Digest Arandia

January 15, 2018 | Author: XierylleAngelica | Category: Negligence, Lease, Assignment (Law), Employment, Damages
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.R. No. 185891, June 26, 2013CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS, Petitioner, v. JUANITA REYES, WILFI EDO REYES, MICHAEL ROY REYES, SIXTA LAPUZ, AND SAMPAGUITA TRAVEL CORP., Respondents. TOPIC: Diligence of a good father of a family FACTS Wilfredo made a travel reservation with Sampaguita Travel for his family s trip to Adelaide, Australia. Upon confirmation of their flight schedule, Wilfredo paid for the airfare and was issued 4 Cathay Pacific roundtrip airplane tickets for Manila-Hong Kong-Adelaide-Hong KongManila.One week before they were scheduled to fly back home, Wilfredo re-confirmed his familys return flight with the Cathay Pacific office in Adelaide. They were advised that the reservation was still okay as scheduled . On the day of their scheduled departure from Adelaide, Wilfredo and his family arrived at the airport on time. When the airport check-in opened, Wilfredo was informed by a staff from Cathay Pacific that Wilfredo s family did not have confirmed reservations, and only Sixta s flight booking was confirmed.Although, they were allowed to board the flight to Hong Kong, not all of them were allowed to board the flight to Manila as it was fully booked. Only Wilfredo s mother-in-law, Sixta, was allowed to proceed to Manila from Hong Kong.On the following day, the Reyeses were finally allowed to board the next flightbound for Manila.Upon arriving in the Philippines, Wilfredo went Sampaguita Travel to report theincident. He was informed by Sampaguita Travel that it was actually Cathay Pacific which cancelled their bookings. ISSUE:Whether Cathay Pacific breached its contract of carriage with the Wilfredo s family? YesWhether Sampaguita breached its contract of services with Wilfredo s family? Yes HELD: Cathay Pacific breached its contract of carriage with the Reyeses when it disallowed them to board the plane in Hong Kong going to Manila on the date reflectedon their tickets. Thus, Cathay Pacific opened itself to claims for compensatory, actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorney s fees and costs of suit. In contrast, the contractual relation between Sampaguita Travel and respondents is a contract for services. The object of the contract is arranging and facilitating the latters booking and ticketing. It was even Sampaguita Travel which issued the tickets. Since the contract between the parties is an ordinary one for services, the standard of care required of respondent is that of a good father of a family under Article 1173 of the Civil Code. This connotes reasonable care consistent with that which an ordinarily prudent person would have observed when confronted with a similar situation. The test to determine whether negligence attended the performance of an obligation is: did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. There was indeed failure on the part of Sampaguita Travel to exercise due diligence in performing its obligations under the contract of services. It was established by Cathay Pacific, through the generation of the PNRs, that Sampaguita Travel failed to input the correct ticket number for Wilfredos ticket. Cathay Pacific even asserted that Sampaguita Travel made two fictitious bookings for Juanita and Michael. The negligence of Sampaguita Travel renders it also liable for damages

Spouses Mamaril vs. The BSP G.R. No. 179382, January 14, 2013 SPOUSES BEN.JAMIN . MAMARIL AND SONIA P. MAMARIL, Petitioners, v. THE BOY SCOUT OF THE PHILIPPINES, AIB SECURITY AGENCY, INC., CESARIO PENA,'' AND VICENTE GADDI, Respondents. PERLAS-BERNABE. J.: FACTS: Spouses Benjamin C. Mamaril and Sonia P. Mamaril (Spouses Mamaril) are jeepney operators. They park their passenger jeepneys every night at the Boy Scout of the Philippines (BSP) for a fee per month for each unit. As usual, all these vehicles were parked inside the BSP compound one evening. However, the following morning, one of the vehicles was missing and was never recovered. According to the security guards CesarioPe (Pe) and Vicente Gaddi (Gaddi) of AIB Security Agency, Inc. (AIB) with whom BSP had contracted (Guard Service Contract) for its security and protection, a male person who looked familiar to them took the subject vehicle out of the compound. ISSUE: Whether or not BSP is liable based on the Guard Service Contract and the parking ticket it issued. HELD: The petition lacks merit. CIVIL LAW: Principle of Relativity of Contracts; Lease With respect to Guard Service Contract, it is undisputed that Spouses Mamaril are not parties therein. Neither did the subject agreement contain any stipulation pour autrui. And even if there was, Spouses Mamaril did not convey any acceptance thereof. Thus, under the principle of relativity of contracts, they cannot validly claim any rights or favor under the said agreement. With respect to the parking ticket, it has been held that the act of parking a vehicle in a garage, upon payment of a fixed amount, is a lease. A lessor-lessee relationship existed between Spouses Mamaril and BSP. Article 1664 of the same Code states that [t]he lessor is not obliged to answer for a mere act of trespass which a third person may cause on the use of the thing leased; but the lessee shall have a direct action against the intruder. Here, BSP was not remiss in its obligation to provide Spouses Mamaril a suitable parking space for their jeepneys as it even hired security guards to secure the premises; hence, it should not be held liable for the loss suffered by Spouses Mamaril.

