Digest Cases for Succession

Ferrer vs. Diaz

FACTS: Petitioner Atty. Ferrer represented Comandante, daughter of spouses Diazes obtain loan to petitioner. The loan was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage Contract. Petitioner further claimed that prior to said loan, Comandante, for a valuable consideration of P600,000.00, which amount formed part of the abovementioned secured loan, executed in his favor an instrument entitled Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided). The Diazes, however, reneged on their obligation as the checks issued by Comandante were dishonored upon presentment. Despite repeated demands, said respondents still failed and refused to settle the loan. Thus, petitioner filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money Secured by Real Estate Mortgage Contract against the Diazes and Comandante.

ISSUE: Is a waiver of hereditary rights in favor of another executed by a future heir while the parents are still living valid? HELD: No. Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil Code, no contract may be entered into upon a future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law. For the inheritance to be considered “future”, the succession must not have been opened at the time of the contract. A contract may be classified as a contract upon future inheritance, prohibited under the second paragraph of Article 1347, where the following requisites concur: (1)

That the succession has not yet been opened.

(2)

That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and,

(3)

That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right which is purely hereditary in nature.

In this case, there is no question that at the time of execution of Comandante’s Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided), succession to either of her parent’s properties has not yet been opened since both of them are still living. With respect to the other two requisites, both are likewise present considering that the property subject

matter of Comandante’s waiver concededly forms part of the properties that she expect to inherit from her parents upon their death and, such expectancy of a right, as shown by the facts, is undoubtedly purely hereditary in nature. From the foregoing, it is clear that Comandante and petitioner entered into a contract involving the former’s future inheritance as embodied in the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by her in petitioner’s favor.

Pecson vs. Coronel (45 phil. 216)

FACTS: Dolores Coronel had suspicions that her nephew was accomplices in the robbery of her house. Thus, in her will, she bequeathed all her properties to her niece’s husband, Lorenzo Pecson. Upon the probate of the will, the deceased’s relatives opposed its contending that it was improbable for her to give her properties to a stranger, or not even her close relatives.

ISSUE: Whether the will was valid for preteriting the said heirs of Dolores.

HELD: No. the liberty to dispose of one’s estate by will when there are no forced heirs is valid. Although the institution of the beneficiary is not usual, it is not void for Lorenzo has rendered services to Dolores. In the absence of any statutory restriction, every person possesses absolute dominion over his property and may bestow to anyone he please.

CASE DIGEST: 1. JOHNNY RABADILLA VS COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA MARLENA COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA

FACTS:

ALEJA BELLEZA (testatrix of a last will and testament)

(+1983) DR. JORGE RABADILLA

Aurora

RUFINA (wife)

Ofelia

Zenaida

JOHNNY RABADILLA

-

-

Alleja Belleza made a codicil attached to his last will and testament in which she is leaving and bequeathing lot 1392 to Jorge Rabadilla. Jorge has the obligation to give Maria Marlena sugar piculs until the latter dies and if in case Jorge predecease Alleja his heir will inherit the lot and will continue with the obligation. By virtue of the codicil the lot was then transferred in the name of Jorge. When he died he was survived by his wife Rufina and children Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida. Maria Marlena then filed a complaint against the heirs of Jorge for the enforcement of the codicil and alleged that the defendant-heirs violated the conditions of the codicil because of the ffg: the lot was mortgage to PNB and Republic Planters Bank in disregard of the tetstatrix specific instruction to sell, lease or mortgage the lot only to the near descendants and sister of Alleja; failure to deliver the piculs of sugar to Maria Marlena and the failure of the bank to comply with the obligation. RTC: dismissed the complaint CA: reversed RTC’s decision stating that non compliance with the obligation, the court deems it proper to order the reconveyance of title of lot from estates of Jorge to the estate of Alleja.

ISSUE: Does the heirs of Jorge Rabadilla has the duty to comply with the obligation imposed by the testatrix in the codicil despite of the fact that it was an obligation imposed upon Jorge.

