitation, t h e r u les of coow nership would still apply and proof of actual contribution wou ld st ill be essen t ia l. Sin ce pet itioner failed t o prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the ricela n d, t h e Court finds no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same. Consequent ly , t h e r iceland should revert t o the conjugal partnership property of the deceased Miguel and pr iv a t e r espon den t Ca r lin a Pa la n g . W ith respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for P20,000.0 0 on w h en sh e was only 22 years old. The testimony of the n ot a r y pu blic w h o pr epa r ed t h e deed of conveyance for the property reveals the falsehood of this cla im . A t t y . Con st a n t in o Sa g u n t estified that Miguel Palang provided the money for the pu r ch a se pr ice a n d dir ect ed t h a t Er lin da ‘s n a m e a lon e be pla ced a s t h e v en dee. T h e transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was clea r ly v oid and inexistent by express provision of law because it was made between person s g u ilt y of a dultery or concubin a g e a t t h e t im e of t h e don a t ion , u n der A r t icle 7 3 9 of t h e Civ il Code. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition a g a in st don ations between spouses now applies to donation s bet w een per son s liv in g t og et h er a s h u sba n d a n d w ife w it h ou t a v a lid m a r r ia g e.

Gu illerma T u m l os vs . Spou ses Ma r i o Fer n a n dez a n d Lou r des Fer n a n dez 3 3 0 SCRA 7 1 8 Fa ct s Herein respondents were the plaintiffs in an act ion for eject m en t filed befor e t h e MT C of V alenzuela against herein Petitioner Guillerma Tumlos, T oto Tumlos, and Gina Tumlos. In their com plaint, the said spouses alleged that they are the absolute owners of an apartment bu ildin g located at ARTE SUBDIVISION III; that through tolerance they had allowed t h e defen da n t s pr ivate respondents to occupy the apartment building for the last seven (7) yea r s w it h ou t t h e payment of any rent; that it was agreed upon that after a few month s, defen da n t Gu iller m a T umlos will pay P1,600.00 a month while the other defendants prom ised to pay P1 ,0 0 0 .0 0 a m onth, both as rental, which agreement was not complied with by the said defendants; that they h ave demanded several times for the defendants t o vacate the premises, as they a r e in n eed of t h e property for the construction of a new building; and that they have also demanded paymen t of P8 4,000.00 from Toto and Gina Tumlos representing rentals for seven (7) years and payment of P1 43,600.00 from Guillerma Tumlos as unpaid rentals for sev en (7 ) y ea r s, bu t t h e sa id dem a n ds w en t u n h eeded. Pet itioner Guillerma Tumlos was the only one who filed an answer to the complaint. She averred t h erein that the Fernandez spouses had no cause of action against her, since she is a co-owner of t h e subject premises as evidenced by a Contract to Sell wherein it was sta t ed t h a t sh e is a cov endee of the property in question t ogether with Respondent Mario Fernandez. Thus, she asked for t h e dism issa l of t h e com pla in t . A fter an unfruitful preliminary conference, the MTC r equ ir ed t h e pa r t ies t o su bm it t h eir a ffidavits and other evidence on the factual issues defined in their pleadings within ten (10) days fr om r eceipt of su ch or der a n d t h er ea ft er pr om u lg a t ed i t s ju dg m en t . Upon appeal to the RTC, petitioner and the two other defendants alleged in their memorandu m on a ppeal that Respondent Mario Fernandez a n d Pet it ion er Gu iller m a h a d a n a m or ou s r elationship, and that they acquired the property in question as their ‗love nest.‘ It wa s fu r t h er a lleged that they lived together in the said apartment building with their tw o (2 ) ch ildr en for a r ound ten (10) years, and that Guillerma administered the property by collecting renta ls fr om t h e lessees of the other apartments, until she discovered that Respondent Mario deceived her a s t o t h e a n n u lm en t of h is m a r r ia g e. In t he same memorandum, petitioner and the two other defendants further averred that it w a s on ly recently that Toto Tumlos was temporarily accomm oda t ed in on e of t h e r oom s of t h e su bject premises while Gina Tumlos acted as a nanny for the children. In short, their pr esen ce t h er e w a s on ly t r a n sien t a n d t h ey w er e n ot t en a n t s of t h e Fer n a n dez spou ses. T h e RTC subsequently rendered a decision a ffir m in g in t ot o t h e ju dg m en t of t h e MT C. T h e petitioner and the two other defendants filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that t h e decision of affirmance by the RTC was constitutionally flawed for failing t o point out dist in ct ly a n d clearly the findings of facts and law on which it was based vis-à-vis the statements of issu es t h ey have raised in their memorandum on appeal. They also averred that the Con t r a ct t o Sell pr esented by the plaintiffs which named the buyer as ‗Mario P. Fernandez, of legal age, marr ied t o Lourdes P. Fernandez,‘ should not be given credence as it was falsified to appea r t h a t w a y . A ccording to them, the Contract to Sell originally named ‗Guillerma Fernandez‘ as the spouse of Respondent Mario. As found by the RTC in its judgment, a new Contract to Sell wa s issu ed by t h e sellers naming the respondents as the buyers after the lat t er pr esen t ed t h eir m a r r ia g e con tract and requested a change in the name of the vendee-wife. Su ch fa ct s n ecessit a t e t h e con clusion that Guillerma was really a co-owner thereof, and that the respondents manipula t ed t h e evidence in order to deprive her of her rights to enjoy and use the property as recognized by la w .

T h e RTC subsequently ruled that the Contract to Sell submit t ed by t h e Fer n a n dez spou ses a ppeared not to be authentic, as there was an alteration in the name of the wife of Respon den t Ma r io Fernandez. Hence, the contract presented by the respondents cannot be given any weight. T h e court further ruled that Guillerma and Respondent Mario acquired the property during their cohabitation as husband and wife, although without the benefit of marriage. From such findings, t h e court concluded that Petitioner Guillerma Tumlos was a co-owner of the subject pr oper t y a n d cou ld n ot be eject ed t h er efr om . T h e CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The CA ruled that from the inception of t h e in st a n t ca se, the only defense presented by private respondent Guillerma is her right a s a co-ow n er of t h e subject property, which was not satisfactorily proven by Guillerma. It was only on appeal that Gu illerma alleged that she cohabited with the pet it ion er -h u sba n d w it h ou t t h e ben efit of m arriage, and that she bore him two (2) children. Attached to her memorandum on appea l a r e t h e birth certificates of the said children. Such contentions and documents should not have been con sidered by the RTC, as they were not presented in her affidavit/posit ion pa per befor e t h e MT C. Ev en if the said allegations and documents could be considered, the claim of co-ownership m ust still fail as Respondent Mario Fernandez is v a lidly m a r r ied t o Respon den t Lou r des Fernandez as per Marriage Contract. Guillerma and Mario are not capacitated t o m a r r y ea ch ot h er. Thus, the property relations governing their supposed cohabitation is that found in Article 1 48 of the Family Code. It is clear that actual contribution is required by this provision. Hence, if a ctual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equ a l sh a r es. In t he instant case, no proof of actual contribution by Guillerma Tumlos in the purch a se of t h e su bject property was presented. Her only evidence was her being named in the Contract t o Sell a s the wife of Respondent Mario Fernandez. Since she failed t o pr ov e t h a t sh e con t r ibu t ed m oney to the purchase price of the subject apartment building, the Court finds no basis to justify h er co-ownership with Respondent Mario. The said property is thus presumed to belong t o t h e con jugal partnership property of Mario and Lourdes Fernandez, it being acquir ed du r in g t h e su bsist en c e of t h eir m a r r ia g e a n d t h er e bein g n o ot h er pr oof t o t h e con t r a r y . T h e RTC also found that Respondent Mario has two (2) children with Guillerma who are in h er cu stody, and that to eject them from the apartment building would be to run count er w it h t h e obligation of the former to give support to his minor illegitimate children, which indispen sa bly in cludes dwelling. Such finding has no leg to stand on, it being based on evidence present ed for t h e fir st t im e on a ppea l. Ev en assuming arguendo that the said evidence was v a lidly pr esen t ed, t h e RT C fa iled t o con sider that the need for support cannot be presumed. Article 203 of the Family Code expressly pr ov ides that the obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the per son w h o h a s a right to receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from t h e da t e of ju dicia l or ex t r a ju dicia l dem a n d. Issu es W h ether or not the petitioner is a co-owner of the property pursuant to Article 148 of the Family Code. W h eth er or n ot t h e pet it ion er ‘s cla im for su ppor t ba r t h e su bject eject m en t su it . Held On the first issue, the Court held that it cannot accept petitioner‘s submission th a t sh e is a coow ner of the disputed property pursuant to Article 144 of the Civil Code. As correctly held by the CA , the applicable law is not Article 144 of the Civil Code, but Article 148 of t h e Fa m ily Code. Un der Article 148 of the Family Code, a man and a woman, who are not legally ca pa cit a t ed t o m arry each other, but who nonetheless live together conjugally, may be deemed co-own er s of a pr operty acquired during the coha bit a t ion on ly u pon pr oof t h a t ea ch m a de a n a ct u a l con tribution to its acquisition. Hence, mere cohabitation without proof of contribution w ill n ot r esu lt in a co-ow n er sh ip.

A rticle 1 44 of the Civil Code applies only to a relationship between a man and a woman, who ar e n ot incapacitated t o marry each other, or t o one in which the marriage of the parties is void from t h e beginning. It does not apply to a cohabitation that amounts to adultery or concubinage, for it w ould be absurd to create a co-ownership where there exists a prior conju g a l pa r t n er sh ip or a bsolu t e com m u n it y bet w een t h e m a n a n d h is la w fu l w ife. Ba sed on evidence presented by respondents, as well as those submitted by pet it ion er h er self before the RTC, it is clear that Mario Fernandez was incapacitated t o marry petitioner beca u se h e was legally married t o Lourdes Fernandez. It is also clea r t h a t , a s r ea dily a dm it t ed by pet itioner, she cohabited with Mario in a state of concubinage. Therefore, Article 144 of the Civil Code is in a pplica ble. In t his case, petitioner fails t o present any evidence that she had made an actual contribution t o pu rchase the subject property. Likewise, her claim of having administered the property du r in g t h e cohabitation is unsubstantiated and in any event, this fact by itself does not justify her claim, for nothing in Article 148 of the Family Code provides that the administration of t h e pr oper t y a m ounts t o a contribution in its acquisition. Clearly, there is no basis for petitioner‘s claim of coow nership. The property in question belongs t o the conjugal partnership of respondents. Hence, t h e MTC and the CA were correct in ordering the ejectment of petitioner fr om t h e pr em ises. On the second issue, the Court disagree with the petitioner that the children‘s right t o su ppor t , w hich necessarily includes shelter, prevails ov er the right of respondents to eject her. The Court em phasized that the case at bar is an ejectment suit whereby respondents seek to exercise t h eir possessory right ov er their property. It is summary in character and deals solely with the issue of possession of the property in dispute and it has been shown that they h a v e a bet t er r ig h t t o possess it than does the petitioner, whose right t o possess is based merely on t h eir t oler a n ce. Fu rther, Article 298 of the Civil Code expressly provides that the obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who ha s a r ig h t t o r eceiv e t h e sa m e n eed it for m aintenance, but it shall not be paid except fr om t h e da t e of ju dicia l a n d ex t r a ju dicia l dem a n d. In t h is ca se, n on e w a s m a de.

Eu st a qu io Ma l l il in v s. Ma . El v i r a Ca st i l l o 3 3 3 SCRA 6 2 8 Fa ct s On February 24, 1993, petitioner Eustaquio Mallilin, Jr. filed a com plaint for "Partition a n d/or Pay ment of Co-Ownership Share, Accounting and Damages" against r espon den t Ma . Elv ir a Ca stillo. The com plaint alleged that petitioner and respondent, both married and with children , bu t separated from their respective spouses, cohabited after a brief courtship sometime in 19 7 9 w hile their respective marriages still subsisted. During their union, they set up the Superfreig h t Cu stoms Brokerage Corporation, with petitioner as president and ch a ir m a n of t h e boa r d of dir ectors, and respondent as vice-president a n d t r ea su r er . T h e bu sin ess flou r ish ed a n d pet itioner and respondent acquired real and personal properties which were registered solely in r espondent's name. In 1992, due t o irreconcilable differences, the couple separated. Pet it ion er dem anded from respondent his share in the subject properties, but respondent refused alleg in g t h a t sa id pr oper t ies h a d been r eg ist er ed solely in h er n a m e. In h er Amended Answer, respondent admitted that she engag ed in t h e cu st om s br oker a g e bu siness with petitioner but alleged that the Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporat ion w a s or ganized with other individuals and duly r eg ist er ed w it h t h e Secu r it ies a n d Ex ch a n g e Commission in 1987. She denied that she and petitioner lived as husband and wife beca u se t h e fa ct was that they were still legally married to their respective spouses. She cla im ed t o be t h e ex clusive owner of all real personal properties involved in petitioner's action for partition on th e g r ound that they were acquired entirely out of her own money and registered solely in her name.

On November 25, 1994, respondent filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, in accordance w it h Ru le 34 of the Rules of Court. She contended that summary judgment was proper, beca u se t h e issu es r a ised in t h e plea din g s w er e sh a m a n d n ot g en u in e.

v oid ab initio, provided it is not bigamous, ther efor e, does n ot cov er pa r t ies liv in g in a n a dulterous relationship. Art. 1 48 of the Family Code, h ow ev er , pr ov ides for a lim it ed co ow nership in cases where the parties in u n ion a r e in ca pa cit a t ed t o m a r r y ea ch ot h er .

T h e respondent contended that even if she and petitioner actually cohabited, pet it ion er cou ld n ot validly claim a part of the subject real and personal properties because Art. 144 of t h e Civ il Code, which provides that the rules on co-ownership shall govern the properties acqu ir ed by a m an and a woman living together as husband and wife but not married, or un der a m a r r ia g e w hich is void ab initio, applies only if the parties are not in any way incapacita t ed t o con t r a ct m arriage. In the parties' case, their union suffered the legal impediment of a pr ior su bsist in g m arriage. Thus, the question of fact being raised by petitioner, i.e., whether they lived t og et h er a s husband and wife, was irrelevant as no co-ownership could exist between t h em . Fu r t h er , r espondent maintained that petitioner cannot be considered an unregister ed co-ow n er of t h e su bject properties on the ground that, since titles t o the land are solely in her n a m e, t o g r a n t pet itioner's prayer would be to a llow a colla t er a l a t t a ck on t h e v a lidit y of su ch t it les.

It w as error for the trial court to rule that, because the parties in this case were not capacitated to m arry each other at the time that they were alleged t o have been living together, they cou ld n ot h ave owned properties in common. The Family Code, in a ddit ion t o pr ov idin g t h a t a coow nership exists between a man and a woman who live t ogether as husband and w ife w it h ou t t h e benefit of marriage, likewise provides that, if the parties are incapacitat ed t o m a r r y ea ch ot h er, properties acquired by them through their joint contribu t ion of m on ey , pr oper t y or in dustry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their contributions which , in t h e a bsence of proof t o the contrary, is presumed t o be equal. Ther e is t h u s co-ow n er sh ip ev en t h ou g h t h e cou ples a r e n ot ca pa cit a t ed t o m a r r y ea ch ot h er .

Pet itioner opposed respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. 8 He contended that t h e ca se pr esented genuine factual issues and that Art. 144 of the Civil Code had been r epea led by t h e Fam ily Code which now allows, under Art. 148, a limited co-ownership even though a man and a w om an living together are not capacitated to marry each other. Petitioner also asserted t h a t a n im plied trust was constituted when he and respondent agreed to register the properties solely in t h e latter's name although the same were acquired out of the profits made from their broker a g e bu sin ess. Pet it ion er in v oked A r t icles 1 4 5 2 a n d 1 4 5 3 of t h e Civ il Code. On January 30, 1995, the trial court rendered its decision grantin g r espon den t 's m ot ion for sum mary judgment. It ruled that an examination of the pleadings shows that the issues involved w ere purely legal. The trial court also sustained respondent's contention that petitioner's act ion for partition amounted to a collateral attack on the validity of the certificates of title covering the su bject properties. It held that ev en if the parties really had cohabited, the action for pa r t it ion cou ld not be allowed because an action for partition a m on g co-ow n er s cea ses t o be so a n d becomes one for title if the defendant, as in the present case, alleges exclusive ownership of t h e pr oper t ies in qu est ion . For t h ese r ea son s, t h e t r ia l cou r t dism issed Ca se. On appeals, the Court of Appeals, ordered the case remanded to the court of origin for t r ia l on t h e merits. It cited the decision in Roque v. Intermediate Appellate Court to the effect t h a t a n a ction for partition is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation a n d conveyance of a determinate portion of the proper t ies in v olv ed. If t h e defen d a n t a sser t s ex clusive title ov er the property, the action for partition should not be dismissed. Ra t h er , t h e court should resolve the case and if the plaintiff is unable to sustain his claimed st a t u s a s a coow ner, the court should dismiss the action, not because the wrong remedy was av a iled of, bu t because no basis exists for requiring the defendant to submit to partition. Resolv in g t h e issu e w hether petitioner's action for partition was a collateral attack on the validity of the certifica t es of t itle, the Court of Appeals held that since petitioner sought to com pel respondent t o ex ecu t e documents necessary t o effect transfer of what he claimed was his sha r e, pet it ion er w a s n ot a ctually attacking the validity of the titles but in fact, recognized their v a li dit y . Fin a lly , t h e a ppellate court upheld petitioner's position that Art. 144 of the Civil Code had been repealed by A r t . 1 4 8 of t h e Fa m ily Code. Respondent moved for reconsideration of the decision of Court of Appeals. Subsequ en t ly , t h e Court of Appea ls g r a n t ed r espon den t 's m ot ion a n d r ev er sed it s pr ev iou s decision . Issu e W h ether or not the fact that the petitioner and respondent in deed coh a bit ed is m a t er ia l t o det er m in e co-ow n er sh ip of pr oper t ies bet w een t h e pa r t ies. Held T h e Court held that although Art. 144 of the Civil Code, applies only to cases in which a man and a w oman live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage provided they are not in capacitated or are without impediment to marry each other, or in w h ich t h e m a r r ia g e is

In t his case, there may be a co-ownership between the parties. Consequently, whether petitioner a n d respondent cohabited and whether the properties involved in the case are part of the alleged co-ownership, are genuine and material. All but one of the properties involved wer e a lleg ed t o h ave been acquired after the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1 988 . W it h r espect t o t h e pr operty acquired before the Family Code took effect if it is shown that it was r ea ll y a cqu ir ed u n der t h e r eg im e of t h e Civ il Code, t h en it sh ou ld be ex clu ded.

El n a Mer ca do-Feh r v s. Br u n o Feh r OCT OBER 2 3 , 2 0 0 3 Fa ct s T h is case arose from a petition for decla r a t ion of n u llit y of m a r r ia g e on t h e g r ou n d of psy chological incapacity to com ply with the essential marital obligations under Article 36 of t h e Fam ily Code filed by petitioner Elna Mercado-Fehr against respondent Bruno Feh r befor e t h e Reg ion a l T r ia l Cou r t of Ma ka t i in Ma r ch 1 9 9 7 . A fter due proceedings, the trial court declared the marriage between petitioner and respon den t v oid ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code and ordered the dissolution of their con ju g a l pa rtnership of property. Custody ov er the two minor childr en w a s a w a r ded t o pet it ion er . A fter a careful scrutiny of the inventory of properties submitted by both parties, the Court fin ds t h e follow in g pr oper t ies t o be ex clu ded fr om t h e con ju g a l pr oper t ies: a ) The Bacolod property, considering that the same is ow n ed by pet it ion er ‘s pa r en t s; a n d b) Suite 204 of the LCG Condom inium, considering that the same was purchased on installment ba sis by respondent with his exclusive funds prior to his marriage, as evidenced by a Contract t o Sell da t ed Ju ly 2 6 , 1 9 8 3 . In v iew of the above decision, Suite 204, LCG Condom inium w a s decla r ed t h e EX CLUSIV E PROPERTY of respondent. Accordingly, petitioner was directed to transfer ownership of Su it e 2 0 4 in t h e n a m e of r espon den t . T h e Petitioner and Respondent are further enjoined to jointly support their m in or ch ildr en , Michael and Patrick Fehr, for t h eir edu ca t ion , u n ifor m s, food a n d m edica l ex pen ses. Pet itioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said Order with respect to th e a dju dica t ion of Su ite 204, LCG Condominium and the support of the children. Petitioner alleged that Suite 20 4 w as purchased on installment basis at the time when petitioner and r espon den t w er e liv in g ex clusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, hence the rules on co-ownership sh ou ld a pply in a ccor da n ce w it h A r t icle 1 4 7 of t h e Fa m ily Code. Resolving said motion, the trial court held that since the mar r ia g e bet w een pet it ion er a n d r espondent was declared void ab intio, the rules on co-ownership should apply in the liquidation

a n d partition of the properties they own in common pursuant to Article 147 of the Family Code. T h e court, however, affirmed its previous ruling that Suit e 2 0 4 of LCG Con dom in iu m w a s a cquired prior t o the couple‘s cohabitation and ther efor e per t a in ed solely t o r espon den t .

t hat the property regime of the parties should be divided in accor da n ce w it h t h e la w on coow n er sh ip.

Pet itioner filed a notice of appeal questioning the order of the t r ia l cou r t bu t su bsequ en t ly w ithdrew the notice and instead filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with the Cou r t of A ppea ls, qu est ion in g t h e fin din g s of t h e t r ia l cou r t .

Ja cinto Saguid vs. Hon. Court Of Appeals, The Regional Trial Cou r t , Br a n ch 94, Boa c, Ma r in du qu e a n d Gi n a S. Rey JUNE 1 0 , 2 0 0 3

T h e Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of mer it . Pet it ion er filed a m otion for reconsideration of said Decision, which was also den ied by t h e a ppella t e cou r t .

Fa ct s Gina S. Rey was married, but separated de facto from her husband, when sh e m et pet it ion er Ja cinto Saguid som etime in July 1987. After a brief courtship, the tw o decided t o coh a bit a s h usband and wife in a house built on a lot owned by Jacinto‘s father. Jacinto made a liv in g a s t h e patron of their fishing vessel ―Saguid Brothers.‖ Gina, on the other hand, wor ked a s a fish dea ler, but decided to work as an entertainer in Japan from 1992 to 1994. In 1996 , t h e cou ple decided t o sepa r a t e.

Issu e W h ether or not Suite 204 of LCG Condominiu m sh ou ld be g ov er n ed by t h e r u les on co ow nership and what rules should be applied in the settlem en t of t h e com m on pr oper t ies? Held It a ppears from the facts, as found by the trial court, that in March 1983, after two years of long distance courtship, petitioner left Cebu City and moved in w it h r espon den t in t h e la t t er ‘s r esidence in Metro Manila. Their relations bore fruit and their first child, Michael Bru n o Feh r , w as born on December 3, 1 983. The couple got married on March 14, 1985. In t h e m ea n t im e, t h ey purchased on installment a condominium unit, Suit e 2 0 4 , a t LCG Con dom in iu m , a s ev idenced by a Contract to Sell dated July 26, 1 983 executed by respondent as the buyer and J.V. Sa ntos Commercial Corporation as the seller. Petitioner also signed the con t r a ct a s w it n ess, u sing the name "Eln a Mer ca do Feh r ". Upon com plet ion of pa y m en t , t h e t it le t o t h e con dom in iu m u n it w a s issu ed in t h e n a m e of pet it ion er . In light of these facts, the Court gave more credence to petitioner‘s submission tha t Su it e 2 0 4 w as acquired during the parties‘ cohabitation. Accordingly, under Article 147 of the Family Code, sa id property should be governed by the rules on co-ownership. Article 147 applies to union s of pa rties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, bu t w hose marriage is nonetheless void, as in the case at bar. This provision creates a co-owner sh ip w it h r espect t o t h e pr oper t ies t h ey a cqu ir e du r in g t h eir coh a bit a t ion . T h is peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a m a n a n d a w om a n , su ffer in g n o leg a l im pediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a v oid m arriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the first pa ragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a party t o contract marriage, i.e., any "m a le or fem ale of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments ment ion ed in A r t icle 3 7 a n d 3 8 " of t h e Code. Un der this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry sh all be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is pr ima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A pa r t y w h o did n ot pa rticipate in the acquisition of the property shall still be considered a s h a v i n g con t r ibu t ed t h ereto jointly if said party‘s "efforts consisted in the car e a n d m a in t en a n ce of t h e fa m ily h ou seh old." T hus, for Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry ea ch ot h er; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void. All these elements are present in the case at bar . It h a s not been shown that petitioner and respondent suffered any impedim en t t o m a r r y ea ch ot h er. They lived exclusively with each other as husband and wife when petitioner moved in with r espondent in his residence and were later united in marriage. Their marriage, h ow ev er , w a s fou nd to be void under Article 36 of the Family Code because of r espon den t ‘ s psy ch olog ica l in ca pa cit y t o com ply w it h essen t ia l m a r it a l oblig a t ion s. T h e disputed property, Suite 204 of LCG Condominium, was purchased on installment basis on Ju ly 26, 1 983, at the time when petitioner and respondent were already living together. Hence, it sh ould be considered as common property of petitioner and respondent. Further, the Court held

On January 9, 1997, private respondent filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery of Persona l Pr operty with Receivership against the pet it ion er . Sh e a lleg ed t h a t fr om h er sa la r y a s en tertainer in Japan, she was able to contribu t e P7 0 ,0 0 0 .0 0 in t h e com plet ion of t h eir u nfinished house. Also, from her own earnings as an entertainer and fish dealer, she was able t o a cquire and accumulate appliances, pieces of furniture and household effects, with a t otal va lu e of P1 11,375.00. She prayed that she be declared the sole owner of these personal properties a n d t hat the amount of P70,000.00, representing her contribution t o the construction of their house, be r eim bu r sed t o h er . Pr ivate respondent stated that she had a total of P35,465.00 share in the joint accou n t deposit w hich she and the petitioner maintained. Gina declared that said deposits wer e spen t for t h e pu r ch a se of con st r u ct ion m a t er ia ls, a pplia n ces a n d ot h er per son a l pr oper t ies. Pet itioner, on the other hand, claimed that the expenses for the construction of their house were defrayed solely from his incom e. He averred that private respondent‘s meag er in com e a s fish dea ler rendered her unable to contribute in the construction of said house. Petition er fu r t h er con tended that Gina did not work continuously in Japan from 1992 t o 1994. When their h ou se w as repaired and improved sometime in 1 995-1 996, private respondent did n ot sh a r e in t h e ex penses because her earnings as entertainer were spent on the daily needs and business of h er pa rents. Petitioner further claimed that his savings from his incom e in the fishing business were t h e on es u sed in pu r ch a sin g t h e dispu t ed per son a l pr oper t ies. T h e respondent was allowed to present ev idence ex parte after t h e t r ia l cou r t decla r ed t h e pet itioner as in default for failure t o file a pr e -t r ia l br ief. Pet it ion er filed a m ot ion for r econsideration but was denied. Subsequently, a decision was rendered in favor of the pr iv a t e r espon den t . On appeal, said decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals except for the a w a r d for m or a l da m a g es. Issu e W hat provision of the Family Code shall governed the property regime of t h e pet it ion er a n d pr iv a t e r espon den t ? Held T h e Court held that the property regime of Jacinto and Gina, who was validly married to another m an at the t ime of her cohabitation with the former, should be gov erned by Article 1 4 8 of t h e Fam ily Code, as it applies to adulterous relationships and under this r eg im e, pr oof of a ct u a l con t r ibu t ion is r equ ir ed. In t he case at bar, although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1987, which is before the date of the effectivity of the Family Code, Article 1 4 8 st ill a pplies beca u se t h is pr ov ision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of t h e Civ il Code. Befor e

A rticle 1 48 of the Family Code was enacted, there was no provision governing property relation s of cou ples living in a state of adultery or concubinage. Hence, even if the coh a bit a t ion or t h e a cquisition of the property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 1 4 8 g ov er n s. In t he case at bar, the controversy cen t er s on t h e h ou se a n d per son a l pr oper t ies of t h e pa rties. Private respondent alleged in her complaint that she contributed P7 0,0 0 0 .0 0 for t h e com pletion of their house. However, nowhere in her testimony did she specify the extent of her con tribution. What appears in the recor d a r e r eceipt s in h er n a m e for t h e pu r ch a se of con st r u ct ion m a t er ia ls in t h e t ot a l a m ou n t of P1 1 ,4 1 3 .0 0 .

sin ce it was based upon a ground which was not passed upon by the trial court. That petitioner s‘ claim for damages was barred by prescription with respect t o claims before 1984; that there were n o r entals due since private respondent Hontiveros was a possessor in good faith and for va lu e; a n d that private respondent Ayson had nothing to do with the case as she wa s n ot m a r r ied t o pr ivate respondent Gregorio Hontiveros and did not have any proprietary interest in the subject pr operty. Private respondents prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and for an order against pet itioners to pay damages t o priva t e r espon den t s by w a y of cou n t er cla im , a s w ell a s r econ v ey a n ce of t h e su bject la n d t o pr iv a t e r espon den t .

On the other hand, both parties claim that the money used to purchase the dispu t ed per son a l pr operties came partly from their joint account. While there is no question t h a t bot h pa r t ies con tributed in their joint account deposit, there is, however, no sufficien t pr oof of t h e ex a ct a m ount of their respective shares therein. Pursuant t o Article 148 of the Fam ily Code, in t h e a bsence of proof of extent of the parties‘ respective contribution, their share shall be presumed to be equal. Here, the disputed personal properties were valued at P111,375.00, the existence a n d v alue of which were not questioned by the petitioner. Hence, their share therein is equivalent t o on e-h a lf, w h ich is P 5 5 ,6 8 7 .5 0 ea ch .

Issu e: W h ether or not the RTC palpably erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground t h a t it does n ot allege under oath that earnest efforts toward a comprom ise were m a de pr ior t o filin g a s r equ ir ed by A r t . 1 5 1 of FC.

On the basis of the evidence established, the extent of private respondent‘s co-owner sh ip ov er t h e disputed house is only up to the amount of P11,413.00, h er pr ov en con t r ibu t ion in t h e con struction thereof. While for the personal properties, her participation should be limited only t o t h e a m ou n t of P5 5 ,6 8 7 .5 0 .

Mor eover, as petitioners contend, Art. 151 of the Family Code does not apply in th is ca se sin ce t h e suit is not exclusively among family members. Petitioners claim that whenever a stranger is a party in a case involving family m em ber s, t h e r equ isit e sh ow in g of ea r n est effor t s t o com prom ise is no longer mandatory. They argue th a t sin ce pr iv a t e r espon den t A y son is a dm ittedly a stranger to the Hontiveros family, the case is not covered by the r equ ir em en t s of A r t . 1 5 1 of t h e Fa m ily Code.

T HE FA MILY A S A N INST IT UT ION

Spou ses Augusto Hontiveros & Maria Hon t iv er os v s. RT C Br . 25, Il oil o Cit y & Spou ses Gr egor i o Hon t iv er os & T eodor a A y son G.R.No. 1 2 5 4 6 5 Ju n e 2 9 , 1 9 9 9 Fa ct s: Spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a com pla in t for da m a g es a g a in st pr iv a t e r espon den t s Gr eg or io Hon t iv er os a n d T eodor a A y son befor e t h e RT C Iloilo Cit y . Pet itioners alleged that they are the owners of a land located at the town of Jamindan, Prov ince of Ca piz, as shown by OCT No. 0-2124, issued pursuant to the decision of t h e In t er m edia t e A ppellate Court which modified decision of CFI Capiz, in a land registration case filed by private r espondent Gregorio Hontivero. Also, that they were deprived of incom e fr om t h e la n d a s a r esult of the filing of the land registration case. The income consisted of rentals from t ena n t s of t h e land in the amount of P66,000.00 per year from 1968 to 1987, and P5 95,000 .0 0 per y ea r t h ereafter; and that private respondents filed the land registration case and withheld possession of t h e la n d fr om pet it ion er s in ba d fa it h . Pr ivate respondents denied that they were marr ied a n d a lleg ed t h a t pr iv a t e r espon den t Hontiveros was a widower while private respondent Ayson was single. They denied t h a t t h ey h a d deprived petitioners of possession of and in com e fr om t h e la n d. T h ey a lleg ed t h a t possession of the property in question had already been transferred to petitioners on Aug u st 7 , 1 985, by virtue of a writ of possession, dated July 18, 1985, issued by the cler k of cou r t of t h e RT C Capiz, Mambusao, the return thereof having been received by petitioners‘ coun sel. Sin ce t h en, petitioners have been directly receiving rentals from the tenants of the land. The complaint fa iled t o state a cause of action since it did not allege that earnest efforts t owards a compr om ise h a d been made, considering that petitioner Augusto Hontiveros and private respondent Gregorio Hontiveros are brothers. The decision of the IAC in Land Registration Case was n u ll a n d v oid

Held: No. This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of com pr om ise u n der t h e Civ il Code.

W e agree with petitioners. The inclusion of priva t e r espon den t A y son a s defen da n t a n d pet itioner Maria Hontiveros as plaintiff takes the case out of the ambit of Art. 151 of the Fam ily Code. Under this provision, the phrase ―members of the same family‖ refers to the husband and w ife, parents and children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters, whether full or h a lf-blood. In Gayon v. Gayon, the enumeration of ―brothers and sisters‖ as members of the sa m e fa m ily does n ot com prehend ―sisters-in-law.‖ In that case, then Chief Justice Concepcion em ph a sized t hat ―sisters-in-law‖ (hence, also ―brothers-in-law‖) are not listed under Art. 217 of the New Civil Code as members of the same family. Since Art. 150 of the Family Code repeats essentially t h e sam e enumeration of ―members of the family,‖ we find no reason to alter existing jurispruden ce on t he mater. Consequently, the court a quo erred in ruling that petitioner Guer r er o, bein g a br other-in-law of private respondent Hernando, was required to exert earnest efforts towa r ds a com pr om ise befor e filin g t h e pr esen t su it . Religious relationship and relationship by affin it y a r e n ot g iv en a n y leg a l effect in t h is ju risdiction. Consequently, private respondent Ayson, who is described in the complaint a s t h e spou se of respondent Hontiveros, and petitioner Maria Hontiveros, who is admittedly the spouse of pet itioner Augusto Hontiveros, are considered str a n g er s t o t h e Hon t iv er os fa m ily , for pu r poses of A r t . 1 5 1 . Pet itioners finally question the constitutionality of Art. 151 of the Family Code on the ground that it in effect amends the Rules of Court. This, accordin g t o t h em , ca n n ot be don e sin ce t h e Con stitution reserves in favor of the Supreme Court the power t o prom ulgate rules of pleadin g s a n d procedure. Considering the conclusion we h a v e r ea ch ed in t h is ca se, h ow ev er , it is u nnecessary for present purposes t o pa ss u pon t h is qu est ion . Cou r t s do n ot pa ss u pon con st it u t ion a l qu est ion s u n less t h ey a r e t h e v er y lis m ota of t h e ca se.

Ga udencio Guerrero vs. RTC Ilocos Norte, Judge Lu is Bel l o & Pedr o Her n a n do G.R. No. 1 0 9 0 6 8 Ja n u a r y 1 0 , 1 9 9 4 Fa ct s: Filed by petitioner as an accion publicana against priva t e r espon den t , t h is ca se a ssu m e d a n other dimension when it was dismissed by respondent Judge on the ground that t h e pa r t ies being brother-in-law the complaint should have alleged that earnest efforts wer e fir st ex er t ed t ow a r ds a com pr om ise. A dm ittedly, the complaint does not allege that the parties exerted ea r n est effor t s t ow a r ds a com prom ise and that the same failed. However , pr iv a t e r espon den t Pedr o G. Her n a n do a pparently overlooked this alleged defect since he did not file any motion to dismiss nor a t t a ck t h e com plaint on this ground in his answer. It was only at the pre-tr ia l con fer en ce, t h a t t h e r elationship of petitioner Gaudencio Guerrero and Hernando was noted by respon den t Ju dg e Lu is B. Bello, Jr . Gu errero claims that since brothers by affinity are not members of the same family, he w a s n ot r equ ir ed t o ex er t effor t s t ow a r ds a com pr om ise. Issu e: W h ether brothers by affinity are considered members of the same family contemplat ed in A r t . 2 17, par. (4), and Art. 222 of the New Civil Code, as well as under Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16 , of t h e Ru les of Court requiring earnest efforts towards a compromise before a suit between them m a y be in st it u t ed a n d m a in t a in ed. Held: No. The reason for the requirement that earnest efforts at compromise be first exerted befor e a com plaint is given due course is because it is difficult t o imagin e a sa dder a n d m or e t r a g ic spectacle than a litigation between members of the same family. It is necessary that every effor t sh ould be made t oward a com promise before a litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in t h e family. It is known that a lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bit t er n ess t h a n between strangers. A litigation in a family is to be lamented far more than a la w su it bet w een st r a n g er s . In Gayon v. Gayon, the enumeration of brothers and sisters as members of the same family does n ot comprehend sisters-in-law. The attempt t o comprom ise as well as inability t o su cceed is a con dition precedent to th e t h e filin g of a su it bet w een m em ber s of t h e sa m e fa m ily . Since Art. 150 of the Family Code repeats essentially the same enumeration of "m embers of t h e fam ily", we find no reason to alter existing jurisprudence on the matter. Consequently, the court a quo erred in ruling that petitioner Guerrero, being a brother-in-law of pr iv a t e r espon den t Hernando, was required t o exert earnest efforts towards a comprom ise before filing the presen t su it . A lso, Guerrero‘s wife has no actual interest and participation in the la n d su bject of t h e su it , w h ich t h e pet it ion er bou g h t , befor e h e m a r r ied h is w ife.

Hi yas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. vs. Hon. Edmundo Acuña, RTC Judge Calooca n Ci t y a n d A l ber t o Mor en o G.R. n o. 1 5 4 1 3 2 A u g u st 3 1 , 2 0 0 6 Fa ct s:

A lberto Moreno filed with the RTC of Caloocan City a complaint against Hiyas Savings and Loan Ba nk, his wife Remedios, the spouses Felipe an d Ma r ia Ow e a n d t h e Reg ist er of Deeds of Ca loocan City for cancellation of mortgage. Respondent Moreno contends that he did not secure a ny loan from petitioner, nor did he sign or execute any contract of mortgage in its favor; that his w ife, acting in conspiracy with Hiyas and the spouses Owe, who were the on es t h a t ben efit ed fr om the loan, made it appear that he signed the contract of mortgage; that he cou ld n ot h a v e ex ecu t ed t h e sa id con t r a ct beca u se h e w a s w or kin g a br oa d. Pet itioner filed a motion to dismiss because private respondent failed to comply with Article 151 of t h e Family wherein it is provided that no suit between members of t h e sa m e fa m ily sh a ll pr osper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or pet it ion t h a t ea r n est effor t s t oward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. Petitioner contends t h a t sin ce the complaint does not contain any fact or a v er m en t t h a t ea r n est effor t s t ow a r d a com prom ise had been made prior to its institution, then the complaint should be dismissed for la ck of ca u se of a ct ion . RT C denied the motion to dismiss, it held that earnest efforts t ow a r ds a com pr om ise is n ot r equired before the filing of the instant case considering that the above-entitled ca se in v olv es pa r t ies w h o a r e st r a n g er s t o t h e fa m ily . Issu e: W h ether or not lack of earnest efforts toward a compromise is not a g r ou n d for a m ot ion t o dism iss in suits between husband and wife when other parties who are strangers t o t h e fa m ily a r e in v olv ed in t h e su it . Held: Y es. The Code Commission that drafted Article 222 of the Civil Code from which Article 1 5 1 of t h e Family Code was taken explains: it is difficult t o imagine a sadder and more tragic spect a cle t han a litigation between members of the same family. It is necessary that every effort should be m ade toward a compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is known that a lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bit t er n ess t h a n bet w een st r a n g er s. In Ma gbaleta vs. Gonong, the case involved brothers and a stranger t o the family , t h e a lleg ed ow ner of the subject property. The Court, taking into consideration the explanation made by th e Code Commission in its report, ruled that: These consideration s d o not however weigh en ou g h t o m ake it imperative that such efforts t o comprom ise should be a jurisdictional pre-requisite for t h e maintenance of an action whenever a stranger t o the family is a party thereto, whet h er a s a n ecessary or indispensable one. It is not always that one who is alien t o t h e fa m ily w ou ld be w illing to suffer the inconvenience of; much less, relish the delay and the com plica t ion s t h a t w rangling between or among relatives more often t h a n n ot en t a il. Besides, it is n eit h er pr actical nor fair that the determination of the rights of a st r a n g er t o t h e fa m ily w h o ju st h a ppened to have innocently acquired som e kind of interest in any right or proper t y dispu t ed a m ong its members should be made to depen d on t h e w a y t h e la t t er w ou ld set t le t h eir differ en ces a m on g t h em selv es. 22 x x x . Hence, once a stranger becomes a party t o a suit involving members of the same family, the la w n o longer makes it a condition precedent that earnest efforts be made towar ds a com pr om ise befor e t h e a ct ion ca n pr osper . Pet it ion is Dism issed.

FA MILY HOME Modequ i l l o v s. Br ev a G.R. No. 8 6 3 5 5 Ma y 3 1 , 1 9 9 0 Fa ct s: In 1 988, a judgment was rendered by the Court of Appeals in "Francisco Salinas, et al. vs . Jos e Modequillo, et al.” finding the defendants-appellees Jose Modequ illo a n d Ben it o Ma lu ba y jointly and severally liable to plaintiffs-appellants as compensa t ion for t h e dea t h of A u die Sa linas for hospitalization expenses of Renato Culan- Culan. The said judgment having becom e final and executory, a writ of execution was issued by the RTC Davao Cit y t o sa t isfy t h e sa id ju dgment on the goods and chattels of the defendants Jose Modequillo and Benito Malu ba y a t Ma la la g , Da v a o del Su r . T h e sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion Malala g , Da v a o del Su r con taining an area of 600 square meters with a market value of P34,550.00 and assessed v a lu e of P7 ,570.00 per Tax Declaration No. 87008-01359, registered in the name of Jose Modequ illo in the office of the Provincial Assessor of Davao del Sur; and a parcel of agricultural land located a t Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao del Sur containing an area of 3 hectares wit h a m a r ket v alue of P24,130.00 and assessed value of P9,650.00 per Tax Declarat ion No. 8 7 -0 8 -0 1 8 4 8 r egistered in the name of Jose Modequillo in the office of the Provincial Assessor of Da v a o del Su r . A m otion to quash and/or to set aside levy of execution was filed by defendant Jose Modequ illo a lleging that the residential land located at Poblacion Malalag is where the family home is bu ilt sin ce 1969 prior to the commencement of this case and as such i s exempt from execution, forced sa le or attachment under Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment debt sought to be enforced against the family home of defendant is not one of those enumerated under Article 155 of the Fa m ily Code. A s t o t h e a gricultural land although it is declared in the name of defendant it is alleged to be st ill pa r t of t h e public land and the transfer in his favor by the original possessor and applicant w h o w a s a m ember of a cultural minority was not approved by t h e pr oper g ov er n m en t a g en cy . A n opposit ion t h er et o w a s filed by t h e pla in t iffs. Issu e: W h ether or not a final judgment of the Court of Appeals in a n a ct ion for da m a g es m a y be sa t isfied by way of ex ecu t ion of a fa m ily h om e con st it u t ed u n der t h e Fa m ily Code. Held: Y es. Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot fr om t h e t im e it is occupied as a family residence. There is no need to constitute the sam e ju dicia lly or ex trajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family actually resides in the prem ises, it is, t h erefore, a family home as contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors should take the necessa r y pr ecautions t o protect their interest before extending credit to the spouses or head of the family w h o ow n s t h e h om e. A rt. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or att a ch m en t ex cept : (1 ) For n on -pa y m en t of t a x es; (2 ) For debt s in cu r r ed pr ior t o t h e con st it u t ion of t h e fa m ily h om e; (3 ) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution ; a n d (4 ) For debts due t o laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material men and others who h ave rendered service or furnish ed m a t er ia l for t h e con st r u ct ion of t h e b u ildin g . T h e exemption provided as aforestated is effective from the time of the constitution of the family h om e as such, a n d la st s so lon g a s a n y of it s ben eficia r ies a ct u a lly r esides t h er ein .

In t he present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constitut ed a s a fa m ily h om e whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a fa m ily h om e by operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a fam ily h om e upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year aft er it s pu blication in t h e Ma n ila Ch r on icle on A u g u st 4 , 1 9 8 7 (1 9 8 8 bein g a lea p y ea r ). T h e contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family home from t h e t im e it w a s occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well- taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it is provided that "the provisions of this Chapt er sh a ll a lso g ov er n ex ist in g fa m ily r esidences insofar as said prov isions are applicable." It does not mean that Articles 152 and 1 5 3 of sa id Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to hav e been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effect iv it y of t h e Fam ily Code and are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred befor e t h e effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162 simply means that all existing family residences at t h e t im e of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and ar e pr ospect iv ely en titled t o the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. Article 1 6 2 does n ot st a t e t h a t t h e pr ov ision s of Ch a pt er 2 , T it le V h a v e a r et r oa ct iv e effect . Is t h e family hom e of petitioner exempt from execution of the money judgment aforecit ed? No. T h e debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at the t ime of the v ehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the money judgment arising therefrom was ren der ed by the appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on A ugust 3, 1988. This case does not fall under the exemptions from execut ion pr ov ided in t h e Fa m ily Code. A s t o the agricultural land subject of the execution, the trial court correctly ruled that the levy t o be m ade by the sheriff shall be on whatever rights th e pet it ion er m a y h a v e on t h e la n d.

Fl or a n t e Ma n a cop v s. CA a n d F.F. CRUZ & CO., INC., G.R. No. 1 0 4 8 7 5 Nov em ber 1 3 , 1 9 9 2 Fa ct s: Ow ing to the failure to pay the sub-contract cost pursua n t t o a deed of a ssig n m en t sig n ed between petitioner's corporation and private respondent herein, the latter filed on July 3, 1989, a com plaint for a sum of money, with a prayer for preliminary attachment, against the former. As a con sequence of the order on July 28, 1989, the corresponding writ for the provision a l r em edy w as issued on August 11, 1989 which triggered the attachment of a parcel of land in Quezon City ow ned by Manacop Con st r u ct ion Pr esiden t Flor a n t e F. Ma n a cop, h er ein pet it ion er . T h e petitioner insists that the attached property is a family home, having been occupied by h im a n d h is fa m ily sin ce 1 9 7 2 , a n d is t h er efor e ex em pt fr om a t t a ch m en t . RT C h eld t h a t t h e su bject pr oper t y is n ot ex em pt fr om a t t a ch m en t . Issu e: W h et h er or n ot t h e pr oper t y of Flor a n t e Ma n a cop is ex em pt fr om a t t a ch m en t . Held: No. The debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at the time of t h e vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the money judg m en t a r isin g t h er efr om w a s r endered by the appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. This case does not fall under the exemptions from execution prov ided in t h e Fa m ily Code.

T h e contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family home from t h e t im e it w a s occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well-taken. Under Article 1 62 of the Fam ily Code, it is provided that "the provisions of this Chapt er sh a ll a lso g ov er n ex ist in g fa m ily r esidences insofar as said prov isions are applicable." It does not mean that Articles 152 and 1 5 3 of sa id Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to hav e been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effect iv it y of t h e Fam ily Code and are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred befor e t h e effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162 simply means that all existing family residences at t h e t im e of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and ar e pr osp ect iv ely en titled t o the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. Article 1 6 2 does n ot st a t e t h a t t h e pr ov ision s of Ch a pt er 2 , T it le V h a v e a r et r oa ct iv e effect .

Fl or a n t e Ma n a cop v s. CA a n d E & L MERCA NT ILE, INC. 2 2 7 SCRA 5 7 Fa ct s: On March 10, 1972, Petitioner Florante F. Manacop and his wife Eu la celi pu r ch a sed a 4 4 6 squ are-meter residential lot with a bungalow, in consideration of P75,000.00. The pr oper t y is loca t ed a t Com m on w ea lt h V illa g e, Com m on w ea lt h A v en u e, Qu ezon Cit y . Pr ivate Respondent E & L Mercantile, Inc. filed a complaint against petitioner and F.F. Manacop Con struction Co., Inc. before the RTC Pasig t o collect an indebtedness of P3,359,218.45. Instead of filing an answer, petitioner and his company entered into a compr om ise a g r eem en t w it h pr iv a t e r espon den t . On July 15, 1 986, E & L Mercantile filed a motion for execution which the lower court. However, ex ecution of the judgment was delayed. Ev entually, the sheriff levied on severa l v eh icles a n d ot h er personal properties of petitioner. In partial satisfact ion of t h e ju dg m en t debt , t h ese chattels were sold at public auction for which certificates of sale were correspondingly issued by t h e sh er iff. Pet itioner and his company filed a motion t o quash the alias writs of execution an d t o st op t h e sh eriff from continuing to enforce them on the ground that the judgment was not yet executory . Pr ivate respondent opposed the motion alleging that the property covered by TCT No. 1 7 4 1 8 0 cou ld not be considered a family home on the grounds that petitioner was already living abr oa d a n d that the property, having been acquired in 1 972, should have been judicially constituted as a fa m ily h om e t o ex em pt it fr om ex ecu t ion . RT C ruled in favor of private respondent. It held that petitioner‘s residen ce w a s n ot ex em pt fr om execution as it was not duly constituted as a family home, pu r su a n t t o t h e Civ il Code. CA a ffir m ed. Issu e: May a writ of execution of a final and executory judgment issued before the effectiv it y of t h e Family Code be executed on a house and lot constituted as a family hom e under the provision of sa id Code? HELD Y es. [The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error. On the contra r y , it s Decision a n d Resolu t ion a r e su ppor t ed by la w a n d a pplica ble ju r ispr u den ce. ] Pet itioner contends that the trial court erred in holding that his residence was not exempt fr om ex ecution in view of his failure to show that the property involved ―has been duly constituted as a fam ily hom e in accordance with law.‖ He asserts that the Family Code and Modequillo r equ ir e

sim ply the occupancy of the property by t h e pet it ion er , w it h ou t n eed for it s ju dicia l or ex t r a ju dicia l con st it u t ion a s a fa m ily h om e. Pet itioner is only partly correct. True, under the Family Code which took effect on A u g u st 3 , 1 988, the subject property became his family hom e under the simplified process em bodied in A rticle 153 of said Code. However, Modequillo explicitly ruled that said provision of the Family Code does not have retroactive effect. In other words, prior to August 3, 1988 , t h e pr ocedu r e m andated by the Civil Code h a d t o be follow ed for a fa m ily h om e t o be con st it u t ed a s su ch. There being absolutely no proof that the subject property was judicially or extrajudicia lly con stituted as a family home, it follows that the law‘s protective mantle cannot be availed of by pet itioner. Since the debt involved herein was incurred and the assailed orders of the trial cour t issued prior to August 3, 1988, the petitioner cannot be shielded by the benevolent provisions of t h e Fa m ily Code. Pet itioner contends that he should be deemed residing in the family home because his stay in the Un ited States is merely temporary. He asserts that the person staying in the house is his ov erseer a n d that whenever his wife visited this country, she stayed in the family home. This con t en t ion la cks m er it . T h e law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family hom e either by the owner thereof or by ― any of its beneficiaries‖ must be actual. That which is ―actual‖ is something r ea l, or a ct u a lly ex isting, as opposed t o som ething merely possible, or to som ething which is pr esu m pt iv e or con structiv e. A ct u a l occu pa n cy , h ow ev er , n eed n ot be by t h e ow n er of t h e h ou se specifically. Rather, the property may be occupied by the ―beneficiaries‖ enumerated by Art icle 1 5 4 of t h e Fa m ily Code.

Spou ses Eduardo & El sa Versola vs. CA, Sheriff Madolaria, Judge Layosa, Register of Deeds of QC & Dr . V ict or ia On g Oh G.R. No. 1 6 4 7 4 0 Ju ly 3 1 , 2 0 0 6 Fa ct s: Pr ivate respondent Dr. Victoria T . Ong Oh granted a loan to a certain Dolores Ledesm a in t h e a m ount of P1 M. As a security for said loan, Ledesma issued to private respondent a check for the sam e amount dated 10 February 1993 and promised to execute a deed of real esta t e m or t g a g e ov er her house and lot located at Tandang Sora, Qu ezon Cit y w h ich did n ot m a t er ia lize. Su bsequently, Ledesma sold the said house and lot to petitioners for P2.5 M. Pet it ion er s pa id Ledesma P1 M as downpayment, with the remaining balance of P1 .5M t o be pa id in m on t h ly in stallments of P75,000. Petitioners, however, were only able to pay the amount of P50,000.0 0 t o Ledesma. T o raise the full amount that Ledesma demanded, petitioners a pplied for a loa n w ith Asiatrust Bank, Inc. (Asiatrust) in the amount of P2M. In the course of the applicat ion for sa id loan, petitioners, private respondent, and Ledesma convened with Asiatrust to ar r iv e a t a sch eme t o settle the obligation of Ledesm a t o pr iv a t e r espon den t a n d t h e oblig a t ion of pet it ion er s t o Ledesm a . In keeping with the foregoing agreement, private respondent granted Ledesma a n a ddit ion a l loan of P450,000.00. Ledesma, in turn, executed a Deed of Sale transfer r in g t h e t it le of t h e su bject property to petitioners. Private respondent then delivered the t itle of the said property t o A siatrust. The Deed of Sale was registered and the t itle in the name of Ledesma w a s ca n celled a n d a new one was issued in the names of petitioners. Thereafter, Asiatrust approv ed t h e loa n a pplication of petitioners. However, when Asiatrust tried t o register the Real Est a t e Mor t g a g e cov ering the subject property executed in its favor by petitioners, it discov ered a notice of levy on ex ecution was annotated on the title in connection wit h Ledesm a 's oblig a t ion t o a cer t a in Miladay's Jewels, Inc., in the amount of P214,284.00. Because of this annotated encumbr a n ce, A siatrust did not register said Real Estate Mortgage and refu sed t o r elea se t h e P2 M loa n of

pet itioners. When private respondent presented Ledesma's check for payment , t h e sa m e w a s dishonored for the reason that the account was already closed. Subsequ en t ly , w h en pr iv a t e r espondent presented for payment the check issued by petitioners, the said check wa s likew ise dishonored because there was a stop payment order. With the dishonor of the checks a n d w i t h A siatrust's refusal t o release the P2M loan of petitioners, private respondent came away empt y h anded as she did not receive payment for the P1 .5M loan she gran t ed t o Ledesm a t h a t w a s a ssumed by petitioners. As a result, private respondent filed a Compl a in t for Su m of Mon ey a g a in st Ledesm a , pet it ion er s, a n d A sia t r u st . RT C r u led in fa v or of Dr . V ict or ia T . On g Oh . CA a ffir m ed w it h m odifica t ion . Pr ivate respondent filed a Motion for Execution with the RTC. The proper t y in t h e n a m e of Spouses Versola were subsequently levied upon. On 5 August 2002, privat e r espon den t filed w ith the trial court an Ex-parte Motion for Issuance of Confirmation of Ju dicia l Sa le of Rea l Pr operty of Sps. Eduardo and Elsa Versola. Petitioners opposed the said motion on the following g r ounds: (1) the property sold at the public auction is the family home of petit ion er s w h ich is ex empt from execution pursuant to Article 155 of the Family Code; and (2) no applica t ion w a s m ade by private respondent for the determination of the v a lu e of t h eir fa m ily h om e t o be su bject ed t o ex ecu t ion , a s r equ ir ed u n der A r t icle 1 6 0 of t h e Fa m ily Code. Pet itioners maintain that said objection t o the sale was based on the fact that there was no order or clearance from the trial court for the sheriff to proceed with the auction sale, in clear violation of A rticle 160 of the Family Code, wh ich r equ ir es a n a pplica t ion by t h e cr edit or a n d a det ermination of the actual value of the family home by the court ordering the sale of pr oper t y u n der ex ecu t ion . Issu e: W h ether or not petitioners timely raised and prov ed t h a t t h eir pr oper t y is ex em pt fr om ex ecu t ion . Held: No. A r t icle 1 5 3 of t h e Fa m ily Code pr ov ides: T h e family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occu pied a s t h e fam ily residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as its beneficiaries resides therein, t h e family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or atta ch m en t ex cept a s h er ein a ft er pr ov ided a n d t o t h e ex t en t of t h e v a lu e a llow ed by l a w . Un der the cited provision, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence; there is n o n eed t o con st it u t e t h e sa m e ju dicia lly or ex t r a ju dicia lly . T h e settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal privilege granted t o the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the sh eriff, but by the debtor himself before the sale of the property a t pu blic a u ct ion . It is n ot su fficient that the person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home. T h is claim for exemption must be set up and proved t o the Sheriff. Failure to do so would est op t h e pa r t y fr om la t er cla im in g t h e ex cept ion . In t he instant case, it was only after almost two years from the t ime of the ex ecu t ion sa le a n d a ft er the "Sheriff's Final Deed of Sale" was issued did petition er s r ig or ou sly cla im in t h eir Opposition t o private respondent's Ex-parte Motion for Issuance of Confirmation of Judicial Sale of Rea l Property of Sps. Eduardo and Elsa Versola that the property in question is exempt fr om ex ecution. Ev en then, there was no showing that petitioners adduced evidence to prove that it is in deed a fa m ily h om e.

Per l a Pa t r icio v s. Ma r cel i n o G. Da r i o III a n d CA G.R. No. 1 7 0 8 2 9 Nov em ber 2 0 , 2 0 0 6 Fa ct s: On July 5, 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife, petitioner Perla G. Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private respondent Marcelin o G. Dario III. Am ong the properties he left was a parcel of land with a residential house and a pr e -sch ool bu ilding. On August 10, 1987, petitioner, Marcelino Marc and private respondent, extrajudicially set tled the estate of Marcelino V. Dario. Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelin o Ma r c for m a lly a dv ised private respondent of their intention to partition the subject property and terminate th e co-ownership. Private respondent refused t o partition t h e pr oper t y h en ce pet it ion er a n d Ma r celin o Ma r c in st it u t ed a n a ct ion for pa r t it ion . T h e RTC ordered the partition and the sale of the property by public a u ct ion . T h e Cou r t of A ppeals dismissed the complaint for partition filed by petitioner and Marcelino Marc for lack of m erit. It held that the family home should continue despite the death of one or both spou ses a s lon g as there is a minor beneficiary thereof. The heirs could not partition the property unless the court found compelling reasons to rule otherwise. The appellate court also held that the m in or son of private respondent, who is a grandson of spou ses Ma r celin o V . Da r io a n d Per la G. Pa t r icio, w a s a m in or ben eficia r y of t h e fa m ily h om e. Issu e: W h ether Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, the minor son of private respondent, can be considered a s a ben eficia r y u n der A r t icle 1 5 4 of t h e Fa m ily Code. Held: No. Article 154 of the Family Code enumerates who are the beneficiaries of a family h om e: (1 ) T h e husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the h ea d of a fa m ily ; a n d (2 ) T h eir pa rents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for leg a l su ppor t . T o be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur: (1) they must be among the r elationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family h om e; a n d (3 ) t h ey a r e depen den t for leg a l su ppor t u pon t h e h ea d of t h e fa m ily . A s t o the first requisite, the beneficiaries of the family home are: (1) The husband and wife, or an u nmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descen da n t s, br others and sisters, whether the rela t ion sh ip be leg it im a t e or illeg it im a t e. T h e t er m ― descendants‖ contemplates all descendants of the person or persons who constituted the family h om e without distinction; hence, it must necessarily include t h e g r a n dch ildr en a n d g r ea t g randchildren of the spouses who constitute a family h om e. Ubi lex non dis tinguit nec nos dis tinguire debemos. Where the law does not distinguish, we should n ot dist in g u ish . T h u s, pr ivate respondent‘s minor son, who is also the grandchild of decea sed Ma r celin o V . Da r io sa t isfies t h e fir st r equ isit e. A s t o the second requisite, minor beneficiaries must be actually living in the family home to avail of t h e benefits derived from Art. 159. Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, also known as Ino, the son of pr ivate respondent and grandson of the decedent Marcelino V. Dario, has been livin g in t h e fam ily hom e since 1 994, or within 10 years from the death of the decedent, hence, he satisfies the secon d r equ isit e. However, as to the third requisite, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot demand support fr om h is paternal grandmother if he has parents who are capable of supporting him. The liability for legal support falls primarily on Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV‘s parents, especially h is fa t h er , h erein private respondent who is the head of his immediate family. The law fir st im poses t h e

obligation of legal support upon the shoulders of the parents, especially the father, and on ly in t h eir defa u lt is t h e oblig a t ion im posed on t h e g r a n dpa r en t s. Ma rcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV is dependent on legal support not from his gr a n dm ot h er , bu t fr om his father. Thus, despite residing in the family h om e a n d h is bein g a descen da n t of Ma rcelino V. Dario, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Da r io IV ca n n ot be con sider ed a s ben eficia r y con templated under Article 154 because he did not fulfill the third requisite of being depen den t on h is grandmother for legal support. It is his father whom he is dependent on leg a l su ppor t , a n d who must now establish his own family home separate and distinct from that of his parents, bein g of leg a l a g e.

PA T ERNIT Y A ND FILIA T ION

Ma r iano Andal vs. Eduvigis Macaraig G.R. No. L-2474 May 30, 1951 FA CT S: Em iliano Andal was the owner of the parcel of land in question hav in g a cqu ir ed it fr om h is m other Eduvigis Macaraig by virtue of a donation propter nuptias executed by the latter in favor of t h e former on the occasion of his marriage to Maria Dueñas. Em ilia n o A n da l h a d been in possession of the land from 1938 up t o 1 942, when Eduvigis Macaraig, taking advant a g e of t h e a bnormal situation then prevailing, entered the land in question. Emiliano Andal became sick of t u berculosis in January 1 941. Sometime thereafter, his brother, Felix, went to live in his house t o h elp him work his farm. His sickness became worse that on or about September 1 0 , 1 9 4 2 , h e became so weak that he could hardly mov e and get up from his bed. On Septembe r 1 0 , 1 9 4 2 , Ma r ia Duenas, his wife, eloped with Felix, and both went to live in the house of Maria 's fa t h er , u ntil the middle of 1943. Since May, 1942, Felix and Maria had sexual intercourse a n d t r ea t ed ea ch other as husband and wife. On January 1 , 1 943, Em iliano died without the presen ce of h is w ife, who did not even attend his funeral. On June 17, 1 943, Maria Dueñas gave birth t o a boy , w ho was given the name of Mariano Andal. If the son born to the couple is deemed leg it im a t e, t h en he is entitled t o inherit the land in question. If otherwise, then the land should revert ba ck t o Eduvigis Macaraig as the next of kin entitled to succeed him under the law. The low er cou r t r en der ed ju dg m en t in fa v or of t h e pla in t iffs. ISSUE: W h ether or not the child born by Maria is con sider ed a s t h e leg it im a t e son of Em ilia n o. HELD: Y es. Article 108 of the Civil Code provides that children born after the one hundred and eig h t y day s next following that of the celebration of marriage or within the three hun dr ed da y s n ex t following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate. This pr esumption may be rebutted only by proof that it was physically im possible for the husban d t o h ave had access t o his wife during the first one hundred and twenty days of the thr ee h u n dr ed n ext preceding the birth of the child. Im possibility of access by husband to wife would include (1) a bsence during the initial period of conception, (2) impotence which is patent, continu in g a n d in curable, and (3) imprisonment, unless it can be shown that cohabitation took pla ce t h r ou g h cor r u pt v iola t ion of pr ison r eg u la t ion s. Since the boy was born on June 17, 1943, and Em iliano Andal died on January 1, 1943, that boy is pr esumed t o be the legitimate son of Emiliano and his wife, he having been born within th r ee h undred (300) days following the dissolution of the marriage. There was no ev idence presen t ed

t hat Em iliano Andal was absent during the initial period of conception, especia lly du r in g t h e per iod comprised between August 21, 1942 and September 1 0, 1942, which is included in the 120 day s of the 300 next preceding the birth of the child Mariano Andal. On the contra r y , t h er e is en ough evidence to show that during that initial period, Em iliano Andal and his wife w er e st ill liv ing under the marital roof, or at least had access one t o the other. Even if Felix, th e br ot h er , w as living in the same house, and he and the wife were indulging in illicit intercourse since May, 1 942, that does not preclude cohabitation between Em iliano and his wife. A lso, ev en t h ou g h Em iliano was already suffering from tuberculosis and his condition then was so serious t h a t h e cou ld hardly move and get up from bed does not sh ow t h a t t h is does n ot pr ev en t ca r n a l in tercourse. He was not impotent. The fact that Maria Dueñas has committed adultery ca n n ot a lso overcome this presumption. Therefore, presumption of legitimacy under the Civ il Code in fa v or of t h e ch ild h a s n ot been ov er com e.

T eofista Babiera vs. Presentacion B. Catotal G.R. No. 138493 June 15, 2000 FA CT S: Pr esentacion B. Catotal filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Node, Branch II, Ilig a n City, a petition for the cancellation of the entry of birth of Teofista Babiera in the Civil Registry of Iligan City. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3046. From t h e pet it ion filed, Pr esentacion asserted that she is the only surviving child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Ca r iñ osa , w h o died on Ma y 2 6 , 1 9 9 6 a n d Ju ly 6 , 1 9 9 0 r espect iv ely . On September 20, 1996 a baby girl was delivered by "hilot" in the house of spouses Eugenio a n d Hermogena Babiera and without the knowledge of said spouses, Flora Guinto, the mother of th e ch ild a n d a h ou sem a id of spou ses Eu g en io a n d Her m og en a Ba bier a , ca u sed t h e r egistration/recording of the facts of birth of her child, by simulating that she wa s t h e ch ild of t h e spouses Eugenio, then 65 years old a n d Her m og en a , t h en 5 4 y ea r s old, a n d m a de Hermogena Babiera appear as the mother by forging her signature. Petitioner, then 15 years old, sa w with her own eyes and personally witnessed Flora Guinto give birth t o Teofista Gu in t o, in t h eir h ou se, a ssist ed by "h ilot ". T h e birth certificate of Teofista Guinto is void ab initio, as it wa s t ot a lly a sim u la t ed bir t h , signature of informant forged, and it contained false entries, t o w it : a ) T h e ch ild is m a de t o a ppear as the legitimate child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Herm og en a Ca r iñ osa , w hen she is not; b) The signature of Hermogena Cariñosa, the mother, is falsified/for g ed. Sh e w as not the informant; c) The family name Babiera is false and unlawful and her correct fam ily n ame is Guinto, her mother being single; d) Her real mother was Flora Guinto and her status, an illegitimate child. The natural father, the carpenter, did not sign it. Also, the respondent Teofista Ba r biera's birth certificate is void ab initio, and it is patently a simulat ion of bir t h , sin ce it is clinically and medically impossible for the supposed parents to bear a child in 1 956 beca u se: a ) Hermogena Cariñosa Babiera, was already 54 years old; b) Hermogena's last child birth w a s in t h e year 1941, the year petitioner was born; c) Eugenio was already 65 years old, t h a t t h e v oid a n d simulated birth certificate of Teofista Guinto would affect the hereditary rights of petitioner w h o in h er it ed t h e est a t e. T h e trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner therein. Teofista averred "t h a t sh e w a s a lw a y s kn own as Teofista Babiera and not Teofista Guinto and that plaintiff is not the only su r v iv in g ch ild of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena C. Babiera, for the truth of the matt er is t hat they are sisters of the full-blood. The Court of Appeals held that the ev iden ce a ddu ced du ring trial proved that petitioner was not the biological child of Hermogen a Ba bier a . It a lso r u led that no evidence was presented t o show that Hermogena became pr eg n a n t in 1 9 5 9 . It fu rther observed that she was already 54 years old at the time, and that her last pregnan cy h a d occurred way back in 1941. The CA n ot ed t h a t t h e su pposed bir t h t ook pla ce a t h om e , n otwithstanding the advanced age of Hermogena and its concomitant medical com plica t ion s.

Mor eover, petitioner's Birth Certificate was not signed by the loca l civ il r eg ist r a r , a n d t h e signature therein, which was purported t o be that of Hermogena, was different from h er ot h er sig n a t u r es. ISSUE: W h ether or not Teofista is the legitimate child of spouses Eugenio Ba bier a a n d Her m og en a Ca r iñ osa . HELD: No. Article 171 of the Family Code states that, the child's filiation can be impugned only by t h e fa ther or, in special circumstances, his heirs. Respondent has the requisite standing t o in it ia t e t h e present action. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, provides that a real party in interest is on e "who stands t o be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party en t it led t o t h e avails of the suit.‖ The interest of respondent in the civil status of petitioner stems fr om a n a ction for partition which the latter filed against the former. The case concerned the pr oper t ies in herited by respondent from her parents. Moreover, Article 1 7 1 of t h e Fa m ily Code is n ot a pplicable to the present case. A close reading of this prov ision shows that it applies to instances in which the father impugns the legitima cy of h is w ife's ch ild. T h e pr ov ision , h ow ev er , pr esupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring of the mother. The present case alleg es a n d shows that Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner. In other words, the prayer her ein is n ot to declare that petitioner is an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but t o est a blish t h a t t h e form er is not the latter's child at all. Verily, the present action does n ot im pu g n pet it ion er 's filiation to Spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, because t h er e is n o blood r ela t ion t o im pugn in the first place. Also, the prescriptive period set forth in Article 170 of the Family Code does n ot apply. Verily, the action to nullify the Birth Certificate does not prescr ibe, beca u se it w as allegedly void ab initio. A birth certificate may be ordered cancelled upon a dequ a t e pr oof t hat it is fictitious. Thus, void is a certificate which shows that the mother was already fifty -fou r y ears old at the time of the child's birth and which was signed neither by the civil registrar nor by t h e supposed mother. Because her inheritance rights are adversely affected, the legitimate ch ild of su ch mother is a proper party in the proceedings for the cancellation of the said cer t ifica t e.

Ma r issa Benitez-Badua vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 1 05625 January 24, 1994 FA CT S: T h e facts show that the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian owned various properties especially in Laguna. Isabel died on April 25, 1 982 . V icen t e follow ed h er in t h e g r a v e on Nov ember 13, 1989. He died intestate.The fight for administration of Vicente's estate ensued. On September 24, 1 990, private respondents Victoria Benitez-Lirio and Feodor Ben it ez A g u ila r (V icente's sister and nephew, respectively) instituted Sp. Proc. No. 797 (90) befor e t h e RT C of Sa n Pa blo Cit y , 4 t h Ju dicia l Reg ion , Br . 3 0 . T h ey prayed for the issuance of letters of administration of Vicente's estate in fav or of pr iv a t e r espondent Aguilar. They alleged, that the decedent is survived by no other h eir s or r ela t iv es either any ascendants or descendants, whether legitimate, illegitimate or legally adopt ed. A lso, despite claims or representation t o the contrary, petitioners can well and truly establish , g iv en t h e chance t o do so, that said decedent and his spouse Isabel Chipongian who pre-deceased him, a n d whose estate had earlier been settled extra-judicial, were with ou t issu e a n d/or w it h ou t descendants whatsoever, and that one Marissa Benitez-Badua who was raised and cared by them sin ce childhood is, in fact, not related to them by blood, nor legally adopted, and is therefore n ot a legal heir. Petitioner opposed the petition and alleged that she is the sole heir of the decea sed V icen t e Ben it ez a n d ca pa ble of a dm in ist er in g h is est a t e. T h e parties further exchanged reply and rejoinder t o buttress their legal post u r es. Pet it ion er t r ied t o prove that she is the only legitimate child of the spouses V icen t e Ben it ez a n d Isa bel Ch ipon g ia n .

Sh e submitted documentary evidence, among others: (1) h er Cer t ifica t e of Liv e Bir t h ; (2 ) Ba ptismal Certificate; (3) Income Tax Returns and Information Sheet for Membership with t h e GSIS of the late Vicente naming her as his daughter; and (4) School Records. She a lso t est ified t hat the said spouses reared and continuously treated her as their legitimate daught er . On t h e ot h er hand, private respondents tried to prove, mostly thru testimonial evidence, tha t t h e sa id spou ses failed to beget a child during their marriage and that the late Isabel, then thirty six (3 6 ) y ears of age, was even referred to Dr. Constantino Manahan, a noted obstetrician-gynecolog ist , for treatment. The trial court decided in favor of the petitioner. However, the Court of A ppea ls, r ev er sed t h e sa id decision of t h e t r ia l cou r t . ISSUE: W h ether or not petitioner is the legitimate child and thus the su r v iv in g h eir of t h e spou ses Ben it ez. HELD: No. A careful reading of Articles 1 64, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code will show that they do n ot contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a child is alleged not to be the child of n ature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situa t ion w h er e a h u sba n d (or h is h eir s) den ies a s h is ow n a ch ild of h is w ife. T hus, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of sa id ch ild by pr ov in g : (1 ) it w a s phy sically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of t h e 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for biological or ot h er scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that in case of children conceiv ed t hrough artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification by eit h er pa r en t w a s obt a in ed t h r ou g h m ist a ke, fr a u d, v iolen ce, in t im ida t ion or u n du e in flu en ce. A rticles 170 and 171 speak of the prescriptive period within which the husband or any of his heirs sh ould file the action impugning the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it refused t o apply these articles to the case at bench for it is not one where t h e h eirs of the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Ra t h er , t h eir clear submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel. Fact u a l fin din g of t h e a ppellate court that petitioner was not the biological child or ch ild of n a t u r e of t h e spou ses V icente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian is meritorious. There was strong and convincing evidence t hat Isabel Chipongian never became pregna n t a n d, t h er efor e, n ev er deliv er ed a ch ild.

Ja o vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. L-49162 July 28, 1 987 FA CT S: Pet itioner, assisted by her mother, filed a case for recognition and support again st Per ico Ja o. T h e latter denied paternity thus the parties agreed to a blood grouping test con du ct ed by t h e Na tional Bureau of Investigation. The result indicated that the petitioner could not have been the offspring of the latter and her mother, Arlene. The low er cou r t fou n d t h e t est con clu siv e h owever, upon a second motion for reconsideration the trial resulted on the declar a t ion of t h e pet itioner being the child of Perico and is entitled t o support. The latter questioned said decision t o t h e Cou r t of A ppea ls w h er e it r ev er sed sa id decision of t h e low er cou r t . ISSUE: W h ether or not the results of the blood grouping test are admissible and con clu siv e t o pr ov e n on -pa t er n it y . HELD:

Y es. The use of blood typing in cases of disputed percentage has already become an im por t a n t legal procedure. There is now almost universal scientific agreement that blood grouping tests are con clusive as to non-paternity, although inconclusive to paternity. This is because the fact t h a t t h e blood type of a child is a possible product of t h e m ot h er a n d a lleg ed fa t h er does n ot con clusively prov e that the child is born by such parents. On the other hand, if the blood type of t h e child is not a possible blood type when the blood of the mother and that of the alleged father a r e cr oss-m a t ch ed, t h en t h e ch ild ca n n ot possibly be t h a t of t h e a lleg ed fa t h er .

A rtemio G. Ilano vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 1 04376 February 23, 1994 FA CT S: Leon cia first met petitioner Artemio G. Ilano while she w a s w or kin g a s secr et a r y t o A t t y . Ma r iano C. Virata. Petitioner was one of the clients of Atty. Virata. On several occasions, she and pet itioner t ook lunch together. Sometime in 1957, Leoncia, then managing a business of her own a s Namarco distributor, met petitioner again who was engaged in the same busin ess a n d t h ey r enewed acquaintances. Since t h en , h e w ou ld g iv e h er h is u n sold a lloca t ion of g oods. La t er, he courted her more than four years. Their relationship became intim a t e a n d w it h h is pr om ise of marriage, they eloped to Guagua, Pampanga in April, 1962. They stayed a t La Mesa A partment, located behind the Filipinas Telephone Company branch office, of wh ich h e is t h e pr esident and general manager. He came home to her three or four times a week. The apartment w as procured by Melencio Reyes, Officer-in-Charge of the Filipinas Telephone Company branch office. He also took care of the marketing and paid rentals, lights and water bills. Unable to speak t h e local dialect, Leoncia was provided also by Melencio with a m a id by t h e n a m e of Nen a . Pet itioner used t o g ive her P7 00.00 a month for their expenses at home. In June, 1 962, Leoncia, w ho was conceiving at that time, was fetched by petitioner and they transferred t o San Juan St ., Pa say City. In October, 1962, she delivered a still-born female child at the Manila San it a r iu m . T h e death certificate was signed by petitioner. Thereafter, while they were living at Highway 54 , Ma kati, private respondent Merceditas S. Ilano was born on December 3 0 , 1 9 6 3 a lso a t t h e Ma n ila Sanitarium. Her birth was recorded as Merceditas de los Santos Ilano, child of Leon cia A guinaldo de los Santos and Artemio Geluz Ilano. Leoncia submit t ed r eceipt s issu ed by t h e Ma n ila Sanitarium to show that she was confined there from December 30, 1963 until January 2, 1 964 under the name of Mrs. Leoncia Ila n o. T h e su ppor t by pet it ion er for Leon cia a n d Mer ceditas was sometimes in the form of cash personally delivered by him, thru Melencio, t h r u Ely nia (niece of Leoncia) or thru Merceditas herself. Sometim es in t h e for m of a ch eck like Ma n ila Banking Corporation Check No. 81532, the signature appearing ther eon h a v in g been identified by Leoncia as that of petitioner because he often gives her checks which h e issu es a t h om e and saw him sign the checks. During the time that petitioner and Leoncia wer e liv in g a s h u sba n d a n d w ife, h e sh ow ed con cer n a s t h e fa t h er of Mer cedit a s. W h en Merceditas was in Grade I at the St. Joseph Parochial School, he signed her Repor t Ca r d for the fourth and fifth grading periods as her parent. Those signatures were both ident ified by Leon cia and Merceditas because he signed them in their residen ce in t h eir pr esen ce a n d of Ely nia. Since Merceditas started to have discernmen t , h e w a s a lr ea dy t h e on e w h om sh e r ecognized as her Daddy. He treated her as a father would to his child. He w ou ld br in g h om e ca ndies, t oys, and anything a child enjoys. He would take her for a drive, eat at restaurants, a n d ev en cuddle her t o sleep. In May, 1963, Ruth Elynia Mabanglo, n iece of Leon cia , liv ed w it h Leon cia and petitioner. She accompanied her aunt when she started having labor pa in s in t h e m orning of December 30, 1963. Petitioner arrived after five o'clock in the afternoon. W h en t h e n urse came to inquire about the child, Leoncia was still unconscious so it was fr om pet it ion er t hat the nurse sought the information. Inasmuch as it was already pa st sev en o'clock in t h e ev ening, the nurse prom ised to return the following morning for his signature. However, he left a n instruction to give birth certificate to Leoncia for her signature, as he was leavin g ea r ly t h e following morning. Prior to the birth of Merceditas, Elynia used to accompa n y h er a u n t a n d

som etimes with petitioner in his car to the Manila Sanitarium for prenatal check-up. A t t im es, sh e used to go t o his office at 615 Sales St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, upon his instructions to get money a s support and sometimes he would send notes of explanation if he cannot come w h ich sh e in t urn gave t o her aunt. They stayed at 112 Arellano St., then Sta. Cruz, Manila in 1966 before they finally transferred to Gagalangin in 1 967. Petitioner lived with them up to June, 1971 w h en h e st opped com in g h om e. ISSUE: W h et h er or n ot Mer cedit a s is t h e ch ild of A r t em io a n d is en t it led t o su ppor t . HELD: Y es. Under the then prevailing provisions of the Civil Code, illegitimate children or those who are con ceived and born out of wedlock were generally classified in t o t w o g r ou ps: (1 ) Na t u r a l, w hether actual or by fiction, were those born outside of lawful wedlock of paren t s w h o, a t t h e t im e of conception of the child, were not disqualified by any impediment to marr y ea ch ot h er a n d (2) Spurious, whether incestuous, were disqualified to marr y ea ch ot h er on a ccou n t of certain legal impediments. Since petitioner had a subsisting marriage to a n ot h er a t t h e t im e Mer cedit a s w a s con ceiv ed, sh e is a spu r iou s ch ild. In t his regard, Article 287 of the Civil Code provides that illegitimate children other than natural in accordance with Article 269 and other than natural children by legal fict ion a r e en t it led t o su pport and such successional rights as are granted in the Civil Code. The Civil Code ha s g iv en t h ese rights to them because the transgressions of social conventions committed by the par en t s sh ould not be visited upon them. They were born with a social handicap and the law should help t h em t o surmount the disadvantages facing them t h r ou g h t h e m isdeeds of t h eir pa r en t s. However, before Article 287 can be availed of, there must first be a recognition of paternity either v oluntarily or by court action. The Court finds that there is sufficient ev idence of recognition on t h e part of petitioner. The evidences su bm it t ed like t h e sig n a t u r e in t h e r epor t ca r ds, t estimonies, and other pieces of evidence shows that petitioner indeed recognized Merceditas a s h is ch ild a n d t h u s en t it les h er t o su ppor t .

Cor ito Ocampo Tayag vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 95229 June 9, 1992 FA CT S: Pr ivate respondent is the mother and legal guardian of her minor son, Chad Cuy u g a n , by t h e fa ther of the petitioner, the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo. Petitioner is the known administratrix of t h e real and personal properties left by her deceased fath er , sa id A t t y . Oca m po, w h o died in testate in Angeles City on September 28, 1983. Private respondent has been estr a n g ed fr om h er husband, Jose Cuyugan, for several years now and during which t ime, she and Atty. Ricar do Ocampo had illicit amorous relationship with each other that, as a consequence t h er eof, t h ey beg ot a child who was christened Chad Cuyugan in accordance with the ardent desire and behest of sa id Atty. Ocampo. Chad, the son of private respondent by the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, who w as born in Angeles City on October 5, 1980 h a d been sir ed, sh ow er ed w it h ex cept ion a l a ffection, fervent love and care by his putative father for being his only son a s ca n be g lea n ed fr om indubitable letters and documents of the late Atty. Ocampo t o herein private respon den t . T h e minor, Chad D. Cuyugan, although illegitimate is nevertheless ent it led t o a sh a r e in t h e in testate estate left by his deceased father, Atty. Ricardo Ocampo as one of the survivin g h eir s. T h e deceased Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, at the time of his death was the owner of real and persona l pr operty, located in Baguio City, A n g eles Cit y a n d in t h e Pr ov in ce of Pa m pa n g a w it h a ppr ox im a t e v a lu e of sev er a l m illion s of pesos. T h e estate of the late Atty. Ocampo has not as yet been inventoried by the pet it ion er a n d t h e in heritance of the surviving heirs including that of said Chad has not likewise been ascertain ed. T h e only known surviving heirs of the deceased Atty. Ricardo Ocampo are his children, namely :

Cor ito O. Tayag, Rivina O. Tayag, Evita O. Florendo, Felina Ocampo, and said minor Ch a d, for a n d in whose behalf this instant complaint is filed. Pr iv a t e r espon den t h a s n o m ea n s of liv elihood and she only depends on the charity of friends and relatives for the sustenance of h er son , Chad, such that it is urgent, necessary and imperative that said child be extended finan cia l su pport from the estate of his putative father, Atty. Ricardo Ocampo. Several demands, v er ba l a n d written, have been made for petitioner to grant Chad's lawful inheritance, but despit e sa id dem ands, the latter failed and refused an d st ill fa ils a n d r efu ses t o sa t isfy t h e cla im for in h er it a n ce a g a in st t h e est a t e of t h e la t e A t t y . Oca m po. ISSUE: W h ether or not Chad is entitled to inherit from Atty. Ocampo‘s estate as his illegitim a t e ch ild. HELD: Y es. Although petitioner contends that the com plaint filed by herein private respondent mer ely a lleges that the minor Chad Cuyugan is an illegitimate child of the deceased a n d is a ct u a lly a claim for inheritance, from the allegations therein the same may be considered as one to com pel r ecognition. Further that the two causes of action, one to compel recognition a n d t h e ot h er t o claim inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is not new in our jurispr u den ce. A lso, t h e a ct ion h a s n ot y et pr escr ibed. T he applicable law is Article 285 of th e Civ il Code w h ich st a t es t h a t t h e a ct ion for t h e r ecognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the pr esumed parents, ex cept in the following cases: (1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in w hich case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainm en t of h is majority. The Court holds that the right of action of the minor child has been vested by the filing of the com plaint in court under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to the effectiv it y of t h e Family Code. We herein adopt our ruling in the recent case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al. where we held that the fact of filing of the petition already vested in t h e pet itioner her right to file it and t o have the same proceed to final adjudication in a ccor da n ce w ith the law in force at the time, and such right can no longer be prejudiced or im paired by t h e en a ct m en t of a n ew la w .

ISSUE: W h ether or not Claro Antonio and John Paul are children of Carlito and are entitled for support. HELD: No. The rule is well-settled that findings of facts of the Court of Appeals may be reviewed by this court only under exceptional circumstances. One such situation is w h en t h e fin din g s of t h e a ppellate court clash with those of the trial court as in the case at bench. It behooves us therefore t o ex ercise our extraordinary power, and settle the issue of whether the ruling of t h e a ppella t e court that private respondent is not the father of the petitioners is substantiated by the evidence on r ecor d. T h e evidence offered by the petitioners is insufficient to prove their filiation. Petitioners can n ot r ely on the photographs showing the presence of the priva t e r espon den t in t h e ba pt ism of pet itioner Claro. These photographs are far from proofs that private respondent is the fat h er of pet itioner Claro. As explained by the private respondent, he was in the ba pt ism a s on e of t h e spon sors of petitioner Claro. The pictures taken in t h e h ou se of V iolet a sh ow in g pr iv a t e r espondent showering affection to Claro fall short of the evidence required to prove pa t er n it y . T h e baptismal certificates of petitioner Claro naming private respondent as his father has sca n t ev identiary value. There is no showing that private respondent participated in its prepa r a t ion . T h e certificates of live birth of the petitioners identifying private respondent as their fath er a r e n ot also competent evidence on the issue of their paternity. Again, the records do no show t h a t pr ivate respondent had a hand in the preparation of said certificates. Also, there is no proof tha t Fa ther Fernandez is a close friend of Violeta Esguerra and the private respondent which sh ou ld r ender unquestionable his identification of the private respondent du r in g pet it ion er Cla r o's ba ptism. In the absence of this proof, we are not prepared t o concede that Father Fernandez who officiates numerous baptismal ceremonies day in and day out can remember the paren t s of t h e ch ildr en h e h a s ba pt ized.

