E2015 Consti 1 (Muyot) Digests 2
Download E2015 Consti 1 (Muyot) Digests 2...
Consti1 (Prof. Muyot) Finals Reviewer
BARRIOQUINTO vs. FERNANDEZ January 21, 1949, Feria Facts:
Petitioners: Petitioners Norberto Jimenez and Loreto Barrioquinto, charged with the crime of murder Action: To compel respondents to decide whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the benefits of amnesty. Respondents: Commissioners of the 14th Guerrilla Amnesty Commission (GAC)
Petitioners Norberto Jimenez and Loreto Barrioquinto charged with the crime of murder o Barrioquinto not yet been arrested o Jimenez sentenced by CFI life imprisonment. Before expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal, Jimenez became aware of the Proclamation No. 8, dated September 7, 1946, which grants amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged with an act penalized under the RPC in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and committed during the period from December 8, 1941, to the date when each particular area of the Philippines where the offense was actually committed was liberated from enemy control and occupation o Issued by Pres. Manuel Roxas with concurrence by Congress o Based on Art. VII, Sec. 10, par. 6 of Consti o Did not apply to crimes against chastity or to acts committed from purely personal motives Jimenez and Barrioquinto submitted ther cases to the GAC. Jan. 9, 1947 – GAC returned the cases of the petitioners to CFI Zamboanga without deciding WON they are entitled to the benefits of the said Amnesty Proclamation, because Barrioquinto nor Jimenez have not admitted committed the offense
Issue: WON GAC should to immediately proceed to hear and decide the applications for amnesty of petitioners Barrioquinto and Jimenez Held/Ratio: Yes. Pardon granted by the Chief Executive a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof granted to one after conviction looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, i.e., it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does "nor work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon," and it "in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence" (Art. 36, RPC). Amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense. In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation of September 7, 1946, it is NOT necessary that he should admit having committed the criminal act or offense with which he is charged, and allege the amnesty as a defense it is sufficient that the evidence shows that the offense committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty Proclamation. It is not correct to say that "invocation of the benefits of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance." Although the accused does not confess the imputation against him, he may be declared by the courts or the Amnesty Commissions entitled to the benefits of the amnesty. Since the Amnesty Proclamation is a public act, the courts as well as the GAC should take notice of the terms of said Proclamation and apply the benefits granted therein to cases coming within their province or jurisdiction The right to the benefits of amnesty, once established CANNOT be waived, because it is of public interest that a person who is regarded by the Amnesty Proclamation not only as innocent but as a patriot or hero, cannot be punished as a criminal. VERA vs. PEOPLE January 31, 1963, Barrera Facts:
Petitioners: Gaudencio Vera, Restituto Figueras, Lorenzo Ambas, Justo Florido, Paulino Bayran, and 92 others, as John Does, were charged with the complex crime of kidnapping with murder of Amadeo Lozanes, alias Azarcon. Action: Invoking the benefits of Amnesty Proclamation of the President, series of 1946 to the 8th GAC
No one admitted having committed the crime charged. Vera, the only defendant who took the witness stand, denied killing GAC: (Jan. 12, 1956) REMAND to court of origin for trial. It could NOT take cognizance of the case, because the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation, could be invoked only by defendants in a criminal case who (1) admits the commission of the crime (2) pleads that said commission was in pursuance of the resistance movement, and (3) perpetrated against persons who aided the enemy during the Japanese occupation. MR denied GAC: (January 11, 1957): MR DENIED. Defendants NOT entitled to amnesty since deceased was actually a lieutenant of the Hunter's ROTC Guerrilla organization then engaged in the resistance movement it may not be said with any amount of truth that the aforesaid killing was to further the resistance movement at the time, as the defense intimates. Rather, the killing of Lt. Lozañes of the Hunters ROTC Guerrilla would tend to weakened commensurately the resistance movement against the Japanese invaders. CA: (July 27, 1959) GAC AFFIRMED
Consti1 (Prof. Muyot) Finals Reviewer o
Implied admission NOT sufficient, per AO 144 of DOJ: ―. . . in order that the Amnesty Commission may take cognizance of the case, the accused admit that he committed the acts charged against him in furtherance of the resistance movement or against persons who aided in the war efforts of the enemy
Issue: 1. 2.