RULING:

It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent1[10] and compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law. The legitimate children and descendants, in relation to their legitimate parents, and the widow or widower, are compulsory heirs.2[11] Thus, the petitioner, his mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation of law, without need of further proceedings, and the successional rights were transmitted to them from the moment of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death. In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, subject to the condition that the usufruct thereof would be delivered to the herein private respondent every year. Upon the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs succeeded to his rights and title over the said property, and they also assumed his (decedent's) obligation to deliver the fruits of the lot involved to herein private respondent. Such obligation of the instituted heir reciprocally corresponds to the right of private respondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment or performance of which is now being demanded by the latter through the institution of the case at bar. Therefore, private respondent has a cause of action against petitioner and the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint below.

OCTAVIANO MALOLES II vs. PACITA DELOS REYES PHILIPS

FACTS:

(+Feb. 26, 1996) DR ARTURO DE SANTOS

ALICIA (sister)

OCTAVIANO MALOLES II Arturo de Santos Foundation , INC. (sole legatee and devisee of DR ARTURO)

DR Arturo is a Filipino and resident of the Philippines. During his lifetime he filed a probate of his will in the RTC alleging that he has no compulsory heir and that he is appointing his foundation to be his sole legatee and devisee. Copies of the will was given in the custody of Pacita Philips as his executrix. Judge of the RTC allows the probate of the will. When Dr Arturo died petitioner filed a motion for intervention claiming as the only child of ALICIA (testators sister) thus the sole and full blood nephew and nearest kin and also alleged that he is one of the creditors of the testator.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RTC has lost jurisdiction to proceed with the probate proceedings.

RULING: The contention has no merit.

In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that the authority of the court is limited to ascertaining the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. Ordinarily, probate proceedings are instituted only after the death of the testator, so much so that, after approving and allowing the will, the court proceeds to issue letters testamentary and settle the estate of the testator. The cases cited by petitioner are of such nature. In fact, in most jurisdictions, courts cannot entertain a petition for probate of the will of a living testator under the principle of ambulatory nature of wills. However, Art. 838 of the Civil Code authorizes the filing of a petition for probate of the will filed by the testator himself. It provides: Civil Code, Art. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court having jurisdiction for the allowance of his will. In such case, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court for the allowance of wills after the testator’s death shall govern. Miso The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional Rules of Court as may be necessary for the allowance of wills on petition of the testator. Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will, either during the lifetime of the testator or after his death, shall be conclusive as to its due execution.

EN BANC; G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927 Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator, petitionerappellee, vs. ANDRE BRIMO,opponent-appellant. The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it. Portion of the will of Joseph Brimo: Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship having been conferred upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality and, on the other hand, having resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands where I succeeded in acquiring all of the property that I now possess, it is my wish that the distribution of my property and everything in connection with this, my will, be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine islands, requesting all of my relatives to respect this

wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand whatever disposition found in this will favorable to the person or persons who fail to comply with this request.

One of the errors which the oppositor-appellant assignis that the declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the failure not to postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery of the deceased's business to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the Turkish laws.

The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code. But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. (Lim and Limvs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472.) It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and executed. UY KIAO ENG vs. NIXON LEE G.R. NO. 176831 JAN. 15, 2010 FACTS: Nixon Lee, the respondent, filed a petition for mandamus against his mother, the petitioner, to compel the latter to produce the will so that the probate proceeding for the allowance thereof could be instituted. Respondent alleged that he had already requested his mother to settle and liquidate the patriarch’s estate and to deliver to the legal heirs their respective inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so without any justifiable reason. Petitioner denied that she was in custody of the original holographic and asserted that the photocopies of the will were given to respondent and to his siblings. The trial court granted the Demurer filed by the petitioner upon motion for reconsideration. The court of appeals reversed the decision and ordered the production of the will. Petitioner maintains that Mandamus is not the proper remedy. Issue: WON mandamus is the proper remedy to compel the custodian of the will to deliver it to the court having jurisdiction? Held:

The remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by the respondent because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law which is further provided by Rule 75, section 2 to 5, for the production of the original holographic will. The mere fact that the respondent has a photocopy of the will and that he seeks the production of the original for the purpose of probate, the Rules of Court does not prevent him from instituting probate proceedings for the allowance of the will whether the same is in his possession or not.

