E2014 Consti1 Reviewer

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PART I Introduction A. The Constitution as a social contract North Cotabato v. GRP GR No. 183591 October 14, 2008 Ponente: Carpio-Morales, J. B. How to read the Constitution Francisco v. House of Representatives (HOR) Ponente: Carpio-Morales, J. Facts: 1.

Art 11, Sec 8 Constitution – Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this Section.

2.

November 2001 - 12 Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) superseding the Rules approved by th 11 Congress

th



Section 16. – Impeachment Proceedings Deemed Initiated. – In cases where a Member of the House files a verified complaint of impeachment or a citizen files a verified complaint that is endorsed by a Member of the House through a resolution of endorsement against an impeachable officer, impeachment proceedings against such official are deemed initiated on the day the Committee on Justice finds that the verified complaint and/or resolution against such official, as the case may be, is sufficient in substance, or on the date the House votes to overturn or affirm the finding of the said Committee that the verified complaint and/or resolution, as the case may be, is not sufficient in substance. In cases where a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment is filed or endorsed, as the case may be, by at least one-third (1/3) of the Members of the House, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated at the time of the filing of such verified complaint or resolution of impeachment with the Secretary General.



Section 17. Bar Against Initiation Of Impeachment Proceedings. – Within a period of one (1) year from the date impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated as provided in Section 16 hereof, no impeachment proceedings, as such, can be initiated against the same official.

3.

July 2002 – House of representatives adopted a Resolution directing Committee on Justice to conduct an investigation in aid of legislation on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Judiciary Development Fund

4.

June 2003 – Pres. Estrada filed the first impeachment complaint against Davide and 7 associate justices for culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust, and other high crimes; endorsed by Rep. Suplico, Zamora, and Dilangalen  House Committee on Justice dismissed the complain because insufficient in substance

5.

October 2003 – Rep. Teodoro and Fuentebella filed second impeachment complaint founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry; resolution of endorsement/impeachment was signed by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives

Issue: 1. 2.

WON issue is justiciable th WON Rules of Procedure for Impeachment Proceedings adopted by 12 Congress is constitutional and second impeachment complaint is valid

Held/Ratio:

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1.

Justiciable. The Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for judicially discoverable standards for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion through power of judicial review. a. Locus standi - Case is of transcendental pubic importance. b. Ripe for adjudication - the second complaint had been filed and the 2001 rules had been promulgated and enforced. c. Lis mota - (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by th the 12 Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution. d. Judicial Restraint – not an option because the Court is not legally disqualified; no other tribunal to which the controversy may be referred.

2.

Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution. a.

b. c.

Interpretation of the term ―initiate‖ – takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by filing by at least 1/3 of the members of the HR with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Sec 3 (5) of Art XI becomes clear. Sec 3 (5) of Article XI – once an impeachment complains has been initiated, another complaint may not be filed against the same official within a period of one year. Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House. These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give the term ―initiate‖ a meaning different meaning from filing and referral.

C. A framework for constitutional litigation Francisco v. House of Representatives (HOR) supra

PART II Amendment of the Constitution A. Amendment vs. Revision B. Proposal 1. By Congress as a constituent assembly 2. By Constitutional Convention Gonzales v. Comelec Ponente: Concepcion, C.J. Facts: 16 March 1967

The Senate and the House of Representatives passed the following resolutions: (1) R.B.H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No.1, proposing to amend Art. VI Sec. 5 of the Constitution of the Philippines, so as to increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120, as provided in the Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, but each province was to have at least one member;

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(2) R.B.H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution, the convention to be composed of two delegates from each representative district, to be elected in the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November, 1971; (3) R.B.H. No. 3, proposing to amend Art. VI Sec. 16 of the same Constitution as to authorize Senators and the members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention, without forfeiting their respective seats in Congress. 17 June 1967

The Congress passed a bill, which upon approval by the President, became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions Nos. 1 and 3, be submitted for approval by the people, at the General Elections which shall be held on 14 November 1967.

21 October 1967

Petition L-28196 was filed; Petitioner Gonzales, citizen, taxpayer and voter, claims to have instituted the aforementioned case as a class unit, for and in behalf of all citizens, taxpayers and voters similarly situated.

Issue: 1.

2.

3.

WON the Rep. Act. 4913, in submitting the proposed constitutional amendments to the people for approval 1 at the 1967 General Election instead of at an election solely for its purpose, violates Art. XV Sec. 1 of the Constitution (Ratification must be in a special election?); WON the Rep. Act. 4913 violates Art. XV Sec. 1 of the Constitution, since it was not passed with the ¾ vote in joint session required when Congress proposes amendments to the Constitution (Congress = de facto body?); 2 WON the Rep. Act. 4913 violates the due process clause of the Constitution (Art. III Sec. 1 Subsec.1 ), in not requiring that the substance of the proposed amendments be stated on the face of the ballot or otherwise rendering clear the import of the proposed amendments, instead of printing at the back of the ballot only the proposed amendments (Procedure for information dissemination, re: amendments, insufficient?).

Held: Petition is dismissed, writs therein prayed for denied, no special pronouncement as to costs. Ratio: 1.

Legal Basis Art. XV Sec. 1, 1935 Constitution: ―…Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification.‖ Justification Nothing in the provision indicates that the election therein referred to is a ―special‖, not a ―general‖, election.

2.

1

Legal Basis

Art. XV Sec. 1, 1935 Constitution: ―The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification.‖ 2 Art.1 Sec.1 Subsec.1, 1935 Constitution: ―No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.‖

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Art. VI Sec. 5, 1935 Constitution: ―The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than one hundred and twenty Members …The Congress shall by law make an apportionment within three years after the return of every enumeration, and not otherwise. Until such apportionment shall have been made, the House of Representatives shall have the same number of Members as that by fixed by law for the National Assembly, who shall be elected by the qualified electors from the present assembly districts. ..‖ Justification: The Constitution itself provides for the continuance of the districting in such case, therefore rendering legal and de jure the status quo. 3.

Legal Basis Art. XV Sec. 1, 1935 Constitution: ―Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification.‖ Justification ―Submitting‖ (here) means to provide for how, when and by what means the amendments shall be submitted to the people for approval. (Rep. Act 4913 Sec. 2) The publication in the Official Gazette at least 20 days before the election, the posting of notices in public buildings not later than 14 October 1967, to remain posted until after the elections, the placing of copies of the proposed amendments in the polling places, aside from printing the same at the back of the ballot, provide sufficient opportunity to the voters to cast an intelligent vote on the proposal. ―Due process‖ (Art.1 Sec.1 Subsec.1, 1935 Constitution, see Footnote No.2) refers only to providing fair opportunity; it does not guarantee that the opportunity given will in fact be availed of; that is the look-out of the voter and the responsibility of the citizen. As long as fair and reasonable opportunity is given, and in this case it was, the due process clause is not infringed.

4.

By the people through initiative (See RA 6735 August 2, 1989)

Santiago v. Comelec Ponente: Davide, J. Facts: Atty. Delfin filed with the COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution by People's initiative. His proposal is to lift the term limits of elective officials and thus amending Sections 4 and 7 of Art VI, Section 4 of Art VII and Section 8 of Art X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. In his petition, Delfin asked the COMELEC to issue an order (1) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country; (2) cause the publication of such order in newspaper of general and local circulation; and (3) instructing municipal election registrars in all regions of the Philippines to assist him and his volunteers in establishing signing stations. The COMELEC then issued an order directing Delfin to cause the publication of the petition and set the case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC. Thereafter, Senator Santiago, et al., filed a special civil action for prohibition before the Supreme Court. Issue: 1.

2.

Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds therefore, was intended to include or cover initiative on amendments to the Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re: Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum on National and Local Laws)

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3. 4.

5.

regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local officials, as proposed in the draft ―Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution,‖ would constitute a revision of, or an amendment to, the Constitution. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a petition solely intended to obtain an order (a) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering; (b) instructing municipal election officers to assist Delfin's movement and volunteers in establishing signature stations; and (c) directing or causing the publication of, inter alia, the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution. Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is a pending case before the COMELEC.

Held: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Petition is GRANTED; R.A. No. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation; Those parts of Resolutions No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution are declared void; and The court orders the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-037); The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent as against the Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED against private respondents.

Ratio: 1.

The Instant Petition is viable despite the pendency in the COMELEC of the Delfin Petition. COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the Delfin Petition because the said petition is not supported by the required minimum number of signatures of registered voters. COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss the Delfin Petition, which does not contain the required number of signatures. In light of these claims, the instant case may likewise be treated as a special civil action for certiorari under Section I of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

2.

R.A. No. 6735 intended to include the System of Initiative on Amendments to the Constitution, but is, inadequate and incomplete to cover that system because it does not contain any implementation process for Amendments to the Constitution and merely mentions it. This law cannot use the rules and regulations of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 to compensate for this.

3.

COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void. COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELEC‘s power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is therefore misplaced.

4.

COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition. The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the required number of voters. Without the required signatures, the petition cannot be deemed validly initiated.

5.

Further discussion on whether the Delfin Petition is an amendment to, and not a revision of, the Constitution is rendered unnecessary, if not academic.

Lambino v. Comelec GR No. 174153 October 25, 2006 Ponente: Carpio, J. C. Submission Tolentino v. Comelec Ponente: Barredo, J. Facts: 1.

2.

ConCon 1971 was convened by virtue of Resolutions 2 and 4 of the Congress, with RA No. 6132 (Consitutional Convention Act)  this provided in Section 1 of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution As its first formal proposal to amend the Constitution, the Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1, reducing the voting age in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines to 18 years. Resolution

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also included holding of plebiscite on Nov 8, 1971, with the local elections. COMELEC complied with the resolution. Issue: 1. 2.

W/N issue is justiciable W/N it is within the power of the Convention to call for a plebiscite for the ratification by the people of the constitutional amendment proposed in Organic Resolution No. 1 in the manner and form it provides

Held: 1. 2.

YES NO

Ratio: 1.

2.

The Convention is not supreme. As any other convention of the same nature, it owes its existence and derives all its authority and power from the Constitution of the Philippines—as provided in Section 1, Article XV on Amendments. The acts of the Convention, its officers and members are not immune from attack on constitutional grounds. And because of the judicial power to decide on the constitutionality of acts by institutions provided for by the Constitution, the case is jusiticiable by the court. As in the language of Section 1, Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, the amendments to be proposed by the Convention must be submitted to the people in a single election or plebiscite. [provision reads: ―Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for ratification.‖] a.

b.

The amendment now being proposed is only the first amendment, and the plebiscite being called for the ratification of the same is not authorized by Section 1 of Article XV. There should only be one election or plebiscite for the ratification of all amendments the Convention may propose. Any amendment of the Constitution is as important as the whole of it. Hence, all acts of the Convention and the respondent COMELEC in that direction are null and void.

D. Ratification PART III Judicial Review A. Separation of Powers In Re Laureta and Maravilla March 12, 1987 Demetria v. Alba Ponente: Fernan, J. Facts/Issue: WON Sec 44 of the Budget Reform Decree of 1977 is unconstitutional on the grounds that it authorizes the illegal transfer of public moneys, it fails to specify the objectives and purposes for which the proposed transfer of funds are to be made; it allows the Pres. To override the safeguards , form and procedure prescribed by the Constitution; it amounts to undue delegation of the legislative powers `1to the executive; and the decree are in excess of their authority and jurisdiction. Held: Instant petition is granted and Par 1 Sec44 pf PD 1177 is hereby declared null and void. Ratio: 1.

2.

In American jurisprudence, Taxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditures of moneys raised by taxation and may therefore question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of money. In the case of Javier vs. COMELC, SC declared that the Court will not disregard and in effect condone the wrong on simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case has become moot and academic. Justice demands the Court to act not only for the vindication of the outraged right, though gone, for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future.

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3.

Interpretation of Sec 16(5) Art VIII – The constitution allows the enactment of a law authorizing the transfer of funds for the purpose of augmenting an item from savings in another item in the appropriation of the gov‘t branch. Par 1 Sec 44 of PD 1177 unduly extents the privilege granted under the Sec 16(5). It empowers the Pres to indiscriminately transfer funds without regard whether the funds are actually savings or not.

B. Theory and Justification of Judicial Review Angara v. Electoral Commission Ponente: Laurel, J. Facts: 1.

The new constitution for the Independent Philippine Commonwealth was just promulgated. The petitioner, Angara, ran for the position of representative of the First District of the Province of Tayabas to the NA Septmeber 17, 1935 against Ynsua (one of the respondents) and others. On October 7, he was proclaimed by the provincial board of canvassers as the candidate who won the most votes and thus the winner. He took his oath of office on Novermber 15 (the start of the Commonwealth) and was confirmed by the NA on December 3 as an uncontested member of the NA. Also on this day, Res#8 was passed by the NA, confirming the membership of nonprotested elections of members of the NA and, in effect, limiting the time for presentation of protests. However, there was the ELECOM, which was a constitutional body invested with the jurisdiction to decide ―all cases relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the NA‖, was just being formed on December 4 and 6 and just met for the first time on December 9, fixing that day as the last day for the filing of election protests. Ynsua filed his ―Motion of Protest‖ to the ELECOM on December 8, a day before the said body ended the period for filing of election protest.

2.

After that, Angara filed a ―Motion to Dismiss the Protest‖ to the ELECOM on the grounds that he was already confirmed a member of the NA through the Res#8 and through that resolution, the prescribed period for filing of protests had already ended on December 3, and the respondent was late in filing his protest because he filed the protest after December 3.

3.

Ynsua filed an ―Answer to the Motion of Dismissal‖ arguing that there was no constitutional or legal provision which stated that members of the NA cannot be contested after confirmationof the NA. Angara replied to this ―Answer‖ but the ELECOM promulgated a resolution denying the petitioner‘s ―Motion to Dismiss the Protest‖.

4.

The Petitioner now files a protest to the SC, questioning the jurisdiction of the ELECOM over the case, arguing that:

5.

the ELECOM has jurisdiction over the merits of contested elections to the NA but the NA has the power to regulate the proceedings of the NA, granted that ELECOM is part of the NA. ELECOM could only regulate its proceedings if the NA did not provide for it. Res#8 is valid and should be respected, granted that NA is the only body that could regulate the proceedings of the ELECOM Under Par13 of §1 of Ordinance appended to the Constitution and par6Art7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law as well as §1 and 2 of art VIII of the Constitution, SC has jurisdiction to pass upon the fundamental questions raised in this issue because it involves the interpretation of the Constitution of the Philippines The Solicitor-General responded on behalf of ELECOM arguing that:

6. 7.

8.

ELECOM is a constitutional body invested with the jurisdiction to decide ―all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualification of the members of the NA‖ and that Dec 9 was the date fixed by ELECOM as the last day of filing for protest and its resolution dated January 23, 1936 was an act of its legitimate exercise of quasi-judicial functions. Said act is beyond cognizance or control of SC. 10. Res#8 did and could not deprive ELECOM of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of election protests filed within the limit that the ELECOM would set. 11. ELECOM is not an ―inferior tribunal, or corporation, or board, or person‖ 12. Ynsua filed an anwer arguing that: 9.

13. Res#8 did not limit his filing for protest for ELECOM fixed the deadline on Dec 9 and not on the passage of Res#8, which was on Dec3 14. Respondent filed protest before ELECOM ended the period for filing election complaints

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15. ELECOM acquired jurisdiction over election protest and Jan 23 resolution of ELECOM denying the ―Motion to Dismiss the Protest‖ was not reviewable by the SC by means of a writ of prohibition since it was part of ELECOM‘s jurisdiction 16. No constitutional nor legal provision requires the confirmation of members of the NA and that the said confirmation could not limit the period for filing protest 17. ELECOM is an independent constitutional entity with quasi-judicial functions and thus, its decisions are final and unappealable; also ELECOM is a constitutional creation which is not an inferior tribunal, or corporation, board, or person and is not subject to a writ of prohibition from the SC 18. Par6,art7 of Tydings-McDuffie Law is not applicable Issue: 1. 2.

WON the SC has jurisdiction over the ELECOM and the subject matter of the controversy WON, if ever the first is granted, ELECOM acted within or without its jurisdiction in assuming cognizance of the protest filed against the election of Angara

Held/Ratio: 1.

2.

Yes. The SC has jurisdiction over the ELECOM: separation of powers granted by Consti (through separate articles for each branch) but check and balances maintain coordination among the branches. When there are conflicts between the boundaries of powers and functions of each branch, the Judiciary has the power to review and resolve these conflicts through Judicial Review (referred to as Judicial Supremacy). This however is limited to actual cases and controversies. Yes. ELECOM acted within its jurisdiction since ELECOM is recognized as an independent quasi-judicial body which is not an inferior tribunal, or corporation, board, or person, and is granted the powers to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the NA. The present constitution granted the ELECOM with all the powers exercised by the legislature relating to the said function of ELECOM, and this includes the regulation of the rules and procedures of election protests. The confirmation of NA of its members is not required and does not limit the ELECOM of its power to fix dates for election protest, or else this would undermine the power and functions of the ELECOM.

C. Justiciable and Political Questions Miranda v. Aguirre Ponente: Puno, J. Facts: 1. 2. 3.

May 5, 1994: Republic Act 7720 converting the municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an independent component city was signed into law. July 4, 1994: Republic Act 7720 was ratified by the people of Santiago via plebescite. February 14, 1998: Republic Act 8582 was enacted amending RA 7720 ―reclassifying‖ Santiago into a component city from an independent component city.

Issue: 1.

2.

WON the downgrading of Santiago City from and independent component city to a mere component city requires the approval of the people of Santiago City in a plebiscite. >>>Stated otherwise: WON RA 8582 is constitutional As regards present lesson: WON the instant petitions is justiciable

Held: 1.

2. 3.

Ratio:

The ―reclassification‖ of Santiago City by RA 8528 falls under Art X, Sec 10 of the Constitution and Chapter 2, Section 10 of the Local Government Code because it shares a common denominator with those instances listed therein. Petitioners are the mayor and the people of Santiago City. They have legal standing. The question at bar is whether or not petitioners have the right to approve or reject RA 8528 based on Art X Sec 10 of the Constitution. It is evident that it is a legal question and perfectly justciable.

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1.

2.

3.

The instances listed in Art X, Sec 10 of the Constitution and Chapter 2, Section 10 of the Local Government Code which require a plebiscite are as follows: → created, or divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered → The above-mentioned and the ―reclassification‖ to which RA 8528 refers shares a common denominator which is a material change in the rights and duties of the people who reside in the locality in question. → Therefore, a plebiscite is required for this ―reclassification.‖ The leading petitioner, Jose Miranda, is the mayor of Santiago. His power and authority would be directly affected (diminished) if Santiago reverts to becoming a component city of Isabela. → The city will be placed under the administrative supervision of the provincial government The people of Santiago will be directly affected by any substantial change to the classification of Santiago. The people of Santiago are asserting a right (i.e. to approve or reject RA 8528 which will affect them directly) which they feel have been denied them

Francisco v. House of Representatives (HOR) supra La Bugal-B’Laan v. Ramos Ponente: Panganiban, J. Facts: 1.

2.

24 January 2007: the Court en banc declared unconstitutional: (a) certain provisions of RA No. 7942 (Mining Law), (b) its Implementing Rules and Regulations DAO No. 96-40, and (c) the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) dated March 30, 1995, executed by the government with Western Mining Corporation (Philippines), Inc. (WMCP), mainly on the finding that FTAAs are service contracts prohibited by the 1987 Constitution Respondents filed separate Motions for Reconsideration

Issue: 1. 2. 3. 4.

W/N case has been rendered moot by the sale of WMC shares in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, Inc. (a Filipino corporation) and by the subsequent transfer and registration of the FTAA from WMCP to Sagittarius. W/N it is still proper to resolve constitutionality of the assailed provisions, assuming that the case has been rendered moot. the proper interpretation of the phrase: Agreements Involving Either Technical or Financial Assistance, contained in paragraph 4 of Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution. thus, W/N provisions are unconstitutional.

Held: 1. 2. 3.

4.

Because of the validity of sale and the transfer, and that the FTAA is not void per se, the case has become moot. However, there is a need to resolve the unconstitutionality of the assailed provisions. The phrase ―agreements involving either technical and financial assistance,‖ as used interchangeably with the term ―service contracts‖ by the drafters of the Constitution and as interpreted by the court, is not exclusionary and limiting. The assailed provisions are not unconstitutional.

Ratio: 1.

2.

3.

4.

1- Nowhere in the provision is there any express limitation or restriction insofar as arrangements other than the three mentioned contractual schemes are concerned. There is no reason to believe that the framers of the Constitution, a majority of whom where obviously concerned with furthering the development and utilization of the country‘s natural resources, could have wanted to restrict Filipino participation in that area. 2- This provision does not necessarily imply that the WMCP FTAA cannot be transferred to and assumed by a Filipino corporation like Sagittarius, in which event the said provision should simply be disregarded as a superfluity. 3- Section 40 expressly applies to the assignment or transfer of the FTAA, not to the sale and transfer of shares of stock in WMCP. When the transfer of the FTAA happens to be a Filipino corporation, the need for such safeguard is not critical. Petitioners have assumed as fact that which has yet to be established. The Decision of the Court declaring the FTAA void has not yet become final. The FTAA is not per se defective or unconstitutional. It was questioned only because it had been issued to an allegedly non-qualified, foreign-owned corporation.

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a.

5.

6.

a.

7.

a.

8.

9.

10.

11. 12.

13.

The court concedes that there exists the distinct possibility that one or more of the future FTAAs will be the subject of yet another suit grounded on constitutional issues. [as of June 2002, some 43 FTAAs had been filed] The Court must recognize the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest involved, as well as the necessity for a ruling to put an end to the uncertainties plaguing the mining industry and the affected communities as a result of doubts cast upon the constitutionality and validity of the Mining Act, the subject FTAA and future FTAAs, and the need to avert a multiplicity of suits. The real issue in this case is whether paragraph 4 of Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution is contravened by RA 7942 and DAO 96-40. By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act. The use of the word ―involving‖ signifies the possibility of the inclusion of other forms of assistance or activities having to do with, otherwise related to or compatible with financial or technical assistance. These agreements with foreign corporations are not limited to mere financial or technical assistance. Otherwise, the language of the drafters would have certainly been so unmistakably restrictive and stringent as to leave no doubt in anyone‘s mind about their true intent. There was a conscious and deliberate decision to avoid the use of restrictive wording that bespeaks an intent not to use the expression ―agreements x x x involving either technical or financial assistance‖ in an exclusionary and limiting manner. Such intent cannot be definitively and conclusively established from the mere failure to carry the same expression or term over to the new Constitution, absent amore specific, explicit and unequivocal statement to that effect. Pertinent portions of the deliberations of the members of the ConCom conclusively show that they discussed agreements involving either technical or financial assistance in the same breadth as service contracts and used the terms interchangeably. The gamut of requirements, regulations, restrictions and limitations imposed upon the FTAA contractor by the statute and regulations easily overturns petitioners‘ contention. The FTAA contractor is not free to do whatever it pleases and get away with it; on the contrary, it will have to follow the government line if it wants to stay in the enterprise. Ineluctably then, RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 vest in the government more than a sufficient degree of control and supervision over the conduct of mining operations. The exploration permit serves a practical and legitimate purpose in that it protects the interests and preserves the rights of the exploration permit grantee (the would-be contractor)—foreign or local—during the period of time that it is spending heavily on exploration works, without yet being able to earn revenues to recoup any of its investments and expenditures. The evaluation and analysis of the FTAA provisions sufficiently overturn petitioners‘ litany of objections to and criticisms of the State‘s alleged lack of control. The provisions vest the State with control and supervision over practically all aspects of the operations of the FTAA contractor, including the charging of pre-operating and operating expenses, and the disposition of mineral products. The Court does not share the view that in FTAAs with foreign contractors under RA 7942, the government‘s share is limited to taxes, fees and duties. The inclusion of the phrase ―among other things‖ in the second paragraph of Section 81 clearly and unmistakable reveals the legislative intent to have the State collect more than just the usual taxes, duties and fees. BUT, the WMCP FTAA has invalid provisions: Section 7.9 of the WMCP FTAA clearly renders illusory the State‘s 60 percent share of WMCP‘s revenues in providing that: should WMCP‘s foreign stockholders sell 60 percent or more of their equity to a Filipino citizen or corporation, the State loses its right to receive its share in net mining revenues under Section 7.7, with any offsetting compensation to the State. Section 7.8 is likewise invalid, since by allowing the sums spent by government for the benefit of the contractor to be deductible from the State‘s share in net mining revenues, it results in benefiting the contractor twice over. This constitute unjust enrichment on the part of the contractor, at the expense of the government

D. Requisites of Judicial Review 1. Actual Case or Controversy Prematurity PACU v. Secretary of Education Ponente: Bengzon, J. Facts: 1. 2.

Act 1207 approved in 1917 is entitled, ―An Act making the inspection and recognition of private schools and colleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction‖ Act 1207 was amended by Act 3075 and Commonwealth Act 180

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3.

Petitioners assailed that Act 1207 as amended by Act 3075 and Commonwealth Act 180 is unconstitutional on the following grounds: 4. They deprive the owners of schools and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of law 5. They deprive parents of their natural right and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency 6. Their provisions conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power 7. Petitioners claimed that any law requiring governmental approval or permit before a person can exercise a right (in this case, creation of a private school) amounts to censorship 8. Respondents contended that: 9. The matter constitutes no justiciable controversy 10. Petitioners are in estoppel to challenge the validity of the said acts 11. Acts are constitutionally valid Issue: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

WON the requisites for justiciability has been met WON the requirement of securing a permit before opening a school in accordance with the Commonwealth Act 180 deprives the owners of liberty and is therefore unconstitutional WON Sec 1 of Act 1207, which confer on the Secretary of Education unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules and standards, constitute unlawful delegation of legislative power WON the assessment of 1% on gross receipts of all private schools for additional Government expenses in connection with their supervision and regulation is unconstitutional WON the power to regulate the textbooks to be used by the private schools constitute censorship

Held: Denied. Ratio: 1.

2.

3.

4. 5.

No. The Court shall exercise its judicial review only when the petitioners will suffer, or has suffered, an injury as a result of a statute. a. The petitioners already have their permits to operate and are actually operating by virtue of their permits and they did not show that the Secretary of Educations has threatened to revoke their permits. Thus they did not suffer any injury and naturally need no relief in the form they are seeking to obtain. Mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education might under the law withdraw the permit of one of petitioners does not constitute a justiciable controversy. b. The Court has decided to look into the matter so it will not be said that they refused to act even in the face of clear violation of fundamental personal rights of liberty and property. No. The power of the State to regulate establishments or business occupations shall mean the power to require a permit or license. a. March 1924, Act 3162 has created a Board of Educational Survey to make a study and survey of education in the Philippines and of all educational institutions. The Board has reported that a great majority of the private educational institutions are money-making devices for those who organize them and that the youth are not getting what they pay for. This system constitutes a ―great evil‖. It has suggested that a control be organized to supervise the administration of these institutions. The Government, in its exercise of its police power to correct ―a great evil‖, could therefore validly establish the ―previous permit‖ system. No. ―General standard of efficiency‖ and ―adequate instruction‖ shall be sufficient as legislative standards justifying delegation of authority to regulate. a. Despite alleged vagueness, the Sec of Education has fixed standards to ensure adequate and efficient instruction, and the system of public education has, in general, been satisfactorily in operation for 37 years. b. Petitioners do not show how these standards have injured any of them or interfered with their operation No. The legality of any tax impost or assessment falls within the original jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance No. The controversy shall not constitute a justiciable controversy a. The petitioners have not shown that the Board of textbooks has prohibited any text, or that the petitioners refused or intend to refuse to submit some textbooks, and are in danger of losing substantial privileges or rights for so refusing.

Mariano v. Comelec

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Ponente: Puno, J. Facts: 1.

Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of Sections 2, 51 and 52 of R.A. 7854 ―An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati‖

2.

Petitioners held that Section 2 is unconstitutional because it did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds with technical descriptions in violation of Section 10 Article X of the Constitution and Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government

3.

Petitioners claimed that Section 51 attempts to alter the three-consecutive term limit for local elective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7 Article VI of the Constitution. They alleged that this favors the incumbent Mayor, Jejomar Binay, as this will allow him to run again and restart the terms allowed for him.

4.

Petitioners contends that Section 52 is unconstitutional because it sought to increase the legislative district of Makati only by special law, this increase was not expressed in the title of thebill, and the addition of another legislative district is not in accordance with Section 5(3) Article VI of the Constitution in relation to the population survey

Issue: 1. 2.

Whether or not the requisites for a judicial review are present in the case (lis mota, actual controversy, locus standi and ripeness?) Constitutional Issue – Whether or not there was actual controversy in the case?

Held: Court found no merit in the Petition. Case is dismissed. Ratio: 1.

Section 2 of RA 7854 did not change the present territory of Makati and left the resolution of territorial boundaries to the court to decide by virtue of the then existing boundary dispute between Makati and Taguig which was under court litigation.. It is not unconstitutional because Congress had a legitimate reason for not delineating Makati‘s territory by metes and bounds.

2.

The basis for assailing the constitutionality of Section 51 of RA 7854 is premised on contingent events i.e. if Mayor Binay will run again, if he will seek a re-election, etc. There is, therefore, no actual controversy, laid down by the petitioners but merely hypothetical issues which have yet to happen. Petitioners are also not the proper parties to raise the abstract issue as they are residents of Taguig (except Mariano, Jr.) They are also asking for declaratory relief where the Court has no jurisdiction since resolution of the boundary dispute is dependent on the outcome of the litigation.

3.

Section 52 is not unconstitutional because: 1) Constitution did not prevent Congress from creating another legislative district where the law demands so, such as when population has exceeded 250,000 in a certain area 2) the Constitution provides that should the population increase to more than 250,000, a legislative district is entitled to more than one representative 3. the creation of an additional legislative district does not need one title in the assailed law, Court upheld a liberal interpretation of the ―one title-one subject‖ rule where a general title can encompass the provisions related to the title.

Montesclaros v. Comelec GR No. 152295 July 9, 2002 Mootness Atlas Fertilizer v. Sec. DAR Ponente: Romero, J. Facts:

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1. 2. 3. 4.

5.

6.

Atlas et al are engaged in the aquaculture industry utilizing fishponds and prawn farms Petitioners claim that the questioned provisions of CARL violate the Constitution in the following manner: Sections 3 (b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of CARL extend agrarian reform to aquaculture lands even as Section 4, Article XIII of the constitution limits agrarian reform only to agriculture lands. The questioned provisions similarly treat of aquaculture lands and agriculture lands when they are differently situated, and differently treat aquaculture lands and other industrial lands, when they are similarly situated in violation of the constitutional guarantee of the equal protection of the laws. The questioned provisions distort employment benefits and burdens in favor of aquaculture employees and against other industrial workers even as Section 1 and 3, Article XIII of the Constitution mandate the State to promote equality in economic and employment opportunities. The questioned provisions deprive petitioner of its government-induced investments in aquaculture

Issue: 1.

WON some portions of RA 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, are unconstitutional in so far as they include in their coverage lands devoted to the aquaculture industry, particularly fishponds and prawn farms. (RA 6657 Sec. 39b, 11, 13, 16d, 17 & 32 & its implementing guidelines and procedures contained in DAR Admin. Order nos. 8&9) Held: Petition is dismissed. Moot and Academic. Ratio: 2.

The question concerning the constitutionality of the assailed provisions has been rendered moot and academic because RA 7881, approved by congress on February 20, 1995, expressly states that fishponds & prawn farms are excluded from the coverage of CARL.

3.

The court will not hesitate to declare law or an act void when confronted with constitutional issues, neither will it preempt the Legislative & Executive branches of the government in correcting or clarifying, by means of amendment said law or act.

Lacson v. Perez Ponente: Melo, J. Facts: On may 1,2001, GMA was faced by an angry and violent mob with explosive, firearms , bladed weapons , clubs stone, and other deadly weapons, assaulting and attempting to break into Malacanang. Thus she issued proclamation 38, declaring state of rebellion in NCR. She likewise issued General order 1 directing the AFP and PNP to suppress the rebellion in NCR. Warrantless arrests of promoters of the rebellion were effected. Both Ernesto Maceda AND Juan Ponce Enrile were arrested in their respective homes Issue: WON The declaration of the state of rebellion by GMA and the warrantless arrests have basis in fact and in law. Held: The petitions are dismissed. However, in GR 147780 (Lacson), 147781, (Santiago), and 14779 (lumbao), respondents, consistent and congruent with their undertaking earlier averted to, together with their agents … are hereby enjoined from arresting petitioners therein without required warrant for all acts committed in connection with the May 1 siege of Malacanan. Ratio: 1. 2. 3.

Since GMA lifted the state of rebellion on May 6, 2001, the instant petitions were rendered moot and academic. Since Hernani Perez declared that the Justice department and the police intend to obtain warrants of arrests from the courts, the petitioners apprehensions must be laid to rest. The fears of Santiago and Lumbao do not justify the need for remedies of mandamus and prohibition because a warrantless arrest is not without adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law.

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4.

5.

Sec 18 Art VII states that – The pres. Shall be the Commander-in Chief of all the armed forces of the Phils, and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless, violence, invasion or rebellion… LDP is not a real party in interest

In IBP vs. Hon Zamora - The president as Commander in Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather information…In the exercise of the power to call, on the spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. Exceptions to Mootness Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary Ponente: Tinga, J. Facts: 1.

2. 3. 4. 5. -

-

-

-

-

July 27, 2003 – Some 300 junior officers and enlisted men of AFP, armed with ammunitions and explosives, stormed into Oakwood apartments in Makati. They demanded the resignation of GMA, Defense Secretary and the PNP Chief. Later that day, the President issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 both declaring ―a state of rebellion‖ and calling out the AFP to suppress the rebellion. Oakwood occupation ended in the evening after negotiations. August 1, 2003 – President lifted the declaration. PARTIES Sanlakas and Partido ng Manggagawa (PD) a. Sec 18, Art 7 does not require declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the armed forces b. There is no sufficient factual basis for an indefinite period since Oakwood occupation had ceased. Social Justice Society (SJS) as Filipino citizens, taxpayers, law professors and bar reviewers c. Declaration is constitutional anomaly that confuses because overzealous public officers acting pursuant to the proclamation are liable to violate the constitutional rights of citizens d. Circumvention of the report requirement in Sec 18, Art 7, commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from proclamation of martial law e. Presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the President Rep. Suplico et al as citizens and members of House of Representatives f. Their rights, powers, and functions were allegedly affected g. Declaration is a superfluity and is actually an exercise of emergency powers and therefore is a usurpation of the power of the Congress in Art 6, Sec 23 par 2 Sen. Pimentel h. Issuances are unwarranted, illegal, and abusive exercise of a martial law power that has no constitutional basis Solicitor-General i. Case has become moot because of the lifting of the declaration

Issue: 1.

a. WON issue is justiciable given mootness of the issue and legal standing of the parties b. WON petitioners have legal standing WON issuances of the President are valid

2.

Held/Ratio: 1.

1. 2. 3.

The President, in declaring state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article 7 as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article 6. Justiciable even if moot Courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is capable of repetition yet evading review Lacson v. Perez – mootness preclude the Court from addressing its Constitutionality

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4.

5.

6. 2. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

Only Rep Suplico et al and Sen Pimentel have legal standing because when an act of the Executive injures the institution of the Congress and causes a derivative but substantial injury, then any member can file suit (Phil. Constitution Association v. Enriquez) Sanlakas, PM, and SJS have no legal standing because they did not obtain any direct injury from the governmental act that is being challenged. People‘s organization status would not vest them with the requisite personality to question the validity of the presidential issuances (Kilosbayan v. Morato) SJS as taxpayers and citizens have no legal standing because there was no illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation Presidential issuances are valid Art 7, Sec 18 – Sequence of graduated powers: 1.calling out power, 2.power to suspend writ of habeas corpus, 3.power to declare martial law. 2 and 3 require concurrence of actual invasion or rebellion AND that public safety requires the exercise of such power. These are not required in calling-out power (IBP v. Zamora) It does not expressly prohibit the President from declaring a state of rebellion. The Constitution vests the President not only with Commander-in-Chief powers but with first and foremost, Executive powers US Constitutional history: commander-in-chief powers are broad enough as it is and become more so when taken together with the provision on executive power and presidential oath of office President‘s authority to declare state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as chief executive and at the same time draws strength from her commander-in-chief powers The declaration of state of rebellion only gives notice to the nation that such a state exists and the armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress it. Declaration cannot diminish or violate constitutionality protected rights (Lacson) President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity of the exercise of such power. There is no proof that the President acted without factual basis. Declaration of state of rebellion does not amount to declaration of martial law.

Pimentel v. Ermita Ponente: Carpio, J. Facts: Following the vacancy left in GMA‘s cabinet by the Hyatt 10 incident, the President issued appointments to the respondents as acting secretaries of their respective departments, later replacing their acting capacity with ad interim appointments. A group of Senators headed by Sen. Pimentel filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking to declare the appointments unconstitutional. Issue/Held/Ratio: GMA did not infringe on the rights of Congress—the power to appoint is executive in nature and the Committee on Appointments, though it be composed of members of Congress, derives executive power from the Constitution. A department secretary is considered an alter ego of the President; it is only fitting that she personally appoint such a position of great trust and confidence. Bernas argues that ad interim appointments require the approval of the Committee, however, the court held that there was no abuse of appointments as they were made well before the 1 year limit of the positions. Sec 17 Ch 5 Title 1 Book 3 EO 292: : ―… the President may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the function of an office in the executive branch…‖ Art VII Sec 16 -The President shall nominate, and with the consent of the COA, appoint the heads of the executive departments….The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress…but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproved by the COA or the next adjournment of Congress. 2. Proper Party Joya v. PCGG

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Ponente: Bellosillo, J. Facts: 1.

2.

3.

4. 5. 6.

7.

Special Civil Action for Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Injuction and/or Restraining Order seek to enjoin the PCGG from proceeding with the auction sale scheduled on January 11, 1991 by Christie‘s of New York of the following: a. 82 Old Masters Paintings th th b. 18 and 19 century silverware contained in 71 cartons The items were seized from Malacanang and the Metropolitan Museum of manila and place in custody of the Central Bank and alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late President Marcos, his relatives and cronies August 9, 1990 – Mateo Caparas, the Chairman of PCGG wrote then President Aquino requesting her for authority to sign the proposed Consignment Agreement between the Republic of the Phil and Christie, Manson and Woods International Inc (Christie‘s of New York) concerning the sale August 14, 1990 – Pres Aquino, through former Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr. authorized PCGG to sign the agreement August 15, 1990 – PCGG signed the Consignment Agreement with Christie‘s of New York October 26, 1990 – COA submitted to Pres Aquino the audit findings and observations on the Consignment Agreement to the effect that: a. The authority of PCGG Chairman Caparas was of doubtful legality b. Contract was highly disadvantageous to the government c. PCGG had a poor track record in asset disposal by auction in the US d. Assets subject of auction were historical relics and had cultural significance hence their disposal was prohibited by law November 15, 1990 – PCGG, through its new Chairman David Castro, wrote Pres Aquino defending the Consignment Agreement and refuting the allegations of COA Chairman Domingo; Director of National Museum Gabriel Casal issued a certification that the items subject on the Consignment Agreement did not fall within the classification of protected cultural properties and did not specifically qualify as part of the Filipino cultural heritage

Issue: Whether the instant petition complies with the legal requisites for this Court to exercise its power of judicial review over this case Held: Petition is dismissed for lack of merit Ratio: 1.