CALIFORNIA CLOTHING INC. v. QUINONES G.R. No. 175822 October 23, 2013 Ponente: Peralta, J. FACTS: Respondent went inside the Guess USA Boutique in Robinson’s Department Store in Cebu City and decided to purchase the black jeans worth P2098. While she was walking, she was confronted by a Guess employee and told her that she failed to pay for the item she got to which respondent replied that she did and showed the receipt. Respondent then suggested they talk about it in the Cebu Pacific office in the mall. While in there, she was allegedly embarrassed and humiliated by the Guess employees in front of their clients. The next day, Guess employees event sent a demand letter to respondents employers. While the RTC ruled for them, CA reversed the decision saying that the acts done by the employees were not in good faith. Petitioners pray for the reversal of the decision of CA. ISSUE: Did the Guess employees violate Articles 20 and 21 of Civil Code of the Philippines? HELD: The Court affirmed CA’s decision and held that the employees abused their rights and did not have good faith in their actions against respondent where there was no clear evidence that she was evading to pay for the merchandise. The petition is thus denied for lack of merit.

Joyce Ardiente v. Spouses Javier and Ma. Theresa Pastorfide, Cagayan De Oro Water District and Gaspar Gonzales, Jr. GR. NO. 161921, July 17, 2013 "Principle of Abuse of Rights" - Article 19 of the Civil Code FACTS:

Ma. Theresa Pastorfide entered a MOA with Joyce Ardiente where the latter sold, conveyed, and transferred all their rights and interests in the Emily Homes Housing unit to the former. It has been agreed by the parties that the water bill will remain in the account of Ardiente. On March 12, 1999, Ma. Theresa's water supply was disconnected without notice. She complained to the Cagayan De Oro Water District (COWD) and she found out that the account has become delinquent. She paid the three months due and wrote a letter through her counsel to the COWD to explain why her water supply was cut without notice. The general manager of the COWD, Gaspar Gonzalez, replied that it was Joyce Ardiente who requested the disconnection of the water supply. A complaint for damages was filed against Ardiente, COWD and Gonzalez by Ma. Theresa. The RTC ruled in favor of Ma. Theresa on the ground that the defendants committed abuse of their rights. The ruling was upheld by the CA on appeal with modification on the award of the amount for damages.Hence this petition before the SC. ISSUE: Are the defendants liable for damages? RULING: Yes. The court ruled that the principle of abuse of rights under Section 19 of the Civil Code was violated. It provides that "every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." A right, although it is legal for being recognized by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of illegality (Globe Mackay and Radio Corporation v CA), when it is exercised in a manner that does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and the same causes damage to another. The person exercising an abuse of right is thus liable for damages caused to another. The herein petitioner is liable for damages by ordering the cutting of the water supply of the respondent without giving notice about such intention. The COWD and Gonzalez are likewise liable for

damages by disconnecting the water supply without prior notice and for their subsequent neglect of reconnecting the water supply even when the respondent already paid the delinquent account.