Ca melo Cabatania vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 124814 October 21, 2004 Joh n Paul E. Fernandez, et al., vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 1 08366 February 16, 1994 FA CT S: V ioleta P. Esguerra, single, is the mother and guardian ad litem of the t w o pet it ion er s, Cla r o A ntonio Fernandez and John Paul Fernandez, met som etime in 1983, at the Meralco Compound t ennis courts. A Meralco employee and a tennis enthusiast, Carlito used t o spend his week -en ds r egularly at said courts, where Violeta's father served as t ennis instructor . V iolet a poin t ed t o Ca rlito as the father of her two sons. She claimed that they started their illicit sexual relationship six (6) months after their first meeting. The tryst resulted in the birth of petitioner Claro Antonio on March 1, 1 984, and of petitioner John Paul on not know that Carlito was mar r ied u n t il t h e birth of her two children. She averred they were married in civil rites in October, 1983. In March, 1 985, however, she discovered that the marria g e licen se w h i ch t h ey u sed w a s spu r iou s. Pet itioners presented the following documentary evidence: t h eir cer t ifica t es of liv e bir t h , identifying respondent Carlito as their father; the baptismal certificate of petitioner Claro which a lso states that his father is respondent Carlito; photographs of Carlito taken during the baptism of pet itioner Claro; and pictures of respondent Carlito and Claro taken at the h om e of V iolet a Esg uerra. In defense, respondent Carlito denied Violeta's alleg a t ion s t h a t h e sir ed t h e t w o pet itioners. He averred he only served as one of the sponsors in the baptism of petitioner Cla r o. T h is claim was corroborated by the t est im on y of Roda n t e Pa g t a kh a n , a n officem a t e of r espondent Carlito who also stood as a spon sor of pet it ion er Cla r o du r in g h is b a pt ism .

FA CT S: Flor encia‘s version was that she was the mother of pr iv a t e r espon den t w h o w a s bor n on September 9, 1 982 and that she was the one supporting the child. She recounted that a ft er h er h usband left her in the early part of 1981, she went to Escalante, Negros Occident a l t o look for w ork and was eventually hired as petitioner‘s household help. It was while workin g t h er e a s a m aid that, on January 2, 1 982, petitioner brought her t o Bacolod City where they check ed in a t t h e Visayan Motel and had sexual intercourse. Petitioner prom ised t o su ppor t h er if sh e g ot pr egnant. Florencia claimed she discovered she was carrying petitioner‘s child 27 days after their sexual encounter. The sexual intercourse was repeated in March 1982 in San Carlos City. La t er , on suspicion that Florencia was pregnant, petitioner‘s wife sent her home. But petitioner instead br ought her to Singcang, Bacolod City where he rented a house for her. On September 9, 1 9 8 2 , a ssisted by a hilot in her aunt‘s house in T iglawigan, Cadiz City, she g a v e bir t h t o h er ch ild, pr iv a t e r espon den t Ca m elo Reg odos. Pet itioner Camelo Cabatania‘s version was that he was a sugar pla n t er a n d a bu sin essm a n . Som etime in December, 1981, he hired Florencia as a servant at home. During the course of h er em ployment, she would often go home to her husband in the afternoon and return to w or k t h e following morning. This displeased petitioner‘s wife, hence she was told to look for another job. In t he meantime, Florencia asked permission from petitioner t o go home and spend New Yea r ‘s Ev e in Cadiz City. Petitioner met her on board the Ceres bus boun d for Sa n Ca r los Cit y a n d inv ited her to dinner. While they were eating, she confided that she was hard up and pet it ion er offered to lend her save money. Later, they spent the night in San Carlos City a n d h a d sex u a l in tercourse. While doing it, he felt som ething jerking and when he asked her about it , sh e t old

h im she was pregnant with the child of her husband. They went hom e t h e follow in g da y . In Ma rch 1982, Florencia, then already working in another household, went to petition er ‘s h ou se h oping to be re-employed as a servant there. Since petitioner‘s wife was in need of one, sh e w a s r e-hired. However petitioner‘s wife noticed that her stomach was bulging and inquired about the fa ther of the unborn child. She told petitioner‘s wife that the baby was by her husband. Beca u se of h er condition, she was again told t o go home and they did n ot see ea ch ot h er a n y m or e. Pet itioner was therefore surprised when summons was served on him by Florencia‘s counsel. She w as demanding support for private respondent Camelo Regodos. Petitioner refused, denying the a lleged paternity. He insisted she was already pregnant when they had sex. He denied g oin g t o Ba colod City with her and checking in at the Visayan Motel. He vehemently denied h a v in g sex w ith her on January 2, 1 9 8 2 a n d r en t in g a h ou se for h er in Sin g ca n g , Ba colod Cit y . T he trial court gave probative weight t o the testimony of Florencia despite its discovery that she m isrepresented herself as a widow when, in reality, her husband was alive. On appeal, the Cour t of A ppea ls a ffir m ed t h e r u lin g of t h e t r ia l cou r t . ISSUE: W h ether or not Ca m elo sh ou ld be en t it led t o su ppor t a s Ca m elo Ca ba t a n ia ‘s ch ild. HELD: No. Clearly, this petition calls for a review of the factual findings of the two lower cou r t s. A s a g eneral rule, factual issues are not within the province of this Court. Factual findings of the tria l court, when adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, becom e final and conclu siv e a n d m ay not be reviewed on appeal. However, the Court is convinced that this case falls within one of t h e exceptions. Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is requir ed t o est ablish paternity and filiation. A n or der for r ecog n it ion a n d su ppor t m a y cr ea t e a n u nwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the pa r t ies so t h a t it m ust be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and con v in cin g ev iden ce. T h e applicable provisions of the law are Articles 172 and 175 of the Civil Code which states t h a t : t h e filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1 ) The record of bir t h a ppearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a pu blic document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the a bsence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) T h e open a n d con tinuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by t h e Ru les of Court and special laws; Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in t h e same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. Private respondent‘s copy of h is birth and baptismal certificates, the preparation of which was without the knowledge or consent of pet itioner. A certificate of live birth purportedly iden t ify in g t h e pu t a t iv e fa t h er is n ot com petent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in t h e preparation of said certificate. The local civil regist r a r h a s n o a u t h or it y t o r ecor d t h e pa ternity of an illegitimate child on the information of a third person. Also, while a ba pt ism a l certificate may be considered a pu blic docu m en t , it ca n on ly ser v e a s ev iden ce of t h e a dm inistration of the sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of t h e en t r ies w it h r espect to the child‘s paternity. Thus, certificates issued by the local civil registrar and baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be admit t ed in directly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same. Private respon den t fa iled t o pr esen t su fficient proof of voluntary recognition. On the other hand, the fact that Florencia‘s husband is liv ing and there is a valid subsisting marriage between them gives rise to the presumption that a ch ild born within that marriage is legitimate even though the mother may have declared again st it s legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. The presumption of legitimacy does n ot only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the broad principles of n a t u r a l ju stice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is groun ded on t h e policy t o pr otect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy. In this age of genet ic pr ofilin g a n d deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the extremely subjective test of physical resembla n ce or sim ilarity of features will not suffice as evidence to prove paternity and filiation before the courts of la w .

SA YSON VS. COURT OF A PPEA LS (Ja n u a r y 2 3 , 1 9 9 2 ) Cr u z, J.: FA CT S: Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and T eodor o. Elen o died in 1 9 5 2 a n d Ra fa ela in 1 9 7 6 . On e of their children, Teodoro married to Isabel died on 1972. The wife of Teodoro, Isabel th en a ft er died in 1981. The properties of the couple T eodoro a n d Isa bel w er e left w it h pr iv a t e r espon den t s Delia , Edm u n do a n d Dor ibel, w h o w er e t h eir ch ildr en . On April 25, 1983, Maurico, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and Juana (mother of Isabel) filed for pa rtition of the estate of Teodoro and Isabel, which w a s opposed by Delia , Edm u n do a n d Dor ibel, who claimed successional rights t o the estate. Likewise, Delia, Edmundo a n d Dor ibel filed their own complaint for the partition of Eleno and Rafaela‘s estate through representation. Bot h cases were decided in favor of the private respondents. Judge Rafael decla r ed t h a t Delia a n d Edmundo were the legally adopted children of T eodoro and Isabel Sayson by vir t u e of t h e decree of adoption. Doribel was their legitimate daughter as evidenced by her birth cer t ifica t e. Con sequently, the three children were entitled to inherit from Eleno an d Ra fa ela by r ig h t of r epresentation. On the other case, Judge Sañez held that being the legitimate h eir s of T eodor o a n d Isabel as established by the aforementioned evidence, the same excluded the plaintiffs from sh a r in g in t h eir est a t e. T h e Court of Appeals modified the decision in that Delia and Edmundo Sayson are disqua lified fr om inheriting from the estate of the deceased spouses Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, but affirm ed a ll ot h er r espec t s. Hen ce, t h is pet it ion for r ev iew by cer t ior a r i. ISSUE: W h ether or not the private respondents are entitled to inherit from t h eir pa r en t s a n d t h eir g r a n dpa r en t s. HELD: A challenge to the validity of the adoption cannot be made collaterally in a n a ct ion for pa r t it ion bu t in a dir ect pr oceedin g fr on t a lly a ddr essin g t h e issu e. On the question of Doribel's legitimacy, the findings of t h e t r ia l cou r t s a s a ffir m ed by t h e r espondent court must be sustained. Doribel's birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence. It is on e of the prescribed means of recognition under Article 265 of the Civil Code a n d A r t icle 1 7 2 of the Family Code. It is true, as the petitioners stress, t h a t t h e bir t h cer t ifica t e offer s on ly prima facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence. However , su c h ev iden ce is la ckin g in t h e ca se a t ba r . Dor ibel, as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and Delia and Edm u n do, a s t h eir adopted children, are the exclusive heirs to the intestate estat e of t h e decea sed cou ple, con for m a bly t o t h e follow in g A r t icle 9 7 9 of t h e Civ il Code: A rt. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other ascen da n t s, w ithout distinction as t o sex or age, and even if they should come from differ en t m a r r ia g es. A n adopted child succeeds t o the property of the adopting parents in t h e sa m e m a n n er a s a leg it im a t e ch ild. T h e philosophy underlying this article is that a person's love descends first to his childr en a n d g randchildren before it ascends t o his parents and thereafter spr ea ds a m on g h is colla t er a l r elatives. It is also supposed that one of his purposes in acquiring properties is t o lea v e t h em ev entually t o his children as a t oken of his lov e for them and as a provision for their con t in u ed ca r e ev en a ft er h e is g on e fr om t h is ea r t h .

T h ere is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the granddau g h t er of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her deceased father in the distribution of t h e in testate estate of her grandparents. Under Article 981, quoted above, she is entitled to the share h er father would have directly inherited had he survived, which shall be equal t o t h e sh a r es of h er g r a n dpa r en t s' ot h er ch ildr en . Bu t a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia an d Edm u n do, t o w h om t h e g randparents were t otal strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed t o be a leg itimate child and have the same right as the latter, these rights do not in clu de t h e r ig h t of r epresentation. The relationship created by the adoption is between only the adoptin g pa r en t s a n d t h e a dopt ed ch ild a n d does n ot ex t en d t o t h e blood r ela t iv es of eit h er pa r t y .

LIYA O v s. T A NHOT I-LIYA O (3 7 8 SCRA 5 6 3 ) FA CTS: This is a petition for compulsory recognition of William Liyao Jr. as ―t h e illeg it im a t e (spurious) child of the late Willima Liyao against Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Ta n , T it a Rose L. T a n a n d Lin da Ch r ist in a Liy a o (ch ildr en a n d w ife of W illia m ). A ccording to Corazon G. Garcia, William Liyao Jr.‘s mother and representative, she was married t o but living separately from Ramon M. Yulo for more than ten (10) years and coh a bit ed w it h la te William Liyao from 1 965 t o the time of William‘s untimely demise on December 2 , 1 9 7 5 . T h ey lived together with the knowledge of William Liyao‘s legitimate children, Tita Rose L. T a n a n d Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga, who were both employed at the Far East Realty Invest m en t , In c. of which Corazon and William were the vice president and president, respectively. On Jun e 9 , 1975, Corazon gave birth to William Liyao Jr. (Billy). Since then, he had been in con t in u ou s possession and enjoyment of the status of a recognized and/or acknowledged child of W illia m Liy ao by the latter‘s direct and overt acts which among others, the pa y m en t of m edica l a n d h ospital expenses, food and clothing and bringing him t o vacations and various social gatherings a s ev iden ced by t h e pict u r es t a ken on t h e sa id occa sion s. On the other hand, according to Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga, her parents, William Liy a o a n d Ju anita Tanhoti-Liyao, were legally married. She grew up and lived with h er pa r en t s a t Sa n Lor enzo Village , Makati until she got married. Her parents were not separated legally or in fa ct a n d that there was no reason why any of her parents would institute legal separation proceedings in court. Her father came hom e regularly even during out of town t o ch a n g e clot h s u n t il h e su ffered from two strokes before the fatal at t a ck w h ich led t o h is dea t h on Decem ber 2 , 1 975. She further testified that she knew Corazon Garcia is still married t o Ramon Yulo and wa s n ot legally separated from her husband and the recor ds fr om Loca l Civ il Reg ist r a r do n ot in dicate that the couple obtained any annulment of t h eir m a r r ia g e. T it a Rose Liy a o-T a n t estimony was similar to Ms. Linda that their parents were legally married and had nev er been separated. They resided at San Lor en zo V illa g e u n t il t h e t im e of t h eir fa t h er ‘s dea t h . T h e trial court rendered judgment in favor of the William, Jr. and Corazon. However, the Cour t of A ppeals reversed the ruling of the trial court and ruled in favor of Juanita, Pearl a n d Lin da . Issu e: W h et h er or n ot W illia m , Jr . is en t it led t o in h er it . Held: The Court sustained the decision of the Court of Appeals stating that the fact that Corazon h a d been living separately from Ramon at the t ime petitioner was conceived a n d bor n h a s n o bearing to the legitimacy of the child. While the physical impossibility for the husban d t o h a v e sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds in impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears em phasis that the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned in Art. 255

of t h e Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband or in proper cases, h is h eir s u n der t h e con ditions set forth under Art. 262 of the Civil Code. It is therefore clear that the present petition in itiated by petitioner, t o compel recognition by respondents of petitioner William Liyao Jr ., a s t h e illegitimate son of late William Liyao cannot prosper. It is settled that a child born with in a v alid marriage is presumed legitimate even though the mother may have decla r ed a g a in st it s leg itimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. The Court cannot allow pet it ion er t o m aintain his present petition and subvert the clear mandate of the law that only the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs could impugn the legit im a cy of a ch ild bor n in a v a lid a n d su bsisting marriage. The child himself cannot choose his own filiation. If the husband presumed t o be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is fix ed, a n d t h e la t t er ca n n ot ch oose t o be t h e ch ild of h is m ot h er ‘s a lleg ed pa r a m ou r .

DE JESUS v s. EST A T E OF DIZON (3 6 6 SCRA 4 9 9 ) V it u g , J.: FA CTS: Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August 1 9 6 4 . It w a s du ring this marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesu s a n d Jin kie Ch r ist ie A . de Jesu s, h er ein pet it ion er s, w er e bor n . In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G. Dizon ackn ow ledg ed Ja cqu elin e a n d Jin kie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died intestate on 12 March 1992, leaving behind considerable assets consisting of shares of stock in various corporations and some real pr oper t y . It w a s on t h e st r en g t h of h is n ot a r ized a cknowledgement that petitioners filed a com pla in t for "Pa r t it ion w it h In v en t or y a n d A ccou n t in g " of t h e Dizon est a t e w it h t h e Reg ion a l T r ia l Cou r t of Qu ezon Cit y . Respondents, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of t h e deceden t Ju a n G. Dizon , in cluding the corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of t h e ca se, arguing that the complaint, even while denominated as being on e for pa r t it ion , w ou ld n ev ertheless call for altering the status of petitioners from being the legitimate childr en of t h e spou ses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus t o instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesu s a n d decea sed Ju a n Dizon . T h e trial court denied, due to lack of merit. However. the appellate court upheld the decision of t h e lower court and ordered the case t o be remanded to the trial court for further pr oceedin g s. T h e Trial Court decreed that the declaration of h eir sh ip cou ld on ly be m a de in a specia l pr oceeding inasmuch as petitioners were seeking t h e est a blish m en t of a st a t u s or r ig h t . In t he instant petition for review on certiorari, the petitioners maintain that their recognition a s being illegitimate children of the decedent, embodied in a n a u t h en t ic w r it in g , is in it self su fficient to establish their status as such and does not require a separa t e a ct ion for ju dicia l a ppr ov a l. ISSUE: W h ether an action for partition is proper to ascertain the question of pat er n it y & filia t ion or w h et h er it sh ou ld be t a ken in a n in depen den t su it . HELD: T h e filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) t h e r ecor d of birth appearing the civil register or a final judgement; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiat ion in a public document or a private handwritten and signed by t h e pa r en t con cer n ed. In t h e a bsence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuos possession of the st a t u s of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. T h e du e recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a cou r t or r ecord, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledg em en t of t h e

ch ild, and no further court action is required. In fact, any writing is treated not just a ground for com pulsory recognition; it is in itself voluntary recognition that does n ot r equ ir e a sepa r a t e a ction for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for r ecog n it ion is pr edict ed on ot h er ev idence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a sta t em en t before a court or record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the applica ble st a t u e of lim it a t ion s is essen t ia l in or der t o est a blish t h e ch ild's a ckn ow ledg em en t . Su ccinctly, in an attempt to establish their illegitimat e filia t ion t o t h e la t e Ju a n G. Dizon , pet itioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being children of Danilo de Jesu s a n d Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done because the law itself establishes th e leg itimacy of children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents. The presumption of leg itimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only the father, or in exceptiona l in stances the latter's heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born t o h is wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully im pugned tha t t h e pa t er n it y of t h e h u sba n d ca n be r eject ed. T h e rule that the written acknowledgement made by the deceased Jua n G. Dizon est a blish es pet itioners' alleged illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be validly invoked t o be of a n y r elevance in this instance. This issue, i.e whether petit ion er s a r e in deed t h e a ckn ow ledg e illegitimate offsprings of the decedent, cannot be aptly adjudicated without a n a ct ion h a v in g been first instituted to impugn their legitimacy as being the children of Danilo B. de Jesu s a n d Ca rolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful wedlock. Jurispru den ce is st r on g ly set t led t h a t t h e pa ramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally, one that can only be r epudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. Indeed, a ch ild so born in such wedlock shall be considered legitimate although the mother ma y h a v e decla r ed a gainst its leg it im a cy or m a y h a v e been sen t en ced a s h a v in g been a n a du lt er ess.

LA BA GA LA v s. SA NT IA GO (G.R. No. 1 3 2 3 0 5 ; Decem ber 4 , 2 0 0 1 ) Qu isu m bin g , J.: FA CT S: Jose T . Santiago owned a parcel of land located in Sta. Cruz, Manila . A lleg in g t h a t Jose h a d fr audulently registered it in his name alone, his sisters Nicolasa and Amanda (now responden t s h er ein ) su ed Jose for r ecov er y of 2 /3 sh a r e of t h e pr oper t y . T h e trial court in that case decided in favor of the sisters, recognizing their right of ow n er sh ip ov er portions of the property. The Register of Deeds of Manila was required to include the names of Nicola sa a n d A m a n da in t h e cer t ific a t e of t it le t o sa id pr oper t y . Jose died intestate. The respondents filed a complaint for recover y of t it le, ow n er sh ip, a n d possession against herein petitioner, Ida C. Labagala, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila , t o r ecover from her the 1 /3 portion of said property pertaining to Jose bu t w h ich ca m e in t o pet it ion er 's sole possession u pon Jose's dea t h . Respondents alleged that Jose's share in the property belongs t o t h em by oper a t ion of la w , because they are the only legal heirs of their brother, who died intestate and without issue. They claimed that the purported sale of the property made by their brother to petitioner sometime in Ma rch 1979 was executed through petitioner's machinations and with malicious intent, to enable h er to secure the corresponding transfer certificate of title (TCT No. 172334) in petitioner's name a lon e. Respondents insisted that the deed of sale was a forgery .The deed showed that Jose affix ed h is t humbmark thereon but respondents averred that, having been able to graduate fr om colleg e, Jose n ever put his thumb mark on documents he executed but always signed his n a m e in fu ll.

On the other hand, petitioner claimed that her true name is not Ida C. Labagala as cla im ed by r espondent but Ida C. Santiago. She claimed not to know any per son by t h e n a m e of Ida C. La bagala. She claimed to be the daughter of Jose and thus entitled to his sha r e in t h e su bject pr operty. She maintained that she had always stayed on the property, ever since she was a child. Sh e argued that the purported sale of the property was in fact a donation to her, and that nothing cou ld have precluded Jose from putting his thumbm a r k on t h e deed of sa le in st ea d of h is signature. She pointed out that during his lifetime, Jose never acknowledged respondents' claim ov er the property such that respondents had to sue to claim portions thereof. She lamented tha t r espondents had t o disclaim her in their desire t o obtain owner sh ip of t h e w h ole pr oper t y . T r ial court ruled in fa v or of pet it ion er w h ich w a s r ev er sed by t h e Cou r t of A ppea ls. ISSUES: (1 ) whether or not respondents may impugn petitioner's filiation in this action for r ecov er y of t it le a n d possession ; a n d (2 ) whether or not petitioner is entitled t o Jose's 1/3 portion of the property he co-ow n ed w it h r espon den t s, t h r ou g h su ccession , sa le, or don a t ion . HELD: Pet itioner's reliance on Article 263 of the Civil Code is misplaced. This article should be r ea d in con junction with the other articles in the same chapter on paternity and filia t ion in t h e Civ il Code. A careful reading of said chapter would reveal that it contemplat es sit u a t ion s w h er e a dou bt exists that a child is indeed a man's child by his wife, and the husband (or, in proper cases, h is heirs) denies the child's filiation. It does not refer to situations where a child is alleged not t o be t h e ch ild a t a ll of a pa r t icu la r cou ple. A rticle 263 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to assert a n d pr ov e t h a t a per son is not a man's child by his wife. However , t h e pr esen t ca se is n ot on e im pu g n in g pet itioner's legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not merely that petitioner is not a legit im a t e ch ild of Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose at all. Moreover, the pr esen t a ct ion is on e for r ecovery of title and possession, and thus outside the scope of A r t icle 2 6 3 on pr escr ipt iv e per iods. Pet itioner's reliance on Sayson is likewise improper. The factual milieu present in Says on does n ot obtain in the instant case. What was being challenged by petitioners in Sayson w a s (1 ) t h e v alidity of the adoption of Delia and Edmundo by the deceased Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, a n d (2 ) the legitimate status of Doribel Sayson. While asserting that Delia and Edmundo cou ld n ot h ave been validly adopted since Doribel had already been born t o the Sayson couple at the time, pet itioners at the same t ime made the conflicting claim that Doribel w a s n ot t h e ch ild of t h e cou ple. The Court ruled in that case that it was too late t o question the decree of adopt ion t h a t became final years before. Besides, such a challenge t o the validity of the a dopt ion ca n n ot be m a de colla t er a lly bu t in a dir ect pr oceedin g . Pet itioner, who claims to be Ida Santiago, has the same birthdate as Ida Labagala. The simila rity is t oo u n ca n n y t o be a m er e coin ciden ce. Du r ing her testimony before the trial court, petitioner denied knowing Cornelia Cabrig a s, w h o w as listed as the mother in the birth certificate of Ida Labagala. In her petition before this Court, h owever, she stated that Cornelia is the sister of h er m ot h er , Esper a n za . It a ppea r s t h a t pet itioner made conflicting statements that affect her credibility and could cast along shadow of dou bt on h er cla im s of filia t ion . T hus, we are constrained to agree with the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that petitioner is in reality the child of Leon Labagala and Cornelia Cabrigas, and contrary t o her averment, n ot of Jose Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas. Not being a child of Jose, it follows that petitioner can n ot inherit from him through intestate succession. It now r em a in s t o be seen w h et h er t h e pr operty in dispute w a s v a lidly t r a n sfer r ed t o pet it ion er t h r ou g h sa le or don a t ion . Jose did not have the right to transfer ownership of the entire property to p etition er sin ce 2 /3 t h ereof belonged t o his sisters. Petitioner could not have given her consent to the contract, being

a m inor at the time. Consent of the contracting parties is among the essen t ia l r equ isit es of a con tract, including one of sale, absent which there can be no valid contract. Moreover, petitioner a dm ittedly did not pay any centavo for the property, which makes the sale void. Article 1 4 7 1 of t h e Civ il Code pr ov ides: A rt. 1471. If the price is simulated, the sale is void, but the act may be show n t o h a v e been in r ea lit y a don a t ion , or som e ot h er a ct or con t r a ct . Neit h er m a y t h e pu r por t ed deed of sa le be a v a lid deed of don a t ion .

EST A T E OF LOCSIN v s. JUA N C. LOCSIN (Decem ber 1 0 , 2 0 0 1 ) Sa n dov a l-Gu t ier r ez, J.: FA CTS: Eleven months after Juan "Jhonny" Locsin, Sr. died intestate on December 1 1 , 1 9 9 0 , r espondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. filed with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City , a "Pet it ion for Let ters of Administration" praying that he be appointed Administrator of the Intestate Estat e of t h e deceased. He alleged that he is an acknowledged natural child. The trial court issued an order set ting the petition for hearing which order was duly published, ther eby g iv in g n ot ice t o a ll per son s w h o m a y h a v e opposit ion t o t h e sa id pet it ion . Befor e the scheduled hearing, the heirs of Jose Locsin, Jr., the heirs of Mar ia Locsin , Ma n u el Locsin and Ester Jarantilla, claiming to be the lawful heirs of the deceased, filed an opposit ion . T h ey averred that respondent is not a child or an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin , w h o du r in g h is lifet im e, n ev er a ffix ed "Sr ." in h is n a m e. On January 5, 1993, another opposition to the petition was filed by Lucy Salinop (sole heir of the la te Maria Locsin Vda. De Araneta, sister of the deceased), Manuel Locsin and the successor s of t h e late Lourdes C. Locsin alleging that respondent's claim a s a n a t u r a l ch ild is ba r r ed by pr escr ipt ion or t h e st a t u t e of lim it a t ion s. T h e Intestate Estate of the late Jose Locsin, Jr. (br ot h er of t h e decea sed) a lso en t er ed it s a ppearance in the estate proceedings, joining the earlier oppositors. This w a s follow ed by a n a ppearance and opposition of Ester Locsin Jarantilla (another sister of Juan C. Locsin), likewise st ating that there is no filial relationship bet w een h er ein r espon den t a n d t h e decea sed. T o su pport his claim that he is an acknowledged natural ch ild of t h e decea sed, r espon den t su bmitted a machine copy of his Certificate of Live Birth found in the boun d v olu m e of bir t h r ecords in the Office of the Local Clerk Registrar of Iloilo City which contains the in for m a t ion t hat respondent's father is Juan C. Locsin, Sr. and that he was the informant of the fact s st a t ed t h erein, as evidenced by his signatures. To prove the existence and authenticity of Certifica t e of Liv e Birth, respondent presented the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. Respondent also offered in evidence a photograph showing him and his mother, Amparo Escamilla, in fr on t of a coffin bearing Juan C. Locsin's dead body. The photograph, respondent claims, shows that he a n d h is m ot h er h a v e been r ecog n ized a s fa m ily m em ber s of t h e decea sed. Pet itioners claimed that Certificate of Live Birth is spurious. They submitted a certified true copy of Certificate of Live Birth found in the Civil Registrar General, Metro Manila indicating that the birth of respondent was reported by his mother, Amparo Escamilla, and that the same does n ot con tain the signature of the late Juan C. Locsin. They observed as anom alous the fact that wh ile r espondent was born on October 22, 1956 and his birth was recorded on Ja n u a r y 3 0 , 1 9 5 7 , h owever, his Certificate of Live Birth w a s r ecor ded on a Decem ber 1, 1958 revis ed form . T he trial court found that the Certificate of Live Birth and the photograph are sufficien t pr oofs of r espondent's illegitimate filiation. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the order of the t r ia l court. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, while respondent filed a m ot ion for ex ecu t ion pen din g a ppea l. Bot h m ot ion s w er e den ied by t h e A ppella t e Cou r t .

ISSUE: W h ich of the two documents — Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") and Certifica t e of Liv e Bir t h No. 4 7 7 (Ex h ibit "8 ") is g en u in e. HELD: Ex h ibit 8 for t h e pet it ion er s. W ith respect to Local Civil Registries, access thereto by interested parties is obv iou sly ea sier . T hus, in prov ing the authenticity of Ex h ibit "D," m or e con v in cin g ev iden ce t h a n t h ose con sider ed by t h e t r ia l cou r t sh ou ld h a v e been pr esen t ed by r espon den t . T h e event about which she testified on March 7, 1 994 was the record of respondent's birth which t ook place on October 22, 1956, on 37 or 38 years ago. The Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo Cit y a t t hat time was Em ilio G. Tomesa. Necessarily, Vencer's knowledge of respondent's bir t h r ecor d a llegedly made and entered in the Local Civil Registry in January, 1 957 was based merely on her g en er a l im pr ession s of t h e ex ist in g r ecor ds in t h a t Office. W h en entries in the Certificate of Live Birth recorded in the Local Civil Registry vary from th ose a ppearing in the copy transmitted to the Civil Registry General, pursuant to the Civ il Reg ist r y La w, the variance has t o be clarified in more persuasive and rational manner. In this regard, w e fin d V en cer 's ex pla n a t ion n ot con v in cin g . Respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") was recorded in a December 1, 1958 r ev ised form. Asked how a 1958 form could be used in 19 5 7 w h en r espon den t 's bir t h w a s r ecorded, Vencer answered that "x x x during that t ime, maybe the forms in 1956 were a lr e a dy ex hausted so the former Civil Registrar had requested for a new form and they sent us the 19 5 8 Rev ised Form." The answer is a "m a y be", a m er e su pposit ion of a n ev en t . It does n ot sa t isfactorily explain how a Revised Form dated Decem ber 1, 1958 cou ld h a v e been u sed on January 30, 1957 or alm os t (2) years earlier. Upon the other hand, Exhibit "8" of the petitioners found in the Civil Registrar General in Metro Ma n ila is on Municipal Form No 102, revised in July, 1956. We find no irregularity here. Indeed, it is logical t o assume that the 1 956 forms would continue to be used several years thereafter. But for a 1958 form to be us ed in 1957 is unlik ely . T h ere are other indications of irregularity relative t o Exhibit "D." The back cov er of t h e 1 9 5 7 bound volume in the Local Civil Registry of Iloilo is torn. Exhibit "D" is m erely pasted w it h t h e bou n d v olu m e, n ot sew n like t h e ot h er en t r ies. T h e documents bound into one volume are original copies. Exhibit "D" is a carbon copy of t h e a lleged original and sticks out like a sore thumb because the entries therein a r e t y pew r it t en , w hile the records of all other certificates are handwritten. Unlike the con t en t s of t h ose ot h er certificates, Exhibit "D" does not indicate important particulars, such a s t h e a lleg ed f a t h er 's r eligion, race, occupation, address and business. The space w h ich ca lls for a n en t r y of t h e leg itimacy of the child is blank. On the back page of Exhibit "D", there is a purported signature of t h e alleged father, but the blanks callin g for t h e da t e a n d ot h er det a ils of h is Residen ce Cer t ifica t e w er e n ot filled u p. W h en asked to explain the t orn back cover of the bound volume, Vencer had no answer except to st a t e, "I a m n ot a w a r e of t h is beca u se I a m n ot a bookbin der ." T h e records of the instant case adequately support a finding that Exhibit "8" for the petition er s, n ot respondent's Exhibit "D", should have been given more faith and creden ce by t h e cou r t s below . In t his connection, we echo this Court's pronouncement in Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar th a t : "Section 5 of Act No. 3753 and Article 280 of the Civil Code of the Ph ilippin es . . . ex plicit ly pr ohibit, not only the naming of the father of the child born ou t of w edlock, w hen the birth certificate, or the recognition, is not filed or made by him , bu t a lso, t h e st a t em en t of a n y

in formation or circumstances by which he could be identified. Accor din g ly , t h e Loca l Civ il Reg istrar had no authority to make or record the paternity of an illeg it im a t e ch ild u pon t h e in formation of a third person and the certificate of birth of an illegitimate child, w hen s igned only by the m other of the latter, is incom petent evidence of fathers hip of s aid child ." T h e Roces ruling regarding illegitimate filiation is further elucidated in Fernandez vs . Court of Appeals where this Court said that "a birth certificate not signed by the alleged father (wh o h a d n o h a n d in it s pr epa r a t ion ) is n ot com pet en t ev iden ce of pa t er n it y ." A birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence prescribed by both the Civ il Code and Article 1 7 2 of the Family Code for purposes of recognition and filiation. However, birth certificate offers on ly prima facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence. It s ev iden t ia r y w orth cannot be sustained where there exists strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity. In this case, respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 entered in the records of the Local Civil Registry (from which Exhibit "D" was machine copied) has all the badges of nu llit y . W ithout doubt, the authentic copy on file in that office was removed a n d su bst it u t ed w it h a fa lsified Cer t ifica t e of Liv e Bir t h .

EDGA RDO T IJING & BIENV ENIDA T IJING v s. COURT OF A PPEA LS (G.R. No. 1 2 5 9 0 1 ; Ma r ch 8 , 2 0 0 1 )Qu isu m bin g , J.: FA CT S: Pet itioners are husband and wife. They have six children. The youngest is Edgardo T ijin g , Jr ., w ho was born on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife and registered nurse Lourdes Vasquez in St a. Ana, Manila . Petitioner Bienvenida served as the laundrywoman of pr iv a t e r espon den t A n g elit a Dia m a n t e, t h en a r esiden t of T on do, Ma n ila . A ccording to Bienvenida in August 1989, Angelita went to her house to fetch her for a n u r g en t la undry job. Since Bienvenida was on her way to do som e marketing, she asked Angelita to w a it u ntil she returned. She also left her four-m onth old son, Edgardo, Jr., under the care of Angelita a s she usually let Angelita take car e of t h e ch ild w h ile Bien v en ida w a s doin g la u n dr y . Upon her return, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr., were gone. Bienven ida for t h w it h pr oceeded t o A ngelita's house in Tondo, Manila , but did not find them there. Angelita's maid told Bienvenida t hat her employer went out for a stroll and t old Bienvenida to come back later. She retu r n ed t o A ngelita's house after three days, only to discover that Angelita had moved t o a n ot h er pla ce. Bienvenida then complained to her barangay chairman a n d a lso t o t h e police w h o seem ed u n m ov ed by h er plea s for a ssist a n ce. Fou r years later or in October 1993, Bienvenida read in a tabloid a bou t t h e dea t h of T om a s Lopez, allegedly the common-law husband of Angelita, and whose remains were lying in state in Ha g on oy , Bu la ca n . Bienvenida lost no t ime in going to Hagonoy, Bulacan, where she allegedly saw her son Edgardo, Jr ., for the first t ime after four years. She claims that the boy, who was poin t ed ou t t o h er by Ben jamin Lopez, a brother of the late Tomas Lopez, was already named John Thomas Lopez. She a v ers t h a t A n g elit a r efu sed t o r et u r n t o h er t h e boy despit e h er dem a n d t o do so. Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus with the tria l cou r t in or der t o r ecover their son. Petitioners presented two witnesses. The 1 st, witness is Vasquez who test ified t hat she assisted in the delivery of one Edgardo T ijing, Jr. on April 27, 1989 at her clinic. The 2nd, Ben jamin Lopez who declared that his brother admitted to him that John T h om a s Lopez w a s on ly a n a dopt ed son a n d t h a t h e a n d A n g elit a w er e n ot blessed w it h ch ildr en . For her part, Angelita claimed that she is the natural mother of the child. She asserts that at ag e 4 2, she gave birth to John Thomas Lopez on April 27, 1989, at th e clin ic of m idw ife Zosim a

Pa nganiban in Singalong, Manila . She added, though, that she has two other children wit h h er r eal husband, Angel Sanchez. She said the birth of John Thomas was registered by her common law husband, T omas Lopez, with the local civ il r eg ist r a r of Ma n ila on A u g u st 4 , 1 9 8 9 . On March 10, 1995, the trial court concluded that since Angelita and her common -law husba n d cou ld not have children, the alleged birth of John Thomas Lopez is an impossibilit y . T h e t r ia l court also held that the minor and Bienvenida showed strong facial similarity. Accor din g ly , it r u led that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person who is t h e n a t u r a l ch ild of pet it ion er s. T h e sheriff implemented the order of the trial court by taking custody of the minor. In his report, t h e sheriff stated that Angelita peacefully surrendered the minor and he turned ov er the custody of sa id ch ild t o pet it ion er Edg a r do T ijin g . T h e Court of Appeals reversed and expressed its doubts on the propriety of the habeas corpus. In it s view, the evidence adduced by Bienvenida was not sufficient to establish t h a t sh e w a s t h e m other of the minor. It ruled that the lower court erred in declaring that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and Joh n T h om a s Lopez a r e on e a n d t h e sa m e per son . ISSUES: (1 ) W h et h er or n ot habeas corpus is t h e pr oper r em edy ? (2 ) Whether or not Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and th e sa m e per son a n d is t h e son of pet it ion er s? HELD: T h e writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which a n y per son is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person i s withheld from t h e person entitled thereto. Thus, it is the proper legal remedy to enable parents t o r eg a in t h e cu stody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of his own free will. It m ay even be said that in custody ca ses in v olv in g m in or s, t h e qu est ion of illeg a l a n d inv oluntary restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for the availability of the writ a s a r em edy. Rather, it is prosecuted for the purpose of determining t h e r ig h t of cu st ody ov er a ch ild. It must be stressed too that in habeas corpusproceedin g s, t h e qu est ion of iden t it y is r elevant and material, subject to the usual presumptions including those a s t o iden t it y of t h e per son . A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the evidence presented by Bienven ida i s su fficient to establish that John Thomas Lopez is actually her missing son, Edgardo T ijin g , Jr . Fir st, there is evidence that Angelita could no longer bear children . Fr om h er v er y lips, sh e a dm itted that after the birth of her second child, she underwent ligation at the Martinez Hospital in 1 970, before she lived with Tom as Lopez without the benefit of marriage in 1 9 7 4 . Secon d, t h ere is strong evidence which directly prov es that Tomas Lopez is no longer capable of sirin g a son . Benjamin Lopez declared in court that his brother, T om a s, w a s st er ile beca u se of t h e a ccident and that T omas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only a n a dopt ed son . Mor eover, Tomas Lopez and his legal wife, Maria Rapatan Lopez, had no children after a lm ost fift een years together. Though Tomas Lopez had lived with priva t e r espon den t for fou r t een y ears, they also bore no offspring. Third, we find unusual the fact that the bir t h cer t ifica t e of Joh n Thomas Lopez was filed by Tomas Lopez instead of t h e m idw ife. Un der t h e la w , t h e a t tending physician or midwife in attendance at birth should cause the registration of such birth. On ly in default of the physician or midwife, can the parent register the birth of his child. Fourth, t h e trial court observed several t imes that when the child and Bienvenida were both in court, the t w o had strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes. Resemblance between a m in or a n d h is a lleg ed pa r en t is com pet en t a n d m a t er ia l ev iden ce t o est a blish pa rentage. Needless t o stress, the trial court's conclusion should be given high respect, it havin g h a d the opportunity to observe the physical appearances of the minor and petitioner concerned. Fifth, Lourdes Vasquez testified that she assisted in Bienvenida's giving birth to Edgardo Tijin g , Jr ., at her clinic. Unlike private respondent, she presented clinical records con sist in g of a log book, disch a r g e or der a n d t h e sig n a t u r es of pet it ion er s.

A ll these considered, we are constrained t o r u le t h a t su bject m i n or is in deed t h e son of pet it ion er s. T h e w r it of habeas corpus is pr oper t o r eg a in cu st ody of sa id ch ild. A GUST IN v s. COURT OF A PPEA LS A ND PROLLA MA NT E (Ju n e 1 5 , 2 0 0 5 )Cor on a , J.: FA CT S: Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martin‘s alleged biological father , pet itioner Arnel L. Agustin, for support and support pendente lite befor e t h e Reg ion a l T r ia l Court (RTC) of Quezon City . In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel cou r t ed Fe in 1 992, after which they entered into an intimate relationship. Arnel supposedly impregn a t ed Fe on h er 34th birthday on November 10, 1999. Despite Arnel‘s insistence on abortion, Fe decided ot h erwise and gave birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin, on August 11, 2000 at the Capit ol Medical Hospital in Quezon City . The baby‘s birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as t h e father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fe‘s repea t ed r equests for Martin‘s support despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have t h e ch ild com m it t ed for a dopt ion . A r n el a lso den ied h a v in g fa t h er ed t h e ch ild. A rnel denied having sired Martin because his affair and intimacy with Fe had allegedly ended in 1 998, long before Martin‘s conception. He claimed that Fe had at least one other secr et lov er . A rnel admitted that their relationship started in 1993 but "he never really fell in love w it h (Fe) n ot only because (she) had at least one secret lover, a certain Jun, but also because she proved to be scheming and ov erly demanding and possessive. Unable to bear the prospect of losing his wife a n d children, Arnel terminated the affair although he still treated her a s a fr ien d su ch a s by r eferring potential custom ers to the car aircon repair shop" where she worked. Later on , A r n el fou nd out that Fe had another erstwhile secret lover. In May 2000, Arnel and his entire fa m ily w ent to the United States for a vacation. Upon their return in June 2000, Arnel learned t h a t Fe w as telling people that he had impregnated her. Arnel refused to acknowledge th e ch ild a s h is because their "last intimacy was som etime in 1998." Exasperated, Fe started calling Arnel‘s w ife a n d family. On January 19, 2001, Fe followed Arnel t o the Capitol Hills Golf and Count r y Clu b pa rking lot t o demand that he acknowledge Martin as his child. According to Arnel, he could not g et through Fe and the discussion became so heated that he had no "alternative but to mov e on bu t without bumping or hitting any part of her body." Finally, Arnel claimed that the sign a t u r e a n d the community tax certificate (CTC) attributed to him in the acknowledgmen t of Ma r t in ‘s birth certificate were falsified. The CTC erroneously reflected his marital status as single when he w as actually married and that his birth year w a s 1 9 6 5 w h en it sh ou ld h a v e been 1 9 6 4 . Fe a nd Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit themselv es t o DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court. Arnel opposed said m ot ion by invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. He also m ov ed t o dism iss t h e com plaint for lack of cause of action, considering that his signature on the birth certificate was a for gery and that, under the law, an illegitimate child is not entitled t o support if not rec og n ized by the putative father. He attached the certification of the Philippin e Na t ion a l Police Cr im e La bor a t or y t h a t h is sig n a t u r e in t h e bir t h cer t ifica t e w a s for g ed. T h e trial court denied the motion t o dismiss the complaint and ordered the pa r t ies t o su bm it t h emselves t o DNA paternity testing at the expense of the applica n t s. T h e Cou r t of A ppea ls a ffir m ed t h e t r ia l cou r t . ISSUES: (1 ) whether a complaint for support ca n be con v er t ed t o a pet it ion for r ecog n it ion a n d (2 ) whether DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support without violat in g pet itioner ‘s con st it u t ion a l r ig h t t o pr iv a cy a n d r ig h t a g a in st self -in cr im in a t ion . HELD: The assailed resolution and order did not convert the action for su ppor t in t o on e for r ecognition but merely allowed the respondents to prove their cause of action against petition er w ho had been denying the authenticity of the documentary evidence of acknowledgemen t . Bu t ev en if the assailed resolution and order effectively integrated an action to compel r ecog n it ion

w ith an action for support, such was valid and in accordance with jurispruden ce. In T a y a g v . Court of Appeals,20 we allowed the integration of an action to com pel recognition with an action t o cla im on e‘s in h er it a n ce: …In Paulino, we held that an illegitimate child, to be entitled to support and successional rig h t s fr om the putative or presumed parent, must prove his filiation t o the latter. We also said that it is n ecessary to allege in the complaint that the putative father had acknowledged an d r ecog n ized t h e illegitimate child because such acknowledgment is essential to and is the basis of the right t o in herit. There being no allegation of such acknowledgment, the action becomes on e t o com pel r ecognition which cannot be brought after the death of the putative father. The ratio decidendi in Pa ulino, therefore, is not the absence of a cause of action for failure of the petitioner to allege the fa ct of a ckn ow ledg m en t in t h e com pla in t , bu t t h e pr escr ipt ion of t h e a ct ion . A pplying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, although pet it ion er con t en ds t h a t t h e com plaint filed by herein private respondent merely alleges that the minor Chad Cuyugan is a n illegitimate child of the deceased and is actually a claim for inheritance, from t h e a lleg a t ion s t h erein the same may be considered as one to compel recognition. Further, that the two causes of a ction, one to compel recognition and the other to claim inherit a n ce, m a y be join ed in on e com pla in t is n ot n ew in ou r ju r ispr u den ce. A lthough the instant case deals with support rather than inheritance, as in Tayag , t h e ba sis or r ationale for integrating them remains the same. Whether or not respondent Martin is entitled to su pport depends completely on the determination of filiation. A separate action will only r esu lt in a multiplicity of suits, given how intimately related the main issu es in bot h ca ses a r e. T o pa raphrase Tayag, the declaration of filiation is entirely a ppr opr ia t e t o t h ese pr oceedin g s. On the second issue, petitioner posits that DNA is not recognized by this Court as a con clu siv e m eans of proving paternity. He also contends that compulsory t est in g v iola t es h is r ig h t t o pr ivacy and right against self-incrimination as guaranteed under the 1987 Constitu t ion . T h ese con t en t ion s h a v e n o m er it . T h e kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial com pu lsion . T h e r ight against self-incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from t h e lips of t h e accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is n ot a n in cr im in a t ion bu t a s pa r t of object ev iden ce. Ov er the years, we have expressly excluded several kinds of object ev iden ce t a ken fr om t h e per son of the accused from the realm of self-incrimination. T h ese in clu de ph ot og r a ph s,2 8 h a ir,29 and other bodily substances.30We h a v e a lso decla r ed a s con st it u t ion a l sev er a l pr ocedures performed on the accused such as pregnancy tests for women accused of adultery,31 ex pulsion of morphine from one‘s mouth32 and the tracing of one‘s foot to determine its identity w ith bloody footprints.33 In Jimenez v. Cañizares,34 we even authorized the examin a t ion of a w om an‘s genitalia, in an action for annulment filed by her husband, to verify his claim t h a t sh e w as impotent, her orifice being too small for his penis. Some of these pr ocedu r es w er e, t o be su re, rather invasive and involuntary, but all of them were constitutionally sound. DNA t est in g a n d it s r esu lt s, per ou r r u lin g in Y a t a r ,3 5 a r e n ow sim ila r ly a ccept a ble. In n o uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar a ll in cu r sion s in to individual privacy. The rig h t is n ot in t en ded t o st ifle scien t ific a n d t ech n olog ica l a dv ancements that enhance public service and the common good... Intru sion s in t o t h e r ig h t m ust be accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance public service and the common g ood.

ju dgment and discretion when he reaches the age of majority. A s he is of t ender age, he may not y et understand and appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of the sa m e a t t h is poin t m a y ju st pr eju dice h im in h is r ig h t s u n der ou r la w s. In r e: Pet i t i on for Ch a n ge of Na m e of Ju l ia n Lim G.R. No. 1 5 9 9 6 6 Ma r ch 3 0 , 2 0 0 5

Joey Br ion es v s. Ma r i cel Mi gu el , Fr a n ci sca Mi gu el , Lor et a Mi gu el G.R. No. 1 5 6 3 4 3 Oct ober 1 8 , 2 0 0 4

Fa ct s: On 22 September 2002, petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a min or , r epr esen t ed by h is m other Anna Lisa Wang, filed a petition for change of name and/or cancellation of entry in t h e Civ il Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. Petitioner sought to drop his m iddle n a m e a n d h ave his registered name changed from Julian Lin Ca r u la sa n W a n g t o Ju lia n Lin W a n g .

Fa ct s: Pet itioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against respondents Maricel Pineda Mig uel and Francisca Pineda Miguel, t o obtain custody of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda. La t er, petitioner filed an Amended Petition to include Loreta P. Miguel, the mother of the minor, a s on e of t h e r espon den t s.

T h e parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore for a long time because they w ill let him study there t ogether with his sister named Wang Mei Ja sm in e w h o w a s bor n in Singapore…. Since in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the m ot h er a r e n ot ca rried in a person‘s name, they anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will be discriminated a gainst because of his current registered name which carries a middle na m e. Ju lia n a n d h is sist er might also be asking whether they are brother a n d sist er sin ce t h ey h a v e differ en t su rnames. Carulasan sounds funny in Singapore‘s Mandarin language since they do not have the let ter ―R‖ but if there is, they pronounce it as ―L.‖ It is for these reasons that the name of Julia n Lin Ca r u la sa n W a n g is r equ est ed t o be ch a n g ed t o Ju lia n Lin W a n g .

T h e petitioner alleges that the minor Mich a el Kev in Pin eda is h is illeg it im a t e son w it h r espon den t Lor et a P. Mig u el.

T h e RTC rendered a decision denying the petition. The trial court found that the reason given for t h e change of name sought in the petition—that is, that petitioner Julian may be discrim in a t ed a gainst when studies in Singapore because of his middle name—did not fall within the g r ou n ds r ecognized by law. The trial court ruled that the change sought is merely for the convenien ce of t h e child. Since the State has an interest in the name of a person, names cannot be ch a n g ed t o su it the convenience of the bearers. Under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitima t e ch ildr en h ave the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, and there is no reason why this r ight should now be taken from petitioner Julian, considering that he is still a minor. T h e t r ia l court added that when petitioner Julian reaches the age of m a jor it y , h e cou ld t h en decide w h et h er h e w ill ch a n g e h is n a m e by dr oppin g h is m iddle n a m e. Issu e: W h ether or not dropping the middle name of a minor child is contrar y t o A r t icle 1 7 4 of t h e Fa m ily Code Held: T h e touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be ‗proper and reasonable ca u se‘ for which the change is sought. To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not on ly som e proper or com pelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of h is true and official name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held v a lid a r e: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronou n ce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the chang e w ill a v oid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been know n sin ce ch ildh ood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name t o erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when t h e surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired chang e of n a m e w as for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of nam e w ou ld pr eju dice pu blic in t er est . In t he case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle n a m e is convenience. However, how such change of name would make his integration into Singaporea n society easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued u se of h is m iddle n ame would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable ca u se t o dr op it fr om h is r eg ist er ed com plet e n a m e. In a ddition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebu lou s fou n da t ion on w h ich h is pet ition for change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left t o his

T h e petitioner further alleges that he caused the minor child to be brought to the Philippin es so t hat he could take care of him and send him to school. That respondents Maricel P. Migu el a n d Fr ancisca P. Miguel came to the house of the petitioner in Caloocan City on the pretext that they w ere visiting the minor child and requested that they be allow ed t o br in g t h e sa id ch ild for r ecreation at the SM Department store. They promised him that they will bring him back in t h e a ft ernoon, to which the petitioner agreed. However, the respondents did not bring him ba ck a s pr om ised by them. The petitioner went several times to respondent Maricel P. Miguel at Ta n za , T uguegarao City but he was informed that the child is with the latter‘s mother at Batal Heig h t s, Sa ntiago City. When he went there, respondent Francisca P. Miguel told him that Michael Kevin Pin eda is w it h h er da u g h t er a t T u g u eg a r a o Cit y . He sought the assistance of the police and the Department of Social Welfare to locate his son and t o bring him back to him, but all his efforts were futile. Hence, h e w a s con st r a in ed t o file a Pet it ion for Ha bea s Cor pu s. T h e petitioner prays that the custody of his son Michael Kevin Pineda be g iv en t o h im a s h is biological father and as he has demonstrated his ca pa bil it y t o su ppor t a n d edu ca t e h im . T h e respondents filed their Comment, in their Comment, the respondent Loreta P. Miguel denies t h e allegation of the petitioner that he was the one who brought their child to the Philippines and st ated that she was the one who brought him here pursuant to their agreem en t . Sh e likew ise den ies petitioner‘s allegation that respondents Maricel P. Miguel and Francisca P. Miguel w er e t h e ones who took the child from the petitioner or the latter‘s parents. She averred that sh e w a s t h e one who t ook Michael Kevin Pineda from the petitioner when she returned to the Philippines a n d t h a t t h e la t t er r ea dily a g r eed a n d con sen t ed. Respondent Loreta P. Miguel alleges that the petitioner was deported fr om Ja pa n u n der t h e a ssumed name of Renato Juanzon when he was fou n d t o h a v e v iola t ed or com m it t ed a n in fraction of the laws of Japan. She further stated that since the time the petitioner arrived in the Ph ilippines, he has not been gainfully employed. The custody of t h e ch ild w a s en t r u st ed t o pet itioner‘s parents while they were both working in Japan. She added t h a t ev en befor e t h e cu stody of the child was given to the petitioner‘s parents, she has already been living separat ely fr om the petitioner in Japan because the latter was allegedly maintaining an illicit a ffa ir w it h a n ot h er w om a n u n t il h is depor t a t ion . Respondent Loreta P. Miguel prays that the custody of her minor ch ild be g iv en t o h er a n d inv okes Article 213, Paragraph 2 of the Family Code and Article 36 3 of t h e Civ il Code of t h e Ph ilippin es. Issu e: W h o Sh ou ld Ha v e Cu st ody of t h e Ch ild? Held:

Un der the Family Code there are only two classes of children -- legitimate (and those w h o, like t h e legally adopted, have the rights of legitimate ch ildr en ) a n d illeg it im a t e. A ll ch ildr en con ceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless the law it self g iv es t h em leg it im a t e st a t u s. Obv iously, Michael is a natural ("illegitimate," under the Family Code) child, as there is nothin g in the records showing that his parents were suffering from a legal impediment to marry a t t h e t im e of his birth. Both acknowledge that Michael is their son. As earlier explained and pursua n t t o A rticle 176, parental authorit y ov er h im r esides in h is m ot h er , Respon den t Lor et a , n ot w it h st a n din g h is fa t h er ‘s r ecog n it ion of h im . T h ere is thus no question that Respondent Loreta, being the mother of and having sole parent a l a uthority over the minor, is entitled to have custody of him. She has the right t o keep him in h er com pany. She cannot be deprived of that right, and she may not even renoun ce or t r a n sfer it "ex cept in t h e ca ses a u t h or ized by la w . A rticle 213 of the Family Code that, generally, no ch ild u n der sev en y ea r s of a g e sh a ll be separated from t h e m ot h er , ex cept w h en t h e cou r t fin ds ca u se t o or der ot h er w ise. On ly the most compelling of reasons, such as the mother‘s unfitness to exer cise sole pa r en t a l a uthority, shall justify her deprivation of parental authority and the award of custody to someone else. In the past, the following grounds have been considered ample justifica t ion t o depr iv e a m other of custody and parental authority: neglect or abandonment, unemployment, immorality, h a bitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction w it h a com m u n ica ble disea se.

A fter approval of private respondent's account of her administration, t h e cou r t a quo pa ssed u pon petitioner's motion. The court declared private respondent's ten children legitimat ed a n d in stituted and declared them, along with petitioner and priva t e r espon den t , a s t h e h eir s of A ntonio de Santos. Petitioner sought a reconsideration of said order but this was denied. Hence, sh e filed the instant petition for certiorari on June 16, 1992, contending that since only nat u r a l ch ildren can be legitimized, the trial court mistakenly declared as legitimated her half br ot h er s a n d sist er s. Issu e: Ca n n a t u r a l ch ildr en by leg a l fict ion be leg it im ized? Held: A r t icle 2 6 9 of t h e Civ il Code ex pr essly st a t es: A rt. 269. Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside w edlock of pa r en t s w ho, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any im pedim en t t o m a r r y ea ch ot h er , a r e n a t u r a l. In ot her words, a child's parents should not have been disqualified to marry each ot h er a t t h e t im e of con cept ion for h im t o qu a lify a s a "n a t u r a l ch ild." In t he case at bench, there is no question that all the children born to private r espon den t a n d deceased Antonio de Santos were conceived and born when t h e la t t er 's v a lid m a r r ia g e t o pet itioner's mother was still subsisting. That private respondent and the decedent were marr ied a broad after the latter obtained in Nevada, U.S.A. a decree of divorce from his leg it im a t e w ife does n ot change this fact, for a divorce granted abroad was not recognized in this jurisdiction a t t h e time. Ev idently, the decedent was aware of this fact, w h ich is w h y h e h a d t o h a v e t h e m arriage solemnized in Tokyo, outside of the Philippines. It may be a dded h er e t h a t h e w a s likewise aware of the nullity of the Tokyo marriage for after his legitimate, though estranged wife died, he hastily contracted another marriage with private respondent, this time here in Tagaytay.

Ma r i a Rosa r i o de Sa n t os v s. Hon . A n gel es a n d Con ch it a T a l a g de Sa n t os G.R. No. 1 0 5 6 1 9 Decem ber 1 2 , 1 9 9 5 Fa ct s: On February 7, 1941, Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia Bona, which union was blessed with a da ughter, herein petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos. After some time, their relationship became st rained to the breaking point. Thereafter, Antonio fell in lov e with a fellow doct or , Con ch it a T a lag, private respondent herein. Antonio sought a formal dissolution of his first m a r r ia g e by obt a in in g a div or ce decr e e fr om a Nev a da cou r t in 1 9 4 9 . A ware that said decree was a worthless scrap of paper in our jurisdiction which then, as now, did n ot recognize divorces, Antonio proceeded to Tokyo, Japan in 1951 to marry private respondent, w ith whom he had been cohabiting since his de facto separation from Sofia. This union produced elev en children. On March 30, 1967, Sofia died in Guatemala. Less than a month later, on A pr il 2 3, 1967, Antonio and private respondent contracted a marriage in Tagayta y Cit y celebr a t ed u nder Philippine laws. On March 8, 1981, Antonio died intestate leavin g pr oper t ies w it h a n est im a t ed v a lu e of P1 5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 .0 0 . On May 15, 1981, private respondent w en t t o cou r t a skin g for t h e issu a n ce of let t er s of a dm inistration in her favor in connection with the settlement of her late husband's est a t e. Sh e a lleged, among other things, that the decedent was survived by twelve legitimate heirs, namely , h erself, their ten surviving children, and petitioner. There being no opposition, her petition w a s g r a n t ed. A fter six years of protracted intestate proceedings, however, petitioner decided t o in t er v en e. T hus, in a motion she filed she argued that private respondent's children were illegitimate. T h is was challenged by private respondent although the latter admitted during the hearing that all her ch ildr en w er e bor n pr ior t o Sofia 's dea t h in 1 9 6 7 .

A DOPT ION

Repu bl ic v s CA a n d Zen a i da Bobi l es G.R. No. 9 2 3 2 6 Ja n u a r y 2 4 , 1 9 9 2 Fa ct s: On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition t o adopt Jason Con da t , t h en six (6) years old and who had been living with her family since he was four (4) months old, befor e t h e Reg ion a l T r ia l Cou r t . T h e trial court rendered the minor child, JASON CONDAT, be fr eed fr om a ll leg a l obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to his natural pa r en t s, a n d be, t o a ll in tents and purposes, the child of the spouses Dioscoro and Zenaida Bobiles, and the surname of t h e ch ild be ch a n g ed t o "Bobiles" w h ich is t h e su r n a m e of t h e pet it ion er . T h e petition for adoption was filed by privat e r espon den t Zen a ida C. Bobiles on February 2, 1 988, when the law applicable was Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth W elfare Code. Under said code, a petition for adoption may be filed by either of the spouses or by bot h of them. However, after the trial court rendered its decision and while the case was pending on a ppeal in the Court of Appeals, Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code, t ook effect on A ugust 3, 1988. Under the said new law, joint adoption by husband a n d w ife i s m a n da t or y . On the foregoing consideration, petitioner contends that the petition for a dopt ion sh ou ld be dism issed outright for it was filed solely by private respondent without joining her husba n d, in v iolation of Article 185 of the Family Code which requires join t a dopt ion by t h e spou ses. It

a rgues that the Family Code must be applied retroactively t o the petition filed by Mrs. Bobiles, as t h e latter did not acquire a vested right to adopt Jason Condat by the mere filing of her pet it ion for a dopt ion . Issu e: Ca n the Family Code be applied retroactively to the pet it ion for a dopt ion filed by Zenaida Bobiles and granting that the Family Code should not apply retroactively, should the CA h ave modified the trial court‘s decision by granting the adoption in favor of private respon den t on ly , h er h u sba n d n ot bein g a pet it ion er ? Held:

A rticle 246 of the Family Code provides for retroactive effect of appropriate relev a n t pr ov isions thereof, subject t o the qualification that such ret r ospect iv e a pplica t ion w ill not pr ejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or ot h er la w s. A v ested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon ev ents foreign t o t he will of the holder. Vested rights include not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from new obligations created after t h e r ig h t h a s v est ed. Un der the Child and Youth Welfare Code, private respondent had the right to file a pet it ion for a doption by herself, without joining her husband therein. When Mrs. Bobiles filed her pet it ion , sh e was exercising her explicit and unconditional right under said law. Upon her filing t h er eof, h er right to file such petition alone and to have the same pr oceed t o fin a l a dju dica t ion , i n a ccordance with the law in force at the t ime, was already vested and can n ot be pr eju diced or im pa ir ed by t h e en a ct m en t of a n ew la w . W h en private respondent filed her petition in Special Proceedin g , t h e t r ia l cou r t a cqu ir ed ju risdiction there ov er in accordance with the governing law. Jurisdict ion bein g a m a t t er of su bstantive law, the established rule is that the jurisdiction of the court is det er m in ed by t h e st a t u t e in for ce a t t h e t im e of t h e com m en cem en t of t h e a ct ion . A lthough Dioscoro Bobiles was not named as one of the petitioners in the petition for a doption filed by his wife, his affidavit of consent attached t o the petition and expressly made an in tegral part thereof, shows that he himself actually joined his wife in adopting the child. T h ose declarations, and his subsequent confirmatory testimony in open court, are sufficien t t o m a ke h im a co-petitioner. Under the circumstances then obtainin g , a n d by r ea son of h is for eig n r esidence, he must have yielded t o the legal advice that a n a ffida v it of con sen t on h is pa r t su fficed to make him a party to the petition. This is eviden t fr om t h e t ex t of h is a ffida v it . Pu nctiliousness in language and pedantry in the formal requirements sh ou ld y ield t o a n d be eschewed in the higher considerations of substantial justice. The future of a n in n ocen t ch ild m ust not be compromised by arbitrary insistence of rigid adherence to procedural rules on t h e for m of plea din g s.

Her bert Cang vs. CA and Spouses Ron a l d Cl a v a n o a n d Ma r ia Cl a r a Cl a v a n o G.R. No. 1 0 5 3 0 8 Sept em ber 2 5 , 1 9 9 8 Fa ct s:

Pet itioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married on Janua r y 2 7 , 1 973, begot three children, namely: Keith, born on July 3, 1973; Charmaine, born on January 23, 1 9 7 7 , a n d Joseph A n t h on y , bor n on Ja n u a r y 3 , 1 9 8 1 . Du r ing the early years of their marriage, the Cang couple's r ela t ion sh ip w a s u n dist u r bed. However, Anna Marie learned of her husband's alleged extramarital affair with W ilm a Soco, a fam ily friend of the Clavanos. Upon learning of her husband's alleged illicit liaison, Anna Ma r ie filed a petition for legal separation with alimony pendente lit e w it h t h e t h en Ju v en ile a n d Dom estic Relations Court which rendered a decision approving the joint manifest a t ion of t h e Ca ng spouses providing that they agreed t o live separately and apart or fr om bed a n d boa r d.

Pet itioner then left for the United States where he sought a divorce from Anna Marie before t h e Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada. Said court issued the divorce decr ee t h a t a lso granted sole custody of the three minor children to Anna Marie, reserving rights of visitation a t all reasonable times and places t o petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner t ook an American wife and t hus became a naturalized American citizen. In 1986, he divorced his American wife and n ev er r em a r r ied. W h ile in the United States, petitioner worked in Tablante Medical Clinic earning P1 8,000.0 0 t o P2 0,000.00 a month a portion of which was remitted t o t h e Ph ilippin es for h is ch ildr en 's ex pen ses a n d a n ot h er , deposit ed in t h e ba n k in t h e n a m e of h is ch ildr en . Mea nwhile, on September 25, 1987, private respondents Ronald V. Clavan o a n d Ma r ia Cla r a Dia go Clavano, respectively the br ot h er a n d sist er -in -la w of A n n a Ma r ie, filed Specia l Pr oceedings for the adoption of the three minor Cang children before the Regional Trial Cou r t . T h e petition bears the signature of then 14-year-old Keith signifying consen t t o h is a dopt ion . A nna Marie likewise filed an affidavit of consent alleging that her husband had "ev aded his lega l obligation to support his children; that her brothers and sisters including Ronald V . Cla v a n o, h a d been helping her in taking care of the children; that beca u se sh e w ou ld be g oin g t o t h e Un ited States to attend t o a family business, leaving the children would be a problem and would n aturally hamper her job-seeking venture abroad; and that her husband had long for feit ed h is pa r en t a l r ig h t s ov er t h e ch ildr en . Upon learning of the petitioner for adoption, petitioner immediately returned to the Philippin es a n d filed an opposition thereto, alleging that, although private respondents Ronald a n d Ma r ia Clara Clavano were financially capable of supporting the children while his fina n ces w er e "t oo m eager" compared to theirs, he could not "in conscience, allow a n y body t o st r ip h im of h is pa r en t a l a u t h or it y ov er h is belov ed ch ildr en ." Pen ding resolution of the petition for adoption, petitioner moved to reacquire custody ov er h is ch ildren alleging that Anna Marie had transferred t o the United States thereby leaving custody of t h eir children t o private respondents. The Regional Trial Court issued an order finding that Anna Ma r ie had, in effect, relinquished custody ov er the children and, therefore, such custody sh ou ld be t ransferred to the father. The court then directed the Clavanos to deliver cu st ody ov er t h e m in or s t o pet it ion er . Issu e: Ca n minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural paren t on t h e g r ou n d t h a t t h e la t t er h a s a ba n don ed t h em ? Held: It is ev ident that notwithstanding the amendments to the law, the written consent of the natura l pa rent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its validity . T h e w r it t en con sen t of t h e n atural parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adopt ion . Nev er t h eless, t h e r equirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned th e ch ild or t hat such parent is ―insane or hopelessly intemperate.‖ The court may acquire juri sdiction ov er t h e case even without the written consent of the parents or one of the parents provided that t h e pet ition for adoption alleges facts sufficient t o warrant exemption from compliance th er ew it h . However, in cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily because his consent th er et o w as not sought, the matter of whether he had abandoned his child becomes a pr oper issu e for det ermination.The issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is a preliminary issu e t hat an adoption court must first confront. Only upon failure of the oppositor natural fat h er t o pr ov e to the satisfaction of the court that he did not abandon his ch ild m a y t h e pet it ion for a doption be considered on its merits. In its ordinary sense, the word ―abandon‖ means t o forsake en tirely, to forsake or renounce utterly. In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the a ct of abandonment imports ―any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego a ll parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child.‖ It means ―neglect or refusal to per form the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe their children.‖ In t he instant case, records disclose that petitioner‘s conduct did not manifest a settled pu r pose t o for ego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to const it u t e a bandonment. Physical estrangement alone, without financial and m oral deser t ion , is n ot t antamount to abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal oblig a t ion s of lov e, ca r e a n d su pport for his children. He maintained regular communication wit h h is w ife a n d ch ildr en t hrough letters and t elephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to t h eir w h im s.

W h erefore, the questioned Decision and Resolution of the Cou r t of A ppea ls, a s w ell a s t h e decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, are SET ASIDE thereby denying t h e pet it ion for a doption of Keith, Charmaine and Joseph A n t h on y , a ll su r n a m ed Ca n g , by t h e spou se r espon den t s Ron a ld a n d Ma r ia Cla r a Cla v a n o. In t he matter of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus of a minor Ang elie A n n e Cer v a n t es, Nelson Cervantes and Zenaida Cervantes vs. Gina Ca r r eon Fa ja r do a n d Con r a do Fa ja r do G.R. No. 7 9 9 5 5 Ja n u a r y 2 7 , 1 9 8 9 Fa ct s:

T h is is a petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus filed with this Court over t h e per son of t h e m in or A n g elie A n n e Cer v a n t es. T h e minor was born on 14 February 1 987 t o respondents Conrado Fajardo a n d Gin a Ca rreon, who are common-law husband and wife. Respondents offered the child for adoption t o Gina Carreon's sister and brother-in-law, the herein petitioners Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes an d Nelson Cervantes, spouses, who took care and custody of the child when she was barely tw o (2 ) w eeks old. An Affidavit of Consent t o the adoption of the child by herein petit ion er s, w a s a lso ex ecu t ed by r espon den t Gin a Ca r r eon T h e appropriate petition for adoption was filed by petitioners over the child before the Reg ional Trial Court and rendered a decision granting the petition. The child was then known as A ngelie Anne Fajardo. The court ordered that the child be freed from parental authorit y of h er n atural parents as well as from legal obligation and maintenance to them and that from n ow on sh all be, for all legal intents and purposes, know n a s A n g elie A n n e Cer v a n t es, a ch ild of pet it ion er s a n d ca pa ble of in h er it in g t h eir est a t e . T h ereafter, adoptive parents, Nelson and Zenaida Cer v a n t es, r eceiv ed a let t er fr om t h e r espondents demanding to be paid the amount of P150,000.00, otherwise, they would get ba ck t h eir ch ild. Pet it ion er s r efu sed t o a ccede t o t h e dem a n d. A s a result, while petitioners were out at work, the respondent Gina Carreon took the child from h er yaya at the petitioners' r esidence on the pretext that she w a s in st r u ct ed t o do so by h er m other. Respondent Gina Carreon brought the child t o h er h ou se. Pet it ion er s t h er eu pon dem anded the return of the child, but Gina Carreon refused, saying that she had no desire to give u p her child for adoption and that the affidavit of consent to the adoption she had executed w a s n ot fully explained to her. She sent word to the petitioners that she will, howev er , r et u r n t h e ch ild t o t h e pet it ion er s if sh e w er e pa id t h e a m ou n t of P1 5 0 ,0 0 0 .0 0 . Issu e: W h o h a s t h e r ig h t t o t h e cu st ody of A n g elie A n n Cer v a n t es? Held: In a ll cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children, the latter's welfare is pa ramount. The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under five (5) yea r s of a g e, will not apply where the Cou r t fin ds com pellin g r ea son s t o r u le ot h er w ise. In a ll con troversies regarding the custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physica l a n d social welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as well a s social standing of the contending parents. Never has this Court deviated fr om t h is cr it er ion . It is undisputed that respondent Conrado Fajardo is legally married t o a w om a n ot h er t h a n r espondent Gina Carreon, and his relationship with the latter is a common-law husband and wife r elationship. His open cohabitation with co-respondent Gina Carreon will not accord the min or t hat desirable atmosphere where she can grow and develop into an upright and mora l -m in ded per son. Besides, respondent Gina Carreon had previously given birth to another child by another m arried man with whom she lived for almost three years bu t w h o ev en t u a lly left h er a n d v anished. For a minor (like Angelie Anne C. Cervantes) t o grow up with a sister whose fa t h er is n ot her true father, could also affect the moral outlook and values of said minor. Upon the other h and, petitioners who are legally married appear to be morally, physica lly , fin a n cia lly , a n d socially capable of supporting the minor and giving her a future better than wh a t t h e n a t u r a l m other who is not only jobless but also maintains an illicit relation with a m a r r ied m a n , ca n m ost likely g iv e h er . Besides, the minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and con sen t of r espondents. A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving t h e a u t h or it y

v ested in natural parents ov er the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the spouse of t h e natural parent of the adopted, in which case, parental authority ov er the adopted sha ll be ex ercised jointly by both spouses. The adopting parents have the right to the care and custody of t h e a dopt ed ch ild a n d ex er cise pa r en t a l a u t h or it y a n d r espon sibilit y ov er h im . T h e custody and care of the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes are hereby granted to petit ion er s t o w hom they properly belong, and respondents are ordered (if they still have not) t o deliv er sa id m in or t o t h e pet it ion er s im m edia t ely u pon n ot ice h er eof. Ma cario Tamargo, Celso Tamargo and Aurelia Tamargo vs. CA a n d Hon . Ru bio a n d V ict or Bu n du c a n d Cla r a Bu n du c G.R. No.8 5 0 4 4 Ju n e 3 , 1 9 9 2 Fa ct s: On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer T amargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her dea t h . A ccor din g ly , a civ il com plaint for damages was filed with the Regional Trial Court by petitioner Macario Tam a r g o, Jennifer's adopting parent, and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural pa rents against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural paren t s w it h w h om h e w a s liv in g a t t h e t im e of t h e t r a g ic in ciden t . Pr ior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a pet ition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedings before the t h en Cou r t of Fir st Instance. This petition for adoption was grunted on, 1 8 November 1 9 8 2 , t h a t is, a ft e r A delber t o h a d sh ot a n d killed Jen n ifer . In t heir Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the r esu lt of t h e foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not they, but rath er t h e a dopt in g pa r en t s, n amely the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable parties to t h e a ct ion sin ce pa rental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful pet it ion for a dopt ion w a s filed. Pet itioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually l ivin g w it h h is natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mer e filin g a n d g r a n t in g of a pet it ion for a dopt ion . T h e trial court dismissed petitioners' com plaint, ruling that r espon den t n a t u r a l pa r en t s of A delber t o in deed w er e n ot in dispen sa ble pa r t ies t o t h e a ct ion . Pet itioners, then went to the Court of Appeals on a pet it ion for m andam us a n d certiorari qu estioning the trial court's Decision. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, ru lin g t h a t pet it ion er s h a d lost t h eir r ig h t t o a ppea l. Issu e: W h ether or not Adelberto‘s natural parents are indispensable parties t o t h e a ct ion ? Held: This principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently designated as vicarious lia bility, or the doctrine of "imputed negligence, where a per son is n ot on ly lia ble for t or t s committed by himself, but also for t orts committed by other s w it h w h om h e h a s a cer t a in r elationship and for whom he is responsible. Thus, parental liability is made a natural or logica l con sequence of the duties and responsibilities of parents their parental authority which includes t h e in st r u ct in g , con t r ollin g a n d disciplin in g of t h e ch ild. T h e civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor children living w it h t h em , m ay be seen to be based upon the parental authority vested by the Civil Code upon such parents. T h e civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child living w it h it s pa r en t s com m it s a t ortious acts, the parents were negligent in the performance of their leg a l a n d n a t u r a l du t y closely to supervise the child who is in their custody and control. Parental liabilit y is, in ot h er w ords, anchored upon parental authority coupled with presumed parenta l der elict ion in t h e discharge of the duties accompanying such authority. The parental dereliction is, of course, only pr esumed and the presumption can be ov ertuned under Article 2180 of the Civil Code by pr oof t hat the parents had exercised all the diligence of a good fa t h er of a fa m ily t o pr ev en t t h e da m a g e. In t he instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occured when parental a uthority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses, the n a t u r a l pa r en t s of t h e m in or A delberto. It would thus follow that the natural parents who had then a ct u a l cu st ody of t h e m in or A delber t o, a r e t h e in dispen sa ble pa r t ies t o t h e su it for da m a g es.

T h e basis of parental liability for the torts of a minor child is the relationship existin g bet w een t h e parents and the minor child living with them and over whom, the law presumes, the paren t s ex er cise su per v ision a n d con t r ol. W e do not consider that retroactive effect may be giver to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a t ime when adopting parents had no actua l or phy sically custody over the adopted child. Retroactive affect m a y per h a ps be g iv en t o t h e g ranting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or a dvantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold t h a t pa r en t a l a uthority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so a s t o bu r den t h em w it h lia bility for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and w h ich t h ey cou ld n ot h a v e pr evented (since they were at the t ime in the United States and had no physical custody ov er the ch ild Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. Su ch a r esu lt , m or eov er , w ou ld be in consistent with the philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability. Pu t a little differently, no presumption of parental derelict ion on t h e pa r t of t h e a dopt in g pa rents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to th eir con t r ol a t t h e t im e t h e t or t w a s com m it t ed.

LA HOM v s. SIBULO G.R. No. 1 4 3 9 8 9 Ju ly 1 4 , 2 0 0 3 Fa ct s: Spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom filed in 197 1 a pet it ion t o a dopt Melv in Sibulo, Isabelita Lahom`s nephew. The petition was granted in 1972. Hence, the Civil Registrar of Na g a Cit y ch a n g ed t h e n a m e "Jose Melv in Sibu lo" t o "Jose Melv in La h om ." However, in 1999, the petitioner filed a petition to rescind the adoption on t h e g r ou n d of t h e con tinuous refusal of the respondent to change his surname from Sibulo to Lahom a n d for h i s in differ en ce t ow a r ds t h e pet it ion er by fa ilin g t o v isit h er in Na g a . In 1 998, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8552, also known as the Dom estic A dopt ion A ct , w en t in t o effect which deleted from the law th e r ig h t of a dopt er s t o r escin d a decr ee of a dopt ion . Issu e: Whether or not the adoption of respondent may still be r ev oked or r escin ded by a n a dopt er .

W h ile R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a con sequ en t ia l r ig h t t o r escind the adoption decree even in cases where the adoption m ig h t clea r ly t u r n ou t t o be u ndesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court t o apply the la w . Dura lex s ed lex would be the hackneyed truism that those caught in the law have to live w it h . It is st ill n ot eworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, ca n a lways for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of cert a in ben efit s ot h er w ise a ccr u in g t o a n u ndeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an a dopted child his legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely exclude him from h a v in g a sh a r e in t h e disposa ble por t ion of h is est a t e. W HEREFORE, t h e a ssa iled ju dg m en t of t h e cou r t a qu o is A FFIRMED. No cost s.

IN T HE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GA RCIA G.R. No. 1 4 8 3 1 1 Ma r ch 3 1 , 2 0 0 5 Fa ct s: Hon orato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimat e ch ild St eph a n ie Na t h y A storga Garcia alleging that Stephanie has been using her mother's middle name and surn a m e a n d that he is now a widower and qualified t o be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie's m iddle name Astorga be changed to 'Garcia, her mother's surnam e, a n d t h a t h er su r n a m e ― Garcia‖ be changed t o ―Catindig,‖ h is su r n a m e. T h e trial court granted the adoption and ruled that the minor shall be kn ow n a s ST EPHA NIE NA T HY CA T INDIG. T h e petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration prayin g t h a t St eph a n ie sh ould be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name bu t w as denied by the trial court ruling that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing a n a dopt ed ch ild t o u se t h e su r n a m e of h is biolog ica l m ot h er a s h is m iddle n a m e. Issu e: Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother a s h er m iddle n a m e w h en sh e is su bsequ en t ly a dopt ed by h er n a t u r a l fa t h er . Held: W e fin d m er it in t h e pet it ion .

Held: The new law withdrew the right of an adopter to rescind the adoption decree and g a v e t o t h e a dopt ed ch ild t h e sole r ig h t t o sev er t h e leg a l t ies cr ea t ed by a dopt ion .

Us e Of Surnam e Is Fixed By Law

It w as months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein pet it ion er filed a n a ct ion t o r ev oke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law, had already abrogated a n d r epealed the right of an adopter under the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a decree of a doption. Consistently with its earlier pronouncements, the Court shou ld n ow h old t h a t t h e a ction for rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by petitioner a ft er R.A . No. 8 5 5 2 h a d com e in t o for ce, n o lon g er cou ld be pu r su ed.

For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is know n a n d ca lled in the community in which he lives and is best kn ow n . It is defin ed a s t h e w or d or com bination of words by which a person is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the la bel or appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at large addressing him , or in speaking of or dealing with him. It is both of personal as well as public int er est t h a t ev er y per son m u st h a v e a n a m e.

In t erestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside the adoption is subject t o t he five-year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the r ight to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the r equ ir em en t s of a v est e d r ig h t en titled t o protection. It must also be acknowledged t h a t a per son h a s n o v est ed r ig h t in st atutory privileges. While adoption has often been referred t o in the contex t of a "r ig h t ," t h e pr ivilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely cr ea t ed by statute. It is a privilege that is governed by the state's determination on what it may deem t o be for t h e best in t er est a n d w elfa r e of t h e ch ild.

T h e name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2) the su r n a m e or fam ily name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the individu a l a t bir t h or a t ba ptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or family name is tha t w h ich identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent t o child. The given na m e m ay be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname t o which the child is entitled is fix ed by la w . Law Is Silent As To The Us e Of Middle Nam e ' A s correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name. Ev en A rticle 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise kn ow n a s 'An

Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father, is silen t a s t o w h a t m iddle n a m e a ch ild m a y u se. T h e middle name or the mother's surname is only considered in Article 375(1), quoted above, in ca se there is identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descenda n t s, in w h ich ca se, t h e m iddle n a m e or t h e m ot h er 's su r n a m e sh a ll be a dded. Not ably, the law is likewise silent as t o what middle name an adoptee may use. Article 365 of the Civ il Code merely provides that 'an adopted child shall bear the s urname of the adopter. A lso, A rticle 1 89 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the m a t t er , t h u s: "(1 ) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopter s a n d bot h shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationsh ip of pa r en t a n d ch ild, in clu din g t h e r ig h t of t h e a dopt ed t o u se t h e su r n a m e of t h e a dopt er s; The Underlying Intent of Adoption Is In Favor of the Adopted Child ' On e of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deem ed t o be a leg it im a t e ch ild of t h e a dopter for all intents and purposes pursuant t o Article 189 of the Family Code and Sect ion 1 7 A r t icle V of RA 8 5 5 2 . Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled t o a ll t h e r ights prov ided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, in clu din g t h e r ig h t t o bea r t h e su r n a m e of h er fa t h er a n d h er m ot h er , a s discu ssed a bov e. A dditionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie's continued use of her mother's surnam e (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. It is t o be n ot ed t h a t A r t icle 1 89(3) of the Family Code and Section 18, Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) prov ide t h a t t h e adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Steph a n ie ca n w ell a sser t or cla im h er h er edit a r y r ig h t s fr om h er n a t u r a l m ot h er in t h e fu t u r e. Mor eover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in the house built by pet itioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all t h eir n eeds. Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother and father. She calls them 'Ma m a a n d Pa pa. Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie t o use her mot h er 's su rname as her middle name will not only sustain her continued loving relation sh ip w it h h er m ot h er bu t w ill a lso elim in a t e t h e st ig m a of h er illeg it im a cy . Liberal Cons truction of Adoption Statutes In Favor Of Adoption It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane a n d sa lu t a r y , sh ou ld be liber a lly con strued to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. The inter est s a n d w elfa r e of t h e a dopted child are of primary and paramount consideration, hence, every reasonable intendment sh ould be sustained t o prom ote and fulfill these noble and com passionate objectives of the la w . La st ly , A r t . 1 0 of t h e New Civ il Code pr ov ides t h a t : In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawm a kin g body in t en ded r ig h t a n d ju st ice t o pr ev a il. Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father , like St ephanie, to use, as middle name her mother's surname, we find no reason why she should n ot be a llow ed t o do so. W HEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is pa r t ly MODIFIED in t h e sen se that Stephanie should be allowed to use her mother's surname 'GA RCIA a s h er m iddle n a m e.

PA RENT A L A UT HORIT Y DA V ID v s. CA G.R. No. 1 1 1 1 8 0 Nov em ber 1 6 , 1 9 9 5 Fa ct s: Pet itioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of pr iv a t e r espon den t Ra m on R. V illa r , a bu sinessman in Angeles City. Private respondent is a ma r r ied m a n a n d t h e fa t h er of fou r ch ildren, all grown-up. After a while, the relationship between petitioner and private respondent dev eloped into an intimate one, as a result of which a son, Christopher J., was born on March 9 , 1 985 to them. Christopher J. was followed by two more children, both girls, namely Ch r ist in e a n d Ca t h y Ma e. T h e relationship became known t o private respondent's wife when Daisie t ook Christopher J. t o V illar's house in Angeles City and introduced him t o Villar's legal wife. After this, the children of Da isie were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were eventually accept ed by h is leg a l fam ily. In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then six years of a g e, t o g o with his family t o Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused to give back t h e ch ild. Villar said he had enrolled Christopher J. at the Holy Family Academy for the next sch ool y ea r . Hen ce, Da isie filed a pet it ion for habeas corpus on beh a lf of Ch r ist oph er J. T h e RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner ruling that the custody of the child shall be g iv en t o the mother and directing respondent t o give a temporar y su ppor t of P 3 ,0 0 0 .0 0 a m onth. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC`s judgment holding that habeas corpus case was n ot the proper remedy in that the latter contemplate a situation where the parents are married to ea ch other but are separated. Moreover, it ruled that in an adulterous relationship, the quest ion of cu stody shall be brought in a case singularly filed for the purpose and that the trial cour t did n ot acquire jurisdiction ov er the other minor children. It ruled that it is for the best in t er est of Christopher J. That he should t emporarily remain under the custody of respon den t u n t il t h e issue on custody and support shall have been determined in a proper case. Hence, this petit ion . Issu e: W h et h er or n ot t h e cu st ody of t h e ch ild sh a ll be g iv en t o t h e ch ild. Held: Rule 102, §1 of the Rules of Court prov ides that "the writ of habeas corpus shall exten d t o a ll cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by w hich the rightful custody of any person is w it h h eld fr om t h e per son en t it led t h er et o." It is indeed true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that the determination of t h e r ig h t t o t h e cu stody of minor children is relevant in cases where the parents, who are married t o each other , a r e for some reason separated from each other. It does not follow, however, that it cannot a r ise in a n y ot h er sit u a t ion . In t he case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his concept ion , h is fa ther, private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married t o another w om a n ot h er t h a n t h e ch ild's mother. As such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christ oph er J. is u n der t h e pa rental authority of his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of such authority , is entitled to have custody of him. Since, admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of her rightful cu stody of her child by private respondent, she is entitled t o issu a n ce of t h e w r it of habeas corpus .