2.

The Court shall exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal question a. Legal Standing – personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged b. Interest – material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or mere incidental interest; must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and unrelated party c. There are certain instances when the Court has allowed exceptions to the rule on legal standing, as when a citizen brings a case for mandamus to procure the enforcement of a public duty for the fulfilment of a public right recognized by the Constitution and when a taxpayer questions the validity of a governmental act authorizing the disbursement of public funds d. Petitioners claim that as Filipino citizens and taxpayers and artists deeply concerned with the preservation and protection of the country‘s artistic wealth, they have legal personality e. However, the paintings were donated by private persons to the Metropolitan Museum of Manila Foundation and the pieces of antique silverware were given to the Marcos couple as gifts from friends and dignitaries from foreign countries. The confiscation of these properties by the Aquino administration should not be understood to mean that the ownership of these items has automatically passed on to the govt. Petitioners failed to establish that they are the legal owners of the artworks or that the pieces have become publicly owned and thus they do not possess any clear legal right to question their alleged unauthorized disposition The Court shall exercise its power of judicial review only if there is an actual case or controversy a. Since the purpose of this petition for prohibition is to enjoin respondent public officials from holding the auction sale, which is long past, the issues raised have become moot and academic

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Agan v. PIATCO GR No. 155001 May 5, 2003 CHR Employees Association v. CHR GR No. 155336 November 25, 2004 Automotive Industry Workers Alliance v. Romulo GR No. 157509 January 18, 2005 Citizen Standing Tanada v. Tuvera Ponente: Escolin, J. Facts: 1.

Petition to review the decision of the Executive Assistant to the President.

2.

Invoking the people‘s right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 constitution, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette, of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. The respondents would have this case dismissed on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality to bring this petition. Petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel public duty, they need not show any specific interest. Respondents further contend that publication in the OG is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates.

Issue: WON publication in the Official Gazette is an indispensable requirement for the effectivity of the PDs, LOIs, general orders, EOs, etc. where laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates Held/Ratio: 1.

2. 3.

4. 5.

Yes. It is the people‘s right to be informed on matters of public concern & corollarily access to official records, & to documents & papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, shall be afforded the citizens subject to such limitation as may be provided by law (Sec. 6, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution). Laws, to be valid & enforceable, must be published in the OG or otherwise effectively promulgated. The fact that a PD or LOI states its date of effectivity does not preclude their publication in the OG as they constitute important legislative acts. The publication of presidential issuances ―of public nature‖ or ―of general applicability‖ is a requirement of due process. Before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially informed of its contents. Decision Respondents ordered to publish in Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances of general application, and unless so published shall have no binding force and effect. Important Point It illustrates how decrees & issuances issued by one man — Marcos — are in fact laws of general application and provide for penalties. The constitution afforded Marcos both executive & legislative powers. The generality of law (CC Art. 14) will never work w/o constructive notice. The ruling of this case provides that publication constitutes the necessary constructive notice & is thus the cure for ignorance as an excuse. Ignorance will not even mitigate the crime.

Chavez v. PEA and Amari Ponente: Carpio, J. Facts: 1.

Nature: original Petition for Mandamus with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order. Petition also seeks to compel the Public Estates Authority (PEA) to disclose all facts on PEA‘s then on-going renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation to reclaim portions of Manila Bay. The petition further seeks to enjoin PEA from signing a new agreement with AMARI involving such reclamation.

2.

1973: The government through the Commission of Public Highways signed a contract with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay

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3.

1977: President Marcos issued PD No. 1084 creating the PEA, which was tasked to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas and to develop, improve, acquire x xx lease and sell any and all kinds of lands. On the same date, President Marcos issued PD. 1085 transferring to PEA the lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP)

4.

1981: Pres. Marcos issued a memorandum ordering PEA to amend its contract with CDCP which stated that CDCP shall transfer in favor of PEA the areas reclaimed by CDCP in the MCCRRP

5.

1988: Pres. Aquino issued Special Patent granting and transferring to PEA parcels of land so reclaimed under the MCCRRP. Subsequently she transferred in the name of PEA the three reclaimed islands known as the ―Freedom Islands‖

6.

1995: PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands and this was done without public bidding

7.

Pres. Ramos through Executive Secretary Ruben Torres approved the JVA

8.

1996: Senate Pres.Maceda delivered a privileged speech in the Senate and denounced the JVA as the ―grandmother of all scams‖. As a result, the Senate conducted investigations. Among the conclusions were:

9.

The reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; 10. The certificates of the title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and 11. The JVA itself is illegal 12. 1997: Pres. Ramos created the Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view of the Senate Committee report. 13. 1998: The Philippine Daily Inquirer published reports on on-going renegotiations between PEA and AMARI 14. PEA Director Nestor Kalaw and PEA Chairman ArsenioYulo and former navy officer Sergio Cruz were members of the negotiating panel 15. Frank Chavez filed petition for Mandamus stating that the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI and prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of the renegotiations of JVA. He cited that the sale to AMARI is in violation of Article 12, Sec. 3 prohibiting sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations and Article 2 Section 28 and Article 3 Sec. 7 of the Constitution on the right to information on matters of public concern 16. 1999: PEA and AMARI signed Amended JVA which Pres. Estrada approved Issue: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

WON the principal reliefs prayed for in the petition are moot and academic because of the subsequent events WON the petition merits dismissal for failure to observe the principle governing the hierarchy of courts WON the petition merits dismissal for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies WON petitioner has locus standi to bring this suit WON the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final agreement WON the stipulations in the amended joint venture agreement for the transfer to AMARI of certain lands, reclaimed and still to be reclaimed, violate the 1987 constitution; and WON the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the amended joint venture agreement is grossly disadvantageous to the government. >>> Threshold issue: whether AMARI, a private corporation, can acquire and own under the amended JVA 367.5 has. of reclaimed foreshore and submerged area in Manila Bay in view of Sections 2 & 3, Art. 12 of the 1987 constitution

Held/Ratio:

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(1) The prayer to enjoin the signing of the Amended JVA on constitutional grounds necessarily includes preventing its implementation if in the meantime PEA and AMARI have signed one in violation of the Constitution and if already implemented, to annul the effects of an unconstitutional contract

(2) The principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally to cases involving factual questions Reasoning: the instant case raises constitutional issues of transcendental importance to the public (3) The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the issue involved is a purely legal or constitutional question (4) Petitioner has standing if petition is of transcendental public importance and as such, there is the right of a citizen to bring a taxpayer‘s suit on these matters of transcendental public importance (5) The constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final contract and must therefore constitute definite propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order Reasoning The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest reinforces the people‘s right to information on matters of public concern. PEA must prepare all the data and disclose them to the public at the start of the disposition process, long before the consummation of the contract. While the evaluation or review is ongoing, there are no ―official acts, transactions, or decisions‖ on the bids or proposals but once the committee makes its official recommendation, there arises a definite proposition on the part of the government (6) In a form of a summary: a.

The 157.84 has.of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.

b.

The 592.15 has.of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain and outside the commerce of man until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate

c.

Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 has.of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article 12 of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 has.of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article 12 of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain. PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public services. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article 12 that prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

d.

Reasoning:

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2.

3. 4.

5. 6.

7. 8.

9.

CA 141 of the Philippine National Assembly empowers the president to classify lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable (Sec. 6).The President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into—(a) Alienable of disposable, (b) timber, and (c) mineral lands. The President must first officially classify these lands as alienable or disposable, and then declare them open to disposition or concession. Sec. 59 states that the lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows: (a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filling, or other means; (b) Foreshore; (c) Marshy lands (d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes. Sec. 61 states that the lands comprised in classes (a), (b) and (c) of section 59 shall be disposed f to private parties by lease only and not otherwise After the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, government reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of the public domain continued to be only leased and not sold to private parties. These lands remained suis generic as the only alienable or disposable lands of the public domain the government could not sell to private parties. The only way that the government can sell to private parties government reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of the public domain is for the legislature to pass a law authorizing such sale. in case of sale or lease of disposable lands of the public domain, a public bidding is required 1987 Constitution declares that all natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. Article 12, Sec. 3 states that alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years, and not to exceed 1,000 has.in area. ration behind the ban on corporations from acquiring except through lease is not well understood. If the purpose is to equitably diffuse lands ownership then the Consti could have simply limited the size of alienable lands of the public domain that corporations could acquire. If the intent were to encourage ―ownercultivatorship‖ and the economic family-size farm and to prevent a recurrence of cases like the instant case, then placing the land in the name of a corporation would be more effective in preventing the break-up of farmlands. If the farmland were registered in the name of a corporation, upon the death of the owner, his heirs would inherit shares in the corporation instead of subdivided parcels of the farmland. This would prevent the continuing break-up of farmlands into smaller and smaller plots from one generation to the next. In actual practice then, this ban strengthens the consti limitation on individuals from acquiring more than the allowed area of alienable lands of the public domain. Without the ban, individuals who already acquired the maximum area of alienable lands of the public domain could easily set up corporations to acquire more alienable public lands. An individual could own as many corporations as his means would allow him. He could even hide his ownership of a corporation by putting his nominees as stockholders of the corporation. Associational Standing

KMU Labor Center v. Garcia GR No. 115381 December 23, 1994 IBP v. Zamora Ponente: Kapunan, J. Facts: 1)

2) 3) 4)

5) 6) 7)

At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a TRO seeking to nullify on constitutional grounds the order of Pres Joseph Estrada commanding the deployment of the Phil Marines to join the PNP in visibility patrols around the metropolis Alarming increase in violent crimes in MM The President in a verbal directive ordered the PNP and the mArines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression PNP chief through Police Chief Superintendent Edgardo B. Aglipay formulated LOI 02/2000 which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility patrols called Task force Tulungan would be conducted—placed under the leadership of the Police Chief of MM President confirmed his previous directive on the deployment of the marines in a memorandum dated 24 January 2000 (directed to AFP and PNP) Invoking his powers as Commander-in-chief under Sec 18 of Art VII of the constitution 17 January 2000, the IBP filed the instant petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the Philippine mArines null and void and unconstitutional arguing that: a) The deployment of the Philippine marines in MM is violative of the constitution in that:  No emergency situation would justify the deployment of soldiers for law enforcement work— derogation of Art II Sec 3 of the constitution

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

8) 9)

Deployment constitutes an insidious incursion by the military in a civilian function of government (law enforcement)—derogation of Art XVI sec 5(4) of the constitution  Said deployment creates a dangerous tendency to rely on the military to perform the civilian functions of the govt b) In militarizing Law enforcement in MM, the administration is unwittingly making the military more powerful than what it should really be under the constitution The Court, in a resolution (25 Jan 2000) required SG to file his comment SG Comments (submitted 8 Feb 2000) Defends the constitutionality of the act of the pres Petitioner has no legal standing The question of deployment of the marines is not proper for judicial scrutiny since it involves a political question The organization and conduct of police visibility patrols, which feature the team up of one police officer and one phil marine soldier does not violate the civilian supremacy clause in the constitution

Issue: 1. 2. 3.

WON petitioners have legal standing WON the president‘s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review WON the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP

Held: Petition has no merit. Ratio: 1) 2)

Petitioner failed to sufficiently show that it is in possession of the requisites of standing tor raise the issues in the petition The pres did not commit garve abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction nor did he commit a violation of the civilian supremacy clause of the constitution

WHEN QUESTIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE ARE RAISED, the court can exercise its power of judicial review only is the ff requisites are complied with: a) The existence of an actual and appropriate case b) A personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question c) The exercise of judicial review is pleaded in the earliest opportunity d) Constitutional question is the lis mota of the case The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of standing in this case LEGAL STANDING or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of a governmental act that is being challenged INTEREST-means material interest as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved or incidental interest The mere invocation of the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case—too general interest—not a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the case Not only is the presumed injury not personal in character it I likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing The court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is involved—issue of transcendental significance—liberal interpretation—legal controversy The president did not commit grave abuse of discretion in calling out the marines Factual determination of the pres of the necessity of calling the armed forces, particularly the marines to aid the PNP in visibility patrols What the IBP questions, however, is the basis for calling the marines—according to the IBP, no emergency exists that would justify the need for this action—no lawless violence, invasion or rebellion Calls for review of the factual basis for said troop deployment SG- contends that this is not a judicial question but a political question—beyond the review powers of the court

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-

-

-

-

The underlying issues are the scope of the presidential powers and limits and the extent of judicial review COURT‘s view is that the power involved may be no more than the maintenance of peace and order and the promotion of the general welfare 1987 consti expands the power of judicial review—the court cannot agree with the SG that the issue involved is a political question beyond the jurisdiction of the court to review when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue of whether the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met or the limitations respected is justiciable—the problem being one of legality and not its wisdom Question of grave abuse of discretion In view of the constitutional intent to give the pres full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the president‘s decision is totally bereft of factual basis The full discretionary power of the pres to determine the factual basis for the exercise of the calling out power is also implied and further reinforced in the rest of sec 18 Art VII INTENT is to grant the pres the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suspension of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms and this necessitating safeguards by congress and review of these courts The conditions: 1) actual invasion or rebellion; 2) public safety must require it—not required in the case of power to call out the armed forces—the only criterion is that ― whenever it becomes necessary‖ the president mat call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion‖ The implication is the pres is given full discretion and wide latitude in the exercise of the power to call as compared to the two other powers If the petitioner fails, by way of proof to support the assertion gthat the pres acted without factual basis, the court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings The pres as CIC has a vast intelligence network to gather, some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property The pres has already detrmined the necessity and factual basis for the calling of the armed forces Considering all these facts, we hold that the pres has sufficient factual basis to call for military aid in law enforcement and in the exercise of constitutional power

The deployment of the marines do not violate the civilian supremacy clause nor does it infringe the civilian character of the police force Local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP MM police chief is the over all leader of the PNP-Philippine mArines visibility patrol It cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme over civilian authority The deployment of marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force neither does it amount to an insidious incursion of the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of sec 5(4) Art XVI of the consti The real authority in these operations as stated in the LOI is lodged with the head of the civilian institution the PNP and not with the military Hence, the deployment of the marines does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP Military assistance to civilian authorities in various forms persists in the phil jurisdiction—ex. Elections, devt of culture and arts; calamities, conservation of natl resources etc What we have here is mutual support and cooperation between the military and civilian authorities, not derogation of the civilian supremacy Even if the court were to apply rigid standards to the present case to determine whether there is permissible use of the military in civilian law enforcement, the conclusion is inevitable that no violation of the civilian supremacy clause in the consti is committed The court agrees with the SG 1) The soldiers do not control or direct the operation 2) Soldiers also do not have power to prohibit or condemn—brought to nearest police station when caught 3) These soldiers apply no coercive force This court is not inclined to overrule the president‘s determination of the factual basis for the calling out of the marines to prevent or suppress lawless violence

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 

Since the institution of the joint visibility patrol in jan 2000, not a single citizen has complained what his political or civil rights have been violated as a result of the deployment of the marines It was to safeguard peace, tranquility and civil liberties of the people—to give security to our people to enjoy blessings of democracy

Executive Secretary v. CA 429 SCRA 781 May 25, 2004 Kilosbayan v. Guingona Ponente: Chico-Nazario, J. Facts: 1. 2.

3.

4.

PCSO decided to establish an on-line lottery system Berjaya Group Berhad, Sports Toto Malaysia (subsidiary), International Totalizor Systems Inc. (US) plus Filipino investors created in March 1993 the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC). It was intended to provide technical and management services that would be offered and delivered to PCSO. PCSO issued in August 1993 a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the lease contract Berjaya reduced its equity to 40%. PGMC submitted its bid and was evaluated by SPBAC. The bid was forwarded to the Office of the President. The President gave its initial go signal to operate and required the submission of the implementing contract. KILOSBAYAN submitted a letter opposing the on-line lottery system. But Malacanang decided to push through with the project reiterating that PCSO will operate and PGMC is merely a lessor. KILOSBAYAN requested copies of all documents. But on the day of request, the Contract of Lease was executed between PCSO and PGMC.

Issue/Held/Ratio: WON the petitioners have a legal standing? (7-6: yes-no) 1.

2.

Procedural technicality may be brushed or set aside by the Court if the issue is of transcendental importance to the public. It is the Court‘s duty to settle promptly and definitely these cases, to determine whether the officials acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction, given its wide discretion. The case is of transcendental importance. The legal standing of the petitioners deserves recognition and it the exercise of the Court‘s sound discretion, it brushes aside the procedural barrier. i. Paramount public interest ii. Ramification of the issues affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people iii. Counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system

WON the Contract of Lease is valid in light of Sec. 1 of RA 1169 as amended by BP Blg. 42? (7-no) 3.

4.

5.

6.

PCSO cannot share its franchise with another by way of CAJV or assign, transfer or lease the franchise. The franchise granted to PCSO to hold and conduct lotteries allows it to hold and conduct a species of gambling. A statute carrying on a gambling activity or business should be strictly construed. The contract is not to be decided on the basis of its title or designation but on the intent of the parties. Animus hominis est anima scripti. The intention of the party is the soul of the instrument. The contemporaneous and subsequent acts and the intent of the parties must be principally considered. No one should be deceived by the title or designation of a contract. i. Collaboration: acts of working together ii. Association: act of a number of persons uniting together for some special purpose or business iii. Joint venture: association of persons or companies jointly undertaking some commercial enterprise PCSO has no funds and is unwilling to incur expenses and take risks. It was candid enough to state that ―it seeks a suitable contractor which shall build, at its own expense, all the facilities need to operate and maintain the system xxx‖. The only contribution therefore from PCSO would be the franchise or authority to operate the on-line lottery system. PCSO and PGMC had the intention to leave to PGMC the technical, operations and management aspects of the on-line lottery system. Even the employee and management pool would be coming from PGMC. It is only after the expiration of the lease will PCSO operate. Taxpayer’s Standing

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ITF v. Comelec GR No. 159139 January 13, 2004 Voter’s Standing Tolentino v. Comelec 420 SCRA 438 January 21, 2004 Legislative Standing Ople v. Torres 293 SCRA 141 (1998) Governmental Standing People v. Vera Ponente: Facts: th

Respondent in this case is J. Jose Vera, judge of the 7 branch of the CFI of Manila who heard Mariano‘s application for probation in the criminal case. On Nov 27,1936 Mariano filed an application for probation before the TC, under Act No. 4221 (Probation Act), claiming he was innocent of the crime, that he had no criminal record & he would observe good conduct in the future. Judge Tuason of the CFI referred the application to the Insular Probation Office w/ recommended its denial. After, this Judge Vera set the petition for hearing on April 5, 1937. April 2, 1937 Fiscal of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of the probation. April 5,1937 private prosecution (H&S Banking Corp) did the same, alleging Act No. 4221 (if it is not repealed by sec2, a.XV of the consti) violated sec1, aIII of the consti. A supplementary provision was also filed by the private prosecution elaborating on the Act‘s unconstitutionality as an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces. June 28, 1937 Judge Vera promulgated a resolution, concluding that Mariano was innocent, but denied his petition for probation. Mariano filed 3 motions for reconsideration which were set for hearing on July 31,1937. But this was postponed bec a motion for leave to intervene in the case as amicus curiae signed by 33 lawyers was filed with the TC. (although 1 lawyer who signed the motion petitioned for leave to withdraw his appearance since the motion was circulated at a banquet by Mariano‘s counsel & that he signed his name w/o mature deliberation & that he signed out of courtesy to the person who invited him). Fiscal filed a motion for the issuance of an order of execution of judgment and to commit Mariano to jail. Private prosecution also filed an opposition to the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae. Aug 10, 1937 Judge Vera issued an order requiring all the parties, including the movants for intervention as amici curiae to appear before the court on Aug 14. Fiscal moved for the hearing of his motion for execution of judgment instead of the motion for leave to intervene w/c was opposed by Mariano‘s counsel, thus the Fiscal moved for the postponement of both hearings. Judge Vera set the hearing for the motion for execution on Aug 21 but still considered the motion for leave to intervene. Evidence as to the circumstances under w/c the motion for leave to intervene was signed & submitted, was to be heard on Aug 19. BUT THEN…petitioners (Ppl of Phils & H&S Banking Corp) went to the SC on extraordinary legal process to put to what they alleged was an interminable proceeding in the CFI since it fostered ―the campaign of Mariano for delay in the execution of the sentence imposed by the SC, thus exposing the courts to criticism & ridicule bec of the apparent inability of the judicial machinery to make effective a final judgment. Scheduled hearing before the TC was thus suspended upon the issuance of a TRO by the SC on Aug 21. Petitioners allege that Judge Vera acted w/o or in excess of his jurisdiction:

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1. bec he lacks the power to place Mariano under probation since… a) sec 11, Act No.4221, the Act is made to apply only to provinces & doesn‘t state that it is applicable to chartered cities like Manila b) although sec37 of the Administrative Code says that in the absence of a special provision, the term province may be construed to include Manila for the purpose of giving effect to laws of gen. application, Act 4221 is not a law of gen. application c) and even if Manila was considered to be a province, Act 4221 would still not apply since it does not provide for the salary of a probation officer as required by sec11 of the Act 2. bec even if he originally had jurisdiction to entertain the application for probation, he acted w/o or in excess of his jurisdiction by entertaining the motion for reconsideration & by failing to commit Mariano to prison after he gave his June 28, 1937 resolution denying the application, since… a) his jurisdiction & power in probation proceedings is limited by Act 4221 to the granting or denying of applications for probation b) after he issued the order denying Mariano‘s application, it became final & executory at the moment of its rendition c) no right of appeal exists in such cases d) judge Vera lacks the power to grant a rehearing of said order or to modify or change the same 3. bec he found Mariano innocent w/c was a presumptuous finding but w/o foundation in fact or law & is furthermore in contempt of this court and in violation of his oath to office as ad interim judge of first instance 4. Bec respondent judge violated & continues to violate his duty, w/c became imperative when he issued his June 28 order denying the application for probation, to commit Mariano to jail.

They also state that they have no other plain, speedy & adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. H&S Banking Corp also contends that Act 4221, w/c provides for a system of probation for persons 18 yrs of age or over who are convicted of a crime, is unconstitutional bec it violates sec 1, subsec (1), aIII of the Consti w/c guarantees equal protection of the laws bec: a) it confers upon the provincial board of each province the absolute discretion to make said law operative or otherwise in their respective provinces b) bec it constitutes an unlawful & improper delegation to the provincial boards of several provinces of legislative power lodged by the Jones Law (sec8) in Phil. Legislature & the Consti (sec 1, aVI) in the National Assembly c) it gives the provincial boards the authority to enlarge the powers of the CFI in different provinces w/o uniformity (w/c goes against sec2, aVIII Consti & sec 28 Jones Law) Fiscal concurred w/ the allegations of private prosecution & further elaborated that ―probation is a form of reprieve & therefore Act 4221 is an encroachment of the exclusive power of the Chief Executive to grant pardons & reprieves.‖ Respondents allege as special defenses: 1. present petition doesn‘t state facts sufficient in law to warrant the issuance of the writ of certiorari or of prohibition 2. the petition is premature bec the remedy sought by petitioners is the same remedy they ask before the TC & was still pending resolution when this petition was filed 3. since petitioners raised the question as to the execution of judgment before the TC, the TC acquired exclusive jurisdiction to resolve it under the theory that its resolution denying probation is unapopealable 4. the SC cannot exercise jurisdiction to decide on WON the excecution will lie, while the CFI has assumed jurisdiction 5. procedure of the petitioners in seeking to deprive the TC of its jurisdiction & elevate the proceedings to the SC, impairs the authority & dignity of the TC 6. that if the SC has jurisdiction, the present action would not lie bec the resolution of the TC denying probation is appealable; even though the Probabtion Law doesn‘t provide that an applicant may appeal from resolution denying probation, it is a gen. rule that a final order, resolution or decision of an inferior court is appealable to a superior court 7. resolution of TC denying probation, being appealable, had not yet become final & executory since Maraiano filed an alternative motion from reconsideration & new trial w/in the 15 day required period 8. Fiscal of Manila impliedly admitted that the TC resolution denying probation is not final & unappealable

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9. if the TC denying probation is unappealable, the accused can file an action for the writ of certiorari w/ mandamus; but before this writ of certiorari can lie, the accused must first file for reconsideration specifying the error committed by the TC 10. that even if the TC resolution is not appealable, it still retains jurisdiction w/in a reasonable time to correct or modify it in accordance w/ law & justice; that this power to alter or modify an order or resolution is inherent in the courts and may be exercised either motu proprio or upon petition of the proper party, the petition gin the latter case taking the form of a motion for reconsideration 11. that if the resolution of the TC is appealable, it cannot order execution of the same while it is on appeal, for then the appeal would not be availing bec the doors of probation would be closed form the moment the accused commences to serve his sentence (ang haba!! Sorry!!! I just wanted to make sure you guys would understand it…daming arte ng mga to eh! Hehehe  not sure what sir might ask kasi) Issue: 1) WON the constitutionality of Act. No. 4221 has been properly raised 2) WON Act No. 4221 is not unconstitutional  constitutionality is challenged on 3 grounds: a) Act 4221 encroches upon the pardoning power of the Executive b) It constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power c) It denies equal protection of the laws Held: 1) Yes 2) Yes, Act No. 4221 is unconstitutional & void Ratio: SC noted that the TC, in passing on the merits of the application of Mariano & in denying the said application, assumed the task not only of considering the merit of the application, but of passing upon the culpability of the applicant, notwithstanding the final pronouncement of guilt by the SC. Court said: Probation implies guilt by final judgment, While a probation court hearing a probation case may look into the circumstances attending the commission of the offense, this does not authorize it to reverse the findings & conclusions of the SC, either directly or indirectly. 1) The constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised & presented in appropriate cases & is necessary to a determination of the case = the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented. Constitutionality of an act may be raised in actions for prohibition & certiorari when the question of constitutionality is necessary to a decision of the case (eg. Yu Cong Eng v Trinidad). Code of Civil Procedure, sec516 ―The Phil. SC is granted concurrent jurisdiction in prohibition w/ CFI over inferior tribunals or persons, & original jurisdiction over CFI, when such courts are exercising functions w/o or in excess of their jurisdiction. Both the petitioners & respondents are correct that a CFI sitting in probation proceedings is a court of limited jurisdiction – its jurisdiction in such proceedings is conferred exclusively by Act No. 4221. Judge Vera passed on the question of constitutionality on the ground that private prosecutor, not being a party whose rights are affected by the statute, may not raise the question. As a general rule, only those who are parties to a suit may question the constitutionality of a statute involved in a judicial decision. In criminal cases, the question may be raised for the first time at any stage of the proceedings. And even if H&S Banking Corp is not the proper party to raise it, the People of the Phils. is. ―The state can challenge the validity of its own laws.‖

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Since Mariano has been at large for 4 yrs since his conviction and since many have applied for probation, while some are already on probation, the instant case is of great importance & public policy demand that its constitutionality be now resolved. 2) YES a) Act encroaches on the pardoning power of the President? NO Sec 21, Jones Law vests in the Gov-Gen the exclusive power to grant pardons and reprieves and remit fines and forfeitures, w/c is not vested in the President. Framers of the constitution provided that this power can only be exercised after conviction. This grant is exclusive & the legislature cannot exercise this power or delegate it elsewhere. The legislature may legally enact a probation law under its broad power to fix the punishment of any and all penal offenses. And courts may be legally authorized by the legislature to suspend sentence by the establishment of a system of probation. The Probation Act allows the modification in particular cases of the penalties prescribed by permitting the suspension of the execution of the judgment. And the punishment shall not be suffered as long as the conditions of the probation are followed. Thus, it cannot be said that it comes in conflict with the power of the President to grant pardons & reprieves. Probation & pardon are distinct & different. Probation is part of the judicial power wherein the suspension of the sentence simply postpones the judgment of the court temporarily or indefinitely, but the conviction & liability following it & civil disabilities remain & become operative when judgment is rendered. A pardon is part of the executive power w/c exempts the person from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. Thus, the application of probation is a purely judicial act & doesn‘t conflict w/ pardoning power. * it is also diff from reprieve (postpones the execution of the sentence to a certain day) & commutation (changing the punishment assessed to a less punishment) b) Does sec 11 of Act 4221, constitute an undue delegation of legislative power? YES Sec. 11 – ―This act shall apply only in those provinces in w/c the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer.‖ ―The legislative neither must nor can transfer the power f making laws to anybody else, or place it anywhere but where the people have.‖ Thus, its power cannot be delegated to another body or authority. But there is an exception, the central legislative body is permitted to delegate legislative powers to local authorities. Such legislation is not a transfer of general legislative power but rather a grant of the authority to prescribe local regulations. BUT under the Probation Act, the provincial boards may be regarded as administrative bodies endowed w/ the power to determine when the act should take effect in their provinces. As a rule, an act of legislature is incomplete & invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by w/c the administrative board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it – and Act 4221 DOES NOT provide any standards or guides. The applicability & application of the act is entirely placed in the hands of the provincial board. The legislature has not made the operation of the Act contingent on specified facts or conditions to be ascertained by the provincial board. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the law upon the provincial boards. Though there is a right of local selfgovernment & of leaving matters of purely local concern in the hands of local authorities, matters of general legislation, like that w/c treats of criminals in general, and as regards the general subject of probation, discretion may not be vested in a manner so unqualified & absolute as provided in Act 4221. (bec each province has the absolute power to determine WON the act should take effect or operate in their provinces w/c is not allowed) c) Does it violate the equal protection of laws? YES The inequality is said to flow from the unwarranted delegation of legislative

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power (bec the probation act may operate in one province & not in another). Thus, Act 4221 creates a situation in w/c discrimination & equality are permitted.  SO…since Act 4221 is unconstitutional & void, SHOULD THE ENTIRE ACT BE AVOIDED? Sec11 of the act, is inseparably linked w/ the other provisions of Act 4221 & its elimination would result in the bare idealism of the system, devoid of any practical benefit to a large number of people. Respondents argue that even w/o sec11, probation officers may be appointed in provinces under sec 10. But the probation officers & administrative personnel referred to in sec10 (who are to act in the central/probation office) are clearly NOT the probation officers required to be appointed for provinces under sec11. Thus, the entire act was set aside. 3. Earliest Opportunity Umali v. Guingona Ponente: Purisima, J. Facts: 1. 2. 3. 4.

5. 6. 7. 8.

9.

10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

Oct 27 1993 Umali appointed Reg Director of BIR by then Pres FVR [first assigned in Manila 1993-94, then Makati 1994; he was Reg Director of San Pablo] Aug 1 1994 FVR got a confidential memo against Umali for alleged violations of internal rev laws, more particularly: malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance, or the ff: a. issued letters of authority [LA‘s] to investigate taxpayers [despite ban on investigations ordered by Rev Memo 31-93] to favored revenue examiners such as his secretary b. terminated tax cases w/o submitting required investigation reports [so, no exam&review] c. terminated cases w/ reports submitted directly to him which were not reviewed by Asst Division [so, eliminated check&balance designed to safeguard against abuses] d. unlawfully issued LA‘s to taxpayers who got convinced to avail of BIR compromise & abatement program under rev memo---> taxpayers paid smaller amounts in lieu of being investigated e. continued to issue antedated LA‘s requisitioned by him when still in San Pablo, despite the devolution of authority to do such under rev memo dated April 1994 f. in an attempt to cover up his mess, he enlisted the support of other reg directors to question the devolution/centralization of functions of the bureau Aug 2 1994 FVR authorized issuance of Order for preventive suspension of Umali and referred the complaint to PCAGC Aug 9 1994 After informing Umali of charges vs. him, PCAGC directed him to send answer, copies of his Statement of Assets&Liabilities for past 3 yrs., and personal data sheet. Hearing was set on Aug25. afterwards... Umali filed answer and went to hearing with his lawyer. during hearing the parties had chance to ask clarificatory quetions re: authenticity of docus attached to the complaint. no question. so parties agreed to submit the case for resolution upon submitting respective memos Sept 23 1994 PCAGC issued Resolution, finding prima facie evidence to support 6 of 12 charges against Umali for issuing those uninvestigated/unreviewed/antedated LA‘s, as summarized: (a)gross disbodience of the law (b)falsification of official docus plus (c) open disobedience for violation of order requiring turnover of all properties & forms to successor upon transfer, and surrender of unused LA forms Oct 6 1994 FVR [as per recommendation of PCAGC] dismissed Umali thru Admin Order No. 152 w/ forfeiture of retirement benefits etc. Umali MR-ed but denied, and so he filed case Dec 1 1994 Petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction in RTC Mkti : violation of his right to due process and to security of tenure! Dec 2 1994 TRO issued->don‘t enforce dismissal, maintain status quo afterwards... RTC dismissed petition. then Umali MR-ed [PCAGC is an unconsti‘l office, no jursidiction to investigate him]. Case reraffled to new judge who reversed decision, so respondents appealed to CA. April 8 1997 CA decision: reversed RTC [Guingona et al won] so, Umali again MR-ed, but denied. So petition to SC Petitioner contends that as Reg Director, although an appointee under direct authority of FVR, he is a Career Executive Service Office [CESO] with tenurial protection, who can only be removed for cause. [cited Larin vs. Exec Sec wherein ―the presidential power to remove is limited...causes are enumerated in PD No. 807 (Civil Service Decree) Sec 36]. Loss of confidence is not a legal cause for removal, thus his right to security of tenure and due process of law was violated.

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17. While admin& civil cases pending, criminal case referred to Office of the Ombudsman which issued Resolution finding probable cause & recommending action for proper crim cases in the courts [Falsif. of Official Docus & Open Disobedience]. But Special Prosecution Officer [after Umali MR-ed] dismissed charges, approved by Ombudsman Aniano Desierto. All Informations against Umali were recalled. Aug 10 1998, Commissioner Beethoven Rualo of BIR wrote SolGen ―BIR not interested anymore in pursuing case against Umali‖ as per recomm of Legal Dept BIR. Issue: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Did Admin No. 152 violate his right to security of tenure? and was he denied due process of law? Is PCAGC a validly constituted gov‘t agency? Can Umali raise the issue of constitutionality belatedly in his MR to the RTC decision? Given the Ombudsman Resolution dismissing charge, is there still basis to dismiss him & forfeit benefits as per Admin No. 152?

Held: Petition granted. Admin Order No. 152 considered lifted. Petitioner can be allowed to retire with full benefits. Ratio: 1.

CA‘s decision was right on the first three issues.

2.

Umali was not denied due process before the PCAGC— he filed his answer and pleadings with respect to his alleged violations and he attended hearings. Neither is there a violation of what he asserts as security of tenure. His claim of CESO eligibility is wanting of evidentiary support.

3.

As regards the issue of constitutionality of PCAGC, his raising it only in his MR and not at the start of proceedings was too late.

4.

As for the fourth issue, it is worthy to note that in this case, the administrative action against Umali was taken prior to the institution of the criminal case. The charges included in Admin Order No. 152 were based on results of PCAGC‘s investigation and not on the Ombudsman‘s.

5.

In sum, the petition is dismissible on the ground that the issues posited by Umali do not have valid legal basis for overturning the CA decision. However, taking into account the circumstances, this Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, has decided to consider the (a)dismissal of the charges against Umali before the Ombudsman, (b) the letter of the Commissioner of BIR that they‘re no longer interested in the case, and (c) the SolGen‘s position that there is no more basis for Admin Order No. 152 due to substantive supervening events that cannot be overlooked. 4. Necessity of Deciding Constitutional Questions

Arceta v. Mangrobang GR No. 152895 June 15, 2001 PART IV The Three Branches of Government A. Congress 1. Composition, Qualification, and Term of Office a. Senate b. House of Representatives Sema v. Comelec GR No. 177597 July 16, 2008 Macias v. Comelec 3 SCRA 1 (1961) Tan v. Comelec 142 SCRA 727 (1986) Veterans Fed. Party v. Comelec Ponente: Facts:

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In May 1998, the first PL election was held simultaneously with the general elections. In June the Comelec en banc proclaimed 12 parties. In July PL PAG-ASA filed a petition to proclaim the full number of PL representatives as provided in the constitution, i.e. 20%, which they allege as mandatory. Issue: WON 20% is a mere ceiling, not mandatory; WON Comelec gravely abused its discretion in issuing resolution proclaiming as winners several PL groups who lacked the 2% vote requirement, only to fill up the allocated PL seats Held: Yes, a ceiling; Yes, said resolution nullified Panganiban‘s Formula (b): may be replaced by the legislature via a statute a. No. of district representatives x 0.20 = No. of party lis .80

representatives

b. No. of votes of concerned party x No. of additional seats = Additional No. votes for first party

allocated to first party

seats

Ratio: 1. 2. 3.

PL system was devised to replace the reserve seat system; representation by election; PL representatives, by being voted, can rise up to the same dignity as those elected by the people Sec 5(2) of Art VI: PL representatives to constitute 20% of total number of representatives Requisites laid down by LG code: (a) 20% allocation; (b) 2% threshold (meaningful representation; prevent proliferation of small parties); (c) 3-seat maximum (to ensure entry of various parties; no single-group dominance); (d) proportional representation (additional seat in proportion to number of votes).

Bagong Bayani v. Comelec GR No. 147589 June 26, 2001 BANAT v. Comelec GR No.179271 April 21, 2009 Aquino v. Comelec Ponente: Facts: Petitioner Aquino ran – and won – as congressman in the new district of Makati. To meet the residence requirement he transferred from Tarlac and leased a condominium in Makati. Issue: WON Aquino had an actual change of domicile, hence making him a qualified candidate for congressman in Makati; WON second placer can be proclaimed winner when there is a disqualified winning candidate Held: (a) No; Domicile of origin is not easily lost. Petitioner failed to prove an actual removal or actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning former place of residence. (b) No. Votes for Aquino would not have gone automatically to Syjuco if the former was disqualified at the time of election. Ratio: 1.

Residency rule for local officials: Must be a resident of the district where seeks election at least one year prior to the elections. Rationale: to avoid strangers who will transplant themselves in the district for a chance to be elected (to the prejudice of actual residents), despite the fact that they are not familiar with the concerns and aspirations of that community.

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2.

3.

Residence = domicile, in political law. It is where the party ―actually or constructively has his permanent home.‖ Hence there must be ―clear and positive proof‖ showing a successful abandonment of—or removal from—previous domicile. HOR electoral tribunal only has jurisdiction over all contests involving the election, returns, and qualifications of candidates once they have become duly proclaimed members. Otherwise, Comelec has jurisdiction.

Marcos v. Comelec Ponente: Facts/Issue/Held/Ratio: 1.

2.

3. 4.

Held: Imelda Marcos‘ adoption of husbands domicile ceased upon the latter‘s death. There is no need for positive declaration. Hence she can run for public office in Tacloban because it was her domicile of origin, which is not easily lost. Padilla, J. (dissenting): Court must abandon Labo case which held that the second place not automatically winner when winning candidate is disqualified. Padilla said second placer must be automatic winner under the circumstances. Regalado, J. (dissenting): In the absence of affirmative evidence to the contrary, the presumption is that the domicile of wife follows that of her husband and will continue after his death. Davide, J. (dissenting): Burden of proof is upon the wife that she exercised her right to acquire her own domicile after husband‘s death.

Torayno v. Comelec GR No. 137329 August 9, 2009 2. Election a. Regular election b. Special election Tolentino v. Comelec 420 SCRA 438 January 21, 2004 3. Organizations and Sessions a. Election of Officers Santiago v. Guinggona GR No. 1345777 November 18, 1998 b. Quorum Avelino v. Cuenco Ponente: Per Curiam Facts: 1.

Summary: The Avelino I case illustrates judicial review of internal affairs of the legislature. The Court refused to look into the legality of the election of a Senate President, in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy and the Senate’s constitutional power to elect its own president

2.

Before the opening of a morning session of the Senate, Senators Lorenzo Tañada and Prospero Sanidad 3 prepared a resolution enumerating charges against the then Senate President Jose Avelino. AVELINO presided the session and called the meeting in order, and except for a senator who was confined in a 4 hospital and another who is in the United States, all the Senators were present.

3.

TAÑADA sought to be recognized, but AVELINO and his followers prevented TAÑADA from delivering his privilege speech. A commotion later ensued, upon which AVELINO and 9 other senators left the session hall. Subsequently, the Senate President Pro-tempore took the Chair and proceeded with the session. The remaining senators unanimously approved, among others, a resolution ―declaring vacant the position of the

BRYAN SJ: Among which were advocacy of the graft and corruption in the government (particularly those committed by the Liberal Party, to which AVELINO was a member); questionable possession of checks totaling more than P500,000 after AVELINO’s assumption of office; and justification of electoral fraud. 3

4

Similar to the 1987 Const, the Senate is composed of 24 senators under the 1935 Const.

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President of the Senate and designating… Mariano Jesus Cuenco Acting President of the Senate." The next day the President of the Philippines recognized CUENCO as acting Senate President. 4.

Hence, the present petition, AVELINO asking the Court to declare him the rightful Senate President and oust CUENCO.

Issue: WON SC has jurisdiction over the subject matter Held/Ratio: 6-4 vote)

1.

The issue of the validity of the election of the new Senate President is a political question.

2.

The answer is in the negative, in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. We should abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affects only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. If the majority of the Senators want AVELINO to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall, not in the Supreme Court.

3.

The Court will not sally into the legitimate domain of the Senate on the plea that our refusal to intercede might lead into a crisis, even a revolution. No state of things has been proved that might change the temper of the Filipino people as peaceful and law-abiding citizens. It is furthermore believed that the recognition accorded by the Chief Executive to CUENCO makes it advisable, to adopt the hands-off policy enunciated by this Court in matters of similar nature. c. Rules of Proceedings

Pacete v. Commission on Appointments Ponente: Fernando, J. Facts: Felizardo S. Pacete alleged that he was appointed by the then President of the Philippines on August 31, 1964 as Municipal Judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato. He assumed office on September 11, 1964 and discharged his duties as such. As his appointment was made during recess of Congress, it was submitted to the Commission on Appointments at its next session in 1965. Appointment was unanimously confirmed on May 20, 1965 (with Senate President and Chairman of Commission on Appointments Ferdinand Marcos even sending him a congratulatory telegram). Nine months after his confirmation, on February 7, 1966, the then Secretary of Justice advised petitioner to vacate his position as municipal judge. Petitioner was informed that on May 21, 1965, Senator Rodolfo Ganzon (a member of the Commission on Appointments) wrote to its Chairman stating that he was filing a motion for reconsideration of the appointment in view of derogatory information which he had received. Issue: 1. 2.

WON the filing of a motion for reconsideration with the Commission on Appointments (CA), without being acted on, suffices to set at naught a confirmation duly made of an ad interim appointment. WON the issue is a justiciable question, with the CA being an independent organ of the Constitution.

Held/Ratio: 1. As per Altarejos v. Molo, the confirmation stands; it must be given force and effect. Ratio Petitioner buttresses his plea for prohibition on the ground that the letter of then Senator Ganzon, even on the assumption that it was a motion to reconsider an appointment duly confirmed, was without force and effect as it was not approved by the body as a whole. Reasoning

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a. The controlling principle is supplied by Altarejos v. Molo, which interpreted Rule 21 of the Revised Rules of the Commission on Appointments, which reads: ―Resolution of the Commission on any appointment may be reconsidered on motion by a member presented not more than one (1) day after their approval. If a majority of the members present concur to grant a reconsideration, the appointment may be laid on the table, this shall be a final disposition of such a motion.‖ Holding of the Court was that the mere filing of a reconsideration did not have the effect of setting aside a confirmation. In the case, Aldeguer‘s (respondent in Altarejos case) theory would give to the mere filing of a motion for reconsideration the effect which it would have if the motion approved, and hence, would dispense with the necessity of such approval, for which the concurrence of a majority of the members present is necessary. This is inconsistent with Rule 21 of the Revised Rules of the Commission. In case of an adjournment sine die the period for filing the motion for reconsideration having expired, under Section 22, then the motion for reconsideration not having been acted upon is not approved and therefore, has no effect whatsoever. What is decisive is that a confirmation duly made is not nullified simply by a motion of reconsideration being filed, without its being voted upon and approved. b. ―The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the CA or until the next adjournment of Congress.‖ - A distinction is made between the exercise of such presidential prerogative requiring confirmation by the CA when Congress is in session and when it is in recess. In the former, the President nominates, and only upon the consent of the CA may the person assume office. As with ad interim appointments, the appointment takes effect at once. The appointment is effective until disapproval by the CA or until the next adjournment in Congress. There must either be a rejection by the CA or nonaction on its part. 2. The insistence of respondent that the question involved is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court is untenable. It would extend the boundaries of the political question doctrine beyond its legitimate limits. The courts are called upon to see to it that private rights are not invaded. - Although the CA is not a power in our tripartite system of government, it is to all intents and purposes, like the Electoral Tribunals, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ. Its actuation in the exercise of its power to approve appointment submitted to it by the President of the Philippines is exempt from judicial supervision and interference, except on a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the powers as will constitute a denial of due process. Arroyo v. De Venecia Ponente: Mendoza, J. Facts:   



5

A petition for certiorari and/or prohibition challenging the validity of Republic Act No. 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called ―sin taxes‖ on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes. Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit against respondents charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are ―constitutionally mandated‖ so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution. The law originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was approved on third reading and transmitted to the Senate which approved it with certain amendments on third reading on. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on November 21, 1996. At 11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier, proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech, after which he was interpellated. Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento was first to interpellate. He was interrupted when Rep. 5 Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of quorum . Rep. Antonio Cuenco objected to the motion and asked for a

Quorum – the minimum number of members (usually the majority of all the members) who must be present for a deliberative assembly to legally transact business

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head count. After a roll call, the Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) declared the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo appealed the ruling of the Chair, but his motion was defeated when put to a vote. The interpellation of the sponsor thereafter proceeded.  Petitioner Rep. Joker Arroyo registered to interpellate. In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did. What happened thereafter is shown in the following transcript of the session on November 21, 1996 of the House of Representatives, as published by Congress in the newspaper issues of December 5 and 6, 1996: MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move that we now approve and ratify the conference committee report. THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion? MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker? THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none, approved. (Gavel) MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want to know what is the question that the Chair asked the distinguished sponsor. THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There was a motion by the Majority Leader for approval of the report, and the Chair called for the motion. MR. ARROYO. Objection, I stood up, so I wanted to object. THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended for one minute. (It was 3:01 p.m.) (3:40 p.m., the session was resumed) THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed. MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four o‘clock, Wednesday, next week. THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned until four o‘clock, Wednesday, next week. (It was 3:40 p.m.)  On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.  Petitioners‘ principal argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House; that these rules embody the ―constitutional mandate‖ in Art. VI, §16(3) that ―each House may determine the rules of its proceedings‖ and that, consequently, violation of the House rules is a violation of the Constitution itself. They contend that the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is false and spurious. o (1) in violation of Rule VIII, §35 and Rule XVII, §103 of the rules of the House, the Chair, in submitting the conference committee report to the House, did not call for the yeas or nays, but simply asked for its approval by motion in order to prevent petitioner Arroyo from questioning the presence of a quorum; o (2) in violation of Rule XIX, §112, the Chair deliberately ignored Rep. Arroyo‘s question, ―What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?‖ and did not repeat Rep. Albano‘s motion to approve or ratify; o (3) in violation of Rule XVI, §97, the Chair refused to recognize Rep. Arroyo and instead proceeded to act on Rep. Albano‘s motion and afterward declared the report approved; and o (4) in violation of Rule XX, §§121-122, Rule XXI, §123, and Rule XVIII, §109, the Chair suspended the session without first ruling on Rep. Arroyo‘s question which, it is alleged, is a point of order or a privileged motion. It is argued that Rep. Arroyo‘s query should have been resolved upon the resumption of the session on November 28, 1996, because the parliamentary situation at the time of the adjournment remained upon the resumption of the session. o That the session was hastily adjourned and the bill certified by Speaker Jose De Venecia to prevent petitioner Rep. Arroyo from formally challenging the existence of a quorum and asking for a reconsideration.  Respondents‘ defense is anchored on the principle of separation of powers and the enrolled bill doctrine. o Argue that the Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of the rules of the House and that there is no justification for reconsidering the enrolled bill doctrine. o Although the Constitution provides in Art. VI, §16(3) for the adoption by each House of its rules of proceedings, enforcement of the rules cannot be sought in the court. o Contend that, in passing the bill which became R.A. No. 8240, the rules of the House, as well as parliamentary precedents for approval of conference committee reports on mere motion, were faithfully observed. Issue: WON Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting RA No. 8240 Held: NO, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED.

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Ratio: 1. What is alleged to have been violated in the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law. Therefore, it cannot be subject to judicial review.  Petitioners do not claim that there was no quorum but only that, by some maneuver allegedly in violation of the rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum.  Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the constitutional provision that ―each House may determine the rules of its proceedings‖ and that for this reason they are judicially enforceable. However, petitioners mistakenly cite the provision. Instead of supporting judicial review, it supports claims of autonomy of the legislative branch to conduct its business free from interference by courts.  Cases, both here and abroad, all deny to the courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals  Chief Justice Fernando, commenting on the power of each House of Congress to determine its rules of proceedings. o Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure. The above principle is subject, however, to this qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects persons other than members of the legislative body the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights i are involved.  No rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to this Court. We have no more power to look into the internal proceedings of a House than members of that House have to look over our shoulders, as long as no violation of constitutional provisions is shown.  Each of the three departments of our government has its separate sphere which the others may not invade without upsetting the delicate balance on which our constitutional order rests. Due regard for the working of our system of government, more than mere comity, compels reluctance on our part to enter upon an inquiry into an alleged violation of the rules of the House. We must accordingly decline the invitation to exercise our power. 2. The case does not present a situation in which a branch of the government has ―gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction‖ so as to call for the exercise of the court’s power.  Petitioners contend that under Art. VIII, §1, ―nothing involving abuse of discretion [by the other branches of the government] amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is beyond judicial review.‖  Implicit in this statement is an acknowledgment that the jurisdiction of this Court is subject to the case and controversy requirement and to the requirement of a justiciable controversy before courts can adjudicate constitutional questions.  The established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does not present a situation in which a branch of the government has ―gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction‖ so as to call for the exercise of our power. 3. Petitioners were not prevented from seeking reconsideration.  Petitioners claim that the passage of the law in the House was ―railroaded.‖ They claim that Rep. Arroyo was still making a query to the Chair when the latter declared Rep. Albano‘s motion approved.  What happened is that, after Rep. Arroyo‘s interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: ―There being none, approved.‖ At the same time the Chair was saying this, however, Rep. Arroyo was asking, ―What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?‖ The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader‘s motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair.  Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the rules of the House, Rep. Albano‘s motion for the approval of the conference committee report should have been stated by the Chair and later the individual votes of the Members should have been taken.

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  



 

There is no rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically requires that in cases such as this involving approval of a conference committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting. SG pointed out, the manner in which the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was approved was by no means a unique one. It has basis in legislative practice. Majority Leader Arturo Tolentino: The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the House. Insofar as the matter of procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent since I came here seven years ago, and it has been the procedure in this House that if somebody objects, then a debate follows and after the debate, then the voting comes in. The session was suspended to allow the parties to settle the problem, because when it resumed at 3:40 p.m. on that day Rep. Arroyo did not say anything anymore. While it is true that the Majority Leader moved for adjournment until 4 p.m. of Wednesday of the following week, Rep. Arroyo could at least have objected if there was anything he wanted to say. The fact, however, is that he did not. Instead of submitting the proper motions for the House to act upon, petitioners insisted on the pendency of Rep. Arroyo‘s question as an obstacle to the passage of the bill. But Rep. Arroyo‘s question was not, in form or substance, a point of order or a question of privilege entitled to precedence. The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court should not be concerned. Rep. Arroyo‘s earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo waived his objection by his continued interpellation of the sponsor for in so doing he in effect acknowledged the presence of a quorum.

4. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment.  Where there is no evidence to the contrary, this Court will respect the certification of the presiding officers of both Houses that a bill has been duly passed.  The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well established. It is cited with approval by text writers here and abroad. The enrolled bill rule rests on the following considerations: o As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the court to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.  Petitioners have advanced no argument to warrant a departure from the rule, except to say that, with a change in the membership of the Court, the three new members may be assumed to have an open mind on the question of the enrolled bill rule. They are simply banking on the change in the membership of the Court.  The due enactment of the law in question is confirmed by the Journal of the House of November 21, 1996 which shows that the conference committee report on H. No. 7198, which became R.A. No. 8240, was approved on that day. o The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by the Constitution to be recorded therein. The bill which became R.A. No. 8240 is shown in the Journal. Hence its due enactment has been duly proven. IN SUM, It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case may instead appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that body. SEPRATE OPINION Romero, J.

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1. The enrolled bill theory should not be discontinued, but its application must be limited to minor matters relating more to form and factual issues which do not materially alter the essence and substance of the law itself. CONCURRING and DISSENTING OPINION Puno, J. 1. Concurs: does not find any grave abuse of discretion committed by the respondents in granting the petition 2. Dissents: the court has jurisdiction over the petition and the issues are justuciable  In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to categorically reject the political question defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of power. For section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution was intentionally cobbled to empower courts ―x x x to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.‖ This power is new and was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from the US Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The CONCOM granted this enormous power to our courts in view of our experience under martial law where abusive exercises of state power were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the political question doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary vis-à-vis the Executive and the Legislative departments of government. In cases involving the proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus, it is now beyond dubeity that the government can no longer invoke the political question defense.  I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to this new constitutional provision as the case at bar once more calls us to define the parameters of our power to review violations of the rules of the House. We will not be true to our trust as the last bulwark against government abuses if we refuse to exercise this new power or if we wield it with timidity. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons or our own history should provide us the light and not the experience of foreigners. 2. Dissents from the majority insofar as it relied on the enrolled bill doctrine to justify the dismissal of the petition at bar  The principle of separation of powers is thus the principal prop of the enrolled bill doctrine. The doctrine is also justified as a rule of convenience. Supposedly, it avoids difficult questions of evidence. It is also believed that it will prevent the filing of too many cases which will cast a cloud of uncertainty on laws passed by the legislature. The conclusiveness of the enrolled bill is also justified on the ground that journals and other extrinsic evidence are conducive to mistake, if not fraud.  It is high time we re-examine our preference for the enrolled bill doctrine.  Recent case show that we have not blindly accepted the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill. Even in Tolentino, Mr. Justice Mendoza was cautious enough to hold that ―no claim is here made that the enrolled bill is absolute.‖ I respectfully submit that it is now time for the Court to make a definitive pronouncement that we no longer give our unqualified support to the enrolled bill doctrine.  There are compelling reasons for this suggested change in stance. o For one, the enrolled bill is appropriate only in England where it originated because in England there is no written Constitution and the Parliament is supreme. o For another, many of the courts in the United States have broken away from the rigidity and unrealism for the enrolled bill in light of contemporary developments in lawmaking. o And more important, our uncritical adherence to the enrolled bill is inconsistent with our Constitution, laws and rules.  The conclusiveness of an enrolled bill which all too often results in the suppression of truth cannot be justified under the 1987 Constitution. The Preamble of our Constitution demands that we live not only under a rule of law but also a regime of truth. Our Constitution also adopted a national policy requiring full public disclosure of all state transactions involving public interest. Any rule which will defeat this policy on transparency ought to be disfavored. And to implement these policies, this Court was given the power to pry open and to strike down any act of any branch or instrumentality of government if it amounts to grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It is time to bury the enrolled bill for its fiction of conclusiveness shuts off truth in many litigations. We cannot dispense justice based on fiction for the search for justice is the search for truth. I submit that giving an enrolled bill a mere prima facie presumption of correctness will facilitate our task of dispensing justice based on truth. * I didn‘t include Vitug‘s concurring opinion. d. Discipline of members Alejandrino v. Quezon

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Ponente: Malcolm, J. Facts: 1.

A resolution was adopted by the Philippine Senate composed of the respondent Senators, on February 5, 1924, depriving Senator Alejandrino of all the prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments of his office for the period of one year from the first of January, 1924 for disorderly conduct and flagrant violation of the privileges of the Senate for having assaulted the Honorable Vicente de Vera, Senator for the Sixth District.

2.

Petitioner contends that the resolution above quoted is unconstitutional and entirely of no effect, for five reasons.

3.

By special appearance, the Attorney-General, in representation of the respondents, has objected to the jurisdiction of the court, and later, by demurrer, has pressed the same point.

4.

this is, in effect, a suit instituted by one member of the Philippine Senate against the Philippine Senate and certain of its official employees.

Issue: WON the Supreme Court by mandamus and injunction may annul the suspension of Senator Alejandrino and compel the Philippine Senate to reinstate him in his official position? Held: NO Ratio: THE COURTS HAVE NO POWER TO DO AS REQUESTED. Because of the separation of powers, the general rule of mandamus is that the writ will not lie from one branch of the government to a coordinate branch, for the very obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other. Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its members, or its officers, to compel the performance of duties purely legislative in their character which therefore pertain to their legislative functions and over which they have exclusive control. The courts cannot dictate action in this respect without a gross usurpation of power. Precedents have held that where a member has been expelled by the legislative body, the courts have no power, irrespective of whether the expulsion was right or wrong, to issue a mandate to compel his reinstatement. PRECEDENT: 1.) Severino vs. Governor-General and Provincial Board of Occidental Negros The Attorney-General reached the conclusion that "we have no jurisdiction to interfere with the Governor-General of these Islands, as the head of the executive department, in the performance of any of his official acts." -the case relied on Mississippi vs. Johnson and Ord and Sutherland vs. Governor In the State of Mississippi vs. Andrew Johnson, President of the United States it was held that "The Congress is the Legislative Department of the Government; the President is the Executive Department. Neither can be restrained in its action by the Judicial Department; though the acts of both, when performed, are, in proper cases, subject to its cognizance.” In Sutherland vs. Governor of Michigan Judge Cooley, in part, said: ". . . Our government is one whose powers have been carefully apportioned between three distinct departments, which emanate alike from the people, have their powers alike limited and defined by the constitution, are of equal dignity, and within their respective spheres of action equally independent. Neither of the departments can operate in all respects independently of the others, and that what are called the checks and balances of government constitute each a restraint upon the rest. It is mainly by means of these checks and balances that the officers of the several departments are kept within their jurisdiction, and if power is usurped

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or abused, the remedy is by impeachment, and not by another department of the government attempting to correct the wrong by asserting a superior authority over that which by the constitution is its equal. No court can compel the Legislature to make or to refrain from making laws, or to meet or adjourn at its command, or to take any action whatsoever, though the duty to take it be made ever so clear by the constitution or the laws. (how preposterous!!!) Further, in French vs. Senate of the State of California the court held that under their form of government the judicial department has no power to revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative department, or of either house thereof, taken in pursuance of the power committed exclusively to that department by the constitution.." (note: the following has got to be the craziest reasoning of the court I‘ve heard…) The court mentions some of the criticisms of the previous principles herein mentioned ―so as to be fair to the petitioner‖ however, it says that it is too late for these criticisms to be raised since the court can no longer go back and revise previous decisions and overturn them. This, it says, is not only only impracticable but also impossible since at least two decisions of the United States Supreme Court are controlling. These criticisms are: That the three departments of government are independent in so far as they proceed within their legitimate province and perform the duties that the law requires; yet it has never been held that the executive was the sole judge of what duties the law imposes upon him, or the manner in which duties shall be exercised. The final arbiter in cases of dispute is the judiciary, and to this extent at least the executive department may be said to be dependent upon and subordinate to the judiciary. The court says : NO COURT HAS EVER HELD AND WE APPREHEND THAT NO COURT WILL EVER HOLD THAT IT POSSESSES THE POWER TO DIRECT THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OR THE LEGISLATURE OR A BRANCH THEREOF TO TAKE ANY PARTICULAR ACTION Neither does it have the authority to control the actions of subordinate employees acting under the direction of the Senate. The writ of mandamus should not be granted unless it clearly appears that the person to who it is directed has the absolute power to execute it.

On the merits of the controversy: The Organic Act authorizes the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands to appoint two senators and nine representatives to represent the non-Christian regions in the Philippine Legislature. These senators and representatives "hold office until removed by the Governor-General." (Organic Act, secs. 16, 17.) They may not be removed by the Philippine Legislature. (Alejandrino is an appointed Senator) Senate and the House of Representatives on the other hand have the power to "punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel an elective member." (Organic Act, sec. 18.) Either House Is the power to expel the same as the power to suspend? NO. Punishment by way of reprimand or fine vindicates the outraged dignity of the House without depriving the constituency of representation; expulsion, when permissible, likewise vindicates the honor of the legislative body while giving to the constituency an opportunity to elect anew; but suspension deprives the electoral district of representation without that district being afforded any means by which to fill the vacancy. Suspension is equivalent to qualified expulsion or removal. It is beyond the power of any branch of the Government of the Philippine Islands to exercise its functions in any other way than that prescribed by the Organic Law or by local laws which conform to the Organic Law. HOWEVERThe Supreme Court, out of respect for the Upper House of a coordinate branch of the government, takes no affirmative action.

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Osmena v. Pendatun Ponente: Facts: 1.

On June 23, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., in a privilege speech delivered before the House, made the serious imputations of bribery against the President. The House of Representatives, through Resolution No. 59, created a special committee of 15 members to investigate the truth of the charges against the President. It summoned Osmeña to appear before it to substantiate his charges.

2.

On July 14, 1960, Osmeña filed with the Supreme Court a petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Congressman Salipada Pendatun and the fourteen other members of the Special Committee. He asked that said resolution be annulled and that said members of the special committee be enjoined from proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the portion authorizing them to require him to substantiate his charges against the President, with the admonition that if he failed to do so, he must show cause why the House should not punish him. Osmeña alleged: (1) the Constitution gave him complete parliamentary immunity, and so, for words spoken in the House, he ought not to be questioned; (2) that his speech constituted no disorderly behaviour for which he could be punished; and (3) supposing he could be questioned and disciplined therefor, the House took up other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of the House provides that if other business has intervened after the Member had uttered obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be held to answer therefor nor be subject to censure by the House

3.

Aware of the petition, the special committee continued to perform its task, and after giving Osmena a chance to defend himself, submitted its report on July 18, 1960, finding said congressman guilty of serious disorderly behavior. Acting on such report, the House approved on the same day-before closing its sessionHouse Resolution No. 175, declaring him guilty as recommended, and suspending him from office for fifteen months.

4.

Thereafter, Osmeña took the additional position that the House has no power, under the Constitution, to suspend one of its members.

5.

On July 19, 1960, the respondents filed their answer, challenged the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the petition, defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension, upheld House Resolution No. .175 and then invited attention to the fact that Congress having ended its session on July 18, 1960, the Committee-whose members are the sole respondents-had thereby ceased to exist.

Issue: 1. 2. 3. 4.

WON the Constitution gives members of Congress complete parliamentary immunity for words spoken in the House WON the Speech of Osmeña constituted unruly behavior for which he could be punished WON Osmeña can be held to answer for or be censured by the House, given that other business had intervened after gave the speech in question WON the House has the power to suspend its members

Held/Ratio: 1. NO. Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution which provides that "for any speech or debate" in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representatives "shall not be questioned in any other place." This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause I of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States, wherein the provision has always been understood to mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. - Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the

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Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. 2. YES. The House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmeña's conduct constituted disorderly behavior, it would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government. The theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in such situation a prudent refusal to interfere. Each department, it has been said, has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. - "The Legislative power of the Philippine Congress is plenary, subject only to such limitations as are found in the Republic's Constitution. So that any power deemed to be legislative by usage or tradition, is necessarily possessed by the Philippine Congress, unless the Constitution provides otherwise." (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192, 212.) 3. YES. Resolution No. 59 was unanimously approved by the House, such approval amounted to a suspension of the House Rules, which according to standard parliamentary practice may be done by unanimous consent. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action when the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure." 4. YES. For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of Congress have been, or could be censured, committed to prison, suspended, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues. The practice and the traditional power of legislative assemblies to take, disciplinary action against its members, including imprisonment, suspension or expulsion have been recognized in the United States. The Rules of Philippine House of Representatives provide that the parliamentary practices of the Congress of the United States shall apply in a supplementary manner to its proceedings. Decision Petition DISMISSED. Santiago v. Sandiganbayan Ponente: Facts: Three Criminal Cases were filed against the petitioner Criminal Case #1 (filed in the Sandiganbayan) A group of Employees of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) filed a complaint against petitioner Mme. Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago for the legalization of the stay of 32 aliens who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984 in violation of Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which prohibits the legalization of the said disqualified aliens knowing fully well that said aliens are disqualified. Criminal Case #2 (filed in Manila RTC) Violation of PD No. 46 Criminal Case #3 (filed in Manila RTC) Libel For the case filed in Sandiganbayan, petitioner filed several cases in the attempt to enjoin Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the said case and to dismiss the 32 criminal informations. All three motions were repeatedly denied, along with respective petitions for certiorari.

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Meanwhile, while the court was resolving the criminal case on the 32 criminal informations that were filed, the prosecution filed on July 31, 1995 with the Sandiganbayan a motion to issue an order suspending petitioner. Santiago opposed the motion to suspend but to no avail. The order of suspension for 90 days was decreed on January 25, 1996. Hence this petition for Certiorari assailing the authority of the Sandiganbayan to decree the preventive suspension. Issue: 1.) WON Sandiganbayan had authority to order the peititioner‘s preventive suspension? 2.) WON the doctrine of separation of powers by itself may be deemed to have effectively excluded the members of Congress from Republic Act 3019 or its sanctions? Held: 1.) YES. 2.) NO. Ratio: SANDIGANBAYAN HAD THE AUTHORITY TO ORDER THE PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION OF THE PETITIONER. Section 13 RA 3019 Suspension and loss of benefits- any incumbent public officer against whom any valid criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code of for any offense involving fraud upon government of or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Xxx It is a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon the determination of the validity of the information filed before it. Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter of course. Preventive suspension is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. Section 13 does not state that the public officer must be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been charged. The requirement of valid information does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a presuspension proceeding bfore a trial on the merits proceeds. It does not contemplate a proceeding to determine the strength of the evidence of culpability against him, the gravity of the offense charged, or whether or not his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence before the court have a valid basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of the case. All it secures to the accused is the adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the proceedings against him. In her motion to quash informations, the court held that she had admitted hypothetically to the validity of the information by claiming that the acts complained of therein were authorized under Executive Order No. 324 and that the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Investigation Adopted the policy of approving applications for the legalization of spouses and unmarried, minor children of ―qualified aliens‖ even though they arrived in the Philippines after December 31, 1983. This behooved Sandiganbayan to discharge its mandated duty to issue the order of preventive suspension which is distinct from the power of the Congress to discipline its members. This was what the court held in PAREDES v. SANDIGANBAYAN, when Congressman Ceferino Paredes claimed that such preventive suspension issued by the Sandigan bayan is an encroachment of the prerogatives. THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS DOES NOT BY ITSELF EFFECTIVELY EXCLUDE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS FROM RA 3019 AND ITS SANCTIONS. Section 1, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution empowers the court to act to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

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When the question pertains to an affair internal to either Congress or the Executive, the court subscribes to the view that unless an infringement of any specific Constitutional proscription thereby inheres the Court should not deign substitute its own judgment over that of any of the two other branches of government. It is an impairment or a clear disregard of a specific constitutional precept or provision that can unbolt the steel door for judicial intervention. RA 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order. De Venecia v. Sandiganbayan GR No. 130240 February 5, 2002 e. Journal and Record 1) The Enrolled Bill Theory Casco Chemical Cp. V. Gimenez Ponente: Facts: Casco filed a petition for review of the Auditor General‘s decision to deny refund of margin fee for urea and formaldehyde (which the petitioner used in the manufacture of synthetic resin glue) which it claimed to be exempted from margin fees under RA 2609. Auditor of Central Bank refused to approve vouchers for the refund on the ground that the exemption granted by the Monetary Board is not in accord with RA 2609, Sec 2(18) which only exempts ―urea formaldehyde‖— the finished product, not the chemicals (as clarified by NIST). Issue: WON the enrolled bill—which uses the term ―urea formaldehyde‖—is conclusive upon the courts, despite mistake in the printing of the bill and individual statements made on the floor of the Senate. Held/Ratio: Yes. Decision is affirmed. If there is a mistake in printing, this may be corrected by an amendment or corrective legislation, not by judicial decree. 2) Probative Value of the Journal US v. Pons Ponente: Facts: Juan Pons et al, charged with illegal importation of opium. Each were found guilty of the crime and were charged – thus, the appeal of Juan Pons. In the motion, counsel of Pons alleged and offered to prove that the last day of the special session of the Philippine th Legislature for 1914 was the 28 day of February; that act no. 2381, under which Pons must be punished if found guilty, was not passed nor approved on or before the said date. But on March 1; (the journal stated that the session ended 12:00 midnight sine die, however, it is maintained with corroboration by witnesses that the clock was stopped and the session actually ended on the early hours of the day after) thus null and void. Issue: The vital question in this case is the date of adjournment of the legislature; which splits into two more issues: 1. 2.

How this is to be proved, whether by the legislative journals or extraneous evidence. Whether the court can take judicial notice of the journals

Held/Ratio: On WON the court can take judicial notice of the journals

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  



 

Rule 15 and 16 of the Legislative Procedure of the Philippine Commission provides ―that the proceedings of the Commission shall be briefly and accurately stated on the journal‖ and that it shall be the duty of the secretary ―to keep a correct journal of the proceedings of the Commission.‖ The Act of Congress, approved July 1, 1902, provides in Section 7, that the Philippine Assembly shall keep a journal of its proceeding, which shall be published. Section 275 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the existence of ―official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the US and the Philippines shall be judicially recognized by the court without the introduction of proof; but the court may receive evidence upon any of the subjects in this section stated, when it shall find it necessary for its own information, and may resort for its aid to appropriate books, documents, or evidence. Section 313 (as amended by sec. 1 of Act no. 2210) of the same code also provides that ―official documents may be proved as follows: (2) the proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or secretary or printed by their order: provided, that in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature where there is in existence a copy signed by the presiding officers and the secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provision of such Act and of due enactment thereof. In US, journals may be noticed by the courts in determining the question whether a particular bill became a law or not. Thus, the court must take judicial notice of the journal. The journals show that the Legislature adjourned sine die at 12 o‘clock midnight on February 28, 1914.

On whether or not it has to be proven through the legislative journals or through extraneous evidence  



Counsel for the appellant must necessarily depend upon the memory or recollection of witnesses while legislative journals are the acts of the government itself. To inquire into the veracity of the journals would be to violate the respect for a co-equal but separate branch of the government. The court held that if the clock was stopped, ―the resultant evil might be slight as compared with that of altering the probative force and character of legislative records, and making the proof of legislative action depend upon uncertain oral evidence, liable to loss by death or absence, and so imperfect on account of the treachery and memory.‖ This led to the adoption of the rule giving verity and unimpeachability to legislative records. To take this rule away for one purpose is to take it away for all, and the evidence of the laws of the state must rest upon a foundation less certain and durable than that afforded by the law to many contracts between private individuals concerning comparatively trifling matters. Imperative reasons of public policy require that the authenticity of laws should rest upon public memorials of the most permanent character. They should be public, because all are required to conform to them; they should be permanent, that rights acquired today upon the faith of what has been declared to be law shall not be destroyed tomorrow, or at some remote period of time by facts resting only in the memory of the individuals. 3) Matters to be entered in the Journal 4) Journal Entry Rule vs. Enrolled Bill Theory

Astorga v. Villegas Ponente: Facts: In March 1964 HB 9266 (An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of Manila etc.) was filed in the House. It passed on third reading sans amendments in April. When referred to the Senate for approval, upon second reading, many amendments were introduced, and approved by the Senate. When sent back to the House by the Secretary of the Senate, the Senate-approved amendments were not included, but only Sen. Roxas‘ minor amendment on succession which was made by his committee. The House approved this version. Copies were printed and attested by presiding officers including Senate President et al. The President also signed it in June, and the bill became RA 4065. The President and Senate President would later withdraw their signatures upon learning the circumstances. Vice-Mayor filed a petition for Mandamus and Prohibitory Injunction to compel respondents to comply with RA 4065. Issue:

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WON RA 4065 is valid, i.e. the resolution of both Houses was passed in pursuance of Art XV of 1935 Constitution (since the enrolled bill signed by the President was not the version approved by Congress). WON journal entry rule, and not the enrolled bill doctrine, should be adhered to. Held/Ratio: No. Yes. Under the Constitution, the bill is considered approved after it passed both Houses. In this case, the Senate President withdrew his signature so there was no valid passage. Morales v. Subido Ponente: Facts: The House submitted HB 6951 to the Senate. Sen. Rodrigo inserted the phrase below: ―[Chief of a Police Agency must be]…or any high school graduate who has served the police department of a city or who has served as an officer of the Armed Forces for at least 8 years…‖ This was approved by the Senate on the 3rd reading but when the bill emerged from the conference committee (enrolled bill), the part about serving the police department (under which the petitioner is qualified) was deleted. Petitioner argues that omission, whether deliberate or not, was made not by the legislators, but by Congress employees in the proofreading process. Issue: WON enrolled bill doctrine is controlling in this case, i.e. the judiciary ought to adopt a hands-off attitude in matters that took place prior to enactment of a law. Held/Ratio: Yes. The Court held that it cannot go behind the enrolled act to discover what really happened. This is in accordance to respect due to a co-equal branch of government.

5) Congressional Record f. Session 1) Regular sessions 2) Special sessions 3) Joint sessions 4. Salaries, Privileges, and Disqualifications a. Salaries Philconsa v. Mathay Ponente: Facts: Sec 1 of RA 4134 (approved 1964) provided for the increase in salary of members of Congress, to take effect in accordance with the Constitution. However, the budget for the fiscal year 1965-66 (RA 4642) implemented the increase in the salary of members of the HOR set by RA 4134—ahead of scheduled effectivity. The reason given is that the term of the members of the HOR who participated in approval of said Act would expire in 1965, while the term of 8 senators expires in 1969. Issue: WON Sec 14 of Art VI requires that not only the term of all members of the House but also all of the Senators who approved the increase must have fully expired before those increases become fully effective. Held/Ratio:

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Yes, so parts of RA 4642 are declared void. The provision speaks of the ―expiration of the full term.‖ The intendment of the law also requires the expiration of the full term of all members of the Legislature who approved the salary increase. Sec 14 of Art VI of the Constitution provides that no increase in the salary of members of Congress shall take effect ―until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase.‖ (deterrent) Logot v. Mathay Ponente: Facts: Rep. Ligot‘s term in Congress will expire December 30, 1969. He is entitled to retirement gratuity under Commonwealth Act 186, Sec 12(c) as amended by RA 4968. The incoming Members of Congress will have a salary increase from P7,200 to P32,000 as provided for under RA 4134. Petitioner argues that his retirement pay must be computed based on that salary increase, and not on his actual salary as Congressman. Auditor General denied his petition, as well as Rep. Singson‘s who had a similar case. Issue: WON his retirement pay should be computed based on the new increased salary, which he never received as an incumbent. Held/Ratio: No. As the Court held in Philconsa, any salary increase should not take effect until retirement of all legislators who approved it. To grant the petitioner‘s claim is a subtle way of increasing his compensation during his term of office and thus allow what the Constitution prohibits. b. Freedom from Arrest People v. Jalosjos Ponente: Facts: Rep. Jalosjos was convicted of statutory rape which is a non-bailable offense punishable by reclusion perpetua. He is reelected as congressman of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte. He claims that while the case is being appealed, he should be granted parliamentary immunity to discharge his duties as congressman (e.g. attend sessions etc.). To deny him this is to render inutile the voice of the people who gave him a fresh mandate, relying on the ruling in Aguinaldo vs. Santos (1992). Issue: WON membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons in general. Held/Ratio: No. The privileges and rights from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. Election to office does not exempt the official from restraints of general law. In fact, the higher the rank, the greater is the requirement of obedience rather than exemption. Furthermore, under Sec 11 of Art VI, the exemption from arrest while Congress is in session is restricted to offenses punishable by not more than 6 years imprisonment. Members of Congress cannot be compelled to attend sessions (Art VI, Sec 16) if the reason for the absence is a valid one. Aguinaldo vs. Santos involves the administrative removal of a public official and not imprisonment due to a criminal offense, which is an injury to the public that criminal law seeks to redress. This is particularly true in this case because Jalosjos has fled and evaded capture before, and may do so again if not detained. At the Bilibid Prison he is allowed to have an office where he can attend to his constituencies. c. Speech and Debate Clause

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Jimenez v. Cabangbang Ponente: Facts: In 1958 Cong. Cabangbang published in newspapers a letter to the President (while Congress is not in session) regarding a planned coup d‘etat. Planners were unnamed but the alleged instruments (petitioners) were identified. He was sued for libel. Issue: WON publication in question is a privileged communication, and if not, WON it is libelous. Held/Ratio: Yes. No. Such letter to the President when Congress is not in session, and the Congressman-writer is not performing his official duty, is not covered by the privilege under Sec 15 of Art VI. Moreover, the letter was not derogatory to the plaintiffs because it said that they may not be aware of the alleged coup plot. Hence there is no sufficient support for their action for damages. d. Disqualifications Adaza v. Pacana Ponente: Facts: Homobono Adaza was elected governor of Misamis Oriental in 1980. Elected vice-governor was Fernando Pacana. Their respective terms were to expire in 1986. In 1984, Adaza and Pacana both ran for the position of congressman which the former won. When Pacana assumed the governorship of Misamis Oriental, Adaza filed a suit, arguing that he was elected to that office for six years, and that, as is the practice in parliamentary governments of France et al, he can simultaneously hold both positions. He also contends that Pacana was deemed to have abandoned his post of vice-governor when he filed his candidacy for congressman. Issue: WON a provincial governor elected to the Batasan Pambansa can hold both offices simultaneously; WON a vicegovernor who ran, but lost, in the Batasan election, can continue serving as vice-governor. Held/Ratio: No, according to Sec 10, Art VIII of the 1973 Constitution (―A member of the National Assembly shall not hold any other office…‖) Yes, according to Sec 13(2) of Batasan Pambansa 697 (―[Members of sanggunian]…upon filing of certificate of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from office.‖). Puyat v. De Guzman Ponente: Facts: Events that took place in 1979: May 14—election of directors of private corporation IPI, with Puyat Group (PG) as majority over Acero Group (AG); May 25—AG filed a suit claiming that their votes were not properly counted; May 2531—petitoners claim that in conferences with SEC, assemblyman Justice Fernandez appeared as counsel for AG to which PG objected to on constitutional grounds (Sec 11, Art VIII of 1973 Constitution); May 31—when SEC case was called, it turned out that Fernandez purchased stock shares worth P200 on May 15, and filed a Motion to Intervene on May 31; July 17—SEC allowed him to intervene; July 3—Reyes of PG asked Court of First Instance to annul sale of shares, and a TRO was issued enjoining Fernandez from participating in said case; September 4—OSG sided with respondent SEC Commissioner De Guzman. Issue:

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WON Fernandez, as stockholder, may intervene in the SEC case without violating Sec 11, Art VIII of 1973 Constitution. Held/Ratio: No. Under the circumstances (i.e. suspicious acquisition of the nominal shares after the election of directors was contested; before he moved to intervene, he tried to be a counsel for AG, but was contested), the Court was constrained to find that there has been an indirect ―appearance as counsel before an administrative body‖ which is a circumvention of a Constitutional provision. SEC Order was reversed and set aside. e. Duty to Disclose 5. Electoral Tribunals Abbas v. SET Ponente: Gancayco, J. Facts: On October 9, 1987 the petitioiners filed before the SET an election contest against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in May 11, 1987 congressional elections by COMELEC. SET was composed of 3 Justices of the SC and 6 Senators. (Justices Yap, Narvasa and Gutierrez; Senator Estrada, Gonzales, Guingona, Lina Jr., Tamano and Ziga). Senator Joseph Estrada resigned from the SET, and was replaced by Senator Enrile. On November 17, 1987 petitioners filed with the SET a motion for disqualification or inhibation of the Senatormembers thereof from the hearing and resolution of the election contest on the ground that they are all interested parties to the case. Some members of the SET voluntarily inhibited themselves from participating in the hearing and deliberations of the tribunal in the cases against them. After the filing of respective memorandas and oral arguments, the motion for disqualification or inhibition and motion for consideration of the petitioners were denied. Hence, the present case.

Issue: Petitioners contend that consideration of public policy, fair play and due process require the mass disqualification of the SET‘s Senator-members. And that the SET‘s rules of procedure should be amended in order to permit the contest to be decided only by the 3 Justice-members. Held: The petitioner‘s proposal is constitutionally infirm. 1.

By providing for a Tribunal to be staffed by both Justices of the SC and Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those ―judicial‖ and ―legislative‖ components commonly share the duty and uthority of deciding all contests relating ti the election, returns and qualifications of Senators.

2.

The said intent is clearly signalled by the prescribed membership of the SET which is 2 to 1 (6 senators, 3 justices). It is an unmistakable indication that the legislative component cannot be totally excluded.

3.

Litigants must simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the Tribunal, Justices and Senators, singly and collectively.

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4.

Every member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective or partial judgment.

Ratio: The Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justice-Members alone the power of valid juirsidiction of a senatorial election contest. Bondoc v. Pineda Ponente: Grino-Aquino, J. Facts: In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano M. Pineda of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of the province of Pampanga. - On May 19, 1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the election with a lead of 3,300 votes. In due time, Bondoc filed a protest (HRET Case No. 25) in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which is composed of (9) members: 3 Justices of the Supreme Court and 6 members of the House of Representatives chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) as follows: AMEURFINA M. HERRERA

Chairman

Associate Justice, SC ISAGANI A. CRUZ

Member

Associate Justice, SC FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO

Member

Associate Justice, SC HONORATO Y. AQUINO

Member

Cong, 1st Dist., Benguet, LDP DAVID A. PONCE DE LEON

Member

Cong, 1st Dist., Palawan, LDP SIMEON E. GARCIA, JR.

Member

Cong 2nd Dist., Nueva Ecija, LDP JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR.

Member

Cong, 1st Dist., Davao del Sur, LDP JOSE E. CALINGASAN

Member

Cong, 4th Dist., Batangas, LDP ANTONIO H. CERILLES

Member

Cong, 2nd Dist., Zamb del Sur, (GAD, now NP).

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- July 1989 – Bondoc filed petition - Oct 1990 - Bondoc won over Pineda by a margin of twenty-three (23) votes. LDP members in the Tribunal insisted on a reappreciation and recount of the ballots cast in some precincts, delaying the finalization of the decision by at least (4) months. The reexamination and re-appreciation of the ballots resulted in increasing Bondoc's lead over Pineda to 107 votes. Cong Camasura voted with the SC Justices and Cong Cerilles to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest. - March 4, 1991 – Cong Camasura revealed to Cong. Jose S. Cojuangco, Jr., LDP Sec Gen that he voted for Bondoc in the final tally in the case. This revelation stirred a hornets' nest in the LDP which went into a flurry of plotting appropriate moves to neutralize the pro-Bondoc majority in the Tribunal. - March 5, 1991 - HRET issued a Notice of Promulgation of Decision on March 4, 1991 in HRET Case No. 25. - March 13, 1991 – Cong. Cojuangco informed Cong. Camasura by letter that on Feb 28, 1991 LDP had already expelled him and Cong Benjamin Bautista for having allegedly helped to organize the Partido Pilipino of "Danding" Cojuangco, and for having invited LDP members in Davao del Sur to join said political party. Cong Cojuangco notified Speaker Ramon V. Mitra about the ouster of the two congressmen from the LDP, and asked the HoR, through the Speaker, to take note of it especially in matters where party membership is a prerequisite. - March 14, 1991 - the Chairman of the Tribunal, Mme. Jus Herrera, received a letter dated March 13, 1991, from the Office of the Sec Gen of the HoR, informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the HoR decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Cong Camasura, Jr. to the House of Electoral Tribunal. - Justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano promptly apprised the CJ and Assoc Jus of the SC of this "distressing development' and asked to be relieved from their assignments in the HRET because promulgation of the decision previously scheduled for 14 March 1991, is sought to be aborted. The decision reached (5 to 4 vote) may now be expected to be overturned on a motion for reconsideration by the party-litigant which would have been defeated. It was also said that: > Proportional representation in the Tribunal (Art VI, Sec 17 Const) should be amended to provide instead for a return to the composition mandated in the 1935 Const: (3) members chosen by the House or Senate upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and (3) of the party having the second largest number of votes: and a judicial component consisting of three (3) justices from the SC > Suggestions: + The Senate Electoral Tribunal could sit as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the HoR and vice versa. So that there would be lesser chances of non-judicial elements playing a decisive role in the resolution of election contests. + There should also be a provision in the Constitution that upon designation to membership in the Electoral Tribunal, those so designated should divest themselves of affiliation with their respective political parties, to insure their independence and objectivity. (like that‘s possible) - During HRET open session, Tribunal issued a resolution canceling the promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 25 because the decision lacks the concurrence of the 5 members without Cong Camasura's vote as required by Sec 24 of the Rules of the Tribunal and, therefore, cannot be validly promulgated. - March 19, 1991 - SC declined the request of the justices to be relieved of their membership in the tribunal and directed them to do their duties. The court even said that all members of these bodies are appropriately guided only by purely legal considerations in the decision of the cases before them and that in the contemplation of the Constitution the members-legislators, sit in the Tribunal no longer as reps of their political parties but as impartial judges. The term of office of every member thereof should be considered co-extensive with the corresponding legislative term and may not be legally terminated except only by death, resignation, permanent disability, or removal for valid cause, not including political disloyalty. - March 21, 1991 - petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed by Dr. Bondoc against Reps Pineda, Palacol, Camasura, Jr., or any other rep who may be appointed Vice Rep and HRET praying this Court to: 1. Annul the decision of the HoR of March 13, 1991, 'to withdraw the nomination and to rescind the nomination of Rep. Camasura, Jr. to HRET 2. Issue a writ of prohibition restraining whomsoever may be designated in place of Camasura from assuming and discharging functions as a member of the HRET 3. Issue a writ of mandamus ordering Camasura to immediately reassume and discharge his functions as a member of the HRET; and 4. Grant such other relief as may be just and equitable. - The Court required the respondents to comment on the petition > Cong Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. did not oppose the petition. > Cong Marciano M. Pineda's plea for the dismissal of the petition as the Congress' is the sole authority that nominates and elects from its members. HRET allegedly has the sole power to remove any member whenever the ratio in the representation of the political parties in the House or Senate is materially changed on account of death, incapacity, removal or expulsion from the political party; that a Tribunal member's term of office is not co-extensive with his legislative term, for if a member of the Tribunal who changes his party affiliation is not removed from the Tribunal, the constitutional provision mandating representation based on political affiliation would be completely

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nullified; and that the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the LDP, is "purely a party affair" of the LDP and the decision to rescind his membership in the House Electoral Tribunal is the sole prerogative of the House-ofRepresentative Representatives, hence, it is a purely political question beyond the reach of judicial review. > Cong Magdaleno M. Palacol alleged that the petitioner has no cause of action against him because he has not yet been nominated by the LDP for membership in the HRET. Moreover, the petition failed to implead the House of Representatives as an indispensable party for it was the House, not the HRET that withdrew and rescinded Congressman Camasura's membership in the HRET. > Sol Gen also argued that the inclusion of the HRET as a party respondent is erroneous because the petition states no cause of action against the Tribunal. The petitioner does not question any act or order of the HRET in violation of his rights. What he assails is the act of the HoR of withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of Camasura as a member of the HRET. - Bondoc replied that HRET acknowledged that decision by canceling the promulgation of its decision in HRET Case No. 25 to his prejudice. Bondoc also explained that Cong Palacol was impleaded as one of the respondents because after the HoR had announced the termination of Cong Camasura's membership in the HRET several newspapers reported that the HoR would nominate and elect Palacol to take Camasura‘s seat in the Tribunal. Issue: WON the HoR can interfere with the disposition of an election contest in the HRET through "reorganizing" the representation in the tribunal of the majority party Held: - Sec 17 reechoes Sec 11, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution, except the provision on the representation of the main political parties in the tribunal which is now based on proportional representation from all the political parties, instead of equal representation of three members from each of the first and second largest political aggrupations in the Legislature. - The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal as judge of contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives (Robles vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5, 1990). The tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court. It is a non-political body in a sea of politicians. - To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the HRET must be independent. The Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ created for the specific purpose of determining contests relating to election returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly may not be interfered with by the judiciary when and while acting within the limits of its authority, but the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the commission as sole judge of all contests relating to the election and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139.) + Resolution of the House of Representatives violates the independence of the HRET. — The resolution of the HoR is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral Tribunal to be the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc. + Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET. — As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality, and independence even independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach of party discipline," are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. + Expulsion of Congressman Camasura violates his right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET as "sole judge" of congressional election contests are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Therefore, membership in the House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party, or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for "party disloyalty" short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another political group. As the records of this case fail to show that Congressman Camasura has become a registered member of another political party, his expulsion from the LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid cause; hence, it violated his right to security of tenure. - Since the expulsion of Cong Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal by the House of Representatives was not for a lawful and valid cause, but to unjustly interfere with the tribunal's disposition of the Bondoc case and to deprive Bondoc of the fruits of the Tribunal's decision in his favor, the action of the House of Representatives is clearly violative of the constitutional mandate (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)

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Ratio: The House Electoral Tribunal, being an agency independent of the legislature, may not be interfered with by the House Decision WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is granted. The decision of the HoR withdrawing the nomination and rescinding the election of Cong Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal is hereby declared null and void ab initio for being violative of the Constitution, and Cong Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. is ordered reinstated to his position as a member of the HRET. The HRET Resolution No. 91-0018 dated March 14, 1991, canceling the promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 25 ("Dr. Emigdio Bondoc vs. Marciano A. Pineda") is also set aside. Considering the unconscionable delay incurred in the promulgation of that decision to the prejudice of the speedy resolution of electoral cases, the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, and in the interest of justice, hereby declares the said decision DULY PROMULGATED, effective upon service of copies thereof on the parties, to be done immediately by the Tribunal. Costs against respondent Marciano A. Pineda. Codilla v. De Venecia GR No. 150605 December 10, 2002 Pimentel v. HRET Ponente: Carpio, J. Facts: On January 18, 2000, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters addressed to then Senate President Blas Ople, as Chairman of the CA, and to Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Jose A.R. Melo, as Chairman of the HRET. The letters requested Senate President Blas Ople and Justice Melo to cause the re-structuring of the CA and the HRET, repectively, to include party-list representatives to conform to Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which are: ―Sec. 17. The Senate and House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, thre of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six, shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.‖ ―Sec. 17. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in the case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.‖ Usually, the House constituted its HRET and CA contingent by electing its representatives to these 2 constitutional bodies. In practice, the procedure involves the nomination by the political parties of House members who are to occupy seats in the HRET and CA. From available records, it does not appear that after the May 11, 1998 elections the party-list groups in the House nominated any of their representatives to the HRET or the CA. The HRET and CA were composed solely of district representatives belonging to the different political parties. In its meeting of January 20, 2000, the HRET resolved to direct the Secreatary Tribunal to refer Senator Pimentel‘s letter to the Secretary General of the House of Representatives. Petitioners filed their petitions on February 2, 2000. Issue: 1. 2.

WON the present composition of the HRET and CA violates the constitutional requirement of proportional representation because there are no party-list representatives in the HRET. WON the refusal of HRET and CA to reconstitute themselves to include party-list representatives constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

Held: NO/NO Ratio:

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1.

2.

The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, w/in constitutionally defined limits, to choose from its district and party-list representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in HRET and the CA. The petitioners primary recourse rests with the House of Representatives and not with this Court. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, prior recourse to the House is necessary before petitioners may bring the case to the court. Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the Constitution state that party-list representatives must first show the House that they possess the required numerical strength to be entitled to seats in the HRET and CA. Moreover, facts show, at that time, that partylist groups merely refrained from participating in the election process (no mention of nominees) No grave abuse in the action or lack of action by the HRET and CA. Under Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the Constitution and their internal rules, the HRET and CA are bereft of any power to reconstitute themselves. Also, petitions have already been rendered academic with a new set of district representatives elected on May 14, 2001. 6. Commission on Appointments

Daza v. Singson Ponente: Cruz, J. Facts: 1. 2. 3.

House of Representatives appointed Rep. Daza as representative of the Liberal Party in the Commission of Appointments. Thereafter, 24 members of the Liberal Party resigned and joined Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) leaving Liberal Party with only 17 members. LDP had 159 members at that time. The House of Representatives revised its representation in the Commission on Appointments and withdrew the seat occupied by Rep. Daza. Rep. Singzon replaced Rep. Daza, representing LDP.

Issue: WON a political party, as stated in Sec 18 Art VI, should be registered in the COMELEC and should have political stability before it have representation in the Commission on Appointments [NO] Held/Ratio: 1. 2.

3. 4.

The change in the political alliances in the House of Representatives reflected a permanent change. The House of Representatives has the authority to change its representation in the Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its membership. The COMELEC has also granted the petition of the LDP for registration as a political party. Petition dismissed.

Coseteng v. Mitra Ponente: Facts: After the congressional elections of May 1987, the HOR, elected 11 out of 12 Congressmen into the Commission on th Appointments. Upon nomination of the Minority Floor Leader, the House added Roque Ablan as the 12 member of the Commission (representing coalesced minority in the House). A year later, the LDP was organized as the new majority party (w/158 out 202 members from the House). Thus, the House reorganized the Commission on Appointments in order to ensure party representation. Petitioner Coseteng requested Speaker Mitra to appoint her as a member of the Commission of Appointments and HRET. Said request was endorsed by 9 other Congressmen. The reorganization of the Commission took place as scheduled (the only change being the replacement of Daza w/ Singson). As a result, Coseteng and her party KAIBA filed this petition for extraordinary legal writs (w/c is considered a petition for quo warranto and injunction) praying this Court declare null and void the election of several

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Congressmen into the Commission. Her action is based on the theory that their election violated the constitutional mandate of proportional representation because of the ff. reasons: 1) 2) 3)

The LDP is only entitled to 9 seats out of 12 (they were given 10) The members representing the political parties had to be nominated by their respective parties Nomination and election of Verano-Yap and Ablan as representatives of the minority are invalid because they were neither nominated nor elected by such party.

Issue/Held/Ratio: (1) WON the members of the Commission of Appointments were chosen on the basis of proportional representation. Sub issue: WON this is a political question Yes. The petition is DISMISSED. (2) WON this is a political question This is NOT a political question and can still be decided upon by the Court under the expanded jurisdiction provided by Article 8, Sec. 1 of the Constitution. (3) WON the members of the Commission of Appointments were chosen on the basis of proportional representation. Pertinent in this case is Article 6, Sec. 18 of the Constitution: There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, 12 Senators, and 12 Members of the HOR elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties or organizations registered under the party list system represented therein. XXXXX The ruling LDP comprises 80% of the House. 80% of 12 members of the Commission would equal to 9.6 members (rounded off to 10). The remaining 2 seats are apportioned to 1) LP, the next highest party in the Coalesced Minority, and 2) KBL, as the principal opposition party. Such apportionment was done on the basis of political representation. The other political parties such as petitioner‘s KAIBA are bound by the majority‘s choices. Even if it were considered as an opposition party, it certainly isn‘t the PRINCIPAL as it only represents .4% of House membership (Coseteng is the sole member of KAIBA). It should be noted that to be able to claim proportional membership in the Commission, the political party should represent at least 8.4% of the House membership. Additionally: all the Commission members were properly nominated and elected under Article 6, Sec. 18 of the Constitution. Guinggona v. Gonzales Ponente: Facts: The Constitution (sec 18, Art VI) created a Commission of Appointments, of whose 12 seats for each house of legislature must be proportioned among the political parties thereof. The Senate‘s composition after the 1992 Elections were as such: LDP

–

15

NPC

–

5

LAKAS-NUCD

–

3

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–

LP-PDP-LABAN

1

The Senate promulgated this formula to distribute the seats amongst themselves: # of senators of a political party

x

12 seats

total # of senators elected Following this formula, this is how the distribution of the seats looks like: Political Party/Coalition

Membership

Seat s

LDP

15

7.5

NPC

5

2.5

LAKAS-NUCD

3

1.5

LP-PDP-LABAN

1

.5

The problem started when Sen. Romulo, the Majority Floor Leader, submitted 8 names to represent LDP. Sen. Guingona, the Minority Floor Leader, and Sen. Osmeña (the gay one) immediately objected to the eighth submission. To resolve the impasse, Sen. Tolentino suggested that the LDP have 8 seats, both NPC and LAKAS each have 2, and LP coalition have 1. This temporary arrangement, inspite of the vehement objections of Sen. Guingona and Sen. Osmeña, was approved. Sen. Guingona filed a petition to the Commission of Appointments for prohibiting the membership of Sen. Romulo as th the 8 senator of LDP and Sen. Tañada as the sole senator of LP on the grounds that the Tolentino compromise was in violation of the rule of proportional representation accorded by the Constitution (not mentioned how COA resolved this). The compromise gave an additional fraction of seat (and thus vote) to both LDP and LP and took away a fraction of seat/vote from both NPC and LAKAS. Issue/Held/Ratio: WON the seat held by Sens. Romulo and Tañada are constitutional No. The formula provided by the Senate is the best manner of application in implementing sec 18, Art VI of the Constitution. The problem though is what can be done of the fractional seat. The compromise seems to violate the Constitution since it therefore doesn‘t make the representation of the Senate in COA proportional. A party gains a seat while another loses one. The decision held in Tañada v. Cuenco (a fractional seat was given to Tañada) may not be used in this case. In that case (Tañada v. Cuenco) there were only two parties in the Senate and the minority party has only one Senator in it (meaning out of the 24 seats of the Senate 23 were from the majority and 1 was from the minority). In such a case, Tañada was given the extra seat since he alone represents the whole minority bloc. The case is different in this case where there are more than one alternative party. Proportional representation is made so as to place a check on the majority party and maintain the balance of power. In light of this, no party can claim more than what it is entitled to, more especially the majority party.

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In Philippine jurisprudence, a party/coalition must have two or more Senators to automatically have at least one seat in the representatives of the Senate in the Commission of Appointments. This has been established in Coseteng v. Mitra. This thereby automatically disqualifies Tañada. The LP need not worry since LP is still represented in the COA because Enrile, an LP member of the House has been appointed to the Commission. The LP also has the option to form a coalition w/ other Senate parties to gain a seat in the COA. The Senate need not appoint exactly 12 Senators to the COA. What is required is that the COA has at least 13 members (including the ex officio chairperson, so minus the chairperson, only 12 is needed) for it to function. This is because sec. 19, Art VI of the Constitution states that the COA may be called into session by 13 of its members. Now, the Rules of the COA states that there must be at least 4 members from each House for the Commission to work. Thus, insofar as the parties are proportionally represented, it doesn‘t matter if the Senate only appoints 8 members as long as the House can appoint (following the same proportional rule) 4 members; or that the Senate only appoints 6 members so long as the House can appoint 6 also. The seat of Sen. Romulo and Sen. Tañada is therefore invalidated, the former because it disturbs the proportionality of the representation in COA and the latter because his party/coalition did not garner more than two seats.

7. Powers of Congress a. General Plenary Powers b. Limitations on the Legislative Power 1) Substantive limitations 2) Procedural limitations 8. Legislative Process a. Requirements as to bills 1) As to titles of bills Tio v. VRB Ponente: Melencio-Herrera, J. Facts: A month after promulgation, PD 1994 amended the National Internal Revenue Code providing, inter alia: "SEC. 134. Video Tapes. — There shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax." Issue: Is the decree unconstitutional in view of the following attacks by petitioner? 1. Section 10 thereof, which imposes a tax of 30% on the gross receipts payable to the local government is a RIDER and the same is not germane to the subject matter thereof; 2. The tax imposed is harsh, confiscatory, oppressive and/or in unlawful restraint of trade in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution; 3. There is no factual nor legal basis for the exercise by the President of the vast powers conferred upon him by Amendment No. 6; 4. There is undue delegation of power and authority; 5. The Decree is an ex-post facto law; and 6. There is over regulation of the video industry as if it were a nuisance, which it is not." Held: NO Ratio:

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1.

The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof" is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related. The rule also is that the constitutional requirement as to the title of a bill should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. It should be given a practical rather than technical construction.

2.

The 30% tax imposed is not harsh nor oppressive. In imposing a tax, the legislature acts upon its constituents. The tax imposed by the DECREE is not only a regulatory but also a revenue measure prompted by the realization that earnings of videogram establishments of around P600 million per annum have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of an additional source of revenue. It is similar to the 30% amusement tax imposed or borne by the movie industry which the theater-owners pay to the government. The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry.

3.

The President may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders, or letters of instructions, which sharp form part of the law of the land. The said Amendment still pends resolution in several other cases, and the court reserves resolution of the question raised at the proper time.

4.

The grant in Section 11 of the DECREE of authority to the BOARD to "solicit the direct assistance of other agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement functions for the Board" is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion as to its execution, enforcement, and implementation. Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a "fixed and limited period" with the deputized agencies concerned being "subject to the direction and control of the BOARD."

5.

The DECREE is not violative of the ex post facto principle. That section 15 of the DECREE raises a violation of the decree when required proof of registration cannot be presented is an ex post facto law is untenable. There is no question that there is a rational connection between the fact proved, which is nonregistration, and the ultimate fact presumed which is violation of the DECREE, besides the fact that the prima facie presumption of violation of the DECREE attaches only after a forty-five-day period counted from its effectivity and is, therefore, neither retrospective in character.

6.

The video industry is not being over-regulated and being eased out of existence as if it were a nuisance. Being a relatively new industry, the need for its regulation was apparent. Public welfare is at bottom of its enactment, considering "the unfair competition posed by rampant film piracy and losses in government revenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that the activities of video establishments are virtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayor's permit and municipal license fees are required to engage in business."

6

What petitioner basically questions is the necessity, wisdom and expediency of the DECREE. These are primarily and exclusively a matter of legislative concern. "Only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to be. The principle of separation of powers has in the main wisely allocated the respective authority of each department and confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There would then be intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion of a corporate branch, the judiciary would substitute its own. If there be adherence to the rule of law, as there ought to 6

All videogram establishments in the Philippines are hereby given a period of forty-five (45) days after the effectivity of this Decree within which to register with and secure a permit from the BOARD to engage in the videogram business and to register with the BOARD all their inventories of videograms, including videotapes, discs, cassettes or other technical improvements or variations thereof, before they could be sold, leased, or otherwise disposed of. Thereafter any videogram found in the possession of any person engaged in the videogram business without the required proof of registration by the BOARD, shall be prima facie evidence of violation of the Decree, whether the possession of such videogram be for private showing and/or public exhibition."

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be, the last offender should be courts of justice, to which rightly litigants submit their controversy precisely to maintain unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms and prescriptions. The attack on the validity of the challenged provision likewise insofar as there may be objections, even if valid and cogent, on its wisdom can't be sustained." Lidasan v. Comelec Ponente: Facts/Issue/Held/Ratio: Background: RA 4790, creating the municipality of Dianaton in the province of Lanao del Sur, included as part of the new municipality a total of 12 barrios from the neighboring province of Cotabato. Petitioner, a resident of one of the barrios taken from Cotabato, filed an action to declare the act unconstitutional. RD: 3. The title of RA 4790 is misleading as it does not say that part of the territory of the province of Cotabato is being transferred to Lanao del Sur. The subject of a bill should be expressed in the title. 4. When part of a statute is held unconstitutional and the remainder valid, the parts will be separated and the constitutional portion upheld. But when the parts are mutually dependent & not separable, the entire statute must be void. Art VI Sec. 26 (1) - Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. Cruz v. Paras Ponente: Fernando, J. Facts: On November 5, 1975, two cases for prohibition with preliminary injuction were filed with the Bulacan CFI. Petitioners were previously issued licenses by the Municipal Mayor of Bocaue—Torres III since 1958, De la Cruz since 1960, Alipio since 1961, Corpuz since 1972. They invested large sums of money. Their night clubs are well-lighted and without partitions. They do not allow the hospitality girls to engage in immoral acts or go out with customers. These girls have their periodic medical check-ups and none suffers from venereal diseases. Girls who fail to submit their check-up results or those who contracted such diseases are not allowed to work. Crime rate there is better than in other parts of Bocaue or in other towns of Bulacan. Their allegations: 1) Ord No. 84 is null and void as a municipality has no authority to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling; 2) Ordinance is violative of the petitioners‘ right to die process and the equal protection of the law, as the license previously given to petitioners was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing; 3) That under PD 189, as amended, by PD 259, the power to license and regulate tourist-oriented businesses including night clubs, has been transferred to the Department of Tourism. Answers to allegations: 1) The Municipal Council is authorized by law not only to regulate but to prohibit the establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs invoking Section 2243 of the RAC, CA 601, RA Nos. 938, 978 and 1224; 2) Ord No 84 is not violative of petitioners‘ right to due process and the equal protection of the law, since property rights are subordinate to public interests (Good God!). On January 15, 1976 Ordinance No 84 was declared by RTC as constitutional and valid. Ordinance No. 84: ―Section 1.—Title of Ordinance.—This ordinance shall be known and may be cited as the [Prohibition and Closure Ordinance] of Bocaue, Bulacan. Section 2.—Definition of Terms—(a) ‗Night Club‘ shall include any place or establishment selling to the public food or drinks where customers are allowed to dance. (b) ‗Cabaret‘ or ‗Dance Hall‘ shall include any place or establishment where dancing is permitted to the public and where professional dancers are employed. (c) ‗Professional hostesses‘ or ‗hospitality girls‘ shall include any woman employed by any of the establishments herein defined to entertain guests and customers at their table or to dance with them. (d) ‗Professional dancer‘ shall include any woman who dances at any of the establishments herein defined for a fee or remuneration paid directly or indirectly by the operator or by the persons she dances

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with. (e) ‗Operator‘ shall include the owner, manager, administrator or any person who operates and is responsible for the operation of any night club, cabaret or dance hall. Section 3.—Prohibition in the Issuance and Renewal of Licenses, Permits.—Being the principal cause in the decadence of morality and because of their other adverse effects in the community as explained above, no operator of night clubs, cabarets or dance halls shall henceforth be issued permits/licenses to operate within the jurisdiction of the municipality and no license/permit shall be issued to any professional hostess, hospitality girls and professional dancer for employment in any of the aforementioned establishments. The prohibition in the issuance of licenses/permits to said persons and operators of said establishments shall include prohibition in the renewal thereof. Section 4.—Revocation of Permits and Licenses.—The licenses and permits issued to operators of night clubs, cabarets or dance halls which are now in operation including permits issued to professional hostesses, hospitality girls and professional dancers are hereby revoked upon the expiration of the thirty-day period given them as provided in Section 8 hereof and thenceforth, the operation of these establishments within the jurisdiction of the municipality shall be illegal. Section 5.—Penalty in case of violation.—Violation in any of the provisions of this Ordinance shall be punishable by imprisonment not exceeding three (3) months or a fine not exceeding P200.00 or both at the discretion of the Court. If the offense is committed by a juridical entity, the person charged with the management and/or operation thereof shall be liable for the penalty provided herein. Section 6.—Separability Clause.—If, for any reason, any section or provision of this Ordinance is held unconstitutional or invalid, no other section or provision hereof shall be affected thereby. Section 7.—Repealing Clause.—All ordinance, resolutions, circulars, memoranda or parts thereof that are inconsistent with the provisions of this Ordinance are hereby repealed. Section 8.—Effectivity.—This Ordinance shall take effect immediately upon its approval; provided, however, that operators of night clubs, cabarets and dance halls now in operation including professional hostesses, hospitality girls and professional dancers are given a period of thirty days from the approval hereof within which to wind up their businesses and comply with the provisions of this Ordinance.‖ RTC Ratio: ―Those who lust cannot last (Ahahaha!)…[O]bedient to the mandates of good government, and cognizant of the categorical imperatives of the current legal and social revolution, hereby [upholds] in the name of police power the validity and constitutionality of Ord No. 84…‖ Issue: WON a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan,…can prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses. Held: No. Writ of Certiorari is granted and the decision of the lower court dated January 15, 1976 reversed, set aside, and nullied. Ord No 84, Series of 1975of the Municipality of Bocaue is declared void and unconstitutional. The TRO issued by this Court is hereby made permanent. No costs. Ratio: Police power is insufficient to justify the enactment of the ordinance. Through police power, municipal corporations can enact ordinances for regulation that will provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein. Laws enacted are valid unless they go against the Constitution. If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, the ordinance would be valid. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field. The ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. In the guise of police regulation, there was a clear invasion of personal or property rights: personal, in the case of those individuals desirous of patronizing those night clubs, and property in terms of the investments made and salaries to be earned by those employed. There was a reference to RA 938 enacted on June 20, 1953 entitled: ―An Act Granting Municipal or City Boards and Councils the Power to Regulate the Establishment, Maintenance and Operation of Certain Places of Amusement Within Their Respective Territorial Jurisdictions.‖ Its first section says: ―The municipal or city board or council…shall have the power to regulate by ordinance the establishment…‖ On May 21, 1954, the first section

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was amended to include not merely ―the power to regulate, but likewise ―prohibit…‖‖ The title, however, remained the same, exactly worded as RA 938. The power granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition. To construe RA 938 as allowing the prohibition of the operation of night clubs would give rise to a constitutional question. Article VIII, Section 19 par. 1 of the Constitution mandates: ―Every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.‖ It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that between two possible interpretations by one of which it will be free from constitutional infirmity and by the other tainted by such grave defect, the former is to be preferred. The general welfare clause, a reiteration of the Administrative Code provision, is set forth in the first paragraph of Section 149 defining the powers and duties of the sangguniang bayan: ―Enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety…‖ It shall ―(rr) Regulate cafes, restaurants…; (ss) Regulate public dancing schools, public dance halls…; (tt) Regulate the establishment and operation of billard pools…‖ It is clear the municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. A refusal to grant licenses, because no such business could legally open, would be subject to judicial correction. That is to comply with the legislative will to allow the operation and continued existence of night clubs subject to appropriate regulations. This decision should not be interpreted as a retreat from its resolute stand sustaining police power legislation to promote public morals. Distinct from Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Assn, Inc. v City Mayor of Manila where the statute merely regulated the mode in which it may conduct business in order to put an end to practices encouraging vice and morality, what is involved here is a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit, which is unconstitutional. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 p22 Part 3 Ch 2. F. 4. Legislative Process b. Formal Requirements Tobias v. Abalos Ponente: Facts: As taxpayers and residents of mandaluyong, petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No. 7675 otherwise known as ―An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as City of Mandaluyong. Prior to the enactment of the statute, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to one legislative district. Hon Congressional representative Hon. Ronaldo Zamora sponsored the bill and signed by pres. Fidel Ramos becoming RA No. 7675. A plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994. The turnout of the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population: 18, 621 voted ―yes‖ while 7,911 voted ―no‖. Thus, RA 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect. Issue: 1)

RA No 7675 specifically Art VIII Sec 49 thereof is unconstitutional for being violative of three specific provisions of the Constitution. First objection is that it contravenes the ―one-subject-one bill‖ rule as enunciated in Art VI section 26(1) of the Constitution (every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.) this section embraces two principal subjects 1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a HUC and 2) the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.

2)

Second and third objection involve Art VI, Sec 5 (1) and (4) of the COnsti. Petitioners argue that division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts has resulted in increase in the composition of the House of representatives and that it preempts the right of Congress to reapportion legislatives districts pursuant to Sec 5(4).

Held: Contentions are devoid of merit. The petition is DISMISED for lack of merit.

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Ratio: 1)

The creation of separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of conversion into a HUC but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a HUC. A liberal construction of the ―one title-one subject‖ rule, it should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement is the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions germane to that general subject

2)

Statutory conversion of Mandaluyong into HUC with a population of not less than 250 thousand indubitably ordains compliance with the one city, one representative proviso in the constitution—the said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular congressional processes including due consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment of separate legislative districts.

3)

The present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The phrase ―unless otherwise provided by law‖ indicates that composition of Congress may be increased if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment—therefore increase is not unconstitutional

4)

Congress drafted and deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law- Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself (reapportioning of legislative districts

5)

The principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city—the inhabitants of san juan were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of mandaluyong

6)

On the issue of GERRYMANDERING: (practice of creating legislative districts to favor a particular candidate or party)—rep Ronald Zamora, author of the law is the incumbent representative of the former San Juan/mandaluyong district-by dividing the district his constituency has in fact been diminished and not favorable to him

2) Requirements as to certain laws a) Appropriation laws Demetria v. Alba Ponente: Fernan, J. Facts: - Petitioners, in this petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction assailed the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise known as the ―Budget Reform Decree of 1977‖ on the ff. grounds: o it infringes upon the fundamental law by authorizing the illegal transfer of public moneys o it is repugnant to the constitution as it fails to specify the objectives and purposes for which the proposed transfer of funds are to be made o it allows the President to override the safeguards, form and procedure prescribed by the Constitution in approving appropriations o it amounts to undue delegation of legislative powers o the transfer of funds by the President and the implementation thereof by the Budget Minister and the Treasurer are without or in excess of their authority and jurisdiction - Solicitor General, for the public respondents, questioned the legal standing of petitioners. He further contended that: o The provision under consideration was enacted pursuant to Section 16(5), Art.VIII of the 1973 Constitution o Prohibition will not lie form one branch of the government to a coordinate branch to enjoin the performance of duties within the latter‘s sphere of responsibility - On February 27, the Court required petitioners to file a Reply to the Comment

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- Petitioners stated that as a result of the change in the administration, there is a need to hold the resolution of the present case in abeyance - The Solicitor General filed a rejoinder with a motion to dismiss setting forth as ground therefore, abrogation of Section 16(5), Art.VIII of the 1973 Constitution by the Freedom Constitution, rendering the petition moot and academic Issue: 1. WON the case is justiciable 2. WON the Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 is unconstitutional Held/Ratio: 1. YES - The court cited Ecelio Javier v. COMELEC where it said that: ―This Court will not disregard and in effect condone wrong on the simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case has become moot and academic.‖ - As regards taxpayers‘ suit, this Court enjoys that open discretion to entertain the same or not - Where the legislature or the executive branch acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the government had assumed to do, as void. This is the essence of judicial power conferred by the Constitution ―in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.‖ 2. YES. Paragraph 1of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, being repugnant to Section 16(5) Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, is null and void. - Paragraph 1 of Section 44 provides: ―The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.‖ - Section 16(5) Article VIII reads as follows: ―No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.‖ - Prohibition to transfer was explicit and categorical - For flexibility, the Constitution provided a leeway - The purpose and condition for which funds may be transferred were specified - Paragraph 1 of Section 44 unduly over-extends the privilege granted under Section 16(5), and empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard to WON the funds to be transferred are savings, or WON the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which the transfer is to be made - It completely disregards the standards set in the fundamental law, amounting to an undue delegation of legislative power

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Guingona v. Caraque 196 SCRA 221 (1991) Philconsa v. Enriquez Ponente: Facts/Issue/Held/Ratio: Background: The General Appropriations Bill for the fiscal year 1994 has already been passed by Congress on Dec. 17, 1993 and submitted it to the President for approval. On Dec. 30, 1993 the President signed the bill into law, GAA of 1994. On the same day, the President delivered his veto on some provisions and items. Hence, the petitions contesting the constitutionality of his vetoes. Issues: (1) WON the petitioners have legal standing RD: A member of Congress has the legal standing to question the validity of a presidential veto or any other act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress. (2) WON the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) or ―pork barrels‖ is an encroachment by the legislature on executive power, since said power in an appropriation act is in implementation of a law RD: The power of appropriation lodged in Congress carries with it the power to specify the project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law, but it is still the executive that implements the project or activity specified to be funded. [3] WON the act of Congress giving debt service and not education as the highest priority in the allocation of budget unconstitutional RD: The constitutional provision which directs the State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education is merely directory. Art XIV Sec 5(5)- The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education and ensure that teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment. [4] WON veto of the special provision of Article 48 of the GAA of 1994 in the appropriation for debt service without vetoing the entire P86.3 B for said purpose is unconstitutional RD: Any provision which does not relate to any particular item, or which extends in its operation beyond an item of appropriation, is considered ―an inappropriate provision‖ which can be vetoed separately from an item. This ratio was imported from Gonzales v Macaraig regarding the President‘s item veto-power. Art VI Section 27(2) - The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but veto shall mot affect the item or items to which he does not object. Note: The present Constitution only states item-veto but nothing specifies provision veto. However, jurisprudence (Gonzales v Macaraig and PHILCONSA v Enriquez) tackles the question on provision veto, which actually was expressly provided in the 1935 Constitution.) b) Tax laws Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance Ponente: Facts:

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- These are original actions in SC. Certiorari and prohibition, challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716. - RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system by amending National Internal Revenue Code. - Bet Jul 22, 1992 and Aug 31, 1993, bills were introduced in House of Reps to amend NIRC relative to VAT. These were referred to House Ways and Means Committee w/c recommended for approval H No 11197. - H No. 11197 was considered on second rdg and was approved by House of Reps after third and final rdg. - It was sent to Senate and was referred to the Senate Committee on Ways and Means. The Committee submitted report recommending approval of S No 1630, submitted in substitution of S No 1129, taking into consideration PS Res No 734 and H No 11197 - Senate approved S No 1630 on second rdg, and on third rdg by affirmative votes of 13 and 1 abstention. - H No 11197 and S No 1630 were referred to conference committee w/c after meeting 4 times, recommended that HB in consolidation w/ SB be approved in accordance w/ bill as reconciled and approved by the conferees. - The Conference Committee Bill was approved by House of Reps and Senate. The enrolled bill was presented to President who, on May 5, 1994 signed it. It became RA 7716. On May 12, it was published in 2 newspapers of gen circulation and it took effect on May 28. - RA 7716 amended § 103 and made print media subject to VAT in all aspect of operations. However, Sec of Finance issued Revenue Regulations No. 11-94 exempting circulation income of print media. Income fr advertisements are still subject to VAT. - Implementation was suspended until Jun 30 to allow time for registration of businesses. Implementation was stopped by TRO fr Court, by vote of 11 to 4. - Petitioners contend: Re: Art VI Sec 24 1. Although H No 11197 originated fr House of Reps, it was not passed by Senate but was consolidated w/ Senate version in the Conference Committee to produce the bill. The verb ―shall originate‖ is qualified by the word ―exclusively‖. 2. The constitutional design is to limit Senate‘s power in revenue bills to compensate for the grant to the Senate of treaty-ratifying power. 3. S No 1630 was passed no in substitution of H No 11197 but of another Senate bill (S No 1129). Senate merely took H No 11197 into consideration in enacting S No 1630. Re: Art VI Sec 26(2) 1. The second and third rdgs were on the same day, Mar 24, 1994. 2. The certification of urgency was invalid bec there was no emergency. The growing budget deficit was not an unusual condition in this country. 3. Also, it was S No 1630 that was certified urgent, not H No 11197. Re: BCC acted within its power 1. RA 7716 is the bill which the BCC prepared. BCC included provisions not found in the HB or SB and these were ―surreptitiously‖ inserted. BCC met behind closed doors.

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2. Incomplete remarks of members are marked in the stenographic notes by ellipses. 3. The Rules of the two chambers were disregarded in preparation of BCC Report because Report didn‘t contain ―detailed and explicit statement of changes‖ 4. It is required that the Committee‘s report undergo three rdgs in the two houses. - Petitioner Philippine Airlines Inc contends: Re: Art VI Sec 26(1) 1. Neither H No 11197 nor S No 1630 provided for removal of exemption of PAL transactions fr payment of VAT and this was made only by the BCC. This was not reflected in the title. 2. Besides, amendment of PAL‘s franchise may be made only by special law which will expressly amend the franchise (§24 of PD 1590). - Petitioner Cooperative Union of the Philippines contends: Re: Art III Sec 1 1. Withdrawal of exemption of some cooperatives while maintaining that granted to electric cooperatives not only goes against policy to promote cooperatives but also violate equal protection of law. Petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association contends: 2. VAT will reduce mark up of its members by as much as 90%. Petitioner Philippine Press Institute contends: 3. VAT will drive some of its members out of circulation. - Petitioner Philippine Press Institute contends: Re: Art III Sec 4 1. It questions law bec exemption previously granted to press under NIRC was withdrawn. Although exemption was subsequently restored, PPI says there‘s possibility that exemption may still be removed by mere revocation by Secretary of Finance. Also, there is still unconstitutional abridgment of press freedom because of VAT on gross receipts on advertisements. 2. RA 7716 singled out press for discriminatory treatment, giving broadcast media favored treatment. 3. Imposing VAT only on print media whose gross sales exceeds P480,000 but not more than P750,000 is discriminatory. 4. The registration provision of the law is invalid when applied to the press. - Petitioner Philippine Bible Society contends: Re: Art III Sec 5 1. Secretary of Finance has no power to grant tax exemption because that power is vested in Congress and the Secretary‘s duty is to execute the law and the removal of exemption of religious articles violates freedom of thought/conscience.

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- Petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association contends: Re: Art III Sec 10 1. Imposition of VAT violates constitutional provision on no law impairing obligation of contracts - Petitioner Philippine Educational Publishers Association contends: Re: Art II Sec 17 1. Increase in price of books and educ materials will violate govt mandate to prioritize education Issue: Procedural 1. WON there‘s violation of Art VI § 24 of Consti (revenue bill originating exclusively fr House of Reps) 2. WON there‘s violation of Art VI § 26(2) of Consti (three readings on separate days) 3. WON the Bicameral Conference Committee acted within its power 4. WON there‘s violation of Art VI § 26(1) of Consti (only one subject which is expressed in title) / WON amendment of § 103 of NIRC is fairly embraced in title of RA 7716 although no mention is made therein Substantive: 5. WON Art III § 1 (deprivation of life/liberty/property; equal protection) is violated 6. WON Art III § 4 (freedom of speech/expression/press) is violated 7. WON Art III § 5 (free exercise of religion) is violated 8. WON Art III § 10 (no law impairing obligation of contracts) is violated 9. WON Art VI § 28(1) (uniform/equitable; evolve progressive system of taxation) is violated 10. WON Art VI § 28(3) (church/parsonage etc. for religious purpose exempt) is violated 11. WON Art II § 17 (gov‘t priority on education, science and tech) is violated Held/Ratio: - Not all are judicially cognizable, bec not all Consti provisions are self executing. Other govt depts. are also charged w/ enforcement of Consti.

Procedural Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of the RA must be resolved in its favor. An enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of its provisions but also of its due enactment. This is not to say that the enrolled bill doctrine is absolute. But where allegations are nothing more than ―surreptitiously‖ inserting provisions, SC declines going behind enrolled copy of bill. SC gives due respect to other branches of gov‘t.

1. NO there is no violation of Art VI Sec 24

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a. It‘s not the law but the revenue bill which is required to originate exclusively in the House of Reps. A bill originating in House may undergo extensive changes in Senate. To insist that a revenue statute (and not the bill) must be the same as the House bill would deny the Senate‘s power to concur with and propose amendments. It would violate coequality of the legislative power of the two houses. b. Legislative power is issue here. Treaty-ratifying power is not legislative power but an exercise of check on executive power. c. There‘s no difference bet Senate preserving house bill then writing its own version on one hand and on the other hand, separately presenting a bill of its own on the subject matter. Consti simply says that it‘s the initiative for filing the bill that must come fr House of Reps. The Reps are expected to be more sensitive to the local needs. Nor does Consti prohibit filing in Senate of substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of bill fr House so long as action by Senate is withheld pending receipt of House bill. It was only after Senate rcvd H No 11197 that legislation in respect of it began w/ referral to Senate Committee on Ways and Means.

2. NO there is no violation of Art VI Sec 26(2) a. It was because Pres certified S No 1630 as urgent. This certification dispensed w/ printing and rdg the bill on separate days. The phrase ―except when the President certifies to the necessity…‖ qualifies two stated conditions: (1) the bill has passed 3 rdgs on separate days and (2) it has been printed in final form and distributed 3 days before finally approved. To construe that the ―except‖ clause dispenses only with printing would violate grammar rules and would also negate the necessity of the immediate enactment of the bill. Example is RA 5440 which had 2

nd

rd

and 3 rdgs on the same day after bill had been certified urgent.

b. No Senator controverted factual basis of the certification and this should not be rvwd by the Court. c. It was S No 1630 that Senate was considering. When matter was before the House, Pres likewise certified H No 9210 then pending.

3. YES the BCC acted within its power a. ―Give and take‖ often marks the proceedings of BCC. There was also nothing unusual in the executive sessions of the BCC. Under congressional rules, BCCs are not expected to make material changes but this is a difficult provision to enforce. The result could be a third version, considered an amendment in nature of substitute, the only requirement rd that the 3 version be germane to subject of the HB and SB. It is w/in power of BCC to include an entirely new provision. After all, report of BCC is not final and still needed approval of both houses to be valid. b. This could have been caused by stenographer‘s limitations or to incoherence that sometimes characterize conversations. c. Report used brackets and capital letters to indicate the changes. This is standard practice in bill-drafting. Also, SC is not proper forum for these internal rules. d. If this were the case, there would be no end to negotiation since each house may seek modifications of the compromise bill. That requirement must be construed only to mean bills introduced for the first time in either house, not the BCC report.

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4. NO, there is no violation of Art VI Sec 26(1) a. Since the title states that the purpose is to expand the VAT system, one way is to widen the base by withdrawing some exemptions. To insist that PD 1590 in addition to § 103 of NIRC be mentioned in title, would be to insist that title of a bill be a complete index of its content. b. That was just to prevent amendment by an inconsistent statute. And under Consti, grant of franchise for operation of public utility is subject to amendment, alteration, repeal by Congress when common good requires.

Substantive - as RA 7716 merely expands base of VAT as provided in the orig VAT law, debate on wisdom of law should be in Congress.

5. NO there is no clear showing that Art III Sec 1 is violated - When freedom of the mind is imperiled by law, it is freedom that commands respect; when property is imperiled, lawmakers‘ judgment prevails. a. This is actually a policy argument. b. This is a mere allegation. c. This is also short of evidence.

6. NO Art III Sec a is not violated a. There‘s no violation of press freedom. The press is not immune fr general regulation by the State. b. It‘s not that it is being singled out, but only because of removal of exemption previously granted to it by law. Also, the law would be discriminatory if the only privilege withdrawn is that to the press. But that is not the case. The statute applies to a wide range of goods and services. c. It has not been shown that the class subject to tax has been unreasonably narrowed. This limit does not apply to press alone but to all sales. d. The fixed amount of P1000 is for defraying part of the cost of registration. Registration is a central feature of the VAT system. It is a mere administrative fee, not a fee on exercise of privilege or right.

7. NO Art III Sec 5 is not violated a. Consti does not prohibit imposing generally applicable sales and use tax on sale of religious materials by religious org. 8. NO Art III Sec 10 is not violated a. Parties to a contract can‘t fetter exercise of taxing power of State. Essential attributes of sovereign is read into contracts as a basic postulate of legal order.

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9. VAT distributes tax burden to as many goods and svcs as possible, particularly to those w/in reach of higher income grps. Business establishments with annual gross sales of < P500,000 are exempted. Also, regressivity is not a negative standard. What is required is that we ―evolve‖ a progressive taxation system. 10. Consti does not prohibit imposing generally applicable sales and use tax on sale of religious materials by religious org. 11. NO there is no violation of Art II Sec 17 a. Same reason/ratio under issues on free speech/press.

Lung Center v. QC Ponente: Callejo Sr., J. Facts:  

 

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CA affirmed the decision of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals holding that the lot owned by the petitioner and its hospital building constructed thereon are subject to assessment for purposes of real property tax. Petitioner Lung Center of the Philippines o Non-stock and non-profit entity established by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1823. o Registered owner of a parcel of land. Erected in the middle of the lot is the Lung Center of the Philippines. o A big space at the ground floor is being leased to private parties, for canteen and small store spaces, and to medical or professional practitioners who use the same as their private clinics for their patients whom they charge for their professional services. Almost one-half of the entire area on the left side of the building along Quezon Avenue is vacant and idle, while a big portion on the right side, at the corner of Quezon Avenue and Elliptical Road, is being leased for commercial purposes to a private enterprise known as the Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center. o Accepts paying and non-paying patients. It also renders medical services to out-patients, both paying and non-paying. Aside from its income from paying patients, the petitioner receives annual subsidies from the government. Both the land and the hospital building of the petitioner were assessed for real property taxes by the City Assessor of Quezon City. Tax Declarations were issued for the land and the hospital building. Petitioner filed a Claim for Exemption from real property taxes with the City Assessor, on its claim that it is a charitable institution. Request was denied, and a petition was filed before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City (QC-LBAA). QC-LBAA rendered dismissed the petition and held the petitioner liable for real property taxes. QC-LBAA‘s decision was affirmed on appeal by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City (CBAA) which ruled that the petitioner was not a charitable institution and that its real properties were not actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes; hence, it was not entitled to real property tax exemption under the constitution and the law. CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the CBAA. Petitioner avers that it is a charitable institution within the context of Section 28(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. o Its character as a charitable institution is not altered by the fact that it admits paying patients and renders medical services to them, leases portions of the land to private parties, and rents out portions of the hospital to private medical practitioners from which it derives income to be used for operational expenses. o From 1995-1999, 100% of its out-patients were charity patients and of the 282-bed capacity, 60% is allotted to charity patients. o The fact that it receives subsidies from the government attests to its character as a charitable institution. o The ―exclusivity‖ required in the Constitution does not necessarily mean ―solely.‖  Even if a portion of its real estate is leased out to private individuals from whom it derives income, it does not lose its character as a charitable institution. o Even if P.D. No. 1823 does not exempt it from the payment of real estate taxes, it is not precluded from seeking tax exemption under the 1987 Constitution. Respondents aver that the petitioner is not a charitable entity.

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o o o

Failed to prove that it is a charitable institution and that the said property is actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes. Petitioner uses the subsidies granted by the government for charity patients and uses the rest of its income from the property for the benefit of paying patients, among other purposes. Petitioner failed to adduce substantial evidence that 100% of its out-patients and 170 beds in the hospital are reserved for indigent patients.

Issue:   Held: 

1. WON the petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of PD 1823 and the 1973/1987 Constitutions and Section 234(b) of RA 7160. YES. 2. WON the real properties of the petitioner are exempt from real property taxes. PARTIALLY.

Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. QC Assessor is directed to determine the precise portions of the land and the area which are leased to private persons, and to compute the real property taxes due.

Ratio: 1. Petitioner is a charitable institution 

   

 

In the legal sense, a charity may be fully defined as a gift, to be applied consistently with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by bringing their minds and hearts under the influence of education or religion, by assisting them to establish themselves in life or otherwise lessening the burden of government. It may be applied to almost anything that tend to promote the well-doing and well-being of social man. The word ―charitable‖ is not restricted to relief of the poor or sick. The test whether an enterprise is charitable or not is whether it exists to carry out a purpose reorganized in law as charitable or whether it is maintained for gain, profit, or private advantage. Under P.D. No. 1823, the petitioner was organized for the welfare and benefit of the Filipino people principally to help combat the high incidence of lung and pulmonary diseases in the Philippines. The medical services of the petitioner are to be rendered to the public in general in any and all walks of life including those who are poor and the needy without discrimination. As a general principle, a charitable institution does not lose its character as such and its exemption from taxes simply because it derives income from paying patients, or receives subsidies from the government, so long as the money received is devoted or used altogether to the charitable object which it is intended to achieve; and no money inures to the private benefit of the persons managing or operating the institution. The money received by the petitioner becomes a part of the trust fund and must be devoted to public trust purposes and cannot be diverted to private profit or benefit. Under P.D. No. 1823, the petitioner is entitled to receive donations. The petitioner does not lose its character as a charitable institution simply because the gift or donation is in the form of subsidies granted by the government. Substantial evidence that it spent its income, including the subsidies from the government for 1991 and 1992 for its patients and for the operation of the hospital. It even incurred a net loss.

2. Those portions of its real property that are leased to private entities are not exempt from real property taxes as these are not actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes. 



The settled rule in this jurisdiction is that laws granting exemption from tax are construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing power. Taxation is the rule and exemption is the exception. The effect of an exemption is equivalent to an appropriation. Hence, a claim for exemption from tax payments must be clearly shown and based on language in the law too plain to be mistaken. Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1823, relied upon by the petitioner, specifically provides that the petitioner shall enjoy the tax exemptions and privileges: o SEC. 2. TAX EXEMPTIONS AND PRIVILEGES. Being a non-profit, non-stock corporation organized primarily to help combat the high incidence of lung and pulmonary diseases in the Philippines, all donations, contributions, endowments and equipment and supplies to be imported by authorized entities or persons and by the Board of Trustees of the Lung Center of the Philippines, Inc., for the actual use and benefit of the Lung Center, shall be exempt from income and gift taxes, the same further deductible in full for the purpose of determining the maximum deductible amount under Section 30, paragraph (h), of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended. The Lung Center of the Philippines shall be exempt from the payment of taxes, charges

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

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and fees imposed by the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof with respect to equipment purchases made by, or for the Lung Center. o The petitioner does not enjoy any property tax exemption privileges for its real properties as well as the building constructed thereon. If the intentions were otherwise, the same should have been among the enumeration of tax exempt privileges under Section 2.  expressio unius est exclusio alterius  Settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all others. Premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumeration in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned. Section 28(3), Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution o (3) Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly and exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation. o The tax exemption under this constitutional provision covers property taxes only. o Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.: what is exempted is not the institution itself; those exempted from real estate taxes are lands, buildings and improvements actually, directly and exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational purposes.‖ Under the 1935 Constitution, ―... all lands, buildings, and improvements used ‗exclusively‘ for … charitable … purposes shall be exempt from taxation.‖ However, under the 1973 and the present Constitutions, for ―lands, buildings, and improvements‖ of the charitable institution to be considered exempt, the same should not only be ―exclusively‖ used for charitable purposes; it is required that such property be used ―actually‖ and ―directly‖ for such purposes.  substantial change in the Constitution Under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and Rep. Act No. 7160 in order to be entitled to the exemption, the petitioner is burdened to prove, by clear and unequivocal proof, that (a) it is a charitable institution; and (b) its real properties are ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY and EXCLUSIVELY used for charitable purposes for which it is organized. o ―Exclusive‖ is defined as possessed and enjoyed to the exclusion of others; debarred from participation or enjoyment; and ―exclusively‖ is defined, ―in a manner to exclude; as enjoying a privilege exclusively.‖ If real property is used for one or more commercial purposes, it is not exclusively used for the exempted purposes but is subject to taxation. o It is not the use of the income from the real property that is determinative of whether the property is used for tax-exempt purposes. Petitioner failed to discharge its burden to prove that the entirety of its real property is actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes. o Portions of the hospital are used for the treatment of patients and the dispensation of medical services to them, whether paying or non-paying  CHARITABLE o Other portions thereof are being leased to private individuals for their clinics and a canteen  NOT CHARITABLE o A portion of the land is being leased to a private individual for her business enterprise under the business name ―Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center.‖  NOT CHARITABLE

IN SUM, portions of the land leased to private entities as well as those parts of the hospital leased to private individuals are not exempt from such taxes. On the other hand, the portions of the land occupied by the hospital and portions of the hospital used for its patients, whether paying or non-paying, are exempt from real property taxes.

Tan v. Del Rosario Ponente: Vitug, J. Facts: 



There are two consolidated special civil action for prohibition in this case: o G.R 109289: challenged the constitutionality of RA No. 7496, commonly known as the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme (SNIT) o G.R 109446: challenged the validity of Sec. 6, Revenue Regulations No. 2-93 In the first petition, the petitioner were asserting that RA No. 7496 violates Sec, 26 (1) and Sec 28 (1) of Art VI and Sec 1 of Art III. For their first contention, they were saying that the bill‘s title does not express its content. The bill is entitled, ―An Act Adopting the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme For the Self-

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 

Employed and Professionals Engaged In the Practice of Their Profession, Amending Sections 21 and 29 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as Amended‖. The petitioner was saying that the taxation contemplated on the statute is now based on gross income and not net income since the allowance for deductible items have been reduced by the questioned statute. Also in the first petition, the petitioner was arguing that the tax law would not be uniform and equitable since it imposes tax on single proprietorship and professionals differently In the second petition, the petitioner was saying that the respondents have exceeded their authority in promulgating Sec 6, Revenue Regulations No. 2-93, to carry out RA No. 7496 because it applies SNIT to partners in general professional partnerships, which in their position should have been taxed like other normal partnerships

Issue: 1. 2. 3.

WON the RA 7496 contemplates gross income as basis for net income so its title stating net income as basis does not express its subject and content thus in contravention to Sec 26 (1) of Art VI WON the taxation scheme adopted by RA 7946 is not equitable and uniform, thus contravening Sec 28(1) of Art VI WON SNIT rightly applies to general professional partnership as stated in Sec 6, Revenue Regulations No. 2-93

Held/Ratio: 1.

2.

3.

RA 7496 still reflects net income as basis for its taxation scheme and thus its title correctly expresses its subject and content. Limiting or reducing allowable deductions from gross income is not opposed to the net income tax concept a. Various deductions still continue to be well provided under the new law b. Sec 26 of Art VI is aimed to (a) prevent log-rolling legislation intended to unite the members of the legislature who favour any one of unrelated subjects in support of the whole act, (b) to avoid surprises or even fraud upon the legislature, and (c) to fairly apprise the people through such publications of its proceedings as are usually made, of the subjects of legislation. These objectives are sufficiently met by the questioned statute. The statute does not violate Sec 28 of Art VI. That taxation ―shall be uniform and equitable‖ in Sec 28(1) of Art VI shall mean that all subjects or objects of taxation similarly situated, are to be treated alike both in privileges and liabilities. a. The system adopted in income taxation has long been a prevailing rule even prior to Republic Act No. 7496 b. Uniformity does not mean classification as long as (1) the standards that are used therefore are substantial and not arbitrary, (2) the categorization is germane to achieve the legislative purpose, (3) the law applies, all things being equal, to both present and future conditions, and (4) the classification applies equally well to all those belonging to the same class General Professional Partnership should be taxed as a person who practices his profession alone

Garcia v. Executive Secretary Ponente: Facts: Petitioner challenges RA7042 on the ground that: - It defeats the constitutional policy of developing a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos and the protection of Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices - He claims that the law abdicates all regulation of foreign enterprises in this country and gives them unfair advantages over local investments which are practically elbowed out in their own land with the complicity of their own government - Under Section 5 of the said law a foreign investor may do business in the Philippines or invest in a domestic enterprise up to 100% of its capital without need of prior approval o All that it has to do is register with the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Bureau of Trade Regulation and Consumer Protection in the case of a single proprietorship

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o ―The SEC or BTRCP, as the case may be, shall not impose any limitations on the extent of foreign ownership in an enterprise additional to those provided in the Act‖ - Under Section 7, ―non-Philippine nationals may own up to one hundred percent (100%) of domestic market enterprises unless foreign ownership therein is prohibited or limited by existing law or the Foreign Investment Negative List under Section 8 hereof." - However, the system of negative list under Section 8 abandons the positive aspect of regulation and exercise of authority over foreign investments. In effect, it assumes that so long as foreign investments are not in areas covered by the list, such investments are not detrimental to but are good for the national economy. o List A – merely enumerate areas of activities already reserved to Philippine nationals by mandate of the Constitution and specific laws o List B - contain areas of activities and enterprises already regulated according to law and includes small and medium-sized domestic market enterprises or export enterprises which utilize raw materials from depleting natural resources with paid-in equity capital of less than the equivalent of US$500,000.00; meaning, SMEs are for Filipinos. Or even, Filipinos are not encouraged to go big. o List C - contain areas of investment m which "existing enterprises already serve adequately the needs of the economy and the consumers and do not need further foreign investments."; However, existing enterprises must be qualified as Filipino, if not, it shall protect foreign enterprises too - Section 9 is also attacked, because if a Philippine national believes that an area of investment should be included in list C, the burden is on him to show that the criteria enumerated in said section are met - Articles 2, 32, & 35 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1982 are done away with by RA 7042. - By repealing Articles 49, 50, 54 and 56 of the 1987 Omnibus Investments Code, RA No. 7042 further abandons the regulation of foreign investments by doing away with important requirements for doing business in the Philippines. - The Transitory provisions of RA 7042, which allow practically unlimited entry of foreign investments for three years, subject only to a supposed Transitory Foreign Investment Negative List, not only completely deregulates foreign investments but would place Filipino enterprises at a fatal disadvantage in their own country. Sol-Gen answers: - phrase "without need of prior approval" applies to equity restrictions alone o prior to the effectivity of RA 7042, Article 46 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 (EO No. 226), provided that a non-Philippine national could, without need of prior authority from the Board of Investments (BOI), invest in: (1) any enterprise registered under Book I (Investments with Incentives); and (2) enterprises not registered under Book I, to the extent that the total investment of the non-Philippine national did not exceed 40% of the outstanding capital o On the other hand, under Article 47 thereof, if an investment by a non-Philippine nationals in an enterprise not registered under Book I was such that the total participation by non-Philippine nationals in the outstanding capital thereof exceeded 40%, prior authority from the BOI was required. - With the introduction of the Negative List under Sections 8 & 15, the areas of investments not open to foreign investors are already determined and outlined; hence, registration with the SEC or BTRCP, as the case may be, is now the initial step to be taken by foreign investors. - This registration constitutes regulation and exercise of authority over foreign investments. Under SEC and BTRCP rules and regulations, foreign investors must first comply with certain requirements before they can be issued a license to do business in the Philippines. - Section 7 of RA 7042 allows non-Philippine nationals to own up to 100% of domestic market enterprises only in areas of investments outside the prohibitions and limitations imposed by law to protect Filipino ownership and interest. - The Foreign Investment Negative List under Section 8 reserves to Filipinos sensitive areas of investments. List C prohibits foreign investors from engaging in areas of activities where existing enterprises already serve adequately the needs of the economy and the consumer.

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o The Act opens the door to foreign investments only after securing to Filipinos their rights and interests over the national economy. o List A – The provisions of the Constitution and other specific laws regulate or limit the extent of foreign ownership in enterprises engaged in areas of activity reserved for Filipinos o List B - contains areas already regulated pursuant to law already makes it clear that it is regulatory. It channels efforts at promoting foreign investments to bigger enterprises where there is an acute lack of Filipino capital; scheme is for foreign investments to supplement Filipino capital in big enterprises. o List C - to allow healthy competition, Activities which do not adequately meet-the needs of the consumers should not be included in list C; if not, consumers would be at the mercy of unscrupulous producers o Foreign Corporations under a valid license prior to the enactment of RA 7042 necessarily come within the protection of the law. - Section 9 provides for the criteria to be used by NEDA in determining the areas of investment for inclusion in List C o Petition for inclusion therein requires "a public hearing at which affected parties will have the opportunity to show whether the petitioner industry adequately serves the economy and the consumers." o Provision is designed to protect the consumers as not all existing enterprises satisfy the criteria inclusion in List C. - Regarding the repealing of provisions of the Omnibus Investment Code o purposely removed because the determination of the areas of investment open to foreign investors is made easy by the Foreign Investment Negative List formulated and recommended by NEDA following the process and criteria provided in Sections 8 & 9 of the Act - Re the Transitory Foreign Investment Negative List o it practically includes the same areas of investment reserved to Filipino under Section 5", and the ―SEC shall disallow registration of the applying non-Philippine national if the existing joint venture enterprises, particularly the Filipino partners therein, can reasonably prove they are capable to make the investment needed for the domestic market activities to be undertaken by the competing applicant. Senator Paterno as Intervenor: - the over-all strategy embodied in the Act to develop a self-reliant economy, as well as the provisions designed to promote full employment for Filipinos - suggests that the constitutional challenge should be rejected outright for noncompliance with the requisites of a judicial inquiry into a constitutional question, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the constitutional question must be raised by a proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the decision of the case. Issue: WON there is actual controversy 2. WON petitioners have legal standing 3. WON constitutionality lis mota of the case 4. WON this entails a political question Held/Ratio: 1. There is at this point no actual case or controversy, particularly because of the absence of the implementing rules that are supposed to carry the Act into effect a. A controversy must be one that is appropriate or "ripe" for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory 2. The petitioner, as a citizen and taxpayer, and particularly as a member of the House of Representatives, comes under the definition that a proper party is one who has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of. 3. The constitutional question has not been raised tardily but in fact, as just remarked, prematurely. - The constitutional challenge must be rejected for failure to show that there is an indubitable ground for it, not to say even a necessity to resolve it.

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a. Policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. b. based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments c. theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied and determined to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally enacted. - the cause of unconstitutionality has not been proved by the petitioner d. Act does not violate any of the constitutional provisions the petitioner has mentioned 4. What we see here is a debate on the wisdom or the efficacy of the Act, but this is a matter on which we are not competent to rule. a. In Angara v Electoral Commission: "the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation." b. allowed only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," 5 and may not annul an act of the political departments simply because we feel it is unwise or impractical. c. There is no irregularity also, that shows that there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Decision Petition dismissed.

John Hay PAC v. Lim Ponente: Carpio-Morales, J. Facts: Petitioners: John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition, Mateo Carino Foundation Inc., Center for Alternative Systems Foundation, Inc., Regina Victoria Benafin represented and joined by her mother Elisa Benafin, Izabel Luyk represented and joined by her mother Rebecca Luyk, Katherine Pe represented and joined by her mother Rosemarie Pe, Soledad Camilo, Alicia Pacalso alias ―Kevab,‖ Betty Strasser, Ruby Giron, Ursula Perez alias ―Ba-yay,‖ Edilberto Claravall, Carmen Caromina, Lilia Yaranon, Diane Mondoc - Respondents: Victor Lim, President Bases Conversion and Development Authority; John Hay Poro Point Development Corporation, City of Baguio, TUNTEX, ASIAWORLD, DENR - Petition for prohibition, mandamus and declaratory relief with prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of injunction assailing the constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation No. 420, Series of 1994, ―Creating and Designating a Portion of the Area Covered by the Former Camp John Hay as the John Hay Special Economic Zone Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7227‖ - RA 7227: An Act Accelerating the Conversion of Military Reservations into other Productive Uses, Creating the Bases Conversion and Development Authority for this Purpose, Providing Funds therefor and for Other Purposes OR ―Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992‖ > setting out policy to accelerate sound and balanced conversion into alternative productive uses of former military bases under the 1947 Philippine-United States of America Military Bases Agreement, namely Clark and Subic military reservations including extension Camp John Hay Station in Baguio > created Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA), Subic Special Economic (and free port) Zone (Sebuc SEZ) > granted Subic SEZ incentives such tax and duty-free importations, exemption of businesses from local and national taxes > gave authority to the President to create through executive proclamation, subject to the concurrence of the local government units directly affected, other Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in Clark (Pampanga), Wallace Air Station (La Union), and Camp John Hay (Baguio)

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- Aug 16, 1993 – BCDA entered MoA and Escrow Agreement with TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD, private corporations under laws of British Virgin Islands, in preparing for a joint venture for development of Poro Point in La Union and Camp John Hay as a premier tourist destinations and recreation centers - Dec 16, 1993 – BCDA, TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD executed a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) binding themselves to put up a joint venture company called Baguio International Development and Management Corporation leasing areas within Camp John Hay and Poro Point for tourism and recreation Sangguaniang Panglungsod of Baguio City’s Resolutions to BCDA > Sept 29, 1993 –to exclude all the barangays partly and totally located within Camp John Hay from the reach and coverage of any plan or program for development > Jan 19, 1994 – abdication, waiver or quitclaim of its ownership over homelots being occupied by residents of 9 barangays surrounding CJH > Feb 21, 1994 – 15-point concept of the development of CJH which includes protection of the environment, making of a family-oriented tourist destination, priority in employment of Baguio residents, free access to base area, guaranteed participation of the city government in the management and operation of the camp, exclusion of the previously mentioned 9 bgys, liability for local taxes of businesses BCDA-TUNTEX-ASIAWORLD response > modified the proposal stressing the need to declare CJH a SEZ as a condition to its full development according to RA 7227 - May 11, 1994 – sanggunian passed resolution asking mayor to order determination of realty taxes which may be collected from real properties of CJH checking if CJH real properties exempt from taxes and economic activity from local and national taxes - June 1994 – sanggunian passed Resolution No. 255 (Series of 1994) seeking and supporting subject to its concurrence, the issuance of Pres. Ramos of presidential proclamation declaring area of 288.1 hectares of the camp as a SEZ in accordance to RA 7227 - July 5, 1994 – Ramos issued Proc No. 420 establishing a SEZ on Camp John Hay which reads Pursuant to powers vested in me by the law and the resolution of concurrence by the City Council of Baguio… create and designate… former Camp John Hay… as John Hay Special Economic Zone Sec 1. Coverage of John Hay SEZ: 288.1 hectares out of 677 hectares surveyed and verified by DENR Sec 2. Governing Body: pursuant to Sec 15 of RA 7227, the Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA) is established to govern JHSEZ, authorized to determine utilization and disposition of lands subject to private rights and in consultation and coordination with the City Government of Baguio after consultation with its inhabitants, and to promulgate necessary policies, rules, and regulations to govern and regulate the zone thru the John Hay Poro Point Development Corporation (JHPPDC), the implementing arm for its economic development and optimum utilization Sec 3. Investment Climate in JHSEZ: pursuant to Sec 5(m) and Section 15 of RA 7227, the JH Poro Point Development Corporation shall implement necessary policies, rules and regulations governing the zone, including investment incentives, in consultation with pertinent government departments. The zone shall have all the applicable incentives of the SEZ under Sec 12 of RA 7227 and those applicable incentives granted in the Export Processing Zones, the Omnibus Investment Code of 1987, the Foreign Investment Act of 1991, and new investment laws that will be enacted.

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Sec 4. Role of Departments, Bureaus, Offices, Agencies and Instrumentalities: All heads of departments, etc of the government are directed to give full support to BCDA and/or implementing subsidiary or joint venture to facilitate necessary approvals to expedite programs. Sec 5. Local Authority: The affected local government units shall retain basic autonomy and identity. - April 25, 1995 – petition for prohibition, mandamus and declaratory relief challenging Proc. No. 420‘s constitutionality or validity as well as the legality of MoA and JVA between BCDA and TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD - Petitioner’s Allege: 1. Proc. No. 420 grants tax exemptions is invalid and illegal as it is an unconstitutional exercise by the President of a power granted only to the Legislature 2. Proc. No. 420 limits the powers and interferes with the autonomy of the City of Baguio is invalid, illegal and unconstitutional 3. Proc. No. 420 is unconstitutional that it violates the rule that all taxes should be uniform and equitable 4. MoA having been entered into only by direct negotiation is illegal 5. terms and conditions of the MoA is illegal 6. the conceptual development plan of respondents not having undergone environmental impact assessment is being illegally considered without a valid environmental impact assessment - a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction prayed to enjoin BCDA, JHPPDC and the city government from implementing Proc. No. 420 and TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD from proceeding with their plan respecting CJH‘s development pursuant to the JVA - Public respondents (BCDA, JHPPDC, City of Baguio) Allege 1. issues are moot and academic because in November 21, 1995 BCDA formally notified TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD of the revocation of the MoA and JVA 2. in maintaining the validity of Proc. No. 420, extending to the JHSEZ economic incentives to those enjoyed by Subic SEZ (established in RA 7227), the proclamation merely implements the legislative intent of said law to turn the US military bases into hubs of business activity or investment 3. denying Proc. No. 420 derogates the local autonomy of Baguio City or violative of the equal protection clause 4. petitioners have no standing to being suit even as taxpayers in the absence of an actual controversy 5. disregarded hierarchy of courts and the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies - Petitioners Reply 1. doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply since they are invoking the exclusive authority of SC under Section 21 of RA 7227 to enjoin or restrain implementation of projects for conversion of the base areas 2. they possess standing to bring petition as taxpayers

Issue: Procedural 1. WON petitioners violated doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies

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2. WON issues regarding TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD is moot and academic 3. WON present petition complies with the requirements of SC‘s exercise of jurisdiction over constitutional issues Substantive 4. WON Proc. No. 420 is constitutional by providing for national and local tax exemption within and granting other economic incentives to the John Hay SEZ 5. WON Proc. No. 420 is constitutional for limiting or interfering with local autonomy of Baguio City Held/Ratio: 1. Although judicial policy of SC entails not entertaining declaratory relief or direct resort to it except when the redress sought cannot be obtained in the proper courts, or when exceptional and compelling circumstances warrant availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of SC‘s primary jurisdiction, under Sec 21 of RA 7227, only SC has the power to enjoin implementation of projects for the development of the former US military reservations therefore SC will take cognizance of this petition. Reasoning - Also SC retains full discretionary power to take cognizance of such petition. Besides, remanding this case to the lower courts may unduly prolong adjudication of the issues - transformation of an area in CJH into a SEZ is not a simple re-classification of an area TF a crucial issue. Conversion involves > focal point for investments by local and foreign entities > site for vigorous business activity spurring country‘s economic growth > like Sub SEZ, turning into self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and investment center > critical links to a host of environmental and social concerns affecting communities are located and nation in general > challenges in providing an ecologically sustainable, environmentally sound, equitable transition for city in CJH reversion to government property e.g. problem of scarcity of water supply in Baguio City 2. Revocation of the agreements with private respondents made issues regarding them as moot and academic. 3. Yes, present petition complies with requirements for judicial review. Reasoning - Requisites of exercise of power of judicial review 1. existence of an actual or an appropriate case > not conjectural or anticipatory; definite and concrete; parties pitted against each other due to their adverse legal interests > in present case, there is a real clash of interests and rights between petitioners and respondents arising from issuance of Proc. No. 420 converting a portion of CJH into a SEZ where petitioners insist Proc. No. 420 has unconstitutional provisions and the respondents claiming otherwise

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> Pimentel, Jr. v Aguirre: By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged act, the dispute is deemed to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without an overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or law is enough to awaken judicial duty 2. personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question > RA 7227 requires concurrence of the affected local government units to the creation of SEZs and this grant by law on LGUs of the right to concurrence is equivalent to vesting a legal standing on LGUs (recognition of real interests of communities in the utilization of such base areas) > as INHABITANTS OF BAGUIO, assailing Proc No. 420, is personal and substantial that they have sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the government act being challenged; material interest for what is at stake in the enforcement of Proc. No. 420 is the very economic and social existence of the people of Baguio City > Garcia v Board of Investments: residents of Limay, Bataan where SC characterized their interest in the establishment of a petrochemical plant in their place as actual, real, vital and legal for it would affect not only their economic life but even the air they breathe > Petitioners Edilberto Claravall and Lilia Yaranon were duly elected councilors of Baguio at the time; duties included deciding for and on behalf of their constituents on the question of concurrence to Proc. No. 420; they opposed Res. No. 255 which supported Proc. No. 420 3. pleaded in the earliest opportunity 4. constitutional question is the lis mota of the case - 3 and 4 no question since action filed purposely to bring forth constitutionality issues 4. Unless limited by a provision in the Constitution, if there is no express extension of tax exemption and other economic incentives granted by law, any presidential proclamation granting such extension through implication is unconstitutional because it violates Art VI Sec 28(4) which gives the legislature, not the executive, the full power to exempt any person or corporation or class of property from taxation and its power to exempt being as broad as its power to tax. Reasoning - Art VI Sec 28(4): No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the members of Congress. - Sec 3 Proc. No. 420: Investment Climate in JH SEZ: … the zone shall have all the applicable incentives of the SEZ under Sec 12 of RA 7227 and those applicable incentives granted in the Export Processing Zones, the Omnibus Investment Code of 1987, the Foreign Investment Act of 1991 and new investment laws that may be hereinafter enacted > Sec 12 RA 7227: Subic SEZ (b & c) exemption from tariff or custom duties, national and local taxes of business entities (d) free market and trade of specified goods or properties (f) liberalized banking and finance (g) relaxed immigration rules for foreign investors - deliberations of Senate confirm exclusivity to Subic SEZ of the tax and investment privileges

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(discussing Sec 12 RA 7227) Angara: … we must confine these policies to Subic and provide that ―THE SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE OF SUBIC SHALL BE ESTABLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING POLICIES‖… it is very clear that these principles and policies are applicable only to Subic as a free port … so we agreed that we will simply limit the definition of pweors and description of the zone to Subic but that does not exclude the possibility of creating other economic zones within the baselands … the provision now will be confined only to Subic > RA 7916: The Special Economic Zone Act of 1995 - privilege of export processing zone-based businesses of importing capital equipment and raw materials free from taxes, duties and other restrictions > Omnibus Investment Code of 1987 - tax and duty exemptions, tax holiday, tax credit, and other incentives > RA 7042: Foreign Investments Act of 1991 - applicability to the subject zone of rules governing foreign investments in the Philippines - It is clear that under Sec 12 RA 7227 ONLY the SUBIC SEZ which was granted by Congress with tax exemption, investment incentives and the like and no express extension of the aforesaid benefits to other SEZs still to be created at the time via presidential proclamation ; also grant of privileges to JH SEZ finds no support in the other laws specified under Sec 3 Proc. No. 420 which are already extant before the issuance of the proclamation or the enactment of RA 7227 - SC can void an act or policy of the political departments of the govt on two grounds – infringement of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion – and clearly, Proc. No. 420 infringes upon the Constitution 5. NO because when the law merely emphasizes or reiterates the statutory role or functions is has been granted. Reasoning - under RA 7227, BCDA is entrusted with the following (a) to own, hold and/or administer the military reservations of John Hay Air Station, Wallace Air Station, O‘Donnell Transmitter Station… which may be transferred to it by the President - such broad rights of ownership and administration vested in BCDA over CJH, BCDA virtually has control over it subject to certain limitations of law Decision Sec 3 of Proc. NO.420 is null and void and declared no legal force and effect. Proc. No. 420, without the invalidated portion, remains valid and effective

c) Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court Automotive Industry Workers Alliance v. Romulo Ponente: Chico-Nazario, J. Facts: Fabian (president of PROMAT Construction Dev‘t) filed an administrative case against Nestor Agustin (District Engineer of First Metro Mla Engineering District) after a failed amorous relationship between the two, where Fabian

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alleges that Agustin abused his power through acts of oppression, misconduct, and disgraceful misconduct. She seeks the dismissal of Nestor. Nestor was found guilty by Desierto, but upon his motion for reconsideration, Desierto inhibited himself from hearing the case because Nestor‘s new counsel was Desierto‘s close associate. The case was transferred to Deputy Guerrero who exonerated the administrative charges against Nestor. Petitioner now comes to the SC, pointing out the following laws: Section 27 of RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989): In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), when a respondent is absolved of the charges in an administrative proceeding the decision of the Ombudsman is final and unappealable. She submits that the Office of the Ombudsman has no authority under the law to restrict the right of appeal allowed by Republic Act No. 6770. Because of the aforecited provision in those Rules of Procedure, she claims that she found it necessary to take an alternative recourse under Rule 65 (original action for certiorari) of the Rules of Court, because of the doubt it creates on the availability of appeal under Rule 45 (appeal by certiorari)of the Rules of Court. Respondents claim that petitioner cannot assail the rules of procedure of the Ombudsman and question the propriety of the proposition. The SC found that the liability of a public official could fall under the jurisdiction of both the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the Ombudsman, a fact which neither of the parties in this case brought up, prompting the SC to look into the constitutionality of the abovementioned laws against Sec. 30, Art VI of the Constitution. Issue/Held/Ratio: (1) A challenge on constitutional grounds must be raised by a party, but neither party in this case did. Will this prevent the Court from determining the constitutionality of the laws? No. The courts are not at liberty to overlook or disregard its commands that are evasions of the Constitution. When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in a legislative body, it is the duty of the courts to declare that the constitution, and not the statute, governs in a case before them for judgment. Thus, while courts will not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions which are not raised in the pleadings, the rule has been recognized to admit of certain exceptions. It does not preclude a court from inquiring into its own jurisdiction or compel it to enter a judgment that it lacks jurisdiction to enter. If a statute on which a court's jurisdiction in a proceeding depends is unconstitutional, the court has no jurisdiction in the proceeding, and since it may determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that it may inquire into the constitutionality of the statute. The court, in this case ordered the parties to submit their positions and arguments on the subject matter. (2) Petitioner contends that since she appealed via certiorari (Rule 45) authorized by Sec 27 RA 6770, such is not violative of the Constitution. Court says the provision in the Constitution does not refer to quasi-judicial bodies. the very provision cited by petitioner specifies that the appellate jurisdiction of this Court contemplated therein is to be exercised over "final judgments and orders of lower courts," that is, the courts composing the integrated judicial system. It does not include the quasi-judicial bodies or agencies (even if the Ombudsman is mandated by the Constitution, the Court will not make a distinction between special and ordinary agencies), hence whenever the legislature intends that the decisions or resolutions of the quasi-judicial agency shall be reviewable by the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, a specific provision to that effect is included in the law creating that quasi-judicial agency and, for that matter, any special statutory court.

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Court of Appeals is the more appropriate venue. (3) Are the provisions constitutional? Respondent invokes the rule that courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional question, especially when the case can be decided on other grounds. Court says it is necessary in this case to determine constitutionality. Sec. 27 of RA 6770 is unconstitutional for increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the SC without its permission. Deliberations in the Senate also show that there was no effort in getting the opinion of the SC in increasing the appellate jurisdiction. Likewise, Sec. 7, Rule III of Admin. Order No. 07 is unconstitutional. (4) Is Sec. 27 of RA 6770 substantive or procedural? It is merely procedural. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is no; procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure. The right has been preserved in this case. With the mentioned laws declared unconstitutional, the case is referred and transferred to the Court of Appeals

b. Procedure for the passage of bills

Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance supra Philconsa v. Enriquez supra Gonzales v. Macaraig Ponente: Facts/Issue/Held/Ratio: RD: The President may veto inappropriate provisions, an inappropriate provision being a provision which does not relate to a specific item within the appropriations bill. The vetoed provision (Sec. 55 of the General Appropriations Bill of 1989) was inappropriate. The President has general veto power according to Art VI Sec. 27(1) - Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof, otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it. and specific item veto power in Art VI Sec. 27(2) - The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.

Bengzon v. Drilon Ponente: Facts:

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- Petition to review the constitutionality of the veto by the President of certain provisions of the General Appropriations Act (GAA) for the Fiscal Year 1992 - Petitioners are retired justices of the SC and the CA who were receiving monthly pensions under RA No.910 as amended by RA No. 1797 - Respondents Drilon et al are sued in their official capacities of the Executive, involved in the implementation of the release of funds under the GAA - RA910 was enacted in 1953 to provide retirement pensions to Justices of the SC and the CA who have rendered service at least 2o years either in the judiciary or in any branch of govt, or in, both, or having attained the age of 70, or who resign by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of the office; he shall receive until his death the salary which he has received at the time of his retirement - RA910 was amended by RA1797. Identical retirement benefits were given to Consti Commissions and the AFP, under RA1568, as amended by RA3595, and PD578, respectively - Marcos issued successive decrees which automatically readjusted the retirement pensions of military officers and enlisted men. But those in the judiciary and the Consti Commissions were not included in this automatic readjustment, as Marcos repealed the automatic readjustment provisions (Section 3-a of RA1797 and RA3595) for the judiciary and the Consti Commissions - Realizing this unfairness, Congress in 1990 sought to reenact the repealed provisions by approving a bill on the matter (HB16297 and SB740) - Pres. Aquino vetoed the HB on the ground that it would erode the foundation of the policy on standardization of compensation under the Salary Standardization Law, RA6758 - On the other hand, retired CA justices Barcelona and Enriquez filed a petition for readjustment of their pensions in accordance with RA1797 by reasoning out that PD644 repealing RA1797 did not take effect as there was no valid publication pursuant to Tanada v Tuvera, supposedly promulgated in 1975 but published only in the OG in 1983; Court authorized it as a result - As a result of the resolution by the Court, Congress included in the GAA appropriations for the Judiciary intended for the payment of adjusted pensions rates for the retired justices - In Jan 1992, President vetoed portions of Section 1, and the entire Section 4 of the Special Provision for the SC and the Lower Courts on the ground that the President vetoed the HB on the matter already, and such appropriation would erode the policy of salary standardization

Issue: WON the veto by the president of certain provisions in the General Appropriations Act for the Fiscal Year 1992 relating to the payment of the adjusted pension of the retired Justices of the SC and the CA

Held/Ratio: - The President did not veto items but provisions of the law in the GAA. - While veto power is generally all or nothing, vetoing the entire bill or none at all, it does not hold when it comes to appropriation, revenue or tariff bills. o The Constitution has a item veto power to avoid inexpedient riders being attached to an indispensable appropriation or revenue measure; only a particular item or items may be vetoed

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o Item in a bill refers to the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts; it is a specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of law, which happens to be put into an appropriation bill o The President did not veto the general fund adjustment of 500M, to meet certain obligations W HICH is an ITEM. o What she vetoed were provisions – methods and systems placed by Congress to insure that obligations would be paid when they fell due o Thus, augmentation of specific appropriations found inadequate to pay retirement benefits is a provision and not an item o Actually, what she really vetoed were RA1797 and the Resolution of the SC dated Nov 1991. WHICH SHE CANNOT VETO. - The repealing decrees (PD644) of Marcos re taking away the automatic readjustment for the judiciary never became valid law because it was never published, pursuant to the Tanada v Tuvera doctrine; RA 1797 was never repealed and there was no need for an HB in 1990 to restore it so even the president‘s veto of the HB does not even have any effect in the continuing implementation of the law - The Veto by the president trenches upon the constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary o Guaranty of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require o Power to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding highest rates authorized by law o Veto is tantamount to dictating to the judiciary how its funds should be utilized - The Justices have a right to their pensions pursuant to RA1797 o The purpose retirement laws like such is to entice competent men and women to enter the government service and retire with relative security

Miller v. Mardo Ponente: Barrera, J. Facts: - These are different cases taken together as they present only one identical question st

- 1 case: Manuel Gonzales filed complaint against Bill Miller at the DoL, claiming that he is a driver of Miller and was arbitrarily dismissed without separation pay - Miller filed petition for prohibition against Hearing Officer Mardo of the DoL on ground that HO has no jurisdiction to hear and decide on the case - Court rendered decision though that Reorg. Plan 2-A did not repeal Judiciary Act that conferred to CFI original jurisdiction to take cognizance of money claims re violations of labor standards nd

- 2 case: Cresencio Estano filed complaint at the DoL against Chin Hua Trading Co., for not being paid overtime and vacation leave pay as a driver in the company st

- same circumstances as 1 case, and court issued permanent injunction against hearing the cases by the Hearing Officer, as Reorg. Plan 2-A is null and void. RD

- 3 case: Numeriana Raganas filed with CFI a complaint against Sen Bee Trading Company for being underpaid, not being paid overtime, without sick leave and vacation leave pay, as a seamstress - Sun Bee filed motion to dismiss, and insisted that CFI does not have jurisdiction as money claims must be filed with Regional Office of DoL under Reorg. Plan 2-A th

- 4 case: Vicente Romero filed case against Sia Seng at the DoL Sia Leng did noy\t file an answer and a decision was rendered in favor of Romero. But Labor Administrator Hernando refused to issue the writ of execution of the ecision as he believed that Sia Seng deserved to be heard

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they insist as well that Reorg. Plan is not validly passed as a statute and unconstitutional th

- 5 case: Mariano Pabillare filed at the DoL a complaint against Fred Wilson and Co., as he was summarily dismissed wihout cause, without separation pay, and without sufficient notice. - They moved to dismiss as it is only an administrative body, with no power to adjudicate money claims - Certiorari, prohibition and injuction was filed as well – that Reorg Plan is null and void insofar as it vest original exclusive jurisdiction over money claims

Issue: 1. WON Reorganization Plan 20-A, prepared and submitted under the authority of RA 997 as amended by RA 1241, is valid, insofar as it confers jurisdiction to the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor to decide on claims of laborers for wages, overtime and separation pay, etc. 2. WON Reorganization Plan 20-A was validly passed by Congress

Held/Ratio: 1. No it is not valid. - While the Reorganization Commission could create functions, it referred merely to administrative and not judicial functions such as deciding on money claims. Judicial power rests exclusively on the judiciary - While legislature may confer administrative boards quasi-judicial powers, it must be incident to the exercise of administrative dunctions - Conferment of quasi-judicial functions cannot be implied from a mere grant of power to create functions in connection with reorganization of the Executive 2. No it was not validly passed by Congress - A law is not passed by mere silence or non-action of Congress even if it be stated in Sec 6(a) of RA 997 - It is contrary to well-settled and well-understood parliamentary law- that two houses are to hold separate sessions for their deliberations and the determination of the one upon a proposed law is to be submitted to the separate determination of the other.

c. Effectivity of laws Tanada v. Tuvera Ponente: Escolin, J. Facts: 1. Petition to review the decision of the Executive Assistant to the President. 2. Invoking the people‘s right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 constitution, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette, of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. The respondents would have this case dismissed on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality to bring this petition. Petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel public duty, they need not show any specific interest. Respondents further contend that publication in the OG is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates.

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Issue: WON publication in the Official Gazette is an indispensable requirement for the effectivity of the PDs, LOIs, general orders, EOs, etc. where laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates Held/Ratio: Yes. It is the people‘s right to be informed on matters of public concern & corollarily access to official records, & to documents & papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, shall be afforded the citizens subject to such limitation as may be provided by law (Sec. 6, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution). Laws, to be valid & enforceable, must be published in the OG or otherwise effectively promulgated. The fact that a PD or LOI states its date of effectivity does not preclude their publication in the OG as they constitute important legislative acts. The publication of presidential issuances ―of public nature‖ or ―of general applicability‖ is a requirement of due process. Before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially informed of its contents. Decision Respondents ordered to publish in Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances of general application, and unless so published shall have no binding force and effect. Important Point It illustrates how decrees & issuances issued by one man — Marcos — are in fact laws of general application and provide for penalties. The constitution afforded Marcos both executive & legislative powers. - The generality of law (CC Art. 14) will never work w/o constructive notice. The ruling of this case provides that publication constitutes the necessary constructive notice & is thus the cure for ignorance as an excuse. - Ignorance will not even mitigate the crime.

d. Question hour e Legislative investigation Arnault v. Nazareno Ponente: Ozaeta, J. Facts: - This refers to two land deals entered into by the Philippine government as follows: 1. BUENAVISTA ESTATE - The Philippine government leased from San Juan de Dios Hospital for twenty five years the Buenavista estate and had an option to purchase the same for P 3.0 million. This purchase option was exercised by the then occupation republic by tendering the owner the sum of P 3.0 million and, on its rejection, depositing the said funds in Court on June 21, 1944 together with the accrued rentals of P 324,000. - San Juan de Dios on June 29, 1946 sold this same property to Ernest H. Burt, an non-resident American for P 5,000,000 with the initial downpayment of P 10,000 with the balance payable under very favorable terms. Burt was unable to comply with the terms agreed. 2. TAMBOBONG ESTATE - On May of 1946, the same Burt purchase from Philippine Trust Corporation, the Tambobong estate for P 1.2 million with a downpayment of P 10,000.00 and terms which are as generuous as those from San Juan de Dios. There was however no other payment received from Burt. - The Philippine government, through the Rural Progress Administration, acquired this same property from its original owner for the sum of P 750,000 and subsequently instituted a notarial demand upon Burt for the resolution and cancellation of his contract of purchase with Philippine Trust for non payment. The Court of First Instance in this case

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ordered the cancellation of Burt‘s title and the issuance of a new one under the name of Rural Progress Administration. - For one reason or another, despite the fact the Philippine government already owned both the above estate, it again bought the same from Burt for a total consideration of P 5,000,000 (P 4.5 million for Buenavista and P 500,000 for Tambobong). The government paid initially P 1,000,000 for Buenavista and the full amount of P 500,000 for the Tambobong estate through two corporations acting as Burt‘s attorneys-in-fact. These two were represented in the trasaction by one and the same person, Jean L. Arnault. - It was also brought out that the Rural Progress Administration was headed at that time by the Justice secretary who was at the same time Chairman of the Philippine National Bank, the institution that lent the funds to Rural Progress. - The transactions resulted into a public outcry which led into the Philippine Senate adopting Resolution 8 which created a special committee to investigate the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates deal. - The committee was tasked, among others, with determining: a. the validity, honesty, propriety of the purchase b. the fairness of the purchase price c. the parties involved/responsible for the deal - During the public hearings of the Committee, various witnesses were called. Among them and apparently the most important was Jean Arnault, the person who represented Burt in the transactions. - During the said hearing, Arnault confirmed receiving the money from the government and withdrawing, in cash, P 440,000 which he gave to someone on instruction of Burt. When asked to identify the person he gave the money to, he replied that he did not know his name despite the fact that he met the person on many occasions. When pressed to answer, he also said that answering the question might incriminate him. Based on this refusal, the senate approved a resolution on May 15, 1950 arraigning him for contempt and subsequently found him guilty of the charge. He was committed to the custody of the Senate Sergeant at arms until he reveals the name of the person he gave the money to. The Senate adjourned three days later. The work of the Committee however was extended via Resolution 16. - Arnault filed an original action for the issuance of a writ of Habeas Corpus with the Supreme Court to obtain his release cited the following grounds: a. the Senate has no power to punish him for contempt since the requested information is not material to the intended legislation and his refusal to answer has not impeded or obstructed the legislated process. The Senate has already approved bills related to the transactions. b. the Senate lacks the authority to commit him in contempt for a term beyond its legislative session. c. the information sought will be self-incriminating - rior to discussing the issues, the Supreme Court went into the general principles of law with regard the power of either house of Congress to punish a person not a member for contempt as this case is the first of its kind to be tried under the Philippine constitution. In so doing, the Supreme Court had to draw from American precedents in recognition of the fact that the Constitution of the Philippines were patterned after largely American institutions and practices. The discussions were as follows: a. There is no expressed provisions in the constitution which grant power to either House to investigate or exact testimonies to exercise legislative function. However, this power of inquiry, and the process to enforce it, is a necessary element to enable the body to wisely and effectively perform their respective legislative functions. In the absence of information that it requires, Congress has no other recourse but to get the same from others who have

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them. At times, the information required are not entirely accurate or complete. Given this, Congress has the implied coercive to obtain such information. b. The power to compel is limited to information required in a matter into which Congress has jurisdiction to inquire.

Issue: WON the writ of Habeas Corpus should be granted

Held/Ratio: a. The requested information is needed to comply with the direction of the senate as contained in Resolution Nos. 8 & 16 to secure the names of the persons responsible for the transaction. The materiality of the question asked in the public hearing should be determined by its direct relation to the matter being inquired into and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation. The only time that the Supreme Court may interfere with the Senate is when a petitioner is being forced to answer questions which are not pertinent to the matter inquiry. In this case and citing McGrain vs Daugherty, Congress would be guilty of a clear abuse of authority in the exercise of its power. As to whether the information sought to be elicited is material to an proposed legislation, the Court could not say as this is not within their scope. - Citing the case Re: Chapman, where the petitioner was jailed for contempt of the US Senate for refusing to answer questions with regard accounts of Senators in his company, the Supreme Court held that the Philippine Senate has the authority to compel Arnault and if he so refuses to give the information, also the power find him in contempt and to imprison him until he complies with said requirement. b. The power of the Senate to commit Arnault to prison does not end with the termination of the legislative session. The opinion of Justice Malcolm was cited with regard the Candido Lopez case where he opines that the imprisonment of Lopez terminates when the House of Representatives adjourns. Citing however the McGrain case again, the Court said that, unlike the House of Representatives which losses all its members every four years (hence its term is only four years), the Senate is deemed as a continuing body whose members are elected for a six year term and are so divided that only a third of the seats become vacant every two years. Hence, the power of the Senate to hold Arnault is a continuing power. The only caveat of the Supreme Court in this case is that if the Senate disregards the proper limitation to jail parties in contempt, the remedy is with the Court. c. Arnault‘s claim to self incrimination cannot be sustained citing Mason vs US as a precedent. The Court must be given the chance to determine from all the facts and circumstances whether the witness is justified in refusing to answer any question which could incriminate him. Arnault‘s testimony was obviously false. He obviously knew the name of the person he gave the money to. His refusal to testify truthfully is punishable with contempt. Decision Petition is denied

Arnault v. Balagtas Ponente: Labrador, J. Facts: Arnault was attorney-in-fact of Ernest Burt in the negotiations for the purchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by the Government. The purchase was made and the price paid was 5 million pesos. As a result, Senate of the Philippines adopted Resolution No. 8 which created a Special Committee to investigate the ―honesty and validity‖ of the said purchase. In the investigation conducted by the Committee, Arnault was asked to whom a part of the purchase price (Php 440,000) was delivered. Arnault refused to answer this question. Thus, Senate adopted Resolution No. 17 on 15 May 1950, ordering Arnault‘s confinement in Bilibid until he reveals the name of person who received the Php 440,000 and answers other pertinent questions. In December 1951, while still confinement in Bilibid, Arnault executed an affidavit, giving the history of the government purchase and naming Jess Santos as the person who received the Php 440,000. Upon presentation of affidavit, the Committee conducted investigation. At the end of the hearing, Committee did not believe Arnault‘s statement and adopted on 8 November 1952 Resolution No.

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114, ordering the continued confinement of Arnault until he has purged himself of contempt. Arnault filed petition for writ of habeas corpus on 3 March 1953 with CFI Pasay. CFI ruled in favor of Arnault; hence, the appeal of Balagtas, Director of Prisons.

Issue/Held/Ratio: (1) Since the Senate Special Committee did not believe Arnault, can the court review said finding? No. The judicial department of the government has no right to do, much in the same manner, that the legislative department cannot invade the judicial realm in the ascertainment of truth and in the application and interpretation of law, in what is known as the judicial process, because that would be in direct conflict with the fundamental principle of separation of powers established by the Constitution. There are only instances when judicial intervention may lawfully be invoked when there has been a violation of a constitutional inhibition (due process and arbitrary exercise of legislative discretion). In the case at bar, due process has been afforded to Arnault by he had been given the opportunity to be heard. (2) Since the Senate did not believe the statement, is the continued confinement of Arnault, as ordered in Resolution No 114, valid? Yes. Arnault v. Nazareno: ―…the Senate has the authority to commit a witness if he refuses to answer a question pertinent to a legislative inquiry, to compel him to give him the information, by reason of its coercive power and not its punitive power. Patterned after American legislative bodies, the Senate has the power to punish for contempt if the contempt has had the effect of obstructing the exercise of the legislature of its legitimate functions (in this case, the power to investigate). (3) Having answered the question of the Senate Special Committee, did Arnault purge himself of contempt?

No. In order that Arnault can be considered of having purged himself of contempt, it is necessary that he testified truthfully (note that the Senate believed Arnault‘s testament untrue). No person guilty of contempt may purge himself by another lie. This would be repetition of the offense. QUOTABLE QUOTES: On separation of powers: ―When the framers of the Constitution adopted the principle of separation of powers, making each branch supreme within the realm of its respective authority, it must have intended that each department‘s authority to be full and complete…‖

Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Ponente: Padilla, J. Facts: - Petition for prohibition to review the decision of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee - 7/30/1987: RP, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed w/ the Sandiganbayan the civil case no. 0035, ―RP vs. Benjamin ‗Kokoy‘ Romualdez, et al.‖ -The complaint alleges that defendants Benjamin and Juliette Romualdez took advantage of their relationship w/ Defendants Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos to engage in schemes to enrich themselves at the expense of the

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Plaintiff and the Filipino People, among others: -obtaining control over Meralco, Benguet Mining Co., Shell, PCI Bank, etc., selling interests to PNI Holdings, Inc. (corporators, Bengzon Law Offices), the concealment of the assets subject to the complaint from the PCGG under the veil of corporate identity, etc. 8/2-6/1988: reports circulate of the sale of the Romualdez companies for 5M (far below market value) without PCGG approval to the Ricardo Lopa Group, owned by Pres. Aquino‘s brother-in-law, Ricardo Lopa –Sen. Enrile called upon the Senate to investigate a possible violation of S5 of RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt rd Practices Act w/c prohibits any relative of the President by affinity or consanguinity up to the 3 civil degree, to intervene in any transaction w/ the government -the matter was referred to the Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers (Blue Ribbon Committee) -the Committee subpoenaed the petitioners and Ricardo Lopa to testify on ―what they know‖ about the sale of the 36 Romualdez corporations -at the hearing, Lopa and Bengzon declined to testify, the former invoking the due process clause, and both averring that such testimonies would ―unduly prejudice‖ the defendants of civil case no.0035 -petitioners thus filed the present petition for prohibition, praying for a temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief, claiming that the Committee acted in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose -the Committee claims that the Court cannot enjoin the Congress or its committees from making inquiries in aid of legislation, under the doctrine of separation of powers (quoting Angara v. Comelec) -the Court finds this contention untenable and is of the view that it has the jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries and determine the scope and extent of the power of the Blue Ribbon Committee

Issue: 1. WON the Blue Ribbon Committee‘s inquiry is in aid of legislation. 2. WON Congress is encroaching on the exclusive domain of another branch of government. 3. WON the inquiry violates the petitioners‘ right to due process. Held/Ratio: . NO Blue Ribbon Committee‘s inquiry is not in aid of legislation - Sen. Enrile‘s inquiry merely intended to find out WON Ricardo Lopa had any part in the alleged sale of the Romualdez corporations—there was no intended legislation as required by A6 S21 of the constitution. As held in Jean L. Arnault v. Leon Nazareno et al., the inquiry must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power vested in the Committee by the Constitution. In Watkins v. US it was held that Congress‘ power of inquiry is broad but limited, that is, it may not pry into private affairs if such actions are not in furtherance of a legitimate task of congress—no inquiry is an end in itself. 2. YES Congress is encroaching on the exclusive domain of another branch of government - Since the issue had been pre-empted by the Sandiganbayan, any further investigation by Congress would only serve to complicate matters and produce conflicting opinions—as held in Baremblatt v. US, Congress cannot inquire into matters w/c are exclusively the concern of the Judiciary. 3. YES the inquiry violates the petitioners‘ right to due process - It has been held that ―a congressional committee‘s right to inquire is subject to all relevant limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action, including…the Bill of Rights‖. As held in Hutcheson v. US, it can‘t be assumed

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that legislative purpose is always justified by public need; Congress cannot tread on private rights. The doctrine in Cabal v. Kapunan states that the Constitutional right against self-incrimination extends to all proceedings sanctioned by law and in cases in w/c the witness is an accused. Disposition the petitioners may not be compelled by the Committee to appear, testify, and produce evidence before it because such inquiries would not be in aid of legislation and if pursued, would be violative of the principle separation of powers between the legislative and the judicial departments, as ordained by the Constitution. The petition is GRANTED.

Senate v. Ermita Ponente: Carpio-Morales, J. Facts: Senate (petitioner) claims that EO 464 has prevented the exercise of the power of the Senate to perform investigations in aid of legislation; North Rail Project (Enrile privilege speech); election fraud, Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan, wiretapping (Pimentel jr, Estrada, Biazon privilege speeches, Madrigal, Biazon resolutions); fertilizer fund scam (Blue Ribbon Committee) Bayan Muna (petitioner) claims EO 464 infringes on rights of members of Congress (Senate plus House of Representatives) to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws COURAGE (petitioner) claims implementation of EO464 threatens tenure of members of public office, should they be summoned by Congress CODAL (petitioner) claims right to information is threatened by imposition of EO 464 Chavez (petitioner) claims constitutional rights as taxpayer, citizen, and law practitioner claims constitutional rights are violated ALG (petitioner) claims right to information of the public is denied by EO 464 PDP-LABAN (petitioner) claims that EO 464 hampers the legislative agenda of its members in Congress, particularly in the conduct of investigations in aid of legislation IBP (petitioner) claims right to information of the public is denied by EO 464 Ermita (respondent) prays court for dismissal of petitions for lack of merit Issue: 1. 2. 3.

Whether EO 464 contravenes the power of inquiry of Congress (investigations in aid of legislation) Whether EO 464 violates right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern Whether respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion by implementing EO 464 prior to publication

Held: 1. 2.

2. Ratio:

Sections 2(b) and 3 of EO 464 are unconstitutional (void) because it infringes on the right of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation Sections 2(b) and 3 of EO 464 are unconstitutional (void) because it infringes on the right of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, and since investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public, and matters under investigation in aid of legislation are presumed to be a matter of public concern, it thus infringes on the right of the people to information EO 464 is covered by the requirement that the order must have been published before implemented.

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1.

3. 4.

Sections 2(b) and 3 are invalid because claim of executive privilege is implied, not asserted -- no precise or certain reasons given to support claim of executive privilege (respect for co-equal branch of government); Sections 1 and 2(a) valid under Art VI, Sec 22, on the provision on appearances on the question hour (appearance is discretionary then), but this validity cannot be applied on inquiries in aid of legislation (appearance is mandatory unless a valid claim of privilege is made by the President or the Executive Secretary) See above. Since EO 464 has a direct effect on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, it is a matter of public interest, and due process requires that the people be informed of the issuance of the order prior to its implementation.

Sabio v. Gordon GR No. 174340 October 17, 2006 Neri v. Senate Ponente: Leonardo-De Castro, J. Facts: April 21, 2007 – DOTC entered into a contract with Zhing Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of $329,481,290 (P16 B). The project was to be financed by the People‘s Republic of China. In connection with the NBN Project, several resolutions were introduced in the Senate 1. 2. 3. 4.

Pimentel – circumstances leading to the approval of the NBN deal with ZTE, the role played by the officials in able for the deal to be consummated Roxas – urging the President to cancel the ZTE Contract Lacson – national defense implications Santiago – economic justification of the NBN project

Investigation was claimed to be relevant to 3 pending bills 1. 2. 3.

Roxas – subjecting treaties, international or executive agreements involving funding in the procurement of infrastructure projects Roxas – safeguards in contracting loans classified as Official Development Assistance Santiago – concurrence to international agreements and executive agreements

September 18 – Jose de Venecia III testifies to several high executive officials and power brokers using their influence to push the NBN project. It was formerly a BOT project but the NEDA acquiesced to convert it to a gov‘t-togov‘t project. September 26 – attended hearing, deliberated for 11 hours but refused to answer 3 questions, and by invoking executive privilege. i. ii. iii.

Whether the president followed up the NBN project? Were you dictated to prioritize the ZTE? Whether the President said to go ahead and approve the project after being told about the alleged bribe?

Committees issued a subpoena ad testificandum to petitioner, requiring him to appear and testify on November 20. November 15 – Ermita requested respondent Committees to dispense with petitioner‘s testimony on the ground of executive privilege November 20 – Petitioner didn‘t appear November 22 – show cause letter sent

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November 29 – Neri sends letter: 1) non-appearance order by the President, 2) conversation with president involved sensitive national security and diplomatic matters, 3) consent to attend new Senate hearing provided that he be furnished questions in advance. December 7 – petitioner files the present petition assailing the show cause letter dated November 22, 2007. January 1 – Neri declared by committees in contempt of court (Neri files reconsideration order) February 1 – Neri files supplemental petition for certiorari with urgent application for TRO and preliminary injunction, seeking to restrain the said contempt order. Neri Lack or excess of jurisdiction (show cause letter and contempt of court) Executive privilege – 1) order by the President and 2) Senate v. Ermita applicable Sec 7 [12] RA 6713 – Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, and Sec 24[13] (e) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

Senate Testimony is material and pertinent in the investigation conducted in aid of legislation No valid justification for petitioner to claim executive privilege There is no abuse in authority to order petitioner‘s arrest

March 17, 2008 – SolGen filed a motion for leave to intervene and to admit attached memorandum -

Conversation covered by executive privilege Petitioner not summoned in accordance with inquiries in aid of legislation (Sec 21) Art VI and Senate v. Ermita There was an abuse of discretion for alleged non-compliance with subpoena dated November 13, 2007.

Issue: 1. 2.

or not the communications elicited by the subject 3 questions are covered by executive privilege? YES. Whether or not respondent Committee committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order? YES.

Held/Ratio: 1.

Executive Privilege

Definition: Nixon, In Re Sealed Case and Judicial Watch Quintessential and non-delegable presidential power Communication must be authored or ―solicited and received‖ by a close advisor of the President or the President himself; ―operational proximity‖ Remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sough ―likely contains important evidence‖ and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority

All Bases covered by Ermita and Neri ^_^ Power to enter into executive agreement with other countries Communications ‗received‘ by a close-advisor of the president No adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. KUDOS! GMA…

a.

There is a recognized claim executive privilege despite the revocation of EO 646 i. EO 646 doesn’t affect executive privilege because it is in the constitution 1. Neri‘s letter limited its basis on Senate v. Ermita, Almonte v. Velasquez and Chavez v. PEA ii. Jurisprudence in the United States

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Nixon and post-Watergate cases ―confidentiality of conversations that take place in the President‘s performance of his official duties.‖ 2. In re: Sealed Case a. 2 kinds of executive privilege i. Presidential communications privilege -Presidential communications, documents and other materials 1. Pre and post-deliberation, decision-making of the president [ constitution] ii. Deliberative Process Privilege – advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated. 1. Decision-making of executive officials [common law privilege] b. Who are covered? Staff with ―operational proximity‖ 3. Judicial Watch Inc v. DOJ – test of operational proximity a. Deputy Atty. General and the Pardon Atty. too remote to be protected [pardoning power] 4. Other cases: a. Right to withhold documents related to: military or state secrets, identity of government informers, pending investigations, and foreign relations. 5. U.S. v. Curtis-Wright Export Corp – necessity for caution and secrecy in treatymaking iii. Philippine Jurisprudence  executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where inquiry relates to the power textually committed by the constitution to the president [commander-inchief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers]. 1. Chavez v. PCGG – government privilege against full disclosure of state secrets 2. Chavez v. PEA – confidentiality of presidential conversations, correspondences and closed door meeting discussions; 3. Senate v. Ermita – confidentiality of presidential communications iv. Confidentiality in executive privilege is not absolutely protected by the Constitution 1. There must be an urgent public need a. no evidence that it is necessary as an aid to legislation [Art 21] b. use of legislative oversight [Art 22] not applicable to case 2. It is not a guard against wrongdoing a. For Nixon, he had a pending criminal case – which is not so in the case at bar b. Nixon didn‘t claim need to protect military, diplomatic or national security secrets 3. Appropriateness of the function in the performance in which the material is sought – not met [as stated above]; it is a fact-finding committee and not a grand jury v. Right of people to information not applicable to the case at bar 1. Restricted to information ‗as provided by law‘ 2. These are in addition to what jurisprudence classifies as confidential 3. Executive privilege provided for in the constitution. 4. Inquiry in aid of legislation is not a direct function of the ‗people‘s‘ right to information [they are acting in their capacity as public officials] 1.

b.

The Claim of executive privilege is properly invoked i. There must a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter  Nov 17 letter of Exec. Sec. Ermita satisfies the requirement

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2.

ii. A formal and proper claim of executive privilege requires a ―precise and certain reason‖ for preserving their confidentiality  protection of diplomatic and economic relations with China stated Abuse of discretion a. First, there being a legitimate claim of executive privilege, the issuance of the contempt Order suffers from constitutional infirmity. b. Second, respondent Committees did not comply with the requirement laid down in Senate vs. Ermita that the invitations should contain the ―possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry,‖ along with ―the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof.‖ Compliance with this requirement is imperative, both under Sections 21 and 22 of Article VI of the Constitution. This must be so to ensure that the rights of both persons appearing in or affected by such inquiry are respected as mandated by said Section 21 and by virtue of the express language of Section 22. Unfortunately, despite petitioner‘s repeated demands, respondent Committees did not send him advance list of questions. c. Third, a reading of the transcript of respondent Committees‘ January 30, 2008 proceeding reveals that only a minority of the members of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee were present during the deliberation. Section 18 of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provides that: ―The Committee, by a vote of majority of all its members, may punish for contempt any witness before it who disobey any order of the Committee or refuses to be sworn or to testify or to answer proper questions by the Committee or any of its members.‖ Members who did not actually participate in the deliberation were made to sign the contempt Order. d. Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent Committees likewise violated Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the ―duly published rules of procedure.‖ We quote the OSG‘s explanation: The phrase ―duly published rules of procedure‖ requires the Senate of every Congress to publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every Senate is distinct from the one before it or after it. Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years for one-half of the Senate‘s membership, the composition of the Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem, fit. Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the 14th Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm. e. Fifth, respondent Committees‘ issuance of the contempt Order is arbitrary and precipitate. It must be pointed out that respondent Committees did not first pass upon the claim of executive privilege and inform petitioner of their ruling. Instead, they curtly dismissed his explanation as ―unsatisfactory‖ and simultaneously issued the Order citing him in contempt and ordering his immediate arrest and detention,

Garcillano v. HOR GR No. 170338 December 23, 2008 9. Other Powers a. Act as board of canvassers for presidential election Pimentel v. Joint Committee GR No. 163783 June 22, 2004 b. Call a special election for Presidency c. Decide on disability of the President d. Legislative veto or extension or suspension of writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law e. Presidential amnesties f. Concur in treaties g. Declaration of existence of war h. Delegation of emergency powers i. Utilization of natural resources j. Amendment of Constitution k. Power of Impeachment B. Executive Department 1. The President a. Qualifications, election, term and oath b. Privileges and salary

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Republic v. Sandiganbayan Ponente: Corona, J. Facts: - Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari. - Dec 17 1991, the Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government or PCGG, filed a petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan, entitled Republic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E. - Marcos, represented by 7 his Estate/heirs and Imelda R. Marcos, pursuant to RA 1379 . PCGG was created by virtue of Executive Order No. 1 issued on February 28, 1986 by then President Corazon Aquino, and was charged with the task of assisting the President in the ―recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them during is administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship.‖ - In said case, petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) sought: -

a.

the declaration of the aggregate amount of US$356 million (estimated to be US$658 million inclusive of 8 interest as of the time of decision) deposited in escrow in the Philippine National Bank (PNB), as ill-gotten wealth. *The ff account groups, using various foreign foundations in certain Swiss banks, previously held the funds: 1. Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts 2. Xandy-Wintrop: Charis-Scolari-Valamo-SpinusAvertina-Foundation accounts 3. Trinidad-Rayby-Palmy Foundation accounts 4. Rosalys-Aguamina Foundation accounts 5. Maler Foundation accounts

the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million in treasury notes which exceeded the Marcos couple‘s salaries, other lawful income as well as income from legitimately acquired property. These treasury notes are frozen at the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas by virtue of freeze order issued by PCGG. - Oct 18, 1993, respondents Imelda R Marcos, Ma. Imelda M Manotoc, Irene M Araneta and Ferdinand R Marcos, Jr. filed their answer. b.

The General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements - Before case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement and the Supplemental Agreements dated Dec 28, 1993 were executed by the Marcos children and then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global settlement of the assets of the Marcos family - The General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements sought to identify, collate, cause the inventory of and distribute all assets presumed to be owned by the Marcos family under the conditions contained therein. - It was stated in one of the ―whereas clauses‖ the fact that petitioner Republic ―obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal Tribunal on Dec 21 1990 that the US$356 million belongs in principle to the Republic of the Philippines provided certain conditions are met….‖ The decision of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court affirmed the decision of Zurich District Attorney Peter Cosandey granting legal assistance to Republic. Cosandey declared the various 7

An Act Declaring Forfeiture In Favor of the State Any Property To Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing For the Procedure Therefor. Money or a deed or other instrument deposited with a third person for a delivery to a given party upon the fulfillment of some condition. While in the keeping of the third party, the money or instrument is said to be “in escrow”. (Random House Webster’s Legal Dictionary, Random House, New York, 1996) 8

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deposits in the name of the foundations to be of illegal provenance and ordered that they be frozen to await the final verdict in favor of the parties entitled to restitution. - Sandiganbayan conducted hearings on the motion to approve the General/Supplemental Agreements. - Oct 18 1996 petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings. Respondents filed their opposition. - Nov 20 1997 Sandiganbayan denied petitioner‘s motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the motion to approve the compromise agreement ―(took) precedence over the motion for summary judgment‖ - May 26 1998 Mrs. Marcos filed manifestation claiming she was not a party to the motion for approval of the Compromise Agreement and that the owned 90% of the funds with the remaining 10% belonging to the Marcos estate. The Fund Transfer - Aug 10 1995 petitioner Republic filed with the District Attorney in Zurich, Switzerland an additional request for the immediate transfer of the deposits to an escrow account in PNB. This was granted. - Marcoses appealed, Swiss Federal Supreme Court affirmed ruling of District Attorney of Zurich, and funds were remitted to the Philippines in escrow in 1998. The Petition for Summary Judgment - Mar 10 2000 petitioner filed another motion for summary judgment ―pertaining to the forfeiture of the US$356 million, based on ff grounds: a.

essential facts which warrant the forfeiture of the funds are admitted by respondents in their pleadings and other submissions made in the course of the proceeding b. respondents‘ admission made during pre-trial that they do not have any interest or ownership over the funds tenders no genuine issue or controversy as to any material fact in the present action - Mrs. Marcos filed her opposition, which was later adopted by co-respondents Marcos children. - Mar 24 2000 hearing on motion for summary judgment was conducted - Sep 19 2000 Sandiganbayan granted petitioner‘s motion for summary judgment, stating that there is no issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, and declared the funds, which were deemed unlawfully acquired as illgotten wealth, forfeited in favor of the State. - Mrs. Marcos filed motion for reconsideration on Sep 26 2000; Marcos children followed. - In Jan 31 2002 resolution, Sandiganbayan reversed its Sep 19 2000 decision, stating that ―the evidence offered for summary judgment of the case did not prove that the money in the Swiss Banks belonged to the Marcos spouses because no legal proof exists in the record as to the ownership by the Marcoses of the funds‖, and thus denied petitioner‘s motion for summary judgment. Hence, the present petition. - Petitioner asserts in the main that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing the decision on the ground that the original copies of the authenticated Swiss Federal Supreme Court decisions and their ―authenticated translations‖ have not been submitted to the Court, when in fact the Sandiganbayan quoted extensively a portion of the Swiss decisions in denying a previous motion dated July 29 1999. Petitioner adds that nowhere in the respondents‘ motions for reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration were the authenticity, accuracy and admissibility of the Swiss decisions ever challenged. - Respondents, of course, assert that the petition should be denied. Analysis of Respondents’ Legitimate Income

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- the Marcoses reported P16,408,442.00 or US$2,414,484.91 in total income over a period of 20 years from 1965 to 1984. - This amount includes Ferdinand Marcos‘ salary as Senate President in 1965, (P15,935) and as President from 1966 to 1985 (1966-1976 at P60,000/year; 1977-1985 at P100,000/year), Imelda Marcos‘ salary as Minister of Human Settlements from 1976 to 1986 (P75,000/year), income from legal practice (P11,109,836), plus other sources. - Ferdinand Marcos made it appear that he had an extremely profitable legal practice before he became President, and that he was still receiving payments almost 20 years after - Computations establish the total net worth of spouses Ferdinand and Imelda, for the years 1965 to 1984, in the amount of US$957,487.75. (assuming income from legal practice is valid) - The five group accounts have a total balance of US$356 million.

Issue: 1. WON petitioner Republic‘s action for certiorari is proper. 2. WON respondents raised any genuine issue of fact which would either justify or negate summary judgment. 3. WON petitioner Republic was able to prove its case for forfeiture in accordance with Sections 2 and 3 of RA 1379.

Held/Ratio: 1. Ratio Where the case is undeniably ingrained with immense public interest, public policy and deep historical repercussions, certiorari is allowed notwithstanding the existence and availability of the remedy of appeal. Obiter Almost two decades have passed since the government initiated its search for and reversion of ill-gotten wealth. The definitive resolution of such cases on the merits is long overdue. 2. Ratio Mere denials, if unaccompanied by any fact which will be admissible in evidence at a hearing, are not sufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and will not defeat a motion for summary judgment Obiter Court held that respondent Marcoses failed to raise any genuine issue of fact in their pleadings. Summary judgment should take place as a matter of right. - a genuine issue is an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious and contrived, set up in bad faith or patently lacking in substance. - Respondents failed to specifically deny each and every allegation contained in the petition for forfeiture in the manner required by the rules (Sec 10 Rule 8 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). Their answers include ―they have no sufficient knowledge‖ or ―they could not recall because it happened a long time ago‖ or ―the funds were lawfully acquired‖ without stating the basis of such assertions. - Question: Whether the kind of denial in respondents‘ answer qualifies as the specific denial called for by the rules. No. The Court holds that if an allegation directly and specifically charges a party with having done, performed or committed a particular act which the latter did not in fact do, perform or commit, a categorical and express denial must be made. - The allegations for forfeiture on the existence of the Swiss bank deposits, not having been specifically denied by respondents in their answer, were deemed admitted pursuant to Sec 11 Rule 8 of 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. a.

Propriety of Summary Judgment

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- Summary judgment is proper when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact in the action. The Court is justified in dispensing with the trial and rendering summary judgment if it is demonstrated by affidavits, depositions or admissions that the issues are not genuine but sham or fictitious. - motion for summary judgment is premised on the assumption that the issues presented need not be tried either because these are patently devoid of substance or that there is no genuine issue as to any pertinent fact. - It is a procedural device for the prompt disposition of actions in which the pleadings raise only a legal issue, not a genuine issue as to any material fact. b. Whether petitioner Republic had bound itself to go to trial and had legally waived right it had to move for summary judgment. - Court rules that petitioner could validly move for summary judgment any time after the respondents‘ answer was filed or, for that matter, at any subsequent stage of the litigation. The fact that petitioner agreed to proceed to trial did not in any way prevent it from moving for summary judgment. c.

Whether by the time motion for summary judgment was filed on Mar 10 2000, estoppel by laches had already set in against petitioner. - Doctrine of estoppel or laches does not apply when government sues as a sovereign or asserts governmental rights. Nor can estoppel validate an act that contravenes law or public policy. - estoppel by laches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable or unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, warranting a presumption that the person has abandoned his right or declined to assert it. - in invoking doctrine of estoppel by laches, respondents must show not only unjustified inaction but also that some unfair injury to them might result unless the action is barred. 3. Ratio The prima facie presumption raised by the law that a property is unlawfully acquired when the amount or value is manifestly disproportionate to the official salary and other lawful income of the public officer who owns it stands as proved unless defendant shows, and proves, that these were lawfully acquired and that there are other legitimate sources of income. Obiter burden of proof was on respondents to dispute presumption and show by clear and convincing evidence that the Swiss deposits were lawfully acquired and that they had other legitimate sources of income. A presumption is prima facie proof of the fact presumed, and, unless the fact thus prima facie established by legal presumption is disproved, it must stand as proved. - the Court not only took into consideration that respondents themselves made admissions in their pleadings and testimonies, but that petitioner was able to present sworn statements of witnesses who had personal knowledge of the Marcoses‘ participation in the illegal acquisition of funds.

c. Succession 1) In case of vacancy at the beginning of term 2) In case of vacancy during term 3) In case of temporary disability Estrada v. Arroyo GR No. 146738 March 2, 2001 d. Removal e. Prohibitions f. Exceptions to prohibition from holding another office 1) Vice-President as member of the cabinet 2) Sec. of Justice as member of the Judicial and Bar Council CLU v. Executive Secretary 194 SCRA 317 (1991) Cruz v. COA GR No. 138489 November 29, 2001 NAC v. COA GR No. 156982 September 8, 2004

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2. Powers and Functions of the President a. Executive Power Marcos v. Manglapus Ponente: Cortes, J. Facts: Sept. 28, 1989 – Marcos died in Honolulu Aquino statement – remains of Marcos will not be allowed to be brought to the country in the interest of safety of those who will react conflictingly to the death of Marcos and for tranquility of state & order of society. This will hold until government, whether present or succeeding, decides otherwise. Petitioners…  

1. 2. 3.

pray that necessary travel documents be issued to them pray that respondents be enjoined from implementing Aquino‘s decision to bar return of Marcos‘ remain MFR filed Oct. 2, 1989 w/following arguments: a. barring their return would deny them their inherent right as citizens to return to their country of birth & all other rights guaranteed by the Consti to all Filipinos b. President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country, if she has, she acted arbitrarily c. No basis for barring their return Respondents allege that 1. 2.

MFR is moot & academic as to deceased Marcos Formal rights they‘re invoking, right to return = right to destabilize the country, hide their efforts to destabilize

Issue/Held: Issues and Holding: WON Aquino has the power to prevent Marcos from returning to the country. YES WON Marcos should be allowed to return. NO

Ratio: 1. 2.

Petitioners failed to show any compelling reason to warrant reconsideration. Factual scenario during the time Court rendered its decision has not changed. Threats are still there. Imelda even made a comment about Marcos being the legal president. 3. President has unstated residual powers implied from grant of executive power. Enumerations are merely for specifying principal articles implied in the definition; leaving the rest to flow from general grant that power, interpreted in conformity w/other parts of the Consti (Hamilton). Executive unlike Congress can exercise power from sources not enumerates so long as not forbidden by consti‘l text (Myers vs. US). This does not amount to dictatorship. Amendment No. 6 expressly granted Marcos power of legislation whereas 1987 Consti granted Aquino w/implied powers. 4. It is w/in Aquino‘s power to protect & promote interest & welfare of the people. She bound to comply w/ that duty and there is no proof that she acted arbitrarily or w/gadalej. Holding: Motion denied for lack of merit.

North Cotabato v. GRP supra DENR v. DENR Region 12 Employees GR No. 149725 August 19, 2003 b. Control of executive departments Blaquera v. Alcala Ponente: Facts/Issue/Held/Ratio:

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Background: RA 6791 enacted pursuant to EO 292 or the Administrative code of 1987 provided for productivity incentives to some employees of certain Government agencies (GOCCs in particular). A number of employees who were given such incentives but from whose salaries such were deducted as a refund by the President because he says the same were given by their departments without his consent as required by the RA brought this action to the SC. The Court upheld the constitutionality of the refund. The Government agencies from whose employees deductions were made were not covered by the RA which only included GOCCs with Original Charters. And the President has Control over all Government agencies and GOCCs. RD: There are generally two types of GOCCs: o

Those incorporated under the General Corporation Law are covered by Labor Laws and have the right to bargain collectively, strike, and other such remedies available to workers of private corporations. Functions are mainly proprietary. o Those with Special/Original Charters which are subject to Civil Service Laws, have no right to bargain. Incorporated in pursuance to State Policy. The President of the Head of Government. His/her power includes control which means the power to alter what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. Art IX Sec 5 - Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of government officials and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.

Hutchison Ports v. SBMA GR No. 131367 August 31, 2000 NEA v. COA 377 SCRA 233 (2002) c. General supervision over local governments/autonomous regions Pimentel v. Aguirre GR No. 132988 July 19, 2000 d. Power of Appointment Bermudez v. Torres GR No. 131429 August 4, 1999 Sarmiento v. Mison Ponente: Facts/Issue/Held/Ratio: Ratio Decidendi: The provision in question shall mean that there are certain public officers/offices where the power of appointment is shared by both executive and legislative. Codal – Art 7 Sec. 16 ―The President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments…‖ Notes: The creation of a public office is legislative. But appointment of a public office is executive since it is the Pres. who implements the law. President exercises supervision and control. Supervision means checking WON an individual abuses his/her authority. Control means replacing the act itself with President‘s own discretion. However part of the power to appoint is also vested in the legislative. 2 kinds of appointment: *direct appointment – limited only to certain officers *shared appointment = nomination by the executive (Pres) + confirmation by legislative (Commission on Appointments)

Concepcion-Bautista v. Salonga 172 SCRA 160 (1989) Calderon v. Carale GR No. 91636 April 23, 1992

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Manalo v. Sistoza GR No. 197369 August 11, 1999 Soriano v. Lista GR No. 153881 March 24, 2003 Pimentel v. Ermita Ponente: Carpio, J. Facts: - 7/26/2004: Congress commenced their regular session - 8/25/2004: The Commission on Appointments (composed of members of Congress) was constituted + meanwhile, GMA issued appointments to respondents as acting secretaries of their respective departments: Arthur Yap (DOA), Alberto Romulo (DFA), Raul Gonzales (DOJ), Florencio Abad (DOE) Avelino Cruz (DND), Rene Villa (DAR), Joseph Durano (DOT), Mike Defensor (DENR) + the aforementioned respondents took their oaths of office and assumed their duties as acting secretaries - 9/8/2004: a group of senators, headed by Sen. Pimentel, filed this present petition for certiorari and prohibition, praying for a writ of preliminary injunction to declare these appointments by GMA unconstitutional - 9/23/2004: GMA issued ad interim (temporary) appointments, replacing respondents‘ acting capacity - Sol Gen argues + petition is moot because GMA had issued the ad interim appointments after the recess of Congress; prohibition may not enjoin acts already done. + the power to appoint is executive in nature—the Commission of Appointments, though it be composed of members of Congress, is a body independent of Congress, and its executive power emanates from the Consti. + only Senators Enrile, Lacson, Angara, Ejercito-Estrada and Osmena, as members of the Commission, possess standing in the present petition. - Petitioners’ Argument + petitioners assert that GMA cannot issue such appointments because no law grants such a power S10 Ch2 B4, EO 292: ―…in case of a vacancy in the Office of a Secretary, it is only an Undersecretary who can be designated as Acting Secretary…‖ + while Congress is in session, no appointments can be made w/o the consent of the Commission Respondents’ Argument: -respondents assert that GMA can issue such appointments for the reason that no law prohibits it S16 Ch5 T1 B3, EO 292: ―The Pres. shall exercise the power to appoint such officials as provided by…the law‖ S17 Ch5 T1 B3, EO 292: the Pres. may appoint an officer already in service or any other competent person

Issue:

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WON GMA‘s appointment of respondents as acting secretaries w/o the consent of the Commission of Appointments while Congress is in session is unconstitutional

Held/Ratio: - the court held that the President may make such appointments, as the law expressly provides it S17 Ch5 Title 1 Book 3, EO 292: ―… the President may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the function of an office in the executive branch…‖ - EO 292 applies to appointments vested in the President by law—Congress is not the only source of law S17(3) of the previous provision states: ―In no case shall a temporary designation exceed one (1) year.‖ Petitioners fail to consider that this provision acts as a safeguard against the abuse of such appointments - a department secretary is considered an alter ego of the President, that is, it holds a position of great trust and confidence. Hence, Congress cannot impose that the undersecretary automatically be appointed—the Pres. must appoint an alter ego of her choice. J. Bernas, SJ.: ―acting appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy; ad interim appointments are extended only during a recess of Congress and require submission to the Commission of Appointments for approval or rejection.‖ - notwithstanding Bernas‘ textbook definition, the court finds no abuse of appointments in the present case as such were issued immediately upon the recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one year. Decision Petition DISMISSED

In Re Valenzuela Ponente: Narvasa, CJ. Facts: - The Resolution of the Court En Banc, handed down on May 14, 1998, sets out the relevant facts. - Referred to the Court En Banc by the Chief Justice are the appointments signed by the President under date of March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively. - received at the Chief Justice's chambers on May 12, 1998 - view by Senior Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado, Consultant of the Council, who had been a member of the Committee of the Executive Department and of the Committee on the Judicial Department of the 1986 Constitutional Commission: that on the basis of the Commission's records, the election ban had no application to appointments to the Court of Appeals. Without any extended discussion or any prior research and study on the part of the other Members of the JBC, this hypothesis was accepted, and was then submitted to the President for consideration, together with the Council's nominations for eight (8) vacancies in the Court of Appeals - April 6, 1998: Chief Justice received an official communication from the Executive Secretary transmitting the appointments of eight (8) Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals all of which had been duly signed on March 11, 1998 by the President - In view of the fact that all the appointments had been signed on March 11, 1998 - the day immediately before the commencement of the ban on appointments imposed by Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution - which impliedly indicated that the President's Office did not agree with the hypothesis that appointments to the Judiciary were not

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covered by said ban, the Chief Justice resolved to defer consideration of nominations for the vacancy in the Supreme Court created by the retirement of Associate Justice Ricardo J. Francisco - May 4, 1998: Chief Justice received a letter from the President, addressed to the JBC, requesting transmission of the "list of final nominees" for the vacancy" no later than Wednesday, May 6, 1998," in view of the duty imposed on him by the Constitution "to fill up the vacancy . . . within ninety (90) days from February 13, 1998, the date the present vacancy occurred." - May 5, 1998: Secretary of Justice Silvestre Bello III requested the Chief Justice for "guidance" respecting the expressed desire of the "regular members" of the JBC to hold a meeting immediately to fill up the vacancy in the Court in line with the President's letter . The Chief Justice advised Secretary Bello to await the reply that he was drafting - May 6, 1998: the Chief Justice sent his reply to the President-- stating that no sessions had been scheduled for the Council until after the May elections because of the "need to undertake further study of the matter," prescinding from "the desire to avoid any constitutional issue regarding the appointment to the mentioned vacancy"; delivered to Malacañang May 6, 1998, and a copy given to the Office of Justice Secretary Bello - Justice Secretary and the regular members of the Council had already taken action –on May 6, 1998 they came to an agreement on a resolution: they drew attention to Section 4 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution (omitting any mention of Section 15, Article VII) as well as to the President's letter of May 4, with an appeal that the Chief Justice convene the Council for the purpose "on May 7, 1998 - CJ convoked the Council to a meeting at 3 o'clock in the afternoon of May 7, 1998 - May 7, 1998: Chief Justice received a letter from President: "the election-ban provision applies only to executive appointments or appointments in the executive branch of government," the whole article being "entitled 'EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT.'", "firmly and respectfully reiterate(d) . . . (his) request for the Judicial and Bar Council to transmit . . . the final list of nominees for the lone Supreme Court vacancy." - May 8, 1998: Chief Justice replied: --Section 15 of Article VII imposes a direct prohibition on the President which is the general rule, the only exception being only as regards "executive positions"(judicial positions are covered by the general rule) - Section 4 (1) of Article VIII, unlike Section 15, Article VII, the duty of filling the vacancy is not specifically imposed on the President - normally, when there are no presidential elections Section 4 (1), Article VIII shall apply but when (as now) there are presidential elections, the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII comes into play: the President shall not make any appointments - requesting the regular Members of the Judicial and Bar Council to defer action on the matter until further advice by the Court - May 8, 1998: another meeting was held; closed with a resolution that "the constitutional provisions be referred to the Supreme Court En Banc for appropriate action - May 12, 1998: Chief Justice received from Malacañang the appointments of two (2) Judges of the Regional Trial Court mentioned above; places on the Chief Justice the obligation of transmitting the appointments to the appointees so that they might take their oaths and assume the duties of their office (trouble is that in doing so, the Chief Justice runs the risk of acting in a manner inconsistent with the Constitution) - the Court Resolved that pending the foregoing proceedings and the deliberation by the court on the matter, and until further orders, no action be taken on the appointments of Hon. Valenzuela and Hon. Vallarta which in the meantime shall be held in abeyance and not given any effect and said appointees shall refrain from taking their oath of office and the Judicial and Bar Council is INSTRUCTED to defer all action on the matter of nominations

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- Valenzuela took his oath on May 14, 1998 -- In his "Explanation" he stated that he did so because on May 7, 1998 he "received from Malacañang copy of his appointment . . ." which contained the following direction: "By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties of the office" - The Relevant Constitutional Provisions Section 15, Article VII: "Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein prejudice public service or endanger public safety." Section 4 (1), Article VIII: "The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof ." Section 9, Article VIII: "The Members of the Supreme Court and judges in lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation. For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the submission of the list."

Issue: WON during the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution, the President is nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII Held/Ratio: The appointments of Messrs. Valenzuela and Vallarta on March 30, 1998 were unquestionably made during the period of the ban. Such appointments come within the operation of the first prohibition relating to appointments which are considered to be for the purpose of buying votes or influencing the election. Reasoning - While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest there is no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments during the period of the ban. On the other hand, there is a strong public policy for the prohibition against appointments made within the period of the ban. - Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by Section 15 of Article VII. - journal of the commission which drew up the present Constitution discloses: desire to make certain that the size of the Court would not be decreased for any substantial period as a result of vacancies, the insertion in the provision of the same mandate that "IN CASE OF ANY VACANCY, THE SAME SHALL BE FILLED WITHIN TWO MONTHS FROM OCCURRENCE THEREOF." was proposed - Section 15, Article VII is directed against two types of appointments: (1) those made for buying votes and (2) those made for partisan considerations. The first refers to those appointments made within the two months preceding a Presidential election

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The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15, Article VII consists of the so-called "midnight" appointments - the Court recognized that there may well be appointments to important positions which have to be made even after the proclamation of the new President. Such appointments, so long as they are "few and so spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications," can be made by the outgoing President - The exception allows only the making of temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. Obviously, the article greatly restricts the appointing power of the President during the period of the ban. - Considering the respective reasons for the time frames for filling vacancies in the courts and the restriction on the President's power of appointment, it is this Court's view that, as a general proposition, in case of conflict, the former should yield to the latter - the Constitution must be construed in its entirety as one, single instrument; instances may be conceived of the imperative need for an appointment, during the period of the ban, not only in the executive but also in the Supreme Court. - concerning Valenzuela's oath-taking and "reporting for duty"-Standing practice is for the originals of all appointments to the Judiciary to be sent by the Office of the President to the Office of the Chief Justice, the appointments being addressed to the appointees "Thru: the Chief Justice, Supreme Court, Manila." It is the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court, in the Chief Justice's behalf, who thereafter advises the individual appointees of their appointments and also of the date of commencement of the pre-requisite orientation seminar to be conducted by the Philippine Judicial Academy for new Judges.

De Rama v. CA GR No. 131136 February 28, 2001 Matibag v. Benipayo Ponente: Carpio, J. Facts: - The Case: Petition for Prohibition w/ prayer for a writ of prelim injunction and TRO. Petitioner questions the appointment and the right of respondents to remain in office as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC - On Feb.2, 1999, Petitioner Ma. Angelina Matibag was appointed by the COMELEC en banc as ―Acting Director IV‖ of the Education and Information Dept. (EID), her appointment was renewed on Feb 15, 2000 in a ―Temporary‖ capacity and renewed yet again on Feb 15, 2001 in the same ―Temporary‖ capacity. - On March 22, 2001 PGMA appointed ad interim, respondents Alfredo Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman and Resurreccion Borra, and Florentino Tuason as COMELEC commissioners respectively, for a term of 7 years, expiring on Feb. 2, 2008. They took their oaths and assumed their positions with the President submitting their ad interim appointments to the Commission on Appointments on May 22, 2001 for confirmation. The Commission on Appointments, however, did not act on their appointments. - On June 1, 2001, PGMA renewed their ad interim appointments with the term and the expiration remaining the nd same (for 7 years and expiring on Feb 2, 2008). The new appointees took oath a 2 time and the same was transmitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation on June 5, 2001. The Congress adjourned before the Commission could act on the appointments resulting in the renewal of their ad interim appointments by the rd President for the 3 time on June 8, 2001. - Benipayo, acting as COMELEC chairman, assigned a Velma Cinco as officer-in-charge of EID and reassigned petitioner to the Law Dept, a move which she requested reconsideration for, citing Civil Service Commission

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Memorandum Circular no. 7 (transfer of employees prohibited during election period: Jan.2-June 13, 2001). Benipayo denied the request and citing COMELEC Resolution no. 3300. Petitioner appealed to the COMELEC, filed an administrative and criminal complaint with the Law Dept against Benipayo and while the complaint was pending, she also filed this action. She claims that ad interim appointments violate the constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC, and on temporary appointments and reappointments of its Chairman and members. Petitioner also assails her reassignment to the Law Dept, the appointment of Cinco as well as the disbursements made by the COMELEC Finance Services Dept officer by way of salaries and emoluments in favor of respondents. - PGMA, on Sept. 6, 2001 renewed once again the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason for a term of 7 years expiring on Feb. 2, 2008. Issue: 1.

WON Benipayo‘s ad interim appointment and assumption of office as COMELEC chairman is constitutional

2.

WON issue is justiciable

3.

If Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were indeed appointed lawfully, WON the renewal of their appointments and subsequent assumption of office was constitutional

4.

WON petitioner‘s removal and reassignment is illegal (done w/o approval of the COMELEC as a collegial body)

5.

WON the Officer-in-charge of COMELEC Finance Services Dept, in making disbursements in favor of the new appointees, acted in excess of jurisdiction.

Held/Ratio: 1. An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment made by the Pres. in the meantime that Congress is in recess. It is not an appointment in a temporary or acting capacity. It takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the Pres. once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. Reasoning - Although the last sentence of Art IX-C Sec 1(2) of the Constitution says, ―In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity,‖ an ad interim appointment is not a temporary appointment. A distinction was made between the two in Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v IAC, where it was held that an ad interim appointment as defined in Black‘s Law Dictionary is one that is appointed to fill a vacancy, or to discharge the duties of the office during the absence or temporary incapacity of its regular incumbent. But such is not the meaning nor the use intended in the context of Phil. law. Ad interim is used to denote the manner in which said appointments were made, that is, done by the President, in the meantime, while the body, which is originally vested with the power or appointment, is unable to act. - Although the 1935 Consti did not have the provision prohibiting temporary or acting appointments, this Court then decided such an appointment in Nacionalista Party v Bautista as unconstitutional declaring that, ―It would be more in keeping with the intent, purpose and aim of the framers of the Constitution to appoint a permanent Commissioner than to designate one to act temporarily. Likewise, In Brillantes v Yorac, decided under the present Constitution, this Court struck down as unconstitutional the designation by then Pres. Aquino of Haydee Yorac as Acting Chairperson of the COMELEC. - Art. IX-A §1 should be harmonized with Art. VII §16. for to hold that the independence of the COMELEC requires the Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad interim appointments before the appointees can assume office will negate the President‘s power to make ad interim appointments.

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- The original draft of Art. VII §16 did not provide for ad interim appointments, however, it was reinstated to avoid interruptions in vital govt services that would result from prolonged vacancies in govt offices. The ad interim appointment has since been practiced by Presidents Aquino, Ramos and Estrada. 2. Justiciability of the case: The Court determined the justiciability of the case by tackling the requisites of judicial review raised by the respondents which they claimed to be lacking (actual case/controversy was not raised) > personal and substantial interest of the party Petitioner has a personal and material stake in the resolution of the case. If Benipayo‘s appointment is unlawful, petitioner‘s reassignment is without legal basis; if it is lawful, then she has no cause to complain provided that it was done in accordance with the Civil Service Law. Because of her personal and material stake in the resolution of the constitutionality of respondent’s assumption of office, she has locus standi to raise it as a constitutional issue > exercise of judicial review must be pleaded at the earliest opportunity It is not the date of filing of the petition that determines whether the constitutional issue was raised at the earliest opportunity. The earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to raise it in the pleadings before a competent court that can resolve the same, such that, ―if it is not raised in the pleadings, it cannot be considered at the trial, and if not considered at the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal.‖ Petitioner questioned the constitutionality of the ad interim appointments when she filed her petition before this Court, which is the earliest opportunity for pleading the constitutional issue before a competent body. > the constitutional issue must be the lis mota of the case The Respondents claim that the legality of petitioner‘s reassignment from the EID to the Law Dept. is the issue. The Court, however, held that unless the constitutionality of Benipayo‘s appointment is determined, the legality of petitioner‘s assignment cannot be determined, therefore the lis mota of this case is clearly the constitutional issue raised by petitioner. 3. The phrase ―without reappointment‖ in Art. IX-C §1(2) applies only to appointments by the President and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, regardless of WoN such person appointed completes the term of office. Reasoning The phrase ―without reappointment‖ does not apply to the renewal of appointments to Benipayo, Tuason and Borra because there were no previous appointments that were confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. - The renewal of their appointments was by-passed by the Commission on Appointments. It was not acted upon on the merits at the close of the session of Congress. There was no final decision by the Commission on Appointments to give or withhold its consent to the appointment as required by the Constitution. It is therefore neither fixed nor an unexpired term. Absent such decision, the President is free to renew the ad interim appointment of a by-passed appointee as recognized in Sec.17 of the Rules of the Commission on Appointments. Moreover, their appointments were all for a fixed term expiring on Feb. 2, 2008, clearly not in breach of the 7 year term limit. 4. The COMELEC Chairman is the official expressly authorized by law to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel and the person holding that office, in a de jure capacity, is Benipayo. He has full authority to exercise all the powers of that office for so long as his ad interim appointment remains effective. Moreover, in COMELEC Resolution no. 3300, the COMELEC en banc, approved the transfer or reassignment of COMELEC personnel during the election period. 5. Because Benipayo is held to be the lawful COMELEC chairman, the Officer-in-Charge did not act in excess of his jurisdiction, in the disbursement of their salaries. Decision Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

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Concurred with by JJs: Davide, Bellosillo, Melo, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, and Sandoval-Gutierrez. Puno and Vitug, JJs, were on official leave. Consti Provisions cited: Art. IX-A §1 The Consti Commissions… COMELEC… shall be independent Art. IX-C §1(2) Nature and term of appointment of Comelec chairman and commissioner: (7 years w/o reappointment). In no case shall there be appointment in a temporary or acting capacity. Art. VII §16 power of Pres. to make appointments during recess of Congress… effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress.

Larin v. Executive Secretary GR No. 112745 October 16, 1997 e. Executive clemency Barrioquinto v. Fernandez Ponente: Feria, J. Facts: Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged with murder. Jimenez was sentenced to life imprisonment, while Barrioquinto‘s trial was delayed because he was arrested later than Jimenez. Both submitted their cases to the 9 Guerilla Amnesty Commission pursuant to Proclamation No. 8 which the said commission remanded to the CFI of Zamboanga without deciding if they were entitled to amnesty or not on the ground that neither of them has admitted to the commission of the offense. Issue: WON confession to the crime is necessary to be entitled to the benefits of Proclamation No. 8 (grant of amnesty) Held/Ratio: - In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation of September 7, 1946, it is not necessary that he should admit having committed the criminal act or offense with which he is charged, and allege the amnesty as a defense. For whether or not he admits or confesses having committed the offense with which he is charged, the Commissions should conduct summary hearing of the witnesses both for the complainants and the accused, on whether he has committed the offense in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy, or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he is entitled to the benefits of amnesty and to be "regarded as a patriot or hero who have rendered invaluable services to the nation‖. - Since the Amnesty Proclamation is a public act, the courts and Amnesty Commissions should apply the benefits granted to cases coming within their province or jurisdiction, whether pleaded or claimed by the person charged with such offenses or not, if the evidence presented shows that the accused is entitled to said benefits. - If the courts have to proceed to the trial or hearing of a case and decide whether the offense committed by the defendant comes within the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation although the defendant has pleaded not guilty, there is no reason why the Amnesty Commissions can not do so.

Proclamation No. 8 (dispositive): I, Manuel Roxas, President of the Philippines, in accordance with the provisions of Article VII, section 10, paragraph 6 of the Constitution, do hereby declare and proclaim an amnesty in favor of all persons who committed any act penalized under the Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war effort of the enemy, and committed during the period from December 8, 1941 to the date when each particular area of the Philippines was actually liberated from the enemy control and occupation. This amnesty shall not apply to crimes against chastity or to acts committed from purely personal motives. 9

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- (This case is under ―Executive‖ of our outline, and the following, although really obiter, is most relevant to this section) Difference of Amnesty from Pardon Pardon

Amnesty

-granted by the Chief Executive, thus a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned and which the courts may not take notice of.

-by proclamation of the president with the concurrence of the Congress, and is a public act of which the courts may take judicial notice.

Granted to one after conviction

Granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty, generally before or after institution of prosecution and sometimes after conviction

-looks forward and relieves offender of consequences of crime; abolishes and forgives punishment, but doesn‘t abolish civil liability

-looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, as though he had committed no offense

Doesn‘t restore rights to hold public office, suffrage, unless expressly restored by pardon

Rights not affected as the offender is treated as if he committed no crime at all

Decision respondents ordered to hear and decide the applications for amnesty of petitioners unless courts have already decided WoN they are entitled to benefits of amnesty.

Vera v. People 7 SCRA 152 (1963) Cristobal v. Labrador 71 Phil. 34 (1941) Pelobello v. Palatino 72 Phil. 441 (1941) In Re Lontok 43 Phil 293 (1923) Torres v. Gonzales Ponente: Feliciano, J. Facts: - an original petition for habeas corpus filed on behalf of petitioner Wilfredo S. Torres, presently confined at the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa. - Sometime before 1979, Torres was convicted by the CFI of Manila of the crime of estafa (two counts) and was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of from (11) yrs, (10) mos and (22) days to (38) yrs, (9) mos. and (1) day, and to pay an indemnity of P127,728.75. These convictions were affirmed by the CA. The maximum sentence would expire on 2 Nov 2000. - On 18 April 1979, a conditional pardon was granted by the President on condition that petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law." Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement. - On 21 May 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the President the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to the petitioner. In making its recommendation, the Board relied upon the decisions of this Court in Tesoro vs. Director of Prisons and Espuelas us. Provincial Warden of Bohol. The petitioner had been charged with 20 counts of estafa, which were then pending trial before the RTC, and convicted by the RTC of the

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crime of sedition, which was then pending appeal before the IAC. Many other charges have been brought against the petitioner, although some have been identified as dismissed. - On 4 June 1986, the respondent Minister of Justice wrote to the President informing her of the Resolution of the Board recommending cancellation of the conditional pardon previously granted to petitioner. - On 8 September 1986, the President cancelled the conditional pardon of the petitioner. - On 10 October 1986, the respondent Minister of Justice issued "by authority of the President" an Order of Arrest and Recommitment against petitioner. The petitioner was accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence. - Petitioner now impugns the validity of the Order of Arrest and Recommitment. He claims that he did not violate his conditional pardon since he has not been convicted by final judgment. Petitioner also contends that he was not given an opportunity to be heard before he was arrested and recommitted to prison, and accordingly claims he has been deprived of his rights under the due process clause of the Constitution.

Issue: WON conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before the petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence.

Held/Ratio: - Tesoro vs. Director of Prisons. - It was held that the determination if the parole had been breached rested exclusively in the sound judgment of the GovGen and that such determination would not be reviewed by the courts. As Tesoro had consented to place his liberty on parole upon the judgment of the power that had granted it, the Court held that "he [could not] invoke the aid of the courts, however erroneous the findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered." Tesoro had in effect agreed that the GovGen's determination (rather than that of the regular courts of law) that he had breached one of the conditions of his parole by committing adultery while he was conditionally at liberty, was binding and conclusive upon him. - Sales vs. Director of Prisons - The executive clemency is extended upon the conditions named in it, and it is accepted upon those conditions. The governor may withdraw his grace in a certain contingency, and the governor shall himself determine when that contingency has arisen. It is as if the convict, with full competency to bind himself in the premises, had expressly contracted and agreed that, whenever the governor should conclude that he had violated the conditions of his parole, an executive order for his arrest and remandment to prison should at once issue, and be conclusive upon him. - Espuelas vs. Provincial Warden of Bohol - The Court reaffirmed the Tesoro and Sales rulings. "Due process is not necessarily judicial The appellee had had his day in court and been afforded the opportunity to defend himself during his trial for the crime of inciting to sedition with which he was charged, that brought about or resulted in his conviction, sentence and confinement in the penitentiary. When he was conditionally pardoned it was a generous exercise by the Chief Executive of his constitutional prerogative. The acceptance thereof by the convict or prisoner carrie[d] with it the authority or power of the Executive to determine whether a condition or conditions of the pardon has or have been violated To no other department of the Government [has] such power been entrusted." The status of our case law on the matter under consideration may be summed up in the following propositions: 1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.

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2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Sec 64 of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Art 159 RPC. Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) RAC, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefore by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon. 3. Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and because the conditionally pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for which he was conditionally pardoned, Sec 64 (i) RAC is not afflicted with a constitutional vice. - A convict granted conditional pardon, like the petitioner herein, who is recommitted must of course be convicted by final judgment of a court of the subsequent crime or crimes with which he was charged before the criminal penalty for such subsequent offense(s) ran be imposed upon him. Since Art 159 RPC defines a distinct, substantive, felony, the parolee or convict who is regarded as having violated the provisions thereof must be charged, prosecuted and convicted by final judgment before he can be made to suffer the penalty prescribed in Art 159. - In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him under Sec 64 (i) RAC; or (ii) to proceed against him under Art 159 RPC, upon a convict who "having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon." Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Sec 64 (i) RAC. Decision Petition dismissed f. Commander-in-Chief IBP v. Zamora Ponente: Facts/Issue/Held/Ratio: Ratio Decidendi: [1] When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination as to whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned. [2] There is no grave abuse of discretion by the President in calling out the Marines if there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces. Codal – Art 7 Sec 18 Note: There is no evidence to support the proposition that grave abuse was committed because the power to call was exercised in such a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the military (Art. 2 Sec 3)

Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary Ponente: Tinga, J. Facts: - July 27, 2003 – Some 300 junior officers and enlisted men of AFP, armed with ammunitions and explosives, stormed into Oakwood apartments in Makati. They demanded the resignation of GMA, Defense Secretary and the PNP Chief.

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- Later that day, the President issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 both declaring ―a state of rebellion‖ and calling out the AFP to suppress the rebellion. - Oakwood occupation ended in the evening after negotiations. - August 1, 2003 – President lifted the declaration. - PARTIES > Sanlakas and Partido ng Manggagawa (PD) o Sec 18, Art 7 does not require declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the armed forces o There is no sufficient factual basis for an indefinite period since Oakwood occupation had ceased. > Social Justice Society (SJS) as Filipino citizens, taxpayers, law professors and bar reviewers o Declaration is constitutional anomaly that confuses because overzealous public officers acting pursuant to the proclamation are liable to violate the constitutional rights of citizens o Circumvention of the report requirement in Sec 18, Art 7, commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from proclamation of martial law o Presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the President > Rep. Suplico et al as citizens and members of House of Representatives o Their rights, powers, and functions were allegedly affected o Declaration is a superfluity and is actually an exercise of emergency powers and therefore is a usurpation of the power of the Congress in Art 6, Sec 23 par 2 > Sen. Pimentel o Issuances are unwarranted, illegal, and abusive exercise of a martial law power that has no constitutional basis > Solicitor-General o Case has become moot because of the lifting of the declaration Issue: 1.

WON issue is justiciable given mootness of the issue and legal standing of the parties

2.

WON petitioners have legal standing

3.

WON issuances of the President are valid

Held/Ratio: 1. The President, in declaring state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article 7 as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article 6. - Justiciable even if moot - Courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is capable of repetition yet evading review - Lacson v. Perez – mootness preclude the Court from addressing its Constitutionality - Only Rep Suplico et al and Sen Pimentel have legal standing because when an act of the Executive injures the institution of the Congress and causes a derivative but substantial injury, then any member can file suit (Phil. Constitution Association v. Enriquez)

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- Sanlakas, PM, and SJS have no legal standing because they did not obtain any direct injury from the governmental act that is being challenged. People‘s organization status would not vest them with the requisite personality to question the validity of the presidential issuances (Kilosbayan v. Morato) - SJS as taxpayers and citizens have no legal standing because there was no illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation 2. Presidential issuances are valid - Art 7, Sec 18 – Sequence of graduated powers: 1.calling out power, 2.power to suspend writ of habeas corpus, 3.power to declare martial law. - 2 and 3 require concurrence of actual invasion or rebellion AND that public safety requires the exercise of such power. These are not required in calling-out power (IBP v. Zamora) - It does not expressly prohibit the President from declaring a state of rebellion. The Constitution vests the President not only with Commander-in-Chief powers but with first and foremost, Executive powers - US Constitutional history: commander-in-chief powers are broad enough as it is and become more so when taken together with the provision on executive power and presidential oath of office - President‘s authority to declare state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as chief executive and at the same time draws strength from her commander-in-chief powers - The declaration of state of rebellion only gives notice to the nation that such a state exists and the armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress it. - Declaration cannot diminish or violate constitutionality protected rights (Lacson) - President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity of the exercise of such power. There is no proof that the President acted without factual basis. - Declaration of state of rebellion does not amount to declaration of martial law.

Aquino v. Enrile Ponente: Makalintal, J. Facts: - September 21, 1972, President Ferdinand E. Marcos signed Proclamation No. 1081, proclaiming a state of Martial Law in the Philippines - September 22, 1972, General Order No. 2 was signed by the President which provided an order to the Secretary of National Defense to arrest and take into custody the individuals named in the list for being participants in the conspiracy to seize political and state power in the country and to take over the government by force - Secretary of National Defense, Juan Ponce Enrile, immediately effected the arrest of the herein petitioners - Petitioners sought relief from Court, filing petitions for habeas corpus - Respondents filed their ―Return to Writ and Answer to the Petition‖ and prayed that the petition be dismissed - Pending resolution of these Petitions, petitioners, except for two (Sen. Benigno Aquino, Jr. and Sen. Jose Diokno), were released from custody on different dates under a ―Conditional Release‖

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- December 28, 1973, Diokno filed a Motion to Withdraw Petition, imputing delay in the disposition of his case, and asseverating that because of the decision of the Court in the Ratification Cases and the action of the Members of the Court in taking an oath to support the New Constitution, he cannot ―reasonably expect to get justice in this case‖ - The respondents opposed the motion on the grounds that there is a public interest in the decision of these cases and that the reasons given for the motion to withdraw are untrue, unfair and contemptuous. - The Court denied Diokno‘s motion with a vote of 5 to 7 - Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Muňoz-Palma, Aquino and Barredo voted to grant Diokno’s motion to withdraw petition

Issue: 1. WON the Court has jurisdiction to inquire into the constitutional sufficiency of the proclamation of martial law 2. WON Proclamation No. 1081 is valid given then the circumstances required by the Constitution for the proclamation of a state of martial law 3. WON petitioners were illegally detained entitling them the relief of habeas corpus

Held/Ratio: All petitions dismissed except those which have been previously withdrawn by the respective petitioners with the approval of this Court.

Olaquer v. MC No. 4 150 SCRA 183 (1987) Navales v. Abaya GR No. 162318 October 25, 2004 Lansang v. Garcia Ponente: Concepcion, J. Facts: - 8 consolidated petitions of writ of habeas corpus. Other petitions: L-33965 Arienda vs Sec of National Defense L-33973 David vs Garcia L-33982 Prudente v Yan, Garcia L-34004 Tomas vs Garcia L-34013 Rimando vs Garcia L-34039 De Castro vs Rabago L-34265 Oreta vs Garcia L-34339 Olivar vs Garcia - August 21, 1971 – Plaza Miranda bombing. 8 persons died, several injured

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- August 23, 1971- President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 889 suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, by virtue of the powers vested upon the President by ART VII Section 10 of the 1935 Constitution. His reason was that ―lawless elements have created a state of lawlessness and disorder affecting public safety and the security of the State…‖ and that ―public safety requires immediate and effective action‖ - Several people were apprehended and detained including the petitioners on ―reasonable belief‖ that they had ―participated in the crime of insurrection or rebellion.‖ - August 30, 1971 – Proclamation 889-A amended Proclamation 889. - September 18 and 25, October 4, 1971 -- Proclamations 889-B, 889-C and 889-D lifted the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in some provinces, sub-provinces, cities, EXCEPT in Bataan, Benguet, Bulacan, Camarines Sur, Ifugao, Isabela, Laguna, Lanao, North and South Cotabato, Nueva Ecija, Nueva Viscaya, Pampanga, Quezon, Rizal, Tarlac, Zambales, Aurora, Quirino, and 18 cities including Manila.

Issue: 1.

WON the Court had authority to and should inquire into the existence of the factual bases required by the Constitution for the suspension of the privilege of the writ

2.

WON the Proclamation was valid/ constitutional. WON it complied with ART III Section 1 par 14 11 VII Section 10 par 2 of the Constitution?

3.

WON the President act arbitrarily in issuing PN 889

4.

WON the Petitioners are covered by PN 889. WON petitioners detained should be released

10

and ART

Held/Ratio: 1. YES. Upon deliberation, the Court abandoned the doctrine in Barcelon v Baker and Montenegro v Castañeda (determination by the President of existence of any of the grounds prescribed by the Constitution for the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus should be conclusive upon the courts. The President, with all the intelligence sources was in a better position than the SC to ascertain the real state of peace and order). The grant of power to suspend the privilege is neither absolute no unqualified. The authority to suspend the privilege of the writ is circumcised, confined, restricted (more so because it is stated in the negative – “shall not be… except”), and like the limitations and restrictions imposed upon the legislative department, adherence thereto and compliance therewith may, within proper bounds, be inquired into by courts of justice. - The Executive is vested with the power to suspend the privilege of the writ, and the Executive is supreme within its own sphere, however, the separation of powers goes hand in hand with the system of checks and balances. The authority to determine whether or not the Executive acted within the sphere allotted to him is vested in the Judiciary. 2. YES. a. Proclamation 889, as amended by Proclamation 889-A, declared the existence of an uprising -- ―lawless elements xxx joined and banded their forces together for the avowed purpose of staging, undertaking, waging and are actually engaged in an armed insurrection and rebellion xxx‖ b. The 2 conditions for a valid suspension a) there must be ‗invasion, insurrection, or rebellion‘ or ‗imminent danger thereof‘ and b) ‗public safety must require the aforementioned suspension‘ are PRESENT.

“The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, in any way of which events the same may be suspended wherever during such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist.” 11 “The President shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, and, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion. In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof when the public safety requires it, he may suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.” 10

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st

c. The 1 condition can be attested through jurisprudence (there were a lot of cases already – HUKBALAHAP, etc). The emergence and establishment of CPP NPA is proof of the existence of a rebellion. nd

d. The 2 condition is justified through the reports of the acts of the NPA (its infiltration of several mass-based organizations, various killings and bombings, encounters with the military, etc) and the threat it poses to the public safety. According to intelligence reports, the CPP and its front organizations are capable of preparing powerful explosive, and that there was a plan of a series of assassinations, kidnappings, mass destruction of property, etc. 3. NO. The President did not act arbitrarily. He had possession of intelligence reports, he consulted his advisers, and had reason to feel that the situation was critical. The suspension of the privilege of the writ in the entire Philippines was justified as he could not have ascertained the places to be excluded at the time of the proclamation, and he gradually lifted the suspension. 4. Some petitioners were already released and with respect to them, the issue is moot and academic. As to petitioners David, Felipe, Olivar, de los Reyes, del Rosario and Sison, still under detention, they have been charged with violation of the Anti-Subversion Act/ accused of overt acts covered by the PN 889. The PN 889 being valid, their release may not be ordered by the SC, but the CFI is directed to act with utmost dispatch in conducting the preliminary investigation of the charges and to issue corresponding warrants of arrest if probable cause is found or otherwise , to order their release. Decision President did not act arbitrarily. PN 889 not unconstitutional. Petitions L33964, L33965, L33982, L34004, L34013, L34039, L34265 dismissed. CFI to conduct investigation and issue warrants of arrest or order of release as to petitioners still under detention. All concur. Fernando dissents only as to the fourth issue.

In Re De Villa GR No. 158802 November 17, 2004 David v. Arroyo Ponente: Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. Facts: 1)

2) 3) 4) 5)

6) 7) 8)

7 consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in issuing Presidential proclamation No. 1017 (PD 1017) and General Order No. 5(G.O. No. 5) President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo committed grave abuse of Discretion Unconstitutional issuances February 24, 2006: anniversary of EDSA People Power I—president issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency Section 18 Art 7 of the Constitution Conspiracy of the political opposition with the leftists (NDF-CPP-NPA) and rightists (military adventurists) Bring down the Philippine state Magnified by elements of media Hindering the growth of the economy Give totalitarian forces to the leftists and rightists Art 2 Sec 4 of Consti—defense and preservation of the democratic institutions Clear and present danger to the safety and integrity of the Phil state and Filipino people Sabotaging confidence in the government and fait in the country Same day issued : G. O No. 5—implementing PP 1017 Asked the AFP and PNP to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country Midnight of Feb 23, 2006 pres convened security advisers and several cabinet members to assess gravity of the fermenting peace and order situation—suspended classes in all levels in the entire NCR After one week, March 3, 2006- lifted PP 1017 and issued Proclamation no. 1021 – section 18 Art VII and Section 17 Article XII

SOLICITOR GENERAL‘s CLAIMS a) Intent of the Constitution to give full discretionary powers to the president in determining the necessity of calling our the armed forces

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b)

January 17, 2006: member s of the Magdalo Group who indicted the Oakwood mutiny escaped their detention cell in Fort Bonifacio Taguig City—calling the people to show and proclaim displeasure at the sham regime—not only street protests but wearing red bands on left arms c) February 17, 2006: authorities got hold of OPlan Hackle I Document – plans for bombings and attacks during the PMA Alumni Homecoming in Baguio City—assassinate selected targets including cabinet members and president—Pres did not attend—a bomb was found during celebration d) February 21, 2006:recapture of Lt. San Juan in batangas- 2 disks –containing minutes of meeting of Magdalo group and NPA e) Lt. San Juan, prior to arrest declared D-Day on February 24, 2006 f) February 23, 2006: PNP Chief Arturo Lomibao intercepted info that members of PNP Special Action Force were planning to defect—ordered SAF Commanding General Marcelino Franco Jr. to disavow any defection g) Same day: house of former Congressman Peping Cojuangco: business and mid-level government and midlevel govt officials plotted to bring down the Arroyo administration h) Nelly Sindayen from TIME Magazine: reported Pastor Saycon called a US government official about his group‘s plans if Pres Arroyo is ousted also phoned a man code named Delta—identified as B./Gen Danilo Lim—Commander of the Army‘s elite Scout Ranger i) Danilo Lim and Brigade commander Col. Ariel Querubin confided to Gen Generoso Senga Chief of Staff of the AFP—that a huge number of soldiers would join Anti-Arroyo protests and they were breaking the chain of command to join forces wanting to unseat the pres j) Senga remained faithful to the Commander-in-chief to chain of command k) He took custody of Lima and Querubin to return to Phil Marines HQ in fort Bonifacio l) CPP-NPA called for intensification of political and revolutionary work within military and police establishments m) NDF- Cesar Renerio—announced growing anti-arroyo groups within the military and police—nearing ouster of the pres (first half of 2006) n) Bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan o) Raid of army outpost in benguet—death of 3 soldiers p) Directive of the CPP ordering its front organizations to join 5000 Metro Manila radicals and 25,000 more from the provinces in mass protest PETITIONERS‘ CLAIMS th a) Cancellation of all programs and activities related to 20 anniversary of Edsa People Power I b) Revoked permits to rally issued by local government units c) Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor announced that warrantless arrests and take over of facilities including media, can already be implemented d) Dispersal of protests and rallies (EDSA, Cubao, Santolan, Ayala Ave and Paseo de Roxas, Makati) e) Arrested without warrant Prof. Randy David and Ronald Liamas (pres of Akbayan) f) Feb 25, 2006: 12:20 early morning: raid of the Daily Tribune offices in Manila and Malaya and Abante g) NTC Ronald Solis urged television and radio networks to cooperate with government or there will be a takeover- a balanced reporting h) Feb 25, 2006: arrest of Congressman Crispin Beltran (Anakpawis and KMU)—warrant dated 1985—case of inciting rebellion i) Satur ocampo (Bayan Muna rep) eluded arrest – public forum at the Sulo Hotel, QC; drivers taken into custody j) Arrested: Retired Major General Ramon Montano; attempts to arrest: Satur ocampo, Teodoro Casino, and Gabriela Representative Liza Maza; arrested: Bayan Muna Rep. JOsel VIrador; (turned over o the custody of House of Reps—―Batasan 5‖ decided to stay indefinitely) CASES: 1) GR No 171396: Randolfo S.David et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that a) encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; b) subterfuge to avoid constitutional requirements for imposition of martial lw; c) violates constitutional guarantees for freedom of the press and speech and assembly 2) GR no. 171408: Ninez Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co. Inc. – challenged CIDG raid of Daily Tribune—case of censorship and prior restraint, absolutely no emergency to warrant the issuance of PP 1017 3) GR no. 171485: Francis escudero and 21 members of House of Rep- asserted: PP 1017 and G.O No 5 constitutes usurpation of legislative powers; violative of freedom of expression, declaration of martial law; grave abuse of discretion of pres 4) GR. NO. 171483: petitioner KMU, NAFLU-KMU and members: unconstitutional: a) arrogate president to power to enact laws and decrees; b) issuances without factual basis; c) violate freedom of expression and right of people to peaceably assemble

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5) 6)

7) 

GR no. 171400: Alternative Law groups Inc: unconstitutional: a) sec 4 of Art II was violated; b) Sec 1,2 and 4 of Art III, c) Sec 23 of Art VI and Section 17 of Art XII of constitution GR no. 171480: Jose Anselmo Cadiz et al: arbitrary and unlawful exercise by the Pres of Martial law powers; exercise of emergency powers without congressional approval; PP 1017 goes beyond nature and function of a proclamation defined under Revised Admin Code GR. No 171424: Loren Legarda: unconstitutional: violating freedom of expression; freedom of the prss and access to info of public concern SOLICITOR GEENERAL countered: a) Petitions should be dismissed for being moot b) Petitioner in GR nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171424 (Legarda) 171483 (KMU) 171485 (Escudero et al) and 171489 (Cadiz) have no legal standing c) It is not necessary for petitioners to implead pres arroyo as respondent d) PP 1017 has constitutional and legal basis e) It does not violate people‘s right to free expression and redress of grievances

Issue: A.

B.

Procedural 1) Whether the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot and academic 2) Whether petitioners in said cases have legal standing Substantive: 1) Whether the SC can review the factual bases of PP 1017 2) Whether the PP 1017 and GO NO 5 are unconstitutional A) Facial challenge B) Constitutional basis C) As applied change

Held/Ratio: I. -

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Moot and Academic principle Judicial review power of the court Following requisites: a) Actual case or controversy b) Petitioners raise questions of constitutionality c) Constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity d) Decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself st nd Respondents: 1 and 2 requirements are absent Court: the contention lacks merit MOOT AND ACADEMIC CASE: one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events so that declaration would be of no practical use or value COURT: vital issues involved: illegal acts: Are PP 1017 and GO no 5 constitutional and valid? Do they justify illegal acts? The court will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic if: a) There is grave violation of the Constitution b) Exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest is involved c) When constitutional issues raised require formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public d) The case is capable of repetition , yet evading review All of these exceptions are present: justify court‘s assumption of jurisdiction over the petitions Even a ―moot‖ case can be decided on if the party raising it in a proper case has been and/or continues to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of its issuance II.

Legal Standing -Locus standi – right of appearance in court of justice in a given question - provides that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest –the party who stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit - difficulty in identifying this is a public suit—plaintiff asserting a public right in assailing an allegedly illegal official action - he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection—he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing relief as a ―citizen‖ or taxpayer

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-direct injury- for private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or legislative action, and it is not sufficient that he has a general interest common to all members of the public - but there are times were liberal policy has been observed on technicality on locus standi= principle of transcendental importance—even without direct injury- ( cases involving constitutional issues, taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, legislators - all have legal standing except cadiz and IBP and Loren Legarda (but considered transcendental importance principle) - The president cannot be implead as a respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure, of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case—degrade the dignity of the high office of the President and free him from harassment B.Substantive I. Review of factual bases - in times of national emergency, the President must be given absolute control for the very life of the nation and the government is in great peril. The president it intoned, is answerable only to his conscience, the people and God… but this does not prevent an examination as to whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion—determine whether is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government * petitioners failed to show that president arroyo’s exercise of the calling-out power by issuing PP 1017 is totally bereft of factual basis * solicitor general presented supporting reports, records and circumstances – petitioners presented nothing to refute such events - president in judging the seriousness of the incidents, was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion 

III. Constitutionality of PP 1017 and GO NO.5 Doctrines of Several Political Theorists in the Power of the President in Times of Emergency John Locke (prerogative doctrine)- In times of emergency ―prerogative power to act according to discretion for the public good, without the proscription of the law and sometimes even against it (appeal to heaven as remedy) Jean-Jacques Rousseau: assumed the need for temporary suspension of democratic processes of government in times of emergency (supreme magistracy—tenure of office of prescribed duration to avoid perpetuation of dictatorship) John Stuart Mill: in cases of extreme necessity, the assumption of absolute power in the form of a temporary dictatorship Niccolo Machiavelli: emergency powers is one element in the whole scheme of limited government— incorporate in the constitution a regularized system of standby emergency powers—fixed rules for applying it—capacious reserve of power and speed and vigor in its application in time of emergency, with effective constitutional restraints Frederick Watkins: ―no reason why absolutism should not be used as a means for the defense of liberal institutions, provided it serves to protect established institutions from the danger of permanent injury in a period of temporary emergency and is followed by a prompt return to the previous forms of political life—―strict political conservatism‖; dictatorship should be relatively short Carl Friedrich: emergency executive must be appointed by constitutional means; he should not enjoy power to determine the existence of an emergency; emergency powers should be exercised under a strict time limitation, and last the objective of emergency action must be the defense of the constitutional order Clinton Rossiter: ―constitutional dictatorship‘- secure to Congress the final responsibility or declaring the existence or termination of an emergency and he places great faith in the effectiveness of congressional investigating committees Scott and Cotter: ―Concept of constitutionalism‖- the suggestion that democracies surrender the control of government to an authoritarian ruler in time of grave danger to the nation is NOT based upon sound constitutional theory—procedural limitations; political responsibility; historical and proper test of constitutionalism was the existence of adequate processes for keeping government responsible REAL PROBLEM IN EMERGENCY GOVERNANCE: that of allotting increasing areas of discretionary power to the Chief executive, while insuring that such powers will be exercised with a sense of political responsibility and under the effective limitations and checks—check and balance mechanisms

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a. Facial challenge Overbreadth—void on its face (accdg to petitioners)—―chilling effect‖ affects both unprotected and protected rights under sec 4 Art III of consti Overbreadth doctrine- tool for testing statutes in free speech cases; not intended for testing the validity of a law that reflects legitimate state interest PP 1017 is not directed to free speech or even speech-elated conduct- only directing AFP to prevent and suppress all forms of lawless violence Facial validation is considered as manifestly strong medicine to be used sparingly and only as a last resort and is generally disfavored Pinpointing its flaws and defects not on its actual operation to petitioners—is rarely an appropriate task of the judiciary Challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully—must establish that there can be no instance when the assailed law may be valid- petitioners did not attempt to show whether this situations exists Ground of vagueness: unwarranted: a law is facially valid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application\

b. Constitutional basis First provision: calling out power: Court held Sec 18 Article VII of Constitution Sec 18: The President shall be the CIC of all AFP and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forced to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion Calling out power includes: power to suspend writ, power to declare martial law Whenever necessary? To prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion – is this present in the case? YES—as stated, the circumstances then prevailing, Pres Arroyo found it necessary to issue PP 1017—owing to her vast information networks—she is in the best position to determine the actual conditions of the country In declaring the state of emergency pres relied not only on Sec 18 Art VII but also Sec 17 Art XII (take over); Indeed PP 1017 calls for an awesome power Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is a declaration of Martial Law: -- what define PP 1017 are its wordings— it is plain therein that what the pres invoked was her calling out power Justice Mendoza said that PP 1017 is not a declaration of martial law—just a call to AFP, it cannot be used to justify acts that only under a valid declaration of martial law can be done a) arrests and seizures without warrants; b) ban on public assemblies; c) take over of news and media; d) issuance of PDs (power by CIC only where there is valid declaration of ML) Second Provision: Take care Power Power to ensure that laws are faithfully executed Sec 17 Art VII: pres shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure the laws be faithfully executed Petitioners Escudero et al argue that PP 1017 is unconstitutional as it arrogated the pres the power to enact laws and decrees in violation of Sec 1 Art VI of the Constitution- ―to enforce obedience to the laws and all decrees orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon direction‖ Is it within the domain of the president Arroyo to promulgate decrees? President is granted ORDINANCE POWER under Chap 2 Book III of EO No. 292. She may issue the following: a) Eos; 2) AOs; 3) Proclamations; 4) Memorandum Orders; 5) Memorandum circulars; 6) general or Special Orders However, she cannot issue decrees which are laws with the same category and binding force as statutes This court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants Pres Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees Can pres Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees and laws through the military? -she has no authority to promulgate decrees therefore they cannot be enforced Third Provision: Power to Take over -Sec 17 Art XII - what could be the reason of Pres Arroyo in invoking the above provision when she issued PP 1017? - during state of emergency PP 1017 purports to grant the Pres. Without any authority or delegation from Congress to take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility of business affected with public interest—for the successful prosecution by the Government of its effort to contain, solve and end the present national emergency—

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- encroachment of legislative powers—according to petitioners- the exercise of emergency powers such as the taking over the privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest, is a different matter—Congress is the repository of emergency powers---they can grant emergency power to the President - delineate declaration of state of emergency and exercise of emergency powers - declaration: no need for congressional legislation - Whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof   

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     

The term EMERGENCY: existence of conditions suddenly intensifying the degree of existing to life or wellbeing beyond that which is accepted as normal. Elements of intensity, variety and perception Classifiable under: a) economic, b) natural disasters, c)national security Argument: congress may not convene during emergencies—cannot delegate power to pres—court emphasized that legislative power through which extraordinary measures are exercised remains in Congress even in times of Crisis c. As applied challenge Right against unreasonable searches and seizures, freedom of assembly and freedom of speech GR NO 171396: warrantless arrest of R. David and Llamas GR NO 171409: CAcho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co Inc : warrantless search and seizures GR No. 171483: KMU and NAFLU KMU: dispersal of their rally Can this court adjudge as unconstitutional PP 1017 and GO NO 5 on the basis of these illegal acts? Does this illegal implementation of a law render it unconstitutional? Courts are not at liberty to declare statues invalid The validity of a statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to accomplished desired en and NOT from effects in a particular caseThe court CANNOT adjudge a law or ordinance unconstitutional on the ground that its implementor committed illegal acts—criterion for validity is to be measured by the essential basis for exercise of power and NOT mere incidental result arising from its exertion Rules to be valid should be REASAONABLE, NOT ARBITRARY or CAPRICIOUS The absence of law defining acts f terrorism may result in abuse and oppression on the part of police and military An act can only be considered a crime if there is a law defining the same as such and imposing the corresponding penalty thereon Inviolable right to security or persons, property, houses, papers etc—not probable cause and authorization by a validly issued search or arrest warrant Clear and present danger rule to limit Assembly right of citizens—this case arbitrary dispersal and arrest of David and KMU group—canceling of permits issued by LGUs without notification (inciting to sedition?) Freedom of speech and of the press: search and seizure without warrant: requirement: criminal procedure: 1) search warrant (sec 4); 2) presence of the lawful occupant (sec 8); and 3) served at daytime (sec 9)—not all met in this case—plain CENSORSHIP Court cannot tolerate blatant disregard for a constitutional right

DECISION OF SC:  The petition is partially granted. The Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL in so far as it constitutes a call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence  Provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL  Provision of PP 1017 declaring national emergency under Sec 17 Art VII of the constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL but such declaration does not authorize the President to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest without prior legislation  GO NO. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017 whatever is necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence  Considering that acts of terrorism have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of GO NO. 5 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL  Warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies, in the absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other materials, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

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g. Emergency Powers h. Contracting and guaranteeing foreign loans Constantino v. Cuisia Ponente: Facts/Issue/Held/Ratio: Background: Petitioners questioned the Comprehensive Financing Program initiated to manage the country‘s external debt problem through a negotiation-oriented debt strategy by means of buyback or bond conversion, averring that the same were not ―loans‖ nor ―guarantees,‖ and that even assuming arguendo that this was constitutional, it is only the President, and not the Secretary of the Department of Finance who can exercise it. The Court upheld the Constitutionality of the program saying that -

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buyback is a necessary power which springs from the grant of the foreign borrowing power and that bonds, being representations of an issuer‘s contractual promise to pay back money borrowed, are also within the Executive power to contract loans. And that the evident exigency of having the Secretary of Financing implement decisions on debt-relief are deep within the realm of the expertise of the Secretary of the Department of Finance.

RD: - The Constitution, as a rule, does not enumerate – let alone enumerate all – the acts which the President (or any other public officer) may not do, and the fact that the Constitution does not explicitly bar the President from exercising a power does not mean that he or she does not have that power. - Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency: Though the President is the Executive and no other, the heads of the executive departments are his/her alter ego in matters that require the exercise of the President‘s discretion by law. A necessary qualification for department secretaries to act, however, is the prior consent to or subsequent ratification by the President. Art VII Sec 20 - The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. The Monetary Board shall, within thirty days from the end of every quarter of the calendar year, submit to the Congress a complete report of its decision on applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the Government or government-owned and controlled corporations which would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other matters as may be provided by law. Art VII Sec 1 - The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.

i. Foreign affairs Nicolas v. Romulo GR No. 175888 February 11, 2009 (re Nicole’s case) People’s Movement for Press Freedom et al v. Manglapus GR No. 84642 En Banc Resolution dated April 13, 1888 Comm. Of Customs v. Easter Sea Trading Ponente: Facts: Eastern Sea Trading was the consignee of several shipments of onion and garlic which arrived at the Port of Manila from August 25 to September 7, 1954. Some shipments came from Japan and others from Hong Kong. ● Executive Order No. 328 Dated June 22, 1950. From and after said date, (1) no commodity may be exported to or imported from Occupied Japan without an export or import license from the Central Bank of the Philippines or the Import Control

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Administration, and (2) that the annual exports and imports to the Philippines and from Occupied Japan, as contained in the Trade Plan shall be allocated and the licenses therefor shall be issued only to bona fide Philippine exporters and importers…. This is controversial in this case because it is in the nature of an executive agreement between the President and Japan. ● Central Bank Circulars Nos. 44 and 45 These were issued pursuant to EO 328. shipments to and from abroad need to be certified by the Central Bank. ● In as much as none of the shipments had the certificate required by Central Bank Circulars Nos. 44 and 45 for the release thereof, the goods thus imported were seized and subjected to forfeiture proceedings. Collector of Customs of Manila, on September 4, 1956, declared said goods forfeited to the Government. On appeal, Commissioner of Customs affirmed the decision. Court of Tax Appeals, however, reversed the decision of the Commissioner of Customs. Issue: The Central Bank hinges its authority to implement Circular Nos. 44 and 45 under Executive Order No. 328. WON the Executive Order No. 328 is valid insofar as it seeks to implement an executive agreement extending the effectivity of our Trades and Financial Agreements with Japan? Held: The decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another one shall be entered affirming that of the Commissioner of Customs, with cost against respondents, defendant-appellee, Eastern Sea Trading. The validity of EO No. 328 and Central Bank Circulars are upheld. Ratio: I. On the validity of Executive Order No. 328 The Court of Tax Appeals entertained doubts on the legality of the executive agreement sought to be implemented by Executive Order No. 328, owing to the fact that our Senate had not concurred in the making of said executive agreement. ● Treaties versus Executive Agreements The concurrence of said House of Congress is required by our fundamental law in the making of "treaties" (Constitution of the Philippines, Article VII, Section 10[7]), which are, however, distinct and different from "executive agreements," which may be validly entered into without such concurrence. Treaties are formal documents which require ratification with the approval of two thirds of the Senate. Executive agreements become binding through executive action without the need of a vote by the Senate or by Congress. ―. . . the right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our history we have entered into executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular relations, most-favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims. The validity of these has never been seriously questioned by our courts.‖ International agreements involving political issues or changes of national policy and those involving international arrangements of a permanent character usually take the form of treaties. But international agreements embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well-established national policies and traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature usually take the form of executive agreements. The validity of the executive agreement in question is thus patent. In fact, the so-called Parity Rights provided for in the Ordinance Appended to our Constitution were, prior thereto, the subject of an executive agreement, made without the concurrence of two-thirds (2/3) of the Senate of the United States. II. On the validity of the Central Bank Circulars The authority of the Central Bank to regulate no-dollar imports and the validity of the

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aforementioned Circulars Nos. 44, and 45 is in question. ● Sec. 2 of Republic Act No. 265, in relation to section 14 of said Act) The Central Bank is vested with broad power under its charter, to: maintain our monetary stability and to preserve the international value of our currency It is authorized, under its charter to issue such rules and regulations as it may consider necessary for the effective discharge of its responsibilities. Such connotes the authority to regulate no-dollar imports, owing to the influence and effect that the same may and do have upon the stability of our peso and its international value. III. On the absence of an Import Control Commission The lower court held that it would be unreasonable to require from respondent-appellee an import license when the Import Control Commission was no longer in existence and, hence, there was, said court believed, no agency authorized to issue the aforementioned license. This conclusion is untenable, for the authority to issue the aforementioned licenses was not vested exclusively upon the Import Control Commission or Administration. Executive Order No. 328 provided for export or import licenses "from the Central Bank of the Philippines or the Import Control Administration" or Commission. The latter was created only to perform the task of implementing certain objectives of the Monetary Board and the Central Bank, which otherwise had to be undertaken by these two (2) agencies. Upon the abolition of said Commission, the duty to provide means and ways for the accomplishment of said objectives had merely to be discharged directly by the Monetary Board and the Central Bank, even if the aforementioned Executive Order had been silent thereon. Go Tek v. Deportation Board Ponente: Facts/Issue/Held/Ratio: Go Tek is an alien ordered deported by the Deportation Board. Question is WON the State has the power to deport undesirable aliens. Held that the State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens. The Chief Executive may exercise the power ―when he deems such action necessary for the peace and domestic tranquility of the nation.‖ There is no legal or constitutional provision defining the power to deport aliens because the intention of the law is to grant the Chief Executive ―full discretion to determine whether an alien‘s residence in the coutnry is so undesirable as to affect or injure the security, welfare or interest of the State.‖ j. Legislation 1) Address Congress 2) Preparation and submission of the budget 3) Veto power 4) Emergency powers k. Immunity from suit Beltran v. Macasiar GR No. 82585 November 14, 1988 Gloria v. CA GR No. 119903 August 15, 2000 3. Vice President a. Qualifications b. Privileges and salary c. Prohibitions d. Succession C. The Judicial Department 1. Judicial Power 2. The Supreme Court a. Composition b. Mode of Sitting

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MMDA v. Jancom GR No. 147465 April 10, 2001 People v. Gacott GR No. 116049 July 13, 1995 c. Appointments and qualifications d. No non-judicial work for judges Meralco v. Pasay Trans Co. 57 Phil 600 (1932) Garcia v. Macaraig 30 SCRA 106 (1971) e. Salary Nitafan v. Comm. Of Internal Revenue 152 SCRA 284 (1987) f. Tenure g. Removal In Re Gonzales 160 SCRA 771 (1988) h. Fiscal autonomy i. Jurisdiction Santiago v. Bautista 32 SCRA 188 (1970) Felipe v. Leuterio 91 Phil 482 (1952) j. Deliberations Prudential Bank v. Castro 158 SCRA 646 (1988) Consing v. CA 177 SCRA 14 (1989) k. Voting Cruz v. DENR Ponente: Per Curiam Facts: - Republic Act No. 8371 (Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997) - Indigenous peoples/cultural communities (IP/ICC) -Group of people identified by self-ascription and ascription by others, who have continuously lived as organized community on communally bounded and defined territory; - Ancestral lands (sec.3b IPRA) - Land occupied by members of the ICC/IP since time immemorial, by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest, under claims of individual or traditional group ownership,... including residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms, and tree lots. - Ancestral domains (sec.3a IPRA) - Areas generally belonging to ICC/IP comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas and natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICC/IP, by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial continuously to the present... including ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other resources, and lands no longer occupied exclusively by ICC but to which they had

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traditional access, particularly the home ranges of ICC who are still nomadic or shifting cultivators. - Procedure: CRUZ and EUROPA, as citizens and taxpayers (upon the plea that questions raised are of "transcendental importance"), filed for PROHIBITION (directing NCIP to cease from implementing IPRA and its IR; DENR Secretary to cease from implementing Circular 2; DBM Secretary to cease from disbursing public funds) and MANDAMUS (commanding DENR Secretary to comply with his duty of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate) assailing certain provisions of RA8371 (IPRA) as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Issue: The following provisions of RA8371 and its Implementing Rules were questioned (1) Sections 3a, 3b, 5, 6, 7, 8, 57, 58 amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State's ownership over LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (including the minerals and other natural resources therein) in violation of the REGALIAN DOCTRINE. (2) Sections 3a and 3b violate the RIGHTS OF PRIVATE LANDOWNERS. (3) Sections 51, 52, 53, 59, 63, 65, 66 which define the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and make customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and lands, violate the DUE PROCESS clause of the Constitution. (4) Rule 7, Part 2, Section 1 of the NCIP Admin. Order No.1, which provides that "the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination", is invalid as it infringes upon the President's power of control over executive departments.

Held/Ratio: There was NO MAJORITY VOTE reached as the Justices were equally divided at 7-7. The case was then redeliberated upon, but the voting still remained the same. Accordingly, the petition is DISMISSED pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. - Those in favor of dismissing petition: J. Kapunan, J. Davide Jr., J. Bellosillo, J. Quisumbing, J. Santiago, J. Puno, J. Mendoza - Those in favor of granting petition: J. Panganiban, J. Vitug, J. Melo, J. Pardo, J. Buena, J. Gonzaga-Reyes, J. De Leon l. Requirements as to decisions Valladolid v. Inciong 121 SCRA 205 (1992) Nunal v. COA 169 SCRA 384 (1996) People v. Bugarin 273 SCRA 384 (1996) Hernandez v. CA 228 SCRA 429 (1993) Yao v. CA GR No. 132428 October 24, 2000 Dizon v. Judge Lopez AM 96-1338 September 5, 1997 Asiavest v. CA GR No. 110263 July 20, 2001

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m. Petition for Review/Motion for Reconsideration Tichangco v. Enriquez GR No. 150629 June 30, 2004 Fr. Martinez v. CA GR 123547 May 21, 2001 n. Periods for deciding cases Re: Delays in the Sandiganbayan AM No. 00-8-05-SC November 28, 2001 o. Presidential Electoral Tribunal p. Administrative powers 1) Supervision of lower courts In re Demetria AM No. 00-7-09 March 27, 2001 In re Letter of PJ Vasquez AM No. 08-8-11-CA September 9, 2008 2) Temporarily assign judges to other stations in public interest 3) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid miscarriage of justice People v. Pilotin 65 SCRA 635 (1979) Mondiguing v. Abad 68 SCRA 14 (1975) People v. Sola 103 SCRA 393 (1981) 4) Appointment of officials and employees of entire judiciary 5) Promulgate rules concerning the enforcement and protection of constitutional rights 6) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure 7) Admission to the Practice of Law Zaldivar v. Gonzales 166 SCRA 316 (1988) In re Cunanan 94 Phil 534 (1954) Aguirre v. Rana Bar Matter No. 1036 June 10, 2003 8) Integration of the Bar In re Edillon 84 SCRA 554 (1978) In re IBP Elections Bar Matter No. 491 Ovtober 6, 1989 9) Legal Assistance to the Underprivileged q. Report on the Judiciary 3. Lower courts a. Qualifications and appointments b. Tenure De La Llana v. Alba 122 SCRA 291 (1983) 4. The Judicial and Bar Council 5. Automatic release of appropriation for the judiciary