Digested Cases

1. Louh vs. BPI G.R. No. 225562, March 8, 2017 Facts: Facts: A complaint for collection of sum of money was filed by BPI against spouses Louh because they were unable to pay purchases made on their credit cards. They owed BPI the total amount of P533,836.27. Defendant William filed before the RTC a Motion for Extension of Time to File an Answer or Responsive Pleading. Pleading. The RTC granted an extension of 15 days or up to March 4, 2012, but the Spouses Louh still failed to comply within the prescribed period. BPI filed a motion to declare Spouses Louh in default. Before the RTC can rule on BPI’s motion, Spouses Louh filed an Answer more than three months after the prescribed period. RTC rendered a Decision and ordered the Spouses Louh to solidarily pay BPI (1) P533,836.27 plus 12% finance finance and 12% late payment annual charges starting from August 7, 2010 until full payment, and (2) 25% of the amount due as attorney’s fees, plus P1,000.00 per court hearing and P8,064.00 as filing or docket fees; and (3) costs of suit. However, the RTC found the 3.5% finance and 6% late payment monthly charges imposed by BPI as iniquitous and unconscionable . Hence, both charges were reduced to 1% monthly. Anent the award of attorney’s fees equivalent to 25% of the amount due, RTC found the same to be within the terms of the parties’ agreement.

On appeal, Spouses Louh reiterated that the RTC wrongly declared them in default since by reason of William’s sickness, they were entitled to a relaxation of the rules. Moreover, BPI had failed to offer preponderant evidence relative to the actual amount of the Spouses Louh’s indebtedness CA affirmed the RTC Decision in toto. Issue: Whether or not Defendant Spouses were properly declared in default and rules should have been relaxed  only when, for the most persuasive of reasons, they may Ruling: Ruling: Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed except  only be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed procedure. The rules were instituted to be faithfully complied with, and allowing them to be ignored or lightly dismissed to suit the convenience of a party like the petitioner was impermissible. Such rules, often derided as merely technical, are to be relaxed only in the furtherance of justice and to benefit the deserving. Their liberal construction in exceptional situations should then rest on a showing of justifiable reasons and of at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with them. them . x x 31 x.  (Citations omitted and emphasis and italics ours) The Spouses Louh failed to show that they exerted due diligence in timely pursuing their cause so as to entitle them to a liberal construction of the rules, which can only be made m exceptional cases. 2. Ruben Manalang et al vs. Bienvenido and Mercedes Bacani G.R. No. 156995, January 12, 2015 FACTS: Petitioners Ruben Manalang, Amado Manalang, Carlos Manalang, Concepcion M. Gonzales, Ladislao Manalang and Luis Manalang were the co-owners of Lot No 4236 with an area of 914 square meters of the Guagua Cadastre, and declared for taxation purposes in the name of Tomasa B. Garcia. The land was covered by approved survey plan Ap-03-004154. Adjacent to Lot 4236 was the respondents’ Lot No. 4235 covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. N-216701. In 1997, the petitioners caused the relocation and verification survey of Lot 4236 and the adjoining lots, and the result showed that the respondents had encroached on Lot No. 4236 to the extent of 405 square meters. A preliminary relocation survey conducted by the Lands Management Section of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) confirmed the result on the encroachment. When the respondents refused to vacate the encroached portion and to surrender peaceful possession thereof despite demands, the petitioners commenced this action for unlawful detainer on April 21, 1997 in the MTC of Guagua (Civil Case No. No. 3309), and the case was assigned assigned to Branch 2 of that that court. On September 17, 1998, the MTC (Branch 2) dismissed Civil Case No. 3309 for lack of jurisdiction based on its finding that the action involved an essentially boundary boundary dispute that should be properly resolved in an accion reivindicatoria. On appeal, however, the RTC reversed the MTC (Branch 2), and remanded the case for further proceedings,5holding that because there was an apparent withholding of possession of the property and the action was brought within one year from such withholding of possession the proper action was ejectment which was within the jurisdiction of the MTC. Upon remand, the MTC, Branch 1, ultimately dismissed the complaint and counterclaim for lack of merit through the decision rendered on August 31, 2000. Once more, the petitioners appealed to the RTC. At that point, the RTC ordered the

petitioners to conduct a relocation survey to determine their allegation of encroachment, and also heard the testimony of the surveyor. On September 19, 2001, the RTC rendered its judgment whereby it reversed and set aside the MTC’s decision of August 31, 2000. ISSUE: Whether the RTC had authority to receive additional evidence on appeal in an ejectment case? RULING: RTC, in an appeal of the judgment in an ejectment case, shall not conduct a rehearing or trial de novo. In this connection, Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court clearly provides: Sec. 18. Judgment conclusive only on possession; not conclusive in actions involving title or o wnership. —x x x. x x x x The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the ap propriate Regional Trial Court which shall decide the same on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Court. Hence, the RTC violated the foregoing rule by ordering the conduct of the relocation and verification survey "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction" and by hearing the testimony of the surveyor, for its doing so was tantamount to its holding of a trial de novo. The violat ion was accented by the fact that the RTC ultimately decided the appeal based on the survey and the surveyor’s testimony instead of the record of the proceedings had in the court of origin. Secondly, on whether or not Civil Case No. 3309 was an ejectment case within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC, decisive are the allegations of the complaint. 3. Romeo Caluzor vs. Deogracias Llanillo and Heirs of Lorenzo Llanillo G.R. No. 155580, July 1, 2015 FACTS: Lorenzo Llanillo (Lorenzo) owned the parcel of land (land) wi.th an area of 90, 101 square meters, more or less, known as Lot 4196 and situated in Loma de Gato, Marilao, Bulacan. The land was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 25864 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan. The petitioner averred that Lorenzo took him into the land as a tenant in 1970, giving to him a sketch that indicated the boundaries of the portion he would be cultivating. To effectively till the land, the petitioner and his family were allowed to build a makeshift shanty thereon. Even after the death of Lorenzo, the petitioner continued giving a share of his produce to the family of Lorenzo through Ricar do Martin (Ricardo), Lorenzo’s overseer. In 1990, respondent Deogracias Deogracias Lanillo (Deogracias), the son of Lorenzo, offered to pay the petitioner petitioner P17,000.00/hectare of the cultivated land in exchange for turning his tillage over to Deogracias. In the end, Deogracias did not pay the petitioner. Instead, on August 5, 1994, Deogracias and persons acting under his orders forcibly ejected the petitioner and his family by levelling their shanty and plantation with the use of a bulldozer. The efforts of the Barangay Agrarian Reform Council to conciliate failed; hence, the authority to file a case was issued to the petitioner. The petitioner instituted this case against Deogracias in the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) in Malolos, Bulacan, demanding the payment of disturbance compensation. He amended his complaint to implead Moldex Realty Corporation (Moldex) as an additional defendant upon discovering that the latter had entered the land to develop it into a residential subdivision. He prayed for the restoration of his possession of the tilled land, and the payment of disturbance compensation. Meanwhile, on April 12, 1995, 1995, the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Agrarian Reform (DAR) granted granted the application for the conversion of the land from agricultural to residential and commercial uses filed by Deogarcias, through Moldex as his atto rney-in-fact. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner resorted to the wrong remedy of a special civil action for certiorari and should be dismissed. RULING: It is clear that the CA promulgated the assailed decision in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction to review and pass upon the DARAB’s adjudication by of the petitioner’s appeal of the PARAD’s ruling. As such, his only proper recourse from such decision of the CA was to further appeal to the Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Despite his allegation of grave abuse of discretion against the CA, he could not come to the Court by special civil action for certiorari. The remedies of appeal and certiorari were mutually exclusive, for the special civil action for certiorari, being an extraordinary remedy, is available only if there is no appeal, or other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In certiorari, only errors of jurisdiction are to be addressed by the higher court, such that a review of the facts and evidence is not done; but, in appeal, the superior court corrects errors of judgment, and in so doing reviews issues of fact and law to cure errors in the appreciation and evaluation of the evidence. Based on such distinctions, certiorari cannot cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal. It is obvious that all that the petitioner wants the Court to do is to revisit and review the facts and records supposedly substantiating his claim of tenancy and his demand for

consequential disturbance compensation. He has not thereby raised any jurisdictional error by the CA, and has not shown how the CA capriciously or whimsically exercised its judgment as to be guilty of gravely abusing its discretion. 4. Knights of Rizal vs. DMCI et al. G.R. No. No. 213948, April 19, 2017 Facts: DMCI started construction of Torre De Manila Condominium, after it was issued Building permit by the City Of Manila Office allowing it to build a 49 Story with Basement & 2 penthouse Level Residential Condominium. However the City Council of Manila issued Resolution No. 121 enjoining the Office of the Building Official to temporarily suspend the Building Permit of DMC citing among others, that “the Torre de Manila Condominium, based on their development plans, upon completion, will rise up high above the back of the national monument, to clearly dwarf the statue of our hero, and with such towering heights, would certainly ruin the line of sight of the Rizal Shrine from the frontal Roxas Boulevard vantage point.” The City Council issued a resolution which states that “the City Council of Manila find[s] no cogent reason to deny and/or reverse the aforesaid recommendation of the [MZBAA] and hereby ratifies] and confirm[s] all previously issued permits, licenses and approvals issued by the City [Council] of Manila for Torre de Manila[.]”

On 12 September 2014, the Knights Of Rizal, a “civic, patriotic, cultural, non - partisan, non-sectarian and non-profit organization” 18 created under Republic Act No. 646,19 filed a Petition for Injunction seeking a temporary restraining order, and later a permanent injunction, against the construction of DMCI- PDI’s Torre de Manila condominium project. The KOR argues that the subject matter of the present suit is one of “transcendental importance, paramount public interest, of overarching significance to society, or with far- reaching implication” involving the desecration of the Rizal Monument. Issues: Whether or not the Court can issue a writ of mandamus against the officials of the City of Manila to stop the construction of DMCI-PDI’s Torre de Manila Project. RULING: The petition for mandamus lacks merit and must be dismissed. Mandamus does not lie against the City of Manila. The Rules on Civil Procedure are clear that mandamus only issues when there is a clear legal duty imposed upon the office or the officer sought to be compelled to perform an act, and when the party seeking mandamus has a clear legal right to the performance of such act. In the present case, nowhere is it found in Ordinance No. 8119 or in any law, ordinance, or rule for that matter, that the construction of a building outside the Rizal Park is prohibited if the building is within the background sightline or view of the Rizal Monument. Thus, there is no legal duty on the part of the City of Manila “to consider,” in the words of the Dissenting Opinion, “ the standards set under Ordinance No. 8119 ” in relation to the applications of DMCI-PDI for the Torre de Manila since under the ordinance these standards can never be applied outside the boundaries of Rizal Park. 5. SIY vs. Tomlin G.R. No. 205998, April 24, 2017 Facts: Petitioner William Anghian Siy filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (RTC) a Complaint for Recovery of Possession with Prayer for Replevin against Tomlin et al. In his Complaint, petitioner alleged that he is the owner of a 2007 model Range Rover with Plate Number ZMG 272 which he purchased from Alberto Lopez III (Lopez) on July 22, 2009; that in 2010, he entrusted the said vehicle to Ong, a businessman who owned a second- hand car sales showroom (“Motortrend” in Katipunan, Quezon City) after the latter claimed that he had a prospective buyer therefor; that Ong failed to remit the proceeds of the purported sale nor return the vehicle; that petitioner later found out that the vehicle had been transferred to Chua; that in December, 2010, petitioner filed a complaint before the Quezon City Police District’s Anti -Camapping Section; that Ong, upon learning of the complaint, met with petitioner to arrange the return of the vehicle RTC issued the writ of replevin after posting a bond of 8 million.

