E2015 Consti 1 (Muyot) Digests 1

E2015 Constitutional Law 1

Prof A. Muyot

Joya v PCGG Dean Jose Joya et al, petitioners v. Presidential Commission of Good Governance (PCGG) et al, respondents Doctrine: ―legal standing‖ is a personal and substantial interest in the case; person/s shall have sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged; material and direct interest Nature: Special Civil Action for Prohibition and Manadamus Date: 1993 August 24 Ponente: Bellosillo Short Version: The petitioners, for the second time, pray for the writs of prohibition and mandamus to be issued against the PCGG for the auction of 82 Old Masters paintings and 71 cartons of silverware seized from the Malacañang and Metropolitan Museum, perceived to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, last 11 January 1991. Facts: 1) 1990 August 9, then-PCCG Chairman Caparas wrote then-Pres. Aquino to request for her authority to sign the proposed Consignment Agreement between RP and Christie’s. 2) 1990 August 14, then-Executive Sec Macaraig Jr. authorized the Agreement. 3) 1990 August 15, Caparas signed the Agreement, January 11, 1991 being the date of auction 4) 1990 October 26, the COA submitted to the Pres the audit observations re the pieces for auction— alleging that they were ―historical relics and had cultural significance‖ and that the auction would be disadvantageous for the government. 5) 1990 November 15, Gabriel Casal of the National Museum issued a certification that the items did not fall within the classification of protected cultural properties and part of the Filipino Heritage. 6) 1991 January 7, petitioners file this original petition. 7) 1991 January 9, Resolution denying the application for preliminary injunction because the petitioners failed to present a clear legal right to a restraining order, and proper parties has not been impleaded. 8) 1991 January 11, the auction proceeded. With the proceeds turned over to the Bureau of Treasury. 9) Petitioners filed another motion in 1991 February 5. Issue/s: Whether the petitioners have legal standing, as citizens, taxpayers and concerned artists

Held: No, the petitioners failed to prove that they had ―legal standing‖ (a personal and substantial interest in the case; sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged; material and personal interest) As citizens: the paintings were donated by private persons to the Metropolitan Museum of Manila Foundation, to which the ownership of the paintings legally belong; the confiscation did not mean acquisition of ownership. The petitioners failed to show that they are the legal owners of the artworks or the valued pieced have become publicly owned. As taxpayers, the governmental acts being questioned must involve disbursement of public funds; the items in question were acquired not with public money. Since the auction ―had long been over‖ the case in question has become moot and academic. Decision: petition for prohibition and mandamus is DISMISSED.

Agan v PIATCO Demosthenes P. Agan, Jr. et al, petitioners, v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc., et al, respondents. Doctrine: loss of livelihood is a direct and personal interest Nature: Special Civil Action - Prohibition Date: 2003 May 5 Ponente: Puno Short Version: The petitioners (a mix of employees and service providers of NAIA Terminal I and II), which stand to lose their livelihood with the implementation of 1997 Concession Agreement, Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA) and Supplements, seeks to prohibit PIATCO, MIAA and DOTC in the implementation of said agreements. Facts: 1) 1989 August, DOTC engaged Aeroport de Paris (ADP) to conduct a comprehensive study of the NAIA to determine whether the present airport can cope with the traffic development up to the year 2010. 2) ADP submits its Draft Final Report to the DOTC on December 1989. 3) 1994 October 5, Asia’s Emerging Dragons Corp. (AEDC) submitted an unsolicited proposal to the Government through DOTC/MIAA for the

