Digests For Criminal Procedure PDF
October 14, 2022 | Author: Anonymous | Category: N/A
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DIGESTED CASES FOR CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Mula Iane Gem M. JD 2-2
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Tickler: Doctrine: Case Title: Facts: Issue: Ruling: ---0---
Tickler: Thiscasetalksabouthowtheplacewherethecrimewascommitteddeterminesnotonlythevenue
oftheactionbutisanessentialelementofjurisdiction. Doctrine: Jurisdiction Jurisdictionofthecourt ofthecourtisdeterminedbyt isdeterminedbytheallegationsoftheco heallegationsofthecomplaintorinformatio mplaintorinformationandonce nandonce
shown,thecourtmayvalidlytakecognizanceofthecase; Howjurisdictionattaches;Theplacewherethecrimewascommitteddeterminesnotonlythevenueofthe actionbutisanessentialelementofjurisdiction. Case Title:
ANA LOU B. NAVAJA v. MANUEL A. DE CASTRO + CASTRO + GR No. 182926, Jun 22, 2015 PERALTA, J. Facts:
The case arose from a complaint filed by private respondent DKT Philippines, Inc. Represented by Atty. Edgar Borje against petitioner Ana Lou Narvaja, alleging that while she was still its Regional Sales Manager, she falsified a receipt by making it appear that she incurred meal expenses for P1,810.00 instead of the actual amount of P810.00 at Garden Café, Jagna, Bohol, and claimed reimbursement for it. She was charged with falsification of private document before the MCTC of Jagna Bohol. Narvaja filed a motion to quash/defer arraignment on the ground that none of the essential elements of the crime of falsification of private document occurred in Jagna, Bohol, hence, MCTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case due to improper venue. MCTC denied the motion to quash. She then filed a motion for reconsideration which was also denied. She then filed a petition for certiorari before RTC for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. The court denied it for lack of legal basis or merit and that there were sufficient evidences
indicating that the falsification took place in Jagna Bohol. If the court were to follow the logic of o f the petition, her claim that her request for reimbursement was made in Cebu City not in Jagna, Bohol would likewise give no showing or indication that the falsification was done in Cebu. It would result to a “neither here nor there” situation.
Narvaja elevated the case on appeal to the CA and was also dismissed, affirming in toto the decision of the RTC. Her motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: WON the MCTC of Jagna, Bohol does not have jurisdiction over the criminal case and WON there was w as
an improper venue
Ruling:
No. Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. Under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the criminal action shall sha ll be instituted and tried in the court co urt or municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred. Based on the allegations of the complaint, the falsification of private document was actually committed in Jagna, Bohol. Guided by the settled ruled that the jurisdiction of the court is determine determined d by the allegations of the complaint or information and not by the result of proof, the court holds that Narvaja’s case falls within w ithin the
territorial jurisdiction of Jagna, Bohol.
---0--Tickler: Thiscaseisabouthowjurisdictioninacriminalactionisconferred,particularlycriminalactions
arisingfromviolationsofP.D arisingfromviolat ionsofP.D.957oth .957otherwiseknownas erwiseknownasTheSubdivisionand TheSubdivisionandCondominiumBuyers' CondominiumBuyers'Protective Protective Decree. Doctrine: Jurisdiction of the Court in Criminal Cases; Jurisdiction is conferred by law; Jurisdiction over criminalactionsarisingfromviolationsofPD957isvestedintheregularcourts. Case Title: Title:
MA. LUISA G. DAZON, PETITIONER, VS. KENNETH Y. YAP AND PEOPLE OF O F THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS GR No. 157095, Jan 15, 2010 DEL CASTILLO, J.
Facts:
Respondent Kenneth Yap was the president of Primetown Property Group, developer of Kiener Hills Mactan Condominium, a low-rise condominium project. Petitioner made a down payment with Primetown for purchase of a unit as well as several installments payments totalling to P1Million plus.
Primetown however failed to finish the condominium project. Dazon demanded the refund of her payments from Primetown, pursuant to P.D. 957 otherwise known as the SubdivisionandCondominium Buyers'ProtectiveDecree.
She then filed a criminal complaint with the office of the City Prosecutor of Lapu-Lapu City for violation of P.D. 957. Subsequently, after finding probabble cause, an information was filed with RTC of Lapu-Lapu. Meanwhile, Yap filed a petition for review with the Department of Justice wherein the trial prosecutor ordered to cause the withdrawal of the information. Hence, the prosecutor file a motion to withdraw information with the RTC. It was granted by the court and Dazon’s motion for reconsideration
was denied.
Issue: WON RTC has jurisdiction over a criminal action arising from P.D. 957 and not HLURB Ruling:
Yes. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and that there is no law expressly vesting on the Housing and Land Regulatory Board exclusive jurisdiction over criminal actions arising from violations under P.D. 957. Not having been specifically conferred with power to hear and decide cases which are criminal in nature, as well as to impose penalties, HLURB had no jurisdiction over the case. Sec. 20 of B.P. 129 vests to RTC exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, cou rt, tribunal or body except those falling un under der the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Hence, it is the RTC of Lapu-Lapu that has jurisdiction to hear and decide on the case.
