Digest of Bersamin cases

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Phil-Agro Industrial Corporation March 13, 2017 G.R. No. 193987 Facts: 19 parcels of land owned by the respondent were placed under the coverage of Comprehensive Agrarian Reform. On its amended decision, the CA ordered the petitioner to pay 1% interest per annum counted from the taking until fully paid. Issue: (Political Law; Expropriation; Just Compensation) Whether or not the award of 1% per annum on the amount of just compensation is proper. Ruling: The rationale for imposing the interest is to compensate the respondent for the income it would have made had it been properly compensated for its properties at the time of the taking. The need for prompt payment and the necessity of the payment of interest is to compensate for any delay in the payment of compensation for property already taken. The award of interest is imposed in the nature of damages for delay in payment which makes the obligation on the part of the government one of forbearance to ensure prompt payment of the value of the land and limit the opportunity loss of the owner. Therefore, there is no need for the payment of 1 % interest per annum to cover for the increase in value of real properties.

People of the Philippines vs. King Rex Ambatang March 29, 2017 G.R. No. 205855 Facts: Accused was charged with murder of 60-year old Ely Vidal. In support of his alibi, his mother and his girlfriend claimed that he was inside the house when the stabbing occurred. Issue: (Criminal Law; Evidence; Alibi as defense) Whether the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder. Ruling: It is settled that "factual findings of the trial court and its evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal, unless the trial court is shown to have overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied any fact or circumstance of weight and substance. An examination of the records shows there is nothing that would warrant the reversal of the Decisions of the Regional Trial Court and of the Court of Appeals.

The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are sufficient to convict accused-appellant. The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals made definitive findings that Jennifer and Acaba made positive, unequivocal, and categorical identifications of accused-appellant as the person who stabbed the deceased Vidal. It is well settled that positive identification by the prosecution witnesses of the accused as perpetrators of the crime is entitled to greater weight than their denials and alibis. True, accused-appellant's alibi was corroborated by Gina Canapi and Nicepura Ambatang. However, an alibi, especially when corroborated mainly by relatives and friends of the accused, is held by this Court with extreme suspicion for it is easy to fabricate and concoct. Furthermore, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity. The excuse must be so airtight that it would admit of no exception. Where there is the least possibility of accusedappellant's presence at the crime scene, as in this case, the alibi will not hold water.

Philippine National Bank vs. Lilibeth Chan March 13, 2017 G.R. No. 206037 FACTS: Respondent leased a commercial building to petitioner. From October 2004 to January 2005, PNB applied the rentals to the respondent’s outstanding loan while from January 2005 to February 2006, it deposited the rentals in a separate non-drawing savings account due to an alleged claim of certain Lamberto Chua over the property being leased. ISSUES: 1. Whether PNB properly consigned the disputed rental payments in the amount of Pl,348,643.92 with the Office of the Clerk of Court of the MeTC of Manila. 2. Whether PNB incurred delay in the payment of rentals to the respondent, making it liable to pay legal interest to the latter. 3. Whether PNB is entitled to the disputed rental proceeds in order to cover the alleged deficiency in payment of the respondent's liability after the foreclosure proceedings. RULING: 1. Note that PNB's deposit of the subject monthly rentals in a non-drawing savings account is not the consignation contemplated by law, precisely because it does not place the same at the disposal of the court. Consignation is necessarily judicial; it is not allowed in venues other than the courts. Consequently, PNB's obligation to pay rent for the period

of January 16, 2005 up to March 23, 2006 remained subsisting, as the deposit of the rentals cannot be considered to have the effect of payment. 2. It is important to point out that PNB's obligation to pay the subject monthly rentals had already fallen due and demandable before PNB consigned the rental proceeds with the MeTC on May 31, 2006. Although it is true that consignment has a retroactive effect, such payment is deemed to have been made only at the time of the deposit of the thing in court or when it was placed at the disposal of the judicial authority. Based on these premises, PNB's payment of the monthly rentals can only be considered to have been made not earlier than May 31, 2006. Given its belated consignment of the rental proceeds in court, PNB clearly defaulted in the payment of monthly rentals to the respondent for the period January 16, 2005 up to March 23, 2006, when it finally vacated the leased property, As such, it is liable to pay interest in accordance with Article 2209 of the Civil Code. 3. As for the issue on PNB' s entitlement to the subject rental proceeds to cover the deficiency in payment after the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property, we agree with the CA' s finding that there is no sufficient evidence on record to show that such a deficiency exists. Unfortunately, the Statement of Account submitted by PNB is not enough to prove this claim, considering that it is unsupported by any corroborating evidence. Besides, the copy of the document in our records, both in the CA rollo and the Supreme Court rollo, consists of illegible pages.

Rose Yap Paras vs. Justo de Jesus Paras March 13, 2017 A.C. No. 5333 FACTS: This administrative case stemmed from the disbarment complaint filed by Rosa Yap Paras against her husband Justo de Jesus Paras for which he was suspended from the practice of law for a year. Complainant filed a motion to declare in contempt and disbar the respondent alleging that the latter continued to practice law while suspended. ISSUES: LEGAL ETHICS 1. Whether the respondent should be held administratively liable for practicing law while he was suspended 2. whether his suspension should be lifted

RULING: 1. According to jurisprudence, the "practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, as well as legal principles, practice or procedure[,] and calls for legal knowledge, training[,] and experience." During the suspension period and before the suspension is lifted, a lawyer must desist from practicing law. It must be stressed, however, that a lawyer's suspension is not automatically lifted upon the lapse of the suspension period. The lawyer must submit the required documents and wait for an order from the Court lifting the suspension before he or she resumes the practice of law. In this case, the OBC correctly pointed out that respondent's suspension period became effective on May 23, 2001 and lasted for one (1)year, or until May 22, 2002. Thereafter, respondent filed a motion for the lifting of his suspension. However, soon after this filing and without waiting for a Court order approving the same, respondent admitted to accepting new clients and cases, and even working on an amicable settlement for his client with the Department of Agrarian Reform. Indubitably, respondent engaged in the practice of law without waiting for the Court order lifting the suspension order against him, and thus, he must be held administratively liable therefor. 2. In Sanchez v. Torres, the Court ruled that the penalty of suspension or disbarment can no longer be imposed on a lawyer who had been previously disbarred. Nevertheless, it resolved the issue on the lawyer's administrative liability for recording purposes in the lawyer's personal file in the OBC. Hence, the Court held that respondent therein should be suspended from the practice of law, although the said penalty can no longer be imposed in view of his previous disbarment. In the same manner, the Court imposes upon respondent herein the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, although the said penalty can no longer be effectuated in view of his previous disbarment, but nonetheless should be adjudged for recording purposes. That being said, the issue anent the propriety of lifting his suspension is already moot and academic.