No. 34.Testate Estate of the Deceased MARIANO MOLO Y LEGASPI. JUANA JUAN VDA. DE MOLO,petitioner-appellee, vs. LUZ, GLICERIA and CORNELIO MOLO,oppositors-appellants. Facts: Mariano Molo died in 1941 survived by his wife, Juana de Molo and Luz and Cornelio Molo (niece and nephew). During his lifetime Mariano executed two wills; one in year 1918 and 1939. After Mariano’s death his wife filed a petition to probate the will of 1939 but was opposed by Luz and Cornelio contending that its execution was not in accordance with the law, the court then denied the probate of the will. Again, the wife filed a second petition to probate the will of 1918, and was opposed by Luz and Cornelio, stating that the will 1918 was deliberately revoked by Mariano. However, the court allowed the will to probate. Issue: whether or not the will of 1918 was revoked by the will of 1939 Ruling: NO. An invalid revoking will cannot validly revoked the previous will. As when the subsequent will was executed not in accordance with the law, it does not produce the effect of annulling the previous will. Akin to this case, since the 1939 was executed not in accordance with the law then it has no effect of annulling the 1918 will. The allowance of the will of 1918 is in consonance with the Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation. In this doctrine it is said that the revocation of the original will depend on the efficacy of the subsequent will. The revocation will be conditional and dependent upon efficacy of new disposition. Hence, if the subsequent will was not allowed to probate then it prevents the revocation of the original will.

Rodelas vs Aranza

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RICARDO B. BONILLA deceased, MARCELA RODELAS, petitioner-appellant, vs. AMPARO ARANZA, ET AL., oppositors-appellees, ATTY. LORENZO SUMULONG, intervenor

GR L-58509 December 7, 1982 Relova

FACTS:

  



In 1977, Marcela Rodelas filed a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo B. Bonilla who died in 1976 and for the issuance of letters testamentary to her. Amparo Aranza and the others opposed the petition; saying that, among others, the alleged holographic will, not its copy, must be produce to have an effect, as held in Gam v. Yap. The lower court dismissed the petition for probate of the will. It held that “once the original copy of holographic will is lost, a copy cannot stand in lieu of the original.” Also, the lapsed of fourteen (14) years shows that the holographic will has been discarded by the decedent. Rodelas appealed the lower court’s decision in holding that a will may not be proved by its copy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a holographic will, which was lost or cannot be found, can be proved by means of a photostatic copy?

HELD:

Yes, the will can be probated.

It is true that the best and only evidence for a holographic will is the testator’s handwriting. Nonetheless, if there is phototastic copy presented, it may be allowed because comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator.

A copy of the lost/destroyed holographic will may be admitted because the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court.

DOROTHEO vs. CA 320 SCRA 12

FACTS: Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro and Aniceta. Aniceta died in 1969 without her estate being settled. Alejandro died thereafter. Lourdes, claiming to have taken care of Alejandro before he died, filed a petition for probate of Alejandro’s will. In 1981, the will was admitted to probate but private respondents did not appeal from the said order. In 1983, upon motion of the private respondents, the trial court ruled that the will was intrinsically void and declared private respondents as the only heirs of the late spouses.

HELD: Probate proceedings deal generally with the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated particularly on these aspects:

•Whether the will submitted is indeed the decedent’s last will and testament •Compliance with the prescribed formalities for the execution of wills •The testamentary capacity of the testator •And the due execution of the last will and testament. Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a determination of whether the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time of its execution.

The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be raised even after the will has been authenticated.

Doctrine: It does not necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid last will and testaments is always intrinsically valid