---0---
Tickler: Thiscasetalk Thiscasetalksabouthowcriminalactions sabouthowcriminalactionsareinstituted,particularlyt areinstituted,particularlythosecasesreferredtoinRule hosecasesreferredtoinRule
110(b)oftheRevisedRulesofCriminalProcedure. Doctrine: Asa Asageneralrule, generalrule,acriminal acriminalactionis actioniscommencedby commencedbyacomplaint acomplaint orinformation,bothof orinformation, bothof which
arefiledincourt.Ifacomplaintisfileddirectlyincourt arefiledincourt.Ifacomplaintis fileddirectlyincourt,thesamemustbefiledbytheoffendedpa ,thesamemustbefiledbytheoffendedpartyandin rtyandin caseofaninformation,thesamemustbefiledbythefiscal.However,acomplaintfiledwiththefiscalprior toajudicialactionmaybefiledbyanyperson. Case Title:
JORGE SALAZAR, petitioner,vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent G.R. No. 149472. October 15, 2002 PUNO, J. Facts:
The accused received from Olivier Philippines and Skiva International, Inc. the amount of $41,300.00 for the sole purpose of meeting the cost of textile and labor in the manufacture of seven hundred dozen stretch twill jeans which he (accused) is duty bound to deliver to said complainant, and the accused once in possession of the same, far from complying from his obligation, with unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence and to defraud said complainant, did, then and there willfully and unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert the same for his own personal use and benefit despite repeated demands to return the said amount, failed and refused and still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of said complainant, in the aforementioned amount of $41,300.00or its equivalent in Philippine currency. Issue: WON it is necessary that the proper offended party file a complaint for purposes of preliminary
investigation by the fiscal
Ruling:
No. It is not necessary that the proper “offended party” pa rty” file a complaint for purposes of prelim inary
investigation by the fiscal —a “complaint” filed with the fiscal prior to a judicial action may be filed by any person; If a complaint is filed directly in court, the same must be filed by the offended party and in case of an information, the same must be filed by the fiscal. —The “complaint” referred to in Rule 110 contemplates one that is filed in court to commence a criminal action in those cases where a complaint of the offended party is required by law, instead of an information which is generally filed by a fiscal. It is not necessary that the proper “offended party” file a complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by the fiscal. The rule
is that unless the offense subject of the complaint is one that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, any competent person may file a complaint for preliminary investigation. Thus, as a general rule, a criminal action is commenced by a complaint or information, both of which are filed in court. If a complaint is filed directly in court, the same must be filed by the offended party and in case of an information, the same must be filed by the fiscal. However, a “complaint” filed with the fiscal prior to a judicial action may be filed
by any person. Thus, in the case at bar, the complaint was validly filed by Skiva despite the finding of the lower court that petitioner had no obligation to account to Skiva.
---0---
Tickler: ThiscasecoverstheeffectsoftheinstitutionofacriminalactionparticularlystatedinRule110,
Section1(b)oftheRevisedRulesofCriminalP Section1(b)oftheR evisedRulesofCriminalProcedureandthatthere rocedureandthatthereisnomoredistinct isnomoredistinctionbetweencases ionbetweencases unde under r the the RP RPC C an and d thos those e cover covered ed by by spec specia ial l laws laws wit with h res respe pect ct to to th the e inte interr rrup upti tion on of of the the peri period od of of prescription. Doctrine: T heinstitutionofthecr heinstitutionofthecriminalactions iminalactionshallinterruptt hallinterrupttherunningofthe herunningoftheperiodofprescript periodofprescriptionofthe ionofthe
offensechargedunlessotherwiseprovidedinspeciallaws. Itistheinstitutionofcriminalaction Itisthe institutionofcriminalactions,whetherfiledwith s,whetherfiledwiththecourtor thecourtorwiththeOfficeoftheC withtheOfficeoftheCityProsecutor, ityProsecutor, thatinterruptstheperiodofprescriptionoftheoffensecharged. Case Title:
PEOPLE v. MA. THERESA PANGILINAN + PANGILINAN + GR No. 152662, Jun 13, 2012 PEREZ, J.
Facts:
On 16 September 1997, Virginia C. Malolos filed an affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22 against Ma. Theresa Pangilinan (respondent) with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. The complaint alleges that respondent issued nine (9) checks with an aggregate amount amount of Nine Million Six Hundred Fifty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-Two Pesos (P9,658,592.00) in favor of private complainant which were dishonored upon presentment for payment. Consequently, the case was modified, and only on February 3, 2000 that two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22 were filed against respondent Ma.Theresa Pangilinan in the Metropolitan Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. City. On 17 June 2000, respondent filed an “Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest” before MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City. City. She alleged that her criminal liability liability has been
extinguished by reason of prescription. In defense of her claim, Pangilinan said that the prevailing law that governs the prescription of special penal law, B.P. 22, is Section 2 of Act No. No . 3326 (AnActToEstablishPeriodsOfPrescriptionForViolationsPenalized BySpecialActs) where the right to file an action to a “proper court” and not to merely to prosecution office for B.P. 22, prescribes four (4) years from the commission of the crime crime.. The imputed violation occurr occurred ed sometime in 1995, and only on February 3, 2000 that a case was formally filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court, therefore the action already prescribes. RTC granted the motion. On the other hand, the complainant argued that the filing with the office of city prosecutor constitutes an interruption to the prescription.
Issue: Is filing complaint to city prosecutor office considered a “judicial proceeding” that can interrupt
prescription of crime under B.P. 22, a special law?
Ruling:
YES. Following a catena of cases, the court held that, there is no more distinction between cases case s under the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and those covered by special laws with respect to the interruption of the period of prescription; that the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation in the office of prosecutor against accused interrupts the period of prescription.
Following the factual finding the crime was committed sometime in 1995, the filing of complaint on September 1997, two (2) years from the commission of the crime validly interrupts the running of prescription. Therefore, the action against the respondent Pangilinan did not prescribe.
---0--Tickler: Thiscases Thiscasespeaksabout peaksaboutthedefinitionof thedefinitionofinformationasstated informationasstatedinRule110Section inRule110Section2anditsbeing 2anditsbeingthe the
samewithorconsideredasapleading. Doctrine: Rule110, Rule110,aninformationisdefinedasan aninformationisdefinedasanaccusationinwriting accusationinwritingchargingapersonwithano chargingapersonwithanoffense, ffense,
subscribedbytheprosecutorandfiledwiththecourt. Inaccordancewiththeabovedefinit Inaccorda ncewiththeabovedefinition,itisclearthataninformat ion,itisclearthataninformationisa ionisa pleadingsincetheallegations pleadingsincetheallegations therein,whichchargeapersonwithanoffense,isbasicallythesameasacomplaintinacivilactionwhich allegesaplaintiff'scauseorcauseofaction. Case Title:
PEOPLE v. JESUS A. ARROJADO + ARROJADO + GR No. 207041, Nov 09, 2015 PERALTA, J. Facts:
Jesus Arrojado, charged with Murder in an Information filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Roxas City, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Information against him on the ground that the investigating prosecutor who filed the Information did not indicate therein the number and date of issue of her Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificate of Compliace, as required by Bar Matter No. 1922 promulgated by the Court on June 3, 2008. The Office of the City Prosecutor opposed the Motion to Dismiss, contending that 1) the Information sought to be dismissed is sufficient in form and substance; (2) the lack of proof of MCLE compliance by the prosecutor who prepared and signed the Information should not prejudice the interest of the State in filing charges against persons who have violated the law; and (3) and administrative
edict cannot prevail over substantive or procedural law, by imposing additional requirements for the sufficiency of a criminal information. The RTC dismissed the Information without prejudice. The prosecution’s motion for reconsideration was
also denied, hence the People of the Philippines filed a petition petition for certiorari and/or mandamus before the Court of Appeals. The CA, however, dismissed the petition. It held that the prosecution was not without any recourse other than a petition for certiorari/mandamus as it may simply re-file the Information as the dismissal thereof was without prejudice. Thus, the People of tthe he Philippines represented by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Roxas City filed file d the instant petition for review on certiorari to assail the CA decision. Issue: Whether or not the Motion to Dismiss the Information was proper for failure of the Investigating
Prosecutor to vindicate her MCLE Certificate of Compliance as required under Bar Matter No. 1922.
Ruling:
The petition lacks merit. Pertinent portions of B.M. No. 1922, provide as follows: The Court further Resolved, upon the recommendation of the Committee on Legal Education and Bar Matters, to REQUIRE practicing members of the bar to INDICATE in all pleadings filed before the courts or quasi-judicial bodies, the number and date of issue of their MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption, as may be applicable, for the immediately preceding compliance period. Failure to disclose the required information would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the records. xxxx Under Section 4, Rule 110 of the same Rules, an information is defined as an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the prosecutor and filed with the court. In accordance with the above definitions, it is clear that an information is a pleading since the allegations therein, which charge a person with an offense, is basically the same as a complaint in a civil action which alleges a plaintiffs cause or cause of action
As to petitioner’s contention that the failure of the i nvestigating prosecutor to indicate in the subject
Information the number and date of issue of her MCLE Certificate of Compliance is a mere formal defect and is not a valid ground to dismiss such Information, suffice it to state that B.M. No. 1922 categorically provides that “[f]ailure to disclose the required information would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the records.”
The Court agrees with the CA that the dismissal of the Information, without prejudice, did not leave the prosecution without any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. To avoid undue delay in the disposition of the subject criminal case and to uphold the parties’ respective rights to a speedy disposition of their
case, the prosecution, mindful of its duty not only to prosecute offenders but more importantly to do justice, could have simply re-filed the Information containing containing the required number and date of issue of the investigating prosecutor’s MCLE Certificate of Compliance, instead of resorting to the filing of various
petitions in court to stubbornly insist on its position and question the trial court’s dismissal of the subject Information, thereby wasting its time and effort and the State’s resources.
Even when the motion for reconsideration of the RTC Order dismissing the subject Information was filed, the required number and date of issue of the investigating prosecutor’s MCLE Certificate of Compliance
was still not included nor indicated. Thus, in the instant case, absent valid and compelling reasons, the requested leniency and liberality in the observance of procedural rules appear to be an afterthought, hence, cannot be granted. In any event, to avoid inordinate delays in the disposition of cases brought about by a counsel’s failure to
indicate in his or her pleadings the number and date of issue of his or her MCLE Certificate of Compliance, this Court issued an En Bane Resolution, dated January 14, 2014 which amended B.M. No. 1922 by repealing the phrase “Failure to disclose the required i nformation would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the records” and replacing it with “Failure to disclose the required information would subject the counsel to appropriate penalty and disciplinary action.” Thus, unde r the
amendatory Resolution, the failure of a lawyer to indicate in his or her pleadings the number and date of issue of his or her MCLE Certificate of Compliance will no longer result in the dismissal of the case and expunction of the pleadings from the records. Nonetheless, such failure will subject the lawyer to the prescribed fine and/or disciplinary action. In light of the above amendment, while the same was not yet in effect at the time that the subject Information was filed, the more prudent and practical thing that the trial court should have done in the first place, so as to avoid delay in the disposition of the case, was not to dismiss the Information but to simply require the investigating prosecutor to indicate therein the number and date of issue of her MCLE Certificate of Compliance. ---0--Tickler: Thiscasetalksabouthowcriminalcasesshouldbeconsolidatedsoasnottodefeatthepurposeof
promoting amoreexpeditiousandlessexpensiveresolutionofthecontroversyofcasesinvolvingthesame businesstransaction. Doctrine: Sec.22,Rule119oftheRulesofCourtstating:Sec.22.Consolidationoftrialsofrelatedoffenses. – Chargesforoffensesfoundedont Chargesforoffensesfoundedonthesamefacts hesamefactsorformingpartofa orformingpartofaseriesofoffenses seriesofoffensesofsimilarchar ofsimilarcharacter acter
maybetriedjointlyatthediscretionofthecourt. Case Title:
ROMULO L. NERI v. SANDIGANBAYAN + SANDIGANBAYAN + GR No. 202243, Aug 07, 2013 VELASCO JR., J. Facts:
Petitioner Romulo L. Neri (Neri) served as Director General of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) during the administration of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. In connection with the botched Philippine-ZTE National Broadband Network (NBN) Project, the Ombudsman filed two criminal information, the first against Abalos, and the second against Neri. The Office of the Special
Prosecutor then moved for the two cases’ consolidation, to promote a more expeditious and less expensive
resolution of the controversy of cases involving the same business transaction. Issue: WON Consolidation of the two cases is proper. Ruling:
NO. Consolidation is a procedural device granted to the court as an aid in deciding how cases in its docket are to be tried so that the business of the court may be dispatched expeditiously while providing justice to the parties. Toward this end, consolidation and a single trial of several cases in the court's docket or consolidation of issues within those cases are permitted by the rules. The term "consolidation" is used in three (3) different senses or concepts, thus: a (1)Where all except one of several actions are stayed until one is tried, in which case the judgment [in one] trial is conclusive as to the others. This is not actually consolidation but is referred to as such. (quasi consolidation) (2)Where several actions are combined into one, lose their separate identity, and become a single action in which a single judgment is rendered. This is illustrated by a situation where several actions are pending between the same parties stating claims which might have been set out originally in one complaint. (actual consolidation) (3)Where several actions are ordered to be tried together but each retains its separate character and requires the entry of a separate judgment. This type of consolidation does not merge the suits into a single action, a ction, or cause the parties to one action to be parties to the other. (consolidation for trial). To be sure, consolidation, as taken in the above senses, is allowed, as Rule 31 of the Rules of Court is entitled "Consolidation or Severance." And Sec. 1 of Rule 31 provides: Section 1.Consolidation. – When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay. The counterpart, but narrowed, rule for criminal cases is found in Sec. 22, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court stating: Sec. 22.Consolidation of trials of related offenses. – Charges for offenses founded on the same facts or forming part of a series of offenses offens es of similar character may be tried jointly at the discretion of the court. As complemented by Rule XII, Sec. 2 of the Sandiganbayan Revised Internal Rules which states: Section 2.Consolidation of Cases. – Cases arising from the same incident or series of incidents, or involving common questions of fact fa ct and law, may be consolidated in the Division to which the case cas e bearing the lowest docket number is raffled. The prosecution anchored its motion for consolidation partly on the aforequoted Sec. 22 of Rule 119 which indubitably speaks of a joint trial.||| Joint trial is permissible "where the [actions] arise from the same act, a ct, event or transaction, involve the same or like issues, iss ues, and depend largely or substantially subs tantially on the same evidence, provided that the court has jurisdiction over the cases to be consolidated and that a joint trial will not give one party an undue advantage or prejudice the substantial rights of any of the parties." More elaborately, joint trial is proper where the offenses charged are similar, related, or connected, or are of the same or similar character or class, or involve or arose out of the same or related or connected acts, occurrences, transactions, series of events, or chain of circumstances, or are based on acts or transactions constituting parts of a common scheme or plan, or are of the same pattern and committed in the same manner, or where there is a common element of substantial importance in their commission, or where whe re the same, or much the same, evidence will be competent and admissible or required in their prosecution, and
if not joined for trial the repetition or reproduction of substantially the same testimony will be required on each trial. Criminal prosecutions primarily revolve around proving beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the elements of the crime charged. As such, they mainly involve questions of fact. There is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises from the truth or the falsity of the allegations of facts. Put a bit differently, it exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the inquiry invites calibration of the whole gamut of evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation. A consolidation of the Neri case to that of Abalos would expose petitioner Neri to testimonies which have no relation whatsoever in the case against him and the lengthening of the legal dispute thereby delaying the resolution of his case. Consolidation here he re would force petitioner to await the conclusion of testimonies against Abalos, however irrelevant or immaterial as to him (Neri) before the case against a gainst the latter may be resolved – a needless, hence, oppressive delay in the resolution of the criminal case against him. ---0--Tickler: Thiscased Thiscasediscussesthatanamendment iscussesthatanamendmentorchangeofthetimeofthecommission orchangeofthetimeofthecommissionofthecrime,when ofthecrime,when
thedisparityisnotsogreat,isonlyaformalamendmentintheinformat thedisparityisnotso great,isonlyaformalamendmentintheinformation.Aformalamendmentdoesnot ion.Aformalamendmentdoesnot requireasubsequentarraignmentasthepurposeofwhichistoINFORMTHENATUREANDCAUSEOFTHE ACCUSATION. Doctrine: Sec.14, Sec.14,Rule110oftheRevised Rule110oftheRevisedRulesonCrimin RulesonCriminalProced alProcedureprovide ureprovidesthat, sthat,“[a]complain “[a]complaintoran toran
Informationmaybeamended,informorinsubstance,withoutleaveofcourt,atanytimebeforetheaccused entershisplea.Afterthepleaandduringtrial,aformalamendmentmayonlybedonewithleaveofcourt andwhenitcanbedonewithoutcausingprejudicetotherightsoftheaccused.” Case Title:
LETICIA I. KUMMER v. PEOPLE + PEOPLE + GR No. 174461, Sep 11, 2013 2 013 BRION, J. Facts:
On one fateful night, the evidence of the prosecution reveals, Johan Kummer, a minor, the son of Leticia Kummer, shot a certain Jesus Mallo, Jr. According to the eyewitness, Amiel Malana, he and Jesus Mallo went to the house of Kummer's. Jesus knocked on the door of the Kummer’s house, declaring that he is “Boy Mallo”. Then, according to the testimonies of Malana, Johan shot Mallo dead with a shotgun. Being a
