E2015 Consti 1 (Muyot) Digests 2.pdf

E2105 Constitutional Law 1

Santiago v Sandiganbayan Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, petitioner, v. Sandiganbayan, respondent. Doctrine: RA3019 Sec 13 is not a penalty but a ―preliminary preventive measure.‖ Nature: Certiorari Date: 2001 Apr 18 Ponente: Vitug Short Version: Petitioner assails the order of 90-day preventive suspension by the Sandiganbayan with regard to criminal case against petitioner in violation of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act. Facts: 1) 1992 Sandiganbayan issued an order to enjoin petitioner from leaving the country. 2) 1996 Jan 5, Sandiganbayan suspends Santiango from her duties as head of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) regarding the criminal case against her. 3) Santiago allegedly approved the legalization of unqualified ―aliens‖ who entered the country in Jan 1984. Issue/s: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has the authority to suspend Santiago as a Senator. Held: Yes, because the order of suspension prescribed by RA 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own members. Sec 13 of RA 3019 is not a penalty but a preliminary preventive measure. Decision: Petition DISMISSED

De Venecia v Sandiganbayan Jose De Venecia, et al., petitioners, v Sandiganbayan, respondents. Doctrine: The suspension provided for in the Anti-Graft law is mandatory not a penalty. Nature: Certiorari Date: 2002 February 5 Ponente: Short Version: The petitioners seek to annul the Order dated 28 August 1997 of the Sandiganbayan directing the preventive suspension of Rep. Paredes and the Resolution dated 29 August 1997 declaring Speaker De venecia in contempt of court. Issue/s: Whether the Sandiganbayan may cite in contempt of court the Speaker of the House for refusing to implement the preventive suspension order of a member of the House re a criminal case. Held: Yes, the suspension provided for in the Anti-Graft law is mandatory not a penalty. Decision: the case is deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED for being moot

Prof Muyot

Casco Chemical Co. v Gimenez Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc., petitioner, v. Hon. Pedro Gimenez, in his capacity as Auditor General of the Philippines, and Hon. Ismael Mathay, in his capacity as Auditor of the Central Bank, respondents. Doctrine: The enrolled bill is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. Nature: review – decision – Auditor General denying a claim for refund of petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. Date: 1963 February 28 Ponente: Concepcion Short Version: The petitioner assails the decision of the Central Bank to deny their application for exemption from the margin fee pursuant to Sec 2, RA 2609. Facts: 1) Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2609, otherwise known as the Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law, the Central Bank of the Philippines issued on July 1, 1959, its Circular No. 95. fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. 2) The Bank later promulgated a memorandum establishing the procedure for applications for exemption from the payment of said fee, as provided in said Republic Act No. 2609. 3) Several times in November and December 1959, petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. — which is engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues, used in bonding lumber and veneer by plywood and hardwood producers — bought foreign exchange for the importation of urea and formaldehyde — which are the main raw materials in the production of said glues — and paid therefore the aforementioned margin fee aggregating P33,765.42. In May, 1960, petitioner made another purchase of foreign exchange and paid the sum of P6,345.72 as margin fee therefore. 4) Petitioner had sought the refund of the first sum of P33,765.42, relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of said Bank, dated November 3, 1959, declaring that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. 5) The respondents deny the application for exemption. 6) Petitioner maintains that the term "urea formaldehyde" appearing in this provision should be construed as "urea and formaldehyde" (emphasis supplied) and that respondents herein, the Auditor General and the Auditor of the Central Bank, have erred in holding otherwise. 7) Petitioner contends, however, that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction "and" between the terms "urea" and "formaldehyde", and that the members of Congress intended to exempt "urea" and "formaldehyde" separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called "urea" formaldehyde", not the latter as a finished product, Issue/s: Whether or not "urea" and "formaldehyde" are exempt by law from the payment of the aforesaid margin fee.