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E2015 Constitutional Law 1

Prof A. Muyot

development of NAIA Terminal III under a BOT agreement. 4) 1996 February 13, the NEDA passed Board Resolution No. 2 which approved the NAIA IPT III project. 5) 1996 July 23, the Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee invited all bidders to a pre-bid conference on Jul 29. Second pre-bid confe was held on August 29. 6) 1996 September 20, the Paircargo Consortium (composed of People’s Air Cargo and Warehousing Co., Inc., Phil. Air and Grounds Services, Inc., and Security Bank Corp.) submitted their competitive proposal to the PBAC. 7) 1996 October 2, PBAC notified AEDC that Paircargo, had pre-qualified. 8) 1997 February 27, Paircargo Consortium incorporated into PIATCO. 9) 1997 April 1, DOTC submitted the concession agreement for the second-pass approval of the NEDA-ICC. 10) 1997 July 9, the DOTC issued the notice of award for the project to PIATCO. July 12, the Government and PIATCO signed the 1997 Concession Agreement. 11) 1998 November 26, the Government and PIATCO signed ARCA. 12) Government and PIATCO signed three Supplements to the ARCA dated 27 Aug 1999, 4 Sept 2000, and 22 June 2001. 13) 2002 Sept 17, the workers of the international airline service providers filed a petition for Prohibition. Other petitioners followed filing. 14) 2003 March 6, PIATCO informed the Court that PIATCO commenced arbitration proceedings before the International Court of Arbitration pursuant to Sec 10.02 of the ARCA. Issue/s: 1) Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing 2) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction citing the alleged violation of the rule on hierarchy of courts and the ICC arbitration proceedings 3) Whether Paircargo Consortium was a valid bidder 4) Whether or not the 1997 Concession Agreement, ARCA, and Supplements are valid? Held: 1) Yes, the 1997 Concession Agreement and the ARCA grant PIATCO the exclusive right to operate a commercial international passenger terminal within the Island of Luzon, with the existing contracts and agreements of MIAA will not be carried over to the NAIA IPT III, the petitioners stand to lose employment—a property right which is ―zealously protected‖ by the Constitution.

The financial prejudice brought about by the PIATCO contracts is legitimate interests sufficient to confer legal standing. The HOR, citizens and taxpayers have standing because the contracts compel the Government and/or the HOR to appropriate funds necessary to comply with the provisions therein. The Court grants standing in matters raising serious legal questions with impact on public interest. 2) Yes, the rule of hierarchy of courts may be relaxed in exceptional circumstances in cases of transcendental importance for the speedy disposition of the instant cases. Sec 10.02 of the ARCA which enables PIATCO to file in ICA binds only the parties to the ARCA and not the petitioners. The interest of justice would be best served if the case is adjudicated in a single and complete proceeding. 3) No, because PIATCO failed to satisfy the required ―financial capability to undertake the project in the minimum amount of 30% of the project cost.‖ Since the project cost was estimated to be around P9B, PIATCO has to have at least P2B at the time the bid is submitted. 4) No, the 1997 Concession Agreement contained provisions that substantially depart from the draft Concession Agreement included in the Bid Documents. These changes are: modification on the public utility revenues and non-public utility revenues that may be collected by PIATCO; and the assumption by the Government of the liabilities of PIATCO in the event of the latter’s default thereof. Direct government guarantee is not allowed by the BOT Law (RA7718). PIATCO cannot obligate the Government to pay ―reasonable cost‖ upon takeover pursuant to Article XII, Section 17 of the Constitution. The Constitution strictly regulates monopolies (Article XII, Section 19) The Supplements being accessory contracts to ARCA are likewise null and void. Decision: The 1997 Concession Agreement, the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement and its Supplements are set aside for being NULL AND VOID.

CHR Employees Association v CHR Commission on Human Rights Employees’ Association (CHREA), represented by its President Marcial Sanchez Jr., petitioners, v. Commission on Human Rights, respondent. Doctrine: ―proper party‖ is one who has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of

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Prof A. Muyot

Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals Date: 2004 November 25 Ponente: Chico-Nazario Short Version: The CHREA assails the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals granting the CHR the authority to reclassify and upgrade its personnel positions without the approval of the DBM, seeing the CHR as a constitutional commission imbued with fiscal autonomy. Facts: 1) 1998 February 14, Congress passed RA 8522, GA Act of 1998 which, in Article XXXIII, state that ―the Constitutional Commissions and Offices enjoying fiscal autonomy are authorized to formulate and implement the organizational structure of their respective offices.‖ 2) CHR Chairperson and Commissioners promulgated a Resolution dated 1998 Sept 4 adopting an updating and reclassification scheme among selected positions in the Commission. 3) The DBM denied the request saying that: ―…fiscal autonomy does not vest the agency with the authority to reclassify, upgrade and create positions without approval of the DBM,‖ 4) 1999 March 29, CSC-NCR Office recommended to the CSC-Central Office that the subject appointments be rejected. 5) CSC-Central Office denied CHREA’s request in 1999 Dec 16. The same office denied CHREA’s motion for recon on 2000 June 9. 6) The Court of Appeals likewise rendered the same judgment as that of CSC-Central Office because the CHR has fiscal autonomy. Issue/s: 1) Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi, given that the CHR has not recognized in writing or formal record that CHREA is a bona fide organization of its employees 2) Whether or not the CHR can upgrade and reclassify its employees without DBM approval Held: 1) Yes, CHREA, consisting of rank and file employees of the CHR, stood to lose directly because the reclassification scheme entails eating up the Commission’s savings allocated for Personnel Services, from which the benefits of the said employees are derived. The personality of CHREA was a non-issue with CSC, when it took cognizance of the former’s request, and the Court of Appeals. As a rule, an