minor, Johan was released at the cognizance of his father. Then he left the country without notifying the court. In defense, Leticia Kummer produced another version of the story which shows that they were sleeping innocently in their house on that fateful night, when there was a commotion outside their house, admitting however that, when they were practically disturbed by the said commotion, com motion, Johan got a shotgun and fired outside their house, without intention to kill or injure anybody, especially Jesus. An Information was filed with the Court on January 12, 1989, which was later on modified. modifie d. This modification was about the date of the commission of the crime. The modification, however, happened after she was arraigned. The RTC convicted her and Johan, who was out of the Philippine Legal System’s reach. She a ppealed the case
to the CA, which was denied and affirmed the RTC's decision, arguing, among others, that by virtue of the amendment of the Information, she should have been arraigned again; and, since she was not, there was a blatant violation of her right righ t to be informed of the nature of her case, since an amended Information is a new Information. Hence, all proceedings which the case had undergone were void Issue: Does she have to be arraigned again? Ruling:
No. She does not have to be arraigned again. Note that only the date was amended. Sec. 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that, “[a] complaint or an Information may be amended,
in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during trial, a formal amendment may only be done with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.” Accordingly, a change in time in the c ommission of the crime, when the disparity is not so great, is only a formal amendment. In view of the foregoing, the amendment was from “July” to “June” can only be reg regarded arded as formal amendment. Moreover, it does not
and could not prejudice the rights of the accused, because (1) it does not change the nature of the crime, and (2) it does not render the defenses prepared for the former Information as it stood invalid. Having said all these, a formal amendment does not require a subsequent arraignment as the purpose of which is to INFORM THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION. Since the nature and cause of the accusation are not changed by a formal amendment, a re-arraignment is not necessary, as she was already informed of these things. Hence, there has been no violation of her rights as accused. Hence, she does not have to be arraigned again. ---0--Tickler: Thiscasetalksabo Thiscasetalksabouthowcriminalactions uthowcriminalactionsareenjoinedsubjecttocertainexceptionsaspro areenjoinedsubjecttocertainexceptionsasprovidedby videdby
theRulesofCourt. Doctrine: Criminalprosecutionsmaynotberestrained,eitherthroughapreliminaryorfinalinjunctionora
writofprohibition,exceptint writofpro hibition,exceptinthefollowinginstances:(1) hefollowinginstances:(1)Toaffordadequateprotect Toaffordadequateprotectiontotheconstitu iontotheconstitutional tional rightsoftheaccused;(2)Whennecessaryfortheorderlyadministrationofjusticeortoavoidoppressionor multiplicityofactions;(3)Whenthereisaprejudicialquestionwhichissub-judice;(4)Whentheactsofthe officerarewithoutorinexcessofauthority;(5)Wheretheprosecutionisunderaninvalidlaw,ordinanceor officerarewithoutorinexcessofauthority;(5)Wherethepros ecutionisunderaninvalidlaw,ordinanceor regulation;(6)Whendoublejeopardyisclearlyapparent;(7)WheretheCourthasnojurisdictionoverthe offense;(8)Whereitisacaseofpersecutionratherthanprosecu offense;(8)Whereitisacaseofpersecut ionratherthanprosecution;(9)Wherethechargesaremanifestly tion;(9)Wherethechargesaremanifestly falseandmotivatedb falseand motivatedbylust ylustforvengeanc forvengeance;(10) e;(10)Whenthere Whenthereisclearly isclearlyno noprimafacie primafaciecaseaga caseagainstt insttheacc heaccused used andamotiontoquashonthatgroundhasbeendenied;(11)Preliminaryinjunctionhasbeenissuedbythe SupremeCourttopreventthethreatenedunlawfularrestofpetitioners.” Case Title:
DIRECTOR GUILLERMO T. DOMONDON, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 129904. March 16, 2000 BUENA, J. Facts:
On February and May 1994, four separate information were filed at the Sandiganbayan against certain officials of the Philippine National Police due to the discovery of a chain of irregularities within the PNP Commands. The petitioner was included as an accused on account of his approval of the Advice Allotment in the amount of P5M and P15M respectively which amounts to a violation of the AntiGraft Law und under er Sec 3 of RA 3019. On May 17, 1994, the Sandiganbayan issued 2 orders, the first was ordering the prosecution to demonstrate probable complicity in the transaction described in the information and the second order was deferring action on the motion for consolidation considering the uncertainty of the Court in proceeding the case at this time and considering that only one of the 15 accused filed a motion for consolidation. A Motion to Admit Amended Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan on August 26, 1997 and included petitioner as they were recommended for further prosecution by the Ombudsman. Petitioner alleges that respondents Desierto, Villa and Tamayo acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion for consolidation, claiming that since all of the pertinent cases have been remanded by the Sandiganbayan to the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the Office of the Ombudsman for reinvestigation, "jurisdiction has reverted" in the latter and "…it is grave abuse of discretion to refuse to perform the duty of consolidating these cases. Issue: Whether or not Sandiganbayan should be enjoined from proceeding with the hearing and other
incidents of Criminal Case No. 20574 against the petitioner during the pendency of the petition. Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court held that the contentions of the petitioner are untenable. The Court explained : “Well settled is the rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained, either thr ough a preliminary or final injunction or a writ of prohibition, except in the following instances: (1) To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (2) When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; (3) When there is a prejudicial question which is sub-judice; (4) When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (5) Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (6) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (7) Where the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (8) Where it i t is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; (9) Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by lust for vengeance; (10) When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash quas h on that ground has been denied; ella (11) Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners.”