VDA. DE KILAYKO v TENGCO 207 SCRA 600; March 27, 1992

FACTS: Maria Lizares y Alunan died and left her "testamento" in the possession and custody of her niece, Eustaquia Lizares, who later filed a petition for the settlement of her estate. The probate court declared the will probated and appointed Eustaquia as the executrix of the estate of Maria Lizares. - Eustaquia filed a project of partition, which was granted by the probate court. Simultaneously, said court declared the heirs, devisees, legatees and usufructuaries mentioned in the project of partition as the only heirs, devisees, legatees and usufructuaries of the estate; adjudicated to them the properties respectively assigned to them, and ordered the Register of Deeds to effect the corresponding transfer of properties. - Eustaquia filed an urgent motion to reopen the testate proceedings in order that some properties of Maria Lizares which had been omitted in the partition be adjudicated to her. The Court granted the motion and adjudicated to Eustaquia certain shares of stocks, a revolving fund certificate, plantation credits and sugar quota allocations, and real or personal properties of Maria Lizares which were not given by her to any other person in her last will and testament. The heirs executed an agreement of partition and subdivision, thereby terminating their co-ownership over the inherited land. - Eustaquia Lizares died single without any descendant. - Rodolfo and Amelo Lizares were appointed joint administrators of her intestate estate. - On the strength of the testamentary provisions contained in pars. 10 and 11 of the will of Maria Lizares, which were allegedly in the nature of a simple substitution, CelsaL. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. filed a motion to reopen once again the testate estate proceedings of Maria Lizares. They prayed among others that a substitute administrator be appointed. - The intestate heirs of Eustaquia opposed the motion, alleging that the court had no more jurisdiction to reopen the testate estate proceedings of Maria Lizares as the order of closure had long become final and that the testamentary provisions sought to be enforced are null and void. The Court denied the motion to reopen the testate proceedings. - Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of real property against the joining administrators of the estate of Eustaquia Lizares. - The joint administrators filed the present petition. Petitioners contend, among others, that the claim of petitioners over the properties left by their niece Eustaquia and which the latter had inherited by will from Maria Lizares, was groundless because paragraphs 10 and 11 of Maria's will on which Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. base their claim, conceived of a fideicommissary substitution of heirs. Petitioners claim that said provisions of the will are not valid because under Article 863 of the Civil Code, they constitute an invalid fideicommissary substitution of heirs.

ISSUES 1. WON the independent action for reconveyance should prosper. 2. WON petitioners are the conditional substitute heirs of Eustaquia in the testate estate of Maria Lizares

HELD 1. NO Ratio

A final decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees. If the decree is erroneous, it should be corrected by opportune appeal, for once it becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem, unless properly set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud.

Reasoning Any challenge to the validity of a will, any objection to the authentication thereof, and every demand or claim which any heir, legatee or party interested in a testate or intestate succession may make, must be acted upon and decided within the same special proceedings, not in a separate action, and the same judge having jurisdiction in the administration of the estate shall take cognizance of the question raised, inasmuch as when the day comes he will be called upon to make distribution and adjudication of the property to the interested parties.- The facts show that the petitioners recognized the decree of partition sanctioned by the probate court and in fact reaped the fruits thereof.

Hence, they are now precluded from attacking the validity of the partition or any part of it in the guise of a complaint for reconveyance. A party cannot, in law and in good conscience be allowed to reap the fruits of a partition, agreement or judgment and repudiate what does not suit him. Thus, where a piece of land has been included in a partition and there is no allegation that the inclusion was affected through improper means or without petitioner’s knowledge, the partition barred any further litigation on said title and operated to bring the property under the control and jurisdiction of the court for its proper disposition according to the tenor of the partition. - Moreover, when petitioners. moved for the reopening of the testate estate proceedings of Maria Lizares, the judicial decree of partition and order of closure of such proceedings was already final and executory, then reglementary period of thirty days having elapsed from the time of its issuance, with no timely appeal having been filed by them.- The only instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the better practice to secure relief is the opening of the same by proper motion within the reglementary period, instead of an independent action, the effect of which if successful, would be for another court or judge to throw out a decision or order already final and executed and reshuffle properties long ago distributed and disposedof.

2. NO Ratio

When a testator merely names an heir and provides that if such heir should die a second heir also designated shall succeed, there is no fideicommissary substitution. The substitution should then be construed as a vulgar or simple substitution under Art.859 of the Civil Code but it shall be effective only if the first heir dies before the testator.

