Digest - (4th Batch) Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee

carlotroyacelotttapadomanalo 1. Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee Facts: Cheong Boo, a native of China died in Zamboanga, Philippine Islands on August 5, 1919 and left property worth nearly P100,000 which is now being claimed by two parties - (1) Cheong Seng Gee who alleged that he was a legitimate child by marriage contracted by Cheong Boo with Tan Bit in China in 1985, and (2) Mora Adong who alleged that she had been lawfully married to Cheong Boo in 1896 in Basilan, Philippine Islands and had two daughters with the deceased namely Payang and Rosalia. The conflicting claims to Cheong Boo’s estate were ventilated in the lower court that ruled that Cheong Seng Gee failed to sufficiently establish the Chinese marriage through a mere letter testifying that Cheong Boo and Tan Bit married each other but that because Cheong Seng Gee had been admitted to the Philippine Islands as the son of the deceased, he should share in the estate as a natural child. With reference to the allegations of Mora Adong and her daughters, the trial court reached the conclusion that the marriage between Adong and Cheong Boo had been adequately proved but that under the laws of thePhilippine Islands it could not be held to be a lawful marriage and thus the daughter Payang and Rosalia would inherit as natural children. The lower court believes that Mohammedan marriages are not valid under the Philippine Island’s laws this as an Imam as a solemnizing officer and under Quaranic laws.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the Chinese marriage between Cheong Boo and Tan Dit is valid. 2. Whether or not the Mohammedan marriage between Cheong Boo and Mora Adong is valid

HELD: The Supreme Court found the (1) Chinese marriage not proved and Chinaman Cheong Seng Gee has only the rights of a natural child while (2) it found the Mohammedan marriage to be proved and to be valid, thus giving to the widow Mora Adong and the legitimate children Payang and Rosalia the rights accruing to them under the law. The Supreme Court held that marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract but it is a new relation, an instruction in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. The presumption as to marriage is that every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together inapparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency of the law. As to retroactive force, marriage laws is in the nature of a curative provision intended to safeguard society by legalizing prior marriages. Public policy should aid acts intended to validate marriages and should retard acts intended to invalidate marriages. This as for public policy, the courts can properly incline the scales of their decision in favor of that solution

which will most

effectively promote the public policy. That is the true construction which will best carry legislative intention into effect. Sec. IV of the Marriage law provides that “all marriages contracted outside the islands, which would be valid by the laws of the country in which the same were contracted, are valid in these islands. To establish a valid foreign

1

carlotroyacelotttapadomanalo marriage pursuant to this comity provision, it is first necessary to prove before the courts of the Islands the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact, and it is then necessary to prove the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence. A Philippine marriage followed by23 years of uninterrupted marital life, should not be impugned and discredited, after the death of the husband through an alleged prior Chinese marriage, “save upon proof so clear, strong and unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction of the existence of such impediment.” A marriage alleged to have been contracted in China and proven mainly by a so-called matrimonial letter held not to be valid in the Philippines.

2. Gerona v. Secretary of Education FACTS: 1. Petitioners belong to the Jehova’s Witness whose children were expelled from their schools when they refused to salute, sing the anthem, recite the pledge during the conduct of flag ceremony. DO No. 8 issued by DECS pursuant to RA 1265 which called for the manner of conduct during a flag ceremony. The petitioners wrote the Secretary of Education on their plight and requested to reinstate their children. This was denied.

2. As a result, the petitioners filed for a writ of preliminary injunction against the Secretary and Director of Public Schools to restrain them from implementing said DO No. 8.

3. The lower court (RTC) declared DO 8 invalid and contrary to the Bill of Rights.

ISSUE: Whether or not DO 8 is valid or constitutional

DO 8 is valid. Saluting the flag is not a religious ritual and it is for the courts to determine, not a religious group, whether or not a certain practice is one.

1. The court held that the flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee and protect. Considering the complete separation of church and state in our system of government, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance. Saluting the flag consequently does not involve any religious ceremony.

After all, the determination of whether a certain ritual is or is not a religious ceremony must rest with the courts. It cannot be left to a religious group or sect, much less to a follower of said group or sect; otherwise, there would be

2

carlotroyacelotttapadomanalo confusion and misunderstanding for there might be as many interpretations and meanings to be given to a certain ritual or ceremony as there are religious groups or sects or followers.

2. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption form or noncompliance with reasonable and non-discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority. In enforcing the flag salute on the petitioners, there was absolutely no compulsion involved, and for their failure or refusal to obey school regulations about the flag salute they were not being persecuted. Neither were they being criminally prosecuted under threat of penal sacntion. If they chose not to obey the flag salute regulation, they merely lost the benefits of public education being maintained at the expense of their fellow citizens, nothing more. According to a popular expression, they could take it or leave it. Having elected not to comply with the regulations about the flag salute, they forfeited their right to attend public schools.