Corollary to the rule, the courts cannot interfere with the discretion of the fiscal or Ombudsman to determine the specificity and adequacy of the averments of the offense charged. He may dismiss the complaint forthwith if he finds it to be insufficient in form or substance or if he otherwise finds no ground to continue with the inquiry; or he may proceed with the investigation if the complaint is, in his view, in due and proper form. However, while the Ombudsman has the full discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed, this Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman’s action when there is an abuse of
discretion, by way of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Thus, we proceed to determine whether the respondents Ombudsman Desierto and Overall Deputy Ombudsman Villa acted with grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Such arbitrariness or despotism does not obtain here. With regard to
responde nts’ denial of petitioner’s motion for consolidation of Crim. Case No. 20574 with Crim. Case Nos. 20185, 20191, 20192, 20576 and 22098, we find the same to be well well-founded. -founded. While the Ombudsman has full discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in the Sandiganbayan, once the case has been filed with said court, it is the Sandiganbayan, and no longer the Ombudsman, which has full control of the case so much so that the information may not be dismissed, or in the instant case, may not be consolidated with other pending cases, without the approval of the said court. Thus, the Court dismissed the petition for prohibition and prayer for issuance of preliminary injunction to nullify the order of the Ombudsman. ---0--Tickler: Thi Thiscaseclear scaseclearly ly explai explainsthat nsthat Jur Jurisd isdict iction ion over over thesubject thesubject matter matter ina cri crimina minal l case case cannot cannot be
conferreduponthecourtbytheaccused,byexpresswaiverorotherwise.Thatjurisdictionisconferredby thesovereignauthoritythato thesovereignau thoritythatorganizedthecourta rganizedthecourtandisgivenonlybyla ndisgivenonlybylawinthemann winthemannerandform erandformprescribed prescribed bylaw. Doctrine: Inc Incriminalcases, riminalcases,venueisju venueisjurisdictional.A risdictional.Acourt courtcannotexercisejurisd cannotexercisejurisdictionovera ictionoverapersonch personcharged arged
withanoffensecommittedoutsideitslimitedterritory. Inacriminalcase,theprosecutionmustnotonlyprovethattheoffensewascommitted,itmustalsoprove theidentityoftheaccusedandthefactthattheoffensewascommittedwithinthejurisdictionofthecourt. Case Title:
HECTOR TREAS, Petitioner, versus PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. G. R. No. 195002 SERENO, J. Facts:
A house-and-lot in Iloilo City covered by TCT No. 109266 and availed the services of he herein rein petitioner, Atty. Hector Treas (Hector) regarding the transfer of the title in the Former’s name. Hector informed Elizabeth that for the titling of the property in the name of her aunt Margarita, the following expenses would be incurred: 1)P20,000.00- Attorneys fees; 2) P90,000.00-Capital Gains Tax; 3) P24,000.00- Documentary Stamp, and 4) P10,000.00- Miscellaneous Expenses. Thereafter, Elizabeth gave P150,000.00 to Hector who issued a corresponding receipt dated December 22, 1999 and prepared [a] Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage. Subsequently, Hector gave Elizabeth Revenue Official Receipts with official receipt nos. covering P96,000.00 and P24,000.00. However, she was informed by the BIR that the receipts were fake. Hector admitted to her that the receipts were fake and that he used the P120,000.00 for his other transactions. To settle his accounts, Hector issued in favor of Elizabeth a Bank of Commerce check dated November 10, When 2000 the in the amount of P120,000.00, deductingMakati from Branch, P150,000.00 the was P30,000.00 as attorneys fees. check was deposited with the PCIBank, the same dishonored
for the reason that the account was closed. Notwithstanding, repeated formal and verbal demands, appellant failed to pay. Thus, the instant case of Estafa was filed against him. An information was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor before the RTC, both of Makati which reads: “That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1999, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, C ourt, the above-named accused, received in trust from ELIZABETH LUCIAJA the amount of P150,000.00” During arraignment, petitioner, entered a plea of Not Guilty. And due
to old age and poor health, and the fact that he lives in Iloilo City, petitioner was unable to attend the pretrial and trial of the case. On 8 January 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime of Estafa. Hector appealed before the CA but the CA affirmed the RTC’s decision. Aggrieved, Hector appealed before
the Supreme Court and asserts that nowhere in the evidence presented by the prosecution does it show that ₱150,000 was given to and received by petitioner in Makati City. Instead, the evidence shows that the
Receipt issued by petitioner for the money indicates only date, without any indication of the place where it was issued. Petitioner claims that the only logical conclusion is that the money was actually delivered to him in Iloilo City, especially since his residence and office were situated there as well. Thus, the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case.
Issue: Can the Regional Trial Court of Makati acquire acqu ire jurisdiction over the crime of estafa which the
prosecution failed to allege any of the acts material to such crime had occurred in Makati City?
Ruling:
No. The accused is correct in his argument that he is not required to present evidence to prove lack of jurisdiction when such lack lack is already indicated in the prosecution evid evidence. ence. As a settled principle in criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. A court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense committed outside its limited territory. As explained in the case of Isip v. People, the place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been commit committed ted or any one of its essential ingredients should have h ave taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the the court has jurisdiction jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person pe rson charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. Moreover, Section 15 (a) of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure of 2000 provides that subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense offen se was committed or where any of its
essential ingredients occurred. Hence, jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign authority that organized the court and is given only by law in the manner and form prescribed by law. This Court consistently rules that it is unfair to require a defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense or it is not the court of proper venue. In a criminal case, the prosecution must not only prove that the offense was committed, it must also prove the identity of the accused and the fact that the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of the court. There is nothing in the documentary evidence offered by the prosecution that points to where the offense, or any of its elements, was committed. A review of the testimony of Elizabeth also shows that there was no mention of the place pla ce where the offense was allegedly committed. Although the prosecution alleged that the check issued by petitioner was dishonored in a bank in Makati, such dishonor is not an element of the offense of estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC. There being no showing that the offense was committed within Makati, the RTC of that city has no jurisdiction over the case. ---0--Tickler: Thecasediscusseshowjurisdictionofthecourtisacquiredovercriminalcasesinvolvingcontinuing
ortransitorycrimes,particularlyB.P.22cases. Doctrine: Apersonchargedwithacontinuingortrans Apersonchargedwithacontinuingortransitorycrimemaybe itorycrimemaybevalidlytriedinanymunicipalityor validlytriedinanymunicipalityor territorywheretheoffensewasinpa territorywheret heoffensewasinpartcommitted.App rtcommitted.Applyingtheseprinciples,a lyingtheseprinciples,acriminalcasefor criminalcaseforviolationof violationof