Issue: Whether the writ of replevin is proper? Ruling: Petition must be denied.

“In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must convincingly show that he is either the owner or clearly entitled to the possession of the object sought to be recovered, and that the defendant, who is in actual or legal possession thereof, wrongfully detains the same.” “Rule 60 x x x allows a plaintiff, in an action for the recovery of possession of personal property, to apply for a writ of replevin if it can be shown that he is ‘the owner of the property’ claimed … or is entitled to the possession thereof.’ The plaintiff need not be the owner so long as he is able to specify his right to the possession of the property and his legal basis therefor.” Considering that he was no longer the owner or rightful possessor of the subject vehicle at the time he filed Civil Case No. Q-11-69644 in July, 2011, petitioner may not seek a return of the same through replevin. Quite the contrary, respondent, who obtained the vehicle from Chua and registered the transfer with the Land Transportation Office, is the rightful owner thereof, and as such, he is entitled to its possession . For this reason, the CA was correct in decreeing the dismissal of Civil Case No. Q-11-69644, although it erred in ordering the return of the vehicle to the PNP-HPG, which had no further right to hold the vehicle in its custody. As the registered and rightful owner of the subject vehicle, the trial court must return the same to respondent. 6. Saint Mary Crusade to Alleviate Poverty of Brethren Foundation Inc. vs. Hon. Teodoro Riel G.R. No. 176508, January 12, 2015 FACTS: Petitioner claimed in its petition for reconstitution that the original copy of OCT No . 1609 had been burnt and lost in the fire that gutted the Quezon City Register of Deeds in the late 80’s. Initially, respondent Judge gave due course to the petition, but after the preliminary hearing, he dismissed the petition for reconstitution through the first assailed order. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the dismissal. RTC denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of any cogent or justifiable ground to reconsider. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of its jurisdiction in dismissing its petition for reconstitution on the basis of the recommendation of the LRA and the opposition of the Republic and the UP despite having initially given due course to t he petition for reconstitution. RULING: No. The petition for certiorari and mandamus did not show how respondent Judge could have been guilty of lacking or exceeding his jurisdiction, or could have gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Under Section 12 of Republic Act No. 26, the law on the judicial reconstitution of a Torrens title, th e Regional Trial Court (as the successor of the Court of First Instance) had the original and exclusive jurisdiction to act on th e petition for judicial reconstitution of title. Hence, the RTC neither lacked nor exceeded its 37 authority in acting on and dismissing the petition. Nor did respondent Judge gravely abuse his discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction considering that the petition for reconstitution involved land already registered in the name of the UP, as confirmed by the LRA. Instead, it would have been contrary to law had respondent Judge dealt with and granted the petition for judicial reconstitution of title of the pet itioner.

7. Fortune Life Insurance Company Inc. vs. Commission on Audit January 27, 2015 | G.R. No. 213525

FACTS: Respondent Provincial Government of Antique and the petitioner executed a memorandum of agreement  concerning the life insurance coverage of qualified barangay secretaries, treasurers and tanod, the former obligating P4,393,593.60 for the premium payment, and subsequently submitting the corresponding disbursement voucher to COAAntique for pre-audit. The latter office disallowed the payment for lack of legal basis under Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code). Respondent LGU appealed but its appeal was denied. Consequently, the petitioner filed its petition for money claim in the COA. On November 15, 2012, the COA issued its decision denying the petition. The p etitioner received a copy of the COA decision on December 14, 2012, and filed its motion for reconsideration on January 14, 2013. However, the COA denied the motion, the denial being received by the petitioner on July 14, 2014. ISSUE: Whether or not Fresh period under Neypes applies to petition for certiorari under Rule 64?

RULING: No. Fresh Period Rule under Neypes did not apply to the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. The reglementary periods under Rule 42 and Rule 64 are different. In the former, the aggrieved party is allowed 15 days to file the petition for review from receipt of the assailed decision or final order, or from receipt of the denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. In the latter, the petition is filed within 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission concerned, interrupts the period; hence, should the motion be denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, which shall not be less than five days in any event, reckoned from the notice of denial. 8. Berlinda Oribello vs. Court of Appeals and Remedios Oribello  August 5, 2015 | G.R. No. 163504 FACTS: Before RTC of La Union was an action for partition and damages involving twelve parcels o f land. Eight was in the name of Toribio Oribello, two in t he names of Toribio and Rosenda Oribello, one in the names of Toribio and and Berlinda Padilla Oribello, and one in the names of Toribio and Ma. Emilia Oribello. Toribio was twice married. His first wife was Emilia. Toribio's marriage to Emilia was dissolved pursuant to the decision of the Superior Court of California, County of Sacramento, U.S.A. Toribio married appellee before the municipal mayor of Agoo, La Union. He died intestate on August 18, 1993. Instituted on May 27, 1997 by Remedios Oribello, represented by her natural father Alfredo Selga, against appellee, the action was anchored on the theory that appellant is an adopted daughter of Toribio. Denying that appellant is an adopted daughter of Toribio, appellee averred in her answer that the decree of adoption was fraudulently secured by Alfredo. RTC rendered its Judgment after trial. CA vacated and remanded the case to the lower court. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent was able to prove that she was entitled to partition RULING: The respondent did not discharge her burden of proof as the plaintiff to show that she was entitled to the partition. RTC correctly ruled against the right of respondent Remedios Oribello to demand the partition of the real property belonging to the late Tomas Oribello on the ground that she had not substantiated her right to the partition by preponderance of evidence. The proceeding under Rule 69 of the R ules of Court is a judicial controversy between persons who, being co-owners or coparceners of common property, seek to secure a division or partition thereof among themselves, giving to each one of them the part corresponding to him. The object of partition is to enable those who own property as joint tenants, or co-owners, or tenants in common to put an end to the joint tenancy so as to vest in each a sole estate in specific property or an allotment in the lands or tenements. To accord with the nature of the remedy of judicial partition, there are two stages defined under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. The first relates to the determination of the rights of the parties to the property held in common. The second concerns the physical segregation of each party's just share in the property held in common. The second stage need not be gone into should the parties agree on the physical partition. RTC correctly found that Remedios Oribello did not satisfactorily establish her co-ownership of the properties left by the late Toribio Oribello. 9. ATTY. JANET D. NACION v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, MA. GRACIA PULIDO-TAN, JUANITO ESPINO AND HEIDI MENDOZA G.R. No. 204757, March 17, 2015 Facts: Atty. Janet Nacion was assigned by COA to the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) as state Auditor. When Nacion was already holding the position of Director IV of COA, a formal complaint was filed against her alleging that she received benefits from the MWSS in the form of bonuses amounting to 73,542.00, availing of MWSS housing project, availing of multi-purpose car loan. Nacion admitted that she availed of the housing project and multipurpose loan, but denied having received bonuses amounting to 73,542.00. In Nacion’s defense she claims that she received the benefits in good faith, as the prohibition to receive benefits other than those given by COA was only issued on July 2004, after she had already availed of such benefits. Nevertheless, she was willing to reimburse the 73,542.00, and give up her right over the lot. COA found Nacion guilty of grave misconduct and violation or reasonable rules and regulations. ISSUE: Whether or not COA committed grave abuse of discretion in finding Nacion guilty. Ruling: “[a]n act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a ‘capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.’” Upon review, the Court holds

that no such grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to t he COA for the procedure it observed, its factual findings and conclusions in Nacion’s case. 10. ONOFRE V. MONTERO v. TIMES TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. G.R. No. 190828, March 16, 2015 Facts: Respondent TTCI is engaged in the business of transportation of passengers and goods. On August 23, 1997 TTCI president and board of directors ordered Santiago to gradually dispose of the assets of TTCI due to severe business losses. Santiago also terminated 119 of TTCI’s em ployees. Four years later, after TTCI had already ceased its operation, several complaints for unfair labor practice, and money claims were filed against it. In response TCCI claimed that the actions were already barred by prescription. The LA ruled in favor of the petitioners, but when the case was elevated to the NLRC, it observed that the LA had ignored the rule on prescription. Issue: Whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled in favor of the respondents Ruling: The Court has thoroughly reviewed the records in this case and finds that the NLRC did not commit any grave abuse of its discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering its decision in favor of the respondents. The CA acted in accord with the evidence on record and case law when it dismissed the petition and affirmed the assailed decision and resolution of the NLRC. 11. TEOFILO B. ADOLFO v. FE. T. ADOLFO G.R. No. 201427, March 18, 2015 Facts: Petitioner insists that respondent’s failure to reply to his written request for admission resulted in her admitting that the subject property is a conjugal asset, applying Rule 26, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules; that the CA grossly erred in disregarding the rule; that with the resulting admission, there remains no genuine issue to be resolved in civil case, such that judgment based on the pleadings is proper. Finally, petitioner adds that respondent’s trifling with the law and rules of procedure – by conveniently claiming in one case that the subject property is conjugal, and then in another that it is paraphernal – should not be countenanced; she should be held to her original declaration that the subject property is conjugal. Issue: Did the Court of Appeals erred in deciding the case on a question of substance not in accord with law, Rule 26 of the 1997 Rules?

Ruling: Judgment on the pleadings is proper “where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading.” Summary judgment, on the other hand, will be granted “if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. On the other hand, “whether x x x the issues raised by the Answer are genuine is not the crux of inquiry in a motion for judgment on the pleadings. It is so only in a motion for summary judgment. In a case for judgment on the pleadings, the Answer is such that no issue is raised at all. The essential question in such a case is whether there are issues generated by the pleadings.”47 “A ‘genuine issue’ is an issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim. When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then there is no real or genuine issue or question as to the facts, and summary judgment is called for. 12. Heirs of Johnny Aoas Vs. Juliet As-Il G.R. No. 219558; October 19, 2016 Facts: As-il filed a complaint for forcible entry and damages against the Heirs of Aoas before the MTC, claiming absolute ownership and possessory rights over the 42 square meter portion of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-57645. She discovered that the Heirs of Aoas, by stealth and strategy, initiated the preparatory digging, clearing and construction of a house and enclosing the subject land, thus, depriving and dispossessing her of the same; and that when confronted, they asserted ownership of the same property. From the foregoing, As-il asked the MTC to order the Heirs of Aoas to vacate the subject property and that compensation be given to her as well as damages and attorney’s fees. Issue: Whether Rule 70 is the proper remedy.

