Domingo vs. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 572

 

73. Domingo vs. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 572 FACTS:  Soledad Domingo, married with Roberto Domingo, filed a petition or the declaration o nullity o marriage and separation o property. She did not know that Domingo had been previously married to Emerlinda dela Paz. She came to know the previous marriage when the latter filed a suit o bigamy against her. Furthermore, when she came home rom Saudi during her one-month leave rom work, she discovered that Roberto cohabited with another woman and had been disposing some o her properties which is administered by Roberto. The latter claims that because their marriage was void voi d ab initio, the declaration o such voidance is unnecessary and superfluous. On the other hand, Soledad insists the declaration o the nullity o marriage not or the purpose o remarriage, but  in order to provide a basis or the separation and distribution o properties acquired during the marriage.

the provision in question, as it finally emerged, did not state "The absolute nullity o a previous marriage may be invoked solely  or  or purposes o remarriage . . .," in which case "solely" would clearly qualiy the phrase "or purposes o remarriage." Had the phraseology been such, the interpretation o petitioner would have been correct and, that is, that the absolute nullity o a previous marriage may be invoked solely  or  or purposes o remarriage, thus rendering irrelevant the clause "on the basis solely o a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void." That Article 40 as inally formulated included the signiicant clause denotes that such inal judgment declaring the previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage.  remarriage.  Undoubtedly, one can conceive o other instances where a party might well invoke the absolute nullity o a previous marriage or purposes other than remarriage, such as in case o an action or 1. 2. 3. 4.

 ISSUES ISSUES:: whether or not a petition or judicial declaration o a void marriage is necessary. I in the afirmative, whether the same should be filed only or purposes o remarriage. RULING: NO AND NO The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee 16 16 which  which drated what is now the Family Code o the Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must irst secure a judicial declaration of  the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again. In act, the requirement or a declaration o absolute nullity o a marriage is also or the protection o the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration o the nullity o his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.  Article 40 of the Family Code provides:  Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a inal judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n) Crucial to the proper interpretation o Article 40 is the position in the provision o the word "solely." As it is placed, the same shows that it is meant to qualiy "final judgment declaring such previous marriage void." Realizing the need or careul cratsmanship in conveying the precise intent o the Committee members,

5.

liquidatio ion n, partition, distri dis tribut bution ion and and separa separatio tion n o propert property y betwee between n the erstwhile spouses, an acti action on or or the the custo custody dy and and suppor supportt o thei theirr common children and delive del ivery ry o the the latter latters' s' presum presumpti ptive ve legit legitimes imes..

This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In other words, or purposes o remarriage, why should the only legally acceptable basis or declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity be a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void? Whereas, or purposes other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable? Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an "inviolable social institution, is the oundation o the amily;" as such, it "shall be protected by the State." As a matter o policy, thereore, the nullification o a marriage or the purpose o contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on the basis o the perception o  both parties or o one that their union is so deective with respect to the essential requisites o a contract o marriage as to render it void ipso jure and jure and with no legal eect — and nothing more. Were this so, this inviolable social institution would be reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky oundations indeed. And the grounds or nulliying marriage would be as diverse and ar-ranging as human ingenuity and ancy could conceive. For such a social significant institution, an oficial state pronouncement through the courts, and nothing less, will satisy the exacting norms o society.