Doc 8973 - Security Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation Againts Acts of Unlawful Interference

EXTRACTS FROM THE Security Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation  Against Acts of Unlawful Interference Interference (Doc 8973), Seventh Edition VOLUME I — NATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION Appendix 1 IN-FLIGHT SECURITY OFFICERS GENERAL 1. The deployment of in-flight security officers (IFSOs) 1 on board commercial aircraft is a critical security measure that needs to be thoroughly studied by States prior to adoption. IFSOs can prevent and suppress acts of unlawful interference if they are well selected, trained and educated in the consequences of their intervention, whereas failure to properly select and train IFSOs can lead to serious accidents. Thus, States need to pay close attention to the legal, operational and tactical factors governing the use of IFSOs. 2. As a first principle, the use of IFSOs must not diminish the reliance of States on the implementation of essential ground security measures and controls as measures to prevent acts of  unlawful interference with civil aviation. a viation. 3. The decision to use IFSOs rests with the State. States should consider the views of  aircraft operators in the development of the IFSO programme. SELECTION 4. It is essential to have confidential, written and formal procedures for selecting, training and qualifying IFSOs. The most critical aspect is that of the qualification criteria established by the State to allow IFSOs to be armed and to apply the rules of engagement. The standards for IFSOs are far higher than those for routine police, military or security tasks. All IFSO applicants should undergo extensive psychological and physical examinations and be subject to routine re-examination throughout their careers. The stress and strain of IFSO duties, combined with the critical judgement that IFSOs must exercise, require emotionally stable and mature individuals. Personal background checks should be conducted prior to selection. 5. Criteria should be developed by which applicants may be determined as qualified candidates for the job of IFSO. Only the best qualified persons should be selected. 6.

The following criteria may apply to the selection of IFSOs, who should demonstrate: a) strong social and communication skills; b) an ability ability to deal with stress; c) physical and mental fitness; d) a good good memory memory and ability ability to concentrate; concentrate; e) an ability to work effectively as part of a team or independently;

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 In-flight Security Officer (IFSO). A person who is authorized by the government of the State of the Operator and the government of the State of Registration to be deployed on an aircraft with the purpose of protecting that aircraft and its occupants against acts of unlawful interference. This excludes persons employed to provide exclusive personal protection for one or more specific people travelling on the aircraft, such as personal bodyguards.

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f)

an ability to be assertive and effective;

g) good manners and appropriate appearance; h) skills to deal with situations of physical danger; i)

skill in dealing with firearms and also engaging in unarmed combat; and

 j)

freedom from drug dependencies, and excellent self-discipline. TRAINING

7. The type and depth of the training programme for IFSOs will vary depending on the initial selection criteria. It is advantageous if IFSOs are selected from a group of individuals who are already extensively trained in using firearms and possess police or security experience. However, all IFSOs should undergo the same qualification procedures regardless of their prior experience or duties. 8.

The training programme for IFSOs should include: a) techniques for apprehension and detention; b) unarmed offensive and defensive close-quarters combat skills; c) observation and surveillance; d) search of aircraft and seizure; e) use of other-than-lethal weapons or force; f)

extensive firearms training;

g) knowledge of aircraft interior design and configuration; h) Human Factors training, especially the physiological and psychological effects of low air pressure and reduced levels of oxygen at high altitude; i)

techniques for operating within restricted and confined spaces, such as an aircraft in flight;

 j)

realistic simulation of operations by using mock-up aircraft;

k) training on the application of the rules of engagement; l)

situational awareness training; and

m) discreet and secretive communication methods. 9. Training for IFSOs should also include specific instruction on the exercise of authority over international waters or within the airspace of another Contracting State. This is a critical area that should be well understood by all those involved in the programme. 10. The following aviation-related topics may also be part of the training curriculum for the IFSO training programme:

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a) aviation operations for both airports and aircraft operators; b) types of aircraft and their performance capabilities and cabin equipment; c) flight and cabin crew functions; d) ticketing and check-in procedures; e) airport organizational structure; f)

pre-board routing of passengers, baggage, cargo and mail;

g) general concepts of flight planning and alternative airports; h) passport and visa rules and regulations; i)

customs rules and regulations;

 j)

emergency and evacuation procedures;

k) handling psychologically distraught or deranged people; l)

recognition of improvised explosive devices;

m) recognition of dangerous goods and prohibited substances (drugs); and n) least-risk bomb location. 11. The aviation-related topics for the IFSO training programme should be developed by the appropriate authority for security, while law enforcement aspects should be the responsibility of the national police force, thereby ensuring that the entire IFSO training programme has been developed by the relevant subject matter experts. All IFSOs should have training in the culture, environment, politics and threat situations found in different countries, and should have knowledge of the police, military and aviation security entities stationed at the foreign airports to which they may be deployed. They should be well informed about the support they can expect from the aircraft operator and airport authority, the locations and procedures for storing weapons, and contact information for key personnel at all of the above organizations. SCOPE OF DUTIES 12. In the event a State decides to implement an IFSO programme, there are a number of  duties that may be assigned to its officers: a) suppression of acts of unlawful seizure or sabotage by use of minimal or deadly force, as required, and apprehension of suspects; b) application of least-risk bomb location procedures in the event a suspected explosive device is discovered on an aircraft; c) protection of the flight crew compartment; d) security search or inspection of the aircraft prior to boarding passengers, baggage, cargo or mail;

-4e) physical search and inspection of passengers and baggage boarding or re-boarding the aircraft at the origin or intermediate stops; f)

in-flight search of an aircraft under threat; and

g) security supervision of the passenger cabin during flight and transit locations.  Note: Duties listed above under d)-g) should not be exercised by IFSOs when they are armed or  operating covertly .

13. IFSOs should not be employed in the role of purser, flight attendant or any other crew member with dedicated safety tasks. It is not feasible for IFSOs to perform security and flight duties simultaneously. Generally, an IFSO should not intervene in situations involving unruly passengers. Such events should be handled by the cabin crew. IFSOs must be constantly aware that such a situation could be a diversion intended to identify an IFSO. 14. The use of IFSOs to perform aviation security duties at airports within a Contracting State is a matter to be decided by the State. 15. The number of IFSOs deployed and their operational control depends in general on the scope and degree of security coverage required and the extent of the aircraft operator’s flight schedule and routes. IFSOs should only operate as a team comprised of at least two officers. On larger aircraft or more threatened routes, a larger team is highly desirable. DUTY SCHEDULES 16. The length of time that a member of an IFSO team may remain on operational status has not been scientifically studied or determined, but it is widely believed that IFSOs need to be relieved of  flying duties at regular intervals. Considering the level of mental agility and alertness required, IFSOs would appear to benefit from rotational duties. The schedule should rotate IFSOs on specific flights often enough that they do not become known to frequent travellers or suspicious groups. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 17. Specific and detailed rules of engagement must be prepared, authorized and clearly communicated to all IFSOs. The rules of engagement should clearly describe under what conditions IFSOs are authorized to use force and make arrests or detentions. Classified versions of the rules of  engagement should be provided only to eligible parties, as determined by the competent national authority. The pilot-in-command should be briefed about the rules of engagement by the IFSO team leader. COMMAND AND CONTROL 18. IFSOs should be under the authority of the pilot-in-command of the aircraft, although an IFSO can act independently when this is authorized by the rules of engagement. 19. One member of the IFSO team should be designated as the team leader, with authority over, and responsibility for, all members of the IFSO team. OVERT AND COVERT DEPLOYMENT 20. IFSOs may be deployed either overtly or covertly. The IFSO may take part in some of the pre-board security procedures observed by passengers and thus become a visible deterrent to unlawful acts aboard the aircraft. When operating covertly, the IFSO may appear to be a normal passenger who has no association with flight or cabin crew or unconcealed IFSOs.