3. The Filipino flag is not an image that requires religious veneration; rather it is symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, of sovereignty, an emblem of freedom, liberty and national unity; that the flag salute is not a religious ceremony but an act and profession of love and allegiance and pledge of loyalty to the fatherland which the flag stands for; that by authority of the legislature, the Secretary of Education was duly authorized to promulgate Department Order No. 8, series of 1955; that the requirement of observance of the flag ceremony or salute provided for in said Department Order No. 8, does not violate the Constitutional provision about freedom of religion and exercise of religion; that compliance with the non-discriminatory and reasonable rules and regulations and school discipline, including observance of the flag ceremony is a prerequisite to attendance in public schools; and that for failure and refusal to participate in the flag ceremony, petitioners were properly excluded and dismissed from the public school they were attending.

3. Tanada and Fernando FACTS: In the course of its ministry, American Bible Society’s Philippine agency has been distributing and selling bibles and/or gospel portions thereof (since 1898, but except during the Japanese occupation) throughout the Philippines and translating the same into several Philippine dialects. On 29 May 1953, the acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed the Society that it was conducting the business of general merchandise since November1945, without providing itself with the necessary Mayor’s permit and municipal license, in violation of Ordinance 3000, as amended, and Ordinances 2529, 3028 and 3364, and required the Society to secure, within 3 days, the corresponding permit and license fees, together with compromise covering the period from the 4th quarter of 1945 to the 2ndquarter of 1953, in the total sum of P5,821.45. On 24 October 1953, the Society paid to the City Treasurer under protest the said permit and license fees, giving at the same time notice to the City Treasurer that suit would be taken in court to question the legality of the ordinances under which the said fees were being collected,

3

carlotroyacelotttapadomanalo which was done on the same date by filing the complaint that gave rise to this action. After hearing, the lower court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Plaintiff is engaged in the distribution and sales of bibles and religious articles. The City Treasurer of Manila informed the plaintiff that it was conducting the business of general merchandise without providing itself with the necessary Mayor's permit and municipal license, in violation of Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, and required plaintiff to secure the corresponding permit and license. Plaintiff protested against this requirement and claimed that it never made any profit from the sale of its bibles.

ISSUE: Whether or not said Ordinances are constitutional and valid.

HELD: It is true the price asked for the religious articles was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same, but this cannot mean that plaintiff was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit. For this reasons, the provisions of City Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, which requires the payment of license fee for conducting the business of general merchandise, cannot be applied to plaintiff society, for in doing so, it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship, as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs. Upon the other hand, City Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, which requires the obtention of the Mayor’s permit before any person can engage in any of the businesses, trades or occupations enumerated therein, does not impose any charge upon the enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution, nor tax the exercise of religious practices? Hence, it cannot be considered unconstitutional, even if applied to plaintiff Society. But as Ordinance No. 2529 is not applicable to plaintiff and the City of Manila is powerless to license or tax the business of plaintiff society involved herein, for the reasons above stated, Ordinance No. 3000 is also inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff.

4. Iglesia ni Cristo v. Gironella FACTS: Teofilo C. Ramos, Sr., in behalf of Iglesia Ni Cristo, contends that there was no need for the statement of the respondent Judge who referred to their actions in court as a “gimmick.” Judge Leopaldo B. Gironella is being charged with ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming member of the bench. Respondent argues that charges against him are unfair and unfounded. He alleges that such statements complained of are his honest appraisal and evaluation of the evidence presented. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Judge is guilty of ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming member of the bench

4

carlotroyacelotttapadomanalo HELD: The use of of the word “gimmick” could offend the sensibilities of the members of Iglesia ni Cristo. It is not inaccurate to state that as understood by popular sense, it is not exactly complimentary. It may indicate lack of sincerity. It is a ploy or device to persuade others to take a course of action, which without it may not be acceptable. While it would be going too far to assert that intentional deceit is employed, it could have the effect. The Latin maxim, suggestio falsi est suppresio veri, comes to mind. It is to be expected that a religious sect accused of having to resort to a “gimmick” to gain converts would certainly be far from pleased. Freedom of religion implies respect for every creed. No one, much less of a public official, is privileged to characterize the actuation of its adherents in a derogatory sense. It should not be lost of sight of either that the attendance at a trial of many members of a religious sect finds support in a Constitution. The right to a public trial is safeguarded by the public law. No adverse implication can arise from such concurrence. It goes without saying that if their presence would create disorder, it lies within the power of a trial judge to maintain proper decorum.

5. Ebralinag V. Schools Division Superintendent of Cebu

FACTS: Petitioner were expelled from the by the school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 of July 11, 1955, and by Department Order No. 8 dated July 21, 1955 of Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions. Jehovah’s Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are “acts of worship” or “religious devotion” (p.10 of, Rollo) which they “cannot conscientiously give . . . to anyone or anything except God”. They consider the flag as an image or idol representing the State

ISSUE: Whether school children who are members of a religious sect known as Jehovah’s Witnesses may be expelled from school for disobedience or R.A. No. 1265 and Department Order No. 8, series of 1955.

HELD: Court held that exemption are accorded to the Jehovah’s Witnesses with the regard to the observance of the flag ceremony out of respect for their religious beliefs, however “bizarre” those beliefs may seem to others. Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the flag ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt such patriotic exercise. Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest

5

carlotroyacelotttapadomanalo protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator. Also, the expulsion of members of Jehovah’s Witnesses from the schools where they are enrolled violates their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to “protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education, and to make such education accessible to all (Sec. 1, Art. XIV).