Reasoning Although the testatrix intended a fideicommissary substitution in paragraphs 10 and11 of her will, the substitution can have no effect because the requisites for it to be valid, had not been satisfied. The allegation of the joint administrators that paragraphs 10 and 11 of Maria Lizares' last will and testament conceives of a fideicommissary substitution under Article 863 of the Civil Code is baseless as said paragraphs do not impose upon Eustaquia a clear obligation to preserve the estate in favor of Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al., neither may said paragraphs be considered as providing for a vulgar or simple substitution.- In this case, the instituted heir, Eustaquia, survived the testatrix, Maria Lizares. Hence, there can be no substitution of heirs for, upon Maria Lizares' death, the properties involved unconditionally devolved upon Eustaquia. Under the circumstances, the sisters of Maria Lizares could only inherit the estate of Eustaquia by operation of the law of intestacy. Case No. 33 GR No. 76464 February 29, 1998 158 SCRA 451 TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTO, ALDINA MALOTO CASIANO, CONSTANCIO MALOTO, PURIFICACION MIRAFLOR, ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF MOLO, AND ASILO DE MOLO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PANFILO MALOTO AND FELINO MALOTO, respondents. Adriana Maloto

- Testatrix

Heirs (Niece and Nephews): Aldina Maloto – Casiano Constancio Maloto Panfilo Maloto Felino Maloto Devisees/Legatees: Asilo De Molo

The Roman Catholic Church Purificacion Miraflor Witnesses: Guadalupe Maloto Vda. De Coral – househelp of Adriana Eladio Itchon - driver of Adriana Facts: Adriana died on October 20, 1963 leaving her niece and nephews as heirs. Believing that she died intestate, the heirs commenced an intestate proceeding for the settlement of their aunt’s estate. While the case was still in progress, the heirs agreed to an extrajudicial settlement to divide the estate into four equal parts and be distributed to them equally. The agreement was presented to the court. Three years later, Atty. Palma, an associate of Adriana’s lawyer, discovered an original copy of what purports to be the Last Will and Testament of Adriana. Atty. Palma submitted it to the Clerk of Court where the case was pending. According to the will, while Panfilo and Felino were still named heirs, their share in the estate is much less compared to Aldina and Constancio. Devisees and legatees were also named (listed above). Petitioners filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration to dismiss the pending case and allow the probate of Adriana’s will. Both the trial court and the CA denied the motion. The CA held that there was animus revocandi to revoke the will by the order of Adriana to Guadalupe to burn a copy of the will. Issue: WON there was a valid revocation of the will. Held: The SC reversed the ruling of the CA. The provisions of the new Civil Code pertinent to the issue can be found in Article 830. Art. 830. No will shall be revoked except in the following cases: (1) By implication of law; or (2) By some will, codicil, or other writing executed as provided in case of wills: or

(3) By burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating the will with the intention of revoking it, by the testator himself, or by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction. If burned, torn cancelled, or obliterated by some other person, without the express direction of the testator, the will may still be established, and the estate distributed in accordance therewith, if its contents, and due execution, and the fact of its unauthorized destruction, cancellation, or obliteration are established according to the Rules of Court. Animus revocandi is just one of the necessary elements for the proper revocation of a will. The physical act of burning does not per se constitute an effective revocation. It was proven that Guadalupe and Eladio were illiterates and could not have known whether the document that Guadalupe burned as witnessed by Eladio was a will, much less the will of Adriana. The burning was not proven to have been done under the express direction of Adriana. Also, according to the witnesses, Adriana was not present during the burning of the documents.

Case 15. Antonio Baltazar, et al., petitioners vs Lorenzo Laxa, respondent. G.R. No. 174489; April 11, 2012

FACTS:

Pacencia was a 78 year old spinster when she made her last will and testament. Childless and without any brothers or sisters, she bequeathed all her properties to respondent Lorenzo Laxa and his wife and their children. The relationship of Lorenzo and Pacencia was like that of a mother and child since Pacencia took care of him since birth and took him in as an adopted son, conversely, Lorenzo came to know and treated Pacencia as his own mother. Pacencia has been living with Lorenzo’s family while they were still in the Philippines. Lorenzo and family migrated to the United States. Six days after the execution of the will, Pacencia left for the United States, there she resided with Lorenzo and his family until her death on January 4, 1996.