WON it is not necessary for the defendants to admit the commission of the crime to be entitled to amnesty WON the case is validly applied for an amnesty
Yes. New ruling: People vs. Llanita, et al. (April 26, 1950) and People vs. Guillermo, et al. (May 19, 1950), wherein: defendants must admit commission of crime to be entitled to amnesty "It is rank inconsistency for appellant to justify an act, or seek forgiveness for an act which, according to him, he has not committed. Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime, and when an accused maintains that he has not committed a crime, he cannot have any use for amnesty. Where an amnesty proclamation imposes certain conditions, as in this case, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove the existence of such conditions. The invocation of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance, which means that the pleader admits the allegations against him but disclaims liability therefor on account of intervening facts which, if proved, would bring the crime charged within the scope of the amnesty proclamation." (Emphasis supplied.) No. The killing of the deceased was NOT in furtherance of the resistance movement, but was due to the rivalry between (1) the Hunter's Guerrilla, to which he belonged, and (3) the Vera's Guerrilla of petitioners.
CRISTOBAL vs. LABRADOR December 7, 1940, Laurel This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in its election case No. 7890, rendered on November 28, 1940, sustaining the right of Teofilo C. Santos to remain in the list of registered voters in precinct No. 11 of the municipality of Malabon, Province of Rizal. The antecedents which form the factual background of this election controversy are briefly narrated as follows:
Petitioner: Cristobal, he believes that the pardon to Teofilo did not restore Teofilo to the full enjoyment of his political rights, because (a) the pardoning power of the Chief Executive does NOT apply to legislative prohibitions; (b) the pardoning power here would amount to an unlawful exercise by the Chief Executive of a legislative function; and (c) the respondent having served his sentence and all the accessory penalties imposed by law, there was nothing to pardon.
March 15, 1930 – CFI Rizal found Teofilo C. Santos, respondent herein, guilty of the crime of estafa and sentenced him to 6 months of arresto mayor, committed Toribio Alarcon and Emilio Raymundo, the amounts P375 and P125 CA: (December 20, 1930) AFFIRMED Imprisoned from March 14, 1932 - August 18, 1932 Civil liability was Despite conviction, Teofilo continued to be a registered elector in the municipality of Malabon for 1934 and 1937, seated as the municipal president of that municipality. August 22, 1938 - Commonwealth Act No. 357, ―Election Code‖ approved by the National Assembly o Section 94, paragraph (b) of Election Code disqualifies Teofilo from voting for having been "declared by final judgment guilty of any crime against property." In view of this provision, Teofilo applied to the President, for an absolute pardon He was favorably recommended by the Secretary of Justice December 24, 1939 – pardon GRANTED, restoring the respondent to his "full civil and political rights, except that with respect to the right to hold public office or employment, he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature and involving no money or property responsibility." November 16, 1940 - Petitioner Miguel Cristobal filed a petition for the exclusion of the name of Teofilo from the list of voters because Teofilo is disqualified under paragraph (b) of section 94 of the Election Code. Court: (November 28, 1940) DENIED. Pardon has had the effect of excluding the respondent from the disqualification Cristobal filed petition for certiorari It is the contention of the petitioner that the pardon granted by His Excellency, the President of the Philippines, to the respondent, Teofilo C. Santos, did not restore the said respondent to the full enjoyment of his political rights, because (a) the pardoning power of the Chief Executive does not apply to legislative prohibitions; (b) the pardoning power here would amount to an unlawful exercise by the Chief Executive of a legislative function; and (c) the respondent having served his sentence and all the accessory penalties imposed by law, there was nothing to pardon. All these propositions involve an inquiry into the primary question of the nature and extent of the pardoning power vested in the Chief Executive of the Nation by the Constitution.
Issue: WON pardon by the President may be restricted by legislative action Held/Ratio:
Yes. Par. of section 11 of Article VII Consti: o “The President shall have the (1) power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction, for all offenses, except in cases of impeachment, upon such conditions and with such restrictions and limitations as he may deem pro to impose. He shall have the (2) power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of the National Assembly." o 2 limitations: 1. The power be exercised AFTER conviction; and
Consti1 (Prof. Muyot) Finals Reviewer
2. Such power does NOT extend cases of impeachment. Subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power CANNOT be restricted or controlled by legislative action. An absolute pardon removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction. ICAB, the disability is the result of conviction without which there would be no basis for disqualification from voting. When pardon is granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, it removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction. o ICAB, while the pardon extended to Teofilo is conditional in the sense that "he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which a clerical or manual in nature involving no money or property responsibility," it is absolute insofar as it "restores the respondent to full civil and political rights."
PELOBELLO vs. PLATINO June 20, 1941, Laurel Facts:
Petitioner: Florencio Pelobello, instituted quo warranto proceedings in the CFI Tayabas against Gregorio Palatino, the mayor-elect of the municipality of Torrijos, Province of Marinduque.