T h e fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground for or der in g h im to give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under A r t . 2 1 3 of t h e Family Code, "no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the moth er u n less t h e cou r t fin ds com pellin g r ea son s t o or der ot h er w ise." Nor is the fact that private respondent is well-off a reason for depriving petitioner of the custody of h er children, especially considering that she has been able t o rear and support t h em on h er ow n since they were born. Petitioner is a market vendor earning from P2 ,0 0 0 t o P3 ,0 0 0 per m onth in 1 993 when the RTC decision was rendered. She augments her income by w or kin g a s secretary at the Computer System Specialist, Inc. earning a monthly income of P4,500.0 0 . Sh e h a s an arrangement with her employer so that she can personally attend to h er ch ildr en . Sh e w orks up to 8:00 o'clock in the evening t o make up for tim e lost du r in g t h e da y . T h a t sh e r eceives help from her parents and sister for the support of the thr e e ch ildr en is n ot a poin t a gainst her. Cooperation, compassion, love and concern for every member of t h e fa m ily a r e characteristics of the close family ties that bind the Filipino family and have made it w h a t it is. A lthough the question of support is proper in a proceeding for that purpose, the grant of support in this case is justified by the fact that private respondent has expressed willingness t o su ppor t t h e minor child. The order for payment of allowance need not be conditioned on the grant to him of cu st ody of t h e ch ild. In t he case at bar, as has already been pointed out, Christopher J., being less than seven years of a g e at least at the t ime the case was decided by the RTC, cannot be t a ken fr om t h e m ot h er 's cu stody. Ev en now that the child is over seven years of age, the mother's custody ov er h im w ill h ave to be upheld because the child categorically expressed preference t o live with his m ot h er . Un der Art. 213 of the Family Code, courts must respect the "choice of the child ov er seven yea r s of a g e, unless the parent chosen is unfit" and here it has not been shown that th e m ot h er is in a ny way unfit t o have custody of her child. Indeed, if private r espon den t lov es h is ch ild, h e sh ould not condition the grant of support for him on the award of his custody to h im (pr iv a t e r espon den t ).

h owever contended that an unknown third person, whom Wendell m a y h a v e displea sed or a ntagonized by reason of his work as narcotics in for m er m u st h a v e ca u sed t h eir dea t h . Ju lie Ann`s parents filed a case to recov er civil damages arising from the vicariou s lia bilit y of W en dell`s pa r en t s u n der A r t . 2 1 8 0 of t h e Civ il Code. Issu e: W h et h er or n ot pet it ion er s a r e lia ble for v ica r iou s lia bilit y . Held: In im posing sanctions for the so-called vicarious liability of petitioners, respondent cou r t cit es Fuella cs Callado, et al. Which supposedly holds that ―the subsidiary liability of parent s for dam ages caused by their m inor children im posed by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code cov er s obligation arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offen ses,‖ follow ed by a n ex t en ded qu otation ostensibly from t eh same case explaining why under Article 2180 of the Civil Code and A rticle 1 01 of the Revised Penal Code parents should assume subsidiary liability for the dama g e cause by their minor children. Now, we do not have any objection t o the doctrinal rule holdin g t h e parents liable, but the categorization of their liability being subsidiary, and not prima r y , in n ature requires a hard second look considering previous decisions of this court on t h e m a t t er w hich warrant comparative analysis. Our concern stems from our readings that if the liability of t h e parents for crimes or quasi-delict of their minors is subsidiary, then the parents can neither inv oke nor be absolved of civil liability on the defense that they acted with dilig en ce of a g ood fa ther of the family to prevent damages. On the other hand, if such lia bilit y im pu t ed t o t h e pa rents is considered direct and primary, that diligence could constitute a v alid and substan t ia l defen se. W e believe that the civil liability of the parents for quasi -delict s of t h eir m in or ch ildr en is pr imary and not subsidiary. In fact, if we apply Article 2180 of the Civil Code which provides for solidary liability of joint t ortfeasors, the persons responsible for the act or omission , in this case t h e minor and the father , in cas of his death or incapacity, the mot h er , a r e solida r y lia ble.

W HEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and priva t e r espon den t i s ORDERED t o deliver the minor Christopher J. T. David t o the custody of his mother, the herein pet itioner, and to give him temporary support in the amount of P3,000.00, pending the fixing of t h e a m ou n t of su ppor t in a n a ppr opr ia t e a ct ion .

Un der the foregoing rule, we hereby rule that the parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses committed by theri min or ch ildr en u n der t h eir legal authority or control, or who live in their company, unless it is proven that the form er a cted w it h t h e dilig en ce of a g ood fa t h er of t h e fa m ily t o pr ev en t su ch da m a g es.

Li bi v s IA C G.R. No. 7 0 8 9 0 Sept em ber 1 8 , 1 9 9 2

In t he case at bar, whether the death of hapless Julie Ann Gotiong was caused by a felon y or a qu asi-delict committed by Wendel Libi, respondent court did not err in holding petitioner liable for damages arising therefrom. Subject to the preceding modifications of t h e pr em ises r elied u pon by it therefor and on the bases of the legal imperatives herein explained, we conjoin w it h it s findings that said petitioners failed t o duly exercise the requisite diligentissimi patris familias t o pr ev en t su ch da m a g es.

Fa ct s: Respondent spouses are the legitimate parents of Julie Ann Gotiong who was a n 1 8 -y ea r -old fir st year commerce student of the University of San Carlos, Cebu City while petitioners are t h e pa rents of Wendell Libi who was then a minor between 18 and 19 years of age liv in g w it h h is pa r en t s. Ju lie Anne Goting and Wendell Libi were sweethearts until after two years when Julie Ann broke u p with Wendell after she supposedly found him to be sadistic and irresponsible. During the first a n d second weeks of their break up, Wendell kept pest er in g Ju lie A n n w it h dem a n ds of r econciliation but the latter persited with her refusal prompting the former t o resort to t h r ea t s a gainst her. Hence, Julie Anne stayed at the house of her bestfriend to avoid Wendell. Julie An n a n d Wendell died each from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the sme firearm, a r ev olv er licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi which was recover ed fr om t h e scen e of t h e cr im e in side t h e r esiden ce of pr iv a t e r espon den t s. Pr ivate respondent submitted that Wendell caused their daughter`s death by shooting h er with the firearm and then turning the gun on himself t o com m it su icide. Pet it ion er `s,

LA YUG v s.CA G.R. No. 1 1 5 6 4 0 Ma r ch 1 5 , 1 9 9 5 Fa ct s: Pet itioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met som etime in 1 976 in Iligan City where Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel Corporation and T er esit a w a s em ployed as a nurse in a local hospital. In 1977, T eresita left for Los Angeles, California t o w or k a s a nurse. She was able t o acquire immigrant status sometime later. In 1984, Reynaldo was sent by his employer, the National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as its liaison officer a n d Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a common law relationship of husba n d a n d w ife. Subsequently, Rosalind Therese was born. While they wer e on a br ief v a ca t ion in t h e Ph ilippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon their return t o the U.S.A ., Reg in a ld V in ce w a s bor n .

T h e relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate somet im e in 1 9 9 0 . T eresita blamed Reynaldo for the break-up, stating he was always naggin g h er a bou t m on ey m atters. Reynaldo, on the other hand, contended that T er esit a w a s a spen dt h r ift , bu y in g ex pensive jewelry and antique furniture instead of attending t o household expenses. Teresita left Rey naldo and the children and went back to California. She claims, however, that she spent a lot of m oney on long distance telephone calls t o keep in con st a n t t ou ch w it h h er ch ildr en . Rey naldo brought his children home to t h e Ph ilippin es, bu t beca u se h is a ssig n m en t in Pit tsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent back by his company to Pitt sbu r g h . He h a d t o leave his ch ildr en w it h h is sist er , co-pet it ion er Gu iller m a La y u g a n d h er fa m ily . T eresita claims that she did not immediately follow her ch ildr en beca u se Rey n a ldo filed a cr iminal case for bigamy against her and she was afraid of being arrested. Teresita, meanw h ile, decided to return t o the Philippines and filed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus a g a in st h er ein t w o pet it ion er s t o g a in cu st ody ov er t h e ch ildr en . T h e RTC dismissed the petition for habeas corpus suspendeding T eresita's parental a u t h or it y ov er Rosalind and Reginald and declared Reynaldo t o have sole parental authority ov er them but w ith rights of visitation. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision . Hen ce, t h is pet it ion . Issu e: Whether or n ot t h e pet it ion er is en t it led t o t h e cu st ody of t h e t w o ch ildr en . Held: In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts a r e m a n da t ed by t h e Fam ily Code to take into account all relevant considerations. If a child is under sev en y ea r s of a g e, the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian. The presumption is strong but it is n ot conclusive. It can be overcome by "com pelling reasons". If a child is ov er seven, his choice is pa ramount but, again, the court is not bound by that choice. In its discretion, the court may fin d t h e chosen parent unfit and award custody t o the other parent, or even t o a t h ir d pa r t y a s it deem s fit u n der t h e cir cu m st a n ces. In t he present case, both Rosalind and Reginald are now ov er sev en y ea r s of a g e. Rosa lin d celebrated her seventh birthday on August 16, 1 993 while Reginald reach ed t h e sa m e a g e on Ja nuary 12, 1 995. Both are studying in reputable schools and appear t o be fa ir ly in t ellig en t ch ildren, quite capable of thoughtfully determining the parent with whom they wou ld w a n t t o liv e. Once the choice has been made, the burden returns t o the court t o investigate if the pa r en t t h u s ch osen is u n fit t o a ssu m e pa r en t a l a u t h or it y a n d cu st odia l r espon sibilit y . W e are inclined to sustain the findings and conclusions of the regional trial court because it gave g r eater attention to the choice of Rosalind and considered in det a il a ll t h e r elev a n t fa ct or s bea r in g on t h e issu e of cu st ody . W h en she was a little ov er 5 years old, Rosalind was referred to a child psychologist, Rita Flor es Ma cabulos, to determine the effects of uprooting her from the Assumption Colleg e w h er e sh e w as studying. Four different tests were administered. The results of the t ests are quite revealing. T h e responses of Rosalind about her mother were very negative causing the psychologist to delve deeper into the child's anxiety. Among the things revealed by Rosalind was an inciden t w h er e sh e saw her mother hugging and kissing a "bad" man who lived in their house a n d w or ke d for h er father. Rosalind refused t o talk to her mother even on t h e t eleph on e. Sh e t en ded t o be em otionally emblazed because of constant fears that she may have to leave school and her aunt's fa m ily t o g o ba ck t o t h e Un it ed St a t es t o liv e w it h h er m ot h er . A t about the same time, a social welfare case study was conducted for the purpose of securing the t ravel clearance required before minors may go abroad. Social Welfare Officer Emma D. Estrada Lopez, stated that the child Rosalind refused to go back to the United States and be reunited with h er mother. She felt unloved and uncared for. Rosalind was more attached to her Yaya w h o did ev erything for her and Reginald. The child was found suffering from emotional shock caused by h er m ot h er 's in fidelit y . Respondent Teresita, for her part, argues that the 7-y ear age reference in the law applies t o t h e da te when the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is filed, not t o the da t e w h en a decision is r endered. This argument is flawed. Considerations involving the choice made by a child must be

a scertained at the t ime that either parent is given custody ov er the child. The matter of custody is n ot per m a n en t a n d u n a lt er a ble. T h en t oo, it must be noted that both Rosalind and Reginald are now ov er 7 year s of a g e. T h ey u nderstand the difference between right and wrong, ethical behavior and deviant imm or a lit y . T h eir best interests would be better served in an environment ch a r a ct er ized by em ot ion a l st a bility and a certain degree of material sufficiency. There is nothing in th e records to show that Rey n a ldo is a n "u n fit " per son u n der A r t icle 2 1 3 of t h e Fa m ily Code. T eresita does not deny that she was legally married to Roberto Lustado on December 17, 1984 in Ca lifornia. Less than a year later, she had already driven across the continental United Stat es t o commence living with another man, petitioner Reynaldo, in Pittsburgh. The two were married on October 7, 1987. Of course, to dilute this disadvantage on her part, this ma t t er of h er h a v in g con tracted a bigamous marriage later with Reynaldo, T eresita tried to pict u r e Rey n a ldo a s a r a pist, alleging further that she told Reynaldo about her marriage to Lusta do on t h e occa sion w hen she was raped by Reynaldo. Expectedly, Judge Harriet Demetriou of the Pasig RTC lent no w eight t o such tale. And even if this story were given credence, it adds to and not subtracts from t h e conviction of this Court about Teresita's values. Rape is an insidious crime against priv a cy . T h e argument that moral laxity or the habit of flirting from one man t o a n ot h er does n ot fa ll u nder "compelling reasons" is neither meritorious nor applicable in this case. Not only a r e t h e ch ildren ov er seven years old and their clear choice is the father , bu t t h e illicit or im m or a l a ctivities of the mother had already caused emotional disturbances, personality con flict s, a n d ex posure to conflicting moral values, at least in Rosalind. This is not to mention her conv ict ion for t h e cr im e of big a m y , w h ich fr om t h e r ecor ds a ppea r s t o h a v e becom e fin a l. T h e law is more than satisfied by the judgment of the trial court. The children are now both ov er sev en years old. Their choice of the parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear from the record. Fr om all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person, thus meeting the two requirements fou n d in t h e fir st paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code. The presumption under the second paragra ph of sa id a r t icle n o lon g er a pplies a s t h e ch ildr en a r e ov er sev en y ea r s. W HEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANT ED. T h e decision of t h e Cou r t of A ppea ls is r ev ersed and set aside, and the decision of Branch 96 of the Regional Trial Court of the Nationa l Ca pital Judicial Region stationed in Quezon City and presided over by the Honorable Lu ca s P. Ber samin in its Civil Case No. Q-92-14206 awardin g cu st ody of t h e m in or s Rosa lin d a n d Reg inald Espiritu to their father, Reynaldo Espiritu, is reinstated. No special pronouncemen t is m a de a s t o cost s.

SA NT OS v s. CA G.R. No. 1 1 3 0 5 4 Ma r ch 1 6 , 1 9 9 5 Fa ct s: Pet itioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by pr ofession , w er e m arried in Iloilo City in 1986. Their union beget only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. From the time t h e boy was released from the hospital until som etime thereafter, he had been in t h e ca r e a n d cu stody of his maternal grandparen t s, pr iv a t e r espon den t s Leopoldo a n d Ofelia Bedia . Pet itioner and wife Julia agreed t o place Leouel Jr. in the tempora r y cu st ody of t h e la t t er 's pa rents, the respondent spouses Bedia. The latter alleged that they paid for all the hospital bills, a s well as the subsequent support of the boy because petitioner could not afford t o do so. Ju lia Bedia-Santos left for the U.S.A. in 1988 to work. Petitioner alleged that he is n ot a w a r e of h er w hereabouts and his efforts t o locate her in the United States proved fu t ile. PR`s cla im t h a t a lthough abroad, their daughter Julia had been sending financial support t o them for h er son . PR`s contended that petitioner abducted the boy when petitioner along with his t w o br ot h er s v isit ed t h e Bedia h ou seh old, w h er e t h r ee-y ea r old Leou el Jr . w a s st a y in g .

T h e spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Min or W a r d Leou el Sa ntos Jr., before the RTC which was granted on the same day and wa s a ffir m ed by t h e CA . Issu e: W h ether or not the custody of minor Leouel Santos, Jr. shall be a w a r ded t o t h e pet it ion er . Held: The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are dut y bound and entitled to keep them in their custody and company.The child's welfare is always th e pa r a m ou n t con sider a t ion in a ll qu est ion s con cer n in g h is ca r e a n d cu st ody . T h e law vests on the father and mother joint parental a u t h or it y ov er t h e per son s of t h eir common children. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. Only in case of the parents' death, absence or unsuitability m a y su bstitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent. The situation obtaining in the case at bench is one where the mother of the minor Santos, Jr., is working in t h e Un it ed St ates while the father, petitioner Santos, Sr., is present. Not only are they physically apa r t bu t a r e also emotionally separated. There has been no decree of legal separat ion a n d pet it ion er 's a t tempt to obtain an annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity of h is w ife h a s fa iled. Pet itioner assails the decisions of both the trial court and the appellate court t o award custody of h is minor son to his parents-in-law, the Bedia spouses on the ground that under Art. 214 of t h e Fam ily Code, substitute parental authority of the grandparents is proper only when both parents a r e dead, absent or unsuitable. Petitioner's unfitness, according to him, has not been successfully sh ow n by pr iv a t e r espon den t s. W e find the aforementioned considerations insufficient to defeat petitioner's parental authorit y a n d the concomitant right t o have custody ov er the minor Leouel Santos, Jr., particularly sin ce h e has not been shown to be an unsuitable and unfit parent. Private respondents' demonstra t ed lov e and affection for the boy, notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still preferr ed ov er t h e g randparents. The latter's wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly because there is n o pr oof t hat at the present time, petitioner is in no position to support the boy. T h e fa ct t h a t h e w a s u nable to provide financial support for his minor son from birth up to ov er three years when h e t ook the boy from his in-laws without permission, should not be sufficient reason t o strip him of h is permanent right to the child's custody. While petitioner's previous inattention is inexcusable a n d merits only the severest criticism, it cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the u nfavorable decision against him and his efforts to keep his only child in h is cu st ody m a y be r egarded as serious efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To a w a r d h im cu st ody w ou ld h elp en hance the bond between parent and son. It would also give the father a chan ce t o pr ov e h is lov e for his son and for the son to experience the warmth and support which a father ca n g iv e. W HEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated A pril 30, 1992 as well as its Resolution dated November 13, 1992 are h er eby REV ERSED a n d SET ASIDE. Custody ov er the minor Leouel Santos Jr. is awarded to his legitimate father, herein pet it ion er Leou el Sa n t os, Sr .

NERISSA Z. PEREZ, petitioner, vs. T HE COURT OF A PPEA LS (Ninth Divis ion) and RA Y C. PEREZ, res pondents . 255 SCRA 661 ROMERO, J. FA CT S:

Pr ivate respondent Ray Perez is a doctor of medicine practicing in Cebu while petitioner Nerissa, h is wife is a registered nurse. They were married on December 6, 1 986. After six misca r r ia g es, t w o operations and a high-risk pregnancy, petitioner finally gave birth t o Ray II in New York on Ju ly 20, 1992. Petitioner who began work in the US in October 1988, used part of her earnings to bu ild a model house in Mandaue City, Cebu. She also sought medical attention for her successive m iscarriages in New York. In February 1992, petition er beca m e a r esiden t a lien . Pr iv a t e r espondent stayed with her in the US twice and took care of her when she beca m e pr eg n a n t . Un like his wife, however, he had only a t ourist visa and was not em ployed. In January 1993, t h e cou ple and their baby arrived in Cebu. After a few weeks, only Nerissa returned to the US. When Ner issa came home a few days before Ray II‘s first birthday, the couple was no lon g er on g ood t erms. Petitioner did not want to live near her in-laws and rely solely on her husband‘s m ea g er in come of P 5 ,000.00. She longed t o be with her only child but her husband wa s keepin g h im a way from her. On the other hand, Ray wanted to stay here , where he could raise his son even as h e practiced his profession. Petitioner was forced to move to her parent‘s h om e in Ma n da u e. Ner issa filed a petition for Habeas Corpus asking respondent to surrender the custody of t h eir son t o h er . T h e court a quo issued an Order awarding custody of the one year old child to his mother, citin g pa ragraph 2, of Art. 213 of the Family Code which provides that no child under seven years of age sh all be separated from the mother, unless t h e Cou r t fin ds com pellin g r ea son s t o or der ot h erwise. On appeal, the CA reversed the trial court‘s order and awarded custody of the boy t o h is father. Holding that granting custody to the boy ‘s fa t h er w ou ld be for t h e ch ild‘s best in t er est a n d w elfa r e. ISSUE: A s between father and mother, who should have rightful custody of a ch ild w h o bea r s in h is per son bot h t h eir g en es? HELD: W h en the parents of the child are separated, Article 213 of the Family Code is the applicable law. Since the Code does not qualify the word ―separation‖ to mean ―legal separation‖ decr eed by a court, couples who are separated in fact, such petitioner and private responden t , a r e cov er ed w it h in it s t er m s. T h e Revised Rules of Court also contains a similar provision . Rule 99, Section 6 (Adoption a n d Cu stody of Minors). The provisions of law mandate that a child under 7 years of age shall not be separated from his mother unless the court finds compelling reasons t o order otherwise. The use of t h e word ―shall‖ in Article 213 of the Family Code and Rule 99, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Cou r t con n ot es a m a n da t or y ch a r a ct er . T h e general rule that a child under 7 years of age shall not be separated from his mother finds its r a ison d' etre in the basic need of a child for his mother‘s loving care. Only the most com pellin g r easons shall justify the court‘s awarding the custody of such a child t o som eone other t h a n h is m other, such as her unfitness to exercise sole parental author it y . In t h e pa st t h e follow in g g r ounds have been considered ample justification t o deprive a mother of custody and pa r en t a l a uthority: neglect, abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenn ess, dr u g a ddiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity and being sick with a communicable disease. It has lon g been settled that in custody cases, the foremost consideration is always the welfare and best in t er est of t h e ch ild. (Gutierrez, Alvin F.)

BONIFA CIA P. V A NCIL, petitioner, vs . HELEN G. BELMES, res pondent G.R. No. 132223 SA NDOV A L-GUT IERREZ, J. FACTS: Bon ifacia Vancil is the mom of Reeder C. Vancil, a US Navy serviceman who died in US in 1986 . Reeder had a common-law wife, Helen Belmes, with whom he had two kids, Valerie & Vin cen t .

Bon ifacia instituted guardianship proceedings ov er person & properties of Valerie (6 yr s old) & V incent (2 yrs old). Estate consists of proceeds from their dad‘s pension benefits worth P1 0 0 k. RT C Cebu a ppoin t ed Bon ifa cia a s leg a l & ju dicia l g u a r dia n . Na tural mother Helen opposed claiming she already filed a similar petition for guardianship. She la ter on filed a motion for Removal of Guardian &Appointment of New One claiming tha t sh e‘s t h e natural mom in actual custody of & exercising parental authority ov er children. She fur t h er a sserted that Bonifacia was a resident of Colorado, USA & that she‘s a natur a lized US cit izen . Reg ion a l T r ia l Cou r t r eject ed & den ied m ot ion . T h e Court of Appeals reversed. FC 225: parents, father or in his absence, mother are consider ed a s natural guardian of minor children. Revised ROC Rule 93 Sec. 7 con fir m s desig n a t ion of pa rents as ipso facto guardian of their minor kids w/o need of court appointm en t & su ch ca n on ly be transferred to another person for a good reason. CA found no reason why biological mom sh ould be deprived of her legal right. Affirming RTC would abdicate & viola t e t h e v er y ba sic fu ndamental t enets in civil law & the constitution on family solidarity. Bon ifacia claims that sh e should be appointed as the guardian based on the u ndisputed proof that Helen‘s live-in pa r t n er h a s r a ped V a ler ie sev en t im es w h ile u n der Helen ‘s cu st ody . ISSUE: W h et h er or n ot Bon ifa cia sh ou ld be a ppoin t ed a s t h e g u a r dia n HELD: No. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The case is moot. Valerie since already turned 18 on Sept. 2 , 1 998. Only thing in dispute is guardianship of Vincent. Art. 211 (FC): Father & m other s hall jointly exercise parental authority over their common children. Father’s decision shall prevail in cas es of disagreement unless there’s a judicial order to the contrary. Thus, Helen, being the natural mom of Vincent has the natural & legal right to his custody. Such right is inherent & not created by state/decision of courts but derives from nature of parental relations hip (Sagala-Eslao vs . CA). Art. 214 (FC) allow s s ubs titute parental authority of s urviving grandparent only in case of death, absence or unsuitability of parents . Helen is very m uch alive & has continuously exercised parental authority over Vincent. Helen’s unfitness was only as serted Valerie & since she’s already of major age, such cannot be appreciated anymore. Ev en if Helen were unfit, Bonifacia still won‘t qualify considering that she‘s a US citizen & r esiden t . Sh e won‘t be able to perform the responsibilities &obligations r equ ir ed of a g u a r dia n . Most pr obably she‘ll just delegate those duties to another person who might not be qu a lified. Sh e‘s been out of the country since 1987 and considering that she‘s old & was previously convict ed of libel, it‘s not likely that she‘ll come back here to fulfill her duties. Besides, only2 yrs a r e left for h er to exercise guardianship ov er child. True that law does not require court s t o on ly a ppoin t r esidents as guardians but court should not appoint guardians who are not with in ou r cou r t s‘ ju r isdict ion for it w ill be difficu lt t o pr ot ect t h e w a r ds in su ch in st a n ces. VITUG, CONCURRING: Law & jurisprudence recognizes deep ties that bin d pa r en t & ch ild. Pa rents are placed 1st in rank in matters of parental authority. Child‘s legitimacy doesn ‘t a ffect t h e order of priority in exercise of parental authority. FC176 states that illegitimate child shall be u nder pa r en t a l a u t h or it y of m om w h o sh ou ld be en t it led f or t h e ch ild‘s cu st ody . (Gutierrez , Alvin F.)

ST . MA RY’S ACADEMY, petitioner, vs . WILLIA M CA RPIT A NOS and LUCIA S. CA RPIT A NOS, GUA DA DA NIEL, JA MES DA NIEL II, JA MES DA NIEL, SR., and V IV ENCIO V ILLA NUEV A , res pondents . G.R. No. 143363 PARDO, J. FACTS: In February 1995, defendant-appellant St Mary‘s A ca dem y of Dipolog Cit y con du ct ed a n en rollment drive for the SY 1995-96.Part of the campaign was the v isit a t ion of sch ools fr om

w here prospective enrollees were studying. A student of that school and part of the ca m pa ig n , Sh erwin Carpitanos along w/other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep driv en by James Daniel II, a 15 year old student of the same school. En route t o Larayan Elem School, it w as alleged that minor James drove the jeep in a reckless mann er a n d a s a r esu lt t h e ― jeep t urned turtle‖. Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident. T h e Regional Trial Court held St Mary‘s liable for indemnificat ion for loss of Sh er w in ‘s life, a ctual damages for burial and so-related expenses, attorney‘s fees and moral damages. The Court of A ppeals affirmed decision but absolved from any liability the driver-m inor James a n d jeep‘s ow ner Vivencio Villanueva. St. Mary‘s appealed. The Court of Appeals reduced actual damages to Ph P25K but affirmed the rest of its previous decision. School filed Motion for Reconsider a t ion bu t w a s den ied. Hen ce, t h is a ppea l. ISSUES: 1. W h ether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding St. Mary‘s liable for sa id dea t h 2. W h ether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the award of moral da m a g es a g a in st t h e sch ool HELD: Y es.CA held school liable under Arts 218 & 219 FC, pointing out that petitioner was negligent in a llowing a minor t o drive in the campaign t o visit public schools to solicit enrollment. School was a lso liable in not having a teacher accompany the minor studen t s in t h e jeep. How ev er , for pet itioner t o be liable, it must be shown that the act or omission considered as negligent was th e pr oximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence, must have a causal conn ect ion t o t h e a cciden t . Bu t respondent-spouses Daniel and Villanueva admitted t h a t t h e im m edia t e ca u se of t h e a ccident was not the negligence of the school or the reckless driving of James Daniel II, bu t t h e detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. This was confirmed by the testimony of t h e t raffic investigator who instituted a report of the accident. Hence, reliance on Art 2 1 9 FC t h a t ― those given the authority and responsibility under Art 218 shall be principally a n d solida r ily lia ble for damages caused by acts orom issions of the unemancipated minor‖ w a s u n fou n ded. Lia bility, whether caused by the negligence of the minor-driver or mechanical detachment of the jeep‘s steering wheel guide, must be pinned on the minor‘s parents primarily. The negligen ce of St Ma r y ‘s w as on ly a r em ot e ca u se of th e a cciden t , a n ev en t t h a t t h e sch ool h a d n o con t r ol ov er . 2 . Y es. Incidentally, there was no question tha t t h e r eg ist er ed ow n er of t h e v eh icle w a s r espondent Villanueva for he even admitted this fact. The Court has held t h a t t h e r eg ist er ed ow ner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be respon sible t o t h e pu blic or to 3rd persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was being driven on t h e h ighways or streets. It is not the schools but the registered owned of the vehicle who shall be held r esponsible for damages for the death of Sherw in Ca r pit a n os. Ju dg m en t r ev er sed. Ca se r em anded t o T C for det er m in a t ion of lia b ilit y of defen da n t s ex clu din g St Ma r y ‘s. (Gutierrez, Alvin F.)

EDWA RD V. LACSON, petitioner, vs. MAOWEE DABA N LA CSON and MA ONA A DA BAN LACSON, repres ented by their mother and guardian ad -litem, LEA DA BA N LA CSON, res pondents G.R. No. 150644 GARCIA, J.: FACTS: T h e sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson a r e leg it im a t e da u g h t er s of pet itioner Edward V. Lacson and his wife, Lea Daban Lacson. Maowee was born on December 4, 1 974, while Maonaa, a little less than a year later. Not long after the b irth of Maonaa, petit ion er

left the conjugal hom e in Molo, Iloilo City, virtually for cin g m ot h er a n d ch ildr en t o seek, a pparently for financial reason, shelter som ewhere else. For a month, they st a y ed w it h Lea ‘ s m other-in-law, Alicia Lacson, then with her (Lea‘s) mother and th en w it h h er br ot h er Noel Da ban. After som e time, they rented an apartment only to return la t er t o t h e h ou se of Lea ‘s m other. As the trial court aptly observed, the sisters and their mother, from 1 976 to 1994, or for a per iod of eighteen (18) years, shuttled from one dwelling place t o a n ot h er n ot t h eir ow n . It a ppears that from the start of their estrangement, Lea did not badger her husband Edw a r d for su pport, relying initially on his commitment memorialized in a note dated December 10, 1975 t o g iv e support t o his daughters. As things turned out, however, Edward reneged on his promise of su pport, despite Lea‘s efforts towards having him fulfill the same. Lea would admit, though, that Edward occasionally gave their children meager amounts for school expenses. Through the years a n d up to the middle part of 1992, Edward‘s mother, Alicia Lacson, also gave small amou n t s t o h elp in the schooling of Maowee and Maonaa, both of whom eventually took up nu r sin g a t St . Pa ul‘s College in Iloilo City. In the early part of 1 995 when Lea, in behalf of her two da u g h t er s, filed a complaint against Edward for support before the Region a l T r ia l Cou r t of Iloilo Cit y , Br a n ch 3 3 , Ma ow ee w a s a bou t t o g r a du a t e. In t hat com plaint dated January 30, 1995, as amended, d ocket ed a s Civ il Ca se No. 2 2 1 8 5 , Ma owee and Maonaa, thru their mother, averred that t h eir fa t h er Edw a r d, despit e bein g g a infully employ ed and owning several pieces of valuable lands, has not provided them suppor t sin ce 1976. They also alleged that, owing to years of Edward‘s failure and neglect, their m ot h er h a d, from time to time, borrowed money from her brother Noel Da ba n . A s sh e w ou ld la t er t estify, Lea had received from Noel, by way of a loan, as much as P400,000.00 t o P600,000.00 . A s a pplied for and after due hearing, the trial court granted the sister s Ma ow ee a n d Ma on a a su pport pendente lite at P12,000.00 per month, subject to the schedule of paymen t a n d ot h er con ditions set forth in the court‘s corresponding order of May 13, 1996. Following trial, the RT C r endered on June 26, 1997 judgment finding for the plaintiff sisters, as r epr esen t ed by t h eir m other. In that judgment, the trial court, following an elaborat e for m u la set for t h t h er ein , or dered their defendant father Edward to pay them a specific su m w h ich r epr esen t ed 2 1 6 m on t h s, or 1 8 y ea r s, of su ppor t in a r r ea r s. ISSUE: W h ether or not the Court of Appeals erred in the grant of support in arrears from 1976 t o 1 9 9 4 HELD: T h e Court finds no adequate reason to disturb the factual determination of the CA confirmatory of t hat of the trial court respecting the demand Lea made on the petitioner t o secure support for t h e respondents. As a matter of long and sound appellate practice, factual findings of the CA a r e a ccorded respect, if not finality, save for the most compelling and cogent reasons. Not one of the w ell-recognized exceptions to this rule on conclusiveness of factual findings appear to obtain in t h is case. Accordingly, the Court cannot grant the petitioner ‘s plea for a r ev iew of t h e CA ‘s fin dings bearing on the actuality that, as basis for an award of support in arrears, an extrajudicial dem and for support had been made on the petitioner as evidenced by the December 1 0 , 1 9 7 5 n ot e adverted to. Lest it be ov erlooked, the jurisdiction of the Court in a petition for r ev iew , a s h ere, is generally limited to correction of errors of law. Complementing that postulate is the rule t hat the Court is not bound t o analyze and weigh all ov er again the evidence already consider ed in the proceedings below, except when, as earlier indicated, compelling reasons demand a review of t h e fa ct u a l con clu sion s dr a w n fr om su ch ev iden ce. (Gutierrez , Alvin F.)

ROPERT Y

LEUNG YEE, plaintiff-appellant, vs. FRANK L. STRONG MACHINERY COMPA NY and J. G. WILLIA MSON, defendants -appellees G.R. No. L-11658

CARSON, J. FA CT S: T h e "Compañia Agricola Filipina" bought rice-cleaning machinery from the machinery company, a n d executed a chattel mortgage thereon to secure payment of the purchase price. It included in t h e mortgage deed the building of strong materials in which t h e m a ch in er y w a s in st a lled, w ithout any reference to the land on which it stood. The indebtedness secured by this instrument n ot having been paid when it fell due, the mortgag ed pr oper t y w a s sold by t h e sh er iff, in pu rsuance of the t erms of the mortgage instrument, and wa s bou g h t in by t h e m a ch in er y com pany. The mortgage was registered in the chattel mortgage reg ist r y , a n d t h e sa le of t h e pr operty to the machinery com pany in satisfaction of the mortgage was annotated in t h e sa m e r egistry on 29 December 1913. On 14 January 1914, the "Com pañia Agricola Filipina" executed a deed of sale of the land upon which the building stood to the machinery com pany, but this deed of sa le, although executed in a public document, was not registered and made no reference to the bu ilding erected on the land and would appear to have been executed for the purpose of cu r in g a ny defects which might be found to exist in the machinery company's t itle to the building under t h e sheriff's certificate of sale. The machinery com pany went into possession of the building at or a bout the time when this sale took place, that is to say, the month of December 1913, and it h a s con tinued in possession ever since. At or about the time when the chattel mortgage was executed in favor of the machinery company, the "Compañia Agricola Filipina" executed another mortgage t o Leung Y ee upon the building, separate and apart from the land on which it st ood, t o secu r e payment of the balance of its indebtedness to Leung Yee under a contract for the construction of t h e building. Upon the failure of the mortgagor to pay the amount of the indebtedness secu r ed by the mortgage, Leung Yee secured judgment for that amoun t , lev ied ex ecu t ion u pon t h e bu ilding, bought it in at the sheriff's sale on or about the 18 December 1914, and had the sheriff's certificate of sale duly registered in the land registry of the Province of Cavite. At the time w h en t h e execution was levied upon the building, the machinery company, which was in possession , filed with the sheriff a sworn statement setting up its claim of title and demanding the release of t h e property from the levy. The Court gave judgment in favor of the machinery company, relying u pon Article 1473 and the fact that the company had its title to the building register ed pr ior t o t h e da t e of t h e r eg ist r y of pla in t iff‘s cer t ifica t e. Hen ce, t h e a ppea l. ISSUE: W h ether or not the plaintiff to recover possession of the building from the machinery com pa n y HELD: T h e Supreme Court affirmed the judgment with costs against the appellant. Buildin g sepa r a t e fr om land does not affect character as real property; Registry of chattel mortgage does not affect character of the building and the machineries installed therein. T h e Ch a t t el Mor t g a g e La w con templates and makes provision for mortgages of personal property; and the sole purpose and object of the chattel mortgage registry is to provide for the regist r y of "Ch a t t el m or t g a g es," m ortgages of personal property executed in the manner and form prescribed in the statute. T h e bu ilding of strong materials in which the machinery was installed was real pr oper t y , a n d t h e m ere fact that the parties seem to have dealt with it separate and apart from the land on which it st ood in no wise changed its character as real property. It follow s t h a t n eit h er t h e or ig in a l r egistry in the chattel mortgage registry of the instrument purporting to be a chattel mortgage of t h e building and the machinery installed therein, nor the annotation in that registry of the sale of t h e mortgaged property, had any effect wh a t ev er so fa r a s t h e bu ildin g w a s con cer n ed. Possession before sheriff‘s sale, not Article 1 473 (on good faith), controlling as t o ow n er sh ip of pr operty. The ruling cannot be sustained on the ground of Article 1473, second paragraph, but on t h e ground that the agreed statement of facts discloses that neither the purchase of the buildin g by plaintiff nor his inscription of the sheriff's certificate of sale in his favor w a s m a de in g ood fa ith, and that the machinery company must be held to be the owner of the proper ty u n der t h e t h ird paragraph of the above cited article of the code, it appearing that the compa n y fir st t ook possession of the property; and further, tha t t h e bu ildin g a n d t h e la n d w er e sold t o t h e m achinery com pany long prior to the date of the sheriff's sale to the plaintiff. (Gutierrez , Alvin F.)

DEV ELOPMENT BA NK OF T HE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs . COURT OF A PPEALS, MYLO O. QUINTO and JESUSA CHRISTINE S. CHUPUICO, respondent. G.R. No. 109946 BELLOSILLO, J. FACTS: Dev elopment Bank of the Philippines filed this petition for review on certior a r i a ssa ilin g t h e decision of the Court of Appeals holding that the mortgages in favor of the bank were v oid a n d in effectual because when constituted the mortgagors, who were merely applicants for free patent of t h e property mortgaged, were not the owners thereof in fee simple and ther efor e cou ld n ot v alidly encumber the same. Petitioner granted a loan of P94,000.00 to t h e spou ses Sa n t ia g o Olidiana and Oliva Olidiana. To secure the loan the Olidiana spou ses ex ecu t ed a r ea l est a t e m ortgage on several properties. At the time of the mortgage the property was still the subject of a Fr ee Patent application filed by the Olidianas with the Bureau of Lands but r eg ist er ed u n der t h eir name in the Office of the Municipal Assessor of Molave for taxation purposes.The Olidiana spou ses filed with the Burea u of La n ds a Reques t for Am endm ent of t h eir Fr ee Pa t en t a pplications ov er several parcels of land including Lot No. 2029 (PIs-61). In this r equ est t h ey r enounced, relinquished and waived all their rights and interests over Lot No. 2029 (Pls-6 1 ) in fav or of Jesusa Christine Chupuico and My lo O. Quin t o, r espon den t s h er ein . T h is secon d m ortgage also included Lot No. 2029 (Pls-61) as security for the Olidia n a spou ses fin a n cia l obligation with petitioner. Thereafter, for failure of Santiago and Oliva Olidiana to comply w it h t h e terms and conditions of their prom issor y n ot es a n d m or t g a g e con t r a ct s, pet it ion er ex trajudicially foreclosed all their mortgaged properties. However, w h en pet it ion er t r ied t o r egister the sale and the affidavit of consolidation and to have the tax declaration transferred in it s name it was discovered that Lot No. 2029 had already been divided and covered in the na m e of Jesusa Christine Chupuico, while the other half known as Lot 2029-B was covered by the same in the name of Mylo 0. Quinto. Since there was no showin g t h a t t h e sa les a pplica t ion w a s a pproved before the property was mortgaged, the trial court concluded that the Olidiana spouses w ere not yet its owners in fee simple when they mortgaged the property. The low er cou r t a lso sa id that with the subsequent issuance of the Free Pa t en t by t h e Bu r ea u of La n ds for t h e r espondents. Therefore petitioner could not have acquired a valid title over the subject propert y by virtue of the foreclosure and subsequent sale at public auction. Resultantly, t h e t r ia l cou r t declared the following as null and void. Petitioner then appealed t o the Court of Appeals w h ich likew ise r u led in fa v or of r espon den t s, h en ce t h e in st a n t pet it ion . ISSUE: W h ether the land in dispute could have been validly mortgaged while still the subject of a Fr ee Pa t en t A pplica t ion w it h t h e g ov er n m en t HELD: Pet itioner bank did not acquire valid title over the land in dispute because it w a s pu blic la n d w hen mortgaged to the bank. The Court cannot accept petitioner‘s conten t ion t h a t t h e lot in dispute was no longer public land when mortgaged t o it since the Olidiana spouses had been in open, continuous, adverse and public possession thereof for m or e t h a n t h ir t y (3 0 ) y ea r s. Mea nwhile the government still remained the owner thereof, as in fact the application could still be canceled and the land awarded to another applica n t sh ou ld it be sh ow n t h a t t h e leg a l r equirements had not been complied with. What divests the government of title t o the land is the issuance of the sales patent and its subsequent registration with the Register of Deeds. It is t h e r egistration and issuance of the certificate of title that segregate public lands from t h e m a ss of pu blic domain and convert it into private property. Since the disputed lot in the ca se befor e u s w as still the subject of a Free Patent Application when mortgaged to petitioner a n d n o pa t en t w as granted to the Olidiana spouses. Thus, since the disputed property was not ow n ed by t h e

Olidiana spouses when they mortgaged it to petitioner, the contracts of mortgage an d a ll t h eir su bsequent legal consequences as regards the subject lot a r e n u ll a n d v oid. It is es s ential requisite for the validity of a mortgage that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of a property m ortgaged, and it appearing that the mortgage was constituted before the issuance of the patent t o t he mortgagor, the mortgage in question must of necessity be void and ineffective. For the law ex plicitly requires an imperative for the validity of a mortgage that the mortgagor be the absolute ow n er of w h a t is m or t g a g ed. A TOK-BIG WEDGE MINING COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and LIWA N CONSI, res pondents . G.R. No. 88883 PARAS, J. FACTS: Fr edia Mineral claim of about nine (9) hectares situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet, was located som etime between December 25, 1930 and December 31, 1 930, a period of six (6) days, by A .I. Rey nolds in accordance with the prov isions of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, better kn ow n a s the Philippine Bill of 1902, in a so-called Declaration of Location. T h e sa id Decla r a t ion of Location of mineral claim was duly recorded in the Office of the Mining Recorder som et im e on Ja nuary 2, 1931. Fredia mineral claim, together with other minera l cla im s, w a s sold by A .I. Rey nolds to Big Wedge Mining Company, the earlier corporate name of Atok Big Wedge Minin g Com pany, Inc. in a Deed of Sale executed on November 2, 1931. Since then petitioner A t ok h a s been in continuous and exclusive ownership and possession of said claim up to the present. Atok h a s paid the realty taxes and occupation fees for the Fredia mineral claim. The Fredia m in er a l claim together with other mineral cla im s ow n ed by A t ok h a s been decla r ed u n der T a x Declaration No. 9535 and that in view of Presidential Decree No. 1214 an applica t ion for lea se w a s filed by A t ok cov er in g t h e Fr edia m in er a l cla im . On the other hand, private respondent Liwan Consi has a lot below the land of a certain Mr. Acay a t Tuding Slide, It ogon, Benguet. He constructed a house thereon som etime in 1964. T h e lot is cov ered by Tax Declaration No. 9462. When he first constructed his house below th e lot of Mr . A cay he was told that it was not necessary for him to obtain a building permit a s it w a s on ly a n ipa hut. And no one prohibited him from entering the land so he was con st r u ct in g a h ou se t h ereon. It was only in January 1984 when private respondent Consi repaired the said house that people came to take pictures and told him that the lot belongs to Atok. Private respondent Consi h a s been paying taxes on said land which his father before him had occupied. On January 198 4 , t h e security guards of Atok infor m ed Felicia n o Rey es, Secu r it y Officer of A t ok, t h a t a con struction was being undertaken at the area of the Fredia mineral claim by private respondent Liwan Consi. Feliciano Reyes instructed the cashier to go and take pictures of the construct ion . Feliciano Reyes himself and other security guards went to the place of the construction t o verify a n d then to the police to report the matter. On March 1, 1984, Atok filed a complaint for forcible en try and detainer against Liwan Consi. On January 29, 1987, after due h earing, the Mun icipa l T r ial Court of Itogon. This case against Liwan Consi is hereby ordered dism issed. Pet it ion er A T OK appealed the decision t o the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio and Benguet. the Court of A ppeals denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner ATOK. Hence, the petit ion . ISSUE: W h ether or not an individual's long term occupation of land of the public domain vests him with su ch r ig h t s ov er t h e sa m e a s t o defea t t h e r ig h t s of t h e ow n er of t h a t cla im HELD: It is of n o importance whether Benguet and Atok had secured a patent for as h eld in t h e Gold Cr eek Mining Corporation case, for all physical purposes of ownership, the owner is not required t o secure a patent as long as he complies with the provisions of the mining laws; his possessor y r ight, for all practical purposes of ow n er sh ip, is a s g ood a s t h ou g h secu r ed by pa t en t . In t he case at bar, the evidence on record pointed that the petitioner Atok has faithfully complied w ith all the requirements of the law regarding the ma in t en a n ce of t h e sa id Fredia Mineral Claim . The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and under th e laws then in force removed it from the public domain . By su ch a ct , t h e loca t or s a cqu ir ed ex clusive rights over the land, against even the government, without need of any further act such

a s the purchase of the land or the obtention of a patent ov er it. A s t h e la n d h a d becom e t h e pr ivate property of the locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as they did, to Ben g u et a n d Atok. With this ruling enunciated by the Court, it can further be decla r ed a n d h eld t h a t pet itioner Atok has the exclusive righ t t o t h e pr oper t y in qu est ion . (Gutierrez, Alvin F.)

Pet itioner then filed an action for Quieting of Title and Damages against h er ein r espon den t .

Repu bl i c v s. De Gu zm n a , et .a l . 3 2 6 SCRA 5 7 4

Respondent‘s motion for execution was granted by the trial court and was affirmed by t h e CA .

FA CT S:

W h ether or not the petitioner is entitled to retain possession of t h e pr oper t y u n t il payment of the loan and the value of the necessary and useful improvements made u pon su ch pr oper t y .

Con flicting applications for confirmation of im per fect t it le w a s filed by Nor m a A lm a n zor a g a in st r espon den t s ov er la n ds loca t ed in Sila n g , Ca v it e. It is undisputed that the lands were released as agricultural land on 1 965 and that t h e Pet it ion for Con fir m a t ion of Im per fect T it le w a s filed by t h e r espon den t s on 1 9 9 1 . T h e t r ia l cou r t r u led in fa v or of t h e r espon den t s. T h e CA a ffir m ed su ch r u lin g . ISSUE:

W h ether or not the respondents have ov erthrown the presumption that the lands a r e pa r t of t h e pu blic dom a in ?

T h e t r ia l cou r t r u led in fa v or of t h e pet it ion er . T h e CA reversed the same. It ruled that the transaction that was entered into was a n equ it a ble m or t g a g e a n d n ot a sa le t h u s, t h e pet it ion er ‘s OCT is v oid.

ISSUE:

HELD:

A s the sole owner, the respondent has the right to enjoy her proper t y w it h ou t a n y ot h er lim it a t ion s t h a n t h ose est a blish ed by la w . A s a general rule, the mortgagor retains possession of the mortgaged property. A m or t g a g e is m er ely a lien . Possession is an essential attribute of ownership. It would be redundant for the respondent to go ba ck t o cou r t t o est a blish h er r ig h t t o possess t h e pr oper t y .

HELD:

T h e petition for confirmation of imperfect t itle was filed four (4) y ea r s sh or t of t h e r equired thirty (30) yea r per iod possession r equ ir em en t u n der PD 2 9 a n d RA 6 9 4 0 . T h e respondents‘ period of occupancy ov er the subject land 26 years at the time of t h e filin g of t h e petition, four (4) years short of the required 30-y ear period possession requiremen t u n der t h e la w . Pr ior to its declaration as alienable land in 1965, any occupation or possession thereon cannot be con sider ed in t h e cou n t i n g of t h e 3 0 -y ea r possession r equ ir em en t . T h e rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified a s forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of t h e disposa ble a g r icu lt u r a l la n ds of t h e pu blic dom a in .

Isa gu i r r e v s. De La r a 3 3 2 SCRA 8 0 3 FA CT S:

Gem in ia n o et . a l . v s. CA 2 5 9 SCRA 3 4 4 FA CT S:

T h e subject lot was originally owned by petitioner‘s mother Paulina. A n u n fin ish ed bungalow was constructed on the lot by the pet it ion er s. T h e sa id bu n g a low w a s sold by pet it ion er s t o r espon den t in 1 9 7 8 . Mea nwhile, a contract of lease ov er the lot was earlier entered into by the petitioners‘ mother in fa v or of t h e r espon den t s for a per iod of 7 y ea r s. Pet itioners, after having the lot registered in their names, filed a case for unlawful detainer a n d da m a g es a g a in st t h e r espon den t s. T h e lower court ruled in favor of the respondents. On appeal, the RTC reversed t h e sa m e a n d or dered the petitioners t o reimburse the respon den t s for t h e v a lu e of t h e h ou se a n d t h e im pr ov em en t s. T h e CA a ffir m ed t h e RT C.

A lejandro De Lara was the original applica n t -cla im a n t for Miscella n eou s Sa les A pplication on 1942. He was succeeded by his wife, respondent Felicitas De Lara upon his death.

ISSUE:

On said land stood a 2-story commercial and residential apartmen t in t h e n a m e of pr iv a t e r espon den t ‘s son s.

HELD:

Som etime on 1960, a ―Deed of Sale and Special Cessation of Rights and Interests‖ was execu t ed in favor of the petitioner, Cornelio. Su bsequ en t ly , a n OCT w a s ex ecu t ed in h is n a m e. Mea n w h ile, a n OCT w a s issu ed t o t h e r espon den t a n en t t h e sa les a pplica t ion .

W h ether or not the respon den t s w er e bu ilder s in g ood fa it h or m er e lessees.

Being mere lessees, the respondents knew that their occupation of the premises would con tinue only for the life of the lease. Thus, they cannot be considered as possessors or builder s in g ood fa it h . A rticle 448 of the Civil Code in relation to Article 546 of the Civil Code applies only to possessors in good faith. It does not apply where one‘s only inter est is t h a t of a lessee u n der a r en t a l

con tract; otherwise, it would always be in the power of the tenant t o ―improve‖ his landlor d ou t of h is pr oper t y .

Sa id agent, through one of its employees, accompanied Kee‘s wife to inspect lot 8. Unfortunately, t h e pa r cel of la n d poin t ed t o w a s Lot 9 . Kee then constructed improvements on said property. Jardinico then filed a n ej ect m en t ca se a g a in st Kee.

T ecn oga s v s. CA Febr u a r y 1 0 , 1 9 9 7 FA CT S:

ISSUE: W h ether or not a lot buyer who constructs improvement s on t h e w r on g pr oper t y er r on eou sly deliv er ed by t h e ow n er ‘s a g en t , a bu ilder in g ood fa it h ? HELD: Kee was in good faith. At the time he built improvements of Lot 9, Kee believ ed t h a t sa id lot was what he bought from petitioner. The rights of Kee and Jardinico vis-à-vis each other, a s builder in good faith and owner in good faith respectively are regulated by law (448, 546, 548, Civ il Code).

Pla intiff is a domestic corporation and a registered owner of the subject land located in Sa n Dionisio, Paranaque. It purchased the subject land from Pariz Industries, Inc. in 1970 w it h t h e bu ildin g s, im pr ov em en t s a n d t h e w a ll ex ist in g t h er eon . Dedendant Eduardo Uy was the registered owner of t h e la n d a djoin in g pet it ion er ‘s la n d. T ecnogas offered to buy from Uy the portion of the latter‘s land occupied by t h e por t ion of it s bu ildin g s a n d w a ll. Uy r efu sed.

Ben it ez v s. CA 2 6 6 SCRA 2 4 2 FA CT S:

ISSUE:

W h ether or not the plaintiff is con sider ed a bu ilder in ba d fa it h beca u se h e is pr esumed to know the metes and bounds of his property as described in the Certificate of T it le.

Som etime on 1986, petitioners purchased a lot fr om Ca v it e Dev elopm en t Ba n k. Su bsequ en t ly , t h e r espon den t s bou g h t t h e sa m e.

HELD:

Respondents then bought another property adjacent t o that of petitioner‘s land. Thereafter, t h e form er then filed a case against the latter for ejectment upon discovery of the for m er t h a t t h e la t t er ‘s h ou se en cr oa ch ed on t h e for m er ‘s la n d.

T h e plaintiff purch a sed t h e la n d w it h t h e st r u ct u r es a lr ea dy in ex ist en ce.

A rticle 5 27, Civil Code presumes good faith since no proof exists to show that the encroachmen t ov er a narrow, needle-shaped portion of the respondent‘s land was don e in ba d fa it h by t h e bu ilder of t h e en cr oa ch in g st r u ct u r es. It is presumed that possession continues to be enjoyed in the same character in w h ich it w a s a cqu ir ed, u n t il t h e con t r a r y is pr ov ed. T hus, plaintiff is deemed to have stepped into the shoes of the seller in reg a r d t o a ll r ig h t s of ow nership over the land sold, including the right to compel the defendant to exercise eit h er of t h e opt ion s u n der A r t . 4 4 8 , Civ il Code. Pla intiff must also pay rent for the property occupied by its building but only up to the da t e t h e r espondent serves notice of its option upon plaintiff and the trial court if such option is for t h e r espon den t t o a ppr opr ia t e t h e en cr oa ch in g st r u ct u r e.

Pl ea sa n t v i l l e Dv t . Cor p. v s. CA 2 5 3 SCRA 1 0 FA CT S: Robillo purchased from petitioner Lot 9 in Pleasantville Subdivision, Bacolod City. In 1 975, respondent Jardinico bought the rights from Robillo. At tha t t im e, Lot 9 w a s v a ca n t . Mea nwhile, on 1974, respondent Wilson Kee bought on installment Lot 8 of sa id su bdiv ision fr om CT T EI (ex c lu siv e r ea l a g en t of pet it ion er ).

MeT C r u led in fa v or of t h e r espon den t s. T h e RT C a n d CA a f fir m ed t h e sa m e. ISSUE:

W h ether or not possession of a lot encroached upon by a part of anot h er ‘s h ou se be r ecov er ed in a n a ct ion for eject m en t . HELD:

Y es, w it h in 1 y ea r fr om la st dem a n d.

T hat petitioners occupied the land prior to respondents‘ purchase thereof does not n eg a t e t h e la t t er ‘s ca se for eject m en t . Pr ior physical possession is not required. Possession can be acquired by material occupation, by t h e fact that a thing is subject t o the a ct ion of on e‘s w ill or by t h e pr oper a ct s a n d leg a l for m a lit ies est a blish ed for a cqu ir in g su ch r ig h t .

Ev a del Rea l t y v s. Sor i a n o A pr il 2 0 , 2 0 0 1 FA CT S:

Respondent-spouses as sellers, entered into a ―Contract t o Sell‖ w it h pet it ion er a s buyer ov er a parcel of land which is part of a huge tract of la n d kn ow n a s t h e Im u s Est a t e. Upon payment of the first installment, the petitioners introduced improvemen t s t h er eon a n d fen ced off t h e pr oper t y w it h con cr et e w a lls.

T h ereafter, the respondents discovered that the area fenced off by the petitioners exceeded t h e a r ea su bject of t h e con t r a ct by 2 ,4 5 0 squ a r e m et er s. A com plaint for accion reinv in dica t or ia w a s filed by r espon den t s a g a in st pet it ion er .

A rticle 457 excludes all deposits caused by human intervention. Alluvion must be the exclu siv e w ork of nature. When a land was not formed solely by the natural effect of the water cur r en t of t h e river bordering said land but as a consequence of the direct and deliberate int er v en t ion of m a n , it m a n -m a de a ccr et ion a n d, a s su ch , pa r t of t h e pu blic dom a in .

T h e t r ia l cou r t , by w a y of a su m m a r y ju dg m en t , r u led in fa v or of r espon den t s. ISSUE: W h ether or not the issue regarding petitioner‘s good faith or bad fa it h a s a bu ilder sh ou ld h a v e been per em pt or ily disposed of by t h e t r ia l cou r t . HELD: T h e petitioner admitted in its Amended Answer that the lot in dispute is cov er ed by t h e T CT of r espon den t s. W ith this admission, petitioner can no long er cla im t h a t it w a s a bu ilder in g ood fa it h . Mor eover petitioner, as a real estate developer is presumed to be experienced in bu sin ess a n d ou ght to have sufficient t echnical expertise to correctly determine the metes and boun ds of t h e la n d it a cqu ir es.

DESA MPA RA DO V DA DE NA ZA RENO et a l . v s. COURT OF A PPEA LS et a l . 2 5 7 SCRA 5 8 9 ; GR. No. 9 8 0 4 5 ; Ju n e 2 6 , 1 9 9 6 FA CT S: A parcel of land is situated in Telegrapo, Puntod, Cagayan de Oro City. It was formed as a result of sa wdust dumped into the dried-up Balacanas Creek and along the banks of the Cagayan riv er by Sun Valley Lumber Co. Private respondents Jose Salasan a n a n d Reo Ra ba y a lea sed t h e su bject lots on which their houses stood from Petitioner Antonio Nazareno. For refusa l t o pa y r en t a ls, r espon den t s w er e eject ed. A ntonio Nazareno caused the approval by the Bureau of Lands of the survey plan to per fect h is t itle over the accretion area being claimed by him. How ev er , it w a s pr ot est ed by pr iv a t e r espondents. The petitioners claim that the subject land is private land being an accretion to h is t it led pr oper t y , a pply in g A r t icle 4 5 7 of t h e Civ il Code. ISSUE: W h et h er or n ot A r t icle 4 5 7 of T h e Civ il Code a pplies. HELD: No. The following requites should all concur in or der for a ccr et ion t o a pply a s a m ode of a cquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil Code: (1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be g radual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the riv er (or sea ); a n d (3 ) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the sea coast ) . Pet itioners admit that the accretion was formed by the dumping of bou lder s, soil a n d ot h er filling materials on portions of the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River bounding their la n d. It cannot be claimed, therefore, that the accumulation of such boulders, soil a n d ot h er fillin g m aterials was gradual and im perceptible, resulting from the action of the waters or the current of t h e Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River. A bsence of the first and second r equ isit es, t h ey ca n n ot cla im t h e r ig h t s of a r ip a r ia n ow n er .

HEIRS OF EMILIANO NAVARRO vs. INTERMEDIATE A PPELLA T E COURT A ND HEIRS OF SINFOROSO PA SCUA L G.R. No. 6 8 1 6 6 . Febr u a r y 1 2 , 1 9 9 7 FA CT S: Pet itioners' predecessor-in-interest, Em iliano Navarro, filed a fishpond applica t ion w it h t h e Bu reau of Fisheries covering twenty five (25) hectares of foreshore land in Sibocon , Ba la n g a , Ba taan. The Director of Fisheries, gave due course to his application but only t o t h e ex t en t of sev en (7) hectares of the property as may be certified by the Bureau of Forestry a s su it a ble for fish pon d pu r poses. Som etime in the early part of 1960, Sinforoso Pascual filed an application to register and confirm h is title to a parcel of land, situated in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan. Pascual claimed that this land is a n accretion to his property, situated in Barrio Puerto Rivas, Balanga, Bataan. Sinforoso Pascual cla im ed t h e a ccr et ion a s t h e r ipa r ia n ow n er . Em iliano Navarro filed an opposition to Pascual's application. Navarro claimed t h a t t h e la n d sou ght to be registered has always been part of the public dom ain, it being a part of the foreshore of Ma nila Bay. He was a lessee and in possession of a part of the subject property by v ir t u e of a fishpond permit issued by the Bureau of Fisheries and confirmed by the Office of the Pr esiden t a n d also that he had already con v er t ed t h e a r ea cov er ed by t h e lea se in t o a fish pon d. ISSUE: Is la n d be con sider ed a s for esh or e la n d? HELD: Y es. The third requisite of accretion is absent in the case at bar. It states that alluvium m u st b e deposit ed on t h e por t ion of cla im a n t 's la n d w h ich is a dja cen t t o t h e r iv er ba n k. Here private respondents' own land lies between the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers; in front of their la nd on the northern side lies the disputed land where before 1948, there lay the Manila Bay . If t h e accretion were to be attributed to the action of either or both of the T a lisa y a n d Bu la ca n Riv ers, the alluvium should have been deposited on either or both of the easter n a n d w est er n boundaries of private respondents' own tract of land, not on the northern portion thereof which is a dja cen t t o t h e Ma n ila Ba y . T h e disputed land is an accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or on w hat used to be the for eshore of Manila Bay which adjoined private respondents‘ own tract of land on the nort h er n side. Hence, the land which is adjacent t o t h e pr oper t y belon g in g t o Pa scu a l ca n n ot be con sider ed a n a ccr et ion ca u sed by t h e a ct ion of t h e t w o r iv er s.

ROBLES et a l v s. CA 3 2 8 SCRA 9 7 ; G.R. No. 1 2 3 5 0 9 ; Ma r ch 1 4 , 2 0 0 0 FA CT S: Leon Robles primitively owned a land which he occupied the same openly and adversely as early a s 1 916 and paid its taxes. When Leon died his son Silvino Robles inherited land, took possession

a n d paid taxes. Upon Silvino‘s death, his widow Maria de la Cruz and his children inherited t h e pr operty, took adverse possession and paid taxes. However, the task of cultivating the lan d w a s a ssigned to Lucio Robles. Plaintiffs entrusted the payment of the land taxes t o their co-heir a n d h a lf-br ot h er , Hila r io Robles. In 1 962, the tax declaration in Silvino‘s name was canceled and transferred Hilario Robles a n d h is wife. In 1966, Andrea Robles secured a loan from the Cardona Rural Bank, Inc., using the tax declaration as security. When the mortgage debt was unpaid, it was auctioned for sale and Rural Ba nk was the highest bidder. Consequently the spouses Robles failed t o redeem property. Thu s, t itle was transferred in the name of Rural Bank. Then Rural Bank sold the same t o t h e Spou ses V er g el Sa n t os a n d Ru t h Sa n t os. In 1 987, plaintiff discovered the mortgage and attempted to r edeem t h e pr oper t y , bu t w a s u nsuccessful. The spouses Santos also took possession of the property and secured a free paten t in t h eir n a m es. Hen ce a pet it ion for qu iet in g of t it le t o t h e la n d w a s filed. ISSUE: W ill t h e pet it ion pr osper ? HELD: Y es. Hilario mortgaged the disputed property t o the Rural Bank of Cardona in his capacit y a s a m ere co-owner thereof. The said transaction did not divest the plaintiff of title to the property a t t h e t im e of t h e in st it u t ion of t h e com pla in t for qu iet in g of t it le. A n action to quiet title is a remedy for the removal of any cloud or doubt or uncertain t y on t h e t itle to real property. It is essential for the plaintiff or complainant to have a legal or an equitable t itle to or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action. Also, t h e deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that is being alleged as a cloud on plain t iff‘s t it le m u st be sh own to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or leg a l effica cy . A lso, there is an irregularity when the tax declaration of Silvino was cancelled since there was no in st r u m en t or deed of con v ey a n ce ev iden cin g it s t r a n sfer t o Hila r io Robles.

De A v i l es v s. CA 2 6 4 SCRA 4 7 3 FA CT S: Edu ardo Aviles was in actual possession of the afore-described property since 1957 . In fa ct h e m ortgaged the same with the Rural Bank and Philippine National Bank. When the property w a s in spected by a bank representative, Eduardo Aviles, in the presence of the bou n da r y ow n er s, n amely, defendant Camilo Aviles, Anastacio Aviles and Juana and Apolonio Joaquin, pointed t o t h e inspector the existing earthen dikes as the boundary limit s of t h e pr oper t y a n d n obody objected. When the real estate mortgage was foreclosed, the property was sold at public auct ion bu t this was redeemed by plaintiffs' m other and the land was subsequen t ly t r a n sfer r ed a n d decla r ed in h er n a m e. On March 23, 1983, defendant Camilo Aviles asserted a color of t itle over the northern portion of t h e property with an area of approximately 1,200 square meters by constructing a bamboo fence (t hereon) and moving the earthen dikes, thereby m olest in g a n d dist u r bin g t h e pea cefu l possession of t h e pla in t iffs ov er sa id por t ion . ISSUE: W ill t h e r em edy of qu iet in g of t it le a pply for set t lin g a bou n da r y dispu t e?

HELD: No. Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any clou d u pon or dou bt or u ncertainty with respect to title to real property. T o avail of the remedy of qu iet in g of t it le, a pla intiff must show that there is an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which con stitutes or casts a cloud, doubt, question or shadow upon the owner's t itle t o or in t er est in r ea l pr oper t y . However, the Agreement of Partition executed by private respondent and his brothers (including t h e petitioners' father and predecessor-in-interest), in which their r espect iv e sh a r es in t h e in herited property were agreed upon, and the Deed of Sale ev iden cin g t h e r edem pt ion by pet itioner Anastacia Vda. de Aviles of the subject property in a foreclosure sale a r e in n o w a y documents that constitute a cloud or cast a doubt upon the t it le of pet it ion er s. In fa ct , t h e u ncertainty arises from the parties' failure to situate a n d fix t h e bou n da r y bet w een t h eir r espect iv e pr oper t ies. T h e construction of the bamboo fence enclosing the disputed property and the moving of earthen dikes are not the "clouds" or "doubts" which can be removed in an action for quieting of t itle. An a ction to quiet title or to remove cloud may not be brought for the purpose of settling a boundary dispu t e.

SPOUSES MA NUEL a n d SA LV A CION DEL CA MPO, v s. CA & HRS. OF J. REGA LA DO, SR. 3 5 1 SCRA 1 ; G.R. No. 1 0 8 2 2 8 ; Febr u a r y 1 , 2 0 0 1 FA CT S: Sa lom e, Consorcia, Alfredo, Maria, Rosalia, Jose, Quirico and Julita, all su r n a m ed Bor n a les, w ere the original co-owners of 27, 170 sq. m. lot known as Lot 162 under OCT No. 18047. The lot w a s div ided in a liqu ot sh a r es a m on g t h e eig h t co-ow n er s. Sa lom e sold part of her 4/16 share in Lot 162 to Soledad Daynolo. Thereafter, Soledad Da y n olo im mediately took possession of the land and built a house thereon. A few years la t er , Soleda d a n d her husband, Simplicio Distajo, mortgaged the subject portion of Lot 1 62 as secu r it y for a debt to Jose Regalado, Sr. Then three of the eight co-owners of Lot 162, specifica lly , Sa lom e, Con sorcia a n d A lfr edo, sold 2 4 ,9 9 3 squ a r e m et er s of sa id lot t o Jose Reg a la do, Sr . Sim plicio Distajo, heir of Soledad Daynolo who had since died, paid t h e m or t g a g e debt a n d r edeemed the mortgaged portion of Lot 162 from Jose Regalado, Sr. The latter, in turn, executed a Deed of Discharge of Mortgage in favor of Soledad's heirs, namely: Simplicio Dist a jo, Ra fa el Dist ajo and Teresita Distajo-Regalado. On same date, the said heirs sold the redeemed portion of Lot 1 62 for P1 ,500.00 t o herein petitioners, the spouses Manu el Del Ca m po a n d Sa lv a cion Qu ia ch on . ISSUE: Is t h e sale by a co-owner of a physical portion of an undivided proper t y h eld in com m on be v a lid? HELD: Y es. Salome's right to sell part of her undivided interest in the co-owned property is absolu t e in a ccordance with the well-settled doctrine that a co-owner has full ownership of his pro-indiv iso sh are and has the right to alienate, assign or mortgage it, and substitute anoth er per son in it s en joyment. Since Salome's clear intention was to sell merely part of her aliquot share in Lot 162, in our view no valid objection can be made against it and the sale can be given effect t o t h e fu ll ex t en t .

Ev en if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but n ot t h ose of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. Since a co-owner is entitled t o sell h is undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner will only transfer the right s of sa id co-owner to the bu y er , t h er eby m a kin g t h e bu y er a co-ow n er of t h e pr oper t y . In t his case, Regalado merely became a new co-owner of Lot 162 t o t h e ex t en t of t h e sh a r es w hich Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could validly convey. Soledad retained h er r ig h t s a s coow ner and could validly transfer her share to petitioners in 1 951. The logical effect of the secon d disposition is to substitute petitioners in the rights of Soledad as co-owner of the land. Needless t o say, these rights are preserved notwithstanding the issuance of TCT No. 14566 in Reg a la do's n a m e in 1 9 7 7 .

Rodi l En t er pr i ses v s. CA G.R. No. 1 2 9 6 0 9 ; Nov em ber 2 9 , 2 0 0 1 FA CT S: Pet itioner Rodil Enterprises Inc. is the lessee of the Ides O'Racca Building since 1 959 . It w a s a "form er alien property" ov er which the Republic of the Philippines acquired ownership by virtue of RA 477. In 1972, the lease contract between RODIL and t h e REPUBLIC w a s r en ew ed for a n other 15 years. In 1980, RODIL entered into a sublease contract with respon den t s Ca r m en Bon doc, et al. members of the Ides O'Racca Building Tenants Association Inc. (ASSOCIATION). In 1 982, authorization of the sale of "former alien propertie s" cla ssified a s com m er cia l a n d in dustrial, and the O'RACCA building was classified as commercial property . In 1 9 8 7 ,RODIL offered to purchase the subject property. In 1997, ASSOCIATION also offered to lease the sa m e bu ildin g . In May 18, 1992, RODIL signed a renewal contract which would extend the lea se for 1 0 y ea r s fr om 1 September 1987. A supplement to the renewal contract was subsequently entered into on Ma y 25, 1992 where rentals on the previous lease contract were increased. In September 1 9 9 2 : spou ses Saturnino Alvarez and Epifania Alvarez, sublessees of RODIL, filed with the Office of the Pr esident a letter-appeal assailing the authority of Factoran to enter into the renewal contract of Ma y 18, 1992 with RODIL, a n d cla im in g t h e r ig h t t o pu r ch a se t h e s u bject pr oper t y . A SSOCIATION instituted another Civil Case praying for the setting aside of the renewal contract of 1 8 May 1992 as well as the supplementary contract of May 25, 1992. Finally in 1 9 9 3 , RODIL filed an action for unlawful detainer against Divi soria Footwear (priva t e r espon den t s) a n d a sim ila r a ct ion a g a in st Ch u a Hu a y Soon (a lso pr iv a t e r espon den t s). T h e lower court dismissed the action filed by the ASSOCIATION. The Office of t h e Pr esiden t t h en denied the letter-appeal of the spouses Alvarez but nullified the renewal contract of 1 8 May 1 992 and the supplementary contract of 25 May 1 992. Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila upheld RODIL's r ight t o eject respondents Bondoc, Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria Footwear and Ch u a Hu a y Soon . The RTC affirmed MTC decision. However the appellat e cou r t decla r ed t h e r en ew a l con t r a ct bet w een RODIL a n d t h e REPUBLIC n u ll a n d v oid. ISSUE: W h et h er or n ot t h e Repu blic bein g t h e ow n er h a s fr eedom t o dispose of a t h in g . HELD: Y es. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those est ablished by law. Every owner has the freedom of disposition ov er h is pr oper t y . It is a n a t tribute of ownership, and this rule has no exception. The REPUBLIC being the ow n er of t h e disputed property enjoys the prerogative to enter int o a lea se con t r a ct w it h RODIL in t h e ex ercise of its jus disponendi. Hence, as lessor, the REPUBLIC has the right t o eject usurper s of t h e leased property where the factual elements required for relief in a n a ct ion for u n la w fu l det a in er a r e pr esen t .

T h e contracts of 18 May 1 992 and 25 May 1992 are valid. CA invalidated the contract s beca u se t h ey were supposedly executed in violation of a temporary restraining order issued by th e RT C. CA however failed t o note that the order restrains the REPUBLIC fr om a w a r din g t h e lea se con t r a ct on ly a s r eg a r ds r espon den t A SSOCIA T ION bu t n ot pet it ion er RODIL. In a n action for unlawful detainer the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession . Respondents have admitted that they have not en t er ed in t o a n y lea se con t r a ct w it h t h e REPUBLIC and that their continued occupation of the subject property was merely by vir t u e of a cquiescence. The records clearly show this to be the case. T h e REPUBLIC m er ely issu ed a "t em porary occupancy permit" which was not even in the name of t h e r espon den t s Bon doc, Bon doc-Est o, Div isor ia Foot w ea r or Ch u a bu t of r espon den t A SSOCIA T ION. Since the occupation of respondents was merely t oler a t ed by t h e REPUBLIC, t h e r ig h t of possession of the latter remained uninterrupted. It could therefore alienate the same to anyone it ch ose. Unfortunately for respondents, the REPUBLIC chose to alienate the subject premises t o RODIL by virtue of a contract of lease entered into on 18 May 1992. Resultantly, petitioner h a d t h e right t o file the action for unlawful detain er a g a in st r espon den t s a s on e fr om w h om possession of pr oper t y h a s been u n la w fu lly w it h h eld.

Heir s of Rom a n Sor ia n o V CA & Spou ses A ba l os G.R. No. 1 2 8 1 7 7 ; A u g u st 1 5 , 2 0 0 1 FA CT S: T h e land in question was originally owned by Adriano Soriano, upon his death, it pa ssed on t o h is heirs who leased the same to the spouse De Vera for a period of 15 years. Roman Sor ia n o a s on e of the children of Adriano Soriano, acts as the caretaker. The property was subdivided in t o t w o lots, lot 1 was sold to respondent spouses Abalos. As a co-owner of lot 2, Roman ow n es ¼ , t h e ¾ of which was also sold t o the spouses Abalos. He was ousted as ca r et a ker of t h e la n d. Rom an Soriano filed a case for reinstatement and reliquidation. The agrarian court au t h or ized t h e ejectment, but on appeal the CA reversed. Su bsequ en t ly t h e pa r t ies en t er ed in t o a n a greement allowing Roman t o sublease the property. The spouses Abalos filed an application for r egistration of the t itle of lot 1 and the ¾ of lot 2, which was granted. The petitioner filed w it h DA RA B for ― Secu r it y of T en u r e‖ w it h pr a y er for pr elim in a r y in ju n ct ion . T h e lower court ruled that the spouses Abalos are the real owner of t h e la n d. T h ey filed a n a pplication for the writ of execution of the decision, and to oust Rom an Sor ia n o a n d t h e su b lessee. How ev er t h er e w a s a pen din g ca se w it h DA RA B. ISSUE: W h ether or not the winning party in the land registration case can effectively oust the possessor w h ose secu r it y of t en u r e r ig h t s a r e st ill pen din g w it h DA RA B. HELD: No. The prevailing party in land registration case cannot be placed in possession of t h e a r ea w hile it is occupied by the one claiming t o be an agricultural tenant, pending declaration that the la tter‘s occupation was lawful. Judgement of ow n er sh ip does n ot in clu de possession a s a n ecessa r y in ciden t . Possession a n d ow n er sh ip a r e dist in ct leg a l con cept s. T h ere is ownership when a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected t o his will in a m anner not prohibited by law and consistent with the right of others. Ownership confers certain r ights to the owner, among which are the rights to enjoy the thing owned and the right to exclude ot h er person from possession. While possession is the holding of the thing or en joy m en t of a

r ight. A person may be declared owner but may not be entitled t o possession. It ma y be in t h e h a n d if a n ot h er a s a lessee or a t en a n t .

SERA SPI v s. COURT OF A PPEA LS G.R. 1 3 5 6 0 2 – A pr il 2 8 , 2 0 0 0

A lso, under Article 714, the ownership of a piece of land cannot be acquired by occupat ion , n or ca n respondent claim that he acquired his right through succession because he was an heir to the or iginal owner, remember that the property was validly partitioned and the subject lots a r e n ot pa rt of those which he inherited, and lastly, he cannot be considered in good faith as he ent er ed t h e property without the knowledge and permission of the original owner, thus ma kin g h im a m er e u su r per . W h en the property belonging to another is unlawfully taken by another, the former has the right of a ction against the latter fir the recovery of the property and such right may be transferr ed by t h e sale or assignment of the property and the transferee can maintain such action ag a in st t h e w r on g doer .

FA CT S: T h e lots in question were originally owned by Marcelin o Reca sa a n d a r e bot h sit u a t ed in Ba rangay Lapnag, Banga, Aklan. When Marcelino died in 1943, and in 1948 his intestate est a t e w as partitioned into three parts to his corresponding heirs in his Three (3) marriages during h is lifet im e.

*1 9 7 4 -1 9 8 3 in on ly 9 y ea r s.

In t he same year, Patronicio Recasa (the representing the heirs first marriage) sold their share to Dom inador Recasa (representing heirs in the second marriage). In 1950, Dom inador sold t h eir sh a r e t o Qu ir ico a n d Pu r ifica cion Ser a spi.

CA T A PUSA N v s. COURT OF A PPEA LS G.R. 1 0 9 2 6 2 – Nov em ber 2 1 , 1 9 9 6

In 1 958, the Seraspis acquired a loan from Kalibo Rural Bank, Inc. (KRBI) the subject land being t h e security, however, they failed to pay the loan and the property was foreclosed and sold to the h ighest bidder KRBI, and subsequently sold the same t o Manuel Rata (brother-in-law of Quirico Ser a spi) w h o a llow ed Qu ir ico t o a dm in ist er t h e sa m e. In 1 974, private respondent Simeon Recasa (Marcelino‘s h eir by h is t h ir d m a r r ia g e) t ook a dv antage of the fact that Quirico was paralyzed due t o a stroke, forcibly enter ed t h e la n ds in qu est ion a n d t ook possession t h er eof. In 1 983 the Seraspis were able to purchase the lands from Manuel Rata and th er ea ft er filed a ca se a g a in st Sim eon Reca sa for r ecov er y of possession of t h e la n ds. RT C r u led in fa v or of Ser a spi, bu t CA r ev er sed on a ppea l. ISSUE: W h et h er t h e t h er e w a s a cqu isit iv e pr escr ipt ion in fa v or of Sim eon Reca sa ? HELD: No, t h er e w a s n o a cqu isit iv e pr escr ipt ion A cquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary . In t h e case at bar, respondent claim ordinary prescription t h r ou g h a dv er se possession of t h e pr oper t y for m or e t h a n T en (1 0 ) y ea r s u n der A r t . 1 1 3 4 of t h e Civ il Code. However, for purposes of prescription, respondent was not able to prove his ju st t it le or g ood fa ith required by acquisitive prescription, as he did not a cqu ir e possession of t h e pr oper t y t hrough the modes recognized by the Civil Code for acquisition of ownership or other real rights, n a m ely : Occu pa t ion In t ellect u a l cr ea t ion La w Don a t ion Su ccession T r a dit ion in con sequ en ce of cer t a in con t r a ct s Pr escr ipt ion

FA CT S: Bon ifacio Catapusan was first married to Narcissa Tanjuatco, the only surviving heir of Dominga Piguing, their (4) children are the private respondent in the case at bar. Narcissa died in 1 9 1 0 , Bon ifacio got married for the second time, and the children in the secon d m a r r ia g e a r e t h e pet it ion er s in t h is ca se. Bon ifacio died in 1940. Thereafter in 1974, petitioners filed an action for partition of t h e lot in qu estion located in Wawa, Tanay, Rizal. Petitioners claim that the Wawa Lot is the pr oper t y of t h eir father (Bonifacio) therefore it is co-owned by the heirs of the first and the second marriage. A s proof of their claim, they have presented tax declarations of the four (4) adjacent land owners st ating in such document that the owner of the subject lot is Bonifacio Cat a pu sa n . W it n esses w er e a lso pr esen t ed a n d t est ified t h a t t h ey sa w Bon ifa cio w or kin g on t h e lot . Respondent on the other hand, argues that the Wawa lot was origina lly ow n ed by Dom in g a Piguing and inherited by Narcissa Tanjuatco as her paraphernal property; hence petitioners have n o r ight ov er the lot. As evidence, they‘ve presented tax declarations in th eir n a m es a n d a lso a lleged that they have been in open, continuous and uninterrupted possession of the said lot for m or e t h a n 5 0 y ea r s. T h e RTC ruled in favor of respondents declaring them as ow n er of t h e pr op er t y , a n d su ch decision w a s a ffir m ed by t h e Cou r t of A ppea ls ex cept for A t t or n ey ‘s fees. ISSUE: W h et h er Bon ifa cio is t h e ow n er of t h e lot ? HELD: No, He is n ot a n ow n er . T h e tax declarations of neighbors stating that Bonifacio is the owner of the lot is not conclusiv e, so a s the testimonies of the neighbors that they saw him working on the lot. As oppose to the tax decla r a t ion s of t h e r espon den t s sh ow in g t h ey ow n t h e la n d. Possession be mere t olerance cannot ripen into ownership even if such possession have been for a long period of time. Also, the decla r a t ion of ow n er sh ip m a de by t h e RT C in fa v or of r espondents is proper because ownership must be decided first before partition may be granted.

G.R. 1 0 8 5 5 8 – Ju n e 2 1 , 2 0 0 1 FA CTS: The lot in question is an unregistered parcel of land in Antipolo, Naval, Ley t e w it h a n a r ea of 3,267 square meters, which latter turned ou t t o be in fa ct 1 1 ,9 2 7 squ a r e m et er s.

V ERDA D v s. COURT OF A PPEA LS G.R. 1 0 9 9 7 2 – A pr il 2 9 , 1 9 9 6 FA CT S: Ma caria Atega was married twice during her lifetime, first with Angel Burdeos, and second wit h Ca nuto Rosales. She owned a land in Butuan City about 248 sq. m ., Ma ca r ia died in 1 9 5 6 . T h e petitioner is the Zosima Verdad, who purchased the l ot in question for P23 ,0 0 0 .0 0 fr om h eirs of Macaria‘s son (Ramon Burdeos) in 1982. When Socorro (wife of t h e decea sed Da v id Rosa les who died some time after his mother Macaria died) found out in March 30, 1987 that the lot was sold to Verdad, she sought intervention of the Lupong Tagapamayapa for r edem pt ion , h er tender of P23,000.00 was refused because the current va lu e of t h e pr oper t y is h ig h er . October 16, 1987, no settlement was rea ch ed, t h u s a ca se w a s filed by Socor r o (pr iv a t e r espondent) for ―Legal Redemption with Preliminary Injunction‖, which the RTC denied statin g t h a t r edem pt ion per iod a lr ea dy la pse. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, it reversed the RTC and declared that Socorro has the right to r edeem t h e pr oper t y . ISSUE: W h ether Socorro Cordero Vda. De Rosales is capacitated to redeem the property ev en if sh e is on ly r ela t ed by a ffin it y t o Ma ca r ia A t eg a a n d n ot a n h eir ? HELD: Y es, Socor r o is ca pa cit a t ed t o m a ke t h e r edem pt ion . Ev en if she is not an heir to Macaria, she is an heir to David Rosales who inherited a share of h is m ot h er ‘s est a t e. A rticle 995 of the Civil Code, in the absence of legitimate descenda n t s a n d a scen da n t s, a n d illegitimate and their descendants, whether legitimate of illegitimate, the surviving spouse sh a ll in herit, without prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be a n y , u n der a r t icle 1 0 0 1 . T h e right t o redeem spawned from the non-disclosure of the sale to all co-owners when the sa le is in favor of a third person. In fact, written notice is required u n der A r t icle 1 6 2 3 , a n d t h e r edem pt ion per iod is 3 0 da y s fr om r eceipt of su ch n ot ice. In t he case at bar, no notice was given, hence, t h e 3 0 da y per iod st a r ed fr om t h e t im e of discovery of the sale on March 30, 1987 , a n d st a y ed by t h e pr oceedin g s in t h e Pu n on g T a g a pa m a y a pa .

A case was initiated t o declare ownership of the land in question . Her ein pet it ion er s cla im ow nership of the land through succession from Ignacio Montes and presented tax decla r a t ion s fr om 1944 – 1 947 in the name of Ignacio Montes, but were only paid in 1981. Plain t iff A n dr ea T a buso claim to be a successor in interest of Andrea Elaba (daughter of Maria Montes [Mar ia is t h e Sister of Ignacio Montes]). Also, there is a house built on the lot by Marcelo Tabuso (father of A n dr ea T a bu so). Pr ivate respondent however, alleged that the land was originally owned by Maria Mon t es, bu t sh e donated it t o Isabel Elaba as supported by a document executed on Septem ber 2 4 , 1 9 2 3 , t h ereafter Isabel sold the lot t o Esteban Abad in 1948. V a r iou s t a x decla r a t ion s w er e a lso pr esented by respondent showing that from 1948 – 1 9 8 2 t a x h a s been pa id on t h e lot by r espondent‘s predecessors in interest mainly by Esteban Abad. A lso, pa r t of t h e lot is bein g r ented by one Valentin Poblete from Menesio Abad (heir of Esteban) as eviden ced by a lea s e con t r a ct . Du r ing trial, petitioners also presented as witness the counsel of defendant, Atty. Jose Gonzales, w ho testified that he owns a lot adjacent to the land in question a n d t h a t h e h a v e per son a l kn owledge that the land in question had been in the possession of the heir s of Est eba n A ba d. RT C ruled that owner of the property is the respondents, which was upheld by the CA on appeal. ISSUE: Whether the CA was correct in declaring respondents as owner of the land in qu est ion ? HELD: Y es, Cou r t of A ppea ls w a s cor r ect . T h e totality of evidence presented leans heavily in favor of herein private respondents. They have been able to adduce evidence which support their claim that they have been in open, continuous, a n d uninterrupted possession for more than 60 years. Also, in view of the size of the land which is 1 1,927 square meters, it is unbelievable for an alleged owner such as Tabuso t o bu ild on ly a ― barong-barong‖ (small house) in the lot, which w a s la t t er sh ow n t o be a llow ed by m er e t olerance by a letter addressed t o plaintiff asking them to vacate the property within 3 m on t h s t im e. A lso, petitioners are bound by the testimony of Atty. Gonza les ev en if h e is cou n sel for t h e pr ivate respondent because he was presented by the plaintiff themselv es a s h ost ile w it n ess. Pet itioners‘ possesses the land as mere holders, distinguished from possession in the concept of a n owner, being a mere holder acknowledges another super ior r ig h t ov er t h e pr oper t y h e possess. *Petitioners also raised an issue regarding the adjudication of 11,927 square meter s t o pr iv a t e r espondent when the tax declarations only state 3,267 square meters. This is untenable, because w hat defines a piece of land is not the numerical data indicated as its area, but the boundaries or ― m etes and bounds‖ specified in its description as enclosing t h e la n d in dica t in g it s lim it s.