-521. The obvious drawback to overt operation is that the IFSO could become a target for attack. This is not a risk with covert deployment; however, the concealed IFSO cannot participate in any security procedures involving passengers. 22. There are merits to combining aspects of overt and covert deployment. Both can provide a preliminary deterrent to unlawful acts against civil aviation. A public relations programme centred on the IFSOs, without disclosing their identities, can be extremely helpful in deterring future unlawful acts. FIREARMS, WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT 23. Firearms issued to IFSOs should be specifically selected, tested and authorized for use on aircraft, as standard police and military weapons and ammunition may be unsuitable for this environment. Before establishing an IFSO programme, States should contact ICAO for referral to other Contracting States that already employ IFSOs and are willing to share technical details on suitable firearms and ammunition. 24. Consideration should be given to the carriage of non-lethal weapons by IFSOs, depending on the rules of engagement under which they will operate. 25. Airports used by armed IFSOs must provide for adequate storage and maintenance of  their firearms and ammunition. All IFSOs must carry effective restraining devices that they are proficient in using. 26. Once airborne, communication between IFSOs and flight crew should be avoided or kept to a minimum so that secrecy will not be compromised. IFSOs need to be well trained and rehearsed in responses to acts of unlawful interference, thus negating or reducing their dependence on electronic or direct communication. Discreet communication and sign language are highly recommended for use by IFSOs. THREAT ASSESSMENT 27. A proposal to establish an IFSO programme needs to be thoroughly studied by the State. On this basis, the deployment of IFSOs can then be considered for both domestic and international operations. The term of deployment depends wholly on the threat assessment and the State’s judgement of  its aviation security needs. CONFIDENTIALITY 28. Tactical details of IFSO programmes must remain classified. Under no circumstances should any State allow for leakage of IFSO information provided by other States. It may be appropriate for national laws or civil aviation programmes to incorporate a clause prohibiting leaks. To the extent practicable, this measure also can be applied to bilateral or multilateral agreements on IFSOs. COST OF IFSOs 29. The development and implementation of IFSO programmes can be expensive, and it is up to the State to determine how to cover this cost. ————————

-6Model Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation Regarding the Deployment of Armed In-Flight Security Officers on Flights Between ( ) and ( )

(

) and (

) (hereinafter referred to as “the Parties”)

Desiring to cooperate to achieve the highest standard possible in aviation security; Expressing their intention to deploy armed In-Flight Security Officers (hereinafter referred to as “IFSOs”) on board aircraft registered and operating between their States on the basis of applicable international rules and instruments including the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board   Aircraft, Signed at Tokyo on 14 September 1963 (hereinafter referred to as “State Aircraft”); The Parties have reached the following understanding: 1.

The purpose of this Memorandum of Understanding (hereinafter referred to as “MOU”) is to enhance the security of civil aviation.

2.

Police officers or other appropriately trained State employees will be deployed as IFSOs who, with the consent of the aircraft commander, will maintain and/or restore security or order on board the aircraft of ( ) and ( ) flying between the two States.

3.

Notwithstanding the decision by one Party to commence deployment of IFSOs on board its State’s aircraft and to implement the necessary measures under this MOU, the date for commencing IFSO deployment shall remain at the discretion of the other Party.

4.

Upon request, each Party will grant the other Party, in accordance with its national laws and regulations, general permission for IFSOs to carry firearms, ammunition and other necessary equipment on flights between ( ) and ( ). This permission will include the carriage of  firearms both on board aircraft and in security-restricted areas of airports serving international civil aviation located in ( ) and ( ).

5.

Permission to carry firearms will be granted under the following conditions: a) IFSOs carrying firearms, ammunition and other equipment may disembark from the aircraft and can remain in the security-restricted areas of the other Party’s international airports only when escorted by a representative of the host Party’s responsible national authority; b) Upon disembarking from the aircraft, IFSOs shall be escorted by the r epresentative to an area at the arrival airport designated by the responsible national authority, and at this location shall leave their firearms, ammunition and other equipment securely stored under guard; and c) IFSOs will present upon request certified copies of their permission to carry firearms.

6.

Either Party planning to deploy IFSOs will notify the national coordinating office of the other Party in writing at least ten (10) days in advance of the relevant flight. In case of imminent danger, notification may be provided without delay. The written notification will contain the information specified in Annex 1 to this MOU, and shall be treated as strictly confidential.

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In the case of an incident on board an aircraft requiring IFSOs to take appropriate action to avert any danger or maintain security, the IFSOs will inform the relevant authorities of both Parties. If  temporary detention is necessary, the person or persons who caused the incident will be delivered by the aircraft commander to the competent authorities after landing in the territory of the other Party or of another State, as IFSOs will not hold any powers in this respect.

8.

Each Party will designate a national coordinating office in Annex 2 to this MOU that will carry out the duties specified in this MOU. The coordinating offices will draw up and jointly decide upon operational procedures to be followed with respect to the deployment of IFSOs, the contents of  which shall not be disclosed to any third party without the consent of both Parties.

9.

The Parties may review this MOU from time to time to exchange information and experiences. Any new issues, necessary amendments or differences arising out of the interpretation of this MOU may be discussed and settled during such reviews.

10. This MOU shall be written in duplicate in both English and _________ respectively, and signed thereon. In case of any dispute as to the interpretation of this MOU, it shall be resolved by discussion and mutual understanding, and in case of any dispute as to the interpretation of the _________ and English language versions of this MOU, the English language version shall prevail. 11.

