Digest

PIMENTEL V. ERMITA G.R. NO. 158088 06 JULY 2005 Nature of the Case: This is a petition for mandamus filed by petitioners to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to the Senate of the Philippines for its concurrence in accordance with Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Facts: The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court which ―shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern xxx and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions.‖ Its jurisdiction covers the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression as defined in the Statute. Petitioners filed the instant petition to compel the respondents — the Office of the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs — to transmit the signed text of the treaty to the Senate of the Philippines for ratification. The Philippines, through Charge d’ Affairs Enrique A. Manalo of the Philippine Mission to the UN, signed the Rome Statute on Dec. 28, 2000. Its provisions, however, require that it be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory states. Petitioners now file this petition to compel the Office of the President to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute to the Senate for its concurrence. Issue: Whether the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs have a ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine Mission to the United Nations even without the signature of the President. Held: In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the country’s sole representative with foreign nations.[12] As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country’s mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations.[13] In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states. Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that ―no treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.‖ In filing this petition, the petitioners interpret Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to mean that the power to ratify treaties belongs to the Senate. The usual steps in the treaty-making process are: negotiation, signature, ratification, and exchange of the instruments of ratification. The treaty may then be submitted for registration and publication under the U.N. Charter, although this step is not essential to the validity of the agreement as between the parties.

Negotiation may be undertaken directly by the head of state but he now usually assigns this task to his authorized representatives. These representatives are provided with credentials known as full powers, which they exhibit to the other negotiators at the start of the formal discussions. It is standard practice for one of the parties to submit a draft of the proposed treaty which, together with the counter-proposals, becomes the basis of the subsequent negotiations. The negotiations may be brief or protracted, depending on the issues involved, and may even ―collapse‖ in case the parties are unable to come to an agreement on the points under consideration. If and when the negotiators finally decide on the terms of the treaty, the same is opened for signature. This step is primarily intended as a means of authenticating the instrument and for the purpose of symbolizing the good faith of the parties; but, significantly, it does not indicate the final consent of the state in cases where ratification of the treaty is required. The document is ordinarily signed in accordance with the alternate, that is, each of the several negotiators is allowed to sign first on the copy which he will bring home to his own state. Ratification, which is the next step, is the formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its representatives. The purpose of ratification is to enable the contracting states to examine the treaty more closely and to give them an opportunity to refuse to be bound by it should they find it inimical to their interests. It is for this reason that most treaties are made subject to the scrutiny and consent of a department of the government other than that which negotiated them. Purpose of Ratification Petitioners’ submission that the Philippines is bound under treaty law and international law to ratify the treaty which it has signed is without basis. The signature does not signify the final consent of the state to the treaty. It is the ratification that binds the state to the provisions thereof. In fact, the Rome Statute itself requires that the signature of the representatives of the states be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory states. Ratification is the act by which the provisions of a treaty are formally confirmed and approved by a State. By ratifying a treaty signed in its behalf, a state expresses its willingness to be bound by the provisions of such treaty. After the treaty is signed by the state’s representative, the President, being accountable to the people, is burdened with the responsibility and the duty to carefully study the contents of the treaty and ensure that they are not inimical to the interest of the state and its people. Thus, the President has the discretion even after the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative whether or not to ratify the same. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does not contemplate to defeat or even restrain this power of the head of states. If that were so, the requirement of ratification of treaties would be pointless and futile. It has been held that a state has no legal or even moral duty to ratify a treaty which has been signed by its plenipotentiaries. There is no legal obligation to ratify a treaty, but it goes without saying that the refusal must be based on substantial grounds and not on superficial or whimsical reasons. Otherwise, the other state would be justified in taking offense. President has the Power to Ratify Treaties It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus. This Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the

President in the performance of his official duties. The Court, therefore, cannot issue the writ of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is beyond its jurisdiction to compel the executive branch of the government to transmit the signed text of Rome Statute to the Senate. Petition is DISMISSED.