Ruling: it is clear that this case deals not with the right to possess the property. Instead, the main discussions in the lower courts and the CA went around the boundary dispute between the c ontending parties over the 42 square meter parcel of land. This is apparent from the fact that the p roperties being claimed by both parties are covered by separate certificates of title and overlapped each other. Stated differently, both parties lay claim to that property on the basis of their certificates of title, both of which cover the contested land. The MTC and RTC findings confirm this. Settled is the rule that a boundary dispute, as in this case, can only be resolved in the context of an accion reivindicatoria, and not in an ejectment case. In Manalang v. Bacani, the Court held that boundary dispute cannot be resolved in ejectment proceedings as it involves different issues, to wit: The boundary dispute is not about possession, but encroachment, that is, whether the property claimed by the defendant formed part of the plaintiffs property. A boundary dispute cannot be settled summarily under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the proceedings under which are limited to unlawful detainer and forcible entry. In unlawful detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds the possession of the premises upon the expiration or termination of his right to hold such possession under any contract, express or implied. The defendant’s possession was lawful at the beginning, becoming unlawful only because of the expiration or termination of his right of possession. In forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the very beginning, and the issue centers on which between the plaintiff and the defendant had the prior possession de facto. 13. Tan Siok Kuan a nd Pute Ching Vs. Felicisimo “Boy” Ho, et al.; G.R. No. 175085; June 1, 2016 Facts: Seven (7) separate complaints for unlawful detainer were filed by petitioners Tan Siu Kuan and Pute Ching against defendants Avelino Bombita (Bombita), Felix Gagarin (Gagar in), Bernardo Napolitano (Napolitano), Felicisimo “Boy” Ho (Ho), Rodolfo Returta (Returta), Vicente Salas (Salas), and Lolita Malonzo (Malonzo). Defendants were given ten (10) days to pay the rentals due or else to vacate the premises and turn over the possession thereof to petitioners, but defendants allegedly ignored petitioners’ demand, warranting the filing of the complaints for unlawful detainer. Defendants argued that the lease agreements they have executed with petitioners are void ab initio, petitioners being Chinese nationals who are not entitled to own real property in the Philippines. Moreover, they claimed to have been in possession of the subject premises since 1968 or some 35 years ago, thus plaintiffs action cannot be one for ejectment or unlawful detainer, but accion publiciana which must be filed before the RTC.[11] Issue: Whether a lessor-lessee relationship between the parties was properly established. Ruling: No. they have not shown any evidence of a lease between them and respondents, be it express or implied. As keenly observed by the CA, there was no mention of how and when the alleged contract of lease started, there was no proof of prior payment of rentals or any prior demand for such payment considering petitioners’ allegation that respondents failed to pay rentals since 1997 and that the case was instituted only in 2003.

Moreover, there is merit in respondents’ invocation of the principle of  res inter alios acta or that principle which states that “the right of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided, among which are: (1) admission by third party, (2) admission by co-partner or agent, (3) admission by conspirator, and (4) admission by privies.” 14. David Yu Kimteng, et al. Vs. Atty. Walter T. Young, et al. G.R. No. 210554; August 5, 2015 Facts: Petitioners ask that law firm, Young Revilla Gambol & Magat, and Judge Ofelia L. Calo (Judge Calo), be cited in contempt of court under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.[2] Anastacio Revilla, Jr. (Revilla) was disbarred on December 2009 in an En Banc Resolution of this court in A.C. No. 7054 entitled Que v. Atty. Revilla, Jr. Walter T. Young (Atty. Young), Jovito Gambol (Atty. Gambol), and Dan Reynald Magat (Atty. Magat) are lawyers practicing under the firm, Young Revilla Gambol & Magat.[9] They entered their appearance in the liquidation proceedings of the Ruby Industrial Corporation as counsels for the liquidator. An Opposition was filed against the appearance of Young Revilla Gambol & Magat on the ground that Revilla was already disbarred in 2009. Issue: whether private respondents Atty. Walter T. Young, Atty. Jovito Gambol, and Atty. Dan Reynald R. Magat are in contempt of court when they continued to use respondent Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr.’s name in their firm name even after his disbarment

Ruling: Maintaining a disbarred lawyer’s name in the firm name is different from using a deceased partner’s name in the firm name. Canon 3, Rule 3.02 allows the use of a deceased partne r’s name as long as there is an indication that the partner is deceased. This ensures that the public is not misled. On the other hand, the retention of a disbarred lawyer’s name in the firm name may mislead the public into believing that the lawyer is still authorized to practice law. The use of a deceased partner’s name in a law firm’s name was allowed upon the effectivity of the Code of Professional Responsibility, with the requirement that “the firm indicates in all its communications that said partner is deceased.” [53] From the time respondent Revilla was disbarred in 2009, it appears that no efforts were exerted to remove his name from the firm name. Thus, respondents Atty. Young and Atty. Magat are held liable for contempt of court. 15. Zuneca Pharmaceutical, Akram Arain and/or Venus Arain M.D. dba Zuneca Pharmaceutical Vs. Natrapharm, Inc. G.R. No. 197802; November 11, 2015 Facts: Since 2003 or even as early as 2001, petitioners have been selling a medicine imported from Lahore, Pakistan bearing the generic name “CARBAMAZEPINE,” an anti-convulsant indicated for epilepsy, under the brand name “ZYNAPS,” which trademark is however not registered with the IPO. “ZYNAPS” is pronounced exactly like “ZYNAPSE.” Respondent is an all-Filipino pharmaceutical company which manufactures and sells a medicine bearing the generic name “CITICOLINE,” which is indicated for heart and stroke patients. The said medicine is marketed by respondent under its registered trademark “ZYNAPSE,” which respondent obtained from the In tellectual Property Office (IPO) on September 24, 2007 under Certificate of Trademark Registration No. 4-2007-005596. With its registration, the trademark “ZYNAPSE” enjoys protection for a term of 10 years.. Respondent further alleged that petitioners are selling their product “ZYNAPS” CARBAMAZEPINE in numerous drugstores in the country where its own product “ZYNAPSE” CITICOLINE is also being sold. Respondent sent petitioners a cease-and-desist demand letter. In its December 21, 2007 Order,[21] the Regional Trial Court (RTC) denied respondent’s application for a TRO, ruling that even if respondent was able to first register its mark “ZYNAPSE” with the IPO in 2007, it is nevertheless defeated by the prior actual use by petitioners of “ZYNAPS” in 2003. RTC denied the application for a writ of preliminary injunction. Issue: Whether the CA may order a permanent injunction in deciding a petition for certiorari against the denial of an application for a preliminary injunction issued by the RTC? Ruling: A preliminary injunction, like any preliminary writ and any interlocutory order, cannot survive the main case of which it is an incident; because an ancillary writ of preliminary injunction loses its force and effect after the decision in the main petition. Here, this Court is being asked to determine whether the CA erred by issuing a permanent injunction in a case which questioned the propriety of the denial of an ancillary writ. But with the RTC’s December 2, 2011 Decision on the case for “Injunction, Trademark Infringement, Damages and Destruction,” the issues raised in the instant petition have been rendered moot and academic. We note that the case brought to the CA on a petition for certiorari merely involved the RTC’s denial of respondent’s application f or a writ of preliminary injunction, a mere ancillary writ. Since a d ecision on the merits has already been rendered and which includes in its disposition a permanent injunction, the proper remedy is an appeal36 from the decision in the main case. ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled in favor of the respondents. Ruling: The Court has thoroughly reviewed the records in this case and finds that the NLRC did not commit any grave abuse of its discretion amounting to lack o r in excess of jurisdiction in rendering its decision in favor of the respondents. The CA acted in accord with the evidence on record and case law when it dismissed the petition and affirmed the assailed decision and resolution of the NLRC. 16. BSP vs. Legaspi GR No. 205966, March 02, 2016 Facts: BSP filed a Complaint for annulment of title, revocation of certificate and damages (with application for TRO / writ of preliminary injunction) against respondent. The RTC issued the preliminary injunction against respondent. In one of his defenses, Legaspi alleged that RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the action because the complaint, a real action, failed

to allege the assessed value of the subject property. BSP countered that a tax declaration showing the assessed value and latest zonal value was annexed to the complaint. Issue: Whether or not failure to allege the amount in the face of the complaint would tantamount to a lack of a cause of action. Ruling: It depends. The Honorable Supreme Court stated that:

“The non-inclusion on the face of the complaint of the amount of the property, however, is not fatal because attached in the complaint is a tax declaration (Annex “N” in the complaint) of the property in question showing that it has an assessed value of P215,320.00. It must be emphasized that annexes to a complaint are deemed part of, and should be considered together with the complaint  (emphasis mine). In Fluor Daniel, Inc. – Philippines vs. E.B. Villarosa and Partners Co., Ltd., this Court ruled that in determining the sufficiency of a cause of action, the courts should also consider the attachments to the complaint, thus: We have ruled that a complaint should not be dismissed for insufficiency of cause of action if it appears clearly from the complaint and its attachments that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. The converse is also true. The complaint may be dismissed for lack of cause of action if it is obvious from the complaint and its annexes that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief”  17. Mathaeus vs. Spouses Medequiso GR No.196651, February 03, 2016 Facts: The Tagbilaran MTCC rendered a decision ordering petitioner to pay respondents P30,000. Petitioner interposed an appeal before the RTC of Bohol. The RTC affirmed the decision of the MTCC. Petitioner moved to reconsider but the RTC upheld its judgment. Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the CA however it was dismissed by the court. The Court of Appeals ratiocinated that the Verification and Certification on Non-Forum Shopping was sworn to not before a notary public but before a clerk of court ergo considered as improperly verified and treated as unsigned and dismissible. Issue: Whether or not such action would lead to the dismissal of the case. Ruling: Yes, it would lead to the dismissal of the case. Specifically with respect to certifications against forum-shopping, we have repeatedly held that “non -compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not c urable by its subsequent submission or cor rection thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of ‘substantial compliance’ or presence of ‘special circumstances or compelling reasons.”‘ Taking the foregoing circumstances and considerations to mind, the Court is not inclined to r elax the rules for the petitioner’s benefit; it perceives no compelling reasons or circumstances to rule in his favor. 18. Angelina De Guzman, et al. vs. Gloria A. Chico G.R. No. 195445. December 7, 2016 Facts: The subject of this case is a property situated at 7-A 32 A. Bonifacio Street, Bangkal, Makati City, previously registered under the name of petitioners, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 164900. On January 14, 2009, respondent filed (for the same property), an Ex Parte Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession (LRC Case No. M-5188) with the RTC of Makati City. This ex parte petition was raffled to Branch 59 (court a quo ). RTC denied petitioners motion. It ruled that the ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession filed by respondent in LRC Case No. M5188, although denominated as a petition, is not an initiatory pleading, and, thus, does not require a certificate of nonforum shopping. Issue: Whether a certificate against forum shopping is required in a petition or motion for issuance of a writ of possession? Ruling: No certificate against forum shopping is required in a petition or motion for issuance of a writ of possession. We affirm the ruling of the CA that a certificate against forum shopping is not a requirement in an ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession. An ex parte petition for the issuance of writ of possession is not a compl aint or other initiatory pleading as contemplated in Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. What distinguishes a motion from a petition or other pleading is not its form or the title given by the party executing it, but rat her its purpose. A petition for the issuance of a writ of possession does not aim to initiate new litigation, but rather issues as an incident

