Digested Cases

1. PHILIPPINE MOVIE PICTURES WORKERS' ASSOCIATION vs. PREMIERE PRODUCTIONS, INC. G.R. Nos. L-7771-73; May 31, 1955 FACTS: Petitioner Philippine Movie Pictures Workers' Association (PMPWA), is a labor organization whose members were employees and laborers of the respondent Premiere Productions, Inc., a corporation engaged in the production of movie pictures. These cases for review by certiorari were filed in view of the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) permitting the respondent company to lay-off its personnel, and for the rendition of another decision holding the leases entered into by the movie company to be illegal and that the company and its officers and agents be held to have committed contempt of court in entering into those leases without authority of the CIR. After the company had answered the three petitions of PMPWA for contempt and injunction, by agreement of both parties, all three incidental cases were heard jointly. During the hearing held before Presiding Judge Roldan and in the presence of one Martin Dolorico, a Commissioner of the CIR, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts and stated therein their respective contention, after which, both parties submitted the cases for decision without further evidence. No decision was immediately rendered because both parties asked for time to enable them to bargain collectively, the negotiations commencing in January, 1953 and lasting until July of the same year. But the decision ended by denying the three petitions for injunction and for contempt of court. Upon motion for reconsideration by the PMPWA and over the opposition of the company, the CIR en banc reconsidered the decision aforementioned and set it aside, saying that before rendering a final decision, the court should have awaited further presentation of evidence on the supplemental petition of April 18, 1953, "so that all ingredients for the proper disposal of the case would have been complete." ISSUE: Whether or not the decision rendered by the CIR is premature and may be appealed to the Court? HELD: The majority of the Tribunal believe that it is unnecessary to go into the merits of the present cases, because the resolution of the majority of the CIR setting aside the decision of Judge Roldan, left the cases without any decision to appeal from, and that said resolution is in the nature of a mere interlocutory order, which is not subject to appeal. In view of the foregoing, these petitions for certiorari are hereby denied, and the cases are ordered remanded to the CIR for further proceedings. No costs.

2. MOISES DE LEON vs. NLRC G.R. No. 70705; August 21, 1989 FACTS: De Leon was employed by private respondent La Tondeña Inc. on December 11, 1981, at the Maintenance Section of its Engineering Department in Tondo, Manila. His work consisted mainly of painting company building and equipment, and other odd jobs relating to maintenance. He was paid on a daily basis through petty cash vouchers. After more than a year of service, he requested from respondent company that lie be included in the payroll of regular workers. Private respondent's response to this request was to dismiss petitioner from his employment on January 16, 1983. La Tondeña claimed that petitioner was not a regular employee but only a casual worker. Having been refused reinstatement despite repeated demands, De Leon filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, reinstatement and payment of backwages before the Office of the Labor Arbiter. Labor Arbiter Bienvenido S. Hernandez rendered a decision finding the complaint meritorious and the dismissal illegal; and ordering the respondent company to reinstate petitioner with full backwages and other benefits. On appeal, however, the above decision of the Labor Arbiter was reversed by the First Division of the National Labor Relations Commission by virtue of the votes of two members which constituted a majority. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Commission erred and gravely abuse its discretion in reversing the Order of the Labor Arbiter, violating the Constitutional and statutory provisions for the protection of labor? HELD: The Court sustained the position of the Solicitor General that the reversal of the decision of the Labor Arbiter by the respondent Commission was erroneous. The law on the matter is Article 281 of the Labor Code, which reinforces the Constitutional mandate to protect the interest of labor. Its language evidently manifests the intent to safeguard the tenurial interest of the worker who may be denied the rights and benefits due a regular employee by virtue of lopsided agreements with the economically powerful employer who can maneuver to keep an employee on a casual status for as long as convenient. Any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether continuous or intermittent, is deemed regular with respect to the activity he performed and while such activity actually exists. The test is whether the employee is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. The inexplicable disregard of established and decisive facts which the Commission itself admitted to be so, in justifying a conclusion adverse to the aggrieved laborer clearly spells a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission are hereby annulled and set aside. The Order of Labor arbiter Bienvenido S. Hernandez dated April 6, 1984 is reinstated.

