Digest Lambert, Valenzuela, Ong, Stedoring

LAMBERT v HEIRS OF CASTILLON (Pau) G.R. No. 160709. February 23, 2005

Facts: In the evening of January 13, 1991, Ray Castillon visited the house of his brother Joel Castillon at Tambo, Iligan City and borrowed his motorcycle. He then invited his friend, Sergio Labang, to roam around Iligan City. Ray drove the motorcycle with Sergio as the backrider. At around past 10:00 p.m., after eating supper at Hona’s Restaurant and imbibing a bottle of beer, they traversed the highway towards Tambo at a high speed. Upon reaching Brgy. Sto. Rosario, they figured in an accident with a Tamaraw jeepney, owned by petitioner Nelen Lambert and driven by Reynaldo Gamot, which was traveling on the same direction but made a sudden left turn. The incident resulted in the instantaneous death of Ray and injuries to Sergio. Respondents, the heirs of Ray Castillon, thus filed an action for damages with prayer for preliminary attachment against the petitioner Nelen Lambert. The complaint was subsequently amended to include the claim by Joel Castillon for the damages caused to the motorcycle. On June 29, 1993, after a full-blown trial, the court a quo rendered a decision in favor of the Castillon heirs but reduced Lambert’s liability by 20% in view of the contributory negligence of Ray. On the claim of Joel Castillon, the evidence shows that he is not the real owner of the motorcycle. He is not the real party in interest. Accordingly, his complaint is dismissed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Issue/s: 1.

Did the CA err in not applying the doctrine of Edna A. Raynera vs. Freddie Hiceta and

Jimmy Orpilla that drivers of vehicles “who bump the rear of another vehicle” are presumed to be the cause of the accident? In other words, was Lambert negligent? 2.

Does the act of tailgating merely constitute contributory negligence?

Lambert insists that the negligence of Ray Castillon was the proximate cause of his unfortunate death and therefore she is not liable for damages. Held

1. No. Clearly, the abrupt and sudden left turn by Reynaldo, without first establishing his right of way, was the proximate cause of the mishap which claimed the life of Ray and injured Sergio. Proximate cause is defined as that which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. The cause of the collision is traceable to the negligent act of Reynaldo for without that left turn executed with no precaution, the mishap in all probability would not have happened. Petitioner misunderstood our ruling in Raynera v. Hiceta. That case also involved a motorcycle crashing into the left rear portion of another vehicle, and we declared therein that drivers of vehicles “who bump the rear of another vehicle” are presumed to be “the cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence”. Raynera, being the driver of the rear vehicle, had full control of the situation as he was in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him. Thus, the theory that drivers of vehicles “who bump the rear of another vehicle” are presumed to be the cause of the accident is, as in this case, sufficiently contradicted by evidence, which is the sudden left turn made by Reynaldo which proximately caused the collision. 2. Yes. The SC found it equitable to increase the ratio of apportionment of damages on account of the victim’s negligence. Article 2179 reads as follows: When the plaintiff’s negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. The defendant must thus be held liable only for the damages actually caused by his negligence.[15] The determination of the mitigation of the defendant’s liability varies depending on the circumstances of each case. In the case at bar, it was established that Ray, at the time of the mishap: (1) was driving the motorcycle at a high speed; (2) was tailgating the Tamaraw jeepney; (3) has imbibed one or two bottles of beer; and (4) was not wearing a protective helmet.[21] These circumstances, although not constituting the proximate cause of his demise and injury to Sergio, contributed to the same result. The contribution of these circumstances are all considered and determined in terms of percentages of the total cause. Hence, pursuant to Rakes v. AG & P, the heirs of Ray Castillon shall recover damages only up to 50% of the award. In other words, 50% of the damage shall be borne by the private respondents; the remaining 50% shall be paid by the petitioner.

Valenzuela vs. CA| Kapunan

G.R. No. 115024, February 7, 1996 | 362 SCRA 56 FACTS At around 2:00 in the morning of June 24, 1990, plaintiff Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving a blue Mitsubishi lancer with Plate No. FFU 542 along Aurora Blvd. with a companion, Cecilia Ramon, heading towards the direction of Manila. Before reaching A. Lake Street, she noticed she had a flat tire and stopped at a lighted place to solicit help if needed. She parked along the sidewalk, about 1. feet away, put on her emergency lights, alighted from the car, and went to the rear to open the trunk. She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car when she was suddenly bumped by a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li and registered in the name of defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc. Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the windshield of the car of the defendant and then fell to the ground. She was pulled out from under defendant’s car. She was brought to the UERM Medical Memorial Center where she was found to have a “traumatic amputation, leg, left up to distal thigh (above knee).” She was confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days and was eventually fitted with an artificial leg. The expenses for the hospital confinement (P 120,000.00) and the cost of the artificial leg (P27,000.00) were paid by defendants from the car insurance. Defendant Richard Li denied that he was negligent. He said he was travelling at 55 kph; considering that it was raining, visibility was affected and the road was wet. Traffic was light. He testified that he was driving along the inner portion of the right lane of Aurora Blvd. towards the direction of Araneta Avenue, when he was suddenly confronted, in the vicinity of A. Lake Street, San Juan, with a car coming from the opposite direction, travelling at 80 kph, with “full bright lights.” Temporarily blinded, he swerved to the right to avoid colliding with the oncoming vehicle, and bumped plaintiff’s car, which he did not see because it was midnight blue in color, with no parking lights or early warning device, and the area was poorly