or consequence of the original registration or cadastral proceedings. As such, the requirement for a forum shopping certification is dispelled. 19. Majestic Plus International, Inc. vs. Bullion I nvestment and Development Corporation/Majestic Plus International, Inc. Vs. Bullion Investment and Development Corporation, et al. G.R. No. 201017/G.R. No. 215289. December 5, 2016 Facts: On June 30, 2003, the City of Manila, through then City Mayor Joselito Atienza, and Bullion, represented by its President Roland Lautachang, entered into a Contract for the lease of the said property for a period of twenty-five (25) years. Under the Contract, Bullion, as lessee, agreed to construct two 4-storey buildings, one of which shall be used as an extension office of the Manila City Hall for its institutional services, while the other shall be used for commercial purposes. Bullion then commenced construction and was able to finish and turn over the City Hall extension building to the Manila City Government. Bullion filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA which granted the aforesaid Petition and annulled and set aside the Special Order and the two (2) other assailed Orders. Hence, this pet ition. Issue:  Whether Branch 46, RTC of Manila, despite being designated as an SCC, has jurisdiction to hear and decide Majestic's suit for specific performance? Rulings: Yes. The matter of whether the RTC resolves an issue in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court is only a matter of procedure and has nothing to do with the question of jurisdiction. Moreover, it should be noted that Special Commercial Courts (SCCs) are still considered courts of general jurisdiction. Section 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799, otherwise known as The Securities Regulation Code, directs merely the Supreme Court's designation of RTC branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes. The assignment of intracorporate disputes to secs is only for the purpose of streamlining the workload of the RTCs so that certain branches thereof like the SCCs can focus only on a particular subject matter. 20. 24-K Property Ventures, Inc. Vs. Young Builders Corporation G.R. No. 193371. December 5, 2016 Facts: On 7 August 1996, petitioner and respondent entered into a Construction Contract wherein respondent undertook to construct for petitioner a 20-storey office/residential building along Tomas Morato, Quezon City for the price of P165,000,000.00. In 1988, petitioner was hit by the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 and it incurred arrearages. Respondent refused to continue with the construction unless petitioner issued securities for its unpaid obligations. Petitioner then executed in respondent's favor a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over two parcels of land covered by TCT No. N-164112 and No. N-164113. At that time, these lots were bare and without improvements. In 1999, respondent filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against petitioner before the CIAC. Meanwhile, petitioner commenced the construction of another condominium project on the two p arcels of land. Issue: Whether the levy effected on the real properties of petitioner was proper. Ruling: No. It is doctrinal that "a lawful levy of execution is a prerequisite to an execution sale, either of real estate or of personalty, to the conveyance executed in pursuant thereof, and to the title acquired thereby." A proper levy is indispensable to a valid execution sale, and an execution sale, unless preceded by a proper levy, is void and the purchaser in said sale acquires no title to the property sold thereunder. In the case at bar, we find that the levy effected on the real properties of petitioner was improper. A valid demand for the immediate payment of the full amount stated in the writ of execution and all lawful fees is necessary to a proper levy. 21. Fernando Medical Enterprises, Inc. vs. Wesleyan University Philippines, Inc. G.R. No. 207970. January 20, 2016 Facts:  From January 9, 2006 until February 2, 2007, the petitioner, a domestic corporation dealing with medical equipment and supplies, delivered to and installed medical equipment and supplies at the respondent's hospital. According to the petitioner, the respondent paid only P67,3 57,683.23 of its total obligation of P123,901,650.00, leaving unpaid the sum of P54,654,195.54. After the RTC denied the motion to dismiss on July 19, 2009, the respondent filed its answer. On September 28, 2011, the petitioner filed its Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings, stating that the respondent had admitted the material allegations of its complaint and thus did not tender any issue as to such allegations.

The respondent opposed the Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings, arguing that it had specifically denied the material allegations in the complaint.

Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in going outside of the respondent's answer by relying on the allegations contained in the latter's complaint for rescission?

Ruling: Yes, the Court of Appeals erred in going outside of the respondent's answer by relying on the allegations contained in the latter's complaint for rescission. In order to resolve the petitioner's Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings, the trial court could rely only on the answer of the respondent filed in Civil Case No. 09-122116. Under Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules of Court, the answer was the sole basis for ascertaining whether the complaint's material allegations were admitted or properly denied. As such, the respondent's averment of payment of the total of P78,401,650.00 to the petitioner made in its complaint for rescission had no relevance to the resolution of the Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings. The CA thus wrongly held that a factual issue on the total liability of the respondent remained to be settled through trial on the merits. It should have openly wondered why the respondent's answer in Civil Case No. 09 -122116 did not allege the supposed payment of the P78,401,650.00, if the payment was true, if only to buttress the specific denial of its alleged liability. The omission exposed the respondent's denial of liability as insincere. 22. HEIRS OF DANILO ARRIENDA VS. ROSARIO KALAW, RESPONDENTS G.R. NO. 204314 FACTS: On January 18, 2001, Danilo Arrienda filed against herein respondent and three other persons a Complaint for unlawful detainer with the MTC of Calauan, Laguna, alleging that: he is the owner of an 11,635 square-meter parcel of land located along National Road, Barangay Lamot 2, Calauan, Laguna; the seller of the property warranted that the same is not tenanted and is free from any occupants or claimants. Despite such warranty, Arrienda later discovered, that a portion of it was actually being occupied by herein respondent and the other defendants. After talking to respondent and the other defendants, petitioner allowed them to continue occupying the premises in which they have settled, subject to the condition that they will immediately vacate the same upon prior notice by Arrienda that he will be needing it . ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over Arrienda's appeal of the MTC Decision. RULING: Yes. It bears to reiterate that under Batas Pambansa Bilang. 129 (B.P. Blg. 129), as amended by Republic Act No. 7691 (RA 7691), RTCs are endowed with original and appellate jurisdictions. For purposes of the present petition, Section 19 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, provides for the RTCs’ exclusive original jurisdiction in civil cases involving title to or possession of real property or any interest therein. Finally, in coming up with its Decision, the RTC made an exhaustive and definitive finding on Arrienda's main cause of action. It is within the RTC's competence to make this finding in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, as it would, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. 23. SPOUSES HERMINIO E. ERORITA and EDITHA C. ERORITA vs. SPOUSES LIGAYA DUMLAO and ANTONIO DUMLAO G.R. No. 195477 FACTS: Spouses Antonio and Ligaya Dumlao are the registered owners of a parcel of l and located at Barangay San Mariano, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, and covered by TCT No. T -53000. The San Mariano Academy structures are built on the property. The Spouses Dumlao bought the property in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale on April 25, 1990. Because the former owners, Spouses Herminio and Editha Erorita, failed to redeem it, the title was consolidated in the buye rs’ name. On December 16, 2002, the Spouses Dumlao asked the petitioners to vacate the property. Although the Spouses Erorita wanted to comply, they could not immediately close the school without clearance from the Department of Education, Culture, and Sports to whom they are accountable. On March 4, 2004, the Spouses Dumlao filed a complaint for recovery of possession before the Regional Trial Court (RTC ) against the defendants Hernan, Susan, and the Spouses Erorita. ISSUE: Whether the RTC had jurisdiction? RULING: No, the allegations in the complaint determine the nature of an action and jurisdiction over the case.5Jurisdiction does not depend on the complaint’s caption.6 Nor is jurisdiction changed by the defenses in the answer; otherwise, the defendant may easily delay a case by raising other issues, then, claim lack of jurisdiction. Thus, although the complaint

bears the caption "recovery of possession," its allegations contain the jurisdictional facts for an unlawful detainer case. Under RA 7691, an action for unlawful detainer is within the MTC’s exclusive jurisdiction regardless of the property’s assessed value. In the present case, however, the complaint clearly contained the elements of an unlawful detainer case. Thus, the case should have been filed with the MTC. The RTC had no jurisdiction over this case. 24. Fairland Knitcraft Corporation Vs. Arturo Loo Po G.R. No. 217694; January 27, 2016 FACTS: In a complaint for unlawful detainer, filed before the MeTC, Fairland alleged that it was the owner of Condominium Unit No. 205 in Cedar Mansion II on Ma. Escriba Street, Pasig City. The said unit was leased by Fairland to Po by verbal agreement, with a rental fee of P20,000.00 a month, to be paid by Po at the beginning of each month. From March 2011, Po had continuously failed to pay rent. For said reason, Fairland opted not to renew the lease agreement anymore. ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint sufficiently alleges a cause o f action for unlawful detainer. RULING: Yes. A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following: (1) initially, possession of the property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by the plaintiff to the defendant of the termination of the latter's right of po ssession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property, and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one (1) year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment. There is no question that the complaint filed by Fairland adequately alleged a cause of action for unlawful detainer. 25. SPS. ROLANDO AND SUSIE GOLEZ v. HEIRS OF DOMINGO BERTULDO GR No. 201289, May 30, 2016 FACTS: In 1976, Benito Bertuldo (Benito) sold Lot 1024 to Asuncion Segovia acting for her daughter, Susie Golez They executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 10, 1976, clearly indicating the lot's metes and bounds. After the sale, the Sps. Golez started the construction of their house on Lot 1025, instead of on Lot 1024. On February 17, 2009, the respondents filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer   against the Sps. Golez with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of President Roxas, Capiz. ISSUE: whether or not the unlawful detainer case filed by the respondents against the petitioners was proper. RULING: No. In the present case, the Sps. Golez's possession of Lot 1025 as unlawful from the start and bereft of contractual or legal basis. Domingo did not tolerate the possession of Sps. Golez since he had immediately objected and protested over the construction of Sps. Golez's house on Lot 1025. Notably, the RTC expressly found that there was no tolerance or permission on the part of Domingo on the construction of the Sps. Golez house on Lot 1025. Since tolerance has not been effectively alleged in the complaint, the complaint fails to state a cause of action for unlawful detainer. Therefore, the MCTC had no jurisdiction over the respondents' complaint. 26. ALICIA Y. LAUREL, substituted by her sole heir and legal representative JUAN MIGUEL Y. LAUREL, v. FERDINAND M. V ARDELEON FACTS: On July 23, 2004, petitioner Alicia Y. Laurel filed a Complaint5 for recovery of possession and ownership and/or quieting of title against respondent Ferdinand M. Vardeleon concerning a 20,306-square meter island in Caticlan, Malay, Aldan. During the scheduled October 12, 2005 hearing, petitioner was present, together with substitute counsel Atty. Roy Villa and her first witness. Petitioner moved in open court to postpone trial on the ground that there are pending motions that have to be resolved, and that the substitute lawyer had yet to confer with the witness, since her true counsel, Atty. De la Vega - who originally interviewed the witness - was not present. The case was dismissed on the ground of failure to prosecute on petitioner's part, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. ISSUE: Whether or not the court committed serious error and grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner's complaint?