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FACTS: ISSUE: HELD: 1. CALALANG VS. WILLIAMS G.R. No. 47800. December 2, 1940 MAXIMO CALALANG, petitioner, vs. A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL., The case of Calalang vs Williams is known for the elegant exposition of the definition of social justice. In this case, Justice Laurel defined social justice as “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy” but humanization of laws and equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. As I browse through the entire case, I found out that there is more to this case than the definition of social justice. In fact, another important issue raised here is whether there was a valid delegation of power by the National Assembly to the Director of Public Works. Let us begin with the facts of the case. FACTS: In pursuance of Commonwealth Act 548 which mandates the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on such roads and streets to promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads, the Director of Public Works adopted the resolution of the National Traffic Commission, prohibiting the passing of animal drawn vehicles in certain streets in Manila. Petitioner questioned this as it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power by the National Assembly to the Director of Public Works? RULING: There is no undue delegation of legislative power. Commonwealth Act 548 does not confer legislative powers to the Director of Public Works. The authority conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, “to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines” and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic “whenever the condition of the road or the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest.” The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law.

2. SALAZAR VS. ACHACOSO GR 81510, 14 March 1990 FACTS: On 21 October 1987, Rosalie Tesoro of 177 Tupaz Street, Leveriza, Pasay City, in a sworn statement filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) charged Hortencia Salazar of 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, allegedly the former's manager, for withholding the former's PECC Card. On 3 November 1987, Atty. Ferdinand Marquez to whom said complaint was assigned, sent to Salazar a telegram directing the latter to directly appear before Ferdie Marquez, POEA Anti-Illegal Recruitment Unit 6/F, POEA Building, EDSA corner Ortigas Avenue, Mandaluyong on 6 November 1987 at 10 a.m. RE case filed against Salazar. On the same day, having ascertained that Salazar had no license to operate a recruitment agency, Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued his Closure and Seizure Order 1205 against Horty Salazar. On 26 January 1988, POEA Director on Licensing and Regulation Atty. Estelita B. Espiritu issued an office order designating Atty. Marquez, Atty. Jovencio Abara and Atty. Ernesto Vistro as members of a team tasked to implement Closure and Seizure Order 1205. Doing so, the group assisted by Mandaluyong policemen and mediamen Lito Castillo of the People's Journal and Ernie Baluyot of News Today proceeded to Salazar's residence. There it was found that Salazar was operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Before entering the place, the team served said Closure and Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar who voluntarily allowed them entry into the premises. Mrs Flora Salazar informed the team that Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with Moreman Development (Phil.) However, when required to show credentials, she was unable to produce any. Inside the studio, the team chanced upon 12 talent performers — practicing a dance number and saw about 20 more waiting outside. The team confiscated assorted

costumes which were duly receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar. On 28 January 1988, Flora Salazar filed with POEA a letter, requesting that the personal properties seized at Horty Salazar's residence be immediately returned on the ground that said seizure was contrary to law and against the will of the owner thereof. On 2 February 1988, before POEA could answer the letter, Salazar filed the petition for prohibition, contesting the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of arrest and seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code, prohibiting illegal recruitment. On even date, POEA filed a criminal complaint against her with the Pasig Provincial Fiscal (IS-88-836). ISSUE: Whether the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code. HELD: Section 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, as now written, was entered as an amendment by Presidential Decrees 1920 and 2018 of the late President Ferdinand Marcos, to Presidential Decree 1693, in the exercise of his legislative powers under Amendment 6 of the 1973 Constitution. Under the latter, the then Minister of Labor merely exercised recommendatory powers for the arrest and detention of any person engaged in illegal recruitment. On 1 May 1984, Mr. Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree 1920, with the avowed purpose of giving more teeth to the campaign against illegal recruitment. The Decree gave the Minister of Labor arrest and closure powers. On 26 January 1986, Mr. Marcos, promulgated Presidential Decree 2018, giving the Labor Minister search and seizure powers as well. The decrees in question stand as the dying vestiges of authoritarian rule in its twilight moments. Under the new Constitution, "no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. It is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest." Mayors may not exercise this power. Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body. The Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, the Court declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect. For the guidance of the bench and the bar, the COurt reaffirmed the principles that (1) Under Article III, Section 2 , of the 1987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest and search; and (2) The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President or the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation. Thus, the Court herein granted the petition, declaring Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code unconstitutional and null and void, and thus ordering the POEA to return all materials seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order 1205.