BP22maybefiledinanyoftheplaceswhereanyofitselementsoccurred – inparticular,theplacewhere inparticular,theplacewhere thecheckisdrawn,issued,delivered,ordishonored. Case Title:
ARMILYN MORILLO v. PEOPLE PEOPLE + GR No. 198270, Dec 09, 2015 PERALTA, J. Facts:
Sometime in July 2003, respondent Richard Natividad, Milo Malong and Bing Nanquil, introducing themselves as contractors doing business in Pampanga City under the name and style of RB Custodio Construction, purchased construction materials for their project inside the Subic Freeport Zone from petitioner Armilyn Morillo, owner of Amasea General Merchandize and Construction Supplies. The parties agreed that twenty percent (20%) of the purchases shall be paid within seven (7) days after the first de delivery livery and the remaining eighty percent (80%) to be paid within thirty-five (35) days after the last delivery, all of which shall be via postdated checks. Pursuant to the agreement, petitioner delivered construction materials amounting to a total of P500,054.00 at the construction site where respondent and his partners were undertaking their project. After the last delivery, respondent paid P20,000.00 in cash and issued two (2) post-dated checks, drawn from Metrobank, Pampanga branch, in the amounts of P393,000.00 and P87,054.00. Upon maturity,
petitioner attempted to deposit the checks in her savings account at Equitable PCI Bank, San Lorenzo, Makati City. They were, however, dishonored by the drawee bank. Immediately thereafter, petitioner communicated the dishonor to respondent and his partners and demanded for payment. Again, respondent issued two (2) post-dated Metrobank checks and assured petitioner that they will be honored upon maturity. Upon deposit in her savings account at Equitable PCI Bank, Makati Branch, the checks were once again dishonored for the reason that the account from which they were drawn was already a closed account. Consequently, petitioner made several demands from respondent and his partners, but to no avail, prompting her to file a complaint with the City Prosecution Office, Makati City. Thus, on August 12, 2004, two (2) Informations were filed against respondent and Milo Malong.
Issue: Whether or not MeTC of Makati City has ha s jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling:
Yes. It is well settled that violation of BP 22 cases is categorized as transitory or continuing crimes, which means that the acts material and essential thereto occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another. Accordingly, the court wherein any of the crime’s essential and material acts have been
committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it i t being understood that the first court taking cognizance co gnizance of the same excludes the other. Stated differently, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed. Applying these principles, a criminal case for violation of BP 22 may be filed in any of the places where any of its elements occurred – in particular, the place where the check is drawn, issued, delivered, or dishonored. Guided by the foregoing pronouncements, there is no denying, therefore, that the court of the place where the check was deposited or presented for encashment; can be vested wi with th jurisdiction to try cases involving violations of BP 22. Thus, Thu s, the fact that the check subject of the instant case was drawn, issued, and delivered in Pampanga does not strip off the Makati MeTC of its jurisdiction over the instant ins tant case for it is undisputed that the subject check was deposited and presented for encashment at the Makati Branch of Equitable PC IBank. The MeTC of Makati, therefore, correctly took cognizance of the instant case and rendered its decision in the proper exercise of its jurisdiction. First of all, the Court stresses that the appellate court’s dismissal of the case is not an acquittal of
respondent. Basic is the rule that a dismissal of a case is different from an acquittal acqui ttal of the accused therein. Except in a dismissal based on a Demurrer to Evidence filed by the accused, or for violation of the right of the accused to a speedy trial, the dismissal of a criminal case against the accused will not result in his acquittal. In the oft-cited People v. Salico, the Court explained: This argument or reasoning is predicated on a confusion of the legal concepts of dismissal dism issal and acquittal. Acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted because the evid ence does not show that defendant’s guilt is beyond a reasonable doubt; but dismissal di smissal does not decide the case on the merits or that the defendant iiss not guilty. Dismissal terminates the proceeding, either because the court is not a court of competent jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or information is not valid or sufficient in form and substance, etc.
The only case in which the word dismissal is commonly but not correctly used, instead of the proper term acquittal, is when, after the prosecution has presented all its: evidence, the defendant moves for the dismissal and the court dismisses the ease on the ground that the evidence fails to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant defenda nt is guilty; for in such case the dis dismissal missal is in reality an acquittal because the case is decided on the merits. If the prosecution fails to prove that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court and the case is i s dismissed, the dismissal is not an acquittal, a cquittal, inasmuch as if it were so the defendant could not be again prosecuted before the court of competent jurisdiction; and it is elemental that in such case, the defendant may again be prosecuted for the same offense before a court of competent jurisdiction. Thus, when the appellate court herein dismissed the instant case on the ground that the MeTC lacked jurisdiction over the offense charged, it did not decide the same on the merits, let l et alone alon e resolve the issue of respondent’s guilt or innocence based on the evidence proffered by the prosecution. The appellate court
merely dismissed the case on the erroneous reasoning that none of the elements of BP 22 was committed within the lower court’s jurisdiction, and not because of any finding that the evidence failed to show respondent’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Clearly, therefore, such dismissal did not operate as an
acquittal, which, as previously discussed, may be repudiated only by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, showing a grave abuse of discretion. Thus, petitioner’s resort to Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court cannot be struck down as improper. In a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, the parties raise only questions of law because the Court, in its exercise of its power of review, is not a trier of facts. There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law la w is on certain state of facts and which does not call for an existence of the probative value of the evidence presented by the partieslitigants. In the instant case; the lone issue invoked by petitioner is precisely “whether the Court of Appeals erred
when it ruled that the Metropolitan Trial Court Co urt of Makati City did not have jurisdiction over the case despite clear showing that the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of said court.” Evidently, therefore,
the instant petition was filed within the bounds of our procedural rules for the issue herein rests solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances insofar as the commi commission ssion of the crime of BP 22 is concerned. In criminal cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the averments of the complaint or Information, in relation to the law prevailing at the time of the filing of the complaint or Information, and the penalty provided by law for the crime charged at the time of its commission. Thus, when a case involves a proper interpretation of the rules and jurisprudence with respect to the jurisdiction of courts to entertain complaints filed therewith, it deals with a question of law that can be properly brought to this Court under Rule 45.