issue neither raised in the complaint nor in court below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. 2) No, the CHR is not a Constitutional Commission, and is not imbued with fiscal autonomy; and as such, should follow the Salary Standardization Law and require DBM approval for all reclassification and upgrading of personnel positions. Decision: Petition is GRANTED; the CA Decision and Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE; CSC-NCR Mar 29 1999 ruling REINSTATED.

Automotive Industry Workers Alliance v Romulo Automotive Industry Workers Alliance (AIWA) and its Affiliated Unions, petitioners, v. Hon. Alberto Romulo, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and Hon. Patricia Sto. Tomas, in her capacity as Secretary of Labor and Employment, respondents. Doctrine: the rule on standing a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed in cases when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overarching significance to society, or of paramount public interest Nature: Special Civil Action - Certiorari Date: 2005 January 18 Ponente: Chico-Nazario Short Version: AIWA, as labor unions representing its members and as taxpayers, assails the constitutionality of EO 185 (conferring upon the Secretary of Labor and Employment the duties of the NLRC Chairperson). The Court finds their petition lacking in merit as to the requisite of legal standing. Facts: 1) EO 185 is released on 2003 March 10. 2) Respondents allege that: a) the petition does not pose an actual case or controversy as petitioner failed to cite how EO 185 has prejudiced or threatened to prejudice their rights and existence as labor unions and as taxpayers; b) the petitioners have no locus standi, not even in their capacity as taxpayers because labor unions are exempt from paying taxes; c) the administrative supervision granted by the Labor Code to the NLRC Chairman over the NLRC does not place them beyond the President’s broader power of control and supervision. 3) Petitioners affirm their locus standi as they are suing for and in behalf of their members and the employees of NLRC who have pending cases for dismissal.

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E2015 Constitutional Law 1

Prof A. Muyot

Issue/s: 1) Whether or not the petitioners have standing 2) Whether or not EO 185 is valid and constitutional Held: 1) No, petitioners have not shown that they have sustained or in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the enactment of EO 185. As labor unions, it cannot be said that EO 185 will prejudice their rights and interests considering that the scope of authority conferred upon the Secretary of Labor does not extend to the power to review, reverse, or modify decisions of the NLRC. As taxpayers, petitioners have not established disbursement of public funds in contravention of law or the Constitution. The issue raised is not enough to make the Court waive the procedural issue of standing as the grant of authority to the Secretary of Labor and Employment is limited to the departments to which it is addressed. It is administrative in nature. 2) The answer will have to wait until the proper party in a proper case assails its validity.

performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest. Issue/s: 1) Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing 2) Whether or not the publication in the Official Gazette a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws Held: 1) Yes, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners is a public right recognized by the Constitution. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same. 2) Yes, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated. The publication of all presidential issuances ―of a public nature‖ or ―of general applicability‖ is a requirement of due process. Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 - ―shall‖ Decision: The Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

Decision: Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Tañada v Tuvera Lorenzo M. Tañada et al, petitioners, v. Hon. Juan C. Tuvera et al, respondents.

Chavez v PEA and Amari Francisco I. Chavez, petitioner, v. Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation, respondents.