This MOU shall come into effect at the date of the last signing and will remain in effect until either Party informs the other Party in writing by giving reasonable notice, which shall be at least thirty (30) days in advance, that it wishes to terminate such cooperation.

Signed on behalf of [NAME OF PARTY] Name: ________________________ Position: _______________________ Date of signature: ______________________

Signed on behalf of [NAME OF PARTY] Name: ________________________ Position: _______________________ Date of signature: ______________________

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-8Annex 1 to the Memorandum of Understanding Information to be Included in the Written Notification of  In-Flight Security Officer (IFSO) Deployment Pursuant to Article 6 of the Memorandum of Understanding

a) date and time of mission, including the planned flight information (including flight number and time);

length

of

stay;

b) number of IFSOs per mission; c) complete names of all persons, indicating name of mission leader; d) passport numbers; e) weapons type, make and serial number; f)

type and quantity of ammunition; and

g) details of other mission-related equipment to be carried on the aircraft, such as radios or handcuffs.

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-9Annex 2 to the Memorandum of Understanding List of National Coordinating Offices Pursuant to Article 8 of the Memorandum of Understanding

NAME OF PARTY Central contact office for IFSO deployment: Name of authority: Postal/zip code: Address: Tel.: Fax: E-mail: NAME OF PARTY

Central contact office for IFSO deployment: Name of authority: Postal/zip code: Address: Tel.: Fax: E-mail:

- 10 VOLUME IV — PREVENTIVE SECURITY MEASURES

DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL/VIPs ...

3.4.3 Diplomatic personnel accredited to the State concerned (where the diplomat is boarding an aircraft), and travelling diplomatic couriers, enjoy certain privileges and immunity from prosecution while acting in an official capacity as representatives of their State. These privileges are contained in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations done at Vienna on 18 April 1961. 3.4.4 The Vienna Convention stipulates that the person of a diplomatic agent and his/her personal baggage should not be exempted from the normal security screening process unless the State concerned agrees to such an exemption specifically, or the baggage is part of the diplomatic bags/pouches referred to in 3.4.19 to 3.4.27. 3.4.5 The Vienna Convention states that the personal baggage of a diplomatic agent should be exempt from customs inspection only if it contains articles for the official use of the mission or for the personal use of the agent or members of his/her family forming part of the agent's household (Article 36). The Convention also places an obligation on all diplomatic personnel (Article 41) "to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving State", including legally enforceable pre-boarding screening. 3.4.6 Additionally, although certain passengers may have diplomatic immunity, including personal inviolability, they are nevertheless subject to routine pre-boarding inspection/screening as necessary for aircraft security. While the personal property of certain persons may be inviolable, for the purpose of civil aviation security, personal baggage, including hand and hold baggage belonging to diplomats and their family members, is subject to the same screening requirements applied to regular baggage. 3.4.7 On those occasions when normal processing is considered inappropriate, private screening should be provided upon request. However, private screening should not be the norm. Private screening may be carried out in a private area on the premises leased by the aircraft operator (e.g. lounge) or, by special arrangement with the airport operator, in an area such as a VIP lounge which could, if  necessary, be equipped with appropriate facilities that would allow for the screening of diplomats and other privileged persons. 3.4.8 Special attention should be put on passengers working for diplomatic missions but not covered by diplomatic immunities, such as drivers, assistants or even professionals who possess identity cards similar to those of diplomats, but may not benefit from the diplomatic privileges and immunities agreed by the State. If a State exempts designated diplomats or develops special security screening arrangements for them, the State will need to include these exemptions or special screening procedures as part of their national civil aviation security programme. Special arrangements should be clear to and undisputable by, the staff at the airport and should be reflected in the standard operating procedures (SOPs) of the airport security programme. Details of special arrangements together with the nominative list of beneficiaries, should also be made officially known to the persons/entities concerned to avoid any problems at the airport. Finally, these special arrangements will, of necessity, be jointly developed, or at least vetted, by the diplomatic/protocol authorities of the State in addition to the appropriate authority for aviation security.