CIVIL LAW; LEASE; Essentially not personal in character; No novation in sublease; Lessee can sublease as long as it is not expressly prohibited; When Lessor should pay 1/2 value of improvements introduced Analita P. Inocencio vs. Hospicio De San Jose G.R. No. 201787, 25 September 2013

In this case, the Supreme Court held the clause "contract is non-transferable unless prior consent of the lessor is obtained in writing" to refer to transfers inter vivos and not transmissions mortis causa. Since lease contracts are not personal in character, the SC explained that the rights of a lessee may be transferred to an heir via intestate succession and unless prohibited, the heir can exercise the same rights as the lessee-predecessor-in-interest. A lessee is also not prohibited from sub-leasing the leased property or premises provided no express prohibition exists in the contract of lease. When there is a sub-lease, there is likewise no novation of the contract of lease, since the original juridical relation between the lessor-lessee remains (as opposed to an Assignment of the Lease when the lessee is replaced by the assignee). Another notable point made in this case is the fact the simultaneous lease of the building likewise includes with it, the lease of the land on which the property is located. Thus, rental payment for the building includes rental for the lot. With respect to improvements introduced by the lessor in good faith on the property, the SC held that the lessor is entitled to be paid 1/2 value of the improvements introduced at the time the lease is terminated, provided that the following requirements are present: (1) the improvements were introduced in good faith; (2) the improvements are useful; and (3) suitable to the use for which the lease is intended, without altering the form and substances. Should the lessee refuse to reimburse the lessor, the latter may then cause the demolition of the improvements introduced.

ALLIED BANKING CORP vs BPI G.R. No. 188363 February 27, 2013 A collecting bank is guilty of contributory negligence when it accepted for deposit a post-dated check notwithstanding that said check had been cleared by the drawee bank which failed to return the check within the 24-hour reglementary period. FACTS: On October 10, 2002, a check in the amount of P1,000,000.00 payable to "Mateo Mgt. Group International" (MMGI) was presented for deposit and accepted at petitioner's (Allied Bank) Kawit Branch. The check, post-dated "Oct. 9, 2003", was drawn against the account of Marciano Silva, Jr. (Silva) with respondent BPI Bel-Air Branch. Upon receipt, petitioner sent the check for clearing to respondent through the Philippine Clearing House Corporation (PCHC).3 The check was cleared by respondent and petitioner credited the account of MMGI with P1,000,000.00. On October 22, 2002, MMGI’s account was closed and all the funds therein were

withdrawn. A month later, Silva discovered the debit of P1,000,000.00 from his account. In response to Silva’s complaint, respondent credited his account with the aforesaid sum.4 Petitioner filed a complaint6 before the Arbitration Committee, asserting that respondent should solely bear the entire face value of the check due to its negligence in failing to return the check to petitioner within the 24-hour reglementary period as provided in Section 20.17 of the Clearing House Rules and Regulations8 (CHRR) 2000. In its Answer with Counterclaims,9 respondent charged petitioner with gross negligence for accepting the post-dated check in the first place. It contended that petitioner’s admitted negligence was the sole and proximate cause of the loss. 1. What does the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance enunciate? The doctrine of last clear chance, stated broadly, is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff’s negligence.22 The doctrine necessarily assumes negligence on the part of the defendant and contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, and does not apply except upon that assumption.23 Stated differently, the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude him from recovering damages caused by the supervening negligence of the defendant, who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.24 Moreover, in situations where the doctrine has been applied, it was defendant’s failure to exercise such ordinary care, having the last clear chance to avoid loss or injury, which was the proximate cause of the occurrence of such loss or injury.25 2. Does the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance apply in this case? YES. In this case, the evidence clearly shows that the proximate cause of the unwarranted encashment of the subject check was the negligence of respondent who cleared a post-dated check sent to it thru the PCHC clearing facility without observing its own verification procedure. As correctly found by the PCHC and upheld by the RTC, if only respondent exercised ordinary care in the clearing process, it could have easily noticed the glaring defect upon seeing the date written on the face of the check "Oct. 9, 2003". Respondent could have then promptly returned the check and with the check thus dishonored, petitioner would have not credited the amount thereof to the payee’s account. Thus, notwithstanding the antecedent negligence of the petitioner in accepting the post-dated check for deposit, it can seek reimbursement from respondent the amount credited to the payee’s account covering the check.

Phoenix Construction vs. IAC March 10, 1987 Ponente: Feliciano, J. FACTS: Petitioners: PHOENIX Construction Inc., and Armando U. CARBONEL Respondents: The Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) and Leonardo DIONISIO 1. On November 15, 1975 (Martial Law period), about 1:30AM, respondent Dionisio, a marketing man, was driving home from a dinner meeting where he had a shot or two of liquor. He had just crossed an intersection and while driving down the street, his headlights were turned off. When he switched on his headlights to “bright”, he suddenly saw a Ford dump truck some 2 ½ meters away from his Volkswagen car. It was later found out that he did not a curfew pass that night.