lighted. He alleged in his defense that the left rear portion of plaintiff’s car was protruding as it was then “at a standstill diagonally” on the outer portion of the right lane towards Araneta Avenue (par. 18, Answer). He confirmed the testimony of plaintiff’s witness that after being bumped the car of the plaintiff swerved to the right and hit another car parked on the sidewalk. Defendants counterclaimed for damages, alleging that plaintiff was reckless or negligent, as she was not a licensed driver. ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the court should sustain the version of plaintiff or defendant W/N there was contributory negligence on the part of Valenzuela W/N Alexander Commercial Inc. can be held solidarily liable with Li HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI Sustain Plaintiff The version presented by defendant could not be sustained as witnesses in the area testified that he was driving very fast and zigzagging. Also the facts as he narrated are highly unprobable seeing as the street was actually well lighted. Had he been traveling at a slow speed, he would have been able to stop in time so as not to hit the plaintiff even if the road was wet. The only reason why he would not have been able to do so would be if he was intoxicated which slows down reactions. No Li contends that Valenzuela should not have parked on the side of the road and looked for a parking space. The court rationalized using the emergency rule which states “An individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and

upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence.” Valenzuela could not have been expected to go to a side street where the chances of finding help would have been lower. No Although the Li was an employee of American, no proof was adduced as Li claimed, that he was out late that night on a social call in the exercise of his functions as assistant manager.

VALENZUELA VS. CA 253 SCRA 303

FACTS: A case was filed by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela, which was an action to recover damages based on quasi-delict, for serious physical injuries sustained in a vehicular accident on June 24, 1990. During the accident, Valenzuela’s left leg was severed up to the middle of her thigh, with only some skin and muscle connected to the rest of the body so she had to be amputated. She was confined in the hospital for twenty days and was eventually fitted with an artificial leg. The lower court found Richard Li, the person driving the Mitsubishi Lancer, guilty of gross negligence and liable for damages under 2176 of the Civil Code. Alexander Commercial Inc., Li’s employer, was also found jointly and severally liable. Upon appeal, CA agreed with the decision of the lower court regarding the liability of Li. However, CA absolved the liability of Alexander Commercial Inc. CA also reduced the claim for moral damages. Hence, both parties assailed the respondent court’s decision by filing two separate petitions.

ISSUE: Should Alexander Commercial Inc. be held jointly and severally liable?

RULING: Yes. The Court agreed with the CA that the relationship of the employer and employee was not based on the principle of respondent superior, which held the master liable for acts of the servant, but that of pater familias, in which the liability ultimately fell upon the employer for his failure to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of his employees. Under the concept of pater familias embodied by Article 2180, the employer may be relieved from any liability upon showing that he exercised the diligence of a good father of the family. Once the evidence is introduced showing that the employer exercised the required amount of care, half of the employer’s burden is overcome. However, the question of diligent supervision depends on the circumstances of employment. In the instant case, Li, as an Assistant Manager of the company, admitted that his functions did not require him to scrupulously keep normal office hours as he performs social and work-related functions. The service car assigned to Li, therefore, enabled both to put up the front of a highly successful entity, increasing the latter’s goodwill before its clientele. It also facilitated meeting between Li and its clients by providing the former with a convenient mode of travel. Assuming that he really came from his officemate’s place as Li claimed, the same could give rise to speculation that he and his officemate had just been from a work-related function, or they were together to discuss sales and other work related strategies. Moreover, Alexander Commercial Inc. had not demonstrated to the satisfaction of the court that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li. No allegations were made as to whether or not the company took the steps necessary to determine or ascertain the driving proficiency and history of Li to whom it gave full and unlimited use of a company car. Not having been able to overcome the burden of demonstrating that should be absolved of liability for entrusting its company car to Li, said company based on the principle of bonus pater familias, ought to be jointly and severally liable with Li for the injuries sustained by Valenzuela during the accident. Thus, the decision of the CA was modified with the effect of reinstating the decision of the RTC.

Torts And Damages Case Digest: Marcelo Macalinao, Et Al., V. Eddie Medecielo Ong (2005) Lessons Applicable: Res Ipsa Loquitur (Torts and Damages)

Laws Applicable:

FACTS:

April 1992: Sebastian instructed Macalinao, Ong and 2 other truck helpers to deliver a heavy piece of machinery to Sebastian’s manufacturing plant in Angat, Bulacan While delivering, the Genetron’s Isuzu Elf truck driven by Ong bumped the front portion of a private jeepney. Both vehicles incurred severe damages while the passengers sustained physical injuries as a consequence of the collision. Macalinao was brought to Sta. Maria District Hospital for first aid treatmentthen to Philippine Orthopedic Center then to Capitol Medical Center and lastly, to Philippine General Hospital due to financial considerations. His body was paralyzed and immobilized from the neck down. He filed against Ong and Sebastian. A criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries was instituted but was not ensued. November 7 1992: Macalinao died and was substituted by his parents. RTC: Ong negligent and Sebastian failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Ong thus ordering them jointly liable to pay actual, moral, and exemplary damages as well as civil indemnity for Macalinao’s death CA: reversed for lack of evidence ISSUE: W/N Ong may be held liable under the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur

HELD: YES.

photographs clearly shows that the road where the mishap occurred is marked by a line at the center separating the right from the left lane While ending up at the opposite lane is not conclusive proof of fault in automobile collisions, the position of the two vehicles gives rise to the conclusion that it was the Isuzu truck which hit the private jeepney rather than the other way around. Based on the angle at which it stopped, the private jeepney obviously swerved to the right in an unsuccessful effort to avoid the Isuzu truck.

Since respondents failed to refute the contents of the police blotter, the statement therein that the Isuzu truck hit the private jeepney and not the other way around is deemed established. While not constituting direct proof of Ong’s negligence, the foregoing pieces of evidence justify the application of res ipsa loquitur, a Latin phrase which literally means “the thing or the transaction speaks for itself Res ipsa loquitur recognizes that parties may establish prima facie negligence without direct proof, thus, it allows the principle to substitute for specific proof of negligence permits the plaintiff to present along with proof of the accident, enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine, create an inference or presumption of negligence and thereby place on the defendant the burden of proving that there was no negligence on his part based on the theory that defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it while the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and is therefore compelled to allege negligence in general terms and rely upon the proof of the happening of the accident in order to establish negligence can be invoked only when under the circumstances, direct evidence is absent and not readily available grounded upon the fact that the chief evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is practically accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to the injured person requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur:

(1) The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; - No two motor vehicles traversing opposite lanes will collide as a matter of course unless someone is negligent

(2) It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants - Driving the Isuzu truck gave Ong exclusive management and control over it

(3) The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiffresponsible is eliminated

(4) defendant fails to offer any explanation tending to show that the

injury was caused by his or her want of due care (Based on American Jurisprudence) - defendant fails to offer any explanation tending to show that the injury was caused by his or her want of due care Macalinao could no longer testify as to the cause of the accident since he is dead. Petitioners, while substituting their son as plaintiff, have no actual knowledge about

the event since they were not present at the crucial moment evidence as to the true cause of the accident is, for all intents and purposes, accessible to respondents but not to petitioners two truck helpers who survived, both employees of Sebastian, and Ong, who is not only Sebastian’s previous employee but his co-respondent in this case as well REPUBLIC VS. LUZON STEVEDORING CORPORATION 21 SCRA 279

FACTS: In the early afternoon of August 17, 1960, barge L-1892, owned by the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation was being towed down the Pasig River by two tugboats when the barge rammed against one of the wooden piles of the Nagtahan bailey bridge, smashing the posts and causing the bridge to list. The river, at the time, was swollen and the current swift, on account of the heavy downpour in Manila and the surrounding provinces on August 15 and 16, 1960. The Republic of the Philippines sued Luzon Stevedoring for actual and consequential damage caused by its employees, amounting to P200,000. Defendant Corporation disclaimed liability on the grounds that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees that the damages to the bridge were caused by force majeure, that plaintiff has no capacity to sue, and that the Nagtahan bailey bridge is an obstruction to navigation. After due trial, the court rendered judgment on June 11, 1963, holding the defendant liable for the

damage caused by its employees and ordering it to pay plaintiff the actual cost of the repair of the Nagtahan bailey bridge which amounted to P192,561.72, with legal interest from the date of the filing of the complaint.

ISSUE: Was the collision of appellant's barge with the supports or piers of the Nagtahan bridge caused by fortuitous event or force majeure?

RULING: Yes. Considering that the Nagtahan bridge was an immovable and stationary object and uncontrovertedly provided with adequate openings for the passage of water craft, including barges like of appellant's, it was undeniable that the unusual event that the barge, exclusively controlled by appellant, rammed the bridge supports raises a presumption of negligence on the part of appellant or its employees manning the barge or the tugs that towed it. For in the ordinary course of events, such a thing will not happen if proper care is used. In Anglo American Jurisprudence, the inference arises by what is known as the "res ipsa loquitur" rule The appellant strongly stressed the precautions taken by it on the day in question: that it assigned two of its most powerful tugboats to tow down river its barge L-1892; that it assigned to the task the more competent and experienced among its patrons, had the towlines, engines and equipment doublechecked and inspected' that it instructed its patrons to take extra precautions; and concludes that it had done all it was called to do, and that the accident, therefore, should be held due to force majeure or fortuitous event. These very precautions, however, completely destroyed the appellant's defense. For caso fortuito or force majeure (which in law are identical in so far as they exempt an obligor from liability) by definition, are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable, "events that could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable" (Art. 1174, Civ. Code of the Philippines). It was, therefore, not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as was commonly believed but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the happening was not impossibility to foresee the same. The very measures adopted by appellant prove that the possibility of danger was not only foreseeable, but actually foreseen, and was not caso fortuito.