6. Long V. Basa FACTS: Joseph Lim, Liu Yek See, Alfredo Long and Felix Almeria, petitioners, were members of a religious group known as "The Church In Quezon City (Church Assembly Hall), Incorporated" which was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1973. The members of the said Church vested upon their Board of Directors the absolute power to admit and expel a member of the Church. As early as 1988, the Board of Directors observed that certain members of the church including petitioners herein exhibited conduct which was dishonorable, improper and injurious to the character and interest of the Church. They warned petitioners that if they persist in their highly improper conduct, they will be dropped from the membership of the Church. However, petitioners ignored their repeated admonitions. Alarmed that petitioners' conduct will continue to undermine the integrity of the principles of faith of the Church, the Board of Directors, during its August 30, 1993 regular meeting, removed from the membership list certain names of members, including the names of herein petitioners. On September 29, 1993, petitioners and others questioned their expulsion by filing with the SEC Securities Investigation and Clearing Department a petition seeking mainly the annulment of the August 30, 1993 membership list and the reinstatement of the original list, on the ground that it was made without prior notice and hearing. Subsequently, SEC Hearing Officer Manuel Perea ruled, among others, that the expulsion was in accordance with the Church By-laws.

ISSUE: Whether or not the expulsion is valid

HELD: No. The provision on expulsion under the Church By-Laws, as phrased, may sound unusual and objectionable to petitioners as there is no requirement of prior notice to be given to an erring member before he can be expelled. It must be stressed that the basis of the relationship between a religious corporation and its members is the latter's absolute adherence to a common religious or spiritual belief. Once this basis ceases, membership in the religious corporation must also cease. Thus, generally, there is no room for dissension in a religious corporation. And where, as here, any member of a religious corporation is expelled from the membership for espousing doctrines and teachings contrary to that of his church, the established doctrine in this jurisdiction is that such action from the church authorities is conclusive upon the civil courts. The courts will likewise exercise jurisdiction to grant relief in case property or civil rights are invaded, although it has also been held that involvement of property rights does not necessarily authorize judicial intervention, in the

6

carlotroyacelotttapadomanalo absence of arbitrariness, fraud, and collusion. Another specific instance when intervention by the courts becomes warranted is when the proceedings in question are violative of either the by-laws of the society itself or the basic law of the land, such as when there is a violation of the fundamental right to due process of law.

7. Province of Abra V. Fernando FACTS: The provincial assessor of Abra levied taxes on the real property of the Catholic Bishop of Bangued. The latter filed for relief on the ground that the Constitution grants tax exemption on properties exclusively, directly and actually used for religious or charitable purposes. Judge Hernando, after a summary hearing granted the relief out right and without hearing the side of petitioner, stating that the CBB without a doubt falls within the said Constitutional exemption. The case is submitted to the SC on certiorari

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge erred in denying the petitioner’s motion to question the exemption being claimed by the CBB

HELD: The Supreme Court granted the certiorari, stating that it is only right to seek proof that the said properties fall within tax exemption granted by the Constitution. The Constitution provides that “charitable institutions, mosques and non-profit cemeteries and required that for the exemption of “lands, buildings, and improvements,” they should not only be “exclusively” but also “actually” and “directly” used for religious or charitable purposes. The exemption from taxation is not favored and is never presumed, so that if granted it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer. In this case, there is no showing that the said properties are actually and directly used for religious or charitable uses. It was wrong for the judge not to let the petitioner seek proof as to whether CBB really not only exclusively, but also actually and directly use the said properties for religious or

8. Marcos V. Manglapus Facts: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their right

7

carlotroyacelotttapadomanalo to travel because

no

law

has

authorized

her

to

do

so.

They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been

ratified

by

the

Philippines.

Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President (Aquino) may prohibit

the

Marcoses

from

returning

to

the

Philippines.

Held: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's country, a distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rightstreat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any country, including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security, public order, public health or morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the

right

to travel.

The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of International Law and under our Constitution as part

of

the

law

of

the

land.

The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during

the

past

few

years

after

the

Marcos

regime.