E2105 Constitutional Law 1

Held: No, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2609 reads: The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one hereof shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following:. xxx xxx xxx XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users. Said individual statements do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate the intent of the House of Representatives. The enrolled bill—which uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea and formaldehyde"—is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

Prof Muyot

Held: Yes, Act No. 1679 provides that the Secretary of the Commission shall perform the duties which would properly be required of the Recorder of the Commission under the existing law. And rules 15 and 16 of the Legislative Procedure of the Philippine Commission provides, among other things, "that the proceedings of the Commission shall be briefly and accurately stated on the journal," and that it shall be the duty of the Secretary "to keep a correct journal of the proceedings of the Commission." Counsel for the appellant, in order to establish his contention, must necessarily depend upon the memory or recollection of witnesses, while the legislative journals are the acts of the Government or sovereign itself. From their very nature and object the records of the Legislature are as important as those of the judiciary, and to inquiry into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws. Decision: The judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED.

Decision: Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED

United States v Pons The United States, plaintiff-appellee, v. Juan Pons, defendant-appellant. Doctrine: The journals of the legislature have been declared conclusive upon the courts, Nature: Appeal Date: 1916 August 12 Ponente: Trent Short Version: The petitioner assails the validity of R 2381, for which he will be punished if found guilty, on the ground that it was passed on Mar1 1914 instead of Feb 28. Facts: 1) 1915, Apr 10, Gabino Beliso, Juan Pons, and Jacinto Lasarte, conspiring together and plotting among themselves, did, knowingly, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and fraudulently, bring from Spain, on board the steamer Lopez y Lopez, and import and introduce into the city of Manila, 520 tins containing 125 kilograms of opium of the value of P62,400, 2) Pons and Beliso were found guilty; while Lasarte was not yet arrested. Beliso and Pons appealed but Beliso withdrew his appeal so the judgment as to him became final. 3) Petitioner alleged and offered to prove that the last day of the special session of the Philippine Legislature for 1914 was the 28th day of February; that Act No. 2381, under which Pons must be punished if found guilty, was not passed or approved on the 28th of February but on March 1 of that year; and that, therefore, the same is null and void. Issue/s: Whether or not RA 2381 was passed on the appropriate date for it to be considered valid.

Astorga v Villegas Herminio A. Astorga, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of Manila, petitioner, v. Antonio J. Villegas et al, respondents. Doctrine: The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. Nature: Date: 1974 Apr 30 Ponente: Makalintal Short Version: The petitioner relies on the validity of House Bill 9266 with amendments passed by Sen Roxas (which later became RA 4065) in assailing the order of respondent Mayor in enjoining him from exercising the powers as Acting Mayor. Facts: 1) 1964 March 30, House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was filed in the House of Representatives. It was there passed on third reading without amendments on April 21, 1964. Forthwith the bill was sent to the Senate for its concurrence. 2) Senate Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by Senator Gerardo M. Roxas favorably recommended approval with a minor amendment, suggested by Senator Roxas, that instead of the City Engineer it be the President Protempore of the Municipal Board who should succeed the Vice-Mayor in case of the latter's incapacity to act as Mayor. 3) When the bill was discussed on the floor of the Senate on second reading on May 20, 1964, substantial amendments to Section 1 were introduced by Senator Arturo Tolentino. Those amendments were approved in toto by the Senate. The amendment recommended by Senator Roxas does not appear in the journal of the Senate proceedings as having been acted upon. 4) On May 21, 1964 the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the House of Representatives that House Bill No.