3. BERNARDO vs. NLRC Facts: Complainants numbering 43 are deaf-mutes who were hired on various periods from 1988 to 1993 by respondent Far East Bank and Trust Co. as Money Sorters and Counters through a uniformly worded agreement called Employment Contract for Handicapped Workers. In 1988, two (2) deaf-mutes were hired under this Agreement; in 1989 another two (2); in 1990, nineteen (19); in 1991 six (6); in 1992, six (6) and in 1993, twenty-one (21). Their employment[s] were renewed every six months such that by the time this case arose, there were fifty-six (56) deaf-mutes who were employed by

respondent under the said employment agreement. The last one was Thelma Malindoy who was employed in 1992 and whose contract expired on July 1993. Disclaiming that complainants were regular employees, respondent Far East Bank and Trust Company maintained that complainants who are a special class of workers — the hearing impaired employees were hired temporarily under a special employment arrangement In affirming the ruling of the labor arbiter that herein petitioners could not be deemed regular employees under Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, Respondent Commission ratiocinated that complainants were hired as an accommodation to the recommendation of civic oriented personalities whose employments were covered by Employment Contracts with special provisions on duration of contract as specified under Art. 80. Hence, the terms of the contract shall be the law between the parties. The NLRC also declared that the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons was not applicable, "considering the prevailing circumstances/milieu of the case. Issue: The main issue is whether or not the petitioners are regular employees. Held: At the outset, let it be known that this Court appreciates the nobility of private respondent’s effort to provide employment to physically impaired individuals and to make them more productive members of society. However, we cannot allow it to elude the legal consequences of that effort, simply because it now deems their employment irrelevant. The facts, viewed in light of the Labor Code and the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons, indubitably show that the petitioners, except sixteen of them, should be deemed regular employees. As such, they have acquired legal rights that this Court is duty-bound to protect and uphold, not as a matter of compassion but as a consequence of law and justice. The uniform employment contracts of the petitioners stipulated that they shall be trained for a period of one month, after which the employer shall determine whether or not they should be allowed to finish the 6-month term of the contract. Furthermore, the employer may terminate the contract at any time for a just and reasonable cause. Unless renewed in writing by the employer, the contract shall automatically expire at the end of the term. The employment contracts were prepared in accordance with Article 80 of the Labor Code, which provides: ARTICLE 80. Employment agreement. — Any employer who employs handicapped workers shall enter into an employment agreement with them, which agreement shall include: (a) The names and addresses of the handicapped workers to be employed; (b) The rate to be paid the handicapped workers which shall be not less than seventy five (75%) per cent of the applicable legal minimum wage; (c) The duration of employment period; and (d) The work to be performed by handicapped workers. The employment agreement shall be subject to inspection by the Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representatives." The stipulations in the employment contracts indubitably conform with the aforecited provision. Succeeding events and the enactment of RA No. 7277 (the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons), however, justify the application of Article 280 of the Labor Code.

Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56 handicapped workers and renewed the contracts of 37 of them. In fact, two of them worked from 1988 to 1993. Verily, the renewal of the contracts of the handicapped workers and the hiring of others lead to the conclusion that their tasks were beneficial and necessary to the bank. More important, these facts show that they were qualified to perform the responsibilities of their positions. In other words, their disability did not render them unqualified or unfit for the tasks assigned to them. In this light, the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that a qualified disabled employee should be given the same terms and conditions of employment as a qualified able-bodied person. Section 5 of the Magna Carta provides: SECTION 5. Equal Opportunity for Employment. — No disabled person shall be denied access to opportunities for suitable employment. A qualified disabled employee shall be subject to the same terms and conditions of employment and the same compensation, privileges, benefits, fringe benefits, incentives or allowances as a qualified able bodied person. The fact that the employees were qualified disabled persons necessarily removes the employment contracts from the ambit of Article 80. Since the Magna Carta accords them the rights of qualified able-bodied persons, they are thus covered by Article 280 of the Labor Code, which provides: ARTICLE 280. Regular and Casual Employment. — The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season. An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered as regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists." The test of whether an employee is regular was laid down in De Leon v. NLRC , in which this Court held: The primary standard, therefore, of determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the employer. The test is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. The connection can be determined by considering the nature of the work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety. Also if the employee has been performing the job for at least one year, even if the performance is not continuous and merely intermittent, the law deems repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if not indispensability of that activity to the business. Hence, the employment is considered regular, but only with respect to such activity, and while such activity exists. Without a doubt, the task of counting and sorting bills is necessary and desirable to the business of respondent bank. petitioners performed these tasks for more than six months. As held by the Court, Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor Code put an end to the pernicious practice of making permanent casuals of our lowly employees by the

simple expedient of extending to them probationary appointments, ad infinitum. The contract signed by petitioners is akin to a probationary employment, during which the bank determined the employees’ fitness for the job. When the bank renewed the contract after the lapse of the six-month probationary period, the employees thereby became regular employees. No employer is allowed to determine indefinitely the fitness of its employees. As regular employees, the twenty-seven petitioners are entitled to security of tenure; that is, their services may be terminated only for a just or authorized cause. Because respondent failed to show such cause, these twenty-seven petitioners are deemed illegally dismissed and therefore entitled to back wages and reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges. Considering the allegation of respondent that the job of money sorting is no longer available because it has been assigned back to the tellers to whom it originally belonged, 19 petitioners are hereby awarded separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. Moreover, it must be emphasized that a contract of employment is impressed with public interest. Provisions of applicable statutes are deemed written into the contract, and the "parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships from the impact of labor laws and regulations by simply contracting with each other. Clearly, the agreement of the parties regarding the period of employment cannot prevail over the provisions of the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons, which mandate that petitioners must be treated as qualified able-bodied employees. The well-settled rule is that the character of employment is determined not by stipulations in the contract, but by the nature of the work performed. Otherwise, no employee can become regular by the simple expedient of incorporating this condition in the contract of employment. In this light, the court iterates the ruling in Romares v. NLRC : Article 280 was emplaced in our statute books to prevent the circumvention of the employee’s right to be secure in his tenure by indiscriminately and completely ruling out all written and oral agreements inconsistent with the concept of regular employment defined therein. Where an employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business of the employer, such employee is deemed a regular employee and is entitled to security of tenure notwithstanding the contrary provisions of his contract of employment. At this juncture, the leading case of Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora proves instructive. As reaffirmed in subsequent cases, this Court has upheld the legality of fixed-term employment. It ruled that the decisive determinant in ‘term employment’ should not be the activities that the employee is called upon to perform but the day certain agreed upon the parties for the commencement and termination of their employment relationship. But this Court went on to say that where from the circumstances it is apparent that the periods have been imposed to preclude acquisition of tenurial security by the employee, they should be struck down or disregarded as contrary to public policy and morals. In rendering this Decision, the Court emphasizes not only the constitutional bias in favor of the working class, but also the concern of the State for the plight of the disabled. The noble objectives of Magna Carta for Disabled Persons are not based merely on charity or accommodation, but on justice and the equal treatment of qualified persons, disabled or not. In the present case, the handicap of petitioners (deaf-mutes) is not a hindrance to their work. The eloquent proof of this statement is the repeated renewal of their employment contracts. Why then should they be dismissed, simply because they are physically impaired?

The Court believes, that, after showing their fitness for the work assigned to them, they should be treated and granted the same rights like any other regular employees.