Proceedings were had pursuant to the provisions of section 167, in relation with section 94 (a), of the Election Code. It was alleged that the Teofilo, having been convicted by final judgment in 1912 of attack to persons in authority; imprisonment for two years, four months and one day of prision correccional, was disqualified from voting and being voted upon for the contested municipal office, such disqualification not having been removed by plenary pardon. Was granted by the Governor-General a conditional pardon back in 1915; December 25, 1940 - the President, granted the respondent absolute pardon and restored him to the enjoyment of full civil and political rights.
WON the absolute pardon had the effect of removing the disqualification incident to criminal conviction under paragraph (a) of section 94 of the Election Code, the pardon having been granted after the election but before the date fixed by law for assuming office (Sec. 4, Election Code).
No The pardoning power CANNOT be restricted or controlled by legislative action; a. an absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction; b. when granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction. c. That the better view in the light of the constitutional grant in this jurisdiction is not to unnecessarily restrict or impair the power of the President who, after inquiry into the environmental facts, should be at liberty to atone the rigidity of the law to the extent of relieving completely the party or parties concerned from the accessory and resultant disabilities of criminal conviction. d. ICAB, i. it is admitted that the Platino committed the offense more than 25 years ago; ii. he had already merited conditional pardon from the Governor-General in 1915; iii. thereafter he had exercised the right of suffrage, was elected councilor of Torrijos, Marinduque, for the period 1918 to 1921; was elected municipal president of that municipality three times in succession (1922-1931); and finally elected mayor of the municipality in the election for local officials in December, 1940. Under the circumstances above, it is evident that the purpose in granting him absolute pardon was to enable him to assume the position in deference to the popular will; and the pardon was thus extended on the date mentioned hereinabove and before the date fixed in section 4 of the Election Code for assuming office. We see no reason for defeating this wholesome purpose by a restrictive judicial interpretation of the constitutional grant to the Chief Executive. We, therefore, give efficacy to executive action and disregard what at bottom is a technical objection.
IN RE LONTOK April 7, 1922, Malcolm Facts:
Action: For disbarment of Marcleino Lontok because of being convicted of bigamy, a crime involving moral turpitude (Code of Civil Procedure, Sec. 21.) Lontok, in answer, prays that the charges be dismissed, and bases his plea principally on a pardon issued to him by former Governor General Harrison. Lontok was convicted CFI Zambales of the crime of bigamy, AFFIRMED by the SC. February 9, 1921 - a pardon was issued by the Governor-General of the following tenor: Lontok’s sentence REMITTED provided he shall not again be guilty of any misconduct
Issue: WON an action for disbarment is proper when a lawyer commits a crime involving moral turpitude Held/Ratio: No Where proceedings to disbar an attorney are founded on, and depend alone, on a statute making the fact of a conviction for a felony ground for disbarment, it has been held that a pardon operates to wipe out the conviction and is a bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of the attorney after the pardon has been granted. But where proceedings to disbar an attorney are founded on the professional misconduct involved in a transaction which has culminated in a conviction of felony, it has been held that while the effect of the pardon is to relieve him of the penal consequences of his act, it does not operate as a bar to the disbarment proceeding, inasmuch as the criminal acts may nevertheless constitute proof that the attorney does not possess a good moral character and is not a fit or proper person to retain his license to practice law.
Consti1 (Prof. Muyot) Finals Reviewer
"A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender; o When the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the of fender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching; If granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity. "There is only this limitation to its operation; it does not restore offices forfeited, or property or interests vested in others in consequence of the conviction and judgment." Article 130 of the Penal Code: one of the different ways by which criminal liability is extinguished is by pardon. The motion for disbarment is based solely on the judgment of conviction for a crime of which the respondent has been pardoned, and that the language of the pardon is not such as to amount to a conditional pardon similar in nature to a parole. If Lontok should again be guilty of any misconduct, the condition of his pardon would be violated, and he would then become subject to disbarment.
TORRES vs. GONZALES July 23, 1987, Feliciano
Petitioner: William Torres, presently confined at the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa Action: Original petition for habeas corpus filed on behalf of petitioner. He impugns the validity of the Order of Arrest and Recommitment. He claims that (1) he did not violate his conditional pardon since he has not been convicted by final judgment in estafa and sedition; (2) he was not given an opportunity to be heard before he was arrested and recommitted to prison, and accordingly claims he has been deprived of his rights under the due process clause of the Constitution.
We issued the writ and during the hearing and from the return filed by the respondents through the Solicitor General, and other pleadings in this case, the following facts emerged: Facts: