DTI-technology

Avimanyu Datta, M.S. Information Systems, B.Sc. Computing and Information Systems Business Case Study

Display Technologies Incorporated (DTI): What went wrong? In 2000, IBM and Toshiba ended their 12-year LCD manufacturing joint venture, which resulted in the end of Display Technologies Incorporated

(DTI), one of the most technologically

innovative organization till date. Introduction In the late 1993, Display Technologies Incorporated (DTI) was asked by IBM and Toshiba to increase the production of Liquid Crystal Display (LCD) screens for note book computers from 50,000 to 100, 000 per month. The reason was that both the companies had a backlog of notebook computer orders 1. IBM and Toshiba were the founders as well as the sole customers of DTI. Hence, Toru Shima, president of DTI did not have an option He knew if DTI could not meet the requirements, both IBM and Toshiba would look for alternatives. Shima knew that manufacturing so many pieces would be very difficult, mainly due to the fact that the type of LCDs DTI made were extraordinarily difficult to manufacture. It required hundreds of delicate steps each performed on some of the most expensive, state-of- the-art manufacturing technology in the electronics industry. Along with the technology and the manufacturing process, the rapid change of product requirement added to the overall complexity. Shima was left with three choices 2 to meet the requirement∗: 1. Focusing on increasing yield on the existing production line. The company was producing 50,000 pieces per month, a cumulative yield of only 44.6%.

Therefore, Shima

considered improving the yield as a strategic choice. 2. Increase production by adding one more manufacturing plant. 3. Shifting to a new production technology. This was where Shima thought of reengineering the entire manufacturing process. Shima had to take a decision, in choosing the appropriate strategy that would not only meet the present needs but also, capture the future as soon as possible. If DTI could not Avimanyu Datta prepared this case mainly for his research work on organizational self-renewal and ambidextrous structure. In addition, this case can be purpose of classroom discussion. 1 West, J., & Bowen, H.K. (1998). Display Technologies, Inc. In Burgelman, R.A., Maidique, M.A., & Wheelwright.C. (2001). Strategic Management of Technology and Innovation (p. 172). New York: McGraw Hill Irwin.

Gupta, J. (n.d). Display Technologies Incorporated. Ball state University. Retrieved October 4, 2002 from http://nova.bsuvc.bsu.edu/~jgupta/disp.PDF.

2

∗

Details of each step are discussed in a later section.

Copyright © 2005 Avimanyu Datta.

Avimanyu Datta, M.S. Information Systems, B.Sc. Computing and Information Systems Business Case Study

capture the future technology, then both their existing rivals such as Sharp, and NEC; and new entrants such as Hitachi, Adi, Hoshiden, Matsushita, and Sanyo would affect its market position. Background IBM and Toshiba, who were the leaders in world computer and electronics industries, introduced the first notebook computers in 1985 and 1988 respectively. Together the two companies established DTI in 1988, as an equally owned joint venture to manufacture large color LCDs. It was formed out of two Japanese factories, in Yasuand Himeji. Yasu was an IBM factory and Himeji belonged to Toshiba. The joint venture presented an opportunity to the companies to share their knowledge. Whereas IBM offered fundamental research capabilities and brand equity in the Personal Computing (PC) world, Toshiba contributed its experience and knowledge high volume manufacturing of Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM)∗∗, and passive matrix LCD production, both of which would add up to the knowledge of LCD manufacturing for DTI.

As Tsuyoshi Kawanishi, senior executive vice president in Toshiba put

it: “The key was to establish a win-win situation for the two partners. IBM could offer brand equity in the PC world, its PC interface applications, and the depth of research. Toshiba could offer semiconductor process technologies to the LCD production and close relationships with equipment vendors.” (West and Bowen, p. 175). Technology of the Active Matrix version of LCD Both, Toshiba and IBM decided to produce the thin-film transistor (TFT) active-matrix of version of the LCD, which provided faster response and sharper contrasts as opposed to the passive matrix version of the LCD. Active Matrix LCDs were made by sandwiching a layer of

∗∗

DRAM is a type of memory used in most personal computers. Memory is the network of electrically-charged points in which a computer stores quickly accessible data in the form of 0s and 1s. Random access means that the PC processor can access any part of the memory or data storage space directly rather than having to proceed sequentially from some starting place. DRAM is dynamic in that, unlike static RAM (SRAM), it needs to have its storage cells refreshed or given a new electronic charge every few milliseconds. Static RAM does not need refreshing because it operates on the principle of moving current that is switched in one of two directions rather than a storage cell that holds a charge in place. Static RAM is generally used for cache memory, which can be accessed more quickly than DRAM. DRAM stores each bit in a storage cell consisting of a capacitor and a transistor. Capacitors tend to lose their charge rather quickly; thus, the need for recharging. A variety of other RAM interfaces to the computer exist. These include: EDO RAM and SDRAM (Source: http://searchstorage.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid5_gci213914,00.html ).

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Avimanyu Datta, M.S. Information Systems, B.Sc. Computing and Information Systems Business Case Study

special liquid crystal between sheets of glass, known as substrates to produce a full color display. When voltage was applied to the liquid crystals, millions of tiny separate light sources, called pixels were turned on and off. To create a coherent image, each pixel was controlled by a separate transistor that instructed each pixel when and how to turn on. In a TFT version of this technology as used by Toshiba and IBM, the transistors were processed into a very thin layer on the surface of sheets of glass. The addition of this thin layer of transistors, critical to the performance of the product presented complex manufacturing challenges for DTI. Manufacturing steps involved and tools employed In 1993, LCD manufacturing was divided into three sub processes

(a) transistor array

process, (b) cell formation process, and (c) module assembly process, with productivity of 75%, 70% and 85% respectively. Thus the yield was only 44.6%. Defects introduced in one of the earlier sub-processes could not be until the end of the third sub process, where a functional testing was done. This was the main cause for such low yield. Exhibit 1 summarizes the jobs done, throughput time and the productivity, difficulties associated of each in each of the sub process. Exhibit 1. Manufacturing sub processes of TFT version of LCD in 1993 deployed by DTI Sub Processes 1. Transistor Array Process

Task description

Throughput time Two weeks

Productivity Difficulties associated

Depositing millions of transistors in 75% Difficulties with a glass sheet or the substrate that semiconductor was later cut into two 10.4 inch fabrication LCD panels per sheet. 2. CellInjected Liquid crystal materials One week 70% Glass handling Formation into a 0.5 micron narrow space Process between the coated surfaces of the glass sheets, thereby forming a cell. One day 85% Electronics assembly 3. Module Assembled a complete TFT-LCD Assembly unit. The glass and liquid crystal pricess was linked to the printed circuit board, (where each of the individual pixels were connected to the board), drive circuit, and back lit assembly Source: West, J., & Bowen, H.K. (1998). Display Technologies, Inc. In Burgelman, R.A., Maidique, M.A., & Wheelwright, S.C. (2001). Strategic Management of Technology and Innovation (p. 172). New York: McGraw Hill Irwin. Copyright © 2005 Avimanyu Datta.

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Avimanyu Datta, M.S. Information Systems, B.Sc. Computing and Information Systems Business Case Study

With this manufacturing process, coupled with Shima’s methodologies the production was raised to 50,000 units per month. The methodologies employed by Shima to raise the production were: 1. Standardized Processes: Shima employed Toshiba’s semiconductor engineers to transplant methodologies established in DRAM, to improve the transistor array step. He also employed Toshiba’s passive matrix LCD engineers to improve upon the cell formation process. This helped to optimize the line balance and locate bottlenecks in the production process. 2. Collaboration with Materials Suppliers: Due to high cost of materials for LCD manufacturing, Shima convinced the suppliers to reduce the major material cost like backlight units and Printed Circuit Boards (PCB). 3. Preventive maintenance to maximize mean time between failures. Shima developed a 24-hour on site support systems, in which equipment vendors stayed at the plant round the clock for first three to six months after installation to support the new equipment. Shima also enforced that all operators should monitor the process themselves and undertake routine maintenance of their own equipment. With this the mean time between failures increased by 300 %. Growth of DTI and its new Challenges As the production increased the market share of DTI in TFT-LCD screens had grown up to 17% of the total share. DTI led the notebook PC industry, and the 10.4 inch size became the industry standard. The introduction of IBM’s Think Pad note book using the DTI 10.4 inch panel was a huge success. In 1992, Toshiba sold 60,000 note book computers giving it the largest share in the world market and IBM achieved fifth rank. The huge success of the notebook computer and especially with the market share of IBM and Toshiba posed a huge challenge for DTI. DTI had to double production from 50,000 to 100,000 units per month. Industrial Context to the Challenge DTI was lagging far behind the industrial leaders, Sharp and NEC. Sharp was the early leader in the LCD-TFT manufacturing and enjoyed economies of scale in production. Their clients were Compaq, Apple and also IBM & Toshiba. In 1993, Sharp produced 150,000 LCDs per month and was planning to invest $950 Million to increase the production to 400,000 during Copyright © 2005 Avimanyu Datta.

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Avimanyu Datta, M.S. Information Systems, B.Sc. Computing and Information Systems Business Case Study

the period 1993 to 1995. NEC was the second largest producer of TFT-LCD panels and enjoyed a 50% domestic market share in Japan. NEC was producing 80,000 units per month and was planning to invest $760 million to reach a 150,000 by 1996. There were threats also from small LCD who might move in if DTI could not meet the marketing demand. They were Hitachi, Adi, Hoshiden, Matsushita, and Sanyo. Last but not the least, a half billion dollar consortium sponsored by the U.S Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), was inventing ways to simulate U.S. firms to enter the business with radical new technologies. To this trend, new entrants would automatically emerge with the exceeding in demands (Christensen 1992a 3; Christensen, 1992b 4; Christensen and Bower, 1996 5). Hence DTI had to cope with the pressure in doubling its production, prepare for production exceeding supply and a new phase in which it must compete on the basis of low cost. Choices for Shima Shima had three choices in order to meet the requirement, they were: 1. Focusing on increasing yield on the existing production line. The existing manufacturing consisted of three major steps, (a) transistor array process, (b) cell formation process and (c) module assembly process, with productivity of 75%, 70% and 85% respectively, and thereby getting a cumulative yield of 44.6% only. Add capacity by building a second line similar to the existing one. This is simply duplicating the existing production line in order to double the productivity. 2. Add capacity by building a second line similar to the existing one. This simply meant duplicating the existing production line in order to double the productivity. 3. Shifting to a new production technology. This was where Shima though of reengineering the entire manufacturing process. It had two main dimensions, (a) using a larger glass substrates, the new system could produce four 10.4 inch LCD panels, as opposed to two The following articles will prove useful in order to apprehend how new entrants often have a technological edge against incumbents: 3 Christensen, C.M.(1992b). Exploring the limits if technology S-curve. Part I: ComponentTechnology. Production and Operations Management Society. In Burgelman, R.A., Maidique, M.A., & Wheelwright, S.C. (2001). Strategic Management of Technology and Innovation (p. 142). New York: McGraw Hill Irwin. 4

Christensen, C.M.(1992b). Exploring the limits if technology S-curve. Part II: Architecture Technology. Production and Operations Management Society. In Burgelman, R.A., Maidique, M.A., & Wheelwright, S.C. (2001). Strategic Management of Technology and Innovation (p. 142). New York: McGraw Hill Irwin. 5

Christensen, C.M. & Bower, J.L (1996). Customer Power, Strategic Investment and Failure of Leading Firms. In Burgelman, R.A., Maidique, M.A., & Wheelwright, S.C. (2001). Strategic Management of Technology and Innovation (p. 428). New York: McGraw Hill Irwin.

Copyright © 2005 Avimanyu Datta.

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Avimanyu Datta, M.S. Information Systems, B.Sc. Computing and Information Systems Business Case Study

in the existing manufacturing process and (b) to integrate the three sub processes into one whole process, which would decrease the waiting time between sub processes and reduce the rate of loss from loading and unloading between the three sub processes Exhibit 2 summarizes the information related to cost, time to implement, advantages and disadvantages for each of the choice that Shima was confronted with. Exhibit 2. Three strategic Choices for Shima. Choice 1. Focusing on increasing yield on the existing production line.

Time 6 – 24 months

Cost 1. Capital expenditure: $6million 2. 30 extra engineers @ $100,000 (fully loaded) each per year = $1.5 – 6 million 3. 10 % lost production (experimentation on the line) @ $10million per month = $60- $240 million.

Advantages 1. It promises to supply the required increase in output relatively cost efficiently, at least in terms of expenditure on equipment. 2. It would provide a deeper understanding of flat panel Display manufacture.

Disadvantages 1. It is not certain that DTI would reach the target yield rate. 2. DTI risks being left behind if other producers successfully move to more automated, larger systems first

2. Duplicate the existing production line

9 months

1. Capital expenditure = $200million 2. 50 engineers @ $100,000 (fully loaded) each X 9 months = $3.75 million

1.It effectively removes the risk of failure to reach 100,000 target. 2.It is able to harvest the time and energy already invested in the existing process

1. DTI makes no preparation to move to the new generation of technology, risking being caught off guard by fleet-footed competitors 2. DTI's cost structure remains the same: it is simply duplicated. 3. The attention of DTI’s engineers and management is diverted from learning

3. Invest in a radically new line employing new technologies

15-30 months

1. Equipment cost=$300million 2. 100 engineers @$100,000 each year for 15 to 30 months= $ 1.5 to $ 3 million

1. It promises to double output, even at the current 45% yield ratio. 2. It potentially promises to standardize the industry on Toshiba's production equipment, reducing future plant costs

1. This is the most technologically uncertain option

Source: Gupta, J (n.d.). Display Technologies Incorporated. Ball state University. Retrieved October 4, 2002 from http://nova.bsuvc.bsu.edu/~jgupta/disp.PDF. Other than the information summarized in Exhibit 2, Shima had to understand the capabilities of each option, and to whom is Shima accountable. This is because unless Shima knows the exact accountability of DTI to its stakeholders, a proper choice of the strategy cannot

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Avimanyu Datta, M.S. Information Systems, B.Sc. Computing and Information Systems Business Case Study

be made even with the knowledge of the capabilities. Exhibit 3 summarizes the capabilities of each of the choices based on the data gathered from Gupta (n.d.). Table 3 Capabilities of the Choices. Choices 1. Focusing on increasing yield on the existing production line. 2. Duplicate the existing production line 3. Invest in a radically new line employing new technologies

Capabilities Deeper understanding of the elements of the process Meet existing demand, with little risk of capacity shortfall A radical jump in performance. Understanding of continuous flow production

DTI or rather the decision Shima would make would affect three major stakeholders. These were: 1.

IBM: DTI must supply screens with minimal investment.

2.

Toshiba: Accumulate Technological knowledge for the long term.

3.

Employees: Maintain a focus on learning. Decision made by Shima and its result Shima had to make a decision; in choosing the appropriate strategy that would

not only meet the present needs but also, capture the future as soon as possible. If DTI could not capture the future technology, then both their existing rivals and new entrants would affect them. Shima did not opt for one specific choice but made a sequential strategy. First he opted for option 1 and then switched to option 3. In option 1 Shima focused on increasing the Yield. Once the yield increased from 44.6% to 70%, in only nine months he shifted to option 3. Within 15 months Shima tripled the production rate. The end of display technologies incorporated Despite DTI’s huge technological success, in 2000 IBM and Toshiba ended their 12-year old LCD manufacturing joint venture 6, which resulted in the end of DTI. The reason, as quoted

6

ITWorld.com (July 3, 2001). Toshiba, IBM to break up LCD joint venture. ITWorld.com. Retrieved October 5, 2002 from http://www.itworld.com/Comp/3940/IDG010703toshiba/

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Avimanyu Datta, M.S. Information Systems, B.Sc. Computing and Information Systems Business Case Study

by Robertson7 (July 2001) was the drastic fall in price of the commodity notebook PC panels had slashed the profit Margins severely. According to Barry Young (Shim8, 2001), a market research analyst at DisplaySearch “With the falling prices of LCDs, it's getting harder for companies to make any money and, as a result, everyone is looking for new markets to address9. So market Innovation of its founders led to the Decline of DTI. While Toshiba saw opportunity in mid-to small scale sized LCDs display for cell phones and hand held devices, IBM’s focus shifted to high resolution LCDs for computer monitors. DTI’s medium-to-small panel production line was transferred to a Toshiba subsidiary, while the rest of the company will become an IBM subsidiary for large panel production. Both IBM and Toshiba equally divided the assets of DTI. Toshiba took over their factory at Himeji whereas IBM took over theirs’ in Yasu. Both the companies got 600 employees each and IBM had a worth $80.45 million. In fact IBM collaborated with Taiwanese giant Chi-Mei Optolectronics to manufacture large LCD panels. Chi Mei purchased the development and production assets of DTI from IBM and licensed intellectual property for LCDs from IBM. Toshiba with their DTI assets collaborated with Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. Ltd in Singapore to produce LCD for handheld devices and cell phones10.

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Robertson, J. (July5, 2001). IBM and Toshiba confirm breakup of display venture. Silicon Strategies. Retrieved October 4, 2002 from http://www.siliconstrategies.com/printableArticle?doc_id=OEG20010705S0051 8

Shim, R. (July 6, 2001). IBM to specialize in large monitors. CNET News.com. Retrieved October 4, 2001 from http://news.com.com/2100-1040-269559.html?legacy=cnet

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Shim, R. (July 6, 2001). IBM to specialize in large monitors. CNET News.com. Retrieved October 4, 2001 from http://news.com.com/2100-1040-269559.html?legacy=cnet

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Rohde, L. (July 3, 2001). Toshiba, IBM to break up LCD joint venture. Info World. Retrieved October 5, 2002 from http://iwsun4.infoworld.com/articles/hn/xml/01/07/03/010703hnlcdbreak.xml

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Avimanyu Datta, M.S. Information Systems, B.Sc. Computing and Information Systems Business Case Study

Annexure Teaching Note SUMMARY This case exemplifies the fact that how despite tremendous technological innovation, an organization faces extinction due to market innovation by its owners. This case serves a point of refute to the traditional management thinking that positively links technological innovation to unremitting competitive advantage. The success of DTI to meet their customer’s (IBM and Toshiba, who were also it’s owners) requirement and overcome the manufacturing bottlenecks is an example of managing radical technological innovation. It was Toru Shima’s (President, DTI) vision of mixing the right strategies due to which they not only met the requirement of 100,000 units per month but also overcome the hurdles imposed by the complex technological and manufacturing process. As a result the production not only doubled but also tripled. But due to the increased competition and slumping that led to increased pressure on the manufactures of LCDs, led IBM and Toshiba seek for different market focus. While Toshiba saw opportunity in mid-to small scale sized LCDs display for cell phones and hand held devices, IBM focussed on larger, high resolution LCDs for computer monitors. This ended their common vision, and resulted in the end of DTI. TEACHING OBJECTIVES AND TARGET AUDIENCE The teaching objectives of this case are: To understand whether technological innovations can promise sustainable competitive advantage. Can the fate of an incorporated organization tied to their owners or could they carve a separate identity.

This case could find its place in programs like: MBA, MS Systems Engineering/Sciences, MS, MA Organizational change programs in their classes on strategy.

TEACHING APPROACH AND STRATEGY In fact it would be highly advisable for students and faculty members to consult Moore (1993), Burgelman & Grove (1996) alongside the case. For the more inquisitive minds who would seek deeper understanding may consult Prahalad and Hamel (2002) Copyright © 2005 Avimanyu Datta.

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Avimanyu Datta, M.S. Information Systems, B.Sc. Computing and Information Systems Business Case Study

and Grove (1996). The case should be used to trigger discussions about the role of technological innovations in determining an organization’s fortunes. In fact while this case says it does not, several others in the academic literature mentions it does, particularly the ones dealing with high tech startups from the American West Coast like, SUN Microsystems, CISCO Systems etc. This case should illustrate that impact of technological innovations cannot be studied under one theory of behavior, but should be integrative function of many. ANALYSIS A common vision between IBM and Toshiba led to the formation of DTI. When this common vision ended and each of the organizations sought to seek different market, the fate of DTI was decided. It was extinction.Thus, traditionally it could be said that the fate of DTI was inevitable and should not be discussed along with the lines of organizational failure or death/extinction. Yet such school of thought may not entirely impede a debate whether such a fate could have been reversed. Death of a firm as quoted by Moore (1993)11, is an inevitable alternative to self-renewal. Professor Moore’s view of firm exists beyond its sole identity.

He views an

organization as an ecosystem consisting of the itself, with its suppliers, customers etc. Only the one with a better ecosystem survives beyond the last two of the four stages identified by Moore, which are: (a) Birth, (b) Expansion, (c) Leadership, and (d) self renewal. Self-renewal is the only process in sustaining industrial leadership. A successful firm should always adapt itself or even change the ecosystem to its favor to which it belongs, it were to survive beyond a Strategic Infection Point (SIP)

∗∗∗

. Prahlad and Hamel (2002)12 in their book had mentioned that those

firms that change the rules of the game survive in the long run and lead the industry. Thinking their view in Moore’s terms will led to the conclusion that self renewal is perhaps a mean to change the rules of the game. The market innovation of IBM and Toshiba had triggered a 11 Moore, J. (1993). Predators and Prey. A new Ecology of Competition. . In Burgelman, R.A., Maidique, M.A., & Wheelwright, S.C. (2001). Strategic Management of Technology and Innovation (p. 272). New York: McGraw Hill Irwin. [James Moore is a professor of Management and Law at Harvard University]

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Strategic Inflection Point is a concept that refers to an event or time period during which the underlying fundamentals of a situation have changed and the future is altered in a meaningful way. 12 Prahalad, C.K. and Hamel, G. (2002). Competing for the Future. New Delhi: Tata McGraw Hill [C.K Prahalad is Professor of Strategy in University of Michigan Gary Hamel is the professor of International management in London Business School]

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Avimanyu Datta, M.S. Information Systems, B.Sc. Computing and Information Systems Business Case Study

Strategic Inflection Point (SIP) that DTI should have realized and acted accordingly. SIP according to Burgelman and Grove (1996)

13

and Grove (1996)14 is the realization that

something has changed and follows two alternative paths, which are (a) sustained leadership through renewal or (b) Extinction. In fact the failure of DTI to exist beyond the boundaries and realm of IBM and Toshiba triggers the question whether one should be skeptical about Technological Innovation as the only means of survival and attainment of business leadership.

Burgelman, R,A. & Grove, A. S. (1996). Strategic Dissonance. In Burgelman, R.A., Maidique, M.A., & Wheelwright.C. (2001). Strategic Management of Technology and Innovation (p. 362). New York: McGraw Hill Irwin. [Andrew S. Grove is the cofounder and the CEO of Intel. Corp. He also teaches Strategy as an adjunct faculty in Stanford University’s Graduate School of Business. Robert A. Burgelman is the professor of Strategy at Stanford University’s Graduate School of Business]

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Grove, A. (1996). Only the Paranoid Survive: Exploit the Crisis Point that Challenge every Company and Career. New York: Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc.

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Avimanyu Datta, M.S. Information Systems, B.Sc. Computing and Information Systems Business Case Study

READINGS AND REFERENCES Burgelman, R,A. & Grove, A. S. (1996). Strategic Dissonance. In Burgelman, R.A., Maidique, M.A., & Wheelwright.C. (2001). Strategic Management of Technology and Innovation (p. 362). New York: McGraw Hill Irwin. Christensen, C.M.(1992a). Exploring the limits if technology S-curve. Part I: Component Technology. Production and Operations Management Society. In Burgelman, R.A., Maidique, M.A., & Wheelwright, S.C. (2001). Strategic Management of Technology and Innovation (p. 124). New York: McGraw Hill Irwin. Christensen, C.M.(1992b). Exploring the limits if technology S-curve. Part II: Architecture Technology. Production and Operations Management Society. In Burgelman, R.A., Maidique, M.A., & Wheelwright, S.C. (2001). Strategic Management of Technology and Innovation (p. 142). New York: McGraw Hill Irwin. Christensen, C.M. & Bower, J.L (1996). Customer Power, Strategic Investment and Failure of Leading Firms. In Burgelman, R.A., Maidique, M.A., & Wheelwright, S.C. (2001). Strategic Management of Technology and Innovation (p. 428). New York: McGraw Hill Irwin. Gupta, J (n.d.). Display Technologies Incorporated. Ball state University. Retrieved October 4, 2002 from http://nova.bsuvc.bsu.edu/~jgupta/disp.PDF. ITWorld.com (July 3, 2001). Toshiba, IBM to break up LCD joint venture. ITWorld.com. Retrieved October 5, 2002 from http://www.itworld.com/Comp/3940/IDG010703toshiba/ Grove, A. (1996). Only the Paranoid Survive: Exploit the Crisis Point that Challenge every Company and Career. New York: Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc. Moore, J. (1993). Predators and Prey. A new Ecology of Competition. . In Burgelman, R.A., Maidique, M.A., & Wheelwright, S.C. (2001). Strategic Management of Technology and Innovation (p. 272). New York: McGraw Hill Irwin. Porter, M.E (1980). Competitive strategy: Techniques for analyzing industries and competitors. New York: Free Press. Prahalad, C.K. and Hamel, G. (2002). Competing for the Future. New Delhi: Tata McGraw Hill Robertson, J. (July5, 2001). IBM and Toshiba confirm breakup of display venture. Silicon Strategies. Retrieved October 4, 2002 from http://www.siliconstrategies.com/printableArticle?doc_id=OEG20010705S0051

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Rohde, L. (July 3, 2001). Toshiba, IBM to break up LCD joint venture. Info World. Retrieved October 5, 2002 from http://iwsun4.infoworld.com/articles/hn/xml/01/07/03/010703hnlcdbreak.xml Shim, R. (July 6, 2001). IBM to specialize in large monitors. CNET News.com. Retrieved October 4, 2001 from http://news.com.com/2100-1040-269559.html?legacy=cnet West, J., & Bowen, H.K. (1998). Display Technologies, Inc. In Burgelman, R.A., Maidique, M.A., & Wheelwright, S.C. (2001). Strategic Management of Technology and Innovation (p. 172). New York: McGraw Hill Irwin.

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