T h ere was clear intent t o r edeem a t t h a t t im e bu t t h e offer w a s r eject ed by V er da d. DIZON v s. COURT OF A PPEA LS G.R. 1 1 6 8 5 4 – Nov em ber 1 9 , 1 9 9 6 T A BUSO v s. COURT OF A PPEA LS

FA CT S:

A ida Dizon mortgaged the subject lot t o Monte de Piedad Bank on October 23, 1980 and failed to pay the loan obligation, hence the house and lot mortgage was thereafter foreclosed. T h e ba n k t old Dizon that she can repurchase the property, having no means t o pa y t h e a m ou n t a t t h e m om ent, she asked Elizabeth Santiago to repurchase the property in the amount of P550,000.00 on May 28, 1987. The TCT of Dizon was cancelled and a new one was issued in favor of Santiag o in view of the Deed of Absolute Sale signed by Dizon in Favor of Santiago, also, a n ― Opt ion t o Buy Back‖ was signed by the same parties giving Dizon the option t o buy back the said proper t y fr om Santiago within a period of Three (3) months, with the stipulation that if Dizon fa iled t o u sed the option within the agreed period, Dizon shall vacate the property in favor of Sa n t ia g o. T h e period lapse without Dizon exercising her option t o buy, thereafter, Santiago asked Dizon t o v acate the premises. Dizon refused, which prompted Santiago to file an Ejectmen t ca se befor e t h e MTC. After trial, MTC ordered Dizon t o vacate the property. RTC reversed and order ed t h e ca ncellation of the TCT in favor of Dizon. CA affirmed on appeal, but reversed itself upon MR of Sa n t ia g o. ISSUE: W h et h er Dizon is en t it led t o possession of t h e su bject pr oper t y ?

By acquisitive prescription of the property under Article 1134 of the New Civil Code, own er sh ip a n d other real rights ov er immovable property may be acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of T en (10) years. In the case at bar, respondent a cqu ir ed t h eir r ig h t s ov er t h e pr operty through tax declaration of Sinforoso, w hen he died in 1930 respondents con t in u ed t o possess the property and paid taxes from 1 932-1948 in the concept of an owner. Such possession w as not disturbed until 1952 when Margarito took joint possession of the la n d, h ow ev er , t h e possession of respondent which is public, peaceful, and un in t er r u pt ed a lr ea dy r ipen ed t o ow n er sh ip. *T he affidavit that allowed the transfer of tax declaration fr om Sin for oso t o Ma r g a r it o w a s dou btful t o say the lease, because one of the alleged signatories is t h e r espon den t m ot h er of Hon orata who testified that she was illiterat e a n d cou ld n ot h a v e sig n ed t h e docu m en t . *Possession of petitioners cannot ripen into ow n er sh ip beca u se su ch possession w a s n ot ex clusive as they possess the property at the same time respondent are also living therein fr om 1 9 5 2 -1 9 8 5 . 1 9 8 5 r espon den t ou st ed pet it ion er fr om t h e pr oper t y .

HELD: No, Dizon is n ot en t it led t o possession . T h e title of the property held by the private respondent is enough pr oof t o h old t h em a s t h e r ightful possessor upon default of Dizon t o exercise her right to redeem the property. A lso, t h e st ipulation that Dizon, upon failure to buy back the property within the specified per iod, sh a ll v acate the property is a binding agreement, thus, Santiago is already entitled to possession aft er t h e la pse of t h e sa id per iod. T h is is ofcourse without prejudice t o Dizon‘s right to file a n ot h er a ct ion t o det er m in e t h e ow nership of the property, which she interposed as a defense alleg in g t h a t t h e sa le w a s a n equ itable mortgage. The RTC made an error in ordering the cancellation of t h e T CT beca u se Ejectment cases only dwell on the rightful possession and does not determine owner sh ip w it h fin a lit y .

CEQUENA v s. BOLA NT E G.R. 1 3 7 9 4 4 – A pr il 6 , 2 0 0 0 FA CTS: The land subject of the dispute has an area of 1,728 squ a r e m et er s a n d sit u a t ed in ba rangay Bangad, Binangonan, Province of Rizal. Respondent Honorata Mendoza Bolante is the on ly daughter of Sinforoso Mendoza, while petitioner Cequena is the da u g h t er of Ma r g a r it o Men doza . Sin for oso a n d Ma r g a r it o a r e br ot h er s. T h e subject lot was declared for tax purposes by Sinforoso since 1926. When he died in 1930, his w ife and daughter continuously possessed the land, and when respondent was of ag e in 1 9 4 8 , sh e paid the taxes for the lot from 1932-1 948. Margarito acquired joint possession fr om 1 9 5 2 , a n d by a virtue of an affidavit signed allegedly by r espon den t ‘s m ot h er , t r a n sfer r ed t a x declaration in the name of Margarito Mendoza starting 1 954, who thereafter cultiva t ed pa r t of t h e la n d w it h h is h eir s fr om 1 9 5 3 -1 9 8 5 u n t il t h ey w er e ou st ed by r espon den t s. T h e dispute ov er who has a better right of possession was raised in the trial court, which decided in favor of the petitioners. The Court of Appeals reversed the said decision a n d decla r ed t h e r espon den t s a s la w fu l ow n er a n d possessor . ISSUE: Whether respondents are the lawful owner a n d possessor of t h e la n d in qu est ion ? HELD: Y es, r espon den t is t h e la w fu l ow n er a n d possessor of t h e la n d.

DEV ELOPMENT BA NK OF T HE PHILIPPINES v s. COURT OF A PPEA LS G.R. 1 2 9 4 7 1 – A pr il 2 8 , 2 0 0 0 FA CTS: The land in dispute has an area of 19.4 hectares located in San Miguel, Province of Bohol w hose original ownership rest with Ulpiano Mumar as evidenced by Tax Declaration since 1917 . In 1 950, Mumar sold the subject property Carlos Cajes (herein private r espon den t ) w h o w a s issued tax declaration in the same year. He occupied and cultivated the land, plantin g ca ssa v a a n d ca m ot e in cer t a in por t ion s of t h e la n d. In 1 969, unknown to private respondent, Jose Alvarez was able to register a parcel of land w it h a n area of 1 ,512,468 square meters and OCT #546 was issued in the same year in h is n a m e. In 1 972 Alvarez sold the property to spouses Beduya to whom TCT #10101 was issued, the for m er a n d the latter never occupied the said lot the property included in it the 19.4 hectares owned by Ca jes. In t he same year, 1972, spouse Beduya acquired a loan from DBP and mort g a g e t h e t h e la n d u nder TCT #10101 for P5 26,000.00, and in 1978 it was again mortgage for another loa n in t h e a m ount of P1 ,430,000.00 in favor of the petitioner (DBP), no ocular inspection of the lan d w a s m a de. In 1 978 private respondent applied for loan from DBP mortgaging the 19.4 hecta r es g iv in g a s ev idence of ownership tax declarations and a certification of the Clerk of Court of t h e Cou r t of Fir st Instance of Bohol that no civil, land regist r a t ion or ca da st r a l ca se h a s been filed or in stituted before the court affecting the validity of the Tax Declaration on the 19.4 hectare la n d. Pr ivate respondent approved the loan, however after releasing the money petitioner fou n d ou t t hat the land mortgaged by private respondent was included in the land covered by TCT #10101, h ence, petitioner immediately cancelled the loan and demanded immediate paymen t . Pr iv a t e r espon den t r epa id t h e loa n . Spouses Beduya failed to pay their loan and the land in TCT #1010 1 w a s for closed. In 1 9 8 5 du ring the foreclosure sale, DBP was the highest bidder, and as spouses Beduya failed to redeem t h e pr oper t y , pet it ion er con solida t ed it s ow n er sh ip. In 1 986, petitioner found out that Cajes is occupying a part of the la n d in T CT #1 0 1 0 1 , DBP dem anded that Cajes vacate the property but private respondent refused, hence, DBP filed a case for ― Recovery of Possession‖ against him. RTC ruled in favor of DBP, but the Cour t of A ppea ls

r ev ersed the decision declaring Cajes the lawful owner of the 19.4 h ect a r es in c lu ded in T CT #1 0 1 0 1 . ISSUE: Whether the CA was correct in adjudicating that the 19.4 h ect a r es in clu ded in T CT #1 0 1 0 1 is ow n ed by pr iv a t e r espon den t Ca r los Ca jes?

t h e sale in favor of Leon was fraudulently obtained through m the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo r endered its decision in Civil Case No. 2389, declaring "the defendants the legal ow n er s of t h e pr operty in question through m achinations and false pretenses. On appeal The CA Reversed the T r ia l cou r t ‘s r u lin g .

HELD: Y es, Cou r t of A ppea ls is cor r ect .

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate court erred in failing to decla r e a ct ion by t h e pr iv a t e r espondents to recover the property in question barr ed by la ch es, est oppel, pr escr ipt ion .

A cquisitive prescription already vested in Carlos Cajes ownership of the 19.4 hectares of land h e w as paying tax on since he has been in open public, peacefu l, u n in t er r u pt ed, a n d a dv er se possession of the said property in the concept of an owner since 1950. Ordin a r y pr escr ipt ion r equires only such possession for Ten (10) years. Thus, in 1969, when the spouses Beduya w er e a ble to register their land under TCT #10101, the private respondent Ca jes a lr ea dy a cqu ir ed ow nership over the 19.4 hectares he acquired from Mumar who have been in possession a s a n ow ner since 1917. Surely, private respondents possession together with Mumar‘s possession and occupation of the 1 9.4 hectares is more than Thirty (30) years r equ ir ed u n der A ct n o. 4 9 6 .

RULING: Laches is negligence or om ission t o assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting t h e presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined to assert it . It s essential elements are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one u n der w h om h e claims, giving rise t o the situation complained of; (2) delay in asserting complainant's right after h e had knowledge of the defendant's conduct and after he has an opportunity to sue; (3) la ck of kn owledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the com plainant would assert the right on w hich he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice t o t h e defen da n t in t h e ev en t r elief is a ccor ded t o t h e com pla in a n t .

A lthough the initial case is recov ery of possession of real property, and collateral a t t a ck is n ot a llowed in t o defeat the indefeasibility of a Torrens T itle, t h e cou n t er cla im of t h e pr iv a t e r espondent when he raised the counterclaim of ownership plus damages, wa s in fa ct a dir ect a t t a ck on t h e t it le.

A t the t ime of signing of the Deed of Sale of August 26, 1948, private respondents , Ram on a n d Rosa were minors. They could not be faulted for their failu r e t o file a ca se t o r ecov er t h eir in heritance from their uncle Leon, since up to the age of majority, they believed and consider ed Leon their co-heir and administrator. It was only in 1975, not in 1948, that they became aware of t h e actionable betrayal by their uncle. Upon learning of their uncle's actions, they filed an action for r ecov er y .

DBP ca nnot be considered a mortgagor in good faith because being a ba n k, it is r equ ir ed t o ex ercise due diligence in its dealings as such are impress with public concern. It a ppea r s fr om t h e facts that it did not conduct inspection of the property of spouses Beduya when they appl ied for loan. Also, even when it has knowledge since 1978 that the private respondent has a claim in t h e land covered by TCT #10101, it still bought the land in question in th e for eclosu r e sa le in 1 985 ignoring the fact that would normally raise suspicion beca u se pr iv a t e r espon den t is occu py in g a pa r t of t h e sa id lot .

V ILLA NUEV A V S CA GR No 1 0 8 9 2 1 A pr il 1 2 , 2 0 0 0 FA CTS: Petitioners are the legitimate children of Leon Villanueva, Concepcion Macahilas vda. de V illanueva is his widow. Leon was one of eight (8) children of Felipe Villanueva, predecessor-in in terest of the parties in the present case.Private r espon den t s a r e r ela t ed by blood t o t h e pet it ion er s a s descen da n t s of Felipe. . T h e remaining undivided portion of the land was held in trust by Leon for his co-heirs. Du r in g Leon 's lifetime, his co-heirs made several seasonable and lawful demands upon him t o subdivide a n d partition the property, bu t for on e r ea son or a n ot h er , n o su bdiv ision t ook pla ce. A fter the death of Leon in August 1 972, private respondents discovered that the shares of four of t h e heirs of Felipe, namely, Simplicio, Nicolasa, Fausta and Maria Baltaza r , spou se of Ben it o, w as purchased by Leon as evidenced by a Deed of Sale ex ecu t ed on A u g u st 2 5 , 1 9 4 6 bu t r eg ist er ed on ly in 1 9 7 1 . Leon som etime in July 1970, executed a sale and partition of the property in fa v or of h is ow n ch ildren, herein petitioners. By virtue of such Deed of Pa r t it ion , pr iv a t e r espon den t s h a d su cceeded in obtaining Original Certificate of T itle (OCT ) No. C -2 5 6 . On A pr il 2 5 , 1 9 7 5 , pet itioners managed to secure separate and independent titles over their pro-indiviso shar es in t h eir r espect iv e n a m es. Pr ivate respondents then filed a ca se for pa r t it ion w it h a n n u lm en t of docu m en t s a n d r econveyance with the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Private respondents contended that

T h ey did not sleep on their rights, contrary t o petitioners' assertion. Under the circumstances of t h e instant case, we do not think that respondent appellate court erred in consider in g pr iv a t e r espon den t s' a ct ion . T h e a ct ion w a s n ot t oo la t e. Fu rthermore, when Felipe Villanueva died, an implied trust was created by oper a t ion of la w between Felipe's children and Leon, their u n cle, a s fa r a s t h e 1 /6 sh a r e of Felipe. Leon 's fr a u du len t t it lin g of Felipe's 1 /6 sh a r e w a s a bet r a y a l of t h a t im plied t r u st . Neither is the action barred by prescription, we held that an action for reconveyance of a pa r cel of la nd based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in 10 years, the point of reference being t h e date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the cer t ifica t e of t it le of t h e pr operty. Here the questioned Deed of Sale was registered only in 1971. Private respondents filed t h eir com pla in t in 1 9 7 5 , h en ce w ell w it h in t h e pr escr ipt iv e per iod. W e held that a land registration case is an action in rem binding upon t h e w h ol e w or ld, a n d con sidering that the private respondents failed to object to the r eg ist r a t ion of t h e r ea lt y in qu estion, then res judicata had set in. True, but notwithstanding the binding effect of t h e la n d r egistration case upon the private respondents, the latter are not deprived of a remedy. W h ile a r ev iew of the decree of registration is no longer available after the expira t ion of t h e on e -y ea r per iod from entry thereof, an equitable remedy is still available. Those wrongfully depr iv ed of t h eir pr oper t y m a y in it ia t e a n a ct ion for r econ v ey a n ce of t h e pr oper ly .

Edu a r do Fon t a n il l a v s Cou r t of A ppea l s Nov em ber 2 9 , 1 9 9 9 FA CTS: Spouses Crisanto and Feliciana Duaman were awarded a homestead patent over a parcel of la nd. Upon their death, private respondent Luis Duaman, one of their children , in h er it ed a fou r-hectare portion of the hom estead. On 21 July 1976, in order to expedite the loan application of h is two (2) sons, Ernesto and Elpidio Duaman, with the Development Bank of the Philippines, pr ivate respondent transferred t o t h em t h e ow n er sh ip of h is sh a r e in t h e h om est ea d.

On 8 August 1985, in view of the imminence of foreclosure of the said lot by the ba n k, Er n est o a n d Elpidio sold the two-hectare portion thereof to Eduardo Fontanilla, Sr. for P30,000.00. The v endee named in the deed of sale was Ellen M.T . Fon t a n illa . . Som et im e la t er , pr iv a t e r espondent informed Edu a r do Fon t a n illa of h is desir e t o r epu r ch a se t h e su bject lot . Pr ivate respondent filed a case with the RTC of Cauayan Isabela a g a in st pet it ion er s for t h e "Repurchase of the Homestead. Upon motion filed by petitioners, the low er cou r t dism issed pr iv a t e r espon den t 's com pla in t for fa ilu r e t o st a t e a ca u se of a ct ion On appeal, the CA reversed the order of the trial court.The CA held that private respondent could st ill exercise the right to repurchase under Section 119 of the Public Land Act (Common w ea lt h A ct No. 141, as amended) despite the fact that it was not him but his son s w h o con v ey ed t h e su bject lot t o pet it ion er s. ISSUE: Whether private respondent, not being the ven dor in t h e sa le of t h e su bject lot t o pet itioners, could no longer exercise his right to repurchase under Section 119 of the Public Land A ct a g a in st pet it ion er s. RULING: Sec. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under t h e fr ee pa t en t or h om est ea d pr ov isions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant , h is w idow , or leg a l h eirs, within a period of five years from the date of conveya n ce.(Com m on w ea lt h A ct 1 4 1 ) t h ese homestead laws were designed to distribute disposable agricultural lot s of t h e " St a t e t o la nd-destitute citizens for their hom e and cultivation." 2 Further, the plain intent of Section 119 is "t o g ive the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for himself and his family the land t hat the State had gratuitously given t o him as a reward for his labor in cleaning and cultivat in g it . Pet itioners argue that private respondent could no longer avail himself of the right to repurchase u nder Section 119 because he was not the vendor of the subject lot. Only the vendor allegedly has t h e r ig h t t o r epu r ch a se. Pet itioner‘s claim is without merit, Our pronouncement in Madarcos that only the v en dor h a s t h e right t o repurchase was taken out of context by petitioners. Said pronouncement may not be sw eepingly applied in this case because of a significant factual difference between the two cases. In Madarcos, we ruled that Cantain (petition herein) cannot repurchase the share of Francisca , h is co-heir, because the homestead had already been partitioned and d istributed among them as h eirs. In other words, in that case, we held that Catain could n ot a v a il h im self of t h e r ig h t g ranted under Section 119 because he was not entitled to repurchase the share of his co-h eir in t h e homestead. Upon the other hand, in this case, private respondent is pr ecisely seekin g t o r epurchase from petitioners his own share in the homestead that he inherited from his paren t s. T h ere is nothing in Section 119 which provides that the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs" must be t he conveyor of the homestead before any of them can exercise t h e r ig h t t o r epu r ch a se. Ra ther, what said law plainly prov ides is that the "applicant, his widow, or legal heir s" sh a ll be en titled t o repurchase the homestead within (5) years from the date of convey ance. In this ca se, t h ere is no dispute that private respondent is the legal heir of spouses Crisan t o a n d Felicia n a Du a m a n , t h e h om est ea der s. Since the transfer of the subject lot by private respondent to his sons does n ot fa ll w it h in t h e pu rview of Section 119, it necessarily follows that the five-year period to repurcha se ca n n ot be r eckoned from the date of said conveyance. Rather, the date of conveyance for t h e pu r pose of counting the five-year period to repurchase under Section 119 is that alienation made t o a t h ir d pa rty outside of the family circle which in this case was the convey a n ce of t h e su bject lot t o pet itioners on 8 August 1 985. Accordingly, private respondent's com plaint for the repurchase of t h e subject lot, which was filed on 20 June 1989, was not time-barred as not more than fiv e (5 ) y ea r s h a d la psed sin ce t h e da t e of it s con v ey a n ce t o pet it ion er s.

Qu im en V s CA a n d Yol a n da Ol i v er os Ma y 2 9 , 1 9 9 6 Fa cts: Petitioner Anastacia Quimen together with her brothers Sotero, Sulpicio, A n t on io a n d sist er Rufina inherited a piece of property situated in Pandi, Bulacan. They agreed to subdiv ide t h e property equally among themselves, as they did, wit h t h e sh a r es of A n a st a cia , Sot er o, Su lpicio a n d Ru fin a a bu t t in g t h e m u n icipa l r oa d. In February 1982 Yolanda purchased a part of the lot from her uncle Antonio through her a u n t A nastacia who was then acting as his administratrix. According to Yolan da , w h en pet it ion er offered her the property for sale she was hesitant t o buy as it had no access t o a public road. Bu t A nastacia prevailed upon her t o buy the lot with the assurance that she would give her a righ t of w a y on h er a djoin in g pr oper t y for P2 0 0 .0 0 per squ a r e m et er . T h ereafter, Y olanda constructed a house on the lot she bought using as her passag ew a y t o t h e pu blic highway a portion of Anastacia's property. But when Yolanda finally offered to pay for the u se of the pathway Anastacia refused to accept the payment. In fact she was thereafter barred by A nastacia from passing through her property. In February 1986 Y olanda purchased the other lot of A ntonio Quimen, located directly behind the property of her par en t s w h o pr ov ided h er a pa thway Although the pathway leads to the municipal road it is not adequa t e for in g r ess a n d eg ress. The municipal road cannot be reached with facility because the store itself obstruct s t h e pa th so that one has t o pass through the back entrance and the facade of the store t o r ea ch t h e r oa d. On 29 December 1 987 Y olanda filed an action with the trial court prayin g for a r ig h t of w a y t hrough Anastacia's property. The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action. On appeal by respondent Yolanda, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court and h eld t h a t sh e w a s en t it led t o a r ig h t of w a y on pet it ion er 's pr oper t y ISSUE: W h et h er Y ola n da is en t it led t o a r ig h t of w a y on h er pr oper t y RULING: Y ES, sh e is en t it led. Y ola n da su fficien t ly est a blish ed t h e pr esen ce of t h e ff: 1. h er estate (dominant estate) is surrounded by other immovable without an a dequ a t e ou t let t o pu blic h ig h w a y ; 2. sh e is w illin g t o pa y t h e pr oper in dem n it y ; 3. t h e isola t ion w a s n ot du e t o t h e a ct s of Y ola n da ; a n d 4. t h e right of way being claimed is at a point least prejudicial t o t h e ser v ien t est a t e. T h e criterion of least prejudicial to the servient estate must prevail ov er the criterion of short est distance. Where the easement may be established on any of several tenements surrounding t h e dom inant estate, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least da m a g e sh ou ld be ch osen. However, if these 2 circumstances do not concur, the way which w ill ca u se t h e lea st dam age should be used even if it will not be the shortest. In this case, Anastacia ‘s pr oper t y is lea st prejudicial since it will not entail the demolition of a sari-sari store which is made of strong m a t er ia ls. A s between a right of way that would demolish a store of strong materials t o provide egress t o a pu blic highway, and another right of way which although longer will require an avocado t r ee t o be cu t dow n , t h e secon d a lt er n a t iv e sh ou ld be pr efer r ed.

V a l l ey La n d Resou r ces v s V a l l ey Gol f Cl u b

G.R. No. 1 2 6 5 8 4 . Nov em ber 1 5 , 2 0 0 1 Fa cts: Victoria Valley Blvd is composed of road lot s w h ich con n ect s Or t ig a s A v en u e a n d Sum ulong Highway. Half of the Boulevard is m a de u p of r oa d lot s ow n ed by defen da n t a ppellant Valley Golf. The other half is supposed to be owned by Hacienda Benit o w it h w h om V alley Golf entered into an agreement, whereby it was agreed that Hacienda Benito and V a lley Golf will own jointly Victoria Valley Blvd, one of the provisions provide that the right of way shall be ow n ed a n d m a in t a in ed join t ly by Ha cien da Ben it o a n d V a lley Golf. T h ereafter, Hacienda Benito transferred ownership and all its rights and interests ov er the r oa d lot s covering half of the Victoria Valley Blvd. to herein plaintiff-appellee Valley Land by virtue of a Mu tual Agreement Valley Golf treated and recognized Valley Land as its alleged new co-owner ov er Victoria Valley Blvd., sharing half of all the proceeds of the grant of right of w a y ov er t h e bou lev a r d. However, in a subsequent review of the agreement between Valley Golf and Ha cien da Ben it o, V alley Golf discovered that there is actually no existing co-ownership between them over Victoria V alley Blvd. Valley Golf retained exclusive ownership ov er the road lots forming part of Victor ia V alley Blvd. notwithstanding their agreement, and that the other half of t h e bou lev a r d is n o lon ger under the name of either Hacienda Benito or Valley Land as the same has been disposed of a lr ea dy a n d is r eg ist er ed in fa v or of t h e A ct iv e Rea lt y & Dev 't . Cor p. Ba sed on said discovery, Valley Golf sought t o recover the sum of mon ey w h ich it a lleg edly r em itted by mistake to Valley Land which represents the supposed share of the latter in the grant of r ight of way. Valley Land in turn sought the cancellation of Valley Golf s t itles ov er t h e r oa d lot s forming half of Victoria Valley Blvd. The cases were filed before the Regional Trial Cou r t of A ntipolo and consolidated therein. In due t ime, the assailed decision was rendered and broug h t t o t h is Cou r t on a ppea l by V a lley Golf ISSUE: Whether Valley Golf is the sole owner of the subject road lots, or V a lley La n d is a coow n er t h er eof RULING: V a lley Golf is t h e sole ow n er of t h e r oa d lot s.

por tion of a parcel of land located in Masbate (and (c) petitioner Merly S. Cabatingan, a port ion of t h e Ma sba t e pr oper t y T h ese deeds of don a t ion con t a in sim ila r pr ov ision s: "That for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR for the DONEE, x x x the DONOR transfers, conveys, by way of donation, unto the DONEE the above property, to becom e effective upon the death of the DONOR xx x” Upon learning of the existence of these donations, respondents filed with the RTC an act ion for A nnulment And Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Donations and Accounting. Respondents allege t hat petitioners, through their sinister machinations and strategies and t a kin g a dv a n t a g e of Con chita Cabatingan's fragile condition, caused the execution of the deeds of donation, and, that t h e documents are void for failing to comply with the provisions of the Civ il Code r eg a r din g form alities of wills and testaments, consider in g t h a t t h ese a r e don a t ion s m or t is ca u sa . Respondents prayed that they be declared as co-owner s of t h e pr oper t ies in equ a l sh a r es, t og et h er w it h Nicola s Ca ba t in g a n . RT C rendered a partial judgment in favor of respondents by declaring the 4 Dee ds of Don a t ion a s null and void for being a Donation Mortis Causa and for failure to comply wit h for m a l a n d solem n requisite under Art. 806 of the New Civil Code; declaring respondents a s co-ow n er s of t h e pr oper t ies of Con ch it a ISSUE: W h et h er or n ot t h e don a t ion s a r e m or t is ca u sa or in t er v iv os RULING: T h e Don a t ion s in t h is ca se a r e Mor t is Ca u sa . In a Donation Mortis Causa, "the right of disposition is not transferred t o the don ee w h ile t h e don or is still alive." In determining whether a donation is one of mortis ca u sa , t h e follow in g ch a r a ct er ist ics m u st be t a ken in t o a ccou n t : (1 ) It conveys no t itle or ownership t o the transferee before the dea t h of t h e t r a n sfer or ; t ransferor retains ownership (full or naked) and con t r ol of t h e pr oper t y w h ile a liv e; (2 ) Before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, a d n u t u m ; (3 ) The transfer shou ld be v oid if t h e t r a n sfer or sh ou ld su r v iv e t h e t r a n sfer ee.

T h e TCT‘s which are the subject of the road right of way and all the rest of the other certifica t es of t itle covering the road lots are solely in the name of Valley Golf. Consequently, there can be no qu estion that Valley Golf is the owner of the road lots. As such owner, Valley Golf has the r ig h t t o enjoy and dispose of the same without any limitations other than those establish ed by la w .

In t he present case, the nature of the donations as mortis causa is confirmed by the fact that t h e don ations do not contain any clear provision t h a t in t en ds t o pa ss pr opr iet a r y r ig h t s t o pet itioners prior t o Cabatingan's death. It establishes the don or 's in t en t ion t o t r a n sfer t h e ow nership and possession of the donated property to the donee only after the for m er 's dea t h .

However, Valley Golf made the mistake of sharing the proceeds of the right of way wit h V a lley La nd. Considering that when the said amount was given to Valley Land, it did not have the righ t t o r eceive the amount as Valley Golf delivered it under the mistaken belief that Valley Land was a co-owner of the lands, thus Valley Lan d w a s u n der oblig a t ion t o r et u r n t h e a m ou n t of P1 ,5 8 5 ,9 6 2 .9 6 .

T h e phra se "t o becom e effect iv e u pon t h e dea t h of t h e DONOR" a dm it s of n o ot h er in terpretation but that Cabatingan did not intend to transfer the ownership of the proper t ies t o pet itioners during her lifetime. Petitioners themselves expressly confir m ed t h e don a t ion s a s m ortis causa in the following Acceptance and Attestation clauses, uniformly found in the subject deeds of donation, "That the DONEE does hereby accept the foregoing donation mortis caus a.

Ca ba t i n ga n v s h ei r s of Cor a zon Ca ba t in ga n G.R. No. 1 3 1 9 5 3 . Ju n e 5 , 2 0 0 2

IGNA CIO GONZA LES, LILIA R. GONZA LES, et a l v s. CA G.R. No. 1 1 0 3 3 5 . Ju n e 1 8 , 2 0 0 1

FA CTS: On February 17, 1992, Conchita Cabatingan executed in favor of her brother, petit ion er Nicolas Cabatingan, a "Deed of Conditional of Donation Inter Vivos for House and Lot" covering (½) portion of the former's house and lot located at Liloa n , Cebu . Fou r (4 ) ot h er deeds of don ation were subsequently executed by Conchita Cabatingan on January 14, 1995, best ow in g u pon: (a) petitioner Estela C. Maglasang, two (2) parcels of land - on e located in Cog on , Cebu a n d the other, a portion of a parcel of land in Masbate. (b) petitioner Nicola s Ca ba t in g a n , a

FA CTS: The deceased spouses Ignacio Gonzales and Marin a Gon za les w er e t h e r eg ist er ed ow ners of two parcels of agricultural Land situated at Barrio Fortaleza, Cabanatuan City, Herein pet itioners are the successors-in-interest or the children and grandchildr en of sa id Gon za les spou ses. On the other hand, private respondents are the farmers and tenants of said spouses who h ave been cultivating the parcels of land even before World War II either personally or throu g h t h eir pr edecessor s-in -in t er est .

On May 7, 1969, Marina Gonzales died intestate and appointed as administratrix of h er est a t e w as petitioner Lilia Gonzales. Prior t o the partition of said estate, Ignacio Gonzales ex ecu t ed a Deed of Don a t ion on Ju ly 1 2 , 1 9 7 2 con v ey in g h is sh a r e of t h e pr oper t y . W h en Presidential Decree No. 27 (P.D. No. 27) took effect on October 21, 1972, the landholdings of t h e spouses Gonzales were placed under Operation Land Transfer by virtue of said decree, and pr ivate respondents were accordingly issued the corresponding Certificates of Land Transfer and Em ancipation Patents. On March 5, 1974, the administratrix Lilia Gonzales filed an applica t ion for r etention with the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform, request in g t h a t t h eir pr oper t y be ex cluded from the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) r esolution dated February 23, 1983 recommending that the land subject of the deed of donation, or Lot No. 5 5 1 -C, be ex em pt fr om Oper a t ion La n d T r a n sfer . ISSUE: Whether the property subject of the deed of donation which was not r eg ist er ed w h en P.D. No. 2 7 t ook effect , sh ou ld be ex clu ded fr om t h e Oper a t ion La n d T r a n sfer . RULING: No. Article 749 of the Civil Code provides that "in or de r t h a t t h e don a t ion of a n im movable may be valid, it must be made in a public document, specifying therein the proper t y don ated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy." Article 709 of the same Code ex plicitly states that "the titles of ownership, or other rights ov er immovable property, which are n ot duly inscribed or annotated in the Registry of property shall not preju dice t h ir d per son s. Fr om the foregoing provisions, it may be inferred that as between the parties t o a donation of an im movable property, all that is required is for sa id don a t ion t o be con t a in ed in a pu blic document. Regist r a t ion is n ot n ecessa r y for it t o be con sider ed v a lid a n d effect iv e. However, in order to bind third persons, the donation must be reg ist er ed in t h e Reg ist r y of Pr operty (now Registry of Land Titles and Deeds). Although the non-regist r a t ion of a deed of don ation shall not affect its validity, the necessity of registration com es into play when the rights of t h ir d per son s a r e a ffect ed, a s in t h e ca se a t ba r . It is undisputed in this case that the donation executed by Ig n a cio Gon za les in fa v or of h i s g randchildren, although in writing and duly notarized, has not been registered in a ccor da n ce w ith law. For this reason, it shall not be bin din g u pon pr iv a t e r espon den t s w h o did n ot pa rticipate in said deed or had no actual knowledge thereof. Hence, while the deed of donation is v alid between the donor and the donees, such deed, however, did not bind the tenants-fa r m er s w ho were not parties t o the donation. From the foregoing, the ineluctable conclusion dr a w n is t hat the unregistered deed of donation cannot operate to exclude t h e su bject la n d fr om t h e cov erage of the Operation Land Transfer of P.D. No. 27, which took effect on October 21, 1 9 7 2 . T o rule otherwise would render ineffectual the rights and interests that t h e t en a n t s-fa r m er s im m edia t ely a cqu ir ed u pon t h e pr om u lg a t ion of P.D. No. 2 7 .

Repu bl i c v s Leon Sil im G.R. No. 1 4 0 4 8 7 . A pr il 2 , 2 0 0 1 FA CTS: On 17 December 1971, respondents, the Spouses Leon Silim and Ildefonsa Ma n g u ba t , don ated a 5 ,600 square meter pa r cel of la n d in fa v or of t h e Bu r ea u of Pu blic Sch ools, Mu nicipality of Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur (BPS). In the Deed of Don a t ion , r espon den t s im posed the condition that the said property should "b e used exclusively and forever for sch ool pu rposes only."1 This donation was accepted by Gregorio Buendia, the Dist r ict Su per v isor of BPS, t h r ou g h a n A ffida v it of A ccept a n ce a n d Con fir m a t ion of Don a t ion . T hrough a fund raising campaign spearheaded by the Parent-Teachers Association of Barang a y Ka uswagan, a school building was constructed on the donat ed la n d. How ev er , t h e Ba g on g Lipunan school building that was supposed to be allocated for the don a t ed pa r cel of la n d in Ba rangay Kauswagan could not be released since the government required that it be built upon a

on e (1) hectare parcel of land. T o r em edy t h is pr edica m en t , A ssist a n t Sch ool Div ision Su perintendent of the Prov ince of Zamboanga del Sur, Sabdani Hadjirol, a u t h or ized Dist r ict Su pervisor Buendia to officially transact for the exchange of the one-half (1/2) hectare old school sit e of Kauswagan Elementary School t o a new and su it a ble loca t ion w h ich w ou ld fit t h e specifications of the government. Pursuant to this, District Supervisor Bu en dia a n d T er esit a Pa lma entered into a Deed of Exchange whereby the donated lot was exchanged with the big g er lot ow n ed by t h e la t t er .. W h en respondent Leon Silim saw, to his surpr ise, t h a t V ice -Ma y or W ilfr edo Pa lm a w a s con structing a house on the donated land, he asked the latter why he was building a house on the pr operty he donated to BPS. Vice Mayor Wilfredo Palma replied that he is already the ow n er of t h e said property. Respondent Leon Silim endeavored t o stop the construction of t h e h ou se on t h e donated property but Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma advised him t o just file a ca se in cou r t . On February 10, 1 982, respondents filed a Com plain t for Rev oca t ion a n d Ca n cella t ion of Con ditional Donation, Annulment of Deed of Ex ch a n g e a n d Recov er y of Possession a n d Ownership of Real Property with damages against Vice Mayor Wilfredo Palma before the RTC of Pa g a dia n Cit y w h ich dism issed t h e com pla in t for la ck of m er it . Not satisfied with the decision of the trial court, respondents appealed in w h ich t h e Cou r t of A ppeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declared the donation null and v oid on t h e g r ounds that the donation was not properly accepted and the condition imposed on the donation w a s v iola t ed. ISSUE: W h et h er or n ot t h e don a t ion is v a lid. HELD: Donations, according to its purpose or cause, may be categorized as: (1) pure or simple; (2 ) remuneratory or compensatory; (3) conditional or modal; a n d (4 ) on er ou s. A n on er ou s don ation is that which imposes upon the donee a reciprocal obligation or, t o be m or e pr ecise, t h is is the kind of donation made for a valuable consideration, the cost of wh ich is equ a l t o or m ore than the thing donated. Unlike the other forms of donation, the validity of and the r ig h t s a n d obligations of the parties involved in an onerous donation are completely govern ed n ot by t h e law on donations but by the law on contracts (Article 733 Civil Code). The donation involved in the present controversy is one which is onerous since there is a bur den im posed u pon t h e don ee t o bu ild a sch ool on t h e don a t ed pr oper t y . In a ccordance to Art. 745 & 749, there was a valid acceptance of the donation in t h is ca se. T h e w ritten acceptance of the donation having been considered by the trial court in ar r iv in g a t it s decision, there is the presumption that this exhi bit was properly offered and a dm it t ed by t h e court. Also, a school building was immediately constructed after the dona t ion w a s ex ecu t ed. Silim h a d kn ow ledg e of t h e ex ist en ce of t h e sch ool bu ildin g pu t u p on t h e lot . T h e condition for the donation in this case was not violated when the lot donated was exchanged w ith another one. The purpose for the donation remains the same - for the establish m en t of a sch ool. The exclusivity of the purpose was not altered or affected. In fact, the exchange of the lot for a much bigger one was in furtherance and enhancement of the purpose of the donation. T h e a cquisition of the bigger lot paved the way for the release of funds for the construction of Bagong Lipunan School Bldg which could not be accommodated by the limited area of the don a t ed lot .

RICKY Q. QUILALA V. GLICERIA ALCANTARA , LEONORA A LCA NT A RA , INES REYES a n d JOSE REYES Decem ber 3 , 2 0 0 1 FA CTS: On February 20, 1981, Catalina Quilala executed a "Donation of Rea l Pr oper t y In t er V iv os" in favor of Violet a Qu ila la ov er a pa r cel of la n d loca t ed in St a . Cr u z, Ma n ila .

T h e "Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" consists of two pages. The first page con t a in s t h e deed of donation itself, and is signed on the bottom portion by Catalina Quilala as donor, Violeta Qu ilala a s don ee, a n d t w o in st r u m en t a l w it n esses. T h e secon d pa g e con t a in s t h e A cknowledgment, which states merely that Catalina Quilala personally a ppea r ed befor e t h e n otary public and acknowledged that the donation was her free and volun t a r y a ct a n d dee d. T h ere appear on the left-hand margin of the second page the signatures of Catalina Quilala a n d on e of the witnesses, and on the right-hand margin the signatures of Violet a Qu ila la a n d t h e ot h er w it n ess. On November 7, 1983, Catalina Quilala died. Violeta Quilala likewise died on Ma y 2 2 , 1 9 8 4 . Pet it ion er Ricky Qu ila la a lleg es t h a t h e is t h e su r v iv in g son of V iolet a Qu ila la .. Mea nwhile, respondents Gliceria Alcantara, Leonora Alcantara, Ines Rey es a n d Ju a n Rey es, claiming to be Catalina's only surviving relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity , ex ecuted a deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate, dividing and adjudicating unto themselv es t h e su bject pr oper t y . T h e trial court found that the deed of donation, although signed by both Cata lina a n d V iolet a , w as acknowledged before a notary public only by the donor, Catalina. Consequently, t h er e w a s n o a cceptance by Violeta of the donation in a public instrument, thus renderin g t h e don a t ion n ull and void. Furthermore, the trial court held that nowhere in Catalina's SSS r ecor ds does it a ppear that Violeta was Catalina's daughter. Rather, Violet a w a s r efer r ed t o t h er ein a s a n a dopted child, but there was no positive evidence that the adoption was legal. On the other hand, t h e trial court found that respondents were first cousins of Catalina Quilala. Howev er , sin ce it a ppeared that Catalina died leaving a will, the tria l cou r t r u led t h a t r espon den t s' deed of ex t r a ju dicia l set t lem en t ca n n ot be r eg ist er ed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming with modification the decision of t h e trial court by dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of action without pr eju dice t o t h e filin g of pr oba t e pr oceedin g s of Ca t a lin a 's a lleg ed la st w ill a n d t est a m en t . ISSUE: V a lidit y of t h e don a t ion ex ecu t ed by Ca t a lin a in fa v or of V iolet a HELD: Article 749 of the Civil Code, the donation of an immovable must be m a de in a pu blic in strument in order to be valid, specifying therein the property donated a n d t h e v a lu e of t h e charges which the donee must satisfy. As a mode of acquiring ownership, donation results in a n effective transfer of title ov er the property from the donor to the donee,and is perfected from the m om ent the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee, provided the donee is not disqualified or prohibited by law from accepting the donation. Once the donation is accepted, it is gener a lly con sidered irrevocable, and the donee becomes t h e a bsolu t e ow n er of t h e pr oper t y . T h e a cceptance, to be valid, must be made during the lifetime of both the donor and the donee.It may be m ade in the same deed or in a separate public document, a n d t h e don or m u st kn ow t h e a ccept a n ce by t h e don ee. In t he case at bar, the deed of donation contained the number of the certificate of title as well a s t h e technical description of the real property donated. It stipulated that the donation was m a de for and in consideration of the "love and affection which the DONEE inspir es in t h e DONOR, a n d a s a n a ct of liber a lit y a n d g en er osit y ." Below the t erms and stipulations of the donation, the donor, donee and their witnesses a ffix ed t h eir signature. However, the Acknowledgment appearing on the second page ment ion ed on ly t h e don or , Ca t a lin a Qu ila la . T h e second page of the deed of donation, on which the Acknowledgment appears, was signed by t h e donor and one witness on the left-hand margin, and by the donee and the other w it n ess on t h e right hand margin. Surely, the requirement that the contracting parties and their w it n esses sh ould sign on the left-hand margin of the instrument is not absolute. The intendment of the law m erely is to ensure that each and every page of the instrument is authenticated by t h e pa r t ies. T h e requirement is designed t o avoid the falsification of the contract after the same has alrea dy

been duly executed by the parties. Simply put, the specification of the location of the signature is m erely directory. The fact that one of the parties signs on the wrong side of t h e pa g e does n ot inv alidate the document. The purpose of authenticating the page is served, and the requiremen t in t h e a bov e-qu ot ed pr ov ision is deem ed su bst a n t ia lly com plied w it h . In t he same vein, the lack of an acknowledgment by the donee before the notary public does n ot a lso render the donation null and void. The instrument should be t r ea t ed in it s en t ir et y . It ca nnot be considered a private document in part and a public document in another part. The fact t hat it was acknowledged before a notary public converts the deed of donation in its en t ir et y a pu blic instrument. The fact that the donee was not mention ed by t h e n ot a r y pu blic in t h e a cknowledgment is of no moment. To be sure, it is the conveyance that should be acknowledg ed a s a free and voluntary act. In any event, the donee signed on the second page, which con t a in s t h e Acknowledgment only. Her acceptance, which is explicitly set forth on the first pa g e of t h e n ot a r ized deed of don a t ion , w a s m a de in a pu blic in st r u m en t .

SPOUSES CESA R and RAQUEL STA. MARIA and FLORCERFIDA ST A . MA RIA V . COURT OF A PPEA LS, a n d SPOUSES A RSENIO a n d ROSLYNN FA JA RDO Ja n u a r y 2 8 , 1 9 9 8 FA CTS: Spouses Arsenio and Roslynn Fajardo are the registered owners of a piece of la n d, Lot No. 1 24, located at Paco, Obando, Bulacan. They acquired said lot under a Deed of Absolute Sale da t ed Febr u a r y 6 , 1 9 9 2 ex ecu t ed b y t h e v en dor s Pedr o M. Sa n ch ez, et a l. Pla intiff's aforesaid Lot 1 24 is surrounded by a fishpond on the northeast portion thereof; by Lot 1 26, owned by Florentino Cruz, on the southeast portion; by Lot 6 -a and a por t ion of Lot 6 -b, ow ned respectively by Spouses Cesar and Raquel Sta. Maria and Florcerfida Sta. Maria , on t h e sou t h w est ; a n d by Lot 1 2 2 , ow n ed by t h e Ja cin t o fa m ily , on t h e n or t h w est . On February 17, 1992, Respondent spouses Fajardo filed a complaint against pet it ion er Cesa r a n d Raquel Sta. Maria or Florcerfida Sta. Maria for the establishment of an easement of righ t of w ay. Respondents a lleged that their lot, Lot 124, is surrounded by properties belonging to other per sons, including those of the petitioners; that since respondents have no adequa t e ou t let t o t h e provincial road, an easement of a right of way passing through eit h er of t h e a lt er n a t iv e pet itioners‘ properties which are directly abutting the provincial road w ou ld be r espon den t s‘ on ly convenient, direct and shortest access to and from the provincial road; t h a t r espon den t s pr edecessors-in-interest have been passing through the properties of petitioner s g oin g t o a n d fr om their lot; that petitioners' mother even promised respondents' predecessors-in-int er est t o g rant the latter an easement of right of way as she acknowledged the absence of an access fr om t h eir property to the road; and that alternative petitioners, despite respon den t s r equ est for a r ight of way and referral of the dispute to the barangay officia ls, r efu sed t o g r a n t t h em a n ea sement. Thus, respondents prayed that an easement of right of way on the lots of defen da n t s be est a blish ed in t h eir fa v or . Defendants, instead of filing an answer, filed a motion t o dismiss on the ground that t h e low er court has no jurisdiction to hear the case since pla in t iffs fa iled t o r efer t h e m a t t er t o t h e barangay lupon. The lower court, however, in its Order dated May 18, 1992, denied said motion on t h e pr em ise t h a t t h er e w a s su bst a n t ia l com plia n ce w it h t h e la w . T h e trial court found that based on the Ocular Inspection Report there was no other way through w hich the private respondents could establish a right of way in order to reach the provincial road ex cept by t r a v er sin g dir ect ly t h e pr oper t y of t h e pet it ion er s. T h e Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the private respondents h a d su fficien t ly est ablished the existence of the four requisites for compulsory ea sem en t of r ig h t of w a y on pet itioners' property, to wit: (1) private respondents' property was, as revealed by t h e Ocu l a r

in spection Report, surrounded by other immovables owned by different indiv idu a ls a n d w a s w ithout an adequate outlet t o a public highway; (2) the isolation of private respondents' property w as not due to their own acts, as it was already surrounded by other immov a bles w h en t h e y pu rchased it; (3) petitioners' property would provide the shortest way from private respondent s' pr operty to the prov incial road, and this way wou ld ca u se t h e lea st pr eju dice beca u se n o significant structure would be injured thereby; and (4) the private respondents were w illin g t o pay the corresponding damages provided for by law if th e r ig h t of w a y w ou ld be g r a n t ed. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT A COMPULSORY RIGHT OF W A Y CA N BE GRA NT ED T O PRIV A T E RESPONDENT S HELD: In the instant case, the Court of Appeals have cor r ect ly fou n d t h e ex ist en ce of t h e r equisites. Private respondents' property is landlocked by neighbor in g est a t es belon g in g t o differ en t ow n er s. T he petitioners try to convince the Court that there are two other existing passage ways ov er the pr operty of Cruz and over that of Jacinto, as well as a "daang tao," for private responden t s' u se. Bu t the examination of the records yields otherwise. Said lots of Cruz and Jacint o do n ot h a v e exis ting passage ways for the private respondents to use. Mor eov er , t h e Ocu la r In spect ion Report reveals that the suggested alternative ways through Cruz's or Jacin t o's pr oper t ies a r e lon ger and "circuitous" than that through petitioners' property. This is also clear from the Sketch Plan submitted by the private respondents wherein it is readily seen that t h e lot s of Cr u z a n d Ja cinto are only adjacent to that of private respondents unlike t h a t of pet it ion er s w h ich is dir ectly in front of priva t e r espon den t s' pr oper t y in r ela t ion t o t h e pu blic h ig h w a y . Un der Article 650 of the Civil Code, the easement of right of way shall be est a blish ed a t t h e point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, wher e t h e distance from the dominant estate t o a public highway may be the shortest . W h er e t h er e a r e sev eral tenements surrounding the dominant estate, and the easement may be est a blish ed on a ny of them, the one where the way is shortest and will ca u se t h e lea st da m a g e sh ou ld be ch osen.The conditions of "least damage" and "shortest distance" are bot h est a blish ed in on e t en em en t — pet it ion er s' pr oper t y . A s t o the "daang tao" at the back of private respondents' property, it must be stressed that under A rticle 651 the width of the easement of right of way shall be that which is sufficient for the needs of t h e dominant estate, and may accordingly be changed from time to time. Therefore, the needs of t h e dominant estate determine the width of the easement.The needs of private r espon den t s' pr operty could hardly be served by this "daang tao" located at the back and which is bordered by a fish pon d.

CRESENCIA CRIST OBA L, ROBERT O MA KIMKIM, DA MA SO MA KIMKIM, SPOUSES SA LVADOR HERMA LINO a n d PONCIA NA MA KIMKIM, MILA GROS MA KIMKIM, REMEDIOS MAKIMKIM, SPOUSES FRANCISCO EST A NISLA O a n d FLORDELIZA MAKIMKIM, ERLINDA MAKIMKIM, JOSE MA KIMKIM a n d GINA MA KIMKIM V. COURT OF APPEALS, CESAR LEDESMA, INC., SPOUSES JESUS C. PA CIONE a n d LERMA B. PA CIONE Ju n e 2 2 , 1 9 9 8 FA CTS: Petitioners own a house and lot situated at Visayas Avenue Exten sion , Qu ezon C it y , w here they have been residing from 1961 to the present. Respondent Cesar Ledesma, Inc., on the ot h er hand, is the owner of a subdivision at Barrio Culiat along Visay a s A v en u e w h ich on ce in cluded the disputed residential lots, Lot 1 and Lot 2, located adjacent t o petitioners' proper t y . Lot s 1 and 2 were originally part of a private road known as Road Lot 2 owned ex clu siv ely by Cesar Ledesma, Inc. Petitioners were using Road Lot 2 in going to and from the near est pu blic

r oa d. When Visayas Avenue became operational as a national road in 1 979, Cesar Ledesma, Inc., filed a petition before the RTC of Qu ezon Cit y t o be a llow ed t o con v er t Roa d Lot 2 in t o r esidential lots. The petition was granted, hence, Road Lot 2 was converted into residentia l lot s designated as lot 1 and lot 2. Subsequently, Cesar Ledesma , In c., sold bot h lot s t o Ma ca r io Pa cione. In turn, Macario Pacione conveyed the lots to his son and dauhter-in-law, respon den t spou ses Jesu s a n d Ler m a Pa cion e. W h en the Pacione spouses, who intended to bui ld a house on Lot 1, Visited the property in 1987, t h ey found out that the lot was occupied by a squatter named Juanita Geronimo an d a por t ion w as being used a passageway by petitioners to and from Visayas A v en u e. A ccor din g ly , t h e spou ses com plained about the intrusion into their property to the Barangay Office. W h en t h e pa rties failed t o arrive at an amicable settlement, the spouses started en closin g Lot 1 w it h a con cr et e fen ce. Pet itioners prostested the enclosure alleging that their property was bou n ded on a ll sides by r esidential houses belonging t o different owners and had no adequate outlet and inlet to Visayas Av enue except through the property of t h e Pa cion es. A s t h eir pr ot est s w en t u n h eeded, pet it ion er s in st it u t ed a n a ct ion for ea sem en t of r ig h t of w a y . A t the instance of the parties, the trial court ordered an ocu la r in spect ion of t h e pr oper t y . T h e trial court dismissed the complaint holding that one essential requisite of a legal easement of r ight of way was not prov ed, i.e., the absence of an alternative adequate way or outlet t o a public h ig h w a y , in t h is ca se, V isa y a s A v en u e. On 16 January 1 996 the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed decision affirming the findings of t h e t r ia l cou r t . ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are entitled to a compu lsor y ea sem en t of r ig h t of w a y HELD: To be entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way, the pr econ dit ion s pr ov ided u nder Arts. 649 and 650 of the Civil Code must be established. These are: (1) that the domina n t est ate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet t o a public high w a y ; (2 ) t hat proper indemnity has been paid; (3) that the isolation was not due to acts of the propr iet or of t h e dominant estate; (4) that the right of way claimed is at a point lea st pr eju dicia l t o t h e servient estate and, in so far as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the domin a n t est ate to a public highway may be the shortest.The burden of prov in g t h e ex ist en ce of t h ese pr er equ isit es lies on t h e ow n er of t h e dom in a n t est a t e. In t he present case, the first element is clearly absent. As found by the trial court and the Cou r t of A ppeals, an outlet already exist, which is a path walk located at the left side of pet it ion er s' pr operty and which is connected to a private road about five hundred (500) m et er s lon g . T h e pr ivate road, in turn, leads to Ma. Elena Street which is about 2.5 meters wide a n d, fin a lly , t o V isayas Avenue. This outlet was determined by the court a quo to be sufficient for t h e n eeds of t h e dominants estate, hence petitioners have no cause t o complain that they have n o a dequ a t e ou t let t o V isa y a s A v en u e. Fu rther, no evidence was adduced by petitioners to prove that the easement they seek to impose on private respondents' property is t o be established at a point least prejudicial to the ser v ien t est ate. For emphasis, Lot 1 is only 164 square meters and an impr ov iden t im posit ion of t h e ea sement on the lot may unjustly deprive pr iv a t e r espon den t s of t h e opt im u m u se a n d en joyment of their property, considering that its already small area will be reduced further by the ea sement. Worse, it may ev en render the property useless for the purpose for w h ich pr iv a t e r espon den t s pu r ch a sed t h e sa m e. It m ust also be stressed that, by its very nature, and when consider ed w it h r efer en ce t o t h e obligations imposed on the servient estate, an easement involves an abnormal restriction on t h e pr operty rights of the servient owner and is regarded as a charge or encumbrance on the servient est ate. Thus, it is incumbent upon the owner of the dom inant estate to establish by clea r a n d

convincing evidence the presence of all the preconditions before his claim for easement of r ig h t of w a y be g r a n t ed. Pet it ion er s m iser a bly fa iled in t h is r eg a r d. On the question of adequacy of the existing outlet, petitioners allege that the path walk is m u ch lon ger, circuitous and inconvenient, as from Visayas Avenue one has to pass by Ma . Elen a St ., t urn right to a private road, then enter, then vacant lot, and turn right ag a in t o ex it fr om t h e v a ca n t lot u n t il on e r ea ch e s pet it ion er s' pr oper t y . W e find petitioners' concept of what is "a dequate outlet" a com plet e disr eg a r d of t h e w ell en trenched doctrine that in order to justify the imposition of an easement of right of way t h er e m ust be a real, not ficititious or artificial, necessity for it. Mere convenience for t h e dom in a n t est ate is not what is required by law as the basis for setting up a com pulsory easement. Ev en in t h e face of necessity, if it can be satisfied without imposing the easement, the same should not be im posed A dm ittedly, the proposed right of way ov er private respondents' property is the most convenient, being the shorter and the more direct route to Visayas Avenue. However, it is not en ou g h t h a t t h e easement be where the way is shortest. It is more improtant that it be where it will cause t h e lea st prejudice to the servient estate. As discussed elsewhere, petitioners failed t o su fficien t ly dem onstrate that the proposed right of way shall be at a point least prejudicial t o t h e ser v ien t est a t e.

Pet itioner opposed the motion on the ground that petitioner was not a pa r t y t o t h e ca se a n d t h erefore not bound by the judgment of the trial court and that it had subsisting r ig h t -of-w a y a g r eem en t s ov er sa id pr oper t y . T h e trial court proceeded with the hearing despite the fa ct t h a t pet it ion er h a d n o cou n sel pr esen t . T h u s, on ly V in es Rea lt y pr esen t ed it s ev iden ce. On the same date, November 27, 1 992, t h e t r ia l cou r t or der ed t h e issu a n ce of a w r it of dem olit ion . On December 7, 1992, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibit ion w it h r est r a in in g or der a n d pr elim in a r y in ju n ct ion a n d t h e sa m e w a s g r a n t ed. On December 11, 1992, the trial court issued another or der dir ect in g t h e Na t ion a l Pow er Cor por a t ion su b-u n it in Ca m a r in es Nor t e t o sh u t off t h e pow er lin es . On the same day, December 11, 1 992, respondent Vines Realty cut down petitioners electric posts pr ofessedly u sin g a ch a in sa w a n d r esu lt in g in a lou d bla st a ffect in g t h e a r ea . Ev en the members of the Sangguniang Bayan at San Jose appealed t o r espon den t Sh er iff t o desist from proceeding with the demolit ion du e t o a r est r a in in g or der bu t t o n o a v a il. On Ja n u a r y 2 6 , 1 9 9 3 , t h e t r ia l cou r t issu ed a n a lia s w r it of dem olit ion

CA MARINES NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (CANORECO) V. COURT OF A PPEALS, HON. LUIS L. DICT A DO, Pr esidin g Ju dge, RT C, Br a n ch 39, Da et , Ca marines Norte, EDUA RDO R. MORENO, LT . COL. RUFINO CHA V EZ, CA PT . A LFREDO BORJA, CONRAD C. LEV IST E a n d V INES REA LT Y CORPORA T ION Nov em ber 2 0 , 2 0 0 0 FA CTS: On May 18, 1989, Conrad L. Leviste filed with the RTC of Daet, Ca m a r in es Nor t e, a com plaint for collection of a sum of money and foreclosure of mort g a g e a g a in st Ph ilippin e Sm elt er Cor por a t ion (PSC). For failure to file an answer to the complaint, the trial court declared PSC in default and allowed pla in t iff Lev ist e t o pr esen t ev iden ce ex -pa r t e. On Nov em ber 2 3 , 1 9 8 9 , t h e t r ia l cou r t r en der ed a decision in fa v or of pla in t iff. W h en the decision became final and executory, the trial court issued a w r it of ex ecu t ion a n d r espondent sheriff Eduardo R. Moreno levied u pon t w o (2 ) pa r cels of la n d issu ed by t h e Reg istrar of Deeds in the name of PSC. On April 24, 1990, the parcels of land were sold at public a uction in favor of Vines Realty Corporation. On April 25, 1990, the Clerk of Court, as ex -officio Pr ov incial Sheriff, issued a Certificate of Sale which Judge Luis D. Dictado, in h is ca pa cit y a s ex ecu t iv e ju dg e, a ppr ov ed. On June 23, 1992, Vines Realty moved for the issuance of a writ of possession ov er said property. On Ju n e 2 5 , 1 9 9 2 , t h e t r ia l cou r t g r a n t ed t h e m ot ion . On August 7, 1992, copy of the writ of possession was served on petitioner as owner of the power lines standing on certain portions of the subject property. Later, on Au g u st 1 2 , 1 9 9 2 , V in es Rea lty filed an amended motion for an order of demolition and removal of im provements on the su bject la n d. A m ong the improvements for removal were the power lines an d elect r i c post s belon g in g t o pet it ion er .

T h e sheriff, at the request of Vines Realty demolished the remaining electric posts resu lt in g in t h e cutting off of pow er su pply t o v a r iou s bu sin ess est a blish m en t s a n d ba r a n g a y s. Mea ntime, on January 19, 1993, the Court of Appeals, prom ulgated a decision dism issin g t h e pet it ion for la ck of m er it . Mea nwhile, in response to the publics urgent basic need, petitioner re-con st r u ct ed it s pow er lines along the provincial road lea din g t o t h e Por t of Osm ea u pon a u t h or it y of DPW H. On April 23, 1993, however, petitioner received a letter dated April 10, 1993, stating tha t V in es Rea lty was the owner of the roadside and that petitioner could not construct power lines therein w ithout its permission. Petitioner promptly replied that the power lines were constructed within t h e right of way of the provincial road leading to the port of Osmea as granted by t h e Dist r ict En g in eer of DPW H. Hen ce t h is pet it ion . ISSUE: Whether petitioner is entitled to retain possession of the power lines located in the lan d sold a t pu blic a u ct ion a s a r esu lt of ex t r a -ju dicia l for eclosu r e of m or t g a g e HELD: The most basic tenet of due process is the right to be heard. A court denies a par t y du e pr ocess if it renders its orders without giving such party an opportunity to present its eviden ce. T h is Court finds that petitioner was denied due process. Petitioner could have negated pr iv a t e r espondents claims by showing the absence of legal or factual basis therefor if only the trial court in the exercise of justice and equity reset the hearing instead of proceeding wit h t h e t r ia l a n d issu in g a n or der of dem olit ion on t h e sa m e da y . T h e trial court failed t o appreciate the nature of elect r ic cooper a t iv es a s pu blic u t ilit ies. T h e acquisition of an easement of a right-of-way falls within the purview of the power of eminent dom ain. Such conclusion finds support in easements of right-of-way where the Supreme Cou r t su stained the award of just compensation for private pr oper t y con dem n ed for pu blic u se.

However, a simple right-of-way easement transmits no rights, except the easement. Vines Realty r etains full ownership and it is not t otally deprived of the use of the land. It can continu e doin g w hat it wants to do with the land, except those that would result in con t a ct w it h t h e w ir es. T h e acquisition of this easement, nevertheless, is not gratis. Considering the nature and effect of t h e installation power lines, the limitations on the use of t h e la n d for a n in defin it e per iod deprives private respondents of its ordinary use. For these reasons, Vines Realty is en t it led t o payment of just compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the money equiva len t of t h e pr oper t y . Ju st com pensation has been understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss, which t h e owner of the res expropriated has t o suffer by reason of the expropriation. The va lu e of t h e la nd and its character at the t ime it was taken by the Government are the criteria for determining ju st compensation. No matter how commendable petitioners purpose is, it is just and equit a ble t hat Vines Realty be compensated the fair and full equivalent for the taking of its property, which is t he measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to the expropr ia t in g en t it y .

BRYA N U. V ILLA NUEV A V . HON. T IRSO D.C. V ELA SCO in h is ca pa cit y a s Pr esiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br a n ch 88, JULIO N. SEBA ST IA N a n d SHIRLEY LORILLA Nov em ber 2 7 , 2 0 0 0 FA CTS: Petitioner Bryan Villanueva is the registered owner of the parcel of land in Quezon City . He bought it from Pacific Banking Corporation, the mortgagee of said property. Th e ba n k h a d a cquired it from the spouses Maximo and Justina Gabriel at a public auction on March 19, 1983. W h en petitioner bought the parcel of land there was a small house on its southeastern portion. It occupied one meter of the two-meter wide easement of right of way the Gabriel spouses grant ed t o t he Espinolas, predecessors-in-interest of private respondents, in a Contract of Ea sem en t of Rig h t of W a y . Un known t o petitioner, even before he bought the land, t h e Ga br iels h a d con st r u ct ed t h e a forementioned sm all house that encroached upon the two-m eter easement. Petitioner was a lso u naware that private respondents, Julio Sebastian and Shirley Lorilla, had filed on May 8, 19 9 1 for easement, damages and with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or rest r a in in g or der against the spouses Gabriel. As successors-in-interest, Sebastian and Lor illa w a n t ed t o en for ce t h e con t r a ct of ea sem en t . On May 15, 1991, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order. On Augu st 1 3 , 1 9 9 1 , it issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction ordering the Gabriels to provide the r ig h t of w ay and to demolish the small house encroaching on the easement. On Augu st 1 5 , 1 9 9 1 , t h e Ga br iels filed a m ot ion for r econ sider a t ion w h ich w a s a lso den ied. Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and upheld the RTCs issuances. The decision beca m e fin a l a n d ex ecu t or y on Ju ly 3 1 , 1 9 9 2 . On January 5, 1995, Judge Tirso Velasco of the RTC in Quezon Cit y issu ed a n A lia s W r it of Dem olition. On June 20, 1995, the sheriff tried to demolish the small house pursuant to the writ. Pet itioner, thereafter, filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals asserting that the ex istence of the easement of right of way was not annotated in his title and t h a t h e w a s n ot a pa rty to the Civil Case. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit and den ied t h e r econ sider a t ion . ISSUE: W h et h er t h e ea sem en t on t h e pr oper t y bin ds pet it ion er

HELD: The subject easement (right of way) originally was voluntarily constituted by agreemen t between the Gabriels and the Espinolas. But as correctly observed by the Court of Appea ls, t h e ea sement in the instant petition is both (1) an easement by grant or a voluntary easemen t , a n d (2 ) an easement by necessity or a legal easement. A legal easement is on e m a n da t ed by la w , con stituted for public use or for private interest, and becomes a continuing property right . A s a com pulsory easement, it is inseparable from the estate to which it belongs, a s pr ov ided for in sa id A r t icle 6 1 7 of t h e Civ il Code. T h e essential requisites for an easement to be compulsor y a r e: (1 ) t h e dom in a n t est a t e is su rrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highw a y ; (2 ) pr oper in demnity has been paid; (3) the isolation was not due t o acts of the proprietor of the domina n t est ate; (4) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) t o t h e extent consistent with the foregoing rule, where the distance from the dominant est a t e t o a pu blic highway may be the shortest. The trial court and the Court of Appeals have decla r ed t h e ex istence of said easement (right of way). This finding of fact of both courts below is conclu siv e on t his Court, hence there is no need to further review, but only to re-affirm, this fin din g . T h e sm all house occupying one meter of the two-meter wide easement obstructs the entry of priva t e r espondents cement mixer and motor vehicle. One meter is insufficient for the needs of priv a t e r espondents. It is well-settled that the needs of the dominant estate determine the widt h of t h e ea sement. Conformably then, petitioner ought to demolish w h a t ev er edifice obst r u ct s t h e ea sem en t in v iew of t h e n eeds of pr iv a t e r espon den t s est a t e. Pet itioners second proposition, that he is not bound by the contract of easem en t beca u se t h e sam e was not annotated in the t itle and that a notice of lis pendens of the complaint t o en for ce t h e easement was not recorded with the Register of Deeds, is obv iou sly u n m er it or iou s. A s a lready explained, it is in the nature of legal easement that the servient estate (of pet it ion er ) is legally bound t o provide the dominant estate (of private respondents in this case) ing r ess fr om a n d eg r ess t o t h e pu blic h ig h w a y . Pet itioners last argument that he was not a party to Civil Case and that he had not been given his day in court, is also without merit under Rule 3 9 , Sec. 4 7 , of t h e Rev ised Ru les of Cou r t . Sim ply stated, a decision in a case is conclusive and binding upon the parties t o sa id ca se a n d t h ose who are their successor in interest by t itle after said case has been commenced or filed in court. In this case, private respondents, Julio Sebastian and Shirley Lorilla, initiated Civ il Ca se on May 8, 1991, against the original owners, the spouses Maximo and Justina Gabriel. T it le in t h e name of petitioner was entered in the Register of Deeds on March 24, 1995, after he bou g h t t h e property from the bank which had acquired it from the Gabriels. Hence, the decision in Civil Ca se binds petitioner. For, although not a party t o the suit, he is a successor-in-interest by t it le su bsequ en t t o t h e com m en cem en t of t h e a ct ion in cou r t .

COST ABELLA CORPORATION V. COURT OF A PPEA LS, KA T IPUNA N LUMBER CO., INC., A URORA BUST OS LOPEZ, MA NUEL S. SA T ORRE, JR., JOSEFA C. REV ILLES, FELIX TIUKINHOY, JR., PERFECT A L. CHUA NGCO, a n d CESA R T . ESPINA Ja n u a r y 2 5 , 1 9 9 1 FA CTS: Petitioner owns the real estate properties situated at Sitio Buyong , Ma r iba g o, La pu La pu City, on which it had constructed a resort and hotel. The private respondents, on the other h a n d, a r e t h e ow n er s of a djoin in g pr oper t ies. Befor e the petitioner began the construction of its beach hotel, the private respondents, in going t o a nd from their respective properties and the provincial road, passed through a pa ssa g ew a y w hich traversed the petitioner's property. In 1981, the petitioner closed t h e a for em en t ion ed pa ssageway when it began the construction of its hotel, but nonetheless opened an ot h er r ou t e

a cross its property through which the private respondents, as in the past, were allowed t o pa ss. Som etime in August, 1982, when it undertook the construction of the second phase of its bea ch h ot el, the petitioner fenced its property thus closing even the a lt er n a t iv e pa ssa g ew a y a n d pr ev en t in g t h e pr iv a t e r espon den t s fr om t r a v er sin g a n y pa r t of it . A s a direct consequence of these closures, an action for injun ct ion w it h da m a g es w a s filed a gainst the petitioner by the private respondents on September 2, 1982. In their complaint, t h e pr ivate respondents assailed the petitioner's closure of the original pa ssa g ew a y w h ich t h ey (private respondents) claimed to be an "ancient road right of way" that had been existing befor e W or ld War II a nd since then had been used by them, the community, and the g en er a l pu blic, either as pedestrians or by means of vehicles, in going to and coming from Lapu-Lapu Cit y a n d ot h er parts of the country. The private respondents averred that by closing the alleged road right of w ay in question, the petitioner had deprived them access to their properties and caused them da m a g es. In t he same complainant, the private respondents likewise a lleg ed t h a t t h e pet it ion er h a d con structed a dike on the beach fronting the latter's property without t h e n ecessa r y per m it , obstructing the passage of the residents and local fishermen, and trapping debris and flotsam on t h e beach. They also claimed that the debris and flotsam that had accumulated prevented t h em fr om using their properties for the purpose for which they had acquired them. T h e com pla in t t h is prayed for the trial court to order the re-opening of the origin a l pa ssa g ew a y a cr oss t h e pet it ion er 's pr oper t y a s w ell a s t h e dest r u ct ion of t h e dike. In it s answer, the petitioner denied the existence of an ancient road through i t s pr oper t y a n d counter-averred, among others, that it and its predecessor s-in -in t er est h a d per m it t ed t h e t em porary, intermittent, and gratuitous use of, or passage through, its property by t h e pr iv a t e r espondents and others by mere t olerance and purely as an act of neighborliness. At any rate, the pet itioner alleged, the private responden t s w er e n ot en t ir ely depen den t on t h e su bject pa ssageway as they (private respondents) had another existing and adequate access to the public r oa d through other properties. With respect to the dike it allegedly constructed, th e pet it ion er st ated that what it built was a breakwater on the foreshore land fronting its property a n d n ot a dike as claimed by the private respondents. Moreover, contrary t o t h e pr iv a t e r espon den t s' a ccusation, the said construction had benefitted the community especially the fish er m en w h o u sed the same as mooring for their boats during low tide. The quantity of flot sa m a n d debr is w hich had formed on the private respondents' beach front on t h e ot h er h a n d w er e bu t t h e n atural and unavoidable accumulations on beaches by the action of the t ides and movem en t of t h e w a v es of t h e sea . A fter trial, the court a quo rendered a decision on March 15, 1 98 4 fin din g t h a t t h e pr iv a t e r espondents had acquired a vested right ov er the passageway in controversy ba sed on it s lon g ex istence and its continued use and enjoyment not only by the private respondents, but a lso by t h e community at large. The petitioner in so closing the said pa ssa g ew a y , h a d a ccor din g ly v iola t ed t h e pr iv a t e r espon den t s' v est ed r ig h t . T h e respondent Appellate Court held as without basis the trial court's finding that t h e pr iv a t e r espondents had acquired a vested rig h t ov er t h e pa ssa g ew a y in qu est ion by v ir t u e of pr escription. The appellate court pointed out that an easement of right of way is a discontinuous on e which, under Article 622 of the New Civil Code, may only be acquired by virtue of a title and n ot by pr escr ipt ion . ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the respondent appellate court is grossly erroneou s a n d n ot in accord with the provisions of Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code on easements and the pr ev a ilin g ju r ispr u den ce on t h e m a t t er HELD: T h e pet it ion is m er it or iou s. It is a lready well-established tha t a n ea sem en t of r ig h t of w a y , a s is in v olv ed h er e, is discontinuous and as such can not be acquired by prescription. In sofar therefore as the appellate court adhered to the foregoing precepts, it stood correct. Unfortunately, after making the correct

pr onouncement, the respondent Appellate Court did not order the reversal of th e t r ia l cou r t 's decision and the dismissal of the complaint after holding that no easemen t h a d been v a lidly con stituted ov er the petitioner's property. Instead, the Appellate Court w en t on t o com m it a r ev ersible error by considering the passageway in issue as a compulsory easem en t w h ich t h e pr ivate respondents, as owners of the "dom inant" estate, may demand from the pet it ion er t h e la t t er bein g t h e ow n er of t h e "ser v ien t " est a t e. Ba sed on Article 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, Ba sed on t h e for eg oin g , t h e ow n er of t h e dom inant estate may validly claim a compulsory right of way only after he has est a blish ed t h e ex istence of four requisites, to wit: (1) the (dominant) estate is surrounded by other immovables a n d is without adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) after payment of the proper indem n it y ; (3 ) the isolation was not due to the proprietor's own acts; and (4) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate. Additionally, the burden of proving the existence of t h e for eg oin g pr e-r equ isit es lies on t h e ow n er of t h e dom in a n t est a t e. Here, there is absent any showing that the private respondents had established the exist en ce of t h e four requisites mandated by law. For one, they failed to prove that there is no adequate outlet fr om their respective properties to a public highway. On the contrary, as alleged by the petitioner in its answer to the complaint, and confirmed by the appellate court, "there is another outlet for t h e plaintiffs (private respondents) t o the main road." Thus, the respondent Cou r t of A ppea ls likewise admitted that "legally the old road could be closed." Yet, it ordered the r e - open in g of t h e old passageway on the ground that "the existing outlet (the other outlet) is inconven ien t t o t h e plaintiff." On this score, it is apparent that the Court of Appeals lost sight of the fact that t h e convenience of the dom inant estate has never been the gauge for the grant of compulsory right of w ay. T o be sure, the true standard for the grant of the legal right is "a dequacy ." Hen ce, w h en t h ere is already an existing adequate outlet from the dom inant estate to a public highway, even if t h e said outlet, for one reason or another, be incon v en ien t , t h e n eed t o open u p a n ot h er servitude is entirely unjustified. For to justify the imposition of an easemen t or r ig h t of w a y , "t h er e m u st be a r ea l, n ot a fict it iou s or a r t ificia l n ecessit y for it ." Fu rther, the private respondents failed to indicate in their complaint or even to manifest durin g t h e trial of the case that they were willing t o indemnify fully the petitioner for the right of way t o be established over its property. Neither have the private respondents been able to show that the isolation of their property was not due to their personal or their predecessors-in-inter est 's ow n a cts. Finally, the private respondents failed t o allege, much more introduce any eviden ce, t h a t t h e passageway they seek to be re-opened is at a poin t lea st pr eju dicia l t o t h e pet it ion er . Con sidering that the petitioner operates a hotel and bea ch r esor t in it s pr oper t y , it m u st u ndeniably maintain a strict stan da r d of secu r it y w it h in it s pr em ises. Ot h er w ise, t h e convenience, privacy, and safety of its client s a n d pa t r on s w ou ld be com pr om ised. T h a t in dubitably will doom the petitioner's business. It is therefore of gr ea t im por t a n ce t h a t t h e claimed light of way ov er the petitioner's property be located at a point least pr eju dicia l t o it s bu sin ess. A s a lso earlier indicated, there must be a real necessity therefor, and not mere conven ien ce for t h e dominant estate. Hence, if there is an existing outlet, otherwise adequate, to the highway, the "dom inant" estate can not demand a right of way, although the same may not be convenient . Of course, the question of when a particular passage may be said to be "adequate" depen ds on t h e cir cu m st a n ces of ea ch ca se. T h e isolation of the dom inant estate is also dependent on the particular need of t h e dom in a n t ow ner, and the estate itself need not be totally landlocked. What is im por t a n t t o con sider is w hether or not a right of way is necessary t o fill a r ea son a ble n eed t h er efor by t h e ow n er Bu t while a right of way is legally demandable, the owner of the dominant estate is not at libert y t o im pose one based on arbitrary choice. Under Article 650 of the Code, it shall be est a blish ed u pon two criteria: (1) at the point least prejudicial to the serv ien t st a t e; a n d (2 ) w h er e t h e distance to a public highway may be the shortest. "The court," says Tolentino, "is n ot bou n d t o est ablish what is the shortest; a longer way may be established to avoid injury t o t h e ser v ien t t enement, such as when there are constuctions or walls which can be avoided by a rou n da bou t

w ay, or to secure the interest of the dom inant owner, such as when the sh ortest distance w ou ld pla ce t h e w a y on a da n g er ou s declin e."

T OMAS ENCARNACION V . T HE HONORA BLE COURT OF A PPEA LS a n d T HE INT ESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE EUSEBIO DE SAGUN and THE HEIRS OF T HE LA T E A NICET A MA GSINO V IUDA DE SA GUN Ma r ch 1 1 , 1 9 9 1 FA CTS: Petitioner T omas Encarnacion and private respondent Heirs of the late Aniceta Magsino V iuda de Sagun are the owners of two adjacent estates situated in Bu co, T a lisa y , Ba t a n g a s. Pet itioner owns the dominant estate. Private respondents co-own the 405-square-m eter servient est ate which is bounded on the North by the Nation a l Hig h w a y , on t h e Sou t h by T om a s En carnacion, on the East by Mamerto Magsino and on the West by Felipe de Sa g u n . In ot h er w ords, the servient estate stands bet w een t h e dom in a n t est a t e a n d t h e n a t ion a l r oa d. Pr ior to 1960, when the servient estate was not yet enclosed with a concrete fence, persons going t o t he national highway just crossed the servient estate at no particular point. However, in 1 96 0 w hen private respondents constructed a fence around the servient estate t o provide access to the h ighway. One-half meter width of the path was taken from the servient estate and the other one h a lf meter portion was taken from another lot owned by Mamerto Magsino. No com pen sa t ion w a s a sked a n d n on w a s g iv en for t h e por t ion s con st it u t in g t h e pa t h w a y . It w as also about that time that petitioner started his plant nursery business on his land where he a lso had his abode. He would use said pathway as passage to the highway for his family a n d for h is cu st om er s. Pet itioner's plant nursery business through sheer hard work flourished and with that, it becam e m ore and more difficult for petitioner to haul the plants and garden soil to and from the nursery a n d the highway with the use of pushcarts. In January, 1984, pet it ion er w a s a ble t o bu y a n ow ner-type jeep which he could use for transporting his plants. However, t h a t jeep cou ld n ot pa ss through the roadpath and so he approached the servient estate owners and requested t h a t t h ey sell to him one and one-half (1 1/2) meters of their property to be a dded t o t h e ex ist in g pa thway so as t o allow passage for his jeepney. To his utter consternation, his request was turned dow n by t h e t w o w idow s a n d fu r t h er a t t em pt s a t n eg ot ia t ion pr ov ed fu t ile. Pet itioner then instituted an action seeking the issuance of a writ of easement of a righ t of w a y ov er an additional width of at least two (2) meters over the De Saguns' 405-square-m eter parcel of la n d. Du r ing the trial, the attention of the lower court was called to the existence of another exit t o the h ighway, only eighty (80) meters away from the dominant estate. On December 2 , 1 9 8 5 , t h e low er cou r t r en der ed ju dg m en t dism issin g pet it ion er 's com pla in t . On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court on January 28, 1 987 a n d r ejected petitioner's claim for a n a ddit ion a l ea sem en t . T h e A ppella t e Cou r t t ook in t o con sideration the presence of a dried river bed only eighty (80) meters away from the dominan t est ate and conjectured that petitioner might have actually driven his jeep through the river be d in order to get to the highway, and that the only reason why he wanted a wider easement through t h e De Sagun's estate was that it was more conven ien t for h is bu sin ess a n d fa m ily n eeds ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has sufficiently establish ed h is cla im for a n a ddit ion a l ea sem en t of r ig h t of w a y

HELD: While there is a dried river bed less than 1 00 meters from the dom inant t enement, t h a t a ccess is grossly inadequate. Generally, the right of way may be d emanded: (1 ) w h en t h er e is a bsolutely no access to a public highway, and (2) when, even if t h er e is on e, it is difficu lt or da ngerous t o use or is grossly insufficient. In the present case, the river bed route is traversed by a sem i-concrete bridge and there is no ingress nor egress from the highway. For the jeep to reach t h e level of the highway, it must literally jump four (4) t o five (5) meters up. Moreover , du r in g t h e rainy season, the river bed is impassable due t o the floods. T h u s, it ca n on ly be u sed a t certain times of the year. With the inherent disadvantages of the river bed which make pa ssa g e difficu lt , if n ot im possible, it is if t h er e w er e n o ou t let a t a ll. W h ere a private property has no access to a public road, it h a s t h e r ig h t of ea sem en t ov er a dja cen t ser v ien t est a t es a s a m a t t er of la w . A rticle 651 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)he width of the easement of right of wa y sh a ll be t hat which is sufficient for the needs of the dom inant estate, and may accordingly be ch a n g ed fr om time to time." This is taken t o mean that under the law, it is the n eeds of t h e dom in a n t pr operty which ultimately determine the width of the passage. And these needs may var y fr om t im e t o t ime. When petitioner started out as a plant nursery operator, he and his fa m ily cou ld ea sily make do with a few pushcarts t o t ow the plants t o the national highway. But the bu sin ess g r ew and with it the need for the use of modern means of conveyan ce or t r a n spor t . Ma n u a l h auling of plants and garden soil and use of pushcarts have becom e extremely cumbersome a n d phy sically taxing. To force petitioner to leave his jeepney in the highway, exposed to the elements a n d to the risk of theft simply because it could not pass through the improvised pathway, is sheer pigheadedness on the part of the servient estate and can only be counter-productive for a ll t h e people concerned. Petitioner should not be denied a passageway wide enough t o accomodate his jeepney since that is a reasonable a n d n ecessa r y a spect of t h e pla n t n u r ser y bu sin ess. T h e Court is aware that an additional one and one-half (1 1/2) meters in the width of the pathway w ill reduce the servient estate . But petitioner h a s ex pr essed w illin g n ess t o ex ch a n g e a n equ ivalent portion of his land to compensate private respondents for their loss. Perhaps, it would be w ell for respondents to take the offer of petitioner seriously. But unless and until that opt ion is considered, the law decrees that petitioner must indemnify the owners of the servien t est a t e in cluding Mamerto Magsino from whose adjoining lot 1/2 meter was taken t o con st it u t e t h e or ig in a l pa t h sev er a l y ea r s a g o.

A DRIANA DIONISIO, ET A L. V . JUDGE RODOLFO ORT IZ OF T HE REGIONA L T RIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 89 A ND PABLO TAN GONZAGA, et a l . Decem ber 1 0 , 1 9 9 1 FA CTS: The petitioners are co-owners of lots contiguous to each other situa t ed in t h e Sit io of Ka n g kon g , Dist r ict of Ba lin t a w a k, Qu ezon Cit y . T h e private respondents are also co-owners of lots which are adjacent to the lots own ed by t h e pet itioners. Lot 272-B was later subdivided into two lots where Lot 272-A was assigned t o Chu a Lee and Chua Bun Tong pursuant t o a memorandum agreement executed by and between them. T h ey a r e a lso ow n er s of a n ot h er lot a t t h e u pper por t ion of Lot 2 7 2 -B . By virtue of an agreement entered intobetween the ow n er s of t h e con t ig u ou s lot s a n d t h e m embers of the Quezon City Industrial Estates Association (QCIEA), a right of way was grant ed ov er Howmart Road which is a private road traver sin g t h e con t ig u ou s lot s ow n ed by t h e pet itioners, among others, in favor of the QCIEA members. In return for it s u se, QCIEA pa id com pensation t o the petitioners for this right of way. The private r espon den t s a r e bon a fide m em ber s of t h e QCIEA .

In or der to have access t o Howmart Road, there is a gate in private respondents' 914 sq. m . lot fr onting Howmart Road and another gate in Lot 272-A. As a result of the subdivision of Lot 272, t h e private respondents opened a new gate in Lot 272-B also fronting Howmart Roa d w h ich is n ow t h e g a t e in qu est ion . On October 5, 1989, under the instructions of Maxima Dionisio, certain persons commenced the digging of holes in a parallel line and afterwards pu t u p st eel post s in fr on t of t h e n ew ly con structed gate of private respondents amidst the latter's protestations.The petition er s cla im t hat the surreptitiously constructed gate opened directly into the h ou se of Ma x im a Dion isio, ex posing them to air and noise pollution arising from the responden t s' deliv er y t r u cks a n d ser v ice v eh icles. On November 7, 1989, the private respondents instituted a civil action for damages again st t h e pet itioners. The complaint sought the immediate issuance of a writ of preliminar y in ju n ct ion or dering the petitioner t o remove the barricade erected by them in front of the ir on g a t e. T h e sa m e w a s g r a n t ed. Fift een days later, the petitioners removed the barricade in fr on t of t h e g a t e of t h e pr iv a t e r espon den t s. T h e Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the ground that the issue has a lr ea dy becom e m oot and academic since the petitioners have already complied wit h t h e Or der of t h e low er cou r t . ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondents have an easement of right of way ov er Howmart Roa d HELD: The private respondents' claim that they have every r ig h t t o u se How m a r t Roa d a s pa ssageway to EDSA by reason of the fact that public respondents are bonafide members of t h e QCIEA which has a standing oral contract of easement of right of way with the petitioner s. T h e con tract is still subsisting ev en after its alleged expiration in December, 1988 as evidenced by the t w o (2) letters signed by Maxima Dionisio and At t y . In su ch a ca se, it is a lleg ed t h a t t h e pet itioners did not have the right to put the bar r ica de in qu est ion in fr on t of t h e pr iv a t e r espondents' gate and stop them from using said g a t e a s pa ssa g ew a y t o How m a r t Roa d. T h ere is no question that a right of way was granted in favor of the priva t e r espon den t s ov er Howmart Road but the records disclose that such right of way expired in December, 198 8 . T h e con tinued use of the easement enjoyed by QCIEAincluding the private r espon den t s is by t h e m ere tolerance of the owners pending the renegotiation of the t erms and conditions of said right of w ay. This is precisely shown by the two letters to the QCIEA requestin g for a n in cr ea se in com pensation for the use of Howmart Road. Absent an a g r eem en t of t h e pa r t ies a s t o t h e con sideration, among others, no contract of easement of right of way has been validly en t er ed in to by the petitioners and QCIEA. Thus, the private respondents' claim of an easement of rig h t of w a y ov er How m a r t Roa d h a s n o leg a l or fa ct u a l ba sis. Not having any right, the private respondents are not entitled t o the injunctive relief granted by t h e low er cou r t . T h e Court has held in several cases that in order to be entitled to an injunctive w r it , on e m u st sh ow an unquestionable right ov er the prem ises a n d t h a t su ch r ig h t h a s been v iola t ed. In t he case at bar, the private respondents have not shown that there is an urgent and paramount n ecessit y for t h e issu a n ce of t h e w r it of pr elim in a r y in ju ct ion . T h e records show that there are two (2) gates through which the private respondents may pass to h ave direct access to EDSA: (1) the northern gate which opens directly t o EDSA ; a n d (2 ) t h e sou thern gate along Howmart Road. The records also disclose that the petitioners and the oth er lot owners previously prohibited and prevented members of QCIEA from opening new gates. The claim that they were forced to open a new gate by reason of the subdivision of Lot 272 w h er e a w all was constructed between these 2 lots is untenable. The private respondents can not assert a

r ight of way when by their own or voluntary act, they themselves have cau sed t h e isola t ion of t h eir pr oper t y fr om t h e a ccess r oa d. T h e fact that the barricade constructed by the petition er s w a s a lr ea dy r em ov ed u pon t h e issuance of the questioned preliminary injunction does not make the petition moot and academic a s ruled by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals has the power to recallor lift t h e w r it of pr eliminary mandatory injunction so issued if it finds that the party is n ot so en t it led. Bu t a s ea rlier found, the private respondents are not entitled to the injunctive relief consider in g t h a t t h ey h a v e n o clea r r ig h t ov er How m a r t Roa d. ROMA N CA T HOLIC v s. COURT OF A PPEA LS 1 9 8 SCRA 3 0 0 FA CTS: Private respondents as plaintiffs, filed a com plaint for nullification of deed of donat ion , r escission of contract and reconveyance of real property with da m a g es a g a in st pet it ion er s Flor encio and Soledad C. Ignao and the Roman Catholic Bishop of Im us, Cavite, t oget h er w it h t h e Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, before the Regional Trial Court. Private responden t s a lleged that on August 23, 1930, spouses Eusebio de Ca st r o a n d Ma r t in a Riet a , n ow bot h deceased, executed a deed of donation in favor of therein defendant Roman Catholic Archbishop of Ma nila covering a certain parcel of land, Lot No. 626located at Kawit, Cavite. Said lot consist s of a n area of 964 square meters. The deed of donation allegedly provides that the donee shall not dispose or sell the property within a period of one hundred years from the execution of the deed of donation, otherwise such would render ipso facto null and void the deed of donation a n d t h e pr oper t y w ou ld r ev er t ba ck t o t h e est a t e of t h e don or s. It is further alleged that on or about June 30, 1980, and while still within the prohibitive per iod t o dispose of the property, petitioner Roman Cat h olic Bish op of Im u s, ex ecu t ed a deed of a bsolute sale of the property n in favor of pet it ion er s Flor en cio a n d Soleda d C. Ig n a o for P1 1 4,000. 00. A Transfer Certificate of T itle was issued by the Register of Deeds of Ca v it e on Nov em ber 1 5 , 1 9 8 0 in t h e n a m e of sa id pet it ion er spou ses. ISSUE: W h et h er or n ot t h e ca u se of a ct ion h a d a lr ea dy pr escr ibed. HELD: No. Article 764 of the Civil Code provides that "The donation sh a ll be r ev oked a t t h e in stance of the donor, when the donee fails to comply with any of t h e con dit ion s w h ich t h e form er imposed upon the latter," and that "this action shall prescribe after four years fr om t h e n on-compliance with the condition, may be transmitted t o the heirs of the donor, a n d m a y be ex er cised a g a in st t h e don ee's h eir s. A lthough it is true that under Article 764 of the Civil Code an a ct ion for t h e r ev oca t ion of a don ation must be brought within four years from the non-compliance of the con dit ion s of t h e don ation, the same is not applicable in the case at bar. The deed of donation in v olv ed h er ein ex pressly provides for automatic reversion of the property donated in case of v iola t ion of t h e con dition therein, hen ce a ju dicia l decla r a t ion r ev okin g t h e sa m e is n ot n ecessa r y . W h en a deed of donation, as in this case, expressly provides for a u t om a t ic r ev oca t ion a n d r ev ersion of the property donated, the rules on contract and the general rules on pr escr ipt ion sh ould apply, and not Article 764 of the Civil Code. Since Article 1306 of said Code authorizes the pa rties t o a contract to establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions not contrary t o law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, we are of the opinion that, at the v er y lea st, that stipulation of the parties providing for autom atic revocation of the deed of dona t ion , w ithout prior judicial action for that purpose, is valid su bject t o t h e det er m in a t ion of t h e pr opriety of the rescission sought. Where such propriety is sustained, the decision of t h e cou r t w ill be merely declaratory of t h e r ev oca t ion , bu t it is n ot in it self t h e r ev oca t or y a ct .

