Digest - Orient Insurance Co. vs. MLA Judge E. P. Revilla

ORIENT INSURANCE COMPANY vs. E. P. REVILLA, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and TEAL MOTOR CO., INC., G.R. No. 34098, September 17, 1930 FACTS: The object of Orient Insurance Co.’s (Orient) petition for writs of certiorari and mandamus is to require respondent judge to permit Orient’s counsel to examine a letter, part of which has already been read into the record in the course of the examination of one of the witnesses testifying for private respondent Teal Motor Co., Inc. (TMC). TMC, as plaintiff, filed a civil action against Orient for the purpose of recovering upon 2 fire insurance policies issued by the latter over TMC’s stock merchandise. The policy contained a clause stipulating to the effect that all benefits would be forfeited if, in case of loss, the claim should be rejected by the insurer and action is not commenced within 3 months after such rejection. Orient’s defense alleges that the claim was rejected on April 15, 1929, and that notice of such rejection was given to plaintiff by letter on the same day. However, suit was not instituted by TMC until August 3, more than 3 months after rejection of the claim. According to TMC, on the day they were notified of the rejection, Orient representative E. E. Elser expressly requested TMC to defer judicial action until after July 31 for possibilities of compromise between the parties. TMC relied on the request and delayed institution of action. However, during the trial of the civil case, witness TMC president E. M. Bachrach made an oral statement as to the substance of part of a letter received by TMC from its attorneys, saying that he waited for about a week longer and not having heard anything about it, he received a letter on July 13 from our attorneys urging me to file these cases . When asked by the counsel for Orient to produce the letter, Bachrach only offered in evidence part of the letter supporting his testimony (relating to the urging of the filing of complaints) but refused to reveal the other part as it contained private matter privileged in nature between the attorneys and TMC (relating to contract of fees, retaining of counsel’s services in connection with the cases, alleged to be matters entirely distinct from the issue). Orient demanded for the production of “the best evidence,” it being well-known a rule of law that a witness cannot be permitted to give oral testimony as to the contents of a paper writing which can be produced in court. In response, only a portion of the letter referred to by the witness was read into the record. Orient now insists that inasmuch as all the letters refers to the case then in court, the entire document should be exhibited pursuant to the rule that when part of a document is offered in evidence, the entire document must be presented. ISSUE: Does presentation of part of the letter constitute waiver to present the whole document? Yes. Is a contract for fees and other terms of employment between attorney and client privileged in nature? No. HELD: The excerpt in question must be considered as proof submitted by TMC, and there can be no question that, part of the letter having been introduced in behalf of the plaintiff, the whole of the letter could properly be examined by Orient, in accordance with the express provision of section 283, Code of Civil Procedure. As to the alleged privileged nature of the terms of employment between attorney and client as contained in other portions of the letter, the court found it difficult to consider a contract for fees as privileged. However irrelevant under the circumstances, it cannot be privileged in nature. Contracts between attorneys and clients are inherently personal and considered as private matters, but they are a constant subject of litigation, and contracts relating to fees are essentially not of privileged nature. Nevertheless, assuming arguendo that the letter contained privileged matters, such was waived by the introduction in evidence of part of the letter. Section 238 of the Code of Civil

Procedure, making the whole of a declaration, conversation, or writing admissible when part has been given in evidence by one party, makes no exception as to privileged matter; and neither do jurisprudence on the subject recognize any exception. Hence, Orient was entitled to examine the whole of the letter, with a view to the introduction in evidence of such parts thereof as may be relevant to the case on trial, and the respondent judge was in error in refusing to permit the inspection by Orient.