Doctrine: invoking a public right accords to a citizen legal standing Nature: Petition to review the decision of the Executive Assistant to the President Date: 1985 April 24 Ponente: Escolin Short Version: Petitioner, as taxpayer, seeks to compel the Respondents to publish and/or cause for publication in the Official Gazette various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders invoking the people’s right to be informed on matters of public concern (Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution). Facts: 1) Respondents allege that the petitioners have no legal standing because they are not ―aggrieved parties‖ citing Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. 2) Petitioners argue that since the matter concerns a public right and its object is to compel the

Doctrine: citizen has standing to bring this taxpayer’s suit because the petition seeks to compel PEA to comply with its constitutional duties; mandamus involves the enforcement of constitutional rights which are matters of transcendental public importance Nature: Special Civil Action - Mandamus Date: 2002 July 9 Ponente: Carpio Short Version: The petitioner, as a taxpayer, petitions to compel PEA to disclose all facts on PEA’s then on-going renegotiations with AMARI to reclaim portions of Manila Bay. Facts: 1) 1973 November, Commissioner of Public Highways and Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines entered into a contract to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of

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E2015 Constitutional Law 1

Prof A. Muyot

Manila Bay plus Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. 2) 1977 February, then Pres Marcos created PEA through PD 1084, to reclaim land, and to develop, improve, acquire, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands. Through PD 1085, the lands reclaimed in the Manila Bay under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project will be transferred to PEA. 3) 1981 December, then Pres Marcos issued a Memorandum directing PEA to amend its contract with CDCP—all future works in MCCRRP shall be funded and owned by PEA. 4) 1988 January, then Pres Aquino issued Special Patent 3517, granting and transferring to PEA the land reclaimed under the MCCRRP ―Freedom Islands‖ 5) 1995 April 25, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with AMARI to develop the Freedom Islands; additional reclamation of 250 hectares of submerged areas. 6) 1995 April 28, the Board of Directors of PEA confirmed the JVA; 1995 June 8 then Pres Ramos approved the JVA. 7) Senate files its report re the PEA-Amari JVA on 1997 Sept 16: a) PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI reclaimed lands which are public domain and have yet to be classified as alienable, b) the certificate of titles re Freedom Islands are void, and c) the JVA is illegal. 8) 1997 December, then Pres Ramos created a Legal Task Force to look into the JVA, as per Senate Committee report. LTF upheld the legality of JVA. 9) 1998 April, PDI and Today published reports that on-going negotiations between PEA and AMARI were underway, ordered by then Pres Ramos 10) 1998 April 13, Antonio Zulueta filed a petition for prohibition, and seeks to nullify the JVA. The Court dismissed the petition for unwarranted disregard of judicial hierarchy. 11) 1998 April 27, Petitioner filed instant petition, contending that the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI; and thus, has to disclose all the facts regarding re-negotiations invoking Sec. 28, Article II, and Sec. 7, Article III of the Constitution; and that the sale of lands of public domain is a violation of Section 3, Article XII. 12) 1999 March 30, PEA and AMARI signed Amended JVA; then Pres Estrada approved the JVA on May 28. Issue/s: 1) Whether or not the petitioner has locus standi to bring this suit

2) Whether the Court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the Amended JVA is grossly disadvantageous to the Government Held: 1) Yes, the petition seeks to compel PEA to comply with its constitutional duties: right to information on matters of public concern and the constitutional provision intended to insure the equitable distribution of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipino citizens. Also, the petition raises matters of transcendental importance to the public. 2) No, the Court is not the trier of facts; and since the Amended JVA is null and void ab initio (because it transfers unreclaimed, yet to be classified lands of public domain to a private corporation) it is of no necessity. Decision: Petition is GRANTED. Amended JVA is NULL and VOID ab initio.

KMU Labor Center v Garcia Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center, petitioner, v. Hon. Jesus B. Garcia, Jr., LTFRB, and the Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines, respondents. Doctrine: Nature: Petition for certiorari Date: 1994 December 23 Ponente: Kapunan Short Version: The petitioners assail the constitutionality of certain memoranda, circulars and/or orders of the DOTC and LTFRB regarding fare rate fixing. Facts: 1) 1990 June 26, then DOTC Sec Orbos issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-395 to LTFRB allowing provincial bus operators to charge passengers rates within a range of 15% above and 15% below the LTFRB official rate for one year. 2) 1990 July 24, LTFRB Chairperson Fernando found that the fare range scheme is ―not legally feasible‖ citing Sec 16(c) of the Public Service Act. 3) 1990 December 5, PBOAP filed an application for a fare rate increase with the minimum-maximum scheme. 4) 1990 December 14, LTFRB granted the fare rate increase. 5) 1992 March 30, then DOTC Sec Prado issued Department Order No. 92-587 defining the policy framework for the regulation of transport services.

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6) 1992 October 8, DOTC Sec Garcia, Jr. issued a Memorandum to the LTFRB suggesting swift action in the implementation of rules and procedures as to DO No. 92-587. 7) 1993 February 17, LTFRB issued MC No. 92-009 promulgating the guidelines for the implementation of DOTC DO No. 92-587. 8) 1994 March, PBOAP announced a fare increase of 20% of the existing fares to be effective on 1994 Mar 16. 9) March 16, KMY filed a petition before LTFRB opposing the adjustment of bus fares. LTFRB dismissed the petition for lack of merit on Mar 24. Issue/s: 1) Whether or not the petitioner has standing 2) Whether or not the fare range scheme approved by the DOTC and LTFRB is valid Held: 1) Yes Petitioners, whose members avail of the public transport, are directly affected by the burdensome cost of arbitrary increase in passenger fares. This Court is ―ready to brush aside this barren procedural infirmity‖ in view of transcendental importance of the issues. 2) No, the power of fixing rates of public services is a power delegated by the Legislature to the LTFRB; further delegation of that power by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators is illegal and invalid because what has been delegated cannot be delegated (Potestas delegate non delegari potest). Further delegation constitutes a negation of duty. Decision: Petition is GRANTED; Memos are hereby DECLARED contrary to law. TRO made PERMANENT.

IBP v Zamora Integrated Bar of the Philippines, petitioner, v. Hon. Ronaldo B. Zamora, Gen. Panfilo Lacson, Gen. Edgar Aglipay, and Gen. Angelo Reyes, respondents. Doctrine: The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law is not sufficient to clothe it with standing—this is too general an interest; but the Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit in view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Nature: Special civil action – Certiorari, Prohibition Date: 2000 August 15 Ponente: Kapunan

Short Version: The Petitioner, as the official organization of Filipino lawyers tasked with the bounden duty to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution, assails the constitutionality of the order of Pres Estrada commanding the deployment of the Marines to join the PNP in visibility patrols around the metropolis. Facts: 1) In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, the President, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols called Task Force Tulungan. 2) The Pres confirmed this directive in a Memorandum dated 24 January 2000. 3) Selected areas of deployment are: Monumento Circle, SM North, Araneta Shopping Center, Greenhills, SM Megamall, MCC, LRT/MRT stations, NAIA and MIA. 4) 2000 January 17, the IBP filed the instant petition to annul LOI 02/2000. Issue/s: 1) Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing 2) Whether or not the aforementioned act of the Pres is subject to judicial review 3) Whether or not the Pres ―calling out‖ of the armed forces to assist the PNP violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and civilian character of the PNP Held: 1) No, the aforementioned standing is insufficient, too vague, highly speculative, uncertain; standing needs to be specific and substantial; but the Court relaxes the rules on standing to resolve the issue now, rather than later 2) Yes, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue of whether the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met or the limitations respected, is justiciable—the problem being one of legality or validity, not its wisdom. 3) No, it is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest upon the President full discretion to call forth the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Decision: Petition is DISMISSED.

Executive Secretary v CA The Executive Secretary et al, petitioners, v. Hon. Court of Appeals and Asian Recruitment Council Philippine Chapter (ARCO-Phil.), Inc., respondents.

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E2015 Constitutional Law 1

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Doctrine: A party’s standing before the court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised. Nature: Special civil action – prohibition, injunction Date: 1994 May 5 Ponente: Davide Jr.

Doctrine: An association has standing to file suit for its workers despite its lack of direct interest if its members are directly affected by the action. Nature: Petition – certiorari – CA decision Date: 2004 May 25 Ponente: Callejo, Sr. Short Version: The petitioners seek for a reversal of the CA decision, which affirmed the RTC-QC decision that issued preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of RA 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995), on the ground that respondents has no locus standi, and that the trial and appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion and erred, respectively, in issuing said order. Facts: 1) RA 8042 took effect on 1995 July 15. 1996 Apr 7, the Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 8042 was published in Manila Bulletin. 2) 1995 July 17, ARCO-Phil. filed a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court with the RTC-QC to declare as unconstitutional some provisions of RA 8042. 3) 1995 Aug 24, RTC-QC issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of RA 8042. 4) 1997 Dec 5, CA dismissed the petition and affirming assailed order. Issue/s: 1) Whether or not respondents have locus standi 2) Whether or not the appellate court erred in affirming the RTC Decision that issued TRO Held: 1) Yes, under its Articles of Incorporation, the respondent was organized ―to act as the representative of any individual, company, entity or association on matters related to the manpower recruitment industry. The respondent, then, is the appropriate party to assert the rights of its members because it and its members are in every practical sense identical. 2) Yes, ? Decision: Petition is GRANTED; assailed decision of CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Writ of Preliminary Injunction issue by RTC-QC NULLIFIED.

Kilosbayan v Guingona Kilosbayan, Inc. et al, petitioners, v. Guingona Jr., respondents.

Short Version: Petitioners—as an organization representing those ―who are committed to the cause of truth, justice ad national renewal,‖ taxpayers, members of the Congress, concerned citizens— seek to prohibit and restrain the implementation of ―Contract of Lease‖ executed by PCSCO and PGMC in connection with the on-line lottery system, as the Contract violates Sec. 1 of RA 1169, as amended by BP 42. Facts: 1) PCSO decided to establish an on-line lottery system for the purpose of increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds. 2) Mar 1993, Berjaya Group Berhad organized with some Filipino investors the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation. 3) Aug 1993, PCSO formally issued a Request for Proposal for the Lease of Contract of ―lotto‖ for the PCSO. 4) Aug 15, PGMC submitted its bid to PCSO. By Oct 21, the Office of the President had given the PGMC the go-signal to operate the country’s on-line lottery system. 5) Dec 1, Kilosbayan requested from Guingona copies of documents pertaining to the lottery award. The latter said it will be provided ―before the end of the month.‖ 6) The Contract of Lease was finally executed by the PCSO and PGMC; the Pres approved it on Dec 20. 7) Kilosbayan filed instant petition on 1994 Jan 24. Issue/s: 1) Whether or not the petitioners have standing 2) Whether or not the Contract of Lease violates Sec. 1 or RA 1169 as amended by BP 42. Held: 1) Yes, in cases of transcendental importance the Court brushes aside its technicality; the Court has always had a liberal policy on locus standing 2) Yes, the Contract of Lease is not what it purports to be; it is a joint venture for a period of 8 years in the maintenance of the lotto Decision: Petition is GRANTED. The challenged Contract of Lease is DECLARED contrary to law and invalid.

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E2015 Constitutional Law 1

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Dissenting Opinion, Puno: Petitioners have failed to show standing. Personal level, they have not shown that elemental injury in fact will endow them with a standing to sue. Petitioners are seeking the nullity of a contract not a law; and yet none of the petitioners is a party to the contract, none participated in the bidding; thus they are complete strangers to the contract. They stand neither to gain nor to lose economically by its enforcement. Kilosbayan is not a private commission on audit. As taxpayers, they still don’t have standing because the case does not involve any expenditure of public money on the part of PCSO. As concerned citizens, petitioners are pleading to be allowed to advocate constitutional rights of other persons who are not before the court. They still failed to demonstrate: 1) an injury in fact to himself and 2) the need to prevent the erosion of a preferred constitutional right of a third person. Records do not show that PGMC is a foreign owned and controlled corporation. As legislators, their right to enact laws remains unimpaired and undiminished. They cannot simply advance a generic grievance in common with the people in general.

ITF v COMELEC Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines et al, petitioners, v. Commission on Elections et al, respondents. Doctrine: Petitioners legal standing is recognized following the liberal policy of this Court whenever a case involves ―an issue of overarching significance.‖ Nature: Special civil action - certiorari Date: 2004 January 13 Ponente: Panganiban Short Version: Petitioners, as taxpayers, allege that the COMELEC’s award of contract to Mega Pacific Consortium is invalid mainly because it did not participate in the bidding for the 2004 poll automation project. Facts: 1) 1995 June 7, Congress passed RA 8046 authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated election system in March 1996 elections in ARMM. 2) Dec 22, Congress passed RA 8436 authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated election system (AES) for May 11 1998 national or local elections. 3) May 1998 COMELEC eventually decided against automation.

4) May 2001 elections completely manual. 5) 2002 Oct, COMELEC adopted Resolution 020170, a modernization program, for the 2004 elections. 6) 2003 Jan 24, EO 172 was issued, allocating P2.5B to fund the AES project. COMELEC asked for, and was given, an additional P500M. 7) Jan 28, COMELEC issued Invitation to Bid. 8) Despite failing the technical evaluation done by the DOTC, COMELEC awarded the project to MPC, Apr 15 2003. 8) May 2003 the petitioners contested the award. Issue/s: 1) Whether or not petition have standing 2) Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it awarded to MPC the contract for nd the 2 phase of the comprehensive Automated Election System Held: 1) Yes, there can be no serious doubt that the issue at hand is a matter of transcendental importance—a just justification of the relaxation of the rule on legal standing; as taxpayers, the petitioners are allowed to sue when there is a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds 2) Yes, COMELEC illegally made the award; and it executed, sometime in May 2003, the Contract for the purchase of the defective machines and nonexistent software from a non-eligible bidder. Decision: Petition is GRANTED. COMELEC Resolution No. 6074 declared NULL and VOID. COMELEC is further ORDERED to refrain from implementing any other contract or agreement entered into with regard to this project. Tolentino v COMELEC (2004) Arturo M Tolentino et al, petitioners, v. COMECLEC, Senators. Ralph Recto and Gregorio Honasan, respondents. Doctrine: The requisites for standing: 1) the party showed that s/he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the illegal conduct of the government; 2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and 3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. Nature: Special civil action - Prohibition Date: 2004 January 21 Ponente: Carpio Short Version: Petitioners, as voters, assail the constitutionality of the special elections held last

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May 14, 2004 with the ―normal‖ elections for the Senate seat vacated by VP Guingona. Facts: 1) Jan 2001, PGMA rose to power. She nominated then-Senator Guingona as VP; Congress confirmed the nomination on Feb 2001. 2) Feb 2001, Senate, through Res. No. 84, certified the vacancy; called on the COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election to be held simultaneously with the regular elections on May 14 th 2001. 13 highest vote-getter fills the vacancy for 3yrs only. 3) 2001 June 5, COMELEC proclaimed 13 candidates. 4) June 20, petitioners file instant petition on grounds that COMELEC failed to notify the th electorate that the 13 Senate shall by filled in such manner, and that all candidates for Senators all ran for the 12 seats with 6yr-term. Issue/s: 1) Whether or not the petitioners have standing 2) Whether or not the special election to fill said vacant seat was validly held on May 14 2001

Short Version: Petitioner assails the constitutionality of the Plunder Law for vagueness (the failure to define ―combination‖ and ―series‖ in the aforementioned Law) and overbroad. Facts: 1) Petitioner alleges that: the Plunder Law suffers from vagueness, it dispenses with the ―reasonable doubt‖ standard in criminal prosecutions, and it abolishes the element of mens rea. Issue/s: Whether or not the case merits a judicial review Held: No, the allegations that the Plunder Law is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity. Flexibility, as to meaning, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. The purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law is more imagined than real. Decision: Plunder Law is CONSTITUTIONAL. Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Held: 1) Yes, although the petitioners do not claim that COMELEC illegally disbursed the funds nor that they sustained a personal injury, the rule of standing is relaxed because the right invoked is the right of suffrage. Recto files that he is not a proper party to the case th as he is the 12 Senator in the race. The case th concerns mainly the 13 Senator, Sen. Honasan. 2) Yes, COMELEC’s failure to notify the electorate and perform the subsequent preparations (like a separate ballot, candidacy etc) for the special elections for the three-yr-termed Senator still does not make the special election invalid. Decision: We REMIND COMELEC. DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.

Umali v Guingona Osmundo G. Umali, petitioner, v. Executive Secretary Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., Chairman Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption, The Secretary of Finance, and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, respondents. Doctrine: The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity for it to be granted due course/process. Nature: Petition for review on certiorari CA decision Date: 1999 March 29 Ponente: Purisma

Estrada v Sandiganbayan Joseph Ejercito Estrada, petitioner, v. Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines, respondents.