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DA V ID REY GUZMA N

3 2 6 SCRA 9 0 FA CTS: David Rey Guzman, a natural-born American citizen, is the son of Simeon Gu zm a n , a n aturalized American citizen, and Helen Meyers Guzman, an American citizen. In 1968 Sim eon died. He left to his sole heirs Helen and David an estate consisting of sev er a l pa r cels of la n d loca t ed in Ba g ba g u in , St a . Ma r ia , Bu la ca n . T h ereafter, Helen and David executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Simeon Gu zman dividing and adjudicating to themselves all the property. The document of extrajudicial set tlement was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds. The the pa r cels of la n d w er e a ccordingly registered in the name of Helen Meyer s Gu zm a n a n d Da v id Rey Gu zm a n i n u ndivided equal shares. Later, Helen executed a Quitclaim Deed assigning, t r a n sfer r in g a n d conveying t o David her undivided 1 /2 interest. Since the document appeared not t o h a v e been r egistered, Helen executed another document, a Deed of Quitclaim, confirming the earlier deed of qu itclaim as well as modifying the document to encom pass a ll h er ot h er pr oper t y in t h e Ph ilippines. A signed letter was sent to the Office of t h e Solicit or Gen er a l t og et h er w it h documents showing that David's ownership of the 1 /2 of the est a t e of Sim eon Gu zm a n w a s defective. On the basis thereof, the Government filed a Petition for Escheat praying t h a t 1 /2 of Da v id's interest in the subject parcels of land be forfeited in its favor. David pr a y ed t h a t sa id pet ition be dismissed. The trial court dismissed the petit ion h oldin g t h a t t h e t w o deeds of qu itclaim executed by Helen had no legal force a n d effect a n d t h a t t h e ow n er sh ip of t h e pr operties remained with her. The Government appealed. The appella t e cou r t a ffir m ed t h e decision of t h e t r ia l cou r t . ISSUE : Whether or not David, being an American citizen could validly acquire 1/2 in t er est in ea ch of the subject parcels of land by way of the two deeds of quitclaim as t h ey a r e in r ea lit y don a t ion s in t er v iv os. RULING Yes. There are three (3) essential elements of a donat ion : (a ) t h e r edu ct ion of t h e pa trimony of the donor; (b) the increase in the patrimony of the donee; and, (c) the intent t o do a n act of liberality or animus donandi. When applied to a donation of an immovable pr oper t y , t h e law further requires that the donation be made in a public document and that ther e sh ou ld be an acceptance thereof made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document. In ca ses where the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, it is ma n da t ed t h a t t h e don or sh ould be notified thereof in an authentic form, to be noted in both inst r u m en t s. Not a ll t h e elem ents of a donation of an immovable property are present in the instant case. The transfer of t h e property by virtue of the Deed of Quitclaim executed by Helen resulted in the r edu ct ion of h er patrimony as donor and the consequent increase in t h e pa t r im on y of Da v id a s don ee. However, Helen's intention to perform an act of liberality in favor of David was not sufficien t ly est ablished. However, the inexistence of a donation does not render the repudia t ion m a de by Helen in favor of David valid. There is no valid repudiation of inheritance as Helen had alr ea dy a ccepted her share of the inheritance when she and David execu t ed a Deed of Ex t r a ju dicia l Set tlement. By virtue of such extrajudicial settlement the parcels of land were registered in their n ame in undivided equal share and for eleven (11) years they possessed the lands in the concept of ow ner. Nevertheless, the nullity of the repudiation does not ipso facto operate to conver t t h e pa rcels of land into res nullius to be escheated in favor of the Governm en t . T h e r epu dia t ion being of no effect whatsoever the parcels of land should revert to their priva t e ow n er , Helen , w ho, although being an American citizen, is qualified by h er edit a r y su ccession t o ow n t h e pr oper t y su bject of t h e lit ig a t ion .

r ev oke the donation during their lifetime, and (2) to sell, mortgage, or encumber the proper t ies don a t ed du r in g t h e don or s' lifet im e, if deem ed n ecessa r y . La t er, Diego Danlag, with the consent of his wife, execu t ed a deed of don a t ion in t er v iv os cov ering the aforementioned parcels of land plus two other parcels, again in fa v or of pr iv a t e r espondent. This deed of donation contained two conditions, first, that the Danlag spouses shall con tinue t o enjoy the fruits of the land during their lifetime, and second, that the donee can n ot sell or dispose of the land during the lifetime of the spouses, without their pr ior con sen t a n d a pproval. Mercedes caused the transfer of the parcels' tax d eclaration to her name and pa id t h e t a x es t h er eon . However, spouses Danlag later sold parcels 3 and 4 to herein petitioners, spouses Gestopa. They a lso executed a deed of revocation recovering t h e 6 pa r cels of la n d su bject of t h e deed of don ation inter vivos. Consequently, private respondent filed with the RTC a petition for quieting of t itle over the above parcels of land against the Gestopas and the Danlags. She alleged that she w as an illegitimate daughter of Diego Danlag; that she lived and rendered incalculable beneficial services to Diego and his mother, Maura Danlag, when the latter was still alive. In recognition of t h e services she rendered, Diego executed a Deed of Donation conveying to her the six parcels of la nd. She accepted the donation in the same instrument, openly and publicly exercised righ t s of ow nership over the donated properties, and caused the transfer of the tax decla r a t ion s t o h er n ame. However, through machination, intimidation and undue influence, Diego persuaded t h e h usband of Mercedes, Eulalio Pilapil, to buy two of t h e six pa r cels cov er ed by t h e deed of don ation. Said donation inter vivos was coupled with conditions and, accor din g t o Mer cedes, sin ce its perfection, she had complied with all of them; that she had not been guilty of any act of in gratitude; and that respondent Diego had no legal basis in revoking the subject donat ion a n d t h en in selling the two parcels of land to the Gestopas. However, petitioners a v er r ed t h a t t h e deed of donation dated January 1 6, 1 973 was null and void because it was obtained by the private r espondent through machination and undue influence. RTC ruled that the both t h e don a t ion s m ortis causa and inter vivos as revoked, and therefore have no legal effect. The tria l cou r t a lso declared the spouses Danlag as the absolute owners of the disputed lands. However, CA reversed t h e decision of t h e RT C u pon a ppea l. ISSUES: Whether or not the donation in this case is inter vivos or mortis ca u sa t o det er m in e w hether the donor intended to transfer the ownership ov er the properties upon the execution of t h e deed. W h et h er or n ot t h e r ev oca t ion is v a lid HELD: On the first issue, the court held that the donation was inter vivos a n d t h a t t h e don or in tended to transfer the ownership of the properties. First, Diego Danlag donated the properties in consideration of love and affection for the donee.. Second, the reservation of lifetime usufruct in dicates that the donor intended to transfer the naked ow n er sh ip ov er t h e pr oper t ies. A s correctly posed by the Court of Appeals, what was the need for such reservation if the donor an d h is spouse remained the owners of the proper t ies? T h ir d, t h e don or r eser v ed su fficien t pr operties for his maintenance in accordance with his standing in society, indica t in g t h a t t h e don or intended to part with the six parcels of land. Lastly, the donee accepted the don a t ion . A lim itation on the right t o sell during the donor‘s life implied that ownership ha d pa ssed t o t h e don ees a n d don a t ion w a s a lr ea dy effect iv e du r in g t h e don or ‘s lifet im e. No. A valid donation, once accepted, becomes irrevocable, except on account of officiou sn ess, fa ilure by the donee to comply with the charges imposed in the donation, or in g r a t it u de. T h e don or -spou ses did n ot in v oke a n y of t h ese r ea son s in t h e deed of r ev oca t ion .

GEST OPA V S. COURT OF A PPEA LS Fa cts: Spouses Diego and Catalina Danlag were the owners of six parcels of unregist er ed la n d. T h ey executed three deeds of donation mortis ca u sa , in fa v or of t h e Pr iv a t e Respon den t Mer cedes. All deeds contained the reservation of the rights of the donors (1) to amend, cancel or

NOCEDA v s. COURT OF A PPEA LS 3 1 3 SCRA 5 0 4

FA CTS: On June 1, 1981, plaintiff Aurora Directo, defendant Rodolfo Noceda, and Maria Arbizo, t h e daughter, grandson, and widow, respectively, of the late Celestino Arbizo, ex t r a ju dicia lly set tled a parcel of land, Lot 1121, located at Bitaog, San Isidro, Cabangan, Zambales, which w a s sa id t o have an area of 66,530 square meters. Directo‘s share was 11,426 square meters, Noceda g ot 13,294 square meters, and the remaining 41,810 square meters went t o Maria Arbizo. On the sam e date, Directo donated 625 squ a r e m et e r s of h er sh a r e t o Noceda , w h o is a lso h er n ephew. However, on August 17, 1981, another extrajudicial settlement-partition of Lot 1121 was ex ecuted by plaintiff Directo, Noceda, and Maria Arbizo. Three fifths of the said la n d w en t t o Ma r ia Arbizo while Directo and Noceda got only one-fifth each. In said extrajudicial settlementpa rtition as well as in the Tax Declaration 16-0032 over Lot 1121 in the name of the late Celestino A r bizo, the said parcel of land was said t o h a v e a n a r ea of on ly 2 9 ,8 4 5 squ a r e m et er s. Noceda later constructed his house on the land donated to him by Directo. Directo, on the other h and, fenced the portion allotted t o her in the extrajudicial settlement, excludin g t h e don a t ed por tion, and constructed thereon three huts. However said fence was later removed by Noceda , occupied the three huts and fenced the entire land of Directo wit h ou t h er con sen t . Dir ect o dem anded that Noceda vacate her land, but t h e la t t er r efu sed. T h u s, Dir ect o filed t h e a com plaint for the recovery of possession and ownership and rescission/annulment of donat ion . Du r ing the trial, the lower court ordered that a relocation survey of Lot 1121 be conduct ed. T h e en gineer found that the area of Lot 1121 stated in the extrajudicial set t lem en t -pa r t it ion w a s sm aller than the actual area of said lot which is 127,298 square meters. He further su bdiv ided Lot 1 121, excluding the portions occupied by third persons, known as Lot 8, the salvage zone and t h e road lot, on the basis of the actual occupancy of Lot 1121 by the heirs of t h e la t e Celest in o A r bizo and the extrajudicial settlement-partition. The portion denom inated as Lot A , w it h a n a r ea of 12,957 square meters was the share of defendant Noceda; Lot C, with the sa m e a r ea a s t hat of Lot A, was the share of plaintiff Directo, a portion of which was don a t ed t o defen da n t Noceda ; a n d Lot B, w it h a n a r ea of 3 8 ,8 7 2 squ a r e m et er s, w en t t o Ma r ia A r bizo.

A s t o the second issue, the court holds proper the judgment of respondent CA. ―Article 769 of the New Civil Code states that: ―The action granted to the donor by reason of ingratitude can n ot be r enounced in advance. This action prescribes within one year to be counted from the t im e t h e don or had knowledge of the fact and it was possible for him to bring the action.‖ A s ex pr essly st ated, the donor must file the action to revoke his donation within one year from t h e t i m e h e h a d knowledge of the ingratitude of the donee. Also, it must be shown that it w a s possible for t h e donor to institute the said action within the same period. The con cu r r en ce of t h ese t w o r equisites must be shown by defendant Noceda in order to bar the present act ion . Defen da n t Noceda failed t o do so. He reckoned the one year prescriptive period from the occurrence of th e u surpation of the property of plaintiff Directo in the first week of September, 1985, and not from t h e time the latter had the knowledge of the usurpation. Moreover, defendant Noceda fa iled t o pr ov e that at the t ime plaintiff Directo acquired knowledge of his usurpation, it was possible for pla intiff Directo to institute an action for revocation of her donation.‖The action t o r ev oke by r eason of ingratitude prescribes within one (1) year to be counted from the t ime (a ) t h e don or h a d knowledge of the fact; (b) provided that it was possible for him to br in g t h e a ct ion . It is in cumbent upon petitioner to show proof of the concurrence of these two con dit ion s in or der t hat the one (1 ) year period for bringing the action be considered t o have already prescribed. No com petent proof was adduced by petitioner to prove his allegation. In Civil Ca ses, t h e pa r t y h aving the burden of proof must establish his case by preponderance of evidence. He who alleges a fa ct has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence.Factual findin g s of t h e Court of Appeals, supported by substantial evidence on record are final and conclu siv e on t h e pa rties and carry even more weight when the Court of Appeals affirms the factual findings of the t r ial court; for it is not the function of this Court to re-examin e a ll ov er a g a in t h e or a l a n d documentary evidence submitted by the parties unless t h e fin din g s of fa ct of t h e Cou r t of A ppeals are not supported by t h e ev iden ce on r ecor d or t h e ju dg m en t is ba sed on t h e m isapprehension of facts. The jurisdiction of this court is thus limited to reviewing errors of law u nless there is a showing that the findings complained of are totally dev oid of su ppor t in t h e r ecord or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discr et ion . W e fin d n o su ch sh ow in g in t h is ca se.

T h e trial court declared valid the extra-judicial partition a n d fu r t h er h eld t h a t t h e deed of don ation revoked. It further ordered the defendant to vacate and reconvey that donated portion t o t he plaintiff, and to remove the house built inside the donated portion at the h is ex pen se or pay a monthly rental of P300.00. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the tria l cou r t . ISSUES: Whether or not said lot should be partitioned in accordance with t h e ex t r a -ju dicia l set t lem en t W h et h er or n ot t h e Cou r t of A ppea ls er r ed in r ev okin g t h e deed of don a t ion HELD: The Supreme Court sees no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the respondent Court a s follows: The discrepancies between the extrajudicial settlements executed by plaintiff Directo, defendant Noceda and Maria Arbizo on June 1, 1981 and August 17, 1981 only mea n t t h a t t h e la tter was intended t o supersede the former . T h e sig n a t u r e of defen da n t Noceda in t h e ex trajudicial settlement of August 17, 1981 would show his conformity to the new apportionment of Lot 1121 among the heirs of the late Celestino A r bizo. T h e fa ct t h a t defen da n t Noceda occupied the portion allotted to him in the extrajudicial settlem en t , a s w ell a s t h e don a t ed por tion of the share of plaintiff Directo, presupposes his knowledge of the extent of boun da r ie s of t h e portion of Lot 1121 allotted to him. Mor eov er , t h e st a t em en t in t h e ex t r a ju dicia l set tlement of August 17, 1981 with respect to the area of Lot 1121, which w a s 2 9 ,8 4 5 squ a r e m eters, is not conclusive because it was found out, after the relocation survey was conducted on Lot 1 121, that the parties therein occupied an area larger tha n w h a t t h ey w er e su pposed t o possess per the extrajudicial settlement- par t it ion of A u g u st 1 7 , 1 9 8 1 . A lt h ou g h in t h e ex trajudicial settlement dated August 17, 1981 the heirs of Celestino Arbizo partit ion ed on ly a 2 9,845 square meter lot to conform with the area declared under tax declaration 16-0032 yet the h eirs were each actually occupying a bigger portion the total area of which ex ceeded 2 9 ,8 4 5 squ are meters. This was confirmed by Geodetic Engineer Quejada in his r epor t . T h e su r v ey con ducted on Lot 1121 was only a confirmation of the actual areas being occupied by t h e h eir s t a king into account the percentage proportion adjudicated to each h eir on t h e ba sis of t h eir A u g u st 1 7 , 1 9 8 1 ex t r a ju dicia l set t lem en t .

ELOY IMPERIA L v s. COURT OF A PPEA LS 3 1 6 SCRA 3 9 3 FA CTS: Leoncio Im perial was the registered owner of a parcel of land also known a s Lot 4 5 of t h e Cadastral Survey of Albay, which he later sold for P1.00 t o his acknowledged n a t u r a l son , pet itioner herein, who then acquired t itle over the land a n d pr oceeded t o su bdiv ide it in t o sev eral lots. Petitioner and private respondents admit that despite the contract‘s designation a s on e of ―Absolute Sale‖, it was in fact a donation. Two years after the donation , Leon cio filed a com plaint for annulment of the said deed, on the ground that he was deceived by petitioner in t o signing the said document. The dispute, howev er , w a s r esolv ed t h r ou g h a com pr om ise a greement, which provides that: (1) Leoncio recognized the legality and validity of the r ig h t s of pet itioner t o the land donated; and (2) petitioner agreed to sell a designated 1,000-square meter por tion of the donated land, and t o deposit the proceeds thereof in a bank, for th e con v en ien t disposal of Leoncio. In case of Leoncio‘s death, it was also agreed that the balance of the deposit w ill be w it h dr a w n b y pet it ion er t o defr a y bu r ia l cost s. In t he meantime, Leoncio died, leaving only two heirs, herein petitioner, and a n a dopt ed son , V ictor Im perial. Victor substituted for Leoncio in the case, and moved for execution of judgment, w hich was granted by the court. Fifteen years thereafter, Victor died single and w it h ou t issu e, su rvived only by his natural father, Ricardo Villa lon , w h o w a s a lessee of a por t ion of t h e disputed land. Four years hence, Ricardo died, leaving as his only heirs his two children, C esa r a n d T er esa V illa lon .

Fiv e years thereafter, Cesar and Teresa filed a com pla in t for a n n u lm en t of t h e don a t ion . Pet itioner moved to dismiss on the ground of r es ju dica t a , by v ir t u e of t h e com pr om ise ju dgment, which was granted by the trial court. The Court of Appeals however, reversed the trial court‘s order and remanded the case for further proceedings. Consequently, Cesar a n d T er esa filed an amended complaint in the same case, for ―Annulment of Documents, Reconveyance and Recov ery of Possession,‖ seeking the nullification of the Deed of Absolu t e Sa le a ffect in g t h e a bove property, on grounds of fraud, deceit and inofficiousness. In the amended compla in t , it w as alleged that petitioner caused Leoncio to execute the donation by taking undue advantage of t h e latter‘s physical weakness and mental unfitness, and that the conveyance of said property in fav or of petitioner impaired the legitim e of V ict or Im per ia l, t h eir n a t u r a l br ot h er a n d pr edecessor -in -in t er est . RT C held that it is a donation, and is hereby reduced proportionately insofar as it a ffect ed t h e leg itime of the late Victor Im perial, which share is inherited by the plaintiffs herein, to the extent t hat plaintiffs are ordered to be given by defendant a portion of 10,940 square met er s t h er eof. Cou r t of A ppea ls a ffir m ed t h e decision of t h e RT C. ISSUES: W h ether or n ot t h e pr iv a t e r espon den t s h a d a r ig h t t o qu est ion t h e don a t ion a n d; W h et h er or n ot t h e don a t ion w a s in officiou s a n d sh ou ld be r edu ced. HELD: The court held yes. Article 772 of the Civi l Code provides that: Only those who at the time of t h e donor‘s death have a right to the legitime and their heirs and successors in int er est m a y a sk for the reduction of inofficious donations. As argued by petitioner, when Leoncio died, it was on ly Victor who was entitled to question the donation. However, instead of filing a n a ct ion t o con test the donation, Victor asked to be substituted as plaintiff and even moved for execution of t h e com promise judgment therein. No renunciation of legitime ma y be pr esu m ed fr om t h e for egoing acts. It must be remembered that at the time of t h e su bst it u t ion , t h e ju dg m en t a pproving the compromise agreement has already been rendered. Victor merely participated in t h e execution of the compromise judgment. He was not a party to the compromise agreem en t . Mor e importantly, our law on succession does not countenance tacit repudiation of inheritance. Ra ther, it requires an express act on the part of the heir. Thus, under Article 1051 of Civil Code: T h e repudiation of an inheritance shall be made in a public or aut h en t ic in st r u m en t , or by pet ition presented to the court having ju r isdict ion ov er t h e t est a m en t a r y or in t est a t e pr oceedings. Thus, when Victor substituted Leoncio upon the latter‘s death, his act of moving for ex ecution of the com promise judgment cannot be considered a n a ct of r en u n cia t ion of h is leg itime. He was, therefore, not precluded or estopped from subsequently seeking the reduction of t h e donation, under Article 772. Nor are Victor‘s heirs, upon his death, precluded from doin g so, a s their right t o do so is expressly recognized under Article 772, and also in Article 1 0 5 3 : If t h e heir should die without having accepted or repudiated the inheritan ce, h is r ig h t sh a ll be t r a n sm it t ed t o h is h eir s. A s t o the second issue, the court also rules in the affirmative. The donation is inofficious because Leon cio had no other property at the time of his death, the RTC computed the legitime of Vict or ba sed on the area of the donated property. Hence, in its dispositive portion, it awarded a portion of t h e property to private respondents as Victor‘s legitime. This wa s u ph eld by t h e Cou r t of A ppeals. Our rules of succession require that before any conclusion as to the legal share due to a com pulsory heir may be reached, the following steps must be taken: (1 ) t h e n et est a t e of t h e decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all the payable obligations and ch a r g es fr om t h e v alue of the property owned by the deceased at th e t im e of h is dea t h ; (2 ) t h e v a lu e of a ll don ations subject to collation would be added t o it. Having ascertained t h is a ct ion a s on e for r eduction of an inofficious donation, we cannot sustain the holding of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the applicable prescriptive period is thirty years, under Article 1141 of t h e Civ il Code. The sense of both courts that this case is a ―real action ov er an imm ov a ble‖ a llot s u ndue credence t o private respondents‘ description of their com plaint, as one for ―Annulment of Documents, Reconveyance and Recovery of Possession of Property‖, which suggests the action to be, in part, a real action enfor ced by t h ose w it h cla im of t it le ov er t h e dispu t ed la n d. Un fortunately for private respondents, a claim for legitime does not amount to a claim of t it le. T h e rationale for this is that the donation is a real alienation which conveys ownership u pon it s

a cceptance, hence, any increase in value or any deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of t h e h eir or don ee. W hat, then, is the prescriptive period for an action for reduction of an inofficious donation? The Civ il Code specifies the following instances of reduction or revocat ion of don a t ion s: (1 ) fou r y ears, in cases of subsequent birth, appearance, recognition or adoption of a child; (2) four years, for non-com pliance with conditions of the donation; and (3) at any time during th e lifet im e of t h e donor and his relatives entitled to support, for failure of the donor to reserve property for his or t heir support. Interestingly, donations as in the instant case, the reduction of w h ich h in g es u pon the allegation of impairment of legitime, are not controlled by a particu la r pr escr ipt iv e per iod, for which reason we must resort to the ordinary rules of prescription. Under Article 1144 of t h e Civil Code, actions upon an obligation created by law must be brought with in t en y ea r s fr om the time the right of action accrues. Thus, the ten-year prescriptive period a pplies t o t h e obligation to reduce inofficious donations, required under Article 771 of the Civ il Code, t o t h e ex tent that they impair the legitime of com pulsory heirs. From when shall the ten-year period be r eckoned? The case of Mateo vs. Lagua, 29 SCRA 864, which inv olv ed t h e r edu ct ion for in officiousness of a donation propter nuptias, recognized that the cause of act ion t o en for ce a leg itime accrues upon the death of the donor-decedent. Clearly so, since it is only then tha t t h e n et estate may be ascertained and on which basis, the legitimes ma y be det er m in ed. It t ook pr ivate respondents 24 years since the death of Leon cio t o in it ia t e t h is ca se. T h e a ct ion , t h er efor e, h a s lon g pr escr ibed.

EDUA RT E v s. COURT OF A PPEA LS 2 5 3 SCRA 3 9 1 FA CTS: Pedro Calapine was the registered owner of a parcel of land located in San Cristobal, San Pa blo City, with an area of 1 2,199 square meters. He later executed a deed of don a t ion in t er v ivos, ceding one-half portion thereof t o his niece Helen S. Doria. Later, another deed identically en titled was purportedly executed by Calapine ceding unto Helen S. Doria the whole of the parcel of la nd. Doria then donated a portion of the parcel of land to the Calauan Christ ia n Refor m ed Church, Inc., on the basis of which said transfer certificate of t itle was cancelled and TCT No. T 2 4444 was issued in its name covering 157 square meters and TCT No. T-24445, in the na m e of Helen S. Dor ia cov er in g t h e r em a in in g por t ion of 1 2 ,0 4 2 squ a r e m et er s. Dor ia then sold, transferred and conveyed unto the spouses Romulo and Sally Eduarte the parcel of la nd covered by TCT No. T-24445, save the portion of 700 square meters on which her h ou se w a s er ect ed. Claiming that his signature to the deed of donation was a forgery and that, she w as unworth y of h is liberality, Calapine brought suit against Doria, the Calauan Christian Reformed Church, In c. a n d the spouses Eduarte and asked t o revoke the donation made in favor of Doria to declare null a n d to void the deeds of donation and sale that she h a d ex ecu t ed in fa v or of t h e Ca la u a n Christian Reformed Church, Inc. and the spouses. The tria l cou r t g r a n t ed h eld in fa v or of Ca la pin e. Spou ses Edu a r t e a ppea led, w h ich a s dism issed. ISSUE: W h et h er or n ot t h e deeds of don a t ion sh ou ld be r ev oked. HELD: Anent the revocation of the first deed of donation, petitioners submit that paragraph (1 ) of A rticle 765 of the Civil Code does not apply in this case because the acts of ingratitude referred t o t herein pertain to offenses committed by the donee against the per son or pr oper t y of t h e don or. Petitioners argue that as the offense imputed to herein donee Helen Doria - falsifica t ion of a public document - is neither a crime against the person nor property of the don or bu t is a cr ime against public interest under the Revised Pen a l Code, t h e sa m e is n ot a g r ou n d for r ev oca t ion .

In su pport of this contention, petitioners cite the follow in g por t ion s fou n d in T olen t in o‘s Com m en t a r ies a n d Ju r ispr u den ce on t h e Civ il Code: ― Offense against Donor - x x x. The crimes against the person of the donor w ou ld in clu de n ot on ly homicide and physical injuries, but also illegal detention, threats and coercion ; a n d t h ose a gainst honor include offenses against chastity and those against the property, include robber y , t h eft , u su r pa t ion , sw in dlin g , a r son , da m a g es, et c. (5 Ma n r esa 175-176).” T h is assertion, however, deserves scant consideration. The full text of the very same commentary cit ed by petitioners belies their claim that falsification of the deed of donation is n ot a n a ct of in g r a t it u de, t o w it : ― Offense Against Donor. All crimes which offend the donor show ingratitude and are causes for revocation. There is no doubt, therefore, that the donee who commits adultery with t h e w ife of t h e donor, gives cause for revocation by reason of ingratitude. The crimes against the per son of t h e donor would include not only homicide and physical injuries, b u t a lso illeg a l det en t ion , t hreats, and coercion; those against honor include offenses against chastity; and th ose a g a in st t h e property, include robbery, theft, usurpation, swindling, arson, damages, etc. [Man r esa 175176].” (It a lics su pplied). Obv iously, the first sentence was deleted by petitioners because it t ot a lly con t r ov er t s t h eir con tention. As noted in the aforecited opinion ― a ll cr im es w h ich offen d t h e don or sh ow in gratitude and are causes for revocation.‖ Petitioner s‘ a t t em pt t o ca t eg or ize t h e offen ses a ccording to their classification under the Revised Pen a l Code is t h er efor e u n w a r r a n t ed con sidering that illegal detention, threats and coercion are considered a s cr im es a g a in st t h e per son of the donor despite the fact that they are classified as crimes against personal liberty and secu r it y u n der t h e Rev ised Pen a l Code. Pet itioners also impute grave error to respondent Court of Appeals in finding t h a t t h e secon d deed of donation dated July 26, 1 984 was falsified. Petit ion er s deplor e t h e fa ct t h a t m or e cr edence was given t o the testimony of the NBI handwriting exp ert who found Pedro Calapin e‘s signature in the second deed of donation to be a forgery despite the existence of contr ov er t in g t estimony by PC-INP Crime Laboratory (PCCL) Chief Document Examiner wh ich pet it ion er s a ddu ced a s ev iden ce on t h eir pa r t . W e are not persuaded. Respondent Court of Appeals and the trial court can n ot be fa u lt ed for g iv ing more weight and credence to the testimony of the NBI handwriting exper t con sider in g t hat the examination of the said witness proved t o be com plet e, t h or ou g h a n d sc ien t ific.

T HE CIT Y OF A NGELES v s. COURT OF A PPEA LS G.R. No. 9 7 8 8 2 . A u g u st 2 8 , 1 9 9 6 FA CTS: In an Amended Deed of Donation, private respondent donated to the City of Angeles 5 1 pa rcels of land. Said deed provides that the properties donated shall be dev ot ed a n d u t ilized solely for the site of the Angeles City Sports Center. Petitioners then started the construction of a dr ug rehabilitation center on a portion of the donated land. Upon lea r n in g t h er eof, pr iv a t e r espondent protested such action for being violative of the t erms and conditions of the amended deed and prejudicial to its interest and to those of its clients and residents. Private r espon den t a lso offered another site for the rehabilitation center. However, petitioners ignored the pr ot est , m aintaining that the construction was not violative of the t erms of the donation. The alternativ e sit e was rejected because, according to petitioners, the site was t oo isolated and had no elect r ic a n d w a t er fa cilit ies. Con sequently, private respondent filed a complaint, alleging breach of the conditions imposed in t h e amended deed of donation and seeking the revocation of the same. The trial cour t issu ed a t em porary restraining order t o enjoin the pet it ion er s fr om fu r t h er pr oceedin g w it h t h e

con struction of the center. The RTC further ordered that the defendants perpetually cea se a n d desist from constructing a Drug Rehabilitation Center or any other building or improvement on t h e Donated Land. It also declared the amended Deed of Donation revoked and rescin ded a n d or dered defendan t s t o pea cefu lly v a ca t e a n d r et u r n t h e Don a t ed La n d t o pla in t iff. Pet itioners filed their Notice of Appeal. However, while the appeal wa s pen din g , pet it ion er s in augurated the Drug Rehabilitation Center. The respon den t Cou r t r en der ed t h e a ssa iled Decision affirming the ruling of the trial court. Subsequ en t ly , t h e pet it ion er s‘ m ot ion for r econ sider a t ion w a s a lso den ied for la ck of m er it . ISSUE: Whether a donor of open spaces in a r esiden t ia l su bdiv ision ca n v a lidly im pose con ditions on the said donation; whether the city government as donee can build and opera t e a dr ug rehabilitation center on the donated land intended for open space; and whet h er t h e sa id don a t ion m a y be v a lidly r escin ded by t h e don or . HELD: The general law on donations does not proh ibit t h e im posit ion of con dit ion s on a don ation so long as the conditions are not illegal or impossible. In regard to donat ion s of open spa ces, P.D. 1 216 itself requires among other things that the recreational areas to be donated be ba sed, as aforementioned, on a percentage (3.5%, 7%, or 9%) of the total area of the subdivision depending on whether the subdivision is low -, medium-, or high-density. It further declares that su ch open space devoted t o parks, playgrounds and recreational areas are non-alienable pu blic la nd and non-buildable. However, there is no prohibition in either P.D. 957 or P.D. 1216 again st im posing conditions on such donation. We hold that any condit ion m a y be im posed in t h e don ation, so long as the same is not contrary to law, morals, g ood cu st om s, pu blic or der or pu blic policy. The contention of petitioners that the donation should be unconditional because it is m andatory has no basis in law. P.D. 1216 does not provide that the donation of the open space for parks and playgrounds should be unconditional. T o rule that it should be so is tantamount t o u nlawfully expanding the provisions of the decree. Private respondent ‘s con t en t ion t h a t t h e con struction of said drug rehabilitation center is violative of the Amen ded Deed of Don a t ion . T h erefore, under Article 764 of the New Civil Code and stipulation no. 8 of the amen ded deed, pr ivate respondent is empowered t o revoke the donation when the donee has failed t o com ply w ith any of the conditions imposed in the deed. We disagree. Article 1 412 of the Civil Code which pr ov ides that: ―If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not constitut e a cr iminal offense, the following rules shall be observed: ―(1) When the fault is on the part of bot h con tracting parties, neither may recover what he has given by virtue of the contract, or dem a n d t h e performance of the other‘s undertaking;‖ comes into play here. Both petitioners and priva t e r espondents are in violation of P.D. 957 as amended, for donating and accepting a don a t ion of open space less than that required by law, and for agreeing to build and operate a sports com plex on t he non-buildable open space so don a t ed; a n d pet it ion er s, for con st r u ct in g a dr u g r ehabilitation center on the same non-buildable area . In a sm u ch a s t h e con st r u ct ion a n d operation of the drug rehabilitation center has been established t o be contrary to la w , t h e sa id center should be removed or demolished. After due consideration of t h e cir cu m st a n ces, w e believe that the fairest and most equitable solution is t o have the City of Angeles, don ee of t h e su bject open space and, ostensibly, the main beneficiary of the construction and operation of the pr oposed drug rehabilitation center, undertake the demolition and removal of said center, and if fea sible, r ecov er t h e cost t h er eof fr om t h e cit y officia ls con cer n ed.

Pr oper t y :A ct i on for Ca n cel l a t i on of T i t l e

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, r epr esen t ed by t h e DIRECT OR OF LA ND, petitioner, vs . T HE COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF IRENE BULLUNGAN, r epresented by her

h u sba n d DOMINGO PA GGA O a n d T HE REGIST ER OF DEEDS OF ISA BELA , res pondents . G.R. No. 1 0 4 2 9 6 , Ma r ch 2 9 , 1 9 9 6

THE PETITIONER: In view of the investigation, the Republic, as represented by t h e Solicit or General, filed a COMPLAINT FOR THE CANCELLATION OF FREE PATENT issued in fav or of Ir en e Bu llu n g a n on t h e g r ou n d of fr a u d a n d m isr epr esen t a t ion .

MENDOZA , J.:

RTC: Com plaint for Cancellation of Free Patent was GRANTED, thus the court ruled in favor of pet itioner, Republic and justified the reversion of the land in qu est ion a s a n a sser t ion of ― a g ov ernmental right.‖ It declared that the Free Patent was null and void insofar as the port ion of Lot su bject t o dispu t e. BASIS: T h e low er cou r t fou n d t h a t Ir en e Bu llu n g a n m a de m isrepresentations by claiming in her application for a free patent that she was in possession of t h e disputed portion of Lot No. 1, Psu-150801, when in fact Vicente Carabbacan was occupy in g a n d cu lt iv a t in g t h e la n d.

Not e: This is a petition for review of the decision of the CA reversing the decision of t h e RT C of Cauayan, Isabela declaring Free Patent No. V-7 9740 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-8817 in the name of Irene Bullungan null and void so far as the portion of Lot No. 1 , Psu -1 5 0 8 0 1 in v olv ed in t h is ca se is con cer n ed. FA CTS: Irene Bullungan (now deceased) applied for a FREE PATENT covering lots situ a t ed in A ngadanan, Isabela. The lots included a portion of lot (Lot No. 1, Psu-150801 between Lot No. 763 and Lot No. 764) which Vicente Carabbacan claimed. (Vicente Carabbacan in this cas e is the pres ent pos s es s or and cultivator of the land in dis pute). BASIS FOR HER APPLICATION OF FEE PATENT (w/c is false): In her application h ow ev er , Ir ene Bullungan stated that the land applied for by her was not claimed or occupied by any other per son and that it was public land which had been continuously occupied and cultivated by h er sin ce 1 9 2 5 . THE DIRECTOR OF LAND’S DECISION: Upon certification of Assistant Public Land that Iren e Bu llungan had been in actual, continuous open, notorious, exclusive and adverse possession of t h e land since 1925, the Director of Lands approved Bullungan's application for free patent a n d a n OCT w a s issu ed in h er n a m e. ST EPS T A KEN BY T HE OPPOSIT OR THE PROTEST: Alleging that a portion of Lot No. 1, Psu-150801 (lot in dispute) covered by t h e fr ee patent issued t o Ir ene Bullungan ov erlapped the lot between Lot No. 763 and Lot No. 7 6 4 , w hich he was occupying, Vicente Carrabacan, (the actual possessor of the land) filed a protest to t h e Director of La n ds on 1 9 6 1 . T h e la t t er on ly or der ed a n in v est ig a t ion on 1 9 8 2 . ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE (1 st) & CANCELLATION OF FEE PATENT: Vicente Carabbacan a lso brought an action for the reconvey a n ce of t h e por t ion of t h e lot in dispu t e a n d t h e ca n cella t ion of fr ee pa t en t a g a in st Ir en e Bu llu n g a n befor e t h e CFI on 1 9 6 1 . DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION BY THE COURT: but this was dismissed by the cou r t w it h ou t pr eju dice. T h e heirs of Irene Bullungan in turn sought t o RECOVER POSSESSION OF T HE LA ND in a n a ct ion filed in CFI on 1 9 7 2 . 2nd ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE: On the other hand, refusing to give up his claim, V icen t e Ca rabbacan filed again a case for reconveyance on 1972. The cases were thereafter tried join t ly . CFI’s DECISION: The court rendered a decision , DISMISSING t h e com pla in t of V icen t e Ca rabbacan and ordering h im t o v a ca t e t h e la n d a n d u ph eld t h e ow n er sh ip of Ir en e Bu llungan. Carabbacan, who had been in possession of the land in question, was finally ou st ed on Decem ber 1 0 , 1 9 8 1 . RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION: Meanwhile, in t h e in v est ig a t ion con du ct ed by t h e Dir ector of lands, it was found out that Vicente Carabbacan had been in actual cultivation of t h e la nd since 1 947, having acquired the same from Tom as Tarayao. The land invest ig a t or st a t e d t hat due to a big flood which occurred in December 1 947, the Cagayan River changed its course by m oving north-east, resulting in the emergence of a piece of land, which is the subject of this dis pute. Carrabacan took possession of the land and cultivated it. He was in t h e con t in u ou s, peaceful, open and adverse occupation and cultivation of the land from December 1 9 4 7 u n t il 1 9 8 1 w h en h e w a s eject ed by v ir t u e of t h e decision in Civ il Ca se.

CA: GRANTED the appeal of private respondent, thus REVERSING the lower court‘s decision . BASIS: on the ground that, after the lapse of one year from the date of issuance of the patent, the St ate could no longer bring an action for reversion. The appellate court held that the certificate of t itle issued in the name of Irene Bullungan became incontrovertible and indefeasible u pon t h e la pse of on e y ea r fr om t h e issu a n ce of t h e fr ee pa t en t . PETITIONER-REPUBLIC ARGUMENT: The Republic controverts the ru lin g of t h e Cou r t of A ppeals. It contends that the doctrine of indefeasibility of Torrens Titles does not bar the filing of a n action for cancellation of title and reversion of land even if more than one yea r h a s ela psed fr om t h e issu a n ce of t h e fr ee pa t en t in ca se of fr a u d in obt a in in g pa t en t s. ISSUE: Whether or not doctrine of indefeasibility of Torrens Title bars the filing of an action for ca ncellation of title, on the ground of fraud, if more than one year has elapsed from the issuance of t h e fr ee pa t en t . HELD:NO. T h e SC a g r eed a s t o t h e a r g u m en t of pet it ion er -Repu blic. T o begin with, there is no question that Free Patent No. 79740 and Original Certificat e of T it le P-8 817 were obtained through fraud. The trial court found that Irene Bullungan falsely stated in h er application for a free patent that Lot No. 1, Psu-150801 was not claimed or occupied by a n y ot h er person. The trial court found that a por t ion of t h e lot in qu est ion h a d been in t h e possession and cultivation of Vicente Carabbacan sin ce Decem ber 1 9 4 7 . In deed pr iv a t e r espondents admit that before Ir ene Bullungan filed her application for a free pat en t , sh e h a d filed a complaint for forcible entry against Vicente Carrabacan. The complaint, which was filed in t h e Justice of the Peace Court of Angadanan, Isabela, was dismissed precisely because the cou r t fou nd that Carabbacan had been in possession of the la n d lon g befor e it w a s sold t o Ir en e Bu llu n g a n by Leon ida T a r a y a o. T h e Court of Appeals did not disturb the trial court's finding in this case that Iren e Bu llu n g a n committed fraud and misrepresentation. It s decision rests solely on the ground t h a t a ft er t h e la pse of one year from the date of issuance of a free patent an a ct ion for t h e ca n cella t ion of pa tent and title on ground of fraud and misrepresen t a t ion ca n n o lon g er be m a in t a in ed. GENERAL RULE: It is settled that once a patent is registered under Act No. 496 (now P.D. No. 1 5 29) and the corresponding certificate of t itle is issued, the land ceases to be part of the pu blic dom ain and becomes private property ov er which the Director of Lan ds w ill n o lon g er h a v e either control or jurisdiction. The Torrens Title issued on the basis of a free patent or homestead pa tent becomes as indefeasible as one which was judicially secured upon the expir a t ion of on e y ea r fr om da t e of issu a n ce of pa t en t a s pr ov ided in P.D. No. 1 5 2 9 . EXCEPTION: However, as held in Director of Lands v. De Luna, even after the lapse of one year, t h e State may still bring an action for the reversion t o the public domain of lan ds w h ich h a v e been fraudulently granted t o private individuals. This has been the con sist en t r u lin g of t h is Cou r t . FRAUD & MISREPRESENTATION: In the case at bar, the failure of Irene Bullungan to disclose t hat Vicente Carrabacan was in possession of the portion of land in dispute constitutes fraud and

m isrepresentation and is a ground for annulling her title. Where public land is acqu ir ed by a n a pplicant through fraud and misrepresentation the State may institute rever sion pr oceedin g s ev en a ft er t h e la pse of t h e on e -y ea r per iod. Pu blic policy demands that one who obtains title t o a public land through fraud sh ou ld n ot be a llowed t o benefit therefrom. Vicente Carabbacan had been in possession of t h e la n d ev en . before Irene Bullunga n bou g h t t h e possessor y r ig h t s t o t h e la n d. It w a s t h er efor e a m isrepresentation for her to state in her application for a fr ee pa t en t t h a t sh e h a d been in possession of the lot in question when the fact is that Carabbacan had been there ahea d of h er . Pataueg, Nick Jr. y Alvers ado SUCCESSION MA RIA USON, plaintiff-appellee, vs .MA RIA DEL ROSA RIO, CONCEPCION NEBREDA, CONRA DO NEBREDA , DOMINA DOR NEBREDA , A ND FA UST INO NEBREDA , Jr ., defendants -appellants . G.R. No. L-4 9 6 3 , Ja n u a r y 2 9 , 1 9 5 3 BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: Not e: This is an ACTION FOR RECOVERY OF THE OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION of five (5) pa rcels of land situated in the Municipality of Labrador, Province of Pangasinan, fi led by Ma r ia Uson against Maria del Rosario and her four children named Concepcion, Conrado, Dom inador, a n d Faustino, surnamed Nebreda, who are all of minor age, before the Court of First Instance of Pa n g a sin a n . FA CT S: Ma r ia Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1 9 4 5 left t h e la nds involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other heir ex cept h is w idow Ma r ia Uson . However, plaintiff-lawful wife claims that when Faust in o Nebr eda died in 1 9 4 5 , h is common-law wife Maria del Rosario took possession illegally of said lands thus depriving her of t h eir possession a n d en joy m en t . DEED OF SEPARATION: Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that on February 2 1 , 1 931, Maria Uson and her husband, the late Faustino Nebreda, executed a public docu m en t w hereby they agreed to separate as husband and wife and, in consideration of their separ a t ion , Ma r ia Uson was given a parcel of land by way of alimony and in return she renounced her r ig h t t o inherit any other property that may be left by her husband upon his death. (waiver of future inheritance) RTC: T r ial court rendered decision ruling in favor of the lawful wife and ordering the defendants (common-law-wife & kids) to restore to the plaintiff the ownership and possession of the la n ds in dispu t e. DEFENDANTs ARGUMENT: In its appeal to the SC, defenda n t cla im ed t h a t pla in t iff h a s a lready relinquished her rights when she expressly renounced any future proper t y sh e w a s t o in herit from her husband. It was also claimed that the provisions of the New Civil Code, g iv in g st atus and rights to natural children, should be given a retroactive effect so that the illegitim a t e ch ildr en of Del Rosa r io w ill be en t it led t o t h e in h er it a n ce. ISSUE 1 : Ma y Ma r ia Un son v a lidly r en ou n ce h er fu t u r e in h er it a n ce? HELD 1 : NO. There is no dispute that Maria Uson, plaintiff-appellee, is the lawful w ife of Fa u st in o Nebreda, former owner of the five parcels of lands litigated in the present case. There is likewise n o dispute that Maria del Rosario, one of the defendants-appellants, was merely a common-la w w ife of the late Faustino Nebreda with whom she had four illegitimate ch ildr en , h er n ow codefendants. It likewise appears that Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 much prior to the effectivit y of t h e new Civil Code. With this background, it is evident that when Faustino Nebr eda died in 1 945 the five parcels of land he was seized of at the time passed from the mom ent of his death t o h is on ly h eir , h is w idow Ma r ia Uson .

A pplying Article 657 of the old Civil Code, Court ruled that the property belongs to the h eir s a t the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor h a d ex ecu t ed a n d delivered to them a deed for the same before his death. The right of ownersh ip of Ma r ia Uson ov er the lands in question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband and t h is is so because of the imperative provision of the law which commands that the rights to succession a r e t r a n sm it t ed fr om t h e m om en t of dea t h (A r t icle 6 5 7 , old Civ il Code). T h e claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right ov er t h e la n ds in qu estion because she expressly renounced to inherit any future property that her husband m a y a cquire and leave upon his death in the deed of separation they had entered into on February 21, 1 931 cannot be entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a con t r a ct n or ca n it be r en ou n ced. T h e decision a ppea led fr om is a ffir m ed. ISSUE 2 : W h ether or not the illegitimate children of del Rosario a r e en t it led t o t h e in h er it a n ce. HELD 2 : NO. Defen dants contend that, while it is true that the four minor defen da n t s a r e illeg it im a t e ch ildren of the late Faustino Nebreda and under the old Civ il Code a r e n ot en t it led t o a n y su ccessional rights, however, under the new Civil Code which became in force in Ju n e, 1 9 5 0 , t h ey are given the status and rights of natural children and are entitled to the successional rights w hich the law accords t o the latter (article 2264 and article 287, new Civil Code), a n d beca u se t h ese successional rights were declared for the first t ime in the new code, th ey sh a ll be g iv en r etroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred u n der t h e pr ior leg isla t ion (A r t icle 2 2 5 3 , n ew Civ il Code). T h er e is n o m er it in t h is cla im PRINCIPLE OF NON-IMPAIRMENT OF VESTED RIGHT AS AN EXCEPTION: A r t icle 2 2 5 3 a bove referred t o provides indeed that rights which are declared for the fir st t im e sh a ll h a v e r etroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred u n der t h e form er legislation, BUT this is so only when the new right s do n ot pr eju dice a n y v est ed or a cquired right of the same origin. Thus, said article provides that "if a right should be decla r ed for the first time in this Code, it shall be effective at once, even though the act or ev en t w h ich g iv es rise thereto may have been done or may have occu r r ed u n der t h e pr ior leg isla t ion , provided said new right does not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right, of t h e sa m e or igin." As already stated in the early part of this decision, the right of ownership of Maria Uson ov er the lands in question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband and t h is is so because of the imperative provision of the law which commands that the rights to succession a r e transmitted from the moment of death (Article 657, old Civil Code). The new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, ther efor e, be a sserted to the impairment of the vested r ig h t of Ma r ia Uson ov er t h e la n ds in dispu t e. VOID DONATION: As regards the claim that Maria Uson, while her deceased husband was lying in state, in a gesture of pity or compassion, agreed t o assign the lands in question t o t h e m in or ch ildren for the reason that they were acquired while the deceased was living with their mot h er a n d Maria Uson wanted to assuage som ewhat the wrong she has done to them, this much can be sa id; apart from the fact that this claim is disputed, we are of the opinion that said a ssignment, if a ny, partakes of the nature of a DONATION OF REAL PROPERTY, inasmuch as it inv olv es n o m aterial consideration, and in order that it may be valid it shall be made in a public docu m en t a n d must be accepted either in the same document or in a se parate one (Article 6 3 3 , old Civ il Code). Inasmuch as this essential formality has not been followed, it resu lt s t h a t t h e a lleg ed a ssig n m en t or don a t ion h a s n o v a lid effect . Pataueg, Nick Jr. y Alvers ado

ISSUE 1 : W h ether or not petitioners were already the owners of the inherited proper t y w h en t h ey ex ecu t ed t h e con t r a ct w it h r espon den t s.

Su ccession a s a Mode of T r a n sfer r in g Own er sh ip ROMULO A . CORONEL, A LA RICO A . CORONEL, A NNET T E A . CORONEL, A NNABELLE C. GONZALES (for herself and on beha l f of Fl or ida C. T u pper , a s a ttorney-in-fact), CIELITO A. CORONEL, FLORAIDA A. ALMONTE, and CATALINA BA LA IS MA BA NA G, petitioners , v s. T HE COURT OF APPEALS, CONCEPCION D. ALCARAZ, and RAMONA PA T RICIA A LCARAZ, a ssi st ed by GLORIA F. NOEL a s a t t or n ey -i n -fa ct , res pondents . G.R. No. 1 0 3 5 7 7 . Oct ober 7 , 1 9 9 6 MELO, J.: Not e: The petition before us has its roots in a COMPLAINT FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE t o com pel herein petitioners (except the last named, Catalina Balais Mabanag) to consummate t h e sa le of a parcel of land with its improvements located along Roosevelt Avenue in Qu ezon Cit y en tered into by the parties sometime in Jan u a r y 1 9 8 5 for t h e pr ice of P1 ,2 4 0 ,0 0 0 .0 0 . FA CT S: 1st CONTRACT OF ABSOLUTE SALE: Peitioner, Romulo Coronel, et. a l. bein g t h e son s a n d da ughters of the decedent Constancio P. Coronel (hereinafter referred t o as Coronels) executed a document entitled ―Receipt of Down Payment‖ in favor of plaintiff Ramona Patricia Alcaraz. The document prov ided that for the t otal amount of P1,240,000.00, wherein a dow n pa y m en t of P5 0,000.00 was initially paid, the Coronels bind themselves to effect the transfer in their names t h e certificate of t itle of the house and lot they inherited from their father. They a lso pr om ised t hat upon the transfer of the TCT in their names, they will immedia t ely ex ecu t e t h e deed of a bsolute sale of the property, and the other party Ramona will pay the balance of P1,190,000.00. (Note: The agreement could not have been a contract to sell because the sellers herein made no express reservation of ownership or title to the s ubject parcel of land . Furtherm ore, the circumstance which prevented the parties from entering into an abs olute contract of s ale pertained to the sellers themselves (the certificate of title was not in their names ) and not the full payment of the purchase price. Under the established facts and circumstances of the cas e, the Court may safely presume that, had the certificate of title been in the names of petitioners s ellers at that time, there would have been no reason why an absolute contract of sale could not have been executed and cons um m ated right there and then). 2nd CONTRACT OF ABSOLUTE SALE/DOUBLE SALE: The Coronels however, upon having t h e pr operty r eg ist er ed in t h eir n a m e, sold it t o Ca t a lin a Ma ba n a g for a h ig h er pr ice (P1,580,000.00), and cancelled and rescinded the contract with Ra m on a by deposit in g t h e a m ou n t of dow n pa y m en t t o a ba n k, in t r u st for Ra m on a . THE COMPLAINT FILED: A complaint for specific performance was filed by the Con cepcion ‘s a g a in st t h e Cor on els. RTC: T he RTC ruled in favor of respondents Conception‘s. Judgment for specific performance is h ereby rendered ordering defendant-Coronel‘s t o execute in favor of plaintiffs a deed of absolute sa le cov er in g t h a t pa r cel of la n d CA: A ffir m ed t h e sa m e. T h e petitioners claim that there could been no perfected contract on January 19, 1985 beca u se t h ey w er e t h en n ot y et t h e a bsolu t e ow n er s of t h e in h er it ed pr oper t y .

HELD 1 : Y es. Article 774 of the Civil Code defines Succession as a mode of transferring ownersh ip a s follow s: A rt. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the pr oper t y , r ig h t s a n d obligations to the extent and value of the inheritance of a person are transmit t ed t h r ou g h h is dea t h t o a n ot h er or ot h er s by h is w ill or by oper a t ion of la w . Pet itioners-sellers in the case at bar being the sons and daughters of the decedent Constancio P. Coronel are compulsory heirs who were called t o succession by operation of law. Thus, at t h e point their father drew his last breath, petitioners stepped into his shoes insofar as t h e su bject pr operty is concerned, such that any rights or obligations pertaining thereto became binding and en forceable upon them. It is expressly provided that rights to the succession a r e t r a n sm it t ed fr om t h e m om en t of dea t h of t h e deceden t . MOOTNESS OF THE ISSUE: Be it also noted that petitioners‘ claim that succession may n ot be declared unless the creditors have been paid is rendered moot by the fact that they were a ble t o effect the transfer of the title to the propert y fr om t h e deceden t ‘s n a m e t o t h eir n a m es. ESTOPPEL: A side from this, petitioners are precluded from r a isin g t h eir su pposed la ck of ca pacity to enter into an agreement at that t ime and they ca n n ot be a llow ed t o n ow t a ke a posture contrary t o that which they took when they entered into the agreem en t w it h pr iv a t e r espondent Ramona P. Alcaraz. The Civil Code expressly states t h a t : A r t . 1 4 3 1 . ― T h r ou g h est oppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, a n d ca nnot be denied or disproved as against the person relying ther eon ‖ . Ha v in g r epr esen t ed t h emselves as the true owners of the subject property at the t ime of sale, petition er s CA NNOT cla im n ow t h a t t h ey w er e n ot y et t h e a bsolu t e ow n er s t h er eof a t t h a t t im e. T h e sale of the subject parcel of land between petitioners and Ramona P. A lca r a z, is deem ed per fect ed. PEITIONER’s ARGUMENT: Petitioners also contend that although there was in fact a perfected con tract of sale between them and Ramona P. Alcaraz, t h e la t t er br ea ch ed h er r ecipr oca l obligation when she rendered impossible the consummation thereof by g oin g t o t h e Un it ed St ates of America, without leaving her address, t eleph on e n u m ber , a n d Specia l Pow er of A t torney for which reason, so petitioners conclude, they were correct in unilaterally rescin din g t h e con t r a ct of sa le. ISSUE 2 : W h ether or not peitioner-seller is correct in unilaterraly rescin din g t h e con t r a ct of sa le bet w een t h e la t t er a n d Ra m on a A lca r a z, t h e bu y er . HELD 2 : W e do not agree with petitioners that there was a valid rescission of the contract of sale in the in stant case. We note that these supposed g r ou n ds for pet it ion er s' r escission , a r e m er e a llegations found only in their responsive pleadings, which by express provision of the rules, ar e deem ed controverted even if no reply is filed by the plaintiffs (Sec. 11, Rule 6, Rev ised Ru les of Court). The records are absolutely bereft of any supporting evidence to substantiate petition er s' a llegations. We have stressed t ime and again that allegations m u st be pr ov en by su fficien t ev idence (Ng Cho Cio vs. Ng Diong, 110 Phil. 882 [1961]; Recar o v s. Em bisa n , 2 SCRA 5 9 8 [1 961]. Mere allegation is not an evidence (La g a sca v s. De V er a , 7 9 Ph il. 3 7 6 [1 9 4 7 ]). Ev en assuming arguendo that Ramona P. Alcaraz was in the United Stat es of A m er ica on February 6, 1985, we cannot justify petitioner-sellers' act of un ila t er a lly a n d ex t r a dicia lly r escinding the contract of sale, there being no express stipulation a u t h or izin g t h e seller s t o ex tarjudicially rescind the contract of sale. (cf. Dignos vs. CA, 158 SCRA 375 [1988]; Taguba v s. V da . de Leon , 1 3 2 SCRA 7 2 2 [1 9 8 4 ])

Mor eover, petitioners are estopped from raising the alleged absence of Ramona P. A lca r a z because although the evidence on record shows that the sale was in t h e n a m e of Ra m on a P. A lcaraz as the buyer, the sellers had been dealing with Concepcion D. Alcaraz, Ramona's mother, w ho had acted for and in behalf of her daughter, if not also in her own behalf. In deed, the dow n payment was made by Concepcion D. Alcaraz with her own personal check for and in beh a lf of Ram ona P. Alcaraz. There is no evidence showing that petitioners ever questioned Concepcion 's a uthority to represent Ramona P. Alcaraz when they accepted her personal check. Neit h er did t h ey raise any objection as regards payment being effected by a third person. Accordingly, as fa r a s petitioners are concerned, the physical absence of Ramona P. A lca r a z is n ot a g r ou n d t o r escin d t h e con t r a ct of sa le. ISSUE 3 : Bet ween the Alcaraz and Catalina Mabanag, who between them is the owner of the propert y su bject t o dispu t e? HELD 3 : It belon g s t o A lca r a z. A rt. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership sh a ll be t ransferred to the person who may have first taken possession t h er eof in g ood fa it h , if it sh ou ld be m ov a ble pr oper t y . Sh ould if be immovable property, the ownership shall belong t o the person acquiring it w h o in g ood fa it h fir st r ecor ded it in Reg ist r y of Pr oper t y . Sh ould there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith w a s fir st in the possession; and, in the absence thereof to the person who presents t h e oldest t it le, pr ov ided t h er e is g ood fa it h . T h e record of the case shows that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 25, 1985 as pr oof of t h e second contract of sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City giving rise to t h e issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of Catalina B. Mabanag on Ju n e 5 , 1 9 8 5 . T h u s, t h e secon d pa r a g r a ph of A r t icle 1 5 4 4 sh a ll a pply . T h e above-cited provision on double sale presumes t itle or ownersh ip t o pa ss t o t h e fir st buyer, the exceptions being: (a) when the second buyer, in good faith, registers the sale ahead of t h e first buyer, and (b) should there be no inscription by either of the t w o bu y er s, w h en t h e second buyer, in good faith, acquires possession of the property ahead of the first buyer. Unless, t h e second buyer satisfies these requirements, title or ownership will not transfer to him t o t h e pr eju dice of t h e fir st bu y er . In h is commentaries on the Civil Code, an accepted authority on the su bject, now a distinguished m em ber of t h e Cou r t , Ju st ice Jose C. V it u g , ex pla in s: T h e governing principle is prius tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right). Knowledge by the first buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the first buyer's rights except when the second buyer first registers in good faith the second sale (Oliv a r es v s. Gon za les, 1 5 9 SCRA 3 3 ). Conversely, knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if he is fir st t o register, since knowledge taints his registration with bad faith (see also Astorga vs. Cour t of A ppeals, G.R. No. 58530, 26 December 1984). In Cruz vs. Cabana (G.R. No. 5 6232, 2 2 Ju n e 1 984, 129 SCRA 656), it has held that it is essential, t o merit the protection of Art. 1544, secon d pa ragraph, that the second realty buyer must act in good faith in reg ist er in g h is deed of sa le (citing Carbonell vs. Court of Appeals, 69 SCRA 99, Crisostom o vs. CA , G.R. No. 9 5 8 4 3 , 0 2 Sept em ber 1 9 9 2 ). (J. Vitug Com pendium of Civil Law and Juris prudence, 1993 Edition, p. 604). In a case of double sale, what finds relevance and materialit y is n ot w h et h er or n ot t h e second buyer was a buyer in good faith but whether or not said second bu y er r eg ist er s su ch second sale in good faith, that is, without knowledge of any defect in the t it le of t h e pr oper t y sold.

A s clearly borne out by the evidence in this case, petitioner Mabanag could not have in g ood fa ith, registered the sale entered into on February 18, 1985 because as early a s Febr u a r y 2 2 , 1 985, a notice of lis pendens had been annotated on the transfer certificate of t itle in the n a m es of pet itioners, whereas petitioner Mabanag registered the said sale som etime in April, 198 5 . A t t h e time of registration, therefore, petitioner Mabanag knew that the same property had already been previously sold to private respondents, or, at least, she was charged with knowledge tha t a pr evious buyer is claiming title to the same property. Petitioner Mabanag cannot close her ey es t o t he defect in petitioners' title t o the property at the time of the registration of t h e pr oper t y . If a v endee in a double sale registers that sale after he has acquired knowledge that there was a previous sale of the same property to a third party or that another person claims sa id propert y in a pervious sale, the registration will constitute a registration in bad faith and will n ot con fer u pon him any right. (Salvoro vs. Tanega, 87 SCRA 349 [1978]; citing Pa la r ca v s. Dir ect or of La nd, 43 Phil. 146; Cagaoan vs. Cagaoan, 43 Phil. 554; Fernandez vs. Mercader, 43 Ph il. 5 8 1 .) T hus, the sale of the subject parcel of land between petitioners a n d Ra m on a P. A lca r a z, per fected on February 6, 1985, prior to that between petitioners and Catalin a B. Ma ba n a g on Febr u a r y 1 8 , 1 9 8 5 , w a s cor r ect ly u ph eld by bot h t h e cou r t s below . Pataueg, Nick Jr. y Alvers ado

CA SE NO. 2 0 2 ISIDORO M. MERCA DO, plaintiff-appellee, v s. LEON C. VIARDO and PROVINCIA L SHERIFF OF NUEV A ECIJA , defendants appellants . G.R. No. L-1 4 1 2 7 , A u g u st 2 1 , 1 9 6 2 FA CT S: T h e spouses Bartolome Driz and Pilar Belmonte were defendants in a case wher e a w r it of ex ecution was issued and levied upon rights and interests the spouses have over a disputed land. By virtue of the writ of execution as above mentioned, the sheriff sold at public acution ½ of t h e lot s subject of controversy. This was was bought by Leon Viardo being the highest bidder .. T h e spou ses failed to redeem the property within the statutory period of one year fr om t h e da t e of sa le. A final bill of sale was issued to buyer Viardo, and a co-owner's copy of the certificate of title w a s likew ise issu ed t o h im . On 28 December 1945 the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in La n d Reg ist r a t ion Ca se a cting upon a verified petition of Leon C. Viardo, ordered th e Reg ist r a r of Deeds in a n d for Nu eva Ecija, t o cancel Original Certificate of T itle and to issue another in lieu t h er eof in t h e n ame of and in the proportion as follows: LEONOR BELMONTE ¼ share; FELISA BELMONTE, ¼ sh are; PILAR BELMONTE, ¹/8 share; LEON C. VIARDO, ¹/8 share; and INES DE GUZMAN, ¼ sh a r e Spouses Driz and Belmonte filed an action in the CFI against the buyer-Viardo for reconveyance of t h e sa id la n d. CFI (now RTC): The court dismissed, including the counterclaim of Viardo. Defen da n t is t h e legal owner of the land in question and the right of redemption of the plaintiff of said la n d h a d a lr ea dy ela psed. Not satisfied with the judgment dismissing his counter-claim, the defen da n t Leon C. V ia r do a ppea led t o t h e Cou r t of A ppea ls.

CA: Pen ding appeal with the Court of Appea ls, Ba r t olom e Dr iz died. His ch ildr en of a g e su bst it u t ed h im in t h e a ppea l.

Mon t illa in favor of Pedro L. Litonjua be paid. This motion was opposed by Claudio Montilla and by A g u st in Mon t illa , Jr ., a dm in ist r a t or of t h e in t est a t e est a t e

T h e judgment of the CA, granting the prayer of Viardo, eventually became final and execu t or y . T h e CFI issued a writ of execution. Prior t o the CA ruling, Belmonte sold her interest in the lan d t o Isidoro Mercado. Mercado then filed a third-party complaint against Belmonte. Viar do t h en su ed Belmonte. CFI ruled that the heirs of Bartolome could not be held lia ble per son a lly for ju dg m en t r en der ed a g a in st t h em . Hen ce, t h is a ppea l.

CFI : issu ed a n or der den y in g t h e m ot ion . Hen ce, t h is a ppea l t o t h e SC.

ISSUE: W h ether or not the heirs of Bartolome Driz can be held personally liable for th e ju dg m en t r en der ed a g a in st t h eir fa t h er ?

HELD: NO. The creditors of the heirs of a deceased person is entitled to collect his claim out of t h e pr operty which pertains by inheritance to said heirs, ONLY AFTER all debt s of t h e t est a t e or in testate succession have been paid and when the net assets that are divisible among t h e h eir s kn ow n . T h e debt s of t h e decea sed m u st fir st be pa id befor e h is h eir s ca n in h er it .

HELD: NO. The only ground of appellant for this contention is that the present owners of these lot s a r e the children of the spouses Pilar Belmonte and Bartolome Driz, the plaintiffs in civil case No. 1 61, and that, upon the death of Bartolome Driz during the pendency of the appeal in civ il ca se No. 1 61, these children were substituted as parties. This assignment of error is wit h ou t m er it . T h e substitution of parties was made obviously because the children of Bartolome Dr iz a r e h is legal heirs and therefore could properly represent and protect whatever interest h e h a d in t h e ca se on appeal. But such a substitution did not and cannot hav e t h e effect of m a kin g t h ese su bstituted parties personally liable for whatever judgment might be render ed on t h e a ppea l a g a in st t h eir decea sed fa t h er . Article 774 of the Civil Code provides: Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the pr operty, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inher it a n ce, of a per son a r e t ransmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by oper a t ion of la w . Mor eover, it appears from the evidence that Bartolome Driz was only a formal party to civil ca se No. 1 61, the real party in interest being his wife Pilar Belmonte. The subject matter in litig a t ion w as Pilar Belmonte's interest in the parcel of land described in original cert i fica t e of t it le No. 3 4 8 4 , w h ich a ppea r s t o be pa r a ph er n a l pr oper t y . T h e trial court, therefore, correctly ruled that the remedy of Leon C. Viardo, the creditor w a s t o pr oceed a g a in st t h e est a t e of Ba r t olom e Dr iz. Ju dg m en t MODIFIED. Pataueg, Nick Jr. y Alv ers ado

In testate of the late AGUSTIN MONT ILLA , SR.; PEDRO LIT ONJUA , a movantappellant, v s. A GUST IN B. MONT ILLA , JR., adminis trator-appellee; CLA UDIO MONT ILLA , oppos itor-appellee. G.R. No. L-4 1 7 0 , Ja n u a r y 3 1 , 1 9 5 2 PA RA S, C.J.: FA CT S: In a Civil Case rendered by the CFI of Negros Occident a l, Pedr o L. Lit on ju a obt a in ed a ju dgment against Claudio Montilla for the payment of the sum of P4,000 with legal interest, plus cost s amounting to P39.00 In due time, a writ of execution w a s issu ed, bu t n o pr oper t y of Cla u dio Mon t illa w a s fou n d w h ich cou ld be lev ied u pon . In or der to satisfy the said judgment Pedro L. Litonjua filed in special Proceeding of the CFI of Negros Occidental, Intestate Estate of Agustin Montilla, Sr., deceased, a motion praying t h a t t h e interest, property and participation of Claudio Montilla, one of the heirs of Agustin Montilla, Sr ., in the latter's intestate estate be sold and out of the proceed the judgment debt of Cla u dio

ISSUE: W h ether or not Litonjua, as a creditor, may go after t h e in t er est of Mon t illa Jr . in t h e in t est a t e Est a t e of A g u st in Mon t illa Sr .

A person who is not a creditor of a deceased, testate or intestate, has NO RIGHT t o in t er v en e either in the proceedings brought in connection with the est a t e or in t h e set t lem en t of t h e su ccession . A n execution cannot legally be levied upon the property of an intestate su ccession t o pa y t h e debts of the widow and heirs of the deceased, until the credits held against the latter at the t im e of h is death shall have been paid can the remaining property that pertains t o t h e sa id debt or s h eir s ca n be a t t a ch ed. Pataueg, Nick Jr. y Alvers ado SOCORRO LEDESMA a n d A NA QUIT CO LEDESMA , v s. CONCHIT A MCLA CHLIN, ET A L., defendants -appellants . G.R. No. L-4 4 8 3 7 , Nov em ber 2 3 , 1 9 3 8

plaintiffs -appellees ,

VILLA-REAL, J.: Not e: This case is an appeal taken by the defendants Conchita McLachlin, Lorenzo Qu i t co, Jr ., Sa bina Quitco, Rafael Quitco and Marcela Quit co, fr om t h e decision of t h e Cou r t of Fir st In stance of Occidental Negros, making the heirs of their deceased father solidary liable as to t h e in debtedness incurred by their deceased father instituted by the plaintiff-creditor in the Intestate Est ate of Eusebio, their grandfather and not in the Intestate Est a t e of Qu it co, t h eir fa t h er . FA CT S: Defendants in this case are the heirs of their decea sed debt or -fa t h er Lor en zo M. Qu it co. COMMON LAW RELATIONSHIP: In the year 191 6 , t h e pla in t iff Socor r o Ledesm a liv ed m aritally with Lorenzo M. Quitco, while the latter was still single, of which relation, lasting until t h e year 1921, was born a daughter who is the other plaintiff Ana Quitco Ledesma . In 1 9 2 1 , i t seem s hat the relation between Socorro Ledesma a n d Lor en zo M. Qu it co ca m e t o a n en d. Lor enzo M. Quitco executed a deed acknowledging the plaintiff A n a Qu it co Ledesm a a s h is n a t u r a l da u g h t er . THE DEBT: On January 21, 1922, Lorenzo issued in favor of the plaint iff Socor r o Ledesm a a pr om issory note for or on behalf of his indebtedness amounting t o 2,000 w /c is t o be pa id on in st a llm en t . THE MARRIAGE TO ANOTHER: Subsequently, Lorenzo married Conchita McLa ch lin . T h ey h a d fou r (4 ) ch ildr en , w h o a r e t h e ot h er defen da n t s.

DEATH: On March 9, 1930, Lorenzo M. Quitco died predeceasing his father, but, still later, that is, on December 15, 1932, his father Eusebio Quitco also died, and as t h e la t t er left r ea l a n d per son a l pr oper t ies u pon h is dea t h . A dm inistration proceedings of said properties were instituted in this court, the said ca se bein g kn own as the "Intestate of the deceased Eusebio Quitco," civ il ca se No. 6 1 5 3 of t h is cou r t . In or der to satisfy the remaining value of the PN, Socorro went a ft er t h e In t est a t e Est a t e of Eu sebio Qu it co, t o cla im t h e in debt edn ess of h is debt or -decea sed son Lor en zo. ISSUE 1 : W h ether or not the action for the recovery of the sum of P1 ,5 0 0 , r epr esen t in g t h e la st in st a llm en t of t h e pr om isor r y n ot e h a s a lr ea dy pr escr ibed. HELD 1 : Y ES. According to the promissory note executed by the decea sed Lor en zo M. Qu it co, on Ja nuary 21, 1 922, the last installment of P1 ,500 should be paid two years from t h e da t e of t h e ex ecution of said promissory note, that is, on January 21, 1924. The complain t in t h e pr esen t ca se was filed on June 26, 1934, that is, more than ten years after t h e ex pir a t ion of t h e sa id per iod. The fact that the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma filed her claim, on August 26, 1933, with t h e committee on claims and appraisal appointed in the in t est a t e of Eu sebio Qu it co, does n ot su spend the running of the prescriptive period of the judicial action for the recovery of said debt, because the claim for the unpaid balance of the amount of the promissory note should not h a v e been presented in the intestate of Eusebio Quitco, the said decea sed n ot bein g t h e on e w h o ex ecuted the same, but in the intestate of Lorenzo M. Quitco, which should have been institut ed by the said Socorro Ledesma as provided in sect ion 6 4 2 of t h e Code of Civ il Pr ocedu r e, a uthorizing a creditor to institute said case through the appointment of an administrator for t h e pu rpose of collecting his credit. More than ten years having thus elapsed from the expira t ion of t h e period for the payment of said debt of P1 ,500, the action for its r ecov er y h a s pr escr ibed u n der sect ion 4 3 , No. 1 , of t h e Code of Civ il Pr ocedu r e. ISSUE 2 : W h ether or not the properties inherited by the defendants from their deceased grandfa t h er by representation are subject to the payment of debts and obligations of their deceased fa t h er , w h o died w it h ou t lea v in g a n y pr oper t y HELD 2 : NO. The claim for the unpaid balance of the amount of the PN should have been presen t ed in the intest a t e of Lor en zo a n d n ot in t h e in t est a t e of Eu sebio, t h e for m er ‘s f a t h er . RIGHT OF REPRESENTATION: While it is true that under the provisions of articles 924 to 927 of t h e Civil Code, a children presents his father or mother who died before him in the propert ies of h is grandfather or grandmother, this right of representation does not m a ke t h e sa id ch ild a n swerable for the obligations contracted by his deceased father or mother, because, as ma y be seen from the prov isions of the Code of Civil Procedure referring to partition of inheritances, the in heritance is received with the benefit of inventory, that is to say, the heirs only answer with the pr operties received from their predecessor. The herein defendants, as heirs of Eusebio Quitco, in r epresentation of their father Lorenzo M. Quitco, are not bound to pay the indebtedness of their sa id fa t h er fr om w h om t h ey did NOT in h er it a n y t h in g . T h e appealed judgment is reversed, and the DEFENDA NT S A RE A BSOLV ED fr om t h e com pla in t , w it h t h e cost s t o t h e a ppellees Pataueg, Nick Jr. y Alvers ado

DKC HOLDINGS CORPORA T ION,petitioner, v s. COURT OF APPEALS, VICTOR U. BA RT OLOME a n d REGIST ER OF DEEDS FOR MET RO MA NILA , DIST RICT III, res pondents . G.R. No. 1 1 8 2 4 8 , A pr il 5 , 2 0 0 0 Y NARES-SANTIAGO, J. Not e: This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal Decision of the CA en t it led "DKC Holdings Corporation vs. Victor U. Bartolom e, et al.", affirming in toto the Decision of the RT C of Valenzuela, which dismissed Civil Case No. 3337-V-90 and ordered pet it ion er t o pa y P3 0 ,0 0 0 .0 0 a s a t t or n ey 's fees. FA CT S: THE LOT IN DISPUTE: The subject of the controversy is a 14,021 square meter pa r cel of la n d located in Malinta, Valenzuela, Metro Manila which was originally owned by private responden t V ictor U. Bartolome's deceased mother, Encarnacion Bartolome, under Transfer Cer t ifica t e of T itle No. B-37615 of the Register of Deeds of Metro Manila, District III. This lot was in fr on t of on e of the textile plants of petitioner and, as such, was seen by the latter as a potential warehouse sit e. THE CONTRACT: DKC entered into a CONT RA CT OF LEA SE W / OPT ION T O BUY w it h En carnacion Bartolom e (plaintiff deceased mother). DKC was given the option t o a.) lease or b.) leas e with purchase the subject land w/c must be exercised within a per iod of t w o (2 ) y ea r s cou n t ed fr om t h e sig n in g of t h e con t r a ct . 1st REFUSAL TO ACCEPT PAYMENT: DKC regularly paid its dues t o En ca r n a cion u n t il h er death. DKC coursed its payment t o Victor Bartolome, the sole h eir of En ca r n a cion . V ict or r efu sed t o a ccept t h ese pa y m en t s. THE TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP OVER THE LOT: Meanwhile, Victor executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication over all the properties of Encarnacion, including the subject lot. According ly , r espondent Register of Deeds cancelled Transfer Certificate of Title No. B-3 7 6 1 5 a n d issu ed T r a n sfer Cer t ifica t e of T it le No. V -1 4 2 4 9 in t h e n a m e of V ict or Ba r t olom e. 2nd REFUSAL TO ACCEPT PAYMENT: On March 14, 1990, petitioner served upon V ict or , v ia r egistered mail, notice that it was exercising its option to lease t h e pr oper t y , t en der in g t h e a m ount of P1 5,000.00 as rent for the month of March. Again , V ict or r efu sed t o a ccept t h e t en der ed r en t a l fee a n d t o su r r en der possession of t h e pr oper t y t o pet it ion er . DKC deposited its paym en t s a t Ch in a Ba n k. DKC filed a COMPLA INT FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND DAMAGES against Victor, praying among ot h er s t h e su r r en der a n d deliver y of possession of t h e su bject la n d in a ccor da n ce w it h t h e Con t r a ct t er m s. RTC: dism issed the complaint filed by DKC, t h u s r u lin g in fa v or of V ict or Ba r t olom e. CA: a ffir m ed in t ot o. BASIS OF RTC & CA: Victor is not a party thereto t o the contra ct en t er ed in t o bet w een h is decea sed m ot h er a n d pla in t iff. ISSUE 1 : W h ether or not the Contra ct of Lea se w it h Opt ion t o Bu y en t er ed in t o by t h e la t e En carnacion Bartolom e with petitioner was terminated upon her death or whether it bin ds h er sole heir, Victor, even after her demise. Stated differently, whether or not Contract of Lease with Opt ion to Buy entered into by the late Encarnacion Bartolome with petitioner is transmissible t o h is sole h eir . HELD 1 :

Y ES. General Rule: Heirs are bound by contracts entered int o by t h eir pr edecessor s-in in terest except when the rights and obligations arising therefrom are not transm issible by (1 ) t h eir n a t u r e, (2 ) st ipu la t ion or (3 ) pr ov ision of l a w . (A r t 1 3 1 1 CC) In t he present case, there is neither contractual stipulation nor legal provision making the right s a n d obligations under the Contract intransmissible. More importantly, the nature of the r ig h t s a n d oblig a t ion s t h er ein a r e, by t h eir n a t u r e, t r a n sm issible. T h e nature of intransmissible rights as explained by Arturo Tolentino, an eminent civilist, is a s follow s: A m ong contracts which are intransmissible are those which are pu r ely per son a l, eit h er by pr ov ision of law, such as in cases of partnerships and agency, or by t h e v er y n a t u r e of t h e obligations arising therefrom, such as those requiring special per son a l qu a lifica t ion s of t h e obligor. It may also be stated that contracts for the payment of money debts are not transmitt ed t o t he heirs of a party, but constitute a charge against his estate. Thu s, w h er e t h e clien t in a con tract for professional services of a lawyer died, leaving minor heirs, and the lawyer, instead of pr esenting his claim for professional services under the contract to the probate court, substituted t h e minors as parties for his client, it was held that the contract could not be enforced against the m in or s; t h e la w y er w a s lim it ed t o a r ecov er y on t h e ba sis of quantum m eruit. In Am erican jurisprudence, "(W)here acts stipulated in a contract require the exercise of specia l kn owledge, genius, skill, taste, ability, experience, judgment, discret ion , in t eg r it y , or ot h er per sonal qualification of one or both parties, the a g r eem en t is of a per son a l n a t u r e, a n d t er m in a t es on t h e dea t h of t h e pa r t y w h o is r equ ir ed t o r en der su ch ser v ice." TEST:It has also been held that a good measure for determining whether a contract termin a t es u pon the death of one of the parties is whether it is of such a character that it may be perform ed by the promissor's personal representative. Contracts to perform personal acts which cann ot be a s well performed by others are discharged by the death of the promissor. Conversely, where the service or act is of such a character that it may as well be performed by another , or w h er e t h e con tract, by its terms, shows that performance by others was cont em pla t ed, dea t h does n ot t er m in a t e t h e con t r a ct or ex cu se n on per for m a n ce. NO PERSONAL ACT: In the case at bar, t h er e is n o per son a l a ct r equ ir ed fr om t h e la t e En carnacion Bartolom e. Rather, the obligation of Enca r n a cion in t h e con t r a ct t o deliv er possession of the subject property to petitioner upon the exercise by the lat t er of it s opt ion t o lea se t h e sa m e m a y v er y w ell be per for m ed by h er h eir V ict or . ISSUE 2 : W h ether or not Victor Bartolome as sole heir is not a party to the contract execu t ed by h is decea sed m ot h er . T h e pr oper t y su bject of t h e con t r a ct w a s in h er it ed by V ict or . HELD 2 : V ictor cannot insist that he is not a party to the Contract because of the clear provision of Art 1 311. Being an heir of Encarnacion, there is PRIVITY OF INT EREST bet w een h im a n d h is deceases mother. He only succeeds to what rights his mother had and what is valid and bindin g a g a in st h er is a lso v a lid a n d bin din g a s a g a in st h im . T h e subject matter of the Contract is lease, which is a property right. Hence, the death of a party DOES NOT excuse non-performance of a contract which involves a property right, and the rights a n d obligations thereunder pass to th e per son a l r epr esen t a t iv es of t h e decea sed. Non per formance is NOT excused by the death of the party when the other pa r t y h a s a pr oper t y in t er est in t h e su bject m a t t er of t h e con t r a ct . Pataueg, Nick Jr. y Alvers ado

A RUEGO V S CA 2 5 4 SCRA 7 1 1 FA CT S: Jose Aruego Sr. had an amorous relationship with Luz Fabian, out of which was bor n A n t on ia a n d Ev ely n A r u eg o. A Com plaint for Compulsory Recognition and Enforcement of Successional Rights was filed by t h e two children, represented by their mother, Fabian. Said complaint prayed for the following : a. T hat Antonia and Evelyn be declared the illegitimate children of t h e decea sed Jose; b. T hat petitioners be compelled t o recognize and acknowledge them as the compulsor y h eir s of t h e decea sed Jose; c. T hat their share and participation in the estate of Jose be determ in ed a n d or der ed deliv er ed t o t h em . T h e main basis of the action for compulsory recognition is their alleged ―open and con t in u ou s possession of t h e st a t u s of illeg it im a t e ch ildr en .‖ RT C declared Antonia as illegitimate da u g h t er of Jose bu t n ot a s t o Ev ely n . It or der ed pet itioners to recognize Antonia and to deliver to the latter h er sh a r e in t h e est a t e of Jose. Pet itioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration alleging loss of jurisdiction on the pa r t of t h e trial court by virtue of the advent of the Family Code. Said motion was denied. CA affirmed. ISSUE: W ON the application of the Family Code will prejudice or impair any vested r ig h t of A n t on ia su ch t h a t it sh ou ld n ot be g iv en r et r oa ct iv e effect . HELD: Y ES. The action brought by A n t on ia for com pu lsor y r ecog n it ion a n d en for cem en t of su ccessional rights which was filed before the advent of the Family Code must be g ov er n ed by A r t 2 8 5 of t h e Civ il Code a n d NOT by A r t 1 7 5 , pa r .2 of t h e Fa m ily Code. T h e Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect as its application will prejudice t h e v est ed r ight of Antonia. The right was vested t o her by the fact that she filed her action under the Civ il Code. T h e action was not yet barred, notwithstanding the fact that it was brought when t h e pu t a t iv e fa ther was already deceased, since Antonia was t h en st ill a m in or w h en it w a s filed – a n ex cept ion t o t h e g en er a l r u le u n der A r t 2 8 5 of t h e Civ il Code.