More than 4 years after the death of Pacencia, Lorenzo filed a petition for probate of the Will of Pacencia and for the issuance of Letters of Administration in his favor. Now come petitioners herein Antonio Baltazar, et al., nephews and nieces of Pacencia, opposing the probate on the grounds that Pacencia, among others, was mentally incapable to make a will at the time of its execution. Petitioners claim that Pacencia was “magulyan” or forgetful wherein she would sometimes leave her wallet in the kitchen then start looking for it moments later. According to petitioners, Pacencia’s forgetfulness was so much so that it effectively stripped her of testamentary capacity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Pacencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will effectively rendering her incapable of making a valid will.

RULING:

No. Pacencia is of sound mind when she made her will. “Forgetfulness does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind.” See Articles 799 and 800. A scrutiny of the will discloses that Pacencia was aware of the nature of the document she executed. She specially requested that the customs of her faith be observed upon her death. She was well aware of how she acquired the properties from her parents and the properties she is bequeathing to Lorenzo and his family. Petition denied. Judgment affirmed.

Case 52. Francisca Tioco DE PAPA, et al., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. Dalisay Tongko CAMACHO, et al., defendants-appellants. G.R. No. L-28032; September 24, 1986 FACTS: The plaintiffs are the grandaunt and granduncles of the defendant, Dalisay. They have as a common ancestor the late Balbino Tioco (who had a sister named Romana Tioco), father of the plaintiffs and great grandfather of Dalisay. During the lifetime of Romana, she gratuitously donated four (4) parcels of land to her niece Toribia Tioco (legitimate sister of plaintiffs). The latter died intestate survived by her husband Estacio Dizon and their two (2) legitimate children, Faustino and Trinidad (mother of Dalisay) and leaving the said four (4) parcels of land as the inheritance of the children in equal pro-indiviso shares. Subsequently, Balbino died intestate, survived by his legitimate children and bu his wife (among the plaintiffs) and legitimate grandchildren, Faustino and Trinidad. In the partition of his estate, three (3) parcels of land were adjudicated as the inheritance of Toribia but as she had predeceased her father, the said three (3) parcesl of land devolved upon her two legitimate children, Faustino and Trinidad in equal pro-inidiviso shares. Faustino died intestate, singled and without issue, leaving his one-half (1/2) proindiviso share in the seven (7) parcels of land to his father, Eustacio, as his sole intestate heir, who reserved the said property subject to a reserva troncal. When Trinidad died intestate, her rights and interests in the land were inherited by her only child, Dalisay and not long after, Eustacio died intestate survived also by his only legitimate child, Dalisay. Dalisay now owns one-half (1/2) of all the seven (7) parcels of land as her inheritance from Trinidad. Dalisay also claims the other half of the said parcels of land by virtue of reserva troncal imposed thereon upon the death of Faustino but the plaintiffs opposed such claim because they claim three-fourths (3/4) of the one-half pro-indiviso interst in said parcel of land, which was inherited by Eustacio from Faustino, or three-eights (3/8) of the said parcels of land, by virtue of their being also third degree relatives of Faustino. The lower court declared that the parties are entitled to one-half (1/2) of the seven (7) parcels of land in dispute, as reservatarios, in equal proportions. Not satisfied, the defendant appealed. ISSUES: 1. 2.

Whether or not all the relatives of the propositus within the third degree in the appropriate line succeed without distinction to the reservable property upon the death of the reservista. Whether or not the rights of the plaintiffs are subject to, and should be determined by, the rules on intestate succession.

RULING: Article 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came.

The reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives reservatarios to whom the property should be returned, but within that group, the individual right to the property should be decided by the applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession, since Article 891 does not specify otherwise. This conclusion is strengthened by the circumstance that the reserva being an exceptional case, its application should be limited to what is strictly needed to accomplish the purpose of the law. Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on instestate succession, the plaintiffs must be held without any right thereto because, as aunt and uncles, respectively, of Faustino (the propositus), they are excluded from the succession by his niece, the defendant, although they are related to him within the same degree as the latter. Had the reversionary property passed directly from the propositus, there is no doubt that the plaintiffs would have been excluded by the defendant under the rules of intestate succession. There is no reason why a different result should obtain simply because “the transmission of the property was delayed by the interregnum of the reserva,” i.e., the property took a “detour” through an ascendant thereby govong rise to the reservation before its transmission to the reservatario. Dalisay Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the entirety of the reversionary property to the exclusion of the plaintiffs.