Short Version: Petitioner, who was charged with malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance as Regional Director for the BIR , assails the constitutionality of the Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and Corruption in his motion for reconsideration dated 1995 Jan at the Regional Trial Court.

Doctrine: A facial challenge does not apply to penal statutes. Nature: Petition to declare RA 7080 as amended by RA 7659 unconstitutional Date: 2001 November 19 Ponente: Bellosillo

Facts: 1) 1993 Oct, Umali was appointed by then Pres Ramos as Regional Director of BIR. Manila: Nov 1993 – Marc 1994, Makati: Mar 1994 – Aug 1994. 2) Aug 1, Pres Ramos received a confidential memorandum against petitioner for alleged

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E2015 Constitutional Law 1

Prof A. Muyot

violations of internal revenue laws, rules and regulations during his incumbency as Reg. Dir. 3) Aug 2, Ramos issued an Order for the preventive suspension of Umali, and referred his case to PCAGC. 4) Aug 25, petitioner appeared with his counsel before the PCAGC. 5) Aug 30, hearing commence; neither asked clarificatory questions re the PCAGC and the documents presented. 6) Sept 23, PCAGC found a prima facie evidence to support 6 of the 12 charges against petitioner. 7) Oct 6, Pres issued AO No. 152 dismissing petitioner from service. 8) Oct 24, the petitioner moved for recon but was denied by Office of the Pres on Nov 28. 9) Dec 1, petitioner filed before the RTC Makati a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction. Dec 23, RTC dismissed the petition. 10) 1995 Jan 10 petitioner filed a motion for recon assailing the constitutionality of PCAGC. 11) 1995 Dec, RTC granted the petition and reversed the original Decision but still the petition appealed to CA. 12) 1997 Apr, CA reversed the Amended Decision; motion for recon denied in Oct 1997. 13) 1995 Jul, Ombudsman found a probable cause against petitioner. But the charges were dismissed in 1996 Nov by SPO II De Guzman, approved by Desierto. 14) 1998 Aug, BIR Commissioner Rualo informed the Solicitor General that it is no longer interested in pursuing the case against Umali. Issue/s: Whether or not the petitioner raised the issue of constitutionality with respect to the requisites of judicial review Held: No, the petitioner failed to satisfy the third requisite—earliest opportunity—because he raised said question ―for the first time at such a late stage of the proceedings below.‖ Decision: Court GRANTS this petition, AO No. 152 LIFTED. (in light of Rualo’s statement)

Arceta v Mangrobang Ofelia V Arceta, petitioner, v. The Honorable Ma. Celetina C. Mangrobang, Presiding Judge, Branch 54 (Navotas), respondent. Gloria S. Dy, petitioner, v. The Honorable Edwin B. Ramizo, Presiding Judge, Branch 53 (Caloocan), respondent.

Doctrine: The Court could not entertain questions on the invalidity of a statute where that issue was not specifically raised, insisted upon, and adequately argued. Nature: Special civil action – Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus Date: 2004 June 15 Ponente: Quisumbing Short Version: The petitioners, in two separate cases, assail the constitutionality of BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law). Both of them being charged with the violation of said law. Facts: 1) 1998 Sept 16, Arceta issued to Oscar R Castro a check amounting to P740,000, which was subsequently dishonored for insufficient funds. She was arraigned, and pleaded not guilty, in 2002 Oct. 2) 2000 Jan 19, Dy issued to Anita Chua a check amounting to P2.5M despite well knowing that she has no sufficient funds with the drawee bank. Issue/s: 1) Whether or not the petition for certiorari has merit 2) Whether or not all the requisites for judicial review have been met Held: 1) No, a special civil action for certiorari will prosper only if a grave abuse of discretion is manifested, and the petitions are devoid of any attachments/copy of an order, decision or resolution issued by the respondent judges so as to place them understandably within the ambit of Rule 65; no sufficient cause of action 2) No, seeking judicial review at the earliest opportunity does not mean immediately elevating the matter to the Court; it should have been immediately raised in the proceedings in the court below. Nor did the Court find the constitutional question the very lis mota presented in the controversy. Every law is presumed to be constitutional. To justify its nullification there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative. Decision: Petition is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.

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