LORENZO V S POSA DA S 6 4 PHIL 3 5 3 Doct r in e: A t ransmission by inheritance is taxable at the time of the predecessor's death, notwithstandin g t h e postponement of the actual possession or enjoyment of the estate by the beneficiary, and the t ax measured by the value of the property transmitted at that t ime regardless of its appreciat ion or depr ecia t ion . Fa ct s: It a ppears that on May 27, 1922, one Thomas Hanley died in Zamboanga, Zamboanga, leaving a w ill and considerable amount of real and personal properties. On june 14, 1922, proceedings for t h e probate of his will and the settlement and distribution of his estate were begun in the Cou r t of Fir st In st a n ce of Za m boa n g a . T h e w ill w a s a dm it t ed t o pr oba t e. T h e Court of First Instance of Zamboanga considered it proper for the best interests of the estate t o a ppoint a trustee to administer the real properties which, un der t h e w ill, w er e t o pa ss t o Ma t thew Hanley t en years after the two executors named in the will, was, on Ma r ch 8 , 1 9 2 4 , a ppointed trustee. Moore t ook his oath of office and gave bond on March 10, 1924. He a ct ed a s t rustee until February 29, 1932, when he resigned and the plaintiff herein was appointed in h is st ead. During the incumbency of the plaintiff as trustee, Defendant Collector of Internal Revenue a ssessed against the estate of Hanley an inher it a n ce t a x t og et h er w it h t h e pen a lt ies for

delinquency in payment. Lorenzo paid the amount under pr ot est . CIR ov er r u led t h e sa id pr ot est a n d r efu sed t o r efu n d t h e sa m e. CFI h eld that the real property of Thomas Hanley, passed to his instituted heir, Matthew Hanley, fr om the moment of death of the former, and that from that t ime, the latter became t h e ow n er t h er eof. Issu e: W h ether an heir succeeds immediately t o all of the property of his or her decea sed a n cest or ? Held: It is w ell-settled that inheritance taxation is governed by the statute in force at t h e t im e of t h e death of the decedent. The taxpayer can not foresee and ought not to be requir ed t o g u ess t h e ou tcom e of pending measures. The SC hold that a transmission by inheritance is taxable a t t h e t im e of the predecessor's death, notwithstanding the postponement of the actual possession or en joyment of the estate by the beneficiary, and the tax measured by the value of t h e pr oper t y t ransmitted at that time regardless of its appreciation or depreciation. The mer e fa ct t h a t t h e est ate of the deceased was placed in trust did not remove it from the operation of our inheritance t ax laws or exempt it from the payment of the inheritance tax. The corresponding inheritance tax sh ould have been paid to escape the penalties of the laws. This is so for the reason already stated t hat the delivery of the estate t o the trustee was in esse delivery of the same estate to t h e cest u i qu e trust, the beneficiary in this case. A trustee is but an instrument or agent for the cest u i qu e t rust. When Moore accepted the trust and t ook possesson of the trust estate he thereby admitted t h a t t h e est a t e belon g ed n ot t o h im bu t t o h is cest u i qu e t r u st .

CA ST A ÑEDA v s. A LEMA NY 3 PHIL 426 Issu e: W h ether or not the will of Doña Juana Moreno was duly signed by herself in t h e pr esen ce of t hree witnesses, who signed it as witnesses in the presence of the testratrix and of each other . It w a s t h er efor e ex ecu t ed in con for m it y w it h la w . Held: T h ere is nothing in the language of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure which supports the claim of the appellants that the will must be written by the testator himself or by someone else in h is presence and under his express direction. That section requires (1) that the will be in writin g a n d (2) either that the testator sign it himself or, if he does sign it, that it be signed by some on e in his presence and by his express direction. Who does the mechanical work of writing the will is a m atter of indifference. The fact, therefore, that in this case the will was typewritten in the office of t h e lawyer for the t estratrix is of no consequence. The English text of section 618 is very plain. T h e mistakes in translation found in the first Spanish edition of the code have been corrected in t h e secon d. (2 ) To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for a ll, t h e fa ct s t h a t a w ill w a s ex ecuted with the formalities required by law and that the testator was in a condition to ma ke a w ill, is the only purpose of the proceedings under the new code for the probat e of a w ill. (Sec. 6 25.) The judgment in such proceedings determines and can determine nothing more. In t h em t h e court has no power to pass upon the validity of any provisions made in the w ill. It ca n n ot decide, for example, that a certain legacy is void and another one valid. It could not in t h is ca se m ake any decision upon the question whether the t estratrix had the power t o appoint by w ill a g uardian for the property of her children by her fir st h u sba n d, or w h et h er t h e per son so a ppoin t ed w a s or w a s n ot a su it a ble per son t o disch a r g e su ch t r u st . A ll such questions must be decided in some other proceeding. The grounds on which a will ma y be disallowed are stated the section 634. Unless one of those grounds appears the will m u st be a llowed. They all have to do with the personal con dit ion of t h e t est a t or a t t h e t im e of it s ex ecution and the formalities connected therewith. It follows that neither this court nor the court below has any jurisdiction in his proceedings to pass upon the questions raised by the appellants

by the assignment of error relating to the appointment of a guardia n for t h e ch ildr en of t h e decea sed. It is claimed by the appellants that there was no t estimony in the court below t o show t h a t t h e w ill executed by the deceased was the same will presented to the court and concerning which this h earing was had. It is true that the evidence does not show that t h e docu m en t in cou r t w a s pr esented to the witnesses and identified by them, as should have been done. But we think t h a t w e are justified in saying that it was assumed by all the parties during the trial in the court below t hat the will about which the witnesses were testifying was the docu m en t t h en in cou r t . No su ggestion of any kind was then made by the counsel for the appellants that it was not the sa m e in strument. In the last question put t o the witness Gonzales the phrase "this will" is used by t h e counsel for the appellants. In their argument in that court, found on page 15 of the record, t h ey t r eat the testimony of the witnesses as referring t o the will probate they w er e t h en opposin g . T h e judgment of the court below is affirmed, eliminating therefrom, however, the clause "el cua l debera ejecutarse fiel y exactamente en todas sus partes." Th e cost s of t h is in st a n ce w ill be ch a r g ed a g a in st t h e a ppella n t s.

IN RE WILL OF RIOSA 3 9 PHIL 2 3 FA CT S: Jose Riosa died on April 17, 1917. He left a will made in the month of January, 1908, in which h e disposed of an estate valued at more than P35,000. The will was duly executed in a ccor da n ce w ith the law then in force, namely, section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The will w a s n ot ex ecuted in accordance with Act No. 2645, amendatory of said section 618, prescribing cer t a in a dditional formalities for the signing and attestation of wills, in force on and after July 1, 1916. In ot h er words, the will was in writing, signed by the t estator, and attested and subscribed by three cr edible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other; but was not sig n ed by t h e t estator and the witnesses on the left margin of each and every page, nor did the attestation state t h ese facts. The new law, therefore, went into effect after the making of the will an d befor e t h e death of the testator, without the t est a t or h a v in g left a w ill t h a t con for m s t o t h e n ew r equ ir em en t s. Sect ion 6 1 8 of t h e Code of Civ il Pr ocedu r e r ea ds: No w ill, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid t o pass any estate, real or per sonal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be in writing and signed by the testator , or by t h e testator's name written by som e other person in his presence, and by his express dir ect ion , a n d attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the t est a t or a n d of each other. The attestation shall state the fact that the testator signed the will, or caused it t o be signed by som e other person, at his express direction, in the presence of three w it n esses, a n d that they attested and subscribed it in his presence and in the presence of each ot h er . Bu t t h e absence of such form of attestation shall not render the will invalid if it is proven that the will w a s in fa ct sig n ed a n d a t t est ed a s in t h is sect ion pr ov ided. A ct No. 2645 has amended section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure so a s t o m a ke sa id sect ion r ea d a s follow s: SEC. 618. Requisites of will. — No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be v alid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be written in the la nguage or dialect known by the testator and signed by him, or by the testator's name written by som e other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by t hree or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other. The t estator or t h e person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, sh a ll a lso sign, as aforesaid, each, and every page thereof, on the left margin, and said pages sh a ll be n umbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each sheet. The att est a t ion sh a ll st ate the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is written, and the fa ct t h a t t h e t estator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his n a m e, u nder his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the la t t er w it n essed a n d signed the will and all pages th er eof in t h e pr esen ce of t h e t est a t or a n d of ea ch ot h er .

T h e Court of First Instance for the province of Albay rendered its decision on December 29, 1917 disa llow in g t h e w ill of Jose Riosa . ISSUE: T h e issue which this appeal presents is whether in the Philippine Islands the law ex ist in g on t he date of the execution of a will, or the law existing at the death of the t est a t or , con t r ols. RULING: T h e rule prevailing in many other jurisdictions is that the validity of the execution of a will m ust be tested by the statutes in force at the time of its execution and that statutes subsequently en acted have no retrospective effect. This doctrine is believed to be supported by the w eig h t of a uthority. It was the old English view; in Downs (or Downing) vs. Townsend (Ambler, 280), Lord Hardwicke is reported to have said that "the general rule as to testaments is, that the time of th e t estament, and not the t estator's death, is regarded." It is also the modern view, including among ot h er decisions one of the Supreme Court of Vermont from which State many of the sect ion s of t h e Code if Civil Procedure of the Philippine Islands relating t o wills are ta ken . (Giddin g s v s. T u r g eon [1 8 8 6 ], 5 8 V t ., 1 0 3 .) Of t he numerous decisions of divergent tendencies, the opinion by t h e lea r n ed Ju st ice Sh arswood (Taylor vs. Mitchell [1868], 57 Pa. St., 209) is regarded to be the best considered. In t h is opin ion is fou n d t h e follow in g : Retrospective laws generally if not universally work injustice, and ought t o be so construed on ly when the mandate of the legislature is imperative. When a t estator makes a will, for m a lly ex ecuted according t o the requirements of the law existing at the time of its execution, it w ou ld u njustly disappoint his lawful right of disposition t o apply to it a rule su bsequ en t ly en a ct ed, t h ou g h befor e h is dea t h . It is, of course, a general rule of statutory construction, as this cou r t h a s sa id, t h a t "a ll st atutes are t o be construed as having only a prospective opera t ion u n less t h e pu r pose a n d in tention of the Legislature to give them a retr ospect iv e effect is ex pr essly decla r ed or is n ecessarily implied from the language used. In every case of doubt, the doubt must be r esolv ed a gainst the restrospective effect." (Montilla vs. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos [1913 ], 2 4 Ph il., 2 20. See also Chew Heong vs. U.S. [1884], 112 U.S., 536; U.S. vs American Sugar Ref. Co. [1906], 2 02 U.S., 563.) Statute law, as found in the Civil Code, is corroborative; article 3 thereof provides t hat "laws shall not have a retroactive effect, unless therein otherwise prescribed." The languag e of A ct No. 2645 gives no indication of retrospective effect. Such, likewise, has been the un ifor m t endency of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands on cases having special applica t ion t o t estamentary succession. (Abello vs. Kock de Monaterio [1904], 3 Phil., 558; Timbol vs. Man a lo [1 906], 6 Phil., 254; Bona vs. Briones, supra; In the Ma t t er of t h e Pr oba t ion of t h e W ill of Bibiana Diquiña [1918], R. G. No. 13176, 1 concerning the language of the Will. See a lso sect ion 6 1 7 , Code of Civ il Pr ocedu r e.) T h e strongest argument against our accepting the first two rules comes out of section 6 3 4 of t h e Code of Civil Procedure which, in negative terms, provides that a will shall be disa llow ed in either of five cases, the first being "if not executed and attested as in this Act pr ov ided." A ct No. 2645 has, of course, becom e part and parcel of the Code of Civ il Pr ocedu r e. T h e w ill in qu estion is admittedly not executed and attested as provided by the Code of Civil Procedu r e a s a m ended. Nevertheless, it is proper to observe that the general pr in ciple in t h e la w of w ills in serts itself even within the provisions of said section 634. Our statute announces a positive rule for the transference of property which must be complied with as completed act at the t ime of the ex ecution, so far as the act of the t estator is concerned, as t o all t estaments made subsequen t t o t h e enactment of Act No. 2645, but is not effective as to testaments made a n t eceden t t o t h a t da t e. T o answer the question with which we began this decision, we adopt as our own the second r u le, particularly as established by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The will of Jose Riosa is v a lid. T h e order of the Court of First Instance for the Province of Albay of December 2 9 , 1 9 1 7 , disallowing the will of Jose Riosa, is reversed, and the record shall be returned to the lower court w ith direction to admit the said will t o probate, without special findings as to costs. So order ed.

ENRIQUEZ V S A BA DIA 9 5 SCRA 6 2 7 FA CT S: On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, par ish pr iest of T a lisa y , C ebu , ex ecu t ed a document purporting t o be his Last Will and Testament. He died on January 1 4, 194 3 a n d left pr operties estimated at P8,000 in value. On October 2, 1946, one Andres Enriqu ez, on e of t h e legatees, filed a petition for its probate in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Some cousins a n d n ephews, who would inherit the estate of the decea sed if h e left n o w ill, filed opposit ion . Du r ing the hearing one of the attesting witnesses, the other two being dead, t est ified w it h ou t con tradiction that in his presence and in the presence of his co-witnesses, Father Sancho w r ot e ou t in longhand the subject document in Spanish which the testator spoke and understood; tha t h e (testator) signed on the left hand margin of the front page of each of the three folios or sheet s of w hich the document is com posed, and numbered the same with Arabic numerals, and fina lly signed his name at the end of his writing at the last page, all this, in the presen ce of t h e t h r ee a t testing witnesses after t elling that it was his last will and that the said three witn esses sig n ed t h eir names on the last page after the attestation clause in his presence and in t h e pr esen ce of ea ch ot h er . T h e opposit or s did n ot su bm it a n y ev iden ce. T h e learned trial court found and declared the subject document to be a holographic will; that it w as in the handwriting of the t estator and that although at the time it was executed a n d a t t h e t im e of the testator's death, holographic wills were not permitted by law still, because at the t ime of t h e hearing and when the case was to be decided the new Civil Code w a s a lr ea dy in for ce, w hich Code permitted the execution of holographic wills, under a liberal view, and t o car r y ou t t h e intention of the testator which according to the trial court is the controlling factor an d m a y ov erride any defect in form, said trial court admitted to probate the subject docu m en t , a s t h e La st W ill a n d T est a m en t of Fa t h er Sa n ch o A ba dia . ISSUE: a pplied.

W h ether or not the provisions of the Civil Code allowing holographic wills sh ou ld be

HELD:

No. The new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) under article 810 thereof provides that a person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated and signed by the t estator himself and need not be witnessed. It is a fact, however, that at t h e t im e t h e su bject document was executed in 1923 and at the time that Father Abadia died in 1943 , h olog r a ph ic w ills were not permitted, and the law at the time imposed certain requirements for the execution of w ills, such as numbering correlatively each page (not folio or sheet) in letters and sign in g on t h e left hand margin by the testator and by the three attesting witnesses, requirem en t s w h ich w ere not complied with in the subject document because the back pages of the first two foli os of t h e will were not signed by any one, not even by the testator and were not numbered, a n d a s t o t h e t h r ee fr on t pa g es, t h ey w er e sig n ed on ly by t h e t est a t or . Bu t Article 795 of this same new Civil Code expressly provides: "The validity of a w ill a s t o it s form depends upon the observance of the law in for ce a t t h e t im e it is m a de." T h e a bov e pr ov ision is but an expression or statement of the weight of author it y t o t h e a ffect t h a t t h e v alidity of a will is to be judged not by the law enforce at the time of the testator's death or at the t im e the supposed will is presented in court for probate or when the petition is decided by t h e court but at the t ime the instrument was executed. One reason in su ppor t of t h e r u le is t h a t a lthough the will operates upon and after the death of the testator, the w ish es of t h e t est a t or a bout the disposition of his estate among his heirs and among t h e leg a t ees is g iv en solem n

ex pression at the time the will is executed, and in reality, the legacy or bequest then becom es a com plet ed a ct . Fr om the day of the death of the testator, if he leaves a will, the title of the legatees and devisees u nder it becomes a vested right, protected under the due process cla u se of t h e con st it u t ion a gainst a subsequent change in the statute adding new legal requirements of execut ion of w ills w hich would invalidate such a will. By parity of reasoning, when one execut es a w ill w h ich is inv alid for failure to observe and follow the legal requirements at the t ime of its execution t h en u pon his death he should be regarded and declared as having died intestate, and h is h eir s w ill t h en inherit by intestate succession, and no subsequent law with more liberal requir em en t s or w hich dispenses with such requirements as to execution should be allowed to validate a defective w ill and thereby divest the heirs of their vested rights in the estate by intestate succession . T h e g en er a l r u le is t h a t t h e Leg isla t u r e ca n n ot v a lida t e v oid w ills.

sh all be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in a n y m a n n er w h a t soev er , ev en sh ou ld t h e t est a t or ot h er w ise pr ov ide‖ . Mor eover, the said condition is contrary to law because it ex pr essly ig n or es t h e t est a t or 's n ational law when, according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the t est a t or is t h e on e t o g ov er n h is t est a m en t a r y disposit ion s. T h erefore, the condition, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, a n d the institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effect iv e ev en a s t o t h e h er ein opposit or . T h e second clause of the will regarding the law which shall g ov er n it , a n d t o t h e con dit ion im posed u pon t h e leg a t ees, is n u ll a n d v oid, bein g con t r a r y t o la w . T herefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of t h is est ate be made in such a manner as t o include the herein appellant Andre Brim o a s on e of t h e leg a t ees.

In v iew of the foregoing, the order appealed from is reversed, and the subject document is denied pr oba t e.

T estate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, a dm in ist r a t or v s. A NDRE BRIMO 5 0 PHIL 8 6 7 FA CT S: T he judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. An dr e Br im o, on e of t h e br ot h er s of t h e decea sed, opposed it . T h e cou r t , h ow ev er , a ppr ov ed it . T he appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect t h e pr ov isions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the law s of h is T u r kish n ationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation or article 1 0 of t h e Civ il Code. Bu t the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testamentary disposit ion s a r e n ot in a ccordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showin g w h a t t h e Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of ev iden ce on su ch la w s, t h ey a r e pr esu m ed t o be t h e sa m e a s t h ose of t h e Ph ilippin es. T here is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of t h e t est a t or Joseph G. Br im o was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary t o our la w s in for ce, m u st be com plied w it h a n d ex ecu t ed. la w ph il.n et A s t o the exclusion of the herein appellant as a legatee, inasmuch as h e is on e of t h e per son s designated as such in will, it must be taken into consideration that such exclusion is based on the la st part of the second clause of the will, which says:‖ that althoug h by la w , I a m a T u r kish cit izen, this citizenship having been conferred upon me by conquest and not by free choice, n or by nationality and, on the other hand, having resided for a considerable leng t h of t im e in t h e Ph ilippine Islands where I succeeded in acquiring all of the property that I n ow possess, it is my w ish that the distribution of my property and everything in connection with t h is, m y w ill, be m ade and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Ph ilippine islands, request in g a ll of my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and ca n cel befor eh a n d w h a t ev er disposition found in this will favorable to the person or persons who fail t o com ply w it h t h is r equ est .‖ T h e institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is t h a t t h e in st it u t ed legatees must respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in accor da n ce w it h t h e la w s of h is n a t ion a lit y , bu t in a ccor da n ce w it h t h e la w s of t h e Ph ilippin es. ISSUE: W h ether or not the condition im posed by the decedent in his will is void being contrary t o la w . HELD: T h e Supreme Court held that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 7 9 2 of t h e Civil Code provides that ― Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or g ood m or a ls

BELLIS v s BELLIS 2 0 SCRA 3 5 8 FA CTS: Amos G. Bellis, born in T exas, was "a citizen of the State of T ex a s a n d of t h e Un it ed St ates." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legit im a t e ch ildr en : Edward, George, (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Hen r y , A lex a n der a n d A n n a Bellis A llsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who surviv ed h im , h e h a d t h r ee leg it im a t e ch ildren: Edwin, Walter and Dorothy and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr ., Ma r ia Cr ist in a Bellis a n d Mir ia m Pa lm a Bellis. A m os G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which h e dir ect ed t h a t a ft er a ll t a x es, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his dist r ibu t a ble est a t e sh ou ld be div ided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Ma r y E. Ma llen; (b) P120,000.00 t o his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Mir iam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the for eg oin g t w o it em s h a v e been sa t isfied, the remainder shall go t o his seven surviving children by his first and second wiv es in equ a l sh a r es. 1 ä w ph ï1 .ñ ët Su bsequently, died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted t o proba t e in t h e Cou r t of Fir st In st a n ce T h e People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid a ll t h e bequ est s t h er ein in cluding the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the t hree (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palm a Bellis, a n d pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the t estator's Last Will and T esta m en t — div ided t h e r esiduary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of t h e t est a t or 's sev en leg it im a t e ch ildr en by h is fir st a n d secon d m a r r i a g es. Ma r ia Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of pa rtition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate childr en a n d, t h er efor e, com pu lsor y h eir s of t h e decea sed. T h e lower court, issued an order ov erruling the oppositions and approving the execu t or 's fin a l a ccount, report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art . 1 6 of t h e Civ il Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did n ot pr ov ide for leg it im es. Issu e: W ON t h e n a t ion a l la w of A m os Bellis sh ou ld a pply in t h e sa id pa r t it ion . Held: Y ES. In t he present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was bot h a n a t ion a l of T ex a s a n d a dom icile thereof at the time of his death. So that even assuming T exas has a conflict of law r u le pr ov iding that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same w ou ld n ot r esult in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law . Ra t h er , t h ey argue that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the t h ir d pa r a g r a ph of A r t icle 1 7 in r ela t ion t o A r t icle 1 6 of t h e Civ il Code.

A rticle 1 6, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applica ble t h e n a t ion a l la w of t h e decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a ) t h e or der of su ccession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of th e pr ov ision s of t h e w ill; a n d (d) t h e ca pa cit y t o su cceed. A ppellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that — Pr ohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object pu blic order, public policy and good customs shall not be r en der ed in effect iv e by la w s or ju dgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country . pr evails as the exception t o Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore -quoted. This is not correct. It is ev ident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it h a s specifically chosen t o leave, inter alia, the amount of succession a l r ig h t s, t o t h e deceden t 's n a t ion a l la w . Specific pr ov ision s m u st pr ev a il ov er g en er a l on es. T h e parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A ., a n d that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, sin ce t h e in trinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of succession a l r ig h t s a r e t o be det ermined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the t estacy of A m os G. Bellis. W h er efor e, t h e or der of t h e pr oba t e cou r t is h er eby a ffir m ed in t ot o.

Bu gn a o v . Uba g 1 4 PHIL 1 6 3 FA CT S: T h e last will and t estament of Domingo Ubag was admitted for probate. It was signed by him in t h e presence of three subscribing and attesting witnesses and appears upon its face t o have been du ly executed in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure on the making of w ills. The instrument was propounded by his widow Catalina Bugnao who is the sole beneficiary. T h e order admitting the will was appealed by the appellants who are brothers and sisters of t h e deceased and would be entitled to share in the distribution of his estate, if probate were den ied, a s it appears that the deceased left no heirs in the direct ascending or descen din g lin e. T h ey con tend that Ubag was not of sound mind and memory, and w a s ph y sica lly a n d m en t a lly in ca pa ble of m a kin g a w ill. T h e appellants pointed out that one of the attesting witnesses stated that the decease sa t u p in bed and signed his name t o the will, and that after its execution food was given him by hi s w ife; w hile the other testified that he was assisted into a sitting position, and was given somethin g t o ea t befor e h e sig n ed h is n a m e. A ppellants also contended that the decedent was physically inca pa cit a t ed t o m a ke t h e w ill because he was then suffering from an advanced stage of tuberculosis, such that he was too weak t o st and or even sit up unaided, and that he could not speak w h en h e h a d a st h m a a t t a cks. Of t he four witnesses appellant presented who tried to prove that the attesting wit n esses w er e n ot present during the signing of the will by the decedent, two of the witnesses stand to in h er it fr om the decedent if the will were denied proba t e. T h ese t w o w it n esses, on dir ect cr oss ex amination, later admitted that they were not even in the house of the decedent at th e t im e of t h e execution of the will. The attesting witnesses, on t h e ot h er h a n d, t est ified on t h e du e ex ecu t ion a n d t est a m en t a r y ca pa cit y of t h e deceden t . A ppellants, who are siblings of the decedent, also claimed that the will was obta in ed by fr a u d con sider in g t h a t t h ey w er e ex clu ded t h er efr om .

T hat the testator was mentally capable of making the will is in our opinion fully establish ed by t h e testimony of the subscribing witnesses who swore positively that, at the time of its execution, h e was of sound mind and memory. It is true that their testimony discloses the fact that h e w a s a t that time extremely ill, in an advanced st a g e of t u ber cu losis com plica t ed w it h sev er e in termittent attacks of asthma; that he was too sick t o rise unaided from his bed; that he needed a ssistance even to rise himself to a sitting position; and that during the paroxysms of asthm a t o w hich he was subject he could not speak; but all this evidence of physical weakn ess in n o w ise est ablishes his mental incapacity or a lack of t estamentary capacity, and indeed the eviden ce of t h e subscribing witnesses as t o the aid furnished them by the testator in preparing the will, a n d h is clear recollection of the boundaries and physical description of the various parcels of land set ou t therein, taken together with the fact that he was able to give to the person who wrote the will clear and explicit instructions as to his desires touching the disposition of his property, is strong ev iden ce of h is t est a m en t a r y ca pa cit y . Counsel for appellant suggests that the fact that the alleged will leaves all t h e pr oper t y of t h e t estator t o his widow, and wholly fails t o make any provision for his brothers or sisters, indicates a lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence; and because of the inherent im probabilit y t hat a man would make so unnatural and unreasonable a w ill, t h ey con t en d t h a t t h is fa ct in directly corroborates their contention that the deceased never did in fact execute the will. Bu t w hen it is considered that the deceased at the time of his death had no heirs in the ascendin g or descending line; that a bitter family quarrel had long separated h im fr om h is br ot h er s a n d sist ers, who declined to have any relations with the test a t or beca u se h e a n d h is w ife w er e a dherents of the Aglipayano Church; and that this quarrel was so bitter that none of his brothers or sisters, although som e of them lived in the vicinity, were present at the time of h is dea t h or a t tended his funeral; we think the fact that the deceased desired t o leave and did leave all of h is pr operty to his widow and made no provision for his brothers and sisters, who themselves w er e g r own men and women, by no means t ends to disclose either an unsound mind or the presen ce of u ndue influence on the part of his wife, or in any wise corroborates contestants' allegation that t h e w ill n ev er w a s ex ecu t ed. For the purposes of this decision it is not necessary for us to attempt to lay down a definit ion of t estamentary capacity which will cover all possible cases which may present themselves, because, a s will be seen from what has already been said, the testator was, a t t h e t im e of m a kin g t h e in strument under consideration, endowed with all the elements of mental capacity set out in the following definition of t estamentary capacity which has been frequently announced in cou r t s of la st resort in England and the United States; and while is some cases t estamentary capacity h a s been held to exist in the absence of proof of some of these elements, there ca n be n o qu est ion t hat, in the absence of proof of very exceptional circumstances, proof of the existence of all these elem en t s in su fficien t t o est a blish t h e ex ist en ce of t est a m en t a r y ca pa cit y . T estamentary capacity is the capacity t o comprehend the nature of the transact ion w h ich t h e t estator is engaged at the t ime, t o recollect the property to be disposed of and t h e per son w h o w ould naturally be supposed to have claims upon the testator, and t o comprehend the manner in w hich the instrumen t w ill dist r ibu t e h is pr oper t y a m on g t h e object s of h is bou n t y . T h e or der pr oba t in g t h e w i ll a ffir m ed.

ISSUE: W h ether the evidence of the a ppella n t s is su fficien t t o pr ov e t h a t t h e t est a t or la cked t estamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the will or that he was induced by fra u d in m a kin g t h e sa m e

JULIANA BAGTAS, plaintiffs-appellee, vs. ISIDRO PAGUIO, ET AL., defen da n t sa ppel l a n t s. 22 PHIL 227 FA CT S: T h e testator,Pioquinto Paguio, for some 14 or 15 years prior to the time of h is dea t h su ffer ed fr om a paralysis of the left side of his body; that a few years prior to his death his hearing became im paired and that he lost the power of speech. Owing t o the paralysis of certain muscles his head fell to one side, and saliva ran from his mouth. He retained the use of his right hand, h ow ev er , a n d was able t o write fairly well. Through the medium of signs he was able to indicate his wishes to h is w ife and to ot h er m em ber s of h is fa m ily .

HELD:

A t the t ime of the execution of his will, four testamentary wit n esses w er e pr esen t : A g u st in

Pa guio, Anacleto Paguio, and Pedro Paguio, and attorney, Señor Ma r co, a n d on e Flor en t in o Ram os.The testator, wrote out on pieces of paper notes and items relating to the disposit ion of h is property, and these notes were in turn delivered t o Señor Marco, who transcr ibed them a n d pu t them in form. The witnesses testify that the pieces of paper u pon w h ich t h e n ot es w er e w ritten are delivered to attorney by the t estator; that the attorney r ea d t h em t o t h e t est a t or a sking if they were his t estamentary dispositions; that the testator assented each tim e w it h a n a ffirmative movement of his head; that after the will as a whole had been thus w r it t en by t h e a t torney, it was read in a loud voice in the presence of the testator and the witnesses; that Señ or Ma rco gave the document to the t estator; that the latter, after looking over it , sig n ed it in t h e pr esence of the four subscribing witnesses; and that they in turn signed it in the presence of t h e t est a t or a n d ea ch ot h er . T h e executrix and widow of the decedent, Juliana Bagtas, filed a petition t o probat e t h e w ill of Pa guio.It was opposed by Isidro Paguio, son of the deceased and several g r a n dch ildr en by a form er marriage, the latter being the children of a deceased daughter. Their opposition is ba sed on t he ground that the will was not executed according to the formalities and requirements of the law, and further that the testator was not in the full of enjoyment and use of his mental facult ies t o ex ecute a valid w ill. CFI Bu la ca n a dm it s t h e w ill t o pr oba t e. Hen ce, t h is a ppea l. ISSUE: DID THE TESTATOR POSSESS THE REQUIRED MENTAL SOUNDNESS TO VALIDLY EX ECUT E A W ILL? HELD: CFI A FFIRMED Upon this point considerable evidence was adduced at the trial. One of the attestin g w it n esses t estified that at the time of the execution of the will the testator was in his right mind, a n d t h a t a lthough he was seriously ill, he indicated by movements of his hea d w h a t h is w ish es w er e. A nother of the attesting witnesses stated that he was not able to say whether deceden t h a d t h e fu ll use of his mental faculties or not, because he had been ill for som e years, and t h a t h e (t h e w itnesses) was not a physician. The other subscribing witness, Pedro Pag u io, t est ified in t h e low er court as a witness for the opponents. He was unable t o state whether or not t h e w ill w a s t h e wish of the testator. The only reasons he gave for his statemen t w er e t h e in fir m it y a n d a dv anced age of the testator and the fact that he was unable to speak. The witness stated that the t estator signed the will, a n d h e v er ified h is ow n sig n a t u r e a s a su bscr ibin g w it n ess. Flor entino Ramos, although not an attesting witness, stated that he was present when t h e w ill w as executed and his testimony was cumulative in corroboration of the manner in which the will w as executed and as to the fact that the testator signed the will. This witness also stated th a t h e h a d frequently transacted matters of business for the decedent and had written letters and made inv entories of his property at his request, and that immediately before and after the execution of t h e will he had performed offices of his character. He stat ed t h a t t h e deceden t w a s a ble t o communicate his thoughts by writing. The testimony of t h is w it n ess clea r ly in dica t es t h e pr esence of mental capacity on the part of the testator. Among other witnesses for the opponents w ere two physician, Doctor Basa and Doctor Viado. Doctor Basa testified that he had a t t en ded t h e testator some four or five years prior to his death and that the latter h a d su ffer ed fr om a cerebral congestion from which the paralysis resulted. The following question was propou n ded to Doct or Ba sa :

Doct or Viado, the other physician, have never seen the testator, but his answer was in reply t o a hy pothetical question as t o w hat be the mental condition of a person who was 79 year s old a n d w ho had suffered from a malady such as the t estator was supposed to have had according to t h e t estimony of Doctor Basa, whose testimony Doctor Viado had heard. He replied and discussed at som e length the symptoms and consequences of the decea se fr om w h ich t h e t est a t or h a d su ffered; he read in support of his statements from a work by a German Physician, Dr. Herm a n Eichost. In answer, however, to a direct question, he stated that he would be unable to certify t o t h e m en t a l con dit ion of a per son w h o w a s su ffer in g fr om su ch a disea se. W e do not think that the testimony of these two ph y sicia n s in a n y w a y st r en g t h en s t h e con tention of the appellants. Their testimony only confirms the fact that the t estat or h a d been for a number of years prior to his death afflicted with paralysis, in con sequ en ce of w h ich h is phy sician and mental strength was greatly impaired. Neither of them attempted t o st a t e w h a t w as the mental condition of the testator at the time he executed the will in question. Th er e ca n be n o doubt that the testator's infirmities were of a very serious character, and it is quite evident t hat his mind was not as active as it had been in the earlier years of his life. However, we cann ot in clude from this that he wanting in the necessary mental capacity t o dispose of his property b y w ill. T h e courts have been called upon frequently to nullify wills executed under such circumstances, bu t the weight of the authority is in support if the principle that it is only when those seekin g t o ov erthrow the will have clearly established the charge of mental incapacity that the cou r t s w ill in tervene to set aside a testamentary document of t h is ch a r a ct er .In t h is ju r isdict ion t h e pr esumption of law is in favor of the mental capacity of the testator and the burden is u pon t h e con testants of the will to prove the lack of t estamentary capacity. The rule of law relating t o t h e pr esumption of mental soundness is well established, and the testator in the case at ba r n ev er h aving been adjudged insane by a court of competent jurisdiction, this presumption cont in u es, a n d it is therefore incumbent upon the opponents to overcome this legal presumption by proper ev idence. This we think they have failed to do. There are many cases and authorities w h ich w e m ight cite t o show that the courts have repeatedly held that mere weakness of mind a n d body , in duced by age and disease do not render a person incapable of making a will. The law does n ot r equire that a person shall continue in the full enjoyment and use of his pristine ph y sica l a n d m en t a l pow er s in or der t o ex ecu t e a v a lid w ill In t he above case the will was sustained. In the case at bar we might draw the same cont r a st a s w as pictured by the court in the case just quoted. The striking change in the physical and mental v igor of the t estator during the last years of his life may have led some of those who knew him in h is earlier days to entertain doubts as t o his mental capacity to make a will, yet we think that the st atements of the witnesses to the execution of the will and statemen t s of t h e con du ct of t h e t estator at that t ime all indicate that he unquestionably h a d m en t a l ca pa cit y a n d t h a t h e ex ercised it on this occasion. At the t ime of the execution of the will it does not appear t h a t h is con duct was irrational in any particular. He seems to have compreh en ded clea r ly w h a t t h e n ature of the business was in which he was engaged. The evidence show that t h e w r it in g a n d ex ecution of the will occupied a period several hours and that the t estator was present during all t h is time, taking an active part in all the proceedings. Again, the will in the case at bar is perfectly r ea son a ble a n d it s disposit ion s a r e t h ose of a r a t ion a l per son .

Q. Referring to mental condition in which you found him the last time you attended him, do you think he w as in his right m ind? A. I can not say exactly whether he was in his right mind, but I noted som e m ental dis order, becaus e w hen I s pok e to him he did not ans w er m e. Doct or Basa t estified at more length, but the substance of his testimony is that the testat or h a d su ffered a paralysis and that he had noticed some mental disorder. He d oes n ot sa y t h a t t h e t estator was not in his right mind at the time of the execution of the will, nor does he give it at his opinion that he was without the necessary mental capacity to make a valid will. He did not st a t e in what way this mental disorder had manifested itself other than that he had noticed t h a t t h e t est a t or did n ot r eply t o h im on on e occa sion w h en h e v isit ed h im .

T RINIDAD NEYRA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ENCARNA CION NEYRA , defen da n t a ppel l ee 76 PHIL 333 FA CT S: Sev ero Nayra died leaving certain properties and two children, by his first m a r r ia g e, n a m ed En carnacion Neyra and Trinidad Neyra, and other children by his second marriage; Th a t a ft er t h e death of Severo Neyra, the two sisters, Encarnacion Neyra and Trinidad Neyra, had ser iou s

m isunderstandings, in connection with the properties left by their decea sed fa t h er .T r in ida d Ney ra filed a complaint against her sister, Encarnacion Neyra, in CFI Manila, for the recovery of ½ of a property left by their deceased father, and demanding at the same tim e ½ of t h e r en t s collected on the said property by the defendant Encarnacion Neyra. CFI decided in fa v ou r of T r inidad but at the same time ordered her to pay Encarnacion the sum of P7 27.77, plus interests, by virtue of said counterclaims.Trinidad Neyra appealed from the said decision, to the Cou r t of A ppea ls. T h e Court of Appeals, dismissed the appeal on a decision dated November 10, 1942, by virtue of sa id agreement or compromise, Atty. Lucio Javillonar, claiming to represent Encarnacion Neyra, w ho had died since November 4, 1942, and other relatives of hers, The heirs of the deceased filed a m otion for reconsideration, claiming that the alleg ed com pr om ise or a g r eem e n t , da t ed Nov ember 3, 1942, could not have been understood by Encarnacion Neyra, as she wa s a lr ea dy t h en at the threshold of death, and that as a matter of fact she died the following day; and that if it had been signed at all by said Encarnacion Ney r a , h e r t h u m bm a r k a ppea r in g on sa id document must have been affixed thereto by Trinidad Neyra's attorney, against Enca r n a cion 's w ill. Pen ding the appeal before CA, Encarnacion became seriously ill and was advised by her religious a dv iser, Fr. Garcia to reconcile with her sister. Trinidad was invited to her sister‘s hom e and they r econciled while Encarnacion was lying in bed. In the course of their conversation w h ich t h ey a lso talked about the properties left by their father and their litigations which had r ea ch ed t h e Court of Appeals, and they agreed to have the latter dismissed, on the condition that the property inv olved therein should be given exclusively t o Trinidad Neyra, that the latter should waiv e h er sh are in the rents of said property collected by Encarnacion, and t h e T r in ida d h a d n o m or e in debtedness t o Encarnacion. Attorney Panis prepared said document of compromise as well a s t h e new will and testament, naming Trinidad Neyra an d Eu st a qu io Men doza ben eficia r ies t h erein, pursuant to Encarnacion's express instructions, and the two documents were prepared, in duplicate, and were ready for signature, since the morning of November 3, 1942; th a t in t h e a ft ernoon of that day, of compromise and last will and t estament to Encarnacion Neyra, slow ly a n d in a loud voice, in the presence of Father Teodoro Garcia, Dr. Moises B. A ba d, Dr . Ela dio A ldecoa, Trinidad Neyra, and others, after which he asked her if their terms were in accorda n ce w ith her wishes, or if she wanted any change made in said documents; that Encarnacion Ney r a did not suggest any change, and asked for the pad and the two documents, and, with the help of a son of Trinidad, placed her thumbmark at t h e foot of ea ch on e of t h e t w o docu m en t s, in du plicate, on her bed in the sala, in the presence of attesting witnesses, Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr . Ela dio R. Aldecoa and Atty. Alejandro M. Panis, after which said witnesses signed at t h e foot of t h e will, in the presence of Encarnacion Neyra, and of each other. The agreement was also signed by Trinidad Neyra, as party, and by Dr. M. B. Abad a n d Eu st a qu io Men doza , a pr ot eg e, a s w it n esses. T eodora Neyra, Presentacion Blanco and Ceferina de la Cruz argue, that when the thumbmark of En carnacion Neyra was affixed to the agreement in question, dated November 3, 1 942, sh e w a s sleeping on her bed in the s ala; and that the attesting witnesses were not present, as they were in t h e caida. ISSUES: W HETHER ENCARNACION WAS OF SOUND MIND WHEN SHE SIGNED HER W ILL A ND T HE COMPROMISE A GREEMENT W HET HER T HE W IT NESSES W ERE PRESENT IN T HE SIGNING OF T HE W ILL HELD: PET IT ION DENIED, CA A FFIRMED 1 .It has been conclusively shown that Encarnacion Neyra died on November 4, 1 9 4 2 , du e t o a h eart attack, at the age of 48, after an illness of about two (2) years. Presentacion Blanco, in t h e course of her cross-examination, frankly admitted that, in the mor n in g a n d a lso a t a bou t 6 o'clock in he afternoon of November 3, 1942, Encarn a cion Ney r a t a lked t o h er t h a t t h ey u nderstood each other clearly, thus showing that the testatrix was really of sound min d, a t t h e t im e of sig n in g a n d ex ecu t ion of t h e a g r eem en t a n d w ill in qu est ion . It m ay, therefore, be reasonably concluded that the mental faculties of persons suffer in g fr om A ddison's disease, like the testatrix in this case, remain unimpaired, partly due to the fact t h a t , on a ccount of the sleep they enjoy, they necessarily receive the benefit of physica l a n d m en t a l

r est. And that like patients suffering from tuberculosis, insom nia or diabetes, they preserve their m en t a l fa cu lt ies u n t il t h e m om en t s of t h eir dea t h . Ju dging by the authorities above cited, the logical conclusion is that Encarnacion Neyr a w a s of sou nd mind and possessed the necessary testamentary and mental capacity, at the t im e of t h e ex ecu t ion of t h e a g r eem en t a n d w ill, da t ed Nov em ber 3 , 1 9 4 2 . 2 .The contention that the attesting witnesses were not present, at the t ime Encarnacion Ney r a t humbmarked the agreement and will in question, on her bed, in the s ala of the house, a s t h ey w ere allegedly in the caida, is untenable. It has been fully sh ow n t h a t sa id w it n esses w er e pr esent, at the time of the signing and execution of the agr eem en t a n d w ill in qu est ion , in t h e sala, where the t estatrix was lying on her bed. The true t est is not whether they actually sa w ea ch other at the time of the signing of the documents, but whether they might have seen ea ch ot h er sign, had they chosen to do so; and the attesting witnesses actually saw it all in t h is ca se. A nd the thumbmark placed by the testatrix on the agreement and will in question is equiva len t t o h er sig n a t u r e.

In r e est a t e of Pir a so, decea sed. SIXT O A COP, pet i t i on er -a ppel l a n t , v s. SA LMING PIRA SO, ET A L., oppon en t s-a ppel l ees. 52 PHIL 660 FA CT S: T h e proponent Acop appeals the judgment of the CFI Benguet, denying the probate of last w ill a n d testament of the deceased Piraso. The will was written in English; that Piraso knew h ow t o speak the Ilocano dialect, although imperfectly, and could make him self u n der st ood in t h a t dia lect, and the court is of the opinion that his will should have been writ t en in t h a t dia lect . ISSUE: W A S T HE W ILL V A LIDLY EX ECUT ED? HELD: CFI A FFIRMED Sect ion 6 2 8 of t h e Code of Civ il Pr ocedu r e, st r ict ly pr ov ides t h a t : "No w ill, except as provides in the preceding section" (as to wills executed by a Spa n ia r d or a r esident of the Philippine Islands, before the present Code of Civil Procedure went int o effect ), "s hall be valid t o pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect t h e sa m e, unles s it be w ritten in the language or dialect k now n by the tes tator," Nor can the presumption in favor of the will established by this court in Abangan vs. A ba n g a n (4 0 Phil., 476), to the effect that the testator is presumed to know the dialect of the locality where h e resides, unless there is proof to the contrary, even he invoked in support of the probate of said document as a will, because, in the instant case, not only is it not prov en t h a t En g lish is t h e la nguage of the City of Baguio where the deceased Piraso lived and where the will was drawn, but t hat the record contains positive proof that said Piraso knew no other language than the Igorrote dia lect, with a smattering of Ilocano; that is, he did not know the English language in which then w ill is written. So that even if such a presumption could have been raised in this ca se it w ou ld h a v e been w h olly con t r a dict ed a n d dest r oy ed. Su ch a result based upon solidly established facts would be t h e sa m e w h et h er or n ot it be t echnically held that said will, in order t o be valid, must be w r it t en in t h e Iloca n o dia lect ; w hether or not the Igorrote or Inibaloi dialect is a cultivated language and used a s a m ea n s of communication in writing, and whether or not the testator Piraso knew the Ilocano dialect w ell en ough to understand a will written in said dialect. The fact is, we repeat, that it is quite cert a in t hat the instrument Exhibit A was written in English which the supposed testator Piraso did n ot kn ow, and this is sufficient to invalidate said will according t o the clear and positive provisions of t h e la w , a n d in ev it a bly pr ev en t s it s pr oba t e.

GERMA N JA BONET A , pl a in t iff-a ppel l a n t , v s. RICA RDO GUST ILO, ET A L., defen da n t s-a ppel l ees. 5 PHIL 541 FA CT S: Ma cario Jaboneta executed under the following circumstances the document in question, which h a s been pr esen t ed for pr oba t e a s h is w ill: Being in the house of Arcadio Jarandilla, in Jaro, in this province, he ordered that the document in question be written, and calling Julio Javellana, An icet o Ja lbu en a , a n d Isa belo Jen a a s w itnesses, executed the said document as his will. They were all t ogether, and were in the r oom w here Jaboneta was, and were present when he signed the docum en t , Isa belo Jen a sig n in g a ft erwards as a witness, at his request, and in his presence and in the presence of the oth er t w o w itnesses. Aniceto Jalbuena then signed as a witness in the presence of the testator, an d in t h e pr esence of the other two persons who signed as witnesses. At that moment Isabelo Jena, bein g in a hurry t o leave, took his hat and left the room. As he was leaving the house Julio Ja v ella n a t ook the pen in his hand and put himself in position t o sign the will as a witness, but did not sign in the presence of Isabelo Jena; but nevertheless, after Jena had left t h e r oom t h e sa id Ju lio Jav ellana signed as a witness in the presence of the testator and of the witness Aniceto Jalbuena. T h e last will and t estament of Macario Jaboneta, deceased, was den ied pr oba t e beca u se t h e low er court was of the opinion from the evidence adduced at the hearing that Julio Ja v ella n a , on e of the witnesses, did not attach his signature thereto in the presence of Isabelo Jena, another of t h e witnesses, as required by the prov isions of section 618 of the Code of Civ il Pr ocedu r e.. ISSUE: EXTRINSIC V A LIDIT Y OF T HE W ILL W IT H RESPECT T O T HE ST A T UT ORY REQUIREMENT OF WITNESSES SIGNING THE WILL IN THE PRESENCE OF EACH OTHER HELD: T RIA L COURT REV ERSED W e can not agree with so much of the above finding of fa ct s a s h olds t h a t t h e sig n a t u r e of Jav ellana was not signed in the presence of Jena, in compliance with the provision s of sect ion 6 1 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The fact that Jen a w a s st ill in t h e r oom w h en h e sa w Jav ellana moving his hand and pen in the act of affixing his signature to the will, taken togeth er w ith the testimony of the remaining witnesses which shows that Javellana did in fact ther e a n d t h en sign his name to the will, convinces us that the signature was a ffix ed in t h e pr esen ce of Jena. The fact that he was in the act of leaving, and that his back was turned while a por t ion of t h e name of the witness was being written, is of no importance. He, with the other witnesses and t h e testator, had assembled for the purpose of executing the testament, and were together in th e sam e room for that purpose, and at the mom ent w h en t h e w it n ess Ja v ella n a sig n ed t h e document he was actually and physically present and in such position with relation to Javellan a t hat he could see everything which t ook place by merely casting his eyes in the proper direction , a n d without any physical obstruction t o prevent his doing so, therefore we are of opinion that the docu m en t w a s in fa ct sig n ed befor e h e fin a lly left t h e r oom . T h e purpose of a statutory requirement that the witness sign in the presence of t h e t est a t or is sa id t o be that the testator may have ocular evidence of the identity of the instrument subscribed by the witness and himself, and the generally accepted t ests of presence are vision a n d m en t a l a pprehension. (See A m . & En g . En c. of La w , v ol. 3 0 , p. 5 9 9 , a n d ca ses t h er e cit ed.) In t he matter of Bedell (2 Connoly (N.Y.), 328) it was held that it is sufficient if the witnesses are t og ether for the purpose of witnessing the execution of the will, and in a position to actually see t h e testator write, if they choose to do so; and there are many cases which lay down the rule that t h e true test of vision is not whether the testator actually saw the witness sign, but w h et h er h e m ight have seen him sign, considering his mental and physical condition and position at the time of t h e su bscr ipt ion . (Spoon em or e vs . Ca bles, 6 6 Mo., 5 7 9 .)

EUT IQUIA A V ERA , pet it ion er -a ppel l ee, v s. MA RINO GA RCIA , a n d JUA N RODRIGUEZ, a s guardian of the minors Cesar Garcia and Jose Gar cia ,object or s a ppel l a n t s

42 PHIL 45 FA CT S: Eu t iquia Avera instituted the probate of the will of one Esteban Garcia; cont est w a s m a de by Ma r ino Garcia and Juan Rodriguez, the latter in the capacity of guardian for t h e m in or s Jose Garcia and Cesar Garcia. The proponent of the will in t r odu ced on e of t h e t h r ee a t t est in g w itnesses who testified that the will was executed with all necessary external form a lit ies, a n d t hat the testator was at the time in full possession of disposing faculties. Upon the la t t er poin t t h e witness was corroborated by the person who wrote the will at the request of the testator. Two of t h e attesting witnesses were not introduced, nor was their a bsen ce a ccou n t ed for by t h e pr oponent of the will. The attorney for the opposit ion in t r odu ced a sin g le w it n ess w h ose t estimony tended to show in a vague and indecisive manner that at the time the will w a s m a de t h e testat or w a s so debilit a t ed a s t o be u n a ble t o com pr eh en d w h a t h e w a s a bou t . T h e trial judge found that the testator at the t ime of the making of the will wa s of sou n d m in d a n d disposing memory and that the will had been properly executed. He accordingly a dm it t ed t h e w ill t o pr oba t e.Hen ce t h is a ppea l ISSUES: w hether a will can be admitted t o probate, where opposition is made, upon the proof of a sin g le a t testing witness, without pr odu cin g or a ccou n t in g for t h e a bsen ce of t h e ot h er t w o; w hether the will in question is rendered invalid by reason of the fact that the sig n a t u r e of t h e t estator and of the three attesting witnesses are written on the right margin of each pa g e of t h e w ill in st ea d of t h e left m a r g in . HELD: low er cou r t a ffir m ed W h ile it is undoubtedly true that an uncontested will bay be proved by the t estimony of only one of t h e three attesting witnesses, nevertheless in Cabang vs. Delfinado (34 Phil., 291), th is cou r t declared after an elaborate examination of the American and English authorities t h a t w h en a con test is instituted, all of the attesting witnesses must be examined, if alive and within reach of t h e pr ocess of t h e cou r t . In t he present case no explanation was made at the trial as to why a ll t h r ee of t h e a t t est in g w itnesses were not produced, but the probable reason is found in the fact t h a t , a lt h ou g h t h e pet ition for the probate of this will had been pending from December 21, 1917, until the dat e set for the hearing, which was April 5 , 1 919, no formal contest was entered until the very day set for t h e hearing; and it is probable that the attorney for the proponent, believing in g ood fa it h t h e pr obate would not be contested, repaired to the court wit h on ly on e of t h e t h r ee a t t est in g w itnesses at hand, and upon finding that the will was contested, incautiously permitted the ca se t o g o to proof without asking for a postponement of the trial in order that he might produ ce a ll t h e attesting witnesses.Although this circumstance may explain why the three witnesses were not pr oduced, it does not in itself supply any basis for changing the rule expounded in the case above r eferred to; and were it not for a fact now t o be men t ion ed, t h is cou r t w ou ld pr oba bly be com pelled to reverse this case on the ground that the execution of the will had not been pr ov ed by a su fficien t n u m ber of a t t est in g w it n esses. W e are of the opinion that the will in question is valid. It is true that the statu t e sa y s t h a t t h e t estator and the instrumental witnesses shall sign their names on the left mar g in of ea ch a n d ev ery page; and it is undeniable that the general doctrine is t o t h e effect t h a t a ll st a t u t or y r equirements as to the execution of wills must be fully complied with. So fa r a s con cer n s t h e a uthentication of the will, and of every part thereof, it can make no possible difference whet h er t h e names appear on the left or no the right margin, provided th ey a r e on on e or t h e ot h er . T h e controlling considerations on the point now before us were well stated In Re will of Abangan (4 0 Phil., 476, 479), where the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Avanceña, in a case where the sig n a t u r es w er e pla ced a t t h e bot t om of t h e pa g e a n d n ot in t h e m a r g in , sa id: The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid s ubstitution o will and testaments and to guarantee the ir truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures s uch ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that

adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the tes tator's las t w ill, m us t be dis regarded. In t he case before us, where ingenuity could not suggest any possible prejudice t o any person, a s a t tendant upon the actual deviation from the letter of the law, such deviation must be considered t oo t r iv ia l t o in v a lida t e t h e in st r u m en t .

IN T HE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JOSEFA VILLACORTE. CELSO ICA SIANO, petitioner-appellee, vs. NATIVIDAD ICASIANO a n d ENRIQUE ICA SIA NO, opposi t or s-a ppel l a n t s. 11 SCRA 423 FA CT S: A special proceeding was commenced on October 2, 1958 for the allowance a n d a dm ission t o pr obate of the original will of Josefa Villacorte, deceased, and for the appointment of petit ion er Celso Icasiano as executor thereof. Natividad Icasiano, a daughter of t h e t est a t r ix , filed h er opposition. Enrique Icasiano, a son of the t estatrix, also filed a manifestation a dopt in g a s h is ow n Natividad's opposition to the probate of the alleged will. Proponent subsequ en t ly filed a m otion for the admission of an amended and supplemental petition, alleging that the deceden t left a will executed in duplicate with all the legal requirements, and that he wa s, on t h a t da t e, su bmitting the signed duplicate , which he allegedly found only on or a bou t Ma y 2 6 , 1 9 5 9 . oppositors Natividad Icasiano de Gomez and Enrique Icasiano filed their joint opposition t o t h e a dm ission of the amended and supplemental petition, but by order, th e cou r t a dm it t ed sa id pet it ion . T h e evidence presented for the petitioner is to the effect that Josefa Villacorte died in the City of Ma n ila on September 12, 1958; that on June 2, 1956, the late Josefa Villacorte executed a last will a n d testament in duplicate at the house of her daughter Mrs. Felisa Icasiano at Pedro Gu ev a r a St reet, Manila, published before and attested by three instrumental witnesses, namely: attorneys Ju sto P. Torres, Jr. a n d Jose V . Na t iv ida d, a n d Mr . V in icio B. Diy ; t h a t t h e w ill w a s a cknowledged by the t estatrix and by the said three instrumental witnesses on t h e sa m e da t e before attorney Jose Oyengco Ong, Notary Public in and for the City of Manila; and that the will w as actually prepared by attorney Fermin Samson, who was also present during the ex ecu t ion a n d signing of the decedent's last will and testament, together with for m er Gov er n or Em ilio Ru stia of Bulacan, Judge Ramon Icasiano and a little gir l. Of t h e sa id t h r ee in st r u m en t a l w itnesses to the execution of the decedent's last will and t est a m en t , a t t or n ey s T or r es a n d Na tividad were in the Philippines at the t ime of the hearing, and bot h t est ified a s t o t h e du e ex ecution and authenticity of the said will. So did the Notary Public before whom t h e w ill w a s a cknowledged by the t estatrix and attesting witnesses, and also attorneys Fermin Samson , w h o a ctually prepared the document. The latter also t est ified u pon cr oss ex a m in a t ion t h a t h e pr epared one original and two copies of Josefa Villacorte last will and testament at his hou se in Ba liuag, Bulacan, but he brought only one original and one signed copy to Manila, retaining on e u n sig n ed copy in Bu la ca n . W itness Natividad who t estified on his failure t o sign page three (3) of the original, admit s t h a t h e may have lifted two pages instead of one when he signed the same, but affir m ed t h a t pa g e t h r ee (3 ) w a s sig n ed in h is pr esen ce. T h e court issued the order admitting the will and its duplicate t o probate. From this or der , t h e opposit or s a ppea led dir ect ly t o t h is Cou r t ISSUE: WHETHER THE WILL IS VALID IN THE ABSENCE OF A WITNESS‘ SIGNA T URE IN ONE PA GE HELD: CFI A FFIRMED On the question of law, we hold that the inadvertent failure of one w itness to affix his signa t u r e t o on e page of a testament, due to the simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course of signin g , is n ot per se sufficient to justify denial of probate. Im possibility of substitut ion of t h is pa g e is a ssured not only the fact that the t estatrix and two other witnesses did sign the defectiv e pa g e,

bu t also by its bearing the coincident imprint of the seal of the notary public befor e w h om t h e t estament was ratified by t estatrix and all three witnesses. The law should not be so strictly a n d lit erally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single witness ov er whose conduct she had no control, where the purpose of the law to guarantee the identity of t h e testament and its com ponent pages is sufficiently attained, no in t en t ion a l or deliber a t e dev iation existed, and the evidence on record attests to the full obser v a n ce of t h e st a t u t or y r equisites. Otherwise, as stated in Vda. de Gil. vs. Murciano, 49 Off. Gaz. 1459, at 1479 (decision on r econsideration) "witnesses may sabotage the w ill by m u ddlin g or bu n g lin g it or t h e a t t est a t ion cla u se". T hat the failure of witness Natividad to sign page three (3) was entirely through pure oversight is sh own by his own testimony as well as by the duplicate copy of the will, which bears a com plet e set of signatures in every page. The text of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment before t h e Notary Public likewise ev iden ce t h a t n o on e w a s a w a r e of t h e defect a t t h e t im e. T h is would not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal application of the st atutory requirements, where the purposes of the law are otherwise satisfied. Thus, despite t h e lit eral tenor of the law, this Court has held that a testament, with the only page signed at its foot by testator and witnesses, but not in the left margin, could nevertheless be probated (A ba n g a n v s. Abangan, 41 Phil. 476); and that despite the requirement for the correlative letter in g of t h e pa ges of a will, the failure to make the first page either by letters or numbers is not a fatal defect (Lopez vs. Liboro, 81 Phil. 429). These precedents exem plify t h e Cou r t 's policy t o r equ ir e sa t isfaction of the legal requirements in order t o guard against fraud and bid faith but w it h ou t u n du e or u n n ecessa r y cu r t a ilm en t of t h e t est a m en t a r y pr iv ileg e.

T est a t e est a t e of t h e l a t e V ICENT E CA GRO. JESUSA CA GRO, pet i t i on er a ppel l ee, v s. PELA GIO CA GRO, ET A L., opposi t or s-a ppel l a n t s. 92 PHIL 1033 FA CT S: T h is is an appeal interposed by the oppositors from a decision of the Court of First In st a n ce of Sam ar, admitting to probate the will allegedly executed by Vicente Cagro who died in Laoangan , Pa m bu ja n , Sa m a r , on Febr u a r y 1 4 , 1 9 4 9 . T h e main objection insisted upon by the appellant in that the will is fatally defective, because it s a t testation clause is not signed by the attesting witnesses. The signatures of the three wit n esses t o t he will do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause, although the page containing the sam e is signed by the witnesses on the left-hand margin. The petitioner and appellee con t en ds t hat signatures of the three witnesses on the left-hand margin conform substantially to t h e la w a n d m a y be deem ed a s t h eir sig n a t u r es t o t h e a t t est a t ion cla u se. ISSUE: WHETHER THERE IS SUBST A NT IA L COMPLIA NCE W HEN T HE W IT NESSES‘ SIGNATURES APPEAR ON THE LEFT MARGINS BUT NOT IN THE ATTESTATION CLA USE HELD: CFI REV ERSED W e are of the opinion that the position taken by the appellant is correct. The attestation clause is 'a m emorandum of the facts attending the execution of the will' r equired by law t o be m a de by t h e attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily bear their signatures. An unsigned a t t est a t ion clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses, since the om ission of their signatu r es a t t h e bot t om t h er eof n eg a t iv es t h eir pa r t icipa t ion . T h e petitioner and appellee contends that signatures of the three wit n esses on t h e left -h a n d m argin conform substantially t o the law and may be deemed as their signatures to the attestation clause. This is untenable, because said signatures are in compliance with the legal mandate th a t t h e will be signed on the left-hand margin of all its pages. If an attestation clause not sig n ed by t h e three witnesses at the bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it would be easy to add such clause to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the t estator and any or all of t h e w it n esses

Pet itioners opposed the allowance of the will of Mateo on the ground that on the date st a t ed in t h e will, the testator was already of poor health and could not have ex ecu t ed t h e w ill. T h e y likewise questioned the g en u in en ess of t h e sig n a t u r e of t h e t est a t or in t h e sa id w ill. T h e probate court allowed the will. On appeal, the petitioners contended that t h e A t t est a t ion Clause was fatally defective for failing to state that the testator signed in t h e pr esen ce of t h e w itnesses and the witnesses signed in t h e pr esen ce of t h e t est a t or a n d of on e a n ot h er . BEA TRIZ NERA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. NARCISA RIMANDO, defenda n t a ppel l a n t .. 1 8 PHIL 4 5 0 FA CT S: T h e lower court admitted the instrument propounded therein as the last will and t est a m en t of t h e deceased, Pedro Rimando.The defendant appeals the decision, contending that it one of t h e w itnesses was not present during the signing of t h e w ill by t h e t est a t or a n d of t h e ot h er su bscribing witnesses. one of the witnesses was the outside some 8 or 10 feet away, in a sm a ll r oom connected by a doorway from where the will was signed ,across which was hung a cur t a in w hich made it impossible for one in t h e ou t side r oom t o see t h e t est a t or a n d t h e ot h er su bscribin g w it n esses in t h e a ct of a t t a ch in g t h eir sig n a t u r es t o t h e in st r u m en t . ISSUE: W HET HER T HE W ILL W A S V A LIDLY EX ECUT ED EV EN IF ONE OF T HE W IT NESSES W A S IN A NOT HER ROOM DURING T HE SIGNING OF T HE W ILL HELD: LOW ER COURT A FFIRMED In t h e ca se ju st cit ed, on w h ich t h e t r ia l cou r t r elied, w e h eld t h a t : T h e true test of presence of the testator and the witn esses in t h e ex ecu t ion of a w ill is n ot w hether they actually saw each other sign, but whether they might have been seen ea ch ot h er sign, had they chosen to do so, considering their mental and physical condition and position with r ela t ion t o ea ch ot h er a t t h e m om en t of in scr ipt ion of ea ch sig n a t u r e. Bu t it is especially to be noted that the position of the parties with relation to each ot h er at the m oment of the subscription of each signature, must be such that they may see each other sign if t h ey choose to do so. This, of course, does not mean that t h e t est a t or a n d t h e su bscr ibin g w itnesses may be held to have executed the instrument in the presence of each other if it appears t hat they would not have been able to see each other sign at that moment, without changing their r elative positions or existing conditions. The trial court‘s decision merely laid down the doctrin e t hat the question whether the testator and the subscribing witnesses to an alleged will sig n t h e in strument in the presence of each other does not depend upon proof of the fact that their ey es w ere actually cast upon the paper at the mom ent of its subscription by each of them, but tha t a t t hat moment existing conditions and their position with relation t o each other were such that by m erely casting the eyes in the proper direction they could have seen each other sign. T o ex t en d t h e doctrine further would open the door to the possibility of all manner of fraud, substit u t ion , a n d the like, and would defeat the purpose for which this particular condition is prescribed in the code a s on e of t h e r equ isit es in t h e ex ecu t ion of a w ill. CA NEDA V S CA FA CTS: T estator Mateo Caballero is a widower without any children. He executed a will in t h e pr esence of three witnesses. He was assisted by his lawyer and a notary public in the preparation of h is will. Under the said will, the testator disposed of his properties to persons wit h ou t blood r elation to the t estator. The testator himself submitted the will to t h e pr oba t e cou r t bu t t h e t est a t or pa ssed a w a y ev en befor e h is pet it ion cou ld be h ea r d. T h e petitioners, who claimed to be the n eph ew s a n d n ieces of t h e t est a t or , filed for t h e set tlement of the intestate estate of Mateo. The probate proceedings and specia l pr oceedin g s filed w er e con solida t ed.

Court of Appeals, nevertheless affirmed the probate court‘s decision and h eld t h a t t h er e w a s su bst a n t ia l com plia n ce w it h A r t . 8 0 5 . ISSUE: Whether or not the attestation clause contained in t h e la st w ill com plies w it h t h e r equ ir em en t s of A r t . 8 0 5 a n d 8 0 9 ? HELD: In the case of ordinary or notarial wills, the attestation clause need not b e w r it t en in a la nguage or dialect known t o the testator since it does not form pa r t of t h e disposit ion . T h e la nguage used in the attestation clause likewise n eed n ot ev en be kn ow n t o t h e a t t est in g w itnesses. The last paragraph of Art. 805 merely requires that, in such a case, t h e A t t est a t ion Cla u se sh a ll be in t er pr et ed t o sa id w it n esses. A n Attestation Clause refers to that part of an ordinary will whereby t h e a t t est in g w it n esses certify that the instrument has been executed before them and t o the manner of the execution of t h e same. It is a separate memorandum of the facts surrounding the conduct of execution of t h e sa m e. Pa ragraph 3 of Art. 805 requires three things to be stated in the Attestation Clause, t h e la ck of w h ich w ou ld r esu lt in t h e in v a lidit y of t h e w ill: T h e n u m ber of pa g es T hat the testator signed or expressly caused another to sign, the will and every pag e t h er eof in t h e pr esen ce of t h e a t t est in g w it n esses a n d T hat the attesting witnesses witnessed the signing by the testator of the will and all of its pa g es, a n d that said witnesses also signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the t estator a n d of on e a n ot h er . T h e purpose of the law is t o safeguard against any interpolation or om ission of som e of its pages, w hereas the subscription of the signatures of the testator and the attesting witnesses is made for t h e purpose of authentication and identification, and thus indicates tha t t h e w ill is t h e v er y in strument executed by the t estator a n d a t t est ed t o by t h e w it n esses. By a t t est in g a n d su bscribing to the will. The witnesses thereby declare that due execution of the will as embodied in the Attestation Clause. The Attestation Clause provides strong legal guara n t ies for t h e du e ex ecution of a will and t o ensure the authenticity thereof. It n eeds t o be sig n ed on ly by t h e w itnesses and not the testator, absence of the signature of the for m er in v a lida t es t h e w ill. In t he case at bar, the will was comprised of three pages, all numbered correlatively, with the left m argin of each page bearing the respective signatures of the t estator and t h e t h r ee a t t est in g w itnesses. The testamentary dispositions were expresses in Cebuano- Visayan dialect an d w er e signed at the foot by the testator. The Attestation Clause was recite in English a n d is l ikew ise sig n ed a t t h e en d of t h r ee a t t est in g w it n esses. W hat is fairly apparent upon a careful reading of the Attestation Clause herein is t h e fa ct t h a t w hile it recites that the t estator indeed signed the will and all its pages in the presence of t h r ee a t testing witnesses and stated as well the number of pages that were used, t h e sa m e does n ot ex pressly state therein the circumstance that sa id w it n esses su bscr ibed t h eir r espect iv e signatures to the will in the presence of the t estator and of each other. Wh at is clearly lackin g is t h e statement that the witnesses signed the will and every page thereof in t h e pr esen ce of t h e t estator and of one another. The absence of t h a t st a t em en t is a fa t a l defect w h ich m u st n ecessa r ily r esu lt in t h e disa llow a n ce of t h e w i ll. A s t o the substantial com pliance rule under Art. 809, while it may be true that the A t t est a t ion Clause is indeed subscribed at the end thereof and at the left margin of each page by t h e t h r ee a t testing witnesses, it certainly cannot be conclusively inferred therefrom that the said witnesses

a ffixed their respective signatures in the presence of the testator and of each ot h er , sin ce t h e pr esence of such signatures only establishes the fact that it was indeed signed, bu t it does n ot pr ov e that the attesting witnesses did subscribe to the will in the presence of the testator a n d of on e a n ot h er . T h e execution of a will is supposed to be one act so that where the t estator and the witnesses sign on v arious days or occasions and in various combinations, the will cannot be stamped w it h t h e im primatur of effectivity. In a situation like in the case at bar, the defects is not only in the form or language of the Attestation Clause but the total absence of a specific element requires by A r t . 805 . In or der that Art. 809 can apply, the defects must be remedied by intrinsic evidenced supplied by t h e will itself. In the case at bar, proof of the acts requir es t o h a v e been per for m ed by t h e a t testing witnesses san be supplied only by extrinsic evidence thereof. Reversal of the judgmen t r en der ed by t h e CA .

T h e function of a notary public is, among others, t o guar d a g a in st a n y illeg a l or im m or a l a rrangements. That function would be defeated if the notary public were one of the attestin g or in strumental witnesses. For them he would be interested in sustaining the validity of the will a s it directly involves himself and the validity of his own act. It would place him in an inconsist en t position and the very purpose of the acknowledgement, which is t o minimize fr a u d w ou ld b e t h w a r t ed. T o a llow the notary public to act as third witness, or one of the attesting a n d a ckn ow ledg in g w itnesses, would have the effect of having only two attesting witnesses to the will which would be in contravention of the provisions of Art. 805 requiring at least three credible witnesses to act a s su ch and of Art 806 which requires that the testator and the required number of witnesses must a ppear before the notary public to acknowledge the will. The result woukd be, as has been sa id, t h a t on ly 2 w it n esses a ppea r ed befor e t h e n ot a r y pu blic for t h a t pu r pose.

KA LA W V S RELOV A A ZNA R V S GA RCIA FA CTS: Aznar (executor) filed a petition to probate the will of the deceased Edward Christensen g iv ing to Helen Christensen 3, 600 pesos while Lucy all the remainder of his property which was opposed by Helen because it deprives her legitime as an acknowledged natural childr en h en ce sh e is entitled to ½ of the estate bu t CFI opposes t h e fin a l a ccou n t in g of t h e ex ecu t or . ISSUE:W ON Helen is en t it led t o ½ sh a r e of t h e est a t e? HELD: Remand the case to Philippine court for partition be ma de a s t h e Ph ilippin e la w on su ccession provides. The citizenship of the deceases was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, h ence the meaning of national law in Art 16 is the conflict of law rules in California . How ev er , A RT 946 of California Civil Code authorizes the return of the question t o the law of the t estator‘s dom icile, The Philippines. Therefore, the Philippine court should not refer back it to Californ ia . Court of domicile is bound to apply its own law as directed in conflict of la w r u le of deceden t st a t e.

CRUZ V S V ILLA SOR FA CTS: Respondent Manuel Lugay filed a petition for probate of the will of Valent e Cr u z w it h t h e CFI which was opposed by the petitioner, Agapita Cruz on the ground t h a t t h e on e of t h e t hree witnesses is at the same time the Notary Public before whom the will was supposed to have been a ckn ow ledg ed. ISSUE: Whether or not the will w a s ex ecu t ed in a ccor da n ce w it h A r t . 8 0 5 a n d 8 0 6 ? HELD:The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be consider ed a s t h e t h ird instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his havin g sig n ed t h e w ill. To acknowledge before means to avow or to own as genuine, to assent and ―before‖ m ea n s in front or preceding in space or ahead of. Consequently, if the third witness w er e t h e n ot a r y pu blic himself, he would have to avow assent, or admit his having sig n ed t h e w ill in fr on t of h im self.

FA CTS: The private respondent, who claims to be the sole heir of his sist er w h o is Na t iv ida d Ka law, filed for a petition to admit t o probate the holographic will of h is sist er . In su ch w ill, pr ivate respondent Gregorio was named as the sole heir of all the properties left behin d by t h e t est a t r ix a n d w a s a lso n a m ed a s t h e ex ecu t or of t h e w ill. T h e petition was opposed by Rosa, the sister of the testatrix, who claims to have been origina lly in stituted as the sole heir. She alleged that the holographic will contained alterations, corrections a n d insertions without the proper authentication by the full signature of the testatrix as requires by A r t 8 1 4 of t h e Civ il Code. T h e cou r t den ied t h e pet it ion . Rosa filed a Pet it ion for Rev iew on Cer t ior a r i. ISSUE: whether or not the original unaltered t ext after subsequent alteration s a n d in ser t ion s w ere voided by the Trial Court for lack of authentication by the full signature of t h e t est a t r ix , sh ou ld be pr oba t ed or n ot , w it h h er a s sole h eir . Held: No. ordinarily, when a number of er a su r es, cor r ect ion m a de by t h e t est a t or on a h olographic will not be noted under his signature, hence the will is not invalidated as a whole but a s m ost on ly a s r espect s t h e pa r t icu la r w or ds er a sed or cor r ect ed. However in this case, the holographic will in dispute had only one substantial provision, w h ich w as altered by substituting the original heir with another, but which alteration did not carry t h e r equisite of full authentication by the full signature of the testator, the effect mu st be t h a t t h e en tire Will is voided or revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains in the Will after tha t w hich could remain valid. To state that the will as first written should be g iv en effica cy is t o disregard the seeming change of mind of the testatrix. But that change of mind can n eit h er be g iv en effect because she failed to authenticate it in the manner required by law by a ffix in g h er fu ll signature- the intention of the testator could not be ascertained. Howev er , t h er e is clea r sh owing of the testator ‘s in t en t ion t o r ev oke t h e in st it u t ion of Rosa a s h er sole h eir . T hus, the petition is hereby dismissed and the decision of the responden t ju dg e is a ffir m ed.

A JERO V S CA FA CTS: Late Anne Sand left a will and named as devisees the petitioner, Roberto a n d T h elm a A jero, private respondent Clemente Sand, Meriam Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand. Fe

Sa nd, Lisa Sand and Dr. Jose Ajero Sr and their children. Petitioner filed for t h e a llow a n ce of decedent holographic w ill contending that the latter was of sound mind and not a ct in g u n der du ress. Private Respondent opposed it that the testament body and signature was not decedent s h andwriting and such properties, the decedent is not the sole owner. RTC admitted the will while CA reversed it that the will fails t o meet the requirements for its validity under Art 813 and 8 1 4 because the dispositions were either unsigned and undated or signed but not dated and erasu r e h a d n ot been a u t h en t ica t ed by deceden t . ISSUE: W ON t h e w ill is v a lid? HELD: Y es. Art 839, in a petition to admit a holographic will to probate, the on ly issu es t o be r esolv ed a r e: (1 ) w h et h er t h e in st r u m en t su bm it t ed is t h e deceden t ‘s w ill (2 ) whether said will was execu t ed in a ccor da n ce w it h for m a lit ies pr es cr ibed by la w (3 ) whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacit y a t t h e t im e t h e w ill w a s ex ecu t ed a n d (4 ) whether the execution of the will and its signing w er e v olu n t a r y a ct s of t h e deceden t A rt. 813 of the new Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the validity of the disposit ion s con tained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of t h e dispositions, the result is that these disposition s ca n n ot be effect u a t ed. Su ch fa ilu r e, h ow ev er , does n ot r en der t h e w h ole t est a m en t v oid. In t he case at bar, unless, the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on t he date of the holographic will or on testator‘s signature, their presence does not inva lida t e t h e will itself. The lack of authentication will only result in disa llow a n ce of su ch ch a n g es. In a ddition to, courts in probate are limited t o pass only upon the extrinsic validity of t h e w ill. However, exception, Courts are not powerless to do what the situation constrains them to do and pa ss upon certain provisions of the will that Cabadbaran property is in t h e n a m e of h er la t e fa t h er Joh n Sa n d w h ich Dr A jer o qu est ion h er con v ey a n ce.

LA BRA DOR V S CA FA CTS: T estator Melencio died and left a parcel of land and his children as heirs. He a lleg edly ex ecuted a holographic will. The holographic will was subm it t ed for pr oba t e by pet it ion er Sa g r a do, t h e dev isee of t h e pa r cel of t h e la n d. Jesus and Gaudencio opposed the probate of the will on the g r ou n d t h a t t h e w ill h a s been ex tinguished or revoked by implications of law, when the testator, befor e h is dea t h , sold t h e pa rcel of land to the oppositors. The said transaction was evidenced by the new TCT issued in the n ame of the oppositors and the Deed of Sale executed by the testator. Meanwhile, Jesus sold th e pa rcel of land to a 3 rd person, Sagrado sought t o have the Deed of Sale annulled on t h e g r ou n d t h a t it w a s fict it iou s. LC a llowed the probate of the will and declared null and void the Deed of Sale. CA rever sed t h e ju dgment and disallowed t h e pr oba t e of t h e w ill on t h e g r ou n d t h a t it w a s u n da t ed. ISSUE: W ON t h e a lleg ed h olog r a ph ic w ill is da t ed? HELD: The Holographic is dated. It appears that the date when the t estator made th e w ill w a s st a t ed in t h e body of t h e com pla in t , on t h e 2 nd pa g e of t h e w ill

― and this is the day in which we agreed that we are m a kin g t h e pa r t it ion in g a n d a ssigning the respective assignment of the said fish pond, and this being in the month of March , 1 7 th day, in the year 1968, and this decision and or inst r u ct ion of m in e is t h e m a t t er t o be followed, and the one who made this writing is no oth er t h a t MELECIO LA BRA DOR, t h eir fa t h er .‖ T he law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the w ill. T h e on ly requirements are that the date be in the will itself and executed in the hand of the testa t or . T h ese r equ ir em en t s a r e pr esen t in t h e su bject w ill. PEREZ V S T OLET E FA CTS: Dr. Jose Cunanan and Dr. Ev elyn Perez-Cunanan are husband and wife, w h o beca m e A m erican citizens and residents of New York, U.S.A , w it h t h eir ch ildr en , Jocely n m 1 8 ; Ja cqu elin e,1 6 ; a n d Joseph in e,1 4 . Ea ch executed a will also in New Y ork, containing provisions on presumption of survivorship (in t h e event that it is not known which one of the spouses died first, the husband shall be presumed t o h a v e pr edecea sed h is w ife). T o w it: ―If my wife, EVELYN PEREZ-CUNANAN, and I shall die under such circumstances t h a t t h ere is not sufficient evidence t o determine the order of our deaths, then it shall be pr esu m ed t hat I predeceased her, and my estate shall be administered and distributed, in all r espect s, in a ccor da n ce w it h su ch pr esu m pt ion .‖ Fou r days later, on August 27, Dr. Ev elyn P. Cunanan executed her own last will and testa m en t con t a in in g t h e sa m e pr ov ision s a s t h a t of t h e w ill of h er h u sba n d. T o w it: ―If my husband, JOSE F. CUNANAN, and I shall die under such circumstances that there is n ot sufficient evidence t o determine the order of our deaths, then it shall be presumed that h e pr edeceased me, and my estate shall be admin ist er ed a n d dist r ibu t ed in a ll r espect s, in a ccor da n ce w it h su ch pr esu m pt ion .‖ La t er, the entire family perished in a fire that gutted their home. Thus, Rafael, who was n a m ed t r u st ee in Jose‘s w ill, filed for sepa r a t e pr oba t e pr oceedin g s of t h e w ills. La t er, Ev elyn‘s mother, Salud Perez, filed a petition for reprobate in Bulacan. Ra fa el opposed, a rguing that Salud was not an heir according to New York law. He contended that since the wills w ere executed in New York, New York law should govern. He further argued that, by New Y or k law, he and his brothers and sisters were Jose‘s heirs a n d a s su ch en t it led t o n ot ice of t h e r epr oba t e pr oceedin g s, w h ich Sa lu d fa iled to g iv e. For her part, Salud said she was the sole heir of her daughter, Ev elyn, and that the two wills were in accordance with New York law. But before she could present evidence to prove the law of New Y or k, t h e r epr oba t e cou r t a lr ea dy issu ed a n or der , disa llow in g t h e w ills. ISSUE: W h et h er

or

n ot

t h e r epr oba t e of t h e w ills sh ou ld be a llow ed

HELD: The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, w ill on ly be effective in this country upon compliance with the following provision of the Civ il Code of t h e Ph ilippin es: A rt. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if ma de w it h t h e form alities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according t o the formalities observed in h is cou n t r y , or in con for m it y w it h t h ose w h ich t h is Code pr escr ibes. T hus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New Y or k la w s or by Ph ilippin e la w s is im per a t iv e. T h e evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated outside of t h e Philippines are as follows: (1 ) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreig n laws; (2) the t estator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3 ) t h e

w ill has been admitted t o probate in such country; (4) the fact that t h e for eig n t r ibu n a l is a pr obate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills. Ex cept for the first and last requiremen t s, t h e pet it ion er su bm it t ed a ll t h e n eeded ev iden ce. T h e necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the for eig n country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts cannot t a ke ju dicia l n ot ice of t h em . T h is petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a very glaring fact - pet it ion er h a s always considered herself the sole heir of Dr. Ev elyn Perez Cunanan and beca u se sh e does n ot consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the proceedings. Thus, even in the instant petition, she only im plea ded r espon den t Ju dge, forgetting that a judge whose order is being assailed is merely a nominal or formal party. T h e rule that the court having jurisdiction ov er the reprobate of a will shall "cause notice thereof t o be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance" (Revised Rules of Cour t , Ru le 27 , Section 2) means that with regard to notices, the will probated abroad should be treated as if it were an "original will" or a will that is presented for probate for the first time. A ccor din g ly , com pliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require publication and not ice by m a il or per sonally to the "known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the t estator resident in the Philippines" a n d t o t h e ex ecu t or , if h e is n ot t h e pet it ion er , a r e r equ ir ed. T h e brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner's claim, a r e en t it led t o n ot ices of the time and place for proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 7 6 of t h e Rev ised Ru les of Court, the "court shall also cause copies of the notice of the t im e a n d pla ce fix ed for pr ov ing the will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of th e t est a t or , . . . " W HEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge shall a llow pet it ion er r easonable time within which to submit evidence needed for the joint probate of the wills of t h e Cunanan spouses and see to it that the brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan are given a ll n ot ices a n d copies of a ll plea din g s per t in en t t o t h e pr oba t e pr oceedin g s.

T EST A T E EST A T E OF BOHA NA N FA CTS: C.O. Boh a n a n w a s bor n in Nebr a ska a n d t h er efor e a cit izen of t h a t st a t e. Notwithstanding his long residence in the Philippines, he continued and remained to be a citizen of t h e United States and of the state of his pertinent residence to spend the r est of h is da y s in t hat state. His permanent residence or domicile in the United States depended upon his personal in tent or desire, and he selected Nevada as his homicide and therefore at the time of h is dea t h , h e w a s a cit izen of t h a t st a t e. T h e oppositors, Magadalena C. Bohanan and her two children, qu est ion t h e v a lidit y of t h e ex ecutor/testator C.O. Bohanan‘s last will and testament, claiming that they have been deprived of t h e leg it im a t e t h a t t h e la w s of t h e for m con cede t o t h em . A nother, is the claim of the t estator's children, Edward and Mary Ly dia Boh a n a n , w h o h a d r eceived legacies in the amount of PHP 6, 000 each only, and, therefore, have n ot been g iv en t h eir shares in the estate which, in accordance with the laws, should be two- thirds of the est a t e left by t h e t est a t or . ISSUE: WON the t estamentary dispositions of the testator is valid: as t o Magda len a Boh a n a n a n d secon d t o h is ch ildr en ? HELD: The first issue refers to the share that the wife of the t estator, Magdalen a C. Boh a n a n , sh ould be entitled t o receive. The will has not given her any sh a r e in t h e est a t e left by t h e t estator. It is argued that it was error for the trial court t o have recog n ized t h e Ren o div or ce

secured by the testator from his Filipino wife Magdalena C. Bohanan , a n d t h a t sa id div or ce sh ould be declared a nullity in this jurisdiction. The court refused to recognize the cla im of t h e w idow on the ground that the laws of Nevada, of which the deceased was a citizen, allow h im t o dispose of all of his properties without requiring him to leave any por t ion of h is est a t e t o h is form er (or divorced) wife. No right to share in the inheritance in favor of a divorced wife exists in t h e State of Nevada, thus the oppositor can no longer claim portion of t h e est a t e left by t h e t est a t or . W ith regards the second issue, the old Civil Code, which is applicable to this ca se beca u se t h e t estator died in 1 944, expressly provides that successional rights to personal property a r e t o be ea rned by the national law of the person whose succession is in question, thus the two-third rule is n ot en for cea ble. W h erefore, the court finds that the t estator, C.O Bohanan was at the time of his death a citizen of t h e United States and declares that his will and testament is fully in accordance with the law s of t h e St a t e of Nev a da a n d a dm it s t h e sa m e t o pr oba t e. T h e validity of T estamentary dispositions are to be governed by the national law of the t est a t or a n d as it has been decided and it is not disputed that the national law of the testator is that Stat e of Nev ada, which allows the testator to dipose his properties according to his will, like in the case a t ba r . T hus the order of the court approving the project partition made in accordance t o t estamenta r y pr ov ision s m u st be a ffir m ed.

T est a t e Est a t e of Ma l ot o 1 5 8 SCRA 4 5 1 FA CT S: A driana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece and nephews, the petitioners believ in g t h a t n o la st wiil and testament was left they iniateda an intestate proceeding for the settlement of t h eir a unt's estate. While the case was still in prog r ess, t h e pa r t ie s ex ecu t ed a n a g r eem en t of ex trajudicial settlement of Adriana's estate. The agreement provided for the division of the estate in to four equal parts among the parties. They then presented t h e ex t r a ju dicia l set t lem en t a g r eem en t t o t h e t r ia l cou r t for a ppr ov a l. T hree years later, Atty. Sulpicio Palma discov ered a document en t it led "KA T A PUSA N NGA PA GBUBULAT-AN (Testamento)," dated January 3,1940, and purporting t o be the last will a n d t est a m en t of A dr ia n a . It Significantly, the appellate court while finding as inconclusive the matter on whether or not t h e document or papers allegedly burned by the househelp of Adriana, Guadalupe Ma lot o V da . de Coral, upon instructions of the testatrix, was indeed the will, contradicted itself and foun d t h a t t h e will had been revoked. The respondent court stated that the presence of animus revocandi in t h e destruction of the will had, nevertheless, been sufficiently proven. The appellate court ba sed it s finding on the facts that the document was not in the two safes in Adriana's residence, by t h e t estatrix going to the residence of Atty. Hervas to retrieve a copy of the will left in t h e la t t er 's possession, and, her seeking the services of Atty. Palma in order t o have a new will dr a w n u p. ISSUE: W h et h er or n ot t h e w ill w a s r e v oked by A dr ia n a . HELD: It is clear that the physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this case, does n ot per se con stitute an effective revocation, unless the destruction is coupled with animus r ev oca n di on t h e part of the testator. It is not im perative that the physical destruction be done by the testa t or h im self. It may be performed by another person but under the ex pr ess dir ect ion a n d in t h e pr esence of the testator. Of course, it goes without saying that the document destroyed mu st be t h e w ill it self.

In t his case, while animus revocandi or the intention to revoke, may be conceded, for t h a t is a st ate of mind, yet that requisite alone would not suffice. "Animus revocandi is on ly on e of t h e n ecessary elements for the effective revocation of a last will and testamen t . T h e in t en t ion t o r ev oke must be accompanied by the ov ert physical act of burnin g , t ea r in g , oblit er a t in g , or ca ncelling the will carried out by the t estator or by another person in his presence and under h is ex press direction. There is paucity of evidence t o show compliance with these requirements. For on e, the document or papers burned by Adriana's maid, Guada lu pe, w a s n ot sa t isfa ct or ily est ablished to be a will at all, much less the will of Adriana Maloto. For another, the bur ning was n ot proven t o have been done under the express direction of Adriana. And then, the burning was n ot in her presence. Both witnesses, Guadalupe and Eladio, were one in stating that t h ey w er e t h e only ones present at the place where the stove (presumably in the kitchen ) w a s loca t ed in w hich the papers proffered as a will were burned. Nowhere in t h e r ecor ds befor e u s does it a ppear that the two witnesses, Guadalupe Vda. de Corral and Eladio Itchon, both illiterates, were u nequivocably positive that the document burned was indeed Adriana's w ill. Gu a da lu pe, w e t h ink, believed that the papers she destroyed was the will only because, according to her, Adriana t old her so. Eladio, on the other hand, obtained his information that the burned documen t w a s t h e will because Guadalupe t old him so, thus, his t estimony on this poin t is dou ble h ea r sa y .