RULING: This Court has said that "[t]he fundamental test for non prosequitur is whether, under the circumstances, the plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude. There must be unwillingness on the part of the plaintiff to prosecute. The Court declares that the trial court erred in dismissing Civil Case No. 7249, and the appellate court should not have affirmed such dismissal. Petitioner's actuations indicate that she was not at all unwilling to prosecute her case; nor can it be said that - as the trial court puts it - she "refused" to present her evidence. Far from these, she was indeed more than eager to see her case through. When she instituted Civil Case No. 7249 in 2004, petitioner was already eighty-one (81) years of age. Yet, despite her advanced age, the record indicates that petitioner attended the scheduled hearing of October 12, 2005, together with her counsel and the first witness - only that lawyer who attended was a mere proxy, and not petitioner's true counsel who previously conferred with the witness. 27. Jose Sanico vs. People of the Philippines G.R. No. 198753, March 25, 2015 FACTS: Petitioner Sanican and Batiquin were convicted for Violation of Sectio n 103 of Republic Act No. 7942 otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995. The two were criminally charged for trespassing and theft of minerals before the MTCCarmenSogod- Cebu. However, the accused were declared not guilty for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, Sanico’ s counsel filed a notice of appeal in the MCTC. Then, RTC ordered Sanico to file his memorandum on appeal. Sanico did not comply; hence, the RTC dismissed the appeal on the ground of failure to file a memorandum on appeal with prejudice. Atty. Cañete, another lawyer acting for Sanico, filed a MR vis-à-vis the dismissal of the appeal, stating that Sanico had not filed the memorandum on appeal because he had been beset with problems due to his wife’s debilitating illness, as well as his first counsel, Atty. Baring’s own  medical condition which caused her to forget how she got this case and whom to contact as principal counsel hereof. RTC denied the MR. ISSUE: Whether CA committed reversible error in not nullifying the RTC’s order dismissing the appeal for failure to file a memorandum RULING: Both RTC and CA were guilty of the prejudicial error of misapplying the Rules of Court in its dismissal of the appeal timely made by the petitioner. In dismissing the appeal for the sole reason that he did not file the memorandum on appeal, the RTC wrongly relied on Section 7, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, which authorizes the dismissal of the appeal once the appellant fails to file the memorandum on appeal. While, CA erroneously upheld the RTC. The failure to file the memorandum on appeal is a ground for the RTC to dismiss the appeal ONLY in civil cases. The same rule does not apply in criminal cases, because Section 9(c) Rule 122, imposes on the RTC the duty to decide the appeal “on the basis of the entire record of the case and of such memoranda or briefs as may have been filed” upon the submission of the appellate memoranda or briefs, or upon the expiration of the period to file the same. Hence, the dismissal of the petitioner’s appeal cannot be properly premised on the failure to file the memorandum on appeal. Having timely perfected his appeal by filing the notice of appeal in the MCTC, the petitioner was entitled to expect that the RTC would resolve his appeal in due course, whether he filed his memorandum on appeal or not. The unwarranted dismissal of the appeal by the RTC was, therefore, an outright denial of due process to him in a manner that occasioned severe prejudice because his conviction was not reviewed despite his first-time appeal being a matter of right, and because his conviction was then declared to have attained finality, causing the execution of the decision as to its civil aspect. 28. Heirs of Arturo Garcia I vs. Municipality of Iba, Zambales G. R. No. 162217, July 22, 2015 FACTS: The late Melecio R. Bueno was the tenant-farmer beneficiary of an agricultural land located in Poblacion, Iba, Zambales. On October 18, 1999, he brought an ejectment suit in the MTC of Iba against the Municipality of  Iba, Province of Zambales, claiming that in 1983, the Municipality of Iba had constructed the public market on a substantial portion of his land without his consent; and that his repeated demands for the Municipality of Iba to vacate the property had remained unheeded. After due proceedings, the MTC ruled in favor of Bueno. Thence, the Municipality of Iba filed its notice of appeal, but the MTC denied due course to the notice of appeal. Thus, the Municipality of Iba filed its petition for certiorari in the RTC in Iba, Zambales to assail the denial of due course by the MTC. The case was assigned to Branch 69 which ultimately granted the petition for certiorari. The petitioners, who meanwhile substituted Bueno upon his death, moved for the reconsideration of  the judgment granting the petition for certiorari, but the RTC denied their motion for reconsideration. Aggrieved, the petitioners appealed to the CA by petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. ISSUE: Whether the dismissal is proper for being not the proper mode of appeal? RULING: An appeal brings up for review any error of judgment committed by a c ourt with jurisdiction over the subject of  the suit and over the persons of the parties, or any error committed by the court in the exercise of its jurisdiction

amounting to nothing more than an error of judgment. It is very crucial to be cognizant of the different modes of appeal. Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court w hich states that “xxx the appeal to the Court of  Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal xxx”in conjunction with Section 3 and Section 4 of Rule 41, the p etitioners should have filed a notice of appeal in the RTC within the period of 15 days from their notice of the judgment of the RTC, and within the same period should have paid to the clerk of the RTC the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. The filing of the notice of appeal within the period allowed by the Rules sets in motion the remedy of ordinary appeal because the appeal is deemed perfected. It is upon the perfection of the appeal filed in due time, and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties that the RTC shall lose jurisdiction over the case. On the other hand, the non-payment of the appellate court docket fee within the reglementary period as required by Section 4, is both mandatory and jurisdictional, the non-compliance with which is fatal to the appeal, and is a ground to dismiss the appeal under Section 1, ( c), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court. The compliance with these requirements was the only way by which they could have perfected their appeal from the adverse judgment of the RTC. 29. BPI Family Savings Bank vs. Sps. Benedicto & Teresita Yujuico G.R. No. 175796, July 22, 2015 FACTS: City of Manila filed a complaint against the respondents for the expropriation of five parcels of land located in Tondo, Manila and registered in the name of respondent Teresita Yujuico. Two of the parcels of land, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 261331 and TCT No. 261332, were previously mortgaged to Citytrust Banking Corporation, the petitioner’s prede cessor-in-interest, under a First Real Estate Mortgage Contract. Regional Trial Court in Manila (Manila RTC) rendered its judgment declaring the five parcels of land expropriated for public use. The judgment became final and executory on January 28, 2001 and was entered in the book of entries of judgment. The petitioner subsequently filed a Motion to Intervene in Execution with Partial Opposition to Defendant’s Request to Release, but the RTC denied the motion for having been “filed out of time.” ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred when it ruled the case filed by BPI should be dismissed on the ground of improper venue? RULING: It is basic that the venue of an action depends on whether it is a real or a personal action. According to Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is one that affects title to or po ssession of real property, or aninterest therein. The real action is to be commenced and tried in the proper court having jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. In contrast, the Rules of Court declares all other actions as personal actions. The venue of a personal action is the place where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a nonresident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff. Given the foregoing, the petitioner correctly brought the case in the Makati RTC because Makati was the place where the main office of the petitioner was located. 30. Grace Insigne et al vs. Abra Valley Colleges Inc. G.R. No. 204089, July 29, 2015 FACTS: Petitioners Grace Borgoña Insigne, Diosdado Borgoña, Osbourne Borgoña, Imelda Borgoña Rivera, Aristotle Borgoña are siblings of the full blood. Respondent Francis Borgoña (Francis) is their older half-blood brother. The petitioners are the children of the late Pedro Borgoña (Pedro) by his second wife, Teresita Valeros, while Francis was Pedro’s son by his first wife, Humvelina Avila. In his lifetime, Pedro was the founder, president and majority stockholder of respondent Abra Valley Colleges, Inc. (Abra Valley), a stock corporation. After Pedro’s death, Francis succeeded him as the president of Abra Valley. On March 26, 2002, the petitioners, along with their brother Romulo Borgoña and Elmer Reyes, filed a complaint (with application for preliminary injunction) and damages in the RTC against Abra Valley praying, among others, that the RTC direct Abra Valley to allow them to inspect its corporate books and records, and the minutes of meetings, and to provide them with its financial statements. Due to Abra Valley’s failure to file its responsive pleading within the reglementary period provided in the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies, theRTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners. ISSUE: Whether the lower court properly dismissed the case on the ground of the petitioners’  failure to comply with the order issued by the RTC to produce stock certificates? RULING: Under the circumstances, the dismissal of the case on the basis that "the documents presented are not Stock  Certificates as boldly announced by the plaintiff’s counsel, hence, plaintiffs failed to comply with  the order of the Court dated March 8, 2010" was unwarranted and unreasonable. Although Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court expressly

empowers the trial court to dismiss the complaint motu proprio or u pon motion of thedefendant if, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to comply with any order of the court, the power to dismiss is not to wielded indiscriminately, but only when the non-compliance constitutes a willful violation of  an order of consequence to the action. As we have seen, however, the dismissal of the case by virtue of Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court should be undone because the petitioners’ production of the stock certificates was rendered superfluous by their submission of other competent means of establishing their shareholdings in Abra Valley. 31. Nilo Chiongian vs. Victoria Benitez-Lirio et al G.R. No. 162692, August 26, 2015 FACTS: The late Vicente Benitez was married to Isabel Chipongian, the petitioner's sister. Isabel had predeceased Vicente, who died on November 13, 1989. The couple had no offspring. On July 20, 1982, after the death of Isabel, Vicente and the petitioner had executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement respecting the estate of Isabel, whereby the latter waived all his rights to the estate of Isabel in favor of Vicente. According to the petitioner, however, Vicente executed an affidavit on the same date whereby he affirmed that the waiver did not extend to the paraphernal properties of Isabel. Upon the death of Vicente, Victoria Benitez Lirio (Victoria), a sister of Vicente, and Feodor Benitez Aguilar (Feodor), a nephew of Vicente, initiated proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Vicente in RTC. RTC appointed Feodor the administrator of Vicente’ s estate and issued the letters of administration to Feodor. The petitioner intervened in Special Proceedings No. SP-797. Feodor countered with the request that he be allowed to continue to administer all the properties left by Vicente, including the paraphernal properties of Isabel. Petitioner specifically moved for the exclusion of the paraphernal properties of Isabel from Vicente’s estate. However, he withdrew the motion even before the RTC could rule on it. Instead, he filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Complaint-in-Intervention. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner timely filed his appeal RULING: Pursuant to Sec. 2(a), Rule 41, the proper mode of appealing a judgment or final order in special proceedings is by notice of appeal and record on appeal. Under Section 3 of Rule 41, a party who wants to appeal a judgment or final order in special proceedings has 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order within which to perfect an appeal because he will be filing not only a notice of appeal but also a record on appeal that will require the approval of the trial court with notice to the adverse party. The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. In this case, for the petitioner, therefore, the period for perfecting the appeal by record on appeal was 30 days from notice of the final order dismissing the intervention. The start of the period of 30 days happened on September 18, 1998, the date when his counsel received the decision dismissing his intervention. However, the entire time from the filing of his Motion for Reconsideration on October 2, 1998 until his receipt of the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration on March 18, 1999 should be deducted from the reckoning of the period to perfect his appeal. Considering that the petitioner did not submit a record on appeal in accordance with Section 3 of Rule 41, he did not perfect his appeal of the judgment dismissing his intervention. As a result, the dismissal became final and immutable. 32. Rogelio Baronda vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 161006, October 14, 2015 FACTS: Respondent Hideco Sugar Milling Co., Inc. (HIDECO) employed the petitioner as a mud press truck driver with a daily salary of P281.00. He hit HIDECO’s transmission lines while operating a dump truck, causing a total factory blackout from 9:00 pm until 2:00 am of the next day. Power was eventually restored but the restoration cost HIDECO damages totaling P26,481.11. Following the incident, HIDECO served a notice of offense requiring him to explain the incident within three days from notice. He complied. Thereafter, the management conducted its investigation, and, finding him guilty of negligence, recommended his dismissal. The Voluntary Arbitrator dismissed petitioner’s motion and granted HIDECO’s motion for execution. Petitioner filed another motion for execution praying that a writ of execution requiring HIDECO to pay to him unpaid waged, 13th month pay and bonuses; which was granted by the Voluntary Arbitrator. HIDECO instituted a special civil action for certiorari in the Court of Appeals averring that the Voluntary Arbitrator had acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. ISSUE: Whether or not petition for certiorari was the proper remedy. RULING: HIDECO’s proper recourse was to appeal by petition for review and not petition for certiorari. Even if the error sought to be reviewed concerned grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Voluntary Arbitrator, the remedy was an appeal in due course by filing the petition for review within 10 days from notice of the award or decision. This is because certiorari, as an extraordinary remedy, was available only when there was no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary, course of law. The justification for HIDECO’ s resort to the extraordinary equitable remedy of certiorari did not exist due to the availability of appeal, or other ordinary remedies in law to which HIDECO as the aggrieved party could

resort. Although it is true that certiorari cannot be substitute for a lost appeal, and that either remedy was not an alternative of the other, we have at times permitted the resort to certiorari despite availability of appeal or of any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 33. Tung Hui Chung and Tong Hong Chung vs. Shih Chi Huang G.R. No. 170679, March 9, 2016 FACTS: On September 6, 2001, the petitioners, both Australian citizens, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 49, in Manila an amended complaint6 to recover from the respondent a sum of money and damages (with prayer for a writ of attachment). The suit, docketed as Civil Case No. 01-101260, involved the contract to sell dated October 30, 2000, whereby the respondent, as the vendor, undertook to deliver to the petitioners, as the vendees, shares of stock worth P10,606,266.00 in Island Information and Technology, Inc. (the corporation), a publicly listed corporation. The compromise agreement, which was signed by the respondent and by Eduard Alcordo, as the attorney-in-fact of the petitioners, with the assistance of their respective counsels, stipulating that the parties agreed to settle their respective claims and counterclaims, and the respondent acknowledged therein his obligation, was filed and granted by the Court. But the respondent did not pay the second installment despite demand. Instead, he filed in the CA a petition for annulment of judgment thereby seeking to nullify the amended order granting the application for the writ of attachment, and the order approving the compromise agreement. ISSUE: Whether or not judicial compromise agreement could no longer be assailed through certiorari. RULING: Compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties make reciprocal concessions to avoid litigation or to put an end to one already commenced. It attains the authority and effect of res judicata upon the parties upon its execution, and becomes immediately final and executory, unless rescinded by grounds which vitiate consent. Once stamped with judicial imprimatur, it ceases to be a mere contract between the parties, and becomes a judgment of the court, to be enforced through writ o f execution. The CA did not recognize that what it was asked to annul and set aside was no longer the compromise agreement of the parties but already the judgment based on the compromise agreement. The failure to recognize led the CA into granting the unprecedented relief of annulling the compromise agreement on the ground of fraud and lack of consent. In so doing, the CA acted without jurisdiction. First of all, the action before the CA was a special civil action for certiorari that had been brought on March 7, 2005, which was way beyond the period of 60 days from the rendition of the judgment based on the compromise agreement on October 2 0, 2003. With this stamp of judicial approval, the compromise agreement became more than a mere contract of the parties. The judicially approved agreement was thereby turned into a final judgment, immutable and unalterable, regardless of whether or not it rested on erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and regardless of whether the change would be by the court that rendered it or the highest court of the land. 34. Andrew Fyfe et al vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc. G.R . NO. 160071, June 6, 2016 FACTS: In 1998, the respondent underwent rehabilitation proceedings in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which issued an order dated July 1, 1998 decreeing, among others, the suspension of all claims for payment against the respondent. To convince its creditors to approve the rehabilitation plan, the respondent decided to hire technical advisers with recognized experience in the airline industry. This led the respondent through its then Director Luis Juan K. Virata to consult with people in the industry, and in due course came to meet Peter W. Foster, formerly of Cathay Pacific Airlines. Foster, along with Michael R. Scantlebury, negotiated with the respondent on the details of a proposed technical services agreement. Foster and Scantlebury subsequently organized Regent Star Services Ltd. (Regent Star) under the laws of the British Virgin Islands. Petitioner and respondent entered into Technical Service Agreement (TSA) wherein under its terms, penalties shall be payable by the terminating party. Respondent sent notice to petitioner terminating the TSA for lack of confidence and wants to offset the penalty from its advance payment. Petitioner denied the refund and claim for offset and proposed to submit the issue to arbitration pursuant to their TSA. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for review should be dismissed for containing a defective verification/certification. RULING: There was sufficient compliance with the rule on verification and certification against forum shopping. The SPAs individually signed by the petitioners vested in their counsel the authority, among others, "to do and perform on my behalf any act and deed relating to the case, which it could legally do and perform, including any appeals or further legal proceedings." The authority was sufficiently broad to expressly and specially authorize their counsel, Atty. Ida Maureen

V. Chao-Kho, to sign the verification/certification on their behalf. The purpose of the verification is to ensure that the allegations contained in the verified pleading are true and correct, and are not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation; and that the pleading is filed in good faith. This purpose was met by the verification/certification made by Atty. Chao-Kho in behalf of the petitioners. 35. Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) Vs. Heirs of Gavina Ijordan, et al. G.R. No. 173140. January 11, 2016 Facts: On October 14, 1957, Julian Cuizon (Julian) executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale (Deed) covering Lot No. 4539 (subject lot) situated in Ibo, Municipality of Opon (now Lapu-Lapu City) in favor of the Civil Aeronautics Administration ((CAA), the predecessor-in-interest of petitioner Manila Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA). In 1980, the respondents caused the judicial reconstitution of the original certificate of title covering the subject lot. Consequently, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-2431 of the Register of Deeds of Cebu was reconstituted for Lot No. 4539 in the names of the respondents' predecessors-in-interest, namely, Gavina Ijordan, and Julian, Francisca, Damasina, Marciana, Pastor, Angela, Mansueto, Bonifacia, Basilio, Moises and Florencio, all surnamed Cuison. The respondents' ownership of the subject lot was evidenced by OCT No. RO-2431. They asserted that they had not sold their shares in the subject lot, and had not authorized Julian to sell their shares to MCIAA's predecessor-in-interest. Issues: Whether respondents are guilty of estoppel by laches? Rulings: No. MCIAA's assertion of estoppel or ratification to bar the respondents' contrary claim of ownership of their shares in the subject lot is bereft of substance. The doctrine of estoppel applied only to those who were parties to the contract and their privies or successors-in-interest. Moreover, the respondents could not be held to ratify the contract that was declared to be null and void with respect to their share, for there was nothing for them to ratify. Verily, the Deed, being null and void, had no adverse effect on the rights of the respondents in the subject lot. 36. Aldrin Jeff Cudia vs The Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015 Facts: Aldrin Jeff Cudia was a member of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Siklab Diwa Class of 2014. On November 14, 2013, Cudia’s class had a lesson examination in their Operations Research (OR) subject the schedule of which was from 1:30pm to 3pm. However, after he submitted his exam paper, Cudia made a query to their OR teacher. Said teacher, then asked Cudia to wait for her. Cudia complied and as a result, he was late for his next class (English). Later, the English teacher reported Cudia for being late. Meanwhile, Cudia’s family brought the case to the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) where it was alleged that PMA’s “sham” investigation violated Cudia’s rights to  due process, education, and privacy of communication. Eventually, the CRAB ruled against Cudia. This ruling was affirmed by the AFP Chief of Staff. But on the other hand, the CHR found in favo r of Cudia. PMA averred that CHR’s findings are at best recommendatory. Cudia filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus before the Supreme Court. PMA opposed the said petition as it argued that the same is not proper as a matter of policy and that the court should avoid interfering with military matters. ISSUE: Whether or not Cudia’s petitions is proper. 2. Whether or not the PMA can validly dismiss Cudia based on its findings. RULING: Mandamus will not prosper in this case. Cudia’s prayer that PMA should be compelled to reinstate him as well as to give him his supposed academic awards is not proper. The Courts, even the Supreme Court, cannot compel PMA to do so because the act of restoring Cudia’s rights and entitlements as a cadet as well as his awards is a discretionary act. Mandamus cannot be availed against an official or government agency, in this case PMA, whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or judgment. Further, such act which PMA was sought by Cudia to perform is within PMA’s academic freedom as an educational institution – and such performance is beyond the jurisdiction of courts. The petition for certiorari is allowed because the issue herein is whether or not PMA and its responsible officers acted with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed Cudia. Under the Constitution, that is the duty of the courts to decide actual controversies and to determine whether or not a government branch or instrumentality acted with grave abuse of discretion. Thus, PMA cannot argue that judicial intervention into military affairs is not proper as a matter of policy. Suffice it to say that judicial non-interference in military affairs is not an absolute rule. 37. Baclaran Marketing Corporation vs. Fernando C. Nieva and Mamerto Sibulo, Jr. G.R. No. 189881, April 19, 2017

Facts: The case stemmed from a vehicular collision in Taytay Rizal, between a 10-wheeller truck owned by Petitioner BMC and driven by its employee Ricardo Mendoza and a car owned and driven by Defendant Sibulo. The Antipolo Court ruled that the damages suffered by Defendant Sibulo were the result of his own reckless and imprudent driving. On Appeal, the CA reversed the Antipolo Court and held that Mendoza’s negligence caused the collision. It awarded Sibulo damages and the Decision became final and executory. The Antipolo Court issued a Writ of Execution. Petitioner BMC failed to redeem the property within one year from the sale, Nieva consolidated ownership over it. A Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Possession over the property in Paranaque City was granted. Issue: Whether the CA erred in dismissing BMC’s petition for annulment of judgment. Ruling: Corollarily, an order implementing a writ of execution issued over certain real properties is also not a final order as it merely enforces a judicial process over an identified object. It does not involve an adjudication on the merits or determination of the rights of the part ies. Closely related to a writ of execution is a writ of possession. In LZK Holdings and Development Corp. v. Planters Development Bank , the SC explained that a writ of possession is a writ of execution employed to enforce a judgment to recover the possession of land. It commands the sheriff to enter the land and give its possession to the person entitled under the judgment. Thus, similar to a writ of execution, a writ of possession is not a final order which may be annulled under Rule 47. It is merely a judicial process to enforce a final order against the losing party. For this reason the Decision of the Antipolo Court ordering the issuance of writ of possession is also not amenable to an action for annulment of judgment. 38. Laude v. Judge Ginez-Jabalde, et al. G.R. No. 217456, 24 November 2015 FACTS: This involves the celebrated case of Jeffrey “Jennifer” Laude (Jennifer) killed at the Celzone Lodge on Ramon Magsaysay Drive in Olongapo City allegedly by 19-year-old US Marine L/CPL Joseph Scott Pemberton (Pemberton). A Complaint for murder was filed by Jennifer’s sibling, Marilou S. Laude, against Pemberton before the Office of the City Prosecutor which Information was later filed with the RTC in Olongapo City. On 19 December 2014, Pemberton surrendered personally to the RTC Judge and was later arraigned. On the same day of Arraignment petitioner Laude filed an Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender the Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail and a Motion to Allow Media Coverage. The motion was scheduled on 22 December 2014, 2PM. According to petitioners, they were only able to serve the Motion on Pemberton’s counsel through registered mail. In any case, they claim to have also “furnished a copy of the [M]otion personally … at the hearing of the [M]otion. On 23 December 2014, the Urgent Motion was denied, as well as its motion for reconsideration. ISSUE: Are the averments of the petitioner, that the 3-day notice rule should be should be liberally applied due to the timing of the arrest and arraignment, tenable? RULING: NO. Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court clearly makes it a mandatory rule that the adverse party be given notice of hearing on the motion at least three days prior. Failure to comply with this notice requirement renders the motion defective consistent with protecting the adverse party’s right to procedural due process. While the general rule is that a motion that fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 15 is a mere scrap of paper, an exception may be made and the motion may still be acted upon by the court, provided doing so will neither cause prejudice to the other party nor violate his or her due process rights. The adverse party must be given time to study the motion in order to enable him or her to prepare properly and engage the arguments of the movant. In this case, the general rule must apply because Pemberton was not given sufficient time to study petitioners’ Motion, thereby depriving him of his right to procedural due process. 39. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE V. PUREGOLD DUTY FREE, INC. G.R. No. 202789, June 22, 2015 Facts: Puregold had been issued Certificate of Tax Exemption pursuant to Sec. 5 of EO 80. In Coconut Oil Refiners v. Torre, however, the Court annulled the adverted Sec. 5 of EO 80. Then Deputy Commissioner issued a Preliminary Assessment Notice regarding unpaid VAT and excise tax on wines, liquors and tobacco products imported by Puregold. The latter protested the assessment. Pending the resolution of Puregold's protest, Congress enacted RA 9399, which provides that availment of the tax amnesty relieves the qualified taxpayers of any civil, criminal and/or administrative liabilities arising from, or incident to, nonpayment of taxes, duties and other charges. Puregold availed itself of the tax amnesty. However, it received a formal letter of demand from the BIR for the payment of the deficiency VAT and excise taxes. In its responseletter, Puregold requested the cancellation of the assessment on the ground that it has already availed of the tax amnesty under RA 9399. Puregold filed a Petition for Review with the CTA. The CTA 2nd Division denied CIR's MR. The CIR filed a Petition for Review with the CTA en banc which was also denied. The CIR's motion for reconsideration was likewise