SULPICIA JIMENEZ vs TEODORA GRADO GR No. L-46364 April 6, 1990 Facts: Fermin owns a land located in Pangasinan. She had two sons, Fortunato and Carlos Jimenez. Fortunato died and has only 1 child who is the petitioner. When Fermin died, such land, in equal shares was registered in the name of Carlos and Sulpicia. Later on, Carlos died (1936). Melecia, who is the illegitimate child of Carlos, took possession of it and sold it to Edilbert Cagampan who later sold it to the respondent. Sulpicia executed an affidavit adjudicating to herself the other half of the prop which was in the name of Carlos, upon manifestation that she is the only heir of her deceased uncle. TCT was issued in favor of her over the entire land. She then instituted this present action to recover the other portion of the land occupied by the respondent. RTC: Dismissed the action; Respondent is the absolute owner CA: Affirmed in toto MR: Denied Hence, this petition. ISSUES:

1. WON Melecia has the right to inherent the share of Carlos 2. WON Melecia has the right to sell the land to Edilberto

3. WON Teodora has the better right than Sulpicia since she is in an open & notorious possession of the land HELD: 1&2: Melecia had no right to succeed to the estate of Carlos & could not have validly acquired nor legally transferred to Edilberto that portion of the property. Art. 2263 of NCC provides that rights to the inheritance of a person who died w/ or w/o a will before the effectivity of this code shall be governed by civil code of 1889. Since Carlos died on 1936, successional rights must be determined by cc of 1889. Under cc of 1889, to be an heir a child must be either legitimate/d or adopted or else an acknowledged child, hence ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN ARE DISQUALIFIED TO INHERIT. Melecia cannot be even considered as acknowledged natural child because Carlos was legally then married to Susan Abalos & therefore not qualified to marry Maria Cayabyab (mother of Melecia). Hence, Melecia was an illegitimate spurious child & not entitled to any successional rights ins so far as the estate of Carlos is concerned. 3. No. Suplicia’s ownership was covered by a torrens title, therefore no amount of possession thereof by the respondent could ever defeat her proprietary rights thereon. PETITION is GRANTED. NERI VS AKUTIN Facts: Agrpino Neri in his will left all his property by universal title to the children by his 2 nd marriage with preterition of the children by his 1st marriage. SC annulled the institution of heirs and declared total intestacy. Respondents (children by 2nd marriage) filed a MR contending that, there’s no preterition since children by his 1st marriage received their shares in the property through donations and occupation of lands owned by the testator RTC & CA: Eleuterio, appears to have received as a donation a parcel of land from his father but it is not clear whether or not the donation is valid. With respect to Agprino and Agapita parcels of land they have occupied are public land thus not a part of the testator’s estate. Getulia predeceased the testator hence neither Getulia nor her heirs received any share. On the other hand, Rosario & Celerina were likewise not clear whether they received their shares. ISSUE : WON there is preterition HELD: SC agreed with RTC and CA. There is preterition. Testator left all his property by universal title to the children by his 2nd marriage w/o expressly disinheriting the children by his 1st marriage. Therefore, intestacy comes in. Petition is Granted.

GARCIA vs. VASQUEZ April 30, 1970 Rev. Father Lucio V. Garcia, et. al., petitioners,