Mol o v s. Mol o 9 0 PHIL 3 7 FA CT S: T h e deceased died leaving no forced heir in the descending or ascending line, howev er h e w a s su rvived by his weife and and his nieces and nephews who were the legitimat e ch ildr en of h is deceased brother, during his lifetime he executed two wills, on e ex ecu t ed a t 1 9 1 8 a n d t h e su bsequent one in 1939. The latter will contains a clause which revokes the will in 1918. The said w ill con t a in in g t h e cla u se r ev okin g t h e pr ev iou s w ill, h ow ev er , w a s disa llow ed. ISSUE: W h ether the previous will was annulled even if the subsequent will, with revoking cla u se, w a s disa llow ed. HELD: A subsequent will containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallow ed for t h e r eason that it was not executed in conformity with the provisions of section 618 of t h e Code of Civ il Procedure as to making of wills, cannot produce the effect of annulling the prev iou s w ill, in asmuch a s sa id r ev oca t or y c la u se is v oid

Execu t ion of Wil l s

T ol en t i n o v Fr a n ci sco 5 7 PHIL 7 4 9 FA CT S: Gr egorio Tolentino had been married to Benita Francisco, but she predeceased him y ea r s a g o. T h e pair had no children with a number of his wife‘s kin a s su r v iv or s. How ev er , st r a in ed r elations, resulting from grave disagreements, developed between Tolentino and the Fr a n cisco r elations and he determined to make a new will in which, apart from certain legacies in favor of a few individuals, the bulk of his estate, worth probably about P1 5 0 ,0 0 0 , sh ou ld be g iv en t o A dela ida T olen t in o de Con cepcion , a s h is u n iv er sa l h eir .

T o t his end, Tolentino went to the office of Eduardo Gutierrez Repide, an attorney and informed h im that he wanted t o make a new will and desired Repide t o draft it for him. After the necessary pr eliminary inquiries had been made, the attorney suggested to him to bring a copy of t h e w il l pr eviously made which was reduced to itsproper form. As the instrumen t w a s t a kin g sh a p e T olentino stated that he wanted the will to be signed in Repide's office, with the latter a s on e of t h e attesting witnesses. For the other two witnesses T olentino request ed t h a t t w o a t t or n ey s a t tached t o the office, namely, Leon cio B. Mon zon a n d Ra m on L. Su n ico, sh ou ld ser v e. W h en the instrument had been reduced to proper form, changes were made by Tolent in o w it h r egards t o the attesting witnesses. Pursuant to these instru ct ion s Repide m a de t h e desir ed changes in the will and just before twelve o'clock noon of the next day T olen t in o r et u r n ed t o Repide's office and received from him the criminal document with a carbon copy thereof. Repide a dv ised the t estator that the copy should be executed with the same formality as the origin a l in or der that the intention of the t est a t or sh ou ld n ot be fr u st r a t ed by t h e possible loss or destruction of the original.lawphil.netIt is a custom in the office of Repide not t o n u m ber t h e con secutive pages of a will, on the typewriting machine, the duty of numbering the pages bein g left t o t h e t est a t or h im self. T olentino thereupon drew two documents from his pocket saving that it was h is la st w ill a n d t estament, done in duplicate, and he proceeded to read the original to the witnesses. A ft er t h is h a d been completed, Legarda himself took the will in hand and read it himself. He then returned it t o Tolentino, who thereupon proceeded, with pen and ink, to number t h e pa g es of t h e w ill t hus, "Pagina Primera", "Pagina Segunda", etc. He then paged the duplicate copy of t h e w ill in t h e same way. He next proceeded to sign the original will and each of its pages by w r it in g h is n ame "G. Tolentino" in the proper places. Following this, each of the three witnesses signed their ow n respective names at the end of the will, at the end of the attesting cla u se, a n d in t h e left m argin of each page of the instrument. During this ceremony all of the persons concerned in the a ct of attestation were present together, and all fully advertent t o the solemnity t h a t en g a g ed t h eir a t t en t ion . A fter preliminary explanations had been made, Tolentino reque st ed Repide t o keep t h e w ill ov ernight in his safe, In this connection the t estator stated that he did not wish to take the will to h is home, as he knew that his relatives were watching him and would take a dv a n t a g e of a n y ca r elessn ess on h is pa r t t o pr y in t o h is pa per s. On the morning of November 9, 1930, Gregorio Tolentino was found dead in h is bed, h a v in g per ish ed by t h e h a n ds of a n a ssa ssin . ISSUE: W h et h er t h e w ill w a s ex ecu t ed a n d a t t est ed in t h e m a n n er r equ ir ed by la w HELD: T h e peculiarity of this case is that, upon the trial of this proceeding for the probate of the w ill of t h e decedent, two of the attesting witnesses, Jose Syyap and Vergel de Dios, r epu dia t ed t h eir pa rticipation in the execution of the will at the time and place stated; and while ad m it t in g t h e g enuineness of their signatures to the will, pretended t h a t t h ey h a d sev er a lly sig n ed t h e in strument, at the request of the testator, at different places. Thus Syyap, testifying as a witness, claimed that the t estator brought the will to Syyap's house on the afternoon of October 21 a time, be it remembered, when the will had not yet left the hands of the draftsman and upon lear n in g t hat Syyap could not be present at the t ime and place then being arranged for the ex ecu t ion of t h e will, he requested Syyap, as a mere matter of complaisance, to sign the will then, which Syyap did. Vergel de Dios has another story to tell of isolated action, claiming that he signed the will in t h e ev en in g of Oct ober 2 2 a t t h e Hospit a l of Sa n Ju a n de Dios in In t r a m u r o s. W e are unable to give any credence t o the testimony of these two witnesses on t h is poin t , t h e sam e being an evident fabrication designed for the purpose of defeating t h e w ill. In t h e fir st place, the affirmative proof showing that the will was properly executed is adequate, consisten t , a n d convincing, consisting of the t estimony of the third attesting w it n ess, V icen t e Leg a r da , corroborated by Miguel Legarda and Urbana Rivera, two disinterested individuals, employees of La Previsora Filipina, who were present in Legarda's office when the will was executed and w h o lent a discerning attention to what was being done. In t h e secon d pla ce, ea ch of t h e sev en signatures affixed to his will by Syyap appear to the natural eye to have been made by usin g t h e sam e pen and ink that was used by Legarda in signing the will. The same is also probably true of t h e seven signatures made by Vergel de Dios. This could hardly have happened if the signatu r es

of Syyap and Vergel de Dios had been affixed, as they now pretend, at different t imes and places. In t he third place, Both Syyap and Vergel de Dios are impeach ed by pr oof of con t r a dict or y st atements made by them on different occasions prior t o their appearance as wit n esses in t h is ca se. In this connection we note that, after the murder of Gregorio Tolen t in o, a n d w h ile t h e police authorities were investigating his death, Nemesio Alferez, a detective, sent for Syyap a n d qu estioned him concerning his relations with the deceased. Upon this occasion Syyap stated that Gr egorio Tolentino had lately made a will, that it had been executed at the office of La Previsor a Filipina under the circumstances already stated, and that he himself had ser v ed a s on e of t h e a t t est in g w it n esses. T h ese circumstances and other incidents revealed in the proof leave no room for dou bt in ou r m ind that Syyap and Vergel de Dios have entered into a conspiracy between themselves, a n d in con cert with the opponents, t o defeat the will of Gregorio Tolentino although they are well aware t hat said will was in all respects properly executed; and the trial court, in our opinion, committed n o er r or in a dm it t in g t h e w ill t o pr oba t e. W h en a will is contested it is the duty of the proponent to call all of the attest in g w it n esses, if a v ailable but the validity of the will in no wise depends upon the united support of the will by all of t h ose witnesses. A will may be admitted to probate notwithstanding the fact that one or mor e of t h e subscribing witnesses do not unite with the other, or others, in proving all the fact s u pon w hich the validity of the will rests. (Fernandez vs. Tantoco, 49 Phil., 380.) It is sufficien t if t h e court is satisfied from all the proof that the will was execu t ed a n d a t t est ed in t h e m a n n er r equired by law. In this case we feel well assured that the contested will was properly ex ecu t e d a n d t h e or der a dm it t in g t o it pr oba t e w a s en t ir ely pr oper .

SUCCESSION – Pr oba t e of Wil l s

Mer ca do v s. Sa n t os 5 7 Ph il. 7 4 9 FA CT S: Pet itioner Mercado applied for the probate of the will of h is decea sed w ife. T h er e w a s n o opposition t o it. The court then admitted the will to probate. After more than a year, the relatives of h is wife filed a complaint against Mercado on the ground of falsifaction or forgery of t h e w ill pr obated. A motion to quash was filed by Mercado stat in g t h a t t h e w ill h a s a lr ea dy been a dm it t ed t o pr oba t e. It is t h er efor e con clu siv ely pr esu m ed t o be g en u in e. RT C: For r espon den t . Mot ion den ied. CA : A ffir m s RT C. ISSUE: W h et h er t h e w ill is ca n be pr esu m ed t o be g en u in e? HELD: Y es, it is. A criminal action for falsification of will, will not lie after its admission to proba t e. T h is is t h e effect of t h e pr oba t e of a w ill. T h e probate of a will in this jurisdiction is a proceeding in r em . T h e pr ov ision of n ot ice by pu blication as a prerequisite to the allowance of a will is constructive notice to the whole w or ld, a n d when probate is granted, the judgment of the court is binding upon everybody, even against t h e St a t e. T h e probate of a will by the probate court having jurisdiction thereof is considered as conclusiv e a s t o its due execution and validity, and is also conclusive that the test a t or w a s of sou n d a n d disposing mind at the time when he executed the will, and was not acting under duress, menace, fr a u d, or u n du e in flu en ce, a n d t h a t t h e w ill is g en u in e a n d n ot a for g er y . T h e will in question having been probated by a competent court, the law will not admit any proof t o ov er t h r ow t h e leg a l pr esu m pt ion t h a t it is n ot a for g er y .

A criminal action will not lie against a forger of a will which had been duly admitted t o pr oba t e by a court of competent jurisdiction in view of the provisions of sections 306, 333, and 625 of the Code of Civ il Pr ocedu r e.

T est a t e Est a t e of Bia sca n v s. Bi a sca n 3 4 7 SCRA 6 2 1 FA CT S: In 1 975, respondent Rosalina Biascon filed a petition for her appointment as the administrat r ix of t h e intestate estate of Florencio Biascan and Timotea Zulueta. T h e cou r t issu ed a n or der a ppointing her as the regular administrator. Maria Biascon was the legal wife of Flor en cio a n d filed an opposition to the appointment. On April 2, 1981, the court issued an order resolving that Ma r ia as legal wife, and Rosalina and her brother as the natural children of Floren cio, a r e t h e legal heirs of the deceased and upheld the appointment of Rosalina as the admin ist r a t r ix . On Ju ne 6, 1981 or 5 8 days after the receipt of the Order, Maria filed her MFR. On Nov em ber 1 5 , 1 981, the fourth floor of the City Hall of Manila was completely gutted by fire. The records of the set tlement proceedings were among those lost in the fire. Thus, on January 2 , 1 9 8 5 , pr iv a t e r espondent filed a Petition for Reconstitution of the said records. Due to the delay caused by th e fir e and the reconstitution of the records, it was only on April 30, 1985 that the RT C issu ed a n Or der denying Maria‘s June 6, 1981 MFR. Sometime thereafter, Maria died and her lawyer Atty. Lopez was appointed as interim special administrator. Notice of t h is A pr il 3 0 , 1 9 8 5 Or der a llegedly came to the attention of Maria‘s lawyer only on August 21, 1996. Her lawyers thereafter filed a Notice of Appeal and Record of Appeal on September 20, 1996. The TC issu ed a n or der denying the appeal on the ground that it was filed out of time. A petition for certiorari wa s filed w it h t h e CA w h ich w a s likew ise den ied. ISSUE: W h et h er t h e a ppea l w a s filed on t im e? HELD: No, it w a s n ot . Section 1. Rule 109 of the RROC enumerates the orders and judgments in specia l pr oceedin g s w hich may be the subject of an appeal. An appeal is allowed in t h ese ca ses a s t h ese or der s, decrees or judgments issued by a court in a special proceeding constitute a final determination of t h e rights of the parties so appealing. The ruling of the TC that Maria, Rosalina and her brot h er w ere entitled t o participate in the settlement proceedings falls squ arely under pa r a g r a ph b of section 1 , Rule 109 as the proper subject of a ppea l. By so r u lin g , t h e T C h a s effect iv ely det ermined that the three persons are the lawful heirs of the deceased. As such, the same may be t h e pr oper su bject of a n a ppea l. Sim ilarly, the ruling of the TC denying Maria‘s motion t o set aside the order appointing Rosalina a s the regular administratrix of the estate of Florencio Biascan is likewise a pr oper su bject of a ppeal. The order of the TC appointing a regular administrator of a deceased person‘s estate is a final determination of the rights of the parties thereunder and is t h u s a ppea la ble. T h is is in con trast with an order appointing a special administrator which is appointed only for a lim it ed t im e and for a specific purpose. Because of the temporary character and special character of this a ppointment, the Rules deem it not advisable for any party t o a ppea l fr om sa id t em por a r y a ppoin t m en t . It is t hus clear that the Order dated April 2, 1981 may be the proper subject of a n a ppea l in a special proceeding. In special proceedings, the period of appeal from any decision or final or der r endered therein is thirty days. The appeal period may only be interr u pt ed by t h e filin g of a m otion for a new trial or reconsideration. Once the appeal period expires without an appeal or a MFR or new trial being perfected, the decision or order becomes final. Considering that this wa s

on ly on June 6, 1981 or a full 58 days after the receipt of the order that the MFR wa s filed, it is clear that the same was filed out of time. There was no more appeal period to int er r u pt a s t h e Or der h a d a lr ea dy becom e fin a l. It is w ell settled that judgments or orders become final and executory by operat ion of la w a n d n ot by judicial declaration. Thus, finality of a judgment becomes a fact u pon t h e la pse of t h e r eglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected or MFR or new trial is filed. The TC need n ot even pronounce the finality of the order as the same becomes final by operation of law. Being final and executory, the TC can no longer alter, modify or reverse t h e qu est ion ed or der . T h e su bsequ en t filin g of t h e MFR ca n n ot dist u r b t h e fin a lit y of t h e ju dg m en t or der . T h e Order of the trial court denying petitioner‘s Motion for Reconsideration of the April 2, 198 1 Or der was issued on April 30, 1985. Allegedly, petitioner was only made aware of this April 3 0 , 1 985 Order on August 21, 1996 when it inquired from the trial cour t a bou t t h e st a t u s of t h e ca se. Giving petitioner the benefit of the doubt that it had indeed received not ice of t h e or der denying its motion for reconsideration on August 21, 1 996, it follows that petit ion er on ly h a d u ntil the following da y or on A u g u st 2 2 , 1 9 9 6 w it h in w h ich t o per fect t h e a ppea l. A t this point, we note with disapproval petitioner‘s attempt to pass off its Not ice of A ppea l a s h aving been filed on August 22, 1996. In all its pleadings before this Cou r t a n d t h e Cou r t of A ppeals, petitioner insists that its Notice of Appeal was filed the day after it secured the Au g u st 2 1 , 1 996 Certification from the trial court. While the Notice of Appea l w a s ost en sibly da t ed A ugust 22, 1996, it is clear from the stamp of the trial court that the same was received on ly on September 20, 1996. Moreover, in the Order dated October 22, 1996 of the trial court den y in g pet itioner‘s appeal, the court clearly stated that the Notice of Appeal with accompanying Recor d on A ppea l w a s filed on Sept em ber 2 0 , 1 9 9 6 . Con sidering that it is clear from the records that petit ion er ‘s n ot ice of a ppea l w a s filed on September 20, 1996, the same was clearly filed out of t ime as it only had until August 22, 1 9 9 6 w it h in w h ich t o file t h e sa id plea din g .

Nu gu i d v s. Nu gu i d, 1 7 SCRA 4 4 9 FA CT S: Rosa rio Nuguid died and was survived by her parents, brothers and sisters. Petition er Remedios, h er sister, filed for the probate of her holographic will a year after h er dea t h . Rem edios w a s in stituted as the universal heir in the said will. The parents opposed this, claiming that they were pr eterited by the institution of Remedios as the sole heir thereby invalidating the will. The t r ia l court declared the will to be a complete nullity and therefore creating an intestacy of the estate of Rosa r io. ISSUE: W h et h er t h e pa r en t s w er e pr et er it ed cr ea t in g in t est a cy of Rosa r io‘s est a t e? HELD: Y es, t h ey w er e. In a proceeding for the probate of a will, the court‘s area of inquiry is limited to an examina t ion of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will; the due execution thereof; the test a t r ix ‘s t estamentary capacity; and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by la w . In t he case at bar however, a peculiar situation exists. The parties shunned aside the question of w hether or not the will should be allowed probate. They questioned the intrinsic validit y of t h e w ill. Normally, this comes only after the cou r t h a s decla r ed t h a t t h e w ill h a s been du ly a uthenticated. But if the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. In t he event of probate or if the court rejects the will, the probabi lity exist s t h a t t h e ca se w ill com e up once again before the court on the same issue of the instrinsic validity of or n u llit y of t h e will. The result would be a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These practica l con siderations induce the SC t o meet head-on the issue of the nullity of the provisions of the will in qu est ion , t h er e bein g a ju st icia ble con t r ov er sy . T h e deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct a scending line, her parents. Her will does not explicitly disinherit them but simply om it s t h eir

n ames altogether. Said will rather than be labeled ineffective disinheritan ce is clea r ly on e in w hich the said forced heirs suffer from preterition. There is no other provision in the will except t h e institution of Remedios as the universal heir. Such institution by itself is null and void a n d, in testate succession ensues. The disputed order declares the will in question ‗a complete nullity‘. A rticle 854 of the Civil Code in turn merely nullifies ‗t h e in st it u t ion of t h e h eir ‘. T h e w ill h owever, provides for the institution of the petitioner as the universal heir and n ot h in g m or e. T h e r esu lt is t h e sa m e. T h e en t ir e w ill is n u ll. Pr eterition ‗consists in the om ission in the t estator‘s will of the forced heirs or anyone of t h em , either because they are not mentioned therein or though mentioned, they are neither instit u t ed a s h eirs nor are expressly disinherited.‘ Disinheritance in turn ‗is a testam en t a r y disposit ion depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by la w .‘ T h e effects flowing from preterition are t otally different form those of disinherit a n ce. Pr et er it ion u nder Article 854 ‗shall annul the institution of an heir. This annulment is in toto, unless in t h e w ill there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in t h e for m of dev ises or leg a cies. In in effective disinheritance under Article 918, such disinheritance shall also annul the institu t ion of t h e heirs but only insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited, which last ph r a se w a s om itted in the case of preterition. In disinheritance, the nullity is limited to that por t ion of t h e est a t e of w h ich t h e disin h er it ed h eir s h a v e been illeg a lly depr iv ed.

Ca n iza v s. CA 2 6 8 SCRA 6 4 1 FA CT S: Ca niza was 94 years old and was declared incompetent because of her advanced years. Sh e w a s r epresented in this case by Ev angelista, her guardian. Caniza previously allowed the spouses and t h eir relatives to occupy the house without paying any rent out of the g oodn ess of h er h ea r t . However, she needed money for her support, maintenance and medical treatment. A demand by Ev angelista was made on the Estrada‘s to vacate the house but refused cont en din g t h a t t h ey w ould inherit the house as stated in Caniza‘s holographic will. Ev angelista then moved t o ejec t t h e spouses from the premises. The MetTC ruled in favor of Caniza which was rever sed by t h e RT C on the ground that the "action by which the issue of defen da n t s' possession sh ou ld be r esolved is accion publiciana, the obt a in in g fa ct u a l a n d leg a l sit u a t ion ** dem a n din g a djudication by such plenary action for recovery of possession cognizable in the first instance by t h e Regional Trial Court." This was affirmed by the CA. Caniza died during the pendency of t h e a ppea l. ISSUE: W h ether the Estrada‘s may rightfully claim t h e pr oper t y t h r ou g h t h e h olog r a ph ic w ill? HELD: No, t h ey ca n n ot . It is settled that in an action for unlawful detainer, it suffices to alleg e t h a t t h e defen da n t is u nlawfully withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed sufficient, and a com pla in t for u nlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of possession or t h e r efu sa l t o v acate is unlawful without necessarily employing the t erminology of the law. The only issue tha t cou ld legitimately be raised under the circumstances was that involving the Estrada‘s possession by tolerance, i.e., possession de facto, not de jure. It is therefore incorrect to postulate t h a t t h e pr oper remedy for Cañiza is not ejectment but accion publiciana, a plenary action in the RT C or a n a ct ion t h a t is on e for r ecov er y of t h e r ig h t t o possession de ju r e. T h e Estrada‘s possession of the house stemmed from the owner‘s ex pr ess per m ission . T h a t permission was subsequently withdrawn by the owner, as was her right; and it is immaterial that t h e withdrawal was made through her judicial guardian, the latter being indisput a bly clot h ed w ith authority to do so. Nor is it of any consequence that Caniza executed a will bequeathing th e disputed property t o the Estradas, that circumstance did not give them the right t o st a y on t h e pr emises after demand t o vacate on the theory that they might in the fu t u r e becom e ow n er s

t h ereof. The Estrada‘s right of ownership being at best inchoate, no transfer of ownership bein g possible unless and until the will is duly probated. Prior to the probate of the will, any asser t ion of possession by t h em w ou ld be pr em a t u r e a n d in effica ciou s. A w ill is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the t estator's death, it may be ch a n g e d or r ev oked; and until admitted t o probate, it has no effect whatever and no right ca n be cla im ed t h ereunder, the law being quite explicit: "No will shall pass either r ea l or per son a l pr oper t y u nless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court." An owner's int en t ion t o con fer title in the future t o persons possessing property by his t olerance, is not inconsistent with t h e former's taking back possession in the meantime for any reason deemed sufficient. And tha t in this case there was sufficient cause for the owner's resumption of possession is apparent : sh e n eeded to generate income from the house on account of the physical infirmities afflictin g h er , a r isin g fr om h er ex t r em e a g e. W h ile it is indeed well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily t erminated by the death of either the guardian or the ward, the rule affords no advantage t o t h e Est radas. Amparo Ev angelista, as niece of Carmen Cañiza, is one of t h e la t t er 's on ly t w o (2 ) su rviving heirs, the other being Cañiza's nephew, Ramon C. Nevado. On their m ot ion a n d by Resolution of this Court of June 20, 1994, they were in fact substituted as parties in the appeal at ba r in place of the deceased, in accordance with Section 17, Rule 3 of th e Ru les of Cou r t . T h e h eirs of the deceased may be allowed t o be substituted for the deceased, without requ ir in g t h e a ppointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian a d lit em for t h e minor heirs. To be sure, an ejectment case survives the death of a party. Cañiza's demise did n ot extinguish the desahucio suit instituted by her through her guardian. That action, not being a pu rely personal one, survived her death; her heirs have taken her place and now repr esen t h er in t er est s in t h e a ppea l a t ba r .

Section 618 of the Civil Code of Procedure provides that: The attestation shall state the num ber of s heets or pages used, uponwhich the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the w ill in each and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnes s ed and s igned the w ill and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other.” Howev er , t h e a t testation clause of the decedent‘s will stated that it was signed in the ―presence of ot h er s.‖ In r esolving the same, the Court relied on in its decision in In Re Will of Abangan whereby it r u led t hat the object of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is t o close the door against ba d fa ith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and t estaments and to guarantee their t r u t h a n d a uthenticity. Hence, the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a w a y a s t o a t t a in t h ese primordial ends. However, one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law t o restrain and curtail the exercise of the right t o make a will. So when a n i n t er pr et a t ion a lready given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, tha t a dds n ot h in g bu t dem ands more requisite entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator‘s will, mu st be disregarded. The phrase is t h en con st r u ed t o m ea n a s ― of t h e ot h er ‖ a n d is a m er e g rammatical error. Grammatical or clerical errors are not usually considered of vital importance w h en t h e in t en t ion is m a n ifest in t h e w ill.

A CA IN V S. IA C G.R. No. 7 2 7 0 6

2 7 Oct ober 1 9 8 7

FA CT S:

LORENZO PECSON V S. A GUST IN CORONEL, ET A L G.R. No. L-2 0 3 7 4 1 1 Oct ober 1 9 2 3 FA CT S: Decedent Dolores Coronel died testate and without issu e. Sh e a ppoin t ed a s sole h eir h er n ephew, Lorenzo Pecson, wife of her niece Angela Coronel, for the services he rendered for t h e decedent. He was also appointed as executor thereof, and in his absence, decedent ‘s g r a n dson V incent Pecson. As she cannot read and write, he asked Vicente Francisco t o write the w ill a n d sign it in her behalf. In the attestation clause, it stated that the will was signed by “each of (them) us s igned thes e pres ents in the pres ence of others and of the tes tatrix...” Decedent‘s relatives opposed the probate of the will, contending that the will could not be v a lid because first, it is not natural in our culture to exclude a person‘s blood relatives from h er v a st est ate and hence at most, the decedent merely intended to appoint Loren zo a s ex ecu t or ; a n d second, that the attestation clause failed to comply with the provisions of Section 618 of the Code of Civ il Pr ocedu r e, a s a m en ded by A ct No. 2 6 4 5 . ISSUES: W h et h er or n ot t h e r ela t i v es‘ ex clu sion in t h e w ill a m ou n t s t o pr et er it ion ? W h et h er or n ot t h e defect in t h e a t t est a t ion cla u se in v a lida t es t h e w ill? RULINGS: Firs t is s ue: Relatives ’ Exclus ion from the Will T h eir exclusion in the will does not amount to preterition. The liberty to dispose of one‘s est a t e by will when there are no forced heirs is rendered sacr ed by t h e Civ il Code in for ce in t h e Ph ilippines since 1889 which provides: Any person who has no forced heirs may dispose by will all of his property or any part of it in fav our of any pers on qualified to acquire it. T h e pr eference given to Lorenzo is not purely arbitrary, nor a caprice or wh im of t h e m om en t a s t h ere was sufficient proof that Lorenzo indeed rendered services for the decedent even pr ior t o 1 914, and was the decedent‘s administrator and manager of her affairs in the last years of her life. Second is s ue: Defect in the Attes tation Claus e

Nem esio Acain died testate, leaving the following as heirs: h is w ife Rosa Dion g son V da. de Acain, his legally adopted daughter Virginia Fernandez, and his n eph ew s a n d n ieces fr om his brother Segundo Acain. In his will, he bequeathed all of his property to Segundo, and in ca se the latter predecease him, all his property will pass on to Segundo‘s children. A s Seg u n do pr edeceased Nemesio, the former‘s children moved for the probate of the will. Nemesio‘s widow a n d daughter filed a motion to dismiss, contending that they were preterited. T h e t r ia l cou r t den ied their motion. On appeal, the IAC reversed and ordered the t r ia l cou r t t o dism iss t h e pr oba t e of t h e w ill. ISSUE: W h et h er or n ot Rosa a n d V ir g in ia h a d been pr et er it ed? RULING: Y es. Article 854 of the Civil Code provides that: The preterition or om is s ion of one, s ome, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the ins titution of the heir; but the devisese and legacies s hall be valid ins ofar as they are not inofficious . If the om itted compulsory heir should die before the tes tator, the ins titution s hall be effectual, w ithout prejudice to the right of repres entation. Pr eterition consists in the om ission in the testator‘s will of the forced heirs or an y on e of t h em either because they are not mentioned therein , or even though mentioned, t h ey a r e n eit h er in stituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and a nnulment throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance, except those legacies a n d dev ices, u n less it im pa ir s t h e leg it im e of t h e h eir s. In t he case of Rosa, preterition shall not apply as she does not a scen d n or descen d fr om the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. There is no preterition because she is not in t h e direct line. However, in the case of Virginia, preterition applies because as a leg a l a dopt ee, sh e is vested with the same rights and duties as that of a legitimate ch ild of t h e a dopt er a n d m a kes t h e a dopt ee t h e leg a l h eir of t h e a dopt er . T h e universal institution of the petitioner and his siblings t o the entire inherita n ce of t h e testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such inst it u t ion of u niversal heirs-without any other testamentary disposition in the will-amounts t o a declara t ion t h a t n ot h in g a t a ll w a s w r it t en .

r ights ov er their share of the property inherited from Virginia. Both documents were registered 5 y ears after its execution, and a new TCT is issued by t h e Reg ist er of Deeds in Nilo‘s fa v or . Pet itioner Rebecca contends that Delia Viado, their retardate sister, was not part of the ex trajudicial settlement, and hence amounts t o pr et er it ion w h ich sh ou ld in v a lida t e t h e set tlement. Both the trial court and CA ruled in favor of Nilo‘s wife and ch il dr en . Hen ce t h is a ppea l. ISSUE: NERI V S. A KUT IN G.R. No. L-4 7 7 9 9

W h ether or not Delia‘s exclusion from the ext r a ju dicia l set t lem en t a m ou n t s t o pr et er it ion ? 1 3 Ju n e 1 9 4 1

FA CT S:

A gripino Neri died on 12 December 1931 leaving 6 children from his first wife, a n d 5 ch ildren from his second wife Ignacia Akutin. In his will, he stated that his children by t h e fir st m arriage shall have no longer any participation in his estate as they had already receiv ed t h eir corresponding shares during his lifetime. However, during the hearing for declaration of h eir s, t h e court found that contrary to what Agripino declared in his will, that all his childr en by t h e fir st and second marriages are intestate heirs of the deceased without prejudice to one-half of the im provements introduced in the properties during the existence of the last conjugal partnership w hich should belong to Ignacia Akutin. The Court of Appeals modified the decision a n d r u led t hat the will was valid with respect to the two-thirds part which the t estator can freely dispose of. ISSUE:

W h ether or not the om ission of the children by the first wife annuls the institu t ion of t h e ch ildr en by t h e secon d w ife a s sole h eir s of t h e t est a t or ? RULING: Y es. Preterition consists in the om ission in the testator‘s will of t h e for ced h eir s or a nyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they a r e n either instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. In this case, while the children of t h e fir st marriage were mentioned in the will, they were not accorded any share in th e h er edit a r y pr operty, without expressly being disinherited. The omission of a forced heir or anyone of them, w hether voluntary or involuntary, is a preterition if the purpose to disinherit is n ot ex pr essly m ade or is not at least manifest. Except as t o ―legacies and devises‖ which sha ll r em a in v a lid in sofar as they are not officious, preterition avoids the institu t ion of h eir s a n d g iv es r ise t o in testate succession. The w ill in t h is ca se, t h er e bein g n o leg a cies or dev ises, is v oid.

RULING: Y es. However, in the absence of bad faith and fraud, Article 11 0 4 of t h e Civ il Code m ust apply which, in essence, provides that where the preterition is not attended by ba d fa it h a n d fraud, the partition shall not be rescinded but the preterited heir shall be paid the v a lu e of t h e sh a r e per t a in in g t o h er .

PEREZ V S. GA RCHIT ORENA G.R. No. L-3 1 7 0 3 1 3 Febr u a r y 1 9 3 0 FA CT S:

A na Maria Alcantara died testate. The pertinent provisions of her will are a s follow s: NINT H. Being single and without forced heir, to show my gratitude to my niece-in-law, Carmen Garchitorena, of age, married to my nephew, Joaquin Perez A lca n t a r a x x x a s m y sole a n d u n iv er sa l h eir ess t o t h e r em a in der of m y est a t e x x x T ENTH. Should my heiress Carmen Garchitorena dies, I or der that my whole estate shall pa ssu u nimpaired to her surviving children; and should any of t h ese die, h is sh a r e sh a ll ser v e t o in crease the portions of his surviving brothers (and sisters) by accretion, x x x t h e est a t e sh a ll n ev er pass out of the hands of my heiress or her children insofar as it is leg a lly per m issible. A m ong Ana Maria‘s properties is a deposit amounting t o Ph p 2 1 ,4 2 8 .2 3 w it h La Ur bana. Mariano Garchitorena held a judgment for Php 7, 872.23 against Joaqu in , Ca r m en ‘s h usband. He attached the La Urbana deposit t o satisfy his claims. Carmen secured an injunction r est r a in in g t h e ex ecu t ion . Garchitorena contends that the same can be levied because Car m en is a u n iv er sa l h eiress. Carmen contends that the deposit belongs to Carmen‘s children a s fideicom m issa r y h eir s of A n a Ma r ia . ISSUE:

V IA DO NON V S. CA G.R. No. 1 3 7 2 8 7 FA CT S:

1 5 Febr u a r y 2 0 0 0

Spouses Julian and Virginia Viado owned, among others, a house and lot pertained t o a s the Isarog property. Virginia died on 20 October 1982, followed by Julian 3 years later. Left as h eirs were their children namely: Rebecca Viado Non, Delia Viado, Nilo Viado, and Leah V ia do Ja cobs. Both Nilo and Leah died on 22 April 1987. Nilo left as heirs his wife Alicia a n d t h eir 2 ch ildr en . T h e children of spouses Viado lived in the Isarog property together with Nilo‘s widow a n d children. However, a dispute arose when Rebecca Viado Non asked tha t t h e pr oper t y be div ided equally between the 2 families to make room for their growing children. Nilo‘s wife a n d ch ildren claimed absolute ownership ov er the property evidence by a deed of donation execut ed by Julian in favour of Nilo, covering his ½ conjugal share, and a deed of extrajudicial pa r t it ion set tlement in which Julian, Leah, and Rebecca waived in favour of Nilo all their in t er est s a n d

W h et h er or n ot t h e in st a n t ca se is a fideicom m issa r y su bst it u t ion ?

RULING: Y es. Ma n r esa pr ov ides 3 r equ isit es for fideicom m issa r y : Fir st h eir ca lled pr im a r ily t o t h e en joy m en t of t h e est a t e; A n obligation clearly imposed upon him t o preserve and transmit to a 3 rd person the whole or a pa r t of t h e est a t e; Secon d h eir . A pplying the foregoing to the case, Carmen was called to the enjoyment of the estate according to t h e 9 th clause of the will. Clause 1 0th which provides that the ―whole estate shall pass unimpaired t o h er (Carmen‘s) surviving children,‖ thus, instead of leaving Carmen at liberty to dispose of the est ate by will, or by living the law to take its course in case she dies intestate, the said clause n ot on ly disposes of the estate in favour of the disposition thereof in case she shou ld die a ft er t h e t estatrix. The children of Carmen are referred t o as second heirs. Hence, t h e deposit does n ot belong to Carmen as her absolute property, but also to her children, from the moment of death of A n a Ma r ia . It ca n n ot be a t t a ch ed by Ma r ia n o.

G.R. No. L-3 8 9 1 , 1 9 Decem ber 1 9 0 7 RA BA DILLA V S. CA G.R. No. 1 1 3 7 2 5 , 2 9 Ju n e 2 0 0 0 FA CT S: A lejandra Belleza executed a Codicil making Jorge Rabadilla as her heir. The Codicil pr ov ides t hat she is bequeathing No. 1392 of the Bacolod Ca da st r e a n d t h a t sh ou ld Dr . Ra ba dilla pr edecease her, the lot will go t o his wife and children . Sh e a lso st a t ed t h a t it sh a ll be Dr . Ra badilla‘s obligation to deliver in favour of Marlina Coscolluela 75 piculs of Export sugar and 35 piculs of dom estic sugar, until Marlina‘s death. In case of Dr. Rabadilla‘s death , h is h eir sh a ll fu lfil such obligation. In the event that Dr. Rabadilla or his heirs shall later sell, lease, mortg a g e t h e Lot, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall also have the obligation t o r espect a n d deliv er t o Ma r lin a y ea r ly 1 0 0 picu ls of su g a r ev er Decem ber . Dr . Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife and children. His son Johnn y is h erein petitioner. Marlina then filed a com plaint against the heir s of Dr . Ra ba dilla for t h e en forcement of the Codicil. The parties came up with a Memorandum of Agreement whch w a s, h ow ev er , n ot com plied w it h by t h e h eir s. T h e RT C dism issed t h e com pla in t . ISSUE: W h ehter or not Dr. Rabadilla‘s institution in the Codicil is in the na t u r e of a m oda l in st it u t ion ? RULING: Y es. Article 882 of the New Civil Code provides that the statement of the object of t h e in stitution or the application of the property left by the t estator, or the charge imposed on h im , sh all not be considered as a condition unless it appears that such was his intention. That w h ich h a s been left in this manner may be claimed at once provided that the instituted heir or his heirs g iv e security for com pliance with the wishes of the testator and for the return of anythin g h e or t h ey may receive, t ogether with its fruits and interests, if h e or t h ey sh ou ld disr eg a r d t h is obligation. Article 883 provides that when without the fault of the heir, an institution referred t o in the preceding article cannot take effect in the exact manner stated by the testator, it sh a ll be com plied with in a m a n n er m ost a n a log ou s t o a n d in con for m it y w it h h is w ish es. T h e institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in a r t icle 8 8 2 is kn ow n a s a n ins titucion sub modo or modal substitution. In a m oda l su bst it u t ion , t h e t est a t or st a t es: T h e object of t h e in st it u t ion ; Pu r pose or a pplica t ion o t h e pr oper t y left by t h e t est a t or ; Ch a r g e im posed by t h e t est a t or u pon t h e h eir . A ‗m ode‘ imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficscy of h is r ights t o the succession. In a conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends but n ot oblig a t e; a n d t h e m ode oblig a t es bu t does n ot su spen d. In t his case, Alejandra intended Dr. Rabadilla to inherit the property. She likewise im posed a n obligation on him and to his heirs to deliver 1 00 piculs of sugar t o Marlina. However, Alejandr a did not make Dr. Rabadilla‘s inheritance and effectivity of his institution as a devisee, dependent on t he performance of the said obligation. Should the obligation be n ot com plied w it h , t h e pr operty shall be turned over to Alejandra‘s near descendants. The institution of Dr. Rabadilla is ev idently modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without, however, a ffecting the efficacy of such institution. Since testamentary dispositions are gen er a lly a ct s of liberality, an obligation im posed upon the heirs should not be considered a condition u n less it clearly appears from the Will itself that such was the intention of the t estator. In case of dou bt , t h e in st it u t ion sh ou ld be con sider ed a s m oda l in st it u t ion .

MORENT E V S. DE LA SA NT A

FA CT S:

Con suelo Morente died testate. In her will, her husbnd Gumersindo de la Sa n t a w a s m ade sole heir, subject to the condition that he shall not remar r y , r em a in t o liv e w it h h er br others, and that should he have children with anyone, the 2/3 of the estate shall remain for her br other Vicente, or the latter‘s children, and the remaining 1 /3 is su bject t o Gu m er sin do‘s disposa l. Gumersindo married again 4 months after his wife‘s death. Consuelo‘s sister asked for t h e annulment of the legacy in the will on the ground of remarriage. She contends that the mer e a ct off remarriage of Gu m er sin do st r ips h im off of h is r ig h t s a cqu ir ed fr om t h e w ill. ISSUE: leg a cy ?

W h ether or not Consulelo‘s intention that Gumersindo‘s remarriage would forfeit t h e

RULING: No. Article 790 of the Civil Code provides that testamentary provisions may be m a de con fidential and Article 798 provides that a prohibition against another marriage may in certain ca ses be v a lidly im posed u pon t h e w idow or w idow er . In t his case, there was nothing in the will which would mean that it w a s Con su elo‘s in tention that Gumersindo‘s remarriage would strip him of his rights from the legacy. T h er e is n o express condition attached to that legacy in references to the 2 nd marriage, as the will simply sa id he will not marry a g a in . No con dit ion w a s a t t a ch ed in ca se of n on -com plia n ce.

ROSA LES V S. ROSA LES No L-4 0 7 8 9 , 2 7 Febr u a r y 1 9 8 7 FA CT S:

Pet ra Rosales died intestate, leaving as heirs her husba n d For t u n a t o a n d t h eir 2 ch ildren. Carterio Rosales, also a child of Spouses Rosales, predeceased her, and left as heirs h is son Macikequerox and widow Irenea. The estimated gross value of Petra‘s estate was about Ph p 3 0 , 0 0 0 .0 0 . Ma gna Rosales Acebes, her daughter, filed for intestate proceedings and was lat er on a ppointed as administratrix. The court then declared the following as Petra‘s leg a l h eir s, a n d t h eir r espect iv e sh a r es: For t u n a t o Rosa les (h u sba n d) ¼; Ma g n a Rosa les A cebes (da u g h t er ) ¼; Ma cikequ er ox Rosa les (g r a n dson ) ¼; A n t on io Rosa les (son ) ¼. Ir ena appealed, contending that as the surviving spouse of Carterio, she is compu lsor y h eir of Pet r a t og et h er w it h h er son . T h e cou r t den ied h er plea . Hen ce t h is pet it ion . ISSUE:

W h ether or not a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in -la w ?

RULING: No. In testate heirs/ legal heirs are divided into two: those who inherit in t h eir ow n r ight (as in the order of intestate succession provided for in th e Civ il Code), a n d t h ose w h o in h er it by r ig h t of r epr esen t a t ion a s pr ov ided in A r t icle 9 8 1 of t h e Civ il Code. T h ere is nothing in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spou se) is a n in testate heir of her mother-in-law. The provisions of t h e Code w h ich r ela t es t o in t est a t e su ccession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with meticulous exactitude the intestate h eir s of a deceden t , w it h t h e St a t e a s t h e fin a l in t est a t e h eir .

A rticle 887, from which Irenea bases her claim refers to the est a t e of t h e decea sed spou se in which case the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir. It does not apply t o the estate of t h e parent-in-law. The surviving spouse is considered as a 3rd person as regards the estate of t h e pa r en t -in -la w . T h e estate in this case is that of Petra Rosales, the mother-in-law of Irenea. It is fr om Pet ra‘s estate that Macikequerox draws a share of the inheritance by right of represen t a t ion a s pr ov ided in Article 981. Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox is called to succession by law because of his blood rela t ion sh ip. He does n ot su cceed h is fa t h er Ca r t er io w h o pr edeceased his grandmother, Petra Rosales, but the la t t er w h om h is fa t h er w ou ld h a v e su cceeded. Irenea cannot assert the same right of representation as she has no filiation by blood w it h h er m ot h er -in -la w . [G.R. No. 1 3 8 7 7 4 . Ma r ch 8 , 2 0 0 1 ] REGINA FRA NCISCO A ND ZENA IDA PA SCUA L, petitioners , vs . A IDA FRA NCISCO-A LFONSO, res pondent. FA CT S: Respondent Aida Francisco-Alfonso (hereafter Aida) is the only daughter of spou ses Gr eg or io Fr ancisco and Cirila de la Cruz, who are now both deceased. Petitioners, on the other hand, a r e da ughters of the late Gregorio Francisco with his common law wife Julia Mendoza, with w h om h e begot seven (7) children. Gregorio Francisco (hereafter Gr eg or io) ow n ed t w o pa r cels of r esidential land, situated in Barangay Lolomboy, Bocaue, Bulacan, covered by TCT Nos. T-32740 a n d T-117160. When Gregorio was confined in a hospital in 1990, he confided to his da u g h t er A ida that the certificates of title of his property were in the possession of Regina Francisco a n d Zen a ida Pa scu a l. A fter Gregorio died on July 20, 1 990, Aida inquired about the certificates of t itle from h er h a l f sist ers. They informed her that Gregorio had sold the land t o them on August 15, 1 9 8 3 . A ft er v erification, Aida learned that there was indeed a deed of absolut e sa le in fa v or of Reg in a Fr ancisco and Zenaida Pascual. Thus, on August 15, 1 983, Gregorio executed a ―Ka su la t a n sa Ganap na Bilihan, whereby for P25,000.00, he sold the two parcels of land t o Regina Fra n cisco a n d Zenaida Pascual. By virtue of the sale, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan issued T CT No. T 5 9 .5 8 5 t o Reg in a Fr a n cisco a n d T CT T -5 9 .5 8 6 t o Zen a ida Pa scu a l. On April 1, 1991, Aida filed with the Regiona l T r ia l Cou r t , Bu la ca n a com pla in t a g a in st pet itioners for annulment of sale with damages. She alleged that the signature of her late father , Gr egorio Francisco, on the Kasulatan sa Ganap na Bilihan dated August 15, 1983, was a forgery. In t heir joint answer t o the com plaint, petitioners denied the alleged forgery or simulation of the deed of sale. After due proceedings, on July 21, 1994 , t h e t r ia l cou r t r en der ed a decision dism issing t h e com pla in t . T h e Cou r t of A ppea ls Rev er sed t h e decision of t h e RT C. ISSUE: Ma y a legitimate daughter be deprived of her share in the estate of h er decea sed fa t h er by a sim ulated contract transferring the proper t y of h er fa t h er t o h is illeg it im a t e ch ildr en ? HELD: T h e Supreme Court ruled that the kasulatan was simulated. There was no consideration for t h e con tract of sale. Felicitas de la Cruz, a family friend of the Franciscos, t est ified t h a t Zen a ida Pa scual and Regina Francisco did not have any source of income in 1 983, when they bought t h e pr oper t y , u n t il t h e t im e w h en Felicit a s t est ified in 1 9 9 1 . A s proof of incom e, however, Zenaida Pascual testified that she was eng a g ed in oper a t in g a ca nteen, working as cashier in Mayon Night Club as well as buying and selling RTW (Rea dy t o W ear) items in August of 1 983 and prior thereto. Zenaida alleged that she paid h er fa t h er t h e a m ount of P1 0,000.00. She did not withdraw money from her bank account at the Rura l Ba n k of Mey cauayan, Bulacan, to pay for the property. She had personal saving s ot h er t h a n t h ose deposited in the bank. Her gross earnings from the RTW for three years was P9,000.00, and she ea r n ed P5 0 .0 0 a n ig h t a t t h e clu b. Reg ina Francisco, on the other hand, was a market vendor , sellin g nilugaw , ea r n in g a n et in come of P300.00 a day in 1983. She bought the property from the deceased for P15,0 0 0 .0 0 . Sh e had no other source of income.The t estimonies of petitioners were incredible con sider in g t h eir inconsistent statements as t o whether there was consideration for the sale a n d a lso a s t o w hether the property was bought below or above its supposed market valu e. T h ey cou ld n ot

ev en present a single witness to the kasulatan that would prove receipt of the pu r ch a se pr ice. Since there was no cause or consideration for the sale, the same was a simulation and hence, null a n d v oid. Ev en if the kasulatan was not simulated, it still violated the Civil Code provisions insofar a s t h e t ransaction affected respondent‘s legitime. The sale was executed in 1983, when the applica ble law was the Civil Code, not the Family Code. Obviously, the sale was Gregorio‘s way to t r a n sfer t h e property t o his illegitimate daughters at the expense of his legitimate daughter. The sale was ex ecuted to prevent respondent Alfonso from claiming her legitime and rightfu l sh a r e in sa id pr operty. Before his death, Gregorio had a change of heart and informed his daughter about the t it les t o t h e pr oper t y . A ccor din g t o A r t icle 8 8 8 , Civ il Code: ― The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of t h e fa t h er a n d of t h e m ot h er . ― The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half subject t o the rights of illegitimate childr en a n d of t h e su r v iv in g spou se a s h er ein a ft er pr ov ided.‖ Gr egorio Francisco did not own any other property. If indeed the parcels of land involved w er e t h e only property left by their father, the sale in fact would deprive respondent of h er sh a r e in h er father‘s estate. By law, she is entitled to half of the estate of her father as his only legitima t e ch ild. The legal heirs of the late Gregorio Francisco must be determin ed in pr oper t est a t e or in testate proceedings for settlement of the estate. His compulsory heir can not be depr iv ed of h er sh a r e in t h e est a t e sa v e by disin h er it a n ce a s pr escr ibed by la w .

G.R. No. L-1 3 3 8 6 Oct ober 2 7 , 1 9 2 0 SEGUNDA MARIA NIEVA with her husband ANGEL ALCALA, plaintiffs-appellants, v s. MA NUELA A LCA LA a n d JOSE DEOCA MPO, defen da n t s -a ppel l ees. FA CT S:

Ju liana Nieva, the alleged natural mother of the plaintiff Seg u n da Ma r ia Niev a, married Francisco Deocampo. Of said marriage Alfeo Deocampo was born. Juliana Nieva died intestate on April 19, 1889, and her said son, Alfeo Deocam po, in h er it ed fr om h er , a b in t est a t e, t h e pa r cels of la n d descr ibed in Pa r a g r a ph s V a n d X of t h e com pla in t . A lfeo Deocampo died intestate and without issue on July 7, 1 8 9 0 . T h er eu pon t h e t w o pa rcels of land above-mentioned passed t o his fat h er , Fr a n cisco Deoca m po, by in t est a t e su ccession. Thereafter Francisco Deocampo married the herein defendant Manuela A lca la , of w h ich m a r r ia g e w a s bor n Jose Deoca m po, t h e ot h er defen da n t h er ein . Fr ancisco Deocampo died on August 15, 1 9 1 4 , w h er eu pon h is w idow a n d son , t h e defendants herein, took possession of the parcels of land in question, under the claim t h a t t h e sa id son, the defendant Jose Deocampo (a minor) had inherited the same, ab intestate, from h is decea sed fa t h er . On September 30, 1 915, the plaintiff herein, claiming to be a n a ckn ow ledg ed n a t u r a l da ughter of the said Juliana Nieva, instituted the present action for purposes of recovering from t h e defendants the parcels of land in question, particularly described in Paragraphs V a n d X of t h e com pla in t , in v okin g t h e pr ov ision s of a r t icle 8 1 1 of t h e Civ il Co de. ISSUE:

W h ether or not the plaintiff is an acknowledged natural daughter of t h e decea sed Ju liana Nieva and if an illegitimate relative within the third degree is en t it led t o t h e res erva troncal pr ov ided for by a r t icle 8 1 1 of t h e Civ il Code. HELD: T h e lower court held that, even g r a n t in g , w it h ou t decidin g , t h a t t h e pla in t iff w a s a n a cknowledged natural daughter of Juliana Nieva, she was not entitled to the pr oper t y h er e in qu estion because, in its opinion, an illegitimate relative has no right to th e reserva troncal under t h e pr ov ision s of a r t icle 8 1 1 of t h e Civ il Code a n d w h ich r ea ds a s follow s:

― Any ascendant who inherits from his descen da n t a n y pr oper t y a cqu ir ed by t h e la t t er g ratuitously from som e other ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is obliged t o reserve such of t h e property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives wit h in t h e t h ir d deg r ee belon g in g t o t h e lin e fr om w h ich su ch pr oper t y ca m e.‖ SC h eld that the object is to protect the patrimony of th e leg it im a t e fa m ily , follow in g t h e pr ecedents of the foral law. And it could not be otherw is e. Article 943 denies to legitim ate parents the right to succeed the natural child and viceversa, from which it m us t be deduced that natural parents neither have the right to inhering from legitimate ones ; t h e la w in t h e a rticle cited established a barrier between the two families; properties of the legitima t e fa m ily sh a ll n ev er pa ss by oper a t ion of la w t o t h e n a t u r a l fa m ily . ( Ibid. pp. 2 5 1 -2 5 2 .) A r t icle 9 4 3 , a bov e r efer r ed t o pr ov ides a s follow s: A natural or legitimated child has no right to succeed ab intestate the legitimate ch ildr en a n d relatives of the father or mother who has acknowledg ed it ; n or sh a ll su ch ch ildr en or r ela t iv es so in h er it fr om t h e n a t u r a l or leg it im a t ed ch ild. T o h old that the appellant is entitled to the property left by her n a t u r a l br ot h er , A lfeo Deocampo, by operation of law, would be a fragrant viola t e of t h e ex pr ess pr ov ision of t h e for eg oin g a r t icle (9 4 3 ). For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed, without any fin din g a s t o cost s. So or der ed.

G.R. No. 8 3 4 8 4 Febr u a r y 1 2 , 1 9 9 0 CELEDONIA SOLIVIO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CONCORDIA JA V ELLA NA V ILLA NUEV A , r e spon den t s. FA CT S: T h is case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr., author of the fir st post w ar Filipino novel "W ithout Seeing the Dawn," who died a bach elor , w it h ou t descen da n t s, a scendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces. His only su r v iv in g r ela t iv es a r e: (1 ) h i s m aternal aunt, petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-sist er of h is m ot h er , Sa lu st ia Solivio; and (2) the private respondent, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister of h is decea sed fa ther, Esteban Javellana, Sr. He was a posthumous child. His father died barely ten (10) months a ft er his marriage in December, 1916 to Salustia Solivio and four months before Esteban, Jr. was bor n . Sa lustia brought to her marriage paraphernal properties (various parcels of l a n d in Ca lin og , Iloilo covered by 24 titles) which she had inherited from her mother, Gregoria Celo, En g r a cio Solivio's first wife (p. 325, Record), but no conjugal property was acquired during her short-lived m a r r ia g e t o Est eba n , Sr . On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her on ly ch ild, Est eba n , Jr ., in cluding a house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo City, where she, her son, and her sister liv ed. In du e t im e, the tit les of a ll t h ese pr oper t ies w er e t r a n sfer r ed in t h e n a m e of Est eba n , Jr . Du r ing his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt Celedonia and som e close friends his plan to place his estate in a foundation to honor his mother and to help poor but deserving students obtain a college education. Unfortunately , h e died of a h ea r t a t t a ck on Febr u a r y 2 6 ,1 9 7 7 w it h ou t h a v in g set u p t h e fou n da t ion . T wo weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about what to do w it h Est eba n 's pr operties. Celedonia told Concordia about Esteban's desire t o place his estate in a foundation to be named after his mother, from whom his properties came, for the purpose of helping indigen t st udents in their schoolin g . Con cor dia a g r eed t o ca r r y ou t t h e pla n of t h e decea sed. Celedonia was appointed as the administratix of the estat e a n d la t er on t h e cou r t a djudicated her as the sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javallana Jr. and proceeded to set up the "SALUSTIA SOLIVIO VDA. DE JAVELLANA FOUNDATION" Fou r months later, or on August 7, 1978, Concordia Javellana Villa n u ev a fil ed a m ot ion for r econsideration of the court's order declaring Celedonia as "sole heir" of Esteban, Jr ., beca u se sh e too was an heir of the deceased. On September 3, 1 9 8 4 , t h e sa id t r ia l cou r t r en der ed ju dg m en t in Civ il Ca se No. 1 3 2 0 7 , in fa v or of Con cor di a Ja v ella n a -V illa n u ev a .

ISSUE: W h et h er or n ot t h e pr oper t y of t h e decea sed w a s su bject t o r eser v e t r on ca l. HELD: T h e Court finds no merit in the petitioner's argument that the estate of the deceased was subject t o res erva troncal and that it pertains to her as his only relative within the third deg r ee on h is m other's side. The reserva troncal provision of the Civil Code is found in Article 891 which reads a s follow s: A RT. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the la t t er m a y h ave acquired by gratuitous t itle from another ascendant, or a brother or sist er , is oblig ed t o r eserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the ben efit of r ela t iv es w ho are within the third degree and w ho belong to the line from which sa id pr oper t y ca m e. T h e per son s in v olv ed in res erva troncal a r e: 1 . The person obliged to reserve is the reservor (reservista)—the ascen da n t w h o in h er it s by oper a t ion of la w pr oper t y fr om h is descen da n t s. 2 . The persons for whom the property is reserved are the reservees (reservatarios )—r ela t iv es w ithin the third degree counted from the descendant (propositus), and belon g in g t o t h e lin e fr om w h ich t h e pr oper t y ca m e. 3 . The propositus—the descendant who received by gratuitous tit le a n d died w it h ou t issu e, m aking his other ascendant inherit by operation of law. (p. 692, Civil Law by Pa dilla , V ol. II, 1 9 5 6 Ed.) Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not r eser v a ble pr oper t y , for Est eban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the descendant of his mother , Sa lu st ia Soliv io, fr om w hom he inherited the properties in question. Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance subject t o a reservation in favor of his aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative within the third degree on h is mother's side. The reserva troncal applies to properties inherited by an ascendant from a descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or 9 brother or sister. It does not a pply t o pr operty inherited by a descendant from his ascendant, the reverse of the situation cov er ed by A rticle 891. Since the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., died without descendants, a scen da n t s, illegitimate children, surviving spouse, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces, what should apply in t h e distribution of his estate are Articles 1003 and 10 0 9 of t h e Civ il Code w h ich pr ov ide: A RT. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, t h e collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance w it h t h e follow in g a r t icles. A RT. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or sister s, t h e ot h er colla t er a l r ela t iv es sh a ll su cceed t o t h e est a t e. T h e latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference a m on g t h em by r ea son of r ela t ion sh ip by t h e w h ole blood. However, It is true that by the agreement, she did n ot w a iv e h er in h er it a n ce in fa v or of Celedonia, but she did agree to place all of Esteban's estate in t h e "Sa lu st ia Soliv io V da . de Jav ellana Foundation, and therefore, Concordia is obligat ed t o h on or h er com m it m en t a s Celedon ia h a s h on or ed h er s. T h e petition for review was granted. The decision of the trial court and the Court of Appeals were SET ASIDE. Concordia J. Villanueva is declared an heir of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. entitled t o on e-half of his estate. However, comformably with the agreement between h er a n d h er coh eir, Celedonia Solivio, the entire estate of the deceased should be convey ed t o t h e "Sa lu st ia Solivio Vda. de Javallana Foundation," of which both the petitioner and the private respon den t sh all be trustees, and each shall be entitled t o n om in a t e a n equ a l n u m ber of t r u st ees t o con stitute the Board of Trustees of the Foundation which shall adm in ist er t h e sa m e for t h e pu r poses set for t h in it s ch a r t er .

G.R. No. 6 8 8 4 3 -4 4 Sept em ber 2 , 1 9 9 1 MA RIQUIT A O. SUMA YA a n d LA GUNA A GRO-INDUST RIA L COCONUT COOPERATIVE, INC., petitioners, vs. THE HON. INT ERMEDIA T E A PPELLA T E

COURT , and AMADEO, SA NCHO, DONA T O, LUIS, ERA ST O, LUISA , JOSE a n d DOLORES, a l l su r n a m ed BA LA NT A KBO, r espon den t s. FA CT S: Ra ul Balantakbo inherited from two (2) different ascendan t s t h e t w o (2 ) set s of pr oper t ies su bject of this case: 1 ) A one-third (1/3) interest, pro-indiviso in a parcel of land situated in Dita, Lilio (Liliw) Laguna from his father Jose, Sr., who died on January 2 8 , 1 9 4 5 ; a n d 2 ) A on e sev enth (1 /7) interest pro-indiviso in ten (10) parcels of registered la n ds fr om h is m a t er n a l g r a n dm ot h er , Lu isa Ba u t ist a , w h o died on Nov em ber 3 , 1 9 5 0 . On June 13, 1952, Raul died intestate, single, without any issue, and leaving on ly h is m ot h er , Con suelo Joaquin Vda. de Balantakbo, as his sole surviving heir t o the real pr oper t ies a bov e m entioned. On Nov ember 3, 1952, Consuelo adjudicated u n t o h er self t h e a bov e descr ibed pr operties in an Affidavit en t it led "Ca u da l Her eder a r io del fin a do Ra u l Ba la n t a kbo." Con suelo then sold some properties to Mariquita H. Sumaya and Villa Honor io Dev elopm en t Cor poration which the latter in turn transferred and assigned all its rights t o the pr oper t ies in fa v or of La g u n a A g r o-In du st r ia l Cocon u t Cooper a t iv e. On June 3, 1968, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo died. On Ma r ch 4 , 1 9 7 0 , A m a deo, Sa ncho, Donato, Luis, and Erasto, all surnamed Balantakbo, br ot h er s in fu ll bl ood of Ra u l Ba lantakbo and Luisa, Jose and Dolores, also all surnamed Balantakbo, survivin g ch ildr en of deceased Jose Balantakbo, Jr., another brother of the first named Balantakbos, filed t h e a bov e m entioned civil cases to recover the properties described in the respective complaints which they cla im ed w er e su bject t o a res erva troncal in t h eir fa v or . ISSUE:

W h ether or not the properties sold were subject t o a r eser v a t r on ca l a n d if it is n ecessa r y t o r eser v e a n d a n n ot a t e t h e sa m e. HELD:

T h e trial court rendered a decision in favor of t h e Ba la n t a kbos a n d t h e Cou st of A ppea ls a ffir m ed sa id decision . T h e SC Held that consistent with the rule in reserva viudal where the person obliged to reser v e (t he widowed spouse) had the obligation to annotate in the Registry of Property the reser v a ble character of the property, in reserva troncal, the reservor (the ascendant who inherited fr om a descendant property which the latter inherited from another descendant) has the duty to reserve a n d t h er efor e, t h e du t y t o a n n ot a t e a lso. T h e jurisprudential rule requiring annotation in the Registry of Property of the right reserved in r eal property subject of reserva viudal insofar as it is applied to reserva troncal stays despite the a bolition of reserva viudal in the New Civil Code. This rule is consistent with the rule pr ov ided in the second paragraph of Section 51 of P.D. 1529, which provides that: "The act of registra t ion sh all be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned . . ." (em ph a sis su pplied) T h e properties involved in this case are already cover ed by a T or r en s t it le a n d u n less t h e r egistration of the limitation is effected (either actual or constructive), no third persons shall be pr eju diced t h er eby . T h e respondent appellate court did not err in finding that the cau se of a ct ion of t h e pr iv a t e r espondents did not prescribe yet. The cause of action of the reservees did not commence u pon t h e death of the propositus Raul Balantakbo on June 13, 1 952 but upon the death of the reservor Con suelo Vda. de Balantakbo on June 3, 1 968. Relatives within the third degree in whose fa v or t h e right (or property) is reserved have no title of ownership or of fee simple ov er th e r eser v ed pr operty during the lifetime of the reservor. Only when t h e r eser v or sh ou ld die befor e t h e r eservees will the latter acquire the reserved property, thus creating a fee simple, and only t h en w ill they take their place in the succession of the descendant of whom they are relatives w it h in t h e third degree (See Velayo Bernardo v. Siojo, G.R. No. 36078, March 11, 1 933, 5 8 Phil. 89). The r eserva is extinguished upon the death of the r eser v or , a s it t h en becom es a r ig h t of fu ll ow nership on the part of the reservatarios, who can br in g a r eiv in dica t or y su it t h er efor . Non etheless, this right if not exercised within the time for recovery may prescr ibe in t en (1 0 ) y ears under the old Code of Civil Procedure (see Carillo v. De Paz, G.R. No. L-22601, October 28, 1 966, 18 SCRA 467, 473) or in thirty years under Article 1141 of the New Civil Code. The act ion s for r ecovery of the reserved property was brought by herein private responden t s on Ma r ch 4 ,

1 970 or less than two (2) years from the death of the reservor. Therefore, privat e r espon den t s' ca u se of a ct ion h a s n ot pr escr ibed y et . A CCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED. The questioned decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is AFFIRMED, except for the modification on the necessity to annot a t e t h e r ev er sa ble ch a r a ct er of a pr oper t y su bject of res erva troncal.

G.R. No. L-2 3 7 7 0 Febr u a r y 1 8 , 1 9 2 6 MA GIN RIOSA, plaintiff-appel l a n t , v s.PA BLO ROCHA , MA RCELINA CA SA S, MA RIA CORRAL and CONSOLACION R. DE CA LLEJA , defen da n t s -a ppel l ees. FA CT S:

Ma r ia Corral was united in marriage with the deceased Mariano Riosa , it bein g h er fir st and only marriage and during which time she bore him three children named Santiago, Jose a n d Severina. The latter died during infancy and the other two survived their fa t h er , Ma r ia n o Riosa. Santiago Riosa, now deceased, married Francisca Villanueva, who bore him two childr en n amed Magin and Consolacion Riosa. Jose Riosa, also deceased, married Marcelina Ca sa s a n d t h ey had one child who died before the father, the latter therefore leav in g n o issu e. Ma r ia n o Riosa left a will dividing his property between his two children, Santiago and Jose Riosa, givin g t h e latter the eleven parcels of land described in the complaint. Upon the death of Jose Riosa h e left a w ill in w h ich h e n a m ed h is w ife, Ma r celin a Ca sa s, a s h is on ly h eir . On May 1 6, 1 917, the will of Jose Riosa was filed for probate. Notwithstanding the fact t hat Marcelina Casas was the only heir named in the will, on account of the preterition of Ma r ia Corral who, being the mother of Jose Riosa, was his legitimate heir, I Marcelina Casas and Maria Corral, on the same date of the filing of the will for probate, entered into a contract by which they div ided between themselves the property left by Jose Riosa, the eleven parcels of land described in t h e com pla in t bein g a ssig n ed t o Ma r ia Cor r a l. Ma r ia Coral then sold som e parcels of land to Marcelina Casas and the latter t o Pa blo Rocha. However som e of the parcels of land were returned by Pablo to Marcelina alleg in g t h a t t h e sa id pa r cels of la n d w er e er r on eou sly t r a n sfer r ed by Ma r ia t o Ma r ce lin a . A n action was brought by Magin Riosa, for whom the pr oper t y sh ou ld h a v e been r eserved, against Maria Corral, whose duty it was t o reserve it, and against Marcelina Casas a n d Pa blo Rocha as purchasers of parcels 10 and 11. The com plaint prays that th e property t h er ein described be declared reservable property and that the plaintiffs Jose and Consolacion Riosa be declared reservees; that this reservation be noted in the registry of deeds; that the sale of parcels 1 0 and 11 t o Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha be declared valid only in so far as it saves the right of r eservation in favor of the plaintiff Magin Riosa and of the defendant Consolacion Riosa, a n d t hat this right of reservation be also noted on the deeds of sale executed in fav or of Ma r celin a Ca sa s a n d Pa blo Roch a ; ISSUE:

W h ether or not the parcels of land subject t o reserva troncal necessitates the recording of w h ich in t h e r eg ist r y of deeds. HELD:

T h e Supreme Court held that Marcelina Casas, as well as Pablo Roch a , Kn ew of t h e r eservable character of the property when they bought it. They had knowledge of the provision s of t h e last will and testament of Mariano Riosa by virtue of which these parcels were transferred t o Jose Riosa. Pablo Rocha was one of the legatees in the will. Marcelina Casas was the one w h o en tered into the contract of partition with Maria Corral, whereby these parcels were adjudicated t o t he latter, as a legitimate heir of Jose Riosa. Pablo Rocha was the very person who drafted th e con tracts of sale of these parcels of land by Maria Corral t o Marcelina Casas and by the latt er t o h im self. These facts, together with the relationship existing between Maria Corral and Marcelina Ca sas and Pablo Rocha, the former a daughter-in-law and the latter a nephew of Maria Cor r a l, a m ply support the conclusion that both of them knew t h a t t h ese pa r cels of la n d h a d been

in herited by Maria Corral, as her legitime from her son Jose Riosa who had inherited th em , by w ill, from his father Mariano Riosa, and were reservable property. Wherefore, the duty of Maria Corral of recording the reservable character of lots 10 and 11 has been transferred to Pablo Rocha a n d the reservees have an action against him t o compel him t o comply with this obligation. T h e ju dgment appealed from is modified and Pablo Rocha is ordered to recor d in t h e r eg ist r y of deeds t h e r eser v a ble ch a r a ct er of pa r cels 1 0 1 1 , t h e su bject of t h is com pla in t .

G.R. No. L-2 8 0 3 2 Sept em ber 2 4 , 1 9 8 6 FRA NCISCA TIOCO DE PAPA, MANUEL TIOCO, NICOLAS TIOCO and JA NUA RIO PA PA, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. DALISAY T ONGKO CA MA CHO, PRIMO T ONGKO a n d GODOFREDO CA MA CHO, defen da n t s-a ppel l a n t s. FA CT S:

Defendant Dalisay D. T ongko-Camacho and the plaintiffs, Francisco T ioco de Pa pa , Ma nuel Tioco and Nicolas T ioco, are legitimate relatives, pla in t iffs bein g sa id defen da n t 's g randaunt and granduncles and having a common ancestor the late Balbino T ioco (w h o h a d a sist er by the name of Romana Tioco), father of plaintiffs and great grandfat h er of defen da n t . T or ibia T ioco died intestate in l9l5, survived by her husband, Eust a cio Dizon , a n d t h eir t w o leg itimate children, Faustino Dizon and Trinida d Dizon (m ot h er of defen da n t Da lisa y D, T ongko-Camacho) and leaving the four (4) parcels of land as the inherit a n ce of h er sa id t w o ch ildren in equal pro-indiv iso sh a r es. Ba lbino Tioco died intestate, survived by his legitimate children by h is w ife Ma r cia n a Felix (am ong them plaintiffs) and legitimate grandchildren Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon. In the pa rtition of his estate, three (3) parcels of land now covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 1 6545 and 16554 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila, were adjudicated as the inherita n ce of t h e la te Toribia Tioco, but as she had predeceased her father, Ba lbin o T ioco, t h e sa id t h r ee (3 ) pa rcels of land devolved upon her two legitimate children Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon in equ a l Fa ustino Dizon died intestate, single and without issue, leaving his one-half (1/2) pr o-in div iso sh are in the seven (7) parcels of land above-mentioned to his father, Eustacio Dizon, as h is sole in testate heir, who received the sa id pr oper t y su bject t o a r eser v a t r on ca l w h ich w a s su bsequ en t ly a n n ot a t ed on t h e T r a n sfer Cer t ifica t es of T it le. T r inidad Dizon-Tongko died intestate, and her right s a n d in t er est s in t h e pa r cels of la n d a bovementioned were inherited by her only legitimate child, defen da n t Da lisa y D. T on g koCam acho, subject to the usufructuary right of her surviving husband, defendant Primo Ton g ko. Eu stacio Dizon died intestate, survived his only legitimate descendant, defen da n t Da lisa y D. T on g ko-Ca m a ch o. Defendant Dalisay D. T ongko-Camacho now owns one-half (1/2) of all the seven (7 ) pa r cels of la nd abovementioned a s h er in h er it a n ce fr om h er m ot h er , T r in ida d Dizon -T on g ko. Defendant Dalisay D. T ongko-Camacho also claims, upon legal advice, the other half of the sa id sev en (7) parcels of land abovementioned by virtue of the reserva troncal im posed thereon upon t h e death of Faustino Dizon and under the laws on intestate succession; but the plain t iffs, a lso u pon legal advice, oppose her said claim because they claim three-fourths (3/4) of the on e-h a lf pr o-indiviso interest in said parcel of land, which interest was inherited by Eustacio Dizon fr om Fa ustino Dizon, or three-eights (3/8) of the said parcels of land, by virt u e of t h eir bein g a lso t h ir d deg r ee r ela t iv es of Fa u st in o Dizon . ISSUE: W h ether or not all relatives of the praepositus within the third degree in the a ppr opr ia t e lin e su cceed without distinction to the reservable property upon the death of the res ervis ta, or , a s a sserted by the defendant-appellant, the rights of said relatives are subject t o, a n d sh ou ld be det er m in ed by , t h e r u les on in t est a t e su ccession . HELD:

T h e Supreme Court, speaking t h r ou g h Mr . Ju st ice J.B.L. Rey es in Padura vs . Baldovino,, declared the principles of in t est a cy t o be con t r ollin g , Rev ersion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on intesta t e su ccession , t h e pla intiffs-appellees must be held without any righ t t h er et o beca u se, a s a u n t a n d u n cles, r espectively, of Faustino Dizon (the praepositus), they are excluded from the succession by h is n iece, the defendant-appellant, although they are related to him within the same degr ee a s t h e la tter. The court, therefore, held, and so rule, that under our laws of succession , a deceden t 's u ncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of t h e deceden t su r v iv e a n d a r e w illin g a n d qu a lified t o su cceed. Ha d the reversionary property passed directly from the praepositus, there is no doubt t hat the plaintiffs-appellees would have been excluded by the defendant-appella n t u n der t h e r u les of intestate succession. There is no reason why a different result sh ou ld obt a in sim ply because "the transmission of the property was delayed by the interregnum of the reserva;" 6 i.e., t h e property t ook a "detour" through an ascendant-thereby giving rise t o the reservation befor e it s t r a n sm ission t o t h e res ervatario . Upon the stipulated facts, and by virtue of the rulings already cited, the defen da n t -a ppella n t Da lisay Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the entirety of the reversionary property t o the exclusion of t h e pla in t iffs-a ppellees. W HEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the lower Court is rever sed a n d set a side a n d t h e com pla in t is dism issed.

LLor en t e v s. Rodr igu ez, et . A l . G.R. NO. L-3 3 3 9 MA RCH 2 6 , 1 9 0 8 FA CT S: Ma rtina Avalle, widow of Llorente, had during her marriage four legitimate ch ildr en n amed Jacinta, Julio, Martin, and Francisco, all with the surname of Llorente y A v a lle. In t h e w ill executed by her on the 31st of December, 1 900, she instituted as her sole and genera l h eir s h er three first-named children, Jacinta, Julio, and Martin, and the children of the late Francisco, n a m ed Soleda d a n d A dela Llor en t e. Ja cinta died prior to the t estatrix, on the 11th of August, 1901, leaving several legitimate children w ith the surname of Rodriguez y Llorente, and besides them, a natural daugh t er n a m ed Rosa Llor en t e. T h e said Rosa Llorente, the natural daughter of Jacinta Llorente, wanted to become a pa r t y in t h e proceedings for the probate of the will of Martina Avalle, but the legitimate childr en of t h e sa id Jacinta Llorente objected thereto on the ground that they were the sole and exclusive h eir s of t h eir mother, the late Jacinta Llorente, and that the plaintiff, Rosa Llorente, absolutely cannot be a pa r t y t h er et o. T h e Court of First Instance of Cebu, where the will was admitted for pr oba t e, h eld t h a t Rosa Llor ente had no right whatever to the inheritance of the late Martina Avalle, and denied h er a ll r ig h t t o in t er v en e in t h e pr oceedin g s r eg a r din g t h e est a t e of t h e sa id decea sed. ISSUE: Whether or not the hereditary portion which Martina A v a lle left in h er w il l t o h er leg itimate daughter Jacinta Llorente, and which the latter had not been able to possess beca u se of h er death before that of the testatrix, should also pass to her natural daughter, Rosa Llorent e, t h e sa m e a s t o h er leg it im a t e ch ildr en .

HELD: No. From the fact that a natural son has the right t o inherit from the father or moth er w ho acknowledged him, conjointly with the other legitimate children of either of th em , it does n ot follow that he has the right to represent either of them in the succession t o their leg it im a t e a scendants; his right is direct and im m edia t e in r ela t ion t o t h e fa t h er or m ot h er w h o a cknowledged him, but it cannot be indirect by representing them in t h e su ccession t o t h eir a scendants t o whom he is not related in any manner, because he does not a ppea r a m on g t h e leg it im a t e fa m ily of w h ich sa id a scen da n t s a r e t h e h ea d. If Ja cinta Llorente had survived her mother, Martina Avalle, she would have inherited from her, a n d in what she inherited from her mother, her natural daughter, Rosa Llor en t e w ou ld h a v e pa rticipated, in conjunction with her legitimate children, from the day in which the su ccession became operative, because she would then appear by virtue of her own right t o inherit from h er m other the legal quota that pertained to her; but, not because she has said right, would she a lso be entitled to that of representation, inasmuch as there is no legal provision establishing su ch a doctrine; that Rosa Llorente might and should inherit from her natural mother is one thing, and t hat she should have the right to inherit from her who would be called her natural grandmother, r epresenting her natural mother, is quite another thing. The latter right is not recognized by t h e la w in for ce. T h er efor e, t h e ju dg m en t a ppea led fr om is h er eby a ffi r m ed.

FILOMENA PECSON, as administratix of the last will and testament of Florencio Pecson, et al. v s. ROSARIO MEDIAVILLO FA CT S: Som e t ime prior to the 17th day of September, 1910, the last will and t est a m en t of Flor en cio Pecson was presented to the Court of First Instance of t h e Pr ov in ce of A lba y for pr oba t e. Mr . Tomas Lorayes, an attorney at law, opposed the legislation of the will on the ground tha t it h a d not been authorized nor signed by the deceased. However, after h ea r in g t h e r espect iv e pa rties, the court found that the will had been signed and execu t ed in a ccor da n ce w it h t h e pr ov ision s of la w . On the 18th day of September, 1910, the said Tomas Lorayes, representing Basiliso Media v illo a n d Rosario Mediavillo, presented a motion alleging that Rosario Media v illo is a n d Joa qu in Mediavillo was a legitimate child of the deceased Teresa Pecson. Teresa was a dau g h t er of t h e t estator; that the said granddaughter, Rosario Mediavillo y Pecson, w a s disin h er it ed by h er g randfather, the t estator Florencio Pecson, according to clause 3 of the will, because she failed to sh ow h im du e r espect a n d on a cer t a in occa sion r a ised h er h a n d a g a in st h im . On his will, Florencio Pecson state that he disinherited Rosario Mediav illo "beca u se sh e w a s g r ossly disrespectful to me and because on one occasion, when it was I do not r em em ber , sh e r a ised her hand against me. Therefore it is my will that she, the said Rosario Media v illo, sh a ll h a v e n o sh a r e in m y pr oper t y ." ISSUES: Whether or not the court may inquire into the cause of the disinheritance a n d decide w h et h er t h er e is a g r ou n d for su ch disin h er it a n ce. W h ether or not Basiliso Mediavillo, the father of Joaquin Mediav illo, is t h e la t t er s‘ h eir by r epr esen t a t ion . HELD: Y es, the Civil Code (art. 848) provides that disinheritance shall only take place for one of t h e causes expressly fixed by law. In accordance with the provisions of that article (848) we fin d t hat articles 756 and 853 provide the cases or causes for disinheritance; or, in other w or ds, t h e ca ses or ca u ses in w h i ch t h e a n cest or s m a y by w ill disin h er it t h eir h eir s. A rticle 849 of the Civil Code provides that the disinher it a n ce ca n on ly be effect ed by t h e t estament, in which shall be mentioned the legal grounds or causes for such disinheritance. If it is t rue that heirs can be disinherited only by will, and for causes mentioned in the Civil Code, it w ould seen to follow that the courts might properly inquire whether the disinheritance has been m a de pr oper ly a n d for t h e ca u ses pr ov ided for by la w .

T he right of the c ourts t o inquire into the causes and whether there was sufficient cause for t h e disinheritance or not, seems to be supported by express provisions of the Civil Code. Article 850 pr ov ides that "the proof of the truthfulness of the reason for disinheritance shall be establish ed by the heirs of the t estator, should the disinherited person deny it." It would appear then th a t if t h e person disinherited should deny the truthfulness of the cause of disinheritance, he might be permitted to support his allegation by proof. The right of the court to inquire whether or not t h e disinheritance was made for just cause is also sustained by the prov isions of article 851, which in pa rt provides that:Disinheritance made without statement of the reason, or for a cause the truth of w hich, if contradicted, should not be proven . . . shall annul the designation of heirship, in so fa r a s it pr eju dices t h e per son disin h er it ed . W ith reference to the second assignment of error, The Supreme Court h eld t h a t t h e r ig h t of r epresentation shall always take place in the direct descending line, but never in the ascendin g . In collateral lines, it shall take place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters, whet h er t h ey be of t h e w h ole or h a lf blood. It w ill be remembered that the whole argument of the appellants w it h r efer en ce t o t h e fir st a ssignment of error was that Rosario Mediavillo had been disinherited and the court eviden t ly believed that there were no "legitimate children, descendants of the deceased, surviv in g ," a n d t hat therefore the father or mother of said legitimate children would in h er it a s a scen da n t s. In a smuch, however, as there was a descendant in the direct line, surviving, the inheritance could n ot ascend, and for the reason the lower court committed an error in decla r in g t h a t Ba siliso Mediavillo was entitled t o inherit that share of the estate that would have belonged t o Joa qu in Media v illo, h a d h e been liv in g . T h erefore, and for all the foregoing, that part of the judgment of the lower court nullifyin g a n d set ting aside paragraph 3 of the will is hereby affirmed, and that art of sa id ju dg m en t w h ich decrees t o Basiliso Mediavillo one-half of the estate of Florencio Pecson, belon g in g t o T er esa Pecson and which would have been given to Joaquin Mediavillo, had he been surviving, is hereby r ev oked. A nd without any findings as t o costs, it is hereby ordered that the cause be r em a n ded t o t h e low er cou r t .

LOURDES L. DOROT HEO, pet i t i on er , v s. COURT OF A PPEA LS, NILDA D. QUINTANA, for Herself and as Attorn ey -i n -Fa ct of V ICENT E DOROT HEO a n d JOSE DOROT HEO, r espon den t s. FA CT S: Pr ivate respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes. The la tter died in 1 969 without her estate being settled. Alejandro died therea ft er . Som et im e in 1 977, after Alejandro‘s death, petitioner, who claims to have taken care of Alejan dr o befor e h e died, filed a special proceeding for the probate of the latter‘s last will and testament. In 1981, the court issued an order admitting Alejandro‘s will t o probate. Private respondents did not appea l fr om said order. In 1983, they filed a ―Motion To Declare The Will Intrinsically Void.‖ Th e t r ia l court granted the motion and issued an order, declaring Lourdes Legaspi not the wife of the lat e A lejandro Dorotheo, the provisions of the last will and testam en t of A leja n dr o Dor ot h eo a s in trinsically void, and declaring the oppositors Vicente Dor ot h eo, Jose Dor ot h eo a n d Nilda Dor otheo Quintana as the only heirs of the late spouses Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Rey es, w hose respective estates shall be liquidated and distributed according t o the laws on in t est a cy u pon pa y m en t of est a t e a n d ot h er t a x es du e t o t h e g ov er n m en t .‖ Pet itioner moved for reconsideration arguing that she is entitled to some compensation since she t ook care of Alejandro prior t o his death although she admitted that they were n ot m a r r ied t o ea ch other. Upon denial of her motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed to th e Cou r t of A ppeals, but the same was dismissed for failure to file appellant‘s brief w it h in t h e ex t en ded per iod granted. This dismissal became fina l a n d ex ecu t or y on Febr u a r y 3 , 1 9 8 9 a n d a corresponding entry of judgment was forthwith issued by the Court of Appeals on May 16, 1989 .

Pet itioner assails the Order of the Court of Appeals upholding the validity of th e Ja n u a r y 3 0 , 1 986 Order which declared the intrinsic invalidity of Alejandro‘s will that was earlier admitted to pr oba t e. Issu e: May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically v oid in a n or der t h a t h a s becom e fin a l a n d ex ecu t or y st ill be g iv en effect ? Held: T h e pet it ion is w it h ou t m er it . It sh ould be noted that probate proceedings deals generally with the extrinsic validity of the will sou g h t t o be pr oba t ed, pa r t icu la r ly on t h r ee a spect s: ð w h et h er t h e w ill su bm it t ed is in deed, t h e deceden t ‘s la st w ill a n d t est a m en t ; ð com plia n ce w it h t h e pr escr ibed for m a lit ies for t h e ex ecu t ion of w ills; ð t h e t est a m en t a r y ca pa cit y of t h e t est a t or ; ð a n d t h e du e ex ecu t ion of t h e la st w ill a n d t est a m en t . Un der the Civil Code, due execution includes a determination of whether t h e t est a t or w a s of sou nd and disposing mind at the time of its execution, that he had freely executed the w ill a n d w as not acting under duress, fraud, menace or undue influence and that the will is genuin e a n d n ot a forgery, that he was of the proper testamentary age and that he is a person n ot ex pr essly pr oh ibit ed by la w fr om m a kin g a w ill. T h e intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be raised even a ft er the will has been authenticated. Thus, it does not necessarily follow that an ex t r in sica lly v alid last will and t estament is always intrinsically valid. Ev en if the will was validly executed, if t h e testator provides for dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime or r ightful inheritance according to the laws on succession, i[13] the unlawful provisions/dispositions t h ereof cannot be given effect. This is specially so when the courts had already determined in a final and executory decision that the will is intrinsically void. Su ch det er m in a t ion h a v in g a t tained that character of finality is binding on this Court which will no longer be disturbed. Not t hat this Court finds the will to be intrinsically valid, but that a final and execut or y decision of w hich the party had the opportunity to challenge before the higher tribunals m u st st a n d a n d sh ould no longer be reevaluated. Failure to avail of the remedies provided by la w con st it u t es w aiver. And if the party does not avail of other remedies despite its belief that it was agg r iev ed by a decision or court action, then it is deemed to have fully agreed a n d is sa t isfied w it h t h e decision or or der Pet itioner was privy to the suit calling for the declaration of the intrinsic invalidity of the will, a s sh e precisely appealed from an unfavorable order therefrom. A lthough the final and execu t or y Or der of January 30, 1986 wherein private respondents were declared as the only h eir s do n ot bind those who are not parties thereto such as the alleged illegitimate son of t h e t est a t or , t h e sam e constitutes res judicata with respect to those who were parties t o the probate proceeding s. Pet itioner cannot again raise those matters anew for relitigation otherwise that would amount to for um-shopping. It is clear from the executory order that the estates of Alejandro and his spouse sh ou ld be dist r ibu t ed a ccor din g t o t h e la w s of in t est a t e su ccession . No in testate distribution of the estate can be done until and unless the will h a d fa iled t o pa ss bot h its extrinsic and intrinsic validity. If the will is extrinsically void, t h e r u les of in t est a cy a pply regardless of the intrinsic validity thereof. If it is extrinsically va lid, t h e n ex t t est is t o det ermine its intrinsic validity – that is whether the provisions of the will are valid accordin g t o t h e laws of succession. In this case, th e cou r t h a d r u led t h a t t h e w ill of A leja n dr o w a s ex trinsically valid but the intrinsic provisions thereof were void. Thus, the r u les of in t est a cy a pply a s cor r ect ly h eld by t h e t r ia l cou r t . W HEREFORE, the petit ion is DENIED a n d t h e decision a ppea led fr om is A FFIRMED.