2. The dump truck belonged to co-petitioner Phoenix, and was parked there by the company’ driver, co-petitioner Carbonel. It was parked on the right hand side of the lane that Dionisio was driving on, but it was parked facing the oncoming traffic. It was parked askew so it was sticking out onto the street, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were no lights nor were there any “early warning” reflector devices set anywhere near the truck, front or rear. 3. Phoenix permitted Carbonel to take home the truck, which was scheduled to be used the next morning. 4. Dionisio, upon seeing the truck, tried to avoid a collision by swerving to the left, but it was too late. His car smashed into the truck. 5. Dionisio suffered physical injuries, including permanent facial scars, “a nervous breakdown” and loss of two gold bridge dentures. 6. [See resolution of factual issues by the SC, found on HELD part of this digest.] CFI: 7. An action for damages was commenced by Dionisio in the CFI, claiming that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix. 8. Phoenix and Carbonel countered that the proximate cause of Dionisio’s injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident, while under the influence of liquor, without his headlights on, and without a curfew pass. 9. Phoenix also sought to establish that it had exercised due care in the selection and supervision of the dump truck driver. 10. The CFI rendered judgment in favor of Dionisio and against Phoenix and Carbonel. IAC: 11. Upon appeal to the IAC, that court affirmed the CFI’s decision. 12. Hence, the present petition. ISSUE: WON Dionisio’s negligence was an intervening, efficient cause determinative of the accident and the injuries he sustained DECISION: NO. Although Dionisio was found to be negligent, his negligence was not an intervening, efficient cause. The legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio’s injuries was the negligence of Carbonel in the manner by which he parked the dump truck. Petitioners are liable for damages, but these damages must be mitigated because of Dionisio’s contributory negligence. Decision modified whereby Dionisio will shoulder 20% of awarded damages. HELD: [Resolution of factual issues] The Court held that on that night, Dionisio was driving without a curfew pass. Since he was without a curfew pass, he was hurrying home, driving at a fast speed in order to avoid the police. Worse, he turned off his headlights as he was driving down that street in order to escape notice from the nearby

police station. However, the Court held that that the one or two shots of liquor he had did not show that he was so heavily under the influence of liquor as to constitute an act of reckless imprudence. Taken all together, however, the Court drew the conclusion that Dionisio was negligent on the night of the accident. [Note: During the period of Martial Law, no person was allowed to be outside his home during curfew hours, unless he has a curfew pass.] Cause vs. Condition; Almost no distinction between them Petitioners urge that the Carbonel’s negligence was merelt a “passive and static condition” and that Dionisio’s negligence was an “efficient intervening cause,” and that consequently Dionisio’s negligence must be regarded as the legal and proximate cause of the accident rather than the earlier negligence of Carbonel. However, the distinctions between “cause” and “condition have been “almost entirely discredited.” The Court quotes significantly from Prosser and Keeton. The following parts were quoted with emphasis: “Cause and condition… So far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents which have played an important part in producing the result, it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations, particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the result of other active forces which have gone before… Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the “condition” remains static will not necessarily affect liability… “Cause” and “condition” still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the distinction is now almost entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer to the type of case where the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent safety, and some new force intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the distinction between “cause” and “condition” which is important, but the nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause.” Dionisio’s negligence is not an efficient intervening cause Carbonel’s negligence is far from being a “passive and static condition” – it was an indispensable and efficient cause. The collision would not have happened had the truck not been parked askew and without any warning lights or reflector devices. The improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down the street and for having so created this risk, Carbonel must be held responsible. Carbonel owed a duty to Dionisio and others similarly situated not to impose upon them the very risk that Carbonel had created. Dionisio’s negligence was not of an independent and overpowering nature as to cut, as it were, the chain of causation in fact between the improper parking of the dump truck and the accident, nor to sever the juris vinculum of liability. The Court quoted parts of Prosser and Keeton. With emphasis were the following: “Foresseable Intervening Causes. If the intervening cause is one which is ordinary human experience is reasonably to be anticipated, or one which the defendant has reason to anticipate under the particular circumstances, the defendant may be negligent, among other reasons, because of failure to guard against it; or the defendant may be negligent only for that reason… There is an intervening cause combining with the defendant’s conduct to produce result, and… the defendant’s negligence consists in failure to protect the plaintiff against that very risk. “Obviously the defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk or a substantial and important part of the risk, to which the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has indeed come to pass. Foreseeable intervening forces are within the scope of the original risk, and hence of the defendant’s negligence.