BENGZON VS. DRILON G.R. 103524 April 15, 1992 208 SCRA 133 Nature of the Case: The issue in this petition is the constitutionality of the veto by the President of certain provisions in the General Appropriations Act for the Fiscal Year 1992 relating to the payment of the adjusted pensions of retired Justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. Facts: Petitioners are retired justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are currently receiving pensions under RA 910 as amended by RA 1797. President Marcos issued a decree repealing section 3-A of RA 1797 which authorized the adjustment of the pension of retired justices and officers and enlisted members of the AFP. PD 1638 was eventually issued by Marcos which provided for the automatic readjustment of the pension of officers and enlisted men was restored, while that of the retired justices was not. RA 1797 was restored through HB 16297 in 1990. When her advisers gave the wrong information that the questioned provisions in 1992 GAA were an attempt to overcome her earlier veto in 1990, President Aquino issued the veto now challenged in this petition. It turns out that PD 644 which repealed RA 1797 never became a valid law absent its publication, thus there was no law. It follows that RA 1797 was still in effect and HB 16297 was superfluous because it tried to restore benefits which were never taken away validly. The veto of HB 16297 did not also produce any effect. Issue: Whether or not the veto of the President of certain provisions in the GAA of FY 1992 relating to the payment of the adjusted pensions of retired Justices is constitutional or valid. Held: The act of the Executive in vetoing the particular provisions is an exercise of a constitutionally vested power. But even as the Constitution grants the power, it also provides limitations to its exercise. The veto power is not absolute. The pertinent provision of the Constitution reads: The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object. (Section 27(2), Article VI, Constitution) The Constitution provides that only a particular item or items may be vetoed. The power to disapprove any item or items in an appropriate bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the same item. The Constitution, particularly Article VI, Section 25(5) also provides: Sec. 25. (5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

In the instant case, the vetoed provisions which relate to the use of savings for augmenting items for the payment of the pension differentials, among others, are clearly in consonance with the above stated pronouncements of the Court. The veto impairs the power of the Chief Justice to augment other items in the Judiciary's appropriation, in contravention of the constitutional provision on "fiscal autonomy." Finally, it cannot be denied that the retired Justices have a vested right to the accrued pensions due to them pursuant to RA 1797. Retirement laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the retiree because their intention is to provide for his sustenance, and hopefully even comfort, when he no longer has the stamina to continue earning his livelihood. After devoting the best years of his life to the public service, he deserves the appreciation of a grateful government as best concretely expressed in a generous retirement gratuity commensurate with the value and length of his services. That generosity is the least he should expect now that his work is done and his youth is gone. Even as he feels the weariness in his bones and glimpses the approach of the lengthening shadows, he should be able to luxuriate in the thought that he did his task well, and was rewarded for it. For as long as these retired Justices are entitled under laws which continue to be effective, the government cannot deprive them of their vested right to the payment of their pensions.

ANGARA V. ELECTORAL COMMISSION 63 PHIL. 13 (1936) Nature of the Case: This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission, one of the respondents, from taking further cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another respondent, against the election of said petitioner as member of the National Assembly for the first assembly district of the Province of Tayabas. Facts: In the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas; On October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner (Angara) as member-elect of the National Assembly for the said district, for having received the most number of votes and took his oath of office; That on December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being the only protest filed after the passage of Resolutions No. 8 aforequoted, and praying, among other-things, that said respondent be declared elected member of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified; Jose Angara alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during which protests against the election of its members should be presented; (b) that the aforesaid resolution has for its object, and is the accepted formula for, the limitation of said period; and (c) that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period; On December 27, 1935, the herein respondent, Pedro Ynsua, filed an "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal" alleging that there is no legal or constitutional provision barring the presentation of a protest against the election of a member of the National Assembly after confirmation. Issues: The issues to be decided in the case at bar may be reduced to the following two principal propositions: 1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative, 2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to the cognizance of the protest filed the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly? Facts:

(a) That the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the theory of separation of power into the legislative, the executive and the judicial. (b) That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions and duties often makes difficult the delimitation of the powers granted.

(c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries. (d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority. (e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other two departments of the governments. (f ) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly. (g) That under the organic law prevailing before the present Constitution went into effect, each house of the legislature was respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members. (h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by the legislature with respect to contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of its members, to the Electoral Commission. (i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full, clear and complete, and carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests. ( j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an independent constitutional organ pass upon all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or consideration, which object would be frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and regulations regarding the manner of conducting said contests. (k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only section 18 of the Jones Law making each house of the Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its elective members, but also section 478 of Act No. 3387 empowering each house to prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contests against the election of its members, the time and manner of notifying the adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the costs and expenses of contest. (l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election is contested or not, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly. (m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member against whom no protest had been filed prior to said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of its incidental power to prescribe the time within which protests against the election of any member of the National Assembly should be filed. The Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 cannot in any manner toll the time for filing protests

against the elections, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.