URIA RT E v s. COURT OF A PPEA LS a n d BENEDICT O EST RA DA 2 8 4 SCRA 5 1 1 FA CT S: A gatonica Arreza is the offspring of Pedro Arreza and Ursula Tubil. T h e Pr iv a t e r espon den t Ben edicto Estrada is the son of Agatonica. Upon the death of Pedro Arreza, Ursula married Juan

A rnaldo by whom she had another daughter, the decedent Justa. Private respondent Ben edict o Est r a da is t h u s t h e n eph ew of Ju st a by h er h a lf sist er A g a t on ica . Dom ingo Arnaldo is the brother of Juan Arnaldo. Dom ingo and his wife Catalina Azarcon ha d a da ughter, Primitiva Arnaldo. Primitiva then married Conrado Uriarte who had children , on e of w hom was Pascasio Uriarte. The widow and daughters of Pascasio are the petitioners in his case. Pet itioners are thus grandchildren, the relatives within the fifth degree of consanguinity, of Justa by h er cou sin Pr im it iv a A r n a ldo Ur ia r t e. T h e other petitioners are the children of Primitiva and those of h er br ot h er Gr eg or io. T h e ch ildren of Primitiva by Conrado Uriarte, a side fr om Pa sca sio, a r e Josefin a , Ga u den cio, Sim plicio, Dom ingo and Virgilio, all surnamed Uriarte. The ch ildr en of Gr eg or io A r n a ldo, Pr imitiva's brother, by Julieta Ilogon, are Jorencio, Enecia, Nicolas, Lupecino and Felisa. T h ese ot h er petitioners are thus grandchildren and relatives within the fifth degree of consanguinity of Ju st a by h er cou sin s Gr eg or io A r n a ldo a n d Pr im it iv a A r n a ldo. Pr ivate respondent Benedicto Estrada brought this case in the Reg ion a l T r ia l Cou r t for t h e pa rtition of the land left by Justa Arnaldo-Sering. The land, consisting of 2.7 hectares, had been a cquired by Justa as follows: 0.5 hectare by inheritance from her paren t s Ju a n A r n a ldo a n d Ur sula Tubil, and 2.2 hectares by purchase. Private respondent claimed t o be the sole survivin g h eir of Justa, on the ground that the latter died without issue. He com pla in ed t h a t Pa sca sio Ur iarte who, he claimed, worked the land as Justa's t en a n t , r efu sed t o g iv e h im (pr iv a t e r espondent) his share of the harvest. He contended that Pascasio had no right to the entire la n d of Ju sta but could claim only one-half of the 0.5 hectare land which Justa had inherited from her pa r en t s Ju a n A r n a ldo a n d Ur su la T u bil. Pa scasio died during the pendency of the case and was substituted by his heirs. In their answer , t h e heirs denied they were mere t enants of Justa but the latter's heirs entitled to her entire land. T h ey claimed that the entire land, subject of the case, w a s or ig in a lly ow n ed by A m br ocio A rnaldo, their great granduncle. It was allegedly bequeathed to Dom ingo a n d Ju a n A r n a ldo, A m brocio's nephews, in a holographic will executed by Ambrocio in 1 9 0 8 . Dom in g o w a s t o r eceive two-thirds of the land and Juan, one-third. The heirs claimed that the land ha d a lw a y s been in their possession and that in her lifetime Justa never asserted exclusive r ig h t ov er t h e pr operty but only received her share of the harvest from it. They alleged that private respondent did not have any right to the property because he was not an heir of A m br ocio A r n a ldo, t h e or ig in a l ow n er of t h e pr oper t y . ISSUE: Whether a nephew is considered a collateral relative who may inherit if no descenda n t , a scen da n t or spou se su r v iv e t h e deceden t HELD: Y ES. Petitioners misappreciate the relationship between Justa and private respon den t . A s a lready stated, private respondent is the son of Justa's half-sister Agatonica. He is t h er efor e Ju sta's nephew. A nephew is considered a collateral relative who may inherit if no descen da n t , a scendant, or spouse survive the decedent. That private respondent is only a half-blood relativ e is immaterial. This alone does not disqualify him from being his aun t 's h eir . A s t h e Cou r t of A ppeals correctly pointed out, "The determination of whether the relationship is of t h e fu ll or h a lf blood is impor t a n t on ly t o det er m in e t h e ex t en t of t h e sh a r e of t h e su r v iv or s.

SA YSON v s. COURT OF A PPEA LS 2 0 5 SCRA 3 2 1 FA CT S: Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and T eodoro. Eleno died on 1952, and Rafaela on 1976. Teodoro, who had married Isabel Ba u t ist a , died on 1972. His wife died nine years later, on, 1981. Their properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surna m ed Sa y son , w h o cla im t o be t h eir ch ildr en .

On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, t ogether with Juana C. Ba u t ist a , Isa bel's mother, filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodor o a n d Isabel Sayson. The action was resisted by Delia, Edm undo and Doribel Sayson, who alleg ed su ccession a l r ig h t s t o t h e dispu t ed est a t e a s t h e deceden t 's la w fu l descen da n t s. Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complain t , t h is t im e for t h e a ccou n t in g a n d pa rtition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the couple's four surviv in g ch ildren. The complainants asserted the defense, that Delia and Edmun do w er e t h e a dopt ed ch ildren and Doribel was the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. A s su ch , t h ey w er e en titled t o inherit T eodor o's sh a r e in h is pa r en t s' est a t e by r ig h t of r epr esen t a t ion . ISSUE: Whether the adopted children of T eodoro (Delia and Edmundo) are entitled t o in h er it T eodor o‘s sh a r e by r ig h t of r epr esen t a t ion ? HELD:NO! There is no question that as the legitim a t e da u g h t er of T eodor o a n d t h u s t h e g randdaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her deceased father in t h e distribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents. Under Article 981, quoted above, sh e i s en titled t o the share her father would have directly inherited had he survived, w h ich sh a ll be equ a l t o t h e sh a r es of h er g r a n dpa r en t s' ot h er ch ildr en . Bu t a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia an d Edm u n do, t o w h om t h e g randparents were t otal strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed t o be a leg itimate child and have the same right as the latter, these rights do not in clu de t h e r ig h t of r epresentation. The relationship created by the adoption is between only the adoptin g pa r en t s a n d t h e a dopt ed ch ild a n d does n ot ex t en d t o t h e blood r ela t iv es of eit h er pa r t y .

Ba gu n u v s. Pi eda d G.R. No. L-6 6 5 7 4 Ju n e 1 7 , 1 9 8 7 Doct rine: The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in deg r ee t o t h e decedent and excludes the more distant ones except when and to the exten t t h a t t h e r ig h t of r epresentation can apply. By right of representation, a more distant blood relative of a deceden t is, by operation of law, "raised to the same place and degree" of relationship as tha t of a closer blood relative of the same decedent. In the direct line, right of representation is proper on ly in t h e descending, never in the ascending, line. In the collateral line, the right of r epr esen t a t ion m ay only take place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters of the deceden t w h en su ch ch ildr en su r v iv e w it h t h eir u n cles or a u n t s. T h e right of representation does not apply to "other collateral relatives w it h in t h e fift h civ il degree" (to which group both petitioner and respondent belong) who are sixth in t h e or der of pr eference following, firstly, the legitimate children and descendants, secondly, the leg it im a t e pa rents and ascendants, thirdly, the illegitimate childr en a n d descen da n t s, fou r t h ly , t h e su rviving spouse, and fifthly, the brothers and sisters/nephews and nieces, fou r t h deceden t . A m ong collateral relatives, except only in the case of n eph ew s a n d n ieces of t h e deceden t con curring with their uncles or aunts, t h e r u le of pr ox im it y , ex pr essed in A r t icle 9 6 2 , a forequoted, of the Code, is an absolute rule. In determining the degree of rela t ion sh ip of t h e collatera l r ela t iv es t o t h e deceden t , A r t icle 9 6 6 of t h e Civ il Code g iv es dir ect ion . Fa ct s: On 28 August 1995, herein petitioner Ofelia Hernando Bagunu moved to interv en e in Specia l Pr oceedings No. 3652, entitled "In the matter of the In t est a t e Pr oceedin g s of t h e Est a t e of A ugusto H. Piedad," pending before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 117, of Pasay City. A sserting entitlement to a share of the estate of the late Augusto H. Piedad, petitioner a ssa iled t h e finality of the order of the trial court awarding the entire estate to respondent Pastora Piedad con tending that the proceedings were tainted wit h pr ocedu r a l in fir m it ies, in clu din g a n in complete publications of the notice of hearing , la ck of per son a l n ot ice t o t h e h eir s a n d

cr editors, and irregularity in the disbur sem en t s of a llow a n ces a n d w it h dr a w a ls by t h e a dm in ist r a t or of t h e est a t e. Issu e: WON petitioner, a collateral relative of the fifth civ il deg r ee, ca n in h er it a lon g side r espondent, a collateral relative of the third civil deg r ee? Elsew ise st a t ed does t h e r u le of pr ox im it y in in t est a t e su ccession fin d a pplica t ion a m on g colla t er a l r ela t iv es? Held:No. Augusto H. Piedad died without any direct descendants or ascendants. Responden t is t h e maternal aunt of the decedent, a third-degree relative of the decedent, while petitioner is the da ughter of a first cousin of the deceased, or a fifth-degree relative of the decedent. The rig h t of r epresentation does not apply to "others collateral relatives within t h e fift h civ il deg r ee" (t o w hich group both petitioner and respondent belong) who are sixth in the or der of pr efer en ce following, firstly, the legitimate children and descendants, secondly, the legitimate parent s a n d a scendants, thirdly, the illegitimate children and descendants, fourthly, the survi v in g spou se , a n d fifthly, the brothers and sisters/nephews and nieces, fourth decedent . A m on g colla t er a l r elatives, except only in the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent concurrin g w it h t h eir u ncles or aunts, the rule of proximity, expressed in Article 962, aforequoted, of the Code, is a n a bsolute rule. In determining the degree of rela t ion sh ip of t h e colla t er a l r ela t iv es t o t h e decedent, Article 966 of the Civil Code gives direction. Respondent, being a r elative within t he third civil degree, of the late Augusto H. Piedad excludes petitioner, a rel a t i v e of t he fifth degree, from succeeding an intestato t o t h e est a t e of t h e deceden t .

A NSELMA DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, petitioners, and FELIXBERT A PA CURSA gu a r dia n of FEDERICO SA NT ERO, et a l ., v s. INT ERMEDIA T E A PPELLA T E COURT a n d FELISA PA MUT I JA RDIN, r espon den t s FA CTS: ANSELMINA and MIGUEL, all surnamed SANTERO, FACTS: Private respondent filed a Pet ition dated January 23, 1976 with the CFI of Cavite in a special proceeding "In The Matter of t h e Intestate Estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero," praying among ot h er t h in g s, t hat the corresponding letters of Administration be issued in her favor and that she be appointed a s special Administratrix of the properties of the deceased Simona Pam u t i V da . de Sa n t er o. Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who tog et h er w it h Felisa 's m other Juliana were the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamu t i a n d Pet r on ila A suncion. Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa Pa m u t i a n d a n other child who died during infancy. Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascu a l Sa ntero and the mother of Pablo Santero. Pablo Santero was t h e on ly leg it im a t e son of h is pa r en t s Pa scu a l Sa n t er o a n d Sim on a Pa m u t i V da . de Sa n t er o. Pa scual Santero died in 1970, while Pablo Santero died in 1973 and Simona Santero died in 1 976. Pa blo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona Santero a n d h is six m inor natural children to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor ch ildr en w it h Felix ber t a Pa cu r sa . In 1 976, the court declared Felisa Pamuti Jardin as the sole legitimate heir of Sim on a Pa m u t i V da . de Sa n t er o. Befor e the trial court, there were 4 interrelated cases filed to w it : Pet it ion for t h e Let t er s of A dm inist r a t ion of t h e in t est a t e Est a t e of Pa blo Sa n t er o; Pet it ion for t h e Let t er s of A dm inistration of the Intestate Estate of Pascual Santero; Petition for Guardia n sh ip ov er t h e pr operties of an incompetent Person, Simona Pa m u t i V da . de Sa n t er o; a n d Pet it ion for Set t lem en t of t h e In t est a t e Est a t e of Sim on a Pa m u t i V da . de Sa n t er o. Felisa Jardin upon her Motion t o Intervene was allowed to intervene in the intestat e est a t es of Pa blo Santero and Pascual Santero by Order of the Court in 1977. Petitioner An selm a Dia z, a s g uardian of her minor children, filed her "Opposition and Motion t o Exclude Felisa Pamuti from fu rther taking part or intervening in the settlement of the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in the intestate estate of Pascual Santero and Pablo Sant er o. Felix ber t a Pa cu r sa g u a r dia n for h er m in or ch ildr en .

In 1 980, the court issued an order excludin g Felisa Ja r din "fr om fu r t h er t a kin g pa r t or in tervening in the settlement of the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in the intestate estates of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero and declared her to be, not an h eir of t h e decea sed Sim on a Pa m u t i V da . de Sa n t er o." Felisa Jardin filed a Motion for Reconsideration, and it was denied by the trial court. On appeal, t h e Intermediate Appellate Court reversed the decision of the trial court and declaring the Felisa Ja rdin as the sole heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero and ordering oppositors-appellees n ot t o interfere in the proceeding for the declaration of heirship in the estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Sa n t er o. ISSUE: Whether petitioners as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could inherit from Simon a Pam uti Vda. de Santero, by right of representation of t h eir fa t h er Pa blo Sa n t er o w h o is a leg it im a t e ch ild of Sim on a Pa m u t i V da , de Sa n t er o. HELD: NO. Since the hereditary conflict refers solely t o the intestate estate of Simona Pa m u t i V da. de Santero, who is the legitimate mother of Pablo Sa n t er o, t h e a pplica ble la w is t h e pr ov ision of A r t . 9 9 2 of t h e Civ il Code w h ich r ea ds a s follow s: A RT. 992. An illegitimate child has no right t o inherit ab intestato from the legitimate ch ildr en a n d relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives in h er it in t h e sa m e m a n n er fr om t h e illeg it im a t e ch ild. (9 4 3 a ) Pa blo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an illegitim a t e ch ild. On t h e ot h er h a n d, t h e opposit or s (pet it ion er s h er ein ) a r e t h e illeg it im a t e ch ildr en of Pa blo Sa n t er o. A rticle 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a su ccession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relative s of t h e father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but t h is is n ot recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992, Between t h e leg it im a t e fa m ily a n d t h e illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. T h e illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family ; t h e fa m ily is in t urn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the for m er , a n d the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in t h e illeg it im a t e ch ild nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the la w does n o m ore than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment. Thus, petition er s h erein cannot represent their father Pablo Santero in the succession of the letter t o the intesta t e est ate of his legitimate mother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, because of the barrier provide d for u n der A r t . 9 9 2 of t h e New Civ il Code. It is t herefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate ch ildr en a n d relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti V da . de Sa n t er o a s t h e w or d "r elative" includes all the kindred of the person spoken of. The r ecor d sh ow s t h a t fr om t h e commencement of this case the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate h eir s of t h e la t e Sim ona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pa m u t i Ja r din a n d t h e six m in or n a t u r a l or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by th e pr ov ision s of A rticle 992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in h oldin g Felisa Pamuti-Jardin t o be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate est a t e of t h e la t e Sim on a Pa m u t i V da . de Sa n t er o.

G.R. No. L-1 9 9 9 6 A pr il 3 0 , 1 9 6 5 WENCESLA CACHO, petitioner-appell ee, v s. JOHN G. UDA N, a n d RUST ICO G. UDA N, opposi t or s-a ppel l a n t s. REYES, J.B.L., J. FA CT S: Joh n, Rustico and Silvina are siblings. Silvina G. Udan died leaving a purported will naming her illegitimate son, Francisco G. Udan, and one Wencesla Cacho, as her sole heirs, share and sha r e a like. During the probate of the will, opposition was made by her two brother s on t h e g r ou n d t hat the will was not attested an d ex ecu t ed a s r equ ir ed by la w , t h a t t h e t est a t r ix w a s in capacitated to execute it; and that it was procured by fraud or undue influence. Francisco died

pen ding the probate. The RTC denied the oppositions filed by the tw o br ot h er s. Hen ce, t h is a ppea l ISSUE: W ON oppositor brothers, John and Rustico Udan, may cla im t o be h eir s in t est a t e of t h eir leg it im a t e sist er , t h e la t e Silv in a Uda n . HELD: T h e Court ruled that the court below correctly held that they were not, for a t t h e t im e of h er death Silvina's illegitimate son, Francisco Udan, was her heir intestate, t o the exclu sion of h er br others under Articles 988 and 1003 of the governing Civil Code of the Philippines in for ce a t t h e t im e of t h e dea t h of t h e t est a t r ix It decreed that collateral relatives of one who died intesta t e in h er it on ly in t h e a bsen ce of descendants, ascendants, and illegitimate children. Albeit the brothers and sister s ca n con cu r w ith the widow or widower under Article 1101, they do, not concur, bu t a r e ex clu ded by t h e su rviving children, legitimate or illegitimate (Art. 1 003). The trial court committed n o er r or in h olding that John and Rustico Udan had no standing t o oppose the probate of the will. For if the w ill is ultimately probated John and Rustico are excluded by its terms from participation in t h e est ate; and if probate be denied, both oppositors-appellants will be excluded by the illegitim a t e son , Fr a n cisco Uda n , a s sole in t est a t e h eir , by oper a t ion of la w . T h e death of Francisco two years after his mother's demise does not improve t h e sit u a t ion of a ppellants. The rights acquired by the former are only transmitted by his death t o his own h eir s a t law not t o the appellants, who are legitimate brothers of his mother, for the r ea son t h a t , a s correctly decided by the court below, the legitimate relatives of the mother cannot su cceed h er illeg it im a t e ch ild. T h is is clea r fr om A r t icle 9 9 2 of t h e Civ il Code. T h e legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child. This is clea r fr om A r t icle 9 9 2 of t h e Civ il Code. Dav id T . T olen t in o

G.R. No. 7 7 8 6 7 Febr u a r y 6 , 1 9 9 0 ISA BEL DE LA PUERTA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORA BLE COURT OF A PPEA LS a n d CA RMELIT A DE LA PUERT A , r espon den t s. CRUZ, J.: FA CT S: T h e testator, Dominga Revuelta died on July 3, 1966, at the age of 92, leaving her proper t ies t o h er three surviving children, Alfredo, Vicente and Isabel. Isabel was given t h e fr ee por t ion in a ddit ion t o h er leg it im e a n d w a s a ppoin t ed ex ecu t r ix of t h e w il l. V icente and Alfredo opposed the petition for the probate of the will filed by Isa bel. T h e t w o claimed that their mother was already senile at the time of the execution of the will and did n ot fu lly com prehend its meaning, that the properties listed in the inventory of her estate belon g ed t o t h em ex clu siv ely . A lfredo subsequently died, leaving Vicente the lone oppositor. Vicente de la Puerta filed with the CFI of Quezon, a petition to adopt Carmelita de la Puerta, which was thereafter granted. Isa be l a ppealed the said decision to the CA. Vicente died during the pendency of the appeal, prompting h er to move for the dismissal of the case. Carmelita filed a motion for the paym en t t o h er of a m onthly allowance as the acknowledged natural child of Vicente de la Puerta. The said m ot ion w as granted by the probate court granted the motion, declaring that Carmelita w a s a n a t u r a l ch ild of Vicente de la Puerta and was entitled t o the amou n t s cla im ed for h er su ppor t . CA a ffirmed this order of the lower court. Hence, this pet it ion w h er ein t h e pet it ion er 's m a in a rgument is that Carmelita was not the natural child of Vicente de la Puerta, who was married to Genoveva de la Puerta in 1938 and remained his wife until his death in 1 978. Ca r m elit a 's r ea l pa r en t s a r e Ju a n it o A u st r ia l a n d Glor ia Jor da n . ISSUE:

W ON respondent Carmelita de la Puerta, can claim succession a l r ig h t s t o t h e est a t e of h er a lleg ed g r a n dm ot h er . HELD: T h e Court held that Vicente de la Puerta did not predecease his m ot h er a n d Ca r m elit a is a spurious child. It is settled that in testamentary succession, the right of representation can t a ke place only in the following cases: first, when the person represented dies befor e t h e t est a t or ; second, when the person represented is incapable of succeeding the testator; and third, when the per son represented is disinherited by the testator. In all of these cases, since there is a vacancy in t h e inheritance, the law calls the children or descendants of thefiliation of priva t e r espon den t Ca rmelita de la Puerta, who claims successional rights t o the estate of her alleged grandmoth er . per son r epr esen t ed t o su cceed by r ig h t of r epr esen t a t ion . T h e law is clear that there is representation only when relatives of a decea sed per son t r y t o su cceed h im in h is r ig h t s w h ich h e w ou ld h a v e h a d if st ill liv in g . Not having predeceased Dominga Revuelta, her son Vicente had the right t o in h er it fr om h er dir ectly or in his own right. No right of representation was involved, nor could it be invoked b y Ca rmelita upon her father's death, which came after his own mother's death. It would have been different if Vicente was already dead when Dom inga Revuelta died. Carmelita could th en h a v e in herited from her in representation of her father Vicente, assuming the private respondent wa s a lawful heir. As a spurious child of Vicente, Carmelita is barred from inheriting from Dom in g a because of Article 992 of the Civil Code, which lays down the barrier between the legitimate a n d illeg it im a t e fa m ilies. T h is a r t icle pr ov ides qu it e clea r ly : A rt. 992. An illegitimate child has no right t o inherit ab intestato from the legitima t e ch ildr en a n d relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives in h er it in t h e sa m e m a n n er fr om t h e illeg it im a t e ch ild. Ev en as an adopted child, Carmelita would still be barr ed fr om in h er it in g fr om Dom in g a Rev uelta for there would be no natural kindred ties between them and consequently, no legal ties t o bin d t h em eit h er . Ca rmelita, as the spurious daughter of Vicente de la Puert a , h a s su ccession a l r ig h t s t o t h e in testate estate of her father but not to the estate of Dom inga Revuelta. Her claims for su ppor t a n d inheritance should therefore be filed in the proceeding s for t h e set t lem en t of h er ow n fa ther's estate and ca n n ot be con sider ed in t h e pr oba t e of Dom in g a Rev u elt a 's w ill. Da v id T. T olen t in o

G.R. No. 1 1 7 2 4 6 A u g u st 2 1 , 1 9 9 5 BENIGNO MA NUEL, LIBERA T O MA NUEL, LORENZO MA NUEL, PLA CIDA MA NUEL, MADRONA MA NUEL, ESPERA NZA MA NUEL, A GA PIT A MA NUEL, BA SILISA MANUEL, EMILIA MANUEL and N UMERIANA MANUEL, pet it ion er s, v s. HON. NICODEMO T. FERRER, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Cour t , Br a n ch 37, Lingayen, Pangasinan, MODESTA BALTAZAR and EST A NISLA OA MA NUEL, r espon den t s. V IT UG, J.: FA CT S: T h e property involved in this petition for review on certiorari is t h e in h er it a n ce left by a n illegitimate child who died intestate w it h ou t a n y su r v iv in g descen da n t or a scen da n t . Pet itioners, the legitimate children of spouses Antonio Manuel and Beatriz Gu ilin g , filed t h is su it. During his marriage with Beatriz, Antonio had an extra-m arital affair with Ursula Bautista . Fr om this relationship, a child named Juan Manuel was born. Juan Manuel, the illegitimate son of A ntonio, married Esperanza Gamba. In consideration of the marriage, a don a t ion pr opt er n uptias ov er a parcel of land, with an area of 2,700 sqm was executed in favor of Juan Manuel by La urenciana Manuel. Two other parcels of land, were later bought by Juan and registered in h is n ame. The couple were not blessed with a child that is w h y t h ey t ook pr iv a t e r espon den t Modesta Manuel-Baltazar into their fold and so raised her as their own "daughter." On Ju n e 3 ,

1 980, Juan Manuel executed in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Sale Con Pact o de Ret r o ov er a one-half (1 /2) portion of his land. Juan Manuel died intestate on February 21, 1990. T w o y ears later, Esperanza Gamba also passed away. A month after the death of Esperanza, Modest a ex ecuted an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication claim in g for h er self t h e t h r ee pa r cels of la n d. Following the registration of the document of adjudication with t h e Office of t h e Reg ist er of Deeds, the three titles in the name of Juan Manuel were canceled and new titles, were issu ed in t h e name of Modesta Manuel-Baltazar. Modest a ex ecu t ed in fa v or of h er co-r espon den t Est anislaoa Manuel a Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim ov er the unredeemed one -half (1 /2 ) por tion of the land that was sold to the latter by Juan Manuel under the 1980 Deed of Sa le Con Pa cto de Retro. The petitioners filed a complaint filed before the RTC Lingayen , Pa n g a sin a n , seeking the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid instruments. The trial cou r t dism issed t h e com plaint holding that petitioners, not being heirs ab intestato of their illegitimate brother Juan Ma nuel, were not the real parties-in-interest to institute the suit. The motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied by the trial court. Hence, this Petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: W ON the petitioners are entitled to inherit in the intestate estate of their illegitima t e br ot h er , Ju a n Ma n u el. RULING: T h e Court ruled that the petitioners are not entitled t o inherit from the intestate estat e of t h eir illegitimate brother, Juan Manuel under ARTICLE 992, an illegitimat e ch i ld h a s n o r ig h t t o in herit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; n or sh a ll su ch children or r ela t iv e in h er it in t h e sa m e m a n n er fr om t h e illeg it im a t e ch ild. T h e principle of absolute separation between the legitimate family and the illegitim a t e fa m ily w herein such doctrine rejects succession ab intestato in the collateral line between leg it im a t e r elatives, on the one hand, and illegitimate relatives, on other hand, although it does not tota lly disavow such succession in the direct line. Since the rule is predicated on the presum ed w ill of t h e deceden t , it h a s n o a pplica t ion , h ow ev er , on t est a m en t a r y disposit ion s. A barrier dividing members of the illegitimate family from members of the leg it im a t e fa m ily w herein the legitimate brothers and sisters as well as the ch ildr en , w h et h er leg it im a t e or illegitimate, of such brother s a n d sist er s, ca n n ot in h er it fr om t h e illeg it im a t e ch ild. A dm ittedly in her answer, Modesta is not an intestate heir of Juan Manuel. A ward, without t h e benefit of formal/judicial adoption, is neither a compulsory nor a legal heir. Never t h eless, t h e com plaint of petitioners seeking the nullity of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudica t ion ex ecu t ed by Modesta, the three TCT's issued to her favor, as well as the Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim in fa v or of Est a n isla oa Ma n u el, w a s pr oper ly dism issed by t h e t r ia l cou r t . Da v id T. T olen t in o

G.R. No. 8 4 2 4 0 Ma r ch 2 5 , 1 9 9 2 OLIV IA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL, petitioner s, v s. ESPERA NZA C. PA SCUAL-BAUTISTA , MA NUEL C. PA SCUA L, JOSE C. PA SCUA L, SUSA NA C. PA SCUAL-BAUTISTA, ERLINDA C. PA SCUA L, WENCESLA O C. PA SCUA L, JR., INT ESTATE ESTATE OF ELEUTERIO T. PASCUAL, AVELINO PASCUAL, ISOCELES PA SCUA L, LEIDA PA SCUA L-MA RT INES, V IRGINIA PA SCUA L-NER, NONA PA SCUAL-FERNANDO, OCTAVIO PASCUAL, GERANAIA PASCUAL-DUBERT, a n d T HE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE MANUEL S. PA DOLINA of Br . 162, RT C, Pa sig, Met r o Ma n il a , r espon den t s. PA RA S, J.: Fa ct s: Pet itioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged natural children of t h e late Eligio Pascual, the latter being the full blood br ot h er of t h e deceden t Don A n dr es Pa scu a l.

Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 1 2 , 1 9 7 3 w it h ou t a n y issu e, leg it im a t e, a ckn ow ledg ed n a t u r a l, a dopt ed or spu r iou s ch ildr en . A dela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of the late Don Andres Pascual, filed wit h t h e Reg ional Trial Court (RTC), a Special Proceeding for administration of the intestate estate of her la te husband. On October 16, 1985, all the heirs entered into a COMPROMISE A GREEMENT , ov er the vehement objections of the herein petitioners Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pa scu a l T h e Com promise Agreement had been entered into despite the Manifest a t ion /Mot ion of t h e pet itioners Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, manifesting t h eir h er edit a r y r ig h t s in t h e in testate estate of Don Andres Pascual, their uncle. On September 30, 1 987 , pet it ion er s filed t h eir Motion to Reiterate Hereditary Rights and the Mem oran du m in Su ppor t of Mot ion t o r eit er a t e Her edit a r y Rig h t s. Bot h the RTC and CA dismissed the submitted Motions as well as Motions for recon sider a t ion r eit er a t in g t h e h er edit a r y r ig h t s of Oliv ia a n d Her m es Pa scu a l. Hen ce, t h is pet it ion for r ev iew on cer t ior a r i. Issu e: W ON Article 992 excludes recognized natural children from the inherita n ce of t h e decea sed. Ru lin g : T h e Court dismissed the instant petition for lack of merit and affirmed the assailed decision of t h e respondent Court of Appeals. It cited the previous decided case of Diaz v. IAC, w h er e su ch Court ruled that Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a ba r r ier or ir on cu r t a in in t h a t it pr ohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the leg it im a t e ch ildren and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a n a t u r a l t ie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the pur poses of A r t icle 9 9 2 . Bet w een t h e leg itimate family and illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism an d in compatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked dow n u pon by t h e leg it im a t e fam ily; the family is in turn hated by the illegitimate child; the latter consider s t h e pr iv ileg ed con dition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former , in t u r n , sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpa ble ev iden ce of a blem ish br oken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding fur t h er g r ou n ds of r esen t m en t . Elig io Pa scu a l is a leg it im a t e ch ild bu t p et it ion er s a r e h is illeg it im a t e ch ildr en . A pplying the doctrine, respondent IAC did not err in holding that petit ion er s h er ein ca n n ot r epresent their father Eligio Pascual in the succession of the latter to the intestate est a t e of t h e deceden t A n dr es Pa scu a l, fu ll blood br ot h er of t h eir fa t h er . Da v id T. T olen t in o

G.R. No. L-7 7 6 8 Nov em ber 1 4 , 1 9 1 2 MA NUEL SARITA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. ANDRES CANDIA, defenda n t a ppel l ee. A RELLA NO, C.J.: FA CT S: Spouses Apolinario Cedenio and Roberta Montesa are allegedly the owners of a pa r cel of la n d a pparently of an area of 2 cavanes of corn upon which they had planted fruit trees. Respon den t Ca ndia claims ownership ov er the land having purchased the same from Villarosa, the vendee of A polinario. Petitioners claim on the other hand, that a s n ieces a n d n eph ew s,t h ey a r e t h e collateral heirs of Apolinario, through the latter‘s brothers and sisters. Sarita, h ow ev er , is t h e g r a n dn eph ew of A polin a r io. T h e RTC absolved the defendant from the complainant, on the grounds that, with regard t o t h e a n imals and real property sued for, there was no proof whatever that they were in possession of t h e spouses at the time of their death, and, with respect to the land: (1 ) That the defendan t w a s

t h e possessor in good faith continuously and was presumed t o hold under just title so long as the con trary should not be proved; and (2) that neither the plaintiffs nor their alleged predecessor s in interest made demand for it during the period of twenty-six years, since the ownership thereof w as conveyed by Isidario or Apolinario Cedeño to Juan Basa Villarosa, on the 24th of June, 1881, it being that during this very long period of time they did not obtain possession of the propert y . Hen ce, t h e ju dg m en t h a v in g been a ppea led t h r ou g h a bill ex cept ion s. ISSUE: W ON grandnephews h a v e a r ig h t of r epr esen t a t ion ov er t h e est a t e of t h e decea sed. HELD: T h e Court ruled that the right of representation is limit ed t o n eph ew s a n d n ieces w h o a r e ch ildren of brothers and sisters of decedent. The plaintiff Sarita who joins as the representat iv e of h is grandfather in a complaint with others, who are brothers and nephews of the predecessor in interest, lacks such right of representation, for it belongs in the colla t er a l lin e on ly t o t h e n ephews and not to the grandnephews. Hence, sister and n eph ew s of t h e decea sed h a v in g a ppeared to claim the inheritance, they, as the nearest of kin, exclude a remote r ela t iv e like a g r a n dn eph ew . Da v id T . T olen t in o

G.R. No. 1 2 1 0 2 7 Ju ly 3 1 , 1 9 9 7 CORA ZON DEZOLLER TISON and RENE R. DEZOLLER, petitioners, vs.COURT OF A PPEA LS a n d T EODORA DOMINGO, r espon den t s. REGA LA DO, J.: FA CT S: T h is case involves an action for reconveyance filed by herein petitioners against herein pr iv a t e r espondent before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 98, docketed as the aforesaid Civ il Case No. Q-88-1054, ov er a parcel of land with a house and apartment thereon loca t ed a t Sa n Francisco del Monte, Quezon City and which was originally owned by the spou ses Ma r t in Gu er r er o a n d T eodor a Dezoller Gu er r er o. Pet itioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are the niece and nephew , r espect iv ely , of t h e deceased Teodora Dezoller Guerrero who is the sist er of pet it ion er 's fa t h er , Her m og en es Dezoller. Teodora Dezoller Guerrero died on Ma r ch 5 , 1 9 8 3 w it h ou t a n y a scen da n t or descendant, and was survived only by her husband, Martin Guerrero, and her ein pet it ion er s. Pet itioners' father, Hermogenes, died on October 3, 1 973, h en ce t h ey seek t o in h er it fr om T eodor a Dezoller Gu er r er o by r ig h t of r epr esen t a t ion . Records revealed that upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerr e r o, h er su r v iv in g spou se, Ma rtin, executed an Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement adjudicating unto himself, allegedly a s sole heir, the land in dispute which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6 6 8 8 6 , a s a con sequence of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 358074 was issued in the name of Mart in Gu errero. Martin Guerrero then sold the lot to herein private respondent T eodora Dom ingo an d t h ereafter, Transfer Cer t ifica t e of T it le No. 3 7 4 0 1 2 w a s issu ed in t h e la t t er 's n a m e. A fter Martin Guerrero‘s death, Petitioners filed an action for reconveyance claiming that they are en titled t o in h er it on e-h a lf of t h e pr oper t y in qu est ion by r ig h t of r epr esen t a t ion . Bot h the RTC and CA granted the demurrer to eviden ce a n d dism issed t h e com pla in t for r econveyance and declared that the documentary evidence presented by herein petitioners, such a s the baptismal certificates, family picture, and join t a ffida v it s a r e a ll in a dm issible a n d in su fficien t t o pr ov e a n d est a blish filia t ion . Hen ce, t h is a ppea l. ISSUE:

W ON petitioners failed to meet the quantum of proof required by Article 172 of the Family Code t o est a blish leg it im a cy a n d filia t ion HELD: T h e Court ruled for the petitioners and reversed and set a side t h e qu est ion ed ju dg m en t of r espondent Court of Appeals. Petitioners and Private Respondent were declared co-owners of the su bject property with an undivided one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourt h s (3 /4 ) sh a r e t h er ein , r espect iv ely . T h e Cou r t con sider ed t w o poin t s: Firs t is t h e issu e on pet it ion er 's leg it im a cy . T h e documentary evidence adduced by petitioners, taken separately and independently of ea ch ot h er, are not per se sufficient proof of legitimacy nor even of pedigree. It seems that t h e low er courts have regrettably ov erlooked the universally recognized presumption on legitimacy. Ther e is n o presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. An d w ell set t led is t h e r u le t h a t t h e issu e of leg it im a cy ca n n ot be a t t a cked colla t er a lly . T h e issue, therefore, as t o whether petitioners are the leg it im a t e ch i ldr en of Her m og en es Dezoller cannot be properly controverted in the present action for reconveyance. This is aside, of course, from the further consideration that private respondent is not the proper party t o im pugn t h e legitimacy of herein petitioners. The presumption consequently continues to operate in favor of pet it ion er s u n less a n d u n t il it is r ebu t t ed. In dubitably, when private respondent opted not to present countervailing evidence to ov ercom e t h e presumption, by merely filing a demurrer to eviden ce in st ea d, sh e in effect im pliedly a dm itted the truth of such fact. Indeed, she ov erlooked or disregarded the evidentia l r u le t h a t pr esumptions like judicial notice and admissions, reliev e t h e pr opon en t fr om pr esen t in g ev idence on the facts he alleged and such fa ct s a r e t h er eby con sider ed a s du ly pr ov ed. Second is t h e qu est ion r eg a r din g t h eir filia t ion w it h T eodor a Dezoller Gu er r er o. T h e Court is sufficiently convinced, and so hold, that the present case is one instance wher e t h e g eneral requirement on evidence aliunde may be relaxed. Petitioners are claiming a right to part of t h e estate of the declarant herself. Conformably, the declaration made by T eodor a Dezoller Gu errero that petitioner Corazon is her niece, is admissible and constitutes su fficien t pr oof of su ch relationship, notwithstanding the fact that there was no other preliminary evidence thereof, t h e reason being such declaration is rendered competent by virtue of the necessity of receiv in g su ch evidence to avoid a failure of justice. More importantly, there is in t h e pr esen t ca se a n a bsolute failure by all a n d su n dr y t o r efu t e t h a t decla r a t ion m a de by t h e deceden t . Fr om the foregoing disquisitions, it may thus be safely con clu ded, on t h e sole ba sis of t h e decedent's declaration and without need for further proof thereof, that petitioners are the n iece a n d n eph ew of T eodor a Dezoller Gu er r er o. A pplying the general rule in the present case would nonetheless produce the sa m e r esu lt . For w hile the documentary evidence submitted by petitioners do not strictly conform to the rules on t h eir admissibility, we are however of the considered opinion that the same may be admitted by r eason of private respondent's failure t o interpose any timely objection thereto at the time t h ey w er e bein g offer ed in ev iden ce. Da v id T . T olen t in o

G.R. No. 1 0 9 9 7 2 A pr il 2 9 , 1 9 9 6 ZOSIMA V ERDA D v s. CA V IT UG, J.: FA CT S: Pet itioner Zosima Verdad is the purchaser of a 248-square meter residential lot at Ma g a lla n es St reet, now Marcos M. Calo St., Butuan City. Private r espon d en t Socor r o Cor der o V da . de Rosa les, seeks to exercise a right of legal redemption over the subject property a n d t r a ces h er t itle to the late Macaria Atega, her mother-in-law, wh o died in t est a t e on 0 8 Ma r ch 1 9 5 6 .

Du r ing her lifetime, Macaria contracted two marriages: the first with An g el Bu r deos a n d t h e second, following the latter's death, with Canuto Rosales. At the time of her own death, Macar ia w as survived by her son Ramon A. Burdeos and her grandchild (by her daugh t er Felicida d A . Bu rdeos) Estela Lozada of the first marriage and her children of the second marriage, n a m ely , Da v id Rosales, Justo Rosales, Rom u lo Rosa les, a n d A u r or a Rosa les (n ot ice t h a t ot h er r espondents in this case are the children from the 2 nd marriage). Socorro is t h e w ife of Da v id Rosa les w h o som et im e a ft er t h e dea t h of Ma ca r ia , died in t est a t e w it h ou t issu e. It w as discovered that the heirs of Ramon Buderos sold the lot in question t o pet it ion er in a n in strument dated 14, June 1982 (for P5 5,460) and another instrument on 14 Nov 1982 (this time a duly notarized deed of sale for P23,000), which sale was la t er discov er ed by r espon den t Socorro on 30 Mar 1987. Settlement was attempted at the Failure of settlement a t t h e Lu pon g T agapamayapa prompted the Respondent t o initiated a case for the "Lega l Redem pt ion w it h Pr elim in a r y In ju n ct ion " befor e t h e Reg ion a l T r ia l Cou r t of Bu t u a n Cit y . RT C decided that the private respondents' right t o redeem the property had already lapsed. On a ppeal by respondents, Court of Appeals reversed the lower court‘s decision declaring pla in t iffa ppellant, Socorro C. Rosales, entitled to redeem the inheritance rights (Art. 1088, NCC) or pro indiviso share (Art. 1620, NCC) of the Heirs of Ramon Burdeos, Sr. in Lot 5 2 9 , T s-6 5 of t h e Bu tuan Cadastre, within the remaining ELEVEN (11) DAYS from finality hereon, unless writ t en n ot ice of the sale and its t erms are received in the interim, under the same t erms and condition s a ppearing under Exhibit "J" and after returning the purchase price of P23,000.0 0 w it h in t h e for eg oin g per iod. Hen ce, t h is pet it ion . ISSUE: W ON respondents may initiate redemption proceedings ov er the lot, her not bein g a leg a l coh eir , a s w ell a s t h e t im elin ess of t h a t t h e sa id ca se w a s in st it u t ed. HELD: T h e Court denied the petition. On the contention of petitioner as t o the capacit y of Socor r o t o in itiate the redemption proceedings, the Court ruled that Respondent possess the capacity t o ask for a redemption. It is true that Socorro, a daughter-in-law (or, for that matter, a mere relative by a ffinity), is not an intestate heir of her parents-in-law; however, Socorro's right to the property is n ot because she rightfully can claim heirship in Macaria's estate but that she is a legal heir of her h usband, David Rosales, pa r t of w h ose est a t e is a sh a r e in h is m ot h er 's in h er it a n ce. Da v id Rosales, incontrovertibly, survived his mother's death. When Macaria died on 08 Ma r ch 1 956 her estate passed on to her surviving children, among them David Rosales, who thereupon became co-owners of the property. When David Rosales himself later died, his own estate, which in cluded his undivided interest ov er the property inherited fr om Ma ca r ia , pa ssed on t o h is w idow Socorro and her co-heirs pursuant to the law on succession(Art 995 and 1 001 ). Socor r o a n d herein private respondents, along with the co-heirs of David Rosales, thereupon became coow ners of t h e pr oper t y t h a t or ig in a lly descen ded fr om Ma ca r ia . A s t o the t imeliness of the filing of the petition, the Court ruled that such was exercised on t ime . Con cededly, no written notice of the sale was given by the Burdeos heirs (v en dor s) t o t h e coow ners required under Article 1623 of the Civil Code. Hence, the thirty-day period of redemption h a d yet t o commence when priva t e r espon den t Rosa les sou g h t t o ex er cise t h e r ig h t of r edemption on 31 March 1987, a day after she discovered the sale from t h e Office of t h e Cit y T r easurer of Butuan City, or when the case was initiated, on 16 October 1987, befor e t h e t r ia l court. The written notice of sale is mandatory. This Court has long est a blish ed t h e r u le t h a t n otwithstanding actual knowledge of a co-owner, the latter is still entitled to a w r it t en n ot ice fr om the selling co-owner in order to remove all uncertainties abou t t h e sa le, it s t er m s a n d con dit ion s, a s w ell a s it s effica cy a n d st a t u s. Da v id T . T olen t in o

FILOMENA A BELLA NA DE BA CA YO, pet it ion er -a ppella n t , v s.GA UDENCIA FERRA RIS DE BORROMEO, CA T A LINA FERA RIS DE V ILLEGA S, JUA NIT O FERRA RIS a n d CONCHIT A FERRA RIS, opposit or s-a ppellees. G.R. No. L-1 9 3 8 2 A u g u st 3 1 , 1 9 6 5 FA CT S: Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until 1937 when she transfer r ed t o In t r a m u r os, Ma n ila. She was known to have resided in Manilacontinuously until 1 944. More than t en (1 0 ) y ears having elapsed since t h e la st t im e sh e w a s kn ow n t o be a liv e, sh e w a s decla r ed pr esumptively dead for purposes of opening her succession and distributing her est a t e a m on g h er h eir s. Melodia Ferraris left properties in Cebu City. The deceased Melodia Ferraris left n o su r v iv in g dir ect descendant, ascendant, or spouse, but was survived only by collateral relatives, n a m ely , Filom ena Abellana de Bacayo, an aunt and half-sister of decedent's father, Anacleto Ferraris; and by Gaudencia, Catalina, Conchita, and Juanito, all surnamed Ferraris, her nieces an d n eph ew , w ho were the children of Melodia's only brother of full blood, Arturo Ferraris, who pre-deceased h er (t h e deceden t ). T h e trial court ruled that the appellees, as children of t h e on ly pr edecea sed br ot h er of t h e decedent, are nearer in degree than the appellant since nieces and nephews succeed by r ig h t of r epr esen t a t ion . ISSUE: W h o a m on g st t h e cla im a n t s a r e en t it led t o t h e in h er it a n ce? HELD: W e agree with appellants that as an aunt of the deceased she is as far dista n t a s t h e n eph ew s fr om the decedent (three degrees) since in the collateral line t o which bot h kin ds of r ela t iv es belong degrees are counted by first ascending to the common ancestor and then descen din g t o t h e heir. Appellant is likewise right in her contention that nephew s a n d n ieces a lon e do n ot in herit by right of representation (i.e., per stripes) unless concurring with brothers or sist er s of t h e decea sed. Nev ertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intest a cy , n eph ew s a n d n ieces of the de cujus exclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from t h e su ccession. Under Article 1 009, the absence of brothers, sister s, n eph ew s a n d n ieces of t h e decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousin s, et c.) bein g ca lled t o t h e su ccession . Br others and sisters and nephews and nieces inherited ab intes tato ahead of t h e su r v iv in g spou se, while other collaterals succeeded only after the widower or widow. T h e pr esen t Civ il Code of the Philippines merely placed the spouse on a par with the n eph ew s a n d n ieces a n d br others and sisters of the deceased, but without altering the preferred position of the latter vis a-vis t h e ot h er colla t er a ls. T h erefore, a decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as neph ew s a n d n ieces of t h e deceden t su r v iv e a n d a r e w illin g a n d qu a lified t o su cceed.

T hree sets of plaintiffs filed the com plaint, namely: (a) the Bicomongs, ch ildr en of Per pet u a Ba g sic; (b) the Tolentinos, children of Igmedia Bagsic; and (c) Francisco Ba g sic, da u g h t er of Ig nacio Bagsic, in the CFI of Laguna and San Pablo City ag a in st t h e defen da n t s Ger on im o A lm anza and Engracio Menese for the recovery of their lawful shares in the pr oper t ies left by Ma u r a Ba g sic. A fter the death of Maura Bagsic, properties passed on to Cristela Almanza who t ook ch a r g e of t h e administration of the same. Thereupon, the plaintiffs approached her and requested for t h e pa rtition of their aunt's properties. However, they were prevailed upon by Cristeta Almanza n ot t o div ide the properties yet as the expenses for the last illness and burial of Maura Bagsic had not y et been paid. Having agreed t o defer the partition of the same, the plaintiffs br ou g h t ou t t h e su bject again sometime in 1959 only. This t ime Cristeta Almanza acceded to the requ est a s t h e debts, accordingly, had already been paid. Unfortunately, she died without the div ision of t h e pr operties having been effected, thereby leaving the possession and administration of the sa m e t o t h e defen da n t s. T h e trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiffs. The respondents have the right to inherit fr om Ma u r a by r ig h t of r epr esen t a t ion . T h e a ppella t e cou r t cer t ified t h e ca se t o t h e Su pr em e Cou r t . Issu e: W h ether the nephews and nieces from the brothers and sisters whether full or half blood has the r ig h t t o in h er it Held: Y es. The nephews and nieces from the brothers and sisters whether full or h a lf blood h a s t h e r ig h t t o in h er it . In t he absence of defendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, Art. 10 0 3 of t h e NCC provides that collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. It a ppearing that Maura Bagsic died intestate without an issue, a n d h er h u sba n d a n d a ll h er a scendants had died ahead of her, she is succeeded by the surviving collateral relatives, nam ely t h e daughter of her sister of full blood and the ten (1 0) children of her brother and two (2) sisters of h a lf blood in a ccor da n ce w it h t h e pr ov ision of A r t . 9 7 5 of t h e NCC. Un der the same provision, Art. 975, which makes no qualification as to whether the nephew s or n ieces are on the maternal or paternal lin e a n d w it h ou t pr efer en ce a s t o w h et h er t h eir r elationship to the deceased is by whole or half blood, t h e sole n iece of w h ole blood of t h e deceased does not exclude the ten nephews and n of half blood. The only difference in their right of su ccession is provided in Art. 1 008, NCC in relation to Art. 1 006 of the NCC, which provision s, in effect, entitle the sole niece of full blood to a share double that of the nephews a n d n ieces of h a lf blood.

CIT Y OF MA NILA V S. A RCHBISHOP G.R. No. L-1 0 0 3 3 / A u g u st 3 0 , 1 9 1 7

BICOMONG v s. A LMA NZA G.R. No. L-3 7 3 6 5 Nov . 2 9 , 1 9 7 7 Fa ct s: Sim eon Bagsic was married to Sisenanda Barcenas having three children: Perpetua, Igmedia and Ig nacio. When Sisenda died, Simeon married Silvestra producin g t w o ch ildr en : Felipa a n d Ma u r a . T h e subject matter of the complaint concerns the one-half undivided share of Maur a Ba g sic in t h e 5 parcels of land which she inherited from h er decea sed m ot h er , Silv est r a Glor ioso.

FA CTS: In 1 668, Ana Sarmiento resided with her husband in the Cit y of Ma n ila . Sh e ow n ed pr operties consisted of five parcels of land in Malate and Paco. She ma de a w ill a n d la t er on a dded a codicil t o said will. The will contained provisions for the establishment of a "Capella n ia de Misas"; that the first chaplain of said capellania should be her nephew Pedro del Castillo; that sa id will contained a provision for the administration of said property in relation wit h t h e sa id "Ca pellania de Misas" succeeding administration should continue perpetually . In 1 6 7 2 , A n a Sa rmiento died. For more than two hundred years, respondent Roman Catholic Ar ch bish op of Ma n ila , t h r ou g h h is v a r iou s a g en cies, h a s a dm in ist er ed sa id pr oper t y . Pet itioner city of Manila filed an action before the CFI t o have declared escheated to th e cit y of Ma n ila the mentioned property. The theory of the petitioner is that one Ana Sarmiento w a s t h e ow ner of said property and died in the year 1668 without leaving "her or person entit led t o t h e sam e." However, the respondent opposed alleging that it has rightfully and legally succeeded t o

t h e possession and administration of the property in accordance with the terms and prov ision s of t h e w ill of A n a Sa r m ien t o. T h e t r ia l cou r t den ied t h e pet it ion . ISSUE: W h et h er t h e pr oper t y ca n be esch ea t ed in fa v or of Cit y of Ma n ila . HELD: No Section 750 of Act No. 1 90 provides when property may be declar ed esch ea t ed. It pr ov ides, "w hen a person dies intestate, seized of real or personal property . . . leaving no heir or person by law entitled to the same," that then and in that case such property under the procedure provided for by sect ion s 7 5 1 a n d 7 5 2 , m a y de decla r ed esch ea t ed. T h e proof shows that Ana Sarmiento did not die intestate. She left a will. The will pr ov ides for t h e administration of said property by her nephew as well as for the subsequent administra t ion of t h e same. She did not die without an heir nor without persons en t it led t o a dm in ist er h er est ate. It further shows that she did not die without leaving a person by law entitled t o in h er it h er pr oper t y . T h er efor e, t h e pr oper t y in qu est ion ca n n ot be decla r ed esch ea t ed. T h e will clearly, definitely and unequivocally defines and designates what disposit ion sh a ll be m ade of the property in question. The heir mentioned in said will evidently accept ed it s t er m s a n d permitted the property to be administered in accordance therewith. And, so far as the record sh ows, it is still being administered in accordance with the terms of said will for the benefit of the r ea l ben eficia r y a s w a s in t en ded by t h e or ig in a l ow n er .

T ORRES v s. LOPEZ G.R. No. L-2 5 9 6 6

Nov em ber 1 , 1 9 2 6

FA CT S: T om as Rodriguez, had been judicially declared incapable of taking care of himself and had been placed under the care of his cousin Vicente F. Lopez, as guardian. The will instituted as univer sal h eirs of all his property his daughter Luz Lopez de Bueno and cousin Lopez. Lopez died 4 da y s fr om the time the will was made and the testator died about a month thereafter. T h e t im e t h e w ill was made Lopez had not presented his final accounts as guardian, and no such accounts had been pr esen t ed by h im a t t h e t im e of h is dea t h . Ma rgarita Lopez was a cousin and nearest relative of the decedent, filed a case claimin g h a lf of t h e estate of Tomas by intestate succession as next of kin and nearest heir . Lu z, on t h e ot h er h and, claims the same by accretion and in the character of univ er sa l h eir u n der t h e w ill of T om as. Appellant contends that there has supervened a partial intestacy with respect to the ha lf of t h e estate which was intended for Vicente F. Lopez and that this half h a s descen ded t o t h e a ppella n t . T h e t r ia l cou r t r u led in fa v or of Lu z. ISSUE: W h ether or not one-half of the estate of Tomas Rodriquez should go to Margarit a Lopez bein g t h e next of kin a n d n ea r est h eir of V icen t e Lopez or t o h is da u g h t er by a ccr et ion ? HELD: A rticle 753 of the Civil Code which in effect declares that, with certain exceptions in favor of near r elatives, no t estamentary provision shall be valid when made by a ward in favor of his guardia n before the final accounts of the latter have been approv ed. T h is pr ov ision is of u n dou bt ed a pplication to the situation before the court and th e pr ov ision m a de in t h e w ill of T om a s Rodr iguez in favor of Vicente F. Lopez was not any general incapacity on his part, but a specia l in capacity due to the accidental relation of guardian and ward existing bet w een t h e pa r t ies. A ccretion takes place in a t estamentary success when two or more persons are called to the same in heritance or the same portion thereof without special designation of sh a r es a n d secon dly , w hen one of the persons so called dies before the testator or renounces t h e in h er it a n ce or is disqualified t o receive it. In the case before us we have a will calling Vicen t e F. Lopez a n d h is

da ughter, Luz Lopez de Bueno, to the same inheritance without special designation of shares. In a ddition to this, one of the persons named as heir has predeceased the testator, this person being a lso disqualified to receive the estate even if he had been alive at the t ime of the testator's dea t h by reason of his being then the legal guardian of the testator with accounts unsett led, does n ot m ake a case for intestate succession as to his part of the estate. This article (9 8 2 ) is t h e ex a ct a pplication to the case and its effect is to give to the survivor, Luz Lopez de Bueno, not only t h e u ndivided half which she would have received in conjunction with her father if he had been alive a n d qualified to take, but also the half which pertained to him. There was no er r or w h a t ev er , t h erefore in the order of the trial court declaring Luz Lopez de Bu en o en t it led t o t h e w h ole est a t e.

NEPOMUCENO v s. IA C FA CT S: On July 16, 1974, Martin Jugo died and left a will. In the said w ill, t h e t est a t or n a m ed a n d a ppointed herein petitioner Sofia J. Nepomuceno as his sole and only executor of his estate. It is clearly stated in the Will that the t estator was legally married to a cer t a in Ru fin a Gom ez by w hom he had two legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelit a , bu t sin ce 1 9 5 2 , h e h a d bee n est ranged from his lawfully wedded wife and had been living with petitioner a s h u sba n d a n d w ife. The estate was devised to his legal heirs, except the free por t ion w h ich w a s dev ised t o pet itioner. Petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the will but was denied by the court on the opposition of the legal heirs on the ground that petitioner admitted her living in con cu bin a g e w ith the testator, thus, she is wanting in integrity and letters t estamentary should not be issu ed t o h er . T h e Court of Appeals declared the will t o be valid except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is n ull and void, Petitioner contends that the lower court has no jurisdiction in passing upon t h e qu est ion of t h e in t r in sic v a lidit y of t h e w ill. ISSUE: W h ether or not the proba t e cou r t m a y pa ss u pon t h e pr ov ision s of t h e w ill. HELD: NO. T h e respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring t h e w ill t o be v a lidly dr awn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the devise in fa v or of t h e pet it ion er n u ll a n d v oid. T h e general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court‘s a r ea of in qu ir y is lim it ed t o a n ex amination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of t h e w ill. T h e r u le, h ow ev er , is n ot in flexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not pow er less t o do w hat the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the w ill. T h e fa ct t hat the probate court declared a devise made in a will null and void will be sustained wh er e n o u seful purpose will be served by requiring the filing of a separate civil action and restricting t h e court only to the issue of extrinsic validity of the will. There is no useful purpose that w ou ld be served if we remand the nullified provision to the proper court in a sepa r a t e a ct ion f or t h a t pu rpose simply because, in the probate of a will, the court does n ot or din a r ily look in t o t h e in t r in sic v a lidit y of it s pr ov ision s. T h e prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the makin g of a don a t ion bet w een per sons who are living in adultery or concubinage. It is the donation which becomes v oid. T h e g iv er cannot give even assuming that the recipient may receive. The very wor din g s of t h e w ill inv alidate the legacy because the t estator admitted he was disposing the properties t o a per son w it h w h om h e h a d been liv in g in con cu bin a g e.

PA ST OR v s. CA FA CT S: A lv aro Pastor, Sr. (PASTOR, SR.), a Spanish subject, died in Cebu City on June 5 , 1 966, survived by his Spanish wife Sofia Bossio (who also died), their two legitimate children Alvaro Pastor, Jr . (PA STOR, JR.) and Sofia Pastor de Midgely (SOFIA), and an illegitimate child, not natu r a l, by t h e n a m e of Lew elly n Ba r lit o Qu em a da (QUEMA DA ). QUEMADA filed a petition for the probate and allowance of a n a lleg ed h olog r a ph ic w ill of PA STOR, SR., which contained a legacy in favor of Quenada consisting of 3 0 % of Pa st or Sr .‘s 4 2 % sh a r e in t h e oper a t ion of A t la s Min in g . PA STOR, JR. and his wife claimed to be the owners thereof in their ow n r ig h t s, a n d n ot by in heritance Thus, Quemada appointed as special administrator filed for reconv ey a n ce of sa id cla im s of a lleg ed pr oper t ies in clu din g t h e su bject of leg a cy . ISSUE: W h et h er t h e pr oba t e or der r esolv ed w it h fin a lit y t h e qu est ion s of ow n er sh ip. W h et h er t h e pr oba t e or der e r esolv ed t h e in t r i n sic v a lidit y of t h e w ill. HELD: In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issu e by a n d la r g e is r est r ict ed t o t h e ex trinsic validity of the will, As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter w h ich t h e Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining wh et h er a certain property should or should not be included in the inventor y of est a t e pr oper t ies, t h e Pr obate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such det er m in a t ion is pr ov ision a l, n ot con clusive, a n d is su bject t o t h e fin a l decision in a sepa r a t e a ct ion t o r esolv e t it le. Pr obate court erred in assuming in its implementing order that the probate order adjudg ed t h e issues of ownership. In case of death of one of the spouses, their r espect iv e r ig h t s m u st be liquidated and the debts paid in the succession proceedings for the deceased spouse. Certiorari is pr oper where probate court issued erroneous implementing orders of its probate order. Leg a cy m ade in a will cannot be distributed without a prior liquidation of t h e deceden t ‘s est a t e a n d payment of debts and taxes. A legacy is not a debt of the estate for which a writ of execution may issue. An order of execution that varies the t er m s of a fin a l or der ca n be qu est ion ed in a cer t ior a r i pr oceedin g .

SA NCHEZ v s. CA G.R. No. 1 0 8 9 4 7 Sept em ber 2 9 , 1 9 9 7 FA CT S: Pr ivate respondent Rosalia S. Lugod is the only child of spouses Juan C. Sa n ch ez a n d Ma r ia V illafranca while Arturo S. Lugod, Ev elyn L. Ranises and Roberto S. Lugod are t h e leg it im a t e ch ildren of Rosalia. Petitioners Rolando, Florida Mierly, Alfredo a n d My r n a , a ll su r n a m ed Sa nchez, are the illegitimate children of Juan C. Sanchez. Rosalia filed a petit ion for let t er s of a dm inistration ov er the estate of her mother following her death and the estat e of h er fa t h er , Ju an, who was at the t ime in a state of senility. But before the administration proceedings cou ld form ally be t erminated and closed, Juan died. Such that petitioner s a s h eir s of Ju a n , filed a pet ition for letters of administration ov er the intestate est a t e of Ju a n , w h ich pet it ion w a s opposed by Rosalia. Thereafter, Rosalia and petitioners executed a Com pr om ise A g r eem en t w herein they agreed t o divide the properties enumerated therein of t h e la t e Ju a n Sa n ch ez. Pet itioners filed a Motion to require administratrix, Rosalia, to deliver deficiency of 24 hecta r es a n d/or to set aside com promise agreement. Private respondent Rosalia and petitioners ent er ed in to and executed a memorandum of agreement which modified the compromise a g r eem en t .

Nin e years later, petitioners filed a motion to require Rosalia to submit a new inventory a n d t o r ender an accounting ov er properties not included in the compromise agreement. They likew ise filed a motion t o defer the approval of the comprom ise agreement, in which they prayed for t h e a n n u lm en t of t h e com pr om ise a g r eem en t on t h e g r ou n d of fr a u d. T h e trial court declared the com promise agreement void and unenforceable, the same not having been approved by the intestate court and that the same having been seasonably repu dia t ed by pet itioners on the ground of fraud. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and declared the m odified compromise agreement valid and binding. Petition er s con t en d t h a t , beca u se t h e com prom ise agreement was executed during the pendency of the probate proceedings, ju dicia l a ppr ov a l is n ecessa r y t o sh r ou d it w it h v a lidit y . Issu e: Whether or not the comprom ise agreement entered by the parties during the pendency of pr oba t e pr oceedin g s is v a lid a n d bin din g . Held: Y es. Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a com pr om ise a g r eem en t a s "a con t r a ct w hereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or pu t a n en d t o on e a lready commenced." Being a consensual contract, it is perfected upon the meeting of the minds of t h e parties. Judicial approval is not required for its perfection. Petitioners' argument that t h e com prom ise was not valid for lack of judicial approval is not n ov el; t h e sa m e w a s r a ised in Ma y uga vs. Court of Appeals, where the Court ruled: ―It is a lleg ed t h a t t h e la ck of ju dicia l a pproval is fatal t o the compromise. A compromise is a con sen su a l con t r a ct . A s su ch , it is per fected upon the meeting of the minds of the parties t o the contract. And from that m om en t n ot only does it become binding upon the parties, it also has upon them the effect and authorit y of r es judicata (Civil Code, Art. 2037), even if not judicially approved .‖ In the case before us, it is in eludible that the parties knowingly and freely entered into a valid compr om ise a g r eem en t . A dequately assisted by their respective counsels, they each negotiated its t erms and pr ov ision s for four months; in fact, said agreement was executed only after the fourth draft. As noted by the t r ial court itself, the first and second drafts were prepared successively in July, 1969; t h e t h ir d dr aft on September 25, 1969; and the fourth draft, which was finally signed by t h e pa r t ies on October 30, 1969, followed. Since this compromise agreement was the result of a long drawn out pr ocess, with all the parties ably striving t o protect their respective interest s a n d t o com e ou t w ith the best they could, there can be no doubt that t h e pa r t ies en t er ed in t o it fr eely a n d v oluntarily. Accordingly, they should be bound thereby. To be valid, it is merely required u n der t h e law to be based on real claims and actually agreed upon in good faith by the parties ther et o. In deed, compromise is a form of amica ble set t lem en t t h a t is n ot on ly a llow ed bu t a lso en couraged in civil cases. Article 2029 of the Civil Code mandates that a "court shall endeavor to per suade the litigants in a civil case to agree upon some fa ir com pr om ise."In opposin g t h e v alidity and enforcement of the com promise agreement, petitioners har p on t h e m in or it y of Flor ida Mierly, Alfredo and Myna. Citing Article 2032 of the Civil Code, they conten d t h a t t h e court's approval is necessary in compromises entered into by guardians and parents in behalf of t h eir wards or children. However, we observe that a lt h ou g h den om in a t ed a com pr om ise a greement, the document in this case is essentially a deed of partition, pursuant to Article 10 8 2 of t h e Civil Code which provides that "[e]very act which is intended t o put an end to in div ision a m ong co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should pur por t t o be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction."For a partit ion t o be v a lid, Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, requires the concurrence of the following conditions: (1) t h e decedent left no will; (2) the decedent left no debts, or if there were debts left, all h a d been pa id; (3) the heirs and liquidators are all of age, or if they are minors, the latter are represen t ed by their judicial guardian or legal representatives; and (4) the partition was made by means of a pu blic instrument or affidavit duly filed with the Register of Deeds. We find that all the foregoing r equisites are present in this case. We therefore affirm the validity of the part ies' com pr om ise a g r eem en t /pa r t it ion in t h is ca se.

NA ZA RENO V S. CA 5 4 3 SCRA 6 3 7 OCT OBER 1 8 , 2 0 0 0

FA CT S Ma x iminoo Nazareno Sr. and Aurea Poblete were husband and wife. Aurea died on A pr il 1 5 , 1 970 , while Maximo Sr. died on December 18, 1980 . They were survived by t h eir ch ildr en , Na tividad, Rom eo, Jose, Pacifico and Max im in oo Jr . Ma x im in oo Jr . a n d Na t iv ida d a r e pet it ion er s in t h is ca se, w h ile Rom eo a n d h is w ife a r e r espon den t s. Deceased spouses Nazareno acquired propert ies in Qu ezon Cit y a n d in Ca v it e . It is t h e ow n er sh ip of som e of t h ese pr oper t ies t h a t is in qu est ion in t h is ca se. It a ppears that after the death of Maximino Sr. Romeo filed an intestate case in the CFI of Cavite. Rom eo was appointed administrator of his father‘s estate. In the cou r se of t h e pr oceedin g s, Rom eo discovered that his parents executed several deeds of sale conveying a n u m ber of r ea l pr operties in favor of his sister, Natividad. This involv ed 6 lot s in QC on e of w h ich is a lot occupied by Romeo and his wife. T h is lot w a s la t er sold by Na t iv ida d t o Ma x im in o Jr . Rom eo filed on behalf of the estate of Maximino Sr., a case for annulment of sale with dam a g es a gainst Natividad and Maximino Jr. on the g r ou n d t h a t bot h sa les w er e v oid for la ck of con sideration. Trial Court rendered judgement declaring the n u llit y of t h e deed of sa le. CA m odified RT C, or der ed lot s ca n celled a n d r est or ed t o t h e est a t e of Ma x im in o Sr .

dism issed. Ca reversed RTC in so far as lot 943 is concerned, ordered Alber t a a s ow n er of lot 943. ISSUE: 1. Whether the partition inter vivos by Flavio Zaragoza of his properties which in clu des lot 8 7 1 a n d 9 4 3 v a lid? 2 . Whether the validity of the sale and consequently, the TCT ov er lot 943 registered in the n ame of Petitioners Florentina be a valid subject matter of the entire proceeding for the delivery of t h e in h er it a n ce sh a r e. HELD T h is court affirms the decision of CA, lots 871 and 943 were inheritance shares of r espon den t , ba sed on documentary evidence and testimonial evidence. Partition during the lifetime of Flavio za ragoza is valid. It is basic in the law of succession that a partition inter vivos may be don e for a s long as legitimes are not prejudiced. Article 1 080 of the Civil Code is clear, the petition, mu st be dismissed without prejudice t o the institution of a new proceeding were all the indispensable pa r t ies a r e pr esen t for t h e r ig h t fu l det er m in a t ion of t h eir r espect iv e leg it im e. Second Issue. Petition is a collateral attack. It is n ot a llow ed by Sec 4 8 of PD 1 5 2 9 . T h e certificate, in absence of fraud, is eveidence of title and shows exactly th e r ea l in t er est of t h e ow ner. The title once registered. Should not be thereafter impugned, altered or changed ex cept in dir ect pr oceedin g per m it t ed by la w .

ISSUE: Whether upon death of the deceased spouses their estate alone can seek the annulm en t of sa id sa le? W h et h er t h e sa le is v a lid? HELD T h e pet it ion is w it h ou t m e r it . T h e fact that other properties had allegedly been sold by the spouses Maximino Sr. a n d A u r ea does n ot necessarily sh ow t h a t t h e deed of sa le m a de in fa v or of Na t iv ida d is v a lid. T h e trial court and CA found that the Nazareno spouses transferred their pr oper t ies t o t h eir ch ildren by fictitious sales in order to avoid payment of inheritance taxes. It was also foun d ou t t h a t Na t iv ida d h a d n o m ea n s t o pa y for t h e six lot s su bject of t h e deed of sa le. T h e estate of Maximino alone cannot contest the validity of the deed of sale because the estate of A u r ea h a s n ot been set t led. CA decision a ffir m ed.

MENDOZA V S CA 1 9 9 SCRA 7 7 8 FA CT S Pet itioner Mendoza I et al instituted before CFI of Bulacan an action for reconvey a n ce of r ea l pr operty against private respondents spouses Samonte. Petitioners are legitim a t e ch ildr en of deceased Mendoza , Trinidad , their mother sold a pa r cel of la n d t o r espon den t s spou ses Sa m on t e. Pet it ion er s a v er t h a t t h ey a r e en t it led t o leg a l r edem pt ion . A ccording to the plaintiff, the sale of the disputed property in favor of the defendant s w a s n u ll a n d void on the ground that, as a mere co-owner of an undivided estate, Trinidad Mendoza h a d n o r ight t o divide the estate into parts and then convey a part thereof by metes and boun ds t o a t h ird person, since there had never been any partition, judicial or extra judicia l, of t h e est a t e a m on g t h e h eir s of t h eir la t e fa t h er , A r ca dio.

ZA RA GOZA V S. CA 3 4 1 SCRA 3 0 9

T h e trial court dismissed the the petitioner‘s complaint. CA affirmed the d ecision of t h e t r ia l cou r t .

FA CT S Flavio Zaragoza Cano was a register ed ow n er of cer t a in pa r cels of la n d sit u a t ed a t t h e m unicipalities of Cabatuan, New Lucena and Sta. Barbara, Iloilo . He had four children, Glor ia , Za ca r ia z, Flor en t in a a n d A lber t a . On Decem eber 1 9 6 4 h e died w it h ou t a w i ll.

ISSUE: Whether the deed of sale is void? Whether petitioners can still exercise the right of leg a l r edem pt ion ?

A lberta Zaragoza-Morgan filed a complaint against Florentino for delivery of h er in h er it a n ce sh are, consisting of lots 943 and 871 and for payment of damages. She claims that, his fath er in h is lifetime partitioned the said properties among his children. The shares of her brot h er s a n d sist ers were given to them in advance by way of deed of sale, but without valid con sider a t ion . Her share, lots 943 and 871 were not conveyed then. She averred that because of her mar r ia g e, sh e became an American citizen and was prohibited to acquire lands in the Philippines except by h er edit a r y su ccession .

Pet itioner Trinidad is not entitled to one-half (1/2) of sa id lot bu t on ly t o t h e sh a r e of on e leg itimate child or 1 and 1 /3 r ig h t s a n d in t er est , cit in g a r t icle 9 9 6 of t h e Civ il Code.

Pet itioners denied that there was partition of the estate of their father during his lifet im e. T h e t r ial court ruled and ordered adjudication lot 871 to the plaintiff Alberta , the claim for lot 943 is

HELD:

T h e deed of sale is void insofar as it affects the rights and interests of other petitioners beca u se pet itioner Trinidad can only sell her 1 1/3 rights and interest ov er the said lot and no more t h a n t hat. Corollary, the remaining petitioners can still exer cise t h e r ig h t of leg a l r edem pt ion , con for m a bly w it h A r t icle 1 6 2 0 of t h e civ il code.

A ZNA R BROT HERS REA LT CO. V S CA 3 2 7 SCRA 3 5 9 FA CT S Lot n o. 4399 containing an area of 34,325 square meters located at Brgy. Mact a n , La pu La pu City was acquired By Aznar from the heirs of Crisanta Maloloy -on by virtue of an extr a ju dicia l Pa r t it ion of r ea l est a t e w it h deed of a bsolu t e sa le. Pr ivate respondents were allegedly allowed to occupy portions of lot 4399 provided t h a t t h ey leave the land in the event that the company would use the property for its purpose. Later, Aznar en tered into a joint venture with Sta. Lucia Realty for development of the subject lot into a multim illion peso h ou sin g su bdiv ision a n d bea ch r esor t . W h en demands to vacate failed, Aznar filed with MT CC a ca se for u n la w fu l det a in er a n d dam ages. Private Respondents alleged that they are the successors and descendants of the eig h t ch ildren of the late Crisanta and that they had been residing in the concept of own er sin ce t h e t im e of their parents and grandparents. They claim that the deed of absolute sale was simula t ed a n d fraudulent. Thus files with RTC a complaint seeking t o declare the subject docu m en t n u ll a n d v oid. MT CC favored Aznar. RTC ordered demolition. CA reversed and set a side RT C a n d decla r ed Pr iv a t e Respon den t s a s t h e r ig h t fu l possessor s. ISSUE: W h et h er t h e ex t r a ju dicia l pa r t it ion w it h deed of a bsolu t e sa le is v a lid. HELD: Pr ivate respondents claim that not all the known heirs participated in the extrajudicial partition, a n d that two persons who participated and were made parties th er et o w er e n ot t h e h eir s of Cr isa n t a .

In t he course of the proceeding for the probate of Rosendo, Pablo filed a motion t o dism iss t h e pet ition for probate on the ground that he was no longer interested in the allowance of the will of h is late father for its probate would no longer be beneficial t o him. This motion w a s den ied, it w as also denied at the CA. In its decision the CA said, indeed the petitioner stood to g a in if t h e t estate proceedings were to be dismissed because then he would not be compelled to submit for in clusion in the inventory of the estate of Rosendo com prising 149 parcels of land from which he a lone had been collecting rentals and receiving income, to the exclusion and preju diced of h i s br other who was being deprived of his successional rights. Consequently, t h e cou r t decla r ed Pedro and Pablo the only heirs of Rosendo who should share equally upon t h e div ision of t h e la tter‘s estate and thereupon con v er t ed t h e t est a t e pr oceedin g s in t o on e of in t est a cy . A fter eleven years, one Joaquin Chancoco brother in law of Pablo filed a petition for the proba t e of t h e same will of Rosendo on the ground that the decedent owed him P5 000. The petit ion for pr obate was gr a n t ed. T eodor ico A lm in e, son -in -la w of Pa blo w a s a ppoin t ed specia l a dm inistrator, ov er and above the objection s of t h e h eir s of Pedr o. In t a kin g possession , T eoderico also t ook possession of the 63 par cels of la n d su bject of t h e pa r t it ion ea r lier . Ju dge Untalan orderd that the 63 parcels of land should be included in the proceeding s for t h e set tlement of the estate of Rosendo and thereafter proceed as probate proceedings. After 2 years, Ju dge Untalan reconsidered his order and held that the pr oject pa r t it ion is r espect ed a n d u ph eld. Pet it ion er s filed a n MR bu t w a s den ied h en ce t h e in st a n t ca se. ISSUE: Whether the partition should be regarded or r espect ed in v iew w it h t h e pr oba t e pr occedin g s of t h e est a t e of Rosen do HELD

T h is claim even if true would not warrant rescission of the deed. Article 1104 of the Civil Code a s t o pa r t ies w h o w er e a lleg edly n ot h eir s, a r t icle 1 1 0 5 is in poin t .

V erily, the rule that there can be no valid partition among the heirs till after t h e w ill h a s been pr obated. This, of course, presupposes that the proper t ies t o be pa r t it ion ed a r e t h e sa m e pr operties em braced in the will. Thus this rule invoked, is inapplicable in the instant case wher e t h ere are two separate cases each involving the esta t e of t w o differ en t per son com pr i sin g dissim ila r pr oper t ies.

Ex trajudicial partition with deed of absolute sale is a notarized document. As such, it h a s in it s fav or the presumption of regularity and it carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it w it h r espect to its due execution. It is admissible in evidence without further proof of aut h en t icit y . Decision of RT C r ein st a t ed.

T h e project partition is valid and binding upon the brothers as well as upon their heirs especially a s this was accompanied by delivery of possession to them of their respective shares. T h ey a r e du ty bound to respect the division agreed upon by them and em bodied in t h e docu m en t of pa r t it ion . T hus the petitioner could no longer question the exclusion of the lands subject of the pa r t it ion fr om t h e pr oceedin g s for t h e set t lem en t of t h e est a t e of Rosen do.

RA LLA V S. UNT A LA N L-6 3 2 5 3 -5 4 A PRIL 2 7 1 9 8 9

Pet it ion dism issed.

FA CT S Rosendo Ralla, a widower, filed a petition for the probate of his will in the RTC of Albay . In h is w ill he left his entire estate to his son, Pablo (herein petitioner substituted by h eir s), lea v in g n ot h in g t o h is ot h er son , Pedr o.

In t h e m a t t er of t h e Pet i t i on t o a ppr ov e t h e wi l l of Leodega r i a Ju l i a n . FELIX BA LA NA Y, Jr . v s. Ma r t i n ez L-3 9 2 4 7 Ju n e 2 7 , 1 9 7 5

A t the same time, Pedro filed an action for the partition of the estate of their mother, Paz. W it h t h is case, the brothers agreed to amicably compromise via project partition, whereby sixty -three pa rcels of land, apparently forming the estate of their deceased mother wa s div i ded bet w een t h em .

FA CT S Leodegaria Julian died in Davao City , she was survived by her husband Felix Balanay Sr. and by t h eir 6 ch ildr en , Felix Jr ., A v elin a , Bea t r iz, Ca r olin a Delia a n d Em ilia .

Felix Jr. filed in the lower court a petition for the probate of his mother‘s notarial will. In the said w ill, it was declared that, 1.) She was the owner of the southern half of the nine conjugal lots, 2 .) T hat it was her desire that her properties should not be divided among h er h eir s du r in g h er h usband‘s lifetime. She devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all ow n ed by h er. She disposed of in t h e w ill h er h u sba n d‘s on e h a lf sh a r e of t h e con ju g a l a sset s. Feliz Sr. and Avelina opposed the probate on the ground of lack of testamentary capacity, undu e in fluence preterition of the husband and alleged improper partitioned of the con ju g a l est a t e. T h ey claim that Felix Jr. should collate certain properties wh ich h e h a d r eceiv ed fr om t h e t estatrix. Felix Jr. in his reply attatched an affidavit signed by Feliz Sr waiving and ren ou n cin g h ereditary rigts in the estate of his wife in favor of their children. Avelina con t en ded t h a t t h e a ffidavit was void. Lower court denied and gave effect to the affidavit and conformity of Felix Sr. In t he meantime, A lawyer Montana appeared claiming t o be a law y er of Felix Jr , h e filed a m otion to withdraw the probate and t o proceed by intestae estae proceeding. T h e low er cou r t a dopted the view of Atty , Montana that the will was void. So, it dism issed t h e pet it ion for pr oba t e a n d con v er t ed t h e t est a t e pr oceedin g in t o a n in t est a t e pr oceedin g .

A m or a n t e Pl a n v s. IA C L-6 5 6 5 6 Febr u a r y 2 8 ,1 9 8 5

ISSUE: Whether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will, befor e r u lin g on it s a llow a n ce or for m a l v a lidit y , a n d decla r in g i t v oid.

In t he intestate proceeding for the settlement of Regino Bautist a ‘s est a t e, h is w idow filed a m otion dated December 9, 1964 for authority to sell t o Plan the two lots and theater for n ot less t han P140,000. The purpose was to pay the debts amounting to P117,220. The motion was set for h earing. It was indicated that the children were notified through one child Mila g r os Ba u t ist a .

HELD

FA CT S

W e are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are of dubious legality, and because of the motion t o withdraw the petition for probate. The tr ia l cou r t a ct ed correctly in passing upon the will‘s intrinsic validity even before its formal v a lidit y h a d been est ablished. But the probate court erred in declaring the will was void an d in con v er t in g t h e t estate proceeding into an intestate proceeding notwithstanding the fact that in its order it g a v e effect to the surviving husband‘s conformity to the will and t o his renunciation of his hereditar y r ig h t s w h ich pr esu m a bly in clu ded in on e -h a lf sh a r e of t h e con ju g a l est a t e.

Ju dge Jimenez of the probate court granted the authority to sell t o Plan the entire esta t e of t h e deceased for not less than P1 40,000 so as t o pay the obligations of the estate, appearing that a ll h eir s h a v e con for m ed t h er et o.

T h e rule is that ―the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in t h e invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the t est a t or w ou ld n ot h ave made such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been made.‖ (Ar t .7 9 2 CC) ―Where some valid parts will be upheld i f they can be separated from the inv a lid w it h ou t defeating the intention of the testator or interfering with the general testamentary sch em e, or doin g in ju st ice t o t h e ben eficia r ies.‖

Sixteen days after the sale an opposition to the agreement of absolute sale was filed by Feder ico Ba utista child of the deceased. Federico‘s counsel did not file any object ion t o t h e pr oject of pa rtition as per order by the Judge. The reason is not hard to surmise. The estate sou g h t t o be pa r t it ion ed h a d a lr ea dy been sold t o Pla n .

T h e provision of the will of the testatrix should not be divided a m on g h er h eir s du r in g h er h usband‘s lifetime but should be kept intact and that the legitimes sh ou ld be pa id in ca sh is con t r a r y t o a r t icle 1 0 8 0 of t h e Civ il Code. Felix Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his one -h a lf sh a r e of t h e con ju g a l pa rtnership (Art. 179 and Art 1041 CC) but insofar as said renunciation partakes of a donation of h is hereditary rights and his one-half share in the conjugal estate (1061 CC) it should be subject t o t he limitations prescribed in Articles 750 and 752 of the CC. A portion of the estate should be a djudicated to the widower for his support and maintenance or at least his legit im e sh ou ld be r espect ed. In t he instant case there is no doubt that the testatrix and her husband intended to partition t h e con jugal estate in the manner set forth in paragraph V of h er w ill. It is t r u e t h a t sh e cou ld dispose of by will only her half of the conjugal estate but since the husband, after the dissolution of t h e conjugal partnership, had assented to her testamentary partition of the conju g a l est a t e, su ch pa r t it ion h a s becom e v a lid a ssu m in g t h a t t h e w ill m a y be pr oba t ed. In t he instant case, the preterited heir was the husband, the surviving spouse. His pr et er it iion did not produce intestacy. Moreover, he signified his conformity to his wife‘s will and renounced h is h er edit a r y r ig h t s. Hea r in g for t h e pet it ion for pr oba t e a ffir m ed.

On that day, Florencia and Plan executed a deed of sale with assumption of mortgage obligations for the two lots. A motion to approve the sale was filed. Judge signed the orig in a l deed of sa le u nder t h e w or d a ppr ov ed t o in dica t e t h a t t h e sa le w a s oka y ed by pr oba t e cou r t .

Federico contended that because there was no compliance with Section 7 Rule 89 of the Rules of Court the sale was void. Instead of asking the court t o act on his pet it ion for r elief fr om t h e or ders authorizing and approving the sale, Federico filed a separate action against Plan to nullify t h e sale. Judge dism issed the action. He ruled that the nullity of the sael as t o Feder ico‘s 1 /1 6 sh are should be resolved in the intestae proceeding. He filed three t imes same action , a ll h a v e been dism issed. Ca ruled in favor of Federico, it declared void the agreement to sell based on article 1088 of t h e Civ il Code. ISSUE: Whether Federico could nullify in a separate action, instead of an intestate pr oceedin g h is father‘s estate, the sale of two conjugal lots made by his mother, w it h a u t h or iza t ion a n d a ppr ov a l of t h e pr oba t e cou r t . HELD W e hold that the appellate court erred in ordering Plan t o reconvey the dispu t ed pr oper t y t o Federico. Said judgment is ber eft of fa ct u a l a n d leg a l ba sis. Feder ico did n ot pr a y for r econveyance he prayed for receivership for nullification of the agreement to sell a n d t h e sa le it self. Article 1088 of the Civil Code does not justify legal redemption in t h is ca se beca u se it r efers to the sale of hereditary rights, and not t o specific properties, for the payment of the debt s of t h e deceden t ‘s est a t e a s t o w h ich t h er e is n o leg a l r edem pt ion .

In t he instant case we agree with the decision of the Judges that Feder ico‘s r em edy is in t h e in testate proceeding where his petition for relief has been pending for n ea r ly t w en t y y ea r s.

Ma r i a Bi ca r m e v s. CA a n d Cr ist in a Bica r m e L-5 1 9 1 4 Ju n e 6 , 1 9 9 0 FA CT S Ma r ia Bicarme and Cristina Bicarme are the only surviving co-heirs and co-owners and entit led in equal shares over the parcel of lands (cornland and Riceland) in litigation. Spouses Bica r m e died intestate and were survived by children, Maria and Victoria (mother of Cristina ). Cr ist in a in stituted this action for partition, because her aunt, Maria refused to share with her the yea r ly fr uits of the disputed parcels of lan. Maria howeve, maintains t h a t ― sh e a cqu ir ed t h ese t w o pa rcels of land from deceased spouses Bidaya and since then until the present, had been in open, pu blic, peaceful and contionous, adverse possession and enjoyment in the concept of a bsolu t e ow ner. Maria further claims that Cristina never shared or contributed t o the payment of taxes of sa id t w o pa r cels of la n d. T h e trial court stated that the provision in the deed of sale (Maria subscribed that the property is in herited from her father) was in the nature of trust provision in favor of Cristina a s co-ow n er a n d co-h eir . ISSUE: W h o h a s ow n er sh ip r ig h t s ov er t h e lit ig a t ed pa r cels of la n d HELD W e agree with the trial court. By admitting that the cornland is inherited pr oper t y , Ma r ia in effect r ecog n ized Cr it in a ‘s r ig h t s t h er et o a s a co-ow n er co-h eir . Having established that Critina‘s co-ownership rights, maria nonetheless insists that Cr ist in a ‘s r ights are barred by prescription under secs 40 and 42 of act 190 / art 11 1 6 of t h e Civ il Code w here the longest period of both acquisitive and extinctive prescr ipt ion is t en y ea r s. In t h e pr esent case, Cristina, it is alleged, asserted her claims 34 yers after her right of action accr u ed. On Maria‘s claims of acquisitive prescription, the trial court held that Maria was a trust ee w it h r espect to Cristina‘s share. As such, prescription, as a mode of acquiring t itle, could n ot a pply . A n action for partition im plies that the thing is still owned in common. If a co-owner h olds t h e pr operty in exclusive adverse possession as owner, asserting the property in exclusive dominion for a required period, he can acquire sole t itle t o it a s a g a in st co-h eir s or co-ow n er s. T h e im prescriptibly of an action for partition cannot thus be invoked when one of the co-owners h a s possessed the property as exclusiv e ow n er , a n d for a per iod su fficien t t o a cqu ir e it by pr escription. From the moment one of the co0owners claims tha t h e is a bsolu t e ow n er a n d den ies ot h er a n y qu est ion in v olv e is n o lon g er of pa r t it ion bu t of ow n er sh ip. A cqu isit iv e pr escr ipt ion ca n n ot a pply in t h is ca se. A m ere silent possession by a co-owner, his receipt of rents fruits or profit fr om t h e pr oper t y ca nnot serve as proof of exclusive ownership, it is not borne out of clear and com plete eviden ce t hat he exercise acts of possession which unequivocally constitute a n ou st er of t h e ot h er coow n er s. Cr ist in a ‘s r ig h t s t o pa r t i t ion w ill t h er efor e pr osper .