“Thus it has been held… that one who leaves an obstruction on the road or a railroad track should foresee that a vehicle or a train will run into it. “The risk created by the defendant may include the intervention of the foreseeable negligence of others. Xxx The standard of reasonable conduct may require the defendant to protect the plaintiff against ‘that occasional negligence which is one of the ordinary incidents of human life, and therefore to be anticipated… One who parks an automobile on the highway without lights at night is not relieved of responsibility when another negligently drives into it…” Dionisio had contributory negligence The court held that Dionisio’s negligence was “only contributory,” that the “immediate and proximate cause” of the injury remained Carbonel’s “lack of due care” and that consequently Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the court. Hence, on the award of most of the damages, an allocation of 20-80 ratio should be followed, where 20% shall be borne by Dionisio, while 80% shall be borne by petitioners. Last Clear Chance cannot apply Petitioners ask the application of the “last clear chance” doctrine. It cannot apply. The last clear chance doctrine of the common law was imported into our jurisdiction by Picart vs. Smith but is a matter for debate whether, or to what extent, it has found its way into the Civil Code of the Philippines. Its historical function was to mitigate the harshness of another common law doctrine or rule – contributory negligence. The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The Court believes that there is no general concept of “last clear chance” that may be extracted from its common law matrix and utilized as a general rule in negligence cases in a civil law jurisdiction. Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in technical terms, is to determine whose negligence – the plaintiff’s or the defendant’s – was the legal or proximate cause of the injury. That task is not simply or even primarily an exercise in chronology or physics. Chronology of plaintiff’s and defendant’s negligent acts or omissions is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the community. Phoenix is presumed negligent for failing to supervise its employees properly and adequately Carbonel’s proven negligence creates a presumption of negligence on the part of his employer Phoenix in supervising its employees properly and adequately. Phoenix was not able to overcome this presumption of negligence. It failed to show any effort on the part of Phoenix to supervise the manner in which the dump truck if parked when away from company premises. It is an affirmative showing of culpa in vigilando on the part of Phoenix. Decision modified as to the allocation of award of damages.

AMADO PICART v. FRANK SMITH, JR. G.R. No. L-12219, 15 March 1918 STREET, J.: FACTS: On 12 December 1912, on the Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union, Amado Picart was riding on his pony over said bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, Frank Smith Jr. approached from the opposite direction in an automobile, going at the rate of about 10 or 12 miles per hour. As Smith neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road. Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. As the automobile approached, Smith guided it toward his left, that being the proper side of the road for the machine. In so doing Smith assumed that the horseman would move to the other side. The pony had not as yet exhibited fright, and the rider had made no sign for the automobile to stop. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, Smith, instead of veering to the right while yet some distance away or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed. When he had gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, Smith quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing where it was then standing; but in so doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its head toward the railing. In so doing, it was struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence. As a result of its injuries the horse died. Picart received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days. ISSUE: Whether or not Smith is guilty of negligence. RULING: Yes. Smith, in maneuvering his car in the manner described, was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done. In the nature of things the control of the situation had passed entirely to Smith, and it was his duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop or, seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision. Instead of doing this, Smith ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse. When Smith exposed the horse and rider to this danger he was negligent in the eye of the law. The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. What would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case. Abstract speculation cannot be of much value; as reasonable men govern their conduct by the circumstances which are before them or known to them, and hence they can be expected to take care only when there is something before them to suggest or warn of danger. Reasonable foresight of harm is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. In fine, the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding against its consequences.