- 11 ROYALTY AND HEADS OF STATE 3.4.9 State governments extend specific exemptions from the inspection/screening process to visiting Heads of State and Royalty when they are travelling on official business. Such exemptions may not necessarily apply when such persons are travelling as private individuals, unless special, official arrangements have been agreed upon by the appropriate authorities and the diplomatic/protocol authorities. 3.4.10 Exemption from the inspection/screening process is based on the fact that, when travelling on official business, Royalty and Heads of State and their baggage are afforded such a high degree of security by escorting police and other services that the risk of a weapon and/or an explosive device being introduced into their baggage or on board the aircraft is negated. 3.4.11 However, it is worth remembering that representatives of State governments have been assassinated by their close staff including personal bodyguards and assistants. If a State government representative is travelling on a commercial aircraft, with regular passengers, it is advisable to propose special security screening, in appropriate locations and conditions, directly to the State government representative (and not through his/her staff) and to screen his/her cabin and hold baggage to detect explosives or dangerous items that may have been put in that baggage by someone else. 3.4.12 Prior notification of the travel arrangements of such person is to be provided in order that the police and security services may make the necessary arrangements. Such arrangements will include the escort of such persons through terminal security areas. Wherever possible, dedicated areas (VIP lounges, protocol terminals) should be used to avoid contact with the normal passenger circuits. 3.4.13 The Department of Internal Affairs, the Department of Protocol, and the police should be in charge of departure and arrival formalities and security of important persons. 3.4.14 It should be appreciated that there is almost inevitably an increase in the level of risk to flights on which Royalty and Heads of State are travelling. In the case of travel on regular scheduled service, while accompanying officials have an important security responsibility in respect of the official party, the increased risk to other passengers cannot be overlooked. Informal security arrangements for the official party should not be allowed to compromise the security of the flight as a whole and that of the other passengers. 3.4.15 Planning for visits involving travel to and from a State should include specific security planning for the arrival and departure phases and/or domestic movements. 3.4.16 Where travel to, from or within a State is by exclusive charter, military or private aircraft, security involvement will usually be limited to the security of the aircraft itself and such ground security as circumstances may require. Special attention should be placed on possible interferences with normal operations, the potential risk of attacks on the airport/terminal facilities, and/or disruptive behaviour of  protestors in the terminal facilities or on the roads leading to the airport. Any distracting activities that might compromise the quality of security services should not be overlooked. 3.4.17 When any sector of the journey involves travel on a scheduled passenger service, additional security will in most cases be necessary. The degree of security will vary according to the level of threat generated by the presence of the official party. Organizations, in addition to the police and the hosting government department, which should be consulted in such situations are:

- 12 a) the aircraft operator; b) the appropriate aviation security authority; and c) the airport security authority. DIPLOMATIC BAGS/POUCHES 3.4.18 If a passenger is a diplomatic courier, any diplomatic pouches accompanying that courier, 2 whether as cabin baggage or hold baggage, “shall not be opened or detained.” All other cabin baggage items and hold baggage shall be processed in the normal manner. 3.4.19 Diplomatic bags, including cabin baggage and checked hold baggage, should be identified as such by the sending State. “The packages constituting the diplomatic bag must bear visible 3 external marks of their character.” 3.4.20 A courier accompanying a diplomatic bag should possess “an official document indicating his status and the number of packages constituting the diplomatic bag.” 4 3.4.21 Annex 17, Standard 4.5.1, requiring that States establish measures to ensure that hold baggage is “screened prior to being loaded onto an aircraft” does not require or authorize the screening of  diplomatic bags by X-ray or any other method inconsistent with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic  Relations. 3.4.22 The sending State may wish to inform the aircraft operator in advance when diplomatic bags are to be brought on board an aircraft. 3.4.23 If requested to do so, the sending State should be prepared to verify, orally or by written documentation, that the chain of custody of the diplomatic bags was maintained at all times by the sending State and that the diplomatic bags do not endanger the security of the aircraft or its passengers. 3.4.24 In the event that a receiving State, or a State through which a diplomatic bag is transiting or transferring, has specific information that a sending State’s diplomatic bags intended for transportation on an aircraft pose a threat to the security of that aircraft or its passengers, the receiving State or the transiting or transferring State, by decision at the appropriate level, may refuse to board the diplomatic bags but shall not open or detain them. In such cases, the receiving State should so inform the embassy of  the sending State through the usual diplomatic channels. 3.4.25 States may wish to give serious consideration to applying a seal to their own diplomatic bags and requiring States that transport diplomatic bags to, from or through their territory to apply their own seal as a deterrent to tampering. 3.4.26 Receiving States may wish to inform the missions of sending States of their requirements, procedures and expectations with respect to diplomatic couriers and diplomatic bags.

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Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Art. 27(3) Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Art. 27(4) Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Art. 27(5)