September 9, 2017 | Author: kalumyari | Category: Burden Of Proof (Law), Witness, Testimony, Comparative Law, Legal Procedure
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People vs. Delos Santos Manuel vs. People People vs. Cabarreo People vs. Pilolan Velasco vs. People Vateros vs. People Rivera vs. People Valenzuela vs. People People vs. Fabron People vs. Gelong People vs. Antonio People vs. Mariano People vs. Kiron People vs. Delos Santos

GR No. 135919 GR No. 165842 GR No. 138645 GR No. 121828 GR No. 166479 GR No. 138033 GR No. 166326 GR No. 160188 GR No. 114261 GR No. 124871 GR No. 128900 GR No. 134847 GR No. 149259

May 09, 2003 Nov 29, 2005 Jan 16, 2001 Jan 27, 2003 Feb 28, 2006 Feb 22, 2006 Jan 25, 2006 June 21, 2007 Feb 10, 2000 May 13, 2004 July 14, 2000 Dec 6, 2000 Oct 20, 2005

GR No. 135919 May 09, 2003 Supreme Court Reports Annotated People, appellee, vs. Danny Delos Santos, appellant 403 SCRA 153, GR No. 135919, May 9, 2003

Facts:On November 1997, De Leon witnessed the gruesome killing of Flores, while drinking with 3 men, one was the witness Tablate. The two were positive of Delos Santos as the perpetrator but testified only on January 1998. Despite Delos Santos’s alibi, he was found guilty of murder. Issue: WON the testimonies of the witnesses are credible even after the 2-monthperiod Held: Yes. It is but natural for witnesses to avoid being involved in a criminal proceeding particularly when the crime committed is of such gravity as to show the cruelty of the perpetrator, the fear of retaliation can have a paralyzing effect to the witnesses. Besides, settled is the rule that positive identification x x x prevails over alibi and denial. Decision is affirmed with modification. Manuel vs. People GR No. 165842 Nov 29, 2005 EDUARDO P. MANUEL, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent G.R. No. 165842 November 29, 2005 FACTS:This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, convicting the petitioner for the crime of bigamy. Eduardo P. Manuel, herein petitioner, was first married to Rubylus Gaña on July 18, 1975, who, according to the former, was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned and was never seen again by him after his last visit. Manuel met Tina B. Gandalera in January 1996 when the latter was only 21 years old. Three months after their meeting, the two got married through a civil wedding in Baguio City without Gandalera’s knowledge of Manuel’s first marriage. In the course of their marriage, things got rocky and Gandalera learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when he married him. She then filed a criminal case of bigamy against Eduardo Manuel. The latter’s defense being that his declaration of “single” in his marriage contract with Gandalera was done because he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid and that he did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina. The Regional Trial Court ruled against him sentencing him of imprisonment of from 6 years and 10 months to ten years, and an amount 0f P200,000.00 for moral damages. Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA where he alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any malicious intent. The CA

ruled against the petitioner but with modification on the RTC’s decision. Imprisonment was from 2 years, months and 1 day to ten years. Pecuniary reward for moral damages was affirmed. Hence, this petition. Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA where he alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any malicious intent. The CA ruled against the petitioner but with modification on the RTC’s decision. Imprisonment was from 2 years, months and 1 day to ten years. Pecuniary reward for moral damages was affirmed. Issue: WON the petitioner has criminal intent to contract on the second marriage to be liable for bigamy? HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that the prosecution proved that the petitioner was married to Gaña in 1975, and such marriage was not judicially declared a nullity; hence, the marriage is presumed to subsist. The prosecution also proved that the petitioner married the private complainant in 1996, long after the effectivity of the Family Code. The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married the private complainant in 1996, he was of the well-grounded belief that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than 20 years since 1975. He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the presumptive death of his first wife as required by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code. Such judicial declaration also constitutes proof that the petitioner acted in good faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part when he married the private complainant and, as a consequence, he could not be held guilty of bigamy in such case. The petitioner, however, failed to discharge his burden. Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent. Indeed, a felony cannot exist without intent. Since a felony by dolo is classified as an intentional felony, it is deemed voluntary. Although the words "with malice" do not appear in Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, such phrase is included in the word "voluntary." Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act without legal excuse or justification from which another suffers injury. When the act or omission defined by law as a felony is proved to have been done or committed by the accused, the law presumes it to have been intentional. Indeed, it is a legal presumption of law that every man intends the natural or probable consequence of his voluntary act in the absence of proof to the contrary, and such presumption must prevail unless a reasonable doubt exists from a consideration of the whole evidence People vs. Cabareneo GR No. 138645 Jan 16, 2001 People vs. Pilolan

GR No. 121828

Jan 27, 2003

Velasco vs. People

GR No. 166479

Feb 28, 2006

Vateros vs. People

GR No. 138033

Feb 22, 2006

Rivera vs. People

GR No. 166326

Jan 25, 2006

Valenzuela vs. People

GR No. 160188

June 21, 2007

People vs. Fabron

GR No. 114261

Feb 10, 2000

People vs. Gelong

GR No. 124871 May 13, 2004 Supreme Court Reports Annotated People, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Marife Bello (Joann Redillo), Eladio Consuelo,accused-appellants 428 SCRA 388, GR No. 124871, May 13, 2004 Facts: Accused Bello and Eladio were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide. Accused were arrested singly after renting a room at a lodge wherein a man, a messenger/collector in a moneychanger, was found stabbed and dead. There were no actual witnesses to the actual commission of the crime so the prosecution built its case through circumstantial evidence. Issue: WON it can be proved that conspiracy exists. Held: Yes. Conspiracy exists where the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the crime and decide to pursue it. Consequently, direct proof is not essential to establish it. It may be inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together, indicate that accused are parts of the complete plan to commit the crime. People vs. Antonio GR No. 128900 July 14, 2000 People vs. Antonio (G.R. No. 128900) Facts: On November 2, 1996, what should have been an amiable game of cards between two erstwhile friends turned into a deadly confrontation resulting in the fatal shooting of one by the hand of the other. The victim, Arnulfo “Arnie” Tuadles, a former professional basketball player, succumbed instantaneously to a single gunshot wound. Convicted of murder by the trial court as the killer is Alberto “Ambet” S. Antonio, a one-time chairman of GAB. It was during his stint as such that he and Tuadles became socially acquainted. They somehow lost touch, but later became reacquainted when they both started frequenting the International Business Club (IBC. Often, the two would meet with other members and friends to play cards in the gameroom at the second floor of the club. Their preferred games were poker or “pusoy dos”, ordinary poker or Russian poker. Their bets always ran into the tens of thousands of pesos. The tragic events began to unravel in the final hours of November 1, 1996. Antonio, Tuadles, and a certain Danny Debdani, then president of the IBC, had agreed to meet at the club for another poker session, their third night in a row. Antonio arrived at the club first, followed by Tuadles at around midnight. Debdani, however, failed to appear, so after waiting for sometime, Antonio and Tuadles decided to play “pusoy dos”, a game for two (2) players only. They continued playing until morning, pausing only when either of them had to visit the restroom. They stopped playing at around 9:00 o’clock in the morning of November 2, 1996, to eat breakfast. When it came time to tally their scores and collect the winnings from the loser, an argument arose. It is at this point where the prosecution and the defense presented two very different scenarios. The prosecution alleged and sought to prove that in the course of an argument, without warning or cause, Antonio pulled his gun from behind his back and shot Tuadles at very close range, thus employing treacherous means to accomplish the nefarious deed. The pivotal evidence presented by the prosecution was the testimony of one Jose Jimmy T. Bobis, a security guard who testified as to how the shooting of Tuadles occurred. On the other hand, the defense hinged its opposing arguments on the testimony of accused Antonio himself, who testified that their argument was caused by Tuadles’ refusal to pay Antonio’s winnings. In the middle of a heated altercation where they traded expletives, Tuadles suddenly grabbed Antonio’s gun from atop a sidetable. Fearing for his life, Antonio claimed that he reached for Tuadles’ hand and they grappled for possession of the gun. Antonio alleged that the shooting was accidental, and his only motivation was to defend himself. Issue: Whether or not Nieto is liable as an accessory. Held: The Revised Penal Code in Article 19 defines an accessory as one who has knowledge of the commission of the crime, yet did not take part in its commission as principal or accomplice, but took part in it subsequent to its commission by any of three modes: (1) profiting himself or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime; (2) concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof in order to prevent its discovery; and (3) harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public

functions or when the offender is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. Under Article 19(3) of the RPC, there are two (2) classes of accessories, one of which is a public officer who harbors, conceals or assists in the escape of the principal. Such public officer must have acted with abuse of his public functions, and the crime committed by the principal is any crime, provided it is not a light felony. Appellant SPO4 Nieto is one such public officer, and he abused his public function when he failed to effect the immediate arrest of accused Antonio and to conduct a speedy investigation of the crime committed. The evidence in the case at bar, insofar as appellant Nieto's culpability is concerned, shows that in the middle of the argument between appellant Antonio and the deceased, Antonio called Nieto by shouting, “Sarge! Sarge!” Hearing this, SG Bobis woke Nieto up and the latter went upstairs. Immediately thereafter, appellant Antonio shot Tuadles, and then ordered Nieto to get the scoresheet and the cards from the table, which Nieto did. Antonio, Nieto and Bobis went downstairs. Antonio told guards Bobis and Ernesto Olac to go with them, and they all boarded Antonio's Mercedes Benz van, including Nieto. They arrived at Antonio's residence in Greenmeadows Subdivision at around 11:30 o'clock in the morning. There, they had coffee while Antonio made some telephone calls. Soon after, a certain Atty. Abaya arrived and talked to the two security guards, while Nieto was present. Nieto then told Bobis that in his statement, he should say that the two of them, i.e., Bobis and Nieto, were seated outside the entrance of the Club when the incident took place. At 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Nieto, Bobis and Olac returned to the Club. They waited outside until members of the San Juan police, together with Mayor Jinggoy Estrada and Vice Mayor Philip Cezar, arrived at 6:00 o'clock in the evening. After the police investigated the scene, they proceeded to the police station. There, Nieto reiterated his instruction to Bobis to say that the two of them were outside the club. While Bobis gave his statement to the police, Nieto remained in front of him and dictated to him what he should answer to the questions of the police investigator. The foregoing facts were culled from the testimony of SG Bobis. Appellant Nieto's actuations immediately after the commission of the crime demonstrate his liability as an accessory. Being a police officer in the active service, he had the duty to arrest appellant Antonio after the latter committed a crime in his presence, and which he himself witnessed. Unfortunately, he failed to do what was incumbent upon him to do. Instead, he rode with the offender to the latter's house where they stayed for more than five (5) hours.

People vs. Mariano

GR No. 134847

Dec 6, 2000

People vs. Mariano (G.R. No.134847) Facts: Driven by grinding poverty in her home province and lured by the prospect of a lucrative employment in the big city, Michelle Priol, then only sixteen (16), left home for Manila in January 1996 to work as a domestic help. Soon enough Michelle found herself hired at the household of the sisters Ruth Mariano and Ruby Mariano in Bambang, Pasig City. Jenny Priol, Michelle's older sister, testified that she often visited Michelle at the Mariano.residence. However, whenever she would visit Michelle, she and her sister could not freely talk as Ruth and Ruby were always hovering about. Apparently unhappy with the manner she was allowed to visit Michelle - they being constantly watched by the Mariano sisters and denied their privacy - Jenny never went to her sister again after her last visit in November 1996. Sometime afterwards, Ruth and Ruby brought Michelle to her sister Jenny to complain to her that their rice cooker no longer functioned and heaped the blame on Michelle. On that occasion Jenny noticed that Michelle's hair was unevenly cut to the scalp. When asked what happened, Michelle told her that it was Ruby who gave her the ugly haircut. Concerned with the condition of her sister, Jenny confronted Ruby. But the latter angrily replied. Jenny then told Ruby that she was going to take her sister back from them but the furious Ruby hurriedly left with Ruth, taking Michelle with them. That was the last time Jenny saw her younger sister alive. On 17 August 1997, a police received an anonymous call reporting that a woman was seen carrying a rectangular box with a human leg protruding. The caller further informed that the woman then placed the box inside the compartment of a car bearing plate number UPR-561. On the basis of this information, the policemen immediately conducted a "stake-out and surveillance operation" in the vicinity of Bambang as reported. After a couple of minutes, the police officers spotted two (2) women boarding a car with the reported plate number. They turned out to be accused-appellants Ruth Mariano y Lara and Ruby Mariano y Lara. The vehicle was owned and driven by Ruby. The law enforcers, riding in their patrol car followed the vehicle. But the women, perhaps sensing that they were being trailed, drove fast. Alarmed by the suspects' reaction to their presence, the policemen sounded their siren. After a brief chase, the officers overtook the suspects' vehicle and blocked its path. SPO2 Hernandez and SPO1 Fidelino alighted, from their patrol car and introduced themselves as police officers. They ordered Ruth and Ruby to alight from their vehicle.

The lawmen then announced that they would be conducting a visual search of the luggage compartment of the vehicle. Initially, Ruby refused saying that only dirty clothes were in the compartment but later relented the police officers insisted. Upon opening the compartment, SPO2 Hernandez was greeted by a putrid odor emanating from a decomposing body inside the box. Ruth and Ruby identified the body as that of their maid Michelle Priol. Ruth and Ruby were then arrested. With the foregoing findings, Ruth and Ruby were charged with murder. Ruth denied the charge claiming that the victim "died because she got sick, and not because I mauled her." Nevertheless, by her own narration and admission during the trial, Ruth described in lurid details what really happened to Michelle. According to Ruth, Michelle was kind, industrious and respectful at first. However, sometime November 1996 she and her sister Ruby caught Michelle stealing money and jewelry from their bedroom. Thus, they brought her to the police but later desisted from prosecuting Michelle when she pleaded for a second chance and promised that she would not do it again. After that incident, Michelle's attitude changed completely. Ruth claimed that she often caught her stealing money from them and destroying the appliances whenever she cleaned the house, and that whenever she scolded Michelle she would answer back, triggering a fight between them. Ruth confessed in her testimony that she doused boiling water on Michelle several times whenever she was angry. Ruth likewise admitted having pulled Michelle's hair and banged her head (inuumpog ang ulo), and that in the month of July 1997 alone they fought at least six (6) times. She added that she was remorseful afterwards for what she had done and treated Michelle's seared flesh with antibiotics and washed her wounds with guava leaves. On 22 June 1998 Ruth and Ruby were convicted of murder by the trial court. Accordingly, Ruth was sentenced to death while Ruby was found guilty as an accomplice. Issue: Whether or not Ruby, as sister of Ruth Mariano, is considered by law as an accessory exempt from criminal liability by reason of their relationship. Held: While these circumstances strongly indicate that Ruby had knowledge of what her sister Ruth did to Michelle, they are too insufficient to support a finding that Ruby had something to do with the crime so that she should likewise be answerable. With her nominal role, we cannot conscientiously declare that Ruby was a principal or even an accomplice in the crime. The presumption of innocence in her favor has not been overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt. The SC do not agree with the Solicitor General that Ruby should have been convicted as an accessory after the fact x x x x since her act of driving the car where the corpse of Michelle was hidden, her resistance to stop the car when chased by the police and to immediately open the luggage compartment as requested by the police, her act of lying to the police by claiming that the box in the compartment contained only dirty clothes, and her refusal to open said box sufficiently indicate knowledge of the crime and assistance to Ruth Mariano in concealing the corpus delicti to prevent its discovery. Accused-appellant Ruby Mariano is the sister of accused-appellant Ruth Mariano. As such, their relationship exempts appellant Ruby Mariano from criminal liability under Art. 20 of The Revised Penal Code Art. 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability. - The penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such with respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees, with the single exception of accessories falling within the provisions of paragraph 1 of the preceding article (underscoring supplied). The reason for exemption is obvious; it is based on ties of blood and the preservation of the cleanliness of one's name, which compels one to conceal crimes committed by relatives so near as those mentioned in the above-quoted article. This Court is thus mandated by law to acquit accused-appellant Ruby Mariano. As for accused-appellant Ruby Mariano, the Court finds the evidence insufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt her guilt as an accomplice in the commission of the said crime. Neither can she be held liable as an accessory after the fact, as she is exempt from criminal liability by reason of her relationship with her co-accused pursuant to Art. 20 of The Revised Penal Code. Consequently, she is ACQUITTED

People vs. Kiron


FACTS: On December 4, 1993, in celebration of a fiesta in Apas, Lahug, Cebu City, a “benefit disco dance” was held at the local UCMA Village. Appellants, Juanito and Mario Quirol, and the two victims, Benjamin Silva and Roel Ngujo, attended. At the dance, Juanito, Mario and Jed were together and drank all through the night with some friends. Jed was later seen in a drunken state chasing people around while Juanito was seen toying with a Batangas knife. The dance ended just prior to 4 a.m. and prosecution principal witness Wilson Cruz testified that it was about that time when he was asked by Benjamin and Roel to accompany them in escorting some ladies home. Wilson told them to go ahead and that he would just follow. Wilson saw Jed stop the two victims in front of his house and frisk them. The ladies, perhaps not wanting to be delayed, went ahead. Thereafter, Wilson saw Jed bind Benjamin and Roel together with a pair of handcuffs and lead them towards the control tower of the old airport of Lahug, Cebu City. There, the three were met by Juanito and Mario and together they proceeded to the airport runway. A few seconds later, Jed took out his .38 caliber service revolver and shot Benjamin at point-blank range on the head. At around 7 a.m. that same morning, Juanito went to collect his wages at the house of Galileo Banate, a construction foreman for whom the former was working. Galileo observed Juanito to be somewhat in an inebriated state, and so when Juanito asked permission to sleep on the floor, Galileo acceded. Juanito was so sleepy that he unconsciously dropped his Batangas knife. Galileo later saw it beside him on the floor, picked it up and kept it as there were children around who could play with it. When he later gave Juanito his wages, he forgot to return the knife. Four days later, at the construction site, Mario arrived with a policeman and picked up Juanito. Before leaving the construction site, Juanito asked his knife back from Galileo. Galileo retrieved the knife from his house and turned it over to the policeman. A subsequent examination on the knife revealed that it had human bloodstains on it. ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution’s evidence was sufficient to establish appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt? HELD: The court ruled that the Appellants’ attack on the credibility of Wilson by claiming it was unnatural for Wilson not to help the victims who were supposedly his friends is without basis. Whether he could have helped them but did not is not an issue that is determinative of the veracity of the testimony as not every witness to a crime can be expected to act reasonably and conformably to expectation. The fact of the matter is that different people react differently to a given situation or type of situation and there is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange or frightful experience. All things considered, it is more reasonable to expect that rather than leave his hiding place and risk being seen, the witness would stay put and wait until after the perpetrators of the crime had left, which is exactly what he did. Similarly, while it may have been unnecessary for Mario to hold Roel, that does not mean that it did not occur. And, contrary to the contention of appellants, there was no testimony that Mario was still holding Roel when he was shot and, therefore, risked being accidentally hit. Anent Mario’s defense of alibi, despite corroboration from Exequiel Aranas, it is still an inherently weak defense and cannot prevail over a positive identification from a witness found credible by the trial court. Absent arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of significance and influence, we will not interfere with the credence given to the testimony of Wilson over that of Mario and that of Exequiel, as assessments of credibility are generally left to the trial court whose proximate contact with those who take the witness stand places it in a more competent position to discriminate between true and false testimony. Moreover, as correctly discussed by the Court of Appeals, the distance between the scene of the crimes and where Mario claims he passed out is not so far away as to prevent him from being physically present at the place of the crimes or its immediate vicinity at the time the crimes were committed.

Treachery was correctly found to be present as the evidence shows that the concerted acts of appellants and Jed were consciously and deliberately adopted so that the victims would not be in a position to defend themselves or to retaliate. We, therefore, concur in the finding that the crimes were properly qualified to murder.

References: http://www.scribd.com/doc/103639741/CL-10-Case-Digests http://www.scribd.com/doc/110293229/Crim-Digests-Final

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