denied. Thus, the CIR filed with this Court the present petition which introduced an entirely new matter, i.e., based on its Articles of Incorporation, Puregold's principal place of business is in Metro Manila for which reason it cannot avail itself of the benefits extended by RA 9399. Issue: Whether or not the allegation of the CIR regarding the principal place of business of Puregold can be considered on appeal. Ruling: No. During the proceedings in the CTA, the CIR never challenged Puregold's eligibility to avail of the tax amnesty under RA 9399 on the ground that its principal place of business, per its Articles of Incorporation, is in Metro Manila and not in Clark Field, Pampanga. Neither did the CIR present the supposed Articles of Incorporation nor formally offer the same in evidence for the purpose of pro ving that Puregold was not entitled to the tax amnesty under RA 9399. Hence, the Court cannot take cognizance, much less consider, this argument as a ground to divest Puregold of its right to avail of the benefits of RA 9399. In any event, assuming arguendo that petitioner's new allegation can be raised on appeal, the same deserves short shrift. 40. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. GAYAM PASIMIO GR NO. 205590, SEPTEMBER 2, 2015 Facts: Pasimio filed a case for collection o f a sum of money pursuant to the bank deposits she had with PNB. PNB ho wever, after presenting several notarized documents and promissory notes presenting the loans secured by the deposited amount refused to deliver back the deposited amount in light of the compensation when Pasimio failed to pay those loans. The RTC rendered a decision by relying on the statements of Pasimio that she was defrauded in signing pro forma forms which serves as evidence of her loans to the bank. Th e CA affirmed the decision of the RTC and denied PNB’s claim with respect to questions of facts, because the CA said that it is not a trier of facts. Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in refusing rules on factual issues. Ruling: Yes. Section 9 of Bates Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, categorically states that the CA has, inter alia, the power to try cases, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction. It is also w orthy to note that the appellate court's reliance on the factual findings of the trial court is hinged on the latter's firsthand opportunity to hear the witnesses and to observe their demeanor during the trial. However, when such findings are not anchored on their credibility and their testimonies, but on the assessment of documents that are available to appellate magistrates and subject to their scrutiny, reliance on the trial courts factual findings finds no application. The CA's regrettable cavalier treatment of PNB's appeal is inconsistent with Rule 41 of the Rules of Court and with the usual course of judicial proceedings. Thus, in insisting that it is not a trier of facts and implying that it had no choice but to adopt the RTC's factual findings, the CA shirked from its function as an ap pellate court to independently evaluate the merits of this case. To accept the CA's aberrant stance is to trivialize its review function, but, perhaps worse, render useless one of the reasons for its institution. 41. STAR ELECTRIC CORPORATION vs. R & G CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT AND TRADING, INC. G.R. No. 212058, December 07, 2015 FACTS: Star Electric entered into a Construction Contract with R&G where it undertook the installation of electrical, plumbing, and mechanical works in Grami Empire Hotel payable via progress billing method. R&G refused to pay Star Electric’s progess billin gs despite repeated demands thus Star Electric informed R&G that it would not continue to work unless paid. The next day, Star Electric received a letter from R&G that it was terminating its Contract with them claiming that most delivered breakers were second-hand and the rough-in materials were installed improperly. The overall progress of work has also been paid with according to R&G as per the down payment. Thereafter, Star Electric filed a complaint with the RTC to collect the unpaid billings. According to R&G, they refused to pay the progress bills because Star Electric was allegedly guilty of delay and unacceptable workmanship that they even had to contract with CP Giron and PTL Power to repair the alleged defective work of Star Electric. ISSUE: Whether or not it is proper for the Supreme Court to resolve questions of facts in this case. RULING: Yes. It is an established rule that in the exercise of its power of review under Rule 45, the Supreme Court only resolves questions of law and not questions of facts. However, this rule is not absolute. Jurisprudence has recognized several exceptions in which factual issues may be resolved by the Supreme Court, such as: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (4) when the findings of facts are c onflicting;

(5) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (6) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (7) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (8) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. In this case, the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court. 42. BLISS DEVELOPMENT CORP./HOME GUARANTY CORPORATION v. MONT ANO DIAZ, DOMINGO TAPAY, and EDGAR H. ARREZA G.R. No. 213233; August 5, 2015 Facts: Petitioner Bliss Development Corporation (BDC) the registered owner of Lot No. 27, Block 30, located in Quezon City, and covered by TCT No. 331582. On October 19, 1984, it entered into and executed a Deed of Sale over the said property in favor of Spouses Emiliano and Leonila Melgazo (Sps. Melgazo), both of whom are now deceased. By virtue of the several deeds of transfer of rights, Diaz, who got hold of his alleged right from Domingo Tapay, then paid BDC the amortizations due on the property, amounting to PHP 406,915.15, and BDC issued a permit to occupy the property in favor of Diaz. Diaz then introduced improvements on the property, amounting to PHP 700,000.00. In 1992, BDC executed a Contract to Sell in favor of Diaz. In 1994, BDC informed Diaz that respondent Edgar Arreza (Arreza) was claiming that the heirs of Sps. Melgazo sold to him the rights over the property and placed Diaz’s account in “inactive status.” To resolve the conflicting claims of Arreza and Diaz, BDC filed a complaint for Interpleader against them, before the RTC, Makati City. The RTC ruled that Arreza had a better right over the property. This decision became final and executory. In 1996, Diaz filed the present complaint for sum of money against BDC before the RTC, Makati. This was later amended to include Arreza and Tapay as defendants. Both BDC and Tapay argued that their respective acts w ere lawful and done in good faith. Arreza filed a Motion to Dismiss, citing res judicata, arguing that the claim of Diaz is a compulsory counterclaim that should have been pleaded in the Interpleader case. The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss, which the CA, on certiorari, affirmed. When the issue reached the SC in G.R. No. 133113 the Court ruled that the claim as against Arreza is barred by res judicata. Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in not d ismissing the appeal in view of the application of the doctrine of immutability of judgment in the decision of the cou rt in GR No. 133113. Ruling: No. The present claim is not barred by the court’s ruling in G.R. No. 133113— to the effect that Diaz can no longer claim reimbursement from Arreza because of res judicata—for his failure to allege the claim in the interpleader case between them. In G.R. No. 133113, the Court ruled that the claim against Arreza is barred by res judicata, because of a prior Interpleader case between Arreza and Diaz. It further ruled that the claim for reimbursement should have been alleged and proved in the prior case, and failure to do so bars any future action on such claims. In the case at bar, the essential elements of res judicata are not present. First, the interpleader case was between Arreza and Diaz. While it was BDC that initiated the interpleader case, the opposing parties in that prior case is, in fact, Arreza and Diaz. Second, the issues resolved in the interpleader case revolved around the conflicting claims of Arreza and Diaz, and not whatever c laim either of them may have against BDC. Thus, there is no identity of parties, nor identity of subject matter, between the interpleader case and the one at bar. 43. SM LAND INC. v. BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AND ARNEL PACIANO CASANOVA GR NO. 203655, SEPTEMBER 7, 2015 Facts: BCDA move for a second motion for reconsideration. Respondent-movants remain adamant in claiming that the assailed rulings of the Court would cause unwarranted and irremediable injury to the government, specifically to its major beneficiaries, the Department of National Defense (DND) and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). However, in this second motion for reconsideration they merely reiterate matters alr eady decided by this court. Further, the facts provided that this second motion for reconsideration was filed after the finality of the court’s decision

ISSUE: Whether or not BCDA’s move for a second motion for reconsideration be granted? Ruling: No. The concurrence of the following elements are required for a second motion for reconsideration to be entertained: a. The motion should satisfactorily explain why granting the same would be in the higher interest of justice; b. The motion must be made before the ruling sought to be reconsidered attains finality; c. If the ruling sought to be reconsidered was rendered by the Court through one of its Divisions, at least three (3) members of the said Division should vote to elevate the case to the Court En Banc; and d. The favorable vote of at least two-thirds of the Court En Banc’s actual membership must be mustered for the second motion for reconsideration to be granted.

Unfortunately for respondent-movants, the foregoing requirements do not obtain in the case at bench. 44. COMGLASCO CORPORATION/AGUILA GLASS vs. SANTOS CAR CHECK CENTER CORPORATION G.R. No. 202989, March 25, 2015 FACTS: In 2000, Santos Car Check Center (respondent) and Comglasco Corporation (petitioner) entered into a contract of lease for five years of a showroom in Iloilo City. However, petitioner advised respondent that it is pre-terminating the lease effective December 1, 2001, to which respondent did not accede, citing that their contract was for five years. On January 15, 2002, petitioner vacated the premises and stopped paying any rentals. Despite several demands, petitioner ignored the demand letters, hence respondent filed a case for breach of contract. In its answer, petitioner averred that business setbacks caused by the 1997 financial crisis caused it to pre-terminate the contract, which allows pre-termination with cause in the first three years of the contract and without cause after the third year. The trial court held petitioner liable for unpaid rentals from January 16, 2002 to August 15, 2003, as well as attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and exemplary damages. Petitioner appealed to the CA, but the same was denied. Hence, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with the SC, arguing that judgment on the pleadings was not proper in the case as it cannot be deemed to have admitted the material allegations in the complaint in its Answer, having pleaded a valid cause (business reverses caused by the 1997 financial crisis). It further averred that the RTC should have ordered the reception of evidence for that purpose, after which a summary judgment would have been proper. ISSUE: Whether or not judgment on the pleadings is proper in the case.