The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

9. Baldoza V. Dimaano Facts:

8

carlotroyacelotttapadomanalo • Municipal Secretary of Taal, Batangas, charges Municipal Judge Dimaano with abuse of authority inrefusing to allow employees of the Municipal Mayor to examine the criminal docket records of theMunicipal Court to secure data in connection with their contemplated report on peace and orderconditions of the municipality. • Respondent answered that there has never been an intention to refuse access to official courtrecords but that the same is always subject to reasonable regulation as to who, when, where andhow they may be inspected. He further asserted that a court has the power to prevent an improper use or inspection of its records and furnishing copies may be refuse when the motivation is notserious and legitimate interest, out of whim or fancy or mere curiosity or to gratify private site orpromote public scandal. • In his answer, respondent observed; o Restrictions are imposed by the Court for fear of an abuse in the exercise of the right. o There has been recent tampering of padlocks of the door of the Court and with this, to allowan indiscriminate and unlimited exercise of the right to free access, might do more harmthan good. o Request of such a magnitude cannot b immediately granted without adequate deliberationand advisement o Authority should first be secured from the Supreme Court • Case was referred to Judge Riodique for investigation and report. At the preliminary hearing, TaalMayor Corazon Caniza filed a motion to dismiss the complaint to preserve harmony and cooperationamong officers. This motion was denied by Investigating Judge but he recommended theexoneration of respondent. Investigating Judge’s report avers that complainant was aware of the motion to dismiss and he wasin conformity with it. Communications between complainant and respondent reveal that respondentallowed the complainant to open and view the docket books of the respondent under certainconditions and under his control and supervision. • Under the conditions, the Court found that the respondent has not committed any abuse of authority Issue : WON respondent acted arbitrarily in the premises (when he allowed the complainant to open andview the docket books of respondent) Held : No. The respondent allowed the complainant to open and view the docket books of respondentunder certain conditions and under his control and supervision. It has not been shown that the rules andcondition imposed by the respondent were unreasonable. The access to public records is predicated onthe right of the people to acquire information on public concern. Rules/Principles: In People ex rel. Title Guarantee & T. Co vs. Railly, the Court said: “…What the law expects and requires from his is the exercise of an unbiased and impartial judgment, bywhich all persons resorting to the office, under legal authority, and conducting themselves in an orderlymanner, shall be secured their lawful rights and privileges, and that a corporation formed in the manner inwhich the relator has been, shall be permitted to obtain all the information either by searches, abstracts,or copies, that the law has entitled it to obtain.Except, perhaps, when it is clear that the purpose of the examination is unlawful, or sheer, idle curiosity…Itis not their prerogative to see that the information which the records contain is not flaunted before publicgaze, or that scandal is not made of it…It is the legislature and not the officials having custody thereof which is called upon to devise a remedy.

9

carlotroyacelotttapadomanalo

Baldoza vs. Dimaano [AM 1120-MJ, 5 May 1976] Resolution of the Second Division, Antonio (J): 4 concur, 1 on leave, 1 designated to sit in Second Division Facts: In a verified letter-complaint dated September 9, 1975, the Municipal Secretary of Taal, Batangas, charges Municipal Judge Rodolfo B. Dimaano, of the same municipality, with abuse of authority in refusing to allow employees of the Municipal Mayor to examine the criminal docket records of the Municipal Court to secure data in connection with their contemplated report on the peace and order conditions of the said municipality. Dimaano, in answer to the complaint, stated that there has never been an intention to refuse access to official court records; that although court records are among public documents open to inspection not only by the parties directly involved but also by other persons who have legitimate interest to such inspection, yet the same is always subject to reasonable regulation as to who, when, where and how they may be inspected. He further asserted that a court has unquestionably the power to prevent an improper use or inspection of its records and the furnishing of copies therefrom may be refused where the person requesting is not motivated by a serious and legitimate interest but acts out of whim or fancy or mere curiosity or to gratify private spite or to promote public scandal. The case was thereupon referred to Judge Francisco Mat. Riodique for investigation and report. At the preliminary hearing on 16 October 1975, Taal Mayor Corazon A. Cañiza filed a motion to dismiss the complaint to preserve harmony and cooperation among officers in the same municipality. This motion was denied by the Investigating Judge, but after formal investigation, he recommended the exoneration of Dimaano. Issue: Whether the rules and conditions imposed by Judge Dimaano on the inspection of the docket books infringe upon the right of individuals to information. Held: Judge Dimaano did not act arbitrarily in the premise. As found by the Investigating Judge, Dimaano allowed the complainant to open and view the docket books of Dimaano under certain conditions and under his command and supervision. It has not been shown that the rules and conditions imposed by Dimaano were unreasonable. The access to public records is predicated on the right of the people to acquire information on matters of public concern. Undoubtedly in a democracy, the public has a legitimate interest in matters of social and political significance. The New Constitution expressly recognizes that the people are entitled to information on matters of public concern and thus are expressly granted access to official records, as well as documents of official acts, or transactions, or decisions, subject to such limitations imposed by law. The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the public of the nation's problems, nor a meaningful democratic decision-making if they are denied access to information of general interest. Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times. As has been aptly observed: "Maintaining the flow of such information depends on protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination since, if either process is interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases." However, restrictions on access to certain records may be imposed by law. Thus, access restrictions imposed to control civil insurrection have been permitted upon a showing of immediate and impending danger that renders ordinary means of control inadequate to maintain order.

10

carlotroyacelotttapadomanalo 10. Bel Air Village Association, Inc. v. Dionisio Bel Air Village Association, Inc. vs Virgilio Dionisio G.R. L-383454 June 30, 1989 Facts: The Transfer Certificate of Title covering the subject parcel of land issued in the name of Virgilio Dionisio, the petitioner contains an annotation to the effect that the lot owner becomes an automatic member of Bel-Air Village Association, the respondent, and must abide by such rules and regulations laid down by the Association in the interest of the sanitation, security and the general welfare of the community. The petitioner questioned the collection of the dues on the following grounds: the questioned assessment is a property tax outside the corporate power of the association; the association has no power to compel the petitioner to pay the assessment for lack of privity of contract; the questioned assessment should not be enforced for being unreasonable, arbitrary, oppressive, confiscatory and discriminatory; the respondent association is exercising governmental powers which should not be sanctioned. Issue: Whether or not the association can lawfully collect dues Ruling: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. It held that the purchasers of a registered land are bound by the annotations found at the back of the certificate of title covering the subject parcel of land. The petitioner’s contention that he has no privity with the respondent association is not persuasive. When the petitioner voluntarily bought the subject parcel of land it was understood that he took the same free of all ecumbrances except annotations at the back of the certificate of title, among them, that he automatically becomes a member of the respondent association. One of the obligations of a member is to pay certain amounts for the operation and activities of the association. The mode of payment as well as the purposes for which the dues are intended clearly indicates that the dues are not in the concept of a property tax as claimed by the petitioner. They are shares in the common expenses for necessary services. A property tax is assessed according to the value of the property but the basis of the sharing in this case is the area of the lot. The dues are fees which a member of the respondent association is required in hiring security guards, cleaning and maintaining streets, street lights and other community projects for the benefit of all residents within the Bel-Air Village. These expenses are necessary, valid and reasonable for the particular community involved. The limitations upon the ownership of the petitioner do not contravene provisions of laws, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. The constitutional proscription than no person can be compelled to be a member of an association against his will applies only to governmental acts and not to private transactions like the one in question. The petitioner cannot legally maintain that he is compelled to be a member of the association against his will because the limitation is imposed upon his ownership of property. If he does not desire to comply with the annotation or lien in question, he can at any time exercise his inviolable freedom of disposing of the property and free himself from the burden of becoming a member of the association.

11

carlotroyacelotttapadomanalo

11. Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) V. Secretary of Labor FACTS: The Registration of Labor Organization (Registrar) rendered a decision cancelling the SSSEA’s Registration Certificate No. 1-IP169 for failure to submit the following: 1. Failure to furnish the Bureau of Labor Relations with copies of the reports on the finances of that union duly verified by affidavits which its treasurer or treasurers rendered to said union and its members covering the periods from September 24, 1960 to September 23, 1961 and September 24, 1961 to September 23, 1962, inclusive, within sixty days of the 2 respective latter dates, which are the end of its fiscal year; and 2. Failure to submit to this office the names, postal addresses and non-subversive affidavits of the officers of that union within sixty days of their election in October (1st Sunday), 1961 and 1963, in conformity with Article IV (1) of its constitution and by-laws. On the following day, Manuel Villagracia, Assistant Secretary of the SSSEA filed with the Office of the Registrar, a letter enclosing documents that supposed to comply with the abovementioned requirements, but the Registrar found out that the following are still not complied with: 1. Non-subversive affidavits of Messrs. Teodoro Sison, Alfonso Atienza, Rodolfo Zalameda, Raymundo Sabino and Napoleon Pefianco who were elected along with others on January 30, 1962. 2. Names, postal addresses and non-subversive affidavits of all the officers who were supposedly elected on October (1st Sunday), of its constitution and by-laws. Alfredo Fajardo, president of the SSSEA moved for a reconsideration of said decision and prayed for time, up to November 15, within which to submit the requisite papers and data. An opposition thereto having been filed by one Paulino Escueta, a member of the SSSEA, upon the ground that the latter had never submitted any financial statement to its members, said motion was heard on November 27, 1963. Subsequently, or on December 4, 1963, the Registrar issued an order declaring that the SSSEA had “failed to submit the abovementioned requirements and granting the SSSEA 15 days from notice to comply with said requirements, as well as meanwhile holding in abeyance the resolution of its motion for reconsideration. ISSUE: Whether or not the effect of Section 23 of Republic Act No. 875 (“Any labor organization, association or union of workers duly organized for the material, intellectual and moral well being of its members shall acquire legal personality and be entitled to all the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations within thirty days of filing with the office of the Secretary of Labor notice of its due organization and existence and the following documents, together with the amount of five pesos as registration fee, except as provided in paragraph “d” of this section:”) unduly curtails the freedom of assembly and association guaranteed in the Bill of Rights.

12

carlotroyacelotttapadomanalo RULING: There is no incompatibility between Republic Act No. 875 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Upon the other hand, the cancellation of the SSSEA’s registration certificate would not entail a dissolution of said association or its suspension. The existence of the SSSEA would not be affected by said cancellation, although its juridical personality and its statutory rights and privileges — as distinguished from those conferred by the Constitution — would be suspended thereby. To be registered, pursuant to Section 23(b) of Republic Act No. 875, a labor organization, association or union of workers must file with the Department of Labor the following documents: (1) A copy of the constitution and by-laws of the organization together with a list of all officers of the association, their addresses and the address of the principal office of the organization; (2) A sworn statement of all the officers of the said organization, association or union to the effect that they are not members of the Communist Party and that they are not members of any organization which teaches the overthrow of the Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional method; and (3) If the applicant organization has been in existence for one or more years, a copy of its last annual financial report. Moreover, paragraph (d) of said-Section ordains that: The registration and permit of a legitimate labor organization shall be cancelled by the Department of Labor, if the Department has reason to believe that the labor organization no longer meets one or more of the requirements of paragraph (b) above; or fails to file with the Department Labor either its financial report within the sixty days of the end of its fiscal year or the names of its new officers along with their non-subversive affidavits as outlined in paragraph (b) above within sixty days of their election; however, the Department of Labor shall not order the cancellation of the registration and permit without due notice and hearing, as provided under paragraph (c) above and the affected labor organization shall have the same right of appeal to the courts as previously provided.

12. People V. Ferrer Facts: Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion against the following: 1.) Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) aggravated by circumstances of contempt and insult to public officers, subversion by a band and aid of armed men to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for being members/leaders of the NPA, inciting, instigating people to unite and overthrow the Philippine Government. Attended by Aggravating Circumstances of Aid or Armed Men, Craft, and Fraud. The trial court is of opinion that 1.) The Congress usurped the powers of the judge 2.) Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any forms of safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a presumption of organizational guilt by

being

members

of

the

CPP

regardless

of

voluntariness.

13

carlotroyacelotttapadomanalo The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It is an act tooutlaw the CPP and similar associations penalizing membership therein, and for other purposes. It defined the Communist Party being although a political party is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and present danger to the security of the Philippines. Section 4 provided that affiliation with full knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP is punishable. Section 5 states that due investigation by a designated prosecutor by the Secretary of Justice be made prior to filing of information in court. Section 6 provides for penalty for furnishing false evidence. Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses in open court for acts penalized by prision mayor to death. Section 8 allows the renunciation of membership to the CCP through writing under oath. Section 9 declares the constitutionality of the statute and its valid

exercise

under

freedom

if

thought,

assembly

and

association.

Issues: (1)

Whether

(2)

Held: The

or

not

Whether

or

court

holds

RA1700 Not

the

is

a

bill

RA1700

VALIDITY

Of

of

attainder/

ex

violates freedom

the

Anti-Subversion

post of

Act

facto

law.

expression.

of

1957.

A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is the substitution of judicial determination to a legislative determination of guilt. In order for a statute be measured as a bill of attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.) The statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is applied retroactively and reach past conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively is also an ex post facto law.) In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act applies not only to the CPP but also to other organizations having the same purpose and their successors. The Act’s focus is on the conduct not person. Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be shown that membership was acquired with the intent to further the goals of the organization by overt acts. This is the element of MEMBERSHIP with KNOWLEDGE that is punishable. This is the required proof of a member’s direct participation. Why is membership punished. Membership renders aid and encouragement to the organization. Membership makes himself party to its unlawful

acts.

Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4 prohibits acts committed after approval of the act. The members of the subversive organizations before the passing of this Act is given an opportunity to escape liability by renouncing membership in accordance with Section 8. The statute applies the principle of mutatis mutandis or

14

carlotroyacelotttapadomanalo that

the

necessary

changes

having

been

made.

The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Philippine Government should not be the basis of guilt. This declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of the Act. The EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL justifies the limitation to the exercise of “Freedom of Expression and Association” in this matter. Before the enactment of the statute and statements in the preamble, careful investigations by the Congress were done. The court further stresses that whatever interest in freedom of speech and association is excluded in the prohibition of membership in the CPP are weak considering NATIONAL SECURITY and PRESERVATION of DEMOCRACY. The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution under RA1700. In addition to proving circumstances/

evidences

of

subversion,

the

following

elements

must

also

be

established:

1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven that the organization purpose is to overthrow the present Government of the Philippines and establish a domination of a FOREIGN POWER. Membership is willfully and

knowingly

done

by

overt

acts.

2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its subversive purpose. Membership is willfully and knowingly done by

overt

acts.

The court did not make any judgment on the crimes of the accused under the Act. The Supreme Court set aside the resolution of the TRIAL COURT.

13. Caltex Filipino Managers and Supervisors Association V. Court of Industrial Relations (not digested)

G.R. Nos. L-30632-33 September 28, 1972 CALTEX

FILIPINO

MANAGERS

AND

SUPERVISORS

ASSOCIATION, petitioners,

vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., W. E. MENEFEE and B. F. EDWARDS,respondents. RESOLUTION

FERNANDO, J.:p

15

carlotroyacelotttapadomanalo The only question not devoid of significance raised in this motion for the reconsideration of our decision of April 11, 1972 is whether or not an unfair labor practice may be committed against managerial personnel who are members of petitioner Caltex Filipino Managers and Supervisors Association. There are other objections raised, but they cannot prevail against the conclusion reached by us after a most careful study, so evident in the exhaustive opinion penned by retired Justice Villamor with the concurrence of all the members of this Court. Nor is the contention in support of the ground mentioned at the outset sufficiently persuasive as to call for any alteration or modification thereof, much less a reversal. There is no justification then for granting the plea in this motion for reconsideration. In support of its principal ground that managerial personnel could neither claim nor be the object of an unfair labor practice and thus respondent Caltex (Philippines) Inc. could not be held guilty thereof, the memorandum of arguments in support of respondent's motion for reconsideration states the following: "Respondent Company's position in this case was not whimsical. It was dictated by what it believed in good faith was the law. More concretely, respondent Company's posture was solely based on the order dated September 9, 1964 of respondent Court in Case No. 196-MC-Cebu entitled 'In re: Petition for Certification Election at the Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Cebu District, Caltex Supervisory and Foremen's Union, Petitioner,' ... . Having been rendered only on September 9, 1964, said order was so fresh then as to have been indelibly impressed in the mind of respondent Company. In that case, respondent Court declared certain positions in respondent Company's Cebu District as management and excluded them from the bargaining unit of supervisors. Mr. Jose Mapa, for one, in 1958 held the positions of Assistant Terminal Superintendent and thereafter Acting Terminal Superintendent in Opon Terminal in 1958 ... . A stipulation of the parties, ... excluded the position of Terminal Superintendent in Cebu (a position he held in 1958) from the bargaining unit of supervisory personnel. In said order of September 9, 1964, the position next lower to Terminal Superintendent, that is, Assistant Bulk Terminal Superintendent, was declared managerial by respondent Court. Mr. Jose Mapa has never been reduced below manager status since that time." 1 After which came this portion of such memorandum: "In refusing to extend recognition to petitioner because it included managerial personnel, respondent Company, backed by a precedent in a case which in it was a party, acted in good faith. Refusal to recognize a union conglomerate of supervisors and managerial personnel wherein respondent Company had earlier expressed no objection to the recognition of supervisors as such within the appropriate unit we submit is valid. There is consequently no basis to hold it guilty of unfair labor practice. This is in fact what respondent Court found, and which, it is respectfully submitted, should not be disturbed — 'The stand of the company was not a whimsical and flimsy one. It had valid legal basis. It honestly believed that managers, being part of management should not be included in a union of supervisors. This was the ruling of the Court in Case No. 196-MC-Cebu, which was upheld by the Court en banc and the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-24212, prom. April 23, 1965, wherein this Court ruled that the positions of Depot Supervisors, Asst. Bulk Terminal Superintendent, Terminal Accountant and General Clerk were excluded from a union of supervisors on the ground that they are performing managerial functions." 2 Respondent Caltex (Philippines), Inc. would thus impress on us that there is a sufficient legal basis for the proposition advanced by it. There is truth to the statement in the citation from respondent Court that it did rule in Case No. 196-MC-Cebu, promulgated on September 9, 1964, that a depot supervisor did perform managerial functions and should be excluded from the supervisory unit. It is quite misleading to say, however, that as a matter of

law,

such

a

doctrine

was

announced

in

L-24212, promulgated April 23, 1965. As a matter of fact, that portion of the opinion of respondent Court betrays on

16

carlotroyacelotttapadomanalo its face a certain degree of carelessness. It did not even mention the title of L-24212 which is Caltex (Philippines) Inc. v. Caltex Supervisors and Foremen's Union. Nor was there a resolution issued by us therein on April 23, 1965. Our resolution was issued on March 23, 1965. It was worded thus: "After a consideration of the allegations of the petition filed in L-24212 (Caltex [Phil.], Inc. vs. Caltex Supervisors & Foremen's Union, et al.), for review of the order of the Court of Industrial Relations referred to therein, [the Court resolved] to dismiss the petition for lack of merit." 3 What is clear is that respondent Caltex (Philippines) Inc.'s petition was not given due course. That was all. It is therefore extremely farfetched to assert that respondent Court was upheld by us. Such a curt resolution, as is apparent on its face, amounted to no more than that Caltex (Philippines) Inc. was unable to present a sufficiently meritorious petition. It could not have the effect of res judicata. Moreover, the party that could have raised such a question, the Caltex Supervisors and Foremen's Union, did not bother to do so. There was, of course, in addition, a rather lengthy excerpt from the resolution of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations, distinguished by orthodoxy but hardly relevant to the crucial issue and blithely unconcerned with the decisive factor, which is the relationship that should exist between the Filipino executives, members of petitioner Union, and the respondent Company which is either alien-owned or controlled. It would be going too far to dismiss summarily the point raised by respondent Company, that of the alleged identity of interest between the managerial staff and the employing firm. That should ordinarily be the case, especially so where the dispute is between management and the rank and file. It does not necessarily follow though that what binds the managerial staff to the corporation forecloses the possibility of conflict between them. There could be a real difference between what the welfare of such group requires and the concessions the firm is willing to grant. Their needs might not be attended to then in the absence of any organization of their own. Nor is this to indulge in empty theorizing. The record of respondent Company, even the very case cited by it, is proof enough of their uneasy and troubled relationship. Certainly the impression is difficult to erase that an alien firm failed to manifest sympathy for the claims of its Filipino executives. To predicate under such circumstances that agreement inevitably marks their relationship, ignoring that discord would not be unusual, is to fly in the face of reality. There is moreover, in the way this objection was framed, speaking solely of the commission of unfair labor practice on managerial personnel, a lack of appreciation as to what is truly impressed with legal relevance. The basic question is whether the managerial personnel can organize. What respondent Company failed to take into account is that the right to self-organization is not merely a statutory creation. It is fortified by our Constitution. 4All are free to exercise such right unless their purpose is contrary to law. Certainly it would be to attach unorthodoxy to, not to say an emasculation of, the concept of law if managers as such were precluded from organizing. Having done so and having been duly registered, as did occur in this case, their union is entitled to all the rights under Republic Act No. 875. Considering what is denominated an unfair labor practice under Section 4 5 of such Act and the facts set forth in our decision, there can be only one answer to the objection raised that no unfair labor practice could be committed by respondent Company insofar as managerial personnel is concerned. It is, as is quite obvious, in the negative. As mentioned earlier in this resolution, the other grounds, namely, the alleged misinterpretation of paragraphs six and ten of the return-to-work agreement, the failure to consider the strike of petitioner Union as illegal, the claim

17

carlotroyacelotttapadomanalo that the termination of the employment of Jose J. Mapa and Dominador Mangalino as decreed by respondent Court should be upheld, and the award of back wages as well as attorney's fees, had been touched upon and carefully considered in our decision of April 11, 1972. It suffices for us to state that we reaffirm what was set forth therein. WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of respondent Company of April 25, 1972 is denied. Concepcion, C.J., Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur. Makalintal, J., is on leave. Barredo, J., took no part.

14. Visayan Refining Company V. Camus FACTS: Upon the direction of the Governor-General, the Attorney-General filed acomplaint with the CFI (Rizal) in the name of the Government of the Philippines forthe condemnation of a certain tract of land in Paranaque for military and aviationpurposes. The petitioners herein are among the defendants named. Likewise, it wasprayed that the court will give the Government the possession of the land to beexpropriated after the necessary deposit (provisional) of P600, 000.00 as the totalvalue of the property. Through the order of the public respondent, Judge Camus, theprayer was granted.During the pendency of the proceedings, the petitioners raised a demurrerquestioning the validity of the proceedings on the ground that there is no lawauthorizing the exercise of the power of eminent domain. Likewise, they moved forthe revocation of the order on the same ground stated and with additional allegationthat the deposit had been made without authority of law since the money was takenfrom the unexpended balance of the funds appropriated by previous statutes for theuse of the Militia Commission and the authority for the exercise of the power of eminent domain could not be found in those statutes. The demurrer and motion wereoverruled and denied respectively by Camus. This prompted the petitioners to file thisinstant petition to stop the proceedings in the CFI. ISSUE: Can the Philippine Government initiate expropriation proceedings in theabsence of a statute authorizing the exercise of the power of eminent domain? RULING: Yes, it can. The Philippine Government has the general authority to exercisethe power of eminent domain as expressly conferred by Section 63 of the PhilippineBill (Act of Congress of July 1, 1902). It says that the Philippine Government is authorized “to acquire, receive, hold, maintain, and convey title to real and personal property, and may acquire real estate for public uses by the exercise of the right to eminent domain.†•

18

carlotroyacelotttapadomanalo The same is subject to the limitation of due process of law. In consonance with this, Section 64 of the Administrative Code of the PhilippineIslands (Act No. 2711) expressly confers on the Government General the power “to determine when it is necessary or advantageous to exercise the right of eminent domain in behalf of the Government of the Philippine Island; and to directthe Attorney-General, where such at is deemed advisable, to cause the condemnation proceedings to be begun in the court having proper jurisdiction.†• There is no question as to the Governor General’s authority to exercise this power. However, this authority is not absolute. It is subject to two limitations, namely, thatthe taking shall be for public purpose and there must be just compensation.Apparently, the reason behind the taking of the subject land was for military andaviation purposes. This considered a public purpose given the importance of themilitary and aviation in the operation of the State.

15. Provincial of Camarines Sur V. Court of Appeal Facts: On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur passed a Resolution authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial Capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government employees Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province of Camarines Sur, through its Governor, filed two separate cases for expropriation against Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin, at the Regional Trial Court, Pili, Camarines Sur. The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their property. In an order, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court the amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer for damages that private respondents may suffer in the event that the expropriation cases do not prosper. The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief from the order, authorizing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of their property and a motion to admit an amended motion to dismiss. Both motions were denied in the order dated February 26, 1990. In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins asked: (a) that Resolution of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan be declared null and void; (b) that the complaints for expropriation be dismissed; and (c) that the order denying the motion to dismiss and allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property subject of the expropriation and the order dated February 26, 1990, denying the motion to admit the amended motion to dismiss, be set aside. They also asked that an order be issued to restrain the trial court from enforcing the writ of possession, and thereafter to issue a writ of injunction.

19

carlotroyacelotttapadomanalo Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General stated that under Section 9 of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337), there was no need for the approval by the Office of the President of the exercise by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of eminent domain. However, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the Province of Camarines Sur must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as a housing project. The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court, allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' lands and the order denying the admission of the amended motion to dismiss. It also ordered the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings until after the Province of Camarines Sur shall have submitted the requisite approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of the property of the private respondents from agricultural to non-agricultural land. Issue: WON the Province of Cam Sur must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of the San Joaquins. HELD: To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no longer expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc., without first applying for conversion of the use of the lands with the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects would naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would then be the Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use. Ratio: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial court's order allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' property; (b) orders the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings; and (c) requires the Province of Camarines Sur to obtain the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert or reclassify private respondents' property from agricultural to non-agricultural use. The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it sets aside the order of the trial court, denying the amended motion to dismiss of the private respondents. SO ORDERED.

20