vs. Hon. Conrado M. Vasquez, judge of CFI of Mla. & Consuelo Vda. De Precilla, respondents. FACTS: Gliceria A. del Rosario, unmarried, died on September 17, 1965 in Manila, without any descendants, ascendants, brother or sister. Her niece, Consuelo Gonzales-Precilla, petitioned for the nd probate of Gliceria’s last will and testament executed on December 29, 1960 (2 will) and for her appointment as special administratrix. Said petition was opposed by herein petitioners Rev. Fr. Lucio st Garcia, a legatee in an earlier will executed on June 9, 1956 (1 will) by Gliceria and other groups th claiming to be relatives within the 5 civil degree. According to them, the 1960 will was not really intended by Gliceria to be her true will; that her signatures therein were procured through undue and improper pressure and influence; and that it did not comply with the formalities required by law. The CFI granted Consuelo’s petition and she was appointed as special administratrix. The oppositors petitioned for the immediate removal of Consuelo as special administratrix. The 3 instrumental witnesses of the 1960 will testified that Alfonso Precilla, the deceased husband of Consuelo, was the one who asked them to witness the execution of the last will and testament of Gliceria; that the will was already prepared and was read silently by Gliceria before she signed it in the presence of 3 witnesses and the notary public. Dr. Jesus Tamesis, an ophthalmologist, also testified that when Gliceria consulted him on March 11, 1960, he found that her left eye has cataract, denoting a possible glaucoma and that her right eye can only recognize objects or persons at a minimum distance of 20 ft. After his operation on Gliceria’s left eye, he found that her vision was only for viewing distant objects and not for reading print. Thus, it is impossible for her to read the contents of the will that she signed in 1960. ISSUE: WON Art. 808 regarding a blind testator should have been applied to Gliceria’s execution of the 1960 will RULING: YES. Gliceria del Rosario was like a blind testator and Article 808 of the Civil Code should have been observed in the execution of her will. Art. 808. If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him twice; once, by the notary public before whom the will is acknowledged. The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the will himself, is to make the provisions of the will known to the testator, so that he may be able to object if they are not in accordance with his wishes. That the aim of the law is to insure that the dispositions of the will are properly communicated to and understood by the handicapped testator, thus making them truly reflective of his desire, is evidenced by the requirement that the will should be read to the latter, not only once but twice, by two different persons, and that the witnesses have to act within the range of his (the testator’s) other senses. Since such requisites have not been complied with, the order allowing the probate of the 1960 will is reversed and set aside, and Consuelo is ordered to be removed as special administratrix.

ARELLANO vs. PASCUAL December 15, 2010 AMELIA P. ARELLANO, represented by her duly appointed guardians, AGNES P. ARELLANO and NONA P. ARELLANO, petitioners, vs. FRANCISCO PASCUAL and MIGUEL PASCUAL, respondents. FACTS: Angel N. Pascual, Jr. died intestate on Jan. 2, 1999 leaving his siblings, petitioner & respondents, as heirs. Respondents petitioned the RTC of Makati for the Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of Letters of Administration and brought into issue the validity of the parcel of land donated by the decedent to the petitioner assailing that such may be considered as an advance legitime of the petitioner and prayed that their nephew be appointed as administrator. The RTC precluded from determining the validity of the donation but for the purpose of determining whether it formed part of the decedent’s estate, it held that the deed of donation was valid. The properties were thereafter partitioned. The donated property was declared to be part of the estate and subject to collation in accordance with Art. 1061 of the Civil Code which states that: Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition. The CA sustained RTC’s ruling that the donated property is subject to collation and that the value of the property should be deducted from her share in the net hereditary estate. ISSUES: (1) WON the donated property is subject to collation (2) WON the estate should be distributed equally among the parties RULING: (1) NO. Collation has two distinct concepts: (1) it is a mere mathematical operation by the addition of the value of donations made by the testator to the value of the hereditary estate; and (2) it is the return to the hereditary estate of property disposed of by lucrative title by the testator during his lifetime. Its purposes are: (1) to secure equality among the compulsory heirs insofar as possible, and (2) to determine the free portion, after finding the legitime, so that inofficious donations may be reduced. It takes place when there are compulsory heirs since one of its purposes is determination of the legitime and the free portion. Thus, if there is no compulsory heir, there is no legitime to be safeguarded. The decedent left no compulsory heirs [whether primary (legitimate children & descendants), or secondary (legitimate parents or ascendants) or concurring (illegitimate children & surviving spouse)], but only his siblings (collateral heirs) who are not entitled to any legitime (for compulsory heirs). He was liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for his siblings to inherit. His donation to petitioner is considered as donation made to a “stranger,” chargeable against the free portion of the estate. Since there is no compulsory heir, the donated property is not subject to collation. (2) YES, the estate should be partitioned equally among the parties since if there are no compulsory heirs, the collateral relatives would be the ones to succeed to the estate (Art. 1003) and if they are siblings of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares (Art. 1004). The decision ordering the collation of the donated property is set aside.