---0--Tickler: Thoughasageneralrule,rulesofproceduresareliberallyconstrued,theprovisionswithrespectto
therulesonthemannerandperiodsforperfectingappealsarestrictlyappliedandareonlyrelaxedinvery exceptionalcircumstancesonequitableconsiderations,whicharenotpresentintheinstantcase. Doctrine: Theperfectionof Theperfectionofanappealwithintheperiod anappealwithintheperiodandinthemannerpr andinthemannerprescribedbylawis escribedbylawisjurisdictional jurisdictional
andnoncompliancewithsuch andnoncompliance withsuchrequirementsisc requirementsisconsideredfat onsideredfatalandhas alandhastheeffectof theeffectofrenderingthej renderingthejudgment udgment finalandexecutory.
Case Title:
FELY Y. YALONG, Petitioner , v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND LUCILA C. YLAGAN, Respondents. G.R. No. 187174, August 28, 2013 PERLAS-BERNABE, J. Facts:
Respondent Ylagan filed a criminal complaint against Petitioner Yalong for the crime of violation of BP 22. Upon arraignment, Yalong pleaded not guilty to the said charge. The case was then set for pre-trial and therafter, trial ensued. During the trial, Ylagan testifies that Yalong borrowed from her 450,000 with a verbal agreement that the same would be paid back to her in cash, and as payment therof, issued to her a postdated check in the similar amount. amoun t. However, when Ylagan presented the subject check for payment, it was dishonored and returned to her for the reason of “Account Closed”. After several demands from
Yalong, Ylagan filed the instant case. Yalong averred that she already paid the said loan but did not require Ylagan to issue a receipt or acknowledge the same. She also claimed that the subject check belonged to her husband and that while she knew that the said check did not cover sufficient funds, it was alrea already dy signed by her husband when she handed it to Ylagan. The MTCC found Yalong guilty. A motion for reconsideration was denied. She then filed a notice of appeal which was also denied on the ground that Yalong had lost the remedies available to her under the law when she failed to appear without justifiable reason at the scheduled promulgation of the MTCC Decision, she did not surrender within 15 days from the date of such promulgation, she did not file a motion for leave of court to avail of the remedies under the law, and she remained at large. She filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied. Aggrieved, Yalong filed a Petition for Certiorari with Petition for Bail (certiorari petition) before the RTC which denied the petition. The CA dismissed the subject sub ject petition for review on the ground that the order of the RTC was issued in the exercise of its original jurisdiction – where appeal [by filing a notice of appeal with the RTC] – and not a petition for review is the proper remedy. reme dy. Yalong filed a motion for reconside reconsideration ration which was, however, denied. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the CA properly dismissed the subject petition for review on the ground of
improper appeal.
Ruling:
No. While the Rules of Court do not specifically state that the inappropriate filing of a petition for review instead of a required notice of appeal is dismissible, Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules nonetheless provides that appeals to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal app eal with the latter court. It is fundamental that a petition for certiorari is an original ori ginal action and, as such, it cannot be gainsaid that the RTC took cognizance of and resolved the aforesaid petition in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. Hence, Yalong should have filed a notice of appeal with the RTC instead of a petition for review with the CA.
As a consequence of Yalong’s failure to file a notic e of appeal with the RTC within the proper reglementary
period, the RTC Decision had attained finality which thereby bars Yalong from further contesting the same. Verily, jurisprudence dictates that the perfection of an appeal within the period and in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional and noncompliance with such requirements is considered fatal and has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory. To be sure, the rules on appeal must be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable to forestall or avoid unreasonable delays in the administration of justice, to ensure an orderly discharge of judicial business, and to put an end to controversies. Though as a general rule, rules of procedures are liberally construed, the provisions with respect to the rules on the manner and periods for perfecting appeals are strictly applied and are only relaxed in very exceptional circumstances on equitable considerations, which are not present in the instant case. As it stands, the subject petition for review was the wrong remedy and perforce was properly dismissed by the CA.
---0--Tickler: This Thiscasetalksabout casetalksaboutthe theprop propervenueof ervenueofcrimi criminalactio nalactions,part ns,particular icularlywherethecrimeisperjury lywherethecrimeisperjury
andthefalsedeclarationsintheCertificateagainstForumShoppingweremadebeforeanotarypublicin MakatiCity,despiteknowledgethatthematerialstatementssubscribedandsworntowereuntrue. MakatiCity,despiteknowledgethatthematerialstatementssubscribedandsworntowereuntrue. Doctrine: Rule110,Sec.15oftheRulesofCourt;Criminalactionshallbeinstitutedwheretheoffensewas
committed
or
where
any
of
its
essential
elements
occurred.
Case Title:
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and DESI TOMAS, versus PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 192565, February 28, 2012 BRION, J.
Facts:
Desi Tomas was charged with perjury for making a false narration in a Certificate against Forum Shopping. It was alleged that Tomas stated under oath that the Union Bank of the Philippines has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in another tribunal or agency aside from that which is filed before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for the collection of sum of money with prayer of writ of replevin filed against Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe. Tomas filed a motion to quash arguing that the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City does not have jurisdiction over the case case as, though it was notarized in Makati, Makati, the Certificate Certificate against Forum Shopping was used or submitted before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City.
Issue: Whether or not the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City has jurisdiction over the case at bar.
Ruling:
Tomas’ deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was allegedly shown when she made the false
declarations in the Certificate against Forum Shopping before a notary public in Makati City, despite her knowledge that the material statements she subscribed and swore to were not true. Thus, Makati City is the proper venue and MeTC-Makati MeTC -Makati City is the proper court to try the perjury case against Tomas, pursuant to Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as all the essential elements constituting the crime of perjury were committed commi tted within the territorial jurisdiction of Makati City, not Pasay City .
---0---
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