E2105 Constitutional Law 1

9266 had been passed by the Senate on May 20, 1964 "with amendments." Attached to the letter was a certification of the amendment, which was the one recommended by Senator Roxas and not the Tolentino amendments which were the ones actually approved by the Senate. 5) The House of Representatives thereafter signified its approval of House Bill No. 9266; certified and attested by the Secretary of the House of Representatives, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Secretary of the Senate and the Senate President. The President of the Philippines affixed his signature by way of approval on June 18, 1964. The bill thereupon became Republic Act No. 4065. 6) 1964 July 5, Senator Tolentino issued a press statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed into law by the President of the Philippines was a wrong version of the bill actually passed by the Senate because it did not embody the amendments introduced by him and approved on the Senate floor. 7) The Senate President addressed a letter dated July 11, 1964 to the President of the Philippines, explaining that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the secretaries of both Houses as well as by the presiding officers thereof was not the bill duly approved by Congress and that he considered his signature on the enrolled bill as invalid and of no effect. The President subsequently withdraws his signature. 8) Mayor Villegas of Manila issued circulars to the department heads and chiefs of offices of the city government to disregard the provisions of Republic Act 4065. He likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police force who had been assigned to the Vice-Mayor presumably under authority of Republic Act 4065. 9) 1965 April 28, upon motion of respondent Mayor, who was then going abroad on an official trip, this Court issued a restraining order, without bond, "enjoining the petitioner Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga from exercising any of the powers of an Acting Mayor purportedly conferred upon the Vice-Mayor of Manila under the so-called Republic Act 4065 and not otherwise conferred upon said Vice-Mayor under any other law until further orders from this Court." Issue/s: Which House Bill 9266 version was truly ratified and enacted (seeing that there are two amendments)? Held: The Tolentino version. The function of an attestation is not of approval, because a bill is considered approved after it has passed both Houses. Even where such attestation is provided for in the Constitution authorities are divided as to whether or not the signatures are mandatory such that their absence would render the statute invalid. As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made by the presiding officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The lawmaking process in Congress ends when the bill is approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect already present upon its passage. In other words it is the approval

Prof Muyot

by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding officers that is essential. The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. But since both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive withdrew their signatures on the erroneous bill, it has thus become INVALID. Decision: The petition is DENIED and the so-called Republic Act No. 4065 is declared not to have been duly enacted and therefore did not become law. The temporary restraining order dated April 28, 1965 is hereby made permanent.

Morales v Subido Enrique V. Morales, petitioner, v. Abelardo Subido, as Commissioner of Civil Service, respondent. Doctrine: In the event of any discrepancy, the enrolled bill prevails over the matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal. Nature: Petition - appeal Date: 1969 February 27 Ponente: Castro Short Version: Petitioner contends that that the version of the provision (Sec 10, HB 6951), as amended at the behest of Sen. Rodrigo, was the version approved by the Senate on third reading, and that when the bill emerged from the conference committee the only change made in the provision was the insertion of the phrase "or has served as chief of police with exemplary record". Facts: 1) Sec 10, HB 6951 reads: No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's degree and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or police department of any city and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school graduate who has served the police department of a city for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher. 2) The petitioner submitted certified photostatic copies of the different drafts of House Bill 6951 showing the various changes, and a certified photostatic copy of a memorandum which according to him was signed by an employee in the Senate bill division, and can be found attached to the page proofs of the bill, explaining the change in section 10, thus: . Section 10 was recast for clarity (with the consent of Sen. Ganzon & Congressman Montano). It would thus appear that the omission—whether deliberate or unintended—of the phrase, "who has served the police department of a city‖ was made not at any stage

E2105 Constitutional Law 1

of the legislative proceedings but only in the course of the engrossment of the bill, more specifically in the proofreading thereof; that the change was made not by Congress but only by an employee thereof; and that what purportedly was a rewriting to suit some stylistic preferences was in truth an alteration of meaning. Issue/s: Which between the legislative journal and enrolled bill should be used as a more reliable source of the validity of the legislation Held: The enrolled bill; The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of the Philippines shows that section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip form by the Bureau of Printing. We cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. Mabanag v. Lopez-Vito we held that an enrolled bill "imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts." Not in all cases the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain matters which the Constitution expressly requires must be entered on the journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such matters entered on the journal, is a question which we do not now decide. Decision: motions for reconsideration are DENIED.

Prof Muyot