RULING: Yes. Petitioner maintains that the RTC was wrong to rule that its Answer to Santos’ complaint tendered no issue, or admitted the material allegations therein; that the court should have heard it out on the reason it invoked to justify its action to pre-terminate the parties’ lease; that therefore a summary judgment would have been the proper recourse, after a hearing. Petitioner’s alleged poor financial condition cannot release it from the binding ef fect of the contract of lease. As held in Central Bank v. Court of Appeals, cited by respondents, mere pecuniary inability to fulfill an engagement does not discharge a contractual obligation, nor does it constitute a defense to an action for specific performance. A judgment on the pleadings is a judgment on the facts as pleaded, and is based exclusively upon the allegations appearing in the pleadings of the parties and the accompanying annexes It is settled that the trial court has the discretion to grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by a party if there is no controverted matter in the case after the answer is filed. A genuine issue of fact is that which requires the presentation of evidence, as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false issue. The RTC acted correctly in resorting to Section 1 of Rule 34, on Judgment on the Pleadings, to cut short a needless trial. The petition is denied. 45. SPOUSES ABELARDO VALARAO AND FRANCISCA VALARAO, Petitioners, vs. MSC AND COMPANY G.R. No. 185331, June 8, 2016 FACTS: MSC and Company (respondent) entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with Spouses Valarao (petitioners) to develop the latter’s landholding in Angat, Bulacan for residential use. The parties entered into a subsequent Contra ct Agreement where petitioners undertook to reimburse respondent’s expenses for the project’s topographic survey, site relocation, subdivision plans and specifications. They also agreed to give an advance payment of P8.55M as mobilization expenses for land development which will be paid upon the contract's execution. However, petitioners failed to pay after demand and even after MSC completed 30% of the project. Respondent instituted a complaint for collection of sum of money, damages and rescission. The RTC rendered its decision in favor of respondent, o rdering the petitioners to pay the former P16.3 M and other reliefs. ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of finality or immutability of judgment has set in. RULING: Yes. The CA decision on February 21, 2008 had become final and executory. The al leged timely submitted Motion for Reconsideration filed on March 11, 2008 was not properly filed in its due form considering that the copy of the motion attached to the petition lacked material portions, including the end of its prayer and the required signature of counsel. Further, the counsel of petitioners failed to file a timely Motion for Extension or Petition with the SC despite the receipt of the May 28, 2008 resolution denying his motion for reconsideration. The doctrine of finality or immutability of judgment has already set in. Under this doctrine, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any act which violates this principle must immediately be struck down. The doctrine admits of cer tain exceptions, which are usually applied to serve substantial justice, particularly in the following instances: (1) the correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances transpire after

the finality of the decision, rendering its execution unjust and inequitable. None of these circumstances attends the present case. Although there are exceptions to this doctrine, none of the circumstance attends the abovementioned case. The petition is denied. 46. LEO Y. QUERUBIN, MARIA CORAZON M. AKOL, AND AUGUSTO C. LAGMAN, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC G.R. No. 218787, December 08, 2015 FACTS: The COMELEC released bidding documents for the Lease of Election Managment System and Optical Scan System to be used in the 2016 election. Smartmatic JV responded to the call and submitted its bid for the project as w ell as other companies. During the opening of the bids, Smartmatic JV informed the BAC of the COMELEC that one of its partners, SMTC, had a pending application with the SEC to amend its AOI. Smartmatic JV and another c ompany, Smartmatic later on was declared that Smartmatic was eligible for their vid. Later on, at the conduct of post-qualification, the BAC, disqualified Smartmatic JV for failure to submit valid AOI and the demo unit did not meet the technical requirements. Smartmatic moved to reconsider this but was denied thus they filed a Protest with the COMELEC en banc. The COMELEC en banc ruled in favor of Smartmatic and found that it met the requirement need for the project. The petitioner then questioned the sufficiency of what Smartmatic has sent with the Supreme Court via Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. ISSUE: Whether or not Rule 64 is the proper remedy. RULING: No. The Court has consistently held that the phrase "decision, order, or ruling" of c onstitutional commissions, the COMELEC included, that may be brought directly to the Supreme Court on certiorari is not all-encompassing, and that it only relates to those rendered in the commissions' exercise of adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. In the case of the COMELEC, this would limit the provision's coverage to the decisions, orders, or rulings issued pursuant to its authority to be the sole judge of generally all controversies and contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of elective offices. Consequently, Rule 64, which complemented the procedural requirement under Article IX-A, Section 7, should likewise be read in the same sense — that of excluding from its coverage decisions, rulings, and orders rendered by the COMELEC in the exercise of its administrative functions. In such instances, a Rule 65 petition for certiorari is the proper remedy. 47. SPOUSES FLORENTINO AND CONSOLACION TABALNO, Petitioners, vs. PAULINO T. DINGAL, SR. AND JUANITA GALOLA VDA. DE DINGAL G.R. No. 191526, October 5, 2015 FACTS: The case rooted from a forcible entry case filed by Paulino Dingal, Sr. (Paulino) before the MCTC Abuyog, Leyte against petitioners. On March 31, 2008, the MCTC ordered the petitioners to vacate the premises and restore its possession to Paulino; demolish any and all structures illegally constructed therein at their expense; and pay Paulino P50,000.00 as damages for the use and occupation of the lot in dispute, P30,000.00 as attorney's fees, and P3,500.00 as litigation expenses. Petitioners appealed the decision to the RTC. Paulino filed a Motion to Dismiss the appeal and prayed for the issuance of a writ of execution. During the pendency of the case, Paulino died. Hence, his wife filed an omnibus ex parte Motion for Substitution which was granted by the RTC. The petitioners contested the same and charged the RTC with grave abuse of discretion in granting the substitution of Paulino by his wife Juanita. They argue that, under Section 4, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the husband and the wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as may be provided by law. ISSUE: Whether or not the wife may substitute her deceased husband in a pending case. RULING: Yes. There are three kinds of actions available for the recovery of possession of real property: (1) accion interdictal or ejectment case; (b) accion publiciana; and (3) accion reivindicatoria. These actions survive the death of a party. Under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the heirs of a deceased party may be substituted for the latter on a pending action where the claim is not thereby extinguished. Forcible entry, as well as unlawful detainer, belongs to the class of action known as accion interdictal - where the issue is the right of physical or material possession of the subject real property that, therefore, survives the death of a party. Forcible entry cases are actions in personam - affecting only the particular person sought to be held liable - that generally do not survive a party's death. Nonetheless, because it is a real action that primarily and principally affects property and property rights, it survives the death of either party. The forcible entry case filed by Paulino against petitioners, survived his death. Hence, pursuant to Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, Juanita, the surviving spouse and heir of Paulino, could have and had properly been substituted for him in the forcible entry case. 48. RISOS-VIDAL V. COMELEC,

G.R. NO. 206666, JANUARY 21, 2015 FACTS: On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada, for the crime of plunder. Accordingly, the accused Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification. On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (former President Arroyo) extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada. On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of Manila. Risos-Vidal, the petitioner in this case, filed a Petition for Disqualification against former President Estrada before the COMELEC. Risos-Vidal anchored her petition on the theory that “[Former President Estrada] is Disqualified to Run for Public Office because of his Conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan sentencing Him to Suffer the Penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with Perpetual Absolute Disqualification.” The COMELEC, dismissed the petition for disqualification declaring categorically that [former President Estrada’s] right to seek public office has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo. Risos-Vidal invoked the Court’s jurisdiction by filing the present petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public office as a result of the pardon granted to him by former President Arroyo. RULING: The petition for certiorari lacks merit. Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. Risos-Vidal theorizes that former President Estrada is disqualified from running for Mayor o f Manila in the May 13, 2013 Elections, and remains disqualified to hold any local elective post despite the presidential pardon extended to him in 2007 by former President Arroyo for the reason that it (pardon) did not expressly provide for the remission of the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification, particularly the restoration of his (former President Estrada) right to vote and be voted upon for public office. She invokes Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code as the foundations of her theory. 49. Michael Guy vs. Atty. Glenn Gacott, GR No. 206147, January 13, 2016 Facts: It appears from the records that there was a breach of contract where the seller of transceivers that were defective was not able to replace the same or refund the amount paid. A suit was filed against the corporation that sold it which was later on discovered to be a partnership. Summons was served upon the partnership and after trial, judgment was rendered against it. Appeal not having made, the judgment became final and executory. The Sheriff levied upon a vehicle belonging to Guy, a partner, but he moved to lift the levy because he was not the judgment debtor. The motion was denied, holding that as a registered partnership, Guy should be treated as a general partner and may be held jointly and severally with the partnership. Issue: Whether a service of summons upon a partnership binds a partner? Ruling: Guy is not bound by the service of summons upon the partnership. This is especially so that summons was not served upon the general manager. The partnership was never shown to have been served with the summons through any of the enumerated authorized persons to receive such. Service of summons upon persons other than those enumerated in Section 11 is invalid. Even substantial compliance is not sufficient service of summons. It is not correct to say that it was immaterial whether the summons to the partnership was served on the theory that it was a corporation. Although a partnership is based on delectus personae or mutual agency, whereby a partner can generally represent the partnership in its business affairs, it is non sequitor that a suit against a partnership is necessarily a suit impleading each and every partner. It must be remembered that a partnership is a juridical entity that has a distinct and separate personality from the persons composing it. 50. ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION v. SPOUSES RODOLFO & GLORIA MADRIAGA GR No. 196670, October 12, 2016 Facts: Respondent Spouses Rodolfo and Gloria Madriaga obtained a P750,000.00 loan from Allied Bank (the Bank) secured by a real estate mortgage on their property. Respondents alleged to have religiously paid the loan from June 1996

to August 1999 through Leo Nolasco (Nolasco), the Bank's Creditor Investigator/Appraiser, in the aggregate amount of P628,953.96. In July 1999, respondents converted the remaining Balance of their loan, including interest, in the amount of P380,000.00 to a term loan. Payments were regularly coursed to Nolasco. On 25 May 2001, respondents received a demand letter from the Bank for the payment of P399,898.56. The Bank filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage over respondents' property. The respondents countered with a complaint for specific performance to examine the loan documents. Answer was filed by the bank. Then, they moved that they be allowed to file an amended complaint which was granted but which they never filed despite repeated extensions. They likewise failed to move that the case be set for pre-trial. The court dismissed the case for failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time and to comply with the order of the court. The Trial court ruled that they were trying to employ dilatory tactics to thwart the foreclosure of their property. Issue: Whether the trial court correctly dismissed respondents' complaint for failure to prosecute? Held: Under Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, the failure on the part of the plaintiff, without any justifiable cause, to comply with any order of the court or the Rules, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, may result in the dismissal of the complaint either motu proprio or on motion by the defendant. There are three (3) instances when the trial court may dismiss an action motu proprio, namely: 1) where the plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial; 2) where he fails to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time; and, 3) when he fails to comply with the rules or any order of the court. In this case, respondents should have set the case for pre-trial right after their receipt of the Bank's Rejoinder in May 2002. Instead, respondents sought to delay the proceedings by manifesting that an amended complaint will be. filed. Respondents' offered excuse that their financial status forced the successive withdrawals of t heir counsels deserves scant consideration. PAO even admitted that respondents failed the indigency test. The failure of respondents to promptly set the case for pre trial, without justifiable reason, is tantamount to failure to prosecute. Respondents cannot blame their counsels because they too had been remiss in their duty to diligently pursue the case when they failed to secure the services of a counsel within the given p eriod. Respondents' laxity in attending to their case ultimately led to its dismissal. Indeed, respondents were in the brink of losing their property to foreclosure. This situation should all the more pursue the case relentlessly. The law aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights. Vigilantibus, sed non dormientibus  Jura subverniunt.