KILOSBAYAN vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 128054, October 16, 1997 Facts: A complaint was filed against private respondents, alleging that Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) were used for electioneering purposes. Kilosbayan alleged that DILGNCR collaborated with Philippine Youth Health and Sports Development Foundation, Inc. (PYHSDFI), the former approving allotment to the latter 70M allegedly use to buy medical and sports equipment that was distributed few days before election and stopped at the day of election. Comelec investigators submitted the dismissal of the complaint for lack of evidence to prove probable cause. Kilosbayan provided news clippings, regarding alleged use of funds resulting from the said transaction of DILG-NCR and PYHSDFI and arguments to support its claims. The new paper clippings was regarded as hearsay. Kilosbayan filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that they are not responsible for the production of evidence by using public funds, it is the COMELEC who should search the evidence by using public funds and with the help of other agencies of the government as the constitution gave them the responsibility to prosecute election offenses. The motion was denied, thus this petition to compel COMELEC to prosecute the private respondents Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC can be compelled to produce evidence despite the complainants’ failure to prove probable cause. Held: The Comelec did not commit any act constituting grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner Kilosbayan’s letter-complaint against herein respondents, the former having failed to prove its case against the latter. As such, this petition must be dismissed. Section 2 (7) of Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Comelec shall exercise the power to ―investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices‖. Discerning the rationale for this grant of prosecutorial powers to the Comelec, we already had occasion to rule, thus: ―The grant to the COMELEC of the power, among others, to enforce and administer all laws relative to conduct of election and the concomitant authority to investigate and prosecute election offenses is not without compelling reason. The evident constitutional intendment in bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of elections, failure of which would result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote.‖ Insofar as the prosecution of election offenses is concerned, therefore, the Comelec is the ―public prosecutor with the exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary investigation and the prosecution of election offenses punishable under the [Omnibus Election] Code before the competent court.‖ This constitutional and statutory mandate for Comelec to investigate and prosecute cases of violation of election law translates, in effect, to the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving election offenses for the twin purpose of filing an information in court and helping the Judge determine, in the course of preliminary inquiry, whether or not a warrant of arrest should be issued. The determination of probable cause in any criminal prosecution, is made indispensable by the Bill of Rights which enshrines every citizen’s right to due process, the presumption that he is

presumed innocent, and the inadmissibility against him of any damaging evidence obtained in violation of his right against self-incrimination. As Justice Reynanto S. Puno has pointed out, probable cause is neither an ―opaque concept in our jurisdiction‖ or a ―high level legal abstraction to be the subject of warring thoughts‖ It constitutes those ―facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed‖ by the person sought to be judicially indicted. In determining probable cause, however, the public prosecutor must have been apprised by the complainant of his evidence in support of his accusatory allegations. In other words, determining probable cause is an intellectual activity premised on the prior physical presentation or submission of documentary or testimonial proofs either confirming, negating or qualifying the allegations in the complaint. The contention of petitioner Kilosbayan – that it is the Comelec that is duty-bound to search for evidence to prove its letter-complaint – is downright erroneous. The task of the Comelec as investigator and prosecutor, acting upon any election offenses complaint, is not the physical searching and gathering of proof in support of a complaint for an alleged commission of an election offense. A complainant, who in effect accuses another person of having committed an act constituting an election offense, has the burden, as it is his responsibility, to follow through his accusation and prove his complaint. If the complainant fails to proffer the necessary evidence to show probable cause, notwithstanding the lack of denial or any evidence in controversion, of the accusation, the complaint must be dismissed, since any person accused of a crime is presumed innocent and does not at all have to make a response or reaction to charges against him. The Comelec, is acting upon an election offense complaint in the course of preliminary investigation, initially facilitates the confrontation process between the complainant and the respondents by requiring the submission of and interfacing, their respective evidences. Ultimately, the Comelec passes upon the contending parties' respective submissions and proof and weighs the fact and circumstances established therefrom. Contrary to the asseveration of petitioner Kilosbayan, the preliminary investigation is not an occasion for Comelec to, as a duty, spoonfeed the complainant with evidence needed to prove its case.