Loadmasters vs Glodel and R&B Digest G.R. No.179446: January 10, 2011 LOADMASTERS CUSTOMS SERVICES, INC. Petitioner vs. GLODEL BROKERAGE CORPORATION and R&B INSURANCE CORPORATION Respondents MENDOZA, J.: FACTS: Columbia Wire and Cable Corporation (Columbia) insured a cargo of copper cathodes through R&B Insurance Corporation (R&B). Columbia also engaged the services of Glodel Brokerage Corporation (Glodel) for the transport of the cargo to Columbia facilities. Glodel then engaged the services of Loadmasters Customs Services (Loadmasters) for the delivery of said cargo to Columbia. Out of 12 trucks, owned by Loadmasters, used to deliver the cargo of Columbia, only 11 made it to their respective destinations. /span>Columbia claimed the amount of loss from R&B, which sued both Glodel and Loadmasters. The RTC ruled in favor of R&B, but did not hold Loadmasters liable. Both R&B and Glodelappealed the judgement. The Court of Appeals modified the decision of the RTC and ruled that Loadmasters, being the agent of Glodel, is liable to Glodel for all the damages it might be required to pay. ISSUES: Whether or not Loadmasters is an agent of Glodel, and whether or not it may be held liable under the transaction between Glodel and Columbia. HELD: Petition is partly meritorious Civil Law: Glodel and Loadmasters are both common carriers, as they hold out their carriage services to the public. As such, under the Civil Code, they are mandated to show extraordinary diligence in the conduct of transport. In the case at bar, both Glodel and Loadmasters were negligent as the cargo failed to reach its destination. Loadmasters failed to ensure that its employees would not tamper with the cargo. Glodel failed to ensure that Loadmasters is sufficiently capable of completing the delivery. Glodel and Loadmasters are therefore joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable to R&B Insurance. Loadmasters cannot be considered an agent of Glodel. Loadmasters in no way represented itself as such, and in the transfer of cargo, did not represent itself as doing such in behalf of Glodel. In fact, Loadmasters is not privy to the agreement between Glodel and Columbia. It cannot be considered an agent of Glodel, and cannot be held liable to Glodel. Remedial Law: Though Glodel has, admittedly, a cause of action against Loadmasters, it has effectively waived it by failing to raise the cross-claim. The rules of procedure states that compulsory counterclaims and cross-claims not pleaded are deemed waived. They cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.


OCEAN BUILDERS and/or HAO vs. SPOUSES CUBACUB G.R. No. 150898 April 13, 2011

FACTS: Bladimir Cubacub was employed as maintenance man by petitioner Ocean Builders Construction Corp. at its office in Caloocan City. Bladimir was afflicted with chicken pox. He was thus advised by petitioner Hao, the company’s general manager, to rest for 3 days which he did at the company’s “barracks.” 3 days later, Bladimir went about his usual chores. Later in the afternoon, however, he asked a coworker Silangga, to accompany him to his house in Capas, Tarlac so he could rest. Informed by Silangga of Bladimir’s intention, Hao gave Bladimir P1,000.00 and ordered Silangga to instead bring Bladimir to the nearest hospital. Along with co-workers Narding and Vergado, Silangga thus brought Bladimir to the nearest Community Hospital, a primary-care hospital around 1 kilometer away from the office of the company. The hospital did not allow Bladimir to leave the hospital. He was then confined. The next day, Bladimir’s parents-respondent spouses Cubacub, with their friend Dr. Frias, arrived at the Hospital and transferred Bladimir to the Quezon City General Hospital where he was placed in the ICU and died the following day. Bladimir’s parents-herein respondents later filed before the Tarlac RTC at Capas a complaint for damages against petitioners, alleging that Hao was guilty of negligence which resulted in the deterioration of Bladimir’s condition leading to his death. The Tarlac RTC dismissed the complaint, holding that Hao was not negligent. On respondents’ appeal, the CA eversed the trial court’s decision, holding that by Hao’s failure to bring Bladimir to a better-equipped hospital, he violated Article 161 of the Labor Code. ISSUE: Is petitioner company and its co-petitioner manager Hao guilty of negligence. HELD: NO Art. 161 of the Labor Code provides: ART. 161. Assistance of employer. – It shall be the duty of any employer to provide all the necessary assistance to ensure the adequate and immediate medical and dental attendance and treatment to an injured or sick employee in case of emergency. The Implementing Rules of the Code do not enlighten what the phrase “adequate and immediate” medical attendance means in relation to an “emergency.” It would thus appear that the determination of what it means is left to the employer, except when a full-time registered nurse or physician are available on-site as required, also under the Labor Code, specifically Art. 157 which provides:

Article 157. Emergency Medical and Dental Services. ─ It shall be the duty of every employer to furnish his employees in any locality with free medical and dental attendance and facilities consisting of: (a) The services of a full-time registered nurse when the number of employees exceeds fifty (50) but not more than two hundred (200) except when the employer does not maintain hazardous workplaces, in which case, the services of a graduate first-aider shall be provided for the protection of workers, where no registered nurse is available. The Secretary of Labor and Employment shall provide by appropriate regulations, the services that shall be required where the number of employees does not exceed fifty (50) and shall determine by appropriate order, hazardous workplaces for purposes of this Article; (b) The services of a full-time registered nurse, a part-time physician and dentist, and an emergency clinic, when the number of employees exceeds two hundred (200) but not more than three hundred (300); and (c) The services of a full-time physician, dentist and a full-time registered nurse as well as a dental clinic and an infirmary or emergency hospital with one bed capacity for every one hundred (100) employees when the number of employees exceeds three hundred (300). In the present case, there is no allegation that the company premises are hazardous. Neither is there any allegation on the number of employees the company has. If Hao’s testimony would be believed, the company had only seven regular employees and 20 contractual employees ─ still short of the minimum 50 workers that an establishment must have for it to be required to have a full-time registered nurse. The Court can thus only determine whether the actions taken by petitioners when Bladimir became ill amounted to the “necessary assistance” to ensure “adequate and immediate medical . . . attendance” to Bladimir as required under Art. 161 of the Labor Code. As found by the trial court and borne by the records, petitioner Hao’s advice for Bladimir to, as he did, take a 3-day rest and to later have him brought to the nearest hospital constituted “adequate and immediate medical” attendance that he is mandated, under Art. 161, to provide to a sick employee in an emergency. AT ALL EVENTS, the alleged negligence of Hao cannot be considered as the proximate cause of the death of Bladimir. Proximate cause is that which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which, the result would not have occurred. An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or failure to act, whenever it appears from the evidence in the case that the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing

about or actually causing the injury or damage, and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission. Advertisements

G.R. No. 173259

July 25, 2011

Philippine National Bank, petitioner vs. F.F. CRUZ and CO., INC., respondent, FACTS: This petition for review arose from a case for damages filed by FF Cruz against PNB. Plaintiff FF Cruz has open an account at PNB-Timog Ave. Branch, wherein its president and its secretary-treasurer were the named signatories. Plaintiff FF Cruz, avers that PNB has been negligent to deduct the cashier’s and manager’s checks amounting to Php9,950,000.00 and Php3,260,000.00, respectively, as the same were unauthorized and fraudulently made by the company accountant Aurea Caparas as both the president and the secretary were out of the country at that time. The plaintiff seeks to credit back and restore to its account the value of the checks, to which the defendant bank refused as the defendant bank alleged that it exercised due diligence in handling the account of FF Cruz, as the application of said checks have passed a through standard bank procedures and it was only after finding that it has no infirmity that the checks were given due course. The trial court rendered a Decision against defendant bank for not calling or personally verifying from the authorized signatories the legitimacy of the subject withdrawals considering that they were huge amounts. For this reason, defendant PNB had the last clear chance to prevent the unauthorized debits from the FF Cruz account. And thus, PNB should bear the whole loss. On appeal, the Court of Appeal, affirmed the Decision of the trial court with modification on the award for damages that PNB should only pay 60% of the actual damage and the Plaintiff FF Cruz should bear the remaining 40% for its contributory negligence by giving authority to its company accountant to transact with defendant bank PNB. Petitioner PNB appealed the Court of Appeals’ Decision. ISSUES: Whether or not the principle of last clear chance principle is applicable to held the defendant bank liable for damages.

RULING: The Court ruled that the finding of the appellate court that PNB failed to make a proper verification as the manager’s check do not bear the signature of the bank verifier, thus casting doubt as whether the signatures were indeed underwent the proper verification. In view of the foregoing, the Court ruled that PNB was negligent in handling the FF Cruz account specifically with respect to PNB’s failure to detect the forgeries in subject application for manager’s check which could have prevented the loss. It further states, that PNB failed to meet the high standard of diligence required by the circumstances to prevent the fraud, where the bank’s negligence is the proximate cause of the loss and the depositor is guilty of contributory negligence, the damage between the bank and the depositor, a 60-40 ratio applies. Wherefore, the petition was denied and the CA’s Decision is affirmed.

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